# Juarez and the Mexican Republic During the French Intervention: Government Under Crisis

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**Distribution Statement:** Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

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**Supplementary Notes:**  
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree at the University of Texas at Austin.

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**Key Words:** History of Mexico, Nineteenth Century Liberalism, Benito Juarez, Nineteenth Century Mexican Government, Mexican Bureaucracy, Mexican Revenue Administration, Latin American History.

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**Abstract:**  
The republican government of Benito Juarez left Mexico City on May 31, 1863, to flee the occupying forces of the Second French Empire and returned on July 15, 1867, after the withdrawal of the French and the defeat of the Mexican imperial government. Despite imperial occupation of major cities and ports, Juarez continued to exercise governing authority over a significant portion of the Mexican body politic. Examination of the federal government's revenue system, bureaucracy, and communications provides insights into the
Block 20, ABSTRACT, (continued).

Although the role and influence of the federal government was understandably diminished by the French occupation of most major population centers and sources of revenue, Juarez took extraordinary measures to consolidate his leadership over various parts of the republican resistance. These efforts had far reaching impact on the relationship of federal and state authority and the development and control of federal institutions of government, especially in northern Mexico. Archival research in this field promises to lend further insight into the nature of Mexican governance in this period and its relationship to the Mexican people.
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GOVERNMENT UNDER CRISIS

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Final Report, 2 May 1984

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APPROVED:

[Signature]

Nancy M. Barker
This is dedicated to my patient wife,  
whose encouragement sustains me as she will never know.
JUÁREZ AND THE MEXICAN REPUBLIC DURING THE FRENCH INTERVENTION:
GOVERNMENT UNDER CRISIS

BY

JOHN MARTIN WILLIAMSON, B.S.

THESIS
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

May 1984
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although this project is humble compared to the many extensive works she has inspired and supervised, I wish to acknowledge the singular role Professor Nettie Lee Benson has played in its development. As students and faculty will readily attest, her extraordinary knowledge of Mexican historiography is exceeded only by her dedication and professionalism as a teacher and mentor. She first raised the question, "What was Juárez doing during the Intervention" in a seminar in the fall of 1982. Thus she conceived this project, she identified resources available in the Benson Latin American Collection, and she contributed her commonsense and insight. She is unquestionably the greatest resource a student could have. I am also indebted to the librarians and staff of the Latin American Collection who are most efficient and cordial in their assistance with the library's resources. Finally, friends and acquaintances in the Latin American Collection have shared ideas and responded to mine on the subject at hand which has been both enjoyable and beneficial. Nevertheless, any shortcomings in this report are entirely my own.

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INTRODUCTION

Historiography and Perspective

From May 31, 1863 to July 15, 1867, the republican government of Benito Juárez regressed into northern Mexico as the Second Empire under Maximilian occupied much of the nation. The historiography of this period of Mexican history generally focuses on the actions of the imperial government and gives only passing comment to the existence and actions of the republican government under Benito Juárez. This neglect is ostensibly due to the relatively sparse resources available on the activities of the Juárez government or perhaps reflects the assumption common to so much work in nineteenth century Mexican history that Mexico City represents the sum of Mexican experience in any given age. After the collapse of the Empire in 1867, Juárez was able to rapidly consolidate national government in Mexico City, keeping alive the initiatives won in the Wars of the Reform. The rapid extinction of the imperial government and the equally rapid reestablishment of republican government suggests that greater insights are needed into the actions of Juárez during his absence from Mexico City, and into the nature and status of republican governance at this point in the nineteenth century.

The events of the 1860's were the culmination of a conflict which derived from fundamental disagreements over how Mexican society was to be
ordered. On the one hand, the conservatives sought to protect and preserve a society in which corporations were the elemental components of the body politic and liberals sought a social and political order founded on the individual. Interlaced in these issues were the shifting loyalties of regional interests, though perhaps having a preference in this fundamental debate, wished above all to preserve their local prerogatives over their destinies. This conflict exploded with the liberal rejection of the centralist government of Santa Anna in 1855 and the promulgation of the liberal program in several decrees which were subsequently formalized in the Constitution of 1857. The issue was not to be settled so easily and the War of the Reform ensued from 1858 to 1860.

The Intervention was precipitated by the decision of the Juárez government in the summer of 1861 to suspend payment on foreign debt due to the general fiscal incapacity of the victorious liberal government emerging from the War of the Reform. Napoleon III forged an alliance with England and Spain to occupy the port of Veracruz, Mexico's prime maritime port, and extract payment's due on the foreign debt from customs duties. Spanish troops were the first to land in December 1861, and shortly thereafter, growing chary of Napoleon's grand designs for the Intervention, the British and Spanish withdrew from the enterprise. Undaunted, Napoleon III collaborated with Mexican conservatives to install a European prince on a Mexican throne while the United States was preoccupied with its own civil war.

The occupation of Mexico by imperial forces was made in phases
and provides an essential perspective for an investigation into the republican experience in the same period. As the French landed at Veracruz, many conservative Mexicans declared their loyalty to the Empire and joined forces with and promoted the imperial cause. The French and conservative Mexican forces fought their way inland in the spring of 1862 only to be defeated at the now famous Battle of Puebla on May 5. Imperial forces withdrew to Veracruz to reorganize and await reinforcements from France for the remainder of 1862 and commenced another inland campaign in the spring of 1863. After a two month siege at Puebla, Juárez left Mexico City with his government headed for San Luis Potosí on May 31, 1863, and the Empire took the nation's capital in June. The imperial advance forced Juárez to Saltillo in December 1863 while the French occupied or blockaded the nation's principal ports.

By the early months of 1864, the Empire occupied the capitals of the nation's central states. About half of the states, principally those in the extreme north and south, remained nominally under republican control. Several of these were plagued with internal political disputes within the liberal camp while waging a constant battle against brigands and conservative guerillas. In May 1864, Maximilian arrived at Veracruz and in June he took his place at the head of the imperial government in Mexico City. The reign of Maximilian was complicated by the fact that he was a liberal, as were the the monarchs of Europe in that era. Later that year, French forces campaigned against Gen. Porfirio Díaz in the south and maneuvered to drive Juárez out of the nation in the north while further tightening control on the nation's maritime ports. In August,
Juárez was forced from Monterrey, and he established his capital in Chihuahua in October. By Christmas 1864, Juárez had lost all maritime ports on the Caribbean coast while the French tried to extend their occupation to the principal cities in western Mexico.

Both imperial and republican governments faced internal crisis amid the ongoing war in 1865. General dissatisfaction spread among conservative supporters of the Empire as Maximilian increasingly displayed his liberal credentials. Many republicans became dismayed at the decision of Juárez to extend his term in office to the end of the war as his elected term expired on the last day of November that year. On the military front, the Empire sought to suppress the strongholds of republican guerilla resistance and in the fall tried to push Juárez out of the nation through the northern border. The records of the Empire amply suggest that imperial forces handed the beleaguered republicans a defeat at virtually every encounter. Nevertheless, those same records suggest that the republicans presented a constant challenge to the Empire and were seemingly present in the vast territories not physically controlled by imperial forces. At the ebb tide for the republican government, Juárez and his ministers were in Paso del Norte and only six state capitals were not governed by imperial rule.

As the victory of the North became imminent in the United States Civil War, the U.S. government placed increasing pressure on Napoleon III to withdraw troops from Mexico. This and spreading discontent in France made the French participation in the Intervention painful if not untenable. Despite the supplications of the Mexican Empress Carlota,
Napoleon III announced plans to withdraw French troops in phases beginning in 1866 and the tide turned against the Empire. The decline of the Empire was precipitous as many conservatives had already given up the fight and monarchist liberals readily switched loyalty to Juárez as French troops withdrew. The hapless Maximilian was captured with the remnants of his imperial army at Querétaro on May 15, 1867, tried by court martial, and executed on June 19. After careful preparations, Juárez reentered Mexico City on July 15 amid triumphant celebration. The monarchist movement was dead and the radical conservatives of the Church party would not be heard from again until the next century. Juárez again addressed himself to the consolidation of the liberal victory of the Reform on a nation-wide basis.

The literature offering insights into republican activities during the Intervention is very limited. A dissertation by Robert C. Overfelt provides an invaluable chronology of events and a bibliography of sources which offer a basis for further investigation. Also useful are the biographical histories of Ralph Roeder on Juárez and Frank A. Knapp on Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada. Roeder's work unfortunately lacks documentation of the diverse sources consulted in his research. Much of his research on the Intervention seems to rest on imperial sources, while specific insights into the actions and thoughts of Juárez are drawn from his correspondence with his son-in-law, Pedro Santacilia. Knapp's work offers insights into the relationships between Juárez and his ministers that stayed with him throughout the fight, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada and José María Iglesias, as well as some suggestions of their interests and
abilities during their absence from Mexico City. Yet these works cite only scattered initiatives of the republican President and their style and content do not support a perception of an ongoing process of republican governance.1

Other works on the period provide useful perspectives on events while not independently supporting conclusions about the status of republican governance in the period. For example, Jack Audrey Dabbs' study on the French Army in Mexico offers a useful study of the nature and extent of the French occupation of key cities and ports as well as operations against the republican forces. State histories of various Mexican states supply many details of local events which were the motive force of many republican actions during the period. Examples include Jesús Romero Flores's Historia de Michoacán, and Primo Feliciano Velázquez's Historia de San Luis Potosí. Finally the work of Paul Vanderwood on the Mexican rural police force (rurales) provides a valuable perspective on the function and causes of brigandage in the third quarter of the century.2

Yet what is lacking is a critical review of the Juárez government in this period of crisis. How did he govern, or indeed, did he govern? What was the nature of the republican government through this period? How can insights into this period contribute to a fuller understanding of the evolution of liberal institutions of government emerging from the Wars of the Reform? What can be said concerning the legitimacy and popular support of the Juárez government at this time? These are some of the significant questions that arise when contemplating this troubled
passage in Mexican history. This investigation does not presume to provide answers to these large questions, but merely seeks to refine our perceptions of the actions and role of the Juárez government in its absence from Mexico City from May 1863 to July 1867. It is hoped that this study will contribute insights relevant to the broader issues of the period.

An effort is also needed to evaluate the role of this period in the greater context of the nineteenth century evolution of Mexican governance. Most general histories seek to bridge the two countervailing realities of the century. According to popular perceptions, the Mexican nation was born into political chaos and ended the century in authoritarian orderliness. The dichotomy would perhaps be better characterized in terms of the relative strength of the executive versus the legislative branch of government. Legislative superiority and jealous efforts to prevent the institutionalization of presidential authority beyond tightly drawn boundaries created the superficial evidence now generally viewed as political chaos. The regional representation of the legislature perhaps tended to tolerate the perpetuation of strong local leaders who engaged in the struggle to delimit national authority over the states. Undeniably the republic had undergone a tremendous political transformation by the end of the century evidenced by the consolidation of liberal reforms and facilitated by railroadization in the Porfiriato.

Many authors assume that emergence of executive superiority and consolidation of federal authority over the states was the product of
Porfirian politics and make little effort to identify the roots of this process. For example, Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman note that Porfirio Díaz adroitly moved governors and military commanders around in the nation to keep local political chiefs from mobilizing against his authority. Daniel Cosío Villegas improves upon this perception by demonstrating that the process of consolidating federal authority was in progress under Juárez in the Restored Republic and that Díaz merely improved upon centralizing policies and tactics instituted by Juárez. He notes for example that Juárez used the extraordinary powers granted him for the duration of the Intervention through December 8, 1867 and replaced at least two governors who voiced opposition to his Convocatorio in the fall of 1867. The unsuccessful and controversial measure contained five constitutional amendments aimed at enhancing the power of the executive relative to the legislative branch to be voted on in a plebiscite thus circumventing the provisions of the Constitution of 1857 for amending the Constitution. This illustrates at once the concern of Juárez with the balance of power between the federal branches of government and his tactics employed to keep local opposition in check. But during the Intervention, Juárez appointed governors to states with no apparent regard for the domicile of the appointee and suspended sitting constitutional state governments to cement his control over the republican resistance in various states. Therefore, this investigation suggests that the program of extending central authority was actively pursued throughout the Intervention and significant progress was made toward consolidating federal authority, especially in northern Mexico.
This investigation commenced with the objective of finding out what Juárez did during the Intervention. The scope subsequently broadened as it became apparent from the sources available that significant insights could be gained into the nature of Mexican republican governance at this point in the century. Specifically, the relationship of federal authority to various state authorities and the status of institutional development at the federal level have come into focus through this effort. As a unifying theme, this report explores the question, did Juárez govern? The answer is not one but many perspectives lending insight into the relative strength of imperial occupation, loyalties of local republican leaders, and the practical limitations imposed by the geographical distance between the migratory Juárez government and the various locales.

A Model of Governance

To facilitate and organize this report, the following model of governance is offered. Seemingly throughout history, and certainly in the recent past, human government rests on four key dimensions: revenue, bureaucracy, communication, and control. These four aspects of human governance demonstrate a synergistic relationship, but generally the first three play a decisive role in sustaining the function of the last. That is, operating revenue, a loyal officialdom, and the ability to communicate enable a ruling authority to effect control. The absence of any of the four should lead one to seriously question the effectiveness and viability of the alleged authority. Ultimately, the effective
function of a government signifies the coalescence of the wills of the governed and their rulers. This model does not discount the critical role of the loyalties of leaders in the constituent parts of the nation, but seeks to focus first on the mechanics of governance and to assess the national government's capacity to govern.

It is conceivable that in the temporary absence of operating revenue an existing ruling institution might persist on the strength of a loyal officialdom, yet over time one must seriously question if it has been reduced from being a government to being merely a symbol of the aspirations of a social body. Revenue was a persistent problem during the first half-century of Mexican national history and was aggravated by the exigencies of foreign occupation during the French Intervention. Nevertheless, there was a system of revenue collection and management which has received practically no study.

All governments necessarily need a corps of officials through which policy and administration are effected. The Mexican bureaucracy of the last century has received scant development on a systematic basis, though the organization, size, and function of the federal corps of officials has great implications for the understanding of Mexican governance. A thorough analysis of the nation's bureaucracy must ascertain its size and organization, the system of remuneration used to support public offices, the manner of recruitment and criteria for selection of officials, and its loyalty and responsiveness to the wishes of the national government. Most of these issues must await archival research but preliminary findings are supported in the sources developed
herein. There was a substantial officialdom serving the national government through which policy and administration were effected. The extent to which these officials were accountable and responsive to national authorities needs much development as does the question of the manner and source of their remuneration.

Similarly, the loss of communication would seemingly reduce a body politic to the perpetuation of static policies or limit higher ruling authority to merely sanctioning policy decisions effected autonomously at lower levels. This subject requires sensitivity to the technological limits which all governments were subject to in the last century. The central location of the federal government in Mexico City made government of the nation feasible within certain limitations. Even under optimal conditions, the process of governance was heavily dependent on the judgement of officials located in remote reaches of the nation. As the Juárez government migrated northward, stopping finally on the nation's northern border, its capacity to carry on routine correspondence with the southern parts of the nation was understandably diminished. The inability of a government to communicate within its jurisdiction forebodes serious problems in mobilizing and coordinating resources and in giving the body politic direction and purpose.

Therefore, the relevance of this model to the republican government during the French Intervention is clear. An investigation into the question of the role and activities of the Juárez government during its absence from Mexico City must encompass all four. Insights into its ability to control a base of revenue, the size and loyalty of
the nation's bureaucracy, and the limitations on communications in this period should demonstrate the mechanical and practical aspects of government in republican areas. Together, these provide an important perspective in evaluating the apparent successes and failures of Juárez to direct and control the body politic in the Mexican nation. The actions and abilities of his government in this period of crisis illuminate the status and nature of Mexican republican government and its relationship to the Mexican people in this era.

This report follows the pattern of the preceding model of governance. First the revenue base of the Mexican nation is examined with a focus on the existence of routine practices of revenue management and the changing revenue resources of the Juárez government during various phases of the Intervention. Next, the organization, size, and function of the nation's bureaucratic corps is reviewed with emphasis on the treasury bureaucracy. The communication facilities of the federal government are examined next, comparing communications while the government remained in Mexico City with those in evidence while the government travelled in northern Mexico. Finally, attention is turned to the control exercised by the republican government, noting first the limitations on control exercised by the imperial government, then the measures available for the President to gain control over local events when federal authority was contested, and ending with four state case studies which illustrate the range of experience of the federal government in its relations with various regions in the nation.

From a correlation of republican laws and decrees,
correspondence, and consular reports, it is clear that during his absence from Mexico City, Juárez actively sought to govern areas not under occupation by the Empire and to direct the resistance in many areas ostensibly in the imperial domain. As the Intervention progressed, his success was increasingly circumscribed by the loss of many key population centers and sources of revenue, and the ability of the national government to exercise control was determined by the strength and loyalties of local republican leaders. Continued research and analysis promise to lend valuable insights into the nature of Mexican republican institutions in this period and deeper understanding of the matrix of regional variations which characterize Mexican political realities of the nineteenth century.
### Timetable of the Nomadic Republic

**Place** | **Arrived** | **Departed** | **Residence Months Days Route** | **Travel Time by Days**
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Mexico | May 31, 1863 | | | 9
San Luis Potosi | June 9, 1863 | December 22, 1863 | 6 13 | Mexico to San Luis Potosi
Saltillo | January 9, 1864 | February 10, 1864 | 11 | San Luis Potosi to Saltillo
Monterrey | February 12, 1864 | February 14, 1864 | 3 | Saltillo to Monterrey
Saltillo | February 14, 1864 | April 2, 1864 | 1 16 | Monterrey to Saltillo
Monterrey | April 2, 1864 | August 15, 1864 | 4 13 | Saltillo to Monterrey
Chihuahua | October 12, 1864 | August 5, 1865 | 8 24 | Monterrey to Chihuahua
Paso del Norte | August 14, 1865 | November 13, 1865 | 2 29 | Chihuahua to Paso del Norte
Chihuahua | November 20, 1865 | December 9, 1865 | 19 | Paso del Norte to Chihuahua
Paso del Norte | December 18, 1865 | June 10, 1866 | 5 23 | Paso del Norte to Chihuahua
Chihuahua | June 17, 1866 | December 10, 1866 | 5 23 | Chihuahua to Durango
Durango | December 26, 1866 | January 14, 1867 | 19 | Durango to Zacatecas
Zacatecas | January 22, 1867 | February 2, 1867 | (7) | Durango to Zacatecas
San Luis Potosi | February 21, 1867 | July 3(?), 1867 | 4 (7) | Zacatecas to San Luis Potosi
Mexico | July 15, 1867 | | | (7) San Luis Potosi to Mexico

Total time absent: 4 years, 1 month, 15 days.
Estimated time en route: 6 months.
Approximation.

**Source:** Knapp, *The Life of Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada*, pp. 80-81.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER I

REVENUE

A Perspective on Revenue

The success of a government rests in large measure on its ability to obtain and allocate wealth under its jurisdiction for the purpose of securing essential functions and services. Although this was a fundamental and persistent problem throughout the first half-century of Mexican national history, it should not be assumed that it was due to a total lack of system or policy with regard to taxation and revenue management. On the contrary, an examination of correspondence and decrees of this period suggests that there was an exhaustive body of law and widely known standard practices related to the collection and management of revenue. The extraordinary and dire circumstances which confronted the Mexican nation in the two generations preceding the Intervention simply placed demands on the revenue system which exceeded resources and precluded the creation of a stable and consistent balance of expenditures and income.

This troubled passage in Mexican history should be regarded as a phase in the consolidation of federal authority in several key areas of revenue administration. Much work is needed to reconstruct the mechanics
of revenue management in the period; meanwhile, the historian is forced to consider only tentative conclusions. Until archival records of tax receipts, bureaucratic reports, and expenditures are examined and evaluated, the student of the period must carefully weigh his assumptions about the nature of the Mexican political and bureaucratic system at the time of the Intervention. Many assume that nineteenth century Mexican history is characterized by an absence of regular governmental procedure and focus on the changes of top political leadership to verify this perception. Yet one could as effectively assume that decrees were often published due to the need to deviate from a standard procedure. Operating on the negative assumptions noted above, one might interpret every seemingly desperate action of the Juárez government to acquire revenue during the Intervention as evidence of its incapacity. An understanding of the nature of the Mexican body politic in this period would be better advanced by seeking the evidence of a degree of regularity in practice reflected in the published decrees and correspondence.

This chapter seeks to evaluate evidence of standard and regular revenue practice reflected in the theory and practice of federal revenue administration at the time of the Intervention, and the trends in revenue management and sources of revenue during three phases of the Intervention. The administration of federal revenue underwent rapid decentralization from invasion in December 1861 until the French defeat at Puebla. This was followed by a 22 month recentralization effort by the Juárez government with limited success. Finally, Juárez acceded to
practical needs of ongoing military operations and delegated broad authority to regional commanders. In the final analysis, the results of such an investigation have significant implications with regard to the ruling capacity of the Juárez government during its absence from Mexico City.

Theory and Practice of Federal Revenue Administration

The revenue base of the Mexican nation in the middle of the nineteenth century was divided between the various levels of government under the federal system. Generally taxes on external trade, mint operations, tobacco, mail, the national lottery, and foreign merchandise, and revenue from the sale of nationalized property and unsettled federal lands were reserved for the national government. Additionally all revenue generated within the Federal District and territories fell under federal jurisdiction. Of these the most lucrative and readily controlled were the customs revenues. States generated revenue through taxes on textile mills, internal trade, and other taxes not reserved for the national government. The states were obligated in theory to contribute a monthly amount to the federal treasury apportioned to the relative wealth of each state's economy.¹

There are mixed indications of the effectiveness of this revenue system in the Mexican body politic on the eve of the Intervention. For example, there is evidence in correspondence that the federal standards governing federal and state jurisdictions over revenue sources were
honored in at least some states. In March 1862, Gen. Jesús González Ortega requested specific authority from Juárez to divert federal tax revenue from a merchant house in Zacatecas to the mobilization of forces in that state. He additionally requested that federal funds from the ports at Mazatlán and Tampico be allocated for the forces in San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, and Aguascalientes. In addition to indicating the governor's respect for federal revenue jurisdictions, this correspondence suggests that González Ortega recognized in the federal treasury a rather sophisticated capacity for communication and revenue management. It is significant that González Ortega addressed federal authorities in Mexico City to gain access to funds dispersed in port facilities as diverse as Tampico and Mazatlán.

Conversely, there are indications as well that the leadership in other states largely disregarded federal theory and routinely collected and dispersed funds from sources which were supposed to be reserved for the federal government. For example, the governor of Nuevo León and Coahuila, Santiago Vidaurri, wrote Juárez in March of 1862 concerning the state of affairs in Tamaulipas. He requested a free hand in Tamaulipas and proposed to determine why the customs houses in that state had not produced revenue for the federal treasury for seven years. The perennial struggles between local political leaders and the extreme localism which marked that state's politics no doubt accounted for the routine diversion of federal revenue to local purposes. It is ironic that Vidaurri would offer to represent the federal government's revenue interests in Tamaulipas since he became increasingly recalcitrant in refusing to meet
federal obligations and turn over federal funds collected in his states.³ Therefore it is evident that the federal theory of dividing the revenue base between state and national governments was unevenly observed on the eve of the Intervention. Pending further investigation, it seems likely that many states routinely observed federal jurisdictions while others with long histories of extreme localism did not.

Whether the authority of the federal treasury in Mexico City was recognized in the diverse reaches of the nation, the mechanical means to direct revenue matters were available. Large sums of money could be transferred over long distances without fear of theft through the use of commercial bills of exchange (libranzas). This is illustrated in the transfer of tax revenue from Aguascalientes to the federal treasury in six bills of trade in August 1862. Additionally, when Gen. Ignacio Comonfort was assassinated in November 1863, he was carrying 47,400 pesos in bills of exchange from a federal treasury office to a distant military headquarters. The assistant to the Minister of War corresponded with the commercial house of Larrache and Company requesting reimbursement of the lost bills. It appears from the series of correspondence that the treasury was eventually reimbursed although the bills were never recovered. Another example is the transfer of 1000 pesos in 1865 from the federal treasury to Matías Romero in Washington, D.C. for him to expedite to the Mexican prisoners of war held in France. Bills of exchange were drawn on the treasury office in Chihuahua and were routed through the customs house at Paso del Norte to Santa Fe where they were to be redeemed for Mexican silver pesos. From there additional bills
were to be purchased for the transfer to Washington, D. C. payable to Matías Romero. 4

Therefore the relationship of the theory and practice of federal revenue management was not uniform across the nation at the time of the Intervention. The mechanical capacity to direct revenue matters was present and the success of central treasury administration depended ostensibly on the loyalties of local political leadership. This was a characteristic of Mexican federalism which did not originate in the intervention but persisted from previous generations. In some areas, pressures of warfare aggravated ongoing problems of revenue management and in other areas completely frustrated it. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a standard system of revenue administration and the Juárez government generally sought to protect it.

Invasion to the Battle of Puebla

(December 1861 to May 1862)

The foreign invasion placed extreme centrifugal pressures on the federal system of revenue at the same time Juárez was working to protect and consolidate federal authority. The initial mobilization effort demanded rapid dispersal of funds, thus governors were extended extraordinary authority over federal revenue within their states. In the mobilization decree of December 17, 1861, the Congress authorized governors to draw revenue from federal treasury offices located within their states and to allocate proceeds of federal revenue sources to the activation of state militia and national guard forces. This authority
was to continue only as long as required for the governors to muster and deploy in federal service the required troop contingents under the mobilization decree. This action fulfilled the constitutional obligation of the federal government to pay for the service of state forces while in federal service.5

Thus the pressing needs of mobilization forced Juárez to adopt policies that were at cross-purposes to the preservation of federal authority over the administration of revenue. Nevertheless he sought to preserve the essential aspects of the federal revenue system. From the time of the invasion of European forces until the French defeat at Puebla, Juárez issued five decrees annulling various state laws which violated federal jurisdictions with regard to management of revenue. For example, in January 1862, he annulled a Sinaloa decree which sought to place restrictions on foreign trade in the state and a Colima law which taxed interstate trade (alcabala), thus attempting to enforce the constitutional prohibitions against those practices. In March, he annulled a Michoacán law which restricted foreign trade and another Sinaloa law, this one claiming title of federal land for the state. In April he annulled a Chihuahua law which claimed revenue proceeds from the sale of federal land in the state.6

The length of time from the promulgation of the objectionable state law to the action of the federal government declaring them unconstitutional reveals interesting insights into the federal administration of revenue in this period. The annulling of the Colima decree came three weeks after the promulgation of the state law. The
Michoacán law was declared unconstitutional only 15 days after its issue and the Sinaloa law of 25 March was invalidated nine weeks after its release. For the federal government to be apprised of state legal initiatives in a timely fashion, it seems likely that either the states provided a copy of new laws to the federal government, federal officials in the states reported state developments to the federal government, or officials in Mexico City were able to follow state events in the press or in private correspondence. Only in the case of Chihuahua did the federal action come a substantial period of time after the publishing of the state ordinance, invalidating laws dating from 1857, 1858, and January and October 1861. This seemingly illustrates the relative strength of federal revenue administration in the various reaches of the nation. The more central states were in closer contact with the federal government and were likely connected with a routine system of official communications. Chihuahua, like Nuevo León-Coahuila and Tamaulipas, was probably outside the orbit of routine federal control and communication in matters of revenue.

Despite the efforts of Juárez to protect federal revenue jurisdictions, routine federal levies were not sufficient to support the demands placed on the treasury. The financial straits of commanders in the field in this early phase of the Intervention illustrates this fact. For example, Gen. Felipe M. Berriozábal wrote to Juárez in March 1862 and concluded, "I have faith, and I have will; but I don't have a single peso nor the wherewithal to get it without instructions from the government."7 In this regard, Matías Romero notes that the civil war had not been
effectively terminated in many parts of the nation. While reactionary bands were not able to control any locale for an extended period of time and they held no key population centers, their activities provided a drag on economic activity, frustrated the routine collection of federal taxes, and placed burdens on the federal treasury. The federal government entered the fiscal year from July 1861 to June 1862 (FY 1861) with a budget of a little over 8 million pesos and he estimates that actual expenditures amounted to over 15 million pesos.\textsuperscript{8}

Comment on routine sources of revenue is notably absent in the decrees and correspondence of the Juárez government in these early months of the Intervention. It is interesting that with the exception of the constitutional actions of Juárez noted above, there is little record of an effort being made to gain tighter control over such revenue sources such as mint operations, the state contribution (contribución del estado or contiyente), customs, stamped paper (papel sellado), or the sale of federal lands and corporate property nationalized by the Reform. It is clear that customs revenue was immediately diminished by the occupation of Veracruz by the Triple Alliance and successive occupations and blockades of other ports imposed by the French. One cannot assume that silence on these issues denotes full compliance with federal standards as is illustrated in the failure of certain northern customs houses to surrender revenue to the federal treasury. Perhaps the lack of official communication reflecting attempts to gain control over routine sources of revenue suggests that the government was reasonably sure that it already controlled that which it could feasibly control given the state of
federal institutions in the nation. That is to say, revenue constitutionally belonging to the federal government but appropriated by local authorities was probably not seen as reasonably within the reach of federal authorities in view of the strength and loyalties of local leaders. The interpretation of this apparent lack of concern with conventional sources of revenue is open to debate and must await archival research for more satisfying answers.

Due to the extreme demands placed on the federal treasury, the Congress decreed a 1% tax on capital valued over 500 pesos in December 1861 and again in February 1862. It is significant that these decrees based this levy on property valuations established in law in the 1830's. This suggests that there was an organized system for the appraisal of property for the purpose of tax collections and that property valuations were known both generally and in treasury offices. Each of these decrees contained explicit instructions for the payment of the levy and established penalties for nonpayment. On June 7, 1862, Juárez issued a decree annulling two Yucatán laws published in February and March that year which suspended the federal tax on capital in that state. Other than this action, there is no mention of this extraordinary tax on capital in correspondence or in official decrees to indicate that the states were reacting to the imposition of this new tax. As a result, there is little to confirm the effectiveness of this levy from the invasion to the French defeat at Puebla. Nevertheless, the immediate loss of the nation's principal source of customs revenue due to imperial occupation of Veracruz in December 1861 and the expenditure of seven
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million pesos in excess of budget noted by Romero suggest that an extraordinary source of operating revenue must have been available in the fiscal year from July 1861 to June 1862. Presumably, much of this expenditure in excess of budget came from this extraordinary tax on capital.

Thus the federal system of revenue management was strained by the advent of additional warfare in the wake of the divisive and costly War of the Reform. The extraordinary demands of mobilization required that the federal government adopt decentralizing policies which frustrated the ongoing effort to consolidate federal institutions. Nonetheless, Juárez acted to preserve federal jurisdictions by declaring certain state laws unconstitutional. One might be tempted to interpret the acts of overturning state laws as an indication of the ineffectiveness of the federal division of the tax base; however, an argument to the contrary is equally convincing. Recall that the state governments were equally pressed in the urgent program of mobilization of state militias, thus they too sought extraordinary means to garner funds. The fact that the federal government was rather quickly informed of these state actions and published responses to them further suggests that there was a large degree of regularity in official communication between the states and the federal government. This is an essential aspect of effective revenue management. The first five months of the Intervention demonstrate the capacities and limitations of the federal system of revenue management. The pattern parallels the loyalties of local political leadership and suggests that subsequent difficulties in controlling revenue must be
weighed in the context of the federal government's experience while still in Mexico City.

Efforts at Recentralization
(May 1862 to March 1864)

After the battle at Puebla on May 5, 1862, Juárez recognized the need to conserve resources for a potentially lengthy war and he began an effort to recentralize revenue management. In the twenty-two months that followed the victory at Puebla, Juárez continued to work to protect federal jurisdictions and additional measures were taken to try to garner essential funds while conventional sources of revenue continued to dwindle. The migration of the Juárez government from Mexico City to Monterrey, through San Luis Potosí and Saltillo, was paralleled by a reduction of the federal government's sphere of influence in treasury matters to the states immediately surrounding it. In this period, control over revenue devolved to progressively lower levels of political and military authority. At the same time, Juárez came into direct conflict with the traditional bastions of extreme localism and extended control over federal institutions in northern states not previously exercised.

On May 13, 1862, and following 5 months of unrestrained spending by the governors, the President issued a decree withdrawing from them the authority to intervene in matters of federal revenue. The reason given was that overwhelming expenditures in the war effort were draining the treasury. It was much easier to extend the privilege than to remove it
as evidenced by the repeated communications of the federal government well into 1863 attempting to delimit the prerogatives of the governors in matters of the federal treasury. In May 1862, Juárez ordered that the governors immediately cease drawing on federal funds. In July the same year, he denied the governors the authority to alter federal taxes on foreign trade and declared any agreements made by them void. In July 1863, Juárez issued a decree addressing the authority of governors and military commanders of states under siege. Their authority was essentially limited to actions vital to the war effort. According to the decree, they were required to submit budgets and they could intervene in the management of federal revenue only in those matters specifically authorized by the President. Later the same month, Juárez issued a decree reiterating the requirement for budgets and establishing federal treasury offices in states where they did not already exist. Whether the governors or military commanders submitted budgets and the actual relationship of governors and commanders to the federal treasury and its offices in the various states is yet unproven and waits further research in archival sources.

The remainder of 1862 witnessed additional attempts by the states to garner revenue through violating federal sovereignty and the commensurate responses of the federal government. In May, Juárez issued a decree annulling a decree of Nuevo León-Coahuila which reduced the width of the free zone along the Rio Bravo by half. On July 7, 1862, Juárez annulled a Querétaro law which sought to modify the application of the federal tax on capital. Later in July and August, Juárez invalidated
decrees of Jalisco and Colima which required the federal treasury office in those states to issue a loan to state citizens. In September, Juárez declared unconstitutional a Zacatecas law which commissioned a state official to have a voice in the dispersal of federal funds in that state.12

These actions reflect the administrative capacity of the federal treasury and, in some measure, suggest the effectiveness of the extraordinary tax on capital. The time from the issuance of the Querétaro decree until Juárez declared it unconstitutional was seven weeks. The Colima-Jalisco laws were invalidated only three weeks after they were published, while the Zacatecas law was suspended by Juárez only eighteen days after it was promulgated. Thus the Juárez government remained in close liaison with these states while his government remained in Mexico City. Additionally, the fact that the Querétaro law attempted to modify the federal tax on capital suggests that indeed the tax was imposed in that state.

Although a fiscal measure of the effectiveness of these tax initiatives might be found in archival sources, there are indications in correspondence that the tax on capital was being imposed and the proceeds were being forwarded to the federal treasury. In August of 1862, the governor of Aguascalientes mentioned in correspondence to Juárez that commercial bills of exchange (libranzas) were being remitted in payment of the 1% tax on capital. In the same month the governor of Chiapas also wrote to Juárez informing him of a tax payment being transmitted along with a troop contingent from the state. Additionally, the governor of
Guerrero wrote that the people of his state were not happy about the federal tax surcharge, probably referring to the same tax on capital.13

Romero estimates that actual expenditures exceeded budgeted expenses in fiscal year July 1862-June 1863. The federal government budgeted to spend just under 10 million pesos during this fiscal year, but estimated actual expenditures were 17.5 million pesos. In view of the increasingly tight French naval blockade of key ports, it appears likely that unconventional sources of revenue provided the difference. Another extraordinary measure undertaken by the federal government to raise operating cash was the issuance of government bonds from September 1862 to May 1863. The Congress authorized the printing of 15 million pesos in bonds to be secured by 50% of the customs revenue, 20% of the state contribution, and 10% of the taxes collected in the Federal District. By the time the federal government departed Mexico City a little less than 4 million pesos worth had been sold and the Minister of the Treasury ordered the remaining unissued bonds burned. There is simply a lack of comment on the administration of the conventional and traditional sources of revenue. Since federal revenues remained relatively high through this fiscal year and customs receipts declined, it appears that other conventional sources of federal revenue likely remained strong while the extraordinary tax on capital and the federal bond issue substantially augmented federal revenue.14

In May 1863, Juárez took the federal government to San Luis Potosi and continued the effort to tighten central control on revenue administration. Matías Romero observes that during the summer and fall
of 1863 these efforts were met with only limited success. He attributes limitations on success to the circumstances of the period. In the context it seems that he is referring to the successive occupation of key population centers and occupation or blockade of ports. In addition to the actions described above he notes that Juárez issued a prohibition for governors and commanders to incur debt in the name of the federal government. It is not clear if such a practice had been authorized up until that time, but it is clear that it was done. The issuance of federal debt obligations by other than federal treasury authorities denotes a serious degeneration of central revenue administration. Much archival work is needed to evaluate the degree of success of these centralizing efforts, but the likely trend was toward direct control of revenue collection and expenditure at progressively lower levels of military and political authority.

Other actions of the Juárez government after its departure from Mexico City further reflect this effort to preserve federal jurisdictions over revenue matters. In August 1863, he issued a warning to the Governor of Michoacán not to alter federal policy on confiscated property lest he be guilty of violating essential rights guaranteed innocent citizens. In September 1863, he directed the Minister of the Treasury to republish the standing laws concerning the division of revenue between the states and the national government and he annulled a Michoacán state decree which altered the federal tax on capital. In October, a Jalisco law was overturned which presumed to force the sale of federal land and nationalized property and keep the proceeds of the sale in the state.
The Michoacán law was invalidated only 17 days after it was published, while the Jalisco law was addressed after a delay of over four months. These mixed indications are not conclusive but in the case of Michoacán it seems apparent that in the early months of the government's stay in San Luis Potosí, the treasury kept close liaison with certain states.

Indications of the relationship of the federal treasury to the ongoing operations of republican military forces are mixed. As part of his program to recentralize revenue administration, Juárez instructed the Minister of the Treasury in August 1863 to issue orders to the federal treasury officials in each state not to disclose the disposition of their revenues to governors, military commanders, or any other official. The justification offered for this was that military commands were reportedly meeting all their essential needs through foraging in their area of operations. This would seemingly indicate that military units were not to be dependent on the federal treasury but were expected to forage supplies in the populations through which they passed.

Juárez published a decree later that same month stating that it had come to his attention that certain military commanders were imposing unauthorized taxes on the towns in their theater of operations. This he said was intolerable and ordered that it stop immediately. To underscore his objections to this practice, Juárez decreed that the treasury would no longer honor any debt incurred by commanders engaged in such practices. This clearly implies that the federal treasury was, at least until the fall of 1863, backing the indebtedness of republican military
forces which they most likely assumed through forced loans. Additional research is needed in archival sources to illuminate further these practices. If debt obligations were indeed being assumed by the federal treasury during the Intervention, then research might uncover some evidence of the redemption of such debentures or acceptance of them in lieu of tax obligations during the Restored Republic.  

The revenue of the federal government in fiscal year 1863-1864 declined dramatically as the Empire tightened its hold on key population centers. Romero observes that in this fiscal year, the only maritime customs house which remained in republican hands was the one at Matamoros. Customs revenue was unusually high there due to the United States Civil War and the blockade of the north bank of the Rio Bravo. Nevertheless, Romero estimates that actual expenditures fell short of budgeted expense for the first time since the invasion, reflecting the loss of key sources of revenue such as the Federal District. Budgeted expenses were 8.5 million pesos while estimated actual expenditures were less than 7 million pesos. To compensate for this decline in revenue, Juárez issued a decree imposing a tax on cotton on July 28, 1863, and another extraordinary tax on capital on July 31, 1863. Another feature of the year following the departure from Mexico City was the effort by the republican government to suppress trade with French controlled areas through licensing and taxing trade.  

The federal government pursued an active role in treasury matters even though it had moved to San Luis Potosí. Apparently, Juárez still expected the state contribution to the federal treasury to be paid even
by states that were occupied by French forces and issued instructions to facilitate it. The governors of states occupied by the imperial forces were directed to liquidate their state's obligation in the nearest federal treasury office not under occupation by the enemy. The respective treasury officials were to render an account to the federal treasury of these tax receipts. Later that month, Juárez issued a decree authorizing the duty free import of corn in the ports of entry at Matamoros, Piedras Negras, and Manzanillo. In November 1863, Juárez increased the authorization for the customs house staff at Mazatlán to facilitate the collection and administration of customs revenue. Unfortunately, the documents which provide these insights do not illuminate the success or failure of these measures.

The actions by Juárez in response to state violations of the federal system of revenue reflect several significant features of revenue administration and political organization in the nation at that time. For example, the fact that governors were seeking to gain access to or control of federal funds suggests that federal revenue collected within the states did represent a significant prize to be seized. Similarly, attempts by governors to alter the manner or timing of remittance of federal taxes demonstrates that indeed the weight of federal exactions were felt in the states. The degree of compliance with the actions of Juárez to suspend state interference in matters of federal revenue is a subject which needs much development. Nevertheless, these actions demonstrate at once the theory and difficulties of the federal division of the revenue base under the pressures of escalating warfare.
Additionally, a significant body of evidence suggests that there was a standard system of revenue management which the President sought to control and preserve through these early phases of the Intervention.

When evaluating the success of Juárez in recentralizing revenue administration from the battle of Puebla to March 1864, the general status of contemporary federal institutions should be kept in mind. The changes and innovations in governmental structures during the middle years of the century were accompanied by commensurate modifications in the administration of the revenue base which were probably slow in being fully implemented. Difficulties in controlling revenue administration did not begin with the Intervention but were exacerbated by the additional demands of war. The following chapter addresses the legislative history of the federal treasury bureaucracy and notes its tentative development midst debates of centralism, federalism, and localism, complicated in the struggle for a liberal versus a corporate model of society. In this regard, note the prohibition of the state interstate commerce tax (alcabala), inspired by notions of creating a national marketplace, contained in the Constitution of 1857 which ostensibly was never effectively enforced until much later in the century. After annulling a state law taxing interstate trade in January 1862, Juárez issued a decree in April that same year permitting states to do so due to the demands of the war effort. As noted above, the treasury bureaucracy was apparently unevenly organized in the various states of the federation as evident in inconsistent experience in official communication and the efforts of Juárez to regularize and
strengthen its organization. These realities provide the backdrop and define the limitations on any program of centralization of revenue management. Therefore, one must be extremely careful in discerning the reality of revenue practice which is reflected only in part in the official decrees of the period.

Pragmatism and Decentralization
(March 1864 to July 1867)

By the spring of 1864, it became obvious that military commanders would need greater freedom of action as the national government was forced out of communication with a growing portion of the republican areas. Thus the federal government granted extensive authority to regional commanders in matters of war and treasury. Not unexpectedly, as the Juárez government was forced further north and became increasingly isolated from vital sources of revenue, its control over revenue management was diminished. The management of revenue within republican controlled areas devolved to local control as the resistance effort was increasingly reduced to local guerrilla forces. Nevertheless, throughout the rest of the Intervention, efforts were taken to administer federal revenue and to garner funds essential to the Juárez government's operation. Needless to say, the decentralizing policies essential to the war effort tended to frustrate the ongoing efforts to consolidate the federal government's authority and control over federal revenue sources while the attention of Juárez was increasingly focused on northern Mexico.
Romero notes that Juárez recognized the need for regional commanders to control essential matters of revenue and military maneuvers due to the limitations on communication. When designating the commander of the Army of the Center in March 1864, Juárez extended authority to Gen. José López Uraga over all revenue in the states under his command, whether state or federal, and command authority over all public officials, whether civil or military. After López Uraga defected to the imperial cause, Gen. José María Arteaga was appointed to command the Army of the Center in July 1864 with the same extraordinary powers extended to his predecessor. Paralleling general acquiescence to the less central system of revenue management necessitated by the war, Juárez eliminated the General Administration of Federal Revenue established only eight months before in the midst of recentralization efforts.

Continued blockade and occupation of most key ports deprived the federal treasury of critical operating revenue while the occupation of the principal population centers of the nation isolated it from key internal sources of funds. Estimations of the desperate condition of the federal treasury in this period are given in the report of Matías Romero in his Memoria de Hacienda of 1872. Budgeted expenses of fiscal year 1864-1865 were 7.2 million pesos while he estimated actual expenditures were less than 6 million. Similarly, budgeted expenses for fiscal year 1865-1866 were 6.1 million pesos while actual expenditures were estimated at just over 5 million. The increasing areas under republican control in the closing year of the Intervention are reflected in the budget figures for fiscal year 1866-1867. Budgeted expenses were 9.8 million pesos and
expenditures were estimated at little over 8 million. Scattered references to the general fiscal plight of republican military commanders to illustrate the condition of the federal treasury may be found in correspondence and consular reports. For example, the United States consul at Manzanillo reported in May 1864 that Gen. López Uraga was running desperately short of specie with which to procure essential supplies.25

In addition to the formal extension of authority to regional commanders and the incapacity of the federal treasury, there was a general tendency for local commanders to take revenue matters into their own hands. This should not be unexpected as the federal government was less and less in communication with them and the distinction between guerilla and regular forces became increasingly blurred. Thus the control of revenue devolved to local military and political leadership as the resistance effort progressively degenerated to local and disparate efforts in this phase of the Intervention. Due to the continuing circumstances discussed above, conventional sources of revenue were of decreasing significance in supporting the resistance effort and commanders and guerilla leaders took wealth where it could be found. The reports of United States consuls and other sources are replete with commentary on the frequent collections administered by local commanders and officials. There are both instances of property taxes and other onerous exactions euphemistically called loans.

A Texas newspaper, The Daily Ranchero, quotes an imperial paper of Matamoros reporting that Gen. Miguel Negrete collected about 580,000
pesos from Monterrey, Parras, and Saltillo. These papers displayed an obvious sympathy for the Empire and no doubt exaggerated the sums reported. More credible is the report of the U.S. Consul at Paso del Norte who reported that several forced loans were collected in that city although no estimate is given of the amount of revenue collected. He noted that the last one prior to the Juárez government's move to Chihuahua was especially burdensome on United States citizens living there. The presence of Juárez in that city while these loans were extracted suggests that he at least tolerated them if he did not authorize them. The U.S. Vice-Consul at Matamoros estimated that 400,000 pesos had been extracted from Mexican citizens by liberal republican leaders through forced loans and confiscations in that city. He noted with certainty that this was done for the enrichment of local strong men and without any supervision of the republican government.

William H. Corwin, the United States Minister to Mexico, described the activities of republican guerilla forces in the center of Mexico in his official correspondence to the Secretary of State. He noted that scattered guerilla bands roamed the countryside, occasionally seizing a town ostensibly under imperial occupation though lightly garrisoned, and extracted forced loans and arbitrary taxes from the defenseless population. These bands then evacuated the town at the first sign of approaching troops, often leaving a line of plundered haciendas in their path. He reported that the guerilla leader, Figueroa, made off with over 82,000 pesos from the town of Tehuacan.

From the republican point of view, such raids were no more than a
standard procedure for resupply. In correspondence between the Minister of Relations to the Minister of War it is reported that Gen. Juan N. Cortina had raided a town under imperial rule, San Fernando, to gather supplies and horses. After a two hour raid, he returned to Santa Rosalia where his brigade was headquartered and related his success to the Minister of War.28

The imposition of forced loans was not necessarily done in the haphazard and unregulated fashion as generally portrayed in consular reports, but an effort was made in some instances to render public accounting of expenditure. In April 1865, the commander of forces at Hidalgo del Parral, Chihuahua, published in the official newspaper of the Juarez government in Chihuahua (Periódico oficial) an accounting of revenue collected in a forced loan of January that year. The notice provided a list of 102 individuals from whom 16,705 pesos had been taken and further rendered an itemized account of how the entire sum was spent in the war effort.29 It is conceivable that such an official document could form the basis for a subsequent claim for remuneration but that possibility awaits further study.

The absence of communication or comment on revenue affairs in areas other than northern Mexico suggests the limitations of communication and influence for the republican government during this period. Despite the efforts of Juarez to regulate and control revenue administration in northern Mexico, the degeneration of central political and military authority took its toll. This is illustrated in the extreme case of Tamaulipas as observed by the United States Vice-Consul at
Matamoros. He reported that Gen. Canales had usurped the governorship of the state of Tamaulipas while Gen. Cortina controlled the roads to the interior. Therefore anyone daring to conduct trade with the interior would have to pay duty to Canales in Matamoros and then again to Cortina if apprehended by him on interior roads. Since Gen. Mariano Escobedo did not recognize either one of these authorities, another duty would be required in Monterrey. 30

Sources of Federal Revenue during the Intervention

Although the federal treasury was deprived of the principal sources of revenue on which it normally relied, the Juárez government was not totally without recourse. The following discussion of the federal government's efforts to garner funds while in northern Mexico, however, must be evaluated in the light of the preceding discussion. The federal treasury was apparently not a significant source of operating revenue for the military effort of the republican resistance through this last phase of the Intervention. Nonetheless, the treasury actively engaged in efforts to control northern customs houses, collect forced loans, collect extraordinary taxes, mint copper coinage, adjudicate the sale of nationalized property and federal lands, and administer stamped paper. Additionally, the treasury received donations from foreign patriotic committees and negotiated concessions for rail and canal works.

The Juárez government issued many decrees and circulars related to the administration of customs revenue during its migration through
northern Mexico. A spate of public actions on customs activities gives the distinct impression that the federal treasury was concerned with details of operation and administration and was in fact receiving revenue from this source. In the spring of 1865, the Minister of the Treasury, José María Iglesias, travelled to Matamoros for the purpose of putting matters of public administration of customs revenues in order. While there he published a detailed decree concerning the procedures the customs house was to follow. In the same month he issued instructions for the payment of customs fees specifying that 90% could be paid in bills of exchange and that 10% was required in cash. This was ostensibly to insure that the customs treasury at Piedras Negras would be supplied with enough cash to enable it to pay salaries to customs officials since commercial bills of exchange could only be redeemed by the payee, the federal treasury in Monterrey. It seems highly unlikely that such a policy statement would have been made unless the customs house at Piedras Negras was indeed receiving tax payments. In that same month differential tax rates were published for cotton received at Piedras Negras for domestic manufactures and that received for reexport. Also in May, the Minister of the Treasury issued the decision of the President establishing routine procedures for the authorization of individuals to send money to the customs house at Piedras Negras for the purpose of paying for imported goods. All that was required from that time on was the payment of the required circulation tax and federal contribution to the treasury. 31

In June 1864, the President issued a decree exempting all books
and printed material from any taxation at any port of entry into the nation. The following month the Minister of the Treasury published a circular to clarify confusion which had resulted from the exemption on printed matter of the preceding month. This combination suggests that not only was the Juárez government publishing decrees, but they were being read and questions were being raised as a result. Needless to say, it is likely that these decrees were only circulating in the states immediately surrounding the federal government.32 The next official action regarding administration of customs revenue came in December 1866. This circular exhorted administrators of maritime customs houses to cease granting rebates to merchants immediately due to the dire needs of the federal treasury. The rather long silence coincided with the Juárez government's residence in Chihuahua and Paso del Norte, suggesting that either customs administration was fairly uneventful in the interim or that its capacity to influence events in even the northern ports of entry was severely curtailed. The answer must wait for additional research though the frustrated tone of the December 1866 decree implies that the latter was the case.33

While in Monterrey, the President decreed an extraordinary tax to be collected by the governors on behalf of the federal government. The decree specified that the states of Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Coahuila were to pay 5,000, 50,000, and 30,000 pesos respectively. The governors of the remaining states not occupied by the Empire were to select the quotas they would fulfill. The specific identification of these three states might be explained by the previous difficulties which the federal
treasury had encountered in obtaining federal revenue from them. If this were the reason, it would seem appropriate for Juárez to include Chihuahua since its governor, Luis Terrazas, was guilty of appropriating federal revenue. It seems plausible that Juárez chose to specify quotas for these states because it was thought probable that the tax could be collected by their governors. Chihuahua was still in a state of rebellion against the republican government at this time.34

Still further north in Chihuahua, the republican government met with local political leadership and presented its financial plight. The measure perceived as least burdensome and consequently agreed to by local leaders was a monthly tax of 24,000 pesos to be gathered for a six month period through the agency of committees formed from existing public officials at state, cantonal, and municipal levels. To make this action less objectionable and to pay back federal debts incurred through forced loans in the preceding months, the president authorized the minting of 170,000 pesos of copper coinage by the Chihuahua mint. The decrees do not make it clear how the copper coinage was to be distributed except in the case of repaying forced loans collected by the federal government.35

Other sources of revenue include the sale of stamped paper, fees collected from the adjudication of nationalized and confiscated property and goods, donations received from patriotic committees in and out of the nation, and security bonds received as part of railroad and canal concessions. There is no figure available for any of these sources of revenue and only their occasional mention in official decrees and correspondence reveal their existence and suggest their role and
Nationalized property refers to the corporate property which was nationalized in the Reform. Confiscated property refers to that private property belonging to individuals declared traitors by the Juárez government and confiscated under the authority of an act of 16 August 1863. During the Intervention, the Juárez government announced procedures for the administration of this property and the distribution of fees collected among federal officials who adjudicated the sale, their commissioned agents, and the federal treasury. There is no indication of the significance of the revenue derived from these transactions although scattered evidence that this activity was ongoing may be found in correspondence, decrees, circulars, and the Periódico oficial.

In May 1865, the Juárez government issued a decree countering an imperial law which claimed to reverse the republican adjudications of nationalized property. In August 1866, Juárez issued a decree requiring the speedy adjudication of nationalized property. Later that year, instructions were issued to the governor of Sonora reminding him that only the federal government could approve the sale of nationalized property and then a new policy was published granting the governors the authority to approve certain routine transactions. The administration of nationalized property continued to be a concern through the rest of the Intervention and after the Juárez government returned to Mexico City.

The Juárez government negotiated four concessions for rail and canal works during the Intervention. The first, a railroad line to run from Matamoros to Boca del Río, required a subsidy from the federal
treasury of 100,000 pesos to be released in two increments. The first payment of 50,000 pesos was to be released when the government approved the rail company's plans which, according to the contract, was to be within three months. The second would be paid when the line was completed. Thus Juárez approved a contract which obligated the treasury to an expenditure of 50,000 pesos in the summer of 1864. The second concession was for a rail line from Presidio del Norte or the Villa del Paso (Paso del Norte) to Guaymas or another point on the Gulf of California. This contract did not obligate the treasury to any current expenditure but offered tax exemptions as incentives for the company to complete its work. Additionally, the company was obligated to pay a security bond of 30,000 pesos to the treasury which would be forfeited if the company failed to uphold the terms of the agreement.39

In August 1866, the government issued another concession, this one for a canal from Mazatlan to Santiago Izcuintla. Like the previous rail contract, this agreement offered tax exemptions for incentives to the company but required no security bond and offered no other payment from the treasury. If the company failed to meet the terms of the contract, the government retained the right to assume ownership of the portion of the works completed. The last concession was for a rail line across the isthmus of Tehuantepec. This decree invalidated an existing concession of 1857 due to the failure of the previous concessionaire to comply with the terms of its contract. This concession granted title to alternating sections of land along the line to subsidize the construction of the line and required a security bond of 100,000 pesos in gold from
the company. Therefore the treasury was obligated to disburse funds only in 1864, relatively early in the Intervention while the government remained in Monterrey, and later concessions required the contracting company to deposit a security bond to demonstrate its intent.

Finally, another source of some revenue during the Intervention was donations from sympathetic individuals and groups inside and outside the nation. In September 1863, the Minister of Relations acknowledged the receipt of 2,900 lbs sterling (about 14,500 pesos) from public commissions in Peru and Chile. These were donations from private individuals collected by public service organizations formed for this purpose and they were not funds from the governments of these countries. The donation from Chile was given for the support of hospitals for the wounded and the Peruvian donation was apparently an unrestricted gift. Both were transmitted in commercial bills of exchange negotiated by major British merchant houses. In the same year, the governor of Tamaulipas forwarded a donation from a sympathetic foreign merchant for the support of Mexican prisoners of war in France. Admittedly, these were not sizeable sums relative to the costs of the war effort, but they reflect the perceptions of the donors and suggest some insights into the ability of the federal structure to communicate and transfer funds over long distances.

Despite the extreme difficulties imposed by the invasion and occupation of the nation by imperial forces, the Juárez government was constantly concerned with matters of treasury and finance evidenced by the repeated decrees and circulars issued seeking to direct and
administer treasury matters. The experience of the Juárez government in Mexico City in the early months of the Intervention was characterized by the contradictory demands of having to extend broad authority to the governors to facilitate the mobilization effort while trying to preserve federal jurisdictions in revenue management. After the victory at Puebla on May 5, 1862, Juárez began a program of recentralization of revenue management. The extent of success is known only in the vaguest terms but the pressures of warfare pressed heavily on the federal treasury. Juárez continued his efforts at central management for about nine months after his departure from Mexico City, but was forced into a more flexible policy by the loss of key sources of revenue by the imperial occupation. In the remainder of the Intervention, from March 1864 to the return to Mexico City in July 1867, Juárez and his ministers remained active in their efforts to garner operating revenue and manage what revenue was available. Nevertheless, the pressures toward nearly autonomous action by local military leadership was overwhelming. Significantly, from the time that the Juárez government left San Luis Potosí, the actions of his government related to revenue increasingly focused on matters within the immediate proximity of the federal government. In summary, the Juárez government's apparent isolation from consistent sources of revenue does not auger well for its capacity to govern. Despite the consistent and deliberate efforts to maintain control over the administration of federal revenue and to secure sources of funds, revenue management seemingly devolved to the initiative of local regular and guerilla commanders, foraging funds as well as horses and food from the populations through which they passed.
ENDNOTES


3Vidaurri offers to determine why Tamaulipas had produced no federal revenue in seven years in correspondence to Benito Juárez, 12 March 1862, ibid., 6:91-92; Vidaurri offers excuses why he cannot comply with federal mobilization requirements in a letter to Juárez, 8 May 1862, ibid., 6:472-473, and in another to Juárez, 13 August 1862, ibid., 6:794-796; the Minister of the Treasury writes to Vidaurri urging him to remit lawful and required federal revenue collected under his jurisdiction, 20 January 1864, Colección de leyes, 1:270-271; Vidaurri responds to Minister of Treasury letter and offers excuses for his failure to comply with instructions, 24 January 1864, ibid., 1:271-275; Minister of Treasury becomes adamant in requesting Vidaurri release federal funds, 28 January 1864, ibid., 1:275-280; Vidaurri engages in additional delay tactics in a letter to the Minister of Treasury, 1 February 1864, ibid., 1:281-286; Minister of Treasury issues another adamant demand for compliance to Vidaurri, 3 February 1864, ibid., 1:286; Circular of the Minister of Treasury addressed to governors explains Vidaurri's recalcitrance and justifies President's action against him, 26 February 1864, ibid., 1:225-234.
4 Ponciano Arriaga to Benito Juárez, 14 August 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 6:798-799; Juan Suárez y Navarro to Larrache and Company, 17 November 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:200-203; José María Iglesias to Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, 27 March 1865, ibid., 2:189-201.

5 Decree of Congress dated 17 December 1861, Legislación mexicana, 9:342; Mexico, Constitution of 1857, art. LXXII, sec. 19 and 20.


7 Gen. Felipe M. Berriozábal to Benito Juárez, 17 March 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 6:100.

8 Matías Romero, Memoria de hacienda y crédito público, correspondiente al cuadragésimoquinto año económico, Presentada por el secretario de hacienda al congreso de la unión, (México: Imprenta del gobierno, en palacio, a cargo de José María Sandoval, 1870), pp. 543-545. (Hereinafter cited as Romero, Memoria de hacienda.)


10 Decree of Government, 7 June 1862, ibid., 9:475; Romero, Memoria de hacienda, pp. 543-545.


14 Romero, Memoria de hacienda, pp. 573-574, 580-581. The
Minister of Relations sent letter to the governor of Campeche acknowledging the receipt of over 1,099 pesos which were the proceeds of bonds sold in that state for the support of hospitals for the wounded. It is not known if this bond issue is related to the one authorized by Congress in the previous year in Minister of Relations to governor of Campeche, 24 September 1863, Colección de leyes, 1: 129-130.

15Matías Romero, Memoria de hacienda, p. 593.

16Warning to Governor of Michoacán in Decree of Government, 1 August 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:74-75; Republished standing laws on division of revenue base in Decree of Government, September 1863, ibid., 1:113-126; Michoacán decree annulled in Decree of Government, 26 September 1863, Legislación mexicana, 9:657, and Colección de leyes, 1:141-142; Decree of Government, 8 October 1863, ibid., 1:159-160.

17Decree of Government, 12 August 1863, ibid., 1:84.

18Decree of Government, 31 August 1863, ibid., 1:105-106.

19Romero, Memoria de hacienda, p. 589-594. U.S. Consul at Manzanillo reported that by November 1863, the French held Tampico, San Blas, and Veracruz, and by the end of January, the Manzanillo customs house had fallen, in William H. Blake, U.S. Consul at Manzanillo, to William H. Seward, U.S. Secretary of State, 4 November 1863, Despatches Received by the Department of State from U.S. Consuls in Manzanillo, 1826-1906 (hereinafter cited as U.S. Consuls in Manzanillo); and Blake to Seward, 28 January 1864, ibid. Juárez decrees tax on cotton in Decree of Government, 28 July 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:73-74; Juárez decrees additional tax on capital in Decree of Government, 31 July 1863, ibid., 1:75-77.


21The constitutional prohibition is found in Mexico, Constitution of 1857, art. CXII, sec. 1. A Colima law taxing interstate trade was annulled in Decree of Government, 29 January 1862, Legislación mexicana, 9:372; the tax was reinstated by Juárez in Decree of Government, 14 April 1862, ibid., 9:434.


26 The Daily Ranchero (Brownsville, Texas) 7 June 1865, vol. I, no. 13, p. 2; Reuben W. Cree, U.S. Consul at Chihuahua, to William H. Seward, U.S. Secretary of State, no. 6, 28 February 1866, Despatches received by the Department of State from U.S. Consuls at Ciudad Juárez (Paso del Norte), 1871-1906 Register, 1850-1906, and despatches, April 10, 1850-December 23, 1869 (hereinafter cited as U.S. Consuls in Paso del Norte); Henry I. Cuniffe, U.S. Consul at Paso del Norte, to Seward, no. 6, 2 March 1866, ibid.; Cuniffe to Seward, no. 4, 2 July 1866, ibid.; and Albert Iuck, U.S. Vice-Consul at Paso del Norte, to Seward, no. 3, 4 December 1866, ibid.; Louis Avery, U.S. Consul at Matamoros, to Seward, no. 24, 9 August 1866, Despatches Received by the Department of State from U.S. Consuls in Matamoros, 1826-1906 (hereinafter cited as U.S. Consuls in Matamoros); and Avery to Seward, no. 25, 23 August 1866, ibid. Blake to Seward, no. 9, 23 April 1864, U.S. Consuls in Manzanillo; Blake to Seward, no. 20, 30 June 1864, ibid.; Blake to Seward, unnumbered, 4 November 1864, ibid.; Blake to Seward, no. 31, 29 December 1864, ibid.; and Blake to Seward, no. 7, 30 September, 1866, ibid. Franklin Chase, U.S. Consul at Tampico, to Lewis D. Campbell, U.S. Minister to Mexico, no. 8, 10 March 1867, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, 1823-1906 (hereinafter cited as U.S. Ministers). The Minister of the Treasury acknowledged a decree of the governor of San Luis Potosí which imposed a 1% tax on capital in that state, 20 April 1867, Colección de leyes, 3:167.

27 William H. Corwin, Acting U.S. Minister to Mexico, to Seward, no. 11, 22 July 1865; and Corwin to Seward, no. 12, 27 August 1865, U.S. Ministers.

28 Communications between the Minister of Relations and the Minister of War, 12 May 1865, Colección de leyes, 2:235-239.


30 Avery to Seward, no. 27, 3 September 1866, U.S. Consuls in Matamoros.

31 Notice to governors of Iglesias' impending absence from Monterrey, Decree of Government, 20 April 1864, Colección de leyes, 2:28; instructions for administration of customs house activities in Decree of
Government, 3 May 1864, ibid., 2:33-35; policy concerning payment of fees at Piedras Negras found in Decree of Government, 7 May 1864, ibid., 2:39; customs tax policy on cotton published in Decree of Government, 17 May 1864, ibid., 2:51-52; Procedures for remitting money to Piedras Negras found in Decree of Government, 21 May 1864, ibid., 2:46.

32 Tax exemption on imports of printed matter found in Decree of Government, 25 June 1864, ibid., 2:75; interpretation of Presidential decree published in Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 6 July 1864, ibid., 2:79-80.

33 Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 1 December 1866, ibid., 3:140-141.

34 Decree of Government, 2 August 1864, ibid., 2:89-90.

35 Although there is nothing to directly confirm the effective collection of this tax in subsequent correspondence or the official newspaper (Periódico oficial), there was a parallel occurrence over the same time period. Patriotic committees were formed in the same fashion as were decreed for the collection of this tax, at state, cantonal, and municipal levels, to collect contributions for the benefit of Mexican prisoners of war deported to France. The Periódico oficial of May 20, 1865 published a report of the sum collected by the patriotic committees demonstrating the capacity of public figures to gather revenue from the population of Chihuahua in the same fashion decreed for the collection of the monthly tax. See the chapter on bureaucracy for a further discussion of the significance of this incident. Decree of Government, 7 March 1865, Colección de leyes, 2:165-168; Decree of Government, 29 July 1865, ibid., 2:249-250; Periódico oficial, 20 May 1865, vol. I, no. 84, p. 1. For the decrees concerning the minting of copper coinage see Decree of Government for minting of 70,000 pesos, 1 January 1865, Colección de leyes, 2:130-131; Decree of Government for minting of 40,000 pesos, 7 March 1865, ibid., 2:169-170; Decree of Government for minting of 100,000 pesos, 29 July 1865, ibid., 2:249-250.

36 Evidence concerning the administration of stamped paper is developed in the chapter on bureaucracy.

37 See the Decree of Government, 10 November 1863, for a reference to the 16 August decree, ibid., 1:216-217. Juárez issued several decrees related to the administration of nationalized and confiscated property. On 27 July 1863 he ruled that an individual that pledged payment or posted bond for the purchase of nationalized property and then remained under the occupation of the Empire would lose the right to that property in one month in Decree of Government, ibid., 1:68-69. On 19 August 1863 he authorized federal treasury official in the state to commission agents
to manage confiscated property located outside the central districts of
the state in Decree of Government, ibid., 1:100. On 10 November 1863 the
Minister of the Treasury issued a decree for Juárez which divided the 5%
commission between treasury agencies and officials in Decree of
Government, ibid., 1:216-217. The actions of the federal government with
regard to nationalized property in Chihuahua is discussed in the next
chapter.

38Decree of Government, 11 May 1865, ibid., 2:229-235; Decree of
Government, 31 August 1866, ibid., 3:90-91; Decree of Government, 24
October 1866, ibid., 3:121-123; Decree of Government, 21 November 1866,

39Decree of Government, 13 May 1864, ibid., 2:40-44; Decree of

40Decree of Government, 25 August 1866, ibid., 3:84-90; Decree of

41Minister of Relations to the people of Copiapó, Chile, 21
September 1863, ibid., 1:131-135; Minister of Relations to people of
Peru, 21 September 1863, ibid., 1:135-140; Governor of Tamaulipas to
Benito Juárez, 26 October 1863, ibid., 1:168-170.
CHAPTER II

BUREAUCRACY

A Perspective on Bureaucracy

The sources reviewed in this report provide only occasional insights into the condition and size of the federal bureaucracy during the Intervention. This subject is largely neglected in the historiography of Mexican governance in the nineteenth century. As yet there is no authoritative analysis on the federal bureaucracy on the eve of the Intervention. The size of the government travelling with Juárez dwindled as it was forced farther north. Frank A. Knapp reports that while the government was in Paso del Norte it consisted of Juárez, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, and José María Iglesias, and only one or two assistants for each. Yet in decrees and circulars issued by this nucleus of government there are repeated references to federal and state treasury officials and local political chiefs. The clear indication seems to be that there was an impressive administrative capacity resident in the nation and that Juárez actively sought to maintain contact with and control over that which he could. Additional work needs to be done to determine the actual nature and function of bureaucratic office in the process of governing in this period. J. F. Bosher’s work on the
transition of the French officialdom from venal office to true salaried professional office may serve as a model for further study. This perspective is essential to gauge the extent and nature of control the national government actually exercised over the bureaucracy. The binding and unifying qualities of the officialdom of the Mexican nation in this period of so many divergent forces needs much development. This chapter will first examine the history of the treasury bureaucracy as reflected in official decrees and then examine the evidence of the existence and function of the bureaucracy during the French Intervention.

**History of the Treasury Bureaucracy**

The treasury bureaucracy was of special significance as it linked the government's revenue base to the political establishment. To fully appreciate the significance of the initiatives taken in the effort to manage federal revenues during the French Intervention, it is necessary to know the background of the treasury bureaucracy of the departments. The treasury offices of the departments (*jefetura de hacienda*) came into existence with a decree of April 17, 1837 under the centralist constitution of 1837. Chief treasury bureaucrats, called Superior Chiefs (*Jefes Superiores*) were authorized in each department for the purpose of tax collection and administration. Each was given an office staff of 14 including a treasurer, treasury officials, recorders, a money counter, a cashier and an office boy. The authorizing decree set salaries for each official and employee in the departmental treasury offices but the subject needs additional development to determine the sufficiency and
source of these salaries as an indication of the professionalism of this bureaucratic corps. Additionally, the precise manner in which revenue was collected and disbursed, the method by which officials were selected and appointed, and the responsiveness of these offices to the policy of the national government are critical issues in gauging the nature of the Mexican bureaucracy at various points in the nineteenth century. Presumably this bureaucracy became a symbol of the centralist regime and it is interesting to trace its development in legislation up to the French Intervention.

On December 16, 1841, President Santa Anna decreed that the Superior Chiefs would be terminated to facilitate efficiency. The departmental treasuries were to continue to function under the inspection of the General Commandants (Comandante Generales) of the departments. Without knowing the circumstances surrounding that action one suspects that either this was an economizing effort or that there was some contention over the authority of the Superior Chiefs relative to the General Commandants. No further mention is made of the Superior Chiefs in Mexican legislation until Santa Anna, as centralist dictator, reinstituted the Superior Chiefs in his efforts to establish a centralist authoritarian state. His centralizing efforts were further reflected in his decree of the following year forbidding the departmental governors from drawing funds from the treasuries of the general government located in their departments. Apparently the essential elements of a treasury bureaucracy survived under both centralist and federalist governments since both necessarily had to manage general revenues; however, the
Superior Chiefs were likely by this time to be clearly identified with the centralist state.

In the fall of 1855, the government formed under the Plan de Ayutla with Juan Álvarez as the Provisional President issued a series of decrees reflecting the contradictory demands of federalist rhetoric and practical needs of governing. On the seventh of October, a decree was issued explaining that it was essential for the caudillos of the Plan de Ayutla to refrain from interfering with the functions of the general treasury and refer all treasury matters to the Minister of the Treasury. Three days later Álvarez decreed that the centralist treasury bureaucracy be dismantled (jefeturas de hacienda and tesorarias departamentales) and their functions related to general revenues be entrusted to the treasuries of the respective states. In this action the governors were to propose for the federal government's approval the remuneration they felt appropriate for the service rendered by the state treasury officials in the administration of federal revenues. Conversely, in a decree of the following month, the Álvarez government stated that all causes for the states to interfere in the matters of the federal treasury had ceased and that such activity reduced that federal government to incapacity. One suspects that some of the confusion in these actions reflected the lack of cohesion and clear plan of action that understandably characterized the provisional government. Recall that in early December 1855, the leaders of the Ayutla revolt divided over the Juárez law and Álvarez returned to Guerrero leaving the effort of structuring the new government to Ignacio Comonfort and his cabinet of moderates.
One further suspects that the decree of October 10, 1855, dismantling the treasury bureaucracy was never fully carried out. The next mention of it in official decrees came shortly after the first Europeans had landed at Veracruz initiating the Intervention. On December 17, 1861, the Minister of the Treasury issued instructions to the treasury chief (jefe de hacienda) of Veracruz. Due to the invasion he was to render an account of his assets to the President, deposit his records in the American consulate keeping only those documents essential to his continued function, and leave the occupied area continually advising the general government of his movements so as to be of the greatest service to the national forces.8

Following the liberal victory in the Wars of the Reform, Juárez addressed the professionalism and loyalties of the bureaucratic corps of the nation. On December 20, 1861, the Minister of the Treasury issued a circular to federal treasury chiefs and administrators of stamped paper advising them that they could not accept commissions or salaries from any source other than the federal government without compromising their professional status and forfeiting their jobs. In the same vein the Minister of the Treasury issued another circular on January 22, 1862, announcing that only the federal government could make appointments of local treasury officials, customs officials, and their employees. Although the effectiveness of these decrees needs confirmation in other sources, these actions indicate that the Juárez government was attuned to the need for a professional and responsive bureaucracy to implement and administer the liberal program successfully defended in the preceding
civil war. The significance of these decrees is found in the fact that they spoke of an existing and functioning treasury bureaucracy and that there was no mention of the Superior Chiefs.

Juárez and his ministers continued to be concerned with their government's ability to collect and administer revenue after they left Mexico City. In a decree of July 20, 1863, the President directed that the treasury offices (jefetura de hacienda) be reestablished in the states and territories where they did not exist. Furthermore he directed that all state and federal revenues be kept separate in accordance with the law of September 12, 1857 which essentially divided the tax base of the nation between state and federal jurisdictions. Note that he did not reestablish the Superior Chiefs. They were perhaps too closely identified with centralist government but he did, nevertheless, confirm his support for a treasury bureaucracy essential for central rule, be it centralist or federalist.

This history of the Mexican bureaucracy needs much development from other archival sources due to the unquestionable pitfalls of dealing only in official sources. The preceding recap of the history of the treasury bureaucracy is intended to serve only as a cursory overview of the larger trends evident in the laws and decrees of the Mexican nation.

**Bureaucracy during the French Intervention**

There are scattered estimates of the size of the federal bureaucratic corps in related sources. Romero Flores Caballero notes, for example, that while the Juárez government was in San Luis Potosí, its
first stop on its inland travels, there were 6,000 employees of the Secretariat of Direct Taxes and 6,800 employees of the General Administration of Mails spread throughout the states of the federation. Matías Romero calculates that in this period approximately 12% of the federal government's revenue was consumed in the process of administering of tax collections. Using a rough approximation of the average cost to the government per treasury employee and Romero's estimations of federal expenditures, an estimate of the number of treasury employees may be derived. The totals range from a high of about 3000 the year of the invasion to a low of between 800 and 900 in 1865. Therefore the existence of a significant corps of government officials is not in question. Who controlled it is.

The bureaucracy was not a monolithic entity and was a continuing object of concern before the Juárez government left Mexico City. Several actions demonstrate the complexities of administering and controlling the federal and state bureaucracies. The size and activities of the federal bureaucracy and the relationship of the Juárez government to it must be evaluated in two phases of the Intervention. Understandably, the ability of the Juárez government to direct the bureaucracy was decidedly different while it remained in Mexico City compared with its abilities while residing in Paso del Norte. Therefore, the bureaucracy is examined both while the government remained in central Mexico and while Juárez travelled through the northern states. Despite the obvious limitations imposed by the war, Juárez and his ministers never ceased to have an active interest in the nation's bureaucracy.
From Invasion to Departure from Mexico City

There are numerous references in correspondence and ministerial circulars to officials of the bureaucracy in the period following the invasion of the Triple Alliance and the departure of the Juárez government from Mexico City. Although the significance of each reference and its context in the general and local progression of events needs further development, the following observations are in order. The actions of governors and military commanders in the mobilization effort reflect their recognition of the presence and significance of a federal bureaucratic corps. Additionally, the bureaucracy was evidently perceived as representative of federal authority and the President sought to preserve the legal jurisdiction of the federal government over it despite resistance and contention within the states.

On June 18, 1862, the governor of Oaxaca suspended the federal offices of military and treasury officials in the state. Juárez issued a decree annulling the governor's action on June 27. On the same day Juárez suspended the same offices using the authority of the federal government. He apparently did not wish to contest the governor's desire to be free from their authority, but did want to preserve the jurisdiction and prerogatives of the federal government. This may be contrasted with the actions of Gen. Jesús González Ortega in states under his command. Upon appointment as military commander of the states of San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes, and Zacatecas, he took action to consolidate public authority in entities of known loyalties. He suspended public
authorities at the cantonal and municipal level and replaced them with military agencies (Agencias de la comandancia militar). This action was evidently not opposed by Juárez. It seems that while governors enjoyed broad authority in matters below the federal level, a deliberate effort was made to preserve the jurisdiction of the federal government over its officialdom. This was demonstrated in the case of Zacatecas as Juárez annulled a decree from its governor which sought to establish a state official who was to have a voice in the dispersal of federal revenue within the state.

The governors of the states of Guerrero and Hidalgo refer to the bureaucracy in their letters to Juárez concerning their mobilization efforts. Manuel R. Gallo of Guerrero noted the general discontent in the state over increased taxation. He observes that up to that time, federal officials had conducted themselves in a circumspect fashion with respect to the unpopular measures, not needlessly inciting resentments and provincialism which was a tendency in the local population. This would seem to indicate that federal officials were in fact standing at the crucial juncture of local and federal interests. The governor of Hidalgo wrote to Juárez explaining that he was faced with a serious conflict between the judge (Juez de Letras) of Tulancingo and the employees of the revenue bureaucracy. He does not specify what the substance of the dispute was but he did explain that he was forced to leave a military commander in Jacala with 800 men to maintain order. These examples demonstrate the existence of federal bureaucratic offices in various parts of the nation. The role they played in the variegated political
universe of the Mexican nation at this time warrants further research.

After Departure from Mexico City

After leaving Mexico City for San Luis Potosí, the Juárez government continued to take measures to extend control over political, financial, and military activities in the nation. Many of these provide insights into the existence and operation of the federal bureaucracy. As would be expected, the federal government's apparent span of control diminished as it moved north, yet there are extensive references in various sources which ostensively indicate continued function of public officials at all levels and, in some instances, in response to federal authority. The circulars issued by the cabinet ministers and other communications repeatedly reflect a concern with administrative procedures and bureaucratic housekeeping. Although further research is needed to verify the findings of this investigation, the available evidence suggests that there was an extensive network of officials at all levels of government through which Juárez and his ministers attempted to exercise control. The regional and national archives of Mexico offer the best hope of confirming this perception and filling in missing details.

The actions of Juárez in trying to regain control over federal revenue relinquished to the governors in the mobilization effort included the creation of new offices to administer and direct the actions of an existing corps of officials. On 20 July 1863, he directed that federal treasury offices (jefetura de hacienda) be established in states and territories where they did not already exist and that federal and state
revenue be segregated. The next day he decreed that an office of the Director of Federal Revenue be created, employing 18 officials on a budget of 20,400 pesos for the purpose of administering the collection and dispersal of federal revenue. All treasury offices in the nation were directed to report their financial status in detail so that this central office could effectively control and account for funds dispersed. In September 1863, the Minister of the Treasury reissued the decrees of 1857 which specified the sources of federal and state revenue so that these officials and the governors would have no reason for confusion as to the correct distribution of revenue. The office of the Director of Federal Revenue was suspended on March 1, 1864, and his duties returned to the Minister of the Treasury. This might suggest that either the initiative was not effective, that it became unnecessary due to the reduced revenue base of the federal government, that the government was forced into austerity measures as a result of the dire condition of the treasury, or all of these. Although the efforts made in the summer and fall of 1863 do not necessarily denote the successful control of the federal bureaucratic corps, they do demonstrate the concern of Juárez with controlling an existing bureaucracy which was spread across the nation. 15

Other actions and communications also suggest that a sizable federal bureaucratic corps existed throughout the Intervention. For example, a significant activity of the federal treasury offices in the states was the administration of property confiscated from traitors and corporate property nationalized under the Laws of the Reform. Certain
Mexicans who remained in territories occupied by the imperial authorities and individuals that actively supported the imperial government were declared to be traitors in a decree of August 1863. This decree also provided for the confiscation and sale of their property and for the proceeds to pass to the federal treasury, to the war effort, and to a fund for the benefit of survivors of republican soldiers killed in the war. To this end, the senior treasury officials in the states were authorized to commission representatives to administer properties located outside the central districts of the state in which they had jurisdiction. A decree of November 10, 1863 established a compensation of 5% of the proceeds of the sale of nationalized or confiscated property as follows: 3% to the commissioned agent appointed by the treasury office, 1% to the treasury office that held jurisdiction over the property, and 1% to the senior federal treasury official who adjudicated the action.\textsuperscript{16}

Notably the republican government could not effect confiscation of property in areas occupied by the imperial forces. However, this decree could act as a deterrent against disloyalty in the areas still controlled by the republican government and could provide some revenue in areas retaken by republican forces. The fact that federal officials were authorized to commission agents to act on their behalf in the administration of property outside the central districts of their states suggests that the federal treasury bureaucracy was limited to an office in the capital of each state. Additionally, awarding certain officials and offices with a commission derived from the proceeds of the sale of
property suggests a pattern for remuneration of officials. Although these officials were ostensively salaried, the revenue which was to recompense their labors was not disbursed from a central national treasury but was derived from local treasury business. As suggested above, this needs much development, but one can readily see the source of revenue for salaries has great implications for the relationship of the republican government to its bureaucratic corps.

There is evidence from various sources that federal treasury officials were indeed engaged in this activity directed by the Juárez government at different times during the Intervention. In January of 1864, after Juárez had moved to Saltillo, a representative of the federal treasury office of San Luis Potosí was moving a herd of horses across Nuevo León to Tamaulipas at the order of the President when a force loyal to Santiago Vidaurri, governor of Nuevo León, unlawfully seized the herd. In addition to its grave implications in the ensuing struggle between Juárez and Vidaurri, this incident illustrates the function of the decrees of the fall of 1863.

The administration of nationalized property in Chihuahua demonstrates both the existence of federal treasury officials in that state and the limitations of the republican government's control over them. Upon moving to Chihuahua, the Minister of the Treasury determined that nationalized corporate property had not been adjudicated in accordance with standing instructions of the federal government. To minimize confusion, the Minister of the Treasury issued a decree on November 12, 1864 signed by Juárez which provided that the federal
government would recognize and approve all adjudications of nationalized property performed in Chihuahua, although legally in violation of established procedures, provided that the property transfer was not contested and that a 4\% transfer fee was paid to designated federal authorities. On the 15th an amplification was issued and on the 18th a list of known contested properties which had come to the attention of the Minister of the Treasury was passed on to the federal treasury office of the state. The amplification provided precise wording to be used in receipts issued by the federal treasury office in Chihuahua, stated that the federal treasury office of the state would split the transfer fee with the state's treasury authorities, and established procedures for the impounding of property of equivalent value in cases where individuals failed to pay the required transfer fee.18 Significantly, the procedures decreed by the federal government had not been followed before the arrival of the Juárez government in Chihuahua, yet the attention to detail seen in the instructions and decrees issued in Chihuahua gives the distinct appearance of significant administrative capacity in the state and federal officialdom in Chihuahua.

Other scattered indications of the function of federal treasury offices in the adjudication of nationalized and confiscated property is evident as well. A public legal notice appeared in the official newspaper (Periódico oficial) of August 6, 1866 announcing that the estate of Clemente Remes was being confiscated under the provisions of the law of August 16, 1863. In October of that year, the Minister of the Treasury issued a communique to the governor of Sonora reminding him that
all adjudications of confiscated or nationalized property would be handled by the officials designated by the federal government. On November 21, 1866, the Minister of the Treasury issued a communique modifying the procedures for the adjudication of confiscated properties to give greater discretion to governors in cases of clear and aggravated treason but requiring all cases not involving clear and aggravated treason be reviewed directly by the federal government. The federal treasury offices continued to have a central role in the administration of this program.19

Numerous other communications with and about federal treasury offices in various parts of the nation further indicate their existence and the efforts of the Juárez government to control them. In October 1863, a circular of the Minister of the Treasury required the federal treasury offices to remit a monthly account of all receipts, plus inventories and invoices of goods entering and leaving their jurisdictions.20 This ambitious requirement suggests that the treasury offices represented a substantial bureaucracy capable of managing a significant administrative load. The actual conduct of affairs needs evaluation in independent sources. If such documents are preserved in the treasury archives of the Mexican nation, extensive insights into the size and function of the treasury bureaucracy might be gained as well as an appreciation for the content and volume of regional trade in this period.

Other actions in the northern states further demonstrate the continuing effort to direct the officialdom of the nation. These
included instructions for officials to suspend hiring of lower officials, the establishment of a new federal treasury office in the newly reconstituted state of Coahuila, instructions for the federal treasury office of Sonora concerning the legal status of certain contested property, and several communiques issued by Gen. Porfirio Díaz in the closing days of the Intervention concerning the administration of federal treasury offices in areas newly recaptured from the Empire on the eastern front. 21 In these diverse communications, a pattern is clear. Although several were addressed to the federal treasury offices in general, the ones containing specific and detailed instructions and decisions were consistently addressed to the offices in the states surrounding the Juárez government.

Numerous actions concerning administration of ports of entry indicate the existence of a customs bureaucracy and the Juárez government's concern with it. The status of port revenues has been discussed in the preceding chapter, yet the Juárez government did what it could to optimize control and efficiency in the administration of customs. Although the maritime ports were either occupied or blockaded by the French through much of the Intervention, the over-land ports of entry on the northern frontier were generally open. Due to the lucrative revenue of port customs activities, they were also heavily contested in the struggle with localism and extreme federalism in northern Mexico. In addition to the official communications of the Juárez government with and concerning the customs bureaucracy, there are scattered references in United States consular reports which recognize the ongoing though limited
role of the republican government in administering port activities.

As in the case of the federal treasury offices, the communications and actions of the Juárez government with the customs bureaucracy show a significant attention to detail and administrative procedures. As in the pattern observed in the case of federal treasury offices, most were focused on affairs in the northern portions of the nation. While communiques demonstrate concern, they do not necessarily denote federal control of policy and action.

Several actions in 1863 and 1864 illustrate the efforts of Juárez to gain control of and support customs activities. In October 1863, Juárez decreed that a new district court be established in Matamoros to facilitate the business of the federal treasury in that port. The following month, he decreed that the customs house staff at Mazatlán was insufficient and authorized its expansion. In May 1864, the Minister of the Treasury issued detailed instructions to the administrator of maritime customs at the port of Matamoros to assure the efficient and accurate administration of federal tax revenue. Later that same month, he published rates of taxation for cotton arriving at Piedras Negras. This action distinguished between cotton imported for domestic use and that arriving for reexport. Additionally, rates of taxation were announced for cotton shipped to Monclova, Monterrey, and Saltillo. It appears the objective was to standardize rates in the cities. A few days later the Minister of the Treasury publicized instructions for the issuance of routine licenses for the transfer of funds to the ports of entry at Piedras Negras and Laredo. This would seem to suggest that
there was sufficient demand for the licenses to warrant the publishing of routine procedures and would further be dependent on an effective link of officials in interior cities and the respective ports of entry.22

Perhaps more indicative of the true status of federal control over customs administration is the circular sent to administrators of maritime customs on December 1, 1866. In it the Minister of the Treasury directed customs officials to stop granting rebates on federal tax rates to merchants trading in their jurisdiction. He noted that this produced uneven rates of taxation in the nation and hurt the federal treasury.23 This service was perhaps extended in exchange for other unofficial remuneration made directly to the customs officer thus depriving the federal treasury of revenue. A circular issue to the governor of Tabasco in March 1867 seems to confirm this perception since the Minister of the Treasury refers to the commonplace rebates of up 40% as a corrupt practice. It further appears that this governor had not previously received the information concerning the full and consistent enforcement of tax schedules before this time.24 Together these actions reflect the ongoing concern of the Juárez government with the customs bureaucracy while also suggesting the limits of its control.

Another part of the federal bureaucracy in evidence in scattered sources is the administration of stamped paper (papel sellado). References may be found throughout the Intervention to directives and decisions concerning the use and administration of officially stamped paper which the government employed as a form of tax on public and commercial transactions. Like the federal treasury offices located in
the states, officials of the federal administration of stamped paper were apparently found in many states. References to them may be found in Michoacán in April 1864, in a court decision of the district court of Chihuahua of January 1865, in two public legal notices found in the official paper of the Juárez government (Periódico oficial) in 1865 and 1866, and in two announcements of Gen. Porfirio Díaz as commander of the Army of the Eastern Front in 1867.25

As discussed in the preceding chapter, the administration of revenue devolved increasingly to local military authorities. Scattered references to military administration presents a mixed perception of the relationship of the Juárez government to its commanders administratively. Although examples may be found of attempts at central administration of the military effort, tangible and practical matters were apparently handled at the initiative of the commander in the field. The administration of promotions, efforts at centralized accountability, military discipline, and the practices of foraging and forced loans demonstrate the diversity of military administration.

An example of the attempt at central administration is the promotion of officers on approval of the President. It appears, from the communications to and from the federal government that the legitimate authority of the President in these matters was respected although the relatively few examples of it suggests that this was not a systematic and routine procedure. While governors commissioned and promoted officers in their respective national guard forces, it seems plausible as well that when the President gave extraordinary powers over matters of war and
treasury to regional commanders, the authority to issue patents and promotions in Mexican regular forces was delegated as well. The decentralized condition of the administration of military promotions is further demonstrated in an effort in 1866 by the Minister of War to consolidate a complete list of legitimate commissions and patents in the nation's military forces. Nevertheless, it would appear from the decrees of the federal government and the requests for promotions submitted by these commanders that the authority of the President was respected in matters of military promotions although the opportunities to administer them were limited.26

Specific references to promotions in the laws and decrees of the period are limited. There are only two examples of the President issuing decrees promoting living officers and one case of posthumous promotions. There is one instance in which the promotions made by a commander in the field were nullified because he did not have the authority to make them. Three of the four cases found are from the same Guardia de los Supremos Poderes suggesting that an especially close tie existed between this unit and the federal government. It may even be the personal escort of the federal government as its name suggests though other confirmation is needed. Unless archives contain other records not included in the collections of laws, decrees, and circulars of the federal government, it is apparent that military administration was largely decentralized paralleling revenue administration in the same period.27

Efforts to require periodic administrative reports and budgets from commanders and governors and the attempted creation of a central
Inspector General likewise imply a serious effort to maintain central administration and accountability. The protests of the Minister of War at the lack of reports and the general lack of related laws, decrees, and circulars suggests this effort was less than successful. In contrast to the repeated communications with great attention to detail and administrative procedure seen in other branches of the bureaucracy, centralized military administration seems to have been an ambition rather than a reality. A monthly report of military status was first required in February after the invasion by the Triple Alliance. Related subsequent directives include one in July 1863 requiring that governors submit budgets to the Minister of the Treasury, another in September 1863 instituting an Inspector General of all republican armed forces, and another in October 1865 demanding monthly reports from military commanders. After he claimed inability to carry out orders to march to Querétaro due to a lack of materiel, Ascensión Gómez of Tamaulipas was rebuffed by the Minister of War for having failed to produce any document reporting his problems. This incident illustrates at once the administrative expectations of the Juárez government and the lack of compliance with them in this instance. The evidence that the Ministry of War was able to exercise administrative control over more than a very limited portion of forces engaged in the war effort is quite limited. If the Juárez government was able to gain the compliance of military commanders with its administrative program, it seemingly had few resources to allocate to its commanders. In a decree of April 1864, the Minister of War advised commanders that the federal treasury was so
depleted that it could no longer honor debts incurred by military commanders that exceeded their budgets. This suggests that at least through this time, the federal treasury was supporting military operations through the honoring of debts incurred by commanders and apparently some commanders were indeed submitting budgets. It is not clear if and when this ceased as the Juárez government withdrew further north.28

The service of guerilla forces illustrates the generally decentralized nature of military administration in this period. The formation and control of guerilla forces was authorized in a regulation of May 22, 1862. The regulation provided for the recruitment, organization, and pay of guerilla forces under the direction of commanders of regular forces in the same zone of operations. Efforts were made to restrict their activities to the areas around French forces, essentially making brigandage legal so long as it was directed against areas occupied by the Empire. The reports of U.S. consuls reflect the highly fluid nature of military command and administration. Repeated references may be found in which consuls bemoan the unreasonable and irregular impositions of forced loans by irresponsible or self-serving local commanders. There seems little indication that the Juárez government was willing or able to restrict the activities of such local commanders as indicated in forced loans collected in Paso del Norte while the Juárez government resided there in March 1866. Additionally, logistical sustenance of military forces, both regular and guerilla, was ostensibly obtained largely through the initiative of local commanders.
by foraging among the local populace. 29

The imposition of military discipline at the order of the Juárez government is demonstrated in isolated cases with mixed results. In November 1863, allegations of assassination and kidnapping were registered with the Commander of the Army of the Center concerning the conduct of a guerilla commander, Col. Gerónimo Fragoso. There is no evidence in sources reviewed herein that any action was taken against him. In February 1864, the allegation of the murder of the governor of San Luis Potosí was raised against a subordinate commander under Santiago Vidaurri named Santos Pinilla. The rebellion of Vidaurri precluded any remedial action being taken for at least several months and there is no indication that the individual was ever apprehended. These demonstrate the practical limits of the Juárez government's imposition of military discipline. The war was fought with disparate military forces, organized, supplied, and led largely at local initiative. This created an extremely fluid and unmanageable situation for the maintenance of military discipline. One incidence demonstrates the will and ability of Juárez's ministers to impose remedial action where possible. In February 1865, a Lieutenant under the command of Gen. Melquiades Campos was accused of committing various crimes against property and persons at an hacienda in southern Chihuahua while on a foraging mission to obtain volunteers, horses, and arms. The complaint was addressed to the Minister of Relations who in turn relayed it to the Minister of War. The result was the relief and imprisonment of the Lieutenant and the reprimand of his commander. It was no doubt easier to impose discipline
when the individual was not an influential and powerful local figure and when the incident occurred in the vicinity of the republican government. 30

Military administration is illustrative of the efforts of the Juárez government to exercise control over events in areas not occupied by the Empire while demonstrating the practical limits of effectiveness. Juárez issued commissions and authorized promotions yet for practical reasons this aspect of administration was largely decentralized. The Minister of War attempted to obtain periodic reports from commanders, but there is limited evidence of significant success at this. Although there are indications that military unit budgets were employed at some time during the Intervention and that the treasury honored debts incurred by commanders at least through the spring of 1864, the general lack of federal revenue and isolation of the federal government from sources of revenue discussed in the preceding chapters necessarily calls these perceptions into question. Legal initiatives to authorize the service of foreigners and guerilla forces probably did little more than sanction realities that would have existed with or without the consent of the federal government. At the same time, however, Juárez and his ministers did pursue and in some measure gain control over actions in their periphery. Despite the extraordinary obstacles that faced Juárez and his ministers, his government exercised an authority generally recognized as legitimate by those who corresponded and came in contact with it.

For the purpose of this investigation, the administration of justice through the system of federal courts is regarded as a branch of
the officialdom through which Juárez could exercise control. The judiciary is generally considered an entity separate from the executive arm of government. Nevertheless, during the Intervention acting under the authority of his extraordinary powers, Juárez took action to establish federal courts in parts of the nation, appointed officers and judges to courts, and in some instances acted as a court of final appeal due to the absence of the Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court. Additionally, the Juárez government continued to issue guidelines for the prosecution of justice under the changing conditions imposed by the growing occupation of territory by the Empire.

On two occasions the Minister of Justice issued decrees from Juárez reversing the general suspension of the federal court system of January 24, 1862. That suspension had provided for the functions and jurisdictions of various federal courts to be passed to state treasury authorities. In November 1863 and September 1866, Juárez decreed that the previously existing system of courts would be reestablished as the federal government saw fit. Although some district and circuit courts were established by decrees in the succeeding years, those actions were generally restricted to northern states. The general decree concerning the reestablishment of federal courts issued in 1866 was essentially a repeat of the 1863 decree. It is perhaps significant that the repeat of the general decree concerning the reestablishment of the federal court system was issued as the Juárez government was in Chihuahua contemplating a move to Durango as the Empire began its collapse. This reflects the rather limited ability of the Juárez government to implement decreed
action during the intervening years due to the occupation of much of Mexico.

District and circuit courts were decreed to be established in Hidalgo in 1862; Tamaulipas, Zacatecas, Yucatán, and Campeche in 1863; and Nuevo León and Coahuila in 1864. Presidential appointments of judges or court officers were ostensibly made in Hidalgo in 1862, Nuevo León and Coahuila in 1864, and San Luis Potosí in 1867. Presumably, the judges and officers of the reestablished federal courts were either the ones that had occupied the bench before the suspension or were appointed at the authority of governors or regional military commanders. Several appeals rulings were issued in cases involving criminal justice, civil actions, conflicts between municipalities from 1863 through 1866 and at least seven rulings concerning the granting of land title were issued while the Juárez government was in the state of Chihuahua. Additionally, Juárez issued legal guidelines. In 1863, instructions were issued for the prosecution of cases involving litigants or property in areas occupied by the Empire. Others concerned the function of the judiciary under the state of siege in the state of Chihuahua in 1864 and the prosecution of robbery cases in San Luis Potosí in 1867. Finally, a decree was issued in July 1864 which sought to reconstitute the Supreme Court, though there is no indication as to the success or failure of that effort.32 Consistent with the patterns observed with regard to the other branches of the officialdom, Juárez issued general decrees concerning the judiciary but specific and detailed actions such as appointments, appeals rulings, and land title grants were generally
reserved for the courts in states surrounding his government.

In conclusion, the existence of a federal officialdom in Mexico and the relationship of the Juárez government to it bears great significance in the question of the governing capacity of the Juárez government. Of central importance was the federal treasury bureaucracy. Juárez actively sought to enlarge and extend control over the extensive corps of officials involved in the collection and administration of revenue. There is evidence that despite the obvious limitations imposed by the imperial occupation, the federal government was able to implement policy and administer this branch of the bureaucracy in republican areas through much of the Intervention. Similar perceptions with modification are valid for the administration of stamped paper, military administration, and the administration of justice. In all these branches of republican officialdom, Juárez exercised greatest control in states he personally occupied and ones immediately adjacent to them. This was in part due to the problems of communication which the federal government faced. Nevertheless, the many administrative and bureaucratic activities of Juárez and his ministers in Northern Mexico present a picture of a population governed by an extensive administrative system. This perception should counter the assumption common to much literature that Mexico lived in a state of chaos and near anarchy from independence to the Porfiriato.
ENDNOTES

1Knapp, The Life of Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, p. 97.


3Decree of Government, 17 April 1837, Legislación mexicana, 3:363-376.


6Decree of Government, 7 October 1855, ibid., 7:566; Decree of Government, 10 October 1855, ibid., 7:570; Decree of Government, 3 November 1855, ibid., 7:594.


8Minister of the Treasury to jefe de hacienda of Veracruz, 17 December 1861, Juárez, Documentos, 5:450.


11The figures used for this estimation are taken from the organization of treasury offices decreed for Coahuila on July 15, 1864, the authorized staff of the customs house at Mazatlán to gain an approximate cost per employee, plus the federal revenue estimates provided in Romero's Memoria de Hacienda. This calculation assumes that the cost per federal employee was constant as decreed in the following references. This is understandably open to challenge and is only intended to give a rough estimate of the order of magnitude of the
bureaucratic corps. The decline of federal employees suggested above is consistent with the occupation of a growing portion of the nation by the French and the corresponding decrease in areas under republican control. If the federal government fell delinquent in paying salaries to officials in republican areas as would seem likely due to the general diminution of commerce, the employee estimates above would be too small. Decree of Government, dated July 15, 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9: 688-689; Romero, Memoria de Hacienda, pp. 519, 543-545, 573-574, 590-591, 623-624, 654-655, 678-679.


14Manuel R. Gallo to Benito Juárez, 26 July 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 6:781; Governor of Hidalgo to Benito Juárez, 7 August 1862, ibid., 6:788.


16Decree of Government, 19 August 1863, ibid., 1:100; Decree of Government, 10 November 1863, ibid., 1:216-217.

17Magistrate of the First Court of Galeana to the governor of Nuevo León, 23 January 1864, ibid., 1:266-268; Circular of the Minister of Relations, 26 February 1864, ibid., 1:225-234.

18Decree of Government, 12 November 1864, ibid., 2:96-97; Circular of the Minister of the Treasury, 15 November 1864, ibid., 2:97-99; Minister of the Treasury to the federal treasury office of Chihuahua, 18 November 1864, ibid., 2:99-100; Minister of the Treasury to the federal treasury office of Chihuahua, 23 November 1864, ibid., 2:105.

19Legal notice published in the Periódico oficial, 6 August 1866, vol. II, no. 10, p. 4; José María Iglesias to Ignacio Pesqueira, 24 October 1866, Colección de leyes, 3:121-123; Circular of the Minister of the Treasury, 21 November 1866, ibid., 3:134-137.

20Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 20 October 1863, ibid., 1:165-167.

22 Decree of Government, 24 October 1863, ibid., 1:174-175; Decree of Government, 24 November 1863, ibid., 1:210-212; Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 3 May 1864, ibid., 2:33-35; Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 17 May 1864, ibid., 2:51-52; Minister of Treasury to the federal treasurer, 21 May 1864, ibid., 2:46.

23 Circular of the Minister of the Treasury, 1 December 1866, ibid., 3:140-141.

24 Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 30 March 1867, ibid., 3:254-255.


26 Governors were instructed to publish lists of officers they had promoted in their national guard forces so that other commanders might recognize the legitimate status of their patents in Circular of the Minister of War, 1 August 1863, ibid., 1:85-86; Circular of the Minister of War, 13 January 1866, ibid., 2:300-302.

27 Promotions of living officers made on request of their commander in Minister of War to Col. Antonio Rosales, operating in Sinaloa, 9 January 1865, ibid., 2:141-142; and in Minister of War to the officers of the Batallón Guardia de los Supremos Poderes, 28 August 1865, ibid., 2:252-253; posthumous promotions so surviving families could enjoy benefits of higher lifelong pensions seen in Communique of Government to Commander of the Brigada Guardia de los Supremos Poderes, 30 August 1865, ibid., 2:251-252; nullification of promotions made by a Commander of the same Guardia de los Supremos Poderes is found in Circular of the Minister of War, 8 January 1866, ibid., 2:300.

28 Circular of the Minister of War, 20 February 1862, Legislación
mexicana, 9:385; Decree of Government, 20 July 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:62-64; Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 28 September 1863, ibid., 1:154-156; Decree of Government, 21 April 1864, ibid., 2:28-29; Circular of the Minister of War, 14 October 1865, ibid., 2:298-299; Minister of War to Ascensión Gómez, 16 March 1867, ibid., 3:167-170.

29 Guerilla service was authorized by the Regulation of Government, 22 May 1862, Legislación mexicana, 9:466; service of foreigners was similarly authorized by Decree of Government, 11 August 1864, ibid., 9:691-692, and Colección de leyes, 2:91-93; forced loan imposed by republican commander reported by Blake to Seward, 4 November 1864, U.S. Consuls in Manzanillo; forced loans collected in Paso del Norte reported by Cuniff to Seward, 2 March 1866, U.S. Consuls in Paso del Norte; foraging by regular forces in evidence in official correspondence, Minister of War to Minister of Relations, 20 May 1865, Colección de leyes, 2:240-246; and by guerilla forces in Romero Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:395.

30 Jesús Suárez y Navarro to the Commanding General of the Army of Operations, 26 November 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:212-214; Circular of the Minister of Relations, January 1864, ibid., 1:235-240; Governor of San Luis Potosí to Minister of War, 1 February 1864, ibid., 1:302-306; Minister of Relations to Minister of War, 17 February 1865, ibid., 2:159-162.


32 In a letter from Pedro Hinojosa to Benito Juárez the former acknowledges the creation of a Supreme Tribunal of Hidalgo and conveys a recommendation for the post, Juárez, Documentos, 6:781-782. District or circuit courts were decreed to be established and on two occasions appointments were made in the following decrees: district court of Matamoros, Tamaulipas in Decree of Government, 24 October 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:174-175; district and circuit courts established in Zacatecas, Yucatán, and Campeche in Decree of Government, 7 November 1863, ibid., 1:185-186; district court established in Nuevo León-Coahuila in Decree of Government, 4 April 1864, ibid., 2:21-22; judge appointed to Nuevo León-Coahuila district court in Decree of Government, 9 April 1864, ibid., 2:23-25; district court decreed for Nuevo León in Decree of Government, 8 June 1864, ibid., 2:69-70; district court
established in Coahuila in Decree of Government, 14 August 1864, ibid., 2:82-84; court officer appointed in San Luis Potosí in Decree of Government, 3 April 1867, ibid., 3:155-156. Rulings on appeal were issued in the following decrees: dispute between municipalities over water rights settled in Decree of Government, 8 October 1863, ibid., 1:153-154; legal status of a minor decided in Decree of Government, 8 December 1863, ibid., 1:224-225, and Decree of Government, 16 December 1864, ibid., 2:126; status of civil estate resolved in Decree of Government, 22 November 1864, ibid., 2:104; excessive punishment for violation of law requiring use of stamped paper in official transactions modified in communique from Minister of Justice to district court of Chihuahua, 18 January 1865, ibid., 2:149-150; court-ordered release of criminal suspect reversed in a communique from the Minister of Justice to President of Tribunal of Justice of Chihuahua, 18 April 1865, ibid., 2:215-220; dispute concerning reconstruction of flood damaged irrigation works decided in communique from Minister of Justice to political chief of the Cantón de Bravos, Chihuahua, 10 March 1866, ibid., 2:312-324; final appeal of death sentence for four convicted criminals resulted in the confirmation of two death sentences while the other two were remanded to military tribunals for the assignment of lesser penalties in Decree of Government, 9 October 1866, ibid., 3:116-117. Announcements and decrees concerning the granting or recognition of land title are found in the following: Minister of Justice to the governor of Chihuahua, 17 October 1865, ibid., 2:265; Minister of Justice to the governor of Chihuahua, 24 January 1866, ibid., 2:310-311; Minister of Justice to the governor of Chihuahua, 24 February 1866, ibid., 2:311; Minister of Justice to the governor of Chihuahua, 27 February 1866, ibid., 2:311; Minister of Justice to the governor of Chihuahua, 4 March 1866, ibid., 2:312. Legal guidelines were established in the following: Decree of Government, 15 October 1863, ibid., 3:255-257; Decree of Government, 18 November 1864, ibid., 2:101-103; Decree of Government, 27 May 1867, ibid., 3:200-201. The Supreme Court magistrates were recalled in Decree of Government, 10 July 1864, ibid., 2:80-81.
CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATION

A Perspective on Communications

The ability of a governing authority to communicate with the constituent parts of the body politic is a vital issue in its capacity to govern. This chapter explores the ability of the Juárez government to communicate and the degree to which this function supported or frustrated its ruling authority. A review of the communications of the Juárez government reveals many obvious limitations, yet such an investigation must be framed in the context of the methods of communication available in that era and in terms of the political conditions of the nation which persisted throughout this period. Therefore, communication between Juárez and authorities at federal, state, and local levels should be evaluated in terms of the length of time required for communication and the substance of the communication.

Different events and circumstances required varying degrees of speed in communications. Some events of importance to the federal government required immediate action and were irreversible once a decision was made. Other events required decisive action, yet were reversible after some delay. Finally, some decisions could wait for
extended periods of time or be reversed after a lengthy delay without adverse effect. It also seems obvious that the longer the time delay in effecting decisions of the ruling authority, the more the effectiveness of that authority must be questioned. Therefore, from an analysis of circumstances and the substance of official communications, one may draw conclusions about the relationship of the Juárez government to the Mexican body politic.

The above considerations provide the framework in which to evaluate the effectiveness of governmental communications in terms of the time required. Distance provided an absolute limit on the speed, hence capability, of official communication. The loyalty and will of the recipient occasionally reduced the effectiveness of official communications further, but the time needed to cover the distance between officials could not be reduced beyond a certain point. Therefore this observation is clear, the time required to communicate was directly proportional to the distance which had to be traversed. From the location of the Juárez government at any given moment, concentric circles of maximum theoretical influence may be drawn. At the closest distances, Juárez could optimally influence all the types of decisions outlined above. At intermediate distances, Juárez could hold ultimate influence over reversible events in which local authorities took action but referred the review or final disposition to the federal government. At the greater distances from his government, Juárez could only exercise direct control over the least time-sensitive events.

Measuring the length of time needed to effect communication at
various points during the Intervention is possible but presents several pitfalls. For example, it may be measured by examining exchanges of dated correspondence, or by correlating decrees issued by the federal government with their promulgation in various areas. To do this, certain assumptions must be made concerning the delay of response taken by each correspondent. In this study, only a partial correlation of the communications has been made due in part to apparent gaps in the sources and due in large measure to limitations of time. Additionally, direct comparison of communications before and after the government left Mexico City is difficult due to the fundamental asymmetry of the available sources. Communications to Juárez are found in the Juárez papers, compiled by Tamayo. This is an essentially consistent source throughout both periods. The communications received by the ministers of the Juárez government and those issued by the government are preserved in substantial detail in the Colección de leyes, decretos y circulares from May 31, 1863 through July 1867. The only comparable source for the communications issued by the Juárez government while still in Mexico City is Legislación mexicana, compiled by Lozano y Dublán. This source reflects generally the most formal communications of the government, omitting many circulars and personal communiques. Therefore, the nature of the sources might lead one to conclude that Juárez communicated more extensively with federal authorities, with governors, and with military commanders after he left Mexico City than before. An examination of the content of extant records suggests that perhaps the opposite was true. The absence of the less formal communications of the government while
remaining in Mexico City often precludes the careful analysis of the time required in communication, but a critical review of the content of communications offers significant insights nonetheless. Therefore, this chapter emphasizes the substance of individual communications, making correlations where possible.

Much is revealed in the substance of communications. For example, as suggested in the preceding chapters, a concern with routine detail and administrative procedure would seemingly denote the function of an effective and regular system of administration. The correspondence preserved in the Juárez papers reflects the federal government's significant awareness of events in the nation. Similarly, the supplications to and responses of the federal government reflect the perceptions of citizens and leaders in the Mexican body politic of the authority and abilities of the federal government. Finally, many actions of Juárez reflected in decrees denote prior knowledge of events in various parts of the nation without revealing how or when he was apprised of them.

The large number and diversity of governmental communications during the Intervention requires a systematic method to organize and evaluate them. To provide a comparative framework, this chapter examines communication in two categories, while the Juárez government remained in Mexico City from January 1862 to May 1863, and as the government regressed through northern Mexico from June 1863 to July 1867. The period in which Juárez remained in Mexico City is offered as a standard against which to evaluate the communications of his government while in
northern Mexico. In each of these periods, communications are reviewed between federal officials, within the military, and with the constituent parts of the federation. In the period outside Mexico City, brief note is made as well of the communications of Juárez with foreign capitals.

The length of time required to effect communications and the substance of communications provide insights into the governing capacity of the federal government through the course of the Intervention. From this perspective it is possible to evaluate the relationship of the Juárez government with various authorities. As suggested above, the loyalties of key local leaders played a decisive role in determining the influence and control exercised by the national government but that perspective is reserved for the succeeding chapter on control. This chapter suggests that the extensive communication of Juárez with other governing authorities in the nation denotes a continuity of essential governing functions and a capacity to govern despite the obvious limitations imposed by distance. There is yet much to be learned from further analysis of these sources.

**Communication while in Mexico City**

The communications of the Juárez government while it remained in Mexico City provides an appropriate standard against which to compare its communications later in the Intervention. When examining the communications of this period, it should be remembered that the decade from 1857 to 1867 was one of extraordinary difficulty and that, as Matías Romero states, the Intervention began while the civil war was yet
unresolved. Additionally, Romero observes that the activities of reactionary bands frustrated tax collections and presumably communications while the republican government sought to consolidate its position. Therefore, it is important to establish an understanding of what matters the Juárez government concerned itself with and the types of communications engaged in while in Mexico City. This provides an essential frame of reference in which to evaluate the changes in the communication patterns engaged in while in northern Mexico. If the governing role of the Juárez government was diminished while outside Mexico City, then the change should be reflected in the communications. As noted above, it is essential to weigh the variations in the nature of the sources between this and the subsequent period when drawing conclusions. In this first portion of the chapter, communication is reviewed between federal authorities, within the military, and between federal and state authorities. In the interest of economy, reference is made to the preceding two chapters where the topic has been previously developed.

The communications of the Juárez government with the federal bureaucracy while it remained in Mexico City are not recorded in the sources reviewed in this investigation. Nevertheless, there is indirect evidence that argues for the existence of routine bureaucratic communication as well as evidence of the limitations of such communications. As noted in preceding chapters, Juárez decreed an extraordinary tax on capital immediately after the first European troops landed at Veracruz. According to the decree, this tax was to be
collected through the agency of the federal treasury offices located in the states. Subsequent receipt of tax revenues from this source as noted in preceding chapters demonstrates the effectiveness of this bureaucratic communication channel. Only work in archival sources offers any hope of determining the frequency and speed of these communications.

Other indirect evidence is less positive. Recall the circular addressed to treasury officials and administrators of stamped paper in the states forbidding them to receive commissions or otherwise hold employment. This suggests that an effort at communication was made but there is little to indicate if the communique was received, much less complied with. This issue was still regarded as a problem at the end of the Intervention as demonstrated in a similar prohibition issued in August of 1867. The initiative of the Congress to direct the federal treasury to issue fifteen million pesos in bonds suggests an assumption of the capacity to communicate with prospective purchasers of the bonds. Although Matías Romero reports that almost four million pesos were sold, there is no indication where the bonds were sold. It seems very plausible that the principal market for such bond issues was in Mexico City. As developed in preceding chapters, many states were seemingly in close liaison with the federal government, while in others, especially in the northern states, the federal government exercised no control over its constitutional and lawful revenue base. In such cases, the quality of communications was made somewhat irrelevant by the strong and independent local leadership.

Perhaps the best indication of bureaucratic communication within
federal treasury authorities is found in the fiscal status of the federal government as reported by Romero. The very substantial revenue which the federal government collected and disbursed in the seventeen months that the government remained in Mexico City reflected an administrative activity, hence capacity for communication in the federal bureaucracy. Archival research holds the promise of disclosing the frequency, nature, and significance of bureaucratic communication which is only suggested in the records available at present.³

The federal government held constitutional authority to administer mail routes and revenue through which routine private and official communication was presumably carried. The extent and efficiency of mail administration at the end of the Wars of the Reform is a matter needing additional study. In the sources reviewed in this work, there is only limited evidence concerning the function of federally sponsored mail routes before the government’s departure from Mexico City. The budget figures of Matías Romero and the estimations of the size of the federal government in San Luis Potosí offered by Flores Caballero offer some insight into the size and extent of mail administration in this period. Romero reports that in the fiscal year beginning in July 1863 the mail administration was budgeted for expenditures of 6,200 pesos which would barely pay for a treasury office or district court with five to seven employees. At the same time, Flores Caballero states that the administration of mails employed about 6,800. Clearly, the wages of mail couriers and administrators located throughout the nation were not reflected in the federal budget and were likely derived from the postage
fees collected.

The decentralized nature of revenue management within the administration of mails might well indicate that the continued operation of mail routes depended less on the supervision and direction of the federal government than on the security of local routes. That is to say, where routes could be secured from assault and robbery, mail could continue to be carried and the couriers paid. Where the disruptions became excessive, there were local interruptions of mail service. The previously cited comment of the United States consul at Manzanillo in 1864 that the federal government had abandoned almost all its mail routes clearly suggests that the norm for this era was for the national government to sponsor routine mail service. His comment was made in explanation of high postage costs charged to the U.S. Department of State. He suggested that mail could almost always be transmitted, though at higher cost as suggested above. Although there is virtually no direct mention of it in correspondence while the Juárez government remained in Mexico City, every indication is that there was a mail administration of significant size.

As suggested in preceding chapters, the Juárez government communicated with judicial authorities during the Intervention, rendering judgments and establishing judicial jurisdictions. In the months from the invasion to the departure from Mexico City, however, there is very little mention of judicial matters in official decrees or correspondence, perhaps reflecting the government's primary focus on the military mobilization in progress or perhaps reflecting the differences in the
sources used in this investigation. Another possible explanation is found in the abolition of the federal system of courts in January 1862. A decree of November 1863 reinstated district and circuit courts and rescinded the previous action of the federal government. The earlier action assigned the functions of the Superior District Tribunal to the Supreme Court; the responsibilities of the district courts were to pass to the treasuries of the respective state, and the functions of the circuit courts were to pass to the Superior Tribunal of Justice of the respective state treasury. There is no explanation given in the decrees leaving one to speculate that perhaps it was done in the interests of preserving federal revenue for the mobilization effort which was gaining momentum at that time.4

Whatever the reasons for the action in January 1862, it apparently relegated most trial and appeal functions to state authorities thus limiting the need and opportunity for the federal government to intervene in judicial matters in the early months of the Intervention. Nevertheless, the federal government was not completely detached from the administration of justice as reflected in correspondence of the governor of Hidalgo in which he refers to the newly created Superior Tribunal of Justice of Hidalgo and commends an individual for the President's favorable consideration for appointment.5 Thus the federal government may have had an attenuated role in the administration of justice while it remained in Mexico City, but the President retained some hand in the appointment of judges and was ostensibly able to effectively communicate to exercise that authority.
While it remained in Mexico City, the Juárez government attempted to establish control over and communication within the military for administrative and operational purposes. The concern of the Juárez government with military administration while it remained in Mexico City is best reflected in the efforts of the Minister of War to gain accountability of military forces and the correspondence of commanders to Juárez and the Minister of War concerning replacements. Additionally, the authorization for governors to disperse federal funds in their states was communicated early in the Intervention as discussed in earlier chapters. Other administrative concerns such as discipline and the issuance of promotions and commissions appear only rarely in records while the government remained in Mexico City.

The efforts of the Minister of War to muster state militia forces began shortly after the invasion. Following the general mobilization decree of December 17, 1861, an Inspector General for militia forces was decreed for the Federal District with the apparent intent of coordinating and controlling the flow of men and materiel soon expected to be arriving from the states. On January 17, 1862, the Minister of War issued a decree instructing the governors to expedite the deployment of troops to the Federal District. The next month, another circular was issued requiring a monthly accounting of troops under arms so that the War Ministry could plan operations. In July 1862, Juárez issued a general call for cooperation from the governors specifically requesting immediate deployment of additional men and resources to the capital for federal service.6
These communications were evidently received by most if not all governors as reflected in correspondence and in the deployment of troops to Mexico City. Even the governor of Nuevo León, Santiago Vidaurri, responded to the correspondence of Juárez and his Minister of War, though he offered more excuses than troops and materiel. In May 1862, he reported ordering two cavalry units from his states to join in federal service and further said he was organizing guerilla units. Nevertheless, the excuses he offered for not doing more suggest he was trying to sound very cooperative while meeting minimal requirements. Other governors mentioned the deployment of troops to Mexico City in correspondence to Juárez and, of course, enough forces were mustered under the command of Ignacio Zaragoza to secure a victory over the French at Puebla on the memorable fifth of May 1862. Thus despite the many difficulties facing the republican government in the early months of the Intervention, communications were apparently effective enough to permit the mobilization of forces essential for the early phases of the war.

The logistical needs of the forces on the eastern front are evident in the correspondence from commanders to the federal government. On August 7, 1862, Gen. Zaragoza responded to a letter from Juárez dated August 5 in which he explains that he still needed hundreds of carts and pack mules despite his significant success in foraging men and arms from among the population of Puebla. Two days latter he writes concerning the pressing need for more officers and men for his force. This correspondence suggests that communication from Mexico City to the commanders on the eastern front took about 2 days to cover seventy-five
to one hundred miles. Later that same month, the commander of the Brigade of Michoacán wrote to the Minister of War reporting that he was having difficulty in getting replacements from the various leaders in his state who had promised them.8

While his government remained in Mexico City, Juárez did concern himself with the tactical decisions of troop deployments and larger campaign decisions. In addition to seeking the cooperation of the governors in mobilizing forces, Juárez actively engaged in the debate whether to pursue the offensive after the victory at Puebla. This is illustrated in the curious correspondence from Gen. Jesús González Ortega in which he first expressed support for Gen. Zaragoza and the idea of a republican offensive, and then three days later he suggested that prudence might be the wiser course to follow. From these letters, it is clear that Juárez was engaged in the serious matters of developing strategy for military campaigns and communicated concerning it among the principal commanders of republican forces.9

Additionally, the correspondence reveals that Juárez was apprised of developing events in various parts of the nation, enabling him to take an active role in managing events. In January 1862, Juárez received correspondence from Juan José de la Garza informing him of French attempts to land troops at Tampico. In the same month, Juárez coordinated actions of military forces from two states to impose order in another state. On January 13, 1862, Juárez ordered Santiago Vidaurre to march to Tamaulipas with 2000 men to establish order and assume command of the state. On the twenty-eighth of the same month he directed 1000
men be sent from San Luis Potosí to reinforce the efforts of Vidaurri. The following month he accepted the mediation of Gen. González Ortega in the Tamaulipas affair to seek a political solution to the feud. The extensive correspondence on this matter illustrates the active role Juárez was able to take in the management of local events despite limitations on communications.10

Perhaps the best indication of the extensive knowledge of Juárez of the general affairs in the nation is reflected in his actions to overturn unconstitutional state laws, his appointments of military commanders and governors, and his use of the state of siege. These actions will be examined again in the succeeding chapter for their significance in terms of the control exercised by the Juárez government, but it is first necessary to recognize their significance in terms of the abilities of the Juárez government to communicate within the federation.

The actions of Juárez to annul various state laws during the Intervention has already been discussed in preceding chapters. Recall that while the government remained in Mexico City, Juárez generally issued a response to an objectionable state decree within one month, in several cases within two to three weeks. As suggested in the preceding chapters, this clearly indicates that most states were in close communication with the federal government whether through official or unofficial channels. Obviously if the President was not informed of these actions by the states, he would not have been able to respond appropriately. Considering the time that was doubtless spent in consultation with the ministers before issuing a response, the relatively
short time lapses are impressive.

Another indication of the state of communications in the nation during the government's stay in Mexico City was the action by the President to appoint commanders and governors in various states. These actions reflect both the capabilities and limitations of communications within the republican camp. On the one hand, the President clearly had sufficient knowledge of major developments to address the leadership structure of the republican cause, while ostensibly the technological limits on communications precluded his involvement in many decisions except on a review basis.

The mobilization of forces from many states and their simultaneous movement to the nation's center placed demands on the Ministry of War which perhaps exceeded its managerial resources. Thus to compensate for the limitations on communications and to facilitate the logistical support and tactical deployment of the state forces, Juárez designated regional commanders. On September 23, 1862, the states of Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Veracruz were put under the command of the Commanding General of the Army of the East. In November 1862, the Federal District, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, and Michoacán were put under the command of the Commanding General of the Army of the Center. Additionally, the states of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas were directed to send replacements to units under this command. These actions reflect the efforts of the Juárez government to coordinate military command and support despite the limitations on communications. Little is known as yet of the inner workings of the regional military
commands.

The repeated actions of Juárez to declare various states under siege while the government remained in Mexico City clearly suggests that he had timely information on which to base such decisions. Most instances of this constitutional measure need further study to identify the specific information that he was acting on to establish accurately how quickly he was able to get information and the effectiveness of his decisions. Nevertheless the frequency and pattern of these actions is informative. From the invasion to the battle of Puebla, Juárez declared ten states under siege. In most instances, the circumstances motivating this measure are not known in detail though most seem to have been in response to the threat of invasion. In the subsequent year, before the government left Mexico City, three states were declared under siege, one in response to domestic political disruptions, one in anticipation of imminent invasion, and the other unknown. In four instances, the state of siege was lifted. Although little is known as yet of the details why these actions were taken when they were, it is most plausible that the President was responding to specific information on which he based his decision.

For example, details are available in two instances. In the state of Tamaulipas, as discussed above and developed in greater detail in the following chapter, Juárez not only declared the state under siege, but mobilized troops from San Luis Potosí under the command of Santiago Vidaurre of Nuevo León to enforce the decree and suppress fighting which followed an electoral battle. Several communications relayed to Juárez
in the ensuing weeks and months from the disaffected governor-elect and his partisans demonstrate that Juárez was informed of developments and was able to take decisive action in response to them.  

Similarly, in the state of San Luis Potosí, siege was declared shortly after the invasion of the Triple Alliance. Primo Feliciano Velázquez reports that this action was taken not because the state was in any imminent threat of invasion, but because there were great demonstrations of public outrage against the Spanish population in that state. Thus the president declared siege in effect to give the governor the extraordinary powers needed to maintain order. In October that year, siege was lifted in that state. The following February, the governor became embroiled in a domestic state controversy concerning remittances made to the miners of Catorce. Again the President acted to quell the dispute by declaring a state of siege and designating Vicente Chico Sein as governor and commander. Only three weeks later, Chico Sein demonstrated signs of mental instability and the senior military commander in the state assumed command of military and political affairs. In the former two instances, the president was apprised of developments and took decisive action in response to communications he received. In the case of the replacement of Chico Sein, the military commander took immediate action and then informed the president who condoned the action after the fact. These incidents demonstrate that time is of different importance in various events. In the replacement of mentally unstable governor, the military commander felt there it was not necessary nor appropriate to wait for authority to relieve the incompetent governor who
had begun issuing erratic and irresponsible commands. In the former two cases in which serious questions of constitutional propriety were involved, state authorities deferred any action to the president.13

While the republican government remained in Mexico City, there is no evidence of communication between the federal government and municipalities as is in evidence later in the Intervention. One explanation might be the difference in the sources for each period. Another plausible explanation might be the overwhelming concern which preoccupied authorities at all levels of government in mustering forces in response to the invasion. Together the communications of the federal government reflect the different relationships which national authorities had with various locales. While the government did communicate with federal authorities across the nation, with military commanders, and with state authorities, the limitations of the period must be kept in mind as well. Communications were limited by the irreducible hurdle of distance and the responsiveness of key leaders further limited the effectiveness of communications while the government remained in Mexico City. This perspective is necessary if the succeeding period is to be gauged fairly.

Communications while in Northern Mexico

The correspondence and decrees of the Juárez government while it migrated through northern Mexico provide a checkered pattern of successes and failures in communications. On the one hand, correspondence seemingly travelled at the rate of sixty miles per day in areas not occupied by the French. On the other hand, Juárez was out of contact
with remote parts of the republican resistance for weeks or months at a
time. Liaison with authorities in the states immediately surrounding the
federal government in its travels seems to have been almost constant,
while communication with republican forces in remote areas such as
Michoacán required extraordinary measures. Frank A. Knapp notes, for
example, that during the months Juárez was in Paso del Norte, some areas
remained out of communication with his government apparently for months
at a time.14 Thus the role of communications in the governance of the
Juárez government in northern Mexico is as varied as the diverse reaches
of the nation.

Perhaps of more significance than an understanding of the time
limitations on the communications of the federal government are insights
into the content and substance of those communications. The substance of
communications has already been alluded to in the discussions of the
government's revenue base and bureaucracy in the preceding chapters.
These perceptions are refined further with a careful review of
communications outside Mexico City. As in the preceding portion of this
chapter, communications will be examined between federal authorities,
within the military establishment, and between state and federal
authorities. Additionally, note is made of communications outside the
nation for the purpose of illustrating both the capabilities and
limitations of long distance communications in that age.

Communications between federal authorities is reflected in the
official communiques of the federal treasury authorities, the function of
the administration of the mails, and in judicial decisions. Treasury
communications were by far the most prevalent official communications within the federal establishment and have been related in part in the preceding chapters. Treasury communications will be reviewed in the following categories: general revenue and tax administration, customs administration, and federal land administration including the administration of confiscated property. The intention is to illustrate the substantial and significant official treasury communication effected throughout the government's travels in northern Mexico while simultaneously illustrating its limitations.

Some indication of the ability of the Juárez government to communicate in order to effect administration of revenue is seen in the time constraints imposed for compliance with tax measures. The tax on capital decreed on July 31, 1863 required payment in two installments, the first within fifteen days and the second within forty five. The announcement of a deadline for compliance with this tax suggests a high expectation of relatively rapid communication and compliance. The reality of revenue collections might be discovered in the treasury archives of the Mexican nation as suggested in foregoing chapters, nevertheless, the relatively short period of time allotted for compliance with this tax seems significant. In September the same year, the Minister of the Treasury published a decree allowing an additional eight days for the states that had been invaded to comply with the federal tax on cotton.15

Similarly, the proscriptions of the Juárez government against the tax abuses of military commanders suggests that it was indeed informed of
such practices though its success in controlling them needs further study. In this decree, the announcement was made that the federal treasury would not acknowledge any indebtedness of such commanders. This decree clearly suggests that the treasury was in communication with individuals and municipalities suffering such abuses and the treasury offices in which those commanders might seek to transfer their indebtedness to the national treasury.16

As suggested in previous chapters, the President's attempts to centralize revenue administration between May 1862 and March 1864 imply an awareness of the condition of revenue management and a frustration with it. Through the creation of federal treasury offices in the states and a general director of federal revenue, Juárez sought to streamline bureaucratic procedures which implicitly depended on effective communications. It seems unlikely that a pragmatic politician like Juárez would have undertaken the effort if the rudimentary elements of such a program were not feasible. The subsequent decentralization through the delegation of broad authority to regional commanders perhaps reflects the effective limits of communication. By the spring of 1864, Juárez and his ministers realized that they were simply too isolated from events outside their immediate periphery to effectively manage revenue centrally. Thus their efforts were generally restricted to local events and policy through the middle years of the Intervention.17

Decrees and circulars issued in the fall of 1863 indicate a dialog between the Minister of the Treasury and officials in various states. For example, in November, Juárez approved the recommendation of
an employee of the state treasury of Jalisco concerning the use of different tax rates for ginned and unginned cotton. In the same month, the Minister of the Treasury issued a communique which clarified the tax authority of governors in states occupied by the French. This appears to have been in response to a query from such a governor. Additionally, the Minister of Justice issued a decree signed by Juárez which granted tax exempt status to two haciendas. Obviously, a request for such exemption must have initiated this action. Unfortunately the location of these haciendas relative to the Juárez government is not known.18

Although the treasury communications after the spring of 1864 were increasingly focused on activities in the northern states, there were nevertheless communications to suggest a continuing dialog. Illustrating this is the decree of May 1864 in which the Minister of Relations clarified republican restrictions on trade with French controlled areas in response to queries by several merchants. There is no indication how close these merchants were to the federal government geographically and it is possible that they resided in the same city with the government.19

These and several other communications referred to in preceding chapters illustrate the continuous activity of the Juárez government with respect to revenue management. The tendency toward communication and influence within a diminishing radius is also evident. When the government began its migration south anticipating the collapse of the Empire, the Minister of the Treasury was required to reissue a copy of a decree published while the president was in Chihuahua to republican
officials in Jalisco since they were apparently not aware of the president's decisions while he was in the north. A second instance appears similar except that the need to republish a decree was different. In March 1867 the Governor of San Luis Potosí requested clarification of the federal tax on cotton. This law was originally issued while the government resided in San Luis Potosí almost four years before so there is little doubt that the governor at that time received notification in the original action. In this case, it appears that continuity in administration suffered due to the occupation of the state by the Empire and the changes of the governorship in the interim.20

A similar isolation from regular republican administration is also evident in the actions of Gen. Porfirio Díaz on the eastern front. A series of actions taken there as his forces advanced established procedures for administration of revenue and standards for the imposition of fines and penalties. These and other actions by Díaz seemingly demonstrate that the states on the eastern axis from Mexico to Veracruz had most likely been completely out of contact with Juárez.21

The administration of customs reflects the same diversity of communications experience as general revenue administration. In 1863, communications suggest a fairly broad range of port facilities were in communication with the Juárez government. As the Intervention progressed, these dwindled to just those ports of entry in the northern states. The best means of confirming the effectiveness of federal communications is to find federal decrees in consular reports as published in the respective port city. Only one such instance was found
in the sources reviewed in this investigation. In correspondence to the United States Minister to Mexico in July 1863, the U.S. Consul at Manzanillo sent a copy of a decree limiting bullion shipments from that port allegedly issued by Juárez. No decree to that effect is found in the extant laws and decrees of the republican government. It is likely that the decree was simply not preserved in the records of the period. 

Also in the fall of 1863, Juárez issued a decree authorizing the duty free importation of corn in the ports of entry at Manzanillo, Matamoros, and Piedras Negras due to grain shortages in the surrounding areas. He further granted the authority to governors to do the same if they had international ports of entry under their jurisdictions and if in their judgement it was justified. This action was no doubt taken in response to supplications from local authorities. In the next month Juárez acknowledged the deficiencies of the customs house at Mazatlán and authorized its expansion to a staff of 52 and an annual budget of over 49,000 pesos. These actions illustrate the geographically diverse communications with customs houses early in the years outside Mexico City.

In the spring and summer of 1864 communications with and about customs house activities continued but were increasingly limited to a few ports of entry in the northern states. As detailed in the preceding chapters, the Minister of the Treasury travelled to Matamoros in May 1864 to put administrative matters in order and several communiques were issued governing the customs operations at Piedras Negras. In July 1864, the President issued a decree that all printed matter would be
permitted duty free transit at all ports of the nation. The following
month the Minister of the Treasury responded to numerous questions
concerning this policy in a circular. Although this does indicate at
least some circulation of this decree, there is no indication of the
extent of its distribution. It is most plausible that it was limited to
the ports of entry which appear in other communications of the same
period.25

Indications for communications related to customs activities late
in the Intervention suggest that there was a significant discontinuity in
federal communication and administration in many ports of the nation.
For example, the December 1866 prohibition against customs discounts
suggests a breakdown of approved procedure as suggested in preceding
chapters. Similarly the actions of Porfirio Díaz as Commander of the
Eastern Front illustrate the need for basic administrative guidance in
the ports of the Caribbean. In the same period, the Minister of the
Treasury issued instructions to the governor of Tabasco concerning the
administration of duties. This information is suggestive of the problems
the federal government had in exercising control over its constitutional
jurisdictions in this period without offering insight into the status of
federal control relative to other periods. A decree issued by Juárez in
the Restored Republic which directed governors to locate their capitals
at interior points and not at ports of entry suggests that federal
control over customs administration was a long term problem. The
decree's stated purpose was to reduce the unlawful interference of state
leaders in matters of federal revenue.26
Communications related to the management of federal land, nationalized property, and confiscated property similarly reflect the pattern evident in the above treasury communications. The republican government communicated general instructions to treasury authorities concerning the adjudication of federal properties in the months from the departure from Mexico City to the end of 1863. These included policies related to federal properties under occupation of the Empire and those belonging to treasonous individuals that joined the imperial cause. By 1864, communications narrowed to a concern with affairs in northern Mexico, suggesting the limits on effective communication. This is illustrated by the detailed and frequent communications related to the administration of properties in Chihuahua and other northern states. Many of these actions were implementations of policies previously disseminated while the government remained in Mexico City which suggests that effective communications with northern Mexico awaited the arrival of the Juárez government.

Another interesting and significant trend evident in these communiques is the diminishing distance between the federal government and the individual with respect to land management. Throughout the Juárez government's stay in Mexico City in 1862 and 1863 and the initial months of its travels northward, adjudications of land were apparently done through the agency of federal treasury offices as evidenced in the pattern of circulars and decrees of that period. Land title grants therefore do not appear in the records of the laws and decrees of the federal government, rather the policy pronouncements that regulated them.
Once the government arrived in Chihuahua and through much of the rest of the Intervention, individual grants of land title appear in the records of the federal government. Rather than the result of a long range trend, this was likely due to the general reduction of the bureaucratic corps and the heightened role of the federal government in the local affairs of northern Mexico due to its proximity.28

Despite many obstacles, mail service played a significant role in the function of the Juárez government during the Intervention. To gain insights into its function and significance, the administration of mail communications must be examined both in terms of the government's administrative procedure and policy and for evidence of its function at different times during the Intervention. As noted in the first portion of this chapter, the federal budget and employment figures indicate that the administration of mails was decentralized in terms of fiscal management. Nevertheless, the support of communications through mail service was of considerable interest to the federal government and there is repeated indication of the movement of mail despite many difficulties. An example of the federal government's interest in and frustration with mail administration is found in a decree of July 1863 in which Juárez noted that many commanders were appropriating the horses belonging with the mail service for use as cavalry. He proscribed this practice noting that communications were essential to the war effort. During that same summer, the Minister of Relations issued a circular to the governors observing that a cause of the failure of mail service was lack of support from the governors. Thus he urged them to protect and secure the routes
for mail couriers regardless of any overdue payments for such services.29

In the process of reducing the size and staff of the federal government in the months following its departure from Mexico City, the administration of mails was consolidated under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Relations, then Manuel Doblado. As the Intervention progressed, the Minister of Relations exercised general responsibility over communications to and from the federal government. Communications related specifically to the jurisdictions of the other members of the cabinet were addressed to and initiated by them, of course, but in general, the communications of the federal government and the supervision of communications procedure and policy rested with the Minister of Relations.30

Therefore, the Minister of Relations issued communications to authorities in the nation concerning the status and function of the federal government and developing conditions in the nation. This is illustrated by the repeated notices published informing the governors and the citizenry of the movement of the capital and the President. Perhaps inspired by the casual manner in which Santa Anna had abandoned his duties in the nation's early years, and in an effort to keep the President under the scrutiny of the Congress, the authors of the Constitution of 1857 restricted the President from leaving the residence of the nation's supreme government. Therefore, the Minister of Relations scrupulously published notice not only of the President's movements but also of the transfer of the national capital in each instance.31

The Minister of Relations also sponsored the publication of
information concerning significant developments in the republican government and the nation. This is illustrated by the notices of the fall of San Luis Potosí, the departure of the Minister of the Treasury on official business, and the complete record of events and correspondence related to the rebellion and eventual suppression of the governor of Nuevo León, Santiago Vidaurri.\textsuperscript{32}

The Minister of Relations also managed policy related to communications to and from the federal government. Lerdo published instructions to the governors concerning the handling of notices, communiques, circulars, and decrees. They were instructed to retain all such correspondence for their private use until they saw them published in the official newspaper. This was to prevent critical information concerning military operations from being disseminated without regard for secrecy and security. The following month, the President decreed that all officials were obligated to present copies of dispatches to the official newspaper for publishing except those under the purview of the Minister of War for the reason stated above. The announcement of these policies clearly suggests the flow of dispatches between various officials of the federation, the distribution of the official newspaper, and the role of various cabinet ministers in matters of communication. When the mail service from Chihuahua to Rio Florida was interrupted by Indian attack, the administrator of mails reported the fact to the Minister of Relations. Yet by design or default, the administrators of mail located in the states fell under the influence of the governor and commanders of their jurisdiction. In the case of Michoacán, a governor
adopted inflexible policies which disaffected public officials, including
the administrator of mails, and drove them from an active role in the
republican resistance in the state. 33

Evidence of the continued flow of mail is found throughout the
Intervention. Even the reports of the abandonment of routine courier
routes by the U.S. Consul at Manzanillo noted that correspondence still
got through, though at increased cost. Occasional comments in primary
and secondary sources concerning mail arrivals may also be found. After
Juárez announced his intent to remain in the Presidency until legitimate
elections could be held, Manuel Ruiz renounced the Juárez government and
offered his services to the French. The correspondence was directed from
Ruiz at Hidalgo del Parral to the Minister of Justice with the government
at Chihuahua, and from Ruiz to the French garrison at Rio Florida.
Another indication of mail transmissions is the occasional public notice
given in the official newspaper about mail arrivals. 34

The role of mail communication in supporting the government of
Juárez during the Intervention deserves additional development. From the
diverse vantage points reviewed herein it seems clear that routine mail
did pass between federal authorities where unopposed by imperial
occupation. On the other hand, extraordinary measures were needed to
communicate in areas occupied by the French. The Minister of Relations
generally managed the communications of the federal government with
active supervision of policy and through use of the official newspaper. 35
Financial support of mail service was decentralized and the large
distances made the administrators of mail in the states vulnerable to the
vagaries of local political and military leadership.

As noted in the chapter on the bureaucracy, Juárez took an active role in the function of the judiciary. In some cases this required communication over long distances. For example, in October 1863, while his government was in San Luis Potosí, Juárez issued a decision against a Spaniard residing in Matamoros. Communication in the judiciary function of the republican government paralleled other types of communication in that it was increasingly restricted to the northern states in the middle years of the Intervention. As the government moved south in 1867, decisions and interpretations were reissued as the republican system of justice was reinvigorated in areas formerly controlled by the Empire.

A decree of October 1863 provided procedures for adjudication of matters involving citizens residing in areas under imperial occupation. The provisions of this decree give some insight into the perceptions of the government concerning the effectiveness of communication into imperial areas at this fairly early date. Republican judicial authorities were empowered to administer cases if the property in dispute was under republican jurisdiction, or failing that, cases emanating from territories under enemy occupation could be heard as long as the defendant resided in the jurisdiction of the court. Additionally, a case could be heard if the contract under dispute was entered into under republican jurisdiction, regardless of the defendant's present location. In this last instance, provision was made for the public notice of imminent proceedings and for a waiting period for the defendant to respond which was one day for each three leagues distance to the
defendant's residence to a maximum of thirty days, or thirty days if the
current residence was unknown. Although the effect may have been
arbitrary for defendant's residing in remote areas, the government's
expectations for the transmission of information is evident. 37

Other judicial rulings, especially those issued in response to an
appeal from distant authorities, further illustrate the communications of
the federal government. Judicial actions in 1863 include the formation
of courts in four states as noted in preceding chapters, the granting of
tax exemptions as noted earlier in this chapter, and decisions related to
the appointment of supreme court justices whose terms expired on December
1. Additionally, Juárez issued rulings concerning the status of a coal
concession adjacent to federal land in the state of Sinaloa and the legal
status of a minor for the purpose of administration of an estate. 38

In April 1864, Juárez decreed that the district court of Nuevo
León-Coahuila be established and in June he established a district court
in Monterrey. In August 1864, a separate district court was established
for the state of Coahuila. A decision concerning a family estate was
issued in Chihuahua in November 1864 and another ruling concerning the
minority of an individual related to the management of an estate. 1865
witnessed additional rulings but as in the previous year they were
generally limited to a few northern states. The geographical focus of
the Juárez government's communications related to judicial matters is
illustrated in an 1866 decision concerning the reconstruction of an
irrigation works destroyed in a flow of the Chamizal area in 1865. This
was issued while the government resided in Paso del Norte at a time when
very few judicial communications were issued. Note that the Chamizal is adjacent to Paso del Norte.39

The reissuance of decisions and decrees as the Juárez government migrated south illustrates the difficulties it had in communicating and implementing judicial decisions while it was in northern Mexico. In September 1866, the Minister of Justice again issued the decree of November 5, 1863, which reinstated the federal court system. This suggests that the efforts of Juárez to strengthen the national government in the federal system had to wait until the government's return to Mexico City and the Restored Republic. Similarly, interpretations of law had to be reissued and actions of the Second Empire undone. Ineffective communications and the lack of means to implement Presidential decisions except in the northern states forced Juárez to wait to consolidate his liberal victories in the Wars of the Reform.40

The efforts of the Juárez government to exercise administrative and operational control over the military offers many insights into the ability of Juárez and his ministers to communicate while outside Mexico City. In general, a review of the official correspondence of Juárez with his commanders reveals much the same pattern developed in other aspects of governance in this period. Initially upon leaving Mexico City, a number of decrees and circulars which were general in nature demonstrate the continued communications of Juárez in both operational and administrative matters with republican resistance leaders in much of the nation. By 1864, communications related to administration and operational command was increasingly limited to affairs in the northern
states. Despite the obvious limitations in time and distance which grew ever greater as the government regressed northward, Juárez continued to receive operational reports and in some instances continued to issue directives in operational and administrative matters. The effectiveness of these communications is addressed in the succeeding chapter.

The effort of the Juárez government to exercise general control over military administration in the early months after the departure from Mexico City is illustrated by the creation of an inspector general as detailed in the preceding chapter. By 1864, there is little evidence of any extensive communication concerning military administration. The increasing focus on northern Mexico is demonstrated by the government's actions relative to the intransigence of Santiago Vidaurri. Other communications indicative of the extent and limits of communications for administrative purposes include instructions issued to the governor of Coahuila in May 1864 to apprehend a Lieutenant Colonel that had been relieved from command by Gen. José López Uraga and to have him sent to the Minister of War. There is no indication of the success of this directive.41

An exchange of communiques between the Minister of Relations at Chihuahua and the Minister of War at Hidalgo del Parral illustrates that communications could pass at the rate of sixty miles per day in republican controlled areas. The ministers responded to each other's correspondence every third day over a distance of 180 miles concerning the discipline of a Lieutenant that had exceeded the law in foraging men and arms from a local hacienda. In another event related to military
discipline and administration, Juárez received correspondence from the Minister of War decrying the capitulation agreement made by republican commanders at Matamoros with imperial commander Gen. Tomás Mejía. The President's rebuttal was issued six weeks after the agreement was signed on June 22, 1866, perhaps delayed by the indirect manner in which he was informed of the agreement. In both these instances, the Minister of War, Miguel Negrete in the former instance and Ignacio Mejía in the latter, was not located with the federal government but 180 or more miles away to be closer to units confronting imperial forces. Thus the understandable problems imposed by slow land communications over long distances in northern Mexico were partly compensated for by the forward position of the President's primary advisor in military affairs.42

The communications of the Juárez government concerning the operations of the military suggest a closer liaison than do those related to administration. This reflects the priority of Juárez in the war effort as well as the realities of the organization of military units in the period. Almost all units active in the republican cause were activated and led by the initiative of governors and local commanders loyal to the republic, especially after the republican defeat at Matehuala on May 29, 1864, and Cerro de Majoma on September 21, 1864. Therefore the role of the federal government was not as significant administratively as it might have been if assets of the federal army had been larger.

In general, the communications of the Juárez government with regard to military operations must be examined in terms of the tactical
directives issued by Juárez, military reports received by the Juárez government, and the designation of republican leadership by Juárez. The distances over which communications had to travel and the time constraints thus imposed made it impractical for Juárez to personally direct the war effort. The forward location of the Minister of War noted above was one response to this fact. The directives issued by the Minister of War are not generally recorded in the sources reviewed herein. More frequently Juárez received reports of tactical developments of units in northern Mexico and less from elsewhere in the resistance. The distance and time considerations mentioned above made the appointment of republican commanders and governors the most significant activity of Juárez in terms of military leadership. Such commanders and governors were necessarily entrusted to act on their initiative and their actions were subject only to the review of the federal government after some delay. The significance of this activity of Juárez will be reexamined in the following chapter for its import in the development of central authority in the federation. The focus here is only on the role of communication.

Tactical instructions issued by the Juárez government appear only a few times in the sources examined in this investigation. By their very nature, tactical and operational instructions would not be routinely recorded as would decisions of policy. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that Juárez would be able to effectively issue tactical instructions due to the understandable delay in communications. Examples of tactical maneuvers ordered by the federal government are rare. For example, in
order to enforce his policy concerning commerce with occupied areas, Juárez instructed the commander of the Army of the Center to seize trade going from republican areas to imperial areas in October 1863. In November 1865, Juárez instructed the Commander of the Army of the Center, Gen. José María Arteaga, to move his headquarters to Huetamo. Arteaga had complied with this directive by the following January. As the Intervention drew to a close, Juárez issued orders for military commanders to concentrate on Querétaro where Maximilian was gathering forces for a last stand. Archival records of the Minister of War and closer scrutiny of correspondence received by the Juárez government may offer some insights into the relationship of Juárez to his military commanders in terms of tactical decisions.43

Perhaps more significant and certainly more frequent were the reports of tactical operations received by Juárez. Although the Minister of War issued directives while the government remained in Mexico City and again in 1865 requiring submission of monthly reports, there is seemingly nothing to verify whether or not commanders complied with the order. Reports from commanders were generally submitted after some significant confrontation with enemy forces. In January 1864, the governor of San Luis Potosí reported that he was being driven out of the state by imperial forces. Manuel Doblado reported the outcome of the battle of Matehuala and the resultant dissolution of the Army of the North in May 1865. Other reports were received throughout the rest of the Intervention. All these communiques afforded Juárez the necessary information to plan the movements of his government and take action to
appoint commanders and governors as needed. 44

Despite the somewhat limited evidence that Juárez was regularly informed of tactical developments and sparse indications that he actively directed tactical maneuvers, there is substantial record of his involvement in the appointment of republican leadership. The selection of loyal military and political leadership was a key element in the preservation of the republican and liberal cause. Selected states will be examined more closely in the succeeding chapter, but several observations are appropriate here. Despite local disputes and occasional rebellions, the appointments of Juárez were generally received as legitimate authorities. The republican camp became badly fractured through the course of the Intervention. Many prominent leaders joined the imperial cause and still more went to the United States under the pretense of seeking material aid. The republican victory in the Intervention was won largely through outlasting France and the Empire, the former increasingly weighed down by events in Europe and the United States, and the latter worn thin by the incessant drain of brigandage and campaigns against an elusive enemy. By the end of the war, Juárez knew with certainty the republicans who would stand with him against all odds and most were in key positions of leadership appointed by Juárez.

The appointment of commanders and governors reflects much about the status of communications in northern Mexico. The President first had to be apprised of the need for the appointment and next he had to have the facility to communicate it to the individual and interested authorities. The changes of leadership in the Army of the Center
illustrate the interest and activity of Juarez in appointing key republican leaders. The regional commander of the Army of the Center had the authority to appoint governors under his command, but the selection of the regional commander was reserved for the President. In states not under the command of a regional commander, Juarez continued to designate governors as appropriate. Details of these communications with the commander of the Army of the Center are found in the next chapter in the discussion of Michoacan. Therefore, communications were a key element in the process of selecting and notifying individuals selected for command.

Numerous appointments were made in northern Mexico as well. After the suppression of the revolt of Santiago Vidaurri, Juarez appointed Jesus Jose Casavantes governor of Chihuahua and Jesus Maria Benitez y Pinillos governor of Nuevo Leon in April 1864. He additionally gave the governor of Durango, Jose Maria Patoni, command over Chihuahua to support Casavantes. After the separation of the states of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon in the spring of 1864, Juarez appointed Miguel Gomez Cardenas governor. Just two months later he resigned and Juan de la Fuente was designated to assume the post. Also in 1864, Juarez appointed another governor of Nuevo Leon and a governor of Chihuahua. In 1865, Juarez appointed governors for Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Mexico, and Tamaulipas. The actions of Porfirio Diaz on the eastern front in 1867 demonstrate that perhaps he had sweeping powers to appoint and recognize governors of states as they were liberated from the Empire. In summary, the designation of commanders and governors during the government's absence from Mexico City best illustrates the relationship that Juarez
had with the various parts of the republican resistance. The status of communications forced Juárez to depend on trusted subordinates and through the course of the Intervention, he discovered just who they were.45

Another indication of the communication facilities of the republican government is the use of the state of siege to influence the status of republican leadership. In some cases, the state of siege was employed only to give the governor the extraordinary powers to best face the invading imperial forces. In other cases it was employed specifically to bring local leadership under the control of the President. The former was generally the case before the government left Mexico City, the latter was often the case while Juárez was in northern Mexico. In either case, the President needed specific information on which to base his decision. The state of siege was never used in a general sense, that is, throughout the nation, therefore, the President acted on specific information each time he employed it or lifted it in a particular state.

While Juárez was outside Mexico City, the state of siege was employed five times in 1863 and 1864, and once again in 1866. Juárez primarily used the state of siege in this period to suppress rebellions against his government or authorities supported by him. This is illustrated in the cases of Durango, Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Chihuahua. It was imposed in Sonora due to imminent threat of invasion and once in Guerrero though no reason was given in this last case. In one case, San Luis Potosí, the state of siege was lifted and the governorship restored
to the last elected governor. Tamaulipas remained under siege throughout the Intervention and Juárez resisted repeated appeals from the last elected, though disputed, governor of the state. Thus the state of siege demonstrates the involvement of Juárez in the leadership issues of the resistance and implicitly shows that he enjoyed sufficient information on which to act. Several of these actions will be reviewed in the next chapter on control.46

Two final activities of the Juárez government demonstrate the communications of Juárez and his ministers with other authorities within the federation. One is the elevation of new municipal entities such as cantons and villages, and the other is the President's constitutional function in managing electoral issues and calling for elections. In the case of the former, the President issued decrees instituting new villages on six occasions during the Intervention. In all but one, these were located in northern Mexico, the exception being in the state of México in 1866. On one occasion he created a new canton and on another he overruled a local commander who was establishing a new district without authority. Each of these actions were initiated by an application from the local populace, thus inherent in each is a communication link from the President of the republic, through various levels of government to the lowest political unit of the federation. The pattern of these actions parallels that of most communications of the period, that is, they are centered in northern Mexico. The supplication of the citizens of Huejutla, México in November 1866 provides some clue to the diminution of imperial control and occupation late in 1866.47
Although the Congress never convened a regular session during the government's absence from Mexico City, the President was engaged in his duties under the constitution and the electoral law of February 12, 1857. Members of the Permanent Deputation accompanied him at least until he reached Chihuahua and three attempts were made to convene the Congress. The first two attempts were made in San Luis Potosí and ended with a quorum but not sufficient deputies to consider it a regular session of Congress. A manifesto was issued by this assembly restating the republican position on the Intervention. The third attempt was less successful and it was made in Monterrey. The Permanent Deputation approached the President when each attempt to convene the Congress was made and requested that he notify the governors of the upcoming assembly of deputies. The Permanent Deputation also identified a problem in the deputation from Zacatecas since some of the members were representing more than one district at a time. Thus the President authorized primary and secondary elections to resolve it. Additionally the Permanent Deputation had a role in installing the state legislature of Chihuahua. There is no mention of the members of the Permanent Deputation from the time Juárez left Chihuahua for Paso del Norte through the end of the Intervention. The presumption was expressed by the members of the Permanent Deputation that the President was in communication with the governors of the republic.48

External Communications

Although communications outside the nation were slow, as would be
expected in that era, Juárez and his ministers did communicate extensively with Matías Romero in Washington, D.C., and through him with individuals and authorities in Europe and Latin America. Communication with Washington, D.C. took about one month since correspondence had to travel overland through the northern frontier to Santa Fe and then east during much of the Intervention. Knapp notes that Lerdo sent a copy of each bi-weekly official newspaper of the republican government (Periódico oficial) to Romero in addition to other less formal correspondence. Romero in turn relayed communications to Jesús Terán, the Mexican minister to Europe, and other parties in Europe and Latin America. This connection is thoroughly documented in ten volumes of correspondence compiled by Romero and clearly demonstrates that Juárez did not operate in a vacuum in terms of world events. The appearance of correspondence in this collection from republican leaders in various parts of Mexico suggest that Juárez and his ministers were apprised of Mexican events through this channel even if they could not secure direct internal communications. This is a valuable source on the period and needs much development.49

A sampling of external communications demonstrates the variety and substance of this liaison with Romero. In April 1865, the Minister of Relations corresponded with Romero concerning the efforts of Maximilian to offer Mexican territory as collateral for a loan from another government. On January 18, 1866, Juárez granted permission to the U.S. commander of Fort Bliss for U.S. troops to pursue marauding Indians into Mexican territory. Two months later, the U.S. Secretary of
State extended his gratitude for the Mexican government's policy. In August 1866, Juárez asked Romero to contact a U.S. citizen who had contracted to build a railroad and inform him that he had violated his contract and thus his concession was revoked. This sample of diplomatic mail illustrates that the Juárez government enjoyed communications consistent with the state of technology of that day.50

Similarly, the Juárez government had some communications with Europe and with Latin America. In addition to the Minister to Europe, Jesús Teran, the Juarez government corresponded with a Belgian private foundation which was opposed to the participation of Belgian troops on behalf of the Empire. Additionally, one thousand pesos were expedited to Washington, D.C. and on to France for the benefit of Mexican prisoners of war deported to Europe early in the Intervention.51 Juárez also had limited contact with other authorities in Latin America. As mentioned in preceding chapters, donations were received from Chilean and Peruvian private organizations and a medallion intended for Gen. Zaragoza was forwarded from the people of Montevideo to the President.52

Conclusion

Thus the communications of the Juárez government reveal much about the governing capacity of the federal government. As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the communications of the period suffered significant limitations for technological as well as political reasons. As the government moved farther north, effective and timely communications were generally restricted to the states surrounding
Juárez. Communications over longer distances suffered longer delays and required extraordinary measures. Equally important, though, were the loyalties of the commanders of the republican cause. States at great distances but led by republicans committed to the Juárez government were more closely tied to the policy and purpose of the federal government than were states at shorter distances but led by men unimpressed by institutional authority. That is the theme of the next chapter in this investigation.
ENDNOTES

1Romero, Memoria de Hacienda, p. 543.

2Decree of Government, 1 August 1867, Colección de leyes, 3:311-313.

3Romero, Memoria de hacienda, pp. 543-545; 573-574.

4The abolition of the federal court system is found in Decree of Government, 24 January 1862, Recopilación de leyes, 8:39-41; the action rescinding this 1862 decree and reinstituting the federal court system may be found in Decree of Government, 5 November 1862, Colección de leyes, 1:177-178.

5Pedro Hinojosa to Benito Juárez, 26 July 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 3:781-782; Pedro Hinojosa, 7 August 1862, ibid., 6:788.


7Santiago Vidaurri to Benito Juárez, 8 May 1862, ibid., 6:472-473; Angel A. Corzo to Benito Juárez, 13 August 1862, ibid., 6:796-797; Ponciano Arriaga to Benito Juárez, 14 August 1862, ibid., 6:798-799.

8Gen. Ignacio Zaragoza to Benito Juárez, 7 August 1862, ibid., 6:789; Zaragoza to Minister of War, 9 August 1862, ibid., 6:792-793; Nicolás de Régules to Minister of War, 18 August 1862, ibid., 6:803-804.

9González Ortega to Juárez, 5 August 1862, ibid., 6:786-787; González Ortega, 8 August 1862, ibid., 6:790-791.

10Juan José de la Garza to Benito Juárez, 22 January 1862, ibid., 5:605-606; Benito Juárez to Santiago Vidaurri, 13 January 1862, ibid., 5:568-569; Vidaurri to Juárez accepting the appointment over affairs in Tamaulipas, 14 January 1862, ibid., 5:569; González Ortega to Juárez concerning his mediation in Tamaulipas, 6 March 1862, ibid., 6:43; Juárez to Vidaurri congratulating him on his success in Tamaulipas, 8 March 1862, ibid., 6:66.

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12 González Ortega forwards two letters from partisans in Tamaulipas to Juárez, 22 March 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 6:141.


14 Knapp, Life of Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, p. 97.

15 Instructions related to the federal tax on capital may be found in Decree of Government, 16 July 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:44-45, and Decree of Government, 31 July 1863, ibid., 1:75-77; instructions related to the compliance with the tax on cotton are in Decree of Government, 28 July 1863, ibid., 1:73-74, Decree of Government, 15 September 1863, ibid., 1:128, and Decree of Government, 24 September 1863, ibid., 1:128-129.

16 Juárez denounces tax abuses of some commanders in Decree of Government, 31 August 1863, ibid., 1:105-106; treasury offices in states directed not to disclose their fund status in Decree of Government, 12 August 1863, ibid., 1:84; Juárez announces that federal treasury will not honor debts of commanders that exceed their budgets in Decree of Government, 21 April 1864, ibid., 2:28-29.


19 Trade restrictions with French controlled areas clarified in Decree of Government, 7 May 1864, ibid., 2:35-37.
Circular of Minister of Relations, 7 June 1867, transmitting copy of presidential decree of 18 November 1864, ibid., 3:253-254; Communiqué of the Minister of Treasury, 25 March 1867, transmitting copy of presidential decree of 4 August 1863 concerning the federal tax on cotton, ibid., 2:154-155.


John Xantus to Thomas Corwin, unnumbered, 22 July 1863, U.S. Consuls in Manzanillo.

Duty free import of corn authorized in Decree of Government, 24 October 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:173-174; customs house at Mazatlán expanded in Decree of Government, 24 November 1863, ibid., 2:210-212.

Instructions to customs house at Matamoros in Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 3 May 1864, ibid., 2:33-35; instructions for payment of fees at Piedras Negras contained in Communiqué of the Minister of the Treasury, 7 May 1864, ibid., 2:39; instructions for payment of tax on cotton at Piedras Negras in Communiqué of the Minister of the Treasury, 17 May 1864, ibid., 2:51-52; administrative procedures for payment of circulation tax announced in Memorandum of the Minister of the Treasury, 21 May 1864, ibid., 2:46.

Duty free import of printed matter announced in Decree of Government, 25 June 1864, ibid., 2:75; clarification of this policy published in Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 6 July 1864, ibid., 2:79-80.

Prohibition of customs discounts in Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 1 December 1866, ibid., 3:140-141; Diaz issues instructions for customs tax, Decree of the Commander of the Eastern Front, 14 March 1867, ibid., 3:264-266, and in Decree of the Commander of the Eastern Front, 16 March 1867, ibid., 3:258-259; and in Decree of the Commander of the Eastern Front, 3 April 1867, ibid., 3:186-189; and in Decree of the Commander of the Eastern Front, 6 April 1867, ibid., 3:190-191; Circular of the Minister of Treasury, 30 March 1867, ibid., 3:254-255; Decree of Government, 22 July 1867, ibid., 3:293-294.

The following decrees issued in the months after the departure from Mexico City address the general policies of the government toward land management: Decree of Government, 27 July 1863, ibid., 1:68-69; Decree of Government, 19 August 1863, ibid., 1:100; Decree of Government, 19 August 1863, ibid., 1:216-217. These decrees are specific in nature and address the administration of land in Chihuahua: Decree of Government, 15 November 1864, ibid., 2:97-99; Decree of Government, 18
In this communiqué the Minister of the Treasury responds to complaints by the governor of Chihuahua about difficulties he is having in applying the federal government's land policies, José María Iglesias to the governor of Chihuahua, 24 November 1864, ibid., 2:105-106. Juárez directs the governor of Chihuahua to seize the assets of the charity fund of Hidalgo del Parral for non-compliance with treasury requirements, 3 December 1864, ibid., 2:124-125. Communication between imperial and republican areas is illustrated by the response of the Juárez government to an imperial decree reversing the republican adjudications of corporate property, Decree of Government, 11 May 1865, ibid., 2:229-235.


29Circular of the Minister of Relations, 18 June 1863, ibid., 1:34-35; Decree of Government, 8 July 1863, ibid., 1:50; Decree of Government, 23 July 1863, ibid., 1:67-68.

30Consolidation of the administration of mails under the Minister of Relations in Decree of Government, 3 September 1863, ibid., 1:107.

31President to move to Monterrey, Circular of the Minister of Relations, 5 February 1864, ibid., 1:307; President moves to Paso del Norte, Circular of the Minister of Relations, 15 August 1865, ibid., 2:251; President arrives in Chihuahua, Circular of the Minister of Relations, 20 November 1865, ibid., 2:295-296; President regresses to Paso del Norte a second time, Circular of the Minister of Relations, 9 December 1865, ibid., 2:296-297, and Circular of the Minister of Relations, 18 December 1865, ibid., 2:251; President arrives in Durango, Circular of the Minister of Relations, 26 December 1866, ibid., 3:146; President arrives in Mexico City, Circular of the Minister of Relations, 15 July 1867, ibid., 3:286-288.

32Fall of San Luis Potosí announced in Decree of Government, 3 January 1864, ibid., 1:226; imminent absence of the Minister of the Treasury on official business in Matamoros announced in Decree of Government, 20 April 1864, ibid., 2:28; details of Vidaurri revolt found in Decree of Government, 26 February 1864, ibid., 1:225-234, and newly appointed governor of Nuevo León instructed to publish decrees from Saltillo related to the confrontation with Vidaurri in Decree of Government, 26 April 1864, ibid., 2:32-33.
33Instructions sent to governors concerning publication of notices and communiques in Circular of the Minister of Relations, 19 April 1864, ibid., 2:27; policy concerning presentation of dispatches for publishing announced in Decree of Government, 17 May 1864, ibid., 2:45-46; Administrator of Mail reports disruption of service to Minister of Relations, 6 May 1865, Periódico oficial, vol. I, no. 89, p. 4; Gen. Juan B. Caamaño, governor of Michoacán, adopted inflexible policies thus disaffecting public officials, Romero Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:223-225, 228-229.

34Blake to Seward, concerning interruptions in mail service and higher cost of communications, unnumbered, 3 April 1864, U.S. Consuls in Manzanillo; and Blake to Seward, unnumbered, 30 June 1864, ibid.; Romero Flores notes mail arrival at Uruapan, republican state capital in Michoacán, on 9 October 1865 in Historia de Michoacán, 2:333; Manuel Ruíz to the Minister of Justice, 30 November 1865, Colección de leyes, 2:302-310; Official newspaper carries notice of mail arrival from Matamoros, Periódico oficial, 1 March 1866, vol. II, no. 10, p. 4.

35Knapp, The Life of Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, p. 97.

36A Spaniard sued for monetary indemnification of damages suffered from a wrongful assault by government troops. Juárez decided that the government was not pecuniarily liable since the troops were not acting under orders from the government, but ruled that the government was obligated to identify and punish the offenders in Decree of Government, 6 October 1863, Colección de leyes, 1:158-159.


39District court of Nuevo León-Coahuila founded in Decree of Government, 4 April 1864, ibid., 2:21-22; District court of Monterrey founded in Decree of Government, 6 June 1864, ibid., 2:69-70; District court of Coahuila founded in Decree of Government, 14 August 1864, ibid., 2:83-84; ruling concerning status of estate in Decree of Government, 22 November 1864, ibid., 2:104; status of a minor, Decree of Government, 16 December 1864, ibid., 2:126; penalty of district court of Chihuahua overturned by the President as excessive in Decree of Government, 1 January 1865, ibid., 2:149-150; release of criminal ordered by Chihuahua district court reversed by President in Decree of Government, 18 April
1865, ibid., 2:215-220; ruling concerning Chamizal irrigation works in
Decree of Government, 10 March 1866, ibid., 2:312-324.

Decree reinstating the federal court system was republished in
Decree of Government, 18 September 1866, ibid., 3:93-94. The Minister of
Justice sent a communique to the governor of San Luis Potosí denouncing
and nullifying the concession granted by the Imperial government to build
a telegraph from Guanajuato to México in Decree of Government, 27 May
1867, ibid., 3:201-205. Minister of Justice issues circulars and decrees
related to laws on robbery to the governor of San Luis Potosí on 27 May
1867, ibid., 3:200-201.

Inspector General formed in Decree of Government, 28 September
1863, ibid., 1:154-156; governor of San Luis Potosí tells Juárez about
assassination perpetrated by forces loyal to Vidaurre, 1 February 1864,
ibid., 1:302-306; Minister of War directs Vidaurre to conduct
appropriate investigation, 2 February 1864, ibid., 1:306-307; directive
from Minister of War to governor of Coahuila, 28 May 1864, ibid., 2:53-
54.

Minister of War and Minister of Relations exchange
correspondence, 17 February 1865, ibid., 2:159-162; Minister of War and
Juárez correspond concerning actions of Carbajal at Matamoros, 4 August
1866, ibid., 3:74-76.

Benito Juárez to the Commander of the Army of the Center, 3
October 1863, ibid., 1:142-143. The instructions of Juárez for Arteaga
to move his headquarters and Arteaga’s compliance are found in Romero
Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:269-270, 280. Regules receives
instructions to concentrate at Querétaro, 11 February 1867, Romero
Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:448. Minister of War to Gen. Ascensión
Gómez concerning his deployment to Querétaro, 27 March 1867, Colección de
leyes, 3:171, and 3 April 1867, ibid., 3:175-178.

Circular of the Minister of War requiring monthly report, 14
October 1865, ibid., 2:298-299. Governor of San Luis Potosí reports his
disposition to Juárez, 25 January 1864, ibid., 1:286-287. Manuel Dobrado
reports results of battle to Juárez, 23 May 1864, ibid., 2:47-49, and 29
May 1864, ibid., 2:55. Minister of War receives battle report from the
governor and commander of Sinaloa, 7 January 1865, ibid., 2:135-140. The
Minister of War receives report from Gen. Ramón Corona, 20 January 1865,
Juárez, Documentos, 6:594-596, and the Oficial mayor responds, 4 February
1865, Colección de leyes, 2:154-157.

Benítez y Pinillos appointed governor of Nuevo León in Decree
of Government, 13 April 1864, ibid., 2:26-27. Governor of Durango given
command over Nuevo León to support Benítez y Pinillos in Decree of


47Juárez establishes a new village in Coahuila and directs the governor to carry out the necessary steps to establish its political organization in Decree of Government, 8 September 1864, ibid., 2:93-94.

48 The Permanent Deputation gives the Minister of Relations official notice that elections will be held, 24 August 1863, ibid., 2:86-88. The Permanent Deputation gives the Minister of Relations official notice of imminent sessions of Congress and requests the President inform the governors, 24 August 1863, ibid., 1:104-105. Notice was sent out to the governors advising them that the delegates may not be state employees or in military command, 12 October 1863, ibid., 1:156-157. Juárez authorizes special elections in Zacatecas to resolve a delegate problem, Decree of Government, 29 October 1863, ibid., 1:171-172. Congress convenes, has a quorum, but insufficient numbers to hold a session of Congress, a manifesto is issued, 27 November 1863, ibid., 1:203-209. Permanent Deputation requests President inform governors of date for next session of Congress, 31 March 1864, ibid., 2:19. President issues communique to the governors concerning session of Congress, 4 April 1864, ibid., 2:22-23. States not occupied by the Empire instructed to hold elections, 16 July 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:689-90, and Colección de leyes, 2:86-88. Chihuahua holds elections and Permanent Deputation installs state legislature, Permanent Deputation to the Minister of Relations, 3 July 1865, ibid., 2:246-249.

49 Knapp, p. 97; Romero, Correspondencia de la legación mexicana en Washington durante la intervención extranjera, 1860-1868, colección de documentos para formar la historia de la intervención, 10 vols. (México: Imprenta del gobierno, en palacio a cargo de José M. Sandoval, 1871).

50 Minister of Relations to Mexican Minister to the United States concerning Maximilian's efforts to mortgage or alienate Mexican territory
in exchange for foreign loans, 20 April 1865, Colección de leyes, 2:212-215. Juárez grants permission for U.S. troops to pursue Indians into Mexico, 18 January 1866, ibid., 3:3-5; Seward's acknowledgement, 14 March 1866, ibid., 3:5-9; concession cancelled, 6 August 1866, ibid., 3:77-82.

51 Minister of Relations acknowledges correspondence from Belgian foundation, 23 September 1865, ibid., 2:260-265. 1,000 pesos sent to Mexican Minister to U.S. to be forwarded to Mexican prisoners of war in France, 27 March 1865, ibid., 2:189-201. Minister of war conveys high esteem of the President to Gen. Epitacio Huerta in France, 5 April 1865, ibid., 2:202-203.

52 Mexican Minister to U.S. receives medal from Montevideo from the U.S. Secretary of State, 18 October 1864, ibid., 2:142-149. Juárez receives donation from Chile, 21 September 1863, ibid., 1:131-135. Mexican Minister to U.S. sends medallion for President from citizens of Montevideo, 18 October 1864, ibid., 2:142-149. Minister of Relations to Mexican Minister to U.S. concerning the medallion from Montevideo, 9 January 1865, ibid., 2:184-149. Juárez responds to a letter from the President of Colombia, 9 September 1865, ibid., 2:253-259.
CHAPTER IV

CONTROL

A Perspective on Control

The foregoing analysis of the state of revenue, bureaucracy, and communications provides a framework in which to evaluate the events of the period which suggest the President's success or failure in governing the various reaches of the nation. As would be expected in view of the preceding chapters, the control exercised by the Juárez government fluctuated throughout the Intervention based on the geographical location of the government and the time period in the Intervention. That is to say, at any moment during the Intervention, the relationship of Juárez to the various republican areas in the nation varied greatly. Additionally, at different times during the Intervention, his relationship to a particular area also varied greatly. This chapter begins with insights into the extent and nature of imperial control. Next the elements of governance developed in the preceding chapters are explored for their significance in the question of republican control, followed by a review of the means of the control available to the Juárez government. Finally, the experience of the Juárez government with several states will be reviewed to illustrate the diversity and complexity of the question.

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While the Empire could boast the occupation of all but six state capitals at the height of the Intervention, the evidence is great that the control it exercised was limited largely to the main cities of commerce. Therefore, listing the states under occupation by the Empire only begins to address this question. Generalizations about the extent of Imperial control must be judged very carefully since the control of the Empire was seemingly effective only in those communities physically occupied by its military forces. Repeatedly, conservative forces marched on various villages in Michoacán to fight a skirmish or find only traces of a withdrawing republican force. Upon returning to their garrison in the larger communities, the villages thus taken would be quickly reoccupied by republican regular or guerilla units.

Scattered comments in ministerial and consular reports further describe this phenomenon. For example, in August 1863, the United States Minister to Mexico, Thomas Corwin, reported to the United States Secretary of State that while the French controlled the port of Veracruz, republican forces still held Jalapa, a strong and populous town in the same state. In March 1864, the French situation had little improved as the Minister reported that their control extended only to those towns actually occupied by military force. Although he noted that there was effectively no hostility against the French in the occupied communities, neither was there any positive recognition of French authority. Later that same year, the new United States Minister to Mexico and brother of his predecessor, William H. Corwin, reported that republican guerillas continued to plague French regulars in northern Puebla and around Jalapa.
In March 1865, he reported that despite success in the recent campaigns against guerilla bands in Oaxaca and Michoacán, new ones sprung up as quickly as others were defeated. He further noted that as soon as imperial forces left a village, liberal bands immediately occupied it. He goes on to observe in August 1865 that the French would likely never control the country since liberal forces fill all areas in the countryside which are not physically occupied by imperial troops.¹

Reports of United States Consuls in various port cities further demonstrate the limitations of imperial control of territory in states they occupied. William H. Blake, United States Consul at Manzanillo, reported that liberal forces occupied a portion of an allegedly imperial controlled area and collected taxes with impunity. In January 1865, he reported that liberal forces controlled much of the countryside and that imperial forces were limited to the principal cities. Similarly, he reported in September 1866 that liberal forces readily organized in the countryside while imperial forces occupied Colima, Zapotlan, and Guadalajara. The contradiction of imperial occupation versus effective imperial control is illustrated in the extreme in the case of Tamaulipas. In January 1865, the U.S. Consul at Matamoros, Emanuel D. Etchison reported that Gen. Tomás Mejía of the imperial army was in that city and carried the title of Commanding General of Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas. In April 1865, the U.S. Consul, Amzi Wood, reported that Mejía had put the departments of Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas under siege and appointed a court martial to administer justice and suppress brigandage. In January 1866, the U.S. Vice-Consul, Louis Avery,
observed that he could see more of Tamaulipas from the church tower in Matamoros than the Empire had ever controlled in that state.\textsuperscript{2} Undoubtedly, the imperial experience in controlling areas under occupation was as varied as the republican experience and in general terms, the inverse of it.

The preceding observations suggest that the Empire's control was at best a very porous web. Virtually complete control could be exercised over limited areas for the time imperial troops occupied it, yet never was the military strength of the French and Mexican conservatives great enough to occupy all the areas ostensively under their control. This perception is supported by the commentary of the Mexican emissary to Europe, Jesús Terán, in correspondence with Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, Minister of Relations.

This system [of guerilla warfare] is much more dreadful, in as much as it never reveals its power; it obtains victory by the force of defeats, and the conqueror each day believes the triumph certain, until slow consummation and annihilation come to release him from the error. Mexico achieved her independence with eleven years of continuous defeats; in the same manner she effected the reform in three years; and thus she will now save her independence and her institutions.\textsuperscript{3}

Therefore, this leaves some opening to consider who controlled the countryside even within the central states of the nation. The answer is not simple but is as varied as the patchwork of political loyalties which characterized the nation at that time.

Elements of Governance

The elements of governance developed in preceding chapters have
great significance in the capacity of the Juárez government to exercise governing control during the Intervention. They provide a general context and delimit the range of possibilities to be considered in evaluating the government's exercise of control. From the viewpoint of these topical discussions, the actions of the Juárez government to extend control over republican held and contested areas become more coherent.

Recall that even though the Juárez government was involved in some revenue gathering activity at virtually all points during the Intervention, control over the bulk of the revenue base evidently devolved to local control. As Juárez moved north, so also the decrees and circulars emanating from his government reflect a concomitant narrowing of interest to affairs in its immediate periphery. Nevertheless, there was at all times an impressive capacity to transfer funds over long distances within republican areas through the use of commercial bills of trade. One should expect the activities of Juárez with respect to exercising control over local policy and events to parallel the pattern seen in revenue management. The capacity of the federal government to exert influence over detailed aspects of local revenue management in northern states gave rise to conflict and disputes which were not an issue in the more remote states. At the same time, the collection and management of federal funds by local commanders and governors necessarily enhanced their authority in matters of policy and the administration of the nation's officialdom.

The federal bureaucracy demonstrates a similar pattern. Republican decrees, circulars, and correspondence clearly suggest that
public officials remained active in all areas of the republican resistance. Nonetheless, it is also evident that Juárez and his ministers engaged in the detailed management of the bureaucratic corps only in the northern states during the middle years of the Intervention. This parallels the decentralization of revenue management and the enhanced role of governors and regional commanders necessitated by the urgency of military operations. Thus one should expect to find the success of the republican government to exercise control modulated by the distance of the respective locale from the federal government and the degree to which authority had to be delegated in that specific theater of operations due to the war effort. Therefore, this pattern was more significantly influenced by the urgency of local resistance activities and was not determined exclusively by the ability of the government to communicate.

The ability of the Juárez government to communicate extended far into the resistance effort at all times. The obvious limitations of time imposed by relatively slow overland communications of that day were exacerbated as Juárez moved to the northern fringes of the nation. In areas not occupied by the Empire, the Juárez government communicated at the average rate of sixty miles per day. Communications with hotly contested areas necessitated extraordinary means and mail service was irregular. These limitations impacted on the information available to the government as well as its ability to disseminate instructions. The result of the patterns in these three elements of governance was to greatly emphasize the role and significance of local leadership. The
question of the Juárez government's control essentially devolves to the loyalty and will of subordinate leaders. Therefore the program of governmental control pursued by Juárez consisted of an appeal to local leaders for cooperation followed by remedial measures in the event of recalcitrance. An examination of the measures available to him to enforce his will is required and finally a review of the pattern evident in several states demonstrates the diversity of the period.

Remedial Measures

The happiest circumstance for the republican government in this troubled period would have been the willful and voluntary acceptance of federal authority by state leaders. Such is not a reasonable expectation in view of the protracted tensions within the Mexican body politic stemming from localism and federalism versus the sovereignty of the national government witnessed throughout the first half-century of national life. When local political leadership resisted national authority, the President had a range of options. The mildest was to merely declare the action or inaction of the state government unconstitutional and direct that the governor take remedial action. This he did thirteen times in the fifteen months from the European invasion to the republican government's departure from Mexico City. In the succeeding four years this measure was taken only five times. The period of least activity coincided with his digression to Chihuahua and Paso del Norte.

Much detailed work needs to be done to determine the extent to
which the governors responded to the President's constitutional authority in cancelling objectionable state laws. There is some correspondence to indicate that local authorities at least paid lip-service to the remedial action decreed by the federal government. It is perhaps significant that this measure was taken most frequently while the government was in central Mexico and enjoyed optimal communications. The lack of timely communication concerning the actions of local officials in remote areas is an obvious handicap in the management of constitutional issues and protection of federal jurisdictions.

The next measure available to the President was the declaration of the state of siege. This act constitutionally gave the President the authority to appoint a military commander over the political and military affairs in a state and the effect was to federalize the state government. The principal use of this power was for the benign purpose of facilitating the effort of mobilization early in the Intervention. In later instances, he used this power to depose uncooperative constitutional governors and replace them with the military commander of his choice. Similarly he could shift authority back to the last constitutionally elected governor in the event that the military commander grew recalcitrant. The state of siege was used as well to lend support to a governor facing difficulties in his jurisdiction.4

In the event that the local situation was not amenable to constitutional remedies he had little choice but to mobilize military force to suppress the rebellion and install leadership of his choice. This was done on at least two occasions. As the Intervention progressed
and the regular forces of the republicans dissolved into small and disjointed guerilla bands the President had a diminishing capacity to employ this measure. The two occasions which necessitated decisive military intervention to suppress rebellions occurred while the republicans still had sufficient regular forces to be effective. This range of remedial options exercised by Juárez are illustrated in the cases of San Luis Potosí, Michoacán, Nuevo León and Coahuila, and Tamaulipas. Principal themes in these case studies include the complexity and diversity of events confronting the federal government, and the flexibility of Juárez in meeting them.

San Luis Potosí

San Luis Potosí demonstrates the case of a state in which the Imperial occupation precluded communication and any vestige of the governing role of the republican government through most of the Intervention. From the time the republican government left it to the time it returned two years later there is no reason to expect nor any evidence discovered thus far to indicate that the Juárez government had any direct impact on state events or politics. Michoacán by contrast demonstrates the case of a state on the fringe of Imperial control and constantly contested by local republican forces. The location of the Juárez government relative to each state provides an interesting contrast in influence. San Luis Potosí was much closer to Juárez in distance and thus in time, yet it was seemingly out of the republican orbit of influence. Juárez evidently exercised greater influence in Michoacán
despite the greater physical distance. This is perhaps explained by the geography of each state and possibly by its relative position within the imperial system of communications and commerce. The question awaits additional and detailed development. In both San Luis Potosí and Michoacán only limited remedial measures were employed. Imperial occupation made them irrelevant for much of the Intervention in the former and the loyalties of key leaders made them unnecessary in the latter.

San Luis Potosí was one of four states declared under siege in January 1862 and one of the ten so distinguished before the Battle of Puebla in May of that year. Although the decree does not give the reason for the siege action, Velázquez suggests that the governor, Sóstenes Escandón, was able to control the intense anti-Spanish demonstrations and violence which followed the invasion only with some difficulty. Thus Juárez responded to information from the state and recognized the legitimate need to support the governor in his efforts to preserve public order. Later that same month, Gen. Jesús González Ortega arrived in San Luís Potosí as the newly appointed governor and military commander and began the efforts to mobilize forces to counter the invasion. He immediately suspended all municipal political boards and town councils and invested their functions and jurisdictions in military agencies. Thus in the opening days of the Intervention, Juárez seemingly exercised decisive control over political and military events in the state of San Luis Potosí through the appointment of a trusted liberal commander. There is no record of any protest against these actions by state citizens
in the sources reviewed herein.  

Communications and influence over events in the state continued into the spring as reflected in internal and external developments. In February, Juárez directed González Ortega to deploy 1,000 men from San Luis Potosí into the neighboring state of Tamaulipas to enforce conditions of siege. In March, González Ortega corresponded with Juárez reporting the subversive activities of reactionary guerillas, requesting authority to disperse federal funds and offering opinions on divisive issues within the liberal camp. The immediate conditions for siege had apparently passed by April as the President lifted the state of siege and another governor, José María Aguirre, was appointed. Velázquez does not mention who appointed the new governor, but notably he was not the same governor who had been displaced by the state of siege.

Despite the return to civilian government in April, the state of siege was not formally lifted until October 1862. The decree lifting siege stated that the last constitutionally elected governor would reassume leadership of the state. This illustrates some key features of the state of siege. The declaration of siege in effect federalized state government and transferred broad prerogatives to the authority named by the federal government. Nevertheless, the actual practice of governance under siege varied with the specific situation and the President took action to delimit the authority of governors and commanders of states under siege to prevent abuses of such extensive powers. In San Luis Potosí, the state of siege was accompanied by severe modifications of normal institutions of government while the need persisted, but as the
situation became less inflammatory, more normal conditions were permitted until finally siege was lifted and the last elected governor reestablished his government. While the state of siege was generally accompanied by the designation of a military commander and governor of the state, the relationship was not fixed. There is no indication, for example, that the successor to González Ortega in San Luis Potosí was a military man, yet in November 1862, the state under a constitutional governor was placed under the consolidated command of the Army of the Center.7

The state was declared under siege again in February 1863 as a result of a controversy surrounding the acting governor of the state. Juárez responded to the decaying governing capacity of Ambrosio Espinosa and appointed Vicente Chico Sein to assume command under siege. The following month, Chico Sein displayed signs of mental instability and the senior military commander of forces in the state assumed command and notified the President. These events illustrate the comparatively close supervision of some internal state affairs exercised by Juárez while his government remained in Mexico City. Implicit in these actions is an effective flow of information to and from the Juárez government and a ready acceptance of federal authority.8

The close liaison between federal and state authorities continued as the Juárez government left Mexico City on May 31, 1863 and migrated to San Luis Potosí, arriving on June 9. Until the Juárez government left the state in December of that year, Juárez pursued the program of recentralization detailed in preceding chapters. Perhaps the intercourse
of the federal government with that of the host state is understated in the extant records due to the proximity of the two governments and the diminished need to reduce routine communications to writing. That fall the political disputes of the state were sufficiently quieted for Juárez to again lift the state of siege and return governing authority to Sóstenes Escandón. The supervision of the military campaign in the Sierra Gordo necessitated the extended absence of Escandón and Espinosa again exercised authority as acting governor. San Luis Potosí is distinguished by the relatively uneventful transfer of leadership on command from the President as illustrated in these events.9

After Juárez left San Luis Potosí on December 22, 1863, his control over events therein quickly deteriorated. In January 1864, the Minister of Relations issued a circular announcing that the capital of the state had fallen to the French on the third of the month. On the twenty-eighth, the governor and military commander of the state, Col. Francisco de P. Villanueva, was assassinated by partisan forces of Santiago Vidaurri of Nuevo León while en route to Tamaulipas. This was the first in a series of events in the confrontation with Vidaurri which lasted for several months. There is no record of the manner in which this new governor had been appointed, nor is there any indication that the state had been placed under siege again. Several significant observations are appropriate. The governor was a military man and he is referred to as a military commander of the state while the state was ostensibly under constitutional rule. It is possible that the record of an additional declaration of siege is simply missing from the official
records, but nevertheless it suggests a pattern confirmed in all states reviewed in this investigation. There was an inexorable trend of authority from civil to military leadership regardless of the use of the state of siege as the Intervention progressed. This observation must be kept in the perspective of the history of the Mexican nation to that point. Mexico had been at war for much of its first half-century of national life and military men figured large throughout.  

It is significant that the government of San Luis Potosí migrated to the neighboring state of Tamaulipas. The imperial control of the state was apparently extensive enough to preclude the state government from operating within the state borders as was the case in other states partially occupied by the Empire. The United States Minister to Mexico, Thomas Corwin, reported San Luis Potosí was one of the areas under French control in the latter part of March though he notes that generally imperial forces only occupied the principal towns of the states under their control. After the decisive defeat of Gen. Manuel Doblado at Matehuala and the resultant dissolution of the Army Corps of the North, the republican record falls silent on events in San Luis Potosí. In July 1864, there is mention of the Brigade of San Luis incorporated into the First Division of the Army of the Center in Michoacán as a numbered brigade, possibly indicating that San Luis Potosí was completely abandoned by the republican resistance.

The next mention of San Luis Potosí is in late 1866 and early 1867 when the Empire began its retreat. Juárez occupied the state capital on February 28, 1867 and his ministers issued several official
communications to the state government as it was reestablished. In March 1867, the Minister of the Treasury and Public Education, José María Iglesias, reissued a decree concerning the taxation of the produce of cotton mills originally published on August 4, 1863. In other communications, the ministers of Juárez approved a plan for improvement in an institute in the state, confirmed a state policy excluding partisans of the Empire from holding public office, appointed an official of the district court of San Luis Potosí, and interpreted various laws. From all appearances, the state government did not exist within the borders of San Luis Potosí from February 1864 to the winter of 1866 to 1867. Thus the Juárez government had no discernible influence on military or political developments in the state during those years.¹²

**Michoacán**

The issue of governmental control in the republican resistance in Michoacán is checkered by the occasional though distant influence exercised by Juárez and the process of decision by consensus practiced by local commanders at various times during the Intervention. A distinguishing feature of this state is the essential cooperation extended to Juárez by the principal leaders of the resistance at the times he was least able to enforce his will. One reason for the lack of conflict between federal policy and local preference might have been the distance and inability of Juárez to monitor events in detail. Nevertheless, there were ample chances for local opportunists to exploit the relatively weak position of the federal government, yet when such
tendencies emerged, leaders loyal to the republican government consistently gained the upper hand. This state best illustrates that cooperative and loyal local leadership made a decisive difference in the influence of the Juárez government when all other factors were adverse.

While the federal government remained in Mexico City, Michoacán was consolidated into the command of the Army of the Center and two remedial measures were applied to the state. In March 1862, Juárez annulled a state decree restricting the export of silver bullion by foreigners to three shipments per month. This state measure transgressed the federal jurisdiction over foreign trade. A decree of government of November 1862 placed Michoacán under the command of the Army of the Center. This again illustrates that the state of siege was not essential to establish a military command structure superior to the states. In February 1863, the President declared the state under siege due to the disintegration of local political control. Gen. Epitacio Huerta, apparently a loyal Juárez general, had to be removed due to a revolt led by Gen. Manuel García Pueblita in Zitacuaro. Additionally, key leaders in Morelia, the capital city, rebelled against Huerta. Rather than concede the governorship to leaders of the rebellion, he appointed Gen. Santiago Tapia governor of Michoacán. Tapia had an illustrious reputation from the War with the United States and as a defender of the Plan of Ayutla. The Brigade of Michoacán did participate in the mobilization and deploy to the east coast, as demonstrated in correspondence between the Minister of War and the commander of the Brigade of Michoacán, Nicolás de Régules, located at Jalapa in the state.
of Veracruz.\textsuperscript{13}

Shortly after the his departure from Mexico City in the summer of 1863, Juárez issued a warning to the governor of the state, Huerta, not to exceed the law in managing the property of traitors. There is no record of the siege action in the laws and decrees and it is unknown when and how Huerta became the governor of the state again. Notably, the imposition of siege did not assure the full and unqualified cooperation of the governor. In a similar vein, the President annulled a state law which sought to alter the federal tax on capital. As suggested in the chapter on revenue, this suggests that the federal decree for this extraordinary tax was received and implemented in the states. The President appointed José López Uruga to command the Army of the Center in September, and in October, while the state government prepared to evacuate Morelia, he appointed Gen. Felipe B. Berriozábal to succeed López Uraga as governor of Michoacán. The dates and reasons for the succession of Tapia to Huerta and Huerta to López Uraga are not known, nor is it known whether the President had a role in their selection. Later in the Intervention, Juárez appointed governors only in the northern states, where he was thoroughly informed about local events while regional commanders exercised broad authority over the appointment of political leadership under their command.\textsuperscript{14}

In the winter of 1863, while the Juárez government continued its migration from San Luis Potosí northward to Saltillo, the Army of the Center under López Uraga suffered the loss of Morelia and a growing lack of confidence in their commander. Eastern portions of the state fell
under Imperial attack while communities known for their conservative sentiments declared for the conservative cause in the northern part of the state. Berriozábal took his government to Uruapán and then dispersed it in sympathetic villages in the western reaches of the state. Significantly his government was never forced from the state and guerilla forces led by such notable men as Vicente Riva Palacio were supported by the citizenry. Increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of leadership and inaction of López Uraga, Berriozábal relinquished his governorship to Gen. Juan B. Caamaño on March 31, 1864, and regressed toward the federal capital then at Monterrey. Coincidentally, he did this on the same day Juárez delegated sweeping authority to López Uraga though the action of each could not have been known to the other for some days or weeks later. This action by Berriozábal was apparently taken autonomously and there is no indication by what reasoning Caamaño was the rightful successor. 15

The departure of Berriozábal marked the beginning of an unsavory period in which Michoacán was burdened by an unyielding governor and an ineffective regional commander. Caamaño immediately implemented untoward policies which served to alienate the republican cause from the citizenry, dispossess civilian public officials, and weakened republican guerilla forces while surrendering a propaganda victory to the imperial cause. He transferred the public offices of the state to military commanders thus dispossessing many civilian officials and losing their support, expertise, and influence among the state's citizenry. He placed severe restrictions on the activities of republican guerillas while the Empire actively recruited counterguerrillas in the state, yet the French
were able to accuse him of representing disorder due to his unreasoning and excessive reaction to the defection of one of his subordinates. Among the disaffected officials were the magistrates of the state's Supreme Court, employees of the federal treasury office, the federal Administrators of the Mails and Stamped Paper, the General Treasurer of the state, and the Treasurer of Public Welfare. The governor preoccupied himself with external and superficial appearances of discipline while demonstrating insensitivity to the requirements of fighting a complex struggle against a foreign invader largely with guerilla forces. This short governorship may serve as a study of failed leadership in guerilla warfare, lacking the most essential characteristic, flexibility.

In July, López Uraga joined Caamaño in Uruapan to plot their defection seeking to take as many republican partisans with them as possible. Upon learning of these machinations, the republican commanders of the state convened a war council and selected Gen. Manuel García Pueblita as governor and commander. When their subordinates asserted their loyalty to the republican cause and the authority of the federal government, Caamaño and López Uraga fled to Mexico City and offered their services to the Empire. Pueblita deferred the political office to Antonio Rodríguez Gil while accepting the military command. On July 19, 1864, this action was submitted to José María Arteaga for review as next in command to López Uraga and a division commander in the Army of the Center. During this same period, the actions of Berriozábal in Michoacán were reviewed by Juárez in Monterrey and the general was absolved of any wrongdoing. Acting on the information provided by Berriozábal, Juárez
issued a decree on July 1, 1864, transferring the command of the Army of the Center to Arteaga and ordering López Uruga to report to the federal capital in Monterrey.  

This series of events illustrates several key features of the relationship of the Juárez government to the republican resistance in remote areas. The distances precluded the President from taking decisive and timely action even in the critical instance of mutiny by senior leaders. The strength of republican loyalty alone accorded Juárez the opportunity to sustain influence over developments at such great distances. Significantly, loyalty was not merely to the personality but to the office as illustrated in the uneventful transfer of authority from Pueblita to Gen. Carlos Salazar on order of Arteaga on July 26, two days after a republican defeat at Patzcuaro. This is all the more striking when one considers that Pueblita was in effect popularly elected and a veteran of the campaign in Michoacán and Salazar had just arrived from another state. This perception provides some balance to the rather banal caudillo stereotype so common in Mexican historiography of the period which discounts the function of institutional authority and emphasizes the personalistic, self-serving authority of local strong men. Additionally, these events illustrate the broad prerogatives accorded the regional commander in the selection of governors under his jurisdiction and command.

Other events of 1864 further illustrate the relationship of political and military leadership. For example, in November 1864, Juárez issued a directive for the Commander of the Army of the Center to move
his headquarters from Zapotlan in Jalisco to Michoacán to be closer to
events in contested areas. It seems apparent from the subsequent
campaigning of Arteaga in Michoacán that he complied with this directive.
The following month, Pueblita was appointed governor of Querétaro and
directed to march toward Querétaro. The unfortunate Pueblita may have
nominally been the governor of Querétaro but he never set foot in the
state as such. The latter demonstrates the republican practice of
appointing governors of states in no fashion under republican control.
Care must be taken in evaluating the elevation of individuals to
governing office without the practical and real ability to exercise
authority over the legal jurisdiction thus assigned. 19

1865 witnessed a mutiny by the governor of Michoacán, a series of
republican defeats, the capture and execution of Arteaga, and the popular
selection of Riva Palacio to replace him in command the Army of the
Center. While respect for institutional authority was not absent in this
period of crisis, neither were intrigues. In January 1865, Riva Palacio
travelled from Huetamo to Uruapan to assume the governorship of the state
from Salazar. Salazar refused to recognize the orders and Riva Palacio
returned to Huetamo for aid. Salazar then called a council of war of his
commanders and obtained a pledge of support from them including his
second in command, Nicolás de Régules. He further obtained support for
his decisions concerning military campaigns even if he chose to march to
Jalisco. Interestingly they affirmed their allegiance to the government
of Benito Juárez and the General Headquarters of the Army of the Center
as the legitimate chain of command. Within a few days, Salazar led his
carefully contrived rebellion to Tancítaro and on to Apatzingán. Arteaga responded to this mutiny by mobilizing forces from Zitacuaro and pursuing Salazar west. Although Arteaga was unable to apprehend Salazar, his calls for discipline and obedience were heard by many of Salazar's subordinates and the mutiny quickly dissolved. Unfortunately, the confluence of the events of that winter led to the effective dissolution of the Army of the Center as a conventional fighting force. Arteaga did succeed in installing Riva Palacio in Salazar's place and the leader of the mutiny subordinated himself to the authority of Arteaga in March 1865. On rumors of liberal infighting in Michoacán, imperial forces advanced on Zitacuaro. It is interesting that Salazar saw advantage in claiming loyalty to Juárez while in fact leading a mutiny against legally constituted republican authorities. This suggests the emblematic and legitimizing role of the liberal constitution of 1857 and its living symbol, the President.

The remainder of 1865 brought more setbacks to the republican resistance in Michoacán. In the closing days of 1864, a Belgian regiment had arrived in Mexico to fight for the Austrian prince, Maximilian. Its first major engagement came in a bloody battle at Tacámbaro where the republicans took many prisoners. In retribution, the village of Zitacuaro, a community of known republican sympathies, was burned to the ground by the Belgians. In June, a small and desperate force was led in recapturing Uruapán by Arteaga, himself chronically ill. The utter dissipation of the Army of the Center forced Riva Palacio and Arteaga to abandon Uruapán within a few days only to be overtaken at Cerro Hueco and
dealt a severe defeat marking the low point of the Army of the Center. Also in the summer of 1865, Gen. Manuel García Pueblita died from wounds received from a French patrol.\textsuperscript{21}

In the fall of 1865, rumors that Juárez had left Mexico swept the Empire. Based on this, Maximilian announced that since there was no longer any pretext for legitimate resistance to imperial authority, individuals caught in rebellion to the Empire would be regarded as common criminals. They were to be tried by court martial and executed within twenty-four hours of their capture. On October 13, Gen. Arteaga, Gen. Salazar, and various republican commanders were captured in battle at Santa Ana Amatlán, and were subsequently tried and executed on October 21. After their capture, Riva Palacio convened a war council and was selected by the republican leaders of the Army of the Center to assume command. The action was then submitted to the President for approval. Later in the same month, a delegation of officers approached Riva Palacio at Tacámbaro and requested that he appoint Régules to the command of the First Division of the Army of the Center. These events again illustrate the manner in which continuity in command was maintained despite the distance of the federal government from the action.\textsuperscript{22}

Riva Palacio exercised command of the Army of the Center through the winter months. In December he conducted an exchange of prisoners with Gen. Bazaine of the imperial army and in February he led republican forces in battle. In the previous year, Gen. José María Patoni of Sinaloa had been instructed to refer any question concerning an exchange of prisoners with the imperial army to the President. Another
fascinating episode was the defection of a contingent of Belgian officers and soldiers from the imperial garrison at Morelia to the republican cause. With the approval of Riva Palacio, they were incorporated into the Army of the Center with authorization to wear distinctive uniforms as the Foreign Legion (Legión Extranjera). The incorporation of foreign troops was consistent with the authority extended to commanders by the President in a decree of August 11, 1864. The recruitment of foreigners was ordered stopped by the President on September 28, 1866. There is no indication that Riva Palacio sought authority from the federal government for either of these actions of January 1866.23

Juárez was apprised of developments in the Army of the Center during the winter months and on February 15, 1866, the official newspaper (Periódico oficial) carried a notice that Régules was succeeding Arteaga in command of the Army of the Center. After suffering a defeat at Magdalena, Riva Palacio and Régules retired to Tacámbaro where they set about the task of reorganizing the survivors of the battle. On February 25, a Col. Pablo Haro arrived in Tacámbaro disguised as a commercial agent of a North American mercantile house. After one of the officers of the Army of the Center recognized him and verified his true identity, he disclosed his special mission in travelling to Michoacán. He revealed communications to Riva Palacio from the President for the promotion of Nicolás de Régules to the rank of General of Division and his appointment as Commanding General of the Army of the Center. Riva Palacio directed that the available troops be gathered in the town plaza and the orders be read. Although certain subordinate commanders insisted that Riva Palacio
remain to lead the state government, he rejected any such notion in order to leave Régules complete latitude in managing his new command. He departed the next day for Huetamo.24

Régules immediately took actions to invigorate the Army of the Center including efforts to regularize tax collections and the appointment of a new governor of the state of Michoacán, a lawyer named Justo Mendoza. He thus chose to separate the Commander of the First Division and the governorship which had been joined in one official until that time, with the exception of the short and ineffectual governorship of Antonio Rodríguez Gil in 1864. Régules remained commander of the Army of the Center through the rest of the Intervention and into the Restored Republic under the demobilization plan. Riva Palacio remained out of the fight for only a short time and petitioned for a position in the Army of the Center in the spring of 1866 and was confirmed as governor of the state of México. In November 1866, he moved into México and occupied Toluca and later participated in the siege at Querétaro.25

The events of Michoacán simultaneously illustrate the extent and limits of federal control on events in remote parts of the republican resistance. The fairly dependable loyalty of key leaders accorded the President an essential control he would have otherwise been unable to enforce. The broad prerogatives accorded the Commander of the Army of the Center, which were generally reserved to the federal government in areas closer to its itinerant capital, illustrate the practical limits of central governmental control over long distances with nineteenth century communications facilities. This difficulty in communication due to
distance aggravated by imperial occupation reduced his role to one of merely reviewing local initiatives. Nevertheless, he was able to effect influence in key matters due to the generally underrated respect for institutional authority evident in at least this part of the Mexican republic.

**Nuevo León - Coahuila**

If the history of Michoacán lends significant insights into the respect for institutional authority, then Nuevo León offers a classic example of the stereotypical case of a strong, personalistic, caudillo-style leader, Santiago Vidaurri. The institutional authority of the President was respected by Vidaurri only when it did not interfere with his designs for personal aggrandizement. He did not hesitate to ignore it when it did. Vidaurri had joined the states of Coahuila and Nuevo León during the Wars of the Reform and no central authority in the republic had possessed the power to reverse the action since. These states provide an example of control extended by Juárez through the application of all remedial measures described in the introduction to this chapter. Unlike the case of Tamaulipas, the states of Nuevo León and Coahuila were the crowning success stories of the Intervention. The displacement of Vidaurri and the personal contact of Juárez as a powerfully empathetic national figure and symbol of the Reform did much to extend the cause of republican government in northern Mexico. This single fact perhaps exceeds all others in the significance of the migration of the Juárez government in these troubled years.
The contradictory relationship of the caudillo-style leader to institutional authority is demonstrated early in the Intervention. As all governors, Vidaurri was called upon to mobilize and deploy the state's contingent of militia under federal command. At the same time, Juárez called on Vidaurri to intervene in the internal disputes of his neighboring state, Tamaulipas. The governor readily responded to the call for intervention in Tamaulipas and he reported success in the effort. His response to the mobilization decree was less positive. In apparent response to correspondence from the Minister of War, Vidaurri wrote to Juárez in May 1862 claiming to have ordered troops to Mexico City as directed and reported that he was organizing guerilla forces in his state. In a letter to Juárez of August 1862, Vidaurri responded to the request of the President for cooperation by protesting the great sacrifices the state of Nuevo León had already made to the republican cause. Although other sources are needed to confirm the action and inaction of Vidaurri, the tone of the correspondence suggests that the governor readily neglected calls for submission to national republican authority. The only other official action preserved in the sources for the opening days of the Intervention reviewed in this investigation was the annulling of a state law reducing the free zone along the Rio Bravo by half. Based on the unfolding of events as the Juárez government moved north, Nuevo León and Coahuila seem to have operated at the fringe of federal control in the early days of the Intervention.26

As Juárez prepared to leave San Luis Potosí in December 1863, the conflict and tensions between Vidaurri and the federal government
worsened. As noted in the above discussion on San Luis Potosí, forces loyal to Vidaurri were implicated in the ruthless assassination of the governor of that state in January 1864. This incident reflected an apparent antipathy which existed within the liberal camp between local leaders of the northern states. González Ortega noted this antipathy in correspondence to Juárez in 1862. He reported that he had to intervene in the delivery of an arms shipment destined for Vidaurri that had been seized by a bitter enemy of Vidaurri, C.J. B. Eugenio García. The complicity of Vidaurri in the assassination of the governor of San Luis Potosí was established through his failure to make any effort to prosecute the guilty party. Vidaurri was similarly implicated in the theft of a herd of horses being lawfully driven across his state to Tamaulipas by a representative of the federal treasury office of San Luis Potosí. In the same period, suspicions were raised that Vidaurri was maintaining a liaison with the imperial forces occupying San Luis Potosí near his state borders.

The months of January and February were filled with correspondence to and from the Juárez government at Saltillo with the unresponsive Vidaurri in Monterrey. The governor was unrelenting in his insistence on maintaining control over custom receipts in his states, and he attempted to deflect demands of the federal treasury to the customs house at Matamoros, which was responsive to neither Vidaurri's nor the federal government's authority at that time. While sounding receptive to the Juárez government's plans to move to Monterrey on the one hand, he issued a circular to his state on the other maligning the governing
capacity of the Juárez government. The correspondence between him and the Minister of the Treasury grew increasingly belligerent as the governor refused to relinquish funds to the federal government until Juárez declared the states under siege, separated them into two separate states, and appointed governors.28

As would be expected, the use of constitutional powers by the President had no measurable effect on Vidaurri, and Juárez mobilized troops under the command of Manuel Doblado to enforce the federal action. Returning to a guise of democratic principles to vindicate his rejection of federal authority, Vidaurri claimed he did not have the authority to decide the fate of the two states and called for a plebiscite to decide the matter. Juárez issued a decree in response to this tactic announcing that such an election was unconstitutional and that all who participated in it would be guilty of treason as the governor was. In one final maneuver, Vidaurri offered to negotiate with Juárez to avoid needless bloodshed, but Juárez was resolute and insisted that he immediately and unconditionally submit to constitutional authority.29 Unwilling to do that, Vidaurri fled to the United States and subsequently returned to join the imperial cause.

In the spring of 1864, Juárez consolidated his success in displacing Vidaurri. In April he formed a district court for the states of Nuevo León and Coahuila, appointed governors for each with instructions to reorganize the state governments, and issued a ruling in favor of those who participated in Vidaurri's vote despite the hard line of his original prohibition, provided they had voted against the Vidaurri
plan. In May he annulled a Nuevo León law of the previous year which unlawfully taxed foreign trade and in the summer months he established independent district courts in the two states and appointed a governor for the state of Coahuila. The federalizing of the state governments in the state of siege did not assure the republican government of trouble free administration as evidenced by the resignation of the first governors appointed for Coahuila and Nuevo León and the subsequent appointments of two replacements. The decrees and correspondence do not illuminate the reasons for the additional change in leadership but it illustrates the difficulty of consolidating federal control regardless.30

The remainder of the federal government’s experience with Nuevo León and Coahuila during the Intervention was seemingly uneventful. There are no indications of extraordinary actions taken against either state government, but rather subsequent actions form a routine list of treasury and municipal initiatives which have been discussed in previous chapters. The significance of the remedial actions against the government of Santiago Vidaurre for the future of federal authority in northern Mexico cannot be overstated. The region warrants additional study to fill in details only indirectly discernible in the decrees of the period, nonetheless these events were seemingly a turning point for federal administration in northern Mexico.31

Tamaulipas

At the outset of the Intervention, Tamaulipas was embroiled in an electoral fight which perpetuated the violence and contentions of the
civil war. While the state was threatened by invasion very early in the
Intervention, in fact the state of siege was imposed to gain the upper
hand on the internal discord in the state. Thus the President
commissioned the governors of San Luis Potosí and Nuevo León to intervene
in Tamaulipas. After the initial victory, the former president of the
Republic, Ignacio Comonfort, was made governor and commander of the state
until siege was lifted in May 1863. While the federal intervention in
state politics succeeded in preventing the victor in the bloody electoral
struggle, Juan de la Serna, from assuming office and at least temporarily
dislodged Carbajal from his stronghold at Matamoros, it seemingly did
little to bring state affairs under federal control. Intermittently
throughout the Intervention, there were repeated incidents in which local
leaders, even those appointed by Juárez, demonstrated complicity in
schemes which subverted the authority of the federal government.32

The changes of the governors of Tamaulipas were numerous and few
details are available on them. A generally favorable impression of
developments given by official communication with leaders in the state is
repeatedly shattered by events which belie the fundamental lack of
federal control. For example, in May 1863, the President lifted the
siege in Tamaulipas without explanation and installed Albino López to
restore constitutional government. Additionally, Romero reports that the
customs house at Matamoros remained in republican hands and enjoyed
exceptionally high revenues throughout the fiscal year, 1863 to 1864.
Other routine communications during the middle months of 1863 suggest no
untoward circumstances despite an unexplained change of governors between
May and October 1863. Yet by November of 1863, it is evident in correspondence between the Minister of Relations and the commander of a district in Tamaulipas that the state was effectively being partitioned among various republican leaders due to the incapacity of one to lead effectively the entire state. Lerdo wrote to Col. Jesús Fernández García congratulating him on his efforts against criminal elements in the vicinity of Matamoros and in mobilizing forces and commissioned him to continue to serve as the governor and commander of his district so long as the governor of the state was unable to do so.33

In the same month, Lerdo responded to a petition from the citizens in the state asking that siege be lifted and de la Serna be permitted to assume office. Lerdo responded that the President thought it best not to reopen potentially explosive issues at a time when the republican cause most needed unity. They were directed, therefore, to continue to respond to the political and military command of Fernández García in the northern district and Eufemio M. Rojas in the central and southern districts. The citizens' petition gives no hint that they were aware that siege had been formally lifted in May that year though their candidate had not been permitted to assume office according to that decree. Evidently the Juárez government had attempted to manage the internal politics of Tamaulipas by decree but had been forced to confirm a reality of state political developments which progressed essentially unaltered by federal pronouncements.34

Early in 1864, the United States Consul reported a bizarre series of events in Matamoros which similarly discounts any evidence that the federal government exercised control over state politics. A Mexican general named...
federal government exercised control over state politics. A Mexican general named Cobos arrived in Matamoros and placed the alleged governor of at least that part of the state of Tamaulipas in confinement and made preparations to declare for the Empire. Republican commanders R. Vila and Col. Juan Cortina discovered that plan and arrested and executed Cobos. Ruiz was released from jail and told to leave town and Cortina declared de la Serna the new governor of the state. Ruiz, not to be so easily set aside, returned with a detachment of troops and forced an uneasy alliance on Cortina to direct efforts against imperial forces at Tampico. The pact dissolved when a partisan of Cortina was executed after insulting Ruiz and shooting a pistol at the men attempting to arrest him. After an overnight battle, Cortina's force gained the upper hand and Ruiz and his followers fled to Brownsville. There is no mention in this report of the man most recently regarded by the republican government as the governor and military commander of the northern district of the state and supposedly headquartered in that same city, Fernández García.35

The remainder of 1864 saw increasing pressures from imperial occupation while the Juárez government continued to engage in fairly routine though sporadic communication with leaders in the state. In April, Juárez issued instructions to the governor of Tamaulipas to apprehend an individual continuing to use the title of French Vice-Consul in correspondence. The exequatur of all French consuls had been suspended while the federal government was in San Luis Potosí. Furthermore this individual had been implicated in machinations to aid
the French occupation of Tamaulipas. This communiqué seemingly indicates that Juárez and his ministers were fairly well informed of events and acted on the information. In May, the Minister of the Treasury, Iglesias, travelled to Matamoros to supervise the administration of customs revenues, and Juárez issued a concession for the construction of a rail line from Matamoros to Boca del Río on the Caribbean coast. In June, a ruling against monetary indemnification of damages suffered in the rebellions at Matamoros was issued by Juárez and the jurisdiction of the district court of Nuevo León was stated to encompass Tamaulipas. In August, as the federal government prepared to leave Monterrey, Juárez decreed an extraordinary tax on the northern states including 50,000 pesos from Tamaulipas. By August the imperial commander, Gen. Tomás Mejía, was reportedly in possession of Ciudad Victoria and marching on Matamoros. The newly arrived U.S. Consul at Matamoros submitted his portfolio to Mejía in November.

Consular and ministerial reports in 1865 suggest that the imperial occupation of the major cities of commerce in Tamaulipas brought a respite to the liberal infighting as republicans focused their efforts on expelling the enemy. As suggested in the introduction of this chapter, the imperial control of Tamaulipas was limited to a few key cities and republican forces reportedly controlled the countryside. The significance of the temporary cooperation displayed by the republicans of the state should not be overemphasized since they reverted to their characteristic infighting once the imperial forces began to be withdrawn. For example, the U.S. Minister to Mexico reported the republicans in
control of Ciudad Victoria in January 1866 and the republican commanders, Juan Cortina and Servando Canales, embroiled in a dispute.37

In June 1866, republicans secured a decisive victory at Santa Gertrudis by surprising and capturing a two hundred wagon supply convoy and routing its 1,000 man escort. The republican commander, Gen. Mariano Escobedo, left the city of Matamoros to pursue operations in the interior, leaving Gen. José María Carbajal as governor and commander of the state supported by Juan Cortina to reduce the one hundred-man imperial garrison. The U.S. Vice-Consul at Matamoros reported the intrigues which followed. While in command of the siege of the imperial garrison, Carbajal decided to negotiate a settlement with Tomás Mejía and accorded what the Juárez government regarded as very generous terms of surrender. Upon hearing of the accord, Juárez annulled it and the Minister of War sent a blistering rebuttal to Carbajal for his poor judgement. Thus dissatisfied with Carbajal, Juárez appointed a trusted liberal and republican, Santiago Tapia, to assume the governorship. In the meantime, Canales recognized that Carbajal was unpopular in that city and seized the chance to usurp the governorship of the state. Further complicating matters, Gen. Juan Cortina maintained forces within ten miles of the city waiting for an opportunity to assail Canales. As a result commerce passing through Matamoros destined for the interior had to pay duty to Canales at the customs house in the port, again to Cortina if apprehended on the roads to the interior, and a third time to Escobedo since he did not recognize either of the pretenders.38

The record falls silent on the situation in Matamoros after an
exchange of correspondence in the fall of 1866. Canales wrote Juárez informing him of his assumption of command in that city in August to avert a collapse of governing authority. The Ministers of Relations and War responded in separate communiques informing him of the appointment of Tapia as governor and directing him to report to the federal capital to account for his actions. In the interim, Tapia had arrived in Matamoros on September 7, and Canales had him jailed two days later under the pretense of awaiting authoritative response from Juárez. The U.S. Vice-Consul at Matamoros reported that he suspected Canales had intentions of joining the González Ortega conspiracy. Even so, there is no indication that Canales ever declared himself in rebellion against the Juárez government, though his actions belied it.39

With the appointed governor presumably in jail in Matamoros, the Juárez government was forced to deal with the nominal commanders of the other districts of the state. In a communique to Ascensión Gómez, addressed as governor, the Minister of Relations advised that all pardons for involvement in the imperial occupation had to be referred to the President for action. This was in apparent response of a decree by Gómez which presumed to regulate pardons under his jurisdiction. Gómez was headquartered in Tampico and ostensibly governed the southern districts of the state. In February, Gen. Gómez and Manuel M. Cuesta submitted a request for a loan for 5 million dollars to the U.S. Consul at Tampico requesting that it be forwarded to the Secretary of State. To secure the loan, they offered the future revenue of the customs house at Tampico. The U.S. Minister to Mexico, notes in his correspondence to the Secretary
of State that both these men were known to have been supporters of González Ortega. Possibly unaware of the attempted loan negotiations in Tampico, the Minister of War began a correspondence in late February directing Gómez to march with a brigade to San Luis Potosí to be incorporated into the final campaign against the Empire. Subsequent communiques became increasingly strident while Gómez offered increasingly ludicrous excuses for his inaction. On April 23, Juárez declared the disobedient General in Tampico in criminal revolt against the federal government and directed the Minister of War to strike the names of the mutineers from the official rolls of the army. Thus in Tamaulipas, the Intervention ended as it had begun. Local internecine fighting in the liberal camp continued to frustrate every effort of the federal government to gain control over authorities and events of that northeastern state.40

The states reviewed in this chapter illustrate the many relevant issues which together molded the President's ability to extend control over republican areas during the Intervention. On the one hand, large distances provided an absolute limit on the effectiveness and speed of communications. Yet the strong influence of local leadership provides for a much more complex pattern to emerge. The key role of regional and state leadership made the selection and appointment of commanders and governors of utmost importance. Therefore, the actions of Juárez in managing the leadership in the republican cause provide significant
insights into the nature and effectiveness of federal authority. Juárez governed to the extent that local leadership recognized his authority. The experience of Michoacán suggests that respect for institutional authority permitted the exercise of control though against great obstacles and over long distances. By contrast, the experience of the northern states suggests that despite the relatively fewer obstacles, control was only exercised through great effort, if at all. While federal authority was ostensibly well-established in Michoacán, the actions of Juárez in northern Mexico had an especially positive effect on the future of federal authority in that region.
ENDNOTES

1William H. Corwin to Seward, no. 45, 23 August 1863, U.S. Ministers; Corwin to Seward, no. 53, 28 March 1864, ibid.; Corwin to Seward, no. 3, 29 August 1864, ibid.; Corwin to Seward, no. 8, 28 March 1865, ibid.; Corwin to Seward, no. 13, 27 August 1865, ibid.

2Blake to Seward, no. 31, 29 December 1864, U.S. Consuls in Manzanillo; Blake to Seward, unnumbered, 29 January 1865, ibid.; Blake to Seward, no. 7, 30 September 1866, ibid.; Etchison to Seward, unnumbered, 10 January 1865, U.S. Consuls in Matamoros; Wood to Seward, unnumbered, 15 April 1865, ibid.; Avery to Seward, no. 4, 24 January 1866, ibid.


4Juárez imposes a state of siege in Durango to support José María Patoni against a military mutiny led by Col. Tomás Borego, Decree of Government, 22 June 1863, Legislación mexicana, 9:630.


6Juárez advises Vidaurre that 1,000 men have been ordered from San Luis Potosí to reinforce his efforts in establishing order in Tamaulipas, 28 February 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 6:30. González Ortega reports on subversive activities of conservative forces and requests authority over funds, 4 March 1862, ibid., 6:41. González Ortega reports capture of war materiel and more details on conservative activities, 6 March 1862, ibid., 6:44. González Ortega offers Juárez opinions on liberal issues and reports more on conservative activities, 17 March 1862, ibid., 6:107. González Ortega left and another governor was appointed who reestablished civil institutions of government and suspended minting of copper coinage, Velázquez, Historia de San Luis Potosí, 3:362.

Espinosa became embroiled in controversy surrounding questionable obligations and remittances to the miners of Catorce and controversial policies with regard to the national guard including payments for extensions of service. Thus the state of siege was reimposed in Decree of Government, 25 February 1863, ibid., 9:593, compared with Velázquez, Historia de San Luis Potosí, 3:364. Gen. Francisco Alcalde assumes command, ibid., 3:364-365.

Siege lifted in October 1863, ibid., 3:364.

Comments on the imperial advance and the retreat of Juárez are found in Thomas Corwin to Seward, no. 49, 14 July 1863, U.S. Ministers. Villanueva reports he is driven from San Luis Potosí in correspondence to the Minister of War, 25 January 1864, Colección de leyes, 1:286-287. LTC Rafael Quesada, commander of Villanueva’s guard detachment, writes to the Minister of War detailing the assassination of the governor, 30 January 1864, ibid., 1:305-306. The new governor of the state, Camilo Nino, writes the Minister of War from Tamaulipas to explain that the assassination was not a case of mistaken identity since the murderer called the governor by name before executing him, 1 February 1864, ibid., 1:302-305. The Minister of Relations details the implication of Vidaurri in the assassination of Villanueva in Circular of the Minister of Relations, January 1864, ibid., 1:235-240.

Thomas Corwin to Seward, US Secretary of State, no. 53, 28 March 1864, U.S. Ministers. William H. Corwin reports to Seward the extent of the republican defeat at Matehuala, no. 1, 28 May 1864, ibid. Doblado reports defeat at Matehuala to the Minister of War, 29 May 1864, Colección de leyes, 2:55. Romero Flores notes that the Brigade of San Luis was serving in Michoacán in Historia de Michoacán, 2:256-258.


Juárez annuls state decree in Decree of Government, 11 March 1862, Legislación mexicana, 9:392. Régules writes to the Minister of War that he is


16Romero Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:223-238.

17Berriozábal absolved, 15 June 1864, Colección de leyes, 2:71-73; Arteaga appointed commander of the Army of the Center, 1 July 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:686-87, and Colección de leyes, 2:76-77; López Urága and Caamaño plot defection and republican loyalists select Pueblita, Romero Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:236-239, 256.

18Ibid., 2:255-258.

19Ibid., 2:269-270, 278-279.

20Ibid., 2:280, 282-287, 293, 317.

21Ibid., 2:320-329; Corwin to Seward, no. 11, 22 July 1865, U.S. Ministers.

22Romero Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:343-351, 359-360; Corwin to Seward, no. 14, 28 October 1865, U.S. Ministers.

23Romero Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:360-365, 368; Patoni given instruction concerning prisoner exchange in Sinaloa, Minister of War to Patoni, 7 January 1865, Colección de leyes, 2:135-140; Decree of Government, 11 August 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:691-692; Decree of Government, 28 September 1866, ibid., 9:734.

24Periódico oficial, 15 February 1866, vol. II, no. 8, p. 4; Romero
Flores, Historia de Michoacán, 2:376-377; Régules to Juárez, 7 March 1866, Juárez, Documentos, 10:723-725.


26Juárez wrote to Vidaurre appointed him military commander of Tamaulipas and directing to intervene, 13 January 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 5:568-569; Vidaurre responds to Juárez accepting the appointment, 14 January 1862, ibid. 5:569; Vidaurre reports success to Juárez, 29 February 1862, ibid., 6:30; Vidaurre writes to Juárez claiming to have sent troops, 8 May 1862, ibid., 6:472-473; Juárez appeals to the governors for additional cooperation, 25 July 1862, ibid., 6:779; Vidaurre protests the sacrifices his state had already made, 13 August 1862, ibid., 6:794-796; state law annulled, Decree of Government, 28 May 1862, Legislación mexicana, 9:471.

27González Ortega to Juárez, 17 March 1862, Juárez, Documentos, 6:107; Magistrate of court of Galeana to Vidaurre explaining the legitimate authority of the treasury official to drive herd across Nuevo León, 23 January 1864, Colección de leyes, 1:266-268; Minister of War to Vidaurre directing him to conduct the investigation and execute justice for the execution of Villanueva quickly, 2 February 1864, ibid., 1:306-307; Circular of the Minister of Relations detailing Vidaurre’s complicity in the assassination of Villanueva and suspected liaison with the French, January 1864, ibid., 1:235-240.

28Circular from Vidaurre to the citizens of his states decrying the deplorable state of anarchy in the nation except under his leadership, 2 January 1864, ibid., 1:263-266; Minister of Treasury requests federal funds be released, 20 January 1864, ibid., 1:270-271; Vidaurre replies that his states face extraordinary circumstances which preclude his compliance, 24 January 1864, ibid., 1:271-275; Minister of Treasury rebuts noting lack of any detail of the difficulties to which Vidaurre refers and insists Vidaurre comply, 28 January 1864, ibid., 1:275-277, and 28 January 1864, ibid., 1:277-280; Vidaurre offers more double talk to the Minister of Treasury, 1 February 1864, ibid., 1:281-286; Minister of the Treasury to Vidaurre demanding he immediately comply with federal orders, 3 February 1864, ibid., 1:286; Juárez announces his attention to move to Monterrey, 5 February 1864, ibid., 1:307; Vidaurre to Juárez stating that he was welcome in Monterrey, 7 February 1864, ibid., 1:308; Vidaurre addresses the citizens of his states promoting his own authority over that of the federal government as the best hope for maintaining order, 15 February 1864, ibid., 1:323-325; Circular of the Minister of Relations to the governors detailing the confrontation with Vidaurre and publishing copies of correspondence between Vidaurre and the federal government, 26 February 1864, ibid., 1:225-234; Decree of Government separating Nuevo León and Coahuila, 26 February 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:673, and Colección de leyes, 1:260-261, and ibid., 2:3-4; Decree of
Government placing Coahuila under siege, 26 February 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:674, and Colección de leyes, 1:261-262, and ibid., 2:4-5; Decree of Government placing Nuevo León under siege, 26 February 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:674, and Colección de leyes, 1:262-263, and ibid., 2:5-6.

29 Decree of Government denouncing the election, 5 March 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:675-76; Vidaurri to Juárez offering terms for negotiation, 24 March 1864, Colección de leyes, 1:325-326; Minister of War to Vidaurri relaying the Juárez government's insistence on surrender, 25 March 1864, ibid., 1:326-327.

30 Circular of the Minister of Relations to governors announcing overthrow of Vidaurri, 31 March 1864, ibid., 2:18; Circular to citizens of Nuevo León praising their loyalty to the constitution, 4 April 1864, ibid., 2:19-21; Decree of Government establishing district court, 4 April 1864, ibid., 2:21-22; Juárez to Manuel Ruíz appointing him district court judge, 9 April 1864, ibid., 2:23-25; Juárez to Jesús María Benítez Pinillos appointing him governor of Nuevo León, 13 April 1864, ibid., 2:26-27; Minister of Relations to Benítez Pinillos concerning reorganization of state government, 14 April 1864, ibid., 2:26-27; Decree of Government providing for exemption from prosecution for those that voted against Vidaurri's plan in his unconstitutional election, 26 April 1864, ibid., 2:31-32; Decree of Government, 14 May 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:684-85, and Colección de leyes, 2:44-45; Decree of Government establishing district court of Nuevo León, 8 June 1864, ibid., 2:69-70; Decree of Government appointing governor of Coahuila, 17 June 1864, ibid., 2:74; Decree of Government establishing district court of Coahuila, 14 August 1864, ibid., 2:83-84; Decree of Government appointing new governor of Coahuila, 17 June 1864, ibid., 2:74; Decree of Government appointing new governor of Nuevo León, 13 July 1864, ibid., 2:74.

31 Decree of Government establishing a treasury office in Coahuila separate from that of Nuevo León, 15 July 1864, Legislación mexicana, 9:888-89, and Colección de leyes, 2:85; Decree of Government imposing an extraordinary tax on several northern states, 2 August 1864, ibid., 2:89-90; Decree of Government establishing a new village in Coahuila, 8 September 1864, ibid., 2:93-94; Decree of Government of Coahuila implementing Presidential decree creating new village, 6 October 1864, ibid., 2:94-95; Decree of Government issuing land title in Coahuila, 17 October 1865, ibid., 2:265; Decree of Government issuing land title in Coahuila, 24 January 1866, ibid., 2:310-311; Minister of Treasury to governor of Coahuila advising that federal government could not indemnify citizens against all damages suffered in the war, 9 September 1866, ibid., 3:12d-130; Decree of Government establishing a new village in Coahuila, 24 November 1866, ibid., 3:139-140; Minister of Relations to military commander in Coahuila acknowledging that after the General had been ordered to desist in creating a new district he did so, 29 April 1867, ibid., 3:187-188.
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CONCLUSION

The actions of the Juárez government during the Intervention reveal many insights into the status of republican government at this stage in the nation's political development. Conclusions about its role in the republican resistance and relationship to various authorities within the federation during this period of crisis must be framed in the context of contemporary events. The development of this subject has been pursued on a topical basis owing to the nascent stage of development of the resources used in this investigation. To draw together perspectives offered in various parts of this report, the following chronology is offered. Each stop of the republican government on its journey northward and back provide insights into the priorities and capabilities of the republican government as well as some indication of the perception of the leaders and citizens of the nation in their response to national authority.

The experience of the Juárez government while it remained in Mexico City provides an essential backdrop against which to evaluate its succeeding activities. One should not expect its governing capacity while in northern Mexico to have been greater than it was in Mexico City, nor should one assume that it exercised uncontested authority and control over developments in the federation while in the ancient capital. As
Illustrated above, the national government exercised direct authority over an extensive bureaucracy, although the professional integrity of federal officials and interference by state authorities was a problem through this period. Revenue management is a subject needing much development but correspondence, decrees, and circulars indicate that federal revenue was a significant source of wealth. Further research will perhaps confirm the details of what seems apparent in the resources reviewed herein that there was a regular system of revenue administration which employed the efforts of a significant bureaucracy represented in every state of the union. Nevertheless, the Juárez government at the time of the invasion on December 14, 1861, was seeking to consolidate the liberal victory of the War of the Reform and ruled in a very fluid manner, tolerating many deviations from the state of government envisioned by the President, and indeed, by the Constitution.

From the invasion to the Battle of Puebla on May 5, 1862, the federal government pursued decentralizing policies in terms of revenue management to facilitate mobilization of state militia while seeking to protect federal jurisdictions and prerogatives at every opportunity. Following the invasion, an extraordinary tax on capital was declared, resting on an extensive system of property valuations recorded with the federal treasury offices in the states. This period illustrates the limitations on effective communications even while the government remained in Mexico City. While attempting to focus the nation's energies on the foreign enemy, Juárez was forced to deploy political and military resources against bloody infighting in Tamaulipas and extend
extraordinary authority to the governor of San Luis Potosí to squelch civil disorder and violence directed at innocent Spanish residents. Despite the characteristic reluctance of northern governors to deploy state forces under federal command and their habitual meddling in federal revenue matters within their states' boundaries, the President exercised sufficient control over national events to bring a force of 20,000 men to bear against the French and to secure victory at Puebla on May 5, 1862.

Following the victory at Puebla, the President recognized the need to preserve resources for the potentially long struggle which lay ahead and he embarked on a program of recentralization. Several state decrees were annulled and limits on the authority of governors were published. While the administration of federal revenue was apparently very difficult to regain control over, the President engaged in the development of strategic plans and the intervention into unsettled events in San Luis Potosí, illustrating the diverse governing activities his government was pursuing. The French and Mexican conservative forces left their garrisons in Veracruz in the spring of 1863 and threatened Mexico City. After initial preparations for the defense of the city, Juárez and his government evacuated it on May 31, 1863, and moved the republican capital to San Luis Potosí.

By this time, the French blockade and occupation of the nation's ports began to put pressure on the federal revenue base, which was heavily dependent on customs revenue. To compensate for revenue shortages, Juárez decreed a second extraordinary tax on capital and a tax on cotton to be effective throughout the nation. Although the actual
fiscal effects of these initiatives awaits archival research, correspondence of Juárez with several governors indicates that at least some states were responding to the measures declared in San Luis Potosí. The government sought to maintain normal relations with state authorities and the federal bureaucracy through 1863, but increasingly felt the pressure of imperial occupation on communications while key population centers fell under imperial control, thus further reducing the revenue assets under federal direction. Also while in San Luis Potosí, Juárez announced policies regarding the adjudication of federal lands including corporate properties nationalized in the Reform, and private property of individuals who traitorously joined the imperial cause.

Also while in San Luis Potosí, Juárez appointed José López Uraga to command the Army of the Center and designated new governors in Tamaulipas, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, and Michoacán. While reflecting the federal government's knowledge of local developments, these actions also illustrate the range of control exercised by the Juárez government. The appointment was observed and uncontested in Michoacán, of virtually no effect in Tamaulipas, and effective in San Luis Potosí until the imperial occupation forced the state government from the state. Additionally, an effort was made to assemble the national Congress, succeeding in gathering a quorum but an insufficient number for the assembly to be considered a regular session. Also while in San Luis Potosí, Juárez issued various decrees in civil and diplomatic matters, and took steps to appoint new members of the Supreme Court to replace those whose terms were expiring. On December 22, 1863, Juárez and his
ministers evacuated San Luis Potosí and arrived in Saltillo on January 9, 1864.

In January 1864, the ministers of the federal government engaged in correspondence with Santiago Vidaurri of Nuevo Leon seeking his cooperation in the release of federal revenue collected within his jurisdiction and trying to determine his true intentions. A series of incriminating actions disproved Vidaurri's protests of loyalty to the Juárez government and the President declared Nuevo León and Coahuila under siege. Since Vidaurri refused to respond to constitutional authority, Juárez directed Manuel Doblado to march against Monterrey thus displacing the recalcitrant Vidaurri on March 25. The example was seemingly sufficient for Luis Terrazas in Chihuahua, since after Juárez declared his state under siege in April, the governor fled the state in August while a military force under command of José María Patoni of Durango approached Chihuahua to force the installation of a new governor selected by Juárez. In the same month, Juárez issued a decree extending broad authority to the Commander of the Army of the Center, López Uraga, conceding the practical limitations on his government's ability to engage in governing functions at such great distances. Thus while the President was realizing great successes in displacing the habitually troublesome governors of the northern states, he was forced to cede prerogatives to regional commanders due to difficulties in communicating over long distances.

The unfaithfulness and ineffectiveness of López Uraga as Commander of the Army of the Center and the governor of Michoacán,
required Juárez to appoint a new commander and deputy commander for that post and new governors of Michoacán and Jalisco. Additionally, difficulties in the states of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Chihuahua necessitated the appointment of three new governors for those states. Shortly before leaving Monterrey in August 1864, Juárez decreed an extraordinary tax for the states of Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas. There is no evidence readily available to confirm or deny the effectiveness of this tax measure.

Juárez and his itinerant government arrived in Chihuahua on October 12, 1864. The direct control of revenue management by the federal government was seemingly minimal with the exception of the customs houses at a few northern ports of entry. Regular communications were restricted to northern states, but in those states there was a significant activity by the federal government in civil matters, reflecting the general acknowledgement of the authority of the federal government by its many petitioners. Federal officials in the northern states appeared responsive to federal authority, while in the same period, federal officials in regions remote from the federal government were subject to the virtually unchecked prerogative of local commanders and governors. Juárez initiated a monthly tax in the state of Chihuahua, issued detailed guidelines for the operation of the federal treasury office in that state, and directed the minting of some 170,000 pesos of copper to obtain essential operating revenue for his government. Local commanders and governors collected taxes and forced loans with little regard for federal jurisdictions, yet little is known about the role of
the federal treasury offices in the states in supporting the resistance efforts of state militias.

Also while in Chihuahua, Jesús González Ortega asked the Minister of Relations for an interpretation of the current Juárez term of office in view of the Constitution's provision for a four year term. After being told that the term would expire on the last day of November 1865, González Ortega obtained permission to leave the nation through Paso del Norte for the purpose of reentering the nation at another point in order to carry on the resistance there.

The digression of Juárez and his cabinet to Paso del Norte first weeks of August 1865 signaled the low point of the republican resistance. Despite the obvious difficulties in communicating over the great distances from the northern border of the nation to virtually all parts of the republican resistance, Juárez made his decisions felt. He had a controlling influence in the selection of the replacement of the Commander of the Army of the Center after the execution of Gen. José María Arteaga, though after a significant delay. Arteaga was executed in October 1865, and the appointment of Nicolás de Régules was made effective in February 1866. Additionally the President was petitioned by various citizens and municipal authorities in northern Mexico, revealing their recognition of his government as legitimate and effective. In November 1865, Juárez declared his intention to hold the presidency until valid national elections could be held. This precipitated the revolt of several republicans that had remained loyal to his government to that point while many others renewed their pledge of support. Juárez dealt a
blow to the apparent successor to the presidency, President of the Supreme Court González Ortega, by declaring him absent from the country without license and ordering his arrest should he be seen within the national boundaries.

On October 29, 1865, the French withdrew from Chihuahua under pressure from Terrazas and Juárez subsequently appointed him governor of the state. Juárez prematurely moved his government to Chihuahua on November 13 and was driven back to Paso del Norte on December 9. González Ortega issued a manifesto from San Antonio, Texas, declaring his claim to the presidency on the day after Christmas, 1865. The Minister of Relations issued the government's reply to González Ortega's manifesto, asserting that it was in the nation's best interest for Juárez to continue in office and discounting the legitimacy of González Ortega's claim to the presidency and his qualifications for the office. While remaining in Paso del Norte, Juárez issued several land titles for federal lands and rulings in municipal disputes.

On June 17, 1866, Juárez returned to Chihuahua as the decline of the Empire became obvious to all. While the republican forces enjoyed victories over the imperial forces, the appointed governor of Tamaulipas was jailed in that state by a rebellious liberal claiming loyalty to the Juárez government while rejecting its decision concerning the governorship of the state. The last siege action of the Intervention was taken in the state of Guerrero on August 27, 1866, and the Juárez government began to issue several decrees that had originally been issued much earlier in the Intervention but apparently never implemented in many
parts of the nation. Therefore, as the Empire collapsed, Juárez and his ministers took the initiative in reorganizing and reinvigorating state governments and the federal bureaucracy.

On December 10, 1866, Juárez and his government left Chihuahua and arrived in Durango on December 26. On the same date, González Ortega reentered the nation and on January 8, 1867, he was apprehended and jailed by the governor of Zacatecas. Juárez moved his government to Zacatecas on January 22 and narrowly escaped capture by conservative forces on January 27. As more areas came under republican control, communications improved and local commanders were able to return to jurisdictions denied them for much of the Intervention to collect taxes and increase the strength of their forces. The Minister of War began to orchestrate the concentration of forces in early February and at the end of the month, siege was laid at Querétaro. Juárez arrived in San Luis Potosí on February 21, 1867, and waited there while Gen. Mariano Escobedo directed the siege at Querétaro. While Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and other northern states seemed firmly in the Juárez camp, Tamaulipas continued to bedevil the federal government and the Intervention ended with Tamaulipas in revolt against the federal government.

While Querétaro lay under siege, Gen. Porfirio Díaz issued numerous military and political initiatives in the eastern states as the Commander of the Army of the East. The initiatives clearly suggest that extensive measures were needed to institute republican authority where none had existed through much of the Intervention. Maximilian was captured on May 15, court-martialed on June 12, and executed after a
three day stay of execution on June 19. Juárez triumphantly reentered Mexico City on July 15, 1867, and issued numerous initiatives to reestablish and reinvigorate the nation's governing processes. Military forces were demobilized and reorganized into peacetime commands, the Ministry of the Treasury was reorganized with 114 employees in the Mexico City staff, and temporary members of the Supreme Court were appointed pending regular elections.

In the final analysis, it is clear that Juárez was able to maintain essential control of events in the northern States he occupied and employed extraordinary means, such as siege and military force, to do so. One by product of this and the ongoing resistance against the invasion was the gravitation of political leadership from civil to military. One should note, however, that the nation had been at war for much of its early national history and military men counted large throughout. Through the course of the Intervention, control of revenue devolved to lower levels as central administration became less feasible due to difficulties in communication and Imperial occupation of the major population centers. Thus Juárez became detached from much of the federal officialdom except that located in his immediate surroundings so that his influence apart from his personal presence was modulated entirely by the loyalty of local leaders.

Nevertheless, Juárez survived on the legitimate claim to authority embodied in the Constitution of 1857 and on widespread popular recognition of him as a symbol of the nation's will and aspirations. At every stop in his journeys in northern Mexico, Juárez received petitions
from citizens and officials coming from various distances seeking a judgement in civil and municipal affairs. This demonstrates their recognition of his authority and the authority of his government. Although certain local leaders resisted federal jurisdiction over revenue matters, Juárez generally could call on military support from governors of neighboring states to suppress the rebellious leader. The forces at hand which enabled him to overcome recalcitrant leaders was not generally regular army forces commissioned and salaried under his authority, but state militia forces under command of the respective governor or designated commander. This pattern would seemingly indicate the essential cohesion of the republican regime emerging from the War of the Reform despite the many divisions which bedevilled the liberal camp. Thus Juárez adroitly manipulated local events and gradually but steadily extended national and central direction over the bastions of extreme federalism and localism of the early national period.

This has great implications for the role of this period in the transformation which took place between Independence and the end of the century. It is clear that Juárez began the centralizing process long before the advent of Porfirián politics and he evidently pioneered the practice of appointing of trusted compatriots to critical positions in times of crisis. Additionally, Juárez emerged from the Intervention all the wiser concerning the character and loyalties of prominent state and national leaders. Just as the Intervention discredited the conservative machinations for monarchy, so also it significantly narrowed the field of legitimate and serious contenders in the liberal camp to those who had
held firm in the patriotic cause. This made all the more feasible the politics of domination and manipulation and effectively silenced many of the contending voices which had made the politics of consensus so difficult in the early national period. Thus Juárez seems to have inspired the political formula which was to later bring stability, even rigidity, to Mexican politics.

Another significant finding is also relevant to the nature of nineteenth century Mexican political life. The Mexican body politic appears to have been characterized by an extensive and largely effective network of administrative and political office. Despite the apparent lack of consensus and the explosive struggles that spanned the middle of the century, one sees an underlying orderliness and organization reflected in the administrative capacity which persisted throughout. Thus the assumptions common to much literature concerning the presumed lack of consistency and regularity in nineteenth century Mexican political processes should be challenged through further research into the organization and function of the bureaucracy and the administration of the revenue base.

What then are the implications of this period for the consolidation and development of liberal institutions of government emerging from the Reform? The direct impact of Juárez during the Intervention was most significant in his immediate periphery. The migration of Benito Juárez through northern Mexico brought him into decisive conflict with the perennial strongholds of federalist extremism and localism and through a blend of military and political action he was
able to prevail. Not insignificantly, effective control over federal jurisdictions in revenue collection was thus enhanced where it had been most lacking. Therefore, this episode did much to advance the cause of republican central government in Northern Mexico and brought this sector of the Mexican body politic in direct contact with him as the great symbol of Mexican nationalism and liberalism. Although an analysis of the government of Benito Juárez during the French Intervention reveals many limitations in practical matters of governance, his emergence as an emblem of the aspirations and identity of the Mexican people disclose a far greater and longer lasting impact.
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This thesis was typed by the author