JAPAN AND THE SOVIET THREAT:
PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS

by

Curtis A. Kemp

December 1983

Thesis Advisor: E. A. Olser

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
**Japan and the Soviet Threat: Perceptions and Reactions**

**ABSTRACT**

Japan and the USSR occupy neighboring positions geographically, yet stand vastly separated due to historical and cultural reasons. A cloud of distrust permeates bilateral relations. Since 1978, greatly expanded Soviet military forces in Northeast Asia have been added to this unstable foundation. With such military power so close, one might think Japan would be acutely concerned. This paper examines...
the security perceptions of various Japanese groups, the Japan-USSR economic linkages to the security issue, and the extent which Japan's ongoing defense programs represent a direct response to the Soviet "threat." The US government would like to believe that Japan shares a similar security outlook of the USSR. This study demonstrates that marked differences currently exist, but suggests that Japanese perceptions of (and responses to) the Soviet "threat" are in a state of flux.
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Japan and the Soviet Threat: Perceptions and Reactions

by

Curtis A. Kemp
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1972

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 1983

Author:  Curtis A. Kemp
Approved by:  Edward A. Olson  Thesis Advisor

Claude A. Buss  Second Reader

Herman W. Blandin  Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

K. T. Marshall  Dean of Information and Policy Sciences
ABSTRACT

Japan and the USSR occupy neighboring positions geographically, yet stand vastly separated due to historical and cultural reasons. A cloud of distrust permeates bilateral relations. Since 1978, greatly expanded Soviet military forces in Northeast Asia have been added to this unstable foundation. With such military power so close, one might think Japan would be acutely concerned. This paper examines the security perceptions of various Japanese groups, the Japan-USSR economic linkages to the security issue, and the extent which Japan's ongoing defense programs represent a direct response to the Soviet "threat." The US government would like to believe that Japan shares a similar security outlook of the USSR. This study demonstrates that marked differences currently exist, but suggests that Japanese perceptions of (and responses to) the Soviet "threat" are in a state of flux.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION --------------------------------------- 9
   A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES --- 10

II. CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES -------- 20
   A. CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ----------------- 31
   B. OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET PACIFIC FORCES ---------- 34

III. ATTITUDES OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT --------- 39
    A. PRIME MINISTERS: PRIORITIES AND THE USSR --- 39
    B. PRIME MINISTERS: ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE
       MEASURES ---------------------------------------- 49
    C. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY -------------------------- 56
    D. THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY ---------------------- 60
    E. VIEWS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES --------------- 65
       1. Japan Socialist Party (JSP) ------------------- 66
       2. Japan Communist Party (JCP) ------------------- 68
       3. Komeito --------------------------------------- 69
       4. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) ----------- 70
       5. New Liberal-Democratic Federation
          (NLDF) ---------------------------------------- 71

IV. PERCEPTIONS OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS --------- 73
    A. JAPAN-SOVIE'T TRADE ---------------------------- 73
    B. JAPAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN SIBERIA --------------- 75
    C. PERCEPTIONS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY ------ 79
    D. PERCEPTIONS OF SCHOLARS ---------------------- 85
GLOSSARY

AAW Anti-Aircraft Warfare
AGI Auxiliary General Intelligence (intelligence collection ship)
AOR Replenishment Oiler
APC Armored Personnel Carrier
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
CC Command Ship
CG Guided-missile Cruiser
CL Light Cruiser
COMSEVENTHFLT Commander Seventh Fleet
CV Aircraft Carrier
CVHG Guided-missile V/STOL Aircraft Carrier
DD Destroyer
DDG Guided-missile Destroyer
DDH Helicopter Destroyer
DE Frigate (Destroyer Escort)
DSJP Daily Summary of Japanese Press
FF Frigate
FFG Guided-missile Frigate
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Force
LPD Amphibious Transport Dock
MIRV Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeping Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Mutual Security Treaty (Japan-US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Submarine (diesel-electric)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Nuclear-powered Ballistic-missile Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Cruise-missile Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSGN</td>
<td>Nuclear-powered Cruise-missile Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASS</td>
<td>Towed Acoustic Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL</td>
<td>Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

The relations between any two nations are dynamic and driven by a complex set of factors. In the US, the theme of the Soviet "threat" takes on certain meanings because various Soviet actions over the years have been plainly aimed at upsetting US foreign policy and establishing quick response strike forces postured against deployed US military units, as well as intercontinental missiles targeted against the US homeland. But how does Japan view the Soviets? Because Japan has been defensively aligned with the US since it regained its sovereignty after World War II, too often Americans think that Japan views (or should view) the Soviets through "red, white, and blue-tinted" glasses. However, Japan is its own country, with its own set of interrelationships and views of the USSR.

This paper will attempt to evaluate Japan's perceptions of the Soviet "threat" by examining the views of various Japanese communities, both within and outside of the government. The economic relations between the two countries will also be reviewed to determine the degree of dependency which exists today, and projected prospects for the future. Japan's security programs will then be analyzed to determine what Japan is actually doing on defense matters and to what degree these efforts appear to be a reaction to perceptions of
the Soviet "threat," responses to pressure from the US, or other factors.

The purpose of this study is to help Americans gain a clearer understanding and appreciation of the views of the Japanese on this subject. The US has often been quick to expect Japan to understand and accept US views, but only when mutual understanding is achieved can the Japan-US partnership best serve the interests of both countries.

To set the background for this study, the significant historical events between Japan and the USSR will be re-viewed because many of these issues have had lasting impact on Japan-Soviet relations.

A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

One Western scholar summed up the history of Japan-Soviet relations quite succinctly when he commented, "It would be hard to name any pair of peoples less well suited to get along with each other."¹ The roots of this tenuous relationship lie embedded in the common historical experiences of these two neighbors. The bitterness emerging from some of these events has lingered on and certain issues remain unresolved even today. A review of the significant incidents shared by these two nations may provide some insight into the attitudes of each nation towards the other.

It is interesting that the first recorded contacts be-tween the Japanese and Russians took place in the Kurile Islands which today remain a central topic of controversy.
By 1739, Russian explorers had reached the Kuriles. As subsequent expeditions gradually worked their way south along the chain of islands, the Russians finally set foot on Hokkaido in 1778. When one recalls that these initial contacts occurred in the midst of the Tokugawa period of isolation in Japan, it is not hard to imagine how a xenophobic outlook developed amongst the Japanese with regards to Russia, though history does not support sufficient Russian capability or intent to threaten Japan.

With increased exposure between the Japanese and Russians (particularly in the northern areas), territorial disagreements soon arose. Negotiations to resolve these disputes resulted in the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) which recognized the joint interests of both countries in Sakhalin and divided possession of the island chain (at the eastern border of the Sea of Okhotsk) between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. This treaty was modified by the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875) which turned over the Kurile Islands to Japan in return for recognition of Sakhalin as exclusively Russian territory.

Expansionism struck a popular theme in the late 19th century and Japan and Russia were both caught up in this movement. The interest of these two countries in the Korean Peninsula eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). Japan's surprise attack on the Russians at Port Arthur likely left a permanent scar on the Russian psyche. Japan's
victory in this war was indeed impressive but did not eliminate the Russian threat. By the time the fighting ceased, Japan's forces were hard pressed to carry on the war much longer. Their logistics pipeline was deteriorating rapidly as supplies and ammunition approached critical levels. Though Russia had experienced severe difficulties in supporting a war effort so far from its capital, its supply of manpower would have proved almost inexhaustible. War demands impacted more on the resources of the victor than the defeated. Though Russia lost this match, Japan knew it was only a temporary setback in Russia's rise to greater power.

When the Treaty of Portsmouth officially concluded the war in 1905, Russia was forced to cede southern Sakhalin to Japan, give up former gains in Manchuria, and recognize Japan's privileged status in Korea. Japan wasted little time in taking absolute control of Korea (annexed in 1910) which in part, provided an effective means of deterring Russian intervention in the area (though deterred, the events at the conclusion of World War II suggest that Russia had not lost interest in the Korean Peninsula). Up through World War I, various agreements were concluded between Japan and Russia which for the most part dealt with recognizing spheres of interest of each party. After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia (hereafter referred to as the Soviet Union or USSR), Japan participated with other nations in the Siberian intervention by deploying troops to Siberia in 1918. While
the other powers involved withdrew their troops by 1920, Japanese troops remained within Siberia and the Soviet Far East (mainly in northern Sakhalin) until 1925 when a withdrawal was negotiated in return for oil and coal from Sakhalin.  

Over the next decade, Japan's concern over the growing Soviet ideological and military threat resulted in its entering into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany (1936). However, as World War II got underway and Japan saw the potential of the Soviets, Americans, and British allying in opposition to Japanese plans in East Asia, Japan moved to improve its position by concluding a Neutrality Pact with the USSR (1941). The Soviets demonstrated their lack of sincere support for the Neutrality Pact as early as October 1943 when Stalin informed US Secretary of State Hull at an Allied Foreign Ministers conference that the USSR planned to provide assistance against Japan after victory was achieved over Germany.  

The fates of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were decided at Yalta in February 1945 when President Roosevelt agreed to turn over the areas to the USSR for its entry into the war against Japan. The Agreement stated that these territories would be returned to the USSR in recognition of the "treacherous attack of Japan in 1904." As one looks at the pattern of Japan-Soviet relations since World War II, these latter stages of the war appear to mark a major turning
point. Considering the Soviet tendency to respect others according to their military prowess, it seems that Japan had henceforth lost much of its bargaining position. In the spring of 1945, Japan sought a "non-aggression" commitment and economic support from the USSR. The Soviets made no serious effort to deal with these requests. On August 9th, the same day that the second atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, Soviet forces entered Manchuria. By August 14th, Japan called for a halt to the hostilities.

Nearly complete exclusion of the Soviets from the Allied Occupation of Japan greatly irritated the USSR. It must have seemed that the war had barely ended and already the Americans ignored Soviet concerns in their own backyard. Perhaps this memory has encouraged the Soviets to still endeavor to gain the influence over Japan that they were denied in the Occupation years. With the USSR's direct influence over Japan thwarted by the US, Soviet efforts appeared to have been aimed at assisting the Japan Communist Party (JCP) gain influence, lobbying for the removal of US forces from Japan, and/or channeling Japan towards a neutralist position (i.e., remove any threat to the Soviet homeland).  

The POW issue has had lasting memories for the Japanese. Nearly 600,000 Japanese were taken into custody by the Soviets as the war ended. More than a year passed before the first Japanese POW's returned from the USSR (December 1946). Repatriation over the next six years proceeded in slow and
sporadic steps. By the early 1950's, the Japanese government estimated that 234,151 Japanese prisoners had died while interned by the Soviets, 18,797 were listed as "missing," and 17,637 remained imprisoned. From accounts of repatriates, Japanese prisoners were extensively used as forced labor (some consider the term "slave labor" more appropriate) under bleak work conditions and were routinely subjected to copious amounts of "educational" material espousing the glories of the Communist system and the evils of US intentions. The JCP apparently enjoyed some success in finding new recruits from among the repatriates though probably not to the degree hoped for by the Soviets, and certainly not comparing with the amount of anti-Soviet sentiment created in Japan as a result of the POW issue.

The USSR refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Its main objectives centered around the lack of guarantees that Japan could never again become an aggressor, opposition to US forces stationed in Japan, and opposition to the security agreement between Japan and the US. Even at this time, the Soviets recognized the significance of the straits around Japan. They recommended an amendment to the Treaty to gain unrestricted use of the waters and straits around Japan, which was disapproved.

When Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama came to power in 1954, he actively pursued normalization of relations with the USSR, even if it meant sidestepping central issues such
as the dispute over the Northern Territories. As a result, diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1956. Relations remained respectable through the 1960's as both countries displayed a willingness to concentrate on peripheral matters in the spirit of "peaceful coexistence."

The 1970's witnessed a period of decline in Japan-Soviet relations. In 1976, a Soviet pilot (Lt. Viktor Belenko) defected and landed his MIG-25 in Hakodate, Japan. The Soviets were outraged when the Japanese allowed US personnel to analyze the plane before returning it to the USSR. The continuous arguing over fishing rights and the frequent seizures of Japanese fishing vessels by the Soviets irritated the Japanese. Additionally, the Soviet's disapproval of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978 became manifest in the buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the introduction of troops and military equipment to the Northern Territories. The Soviet military entry into Afghanistan in December 1979 served notice to the world that the Soviets were not reluctant to use their military power in areas outside of Eastern Europe. Recent incidents causing further concern for both parties have been Japan's pledge to protect the sea lanes within 1000 miles of Japan and the Soviet deployment of Backfire bombers and SS-20 missiles to the Far East.

In evaluating the current situation from the Japanese perspective, the following issues continue to be pertinent:
a) The Northern Territories: The Japanese have long considered the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Hobomai group (see Figure 1) as an integral part of Japan. Previously inhabited by Japanese, they were recognized in past treaties as Japanese territory, and Japan believes they were wrongfully occupied by Soviet forces immediately following World War II. The unresolved issue serves as an unpleasant reminder of the time when Japan was a defeated country. Former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato may have accurately expressed the Japanese desire to resolve this problem when he stated, "I just want to tie up the loose ends of the war." \(^{11}\)

b) the US-USSR military balance: Whereas once the US could be recognized as the predominant military power in the Pacific, this no longer holds true. Factors contributing to this shift include the drawdown of US forces following the withdrawal from Vietnam, the significant increase in Soviet military strength in the region, the proposed pullout of US troops from Korea, and the new policy emphasis on the Nixon Doctrine calling for US allies to do more for themselves. The potential ramifications for Japan were suggested by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in April 1980 when he stated, "The United States is not a superpower any longer. The days are gone when we were able to rely on America's deterrence."\(^{12}\)

c) The Soviet military buildup: The marked expansion of the Soviet military in the East Asia region in recent years has created increasing anxiety among the Japanese (see Chapters II and V).
The Northern Territories


Figure 1
d) Soviet diplomatic style: Though the brusque nature of the Soviets somewhat offends the Japanese, more importantly, they object to the lack of respect afforded them by the USSR. The Japanese consider the unilateral Soviet release of a draft treaty on USSR-Japan friendship and cooperation (February 1978) as a prime example of the disregard the Soviets show for Japan as a fellow sovereign nation.

e) Fishing rights: Since Japan regained its sovereignty in the early 1950's, jockeying over Japanese fishing rights in the northern areas (the Sea of Okhotsk, in the vicinity of the Kuriles, and the Bering Sea) have persisted. Though interim agreements have been concluded at different times, hard fought negotiations routinely address fish quotas, area usage fees, and the seizure of Japanese boats by the Soviets.

f) The Siberian connection: The Japanese have involved themselves in a number of projects to cultivate some of the natural resources of Siberia and provide new inputs to the Japanese market.

With the above background information in mind, the impact of the Soviet "threat" on Japan will now be examined.
II. CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

In attempting to size up the "threat" posed by a nation, consideration must be given to both the capabilities and intent of that nation to carry out such a threat. No matter how much one nation despises another, if the one does not possess the capability to attack the other, it cannot posture a viable threat. Conversely, simple because one nation possesses impressive power projection capabilities, without the intent to employ these capabilities against another, it does not pose a threat. The military capabilities of the Soviet Pacific forces (in particular, the Soviet Navy) have significantly improved since the end of World War II (especially since the late 1970's). This military buildup has not been directed solely at any one country alone, but for Japan, it presents potential problems which must be considered when addressing national security.

At the close of World War II, the USSR set a high priority on establishing "friendly" buffer states along its European borders as part of its defense strategy against the West. East Asia never provided as neat a package to deal with for the Soviets as did Europe. Not only was a vast amount of ocean involved, but also fewer, and less rigid defense agreements (with the US) had been contracted, and the Soviets seemed to find it more difficult to gauge the reactions of
the nations of the Orient. The Soviet Pacific Fleet emerged unscathed from World War II (as opposed to the other Soviet fleets) but still possessed extremely limited capabilities. Its capabilities centered around coastal defense with emphasis on mine warfare. The power projection capabilities of the other Soviet forces (over water) were also nil.

Soviet forces in general remained oriented towards close-in defense of the homeland until the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The new Soviet priority then became the development of ICBM's. The US Navy reigned supreme in the Pacific and the Soviets had little with which to offer a challenge. The Soviet Pacific Fleet of the mid-1960's contained only a handful of DDG's/FF's, about a hundred submarines, and numerous older combatants and minor naval warships. About this same time, the US began deploying the Polaris A3 missile aboard its SSBN's. Though the USSR recognized the threat posed by the US Navy's CV's and SSBN's, only a gradual response evolved in the Soviet Pacific Fleet. In 1974, the Soviet Pacific Fleet possessed ten major surface combatants with credible ASW and/or anti-CV capabilities.

The withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam and the extensive cutbacks in US deployed forces and ships in the mid-1970's marked the end of US absolute predominence in the Pacific. However, this in itself did not spur on rapid Soviet naval expansion. In fact, at the end of 1977, Admirals Zumwalt and Bagley in an article commented that little change had occurred in the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the last ten years whereas
the Soviet Army and Air Force in the Far East reflected much progress. In contrast, the next two years (1978-79) must be considered a watershed period for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Whereas the gradual Soviet naval buildup in the late 1960's/early 1970's appears to have been primarily a response to military stimuli (US CV's and SSBN's), the new (and more significant) response about to occur appears more as a military response resulting from political developments in East Asia. The Soviets were quite vocally displeased when Japan and China signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978 (especially because of its "anti-hegemony" clause) and were no doubt further aggravated when the US formally recognized China in December 1978. Possibly, with visions of a US-China-Japan alliance wrapping its arms around the Russian bear, the Soviets reacted swiftly. Relations markedly improved with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) which culminated in the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Peace and Friendship (November 1978). Significant Soviet troop buildups began in the Northern Territories of Japan and air surveillance missions around Japan were stepped up (see Figures 2 and 3). As part of the response to this new perceived threat, the capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet received direct attention. Before the end of 1979, the Minsk (CVHG), two Karas (CG), one Kresta II (CG), the Ivan Rogov (LPD), one AOR, and one Krivak (DDG) were introduced into the Pacific Fleet.
Military aircraft
(A) Flights southward over the Japan Sea 192
(B) Flights over the Tsushima Straits 7
(C) Flights east of coast of Okinawa, etc. 3
(D) Flights southward over the Pacific Ocean 17
(E) "Tokyo Express" flights, etc. 9
(F) Flights off eastern Hokkaido 12
(Total 240/year instances)

Vessels
(a) Passage through Tsushima Straits 165
(b) Passage through Tsugaru Straits 80
(c) Passage through Soya Straits 205
(Total: 430/year instances)

Note: Number of ships and instances indicates average figures over the past five years.


Figure 2

23
SOVIET OCCUPATION OF JAPANESE NORTHERN TERRITORIES


Figure 3
In response to the invasion of Vietnam by the PRC in February 1979, the Soviets sent a task group to the South China Sea (apparently as a show of force in support of Vietnam) consisting of five surface combatants, an amphibious vessel, a minesweeper, and other auxiliary vessels (with probable submarine support also). As this new Soviet aggressiveness in the Pacific emerged, naval improvements continued, highlighted by weapons/platform sophistication and advances in ASW capabilities. By the early 1980's, no longer did antiquated ships constitute the bulk of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

The following figures give some idea of the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet since 1974:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub (other)</td>
<td>(40 nuclear)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major surface</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor surface</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious (large)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Auxiliaries</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there obviously have been quantitative improvements, the qualitative improvements are more impressive. About 40% of the Soviet SSBN inventory is now in the Pacific Fleet. Of the "other" 95 submarines, about 23 are SSG/SSGN's which represent a formidable threat to enemy surface combatants. The surface combatants are highlighted by 1 CV, 7 CG's,
2 CL's, 1 CC, 11 SAM DDG's, 6 FFG's, 15 DD's, 30 FF's, and 55 missile craft/corvettes.  

Soviet Naval Air (SNA) in the Pacific region features the following aircraft:

- IL-38 May c15
- Tu-95 Bear c20
- Tu-16 Badger 125
- Tu-22 Blinder 15
- Backfire c40
- Yak-36 Forger c20 (onboard Minsk)

The impressive capabilities of the Backfire bomber deserve comment. The Backfire has a combat radius (without refueling) of over 3000 NM and can attain speeds up to 1100 KTs.  

Considering that most Pacific Backfires are stationed just north of Vladivostok, they can be out over the Sea of Japan or Sea of Okhotsk almost immediately after takeoff, and on a direct flight could be over Tokyo in less than an hour (though with its combat radius, the Backfire is capable of approaching the main islands of Japan from any direction). Nuclear capable and effective against either surface combatants at sea or against land targets, the Backfire can carry a large assortment of bombs or air-to-surface missiles.

The Marine Corps of the Soviet military is the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI). Of the estimated 12,000 personnel in the SNI, the greatest proportion (about 8,000) are stationed in the Pacific (near Vladivostok). This large deployment of SNI to this area suggests their possible use in securing the northern tip of Hokkaido bordering the Soya Strait which
would be a critical passage for the Soviets to maintain in
time of conflict to enable sea communication between Vladi-
vostok and the Sea of Okhotsk/Petropavlovsk.

The tempo and type of operations of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet in recent years give some indications of its growing
importance in Soviet planning. While in 1975 the fleet
averaged about 7000 out of area ship days (number of days of
operation outside of territorial waters), by 1981 these out
of area operations had jumped to 11,500 days. Part of these
out of area operations involves the fleet's support for the
Soviet Indian Ocean forces. Ten surface combatants and one
submarine are routinely deployed from the Soviet Pacific
Fleet to support this mission.

Though Soviet air surveillance missions had routinely
conducted reconnaissance over the Sea of Japan, beginning
in July 1976 the Soviets initiated flights off the eastern
coast of Japan for the first time. As can be seen in Figure
2 these flights in the east have expanded in both number and
scope and now exceed 40 per year.

The Ivan Rogov did not become a permanent member of the
Soviet Pacific Fleet but the Minsk appears more likely to
stay based on the delivery of an 80,000 ton floating drydock
to Vladivostok from Japan in 1978.

Regarding specifically Japan, the Soviets demonstrated
considerable foresight when they insisted on the return of
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands at the end of World War II.
Their subsequent occupation of the four islands recognized by most as Japan's Northern Territories (Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu) provided a natural defensive barrier between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean. Though this aspect of the regional geography offers some degree of protection, other geographical factors have been less kind. With the exception of Petropavlovsk and Magadon, ships departing Soviet ports normally need to transit through the Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya Straits (see Figure 2) to gain access to the open ocean. The Tsushima Strait, while the widest of the three, is flanked and observed closely by Japan and South Korea. The Tsugaru Strait (between Honshu and Hokkaido) is completely within Japanese waters. Uninterrupted access to the Soya Strait (between Sakhalin and Hokkaido) is considered the "number one priority" for the Soviets in the opinion of VADM M. Staser Holcomb (COMSEVENTHFLT). The strait is 24 miles wide and represents an important Soviet sea communications link. Since Petropavlovsk (home of most Pacific Fleet submarines) has no logistics support available via overland means, it depends primarily on logistics by sea. The majority of this support comes from the Vladivostok area through the Soya Strait. Since Japan borders the Soya Strait to the south, some believe that in a time of conflict the Soviets may quickly move to gain control of this northern tip of Hokkaido (as discussed earlier).

In the second half of the 1970's as Japan-China relations continued to improve, the Soviets expressed their displeasure
through normal diplomatic channels and through military actions. In May 1978, the Soviets began increasing their troop strength in Japan's Northern Territories. This marked the first influx of Soviet troops into this area since 1960. From the end of World War II until 1960, a division of Soviet troops occupied the Northern Territories. Subsequently, the forces were reduced to 2,000 border guards until the new arrival of troops in May 1978. In July 1978, Soviet naval units conducted amphibious and gunnery exercises in the vicinity of Etorofu. This flexing of Soviet muscles did not deter the Japanese from their diplomatic endeavors and in August 1978 a Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed between Japan and China. The "anti-hegemony" clause contained in this treaty was considered as a direct affront by the Soviets. The Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories continued and Soviet leaders made it quite clear that they were not approachable on the subject of eventual return of the Northern Territories to Japan. Today approximately 10,000 troops are deployed in the Northern Territories. Their support equipment not only includes such standard items as mixed artillery, tanks, APC's, and surface-to-air missiles, but also 130mm cannons and helicopter gunships (the MI-24 Hind). Additionally, ten MIG-21 fighter aircraft were deployed to the Northern Territories in late 1982 and by January 1983, twenty MIG-23's were discovered in the area. Some of the air bases have also been used in
conjunction with Tu-95 Bear operations. Soviet radar defense sites have also been installed on the islands and there have been reports of Soviet warships using Hittokappa Bay on Etorofu as an anchorage (the same staging area used by the Imperial Japanese Navy in preparation for the attack on Pearl Harbor). In late August 1983, building materials were transported to Suisho Island (one of the Habomai group) by the Soviets. It remains unknown whether these materials are being used on the island's lighthouse or for new construction. The island is currently guarded by members of the Soviet Border Patrol. Additionally, the Soviets are upgrading the military facilities on Shimushir Island, one of the Kurile Islands about halfway between Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula.

As Japan-China relations improved and as Japan appeared to be warming to US proposals to accept greater regional defense responsibilities, the Soviets continued to exert pressure on Japan to discourage these moves. Air reconnaissance missions around Japan were further intensified which included occasional airspace violations of Japanese territory (about two incidents per year). Warship activity likewise increased. Soviet ship passages through the straits around Japan increased from an average of 300 in 1977 to 360 by 1982. On 22 April 1981 a Krivak DDG expended 18 rounds of 100mm gunfire while conducting target practice on a buoy about 30 miles northwest of Kyoroku Island (with numerous
Japanese fishing boats in the area). The Soviets also obstruct Japanese fishing operations by declaring extensive sea areas off limits in order to conduct at-sea missile tests.

Besides those aircraft assigned to Soviet Naval Air previously mentioned, another estimated 200 bombers and 1550 tactical fighters serve in the Soviet Far East Air Force. Of these 200 bombers, about 40 are Backfires (for a total of about 70 Backfires among the Soviet military forces in the Far East). The tactical fighters have quadrupled in number since 1966. Not only have the number of aircraft significantly increased, but older aircraft have been replaced by some of the USSR's most modern planes.

Possibly the most politically and militarily influential additions to the Soviet Far East forces have been the SS-20 Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles which the Soviets began deploying to Siberia (near Lake Baikal) in 1977 and now number over 100. Contained in mobile missile launchers, these missiles each carry three nuclear MIRV warheads. With a range of about 3000 NM, both China and Japan lay within easy striking range of these missiles.

A. CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The potential impact of the Soviet military buildup on Japan cannot be fully appreciated by focusing only on the areas proximate to Japan. Japan's dependence on uninterrupted sea lines of commerce extends its Achille's Heel far from its
immediate body. In addition, Soviet actions in the Pacific result not only from concerns about Japan, but also (and often more so) from concerns about China and the US.

The year 1978 witnessed important improvements in China's relations with Japan and the US. To counter this perceived encirclement plan, the Soviets initiated diplomatic and military moves to outflank China. The Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam in November. This Soviet support paved the way for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in December. China's "punitive" incursion into Vietnam in February 1979 not only failed to demonstrate its military might over the Vietnamese, it opened the door for the Soviet Navy in the South China Sea. The Soviets responded to the Chinese invasion by detaching a task group of ships to the South China Sea as a sign of support for Vietnam. The Chinese Navy made no response to this Soviet task group (though statistics would suggest that the Chinese Navy ranks third in the world, it is primarily coastal defense oriented and has minimal force projection capabilities). The real winner of China's "punitive" action was the USSR.

By March 1979 the first Soviet naval units were sighted in Cam Ranh Bay, by April two TU-95 Bears were using the air facility at Da Nang, and a Foxtrot submarine soon appeared in Cam Ranh Bay. In less than a year the Soviets broke out of their perceived position of potentially being bottled up in the Pacific to a position of impressive power projection.
capabilities which strategically threatened the other major players in the Pacific.

Cam Ranh Bay offered the Soviets a warm water port with direct access to the open sea in a strategically critical location. Its location and facilities offer excellent logistics/repair support for units transiting to and from the Indian Ocean. Its proximity to the Malacca Strait and its eastern approaches offers an excellent location from which to conduct continual air, surface, and sub-surface surveillance activities in the South China Sea plus an immediate capacity to interdict critical sea lanes of economic (especially crucial to Japan) and military importance. This new forward deployed posture enables the Soviets to respond more rapidly to many Third World events that might arise. Additionally, the relatively short distance between Vietnam and the Philippines (720 NM) offers the opportunity to conduct preemptive air strikes against Subic Naval Base or Clark Air Base, or conduct mining operations against Subic Bay.

The USSR currently keeps about 10 ships at Cam Ranh Bay including a cruise missile submarine, one major combatant, two minor combatants, an AGI, oiler, repair ship, replenishment (stores) ship, and buoy tender. There have also been indications of ongoing construction of support facilities for nuclear submarines. In recent years SSG/SSGN units have patrolled the South China Sea in areas where they could
threaten Japanese merchants or US Naval forces transiting to and from the Indian Ocean. Four Tu-95 Bears are deployed to Cam Ranh Bay and conduct routine surveillance flights over the South China Sea. Their flight patterns extend north to the Bashi Channel (between Taiwan and the Philippines) and south to Natuna Island (along the sea route to the Malacca Strait). 19

B. OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET PACIFIC FORCES

Pertinent objectives of Soviet military forces in the Pacific include:

1) Preservation of the Sea of Okhotsk as an SSBN bastion. This stands out as one of the most important objectives of the Soviet military—protection of the strategic strike forces. To support this goal it appears the Soviet military expansion program in the Kurile Islands and Northern Territories is an attempt to construct "a barrier impenetrable by hostile forces." 20

2) Prevention of Japan from becoming part of a power alignment with the US or China. Historical relations between the USSR and Japan reflect a definite lack of trust on both sides. At the close of World War II the Soviets lobbied to gain influence over the administration of Japan, probably with the intention of trying to mold it into another buffer state as in Eastern Europe. They strongly opposed the US domination of the Allied Occupation in Japan and felt threatened by the US-Japan security arrangements which eventually
evolved, and the stationing of US forces in Japan. The USSR has at times appealed to the strong sentiment of pacifism in postwar Japan, and at other times has taken political and military steps in an attempt to move Japan towards a position of neutralism of "Finlandization." With Japan now leaning towards a stronger supportive role for US objectives in the Pacific, Soviet diplomatic and military maneuvers have been targeted at creating a sense of isolation for the Japanese.

3) Containment of Chinese power in East Asia. The USSR wants to avoid the possibility of a two front war with Western Europe and China as it would heavily strain their military resources. To insure that China did not become overconfident about its regional prowess after strengthening relations with Japan and the US, the USSR allied with Vietnam, strengthened its Pacific Fleet, and set up shop in the South China Sea to form its own encirclement of China.

4) Deny the US supremacy of the seas and deter "destabilizing" actions by Western/Eastern powers.

5) Maintain a capability to interdict enemy sea lines of communications and protect Soviet SLOC's. With its access to Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet Navy enjoys a favorable position to not only interdict shipping transiting the Malacca Strait but also to help keep these areas open for Soviet shipping. It should be remembered that the Soviet Far East has extremely limited logistics support (air lift and one railroad).
The sea lanes through Malacca are important to the Soviets as well as many other nations. Therefore, Soviet interdiction tactics may prefer selective interdiction (e.g., by submarines) vice completely denied passage as would result from mining. Additionally, unrestricted passage through the straits around Japan (especially Soya) will be important in times of crisis/conflict.

6) Promote Soviet interests throughout the Pacific.
The radius of this capability was markedly extended by the addition of Vietnam support facilities.

Changes in Soviet military forces in the Pacific reflect changing attitudes of the Soviet government towards the Pacific region. Though formerly given minimal thought, the region has assumed a new perspective for the Soviets. Though much of the Sino-Soviet border is rugged and barren, the Soviets cannot ignore the threat potential of their Chinese neighbor. The USSR stations 52 divisions of troops in the Far East (approximately 470,000 personnel), most along the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets continue to assure the Japanese that the SS-20 missiles located in Siberia are directed against China.

The Northeast Asia region carries new significance for the USSR. In a world of dwindling natural resources, Siberia has just begun to be recognized for its vast natural wealth which has barely been touched thus far. To reduce the vulnerability of its SSBN's, the Soviets have turned the
Sea of Okhotsk into a protective haven, from where SLBM's can be launched without the submarines venturing out into the Pacific where they face likely detection (by US forces) while enroute to their patrol stations. As the strategic value of Northeast Asia has increased for the USSR, it provides little comfort for the Soviets to see the region predominantly aligned with the US (ROK and Japan).

Though the Soviets likely viewed US failures in Vietnam with satisfaction, disappointment probably remains over ASEAN's tilt towards the US. Since the USSR achieved little success in its diplomatic dealings with Pacific nations, it turned to military pressure to influence political outcomes.

Although Soviet Pacific forces (especially the Soviet Navy) have made impressive strides since the late 1970's, shortcomings still exist. In Northeast Asia, choke points and ice continue to hinder unrestricted operations. The amphibious capabilities of the Soviet Navy remain limited. Little capability exists to provide air cover for surface and submarine units at extended ranges from land with only one aircraft carrier in the Pacific inventory. Additionally, the problem of lack of forward bases and long range logistics support should not be considered resolved by the facilities currently enjoyed by the USSR in Vietnam. Though Vietnam leans heavily on the Soviets for economic/military assistance ($3-4 million per day), it retains a strong independent will and has previously demonstrated the
capacity to shift alignments when considered in its best interests.

In summary, with respect to Japan, the USSR possesses the capability to interdict vital SLOC's, conduct INF or aircraft strikes against Japan, carry out air, surface, and subsurface operations against JMSDF ships in the vicinity of Japan, and to mount an amphibious assault on Hokkaido.

While the USSR has been able to use alignments with other countries (i.e., India and Vietnam) to assist in "encircling" China, it has not readily enjoyed this same opportunity with regard to Japan. As a result, the Soviets have resorted to direct action and employed their own forces to pressure and attempt to isolate Japan. These actions have taken the form of an expanded Soviet Pacific Fleet with increased operations near Japan, large Soviet troop and equipment movements into the Northern Territories, and frequent surveillance flights around Japan. The impact of this growing Soviet military might on the Japanese will be addressed in the remaining chapters.
III. ATTITUDES OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Any government is composed of a multitude of departments and divisions. To sample most of these divisions would present problems of collecting sufficient data to support any meaningful results. Consequently, for the purposes of this paper, the offices of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Japan Defense Agency and the positions of the opposition parties will be examined with regards to pertinent views which have developed with respect to security matters and the Soviet threat in the postwar period.

A. PRIME MINISTERS: PRIORITIES AND THE USSR

In the early 1950's, Prime Minister Yoshida laid the groundwork for what became known as the "Yoshida strategy." The basic components of this strategy were: 1) economic recovery, 2) rejection of rearming, 3) economic and diplomatic alignment with the US and United Kingdom, and 4) dependence on the US for security. Of these, economic recovery stood out as the leading priority in Yoshida's mind. The Yoshida strategy set Japan's course for most of the next two decades.

The USSR was regarded by the Japanese government as a less than friendly neighbor, but certainly not a threat. When Prime Minister Hatoyama came into office in 1954, he devoted himself to improving Japan-Soviet relations and succeeded in normalizing relations by late 1956. Though some
difficult issues remained unresolved (such as the Northern Territories), Japan opted to deal with the Soviets on peripheral issues to maintain a positive relationship. As Japan strived to reestablish itself internally and externally, and mend its war wounds, it sought to avoid external complications in order to maximize economic progress. Constructive relations with members of the international community became a necessity and the sticky issues could be temporarily side-stepped. This basic outlook held true throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's.

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's administration exemplified this diplomatic approach in the early 1970's as it sought more mature relations with the Communist countries. Tanaka finalized the normalization of relations between Japan and China in 1972. Sensing that Japan had attained a stable base of economic prosperity and that the time had arrived to resolve more difficult problems, he personally travelled to Moscow in October 1973 (the first time since 1956 that a Japanese prime minister had visited the USSR) with the intent of specifically addressing the Northern Territories issue and seeking progress towards concluding a peace treaty. At the conclusion of the talks, it was reported that some problems remained "outstanding." When queried on whether the Northern Territories was one of these "outstanding" issues, Prime Minister Tanaka replied, "there are no such things as outstanding problems which do not include the territorial
problem.\textsuperscript{2} Though the Soviets expressed interest in promoting closer relations (on their terms), the stage was set for a gradual cooling of official Japanese relations with the USSR.

As the US began cutting back its Pacific military forces in the mid-1970's, visions of a "power vacuum" began to take shape in the minds of some Pacific countries which had security ties with the US. Japan's interest in national security matters increased but the USSR was still not regarded as posing a threat. Concerns over the USSR were dampened by blossoming Japanese ties with China and the widening Sino-Soviet split. Japan felt it could pursue an "omni-directional" diplomacy of maintaining positive relations with all countries.

The USSR did not share Japan's optimism about "omni-directional" relations and sought to preclude the conclusion of a friendship treaty between Japan and China. In early February 1978, Brezhnev sent a letter to Prime Minister Fukuda encouraging a friendship treaty between Japan and the USSR. Though Japan showed no interest in the suggestion, the Soviets unilaterally published a proposal for a Soviet-Japan "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" in Izvestia on February 23, 1978. If insult to the Japanese government was intended, then success was achieved. Aside from the significant fact that the Japanese had not participated in drafting the proposal, Japan objected to the following
items in the treaty draft: the Northern Territories were not addressed, the treaty would negate Japan-US security arrangements, the treaty was open-ended (i.e., no termination date), and the security clause used in the treaty resembled those used by the Soviets with their "client" states rather than showing proper respect for Japan as an independent sovereign nation.³

The Soviets' continued warnings to Japan over the impending Sino-Japan Friendship Treaty only served to harden the resolve of Prime Minister Fukuda. He continued to stress that the "hegemonic" clause being discussed for the treaty was not aimed at any third nation, but he also indicated that he had "no intention of taking a policy of making concessions to the Soviet Union."⁴

Failing to dissuade Japan from signing a friendship treaty with China, the Soviets turned to their military to bring new pressures on the Japanese. Soviet troops commenced moving into the Northern Territories beginning in May 1978. As the numbers of Soviet combat troops and equipment arriving on the islands continued to rise, the Japanese government seemed somewhat baffled by this latest Soviet tactic. Few options were available to counter the Soviet actions except words, and even these had few barbs. In February 1979, the Diet called for a resolution to the problem and expressed its "regrets" over the Soviet actions (my emphasis).
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) sounded the bell more clearly in Japan that the Soviets would take direct military action against an Asian country when deemed in their interests. Prime Minister Ohira was quite upset over the Afghanistan situation. Not only had the USSR demonstrated a willingness to militarily intervene outside of its Eastern European sphere, but it now posed a direct threat to Japan's economic lifelines in the Middle East with no substantial regional power to deter them (since the Iranian government had recently been overthrown). The Prime Minister felt that some sort of punitive response was in order but at the same time, he did not want to eliminate the foundation of constructive relations with the Soviets. This attitude was apparent in the compromise embargo effected in February 1980.

Finding a label for the USSR that was accurate, yet not offensive, apparently created an internal struggle for Prime Minister Ohira. On January 22, 1980, he commented that the USSR was "defensive" in nature. Only one week later, he modified his previous comments by stating that the Soviet troops in the Northern Territories (which now were at division strength) did pose a "potential threat to Japan." No prime minister in the postwar period had previously referred to the USSR as a threat.

Just as Prime Minister Ohira was converted from thinking of the Soviets as purely "defensive," a similar process took
place with his successor, Zenko Suzuki. Speaking before the Diet on January 30, 1981, Suzuki commented that the USSR did not represent an immediate danger to Japan. Shortly thereafter, in an appeal to raise nationalistic feelings, he marked February 7th as the first Northern Territories Day, in remembrance of the day Japan acquired those islands from Russia in 1855 (Treaty of Shimoda). By May, Prime Minister Suzuki was pledging to the US that Japan would build up the SDF to enable defense of the sea lanes within 1000 miles of Japan. Then at the Ottawa Summit in July, he emphasized that world peace was threatened by the expansion of Soviet military forces.

While it remains cloudy whether Prime Minister Suzuki became whole-heartedly converted in his views of the Soviets, or whether he simply tended to bend with the wind, there has been little doubt about the stance of the current prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone. In office less than two months, he rattled the Soviets' cages (and many in Japan) with some of his comments while in the US in January 1983. His remarks on the "common destinies" of Japan and the US plus his analogy of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" spun many heads in the international arena. Actually, the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" quote is not quite accurate. When he made this comment to senior Washington Post personnel at a breakfast on January 18, his interpreter translated his comment into English as "unsinkable aircraft carrier." However, it more correctly should have been translated as
"large aircraft carrier" since the words used by the Prime Minister were "okina koku bokan" vice fuchin kubo. Aside from the emotional impact of the translation, the thrust of the comment was that the Japanese "carrier" would help to protect Japan from Soviet Backfire bombers. He further commented that Japan should work towards the capability of restricting Soviet usage of the straits around Japan in times of crisis and that Japan should strengthen its air defenses in order to effectively counter Soviet strike forces.

Not surprisingly, the USSR reacted sharply to the Japanese leader's comments. Tass wrote that "Such a planner will cause Japan to become a target of a retaliatory strike...this will lead Japan, which is a densely populated country, to far more serious nationwide devastation than that 37 years ago." Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev informed a visiting Japanese business delegation in February that Japan's "carrier" would not last more than 20 minutes if the USSR decided to take military action against Japan.

Thus far, Prime Minister Nakasone seems undaunted by the rhetoric emanating from Moscow. In his dealings with the Soviets as well as other nations, one of his foremost goals has been to gain respect for Japan as a major player in the international arena. Nakasone instructed Ambassador Takashima (Japanese ambassador to the USSR) in April 1983 to inform Soviet officials that a Gromyko visit to Japan was expected as the next move to improve relations since Soviet Foreign Ministers had come to Japan only three times, whereas Japanese
Foreign Ministers had travelled to the USSR six times. As the Prime Minister put it, "This concerns Japan's prestige."\(^{11}\)

Nakasone has signaled both his own people and other nations that Japan is moving to clearly demonstrate its status as a member of the West and will assume a political posture commensurate with its economic influence. He emphasized these points during his trips to the ROK, the ASEAN nations, Washington, and at the Williamsburg Summit.\(^{12}\) At Williamsburg, he took the lead in addressing security issues and claimed to the leaders in attendance that "the security of our countries is indivisible." He stressed that a united front amongst the Western nations was necessary to increase the Soviet's willingness to negotiate. His strong position on the unacceptability of the Soviets transferring SS-20's from Europe to Siberia was evident when he stated that, "We Japanese don't want the Soviet Union to use Asia as a garbage dump for any SS-20's it may withdraw from Europe."\(^{13}\)

Although Prime Minister Nakasone has not shied away from confronting the USSR on various issues, he would welcome improved relations if the Soviets demonstrated a sincere interest to effect changes. He stated in March 1983, "the basis for improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is the settlement of the territorial problem...My intention is to endeavor for a breakthrough, perseveringly, with some degree of flexibility."\(^{14}\)

The Nakasone government has been firm but has avoided overreacting to Soviet-related incidents, as evidenced by
such Soviet intelligence activities as the Levchenko affair, the Vinogradov case, and "spy boat" operations. The Levchenko affair involves Stanislov Levchenko, a supposed Soviet reporter for the Novoye Vremya (New Times), who was initially assigned to Tokyo in 1975. On October 24, 1979, he requested political asylum from US officials in Tokyo, identifying himself as a KGB agent, and was immediately flown to the US. In Levchenko's subsequent testimony concerning his activities in Japan (which was released in segments beginning in late 1982), Levchenko claimed to have recruited the services of up to 200 Japanese, including Diet members (mostly JSP), one former Cabinet minister, newspaper officials, journalists, academicians, and at least one SDF officer.  

When bits of Levchenko's testimony were released in December 1982, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda remarked to an Upper House Committee, "We have to take it seriously, but I think most people discount the allegations as untrue."  

Whereas some countries would eagerly pursue prosecution of individuals named as possible Soviet collaborators, the Japanese government has been hesitant to do so. It seems to prefer not to create significant controversy over the matter. Many Japanese recommend that since Levchenko caused little harm to Japan, the issue should be dropped. At the bottom of it all, one senses that the Japanese have little regard for the testimony of a foreigner against their own people.  

Another Soviet intelligence gathering case, reported in June 1983, involved Soviet embassy First Secretary Vinogradov.
He had attempted to persuade a high-technology company official who was about to retire, to set up a dummy organization to pass on technical information to the Soviets in return for monetary rewards. The Japanese government discovered the plan and deported Vinogradov. This incident again aroused little anti-Soviet sentiment.\textsuperscript{17}

The USSR also appears to be taking advantage of its position in the Northern Territories with respect to Japanese fishermen. Estimates indicate that up to 65 "spy boats" (actually Japanese fishing boats) may be providing Japanese technology in the form of electronics and integrated circuits, in return for fishing privileges around the Northern Territories (reportedly rich in crab and scallops). Since the Soviets control these areas, it is difficult for Japanese officials to counter this activity.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite these Soviet intelligence activities in and around Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone confirmed that he had no intention of enacting a Spy Prevention Law (lingering domestic concern over government secrets outweighs concern for information passed on to the Soviets).

When KAL Flight 007 was shot down by the Soviets on September 1, 1983, Nakasone's response hinted at but did not concentrate on the Soviet "threat." Though 28 of his countrymen lost their lives in the incident, the actions of the Prime Minister showed an interest in not erecting new obstacles to further impede Soviet-Japan relations. While
labelling the incident a "barbarous act," at the same time he warned that "we must not make this incident a new source of East-West confrontation." He declared that unilateral action would not be taken but rather a consensus response would be worked out with Seoul and Washington. The KAL incident did however, give the Prime Minister an opportunity to edge public concerns toward his security outlook. In his remarks on the tragedy, he commented, "I think (the people) have come to understand, through this incident, in what a severe situation the international situation is placed." Nakasone respects the threatening capabilities of the Soviets, but he refuses to shrink in the face of them. He recognizes that Japan cannot (yet) stand alone against the USSR but that bargaining leverage can be gained when acting in concert with other Western nations.

B. PRIME MINISTERS: ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE MEASURES

Concern over the perceived Soviet "threat" could be reflected in part by Japanese leaders' approaches to various defense issues such as the development of the SDF, security ties with the US, budget allocations for defense, degree of support for Japan's restrictive constitution, and nuclear weapons policies. Consistencies and inconsistencies among Japan's prime ministers on these matters will be examined.

As mentioned earlier, part of Prime Minister Yoshida's strategy was rejection of rearmament. Since he opposed the idea of reestablishing large military forces, Yoshida
proposed that the US could continue to post troops within the country (after Japan regained its independence) in return for a formal US commitment to defend Japan. Though the US initially balked at the idea, the Cold War and anti-Communist atmosphere of the times eventually swung the US to accept the offer. Japan's approach to the problem was not particularly anti-Soviet. Japan was an unprotected and decimated country. Some sort of protective shell needed to be established to enable Japan to rebuild itself economically. The 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty became the cornerstone of Japan's defense. When the Self-Defense Forces were formally created in 1954, they were regarded as a minimal force to deal with disaster relief, internal security, and limited defense operations. The development of the SDF has been restricted since its birth. It has continually been constrained by the Constitution. It has been limited by the responsibilities shouldered by the US through the Japan-US Security Treaty. For the most part, the prime ministers of Japan have been satisfied to keep the SDF within these constraints. When the Kishi Cabinet set forth the Basic Policy for National Defense in 1957, it was explicitly acknowledged that the growth of the SDF would depend on availability of resources and domestic support. The defense of the nation remained dependent on the security treaty with the US. Kishi's belief in the necessity of strong security ties with the US were such that he sacrificed his office in order to push through a new security treaty with the US (the MST) in 1960.
With its security blanket renewed, Japan dedicated itself to internal affairs and economic development. In the early 1970's, Japan underwent a period of "de-Americanization" during which a new spirit of nationalism and self-confidence began to emerge. Factors which contributed to this outlook included: 1) the phenomenal economic progress of Japan, 2) the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, and 3) the Nixon "shocks" (the President's visit to China and the floating of the dollar). This developing sense of assuredness was brusquely sobered by the 1973 oil crisis. By 1975, a "re-Americanization" process had been effected resulting from Japan's recognition of its acute economic vulnerability, a renewed awareness of the value of the MST, improved relations with China, and a realization that North Vietnam's intentions were less humane than some had previously believed.

In 1976, greater definition was given to the SDF by means of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) adopted by the Miki government. This document established a "standard defense force concept" which included quantitative and qualitative goals for the SDF. The capabilities of the SDF were to be limited to an ability to counter a "limited and small scale aggression" and the mission of the SDF came to be referred to as "exclusively self-defensive." Though the NDPO purports flexibility by its statement that it is based on the international environment that existed in 1976, no prime minister to date has suggested that the NDPO goals for the
SDF be expanded in spite of the significant increase in Soviet military capabilities around Japan during this same period.

Prime Minister Nakasone has not called for a quantitative expansion of the SDF thought he has suggested a broader purpose than just an "exclusively self-defensive" force. He is attempting to shift the mission of deterrence from exclusively a US function to that of the SDF. As he stated in January 1983:

...the Soviet Union has been constantly expanding its armaments, and the Soviet Union has spread its power globally. On that point, the Free World has been lagging behind, and it is trying to catch up. We are all making efforts, with the belief that we must create deterrent power, in order to avoid war and to maintain peace.²³ (my emphasis)

Nakasone made similar comments at the Williamsburg Summit on the importance of deterrent capabilities. He has also suggested new roles for the SDF which have caused the Japanese to expand their thinking on defense issues. When questioned before the Diet in February 1983, Nakasone made some rather pointed remarks that Japan might assist the US in blockading the straits around Japan to help contain the Soviets. He noted that certainly Japan cannot face Soviet military forces alone, but together with the US, Japan could act as a "shield" and the US as a "lance" in their military strategies.²⁴ One month later, again before the Diet, Nakasone remarked that if Japan was in danger of having its supply lines cut, the SDF might be used to help protect foreign registry ships on the high seas (destined
for Japan). The Prime Minister has supported the concept of accepting responsibility for defending Japan's sea lanes within 1000 miles of Japan, though the specifics of this mission have not yet been fully defined.

Though Prime Minister Nakasone suggests new roles for the SDF, he summed up his position on the SDF when he stated, "I'm not advocating rearmament. What I'm advocating is modernization and improvement of the existing SDF. Japan must be able to defend its territorial airspace and it must be able to protect itself against attacks and secure its sea lanes to some extent. We must upgrade the quality of our forces to achieve these objectives." Even after the KAL 007 incident, though Nakasone expressed his opinion that the Soviet action symbolized the threat in the Northeast Asia region, he reminded his listeners that Japan's defense buildup would remain "gradual."

Turning to prime ministers' attitudes towards the defense budget, there has been a fairly consistent pattern of keeping defense spending at a minimal level. When the Miki Cabinet adopted the 1% (of GNP) ceiling for defense spending in 1976, it recognized that the policy was to be just "for the time being." Yet it has been staunchly supported by each successive prime minister. Even after the Soviet buildup in the Northern Territories and the invasion of Afghanistan, though 73% of the lower house Diet members viewed the Soviet military as a "threat," concern was not great enough to raise
defense spending over 1% of GNP. In July 1980, a national security advisory group for Prime Minister Ohira released its "Report on Comprehensive National Security" which recommended a 20% increase in yearly defense spending to attain the NDPO goals. Though this would have raised defense expenditures to only 1.07% of GNP, the recommendation was rejected. The prime minister seems to have little power to change those things which have won general acceptance. As Prime Minister, Nakasone has assured his people that the 1% ceiling will be respected even though a less constrained Nakasone in 1978 advocated increasing security expenditures to 3% of GNP (including energy related measures).

Just as the 1% defense ceiling has stood up well over the years, so have other defense constraints such as the Constitution and nuclear weapons policies, in spite of a dynamic international environment. Unlike most of his predecessors, Nakasone favors amending the Constitution. While LDP Executive Board Chairman in 1978, he proposed revising the Constitution "in a brave manner" and emphasized that "the right of belligerency should be recognized to the SDF." Though as prime minister, he no longer openly advocates revision, he reminds the Japanese that they should have no reservations about changing the Constitution if deemed desirable. Nakasone's interest in revising the Constitution appears to stem little from concern over the Soviet "threat," but rather from a desire to have a governing document which
truly expresses the will of the Japanese people rather than the foreign government which initially drafted the document.

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles remain firmly supported by the Prime Minister's office. Though as head of the JDA in the early 1970's, Nakasone took the position that tactical, defensive nuclear weapons would not be unconstitutional, he has not proposed any changes in nuclear weapons policies since becoming Prime Minister. Some may be baffled (including some Japanese) by the tactics of Prime Minister Nakasone on security matters. In short, he is a masterful gamesman. Though a man of determination, he realizes he is also a servant of the people. He prods his countrymen to consider unpleasant issues such as security alliances, blocking of straits, and the shortcomings of the Constitution. Yet he continually assures the public that the status quo will be maintained and if changes are to be made, they will be gradual. Similar to his issuance of the first Defense White Paper in 1970 (while Director-General of the JDA), he continues to throw the issues before the people in order to increase public awareness and chisel away at the "insular" mentality of much of his population. He seeks a change in the mood of the people but he knows he cannot change it directly. He seems to hope that by increasing the public's awareness of the consequences of various potential situations, that the people will eventually recognize the need for change and seek modified policies from the government. Though a gambler, he is not a reckless gambler. He fully realizes
the fragility of his position and well knows that if he loses the confidence of his party, he can lose his job virtually overnight.

C. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

As would be expected, the views of the office of the Foreign Minister towards the Soviet Union have tended to be relatively optimistic and espouse the importance of diplomacy as the key to successful relations. In 1969, the Foreign Ministry viewed Japan as "safe under an adequate security arrangement," a view that was generally shared throughout Japan. The Foreign Policy White Papers of Japan throughout the first half of the 1970's read almost identically with respect to the Soviet Union; the positive aspect of economic relations was noted and the importance of "good neighborly relations" for the stability of Asia was stressed. Even in early 1978, Foreign Minister Sonoda remained optimistic about Japan-USSR relations. After meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow in January 1978, Sonoda returned to Japan predicting that the Northern Territories problem would be settled within 5 years. As negotiations for the Japan-China Friendship Treaty continued, he maintained a belief that Japan could diplomatically walk the tightrope and maintain good relations with both the USSR and China as part of its "omni-directional" policy. By the time the treaty was signed between Japan and China, the Soviets' adamant opposition to the process had dimmed Sonoda's optimism. He
realized that the treaty represented an alignment of Japan with US international policy.\textsuperscript{34}

By 1979, some new terms could be seen in Japan's Foreign Policy White Papers which have continued to reappear in subsequent official papers and statements. It is still clear that Japan seeks friendly relations with the USSR, but it now specifically points out that relations should be mutually beneficial and founded on trust and understanding. The timing of these comments reflects Japan's disapproval of Soviet actions against the 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty and also the expansion of Soviet military forces in the Northern Territories. The approach of the Foreign Minister's office on security matters remained cautious as can be seen from Foreign Minister Sonoda's comment in February 1979 that "it will not be wise to fan anti-Soviet sentiments and the Japanese-Soviet confrontation unnecessarily"\textsuperscript{35} (my emphasis). Though no mention of a "threat" is made, it seems noteworthy that Japan-USSR security relations had been raised to the level of "confrontation."

The Foreign Minister has preferred to downplay the military aspects of Japan-Soviet relations. In its 1981 White Paper, it emphasized that Japan was committed to not becoming a military power, that stable relations with the Soviets was "indispensable" for the security of Japan, that Soviet action in the Northern Territories "ran counter to the spirit of friendship between the two countries" but that Japan's primary response would remain peaceful negotiations, and that

57
Japan's policies toward the USSR would center on maintaining a "firm, coherent stance and a cool, patient attitude."^36

When Foreign Minister Abe assumed his office in the Nakasone government, it appeared that he would carry on much the same as his predecessors with regards to the USSR. When questioned on Japan's position on the INF issue, he remarked that this was an issue which must be worked out between the US and USSR. Though a supporter of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, he also sees this constraint as depriving Japan of any bargaining power when facing major international problems. He felt that Japan would have to "watch closely" the progress of the INF negotiations before deciding what future steps would be taken.^37

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's comment on the possibility of transferring SS-20's from Europe to Asia rankled the Japanese government and appeared to be the catalyst that thrust Japan fully into the INF issue. No longer were INF missiles something to be resolved only among the superpowers. Japan threw itself fully behind the Western camp and declared that it would actively participate in this international problem. Whether this reaction stemmed more from concern of being within the Soviet missile envelope or more from Japan's decision to no longer be insulted and intimidated by the USSR is difficult to say.

By April 1983, Foreign Minister Abe frequently spoke out on the INF issue, remarking how the Soviet military posed
a "very big threat" and declaring that "Asia will not be victimized" by moving SS-20's from Europe to Asia (a position which was readily supported by China also). Japan had cast its lot to become an active participant in international issues rather than just an observer. Japan began to address issues previously avoided. When the Foreign Minister's office dispatched UN Bureau Director-General Kadota to the USSR in July 1983, he was instructed to not only discuss the INF issue, but also to address other global affairs including Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Japan thus demonstrated its intent to maintain a dialogue with the USSR (with a broadened agenda), but also reminded the Soviets that it expected a visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko before Japan's Foreign Minister again makes an official visit to the USSR.

Foreign Minister Abe continued his outspokenness on the USSR after the KAL incident in September 1983. When the USSR vetoed a UN draft resolution relating to the incident, Abe remarked, "Probably no one will permit the Soviet Union's shameless attitude. Opposed to the Soviet Union's continuing to show such an illogical and insincere attitude, Japan will continue to make all efforts for the clarification of the facts..." While assuming a new stance on international issues and speaking out more frankly on Soviet-related incidents, this does not confirm a significant degree of concern about the
Soviet "threat." There is little to suggest that the Foreign Minister's office supports any significant expansion of Japan's defense programs, nor changes to the Constitution, nor dramatic increases in the defense budget. The Foreign Minister's job centers on diplomacy and Japan has indicated its sincere interest in keeping the lines of communication open between Tokyo and Moscow. However, the Foreign Minister has also made it clear that Japan expects to be regarded with respect.

D. THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY

In reviewing the positions of the Japan Defense Agency over the years, one does not observe a tendency to concentrate on "worst-case" analyses as is more common in the US Defense Department. The JDA up until the late 1970's almost singularly stressed diplomacy as the key to national security. Only within recent years did its military responsibilities seem to take on new dimensions.

Japan's Defense White Papers have routinely contained charts and statistics on Soviet flights and ship passages in the vicinity of Japan (such as Figure 2). Japan's concern over not making waves in the early 1970's can be seen in the 1971 Defense White Paper in which the country conducting the flights and ship passages around Japan is listed as "unidentified." No countries were pointed out as particular concerns for Japan. By the mid-1970's, the opinions of the JDA reflected less certainty about peace in the
Pacific. The JDA noted that building Japan's defenses too rapidly would cause anxiety among other Asian nations but also noted that if defense capabilities in the region were weak, it would create a "power vacuum" that could be destabilizing. With respect to Japan, the Japan-US security arrangements make "...full scale armed aggression against Japan...hardly conceivable. But limited aggression may be considered a possibility." These comments seemed to infer that a need existed for someone (the US) to keep the military balance from drastically shifting. The paper goes on to stress that diplomatic means will remain the primary defensive action for Japan.

In 1978, the JDA concluded that the US no longer held a clear margin of superiority over the USSR in various military capabilities. In an effort to stir up public support for SDF improvements, the JDA discussed the role of military power in "comprehensive security" and noted that when deterrence fails, military power then "becomes the most important means to protect the country's independence." Though the developing situations around Japan were considered "serious," Japan's response would be to "watch things closely."

The JDA was well aware of likely Soviet responses if a Sino-Japanese treaty was concluded. An early 1978 JDA analysis of Soviet reactions to the treaty predicted a build-up of Soviet naval units, early deployment to the Pacific
of a Soviet aircraft carrier, early deployment of Backfire bombers to the Far East, and increased Soviet harassment and diplomatic pressure directed against Japan. Thus, the JDA was not surprised by Soviet military moves during the 1978-79 period, only somewhat frustrated by Japan's helpless position. As JDA Director General Kanemaru assessed Soviet military strength around Japan in May 1978, "This is...[like]...a situation of countering machine guns with bamboo spears."46

In its next White Paper (1979), the JDA observed:

...the Soviet Union is now strong enough to compete with the US in nuclear war capability in general as well as in conventional war capability in Europe and the Far East...the Soviet Union is making it difficult for the US to insure the safety of air and sea lines of communication...

Soviet military expansion in the Far East was referred to as an "increased potential threat." Though previous defense equipment acquisition programs fell short of their goals, the JDA now stressed that the goals of the current program should be "reached as soon as possible."48

References to the USSR as a "potential" threat (i.e., lacking interest in actually using military force against Japan) continued in subsequent Defense White Papers. Even the buildup of Soviet forces in the Northern Territories has not been perceived as a direct threat on Japan, but rather as part of a grand Soviet defensive plan and an effort to put political pressure on Japan to drop the Northern Territories issue.49 The primary reason the JDA (as does much
of Japan) has not shown greater concern over Soviet military might which in areas such as Hokkaido is only a few miles away from the main islands, is its tendency (at least until more recent years) to not see Japan as an active part of the security equation. The active participants were the US and USSR. Almost all analyses promulgated by the JDA evaluated the balance of power between the US and USSR. Increased Soviet capabilities were evaluated with respect to US capabilities, rather than with respect to their direct effect on Japan and SDF capabilities. Japan, as spectator, sat in the stands and kept score on the game between the superpowers. This detached attitude was reflected in a comment made by a JDA spokesman in 1978 in response to a US advisory to soon expect a Soviet aircraft carrier in the Far East. The JDA representative remarked that "the combat and attack power of the Soviet carrier-borne planes will not be great, and the predominance of America's naval power, with the Seventh Fleet as its mainstay, will not be upset."  

Since the beginning of the 1980's, the JDA has begun to proclaim a greater need for Japan to be able to handle its own defense responsibilities (as set forth in the NDPO). As Soviet military power has continued to grow in North-east Asia and it has become more apparent that US capabilities are globally stretched thin, Japan recognizes that it needs to play a greater participatory role to maintain the security of the country. In promoting Japan's increased
responsibilities in this area, the JDA stated in its 1982 Defense White Paper that "...military power is indispensable for national security and also forms part of the framework of international order."\(^{51}\)

Though the JDA may consider military power as indispensable, it likewise considers security arrangements with the US as indispensable. In essence, the JDA views Japan's three pillars of defense as: 1) a strong public will to preserve independence, 2) the effective consolidation of defensive capabilities, and 3) maintaining the Japan-US Security Treaty.\(^{52}\)

The predominant views of the JDA on the USSR and defense matters were probably best summed up in an Asia Pacific Community article in the summer of 1982 in which then JDA Director General Ito wrote:\(^{53}\)

- a) Japan must be responsible for protecting itself but "minimal" self-defense should not be exceeded.
- b) The Soviet military buildup was mainly a reaction to China and other Pacific nations (no mention is made of Japan).
- c) The restrictions of the Constitution and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles should be upheld.
- d) Japan's defense capability is insufficient, but it is growing steadily.
- e) Japan should assume more of its defense burden (within Constitutional constraints).
f) It is doubtful that current defense goals can be reached with less than 1% of GNP going to defense each year.

g) the 1976 NDPO should not be revised. Instead, goals listed should be achieved in a timely manner.

The JDA pushes for more significant increases in the defense budget and points out its difficulties in meeting procurement plans because of the 1% ceiling, but its voice does not carry significant weight within the Japanese government. However, the JDA does realize the importance of building its own forces to form part of a credible deterrent and within existing constraints, has acted to promote improvements and modernization within the SDF (discussed in Chapter VI). In assessing the overall Soviet "threat," the JDA doubts that the USSR would attack Japan in the near future, yet it predicts that the Soviets will continue to expand militarily and use force where advantageous to gain political leverage.54

E. THE VIEWS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

Difficulties arise in evaluating opposition parties' views of the Soviet threat due to limited policy statements on the subject. Specific policies on some defense matters do exist though some parties have made modifications to previous positions as they have become less practical in the changing international environment.
1. **Japan Socialist Party (JSP)**

As Japan's largest opposition party and the one with the closest ties to the USSR, the JSP does not acknowledge any Soviet "threat." The JSP was the only party which saw benefit in Brezhnev's 1969 proposal for an Asian collective security system and has routinely supported the conclusion of a friendship treaty with the USSR as an important step towards peace.\(^5\)

According to JSP leaders, the problems that do arise with the USSR mainly result from Japan's (i.e., LDP) rhetoric and mishandling of situations. As an island nation, they see little possibility of Japan becoming involved in a war, unless Japan "creates a seed of trouble by itself."\(^6\)

The JSP feels that a rearmed Japan would invite problems upon itself and that their position of "unarmed neutrality" stands as the only means to achieve true security.

The JSP normally avoids ridiculing the Soviets. When the Levchenko affair became of interest in Japan and the LDP proposed the formation of a special investigative committee to review the case, the JSP was the only party which opposed the proposal. When KAL 007 was downed by the Soviets, the JSP declined to condemn the Soviets, but rather stated how the incident showed the necessity for global disarmament to preclude a reoccurrence of such an incident. However, disagreements between the JSP and USSR do exist on some issues. When the Soviet Communist Party sent a letter
to the JSP in January 1983 promising Soviet "guarantees" for Japan's security if Japan pledged to strictly uphold its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the JSP's conditional response assured the Soviets of the party's full support of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, but also reminded the Soviets that return of the Northern Territories, removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and a pledge of non-interference in Poland should first be addressed.\(^{57}\) Basically, the JSP opposes military pressure tactics by any country.

On other defense matters, the JSP has consistently opposed the SDF and the Japan-US security arrangements. The US has been viewed as an "imperialist" nation which will likely lead Japan into dangerous international situations. The SDF should be eventually dissolved and replaced by an organization dedicated to civil development (e.g., public work projects). Japan should not enter into any military alliances nor allow any foreign troops on its soil. Though Japan's buildup of the SDF seems gradual by most standards, it is anathema to the JSP. In response to the 1981 JDA Mid-term Estimate, the JSP declared that the plan "defines the 1980's as an age of war and armaments expansion, and it aims at constructing a military state structure, which will shoulder a part of the world war between the US and the Soviet Union."\(^{58}\)

The JSP strongly supports the current wording of the Constitution and promotes the theme of global disarmament. The JSP believes a policy of "non-alignment, neutrality,
and all-directional diplomacy"59 best suits the needs of Japan. This strategy would enable Japan to become a member of the world vice just a member of the West.60

2. **Japan Communist Party (JCP)**

The JCP has had an erratic relationship with the USSR in the postwar era. The Soviet Communist Party has failed in keeping the JCP within its fold because the members of the JCP are foremost, Japanese, and only secondarily, Communists. The JCP certainly sees no threat posed by the Soviets and would prefer a friendly but loose relationship with the USSR. The JCP would welcome a friendship treaty with the USSR but as a peace-oriented party, it opposes "big-powerism," which includes Soviet interventions in Afghanistan, Poland, and the Northern Territories.61 The Northern Territories issue transcends party differences. No party can afford not to support the return of the Northern Territories for it would be unpatriotic. In fact, the JCP's position on the issue is the most demanding--it calls for the return of all the Kurile Islands (quite unrealistic but probably good for a few votes). The autonomy of the JCP from the Soviets was again evident after the Korean airliner incident which the JCP described as "impermissible barbarity."62

The JCP considers the US much more a threat than the USSR. Following Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the US in January 1983, the JCP announced its concern over Japan becoming enmeshed in "Reagan's limited nuclear war plan."63
As with the JSP, the JCP views that the US is leading Japan down a dangerous path. The JCP favors dissolving the Japan-US Security Treaty and adopting a security policy dedicated to "nonalignment, neutrality, and self-defense." The SDF should eventually be disbanded after the members are "re-educated" on the ills of their previous ways. Rather than a formal SDF, the JCP envisions kind of a "peoples' war" defense concept. As stated in the JCP's security position paper,

In the event of intervention or aggression, the right of self-defense, an inalienable right of a sovereign state, will be exercised. The country's independence and safety will be protected by mobilizing every means available, with the unity and support of the people.\(^6\)

The JCP firmly supports the current Constitution and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. It sees Northeast Asia as a low-threat environment in which Japan need not waste its money on elaborate defense forces or depend on military alliances for security.

3. Komeito

Up until the 1980's, Komeito opposed the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty, and favored a position of neutrality for the country. The party supported the transformation of the SDF into a smaller national guard to meet defense needs. The Japan-US Security Treaty should be discontinued and replaced by a Japan-US Friendship Treaty (which would also be desirable with other major nations such as the USSR and China).

A shift in the Komeito position occurred at its 18th convention in December 1980. While claiming that the
Security Treaty must eventually be phased out, the party recognized it as serving Japan's interests for the time being until improvements in global affairs could be achieved which would no longer necessitate the Security Treaty. The constitutionality of the SDF was recognized by Komeito for the first time and again, though the shift to a national guard should eventually take place, the SDF was acceptable as long as its missions were "limited strictly to exclusively defensive operations to protect the integrity of the nation's territorial land, air, and sea and to maintain it in its present form for the time being under strengthened civilian control."65

Komeito supports the current Constitution, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and opposes increases in defense allocations. Its decision to alter its security policies were likely less related to increased concerns over the Soviet "threat" than as a more realistic defense stance which would have more voter appeal.

4. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)

Though socialist in name, the DSP is a conservative party in nature. There is little reason to believe that the DSP is overly concerned about the USSR but it does support an armed nation concept (non-nuclear) for defense purposes and calls for maintaining the Japan-US Security Treaty. The only opposition party which did not oppose proposed technology transfer arrangements between Japan and the US, the DSP supports Japan's alignment with the West and
acknowledges Japan's responsibility to contribute to the common defense. However, such efforts should be steered by constitutional and budgetary constraints. However, this does not mean accepting all existing programs as is. The DSP has called for a critical review of the NDPO and some of its leading members have advocated pushing defense spending above 1% of GNP if it appears necessary to meet Japan's defense requirements.

Of the major opposition parties, the DSP security policies most closely resemble those of the LDP. Diplomacy and other peace efforts form the core of DSP policy and defense matters should always be subject to strong civilian leadership. The DSP's 1983 Action Policy related the essence of the party's approach to improving international relations when it stated, "We must make efforts to ease tension, to promote nuclear disarmament, and to re-vitalize the world economy."

5. New Liberal-Democratic Federation (NLDF)

The New Liberal Club and Socialist Democratic Federation joined forces in September 1981 to create the NLDF. It is the youngest and smallest of the opposition parties and there is scant information available on their attitude towards the USSR. The NLDF security platform is built around "peace diplomacy" with the ultimate goal of global disarmament. The party does not dispute Japan's Constitution and strongly backs the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. It
supports continued bilateral security arrangements with the US and accepts the need for the SDF. It appears the NLDF would favor continued budgetary restrictions on defense spending since its security policy warns that "unbridled rearmament must be avoided."
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

Having sampled the attitudes of those who carry the diplomatic torches in Japan, the economic ties between the USSR and Japan will be examined (especially Siberian joint ventures), along with perceptions of Japanese business and Japanese scholars. At first glance, it would appear that Siberia's abundance of natural resources would offer a close at hand cornucopia for resource starved Japan. When reviewing Soviet-Japanese economic linkages, it is important to note the prospects for one nation gaining leverage over the other and the potential for this impacting on the security relations between the two countries.

Scholars in many countries constitute an important foreign policy interest group. The various perceptions of Japanese scholars with respect to the USSR and security matters will be reviewed, along with the potential influence that this group holds.

A. JAPAN-SOVIET TRADE

Historically, Japan-Soviet trade has not been impressive. Prior to World War II, neither Japan's exports or imports exceeded 2.5% of Japan's totals. Trade was nil during most of the Cold War years. Since the late 1950's, Japan-Soviet trade has increased greatly but even by 1982, it only accounted for 2% of overall Japanese trade. The pattern
first half of 1983 proved even more dismal. Japanese exports were down 19.1% over the previous year and imports were down 24.7%. Japan's concern on the INF issue and decision to align itself with the West may negatively affect Japan-Soviet trade more than the Afghanistan issue. It remains to be seen whether this is just a temporary shift or will have longer range effects.

Currently, Japan's primary exports to the USSR consist of iron and steel materials (in particular, steel pipe). These materials accounted for 40% of Japan's exports in 1982. Heavy building machinery is another leading export item. Though coal and timber had been Japan's leading imports from the USSR in the 1970's, gold became the major import by the early 1980's. Gold imports surged from $47 million in 1980 to $535 million in 1981. The promotion of gold is probably viewed by the Soviets as a means to help reduce the growing trade imbalance while also acquiring inputs of hard currency.

B. JAPAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN SIBERIA

One paradox that has plagued the USSR for many years involves the fact that although Siberia appears to hold a wealth of resources, the Soviet economy has been in such poor condition that the country needs outside technology and money to enable these resources to be harvested. As one Soviet specialist on Siberia commented, "The cost of developing the much-heralded potential resources of Siberia is almost prohibitive with standard technology, which is 20 to 30 years
behind in the performance and capacity to operate in extreme environments." The other half of the problem was summarized quite nicely by another Soviet official when he commented, "How much we could do if we only had money." The lack of Soviet technology has even restricted accurate or extensive surveying of Siberian resources.

With Japan and the US possessing the leading high-technology industries in the world, and since the US was viewed by the Soviets as the less desirable business associate, the USSR directed its primary efforts toward Japan. In the mid-1960's, the Soviets worked diligently to interest Japan in various Siberian projects. One important factor centered around Japan's willingness to accept natural resources as partial payment for credits loaned. For the Japanese, the appeal of joint Siberian projects lay in the promise of useful products at lower prices and lower transportation costs (due to geographic proximity).

In 1966, the Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee came into being as the planning forum for cooperative endeavors between Japan and the USSR. The first major Japan-Soviet Siberian venture (contracted in July 1968) involved timber development. The agreement called for Japan to provide $163 million in supplies (mostly development equipment) in return for 5 years of timber valued at $183 million. In December 1970, an agreement was signed between Japan and the USSR for the development of a port facility at
Wrangel (just east of Nakhodka), to include construction of three piers capable of heavy loading operations, and support equipment for handling timber, gas, and coal. Japan would supply $80 million worth of building equipment and materials. According to the Soviets, the port of Wrangel was designed to relieve the overloading of Nakhodka and to directly facilitate trade with Japan.\textsuperscript{10} It does not take much imagination to also realize that a port with such heavy loading capabilities could also have important military use as an additional logistics support facility.

After five years of negotiations, a deal concerning wood chip processing was concluded in 1972. Again, Japan provided equipment (valued at $45 million) in return for the product. Two years later, a further agreement encompassed additional ventures in coal, timber, and gas for which Japan advanced the Soviets $1,050 million in credits.\textsuperscript{11} 1975 found Japan providing support for offshore oil exploration in the Sakhalin area in return for 50\% of the oil returns.\textsuperscript{12}

One joint project that failed to materialize occurred in the 1974-75 timeframe. Though initial attempts by the USSR to interest Japan in assisting to build an oil pipeline extending from western Siberia to the Soviet east coast were favorably received by Japan, prior to arrangements being finalized, Tokyo backed out of the deal. Several factors seemed to contribute to Japan's change of mind: 1) the potential strategic ramifications of the project (i.e., a permanent supply of oil to the Soviet Far East); 2) a reluctance to
get so deeply involved financially in a project in which the returns (oil to Japan) could so easily be cut off; 3) pressure from the Chinese to refuse the offer; and 4) a Soviet cut-back in promised delivery from 30-50 million tons/year to 25 million tons/year.13

By 1978, Japanese national and private loans toward Siberian projects totaled $3 billion (50% from each sector).14 While it is not yet clear how mutually profitable the Siberian projects will be for Japan and the USSR, it appears that Japan intends to maintain some degree of involvement. Even when the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan (December 1979) took place, Japan shared in the West's displeasure over the incident, but it was reluctant to fully support an embargo on equipment and loans to the USSR. Japan chose a compromise position by freezing uncompleted contracts, but continued delivery of credits under existing contracts. The Soviet-Japanese 1980 planning meeting on Siberian ventures took place as scheduled and in April 1980, Japan stated its intentions to exempt the Sakhalin offshore oil project from previously imposed restrictions and prepared to resume drilling operations.15 When the US further tightened its embargo requirements in June 1982 (restricting oil and gas support material manufactured in the US), Japan formally objected, claiming such action ran counter to international law and could seriously damage Japan-Soviet trade.16 Desiring to continue the Sakhalin projects, Japan decided to resume drilling using available Soviet equipment vice Japanese
(dependent on US parts). After US sanctions were eased in November 1982, Japanese rigs again went into operation. The first Japanese-Soviet contract concluded after the modification of sanctions arranged for Japan to provide 500 pipe layers for the prospective Siberian gas pipeline. In 1983, the primary ongoing joint Siberian projects consisted of Sakhalin oil/gas and Yakutsk coking coal. Since the late 1970's, Japan has remained cautious about making commitments in Siberia.

The Japanese government does not foresee that involvement in Siberia (or overall trade with the USSR) will create any Soviet leverage over Japan. A Japanese dependency does not exist nor is one developing. Japanese officials have indicated that Japan's dependency on individual Soviet resources would probably not be allowed to exceed 20% of Japan's needs. Thus far, Japan shows no indications of even approaching such limits. Japanese estimates for 1990 reflect importation of Siberian coking coal at about 10% and Sakhalin oil at 1%. As long as alternate sources exist for these resources, Japan should maintain considerable economic freedom to maneuver.

C. PERCEPTIONS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

When a neighboring country such as the USSR offers a multitude of profitable economic opportunities, one would expect a competitive business community such as Japan's, to downplay security problems between the two nations. Many
Japanese businessmen believe that economic cooperation with the USSR reduces the potential of a Soviet "threat." In their opinion, by increasing economic contacts with the USSR, Japan demonstrates that it is not opting to isolate its neighbor which in turn, can help reduce Soviet-US tension in Northeast Asia. Through greater cooperation, the probability of armed confrontation can be reduced by minimizing misperceptions and promoting greater understanding between the two parties. If Japan refused to assist the USSR in the development of Siberia, Soviet shortages might eventually develop which could heighten tensions and cause the Soviets to forcibly seek alternatives elsewhere (such as the Middle East).

The tendency of the Japanese to focus on the positive aspects of economic matters can be seen from a Japanese project completed in 1978 involving construction of a floating drydock. Though the Japan Defense Agency had its doubts about the project, Japan proceeded to build this 80,000 ton floating drydock based on the Soviet's assurance that the dock was intended for merchant ships. Considering that the dock is capable of docking a Kiev-class aircraft carrier (CVHG), that the drydock has been based in Vladivostok (one of the primary military ports in the Soviet Pacific), and the fact that the Soviets do not possess any commercial vessels in the Pacific of a size to warrant such a repair platform, it provides some evidence that the dock may be intended for extensive military use.
Throughout the 1970's, Japanese businessmen remained optimistic about continued cooperative projects in Siberia despite the obstacles that cropped up in working with the Soviets, such as: Soviet bureaucratic red tape and resultant delays, the tendency of the Soviets to alter plans without conferring with the Japanese, the Soviets' argumentative nature in concluding agreements, and the Soviet requirement that goods bound for Japan be carried on Soviet vessels (reducing financial opportunities for Japanese merchants). These things notwithstanding, the Soviets did attempt to meet contractual commitments.22

With Afghanistan and the US-led levying of sanctions against the USSR, reactions among Japanese businessmen were mixed. While some hated to limit economic opportunities, most followed the recommendation of Chairman Inayama of the powerful Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) who supported US efforts, in the hope that pressure could be brought to bear on the Soviets to encourage negotiations on arms limitations.23

As it became apparent that Soviet behavior with respect to Afghanistan was difficult to influence, increasing numbers of Japanese businessmen became eager to revitalize Japan-Soviet trade relations. Some felt shortchanged because certain European countries showed limited regard for the sanctions and made deals with the Soviets which Japan was intentionally passing up. When the US sent a 250-man
business delegation to the USSR in November 1982, it further stimulated the Japanese business community. As a result, a 250-man Japanese business mission visited the USSR from February 22-27, 1983. The mission was headed by Shigeo Nagano, president of Japan's Chamber of Commerce. While the Soviets hoped the mission would lay the groundwork for expanded cooperation on Siberian projects, Nagano reflected the shift in Japan's economic approach when he stated, "Our aim is to discuss ordinary trade and existing economic relations with the Soviets...that is, projects already underway."^24

Senior Soviet officials who met with the Japanese trade delegation in the USSR, spoke of Soviet economic difficulties, stressed the importance of Siberian development, and recommended Japan lift its economic sanctions. They also reminded their visitors that the USSR could always turn to Western Europe if Japan was not interested in helping. The Japanese did not pledge to resolve any specific issues but expressed a sincere interest in expanding trade as possible without defying sanctions. The willingness of the Japanese businessmen to promote increased economic activity was represented by Nagano's statement that resolution of the Northern Territories issue was not a prerequisite to improving trade relations.^25

The USSR recognizes that its relations with the private Japanese business sector are smoother than relations with the Japanese government. The Soviets strive to stay on the good side of these businessmen in hopes of creating
discontent between business and government on the handling of Soviet affairs. When Izvestia political affairs commentator A.E. Bobin visited Japan in March 1983, he commented on the Nagano trade mission thusly:

Mr. Nagano is considering the national interests of Japan, in contrast to Prime Minister Nakasone. I think that if Japan and the Soviet Union make the most of the lessons learned from the Nagano trip to the USSR, and make preparations carefully by April of next year [next scheduled economic conference], then it will become possible to achieve big results, which will prove a plus for the two sides.26

While Japanese businessmen are anxious to promote improved trade with the Soviets, it appears doubtful that Japan will again have the enthusiasm for developing Siberia which it demonstrated in the late 1960's and the 1970's. Whether by its own choice or resulting from pressure from the government, Japan's business sector, for the time being anyway, has become reluctant to commit itself to projects which promote a stronger USSR. As Mitsubishi Shoji President Yohei Mimura remarked, future Japan-Soviet joint ventures should concentrate on such areas as "light industries and commercial enterprises, which are helpful to the improvement of people's living..."27

When Japan limits its view of the USSR to economic matters only, the concept of "threat" seldom enters the picture. Economically, the Soviets appear to have greater needs from Japan than vice versa. The Soviets need money and technology to develop Siberia and improve their overall economy. They have few alternatives. The Japanese find
Soviet natural resources helpful, but adequate alternatives exist. Considering the Soviets' additional need for grain from the West (especially the US), it tends to limit the extent of pressure the USSR can currently exert on Japan. However, the Soviet's potential to improve their self-sufficiency in these areas appears much greater than Japan's potential to overcome its current (and almost absolute) dependency on imported resources.

Business attitudes towards various defense matters generally support the positions of the LDP government. However, there are some significant companies involved in defense production which would heartily support a stronger SDF and increased defense budget. A study by the Keidanren Defense Production Committee in 1977 recommended that Japan reduce military imports, expand domestic defense production, and eliminate the 1% ceiling on defense spending. Numerous defense contractors would also like to see the ban on weapons exports lifted. There has not been any significant indications of business interests in changing Japan's nuclear weapons policies though Japan's industries could likely produce nuclear weapons within only a few years.

The interests of some industries is building a stronger SDF appear derived more from profit motivation than as a needed response to a perceived Soviet "threat." Underutilized and hungry for new contracts, Japan's defense industries would welcome the opportunity to contribute more to the defense of Japan.
D. PERCEPTIONS OF SCHOLARS

Scholars in numerous countries have become influential foreign policy interest groups. Their writings offer both fresh ideas and continuous critiques of current policies. In the US, scholars have the opportunity to have direct impact on foreign policy since this group is frequently drawn upon to fill posts in the governing administration. The situation is not quite the same in Japan, but in recent years, scholars have gained greater respect (and a wider audience) for their opinions on foreign policy matters. In the late 1970's, as the taboos on discussing various defense issues began to fall, Japanese scholars eagerly stepped in to fill this void of silence. As an editor of a Japanese magazine commented in 1980, "It may be that finally the time has come in the debate on Japanese defense to 'let a hundred flowers bloom.'"

The views of Japanese scholars on the Soviet threat and other defense matters range across a broad spectrum. Professors Hiroshi Kimura and Mike Mochizuki have each provided excellent categorizations for Japanese security views. Kimura breaks down Japanese thinkers as either "pacifists," "realists," or "alarmists." Mochizuki refers to similar groupings as either "unarmed neutralists," "political" and "military realists," or "gaullists." These categories will be useful for the purposes of this paper.

1. Pacifists (Unarmed Neutralists)

The pacifists (unarmed neutralists) prefer to focus on diplomatic and economic relations vice the military
character of nations. Due to Japan's economic dependencies, international cooperation is essential for Japan's survival and military means only serve to endanger Japan's welfare. This group strongly advocates disarmament and arms control.

With respect to the USSR, the pacifists claim that the US has used scare tactics to mislead Japanese views of the Soviets. In reality, the USSR is not as militarily strong as portrayed, its economy is riddled with problems, its international influence is declining, and attack on Japan is highly unlikely. Diplomacy is the only answer for dealing with the Soviets. In the unlikely event that the Soviets did attack, Michio Morishima suggests that the Japanese "should surrender in an orderly manner, white flag and red flag in hand." The SDF has historically been opposed by the pacifists, though some acceptance has occurred in recent years as former criticisms have become less defensible. Others, such as Takeshi Igarashi, continue to question the constitutionality of the SDF and warn that "the very existence of military might always constitutes a menace." Morishima adds that "National security should be protected not by military hardware but by software in the form of economic and cultural cooperation with other countries." The pacifists look upon the Japan-US security arrangements with contempt. They believe that dependence on one nation is undesirable, Japan should no longer suffer as a pawn of US world strategy, and the US cannot be trusted.
to aid Japan in a crisis. Japan should dissolve the MST, seek independent policies from the US, and work towards contracting a multitude of friendship treaties in the international domain.

Japan's pacifists consider any increase in defense spending as "dangerous" and strongly support the "peace" Constitution and all restrictions on defense which have been established (e.g., 1% ceiling, ban on weapons exports, Three Non-Nuclear Principles). Due to Japan's historical experiences, they believe Japan has an obligation to play a leading role in reducing nuclear arms in the world.

While the pacifists do not have the largest following in Japan, their appeal remains extensive enough to act as a "brake" on the Japanese government, creating resistance to changes in defense policy.

2. Realists

The realists, which Mochizuki has further classified as either "political" or "military" realists, reflect the predominant current thought in Japan. In general, the realists recognize that Japan should exercise extensive economic and political responsibilities in global affairs, and should militarily play a contributary (vice independent) role in the defense of Japan. The political realists note the importance of both internal and external factors in determining security policies. They recognize that due regard must be given to the pacifistic leanings still existing in Japan. They recognize that the people are
unwilling to readily support measures which would diminish the economic prosperity to which they have grown accustomed. Furthermore, it is not reasonable for Japan to assume an autonomous military posture due to the high cost involved and the anti-Japanese sentiment it would create in East Asia. Japan's dependence on the outside world cannot be overlooked and efforts should be made to reduce vulnerabilities and improve relations with major suppliers.36

The military realists base their recommendations on currently perceived military threats without restricting options because of domestic constraints. They believe military capabilities must be duly respected since intentions can rapidly change and one might not have sufficient time to react unless prepared beforehand.37

Most Japanese realists do not view the USSR as overly threatening. As long as US-USSR forces remain relatively balanced in the Pacific; they do not foresee the Soviets taking direct action against Japan. Numerous realists, such as Hiroshi Kimura, see the USSR as opportunistic. The Soviets usually will act to acquire easy gains, but not take action where the risks are high (especially the possibility of direct conflict with the US). In Kimura's opinion, the USSR would prefer to "Finlandize" Japan (i.e., to gain direct influence without having to sacrifice the invaluable industrial base of the country).38 Another realist, Masamichi Inoki, head of the Research Institute for
Peace and Security, believes the USSR has four goals with respect to Japan:

1) To sever the US-Japan military nexus.
2) To prevent Japan from becoming a military power.
3) To preclude the formation of a tightly knit Japan-China team.
4) To secure Japan's economic and technological capabilities to exploit Siberian resources.

To achieve such goals, most realists believe the Soviets will employ various types of pressure tactics rather than taking direct military action (though the Afghanistan invasion made some less confident on this point). The realists normally envision attack by the Soviets only as a last resort, but the potential threat is directly affected by the degree of instability in the US-USSR military balance. As the US loses its strategic edge, they see Japan with an increased defense role.

The realists recognize the importance of building a credible "defense" force but vary on the magnitude of the buildup. In defining these differences, one might label one group as "minimalists" and the other as "deterrents." The "minimalists" advocate only enough improvements in the SDF to provide an "exclusively defensive" defense which can repel a small-scale attack for a short period of time.

The "deterrents" advocate achieving the NDPO goals as soon as possible (some call for expanding the NDPO goals) in order to create a defense force capable of blocking straits,
defending sea lanes, and substantially raising the costs of
attack in order to deter potential aggressors.

Agreement exists among the realists on the necessity
of maintaining the Japan-US security arrangements. Some
would like the MST rewritten to reflect a truly "mutual"
security relationship but all appreciate its deterrent
effects. Makoto Momoi would further like to see Japan pro-
mote confidence building measures to form a type of "bonus
deterrence" (i.e., rewards to nations for steps taken to
avoid conflict). "Retaliatory deterrence" would remain
entrusted with the US. Masashi Nishihara sees a need for
Japan to go beyond security arrangements with the US. Be-
cause of similar vulnerabilities shared between Japan and
Western Europe with regards to US-USSR relations and energy
dependencies, he recommends that a new strategic relationship
be built between these two parties to protect their security
interests. While the realists appreciate the need to carry
out cooperative policies with the US, some believe that US
attitudes toward the USSR are too narrow-minded and that care
should be taken to avoid isolating the Soviets. The realists
generally support Japan's decision to align itself with the
West, but they stress the importance of extending diplomatic
and economic opportunities to the USSR to promote improved
relations.

Realists' attitudes toward defense spending differ
widely. Some political realists believe 1% of GNP should not
be exceeded because of domestic constraints, others feel
increases are necessary as a symbol of Japan's sincerity to support the Japan-US "alliance," and military realists definitely recognize the need to go beyond the 1% ceiling to build substantial defense forces. The Center for Strategic Studies Institute (reflecting the military realists' position) recommends that defense spending will need to go as high as 2.5% of GNP by 1986 to construct an adequate defense.43

On the question of Japan's Constitution, most realists consider it a satisfactory framework within which to work, some would like to see changes, but nearly all recognize the unlikelihood of effecting revisions due to popular support for the current document. On the nuclear issue, most realists support the Three Non-Nuclear Principles though some have recommended that the principles be modified to two-and-a-half (permitting transit of US vessels with nuclear weapons through Japanese territory).44 The realists prefer to remain under the US nuclear umbrella.

In summary, the prevailing realists' attitudes reflect that:

1) Japan deserves international respect in political as well as economic affairs.
2) Attack by the USSR is not likely, but should not be discounted. Therefore, adequate defense forces should be established to discourage such a future possibility.
3) Japan should build a comprehensive policy toward the USSR. Diplomatic and economic options should remain
open to encourage sincere, positive relations but Japan expects the respect of an equal and will resist intimidation.

4) Japan chooses to align itself with the West and will maintain its security ties with the US.

3. **Alarmists (Gaullists)**

For the alarmists (gaullists), Japan has not developed proportionately in the postwar period. As a result, it is deformed. While possessing economic preponderance, its military forces exist in a shriveled state. In order to rectify these inequities, the legalities currently restricting Japan such as the Constitution, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the weapons export ban, and the 1% ceiling should be scrapped and a new administrative framework should be erected.⁴⁵

The alarmists view the USSR as an "aggressive, expansionist state energized and guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology and influenced by its geographical location; the increased military capability reflects the Soviet intention of expansion; the Soviet threat to the West and Japan is to be taken seriously and considered to be imminent...."⁴⁶

In order for Japan to truly regain its sovereignty, alarmists such as Tetsuya Kataoka contend that Japan must rearm and become militarily self-reliant. US actions have precluded Japan from "committing herself politically and strategically," but it is naive to believe US forces would
readily come to aid Japan in an emergency. The SDF should be significantly strengthened to attain offensive capabilities including nuclear weapons.

The alarmists consider the current MST insulting and maintain that it should be rewritten to reflect full mutuality. They believe that the national interests of Japan and Japan-US common interests would be best served by a militarily independent Japan. Though the alarmists advocate a strong military posture, it is interesting that no SDF officers of any stature (either retired or active) champion the alarmist approach. The alarmists remain a minor force in Japan. A seriously alarming external stimulus would probably be required to induce a sizeable shift to this line of thought (such as considerable loss of confidence in the US or direct military action against Japan).

Among the scholars, the three main groups of views all reflect their own brand of nationalism. To an outside observer, it is somewhat ironic that the Japanese viewpoint which most mirrors Asian nationalism in the postwar period (i.e., the alarmists), appears to be looked upon by the majority of Japanese as the least appealing, as will be seen when popular perceptions are discussed in the next chapter.
V. POPULAR PERCEPTIONS

As in previous chapters, priorities, views of the USSR, and attitudes towards the SDF and other defense matters will be reviewed to gain some insight on the Japanese general public’s perceptions of the Soviet "threat." The results of opinion polls were used extensively in this evaluation and while opinion polls have enjoyed much popularity in post-war Japan, as with any opinion surveys, they should not be regarded as indisputable reflections of Japanese thoughts, but rather as indices of possible changes.

A. OUTLOOKS AND PRIORITIES

Militarism characterized Japan as it entered World War II, and anti-militarism characterized the country as it emerged from the Occupation in the early 1950's. These attitudes became deeply entrenched in a society which felt cheated by its former military leaders. Defeat for the Japanese was not merely failure, it was insufferable. Throughout their history, the Japanese had never experienced defeat. They vowed that such shame should never befall their country again. Since the ways of the military had caused them to "bear the unbearable," other means were sought to lead Japan to prosperity.

Within an island nation where economic recovery stood as the top priority, it is not difficult to understand why
minimal public concern arose over external affairs, especially with the "guarantee" of the US-Japan Security Treaty in place to preclude such anxieties. "Lack of concern" probably well describes the Japanese attitude towards foreign affairs for many years following World War II. In a 1970 survey, 74% of those polled indicated their "main interests" centered on domestic issues, while only 8% listed foreign policy as a primary interest. The Japanese seem to view foreign affairs as if these international events took place on the other side of the window of Japan's house. They watch external events, sometimes examining them closely, but do not feel a sense of involvement until events directly impact on Japan. Not only geographically insular, the Japanese have formed somewhat insular attitudes. In one poll conducted in 1970, 72% expressed little or no interest in defense matters. The theory of "unarmed neutralism" appealed to the anti-military sentiments of many during the Cold War era. The proponents of this philosophy warned that the US-Japan Security Treaty would entangle Japan in the US-USSR confrontation. This line of thought promoted attitudes of non-involvement. The 1970's and detente deflated the unarmed neutralists' arguments, but deteriorating US-USSR relations since the late 1970's have again expanded the unarmed neutralists' audience. A March 1981 Asahi poll found 30% of the respondents favoring a stance of unarmed neutralism.

The Japanese are the most widely read people in the world, but this does not equate to being "most aware" or
"most concerned." Statistics for newspaper circulation in 1979 showed that an average of 569 copies per 1000 people were distributed (as compared to 282 per 1000 for the US). Additionally, radios were owned by 777 out of each 1000 people and for televisions, 245 per 1000. While this suggests that the media has the potential to be quite influential in shaping opinions in Japan, until recent years, the media (as well as most of Japan's leadership) showed little interest in Japan's participation in international affairs.

The attitudes of the Japanese public are not only complex, but sometimes seem contradictory. While the USSR and Communism are both unpopular amongst the Japanese, minimal interest exists in support of an explicit anti-Soviet alliance. The Japanese prefer that security problems be worked out by other nations. Though discussion of most defense and military topics was formerly considered taboo by many Japanese, events in the late 1970's (especially increased Soviet operations around Japan and Afghanistan) brought such controversial topics as non-nuclear principles, the defense budget, revision of the Constitution, and size/deployment of the SDF into more open debate. Again, one should not read too much into this. Open discussion does not infer intentions to make new commitments. Though the Japanese have grown more comfortable in debating various security topics, demands for change have not emerged. While new commitments may remain distant, the trend reflects greater awareness and interest in international issues. A public survey by the
Prime Minister's office in December 1981 exemplifies this trend. Of 10,000 people surveyed (nationwide), 66% recognized that the international situation had become more severe. When asked what international problems concerned them the most, they responded:

- US-Soviet military balance: 37%
- Soviet forces in Northern Territories: 36%
- Problems in Poland: 31%
- Iran-Iraq dispute: 19%

Table 1 (an excerpt from a survey conducted by the Atlantic International Problems Research Institute in May 1983) illustrates that Japanese "concerns" do not differ markedly from those in the US and West Europe. The three major areas of concern noted by the Japanese were "threat of war," "crime," and "inflation." A greater percentage of Japanese (27%) than any other country listed "energy crisis" as a major concern, which suggests the Japanese public's awareness of their economic vulnerability. In response to this question, as in all eleven survey questions on aspects of security which were reported in this Asahi article, Japan gave the highest percentage of "no answer" or "don't know" responses than any other country which suggests less interest in security matters than other countries.

One Diet member remarked that the Japanese have "entered the halls of the nouveau riche." Due to this relative prosperity, self-interest among the Japanese has grown, along with an interest in preserving conditions as they are now,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>W. Germany</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Holland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat of War</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Crisis</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequacy of Defense Power</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Rate of Unemployment</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality and Unfairness in Soc.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Deficits in Finances</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty of Political Leadership</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer; Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and avoiding involvement in international affairs. This tendency to avoid delving deeply into international problems partially accounts for the continued popularity of the somewhat idealistic philosophy of "omni-directional" diplomacy, in which Japan can enjoy friendly relations with all nations. Though some say nationalism is growing among the Japanese, this nationalism normally does not embrace a militaristic nature.

B. THE USSR

As should be evident from earlier comments, history has done little to foster a positive spirit between the Japanese and Russians. In Japan, with its high level of education, the public is well aware of these historical issues and continues to harbor negative feelings towards the Soviets. But the Japanese are also a product of their environment and just as attitudes towards China underwent significant change in the 1970's due to improved Japan-China relations, one should not rule out a future positive change in Japan-Soviet relations if facilitated by modifications in the external environment.

In two separate public opinion polls conducted in 1949, the USSR ranked as the most unpopular country, while the US ranked as the "most liked" country. This disparity in attitudes towards two recent enemies was highly colored by anti-Soviet feelings which emerged because of the perceived Soviet betrayal of Japan in 1945 (by breaking the 1941
Non-aggression Pact), the elongated and oppressive Soviet detainment of Japanese POW's, and the pro-American sentiments which grew out of the US Occupation. Though the Japanese "disliked" the Soviets, it certainly did not mean that improved relations were not desired. Three separate polls conducted in the 1952-53 timeframe reflected that approximately 50% of the Japanese favored a peace treaty with the USSR while only 20% were opposed (30% fell into the "don't know" category).

Routinely, less than 5% of Japanese polled have listed the USSR as their "most liked" country, however, degree of "dislike" has varied over the years. While in the early 1960's, one set of polls indicated that about 50% of those polled did not like the USSR, this decreased to 25% by the early 1970's (during detente), and by the late 1970's, had increased to about 75%.

The Northern Territories issue, the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, and the invasion of Afghanistan no doubt accounted for much of this change. The hope of the early 1970's was reflected in a 1974 San-kei poll on the desired level of relations with the Soviets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More extensive relations</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain status quo</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less relations</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No relations</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the Japanese may have believed that expanded relations with the Soviets would be worthwhile, the USSR's position in the international hierarchy remained low as can...
be seen from these polls conducted by the Asahi in 1971 and 1978 which asked which country Japan should maintain the friendliest relations: 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971 (%)</th>
<th>1978 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another 1978 Asahi poll showed that only 3% of those polled foresaw closer relations with the USSR in the future. 15 The general feeling amongst the Japanese at the close of the 1970's, was that relations with the USSR would remain "cool" until the Northern Territories problem was resolved. In the early 1980's, the Japanese government and press enlightened the public about a new obstacle in Japan-USSR relations—the Soviet SS-20's stationed in the Far East. Anti-Soviet feelings intensified after Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's remark on April 2, 1983 that the USSR might transfer SS-20's from Europe to Asia. Though the Japanese press often takes anti-government, anti-defense, and anti-American positions, it reacted strongly against the Soviets' attitudes toward SS-20's in Asia. Soviet tactics further aggravated the Japanese. Shortly following Gromyko's comments, Soviet Premier Tikhonov remarked to Japanese Ambassador Takashima that "There is no territorial problem between Japan and the Soviet Union. Among the Japanese people, there is no
distrust in the Soviet Union, and the territorial problem is used as a means to plant it among them.¹⁶ Administrative-level talks held between Japan and the USSR in April 1983 did little to raise Japanese hopes for improvement. Editorials from the Sankei, Tokyo, and Nihon Keizai all commented on the futility of the talks, that the USSR did not appear sincere about improving relations, that the SS-20's in Siberia were fast becoming an important issue, and that the new Soviet leader (Andropov) offered little hope for optimism about future Japan-Soviet relations.¹⁷

Except for Siberian resources, the Japanese find little fascination in things Russian, and their interests in the USSR are diminishing. The Japanese exhibit minimal desire to travel to the USSR, only a few institutions on Soviet studies exist in Japan, and dwindling numbers of students study Russian.¹⁸ The current situation reflects no impending change in these negative Japanese attitudes towards the USSR.

Since Japan regained its independence in 1952 (and also gained a protective security pact from the US), the Japanese have had difficulty visualizing a military threat to their country. In a 1970 poll conducted by the Central Research Service in Tokyo, only 22% feared that "some country" might attack Japan while 47% perceived no threat to Japan (31% were undecided). Of those fearing possible attack, China ranked almost equally with the USSR as the major threat.¹⁹
With the detente of the early 1970's, Japanese threat perceptions remained low and concern over China steadily faded until it became negligible after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty in 1978. This left the USSR as the sole major perceived threat. In a Yomiuri nationwide poll in 1978, when asked if any country was considered a threat, 57% listed the USSR, 10.8%--US, 10.5%--China, and 10.4%--no threats. However, listing a country as a possible threat does not necessarily equate to fear of military attack in the minds of the Japanese. An Asahi poll in 1978 found that the majority of respondents (54%) had no fear of attack (33% feared attack). While a large number of the population did not foresee a possible attack on Japan, a realization did exist that Japan might be involved in a conflict because of its position with respect to the major powers in the area (US-USSR-China). In a 1978 public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's office, 44% of the respondents considered that there was some danger of Japan being attacked or becoming involved in war. 36% replied that "no danger" existed.

The degree of Japanese distaste for the USSR and the perceptions of the Soviets as a serious "threat" conform poorly with each other. This disparity was reflected in a 1979 Japanese survey in which only 17% of those who viewed Japanese-Soviet relations as "not good" considered the USSR as a military threat to Japan. This lack of concern about the Soviet military can be partially attributed to lack of
awareness. The press had shown little interest in Soviet military movements around Japan until 1978-79. Increased press coverage stemmed from the changing US-USSR military balance and the Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories. Though this increased the public's awareness of Soviet military expansion in the region, the general attitude expressed in the press did not portray an increased threat to Japan, but tended to view Soviet moves as defensive in nature, mainly to protect Soviet military assets in the Sea of Okhotsk.24 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan cast doubts about the defensive nature of the Soviets, and increased Japanese awareness and concern. By 1981, a public opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister's office indicated that public recognition of the danger of Japan being attacked or involved in a war had increased from 44% in 1978 to 60%, while those taking the stance that no danger existed decreased from 36% (1978) to 21% (19% were undecided). Another question in this same 1981 poll indicated that 70% of the respondents were "gravely concerned about the possibility that Japan may be subject to foreign armed attack or undue political pressure backed by military strength."25 This demonstrated a public recognition that Japan was subject to external "pressures," but not necessarily that attack was seriously possible.

The next incremental increase in defense concerns among the Japanese took place during 1982-83 as the public became
more aware of Soviet supersonic Backfire bombers and SS-20 INF missiles. The expanded publicity over Japan's location within range of the 100-plus SS-20's deployed in Siberia spawned new fears in the country which had previously witnessed the devastating effects of nuclear weapons. In an editorial in the Asahi in July 1983, Shunji Taoka asks why so much rhetoric pours forth concerning SS-20's when Japan has been well within range of Soviet SS-5 missiles positioned in the Far East since 1962. Greater public awareness, strained Japan-Soviet relations, changes in the US-USSR military balance, and anxieties about US willingness to defend Japan may partially answer this question. Uneasiness over Soviet military capabilities in Northeast Asia appears to be gradually mounting. In a Tokyo Shimbun survey of March 1983 which asked to what degree the USSR was considered a "threat," respondents answered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Perception</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly feel the USSR is a threat</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR is a threat to some extent</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not much of a threat</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That 58.1% considered the USSR a threat may represent increased apprehension on the part of the Japanese, however, this does not necessarily mean the need is recognized to do more militarily to counter the Soviets.

After the KAL incident in September 1983, the initial Japanese public reaction reflected heightened concern over Soviet military power. A Yomiuri poll within Tokyo
found 91.6% regarded the USSR as a military threat to Japan and in another poll, 46.3% of those questioned indicated that defense efforts should be increased. However, rather than showering condemnation upon the Soviets, most press articles emphasized a desire to learn the facts of the incident. More concern was expressed as to why the jet was off course rather than why the Soviets shot it down. Japanese relatives of those killed sent a letter to KAL blaming KAL for the incident since the plane had infringed on Soviet territory. As can be seen in the following statistics from one survey, anti-Soviet responses were not highly supported by the Japanese:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Request full explanation of incident</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolve compensation issue</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest to USSR</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial Japanese reactions mainly responded to the "shock" of this incident. It is still too early to predict the long range effects on the public. While it certainly appears that distrust of the Soviets was confirmed, it related more to the Soviet delay in releasing the facts than the actual act of shooting down the airliner. Future interest is actually expanding the SDF and increasing the defense budget will be more revealing of the true effect on the public.

C. DEPENDING JAPAN

Once the Japanese possessed a "peace" Constitution and a protective shield (the US-Japan Security Treaty), it proved
difficult for many Japanese to determine the extent of their personal responsibility to defend the nation. When the Japanese think of security, and particularly defense matters, the use of military force does not readily materialize in their minds. Part of this difficulty is historic in nature. The Japanese have never had to fight an enemy within the boundaries of the main islands. Nor have there been internal rebellions which required a national response. Therefore, scenarios concerning defense of the nation are sometimes difficult to imagine. As Makoto Momoi puts it, in a consensus-centered decision-making, the defense problem "bewilders" the people.31

The lack of enthusiasm for assuming defense responsibilities in the 1960's was apparent in a 1967 survey conducted by Kyodo News Service amongst 2400 people. When asked how best to protect the security of Japan, responses were:32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depend on joint protection under US-Japan Security Treaty</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen SDF and independently protect Japan</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolish MST and place security under UN</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarm and become neutral</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even in 1978, a poll by Asahi suggests that military force was still not viewed as the primary means of defending the country. When asked what stood as the most significant factor that protected Japan, responses ranged as follows:33
Economic Power 20%
Peace Constitution 15%
Patriotism 13%
SDF 2%
US Support 2%
Peace Diplomacy 42%
Other 2%
No Answer 4%

In another poll in 1978 (Yomiuri), only 15% replied that they had a "great interest" in defense problems, 39% replied "some interest," and 28% said "not much interest."  

Defense awareness may have increased between 1978 and the early 1980's, but less reason exists to believe that willingness to actively defend the country has increased. 1978 and 1981 surveys by the Prime Minister's office showed the following results on this issue:

**Willingness to defend country (%):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather strong</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather weak</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very weak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resistance in event Japan is invaded (%):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Join SDF and fight</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support SDF in some way</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerilla-type resistance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed resistance</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No resistance</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The differences are too small to try to read anything into them, but certainly, support for military responses to emergencies witnessed no increase. Makoto Momoi made the following observation on the subject:

The key conceptual difference between Japanese and Americans concerns public attitudes toward national security, and, in particular, toward the role of the military in assuring security...the Japanese public is broadly skeptical about the utility of military power as a means of assuring national security. Most Japanese believe that military power in itself does not symbolize either national prestige or glory. Nor do they see it as effectively serving political or economic purposes...

While the tool of military force is still not broadly supported even in defending the nation, there appears to be a growing interest in arms control (especially since all the publicity about SS-20's in Asia) and an increasing awareness that Japan should be a participant in any such peace process.37

D. THE PEOPLE AND THE SDF

The Japanese public's support for the SDF has improved considerably since its establishment in 1954. The following statistics (%) from surveys by the Prime Minister's office are pertinent:38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favor SDF</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose SDF</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/ don't know</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The public's favorable attitude towards the existence of the SDF does not mean a comparable recognition of the SDF.
as the "defenders of the nation." Since the early 1970's, over 50% of the people have seen the aim of the SDF as "national security" (high of 60% in 1981 Prime Minister's survey), about 20% have considered "internal security" as the primary aim, and about 13% responded "disaster-relief operations." Though the public sees national security as the actual main aim of the SDF, it was not until the 1978 Prime Minister's poll that "national security" received greater support than "disaster-relief operations" in the public's view of where "future" SDF emphasis should be placed. As for the public's view of "proven" effectiveness, over 70% have consistently stated that the SDF has been most useful in "disaster-relief operations" while less than 10% replied "national defense." Questions about US defense credibility stemming from the withdrawal from Vietnam and the proposed troop withdrawal from the ROK may have been major contributing factors to this changing perception about the "future" role of the SDF. If this were true, one might expect to see a trend supporting a significantly stronger SDF. However, as these statistics (%) indicate, such has not been the case:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen SDF</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain status quo</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce SDF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though it appears more of the public now see a need for a stronger SDF than in the days of détente in early 1970's, the
majority of the people remain content with the *status quo*. Even when *Yomiuri* asked (April 1978) if Japan's forces should be strengthened in light of possible US military detachment from Asia, 31% replied "yes," 22% replied "no," and 47% fell into the "don't know" category.  

The public remains ambiguous in its perceptions of how the SDF can and should contribute to the defense of Japan. Recognition of the SDF's role in "national defense" has improved, but anxieties over a strong military preclude consensus support for a rapid military buildup. The JDA, in its 1982 Defense White Paper, sums up the public's position by stating that it "seems to reflect the difficulty which the people have in understanding the significance and role of the SDF as [a] deterrent--something largely invisible to the public eye, yet essential to national security."  

E. THE US AND THE MST  

Japan has maintained a security pact with the US since 1951. Public opinion polls suggest that the Japanese have not only grown accustomed to this defense arrangement, but have come to prefer the relationship (or have resigned themselves that no other reasonable way exists to protect Japan). As can be seen from the following surveys by the Prime Minister's office, support for the MST-SDF combination has steadily grown since the early 1970's.
Possibly the marked increase in support for the "MST plus SDF" between 1972 and 1975 could be attributed to the acute vulnerability witnessed by the Japanese during the 1973 oil embargo when they may have also recognized the inadequacy of the SDF alone. The MST itself is recognized as a positive factor in Japan's security. When asked if the MST "contributed to Japan's peace and safety," 66% of those surveyed in both 1978 and 1981 gave affirmative replies (though 36% said "yes, with reservations"). Only 12% gave negative responses (both polls). These attitudes were also shown in a November 1978 Asahi poll in which 49% of the respondents indicated the MST supported Japanese interests while 13% said the treaty was not in the interests of Japan.

Interestingly, though the MST is viewed as an important segment of Japan's security posture, confidence in US willingness to actually come to Japan's assistance in an emergency is not widely shared as these two 1978 polls indicate.
Do you think the US will defend Japan in an emergency?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yomiuri</th>
<th>Asahi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/don't know</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With such doubts about US resolve, one might think the Japanese would strive to build greater self-reliability but as can be seen from previously mentioned polls, increased support for a stronger SDF has been minimal. This reluctance to build up defense capabilities can also be seen in the public's attitude towards US pressure on Japan for greater defense efforts. A 1981 Yomiuri poll showed only 8.7% accepted US pressure positively, 32.7% accepted pressure reluctantly (within limits), and 44.6% preferred "resistance."\(^{47}\)

Though much publicity has surfaced in Japan in recent years about possible shifts in the US-USSR military balance in the region, a survey conducted by USIA in November 1982 showed that the Japanese believed that US and Soviet military power were essentially equal and that this equivalency would still persist in 1990.\(^{48}\) Thus, from the above, it appears that the Japanese believe in the necessity of the MST, see US military capabilities at parity with the USSR, but question the willingness of the American people to actually fight to protect Japan.

F. VIEWS ON OTHER SECURITY ISSUES

The Japanese public's attitude towards the defense budget again shows support for the status quo as the preferred
option. Little change occurred between the 1978 and 1981 polls by the Prime Minister's office except for somewhat of an increase in those favoring reducing defense spending (in spite of the Soviet military buildup and Afghanistan): 49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expand budget</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain current budget</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce budget</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the Japanese Constitution, though the authorship may have been primarily American, its "peaceful" nature has appealed to most Japanese. Though defense issues have been more actively discussed in recent years, the masses have shown little interest in changing the Constitution. The majority of the people still support the Article 9 "no war clause."50 Towards the Constitution as a whole, an April 1981 Yomiuri poll showed 69% "generally agreed" with the Constitution, 10.5% "generally disagreed," and 20.5% gave "don't know" responses. When the same poll asked if the Constitution should be revised, 43.9% responded that this was "undesireable," 27.8% said it was "desirable," and 28.3% said they "didn't know."51 Even though the majority of the Japanese support the SDF, a November 1978 Asahi survey reflected that 71% of those polled opposed amending the Constitution to allow Japan to possess armed forces.52 The Japanese public seems satisfied to accept the constitutionally questionable SDF "as is" rather than risk recognizing "military" forces which might adopt "offensive" characteristics.
Concerning the nuclear weapons option, most Japanese have consistently opposed the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan. When two newspapers in 1975 surveyed the attitudes of the Japanese on the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," the responses were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sankei</th>
<th>Asahi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree (with &quot;principles&quot;)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An Asahi poll in March 1981 showed similar attitudes in the early 1980's (71% of the respondents indicated their opposition to nuclear weapons for Japan). An Asahi poll in March 1981 showed similar attitudes in the early 1980's (71% of the respondents indicated their opposition to nuclear weapons for Japan).  

The Japanese thus far appear steadfast in their opposition to nuclear weapons either possessed by or present within the boundaries of Japanese territory, yet the public doubts whether the Japanese government strictly upholds the third principle (no introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan). The question most often arises when major US Navy combatants make port calls in Japan. The Japanese government consistently infers that the non-nuclear principles are being followed, and this reassurance seems to placate the masses, though as this 1975 Asahi poll suggests, the people, in reality, doubt that this standard is being upheld.
Do you think the principle of not allowing nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan is being observed?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This discontinuity may seem odd to an outsider, but the Japanese seem either willing to turn their eyes once they are told something does not exist and/or their level of concern is so low, they prefer to overlook the issue.

Overall, popular perceptions reflect trends of increasing concern for the Soviets, increasing support for the SDF and the Japan-US security arrangements, and a growing awareness that Japan should do more in its defense efforts. A September 1983 nationwide survey by Yomiuri indicated that while 45.2% of the respondents considered Japan's defense efforts sufficient, 39.5% considered efforts insufficient. This closing of the gap appears to reflect that fundamental changes in Japanese attitudes toward defense are taking place. However, these changes are not rapidly occurring as lingering anti-military sentiment work to keep the reins taut on the defense budget and the power potential of the SDF.
VI. DEFENSE TRENDS IN JAPAN

Attitudes of various Japanese communities have been examined but also of relevance are the actual defense measures which Japan has taken and how (or whether) they relate to the perceived Soviet "threat."

A. JAPAN'S DEFENSE PLANS

As discussed earlier, the initial plans to rearm Japan in the early 1950's were neither originated by nor enthusiastically supported by Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida's primary interests centered on independence and the opportunity for Japan to regain prosperity under a protective US security cloak. A formerly classified Japan-US document from this period relates that "Simultaneously with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty and the Japanese-American Security Cooperation Agreement, it will be necessary for Japan to embark upon a program of rearmament." This requirement called for a force of 50,000 troops to be created in addition to the National Police Reserve. Japan's initial Self-Defense Forces may have resulted from US concerns over the USSR, but certainly not from Japan's concerns.

In May 1957, Japan's Cabinet approved the Basic Policy for National Defense (see Appendix A). The Basic Policy rationalizes the necessity for the SDF and reaffirms Japan's defense dependence on the US. One of the principles of the
Basic Policy aims to "...develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation." In essence, the domestic environment vice the international environment was to be the dominant factor determining the development of defense policies.

Four five-year defense buildup plans followed the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense. These plans included specific goals for expanding the defense capabilities of Japan. The fourth five-year plan (which ended in 1976) fell far short of its mark in meeting equipment acquisition goals. Rising equipment costs and budgetary restrictions were cited as reasons for unfulfilled goals, but such cuts also reflect limited concern about external threats. In 1976, vice a new defense plan, the government initiated a National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). Unlike previous plans, the NDPO avoided setting target dates for achieving objectives. Established in the same year that the 1% defense spending ceiling was officially recognized, the Miki government seemed determined to hold down the level of defense spending and concentrate on qualitative vice quantitative improvements. An extensive document, the NDPO sums up Japan's defense responsibilities as follows:

...Assuming that the international political structure in this region--along with continuing efforts for global stabilization--will not undergo any major changes for some time to come, and that Japan's domestic conditions will also remain fundamentally stable, the most appropriate defense goal would seem to be the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in
peace time and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small-scale aggression. (my emphasis)

In describing the regional situation in 1976, the NDPO considered the region around Japan in a state of "equilibrium" between the USSR, US, and China. According to JDA Director-General Sakata in 1976, one of the primary goals of the NDPO was to sway the public towards greater support of defense issues: "The NDPO is a watershed in postwar defense policy not because it marked a major departure in military policy, but because it helped create an environment in which the open discussion of security issues was no longer taboo." Some add that Japan also sought to solidify the US commitment to Japan by demonstrating an effort to make defense improvements (though it could also be argued that during these years of US cutbacks in Asia, Japan's reorientation away from quantitative increases may have been designed to keep the US commitment by ensuring Japan's forces did not reach a level of self-sufficiency).

To better manage the programs laid out in the NDPO, the JDA draws up the Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate every three years (beginning in 1978). The latest of these estimates (chugyo) was formulated in 1981 and is referred to as the "56 Chugyo" (1981 was the 56th year of the Showa era). Intended as an internal planning document of the JDA, the "56 Chugyo" presents an outline for FY 1983-87 to basically achieve the goals of the NDPO. Based on the "56 Chugyo,"
the JDA submits requests annually for approval. While the Cabinet reviewed the "56 Chugyo" when first introduced, it merely acknowledged the document rather than suggesting any approval of it. As a result, yearly submissions by the JDA may or may not be approved in full, depending on various conditions at the time. The basic result is a long range plan that always has the potential to become longer, but seldom shorter. Although the JDA has recommended that the goals of the NDPO be achieved as soon as possible, budgetary restrictions thus far have caused both JDA officials and private research institutes to predict that the "56 Chugyo" goals will not even be achieved by 1987. A sense of urgency does not seem to exist.

Many would argue that the international environment has changed significantly enough since 1976 to warrant a critical review of the NDPO. However, no such move appears near at hand. Essentially, the core of Japan's defense policy remains the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense.

B. DEFENSE SPENDING

The average percentage of GNP dedicated to defense among the Western nations (NATO plus Japan) was 2.9% in 1981 compared to less than 1% for Japan. On the positive side, by NATO's formula for computing defense spending, Japan's expenditures increased from $5.71 billion in 1971 to $10.57 billion in 1981 which upped its ranking among this group from sixth to fifth position. This monetary change represented
an 85% increase, the highest of any major industrialized nation (only Turkey and Greece exceeded this increase). ³ Among non-nuclear countries, Japan ranks third in defense expenditures. While the US has encouraged NATO to attain 3% real growth in defense outlays, few have been able to meet the challenge in recent years (exceptions--UK, Canada, and Luxemburg). However, Japan has easily topped this NATO goal each year.⁴

In spite of the fact that most of Japan's government components in the last couple of years have endured budget cuts (up to 10%), the defense budget has continued to increase at a rate exceeding 6%. Additionally, changes have taken place within the budget which reflect realignments of priorities. The percentage of the defense budget going towards "personnel and provisions" decreased from 56% in 1976 to 46.6% in 1982 while expenditures on "equipment" rose from 16.4% to 22.4% in the same time period (and reached 24% in 1983).⁵ Another point worthy of note is the fact that the US bases located in Japan are provided rent free (in contrast to Philippine bases) and Japan contributes over $1 billion/year in support of these facilities.

The above notwithstanding, the fact remains that Japan has not felt it necessary to meet the minimum requests submitted by the JDA. The "1% ceiling" continues to have a kind of impenetrable aura about it. For FY 1984, the JDA indicated an 8.9% increase was required over the previous
year's defense budget. When negotiations were completed on the rough estimate budget in July 1983, only a 6.88% defense increase was approved. Even though the JDA had previously stated that increases of at least 8.5% were needed (through 1987) in order to attain the "56 Chugyo" goals, concern within the government was insufficient to support these requests. LDP Executive Board Chairman Hosoda labelled the 6.88% increase as insufficient to carry out Japan's pledges to the US and called for a greater increase, even if 1% of GNP was surpassed. Even in this concern expressed by a leading LDP Diet member, emphasis was placed on meeting US expectations vice meeting a specific external threat.

In a related security area, Japan has realized it can contribute towards the international welfare through its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) program. Readily accepting this responsibility, Japan's economic assistance underwent significant increases from 1971-1981. In 1981, its ODA expenditures reached $3.17 billion which ranked it third among the Western nations (tied with West Germany), behind only the US and France. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japan boosted its economic assistance to Pakistan, Turkey, and Thailand. More recently (1983), it increased its assistance to Jamaica and Honduras, and pledged to provide a ¥ 300 million grant to El Salvador, while refusing to reestablish aid to Nicaragua. Steps such as these, exemplify the type of action Japan can take in response
to perceived destabilizing activities. Japan's justification for these moves was because it "wishes to keep in step with the US and others." For the five year period 1980-84, it is estimated that Japan will pass out $21.4 billion in ODA which will double its previous five year effort.

C. NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE SDF

Though some of the equipment within the SDF reflects a certain degree of antiquity, recent construction and procurement programs exhibit the rapid approach of an impressive level of modernization. The question to be answered is whether these improvements can predominantly be traced to concern for the Soviet "threat," or whether other factors such as US pressure or bureaucratic politics within the SDF have been largely responsible.

1. Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

In the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the primary battle tank for many years was the Type-61 (introduced in 1961). Outdated, these tanks are gradually being replaced by the Type-74 (introduced in 1975). Well respected for its capabilities, the Type 74's numbered 350 in use as of 1982 (plus 560 Type-61) with plans to reach a total of 465 Type-74's by the end of FY 1983. Development of a new main battle tank (Type-88) began in 1976 which if on schedule, will begin to enter the field in 1988. Though both the Type-61 and Type-74 tanks have been domestically produced (Mitsubishi), the Type-88 will probably have a foreign manufactured
120mm gun (from West Germany) and its armor plating may also come from a foreign source. This change in policy reportedly will enable the Japanese to get a better gun, improve interoperability with other Western nations, and help reduce trade tensions\(^{11}\) (the latter possibly being the primary reason).

Though a new 155mm self-propelled howitzer (SPH) was introduced in 1978, research has already begun on a new model (as of 1983). Recognizing the need for effective communications in the field, 10 Type-82 command communications vehicles were ordered in FY 1982. There were none in the inventory previously. Another new addition will be the AH-1S anti-tank helicopter, 12 of which were ordered in FY 1982. These helicopters carry anti-tank missiles which have an effective range of about 4 km. Research efforts are also being conducted to develop an effective land-to-ship missile to enable the GSDF to take action against enemy naval units.\(^{12}\)

The recent development of a laser-guided anti-tank missile by Kawasaki Heavy Industries will enhance GSDF capabilities when it enters the field in 1985. The missile is considered to be quite advanced by Western standards.\(^{13}\)

Many of the above programs began prior to 1978 when the last surge of Soviet military capabilities commenced in the region. Therefore, there is little reason to believe these programs resulted much from a perceived external
threat. The communications improvements relate directly to a major weakness which continues to plague the SDF, and had been long needed with or without external stimuli. The most recent developments (AH-1S helicopter, land-to-ship missiles, and laser-guided anti-tank missiles) bear a stronger relation to perceived threat perceptions. With the significant Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories, the Soviets have improved their ability to make an amphibious landing on Japan (Hokkaido). Though many Japanese consider this unlikely, it is one of the few scenarios which the GSDF can realistically focus on. While these recent improvements may be related to concern over a Soviet landing in Japan, it is difficult to say that they are not just as much the result of bureaucratic haggling to insure the GSDF gets its share of improvements along with the other services.

2. **Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)**

When one views the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), he cannot help but notice the newness of most of these vessels. Of a total of 62 major combatants (DE and larger, including submarines) as of 1983, 44 were built within the last 15 years (71%). Moreover, as can be seen below, new construction since 1979 reflects the emphasis being placed on improving ASW capabilities (figures in parentheses indicate planned units):
Recent improvements in the MSDF include the addition of TASS (Towed Array Surveillance System) which has already been installed on the latest DDH (Kurama) and will be added to other destroyer-type ships in the future. This passive ASW sensing system offers a marked improvement in submarine detection effectiveness over active sonar systems. Anti-ship capabilities have been enhanced by the addition of Harpoon surface-to-surface missile systems in four ships thus far and will be placed in most new construction units. Beginning in 1980, Harpoon was also added to all new construction Yushio-class submarines. To improve survivability in an air attack environment, most major units are scheduled to get Point Defense missile systems and/or CIWS (Close-In Weapons System—a rapid fire gatling gun-like system used against high speed incoming missiles). These new systems are being procured from the US and represent the latest systems currently in use onboard US Navy ships.

In reviewing the pattern of MSDF ship construction, it is evident that minesweeping units have been a continuing
priority over the years. Since 1967, 39 minesweeping units have entered the fleet (33 MSC's and 6 MSB's). Japan's minesweeping force (which also includes nine KV10711 helicopters) is impressive by any standard. US Navy capabilities pale in comparison. Though new programs have been initiated, current US Navy assets are aged and less than a handful are in active service. Japan has maintained a proficient minesweeping capability throughout the postwar period. Obviously, the ability to keep critical harbors and restricted waterways clear of mines has remained a high priority for Japan. Current minesweeping assets would also prove invaluable in clearing channels were the straits around Japan mined. However, the consistent building pattern of minesweepers with no increased rate of production in recent years, suggests little change in defense philosophy. With US cutbacks in minesweepers over the past 30 years, perhaps the US has encouraged Japan to maintain a credible minesweeping force, in hopes that these units might be available in a crisis situation (reminiscent of Japanese minesweepers utilized during the Korean War). In reality, this may be a naive expectation of the more independent Japan of today's world.

Another significant addition to the MSDF has been the procurement of P-3C ASW aircraft from the US. Again, this is highly advanced equipment with superlative ASW capabilities. The first three P-3C's arrived in Japan in 1981, five
more in 1982, and a total of 72 are planned for acquisition. The first P-3C squadron was established at Atsugi in 1982. 16 Qualitative improvements in the MSDF since the late 1970's have been significant, especially in strengthening ASW and AAW capabilities. While these programs may have been considerably influenced by the US, the modifications do represent marked improvements in weaknesses relating directly to the Soviet naval posture in the vicinity of Japan. Also noteworthy is that many systems being acquired by Japan are the most sophisticated available to US Navy units. A system such as Harpoon, not only vastly improves defense capabilities, but also represents the best offensive anti-ship missile available to most US ships. Japan's concentrated efforts to acquire such sophisticated ASW and AAW weapons and sensors since the later 1970's suggest substantial concern for Soviet military capabilities.

3. Air Self Defense Force (ASDF)

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has also had its share of improvements. The F-4EJ's have acted as the primary interceptors of the ASDF since 1969. To compensate for their age, equipment updates will be introduced including an improved radar, new air-to-air missiles, and a new fire control system for greater bombing accuracy. Though a bombing system was not installed in the original planes because they were considered "offensive" in nature, the 1981 and 1982 budgets authorized funds to install these computer-based firing systems. When some Diet members became aware of these
changes, they questioned Prime Minister Suzuki who claimed he had not been informed of the true impact of the equipment changes. The JDA explained the reasoning for the modification thusly, "...equipment which the country is allowed to possess within the framework of the above policy [i.e., no aggressive or offensive equipment] may change, depending on changes in the prevailing situation, such as progress in military technology." This incident provides an excellent example of the elasticity of Japanese regulations. Though Japanese policies seem extremely difficult to "officially" change, their interpretations may be modified from time to time to meet certain needs. This flexibility satisfies two requirements: 1) what needs to get done, gets done and 2) the people feel assured that policies will not be changed without their direct support. In reality, the above example intimates that certain changes deemed necessary by a governmental department such as the JDA, may at times be initiated without the explicit approval (or knowledge) of the majority of Japanese within or outside of the normal government decision-making process.

A big boost to the ASDF will result from the acquisition of the sophisticated F-15 fighter, developed in the US. This aircraft can reach speeds greater than mach 2.5 and can carry an impressive array of armaments. Japan has ordered approximately 150 of these planes, 14 of which were delivered in March 1981.
To begin building an airborne early warning (AEW) capability and supplement ground radar facilities, two E-2C's were procured from the US in 1982. These planes can conduct a 360° search out to 260 nautical miles, track up to 250 targets, and coordinate 30 intercepts. Japan intends to acquire at least 8 of these aircraft.

These attempts to fill the gaps in air detection and intercept capabilities in recent years represent a response to the most likely threat to Japan (i.e., bomber or missile strikes). The only country that poses this threat is the USSR and such strikes can be effected within minutes due to the close proximity of the two countries. The procurement of early warning and fast reaction aircraft such as the E-2C and F-15 signify a recognition by Japan of this defense vulnerability, however the lengthy time involved in actually acquiring this equipment implies that the Japanese government as a whole does not feel a sense of urgency in reducing these vulnerabilities. The 6.88% cap placed on defense increases for FY 1984 will cause hardships for the JDA, which has indicated it plans to make cuts in the areas of personnel and training support. However, the JDA intends to proceed with equipment procurement plans to meet the "56 Chugyo" goals even if it involves delaying payments to the defense industry. As a result, the indebtedness of the JDA continues to grow and it is only a matter of time until increased monies will need to be made available if contractors are to be paid. 20
D. RESOURCE STOCKPILING

One weakness which Japan will likely never overcome is its resource dependence on other nations. Resource poor, Japan depends on a free flow of imports for its livelihood. The following is a sample of the quantities of certain materials which must be imported:\textsuperscript{21}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>crude oil</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iron ore</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coal</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bauxite</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chromium</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cobalt</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>copper</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manganese</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nickel</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tin</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zinc</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wheat</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cotton</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In recent years, Japan attempted to reduce certain economic vulnerabilities, especially Middle East oil, by pursuing resource diversification, energy substitutes, and conservation efforts. In 1981, crude oil consumption dropped 9.7% and oil imports decreased 10.4%. Of total oil imports, Middle East oil imports declined from 73.2% in 1980 to 69% in 1981 (other major suppliers were Indonesia, Mexico, and China). Though crude oil still accounted for 62% of all energy used in Japan, MITI set goals to reduce this to 49% by 1990.\textsuperscript{22}
To reduce its oil dependence, Japan is also turning more to coal, liquified natural gas (LNG), and nuclear power as energy sources. A 1983 report by Japan's Comprehensive Energy Research Council estimated that by 1990, increases in LNG and coal usage will continue, and atomic energy consumption will double. The report also recommends decreasing efforts in pursuit of oil substitutes due to the current availability and low cost of oil. The Council predicted that MITI's target to reduce oil dependence to 49% by 1990 will not be reached until nearly 1995 (see Table 2 below). 23

TABLE 2
(Figures listed are percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>17.6-18.5</td>
<td>17.3-20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.5-11.1</td>
<td>14.9-15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.2-13.1</td>
<td>13.1-13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7-5.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fuels</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.6-2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To help reduce the risks of reduced oil supplies, Japan became a member of the International Energy Program. The program was formed in 1974 (as a result of the 1973 oil crisis), is comprised of Japan, the US, most NATO countries,
Australia, and New Zealand, and is designed to provide mutual oil support during crises periods. Japan's oil stockpiling goals have become quite ambitious over the last decade. Oil stockpiling policies come under the auspices of MITI and stockpiles are maintained primarily at commercial sites vice dedicated government sites. At the time of the 1973 oil crisis, MITI had been "suggesting" that 45-day oil stockpiles be maintained. After the oil crisis, the Petroleum Stockpiling Law of 1975 established a 90-day goal, to be achieved by 1980. The following estimated figures show that actual "days of emergency oil reserves on hand" have consistently lagged behind goals, but significant progress in building reserves has taken place:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>days</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1978, the Japan National Oil corporation was formed (under government management) and was directed to attain a 13-day stockpile of oil reserves (in addition to the 90-day requirement levied on the commercial companies).

Japan also has stockpile programs for certain minerals. Copper, zinc, and aluminum have been routinely stockpiled in the past and in December 1981, Japan approved a new 10-day stockpile program for chromium, molybdenum, nickel, and tungsten.

The fact that Japan sets specific goals and target dates for resource usage and supplies, yet not for attainment
of military capabilities, suggests something about Japan's priorities with respect to security. While its stockpiling programs are certainly aimed at protecting the welfare of the nation during shortage periods such as the 1973 oil crisis, its willingness to postpone target dates and ease policies due to current low oil costs, reflects a lack of serious concern over supply lines being interdicted.

E. JAPAN-US DEFENSE COOPERATION

Japan and the US have participated in various security consultative committees since the MST was adopted. Most of these have avoided tackling difficult security problems but rather deal with reviewing the Status of Forces Agreement or sometimes take the form of lecture sessions by the US. However, in 1976, the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation was created and assigned to draft an outline to facilitate joint operations between US and SDF forces. In 1978, the subcommittee presented the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation which were subsequently approved by Japan's National Defense Council and Cabinet. The Guidelines set forth recommendations to improve US-Japan cooperation on defense matters and address such areas as joint planning for emergency situations, improvement of coordination and communications, intelligence sharing, and logistics planning. The Guidelines paved the way for a new emphasis on combined training. Though the MSDF has routinely conducted training with the US Navy since 1955, such has not been the case for the other two defense forces and their US counterparts.
In 1978, the ASDF commenced training exercises with the US Air Force and between 1978-81, participated in 36 combined training sessions involving fighter tactics, reconnaissance, and search and rescue training. GSDF training with US forces did not occur until 1981 when a communications exercise and command post exercise were conducted. Actual maneuvers between GSDF and US Army units were first held in November 1982 near Mt. Fuji. The exercise scenario centered on the popular theme of repelling an invasion of Hokkaido.

The largest US-Japan combined exercise took place in the vicinity of Japan from September 25-October 5, 1983. Besides US forces, 30,000 SDF personnel, 117 SDF aircraft, and over 50 MSDF ships participated. The exercise was designed to practice straits control (Tsushima and Tsugaru), plus an emergency deployment of forces to Hokkaido (the popular scenario again). The benefits of these combined exercises are numerous, but in particular, they increase understanding between SDF and US forces, and actually practice emergency coordination rather than just talk about it. This represents a greater Japanese commitment to and acceptance of US defense policy since the late 1970's. This training cannot but help elevate the defense readiness posture of Japan and based on the scenarios being exercised, the SDF probably has little doubt about the origins of the threat to Japan.
In September 1982, Japan signed an agreement to permit the US to deploy approximately 50 F-16 fighter aircraft to Misawa (northern Honshu) between 1985-88. The USSR immediately objected and in its official protest to Japan indicated that the Soviets "would view the appearance of US planes with an increased range of action and nuclear capability near Soviet borders as a hostile step posing an immediate threat to the security of the Soviet Union." The Japanese government's rejection of the Soviet protest and intention to allow deployment of the F-16's as scheduled indicates at least tacit recognition of the need to counter the formidable Soviet air strike capability.

A 1983 Asahi article reported that the US uses Japanese territory from which to stage 15 intelligence collecting aircraft, including 3 SR-71 Blackbirds and 10 RC-135's. The apparent acceptance by the Japanese government of these aircraft operations in Japan insinuates that the government makes stronger contributions to counter USSR capabilities than it reveals to its public.

Another plus for US-Japan defense efforts was marked by Prime Minister Nakasone's announcement in January 1983 that Japanese defense technology could be made available to the US. If this is effected (no memorandum of understanding has yet been concluded), this will provide for a mutual flow of technology for the first time. While some in the US claim there will be great interest in such Japanese materials as fiber optics, ferrite paint, and microchips, the primary
objective of mutually shared technology is to establish an opportunity for technological cooperation which would facilitate joint research and development at lower costs. 29

Japan-US defense cooperation has been stepped up considerably since 1978. While in some ways it may be viewed as appeasement of the US, it also allows Japan the least objectionable way to improve its defense capabilities.

F. DEFENDING THE SEA LANES

In early 1978, the JDA estimated that the ASDF could provide air cover for MSDF units out to about 90 nautical miles. With growing concern over Soviet airpower in Northeast Asia, the JDA began studies on the construction of four 10-15,000 ton aircraft carriers in order to extend air defense coverage for the MSDF. The proposal envisioned that the carriers would carry V/STOL aircraft and that one carrier would be assigned to each of the four MSDF fleets. 30 This study probably resulted from efforts by the MSDF to introduce aircraft carriers into its defense structure. Though this concept apparently fizzled out, measures were soon initiated to upgrade AAW capabilities on MSDF units (as discussed earlier in this chapter). That such programs were being studied in 1978 also gives some indication that the JDA was considering a greater "blue-water" role for the MSDF.

When US Secretary of Defense Weinberger met with Japan's Foreign Minister in March 1981, he explained that he did not see US responsibilities in the vicinity of Japan as encompassing
sea lane defense. Japan's response came two months later during Prime Minister Susuki's visit to Washington when he expressed that Japan could defend its sea lanes within 1000 miles of its shores. Once the statement was made, the US was satisfied, Prime Minister Suzuki went back to Japan, and little else concrete happened. Then in January 1983 when Prime Minister Nakasone visited Washington, he made the following statement: "For the ocean our defense should extend several hundred miles and if we are to establish sea lanes then our desire would be to defend the sea lanes between Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of Taiwan and Osaka". The importance of these two sea routes should be readily apparent since most of Japan's oil imports travel along the southwestern sea lane and over half of Japan's total strategic resources arrive via the southern sea route from the Southwest Pacific.

In May 1983, responding to a query from within the Upper House, the Nakasone Cabinet defined the objective of sea lane defense as the protection of maritime traffic to support Japan during an emergency situation such that prolonged combat could be supported if necessary. The recently released 1983 Defense White Paper also refers to this issue by stating that Japan's defense requirements extend to "a radius of several hundred miles of Japan and, in case of armed attack on the country, protecting sea routes for about 1000NM" (my emphasis). Though defense of the sea lanes has not yet been fully defined, it appears from the above statements that
Japan's interests cover just two particular sea lanes (not the waters between the sea lanes) and that Japan's support for these sea lanes out to 1000 NM will not materialize until after hostilities have commenced. A US-Japan joint study group began working on the sea lane defense issue in March 1983 and is scheduled to complete its study by the end of the year. Topics under review include threat analysis, proposed responses to likely threats, types of forces needed in an emergency, and requirements for executing joint operations.  

It has been estimated that in a time of conflict Japan would minimally need to maintain a flow of 1/3 of its normal imports to meet minimum needs (including defense requirements). The threats to the two sea lanes previously mentioned could consist of Soviet air, surface, and/or submarine units. All have the capability to interdict Japan's sea lanes. While a sea lane defense philosophy is still "officially" under study, other developments hint that some sense of direction already exists. In January 1983, Japan and the US agreed to build "marine environment observation facilities" at White Beach, Okinawa. The purpose of the project is reportedly to support ASW operations. These facilities, located on the east coast of Okinawa and looking out over both sea lanes previously mentioned should directly support submarine detection operations in these areas.  

Along with acknowledging some responsibility for sea lane defense, the Prime Minister and some senior Defense
personnel have voiced their support for the idea of the SDF blocking the straits around Japan in time of an emergency (Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya). Acceptance of this role was exemplified by MSDF Chief of Staff ADM Maeda in February 1983, when he informed a press conference that the objectives of such a mission for Japan would be to: 1) block enemy submarines from exiting the Sea of Japan, 2) obstruct the passage of enemy warships, and that 3) 30% blockage would be considered effective. Though he did not comment on the means to be used in blocking the straits, Joint Staff Council Chairman ADM Yata foresees the laying of mines coupled with the use of hydrophone arrays (on the ocean bottom) providing submarine locating information to surface combatants and aircraft patrolling the area. The JDA in February 1983 recommended that the new C-130H aircraft being procured from the US be equipped with minelaying capabilities (Japan's P-3C's and P-2J's currently are so equipped). The Agency also requested permission to routinely station a surveillance ship in the Soya Strait as had already been done in the Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits. An MSDF ship does now monitor the Soya Strait.

Despite the fact that the SDF has more concrete plans and is better prepared to carry out the mission of blocking straits than defending 1000 NM sea lanes, problems remain. ADM Yata makes the important point that mining a strait is a major government decision and that it is not logical to believe that this would automatically be accomplished if
hostilities commenced between the US and USSR. Furthermore, because of the "exclusively defensive" orientation of Japan, a blockade is not envisioned until an attack has been made on Japan.40 Coming from the leading SDF officer whose concern about the Soviets probably exceeds most Japanese, these comments should make it clear to observers that even though Japan may be in the Western camp, threats to the US do not necessarily equate to threats to Japan. Another related factor which reveals less than pressing concern over "bottling up" the Soviets, stems from an estimate that many of Japan's mines are not ready for immediate use and may require months to prepare for service.41

Even if defending the sea lanes within 1000 NM does soon emerge as a well-defined mission of the SDF, it does not signify a strong response to a perceived Soviet threat. The US has been leaning on Japan for some time to adopt this responsibility as part of a "division of labor" scheme. Thus the response appears more a result of US pressure than Soviet pressure. Moreover, Japan's tardiness in acquiring the assets to independently carry out this mission, reflects minimal belief that the USSR would actually use direct force against Japan.

G. REFLECTIONS ON DEFENSE WEAKNESSES

Weaknesses reveal the flaws in a nation's defense capabilities. Numerous weaknesses exist in Japan's defense structure. Some have resulted from legal restrictions,
some from public pressure, and some from neglect. Those defense weaknesses which relate to concern (or lack of concern) for the Soviet "threat" are summarized below.

1) Japan has no anti-espionage laws. If defense secrets are stolen, the culprit can only be charged with theft and might face a prison sentence of about one year. Even with recently publicized incidents such as the Levchenko and Vinogradov case, no serious move has been initiated to establish an anti-espionage law.

2) Contact between the three defense forces until recent years was minimal. An integrated exercise with all three forces had not been held until 1981. No joint command structure exists and each defense force works directly for the Director General of the JDA. Integrated plans are not established for equipment procurement nor are integrated plans in place for handling actual emergency situations. It is difficult to imagine that a country which viewed another as a realistic threat would not ensure that military operations could be executed with maximum coordination and efficiency.

3) Long range communications and EW capabilities are deficient.

4) Logistics support (including airlift and sealift capabilities) depends heavily on civilian components and are inadequate to support sustained operations. Nearly all supplies are transported by civilian carriers who normally make little extra effort to support defense needs. Even in a time of conflict, there are no provisions for civilian
shippers to give priority to the JDA. Within the SDF, current logistics capabilities are extremely limited and cannot support SDF units over an extended period or at any distance from Japan. As an example, the MSDF has only two oilers available to provide at-sea refueling for all its naval units.

5) Ammunition supplies are low. In 1960, Japan possessed 140,000 tons of ammunition. By 1978, these quantities fell to 70,000 tons (much of this decrease may have resulted from retiring old ammunition). During security talks in 1978, the US expressed its concern that the SDF possessed less than two weeks supply of ammunition even though a one month supply stood as the goal to be maintained. Until 1980, no torpedoes were carried aboard MSDF ships nor were any missiles carried by ASDF aircraft. As of May 1983, Japan's ammunition still remained insufficient to support current weapons systems for more than two weeks of operations (about 80,000 tons). The JDA has voiced its concern that quantities should be increased to a one month supply as soon as possible, but the fact remains that negligible increases have occurred in the last 5 years despite marked changes in Soviet military capabilities in the region.

6) Though the GSDF would most likely be needed to oppose an amphibious assault, its equipment poorly supports such a mission. Some improvements are in progress as previously discussed.
7) MSDF AAW capabilities are weak due to relatively few installed systems. Improvements are being made as noted earlier. In the area of ASW, the MSDF has reasonable detection capabilities considering the size of the fleet. However, its attack capabilities are currently nil due to not only a paucity of torpedoes but also the fact that most of the torpedoes currently in stock have poor capabilities against a high speed nuclear submarine.

8) The SDF lacks sufficient capabilities to detect or combat enemy aircraft approaching Japan. The 28 radar sites around Japan which make up the BADGE system (Basic Air Defense Ground Environment) have been in use since the 1960's. They have poor detection capabilities against supersonic low flyers, can be easily jammed, and are virtually unprotected (as are Japan's air bases). Though work is underway to improve BADGE, it will be a lengthy process. Japan was void of any AEW systems until the recent procurement of two E-2C's from the US. Additionally, Japan's ground-to-air missile sights (HAWK and NIKE) are aging and capabilities against high speed aircraft are questionable. Some of these missiles will be replaced with improved versions in the upcoming years. Most Japanese fighters do not have inflight-refueling equipment installed (another system previously evaluated as "offensive") which severely limits the time they can continuously stay aloft. In addition, missile supplies may not even last for 5 sorties per plane. 44
9) **Actual** defense capabilities do not meet **implied** defense capabilities. The Chairman of the Joint Staff Council remarked in July 1980 that even if Japan met its 1984 defense improvement goals, it would not be able to stop a "small-scale, limited aggression." 45

In spite of these defense weaknesses which still face Japan, significant **qualitative** improvements have taken place. Through its current acquisition and building program, Japan now possesses some of the world's finest military equipment and the necessary **training** to effectively use this equipment. Quantitative shortages represent the primary remaining equipment deficiency which can be corrected much easier and more rapidly than the other two factors (quality and training).

Greater emphasis is being placed on MSDF and ASDF improvements which seems to indicate a better appreciation of most likely types of military action against Japan. Moreover, the significant efforts taken since 1978 to establish an operational framework (vice just plans on paper) for joint US-Japan defense procedures, has produced a respectable deterrent force in which Japan plays an integral role. While Japan's defense improvements may remain incremental, the government's defense moves have been more indicative of an active participant rather than a casual observer.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

The Commander-in-Chief of US Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC) commented in June 1983 that "the Soviet threat is perceived essentially the same by both the US and Japan. The difference is in the urgency of the need to meet the threat..." The preceding chapters have attempted to demonstrate that the differences in US and Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat are a bit more extensive and complex than indicated in the above statement. When one talks of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet "threat," he must talk in the plural, for a singular line of thought does not exist. Further complexities arise in attempting to evaluate Japanese attitudes because of the Japanese tendency to be less than frank when addressing controversial issues.

After reviewing Soviet military capabilities in the Northeast Asia region, it is apparent that the Soviets could readily carry out a massive conventional and/or nuclear attack on Japan. And yet, in a country which suffered defeat in the last world war, which dedicated itself to domestic development and non-military factors in its foreign relations, and which has prospered while under the protection of a security pact with a major power, it has proved difficult for many Japanese to visualize a military threat to their country. Due to this unique environment in the postwar period, Japan became accustomed to its limited participatory
role in defense matters. As a result, Japan fell into the
"observer syndrome" for many years. This led Japan to be-
come reaction-oriented on defense matters. Repeatedly,
Japanese comments on various security issues conclude with
remarks such as "we must watch these events closely." As
a result, the Japanese have tended to observe developing
situations until forced to react. As Masataka Kosaka puts
it:

The Japanese seldom try to change or create the
international environment, but simply adapt them-
selves to it. Therefore, although shocked when the
environment changes radically, they quickly resign
themselves to fate and adapt successfully to the
new situation. Thus, occasional shocks play a
healthy role in Japan, for otherwise she would stay
in what might be called 'immobilism.'

Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat cannot be
neatly packaged. Until recent years, most Japanese saw
little threat to their country. Even among Japanese leading
officials, concern about the Soviets was low. The foremost
opposition parties claim there is nothing to fear from the
Soviets. Japanese businessmen prefer to concentrate on the
economic gains available from the USSR. The scholars have
mixed views but are only recently emerging as an audible voice
in Japan. The public masses have resembled sleeping child-
ren with respect to defense issues--they have lacked concern
due to a certain sense of immunity. The only threats they
have been able to recognize are those impacting on economic
lifelines, such as during the 1973 oil crisis. The Japanese
people have reached economic prosperity and they want to
preserve this prosperity, but the majority do not equate personal affluence with the survival of the nation. Though the people have come to accept and support the existence of the SDF, they do not see a need to spend additional funds to expand it. One of the most striking things in reviewing public opinion polls on security issues is the large proportion of "don't know" or "no comment" answers. This suggests that a significant degree of apathy remains among the general populace. Kiichi Miyazawa accurately describes this paradox of the public:

We witness now in Japan some growth of public opinion in support of self-defense efforts and of our security ties with America. And yet no national consensus exists on the need for a steady and substantial improvement in the nation's defense capabilities. There is still little public awareness that Japan should participate in the concerted efforts of America and its alliance partners to maintain a global military balance in order to defend our basic values of freedom and democracy.3

In the US, "defense" has frequently been used as a rallying point to "do whatever is necessary" regardless of constraining factors. In Japan, defense issues have not stood for a similar driving force. Instead, constraints have been foremost considered, then decisions made based on these constraints. The impact (and frustrations) of these constraints are mirrored in these comments on the defense budget by JDA Director General Tanikawa in March 1983:

...when we think about the future, I have a feeling that, even from the standpoint of attainment of the level of the Defense Plan General Outline [NDPO] at an early date, we have been forced to slow down our pace...There was nothing we could do, in the light of the present financial circumstances, but I think
we must make efforts to catch up a little more, if the financial situation turns favorable even by a little in fiscal 1984 and after. (My emphasis)

In spite of the aforementioned factors, shifts in attitudes towards the USSR do appear to be taking place. These ongoing shifts have been primarily stimulated by the Japan-China Friendship Treaty, perceived changes in the US-USSR military balance, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the SS-20 missile issue. The Japan-China Friendship Treaty enabled Japan to remove China from its "potential threat" list which allowed it to focus more attention on its problems with the USSR. Furthermore, adverse Soviet reaction to the treaty (in particular, the rapid military buildup in the vicinity of Japan) increased Japanese awareness of proximate Soviet military power. As the expansion of Soviet forces continued, confidence in the infallibility of the US protective shield began slowly eroding. The invasion of Afghanistan had important psychological impact on the Japanese. It created a greater sense of insecurity about the USSR and doubts about Soviet international ambitions. As publicity increased about SS-20 missiles in Asia (especially after Soviet comments that some European missiles might be shifted to Asia), more Japanese began to realize that other vulnerabilities existed besides just economic dependencies.

Even though national security concerns are slowly on the rise, the Japanese are reluctant to take decisive action until they perceive that conditions are exactly
right. A change in mood must precede the desire to act and usually involves a long process. This need to establish appropriate moods prior to taking action is well understood by Japan's political leaders. Though Prime Minister Nakasone seems to clearly recognize a Soviet "threat," he is an exception among past prime ministers. He has confronted the Soviets head-on regarding security issues and seems intent on raising the level of public concern over security matters and demonstrating that economics and diplomacy alone are not sufficient in dealing with a country like the USSR. In his attempts to alter the public mood to conform more to his own thinking, he aims at the Japanese core by reminding people of such essential intangibles as "pride," "dignity," and "respect." The results remain to be seen. When a tangible "barrier" is overcome, such as the 1% ceiling on defense spending, it will represent a sincere recognition of the Soviet threat (and/or a response to US pressure).

Meanwhile, those leaders in government who do hold a healthy respect for the Soviet threat, will continue to quietly work to sharpen Japan's defense capabilities. Japan's acquisition programs to attain modern weapons systems and its increased defense cooperation with the US suggest that a certain sense of urgency does exist in some circles of government. Additionally, the government's initiatives to expand security concerns beyond its own borders, such as defending sea lanes, involving itself in
international INF problems, and establishing security discussions with the ROK, symbolize new dimensions in Japan's security outlook.

The US should not expect Japan to unconsciously embrace American views of the Soviet "threat," but it can provide a constant flow of objective data on the Soviets, demonstrate a sincere interest to tackle common problems jointly, and allow Japan to form its own opinions. Currently, the majority of Japanese do not perceive the Soviets as posing a serious threat to Japan. However, Japanese perceptions and reactions to the Soviet "threat" are in transition. This transition is being led by a growing group of elites, both within and outside of the government, who recognize the need for Japan to develop a respectable defense posture in order to preclude intimidation by any country. If these "wise men" are successful in their endeavors, the US will likely not be disappointed with the results.
APPENDIX A

BASIC POLICY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.

3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.

4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in future deterring and repelling such aggression.
NOTES

CHAPTER I


3. Ibid., p. 3.


7. Ibid., p. 25.

8. Ibid., p. 42.

9. Ibid., p. 78.


11. Ibid., p. 712.


CHAPTER II


6. Ibid., p. 198.


14. Oka, p. 3.

15. JDA, p. 31.


CHAPTER III


7. Ibid., p. 240.


20. Mochizuki, pp. 5-6.


22. Ibid., p. 37.


30. Ibid., p. 119.


35. Whiting, p. 117.


42. White Papers of Japan 1976-77, p. 23.


44. Ibid., p. 29.


47. White Papers of Japan 1979-80, p. 28.

48. Ibid., p. 34.


54. JDA, p. 6.


CHAPTER IV


10. Ibid., pp. 124, 135.
11. Ibid., p. 134.
12. Whiting, p. 137.
15. Ibid., pp. 217-218.


20. Ibid., pp. 142-143.
21. Ibid., p. 141.
22. Ibid.


32. Ibid., p. 21.


37. Ibid., pp. 28-29.


43. Mochizuki, p. 35.

44. Ibid., p. 20.


49. Ibid., p. 28.
CHAPTER V


2. Ibid.


11. Hellman, p. 76.


22. JDA, p. 130.

23. Whiting, p. 115.

24. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

25. JDA, Foreward and p. 130.


33. Kataoka, p. 43.

34. DSJP, April 22-24, 1983, p. 10.

35. JDA, p. 130.


42. JDA, p. 131.

43. Ibid., p. 126.

44. Ibid.

45. Kataoka, p. 43.

46. Ibid. and DSJP, April 22-24, 1978, p. 11.


49. JDA, p. 127.


164
52. Kataoka, p. 43.


55. Kubo, p. 112.


CHAPTER VI


4. Ibid., p. 51.


8. DOD, p. 15.


25. Ibid., pp. 63-64.


40. Yata, p. 46.


44. Yata, p. 47.

45. Wells, p. IV-35.

CHAPTER VII


6. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS, MONOGRAPHS, AND PAPERS


PERIODICALS


Igarashi, Takeshi, "Farewell to the Peace-loving State," Japan Echo (Summer 1983).


Ito, Soichiro, "The International Situation and Japan's Defense," Asia Pacific Community (Summer 1982).

Kimura, Hiroshi, "Failure of Soviet Policies Toward Japan," Asia Pacific Community (Spring 1982).


Miyazawa, Kiichi, "To Meet the Challenge," Asian Survey (July 1980).


Okumiya, Masatake, "Why We Should Defend Sea Lanes," Japan Echo (Summer 1983).


NEWSPAPERS

The Asia Record

The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly

The Christian Science Monitor


Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Asia and Pacific

Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Japan Report

The Japan Times Weekly

The New York Times
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Distribution List</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Professor Claude A. Buss, Code 56Bx Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Associate Professor Edward A. Olsen, Code 560s Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Adjunct Professor Stephen Jurika, Jr., Code 56Jk Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>CDR James E. Auer, USN (Ret.) 1060 North Montana Street Arlington, Virginia 22205</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>COL David E. Holt, USAF 213 Arnold Circle Biloxi, Mississippi 39531</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>ADM Naotoshi Sakonjo, JMSDF (Ret.) Research Institute for Peace and Security Tokyo, Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>CAPT Akira Tamai, JMSDF Embassy of Japan 112 Empire Circuit Yarralumla Act 2600 Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>CDR Sedao Seno, JMSDF (Ret.) 496 Nagae Hayama Cho Kanagawa Ken 240-01 Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name and Contact Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 11. | Professor Hiroshi Kimura  
Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University  
Kita 9 Nishi 7  
Kita-ku Sapporo  
Japan |
| 12. | Professor Yoichi Masuzoe  
Political Science Department  
Tokyo University  
Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153  
Japan |
| 13. | CDR Glenn E. Kemp, USN (Ret.)  
8885 Belle Rive  
Jacksonville, Florida 32216 |
| 14. | Yvonne Kemp  
#19 2821 Parliament Avenue  
Regina, Saskatchewan  
Canada S4S - 211 |
| 15. | LCDR Curtis A. Kemp, USN  
223 Old Dominion Drive  
Summerville, South Carolina 29483 |
| 16. | Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs, Code 56Bc  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California 93943 |