GLOBAL DEMANDS: LIMITED FORCES

US ARMY DEPLOYMENT

Stuart L. Perkins

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FOREWORD

Since World War II, US military planning has tended to view the world as separate rather than related regions. In 1980, however, a new administration espoused a more activist and unified defense policy, and supported a buildup to counter what it perceived as a growing Soviet threat, manifested in such scattered areas as Afghanistan, Central America, and Poland. In this context, planning for a global conflict acquired an urgency unknown since the last world war.

Colonel Stuart L. Perkins, US Army, questions whether the United States has sufficient military forces to implement its defense strategies through the middle 1980s. Colonel Perkins isolates a major problem, that of reconciling competing demands for US land combat forces around the world. He compares through fiscal year 1987 those forces already programmed with deployment strategies already determined, then suggests several options for deploying our ground forces in a worldwide conflict. All the military options posed in this book would require difficult political decisions involving allocations of limited resources. To deter conflict through strong defense, our strategy and forces nevertheless must be brought into better balance. Studies such as the one at hand concretely spell out the implications of our strategic planning and move us closer to better, wiser use of soldiers and equipment.

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PREFACE

Planning for global war is an art that has been allowed to atrophy in the United States since 1945. Until recently, military staffs carried out most operational planning on the basis of discrete regions, within a superficial global paradigm. First the concentration was on Western Europe, then on Vietnam, and since 1978, on Southwest Asia. Other requirements have been treated cyclically as crises arose. This compartmented planning style has been reinforced by a national propensity for concentrating only on immediate problems, with Government policymakers giving insufficient attention to long-range possibilities.

In late 1980, however, the Polish crisis diverted attention from Southwest Asia, forcing the military planning community to give more attention to multiregion requirements. Now, planning for a worldwide conflict is central to the Reagan administration's military strategy.

Budgetary competition is the central and most visible activity in Washington. Because planning for mission accomplishment with existing resources is not directly related to these budgetary matters, it is not publicly touted. This study is an attempt to stimulate public discussion about the employment of conventional forces. I hope to the same extent to which people are debating the employment of strategic nuclear forces. In addition, I hope the study will encourage similar efforts on the use of US Air Force and Naval forces in a worldwide conflict.

Department of Defense planning for fiscal years 1983-1987, including the fiscal year 1983 budget submitted in January 1982, provided the latest programing information avail-
PREFACE

A study of this scope has necessarily involved numerous individuals. It is impossible to acknowledge everyone. However, I especially appreciate the advice and assistance provided to me by James E. Tyler and Army Lieutenant Colonel John D. Bergen, Office Secretary of Defense; Air Force Lieutenant Colonels Charles W. Seifert and Robert J. Isaak, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel William R. Hart, Army Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Boose, Air Force Colonel David S. Hinton, and Navy Captain John S. Ekstrom—Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Howard Rudnick, Defense Intelligence Agency; Colonel John R. Landry, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel E. Ward Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Watters, Major James T. Hill, Major Richard T. Schaden, and Lieutenant Colonel William T. Norman—Army Staff; Army Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Morai (Ret) and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Simpson, National Guard Bureau; Colonel Matthew P. Caufeld and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Wilkerson—Headquarters Marine Corps; Dr. John Child, American University; Air Force Colonel Antonio Lopez, Inter-American Defense Board; Dr. Steven L. Canby, civilian consultant; and Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Thomas V. Draude, National War College. Finally, I want to thank the members of the National Defense University Research Directorate, especially Colonel Frederick T. Kiley, USAF, for superb support.

STUART L. PERKINS
1. US DEFENSE POLICY

THE UNITED STATES has rarely had a coherent strategy for the conduct of a war as it ensued. Military forces are maintained, but comprehensive planning for their use has been wanting. Because democracies see military power as a necessary evil and assume wars are to be of short duration, they tend to avoid strategic planning. This tendency is particularly pronounced in the United States.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES TO DEMANDS

Historically, this US propensity for disengagement from the realities of world affairs—strategic detachment—has not been disastrous because the oceans acted as barriers to threats from abroad and the country was blessed with nonthreatening neighbors. In the nuclear era, however, national defense has taken on an entirely different character. All nations are vulnerable, to the extent that the very idea of national sovereignty is in question. Even US geographical advantages have been essentially nullified: the United States has taken on the characteristics of a continental power. For example,

1. US foreign policy is increasingly anticipatory or precautionary, as if neighboring states were hostile.

2. Like a continental power, the United States is more concerned about the specifics of the status quo; that is, the country seeks to maintain current balance-of-power arrangements.

3. US domestic and foreign policies are now interwoven.
Nevertheless, US policy vacillates between Wilsonian idealism and Bismarckian realpolitik, inhibiting or even preventing long-term planning and programming for defense. This cycle has produced a division between policy and strategy on the one hand and forces and other resources necessary for implementation on the other. This dichotomy has been termed the strategy-force mismatch. Because modern warfare permits no time for significant preparations once a conflict occurs, adherents of a strong defense argue for immediately available forces that match the demands of the stated national military strategy.

The American people are unaccustomed to living with a constant threat to their survival, but such a threat is the nature of things in the modern age. The Soviet threat continues to expand relentlessly. Yet the Reagan administration's efforts to bolster defense hinge on the success of domestic economic programs which undergird continuing public support for increased defense spending. Just as important, countering the Soviet threat depends on the cooperation and active support from US allies and friends abroad, particularly in Europe and Japan. This meshing of policies illustrates the continental nature of the US defense predicament. It is perhaps more true than in 1776 for Benjamin Franklin that "we must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately."

The major impetus for the current US defense buildup is the need to support national policy with a genuine military capability. Yet elements that have been characterized by James R. Schlesinger as seeing "moral virtue in weak military force" still exist in the United States. It is not enough to demonstrate a military need for increased defense capabilities. The needs must be clearly and publicly articulated—indeed, sold.

THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED SITUATION THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1987

Any discussion of national security issues, particularly military strategy, must take into account the increasing complexity of modern life, the interdependence of nations, and the expanding military capability of the Soviet Union. The Soviets' capability
to influence events worldwide is growing. Not all turmoil is Communist inspired, but the world will continue to experience instability and the Soviet Union will continue to exploit that instability wherever the opportunity arises. Yet the United States has witnessed and acquiesced in what former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., has described as “perhaps the most complete reversal of global power relationships ever seen in a period of relative peace.”

Some comparisons show that the USSR has gained at least marginal strategic superiority. But the danger is not so much a strategic nuclear conflict as it is potential Soviet coercion of the United States and its allies during a crisis. Many experts contend that the military gap is so great that, even if all the current programs are implemented, the United States will remain inferior throughout the entire decade. According to some estimates, even annual increases of 14 percent in defense investments would not correct the existing imbalance until the 1990s.

The Soviet theater nuclear forces opposite Western Europe and Southwest and Northeast Asia provide full coverage against every potential opponent in areas adjacent to the USSR. The Soviets’ conventional capability is massive, particularly in ground forces, enabling them to threaten control of any land battle in Eurasia. Unfortunately, US vital interests overseas lie largely on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. Although the US Navy remains superior, the Soviets have a growing naval capability that may soon include a large aircraft carrier, thus reinforcing a Soviet trend to build forces for projecting power beyond the Eurasian continent.

The Soviets also have numerous well-armed surrogates and allies throughout the world. North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Vietnam are strategically situated and armed to significantly influence activities in a general war.

NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY AS SEEN BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The Reagan administration believes that the United States is in a prewar situation not unlike the 1930s and that it is impor-
tant to act decisively to prevent a major conflict. This perception stems from the Soviet threat which, as manifested directly in Afghanistan and indirectly on the periphery of the United States, is becoming more ominous. The administration does not seek to overemphasize the military dimension of national security but seeks to promote recognition of the worldwide scope of Soviet military capabilities. Moreover, this massive military power has been turned to political advantage. For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union remains the only country that can threaten directly the security of the United States.

Restoration of the credibility of US power is the key to US defense policy. The administration believes that it must work to mold an environment that furthers US interests, to this end it is supporting a more activist and anti-Soviet approach on a global scale. In recognition that the Soviet global threat cannot be countered unilaterally, the United States is working with a broad range of individual states, downplaying internal limitations on human rights, for example, while seeking to develop regional counters to Soviet imperialism.

The administration believes that, if left unchecked, Soviet military power could paralyze the West. The Kremlin is applying Sun Tzu’s maxim: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” The Soviets realize that military power has great utility as latent force; they know that it does not have to be employed directly to have significant effect.

The challenge to the United States is to develop a consensus about the Soviet threat and to muster support for dealing with it. The basic goal is peace with freedom. Peace is not seen as an end in itself, rather, the objective is life of a certain quality.

Although the Soviet threat is seen as real, some observers believe that the Soviet Union is in a historic decline. A potential danger pointed up by proponents of this view is that the Kremlin will seek to exploit a concocted external threat and will engage in further military actions, thereby diverting attention from internal problems.

Because the Soviets are aggressive, US policy and strategy are often reactive. But the United States must also be prepared
to exploit available strategic warning, to mobilize rapidly, and to deploy the requisite forces wherever the threat develops. As a result, the administration is emphasizing force readiness and improvement of the industrial base.

The United States is unlikely to close the gap in the US-USSR conventional forces soon; correctives probably lie beyond fiscal year 1987. For now, the emphasis is on increasing the capabilities of existing forces and expanding these forces as quickly as possible in conjunction with overall national economic requirements. The emphasis is on deterring the Soviets from developing the ability to fight and defeat the enemy.

The United States does not intend to match the Soviets numerically, particularly with land forces. The object will be countervailing power not tied to 1 1/2 wars or any other such measure. The United States must be prepared to confront the Soviets in Southwest Asia, Europe, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia—even in Africa and Central America, though probably not in the last two regions in a general war. Any US-Soviet conflict is considered likely to spread very quickly. The primary focus overseas is NATO, with the security of the Persian Gulf seen as integral to the defense of Europe.

The United States intends to confront the Soviets wherever they menace vital national interests and those of its allies. To this end the Defense Department is developing programs that permit the United States to meet worldwide threats simultaneously, it must be able to conduct multiregion operations without curtailing military capabilities in any critical region. But the planned force buildup will not apply equally to all services. As Secretary of Defense Weinberger has stated, "Our primary instrument to project our military power to distant, but vital, regions remains the Navy."

In view of the propensity of the Soviets to emphasize the role of military power, the danger of nuclear war remains very real. There is convincing evidence that the Soviets have never ceased to believe that nuclear war could be fought and won. Some US planners consider arms control not only insufficient for curbing the massive Soviet capabilities, but possibly an obstacle
to getting on with the required catchup effort—this, notwithstanding the political importance of the arms control process itself. Current US defense policy requires nuclear forces capable of—

1. Deterring strategic strikes on the United States and its allies;
2. Deterring large-scale conventional attacks;
3. Preventing coercion with nuclear forces against either the United States or its allies;
4. Limiting damage, in the event of nuclear war, by maintaining an enduring war-fighting capability.

The administration’s activist, anti-Communist policy also requires another capability—the ability to coerce the Soviets (or any other opponent) in a crisis. This raises a major philosophical argument—the need for nuclear superiority. Indeed, in the view of former Secretary of State Haig, the acceptance of a goal of less than superiority, such as essential equivalence, has been debilitating to the Nation. The need for a strategic war-fighting capability has been difficult to articulate because a significant element of US society has opposed building any nuclear war-fighting capability. Because of the severe reaction at home and overseas to the administration’s early open discussions of nuclear war-fighting, public statements later shifted to emphasize deterrence. But defense programs indicate that a capacity for nuclear war-fighting remains a central objective: “The melody, if not the policy . . . is changing.” The United States is building a nuclear war-fighting capability “for deterring or prosecuting a global war with the Soviet Union.” Such a countervailing capability through a strategic exchange that entails defeat of the enemy requires, in my judgment, de facto nuclear superiority.

Countering the massive Soviet threat requires the support of the entire free world; collective security is the obvious answer. It is neither possible nor desirable for the United States unilaterally to counter the Soviets worldwide. To this end, arms sales (foreign aid in general) are an integral part of the combined defense effort envisaged by the administration. The object is to
buttress those states that oppose the expansion of Communist influence and to promote support for US policy. Our security interests and the need for mutual support dictate that the United States continue its commitments to Europe and its support to those countries outside Europe that are important to US policy objectives.

United States defense policy is not, as has been argued, designed to avoid extensive new commitments. Indeed, the internal dynamics of the policy require the opposite. The administration is eager to demonstrate reliability to US allies and friends, and to portray a revitalized national will to the Kremlin. Extensive US commitments to Egypt and the steps taken to assist the Sudan in 1981 demonstrated reliability to US friends; the Libyan incident in the Gulf of Sidra, also in 1981, illustrated a revitalized national will. If the United States continues such activities in the future, however, it may overextend available resources. The danger is not in selective engagement but in unlimited involvement wherever Soviet activities or gains are discerned. This desire to counter every perceived Soviet move is exacerbated by the ambiguity surrounding the question of which interests are vital.

Our allies and friends are not enthusiastic about such an expansive, activist policy to counter the USSR worldwide. They sometimes condemn a US propensity to apply military medicine to what they perceive to be politico-economic problems. Furthermore, their perception of the threat is less alarmist. One can see that Soviet military power has already undercut the resolve of many Western countries and other potential allies throughout the world:

1. In Europe, only the United States, among NATO allies, has significantly increased its defense effort. The allies are lagging on defense programs agreed to even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

2. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the threat is believed to come from Israel or a neighboring state; neither superpower is welcome.
3. In Japan, the defense budget remains below 1 percent of the gross domestic product.

4. In China, defense spending has been cut, and the country is reducing the size of its defense establishment; Beijing is unlikely to become involved in a US-Soviet conflict.

5. In Africa, the United States is seen as a reactionary backer of white-ruled South Africa, not as a support of majority rule.

6. In Latin America, real socioeconomic problems rather than Communists are seen as the causes of unrest.

THE ISSUE

With this background on the strategy and forces relationship, the projected military situation, and the defense policy of the United States, we can examine in detail current US military strategy for the period through fiscal year 1987 and the Army combat forces (and strategic lift) projected to be available to implement the strategy. We can also expect that the normal tensions within a democracy between national security needs and social welfare will be further strained in the 1980s by the recession now plaguing the Western economies. Thus, it is important to seek alternatives for the most effective use of the military resources available to the nation. After we review US Army force utilization by examining the current US military strategy for a worldwide conventional conflict, we can then consider the options for better using Army forces to accomplish US strategic objectives and speculate on implications for other forces, ours and foreign.
2. US MILITARY STRATEGY

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Publication 1 defines military strategy as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force." That is, military strategy involves the use (employment) of existing capabilities as distinct from "strategy" and "national strategy," which subsume the development of resources (including military forces) as well as their use.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) includes a recommended military strategy in the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) that is normally submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense. The JCS seeks to have the recommended military strategy included in the annual Defense Guidance, which provides guidance for the next 5-year force planning and development cycle for the military services. But the military strategy in the JSPD is not directly related to operational planning or actual employment of forces. So, in the one instance that a general military strategy is prepared, it is for the wrong purpose.

In keeping with their legislated responsibilities to provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces, the JCS normally provides annual strategic guidance for the employment of assigned (existing) forces to the commanders of the unified and specified commands and the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).*

* The RDJTF was upgraded on 1 January 1983 to Unified Command for Southwest Asia; the Commander, RDJTF is now Commander in Chief, US Central Command (CINCCENT).
And, as for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, although the plan responds to guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, such as in the now-outdated Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning, neither the Secretary nor anyone in OSD reviews it.

Out of this seeming confusion over strategy and its use or misuse, two schools of thought have evolved within the defense establishment: the "one strategy" school, and the "multiple strategies" school.

Proponents of the one strategy school argue that the JSPD strategy is the only valid US military strategy, that any deviations from it are risk equations, that to articulate a strategy that accomplishes the task with current forces would undermine stated requirements for additional resources, and that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay out a "blueprint" for war-fighting with available resources.

Proponents of the multiple strategies school argue that the United States should have an array of strategies, one each for the planning (JSPD), the programed (budget constrained) force, and the current force. The multiple strategies proponents also argue that the planning strategy, somewhat circumscribed, entails force requirements that may never be achieved, that planners and policymakers must differentiate between force planning and force employment; and that the United States must have a strategy for employment of current forces. Some pundits in this latter school even argue for a minimum-risk force (unconstrained) strategy. The Navy and the Air Force normally adhere to the one strategy school, but the Army, sometimes joined by the Marine Corps, falls in the multiple strategies camp.

Some confusion also exists over just what US national security policy is. But contrary to what the gadflies say, the policy is not difficult to understand. Unfortunately, there is no broad-based national consensus on interests and objectives from which strategy should be derived. Thus, each incoming administration articulates its views anew and builds a policy framework to support them. (The lack of continuity is well illustrated by the
abrupt shifting about when Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter. Moreover, each administration finds it politically advantageous not to be too explicit and thereby create a target for its antagonists. This ambiguity frustrates some analysts and bureaucrats.

The Reagan administration has provided a defense policy that sets forth in general terms the administration's perceptions of national interests and objectives. However, a core of opposition remains within the Government, a so-called network, which views the world differently and opposes an activist anti-Communist policy. In a country where the national motto could be "Out of One Many," it may never be possible to secure broad consensus on a national security blueprint. Although ideally it is desirable to have an agreed, precisely hewn framework, in reality, constructing such a framework will remain a perennial problem.

The administration does not want to provide potential adversaries with details of national strategy. Nor do the authorities want to articulate a rigid conceptual structure that would stultify thinking and distract from reality. Thus, stated broadly and in line with policy, the focus of US strategy is on containment of the Soviet threat on the Eurasian landmass, particularly in three major regions: Western Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. (See figure 2-1.) Containment on Eurasia, rather than maritime superiority, therefore, is the true core of the US military strategy for global conflict. Although there may be contingencies involving other regions in the future, no major US Army formation would be available for employment outside the three areas of concentration without degradation of capabilities in the more critical regions.

The United States maintains a flexible strategy of countervailing power which, although designed to permit strikes wherever the Soviets are vulnerable, basically means maintenance of a capability to respond in kind to aggression. Because of an acknowledged nuclear inferiority, conventional forces play a greatly increased role in the strategy. In my judgment, the nuclear option is not a viable war-lighting alternative, except in response to Soviet first use or to a direct threat to US national survival.
Floure 2-1. Containment Strategy
Having ruled out any fixed sizing parameters for strategic planning, e.g., 1 ½ or 2 wars, US military strategists now prepare to respond wherever national security is threatened worldwide. The United States will concentrate its forces to defend the areas considered most vital, exploiting the principle of mass collectively with its allies and friends.

Priorities for the commitment of forces must be established, whatever the level of defense spending. Although many observers now recognize the futility of trying to spread US forces thin enough to cover all regions on the globe, there is a contradictory US defense planning emphasis on exploiting the unique capabilities of US/Western forces in areas of greatest Soviet vulnerability—“horizontal escalation.” At the same time, the United States will not necessarily limit its response to regions chosen by the aggressor. The strategy calls for the nation to be prepared for a worldwide war of unlimited duration, in a conventional, chemical, and nuclear environment.

The Reagan administration is working to improve the US ability to respond to Soviet aggression, which as stated earlier, it assumes may quickly escalate to global conflict. Since the United States is already well entrenched in Europe and Korea, military staffs are now concentrating on the third vital strategic zone overseas, Southwest Asia. The United States seeks to increase its military presence there to enhance its ability to respond rapidly to aggression. Because of both the distance from the area and the limited resources in Southwest Asia, US strategists plan to deploy quickly forces based in the continental United States to the area of likely conflict to join any forces forward-deployed in the region. Although some Army forces, particularly the rapidly deployable units, will be among those dispatched early on, the emphasis will be on naval (and air) power.

The United States will project military power to those regions where the states have relatively weak defenses, particularly where only the United States can provide credible opposition to a Soviet incursion. This strategy theoretically represents a significant change in regional priorities, away from primary concentration on Western Europe. Indeed, resources, particularly ground and air power, are being substantially reallocated to the
RDJTF, which is intended primarily to protect Southwest Asia. Through fiscal year 1987, the administration is developing no new land forces to support the expanded commitments entailed by Southwest Asia. Further, the increased requirement for strategic lift may also entail diversions from the European reinforcement mission. Defending US vital interests adjacent to the Soviet Union with limited resources is not easy.

But maintaining distant forces is part of a strategy of forward defense which seeks to avoid fighting on the beaches of Massachusetts or California. While political constraints within NATO mute discussion of this subject, President Reagan did state that we are in Europe "because that NATO line is our first line of defense." *

Unfortunately, this overseas orientation has blurred the meaning of national defense. Consider, for example, that even while the nation allocates over $200 billion a year for defense, the continental United States is essentially undefendable. In addition to strategic missiles, a manned bomber could probably attack any target in North America without detection. In the context of a global war, however, the US military presence overseas is designed to engage the enemy as far from the US homeland as possible. Thus, in the missile era, the forward defense concept has validity. Since the Soviets achieved nuclear parity in the late 1970s, a war may now be won or lost with conventional forces in distant locales. Hence, although there may be some altruism in the US global strategy, US treasure is being diverted overseas for national defense, broadly defined.

The military strategy for the employment of forces to various theaters overseas is a preliminary scheme of action developed for planning purposes in the event a crisis develops. The actual situation will determine where forces are deployed. Since the initiative lies with the Kremlin, forces could be employed in a manner far different than postulated in military strategy.
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Because there is no apparent, significant ground threat to US national territory per se, Army forces concentrate on protecting US vital interests overseas—the forward defense. In the event general war results, Army responsibilities in the continental United States would be limited to civil defense support; so no major units are permanently assigned to continental US-based missions. Units awaiting deployment are available for temporary use by the Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command (USCINCRED) for tasks that may arise. After all initial deployments are completed, at least one or two infantry divisions may be available in the continental United States as strategic reserves until mobilization generates new units.

Outside the continental United States, a brigade is permanently located in Alaska and one brigade is permanently located in Panama for defense of the canal. Forces are also available for contingencies which might require reinforcement of Alaska or Panama.

NATO AND WESTERN EUROPE

One of the permanent fixtures in US defense policy is the commitment to NATO and adherence to the NATO strategy of flexible response. The emphasis is on deterrence, but contrary to the rhetoric, response to aggression is not automatic. Each Alliance member is to take "such action as it deems necessary." 

In the event of war, NATO strategy would deploy in-place forces to their respective general defensive positions and conduct a direct defense. Earlier, the focus was on operations on the Eurasian landmass, with all other activities, including naval operations, seen as supportive. But as US strategy takes on a global focus, Central Europe becomes merely another adjunct to a primarily maritime strategy. It is not at all clear how this shift in focus will enhance containment of a continental power at the inner-German border, but an unmistakable diversion from a NATO-centered strategy has occurred.
Direct defense seeks to minimize loss of territory on the European continent. The strategy does not permit trading significant space for time; hence a classical mobile defense is ruled out. In Europe, one finds not only a lack of geostrategic depth but also an understandable antipathy among the West Germans to give up territory, even temporarily. (This is not to deny the Bundeswehr's recognition of the belt-like quality of a modern defensive system.)

A capability for escalation is important for deterrence, but the West no longer possesses a credible option for nuclear first use. Thus President Reagan's statement in late 1981 about limiting a war, even a nuclear war, to Europe was a statement of strategic reality. Indeed, that view fully accords with the flexible response strategy. Unfortunately, although the United States may have long viewed theater nuclear forces as "usable" to the Europeans they were and remain only part of the deterrence equation. The European Allies never support the concept of actually fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe.

The NATO strategy of flexible response "reflects a carefully worked out compromise" that was accepted only after years of US pressure to shift away from massive retaliation. Strategists in the United States envisage war in Europe as a potentially "limited" theater conflict, but the Allies view it as "general" and "strategic." At the same time that the United States focuses on war-fighting, the Allies emphasize deterrence because they realize that either a prolonged conventional war or a theater nuclear conflict would destroy Europe. Strategy of the United States seeks to limit a war to Europe, and US leaders contemplate continued US-Soviet hostilities if Europe should be lost. Withdrawal from Europe would not end the conflict.

To be sure, national interests—rather than concern about the security of US territory—also motivate the Allies who, for their own interests, want the United States involved in any European conflict. For the United States, part of the value of having allies is to permit resistance to aggression short of a strategic nuclear exchange. Thus, to maintain solidarity, all parties have shifted to an "imposing museum of military metaphors."
Although massive retaliation has been abandoned, the Europeans have never accepted the requirement to develop a fully capable conventional defense. Indeed, they believe that an effective conventional defense would undermine deterrence by decoupling the US strategic force from the deterrence equation in Europe. NATO authorities never intended to eliminate reliance on strategic nuclear deterrence by developing conventional capabilities that could repel a major Warsaw Pact invasion. Responsible parties on both sides of the Atlantic understood all along that domestic political and economic realities would limit the extent of conventional defenses.

The United States, however, has continued to press the Allies over the past 20 years, particularly since the mid-1970s, to take steps to provide for an effective conventional defense. Yet, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Andrew Goodpaster seems to have accepted conventional defense only as an "intermediate" capability. More recently, as the Soviet threat has grown and detente has become jaundiced, the United States has increased pressure with initiatives to enhance conventional capabilities: the 3 percent solution, the Long-Term Defense Program, the so-called Phase I and Phase II measures before and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the burden sharing increase, and the coercive warnings about the shift of US resources to Southwest Asia. To some observers, it all smacks of throwing money at the problem. The Allies will continue to focus on the nuclear element, hoping to secure defense "on the cheap"—plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

The US Army is assigned two corps sectors in West Germany, organized with two armored and two mechanized divisions and two armored cavalry regiments. The other major US ground force commitment is an Allied Forces Central Europe reserve corps, of which one armored and two mechanized brigades are forward deployed. The SACEUR has stated a requirement for 10 US divisions to be in Europe by M + 10 days (or D-Day). This requirement is the basis for the POMCUS (prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets) objective of...
six division sets of equipment, to permit the rapid deployment of six divisions to join the four now in Europe.

Upon a decision to reinforce NATO, follow-on Army units would flow to Europe. These forces would include all the remaining continental US-based reserve forces, less probably one or two divisions to be retained temporarily as a strategic reserve. Thus, without a simultaneous Persian Gulf contingency and with two infantry divisions in the Pacific, some 20 to 24 US Army (and Marine Corps) divisions (plus separate brigades and regiments) could eventually be located in Europe. Pacific-based “swing” forces also could be deployed there. (As will be seen, the US Army continues to focus its resources almost entirely on one theater, with forces dual-committed for tasks outside Europe.)

The NATO requirement coopts not only the bulk of US combat forces but essentially all the available strategic airlift and sealift, supplies, and equipment. More balanced allocation of forces for planning is inherent in the evolving global strategy, but despite the warnings, no reductions in US land force commitments to NATO have actually been made. In fact, formal US commitments to NATO have been increasing even as the need was being recognized for diverting some forces for use in Southwest Asia.

In 1981 SACEUR proposed a controversial Rapid Reinforcement Plan under which some US Army divisions would be made available for planning to reinforce the NATO flanks, primarily in the Mediterranean. While the Army has carried out rapid reinforcement exercises in the Mediterranean region in the past, no infrastructure exists to support any major US Army forces that might deploy there. Further, any major reinforcement of the flanks would weaken the already tenuous position in the critical Central Region. I believe that the United States views the NATO flanks as economy-of-force regions. The Rapid Reinforcement Plan, therefore, was opposed within the Army hierarchy—quite justifiably, in my judgment. Nevertheless, the United States approved the plan in 1982.
SOUTHWEST ASIA

The administration views the region from Turkey to Pakistan, including the Horn of Africa, as a strategic entity. Recognizing the difficulty of unilateral action there, the Reagan administration originally sought to gain regional support by building a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet threat. Although the consensus did not evolve, the administration still hopes to develop an integrated regional defense, particularly air defense, against Soviet and Soviet-supported penetrations. (This is the regional slice of the global military strategy.) The object is not to secure formal alliances or to establish a large-scale US force presence, but rather to help states in the region, principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in resisting Soviet-inspired threats and to promote general cooperation. Such cooperation would not only enhance deterrence; it could reduce requirements for outside forces. However, part of the rationale for the earlier strategic consensus was to promote a milieu that would facilitate rapid deployment of the RDJTF.

The administration believes the Soviet threat has shifted from Europe to Southwest Asia. In this case US military strategy for Southwest Asia in a worldwide war focuses on maintaining continuous access to Persian Gulf oil by preventing Soviet control of the oil, either directly or indirectly. The US response to Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia, according to President Reagan, will be automatic—a unilateral effort, if necessary. Although allied and friendly nation support would be needed in Southwest Asia, only the United States is capable of providing an effective military response to a Soviet incursion there. However, the United States continues to encourage allied participation in planning for the defense of the Gulf oil resources and expects the Europeans and the Japanese to provide some assistance.

Despite the announced US policy, the United States might not be invited to intervene in Southwest Asia to counter a Soviet invasion. In any case, the task would be extremely difficult because logistical capacity in the area is limited: the air lines of communications are 7,000 miles long, and the sea lines of communications are 8,000 (Suez open) to 12,000 miles long. Upon
receipt of strategic warning, assuming an early decision to mobilize and deploy forces, the United States would rapidly deploy a balanced force to Southwest Asia to place in the path of the expected Soviet invasion force. This is a form of "preemptive deterrence." Major Army forces would come in behind naval and air forces deployed earlier. The object would be to establish a situation in which the Soviets were forced to decide on a historic encounter between US and Soviet forces. Some authorities consider the size and nature of the US forces for this task as relatively unimportant.

In contrast to operations in Europe where a sophisticated infrastructure exists, in Southwest Asia the United States would initiate operations with only a small Army contingent, a naval presence, an Air Force element, and equipment from maritime prepositioned ships located at Diego Garcia. The force would rely for support on the "mobility triad" of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment. Although sustained land operations require large support bases, no such bases are likely to be available early on. Egypt has offered the use of Ras Banas, and the United States is quietly seeking support "facilities" closer to the Gulf region. Without nearby support facilities, effective ground operations will not be possible. This limitation is significant because, as in Europe, the threat is land oriented; preventing Soviet control of the oil requires going onto the Eurasian landmass and occupying blocking positions well inland to inhibit Soviet movement to the Gulf. The JCS believe this action requires balanced multiservice forces. The Army has a significant role in countering the highly mechanized and armored forces of the Soviet Army.

As in Europe, the advantage lies with the Soviets. Indeed the West's ability to prevent a strong thrust south is highly questionable. Therefore, US global strategy dictates consideration of worldwide escalation. It should be noted, however, that the administration appears to be backing away from the "automatic" aspect of horizontal escalation.

Although the United States views any US-Soviet confrontation as having global implications, the United States does not necessarily seek to expand a conflict that may originate in
Europe, at least not with major ground forces. But the nation’s leaders will consider horizontal escalation of any Soviet confrontation that begins elsewhere—confirming the NATO Allies’ worst fears. Thus, in my judgment, a contradiction in US strategy exists regarding ground forces: On the one hand, US strategy seeks to limit any European conflict, concentrating the damage in one region; on the other hand, the United States would seek allied assistance in any major confrontation that begins outside Europe, a conflict the United States may join without seeking allied advice. In a conflict that begins initially in Europe, in all probability no major Army forces would be held back for operations elsewhere.

The RDJTF is not supposed to be considered a nuclear trip wire but rather a deterrent force—a “signal.” The near-term outlook for a successful defense in Southwest Asia is pessimistic, but US vital interests dictate making a major effort to counter a Soviet incursion, even though the force may be deployed and fail to stave off disaster. Great uncertainty remains about whether nuclear weapons would be employed in the region.

Operations in Southwest Asia are highly sensitive to the timeliness of decisions to mobilize and deploy. Upon receipt of a warning, the President could call up 100,000 reservists under his authority, and later probably declare partial mobilization. I believe that full mobilization is unlikely until a Soviet invasion occurs. As stated earlier, successful deterrence is contingent on placing US forces between the Soviet units and the Gulf, preferably before the invasion. Such rapid deployment would require coopting practically all available airlift and sealift; even then, ships will not arrive in the Gulf until the fourth week after M-Day. The Army has task-organized light force packages for rapid deployment by air, with equipment and heavy units following by sea (some 90 percent of the total requirement). Currently the Army could deploy a corps headquarters and combat units drawn primarily from three divisions to Southwest Asia. (The 82d Airborne is the Army’s most rapidly deployable division.)

Callup of Reserve Component forces is necessary to carry out this deployment. Indeed, the size of the Army force package is limited by support capabilities, but the Army does plan to expand the Rapid Deployment Force-Army (RDF-A) in the future.
This expansion will entail building a full expeditionary force because of the lack of support facilities in Southwest Asia.

As the deployment time for US forces decreases, deterrence increases, thus the RDJTF may be predeployed to an intermediate support facility. Assessments differ on how rapidly Army units can arrive in the Gulf region. Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, Commander, RDJTF, has stated that a brigade could reach the region in three to four days, with the combat elements of a division in place in less than two weeks. In a 1980 command post exercise, it took 169 days to close the entire RDJTF.³⁴

If Saudi facilities are not made available, the RDJTF would probably deploy to Egyptian and perhaps Omani facilities. The administration is programming a buildup of Ras Banas in Egypt to provide the deploying forces a place to rest and prepare to stage forward into the Southwest Asia and Persian Gulf region. But Ras Banas is too far from possible operational areas, so efforts continue to secure agreements for closer facilities. The Saudis resist being drawn into planning for the RDJTF and have even pressured Oman to reduce its role in such planning.³⁵

It is not clear where the forces would deploy in a crisis before the Ras Banas facility is completed. Oman is a possibility, but general support facilities being established in Somalia and Kenya perhaps could serve as intermediate sites. Israel is another, albeit unlikely, alternative. All these peripheral facilities are a significant distance from the operational area. The bulk of the US strategic lift would be occupied deploying forces from the United States. Thus, movement forward from intermediate bases would probably be accomplished with intra-theater airlift and a few C-5 aircraft.

Army forces have some supplies aboard the ships in the Near Term Prepositioned Force at Diego Garcia. The equipment will be available in the event a benign environment exists and port facilities are available. The Near Term Prepositioned Force could link up with Army forces outside the operational area. If hostilities were already joined, the Marine Corps might have to make an amphibious assault in the Gulf region to clear port facilities. In any case, a support team has to join the ships before the
equipment is serviced and off-loaded. Barring combat losses, Army forces would secure their supplies by using "local indigenous vehicles, road march, Near Term Prepositioned Force vehicles, shuttle, or similar means." Other ammunition and equipment flowing into the operational area by sea would be those currently earmarked by NATO.14

Apparently, current intentions are to occupy positions in the Southwest Asia and Persian Gulf region and to seek to deter Soviet movement toward the Gulf.17 US forces would seek to counter any Soviet efforts to penetrate US positions. While it is not the intent of this paper to critique US military strategy, the reader will note another contradiction. Forces in Egypt or forces dispersed to prevent Soviet control of area oilfields would not necessarily deter or inhibit Soviet penetration into northern Iran. Indeed, establishing defenses which leave northern Iran uncovered could lead the Soviets to draw an analogy to events that followed the famous speech of then Secretary of State Dean Acheson on 12 January 1950, in which the US defense perimeter was defined, leaving Korea outside, and war ensued. Furthermore, I believe that accepting the loss of northern Iran probably would only forestall the inevitable.

But the United States faces serious problems in that, at least through fiscal year 1987, insufficient resources will be available to adequately protect security interests in Southwest Asia. Because a response to Soviet aggression in the region is deemed necessary, the potential for escalation is high. Former USCINCRED General Volney F. Warner believes that the United States should be prepared to accept the loss of an Army division and a Marine brigade to prove to the Soviets they cannot act unchallenged. But currently, policy to avoid a conflict that the United States cannot win would counsel against a direct ground response to major Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia.

One great advantage exists in Southwest Asia—geopolitical depth. The United States is apparently building a capability to defend in the region, but in the interim, steps in the event deterrence fails are unclear. The overall global situation will be assessed to determine the extent of the commitment that can be made in Southwest Asia.
The French and the British will probably provide some allied maritime support for the defense of Southwest Asia, and the United States will probably seek "show the flag" activities by other nations to promote an allied effort. But Turkey is unlikely to support any operations that do not involve NATO, and other US allies are unlikely to expand their defense effort significantly to secure Persian Gulf oil. Accepting these realities, the United States seeks to have the NATO Allies and Japan do more in Europe and Northeast Asia, respectively. However, the United States also will continue its efforts to secure broader support for defense of Persian Gulf oil.

If the Soviets occupy northern Iran, a stalemate is possible. If the Soviets conduct a major buildup and continue south, penetration to the Gulf also is possible. Soviet forces could reach the Gulf from Afghanistan in five days.

PACIFIC REGION

In the entire Pacific region, US Army combat forces are likely to be involved to only a limited degree during a general war. In the era of containment, the Pacific has been considered an economy-of-force region, particularly for land forces. By and large, under the current administration, this strategic perspective continues. Combined planning for the defense of Japan still evolves under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Elsewhere in the Pacific region, the United States remains committed to the defense of Korea, a unilateral 1952 declaration regarding the security of Thailand (reinforced by President Reagan in October 1981), and the ANZUS Treaty.

Korea could be rapidly reinforced in a worldwide crisis, but primarily with air and naval forces and logistical support. The focus on air and naval forces in the Pacific extends back to the Nixon Doctrine announced in 1968, derived from a recognition that national resources are limited, and that the United States needed to develop a policy that the public would support over the long term. The Nixon Doctrine also manifested a desire to avoid involvement in another major Asian land war, thus it further reinforced the primacy of Europe. (Interestingly, the Nixon Doctrine
was not applied to NATO directly.) Clearly the intent was to
downplay the role of ground forces outside Europe, particularly
in Asia. Even today, in the context of a worldwide war, US re-
regional objectives on the Asian continent are limited. Therefore,
early reinforcement or resupply of forward-deployed forces there
in the event of a global conflict is unlikely. 62

In the Pacific, the US Army maintains the 2d Infantry Divi-
sion (seven maneuver battalions) in Korea, and the two-brigade
25th Infantry Division as well as the 29th Separate Infantry
Brigade (National Guard) in Hawaii. If a global crisis were to de-
velop, some forces could be deployed elsewhere as part of the
so-called "swing" strategy. 63 In the event of a crisis in Europe,
the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), could be directed to
redeploy selected forces to the Atlantic and European theaters.
While most attention is given to naval elements, the "swing" package includes Army and Air Force forces as well. These rede-
ployments are not automatic; the decision to redeploy and the
designation of forces will be made as the situation develops.
Thus, the Army's regional major combat presence could consist
of at least one to two divisions.

In view of his interest in the eventual reunification of Korea,
Kim Il-sung would possibly exploit the chaos of a worldwide war
by invading South Korea, pressure from China notwithstanding. 64
Thus, any major land operation in the Pacific region will probably
be fought in Korea as part of the overall US Eurasian contain-
ment strategy. That is, the United States is bound to defend
Korea by a Mutual Defense Treaty, and being party to the 1953
Armistice Agreement (which South Korea is not), the United
States has a legal responsibility for peace on the peninsula. The
United Nations Command is the organizational entity that carries
out the armistice responsibilities.

The 2d Infantry division, currently positioned north of Seoul
across the main approaches from the north, is in strategic
reserve for the 8th US Army. One battalion is just south of the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) near Panmunjom. The division, particu-
larly the battalion near the DMZ, would be quickly involved in any
conflict. It is this combat presence, well forward, between the
North Korean forces and Seoul, that enhances deterrence on the
peninsula. Since 1974, the defense concept has been to fight and defeat the enemy north of Seoul, reinforcing the role of the 2d Infantry Division. Thus US combat forces will probably remain in place for some time to come.

OVERALL STRATEGIC VIEW

The foregoing presentation of US global strategy by region points up the continued primacy of European defense, at least for Army forces. One of the dilemmas our policymakers face is that the war may—indeed, is likely to—commence outside Europe: in Southwest Asia, Korea, or elsewhere. Such a situation could be happenstance; more ominously, it could be a feint seeking to draw off US forces from a more vital region. Unfortunately, as the reacting force, the United States may march to the sound of the guns as if the engagement were the "only game in town." In the event a conflict breaks out in the Western Pacific or even Southwest Asia, it will be necessary to exercise tremendous national resolve not to deploy large numbers of forces there. In Southwest Asia, particularly, and in view of perceived and vital interests there, this restraint will prove very difficult.

The United States ultimately seeks to be able to engage the Soviets simultaneously in several theaters to fulfill the containment strategy—ironically, in every case except with Army forces, the key to Eurasian containment. In view of this expectation, we must examine US Army capabilities to meet the postulated US military strategy for global war.
3. FORCE CAPABILITIES

W HATEVER THE CAPABILITIES of its military forces, US national will to ensure survival of our nation-state and way of life must underpin defense expenditures or the defense efforts may be wasted. Although condemned by many, the negatively synergistic effect of a weakened national will and low defense expenditures is, in fact, perversely logical, particularly so in view of similar trends among the allied nations without which a conflict with the USSR cannot be successfully engaged.

US ARMY FORCES MISSION

The US/Allied policy of deterrence with respect to the interior of the Eurasian landmass points up the continued requirement for viable ground forces and ultimately, as the 1982 Falkland crisis has confirmed, ground forces must occupy and defend territory. But the US Army manifests US national experience and culture, not the perceived US national role in the world. The United States has the fifth-largest Army in the world, behind those of China, USSR, Vietnam, and India—too small to accomplish the required mission, in view of the worldwide Soviet threat.

Contrary to some perceptions, the Army's role is not direct defense of US territory. As noted in chapter 2, that role is deployment of forces overseas to engage in forward defense as far from the United States as possible.

Since the NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict is the most demand-
ing, the focus of these defense efforts is on Europe. But while Army planners continue to emphasize NATO, they are also looking at regions of most probable conflict. The increasingly global nature of the threat challenges the United States to meet requirements outside Europe without degrading the collective capabilities of NATO. The Army’s Active Component must be prepared to meet threats to NATO and elsewhere and hold while the Reserve Components (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) mobilize and deploy to reinforce. Unfortunately, because the Army has not been modernized over the past two decades, and because its basic structure needs strengthening, the Army’s ability to accomplish the assigned mission is in question.

Following the euphoric early months of the Reagan administration when it had appeared that defense spending would be open ended, the perennial fiscal and political realities reappeared, dictating establishment of tough priorities. The Army subsequently has concentrated on modernizing its existing force instead of adding needed force structure. Indeed, no significant increases in end-strength are expected before fiscal year 1987-88.

While pointing up deficiencies, it is important to note that the US Army is ready to join battle, albeit for limited duration. But, it needs to be fleshed out to sustain combat. The forward-deployed forces are manned, equipped, and mission oriented. What they lack are trained and ready reinforcements, strategic lift, war reserve stocks, and a supportive industrial base.

In view of the demonstrated inability to predict the setting and nature of future wars, the United States needs broadly flexible forces. The Reagan administration’s defense budget increases (supplementals) for fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 1982 only partially corrected the serious deficiencies that exist in the Army. However the increases did place the Army on the right course.

The US Army faces formidable tasks. First, it confronts an enemy that has more than 180 divisions, is capable of operating on multiple fronts simultaneously, and has interior lines of communication. Second, it must cope with a politically motivated
strategy in the main theater (Europe) that dictates relatively static operations well forward. Third, the United States is short of strategic mobility. But one senses salt in the air over any report that the seemingly insurmountable task on the continent argues for transfer of Army resources to another service. At the national level, except in a crisis, the defense equation is not usually one of ability at the moment, but of building a capability over time, while factoring into the equation allied support for a collective effort.

Force structure. In a global strategy, force requirements, in theory, have no upper limit during planning. But, in reality, resource limitations have dictated concentration on two major Eurasian contingencies—defense of Western Europe and protection of access to Persian Gulf oil. Providing the wherewithal even for these areas of main concern is another question. Indeed, if a general war were to begin outside Europe, the intent to reduce support for NATO is understood. Since the strategy places unusual reliance on a large reserve contingent, mobilization is crucial. Yet planners appear reluctant to question the value of large, ill-equipped reserve forces in a technological age that permits initiation of massive attacks with little or no mobilization, but perceptions are important, and it is the role of the national leaders to prepare to meet the full spectrum of possible threats, considering political realities—foreign and domestic.

The task is to structure the Army forces for rapid deployment for the European battlefield and to provide more discrete force packages for requirements outside NATO. The Army is tailoring these latter contingency forces for rapid deployment to any environment to counter sophisticated opponents that may have a broad range of armored vehicles, antiair weapons, and tactical mobility. Unfortunately, the Army’s authorized strength is not sufficient to accomplish this wide array of mission requirements. The 24-division force (16 active and 8 reserve) is termed the minimum prudent force, yet the Active Component structure heavily relies on “round-out” units from the Reserve Components.

Greater use of reserve round-out units is under consider-
aion. Even the Rapid Deployment Force-Army has a National Guard round-out unit. Yet, in a crisis, the Army does not plan to deploy the round-out unit concurrently with its Active Component partner. Although the round-out unit is being upgraded to permit simultaneous deployment, the ad hoc arrangement fills out the division with an Active Component unit, thus calling into question the round-out concept.

Considering the likelihood of minimum mobilization time, the Army must provide the resources for its reserve forces and an integral part of the US ground forces. Unlike the Air Force, the Army historically has never fully supported the Reserve Components. Yet the Volunteer Army was adopted with the understanding that reserve forces would be called up in the event of a crisis. Today, the Reserve Components provide two-thirds of the total Army logistical support and nearly one-half of the combat units. The Total Army concept must be a reality.

The nature of the threat in likely contingency areas outside Europe and the stated requirement for all Army forces to be adaptable to the NATO battlefield mean that the entire Army force structure must be highly flexible. The Army usually assumes that combat forces are fungible, that they are capable of being deployed to any region of the world and conducting effective operations. If forces are assumed to be interchangeable, worldwide, multiple commanders can use the same units for planning purposes, as a result, shortfalls can be masked until a crisis develops. But, in my judgment, major Army units, particularly mechanized and armored ones, are not fungible—if immediate combat effectiveness is crucial. Denial of interchangeability, though, even for heavy units, poses difficulties. Army forces would be packaged and oriented for specific regions. As a result, the much-touted global flexibility would be circumscribed. Furthermore, as non-NATO contingency requirements expand, formal US commitments to NATO would probably have to be reduced.

The Army should squarely face the issue of interchangeability. A unit will be fully effective in a desert environment only if it concentrates totally on that mission. If a unit is to be prepared to fight in Germany’s Fuwe Gap, it should not be diverted to desert.
arctic, or jungle training. The issues here surround critical resources: training and staff planning time, regionally specific doctrine, and differing materiel and maintenance requirements.

This mission-specific proposal also poses serious difficulties for light divisions. The 82d Airborne Division is the only division based in the United States that is manned, equipped, and trained for immediate deployment. Thus the division is alerted for practically every crisis, wherever developed. Yet the division is part of the RDF-A, uniquely under the operational control of the Commander, RDJTF; it should be concentrating solely on the Southwest Asian mission. As the situation is, the division must divert some of its time to other missions.

Of perhaps greater consequence would be the actual employment of an RDJTF-committed force outside Southwest Asia. In the event of a follow-on crisis in the primary area, chaos would reign. Yet, if a crisis were to evolve tomorrow in Timbuktu requiring a ground force, the 82d Airborne Division would probably be committed. (If asked for an alternative, one might recommend the US Marine Corps or the French force d'intervention.) A 24-division force will be incapable of supporting the administration's global strategy in all regions simultaneously.

The Army is modernizing its forces through a program called Army 88, which encompasses examination of the divisions, corps, and echelons-above-corps. The program evolved from studies of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war experience, the evolving Soviet threat, and the need to update the forces structure to exploit new doctrine and new equipment.

A structure is designed for the European battlefield, the new heavy division (Division 86) will have 10 battalion divisions. Similar studies are underway for the infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions, with the proviso, as stated previously, that they be useable in both NATO and non-NATO environments.

The number of Army combat units will not significantly change during the 1980s. Early plans to revert the 7th Infantry Division (two Active Component brigades) to cadre status have been rescinded, but the Active Component-Reserve Component mix in the Army 86 study is still being developed. While plans for
two new Active Component divisions have been dropped, consider-
eration is being given to organizing two additional Reserve Com-
ponent divisions, using existing brigades.  

One of the Army's force structure problems concerns its
"tail"—its support capability. In 1975, with pressure from Con-
gress, the Army converted numerous personnel support tasks to
combat tasks, providing a politically more palatable "tooth to
tail" ratio. This move dictated increasing reliance on the Euro-
pean Allies for host nation support. Although the Army opposed
this action, national leaders deemed this loss of flexibility ac-
ceptable because, until recently, security concerns focused al-
most totally on European defense after withdrawal from Vietnam.
The Army does support the host nation support concept. How-
ever, when concern was raised about Persian Gulf oil and a
global strategy evolved, the Army found its organic support capa-
bility emasculated by overreliance on European host support
concept. The Army had lost the capability for conducting large-
scale operations outside Europe. Furthermore, the NATO Allies
have not provided all the required host nation support for Europe:
thus, even in the main theater, serious shortfalls exist. And much
of the existing support is performed by civilians who probably
would evacuate the area in a crisis.

Operations in Southwest Asia on the scale envisaged will
require a massive support structure. Indeed, the Army will have
to resurrect the Expeditionary Force concept and to plan to
transport literally everything required to the region. Critics will ar-
gue that countries in the region should provide much of this sup-
port, as in Europe, but except in a few categories, this is unlikely
to happen. Thus, not only limited host nation support but also the
lack of permanent operating bases dictate that the Army take
steps to enable it to fight without significant outside support. Of
the 3½ divisions that are allocated for planning in the austere
environment in Southwest Asia, the Army now has the capability
(with Reserve Component augmentation) to support only sel-
clected forces, with some shortfalls, until a sea line of communi-
cations is established.

Material. The Army has only about half the equipment
needed to field the currently understructured force, and much of what it has is outdated. While the Air Force and Navy began modernizing during the 1970s, the Army used the immediate post-Vietnam period, drawing on the Arab-Israeli war experiences, to do intense research and development. In view of the tremendous advances in quality which the Soviet forces have made during this period, the Army need for modernization has now reached critical proportions.

Rapid modernization is essential if US forces are to survive on the modern battlefield. In the next five years, the Army expects to introduce more than 20 new major systems and several hundred minor ones; this is the well-known "bow wave" of modernization efforts that will reach a crescendo in the 1980s. The bill will approach $240 billion, of which only 33 percent was programmed through fiscal year 1982. For example, the Army is short more than 183,000 trucks (1 ½ to 10 tons each); it should spend more than $25 billion during the next two decades for trucks alone. Indeed, General Frederick J. Kroesen, Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Europe (CINCUSAREUR), has told the Congress that most of the wheeled vehicles in Europe are so "old and obsolescent" that they would not be functional in a wartime situation. As The Economist reports, "it will take money by the bucketful" to make the US Army a modern, sustainable fighting machine.

It is easy to see why modernization, in my judgment, is second only to manpower as a major Army problem. As a result of continuous deferrals—including one in the fall of 1981, reducing programmed procurement of critical equipment—the Army has been constantly falling behind, and the bill keeps going up. Part of the problem is the mandated use of politically motivated inflation factors for budgeting purposes, but the real problem lies in the establishment of balanced priorities among the Services within the Defense Department. In addition, a number of production delays have escalated costs. However, less efficient production may be necessary to develop and maintain an adequate industrial base.

Clearly, correctives to the backlog in Army requirements are several years away. In the meantime, as one US Army gener-
The top priorities—the M-1 tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Patriot, and the Advanced Attack Helicopter—are clear because they provide the greatest force multiplier effect, but other important needs keep surfacing. For example, the modernization effort significantly increases overall fuel and ammunition requirements, putting greater reliance on technology; Clausewitz-like "friction" always diminishes expected performance. Moreover, as General Donald R. Keith has said, "Technology won’t save us if we don’t field it."

One serious drain on Army resources is POMCUS—prepositioning of materiel configured to unit set—that is, equipment forward deployed in Europe for US divisions. Filling and maintaining these stocks drain Army dollars and reduce global flexibility. The Secretary of Defense has directed establishment of six division sets of POMCUS equipment in Europe. While shortages exist, the first four division sets are essentially in place. Facilities for the last two are being completed, and fill was to begin in fiscal year 1983. Even though the Congress looks askance at expanding this program, the administration continues to push it because of the apparent political problems involved in reversing agreements with the Allies. The Army maintains that fill of POMCUS must be considered in the context of overall service needs.

The problems associated with POMCUS are these: (1) The equipment is more readily available for use worldwide if positioned in the continental United States. (2) POMCUS storage sites will be an early target, so the prepositioned supplies are only usable before a war breaks out. (3) Ironically, POMCUS increases airlift requirements because of the surge in troop lift the scheme assumes. (Admittedly, fast sealift would not negate the need for airlift for troops.) (4) The Warsaw Pact has such a preponderance of combat power that the improvement in force ratios which POMCUS provides to NATO would be quickly lost. (5) More important, strategic lift is now not sufficient enough to rapidly deploy the force. Nevertheless, the Army still plans to add the remaining two POMCUS sets to enable the United States to meet its commitment for a 10-division force in Europe by M + 10 (D-Day).
Notwithstanding the major emphasis placed by the Chief of Staff in recent years on the Total Army approach,21 the materiel situation in the Reserve Components is abysmal. The current Army leadership has made a major effort to reduce the inequity in treatment between active units and those in the Reserve Components. Indeed, the General Accounting Office commended the Army for its Total Army approach to management.22 But the Army bureaucracy still does not fully support the Total Army concept. A cursory check finds that an anti-Reserve Component bias continues to exist.

As an example, whether active or reserve, every unit requires a certain amount of preparation before deploying overseas. In the case of Reserve Component major combat units, the Army Staff employs a NET (not earlier than) formula to calculate availability: Mobilization Station Arrival + [(Training Weeks − 3) × 7] + 4. This means that closure time at the mobilization station, required training time (to reach C-2 status),∗ and preparation for overseas movement (POM) time are added together to determine the earliest date and time a reserve unit can deploy.

For active units, no formula is employed; they are assumed to be available on M-Day. Yet, active units require predeployment training; they also need POM time for processing, packing, crating, and the like. This difference in calculating active and reserve unit availability is critical because the data are used to develop latest arrival dates in operation plans that also determine unit resourcing; that is, later arriving units have a lower priority for equipment. It would appear that the Army applies more stringent criteria for deployment to reserve units.

Reserve Component forces are caught in a circular argument: latest arrival dates based on capabilities, but because these dates also determine resourcing, reserve forces can never improve their capabilities to achieve better latest arrival dates.

∗ The JCS Readiness Reporting System categories are as follows: C-1, Fully Combat Ready; C-2, Substantially Combat Ready; C-3, Marginally Combat Ready; C-4, Not Combat Ready; C-5, Not Combat Ready due to Reequipping, Reorganization, Product Improvement, or Replacement Training Unit.
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(Admittedly this issue is far broader than just hardware.) One finds a lack of logic regarding the entire issue of unit availability. While the Army Staff computes Reserve Component unit availability for major combat units, it considers all the nonmajor combat and support units as available on the date required by the supported theater commander, regardless of component.

**Sustainability.** To the leadership, sustainability is the Army's weakest area. Indeed, some units are cannibalizing selected items just to keep operating in peacetime. If one were to use Program Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT) on the problem, the critical path would usually lead to a paucity of stocks. In Europe, for example, CINCUSAREUR does not have stocks on hand to support sustained combat operations.

The worldwide shortfall in resources is not simply a function of ammunition (of which NATO requirements are 80 percent of the Department of the Army program). The shortages extend across the entire spectrum of supplies, spare parts, and major items of equipment. The requirement to stage available supplies forward early on in a crisis will further exacerbate an already serious shortfall in strategic lift which, in turn, is vulnerable to interdiction. Furthermore, a gap is expected between exhaustion of existing stocks after D-Day (D) and new production (P) after mobilization. There is no D-Day to production (D-P) capability in the US system for most vital items. This expected gap points up the dynamic relationship between existing stocks and the civilian industrial base capacity. While it seeks to expand stockpiles, the Army is pressing for improvements to the industrial base.

Another problem concerns the proper assumptions to use regarding the stocks and consumption rates of the NATO Allies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's assumptions regarding allied stocks and consumption rates are more optimistic than the Army deems prudent. A longstanding disagreement continues within the Alliance over consumption rates and stockage levels. (The reader will recall the Allies' belief that an effective conventional defense undermines deterrence.) Since no acceptable agreement has been reached, the United States continues to use national (higher) rates to compute its requirements. The United
States, in reality, is providing stocks for the NATO Allies. This practice is directly contrary to the intent of the Congress, which permits peacetime stockage only for South Korean forces.

While steps to enhance interoperability may be laudatory militarily, these same steps facilitate the wartime dispersal of stocks prepositioned ostensibly for US troops. Thus, even if the Army meets its approved stockage objectives, the supplies may prove inadequate because of shared use. This is an important issue; the Army Staff has estimated that if sufficient US stocks were on hand to offset expected allied deficiencies, terrain loss could be reduced by half. But this stockage burden should be placed squarely on the Allies.

For Southwest Asia, the Army has limited quantities of supplies, ammunition, and water for a small force aboard the ships in the Near-Term Prepositioned Force at Diego Garcia. Supplies and equipment earmarked for NATO will have to be used in any conflict in Southwest Asia, further exacerbating an already critical supply situation in Europe—the more vital region. Additionally, supply flow will be a problem because limited logistics—over-the-shore capability exists in the structure. However, the Army is aggressively pursuing the ability to supply operational units without using port facilities.

One other burden impinges on the Army. In addition to having been assigned to conduct sustained operations with large forces, the Army has the mission of providing common service support to forces of the US Air Force and Marine Corps as necessary. Also, in 1981, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to provide water for all HKJTF forces deployed to Southwest Asia.

**Doctrine.** A new doctrinal concept for war-fighting called the Air-land Battle undergirds all of the modernization efforts. The concept is designed to counter the postulated Soviet threat and to exploit the capabilities of a modern army. Focusing on the Army's most difficult military task—European defense—the Air-land Battle concept envisions concurrent battles at several echelons, and provides specific time-distance and force-
slice responsibilities for brigade, division, and corps commanders. Authorities expect that the war will be fought on an "integrated battlefield" encompassing conventional, chemical, and nuclear operations simultaneously.17

Manning and training. In my judgment, manning, the meeting of personnel requirements, will be the major Army challenge in the years ahead. For fiscal year 1982, personnel costs consumed 49 percent of the Army budget (including retirement, claims, and housing). While this figure seems high, it's important to remember that the Army is manpower intensive and that trained and motivated people are more essential than hardware.28

Above all, it will take years for the Army to recover from the social engineering initiated by Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army during the Carter administration. Within the Army hierarchy, dissatisfaction with Alexander's policies was apparently widespread, as evidenced by the numerous policy reversals under the new administration in 1981.29 These are welcome changes because the availability of trained, qualified manpower in the required numbers remains the Achilles heel of US military strategy in the 1980s.

The authorized Active Component end-strength (780,000 in fiscal year 1982) is insufficient to support the current structure, let alone the improvements surrounding Army 85. Nor will the projected increases adequately support the modernization effort or the current structure (see table 3-1). Indeed, the end-strength dips by 10,000 in fiscal years 1983 and 1984, jeopardizing the Army's program for the 1980s.

Weighed against requirements the Active Components continue to suffer serious manpower deficiencies primarily from constraints on end-strength. In the current structure, four Active Component divisions have only two brigades, and many required support units are not organized. At one time, numerous platoons and crews were reduced to zero strength throughout the Army. Although this situation has now been essentially corrected, the 101st Airborne Division (air assault) and RDJTF unit had 27 pla-
Table 3-1. Active Army End-strength Estimated for Fiscal Year 1981 and Proposed for Fiscal Years 1982 to 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Army End-strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>770,000</td>
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<td>785,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>799,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>815,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


...toons at zero strength as recently as 1981. The Army will probably have some units at zero strength through fiscal years 1983 to 1984.28

If the original overall modernization plan had been implemented completely, including the organization of Division 86 and the building of a structure for viable organic support capability, the effort would have broken the current 16-division Active Component structure with the strength ceilings authorized. But other factors—such as disapproval of the Army's request to increase its authorized civilian strength—impinged on the modernization plans. Recognizing that not enough spaces were available to carry out the modernization and reorganization program, the Army Staff revised Army 86 plans in late 1981. In order to retain 16 divisions, the staff reduced the comprehensive support structure originally envisaged. In other words, the Army's structure remains heavily oriented toward mobilization. The crucial question is whether the Army will have the complete organic support capability required to conduct operations in an austere environment on short warning. If not, barring a significant increase in end-strength, the better option might be to eliminate two Active Component divisions, if their retention undermines the support structure.

Although inadequate, authorized strength goals were met in 1981, and quality did improve, with 81 percent of the new person-
nel holding high school diplomas. The Army intends to support the volunteer concept as long as the personnel requirements in quantity and quality can be met. Costly inducements will be necessary to secure the special skills and quality required. The Reserve Components continue to suffer from personnel shortages, about 70,000 as of 30 September 1981: the Army National Guard was 93 percent filled and 35,000 short, and the Army Reserve was 87 percent filled and 35,000 short.

The Army has a mobilization strength of 450,000 soldiers from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The strength is now 205,000, so there is a shortfall of a quarter of a million soldiers. Perhaps more importantly, the IRR personnel available do not have the required skills needed for mobilization. During the Nifty Nugget Mobilization Exercise in 1978, only 17 percent of the enlisted personnel in the IRR had the skills required by the committed forces—primarily combat, armor, and infantry. While the IRR strength is increasing, the skill array remains a serious problem. In that same 1978 exercise, it was necessary to break up Active Component and Reserve Component units to meet the requirements for filler personnel. Indeed, in any actual contingency, the same action would be taken, at least with units from the Reserve Components. Thus, 24 maneuver divisions probably will not be available for commitment. This is a critical issue, for the theater commanders plan on receiving these forces as integral combat units to be committed as maneuver elements in an already tenuous situation.

A lack of adequate medical surge capability further exacerbates the filler problem. The Army has only 18 percent of its wartime operating rooms, and it is short 3,500 doctors. Currently, according to John H. Moxley, III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, "fewer than one in 10 wounded United States servicemen would receive surgery for his wounds" in Europe. It would be worse in Southwest Asia: the seriously wounded would die and a rapid evacuation policy would further strain an already overtaxed strategic lift.

While distasteful to some, the draft may need to be reinstated in the mid-1980s. The administration remains optimistic that this step can be avoided, but the dollar cost of the volunteer
system appears prohibitive. Moreover, military pay is not remaining competitive with wages in industry, assuming economic recovery. The shortage is not just in active riflemen; the Army must find people to meet its special skill requirements for both the Active Components and Reserve Components, to fill out a large mobilization base and to meet requirements for highly qualified personnel such as medical doctors.

Training. The commander's priority is training, focusing on unit readiness. The modernization effort will make the training problems more complex and more expensive in the 1980s, even though the Army continues to emphasize the most cost-effective training possible while seeking quality results.

To enhance cohesiveness and readiness and to reduce unit turbulence, the Army is adopting the regimental system and unit rotation. In addition, in 1981 a Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training (COHORT) test was initiated that keeps a company together from its inception at a training center through the entire initial enlistment of the troops. The Army plans to expand this concept to permit battalion rotations between bases at home and overseas.

Initial entry training has been extended to eight weeks to provide time for repetitive instruction and to add training in communication, land navigation, and opposing forces. A 1982 GAO report questioning the validity of the additional training notwithstanding, the expanded training time is needed. But all required training will still not be presented at the training centers; unit cadre will continue to provide initial training on many important subjects. But because of an Army-wide shortage of experienced noncommissioned officers, providing this training remains a serious problem for units. For instance, a 1981 GAO report found that soldiers in units are not receiving instruction on all critical subjects.

Other related problems will remain through the 1980s. Training will continue to be cyclic because of other, sometimes insidious, requirements for unit time; for example, diversions for housekeeping will be ever present, particularly since increases
requested in the Department of the Army civilian strength were disapproved.

*Readiness.* Readiness is a function of force structure, materiel, doctrine, manning, and training. The readiness goal of an Army unit is a function of its mission. It is neither affordable nor realistic to keep all Army units 100 percent ready. Thus all units are not provided with the resources to achieve a C-1 rating. The forward-deployed units in Europe and Korea, and some units in the United States, particularly RDF-A units, are generally mission-ready. In the personnel category alone, the other Active Component and Reserve Component units would require 30,000 to 40,000 men to be ready for deployment.

The Army could support an RDJTF deployment with a portion of the Presidential callup of 100,000 personnel from the Reserve Components. But, while some units are in excellent condition, the Reserve Components, by and large, do not meet an acceptable readiness standard. As a rule of thumb, the Army Staff considers Reserve Component units available for deployment after M + 30. (The NET [not earlier than] formula mentioned earlier is for detailed planning.)

In 1980, 6 of the 10 Active Component divisions in the continental United States were not combat ready; now 9 of the 10 are in acceptable condition. Though they appear to be ready, however, even forward-deployed units suffer from years of neglect. In Europe, some of the Allies question the reliability of some US units. Significantly, the issue is not one of leadership or morale; it is one of giving the Army the proper resources to accomplish its assigned mission.

It will be costly and time-consuming to correct the inequalities of the past, compounded by the exigencies of the modernization effort. For example, only one division was projected to raise its equipment C-rating from C-3 to C-2 between 1981 and 1983. Even this change assumes that resources currently programmed will be provided on schedule. Barring a great influx of resources, including personnel, there is no magic formula for improving readiness.
STRATEGIC LIFT

The subject of strategic mobility is a frustrating one for the Army. Although it cannot conduct its mission without such lift, the Army has very little direct influence over the programs or other service decisions that significantly affect overall availability of strategic lift, such as prepositioning of Air Force equipment in Europe. Essentially, the Army seeks to meet the unit delivery dates stipulated by the theater commanders through a combination of forward-deployed units, prepositioned equipment, and rapid deployment of reinforcement based in the United States. With the forward-deployed units in place, and POMCUS improvements underway, the major issue for the Army regarding inter-theater movement involves the adequacy of available strategic airlift and sealift.

Here one finds a contradiction in Army planning. While the NATO scenario traditionally is considered the most demanding for Army forces and thus frames the Army structure, that scenario is not what the Army desires for strategic lift planning. Meeting the NATO 10-division D-Day (M + 10) requirement, assuming six division sets of POMCUS, demands less strategic lift surge than the Southwest Asia scenario. This is so because the shortfall in Southwest Asia occurs in all categories of cargo capacity, not trooplift. (Distance is another factor.) If the national focus remains on NATO for programming, the strategic lift will be inadequate. The picture for European defense is further skewed when allied airlift and sealift are factored into the NATO equation, reducing visible US lift requirements.

Strategic mobility for the Army is a serious problem, one for which no early correctives exist, particularly in outside airlift capacity and fast sealift. Right now, the Army could say, with the Marine Corps, that "we have more lift than we have . . . Larry available." 44

One of the embarrassing issues within the Department of Defense is the failure to relate the size of the forces to be moved with strategic lift availability. The Office of the Secretary of Defense should coordinate the size of the Army forces (and the other services' forces lacking organic strategic mobility) and the
amount of strategic airlift and sealift procured. As pointed out for the Senate Subcommittee on Armed Services, serious shortfalls exist in the required ground forces to implement the national military strategy. There the thrust should not be on tailoring the Army, as President Eisenhower proposed, to accommodate available airlift and sealift, but on increasing the lift.44

Currently, the Army builds forces to accomplish the ground combat mission and then presses for the strategic lift necessary for rapid deployment. Although the Air Force and Navy consider Army needs, strategic airlift and sealift fall well behind other perceived Air Force and Navy requirements in competing for budget dollars. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have authority to mandate a balanced effort. Indeed, the Joint Chiefs' assessment of military programs—the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum—is usually prepared so as not to rank one service's program ahead of another's. The assessment memorandum addresses the need for more strategic lift, for example, without ranking that requirement against others, such as attack carriers.

Although airlift is essential, the Army is highly interested in sealift for non-POMCUS-related deployments. Indeed, when the first 10 ships close into a Persian Gulf port, they deliver more cargo than all the airlifted cargo delivered for a month.1 Airlift consumes significant amounts of fuel (more than 6 tons for each cargo ton delivered during the 1973 war), and adequate aerial tanker support is not available. Thus, sealift will account for more than 90 percent of total tonnage delivered in a future crisis. The Army is looking toward fast sealift and limited prepositioning of equipment to enhance global flexibility. However, the need remains for additional outside airlift capability.

Airlift. Unfortunately, the strategic airlift picture will not significantly change until late in fiscal year 1986. At present, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) operational force consists of 70 C-5As and 234 C-141Bs. In time of crisis, this fleet is reinforced by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), which can provide some 430 aircraft phased in over time. the Commander in Chief of the Military Airlift Command (CINMAC) may call up some 52 aircraft (stage I) to meet peacetime requirements; the Secretary of
Defense can add some 56 (stage II) for minor contingencies, and the President, after declaring a national emergency, can add some 322 (stage III) (figure 3-1).

The organic MAC aircraft and CRAF stage I can, hypothetically, deliver a mechanized division to the Persian Gulf in about 22 days. This assumes that all available airlift is allocated to that single task; that the intermediate bases with landing rights and fuel are available (minimum tanker requirements), that overflight rights are granted; that the CRAF aircraft are available without delay; and that the bulk of the aircraft are operational. In the event of a conflict, none of these assumptions may be relied upon.

In any major crisis with the Soviet Union, the United States will undertake certain activities worldwide, necessitating global allocation of available lift. In my judgment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff probably should not allocate more than 70 to 75 percent of available airlift to any one task, for planning other worldwide needs and priority regions may change as the crisis evolves. Furthermore, landing and overflight rights are not likely to be available to fully support a Southwest Asia contingency—note the 1973 Arab-Israeli war experience; thus the requirement for significant tanker support is valid. Moreover, authorities must activate the CRAF resources early on; otherwise, they may arrive late and in fewer numbers than expected. As yet, the CRAF has never been activated; MAC now uses the aircraft on a contract basis. In a crisis, as the numbers called up increase, commercial requirements may compete for the same resources. In addition, many civil aviation pilots are in the Air Force Reserve Component. However, civil aviation crew ratios indicate that pilot availability should not be a problem.

Finally, the condition of the MAC aircraft is an issue. The C-5 is the only aircraft capable of handling outsize cargo. (See figure 3-2.) The current C-5As are undergoing wing modification that will be completed in June 1987. In the interim, their allowable cabin load has been reduced for peacetime operations. While designed to lift two 50-ton tanks, the C-5A probably would do so only in an actual emergency, unless the wing modification were complete.

Figure 3-1. Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Because of crew limitations and shortages in spare parts, the current C-5A and C-141A aircraft can meet only 62 percent of the surge and 52 percent of the sustained flying hour objectives for the current fleet. This failing will be corrected in fiscal year 1985. In addition, normal maintenance requirements mean that only about 63 C-5As will be available to initiate deployment. Over a 180-day period, some one-third probably will be lost, leaving about 47 C-5As. This study focuses on the C-5 inventory, because the most serious airlift problem is outsize capability. If the C-47 is counted, passenger lift appears to be generally adequate. The C-141 (Model B) stretch program has reduced the shortages in oversize capability by increasing potential cubic capacity to the equivalent of 90 additional C-141s.

But another problem looms large—tanker availability. The 615 KC-135 tankers in the fleet were procured for the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and not for strategic deployment of other forces. In any crisis with the USSR, the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), should have first call on these resources to support the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Yet, the entire fleet is insufficient to meet all SAC requirements, which amount to about 1,000 tankers. The proliferation of refuelable resources and the expanding need to use tankers for strategic deployments and tactical operations exacerbate this shortfall. In a crisis, the national command authorities will be faced with a serious problem, choosing between supporting the SIOP and rapidly deploying a force overseas for deterrence.

And finally, all these resources would not be available for early deployment of Army forces. For example, selected Air Force units will probably have a higher priority early on in a crisis in Southwest Asia.

Considering all these factors, the current strategic airlift capability (with programmed enhancements) meets less than one-half the overall requirements before sealift closes. A 1981 congressionally mandated mobility study found that strategic lift capabilities were seriously deficient in all major scenarios involving NATO and Southwest Asia. The then-programmed improvements would have enabled meeting just one-half the lift...
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OUTSIZE

OVERSIZE

BULK


Figure 3-2. US Current Airlift Aircraft
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requirements. (Twenty percent of the material to be moved in the first 15 days of a major crisis is outsize.)

Many analysts saw the CX advanced airlifter as the needed panacea; indeed, the Army supported the program. But the Air Force Chief of Staff and others have pointed out that the CX alone cannot make up for the shortfall. The Defense Department has decided to expedite corrective action and to purchase 50 C-5B aircraft and 40 more KC-10 cargo/tankers, in lieu of the CX. Unfortunately, in addition, further improvements to the CRAF are to be deferred.

A Lockheed Corporation representative reported that, if an October 1982 contract date is assumed, the first squadron (16 aircraft) of C-5Bs could be available by the end of fiscal year 1986. A production capability of 2 aircraft per month would produce 40 by the end of fiscal year 1987, and 50 about mid-fiscal year 1988. Together with the KC-10 aircraft (which, incidentally, have a large cargo capacity), the C-5B aircraft will improve the US strategic airlift capability by roughly 100 percent by 1989.

It is unfortunate that CRAF improvements are ceasing at the very time the CRAF is becoming more important and many aircraft in the current CRAF fleet are nearing retirement (20 percent of the fleet). I expect this program to be revived. Even with the revised program, shortfalls will exist. Indeed, the 1981 congressionally mandated mobility study recommended an increase in airlift capacity of 20 million ton-miles per day. To meet this requirement would entail the addition of up to 120 C-5B aircraft over existing capabilities, more than twice the number now programmed. In addition, with the Army's reorganization and equipment modernization program, Army airlift requirements will continue expanding. Outsize equipment will increase by 80 percent, so that 50 percent of the Army's major items will be outsize by 1986. Airlift will never be able to meet these lift requirements.

For this reason, the Army believes the immediate priority should be fast sealift. Even with 100 additional C-5 aircraft, more than two weeks still would be required to deploy a mechanized division to the Persian Gulf by air. Delivery of large units with organic equipment by airlift is just not a realistic option, particularly considering worldwide requirements and competition.
among the services for the same lift. In addition, balanced sus-
tainable forces must be projected into the region, a further miti-
gating argument against all-airlift support.

Sealift. The view of sealift is distorted. Although the majority
of tonnage is indeed moved by air during the first 30 days of a
crisis, when time is extended, the critical role of sealift manifests
itself. (See figure 3-3.) Experience indicates that more than 90
percent of overall tonnage will move by sea in any major contin-
gency. Indeed, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Congress
that “without adequate and reliable sealift, literally none of our
military plans is executable.” In the Persian Gulf, as stated
earlier, arrival of the first 10 ships equals roughly a full month of
airlift.82

Unfortunately, available ship bottoms cannot meet global
requirements either, and very little of the shipping is either rapid-
ly available or capable of fast-transit. Moreover, too few tankers
are available to support petroleum, oils, and lubricants require-
ments for the air bridge.83 The Military Sealift Command (MSC)
has some 131 ships, one-half of which are under contract. Under
MSC command are 66 ships (33 tankers, 33 dry cargo) dispersed
throughout the world. Backing up the MSC is the National De-
fense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) of 150 ships, with an average age of
35 years. The age of the seafarers who would crew these ships
was said to average 50 to 53 in 1981.84 While the NDRF is poten-
tially available in 60 days (a “rosy” projection), 32 of the ships,
called the Ready Reserve force, have been refurbished and are
available in 5 to 10 days. Six are in the “enhanced” Ready Re-
serve force and are available in five days.85

Another pool of shipping, those ships in the Sealift Readi-
ess Program, includes about 170 dry cargo ships and 25
tankers, all commercial bottoms subsidized by the Government
and hypothetically available for emergencies other than mo-
bilization. These resources are also dispersed worldwide. To se-
cure these resources probably would require a minimum of 20 to
45 days, but they would be phased in for military support under
directive of the Maritime Administration. One observer has
called the Sealift Readiness Program shipping a “non-asset, as
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illusory as a Hollywood set." Also, the Sealift Readiness Program activation authority has never been implemented, to do so would be highly political and might involve lengthy litigation, even though the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was made more binding in late 1981. In addition, there is also a Voluntary Tanker Agreement under which commercial resources might be made available to meet military requirements, but these ships are available through other means, such as the Sealift Readiness Program.

Finally, upon Presidential proclamation, the United States has requisitioning authority over US-owned, foreign-registered ships. In this category are some 236 dry cargo ships, of which 15 have military potential, and 159 tankers, 54 of which are militarily useful. For NATO support operations, the Allies have agreed to make available some 600 ships to meet US lift requirements. The United States expects to use about 420 of these allied ships. In the Pacific, South Korea is making some shipping available to support Korean contingencies.

From all the aforementioned sources, more than 1,000 ships could be available for a global conflict, an indication of a shortfall of 70 to 80 percent of projected requirements. Wartime losses would further exacerbate the problem. For comparison, on the eve of World War II, the United States had almost 1,400 merchant ships; today less than 500 US ships remain with military utility. Specific ship plots and configuration requirements also further limit flexibility. It has been estimated that up to 8,000 ship arrivals a month would be required to sustain NATO operations alone, including support for US and allied forces. And "thundering losses" will occur. Moreover, as stated earlier, operations in Southwest Asia would be an even more prodigious task than reinforcing NATO.

Several initiatives are underway to meet these requirements. First is the SL-7 program. Eight of these high-speed (33 knots; however, probable sustained top speed is 28 knots) ships have been purchased and some are being at least partially modified to roll-on/roll-off configuration to enhance their utility—for example, to carry Army tanks. The conversion should be complete in fiscal year 1984. Three to five of these ships can deliver
a mechanized division to Southwest Asia in 11 to 12 days, or can cross the Atlantic to Europe in 3½ days. These ships will be a "dedicated surge force" positioned at US ports for immediate use.71

The Near-Term Prepositioned Force program is being expanded with four additional ships from the NDRF for ammunition prepositioning. The Navy is acquiring a chartered SEABEE barge carrier to transport outsize equipment. Also, a Maritime Prepositioning Ship program is underway for the US Marine Corps that should ease competition for other resources. Finally, the Navy is expanding the Ready Reserve Force to 44 ships, with the "enhanced" slice going up to 14 ships which are to be available in 5 days.72 However, all these efforts will be offset somewhat by a 1982 decision to reduce operating subsidies for US shipping, which will preclude further Sealift Readiness Program accessions except for charters.73

Strategic mobility. Major improvements are underway in the strategic mobility arena. But even with the enhancements planned, US strategic airlift and sealift is now and will remain insufficient through fiscal year 1987 to meet requirements for a worldwide war. While the available lift may appear sufficient in numbers for NATO operations alone, current resources are inadequate to meet early surge requirements, which are the key to deterrence. This situation is further clouded when worldwide needs are factored into the equation. The security of Europe and Southwest Asia are "inextricably linked," so resources adequate for just one region will be inadequate to deter or fight in the larger context.

ALLIED SUPPORT

As was stated in chapter 1, collective security is the only realistic response to the massive threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. That conclusion notwithstanding, the Army has been understandably reluctant to rest success in battle on the performance of non-US participants. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, particularly during the Carter administration,
gave increased attention to a collective defense effort for both threat and budgetary reasons. Yet, the allies in NATO and Northwest Asia have not fulfilled expectations, and the current worldwide economic malaise makes any significant improvements on their part unlikely for the foreseeable future.

The dilemma for the Army can be set squarely: in the event conflict occurs in a vital region overseas, the Army must move millions of tons of supplies and organize a complex support system within the theater. Civilian authorities have not permitted the Army to organize the requisite support structure—the "tail"—to do the job. Instead, the Army has been forced to focus on combat units while civilian authorities renegotiate with the allies for the requisite logistical assistance—host nation support. In some cases, the support is available, but in many cases the allies provide only vague "agreements in principle." Thus, a serious support gap exists. To an Army planner dealing with life-and-death issues, informal agreements or sentiments of "reasonable assurance" are unacceptable. The required support must be available or defenses will fail. Mutual support arrangements that unbalance the Army force structure seriously inhibit, if not prevent, employment of the force in regions where significant host support is not available, as in Southwest Asia. The Army should be suspicious of host nation support, where such efforts undercut the Army's ability to protect US vital interests worldwide. In a crisis, national interests prevail.

Ground combat forces expectations. The Allies carry a significant responsibility for the defense of Europe. Of the eight forward corps in the central region, three are West German, one is British, one is Dutch, one is Belgian, and only two are American. But this picture is misleading. Much has been made of the fact that the Europeans now provide some 90 percent of the land forces. Should it be any other way for the defense of home territory? It also is often forgotten that the United States is NATO territory. Moreover, the 90 percent figure applies only to the peacetime premobilization posture. Often in mobilization, the relative participation of the United States and its allies changes significantly. The defense of Europe is clearly predicated on combat reinforcements from the United States.
It has been said that NATO is a medium for defending Europe with US leadership, manpower, and materiel assistance. The use of these collective capabilities outside Europe is another question, for as pointed out by Major General Richard C. Bowman, NATO is not a "global confederacy." The limitation on the use of collective defense capabilities applies to US security relationships worldwide.

In view of the severe political (and economic) restraints and threats to security in their own regions, the NATO Allies are unlikely to provide any significant ground forces to oppose the Soviets in Southwest Asia. The situation among the Southwest Asian states is equally constrained, perhaps more so, because of their political diversity and the comparative weakness of their armed forces. They cannot be expected to oppose directly Soviet units alone. But their support, potentially including remnants of the Iranian forces, would be critical in countering a Soviet invasion.

In Northeast Asia, the situation is different only in degree, when it is viewed through the prism of US strategy. The Japanese Self-Defense Force provides for the defense of Japan, with the United States assisting primarily in tactical air power. The same is true in South Korea where US ground forces are not required to defend against North Korea. Against Japan, the Soviets would have to launch a major airborne/amphibious assault while they were distracted in other theaters; in Korea, China could be expected to oppose the diversion there of Soviet troops. In any case, significant US ground reinforcements are not available for the Pacific region in a global conflict.

Service support. The issues of allied support for US forces have never been fully aired because of the sheer magnitude of the task and its political sensitivity. The matter is usually tackled piecemeal. Indeed, the United States is reluctant to press its allies for what is really required. As the situation stands today and through fiscal year 1987, in the event conflict ensues, much essential support will not be available. The gap is so wide that it could not be closed in a few years, even if political agreements were consummated—a highly doubtful event.
In NATO, the US forces must operate under "reasonable assurance" in regards to the availability of host nation support. To demand fully consummated agreements is deemed unreasonable. Army logisticians are caught between US budget-based directives to cut the "tail" and wary allies who will not commit themselves to provide the support required to sustain US forces in a conflict. For example, the Army is short seven engineer battalions for its two forward-deployed corps in Europe. The allies have agreed to provide "some" of the required support for repairs and damage control.

But the allies are making a major contribution through host nation support arrangements for a broad array of activities. Many bilateral agreements commit certain allies to diverting significant resources to support of US forces. West Germany, for example, is planning to dedicate more than 90,000 reservists to provide logistical support to US units. This said, however, significant requirements remain outstanding in the areas of "decontamination, engineering support, maintenance, material handling, medical, personnel, POW handling, security services, transportation, wartime stationing, airfield damage repair, air base security, facilities, transportation and vehicle support." The same is true for support of the lines of communication in Europe. It may be politically prudent to say that "the prospect... is encouraging" or that "there had been a significant breakthrough." But the resources involved are so great that the allies will not provide them in any reasonable timeframe. For example, West Germany is very positive about meeting US requirements, but a recent West German Defense Military report projected an inexorable decline in the Federal Republic's ability to meet its own needs over the next 20 years. This tension on the Bonn government to expand its own defense capabilities and to provide financial support for other US requirements in Europe clearly is exacerbated by pressure from the United States and other allies.

It is hard to put a good face on the host nation support issue. The United States currently plans to deploy forces into Europe far in excess of what may be reasonably supported with the current and projected (through fiscal year 1987) support.
structure. As CINCUSAREUR, General Frederick Kroesen has stated that the Army force now in Europe "lacks sufficient support forces to guarantee its staying power." Furthermore, a conflict in Southwest Asia would necessitate drawing on the combat support units now in Europe.6

While facilities are available in Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and Egypt to support US forces, no formal host nation support agreements exist in Southwest Asia. The RDJTF is examining what might be available and will submit requirements for consideration by political authorities. Right now, and for some time to come, US forces deploying to that region will have to transport literally everything required, even refined fuel-coals to Newcastle! The requirements for desert fighting are mind-boggling. Take ground transport: Rommel required 350 tons a day, including water, to support one motorized division over a 300-mile supply route. In addition to the division's organic transport, the German Army High Command estimated a need for 1,170 additional trucks to transport the required supplies for the one division.61 The United States must be able to support a number of Army divisions over distances exceeding Rommel's. In view of their vulnerability, pipelines and aircraft will not eliminate the ground transportation problem. And this study addresses only Army combat forces. When the entire joint forces are factored into the equation, one can understand why the RDJTF is over 220,000 personnel!

THE MISMATCH WITH STRATEGY

Only a holistic view permits one to observe the complexity of the Army. Increasing Reserve Component capabilities reduce Active Component resource allocations. acquiring new personnel must be weighted against retention of the old; combat-effective units may not be useful if insufficient strategic mobility is available. expedited modernization requires increased manpower, increased training requires adequate numbers of trained noncommissioned officers, and increased manpower levels may not be effective if equipment and ammunition levels go down. The Army is like a house of cards. One new system is contingent
on many others. If one system or supporting unit falls out, perhaps by congressional or national command authority directive, the entire organization may be affected. Indeed, the Army's overall doctrine for the future is contingent on the new organization and modern systems becoming operational in a timely manner.

The administration has available for its use an Army with its forward-deployed forces and most of its Active Component continental US-based divisions trained and ready for combat, albeit for a limited period. The other Active Component divisions are less ready, and the Reserve Component reinforcing divisions are even less so. By fiscal year 1987, the modernization effort will be well underway. But, although firepower will be significantly increased and the force will have greatly improved sustainability, the Army will still be unable to carry out the national military strategy. Many of the units, particularly in the Reserve Components, will still have outdated equipment—even though reliance on the Reserve Components will be increasing. The units across the board will be at varying stages in the modernization process, feeling the tension and frustration of manpower shortages and trying to cope with the new doctrine which is predicated on a highly modernized and properly manned force.

Shortfalls exist in entire Army division slices. Review of congressional testimony and information released on the Defense Guidance for fiscal years 1984-86 permits us to infer that the Army Planning Force, that force required to carry out the strategy with "reasonable assurance" of success, exceeds 30 divisions. The current 24-division force is the minimum essential force deemed adequate only for deterrence, not for fighting a global war.

Equally serious is the inability of the United States to deploy rapidly a major force to any hotspot, particularly outside Europe, thus weakening deterrence and placing US vital interests in jeopardy. The decision to purchase C-5A aircraft and SL-7 ships will, by the mid-1980s, provide the capability to deploy more divisions rapidly, a major step forward. But competing requirements for this lift and the possibility of simultaneous global requirements put these improvements into a more modest perspective.
Finally, the United States can count less on its allies at the very time when cohesive combined action is required. At present the first line of defense in any region of the world is supported essentially by US resources. Since containment of the Soviets on the interior of the Eurasian Continent depends on effective allied support, some abrupt, if not coercive, measures will be required to jar the Western allies—and Japan—out of their lethargy.

In sum, one finds a hollow Army, but a dynamic organization well on the way to recovery, if adequately supported. But, the Army must ruthlessly review requirements and the resources available, and then it must recommend the commitment of its combat power to the most critical points in meeting the Soviet threat. The next step is to consider options for better employing available Army combat forces in a worldwide war scenario.
4. STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR US ARMY FORCES

It SHOULD BE CLEAR from the previous chapters that the United States seriously lacks the wherewithal—it is short more than a few Army divisions, among other things—to fulfill the US military strategy. The principal need, therefore, is to provide the resources necessary to build the required military capability. Even assuming the requisite national will and congressional support, this buildup would take time—perhaps a decade or more after the decision to do so, unless the nation decided to mobilize.

The requirement is for a fully manned and modernized Army, both Active and Reserve Components, organized as an expeditionary force that is fully sustainable for as long as the Soviets can fight, and backed by the requisite strategic mobility to deploy rapidly the force to any trouble spot worldwide. Only thus can the United States hope to contain the Soviets on the interior of the Eurasian Continent and have deterrence endure. Unfortunately, the administration apparently has no intention of building up the Army to accomplish this vital mission. It thus becomes necessary to look for options for further rationalization of the planned use of available Army combat forces to maximize their potential in the most critical theaters.

The nation will have to deal with this shortfall in resources by conducting theater operations sequentially, at least as regards major Army force commitments. Historically, the sequential conduct of operations has not been unusual for a democracy. In World War II, the European theater received initial emphasis;
attention shifted to the Pacific only after V-E Day. It is often forgotten, however, that significant resources were employed in the Pacific during the 1942 to 1945 period. For example, there were 21 Army divisions in the Pacific theater on V-E Day, the Army had grown to 83 divisions worldwide during the course of the war. Also, more naval forces were employed in the Pacific than in the primary Atlantic-European theater.

While the need to consider sequential theater operations is generated largely by the shortfall in resources, the global impact is blurred, if not hidden, by the untoward emphasis still placed on single regions. For example, USCINCEUR, Commander of the RDJTF, and CINCPAC could consider the use of the same units, supplies, and equipment. Further, all theater commanders draw on the same strategic mobility resources. The need for detailed examination of a worldwide conflict—multiregional planning, and manifest, the impact of having the same forces available for planning to several theaters—must be constantly emphasized. For, despite the new emphasis on global conflict, under the present system more reasoned multiregional planning still may occur only at a time of international crisis.

How such operations will be carried out in the face of an enemy with more than 180 land divisions that can fight on several fronts simultaneously is not clear. Once forces are engaged in, say, Southwest Asia, it would be virtually impossible to disengage those forces and relocate them to Europe. Moreover, strategic mobility resources would already be severely taxed meeting multiple intertheater requirements from the United States, thereby making a major intracontinental relocation above the Eurasian periphery highly unlikely. Therefore, employing major forces in the Persian Gulf early on in a conflict may guarantee failure of defenses in the more vital region—Central Europe. If, alternatively, all the forces were deployed to and engaged in Europe, no significant forces would be available for other theaters, the "vital" nature of Persian Gulf oil notwithstanding.

Military staffs must provide for the concentration of existing forces at all vital locations on the Eurasian continent with the understanding that, once deployed, they probably will not redeploy...
elsewhere, at least in the first few months of a conflict. To do this necessitates ranking US interests worldwide and, in view of the resource shortfall, being willing to expose regions of lesser importance to destruction or occupation if other allied or friendly forces are unavailable or if they fail to sustain a defense.

Consider the following six options for geographically reorienting available land combat forces to concentrate better against those vital regions most susceptible to major Soviet ground invasion. The first option addresses forces for the most recently added task—security of Persian Gulf oil. But, because the strategy-force mismatch now primarily relates to meeting already deficient force requirements for NATO and simultaneously supporting major operations in Southwest Asia, the remaining options will consider how to make Army combat units available to meet these dual regional requirements while taking into account the needs of less important regions and allied-friendly nation capabilities worldwide.

OPTION 1. FORMALLY REDUCE THE US ARMY FORCE COMMITMENT TO NATO

The NATO commitment now coopts the majority of the US general purpose forces, particularly in the Army. Therefore, if one assumes no increase in Army forces to meet global requirements, it is to the NATO commitment that one naturally looks for forces to meet additional tasks such as the defense of Southwest Asia. Other services have already taken this step. To meet Indian Ocean defense requirements, for example, the Navy downgraded one aircraft carrier as a NATO resource and withdrew it from full-time commitment to the Mediterranean in 1980. Inasmuch as the conventional balance favors the East, particularly in land forces, no Army units can be withdrawn from NATO without further degrading European defenses. Therefore, allied capability and will to offset any US force reductions are key considerations. Straight away, it is important to note that the issue here is not one of reducing the US forces now deployed in Europe. Reductions contemplated in this option are from those US Army forces based in the continental United States but committed to reinforce Europe in a crisis.
As pointed out earlier, the Army now has four divisions and six brigades or regiments forward deployed in Europe. (One, the Berlin Brigade, is not committed to NATO.) An additional 15 divisions and 18 brigades or regiments are formally committed to NATO (that is, in the "assigned" or "earmarked" category). Assuming that there are six sets of division equipment in POMCUS and that the United States can deploy rapidly two heavy divisions with their equipment by sea, the Army should meet its D-Day (M + 10) commitment. The forces considered "available" for deployment elsewhere include the 14 divisions in the United States (of which 9 are committed formally to NATO beyond the initial 10-division force).

Any major force commitments outside Europe necessarily will reduce the forces available for NATO, as some contingency forces are also allocated to NATO. Thus, because the United States currently can deploy units drawn from the 3½ Army divisions allocated for planning to Southwest Asia, the US commitment to the Alliance has been reduced already, de facto if not de jure. The Alliance has been on notice since April 1980 about US intentions to deploy major forces to Southwest Asia.1 It would appear prudent and politically important to report this planned degradation to NATO officially in the annual Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). It is politically expedient—but deceptive—to argue that these forces still might go to Central Europe, because the likelihood of a war beginning there is very low indeed. Moreover, some of the allies informally have suggested placing the RDJTF forces in the DPQ "other forces" category (that is, forces that might cooperate with NATO at some future time).

The first reason the United States should make a formal change in its commitment is for clarity of purpose: to leave these RDJTF forces committed to several contingencies is to engage in a "mirror game." Ever since NATO was established, US attempts to encourage significantly increased allied defense efforts have been a signal failure. Indeed the allies have made improvements, but to underscore a point made in chapter two, they have no intention of building an effective conventional defense capability. The commitment of the US strategic nuclear system is, of course, a major obstacle. Another impediment, in my judgment, is the high level of US general purpose forces committed
to European defense. Moreover, in view of the potential for short warning, it is impossible to move more than 15 divisions across the Atlantic in time to influence a decision. A former US ambassador to NATO reported that it was ludicrous to predicate the defense of Europe on reinforcements from the United States. It is possible that a formal reduction in the US commitment might shake the allies out of their lethargy. If not, there is no real loss, since many of these reinforcing units would not be in Europe anyway if a conflict had, in fact, occurred first in Southwest Asia.

With a population base of 222 million, the United States maintains an active duty force of 2 million. The allies (excluding Spain), with a population base of 350 million, maintain 3.2 million soldiers in uniform. The United States and allied ratios of military forces to population are reasonably close for Active Component forces. In gross terms, without factoring out requirements outside Europe, the United States provides 39 percent of the active forces among the NATO Allies. For reserve forces, the United States provides only 19 percent of the overall total, but a utility comparison is striking. With 605,000 personnel, the US Army Reserve Components provide eight divisions and 30 brigades or regiments, of which seven divisions and 24 brigades or regiments deploy to Europe. With 2.1 million (less United States) ground force reserves, the allies produce only two additional divisions (equivalent). Even allowing for rear area security and other support requirements, the allies could organize and equip many additional combat units. Indeed, one of the Long-Term Defense Program measures involves the allies doing just that.

So, after mobilization, the US Army eventually provides almost half the combat divisions (equivalent) in NATO even though the allies are operating from a population base that is larger by 100 million. Apologists for the allies in and out of uniform have clouded this picture by constantly pointing out that the allies now provide 90 percent of the ground force in Europe.

Indeed, the Europeans have purposely not organized their reserve forces into units. To do so might create an effective conventional defense that would, in their view, weaken deterrence. The allies also are concerned that excessive pressure on Europe to form reserve units might undermine the active force structure
in certain countries. And, longstanding bias against reserve forces, in general, among US personnel also poses an obstacle.6

One finds the same general situation when examining defense expenditures. In 1979, with 38.6 percent of the NATO countries' population, the United States provided 58.2 percent of the total defense expenditures. Of all the allies, only West Germany exceeds this population percentage in defense spending.7 The United States provides more than 50 percent of the total NATO defense expenditures, even though the NATO Allies' gross domestic product exceeded that of the United States by $435 billion in 1979.4 Overall, the United States spent 5.2 percent of its gross domestic product for defense in 1979, as opposed to 3.4 percent for the allies. As with the manpower comparisons, the conclusion is clear. Equity dictates significantly increased defense spending on the part of the allies. Yet here again, the allies' apologists often obscure this issue by pointing to declining US defense spending (as a percentage of national output) in the 1970s, or skew the allied effort, for example, by factoring out Canada.9

It appears, then, that the manpower and treasure are available within Alliance resources, not only to organize combat units to replace US divisions, but also to increase overall conventional force capabilities. The allies should take these steps posthaste, US actions notwithstanding.

To separate the current RDJTF from formal NATO commitments, the US Army force commitment would have to be reduced by only one division in the near term. Thus, the replacement impact on allied resources is not great. Over the five-year period, the United States could withdraw two more divisions, thus permitting the allies to phase in their assumption of these responsibilities. The units involved would not detract from the 10-division M + 10 force, but could be drawn from later-deploying divisions that may not significantly influence the outcome of the battle. (See figure 4-1.)

After a temporary dip toward the West when the initial 10 US divisions arrive and if we employ data available in December 1980, we find that the projected massive Soviet buildup quickly returns the Soviet advantage at about 1.7:1 in the Warsaw Pact's

Figure 4-1. Shifting Warsaw Pact/NATO Force Balance: 90 Days Following Post-Mobilization
favor. (Anything exceeding 1.44:1 is considered unfavorable to NATO; anything over 1.62:1 is unacceptable.) Although NATO has made some absolute improvements, the relative advantage of the Warsaw Pact continues to grow. Thus, the larger NATO defense problem, which is outside the context of this study, is far broader than allied replacement of five US divisions.

A common argument usually offered by civilian strategists is that US forces and supplies in Europe are "half-way to the Gulf." It is hard to imagine that the United States would draw any significant forces and equipment from Europe to prepare to engage the Soviet Union in Southwest Asia. Such a move to undermine NATO defenses in Europe at the peak of a major crisis with the Soviet Union would be in neither the US nor the collective Alliance interest. Indeed, in view of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war experience, the allies would express considerable opposition to such diversions. Thus, efforts now to rationalize the US commitment to NATO would permit better planning for the global war case.

Another positive effect of reducing the flow of US reinforcements to NATO would be reduction of the sale of the required European infrastructure, supplies, and equipment for US forces, now woefully underfunded. Support costs for 19 divisions are not insignificant.

All the discussion so far begs the question: How vital is Western Europe to the United States? If Europe is indeed the most vital US interest overseas, should forces be diverted from NATO to other regions? While these issues are more questions of policy than strategy, they relate to the issue at hand. A policy that expands global commitments, without expanding the Army forces to meet the new requirements, forces the issue of global priorities into very sharp relief. For military strategists risk equations must be made regionally and globally, and they must consider drawing down capabilities in some regions to provide at least a modicum of capability in other vital areas. Even though the security of Western Europe is a vital US interest, some reduction in the US Army force commitment to NATO merits serious consideration by our political authorities.

The worst alternative would be to continue the current multiple-tasking of forces for the global war case. This situation
poses no incentive for the allies to face squarely the current inadequacy of existing conventional forces. The units involved dilute precious training time trying to be prepared for vastly different environments. Effective planning for worldwide war is inhibited, and critical decisions for deployments are deferred until a crisis is at hand. Clearly, something must be done. The remaining options suggest ways to make forces available from other global regions to permit the United States to meet force requirements for Southwest Asia while mitigating the impact on NATO.

OPTION 2. CONCENTRATE ARMY ON ITS NATO MISSION AND REASSIGN ITS RDJTF MISSION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

The primary responsibility for the RDJTF ground force mission could be assigned to the US Marine Corps. Assigning an all-Marine Corps force to Southwest Asia could permit the Army to concentrate on the NATO mission. Indeed, the Senate Appropriations Committee has suggested to the Secretary of Defense that the Marine Corps form the core of the RDJTF. The committee noted that "the traditional role of the US Marine Corps and its current force structure have been designed as one appropriate to quick response to crises around the world."

Brigadier General Philip L. Bolte (Retired) recommended a division of responsibilities—specialization—for the Army and the Marine Corps, suggesting that the Army concentrate on NATO and the Marine Corps on non-NATO contingencies. He recognized, however, the need to make the Army responsible for reinforcing the Marine Corps forces for sustained operations.

Such specialization would greatly facilitate the planning task and training requirements for both services. Considering current plans to employ forces drawn from the 3 1/2 Army divisions allocated for planning and 1 1/2 Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF) in Southwest Asia in the near term, the Marine Corps could indeed offset the loss of Army combat forces, perhaps with some degradation in mechanized and armor capability. The Army's NATO commitment would not have to be diminished.

Two of the four (three active, one reserve) Marine Amphi-
bious Forces are committed to NATO; thus, this option would entail elimination of US Marine Corps commitments to European defense. But a de facto reduction in Marine Corps commitments to NATO, similar to that of US Army Forces, has already occurred. The 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, is the initial force that could deploy to Southwest Asia; indeed it is 7th MAB's equipment that is aboard the Near-Term Prepositioned Force at Diego Garcia. A composite or Air Force would follow by sea. If the present strategy is fully implemented, only one composite MAF would be left from the NATO-oriented force, and that with no amphibious shipping, at least early on. Thus, this option would eliminate only the remaining land-bound MAF from the NATO commitment.

Availability of the other Marine Corps forces remains to be examined. These forces include the III MAF which, although traditionally focused on Korea, could be made available for operations in the Persian Gulf. These forces are all trained for operations in Southwest Asia. Now, while the three active MAFs provide roughly the same firepower as the Army-Marine Corps package now considered for Southwest Asia, the Marine Corps also has a reserve division—the 4th Division-Wing Team (DWT).

Apparently suffering from the same antireserve bias as the Army, the 4th Marine DWT lacks equipment and personnel; thus, it cannot form a full-fledged MAF. This division is used to augment and reinforce the three active divisions. After a period of preparation and training, the residual force is available for deployment as a MAB (brigade-size core) with austere organic air support. This tactical air degradation would not necessarily be critical in Southwest Asia, as the Air Force could provide the requisite tactical air support, although perhaps less efficiently than would be the case with organic resources. Nor would the delay in availability be a greater problem than already exists, for the paucity of strategic lift already dictates late deployments for many units.

To sum up the force picture, 3½ MAFs could be made available for deployment to Southwest Asia by eliminating all US Marine Corps support to NATO and South Korea. In view of the severe limitations on the force that would be available in NATO
and the lack of demonstrated need in South Korea, this would appear to be a reasonable alternative. But some Army reinforcement, at least one division, is required to enhance the immediate deterrent effect and to bolster defense against a mechanized and armored attack. The Marine Corps needs heavy units, armored or mechanized, for reinforcement. Thus, it would be prudent to withdraw a mechanized division from NATO and replace it with a light division.

Focusing solely on Southwest Asia for general war would give the Marine Corps a specific mission, something many Marines have long sought. The Marine Corps traditionally has assumed responsibilities worldwide. As Francis J. West, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), has stated, "It is difficult to discuss the Marine Corps in terms of a central threat." "This lack of specific focus poses difficulties for organization and training, but supporters of a global orientation point up the flexibility gained by such a deliberate nonspecialization. As the Navy Secretary said, "The flexibility, readiness, and the 'strike force' character of the Marine Corps represents the epitome of the global operation of maneuver warfare."

A heavier Marine Corps orientation also would enhance the RDJTF's forcible entry capability (assuming increases in amphibious lift). At present, Army forces must assume a benign environment for initial deployments (notwithstanding a limited brigade-size parachute drop capability); even the 7th MAB equipment aboard the Near Term Prepositioned Force requires benign environment for delivery. (Indeed, Marines take exception to calling the NTPF a 'Force.') Marine Corps control would change the character of the planning and preparations, perhaps including the consolidation now in the Pacific (if not the Indian Ocean) of essentially all available amphibious shipping. One might even argue for afloat MAB in the Indian Ocean region in place of the smaller Marine Amphibious Unit. Such planning would undertaken programs to increase the US amphibious assault capability which is now seriously deficient. Currently, while the US capability of lifting 1½ MAFs is touted, "the Marine Corps would be hard pressed to conduct an amphibious landing with the assault echelon of a MAF, or with a single MAB equipped for sustained operations. In addition, the fleet of 61 ships potentially
available for amphibious operations is declining because replacements are not being built rapidly enough.

Advocates of global flexibility might argue that if this valuable asset were concentrated in one theater, the Soviets would be relieved of the requirement for planning to counteract Marine Corps forces elsewhere. But the facts do not bear out this view. In the event of a US-Soviet crisis involving the Persian Gulf, selected Marine Corps forces may be deployed to the Gulf via all available amphibious shipping. Upon arrival, the forces might or might not conduct an amphibious assault. During this critical period of approximately 30 to 45 days, no amphibious lift would be available for use elsewhere. Regardless of Commander, RDJTF needs, the amphibious ships could not be redeployed to another theater without a long, slow transit (at this stage, one assumes the Suez Canal would be closed), and the naval escort forces would not be available in the early weeks after D-Day. Once the United States is seriously engaged with Soviet forces in any single theater, the idea of global flexibility for Marine Corps forces does not hold up if rapid response is part of the equation. Moreover, the Commander, RDJTF would presumably fight hard to retain the amphibious lift in the Gulf area to enhance his flexibility.

Staff officers at Marine Corps Headquarters argue that Marine Corps units should be employed in support of the naval campaign—that it is wrong to weigh two alternatives, NATO or Southwest Asia, both of which imply misuse of Marine Corps capabilities. This is a valid doctrinal criticism, but the national military strategy already considers the employment of significant Marine Corps resources in Southwest Asia on a sustained basis against Soviet forces.

The option under consideration here begins with the recognition that there are 3½ MAFs available, but amphibious lift for only an assault echelon MAF. How are these forces to be employed in a worldwide war? It is hardly likely that in a general war with vital security interests in jeopardy any combat forces would be kept out of action awaiting the arrival of amphibious shipping. The paucity of amphibious lift and Army resources means that the Marine Corps very likely would be massed in a
major conflict. There are indeed some missions in support of the naval campaign, such as island or choke-point security, that do not require amphibious lift. But these missions would tie up the Marine Corps forces much as the Southwest Asia commitment does. This is the reason the Marine Corps seeks early Army relief from such tasks as island security. This study deals with the realities of the strategy-force mismatch, not doctrine; we should point out that although it may be desirable, permanently employing Marine Corps forces misuses their capabilities. There is some truth to this point, but in a nip-and-tuck global conflict, all forces will be employed to accomplish national objectives. In Korea and Vietnam, Marine Corps forces were employed inland for sustained operations exactly as the Army was.

The political impact resulting from the removal of Marine Corps forces from Northeast Asia is another issue. In the early stages of a worldwide war, Japan would be under heavy pressure from the Kremlin and the West; thus the possibility of a neutral Japan (and China) cannot be discounted. At this critical juncture, it will be important for the United States to maintain a military presence in the Western Pacific, particularly with naval forces. If the majority of the Pacific Fleet's surface forces were occupied elsewhere, it would be difficult to provide such a presence, at least in the early weeks of the war. If the III MAF forces redeploy to Southwest Asia, the US ground combat presence would be anchored by the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, which is not necessarily perceived as a regional strategic force. It will thus be highly desirable to recover a significant naval presence in the Western Pacific as soon as possible.

The most serious problem with this option is Marine Corps organization. A MAF is simply not organized and equipped for sustained operations against a sophisticated mechanized force. Building a stronger, yet mobile, antitank capability and establishing a more enduring logistical support capability would be required (Army reinforcement notwithstanding). But this issue, again, is far larger than operations in Southwest Asia. Many potential enemy forces worldwide now have mechanized and armor forces. Thus, the Marine Corps has recognized and has already taken steps to increase its firepower and enhance its antitank capability.
The main issue here is one of degree. The Marine Corps will always give primacy to rapid deployment that affects the nature of its organization and equipment. The idea of "heavying up" is unacceptable to Marine Corps authorities. The Corps seeks to retain a tie to the amphibious assault, which since the Korean War emphasizes air-transportable equipment and the helicopter assault. Clearly, the Marine Corps does not want to become another land army. Although rapid deployment and heavier forces create a serious dilemma, it is not insurmountable. The Army is dealing with the same issue, for neither the Army nor the Marine Corps now possesses an adequate capability. This option suggests concentrating the Southwest Asia ground defense effort primarily in the Marine Corps.

**OPTION 3. REPLACE THE 2D INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA**

The option of withdrawing a US Army unit from South Korea would not necessarily involve a reduction in US ground forces, but would potentially change the type of forces and perhaps cause a relocation. Indeed, after visiting with North Korean leaders, including Kim Il-sung, Representative Stephen J. Solarz concluded that "in the absence of a significant reduction of tensions in Korea and/or the establishment of an acceptable and indigenous balance of power between the two Koreas, it would be a mistake to withdraw our forces from South Korea." The issue is whether the United States can afford to leave a much-needed Army combat unit in a region of lesser priority for deterrence when serious risks exist in more vital regions.

The United States clearly intends to remain a Pacific—as opposed to an Asian—power; East Asia and the Pacific form an integral security region in the US global security matrix. The nation will maintain some presence in, and capacity to operate on, the Asian Continent.

At the same time, the United States views Europe and Southwest Asia as more important to its national security than Korea or Northeast Asia in general. Thus, regional adjustments should be supportable if they enhance the US position in other
more important areas—thereby improving the US position vis-a-vis the Soviets globally—without significantly degrading the US position in Asia. Improvement of overall global flexibility should enhance US security.

Since 1971, the only US ground troops stationed near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Korea have been one battalion of the 2d Infantry Division to provide support for the Military Armistice Commission Headquarters area and a small detachment with the United Nations Command Infantry Division, strategically positioned between the DMZ and Seoul and the only remaining US ground combat force in Korea. Only 30 kilometers from the DMZ, the capital city is practically within North Korean artillery range. In 1950 Seoul was seized by the North Koreans in only three days, so the requirement for major ground troops north of Seoul is obvious.

The US role in Korea is an excellent manifestation of the Nixon Doctrine under which the South Koreans provide the bulk of the military manpower, backed by US air, naval, and logistical support. Since the departure of the 7th Infantry Division in 1971, the 2d Infantry Division has been in strategic reserve. The South Korean Army has improved over the past decade, and the role of the US ground force has come to be viewed by some observers as primarily one of deterrence. Understandably, this view is disputed by some current and former US Army leaders in Korea. Notwithstanding such objections, a 14,000-strength division is quantitatively insignificant compared to the half-million South Korean ground forces, which are backed by a reserve force of 1.1 million. Moreover, South Korean authorities stated in 1970 that, with proper assistance, by 1975 their country could handle its own defense. Again, in 1975, President Park stated that in four to five years South Korea would be able to defend itself without US support.

In a time of crisis, the major outside need is for US air and naval forces and logistical support. Some additional US Army forces might be deployed to Korea in a unilateral contingency, as practiced in the Team Spirit exercise series. But such deployments in a worldwide conflict would require degradations elsewhere. However, elements of III MAF could stage forward to
Korea from Okinawa and Hawaii as part of the naval force. Whether this move would actually take place would depend on the situation at the time. Now some of these Marine Corps forces are also committed to Southwest Asia, but conceivably, the division could be available for reinforcement of Korea partly because the forces would not arrive en masse; however, they have no viable mission early on.

Furthermore, in a global conflict, regions with higher priority would coopt all the strategic airlift and sealift, including amphibious shipping. No US strategic lift would be available to move the Marine Corps forces forward to Korea. Korean airlift and sealift could be used, but the Koreans have sufficient amphibious shipping to move only 2,500 personnel, a battalion landing team. Even under the best conditions, these forces would dribble into Korea. This problem could be solved by stationing III MAF in Korea permanently.

Because the most serious ground force shortfall worldwide is in US Army forces, stationing the requisite Marine Corps forces in Korea permanently would permit relocation of the 2d Infantry Division, thus making it available for higher priority requirements in Southwest Asia or Europe. The current 2d Infantry Division organization is unique, the result of peninsular geography and evolutionary force reductions. Its three brigades include only seven battalions: two armored, two mechanized, and three infantry. In addition, an air cavalry squadron is available that could be used as a maneuver unit. Thus, a light Marine amphibious force of six battalions might provide more firepower than the Army division, especially with the MAF's organic tactical air element. Indeed, the most pressing immediate reinforcement requirement in Korea is for tactical air support.

Such an exchange in forces would enable senior US policymakers to address the issue of where to station the US ground force. Political authorities have long been concerned that placing US ground troops between the DMZ and Seoul would make US involvement in any conflict automatic, eliminating any opportunity for national-level consideration. It is, of course, the very placement of the 2d Infantry Division that enhances deterrence on the peninsula. And other US personnel remain in the
DMZ; about 200 US personnel who might not be withdrawn early on in a crisis are involved in supporting the joint security area.

While a small US force is required in the DMZ to support the joint security area, it might be desirable to locate the main body of the Marine Corps force in P'ohang, well to the south of Seoul, with South Korean marine forces. This relocation would significantly enhance the training opportunities for the US units. US Marine Corps forces on Okinawa have been experiencing increasing constraints on their training, something they would not obtain in Korea. The III MAF units now eagerly seek opportunities to deploy forward to Korea for training. Even if the force were to occupy the northern facilities vacated by the 2d Infantry Division (the cheaper alternative), they would still be able to conduct training far superior to that available in Okinawa. Also, South Korean marine units are stationed in the North on the Kimpo Peninsula, near the 2d Infantry Division facilities.

Locating the replacement forces south of Seoul might affect the deterrence equation, but not altogether negatively over the long term. The likelihood of not engaging US ground troops (other than United Nations Command and Military Armistice Commission support forces) immediately could lower deterrence (although a small US Marine Corps force would probably be near the DMZ). But the change would serve to drive South Korea to seek independent capabilities more quickly. As former Premier Kim Chong-pliJ stated in 1972, "The US troops now stationed in our country will return home sooner or later. This means that we must defend our country through our own strength." 24

Historically, the reversal of the Carter withdrawal plan will probably be seen as a temporary ebbing in the long-term ground force withdrawal from Korea. Placing the Marine Corps force south of Seoul could be viewed as a "next step" on the slow withdrawal process. Regardless of Reagan administration statements to the contrary, the Koreans see such a withdrawal as inevitable.25 If the move is made gradually and if it is properly coordinated, Japan would likely support it as well. But the withdrawal issue exceeds the timeframe of the option under consideration here and is only directly related to the basing option.
Without question, under this option the Marine Corps forces located in South Korea would be less flexible, but as we have seen, mobility resources are inadequate to give these forces global flexibility anyway. Moreover, the battalions in Korea would probably operate there on a rotational basis, thereby ensuring that all forces receive periodic amphibious training.

As for the question of financing, some cost sharing with regional states might be worked out, although direct Japanese financial support for military activities in Korea would have to be avoided. Such support would help to offset the grumbling in Congress about defense burden sharing. Moreover, there might be a reduction in the US presence on Okinawa unless the 2d Infantry Division were relocated there.

Since this study concerns Army forces, the focus in this option is on making the 2d Infantry Division available for requirements of higher priority. In other words, the issue is whether the United States can afford to leave the division dispositioned where it is not needed for defense while defense of more vital interests hangs in the balance. One could argue that the III MAF force is available to deploy elsewhere (as in the previous option). But Marine Corps forces are less capable of handling a direct confrontation with Soviet mechanized and armored units in other regions than they are of operating against North Korean forces in terrain less suitable for mechanized operations. Moreover, were the Pohang basing option to be selected and a crisis occur, withdrawing the entire force for deployment elsewhere (even operationally within Korea) would be far easier than disengaging the 2d Infantry Division from its forward positions. In the midst of a major crisis, however, particularly if conflict were to break out on the peninsula, the South Korean Government would undoubtedly oppose the withdrawal of any combat forces from Korea. The Soviets may encourage Kim Il-sung to attack for exactly this purpose—to tie down US resources.

The potential benefits, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division from Korea, would precipitate serious political undercurrents in Northeast Asia, particularly in Korea. The sensitivity demonstrated about this issue essentially precludes any major changes without political damage.
OPTION 4. RELY ON STATES IN THE REGION FOR GROUND FORCES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

Another option for reducing commitments for US Army forces in Southwest Asia is to rely on states in the region for ground forces. Requirements for US forces to counter a Soviet incursion in Southwest Asia are the greatest potential drain on the NATO commitments. As we have seen, if an emergency develops in Southwest Asia involving a serious Soviet threat, the United States is now considering the deployment of Army forces drawn primarily from the three divisions allocated for planning in the region. If such a contingency were to precede a direct threat to NATO, these forces would not be available for deployment to Europe. Moreover, it is undesirable to divert more than token European-oriented combat units, US or allied, away from Central Europe while NATO remains inferior to the Warsaw Pact.

In the event the United States were to rely on states in the region for the bulk of the ground force, it would be reasonable to expect that the full spectrum of US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps forces might still be deployed to Southwest Asia, and that US-sponsored command and control and logistical support would be provided. Without such support, defense against a Soviet invasion would be impossible in any case. Furthermore, regardless of the primacy of its involvement, the United States naturally seeks the widest possible support for, and participation in, operations against Soviet forces. If selected regional states were to provide all or even a portion of the required ground forces, and thereby reduce US requirements, the impact on the direct defense of Europe would be reduced. (It is understood that any operations outside Europe will affect NATO to some degree because, at minimum, logistical support would be diverted from that region.)

Operating alone, military units from regional states cannot directly confront Soviet first-line units successfully. But with the requisite training and modern equipment, US tactical support, and the advantages of rugged terrain, selected regional units might be able to perform reasonably effectively. The performance of the mujahedin in Afghanistan against Soviet forces is instructive in this regard.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR US ARMY FORCES

Since it is close by and has an army of 470,000 (17 divisions and 19 additional brigades), Turkey would appear to be a likely candidate to provide forces for operations in Iran against a Soviet invasion. (Some of these units are understrength and poorly equipped.) However, as was pointed out in chapter 2, Turkish authorities have ruled out participation in such a conflict, except as part of NATO. Moreover, in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, Turkey would expect to be fully engaged defending its own territory on NATO's southern flank. Thus, we must look elsewhere for potential replacements for US Army divisions.

Table 4-1 depicts other potential regional sources for ground combat units. The most distant country, Egypt, is a possibility. With 10 divisions, Egypt might be willing to allocate a portion of these forces for operations in Iran if provided strategic lift and supported logistically by the United States. But the expected Soviet control of the Eastern Mediterranean might embolden the Libyans to act against Egypt, in concert with Soviet naval operations. Thus, some Egyptian forces would be required to defend along the Libyan border.

Considering the Libyan threat (an army of 45,000, organized into 12 armored and 24 mechanized infantry battalions, a national guard battalion, and 2,600 main battle tanks), the Egyptians would probably want to retain at least half of their army divisions at home. Thus, planners could count on one armored, one mechanized, and three infantry divisions from Egypt as being available for operations in Iran. Moreover, while heavy units are desirable in Iran, infantry divisions are more easily and rapidly deployed. The distance involved is the same as for US forces that would use Egyptian bases. Major efficiencies would result if even a portion of the planned deployment of US units to the region from the continental United States were not required.

In May 1961, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman formed the Gulf Cooperation Council, a collective regional defense system. The council is said to include a joint military strike force, a collective air defense system, and a joint military command. Although domestic violence and threats from the Islamic revolution in Iran contributed to establishment of the council, it was also a response to the So-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army Strength</th>
<th>Major Army Combat Formations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>235,000</td>
<td>Divisions: 3 armored, 2 mechanized, 5 infantry, 10 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>About 4 brigades (equivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion, 1 armored carrier squadron, 1 brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>3 brigades (equivalent), 1 armored battalion, 4 infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1 armored battalion, 4 infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>About 4 brigades (equivalent), 6 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Divisions: 2 armored, 2 mechanized, 1 brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Divisions: 2 armored, 2 infantry, 4 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>Divisions: 4 armored, 4 mechanized, 4 maintenance, additional brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>Divisions: 11 armored, 55 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>Divisions: 2 armored, 16 infantry, 8 brigades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

viet invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, the regional states share a common interest in countering the growth of Soviet influence in the region, notwithstanding their desire to downplay ties with the United States. Therefore, the member states might be willing to cooperate in planning to counter a Soviet incursion into Iran, perhaps in conjunction with planning to counter the threat posed by Khomeini.

In the absence of an immediate external threat, the United Arab Emirates might provide one division (equivalent), with only light armored vehicles, for Iranian operations. These forces are primarily controlled by Abu Dhabi. But analysts do not consider them to be an effective fighting force, and internal turmoil in the United Arab Emirates makes any external deployments highly unlikely. Although some observers are optimistic about the future of this collective, others are pessimistic to the point of predicting that the United Arab Emirates will be one of the first Gulf states to succumb to radical pressures. Therefore, no United Arab Emirates units are considered available for operations in Iran.

Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman together might provide another division equivalent. But Bahrain and Qatar have very limited military capabilities, and Bahrain, in particular, harbors a significant radical element in its society. Hence it might be better not to promote a major conventional force buildup in these two countries, the only ones in the region not caught up in the arms race (although Bahrain contracted for its first jet fighter in early 1982). Kuwait has only one armored brigade with "even a token military capability against a nation like Iraq or Iran." Because Kuwait is primarily concerned about the Iraqi threat, it is unlikely that any Kuwaiti forces would be made available for operations in Iran. This leaves Oman, the only country other than Iraq and Iran with forces that have combat experience. Omani forces are well supported and are advised by some 600 British military personnel. However, it is likely the Sultan will focus on the threat from South Yemen, which has an army of 22,000 organized in 1 armored brigade, 11 cadre infantry brigades, and 1 cadre marine brigade. Thus, among these remaining Gulf states, it would not be prudent to plan for any combat formations for Iranian operations.
Saudi Arabia would probably best concentrate available combat forces on interior defense, particularly the oilfields, guarding against possible incursions from Iraq and South Yemen. Thus, only a token Saudi force should be counted on for combined operations in Iran.

The next major source of ground combat power is Jordan. However, like Egypt, Jordan would be concerned about immediate territorial defense, in this instance against Syria. The Syrian Army consists of 170,000 men organized into four armored and two mechanized divisions and four additional brigades. Thus, assuming the Syrian threat persists, Jordan would want to keep most of its combat formations at home. One Jordanian mechanized division might be made available for Iran, and if Israel were to position its forces against the Syrian border, a Jordanian armored division might be made available.

Iraq could be a prime source for ground forces, notwithstanding the destruction of several divisions in the war with Iran in 1982. However, Iraq’s political alignment cannot be determined now; thus, no Iraqi forces are factored into the current equation as being available to operate against Soviet formations in Iran. If a Soviet invasion were to cause Iraq to shift alignment to the West, Iraqi divisions would add significantly to the defense effort. However, Iran would not be expected to permit the deployment of Iraqi forces on Iranian territory. Although the Iraqi forces performed poorly in sustained operations against Iran, they have gained important combat experience. Undoubtedly, US logistical support would be required, but the United States would experience great difficulty in helping those nations equipped with Soviet Bloc matériel.

Iran probably would oppose a Soviet invasion with not only the regular forces shown in table 4-1 but also its 400,000 reserves and 75,000 paramilitary forces. Thus, although Iran’s participation has not been factored into this equation, it is possible that it might solicit outside assistance and cooperate in a defense effort. In view of the US logistical relationship that existed with the shah, it would be somewhat easier for the United States to support Iranian forces equipped with US matériel than to support others in the region, such as Iraq.
The potential sensitivity of the Arab-Israeli situation precludes the planned use of Israeli ground combat formations outside that nation's borders. This is unfortunate, as they are the elite force in the region. These forces could, however, be used indirectly, as indicated earlier, to "free up" Arab units. Israeli formations also could be pooled as a strategic reserve for a "last ditch" defense when regional sensitivities might be disregarded.

Finally, Pakistan appears to be the other major regional source of ground forces; indeed, some Pakistani units are already in Saudi Arabia. But employment of Pakistani forces against the Soviets in Iran would undoubtedly precipitate Soviet strikes against, and perhaps an invasion of, Pakistan. Such an outcome would be a highly undesirable one, considering the difficulty the United States would experience in helping to defend Pakistan in a worldwide war. The best option would seem to be to encourage Pakistan to see to its own national defense. Thus, no Pakistani forces are considered available for operations against Soviet forces outside Pakistan.

In summary, six divisions—five Egyptian, and one (possibly two) Jordanian—might be available to be employed against a Soviet incursion in the region, in lieu of US Army units. Moreover, Iranian and Iraqi units might cooperate. With US command and control, training, deployment assistance, and logistical support, together with US Marine Corps units to bolster the line, these regional formations might be able to operate reasonably well. Planning for such combined operations would help to solidify US-Arab relations and significantly enhance the US regional position. Indeed, if a sufficient prehostilities strategic consensus were reached, planning for such a combined defense would aid the US position immeasurably. Further, such planning for land defense naturally follows and complements current US efforts to develop a regional air defense.

Unfortunately, any early consensus about the Soviet threat is unlikely. Thus, cooperative defense efforts should focus now on intraregional threats, a position the Reagan administration appears to be shifting to already. Concentrating on the intraregional threat removes the necessity to press for an anti-Soviet strategic consensus and lends, ironically, to shift attention from
Israel. (However, some accommodation in the Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine is essential for stability in the region.) This new focus does not mean that previous US efforts should be dropped, but rather that US activities directed against countering Soviet influence should be given less visibility.

Focusing on the intraregional problem is dangerous. With the RDJTF Headquarters as the primary planning agent for the region, it may appear that the emphasis is shifting to US intervention planning. But this shift may be counterproductive. The RDJTF will be forever tainted as a US force d'intervention. Thus, the US leadership must be sophisticated and maintain low visibility; US involvement should be tied to regional defense efforts. One observer has wisely counseled a "looser posture," not tying ourselves to any particular regime.

One sensitive aspect of using regional forces for the role contemplated is that the support and participation are desirable, whether or not US Army forces are deployed to the region. In the near term although the Army is considering the deployment of forces drawn from the 3 1/2 divisions allocated for planning, regional forces could completely offset US Army formations in numbers and perhaps in firepower (considering the type of units to be deployed) if not in quality and reliability. Admittedly, in a crisis it may be desirable to deploy a US Army division rapidly to the region for deterrent purposes. But it would not seem necessary to deploy follow-on US Army combat formations, assuming regional states would support the concept. With the 82d Airborne Division (which is not committed to NATO) as the lead element, no degradation of the formal US Army commitment to NATO would appear to be necessary.

It is important to note that the mission for these forces would be to interdict and blunt the movement south of Soviet formations. Like the US forces, these forces would primarily serve to deter a Soviet invasion and if that were to fail would counter the attack and seek to dissuade the Soviets from continuing south. Such operations, including delaying actions, are more in line with regional military capabilities backed by US support.

It may be possible to secure support from Japan and from European allies to finance the upgrading of selected regional
forces for the role contemplated. If such a program were undertaken, regional forces could offset the out-year projection for US Army forces.

Offering British, French, and possibly US military advisers to the regional armed forces involved in the postulated combined defense planning could serve as a supporting initiative. The option offers an excellent opportunity for increasing allied involvement in the Southwest Asia defense effort. In addition, certain countries in the region have a role to play in military assistance. In the past Egypt has provided advisers to North Yemen. Jordan is now advising Oman’s internal security forces, and Saudi Arabia has considered replacing US advisers with representatives from Turkey and Pakistan. The United States should support these highly laudatory initiatives. They permit the United States not only to maintain a low visibility but to coopt selected states into the regional defense effort, e.g., Turkey. In combination with the previously mentioned security assistance programs, these activities should expand the Western presence in the region thereby enhancing US influence. Moreover, in the framework of an overall global strategy, this concept is entirely in accord with the US policy of exploiting allied and other friendly capabilities.

This option carries a potential danger. Because the most probable threat to regional stability is internal unrest rather than Soviet aggression, expanding the military forces in the region may have a destabilizing influence. Although the option would free US Army forces to concentrate on NATO, excessive military buildup within Southwest Asia could precipitate the very crisis the United States seeks to avoid. But the regional arms race is already underway, and it would seem to be in the West’s interest to seek to influence military developments in the region. Only modest force goals should be promoted, however, to bolster Western interests while not undermining the current modicum of stability.
OPTION 5. DO NOT RETAIN US ARMY COMBAT UNITS
IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

Access to the Panama Canal is no longer considered vital because the largest warships and tankers can no longer make the transit. The current buildup in US naval forces further reduces its importance. The canal does, however, remain important to the US economy and national security, particularly in a worldwide war; thus, security of the canal is a key issue. Nevertheless, the issue must be considered and the risk evaluated relative to other regional requirements.

The US Army is now responsible for the land defense of the Panama Canal. (It requested by Panama, the Army could also assume responsibility for security of the new oil pipeline that traverses the country.) The threat to the canal includes potential air strikes from Cuban aircraft (refueled in Nicaragua) and Soviet submarines, but the main land challenge is sabotage or small guerrilla teams. The ground force problem is essentially one of local security around specific key points, such as dams, the narrow canal passages, and the locks. These points are critical because the equipment is one-of-a-kind, any serious damage would be difficult to repair. Replacement parts for the locks would have to be fabricated. If a ship were sunk in one of the narrow passages, several days would be required to clear the route.

For canal defense, the 193d Infantry Brigade is permanently stationed in Panama. The brigade is organized with one mechanized and two infantry battalions, one infantry battalion has one airborne-qualified company. In a major crisis, the 193d Brigade could be joined by other forces, the Army has yet another unit located in the Caribbean region, the 92d Separate Infantry Brigade, Puerto Rican National Guard.

With Panama itself, the only indigenous ground force is the Guardia National, 10 rifle companies. Three of these companies operate in the vicinity of the canal. The United States has long sought to expand the Guardia National into a more traditional army organization—something that could be more important as the expected United States departure in 1999 draws closer. But the Guardia National is primarily a political, and only secondarily
STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR US ARMY FORCES

a military, organization. The Panamanian authorities appear reluctant to reorient the organization that undergirds governmental authority.

One observer has estimated that two military police battalions could handle the canal security task. The "presence" role of the 193d Infantry Brigade constitutes another issue. Indeed, the role of Army forces is very important throughout Latin America, so the presence of US Army forces in Panama carries more weight with regional authorities than the presence of other service forces. It is therefore important that no effort be made to withdraw the brigade from its normal peacetime presence mission, particularly in the aftermath of the Falklands crisis. In other than a general war, US forces would probably best fulfill general peacetime missions.

In a worldwide war, however, we must question the prudence of deploying separate infantry brigades in the Caribbean region for low-risk security tasks while defense of the West's position in Europe and Southwest Asia hangs in the balance. This is not to argue that the Western Hemisphere is less important—indeed, it ranks ahead of Eurasia; the suggestion here is to weigh the risks involved in the several theaters from a global perspective. What are the alternatives?

Having secured full sovereignty over all Panamanian territory, the government of Panama certainly wants to improve its national defense capability. However, local authorities have been reluctant to make the changes US authorities deem necessary. In view of the treaty requirement for a US withdrawal by the end of the century, more attention will have to be given to Panamanian defense capabilities during a global crisis, notwithstanding recommendations herein regarding the wartime redeployment of the 193d Infantry Brigade. With a population of two million, Panama has the demographic base to support an expanded defense force. The major problem will be financial.

Other states in Latin America have a vested interest in defense of the canal, for they all derive great economic benefit from a smoothly operating canal. But there is probably no single international agency that would be willing to coordinate canal de-
fense, and Panama might oppose a proposal for one as interfering with its national prerogatives.

The Rio Treaty does obligate member states to come to the aid of other signatories in the event of a threat from outside the hemisphere. The problem for the United States is convincing Latin governments that a threat exists. The Organization of American States is an unlikely possibility; it is not a military alliance. Its organization provides for a defense committee, but by design, it has never been convened. The history of the Organization of American States clearly points to a continued political orientation for that body in the future. The Inter-American Defense Board does indeed have a planning mission for the region, and it has examined the canal defense issue in general terms. But the board, also, by design has no implementation body or authority. Any efforts toward better regional defense coordination will undoubtedly have to be worked through US leadership on a bilateral or selected multilateral basis.

Table 4-2 identifies a number of potential regional sources, other than Panama, for ground forces to replace the US brigades planned for canal and regional defense. Venezuela is already involved in regional defense planning with the United States; for example, in early 1982 the United States decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to Venezuela. Unfortunately, Venezuela and Panama were vociferous opponents of the United States during the Falklands crisis. Yet, the Venezuelan Government is very concerned about the expanding threat from Cuba and has a major defense improvement program underway. With the army forces currently available, Venezuela could easily replace US forces in the canal security role and assume security responsibilities for critical facilities in the Antilles chain outside Puerto Rico. Within the Antilles, security is geographically compatible, enabling Venezuela to organize a coordinated joint air, naval, and ground force defense effort in the Antilles subregion. The canal defense role could be coordinated with Colombia. Developing these interrelated functions would be an excellent way to expand the defense effort for the entire region.

The next possibility is Colombia, ideally suited geographically to help defend the canal. The Colombian Army also has
## Table 4-2. Potential Participants in a Panama Canal Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Active Army Strength</th>
<th>Major Combat Formations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>1 armored brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 cavalry battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 mechanized battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11 infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 ranger battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>10 infantry brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 ranger battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 airborne battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>6 divisions (nominal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 horse cavalry regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 airborne battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 presidential guard battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 independent companies (cadre battalion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>12 divisions (brigade size)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 presidential guard cavalry division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 armored reconnaissance squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>182,750</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 infantry brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 jungle battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>6 armored cavalry regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 infantry brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 mountain brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 jungle brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>7 cavalry regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24 infantry regiments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

forces extant, fully capable of replacing US forces in Panama during a major global crisis. Although Colombia would probably agree to provide assistance in defense of the canal, Panama might oppose the presence of Colombian forces on its territory, in view of their history. But such sensitivity could likely be overcome in the event of a serious threat to the canal.

Ecuador and Peru, on the Pacific side, have forces suitable for assisting in the ground security roles, but neither country is likely to dispatch forces to Panama. Ecuador’s primary security concern is a continuing border dispute with Peru, and Peru must look to protecting its border with Ecuador and the Bolivian-Chilean border in the south. Canal security, although important, ranks behind these more immediate security problems.

Brazil, Argentina, and Chile all have significant numbers of army units capable of performing the security role in Panama, but because Panama is more Central America/Caribbean oriented, it is unlikely that these countries would be invited to participate in the canal defense role. Argentina, particularly, is not likely to engage in any highly visible planning efforts over the near term that involve the United States.

The best alternative embraces aggressively upgrading Panamanian capabilities for unilateral canal defense and promoting a collective subregional defense effort with Colombia and Venezuela in a reinforcing role. Colombia would cover the Pacific side and Venezuela the Atlantic quarter. If the border dispute between Colombia and Venezuela prevents such collaboration, a joint Panamanian-Venezuelan effort is an alternative. If the external threat increases (perhaps small units infiltrate into Panama directly from Cuba or overland from Nicaragua), Panama might call for outside reinforcements. Such a collective endeavor is exactly the platform needed to build up a regionwide defense. A defense effort like this would require significant US military assistance and an agreement providing US logistical support to any forces committed operationally. However, Panama would certainly have a veto over the forces selected to participate in operations on its territory.

To make this collective defense effort hang together, the United States must maintain a “presence” in the region and pro-
vide the wherewithal and leadership, but three combat infantry brigades are not necessary for this purpose, particularly during a worldwide conflict. Without question, Army forces have a unique role in Latin America. But many US units, including Army forces, would probably be operating in and staging through the region in a major crisis, all of which would reinforce the "presence" mission.

For similar reasons, security must be provided for facilities in Puerto Rico. In a worldwide conflict, Puerto Rico would undoubtedly be a target for subversion and terrorist attacks. But in view of the more serious situation in Europe and Southwest Asia, it is not unreasonable to consider passing the local security mission along to local police authorities. What may be necessary is establishing a militia for the island, similar to those state forces organized in the United States during World War II after the National Guard was mobilized.31

A more serious problem concerns the threat from Cuba and the possible need to invade the island to remove that threat. In the worldwide war scenario this study considers, the United States might very well carry out operations against Cuba. The importance of this requirement will have to be weighed against other global demands.42 It is also possible that regional states could provide the ground forces to commit against the Castro regime if a land campaign were directed.

The discussion so far assumes a compatibility of interests between the United States and Latin America regarding the Soviet threat. In fact, Latin American states are seeking to avoid involvement in the superpower confrontation.43 The Falklands crisis created a cleavage that will persist for a long time. Like Japan, the Latin American states might remain neutral in the event of global war.44

Nevertheless, while "deep poverty and political repression at home" are more responsible than ideology is for regional strife, many Latin American countries do fear the threat posed by Soviet-supported Cuba. The United States must use this common concern to develop a regional defense capability that can be exploited for local contingencies and global war. In a broader
context, the administration already is considering the use of Latin American industrial capacity to augment limited national resources during a mobilization. Militarily, regardless of whether a collective security arrangement evolves, the United States may not be able to leave critical combat forces in the region during a global war.

In all, the United States could divert from one to three infantry brigades, acclimated to warm weather, from the Caribbean region to handle more important tasks. As with the option of relying on states in Southwest Asia, this alternative is in accord with the national command authorities' efforts to exploit fully the capabilities of the Allies and other friendly nations. The military assistance and logistical support entailed would be a cheap price to pay for an evolving regional defense effort that would permit the United States to play an economy-of-force role in the region.

**OPTION 6: DO NOT REINFORCE ALASKA WITH GROUND FORCES**

At present the Army has permanently stationed the 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska, along with the famous Alaskan Scouts. In a major conflict, the United States could reinforce Alaska from the continental United States. The issue is whether the threat justifies such reinforcement, that is, whether the reinforcing unit would not be better employed elsewhere.

The ground threat the Soviets pose to Alaskan territory is generally limited to small teams of naval infantry or regular army forces, with limited air support. The Soviets probably would not seek to secure a major lodgment on North America.

The 172d Infantry Brigade (whose headquarters are in Fort Richardson, Alaska) is organized as three infantry battalions (including one airborne company in each battalion). The Alaskan Scouts, actually the 207th Infantry Group (Scout), Army National Guard, include more than 2,000 personnel organized into five scout battalions, each averaging almost 400 personnel. With light weapons and special communications equipment, this force can cover vast amounts of territory, primarily on foot (like the
STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR US ARMY FORCES

172d Infantry Brigade. Nonorganic aviation assets that can lift a company are available in Alaska, but this capability is very limited, given the territory to be covered. However, considering the extreme environmental conditions, the limited threat, and the greater risk in Europe and Southwest Asia these forces would seem to be adequate.

But, the vastness of the region and the fact that it is US territory support the need for additional ground forces to protect vital facilities and lines of communications. The Alaskan oil pipeline could be especially important if access to Saudi oil were to be cut off. From a global perspective, however, other theaters are subject to far greater risks than Alaska faces, so reinforcement of Alaska’s defenses seems problematical. Although the United States might need to make other arrangements in the event the situation in the Pacific theater deteriorates, particularly in the region adjacent to Alaska, Alaskan reinforcements should be focused elsewhere.

OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON OPTIONS

Clearly, we have options for better using US Army forces in a global war, especially for forces countering a Soviet invasion of Southwest Asia. If Europe and Southwest Asia are considered alone, NATO commitments must be reduced to meet requirements for Southwest Asia. A Southwest Asian focus for the US Marine Corps, however, would permit the Army to concentrate on European defense.

From a global perspective, more than two divisions (equivalent) could be withdrawn or reoriented from Latin America, Alaska, or Korea. This includes the one to two divisions remaining in the continental United States as a strategic reserve. In addition, with training and support the states in Southwest Asia could augment US forces with at least six divisions.
5. A GLOBAL VIEW

FEW PEOPLE enjoy thinking about the difficult decisions that will be required in a major crisis. Much of this reluctance to tackle the tough questions is due to the wide gap between strategy and forces, the result of allowing the US defense establishment to atrophy for many years. But strategy involves making the tough choices. Ranking the world’s regions and fully exploiting all available combat power are absolutely essential for effective war planning. If our resources are inadequate, some important tasks will remain undone because the limited forces available will be committed to regions deemed more important.

THE TOUGH CHOICES

All this points up the need, repeated throughout this study, to supply the proper resources to the Army to fulfill its assigned role in the national security equation. In combat power alone, the Army requires additional forces equal to about one-fifth of the current total Army structure. With such a shortfall, the situation will be nip and tuck should the nation become involved in a major conflict with the Soviet Union.

This does not mean the United States is now fully exploiting the resources available. The reasons for this presumed inefficiency are many; perhaps the fundamental reason is that the United States tends to develop only general strategic guidelines which permit national leaders to avoid the difficult choices until a crisis evolves. But without sharp ranking of national security objectives and the world’s regions, definitive global planning is im
possible. In this study, using the current military strategy, enough clear options have been found to provide a framework against which to examine the possible allocation of the limited US Army forces available by fiscal year 1987. Indeed, we found in some areas perhaps too many forces are being allocated while in other more vital regions resources are inadequate.

RATIONALIZING THE GLOBAL VIEW

In chapter 4 a number of options for rationalizing the use of available Army combat forces as discrete entities were examined. From a review of these options we may draw the following conclusions:

1. Current military requirements outside Europe do not in themselves necessarily dictate a reduction in formal commitments of Army forces to NATO, although some reduction in the commitment of Army and Marine Corps forces may be desirable. If we consider the relative importance of the other regions, the potential role of the US Marine Corps, and the relative risks involved, other sources for combat power appear to be available. Some unit-for-unit exchanges may be called for, such as placing all RDJTF forces in the "other forces" category in the DPO. If MAF were to replace an Army division in the RDJTF, the Army could replace a NATO "earmarked" mechanized infantry division in the DPO with a light division, thereby leaving the mechanized unit free to support the Marine Corps.

The status of US forces notwithstanding, the European allies should aggressively organize and equip new reserve combat units from the massive trained manpower pool available. Regardless of the level of US support, the serious shortfall in NATO relative to the Warsaw Pact makes this allied effort absolutely essential. Moreover, because US units beyond the 10-division D-Day force cannot reach the European theater rapidly, European sources are essential.

The ultimate decision regarding the level of US Army forces committed to NATO remains a political one. US Marine Corps
forces or other forces outside Europe could fulfill non-NATO tasks, and the United States could curtail or eliminate some of its less important commitments outside Europe. These actions would release resources that could mitigate the apparent necessity for the United States to reduce its NATO commitment. Alternatively, the United States could choose to maintain its commitments outside Europe at the level stipulated; such a decision would eventually dictate some reduction in US forces allocated to European defense. Some change in US commitment to NATO may be desirable if only to force the allies to recognize current inequities.

2. For planning a worldwide war, the bulk of US Marine Corps forces should be concentrated in Southwest Asia, with a reduction in the Marine Corps commitment to NATO. Some of the Marine Corps forces committed to NATO, including all available amphibious lift, are already being considered for employment in Southwest Asia. The additional potential degradation to NATO would amount to the loss of a Marine Amphibious Force without sea legs. Presumably, SACEUR would prefer to retain Army divisions than to trade them for immobile Marine Corps units. Marine Corps units now focused on Korea could be diverted to Southwest Asia, because these Pacific-based units appear to have no significant role in Northeast Asia; they would be better used in Southwest Asia. Furthermore, in a worldwide crisis these units would probably get priority lift for deployment to the Persian Gulf region, but they probably would not have any priority for US resources for a relocation from Okinawa to Korea.

The concentration of Marine Corps units in the Gulf region would not completely eliminate the need for some Army combat forces there. Elements of the 82d Airborne Division will probably continue to serve as a quick-reaction force. After the Marines were established in the region, the 82d Airborne Division could be withdrawn and held in strategic reserve, under control of the national command authorities. The need remains for heavy mechanized/armor forces to reinforce the Marine Corps formation. Until states in the region are prepared to hold such units, the Army mechanized division will be required for operations in
Southwest Asia. Current efforts by the Marine Corps to increase firepower and enhance antiarmor capabilities notwithstanding, Marine Corps formations will not be able to sustain operations against Soviet forces without augmentation. The heavy units diverted from Europe can be replaced with light divisions. It is, of course, possible that states in Southwest Asia could provide this expanded augmentation as well. The ultimate decision on whether to rely on US or regional mechanized and armored forces will depend on the mission, the readiness of the regional forces, the political situation in the region, and the relative priority of Southwest Asia vis-a-vis Europe.

As long as the serious shortfall in amphibious lift continues, the all-Marine Corps option for Southwest Asia will have merit. The Marine Corps will not have the mobility to play the role of a global strategic reserve, at least through fiscal year 1987.

3. The 2d Infantry Division should remain in Korea as long as US ground forces are required there. The political and economic costs of replacing the division with Marine Corps forces are not worth the candle. Moreover, the Pacific-based Marine Corps units can be better utilized in Southwest Asia (to relieve Army units for Europe).

The importance of the 2d Infantry Division in the perception of North and South Korea and its position between Seoul and the DMZ far outweigh the size and relative firepower it provides. The division’s true importance is political and not military. If, however, the United States were to consider drawing down the Army force presence in the region, the 2d Infantry Division could be replaced with Marine Corps units.

4. Any tradeoffs in US ground force planning for Southwest Asia notwithstanding, the United States should seek to build up effective mechanized and armored units within selected states in the region. The dynamics of the Europe-Southwest Asia defense equation are such that the United States alone will never be able to deploy adequate forces into the Persian Gulf region to effectively counter the likely Soviet threat, particularly without seriously degrading the defense of Europe.
The buildup of local ground forces would be part of a regional defense effort, fully supported by US-allied security assistance, probably including advisers. A US-supported command and control system, tactical air and naval forces, strategic mobility, and logistical support are part of this larger matrix. Above all, the United States should promote this collective effort as a regional endeavor, and thus maintain low visibility.

It will probably be necessary for the Army to provide the initial reaction force and plan to field at least one heavy division to bolster the regional formations and US Marine Corps units. But limiting the Army commitment to one or two divisions could permit the Army to sustain its current formal commitment to NATO with changes only in the type units involved.

5. The Army should plan for securing the Caribbean region in a global war scenario, but it should not set aside units specifically to that task. Ideally, as the units involved now are acclimated to warm weather, they should be considered for employment in Southwest Asia.

 Authorities in Puerto Rico should develop local security measures, perhaps with a territorial militia. Venezuela, fully supported by US security assistance, should assume responsibility for security missions in the Antilles chain. In the event Venezuela demurs, the region should be left unprotected by major US Army combat forces.

The Panamanian Guardia Nacional, improved with US security assistance, should assume responsibility for land defense of the Panama Canal. A realistic assessment of the task suggests that two small security battalions (or the equivalent) could handle the postulated threat. It is not necessary to replicate the US force allocated for defending the canal.

While multinational defense of the Panama Canal is probably not a prudent objective, the United States should encourage development of a multinational force that could respond to any potential crisis in the region. It is in this context that the United States should promote significantly increased Panamanian and other regional defense forces.
6. The United States should continue to plan for the reinforcement of Alaska in a major crisis, but planners should consider the use of the force involved for commitment wherever required. For example, it could be allocated to the Strategic Reserve of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (in lieu of Marine Corps forces diverted to the Gulf region), perhaps for use on NATO's northern flank.

In summary, review of the planned use of Army combat formations in a worldwide war suggests that some reallocation of resources is in order. This study presents a bleak picture of the United States as a world power in decline, having to scrub down every minor unit in seeking to offset the global threat posed by the Soviet Union—and this, in only truly vital areas. To preserve the West's position in Europe and a foothold in Southwest Asia, the United States will have to leave some important regions essentially uncovered by US forces. Deciding to do this will be difficult, but the decision is dictated by the existing mismatch between the stated strategy and available forces.
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CHAPTER 4


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42. Christopher Van Hollen, “Don’t Engulf the Gulf,” Foreign Affairs 59 (Summer 1981) passim.


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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

COHORT .......... Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training
CRAF .......... Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DMZ .......... Demilitarized Zone
DPQ .......... Defense Planning Questionnaire
IRR .......... Individual Ready Reserve
JCS .......... Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSPD .......... Joint Strategic Planning Document
MAB .......... Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC .......... Military Airlift Command
MAF .......... Marine Amphibious Forces
MSC .......... Military Sealift Command
NET .......... not earlier than
NDRF .......... National Defense Reserve Fleet
PERT .......... Program Evaluation and Review Techniques
POM .......... preparation for overseas movement
POMCUS .......... prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets
RDF-A .......... Rapid Deployment Force-Army
RDJTF .......... Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
SAC .......... Strategic Air Command
SIOP .......... Single Integrated Operational Plan
The advisory readers for this book were Richard Schultz, now of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and Army Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Morai of the National Guard Bureau and now retired. The editor was Janis Hietala; the editorial assistant was Pat Williams.