THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC CLERGY: GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS AND
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THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC CLERGY:
GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS AND THEOCRACY

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EXECUTIVE BACKGROUND

The movement launched by the militant Islamic clergy of Iran under Khomeini's leadership in 1962 succeeded in overthrowing the Shah in February 1979. After the fall of the monarchy, the clergy entered a coalition with several nonclerical personalities and groups. These partners were dropped one by one and eliminated from the political scene. At first, the clerical leaders seemed uncertain as to what role the 'Islamic modernists' would play in the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, the clerical leaders were fully determined not to allow the nationalist and liberal political figures to gain lasting power. They also made it clear from the outset that they had no thought of entering into an alliance with the secular left, and none seemed necessary.

In less than two years after their direct takeover of the state--from November 1979 to mid-1981--the militant Shi'ite clergy succeeded in removing secular nationalist and liberal elements from the political scene. The elimination of the rival Islamic forces took an additional year-and-a-half. By the end of 1982, they had destroyed the well-organized and highly dedicated Islamic radicals, the Mujahedin. They had also succeeded in putting an end to the presence of Ayatollah Shari'at-madari and other dissident Ayatollahs as a political force capable of throwing its support behind any oppositional group or organization. Finally, in 1983, the clerical regime destroyed the last remaining political organization of any consequence: the Tudeh Party. In sum, since its direct seizure of power in November 1979, the Shi'ite militant
clergy has ruthlessly dealt with all its organized political opponents, and has by and large succeeded in destroying them.

Having seized power, the militant Shi'ite clergy has been able to hold it for over four years. It has succeeded in gaining control over the government, bureaucracy and the armed forces, most notably through the creation of a hierarchy of 'Political-Ideological' Bureaus. Furthermore, it has created its own distinctive and formidable apparatus of repression in the form of the Revolutionary Courts and the Corps of Revolutionary Guards and its offshoots such as the patrol groups of the 'Vengeance of God.' Confident that their actions are justified in defense of Islam, the ruling clerical elite have been unscrupulous in putting this apparatus of repression to full use against the "enemies of God."

Two preconditions for the long-term viability of the clerical regime are implicit: (1) successful elimination of organized opposition groups, and (2) effective control of the state and the forces of coercion. In addition, the long-term viability of a regime depends on at least three other factors: (3) its legitimacy, (4) the unity of its ruling elite and its ability to carry out concerted political action, and (5) a modicum of popular support.

For the Islamic theocracy to be viable in the long run, Khomeini's charismatic legitimacy has to be converted into a legal order which is believed to be in accordance with the tenets of Shi'ism. As with all charismatic leadership, the problem of succession to Khomeini poses perhaps the greatest threat of disintegration to the regime. Since Khomeini's theory of theocratic government is a major innovation in Shi'ite history, the principles of legitimacy of the clerical regime are problematic. Nevertheless, the sustained efforts being made to popularize the theory of theocratic
government, and the election of an Assembly of Experts which has received the
Imam's instructions on the issue of succession, greatly enhance the prospects
for the survival of the regime after Khomeini's death.

The broad acceptance of the principles of legitimacy of theocratic
government, and more directly the successful solution to the problem of
succession bear on the ability of the ruling clerical elite to remain united,
or at least capable of concerted political action, despite internal differ-
ences and divisions. The less room there is for disputes over the legitimacy
and precise meaning of velayat-e faqih, and the less bitter the quarrels over
Khomeini's succession, the more likely the ruling clergy are to survive
Khomeini as a reasonably unified political elite of an Islamic theocracy in
Iran.

Khomeini has done everything in his power to prevent the development of a
rift within the ruling clergy while isolating the dissident clerics and
forcing them into submission or silence. He has also presided over a sus-
tained and impressive effort to translate Islamic theocracy into a permanent
legal order. There can be no doubt that the longer Khomeini lives, and the
further the process of institutional consolidation of a totalitarian
theocratic state progresses under his supervision, the greater the prospects
for the long-term viability of the clerical regime in Iran. However, such
long-term viability is difficult to assess.

Lastly, the regime is supported by an active technical second stratum,
and it is supported with fanatical enthusiasm by the young cadre of the
revolutionary groups, organizations and agencies. All the indices of
discontent, however, point to widespread dissatisfaction with the regime among
most segments of the adult population in Iran, especially the sizable
secularized middle class. Discontent and disaffection are not organized, and
find no open avenues of political expression under the Islamic totalitarian theocratic state. Nevertheless, if the regime is unable to stem this trend through the revival of the economy and the provision of basic services, continued discontent is, in the long run, likely to erode the control of the ruling clergy over the government and the army. At present, the situation is one of widespread disaffection rather than active opposition, which is made impossible by the Islamic Republic's machinery of repression.

In foreign policy, Iran's clerical regime remains adamant in its hostility towards the United States, and in its firm commitment to export the Islamic revolution. Within the framework of these objectives, foreign policy is conducted with considerable pragmatism. The one exception to this general pragmatism concerns the war with Iraq and stems from Khomeini's determination to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The war with Iraq has caused considerable hardship and discontent, and there has been considerable pressure to terminate it and to make peace with Iraq since the summer of 1982. But Khomeini has firmly opposed peace, and insists on the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the 'liberation' of the Shi'ite holy cities of Iraq.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Shi'ism in the Medieval Period

The various Shi'ite branches of Islam have their nucleus in 'the Party' (shi'a) of 'Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad, who became the fourth and last universally recognized 'rightly-guided' Caliph in 65b and died in 661. Of these, a group organized into a religious sect by the mid-eighth century was to survive various crises of succession and became known as the Imami Shi'ites on account of their doctrine of Imamate (divinely-inspired leadership). The sect was also referred to as the 'Twelvers,' because of their belief that the 12th Imam in the line of succession did not die, but retreated into hiding, or "occultation," thus precluding the emergence of further divinely-inspired Imams.

Twelver Shi'ism bore the permanent imprint of the doctrine of the Imamate formulated under the leadership of the 6th Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765). To assure the lasting sectarian organization of the Shi'ites as a disciplined sect under institutionalized religious authority, he dissociated supreme religious authority from actual political rule, and rested it on 'ilm--divinely-inspired knowledge. Later generations of Shi'ite scholars, the 'ulama or 'the learned,' derived their religio-legal authority from this basic premise without any reference to reigning political authority. Throughout the medieval period, the Twelver Shi'ites reached an accommodation with non-Shi'ite rulers and were therefore considered the 'moderate' branch of Shi'ism. In contrast to the (mainstream) Sunnis, however, Twelver Shi'ites refrained from granting the ruling powers any religious authority, which was invested exclusively in the 'ulama. In this way, the 'ulama were able to persist and flourish independently of government and
independently of government and political vicissitudes. This development has critical implications historically, and in the modern context. In the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Sufism spread amongst the Muslim masses of Iran. Popular Sufism, by admitting the possibility of unmediated contact with God, provided fertile ground for the growth of undisciplined religiosity, and heightened mass receptivity to apocalyptic and "exaggerated" claims to Mahdihood and incarnation. Twelver Shi'ism anathematized such claims as ghuluw, exaggeration, or extremism. Religious groups whose views and practices exceeded the boundaries of Twelver Shi'ism were especially concentrated in northwest Iran and Anatolia, which had experienced a massive influx of Turkman nomadic tribes. The Islamicization of these Turkman tribes was most superficial, and central Asiatic shamanistic elements remained in their religion. The veneration of Ali as a Godhead became quite widespread, and Shi'ite elements were superimposed on the veneer of Sunni Islam. Isma'ili, the founder of the Safavid Empire rose in this milieu of Turkman "extremism" and claimed to be the incarnation of the Prophet, of Ali and the Imams, of the Mahdi and God.

2. Establishment of Shi'ism in Iran

The establishment of Shi'ism as the state religion of Iran dates from the foundation of the Safavid empire in 1501. The empire was created by the military force of a millenarian warrior order whose members adhered to an aberrant variety of Shi'ism described above. Once the conquest of Iran was completed, millenarianism lost its political utility for the new ruling dynasty and became more of a liability than an asset. The Safavids invited a number of Arab Shi'ite theologians to their kingdom to spread the orthodox Shi'ite creed among the population of Iran, which was predominantly Sunni at this time. The incoming ulama hailed the creation of the first Shi'ite state in history,
accepted the legitimacy of the Safavid rulers, and cooperated with the Islamic state in the propagation of Shi'ism. The inflow of Shi'ite theologians and jurists from the Arab lands into Iran under royal sponsorship continued for two centuries. Meanwhile, the Safavid rulers took strong measures to suppress Sufism, a popular, somewhat syncretic expressionist Islam, which was widespread among the masses in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These developments eliminated the rivalry of the Sufi Shaykhs as popular religious leaders, and enabled the Shi'ite clergy to dominate the daily religious life of the masses to an extent unknown in other Islamic lands.

Although the Safavid state remained 'caesaropapist,' integrating Church and State, to its last day, the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries witnessed the growth of an increasingly distinct religious institution which, though still heteronomous, was fairly clearly differentiated from other branches of the state. After the collapse of the Safavid empire in 1736, the Shi'ite clergy were forced to subsist on their own resources, totally independent of the state. The state, furthermore, assumed a ruthlessly hostile posture in this period towards Shi'ism and its custodians. The figures forced self-subsistence resulted in an immediate and drastic decline in religious learning; but in the long run, it bore fruit in the form of the Usuli religious/intellectual movement. The Usuli movement consisted of a revival of Shi'ite jurisprudence which dominated the last decades of the eighteenth and the whole of the nineteenth century. It developed the theory that during the occultation, or concealment of the Twelfth Imam, which is believed to have taken place in the ninth century and to continue to the End of Time, Shi'ite jurists were collectively entitled to religious authority as his vicegerents and, by implication, could collect religious taxes on his behalf. The movement resulted in very considerable enhancement of the power and the independency of Shi'ite religious institutions. The revival of jurisprudence great
augmented the prerogatives of the Shi'ite clergy as the authoritative interpreters of the Sacred Law. Henceforth, their unrivaled dominion over the religious life of the masses was not just the result of the absence of rival Sufi Shaykhs but had a firm doctrinal basis which gained virtually universal acceptance in the nineteenth century.

The Usuli movement assured the independence of religious authority from the political authority and consequently the autonomy and autocephaly of the Shi'ite clergy. By authorizing the collection of religious taxes on behalf of the Hidden (the Twelfth) Imam, the Usuli movement assured a large measure of financial autonomy for the religious institution.

Faced with the weak central government of the Qajars (1785-1925) the power of the religious leaders reached its zenith in the nineteenth century. A rough division of the 'political' and the 'religious' functions of government was worked out, and the Shi'ite clergy assumed independent control of the latter, comprising the religious, judicial and educational institutions.

3. Three Conceptions of Religious Authority in the History of Shi'ism

Norms of authority in religion contain crucial implications both for religious ranking and for political stratification. Shi'ism contains several norms of authority which have the potential for such an impact. All of these are ultimately derivable from the theory of the Imamate, or infallible leadership of the community of believers. The Akhbari (Traditionalist) conception of the Imamate, which was dominant before the eleventh century and was revived in the seventeenth, was hostile to all extension of the authority of the Imams after the concealment of the Twelfth Imam, and conceded de facto religious authority only to the compilers of their Traditions. Indirectly, however, it enhanced the stratification of the Shi'ite community into ordinary believers.
and the descendants of the Prophet, who could claim to partake of the charisma of the lineage of the Imams. Their charisma of descent from the Prophet and the Imams became a source of legitimacy for their privileges under the Safavids, and enhanced their socio-political domination in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Thus, the Akhbari orientations indirectly encouraged the fusion of religious and political authority, and militated against the consolidation of differentiated religious authority of the Shi'ite clergy.

A second historically important norm of authority in Shi'ism is the Mahdistic tenet—the belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam as the Mand or the rightly-guided (messianic) leader at the End of Time. This millenarian norm of authority, when successfully activated by a claimant to Mahdihood immediately instituted a charismatic structure of domination in which religious and political authority were fused in the person of the supreme leader.

Lastly, we have the Shi'ite norm of the juristic authority of the specialists in religious learning. In contradistinction to the previous two norms, the juristic principle enhances differentiated religious authority and creates a basis on which a 'clergy' could be established alongside political authority and independent of it. This last norm of religious authority emerges with the rise of the Shi'ite science of jurisprudence (Usul al-fiqh) in the eleventh century and assumes its final form in the division of the Shi'ite community into mujtahed (authoritative jurist) and mualled (follower) in the nineteenth century.

4. Social Position and Functions of the Shi'ite Clergy in the Nineteenth Century

The organization and social position of the Shi'ite clergy in the nineteenth century merits some attention. The Shi'ite clergy did not constitute a
monolithic group in nineteenth century Iran. Its members shared a devotion to Islam as they conceived it, as well as the necessity of maintaining a public image of piety, decorum and honesty. They were also united by a basic religious education, regularized performance of "religious" tasks, and the public's recognition of their religious role. They were divided, however, by such factors as degree of education, function within the vast field of religious activities, general social status, source and extent of income, access to political and economic power and authority, and personal doctrinal positions.

An especially important factor in determining a religious specialist's personal influence and prestige as a representative of Islam, and consequently a potential political force, was his independence from royal, governmental authority and control. This independence was made possible by the development of the juristic norm of religio-legal authority in the nineteenth century. The more independent a clergyman was from governmental authority, the greater was the likelihood that the community of believers would entrust him with their confidence and depend upon him to defend their interests vis-a-vis the state. Independence was of special significance because there was a whole category of clergy who were dependent upon the state for its position and much of its income, a category whose members were correctly considered "men of the regime." In urban centers, state-appointed religious specialists who were members of the ruling establishment included the Imam Jum'eh, or Friday Prayer Leader, and the Shaykh al-Islam, or head judge. Although holders of such positions were required to have some degree of higher religious education, political considerations and sometimes even gifts to government officials often played a role in appointments, and the positions, while technically not hereditary, tended to remain in the same family. The prevailing attitude
towards the appointed clergy on the part of the general population and the independent clergy ranged from resigned acceptance, through skepticism and mistrust, to disdain.

The political role of the independent clergy in nineteenth century Iran was closely connected to the setting in which it was practiced, the country's cities and towns. The city-quarter was the basic unit into which nineteenth century Iranian cities and towns were divided. It was, in many ways, a self-contained entity, in which most of the spiritual and material requirements of its residents were fulfilled. The mosque shared with the bazaar or market place the role of central focus of an individual's life outside the home. It was much more than a place for public prayer and instruction in the precepts of Islam. Food for the poor was often distributed from the mosque. Children received basic education there. Public demonstrations and the processions of the dastehs, or bands of mourners who paraded and chanted on the ninth and tenth of the month of Muharram to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussayn, frequently set out from mosques. Madrasehs, or theological seminaries and Husayniyyehs or Tekiyehs, structures in which the martyrdom of Imam Hussayn was commemorated, were also found in most city-quarters. These edifices were all closely identified with those individuals of the quarter—lay notables, merchants of substance, and religious dignitaries, who provided the funds for their construction and upkeep through religious endowments, as acts of charity and demonstrations of piety.

It was customary for each city-quarter to have its own dasteh for the Muharram processions. Also, bands of luti, who in theory were governed by a code of chivalry, which encompasses championing the underdog, personal courage, generosity, loyalty, and the ability to forgive, were also associated with the quarters. But the luti bands had the potential, if not supervised,
to develop into unruly gangs of vigilantes. Frequently, also, specialists in a particular craft tended to cluster in the same city-quarter.

The clergy, especially those independent of the government, were an essential element in the lives of most believers in nineteenth century Iranian society in which an individual's daily routine and behavior as well as spiritual and ritual needs were so greatly influenced by the dictates of Islam. A city or town, or on a smaller scale, a city-quarter, which lacked one or another religious specialist was considered inadequate, and communities often competed in attracting renowned Shi'ite doctors and preachers.

Elementary education in the quarter was provided by junior or less highly educated members of the clergy, frequently in the mosques for the general population and in the home for children of notables. And at a higher level of education, the mudarresin, or professors of religious studies, in the madrasas, or theological seminaries, prepared the future clergy. Legal matters and disputes, personal and commercial, centering around the Sacred Law (shari'at), were resolved by religious judges in religious courts, held usually at the judge's residence. There were several other categories of religious specialists, Rowzeh Khwans, commemorators of the Imams and their sufferings, and the preachers. The va'ezzin, or preachers, insured the maintenance of Islamic moral standards and publicly guided the populace along the "straight path," both on private matters and on issues political in nature. The mujtahed, or in some instances, several mujtaheds, stood at the pinnacle of the clergy of the quarter, adding to the prestige of the town. A mujtahed was a powerful and effective spokesperson and a source of influence and protection for the quarter's population. Mujtahed-quarter identification was significant, and it was not infrequent that mujtaheds were identified by name with the quarter in which they resided.
While it is impossible to identify one nineteenth century mujtahed as "typical" of the category, the career of Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Shafti (1766/7-1844/5), is an instructive illustration of the religious, political, social, and economic role of a great mujtahed. In 1802/3, Shafti chose to establish himself in Isfahan, which was to remain his residence until his death. There he settled in Bidabad, a "popular" quarter, famed for its lutis. Over the years, Shafti's residence in Bidabad became one of the major establishments of Isfahan, rivaling those of the great secular notables, and, alongside it, he constructed and endowed a major mosque which bears his name. Shafti seems to have believed firmly that in the absence of the Twelfth Imam it was the duty of the faqin, or jurist, not of the state, to see to it that the Sacred Law was followed and enforced. Shafti is said to have carried out as many as 120 executions and to have flogged numerous malefactors. Like the clerical leader of the current Islamic Revolution, Shafti had extensive financial resources at his disposal. He received large contributions in the form of alms and reliefs, not only from the population of Isfahan, especially for the bazaar, but also from the people of the rest of Iran and India. These funds were used in extensive charitable enterprises, which helped to gain him substantial support from the poor. In the Bidabad quarter of Isfahan, Shafti regularly distributed gifts and provided a highly organized food provision system which is said to have fed 2,000 needy households. He was also a clever businessman and established himself in the ranks of the merchants of Isfahan, where he owned 400 caravansaries and 200 shops. He was as well a major landlord, with holdings which extended beyond the Isfahan region to Yazd, Fars, and his native Gilan.

With his religious authority, his power base in Isfahan, support among the masses, connection with the bazaar, and extraordinary financial resources,
Shafii was a "law unto himself." In fact, he is reported to have had what was, in effect, a personal police force, and could always rely on the support of the lutis of the city. He even participated in open revolt against the shah's governor in the city in 1837-38, a revolt which ultimately resulted in the governor's departure. It was not until 1840 that the central government put an end to the power of the lutis of Esfahan, by executing over 150 of them and sending many others into exile. Although the Shah was able to reprimand two major forces of opposition to him in Esfahan, the Amin od-Dowleh and the lutis, Shafii remained untouchable because of his status as a mujtahed and the local support he possessed.

3. Political Role of the Shi'ite Clergy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Iran

Throughout the nineteenth century there were numerous instances of the leading clergy determining domestic and international politics, with impunity, when they felt that their own interests and the interests of Islam were threatened. In order to maintain their status, they were obliged to speak out and defend what they and the community saw as Islamic interests. Their effectiveness depended to a great extent upon their prestige and moral authority, the inviolable status of their position, access to financial resources which sometimes exceeded those of the central government, close connections with the observant and economically influential bazaar merchants, and the ability to mobilize the lutis and the masses when necessary.

The major foci of political activity of the Shi'ite clergy were the elimination of foreign, non-Muslim domination and influence in the country and what they considered to be the arbitrary exercise of power by the central government against their own status and the interests of Islam, broadly interpreted. One of the earliest examples of the clergy's political strength was
the declaration of *jihad*, or holy war, against Russia in 1826 by leading mujtaheds of the time, which forced the reigning Shah to support the second Perso-Russian War against his better judgment. Clerical opposition to foreign economic involvement is best demonstrated by their efforts in 1872-73 and 1890-91, which forced the Iranian government to cancel, in the first case, the Reuter Concession—by which a British national was granted control of Iran's national resources—and in the second, the Tobacco Regie agreement, which turned over to a British concessionaire the production, sale and export of tobacco. The movement which achieved the cancellation of the tobacco concession is especially significant in light of subsequent clerical political activity. Opposition began with denunciation of the concession from the pulpit, was centered in the cities, involved the bazaar and economic pressure in the form of a boycott on the use of tobacco, said to have been initiated by an injunction (*fatwa*) of the leading mujtahed of the period, and was supported by the urban masses in the form of large public demonstrations. Establishing a pattern which, though often strained, was to continue through the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, Westernizing reformers, many of whom were adamantly anticlerical, allied with the Shi'i clergy because of a shared opposition to Qajar autocratic rule. Moreover, the Shi'i clergy demonstrated that they had the capacity to exploit "modern," Western innovations, such as the telegraph, to their own advantage.

The clergy's image as opponents of foreign domination and Qajar autocracy reached its ultimate fulfillment in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. But it is also important to remember that serious disputes among leading members of the 'ulama came to the fore, centering around the key issue of the Constitution itself, an innovation supplied by the "Westernizing Reformers." While important mujtaheds such as Sayyed Muhammad Tabatabai and Sayyed
'Abdallah Behbehani supported the Constitution, on the condition that it recognized Shi'ite Islam as the state religion and called for the approval of all legislation by a committee of religious jurists, others like Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri, vehemently opposed in principle the idea of man-made legislation embodied in the Constitution.

In emphasizing the antiimperialist and antiautocratic stand taken by the nineteenth century Iranian clergy, one must not, however, overlook another important aspect of their political involvement, one which has reasserted itself in the Islamic Republic, their vehemence in eliminating those whom they considered morally or doctrinally corrupt, and thus enemies of Islam. Great pressure was put upon the government by the clergy to destroy those they considered to be heretics: the Sufis in the first half of the century; and later the Babis and Baha'is, who claim over 20,000 martyrs under Qajar rule.

b. Impact of Twentieth-Century Political Developments on the Shi'ite Clergy

The impact of Western political philosophy began to be felt in Iran in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed Iran's entry into the age of modern politics with the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911).

Some of the early lay advocates of constitutional reform presented their arguments in religious terms. Arguments in favor of political reform and parliamentary democracy by these 'modernists' presented them as conforming to or embodying the commonly-shared Islamic values. During the Constitutional Revolution, a number of prominent Shi'ite jurists themselves also supported the Constitutionalist movement and wrote political tracts justifying parliamentary democracy. These tracts can be seen as the first attempts to address
the twin questions of the legitimiation of parliamentary legislation and the legitimiation of democratic government.

Firstly, the jurists had to solve the problems posed by the necessity of legislation as deliberate regulation of social relations by men. Not fully or even partly envisaging the secularizing effects of parliamentary legislation, the sympathetic jurors typically justified it as having to do with matters of 'custom' ('urf)--as opposed to the sacred law (shar')--and with 'worldly' as distinct from 'religious' matters. Secondly, they treated the problem of legitimizing the political (executive) authority of monarchical constitutional government.

With the advent of constitutionalism, the traditional theory of kingship was discarded. The king was no longer the Shadow of God on earth. For the democrats, his sovereignty rested in part on the will of the people. From the religious point of view, he was a trustee--his position being compared by one most notable Shi'ite jurist to that of the administrator of a religious endowment. This legitimization, however, was conditional upon the confirmation of the king in his office by the Shi'ite authorities.

The Islamic empire inherited the pre-Islamic political ethos. As early as the eighth century, Sassanian influences penetrated into Islam, both in administrative handbooks and in "mirrors" for princes. The Abbasid caliphs encouraged the idea that their caliphate was a continuation of Persian royalty. It remained for the Buyid Dynasty to fully revive the Sassanian conception of kingship. In the tenth century the Buyids assumed the title of Shahinsihah; the title continued to be borne by the Saljuk sultans in the following century. Thus, with the eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate in the tenth century, political theory came to center around the de facto rulers--later to be designated Sultans--rather than the caliphs. By the second half of the eleventh century, a tradition of acclaining the ruler as the Shadow of God on Earth became firmly established. For a further account of the traditional theory of kingship, see AKS Lampton, "Quis Custodiet Custodes: Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government." Studia Islamica 5-6 (1956), or see Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), Chapter III.
Clerical writings were flawed, however, by a number of important misconceptions regarding the nature and underlying principles of parliamentary democracy. The serious secularizing implications of legislation were played down, and a number of flat contradictions between Islamic and liberal political concepts were ignored. Once these implications became clear, these tracts were not to serve as the basis for a modernized Shi'ite political ethic. The pro-constitution jurists soon found themselves on the defensive. The reactionary camp within the Shi'ite clergy continued to gain in strength and was unmistakably predominant by the beginning of the second decade of the century.

Following their disillusionment with Constitutionalism from 1906 onwards, the Shi'ite clergy withdrew from the political arena. The establishment of the Pahlavi regime a decade later assured their increasing exclusion from the polity.

The erosion of clerical control over education had begun even before the Constitutional Revolution. It culminated in the creation of a secular, national educational system with the implementation of Reza Shah's educational reforms. Control over education was the least defensible of clerical prerogatives as it was a contingent fact, lacking any doctrinal basis. More defensible clerical citadels also fell under the attack of the centralizing state. The 1930s witnessed the major defeat of the clergy in the legal sphere, a sphere where clerical domination rested on a firm doctrinal basis. The judiciary was secularized and centralized under state control. Finally, the Endowments Act of 1934 established a centralized control over religious endowments throughout Iran which had largely been under direct or delegated control of the clergy.

The Shi'ite clergy became deeply alienated from the modernizing Pahlavi state and the increasingly secularized political elite which dominated it.
Its opposition to the etatist regime assumed the form of a staunch tradition-
alisn. In their bid to overthrow the Pahlavi regime, Khomeini and some other
cleric naturally turned to the Shi'ite tradition to find ideological assump-
tion. In doing so, they reactivated the process which had unfolded itself
into the early nineteenth century equilibrium between political and religious
power.

It is true in general that once the separation of political and religious
authority is established, given the indisputable superiority of God over
earthly powers, the potential for theocracy is present. However, in the nine-
teenth century, the advocacy of theocracy was to remain a latent possibility,
a possibility which was in fact not to be actualized until the recent decades.

By 1970, however, the Shi'ite clergy no longer felt itself bound by the
nineteenth century balance between political and religious authority (which
was in part reflected in the Constitution of 1906-1907), as this arrangement
had been trampled upon by the state. The Pahlavi state's intensified en-
croachment upon the spheres which had remained under religious control forced
a number of Shi'ite religious leaders to couple their championship of the
menaced Islam with claims of theocratic government. Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini and others extended the technically and specific discussion of
the rights of the regent in the early nineteenth century legal theory of the
Usuli school into a political theory, which proposed theocratic government in
the form of velayat-e faqih--'the sovereignty of the jurist,' or 'the mandate
of the clergy.' The theory of the sovereignty of the religious jurist was put
forward as the Islamic alternative to the Pahlavi regime and was eventually
incorporated by Khomeini's followers into a new Constitution which was rati-
tied by the referendum of December 2-3, 1979.

15
Khemeini's theory of velayat-e faqih, first published in 1971, is a bold innovation in the history of Shi'ism. He generalized the early Usuli arguments, which were designed to establish the legal and religious authority of the Shi'ite mujtaheds, to eliminate the duality of religious and temporal authority. Khemeini categorically stated that "the sovereignty of the jurist means governing and administering the country and implementing the provisions of the sacred law" (R. Khomeini, Hukumat-e Islami, Najaf, 1971, p. 64).

Having firmly rejected the separation of religion and politics, he argued that in the absence of the divinely-inspired Imam, sovereignty devolves upon qualified jurists or the Shi'ite religious leaders. It is, therefore, the religious leaders, as the authoritative interpreters of the sacred law, who are entitled to sovereignty. Furthermore, by assuming the title of Imam, Khomeini paved the way for the eventual restriction of velayat-e faqih, and thus the exercise of sovereignty, to Shi'ism's presumed supreme leader.
II. THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

1. The Militant Clergy and the Islamic Movement

There is a fairly extensive literature on the leadership of the Shi'ite clergy in the nationwide protest against a tobacco monopoly concession to the British in 1891 and about their role in the Constitutional Revolution. In these writings much has been made of the prominence of the Shi'ite clergy in the events of 1905-1906, which led to the granting of a constitution by the monarch. What has remained obscured is that at this stage, the aims of the popular movement were ill-defined, the clearest goal being the establishment of a House of Justice. Once democratic government was stated as its goal, and as the Majlis (Parliament) became progressively defined, signs of dissatisfaction among the Shi'ite clergy with the constitutional movement began to appear. From 1907 onwards, Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri (c. 1909) articulated the clerical opposition to the Majlis and organized many if not most of the Shi'ite clerics into a traditionalist party for the defense of Islam against parliamentary democracy, which was presented as a Western-inspired political innovation. According to Nuri, what had originally been demanded from the monarch had been a 'Majlis of Justice' "so as to spread justice and equity and enforce the Sacred Law; no one had heard of a National Consultative [Majlis, shura-ye melli], [Assembly] or Constitutionalism (mashruta)." The Majlis should not be contrary to Islam, and should 'enjoin the good,' 'forbid the evil' and protect the citadel of Islam." But the constitutionalists "want to make Iran's Consultative Assembly the Parliament of Paris..." We see today that in the Consultative Assembly they have brought the legal books of the
European parliament(s) and have deemed it necessary to expand the law... whereas we, the people of Islam, have a heavenly and eternal Sacred Law.”

In marked contrast to the 'modernist' strategy of presenting Western political concepts and practices as embodiments of the true spirit of Islam, Nuri, the proponent of incipient Islamic traditionalism, highlighted their imported and alien quality, stressing the Europeaness of the parliament and the Constitution of 1906. "Fireworks, receptions of the ambassadors, these foreign habits, the crying of hurrah, all those inscriptions of Long Live, Long Live! Long Live Equality, Fraternity. Why not write on one of them: Long Live the Sacred Law, Long Live the Qur’an, Long Live Islam?" Seven decades later Khomeini and the militant Shi'ite clergy who regarded themselves as disciples of Nuri and subscribed to his views, were to utilize his ideas in achieving the goal of an Islamic Republic.

During his rise to supreme power from 1921 to 1925, Reza Khan (subsequently Shah) Pahlavi reigned ostentatious displays of religiosity, successfully courted the clergy and exploited their fears of Westernism and Republicanism. The leading Shi'ite dignitaries supported Reza Khan and helped him to oust the Qajars and ascend the throne. At least two of them publicly branded those who opposed the Pahlavi's rule as enemies of Islam. However, once securely ensconced on the throne, Reza Shah carried out a vigorous program of modernization and centralization which devastated the institutional foundations of clerical power. Furthermore, he ruthlessly confronted the clergy whenever they showed signs of resistance and protest. In 1926, he humiliated Ayatollah Bafi in the shrine of Qum by having him publicly beaten and dragged by the beard. A much more serious instance of confrontation—and one which the Shi'ite clergy never forgot—was the bloody suppression, in the
summer of 1935, of a clerically-organized antigovernment gathering in the mosque of Gawharshad in Mashhad.

The memory of Nuri as the man who first realized that parliamentary government was a ploy to facilitate Western cultural domination came to be cherished with each reversal of the Shi'ite clergy’s fortune resulting from the Pahlavis’ modernization and centralization policies. Since the Islamic revolution, Khomeini and the militant clergy have claimed and honored him as the hero of the Iranian Islamic movement who sought to prevent its corruption by the Westernized intelligentsia; the advocates of liberalism and nationalism who succeeded in dominating Iran in the subsequent decades.

In the decades prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, individual Shi'ite doctors who did not subscribe to Nuri’s rejection of the Majlis, such as Hasan Khozestani and Ayatollah Kashani, gained prominence in periods of lively parliamentary politics. Outside the Majlis, too, religion emerged as an important factor in Iranian politics owing to the activities of a terrorist group of young clerics, the Fada'iyan-e Islam (Devotees of Islam) who engaged in the assassination of 'corrupt' pro-Western Iranian statesmen and who enjoy the distinction of being the first group to publish a blueprint for Islamic government in 1950. Despite such endemic political activities, and despite widespread agitation against Reza Shah in connection with the removal of the veil in 1935-36, there was no organized and continuous movement among the Shi'ite clergy during the first four decades of Pahlavi rule.

The militant Shi'ite clergy and their lay fellow activists who have attained the highest positions of power in postrevolutionary Iran are unanimous in considering the year 1961 as the beginning of their movement. Early in October 1962, the government publicized a bill for the election of town councils which eliminated the profession of Islam as a condition for the
Khomeni denounced the bill as the first step towards the abolition of Islam and the delivery of Iran to the Bahais, the presumed agents of Zionism and Imperialism who were implicitly enfranchised by the bill alongside women. Clerical agitation continued and was intensified after the Shah proposed, in January 1963, a national referendum on six principles of his reform program, subsequently to be called the 'White Revolution.' Khomeni denounced the referendum vehemently. The Shah responded with determination and severity. The Fayziyyeh seminary in Qum was sacked in March. This show of force failed to intimidate Khomeni, who continued to speak out against the government until his arrest in early June 1963. Khomeni's arrest precipitated massive demonstrations by his followers in Tehran, Qum and other cities, which were bloodily suppressed. The memory of those days provided important inspiration for the clerics in their opposition to the regime. Khomeni was subsequently released, but was kept under supervision in Tehran and finally rearrested and exiled to Turkey in November 1964. He moved to the Shi'ite holy cities in Iraq the following year.

The period 1962 to 1963 witnessed the birth of a movement led by the militant clergy who remained faithful to Khomeni, continued to protest against his detention and exile, and kept in contact with him. Many of the future rulers of the Islamic republic had their first bitter political experience and embarked on clandestine political journalism and organization while using religious sermons as a political platform. Some of the ad hoc organizations and groupings which had come into being for distributing Khomeni's proclamations in Tehran and other cities, and for organizing demonstrations, continued their existence underground. In these clandestine
associations elements from the bazaar, the religious youths and the militant clergy cooperated intimately. One such association, Hey'at-e Mu'ta'alefay-e Islam, had 'clerical advisors' (chosen by Khomeini) attached to it. In January 1965, one of its members succeeded in assassinating Prime Minister Mossad after obtaining an injunction (fatwa) to do so from the group's clerical advisors, who included the late Ayatollah Beheshti. It was disclosed in the trial of its arrested members that the association had also planned to assassinate the Shah and set up a "unified Islamic government."

According to Beheshti, it was in this period that the militant clergy began to think seriously about Islamic government along the lines adumbrated by the Fada'iyan-e Islam in 1950. Khomeini himself turned his attention to the issue of Islamic government in the Shi'ite centers of learning in Iraq, and gave a series of lectures on the topic. (These were to be published by his students in 1971.)

Meanwhile, certain social trends in Iran were creating a receptive audience for the militant Shi'ite clergy. Rapid urbanization in the 1960s and 1970s went hand in hand with increased vitality of religion, as is shown in Table 1.

Many of the recent migrants into cities gathered in mosques and formed religious associations. Meanwhile, the bazaar—the section of the old urban population with the strongest attachment to religion and tradition—benefited from the general economic prosperity and channeled increased funds into religious activities. Religious journals gained progressively wider circulation, and religious books became more and more popular. In the early 1970s, religious titles overtook publications in all other categories, constituting over one quarter of all published books. Alongside this dramatic rise
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*Estimated from projections of the population of Iran on the basis of the censuses of 1956, 1960 and 1970.
**The number of applicants for pilgrimage to Mecca may have exceeded the government quota by as much as 6 to 8 times.
in the number of religious publications, we witness another equally dramatic phenomenon.

From 1965 onwards, there was an astonishing growth in the number of religious associations. These were often affiliated with the groupings of humbler occupations or of poorer city quarters. They met mostly during the religious months of Muharram and Ramadan but occasionally also at other times. By 1974, there were 322 Husayniyyeh-type centers in Tehran, 305 in Khuzestan and 831 in Azerbaijan. It is interesting to note that many of these differed from the traditional Husayniyyeh, offering year-round "revivalist" teaching, study groups and sermons. In addition, there were over 12,300 "Religious Associations" in Tehran alone, most of which were formed after 1955. Of these Associations 1821 designated themselves formally by a title. These titles typically refer either to the guild or profession of the members, or to their geographical town or region of origin, or to their aspirations. As such, they are highly revealing of the social background of their members, and of the type of religious sentiment motivating them to form these associations. The unmistakable impression given by the titles is that their members fall into two quite possibly overlapping social groups: lower middle class guild and professions associated with the bazaar economy, and recent migrants from the provinces. Furthermore, there is no doubt that their religiosity is solidly traditional. Some typical examples include: Religious Associations of Shoemakers, of Workers at Public Baths, of the Guild of Fruit-Juicers (on street corners), of Tailors, of the Natives of Natanz Resident in Tehran, of the Natives of Semnan, of the Desperates (bicharehna of [Imam] Musa ibn Ja'far.)

The expanding Iranian universities, which were admitting an increasing proportion of students from provincial towns and from nonprivileged strata,
did not remain unaffected by the religious revival of the 1960s and 1970s. Islamic societies of students had existed on the margin of university political activities in Iran since the first such society was founded at the University of Tehran in 1942 by Mehdi Bazargan, who was then a professor of engineering. With the Islamic revival of the late 1960s and the 1970s, their members and level of activity increased dramatically. Islamic societies were formed among Iranian students abroad and flourished under the guidance of such future revolutionary figures as Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi (in the U.S.) and Dr. Abu’l-Hasan Bani-Sadr (in France). These societies drew their membership largely from students of engineering, medicine and the natural sciences. They were intensely political, and were crucial contributors to the formulation of an Islamic ideology, and the politicization of the Islamic revival. Since the Islamic revolution and especially after the ouster of Bani-Sadr in 1981, the militants of these Islamic student associations in Iran and abroad have come to constitute the 'second stratum' of Khomeini's regime and occupy the highest echelons of its technical and administrative cadre.

With the spread of Religious Associations in the 1970s, the demand for preachers and cantors outstripped the supply. The unsatisfied demand created a market for religious tapes and cassettes. By the mid-1970s, a survey reported some thirteen centers of recording and distribution of tapes. The contributions of the organizational network created through the Religious Associations to the success of the Islamic revolution was of crucial importance. In essence, they formed the infrastructure of the revolution. Their organizers distributed Khomeini's taped messages and planned the massive demonstrations of the winter of 1978, and enforced order and discipline during
those demonstrations. In the power struggle following the overthrow of the Shah, the associations became the foundation upon which the IRP was built.

As noted in Section 1, the independence of the Shi'ite clergy from the state in the nineteenth century made an alliance with craftsmen and merchants possible, and an enduring alliance between mosque and bazaar came into being. This alliance was further cemented by the link between the Shi'ite clergy and the popular organizations of the city quarters. This traditional alliance formed the basis for the mass demonstrations against the Shah in 1962, and more fatefully, in 1978. (Even the luti, who had become insignificant because of the extensive penetration of the modern state in urban society, were not missing from the picture. One of the two top luti of Tehran, Sayyed Hajj Reza'i, was among the most effective supporters of Khomeini and was tried and executed for his part in organizing the riots of June 1963. A younger latter-day luti, Muhsen Reza'i, is currently the Commander of the Corps of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.)

2. Non-Clerical Opposition Groups Under the Shah

The political developments of 1963 also constitute an important watershed in contemporary history because they herald the decline of the once influential secular political parties, and the gradual assumption of a leading role in opposition politics by religiously connected forces. This change was especially significant for the Tudeh party which lost its monopoly over the socialist movement in Iran and increasingly failed to articulate ideas or programs to attract the new generation of college-educated youth. Consequently, the Tudeh was transformed from being the largest and most important Marxist political party in the Middle East to a small party operating clandestinely in Iran and playing only a marginal role in oppositional political activity. Its demise and the reasons for the rise of
other leftist groups unaffiliated with, and even hostile to, the Tudeh are examined below.

An important contributory factor to the decline of the Tudeh as a political opposition force was the decimation of its leadership and rank and file members after the coup d'état of 1953. The party leaders who survived the severe repression were those who had fled into exile. Thus, after 1953, the Tudeh became a party whose leaders and operations were based outside of Iran and often had little direct contact with the party cells which were forced to operate secretly in Iran. Detente between the USSR and the Warsaw Pact on one side, and the U.S.A. and its NATO allies on the other, also affected the Tudeh, which adopted the strategy of rejecting armed struggle in favor of peaceful change. This new tactic was developed just as the popularity of armed struggle was gaining popular appeal among revolutionary-inclined youth who were taking inspiration from movements like the Algerian Revolution against the French and the Vietnam war. This all occurred simultaneously with the rift between China and the Soviet Union over ideological issues. The Tudeh, like other Marxist parties around the world, suffered splits and defections in the 1960s that further eroded its appeal to the post-1963 generation.

While the Tudeh was not successful in generating widespread support in the 1960s and 1970s, it did manage to attract a limited number of new members. Thus, cells were formed on university campuses, in factories and even within the military. Whenever such cells were discovered by the Shah's secret police, members were rounded up and imprisoned. The severe repression of the Tudeh, the necessity for it to operate underground, and its relatively moderate program of political action—in comparison to the armed struggle...
tactics advocated by the newer and more extreme groups—were all factors making the Tudeh a marginal force in opposition politics during the post-1963 period.

While the Tudeh was relatively ineffective in the years preceding the revolution, Marxist analysis of Iranian society continued to appeal to many youths who were attending the expanding college programs after 1963. Most of the youths who were attracted to Marxist interpretations did not join in formal groups. However, a minority of them, who came to believe in the need for armed struggle to topple the government of the Shah, participated in different clandestine groups which organized guerilla attacks upon official personnel and institutions of the government. The two most important of these groups were the Fada'iyan-e Khalq and the Mujahedin-e Khalq, both of which would play a role in organizing armed resistance toward the regime during the final days of the monarchy and emerge as paramilitary parties after the revolution. The Feda'iyan was founded in 1971 by several individuals who had been involved in Marxist study groups or oppositional political activity since the early 1960s. The Feda'is attracted nationwide attention by staging a sensational raid on a rural gendarmerie station in February 1971. While the organization was eventually suppressed in a series of bloody confrontations with security forces, the willingness of its members to challenge the regime so directly, and the government's apparently frightened response helped to spread the appeal of the Feda'is among college youth. In addition, the Feda'is' extolling of armed struggle, at a time when persons such as Castro, the Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao were heroes to revolutionary-minded youth in Iran, increased the Feda'is' prestige among this segment of the population, but not in Iranian society as a whole. Thus, by the mid-1970s most of the original founders of the organization had been killed, while most of the other
members were in prison. Consequently, the Fedai'yan was not in a position to play a role in the gathering momentum toward revolution during 1978, although the organization would reemerge in 1979.

The Mujahedin also had its origins in the early 1960s. However, the Mujahedin began as a religious organization, albeit with a revolutionary interpretation of Islam which incorporated many Marxist ideas. Eventually the Mujahedin split into a Marxist and an Islamic faction. The Mujahedin also advocated armed struggle and launched its first guerrilla attacks in the summer of 1971, six months after the Fedai'is' initial operation. Like the Fedai'is, the Mujahedin were involved in some sensational shoot-outs with security forces in the early 1970s, and were responsible for a number of bombings and assassinations. By the mid-1970s the Mujahedin also had lost a significant number of founding members in "battle" or through execution. And also like the Fedai'is, the loss of so many leaders and cadres forced a retreat to a more quietist phase. But some leaders did remain alive in prison, and some underground cells did continue to survive, so that the organization was reconstituted in January 1979 in time to play a role in the final phase of the revolution.

All the groups described above, the established Tudeh party, the newer and more radical Fedai'yan and Mujahedin, and other minor groups influenced by Marxist ideas, appealed primarily to college youth in the 15 years prior to the revolution. Both the Fedai'is and Mujahedin in fact originated among students. This was a rapidly increasing population group. The establishment of several new colleges in this period provided opportunities for a greater number of young people to pursue postsecondary education. By 1978, over 300,000 people were enrolled in Iran's colleges. The campuses were a center of dissatisfaction with the monarchical regime and provided fertile ground for
recruiting members imbued with a combination of opposition to the government and idealistic hope that specific action could bring about its collapse. The Tudeh rejected armed resistance as futile in favor of coexistence with the authorities and a conviction in the inevitability of peaceful political change. This seemed less attractive to activist students than the armed resistance tactics of the more radical groups. The Fada'is and Mujahadin in particular had achieved some important propaganda victories by their activities and could "boast" of many martyrs for the revolution. Thus, the guerrilla groups were able to generate more interest and attract more recruits than the Tudeh. The Fada'iyan and the Mujahedin did some of the decisive fighting in Tehran on February 9 to 11, 1979.

After the revolution, the Mujahedin found themselves increasingly appeal to the militant clergy and were violently eliminated from the political scene following the fall of Bani-Sadr. The Fada'iyan were split; a minority was suppressed in the early years of the revolution, the majority threw in their lot and supported Khomeini, awaiting their fate with the Tudeh. The Tudeh Party, despite its continued servile support for Khomeini, was finally outlawed in early 1983, and most of its members arrested.
III. THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND INTERNAL STRATEGY OF THE RULING SHI'ITE CLERGY SINCE THE REVOLUTION

1. The Evolution of a Distinct Clerical Ideology

The political and public activities of the militant Shi'ite clergy in pressed upon its leading elements, such as the late Ayatollahs Musavi and Benehsht, the need for a distinct Islamic ideology. In this enterprise, they were decisively aided by the Islamic 'modernists' such as Khomeini and Mofti (i.e., 1977) and Bani-Sadr. These modernist laymen were their masters in the art of formulating and elaborating a coherent ideology. Nevertheless, even the Shi'ite clergy was suspicious of the modernist laymen who considered them somewhat contaminated by secular ideologies of liberalism, nationalism and socialism. This is especially true of Khomeini himself who wanted his movement to remain purely Islamic in orientation and methodology. In 1972, in a typical statement which demonstrates his resolve on the need of a theocracy, Khomeini warned that the problems of Iran would not be solved so long as "the nation of Islam" remained attached to "the Coleman, liberal, or materialist thought [i.e., political philosophies] and compared them to divines as non-Islam." The differences between the militant Shi'ite clergy and the Islamic 'modernists' who variously accepted elements of nationalism, liberalism and socialism did not take long to surface during the revolution. The militant clergy first attacked the liberal nationalists and then the Islamic modernists.

Already in 1978, Ayatollah Akhondi, had stressed the need for reorganizing the national and liberal intellectuals attract the clerical elite as
they had done during the Constitutional Revolution. Less than five months after the revolution (Late May 1979), Ayatollah Beheshti considered the time ripe for openly fighting nationalism and liberal democracy in the person of Mohamad Narin, the president of the Oil Association and the Chairman of the Iranian National Oil Company. In a speech demanding the trial of Nazir al-treaseh, Beheshti referred to the years 1962-63, and especially June 1963, as the turning point in Iranian history at which the direction of "the pure Islamic revolution" was determined in clear contradistinction to nationalism and liberal democracy. A few months later, Beheshti incorporated this view of the militant clergy into the preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic:

Although the Islamic way of thinking and militant clerical leadership played a major and fundamental role in the constitutional and the nationalist/post-imperialist movements, these movements rapidly disintegrated because they became increasingly distant from the true Islamic position.

At this point, the alert conscience of the nation, led by the Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, realized the necessity of adhering to the true ideological and Islamic path of struggle.

The plan for an Islamic Government based upon the concept of the Mandate of the Clergy (velayat-e faqeih) which was introduced by Imam Khomeini gave a fresh, strong incentive to the Muslim people and opened the way for a genuine ideological Islamic struggle. This plan consolidated the efforts of those dedicated Muslims who were fighting both at home and abroad.

Nuri would have been pleased to see the new theocratic constitution, as he would have been with the first important act of the first Majles to change its name from National to Islamic Consultative Assembly.

As one of the most articulate representatives of the militant Shi'ite clergy, Beheshti attacked 'modernist' attempts to reconcile nationalism, liberal democracy and socialism with Islam as 'mixed thought' (telgatat) and presented the theory of velayat-e faqeih, which was said to be the result of
the researches of the militant clergy on the issue of Islamic government since the 1970s, as the purely Islamic alternative.

Khomeini exploited the death of Ayatollah Taleqani, who had been associated with Islamic liberals such as Bazargan, to underscore the same points of contrasts between his theology and the type of regime envisioned by his Islamic, moderate collaborators. People did not kiss Taleqani's body in the street because he was a liberal. They kissed his hand because he was a St. Jerome monk: he was the deputy of the Holy Imam; because he was the deputy of the Prophet.

The Political Situation After the Fall of the Monarchy

The unity which the different elements of the opposition had achieved in the goal of overthrowing the monarchy eroded rapidly following the success of the revolutionary movement in February 1979. While it is true that there had been considerable discussion about the necessity of creating a democratic government to replace the Shah, those forces which were most committed to democracy had not actually formulated any political strategies for creating and preserving democratic institutions. In contrast, those forces which were not tolerant of political pluralism were better organized. This was especially true of the thousands of militant cleri ces who had emerged as local revolutionary leaders during the final months of the revolution. Given their role, and the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini, the charismatic national leader of the revolution, was such a prominent member of the clergy, it was inevitable that the political views of the religious sector would have to be addressed. The vision of an Islamic theocratic republic put forth by Khomeini and his supporters was fundamentally hostile to political pluralism, except within very narrow limits rhetorically defined by religious authorities.
From the beginning of the post-Pahlavi period, therefore, the conflicting orientations have existed in politics; the clericalist and the dualistic. Broadly speaking, the clericalist orientation holds that religion and politics are inseparable. That is, since it is the proper role of religious authorities to guide believers in this world in order to prepare them for the afterworld, it follows that the clergy should be concerned with all the affairs of the believers. This is not a traditional view within Shi'ite Islam, but it is the view of Khomeini and those members of the clergy who support him; it is also the view of many nonclerical politicians who have allied themselves with the clergy. The dualistic orientation, in contrast, views the proper concern of religion to be specifically spiritual; religion is a private matter between each believer and God, with the clergy functioning as mere guides and authorities on correct Islamic behavior. It is important to note that some prominent members of the clergy subscribed to this more limited view of religion, even to the point of viewing clerical involvement in politics as demeaning to the functions of the clergy as a whole. However, as we shall see, this dualistic outlook was presented before long as inspired by an imperialist plot to emasculate the Islamic community.

The conflicting views of the dualistic and clericalist orientations have had a significant impact upon Iranian politics since 1979. The clericalist orientation has succeeded, but this success has been costly and has not resolved the matter definitively. Up through the end of 1983 it is possible to discern four distinct phases in dualistic-clericalist tension as it has affected governmental politics. The first phase, which lasted from February to November 1979, is the period of the Provisional Government. The second phase, from the end of 1979 until mid-June 1981, corresponds to the presidency of Bani-Sadr. The third phase, from the forcible ouster of Bani-Sadr in June
1981 to Khomeini's stabilization decree (farman) of December 15, 1981, was marked by violent clashes between the ruling clerical party and armed opposition groups, ending with the opposition's suppression. The last stage, the consolidation of the theocracy, has continued to the present.

3. The Provisional Government: February to November 1979

The Provisional Government was established with Khomeini's decree and was a purely secular government. Mehdi Barzagan of the Freedom Movement was Prime Minister, while prominent members of the National Front such as Khojand Bagheri held other posts. It was a government of men who had long opposed the Shah, and who shared a commitment to creating a government based upon socialist democratic practices. For the first six months of its existence, there was a "democratic spring" in Iran. There was no press censorship, political parties of various persuasions from the extreme right to the extreme left operated openly, and there was a tolerance for the cultural demands of the ethnic minorities. At the same time, however, this was a period when the religious forces opposed to secularism were consolidating their power, and when the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) and the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution were created. Indeed, from the very inception of the Provisional government, members of the clergy who would eventually form the leadership of the IRP had set up a secret and parallel government known as the Revolutionary Council.

The Provisional Government and the Revolutionary Council established by Khomeini's decree, became embroiled in continual power contests over policy. The Revolutionary Council approved and implemented a number of decisions without the consultation or approval of the Provisional Government. The relegation of the Provisional Government to the status of a virtually powerless figurehead was highlighted dramatically in mid-August, when the revolutionary Council enforced press censorship against papers considered too
critical of the clergy, decreed the banning of certain secular political parties, and ordered the Revolutionary Guards to invade Kurdish areas of western Iran where the population was demanding greater local autonomy. The final coup de grace against the Provisional Government came in November 1979, when the Revolutionary Council endorsed the seizure of the U.S. embassy and the holding of its diplomatic personnel as hostages. This action vividly demonstrated the total impotence of the Provisional Government and precipitated its resignation.

Perhaps the most significant feature of this period is the demise of the alliance between the Islamic modernists and the militant clergy. The long collaboration both in action and in points of view between Engineer Bazargan and Ayatollah Sayyid Motevall Taleqani demonstrates that an "Islamic liberal" and a leading cleric, both with contrasting social and educational backgrounds, could, in fact, work together—that conflict between the two groups was not inevitable. Bazargan was born in Tehran in 1905 to a pious, well-off merchant family, originally from Azerbaijan. He received his higher education in civil engineering in Paris, returning to Iran in 1936 to begin a long and successful career as a university professor. Taleqani, born in 1910 to a family of sayyids in Taleqan, a relatively remote region northwest of Tehran, pursued theological studies in Qum, and in 1938 went to Tehran where he pursued a career as a teacher and preacher, ultimately at the centrally located Hedayat Mosque. Both men's political activities began around 1940. In that year Taleqani's anti-regime sessions earned him the first of a long series of prison sentences (he is reported to have spent a total of twelve years in prison). Bazargan's initial activities were organizational, setting up an Engineers Association and, significantly, the Islamic Student Society at Tehran University. Bazargan and Taleqani were staunch supporters of
Mossadegh's liberal and nationalist policy but stressed the importance of Islam and its values in shaping Iran's future. In 1961 they joined together with several other like-minded individuals to found the Liberation Movement, the Nezhat-e Azadi, a party dedicated to Islamic values, constitutionalism, and nationalism as articulated by Mossadegh. In his lectures and writing, Bazargan emphasized the relevance of Islam to modern man, its dynamism as an ideology. He emphasized that Islam could not and should not be divorced from politics, economics, and social relationships. In his writings and sermons, perhaps in a more traditional mode of discourse, Taleqani endorsed these sentiments, but spoke out more directly against social and economic inequalities, the Pahlavi regime, and ultimately the institution of the monarchy itself.

From the date of its foundation to the Revolution's triumph, the Liberation Movement was the most visible and best known "Islamic Movement," with support on the campuses, among some intellectuals, and in the middle class. Future "Islamic Liberals," such as Yazdi, Chamran, Amir Entezam, and Qeysizadeh all had Liberation Movement backgrounds. In 1978, Bazargan, although favoring a more gradual approach to social change, was in close communication and cooperation with Khomeini. Taleqani, after his release from prison in November of that year, became the most prominent revolutionary cleric in Iran. Taleqani, in fact, was the most popular clergyman, and quite probably the most popular individual after Khomeini, until his death in September of 1979. He was popular not only because he was "a deputy of the Holy Imam," but because of what he stood for: his courageous record opposing the Pahlavis, his humane concern for the poor, and his openness to a variety of groups including the Mujahedin and Fedayin on the left and sympathy towards the aspirations of ethnic minorities. But in stressing Taleqani's liberal side it should not be
overlooked that he emphasized the application of Islamic Sacred Law, was vehemently opposed to the Baha'i Faith, and ultimately resigned himself to the activities of the Revolutionary Committees. Considering their contribution to the Revolution's success, it is not surprising that both men were given important posts in the Islamic Republic. Khomeini designated Bazargan as Interim Prime Minister, and Taleqani became Tehran's first post-revolution Friday Prayer Leader. Yet their relationships with the emerging clerical faction and with Khomeini himself were marked by tension and criticism. Bazargan was especially critical of the Revolutionary Committees, clerical interference in government matters, and the general climate of revenge, retribution, and suspicion they encouraged. He threatened to resign on several occasions, until he was ultimately forced out of office on November 6, 1979. Like Bazargan, Taleqani openly criticized policies he felt were in error. He initially supported a representative constituent assembly rather than the Assembly of Experts, to which he was elected, and which was favored by the IRP. His situation became difficult as the rift between his associates and allies on the left, and Khomeini and the IRP, widened into open conflict. In fact, in mid-April 1979, Taleqani temporarily closed his private office, went into hiding for a short time to protest arrest by the Revolutionary Committees of two of his sons and a daughter-in-law who were subsequently released on Khomeini's orders, for leftist activities. After a meeting with Khomeini in Qum on April 19, Taleqani seems to have been mollified or at least convinced to cooperate. Afterwards he publicly commended the Revolutionary Committees for their work in combating counter-revolution, and in a sermon delivered at the Fayziyeh Madresseh in Qum, Taleqani publicly criticized youthful extremists (i.e., the Mujahidin) and acknowledged Khomeini as the spirit and soul of the Revolution.
Bazargan, no longer prime minister, but still a member of Parliament, has continued to stress open government and condemn the spirit of revenge and terror which he believes prevails in the Islamic Republic, despite virulent verbal and sometimes physical attacks against him and the Liberation Movement. One cannot help concluding, however, that the IRP establishment tolerates Bazargan only because it no longer considers him effective. Moreover, they can always cite his public criticism as evidence of freedom of speech in the Islamic Republic. Finally, with Taleqani's death and that of Ayatollah Zanjani in January 1984, the Liberation Movement lost its links with high-ranking clergy. Once more a liberal-clerical alliance had failed.

a. The Clerics and Bani-Sadr: November 1979 to June 1981

The virtual elimination of the secularists as a political force shifted the focus of the power struggle in the government to the different factions within the coalition of groups with an Islamic orientation. Realizing their common opposition to the unadulterated theocracy as advocated by the militant clergy, both the 'modernist' Islamic elements and the nationalist and the liberal coalitionists of the earlier phase rallied behind Bani-Sadr. The stage was set for an intense struggle between the Presidency and the clerically dominated Majlis which held its first session in July 1980. This political struggle, whose first manifestation was the prolonged disagreement between the President and the Majlis over the choice of a Prime Minister and then of the cabinet, was greatly complicated by the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. At this stage, neither side was well organized and the power struggle resulted in a stalemate which lasted for a year. A small number of important clerics sided with Bani-Sadr in this period and were forced to recant or retire from the political arena after Bani-Sadr's defeat. It is important to note that Khomeini himself did not, as a rule,
directly intervene in the struggle between Bani-Sadr and the IRP, he preferred to remain 'above politics,' as he apparently had for a few months after the revolution in 1979. This attitude can be explained by two factors: first, he seemed content with the tremendous constitutional gains for the Shi'ite clergy and was cautious to avoid hasty moves which could jeopardize them or be politically costly; and second, he was not yet convinced that it was necessary for the ranking clerics to occupy the highest offices of the state (the matter was being vigorously debated among the militant clergy, and such influential figures as Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, the president of Tehran's important Society of Militant Clergy, were opposed to the idea, as was Khomeini himself according to his recent statements).

The political struggle between Bani-Sadr and the militant clergy eventually became violent. In March 1981, the commemoration of the death of Mossaddeq, the symbol of Iranian nationalism—an event sponsored by Bani-Sadr—was disrupted by an IRP mob. Bani-Sadr was blamed for the incident and criminal proceedings were initiated against him. He was deposed by the Majlis in June 1981, and a major demonstration in his favor on June 20 was bloodily suppressed, with at least 400 persons shot and another 150 arrested and summarily executed for 'spreading corruption on earth.' The brunt of the casualties was borne by the Islamic radicals, the Mujahedin, but a few bazaari supporters of Bani-Sadr were also executed.


This period was marked by the bloodiest power struggle and ended with the suppression of all organized opposition to theocracy except in Kurdistan. A massive explosion at the IRP headquarters on June 28, 1981, killed some 20 important members of the party, including its founder, Ayatollah beheshti. It
was followed by a similar explosion at the Prime Minister's office on August 30 which claimed the lives of President Raja'i and Prime Minister Bahonar. These events seem to have put an end to all doubts in Khomeini's mind, and he resolved on the direct and full takeover of the state by the militant clergy. He appointed a Presidential Council consisting of the Ayatollahs Hasheemi-Kaisanjani, Musavi-Ardabili and Moolavi-Kani, with the latter as Acting Prime Minister. Hujjat al-Islam Khamene'i, having survived an attempt on his life, was elected President on October 2, 1981.

In the period June 1981 to December 1982, the Islamic theocracy passed decisive tests of survival: It survived the decimation of hundreds of its leaders as a result of the explosions of June and August 1981, and of numerous individual assassinations over a period of fifteen months. It survived a serious setback in the war with Iraq, which involved heavy casualties in the summer of 1982. In this period, the bid for the full clerical takeover of the highest offices of the state was accompanied by considerable radicalization of the regime. After the election of Khamene'i to the presidency and the dismissal of Moolavi-Kani as the acting prime minister, every important state functionary was replaced by an IRP loyalist to assure the complete control of the state apparatus by the militant clerical hardliners who are often referred to as the 'followers of the Line of the Imam' (Khatt-e Imami). The move entailed a setback for 'the Household of the Imam,' his son-in-law, the late Ayatollah Esbraqi, who had been favorably disposed towards Bani-Sadr, and his son Ahmad, who was forced to give a few recantatory interviews regretting his past support for the 'Hypocrites' (the Mujahedin), and joining the chorus of denunciation of 'the accursed Bani-Sadr' and 'the accursed Qotb-zadeh.' The purges of the non-IRP, nonloyalist civil servants were carried out with particular thoroughness in the Ministry of the Interior where all layers and
provincial governors in both categories were appointed at the certain moment) were changed. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Guards (Enqelab-e Islami) was becoming much more homogenous. Many of the former 'Islamic' Guards did not report to work or were purged after the purge from the IRP headquarters and in the subsequent months.

By January 1981, the clerics were feeling considerably safer walking around with fewer or no bodyguards. Their perception that the 'Revolution' were finished was perhaps somewhat premature, since the Mujahedin claimed to claim responsibility for several violent incidents in the spring and summer of 1982. By the autumn, however, the level of violence directed against the regime declined dramatically. Statements by the General Prosecutor in Revolutionary Courts that 90 percent of the organized network of the Mujahedin were destroyed seem to have been fairly realistic.


The last phase may be dated from December 15, 1982, when Khomeini issued a decree promising the people of Iran a postrevolutionary era of security and stabilization. By this date organized armed opposition groups had been largely suppressed. The task of institutionalizing the theocratic institutions had begun as early as April 1982, when Khomeini and his followers decided to devote themselves fully to the resolution of the twin problems of xuốngism and of the legitimacy of Islamic theocracy. Both of these issues are crucial to the long-term survival of the regime. The objective of the militant Shi'ite clergy, at this stage was the removal of the most radical of the members of the survival of theocracy: clerical opposition to theocratic government and certain aspects of the legacy of the Shi'ite tradition itself.

To understand the dynamic of the situation at this phase of the event and most important set of questions to be answered in the following, who are
the militant clerics. Who are the clerics opposed to them, and what is the nature of clerical dissent concerning the theory of theocratic government? Waliyat-e Faqihi? Finally, what is the nature of the legitimacy crisis and its relation to the problems of succession to Khomeini? What practical steps have been taken to resolve this twin problem, and what are the prospects for its resolution?

The official historian of the Islamic revolution, in a work written in the mid-1970s, claims that Khomeini has trained 500 Shi'ite doctors (mutahhid) throughout his long teaching career, and that 12,000 students took his courses in the years immediately preceding his exile. The leading personalities of the militant clergy who now occupy the highest positions of power in the Islamic Republic are, with rare exceptions, first and foremost Khomeini's former students, and secondly, his collaborators in the agitations of the 1960s. Socially, they are in all likelihood from the traditional urban background typical of the Shi'ite clergy in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. They were keenly aware of the dispossession of the Shi'ite clergy by the Pahlavi regime and bent on the recovery of lost historical privileges. The younger militant clergy, on the other hand, is heavily drawn from humbler rural and small-town backgrounds. For them, the Islamic revolution has created avenues of rapid upward social mobility. However, the ideological weapon of the ranking militant Ayatollahs for the recovery of their lost privileges is the same as that of the younger clerics for safeguarding their rapid social ascent: Khomeini's theory of theocratic government or Waliyat-e Faqihi.

The theory extends the Shi'ite norm of juristic authority as elaborated in the nineteenth century into a new phase previously not covered by it. If government. Rival theories of government such as democracy and...
the nation apart. Shahwati's theory of the 'Mandate of the Clergy' or the
'Sovereignty of the Jurist' as open to two forceful objections in terms of the
Shi'ite tradition. The first and more fundamental objection is that the
mandate of authority of the Shi'ite clergy during the caliphate of the
Twelfth Imam cannot be extended beyond the religious-legal sphere to civil
government. The second objection is that the mandate in question reflects
the collective religious-juridical authority of all Shi'ite jurists and cannot be
restricted to that of a single supreme jurist nor, by extension, to a supreme
council of three or five jurists (as envisioned in the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic).

The above doctrinal objections to melavat-e taghî have been voiced by the
\begin{itemize}
  \item Ayatollahs Kho'î, Qumi and Shahrudi-inadari who, throughout, put the
\end{itemize}
inconsistency with the principle of the sovereignty of the people, which the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic also pays lip service to. By Ayatollahs
Mahallati, Ahmad Zanjani, 'Ali Tehrani and Mortaza Hamedgar.
The opposition of the last two Ayatollahs, who were among Khomeini's closest
advisers, and of Ayatollahs Mahallati and Qumi, who were his closest
students in 1963 and were imprisoned with him, must have been particularly
disappointing to Khomeini but did not deter him. Of the above-mentioned
Mahallati died in August 1981, and Zanjani in January 1964. Qumi and Teherani
are under house arrest in Mashhad and Kho'î resides in Iraq. Shahrudi-inadari
has been 'demoted' from the rank of Grand Ayatollah, and, despite his
subsequent acknowledgement under immense pressure of the illegitimacy of
democratic government, has been subjected to a campaign of ridicule.

There were about half a dozen Shi'ite dignitaries of this ilk...
Safeguarding the character assassination, now at present Iran, there was
house arrest in Qum. Other clerics who share the views of the above-mentioned
Shi'ite dignitaries are intimidated into silence or, whenever possible,
obliged to declare their support for velayat-e faqih.

The beginning of the rift between the Shi'ite militant clergy and the
clerics who considered them overly politicized goes back to 1964. While
active in protesting against the arrest of Khomeini and the other religious
leaders and in securing their release from prison in 1963, Grand Ayatollah
Shari'at-madari was uneasy about the primacy of political concerns in Qum, as
founded the Dar al-Tablq for traditional apolitical missionary activity and
learning. This was resented by Khomeini and his militant followers because
diverted clerical energies from political activity. There were even clashes
between the two groups in December 1964.

Khomeini and Shari'at-madari, who had become the most influential of the
Grand Ayatollahs by 1978, presented a united front against the Shah during the
last months of his reign. Differences between them surfaced soon after the
revolution, and resulted in serious violent clashes between the supporters of
the two Ayatollahs in Tabriz before the end of 1979. Against this background
one can see that the first obstacle to be removed to pave the way for the
diverse acceptance within Shi'ism of theocratic government, velayat-e
Faqih, and then of the designation of a successor to Khomeini, was the removal
of Shari'at-madari. In April 1982, in a move unprecedented in Shi'ite
history, some 17 out of the 45 professors of the Qum theological seminaries
were prevailed upon to issue a declaration 'demoting' Shari'at-madari from the
rank of Grand Ayatollah. In May-June 1982, the leading pro-Khomeini clerics
further decided on a purge of the pro-Shari'at-madari clergy and of other
'pseudo-clerics' reluctant to accept *velayat-e faqih*. The Society of Militant Clergy was put in charge of 'confirming' the 'true' clerics.

Hand in hand with the denouncing of *Shari'at-modarri* and the denouncing of clerical opposition went a sustained effort to promote the theory of *velayat-e faqih*. *Ayatollah Khaz'ali*, who presided over a series of seminars convened for the discussion of *velayat*, would confirm the principle that "the judge (faqih) is the lieutenant of the lieutenant of God, and his command is God's command." (March 1981). However, as the battle lines were drawn at this stage, just beginning to address the issue of succession to *Khuzestani*, opinions predictably varied as to the precise institutionalization of *velayat-e faqih*, and different positions were publicly aired. There was a concerted attempt as early as 1980 to address Ayatollah Montazeri as the 'heir-apparent jurist' (faqih), Grand Ayatollah, and so forth. There were, however, dissenting voices in this regard, and the campaign of designation waned in April and May.

In Section 1, three Shi'ite norms of authority were identified: the Khawarijist (millenarian), the jurist, and the Akhbari (traditionalist). The first norm was discarded in the mid-nineteenth century and has not been revisited since the revolution. In fact, the term Akhbari is used only as a derogatory label to designate the apolitical, 'stagnant' and 'superstitious' orientation of those clerics who do not subscribe to the politicized and ideologically fervent ideology of the militant clergy and who reject the concept of *velayat-e faqih*. It has been pointed out, *velayat-e faqih*, consists in the extension of the *velayat* of the *imam* to all authority, and so religious to the political sphere so that the legitimacy of the claim to power is made to the protection of the militant clergy. In addition, however, to Islamic revolution has also received ne
The acclamation of Khomeini as 'Imam' by his followers in the 1970s was an unprecedented event in Shi'ite history. The connotation of 'Imam' in the mind of the believers as a divinely-guided leader has undoubtedly served to enhance Khomeini's charisma. Already in 1978 with Khomeini's meteoric advent in the Iranian political arena, there were debates, especially among the uneducated, as to whether he was in fact the Mahdi or merely his 'Forerunner.' Millenarian yearnings and expectations were strengthened by the coincidence of the Islamic revolution in Iran with the turn of the fifteenth Islamic century. In at least one televised occasion, Khomeini was asked by a Majlis deputy from Tehran, with a confirmed habit of comparing Khomeini with Abraham and other prophets, whether or not he was in fact the Mahdi. Khomeini conveniently observed noble silence. In 1982, side by side with the advocacy of veiyat-e-faith and the campaign against dissident clergy, the tendency to attribute supernatural qualities to Khomeini was intensified. The influential late Ayatollah Sadoqi of Yazd, for instance, reported a miracle performed by Khomeini many years earlier (in the form of creating a spring in the middle of the desert under scorching sun).

Khomeini opted for the milder claim and let currency be given to the idea that he was the forerunner of the Mahdi. There is political wisdom in this decision, and a historical precedent. The founder of the Safavid empire in the sixteenth century had claimed Mahdihood and thus used the Mahdistic tenet for the purpose of millenarian mobilisation of the tribes he led in the battlefield. Having completed the conquest of Iran, he recognized the consequences of political volatility stemming from millenarianism, and modified his claim to that of being the forerunner of the Mahdi. Safavid
scribes and historians subsequently attenuated the claim still further to the form that the rule of the Safavid dynasty would continue until the advent of the Mahdi. A strikingly similar development has occurred in Iran in the past two years, this time with a modern revolutionary twist. The most frequently chanted slogan in demonstrations organized by the followers of the line of the Imam has for some time been the following: "O God, O God, keep Khomeini until the Revolution of the Mahdi." In November 1981, the intellectual journal of the followers of the Khatt-e-Imam, Farash, published an astonishing—though not untypical—article on "The Connectedness of the Two Movements" (that of Khomeini and that of the Mahdi) in which the above slogan was recommended to the reader as a constant prayer. The article referred to an interview published in the journal in June of the same year in which a man wounded on the front reported seeing the Mahdi and talking to him. The Mahdi reportedly told him "your prayer, 'O God, O God, keep Khomeini until the Revolution of the Mahdi,' has expedited my Advent by a few hundred years." In September 1982, a clerical deputy of the Majlis predicted the imminent advent of the Mahdi in Jerusalem and cited traditions of the Sixth Imam in support of this prediction.

Khomeini seemingly realizes that although millenarian expectations can motivate young believers to fight courageously and court martyrdom on the front, they are not a stable basis for the consolidation of his regime in Iran. Consolidation requires institutionalization of clerical rule, which can only be achieved on the basis of the extension of the Shi'ite jurisdiction into authority. Khomeini's charisma cannot be transferred to his successor without routinization and institutionalization into the office of the supreme jurist, or to that of a council of supreme jurists. Therefore, the legitimacy of theocratic government has to be established as a new article of Shi'ite
faith, and procedural mechanisms for the selection of a 'jurist' or a 'Council of Jurists' to succeed Khomeini brought into existence. As both these objectives are novel and without precedents in Shi'ite history, their attainment potentially requires all the weight of Khomeini's authority and the efficacy of his unique charisma. At any rate, the realization that the resolution of the problems of legitimization and succession is much more difficult after the death of Khomeini than in his lifetime has prompted Khomeini and the militant clergy to take a series of concerted measures with uncompromising determination.

After the 'demotion' of Shari'at-madari, propaganda on the question of the ayat-e-faqih was stepped up in the government-controlled media. One interesting means of promoting the theory was the publication of the wills of the 'martyrs' of the war. Throughout May and June 1982 (and subsequently), the newspapers would regularly publish the martyrs' profession of faith in vezaghat-e-faqih and their praise for the Imam and the militant clergy. Statements to the effect that obedience to the clergy as 'those in authority' (al-`amal, IV, 59; a term hitherto invariably taken to refer to the Twelve] (willful imams in the Shi'ite tradition) is incumbent upon the believer as a religious duty, were often excerpted from the will and made into headlines in bold letters.

The second anniversary of the explosion at the IRP headquarters in late June 1983 was used to tie the fate of the Islamic Republic to the institution of vezaghat-faqih. The explosion was said to have inaugurated the Islamic Revolution, devoted to the complete instauration of theocracy. The Second Revolution was claimed to be the occupation of the American Embassy which resulted in the liquidation of the pro-American liberals. Since then the Imam and the (the Friday prayer leaders) have incessantly preached the doctrine of
we have enjoined their congregations to obey the clergy as a matter of religious obligation. A headline on the front page of the daily Etela'at in the early days of December 1983, can be taken to represent the culmination of this trend. It was a statement by the Prosecutor General and referred to Khomeini as "valiye faqih" (the jurist sovereign) -- an astonishing phrase in view of the fact that the term "vali" has never been used in the Shi'ite tradition in this general sense except to refer to the Twelve Imams. But the most important measure taken to enshrine the novel doctrine of theocratic government has been to teach it at schools. "Valiye faqih" is now taught at schools throughout the country, most fully as a part of the compulsory course on Islamic ideology and world view in the third grade of high schools.

On the practical front, in August 1982, Khomeini asked the theology professors of Qum to put forward suitable candidates for election to the Assembly of Experts to determine the issue of succession. The Assembly of Experts was elected in December 1982, and held its first meeting on July 15, 1983. It was announced that it would ordinarily convene for one session each year and concluded its initial session for the first year on August 15. The deliberations were not public. It received and sealed the political will and testament of the Iman without disclosing its contents. While speculation has continued that Ayatollah Montazeri is Khomeini's preferred successor, there is no evidence that he has the support of a clear majority of the members of the Assembly of Experts.

From August 1983 onwards, inter-ethnic conventions organized "for the
promotion of friendly association" would pass resolutions echoing and
pledging full support to the concept of "valiye faqih", and declaring
obedience to the faqih a religious obligation.
Meanwhile, the public designation of Montazeri as Grand Ayatollah and the 'Esteemed Jurist' has become routine. His portrait is often displayed with Khomeini's. Like Khomeini, he regularly grants audiences to various groups, and has representatives in various organizations, agencies and even foreign countries. Finally, like Khomeini but less frequently, he issues fatwas and makes various appointments.

Having pushed aside Shari'at-madari and the dissident 'pseudo-clergy' in the spring and summer of 1982, the clerical rulers of the Islamic republic still had to reckon with another organized group of importance which was opposed to the doctrine of veleyat-e faqih, the Hujjatiiyyah. Masters of identifying and isolating political problems and dealing with them one by one, the clerical ruling elite postponed the settling of the affair of the Hujjatiiyyeh until the summer of 1983. The Hujjatiiyyeh, or the Charitable Society of Mahdi, the Proof of God (anjoman-e khajriyyeh-ye hujjatiyyeh-ye mahdaviyyeh) was founded after the coup d'état of August 1953 by Shaykh Mahmud Halabi, who has remained a close friend of Khomeini. Its aim was the "propagation of the religion of Islam and its Ja'farite [i.e., Shi'ite] branch, and the scientific defense of it." It was one of the relatively few centers of religious activity other than the seminaries which was allowed to function after 1963, and many clerics and lay Islamic activists took part in its readings and discussions. Khomsan was its strongest regional base. The society's efforts prior to the revolution were directed against Baha'ism which it regarded as the chief enemy of Islam. After the revolution, as the suppression of Baha'ism became the general clerical policy, the society turned to Marxism as the arch-enemy of Islam. As a society devoted to the Mahdi, the Hujjatiiyyeh could not accept Khomeini's extension of the religious-legal authority to political rule, which it considered the nontransferrable...
prerogative of the Mahdi. The founder and directors of the society insisted on this position and resisted the pressure from the younger, more politicized members to revise its charter, with the result that many of the members who were or hoped to become prominent in the theocratic regime left it to join the ranks of the IRP. The society supported the Islamic republic but without considering it sanctioned by the Sacred Law, and accepted Khomeini's political leadership but refrained from designating him as 'Imam.'

The Hujjatiyyeh first impressed the ruling powers in Iran with their organizational strength and disciplined control over the members in 1981, during the second presidential elections, in which Raja'i was elected. They are believed to be responsible, in part, for the four hundred thousand votes (about 2.5 percent of the total) that were cast for the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi.

From late 1981-early 1982 onwards the Hujjatiyyeh had been under intermittent fire from IRP militants, through the prodding of Puhde ideologue from whom the IRP took many of their cues in the first years of their political experience, but the final hour of reckoning did not come until July 1983. The IRP followers of the line of Imam mounted their full-scale attack and succeeded in persuading Khomeini to refer obliquely to the position of the Hujjatiyyeh as 'crooked' and deviationist. The society wisely accepted a showdown and suspended all its activities indefinitely in deference to the opinion of 'the esteemed leader of the Islamic revolution.' The Hujjat Ministers of Commerce and Labor submitted their resignations.

The chief accusation leveled against the Hujjatiyyeh by the IRP was that they confined their missionary activities to the cultural level, the level of ideas; they were therefore 'stationary' as opposed to dynamic, and had a dry and empty view of Islam. This critique implied that they were not
'ideological' and did not subscribe to the politicized ideological Islam of Khomeini and his followers. A second charge was that they did not accept _velayat-e faqih_ as legitimizing government by clergy during the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi.

In a long series of polemical articles against the Hujjatiyyeh in _Ettela'at_ during September and October 1983, the society was vehemently attacked for being opposed to intervention in politics in the name of religion, and for advocating—like the Baha'is whom they attacked in their apologies for Islam—the separation of religion and politics as concocted by the imperialist propaganda machine. They were further attacked for their separation of religious authority (_marja'iyyat_) from political leadership, which enabled them to endorse Khomeini merely as a political leader and not "as a leader obedience to whom is obligatory [as a religious duty]." In October 1983, the author of the articles reacted sharply to the surreptitious use of the Hujjatiyyeh issue by the Tudeh Party to create division within the Islamic movement by attaching the label of 'Hujjat' to prominent clerics and high government office holders. The Tudeh's attacks on the Hujjatiyyen were said to have been hypocritical, and stemming from the ulterior motive of creating divisions within the ruling clergy and the Islamic nation. Nevertheless, in the concluding article in the series, the author [inadvertently] repeated the Tudeh's chief argument against the Hujjatiyyeh: their opposition to the Line of Imam in matters of economic policy.

Thus, while the dominant IRP view of the Hujjatiyyeh primarily emphasizes their rejection of the theory of _velayat-e faqih_ and accuses them of having swallowed the imperialist-inspired belief in the separation of religion and politics, some members of the IRP also mistrusted the social, and especially economic, conservatism of the Hujjatis. This is not because such members were
under direct Tudeh influence, as alleged by Iranian opposition groups in exile, but rather because certain ideas advocated by the Tudeh have had an important ideological impact on the clerical novices in Iranian politics. The militant clerics have learned many of their political and journalistic tricks and tactics--first used during the antiliberal, antinationlist smear campaigns following the occupation of the American Embassy, their crafting of political slogans, and their mode for political analysis, from the Tudeh ideologues.

Additionally, some members of the IRP advocated varying degrees of governmental regulation of private property, although every IRP member accepted the sanctity of such property under Islamic law. Since any regulation was anathema to the conservative clerics, this inevitably became intertwined in the rivalry between the militant clergy and the conservative clergy. This aspect of the conflict was seized upon by the Tudeh in 1981 and the first months of 1982, which succeeded in giving wide currency to a scheme for dividing the ruling elite of the Islamic Republic into radicals and conservatives in terms of their positions on socioeconomic policies, astutely associating the latter group with the Hujjatis. The scheme was misleading: while the Hujjatis were socioeconomically conservative, not every socioeconomically conservative cleric was a Hujjati or necessarily sympathetic to the Hujjati doctrinal position.

Western analysts who are almost constitutionally indisposed to attach any importance to doctrinal and cultural issues have widely accepted the Tudeh interpretation of the clash between the Hujjatiyyeh and the Khatami Inno because it is stated in terms more familiar to them, and more in line with their preconceptions on the presumed primacy of economic interest over religious and cultural factors. Nonetheless, the Tudeh interpretation greatly
exaggerated the importance of the Hujjatiyyeh as a political group, in exactly
the same way as the influence of the Tudeh Party itself was greatly exag-
gerated.

The Hujjatiyyeh Society apart, the potential for a rift within the ruling
clergy on socioeconomic policy exists and there is, furthermore, a good chance
that division along the socioeconomic and the doctrinal axes would overlap.
Such possibilities were indeed highlighted by the acrimonious debates over
land reform and over the nationalization of foreign trade, which culminated in
the rejection of the bill for nationalization of foreign trade by the Council
of the Guardians in June 1982. The possibilities for a rift within the ruling
clergy seemed strongest in 1982, that is, in the period prior to the increased
pace of institution-building. In this period debates over policies attracted
such attention and absorbed much of the political energies. Several factors
contributed to the surfacing of major disagreements among the ruling clerical
elite. First, the effective suppression of the opposition movement repre-

dented by Mujahedin lessened the need for the clergy as a whole to present a
united front against a threatening enemy. Second, the reversal of the war
with Iraq in Iran's favor, beginning in the spring of 1982, lessened concern
about the military situation and opened up a new area of policy for discus-
sion, namely the appropriateness of carrying the war into Iraqi territory, and
contributed to an atmosphere of less political insecurity among the ruling
elite. Third, the gradual upturn in the economy, cushioned by rising oil
revenues, focused attention on the necessity of developing coherent economic
policies. And finally, the Council of Guardians' veto of several significant
pieces of legislation, including a land reform law and the nationalization of
foreign trade, reopened the debate on domestic issues that had been con-
traversial since the inception of the revolution. This situation, however,
was not to last indefinitely.
The militant clerics of the IRP, who were quick studies in the art of ideological politics, were likely to succeed in conducting politics in their own terms, shifting its focus to unifying rather than divisive issues. In fact, they freed themselves from the tutelage of the Marxists in political analysis, as they had earlier freed themselves from the tutelage of the liberals and nationalists in the elaboration of a coherent world view and ideology. This occurred formally in the early months of 1981, when the Islamic party was dissolved and its members were arrested.

Furthermore, the ruling clergy have wasted no time countering what they considered the excessive influence of socialism, and have determined an official position on some basic socioeconomic principles. In April 1982, the influential Imam Jum'ah of Qom, Ayatollah Moosavini stated that any attempt to establish a classless society was a move against "the natural order of things" which was "itself a form of tyranny and oppression." In a typical statement in September 1983, the new Minister of Commerce, who had replaced the "Hujjati" former Minister, 'Asgarowladi, stressed the regime's respect for the public, the private and the cooperative sectors of the economy. More importantly, the official position has been propagated through government-printed textbooks. A textbook on the "Islamic World-View" for the first grade of high schools, for instance, significantly uses the term 'unitarian society' (khawate 'ahad) popularized by Islamic modernists such as Shari'ati and Hanif Sadi, but omits its content. In this context, a unitarian society is a society based on negation of all worldly idols (tahqiq), other than the One God, and on "equal distribution of opportunities." "A society with no economic differences among its members is one of evident oppression and injustice (because rewards are not proportionate to effort)."
Nevertheless, more radical views are publicly aired by the Prime Minister and other government officials.

Khomeini has always been on guard to avoid divisions among his supporters, such as the one identified and exaggerated by the Tudeh Party Analyst between the Havjatis and the Khatt-e Imam. His attempts to force the dissident circles into submission have always been accompanied by an emphasis on the imperative need for unity among the Shi'ite clergy. Already, in October 1983, Khomeini was warning his supporters against disunity whose seeds were being sown by hidden hands in the service of the superpowers. He venemently attacked the constant 'atmosphere-making' and labeling, and the seditious division of the Shi'ite clergy and its supporters into 'lines': the Line of the Imam, and others. All these presentations were deceptions to create disunity. "There is no line in Iran except the Line of Islam" (Speech on October 6, 1983). The massively orchestrated drive for unity, however, did not come until December; and it was timed to coincide with the nationwide convention of the Imam Jum'ehs, the pillars of the Islamic theocracy under construction. The speeches on the need for unity and avoidance of factionalization by Khomeini and the Friday prayer leaders, who echo his views in the remotest towns of Iran, make it clear that the specter that haunts Khomeini is the division of the Shi'ite clergy during the Constitution Revolution which enabled the secular intelligentsia to defeat and execute Shaykh Fazloyiah Nuri and to oust the Shi'ite clergy from the political arena.

As shown by his words and deeds, Khomeini realizes that, in the long run, the possibility of debilitating rifts within the ruling clergy can only be eliminated by a successful rechanneling of political energies from parliamentary debates and ideological discussions to institution-building and the construction of an Islamic theocratic state. Theocratic consolidation by
impressing upon the militant clergy their common interests as the ruling stratum of the Islamic Republic, encourages unity in action. It thus prevents the division of the ruling clergy on socioeconomic issues, and the clustering of opposing economic interests around the doctrinal issue of "velayat-e faqih." The division of regime supporters into two opposing camps would also be avoided. It is no accident that the concerted drive for the unity of the Shi'ite clergy in December 1983, coincided with the Convention of the Imam Ali which demonstrated the ability—and even more so the future intentions—of the theocratic regime to build a centralized and pervasive institution on the foundation of the religious ritual of Friday congregational prayer.

Institution-building cannot proceed in a situation of endemic political violence and insecurity as it can under conditions of peace and economic prosperity. This consideration notwithstanding, revolutionary turmoil cannot continue indefinitely and the return to normalcy and stability will sooner or later be attempted by any political regime which aspires to continuity. Stability became the official policy of the Islamic regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in December 1983, when Ayatollah issued a decree granting even minor Islamic citizens security, if a political threat and reaction is expected, to promoting the restoration of Islamic unity and the consolidation of the Islamic regime.

The issuance of the decree was immediately followed by the formation of an Assembly of Experts to deliberate on the issue and its contents. The lack of attention to the past three months made it clear that Islamic religious and political leaders have not yet understood the full impact of the revolution. The need for a mechanism which can result in decision-making is evident. For the moment, however, there is the need to understand the extent of the damage caused, the degree of national suffering, and above all, the need for a mechanism which can result in decision-making on the basis of national interests and Islamic unity.
The "prophet-like" decree of the Imam was immediately seen by some as a "rainfall of mercy," "the continuance of the guidance of mankind by the Prophets," and was taken to signal the inauguration of a new era of security, stability and economic prosperity. A Commission (setad) for the Pursuance of the Decree of the Imam was soon set up. Its ranking member, after being instructed by the Imam, made statements to the press reaffirming the sanctity of private property, the determination of judiciary authorities to combat arbitrary confiscations, and the country's need for internal peace and security. In the following two weeks, 24 special investigative teams were sent to the provinces, six revolutionary prosecutors, one commander of the Revolutionary Guards and some other functionaries were dismissed (further dismissals and the reinstatement of a number of employees at the Ministry of Education were reported in November 1983). In March 1982, as another act of mercy, a group of ordinary prisoners were released, or had their sentences commuted, following an earlier amnesty by Khomeini to mark the anniversary of the revolution. The Mujahedin and the leftist groups were explicitly excluded from the Imam's mercy in the decree. To assure this exclusion, in early, the notorious Revolutionary Prosecutor and warden of Evin prison, immediately reacted to the news of its issuance with a wave of summary executions.

On May 19, in response to "the people's concern and anxiety that the Decree of Imam is forgotten," the head of the Commission affirmed the regime's continued commitment to implement the decree. On the same day it was

A quarter million; a well-informed source estimated that six million ballots reached the Ministry of the Interior, although there were doubts in all circles as to how they had been completed. It is quite likely that Khomeini issued his decree partly in reaction to the dismal participation in the elections.
announced that the Selection Committees in charge of the purges of
governmental agencies had been dissolved by Khomeini's order. A few days
later (May 31, 1983), the dissolution of the Commission for the Pursuance of
the Decree of Imam was announced, and Khomeini agreed that the numerous cases
of complaint submitted to it and pending investigations be referred to the
Judiciary. Not much was made of the anniversary of the issuance of the decree
in December 1983, but it has had an impact in achieving other regime goals,
such as reducing Iran's shortage of skilled labor by holding out the hope that
life in revolutionary Iran had become less inhospitable.
IV. CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ISLAMIC THEOCRATIC STATE

In August 1981, Ayatollah Khamene'i, the third president of the Islamic Republic declared that "the Revolution cannot be lasting unless it is embodied in a framework of a legal order." This declaration foreshadowed a speech by Khomeini in which he urged the judges to enforce the Sacred Law and throw away any law inherited from the previous regime which they had reason to believe was contrary to the Sacred Law of Islam. There was immediate orchestration of support for the Imam's pronouncements on the full Islamification of the legal system, and procedural measures to realize this goal were announced. Almost a year later, in July 1983, President Khamene'i made the following declaration: "Political-ideological offices [attached to the army, police and governmental agencies] are an essential and vital foundation of the regime of the Islamic Republic." These two declarations by President Khamene'i capture the ruling clerical elite's objective after the period of violent political struggle with armed opposition groups in 1981-82, ending with the virtual elimination of these groups outside of Kurdistan. The objective can be described as the construction of an Islamic theocratic state with a codified legal system, and with totalitarian ideological control over all institutions and all spheres of life. This objective requires the creation of a set of new Islamic institutions, and the ideological control of the existing and non-Islamic institutions. These two requirements, and the attempts to fulfill them, can be examined separately.
A. Control of Government and Institution Building

The Control of Government

After the October 1978 revolution and with the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the TRP extensively purged the state bureaucracy and the armed forces in order to establish its control over them. The purges seem to have served three main purposes.

Despite the internal political rivalries between the factions, the TRP has been able to rule the country and simultaneously conduct a foreign war. This has been possible due to the crucial support of laymen who provide some of the political cadres and most of the technical and managerial personnel. These lay allies of the clergy constitute an important element of the post-revolutionary political elite. In terms of social origins, they tend to come from lower middle class backgrounds, especially from merchant families. In most cases, the lay politicians are the first persons from their families to have obtained a higher education and leave bazaar occupations. The majority of them have attended colleges and other postsecondary training institutes in Iran, although a sizable proportion studied abroad, particularly those who became politically active in Tehran. Contrary to the views of some Western analysts, these laymen who received graduate-level education in foreign countries tend to emphasize that the time spent outside of Iran was a period for reaffirming their Islamic faith, for discovering Islam. They did not assimilate Western values as a result of their experiences.

The data supplied on 24 of the victims of the explosion of June 1981, who belong to this administrative and technical second stratum of the Islamic Republic—a representative random sample for excellence—give us interesting information on the composition and orientation of the stratum. This information is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Profile of the 24 lay IRP members, belonging to the second stratum of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who perished in the explosion at the IRP headquarters in June 1981*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at the time of assassination</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>24-30 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-44 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bachelor's Degree</td>
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<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's Degree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate</td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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- presumably high school

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<tr>
<th>Last University attended</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Field of Specialization</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/Engineering</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics, business administration and Accounting</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Features of Career</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prominence in Organizing Islamic student associations in Iran and abroad</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-taught knowledge of religious sciences</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political activism in the 1960s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None specified</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special Supplement to Ettela'at, 7 Tir 1361 (28 June 1982)

*Other 'martyrs' of the explosion commemorated in the special anniversary supplement to Ettela'at can be grouped as follows:

- Clerics: 13, of whom 3 had doctorate
- Majlis deputies: 43, of whom 3 had doctorate
- 13 other clerics
While there has been no evidence of disloyalty among the laity politicians who support the IRP, it is also uncertain how firm their commitment is to long-term clerical rule. Certain lay activists within the IRP have had conflicts with some members of the clergy, especially the conservative clerics, over government policy. These include men like Prime Minister Musavi, cabinet minister Behzad Nabi, and Ali Akbar Parvareesh. These men have well-articulated visions of what programs the government should pursue in the revolutionary reconstruction of the country, especially in matters of economic policy. However, as long as the khatt-i-imam clerics continue to share with these lay politicians similar views about the direction of the government, it is unlikely that any serious clerical/lay factionalism will develop. By choice or by necessity, the second stratum accepts responsibility for the time being and the overarchingship of the clergy.

As the performance of government in provision of the basic social and economic services is an important factor in the viability of the regime, attention should be paid at this point to how the lay second stratum is running the state and the economy for the Imam and the ruling clergy.

2. Economic Performance of the Islamic Republic

The revolutionary upsurge of 1978-79 had an adverse impact on the Iranian economy. In the short run, the flight of capital and skilled persons combined with dislocations caused by widespread strikes to drastically curtail agricultural productivity. In the long run, the international community was preoccupied with the protracted hostage affair and the war against Iraq impeded recovery. An additional negative factor were efforts to redirect the economy according to Islamic conceptions. In the longer run, however, the expansion of oil revenues after mid-1982 gradually provided a stimulus to the economy, so that
by the end of 1983 many sectors had recovered to their 1978 levels of
performance.

The flight of capital began in the autumn of 1978 on a massive scale, and
continued until the Provisional Government instituted measures to restrict
transfers abroad in the spring of 1979. The drain of billions of rials from
the banking system had the immediate effect of drying up funds for private
investment. In the same period some 50,000 foreign technicians and upwards of
300,000 Iranian professionals left the country, creating a vacuum of
managerial positions in factories, major construction projects, and other
facilities. These developments brought the construction industry to a virtual
halt for more than a year, caused a few factories to shut down, and brought
about a decline in industrial production in most factories. The near stand-
still in construction had the most serious effect on the economy as 750,000
workers became unemployed. In addition, there were adverse ripple effects
upon thousands of laborers and businesses which had become dependent upon the
construction industry as a major source of income.

None of the governments since 1979 have formulated a coherent program for
managing the economy. All have advocated the necessity of creating a
distinctly Islamic economy which is neither Western (i.e., capitalist) nor
Eastern (i.e., socialist). While general agreement has developed about
certain economic policies the government should pursue, there is no consensus
for an overall economic program. In general, the debate within the new
revolutionary elite has been over the degree to which the government should
intervene in the economy. Private entrepreneurial activity is regarded as
sanctioned by Islam, but those who argue for broad government intervention
advocate wide-ranging regulations over private enterprise, while those who
argue for minimal government intervention insist that economic regulations
must be limited. The IRP itself is divided over the issue of government economic intervention, and this fact explains to a large degree why no coherent economic program has been implemented to date.

One sector of the economy has shown unexpected vitality since the revolution. There has been considerable spontaneous and unplanned growth in small-scale industry. During the chaotic period of 1978 to 1979, when zoning laws became inoperative, there was a tremendous expansion of small workshops on the outskirts of the cities, especially Tehran. The war with Iraq and the stoppage of imports has amounted to complete protection against foreign competition, and has created tremendous opportunities for the entrepreneurs of this sector of the economy to which they have been highly responsive.

While there has been no general economic strategy, there have been various economic policies. These can be examined through the government which initiated them. Starting first with the provisional government, one can find the beginnings of an effort to define an Islamic economy. Some of the principles enunciated during the period of the Provisional Government are still vital components of the current regime's approach to economic matters. For example, during the first days of the revolution both secular and religious leaders explained that a major difference between an Islamic economy and the materialist one of the ancien regime was that the government would utilize its resources to help meet some of the basic needs of the underprivileged, or the mustazain. Since 1979, there has been a conscious effort to provide services for the poorest classes. In practice this has meant using the country's several thousand mosques as distribution centers for ration cards, coupons for food and consumer products, and welfare payments. This system has succeeded in bringing into the slums of the largest cities access to food and services which were unavailable before the revolution. Nevertheless, the efficiency of
the system has remained low. And the fact that much of the food reserved for
the government's distribution through the mosques—which are not under
government control—actually ends up on a thriving black market raises the
possibility of widespread corruption.

The government's distribution program really did not get under way until
the war with Iraq forced the introduction of a rationing system. The national-
alization of the banks, on the other hand, was one policy that was fully
implemented under the Provisional Government and has remained in force. It is
unclear to what degree the nationalization of the private banking sector was a
well-thought-out policy, or the inevitable consequence of disappearing banking
liquidity. The massive cash withdrawals and transfers of capital out of the
country in the six months after September 1978 had confronted the banking
system with the possibility of collapse. Government intervention was viewed
as essential during the spring of 1979, although such intervention could
assum any number of different forms. It is possible that nationalization was
adopted finally because those persons most interested in preserving a private
banking system had little or no contact with the new leaders, many of whom
were suspicious of the banks for having favored large investors over the small
businessmen in the past. Similarly, the government was forced to take over
certain factories in this period because the owners and/or managers had fled
abroad and the production of these selected factories was deemed essential to
the national interest.

One area in which the Provisional Government was interested, and about
which there has been much rhetoric, is agriculture. The Provisional Govern-
ment viewed agriculture as a vital but neglected resource and wished to favor
investment in this sector over the traditional emphasis on industrial produc-
tion. The Provisional Government's short tenure, however, did not permit the
development of an agricultural policy. The Bani-Sadr and IRP governments have not developed a policy either. One outstanding problem is land reform or the redistribution of the 60 percent of agricultural land that was never redistributed under the land reform program of the 1960s. Agricultural experts, both within and outside of the IRP, argue that a reform of land tenure would help alleviate social and economic problems. Upwards of 75 percent of all peasant farmers cultivate acreages which are too small to provide more than a basic subsistence livelihood. Rural poverty contributes to urban migration, which has continued since the revolution. Consequently, there is a labor shortage in many rural areas and a labor surplus in the stagnating urban economy.

However much the regime talks of the necessity of restoring agricultural self-sufficiency, there is, in fact, no coherent agricultural program. Agricultural production is not any more impressive than under the Shah. Some crops have been very good, others poor. And Iran's food imports for all of 1983 are expected to total nearly $4 billion, more than during the last year of the monarchy. Rural problems are compounded by a perception in the villages that their lives could be improved by access to some of the amenities in the cities. To help revitalize the villages, the government created a rural reconstruction brigade called the Jahad-i sazandeghi, made up of young men from the cities. The Jahad's mandate is to build roads, schools, baths, mosques, and electricity pylons. It has carried out a number of construction projects, although probably fewer than its own publications boast about. Initially, the Jahad seems to have been received favorably in many villages, but gradually its members became part of the new government power structure and came to be resented as transient outsiders with whom voluntary cooperation and socialization tends to be avoided.
There has not been any clear industrial policy beyond the efforts to keep critical factories such as the Isfahan steel works and the Kerman area copper mines and smelters operating. The oil industry was badly hurt by the destruction of the Abadan refinery in 1981-82, but by the end of 1983 refineries in other parts of the country had been able to expand production to meet domestic requirements for refined petroleum products. Other industries such as steel, copper, and textiles were producing in 1983 at their 1978 levels, or slightly better. Automobile assembly and tractor production had also recovered. There is still surplus capacity in many factories producing consumer durables. Unemployment, compared to 1979-81, has declined, but is still estimated to be substantial, affecting at least ten percent of the adult male heads of households. This can be attributed to the continued stagnation in construction.

While there is construction proceeding in many cities, it is not at the levels of the prerevolutionary boom days, and is estimated to employ only a fraction of the prerevolution construction work force.

Overall, production seems to be slowly recovering, stimulated by rising oil revenues. It is estimated that Iran earned more than $10 billion from oil in 1983, exceeding the amount earned in any single year under the monarchy. It also means that the government has funds to invest. Naturally, the continuing war with Iraq consumes a large proportion of the government’s budget, whether directly in the form of purchases of military equipment and salaries/provisions for some 400,000 men under arms, or indirectly for payments to widows, orphans, war refugees and reconstruction of war-damaged areas.

Government spending seems to have encouraged private investments. During 1983 several thousand small businesses were started. The failure rate seems to be high, but the formation of new businesses has outpaced bankruptcies by a
two to one margin. The investment in economic infrastructure, however, is very low.

3. The Army

The revolutionary upheaval of 1978-79 affected the armed forces dramatically. As early as February 1978, during the riots in Tehran, a new conscript had refused to fire upon demonstrators. The problem of using rank-and-file soldiers to contain a popular movement which appeared to be supported by the military became more serious as months passed and the demonstrations intensified. Desertions from the army began as early as the autumn of 1978, although precise statistics on the scale of desertions during the last three months of 1978 is not available. After the Shah left the country in January 1979, the morale of the armed forces declined dramatically. Some senior officers did leave the country, while desertions increased. Senior and junior officers both reached a consensus that continued use of the armed forces to repress a mass political movement could destroy the military. Thus, when fighting between units of the military and armed civilian groups developed in February, the top commanders of the armed forces declared the military's neutrality and ordered all personnel back to the barracks.

It is estimated that at least half the army's conscripts had deserted by February 1979. Nonetheless, the army, air force, and navy were still intact. The question was: what would become of the military? There certainly were groups who for a variety of reasons, believed that the armed forces—the symbol of the monarch's support apparatus—should be dismantled. But the consensus within the secret Revolutionary Council, and among the newly constituted Provisional government, was to keep what was left of the army intact, while removing those senior officers most closely identified with repressive
policies of the old regime. Thus, during the next six months, the armed forces were purged of those officers who had been most loyal to the Shah.

There appear to have been major differences of opinion among the members of the Revolutionary Council and the Provisional Government regarding the fate of those officers, with the latter favoring lengthy trials during which the crimes of some of the officers could be fully exposed and documented. The Revolutionary Council members, on the other hand, tended to favor more summary justice. During the first six months, about 50 officers with the rank of second lieutenant or higher were executed after being found guilty of ordering or participating in "massacres" of civilians during the revolutionary upsurge; another 70 officers were purged, but not executed. A total of 763 regular military officers were retired, with generals comprising 65 percent of this figure.

Beginning in September 1979, the armed forces were subjected to the ideological purges that were also carried out in civilian sectors of the government. By the time the war with Iraq broke out a year later it is estimated that 10,000 to 12,000 personnel had been purged from the military for not being sufficiently "Islamic"; an estimated 65 percent of these held the rank of second lieutenant or higher. Officers whose loyalty to "true" Islam was suspect were occasionally suspected of plotting against the regime; at least two conspiracies were "discovered" in the summer of 1980, implicating a total of more than 600 officers, many of whom were executed. In 1981, 11 officers were reportedly executed in connection with Nour-Zadah's alleged plot to kill Khomeini (The Times, August 17, 1981). In 1983, five high-ranking officers of the air force were reportedly arrested for conspiracy to bomb Khomeini's residence (International Herald Tribune, May 27, 1983).
The war with Iraq has had a more dramatic impact on the armed forces than the purges since the war necessarily brought about a major reorganization and permitted the officers who were ideologically in tune with the aims of the revolution to prove their mettle in battle. The army, especially, had to be reconstituted along lines that permitted for supervision of its ideological purity, as well as its operational effectiveness. A separate Political-Idealological Bureau within the Ministry of Defense has responsibility for placing representatives—invariably clergymen—at all hierarchical levels within the army. These representatives make sure that the soldiers are properly instructed in the performance of Islamic prayers and rituals and are properly educated in Islamic doctrine. Their work is aided by the Islamic Societies, which help with education and provide services and privileges to conscripts and officers who become members.

At the close of 1983 the government's control of the army is generally secure. New conscripts brought in since the war with Iraq, the purge of perceived unreliable officers and the elevation in rank of those who have demonstrated their Islamicness have all combined to transform the army into a very different institution from what it was before the revolution. Given the control which the government, and in particular the IRI, is able to exercise over the armed forces, it seems unlikely that the officers of any one of the branches, or all in consort, entertain ideas for any kind of seizure of power.

4. Other Organizations

In addition to these existing governmental structures and the armed forces, the revolution itself gave birth to a number of very important organizations and centers of power. Immediately after the revolution, Islamic Revolutionary Committees sprung up from the traditional networks of connections between the clergy and craftsmen, retailers and youths of the city.
quarters. The Committees soon constituted a rival power structure in the government, and a crucial basis for the militant clergy in their power struggle with Khomeini and Khomeyni. After the overthrow of these “cereal rationalists” and the direct clerical take-over of the state, the militant clergy understandably sought to undermine the autonomy of the Committees as centers of power, and to coordinate their activities with those of the others.

The Revolutionary Committees were put under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior in July 1981. Clerical control over the Committees was preserved while they were integrated into the governmental system. At the same time, there was some friction between the Revolutionary Committees and the Volunteers of the Mobilization Corps which served as an internal security force. The Minister of the Interior put a commission in charge of working out a comprehensive division of labor between the functions of the Committees and the organs such as the police and the Mobilization Corps. In May 1981, a national-wide gathering of the heads of the Committees was organized to further discuss problems of rationalization of organization and coordination of functions with other forces of law enforcement.

In May 1983, the Corps of the Guardians of Islamic Revolution was created. The Revolutionary Guards had been formed to counter the, according to later statements by its founders, to strengthen the hand of the IRP in its bid for total power. In the subsequent years it has been strengthened and armed through the Islamic Revolution and its allies, and has played a major role in the war with Iraq and the Khomeini revolution. Internally, the Guards have proven their effectiveness by defeating the Mujahedin and other anti-government groups. There was considerable friction between the clergy and the Guards when the war broke out, but the necessity of joint operations in the war for well over three years has...
decreased this friction and greatly improved the coordination between the forces. There have even been exchanges of commanding officers. In November 1980, the Ministry of the Corps of Guardians was created. The success of the Corps of Revolutionary Guards stimulated the creation of the Mobilization Corps for aiding internal security forces in towns, and a number of other attempts to be considered in Section B below. In 1982, a special four-year high school for educating prospective Guards was opened under clerical direction. The Revolutionary Guards are well paid and constitute the armed pillar of the Islamic Republic.

In addition, a host of other institutions operating in social, electoral and charitable fields have come into being since the revolution. These include the Foundation for the Disinherited (must'ahaf), the Construction Fund, the Foundation of 15 Khordad (June 5), the Committee to Aid Imam Khomeini, the Commission (setad) for Economic Mobilization, and the Commission (setad) for the Reconstruction and Renovation of the War Zones. These organizations, however, are peripheral to the enterprise of the construction of an Islamic theocratic state. The efforts to build institutions central to theocratic government concern the judiciary and the organization of the Jam'ah Jum'ah (Friday prayer leaders).

2. The Core Islamic Institutions

The Courts of the Islamic Revolution under clerical judges, like the Revolutionary Committees, had been set up immediately after the fall of the monarchy in February 1979. With the installation of the theocratic government and the onset of the drive for the rationalization and rationalization of the power structure in 1982-3, there was an attempt to integrate the Revolutionary Courts into the Ministry of Justice, and a scheme for that purpose was drawn up, by the Supreme Judiciary Council and approved by the Majlis on May 1, 1983.
The attempt was overruled by Khomeini, who was persuaded by the revolutionary prosecutor general who felt that the integration of the Revolutionary Court and the Ministry of Justice in its present state would "endanger the development and the future of the revolution," as the courts of the Ministry of Justice did not have the stamina to "stand up to the test of counter-revolutionary issues. If the integration took place, according to critics of the idea, the country would go with the wind [into the] wind [into the wind]. May 17 and 18, 1983.

The primary argument which impressed Khomeini was undoubtedly that the swift and usually deadly justice of the Revolutionary Courts was necessary to the survival of Islamic theocracy, not only by extirpating counter-revolution but also because of the increasing reliance on the function of its Special Court for the Affairs of Guilds and Trades in combating "economic terrorism," i.e., profiteering and hoarding. There was, however, a secondary but important consideration: The Revolutionary Courts were Islamic reenactments of the Ministry of Justice, which still had to operate with the legal system of the previous regime and ad hoc instructions from the Supreme Council were not. To minimize divergences from the sacred letter, the Shah's modernized Family Protection Law had been replaced by several Civil Courts (madaniyeh) and had been set up to deal with cases in the restrictive area of family law. Nevertheless, the Islamicization of the legal system, commenced under Ayatollah Beheshti in 1979, had not yet produced satisfactory results. This was due to the enormous difficulty of codifying the several hundred, in the past, and the acute shortage of qualified judges persisting on the other, as well as the reluctance of the clerics...
Nevertheless, a group of judges under the direction of the Supreme Judiciary Council were assiduously at work, with a sense of historical mission as the first codifiers of the Sacred Law in Shi'ite history. They revised many of the provisions of the Commercial Code of the previous regime, and drew up an Islamic Penal Code which became law in the summer of 1982. Given the historically unprecedented nature of the enterprise, the Supreme Judiciary Council suggested that all Islamic laws be provisionally enforced for a period of five years. Having been reassured by this law-making activity that there was enough codified Islamic law to avoid chaos, Khomeini made his famous pronouncement on the suspension of all existing non-Islamic laws in August 1982. Since then the work of codification has continued, and there has been a sustained effort to attract and train at least one thousand religious judges to correct the current overwhelming presence of secular judges. The Supreme Judiciary Council regularly interviews and appoints young clerical applicants with a modicum of religio-legal training, and a Judiciary College has been set up to train judges for the newly Islamicized judiciary system.

By 1984 Khomeini was sufficiently impressed by these Islamicizing efforts to allow the Supreme Judiciary Council to proceed with the integration of the Revolutionary Courts into a unified judiciary. On January 22, 1984, the Revolutionary Prosecutor General Musavi Ardabili, who had opposed the merger,
announced the integration of the Revolutionary Courts into the Ministry of Justice, and submitted his resignation. Early in February 1984, the President of the Supreme Judicial Council expressed his satisfaction with the abolition of the Revolutionary Courts in the Ministry of Justice and stated, with unusual precision, that the Judiciary of Iran had become 80 percent Islamic. Some 800 clerics had been attracted to judiciary service, and efforts were being made to overcome the shortage of a further 500 qualified persons (Ittela'at, 13 and 17 Shahrivar, 1362).

One of Khomeini's earliest acts in the Islamic revolution was the revival of the Friday congregational prayer and its full utilization as a political platform. He appointed prayer leaders, Imam Jum'ehs, in all large and small towns. The Imam Jum'eh of the town, who is usually also Khomeini's representative in the same town or region, leads the congregational prayer on Fridays and delivers a political sermon. The political nature of the Friday congregational prayer is clearly brought out by its description in the Iranian media as "the devotional-political prayer" and the "enemy-smashing and unity-generating" gathering of "the lovers of God."

Ever since the 'demotion' of Shari'at-madari and the full-scale promotion of ve'iyatz-e faqih, there have been suggestions, especially by Ayatollah Montazeri, for organizing the Imam Jum'ehs into a centralized national agency. In the second half of 1983, concrete steps were taken to this end. A scheme published in September 1983 envisioned a centralized headquarters for the Imam Jum'ehs in Qom, with a hierarchical structure corresponding to the administrative division of the country into province, city, city-quarter, and the rural hinterland of the city. The organization is to be used for the propagation of ve'iyatz-e faqih and of Islam, and for strengthening the link between "the clergymen and the Imam." The mosques, under the supervision of the Imam
to keep ties with every household in their area, directing essen-
tial foodstuffs and gradually absorb all local groups so as to eventually re-
place the Revolutionary Committees (Mujahed, No. 175, 5 Aban, 1362). Mosques
had already become centers for the distribution of rationed goods, and were
collecting information on families living in the areas around them.

Whether the scheme has been officially sanctioned and scheduled for
implementation is not known. But it is certainly indicative of the future
direction of clerical policy. Since the autumn of 1963, Friday sermons of the
Imam Jum'ehs of large and small towns are extensively covered in the daily
Ketelsat. Predictably, these sermons seek to perpetuate clerical rule by
preaching the ideas of velayat-I faqih doctrine. Less obvious perhaps is the
prominence of foreign policy issues, especially themes of struggle against
American imperialism, and exportation of the revolution. One can only
speculate on the effects of such sermons in remote towns, but it is plausible
to assume that they make for unprecedented politicization of the youth and for
their concern with international politics, which can explain the continual
supply of volunteers from such towns for the Mobilization Corps and the army.

So far, the culmination of the effort to organize the Imam Jum'ehs as an
essential pillar of theocratic government has been the widely pub-

licized, three-day national Seminar of the Councils of Provincial Imam Jum'ehs in
December 1983. Nevertheless, in his speech at the Seminar, Ayatollah
Montazeri went so far as to envision—admittedly for the distant future—the
unification of the office of governor and Imam Jum'eh, which he considered
characteristic of true Islamic theocracy. As regards the less distant future,
remains to be seen whether or not the Imam Jum'ehs will succeed in carrying
forth the immediate task Khomeini has emphatically entrusted to them.
interference in the coming elections for the Majlis to ensure wide participation, and to see to it that reliable Islamic deputies are elected.

D. Ideological Control

The Islamic theocratic state is conceived as a totalitarian state with full control over the moral attitudes and political opinions of all its citizens. It is therefore not surprising that a plethora of institutions for the strict enforcement of morals—conceived of as 'enjoining the good' and 'forbidding the evil' according to the Sacred Law—and an elaborate machinery of indoctrination have come into being in the last three years. Khomeini's vision for an intelligence service consisting of 36 million persons—i.e., the entire nation—should not be taken lightly; nor should his instructions to students in September 1982 to secretly observe their teachers and classmates and report any 'deviant' behavior to authorities.

I. Enforcement of Morals and Indoctrination

The Revolutionary Courts are in charge of the enforcement of morals. They mete out summary justice to the offenders against public morality that are arrested by the Committees, Revolutionary Guards and vigilante groups who regularly patrol the cities. Sentences passed for offenses such as drinking, improper attire for women, unlawful sexual intercourse and homosexuality are speedily carried out by a specially created Judiciary Police. Of particular terror to secularized women is the vigilante group, the Sisters of Zaynab, who, completely covered in black veils, patrol the streets in special cars and search for unsuspecting offenders at any of the slightest 'improper' exposure.

The Ministry of Islamic Guidance is the chief governmental agency in charge of Islamic propaganda. According to a law passed by the Majlis on May 1, 1983, a Ministry of Information is to be established, headed by a cleric.
with the highest qualification in religious jurisprudence (ijtihad). A
Supreme Council of Islamic Propaganda (tal’iqah) has also been established.
In addition, the Islamic Society (tawjam), which played an important role
in the revolutionary mobilization of 1973-79, have remained in existence, esta-
lished new branches, and have assumed the new function of seeing to the
compliance of the members of the agencies to which they are attached. In the
Ministries and Governmental Departments of the Teacher of Islam,
the Armed Forces, Mosques and Factories—all of particular importance. There
have been nationwide conventions of Islamic Societies, and their Coordina-
tion (setad) for the Coordination of the Islamic Societies or Governmental
Departments and Agencies. The Bureau for Islamic Propaganda and the Central
Sekera) for the Coordination of Islamic Propaganda should also be mentioned.
Finally, the national radio and television network, the Islamic Voice and
Vision, is under clerical control.

While the effect of Islamic propaganda on the adult population is not
easy to assess, the regime's success in indoctrinating school children and the
young appears to have been considerable. As will be seen in Section 5.3.2.1,
below, non-'Islamist' school teachers and high school students were exten-
school year, the Minister of Education boasted that 70,000 of the existing
teaching cadre had been familiarized with Islamic ideology. They were to be
joined by 18,000 newly trained persons. The textbooks and syllab have been
revised and their contents made Islamic. (This process will no doubt
continue. In October 1985, it was remarked, in connection with an Educa-
tional Seminar of Biolo, High-School Teachers, that clerical supervision over the
writing of textbooks was "a vital necessity." The young are much more
enthusiastic about the regime than their elders, and are enthusiastic about
enrolling for the army, the cadets in the mobilization corps are male.

1. Political-Ideological bureaus

Political-ideological bureaus are attached to all branches of the Armed Forces, the Police and the Gendarmerie, and to the Ministries. Their functions include ensuring ideological commitment to and knowledge of Islam on the part of the officers and government employees who, in addition to proper Islamic behavior, have to pass examination in Islamic ideology. Clerics in charge of ideological guidance are attached to all army units and constitute a factor of considerable importance in the ideological control of the army. As one indication of their extensive penetration of the armed forces, 270 clerics had been killed on the Iraqi front by June 1982, before the offensive with the heaviest casualties (Ettela'at, 19 Khordad, 1361).

With the onset of the campaign for velayat-e faqih, the recruitment criteria of the Armed Forces and Government became explicitly discriminatory. Except for technical agencies and technical positions requiring expertise and qualifications in scarce supply, the applicants are compelled to subscribe to the theocratic principle of velayat-e faqih. This is true not only of prospective army cadets and employees of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, but also of applicants for the position of bilingual male typist at the National Oil Company.

An important procedure for maintaining Islamic ideological conformity among government officials, officers of the internal security forces and the personnel of revolutionary corps and organizations is the holding of Congregational Prayers of Unity (Jummah-ye vaahdat) in which they are expected to participate.
Paradoxically, the one armed force with which ideological problems first surfaced is the Corps of Revolutionary Guards. This paradox can be explained by the fact that the Revolutionary Guards, considering themselves the pillar of the Islamic Republic, are not susceptible to the mixture of clerical persuasion and intimidation that can be applied to the officers of the army and internal security forces. On some rare occasions, as in Isfahan—where the problem is greatly exacerbated by the rivalry between the Imam Khomeini and the influential octogenarian Ayatollah Khademi, who controls most of the city quarters and the bazaar—there has even been a breakdown of discipline and fighting among the Guards. But the problem was best illustrated in a speech by Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani in June 1983, in which he accused a 'line' among the Guards of insulting the jurists of the Council of Guardians of the Revolution for supporting feudal landlords and capitalists, and of having said that the theological "Professors of Qur'an are like fortune-tellers." The Commander of the Guards retorted by maintaining that Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani was an arch-sorceror of dissent. The clash brings out the antipathy of the Guards for the more conservative clergy—and conversely their sympathy for the critics of the 'line of Imam'—and points to the specter of a divided ruling elite, which haunts Khomeini and which he is determined to avoid at all costs.

3. Counter-Revolutionary Intelligence

Some of the intelligence and security organizations inherited from the previous regime, such as the Protection and Security Unit attached to the Prime Minister's office, have been modified and retained. But the distinctive and most effective intelligence and counterinsurgency organizations are a recent creation of the Islamic revolution. A law passed in September 1983, for example, set up a National Security Council and a hierarchy of similar
visory councils at the province and town levels, to coordinate internal
security and tighten the control of the Minister of the Interior.

In a speech on the first anniversary of the formation of the counter-
revolutionary patrol groups, the Vengeance of God (Gur-Allah) and the Qari'a
(gravity, the hour of last judgment) on September 29, 1983, President
Khamene'i hailed their intelligence successes. "Referring to the fact that in
the early days of the revolution a number of malicious and ignorant people
chanted slogans saying that we had no need for intelligence services,
Khamene'i added: In such an atmosphere, world intelligence organizations like
the KGB and the CIA imported what they wanted" (FBIS, 3 September 1983).
Following the creation of the Vengeance of God, this was no longer the case.

Just one month earlier, the Speaker of the Majlis, Ayatollah Hashemi-
Sadegh, had congratulated the Vengeance of God, and had unabashedly stated
that "the revelations of the 'repentants' from the armed groups of corbstant
[wis God] is the important and distinctive fruit of the Islamic Revolution"
(Altesh'at, 26 Mordad, 1362). In January 1984, President Khamene'i emphasized
that "intelligence work is as important as [being present] on the front"
(Altesh'at, 18 Dey, 1362).

The patrol group, the Vengeance of God, was formed at the height of the
violent clashes with the Mujahadeen and other armed opposition groups when the
intelligence unit of the Corps of Revolutionary Guards seemed inadequate for
dealing with these threats. The patrol units regularly circulate in the
streets of towns, arrest and interrogate suspects, use 'repentants' who are
permanently or temporarily released from jail to identify individuals asso-
ciated with opposition organizations, and search suspected houses. They have
been effective both in discovering organized underground networks, and in
creating an atmosphere of terror in towns by their constant patrolling. With
the extremities of the Vengeance of God, the regime has become more efficient in represent the dominant opposition. Reporting on the massive arrest of the members of the Islamic Party in May 1983, the Commander of the Guards, Kermān, could boast of his corps' experience and expertise, and contrasted the efficient clampdown in the Yūdeh to the bungling of the Guards in connection with the Rajahedīn and the supporters of Bani-Sadr a year or two earlier.

The success of Vengeance of God in the cities has inspired the formation of the patrol group, Army of God (Jund Allah) in the Gendarmerie to combat counterinsurgency—and armed smuggling—in the countryside. In January 1984, the Patrol Group Helpers of God (Jund Allah) began operating in the cities to combat profiteering and hoarding.
V. DISCONTENT AND REACTION TO GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Discontent with the regime has not been easy to assess, due to the tight control which the government exercises over the true expression of dissatisfaction, especially in the period from mid-1981 onwards. Nevertheless, there is evidence that discontent has been widespread, if diffuse, for at least ten years. The most dramatic manifestation of discontent was the Mujahedin’s attempt to mount armed resistance to the regime during the latter part of 1981. This effort was only suppressed by the use of extreme coercive measures, which included the execution of several thousand young activists and the imprisonment of several thousand more.

Discontent can be assessed to some degree by examining the two sectors where it occurs; among ethnic or religious minorities and among social groups.

A. Ethnic and Religious Minorities

The Kurdish ethnic minority of northwest Iran has been in rebellion since the summer of 1978, when government troops invaded the Kurdish areas to suppress demands for local autonomy. The Kurds in Iran number between 10 and 15 million and are concentrated in three regions adjoining the Kurdish areas in Iraq and Turkey. Kurdish discontent with the Persian-dominated government intensified prior to the revolution. There have been periodic rebellions against the central government, the worst being that of 1955. Nowshahr (pop. 50,000) has been a focal point of Kurdish unrest since that time, and it is believed to be at the forefront of opposition to the Islamic Republic. The other
strengthened opposition to the city of Sanandaj (pop. 100,000), the historic capital of Iranian Kurdistan. Both cities have been objects of battle between the Revolutionary Guards, sent to the region in August 1979, and armed Kurdish militia, and have changed hands repeatedly. At present, both are occupied by the government forces. Nevertheless, considerable areas of the mountainous Kurdish countryside remain in the hands of the Kurdish militiamen. There have been periodic battles between them and the Revolutionary Guards since 1979.

The recent demand for autonomy between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds is likely to improve the position of the Iranian Kurdish militiamen by offering them a secure base for operations, and by removing the possible use of Iraqi forces against them by the Iranian government.

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Following the success of the revolution, the tribal leaders of the Caspian Confederation of pastoral nomads returned from 25 years of exile in Europe and the United States. They set about recreating the strong tribal structure which had made this Confederation one of Iran's most powerful pastoral groups prior to 1941. The old tribal leaders were inclined to the revolution, and some of them had returned to their homeland, eager to participate in the new order. Many of the estimated 500,000 Kurious

The two main tribes, Salar and Bagherzadeh in Sistan, the principal pastoral province, which was the habitat of the tribe, were friendly enough to work well communally, with one another and

To the north of the Caspian, the Caspian's leader Khosrow Khan Chehel, a tribal leader, tribal and ethnic nationalist, was eventually one of the leaders that formed the Revolutionary Guards in 1979. He was their best political officer. With a marquis, and the revolutionary guards, they were organized of...
In 1981 the government succeeded in capturing Khosrow Khan and executed him in Tehran. This action has tended to demoralize the Qashqais who have been relatively quiet in the past year. There was also discontent among the Luri-speakingeyer Ahmad, who were involved in violent clashes in the same period. The tribal disturbances in Fars were, for the most part, quelled by the summer of 1982.

Arabs

Khuzestan province and the coastal areas of the Persian Gulf have an Arab ethnic minority. The total Arab population is estimated at 650,000 to one million. The Arabs have had numerous social and political grievances against the Persian-controlled central and local governments for at least 50 years. Since the revolution the Arabs hoped to obtain a measure of local autonomy and recognition of their cultural distinctiveness. The central government was not really willing to accommodate the sensitivities of the Arab minority than it was to accommodate the demands of the Kurds and Qashqais. The emerging leader of the Arabs, the Shi'ite cleric Ayatollah Khaqani, was summoned to Qom and executed to silence. His effective house arrest provoked sporadic protest demonstrations which were suppressed by the Revolutionary Guards. Much more serious was the government campaign carried out against oil installations. There was, however, no effectively organized opposition among the Arabs.

In 1982 when Iraq invaded Khuzestan province in September 1982, it failed to win a significant sympathy among the Arab minority and was unable to gain the government's support and was supported by the local Arabs in its occupation. One of the Arab population in the war zones actually fled to
4. Azerbaijanis

The Azerbaijani Turks constitute Iran's largest single ethnic group, accounting for 20 to 25 percent of the country's total population. They are concentrated in several areas and may comprise a demographic majority. The Azerbaijanis are major in the Azerbaijan and the east Azerbaijan areas (over 50%), Tahirabad and Lanjan, outside of which there are smaller communities. In the majority Azerbaijan population, including Qarv, an industrial center near Tabriz, and Shiraz, a textile center in the southern coastal region, the Azerbaijanis are so intermingled with the Farsi population, it is not even possible to disassociate their concerns from those of the dominant Farsi. No attempt was made by the Azerbaijanis to have a distinct consciousness of themselves as "Iranian" or "Turk." They identify themselves as Azerbaijani. This was the case for the other significantly large groups, for example, the Kurds and the Persians, who do not easily identify with the concept of Iran. The Azerbaijanis' double identity as both Turk and Iranian has been a difficult for a united Azerbaijanist party to accept the New Iranian government and the various groups which have been formed by the government, such as the Democratic Party of Iran and the National Front of Iran. The National Front of Iran is the main group to which the Azerbaijanis belong, and it has considerable support in the Azerbaijan provinces. It is considered to be more conservative and more nationalistic than the Democratic Party of Iran. The National Front is more likely to support the issues of Azerbaijan, as it is more concerned with the rights of the Azerbaijanis. The National Front is more likely to support the issues of Azerbaijan, as it is more concerned with the rights of the Azerbaijanis.
5. Other Ethnic Groups

The two other ethnic minorities whose grievances with the central government involve issues of ethnicity to some degree are the Turkomen, who live in northeast Iran in the coastal plain east of the Caspian Sea, and the Baluchis, who live in southeast Iran in Baluchestan province bordering Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. Neither ethnic group is large—perhaps 350,000 Turkomen and as many as 600,000 Baluch. They have been easily controlled by the Revolutionary Guards despite sporadic clashes between armed elements in both areas and the forces of the central government. While both the Turkomen and the Baluchis do have a strong sense of ethnic identity, there is no developed sense of nationalism among either minority, and thus no sense of conflict with Iranian nationalism. Rather, both peoples desire greater local autonomy from Tehran.

v. The Baha’is

Systematic persecution of over 200,000 members of the Baha’i faith—a religion founded in nineteenth century Iran—has been a daily routine in the Islamic Republic. Some 160 Baha’is have been executed and those who have survived face a daily reign of terror. Baha’i holy places and cemeteries have been destroyed, homes plundered or razed, members of the Baha’i Faith have been kidnapped, and it is almost impossible for Baha’is to earn a living. Government decrees prohibit Baha’is from teaching in schools. Baha’i lawyers and physicians cannot practice, and Baha’is cannot obtain licenses for private businesses. There have been numerous forced conversions of Baha’is to Islam.

Persecution of the Baha’i faith is not an invention of the Islamic Republic. This treatment dates back to the 1850s, to the days of the Bab, the herald of the Baha’i faith, whose followers were subjected to oppressive discrimination on orders of the ‘ulama, on the pretext that they were apostates...
from Islam. Since then, persecution has been the order of the day for Baha'is, including under the Shah, one of whose generals, with the aid of the preacher Falsafi, now reported to be close to Khomeini, participated in destroying the Baha'i center in Tehran.

What makes the Baha'is more vulnerable under the Islamic Republic than ever before is that now the clergy are in complete control, ruling directly without a government buffer to protect the Baha'is. Persecuting Baha'is is one of the few ties which bind various factions of the clergy together. The Hojjatiyeh Association was founded in the 1950s, primarily to destroy the Baha'i faith. The late Ayatollah Taleqani, whom many consider one of the more liberal and progressive clergy, is reported to have ordered the destruction of the holiest Baha'i shrine in Iran, the birthplace of the Bab, in September 1979.

Although the Baha'is constitute the largest religious minority in Iran, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic does not recognize the Baha'i faith. The present Iranian government takes the position that the Baha'i faith is a political party, which it has officially banned. The clergy, through the Islamic Republic government, has leveled a whole range of unsubstantiated charges against the Baha'is, including close connections with SAVAK, spying for Israel and the United States, and plots to destroy the economy of the Islamic Republic. Even though the Baha'is dissolved all their organizations in November 1983 in response to these allegations, persecution continues. Clearly, persecution is fundamentally religious in origin.

B. Discontent Among Different Social Groups

1. The Pre-revolutionary Political Elite

While a significant portion of the old elite has fled into exile, there are still many who have remained to protect their property and investments
from confiscation. The old elite resents its exclusion from political power, regards the new elite as upstarts, and feels very insecure about its wealth. In addition, there is much resentment over the new social codes of the Islamic Republic, and restrictions on travel and foreign exchange transfers. The old elite tends to be secularized and sees no appropriate role in the government for the clergy. Those who have remained in Iran have decided to accommodate themselves to the status quo. Since they did not exert any influence to help save the monarchy in its waning days, it is doubtful that they would actively support political conspiracies. Nevertheless, there does exist much nostalgia for the "old days," and it can be expected that the old elite would welcome restoration of the monarchy.

2. The Secularized Middle Class

The secularized middle class has been evolving for the past 50 years. Nevertheless, it probably constitutes no more than 10 percent of the country's total population. The secularized middle class is almost entirely urban and heavily concentrated in Tehran, although all cities contain an element of this class. Its main characteristics are a secular education at least through high school; among the younger generation (ages 20 to 35), a majority of both sexes have some kind of postsecondary training. A significant minority have been educated abroad, in Europe or the United States. The secularized middle class as a group dominates the professional occupations such as medicine, education, and engineering, and managerial positions in government and industry. It is a highly politicized group, but during the last 25 years of the monarchy it was denied opportunities for meaningful political participation. The activists were drawn off into opposition movements while the majority remained politically passive but alienated.
The leadership and membership for the secular political parties are recruited from this class. This includes the liberal parties such as the old National Front, the National Democratic Front, the Freedom Movement, and other groups which advocate a pluralistic political system, as well as the secular leftist parties such as the Tudeh and the Fedayeen. These parties and the secular middle class as a whole enthusiastically supported the revolution. Indeed, the initial leaders for the revolution in late 1977 and early 1978 were political activists from this class. Even when religious personalities began to emerge as the dominant leaders of the revolution, the secular politicians remained prominent.

The secularized middle class was unprepared for the establishment of a theocracy in Iran. This development has effectively shut the group out of the political process, and it consequently feels as alienated from the revolutionary government as it did from the old regime. The secularized middle class, in particular, abhors the excesses of state terrorism. In addition, this class has a number of nonpolitical grievances. The attempts to control private social behavior are especially resented. Regulations which are perceived as especially irksome include the ban on the consumption of alcoholic beverages, dress codes for women, prohibitions on the playing of music and dancing, and the sexual segregation of beaches, pools, cinemas and other sites of recreation. Economic and foreign policies are also sources of discontent. These latter include restrictions of foreign travel, continuing purges of the civil service, the purges and the closure of the universities— as well as the explicitly discriminatory admission policies of those which have been reopened—and the war with Iraq. There is widespread opposition to censorship, perceived civil and human rights abuses by the security forces, and the emphasis on public displays of religiosity. And there is a tendency
to blame the clerical government for problems such as inflation and inadequate supplies of certain commodities.

A very substantial section of the secularized middle class consists of the employees of the public sector. There is every indication that the level of discontent is highest among this group, which has suffered badly from successive past purges, and which resents the Islamic ideological indoctrination, especially the requirement of passing examinations in Islamic ideology as a condition of promotion or in some cases retention of the positions they occupy. This is especially the case with the employees of the Ministry of Education, who suffered particularly vicious and widespread purges. (According to the European branch in exile of the Iran Teachers Association, by December 4, 1981, over 100,000 or one quarter of all teachers and university professors had been purged, with 600 of them killed, and 2,000 imprisoned.)

It is therefore not surprising that one of the measures taken in pursuance of the Decree of December 15 was the abolition of the hated selection committees in charge of the Islamicizing purges. To gain an idea of the magnitude of the discontent of this class, the number of complaints actually filed provides us with a good indicator. During the six months prior to May 1983, the newly set up Supreme Administrative Court received 20,000 cases of complaints (and dealt with one quarter of them). More revealing still is the staggering number of complaints filed in the same time with the Organization for the Pursuance of the Imam’s Decree. These were not confined to cases of unjust administrative treatment and arbitrary dismissal but included many complaints concerning confiscations, distribution of land in cities by revolutionary courts, and arbitrary arrests. As such, the number of cases of complaints is one of the best indicators of general discontent among all groups in Iranian society, with particular relevance for the middle class.
As is shown in Table 3 below, over 160,000 complaints were filed in the first few months of 1983. It should be noted that this figure represents about one percent of the total adult population of Iran.

Table 3. Cases of Complaints Received by the Commission for the Pursuance of the Imam's Decree [of December 15, 1982]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Area</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Central Committee in Tehran</td>
<td>28,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>13,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Province</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilan</td>
<td>9,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanjan</td>
<td>2,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazandaran</td>
<td>14,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khorasan</td>
<td>13,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushehr</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuzestan</td>
<td>13,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fars</td>
<td>7,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfahan</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerman</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazd</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhturan</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sistan</td>
<td>3,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lurestan</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Azerbaijan</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Azerbaijan</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilam</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamadan</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyer-Ahmad, Chaharmahal, etc.</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>161,534</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Keyhan, 29 Ordibehesht 1362 (May 19, 1983), Ettela'at, 1 and 24 Khordad 1362 (May 22 and June 14, 1983)
The widespread discontent among the middle classes found its first overt manifestation in the silent 'demonstrations' in the streets of Tehran and some other cities in early August 1983, called forth by the clandestine nationalist radio stations, to mark the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution. These silent demonstrations, and the evident spread of monarchist sentiment manifesting itself in the distribution of pictures of Reza Pahlavi II in some cities at the same time, was noted by Khomeini who advised the young Pahlavi to pursue his studies and keep out of politics. The Revolutionary Guards, however, did not seem unduly perturbed. As one of them reportedly remarked in a private conversation, although many people turned out on the day of the demonstrations, they were the sort who would disperse with a couple of shots in the air.

3. The Traditional Middle Class

The traditional middle class, which is closely associated with the bazaar, is not at all secular but retains a strong identification with Shi'ite Islamic practices, and may account for as much as 15 percent of the country's population. Merchants and small-scale entrepreneurs in the covered bazaar areas of the cities and towns, as well as small shopkeepers, comprise a majority of this class. However, there are some salaried personnel, especially small town teachers and lower level bureaucrats, who can be classified as belonging to this class in terms of their social origins, religious attitudes, and insistence upon living conservative life styles. The traditional middle class was also alienated from the old regime, although for different reasons than the secularized middle class. The former group was of ended by the secular policies pursued by the monarchy. Indeed, it felt somewhat threatened by them during the 1970s. Thus, this class gradually became active opponents of the regime, providing much of the financial support.
for the clergy and organizing the crippling economic strikes in the autumn of 1978.

The traditional middle class was in many ways the primary beneficiary of the revolution, at least initially. During the past two years, however, the attitude of this class has become more ambivalent. The traditional middle class is concerned with the protection of private property and profits. Thus, as a group they tend to be suspicious of the economic policies advocated by the khatt-i imamis who are influential in some of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts in Charge of Guild Affairs. Generally, their attitude is that the government should not be involved in any way with regulating economic activity. Indeed, it was the perceived threat to bazaar interests of prerevolutionary economic politics that provided the spark which lit their discontent into revolutionary ferment. While the traditional middle class does not seem to feel any similar sense of threat at the present time, there is still widespread concern about such policies as the nationalization of foreign trade, price stabilization controls, and property confiscations. Even more alarming has been the rhetoric of certain radical khatt-i imamis who have accused the bazaar of war profiteering, and have attempted to inflame public opinion against them for being "hoarders" of scarce commodities and/or "black marketeers." They have intermittently launched antiproteetering, antihording campaigns against the 'economic terrorists,' the last of which began in December 1983 and has continued well into January 1984. It is important to note that the bazaar has at times been vocal in its opposition to such campaigns. (For instance, in late December 1983, three Majlis deputies from Shiraz published in the daily newspapers their letter of protest to the President of the Supreme Judiciary Council against the humiliating public punishment of a merchant.)
While there has been an erosion of support for the regime among the traditional middle class, the group does not seem to be a source of major opposition. Despite their discontent, the regime still has many committed supporters among this class.

4. The Urban Working Class

Iran has been industrializing for nearly 60 years and now has a working class population which constitutes 20 percent of the total population. Historically, the working class of Iran has not been politically active. Initially, the working class tended to be enthusiastic about the revolution, expecting that the new regime would look favorably upon independent labor unions, minimum wage standards, social security legislation, and other reforms and benefits unavailable during the monarchy when labor was tightly controlled. Gradually, however, the working class became disillusioned as the regime temporized on a number of key issues, especially the creation of independent trade unions. Government policy has tended to become progressively more antilabor, culminating in a proposed labor law in the summer of 1983 that would abolish minimum wage standards, permit child labor in factories, prohibit independent trade unions, and in general adversely affect labor interests. Widespread discontent has developed among the working class, manifested in numerous strikes. Nevertheless, there is no organized opposition. Whenever labor leaders have arisen, they have been silenced through imprisonment and/or execution.

5. The Rural Population

The rural population accounts for 50 percent of the country's total. It is comprised of about 17.5 million villagers living in 70,000 villages, and just under 2 million pastoral nomads. The village population is highly
stratification, the basic division being between those who own land (front part) and those who do not. The rural population on the whole has not benefited from the revolution, although their situation has not declined either compared to 1978. The rural population was generally ambivalent in its attitudes toward the old regime and this sentiment transferred to the new government. So far the revolutionary government has not been any more successful than its predecessor in winning support, as opposed to acquiescence, among the rural masses.

C. General Discontent

In addition to the grievances and discontent of specific sectors, one can point to certain indicators which reflect general discontent throughout Iranian society. The decline of the economy after the revolution, the absence of opportunities for employment, and the chronic distribution problem and shortages of basic foodstuffs are the basic economic causes of social disorganization and the resulting diffuse discontent. An enormous increase in drug addiction and crime is the most striking indicator of social disorganization in postrevolution Iran. Despite the execution of hundreds of drug traffickers each year, drug addiction continues to plague Iran, and smuggling drugs has in some areas become a form of armed banditry. According to the police chief, Colonel Samini, 17,000 arrests for drug offenses were made in 1981-82. This figure represents just under 1 per 1,000 of Iran's total urban population. Other crimes, most notably thefts, have also risen sharply.

The waning of enthusiasm for government-sponsored demonstration and funeral processions for martyrs, and the very poor turnout at the elections for the Assembly of Experts in December 1982, are important indices of general dissatisfaction with the regime. More important and revealing as an indicator is the flood of applications for passports and exit permits. As one of the
stabilization measures following the decree of December 15, it was announced on the anniversary of the revolution in February 1983, that applications for passports and permits to leave the country would be accepted by mail only. Newspapers with printed application forms sold out immediately, and by May 1983, 105,000 applications had been received, but only 3,000 passports issued.

It would be wrong to assume that the applications came only from the affluent quarters of Tehran. In August 1983, the head of the passport office in the remote province of Chahar-Mahal and Bakhtiari was hard put to explain a great increase in the demand for passports and pointed to general difficulties of revolutions in a world dominated by imperialism.

One last indicator of discontent to be mentioned are the graffiti and slogans written on the walls in streets of Tehran (observed late in the summer of 1983). The erosion of revolutionary enthusiasm is indicated by the fact that appeals to male chauvinism, through slogans on the veiling of women and the need to guard their virtue, have replaced revolutionary slogans. According to one count, slogans on the veiling of women and the protection of their virtue outnumbered 'Death to American Imperialism' and 'Death to Saddam' by as much as 9 to 1. It is also noteworthy that such slogans as 'Death to Khomeini,' 'Death to the Corrupt Regime of Khomeini,' and 'Khomeini has become Genghis Khan' remain uneffaced.
VI. FOREIGN POLICY OF IRAN

The foreign policy of revolutionary Iran has been dominated by two major events since 1979: the protracted hostage crisis with the U.S. and the war with Iraq. It has also become increasingly identified with the general expansion of the aspirations of the Islamic Revolution to the rest of the Muslim world.

I. General, Foreign Policy and Anti-Imperialism

Ayatollah Khomeini had articulated the ideological foundations of Iran's post-revolutionary foreign policy—the necessity for autarky, anti-imperialism, and championing the interests of oppressed peoples—prior to the realization of the Islamic Republic. Subsequently, spokesmen for the Islamic Republic have reiterated and developed these principles in public pronouncements, but actual practice has varied according to internal developments within Iran and the country's economic and diplomatic requirements. The Islamic Republic does possess a consciously developed strategy. At the same time, however, it is able to maintain a high degree of flexibility, and sometimes lends itself to charges of hypocrisy. By labeling their critics as self-interested adherents of the revolution, however, the defenders of the Islamic Republic, relying upon the moral authority of Khomeini and the revolution, have been extraordinarily effective in refuting such charges.

Lectures which Khomeini delivered in Najaf and published early in 1979, and his speeches and interviews prior to his return to Iran on February 1, 1979, outlined the theoretical framework of the foreign policy strategy the Islamic Republic would follow. Khomeini argued that the superpowers were actually endeavoring to destroy Islam, both directly by conquest and exploitation of
was a passive religion rather than an active, dynamic ideology. The imperialists are also seen as responsible for dividing the Muslim community. Only unification of the Islamic community will liberate the Muslims from occupation and exploitation. Unification, in turn, is impossible without removing oppressive governments, which are themselves a necessary consequence of imperialist dominance.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic identified anti-Imperialism and defense of the oppressed as doctrines of national policy:

(Chapter 10, Principle 152) The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is founded on the basis of ending any type of domination, safeguarding the complete independence and integrity of the territory, defending the rights of all Muslims, practicing nonalignment with respect to the dominating powers and maintaining mutual peaceful relations with nonbelligerent nations;

(Chapter 10, Principle 154) The Islamic Republic of Iran considers its goal to be the happiness of human beings in all human societies... it will protect the struggles of the weak against the arrogant, in any part of the world.

Initially, especially through the efforts of lay ideologues such as Bani-Sadr, the Islamic Republic's anti-Imperialist orientation expanded beyond the Muslim world to champion "third world" causes and interests, and in November 1979 Iran formally joined the non-aligned movement. "Third World" as well as Islamic concerns have guided the Islamic Republic's international relations. In August of 1980, Iran broke diplomatic relations with Chile because of repression there; in 1983, on the fourth anniversary of the Islamic Republic, it opened an embassy in Managua, Nicaragua. Moreover, the Islamic Republic views the 1982 shift of the location of the Non-Aligned Conference from Baghdad to New Delhi, albeit at Iraq's request, as an indication of Iran's influence in the movement. The United Nations, despite Iran's displeasure with certain positions, has also provided a forum in which the Islamic
Republic can epitomize "Third World" and radical interests, by joining in the condemnation of South Africa and Israel.

The Islamic Republic has, however, been pragmatic even within the parameters of its most repeatedly articulated anti-imperialist slogan: "Neither fast nor last." Diplomatic relations with the two great superpowers were not severed immediately following the fall of the Shah, as they were with two other states: South Africa, Vietnam, and Egypt. For example, it is now clear that the Bazargan Provisional Government was moving towards a new relationship with the United States on the eve of the hostage crisis. It was the U.S.'s admission of the Shah in October 1979, which provided ammunition to those who opposed both Bazargan and the rapprochement with the United States. While some critics within and outside Iran have characterized the hostage affair as a failure, its proponents regard it as a victory in the anti-imperialist struggle, and as an exposure of continued American involvement and interference in the Islamic Republic.

The hostage crisis, despite all the rhetoric about combating U.S. imperialism, was not so much a foreign policy matter as a domestic issue. It was used by Khomeini and the militant Shi'ite clergy to consolidate their position over the secularist and the liberal Islamic groups. Khomeini and the militant clergy masterfully used the hostage crisis to stir up anti-Americanism at the time of the referendum for the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. All opposition to the theocratic constitution could be presented as treason and thus muffled. The ratification of the theocratic constitution was thereby assured of a landslide victory.

Furthermore, Khomeini and his militant followers were fundamentally hostile to the U.S. and wanted to see the past close relationship with the U.S. ended. They were alarmed by the perceived willingness of the Provisional
government to accommodate the U.S., and were distrusting of the religious moderates (those who supported Bani-Sadr), whom they also viewed as having pro-American, or at least pro-Western tendencies. They had a deeply fundamentalist opposition to the U.S., which was seen as the source of corruption, moral evil and atheism. While this view is demonological and one-dimensional, it was not put forth for propaganda purposes. The militant clergy genuinely believe the U.S. to be a virtual Satan, and hold this view with the fervor of firm religious conviction. Accordingly, the last 23 years of the deposed Shah's reign are considered as part of a master plot on the part of the U.S. to hold Iran into an un-Islamic society. The militant clergy sincerely believed that the U.S. was plotting throughout 1979 and 1980 to undermine their revolution and restore a subservient monarchy. Thus, they saw the hostage crisis as an opportunity both to punish the U.S. for past deeds and to discourage present and future meddling in Iran's domestic affairs. Only when they could see no further profit in prolonging the crisis, that is, not until after the Iraqi invasion in the autumn of 1980, did a consensus develop for negotiations to release the hostages.

The hostage crisis was clearly detrimental for the Islamic, who opposed confrontation with the U.S., which some saw as a potential ally. The secularists were ill prepared to confront the religious groups which had successfully marshaled mass support by appealing to the symbols of nationalism. The Provisional Government of Mehdi Barzagan was revealed to be impotent by its inability to control the students who were holding the embassy compound, and resigned.

The "moderates" Islamic moderates who tried to assume power via the new constitutional arrangements did not prove to be any more capable of dealing with the extremist positions adopted by the militant clergy. This was
significant, for it meant that Bani-Sadr and his supporters could not confront the religious elites on important policy issues and eroded his credibility as a leftist leader.

Despite ongoing condemnation of the U.S., the perception of current U.S. foreign policy has manifested itself in continued ambivalence in Iran. The Iranian military and technical establishments, with their considerable influence, are dependent upon American support, and are interwined with each other. And Iran is at war. Politically, Iran has reasserted the 1975 oil and gas purchase of Iranian crude by Western states, marketing in Houston, and in the wake of rumors of revived U.S.-Iranian oil negotiations, Kazem Sharif-Abadi, Foreign Ministry Under Secretary for International and Bahaie Affairs, publicly announced that "at present of goods imported from the U.S." (emphasis, October 10, 1979)." The New York Times, "trade between the two nations is drying up," on October 4, 1979. "A billion worth of goods was traded between the U.S. and Iran," excluding perhaps an equal amount of trade through third parties. As yet, however, no evidence has surfaced to indicate that Iran's stance as an outspoken critic of U.S. imperialism has been tarnished.

Iranian policy towards the Soviet Union has been characterized by rhetoric which has on the whole been less consistent and severe than it employed in regard to the United States, and by fluctuating positions in economic relations, despite almost constant rumors and denouncements of Soviet espionage within the Islamic Republic. Initially, in August 1979, Iran cancelled a project to build a second natural gas pipeline to the U.S.S.R. and in November, on behalf of the 1921 treaty, Iran has also reaffirmed the right to intervene in Iran. Despite the Islamic Republic's protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in September of 1980, . . .
January 1983, however, the Iranian press instituted an anti-Soviet campaign, which was, it seems, a reaction to the Soviet decision to supply Iraq with arms. Anti-Soviet rhetoric has been on the upswing during late summer and fall of 1983 following the "confessions" by former Tudeh Party leaders of clandestine Soviet activities in Iran since the revolution. 'Death to the Soviets,' is heard in demonstrations alongside 'Death to America,' and 'Death to Israel,' much more frequently than before, and in a speech to Guards Corps officers on August 71, 1983, Khameini strongly condemned the U.S.S.R. (FBIS VIII, Aug. 22, 1983). Nonetheless Islamic Republic-Soviet cooperation continues. On October 8, 1983, an Iranian-U.S.S.R. protocol was signed to build a dam on the Atrek River.

A variety of explanations can be offered as to why anti-American rhetoric has figured more prominently than anti-Soviet rhetoric in the discourse of the Islamic Republic. Iranians regard the U.S. as more closely associated with the Pahlavi regime than the U.S.S.R. Anti-U.S. statements generally bear more weight in the third world. Because of the U.S.S.R.'s proximity to Iran, and its initial support of the revolution, the Islamic Republic did not antagonize its northern neighbor. Critics of the regime offer further explanations: that reluctance to criticize the Soviets is due to the pro-Soviet leanings of prominent clergymen such as Khomeini. Alternatively, the destruction of the Mujahedin and Fedaiyin, the disbanding of the Tudeh and recent attacks on the U.S.S.R. are viewed by anti-American critics as evidence that the Islamic Republic has been the instrument of the U.S. in the elimination of a Communist presence and Soviet influence in Iran.

This last interpretation is particularly misleading. Before the recent crisis in Lebanon, the clampdown on the Tudeh Party and the Iranian
government’s pragmatic willingness to purchase much needed American military equipment and other goods directly or indirectly had led to speculations on the possibility of a rapprochement between the two countries. Such speculations reflect a serious misreading of the attitude of the Iranian ruling clergy. Anti-Americanism is fundamental to and constitutive of the entire Islamic clerical revolutionary movement. There is no sign that this anti-Americanism is abating, and no likelihood that it will abate as long as Khomeini lives.

Economic factors have governed the Islamic Republic’s relations with Turkey and Pakistan. In general, the Turkish military regime, which was disbanded in December 1953, was not benevolent to Islamic movements. In an interview given in December 1978, Khomeini spoke favorably of "demands for an Islamic State" in Turkey. Rather than export the revolution to Turkey, however, the Islamic Republic has strengthened economic ties and exports oil instead, receiving, in return, much needed meat, sugar, and grain. Economic considerations also determine the Islamic Republic’s relations with Pakistan. Iranian oil is exchanged for Pakistani food products, zinc, and textiles. Cultural and educational exchanges have also been established under agreements signed in March 1982.

The defunctist Assad regime in Syria has a long record of repressing Islamic fundamentalist movements, especially the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1980. Five Muslim Brotherhood members were executed for involvement in a June 1979 attack on military cadets in Aleppo, and Syrian troops are reported to have killed between 3,000 and 10,000 Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters in Hama in February 1982. Although the Islamic Republic supports the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, it has, nonetheless, supported Assad, and condemned the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Etela‘at, March 4, 1982). Syria, like Turkey and...
Pakistan is a market for Iranian oil and provides consumer and agricultural goods in exchange. But political considerations are also important factors behind Iran's support for Assad, especially Syria's strong stand against Israel, its position in Lebanon, and its opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

The Islamic Republic's strident opposition to Israel has been reiterated consistently. Nonetheless, despite repeated denials by spokesmen of the Republic, Iran has purchased spare parts from Israel, another example of Iran's pragmatism given the exigencies and pressure of the Iran-Iraq war.

Despite Iran's pragmatic tendencies, the sincerity of the Islamic Republic's commitment to anti-imperialism, Islamic unity, and the oppressed should not be underestimated. Nor should its unabated hostility towards the United States. Deviations from these stated norms reflect policies which the leaders of the Islamic Republic believe are necessary to insure the survival of the Islamic Revolution.

1. **Export of the Islamic Revolution**

Export of the revolution is a necessary step along the path towards Muslim unity. Khomeini and those who follow his line maintain that Muslims will be prepared to unite only when they have rid themselves of oppressive rulers and have come to know the nature of authentic Islamic government. Export of the revolution has, therefore, become a major foreign policy endeavor of the Islamic Republic. A variety of strategies have been adopted to export the revolution. The effort has been both overt and covert, direct and indirect.

Overt export of the revolution has centered around a massive publication and propaganda effort and a series of programs arranged both in Iran and abroad to bring the Muslims of the world together and to educate them in the
principles of the Islamic Revolution. Gatherings often coincide with important dates in the Islamic Republican calendar such as February 11, the anniversary of the Revolution, the Hajj, the Day of Qods—inaugurated by Khomeini to commemorate the importance of Jerusalem to the World Muslim community—and Muslim Unity week. In December 1982, during Muslim Unity Week, the First International Conference of Friday Prayer Leaders was held in Tehran, and was attended by 135 scholars from 60 countries. June 15, 1982 marked the closing of a seminar of Islamic Liberation Movements, whose participants called for "support for the Islamic Revolution," and recommended the "creation of a mass media system and information company for the world's oppressed" (FBIS VIII, 15 June 1982). Programs organized in 1983 include a Seminar of Islamic Students, the First International Conference of Islamic Thought, a World Competition of Qur'an Reciters, to mark the Fourth Anniversary of the Revolution, and an Islamic Labor Law Conference. The Majlis passed a law establishing the Islamic International University of Iran in January 1984.

The Hajj, or Pilgrimage to Mecca, plays a central role in Khomeini's strategy to spread the message of the Islamic Revolution. He advised the first group of Iranians making the pilgrimage after the foundation of the Islamic Republic that "another duty that must be fulfilled in this vast gathering is to summon the people, as well as all Islamic groups to unity, overlooking the differences between the various Muslim groups." In 1979 and in all subsequent pilgrimages, the Iranian Hajjis have faithfully followed Khomeini's exhortations to relate the message of the revolution, and have done so with an arder and enthusiasm that has been a constant source of friction with the Saudi authorities. This was especially the case in the 1983 Hajj, when Khomeini and Mortazavi urged the pilgrims to raise cries of protest...
against imperialism and oppression, and dispatched a trusted aide, accompanied
by Revolutionary Guards, to oversee this.

Iranian Muslim students committed to the 'line of the Imam' also play an
important international role in exporting the revolution. The Muslim Student
Association, Persian Speaking Group, is the major pro-Khomeini student organi-
zation in the United States, with publications in English, Farsi, and Arabic.
Much of their Arabic material is centered around attacks on Israel and the
Saudi monarchy.

In many countries of the Middle East since 1979 supporters of the Islamic
revolution and its leader have staged numerous public demonstrations. Some
have also participated in overt armed acts against regimes which they consider
'oppressive.' Islamic activists from other Muslim countries are well-received
and occasionally interviewed by the media. However, the Islamic Republic has
consistently denied any direct involvement in the planning or execution of
these acts and Khomeini has emphasized that the revolution should be exported
by the word, not by the sword (FBIS VIII, 25 August 1983). Any role the
Islamic Republic may have played in violent actions has been covert.

The most serious challenges to a current regime have taken place in
Bahrain, a Gulf emirate with a population of about 350,000, of whom an esti-
mated 60 percent are Shi'ite. Until 1975, in fact, Iran claimed Bahrain as
its own territory. In February 1979, shortly after the victory of the Islamic
revolution, Shi'ites with Iranian background demonstrated in support of
Khomeini. Bloody riots followed in August, leading to the arrest of scores of
demonstrators and the deportation of many others. Unrest continued in 1979,
but to a lesser degree than the previous year. Late in 1980, as a concession
to the Shi'a, the authorities released a number of Shi'ite political
prisoners. In December 1981, however, the Bahraini government suppressed a
major coup attempt organized by The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which was identified as a Khomeini-backed organization. No Iranians were included among those tried in connection with the coup attempt, but the Bahraini Prime Minister accused the Islamic Republic of training them within Iran, and identified an Iranian Mullah, Haj Modarresi, who had previously been expelled from Bahrain, as the planner of the operation. Iran denied any involvement but applauded the action. Nonetheless the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain's devotion to Iran is substantiated by an appeal for help it addressed to the "Muslim and combatant Iranian Nation" in March 1982 (Kayhan, 6 March 1982, p. 16).

Shi'ite Muslims have also attempted to export the Islamic Revolution to Kuwait. As early as January 1979, before Khomeini's return to Iran, the Kuwaiti government identified a network of Shi'ite, pro-Khomeini study groups with at least one major arms depot (Christian Science Monitor, January 22, 1979). Kuwait was, however, the first Gulf State to recognize the Islamic Republic during the summer of 1979. And later the same year, the Kuwaiti government revised its laws to conform more closely with Islamic Sacred Law. Iraq's invasion of Iran in September 1981 was followed by strained Iran-Kuwait relations. In October, Kuwait accused Iran of having attacked one of its oil installations and initiated a pronounced anti-Iran policy. Kuwait contributed generously to the Iraqi war effort, donating close to $6 billion through 1981, and permitted 315 million metric tons of cargo for Iraq to pass through its territory in 1981. The Kuwaiti press adopted a decidedly anti-Iranian posture, and the Iranian press reciprocated. In late March 1981, the Kuwaiti government suspended publication of a Muslim fundamentalist paper. Relations were further strained when Kuwait became a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, also in March 1981.
Considerable evidence of pro-Islamic Republic activity in Kuwait surfaced again in 1983. In early March eight Muslim Iranian residents of Kuwait were arrested and deported, including the Vice-Principal of the Islamic Republic Schools in Kuwait (Tehran Times, 9 March 1983). The Kuwaiti authorities also announced the discovery that light arms, hand grenades and explosives were being illegally brought into Kuwait by sea from Iran. In October 40 people were arrested on the charge of illegal entry into Kuwait and possession of weapons, and about 100 men, whom the Kuwaitis claimed were connected with the Khomeini regime, were deported (FBIS VIII, 28 October 1983). On December 12, 1983, bombs exploded at the U.S. and French embassies and civilian targets in Kuwait. Given the previous discovery of illegal importation of explosives by Khomeini sympathizers, the similarity of the incidents with recent terrorist bombings in Lebanon, and the identity of the targets, suspicion was logically directed towards supporters of the Islamic Republic. Iranian and Kuwaiti Shi'ites have figured prominently in those arrested. As with other incidents, the Kuwait bombings were applauded by Islamic Republic authorities as another blow against imperialism, but as on previous occasions they denied any complicity.

In view of their rich oil resources, it is not surprising that the Gulf region continues to be the most exciting arena for the exportation of the Islamic revolution. In January 1984 President Khamene'i inaugurated an 160 kilowatt radio station on the island of Kish, pointing out that the nations of the region were eagerly awaiting the signals of the revolution.

Amal in Lebanon and al-Ba'wa in Iraq are militant political and paramilitary organizations advocating armed struggle, whose membership is almost exclusively Shi'ite. While these movements acknowledge the moral leadership and inspirational role of Khomeini, neither Amal nor al-Ba'wa can
to their initial situation at the Islamic Revolution. Although both events predate February 11, 1979, the establishment of the Islamic Republic dramatically changed their position, providing them with a major external ally.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been dispatched to Syria and isolated areas of Lebanon, and work closely with a group of Lebanese Shi'ites known as Hizb Allah (Party of God), and with the Lebanese branch of al-Da'wa. Their number has recently been put at 1,000 to 2,000 (The New York Times Magazine, February 12, 1984). Having adopted the toppling of the Hussein regime in Iraq as a major foreign policy goal, Tehran also provides a safe haven for the direction of al-Da'wa's armed struggle, including the destruction of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in 1981. Al-Da'wa also has claimed responsibility for the 1981 Bahrain coup attempt (New York Times, December 17, 1981). In Lebanon, where Shi'ite Muslims make up the largest religious community, but lack equivalent political representation in the current system, Amal and its various factions have established their own enclaves in predominately Shi'ite areas. One particular faction, the Islamic Jihad, has consistently demonstrated its commitment to remove foreign forces from Lebanon through terrorist attacks on foreign installations. In Iraq, al-Da'wa, whose leadership is more clerical than that of Amal, has not as yet succeeded in mobilizing the support of Iraq's Shi'ite majority, in large part because of the Ba'athist regime's ruthless efficiency at eliminating key figures of the movement, including al-Da'wa's key ideologue Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr in 1981.

The Islamic Revolution is not, however, an exclusively Shi'ite movement, capable of export only to Shi'ite Muslims. Khomeini and his colleagues, despite the special place given to Shi'ite Islam in the Islamic Republic Constitution, and the dominant position of the Shi'ite clergy in Iran today, have repeatedly stressed that the movement is aimed at all Muslims. Spokesmen
for the Islamic Revolution have portrayed emphatically the divisions between Shi'i and Sunni Islam as just another manifestation of the imperialist strategy of dividing Muslims from each other. In 1983 clerical leaders such as Montazeri and Hashemi Rafsanjani repeatedly met at seminars with Sunni leaders from predominantly Sunni regions of Iran. These meetings provided a forum for discussion of Muslim unity, the role Sunnis have played in the Islamic revolution, Sunni satisfaction with the Islamic Republic, and warnings about imperialist attempts to sow discord. Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini, the Iranian Sunni Kurdish leader now in Paris, tells a very different story, accusing the Islamic Republic of forcing Sunni Kurds to convert to Shi'ism and of resettling Sunnis in non-Sunni regions (Interview with Paul Buitre: Le Monde, 3 November, 1982).

The Islamic revolution stresses broad objectives in its appeal to Sunnis, such as anti-imperialism, anti-authoritarianism, and Muslim unity, with little if any mention of the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, and has taken upon itself the role of spokesperson for the oppressed Muslims of the world. The Sadat and Mubarak governments in Egypt, the Saudi monarchy, and Israel have all become objects of a large-scale propaganda effort.

Attacks on Sadat and Mubarak have been especially strong. In a 1980 speech Khomeini called on Muslims to overthrow Sadat, whom he described "as the same as the infidel" (Agence France-Presse, August 10, 1981). Sadat's assassination was applauded in Tehran where Khaled al-Istambuli, leader of the assassination plot, was honored by having a street named after him, and with a postage stamp struck in commemoration of his act. In May 1982, Montazeri, speaking of Sadat's successor, said, "Mubarak is no different from the traitor Sadat. He, too, shakes hands with the devil and he will suffer the same fate as Sadat." Criticism of Egyptian policy has centered around oppressive rule.
difficult to evaluate the impact of the Islamic Republic's propaganda campaign in Egypt, but Sadat took it very seriously. He sponsored a counter-campaign to mobilize public opinion against Iran, and stressed differences between Shi'ites and Sunnis. The Iranian press, however, continues to maintain that at the 1983 Hajj, "Egyptian pilgrims spoke very enthusiastically about the Islamic Revolution of Iran," which it interpreted as a sign that "Egypt would witness new events in the future" (FBIS VIII, 6 October 1983). This report, however, may be viewed with some skepticism, since it seems likely that the only Egyptians who would speak with the Iranian pilgrims were those opposed to Mubarak.

The overthrow of the Saudi monarchy is a major goal of the Islamic Republic in preparing the way for Muslim unity. In addition to political oppression, subservience to the U.S., support of Iraq, and Saudi claims to the role of 'protector' of the Gulf, Iranian critics have challenged the Saudis' claims to leadership of the Islamic community, charging the royal family with moral perversion, un-Islamic treatment of pilgrims, and reiterating Khomeini's teaching that Islam and monarchy are incompatible. Islamic Republic leaders have frequently issued threats to the Saudi rulers of which the following by Montazeri is illustrative: "We will apply severe punishment to those who have rejected God and who are swayed away from His Pole and the Holy Mosque" (FBIS VIII, 25 July 1983). As in the case of Egypt, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of these attacks within Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government has countered them with strict supervision, regulation, and sometimes arrest and deportation of activist Iranian pilgrims, and an intense anti-Islamic Republic and anti-Khomeini propaganda effort. The Mecca Mosque seizure of 1987 points to anti-Saudi royal family sentiment on the part of "Muslim fundamentalists"
and there are reports of continued unrest and dissatisfaction among the Shi'ites of the Eastern Region since the al-Qhatir incident of 1979.

To dismiss the Islamic Republic's efforts to export the Islamic revolution simply because no other Islamic Republic has been established would be a serious error. The Islamic Republic's moral support alone, and the fact that it was able to depose a U.S.-supported authoritarian regime have boosted the morale, expectations and resolve of Islamic Liberation Movements. The Islamic revolution's success in winning supporters is difficult to evaluate because the campaign is directed towards individuals who, for the most part, live in political environments in which their lives would be in danger if they expressed their opinions. The economic inequalities, the secular nature of the ruling elite in the midst of conservative Muslim societies, harsh and arbitrary rule, and the seeming subservience of governments to foreign powers provide a fertile environment for the Islamic Republic's message and its call to resist oppression and imperialist dominance. Given the central role of Islamic unity in the Islamic Republic's ideology, and with the consolidation of clerical rule in Iran, it is likely that Iran's leadership will devote even more of its energies and resources to exporting the revolution.

Our discussion of export of the revolution has concentrated on the export of principles rather than the possibility of clerical rule emerging elsewhere in the region. The chance that the 'ulama in other Muslim states could, or would want to, take over the reins of government themselves, or whether they would have the capacity to do so if they wished are issues to be considered. The doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or custodianship of the jurisprudent in the absence of the Twelth Imam, is uniquely Shi'ite. It must not be forgotten that even within the Islamic Republic the Shi'ite clergy are not of one mind on this issue. The absence of velayat-e faqih in Sunni theology should not,
However, he sees as obviating Sunni clerics from oversight of the ruler’s conduct or from entering the Sacred Law, or indeed from setting up an Islamic government. This point is emphasized by the ruling clergy in Iran who seek to minimize Sunni-Shi'ite differences. It is highly significant that the discussion of Islamic government in a text on the "Islamic World View" for third-year high school students (Chapter 14) is generally applicable to both Sunni and Shi'ite branches of Islam, while the specifically Shi'ite features of the doctrine of veleyat-e faqih are relegated to a long footnote.

Past examples of theocratic rule by such sects as the Isma'ilis and the Ibadis are of historical interest only. In exploring the possibility of clerical rule in other Muslim states the important fact to consider is not so much the dominant theological school, but rather the nature of secular rule, the links between the clergy and observant Muslims, the clergy’s dependence upon the state, and the availability of the resource of lay Muslim intellectuals.

The possibility of theocratic rule in Saudi Arabia is limited in part by the close historical association between the Wahabi 'ulama and the Saudi dynasty. More than other monarchs of the Middle East, the Saudi rulers’ legitimacy has a basis in religion, as heirs to the political leadership of the Wahabi movement, as custodians of the Holy Shrines in Mecca and Medina and as sponsors of the Hajj. It is because of the religious expectations that Saudis have of their king, that many of the anti-Saudi arguments employed by the Islamic Republic focus on religious and moral issues. If an Islamic revolution were to occur in the Kingdom, it is most probable that it would be led by lay fundamentalists rather than by members of the established clergy, who are closely linked to the ruling family.
At present, theocratic rule in Egypt is a distant possibility. A socio-economic gap between westernized bureaucrats, lay professionals, and businessmen on one hand, and the more observant and impoverished general population does exist. The urban masses provide a potential source of demonstrations and the government has a record of oppression of Muslim fundamentalists. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood, in several different factions and branches, has a well-established history. On the other hand, the government has succeeded in winning over many in the 'ulama establishment to its side, and support for clerical rule seems severely limited. Although some form of Islamic government could emerge in Egypt, it is unlikely to be clerically dominated.

The Iraqi situation is complicated by the Sunni-Shi'ite division within the country, and by Saddam Hussein's demonstrated skill at eliminating religious opposition. The likelihood that observant Sunnis would support rule by the Shi'ite ulema is extremely improbable and could occur only if they were convinced that the Sunni ulema had totally acquiesced to Saddam. Given traditional Sunni-Shi'ite antagonism, it is out of the question that Shi'ite and Sunni ulema could share political power. An alternative, again unlikely, would be a partition of the country into Sunni and Shi'ite sectors. Nevertheless, the theory of wilayat-e faqih is being actively preached to the Iraqis, and a number of Iraqi Shi'ites have already been assembled in Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Bakim.

3. The War with Iraq

It is facing at present a very different foreign policy crisis. The Iraqi invasion was launched in September 1980, and was initially successful in capturing about one-third of Kuwaiti province, including the major port of Mabul al-Fahd (population, ca. 170,000), and the adjacent and

its city of Abadan (population, ca. 300,000) and the major oil refining
tactics. Several small towns and villages were also captured, while the
Iraqis succeeded in retaking the artillery range of Abadan, but also in
the provincial capital of Ahvaz, industrial center of Ahvaz (population
330,000), and the oil towns of Arvand (population 115,000), and
Masjid-e Sulayman (population 80,000).

Following the initial shock of the invasion, the Iranian army and the
Revolutionary guards were able to contain further Iraqi advances and
force a standstill along the front lines for 18 months. Beginning in the spring of
1982, the Iranians launched successful offensives against the Iraqi positions.
By the end of the summer, the Iranians had retaken Ahvaz and several
smaller towns, and launched an offensive into Iraqi territory. During the
past year the war has again become standstill, with the Iranians making slow
advances into Iraqi border regions, but for the most part being repulsed with
heavy casualties on both sides. The Iraqis have not been able to initiate any
major offensives, although the Iranian advances into Iraq have been con-
tained, except in the northern Kurdish zone.

The Iraqi invasion stimulated an outpouring of Iranian nationalist
terror. The Revolutionary Guards expanded its personnel considerably as young
men joined to fight in the war. The army, which had been debilitated by case
deletions during the subsequent to the revolution, and by purges of the
officer corps, was reconstructed. For the first two years of the war, there
seems to have been genuine support for the government's objectives of driving
Iranian territory from foreign troops. Once the tide of war began to turn in
Iran's favor, however, and Iran actually invaded Iraq, public opinion
gradually shifted. By the summer of 1983 there was evidence of widespread
discontent with the war. Since the war, at least during the past two years,
has not been having a seriously adverse impact upon the economy, it is
reasonable to assume that high casualties are a major source of public
distress. There are no authoritative figures for the total number of war dead.
Estimates range from 50,000 to 150,000, and even higher figures have been sug-
gested. In addition, there are at least 100,000 injured and an estimated 1.5
million civilian refugees from Khuzistan Province. Thus, the psychological
impact of this war has been significant. Offensives which have been costly in
human lives and brought only very limited results, have obscured the rationale
for continuing the war. The changed military situation has thus diminished
support for the war, produced a general level of war-weariness, and steadily
increased discontent about its prolongation.

By the end of 1983 there had still not developed any consensus among the
ruling elite regarding a satisfactory way to conclude the war. After 18
months of unpectacular offensives against Iraq on its own territory, military
leaders and key civilian leaders alike seem to believe that Iraq cannot be de-
defeated militarily. Instead Iran's leaders focus on bringing about Iraq's
economic collapse. Iranians are aware of the desperate plight of the Iraqi
economy—a major consequence of the drastic reduction in Iraq's oil exports.
Iran has been frustrated, however, by Iraq's ability to continue to export
modest amounts of oil via a pipeline running from its northern fields
through Turkey, as well as by Iraq's close relations with France and the

A major obstacle to the termination of hostilities with Iraq is
Khomeini's attitude. The Ayatollah is determined to have the secular regime
in Iraq overthrown and replaced by an Islamic republic. Part of Khomeini's
antagonism toward the Ba'ath regime derives from his 13 years of exile living
in the Shi'ite religious city of Najaf in southern Iraq. His residence
coincided with the implementation of many secular government programs which both stripped the Shi'ite clergy of their influential role in Iraqi society and alienated them from the regime. Thus, Khomeini developed a hatred for Iraq's Ba'ath party which is long-standing and deep-rooted. He feels that the same faith and pressure that toppled the secular regime in Iran can work to bring down an equally vicious (in his view) government in Baghdad. For that reason Khomeini has insisted that the war should not end until the Iraqi President and the Ba'ath party are removed from power. It is doubtful that other members of the clerical and lay elite share Khomeini's commitment. The more politically astute members of the khatt-i imam group probably have far fewer illusions about the ease of instigating a revolutionary movement in Iraq.

Nevertheless, up through the end of 1982, no political leader has convinced Khomeini to reassess his policy toward the war with Iraq. It is instructive to note that when pressure for such a reassessment was mounting in late October 1982 and a number of Shi'ite clerics seemed convinced of the unpopularity of the war and of the necessity for peace, rumors in high circles had it that Khomeini's son, Ahmad, leaked statements from Khomeini's will instructing the nation to continue the war, and to avoid all compromise until the liberation of the Shi'ite holy cities of Iraq.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have traced the development of the revolutionary movement of the Shī'a clergy under the leadership of Ayatollāh Ruḥollāh Khomēnī from its inception in 1952 to its overthrow of the Shah in 1979, and have examined Khomēnī's subsequent attempt to create an Islamic theocracy in Iran. The movement of the militant Shī'a clergy has been set in the context of the contemporary Islamic revival in Iran. The clergy's attempt to set up an Islamic theocracy has been considered from the perspective of the historical evolution of Shi'ism.

The record of the militant clergy since their direct seizure of power in November 1978 has been one of ruthless determination to eliminate all opposition to theocratic rule, and of energetic dedication to the building of a theocratic society. In this way to make Islamic theocracy a concrete reality imbued in a permanent legal order. In a relatively short period of time, the militant Shī'a clergy has succeeded in shrewdly outmanoeuvring all their political opponents, in establishing their control over the armed forces, and in creating a formidable apparatus of repression which they have shown no hesitation in putting to full use.

However, Khomēnī's militant followers were originally only one group among the Shī'a clergy, and his theory of Islamic theocratic government is an innovation without precedent in the history of Shi'ism. Therefore, as the novel forms of human society, the long-term viability of the Islamic theocracy requires that Khomēnī's charismatic legitimacy be converted into a legal order which is believed to be in accordance with the tenets of Shi'ism. As with all charismatic leadership, the problem of succession to Khomēnī...
poses perhaps the greatest threat of disintegration to the regime. The ruling clergy have shown considerable determination to deal with these matters while Khomeini is alive. The sustained efforts which are being made to popularize the theory of theocratic government and the election of an Assembly of Experts, which has received the Imam's instructions on the issue of succession, greatly enhance the prospects for the survival of the regime after Khomeini's death.

The broad acceptance of the principles of legitimacy of theocratic government, and more directly the successful solution to the problem of succession—which incidentally entails not only consensus on the choice of successor(s) but, more crucially, the qualities of the successor(s) and his (or their) ability to lead and to rule—bear on the ability of the ruling clerical elite to remain united, or at least capable of concerted political action, despite internal differences and divisions. The less such intra-sector disputes over the legitimacy and precise meaning of velayat-e faqih, and the less bitter the quarrels over Khomeini's succession, the more likely the ruling clergy are to survive Khomeini as a reasonably unified political elite of an Islamic theocracy in Iran.

Differences exist between the typically older conservative clerical personalities with ties to the bazaar and the propertied traditional urban middle classes, and the typically younger radical followers of the line of the Imam whose careers have been largely or entirely devoted to political and ideological activities. Furthermore, the life experience of the conservative clerics makes them familiar with the daily social functioning of the Shi'ite religion in its traditional setting. They are therefore less likely to dismiss the traditional position on the separation of religious authority and government as merely an imperialist plot. The likelihood of doctrinal
differences and conflicting socio-economic attitudes which could produce an irreparable rift within the Shi'ite clergy is real. However, Khomeini is fully conscious of this possibility and is determined to avoid it in at least three ways: (a) by impressing upon the Shi'ite clergy that velayat-e faqih, though a divergence from the Shi'ite tradition, is in the interest of the clergy and that clerics can only gain by its acceptance; (b) by reminding the Shi'ite clergy of the dire prospects of division and the bitter memory of its consequences during the Constitutional Revolution; and (c) most importantly, by increasing organizational controls over the Shi'ite clergy, through the conventions and hierarchical organizations of the Imam Ja'mehs, the reorganization of the seminaries, and the codification of the Sacred Law which is said to put an end to the era of individual ijtehad (religious-legal endeavor) and to open an age of collective and organized clerical interpretation and administration of the Sacred Law.

The observers who have predicted the imminent demise of the regime of the Mullahs in Iran have constantly underestimated not only the political astuteness of the ruling clergy, but also their resolve and determination, and their sense of historical mission. More seriously, they underestimate the fact that the ruling clergy sees its fate as irrevocably tied to the destiny of the Islamic Republic. Unlike the Shah and the political and military elite of the previous regime, they have nowhere to go to outside of Iran, and are committed to defending the regime and to fight for it to the last man.

Divisive factors are most successfully kept at bay when the energy of the militant clergy is fully absorbed in achieving the common goal of the establishment of Islamic theocracy through institution-building and through ideological control of existing institutions. Since 1979, militant clerics have manned the Islamic Revolutionary Courts which have meted out summary
justice to "the enemies of God" and "the corruptors on earth," and have devoted themselves to the enforcement of Islamic morals with increasing firmness. They have also created and manned the "Political-Ideological Bureau" of the various branches of the armed forces and governmental agencies in addition to over ten thousand clerics who have joined various revolutionary bodies, some 300 have entered the Judiciary in order to enforce this new institution of the Islamic theocracy. Many more are serving as Jamatkhana, and are engaged in making the Friday Congregational prayer into the basis for another new institution of theocracy with an integrated and centralized structure. In short, the process of institutionalization of the totalitarian theocratic state is underway, setting up a framework and general direction of the Shi'ite theocracy.

The revolutionary kindness of the various and more specialized vigilante and punitive units set up by the ruling clergy have established an effective and continuous reign of terror which sustains clerical domination over Iran. This oppressive nature of the theocracy makes organized opposition and protest in Iran impossible. However, the various indicators considered in the above pages point to widespread discontent and dissatisfaction with the theocratic regime in many segments of Iranian society. Khominei and the ruling clergy seem aware of the long-term corrosive effects of extensive disaffection and seek to counter it. Interestingly, they attach great importance to the forthcoming Majlis election as the decisive test of the popularity of the theocratic regime.6 These elections thus seem to deserve close scrutiny as an

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6It is almost an unspoken convention of the ilk (includes its Western allies) that Khomeini, on the other hand, on the other hand, has been constantly extorting the people to prove their loyalty to Iran by participating.
indicator of the success or failure of the first attempt by Khomeini and the ruling clergy to mobilize Iranians nationwide since the consolidation of Islamic theocracy.

In the forthcoming sections for the second Majlis, the Majlis itself also receives the challenges of a crucial test, as indicated by its careful and prolonged debates over the electoral law and the requirements for candidacy in January and February 1984.
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