WARSAW PACT: THE QUESTION OF COHESION

Phase II - Volume I

THE GREATER SOCIALIST ARMY: INTEGRATION AND RELIABILITY

by

TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE
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The question of the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact forces is analyzed from the point of view of interaction between national attitudes and the integration mechanisms of the alliance. Functional and attitudinal aspects of integration are correlated with the reliability factor. The years of joint operations and indoctrination are weighed to measure the impact they have had on shaping overall perceptions and identification (or lack thereof) with common goals, and thus on patterns of future combat performance. In the final assessment three crucial components of the Warsaw Pact forces are analyzed: the servicemen, the professional cadre, and the military-political environment in which they interact. Their relative impact on the attitudes/performance mix in peacetime is evaluated and projected for wartime conditions. This is Volume I of a two-volume study.
La question de la cohésion des forces du Pacte de Varsovie est analysée du point de vue de l'interaction entre les dispositions de chaque pays et l'intégration au sein de l'Alliance. Les aspects psychologiques et fonctionnels de l'intégration sont reliés au facteur de fiabilité. Les années de participation conjointe et d'endoctrinement sont évaluées afin de déterminer l'incidence qu'elles ont eu sur la façon de modeler les perceptions et le degré d'identification (ou son absence) à des objectifs communs, et par conséquent l'incidence qu'elles auront sur le rendement futur au combat. Lors de l'évaluation finale, on analyse trois éléments importants des forces du Pacte de Varsovie: les militaires, le cadre professionnel et le milieu politico-militaire dans lequel ils évoluent. On évalue leur impact sur le concept "dispositions/rendement" en temps de paix et on fait également des projections pour le temps de guerre. Il s'agit du premier volume d'une étude publiée en deux volumes.
I. SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM is the code word which describes the paradigm of the "socialist community of nations" (socialisticheskoe sodruzhestvo). The official formula is that the "unbreakable" class unity of the "socialist community of nations" is based on five common features: 1. Marxist-Leninist ideology; 2. the leading role exercised by the communist party in the political system; 3. common social structures; 4. centrally-planned and socially-owned economies; and 5. leadership by the Soviet Union as the most powerful and "most experienced" member.

The relationship between the socialist states is seen as an historically updated version of the Soviet domestic arrangement of "socialist in content" and "national in form." The class "socialist content" is expressed in practice by the parties' monopoly of power and by their subordination to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which is the directing centre of the system. The national identity of component nations is reflected in their formal state structures (as in the case of union republics in the USSR). The dialectics of class and nation (internationalism vs. nationalism) are expressed in the ascendancy of the former over the latter, in a process which leads to an ever closer "drawing together" of socialist nations (sblizhenie) until their eventual merger (sliianie), a process which also affects the component nations and nationalities of the USSR. The "socialist community of nations" is perceived simultaneously as an
extension of the domestic Soviet political system and the nucleus of a future "socialist world system."

The system's linkages connect the centre in Moscow with the periphery by means of vertical channels between bureaucracies (staffed by communist elites) in four major functional areas: 1. the political sphere (separate channels connect the party and state bureaucracies; policy and guidance flow along the party channel, whereas implementation is coordinated through the state channel); 2. the economic sphere (the linkages connect economic ministries and agencies and the CMEA--the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance); 3. the cultural sphere (the linkages connect the ministries of culture and academies of sciences); and 4. the military sphere (the linkages connect the ministries of national defence and Warsaw Pact structures). The four functional system areas are the main channels for integration policies. The system of military integration is the subject of this study, but other linkages are discussed in terms of a general framework relevant to military integration.

This study examines the internal cohesion of the Warsaw Pact military alliance and the political reliability of its national military contingents by focusing on two crucial variables: 1. popular attitudes toward the alliance in member states and 2. integration mechanisms designed to maximize the cohesion of the alliance by minimizing the problem of political reliability.

II. The study treats NATIONAL ATTITUDES as a crucial variable because all Pact armies are conscript armies and the alliance as a whole is multinational. Moreover, the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF), which constitute the central core of the Warsaw Pact, are also multinational, because all nations which make up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are represented in their ranks.

The analysis distinguishes between two types of integration in the multinational Warsaw Pact system: 1. attitudinal integration,
defined as the internalization of the official value system and political loyalty to the Soviet or East European communist parties and the Warsaw Pact alliance system; and 2. functional integration, defined as conformity to the official norms and obedience to the policy directives of the ruling parties and Warsaw Pact command structures. Functional integration is the minimal requirement for military reliability, both within the SAF and in the Warsaw Pact.

This study concludes that the degrees of functional integration of the East European armed forces which has been achieved in the Warsaw Pact is adequate for the purposes of military reliability in a conflict with NATO, but that no attitudinal loyalty has developed, except among the senior cadre. Because of nationalism, Russophobia, and the incongruity of their political cultures with Marxism-Leninism (and its Russian cultural content), the East Europeans have proved to be totally non-receptive to attitudinal integration. In the SAF approximately two-thirds of the conscript manpower—the Russians and Russifying national groups, mainly Slavs—appear to be integrated both in attitudinal and in functional terms. But only functional reliability has been achieved among the remaining one-third (non-Russians) and even this has been marginal among Soviet Moslems. Thus the overall conclusion of the study is that the Warsaw Pact will prove reliable as long as the SAF remain reliable and that the SAF will prove reliable as long as their Russian and Russified core remains loyal to the Soviet regime.

III. Functional integration has been the primary goal of the INTEGRATION MECHANISMS introduced in the Warsaw Pact in the period since 1960. These mechanisms seek the fragmentation of potentially autonomous structures and the reintegration of their components into new structures responsive to Moscow's direction. It is the main thesis of this study that the Soviet Union has attempted to solve the problem of East European reliability by fragmenting national military forces along service lines, detaching elite and specialized units from national control and incorporating these units into a "Greater Socialist Army"
built around the SAF and under the operational control of the Soviet General Staff.

The deployment of forces according to an ethnic key which meets reliability requirements is defined in the study as an "ethnic security map." Under the individual recruitment principle in the SAF conscripts are dispersed throughout the forces according to the command's perception of their reliability and technical capabilities. In the Warsaw Pact, central agencies organize alliance-wide programmes which seek to detach components of national East European armed forces from exclusive control by national agencies, and link them to the corresponding components of the SAF, with the help of a series of bilateral mechanisms. Under the system national components are interchangeable down to the unit (in some cases even subunit) level. Joint exercises and related training programmes prepare Warsaw Pact forces for service in a coalition that is multinational but not multilateral.

This pattern of alliance management, justifiably described as an "alliance of a new type," denies national control over national armed forces to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. The Warsaw Pact denies its five "loyal" allies independent national military capabilities, thus depriving these states of political sovereignty. Romania has succeeded in withholding its forces from Warsaw Pact integrative mechanisms, thus maintaining national control over its armed forces, and has organized a "territorial defence system" designed to deter and, if need be, to resist a Soviet military occupation. Albania, a former member of the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia, the first communist state to stand outside the Soviet bloc, both deploy territorial defence systems directed primarily against a Soviet intervention. National control over national armed forces in these three East European communist states denies their forces to the Soviet Union for the coalition missions defined by Soviet military doctrine.
IV. Fragmentation of national control over the national armed forces of the "loyal" Pact members has been a critical prerequisite for enlisting these forces to engage in the dual mission defined by SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE: "joint defence of the gains of socialism against internal and external enemies." It also ensures that this mission can be carried out by the "loyal" armies only as a joint endeavour of the socialist coalition.

The organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact simultaneously meets Soviet requirements on both the internal and external fronts in Eastern Europe. There are three requirements on the INTERNAL front: 1. Maintaining a highly visible Soviet capability for internal military intervention against either anti-communist movements or national communist regimes seeking independence from the USSR; 2. Deterring a possible NATO military response to a Soviet intervention in East Europe; in particular, a West German response to a Soviet intervention in the GDR; 3. Denying East European defense ministries the capability of defending either national communist regimes or anti-communist successor regimes. The denial of these capabilities results from a fragmentation of control over national armies. The East European political elites which ultimately depend on the assured capability for Soviet intervention support the Warsaw Pact policy of fragmentation of national control over national armed forces. They also support Soviet policies on the external front.

On the EXTERNAL front there is one basic requirement: keeping NATO on the defensive; in particular, keeping West Germany on the defensive. Soviet conventional and nuclear forces meet this requirement largely on their own, but the East European forces, if organized into a reliable multinational force, can contribute to the Soviet military threat against NATO. By serving the purposes of "coalition warfare" they also legitimize the Soviet military presence in Germany. The Warsaw Pact military mechanisms also serve as a nucleus and a prototype of linkages with pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World.

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To meet the requirements of the external and internal fronts of the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union must maintain a highly visible offensive capability against both Eastern and Western Europe. The greatest impediment to this dual offensive capability is East European control over national armed forces. For the Soviet Union the internal and external fronts of the Warsaw Pact are irrevocably united by the division of Germany. The massive Soviet presence in East Germany is linked first to the defence of the Soviet-dependent regimes of East Europe and ultimately to the preservation of Moscow's control over the non-Russian Soviet borderlands. It is also linked westward; first, to the denial of German reunification, and ultimately to West Germany's alliance with the United States and other NATO members. Thus the ramifications of the "German Question," in both the east and west, constitute the central issue in the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in the European theatre.

V. Other CONTROL MECHANISMS within the Warsaw Pact military system complement integration and contribute to the forces' internal and external missions. From the point of view of the Soviet Union they are less reliable, however, because they are administered by the national parties and are thus vulnerable to "nationalist deviations."

The Military Political Administration (MPA) system serves both as an instrument of party control and as an instrument of military socialization. An MPA is simultaneously a department of the party's central committee and an agency of the country's ministry of national defence. It penetrates the armed forces and thus monitors loyalty and morale. Under the communist nomenklatura personnel system it plays a key role in the selection and promotion of the professional military cadre.

The armed forces are also penetrated by the national security police, in a separate control network which is coordinated by the KGB in Moscow. The security police has a double role vis-à-vis the military:
first, security agents in the armed forces perform counterintelligence functions; second, the paramilitary formations of the security police and the militia safeguard the regime against the possibility of a military mutiny.

The cooptation of the professional cadre into the ranks of the privileged "New Class," membership in which implies attitudinal integration, has been another control device. Officer training follows Soviet models; senior East European officers attend Soviet staff schools and are coopted into a "Greater Socialist Officer Corps." A glance on the professional cadre in the East European armies has been directed in their high ratio to peacetime conscript manpower. In the late 1980s the officer corps and other professional cadre constitute, overall, almost one-half of the total military personnel; their numbers approached two-thirds of the total in the air force and the navy. In Eastern Europe the officer corps and other professional cadre plus the security and militia personnel more than match military conscript manpower. This ratio (which is defined in this study as the "ratio of distrust") is 1:1 or higher; it is seven to one in the case of East Germany.

VI. An extensive programme of military political SOCIALIZATION accompanies all other control and integrative mechanisms. It commences virtually in the cradle and ceases only in the grave. The three main themes hammered into the military personnel are "socialist patriotism" (which exploits nationalism and national military traditions) in tandem with "socialist internationalism" (which stresses the class principle as the basis of fraternal unity) and hatred for the "enemy" (the "imperialists" and domestic "counterrevolutionaries"). This programme is organized for the Warsaw Pact by the Soviet MPA and is carried out by the East European MPAs in their armed forces. It pursues four complementary goals:
1. Attitudinal integration of Russian personnel and whatever non-Russian personnel is open to appeals of "socialist internationalism" buttressed by "socialist patriotism." 2. Functional integration of all remaining non-Russians by the strident assertion that within the SAF the Russian soldier assumes the role of an "elder brother" to all non-Russian personnel and that within the Warsaw Pact the Soviet soldier assumes the same role in relation to his "younger brothers" in the East European armies. 3. The declaration that each socialist army has an internal mission to defend the regime, the "socialist community," and the "gains of socialism" in general against "imperialism." This includes a mission to assist "fraternal" regimes in combating internal counter-revolution. There is a corollary message: each socialist army can fulfill its missions only through the closest possible collaboration with "fraternal" armies and, above all, with the SAF. 4. The proscription of alternative socialist military doctrines, such as those espoused by Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia and China, which postulate the defense of national territory solely by national armies, independent of Soviet and "fraternal" support. These four goals of military political socialization are amalgamated in the twin concepts of "boevye sudruzhestvo-bratstvo oruzhia" (combat collaboration and brotherhood in arms), which are code words for the military collaboration of the socialist armed forces in coalition warfare of a "new type."

VII. The management of the problem of political reliability in the Warsaw Pact is both an extension of domestic policies for managing the ethnic factor and a continuation of domestic HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS. There are several precedents for multinational military forces in the Soviet historical experience: 1. Ethnic detachments of non-Russian minorities and East Europeans during the 1918-1921 Civil War; 2. "National-territorial formations" of the Red Army in 1922-1938; 3. National-territorial divisions and regiments organized in 1941-1944 in the Caucasus and in Central Asia; and 4. National formations organized
for the "liberation" of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania in 1943-1946. This study argues that these formations served four purposes on both the internal and external fronts: 1. They legitimized the presence of Soviet troops on the native soil of the national formations; 2. They served as recruitment agencies for future communist elites linked to Moscow; 3. They provided combat forces for Soviet-directed campaigns outside ethnic homelands; and 4. They legitimized the establishment of "socialist" regimes dependent on Moscow. All four purposes serve as precedents for the formation and utilization of East European national armies.

The investigation of historical precedents also raises issues which may be of importance for the future performance of Warsaw Pact forces. One is the effectiveness of multinational socialist armies in the extension of Soviet influence beyond Soviet borders. Another is the crucial role which non-Russian soldiers--particularly Caucasians and Moslems--played in the defence of the critical Caucasus and Stalingrad fronts in World War II. This performance placed the Soviet leadership in a position of enormous indebtedness to their "ethnics," a debt which has never been explicitly acknowledged. But there is also the recurring precedent of mass defections when the imperial system collapsed under the impact of war (the Tsarist Empire in 1917 and the Soviet regime, locally, in 1941); these defections affected not only the minorities but (a point of decisive importance) also the crucial Russian core of the armed forces.

The concept of socialist internationalism and the four mutually reinforcing spheres of integration (of which the military is one) originated in domestic Soviet experience. It was extended to Eastern Europe as the only acceptable and effective alternative to disintegration. The spontaneous and endemic national and social pressures in Eastern Europe have threatened the disintegration of the entire Soviet alliance system from its very inception. Thus the pursuit of "socialist internationalism" has ultimately rested on the capacity of
the Soviet Army to intervene in defence of "the gains of socialism."

VIII. General conclusions indicate that the military cohesion of the Warsaw Pact is based on the functional integration of East European units into a Greater Socialist Army. This has been achieved due to the impact of the military environment (the integrative mechanisms) and the leadership exercised by the professional cadre. Both are expected to remain operational in wartime, but the reliability factor will be adversely affected by mass mobilization and problems of stability in the rear as a result of the failure of the attitudinal integration of the East Europeans and of the Soviet population in the Western borderlands of the USSR.

Problems of reliability will be of greater importance in the case of the Norther Tier contingents because of the size and military importance of the Polish, East German and Czech armies, and because of the strategic location of these countries.

The findings also indicate that functional integration will hold in conditions of a blitzkrieg type Soviet attack on the NATO front; that a prolonged stalemate and/or reverses would seriously undermine the effectiveness of integration mechanisms; and that the entry of NATO troops into Eastern Europe would trigger a collapse of the communist regimes there, with repercussions in neighbouring countries and in the western borderlands of the Soviet Union.

The reliability of the Russian core of the SAF is seen as the crucial component for the functional integration of the Pact forces as a whole.

IX. The arrangement in this summary develops the main theses of this study and thus does not necessarily correspond to the sequence of the chapters.
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Chapter 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

Statement of Purpose

Nationalism has been a major force in the politics of the second half of this century and a source of most international conflicts as well as of many domestic upheavals. National/ethnic attitudes have come to play a major and largely negative role in the integration of both multiethnic states and regional international systems. The Warsaw Pact is no exception. The Soviet Union, its founder and dominant partner, has had to contend with national conflict in domestic as well as in bloc relations. In its domestic expression, the conflict between the Russians -- historically the hegemonial group -- and the non-Russians has become a major problem and ethnic nationalism, inclusive of newly-revived Russian nationalism, has interfered with the process of Soviet national integration. East European nationalism, with its anti-Russian edge, has undermined bloc relations from the outset, has been the source of constant conflicts, and has led to repeated eruptions which have been as damaging to the bloc's cohesion as they have been to the legitimacy of its respective governments.

The professed "internationalist" unity of the WP-CMEA (Warsaw Pact - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) communist state system covers up not only the nation-centred loyalties of the peoples of the states of East Central Europe but also the ruling parties' need to legitimate themselves through nationalism. At the same time the impact of the communist regimes' policies aiming at social and economic transformation and development has released new forces, in all member states of the bloc, which are now coming into conflict with the
centralized and grossly inefficient structures of the system. The intensity and direction of these forces vary according to the particular historical experience of each state, but in all cases they are deeply rooted in and fed by nationalism. These combined social/national tensions have affected the relationship between East European and Soviet societies and their governments and have had an impact on all social strata, inclusive of the military.

Are these tensions reflected in the Warsaw Pact's military strength and cohesion? Few of the many studies of the Pact have directly addressed themselves to the question of the national and social attitudes and perceptions which may affect the behaviour and performance of particular contingents at times of stress and under actual combat conditions. Yet the lessons of recent history indicate that the deeply held attitudes of servicemen and officers have a crucial impact on the effectiveness and battle performance of military units, especially if they are at variance with the official ethos. They determine whether or not a given unit is motivated to fight and how well, who it is willing to fight against, and whether or not there are defections or desertions. Even the most pervasive indoctrination and the most rigid and habit-forming training are inadequate to fully overcome vestigial fears, hates and loyalties which come to the surface when discipline and its enforcement slacken or break down altogether.

The cohesion of an international military force and the effectiveness of its performance under stress depend as much on national attitudes as they do on the success of international integration and the effectiveness of integration mechanisms. As initially conceived, this study aimed at providing an in-depth investigation of national attitudes as they are reflected in relations both within and between the national military contingents of the Warsaw Pact, and an examination of the extent to which these attitudes have had an impact on the alliance's cohesion. But as research progressed it became apparent that interaction between national attitudes and their military environment
was a major factor, and that a true perception of the organization's cohesion required studying both attitudes and the political and structural mechanisms which had been set in place to provide for and to maximize integration. Research and analysis proceeded on the basis of the assumption that both national attitudes and integration mechanisms are part of a broader historical and socio-political setting and thus cannot be properly analyzed outside, and in isolation from, this broader environment.

1. It was therefore assumed that the attitudes and perceptions of conscript armies reflected the attitudes and perceptions of their national constituencies, and that it was possible to draw reliable conclusions concerning the probable effects of such attitudes on the cohesion, performance and reliability of a given military force. The approach was to see the army through the prism of its society rather than to study it in isolation; to see the conscript rank and file as a part of the general population -- the nation's youth -- and the professional military cadre as one of the groups constituting the nation's socio-political elite.

2. It was further assumed that the integration mechanisms which operate within the Pact's military alliance are an essential part of the political, economic and social integrative network which binds member states under Soviet tutelage. Military mechanisms thus have to be seen within this broader system of interconnected linkages. The political systems of the Pact partners all follow the Soviet model; they all subscribe to the primacy of politics as expressed in the monopoly of power exercised by the ruling parties. This primacy penetrates all spheres of life, but first of all the military establishments, because the armed forces are the physical means which ultimately guarantee the authority of each individual party and the survival of the regional alliance as a whole. The approach has been to examine military doctrine, command and administrative structures, and socialization and training mechanisms as links in a network which validates this guarantee
in the intra-bloc context, as well as in the bloc's relations with NATO and with the world at large.

Research Design

The assessment and projection of attitudes is difficult in any system. Because communist societies are closed societies, the problem is compounded by the scarcity or absence of surveys and statistical data, as well as their unreliability, and a general shortage of hard information. Useful statistical information and sociological research data are not readily available or do not exist, and as a rule none are available for the military. Nevertheless, the research design for this study was based on the assumption that data available in Soviet and East European sources can yield reliable information on the subject of social (even military) attitudes and behaviour, and on institutional/power relationships and arrangements, if they are sufficiently numerous, judiciously selected, and carefully assembled (as if one was putting together a jigsaw puzzle). A further condition was the testing of the findings thus obtained against information available from unofficial and emigré sources.

The point of departure for this study was a review of the general literature in the field of Soviet and East European studies which is germane to the subject, of specialized Western studies on the communist military, and of general works on civil-military relations, military psychology and combat behaviour.* This was followed by research in Soviet and East European sources, in the original languages. Here a wealth of data was found. These were not "ready-made" data, but

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fragmented, dispersed and frequently distorted bits of information, many of which were couched in double talk and designed to carry a specific political message. Research in official sources was supplemented by a review of unofficial publications (samizdat), which are finding their way to the West in increasing numbers.

Constraints on time and resources imposed limits on the pursuit of primary sources, particularly in the case of the three Southern Tier Pact members, where linguistic skills and source materials are less readily available than in the case of the USSR and the members of the Northern Tier. For the same reasons it was not possible, as originally planned, to develop and administer a survey of emigrés from Eastern Europe.

Research Themes

Several major research themes were explored. One was the historical and military traditions in Pact member countries and among national subgroups, taking into account particular national myths and stereotypes regarding self and neighbours (be they friendly or hostile), including: attitudes towards authority; perception of duties, obligations, honour, and discipline; and the intensity and content of the national military ethos and military traditions. National and military behaviour during historical "breakdown points" (war, revolution, invasion, and occupation and foreign rule), was another major theme, as were current attitudes towards communism, the ruling regime, the Russians, the Soviet Union, the Western world and the world at large. Prevalent culture patterns, their impact on national perceptions, and their congruity with Marxism-Leninism and communist systemic requirements were seen to be of major importance. Special attention was devoted to the study of each country's military establishments -- the professional cadre especially -- and to the study and analysis of Pact integration mechanisms and socialization patterns, as well as their effectiveness. The attitudes of youth and related
problems, such as alienation, were treated for their relevance to the cohesion theme. The domestic Soviet experience in dealing with the national issue and ethnic national formations was explored in terms of its relevance for Soviet policy towards the East European bloc members.

Throughout the study an effort was made to take into account the various perspectives necessary for an understanding of the relationships within the bloc. First, the Moscow perspective; that is, how Moscow perceives the relationship with junior Pact members within the context of Soviet national interests and domestic and foreign policy requirements. Second, the perspective of each particular capital in the light of the ruling group's perceptions of particular national interests; and third, the perspective of the ordinary citizens of each country.

Final Report

The final report is comprised of two volumes and includes a bibliography. Volume I is entitled THE GREATER SOCIALIST ARMY: INTEGRATION AND RELIABILITY, and Volume II is entitled NATIONAL CONTINGENTS: THE ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY. Volume I briefly reviews the study's findings concerning national attitudes in each member country, but it concentrates primarily on analyzing the integration framework and integration mechanisms in theory and in practice. It also touches on the historical precedents of ethnic military coalitions in the Soviet Union, deals with strategic military doctrine, socialization themes, and factors affecting morale, and summarizes the study's overall findings. Volume II provides an in-depth treatment of each of the member states of the Warsaw Pact and their armed forces. It includes material on the historical background of the military, and the social setting and its impact on military attitudes. The sections dealing directly with the armed forces include a brief summary of their post-1945 evolution (post-1917 for the USSR), an analysis of current attitudes from the ranks up to and including the military-party
relationship at the top, and the pattern of the forces' integration within Warsaw Pact structures. Exceptionally, the focus in the chapter on Romania is on this country's specific pattern of resistance to the Pact's integrative mechanisms.

Volume II also contains a selected bibliography of material which deals specifically with the Warsaw Pact and the "ethnic factor" in the Soviet Armed Forces.
Chapter 2

NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND THE "ETHNIC SECURITY MAP"

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

The Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) constitute the crucial military core of the Warsaw Pact (WP) and play a unique role in the organization. They dominate the Pact within the WP regional system. In 1982 the total number of personnel in the SAF was five million men as compared with a combined total of slightly over one million for the forces of the six East European members of the Pact, a ratio of five to one (see Table 2.1). The disproportion seemingly disappears when viewed in a regional context; only 30 Soviet divisions, with a total of 565,000 men, were deployed in East Central Europe. But they were maintained there at a category I level of combat readiness and were backed by units stationed in the Western USSR as well as by the whole might of Soviet strategic nuclear, air and naval forces. Moreover, the numbers tell only part of the story, for the senior partner's hegemonial role within the alliance is reinforced by a whole range of integrative mechanisms shaped by the Soviet experience and deployed under Soviet direction. In view of the weight of the SAF in the Pact and the determining influence that its doctrine, training, socialization patterns, etc. have for East European military establishments, the analysis which follows treats the themes under discussion within an integrated framework, assessing their relevance first for the SAF and then for the East European forces, but taking into account similarities and differences between the Soviet and East European experiences and their importance for the Pact's overall cohesion.
Table 2.1. Warsaw Pact: Armed Forces Totals, 1982-83
(in thousands)

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<td>694</td>
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<td>1,168.3</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>244</td>
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</table>

1. Includes Border Guards, Internal Security Troops, and some other formations; excludes Militia.
2. Includes Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defence Troops; excludes Long-Range Air Force Troops.
4. It is not clear whether this figure includes the 400,000 Border Guards noted in fn. 3. The total here includes 190,000 KGB Border Troops and 260,000 MVD Security Troops.

Sources: The Military Balance 1982-83 (pp. 11-17) and 1983-84 (pp. 14-24).

The Soviet Union is a multiethnic state, with ethnic Russians comprising only one-half of the Soviet population, and the need to
manage and to integrate its ethnic soldiers has been a priority for the Red Army from its very inception. Thus the question of the national attitudes and overall cohesion of military forces, which has been of concern to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact and ultimately to the leaders of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), applies as much to the Soviet Armed Forces as it does to the national military contingents of other Pact members as they interact within the Pact's framework. Because the nature of the problem is the same and it is addressed, in the final analysis, by the same decision makers, it is hardly surprising that the policy of the Soviet Union towards its subordinate partners in the first regional system established under Soviet leadership should have drawn on the CPSU's experience in dealing with the ethnic factor in domestic Soviet politics, or that it should have been influenced by the Imperial Russian heritage with its legacy of quantitative and qualitative hegemony by the ethnic Russian element.

A perceptive study of military elites in multiethnic societies by Cynthia Enloe suggests that "there is scarcely a state elite in a plural society that does not have a conscious idea of what pattern of inter-ethnic relations best ensures the state's survival. They often have a clear notion of which ethnic groups are most reliable. In numerous countries this will be the ethnic group with which the members of the state-controlling elite themselves identify." Such an elite also has in mind an "ethnic security map" regarding the political dependability of various ethnic groups, which is of particular relevance to the military. This perception has been found to be relevant for the study of the Soviet Armed Forces as well as for the study of national arrangements within the force structure of the Warsaw Pact.

Although diluted by the Soviet state's claim to internationalist class-based loyalties, the Russians' de facto imperial role there has survived the Revolution. Since Stalin's time it has been legitimized by the theory of the Russian "Elder Brother" whose task it has been to assist all others in the building of a new "socialist society." By
extension the "Elder Brother's" leading role and tasks also apply within the Warsaw Pact, as the Soviet Union helps its junior partners in the building of a new "socialist community of nations." In the domestic Soviet context the Russians' leading role has been most pronounced in the Soviet Armed Forces, where they have traditionally provided the majority of the manpower as well as its most reliable element and have dominated the officer cadre. The Soviet Armed Forces, of course, provide the backbone of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact and its command structure.

With the emergence of ethnic conflict in the USSR in the sixties and seventies, and in the face of virulent East European nationalism, there has also been a resurgence of Russian nationalism. Elements of the latter, particularly among the dissidents, have been directed against the communist ruling elite, but overall the Russians' ethnic fears concerning their hegemonial role have coincided with the determination of the ruling political elite to preserve the system and their leading role in it. This has been true both within the narrower parameters of the Soviet state and within the broader setting of the regional socialist state system.

An ethnic security map designed to secure these aims has been discernible in the Soviet Armed Forces and in the structure of the Pact's forces. This includes a pattern of ethnic/national distribution which conforms to the elite's perceptions of the attitudes and reliability of the members of the Soviet and socialist "family of nations," and integration mechanisms designed to neutralize the negative impact of nationalism in military service and to preempt capabilities for organized action by a national group or national formation. The individual recruitment principle and the in-service distribution pattern are the primary means by which an ethnic security map has been charted in the Soviet Armed Forces. The operational fragmentation of national contingents, a network of bilateral ties between East European national contingents and the Soviet Armed Forces modeled on past Soviet
experience with ethnic formations, and Soviet control of the command structures, all serve the same purpose in the Warsaw Pact under a multilateral facade. In both cases these mechanisms are reinforced by the parties' control of military appointments (the CPSU's in the case of command appointments in the five "loyal" Warsaw Pact member armies), by the control network of security police, and by comprehensive political socialization efforts, the last two also coordinated by Moscow.

An in-depth analysis of the national attitudes of all member states of the Pact is the subject of Volume II of this study. This chapter provides only a summary of the findings, which is essential in providing a setting for the discussion of integrative and socialization mechanisms which forms the core of this volume.

The Soviet Armed Forces

Characteristics

The ethnic mix of the Soviet Armed Forces reflects the makeup of the Soviet population, only one-half of which belongs to the Great Russian group. The other half comprises one hundred-odd nations and nationalities, but is weighted heavily in favour of other Slavs (Ukrainians and Belorussians), and the rapidly expanding Moslem Asian group. Demographic change has increased the importance of the ethnic factor in the armed forces, as has the emergence and/or revival of national self-consciousness among major non-Russian national groups. The Soviet Armed Forces have had extensive experience with ethnic formations, but in the postwar period all citizens have been subject to universal military service on the basis of individual recruitment (kadrovyi printsip) and have served in ethnically mixed units. Despite a strong emphasis on their "internationalist" character, the traditions and practices of the Soviet Armed Forces are, in fact, a direct inheritance from the Imperial Russian Army. The language of the forces is exclusively Russian, and ethnic Russians dominate the professional
The Imperial traditions also survive in the approach to doctrine and technology and in the in-service training methods, which institutionalize brutality and stress drill, obedience, and habit-forming exercises rather than initiative. In fact, the training of the officer cadre deliberately invokes and re-adopts the Imperial past. Thus despite their internationalist veneer and composition the SAF are Russian in character and the Russian soldier provides the model which non-Russian conscripts are to emulate. To the "fraternal" armies the SAF project the image of a national Russian army, and in East Europe Soviet soldiers are popularly perceived as "the Russians."

National Attitudes

The Russian character of the SAF and the continuation of Imperial traditions have been a source of strength as a morale builder for the Russians and those assimilated into the Russian majority. In the early Soviet period the inherited hegemonial role of the ethnic Russians was reinforced by the group's demographic dynamism. A high growth rate and vigorous out-migration caused a major shift of the Russian population to the Asian parts of the USSR and to the borderlands, where they came to dominate the fast-growing cities and industrial centres. Their strong cultural impact on the non-Russians made Russification attractive, a trend which was also reflected in the military environment. By the mid-50s, however, the Russians' dynamism was spent and evidence of a serious demographic decline (which was also shared by the other major Slavic groups, the Ukrainians and Belorussians) began to emerge in the late 70's. Their rates of natural growth have decreased, migration has slowed down and reversed direction, and the impact of Russian culture on other groups has weakened. There has also been an overall deterioration in Soviet health standards, which seems to have affected the Russians and their fellow Slavs more than other groups. The above phenomena have been accompanied by an increase in ethnic self-assertion
by non-Russians and a population explosion among the Soviet Central Asians.

Demographic and national trends have aggravated ethnic conflict and have triggered a perception on the part of the Russian majority of a threat to its status which has been accompanied by a renaissance of Russian nationalism over the last two decades. This has been expressed in a new emphasis on Russian national symbolism and on linguistic Russification. Expressions of Russian nationalism, which have been observed among elements ranging from dissidents to the Central Committee of the CPSU, have been particularly strong among the professional cadres of the SAF. At the same time the perception of a decline in comparative terms has fostered negative attitudes towards the non-Russians and their alleged "parasitism." Complaints are being heard across the Russian nationalist spectrum, the gist of which is that the whole burden of the Soviet system has been carried on Russian shoulders, while others have benefited, and that the Russians are fed up with making sacrifices for "junior brothers" both at home and in the bloc. 10

The rapprochement (sblizhenie) policy in Soviet national relations is based on the assumption that, under the leadership of the party, all Soviet national groups are drawing closer together and evolving into a common Soviet mould because they now have a common economic base and a common social structure. The process also envisages mutual cultural "enrichment." In practice, however, the Russian cultural model and value system have come to dominate the common Soviet culture. This has been resented by the newly assertive non-Russians, as has been the revival, in the Brezhnev era, of the "leading role" of the Russians, the "Elder Brother" syndrome which was the keynote of Stalin's last years. The party line nevertheless attempts to ignore ethnic dissatisfaction on the part of Russians as well as non-Russians. At the 24th CPSU Congress (1971), the late Secretary General officially proclaimed that a unified Soviet nation, the "Soviet people," had already emerged.
The Soviet Armed Forces are of primary importance in this task of nation-building. They are seen explicitly as the "school of the nation," and their task in this context is to integrate ethnic recruits into a common pattern. But, as seen above, this pattern is that of a Russian soldier in all but name. As the young conscripts are assigned to multiethnic but Russian-speaking units, and subjected to intensive indoctrination and training, their response to the message is conditioned by their respective group’s level of integration in the society at large.

In the seventies national processes in the Soviet Union were simultaneously affected by two conflicting trends. There was a crystallization and a growing articulation of ethnic nationalism by major ethnic groups, but there was also assimilation of smaller and culturally weaker groups into the surrounding larger and stronger ones. Both trends were acknowledged by Soviet ethnographers. The first trend, which is explained officially as the process of the consolidation of a national "ethnos," has affected major national groups of union republic status and also a few other large national communities such as the Tatars. The second trend, which is ascribed to the impact of urbanization and ethnic mixing ("internationalization") through migration, inter-marriage and military service, and expresses itself first in linguistic assimilation, is seen as the "transfer of ethnic specificity" from the traditional to a modern culture, and thus as the very essence of the process of sblizhenie. In most cases it has meant Russification. But not always, for we learn that dispersed groups such as the Poles and the Jews, small indigenous enclaves such as the ones in Central Asia, or simply individuals who live outside their national areas (including some Russians) tend to denationalize and assimilate into the locally dominant nations, be they Ukrainians, Belorussians or Uzbeks, a phenomenon dysfunctional to "sblizhenie."

The first of these trends, the emergence of particular non-Russian national identities, makes the socialization role of the armed
forces more difficult. The second, the trend towards assimilation, facilitates it, but only if it represents assimilation into the Russian language and culture.

**Functional and Attitudinal Integration**

The emergence of the ethnic nationalism of the non-Russians does not necessarily imply an outward conflict either in the society at large or in the armed forces. Because Russian culture overlays Soviet reality and the Russian language is the country's lingua franca, many non-Russians integrate quite readily into Russian/Soviet patterns in functional (objective) terms. For an ambitious youth who wants to make a career functional integration, which does not require a change in inner national self-perception, is a minimum precondition. It immensely facilitates the life of a conscript in the SAF, for all that is expected of the conscript is a knowledge of basic Russian sufficient to get by, a minimal level of educational skills, a veneer of acculturation, and a low national profile. But this is not synonymous with (subjective) attitudinal integration, which goes beyond outward conformity and requires internalization of the prevalent norms and value system. It also implies linguistic assimilation rather than bilingualism. Functional integration can coexist with ethnic national loyalties, but they are incompatible with attitudinal integration. Yet it is the latter type of integration which has been the ultimate aim of the Soviet sblizhenie policy and of military socialization, and is the ultimate guarantee of loyalty under stress in the armed forces.

In the absence of opinion surveys neither type of integration can be measured. But a close approximation is available from census data on language adherence. An assumption can be made that linguistic assimilation into the Russian language, if not synonymous with attitudinal integration, constitutes a step towards it; and that bilingualism is a necessary requirement for functional integration. Linguistic assimilation does not necessarily mean a loss of ethnic
identity -- as seen among linguistically assimilated Jews or Crimean Tatars -- and a bilingual Ukrainian or Uzbek may have internalized Soviet (Russian) norms and a Soviet (Russian) value system while continuing to adhere to his national language. But because language is one of the primary and most emotionally charged attributes of ethnic identity, such cases are exceptional. Thus, it is felt that language affiliation data can be used as a rough indicator of trends affecting the two types of integration.

Only 13.1 per cent of the non-Russians declared Russian to be their native tongue in 1979 (11.6 per cent in 1970). A breakdown for union republic nations in 1970 (no figures were available for 1979) indicated that only among the Slavs (Belorussians and Ukrainians) was there a substantial minority (20 and 15 per cent of the total group, respectively) assimilated into the Russian language. Among the Moslems the share of assimilated individuals in a given national group did not exceed one per cent, and among the Baltic and Caucasian nations and the Moldavians it did not exceed five per cent (with Armenians at 7.6 per cent as the only exception). The figures for bilingualism, on the other hand, showed a substantial increase over the last decade; nevertheless, it was still rare to see the 50 per cent (bilingualism) mark surpassed. This means that the number of non-Russians who were functionally illiterate in the Russian language was still uncomfortably large (see Table 2.2), with all that this implies.

Both sets of figures, particularly those for bilingualism, are probably higher for young cohorts entering the military service and will be on the upswing in the future because of the emphasis since the late seventies on the teaching of Russian in national language schools in the union republics.
**Table 2.2** Linguistic Affiliation of Union Republic Nations 1970-1979 (in percentages of total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Group</th>
<th>National Language as Native Tongue</th>
<th>Russian Language as Native Tongue</th>
<th>Russian Language as Second Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>85.7 82.8</td>
<td>14.3 36.3</td>
<td>49.8 49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>80.6 74.2</td>
<td>19.0 49.0</td>
<td>57.0 57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>98.6 98.5</td>
<td>0.5 14.5</td>
<td>49.3 49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>98.0 97.5</td>
<td>1.6 41.8</td>
<td>52.3 52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>98.5 97.8</td>
<td>0.6 15.4</td>
<td>29.6 29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenfs</td>
<td>98.9 98.7</td>
<td>0.8 15.4</td>
<td>25.4 25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>98.8 97.9</td>
<td>0.3 19.1</td>
<td>29.4 29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeris</td>
<td>98.2 97.9</td>
<td>1.3 16.6</td>
<td>29.5 29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>91.4 90.7</td>
<td>7.6 30.1</td>
<td>38.6 38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>98.4 98.3</td>
<td>1.4 31.3</td>
<td>26.7 26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>97.9 97.9</td>
<td>1.5 35.9</td>
<td>52.1 52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>95.2 95.0</td>
<td>4.5 45.2</td>
<td>56.7 56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>95.5 95.3</td>
<td>4.4 29.0</td>
<td>24.2 24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>95.0 93.2</td>
<td>4.2 36.1</td>
<td>74.4 74.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No data were available for 1979

Sources:

1. For 1970: **Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.** (Moscow: Statistika, 1971).
A review of the information available on Soviet servicemen supports the assumption that many are still non-integrated in cultural terms and lack an adequate knowledge of the Russian language. It also shows that by and large military service has been effective in promoting functional integration and in breaking the cultural isolation of rural youth. Next to school and the workplace, the armed forces have been the major instrument in bringing up the new functional "Soviet man." But the promotion of attitudinal integration does not seem to have made great strides, as seen in the persistence of national patterns in the union republics despite a constant stream of returning servicemen. It has been a success only in the case of the already assimilating minorities.

Assessed in terms of the two types of integration, the non-Russians can tentatively be grouped into three major categories:

a. Groups affected by both types of integration, which are assimilating into the Russian majority and/or are susceptible to assimilation. These include a number of smaller national groups and dispersed groups; in statistical terms these are the nationalities for which language indicators show both a decline in adherence to their national language and in bilingualism. This category also includes individuals of all ethnic backgrounds who reside outside their national territory and are thus removed from their native cultural environment. Among the members of major nations it includes the Belorussians and Ukrainians, mostly those who are expatriates or live in urban-industrial "internationalized" Russian-speaking areas even in their own republics.

b. Groups which have reached a relatively high level of modernization, and are fully capable of and receptive to functional integration, but are not affected by attitudinal integration because of a conscious perception of a separate national historical and cultural identity. These include the Georgians and Armenians (the relatively high indicator of linguistic assimilation for the Armenians is the result of their exceptionally high mobility); Western Ukrainians and Belorussians; and apparently the Moldavians. Many among the last three
groups, and the Baltic nations, consciously refuse to assimilate into Soviet/Russian patterns. This refusal has become statistically visible in the case of the Estonians -- the most "Western" and modernized of all Soviet nationalities -- whose bilingualism indicator dropped by 4.8 percentage points between the 1970 and 1979 censuses (the only such case recorded).

c. Groups which are still at relatively low levels of modernization and thus have difficulty integrating functionally (a handicap that is decreasing) and are non-responsive to attitudinal integration because of the strength of their traditional cultures. Their failure to respond to pressures for integration is less a result of conscious choice than of profound cultural alienation. This category includes the Soviet Moslems: all of the Asian Moslem union republic nations (Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Azeris), and other Moslem groups. Among them there are differences, depending on the group's exposure to modernization. The Kazakhs and the Tatars (Volga and Crimean) for example, have achieved a high level of functional integration. In the case of the Tatars it is known that many resist attitudinal integration as a matter of deliberate choice. This places them in category "b" above, along with the Balts. If this points to a trend for other Moslems as they modernize, the results could prove to be troublesome politically and in the military sphere.

But in Central Asia there is some evidence that while the Moslem cultural environment is maintained locally and is deliberately enhanced, it has accommodated to and has partially absorbed Soviet norms as the Moslem republics have grown more prosperous (in absolute terms but particularly in comparison with the Iranians, Afghans and Turks across the border), and as the rapidly growing Moslem elites acquire a greater stake in the maintenance of a system which benefits them. The result seems to be a blend of traditional Islamic (and pre-Islamic) and modern Soviet elements in contemporary Central Asian culture, which differs from the Russian-based Soviet European culture but is not necessarily
inimical to the Soviet system. This has facilitated functional integration as seen in the statistics on bilingualism, however inflated these figures may be. If this interpretation is correct then the usual perception of the Moslems' unreliability in the armed forces may have to be modified, even though the cultural alienation factor and ethnic conflict between the Asians and the Europeans may remain significant. But the Moslems' effective integration into the armed forces depends on the enhancement of the "Soviet" as opposed to the "Russian" character of the Soviet Armed Forces. The trend, under Brezhnev at least, has been in the opposite direction, and the growing Russian resentment of their "leading role," noted above, tends to aggravate ethnic prejudices.

The "Ethnic Security Map"

The "ethnic security map" in the Soviet Armed Forces is as much a product of objective circumstances as it is an outcome of specific policies. All Soviet national groups are subject to the draft and, as noted above, the units are ethnically mixed. But the actual distribution of ethnic manpower is governed by several factors. At each successive call-up (at six month intervals) the conscripts are distributed to various units by regional military commissariats which also select the most promising candidates for non-commissioned officer training. The placement of recruits (the share of conscripts in Soviet military manpower in 1982 stood at approximately 75 percent of the total) is governed by current needs and policy requirements. It is apparently an official policy that individuals should serve outside their national area. The first pick of the new soldiers is given to elite and technically more demanding services, such as rocket troops and airborne and naval units, all of which have an obvious preference for well-educated and technically skilled urban Russian-speakers, hence generally for the Russians and others from the western regions of the Soviet Union. Less desirable recruits, such as Asian Moslems, are assigned to units which rank lower on the priority lists.
Officer candidates (and career NCOs) are recruited from volunteers. Because a professional military career requires de facto Russification -- in the functional sense at a minimum -- not all national groups find this option equally attractive and, for educational, cultural and political reasons, not all groups are equally acceptable. The professional cadre in general is dominated by Slavs; officers are predominantly Slav, with a heavy Russian majority. Among general officers (the only category for which hard data are available), the Slavs constitute 90 per cent of the total, and more than 80 per cent of them are Russians. The mix is undoubtedly more varied in the lower ranks, but there it is also heavily weighted in favour of urban, white-collar, better educated, more assimilated and more "cultured" social strata. Increasingly there is evidence that sons follow fathers into professional military service and that "officer families" are encouraged. In ethnic terms all of this gives a prominent edge to the Russians (who are traditionally favoured and are the most advanced in technical-educational terms), to Ukrainians and Belorussians, to other Western groups and to assimilating minorities. Representatives of the latter two groups seem to be fairly common among junior officers.

The ethnic characteristics of the NCO cadre (career and conscript) would seem, on the face of it, to approximate those of the junior officers. But more than one source has indicated that the unteroffizier cadre was so much a Ukrainian and Tatar preserve (both groups are reputed to make excellent NCOs) that NCO selection was entrusted to military commissariats (taking it away from unit commanders), along with instructions that a fair share of candidates from every national group should be sent for NCO training in order to ensure a full complement of NCOs in the ranks during mobilization.

The ethnic composition of reserve units seems to provide the one exception to the overall pattern, as it is believed to reflect the composition of the population of a given military district and is thus
heavily weighted in favour of the locally dominant ethnic groups. Consequently, reserve units have a heavy local national colouration as they are mobilized, which is one reason for the temporary emergence of "national-territorial formations" at the time of the "Great Patriotic War."\textsuperscript{22}

In addition to an appropriate socio-economic background, political loyalty is a vital requirement for a successful professional military career. Non-commissioned officers are overwhelmingly members of the Komsomol and servicemen are also strongly pressured to join. Officer status almost automatically confers party membership, and being a party member in good standing is an essential criterion for advancement and for recommendation to mid-career or senior-level officer training. Senior officers are an integral part of the ruling elite and participate in the privileges of the "New Class." Top military positions confer automatic membership in the party's ruling bodies of republics where a given military district is located, in the CPSU Central Committee and, for the USSR Minister of Defence since 1973, in the Politbureau.

Political and social criteria are also important in the distribution of manpower among service branches. The perception of which groups are "loyal," as well as their technical and educational preparation, are crucial in assignments. Thus the Slavs and the assimilating and functionally well-integrated groups with an urban background dominate the elite units (paratroops, special guard units) and the high prestige, technically sophisticated services (rockets, air defence, air force, etc.). Political undesirables, such as "nationalists," civil and human rights dissidents, and conscientious objectors end up in construction troop units, along with the Moslems who cannot speak Russian. If they are not in construction battalions, then the Moslems generally serve in rifle troop units. They are also prominent among prison guards, where their cultural alienation makes them dependable guardians of dissidents. Because of their generally
smaller physical stature they are also said to serve in tank units. Demographic trends indicate that by the year 2000 the proportion of 18-year-old potential draftees coming from the southern republics (the Caucasus, Central Asia and Kazakhstan) will constitute one-third of the total (as compared to 18.7 per cent in 1970), which means that present ethnic patterns will be increasingly difficult to maintain. But indicators of functional (let alone attitudinal) integration lag far behind those of demographic growth, a matter of considerable concern to Soviet military planners.

Reflecting the trends in society at large, there is evidence that ethnic conflict in the forces has increased, and occasionally assumes violent overtones. This is particularly true in the case of relations between Russians (and Russified elements) and nationally assertive minorities. The Balts in particular hate the Russians and are in turn called "fascists" -- the supreme insult. For cultural rather than political reasons there is a vast chasm between the Europeans and the Moslems; the Moslems are universally pushed around and regarded as inferiors, especially because their Russian is poor and their technical skills are largely non-existent. According to emigrés there is little effort to hide ethnic antagonisms and ethnic slurs abound, both within the ranks and in relations with the civilian population in the area where the troops are stationed. Frustrations generated by appalling in-service social and physical pressures, in the first six months of the conscripts' service in particular, tend to take on an ethnic colouration. Because social relations in the ranks are segregated strictly on the basis of seniority, with each call-up cohort holding together against its juniors and seniors, there is evidence that cleavages along seniority lines dominate. But within each cohort servicemen form informal friendship and mutual support groups along ethnic, religious, language and cultural lines, and these support groups frequently cross the seniority gap.
Strong as they are, ethnic antagonisms in the Soviet Armed Forces do not seem to affect their overall reliability. First, because ethnic conflicts are localized and any possibility of their being mobilized on a broader scale has been preempted by the kadrovyi printsip and the ethnic security map; moreover, their very existence facilitates and is used in the management of a multiethnic force. Second, because the officer cadre possesses a high degree of homogeneity through its domination by Russian and Russified elements and years of training, and has a stake in the preservation and strengthening of the political order and its privileged position within this order. Third, because of the impact of socialization which, for all its shortcomings and resistance to it by alienated "ethnics," fosters pride and confidence in the forces' might and a responsiveness to the need of defending the Motherland. Some of these advantages may be diluted if the Asian Muslim element becomes stronger than the forces' Russian/Slavic core, but this is not yet an immediate problem.

But the ethnic fissures are there and may come apart under extreme prolonged stress. The lessons of both World Wars are there to ponder: the end of World War I for Imperial Russia and the beginning of World War II for the Soviet Union. Since then ethnic tensions may have become stronger and may have crystallized, but at the same time integrative mechanisms have been improved a great deal.

The "Allied" Forces

Characteristics

Outwardly there are few if any points of comparison between the East European member states of the Warsaw Pact and the union republics of the USSR. It is only when one looks at East Europe from Moscow that it becomes clear that the nature of the relationship between the USSR and its East European allies is seen to be the same as the nature of the relationship among the Soviet nations. The only difference is in the
degree of integration, which has been infinitely more advanced in the case of the latter. This difference also means that East European nationalism has been infinitely more pronounced and thus much more difficult to handle, but the mechanisms which have been successfully applied to domestic Soviet politics are presumed also to be applicable in the new "socialist community of nations."

All the East European Warsaw Pact members were sovereign states in the interwar period. Of the Soviet republics only Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were independent, although Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, and Western Moldavia (Bessarabia) were parcelled out among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The Soviet hegemony over East-Central Europe dates only to the end of World War II, while most Soviet nations (with the same exceptions) were a part of the Soviet state from its inception in 1917. Cultural differences are even more profound. Most of East-Central Europe is on the Western side of the great cultural division between Western Christianity (Rome) and Eastern Christianity (Byzantium). Romania and Bulgaria (and the southeastern parts of Yugoslavia) are the only exceptions. Imperial Russia, on the other hand, was the carrier of Byzantine influences which, with a Mongol-Turkic admixture, helped to shape Russian political culture and the political culture of most of its subject peoples.

The history of East-Central Europe and the influences which shaped it are much too complex to be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that no two states in the group are alike and that the conflicts between them have been a feature of the region's history and are far from being resolved, a feature which facilitates Moscow's role in controlling them. None of them were affected by the October Revolution to the point of joining it (the current propaganda line to the contrary). Revolutionary upsurges in Hungary and Germany were short-lived and lacked a popular base, and the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1920 was turned back. All except Czechoslovakia proscribed communist parties (which had few
adherents) in the interwar period, and all participated in the West European system of political alliances and economic exchanges.

Czechoslovakia and Poland were the first victims of Nazi aggression and fought on the Allied side in World War II. But the four other countries (Germany, of course, and Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria), were in the Axis camp. All were occupied by Soviet forces at the war's end, and remained within the Soviet sphere of influence as a result of the post-war division of Europe. For most of these countries it was a reversal of a centuries-old Western orientation. The establishment of communist systems there was a function of the presence of the Red Army and not the result of either a genuine indigenous revolution (as was the case in Yugoslavia and Albania) or freely conducted elections. Czechoslovakia, where the communist party gained a plurality of votes in the free elections of 1946, is a partial exception.

East European attitudes towards the Warsaw Pact, towards the role their countries play in the Pact, and towards their communist regimes are conditioned by three main factors: nationalism and historical perceptions of Russia and the Russians; indigenous political culture patterns and their congruity or incongruity with Marxism-Leninism, and the existence and strength of national military traditions. All of these factors vary from country to country, but in the whole they have been dysfunctional to the new political arrangements and to Soviet-imposed socialization and integration patterns.

Nationalism and Attitudes Towards the Russians

Most East Europeans share strong anti-Russian historical traditions born in the struggle with Imperial Russia's (Soviet) westward expansion. Poland's long history has been a continuous struggle with both its Western and its Eastern neighbours; twice, in the eighteenth century and in 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), Poland was partitioned and occupied as a result of a Russo-German agreement. Russia has also been Romania's principal enemy ever since Romania became
independent in the 19th century; the Moldavian Soviet republic is in fact Romanian Bessarabia. Paradoxically, the Hungarians have been more forgiving towards the Austrians -- against whom they rose in revolt in 1848 -- than against the Russians whose imperial army came to suppress this revolt, fulfilling its obligations under the Holy Alliance. Only Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria entered the 20th century with strong pro-Russian traditions, for the Tsars had supported their national aspirations with respect to the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Porte, respectively.

After Soviet troops entered the area in 1945 popular Russophobia was further reinforced. In the period of consolidation of communist power in Eastern Europe (1945-48), the Soviet presence and Soviet tutelage resulted in the suppression of all independent political forces and the imposition of terror, in economic pillage, and in the initiation of a social and economic revolution from above. All the crises since have evoked either direct Soviet intervention or the threat of intervention: Czechoslovakia in 1948, East Berlin in 1953, Hungary and Poland in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980/81. As a result the fund of good will the Soviet Union enjoyed in Czechoslovakia has dissipated, and notwithstanding declarations of eternal friendship which are made regularly by the ruling parties, the only country where the Soviet Union is seemingly still viewed with a modicum of friendship is Bulgaria.

The ruling communist elites owe their power to the Soviet Union and as far as can be determined in the absence of free expression and free elections, most still depend for survival on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, after 1956 all parties felt it imperative to legitimize their regimes in nationalism. Claims to sovereignty, the trappings of which are carefully preserved in the Pact's formal structures, are seen as vital not only for foreign policy purposes but for domestic consumption -- although popular cynicism and alienation are well documented -- and, perhaps, self-delusion. Given Moscow's heavy-handed
methods and the standing temptation to seek popular approval, the susceptibility of East European communist leaders to "nationalist deviation" has been high, especially after Tito's successful emancipation of Yugoslavia. Desires to gain greater autonomy, however, have been tempered by the imperative of self-preservation, which is the best guarantee, ultimately, of the communist elites' loyalty to the Soviet Union. Moreover, beginning in the sixties, national communist leaders were gradually deprived of a capability to use their own armed forces in defence of the country's national interest, as shall be seen below; the only exception here is Romania's Ceausescu. 27

In each country nationalism has served as a useful prop for the regime, but it has not helped in the Pact's integration. It has been the source of recurrent intra-bloc squabbles, and its anti-Russian, anti-Soviet component has been impossible to eradicate. The Romanian party, which decided to revalidate its socialism through nationalism, has done so by openly resisting all aspects of integration, including military integration. None of the other parties was either willing, or able, or both, to follow suit. Nevertheless, popular approval of communist regimes throughout the bloc seems to be directly proportional to the given party's predilection to do "its own national thing." Thus, although the Romanian regime is domestically the most oppressive of all the East European members of the Warsaw Pact, its defiance of the Soviet Union is supported by the population.

Political Culture and Military Traditions

The congruity between a given country's political culture and Marxism-Leninism has been a touchstone of popular acceptance of the system. The roots of Leninism are firmly planted in authoritarian Russian political culture and its acceptance has been easier in countries with a similar background, such as Bulgaria. Leninism's key features -- the "leading role" of the party resting on the operational principle of democratic centralism, legitimated in ideological claims --
demands a monopoly of power and a monopoly of communications. It thus requires the maintenance of mechanisms of coercion and censorship, and precludes political pluralism and autonomous subsystems, as well as the free exercise of human and civil rights. The rule of law does not exist, for the legal system serves to facilitate the party's task of governance and does not in any way restrain its arbitrary powers. The more anti-authoritarian and democratic the indigenous political culture, the more difficult it has been for the communist system to maintain itself and to develop a meaningful social dialogue, despite the fact (or perhaps because of it) that a commitment to socialism, in its basic original meaning of equality, social justice and democratic participation, has been widespread, at least in the two countries where public opinion surveys became possible when society challenged the system.28

Attitudes towards the political system colour attitudes towards the political and military alliance and towards the role that each country's armed forces are expected to play in pursuing the alliance's objectives. These, by and large, have been negative, as shown above. But strong military traditions and the high social prestige accorded to the military have also been a feature of the political cultures of some of these countries,29 an element which the regimes were quick to utilize. The emphasis placed on national armies in these cases, on heroic military traditions, and on the trappings of military symbolism, have helped to slightly bridge the gap between the system and the people. Nevertheless, the discrepancy which exists between the image of the armed forces and their role as the tool of Soviet interests has contributed to the ambiguity of social attitudes towards the military, and of attitudes within the armed forces themselves.

This discrepancy was particularly glaring in the Stalinist period, and emerged anew after the Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, in Poland the strength of martial traditions and the popular desire to see the armed forces as a genuine
heir to glorious military traditions emerged in the Solidarity period (1980-1981), and this image was carefully cultivated by General Jaruzelski in his capacity as Minister of Defence. As the shock of martial law imposed in December 1981 wore off, a basic ambiguity has persisted and has divided the nation (as well as Western commentators). Most have condemned the coup as "waging war on society" on behalf of the USSR, but there have been many who defend it as serving national interests because it removed the danger of a Soviet invasion. In fact, the coup was a classic exercise by the armed forces of their "internal" task of "defending socialism" as envisaged by Soviet military doctrine. John Erickson quotes a senior Polish general (who defected to the West) to the effect that "here was a Warsaw Pact operation, not the sancta simplicitas of saving Polish honour and territorial integrity."

Although the GDR is the most highly militarized country in Eastern Europe and its NVA (National People's Army) is seen as the "best" of the East European military contingents, the old martial traditions of Prussia seem to have had a limited impact on East German youth, among whom pacifism has been growing. Martial traditions also seem to play a minimal role in Hungary, where pacifism is also spreading. In Czechoslovakia the military ethos was never very popular and the debacle of 1968 has discredited it even further. A certain martial spirit lives on in Romania, but only because its armed forces are seen there as a genuine instrument of national defence against an enemy which, although nameless, is clearly identifiable. Ambiguity concerning the armed forces has been reflected in the generally negative attitude of young men towards the draft, which is well documented in the case of all the bloc countries. It has also been illustrated by the ups and downs in the appeal of a professional military career, even in the countries where its prestige has traditionally been high. The few polls conducted among young people to determine their preferences in the choice of a career found that
military officers ranked low in comparison with other occupations. But the economic and social rewards of a military profession improved in the seventies as part of a bloc-wide build-up and modernization policy for the armed forces and a military career has become more attractive to ambitious young men with minimal emotional commitment either to nationalism or internationalism, but with a desire for status, privilege, and power.

The "Fit" of the Soviet Model

In the context of prevalent popular attitudes and the region's history the task of integrating East European military contingents into the Pact force structures to approximate a Soviet (Russian) military model appears truly formidable, if not impossible. The people do not identify with their communist regimes which, in the northern tier countries at least, are still viewed as agents of the occupying power. They do not identify with the broader international construct of the "socialist community of nations," nor do they recognize or support the Soviet Union's role as the Pact's leader or as their omniscient and benevolent "Elder Brother." At the same time, after 35 years of being consistently reminded that, in the global scale of things, they have been consigned to the Soviet sphere of influence, seemingly in perpetuity, most (the Poles seem to be an exception here) have resigned themselves to making the best of a bad deal, to render unto Caesar the bare minimum they can get away with, and to build for themselves the safest and most comfortable personal niche possible. This attitude has been reinforced by historical traditions of long periods of alien rule during which the people nevertheless succeeded in preserving their culture and national identity and in maintaining their social institutions "in camera." However, they also stand ready to support their communist governments if and as these governments attempt to carve out for themselves a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow and pursue what the populace perceives to be the national interest.
Any attitudinal integration of the East Europeans into the Marxist-Leninist political culture and the Soviet (Russian) value system is at present a pipe dream, if one understands by this the conscious and positive internalization of these values, even in countries with authoritarian traditions. The reason, first and foremost, is nationalism and divergencies in political culture. Nevertheless, there has been a gradual seepage from the Soviet Union of behavioural traits characteristic of the Soviet system. These include such well-known phenomena as contempt for "socialist legality" and the art of hoodwinking the authorities (ochkovitiratel'stvo); theft, bribery and corruption; localism (mestnichestvo) and family compacts (semeistvennost'), i.e. backscratching, influence peddling, and informal power groups; as well as alienation and alcoholism.

Functional integration, i.e. outward adaptation to officially approved norms and patterns, has proceeded apace with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The higher an individual stands on the ladder of power, the more pronounced his functional integration. This includes knowledge of the Russian language. Bilingualism is common at the top but non-existent at the bottom, despite the many years that the Russian language has been a compulsory subject in East European schools. The senior military ranks speak Russian fluently. It is in this group, as well as the senior echelons of the security police and of the party apparat, that one also finds a nucleus of people who have internalized the Soviet value system and thus have in fact assimilated into the Soviet model in attitudinal terms. Overall, they seem to be few in number; but they seem to be most numerous among senior military officers, all of whom have had years of training in Soviet military schools and have formed friendship ties with their peer group in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Inasmuch as the military manpower mirrors popular attitudes, the East European armies are not integrated -- except for their professional nuclei -- and are thus unreliable. Notwithstanding the obvious differences of time and place, the situation is not unlike that which
faced Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the Western borderlands (Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic countries) in 1918-1919. In a broader historical perspective the current level of integration of Pact forces may well appear to resemble the military situation at that time and the task at hand has been to transform unreliable national armies into facsimiles of the Red Army's national-territorial formations of the period of the twenties and early thirties, thus building up what to the authors of this study appears to be a Greater Socialist Army. From Moscow's point of view the main concern seems to be not a change in popular attitudes which, if achievable at all, cannot be done overnight -- although long-range policies towards this aim have not been forgotten -- but the introduction of integrative mechanisms which would deprive the East European governments of the capability to act in an independent fashion. In the military sphere this has been of crucial importance. The mechanisms there have been designed to make the national armies of Pact members integral parts of the Soviet Armed Forces through a system of fragmentation and bilateral ties forged under the umbrella of a multilateral alliance and clustered around a core provided by the Soviet forces stationed in the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Overall, the mechanisms are designed to assure the functional reliability of the East European forces. The policy, the methods, and the precedents are discussed in the chapters which follow.
ENDNOTES

1 Based on *The Military Balance 1983-84* (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983), pp. 11-23. The Soviet Union's regular armed forces in 1982 numbered 5.05 million men, but there were an additional 450,000 border guards (KGB) and internal security (MVD) troops. The Soviet troops in East-Central Europe were deployed as follows: 380,000 in the GDR, 40,000 in Poland, 80,000 in Czechoslovakia and 65,000 in Hungary. Category 1 combat readiness indicates that the unit is at 75 to 100% manpower strength and has complete combat equipment.

2 Romania alone is an exception; although retaining formal membership, it has refused to participate in common arrangements since the early sixties except when compatible with its leaders' perception of national sovereignty.


4 These are discussed in detail in Chapter 1, "The USSR," in Volume II of this study.

5 For a detailed analysis see Chapter 7, "Agencies of the Alliance..." and Chapter 5, "Historical Precedents...," below.

6 See the individual country chapters in Volume II, and Chapter 9, "Military Political Socialization...," below.

7 See Chapter 5, "Historical Precedents...," below.

8 See, for example, S.I. Bruk and M.I. Kabuzan, "Dinamika chislennosti i razvitiiia rasseleniia russkih posle Velikoi Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsii," *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* No. 5 (September-October), 1982.

9 The majority status of the Russians is being barely maintained, as their share in the total population declined from 54.6 per cent in 1959 to 52.4 per cent in 1979. A further decline is predicted by demographers: Murray Feshbach's projections for the year 2000 indicate that the Russians will constitute only 46.7 per cent of the total population. ("The Soviet Union: Population Trends and Dilemmas," *Population Bulletin* 37 (August 1982), Table 6, p. 22. There are also indications that official data may well be inflated, and that, in fact, in the early eighties the Russians no longer constituted a majority of the population. (Personal communication from Murray Feshbach, spring of 1983).

10 This attitude has been visible in the reports of Western
journalists, in the growing number of Western research studies on Russian nationalism, and in the statements of dissidents and émigrés. A typical example has been the reported Russian man-in-the-street attitude towards Poland's Solidarity movement: Poles are accused of rank ingratitude, because not only were they "liberated" by the Soviet Union, but they have been supported ever since and, what's more, they are in fact much better off materially than the Russians.


12 The union republic nations and their population in 1979 were:
Russians (136 million), Ukrainians (42.3 million), Uzbeks (12.4 million), Belorussians (9.4 million), Kazakhs (6.5 million), Azerbaidzhans (5.4 million), Armenians (4.1 million), Georgians (3.5 million), Moldavians (2.9 million), Tadzhiks (2.8 million), Lithuanians (2.8 million), Turkmen (2 million), Kirgiz (1.9 million), Latvians (1.4 million), and Estonians (1 million).

13 Bruk and Kabuzan, op. cit.

14 Religion is another key attribute. There is strong evidence that in the case of major Soviet national groups there has been a) a revival of religious beliefs, and b) a close correlation between religion and nationalism in the case of Greek Catholic (Uniate) Western Ukrainians, Catholic Lithuanians, Orthodox Russians and Moslem Asians.

15 The figures are in fact almost too good to be true, especially in the case of Uzbekistan where, for no apparent reason, the percentage increase was almost double that in the rest of Central Asia.


17 The Balts, Western Ukrainians and Belorussians, and the Jews are considered to be politically unreliable.

18 The data for general officers were obtained on the basis of an ethnic analysis of names. As a rule no data on the ethnic breakdown of the military cadre are available.

19 The "culture" criterion figures prominently in the requirements for admission to officer schools. It seems to be very much geared to Russian cultural stereotypes and in practical terms approximates the ideal of a Russian officer derived from the traditions of the Imperial Army.
In 1970 the Russians were the most urbanized group in the country (68 per cent of them were urban dwellers), barring only Jews, who were 98 per cent urbanized. Groups with urbanization levels higher than 50 per cent were the Tatars, the Armenians, the Latvians and the Estonians. The Ukrainians and the Belorussians had urbanization levels of 49 and 44 per cent, respectively.

See Vol. II, Chapter 1, "The USSR."

See Chapter 5, "Historical Precedents ..." below.

Feshbach, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

See Vol. II, Chapter 1, "The USSR."

See Chapter 3, "Patterns of Political Integration," below.

See the individual chapters in Vol. II.

See Chapters 4 and 6-8 below, and Vol. II, Chapter 8, "Romania."


Poland and East Germany (Prussia) in particular.

See the chapter on Poland in Vol. II.

See Chapter 4 below.


See the country chapters in Vol. II.
Chapter 3

PATTERNS OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

Ties of a "New Type"

In the aftermath of World War II East Central Europe found itself effectively under Soviet domination, with only Yugoslavia, and subsequently Albania, able to break away in order to maintain their national sovereignty. Under Stalin, Soviet controls were established on a bilateral pattern: Soviet agents directly penetrated the newly-established communist power structures in the six "loyal" communist states. But the tide of nationalism released by concessions attendant on the post-1953 struggle for power in the Soviet Union led most East European states to attempt to restore their national sovereignty. Pressures for greater national autonomy on the part of the non-Russian republics also emerged in Soviet domestic politics. Nationalism and the assertion of national demands have been perceived as a major threat by Soviet leaders both on the regional and on the domestic fronts.

Heads rolled on the domestic front (several republican party and government leaders were purged), and a policy of accelerated national integration was announced by Khrushchev at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961. Its core was a new formula of "rapprochement - merger" (sblizhenie-sliianie) which envisaged Soviet national groups growing ever closer together (on the basis of their common social and economic characteristics and class unity) on the road towards the eventual submergence of their particular identities in a common whole. In bloc relations Khrushchev attempted to use the structures of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, established in 1949) to promote integration from above. But his efforts met with varying degrees of resistance from the East Europeans, with Romania
putting the formal provisions of the two charters, especially the unanimity principle, to good use by vetoing arrangements which were considered to be inconsistent with Romanian national interests. The disarray in the bloc in political and economic matters was not duplicated, however, in the military sphere. As he took over as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Pact in 1960, Marshal Grechko proceeded to whip the East European armies into shape and to reintegrate them into the Soviet forces through a program of intensive combat training and multilateral exercises; motivated, undoubtedly, by the spectre of another Hungary and a determination to avoid more Romaniacs.

After Khrushchev's ouster the new leaders continued his integration policy at home, although the merger part of the formula was deemphasized to placate the disgruntled republics. But in bloc relations a new integration policy was introduced which was modelled on the domestic experience. It began to be articulated in Soviet sources in the early sixties, but a full blueprint emerged only after 1968. It envisages simultaneous steps towards integration in four basic areas: political, military, economic and cultural. More subtle and more flexible in dropping the unanimity principle, and in stressing integration from below and in selected sectors, the policy has retained the multilateral umbrella of the Warsaw Pact - CMEA system but has reasserted the vertical and bilateral nature of contacts between Moscow and East European capitals, à la Stalin and in line with "democratic centralism," which has been the CPSU's modus operandi since the days of Lenin.

The Soviet domestic roots of the new integration policy, i.e., the utilization of Soviet domestic experience in the resolution of bloc problems (the nature of which is perceived to be the same as in the Soviet Union), has not only been explicitly acknowledged by Soviet leaders but has become the keynote around which the work of the bloc's ideologists, propagandists and social scientists is being organized.
The immediate and practical relevance of Soviet experience to the USSR's relations with "fraternal" countries is the focus of Leonid Brezhnev's book *Internationalism and Friendship of the Peoples*. According to a review in an authoritative party journal, the theme of the book is the history of the socio-economic and political roots of the friendship of the Soviet nations, and the utility of this experience for bloc relations. This experience is said to provide "a beautiful model of international unity for the countries of the socialist community." The resolution of the national problem in the USSR in particular is "an inspiration" for the bloc:

This experience has a special meaning in the task of the construction of relations between the governments of the socialist community (because) in it they see the beautiful image of true altruistic friendship and cooperation among peoples.

Fraternal military friendship receives a special mention which dates its origins back to the Great October Revolution of 1917:

In the ranks of the Red Army the sons of the nations of our country fought shoulder to shoulder with Hungarians and Poles, Serbs and Croats, Czechs and Slovaks, Bulgarians and Austrians, Germans and Finns, Romanians and Mongols, Koreans and Chinese, and representatives of many other nationalities. This was a military international of revolutionaries.

It should be noted that the national groups mentioned include not only members of the socialist community in good standing, but also "defectors" from this community and nationals of countries where a socialist revolution has yet to take place.
"Socialist Internationalism"

"Socialist Internationalism" is the keynote of and the code word for the relationship of a "new type" among socialist states. Derived from the term "proletarian internationalism" but representing its more progressive and historically higher version, socialist internationalism describes both the class-based unity of the new alliance and its common Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the leading role of the Soviet Union within the relationship. What this means in practice is, first of all, the maintenance of the monopoly of political power within each state by its communist party and, second, these parties' subservience in all matters to the CPSU. The term denies political validity to nationalism and precludes the exercise of national sovereignty by any one state in order to safeguard, it is said, the socialist unity of the whole. Thus the making of decisions for the whole has been the prerogative of the senior partner, the Soviet Union. The term "socialist internationalism" has been ubiquitous. It has cropped up in all aspects of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist states, starting in the political realm and extending into the legal, economic, social, and cultural spheres. As shall be seen below, it has also been an integral part of strategic military doctrine and of the relations between the national contingents of the military forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The principle of "proletarian internationalism" is derived from Marx, but it was first applied after the October Revolution to describe nations and nationalities which henceforth shared a common working class base and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Indeed, the reconquest of the rebellious borderlands in 1919-1921 was justified on the grounds that the principle of proletarian unity is historically a higher and "more progressive" right than the right to national self-determination, a justification which was the forerunner of the Brezhnev doctrine. After the "revolutions" in East Central Europe the relations between the newly-emerged socialist states are also said to be of "a new type," and
for the same reasons. This is expressed in the principle of "socialist internationalism," a historically updated version of proletarian internationalism, because the bonds are between "socialist states," not merely national groups.

General Epishev is explicit in acknowledging the guiding principle of the socialist coalition: "The Warsaw Pact embodies the Leninist principles of socialist internationalism and the unity of the national and international tasks of the defence of world socialism." His formulation is echoed by Poland's Wojciech Jaruzelski: "The Warsaw Pact is ... in its nature a specific and highly organized form of socialist internationalism," because all of its members share the same socio-political system, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the principle of the leading party role (and thus have the same class characteristics) as well as the common aim of defending socialism. Another Polish source notes that these are the fundamentals which give a basic meaning to "brotherhood in arms" with the Soviet Armed Forces, which provide security to all the socialist states, and are at the base of the common military doctrine. Thus the defence of the socialist motherland is a patriotic duty; the defence of the Warsaw Pact international system is an internationalist duty. But the "patriotic duty" of a particular socialist army is ipso facto the "internationalist duty" of its fraternal brethren, because socialist internationalism requires that socialist armies always act together in the "defence of socialism."

It is precisely the Warsaw Pact's "class character" (i.e. socialist internationalism) that differentiates it from NATO as a regional defence organization, for in practice this means that behind the Pact's facade of multilateral state and military institutions there is a power grid of communist parties which has an apex in Moscow. No equivalent party network exists in the NATO countries. The difference is explicitly acknowledged by Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the CPSU Politbureau and the head of the CC International Department, who stated that "the fundamental difference between the (two) alliances is
basically the class difference." Soviet jurists define socialist internationalism as a principle of international law, which means "the commitment of all socialist states ... to subordinate their national interests to the international interests of the entire socialist community and its common aim -- the development of a communist society."\(^1\)

**The Leading Role of Communist Parties**

The leading role and close alliance of communist parties are absolutely crucial characteristics which ensure the unity and military cohesion of the socialist community. An unequivocal statement of the importance of these factors is provided by Leonid Brezhnev himself:

> The crux of the crux (osnova osnov) of our close collaboration, its living soul and its directing organizational force is, of course, the unbreakable militant union of communist parties of the socialist countries, the unity of their world outlook, the unity of their goals, the unity of their will.\(^1\)

To this General Epishev adds that the leading role of communist parties in the military organization of the Pact keeps increasing, dictated by the "need for constantly strengthening the military unity of the socialist countries and their defence preparedness," and by the need to improve ideological work in socialist armies, "educating the fighters of fraternal armies in the spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism."\(^1\)

A military historian repeats Brezhnev's formulation that the parties' collaboration is the "crux of the crux" of the strengthening of fraternal friendship, and adds that the most effective instruments for implementing this "fraternal friendship" in the Pact's military organization have been bilateral and multilateral meetings, consultations and conferences at the higher levels of the military leadership of member states, and at the command level of military contingents. It is at these meetings and consultations that a
"unity of views" on questions of the "construction of national and united armed forces" is developed.  

The Leading Role of the Soviet Union

An indispensable element in the "socialist internationalism" formula is the preeminence of the Soviet Union in the Pact, and of the CPSU among communist parties. This is justified both by the long experience which the USSR has had with the "construction of socialism" and by Soviet military might. General Epishev does not mince words: "The USSR is the major factor in the might of the Warsaw Pact because of its nuclear and rocket strength."  

An echo again comes from General Jaruzelski, who stresses the "basic and priceless role" of the USSR in all aspects of Warsaw Pact collaboration: political, economic, scientific-technical, and military. Predictably, there is also a close parallel in Soviet history: in the formation of the Soviet Union (and representing a prototype for the later role of the Soviet Union within the socialist community), "the decisive role was played by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) around which other republics "voluntarily clustered." This was possible because "the Russian people have given altruistic assistance to other nations of the country in spite of their own difficulties and deprivations."

The Soviet people have played precisely the same role in the socialist community of nations, as numerous East European sources have "gratefully" acknowledged.

The "debt to the USSR" of the East European socialist armies is succinctly summarized by Soviet military historians. The debt has been incurred because the USSR destroyed fascist Germany (all Soviet histories attribute the Allied victory over Hitler solely to the Soviet Union); because it trained the East European armies and supplied them with weapons, military technology and other necessities; because it sponsored the first Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian formations on Soviet soil (and hence provided the all-important nucleus of a trained
cadre); and, finally, because it has protected them from imperialist intervention and domestic counter-revolution.22

"National Form" and "Socialist Content"

The arrangement whereby the communist party is assured of a monopoly of power across the national spectrum, while the specific national identity of component groups is reflected in a formal institutional framework, is known in the Soviet Union as "national in form and socialist in content." In accordance with this arrangement the CPSU is a unitary organization (albeit organized for administrative purposes in accordance with the state's territorial-administrative divisions), while the "national form" is expressed in the formal federal state structure. The trend, condemned and resisted by Moscow, has been for the party organizations in the republics to identify with local national interests and to attempt the articulation of these interests via the republics' party and state bureaucracies. But when it comes to identifying the locus of power, few people still harbour illusions that the supreme state organs such as the USSR Supreme Soviet have powers other than to rubber-stamp the decisions of the CPSU Politbureau.

The party-state relationship in each East European member country of the Warsaw Pact is similar to the party-state relationship in the USSR. But because the degree of centralization is much less pronounced and the level of autonomy of the East European parties is much higher than that of Soviet republican parties, the ties between the East European parties and the CPSU have not been readily visible and thus illusions persist that the formal bodies of the Warsaw Pact constitute the true centre of the Pact's political power. Ever since the fiasco of the Cominform and the failure of the Soviet leadership to resurrect a communist international which would include all the world communist parties and recognize the leading role of the CPSU, the relationship between the bloc's ruling parties has not been institutionalized.
Such institutionalization is said to be unnecessary in conditions of mature socialism. Nevertheless, in the early 1980s there were three departments in the CPSU Central Committee in charge of the world communist movement. The one which deals with bloc ruling parties is the Department for Liaison with Communist and Worker's Parties, currently headed by Konstantin Rusakov (his predecessor, Konstantin Katushev, is the secretary of the CMEA). The bloc parties' ties to the CPSU are cemented through multiple instrumentalities. Most important are contacts between the parties' leaders; Secretary Brezhnev had annual meetings with the secretaries of the East European parties in the Crimea, where they met with him one by one. Other meetings occur at the congresses held by each party and at meetings of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, but most meetings are held on an ad hoc basis, during visits to Moscow. It is at this level that East European challenges, if any, have been articulated, and where there is evidence of East European bargaining. Below the top leadership level the "fraternal" parties coordinate specific activities among themselves at all levels and in all aspects of party work through a plethora of bilateral and multilateral meetings of lower-ranking functionaries. It is Rusakov's department which orchestrates the contacts. To facilitate Moscow's direction there are certain unwritten but obligatory rules and practices in the parties' behaviour which follow CPSU practice and thus extend control lines directly to Moscow. These are the nomenklatura system (control over appointments) as well as the ubiquitous presence of secret police agencies and their linkages to the KGB. There is also a system of self-censorship.23

The Political Consultative Committee is officially the supreme organ of the Pact, but it meets infrequently and has the attributes of a rubber-stamping rather than a decision-making body, very much on the pattern of the USSR Supreme Soviet. At his famous press conference in July 1968 Czechoslovakia's Lt. General Prchlik unequivocally stated that the PCC was not fulfilling its functions:
...in our opinion, one should strengthen the role of the political advisory committee, which should become a regularly, purposefully and systematically-working organ and which should not be entirely dependent on being occasionally convoked; the committee has so far worked very sporadically, thus failing to implement this function.

Overall the agencies of the Warsaw Pact serve either a legitimizing function or an administrative function.

Moscow's policy over the years has been to reduce East European autonomy to a level approximating that of the Soviet republics, while the East European parties and individual leaders have made repeated attempts to maximize their national autonomy and to gain national sovereignty. Control over national armies has been the crucial variable in this contest, and it is the main thesis of this study that Soviet military policies instituted in the early 60s, in the wake of the successful assertion of national sovereignty by Yugoslavia and Albania, have been instrumental in placing all East European national armies (except the Romanian Army) effectively under Soviet military control. As a result, and despite the largely "cosmetic" changes of 1969, Soviet hegemony is unquestionable in the WP military agencies.

There has been a great deal of speculation about the Pact's Joint Staff and its role in peacetime and in war. Specialists generally assume that the Pact's military agencies have primarily administrative tasks, with operational responsibilities for the Pact forces as a whole being retained by the Soviet Armed Forces command. This opinion was recently expressed by two leading British specialists. Commenting on the 1969 reforms of the Pact, John Erickson notes:
At this juncture the staff organization emerged in firm institutional form as the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces still headed by a Soviet general, and a Soviet first deputy chief of staff (with the rank of major general). This was not a staff in an operational sense (at least not at this point): the Joint Staff seems to have discharged more supervisory, training, and administrative functions. The pact lacked specific air defence components, logistics (and mobilization) apparatus and command/ control/ communications (C3) systems.26

Malcolm Macintosh is even more explicit:

The (Pact) Headquarters has no operational capability in peacetime. It has ... no logistics branch, and no transportation or supply services organizations. All of these are provided by the Soviet Ministry of Defence. Moreover, the air defence... is the responsibility of the Soviet Homeland Air Defence Command ... the national air defence forces are linked directly to (its) headquarters ... My suggestion is therefore, that ... in wartime the Soviet High Command ... would take command of whatever East European forces are available ...27

Rapprochement - Merger Formula

The "rapprochement-merger" formula which is said to govern national relations in the Soviet Union is also applied to the process of convergence within the socialist community of nations. According to Secretary Brezhnev, "the process of integration of the socialist countries leads towards their ever closer rapprochement (sblizhenie), which does not, however, erase their national specificity."28 Similar formulations, as applied to East European states and parties and to the socialist armies, appear in other Soviet and East European sources. The merger side of the formula was not stressed in the Brezhnev era, on either the domestic or bloc scene. But shortly after his accession to power the new Secretary General, Yuri Andropov, seemingly revived this theme, stating in his speech at the 60th Anniversary of the USSR that
"Our final objective... is clear. It is, in Lenin's words, not only
the drawing together of nations but also their merger. Although this
statement referred to the domestic scene it was picked up and attacked
by the Romanian party's deputy chief of propaganda because of its
alleged relevance to the bloc and its integration.

Bilateral Treaties and Other Legal Instruments

The relationship between socialist states is governed in detail
not by the Warsaw Treaty -- as communist propaganda claims and many
Western observers erroneously believe -- but by a series of bilateral
treaties and other legal instruments. Thus, should the Warsaw Pact be
ever officially dissolved -- a bait that Communist propaganda has
offered to Western public opinion in exchange for the dissolution of
NATO and the withdrawal of American troops from Europe -- the legal
instruments which underwrite the integration mechanisms binding the East
European states to the Soviet Union will remain firmly in place. Boris
Meissner distinguishes three generations of bilateral treaties between
the East European states and the Soviet Union. He defines the first
generation as primarily security treaties designed by Stalin to
safeguard the newly-acquired Soviet domain in Eastern Europe. The
second generation is defined as "integration treaties," setting the
legal basis for much closer cooperation in the political, economic and
military spheres. The characteristic trait of the third-generation
treaties, according to Meissner, is "that they are applications of the
Brezhnev doctrine."

Between 1945 and 1949 23 first-generation treaties of
friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance were signed in Eastern
Europe. When the Warsaw Treaty -- also a treaty of friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance -- was concluded in 1955 (including
for the first time the GDR and Albania) Khrushchev considered the
alliance system to be complete, with the Warsaw Treaty as its
centrepiece; the bilateral treaties amended in this period indicated
their supplementary nature to the Warsaw Treaty.\textsuperscript{32} But the change of leadership in the Soviet Union brought with it a change in the perception of the "socialist system."

The first of the second-generation treaties was the one concluded by the Soviet Union with the GDR on 12 June 1964. It was also the first bilateral treaty concluded by the GDR. Socialist internationalism was the centrepiece of the new treaties:

In the new alliance treaties the stress on the priority of the principle of "proletarian socialist internationalism" in connection with the principle of peaceful coexistence meant that there was a more emphatic recognition of Soviet hegemony in East Europe.\textsuperscript{33}

Another important difference was the wording of the alliance clause. First-generation treaties invoked the principle of mutual assistance on the basis of Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations, which allowed for common defence against a former (World War II) enemy. Second-generation treaties based mutual assistance on Article 51 of the Charter, which allows for defence in the face of an attack from any quarter. This extended the range of obligations under the second-generation treaties beyond the obligations incurred under the Warsaw Treaty. Twenty second-generation treaties were signed between 1964 and 1972, for the system was not completed until after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{34}

The principles which were included in the first-generation treaties were those of "fraternal and everlasting friendship," "close and all-sided cooperation," and "comradely fraternal assistance." The second-generation treaties went a step further towards integration by stressing a formula, related to the unity of the "socialist community," defined variously as "unity," "solidarity," or "cohesion." The invasion of Czechoslovakia was a milestone in the evolution of the policy of
integration, as it has been reflected in international legal instruments, for it introduced the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. Its major principles were contained in the Bratislava formula of 3 August 1968 which stressed the "common international duty of all socialist countries to support, strengthen and defend socialist gains."35

These two principles, "common international duty" and "defence of the gains of socialism," became a keynote of the third-generation treaties which have also included the reformulated principle of "unity and cohesion" of the socialist community. Two additional points are also stressed: socialist economic integration and, since 1972, a phrase dealing with "closer connections between socialist countries and nations,"36 in fact the "rapprochement" formula. The first third-generation treaty, appropriately enough, was the USSR-Czechoslovakia Treaty of 6 May 1970. The second was the USSR-GDR Treaty of 7 October 1974, and it was in this treaty that all the third-generation characteristics discussed above were fully developed. The Soviet Union also signed a new treaty with Romania on 7 July 1970, but the provisions here did not go beyond the usual characteristics of second-generation treaties. Presumably because of Romanian resistance to becoming a signatory of a treaty which would limit its exercise of national sovereignty, and Soviet unwillingness to complete a system with one piece missing, it was the GDR which has served as a proxy for the Soviet Union in extending the network of third-generation treaties to other countries of the socialist community. The GDR signed alliance treaties with Hungary (24 March 1977), Poland (28 May 1977), Bulgaria (14 September 1977) and Czechoslovakia (3 October 1977),37 all of which contained the formulae discussed above. Meissner comments:

The alliance treaties of the third generation express the Soviet Union's increased claims to hegemony and much stronger integration in the Soviet hegemonial association. Along with the guarantee of security and increased integration comes the legal justification for closer ties
with the community of states led by the Soviet Union. It entitles us to describe these alliance treaties as bloc treaties. Obviously the Soviet Union, due largely to consistent resistance from Romania, had inhibitions about completing further bloc treaties. So the GDR now has the function of being an outrider for the Soviet hegemonial power.\(^38\)

He also notes that since the Czech invasion the principle of "unity and cohesion" has been interpreted by Soviet jurists as "the concrete expression of the principle of socialist proletarian internationalism."\(^39\)

In line with the Brezhnev doctrine, the new generation of treaties not only "prohibits secession" from the socialist community, but also precludes "any divergence from an orthodox communist system of government and society of the communist type."\(^40\) Thus they serve both the external (common defence) and the internal (maintenance of the systemic status quo) functions of the alliance, as these are defined in strategic military doctrine (discussed below). At the 24th Congress of the CPSU Secretary General Brezhnev described the bilateral treaty system of the socialist states as "a developed system of reciprocal alliance obligations of a new socialist type."\(^41\) The legal underpinnings of the Soviet-directed hegemonial system extend beyond international obligations, into the realm of domestic legal systems. The 1977 USSR Constitution includes an unequivocal commitment to socialist internationalism and the construction of a socialist world system. Article 30 reads:

The USSR, as part of the world system of socialism and of the socialist community, promotes and strengthens friendship, cooperation and comradely mutual assistance with other socialist countries on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism, and takes an active part in socialist economic integration and the socialist international division of labour.\(^42\)
Taken in conjunction with Article 69, which states that it is the "internationalist duty" of Soviet citizens to promote friendship and cooperation with others in the promotion of world peace, and Article 29, which provides for the observance of international treaties, the Soviet Constitution legalizes Soviet action in pursuit of the provisions contained in bilateral treaties.

The East European constitutions also have been amended to include references both to a commitment to socialist internationalism and to their membership in the socialist community and/or world socialist system. Last but not least, the commitment of the ruling parties to the common "defence of the socialist community" and to the principles of "socialist internationalism" in its various interpretations and applications has been prominently and repeatedly featured in the resolutions of party congresses.

Global Linkages

One other aspect of the perceived role of the Warsaw Pact needs to be noted. Although at present it is a regional defence organization and a counterpart to NATO, it is seen as the nucleus of a future communist world and the core of "the three great revolutionary forces of today: the world socialist system, the international workers' and communist movement and the national liberation movement" united in an "offensive against imperialism"; the construction of communism is not only the great Soviet aim but the Soviet "internationalist debt" to the world. The global importance of the Warsaw Pact and its linkage to revolutionary processes elsewhere, especially in the Third World, is well summed up by General Jaruzelski:

The emergence of the socialist community became an organic part of a universal process which has transformed the face of the world, moving to the front the socialist social formation as the decisive factor of progress, freedom and peace. This process originated with the Great October
Revolution, the victory of the Russian proletariat, and the formation of the USSR. The USSR's role in World War II and its decisive input into the defeat of fascism has magnified this historical tendency and created beneficial conditions for the working masses of many countries of Europe and Asia to gain power and to carry out and defend revolutionary transformations. In the long-range phase, the same type of conditions also emerged in the American and African spheres. As a result, the world socialist system was formed, colonial structures were destroyed, many new developing countries were created, and the global situation changed out of all recognition.

The Warsaw Pact Treaty has an article (Art. 9) which invites "all European states," irrespective of their social and political systems, to join the Warsaw Pact. This residual invitation to NATO members was placed there to underscore NATO's refusal in 1954 to consider a Soviet request for membership, and this invitation is routinely repeated in Soviet and East European sources. The only condition for admission is that such states should be "peace-loving," but no explanations are offered as to how states with different social systems can fit into the "socialist internationalism" which characterizes the alliance. The formal invitation remains open. In practice, the Soviet Union has a number of bilateral treaties with the countries of the Third World. These include "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" treaties with countries mostly of a "socialist orientation" which resemble first-generation treaties concluded between Pact countries. Thus the socialist community already includes non-regional actors de facto if not de jure. Certainly, East European and Soviet military personnel have been serving as advisers in the various Third World countries linked to Pact members by bilateral treaties. In general, bilateral treaties signed with Third World countries
are all cooperation or entente treaties with subtle gradations but always with the aim of bringing a wide geographical range of countries towards the East Pact system, of course in connection with broader efforts to bring the large group of non-aligned countries generally into partnership with the Soviet Union.49

"Survivals" of Nationalism

An intensive military integration programme has now been in place in the bloc for over ten years. Freedom to deviate from Soviet norms and to resist Soviet policies has been severely restricted. This does not mean that nationalism has disappeared or that it is less of a problem than it was in Khrushchev's heyday. But it is less visible. When and if national demands and differences are articulated, it is usually via party channels and at the highest level, although national antagonisms penetrate the whole structure.

Communist sources refer to the problem obliquely, except in the case of open challenges such as the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring or the Solidarity movement, which are always denounced as counterrevolutionary and are blamed on imperialist subversion and interference. Romania has also been repeatedly denounced for nationalism. But in general the problem is referred to as a vestigial one. The discussion -- as exemplified in the treatment of the problem by Leonid Brezhnev -- is cast in terms of the need to overcome national survivals. But it is recognized that the process of the disappearance of nationalism promises to be a very long one, involving much effort and suffering and fraught with great difficulties which are always compounded by the imperialists, who seek the weakest link in the socialist armour.50

National problems are least visible in the military structures of the Pact, although in 1983 the Moscow correspondent of a Yugoslav journal reported that there were differences within the Warsaw Pact over the armaments race (connected undoubtedly with the difficult economic
situation of all member states) which apparently required an appeal to member states by General Kulikov (the current Commander-in-Chief) to "close ranks," and required visits by Marshal Ustinov, Soviet Defence Minister and Politbureau member, to Budapest and East Berlin. 51

Regarding the general atmosphere in the armed forces, a cautious and understated summary by two Soviet military analysts illustrates some of the problems. Although written in 1968 it still seems to be reflective of the present situation:

It is natural that national features and distinctions inherent in countries and armies might sometimes give birth to certain difficulties in resolving the tasks of military collaboration. The theses of the CC CPSU provide a theoretical grounding for this phenomenon and indicate that, inherited from the past, these differences in levels of economic and social development, in class structure and in historical and cultural traditions give birth to objective difficulties in resolving such vital tasks as the adjustment of many-sided collaboration ... But these differences are successfully overcome when questions are resolved from the position of socialist internationalism, with consideration for common tasks and objective regularities, as well as for the national features of each country ... the dialectical unity of that which is common and that which is separate in the problems of socialist construction and ... in the cause of military collaboration of socialist countries finds expression in the combination of these common regularities and specific national peculiarities. ... But the main thing is that in all Warsaw Pact countries, Marxist-Leninist parties fully and undeviatingly direct the armed forces.52

Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this volume is to investigate the crucial question of whether or not the East European armies are in fact national armies, with a national military mission and an independent capability to exercise this mission. Any attempt to answer this question has to
take a historical perspective. As the evidence of the following chapters overwhelmingly indicates, these armies originated as parts of the SAF or as partisan units eventually linked to the Soviet command, and not as independent armies (Romania is a partial exception), and they continued to be penetrated by Soviet personnel until roughly 1956. In the 1956-68 period -- which, overall, was the period of differentiation and independent initiatives in the bloc -- attempts were made by military leaders in several countries, always in conjunction with like-minded political leaders, to establish an independent mission and create structures compatible with national interests. But after the Yugoslav and Albanian defections none were successful with the exception of Romania. In view of the fact that in the sixties the Soviet leadership took an initiative to transform the Warsaw Pact into a mechanism which, in the operational sense, first fragments the members' military forces and then reintegrates them into the Soviet forces, none of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact has ever had or can now be considered to have a national army, within the definition above, except, again, Romania.

From the Soviet viewpoint the Warsaw Pact forces have a double mission, that of the internal and external "defence of socialism." The first has been defined by the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine; the second has a global application. Neither is compatible with national interests as viewed from Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia, or Bucharest. But it is only in Bucharest that national interest has been the determining principle. East Germany is not viable outside the Pact structure, and thus its perspective is Moscow's perspective.

The Pact's internal mechanisms, political and military, are seen in Moscow as an extension of the Soviet domestic political system to relations among socialist states. Thus the Pact's formal institutional features -- a regional international organization of sovereign states with the PCC, etc. -- are the equivalent of the federal structures in Soviet domestic arrangements and constitute the "national form" part of
political relations which is officially declared to be necessary for the accommodation of vestigial national perceptions. However, the substance of power, the "socialist content" of the system, is centralized and flows through the communist parties. Each has a monopoly of power in its own country: the principle which expresses this situation is the "leading role of the party." In relations among socialist states the leading role of each party (except the CPSU) is modified by another principle, that of "socialist internationalism," which is the code word for the CPSU's control of all other parties.

The form is multilateral, but the system is based on bilateral ties between the Soviet Union and other member states. It operates on the principle of "democratic centralism" -- vertical control lines run from top to bottom -- and is open-ended in that the membership accepts new adherents. The armed forces, along with the security police, are the ultimate guarantors of the system's existence, its further development and planned expansion. They must, therefore, be subordinated to the will of their respective parties (hence the crucial importance of military-political administrations), but also to one political and military centre, the USSR National Defence Committee (the core of the Politbureau) and its operational arm, the Soviet General Staff. In effect the Ministries of Defence of member states are the administrative and training arms of the Moscow centre. From a historical perspective the East European military organizations are a modified version of the national-territorial formations in the Soviet Union as they existed in the twenties and during the Great Patriotic War. The modification in this case has to do with the East Europeans' prickly national sensibilities, and thus the arrangements which have been adopted resemble those which existed in the Caucasus in the transition period after the Caucasian republics were reconquered in 1920 and before they were completely absorbed.

This construct is a paradigm designed in Moscow, but the distribution of real power reflects and supports it. In practice the
picture is less neat, since East-Central Europe has been replete with challenges to the Moscow centre. To be successful these challenges have to originate from within the ruling parties and their military supporters. But the rate of success has been poor, and the stranglehold is very real. Yet because "national forms" have been carefully preserved, and national loyalties (even within ruling parties) outweigh by far the commitment to "socialist internationalism," a residual capability for challenge and explosion remains. Why then is this situation tolerated in view of the obvious power preponderance and demonstrated ruthlessness of Moscow? It can be argued that a diminution of the formal sovereignty of the East European states is not feasible, just as the abolition of the Soviet republics did not prove to be feasible -- despite much talk to the contrary -- at the time of the drafting of the new (1977) Soviet Constitution. But there is another, perhaps more valid reason, which applies to domestic as well as to bloc relations. The "socialist community," and the elaborate ideological panoply used to justify the imposition of the system and the Soviet leading role within it, serves to legitimize the Soviet presence and, more important, the presence of Soviet military power in East Central Europe. Without the Pact and the community framework the Soviet presence would merely be "imperialist" in nature, whereas in the present situation it is rationalized as a "fraternal" presence. This distinction helps to diminish resistance and helps to divide host countries between a "New Class" which is an integral part of the system of "fraternal" linkages and has a vital stake in the system's survival, and society at large. This division has been most starkly and most recently demonstrated in the Poland of "Solidarity" and the Poland of martial law. "Internationalism," "Friendship of Peoples" and "Brotherhood in Arms" also legitimize Soviet global ambitions and feed the foreign policy dynamism of a system which is facing stagnation at home.
ENDNOTES

1 See this author's "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," Problems of Communism 23 (May-June 1974), pp. 1-22.


4 For a discussion of the policy and its domestic linkages see this author's "Socialist Internationalism in Eastern Europe -- A New Stage," Survey 22 (Winter 1976 and Spring 1976). The plans for cultural integration, in particular as they have affected social science work, are discussed in "Mnogostoronnuye programmy po obshchestvennym naukam: itogi piatiletiia," pp. 167-171, Obshchestvennye Nauki No. 3, 1982. This journal (which is published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) reports that according to the 1976-1980 plan of collaboration between the academies of sciences of member countries of the socialist community (including Cuba and Mongolia from outside the bloc), nine problem commissions were set up, all of which link the resolution of a particular problem to the October Revolution and Soviet experience. See also Christopher D. Jones, "The Bureaucracies of Knowledge in the Countries of Real Socialism," paper presented at the AAASS Annual Conference in Kansas City, October 1983.

5 The quotations here are from a review of this book: "KPSS -- Velikaia vdoxnovliaushchaia sila sotsialisticheskogo internatsionalizma i druzhby narodov," Partiiinaiia Zhizn No. 15, 1982, pp. 3-9.

6 Ibid., p. 3.

7 Ibid., p. 6.

8 Ibid., p. 4. This is a direct quote from Brezhnev's book, p. 98.

9 "The interests of socialism are higher than the interests of the right of nations to self-determination" -- V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26 (London: 1960-1970), p. 449; "There are occasions when the right to self-determination conflicts with ... the higher right -- of a working class ... to consolidate its power. In such cases ... the former must give way to the latter." -- J.V. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 158.
Although none of the states of East-Central Europe except Yugoslavia and Albania actually had a revolution, the establishment there of communist states is regarded as a "revolution." In the common social science studies programme noted above, one "Problem Commission" is devoted to the study of the history of the Great October Revolution and the follow-up revolutions, especially the ones in 1921 in Mongolia, 1940 in the Baltic countries, in the 1940s in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and also in Vietnam and Cuba. See the article in Obshchestvennye Nauki, op. cit., p. 168.


17. Ibid., p. 346.


21. "KPSS--Velikaia...," op. cit., p. 4. It is precisely this "altruistic assistance" and the resulting "deprivations" which are being increasingly resented by the Russians. See Chapter 2 above.


23. Otto Ulic compares the operation of self-censorship in communist systems to the behaviour of a herd of cattle enclosed in a pasture.
with an electrified fence. Having touched the fence once or twice, the animals learn to stay away from the enclosure in order to avoid electric shocks. (Personal communication). Members of the East European political elites learn not only what to do but what not to do.


See Chapter 7 below.


"KPSS-Velikaia ...," op. cit., p. 8.


Meissner, op. cit., passim.

Ibid., p. 287.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 287-8.

Quoted in ibid., p. 288.

Ibid., pp. 288-291.

Ibid., p. 288.
Ibid., p. 291.

Ibid., p. 290.

Ibid., p. 284.

Quoted in Epishev, *op. cit.*, p. 341.


See, for example: X S'ezd Bolgarskoi kommunisticheskoi partii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972); Dokumente des VIII Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1971); VII S'ezd Pol'skoi Ob'edinennoi rabochei partii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976); XV S'ezd kommunisticheskoi partii Chekhoslovaki (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977).

"KPSS--Velikaia ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7. See also Article 69 of the Soviet Constitution.


Quoted and explained by Erickson, *op. cit.*, p. 146.


Meissner, *op. cit.*, p. 283 (from the summary of the article).

"KPSS-Velikaia ...," *op. cit.*, p. 8.


See Chapters 5, 6 and 7 below.
See Chapters 7 and 8 below.

See Chapter 4 below.


See Chapter 5 below.
Chapter 4

STRATEGIC MILITARY DOCTRINE: POLITICAL ASPECTS

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

The strategic military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is in fact the strategic military doctrine of the Soviet Armed Forces. As such, it is a framework for the integration of the East European forces of the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet forces. Romania alone was able to remain outside the framework by successfully developing a national military doctrine. Efforts in the same direction by Polish officers in the late 50s (the "Polish Front" concept promoted by General Duszynski) and by a reformist Czech military group in 1968 (the "Gottwald Memorandum") were cut short. The level of integration the joint forces have reached since, inclusive of joint training of Soviet and East European command staffs in Soviet military academies, endeavours to insure that any such attempts are precluded in the future.

The Soviet strategic military doctrine, as Donnelly points out, stems from four basic elements: Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Russian geo-strategic and political heritage, the military experience of the October 1917 Revolution and of the "Great Patriotic War," and the impact of modern military technology. None of the first three elements can be said to have much relevance to the military traditions and past military doctrines of any Pact member other than the USSR. While the balance between these elements has varied, the variations have not affected the crucial importance of the Marxist-Leninist framework in which the doctrine is firmly grounded and which shapes its political goals and the perceptions on which these goals are based. All theoretical assumptions have immediate practical implications. On the whole, Marxist-Leninist ideology has admirably served the interests of the Pact's founder and senior partner. It has legitimized the communists'
monopoly of power which, in the bloc, had in fact benefited the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It has justified the loss of sovereignty by the East Europeans and their integration into the Soviet state system. And it has validated an expansionist global foreign policy which is underwritten by the Pact's military might, all in the name of fulfilling the myth of history's ultimate destiny: the happiness of mankind under world communism, the achievement of which depends on the victory of the "socialist world system" over the "forces of imperialism."

The primacy of the party in the armed forces and the distinction between the dominant political and the military-technical side of the military doctrine is made clear in Soviet sources. The first is within the sole domain of the CPSU, which has "the leading role in the creative development of our military thought and military science"; the second "points out the ways, means and methods of (their) fulfillment." As discussed above, the primacy of politics has affected the nature and the functions of the Warsaw Pact armies and has stamped them with characteristics unknown to Western armies. From the point of view of Pact cohesion it is the political side of the doctrine which concerns us most.

The LEADING ROLE OF THE PARTY is the crucial variable in the shaping of the character of "socialist" armies and the nature of their mission. It derives, we are told, from the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the leading role of the party in socialist states, which has been incorporated into the programs of fraternal ruling parties. The leading role of the party in the military constitutes the main point of difference between the socialist armies of the "new type," and socialist armies. The common ideological base and communist party leadership (the senior position of the CPSU as the most experienced partner is implied throughout) unites socialist states and socialist armies in their joint integrated endeavour to "defend socialism."

The key concept is the DEFENCE OF SOCIALISM which, we are never
allowed to forget, was originally postulated by Lenin. In practice it has been all-embracing. It evokes the "necessity" of the integration of the bloc not only in the military sense but also in all other aspects: political, ideological, economic and cultural. It endows socialist armies with the crucial function of internal and intra-bloc repression, and extends their external function to embrace the whole world. The reasons why it is considered vital for the socialist community (sotsialisticheskoe sodruzhestvo) to pursue its defence of socialism in an integrated fashion are explained by Army General A.A. Epishev, the long-tenured incumbent in the post of chief of the Military Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the first place, according to Epishev, history has validated the truth of Lenin's conclusion that the need to defend socialism from "aggressive designs of international imperialist reactionaries" constitutes one of the general laws which govern the transition from capitalism to socialism. Secondly, the defence of socialism extends beyond the purely military sphere to also embrace economics, culture, politics and ideology. Thirdly, the defence of socialism remains a necessity for as long as imperialism exists, because imperialism constitutes an ever-present threat not only in the form of a direct attack on socialist states, but also in the form of a "quiet counter-revolution." Fourthly and finally the defence of socialism is the key internationalist task of the now powerful socialist system; in conditions of an ongoing struggle between the socialist and capitalist world systems its pursuit is essential to provide the necessary guarantee of peace for the construction of socialism and communism. Thus the "united efforts of all socialist countries in the defence of the world socialist system are now the objective (historical) necessity." The "internationalist task," which refers to the global dimensions of Soviet foreign policy efforts, is habitually referred to in Soviet and East European sources as the "internationalist debt" which they "owe" to the world and humanity.
Seen in a historical perspective, the internal function of socialist armies has been "the armed defence of socialist gains against the intrigues of the subjugated exploiting classes," especially as the latter were able to mount armed resistance in addition to economic, ideological and political opposition. There are three basic ways in which a socialist army can perform its internal function of the "defence of socialism":

a. It can provide backup and support for the organs of internal security;

b. It can engage in direct military action whenever opposition by the "enemies of socialism" "acquires a significant scale, intensity, duration and sharpness";

c. By its very presence it acts as a deterrent to any open activities by class enemies. Examples of activities requiring direct internal military action are: "a counter-revolutionary uprising"; "a mutiny"; "banditry"; and in its most acute form, "a civil war."7

The history of the establishment of Soviet power in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe amply illustrates the practical exercise by socialist armies of all three forms of their internal function. The first time the Red Guards were used to suppress the free expression of popular sovereignty was when Russia's first and only Constituent Assembly (where the Bolsheviks had only approximately 25 percent of the vote) was dissolved on 18-19 January, 1918. The most recent case was the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. It should be noted that the source quoted above (a military text for training in Marxism-Leninism) was published some years before the classic -- in terms of definitions provided -- exercise in direct military action by General Jaruzelski's forces. Invariably, official explanations of the use of military power against the state's own population have endeavoured to create a positive image and have assumed legitimacy in terms of "defending socialism" against "class enemies" supported by the "imperialists." Popular preferences are irrelevant, but a negative connotation which might create sympathy for the target group or groups has been carefully avoided.
As socialism consolidates its gains and matures, the internal defence function of socialist armies is assumed to diminish and eventually to disappear. Because the need for internal suppression of class enemies is temporary and connected with a concrete historical period, this withering away is seen as part of a general law (zakonomernost') which governs the development of socialist armies. In the Soviet Union, now in the stage of "mature socialism," it has officially withered away already. Marginally one might add that Soviet state security and internal affairs organs and their military formations appear fully capable of stepping into the breach should the need arise. Applying the same yardstick, the performance of the function of internal suppression by the Polish Armed Forces is obviously still very much needed.

The situation varies in other bloc countries. Selective "withering away" notwithstanding, the maintenance of constant general vigilance against both internal and external hostile forces is strongly advocated, because "in some periods" internal class struggle may revive or intensify particularly "if stimulated by the imperialists from outside." Within the bloc such vigilance continues to be a matter of top priority, and the bloc-policing duties of Pact armies appear to be a part of both their internal and external functions. The 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia was the first time this responsibility was exercised jointly in response to developments which were classified explicitly as a "quiet counter-revolution" and thereby affected the Czech Army's capability to act. Thirteen years later, in Poland, another joint action was undoubtedly contemplated but proved unnecessary, the level of "vigilance" of the Polish Army (or its leaders) having been built up adequately to permit it to act on its own.

Internal suppression is seen as a transitional need. But the socialist armies perform another internal function which is of a permanent nature: that of being "the School of the Nation." By providing the (almost) entire male population (and a segment of the
female population) with "ideological, political and moral upbringing,"
the armies make a major contribution to the life of each nation. An
additional benefit is the acquisition of technical skills which serve
the civilian economy after military service is completed. The "School
of the Nation" role is seen as unique and as another characteristic
which differentiates socialist armies from capitalist armies. The
Soviet Armed Forces are a prototype in the discharge of the
socialization role, and have been the model for other Pact armies.

As the function of internal suppression withers away, the
emphasis shifts to the EXTERNAL FUNCTION OF SOCIALIST ARMIES, which
becomes broader and more important. This is another way of saying
that with the successful consolidation of power and the growth of
economic and military strength the foreign policy of communist states
becomes more aggressive. At present, the external function of the
Soviet Armed Forces, and by extension of the Pact forces also, is said
to have grown in response to a dangerous increase in international
tensions caused by the mounting threat of an all-out nuclear war, a
"crusade" conducted against the socialist community, and a revival by
the imperialists of neo-colonialist policies. The Soviet Armed Forces,
however, are deemed capable of meeting the challenge and of fully
performing the four aspects of their external function, which are:

the defence of the USSR against a direct attack
by aggressors; the defence -- together with the
fraternal armies -- of the whole socialist
community and of each of its constituent
governments; (rendering) assistance, at their
request, to the peoples of the liberated states
in strengthening their defence preparedness; and
the defence of peace in the world.

A similar fourfold enumeration of the forms of the external function of
socialist armies has been provided by other sources, with
elaborations. The mission of ensuring the security of all the countries
of the socialist community is performed jointly by all the socialist armies, but the Soviet Union is acknowledged "to bear the main burden of defence efforts," putting "its military might at the service of the collective security of allied nations" and rendering "all-around assistance to fraternal armies."\(^{15}\)

The assistance to "liberated" states in strengthening their combat capabilities extends to liberation movements. In this context the Soviet Armed Forces are perceived to be "a part of the international revolutionary liberation force," and their activities are described as "directed towards preventing the export of imperialist counter-revolution," "one of the most important manifestations of (the army's) external function."\(^{16}\) The spokesman being General Epishev, the formulation indicates a high priority placed by Soviet leaders in the seventies on Soviet military activities in the Third World. This priority seems to have been further strengthened in the eighties, and the scope of activities has grown to include the Caribbean basin in addition to the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

The global outreach of operations has been reflected in the buildup of Soviet naval forces and in the use of Soviet and other "fraternal" personnel in the "defence of socialism" world-wide. Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia are considered to be full-fledged members of the "world socialist system." Mongolia's role seems largely limited to being a buffer zone between the USSR and China, and a staging ground for Soviet troops. Cuba has been Moscow's major military surrogate in Africa and in the Caribbean; Vietnam has performed a similar function in Southeast Asia. Although linked to the Soviet Union by bilateral treaties,\(^{17}\) neither is a member of the Warsaw Pact and is thus outside this discussion. Among Pact members only the GDR has been extensively involved in the Third World in the seventies. But others also contribute, and their greater participation in the future is likely. Soviet and East European military schools now train officer candidates and command personnel from the Third World along with Warsaw Pact
The first major military action by Soviet troops undertaken in support of the global mission "to defend socialism" (albeit in an area of traditional Russian expansion) was the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, but hot spots with the potential to become "threats to socialism" were multiplying around the globe in the eighties. In 1983 the USSR was reported to have 210,700 military personnel abroad (105,000 in Afghanistan). In addition to its troops in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had contingents abroad in Mongolia (1,000), Algeria (1,000), Angola (200), Cuba (4,600), Ethiopia (2,400), Iraq (2,000), Kampuchea (800), Laos (500), Libya (1,800), Mali (200), Mozambique (300), Vietnam (7,000), Syria (7,000), North Yemen (500), the PDRY (1,500), and 900 in the rest of Africa. The GDR had contingents in Algeria (250), Angola (450), Ethiopia (550), Guinea (125), Iraq (160), Libya (400), Mozambique (100), the PDRY (375) and Syria (210). Poland had 131 military personnel in Syria, as a part of UNDOF.¹⁸

The last aspect of the armies' external function -- that of peace keeping -- is the exact counterpart of the last aspect of the internal function; namely, by its very might and presence the Soviet Armed Forces and its Pact allies serve as a deterrent to any war-waging by the "imperialists." General Epishev defines this role as essential "to prevent another world war, frustrate the aggressive schemes of international imperialism and save mankind from being exterminated in the holocaust of nuclear rocket war."¹⁹ This formulation has important practical consequences: it absolves the socialist camp ab initio of any blame for any future war, while postulating the imperative of continuously strengthening its military might, and it requires no concessions on the subject of the "defence of socialism" in any of its aspects.

Concerning the first point, it is axiomatic that any such war will always be started by the "imperialists." Disclaimers, such as that by Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, who adds a
phrase "if the imperialists manage to unleash it" to the discussion of "a future world war" are typical and proliferate in Soviet political and military literature. This assumption does not necessarily exclude a variant in which the "peace camp" actually starts shooting first. It may, in fact, be the most likely variant, given the total emphasis in Soviet military strategy on surprise and offensive warfare (see below). In a regional version, the invasion of Afghanistan is a case in point, if explained, as it was, by the need to "defend Afghan socialism" against "imperialist interference." A sample of such phrasing may be found in the late Marshal A.A. Grechko's discussion of global Soviet military activities, when he talked of "resolutely resist(ing) imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear."20

It follows (to return to point number two) that, as a Soviet military textbook instructs officer cadets, the socialist armies have to become "ever stronger" in order to be able to successfully carry out their "peace-keeping" mission.21 In general the "strength for peace" maxim has had the reputation of being a sound military practice since the days of Imperial Rome (si vis pacem para bellum). But the intensity and single-minded preoccupation with which it has been pursued by the Soviet leadership since the inception of the "first socialist state" owes as much to the Marxist-Leninist assumption of a world divided in a life-and-death struggle between "two opposed world systems" as it does to traditional Russian paranoia over security. Khrushchev's military doctrine of January 1960 recognized nuclear weapons as the dominant mode of warfare in any future war, and emphasis on the buildup of Soviet military might, both nuclear and conventional, has been a constant ever since. The two subsequent modifications of the doctrine were, in fact, contingent on the continuous growth of Soviet power. The first, in the late sixties, introduced the possibility of a conflict, in special circumstances, without the use of nuclear weapons. In the words of two noted U.S. military specialists:
Once the Soviet strategic nuclear forces reached parity with the United States and could neutralize American nuclear forces, Soviet military leaders considered the possibilities of waging non-nuclear war under a nuclear umbrella.23

This has been made easier by clear Soviet (Pact) superiority over NATO in conventional forces. The second, in the early seventies, extended the scope of Soviet military activities into the global arena. It is a reasonable deduction that the quest is for nuclear and military superiority which, once achieved, would make a global victory possible without a resort to war.

Contrary to the hopeful view prevalent in the West, Soviet military doctrine does not seem to recognize the possibility of ever slackening the pace of armaments production or moderating the defence effort short of this goal, regardless of fluctuations in East-West tensions or the economic effort involved. In the seventies, the period of "détente," there was a marked relaxation of East-West tensions characterized by a growth in economic and cultural exchanges and political negotiations. Yet it was precisely this decade in which there was a massive buildup in the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. In the Soviet view, détente was the result of a change in the world's "correlation of forces" in favour of the Soviet Union, and of the perception, by the United States, of declining American strength. It was therefore imperative to maximize the resulting advantages. The Soviet military posture during this period was well summarized by the late Secretary General of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, in his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981:

In the report period the party and the government did not for one day forget the question (of the need) to strengthen the defensive power of the country and of its armed forces.24
Secretary Brezhnev, incidentally, was the main architect of détente on the Soviet side. Although Western sources do not agree on the exact figures, ample documentation is available for increases in Warsaw Pact military strength.  

The election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency of the United States, and the change in American foreign and military strategy designed to arrest the decline in U.S. military power and to reverse the trend in the "correlation of forces" favourable to the Soviet Union, has caused an almost hysterical reaction in the Soviet Union and a new emphasis on the need to strengthen Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. The shrillness of the denunciations of the "imperialists" (the United States and its NATO allies) seems to have escalated by several decibels in the 80s in comparison with the preceding period.

In a typical "mirror image" perception, the motivations, policies and actions ascribed by Soviet spokesmen to the "imperialists" read like a review of Soviet motivations, policies and actions, as seen in the West. Thus, the United States and its NATO allies are accused of pursuing military superiority over the Soviet Union by engaging in an arms buildup of a previously unknown magnitude (rockets and all), of seeking an enlargement in NATO's sphere of operations, and of accelerating aggressive policies globally on an unprecedented scale. The United States is credited with triggering both Britain's Falklands "adventure" and Israel's Lebanese invasion. President Reagan's "zero option" is said to be designed to unilaterally disarm the Soviet Union, while encircling it with a network of "more than 1500 bases in 32 countries," each a staging point (platsdarm) for aggression. The emplacement of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe (the FRG in particular) has been of riveting concern and has been the subject of the strongest denunciations in this and other sources.

In addition, "imperialists" are also accused of "ideological warfare," that is, of pursuing a policy of internal subversion in the bloc and in the Soviet Union in order to incite internal national and
ethnic conflicts. A new upsurge of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union (see Vol. II, Ch. 1), and national antagonisms within the bloc are all explicitly blamed on imperialist interference. The general flavour of these perceptions is well conveyed by the following passage:

Beginning in the eighties a so-called "new military strategy" -- a strategy of "direct confrontation" (priamogo protivoborstva) -- between the USA and the USSR was proclaimed by the Reagan administration, in the global as well as in the regional context. The major aim of this strategy is the achievement of full and unquestionable "military superiority," the restoration of "the leading world role of the United States," the "weakening" of the socialist community and, in the final analysis, the destruction of socialism as a socio-political system. Along with this the main emphasis has been on preparation for a protracted (dlitel'naia) nuclear war. The utilization of strategic nuclear weapons is foreseen in all of their many variants -- from so-called limited nuclear strikes to their mass application against a whole range of objectives on Soviet territory and on the territory of the states of the socialist community. The use of conventional means only at various theaters of military operations is not excluded.

The implications are clear; namely, that it is the United States and its NATO allies which are preparing for a global nuclear war to destroy the socialist world system. Thus it is imperative for the Soviet Union to keep up at least the past rate of military growth across the whole spectrum of the Pact's membership. This idea was clearly expressed by Yuri V. Andropov, Brezhnev's successor, at the first CPSU Central Committee Plenum (November 22, 1982) he addressed as the General Secretary:
The aggressive machinations of imperialism force us, together with the fraternal socialist governments, to take care, and to take care seriously, to keep up defence preparedness at a required level (заботиться и заботиться всерьез, о поддержании обороноспособности на должном уровне).31

The message which comes across, to this reader at least, is that Soviet leaders perceive a real threat to the continuation of their world-wide ascendancy and have been acting on this perception not only by keeping up expenditures on military hardware, but also by attempting to improve performance in the two areas which have been crucial for the credibility of Soviet military might: the economy (the subject of the November 1982 CPSU CC plenum), and ideological "upbringing" (the June 1983 plenum), both of which have emerged as major problem areas in the seventies.

The recent change in American policy, if sustained and if extended to bolster NATO's conventional forces, decreases, in the Soviet view, chances for the achievement of Soviet global objectives without a military confrontation. It also multiplies the risks involved in non-nuclear regional ventures à la Afghanistan. And, as the potential for blackmail diminishes, a temptation emerges to carry out a first strike, a temptation which, given the traditional reliance of Soviet military doctrine on offensive strategy, undoubtedly must be in the forefront of Soviet political and military thinking. This offensive strategy, predicated on the full combat readiness of Soviet forces at all times, is based on surprise and the speed of a massive breakthrough, "so as" -- Donnelly notes -- "to be able to preempt the enemy's mobilization and win the war in the initial period ..."32

Analysts differ in their interpretation of the situation. Analysing the first strike temptation, Peter Vigor comes to the conclusion that Soviet forces do not yet have a capability to take such a step.33 Nathan Leites, basing his views on a close scrutiny of numerous Soviet sources, feels that even when contemplating a nuclear
war the Soviet high command sees the primary use of strategic nuclear force as the counterforce necessary to win the war in conditions of a favourable exchange ratio, once it is predicted that the enemy will launch large nuclear strikes, for the Soviets believe that they have a better capacity to recover (to restore civilian and military plant, resources and organization). But the urge to preempt is frustrated by uncertainty over the probable magnitude of the damage that would occur. This would be unthinkable and untenable, argues Andrey Sakharov, the foremost Soviet physicist and dissident, in a letter smuggled out of his Corky exile, a perception which he apparently assumes is shared by the Soviet leaders. Thus he urges the West to even out the imbalance in conventional forces, currently favouring the Soviet Union and its allies.

Any future war is viewed in Soviet sources as a "coalition" war on both sides:

A powerful coalition of countries of the socialist commonwealth will oppose the aggressive imperialist bloc, the former united by a single goal and communality of interests in defending the gains of socialism.

It is precisely the united strategic military doctrine which is supposed to supply the "single goal" and the "communality of interests" in the alliance. An authoritative Polish source comments that the "socialist military coalition" and its "united military doctrine" are new phenomena in military history, because no other past coalition doctrines ever "led to such far-reaching military integration" that the partners were able to develop, as in the case of the Warsaw Pact, "a joint determination of problems of strategic and operational nature," a "joint command system," "joint manoeuvres at the staff-command and troop levels," the "standardization of military technology and the joint development of military industry."
All official Soviet and East European sources agree that the one essential element of the "socialist coalition doctrine" is unity of command, which is the basic precondition for a successful defence of individual fraternal states and of the socialist community as a whole. Unity of command, we are told, is predicated on the common world outlook shared by all Warsaw Pact members (Marxism-Leninism), and is expressed in a common policy shared by all ruling parties grouped around the senior partner, the CPSU. Because their unity of views is based on a common ideology it is unbreakable. If dissension occurs it is inevitably caused by bourgeois nationalist and/or counterrevolutionary elements egged on by imperialist machinations. Unity of command in socialist coalitions is expressed by ongoing coordinated bilateral and multilateral activities and "exchanges of experience" among "fraternal" armies, starting with command personnel and ending at the level of subunits. It embraces all aspects of strategic, operational and tactical planning in the forces' training, technical preparation and deployment. The common defence effort is underwritten by the broader political, social and cultural integration of "fraternal" states, the importance of which for the common defence effort cannot be overestimated.

In practice, and as the review in the chapters below indicates, unity of command means command by SAF Headquarters in Moscow (a wartime model for this command structure was provided by "Stavka" or General Headquarters operations in the Great Patriotic War). No provisions have been made, either in theory or in practical combat training, for any input into decision-making by "allied" politicians or "allied" commanders unless they are located in the Soviet chain of command. According to an authoritative Soviet source, "the coalition strategy determines the military strategy of each member state of the Warsaw Pact." A Polish First Army veteran and a member of Poland's Military Council of National Salvation, Lt. Gen. Florian Siwicki, views "allied" inputs as mere adaptations to local needs: "we have defined doctrinal
assumptions which, while adapted to our needs, are the constituent elements of the general coalition defence doctrine of the socialist countries."\(^{39}\)

Lenin's old debt to Clausewitz is still explicitly acknowledged to be valid for Marxist-Leninist coalition doctrine, despite the Western assumption that it no longer applies in the nuclear age. It does apply, we are told, to limited wars, and limited wars can always escalate into nuclear ones "as long as imperialism exists"; therefore, the socialist camp has to maintain the highest level of defence preparedness.\(^{40}\) Thus the Leninist principle according to which "war is the extension of policy by forceful means" is at the basis of the coalition doctrine, and implies that modern war will be a contest involving all the material and spiritual forces of the adversaries. In this contest victory will go to the side which has more reserves and more sources of strength and endurance, as expressed in the might of its armies and in the spirit of its people: "the spirit of the masses who know why they are spilling blood on the battlefield."\(^{41}\)

The concept of a coalition warfare doctrine had its origins in the cumulative experience of using the armed forces to secure power for communist parties in the non-Russian areas of the old tsarist empire. This was first accomplished in the borderlands in the period of the Bolshevik consolidation of power after the October Revolution, and was followed by the incorporation of the Baltic states and the formation of the nuclei of several East European armies in the USSR during World War II, as discussed below.
END NOTES

2 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 258.
6 A.A. Epishev, Ideologicheskaia bor'ba po voennym voprosam (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), pp. 70-72, my italics.
7 Timorin, op. cit., pp. 352-353.
8 Ibid., p. 249.
10 Timorin, op. cit., p. 353.
11 Epishev, op. cit., p. 82. For an extensive discussion of the importance for the Pact's forces of the function of internal suppression see Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981).
12 Timorin, op. cit., p. 249.
13 Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
15 Epishev, Some Aspects, p. 20.
16 Ibid., p. 21, original italics.


Epishev, Some Aspects, p. 24, original italics.


Timorin, op. cit., p. 355.


Ibid., pp. 58-59, original italics.


See Pravda, passim; Sorokin, op. cit., V.I. Drugov, "Vospityvat' ideino-stoikikh patriotov, internatsionalistov," in Sovetskaia Armiaia -- shkola druzhby i bratstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982); other Soviet sources; and East European sources such as Socjalistyczna Koalicja Obronna (Warsaw: MON, 1980).


Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

Drugov, op. cit., pp. 7-8, and others.

Sorokin, op. cit., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 6, quoting from "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 22 noiabria 1982 g.," (Moscow, 1982), p. 18.

Donnelly, op. cit., p. 43.


Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).


Socjalistyczna Koalicja Obronna, op. cit., p. 35.

G.F. Vorontsov, Voennye koalitsii i koalitsionnye voiny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 265. For a discussion of how this is carried out in practice, see Chapter 7.


Vorontsov, op. cit., p. 262.
The creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 raised a question that Western analysts have wrestled with for some time: what is the political reliability of each of the separate East European contingents of the Warsaw Pact? This chapter suggests that such a question is the wrong one to ask. Instead, the question raised in 1955 was whether the Soviets could resolve the problem of political reliability in the Warsaw Pact by adapting the previous experience of the Soviet Army in incorporating distinct "ethnic" units into a multinational army under Soviet command. The "ethnic" units that have fought under Soviet command have recruited their personnel from polities both inside and outside the USSR. This chapter will examine the Soviet experience with the "ethnic units" and assess its utility for the management of the national reliability factor in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet domestic experience has encompassed four distinct types of ethnic units. These are: 1) the international units of the Bolshevik Civil War made up of prisoners of war captured by the Tsarist Army in World War I; 2) the "Red Armies" of the "independent" Soviet republics of the Civil War; 3) the "national-territorial formations" of the union republics and autonomous districts of the USSR in the period from 1922 to 1938; and 4) the "national-territorial" divisions raised in the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Siberia and the Baltic republics during the Nazi invasion of the USSR.

The International Units of the Red Army

In the initial phases of the Civil War the Red Army organized a substantial number of "ethnic" units recruited from the more than two
million prisoners of war captured by the Imperial Russian Army in World War I. According to a Soviet volume published in 1960 by L.I. Zharov and V.M. Ustinov, between 220,000 to 250,000 "foreign soldiers" fought during 1918 and 1919 in "international units" made up of either one particular nationality or of mixed nationalities. Of these, Hungarians constituted some 70,000-80,000; Czechs and Slovaks, some 9,600; Yugoslavs and Bulgarians -- about 30,000; and Chinese -- about 30,000.2 In addition, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) had additional but smaller East European detachments made up of Poles, Romanians, Germans and Finns.3

According to a list of the international units of the Civil War compiled by Zharov and Ustinov, the RKKA had two distinct "ethnic" divisions, a Polish Red Artillery Division and the Polish Western Division; three distinct "International Brigades"; and 32 separate international regiments. Of these 32 regiments, 15 carried specifically national names (i.e., the First Penensky Czechoslovak Revolutionary Regiment). Of these 15 regiments, some 12 were named for East European nationalities whose countries later made up the membership of the Warsaw Pact. In addition to these forces, Zharov and Ustinov list: 27 separate "international" infantry battalions and equivalent cavalry detachments; six international companies; 41 international "detachments"; one French platoon; and five other "international" military groups.4

In establishing these units, the Bolsheviks relied both on "independent" political agencies representing former prisoners of war and on the special Ninth Section of the Main Staff of the RKKA. The "independent" agency was the Military Commission of the Central Federation of Foreign Groups headed by a Hungarian, Bela Kun. The RKKA assumed direct responsibility for the recruitment and training of command and political cadres for the international units.5 It is not clear from Soviet sources how reliable the international units were. They were used principally in the Soviet Far East and in the Caucasus.6
In 1919 and 1920 hopes were high that some of these foreign units would be instrumental in extending the Revolution to their home countries. Bela Kun was able to establish a short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919. Polish units, accompanied by the nucleus of a Polish communist civil administration, advanced into Poland along with the Red Army in the 1919-1920 Polish-Russian war, but the Polish victory in the celebrated "Miracle of the Vistula" in 1920 precluded any hopes then for the establishment of a Soviet Poland. But a precedent remained which was to be followed in World War II (as shall be seen in the next chapter).

By 1920, two years after the end of World War I, most of the East European soldiers who had served in "international units" appear to have returned home. A number of the veterans of these units later played prominent roles in the communist movements of East Europe. Probably the best known of these veterans was a Croat-Slovenian named Josip Broz, who eventually took over the leadership of the Yugoslav party under the name of Tito.

The Indigenous Ethnic Units of the Red Army, 1917-1921

The experience acquired by the RKKA in the organization and command of ethnic units of foreign soldiers came almost simultaneously with the experience of the Soviet Army in the organization and command of ethnic units recruited from the indigenous non-Russian populations of the Tsarist empire. In the period of consolidation of Soviet power (1917-1921), demands for national self-determination were voiced in all of Russia's borderlands and by representatives of all shades of political opinion, including local Bolsheviks. The demands ranged from independence to autonomy and were accompanied by the emergence of national governments of various political hues (frequently in competition with one another), and of national military formations. The latter were of two kinds: those formed by the so-called "bourgeois nationalists" and those formed under Bolshevik auspices. The first were
eventually destroyed and/or reorganized to fit the Soviet mould, the second were the forerunners of the national territorial formations of 1922-38. Overall, the chaotic situation was complicated by the German offensive (which began on 18 February 1918), by the Civil War and Allied intervention, and by the initial difficulties the Bolsheviks (the Russian Communist Party -- RKP(b)) had in organizing their military effort. 

The RKKA was established by a decree of the Council of National Commissars of the new Russian Republic (RSFSR) on 28 January 1918; but, because it was voluntary and based on the class principle, the troops were untrained and undisciplined, and proved inadequate to oppose seasoned German units and internal White resistance. It took almost a whole year (March to November 1918) for Lev Davidovich Trotsky, then the Commissar of War, to establish centralized control and military discipline; compulsory military service was introduced in July, and old Tsarist officers were brought in to introduce military professionalism; the institution of political commissars was created to ensure the officers' loyalty and the proper class outlook of the troops. Soviet armies were also being formed in the borderlands by local Bolsheviks, in a struggle with White and "bourgeois-nationalist" elements. The sequence is reported in a Soviet military source:

As Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were liberated from German occupation and Soviet power emerged by the end of 1918, large national formations up to and above the Corps level (ob'edinienia) were formed there. The Ukrainian Army, composed of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian revolutionary divisions formed from partisan units, was created in November 1918. The army of Soviet Latvia was established on 5 January 1919 on the basis of a Latvian military group, and the Estland Army on 18 February. At the beginning of 1919, the national formations of Soviet armies included 150,000 Ukrainians, more than 17,000 Chuvashi, more than 12,000 Latvians, about 50,000 representatives of Moslem nations, 3,000 to 4,000 Estonians, and a number of other nations and nationalities.
S.A. Tiushkevich, one of the senior military historians of the USSR, explains the political rationale behind the formation of these ethnic units:

At that time it was inexpedient to form a united multinational Red Army.

Granting (Soviet) republics independence and the right to have national armies was inevitable in those conditions as a step towards political and military unity.10

Tiushkevich adds that the "Red Armies" of the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia and Belorussia-Lithuania fought "shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army of the Russian Federation against the common enemy on the fronts of the Civil War." Other Soviet texts, however, present a less sanguine view of the military results of bowing to the political necessity of national "Red Armies." One such study cites a report made on April 23, 1919 to the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR):

'In the western half of the RSFSR there have been formed a series of Soviet republics which at the present time have taken on a definite aspect of separatist autonomy in the question of the conduct of the war.

'Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Belorussians and Ukrainians are establishing their armies, their apparati for People's Commissariats of Military Affairs, and each acts in its own specific way.

'The result is that the western half of the RSFSR in practice is militarily excluded from the common camp.

'The fragmentation of the armed forces of the RSFSR into national armies is in all respects counterproductive and extremely harmful for our success.'12

Lenin responded to the danger of separatism posed by the national "Red Armies" of the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic states
by drafting a plan for the reorganization of all the armed forces of the various Soviet republics. Lenin's draft called for strict centralization of command, supply, transport and cadre appointments. On April 21, 1919 the Bolshevik Central Committee (CC) endorsed Lenin's draft and on May 4 it issued a directive in which it declared that:

'The experience of the formation of troop units, just like the experience of operations on the western front, testifies without doubt that the tendency of separate Soviet republics to tie military organizations to national borders, including military-territorial organizations, leads in practice to a series of conflicts between local and nationalist claims and the military tasks of the socialist revolution as a whole...

'Therefore the breaking of the unity of administration and command, and the national fragmentation of the army, leads to nationality conflicts in the midst of Red Army units themselves and is a sure path to the disintegration of the army.'

Overriding the Ukrainian Communist leaders at a joint meeting, the Central Committee passed a resolution on 19 May 1919 which abolished the separate Ukrainian Front and Command and placed all military units under the command of the RSFSR's Revolutionary Military Council. This resolution was followed by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) on June 1, 1919, which provided that for military purposes (personnel, supplies, political education and mobilization), each republic constituted a military district which was subordinated to the RMC in the same way as the military districts of the RSFSR.

This decree, we are told, "had great significance in the establishment of the military unity of the Soviet republics." In the final outcome, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as Finland and Poland, succeeded in gaining independence by 1921; but Ukraine and Belorussia became part
of the USSR.

The three main nations of the Transcaucasus area were initially able to establish independent national governments (led by the Mensheviks in Georgia, the Dashnak in Armenia and the Musavat in Azerbaidzhan), each with a national army. But as Bolshevik forces conquered the Caucasus in 1920-1921, these national armies were "reorganized" on the RKKA model. The reorganization left many of the "alien class elements" intact, especially among officers which, Soviet sources admit, was a mistake since they later "fomented rebellion." The command nucleus was provided by the 11th RSFSR Army ("the glorious 11th Army which helped to destroy the Musavat counterrevolution"), renamed the Special Caucasus Army (OKA). All Transcaucasian military formations were subordinated to it, even though administratively they retained separate national structures. In the North Caucasus area the nationalist armed movements were subdued by the RKKA only in 1921. As the USSR was established, treaties were concluded between the RSFSR and the three Caucasian republics which provided, inter alia, for the unification of military organizations and military command.

By and large the Moslems welcomed the Revolution; conservatives because they resented Imperial rule; liberal and reformist elements, because of hopes for reform and autonomy. Many among the Tatars in particular joined the Bolsheviks and contributed to their victory in the Civil War. Moslem activists wanted autonomy but were divided on how to implement it. Tatars and Bashkirs wanted extraterritorial cultural autonomy within a Russian republic. Azeri, Turkestan and Crimean Tatar representatives preferred territorial autonomy within a federation. But, meeting at the First Moslem Congress (Moscow, May 1917) they all agreed on the need for Moslem military units. The First Moslem Military Congress (Kazan, July 1917), dominated by Tatar and Bashkir elements, decided to organize such units.

Tatar/Bashkir political and military bodies were set up in the Volga region in early 1917. An autonomous Ural-Idel state was
proclaimed in November 1917, and by 1918 Moslem military units included
some 50,000 soldiers under Moslem officers. These initiatives were
countered by the RKP(b); in January 1918 a Central Commissariat of
Moslem Affairs (Muskom) was established in the Commissariat of
Nationalities (Narkomnats). It was run by Moslem Bolsheviks, of whom
the highest in rank was Mirsaid Sultan Galiev, a Volga Tatar. Under
Muskom direction non-Soviet Moslem organizations were liquidated by mid-
1918, and Moslem military units were placed nominally under the RKKA,
although they were directed through the intermediary of a Central Moslem
Military College of the Muskom. Under Muskom tutelage the national character of Moslem military
units was preserved, Moslems continued to serve under native officers,
and their numbers swelled to an estimated 250,000 in 1919, contributing
significantly to the Bolshevik victory in Siberia. But the premises
on which their organization was based were unacceptable to the Bolshevik
leadership, so they were disbanded by the end of 1920. During the
ensuing general debate between the autonomists and the centralists,
Sultan Galiev was purged in mid-1923 as a "bourgeois nationalist."
A recent Soviet source has criticized his military policy as an attempt
to establish his own power base:

Thus, under Muskom tutelage the national character of Moslem military
units was preserved, Moslems continued to serve under native officers,
and their numbers swelled to an estimated 250,000 in 1919, contributing
significantly to the Bolshevik victory in Siberia. But the premises
on which their organization was based were unacceptable to the Bolshevik
leadership, so they were disbanded by the end of 1920. During the
ensuing general debate between the autonomists and the centralists,
Sultan Galiev was purged in mid-1923 as a "bourgeois nationalist."
A recent Soviet source has criticized his military policy as an attempt
to establish his own power base:

in every way he tried to exceed his authority, to
make the Moslem units stand apart from the other
units of the Red Army, and to hold them under his
leadership.
In Kazakhstan (Orenburg gubernia) a Kazakh autonomous Alash Orda movement also attempted to establish autonomous political and military bodies. Caught in the struggle between the Whites and the Reds it was briefly allied with the Bolsheviks but was eventually liquidated with the consolidation of Soviet power. In Central Asia (Turkestan and the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara), conservative Moslem society resisted revolutionary change, and even reformist and liberal-nationalist elements were alienated by the anti-Moslem, "colonialist" attitudes of the local Russians who ran the new Soviet agencies. Few Moslem volunteers to join local formations organized under RKKA auspices in 1918-1919, and the Basmachi, a conservative resistance movement, spread. Moslem recruitment is said to have proceeded in conditions of "a sharp class struggle," because "bourgeois nationalists demanded the establishment of a special Moslem army and the departure of all non-Moslem Red Army units from Turkestan," a reference, undoubtedly, to Sultan Galiev and his friends.

Alarmed by the spread of Russian-Moslem conflict, the Bolshevik Central Committee sent a special Commission for Turkestan Affairs to Tashkent with instructions to introduce a more conciliatory policy while at the same time pacifying and consolidating Soviet power in the whole area. A call-up of Moslem soldiers was instituted by the new commander of Soviet forces in Turkestan (and a member of the Commission), Mikhail Frunze. Basing himself on RKKA units from the RSFSR, but with the help of a few local formations, Frunze took Bukhara (which was the center of Basmachi agitation) and, by 1921, succeeded in the pacification of the region, although local flareups of Basmachi resistance continued for a few years.

Data on the ethnic breakdown of the RKKA, which are available for 1921, indicate an overwhelming Slavic majority in all military districts and fronts and a substantial Russian majority as well. For all the experience with "international units" recruited from prisoners of war and with the "national" armies of various Soviet republics, the
Red Army that emerged from the Civil War was for all practical purposes a Russian army (Table 5.1). Even after the introduction of compulsory service in the Caucasus in the mid-1920s, Russians continued to predominate in the call-ups of personnel to military service. (Table 5.2) It was only in the late 1930s that Central Asians began to enter the Red Army in significant numbers. (Table 5.3).

Ethnic Detachments of the RKKA During the Interwar Period

Despite its overwhelmingly Russian nature, the RKKA in the interwar period not only maintained its ethnic units, but increased their number and upgraded their status. This decision was a tactical concession to the demands of the non-Russian republics for both the substance and symbols of federal status. At the 12th Congress of the RKP(b), in April 1923, Ukrainian Communists, supported by representatives of other national minorities, openly called the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army an instrument of Russification and demanded that the RKKA be replaced with a system of national-territorial militia. 28

The Twelfth Party Congress ended with a decision to organize four distinct components within the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: 1) a relatively small cadre army which consisted mainly of Great Russians and russified Slavs; 2) a large reserve force of territorial-militia divisions, which were much less expensive to maintain than regular cadre divisions; 3) a relatively small number of "national" military divisions recruited from the larger Union Republics and "autonomous" national districts; 4) inside regular cadre divisions, ethnic companies, battalions and regiments recruited from the smaller nationalities, in particular the Tatars and Bashkirs, two nationalities which had traditions of military service under the Tsarist regime.

On the basis of the decisions of the Twelfth Party Congress, in 1924 the RKKA raised four Ukrainian rifle divisions, one Belorussian rifle division, two Georgian rifle divisions, one Armenian rifle division and one Azerbaidzhani rifle division. 30 According to a Soviet
Table 5.1 National Composition of Military Formations of RKKA:
1 January 1921 (in % of the total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Group</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>6th Army</th>
<th>9th Kuban Army</th>
<th>Turkestan Front</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trans-Volga</td>
<td>Ural3</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>Kharkov</td>
<td>Southern Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkirs</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Zavolzhskii
2. Privolzhskii
3. Priuralskii

MD—Military District


Note: The category "Other" is based on primary sources. The table includes only large military formations. In addition, in the RSFSR, other groups served in substantial numbers: Armenians, Georgians, Kalmyks, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks and Turkmens, and also Austrians, Arabs, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Greeks, Chinese, Persians, Romanians, Serbs, Finns, and Czechs. The category "others" at the Turkestan Front includes all of the indigenous Central Asian nationalities. Ibid., p. 24.
Table 5.2  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Composition of the 1928 Callup into the RKKA in all regions of the USSR except Central Asia (in percentages of the total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Belorussians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordvins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeri Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkirs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karelians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheremisya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmurts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossetins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus Mountain people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buriat Mongols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmyks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number was 583,500. Slavs* contributed 88.88% of the total.

TABLE 5.3

Draft of Indigenous Central Asian Populations, 1935-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Central Asia: Total Number of Draftees</th>
<th>Draftees by Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5,252</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>3,662</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>7,121</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>17,699</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>55,295</td>
<td>Uzbek 24,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kazaks 18,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tadzhiks 4,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkmens 4,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kirghiz 3,672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Makarov, p. 41.
military scholar, in the fall of 1924 there were 10 national-territorial divisions and seven separate national-territorial "units" (probably regiments). At this time, these "ethnic" detachments constituted about 10 percent of all Soviet military personnel, including the militia formations. A five-year plan adopted in 1924, a plan designed largely by M.V. Frunze, planned to establish national divisions made up of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tadzhiks. The RKKA also planned to raise additional ethnic "units" for service within multinational cadre divisions. According to research by Ellen Jones, the non-Russian ethnic units integrated into cadre combat divisions constituted close to 19 per cent of Soviet military manpower in 1924, in addition to the 10 per cent serving in the national divisions. At the same time, the Soviet Army observed a distinction between "numbered" divisions, informally known as "Russian" divisions, and the national divisions which bore the names of their republics. According to Colonel Makarov of the Soviet Army, six of the Slavic "national-territorial divisions" were considered sufficiently reliable to be designated "numbered" divisions rather than "national" divisions. These were: the 95th, 96th, 99th and 100th Rifle Divisions, all located in Ukraine; the Second Territorial Rifle Division, located in Belorussia; and the First Kazan Rifle Division of the Sub-Volga Military District. The Kazan Division included a Tatar-Bashkir regiment and a Bashkir cavalry squadron.

In the Caucasus, the "Red Armies" of the former independent republics became national-territorial brigades. In 1923 the RKKA expanded three brigades, one each in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaidzhan, into national divisions. A similar process of enlarging ethnic formations took place in the North Caucasus and Central Asia. Colonel Makarov describes this process as follows:

Wherever obligatory military service had not been previously introduced, the processes of the establishment of national formations proceeded gradually.
At first small subunits and units were established and then, according to the degree of preparation of corresponding conditions, more substantial units and formations were established. 39

Citing archives of the Soviet Defence Ministry, Makarov notes that in 1924 the former "national armies" of Bukhara and Khorezm, supplemented by "volunteers" from Central Asia, were incorporated into the RKKA: one rifle battalion; three cavalry squadrons; one cavalry company; one rifle company and one transport company. These units served as the predecessors for the creation of two cavalry squadrons in Dagestan; six cavalry platoons of the mountain tribes of the North Caucasus; (in 1927 these six companies were combined into a cavalry regiment); one rifle battalion in the Karelian ASSR; one cavalry squadron in the Kazakh ASSR; one cavalry squadron in the Buriat-Mongol ASSR; and one rifle company and cavalry platoon in the Iakut ASSR. 40 In 1926 the RKKA began organizing cavalry squadrons and rifle battalions in the Uzbek, Turkmen and Kirghiz districts. These units were expanded into regiments, then brigades, and by 1935 they had emerged as three separate mountain-cavalry divisions, one each from the Turkmen, Uzbek and Tadzhik republics. 41

In the same year, however, the Soviet Army began dismantling both its territorial militia forces and its national-territorial formations. A Soviet political officer writes that the Soviet Defence Ministry carried out these changes to prepare for the possibility of war with Germany and Japan. 42 This explanation implies that the Soviets had little or no confidence in the military reliability of their national-territorial formations in the interwar period for combat with a formidable external opponent. It also implies that the Soviets never intended to use these formations for external objectives. In March 1938, in conjunction with changes in the new USSR Constitution, a joint decree of the Party Central Committee and the Soviet of Peoples'
Commissars abolished all national divisions and units and reassigned their personnel to multinational cadre divisions. According to a study of the Soviet Armed Forces edited by Marshal Grechko, the Soviet government abolished national detachments because of linguistic difficulties that arose in preparing regulations and manuals and because the national detachments "were unavoidably tied to their own territory, which prevented their training for action under different climatic, terrain and tactical conditions." Grechko's explanation also implies that the RKKA never seriously contemplated the use of the national formations in combat.

Makarov all but openly declares that "ethnic" units were developed not as combat units but as training devices which also satisfied domestic political requirements. He also notes the political significance of the units:

National formations were one of the necessary forms of the affirmation of political and national equality, a clear testimony to the securing of equal rights and obligations of all peoples of the USSR in the defence of the socialist fatherland.

They played a great role in the introduction of the non-Russian peoples to obligatory military service, in the training of national command cadres, and in the training in military affairs of the youth of the union republics, autonomous oblasts and national districts.

The available evidence suggests that Makarov's observations, made in 1982, were not mere justifications for the interwar experiment in national formations.

The Soviet official who had assumed the primary responsibility for organizing ethnic formations within the Soviet Army was M.V. Frunze, who held a series of high-level military and party posts from 1922 until his death in 1925. In the period following the XII Party Congress
Frunze made a number of public declarations on the political necessity of maintaining such units as devices which legitimized the RKKA as a federal army. At the same time, Frunze frankly acknowledged the questionable military utility of such national formations. In a speech to the Military Academy of the Red Army in late 1924, Frunze, in his capacities as Commandant of the Academy and Chief of the RKKA General Staff, made the following observation:

It is not known what is better: to have 10 divisions made up of Russian soldiers, well trained and well disciplined; or to have only five good divisions and five national divisions which are poorly trained and of low quality.

From the point of view of the overall long-term perspective, it is very possible that the second alternative will prove more advantageous.46

The principal justification which Frunze advanced for the maintenance of national military formations of questionable military value was the political utility of giving formal recognition to the autonomy of the federal components of the USSR. "We cannot organize our army in any other way," Frunze declared to a meeting of army political workers on November 17, 1924, "A (Union) republic justifiably requires the creation of such units."47 Frunze added, in a declaration frequently cited in Soviet texts,

We never considered our Red Army to be a "Russian" army, an army of one nationality. The Great Russian nationality has constituted and will constitute the nucleus of the army and the basis of all its strength.

But this has not deprived and will not deprive all other nationalities of the Soviet Union of the right and responsibility to defend the Soviet land with weapons in hand.48
Frunze's military career suggests an unspoken corollary to this declaration: the right and responsibility of the non-Russian nationalities to bear arms does not deprive the Great Russian nucleus of the Red Army from the right and responsibility of defending Soviet rule in the non-Russian republics of the USSR. During the Red Army campaigns of 1919-20 in Central Asia Frunze worked out the dynamics of legitimizing the military presence of Soviet troop formations made up largely of Russian personnel by introducing these forces as the fraternal allies of the native Communist military and political organizations. Frunze's success in eliminating native anti-Soviet military forces stands in clear contrast with the failure of the Red Army to prevail over the anti-Communist native military forces of the Baltic states. Frunze further refined the techniques of pre-empting anti-Soviet nationalism during his tours of duty in various official capacities in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, including an assignment as chief of the delegation that negotiated a treaty between Turkey and the Ukrainian Republic, at the time (1921), a nominally independent state.

In his arguments in favor of maintaining national troop formations, Frunze frankly acknowledged, "Among some comrades in some localities there are tendencies to transform national formations into the nuclei of national armies." Frunze dismissed these concerns by declaring that the RKKA had command and control devices adequate to pre-empt any such development toward autonomous national military forces: "...we do not permit the existence of national armies in any separate oblast' or republic." He explained that the RKKA preserved its integrity as a federal army by imposing standard administrative structures, regulations and doctrinal conceptions which converted national formations into components of "a single national entity."

Frunze himself called attention to the possibility that the creation of large territorial militia forces might lead to the creation of an independent national military force in the western regions of Ukraine. He noted that some unnamed comrades saw a "political danger"
in the possibility that the introduction of the territorial-militia system "will lead to the transformation of the majority of the Red Army in Ukraine into a national Ukrainian army." Frunze argued that it would be a greater political risk not to give formal expression to Ukrainian sovereignty in the form of both territorial-militia units and national Ukrainian cadre divisions. He argued that the threat posed by incipient Ukrainian nationalism could best be contained by the imposition of standardized administrative structures, energetic political indoctrination and above all by the recruitment of a Soviet command cadre capable of using both the Russian and Ukrainian languages.

National Officer Schools for Non-Russians

To supply command and political cadres to the ethnic detachments of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and perhaps to multinational cadre formations as well, the Soviets established a series of native-language officer candidate schools to train a cadre of non-Russian officers, some of whom eventually attended the Russian-language mid-career academies of the Soviet Army. In 1923 the officer candidate schools of the Red Army increased their enrolment of non-Russian students, and the number of schools was expanded from seven to thirteen. In 1924 the Soviet Central Committee adopted a resolution which declared,

It is now necessary to begin establishing military schools in the republics and national districts for the quick recruitment of command staff from local personnel who are able to serve as the nucleus of national troop units.

In this matter, it is understood that the party and social composition of the national units, especially of the command, must be assured.
This resolution in turn led to a decree "On the Nationalization of Military-Educational Institutions" of the Revolutionary Military Council on June 9, 1924. This decree called for native-language instruction in some 13 officer candidate schools (Table 5.4). In addition, the RKKA established five political officer schools for non-Russian officers. In addition to recruiting a new cadre of non-Russian officers, the RKKA evidently pursued a deliberate policy of increasing the proportion of non-Russians in the officer corps, although it is not clear where these officers came from. Makarov writes that in the period from 1920-1926 the proportion of non-Russian command cadres increased from 18.0 per cent to 38.3 per cent, and that in the period from 1920 to 1925 the proportion of non-Russian political officers in the RKKA increased from 26.5 per cent to 34.9 per cent.\(^5^6\)

An important, though little discussed issue in the national military schools and national troop units was the issue of the doctrine in which the non-Russian officers and units were to be trained. Although Soviet sources frequently praise Frunze as the author of the "common" or "unified" military doctrine of the RKKA ("edinaia voennaia doktrina"), they fail to explain why the Red Army needed a "common" or "unified" military doctrine. One possible explanation is that such a doctrine served as a critical control device in the various national-territorial units and national officer schools of the RKKA.

National-Territorial Formations of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Siberia During the Great Fatherland War

Despite the abolition of national-territorial units in 1938 the Soviets raised a large number of such ethnic units after the Nazi invasion of the USSR. During the first years of the wartime crisis the Soviets found that there was no better way to mobilize and train non-Russians for combat. The available evidence indicates that the organization of "national" units permitted the Soviets to appeal to the nationalism of distinct ethnic groups in addition to making appeals t.
Table 5.4 Non-Russian Officer Schools, 1924

Command Personnel Schools

- Ukrainian Infantry School for Red Commanders im. VUTsIK
- Ukrainian Cavalry School im. M. Budennego
- Belorussian All-Branch Command School im. M. Frunze
- School of Red "Kommunary" in Moscow*
- International Military School in Leningrad*
- Tatar-Bashkir School im. TatTsIK
- Kazakh Military School im. KirTsIK in Orenburg
- All-Branch Command School im. V.I. Lenina in Tashkent, with attached National Section for Political Education
- All-Branch Central Asian Military School
- Cavalry School of Mountain Nationalities of N. Caucasus im. V.I. Lenina, with attached National Section for Political Education
- Georgian National Military School
- Armenian National Military School
- Azerbaidzhani National Military School

Military Political Education Officer Schools

- International Turkic School in Kazan
- Georgian Military Political School
- Armenian Military Political School
- Azerbaidzhani Military Political Education School
- 2 Ukrainian Companies in the Military Political Education School in Kiev Military District.

* Probably schools for foreign communists also.

Source: Makarov, p. 41
these personnel on the basis of Marxist ideology and "Soviet patriotism." Once the Soviet command had mobilized non-Russian personnel in distinct ethnic formations, the Soviets began breaking down these divisions into smaller and smaller units in order to disperse non-Russian personnel inside multinational divisions. This process involved the transformation of divisions named for union republics into divisions comparable in ethnic composition to the "numbered" divisions of the Soviet Army.

The experience of the national-territorial formations raised in the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Siberia stands: 1) as a continuation of the previous Soviet practice of raising ethnic units within the Soviet Army; 2) as a model for the organization of East European "ethnic" formations on Soviet soil during World War II; and 3) as a potential model for the integration of East European units into the combat formations of the Warsaw Pact. For the Soviets, "ethnic" formations met the political requirements of mobilizing non-Russian personnel by granting different nationalities their "own" units, and the existence of such units enabled the Soviets to train and discipline different nationalities under a Soviet command structure dominated by Russians. To deal with the separatist tendencies inherent in such units, the Soviets insisted on centralized command systems and dispersed such units inside larger multinational formations. Great emphasis was placed on recruitment of political education personnel who were able to communicate with the soldiers in their own languages. Party and Komsomol organizations in the national republics were denuded of their ethnic personnel for this purpose.

The Nazi onslaught began on June 22, 1941, and quickly drove the Soviet Army out of Belorussia, the recently-annexed territories of Bessarabia, eastern Poland and the Baltic states, out of most of Ukraine and much of central Russia. By mid-July 1941 the Germans were at the gates of Leningrad; by September they were on the approaches to Moscow; by December they had captured all but the easternmost districts of
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Armenian National Military School
Azerbaidzhani National Military School

Military Political Education Officer Schools

International Turkic School in Kazan
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Ukraine. By November 1942 the Nazi armies had captured all of Ukraine, the entire North Caucasus region and had advanced to the city of Stalingrad and the lower reaches of the Volga. The outcome of the war depended, according to both Soviet and Western historians, largely on the defence of Stalingrad and on the defence of the oilfields of the Azerbaidzhan republic. In November 1942 German armies stood on the borders of the Georgian republic and within 200 kilometers of the borders of the Azerbaidzhan and Armenian republics. At Stalingrad the Germans were about 200 kilometers from the western borders of the vast Kazakh republic, although they were still thousands of kilometers away from the main population centres of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. It is precisely at these two fronts that non-Slavic manpower proved to be crucial to victory, as shall be seen below.

The Nazi occupation of most of the European portions of the Soviet Union cut off reinforcements from the Slavic populations of these areas. As the Soviet historian A.P. Artem'ev noted,

... a significant portion of the personnel of Ukraine, the Baltic states, Moldavia and other regions [central Russia?] in 1943 still found itself under occupation and was not able to join the regular army.

Many of these personnel participated actively in the partisan struggle.

In correspondence with the degree of the liberation of the temporarily-occupied Soviet territory from the German-Fascist predators, the proportion of the soldiers of these nationalities increased in the composition of our troops.57

In the 1939 census of the USSR, Ukrainians made up 16.59 per cent of the Soviet population and Belorussians 3.11 per cent --
together, 19.7 per cent. The Russians made up 58.41 per cent of the Soviet population in 1939. Artem'ev does not give specific figures for the proportion of Ukrainians and Belorussians in the Soviet Armed Forces at various periods during the war, but on the basis of materials from the archives of the Ministry of Defence he does present figures for the changes in the proportions of Ukrainians and Belorussians among the personnel of the rifle divisions of two unidentified fronts during 1943 and 1944. For one unidentified front, consisting of "more than 200 rifle divisions" the Ukrainians made up 11.62 per cent of all personnel on July 1, 1943 but 22.27 per cent of all personnel by January 1, 1944. For the same dates, the Belorussians made up 1.35 per cent and 2.66 per cent of the personnel of the rifle divisions on this front. The combined share of the Ukrainians and Belorussians in the rifle divisions of this particular front rose from 12.9 per cent of all personnel on July 1, 1943 to 24.93 per cent on January 1, 1944. The percentage of Russians in the rifle divisions of this particular unidentified front was 63.84 on July 1, 1943 and 58.32 on January 1, 1944. The total Slavic contingent in the rifle divisions of this front was 81.81 per cent of all personnel on July 1, 1943 and 83.25 per cent on January 1, 1944.

In studying the archival materials on an unidentified front of more than 100 rifle divisions, Artem'ev writes that the proportion of Ukrainians on this front in July 1943 (he does not give the precise figure), "almost tripled" by July 1, 1944, when the proportion of Ukrainians was 33.93 per cent of all personnel. On July 1, 1944, the Belorussians made up 2.04 per cent of the personnel in the rifle divisions on this front and the Russians made up 51.78 per cent. Had Artem'ev given figures for the proportion of Ukrainians and Belorussians in Soviet fronts during 1941 and 1942, he probably would have demonstrated a far lower participation of these two nationalities in Soviet rifle divisions than in mid-1943.

The impossibility of drawing on the manpower of Ukraine,
Belorussia and the occupied regions of Russia during 1941 and 1942 required the conscription of the non-Slavic populations of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Siberia and Central Asia to reinforce the beleaguered divisions of the Soviet Army. The Soviets deployed the non-Slavic nationalities in national-territorial divisions, of the sort which had been abolished by the decree of 1938, and in multinational cadre divisions. Soviet sources do not indicate why the Red Army chose to revive the national-territorial detachments rather than place all the non-Slavic soldiers in multinational cadre divisions; they simply chronicle the creation of these national detachments.

Artem'ev and other Soviet historians alternate their presentation of very specific information on individual national-territorial rifle divisions formed after the Nazi invasion with vague references to the total proportion of these non-Slavs in the Soviet Army during 1941 and 1942. Artem'ev and his colleagues appear torn between a desire to document the support of the non-Slavic peoples of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Siberia and Central Asia for the Soviet war effort and a desire to obscure the precise degree to which the Soviet Army depended during 1941 and 1942 on non-Slavic personnel. A Soviet history text cites published sources to place the total size of the Soviet Army in May 1942 at 5,500,000 personnel, compared to 6,200,000 Nazi personnel deployed on the Russian front. The text then cites unpublished archival sources of the Ministry of Defence to place the total size in May 1942 of the contingent of Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz and Bashkirs at "more than 1,200,000 soldiers." This figure does not include the other non-Slavic soldiers recruited from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Siberia. According to the figures from this study, the contingent of 1,200,000 non-Slavs constituted about 22 per cent of all Soviet military personnel in May 1942. The nationalities included in the figure of 1,200,000 made up only 8.31 per cent of the Soviet population, according to the 1939 census: Georgians (1.33 per cent); Armenians (1.27 per cent);
Azerbaidzhanis (1.34 per cent); Kazakhs (1.83 per cent); Uzbeks (2.86 per cent); Kirghiz (0.52 per cent) and Bashkirs (0.50 per cent). These figures indicate that in May 1942 the proportion of these nationalities serving in the Soviet Army was almost triple their proportion in the Soviet population.

V.A. Muradian, a Soviet historian, cites unpublished archives of the Soviet Defence Ministry in arriving at an almost identical total. He writes that during the first 10 months of the war, presumably from July 1941 to the end of April 1942, the Red Army had called up "more than 600,000 Georgians, Azerbaidzhanis and Armenians" and "more than 500,000 Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Chechens and Estonians." He adds, citing archives of the Ministry of Defence, that by mid-May 1942 the Soviet Army had mobilized an additional 100,000 Uzbeks and 50,000 Kazakhs. His figures produce a total of 1,250,000, of which the Estonian contingent could have numbered no more than 10,000.

According to Muradian, the soldiers raised from the non-Slavic populations of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Siberia were sent not only to multinational cadre divisions, where the "majority" of personnel consisted of Slavs, but also to national units and formations, which the decree of 1938 had abolished. Citing archives of the Ministry of Defence, he writes that during the spring of 1942, in the divisions raised in the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic, the non-Russian contingents made up "as a rule, 20-40 per cent and more" of all personnel. He adds, "There was a significantly higher percentage of non-Russians in the national units and formations which were formed in Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan.

Soviet sources suggest that the non-Slavs mobilized for service either in the multinational cadre divisions or the rehabilitated national divisions were concentrated during 1941 and 1942 almost exclusively on the crucial Stalingrad and Caucasus fronts. To the degree that they were integrated with Slavic soldiers in multinational cadre divisions or in the national units and formations assigned to
these fronts, their reliability in combat may have critically affected the combat capability of Soviet forces as a whole.

According to Muradian, in the summer of 1942 the non-Russian contingent on the Caucasus front constituted 42 per cent of all Soviet military personnel. He did not, however, identify the national components of the non-Russian contingent, which could have included a substantial number of Ukrainians and Belorussians. This historian did note that on the Kalinin front, which later developed in the area directly north-east of the Caucasus, the proportion of non-Russians in certain "formations" (probably divisions) reached "46 per cent or more," although he does not identify what nationalities made up the non-Russian contingent. He notes that the 62nd Army, which fought in the fierce battle within the city of Stalingrad, was 49.4 per cent non-Russian. Although he does not give specific figures, he does say that the non-Russians in this contingent were Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, Georgians, Bashkirs, Uzbeks and "others." 70

Artem'ev offers some additional information which suggests the critical importance of the non-Slavic population during 1941 and 1942. Citing the archives of the Ministry of Defence, he writes that in August of 1942 the reinforcements for the 40th Army consisted 52 per cent of Russians and 44 per cent of peoples from Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Siberia: Uzbeks (12 per cent); Tatars (11 per cent); Udmurts (9 per cent); Kazakhs (7 per cent); and Mordvins (5 per cent). In giving figures for the reinforcements in May 1942 for the 21st Army, his figures show that almost half the reinforcements consisted of non-Slavs from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Siberia. 71

Citing the archives of the Ministry of Defence, Artem'ev identifies some of the national-territorial rifle divisions raised in the Caucasus and indicates the national composition of some of these formations. He claims that during 1941-42 six national rifle divisions were recruited in the Azerbaidzhan republic. He notes that in 1942 Azerbaidzhan soldiers made up more than 90 per cent of the personnel of
one of these formations, the 402nd Azerbaidzhani Rifle Division. Citing a Soviet publication which does not appear to be available in the West, Artem'ev writes that during 1941-42 the Soviets recruited five national rifle divisions in Armenia, but he does not offer information on the national composition of these particular divisions. Artem'ev, citing archives of the Ministry of Defence, also writes that during 1941-42 the Soviets recruited four national divisions in Georgia. He identified one as being 70 per cent Georgian in composition.72

Also citing archives of the Ministry of Defence, Artem'ev identifies an additional 14 multinational divisions recruited from the Caucasus. He gives the specific national composition of only one of them, the 409th Rifle Division. At "the time of formation," 50 per cent of the personnel of this division were Armenian; 30 per cent Azerbaidzhani; 15 percent Georgian; and 5 per cent Russian. On the basis of the archives of the Soviet Defence Ministry, Artem'ev writes that of the other 13 multinational rifle divisions formed in the Caucasus, five divisions had a contingent of Caucasus peoples ranging from 60 - 70 per cent of the personnel; four rifle divisions had a contingent of Caucasus peoples as "high as 40 per cent."73 According to Artem'ev's figures, the Soviets recruited 29 rifle divisions in the Caucasus during 1941 and 1942, of which 15 were national rifle divisions and 14 were multinational rifle divisions. Muradian writes that during the war as a whole 19 national rifle divisions were formed from the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaidzhan and Armenia.74

A Georgian historian offers a total figure of 33 rifle divisions recruited from the Caucasus. He writes that "at the beginning of the war" the Soviets raised 16 national rifle divisions: eight Georgian divisions; five Armenian divisions and three Azerbaidzhani divisions.75 He lists 17 multinational rifle divisions and two marine brigades made up "primarily" of Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaidzhanis. He writes that these three peoples made up 60-70 per cent of nine divisions; 50-60 per cent of four divisions; and "up to 40 per cent" of four divisions.76
The Soviet Kazakh historian, M.K. Kozybaev, writes that during the first year of the war (presumably July 1941 to July 1942), the republics of Kazakhstan and Central Asia sent 37 rifle, mountain-rifle and cavalry divisions and 27 separate brigades to the front. This may amount to the equivalent of 50 divisions. Combined with the figure of about 30 divisions raised in the Caucasus republics, this suggests a total of about 80 rifle divisions recruited from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Siberia and Central Asia in which the native peoples of these regions made up at least half the personnel. This would account for about half of the total of 1,200,000 personnel mobilized by May 1942 from the non-Slavic populations of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Siberia.

Artem'ev does not offer any confirmation for Kozybaev's figure of 37 divisions and 27 brigades. He does note, however, that by the beginning of 1942 the Kazakh republic had sent 12 rifle divisions to the front and that in 1941 and 1942 the Kazakh and Central Asian republics as a whole sent "tens" of formations to the front. A Soviet "formation" is either a brigade, division or corps. Citing archives of the Ministry of Defence, Artem'ev writes that the divisions formed in Kazakhstan and Central Asia generally were multinational formations, containing large contingents of several local nationalities. He notes that in "many" of the territorial rifle divisions raised in these republics, the non-Slavic populations made up 40 to 80 per cent of all personnel. He offers statistics on only a few rifle divisions, formed in the Kazakh republic. One of them, the 196th Rifle Division, formed in 1942, was 80 per cent Kazakh and 20 per cent "Russians and others." The 313th Rifle Division, formed in 1942, was "one-third Kazakh" and the other two-thirds consisted of unidentified proportions of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Turkmens and "others." The 310th Rifle Division, formed in 1942, was made up 40 per cent of Kazakhs, 25 per cent of Russians, 5 per cent of Ukrainians, and 30 per cent "others." The 195th Rifle Division had a total in 1942 of 4,129
Kazakhs and 1,945 Tatars. During the war, a Soviet rifle division usually had from 8,000-12,000 soldiers.

The Nazi Legions of Soviet Nationalities

The Soviet government was not the only belligerent in the Great Fatherland War to organize non-Russian Soviet peoples into military formations. The Nazis also raised national armies of Soviet nationalities recruited from prisoners of war and prewar emigres. According to Aleksandr Nekrich, the Germans may have organized as many as 1,000,000 such soldiers, the largest contingent of which was a 300,000-man Russian army under a former Lt. General of the Soviet Army, A.A. Vlasov.

Muradian writes that during 1942 the Germans organized national "legions" of some of the numerically-small nationalities of the North Caucasus and national legions of Georgians, Armenians and "Turkestan peoples." He also notes that the Germans undertook major propaganda efforts, mainly through printed leaflets, to stir up anti-Russian and anti-Soviet feelings among the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The reaction of the Stalinist regime to instances of individual collaboration with the Nazis was ferocious: after the liberation of the North Caucasus and the Crimean Peninsula, Stalin ordered the deportation of whole nationalities such as the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, and Kalmyks. When M.I. Kalinin, the old Bolshevik who served as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet during the war, addressed a conference of army political workers from the non-Russian units and formations in August 1943, he began his discussion of political work among the non-Russian soldiers by acknowledging that some of the Soviet nationalities had been collaborating with the Germans:

The war has shown that the Soviet Union is a united, friendly family of nations and that we have such unity as the world has never seen.

Of course, one meets with some insignificant exceptions.
Certain people agree to work with the Germans, some old-timers or some others, but such exceptions do not have any significance, especially for such a big country as ours.86

According to Aleksandr Nekrich the Nazis did not trust the national formations they had raised from captured Soviet soldiers and civilians, and with good reason. They frequently turned against the Nazis even before going into battle.87 However, the question remains as to just how much trust the Soviet Army placed in the national-territorial formations it raised during the Great Fatherland War.

The Main Political Administration and Non-Russian Military Detachments During The Great Fatherland War

During the prewar period, when the Soviet government organized national-territorial formations it relied on the Main Political Administration to handle the problem of the political reliability of soldiers and officers from the non-Russian nationalities. During the war the Main Political Administration once again resumed this function, which was especially important in the formations raised in the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Artem'ev notes in his study that during the first year of the war,

The political and party organs significantly strengthened the internationalist upbringing of the soldiers of the Red Army by adopting the most diverse forms of ideological work.

This work was widely conducted among the soldiers and commanders of Russian, Ukrainian and all other nationalities.

But special attention was devoted to that part of the military personnel who had been called up from the republics of Central Asia, the lower Caucasus, Kazakhstan and from the other national districts and regions.
The importance of work with this category of soldiers was conditioned by the fact that during the initial period of the war their proportion in the composition of Soviet troops grew significantly. According to Artem'ev, the difficulties of integrating these soldiers into cohesive military formations arose because most of them did not know the Russian language, few of them were familiar with industrial technology, and many had no previous military training. Muradian adds that many soldiers "adjusted with difficulty to the unfamiliar and complex experience of combat" because of "religious prejudices," "harmful customs" and a lack of familiarity with climates much colder than those of the southern regions of the USSR. The fragmentary evidence available suggests that during the first year of the war the problems noted by Artem'ev and Muradian adversely affected the military reliability of the non-Russian soldiers drawn from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Siberia and Central Asia. The Georgian historian Tskitishvili writes that during one of the early battles in the North Caucasus the 223rd Azerbaidzhani Rifle Division suffered a collapse of morale and discipline. According to his account the disintegration of this division was due to poor training in the use of weaponry, lack of knowledge of Russian military commands, and poor political work. To rebuild the shattered division, the Soviet command sent into the division 1,500 battle-tested Azerbaidzhans. According to Artem'ev's study, the prerequisite for teaching both weaponry skills and basic Russian military terminology was the conduct of political indoctrination work to motivate soldiers to carry out tasks they were reluctant to perform. In turn, the conduct of successful political work required careful attention to the special characteristics of each non-Russian nationality.
According to Muradian, on May 22, 1942 the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army issued a decree to the political administrations of military districts on improving political work among non-Russian soldiers. This decree came at a time when the non-Slavic soldiers of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Siberia and Central Asia made up almost 25 per cent of all Soviet military personnel. Muradian quotes the following passage of the decree from the archives of the Ministry of Defence:

... Conduct mass-political work with Red Army personnel who do not know Russian in their native languages. Do this by making use of the national cadres in the units of your districts -- commanders, political workers, rank-and-file Communists and Komsomol members -- who know the national languages.93

According to Muradian the decree also required that political workers take systematic action to instill in soldiers an awareness of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. The decree placed a special responsibility on Russian personnel to cultivate such awareness by helping non-Russian soldiers learn how to use weapons and to understand Russian military terminology.94 The decree apparently did not produce the required results. Muradian writes that on June 12, 1942 a Party Central Committee meeting called for an immediate improvement in political work among the non-Russian personnel. The Central Committee removed L.Z. Mekhlis from his post as chief of the Main Political Administration and replaced him with A.S. Shcherbakov, a Central Committee Secretary. The Central Committee also established a special Council of Military-Political Propaganda for the armed forces.95

According to Muradian's study, during the summer of 1942 the Germans intensified their propaganda effort to distribute leaflets and other materials designed to incite anti-Russian feelings among the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia.96 On September 17, 1942
Shcherbakov issued a decree, No. 012, "On Educational Work with Non-Russian Red Army Soldiers and Junior Officers." Muradian writes, on the basis of the archives of the Ministry of Defence, that this document noted that "a significant stratum of the personnel of a majority of the divisions of the Red Army consists of non-Russian soldiers and junior officers, a part of whom know Russian poorly or not at all." Muradian then quotes directly from the decree:

... political organs and military commissars of formations and units have not taken the necessary measures to organize educational work among this stratum of military personnel.

Commissars and political organs have underestimated the entire importance of the political education of non-Russian soldiers and have forgotten that each of them has a native language, native customs and a well-defined form of national life.

They have treated every one of these nationalities alike, not taking into account their national characteristics.

Moreover, many political workers do not know how to organize explanatory work on the questions of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR and the role of the Great Russian People as the elder brother of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

According to Muradian, and Artem'ev as well, the decree of September 17, 1942 required the immediate conduct of political work in the native tongues of the non-Russian soldiers on the following themes:

What the Hitlerites are Intending for the Peoples of the Soviet Union;

On the Fronts of the Fatherland War Defend the Independence of All the National Republics;

The Red Army is the Army of Brotherhood Among the Peoples of Our Country;
Heroes of the Soviet Union Mil'dzikho, Kurban Durdy and Others (non-Slavic recipients of the USSR's highest military decoration);

The Iron Discipline and Steadfastness of Soviet Soldiers is the Guarantee of Our Victory;

The Role of the Great Russian People in the Fatherland War of the Peoples of the USSR Against Hitler's Germany;

The Role of the Great Russian People in the Struggle for the Freedom and Independence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in the Development of Socialism in the Fraternal Soviet Republics.99

The decree of September 17, 1942 also led to the publication of millions of leaflets in the non-Russian languages of the USSR; the use of appropriate texts from national literatures in political indoctrination sessions; the organization of regular correspondence between national troop detachments and Republic agricultural and industrial enterprises; the use of native-language radio broadcasts and of gramophone recordings; the production of 22 film strips on the non-Russian Republics; the organization of choral groups to sing native folk songs; the organization of national theatrical touring companies to entertain the non-Russian soldiers; and even the organization of national delegations of visiting civilians who brought with them not only news from home but local culinary delicacies as well.100 By the beginning of 1943 the Main Political Administration had established a special department to publish propaganda leaflets in non-Russian languages and to publish non-Russian language military newspapers, all of them in the languages of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Siberia: 11 in Uzbek; 10 in Kazakh; 8 in Tatar; 6 in Azerbaidzhani; 5 in Georgian; 4 in Armenian; 2 in Tadzhik, and one each in the Kirghiz, Bashkir and Turkmen languages.101
Conduct of political work in the native languages was directly connected to a programme for teaching Russian to small groups of non-Russian soldiers. In his address to the August 1943 conference of political officers who worked with the non-Russian soldiers, M.I. Kalinin summarized the language policy that had developed in 1942: all soldiers in the Soviet Army were to learn enough Russian to understand military regulations and military commands, but non-Russian soldiers were to receive political education in their native languages. Kalinin added,

Every soldier, including the Russian soldier, takes pride in his nationality and indeed he can't help but take pride -- he is a son of his people!

This consideration is very important. It has especially great significance and it is always necessary to keep this in mind in agitational work.

Cultivate in our people both Soviet patriotism and national pride. Remind every soldier about the heroic traditions of his people, its golden age, its great commanders and military leaders, its fighters for the liberation of the masses.

Kalinin also argued that in order to persuade the non-Russian soldier to fight well in the Soviet Army he first had to be convinced that a German victory would be a catastrophe for his native people.

The conduct of political work in the native languages of non-Russian soldiers, as required by the decree of May 22, 1942 and September 17, 1942, necessitated the recruitment of native cadres to serve as political officers in the national formations and units of the Red Army. These political officers came from two sources: rank-and-file soldiers given special courses in the conduct of political work, and experienced native cadres from the republican Communist Parties. On August 3, 1942 Shcherbakov sent a circular telegram to the heads of the political administrations of the Red Army fronts in which the Chief of
the Soviet Main Political Administration (MPA) ordered:

For the purpose of training cadres of political workers for the middle and senior echelons of front units in which there are soldiers and commanders of Kazakh or Central Asian nationality, organize the training of cadres of these nationalities in military-political courses at the front or in the military schools of the sectors.105

According to Muradian, by February 1943 this order resulted in the graduation of 1,960 Kazakh and Central Asian political commissars. By this date, according to Muradian's figures from the archives of the Ministry of Defence, the republican Communist Parties had, in addition, provided the MPA with 2,429 native cadres to serve as political officers.106 M.K. Kozybaev writes that during the war the Kazakh Communist Party provided the MPA with 22 oblast party secretaries, 123 secretaries of party Komsomol committees at the raion level and 185 deputies for political work of the Machine Tractor Stations and state collective farms of the republic. According to Kozybaev, who cites party archives as his source, these figures represented 30 per cent of all the secretaries of the republic's oblast party committees and 15.7 per cent of all the secretaries of the party city and raion committees. In addition, 42.2 per cent of all the secretaries of the primary party organizations of the republic went into the Kazakh rifle divisions.107 Kozybaev also writes, on the basis of party archives, that during the war the Kazakh republic sent 82,251 Communist Party members and "about 250,000" Komsomol members into the army. He does not break these figures down by nationality (the Kazakhs in 1939 constituted only 38 per cent of the population of Kazakhstan), but he claims that "every third or fourth Kazakh" serving in the Red Army had been either a Party member or Komsomol member before entering the military.108
In another study, also based on party archives, Kozybaev writes that nearly 25 per cent of the entire Uzbek Communist Party joined the Soviet Army, including 116 secretaries of party committees at the city, raion and oblast levels. He does not, however, give the national composition of this contingent. Kozybaev also reports that 1,500 high-ranking members of the Kirghiz Communist Party and 1,070 persons on the nomenklatura list of the Tadzhik republic (that is, the list of people eligible for the most sensitive positions in the republic) went into the army. He does not, however, indicate the nationality of these personnel. The Georgian historian, Tskitishvili, notes that "in the middle of 1942" the party organizations of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaizhan sent "about 2,000" leading party members to serve as political officers in the national divisions of the Caucasus republics.

The National Composition of the Political Workers of the Panfilov Eighth Guards Division, October 1942

The goal of Shcherbakov's program to recruit native speakers as political workers appears to have been to achieve a proportion of a given nationality among the MPA agitators of a division roughly equal to the proportion of that nationality in the division as a whole. Agitators are the political workers responsible for the direct conduct of ideological work among personnel. A similar effort appears to have been made to achieve a proportional representation of each national group in a division in the middle ranks of the party-political apparatus of the division. The statistics assembled by Artem'ev on the national composition of the Panfilov Eighth Guards Rifle Division, an elite formation drawn from Kazakhstan and Central Asia, suggest these patterns. Artem'ev's statistics, which come from the archives of the Ministry of Defence, produce the following table.
Table 5.5  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>All Personnel</th>
<th>Soldiers &amp; Junior Officers</th>
<th>Agitators</th>
<th>Membership: Party &amp; Komsomol</th>
<th>Deputies of Political Officers in Subunits</th>
<th>All Political Workers of Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>19.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>9.1</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
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<td>not given</td>
<td>not given</td>
<td>not given</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of agitators: 712. Rough estimate of size of division: 10,000 personnel. Total number of Party and Komsomol members among agitators: 675.

In assessing these data, Artem'ev concludes:

Such a composition of the agitation collective corresponded to the composition of the soldiers of the division and permitted the organization of agitation-political work with soldiers of various nationalities in their native languages.

The statistics compiled by Artem'ev from the archives of the Ministry of Defence on the Eighth Guards Division suggest that Russians enjoyed a near-monopoly on the higher-level positions in the party-political apparatus of this division; that the Uzbeks were very much under-represented in the party-political apparatus at every level except that of agitators; and that Kazakhs in the division, who were greatly over-represented among the deputies of political officers in charge of political work in subunits, among the party membership, and among the party-political apparatus as a whole, may have carried out much of the
political work with the Central Asian nationalities. Although he does not provide specific information on other multinational divisions or the national divisions of the Great Fatherland War, Artem'ev does note, "The agitation collectives of the other formations of the Soviet Army were filled through a similar process of taking into account the national composition of the troops." Artem'ev's discussion of the Eighth Guards Rifle Division suggests that the principle of proportional representation also obtained in the assignment of command personnel:

The assignment of command and political cadres in the [Eighth Guards Rifle] Division was carried out in such a manner that in each subunit there were representatives of several nationalities.

For example, the commander of the 7th Company of the 19th Regiment was a Tatar who knew Russian well. The political officer was a Russian. The head of the party organization was a Kirghiz. The deputy of the political officer was a Kazakh.

When the commanders of Platoons and squadrons were Russians or representative of other nationalities who did not know the languages of the peoples of Central Asia, the most well-prepared Red Army men of Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek or other nationalities were designated as their deputies.

Such an assignment of leading military cadres provided an opportunity to conduct work in the combat training and ideological-political upbringing of multinational personnel more correctly and in a more differentiated manner.

It promoted the integration of soldiers into a united military collective.

The original commander of the Eighth Guards Division had been Major-General I.V. Panfilov. Panfilov, a Russian, had commanded Bolshevik units in campaigns during the mid-1920s against the "Basmachi," the anti-Soviet Moslem rebels of Central Asia. In 1937 he
served as the head of a department on the staff of the Central Asian Military District and in 1938 he became the Military Commissar of the Kirghiz Republic.

The Dissolution of the National-Territorial Divisions of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia

There does not appear to be enough evidence in Soviet sources to answer the question of whether the programs of political work in native languages and the assignment of command and political cadres in approximate proportion to the percentage of the native populations in the national-territorial rifle divisions of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia made these divisions cohesive and reliable enough to satisfy the Soviet high command. When the great victories at Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus enabled the Soviets to begin a massive counteroffensive during 1943, the proportion of native peoples in the ranks of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asian national-territorial divisions dropped so precipitously that these divisions became indistinguishable from regular cadre divisions in the national composition of their personnel. This change could have been due to the complexities of reinforcing divisions now operating in Ukraine, central Russia and regions further west. It could also have been due to the influx of Slavic manpower from the liberated zones of the Soviet Union. The decline in the proportion of non-Slavs in the divisions originally raised in the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia could also have been due to a decision to reduce the representation of these peoples in the Soviet Army to a share proportionate to their share in the Soviet population as a whole. But it could also be due to a lack of confidence by the Soviet high command in the reliability of the military personnel of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, a concern that may have grown as soldiers from these areas were called to fight on fronts far from the borders of their republics, where they had first battled the Germans.
Artem'ev does not offer any explanation for the decline of the proportion of the nationalities of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in the divisions formed in these republics; he simply notes that this decline took place, beginning in the spring and summer of 1943. In summarizing the changes in the national composition of these formations during the course of the war he declares,

In the rifle divisions which were established in the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan, the proportion of the representatives of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz and Tadzhik peoples was comparatively great.

In many formations, they made up from 40 to 50 per cent of all personnel.

But in the course of military actions the personnel of these divisions departed and dispersed into other military units.

These divisions received new reinforcements and in this manner were transformed into ordinary formations of the Red Army which had in their composition only an insignificant portion of soldiers from the national republics for which the divisions were named.116

In support of his claim Artem'ev offers the following table on the 1943 and 1944 proportions of Kazakh soldiers in some of the national-territorial rifle formations originally raised in Kazakhstan during 1941 and 1942.117
Table 5.6  Proportion of Kazakh Soldiers in Kazakhstan Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division:</th>
<th>July 1, 1943</th>
<th>January 1, 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th Rifle (but not the</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Guards Rifle Division)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Guards Rifle</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Guards Rifle</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Guards Rifle</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73rd Guards Rifle</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th Rifle</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>313th Rifle</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>387th Rifle</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>391st Rifle</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Artem'ev also notes, in the cases of four other rifle divisions formed in Kazakhstan in 1941-42, that by "early 1943" the proportion of Kazakhs in these divisions was no more than 10-15 per cent. Artem'ev points out a similar decline in the share of the peoples of the Caucasus in the national-territorial rifle divisions formed in this region in 1941 and 1942. He cites as examples of this decline the 409th Armenian Rifle Division, the 77th and 223rd Azerbaidzhan Rifle Divisions and the 242nd and 394th Georgian Rifle Divisions. He claims, on the basis of the archives of the Ministry of Defence, that at the beginning of 1943 the soldiers of the nationality for which each division was named made up from 30 to 90 per cent of all personnel in each of these five divisions. But, by "mid-1944," the proportion of any one Caucasus nationality in these particular divisions ranged from a low of 2 per cent to a high of only 15 per cent. In the case of the Caucasus nationalities, Artem'ev does offer explanations for the decline in the proportions of these nationalities in the divisions originally formed in their republics:
To the degree that these divisions went further and further from their republics, it became more complex to reinforce their personnel in the required time with representatives of the corresponding nationalities.

And furthermore, there was not the same kind of necessity as in the initial period of the war, since the soldiers of non-Russian nationality had by 1943 received good military tempering and experience, and many of them had mastered the Russian language and received a good internationalist training.

This in no small degree facilitated their blending with the soldiers of all other nationalities.120

Some Tentative Conclusions Concerning the Soviet Experience in Mobilizing the Non-Slavic Populations of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia During 1941-43

The experience of the Soviet Defence Ministry in integrating non-Slavic soldiers from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia into the Soviet Army is probably so complex that even officials with access to the relevant archival materials may not be entirely sure what conclusions to draw about the mobilization of soldiers from these regions for future conflicts. This study offers some tentative conclusions:

1) The Soviets have in the past found that linguistic and cultural problems have required the formation of distinct national detachments of non-Slavs in order to ensure the effective military training of these soldiers.

2) The Soviet command has evidently not trusted the reliability of the national detachments and has frequently dispersed non-Slavs among predominantly Slavic formations once the non-Slavs have completed training or have been exposed to combat.
3) The native soldiers of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia have, since the Civil War, gone into combat only on their native lands or in the regions immediately adjacent to their homelands. Until the invasion of Afghanistan, by a relatively small force whose exact national composition is unknown, the Soviets do not appear to have had any experience in sending non-Slavic conscript soldiers into battle outside the Soviet Union, except in campaigns that began deep within Soviet territory, against a foreign invader.

4) The MPA has found that effective political work with non-Slavs requires the conduct of indoctrination in the native tongue, with the use of materials from the native culture. Political education work among non-Slavic soldiers, whether in the Civil War, the inter-war period, the Great Fatherland War or the postwar period, has always had to address the question of the relationships among different Soviet nationalities and in particular the question of why the Russians are the "elder brothers" of the other Soviet nationalities in all matters, both military and civilian.

National-Territorial Detachments of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians

In his discussion of the reduction of the proportion of the non-Slavic nationalities in the national-territorial rifle divisions of the Red Army during 1943 and 1944 Artem'ev notes an exception to this rule: the deliberate concentration of soldiers from the Baltic states in national-territorial rifle formations. The Soviets assigned the small numbers of Balts who fought in these divisions a highly important political role in the liberation of the Baltic republics from German occupation, which witnessed extensive collaboration of anti-Soviet Balts with the Germans. The military role of these Baltic divisions in the war was negligible. Before the liberation of the Baltic states one Latvian, one Lithuanian and two Estonian rifle divisions had fought in some of the battles of 1942 and 1943. But the Soviets formed these
divisions mainly for symbolic participation in the liberation of their national republics. According to the Soviet history of the Great Fatherland War, during the liberation of the Baltic regions the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian divisions appear to have fought only on the soil of their corresponding native republics. The largest of the Baltic formations, the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps, was only one of the 57 rifle and tank corps and other formations that participated in the battle for Latvia.

The primary mission of the national-territorial divisions of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians was to provide the basis for national myths which legitimized the re-Sovietization of these states: the true Baltic patriots, fighting shoulder to shoulder with other Soviet nationalities against the Nazis and their Baltic collaborators, liberated their fatherlands from the Germans. Like the national-territorial formations of the Civil War and of the Mongolian revolution, many of the soldiers of the Baltic national-territorial divisions went on to serve in the most important civilian posts in their liberated republics.

V.I. Savchenko, a Soviet historian, writes that in 1941 the Soviets recruited a Latvian rifle division from the 150,000 Latvians living in Russia before the war and from the 40,000 Latvians who fled after the German occupation. According to Savchenko's figures, which are based on archives of the Ministry of Defence, in 1941 Latvians made up 51 per cent of the personnel of the 210th Latvian Rifle Division (later the 43rd Guards Latvian Rifle Division). Russians made up 26 per cent of the personnel; Jews, 17 per cent; Poles, 3 per cent; and other nationalities, 6 per cent. On July 1, 1944 the national composition of this division was as follows: Russians, 47 per cent; Latvians, 35.9 per cent; Jews, 8.5 per cent, Ukrainians, 2.1 per cent; and the remainder, a mixture of several nationalities. On October 18, 1944, the national composition of the division was: Latvians, 40 per cent; Russians, 40 per cent; Jews, 10 per cent; Ukrainians, 2 per cent; and
According to these figures the Latvians who fought in this division for the liberation of their republic were a minority among the personnel. In early 1944, as the Soviet Army approached the Baltic republics, the Soviets reorganized a Latvian training regiment into the 308th Latvian Rifle Division, which together with the 43rd Guards Latvian Rifle Division formed the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps. On July 10, 1944, Russians made up 37 per cent; Jews, 8 per cent; Ukrainians, 2.3 per cent; Belorussians, 1 per cent; Lithuanians, 0.8 per cent; and Tatars, 1.9 per cent. But after the reconquest of the republic, this division, which remained on Latvian soil, became predominantly Latvian in composition. On March 30, 1945, Latvians made up 83.4 per cent of all personnel; Russians, 8.7 per cent; Jews, 5.6 per cent; Ukrainians, 1.3 per cent; and a contingent of Belorussians, Tatars and Lithuanians, 0.1 per cent. In addition, the Soviets conscripted about 50,000 Latvians to serve in military-construction battalions, which were non-combat units. During the war the Soviets also organized a Latvian air regiment which took part in the battle for the Baltic states.

During the liberation of Latvia, political work in the 130th Latvian Corps, which was at best 40 per cent Latvian, stressed party discipline, the atrocities the Germans were alleged to have committed in Latvia and the national liberation mission of the division. Political officers also conducted ideological work on the problem of the collaboration of "bourgeois nationalists" with the Germans and the success these elements had achieved in disorienting the popular masses of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. In organizing political work, the political officers saw to it that political indoctrination was conducted in the native tongues of the soldiers, particularly through the use of native-language military newspapers. The political officers of the Latvian Corps also conducted extensive political work amidst the population of the liberated republic.
In 1941 the Soviets organized the 7th Estonian Rifle Division (later the 118th Guards Estonian Rifle Division) and the 249th Estonian Rifle Division (later the 122nd Guards Estonian Rifle Division). In 1942 these two divisions formed the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps. According to Endel Sogel's anecdotal history of this corps, published in the Soviet Union for popular consumption, in 1943 the 8th Estonian Corps consisted of 10,000 Estonians, 1,600 Russians and 100 soldiers of other nationalities. No statistics appear to be available on the national composition of the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division, formed in 1942, which participated in the liberation of Lithuania in 1944. Muradian mentions that during the battle of Briansk in 1942 this division performed poorly in combat and had to be withdrawn from the front lines. The Main Political Administration dispatched two instructors to supervise the overhaul of political work in the division and to aid in retraining the personnel for combat duty. Artem'ev's brief mention of the Lithuanian Division suggests that the division may have constituted the Lithuanian Communist Party in exile: among its command and political officers were 11 full and candidate members of the Lithuanian Central Committee and 18 secretaries of party committees at the city and oblast levels.

Judging by Artem'ev's discussion of the Baltic divisions, these divisions required their soldiers to prove their loyalty to the Soviet regime in combat with the Germans. Those who proved themselves earned the right to occupy leading posts in the postwar regimes of these Soviet republics. Artem'ev writes:

The workers of the Baltic Republics made up the personnel of a series of national rifle divisions, which had exceptionally great significance.

They were the self-selected center around which united all the progressive forces of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania for the future struggle not only with the fascists but also with the internal counterrevolution and with reactionary nationalism, the two forces which had united to oppose the liberation of the Baltic republics and to destroy the socialist order there.
In these national formations thousands of people went through a school of courage and tempering. New cadres, dedicated to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, were brought up.

These cadres held important posts in the economic and cultural development of their republics in the postwar years.140

Sogel's history of the 8th Estonian Corps confirms for Estonia Artem'ev's conclusions about the illustrious postwar careers of the Baltic veterans. Sogel writes that in 1947 the former soldiers of the Estonian Corps made up 96 per cent of the combined total of the secretaries of party oblast committees and the chairmen of oblast executive committees; 83 per cent of all secretaries of party raion committees; and 60 per cent of the chairmen of all village Soviets. In addition, another 600 veterans were either the directors or the chief engineers of Estonian factories.141

Savchenko does not give specific figures on the postwar careers of the veterans of the Latvian Corps, but he does note,

At the end of the war the soldiers demobilized from the Latvian Corps made up a significant part of the cadres of the party and Soviet organs of the Republics (an especially large number of them were in the party organizations of enterprises and raion governments and were also chairmen of country executive committees and village Soviets).142

The Role of "Ethnic Units" in Soviet Military History

The history of ethnic formations under Soviet command has been the history of military service on both internal and external fronts.
Since 1971, ethnic formations under Soviet command have fulfilled four distinct missions on the internal and external fronts:

1) On occasion, some ethnic formations have served as hosts who have introduced the Soviet army into non-Russian areas as an army of liberation rather than an army of occupation. After the establishment of permanent Soviet garrisons, ethnic formations have continued to serve as hosts whose role is to present the Soviet army as a presence that is fraternal rather than foreign.

2) On occasion, some ethnic formations have provided military-political camouflage for Soviet/Russian forces operating on the territory of a third nationality. When accompanied by distinct ethnic formations, Soviet/Russian troops appear as part of an "internationalist" force rather than as an imperial army.

3) On occasion, some ethnic formations have served as the single most important device for recruiting politically reliable native cadres to fill key party and state posts in their native socialist territories.

4) On occasion, some ethnic formations have prepared non-Russian soldiers for combat under Soviet command, first in division-size formations and eventually in smaller units dispersed within a larger multinational force.

The critical devices for placing ethnic formations under Soviet command for various uses on both internal and external fronts have been:

1) the establishment of a supreme command controlled by Soviet officers and the placing of Soviet officers directly inside non-Russian ethnic units;

2) reliance on Soviet armaments and the Soviet logistical system;

3) acceptance of a common military doctrine formulated by the Soviet Defence Ministry;

4) recruitment and training of a bilingual officer corps capable of taking orders in Russian and issuing commands in the native languages of ethnic formations;
5) the establishment of a network of political officers to deal with the problems of the reliability of ethnic formations and to conduct political indoctrination on the "internationalist" missions of multinational military personnel.

During the period from 1945 to 1955 the Soviets used these devices within the framework of the bilateral treaties signed by the USSR and East European states in the late 1940s. There is evidence in the following chapters that the Soviets have adapted these five control devices for ethnic units in the Soviet Armed Forces both to the organization of East European national armies and to the organization of the Warsaw Pact. These devices appear to have served the Soviets well on both the internal and external fronts in East Europe.

The Warsaw Pact and the Abolition of National Detachments in the Soviet Armed Forces

There is some evidence which suggests that after the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 the Soviets abolished national detachments in the Soviet Armed Forces in order to eliminate potential conduits for the spread of national tensions from the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Army in the event that Soviet and East European formations should ever go into battle together.

A decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of February 1, 1944 made three changes in the 1936 USSR Constitution permitting the organization of national "formations" (in Soviet usage, brigades, divisions or corps) and national "units" (in Soviet usage, regiments, ships or their equivalents). The constitutional changes of February 1, 1944 converted the Ministry of Defence from an All-Union ministry to a Union-Republic ministry, gave each republic the right to have its own formations and units, and gave the Supreme Soviet of each republic the right to decide on the particular formations and units to be mustered from the republic.
This decree coincided with the participation of the Baltic national formations in the liberation of their homelands and may have sought to promote the recruitment of additional Balts for these formations. It also coincided with the participation of East European national formations raised by the Soviets in the liberation of East Europe. The decree may have anticipated the possibility that the liberated fatherlands of East Europe could become union republics of the USSR. The decree also coincided with the dismantling of the national divisions of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia and may have been intended to reassure the soldiers of these regions that they would continue to serve in their own national units and subunits inside multinational divisions.

Because Soviet sources make no mention of the organization of national detachments of Ukrainians or Belorussians for participation in the campaigns of 1944 and 1945, the decree probably applied only to the non-Slavic republics which had raised national detachments as early as 1941. These non-Slavic formations and units appear to have survived until the mid 1950s, probably because of their utility in training soldiers who did not speak a Slavic language and because of their utility in avoiding the problems of trying to integrate soldiers with cultural, historical and religious traditions markedly different from those of the Slavic soldiers of the Soviet Army. The article on the national detachments of the Soviet Army in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia says that "in the mid 1950s" the national formations and units of the Soviet Army were disbanded and their personnel were assigned to multinational troop formations.

In its article on national detachments in the Soviet Army, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia offers two reasons why the Soviets preferred the disadvantage of integrating Soviet nationalities into multinational units and formations to the disadvantages of integrating national units and formations into the army as a whole. The Encyclopedia article states that the necessity for national units and formations "fell away"
because of the formation of the world socialist system and because of the further drawing together of all Soviet nationalities as a result of the socio-political, economic and cultural development of the USSR. 144

The single most important development in the military affairs of the world socialist system in the mid-1950s was the establishment of the Warsaw Pact. If the Soviets had retained national formations and units made up of non-Slavic nationalities they would have had to deal with the complexities of integrating these formations and units not only into the Soviet Armed Forces but also into the Warsaw Pact. This problem would have arisen sooner or later in the staffing of the Soviet Force Groups in Europe and of the formations in the western military districts of the USSR. 145

To deal with the problem of the reliability of the "ethnic" units of the East European armies of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Defence Ministry evidently decided to abolish the comparable "ethnic" units of the Soviet Army. Such a policy appears to have anticipated the dispersal of Eastern European military units within Soviet formations. To their East European allies the USSR's forces would appear as multinational "Soviet" or even "Russian" units rather than as distinct "national" units from union republics of the USSR. The previous history of "ethnic" units in the Soviet Army has demonstrated the Soviet capability for creating the organizational mechanisms necessary to absorb "ethnic units," even from "independent" states, into a multinational military force under one central command.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 53-104.

4. Ibid., pp. 155-158.

5. Ibid., pp. 30-39.

6. Ibid., p. 144.


11. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p. 163.
14 Ibid., p. 163.
15 Ibid., p. 164.
16 R.E. Zeinalov, "Azerbaidzhanskaia Krasnaia armiia v edinom stroiu
vooruzhennykh sil Respublik Zakavkaz'ia" in Mintz, ed., Boevoe
sodruzhestvo, p. 94.
17 Ibid., pp. 93-99.
18 Susan L. Curran and Dimitry Ponomareff, Managing the Ethnic Factor
in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview
(Santa Monica, California: RAND Corp. R-2640/1, July 1982).
19 Krushel'nitskii et al., "Stanovlenie ...," p. 21.
20 Azade-Ayse Rorlich, Chapter 10, "The Revolution: From Cultural
Autonomy to the Tatar ASSR," in The Volga Tatars (unpublished
manuscript), pp. 382-391.
21 Ibid., pp. 390-404.
22 Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet
156-157.
23 Curran and Ponomareff, Managing the Ethnic Factor, p. 16.
24 I.G. Gizzatullin, Zashchishchaia zavoroiania Oktiabria:
Tsentral'naia musul'manskaia voennaia kollegiia, 1918-1920 (Moscow:
Nauka, 1979), p. 34.
26 V.I. Abulgaziev, "Iz istorii bor'by narodov Turkestana za vlast'
sovetov" in Mintz, ed., Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 171.
27 Ibid., pp. 174-176; Curran and Ponomareff, Managing the Ethnic
Factor, pp. 16-18; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism
in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: Johns
28 Carrère d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire, pp. 157-158.
29 Kommunisticheskaiia partiia Sovetskogo soiuza v rezoliutsiakh i
resheniakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts. K. (Moscow:
"Leninskaia natsional'naia politika i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh
vooruzhennykh sil," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 9, 1974, p. 6.


31 N.N. Koniukhovskii, Territorial'naia sistema voennogo stroitel'stva (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961), pp. 61, 68.


33 Ibid.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 43.

42 Koniukhovskii, Territorial'naia sistema, p. 81.


45 Makarov, "Stroitel'stvo ..." p. 43.


47 "Itogi i perspektivy voennogo stroitel'stva v sviazi s
reorganizatsiei tekushchego goda," Nov. 17, 1924, in ibid., p. 191.

44 Ibid.
45 "Itogi plenuma ..." in ibid., p. 238.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 "Budem gotovi," Armiia i revoliutsiia Nos. 11-12, Nov.-Dec. 1923, in ibid., p. 111.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Makarov, "Stroitel'stvo ..." p. 41.
53 "Iz reshenii o prakticheskikh meropriiatiiakh po provedeniiu v zhizn' rezoliutsii XII s"ezda partii po natsional'nomy voprosu" in Chernenko, ed., KPSS, p. 206.
54 Makarov, "Stroitel'stvo ..." p. 41.
56 Ibid., p. 58.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 59.
59 Ibid.
61 In his volume Artem'ev says, on p. 43, that during a two and a half year period the Tadzhik Republic sent 209,000 soldiers into the army, but he does not give any breakdown of the ethnic composition of the soldiers sent from this republic. In 1939 the Tadzhiks made up 59.5 per cent of the population of the Tadzhik republic, although not all Soviet Tadzhiks lived in this particular republic. On p. 43 Artem'ev also notes that during the war the Turkmen republic raised "a series of divisions and brigades," but he does not indicate either the total number of personnel or of divisions and brigades. In 1939 the Tatar population of the Soviet Union represented 2.54 per cent of the entire Soviet population, making it the fifth
largest Soviet nationality after the Russians (58.41 per cent); Ukrainians (16.56 per cent) Belorussians (3.11 per cent) and Uzbeks (2.86 per cent). The role of the Tatars in the Great Fatherland War may be indicated by the fact that the Tatars were in fourth place among the nationalities of the Soviet Union in number of military decorations received during the war and in fourth place in the number of the highest decorations awarded, Hero of the Soviet Union (Artem'ev, p. 176). Although there do not appear to be any figures for the contributions of the smaller non-Slavic populations to the war effort, a Soviet study does discuss individual soldiers and individual units of a series of special formations, mainly cavalry and mountain infantry forces, formed among these peoples. See N.A. Arzumanova, Osoby dobrovol'cheskie (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiiia, 1975).

64 V.A. Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), pp. 73-74.
65 Ibid., p. 74.
67 Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 72.
68 Ibid., p. 73.
69 In his study Artem'ev documents the participation in the battle of Moscow in 1941-42 of five rifle divisions from Kazakhstan, two cavalry divisions from the Uzbek republic, one rifle division and one rifle brigade from the Kirghiz republic and "other formations" (Bratskii Boevoi Soiuz, pp. 116 and also 116-121). He avoids indicating the numbers of divisions from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia that participated in the battles of Stalingrad and the Caucasus. However, this discussion of the military contributions of these divisions to the war effort in 1941 and 1942 is in fact almost exclusively a discussion of action on the Stalingrad and Caucasus fronts (see ibid., pp. 121-142). On pp. 142-154 he also discusses the action of some of these divisions in the great battles of Kursk and Kharkov, which followed the victories of Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, but after this his discussion of the roles of these non-Slavic divisions in the war virtually ceases.

70 Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 74.
71 Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, p. 56.
72 Ibid., pp. 44-46.
Ibid.

74 Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 116.


76 Ibid. The discrepancies in the figures offered by Artem'ev, Muradian and Tskitishvili, which are probably due to the different dates used, might be cleared up if a source referred to in these texts were available in the West: G.S. Burnasian, "Participation of the National Formations of the Lower Caucasus Republics in the Battle for the Caucasus and in the Subsequent Operations of the Red Army in the Great Fatherland War" (Rostov-on-the-Don, 1967). (In Russian).


78 Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, p. 41.

79 Ibid., pp. 41, 43.

80 Ibid., p. 54.

81 Ibid., p. 40.

Ukrainy, 1976).

84 Ibid., p. 76.
85 See Nekrich, The Punished Peoples.
86 M.I. Kalinin, O sovetskoi armii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), p. 89.
87 Nekrich, Punished Peoples, p. 9. See also Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 108.
88 Artem'ev, Boevoi bratskii soiuz, p. 67.
89 Ibid., p. 68.
90 Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 74.
91 Tskitishvili, Na frontakh, p. 284. See also Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, pp. 92-93.
92 Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, pp. 71, 74.
93 Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 75.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., p. 78.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 79; see also Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, pp. 72-73.
100 Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, pp. 79-80, 83-86, 95; Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, pp. 73, 85-87.
101 Sheverdalkin, Vo glave, p. 123; see also Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 84.
102 Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, pp. 67-68.
103 Kalinin, O sovetskoi armii, p. 93.
106 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
107 Muradian, Boevoe bratstvo, p. 75.
108 Ibid., p. 82.
110 Ibid., p. 82.
112 Tskitishvili, Na frontakh, p. 290.
113 Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, pp. 55, 74, 75, 76 for different dates, all during the month of October 1942.
114 Ibid., p. 76.
115 Ibid. He offers only two additional examples: the 213th Rifle Division, in which the 702nd regiment had "a large number of Uzbeks" and in which "more than half" of the agitators in the regiment were Uzbeks. He also notes that in the 402nd Azerbaidzhani Rifle Division 90 per cent of all personnel were Azerbaidzhani and that 98 per cent of all agitators and political workers were either Azerbaidzhani or spoke Azerbaidzhani (pp. 74 and 44 of ibid.).
116 Ibid., p. 55.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., p. 52.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., p. 59
124 Ibid., p. 116.
125 Ibid., p. 501.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., p. 449.
130 Ibid., pp. 313-323.
131 Ibid., pp. 522-534.
132 Ibid., pp. 510-511.
133 Ibid., pp. 499, 510, 511.
134 Ibid., pp. 507, 512, 513.
135 Ibid., p. 514.
136 Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, pp. 49-50.
137 Endel' Sogel, Druzhba zakalennaiia v ogne voiny (Tallinn: Izdatel'stvo Eestraamat, 1975), p. 79.
139 Artem'ev, Bratskii boevoi soiuz, p. 50.
140 Ibid., p. 50.
141 Sogel, Druzhba, p. 71
142 Savchenko, Latyshskie formirovaniia, p. 521.
In the middle 1950s there began a new stage of development in the life of the multinational Soviet Armed Forces. This stage was conditioned by the formation of the world system of socialism and by the further strengthening of the political and economic might of the USSR. Soviet society had made a new major step forward in its sociopolitical, economic and cultural development. A further drawing together of all the nations and nationalities of the country took place. In these conditions, the necessity of national detachments in the union and autonomous republics fell away. The existing republic formations and units were disbanded and their personnel went into the ranks of the multinational formations of the Soviet Army and Navy.

V.N. Koniukhovskii, who wrote what appears to have been a policy study for Khrushchev on the territorial militia system, Territorial'naia sistema (quoted above), has written at least one article on the problem of integrating Soviet nationalities with the other nationalities of the Warsaw Pact. See Col. V. Koniukhovskii and Rear Admiral F. Chernyshev, "The Army of the Friendship of Peoples and Proletarian Internationalism," Voennaia Mysl' No. 11, 1967 in CIA FBIS FPO 0157/68 Nov. 18, 1968, Selected Translations from Voennaia Mysl' (available from the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) pp. 87-88: "...the composition of our armed forces was and continues to be multinational. Our country's multinational nature is practically expressed in the units and formations of the army and navy. This stems from the specific peculiarities of their recruitment. Each nation lives in a definite social and geographical milieu. It has its own history and its own culture and traditions. The situation demands a tactful, differentiated approach on the part of teachers to students and a necessary consideration of their national features, languages, peculiarities of character, experience, education levels and labor skills. It must also be remembered that national features and traditions do not remain unchanged. They are developed, perfected and filled with new socialist content and become the great moving force of Communist development and its armed defence... Internationalist indoctrination acquires special significance for the troops who are beyond the boundaries of the homeland and for border districts and fleets. Considerable work is being carried out among the Soviet troops stationed temporarily on the territory of the GDR, Poland and Hungary to explain the basic principles of military organization in the fraternal socialist countries, and the successes achieved by the workers of these countries in the construction of socialism are graphically demonstrated."
Chapter 6

PATTERNS OF MILITARY INTEGRATION

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Christopher D. Jones

The pattern according to which the East European armies are integrated into the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact has its origins in the pattern of the establishment of the communist armies of Eastern Europe and the use of these forces on both the internal and external fronts. The Soviets organized and trained the operational nuclei of the Polish and Czechoslovak armies and incorporated these forces directly into the Soviet military during 1944 and 1945. The Soviets used a variety of devices to organize the Bulgarian, Hungarian and East German armies as appendages of the Soviet occupation forces. The armies of the five loyal East European members of the Warsaw Pact claim to be the heirs of pre-communist national militaries. But their origins suggest that they are direct descendants of the ethnic formations of the Soviet Armed Forces.

National-Territorial Formations of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Romanians

During the Great Fatherland War the Soviets also organized national-territorial detachments of Poles, Romanians and Czechs and Slovaks to participate in the liberation of their fatherlands. Although there is a parallel to the organization of the Baltic detachments from Balts who had found themselves behind Soviet lines in the war, the Soviet military historian M.I. Semiriaga argues that there was a unique aspect to the organization of East European national-territorial detachments on Soviet soil. In a volume on the East European armies of the Warsaw Pact Semiriaga writes:

The nucleus of the future army of a new type consisted in a series of countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania) of units, formations and superformations which were
established on the territory of the Soviet Union long before the active front was established in these countries.

For the first time in history the working masses were able to establish their armed forces on the territory of another state.1

Like the national-territorial detachments of the Soviet republics, the national-territorial detachments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania contained contingents of Russian and other Soviet nationals. According to the volume mentioned above, by the middle of July 1944 the Polish forces organized by the Soviets numbered 57,355. Of these personnel 85 per cent were Poles. A contingent of Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians made up 10 per cent; the other 5 per cent is not identified. Poles made up only 60 per cent of the officer corps. The Russian-Ukrainian-Belorussian contingent made up 35 per cent. According to the chapter on Poland in Semiriaga's study, the Soviet officers serving in the Polish Army held posts as general staff officers, heads of central administrations, commanders of formations (probably divisions) and units (probably regiments), and chiefs of special units.2 This chapter also notes that the party-political apparatus of the Polish Army was modelled after that of the Soviet Army.3

Semiriaga's chapter on the Czechoslovak Corps recruited by the Soviets notes that as of September 1944 the Corps had 12,000 personnel, among whom were 204 Soviet officers and 419 Soviet soldiers and sergeants (altogether, about five per cent of all personnel).4 This corps also had a party-political apparatus which was formally subordinated to the Czechoslovak Communist Party.5 In its chapter on Romania, the study mentioned above notes that as of March 1944 the Tudor Vladimirescu Division organized in the Soviet Union had 9,580 soldiers. Of the 895 officers, 383 were Romanian officers captured by the Soviets.
and 408 were former non-commissioned officers who had graduated from a
two-month course at the Riazan' infantry school in the USSR. The 105
officers unaccounted for in these totals were probably Soviet officers.
This chapter reports that the Second Romanian Infantry Division, formed
in 1945, had "more than 100 Soviet officer-instructors." This chapter
also notes that the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army
provided the Romanians with a great deal of assistance in the
organization of the party-political apparatus of each of the two
Romanian divisions formed on Soviet soil.

The political factors involved in the military liberation of the
East European states were extraordinarily complicated. The Western
allies of the Soviet Union had recognized both Polish and Czechoslovak
governments-in-exile, a Polish underground army had formed to fight
against the Nazis, and a Slovak partisan movement had developed. In
Romania, military officers took part in a coup which overthrew the pro-
Nazi regime; these officers apparently thought that their country would
fare better if Romania could change its relationship with the Soviet
Union from that of military adversary to military ally. In Hungary, on
the other hand, military officers staged a pro-Nazi coup to salvage, as
they thought, national interests, and in Bulgaria there was a pro-
Communist revolution; all in the last few months of the war. The
communist parties of East Europe, consisting of party members on both
sides of the Soviet lines, saw their future prospects tied not only to
the question of whether Soviet or Western armies liberated their
countries, but also to the question of whether they could mobilize their
own armed detachments.

Semiriaga writes that East European communists appealed to the
East European prisoners of war captured by the Soviet Army to join the
national-territorial formations of East Europeans. These parties used a
number of appeals to recruit soldiers for participation in these
formations and to inspire morale. Semiriaga notes that the most
important of these appeals was to combine their patriotism with
proletarian internationalism -- that is, to fight with the Soviet Army for the liberation of their national fatherlands. In the Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian formations raised on Soviet soil the "political organs, party organizations, commissions and party members" conducted ideological-political indoctrination work on this theme.

The Deployment of East European Units in Soviet Formations

There is a clear parallel between the organization, training and staffing of East European units during World War II and the entire previous Soviet history of the management of "ethnic" units, from the international units of the Civil War to the reorganization of national units in June 1919, the raising of national territorial units during the period 1922-38, and the organization of similar units during the Great Fatherland War in the territories of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states. The available evidence also suggests an equally clear parallel between the deployment of East European units within larger multinational Soviet formations and a similar pattern of deployment of "ethnic" units of the Soviet Army in combat actions.

The small size of the Romanian force organized on Soviet territory (two divisions) and the even smaller Czechoslovak Army Corps (about 12,000 personnel) certainly ruled out any other pattern of deployment in the war against Nazi Germany. But the 57,000 personnel of the First Polish Army constituted a force large enough to fight as a distinct national army, had the Soviets wished to deploy the Polish forces in such a formation. The First Polish Army had four infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, one artillery brigade, one mortar regiment and other specialized units. In fact, Soviet sources indicate that the Soviet command twice promised such a role to the First Polish Army, once as a separate Polish Corps and later as a distinct "Polish Front." According to this Soviet account by M.E. Monin, it was not possible to organize the Polish forces at such levels because of
a shortage of qualified officers. However, Monin also notes that there was no shortage of Polish officers loyal to the Polish Government-in-exile in London. The problem, he writes, was in keeping these officers out of the First Polish Army. This explanation suggests that the failure of the Soviets to permit large-scale operations by the First Polish Army was in fact an expression of Soviet misgivings over the existence of a large, self-contained Polish Army. These misgivings may reflect Soviet memories of the "Red Armies" of Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic states during 1918.

Whatever the explanation for the apparent failure of the First Polish Army to fight as a distinct national army, the fact remains that units of this Polish force were assigned combat roles inside Soviet formations. In a study of Soviet coalition warfare in Europe, a Soviet military historian, G.F. Vorontsov, writes,

... Czechoslovak, Polish and other [East European] troop units and subunits, from the beginning of their formation up until the end of the war, functioned in Europe, as a rule, within Soviet front and army formations.

Therefore, their leadership by the Soviet command was carried out on the principle of their temporary operational subordination.

The critical elements for such integration, according to Vorontsov, were the identical administrative and organizational structures of the allied units, the use of common weaponry, the close links between the allied political officers, and the direct presence of Soviet officers in allied units. Monin's account of the first Polish Army does not give any indication of independent actions by the Polish forces but instead lists a number of instances of the integration of Polish and Soviet forces:

August 9-17, 1944: The First Polish Tank Brigade fought while attached to the Fourth Guards Rifle Corps. In the same operation a number of other Polish units fought -- cavalry, -- engineering construction, anti-aircraft, and air force units.
September 10-14, 1944: The First Polish Kosciuszko Division fought in the Warsaw Operation as part of the 125th Soviet Rifle Corps.18

January 23, 1945: A Polish tank brigade and Polish infantry unit were assigned to the Soviet forces that captured Bydgoszcz.

In the Berlin Operation of the spring of 1945 the Kosciuszko Division, the Second Polish Artillery Brigade, and the Sixth Polish Bridge-Building Battalion fought as part of the Soviet Second Guards Tank Army.19

In the same operation, the First Separate Polish Mortar Brigade fought as part of the Soviet 47th Army.20

In all, the Soviet Union conferred decorations on 29 Polish "units and formations" for their participation in "joint battles with Soviet troops."21

Soviet and East European sources all single out joint service in the Great Fatherland War as the source of the "fraternal friendship" which now binds the members of the socialist community of nations. They also emphasize that this service determined the uniquely progressive (read: integrated on the Soviet model) "new type" of military coalition which is now institutionalized in the Warsaw Pact.22 As Vorontsov notes, the East European units were the units which were to later become "the skeleton of the cadre armies of the countries of the people's democracies."23 Many officers in these units, and particularly the command cadre, were Soviet officers. Some of them shared the ethnic origins of their units and remained with these units throughout the process of their transformation into new national armies; indeed, they
were the instruments of this transformation. The junior officers, on the other hand, who went through training and combat with Soviet troops at the time, have now ascended to top command positions. This is especially true in the case of Poland. Four "Polish" generals in the post-1945 period were Soviet general officers, including General Konstantin Rokossovskii, which illustrates the first point; the composition of the 1981 Military Council of National Salvation illustrates the second, with General Jaruzelski himself as the prime example. In working with the "allied" troops special importance was assigned to political education. The military-political administration apparatus (which is the party's control and socialization mechanism) was practically the first to be organized as East European units were being formed.

As the front moved westward and an anti-German coup took place in Romania, two Romanian armies crossed the lines to join the Soviet forces. In addition, a number of Bulgarian military formations which took part in the overthrow of the pro-Axis regime in Bulgaria were reformed, incorporating the Bulgarian battalions formed in the USSR and partisan detachments into three new Bulgarian armies. These, as well as the two Romanian armies, participated in combat actions against the Germans in the last stages of the war. The Romanian forces were not integrated, however, on the same basis as Polish and Czechoslovak units; their liaison with Soviet troops was maintained by Soviet officers assisted by translators and communication staffs which were attached to the staffs of armies, corps and divisions. In the Bulgarian Army Soviet staffs were augmented by Soviet advisers and instructors who were attached directly to Bulgarian unit commanders. Because many Bulgarian communists who fled the country after the abortive 1923 revolution became professional Soviet military officers and returned to Bulgaria in 1944-45 to take charge of the new Bulgarian Army, the situation there approximated that in Poland and Czechoslovakia. No such cadres were available in the case of Romania.
There were no Hungarian or German units in the wartime Red Army, although extensive propaganda work was conducted among their POWs. The Hungarian Army supported the October 1944 pro-Nazi coup, and despite extensive purges and efforts at Sovietization after the war, it proved to be unreliable in 1956 and had to be rebuilt from the ground up. The GDR armed forces (the NVA) were created on the basis of the postwar People's Police and have become fully integrated as a part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), to which the NVA is officially subordinated.27

Vorontsov emphasizes that during the Great Fatherland War the interchangeability of units extended to Soviet formations serving under "allied" command.28 This sounds more radical than it actually was, considering the fact that most if not all of the senior "allied" commanders were Soviet officers. The practice continues in Pact manoeuvres; the allied commanders are also Soviet-trained, and many of them went through a "baptism of fire" in the Soviet forces during World War II. But most important, Vorontsov stresses that

No special organs of leadership for the military coalition were organized in the USSR Armed Forces (in war time) -- neither at the tactical nor at the operational or strategic levels -- (because) neither the Soviet Union nor its allies fighting on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese fronts saw any need for them. The experience of war shows that the principle of political and military unity of the conduct of war and the centralization and unity of command (edinonachalie) in the management of forces, which had been used in the Soviet Armed Forces, were successfully adopted not only within the allied armies but also between them.29

Published in 1976, the passage is meant to be read as outlining the strategic, operational and tactical guidelines for the combat deployment of Warsaw Pact forces. In the discussion of the Pact's
military organs Vorontsev continues to emphasize that the experience of the Great Fatherland War and the training and deployment of forces, staffs, and command cadre at that time are the subject of studies by the Joint Staff of the "United Armed Forces," and that the results of these studies are being implemented in practice in the training of the allied armies. 30

**Socialist Armies in the Stalinist Period**

The perception that no special agencies were needed to synchronize either military or political integration continued into the immediate postwar period of the consolidation of communist power in Eastern Europe (1945-1948) and until the death of Stalin in 1953. In interparty relations there was an effort to revive formal organizational ties by establishing the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau). But its usefulness was cut short by Yugoslav insubordination and eventual expulsion and it was dissolved, supervision over other communist parties being taken over directly by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. Relations between Moscow and the East European parties -- all of which assumed full political power by 1948 -- were carried out bilaterally and by means of direct penetration of the East European establishments by Soviet personnel. The penetration was particularly extensive within the security agencies.

National armies were initially weak, as hostile or reluctant conscripts had to be trained and socialized and the prewar professional military cadre had to be neutralized or destroyed. Military political administrations were extremely important in this effort and the task would have been impossible but for the presence and support of Soviet occupation troops, and the extensive use of newly-formed security police units and detachments of Soviet NKVD troops. We are told that political work in the armed forces was concentrated primarily on the training of new officers and on purges of "reactionary officers and generals." 31

After 1945 there was an influx of military officers into the new
armies from among those who were either in the country (as in the case of anti-German non-communist partisans in Poland and Czechoslovakia and professional officers in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), or returned from abroad after service in the allied armies. Because of the shortage of officers "non-fascists" among the non-communist cadre were initially taken in, but they were distrusted because of their "alien class origins," were kept under surveillance, and were eventually purged in the late 40s and early 50s.

In formal terms the relationship between the "allied" armies (and between the "allied" governments) was regulated by bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance which were concluded by the USSR with Czechoslovakia in December 1943, with Poland in April 1945, with Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria in 1948, and by the East European countries among themselves. As John Erickson notes, "in almost every sense the various armies were merely an extension of the Soviet army," and their coordination and supervision under bilateral defence treaties was carried out by the Tenth Section of the Soviet General Staff. A Polish source notes that after the "liberation" bilateral treaties included a provision for mutual help but did not provide for joint armed forces or an integrated staff and command structure. But in the circumstances these were hardly necessary. The penetrated Czechoslovak Army, under Spanish Civil War veteran General Ludvik Svoboda, did not protest the 1948 coup. In Poland, after Marshal Rokossovskii became the Defence Minister in 1949 Soviet officers occupied 90 percent of the top positions in the Ministry and all the commands of military districts and key service branches.

Formation of the Warsaw Pact: Internal and External Fronts

In 1955 the Soviets hastily erected a multilateral facade over the bilateral mechanisms of the Soviet-East European alliance system. In May of 1955 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR signed the Warsaw
Treaty, established a WP Joint Command headed by Marshal I.S. Konev of the USSR, a WP staff located in Moscow, and also created the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the WP. The PCC was empowered to establish additional military-administrative agencies.

The establishment of the WP did not testify to a Soviet desire to replace bilateral military relationships with multilateral mechanisms. The establishment of the WP testified to Soviet alarm over the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO. In its post-1945 permutation, the German question remained at the center of the Soviet Union's European security problem: the German Democratic Republic was not only a German state but a socialist state as well, and the survival of the GDR became linked to the survival of the domestic regimes of the other socialist states of the region. In turn, domestic crises in these three states acquired immediate implications for the survival of the GDR. The prospect of West German membership in NATO promised to link the dangers on the internal front in East Europe even more closely to the dangers on the external front.

The first Soviet stratagem for preventing the Federal Republic from joining NATO was the Soviet offer to reunify Germany in exchange for the military neutrality of a greater Germany. The second Soviet device for attempting to prevent entry of the FRG into NATO was the threat to create a counter-alliance in the East to oppose NATO. West Germany proceeded to join NATO and the Soviets proceeded to form the WP. No sooner had the Soviets created a multilateral alliance than they offered to dismantle it -- in exchange for the dismantling of NATO. This offer, like the threat to create an Eastern alliance, demonstrated the abiding Soviet desire to decouple the military potential of West Germany from the military power of the other NATO members.

The challenge on the external front in the mid and late 1950s came not only with the armament of the Bundeswehr as the principal conventional force in NATO but also from the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Germany and the initiation of a permanent intra-NATO
debate on the strategies and tactics of nuclear war.

The challenges on the external front in the 1950s were compounded by severe problems on the internal front. In 1953 Soviet troops had to be sent into action to put down anti-Communist and anti-Soviet demonstrations in the German Democratic Republic. In 1956, reform programs in the Hungarian and Polish parties led to factional rebellions in the two parties and to popular uprisings that were both anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. The Soviet Army had to suppress a full-scale popular revolution in Hungary and then supervise the reconstruction of not only the Hungarian political system but the Hungarian army as well. After having threatened a military intervention in Poland against Gomulka’s accession to power, Khrushchev then witnessed the proposals of Gomulka’s foreign minister, Adam Rapacki, to de-nuclearize Central Europe and partially withdraw Soviet and American troops from the region. At the same time, a Polish general proposed the creation of a separate Polish front within the Warsaw Pact, a front with a separate command, separate doctrine and separate armament and logistical system. In addition, Gomulka secured the removal of most Soviet military advisers from the Polish armed forces.

In 1957 the Soviets again found it necessary to deliver a public denunciation of the alternative model of development for Eastern Europe offered by Yugoslavia. By the late 1950s the Chinese party offered its own model for Communist states outside the Soviet bloc. During 1960 and 1961 Albania defected from the Warsaw Pact altogether, denounced the USSR and openly sided with the Chinese. The Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, secured the approval of the WP PCC for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958. Gheorghiu-Dej then proceeded to assume a neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and to establish cordial relations with both Yugoslavia and Albania. After the creation of the National People’s Army of the GDR in 1956, the USSR faced the additional task of integrating a German socialist army into the Soviet military alliance system.
By the early 1960s three East European Communist states, Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, had withdrawn from effective participation in the Soviet military alliance system. Yugoslavia and Albania had each adopted strategies of "reliance on one's own forces" and Romania had taken the first steps toward the deployment of a similar national defence system. These Balkan strategies were directed mainly against the Soviet army. The first five years of the Warsaw Pact had revealed to the Soviets the necessity of preventing the development of independent national defence systems in East Europe. By the early 1960s Yugoslavia, the first Communist state to stand outside the Soviet bloc, Albania, a member of the WP from 1955 to 1968, and Romania, still a WP member, had demonstrated that in East Europe national sovereignty is based on national control over national armed forces. In Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, East European control over national armed forces has denied the Soviets effective use of East European national military forces on both the internal and external fronts.

By the early 1960s two distinct threats had arisen on the internal front: 1) the possibility of popular anti-Communist uprisings, like those in East Germany in 1953, Poland in June of 1956, Hungary in 1956, and later again in Poland in 1970, 1976 and the post-1980 period. 2) The possibility that native Communist regimes would break free of Soviet control by appealing to their own populations on the basis of a program that combined a distinctly national form of Communism with an appeal to anti-Soviet nationalism. Such programs, developed by the parties in Yugoslavia in 1948, Poland in 1956, Albania in the late 1950s, Romania in the early 1960s and later by Czechoslovakia in 1968, threatened contagion both in Eastern Europe and in the adjoining union republics of the USSR.

By the early 1960s the principal threat on the external front was the possibility of Western political support for challenges to the USSR from within Eastern Europe, in particular, the possibility of West German support for anti-Soviet developments in East Germany. The
principal threat to meeting the requirements of both the internal and external fronts was the possibility of national control over the national armed forces of East Europe.

In response to challenges on both the external and internal fronts, the Soviets began in 1960 a program of strengthening their multinational military system through improvement of its bilateral mechanisms. Although the creation of the WP in 1955 had provided a convenient multilateral facade for these bilateral mechanisms, the Soviets had no intention of creating a multilateral coalition. What they meant to do was to forge stronger bilateral bonds between the separate components of East European militaries and the Soviet Armed Forces.

The last two Soviet commanders of the WP have coupled their public expressions of devotion to the WP alliance system with public declarations on the enduring importance of bilateral military ties in East Europe. In the volume on the WP edited by the current Commander-in-Chief, Marshal V.G. Kulikov, the text declares,

> While noting the exceptionally important role of the Warsaw Pact in the achievement of all-round cooperation of the allied states, it is necessary to emphasize at the same time that the Warsaw Pact in no way diminishes the significance of the bilateral treaties concluded among the socialist states and does not alter the obligations taken on by the partners to these treaties.40

[Emphasis in the original]

These treaties were renewed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Edward Gierek, the former leader of the Polish party, once called the attention of WP military personnel to multiple bilateralism of the Soviet alliance system. In an address to the political rally which concluded the 1976 Shield manoeuvres in Poland, Gierek declared, "the unbreakable unity of each of our countries with the great Soviet Union is the unshakeable basis of the security of the whole socialist
commonwealth.41 The objective of the Soviet program for maintaining a series of bilateral military relationships is to combine these bilateral systems into a multinational coalition organized around the Soviet Armed Forces. A volume published in 1980 by the Polish Ministry of Defence specifically declared that the purpose of the WP was not to develop a multilateral alliance. According to this volume, the WP constituted "an organization of an entirely new type." This text explains that the establishment of the WP

initiated the transition of individual socialist countries from the principle of defence based on national armies connected only by ties of alliances, to a defence system based on armed forces which have been integrated to a well-defined degree. This meant that, even as the military potential of individual members did not change, the military potential of the Pact as a whole has been enriched by new elements: a unitary military doctrine, unified strategic planning and command, purposeful coalition-determined expenditures for defence efforts, and operational and organizational cohesion of armed forces (acting) as a single defence instrument of the whole socialist community.42

For the Soviets, the optimum configuration for meeting the requirements on the internal and external fronts of the WP was "one instrument" forged by combining a series of bilateral ties between the components of the Soviet military and the components of the national armed forces of East Europe.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 17.


4. Ibid., p. 61.

5. Ibid., p. 62.

6. Ibid., p. 178.

7. Ibid., p. 179.

8. Ibid., pp. 15-18.

9. Ibid., p. 18.


11. Ibid., p. 115.

12. Ibid., pp. 122, 125.

13. Ibid., pp. 115, 122, 125.


16. Ibid., pp. 145-149.

17. Ibid., p. 138.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 143.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 143.

23 Vorontsov, op. cit., p. 145.

24 Generals Swierczewski, Poplowski, Koczy, and Rokossovskii. The four were praised by General Jaruzelski as "the leaders and creators of the Polish People's Army who rose from the ranks of the Red Army." Wojciech Jaruzelski, "25 Lat w sluzbie pokoju i socjalizmu," Wojsko Ludowe No. 5, 1980, p. 6.

25 See "Poland," Vol. II.

26 Vorontsov, op. cit., pp. 145-146. According to Vorontsov the same system of advisers and instructors is now used during Warsaw Pact military exercises.

27 See the country chapters in Vol. II.


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., p. 288. See also Chapters 7 and 8 below.

31 Semiriaga et al., op. cit., pp. 20-21.

32 A.A. Epishev, Partiia i Armija, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980), p. 331. For a discussion of these treaties see Chapter 3 above.


34 Socjalistyczna Koalicja Obronna, p. 21.

35 See the chapter on Poland in Volume II.

36 See Robin Allison Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), the basic work on the formation and subsequent development of the
Warsaw Pact.

37 Michael Checinski, *The Post-War Development of the Polish Armed Forces* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1978)

38 For a discussion of the limits placed on the Soviet capability for military intervention in these states and for the subsequent impact on political relations in East Europe, see Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

39 In a 1982 volume edited by A.A. Epishev, Chief of the Soviet Main Political Administration, an essay by Colonel V.V. Semin, one of the most authoritative Soviet commentators on the WP, divided the history of Soviet-East European military relations into three periods: 1945-49; a period from 1949 to 1960; and the present period, beginning in 1960. That is, he did not identify the establishment of the WP in 1955 as a turning point, but rather 1960. See V.V. Semin, "Zashchita sotsializma--internatsional'nyi dolg marksistsko-leninskikh partii," in A.A. Epishev, ed., *KPSS i voennoe stroitel'stvo* (Moscow: Voenizdat, [1982]), pp. 269-273.

40 V.G. Kulikov, ed., *Varshavskii dogovor--soiuz vo imia mira i sotsializma* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), p. 112. I.I. Iakubovskii's text *Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskikh narodov i armii* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975) notes on p. 110: "While playing an exceptionally important role in the realization of all-round cooperation among the allied states, the Warsaw Treaty in no way reduces the significance of the bilateral treaties concluded among the socialist states and does not reduce the obligations taken on by its participants in bilateral agreements."


Chapter 7

AGENCIES OF THE ALLIANCE:
MULTILATERAL IN FORM, BILATERAL IN CONTENT

Christopher D. Jones

The Soviets have attempted to solve the problem of the political reliability of the East European forces of the Warsaw Pact (WP) by detaching components of national military forces from the control of national defence ministries and then linking these components to the Soviet Armed Forces. The goal of Soviet policy in the Warsaw Pact is to create a multinational force rather than a multilateral coalition. The Soviets have developed three main policies to pursue this goal: 1) multinational WP agencies and programmes which correspond to the agencies and programmes of national defence ministries. These agencies and programmes detach individual components of national armed forces from national control. 2) A series of bilateral mechanisms which link the components of national forces to the corresponding components of the Soviet military. 3) Joint training and joint exercise programmes which drill Soviet-East European combat formations for participation in a multinational military force organized around Soviet service branches.

The officer primarily responsible for the development of all three policies was Marshal A.A. Grechko. In developing the structures and programmes of the Warsaw Pact, Grechko concentrated on meeting the requirements of "ethnic security" on both the internal and external fronts of the Soviet alliance system. Agencies and programmes are discussed in this chapter; joint exercises are analyzed in the following chapter.
Marshal Grechko took over the command of the WP in July 1960 and he held this post until 1967, when he became the Soviet Minister of Defence. Grechko brought to the WP demonstrated skills in the command of Russian and non-Russian military personnel for both external and internal missions. Grechko had served as one of the principal commanders in the North Caucasus during 1942, when approximately 42 percent of the Soviet military personnel on this front consisted of non-Russian nationalities. These personnel were organized in 15 "national-territorial divisions" made up primarily of one national group and 14 mixed-nationality divisions. As commander of the Soviet army that liberated southern Poland and Slovakia from the Nazis, Grechko was also the commander of the Polish and Czechoslovak armies organized by the Soviets for these campaigns. The available evidence indicates that these national forces often fought both as divisions and as smaller formations integrated within the Soviet army.

From 1953 to 1957 Grechko served as Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), where he not only commanded the front lines of the external front but also sent Soviet troops to put down the East German uprising of June 17, 1953. Grechko also presided over the transformation of the GDR Barracked Police into the National People's Army (NVA). As Commander of the GSFG, Grechko witnessed the first large-scale joint WP exercise, manoeuvres that involved 11,000 soldiers of the NVA and an unspecified number of troops from the GSFG. From November of 1957 to July 1960, Grechko served as Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces. During this period the Soviet defence ministry dismantled the national "formations" and "units" which the Soviet constitutional changes of 1944 guaranteed to each union republic and dispersed their personnel among multinational detachments.

By placing non-Russian Soviet personnel in integrated multinational units and formations (with the possible retention of
ethnicsubunits), Grechko and his colleagues could not have eliminated the problems of the military and political training of the non-Russian nationalities, which had previously been assigned to the national territorial troop units and formations. The new policy simply eliminated what had been the battle-tested devices for integrating non-Russians into the Soviet army. But if the Soviet army had retained its ethnic formations, the Soviets would have had to deal with the complexities of integrating these formations not only into the Soviet Armed Forces but into the Warsaw Pact as well. This problem would have arisen sooner or later in bringing East European units into regular bilateral contacts with Soviet units, particularly in the joint exercises, which began in 1961.

Even before the initiation of the joint exercises, the Soviets had developed a variety of programs to maintain bilateral links between components of the Soviet forces stationed in East Europe and the corresponding components of the host armies. In a 1961 article Marshal Grechko itemized these programs: evenings of "combat friendship"; meetings of allied soldiers who had won training competitions; joint visits to local industries and collective farms; meetings of allied soldiers with veterans of the military struggles against the Nazis; joint ceremonies marking national holidays; joint concerts and theatrical shows; and joint sports competitions. Intensification of these bilateral links, in the form of joint exercises and related activities, raised the possibility of regular contact between the non-Slavic ethnic units of the Soviet army and East European "ethnic" units. Such contact in turn raised the possibility of mutual contamination of all the non-Russian ethnic units of the WP with anti-Soviet nationalism. It is likely that the Soviet Ground Forces dissolved its ethnic units in order to preempt such unacceptable forms of internationalist solidarity in the joint exercises and joint combat actions of WP forces.

In the memoirs attributed to Colonel Oleg Penkovskii, a Soviet officer who allegedly worked for Western intelligence services,
Penkovskii offers the following commentary on the first joint Warsaw Pact exercises, held in 1961:

Soviet troop manoeuvres will be conducted jointly with the troops of the people's democracies. During manoeuvres the divisions of the satellite countries are included in the T/O of the Soviet Army. This is necessary because we still do not trust them; they might turn their guns and run to the West.

If this statement accurately reflected Soviet views of the reliability of East European military personnel at the time, then it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Soviets had similar concerns about the reliability of divisions or regiments made up of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, or other Soviet nationalities which had been organized into ethnic formations. The drawing of an "ethnic security map" for the WP after 1955 probably accounts for the reorganization of the ethnic security structure within the Soviet Armed Forces.

Marshal Grechko relied on seven major devices for fragmenting national control over national armed forces and then linking the ethnic formations of East Europe to the multinational formations of the Soviet army:

1) A joint command structure controlled by Soviet officers. Within this structure the WP organized irregular but frequent meetings of officers at corresponding levels to coordinate national programs with alliance programs. These meetings took place at the levels of Ministers of Defence on down. This system was supplemented by a network of Soviet liaison officers who represented the WP Commander-in-Chief. The roles played by these officers were much less visible than the roles played by the Soviet military advisers in the post-war period.

2) Programs for joint military exercises on both binational and multinational bases and related training programs.

3) An international division of labour in defence production
and supply designed to maintain the dependence of each national army on the Soviet Union for equipment.

4) Development of a single military doctrine which defined alliance-wide norms for the organization and conduct of all aspects of national military activity.

5) Development of a program to establish Soviet mid-career military academies as the gateways to the top national commands of East Europe.

6) Development of a network of WP political administrations to organize and conduct synchronized programs of political indoctrination.

7) Development of regular bilateral contacts between East European units and the Soviet forces stationed both in East Europe and in the adjoining military districts of the USSR.

The Warsaw Pact Reorganization of 1969

In the middle of the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 Lt. General Vaclav Prchlik, head of the Czechoslovak Central Committee department for the Czechoslovak Armed Forces and internal security forces, publicly complained that the multilateral agencies and programs of the WP served as only facades for Soviet penetration of the command structures of each national East European army. In a press conference held in mid-July, 1968, Prchlik offered the following description of the United Command of the WP:

...the situation is that this command is formed by marshals, generals and officers of the Soviet army and that the other member armies have only their representatives in this joint command.

These representatives, however, have so far held no responsibilities nor had a hand in making decisions, but rather played the role of liaison organs. 9
Prchlik in particular complained that the WP structure accorded national defence ministers no status higher than that of deputies of the Soviet C-in-C. Prchlik added, "As far as relations within this coalition are concerned, we hold the view that they should be improved particularly in such a way as to emphasize the real equality of the individual members of the coalition, to emphasize real equality ..."11

To pre-empt further criticisms of the sort offered publicly by Prchlik -- and perhaps privately by the Romanians -- the Soviets reorganized the administrative structure of the WP to give more formal expression to the equality of the member states, but not to establish agencies that were genuinely multilateral bodies. In October of 1968 the WP defence ministers met in Moscow to discuss "questions concerning the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact."13 At a March 1969 meeting of the PCC, Marshal Iakubovskii, Grechko's successor as WP Commander, presented a report on the reorganization of the alliance structure. The PCC then approved measures creating the present structure of the WP, discussed in the section below. The 1969 reforms placed a Committee of Defence Ministers at the apex of the military-administrative hierarchy of the WP.

The 1969 reforms retained the PCC as nominally the highest political-diplomatic agency of the WP. As Robin Remington has demonstrated in her study of the WP published in 1971, during the period from 1955 to 1970 the PCC witnessed frequent clashes between the Soviets and the Romanians.15 As Remington also notes, during this period the Soviets chose to bypass the PCC in dealing with the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, the Soviet-Albanian dispute of 1960-1961 and the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Since the 1969 reforms the Romanians have continued to use the PCC as a forum in which to make public their differences with the USSR over European security policy, in particular, at the 1978 session of the PCC.16

After the 1969 reorganization the WP developed agencies and programs which seem intended to diminish the authority of the PCC as the
highest political-diplomatic agency of the alliance. On six occasions groups of WP leaders comparable to the national delegations to PCC sessions (party and state leaders, foreign and defence ministers) have met either to discuss only European security issues or European security issues in conjunction with other topics as well. These sessions, which were not designated sessions of the PCC, took place in December 1969, August 1971, July 1972, July 1973, July-August 1975 and June 1983.17

Beginning in 1976 East European party and state leaders began holding regular bilateral meetings with Soviet leaders in the Crimea during the summer months. Soviet leaders have referred to these regular meetings as a semi-institutional framework for the bilateral coordination of the diplomatic and military policies of the WP states.18

In 1976 the PCC established another agency charged with political-diplomatic responsibilities, the Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM). The PCC also created a "Joint Secretariat" to work as an agency for both bodies.19 The creation of the CFM formalized meetings of WP foreign ministers or vice-foreign ministers which had taken place after the 1969 reforms -- in October 1969, January 1970, June 1970, February 1971, November-December 1971, January 1973 and April 1973. Warsaw Pact foreign ministers had also met irregularly before 1969.20

By the late 1970s the WP had developed overlapping multilateral and bilateral devices which deprived the PCC of its status as the sole alliance agency responsible for political-diplomatic affairs. The Romanian government, which had been able to transform the PCC into an occasional forum for coalition politics, has so far not been able to impart a multilateral character to the agencies and ad hoc meetings which have emerged as rivals to the PCC in the formulation of alliance security policy.
Military-Administrative Agencies of the Warsaw Pact

The 1969 reorganization sanctioned by the PCC created a Committee of Defence Ministers; reorganized two existing bodies, the Joint Command of the Joint Armed Forces and the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces; and created three new agencies: the Military Council, the Technical Committee and the Military Scientific-Technical Council. Since 1969, the Warsaw Pact press has also publicly identified the Sports Committee of the Fraternal Armed Forces as the alliance's "authoritative international sports organization." Warsaw Pact sources of the post-1969 period frequently refer to unidentified "other organs of administration" of the Warsaw Pact. The available evidence suggests that these "other organs" include agencies that link together national agencies for military doctrine, officer education, political administration, paramilitary youth training, border troops, and perhaps other internal security forces as well. The Committee of Defence Ministers, the Joint Command, the WP Staff, the Technical Committee, the Military Scientific-Technical Council and the Sports Committee of the Fraternal Armed Forces have three common characteristics: 1) formal representation of East European states; 2) parallel national agencies corresponding to the central WP agency; 3) an organizational structure which assures Soviet domination over the central agency and permits the Soviets to compete with the corresponding national agency for control over the national forces subordinate to the national agency. The unidentified "other organs of administration" probably share these three characteristics but lack participation by the Romanians. The refusal of the Romanians to participate in these agencies probably accounts for the WP policy of not publicly acknowledging their existence.

The Committee of Defence Ministers

The Committee of Defence Ministers (CDM) had its origins in the irregular meetings of WP defence ministers before 1969. These meetings took place in 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1968. Since 1969 the CDM has met
once a year for a session lasting from two to four days. According to the Kulikov text on the WP, the CDM concerns itself with "the most important questions of the strengthening of the defence of the allied states." The chairmanship of the CDM rotates among the member countries in alphabetical order, along with the location of its sessions. Judging by the order of rotation, the CDM uses the Russian alphabet to determine alphabetical order. The authority vested in the CDM is in fact delegated to an agency under Soviet control, the Staff of the United Armed Forces. According to the volumes on the Warsaw Pact edited by the last two WP commanders, Marshals Lakubovskii and Kulikov, the WP Staff, as the "working organ" of the CDM, is the agency responsible for carrying out the Committee's decisions and preparing for its next session. The Chief of the WP Staff is the first deputy of the WP Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), who in turn is a first deputy of the Soviet Defence Minister. Both the WP C-in-C and the Chief of Staff sit as members of the CDM, although it is not clear if they are voting members. This brings the total Soviet representation on the CDM to three of nine members. The responsibilities of the chairman of a given session of the CDM begin and end with the session he chairs. It is not clear if the CDM requires unanimous decisions; the Kulikov text says only that the CDM adopts "coordinated decisions on all questions." This formula may permit the Romanians to avoid commitments taken on by the other members.

The likelihood that the internal organization of the CDM is designed to transfer effective executive authority to the WP C-in-C and his Staff is also demonstrated by the appointment process for both the WP Commander and his deputy, the Chief of Staff. According to the Kulikov text, the WP Commander is not named by the CDM, PCC or any other regularly-constituted WP agency: the text explains that the Commander is chosen "by the decision of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty from the military leaders of any member state according to the existing provision ...." This provision has resulted in an unbroken succession
of Soviet officers as WP Commanders. The Kulikov text also explains that the Commander's first deputy, the Chief of Staff, "is named by the member states of the Warsaw Treaty according to mutual agreement."

This procedure, which also bypasses the PCC and CDM, has also resulted in an unbroken succession of Soviet officers in this post. The current WP Chief of Staff is General A.I. Gribkov. The WP Commander "periodically reports" to the CDM, PCC, and also to member governments. These arrangements suggest that the real function of the CDM is to legitimize the transfer of authority over national armed forces to the WP Commander and his first deputy in the name of the CDM.

The Joint Command

The WP Commander-in-Chief, in addition to his membership in the CDM, presides over the Joint Command of the WP. The Joint Command consists of three series of officers. The first series consists of East European officers who "as a rule" are deputy ministers of defence of WP states. Before the 1969 reforms, East European Ministers of Defence served as deputy commanders in the Joint Command. According to the Kulikov text, the current deputy commanders do not have command responsibilities; instead, "... they concern themselves with questions of the training of the national contingents assigned to the composition of the United Armed Forces." This work brings them into "close interaction" with two other WP agencies, the Staff and the Military Council. But the Joint Command also has a second series of officers who are concerned with the very same functions in the training of the national WP armies. These are senior Soviet generals and their staffs who serve as the liaison representatives of the C-in-C to the national armies, bypassing the East European officers in the Joint Command. The Iakubovskii text on the Warsaw Pact explains that
Representatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces serve in the allied armies with the agreement of the corresponding governments. Their basic functions consist of giving aid to the national command in the training of troops assigned to the United Armed Forces and also the maintaining of constant and close contacts between the United and national commands.

Being highly-qualified generals and officers, having rich experience in the leadership of troops, they are especially useful for the strengthening of military cooperation among the allied armies and in raising the combat readiness of the United Armed Forces.34

The third series of officers in the Joint Command appears to be a series of Soviet officers responsible for the corresponding service branches and support services of the national armed forces of the alliance: ground forces, air forces, air-defence troops, navies, rear services, etc. The 1955 statutes on the Warsaw Pact specified that deputy commanders of the Joint Command could be WP defence ministers and "other military leaders of the member states of the treaty on whom are placed command of the armed forces assigned to the United Armed Forces by each member of the treaty."35 This statute may have been the basis for the simultaneous appointments in 1966 of Marshal P.F. Batitskii as Commander of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Troops and Commander of the WP Anti-Aircraft Troops.36

There is no good answer to the question of why the WP has publicly identified a deputy commander of the Joint Command for Anti-Aircraft Troops but has not identified deputy commanders for other WP service branches. While serving as WP deputy commander, Marshal Batitskii commanded at least four of the publicly-identified joint anti-aircraft exercises of the alliance.43 The WP conducts not only anti-aircraft exercises but also joint exercises among WP ground forces, air forces, rear services and "special troops" (signals units etc.).38 Sometimes the Soviet press has identified the commander of a particular
service branch exercise as the commander of the corresponding Soviet service branch. It is possible that the WP capability for conducting such exercises is based on the existence of permanent WP commands for WP navies, air forces and special troops. John Erickson has recently argued that such Soviet commands exist within the WP and he has even named some of the Soviet officers likely to head such commands.

The Military Council

The Military Council, established in 1969, institutionalized the meetings of high-ranking WP officers that took place prior to 1969 to plan and review joint programs of troop training and military exercises (1965, 1966, 1967, 1968). The Chairman of the Military Council (MC) is the WP Commander and its other members are all the Soviet and East European deputy commanders of the Joint Command. At the end of each training year the annual sessions devoted to the review and planning of exercises take place with the participation of East European officers responsible for training and exercise programs in their armed forces. In addition, in the spring of each year there are usually separate sessions of the MC evidently concerned with administrative issues. According to the Kulikov text on the WP, the recommendations adopted by the MC have only a "consultative character" but "as a rule" WP members carry out the recommendations. This arrangement probably suits the Soviets and the Romanians equally well: the Soviets can avoid Romanian vetoes and the Romanians can ignore the recommendations that, as a rule, are carried out by the other members of the Pact. Like the CDM, the MC rotates the location of its sessions among the Pact members and relies on the WP Staff as its "working organ."

The Warsaw Pact Staff

The WP Staff, which carries out the functions entrusted to both the CDM and the MC, is the "administrative organ" of the WP Commander-in-Chief. The Staff has a series of Soviet officers, whom the Soviet
government is empowered to appoint, and a series of East European officers, who represent their national armed forces. Within the Staff, national party organizations exist for each national group of military officers. In 1976, the Soviet press identified the first deputy chief of the WP Staff as a Soviet lieutenant general, K.K. Pashuk.

The Staff of the WP is responsible for three major functions, each of which empower it to compete with national defence ministries for control of the separate components of national armed forces:

1) All the responsibilities entrusted to the CDM and MC, two bodies whose official competence extends to the fundamental policies of each WP defence ministry. The Kulikov text notes that the WP Staff "...plays a great role in the preparation and organization of the sessions of the Commitee of Defence Ministers and of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces and in the practical execution of their decisions and recommendations."

2) The organization of regular meetings of corresponding alliance agencies at virtually every level. A former Polish deputy chief of the Staff reported this function of the WP Staff in 1975. The number, frequency and scope of the bilateral and multilateral meetings of corresponding alliance agencies is such that these meetings enable the WP staff to penetrate into every level of national defence ministries. According to the Iakubovskii text on the WP, there are regular meetings, both bilateral and multilateral, among corresponding specialists in all branches of the WP armed forces. This text adds that many of these meetings "have the objective of resolving separate questions which concerned the service branches of armed forces of types of troops within a service branch or special troops." In a 1976 article Marshal Iakubovskii wrote that meetings of WP Chiefs of Staff and heads of WP service branches had become "traditional." The late marshal's volume on the WP, published in 1975, lists meetings of WP chiefs of staff in 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1974.
The Kulikov text has much less specific information about the convening of such meetings and does not indicate what WP agency arranges for intra-alliance sessions of corresponding organs. However, this study clearly indicates that there is an extensive alliance program for regular contacts of corresponding national agencies and forces:

... there are systematically conducted meetings of the leading personnel of the General (Main) Staffs of the allied armed forces, as well as bilateral or multilateral consultations.

The working out of separate questions of the development and improvements of service branches and of types of troops are carried out at meetings of corresponding specialists, which are conducted regularly, according to coordinated plans.57

These meetings did not begin with the reorganization of the WP in 1969. A Soviet-Bulgarian study published in 1969 reported that by 1968 the Warsaw Pact had conducted "more than 2500" meetings of WP officers at various levels.58 In organizing such meetings, the WP Staff has the opportunity both to compete with individual national defence ministries for control of the components of national armed forces and also to reconstitute these components into a greater socialist army built around the Soviet military.

3) The organization, conduct and evaluation of joint military exercises. The Kulikov text reports that the WP Staff is responsible for "the working out and conduct of joint manoeuvres, exercises and military games of diverse scale -- from the operational-strategic level to the levels of ground troops and special troops." 59 This function is that of drilling the components of national armed forces for combat inside a larger multinational force. This function also puts the WP Staff in direct competition with national staffs for the organization and conduct of military exercises. Evidence from Soviet sources suggests that central Pact agencies -- probably the WP Staff -- decide
the types of actions for which East European forces train. Colonel Semin notes, "Troop contingents assigned to the Joint Armed Forces daily carry out combat and political training according to the plans of the national commands, but the working out of the basic questions of the joint actions of these troops is carried out according to the Joint Command."60

The system of WP exercises, discussed in a later chapter, also permits the WP Staff to evaluate East European officers in the execution of the actions planned by the WP Staff. Soviet sources frequently identify the joint exercises of the WP as critical examinations of commanders and staffs.61

The Technical Committee and the Military Scientific-Technical Council

Although WP sources have indicated that the Technical Committee of the WP was established in 1969,62 WP sources did not identify this agency by name until 1975.63 According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the head of this agency is chosen "by mutual agreement of the representatives of the WP countries."64 As in the cases of the WP Commander and WP Chief of Staff, this process appears to bypass the higher multilateral agencies of the alliance, the Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of Defence Ministers. In the case of the Technical Committee (TC), WP sources have yet to reveal the name of the officer who heads this committee, the location of the TC, or the locations of its sessions. John Erickson writes that Col. General I.A. Fabrikov heads the TC, but he does not indicate his source for this information.65 A Polish officer has written that East European representatives serve on the TC.66

The reluctance of WP sources to provide information on the TC may reflect not only security concerns, but also the WP's reluctance to reveal that Romania probably refuses to participate in the work of the Technical Committee. Since the late 1960s Romania has pursued two policies that are in complete opposition to the military-technical
policies of its allies: 1) the maximum possible domestic production of weapons systems such as tanks, aircraft and ships; 2) production of "high-tech" weapons through cooperation with non-WP states either through licensing arrangements or co-production.67

The Romanian failure to participate in the work of the Technical Committee may account for the lack of information not only on the TC but also on a sister agency, the Military Scientific-Technical Council. The Iakubovskii and Kulikov texts on the WP, and additional WP sources as well, omit mention of this agency in their discussions of the administrative agencies of the alliance. However, the Kulikov text, in an apparent failure of the Soviet editorial clearance process, mentions in a brief reference to the 1969 reform that the PCC established simultaneously not only the Technical Committee but also the Military Scientific-Technical Council of the WP.68

The extremely limited evidence available suggests that if there is a division of labour between the Technical Committee (TC) and the Military Scientific-Technical Council (MSTC), it is a division between coordination by the TC of the technical requirements of the various generations of weapons deployed in the WP and coordination of research and development by the MSTC. It appears that the WP leaves the problem of the coordination of military-economic production to the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.69

A Czechoslovak economist, writing in 1980, declared that the Soviet contribution to WP defence production came to 80 percent of the total.70 A Soviet expert on WP defence production, A.I. Maslennikov, notes that the WP policy for East European states is "to concentrate their resources on the production of a comparatively narrow circle of defence production and to acquire the remaining military equipment and technology from other countries."71 Maslennikov and another Soviet officer have identified Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia as the major East European weapons producers.72 According to Western sources, production in these states consists of production of components,
production under license to the USSR of older generations of Soviet weapons, including main battle tanks, and limited production of weapons systems of minor importance, such as smaller naval craft. Maslennikov notes that Poland produces aircraft, helicopters, naval vessels, tanks, self-propelled power generators, cross-country vehicles and signals equipment. He credits the GDR with the production of optical and related equipment for targeting enemy forces, explosives, mines, rifle equipment for targeting enemy forces, explosives, mines, rifle equipment, radar and communications equipment.

WP sources have frequently emphasized that the research personnel of the alliance engage in coordinated programs of research on military technology. It is likely that the Military Scientific-Technical Council of the WP is the agency for coordination of this research. In a discussion of the WP program for the coordination of research and development, Maslennikov avoids mentioning either the Technical Committee or the Military Scientific-Technical Council. Instead, he discusses two programs initiated in 1971, one under the auspices of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the other under the auspices of the joint program for cooperation among the Academies of Sciences of the socialist countries. Under these programs, three types of multinational research organizations have been created: 1) "international centers" located in a particular country but with a multinational staff; 2) "coordinating centers," which are national institutions that subcontract work out to foreign socialist research centers; 3) ad hoc multinational working groups to carry out a specific project. Maslennikov reports that the programs of the CMEA and Academies of Sciences together have resulted in "more than 300 scientific-research and project-design collectives." He implies that similar collectives function in the WP for scientific-technical research, but does not say so directly. The Kulikov study mentions that 19 Polish military institutes participate in joint military research projects and names eight of them.
The third dimension of the technical cooperation of WP states is in the coordination of the introduction of proven technology into national armed forces. This appears to be the province of the Technical Committee. In an article by Marshal Kulikov in the Soviet publication *Technology and Armament*, the WP Commander listed four aspects to this type of cooperation: 1) meetings of "leading staffs and specialists" evidently concerned with matters of general policy; 2) conferences and exhibitions devoted to new weapons and equipment produced by the WP states; 3) the exchange of technical specialists, in particular "Soviet military specialists who work in the allied armies at the invitation of national commands"; 4) exchange of technical documentation and other literature related to the use of equipment.

**The Sports Committee of the Fraternal Armed Forces**

The other publicly-identified agency of the WP is the Sports Committee of the Fraternal Armed Forces (SCFAF). According to the Kulikov text, the SCFAF conducts conferences to coordinate the alliance programs for using sports in military training and also conducts a series of allied sports competitions. This agency has at least five non-WP members: Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, Angola and South Yemen. Every four years the SCFAF elects a bureau to administer its activities. In 1974 the head of this bureau was identified as a Soviet officer.

"Other Organs of Administration" of the Warsaw Pact

The significance of the Sports Committee of the Fraternal Armed Forces lies in what its existence suggests about the "other organs of administration" of the WP: if corresponding agencies in national defence ministries have engaged in publicized joint activities, there is a good chance that a WP agency exists to coordinate their joint activities. The *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* and the *Iakovovskii and Kulikov text* both refer to unidentified "other organs of administration of the WP," as does the 1973 "Convention on the Legal Competence,
Privileges and Immunities of the Staff and Other Organs of Administration of the Joint Armed Forces of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact," discussed below as the legal charter for Soviet penetration into the defence ministries of the WP states. The existence of unidentified "other organs of administration" concerned with military doctrine, officer education and political indoctrination is suggested by the fact that WP sources emphasize the role of joint activities in these areas as much as the role of joint activities which are conducted under the auspices of public WP agencies. The reluctance of the WP to identify its "other organs of administration" probably testifies to the reluctance of the WP to acknowledge that Romania refuses to participate in the joint alliance activities of these agencies. The sections below will document the coordination of WP activities in the areas of military doctrine, officer education, political indoctrination and also the coordination of activities by WP border troops and paramilitary youth organizations.

The Warsaw Pact Agency for Military Doctrine

In the WP, Soviet doctrine defines alliance-wide norms for the organization and standardization of the components of the national armed forces and also defines the internal and external missions of the alliance. The common doctrinal propositions adopted by the loyal members of the WP also serve as charters for all the agencies and activities of the Warsaw Pact. Romania's formulation of an independent military doctrine is a declaration of Romania's refusal to integrate its armed forces into the WP mechanisms for alliance cohesion.

Soviet military doctrine has two components: the military-political and the military-technical. The military-political aspects of the doctrine were discussed above. The military-technical component consists of four main "theories" which define organizational norms for the military-administrative agencies of the WP:
1) The theory of the organization and development of a national defence system (voennoe stroitel'’stvo) defines the overall programs and policies which fall within the competence of the Committee of Defence Ministers and national defence ministries: the basic organizational structure of national armed forces; the policies for recruiting civilians; maintaining reserves; and for the organization of internal security troops.

2) The theory of military art, which breaks down into the sub-theories of strategy, operational art and tactics, defines the basic policies for the United Command, the staff of the WP and the service branches of national defence ministries. The theory of military art also provides the basis for the joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact and a common curriculum in the military schools and academies of the alliance. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, noted in the article on "strategy" in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia:

The formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 placed before Soviet military strategy a new task -- the formulation of the common bases of the military strategy of the countries of the socialist community in which the international and national interests of the allied countries are organically combined.

3) The theory of troop training provides a charter for the activities of the Military Council of the WP and for the activities of the unidentified WP agency for the coordination of political indoctrination in the alliance. The theory of troop training also serves as a basis of the mission of the liaison officers of the WP Commander, who have official responsibility for providing assistance to national commands in troop training.

4) The theory of military economics and rear services provides a doctrinal basis for the activities of the Technical Committee, the Military Scientific-Technical Council and the Military Industrial Commission of Comecon.
Major General V.F. Samoilenko, the author of Soviet publications on both nationality policy within the Soviet Armed Forces and on alliance policy within the WP, notes the practical applications of standardized military doctrine:

As a result of cooperation in the area of military theory, very important standards have been adopted in the armed forces of the socialist confederation. These norms synchronize the basic development of regulations, of military administration and of training manuals.

The authors of Soviet military doctrine claim that the military-political component is the more decisive in the formation of a state's military doctrine. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, this is entirely justified. For the five loyal East European members, accepting a common set of military-political axioms is the prerequisite for accepting the Soviet conceptions of the organization of a national defence system; military art; troop training; and military economics and rear services. For Romania, the basis for the rejection of the military-technical component of Soviet doctrine is rejection of the military-political component. The military-political component of Romanian doctrine emphasizes the concept of national control of national armed forces for purely national missions.

Another section of this study discusses the military-political component of Soviet doctrine, which addresses the pursuit of both the internal and internal missions of the WP. The basic military-political component of Soviet doctrine is the concept of "joint defence of the gains of socialism against internal and external reaction." The Soviets do not depend on the intrinsic logic of this proposition to provide the basis for alliance cohesion. The Soviets depend on the state treaties, party programs and various multilateral declarations which have committed the fraternal allies to the principle of joint defence of the gains of socialism.
In addition to these devices, the WP conducts a program for WP officers for regular reaffirmation of the military-political component of alliance doctrine. In its discussions of the forms of cooperation among allied socialist states, Marshal Iakubovskii's signed article in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia notes:

One of the most important directions of socialist military cooperation is the coordination of efforts in the further development of military theory and in a working out of a unity of views on the character and methods of waging war on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

For these purposes, business-like contacts have been established among military-scientific institutions, theoretical conferences are regularly conducted, and there is a joint working out of military-historical themes.91

These contacts include regular exchanges among the WP military academies responsible for the writing and teaching of military doctrine.92 The Kulikov text on the WP, published in 1980, lists conferences on the military-political component of WP doctrine conducted "in the WP Staff" in 1975, 1977, 1978 and 1979.93 If there is no six-member agency for military doctrine, the Military Science Directorate of the Soviet General Staff may serve as the clearinghouse for the formulation of WP military doctrine. In either case, the WP does synchronize the formulation of the military doctrine of six of its seven members. This doctrine serves as a charter for the interaction of the corresponding components of national armed forces. The significance of a common doctrine for the WP may be comparable to the significance of Frunze's development of a "unified military doctrine" in the early 1920s for the multinational units and the national-territorial formations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, as discussed above.
Recruitment of a Greater Socialist Officer Corps: The Warsaw Pact
Agency for Officer Education

During the 1920s and 1930s the Soviets maintained a series of "national-territorial" divisions and regiments recruited from the non-Russian populations of various union republics and autonomous districts of the USSR. One of the critical devices for incorporating these ethnic detachments into the greater Soviet Army was the recruitment of bilingual native officers who were trained in native-language officer candidate schools. However, in order to advance to senior command posts, these non-Russian officers had to receive mid-career degrees from Russian-language military academies.

The WP has developed an officer education system capable of training a comparable bilingual officer corps to perform a similar function within the Warsaw Pact. This system has two tracks — one for officers trained only in national institutions and another for officers who complete mid-career and general staff-level training in Soviet military academies where they are trained in the technical and political complexities of operating in a multinational framework under Soviet command. The Romanians, who insist on educating all their officers only in Romanian institutions, do not participate in the Warsaw Pact programs to recruit a greater socialist officer corps.

In competing with East European mid-career academies for East European applicants, Soviet military academies enjoy the advantages of being the oracles of alliance doctrine for their particular specialties; of having curricula designed to prepare multinational personnel for alliance missions; and of using as the language of instruction the same tongue used as the language of WP command. There is limited evidence that some mid-career WP military academies are also assuming roles in the preparation of allied officers for the interaction of allied forces. A Soviet publication reported in 1983 that "representatives of other socialist states" study in Polish military academies and that Polish officers study in Hungary's mid-career military academy.
Even in the national military academies, the curriculum apparently emphasizes the interaction of a given national force with the Soviet Armed Forces. The Friedrich Engels Military Academy of the GDR, in addition to teaching Russian as part of the curriculum, began in 1976 to conduct Russian-language final examinations in other subjects. According to an East German article of 1978, one of the officer-students at the Academy declared that "...the Russian language is part of our profession. It is the command language of the Warsaw Pact." Another officer reported that he and his comrades had to deal with "entire exercise elements in Russian, as required by a situation imposed upon a combined staff of the allied forces."

For the Soviet and East European military academies which train WP officers, the prerequisite for the education of a greater socialist officer corps is not only a common language of command but a commander doctrine which defines interchangeable missions for comparable components of national armed forces. Education in Soviet military academies provides the optimum conditions for both the linguistic and doctrinal training of alliance officers for such coalition warfare.

In Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia there are a total of 27 officer candidate schools with four-to-five-year curricula. The Soviet Union maintains 133 undergraduate schools, some of which enroll limited numbers of East European students. The loyal East European members of the WP train most of their junior military officers in local officer candidate schools. East European captains and majors seeking promotion to senior ranks must acquire a post-graduate degree in military science from either an East European mid-career academy or an equivalent Soviet military academy. Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany each maintain one such academy for all service branches. Czechoslovakia maintains three -- one for combined arms commanders, one for political officers and one for medical officers. Poland has five mid-career academies: one for combined arms commanders, one for political cadres, one for military engineering specialties, one for
naval officers and one for medical officers.

The Soviet Union maintains 16 military mid-career academies. Most of these offer highly specialized degrees that do not appear to be available in Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of the mid-career engineering academy of Poland. The Frunze Academy in Moscow for combined-arm commanders and the Lenin Military-Political Academy in Moscow for political officers compete with their East European counterparts for East European applicants. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia declares that at least six mid-career Soviet academies train officers from other socialist countries:

- The Frunze Military Academy
- The Lenin Military-Political Academy
- The Malinovskii Academy of Armoured Troops
- The Budennyi Military Academy of Communications
- The Kuibyshev Military Engineering Academy
- The Grechko Naval Academy

Five additional academies have received military decorations from other socialist countries for unspecified reasons, according to the Encyclopedia.

- The Military Academy of Rear Services and Transport
- The Gagarin Military Air Academy
- The Zhukovskii Military Air Engineering Academy
- The Timoshenko Military Academy of Chemical Defence
- The Kalinin Military Artillery Academy

Only the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow is qualified to train the officers of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia for general staff positions and the top commands in service branches and military districts.

It is unlikely that the Soviets rely upon the educational process itself to generate loyalty to the USSR from East European military officers. It is more likely that the Soviets use the admissions process to Soviet military academies to identify those East
European officers who have decided to advance their careers by openly demonstrating their acquiescence in Soviet domination of the WP. Education in the USSR -- three to five years in a mid-career military academy and/or two years in the Voroshilov General Staff Academy -- is education in how to work on a daily basis in close cooperation with Soviet officers. If education in the USSR fails to inspire genuine loyalty to Moscow, it probably succeeds in generating certain expectations of Soviet patronage after graduation. The Soviet commanders of WP agencies have ample opportunities to dispense such patronage in the course of evaluating East European officers in joint military exercises and other joint alliance activities.

The number of East European officers who have graduated from Soviet academies is more than sufficient to fill the key command posts of the East European armies. According to the Kulikov text on the WP "Thousands of officers and generals of the fraternal armies have undergone training in Soviet military academies and other military-educational institutions."102 This study adds, "These officers constitute the backbone of national military forces and have played an important role in the establishment and development of their national armies."103 The Soviet history of the Voroshilov Academy, published in 1976, listed among its alumni four of the five current ministers of defence of the five loyal WP states, all five chiefs of national general staffs, and four chiefs of main political administrations. This text added, "Other graduates of the Voroshilov Academy occupy high posts in their armies."104

The Frunze Academy, which trains Soviet captains and majors for combined arms command posts, also trains East European officers for equivalent positions in East Europe. In a speech honouring the Frunze Academy on its fiftieth anniversary, a Polish general declared, "Just as in the Soviet Army, the graduates of the M.V. Frunze Academy hold responsible leading posts in the armed forces of the socialist states."105
WP sources provide some information about the prominent roles of graduates of Soviet military academies in the East German Army (NVA). According to a 1974 article by the director of the GDR Institute of Military History, "By now hundreds of generals and officers of the NVA display on their uniforms the insignia of graduates from Soviet Military Academies." In a 1970 article a Soviet journalist reported that in the NVA there were "hundreds of generals and officers who have completed Soviet military academies." The East German government has decorated 15 Soviet military-educational institutions for their services in training NVA officers. In a 1976 interview, Lt. General Horst Stechbarth, Commander of the NVA Ground Forces, called attention to the monopoly of graduates of Soviet military academies on regimental and division commands in the NVA: "Presently, regimental and division commanders of the National People's army and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany have known each other from their student days at Soviet military academies."

There are six divisions in the NVA ground forces, each of which has 4-5 regiments (motorized rifle, tank and artillery) plus a series of support subunits. At any given moment, 35-40 alumni of Soviet military academies could fill all the top regimental and divisional commands in the peacetime NVA. An East German publication reported that in 1981 the number of East German alumni of the Voroshilov Academy exceed 100 although it is not clear if this figure referred to retired as well as active-duty personnel.

Although there is not as much evidence available on the roles of alumni of Soviet academies in the other national armies, the numbers of such graduates are probably sufficient to fill the commands of divisions, regiments and perhaps even smaller units in the armed forces of the loyal members of the Warsaw Pact. During 1943-45 the Soviet officer training school in Riazan' commissioned the majority of the junior officers who served in the Polish People's Army organized by the Soviet Defence Ministry during World War II. In a 1978 article Krasnaia
Zvezda noted that

There are thousands of Riazan' Poles. Today they continue their service in the Polish People's Army, and many of them hold positions of command.

Among the graduates of the Riazan' officer school are Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's present national defence minister; Florian Siwicki, Chief of the Polish General Staff; and other well-known military personnel of the Polish Armed Forces.

A joint Soviet-Polish study published in 1975 noted that the Soviet Union at that time provided Poland with "aid in the training of command and engineering cadres necessary for the leadership of subunits, units and formations." Another joint Soviet-Polish study pointed out the advantages to the alliance of having Polish officers study in Soviet academies:

The generals and officers of the Polish Armed Forces who study in the USSR receive a firm grounding in military affairs, become familiar with the leading achievements of Soviet military science, and acquire a high military qualification.

At the same time, study in Soviet schools promotes the strengthening of friendship and comradeship, the improvement of mutual understanding and the establishment of personal contacts.

Graduates of Soviet military academies have taken commands not just in subunits, units and formations of the Polish Army, but also the leading posts in the Military Council of National Salvation, which proclaimed martial law in Poland in December 1981. The Chairman of the
Council, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, is an alumnus of the Voroshilov Academy, as is the deputy chairman, Florian Siwicki, who also serves as chief of the Polish General Staff. At least four other members are also Voroshilov graduates, each of whom was graduated from the USSR with a gold medal for outstanding academic work: Tadeusz Tuczapski, the head of the Polish civil defence system; Tadeusz Hupalowski, who serves both as the General Staff Deputy for mobilization and as the Minister of (Civilian) Administration; Wlodzimierz Oliwa, the Commander of the Warsaw Military District; and Czeslaw Piotrowski, the Chief of Military Research and Technology. According to a Who's Who published in the West, at least three other members of the Council have degrees from Soviet academies: Michal Janiszewski, an alumnus of the Budenny Academy of Military Communications; Ludwik Janczyszyn, a graduate of the Lenin Military-Political Academy; and Eugeniusz Molczyk, the recipient of a degree from an unidentified Soviet military academy.

Without giving any details, a joint Soviet-Bulgarian study published in 1969 stated that the military-educational institutions of the USSR have been "a veritable forge of highly-qualified military cadres for the Bulgarian People's Army." When he presented a decoration to the Voroshilov General Staff Academy for its services to Bulgaria, the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR declared, "In this most authoritative educational institution there has taken place the training of almost the entire leading staff of the Bulgarian People's Army."

The Soviet Curriculum for East European Officers

The available evidence suggests that the programs offered to East European students in Soviet military academies are programs which train these officers for the complexities of combined arms interaction in coalition formations rather than for combined arms actions within distinct national armies. The Soviet-Bulgarian text of 1969 reports that Bulgarian and other non-Soviet officers do course work and write
diploma papers on topics of practical significance for their national
armed forces and for the cooperation of the socialist armies. This
volume adds that the fraternal officers arrive at common views on the
question of tactics, operational art, and military technology. Such
common views, according to the Soviet-Bulgarian study, in turn serve as
the basis for the conduct of joint military exercises. A Soviet
publication noted in 1983 that "several thousand" Bulgarian officers had
completed Soviet shortcourses, military schools and military
academies. An East German publication reported in 1979 on the
conduct of a multinational regimental staff exercise carried out at the
Frunze Military Academy. This exercise, involving officers drawn from
various East European armies, took place under the observation of Major
General P.M. Petrus, at the time, chief of the Frunze section for
foreign military officers.

The Soviet text on the Voroshilov Academy reports that the
course of study for East European officers addresses the problems of
planning joint actions, including joint exercises:

One of the forms of the operational training of (foreign) students is the working out of the
organization and conduct of troop and command
staff exercises.

In the resolution of these practical tasks great
attention is devoted to the questions of joint
planning and organization of the armed forces of
the allied socialist states.

In papers and diploma dissertations the students
as a rule work out those problems which in the
greatest degree correspond to the tasks decided
upon by national armed forces or by the United
Command of the Warsaw Pact.

This text added that the skills of Voroshilov alumni "are clearly
demonstrated in the joint troop and command-staff exercises conducted
according to the plan of the command of the member countries of the
It also noted the command of various WP exercises by East European alumni of the Voroshilov Academy and then pointed out,

A great contribution to the preparation and conduct of the Brotherhood-in-Arms exercises (1970) was made by generals and officers of the armies of the socialist countries who are graduates of the (Voroshilov) Academy and who occupy responsible duties in the central apparatus of ministries of defense, branches of the armed services, of military districts and who command general staffs, divisions, regiments and units.

Conclusion: Officer Education in the Warsaw Pact

The Soviet program for training East European officers in Soviet military academies is sufficiently extensive to recruit an elite portion of East European officers into a greater socialist officer corps. These officers, trained in Russian-language schools for the execution of missions defined by Soviet doctrine, can serve as the critical links between the Soviet command structure and East European staffs, divisions, regiments, and smaller subunits. Education in Soviet military academies affords these bilingual officers the opportunity to work out the technical complexities of joint actions by units and formations of the allied armies. Just as important, the role of Soviet military academies in training East European officers, in conjunction with other control devices, enables the Soviets to control the promotion of officers to the senior ranks of the East European armed forces, with the exception of the Romanian military. Control over the promotion of senior officers may in turn permit the Soviets to maintain all the devices which fragment national control over the national armed forces of East Europe.
Coordination of the WP Political Administrations

After the establishment of the WP the Soviet Main Political Administration (MPA) faced the task of coordinating "internationalist" political education among the ethnic units of the socialist alliance. This was by no means a new task for the Soviet MPA. Soviet political officers had conducted such programs during the Civil War; during the period from 1922 to 1938 among the national-territorial units of the Red Army; and during World War II both among the national-territorial formations of the Soviet Army formed in 1941-43 and among the East European units and divisions raised on Soviet soil.

Of all the activities of the alliance, the programs of coordinated and joint political indoctrination are most directly concerned with cultivating political reliability among WP personnel, and they are probably the most publicized of all joint WP activities. The minimum objective of the synchronized and joint programs conducted among the multinational personnel of the WP is to prevent open manifestations of anti-Soviet nationalism. The maximum objective is to promote two interrelated processes: the acculturation of the non-Russian personnel of Soviet units to the military ethos of the Russian core of the Soviet army and the acculturation of the non-Soviet units of the WP to the military ethos of the Soviet army. Another chapter of this study discusses the interaction of these two processes and the likely successes and failures of WP programs for political indoctrination.

The WP relies on four devices to coordinate political indoctrination in the alliance: 1) the identical structural organization of the MPA agencies; 2) regular meetings of corresponding alliance agencies to plan and review allied programs for political indoctrination programs; 2) a series of bilateral political indoctrination programs; 4) ad hoc joint political agencies to direct allied political activities in the course of joint military exercises. These four devices testify to the functioning of a central WP agency to direct the joint activities of the political administrations of the
alliance. If no such central agency exists, then the Soviet MPA probably assumes the role of the political directorate for the Warsaw Pact.

The Political Administrations of the Five Loyal Members of the WP

The structure of the political administrations of the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia is virtually identical to the structure of the Soviet Main Political Administration (MPA). Romania, which refuses to participate in the joint political activities of the WP political administrations, has a system of party committees in the military very similar to the system of party committees in the Yugoslav Armed Forces. The Romanians established this system in 1964.

In the MPA structures of the five loyal members of the Warsaw Pact the Chief of the MPA serves as a deputy of the Minister of Defence and has the "rights" but not the title of a secretary of the party's Central Committee. Below the Chief is a "Bureau" made up of his principal deputies. Below the Bureau are "Administrations": one for each national service branch, one for each national military district, and one for each Soviet Force Group in East Europe. There are also at least three central Administrations: one for agitation and propaganda, which supervises all military publications; one for organization and party work within the military; an administration concerned with the party organizations of officers; and a third for cadres, that is, evaluation and promotion of political officers.

The next bureaucratic tier consists of "Departments," responsible either to the MPA Chief or to the head of an Administration. There are two central Departments: one for the party youth organizations in the military and one for military research. Departments also exist in each national General Staff, the staff of each national service branch, in each mid-career national military academy and in each national military research institute. Departments also exist in "Formations" -- groupings the size of a brigade, division or
corps. Below each department are the primary MPA and party organizations directly responsible for the conduct of work among military personnel. These agencies correspond to the types of "units" and "subunits" found in the national service branches.

In 1967 the Hungarians created a separate system of party committees alongside the existing MPA organs, but this system does not replace the Hungarian MPA agencies or even compete with them. The purpose of the Hungarian party committees in the military is to involve Hungarian officers in the corresponding party committees of civilian agencies and vice versa. In the event of mobilization, the party committees organized at the regimental level and above dissolve and those below the regimental level become subordinate to the MPA bodies.129

Intra-Alliance Meetings of National MPA Agencies

The existence of parallel administrative hierarchies in the MPA structures of the loyal armed forces of the WP facilitates the conduct of joint meetings of bureaucratic agencies to plan coordinated programs of political indoctrination. The Romanian military, which lacks political agencies corresponding to those of other WP members, does not participate in the joint programs in political indoctrination.

The chief of the Soviet MPA, General Epishev, notes that there is a plethora of meetings among analogous WP political agencies:

The political organs do a great deal for the strengthening of contacts among the fraternal armed forces and the development of their all-around cooperation.

There are meetings of the representatives of the Main Political Administrations; the political administrations of [national] service branches; and meetings of the political administrations of force groups with political administrations of [national] military districts.

There are meetings of the political workers of formations and units and there are conferences and seminars.
Such meetings make possible the organization of a broad exchange of experience on various problems of the guaranteeing of the high quality of combat training of troops, of Marxist-Leninist training of officers, of the political studies of soldiers and non-commissioned officers, of the organization of socialist competition and other forms of the teaching and training of the soldiers of the socialist community.

In his 1974 study of the cooperation of the WP armed forces Colonel General P.I. Efimov of the Soviet MPA called attention to the "participation of responsible workers of the party-political apparatus of the fraternal armed forces in various conferences, symposia, colloquia and seminars on military-theoretical problems and on practical questions of party-political work." In addition, there is an annual exchange program of Soviet and East European military journalists which helps to coordinate the publication programs of the allied military and journals. Since 1968, WP military journalists have held an annual conference to discuss the treatment of military-political issues in the WP press.

Following the 1969 reorganization of the Warsaw Pact the WP press has irregularly but frequently reported meetings of WP political officers at corresponding levels to coordinate alliance programs of political education:

-- August 31 - September 2, 1970: "A meeting in Dresden of generals and officers of the main political administrations of the armed forces of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact ... on current questions of party-political work in the allied armed forces."

-- April 1972: A meeting of "general officers of the main political administrations."

-- October 18-19, 1973: "A meeting in Dresden of the leaders of the political organs of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. There was a discussion of questions of ideological work and of the
further raising of the combat capabilities of the fraternal countries..."136

-- 1974 (date uncertain): A meeting of the political officers of the WP Anti-Aircraft Troops to discuss political education in the anti-aircraft troops of the alliance.137

-- June 22-23, 1976, in Varna, Bulgaria: "...a meeting of the chiefs of the main political administrations of the armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact."138

-- September 5-9, 1977: "A meeting in Moscow of the chief editors of the central military newspapers of the Warsaw Pact countries. The participants in the meeting exchanged experience of the elucidation in the military press of the questions of Marxist-Leninist internationalist education of military personnel..."139

-- September 20, 1978: "A symposium in Warsaw of the youth organizations of the armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact devoted to the question of patriotic and internationalist training of the soldiers of the allied armies."140

-- September 3-6, 1979: "A meeting in Minsk of the ideological workers of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. The participants in the meeting exchanged experience of work in educating the personnel of the fraternal armies in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism..."141

-- 1980 (no date specified): In Warsaw, a meeting of "...the leading ideological workers of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries."142

-- 1980 (no date specified): A meeting of the directors of the allied military presses.143

-- 1981 (no date specified): A meeting of the directors of the WP institutes of military history.144

-- April 1983 in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia: A meeting of the directors of the military-political academies of the WP.145
Bilateral Contacts of the Warsaw Pact Political Organs

There is evidence that Soviet Force Groups in Eastern Europe draw up annual plans for the coordination of MPA work with their host armies, as in the case of the Main Political Administration of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the MPA of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia. According to the Kulikov text on the WP, the number of such joint political activities between the National People's Army and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany "...every year comes to between 30,000-35,000 joint measures..." These bilateral contacts also involve the western military districts of the USSR. A Soviet study of the Belorussian Military District noted that during a two-year period "generals and officers" from the fraternal armed forces delivered "about 200" speeches to the soldiers of the district. This averages out to about two speeches a week. The speakers included unidentified military attaches posted to Moscow, lecturers from the Polish MPA and military historians from East Germany. A Soviet history of the Transcarpathian Military District declares that this district participates in the "systematic exchange of military delegations with other socialist states," including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. The exchange includes delegations of commanders, technical specialists, political officers and military journalists. According to this study, political work in the Transcarpathian Military District focuses on the Warsaw Pact countries, the armed forces of these states and "the internationalist duty" of Soviet soldiers to defend socialism in East Europe. A Soviet volume on the Odessa Military District took note of a similar program of regular exchanges of delegations with Warsaw Pact armies. According to this study, the district had conducted "about 40 recent exchanges of delegations of commanders, political organs, party and party youth organizations."
Political Activities in Warsaw Pact Military Exercises

The conduct of joint political activities during WP exercises goes back at least as far as 1962, the first full year of WP multilateral troop manoeuvres. In an examination of the conduct of political activities during joint WP exercises Colonel Semin of the Soviet army notes that "usually" the political administration of the commander of the exercise organizes the program of joint political activities. This suggests that if an East European officer is commanding a joint WP exercise, his national political administration organizes the political activities. But it also implies that if one of the Soviet officers serving as an exercise commander is also a WP official, such as the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff, a separate WP political agency, rather than the Soviet MPA, may organize the political activities of the exercise.

No matter what agency (a central WP political directorate, an East European MPA or Soviet MPA) is ultimately responsible for the conduct of political activities in a given exercise, the field responsibilities are assigned to what Colonel Semin calls "a united operational group" consisting of representatives of the political administrations whose soldiers are participating in the exercise.

According to the Iakubovskii study of the Warsaw Pact, the united operational group has its representatives in the political departments of the national forces assigned to the exercises and also in the staff which plans and directs the exercise. The united operational group organizes meetings of the fraternal troops, meetings of the soldiers with the local population and programs of "agitation-propaganda" and "cultural enlightenment." This group also supervises a joint press center, a joint multilingual newspaper published during the larger exercises, joint multilingual radio broadcasts, and a joint cinematography group.

Colonel Semin writes that "as a rule" political activities take place during pauses in military action. "When the situation permits"
the joint operational group organizes joint discussions of "military-political and theoretical themes," speeches by propagandists and the exchange of films and stage performances. The meetings of soldiers and civilians sometimes include performances by choral groups, dance troupes and orchestras.\textsuperscript{156}

WP sources report that during the Brotherhood-in-Arms exercises of 1970 in East Germany there were more than 40 meetings of allied military units, more than 200 political rallies involving soldiers and civilians and about 300 cultural programs.\textsuperscript{157} Such joint political activities are not confined to the large multilateral exercises. According to a WP study, during an unidentified routine training exercise of the Central Force Group and the Czechoslovak People's Army there were five meetings of commanders and political officers, six meetings of outstanding enlisted military personnel, four large political rallies and 50 joint excursions.\textsuperscript{158} Political activities appear to take place even during low-level joint tactical exercises. Krasnaia Zvezda reported in 1971 that after jointly laying a pontoon bridge across the Danube, Soviet and Hungarian soldiers attended a concert given by the orchestra of the staff of the Southern Force Group.\textsuperscript{159}

A Warsaw Pact Agency for Internal Security Forces?

The author of a Soviet study of the WP writes that the alliance conducts joint activities among the internal security forces, which he specifically identifies as "troop formations of people's militias, organs of security and border troops."\textsuperscript{160} The limited information available on one type of these forces, the WP border troops, testifies to a pattern of interaction that is almost identical to the pattern of interaction of the regular WP armed forces. A Soviet study of the USSR's border troops, which are under the control of the Committee of State Security (KGB), declares that cooperation among Soviet and East European border troops takes place "in the framework of the WP."\textsuperscript{161}
This study documents the regular ties of the border troops of the USSR with Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia -- but not Romania. These ties involve:

1) the use of Soviet weapons and Soviet technology;
2) coordination of the "doctrine of the border troops";
3) cooperation in the education and training of border troop officers: "The Soviet Union provides aid to the fraternal countries in the basic and advanced training of border troop officers in higher schools for border troops and in Higher Command Courses for Border Troops";
4) regular meetings of command staffs of the border troops; and regular conferences of the "leading staffs" of the allied border troops;
5) joint exercises in the form of "joint reconnaissance and search missions";
6) joint activities of the political organs of the allied border troops: "There are meetings of the representatives of the political workers of the border troops. During joint measures they exchange experience of the organization of Marxist-Leninist training of officers and of the conduct of political activities with personnel ... political work and of the exchange of delegations."

A WP Agency for Paramilitary Youth Training Organizations

There is clear evidence that the WP conducts bilateral and multilateral activities among the corresponding bureaucracies of the paramilitary youth training and sports organizations of the WP. Each WP state has such an organization, headed by a general officer. These organizations are modelled on the USSR's Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF).

For WP youth, participation in the activities of these organizations is the first exposure to planned WP efforts to inculcate political reliability in the military personnel of the alliance. If the WP does not have a central bureau to coordinate the interactions of the
leading bureaucrats of these youth organizations, then the Soviet DOSAAF may carry out this function. These organizations send representatives to each other's congresses, regularly exchange delegations, conduct international conferences on the political indoctrination of youth and hold international summer camps. Since 1978 the Polish and Soviet paramilitary youth training organizations have held annual joint ideological conferences. The primary emphasis in all these activities is on bilateral contacts between the USSR's DOSAAF and the corresponding youth organizations of each WP state except Romania.

The Administrative Agencies of the WP and the 1973 WP Convention

The publicly-identified agencies of the WP and unidentified "other organs of administration" provide devices for the Soviets to penetrate into the analogous agencies of national defence ministries. The information available on the Staff of the WP indicates that the Soviet officers in this agency, acting in the name of the Committee of Defence Ministers, the Military Council and the United Command, can compete with national agencies for control over the components of national armed forces. The 1973 "Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Staff and Other Organs of Administration of the WP" specifically empowers Soviet officers to compete with national agencies by three devices. The Convention: 1) secures the right of extraterritoriality for WP agencies on East European soil; 2) secures the right of the Soviet government to appoint personnel to the "Staff and other organs"; 3) bypasses the multilateral agencies of the WP, the Committee of Defence Ministers and the Political Consultation Committee in the event of any conflict between a national government and a WP agency. Such differences are to be resolved by "state-to-state negotiations."

Section Two of Article One of the Conventions states that "For the purposes of this Convention the term 'Staff of the United Armed Forces' also designates the other organs of administration of the member
Article One of the convention also distinguishes between two sets of officers: those formally appointed as representatives of East European states and those appointed by the Soviet government:

Article 1

1. The Staff of the United Armed Forces consists of generals, admirals and officers of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, on whom are conferred privileges and immunities in accordance with this Convention for the fulfillment of their service duties.

2. On the Staff of the United Armed Forces also work personnel chosen by the government of the place of location of the Staff, part of whom enjoy the privileges and immunities stipulated by this Convention...

3. The place of location of the Staff of the United Armed Forces is the city of Moscow.168

Section 1 of Article 1 does qualify somewhat the Soviet right to appoint personnel to the administrative agencies of the WP:

Article 1

1.... The category and number of personnel enjoying privileges and immunities is agreed upon by the Staff of the United Armed Forces with the General (or Main) Staffs of the member states of this Convention.

A roster of these personnel is annually sent by the Staff of the United Armed Forces to the General (or Main) Staffs of the armed forces of the member states of this Convention.169

Article Two empowers the Staff "to conclude agreements"170 without specifying the partners to such agreements, but the only available parties to agreements are the agencies of national defence...
ministries. Articles Three and Four grant the Staff the rights of a sovereign body on the territory of the member states:

Article 3

2. The premises of the Staff, its property, assets and documents, regardless of their location, enjoy immunity from any form of administrative or juridical interference with the exception of cases in which the Staff itself renounces immunity in a specific case...

5. The Staff of the UAF enjoys on the territory of each member state of this Convention no less favourable conditions in regard to priority, tariffs and rates of charge of the postal service, telegraph and telephone communications than those which the national military command or diplomatic representatives enjoy in that country.171

Article 4

1. In the performance of their service responsibilities the official personnel of the Staff of the UAF enjoy the following privileges and immunities on the territory of each state participating in this Convention:

   a) inviolability of all books and documents...
   b) immunity from personnel arrest or confinement and also from the jurisdiction of legal or administrative institutions in regard to all actions which may be taken in their capacity as official personnel;...

2. The Chief of Staff of the UAF and his deputies, in addition to the privileges and immunities established in section 1 of this article, enjoy on the territory of all member states of this Convention the privileges and immunities granted in the country in question to diplomatic representatives. The designated personnel receive diplomatic passports.172

Should the Staff ever come into conflict with national authorities, the Convention provides for the resolution of such
conflicts without recourse to the Committee of Defence Ministers or any other formally-constituted multilateral agency of the WP. Article Six declares:

**Article 6**

4. Possible contested questions arising from the interpretation and implementation of this Convention will be decided by the member states of this Convention by means of negotiations between the national commands or by diplomatic channels or by any other means of understanding.173

The lack of well-defined procedures for resolving disputes through specifically designed agencies suggests that any contentious questions will be settled by contests of raw strength. Section Five of Article Six establishes the ground rules for such contests: "This Convention is drawn up in one copy in the Russian language."174 The designation of a Russian-language version as the only legal text contrasts with the use of Russian, German, Polish and Czech-language versions as equally valid texts of the original Warsaw Treaty.175

**The Military-Administrative Structure of the WP and the Political Reliability of WP Forces**

The military-administrative structure of the WP testifies to the fact that the Soviets have not sought a solution to the political reliability of East European military personnel through the development of autonomous national military organizations under autonomous national command. The Soviet experience with Romania, a member of the WP, with Albania, a former member, and with Yugoslavia as well, have demonstrated that independent national military forces under the control of an East European Communist regime constitute forces unavailable to the Soviets for offensive use on either the internal or external fronts in East Europe. From the Soviet standpoint, independent East European national
military forces are inherently unreliable.

The purpose of the military-administrative structure of the WP is to fragment national command over national armed forces. The fragmentation of East European military organizations does not solve the problem of the reliability of East European military personnel. It solves the problem of availability. For the Soviets there is only one possible route to the political reliability of East European military personnel for offensive campaigns: the linking of individual elements of East European military organizations to Soviet forces.

**Bilateral Ties of Soviet and East European Forces**

The integration of these components into a Soviet-controlled multinational force takes place through a system of bilateral ties between the East European forces and two sets of Soviet forces: those stationed in East Europe and those stationed in the western military districts of the USSR.

The most visible sign of these bilateral ties is the system of "brother regiments" which participate in joint training programmes, joint exercises and joint political activities. A Soviet study of the East German Army observes that "It is hard to find an [East German] unit which does not maintain multi-faceted ties with a neighbouring unit of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany." 176

Some Warsaw Pact sources testify to the existence of a similar network of unit-to-unit ties between the Soviet and Czechoslovak forces and their participation in joint training and joint exercise programmes. 177 Gustav Husak, the General Secretary of the Czechoslovak party and President of Czechoslovakia, has publicly endorsed "the close cooperation of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and of units of the Czechoslovak Army and Central Group of Soviet Forces." 178
The Bulgarian People's Army maintains a highly developed system of regimental (polk) ties to "brother" regiments in the Soviet Army and to other East European armies as well. This network of fraternal ties even extends to Bulgarian border troop regiments, which maintain regular ties with corresponding Soviet border troop regiments. The limited evidence available suggests that such brother regiments participate in joint exercises such as those held in the Carpathian Military District of the USSR in 1973 which involved Hungarian, Soviet and Bulgarian forces, including a Bulgarian motorized infantry regiment officially designated as the "Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Regiment." Krasnaia Zvezda has pointed out that there is a system of "brother regiments" linking the armies of the USSR, Poland and East Germany. Bilateral ties are conducted on two overlapping levels: military-technical and military-political.

Military-Technical Ties: The NVA and GSFG

The most elaborate and most typical system of bilateral relationships exists between the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and the East German National People's Army. According to Colonel Professor Reinhard Bruehl, director of the GDR Institute of Military History, in December 1969 the NVA and the GSFG issued corresponding directives dealing with intensified contacts between parallel units of the two fraternal armed forces. The commands of "formations" and "units" of the NVA and GSFG have subsequently drawn up such plans of cooperation on an annual basis. According to Bruehl, during the 1971/72 training year "400 staffs, brigades, units and schools" of the NVA and GSFG had opted for joint plans of cooperation, and in the 1974/75 training year the number of such agreements rose to 570. In addition, the GSFG had established similar programmes with 97 GDR Border Guard troop units.

The charter for the system of ties to the "regiment next door" was a decree of the Socialist Unity Party Central Committee Plenum of
December 1973 which required NVA units:

to work shoulder-to-shoulder with the regiment
next door in combat training and army life. Each
serviceman must participate in strengthening
combat cooperation, learn from the glorious
Soviet Army and imitate it. 186

The NVA made it easier to maintain such ties by adopting new
regulations and manuals for all service branches in the 1973/74 training
year which were based on the corresponding documents of the Soviet Armed
Forces. 187

From a practical standpoint joint training and exercises posed
many difficult problems. But, although they recognized these problems,
East German military leaders also expressed their determination to
resolve the difficulties of close unit-to-unit ties. Major General
Joachim Goldbach, chief of the Neubrandenburg service region, discussed
these problems in an interview with the NVA newspaper:

Question: The minister for national defense has
demanded that the National People's Army make use
of the experiences of the USSR army through joint
military training with the Soviet comrades-in-
arms. Can this be so easily accomplished?

Answer: Of course great things are never easily
solved; rather, they are always linked with
persistent, hard work. And training GDR soldiers
to be masters of their military specialty by
joint training with the Soviets is really a great
and excellent thing.

Question: Many questions are being asked on the
organization of joint training. What experiences
have there been up to now?

Answer: First of all, practice has proven that
it is possible to carry out joint military
training. There are particularly impressive
examples in rifle training, in both training and
actual target practice. This is true for motorized riflemen, artillerymen, armored troops, and intelligence units. The comrades of the Friedrich Wolf unit used the tank school driving course together with Soviet comrades. The motorized riflemen of the Hans Kahle barracks trained with their Soviet friends at both their own firing range and at the Soviet range. Commands were given in German one day and in Russian the next day.

Question: What possibilities are there for additional efforts in this direction?

Answer: The first is that all commanders recognize the value of this training. They must not regard it as useless but as valuable help for stabilizing training results. The second is that each success must be organized, beginning with the planning. I mean that planning must be carried out jointly if there is to be actual joint training. The time, place, and necessary material must be promptly coordinated.188

In support of the practicality of such joint actions, a 1973 article in Die Volksarmee reported on the results of a joint exercise conducted by Soviet and East German companies. The article reported that

Naturally, both sides were quite nervous about the exercise before they started. But afterwards, after what was literally a shoulder-to-shoulder attack, the socialist commanders said over breakfast: "It had to go well. We have the same weapons, the same regulations, the same duties and the same ideology. What could go wrong when one is so well trained as we are?"189
In a 1973 interview Defence Minister Heinz Hoffman reported on another such company-level joint exercise and declared that cooperation at the company level is... becoming an everyday experience for soldiers, in other words, it is becoming the very essence of practical socialist brotherhood in arms. Uniform norms and established provisions of combat training are being jointly fulfilled in these activities.190

In a 1978 article which reviewed NVA-GSFG cooperation during the 1970s, three NVA military specialists called attention to the extensive participation of GDR forces in troop manoeuvres and staff exercises on both bilateral and multilateral bases. Their observations suggest the integration of GDR forces into an integrated multinational socialist force:

A great deal of attention is devoted to the exchange of operations groups, communications personnel and communications equipment, as well as to the resubordination of units to the command element of the corresponding fraternal army during exercises.

During the exercises, elements of modern combat were worked out, such as tactical assault landings, forced crossings of wide water barriers, amphibious assault landings and defense against landing forces.191

**Bilateral MPA Contacts**

The practical focus of the multilateral activities of the Warsaw Pact (WP) political administrations is on maintaining bilateral contacts.*  

* This section and the following one are adapted from Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 177, 148-149.
between the Soviet MPA and its East European analogues. Specific information on the links of the Soviet MPA to the political administrations of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, and Poland varies from case to case.\textsuperscript{192} Taken collectively, this information confirms General Epishev's claim that MPA links at every level of the WP armed forces are an organic part of the Warsaw Pact. In 1964 the Romanians abolished their main political administration and greatly reduced the contact between the political agencies of the Soviet and Romanian forces. The bilateral ties of the WP political administrations with the Soviet MPA may be the single most important device used by the Soviets to monitor the practical military applications of the shared military-political axioms of the WP.

**Bilateral Contacts of the Western Military Districts of the USSR**

The Carpathian, Belorussian, and Odessa Military Districts of the USSR maintain similar networks of contacts with the East European forces assigned to the United Armed Forces. Some or all of the Soviet forces in these three military districts may be assigned to the UAF and may be directly under the military-administrative agencies of the Pact.

The Carpathian Military District borders on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. A Soviet history of the Carpathian Military District notes that the district participates in "the systematic" exchange of military delegations with other socialist states," including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{193} The delegations consist of commanders, technical specialists, political officers, and military journalists. The district also maintains ties with economic enterprises and local governments in the border districts of the neighbouring socialist states. According to the Soviet volume on the Carpathian Military District, political work among the soldiers of the district focuses on the Warsaw Pact countries, the armed forces of these states, and the obligation of Soviet soldiers to defend East European socialism against its external and internal enemies.\textsuperscript{194}
The Belorussian Military District borders on Poland. A Soviet history of this district declares that the district's soldiers and Polish troops "have more than once participated in joint exercises and manoeuvres." According to this text, one of these manoeuvres was the "Neman" exercise of July-August 1968, during which the Commander of the Soviet Rear Services, General S.S. Mariakhin, directed the movement of several Soviet divisions to Poland, where they joined forces with Polish and East German units in preparation for the invasion of Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20. This text also notes that in addition to regularly participating in military exercises with Polish troops, "The soldiers of the Belorussian Military District participate in many [other] joint measures conducted in the framework of the Warsaw Pact." These activities include the exchange of "tens of delegations" from the armed forces of Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia. The delegations include commanders and political officers from the command of the district down to the command of individual subunits. This district has frequently been host to WP sports competitions and to frequent ceremonies involving Polish and Soviet troops in the joint commemoration of political and martial anniversaries. One such ceremony in October 1968 brought to the Belorussian town of Lenino the chief of the Soviet Main Political Administration, General A.A. Epishev, and the Polish Defence Minister, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, to dedicate a memorial to Polish-Soviet friendship. According to the Soviet study of the Belorussian Military District, the political officers of the district educate their troops in the traditions of Soviet military aid to East European states struggling against imperialism. Officers from the fraternal armed forces play an important role in the political education program of the district. In the period from 1968 to 1970, East European officers delivered "about 200" speeches to the troops of the district. These officers included the military attaches to the USSR of unspecified socialist countries, lecturers from the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed
Forces, and historians from the East German Institute of Military History.\textsuperscript{202}

The Odessa Military District borders directly on Romania and has naval access to Bulgaria through the services of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the Soviet Navy. The Soviet history of this district does not mention the participation of the district's troops in any joint WP exercises, but the proximity of this district to Bulgaria would make it a likely candidate for supplying the Soviet ground forces and airborne personnel which periodically participate in manoeuvres in Bulgaria. According to the Soviet volume on the district, its troops did participate in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{203}

This text notes that the exchange of military delegations has become "traditional" between the district and the armed forces of Bulgaria and Romania. In 1973, the Military Council of the district, in a review of the training of personnel in internationalism, noted that "recently" there had been "about 40 mutual exchanges" with unspecified socialist armies.\textsuperscript{204} The only exchanges specifically identified by this text were with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia; these included delegations of commanders, political workers, and military journalists.\textsuperscript{205} The Soviet history of the district adds that in 1974 the Bulgarian ambassador, in commemoration of the 30th anniversaries of the Bulgarian revolution and the founding of the Bulgarian People's Army, presented decorations to the commander and staff of the Odessa Military District. This text does not explain why the Bulgarian ambassador chose to honour this particular military district.\textsuperscript{206} It does note, however, that one of the principal goals of political work in the district is to acquaint Soviet soldiers with the organization and special features of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{207} The Odessa Military District has also regularly provided facilities for WP sports competitions and film festivals.\textsuperscript{208} No specific information was given on exchanges with Romanian forces.
On the whole, the elaborate network of bilateral relations between the components of Soviet and East European military forces does not in fact attempt to cultivate genuine loyalty among the fraternal forces. It seeks to surround individual components of the East European forces with a multitude of overlapping control devices. The system of joint military exercises demonstrates the functional utility of these bilateral mechanisms.
ENDNOTES


4. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia (Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia) Vol. 3, p. 49 does not list the month of Grechko's appointment as Commander of the GSFG in 1953 in the entry for Marshal Grechko. However, in the entry for Grechko's successor as commander of the Kiev Military District, Marshal V. I. Chuikov (Vol. 8, p. 486), the Encyclopedia notes that Chuikov assumed Grechko's former post in Kiev in May 1953. This suggests that Marshal Grechko was GSFG Commander in June 1953.


6. A decree of the Supreme Soviet of February 1, 1944 changed the provisions of the 1936 Constitution on national military formations. The 1944 decree gave each union republic of the USSR the right to have its own formations and units, and gave the Supreme Soviet of each republic the right to decide on the particular formations and units to be mustered from the republic. See Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1938-66 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Izvestiia sovetov trudiaishchikhsia SSSR, 1968), Vol. 1, p. 139. See the article on the national-territorial formations of the Soviet army in Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia (The Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 5, p. 553: "In the middle of the 1950s there began a new stage of development in the life of the multinational Soviet armed forces. This stage was conditioned by the formation of the world system of socialism and by the further strengthening of the political and economic might of the USSR. Soviet society had made a new major step forward in its socio-political, economic, and cultural development. A further drawing together of all the nations and nationalities of the country took place. In these conditions, the necessity for national detachments in the union republics and autonomous republics fell away. The existing republic formations and units were disbanded and their personnel went into the ranks of the multinational formations of the Soviet Army and Navy."


Ibid. p. 217.

Ibid.


For the meetings from 1969 to 1975 see Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, pp. 280-287. For the 1983 session see "Soviet Bloc Session Does Not Issue Expected Threat on New Missiles," *New York Times*, June 29, 1983, p. A-4. There were two similar sessions of the party and state leaders of the WP which took place before 1969 but were not designated sessions of the PCC. These took place in August, 1961 and June, 1964. See Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, pp. 274, 276. As an example of the challenge to the PCC made by such meetings see the Kulikov text's account (p. 280) of the meeting of December 3-4, 1969, which suggests that the meeting constituted a rival body to the PCC: "A meeting of party and state leaders of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact took place in Moscow. The participants in the meeting exchanged opinions on a broad circle of problems connected with the strengthening of peace and international security. In this regard special attention was devoted to the questions of achieving security in Europe. The
conviction was expressed unanimously that for the securing of a firm and stable peace it is necessary to proceed on the path of the prevention of the arms race and of universal and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament." The June 29, 1983 meeting involved the seven members of the WP and issued a joint statement on military security. However, the meeting did not produce an expected statement on US plans to deploy missiles in Europe. The delegations from each country included the national party leader, head of government, foreign minister, and defense minister except for Hungary, which sent a state secretary of the defence ministry rather than the minister. See "East Bloc Calls for an End to the Arms Race," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 27, 1983, p. 14.

In his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU Brezhnev declared that in the period between the 25th and 26th Congresses (1976-81) "... there were 37 friendly summit meetings in the Crimea. Without the formalities of protocol, we discussed in a comradely atmosphere the prospects for the development of our relations and key problems of world politics and mapped out tasks for the future." See "Brezhnev's Report to the Congress," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 25, 1981, p. 5. See Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, pp. 289-292, for listings of these meetings in 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979.


Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, pp. 274-279.

Ibid., p. 165.

Ibid., p. 166; Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 145.


Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 166.

Ibid., p. 115.
28 Ibid., p. 166.
29 Ibid., p. 167.
30 Ibid., p. 166.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, pp. 143-144.
36 SVE, Vol. 1, p. 408.
37 See the appendix and also p. 158 of Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, for the exercises of April 4-16, 1969; July 13-17, 1970; an unspecified exercise of 1973 and an unspecified exercise of 1974.
38 Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 158; Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, pp. 155-156.
39 See the appendices in both the Kulikov and Iakubovskii texts.
42 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, pp. 166-167.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
See the discussion below of the 1973 Staff Convention.

Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 168.


Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 167.


Ibid., p. 161.


Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 151.


Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 167.


According to the Iakubovskii text, one of the purposes of the first large-scale multilateral WP exercise, the 1961 Buria manoeuvres, was "checking the preparation of operational staffs to carry out the administration of allied groupings of forces in the complex conditions of a combat situation." See Iakubovskii, *Boevoe sodruzhestvo*, p. 151. After the 1970 Brotherhood-in-Arms exercises, the largest ever held by the WP, Marshal Iakubovskii declared, "... the exercises which have just taken place were a serious examination for the fraternal armies and indicate ... the skills of commanders and staffs in resolving tasks in complex, swiftly-changing circumstances." See *Krasnaia Zvezda*, October 20, 1970, p. 1.
Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 98.


SVE, Vol. 5, p. 682.


Studzinski in Krasnaia Zvezda, March 28, 1975, p. 3.

See the chapter on Romania in Vol. II.

Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 98.

In both Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor and Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, the chapters on the military-economic cooperation of the socialist states are principally discussions of cooperation within the framework of the CMEA, with the observation that military production enlists all branches of the national economies.


A. I. Masslenikov in Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 251.


John Erickson, "Military Management and Modernization Within the Warsaw Pact" in Robert W. Clawson, Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1982), especially p. 215. "[after 1969]...competition in what might be called main weapons systems was eliminated and a form of division of labor introduced, leaving the field of standard armament to the USSR alone and assuring Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact arms cartel. This predominance also extended into the field of licensing, where Soviet R&D costs can be included in the price of tooling and machinery furnished to produce weapons and equipment which themselves emanate from Soviet designs. If this is what is meant by 'standardization' then it is an accomplished fact in the sense that the main weapons systems are duly aligned with Soviet designs and requirements and that no non-Soviet main weapons system has ever been introduced into the inventory of all Warsaw Pact military establishments."
statistical analysis of trends in East European defence spending and also a review of the quantitative literature on this topic see William M. Reisinger, "East European Military Expenditures in the 1970s: Collective Good or Bargaining Offer?" *International Organization* 37 (Winter 1983): 143-155. Reisinger points out that the Soviet Union appears to have given non-military subsidies to those WP states that have maintained or increased the levels of their military spending during the 1970s. He tentatively suggests that the Romanian deviation from general WP policies in defence spending indicates bargaining in the WP over defence spending. In my opinion, the Romanian deviation noted by Reisinger testifies only to the fact of the Romanian deviation and not to the deviation of any other WP state. Michael Checinski offers an analysis of the complex relationship between Polish defence production for non-Polish WP uses, the burden placed on the Polish economy by such spending, and the subsidies offered by the USSR to the Polish economy as a whole. See "Poland's Military Burden," *Problems of Communism* 32 (May-June 1983): 31-44.

74 Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 252.
75 Ibid., pp. 151-152; Iakubovskii, *Boevoe sodruzhestvo*, pp. 109, 146, 161.
76 For documentation of the interaction and coordination of these complementary programs see Christopher Jones, "The Bureaucracies of Knowledge in the Countries of Real Socialism," paper presented at the AAASS Annual Conference in Kansas City, October 1983.
77 Ibid.
78 Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 243.
81 Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 167.
84 SVE, Vol. 5, p. 682; Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 146; Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 98.


87 V.F. Samoilenko, Druzhba narodov -- istochnik mogushchestva sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972); "Voennoe sodruzhestvo stran sotsializma" in S.A. Tiushkevich et al., eds., Voina i armiia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977).

88 Samoilenko, "Voennoe sodruzhestvo," p. 373.

89 See the chapter on Romania in Vol. II.


91 SVE, Vol. 1, p. 527.

92 Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 164.

93 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, pp. 287, 290, 292.

94 As part of Mikhail Frunze's program for the establishment of such ethnic detachments, a Central Committee resolution of 1924 decreed: "It is now necessary to begin establishing military schools in the republics and national districts for the quick recruitment of command staff from local personnel who are able to serve as the nucleus of national troop units. In this matter, it is understood that the party and social composition of the national units, especially of the command, must be assured." "Iz resheniia o prakticheskih meropriiatiakh po provedeniui v zhizn' rezoliutsii XII s"ezda partii po natsional'nomu voprosu" in K.U. Chernenko, ed., KPSS o Vooruzhennykh silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969), p. 206.
See the chapter on Romania in Vol. II.

P. Skorodenko, "Vozrastanie roli..." p. 57.


Ibid.


See the following entries in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia Vol. 2: pp. 175: "The Frunze Academy ...gives aid in the education and training of command cadres for the armies of the socialist countries." P. 172: "Along with the officers of the Soviet Army, personnel of the socialist countries study in the Malinovskii Academy." p. 178: "The Budennyi Academy gives aid in the training of officer cadres for the armies of the socialist countries." P. 220: "For services in the training of military engineers and for carrying out scientific research the Kuibishev Academy has been decorated with the orders of a series of socialist countries." P. 231: "The services of the Grechko Academy in the training of officer cadres ...for the navies of the socialist countries has been recognized ...by the orders of a series of socialist countries." For a reference to the Lenin Academy see E.E. Mal'tsev, ed., KPSS-organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974). P. 482: "The Communist and Workers' Parties and the governments of the fraternal countries highly value the generous aid of the Soviet people and its army in the training of officer cadres with an all-around education. A recognition of these services of the military-educational institutions of the Soviet Army is the presentation of medals by a series of socialist countries to the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, the Frunze Military Academy, the Lenin Military-Political Academy and several others."

Vol. 2 of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia notes that the first three of these academies have received decorations from "a series of socialist countries" (pp. 179, 199, and 201). For the Timoshenko and Kalinin academies, Vol. 2 lists decorations from the GDR only (pp. 179, 180).

Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 159.
Ibid. For an identical quotation, see Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 163.


112 Zhilin and Jadziac, Bratstvo po oruzhiu, p. 358.


114 Kulikov, Akademiia generalnogo shtaba, p. 242.

115 Ibid., p. 271.

116 Ibid., p. 272.

117 Ibid., p. 268.

118 Ibid., p. 269.


Kulikov, *Akademiia generalnogo shtaba*, p. 244.


Ibid., pp. 197-198.

Skorodenko, "Vozrastanie roli...," p. 55.


Ibid., p. 242.

Ibid., p. 243.

Ibid., p. 242.

The information on the structure of the WP political administrations comes from Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe*, Chapter 7.


Kulikov, *Varshavskii dogovor*, p. 281.


Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 289.

Ibid., p. 291.

Ibid., p. 292.

Semin, "Voennno-politicheskii ...soiuz," p. 69.

Ibid., p. 70.

Ibid.


Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 192.


Ibid.


Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 253.


Ibid.

P.A. Zhilin (USSR) and E. Jadziac (Poland), Bratstvo po oruzhiiu (Moscow: Voenzidat, 1975), p. 355.
P.A. Zhilin (USSR) and E. Gefurt (Czechoslovakia), *Na vechnye vremena* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 309.


P.A. Ivanchishin, *Chasovye sovetskikh granit: kratkii ocherk istorii pogranichnykh voisk SSSR* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), 258:

"Combat cooperation in the framework of the Warsaw Pact plays an important role in inter-state relations. In accordance with such combat cooperation ties also develop and strengthen among border troops. Guided by the Leninist proposition on the necessity of the military unity of peoples who have embarked upon the path of socialism, the CPSU and the fraternal Communist and workers' parties direct the activity of the organs of state security and of the border troops to active struggle with the intrigues of imperialist intelligence services."

For all six points, see *Ibid.*, pp. 259-261.


See Article II of the Warsaw Treaty in Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 204.


Ibid.

V.I. Varennikov et al., eds., Krasnoznamennyi prikarpatskii (L'vov: Kameniar, 1976), p. 188.


Ibid., p. 46.

Die Volksarmee No. 19, May 1973, p. 1, translated in JPRS 59227, 7


192 See above and country chapters, Vol. III.


194 "The fraternal ties between our country and the countries of the socialist community and among the armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact have become an important part of the political life of the soldiers of the district. Political workers conduct extensive work in the training of soldiers in the spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism and of high responsibility for the security of our Fatherland and of the fraternal countries in the spirit of constant readiness to come to the defence of the gains of socialism" (ibid., p. 188).


196 Ibid., p. 505.

197 Ibid., p. 501.

198 Ibid., p. 502.

199 Ibid.

200 Ibid., p. 503.

201 "The growing ties between our country and the other socialist countries, and among the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, have had a direct and deep influence on the political training of the troop personnel of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District. The most important direction of the ideological work of commanders, political organs and party organizations is the formation in soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers of the noble qualities of patriot-internationalists and of cultivation of a high responsibility for the peace and security of the fraternal countries and of readiness to render aid to the friendly peoples and
governments which are struggling against imperialism. For example, this work is consciously and purposefully carried out in the Rogachevskii Guards Division. Here, active propaganda is carried out concerning the successes of the workers of the fraternal countries. In political activities, in lectures and discussions, propagandists discuss in detail with the troops the struggle of the party for the strengthening and unification of the world system of socialism; they also discuss in detail the life, military training and special features of the armies of the socialist states. In the Lenin rooms and clubs thematic evening programmes and afternoon programmes are systematically conducted and there are meetings with participants in the liberation of the fraternal countries... The Guards Rogachevskii Division personnel actively maintain ties with one of the divisions of the Polish Army and the workers of the Lublin district, which was liberated by units of the [Rogachevskii] Division from the German-Fascist invaders" (ibid., p. 504).

202 Ibid., p. 505.


204 Ibid., p. 283.

205 Ibid., pp. 280, 281, 283.

206 Ibid., p. 283.

207 "Following the decrees of the party, the Armed Forces of the USSR at all stages of their development strive to be a model of devotion to the principles of proletarian internationalism. Multi-faceted and purposefully directed political education work among the personnel is carried out. It is conducted by commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations. A definite experience in the internationalist training of soldiers has been acquired among the troops of the Red Banner Odessa Military District ..." (Ibid., p. 276) and "In political exercises artillery personnel have become thoroughly acquainted with the life and work of the fraternal peoples of the countries of socialism and with the special features of the military service of their armed defenders. A good source for the deepening of the knowledge of soldiers is political information meetings, thematic evening programs devoted to important dates and events in the histories of the socialist confederation, collective viewing of films and corresponding television broadcasts, and the substantive lectures and speeches of experienced propagandists" (ibid., p. 277).

208 Ibid., p. 281.
208 Ibid., p. 281.
Chapter 8

WARSAW PACT EXERCISES: THE GENESIS OF A GREATER SOCIALIST ARMY?

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Western observers of the Warsaw Pact, particularly those concerned with the combat reliability of East European personnel, have generally assumed that in a war with NATO the armies of East Europe will fight as distinct national forces. The evidence presented below challenges this assumption and suggests a different order of battle. This essay will argue that the ground forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia have been fragmented into elite divisions, regiments and smaller detachments which have been drilled for integration into multinational brigades, divisions and corps made up primarily of Soviet forces.

The ground forces of each of the five loyal East European members of the Warsaw Pact (WP) have been equipped with Soviet weapons and other material produced mainly by other allied states. Each of these five armies has adopted tactical doctrines, regulations and organizational structures virtually identical to those of the Soviet Army.

_viewed from each national defence ministry, the standardized components of these armies constitute miniature versions of the Soviet Ground Forces. Viewed from Moscow, such standardization is a precondition for the interoperability of WP divisions, regiments and smaller detachments. The available evidence suggests that since 1969 the Soviets have sought to develop a system of joint military exercises and related alliance programs which prepare East European personnel for integration into a greater socialist army._
In East Europe national defence ministries conduct programs designed to prepare officers and troops for combat in platoons, companies and battalions. At the battalion and regimental levels, national training and exercise programs function alongside WP programs for drill in combined arms actions involving battalions and regiments drawn from the Soviet Army and from the other armies of East Europe. These overlapping national and WP programs of combined arms exercises may be competing programs of mobilization. But they may also be complementary programs which have the same ultimate objective of preparing East European forces for the special complexities of multinational combined arms actions at the division level and below.\(^1\)

The system of joint WP exercises is probably the most important single device for preparing East European divisions, regiments and perhaps battalions as well for integration into a greater socialist army. But other devices are also crucial: 1) central WP agencies with control over the planning of WP training and exercise programs, in particular WP staff; 2) the recruitment of a bilingual (East European language/Russian language) officer corps which functions as the critical link between national military units and the central WP command structures; 3) the development of an interlocking system of political administrations concerned with preparing allied units politically and psychologically for such action. WP political officers organize ad hoc political staffs during each exercise to direct the political work conducted during the exercise.\(^2\)

In the case of the ground forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia the question of political reliability in combat may not be so much a question of the reliability of distinct national armies, each with its own particular traditions, organizational structures and national missions, but rather a question of whether the WP command has been able to envelope elite components of the East European ground forces in a web of overlapping control systems inside predominantly Soviet formations.
The system for integrating Soviet forces with carefully-selected East European units probably has the effect of fragmenting the national ground forces of the five loyal East European members of the WP into an elite portion closely linked to Soviet command and control systems and a larger portion which acts as a training and reserve force for the elite units available for Warsaw Pact use and for internal security forces.

Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia maintain some 45 ground force divisions altogether, but the total number of Category I divisions maintained by these states is probably around 26 (10 tank divisions and 16 motorized rifle divisions.) These are made up of six East German divisions, 7 Czechoslovak divisions, 8 Polish divisions, and 5 Bulgarian divisions.3

To deploy elite battalions, regiments and divisions of East European forces inside Soviet formations the Soviets would probably have to mix these elite forces not only with the units of the 30 Category I Soviet divisions that the Soviets maintain in Eastern Europe but also with the troops of the approximately 64 Soviet divisions stationed in the western military districts of the USSR. The Groups of Soviet Forces stationed in East Europe have developed liaison programs with the East Europeans that would facilitate such integration,4 as have the Belorussian, Carpathian and Odessa Military Districts, whose forces have occasionally participated in joint WP manoeuvres.5 As noted above, there is also a historical precedent for such integration: the incorporation into the Soviet Army during 1944 and 1945 of battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions drawn from the Polish People's Army (Armia Ludowa,) a force that was organized as a separate army group of approximately 70,000 personnel but which never fought at the level of army group or army corps.

Alternative Models for the Organization of East European Armies

The Soviets have undoubtedly found that the integration of detachments from Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia into a greater socialist army generates very difficult problems of command and control, logistics, and political reliability. But the Soviets have found that such difficulties are in every way preferable to the approach to coalition warfare taken by Romania, a formal member of the WP, Albania, a member from 1955 to 1968, and Yugoslavia, the first Communist state to stand outside the Soviet bloc.

These three states have deployed national defence systems which are designed to function independently of the Soviet Army. In fact, the national defence systems of these states are more or less openly directed against the Soviet Army. Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia have deployed "territorial defence" systems which are designed to mobilize paramilitary forces several times the size of cadre armed forces for national resistance to the installation of a puppet government supported by a foreign occupation army with overwhelming numerical superiority.

The ground forces of these three states have not been configured for actions outside their home territories. According to their national doctrines, the only way these armies can engage NATO forces is if NATO occupies their countries. Albania and Romania both signed the Warsaw Treaty of 1955. In the period from 1959-1961 Albania ceased all military cooperation with the USSR and never joined in any of the overlapping programs which Marshal A.A. Grechko established after his appointment as WP Commander-in-Chief in 1960. In 1968 Albania formally withdrew from the WP to dramatize its opposition to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

By 1964 Romania had effectively withdrawn its forces from participation in the programs established by Marshal Grechko. Bucharest 1) no longer permitted WP manoeuvres on Romanian soil; 2) sent only staff officers and no troops to Warsaw Pact exercises; 3) ceased sending Romanian officers to Soviet military academies; 4) reorganized the party-political system in the Romanian armed forces to conform to the Yugoslav model and thus cut off contacts between the middle and lower levels of Romanian political officers and their Soviet counterparts; 5)
adopted a military doctrine modelled on Yugoslavia's; 6) began to develop a distinct Romanian arsenal made up of weapons produced locally or purchased outside the WP; 7) began a diplomatic policy of searching for security arrangements outside the framework of the WP; and 8) established a system of territorial defence.

The Soviet programme for the integration of elite East European units with those of the Soviet Army is first of all a programme for preventing further defections from the Soviet military alliance system. A second objective of this programme is to integrate East European divisions, regiments and smaller detachments into a combat force made up primarily of Soviet personnel. These two objectives are not merely compatible; each is a prerequisite for the other.

Oleg Penkovskii, the Soviet colonel whose disaffection for the Soviet system prompted him to establish contact with American intelligence services in the late 1950s, offered the following explanation for the pattern of integration in the WP exercises that began in the early 1960s:

- Soviet troop maneuvers will be conducted jointly with the troops of the People's Democracies. During maneuvers the divisions of the satellite countries are included in the T/O of the Soviet Army.

  This is necessary because we still do not trust them; they might turn their guns against the Soviets and run to the West.7

If Penkovskii's explanation is correct, such a pattern of integration, even at the division level, would serve the twin goals of denying independent national military capabilities to East European ground forces and of minimizing the problem of the political reliability of East European personnel.
Levels of Integration in Joint Exercises

In Soviet and WP usage the term "subunit" (podrazdelenie) refers to a platoon, company, battalion or equivalent entity in the national Air Force or Navy. The term "unit" (chast') refers to a ground forces regiment, a naval ship or equivalent Air Force entity. The term "formation" (soedinenie) refers to a brigade or division. For echelons above the division level, the Soviets use the term "superformation" (ob"edinenie). In addition to these general terms, the Soviets also have terms for specific detachments.

WP joint exercises practice combined arms operations. The evidence from Warsaw Pact sources testifies to three patterns of conducting combined arms exercises: 1) The conduct and coordination of distinct national combined arms actions involving the subunits and units of national forces. In such exercises, the level of interaction with other allied forces appears to be the national formation. 2) The conduct and coordination of multinational combined arms exercises in which the level of allied interaction is the national unit and subunit. 3) Exercises which include interaction on the level of national formations and the level of national units and subunits as well.

The evidence below suggests that since the early 1970s the WP has steadily moved towards the conduct of combined arms exercises which integrate national subunits and units into multinational formations. In a 1982 article on joint exercises, two Soviet officers noted,

During the period of the military cooperation of the fraternal armies the practice of conducting joint exercises has extended also to the tactical group, especially in terms of the broadening of the scope of exercises—from the company level to the division level inclusive.

Beginning in 1975, joint regimental tactical exercises have been conducted in the United Armed Forces, including exercises with combat fire.
In the course of exercises in conditions maximally close to those of combat there are worked out practically all the basic questions linked with the preparation and conduct of joint military actions by combat groups made up of coalition personnel...

In addition to suggesting that since 1975 the standard level of the interaction of WP forces is the regiment, Colonels Voloshin and Kolesov note the special problems of combined arms actions involving elements drawn from different national armies:

The organization of (combined arms) interaction in modern circumstances is characterized by marked complexity.

It is even more difficult to resolve this problem when military actions are conducted jointly by several allied armies.

This is the result of the national characteristics of armies, the level of their training, the degree of technical sophistication of equipment, the presence of the language barrier and other factors.

Joint exercises permit the most complete and all-around working out of the question of interactions.

In their discussion of the conduct of joint exercises, Voloshin and Kolesov call attention to the necessity of training the fraternal armies to regroup after completing combat missions: "Exercises, conducted with the drawing in of troops, permit the command to practically work out the questions of the establishment of strike groupings, of parrying of aggression and the destruction of the enemy and the carrying out of regroupings..." They also point out that "the united military command devotes attention...also to the rapid reestablishment of interaction in case it breaks down."
Such concern with the regrouping of allied forces and the reestablishment of interaction among allied forces suggest that even if the preferred WP order of battle is for combined arms actions by distinct national formations, battlefield requirements dictate that the WP command prepare for the necessity of regrouping combined arms formations that are multinational in the composition of their units and subunits. The evidence available from WP sources suggests that although the alliance has practiced for interaction at the level of national formations, the emphasis appears to have shifted steadily to practice for integration at the level of units and subunits.

Joint Exercises of the WP: 1961-1969

The evidence available on the conduct of WP exercises from their inception in 1961 to the reorganization of the WP in 1969 testifies to exercises involving the "subunits" of allied armed forces, of "units" as well, and of "units and formations." In the largest exercises of this period the WP command stressed joint staff work and the interaction of "units and formations" of the allied armies in pursuit of joint missions. This was true of the Quartet manoeuvres of 1963 in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which involved 40,000 personnel from the GDR, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Polish Army and the Czechoslovak Army; the October Storm exercises of 1965 in the GDR, involving 50,000 personnel from the same armies; and the 1966 Vltava exercises in Czechoslovakia, manoeuvres of comparable size involving Czechoslovak, Soviet, GDR, and Hungarian forces.

But the main purpose of the exercises of the 1961-69 period was not so much to integrate the forces of East Europe into a larger force but rather to deny them independent national capabilities and to enhance the Soviet capability for military intervention in each of these states, in particular the three states that lacked Soviet garrisons in 1961: Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. The different histories of
Soviet relations with Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia after 1961 correspond closely to the different decisions taken by these states on continued participation in WP joint exercises.

During this period Bulgaria hosted two major exercises (1964 and 1967), each of which involved naval and airborne landings by Soviet troops plus Soviet-Bulgarian combined arms actions on Bulgarian soil. Romania permitted Soviet troops to manoeuvre in Romania in 1962 and 1963. After two such exercises, at least one of which included naval landings, Bucharest evidently concluded that the mission of Soviet troops sent into Romania was not to prepare for battle with NATO.

The regular conduct of WP exercises in Czechoslovakia enhanced the Soviet capability for rapid and massive occupation of Czechoslovakia while simultaneously preempting the development of an independent Czechoslovak military capability for resisting invasions. Czechoslovakia was the site of joint Czechoslovak-Soviet manoeuvres in September 1962, of joint Czechoslovak-Soviet-GDR manoeuvres in 1964, and of joint Soviet-Czechoslovak exercises in July 1964. In 1966 the Czechoslovak Defence Minister presided over the Vltava manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia, during which allied forces brought, according to Krasnaia Zvezda, enough military equipment into the country to form a column 850 kilometres long, a distance greater than the length of Czechoslovakia from east to west.

In 1967 Marshal I.I. Iakubovskii assumed command of the WP. When an internal crisis developed in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968 Marshal Iakubovskii was able to use the precedent of WP exercises as a device for placing Soviet soldiers on Czechoslovak soil and preparing the allied forces for intervention. In 1968 the only combat that the Czechoslovak People's Army prepared for was combat alongside the Soviet Army, not against it. The new Warsaw Pact C-in-C personally directed the June 1968 Shumava exercises in Czechoslovakia, which served as preparation for the intervention in August.
In 1969 Marshal Iakubovskii presided over a reorganization of
the WP that not only consolidated the previous results of denying the
loyal members of the WP national control over national armed forces but
also pursued the goal of integrating WP forces below the division level,
even in the largest of WP joint exercises.\textsuperscript{21}

**Large-Scale Joint Exercises, 1969-82**

During the period 1969-72 the WP conducted the three largest
exercises it has ever staged. In the period just prior to the signing
of the Helsinki agreements (1975), the WP did not hold large-scale
exercises, but in the late 1970s and early 1980 the alliance once again
began conducting large-scale joint military manoeuvres. In the larger
exercises after 1969, Soviet and East European sources consistently
report the interaction and integration of East European battalions and
regiments with equivalent Soviet detachments.

The Oder-Neisse exercises, involving close to 100,000 troops,
took place in Poland and on the Polish coast from September 21-28, 1969
under the command of Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Polish Minister of
Defence. The Iakubovskii text on the WP reports, in its discussion of
the Oder-Neisse exercises,

> In all stages of the exercise there was extensive
> interaction and mutual assistance among the sub-
> units and units of the allied armed forces in
> carrying out common missions.\textsuperscript{22}

The *Krasnaia Zvezda* coverage of the exercises gave numerous specific
examples of such interaction of units and subunits: an account of a
mission executed by Polish tanks/Czechoslovak motorized rifle
forces/Soviet motorized rifle forces;\textsuperscript{23} an account of an action
conducted jointly by Czechoslovak tanks and East German motorized
infantry;\textsuperscript{24} a description of the interaction of GDR armoured forces/
Czechoslovak airborne forces/Soviet aircraft/Polish aircraft;\textsuperscript{25} an
account of a joint naval landing by "subunits" of Polish and GDR naval infantry; and a description of another joint naval landing which involved Soviet, Polish and GDR naval infantry.

Slightly larger exercises of troops took place in 1970 in the GDR under the command of Heinz Hoffmann, the GDR Defence Minister. These manoeuvres, named "Brotherhood in Arms," involved troops from the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR, as well as the paramilitary forces of the GDR. A discussion of these manoeuvres appeared in a volume on the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) edited by Marshal E. F. Ivanovskii, former commander of the GSFG. This volume noted, "The interaction of the friendly armies [in the 1970 exercise] was carried out not only at the level of troop staffs, but also among units, subunits and even among aircraft and other technical crews." This study discussed a battle waged jointly by subunits of GDR airborne forces with subunits of Bulgarian and Czechoslovak tank forces, and also described a naval landing conducted by "subunits" of Soviet, Polish and German naval infantry supported by "subunits" of airborne forces from each of these three countries. This text also presented an account of the concluding phase of the exercise in which WP soldiers surround and then destroy enemy forces. This action was the work of "units and subunits" of tank forces drawn from the armies of the USSR, Poland, Hungary and East Germany, supported by Bulgarian airborne troops and Czechoslovak infantry landed by helicopter.

In 1972 Czechoslovakia was the site of the Shield 72 manoeuvres, which involved participants from the armies of Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Hungary, the GDR and Poland. According to the Iakubovskii text on the WP, the Shield 72 manoeuvres were comparable in size to the Oder-Neisse and Brotherhood in Arms exercises. A joint Soviet-Czechoslovak study of military cooperation between these two states discussed one of the multinational combined arms actions conducted during Shield 72. According to this account, Hungarian artillery forces began shelling an enemy position after which unspecified Polish and Czechoslovak forces
fought "shoulder to shoulder" while being supported by Soviet motorized infantry. When the "enemy" brought up reinforcements, Soviet tank, artillery and air forces went into action and annihilated the opposing forces.\(^{33}\)

The next large-scale WP exercise following Shield 72 was Shield 76, an exercise involving 35,000 troops in Poland, which was conducted after the conclusion of the Final Act in Helsinki in 1975. A Defence Intelligence Agency report of Shield 76 listed the participating forces of each country, which consisted of regiments, battalions and detachments of similar sizes, some of which were identified by name.\(^{34}\) This account, which analyzed the exercises in terms of actions by forces of the "north" and "south," did not address the question of whether East European forces pursued distinct national missions in the exercises or whether Soviet and East European forces jointly pursued combined arms actions. The Krasnaia Zvezda accounts of the exercises stressed the interaction of allied "units and subunits" in pursuing joint missions.\(^{35}\) One such joint mission was carried out by a Soviet tank battalion under the command of Senior Lt. A. Liubenko and a Polish battalion of unspecified type under the command of T. Raczitski.\(^{36}\)

In the 1980s the WP again began holding large-scale exercises comparable to those of 1969, 1970, 1972 and 1976. The first of these was the 1980 Brotherhood in Arms exercise in East Germany which involved 40,000 troops from the GDR, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. The exercise took place under the command of General Heinz Hoffmann of East Germany. In the opening manoeuvres, in the south-eastern portion of the GDR, motorized rifle and tank forces drawn from the East German and Czechoslovak armies repulsed an enemy attack with the support of allied fighter-bombers and artillery forces from unidentified WP armies.\(^{37}\)

The next day saw the major event of the exercises, a large joint naval landing on the Baltic Coast by Soviet, East German and Polish forces. According to an East German report on the landings, "Soviet
navy pilots demonstrated their ability to hold down the adversary on the coast with concentrated bombing raids while fighter planes of the National People's Army have taken over the protection of the naval units. Soviet and East German helicopters landed assault troops from each army on the beach. Soviet naval hovercraft landed additional troops and heavy equipment. Unidentified craft landed Polish tank forces. The East German coverage concluded, "A second and third wave followed these landing craft of the Polish Navy, the [GDR] People's Navy and the [Soviet] Red Banner Baltic Fleet. More and more units are landing now, the coast has been taken and combat forces are proceeding with their thrust into the interior."

In covering a manoeuvre further south, Krasnaia Zvezda reported that Soviet and Hungarian forces jointly executed a complex attack during which these forces had to regroup after encountering stiff resistance. The WP offensive resumed when a "second echelon" of Soviet and Hungarian forces joined battle. These actions involved the Sukhe Bator Tank regiment of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and a Hungarian battalion (type unspecified). The Soviet Army newspaper observed, "In defence, as in offense, Hungarian and Soviet soldiers act shoulder to shoulder."

Another Krasnaia Zvezda account reported the forced crossing of the Elbe by a large number of "subunits" from the Soviet Army, the East Germany Army and the Czechoslovak Army. In this action an East Germany company under the command of Lt. U. Lehmann came under a counterattack. Soviet artillery and tank forces then came to its rescue: "By joint efforts the soldiers of the fraternal armies defeated the counterattack and continued the offensive."

In September 1982 the WP held the Shield 82 manoeuvres in Bulgaria with the participation of approximately 60,000 personnel drawn from the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. The extensive East-bloc coverage of this exercise frequently described combined arms actions which involved the interaction of units and subunits drawn from different national armies.
In reviewing the exercises, Marshal V.G. Kulikov, who succeeded Marshal Iakubovskii as Warsaw Pact Commander in 1977, declared that large-scale exercises such as Shield 82 permit the WP to resolve the problems of integrating allied forces for the conduct of joint combat missions. Kulikov declared,

In the course of such exercises there is the most effective working out of the questions of the combat coordination and close interaction of the units and subunits of the service branches and special troops of the allied armies.

At the same time the practical actions of the troops permit the checking of the accuracy of our military-theoretical views on the character and means of armed struggle and the feasibility of the standards and calculations which have been made by corresponding staffs in the planning and operations of battle.44

From the official WP accounts of the Shield 82 exercises it appears that what Marshal Kulikov meant by "close interaction" of subunits, units and special forces of the allied armies was not combined arms actions within national armies which coordinated efforts in the exercises but rather combined arms actions within integrated multinational combat formations. The initial phase of the exercises involved joint Soviet-Bulgarian naval landings on the Bulgarian coast, supported by Soviet and Bulgarian aircraft and airborne landings.45

According to Bulgarian coverage of a later action in the exercises:

The attack on the move begins. The tankmen and motorized rifle regiments, the artillerymen and pilots are interacting excellently with the tank subunits of the Soviet Army. With their well-aimed firing and with their rush they clear the way for the tanks of the motorized infantry regiments of the GDR. The front line is approached by the self-propelled artillery as well. The second-line echelons and the reserves come to the fore. The anti-aircraft cover of the offensive is provided by modern and powerful anti-aircraft artillery which advance in a combat line and destroy "the enemy" in movement.
The fighting grows ever more fierce, intense and large-scale. The deployment of the offensive in depth is carried on by the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army, the Polish troops and the Hungarian People's Army...

On the horizon appeared the military-transport planes of the Polish Army. At a precisely-fixed moment they carry out an airborne landing in the rear lines of the "enemy," to assist the front line offensive. The sky grows white with the domes of hundreds of parachutes.

Determined is the forward movement, the deployment and the offensive of the tank troops from the Czechoslovak People's Army. Just as resolute are the actions of the Hungarian People's Army. The detachments of the fraternal armies are acting in perfect coordination.

A Soviet account of another action in the exercises noted,

In the Shield 82 exercises, while attacking in one battle order, allied troops demonstrated outstanding interaction:

Subunits of Bulgarian tankists under the command of Captain G. Karalampiev, of Soviet tankists under Senior Lieutenant A. Bolokhin, and of Soviet motored infantry under Captain P. Markeev, of motorized infantry of the Bulgarian People's Army, and of units of the GDR NVA under Lieutenant T. Vasilev and Lt. Col. Stentzel.

Minimum-Sized Exercises After the Helsinki Agreements

After the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki in 1975 the WP sharply reduced the number of exercises involving more than 25,000 troops. The Helsinki accords require the reporting of exercises involving more than 25,000 troops and also recommends that foreign observers be invited to such exercises. Since 1975 Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia have not reported any national exercises above this level. Unclassified sources do not indicate any
national exercises above the level of 25,000 in the period before 1975. In the case of the Hungarian ground forces, the Commander-in-Chief of the WP has declared that the Hungarian People's Army (HPA) does not conduct independent large-scale exercises. To conduct such exercises, Hungarian units and subunits must interact with Soviet units and subunits. The Kulikov text on the WP, published in 1980, notes in its section on the Hungarian Army,

"The closest friendship ties have been established between the soldiers of the HPA and military personnel of the units and subunits of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces.

..."

"There is not a single major exercise which does not provide for the joint actions of Soviet and Hungarian units and subunits."48

In the late 1970s the WP press began to report regular exercises just above or just below the level of 25,000 troops. In these accounts Soviet and East European military journalists reported the interaction not only of battalions and regiments, as in the large WP exercises, but of companies and even individual personnel.

From February 2-7, 1979, Soviet and Czechoslovak personnel conducted the Friendship 79 exercises, which involved the participation of 26,000 troops.49 Two Soviet journalists reported on the integration of Czechoslovak military personnel into a Soviet artillery battery as part of the plans for the organizational interaction of Czech and Soviet batteries:

"In organizing interaction, the commands of the subunits decided to exchange soldier specialists."

"In each of the batteries there was composite staffing."
The Soviet artillery commander, Sergeant F. Galiamov, gave as his international accounting, Pvts. M. Bibichadze, V. Maksutenko, I. Kuliev, N. Verdev and also soldiers of the Czechoslovak People's Army I. Bartu and Z. Churda.

And then, smiling, he once more went from right to left counting, "A Georgian, a Ukrainian, an Azerbaidzhan, a Czech, a Dagestani and a Czech. And I—I am a Tatar."50

In this account of the interaction among artillery, tank and motorized rifle forces of the two armies the Soviet Army newspaper observed, "The subunits of the fraternal armies efficiently and skillfully carried out their tasks, and skillfully interacted."51 As an example, this article noted that when a Soviet tank battalion was suddenly attacked on its flank, a Czech artillery battery quickly took up a position that allowed it to halt the enemy attack on the Soviet battalion.52 According to the Soviet journalists who reported on this exercise for Krasnaia Zvezda, subunits of the Czechoslovak and Soviet armies had trained together in preparation for the conduct of this joint exercise.53

WP sources provide virtually no information on the Shield 79 manoeuvres of May 12-19, 1979, which involved slightly fewer than 25,000 troops.54 The Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief and the top political leadership of Hungary attended these manoeuvres, which involved Hungarian, Soviet, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian forces.55 The WP did not officially report the Soiuz 81 command staff exercises which covered the territories of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, perhaps because these exercises may have been connected with internal events in Poland. Krasnaia Zvezda, however, did report that the exercises took place and that Marshal Kulikov commanded them.56 Krasnaia Zvezda, perhaps in response to events within Poland, reported only one action during the exercises, a joint bridge-laying effort by subunits of the Polish and Soviet armies. These two subunits evidently had prior experience in such joint projects.57 (The joint bridge-building
exercised is one that frequently appears in Soviet accounts of WP manoeuvres). 58

The WP did report in some detail on the Friendship 82 manoeuvres, which took place in Czechoslovakia from January 25-30, 1982 and involved a total of 25,000 Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Soviet personnel. 59 The Krasnaia Zvezda account of these exercises reported the interaction of a Soviet tank battalion with a Hungarian tank battalion. It also reported that Soviet and Czechoslovak helicopter crews conducted a joint action with Soviet and Czechoslovak tank and motorized infantry forces of unspecific size. According to the Soviet Army newspaper,

...interaction was evident at all stages of the exercises.

When a difficult situation befell one of the participating detachments, Soviet and Hungarian subunits paralyzed the actions of the enemy and a Czechoslovak tank battalion, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Miroslav Yurenka, broke away from the rear to secure a vantage point.

In another situation a Soviet battalion of self-propelled howitzers gave fire support to Hungarian and Soviet tankists and motorized infantry. And there were many such examples. 60

The Friendship 82 manoeuvres, involving less than 25,000 troops, took place in Poland from March 13-20, 1982 with the participation of Polish, Soviet and East German personnel. According to an FBIS report of Warsaw television coverage of the exercises, the following actions took place:

Armored and mechanized subunits from the Soviet Army, the GDR National Peoples Army and the Polish Army set out on the offensive.

Another stage in the exercise was the forced crossing of a deep-water obstacle by using special means and pontoon bridges.
This difficult task fell to the lot of soldiers from units of the Polish Army who were supported, among others, by the artillery of the GDR National Peoples Army.

Meanwhile, Soviet soldiers were carrying out a helicopter landing operation in the rear of the opponent.61

FBIS also reported an interview with Major Mirek Matysek of the Polish Army during the exercises. Major Matysek specifically pointed out the incorporation of foreign "subunits" inside the "units" of another national army: "...some of our subunits -- platoons -- have been included in both German and Soviet Army units and their units have been included in ours."62

Although Major Matysek pointed out that it was a novelty to place foreign platoons inside other national units, this was not a unique instance of WP integration of ground forces personnel. An article written by Krasnaia Zvezda correspondents in 1982 praised the performance of a multinational tank battalion commanded by Captain V. Krott of the Soviet Army. This battalion consisted of "a Soviet tank company commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Artem'ev, a Polish tank company commanded by Lieutenant J. Dolinsky, and a Czechoslovak tank company commanded by Second Lieutenant M. Faltis."63 This battalion evidently performed in a WP joint exercise because its actions were observed by no less a figure than Marshal Kulikov.64 Although the WP infrequently reports the transfer of command authority over a national unit or subunit to another army, such transfers may be regularly practiced in joint manoeuvres by the East German NVA and the GSFG. Two East German officers reported in 1978 in a Soviet publication that in annual joint staff and troop exercises of the NVA and GSFG, "Great attention is devoted to the exchange of operational groups of signals personnel and signals equipment and also to the transfer of control over units in the course of the exercises to the command of the
corresponding fraternal army."  

Low-Level Joint Exercises and Joint Training Programs

The interaction and integration of companies, battalions and regiments reported in large and medium-sized joint exercises may be based on the conduct of regular joint exercises of individual subunits and units and even of joint training programs for allied personnel. In a 1970 interview with Krasnaia Zvezda a Czechoslovak officer briefly discussed the participation of "subunits" of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Central Group of Soviet Forces in "a regular tactical exercise." He added, "Frequently the subunits of the two friendly armies act in joint combat actions, constituting a monolithic striking force."  

A 1982 article in Krasnaia Zvezda noted that the personnel of a Czechoslovak battalion and a Soviet battalion "constantly exchange experience and participate in joint tactical training." This article also pointed out that two of the companies of the Soviet battalion were stationed in a Czechoslovak barracks for training and that a Czechoslovak company had been deployed inside a Soviet "unit."  

In a 1980 article, the Chief of the Political Administration of the Central Group of Forces elaborated on such joint Soviet-Czechoslovak training programs. Major General Goglev explained,

According to a previously-agreed-upon plan, Soviet friends will be visited by, say, a company or battery of Czechoslovak soldiers and our equivalent subunit is sent to them.

The hosts and guests together participate in tactical training, fire training, operation of combat vehicles, defence from mass destruction weapons, physical training and other disciplines.

In tactical training there is a competition among Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers for outstanding fulfillment of combat training tasks and for surpassing established norms.

Joint training permits the soldiers to have a closer knowledge of each other, to establish close personal contacts and friendly ties, and
allows commanders and political workers to acquaint themselves better with the methodology of combat and political training, of ideological-political work and the organization of socialist competition.

A 1981 article devoted to Soviet-East German military cooperation described a joint tactical manoeuvre by a Soviet tank battalion under Major Iu. Kaptsov and an unidentified motorized rifle "subunit" of the East German Army under the command of Lt. Col. M. Slotgauer. This article then noted a similar joint action which involved a Major of the East German Army. This Major reported, "our subunit maintains close ties with one of the battalions of the GSFG. We conduct joint exercises in the field with this battalion."

In a 1981 article on joint tactical exercises of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces and Polish troops, Krasnaia Zvezda noted that "an effective form of the further strengthening of combat brotherhood is the conduct of joint training activities and joint exercises." This article documented the preparation and conduct of a joint training program carried out by a Polish tank company and a Soviet tank company. The commander of the Soviet company, Captain Viacheslav Tarasov, declared,

Our subunits participate in joint camp meetings, which have become an important means of raising the skills of soldiers and of strengthening combat brotherhood.

The meetings are completed in a joint exercise with combat fire.

Moreover, mixed [Polish-Soviet] teams have been formed. Let's say the commander of the tank is a Pole -- the driver will be Soviet or vice-versa. All the mixed teams have received evaluations of "good" and "outstanding."

A 1982 Krasnaia Zvezda article also took note of the training of mixed Soviet-Polish tank crews. These crews then participated in a tactical training exercise involving both mixed crews, Soviet and Polish
tank squads and Soviet and Polish tank companies. All these elements interacted with each other under the command of a Soviet tank battalion commander, Guards Captain Alexander Filiaev. Krasnaia Zvezda described this training exercise as "a new step forward in the working out of the questions of interaction and of the improvement of the combat skills of Soviet and Polish soldiers." 

A Polish military journal also reported in August 1982 on the program of joint training and joint exercises of subunits of Polish and Soviet forces: "Tactical exercises combined with live firing concluded the joint field training of Polish and Soviet tank and howitzer subunits." 

There is even some evidence that joint training exercises are directed at preparing for the integration of WP forces not just on a Soviet-East European basis but on other bilateral and trilateral bases. The Polish military press reported in March of 1976,

Not many months have passed since the time when Polish, Soviet and East German companies trained in joint field formations.

And again we meet comrades in arms from the Warsaw Pact at a training range of the Silesian Military District.

This time soldiers from a unit of the 10th [Polish] Armored Division and from sub-units of the Czechoslovak People's Army are living and training in adjoining encampments.

In a series of short articles devoted to joint training programs of Soviet and East European forces during 1979, Krasnaia Zvezda noted:

1) a joint training competition between a Soviet air force technical support battalion and a rear services "subunit" of the East German Army; 2) joint training and joint political activities by a Soviet motorized rifle company and a unidentified Polish "subunit"; 3) a joint reconnaissance mission performed by the personnel of two Soviet and Hungarian companies with a history of "long-term friendship"; and 4) a
Warsaw Pact Joint Exercises: Conclusions

Soviet and East European accounts of joint WP exercises, particularly accounts since 1969, stress the interaction of allied subunits and units even in the largest of the multilateral exercises. WP accounts of the joint exercises never report that individual national forces execute distinct national missions. These reports suggest that the WP command is training elite East European and Soviet subunits and units to function in multinational divisions and corps in which any given East European detachment will be absorbed into a greater socialist military force made up mainly of Soviet personnel and commanded by Soviet officers.

It is impossible to determine whether the official accounts of the joint exercises give a true picture of the WP order of battle. Nor are these accounts sufficiently informative to answer the following questions:

1. What proportion of Soviet units stationed in East Europe and the western military districts of the USSR train and exercise for such integration?

2. What proportion of East European units train and exercise for such integration?

3. Is the real goal of the exercise not the genuine integration of elite East European units with Soviet forces but rather the fragmentation of East European ground forces so that these forces will be organizationally incapable of challenging Soviet military hegemony in East Europe?

However, it is possible to give tentative answers to an additional question relevant to an examination of the apparent pattern
of the integration of Soviet and East European military forces in joint exercises:

Is there any evidence of independent East European military exercises above the division level?

Since the signing of the Helsinki agreement in 1975, each East European state has been legally obligated to report any military exercises on national soil which involve 25,000 or more personnel. All East European reports since 1975 of exercises above this level have been reports of multinational exercises. Hungary has officially reported exercises (two in 1976 and one in 1980) below the level of 25,000 but each of these has been conducted with Soviet troops. In addition, the smaller exercises reported by the WP press have invariably been joint exercises rather than purely national manoeuvres. However, the lack of evidence for the conduct of independent military manoeuvres by East European states could be explained by:

1. constraints or large-scale national exercises in East Europe because of confined geographical areas and high population densities;
2. the possibility that in joint WP exercises East European commanders and staffs use subunits and units as substitutes for brigades, divisions and corps;
3. the possibility that exposure to command and staff work in large-scale multinational combined arms exercises prepares East European staffs and commanders for the conduct of independent actions at the level of divisions and corps; this exposure could easily be supplemented by national simulations without troops;
4. the possibility that the official emphasis on interaction of units and subunits is intended only as a device to stimulate attitudes of loyalty and comradeship which will be necessary for the political reliability of East European divisions and corps. The exercises may in fact practice combined arms actions by distinct national formations in addition to multinational combined arms actions, by national units and subunits. Such possibilities certainly exist. There is, however, no
unclassified evidence which suggests that these possibilities are more than theoretical. Western studies of East European armies have simply assumed that these armies are trained to fight as distinct national forces. But not one of these studies offers evidence of national military exercises large enough to serve as preparations for the execution of distinct national missions. In his discussions of national training and exercise programs, John Lewis does note that national military exercises culminate in joint military manoeuvres with the Soviet Army.

On the basis of the available evidence, the answer is "no" to the question of whether East European ground forces conduct independent exercises above the division level. The question of whether East European commands have acquired such capabilities remains open, but the limited evidence available suggests that the more visible plan of mobilization is that of integration with Soviet forces at the division level and below.

Conclusion

The available evidence on the conduct of joint WP exercises is not extensive enough to draw firm conclusions about the ultimate objectives of the Warsaw Pact program for multinational military manoeuvres. However, the evidence does suggest several tentative conclusions: 1) the joint exercises enhance Soviet capabilities for military interventions in East Europe; 2) the joint exercises limit -- and perhaps eliminate -- East European national capabilities for combined arms actions above the division level; 3) the joint exercises may serve as devices for a) the fragmentation of East European forces into units and subunits, and b) the regrouping of "interoperable" East European units and subunits into a greater socialist army dominated by Soviet forces.

Such a multinational force clearly generates immense difficulties in command, control, communications and logistics. But
such an army also circumvents the problem of the political reliability of various national armies, each with independent military capabilities. In the long run, the Soviets may find it easier to work out the technical difficulties of command, control, communication and logistics in a multinational WP army than to cultivate political reliability in the national armies of East Europe.
Western observers have noted, very briefly, the continuum of national and WP exercises, though they generally have not attached any special significance to this continuum. See the following passages on national and WP exercises for each of the five loyal members of the WP in William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine and Strategy (n.p.: Institute for Policy Analysis/McGraw Hill, 1982).

Bulgaria (p. 137): "Joint maneuvers, despite small Bulgarian participation, dictate standard procedures and tactics. The annual training cycle culminates in the autumn with the largest of the year's maneuvers. Although these exercises are smaller in scale than those held annually in the Northern Tier, visiting Soviet or Romanian forces occasionally participate in them."

Czechoslovakia (p. 145): "Training exercises regularly include large national combined arms maneuvers and multi-national Warsaw Pact exercises ... Once assigned to a permanent unit, the soldier continues to develop military skills and participates in small unit training. Exercises become progressively larger until the training cycle culminates in participation in multinational maneuvers. Training in the Czechoslovak armed forces, like that throughout the Warsaw Pact, is patterned after the Soviet model."

East Germany (p. 177): "Training progresses from the basic to advanced individual training in sections or crews and then to Platoons. Training in companies, battalions and regiments, emphasizing combined arms operations, is the longest and most important phase of training. Out of each half year of training, two or three months are dedicated to training in companies, battalions and regiments. Divisional and military-region level exercises are also carried out during this phase. The main stress during this training phase is on actual wartime conditions. The annual training cycle culminates with NVA (East German Army) participation in large-scale Warsaw Pact maneuvers."

Hungary (p. 188): "Training in the Hungarian People's Army is geared to the Soviet model for several reasons. All major items of equipment are Soviet-produced and the standardization of tactical doctrine throughout the Warsaw Pact has required standardization of training procedures among the alliance members to insure that all member forces understand common orders and can respond to them in a common manner. In addition, standardized training programs bring each member force to maximum combat readiness at the same season of the year and prepare it for participation in annual joint exercises, usually held in late summer or early autumn."
Poland (p. 205): "Until the mid 1960s, training manuals were mere translations of Soviet manuals. In the late 1960s, training methods were streamlined and new manuals of Polish origin were published to adapt to new equipment and changes in its use and maintenance. Since the bulk of military equipment employed by Polish forces is of Soviet origin, however, basic training practices and tactical doctrine must still conform to the Soviet model. Conscripts are trained in the care and use of small arms, crew-serviced weapons and heavy equipment and they drill with small groups during the winter. Field training and participation in the company, battalion and regimental exercises are carried out during the summer, with the annual training cycle culminating in multi-national Warsaw Pact exercises held in early autumn."

In his monograph, The East German Army (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980) Thomas M. Forster examines briefly the relationship between national and WP exercises in the East German Army. See p. 258: "Training in companies, battalions and regiments -- roughly formation training in the Western sense -- is the longest and most important training phase, occupying two to three months in each training half-year. It includes the divisional exercises and maneuvers at Military District level which round off each half-year and are conducted together with Soviet troops. Afterwards the soldiers return to their own company or battery training." The sections below will draw on Soviet and East European sources to document in greater detail the integration of national and WP programs for ground forces training and exercises.

2 See Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981), Chapters 5, 7, 8. See also sections below of this paper.

3 John M. Collins, US-Soviet Military Balance (n.p.: McGraw/Hill, 1980), pp. 545-547, gives these figures on Category I divisions for East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. He does not give a breakdown on Bulgarian and Hungarian divisions. Lewis, in The Warsaw Pact, writes that the six Hungarian divisions are probably all Category II (above 70 percent of full strength) (p. 193). He writes that five of the Bulgarian motorized rifle divisions are at Category I strength while an additional three are at skeletal strength (p. 133). See also The Military Balance (1983-84), pp. 20-23.

4 See sections below and Jones, Soviet Influence, Chapter 7.

5 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
For a discussion of these systems see Jones, *Soviet Influence*, pp. 79-94.


Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 62.

Ibid., p. 63.


Ibid., for mention of "troop units" of the East German, Polish and Soviet armies during the exercises in Poland of October 1-9, 1962.

I.M. Tretiak et al., eds, *Krasnoznammenyi Belorusskii voennyi okrug* (Minsk: Izdatel'stvo 'Belarus,' 1973), p. 501, identifies a Soviet-Polish exercise during the summer of 1967 which involved the Irkutsk-Pinsk Division of the Belorussian Military District and "soldiers of a Polish formation." The text adds, "Formations and units of the Belorussian Military District and the Polish Army have more than once taken part in joint exercises."

Iakubovskii, *Boevoe sodruzhestvo*, p. 152.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 153.


For a discussion of this reorganization see Jones, Soviet Influence, Chapter 5. See also the remarks by Colonel Professor Reinhard Bruehl, Director of the GDR Institute for Military History, in "Brotherhood in Arms of the Fraternal Armies -- Reliable Guarantor of Socialism and Peace," Horizont Vol. 9., No. 9, 1976, translated in JPRS 67020, 24 March 1976, p. 6: "Consonant with the resolutions adopted in 1969 by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact and as an element in the inevitable historical process of consolidation and intensification of unity, solidarity and all-round cooperation among the socialist countries, the fraternal relations among the armies have achieved a qualitatively new level in recent years. This is characterized by increasingly planned and complex coordination, by the consistent orientation of cooperation in the improvement of combat strength and readiness of the united armed forces, and by the increasing mass nature of fraternal relations in all fields of military life."

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 155.


Ibid.


Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 155.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 156.

P.A. Zhilin (USSR), E. Gefurt (Czechoslovakia), Na vechnye vremena


39 Ibid., p. AA-2.


41 Ibid.


43 Ibid.


45 For accounts of these actions see Rabotnichesko Delo, October 1, 1982, translated in FBIS--Eastern Europe, October 6, 1982, p. AA-6, and "Vzaimodeistvie -- kliuch k pobede," Krasnaia Zvezda, October 1, 1982, p. 1.


51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
64 Ibid.


68 Ibid.

69 Major General M. Goglev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Central Group of Forces, "V dukhe bratskoi druzhby," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil May 1980, No. 9.


78 See endnote number 1.
The members of the Warsaw Pact all place a great emphasis on questions of indoctrination and morale building. Considered to be of vital importance not only for the military but for the whole society, the process begins at the earliest possible age and continues right through military service, and a period in the reserves, until retirement. In terms of indoctrination there is a symbiotic relationship between the armed forces and society. The military strategic doctrine sees the armed forces as the "school of the nation," and society prepares its children first and foremost for military service. Reservists are kept in a state of high military preparedness, and martial virtues, skills and attitudes are fostered among all citizens. All this is done in the name of the "defence of socialism" and the promotion of peace, but in fact it unequivocally prepares the citizens for war.

The result has been a militarized society. The model has been provided by the Soviet Union and it has been imitated by other Pact members with varying degrees of enthusiasm and success: Hungary appears least militarized, while in some aspects the GDR has exceeded the master. One commentator has noted that the Soviet Union not only has a war machine, but that "it is a war machine." Another has observed that in the GDR socialization has created "not just a militarized society but... militarized individuals," a statement which effectively describes a paradigm that Soviet and East European leaders are attempting to bring into life.
Political-military education begins in kindergarten and continues throughout the school years. It is partly the responsibility of the school but primarily of youth organizations, and the whole endeavour is coordinated by local party committees. Elementary school children in the Soviet Union are organized in the "Octobrists" organization known popularly as "Ilich's (Lenin's) Grandchildren"; at the age of nine they join "The Young Pioneers" where they stay until they are fourteen, when they become eligible for the Young Communist League (the Komsomol), designed for the 14 to 28 age group. The Komsomol, which has been the primary conduit for the recruitment of party members, is of special importance in the political indoctrination of the armed forces, because it is responsible for working with the young recruits (drafted at 18 or 19), under the party's direction.

Octobrists and Pioneers receive their first basic indoctrination in the "life and ideals" of Lenin and in "socialist morality." They are organized in military fashion; each group has a leader, and all members wear uniforms and receive insignia of rank and badges of achievement. They go to "Zarnitsa" summer field exercises and attend summer camps where they receive rudimentary military and civil defence instruction, which includes rifle training and learning how to throw a grenade. They are also introduced to the ideas of internationalist brotherhood and learn about the horrors of capitalism and imperialism as well as the heroism of the Great October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War. The Komsomol is the party's right hand, and membership in the organization is still a precondition for advancement for ambitious youths. In 1983 the membership of the Komsomol included over 42 million young people; i.e., about 60 per cent of the 14 to 28 age group in the Soviet Union. Equivalent organizations exist in other member countries of the Pact, although the pattern in many of them (Poland, for example) is much less neat and membership in comparative terms is much smaller.

Pre-induction training is considered to be of the utmost importance as a part of the overall youth socialization effort. It is
also required to compensate for a relatively short period of service: in the Soviet Union the time of service was reduced in 1968 from 3 to 2 years in the army and the air force (retaining 3 years in the navy). Most Pact members follow suit, with some variations.\(^5\) While youth organizations continue to participate in pre-induction training the main responsibility rests with special mass paramilitary organizations such as DOSAAF (The Voluntary Organization for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy) in the Soviet Union, and its equivalents in Eastern Europe: The League for National Defence (LOK, Poland), The Sport and Technology Society (GST, GDR), The Association for Cooperation with the Army (Svazarm, Czechoslovakia), The Voluntary Organization for Cooperation in National Defence (Bulgaria) and the Sport Association for National Defence (Hungary). In Romania, political military education outside the service is carried out jointly by the Union of Communist Youth and by the Patriotic Guards of the territorial defence system.

Pre-induction training is supposed to include the entire 14 to 18 age group, but this has not always been feasible. Even in the Soviet Union, where DOSAAF membership in 1983 was reported to include 103 million young people (or more than one-third of the population)\(^6\) shortcomings in its work are widely discussed in the military press. Its performance is seen as being uneven at best, and frequently not very effective. In the GDR the indoctrination system seems to be extremely well organized. Extensive preschool and school activities are followed by the almost total inclusion of the pre-induction group in joint activities sponsored by the official youth organization (Freie Deutsche Jugend -- FDJ) and the GST; after-service indoctrination is maintained by Workers' Combat groups and Reservist Collectives. Nevertheless, and due undoubtedly to the impact of West Germany next door, the response of East Germans to this indoctrination has been poor. Since 1978, for example, the Lutheran Church has voiced objections to militarization and has supported conscientious objectors.\(^7\) Other Warsaw Pact members do not seem to share the East German ambitions of total coverage. In
Poland the numbers reached by LOK are small (200,000 in 1983),\(^8\) youth organizations have been fragmented since the mid-seventies, and Solidarity's 10 million members (most of them young) testified to the failure of indoctrination in this country. In Czechoslovakia the numbers and performance of Svazarm in the late seventies were still behind the same in 1968, and in Hungary pre-induction socialization efforts were judged to be of lower quality than in the rest of the bloc.\(^9\)

In-service political education is run by the military political administration in each of the integrated armed forces. These are not only little replicas of the Soviet model but work in close collaboration with the Soviet Military—Political Administration (MPA) under the overall guidance of its head, General Epishev.\(^10\) The perception of the SAF's dual role— that of a professional fighting force and of a school of ideological socialization— also exists in the "fraternal" armies, but the two aims are not necessarily complementary or mutually reinforcing. The Soviet pattern aims at the virtual saturation of the soldiers' "free time" with political messages, and this is deeply resented. Responsibility for this effort is shared by the MPA and the party as well as Komsomol organizations; propaganda work involves the media (service and civilian) as well as orchestrated contacts with the population, lectures, seminars, study groups, ceremonial rituals connected with the service, evenings of entertainment, etc.

In the East European armies the pattern is the same, but the scale is generally smaller and performance varies from good to indifferent. In the East German Army (the NVA), officers devote 8 hours and NCO's 4 hours a week to political indoctrination activities and are obliged to take examinations twice and once a year, respectively; NVA units are rated by the level of their political preparedness. In the Hungarian Army, on the other hand, more attention is paid to material incentives than to indoctrination efforts. The responsibility for political education in the Romanian Army is shared by commanders, the
military councils, the Higher Political Council (similar to the MPA), and local party committees.

The Themes

The content of the system of military-political education in the socialist armies is as closely synchronized as is its institutional framework. Identical themes are developed but with modifications to suit particular circumstances. Only Romania is an exception in terms of thematic content, for there the national patriotic theme dominates and the defence of national frontiers takes precedence over the "defence of socialism" in its external and intra-bloc aspects.

Marxism-Leninism provides the basic socialization framework for society at large and for the armed forces. But for military purposes the basic themes are sharpened and refined in order to enhance morale and combat effectiveness, and to build up the soldiers' loyalty and commitment to the socialist Motherland. A positive, indeed a happy picture of "socialist" society and of "communist construction" is one basic theme. Another is the harmonious relationship between members of the "Soviet family of nations" and between "fraternal" states of the "socialist community," the achievements of which make it a "sacred duty" of every citizen to defend the "gains of socialism" against the "imperialistic menace." But in terms of national attitudes three important themes dominate: INTERNATIONALISM and, for the military, its basic core concepts of "Brotherhood in Arms" (bratstvo oruzhiia) and "Combat Friendship" (boevoe sodruzhestvo); PATRIOTISM; and the ENEMY.

The first two themes are closely intertwined and march in tandem, reflecting the dualism inherent in the system: its avowed class (hence socialist and internationalist) nature, but also the still very important question of national identity (the national form). In dialectical terms the two themes are considered to be complementary. In actuality they are in varying degrees conflictual, the ascendancy of one over the other being dictated by the specific conditions in each
country. It is clear in the case of all modern armies that patriotism has been very effective in inspiring soldiers' loyalty by calling on affective and emotional symbolism. An appeal to class as the focus of devotion carries few emotional overtones, and demands intellectual sophistication uncommon (and unwanted) among soldiers. Thus the class-related aspects of indoctrination rely on heavy conditioning, commencing in childhood, and on association with events derived from recent and emotionally charged experience. Memories of the Revolution, of the Civil War, and of WW II are relevant in the Soviet Union, and the struggle against Nazi Germany together with the Red Army is relevant in some of the East European countries, where recent struggles against domestic "oppressors" are also important.

**Internationalism**

For legitimation purposes the multiethnic SAF have as much of a need to develop loyalty to INTERNATIONALISM (which transcends particular ethnic loyalties) as do the multinational forces of the Pact searching for a supranational focus of allegiance. Internationalism is also invaluable for the legitimation of the "ties of a new type" which bind the latter to the Soviet Union and are being extended to the Third World. In the Soviet Armed Forces the code words for the internationalist theme are "Proletarian Internationalism" and "Friendship of the Peoples." "Proletarian Internationalism" describes the class-based unity of interests which applies in the Soviet Union, in the Pact, and between representatives of the "oppressed" world-wide. For Pact members specifically, "Socialist Internationalism" is a substitute. It indicates a historically higher level of relationship: that between socialist states, not merely movements or parties. Leadership by the Soviet Union is an integral part of the definition. "Friendship of the Peoples" and another common term, the "Soviet Family of Nations," denote the class-based unity of the Soviet peoples. The former may assume a broader meaning in East European armies, but there this idea is most commonly expressed by the slogans "Brotherhood in
Arms" and "Combat Friendship."

The heroic dimensions of the Great October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War are standard fare in the socialization of Soviet soldiers into the image of internationalism in wartime; the list of heroes whose deeds are praised and names are remembered includes soldiers of all Soviet nationalities. It is of interest to note that although the heroism of non-Russians is praised as lavishly as that of the Russians, the sequence of heroes, so to speak (and the numbers rewarded), always starts with Russians, followed by Ukrainians and Belorussians, and ends with Caucasians and Central Asians. The participation of the latter in the Great Patriotic War is warmly acknowledged. But nowhere can one find an explicit acknowledgement that non-Russians—in actual fact soldiers from the Caucasus republics and Central Asia—constituted almost one half of the troops defending the crucial Caucasus and Stalingrad fronts in 1942. Their contribution was a vital factor in the battles along these two fronts which proved to be the turning point of the war and the key to victory. The peacetime equivalent of "Brotherhood in Arms" has been the image of a military unit as one "friendly multinational family" where Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Uzbeks, Georgians and others happily soldier together.

Similar themes, adjusted locally, appear in East European military propaganda; revolutionary exploits are celebrated and wartime struggles by partisans and soldiers against the "fascist invaders" "arm in arm" with Soviet comrades are lovingly depicted. Such images are of course totally inappropriate in the case of East Germany or ex-Axis allies such as Hungary or Bulgaria, so the focus there shifts to the heroism of resistance members fighting the Nazis and local "fascists" and, at war's end, participating in the Red Army's victorious advance. Peacetime brotherhood is extolled in depictions of the construction of a "new socialist society" with the assistance of "fraternal parties" and in "vigilantly guarding" the "gains of socialism" with the "fraternal" armies. The highest pitch is reached periodically in coordinated
political education campaigns (in which the local population is involved) which accompany bilateral and multilateral military manoeuvres.

The special role of the Russians (in the domestic context) and of the USSR (in the bloc context) forms a major leitmotif in the internationalism theme, and particularly in the theme of "Friendship of the Peoples" and "Brotherhood in Arms" respectively. In Soviet military indoctrination the Russian "Elder Brother" is credited with the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, with bringing its benefits to the non-Russians, and with assisting the latter in the construction of a better society, benefits they would not have been able to enjoy otherwise. In East European military indoctrination the equivalent has been the Soviet "friend" who "liberated" the East Europeans from "fascist oppressors" opened for them the "road to socialism," assisted them in building it, and now stands on guard against "imperialist" encroachments.

In East European indoctrination in general, the theme is developed as follows: The Russians and the "best" representatives of many other nations (including the one at which the indoctrination campaign is directed) all fought together in the Great October Revolution, the victory of which opened up a glorious future for the participants and for all mankind. At this time the brotherhood of these nations was first cemented in blood, and it was again confirmed in the common struggle against fascism which was won only because of enormous sacrifices by the Soviet Armed Forces and the Soviet people; the bloc's historiographies virtually ignore any input into the victory by the Western allies and by whatever non-communist forces might have been fighting the Nazis locally in World War II. The Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War liberated the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, etc. from the "fascist yoke," in both of its variants (the German Nazis and domestic oppressors). Finally, the USSR and the SAF are there to safeguard and to defend the hard-won socialist victory against the imperialist aggressors and domestic counterrevolutionaries, always
"shoulder-to-shoulder" with their East European comrades.

The relevance of the Great October Revolution is illustrated in one of Marshal Grechko's comments as he praised the participation of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment of Polish volunteers fighting in the Civil War in 1918:

It is precisely from this time (the Great October Revolution) that spring the sources of the brotherhood of the peoples of the socialist countries and of combat cooperation among their armies.14

A Polish military source, in an article (written in the troublesome year of 1981) commemorating the 36th Anniversary of the Polish-Soviet Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation, quotes Poland's then First Party Secretary, Stanislaw Kania, paying tribute to the Soviet Armed Forces which "liberated Poland from Hitlerite occupation" and to the USSR, which assisted Poland in the recovery of its ancient Western lands and gave invaluable assistance in the reconstruction of the ruined country. According to Kania it is the USSR's "might and flowering" which is "the best guarantee of Poland's security and economic development."15

The Soviet Union and Soviet Armed Forces are not only the East Europeans' best friends and altruistic benefactors, but also their teachers. An East German example gives the flavour of the latter theme in its discussion of the presumed attitude of the East German People's Army (NVA) to the SAF:

The attitude of officers, NCO's, and other ranks and their determination to learn from the Soviet Army in all respects contributed significantly to the emergence of the NVA in the late fifties as, in essence, a modern socialist coalition army.16

The way in which Soviet military personnel exercise their teacher's role is illustrated by another East German source which cites a NVA Military
Political Administration chief describing the periodic visits by teachers and students of the Frunze Naval Academy in Leningrad to naval academies in the GDR and Poland as a long-standing practice, designed to introduce the best study methods of Soviet officer candidates into their (East European academies') own training program, under the motto "Being Like Them"...17

Patriotism

But the sterile nature of appeals to class loyalties means that a premium is placed on PATRIOTISM as the key theme in indoctrination. This was first demonstrated by the massive shift of emphasis to patriotic slogans and to the need of defending the "motherland" in the wake of the disastrous retreat of Soviet forces under the Nazi onslaught in 1941. The very name for World War II in the Soviet lexicon, "The Great Patriotic War," testifies to this phenomenon, and "Soviet Patriotism" has become a key theme. While emphasizing that the Motherland is multi-national, the content of the "Soviet Patriotism" theme has depended very heavily on Russian historical and cultural inputs and on the past exploits of Russian (Imperial) armies against the Mongols and Chinese, Turks, Swedes, French, (reactionary) Poles, and Japanese. Russian Imperial generals stand high on the Soviet military pantheon.

The reliance on nationalism and patriotic indoctrination in the East European armies is less equivocal and quite unabashed, especially in Poland, where the appeal to heroic pre-communist military traditions is quite explicit in its symbolism in order to tap a ready emotional response and deep-seated national sentiments. But these appeals are skillfully manipulated to include "internationalist" elements in order to make the nationalist alliance palatable if not desirable and to avoid the pitfalls of Russophobia, which was endemic in the traditional East European military ethos except in the cases of Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria.

Because of East Germany's special problem in representing only a part of the German nation, military indoctrination in the NVA leans more heavily on the class than on the nationalist aspect of the new society. In the mid-seventies, as one observer has noted, there was a tendency to put the "fatherland" in second place after "internationalism." But even so, there are certain nationalistic overtones and throwbacks to Prussian traditions. East Germany is depicted as the nucleus of the German socialist nation, which implies the future "liberation" of the other (capitalist) part and reunification. National symbolism includes historical military traditions of a "progressive" nature, inclusive of the rehabilitation of selected Prussian military leaders.

The dialectics of internationalism/nationalism are expressed in a dual slogan: the defence of the socialist motherland is "a patriotic duty," whereas the defence of the socialist community -- all the Pact members -- is an "internationalist duty." But the dialectics tend to break down in the socialization message when the Russian/Soviet content of the internationalist theme clashes with strongly anti-Russian national historical traditions and sentiments. This has been a problem in the socialization of the Balts (and some other groups) in the USSR. In the bloc it has affected the Poles and Hungarians in particular and, given recent history, the Czechoslovaks as well. In Romania strong anti-Russian sentiments proved to be an asset after Romanian nationalism emerged as the touchstone of national loyalty.

Another problem has been that the internationalist message frequently stands in sharp contrast to reality, making its uncritical absorption by youth in and out of service difficult. The better-educated, nationally-conscious elements in the military may either knowingly reject it or respond with cynicism or alienation; for more poorly-educated rural conscripts it may be so irrelevant that it becomes meaningless despite the dutiful mouthings of the appropriate slogans. Its efficacy, therefore, for legitimation purposes seems to be marginal,
as the continuous emphasis and reliance on patriotism in the indoctrination message seems to indicate. It should be remembered, nevertheless, that the Soviet Army does have certain genuine internationalist revolutionary traditions and a strong sense of pride in past victories, in the country's military might, in the leading role it plays in the bloc and its military alliances, and in its status as a superpower with global interests and responsibilities. In addition, for the East European military leaders the slogan of "brotherhood in arms" may seem to be less empty than for their conscript manpower and junior cadre, and may carry more meaningful personal connotations.

But the evidence which is available from defectors indicates that cynicism and opportunism, combined with ambition, are the dominant characteristics of the East European professional military cadre. In the early period of communist rule there were undoubtedly true believers among them, as there were among party leaders who identified with the internationalist message and looked forward to the construction of a new society. But after more than 35 years of failure and mismanagement few if any such believers are left. As disillusionment set in and the model à la Russe proved to be a disaster, many of the believers were transformed into reformers and dissidents and led the search for a new meaning for socialism within the context of national history and culture. For the military rank and file and the junior cadre nationalism is still the fountainhead of political loyalties.

The emphasis on patriotism and national military traditions (albeit those of a "progressive" rather than of a "reactionary" character) has therefore been of crucial importance in East European military socialization. There is a parallel here to the official historiographies of the major nations of the USSR and, in military conditioning, to the emphasis on national culture aspects of agitprop work among non-Russian national-territorial formations in World War II. Patriotic themes and throwbacks to military traditions have played the role of a bridge, the function of which is to span the
historical gap -- the discontinuity -- between the new "socialist armies" (and their "internationalist" essence) and the country's national ethos. Patriotic socialization covers up and serves to camouflage the organic connection between the "national" armies and the SAF which, to most people in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, still appears as an occupation army.

In the East European military establishments "national form" has been used to the utmost and has proved effective, for the people, and the soldiers who serve, can readily identify with the national flag and insignia, national ranks and uniforms, patriotic songs and national heroes. In popular perceptions this visible form overshadows the actual Soviet-related substance, which is elusive and which, at any rate, the public ignores and does not want to confront if at all possible. A masterful summation of the role and the importance of national and martial trappings for the communist regime appeared in an essay published by a prominent Polish dissident literary figure, Kazimierz Brandys:

What bothers me most is that today in Poland sarmatyzm [the nobility's code of martial virtues] has been licenced, that it is obviously needed by someone, for some reasons, and that it has been approved from outside. It is not only the sword and the breastplate, but also the new military paraphernalia: September (1939) battles, helmets of the revolts, and forest camps ...and anti-Semitism. Sometimes I am very much afraid that very soon all of this would become a Polish folklore, an equivalent of a leszinka [Caucasian dance]: and our virile nationalists will catch on too late and without batting an eyelash, when they, and the rest of us, will be swallowed up together with all this folklore; then our traditions of national struggle will be good-naturedly tolerated, as was the coat of the nobility [kontusz] in royal-imperial Galicia, or as the Cherkess ensembles are now tolerated in Russia. Because possibly all of this has been
agreed upon, and somewhere some bureaucratic heads have known for a long time that it will be necessary to include in the accounts also this small, internal, nationalism, one more to be added.23

The Enemy

The ENEMY and hatred for the enemy is another major theme with a high profile, especially when coupled with the "defence of socialism" slogan in preparing the troops for the contingency of a global war. The themes are the same ones used in the indoctrination of the Soviet public, but the impact on the military is more concentrated. Hate training as part of military indoctrination has been so important that it has led some observers to label the Soviet forces a "school of hate."

Soviet military doctrine (in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology), makes class content crucial for the enemy image. Thus in general terms it is always the "imperialists" (or "fascists" or "capitalists" -- the terms are largely interchangeable) who are the enemy. The image has benefitted enormously from the legacy of the Great Patriotic War.

In any scenario of a future war the "imperialists" are always pictured as the initiators of hostilities. The constant warnings that a threat of imperialist aggression is imminent are well illustrated by a citation from a book by Boris Ponomarev, chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department:

The socialist community and the communist movement, (must) ...bear in mind constantly that imperialism is continuing its material preparations for war at a rapid pace.24

Since the election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency of the United States the frequency and the urgency of the warnings have intensified. It is in the nature of imperialism to "constantly strive to dominate and to expand" which inevitably "breeds wars." And although because of the present "correlation of forces" imperialism is "afraid to start a world war," it nevertheless "perpetually breeds cold war, anti-
détente and anti-communist forces," "causes local conflicts and aggression," "inspires and supports reactionary and counterrevolutionary manifestations," and in general strives for "superiority, which would allow attempts to dictate from positions of strength, or even for the use of force." Imperialism "builds aggressive blocs"; the latest effort directed against socialism is NATO, which is "the main enemy of the socialist community." From the very beginning of its establishment NATO has been directed against the Warsaw Pact and has attempted to break the unity of the Pact, to undermine the socialist military coalition and to weaken the faith of the people of the Pact countries in the "combat friendship" of its united forces.

The focus on the hostile class character of the enemy has been very important because the national historical and military traditions of bloc countries have not been helpful in translating the "imperialist enemy" image into reality. Some Soviet nationalities and most East Europeans respond to the enemy image by thinking of the Russians. But there are some good substitutes. The Germans -- the "capitalist" Germans who are the enemy of the "socialist" Germans and their socialist allies -- have proved to be most useful for this purpose. If Soviet and East European propaganda is to be believed, then the West Germans are almost more of a moving force behind NATO's aggressive designs than are the Americans. West Germany's Bundeswehr is presented as the heart of the NATO forces and West German revanchism is treated as an ever-present danger. For Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular the German danger has been cast in the form of a threat to the countries' boundaries and to the postwar settlement. Thus General Jaruzelski states that:

One should never forget that both world wars in Europe were started by German imperialism, and that the questioning of boundaries established in the first war led to the second war. Today the question of European boundaries has been definitely resolved. There still exists, however, the so-called German problem, which is the result of a revival of rightist nationalist
forces in the FRG, accompanied by militaristic - great power aspirations and Greater German tendencies, directed in particular at the revision of the results of World War II.27

The image of a German enemy has been particularly effective in the socialization of Soviet soldiers and the armies of the countries of the Northern Tier, although the impact was blunted, in the seventies, by Ostpolitik. There is some evidence that, in the popular imagination at least, the "good" "socialist" Germans have also been besmirched by the German tar, and that in some cases (in Poland and in Czechoslovakia in particular) they are more effectively the target of hate than the West Germans.

The United States is synonymous with the "Imperialists" but it is doubtful whether this official label packs much emotional impact even though the wartime alliance has been all but forgotten. The official propaganda line is that the innate hostility of Western democracies to socialism remained alive even during the period of temporary collaboration against Hitler, and that it was instrumental in causing the delay by the West in opening up the second front in Europe and thus unnecessarily prolonging the suffering of the Soviet people in World War II. According to this propaganda this delay was motivated by the hope that socialism would collapse during the war.

In the Soviet Union hostility towards the United States has been fanned by an insistence that the United States is pushing for war and threatens the Soviet Union with a nuclear holocaust. But in Eastern Europe anti-Western propaganda seems to have had little effect and may in fact have been counterproductive. East Europeans have strong family and traditional ties with "America"; their residual friendship ties with Western Europe are even stronger (including even Germany, for example, in the case of the Hungarians). In addition to traditional political and economic ties, East-Central and Western Europe share a common cultural heritage. In the Solidarity period in Poland local wits had a
heyday speculating about the identity of the alleged "enemy" and came to the conclusion that it must be "someone" inhabiting the same "Eurasian Continent."\textsuperscript{28}

For the Soviet population, and the Russians in particular, the Chinese have been the historical enemy, and ever since the Sino-Soviet break in 1961 China has appeared as a major enemy in military propaganda. This image fits in extremely well with the gut fear of the "yellow peril" which has survived in the Russian psyche ever since the 13th-century Mongol invasion. But its effectiveness when applied to the Golden Horde's descendants is problematical and has been of little use in conditioning the East Europeans. On the contrary, the perception of a conflict between the two communist giants has been seen as helpful by the "junior brothers" in their negotiations with Moscow, as in the case of Romania and allegedly, in 1956, Poland.

In Romania, which is almost always an exception, there is no conflict between the themes of internationalism and nationalism because the whole emphasis is on the latter. The leitmotif of military propaganda has been the national alliance between the army and the people, and national sovereignty and its legitimation in historical and military traditions. The whole effort has been directed at developing the soldiers' loyalty to the Romanian socialist state and at preparing them to defend the national territory against any encroachments from outside; the enemy is never named, but his identity is easy to guess.

An "internal enemy" constitutes an important part of the enemy image. A linkage is always established to the "imperialists," who use diversionary tactics inside the socialist camp in order to break its unity, trying "to sow distrust of the CPSU, to start nationalist fires and thus to break the alliance."\textsuperscript{29} The internal forces which are used by the imperialists for this purpose include: "bourgeois nationalists," "revisionists," "right and left opportunists," "counterrevolutionaries" and "political revanchists."\textsuperscript{30} Nationalism of the "bourgeois nationalist" rather than "socialist patriotism" variety is seen as the
key element which motivates "internal enemies."

Judging by the preoccupation with nationalism shown by the official media and the political-military education apparatus, and by the constant allegations that its persistence is due to Western interference, it is obviously perceived as a major weakness. Warnings of the danger of nationalism in the socialist armed forces are explicitly and repeatedly conveyed in the military-political message. A representative statement by General Epishev illustrates this point:

It is not difficult to see that the basic direction of bourgeois propaganda directed at the consciousness of the personnel of the armies of the socialist countries seeks the goal of emphasizing national differences, inciting nationalist prejudices and opposing some socialist countries and armies to others. All this is done to loosen the unbreakable moral and political unity of socialist countries and their armed forces ... (and) to disrupt the fraternal relations which exist among them ... The further strengthening of ties and contacts among the fraternal armies therefore acquires special significance in the plan to counteract bourgeois propaganda.31

The constant threat of nationalism emerging from behind the internationalist facade means that it is very difficult to properly calibrate the "patriotism" message. Nevertheless, it is absolutely essential to do so in order to build up the forces' morale and to secure their support for the ruling regime, and for this reason the carefully preserved trappings of national sovereignty are also important. But because of the ever-present nationalist threat to bloc unity political socialization is synchronized across the spectrum of Pact armies and fits into the overall integrative framework of military administration, training and deployment discussed in the preceding chapters. Some interesting examples of how the political message is "internationalized" in practice illustrate the operation of integrative mechanisms in the
Examples of Integrative Socialization

A long-range organized effort to rewrite the military histories of Pact member states in order to remove bourgeois "falseifications" was initiated in the 70s. The effort has been based on bilateral collaboration between the Institute of Military History of the USSR and equivalent military history institutes in other Pact members, and initially involved the preparation of a series of histories under the general label of "Brotherhood in Arms" (bratstvo oruzhiia). Some of the books have already appeared and were used in the preparation of this study. They are designed to trace the history of the relationship between the Soviet Union and individual East European Warsaw Pact members, concentrating in particular on the history of their military collaboration in World War II. Identical texts are published in Russian and the given East European language, the format is identical, the methodology is Marxist-Leninist, and the subject is approached from a "class perspective." Each book is written by an authors' "collective" composed of military historians from the two countries and headed by two editors, one representing the Soviet and the other the East European side.32

The description below is based on a report describing the preparation of a history of Soviet-Polish military collaboration.33 The book's title is, inevitably, Bratstvo Oruzhiia (in Russian) and Braterstwo Broni (in Polish) and the two co-editors are Col. Dr. Emil Jadziak (for Poland) and Gen. Prof. Pavel A. Zhilin (for the USSR); the Soviet editor clearly outranks the Polish editor. The project is hailed as a brand new type of collaboration, the first ever to apply "a higher level of scientific contacts." A detailed description of how the work was done explains why it is regarded as a "new type" of endeavour:
We started by working out a precise plan of activities... From the start we took care to have a unified character for our activities, setting up for this purpose a joint editorial commission. In the work's second stage the commission worked on the book's individual chapters. Each chapter was jointly written by two authors: a Polish and a Soviet one. Subsequently the materials and the written work were the subject of a critical review (konfrontacja), and final editing; then a unified text was prepared, and finally the book was printed in the two languages.34

The team of authors included 15 Soviet and Polish military scholars, and the book received the First Class prize of the Polish Ministry of National Defence in 1975. We are told that initially there was a language problem, but that it was eventually overcome. The authors indicated that more works of the same type were being planned for the future, one of which was intended to cover the political military aspects of the "liberation of Poland in 1944-1945."35

The written collaboration between the two historical institutes is augmented by jointly written articles, attendance at joint seminars and conferences, and exchanges of personnel between the two institutes. The plan for the next five years (i.e. 1976-1981) envisaged the preparation of a collection of works devoted to "de-falsification" of military history, which is seen as providing a major input into the struggle on the ideological front. The writing of the military histories of Poland's collaboration with Czechoslovakia and the GDR was said to be well-advanced (they have since been published), and a similar project was planned dealing with Poland and Hungary, although, we are told, there were language problems in the latter case.36 It is clear from the article that other partners in the socialist alliance were pursuing the same type of activities.

The second example of multinational collaboration for political socialization purposes concerns the publication of multilingual military newspapers at the time of joint military manoeuvres, an exercise which
is clearly designed to prepare a propaganda network for actual combat situations. Precedents already exist in the publication of military newspapers in languages of the USSR other than Russian during the Great Patriotic War. The total number of division military newspapers published in non-Russian Soviet languages was 22, while the total number of front-line newspapers published during the war in non-Russian Soviet languages on all fronts was 64. However, these seem to have been unilingual or, at most, bilingual. The practice in the Pact, on the other hand, seems to be to actually attempt a multilingual mode of communications -- the message, of course, being the same.

An overall description of the system is provided by a Soviet source:

The organization of collaboration between political administrations receives a great deal of attention in the Soviet Armed Forces and in other fraternal armies. At joint exercises political administrations (politorgany) actively collaborate. Thus, for example, at some exercises mixed, "coalitional," editorial boards of military newspapers, which come out in the languages of the countries whose armies participate in the exercises or manoeuvres, were organized (and continue to be organized). Similar mixed editorial boards are being organized for radio newspapers (radiogazety). In the course of the exercises complex political and mass-cultural measures are being conducted, based on a unified plan; this is done for the soldiers who are participants in the exercises and manoeuvres, and for the local population.38

A Polish military journal has described the process whereby a multilingual field newspaper entitled Shield-76 was published during manoeuvres of the same name held in Poland in 1976 with the participation of the Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak and Polish armies.
under the overall command of the ranking general of the host country, General Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland. We are told that the first issue was prepared by a Polish team before the manoeuvres, but that it was printed in all the languages of the participating armies. Apparently there were a few initial problems which had to be ironed out. First there was the problem of summarizing the material, given the size constraints (the paper had 8 pages) and the need to condense material which originally came from four separate military newspapers. Second, there was the problem of the sequence in which the languages were used. Initially, a decision was made to use a rule which, apparently, is obligatory in the Warsaw Pact; that is, to use a ranking which follows the Russian alphabet. This was later modified, however, by a new rule to first print in the language of the country (or army) which was the subject of a given story. But this was not satisfactory either. Finally a decision was made (and maintained throughout the exercises) to rotate the languages but according to a sequence provided by the Russian alphabet.

Subsequent issues were published by a multinational team. Published every second day, they included reports from the field as well as descriptions of various agitprop activities, and featured the exploits of individual soldiers and units. New features were added as the exercises progressed. On a Czech suggestion a new column called "Report from the Homeland" was introduced. Multiethnic journalistic teams were organized in accordance with a Soviet suggestion. These teams attended various events which were then described by each member in his own language (although texts were closely synchronized) and this speeded up the publication of the paper. When the manoeuvres actually started the paper was printed on red paper and appeared every day. Later the contents became more technical, and after each national army was featured in a particular exercise the event was covered by the appropriate national team, although coverage was always closely synchronized by means of joint consultations. The last issue of the
paper had 12 pages and featured the texts of the speeches given by all the military leaders at the end of the exercises in each of the four languages. According to this description the main problem seems to have been the difficulty of communicating and juggling the four languages. This appears to have imposed considerable constraints on the length and quality of the message.

Effectiveness

A review of Soviet and East European sources indicates that the communist leadership attaches a great deal of importance to political indoctrination and that questions of "ideological upbringing" have been in the forefront of concerns. This has been reflected, for example, in the top priority given to the organization of military-political administrations in communist armies as well as the emphasis on staffing them with the most reliable elements, and in the attention given to indoctrination in terms of both effort and time expended. The intensity of this effort seems to be directly correlated to the decline in the effectiveness of ideology as a mobilizing agent, a phenomenon observed not only among the communist cadre in Eastern Europe (the general public there has never been receptive to communist ideology) but also in the Soviet Union, where the initial impact of ideology was much deeper and the period of exposure has now spanned six decades. As the Brezhnev era ended and a transition era began, ideological concerns matched those relating to economic performance; the first two plenums of the CPSU Central Committee after the change in leadership were devoted to the economy and ideology, respectively. The June 1983 plenum, whose keynote was Konstantin Chernenko's speech detailing ideological problems, was followed by a Komsomol plenum (July 1983), where ideological problems were further discussed in terms of their application to young people in particular. The attitudes of the young are, of course, a crucial variable affecting the morale and effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces.
The Soviet leaders obviously believe that military service is of great importance in moulding the attitudes of the conscripts and thus building a base of support for the political system and for its extension in the Pact structure. Soviet authors feel that "impacting the young psyche" during military service is one of the tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces as "the school of the nation," which strives to maximize young people's positive qualities (belief in the future, social activism, romantic aspirations) and to minimize negative ones (poor work habits, resistance to discipline, "bourgeois" attitudes, etc.). The same beliefs and aspirations are shared by East European leaders.

Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes is consciously utilized by Soviet and East European psychologists for socialization purposes. Soviet psychology stresses the value of repetitive conditioning under saturation conditions and the susceptibility of young minds. Military service is seen as particularly effective, because of its closed and uniform environment, in building up the commitment of young conscripts (and in reinforcing that of the professional cadre) to the political system, to the socialist Motherland and to its internationalist brethren. Efforts to integrate soldiers in the multiethnic Soviet Armed Forces correspond to efforts aimed at integrating the soldiers of the Warsaw Pact into this "new type" of internationalist fraternal socialist alliance. The goals, the political ideology and the leadership are the same.

Not surprisingly, Polish spokesmen are very anxious for the socialization effort to succeed, particularly in the armed forces. Speaking of the importance of the ongoing tightening up of bloc integration, General Jaruzelski stresses the need to develop "friendly contacts" at the "lowest level," which has special importance in military conditions:

It is there among the soldiers, among the young cadre, where the new (historical) stage is being formed, where the long-term perspective of alliance relations is being hammered out...
His views are echoed in a Polish military journal which clearly notes the importance of the young generation and the promise of success which could be realized if only socialization succeeds with the young people:

The situation and the events of the first half of the nineteen fifties -- the time of the birth of the Warsaw Pact -- are simply history to an ever-growing number of people: to one half of our country's population (a conservative estimate), to all the soldiers in basic military service, and to a massive part of even the professional cadre. Thus, the better to understand the present, one has to learn this history.44

In the new "class" edition, one might add. This citation underscores the importance to the communist leadership of long-range socialization efforts such as the writing of joint military histories.

Overall, official sources are not particularly sanguine about either the quality or the effectiveness of political-military propaganda, but the level of response seems to be higher in the Soviet Armed Forces than in any of the East European armies. The greater the contradiction between Marxism-Leninism and the traditional political value system, the less effective the military political propaganda; but strong traditional martial values, where present, compensate in part for the incongruity between traditional and Marxist-Leninist political cultures. Appeals to patriotism are far more effective than appeals to class loyalty. Although the quality of military indoctrination appears to be uniformly poor -- it is unimaginative, simplistic, primitive and repetitive -- the scope is all-embracing, and the intensity aims at compensating for qualitative shortcomings. Its impact on the young conscripts is difficult to judge. The draft-age group is impressionable and, providing that emotional touchpoints are reached, the effects may be positive (from the MPA's viewpoint) and the impact lasting.

Soviet youth in the seventies was reported to be better educated, more cynical, more alienated and less receptive to the
"gospel," as dispensed by the political education apparatus, than in previous decades. The very intensity of the effort appeared to be counterproductive, especially when taking into account the exceptionally harsh environment: discipline of the pistol, divisions between senior and junior ratings, hazing, etc. Similar conditions exist in the East European armies, with youth attitudes even more negative than in the Soviet Union, and alienation higher. The 1980-81 events in Poland testify to the total failure of youth socialization in Marxism-Leninism, to cite an extreme example; and yet the Polish Armed Forces were successfully used to impose and to maintain martial law there. Clearly, in an overall assessment neither the high level of militarization of communist societies nor the years of martial conditioning by schools, youth organizations and all of the media during the period preceding service, as well as in-service indoctrination, can be discounted.

Research on national attitudes in Soviet and East European societies indicates not only a survival but an upsurge in ethnic self-assertion and nationalist sentiments, but these can coexist with a martial spirit and can be manipulated so that military discipline and combat effectiveness are enhanced rather than weakened.

Indoctrination is abetted by an emphasis on strict discipline and an authoritarian leadership style. In the Warsaw Pact armies it has produced an outer shell of conformity which hides alienation and cynicism. In the case of conscripts, there is much evidence that East European and Soviet youth have internalized their own norms which make them disinclined to be warriors, particularly for their political system. The cadre finds economic rewards and, increasingly, political power in the service, but its commitment is based on opportunism rather than ideological conviction. Nationalist appeals which accompany ideological appeals are designed to counter youth alienation. They are helpful, but sometimes serve to complicate matters in terms of relations with "fraternal" contingents and in terms of a confrontation with the West.
ENDNOTES


4 See the country chapters in Vol. II.


6 Zamascikov, op. cit., p. 5. They are organized in 355,000 units in schools and factories and on farms. See also the chapter on the USSR in Vol. II.

7 See the chapter on the GDR in Vol. II.

8 The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 23.

9 See the country chapters in Vol. II.

10 For a detailed discussion of the mechanisms see Chapters 7 and 8 above.

11 See the country chapters in Vol. II.

12 See Chapter 3 above.

13 For the statistics see Chapter 5 above.


15 Quoted in Wojsko Ludowe No. 4, 1981, p. 5.

16 Quoted in Forster, op. cit., p. 83.

Lenin divided the history of every nation into "two streams" (dva potoka) — one of a reactionary character (the exploits of socially oppressive classes and heroes) which should be rejected, and another which is "progressive" (the achievements of the common people in pursuit of social justice) and which forms an appropriate heritage for socialist society. The problem, in the Soviet Union as well as in communist Eastern Europe, has been to decide which is which. The party always has the final say in the matter, but local parties have usually adopted a much broader interpretation than the one found acceptable by Moscow.

Examples in the case of Poland include the continued use of pre-war senior officer ranks, uniforms, special officers' caps with the inevitable eagle (minus the crown) perched on them, and various other insignia. The Polish Naval Academy is named for the defenders of the Westerplatte (a naval base in Gdansk which withstood the German onslaught in WWII for a prolonged period); a Polish revolutionary song ("Warszawianka"), born in the 1831 Revolution against Tsarist Russia and the text of which is explicitly anti-Russian, was the theme tune played by a military band at the graduation of officer cadets at a Polish officers' school (a tape was heard by the author), etc.


G.F. Vorontsov, Voennye koalitsii i koalitsionnye voiny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 263. Vorontsov is not concerned with the minor detail that the establishment of NATO actually predated the establishment of the Warsaw Pact. This is a good illustration that in the minds of Soviet commentators there is no practical difference between the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Armed Forces.
Jaruzelski, op. cit., p. 8.

From a monologue which is part of a song entitled "A Song for Just in Case," in a collection of Solidarity songs recorded on tape at a Gdansk cabaret performance in 1981:

For a year now our life has been a bit more secure and joyful; still, we live in a psychosis and uncertainty ... Are they going to march in, or not? If we were to ask ourselves who are the "they" that are supposed to be marching in, we would answer that "they" are the enemy. And it is well known that we have one enemy. It seems that the situation is simple: the Germans, of course. But -- how could it be the Germans? What kind of an enemy are they if they just found work for 2 million Poles? So? Well, let's keep asking. Who, concretely, is "the enemy"? What do you mean, who? The "Imperialists," of course. The Japanese, perhaps? But, really, the Japanese do not need to march in. We would carry them in if only they were willing to come. Please, note an interesting point. The enemy could not be the Americans, because we never hear that the enemy will fly in, or come by sea. No. They always "march in." Right? Which means that they must be somewhere, together with us, on the same Eurasian plain ... (applause). I deeply believe that they will not march in, but just in case ... (translated by author.)


Vorontsov, op. cit., pp. 263-264. Vorontsov labels the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968 as the work of counterrevolutionaries and explicitly alleges a link between these events and the "imperialists."


See, for example, A.A. Epishev (USSR) and Velko Panin (Bulgaria), Na veki vmesne (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969) and P.A. Zhilin (USSR) and E. Gefurt (CSR), Na vechnye vremena (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975).

Ibid., p. 44. The citation is from an interview conducted by the author of the article with Col. A.W. Antosiak, the leader of the Soviet team.

The book has been published. See I.I. Kostiushko (USSR) and L. Bazilev (Poland), eds., Ocherki istorii sovetsko-polskikh otnoshenii, 1917-1977 (Moscow: Nauka, 1979).

Moryc, op. cit., p. 55.

These included the Caucasian and Stalingrad fronts, as well as the South-Western, Briansk, Leningrad, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Baltic fronts. See N.P. Popov and N.A. Gorokhov, Sovetskaia voennaia pechat' v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, 1941-1945 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), pp. 28 and 31.

Vorontsov, p. 261.


Ibid., pp. 35-36.

Ibid., p. 37.


Jaruzelski, op. cit., p. 9.

Col. Ireneusz Ruszkiewicz, "Gwarant bezpieczenstwa Polski, wspolnoty, socjalizmu (W 26-lecie Układu Warszawskiego)" Wojsko Ludowe No. 5, 1981. Emphasis in the original.

No attempt is made here to discuss social problems within the military, such as the class structure and the conflict between lower and higher ranks, prevalent brutality, alcoholism, suicides, etc. These topics are discussed in the country chapters of Volume II.
Chapter 10

FACTORS AFFECTING MORALE

Ivan Sylvain

Introduction

The Soviet military system, more or less accurately reflected in all Warsaw Pact armies, is at base traditional and typically European, with some important exceptions. It relies heavily on: 1) the efficacy of rigorous training and discipline to produce good soldiers; 2) the regiment as the soldier's family and the central focus of unit pride and tradition; 3) a "cooperative authoritarian" leadership style exercised by well-educated officers, who in the Soviet case are drawn increasingly from a "warrior caste." The significant exceptions to these characteristics will be considered as they arise.

Training, Discipline, and the Social Context

There is a sense of envy in Western military writings for the rigour of Soviet discipline and training. Military men everywhere seem to believe that taking boys and turning them into men and soldiers by having them face a severe "rite of passage," which forces collective problem solving and therefore builds unit identity and morale, creates a better army.\(^1\) Equally, however, there is universal recognition by military professionals that deviants who do not respond to this indoctrination will be present and must be dealt with, especially since these individuals can undermine a group's cultivated definition of the situation and thereby threaten morale.\(^2\) All modern armies, then, adopt social control mechanisms to discover and cull and/or reform disruptive elements through: 1) identification; 2) isolation; 3) transfer; 4) labeling as pariahs; 5) intimidation; 6) espionage; 7) incarceration and expulsion.\(^3\)
At times when the basic social value consensus is being challenged, deviance can be a difficult problem, and during the 1960s and 1970s virtually all Western armies at times experienced severe unit morale degradation as a result of the acts of what were initially a few radical individuals. Soviet and East European Warsaw Pact leaders, of course, have much more stringent standards for what is considered to be acceptable deviance at any time and in any capacity, and utilize social control far more pervasively and strictly. This is done to such an extent that an air of mutual suspicion may have been created which challenges a unit's "comradely" consensus.

Training and discipline (social control) have the virtue of being managed by the military profession, but clearly do not always suffice to create and maintain morale. Before considering other less manageable factors, it is important to re-emphasize the reliance which the Soviet system places on rigorous training and stringent, extremely hierarchical and authoritarian discipline as the foundation for effective morale. Other aspects of this system may, in fact, play only subordinate, accessory roles. These other aspects are, nevertheless, important because military forces cannot be divorced from the social context. History, as well as studies which have been conducted within the United States Army, show that alienated people bring their social distance with them when they enter military service, and this is not necessarily eradicated. If general social norms do not hold military values (usually traditional and ascriptive) in esteem, then getting conscripts in particular to wholeheartedly accept a unit ethos may be unachievable.

The Group

There is, in fact, some debate in Western circles about the way in which primary group loyalty sufficient to sustain men in combat can be cultivated. American research has indicated that a working team of approximately five people creates the optimum sense of solidarity and
loyalty.\textsuperscript{8} Face-to-face friendship bonding is stressed in this approach, and it is not far removed from what is generally believed to be effective in training. According to this research, larger units only tenuously keep individuals committed to cooperative task bonding, and must, therefore, rely on more "abstract" factors such as tradition, social solidarity, ideology and leadership.

Nevertheless, in Europe, where tradition is a much more viable force, the regiment has a long history of effectiveness.\textsuperscript{9} American scholars believe that modern technology obviates this effectiveness, since only small combat teams coordinated by radio, etc. ("at arms length") will be useful at the front. The regiment can also serve, however, as a place where various regions or an ethnic group's primary (and very real) affiliations can be represented and made to feel more at home.

The use of the regiment as a focus for group affiliation contributed to the maintenance of cohesion in the Wehrmacht under severe conditions in WW II\textsuperscript{10} and the Soviets also resorted to this tactic during the so-called "Great Patriotic War." Various imperial powers, including tsarist Russia, have succeeded in utilizing regiments of foreign, conquered but nevertheless warlike peoples, and many of them have gained the status of reliable elite troops as long as they have been used far from home and/or against neighbouring traditional enemies.\textsuperscript{11}

The Soviets have attempted to create "combat collectives" for small unit effectiveness while simultaneously adopting a regimental style. This strongly fosters pride of the regiment and is reinforced by a whole panoply of regimental symbols. But they have steadfastly refused to continue their pre-1938 and WW II ethnic regimental system, for fears of providing foci for ethnic loyalties in the face of a growing nationality problem. Both they and the Americans have chosen to stress integration into either "proletarian internationalism" or the "melting pot," respectively, rather than to create ethnic regiments,
even though evidence shows that this could positively aid unit morale.\textsuperscript{12} The historical evidence also seems to show that both in multiethnic societies and multinational armies, the presence of separate commands which work in tandem, sometimes specialized, cooperation can stimulate healthy "peaceful" competition between different groups or allies.\textsuperscript{13} This does not seem to be evident in the Soviet regimental system. Soviet ethnic units in World War II proved to be very useful, however, and their revival in an emergency situation of a type which arose in 1941 cannot be excluded. Emphasis on the national pride of a regiment has been strong in East European armies, particularly in elite units, but a system of mixed larger formations precludes transference of national loyalties upwards. In the centralized, USSR-led Warsaw Pact structure East European armies are junior, subordinate, and fragmented.

Thus the Soviet military system does not reproduce either the actual experience or the traditional wisdom of the West as far as the importance of face-to-face "buddy" systems or the reflection of primary societal loyalties is concerned, although it contains incomplete and potentially dysfunctional aspects of both. Of course, most East European Warsaw Pact member countries are not faced internally with the same ethnic divisions, but even there Czechs and Slovaks do not always get along and the loyalty of Romania's Transylvanian Hungarians is questionable. The problem for these states lies in taking orders from, rather than co-determining strategy with, a dominant power which for most of them is an historic enemy. The East Germans, in particular, are in a situation where they are expected to fight other Germans for old enemies.

\textbf{Ideology and the MPA}

The armies of the Warsaw Pact attempt to counter their "national" and historical difficulties by a uniquely heavy emphasis on ideology. This is a central exception to Western practice, where the use of abstract ideas to build morale is regarded with suspicion by
leaders and conscripts alike. There are few comparative studies of this phenomenon, but they seem to show that only if a unit is: 1) elite; 2) small; 3) thoroughly indoctrinated; and 4) composed of acolytes of an ideology will it be more rather than less cohesive than other units under stress. This is hardly consistent with the strong emphasis on ideology and the attempt to promote "class hatred" of the enemy which is found throughout the Warsaw Pact.

Indeed, despite (or perhaps because of) an elaborate pre-induction paramilitary training programme and a pervasive emphasis on ideology and authority throughout society, the average East European conscript tends to be sceptical, even cynical, about such exhortations. He does, however, seem to accept military service as a necessary evil, which is at least the minimal attitude necessary for adequate behaviour and performance in peacetime. On the other hand, this is not the zealous world-view conducive to "class hatred." Rather, it indicates a built-in tendency to just get by. Certainly, the universal paramilitary institution-building in the Pact since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 has been directly aimed at countering such "anti-social" tendencies among the youth of Warsaw Pact members.

The primary responsibility for developing the requisite ideological commitment among military personnel belongs to the Military Political Administration (MPA) in its sundry Warsaw Pact forms. This is a unique institution, with no current Western parallels. Its actions and purview firmly bridge the gap between typical morale-building and social control, and through constant indoctrination and attempts at forcing vocal commitment through "self-criticism" (i.e. cognitive dissonance) the MPA tries to build a true class-based solidarity. It creates, however, only a solidarity of silence and withdrawal.

The MPA's role with respect to the officer corps and in promoting a correct leadership style is also significant, although debateable. R. Kolkowicz's long-standing argument that the MPA's presence creates a divided command and causes jealousy among military
professionals has been challenged lately, but it is still defensible. Regardless of whether the political specialists create animosity or simply assume the commander's burden of performing onerous ideological tasks, one should not overemphasize their importance. But the political nature of the Warsaw Pact leadership affects the Soviet-dictated system of morale in other, more general ways.

The overwhelming majority of non-MPA officers are also party members, although they are not necessarily committed ideologues. Both in cultivated leadership style and indoctrination they are carriers of conservative national and authoritarian traditions. Nowhere is the confluence of careerism and party membership in highly authoritarian states more obvious than in the Warsaw Pact's military systems.

An ideology is used to build solidarity which is ostensibly universalistic yet locked somehow in tandem with divergent national traditions. These traditions, however, are only allowed to be interpreted congruent with Russian aims and history. In a sense, this makes both officers and men cynics and co-conspirators against the MPA. National tradition can offer stronger motivations to both, but this runs straight into the problem of conflicting national and ethnic identifications.

Leadership

There is an almost perverse consistency between political indoctrination and social context in the Soviet Bloc. A "cooperative authoritarian" leadership style characterized by "noblesse oblige" may be consonant with these rigidly-controlled societies and a caste inbred and educated into warrior traditions, but is this sufficiently adaptable to modernization? Generally, such a caste is at arms length from the ranks, but where are the experienced NCOs needed to bridge the gap between the Bloc's "gentlemen" and troops?

Since the 1960s the social, political and economic history of the Bloc has been permeated with attempts to deal with new social
problems, and especially those created by the disjunctions between the
system, indigenous political cultures, and centralization and
efficiency. Similarly, having declared themselves people's democracies
and by definition thoroughly egalitarian, personal sacrifices and
repression under a privileged central authority have been continual,
and progressively challenged, especially in Eastern Europe.

In the West there is considerable evidence that a more modern,
technological work-style fits poorly with an authoritarian leadership
model. While experiments with individuals from modern societies showed
that they responded well to more permissive/democratic leadership,
authoritarianism produced sullenness.23 Granted that authoritarianism
is still a daily inescapable reality in Warsaw Pact societies, what will
be the conscript's reaction to the "young gentlemen's bravado" under
fire?24

On one hand, it may be that the Soviet-style formula for morale
can prove to be successful when it is stripped down to its essential
elements. The combination of: daily repetition of statements to the
effect that all military privation is the fault of "capitalist
imperialism"; "inhuman living conditions [that] keep the soldiers tense
like a coiled spring"; and "Daily drilling, shouting and punishment
[that] make them aggressive"; may provide an impulse to "vent...
aggressive feelings" against any enemy. If the situation is managed
properly, "It matters little who these enemies are..."25 On the other
hand, it is obvious that even these three essential elements are
unevenly applied within each army of the Warsaw Pact by unit-type and
status, and among various national armed forces. The credulity of the
18-20 year-old conscript at whom these elements are aimed also varies,
depending on his background (urban or rural, ethnic origin, etc.).
Especially if defeat appears imminent, or if the soldiers have been in
combat for an extended length of time, will social control mechanisms,
including "discipline of the pistol," suffice to keep their aggression
aimed at the appropriate "enemy?" The Chinese attempt during the Korean
war to provide close control and indoctrination in three-man cells may be instructive. This very close and highly ideological form of supervision proved to be brittle in combat, and prisoners proved amenable to allied persuasion. 26

Conclusion

In sum, the Warsaw Pact has a very thoroughly militarized political-economic structure from which it can draw conscripts. Nevertheless they only grudgingly accept their service as legitimate and practice evasion whenever possible, at least in Eastern Europe; yet, they have an emerging military "caste" to lead them. These elements interact in a very rigorous system of training and discipline. Soldiers and officers are simultaneously and constantly exposed to an ideological structure of their "own" history and experience, in an organization which in some respects reflects but does not conform with Western theorists' notions of how to maintain primary loyalty. Finally, social change and "cooperative authoritarianism" do not sit well together, especially without a genuine national movement to back up "tradition."

These elements combine to form an interesting, rather eclectic mixture. It remains an open question whether this mixture comprises a successful, morale-sustaining formula, composed as it is of rather disparate ingredients. It has, after all, never been tested in a major armed conflict with a modern army. Since the red dye giving this formula its characteristic tint is an externally imposed form of social control (using disciplinary measures as well as exhortation), healthy skepticism concerning its probability of success is in order.
ENDNOTES


2 Radine, op. cit., p. 73 goes so far as to argue that "...morale and honour have something of the character of a soap bubble. A soap bubble distributes and disperses surprisingly great tensions as it maintains a structure of resilience and strength. Yet this resilience is particularly vulnerable to a single, pointed assault."

3 Ibid., p. 17.


5 It is interesting to note that V. Suvorov's recent effort to correct what he considers to be many mistaken Western perceptions of the Soviet Army has little to say concerning political indoctrination. See Part Seven, "The Soldier's Lot," in his Inside the Soviet Army (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), pp. 215-287. His discussion is practically limited to less than a page (pp. 228, 229).

6 S. Westbrook, "Sociopolitical Alienation and Military Efficiency," Armed Forces and Society 6 (Winter 1980), pp. 170-189 is a particularly interesting scientific confirmation of this point, unfortunately limited to American recruits only.


8 Peter Watson, War on the Mind (London: Hutchinson's and Co. Ltd., 1978), pp. 119 and 120 -- the C. George experiment.


11 Ibid., pp. 88, 89; and Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State


14 Radine, op. cit., p. 5; Lang, op. cit., p. 81; and Shibutami, op. cit., pp. 413, 414.

15 Lang, op. cit., pp. 80, 81; and Shibutami, op. cit., p. 10.

16 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 312, go so far as to include the sudden late 1960s appearance of "war toys" in Soviet stores as part of this programme.

17 Kolkowicz's position is well known. For an articulate statement of the newer position, see Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), passim.

18 Suvorov, op. cit. For the view that the role of the MPA is, to the contrary, central, important and efficacious for the Soviet Army see E. Jones and F.W. Gripp, "Political Socialization in the Soviet Military," Armed Forces and Society 8 (Spring 1982), pp. 355-387 passim. They too, however, report that discipline and "peer group pressure" may have a greater impact on conscripts than political indoctrination, p. 365.

19 Colton, op. cit., pp. 54-57. These comments can be repeated for all Warsaw Pact members.

20 Making "cooperative authoritarianism" work may, in fact, require a caste thoroughly brought up in "noblesse oblige," Dixon, op. cit., pp. 234-236.


22 See Lang, op. cit., p. 80 for the importance of NCOs. The Soviets
have recognized and have tried since the early 1970s to deal with this problem. See also Jones and Grupp, op. cit., p. 373 for NCO/conscript antagonism and poor small unit leadership in the Soviet forces.

23 See endnote 14.

24 Richardson, op. cit., puts the case exactly where: 1) troops are not under observation by higher units/commanders and in combat; 2) the climate of public opinion (social and unit) does not reinforce individual sacrifice; then 3) "keen" leadership is difficult and may be impossible. See also Shibutami, op. cit., p. viii, and Dixon, op. cit.

25 A. Myagkov, Inside the KGB (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), pp. 157, 158. These quotations have a continuing ring of truth to them, although they are now over ten years old. Myagkov is a KGB defector, trained originally as a military officer. His comments are based on the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, considered to be composed of elite troops. He stresses the naïveté of the young Soviet conscript, and indoctrination as important in moulding impressionable young soldiers and as an element in redirecting aggressive tendencies. The system of primarily, not to say exclusively, negative reinforcement which he describes makes combat, or at any rate manoeuvres, seem to be a holiday by comparison to barracks life. By extension, desertion or a Western prison camp could amount to a prolonged vacation, if the troops believed the above to be viable options.

26 Lang, op. cit., pp. 81, 82.
Chapter 11

THE PRICE OF COHESION AND PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

As noted in Chapter 1, the cohesion of an international military force and the effectiveness of its performance under stress depend as much on national attitudes as they do on the success of international integration and the effectiveness of integration mechanisms. Much depends on the degree to which common goals have been internalized by particular contingents and the degree of compatibility between these goals and particular national aims and attitudes. In the contingents' interaction, their relationships are affected by the nature of the linkages which bind them together, and by perceptions of the equality of their relative positions and of even participation in the flow of mutual transactions. These linkages, relationships and perceptions, as well as the impact of policies designed to foster the cohesion of each of the national contingents and of the Pact forces as a whole, have been examined in this study.

In the assessment below, three crucial components of the forces' structures are analyzed -- the servicemen, the professional cadre, and the military and political environment in which they interact -- and their relative impact on the attitudes/performance mix is evaluated. The level of integration is discussed in its functional and attitudinal aspects and is correlated with the reliability factor. The many years of joint operations and indoctrination are weighed to measure the impact which they have had in the shaping of overall perceptions and identification (or lack thereof) with common goals and thus of patterns of future combat performance.

The original assumption in considering the three components was that in the overall attitudes/performance mix the impact of popular
national perceptions transmitted via the mass conscript base and the particular prevalent youth culture would be found to be decisive. But actual findings revealed a more complex picture and led to conclusions that, however powerful and residually important the influence of the social milieu, it has been secondary, in peacetime, to the impact of the cadre as a crucial component of the ruling class and to the constraints imposed by the environment. The importance of societal perceptions, however, is bound to increase in wartime conditions.

The Environment

Service Environment

The service environment of communist armies shares the hierarchically structured setting and the emphasis on discipline which are common to all armies, but it has important characteristics which are different. One is the prevailing institutionalized brutality and Spartan conditions, the other -- a comprehensive effort at political indoctrination whose intensity and scope far exceed comparable attempts elsewhere. The grim picture of Soviet military life which emerges from studies of the Soviet forces based on defectors' testimonies makes the conditions prevalent in most Western armies appear comparable to a Sunday school picnic. Soviet-type conditions also exist in the East European armies, although their severity may vary in accordance with local conditions and cultural heritage. But, as seen above, Soviet doctrine and training methods as well as official and informal usage and attitudes have been transplanted wholesale and are obligatory in the armies of the Soviet Union's junior partners. A major emphasis has been placed on the saturation of the soldiers' time when training and indoctrination, close order drill and the exhaustive repetition of team work, and discipline of the pistol as well as simulation of actual combat conditions during field exercises. The harshness of the conditions is increased by an informal system of merciless hazing of
fresh recruits, by their seniors from earlier callup cohorts, in which the cadre does not interfere.

The question of equality of ethnic/national components and the evenness of the flow of mutual transactions applies to both the Soviet Armed Forces and to the relationships among the Pact's contingents. In both cases the answer is that one partner is "more equal" than the others, and that this senior partner controls the flow and dominates both the input and the output side of mutual transactions in accordance with the perception of an "ethnic security map." In the SAF the Russians are the senior partner; in the Pact the senior role is played by the Soviet forces. In both cases this situation is resented by the junior "partners," since many of them perceive themselves to be culturally superior to the Russians.

Russian is the language of the SAF and it is also the common language of the Pact, for although each East European army uses its own language, the senior command personnel knows Russian and communicates in Russian across national lines. A thorough knowledge of the language is important in the technical services, and some rudimentary knowledge is required to comprehend instructions in the use of weapons systems. During maneuvers all Joint Staff documentation is in Russian. But despite years of studying Russian at school the average serviceman or junior officer does not know Russian and the need for a common language has been a problem. But it is not seen as a major obstacle to integration, contrary to some Western suppositions. The SAF has operated in a satisfactory fashion for years despite poor Russian-language comprehension on the part of many of its non-Slavic soldiers, and this includes the extreme combat conditions of World War II. As one defector has noted, the non-Russians learn the essential words of command which are sufficient to carry out orders, and greater comprehension could be dysfunctional. During the Czechoslovak invasion, for example, morale problems were higher in Russian units than in ethnic-dominated units, for the soldiers in the latter did not know
where they were or what they were doing. In East European units, as was the case in non-Russian national-territorial formations of the Red Army during World War II, officers can translate to the troops and political officers carry out indoctrination in the language of the servicemen.

The "Alliance" Environment

The "alliance" environment emerges from the review above of the political framework of the Pact and of its military integrative mechanisms. This review does not support the official Soviet and East European viewpoint that these are "sovereign" and "equal" armies, or the perception, held by some Western observers, that the East European armies of the Warsaw Pact are "autonomous." In the first place, various coordinating mechanisms are designed to make the East European parties subservient to the CPSU; the operational code word which describes this state of affairs is "socialist internationalism." In the second place, and in order to thwart any attempt by the parties to effectively pursue their national interest à la Yugoslavia, the East European armed forces are directly linked to Moscow via a system of military controls which bypasses the national capitals and deprives East European communist leaders of effective control over their armed forces and thus denies them the key attribute of national sovereignty.

Only Romania, as has been repeatedly noted, has retained this capability because its leaders were adroit enough to parlay favourable circumstances into sidestepping integration while nominally remaining in the Pact. The case of Romania is exceptional and the Romanian Army remains outside the military integration mechanisms. But the Romanian exception has clouded the general picture, for every time Ceausescu successfully defies Moscow this defiance is interpreted as a proof that this capability is shared by other East European members of the Warsaw Pact.

Moscow's integration design is a paradigm which has been
implemented on a graduated timetable and with much friction. It has been challenged more or less openly by each of the five East European Warsaw Pact parties other than and in addition to Romania. But room for political manoeuvre has been steadily shrinking since Czechoslovakia's "Prague Spring" of 1968, and the constraints on political action have included the Soviet system of controls over the East European Warsaw Pact armies. Despite the unrest of the 50s and 60s these armies were never truly autonomous, and for the last 20 years they have been systematically and progressively integrated into the SAF. 6

From Moscow's point of view the success of the integration of the East European Warsaw Pact armies into the Soviet forces can be measured by evaluating the behaviour of these armies, over time, during various stress periods. Thus, although the Hungarian and Polish armies were heavily penetrated by Soviet personnel, elements of these armies stood by the local communist leaders against the Soviet Union in 1956. In 1968 (a few years after Marshal Grechko began to implement military integration policies under the Pact's umbrella), the Czechoslovak Armed Forces were divided between pro-reform and pro-Soviet factions, and the latter were rumoured to have attempted a coup twice: once to save Antonin Novotny, and once to speed up the removal of Aleksander Dubcek after the Soviet invasion. 7 In Poland in 1981 -- to everyone's surprise -- Polish forces were successfully used for a take-over, "defending socialism" (and Soviet interests) against a spontaneous national mass movement for reform. The situation in Poland was unique in that the party virtually collapsed and the political and military leaderships were merged in the person of the Polish forces' commanding general prior to the imposition of martial law. It is perhaps not coincidental that General Jaruzelski's whole professional career has been shaped by his Soviet military connections.

There are two code words for the East European WP armies' integration into the SAF. These are "bratstvo oruzhiia" (brotherhood in arms) and "boevoe sodruzhestvo" (combat friendship). 8 They both denote
the "ties of a new type" which bind the "fraternal" armies, and the implications are that they are all integral components of a unified entity, the Greater Socialist Army, under Soviet command. Thus, to extend Ivan Volgyes’ definition, the East European WP forces continue to “provide the backbone of domestic defence for the regime against enemies from the outside and the inside,” but this defence has been modified by "socialist internationalism" (as codified by the second and third generations of bilateral treaties) in that it cannot be exercised unilaterally. It is always exercised in "fraternal" consonance and always in the "defence of socialism" as defined by "fraternal" consensus (in actual fact, by the CPSU). It is hardly necessary to add that the perceptions of the CPSU are not synonymous with the East Europeans’ perceptions of their national interests, as was demonstrated by the events in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and elsewhere.

Seen from this perspective, the total operational control which the Soviet Ground Forces Command had of the 1968 invasion appears to be the rule, in terms of the Pact's operations for the future, rather than an exception. The East European contingents went in under Soviet command and played a token role. In fact, it was rumoured that Hungarian units were ordered into Czechoslovakia without consultation with the leadership in Budapest which, unlike the leadership of the Polish, East German and Bulgarian parties, was not in favour of the invasion. The Romanian leaders were explicitly opposed and no Romanian units participated in this action, proving both the existence of linkages and Romania’s non-involvement in them.

Certain aspects of the behaviour of East European military establishments which do not conform to the official version of national sovereignty support the thesis of direct military linkages to Moscow. In defence spending East European contributions are estimated to be heavier than their official budgets indicate and are coordinated by Soviet planning agencies (in collaboration with the CMEA) according to decisions taken by the Soviet leadership. This is apparently one
aspect of economic planning which reflects a clear point of view. The overall joint planning has yet to be implemented, despite pressures from Moscow, although it is coordinated within the CMEA. Accordingly, the East European military are reported to be following their Soviet colleagues, rather than their national leaders, for greater weapons expenditures.13

The East European military press speaks with "its master's voice." At the time of the Solidarity crisis in Poland (August 1980 -- December 1981) the Polish military press was remarkably out of step with the rest of the official Polish press (which blossomed into a variety of viewpoints) in maintaining a strict Soviet party line.14 One example illustrates this point. In the spring of 1981 the Polish Army paper accused KOR (the Committee for the Defence of the Workers) along with the Soviet (but not the Polish) press, of being agents of "anti-intelligence.15 The same accusation has since reappeared in the official indictment of the KOR leaders now awaiting trial in Warsaw.16

Within the "socialist internationalism" framework the military integration mechanisms include: a centralized command structure, with the leading role exercised by Soviet officers; an operational pattern of deployment which places the East European units on a predominantly bilateral pattern in the SAF; and the preparation of a homogenized Soviet-type East European officer cadre.17 Information on the size of the units involved in mixed formations during manoeuvres is not readily available, and references range from "armies" to "subunits." Division-size units are mentioned most frequently. In practice these divisions are probably closer to regimental size, since most East European units do not appear to be kept at full strength.18

New changes in the organizational structure of the SAF, the details of which are not yet available, divide the forces into three major theatres which are subdivided, for operational purposes, into theatres of military operations (TVD's).19 According to The Military Balance (1983-1984), the new "Western Theatre" includes Central and
Eastern European WP forces, the enumeration of which excludes not only Romania, which is not surprising, but also Bulgaria (indicating that the latter may have a local Balkan role); it includes in addition the six military districts of the European USSR (Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Leningrad, and Odessa). The edge of the new reorganization appears to be directed against NATO, and it is undoubtedly linked to the Soviet reaction to the Reagan administration's alleged "war plans."

By officially linking the military operations of the Soviet units stationed in Eastern Europe and in the Western USSR Soviet military leaders have given official recognition to a current practice which includes units from Western Soviet military districts in manoeuvres in East Central Europe, and East European units in manoeuvres in the Western USSR. It is likely that the new TVD's will represent another step in the closer integration of the Soviet and East European forces, as the latters' elite units may well be included in the planned Operation Manoeuvre Groups. Closer integration may also affect other units "designated" to serve under WP joint command. According to The Military Balance (1983-1984)

In wartime, air and ground forces and air defence will be integrated at the TVD level, which should give a flexibility and control which formerly have been difficult to achieve. This improvement in command and control should enhance the fighting capability of the Soviet forces.

Soviet and East European defectors are unanimous in their opinion that the East European contingents of the Warsaw Pact are an integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. A Polish general now living in West Germany told this author that the East European national contingents are nothing more than "national-territorial formations of the SAF; infantry regiments or technical services are within Soviet disposition all the way down." An ex-Soviet staff officer, who
defected after Czechoslovakia, calls the Warsaw Pact "a chimera, called into being to camouflage the tyranny of Soviet communism in the countries under its occupation," adding further that

During a war ...the "allied" divisions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are integrated in the Soviet Armies. None of the East European countries has the right to set up its own Corps, Armies or Fronts.

A prominent Soviet emigré author and philosopher believes that the Polish, Czech and East German units are so closely tied in with the Soviet divisions that any independent move on their part is virtually impossible. They rely on the Soviet forces for their supplies of ammunition, replacement and repair facilities, food and reconnaissance. Above all, they are part of an order of battle and command structure which rule out any large-scale insubordination, much more any uprising on a national scale ... they are cemented into the Warsaw Pact. The system has a stranglehold on them, and that stranglehold ensures efficiency. The Kremlin may not be able to inspire the satellite forces to be enthusiastic defenders of the USSR, but un-enthusiastic cooperation is enough.

And an ex-KGB officer who served in the GDR with the Soviet forces refers more than once to "the fictitious 'independence' of the East German regime."

The Party and the KGB
Although the party and the KGB (and their equivalents in the East European countries) are not part of the military, they are an integral part of the military environment. They administer two control
systems, independent of the military, which converge in Moscow. The party's network of political officers extends downward to the company level; so does KGB surveillance. In their work the political officers use mobilized party members (reports indicate that membership in the officer corps starts at around 80 per cent of the total and up) and Komsomol members among the servicemen. The KGB work in the military is coordinated by its Armed Forces Directorate which, as John Barron reports, is one of the organization's largest and most busy subdivisions. In military units KGB officers rely on a network of recruited agents, and Myagkov describes the methods used by the KGB to recruit these agents.

Political officers are the party's "eyes and ears" and are in charge of a formidable political education effort which is designed to instill "socialist morality" and attitudes of "boundless loyalty" to the "socialist motherland" and its internationalist endeavours. They are subordinated to the Military Political Administration of their forces which is, at the same time, a department of the Ministry of Defence and a department of the Central Committee of the party. The work of all "allied" MPA's is coordinated by the MPA of the SAF. The role of the KGB is that of counter-intelligence: to ferret out and to eradicate "unreliable" elements and spies. Both collaborate in keeping tabs on servicemen and officers, who are also subject to the hierarchical order of command of their army superiors. Suvorov talks of "the triangle of power represented by the Party, Army and KGB which "brings pressure to bear on every officer and, what is more, it does so with each of its corners simultaneously," a perception which is supported by other sources. Promotions and recommendations for military academies depend on party support (party membership is a *de facto* condition for upward mobility) and on a clean bill of health from the KGB.

It is a poorly guarded secret that the KGB controls the security services of the Soviet Union's junior partners. Barron describes the relationship using the Czech security service (the STB) as an example:
The Czechs undertake no significant operation without prior approval of the senior KGB adviser, and STB department heads often submit plans to him before showing them to their own boss. KGB officers continuously observe operations in progress, at times modifying or redirecting them. They automatically see and, if they desire, receive copies of the reports... from around the world. The prudent STB officer never contradicts Soviet policy or betrays any anti-Soviet attitude because he knows that some of his colleagues are loyal not to Czechoslovakia but to the Soviet Union. They have been recruited as clandestine KGB agents, usually while training in Moscow.

To the Czech services (whose work benefits the Soviet Union rather than Czechoslovakia), one must add "the clandestine services of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and most recently Cuba." The KGB frequently takes over agents recruited and developed by satellite services. Barron's information is confirmed by the testimony of defectors. Recently the Christian Science Monitor described how the Polish intelligence service (SB) operated in the United States on behalf of the KGB, gathering military information on the basis of KGB-supplied "shopping lists." The work of the military intelligence branches of the "allied" armies also appears to be coordinated by Moscow.

The placement of military officers is subject to party controls through the well-known practice of nomenklatura. This practice requires that any appointment within the jurisdiction of a given command unit be approved by the appropriate party committee. The appointments of senior officers in all the Pact armies are within the nomenklatura of their Ministries of Defence (ultimately the Pact's Command) and of the Central Committees of their communist parties.

In Poland in 1972 (and there is no reason to suppose that the practice has changed or that it is different in other "socialist countries") top-level military positions were within the nomenklatura of
the Central Committee of the PUWP. In practice they were divided between the nomenklatura of the Politbureau itself, and of the Central Committee Secretariat. The positions within the nomenklatura of the Politbureau were as follows:

Minister and deputy ministers of National Defence (along with all other ministers), and

1. Chief of the General Staff
2. Chief of the MPA
3. Chief Inspector of Territorial Defence
4. Chief Inspector of Military Training
5. Chief of Military Supplies and Logistics (Kwatermistrz WP)
6. Chief Inspector of Technology
7. Commanding officers of Military Districts
8. Commanding officers of the:
   a. Air Force
   b. Navy
   c. Air Defence Army (WOPK)
   d. Border Troops
9. All promotions to the rank of general officers.

The membership of the Polish Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), which took over the government of Poland on 13 December 1981, as martial law was established, included the Defence Minister (general Jaruzelski) and the incumbents of positions 1 through 8 above, as well as some incumbents from the Secretariat's nomenklatura listed below. The Central Committee Secretariat controlled appointments to the positions of deputies for political affairs of all those in groups no. 7 and no. 8 above, plus the positions of:
1. Deputy Chief of the General Staff
2. Deputy Chief of the MPA
3. Chief of Internal Defence Troops (WSW)
4. Chief of the Cadre Department of the Ministry of Defence
5. Chief of the Training Inspectorate
6. Chief of the Inspectorate of Territorial Defence
7. Chief Section II of the General Staff.\textsuperscript{35}

The military nomenklatura undoubtedly operates on the same principle as the nomenklatura in other areas, whereby positions at each level are subject to approval by the next higher party body. In the case of the East European communist parties there is a strong presumption that (except in the case of Romania) key positions within the nomenklatura of the parties' Central Committees are subject to review (if not approval) by the CC CPSU. In the case of senior military appointments it seems beyond question that they are ultimately within the nomenklatura of the Soviet Ministry of Defence and the CPSU Central Committee. This practice, combined with the fact that the senior East European military cadre is trained, almost without exceptions, in Soviet staff schools,\textsuperscript{36} gives the Soviet High Command an intimate knowledge of and effective control over East European military command personnel. It assures, at the same time, that the national parties' leaders do have a say in the appointment of "their" generals, although they have no control over these generals' superiors in the Soviet chain of command.

These triple control mechanisms -- selection and training, placement, and security supervision -- make it clear that political loyalty is as much (or more) a criterion for a military career as is professional competence. It also indicates that senior East European officers are not only coordinated under the umbrella of the Pact, but are also organically integrated into the Soviet military establishment and for all practical purposes are interchangeable with Soviet officers up to but excluding the Pact's top command, which is reserved for Soviet
officers. Thus, to use Christopher Jones' phrase, they are members of a "Greater Socialist Officer Corps." 37

The Attitudes

Servicemen

The conscript base of the Pact forces does reflect the attitudes of its social milieu, but the effect of these attitudes on military performance has been severely limited. In the first place, it is unlikely that the "outside" attitudes which the conscripts bring with them when they start military service will impress anyone or be disseminated as each recruit -- a lonely and generally frightened young man -- attempts to cope with the rigours of basic training and the institutionalized brutality which are most intensive in the first six months of service. Survival depends on adopting a protective hard shell which is required by the environment (the suicide rate appears to be higher in the service than outside). Moreover, the turnover is high, as new recruits come in every six months. It appears that military service is a dreaded experience both in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but it is largely seen as unavoidable. Efforts at draft evasion are more common in Eastern Europe, as are manifestations of pacifism among the young and the appearance of conscientious objectors.

In the second place, the share of conscripts in the military manpower total is not as high as one would expect in armies based on universal military service. In the technically more sophisticated services it amounts to considerably less than one half of the total in the East European Warsaw Pact armies (see Table 11.1). The overall ratio of conscripts to career cadre differed in particular national contingents. In 1983 the SAF had the highest conscript ratio: an estimated 75 per cent of the regular forces' total. But in the East European forces barely more than one half of the military manpower was composed of draftees, and their share in the air force and in the navy was lower. In the Polish Armed Forces, for example, only 23 per cent of
the sailors and 31 per cent of the airmen came from the draft. No figures were available for other specialized units, but there was evidence that the more technically demanding the unit, the higher the percentage of career personnel in it.

In the third place, and for all their known shortcomings, the intensive socialization campaigns described earlier cannot be completely discounted in terms of their impact on the attitudes of young men in the ranks. The patriotic and martial aspects of political education, combined with the cumulative impact of martial conditioning since childhood, undoubtedly influence both morale and performance. As in all armies, the more sophisticated urban youth -- some of them "infected" with Western models and pacifism -- have been much less susceptible to indoctrination than unsophisticated rural youth. The "vigilance" of party and youth organizations, the known presence (but largely unknown identity) of state security agents, harsh discipline and harsh penalties imposed for infractions, as well as peer pressures, all make it very difficult for a serviceman or an officer to stick his neck out in any way, regardless of how negative he may inwardly be towards the system and everything it stands for. One way of dealing with political dissidents (in the Soviet Union and Poland in particular) has been for the authorities to draft them or to call on them for reserve training. Once in the service even the most politically active are helpless, and it seems that communist regimes have little fear that dissidents can cause much trouble in the military ranks. Dissenters are either placed in penal units or are packed off to construction troop units where they do not even handle arms.

The attitudes which servicemen hold in camera are of importance, however, in crisis situations when some or all of the above restraints may cease to operate. In the case of wartime mobilization the ratio of conscripts to cadre is bound to grow quickly, thus increasing the importance of the attitudes they hold for military performance. It is useful, therefore, to remind the reader once again of the position of
Table 11.1  Warsaw Pact: Conscripts in the Armed Forces, 1983 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army:</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>CSR</th>
<th>GDR</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscripts</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>77*</td>
<td>61*</td>
<td>67*</td>
<td>59*</td>
<td>60*</td>
<td>69*</td>
<td>63*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air Force:

| Total                 | 365^2| 34       | 56.5| 37  | 21      | 88     | 32      |
| Conscripts            | n.a. | 18       | 17  | 15  | 8       | 32*    | 10      |
| % of total            | n.a. | 53*      | 30* | 40* | 38*     | 31*    | 31*     |

Navy:

| Total                 | 460  | 8.5      | none | 14  | none    | 22     | 7.5     |
| Conscripts            | 345* | 3        | 8    | 5   | 3.5     |        |         |
| % of total            | 75   | 35*      | 57*  | 23* | 47*     |        |         |

Armed Forces:

| Total                 | 5,050^3| 162    | 204.5| 167 | 105     | 340    | 189.5   |
| Conscripts            | 3,800*  | 94     | 117  | 92  | 58      | 190    | 109     |
| % of total            | 75**    | 58*    | 57*  | 55* | 56*     | 56*    | 58*     |

Armed Forces Total plus Paramilitary as % of the population:

| Population            | 1.8   | 1.8     | 1.8  | 1.3  | 1.0     | 0.98   | 0.84    |

Population:

| Population            | 271,800| 8,990  | 15,500| 16,760| 10,760  | 36,500 | 22,650  |

* -- calculated
** -- estimated

1. Includes the Danube Fleet.
2. Excludes bomber forces of aviation armies.
3. Includes 1.5 million command and general support personnel not listed elsewhere, excludes 400,000 Border Guards.
4. Includes Territorial Defence Forces.

Table 11.2 The Warsaw Pact, 1983: The "Ratio of Distrust":
Conscripts in Regular Forces in Relation to Career Cadre and Paramilitary Forces. (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>CSR</th>
<th>GDR</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Forces Total</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>189.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscripts in Reg. Forces</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>109.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Cadre in Reg. Forces</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary Forces</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia 3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>500^4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,550^5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary and Career Cadre Total</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>117.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary, Career Cadre and Militia Total n.a.</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>218.5</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>585 n.r.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ratio of Distrust-1&quot;</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ratio of Distrust-11&quot;</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>n.r.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Forces stationed in the country</td>
<td>4,274</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Calculated from Table 11.1
2. Source as in Table 11.1
3. Variously described as territorial, people's, or citizen's militia.
5. Romania's Territorial Defence Forces include 900,000 Patriotic Guards and 650,000 members of the Youth Homeland Defence.
6. Not relevant because Romania's militia constitutes a part of the territorial defence forces.
7. The ratio of career cadre plus paramilitary forces to conscripts in the regular forces.
8. The ratio of career cadre plus paramilitary forces plus the militia to conscripts in the regular forces.
9. Source as in Table 11.1.
particular national groups on a functional/attitudinal integration continuum.\footnote{38}

As concluded in the earlier discussion of ethnic perceptions in the Soviet Union,\footnote{39} approximately two thirds of the population appears to have been integrated in both attitudinal and functional terms if such integration is assumed to mean the acceptance of the prevalent Russian cultural norms in their Marxist-Leninist edition. The Russian element is of particular importance in the military service because the SAF consciously continues the traditions of the Imperial Russian Army and a significant component of even the "internationalist" message has strong overtones of loyalty to Mother Russia. This group includes the ethnic Russians and all others prone to assimilate into the Russian majority (including Ukrainians and Belorussians from those areas which have been a part of the Soviet Union since the Revolution) and it constitutes the backbone of the SAF.

The reliability of this group seems to be assured, except perhaps in a crisis situation of a magnitude comparable to the events of the fall of 1941, when the very viability of the Soviet system came into question and the population's latent hatred for it came to the surface. An element of doubt regarding the loyalty to the Soviet state of the Russian majority has been introduced by Soviet political dissidents and political emigrés such as Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander Zinovev or Andrei Amalrik. The doubts are supported by signs of a growing social malaise, the symptoms of which are the bankruptcy of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a mobilizing agent and a search for substitutes which has prompted many people to turn to religion and nationalism.\footnote{40} In practical terms, however, an increase in Russian nationalism benefits Soviet patriotism, and the connection between the small, dispersed and suppressed centres of dissidence and the bulk of the Soviet population is tenuous. The loyalty of the majority core of the SAF in the case of a war regarded as "a defence of the Motherland," or in the case of an attack whose success would reinforce pride in the might of the
Among other national groups the Caucasians (Georgians and Armenians) are largely functionally integrated and are seen as basically loyal. The Balts are functionally integrated but cannot forget their interwar independence or their Western culture and are seen as politically unreliable, as are the Jews, the Crimean Tatars, and Western Ukrainians and Western Belorussians. Among the Soviet Moslems, who are projected to make up one third of all draft-age cohorts by the end of the century, most are still barely integrated even in functional terms. But because of their very alienation from the Europeans and their warrior traditions they may prove reliable against NATO. Moslem troops did, after all, prove to be basically reliable during WW II. Moreover, as the Moslems modernize, they appear to acquire a stake in the preservation of the system even if they dislike the Russians.

The ethnic security map within the SAF maximizes cohesive elements. In the Soviet Union the SAF are perhaps the one island in a sea of social and economic problems of which the people can be proud. The one sector of society which actually works well (in relative terms and despite the image some Western observers have of a "snafu" army), it is the embodiment of the nation's might and a focus for patriotic pride. The armed forces have traditionally been an integral part of the social fabric, in the Tsarist Empire as well as in the Soviet Union. It is a part of the Russian tradition, shared by most of the minorities, that the government is the basic organizational principle of society and that nothing gets done unless it is done by the government and on orders from above. And the armed forces have always been an integral part of the government.

East European traditions are very different. There national societies have survived despite the government and not because of it. In their historical experience the national character and national values were preserved outside the government and the coercive structures of alien rulers. This has been the case with the Poles since the 18th
century tripartite partitions, the Czechs since the Habsburgs' 1620 victory at White Mountain, the Hungarians under the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, the Romanians under the Ottomans and the Russians, and the Bulgarians under the Ottomans. The East Germans have been the one exception, since they are heirs to the Prussian tradition, but they are learning now.

Thus, after 35 years of communist rule in Eastern Europe, the parties and the state structures, the armed forces and the police, are integrated. But the societies are not integrated. This is not to say that an outward accommodation, a degree of functional integration, has not appeared to make survival possible under integrated structures. Part of the functional integration has been the acceptance by the greater part of the population, for the time being, of the inevitability of Soviet hegemony in the present geopolitical circumstances, and of the fact, demonstrated repeatedly, that Eastern Europe is at best of tertiary importance to the democratic West. This acceptance did not come easily and it is the lesson of bitter past experience.

Thus East European draftees share with their societies national aspirations, a Western cultural attraction, and in most cases the perception that their country is occupied by a historical enemy. There is sufficient evidence that, like their people at large, they do not respond to indoctrination except when it is cast in national patriotic terms, and then only if it is backed up by strong martial traditions. (See Fig. 11.1) This makes them basically unreliable as a part of the Warsaw Pact forces unless they can be motivated by perceptions of their own national interest. It is perhaps not without reason that the share of draftees in the East European contingents is substantially lower than that in the SAF. The integration mechanisms discussed above and the whole weight of the military and political environment obviously have to compensate for the total failure of attitudinal integration and for the poor response to political socialization of the average East European serviceman.
5. Executive indicators a historical tradition of survival under alien rule through accommodation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baltic States</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Re)assurance</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Deteriorating)</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>(Very high)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Deteriorating)</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Scythe) Syndrome</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Re)assurance</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bulgaria: High to Medium

Country Traditions: The Russians
Class Authority: Revolutionary
Attitudes: Revolutionary

Figure 11.1

East European Minority Countries of the Warsaw Pact:
Professional Cadre

The second major component under investigation, the professional cadre, has emerged as the crucial variable in dictating the character of and setting the mood for the Pact's forces as a whole. The policies of the last twenty years, and particularly of the last decade, seem to have succeeded in creating a "Greater Socialist Officer Corps" (GSOC). It bears all the basic characteristics of the Soviet officer cadre which, in turn, is very much the heir of Imperial Russian traditions. By all accounts the members of the GSOC are highly-trained professionals; they belong to the communist elite, are economically privileged, and are the recipients of numerous perquisites graded according to rank, in accordance with communist practice. The party and the military elites share common goals and common concerns for the maintenance and the perpetuation of the system, and for the maximization of its power in the international arena.

For years the Soviet Armed Forces have been part, together with the CPSU and the KGB, of an interpenetrated power triumvirate which has prevented any one of its components from taking absolute power. The attempted coup by Lavrentii Beria of the secret police in 1953 was thwarted with the Soviet Army's assistance, and it also helped First Secretary Khrushchev to defeat the Anti-Party Group in 1957. But Marshal Zhukov was soon slapped down by Khrushchev and the power of the Armed Forces declined while that of the KGB revived. An alliance of all three components of the triumvirate brought about Khrushchev's downfall in 1964, and the chiefs of the Armed Forces and the KGB were brought into the Politbureau as full members in 1973. The political power of the Armed Forces continued to rise under Leonid Brezhnev, and most commentators assumed that the SAF supported (the head of the KGB) Yuri Andropov in his accession to the CPSU leadership. Certainly Marshal Ustinov, the Minister of Defence, and particularly Marshal Ogarkov, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, have recently had a great deal of public exposure, which is an unusual phenomenon in the
Soviet Union. The political importance of the Armed Forces has been enhanced in the early 80s by Soviet anti-American war hysteria.

The East European armed forces have wielded far less political clout than their Soviet counterpart with the exception, since the beginning of the Polish Solidarity crisis, of Poland's General Jaruzelski. In accordance with Soviet integration policies all three components of the power triumvirate in Eastern Europe have been gradually brought closer to their Soviet brethren. It seems that the process has been most advanced in the case of the secret police apparati and least advanced in the case of the communist parties, with the military establishment at a point half way in-between.

The Soviet officer corps is highly homogeneous (it is predominantly Slavic, and mostly Russian), and there is little doubt that these officers are fully-integrated members of the system and have internalized its goals, which they see as entirely compatible with both national interests and the interests of their own caste. But their commitment appears to be based on Russian nationalism and their perceptions are pragmatic rather than ideological. The homogeneity of the East European components of the GSOE is less solid, not only because their officers come from varied national backgrounds but also because they are differentiated by rank: the higher the rank the better they fit into the Soviet model. The senior ranks appear to be integrated in both aspects and to have internalized the system's goals, seeing them as compatible with the interests of their own caste if not necessarily with the national interests of their countries.

The whole pattern of these men's social and professional relationships points to Moscow as the focus of their political loyalty. Because the top military commanders are also members of their parties' decision-making bodies (as in the USSR), they themselves are a link in the chain which binds Pact members together. The degree of integration is less extensive for the mid-career military cadre, but because it is from this group that candidates are recruited for the top positions it
can be assumed that, with some exceptions, their perceptions do not significantly diverge from those of their seniors. Some mid-career officers may in fact exceed their seniors in pro-Soviet zeal because of career ambitions. The junior cadre is the least integrated, and apart from officers intent on climbing up the military ladder it tends to reflect popular national attitudes. The junior officers may well be a problem at times of stress, but by virtue of their junior position their capability to act independently is nonexistent in peacetime, and would play a role only in exceptional combat situations. The evidence available in the case of Poland points to strong nationalist feelings with an anti-Soviet colouration among junior officers -- especially in the reserves -- and in junior-level officers' schools. The reliability of the officer cadre seems to depend largely on their self-interest; the modernization of the 70s has gone far in improving their economic conditions and in providing them with social and political benefits. Some may even be convinced that given the present geopolitical situation, working for the Soviet Union is genuinely in the national interest of their countries in the long run. But given the traditional and more recent historical background, the possibility of a patriotic plot or a mutiny cannot be totally excluded and is not excluded by Soviet policy makers, judging by the constraints under which East European officers have to operate. The realities of the situation, and the widely-reported cynicism and opportunism of the East European cadre, would seem to indicate otherwise, but a "Konrad Wallenrod" may always emerge.

Notwithstanding the slogan of "brotherhood in arms," there are numerous points of friction and frustration. One of these is the strong perception of being "Western" and thus more "civilized" than the Russians; yet, within the Pact structure, East Europeans always stand second to Soviet officers in top positions, a pattern which is reminiscent of the usage found in the party and state hierarchies of the Soviet non-Russian republics. Given the small, in most cases, size of
the East European military establishment and the absence of formations larger than a division, there is little room at the top for ambitious East European officers, although theoretically they can command large mixed formations and have done so during manoeuvres. A marshal's baton also seems doubtful (although the rank exists in the Polish Armed Forces -- in memory of Marshal Rokossovskii, no doubt -- and it was apparently established in the NVA in 1982). A the professionalism of the East European officers grows the perception of this subordinate status feeds national animosities, as does the perception of having to do the Soviets' dirty work. There have been reports that participation in the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion was distasteful to some officers; certainly, it appears to have been a non-event in the military historiographies of Poland, Hungary and East Germany and only the Bulgarian military literature has proudly discussed the Bulgarian role in this event.

Cohesion, Reliability, and Performance Expectations

Forces For and Against Cohesion

In recapitulation, the forces which favour the Pact's military cohesion are: the integration of the alliance's professional soldiers; the structural and disciplinary mechanisms which preempt capabilities for independent or disloyal action by dissident individuals or by national military contingents, and minimize the impact of disruptive elements ("the environment"); and intensive political indoctrination, which attempts to mobilize particular patriotism in support of the Pact's objectives and neutralizes attitudes dysfunctional to the maintenance of the system (see Fig. 11.2). This has been more effective in the case of the Soviet than the East European armies. On the credit side of the SAF there is the revival of Russian nationalism (dysfunctional in the case of non-integrated Soviet nationalities and the East Europeans) and certain cultural traditions. Historical
### Warsaw Pact: Cohesion of Military Contingents: Forces Working For and Against

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong>&lt;br&gt; Rituals and Routine&lt;br&gt; Ethnic Security Map: Deployment&lt;br&gt; Intra-Bloc Antagonisms other than Russophobia</td>
<td><strong>Cadre</strong> - &quot;New Class&quot; - Interests&lt;br&gt; Homogenized professional cadre (GSOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indoctrination</strong> (75%)&lt;br&gt; Patriotic Traditions&lt;br&gt; Martial Traditions&lt;br&gt; &quot;Internationalism&quot; - GOR &amp; GPW&lt;br&gt; Pride in Might</td>
<td><strong>Russian Nationalism</strong>&lt;br&gt; (50-65%)&lt;br&gt; <strong>Cultural Traditions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Conflict</strong>&lt;br&gt; Russophobia&lt;br&gt; (15-25%)&lt;br&gt; Youth Alienation</td>
<td><strong>Nationalism</strong>&lt;br&gt; <strong>Cultural Traditions</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GSOC -- Greater Socialist Officer Corps<br> GOR -- Great October Revolution<br> GPW -- Great Patriotic War

...% -- affects ...% of the whole (an arbitrary estimate)
national antagonisms among the East Europeans (see Fig. 11.3) also facilitate Soviet management of the alliance as a whole.

On the debit side, East European nationalism and Russophobia are the most potent of the forces which undermine and may disrupt the Pact's cohesion (see Fig. 11.1). The latter also affects a sizeable (but impossible to accurately determine) proportion of the non-Russians in the Soviet Union. Ethnic conflict within the Soviet Union may prove to be disruptive, but only in the case of western Soviet nationalities. While universal and endemic in the forces, it has festered at a relatively low level of intensity. Youth alienation has been widely observed in both the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, but it is among the East Europeans that it has posed more of a problem to the military authorities. The cultural traditions of the East Europeans (their attitudes toward authority — especially their ability to live with and bypass it — and their martial and/or revolutionary traditions; see Fig. 11.1) have not been helpful for the maintenance of alliance cohesion under Soviet hegemonial rule (see Fig. 11.2).

Cohesion in Peacetime

All of the forces which support cohesion seem to be working in peacetime (the limited efficacy of indoctrination is the one exception) and the functional and instrumental integration of the Pact is progressing. But the latent hostility of the East Europeans to the USSR and to the communist system (reinforced by dissatisfaction in the Western Soviet borderlands) creates a constant threat. There is no doubt that deep internal fissures exist, for they have been repeatedly manifested in the social and political spheres. The sequence of events which accompanied the Prague Spring shook the Pact not only in terms of a post-invasion trauma within the Czech military forces, a decline in their military worthiness and grumbling in the forces, but also because of popular repercussions throughout the bloc. The impact of the Polish debacle has yet to be assessed, but the potential repercussions were
clearly spelled out by Stanislaw Kania, the transitional Polish party secretary who was elected in 1980 and dismissed in 1981:

The situation in Poland and in relation to Poland concerns the security of all socialist countries. Socialist friendship ties are unbreakable and their defence is a matter of concern to each individual state as well as to the whole socialist coalition...48

Military concerns were listed in a Polish military journal in 1981:

The defence capability (obronnosc) of the country has been seriously compromised (in the last few months), which is an obvious confirmation of the existing and highly disquieting state of affairs... Only two elements, the geographic position and the political situation of our country, remained unchanged. All the factors have changed for the worse... the lowering of social discipline, difficulties in the realization of basic tasks by the state, a decline in material production... in communications... an anarchization... the discrepancy between the aims of newly emerged social structures and the aims of the state... This case has more than just Polish dimensions... the security of our borders is assured by the United Armed Forces of our coalition. (But)... First,... the weakening, even transitional, of our defence capability has a negative impact on the strength and defence capabilities of the coalition as a whole... In addition, we need to take into account our geographic position; we are located on the traditionally main strategic direction... Thus the weakening of the position of Poland has broad international repercussions... Second, (as members of the coalition) we have real and timely obligations, the non-fulfillment of which... can cause far reaching repercussions in the state of national and coalitional defence capabilities.49
And John Erickson comments on both the Polish and Czech crisis: "The cost of replacing Czech capability has been a heavy one... replacing Polish capability, if that were possible, would be even higher."50

The very policies adopted by the Soviet leaders reveal their lack of trust in their own people and in their allies. The Pact's system is safeguarded by a triple insurance mechanism: intensive socialization is designed to mold attitudes; if this is ineffective, a military elite has been created with a stake in the preservation of the system; if both of these fail, the institutional/structural constraints are such that no action can be taken by dissatisfied elements. Moreover, the regular armies in each of the communist countries are matched by specialized paramilitary forces which are generally better-equipped than the bulk of the regular forces and are trained for the suppression of internal dissent.

If these special forces are combined with professional (and thus assumed to be committed) elements in the regular forces, they are more than a match for less reliable conscript elements if, despite all safeguards, these become responsive to popular pressures. Not surprisingly, the "ratio of distrust" (the ratio of the combined total of professional cadre and special security troops to conscripts in each of the national armies) is highest in the most exposed and the most volatile East European Pact members (see Table 11.2). It is highest in the GDR and next highest in Poland; in both countries the ratio of politically reliable career cadre plus security troops to conscripts is greater than one (Ratio of Distrust I). If career and paramilitary forces are augmented by militia forces then the figure jumps much higher, with a staggering 7 to 1 ratio in the GDR (Ratio of Distrust II). But the composition of militia forces differs from country to country and they cannot be considered to be as politically reliable as the security police, even though militia members are selected largely because they are members of the party or youth organizations. The Polish militia forces, for example, were deeply penetrated by Solidarity
Fig. 11.3

INTRA-BLOC TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS
AND ANTAGONISMS

Friendships:

Russian-Czech
Russian-Bulgarian
Polish-Hungarian

Antagonisms:

Russian-German
Russian-Polish
Russian-Hungarian
Russian-Romanian
Polish-German
Polish-Czech
Czech-German
Hungarian-Romanian
Hungarian-Slovak
Romanian-Bulgarian
and members of the Polish militia even attempted to set up their own independent union, although this does not apply to the special ZOMO units which took on the main burden of suppressing workers when martial law was imposed.

The distrust factor is further magnified if one takes into consideration the number of Soviet troops stationed in a given country. The virtual security saturation of the GDR makes it clear why there has never been another attempt there to revolt after the abortive 1953 riots. It also illustrates the oft-repeated statement that the GDR troops (the NVA), "are the best trained but the least trusted." The saturation in Poland does not seem to be as high as in the GDR, but one must take into account the fact that the country is hemmed in by two massive concentrations of Soviet forces, one in the GDR and one in the Western military districts of the USSR. Although it is generally assumed (and with justification) that every Soviet citizen is under constant surveillance by the security organs, the comparison of the "ratio of distrust" in the Soviet Union with that in the East European members of the Warsaw Pact brings into focus the extent of the political problem in Eastern Europe: the Soviet ratio is less than half of even the lowest East European ratio (see Table 11.2).

Wartime Performance Expectations

Barring more internal upheavals, peacetime military cohesion of the Pact should and probably would hold if a war is started by a carefully pre-planned and staged anti-NATO blitzkrieg, providing that a mixed formations pattern is maintained and the action is rapid and successful. National units in mixed formations would probably be large enough for a sense of esprit de corps to be maintained (in the case of Polish elite units, for example, where such a spirit is assiduously cultivated), but not large enough to provide an opportunity to break out of the formation. They would be likely to perform well simply for lack of an immediate alternative. The situation would be different if any
such alternatives were to develop (that is, should reverses occur), and possibilities for defection to the West were to open up. The same would apply to anti-Soviet individuals or groups in the Soviet forces.

The risk factor of latent national frustrations erupting in wartime is bound to be magnified by two factors: mass mobilization, and the security of the rear. A mass mobilization in Eastern Europe and in the Western areas of the Soviet Union is bound to maximize the unreliable elements in the armed forces; East European popular attitudes were assessed above. The western periphery of the USSR: the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Belorussia, are areas which were incorporated after WW II and where nationalism, separatism and political dissent have been growing and have become increasingly visible despite the constraints imposed by the system, the high personal risks which are involved, and the repressions which follow. The percentage of "unreliable" elements among the reserves from other parts of the USSR would be lower, but they would still be present. The problem of the Moslems, which emerged in World War II, would reemerge, but in my estimation it would not be as serious as is generally supposed. Their level of functional integration, albeit still low, is now much higher than it used to be; they have no friendship ties with the Western nations, and their commitment to the Soviet motherland (as distinct from Mother Russia) has increased. One should remember that although Moslem participation in the Soviet military effort, during WW II may have been unenthusiastic, and some Moslem troops defected, uncounted multitudes fought and died for the Soviet Union. The Soviet mobilization of reserves (as it was carried out during WW II and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan) builds units out of locally resident reservists, which results in a heavy preponderance in these units of the local national groups. In the past the resulting problem of potential disloyalty was handled in several ways, and these precedents will probably hold in future combat situations. A great deal of emphasis was placed on propaganda in the national languages and
within a national cultural frame of reference -- exactly the practice followed now in the Pact armies and thus unlikely to defuse the problem of nationalism. Other remedies were the use of penal battalions, and the deployment of NKVD troops, with guns at the ready, in the rear of suspect formations. Moreover, as the war progressed, the potential for disloyalty on the part of ethnic units was precluded by reinforcement policies. Units with a high percentage of national minorities were reinforced by mixed manpower, a practice which served to quickly dilute their national character.

Penal battalions were used extensively for offensive purposes (such as the clearing of mine fields). Suvorov comments on the effectiveness of penal battalions for military purposes as well as for political control in WW II:

The Communists are clever people. They saved their dictatorship in a most original way -- by developing a new use for penal battalions, which proved to be a decisive force in the battles with the German army. The Germans choked on the blood of the Soviet penal battalions. Also, with the help of the penal battalions, the Communists destroyed millions of their potential enemies and put an end for several decades to the growth of disobedience and resistance to their regime.

In any Soviet westward offensive the problem of maintaining the security of the rear, and particularly the maintenance of the security of communications, will be formidable. Poland is of crucial importance in this respect. Yet the popular attitudes which were amply revealed during the Solidarity period, as well as in the four waves of resistance which preceded it, and revolutionary and partisan insurgency traditions, all indicate that there is a likelihood of widespread subversion and sabotage (partisan activities cannot be excluded). As in the past this could spill into neighbouring Soviet territory and, given favourable circumstances, it might even infect neighbours to the west and south.
Solidarity has attempted (successfully in some cases) to develop contacts across the borders in Lithuania and Ukraine, and in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary.

The need to maintain strong and reliable paramilitary forces for internal control and control of the rear is self-evident and has been reflected in the "ratio of distrust" discussed above.

A review of the "objective" (equipment and training) and "subjective" (attitudes) capabilities of particular contingents may help in evaluating their particular performance expectations in wartime. The SAF provides the massive core of the Warsaw Pact forces in objective as well as in subjective terms (the latter from the point of view of high reliability), barring unusual contingencies to be discussed below. An objective assessment of the East European contingents indicates that the Northern Tier armies of East Germany, Poland and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia are the only armies of importance against NATO forces; The Hungarian Army is qualitatively and quantitatively the weakest. The level of modernization of the Bulgarian forces is too low for them to be used against main NATO forces. Bulgaria's isolation indicates a local Balkan role, perhaps against the NATO periphery of Greece and Turkey. The Romanian Army is not available for offensive action and is poorly equipped, although it is capable, together with territorial defence forces, of defensive warfare.

In a recent study of the Warsaw Pact Thomas Cason places the Polish Armed Forces first among the East European armed forces in terms of objective capability, since Poland has the largest force with the largest number of critical military elements: combat aircraft, tanks and armoured vehicles, and airborne and amphibious units. The troops are well-trained, with a higher level of combat readiness and the best equipment base. The NVA, although small, is also classified as a first-class force as far as its training, combat readiness and equipment are concerned. Czechoslovak forces are also considered to be objectively "good" with modern equipment and adequate training, although they are
under strength. It appears likely that the NVA, elite Polish formations and some Czech formations would be used in mixed formations for offensive purposes. The NVA, which by all accounts is the most fully integrated into Soviet force structures is also the least trusted. The political reliability of the senior cadre seems assured, but general ferment among the youth and close ties with West Germany mean that the NVA would have to be rated low on reliability and high on potential defections. Hence the NVA is a candidate for use as cannon fodder. The Czech forces have a history of schizophrenia (between a "national" and a "loyal" faction), a tradition of non-fighting (in 1938, 1948, 1968), and were demoralized by the 1968 invasion. In Habsburg times the Czechs were known to change sides as national interest dictated, and it is unlikely that their performance or reliability will be high.

The Polish contingents are the most difficult to evaluate. They are inevitably affected by post-Solidarity trauma, but there are indications that at least some military personnel believe the "national interest" rationale for martial law. The conscript base is totally unreliable, but elite units have been carefully chosen and are reputed to have high morale and to be superbly trained. They will probably fight (and fight well) in a first push, but cannot be counted on for sustained reliability in any circumstances. Although Polish martial traditions and the skilful use of nationalism have helped to shape the Polish forces' good combat posture, revolutionary traditions bode ill for the prospect of loyal service to the Soviet Union.

In the aftermath of 1956 the Hungarians have become resolutely non-martial; they would most likely be reluctant to go to war and reluctant to fight. The Bulgarian forces have few military traditions, but because of pro-Russian sentiments among the cadre, and a perceived convergence of interests with the Soviet Union, they may perform well in a limited Balkan role. However, in the long run the Bulgarian forces will be guided by perceptions of national interest. The Romanians will
probably defend themselves against the Russians; their tradition has been to change sizes at the appropriate moment in pursuit of the national interest. Because of their non-participation in integration mechanisms, and known unreliability, they will probably be allowed to sit things out on the sidelines.

The conventional wisdom has it that the Pact forces will hold together when defending national territory, while fissures will come to the surface if an attack is mounted against NATO forces. This seems unlikely. For the reasons outlined above, a fast and successful attack by Warsaw Pact forces might actually enhance their cohesion. A recently-published major study of armed forces over the ages comes out strongly in support of the effectiveness of traditional military discipline for the cohesion of military forces:

Traditional methods for inculcating and sustaining military discipline remain very effective. Close order drill has lost none of its capacity to arouse elemental sociality among those who participate in it hour after hour. Its utter irrelevance in modern combat may not matter. Other rituals and routines, too, may arise and exert self-perpetuating power to channel and stabilize behavior both within the armed services and in civil society at large. Routine and ritual constitute the standard substitute for faith of the incandescent, personal, and revolutionary kind. As such faiths -- Marxist or liberal-democratic, as the case may be -- fade towards mere shibboleth, ritual and routine alone remain.58

Ritual and routine are the hallmarks of the training of Warsaw Pact armies.

At the same time, however, it seems that the assumption that there will be an automatic "defence of the homeland" reflex is not warranted. This would certainly not be the case in the event of an eastward advance by western armies, which would be likely to bring
popular preferences and hatred for the communist regime to the surface. Even the West Germans might be welcomed if they were under an American umbrella. Such an event could trigger wholesale defections -- even the hard-line cadre might change sides -- and the people of Eastern Europe would dance in the streets (all of this assuming, of course, that there is anyone left after, or if, nuclear weapons are used). If the lessons of World War II have any relevance, and if Soviet dissidents and defectors are right about the hatred the Russians have for the communist regime (the perception of having been "used" and of bearing a major share of suffering under this regime has frequently been raised in recent Russian samizdat writings), a spillover effect may even reach the Soviet Union.

In the final analysis, the cohesion of the Pact's military forces at the present time appears to be of a higher order than might be expected in view of the problems with nationalism and legitimacy which the communist regimes face at home. In some respects the career cadre of the East European armies resemble the Janissaries of the old Ottoman Empire (and have been called so by their national dissidents), the efficacy of the integration mechanisms making up for being kidnapped in childhood. But in other respects these are schizophrenic armies caught between the anvil of national interests and traditions and the hammer of their role as tools of Soviet imperial policies at home and abroad. In the long run they are unreliable. For the SAF the loyalty of their Russian core has always been crucial and will remain so for the foreseeable future. If the Russians hold, so will the SAF. As long as the SAF hold and the integration mechanisms work, the WP alliance will endure. In any event, the cohesion of the SAF will outlast that of the socialist alliance.
ENDNOTES


2 See the country chapters in Vol. II.

3 See Chapter 2 above.

4 Interview with General Leon Dubicki, formerly of the Polish People's Army, Nov. 1982, Hamburg.


6 See Chapter 6 above.


8 See Chapter 9 above. The entry on "boevoe sodruzhestvo" in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia is four pages long and explicitly explains the nature of the relationship. See *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia* Vol. I (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 525-528.


14 See the chapter on Poland in Vol. II.
The accusation was firmly rejected by the accused and publicly denied -- at their request -- by Z.B. Brzezinski, the then National Security Adviser to President Carter. See Kultura (Paris) No. 11, 1983, pp. 107-108.

See Chapters 7 and 8 below.

The Military Balance for 1983-84 indicates that category designations differ for East European and Soviet units. For the East European units category 1 indicates 75% of nominal strength, category 2 -- 50%, and category 3 -- cadre strength only (p. vii). For the Soviet Union category 1 indicates 75-100% strength, category 2 -- 50-75%, and category 3 -- below 50% (p. 16). For a discussion of unit size during manoeuvres and bilateral training exercises see Chapter 8 above.

Ibid., p. 11.

Ibid., p. 16. There are 31 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, and all of them are at cat. 1 readiness. There are 65 divisions in the European USSR (35% of them are at cat. 1 readiness), while all the East European forces number 45 divisions.

These include Polish airborne and amphibious divisions. Other likely units include those under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the whole of the NVA, the area air force units, and the Polish and East German navies now within the Soviet Baltic Fleet.


Interview with General Leon Dubicki, November 1982, Hamburg.

Suvorov, Inside the Red Army, pp. 19-20. Although the existence of two Polish armies has been mentioned, neither Lewis (op. cit., p. 200) nor Cason ("The Warsaw Pact Today: The East European Military Forces," pp. 137-162, in Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1982), p. 153) include an army when enumerating Polish military formations. The SAF have three Marshal ranks above those of Army General. None of the East European armies has a marshal rank except for Poland and the GDR (since 1981). Poland has also retained the traditional general officer ranks of: "General of Brigade," "General of Division," "General of Arms," and "General of Army," as compared to the other
armies, which use the designations of "Major General," "Lieutenant General," "Colonel General," and "Army General." See Lewis, op. cit., pp. 430, 439, 446, 450, 455, 462. This is in accordance with the skillful use of patriotic symbols in the Polish Armed Forces (see Ch. 9 above).


26 Myagkov, op. cit., p. 103 and passim.


28 See Chapters 7 and 8 above.

29 Suvorov, Inside the Red Army, p. 265.

30 Barron, KGB, p. 194.

31 Ibid., p. 197. Given Romania's general position, one must assume that Romanian service collaboration is voluntary and is seen as a function of the national interest.

32 Ibid., p. 198.

33 Myagkov, op. cit. See also Ladislav Bittman (an ex-member of the Czech STB) The Deception Game (New York: Ballantine Books, 1981)


35 "Wytyczne Biura Politycznego w sprawie nomenklatury kadr instancji partyjnych wraz z wykazem stanowisk objętych nomenklatura KC, KW, KP (KM, KD)" [Guidelines of the Politbureau re nomenklatura of party cadres, together with a list of positions within the nomenklatura of the Central Committee and lower party committees], ANEKS (London) No. 26, 1981, pp. 52-55. These documents were first published in Revue Francaise de Sociologie 20 (1979), pp 431-466. Section II of the General Staff is Intelligence.

36 See Chapter 7 above.

37 Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political
See also Chapter 7 above.

38 Functional integration implies outward conformity to the system's norms and values; attitudinal integration implies their internalization (see Chapter 2, above).

39 See Chapter 2 above.


41 The KGB has instructions to keep members of these groups within the military under surveillance. See Myagkov, op. cit., p. 88.

42 See Chapter 2 above.

43 It is interesting to note that senior generals seem to have become a target of Andropov's anti-corruption campaign (see the article by Constantin Simes in The Washington Post, 8 Jan. 1984).

44 See the chapter on Poland in Vol. II. Zbigniew Bujak, one of Solidarity's leaders — (in the underground since Dec. 13, 1981), is reported to be a reserve lieutenant of the elite airborne troops.

45 Konrad Wallenrod is the hero of a poem written by Adam Mickiewicz (Poland's foremost romantic poet of the 19th century). Wallenrod serves the enemy in order to destroy him.

46 Volgyes, op. cit., p. 198.


49 Col. I. Ruszkiewicz, "Gwarant Bezpieczeństwa Polski, Wspólnoty, Socjalizmu (w 26-lecie Ukladu Warszawskiego), Wojsko Ludowe No. 5, 1981.

50 John Erickson, "Stability in the Warsaw Pact?" Current History 81 (November 1982).

51 See the chapter on the USSR in Vol. II.
See Chapter 5 above re national-territorial formations in WW II.

Ibid.

Suvorov, Inside the Red Army, p. 240.

Cason, op. cit., pp. 154-157, 149-152, 152-154, 143-146, 158-160. See also Table 11.2.

Lewis, op. cit., p. 162, reports that in 1965 33 of the top NVA commanders were pre-1933 members of the German Communist Party and socialists with Spanish Civil War records. Another 12 commanders were ex-POW's who became communists when they were imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

See the chapter on East Germany in Vol. II.

The question of the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact forces is analyzed from the point of view of interaction between national attitudes and the integration mechanisms of the alliance. Functional and attitudinal aspects of integration are correlated with the reliability factor. The years of joint operations and indoctrination are weighed to measure the impact they have had on shaping overall perceptions and identification (or lack thereof) with common goals, and thus on patterns of future combat performance. In the final assessment three crucial components of the Warsaw Pact forces are analyzed: the servicemen, the professional cadre, and the military-political environment in which they interact. Their relative impact on the attitudes/performance mix in peacetime is evaluated and projected for wartime conditions. This is Volume I of a two-volume study.
Warsaw Pact forces
Combat performance patterns
Morale
National attitudes
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Cohesion

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