THE ONCE AND FUTURE QUEST
EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL—ISSUES AND PROSPECTS

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The Once and Future Quest: European Arm Control—Issues and Prospects

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1. The weight of these factors and impediments directly affect the prospects for mutual understanding and ultimate agreement.

2. Three sets of arms control negotiations which could have a long range political impact on Europe. These are the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), Theater Nuclear Forces/Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (TFI) talks, and Theater Nuclear Forces/Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (TFI) talks. In each set of negotiations, there are factors encouraging arms control as well as impediments to arms control. The weight of these factors and impediments directly affect the prospects for mutual understanding and ultimate agreement.
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by

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1 August 1983

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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Kathleen M. Preitz.
FOREWORD

This memorandum examines European arms-control negotiations, issues and prospects. The author discusses factors encouraging arms control in Europe as well as impediments to arms control. He covers in some detail the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) discussions. The author concludes with a discussion of how US strategy has encouraged the United States to advocate certain arms-control measures, and how the differing perceptions, experiences, and goals of the United States, Western Europe and the USSR affect approaches to arms control.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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SUMMARY

There are factors encouraging arms control as well as impediments to this lofty quest. The factors considered in this paper are historical, force asymmetries, defense costs, detente, and peace movements. Impediments considered are lack of trust, comparability of forces, data base agreement, verification, technology improvements, conflicting positions on what constitutes stability, consensus achievement within NATO, and linkage to nonarms control issues. Three major sets of negotiations and agreements are discussed and analyzed from the standpoint of the factors and impediments listed above. These negotiations are the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, and the Theater Nuclear Force/Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (TNF/INF) negotiations. Some general conclusions are: strategy should ideally drive both conventional and nuclear development and deployment, yet current forces in-being set limits to strategy; the United States and its European Allies have different perceptions about the goal of arms control, the US seeing it as a reduction of risk resulting from reducing relative quantities of force, the Europeans seeing it as a reduction of tension by improving the quality of the political environment; all arms control efforts are linked and what is accomplished by one can have an impact on what can be accomplished by another.
THE ONCE AND FUTURE QUEST:
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INTRODUCTION

"And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks . . . ." This quote from the Biblical scriptures reflects a quest for disarmament as old as Isaiah. Despite various false starts and frustrations in this quest, the goal continues to capture man's imagination.

The current initiatives in East-West arms control have its genesis in the late 1960's with the beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). This is the latest in a movement that began in the mid-19th century which is concerned with the growth of the destructive power of weapons. The several Geneva Conventions, beginning in 1864; the Hague Conventions; the League of Nations Covenant and the UN Charter, as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological warfare; the 1922 and 1930 Naval Treaties of London; and other efforts were all designed, in part, as a means of curtailing the development and the use of weapons so as to decrease the likelihood of war, and to increase the possibility of restraint and humanitarian conduct should war occur.
By the late 1960's, the proliferation of Soviet and American nuclear forces and the continued confrontation of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe sparked a new recognition by statesmen of the need for negotiations directed toward a peaceful resolution of issues between the superpowers. Actually, the recognition of this need had been developing for over a decade. It started with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and was followed by the ‘Hot Line’ and Partial Test Ban Treaties of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. The continuing efforts toward peaceful resolutions by more direct and specific negotiations are the basis for the analyses of this paper.

We will examine here the factors that encourage continued efforts at arms control and the reduction of tensions as well as those which serve as impediments to the successful conclusion of arms agreements in Europe. We will also review and analyze what could be called the three major efforts to reduce tensions and control arms and the reduction of tensions as well as those which serve as impediments to the successful conclusion of arms agreements in Europe. We will also review and analyze what could be called the three major efforts to reduce tensions and control arms, namely; the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); the conference on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe and the talks on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) currently underway in Geneva.

FACTORS ENCOURAGING ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

A number of factors are likely to compel the United States, the nations of Europe, and the Soviet Union to seek agreements on limiting armaments in Europe.

Historical Conditioning. Henry Kissinger, addressing the impact of historical experiences on nation-states, once noted:

The more elementary the experience, the more profound its impact on a nation's interpretation of the present in light of the past. It is even possible for a nation to undergo an experience so shattering that it becomes the prisoner of its past.

In some ways much of the impetus for arms control in Western Europe today is driven by ghosts of the past. From the wars of
Louis XIV through the Napoleonic expansion, to the terrible carnage of the conflicts of this century, the horrors of war have conditioned the people of Europe. The invention and prolific deployment of the nuclear weapon, however, has added a new and awesome dimension to modern warfare. The potential for "Armageddon" is now a reality and that potential has greatly reinforced the Western hope of establishing a mechanism that would preclude the possibility of another war, incredibly more devastating, in Europe. As a result, stability in crises as well as the arms race has become an important objective to be sought through the mechanism of limitations and controls on armaments.

The Soviet attitude toward arms control, conditioned by militant and revolutionary ideology along with an aggregate of complex emotions—zenophobia, suspicion, fear of internal upheavals, and so forth—also have been influenced by the destructive experiences of history. Military invasions from the time of Genghis Kahn and the Mongols to Hitler's Germany not only have affected the Soviet view of the world but also have colored its judgment on defense needs and the potential utility of compromise and accommodation.

In the East, the Soviet leadership traditionally has seen the Chinese as a threat. China and the USSR share a 4,500 mile border (a significant portion of which is in dispute), along which the Soviet Union now have stationed 47 divisions. Therefore, it is not surprising that at a time when Soviet-Chinese political and ideological differences were approaching their zenith, the Soviet Union was actively pursuing detente with the West. Indeed, concern over the possibility of confronting adversaries on two fronts may well have driven the USSR to seek arms agreements with the West, if for no other reason than to free troops for deployment to the Far East.

In the West, heavy losses to the Germans during the First World War and the swift march to Moscow by numerically inferior Nazi forces during the Second World War have undoubtedly left their indelible imprint on the Soviet psyche. Thus, it is likely that Soviet leaders have become conditioned to an uncertainty over how much is enough military force and continue to remain concerned over any resurgence of German military power.

Soviet leaders also seem to be aware of the potentially catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. Indeed, as early as 1961 Khrushchev warned that "within 60 days of an atomic attack 500
millions to 750 million people could perish." Departing from the Stalinist inevitability of war between capitalism and communism, he concluded that "sober calculation of the inevitable consequence of nuclear war is an indispensable requirement for pursuing a consistent policy of preventing war." Since Khrushchev's statement in 1961, one apparent and clearly understandable principal aim of Soviet policy has been the avoidance of nuclear war.

While there are certain identifiable common threads running between European (East and West) and Soviet views of the role of European armament—particularly nuclear weapons—in the political exigencies of East-West relations, there are certain clearly divergent perspectives that characterize the American view. The impacts of the markedly different historical experiences and geographic locations must be understood if one is to appreciate the areas of contention between the United States and its European allies. On one hand, the allies' search for national identity—stretching back as much as a millennium and fashioned by their participation in and recovery from numerous wars and their experiences with numerous hegemonic states, Spain in the past, the Soviet Union today—has developed into a long-term and cosmic view of the vagaries of history and their place within it. In short, the Europeans appreciate and are reconciled to the undeniable importance of politics and the indeterminacy of national life. They recognize that technological innovations such as exotic weapons may affect national developments but do not necessarily convey permanent advantages. The roles of politics, economics, law and social convention are viewed as primary dimensions of international politics that coexist with national military power.

On the other hand, the geographical isolation of the United States; its relatively brief history yet rapid economic development and its industrial might are among the factors that have fostered a short-term perspective that places great confidence in the efficacy of technological solutions to the problems of states. Moreover, the United States has strong beliefs in the notion that politics is an anathema that is counterproductive to progress and in the assurance that virtue as well as the prerogative of leadership reside on the US side of the Atlantic. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that the United States places primary emphasis upon defense rather than deterrence (as emphasized by the Europeans)
and becomes easily exasperated with its recalcitrant allies. For example, those who refuse to defer to its automatic leadership, who resist US exhortations to increase their defense budgets, and who take ambivalent positions on their 1979 decision to deploy the 572 INF missiles if arms control progress with the Soviet Union is not forthcoming at Geneva.

Another interesting issue between the United States and its allies is their differing perspectives on the role of nuclear weapons. Because of asymmetry of conventional forces favoring the Warsaw Pact (WP), the Western allies desire to retain a relatively low nuclear threshold as a threat to WP aggression. Notwithstanding, there has been growing sentiment in the United States that the United States and its allies must augment and modernize their conventional military assets in this age of theater and strategic parity to maintain the credibility of NATO's flexible response doctrine and raise the nuclear threshold so as to avoid nuclear holocaust.

This leads to a concern on the part of some in Western Europe about whether, and under what circumstances, the United States would use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. The ability of the United States to provide Western Europe with a nuclear umbrella and its willingness to use nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe were from the beginning the cornerstone of the Western Alliance. By the early 1960's, the Soviet Union, however, had gained a second strike capability, at which point the credibility of the US deterrence became questionable. Would the United States risk losing its cities if it launched a nuclear strike in response to a Soviet conventional attack on NATO? Accordingly, Europeans worried that since the USSR had gained strategic nuclear parity, the United States would be less likely to use its nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe against a WP attack should the need arise. This also drew Western European attention to the distorted balance in theater forces. By the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union was fielding the SS-20, and the Backfire bomber had long been a concern to NATO defense planners. The NATO response was the "dual-track" decision in December 1979 to deploy in Western Europe ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II, both capable of striking the USSR. While this decision was hailed as evidence of NATO solidarity, it reinforced concern in some quarters of Western European public opinion about the decoupling
of US strategic interests from those of its European allies. This concern was not new. SALT I and II had raised the issue of reducing the US Forward Based System (FBS) (missiles, land- and sea-based aircraft, and missile-carrying submarines in Scotland and Spain). While the FBS never became a part of SALT, the discussions had raised fears among Europeans that the United States might be trying to detach its nuclear deterrent forces in Western Europe from the US strategic nuclear deterrence on which Western Europe still depended for its ultimate security. The point here seems to be that any change in nuclear deterrence stands the chance of causing a fear by West Europeans of decoupling and raising the nuclear threshold.

Western Europeans, aware that any large-scale conventional conflict on the continent would result in great devastation of Western Europe, have long since pressed for a policy of pure nuclear deterrence. Under this concept, every WP act of aggression on the continent would be met with strategic retaliation. The United States, conscious of the risks such a strategy implies (i.e., for US cities and population), has sought a more flexible approach. The United States clearly is concerned about escalation control. If deterrence fails, conflict should be contained at the lowest possible level and response should be designed to meet aggression with equal force. Western Europe has accepted the concept of flexible response in politics, but it is not comfortable with it. While Western Europe is also concerned about escalation control, it sees the best deterrence to be the threat of strategic retaliation against the USSR. And so, within the Western alliance there are different opinions between the United States and its European allies on nuclear strategy and how best to defend Western Europe. These opinions, however, have generally been kept below the political surface. There has been encouragement for negotiations to reduce arms and, thereby, reduce tension and, hopefully, the probability that NATO would be confronted with a decision on nuclear escalation.

The existence of different interpretations of the Soviet threat, deterrence, the efficacy of detente, and other difficult issues within NATO should not lead one to conclude that the United States and its allies do not retain powerful cultural and economic bonds and share mutual interests in the perpetuation of a Western community.
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies an all too recent and vivid recollection of the horrors of war, a desire to limit financial costs of defense, and attempts to bring some calculability to their respective force planning efforts to hedge against one side's technical breakthrough as well as reduce perceived weaknesses that could trigger nuclear conflict. Also, the strength of nuclear-freeze and peace movements in the United States, Western Europe, and increasingly in Eastern Europe as well as European interests in continuing to enjoy the economic, cultural and social fruits of detente, make the control and limitation of European armaments, particularly nuclear systems, quite an attractive goal for all parties.

**Force Asymmetries.** From the Western perspective, the first and, perhaps, overriding factor encouraging the pursuit of arms negotiations has been the perception of most Western defense planners of a persistent and potentially destabilizing imbalance of forces in Europe. Since the early days of the Atlantic alliance, Western defense planners have struggled with attempts to offset what they saw as a preponderance of Soviet conventional forces on the continent of Europe. This was accomplished first through a reliance on the clearly superior US strategic arsenal and later through a reliance on Western superiority of theater nuclear forces. These forces were not only capable of destroying Soviet conventional military formations, but also posed a threat of escalation to a still somewhat superior US strategic force. The advent of strategic parity and the continued growth of Soviet theater nuclear capabilities, however, has altered the deterrent equation and heightened concern over the stability of the current balance of forces in Europe should a serious crisis occur. As a result, the West has sought through arms control negotiations to reduce the Warsaw Pact advantage in conventional forces as well as prevent a further shift in the balance of theater nuclear and strategic forces.

**Defense Costs.** Another factor encouraging arms control in Europe is the cost of defense. Generally, Europeans as well as Americans have been loath to spend large sums of money on defense. In fact, it could be argued that the prime reason for the long-standing imbalance of conventional forces has been the cost associated with any real attempt at matching those of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact. In the immediate post-World War II era, the demands of recovery and reconstruction seemed to preclude the
kinds of expenditures demanded by the Lisbon decision of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952, i.e., to improve NATO conventional capability significantly. Nuclear weapons seemed to offer "more bang for the buck" and, thus, appeared to provide a cost-effective deterrent at a time when Europe was hard pressed to expand economically.¹⁷

By the early 1960's, however, Soviet advances in medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (MRBM/IRBM/ICBM) seemed to presage an era of declining US nuclear superiority. In Washington, recognition of an impending nuclear parity was marked by a reemphasis on the need to shore-up NATO conventional defenses. The doctrine which issued from a number of studies and pronouncements during the Kennedy Administration became known as the doctrine of flexible response. While this doctrine was designed to contain a conflict at the lowest possible level, it nevertheless became a euphemism for conventional improvements.

European reaction to this new doctrine was mixed. A number of Europeans were concerned that the new doctrine might be the first step of a subtle US attempt to reduce the risk of involving the American mainland to the devastation that might accompany a full-scale nuclear war in defense of Europe, i.e., a decoupling of US strategic interest from those of its European allies. Most Europeans, however, as Raymond Aaron has noted, were "spontaneously hostile" for economic reasons to increases in the size of the NATO conventional forces.¹⁸

Thus, while NATO formally accepted the new doctrine, Europeans continued to oppose, as they had in the past, efforts designed to produce conventional forces to match those of the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, even in the United States the cost of European defense remained an issue and was a driving force behind the Mansfield "Sense-of-the-Senate" Resolution in 1971 to reduce US forces in Europe.¹⁹

By the early to mid-1970's, with the clear emergence of parity at the strategic level and an impending theater nuclear parity, European and American defense establishments, once again, began to focus on ways of improving the NATO conventional defenses.²⁰ To many Western defense specialists the absence of an adequate conventional defense in an age of strategic and theater parity appeared to leave NATO without a credible deterrent to
conventional attack. Nevertheless, the crisis in energy and national economics along with the multiple demands of competing domestic sectors of European as well as the American economies constrained the growth of Western conventional and nuclear forces and continued to add impetus to efforts to achieve a balance of military capabilities in Europe.

Unlike democratic societies which do not always have the option, totalitarian societies will make whatever sacrifice they can to provide themselves with defense forces of their choosing. Even so, the huge cost of defense, undoubtedly, has had an effect on the Soviet Union. Moscow spends a considerably greater percentage of its Gross National Product (GNP) on defense than does the United States or its European allies. Ascertaining the weight of defense as a component of Soviet GNP is one of the more difficult tasks in any study of the Soviet Union. The Soviet defense budget is not open for inspection as is that of the United States. The declared defense budget, which in 1981 amounted to 17.05 billion rubles or only about 2.8 percent of the Soviet GNP, is thought to exclude a number of elements such as military research and development, stockpiling, and civil defense. Indeed, some analysts contend that the declared budget covers only the operating and military construction costs of the armed forces.* Most Western estimates fix Soviet expenditures on defense over the past decade at between 10 and 15 percent of their GNP.

In addition to such large financial outlays for defense, the Soviet Union channels a large portion of its skilled manpower into defense and defense-related industries. This channeling of trained manpower to the arms effort has tended to restrain civil-oriented technological progress and, in general, inhibit economic growth.

In 1964, Nikita Khrushchev pointed explicitly to the adverse impact of military expenditures on the Soviet economy. Writing in Kommunist he said:

> Deificed to support the defense might of the USSR at the present-day modern, to the well-being of the people. With all straightforwardness itenders it. Rockets and cannons—these are not meat, not bread, and not Kasha. If it were not necessary to strengthen the might of the Soviet armed forces, we could show higher living standards of our people.

Other Soviet leaders, including Leonid Brezhnev, have lamented the conflicting demands between the military and consumer parts
In recent years, the rate of growth of the Soviet GNP has declined. In the 1970's, it averaged about 4 percent; in 1981, it dipped below 2 percent. Sensitive to the glowing prospects for renewed economic growth and capital separation, the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, has emphasized the need for improving the Soviet economy. Thus, the constant tug-of-war between defense needs and economic development and expansion, although not as apparent in a totalitarian society as in a democracy, has probably impelled and continues to impel Soviet leadership in the direction of detente and arms control in Europe. Moreover, the Soviet Bloc's prospects for attaining required Western credit, trade, and technology to increase the pace of their economic development is well served by a reduction in tensions brought about through detente and arms control.

Detente. The slow move toward detente, or peaceful coexistence as it has been called by Soviet leaders, began sometime in the mid to late 1950's. An increasing concern over the potential catastrophic consequences and risk of nuclear war gave rise to efforts to reduce tensions between East and West and to bring stability to an otherwise potentially unstable nuclear environment. By the mid-1950's, Secretary Khrushchev had become increasingly uncertain over the potential utility of weapons of mass destruction as instruments in the class struggle. While the Lenin doctrine espoused the inevitability of war between rival factions, the possibility of mutual devastation from a nuclear conflict caused Khrushchev to modify this doctrine at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 where he advocated the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Likewise, concerns over the potential impact of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union were being voiced in the United States as well as in Europe. These concerns came to a focus during the Kennedy Administration as it fought to shift away from the nuclear strategy of massive retaliation to what was thought to be a more balanced strategy that emphasized a graduated response which, at least in theory, would raise the nuclear threshold. By 1963, the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed to establish a "hot line" between the two capitals to assure quick and reliable communication directly between the heads of state to reduce the danger of an accident or miscalculation triggering a nuclear war.
Over the next decade, the United States and the Soviet Union were signatories to a host of agreements designed to defuse crises and moderate the arms race.

Prior to 1969, the Christian Democrats who governed West Germany had maintained a confrontational approach toward the East. The Social Democrats who came to power under Willie Brandt in 1969 believed that the old approach had gained them very little, particularly with regard to some sort of reconciliation with East Germany, and so Willy Brandt, the new Chancellor, initiated Ostpolitik (or his opening toward the East). The limitation of arms in Central Europe fitted well into this concept. Arms control would contribute to the lessening of tension, thereby enhancing detente.

Today, the continued desire to avoid an increase in tensions or a return to the cold war helps fuel the drive for arms control negotiations which are seen as a way of sustaining detente. This is particularly true in Western Europe. Western Europeans recognize the Soviet military threat, of course, but they must live within the shadow of the threat and, therefore, perceive a need for political reconciliation—a need for focusing on ways and means of alleviating the consequences of the division of Europe as well as the potential consequences of another war. Thus, they see arms control and detente as a political venture to achieve political objectives.

Many in the United States view arms control in more military and technical terms. They see arms limitations as a means of reducing the risks caused by the technical capabilities of the weapons themselves and seek ironclad verification procedures to ensure that the lowest possible risk is achieved. They do not see arms control as an element embedded in a larger political strategy to the extent that many Western Europeans do. Nevertheless, even in the United States, the desire in a number of quarters to continue Soviet-American cooperative efforts to increase stability in the nuclear age, albeit under a superpower relationship amended by the realism of Afghanistan, Poland, and what many consider an unrelenting Soviet drive for military superiority, has sustained interest in arms control negotiations.

The Soviet Union, since Khrushchev's open gambit on peaceful coexistence, also has been moved to the arms control conference table. While Soviet strategy and, thus, motives may be questioned, they frequently have expressed their concern publicly over crisis stability and on the potential adverse effects of the arms race.
The Peace Movement. Both Western and Eastern Europe as well as the United States have seen the rise of peace movements. They have become a common factor on the political landscapes of most Western European states since World War II. In recent years, however, they have grown in size and significance. As Western Europeans have become increasingly concerned about the continued growth of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers and their deployment of nuclear weapons in Eastern and Western Europe, there has been a corresponding growth in the size of the peace movement. Today, in Western Europe and in the United States, citizens concerned over what they perceive to be a growing potential for nuclear war have become active participants in national debates over arms and arms control and have become, in some instances, a major force impelling governments to pursue arms control as an alternative to weapons deployments and as part of a broader, national security strategy.

Even the governments of Eastern Europe have not gone untouched by efforts of private citizens to affect the direction of government in the nuclear age. In 1982, evidence of a peace movement in Eastern Europe began to surface. A handful of independent peace activists has been known to exist in Hungary and the USSR for some time. What has been surprising, has been the peace movement in East Germany—one of the most rigid and outwardly loyal of the Soviet satellites. The church is also involved, but the movement seems to extend beyond the church. Groups as large as 3,000 and 5,000 people have gathered at times to protest armaments buildup. An estimated several hundred East German youths are serving jail terms for refusing to serve in the armed forces. In a closed society, it is impossible to calculate what percentage of the population supports such a movement. Nevertheless, there is an apparent public pressure in the East as well as the West for arms control.

IMPEDEMENTS TO ARMS CONTROL

While a number of factors impel both East and West toward arms control negotiations and suggest some promise for achieving agreements to limit arms in Europe, the negotiations themselves are hampered by a host of impediments.

Trust. The common denominator of arms control agreements is trust. In spite of the fact that, in theory, it can be argued that both
sides stand to gain through effective arms limitations, each side fears that the other may attempt to achieve unilateral advantage and undermine the arms control efforts. Such fears are inherent in a nation-state system where each sovereign state ultimately is responsible for its own security and where history stands as evidence that increments to the security of a state are often realized at the expense of others. Concern over the motives of others at the negotiating table is further compounded by the differing historical experiences, perceptions, and capabilities each side brings to the negotiating table as well as an inclination not to divulge, for security reasons, any more information than is necessary to further one's own negotiating objectives.

In the absence of trust, states have sought to establish, during the course of negotiations, those procedures necessary to verify treaty compliance. However, verification is only a weak sister of mutual trust. Even in the presence of procedures which might provide an unambiguous verification capability (and none apparently have been devised), lack of trust can still undermine the basis for an agreement even after it has been reached—which was, in part, the case with SALT II—or to undermine the process before an agreement can be reached—which may now be the case with the current strategic arms reduction talks (START) or the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Comparability of Forces. The attainment or maintenance of parity has been the primary motive behind the West's arms control negotiations of the last two and one-half decades. The West generally has seen parity as a key to stability. While Soviet leaders apparently accept parity as a negotiating objective, it is not clear to US leaders and analysts just what the concept of parity really means to Soviet leaders and analysts. However, even if one assumes the Soviet Union and their East European allies are seeking a true balance of capabilities with the West, agreement among negotiating parties on what constitutes a parity of forces with weapons and force structures that differ in fundamental ways can be a major obstacle to successful negotiations.

The SALT I interim treaty on offensive weapons resulted in Soviet superiority in numbers of ICBM launchers in exchange for a lesser number of launchers but more warheads for the United States, whose systems were considered to be of a superior quality (partially the result of an advantage in multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles [MIRV] and improved guidance...
technologies). The United States learned immediately after SALT I of a problem in trading quantity for quality. By permitting unequal quantitative aggregates, without a corresponding restraint on qualitative improvements, the Soviet Union was free to improve its systems, add warheads with MIRV to their missiles, and thus quickly alter the perceived strategic balance within the parameters achieved through negotiation.

At the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna, it took three years of negotiating before the East finally agreed to the principle of conventional force parity. While the West's concern all along was parity of ground forces in Central Europe, the East took the position that the forces considered should include nuclear forces and other US forward based systems (FBS). Again, the problem of attempting to compare dissimilar forces impeded progress in achieving a negotiated arms control agreement. Likewise, French forces were of concern to the East. The West, despite continued French opposition, agreed to make allowances for French forces in Germany in any reduction agreement. France, however, was not an MBFR participant nor are French forces a part of NATO's integrated military commands. Therefore, it was generally agreed that French forces in France would not be a part of any parity agreement. It is true that for their part, Soviet leaders had evaded having their forces in Hungary and the indigenous Hungarian forces included. Since the Soviet Union believes it needs forces positioned in Central Europe to maintain order in the bloc, it is likely that Soviet leaders considered the overall weight in numbers not as great as it appeared on the surface to Western observers. The East also has been concerned over the quickly mobilizable West German Territorial Army reserves which have not been included in the forces count. There is a total in all services of 750,000 troops, about 600,000 of which are presumed to be Army. For the West, one of the greatest difficulties to overcome in attempting to ensure a comparability of forces in Europe after a negotiated settlement was the result of geographical realities. US forces would have to pull back some 10,000 km across an ocean, whereas reduced Soviet forces would only have to pull back 1,000 km across land. Such differences have made it impossible to agree on what would constitute parity. Yet, such issues cannot be ignored.
Data Base. The data base is inextricably linked to estimates of parity. Even if the difficult questions pertaining to force mission and comparability can be reconciled, there is no basis for discussing tradeoffs—which are the heart and soul of negotiated attempts to achieve an acceptable balance of forces—without a mutually acceptable data base. While the data base has never been a major issue in SALT, it has virtually dominated MBFR. Not only has the type of forces to be counted been an issue, but also the issue has been the number of troops in place—troops being the one type of force both sides could agree to count. For the first three years of MBFR, the East would not reveal the number of troops it has in Central Europe. Finally, in mid-1976, it presented a figure. While the East agreed with the West’s data on western forces, the West felt that the East’s data on eastern forces fell short by about 150,000 troops. Whether or not the East is deliberately trying to deceive, one cannot say. Nevertheless, it remains certain that a mutually acceptable data base is essential as a point of departure if negotiations are to be successful. Unfortunately, it is more difficult, although not impossible, to get a fairly close count of troops and divide their missions than it is ICBMs, bombers, or submarines.

The INF negotiations offer a potential for similar problems over data base. At the present time the problem at INF talks has been more over what to count than the numbers of systems in each of these categories. However, if nuclear capable tactical aircraft are ultimately included, one can be sure there will be serious disagreements over what constitutes a nuclear capable aircraft.

Verification. Verification clearly has been a major issue in the West. In both the SALT I and II agreements, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to rely on the national technical means (NTM) of verification at their disposal to assure treaty compliance. They also agreed not to interfere with each other’s NTM. In the provisions of SALT II, though unratified by the US Senate but generally observed by the superpowers, they went even further and agreed to prohibit deliberate concealment measures which might impede verification by NTM of the provisions of the agreement.

As long as agreements focus on missile launchers in sites, surface launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and bombers, verification of compliance with limitations on strategic systems can be reasonably
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<td>reduced foreign (US, USSR) troops returned to homeland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reduced indigenous forces must be disbanded</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>In return for reduction of 68,000 mm Soviet tank army and the acceptance of collective ceilings on each bloc's force levels (i.e., no demand for specific European sub-ceilings), the West offered to include some PDR in their withdrawals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,000 tactical nuclear warheads</td>
<td>Western goal was to get East to accept principle of asymmetric reductions. According to West, the number of Pact forces was 965,000 rather than East's 805,000 figure.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>54 nuclear capable F-4 aircraft</td>
<td>Western proposal came to be known as OPTION III.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Pershing I and Scud B missiles</td>
<td>300 tanks were 4% of NATO's tank strength and 15% of US tank strength but only 3% of Soviet tank strength. This reduction would increase Pact advantage in this crucial weapon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI: 1978 reduction by all parties to equal 15%</td>
<td>Pact continued to insist on national sub-ceilings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>700,000 troops on each side should be final force levels.</td>
<td>Soviet reductions demanded by NATO did not have to be an integrated tank array.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO would agree to some specificity on national sub-ceilings if Pact would agree to 700,000 man ceilings</td>
<td>Soviets dropped rigid sub-ceilings requirement and seemed to accept West concepts of unequal reductions (i.e., Soviet armor for US nuclear assets).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>XI: Further reductions by each bloc to 700,000 men.</td>
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5 October 1979
- Unilateral Soviet withdrawal of 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks from DDR.

December 1979
- 2 Stage Reduction Plan
  I: 13,000 US/30,000 Soviet troops reduced after both sides agreed on a mutually verifiable data base and on instituted confidence building/associated measures such as those accepted in 1975 in Helsinki (e.g., notification of troop movements).
  II: Specific Western European reductions.
- US announced withdrawal of 1,000 of 7,000 US tactical nuclear weapons but dropped other PBS elements of Option III.

July 1980
- 13,000 US troops
- 20,000 Soviet troops (in addition to 20,000 already withdrawn from DDR).
- No country can comprise more than 50% of alliance’s ground forces.

July 1983, PBS Proposal
- 4 Stage Reductions Over 7 years:
  - Withdrawal of 13,000 US/30,000 USSR troops to their respective homelands.
  - Each phase is to be fully verified on basis of agreed data before start of next phase.
  - Eventual collective ceilings for each bloc of 900,000 forces (700,000 of which are ground troops).
  - "Associated Measures" must be included in agreement.

February 1981
- Soviet proposal recapitulated proposals of last 9 years.

February 1983
- Withdrawal of 13,000/20,000 troops to respective homelands.
- Pact suggested 900,000 ceiling be reached without further debate on current numbers.

18 February 1983
- Soviets agree on effective ceiling of 900,000/700,000 forces as proposed by NATO.
- Small difference between US and USSR reductions as proposed by Soviet Union implies force symmetries are not as great as NATO contends.
- Soviets still refuse to offer a means of verifying pull-out of their forces.

SUMMARY OF PBS PROPOSALS, 1973 - 1983
assured through NTM. Agreements which focus on mobile launchers, missiles instead of launchers, or on size of warheads or throw-weight are likely to complicate seriously the verification problem since VTM are not likely to be effective in determining such less easily identified factors. Moreover, the US problem of determining whether the Soviet Union is complying with agreed missile and warhead limits will be compounded if the Soviet military continues to encode its telemetry during missile tests, as it has been in recent years. This is a treaty violation about which the United States has not always protested since it might reveal US intelligence gathering capabilities.

The problem of verification is likely to be even more complex once one moves away from the strategic level. For instance, it may be difficult to determine if a cruise missile has a nuclear or conventional warhead; or whether certain tactical aircraft are capable of nuclear missions; or since range is a function of payload, whether a certain class of cruise missiles is exceeding the agreed range limitations. INF talks can easily become bogged down over these issues. Likewise, verification at MBFR talks poses formidable problems. Determining gross manpower levels or explicit or implied ceilings on other conventional forces would be difficult at best. John Keliher has noted MBFR verification is a three-tier challenge. First, each side must determine that the agreed upon reductions have taken place. Second, the West must be able to identify promptly any massive reintroduction of Soviet forces and/or a mobilization of East European forces. Finally, and perhaps the most difficult problem, the West must be able to monitor small changes of forces which over time might lead incrementally to an alteration of the agreed upon balance. To such ends, the West has proposed, as part of the MBFR "associated measures," a periodic exchange of data and information on the forces in the area after the treaty becomes effective, ground inspections, and declared MBFR entry and exit points at which each party has the right to place inspectors.

The East apparently considers such measures as too intrusive and refuses to agree to them. The Soviet passion for secrecy is well known, and so their aversion to the type of verification the West believes it must have may well be genuine. They also understand the advantages a closed society has in competing with an open society for information. Without the means which the West is insisting,
verification of an MBFR treaty will be much more difficult for the West than the East. The East can complement its NTM with a full array of information from the West's comprehensive public debates on military plans and weapons and from an abundance of published western documents. The West, on the other hand, can only guess at missions of weapons systems it observes through NTM and make only tentative estimates of ranges and payloads of missiles. Another advantage the East has is that the West is virtually proscribed from cheating by an active and alert media and ever watchful political opposition parties.

Under such circumstances, the East's position on verification measures is not surprising. Nevertheless, from a Western perspective, effective verification remains the *sine qua non* for arms control. As Edward Luttwak has noted, arms control without a high confidence of verification is a contradiction of terms. In the absence of adequate verificaton procedures, arms control may increase rather than reduce incentives for force building and the risk of conflict."

**Technological Improvements.** Technological improvements impinge on both the parity and verification issues. First, during arms control negotiations, how does one compensate for current disparities in the levels of technology of the forces considered? Second, how does one verify changes in technological capabilities after the conclusion of an agreement? Finally, how does one compensate for technological change?

There is also a psychological dimension to the problem of technology which undoubtedly affects the way the Soviet leaders think about arms control. Despite recent Soviet advances in technology, the Soviet Union harbors a long-standing fear of Western technological achievements and remains concerned over the capacity of the West, through rapid technological advance, to alter suddenly the balance of power. From the Soviet perspective, almost every innovation in the technology race has been Western. For example, the West has been first to have: U-2 spy planes, spy satellites, nuclear submarines, missile-launching submarines, a man on the moon, the space shuttle, cruise missiles, computer technology, stealth technology, MIRV, and so on. There are good reasons to believe the Soviet leaders are seriously concerned about the technologies associated with the MX and the cruise missiles, Pershing II, and Trident, modern US tactical fighters, and other
US advances and their consequent impact on the future balance of power. For example, during the 1982 war in Lebanon, the US-supplied Israeli Air Force shot the Soviet-supplied Syrian Air Force out of the sky while successfully avoiding Soviet built antiaircraft missiles. While the Syrians were not equipped with the most advanced Soviet equipment and the ability of the Syrians to employ efficiently their weapons may be called into question, such encounters are likely to increase Soviet uncertainty about the potential impact of what they see as a clear Western edge in technology.

**Stability.** The desire for stability may draw both East and West to the conference table, each side seeking to attain or retain a stable balance of forces and, thus, gain or maintain a position of relative security. Agreeing on what balance of forces and weapons systems will result in a stable environment, however, is not an easy task. Two aspects of stability have been of primary concern among Western elites. First, during noncrisis situations, the balance of forces is such that neither side is driven to major arms acquisitions which may ultimately result in a spiraling arms race. Second, during a crisis, the balance of forces is dynamically stabilizing; that is, no incentives exist which would encourage the preemptive use of force or a mobilization of forces which could result in a military confrontation. Rather, positive incentives exist for parties to the crisis to reduce tensions.

From a Western perspective, the current asymmetry of ground forces in Central Europe has long been a destabilizing force. Moreover, a number of Western defense analysts now consider the Soviet theater nuclear buildup as potentially destabilizing. Both the long-standing imbalance of conventional forces and the growing imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union at the theater nuclear level have sparked incentives for a Western arms buildup in reply to reduce the number of potential advantages in peacetime as well as during crises that Soviet leaders may believe are exploitable.

Notwithstanding, the East contends that an overall balance exists. As a minimum, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states apparently are relatively secure with the current balance and are loathe to alter it in any clearly asymmetrical way. Thus, while the West has sought greater reductions in the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact than those of NATO and the United States seeks to reduce both the US and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear
forces to zero, Soviet leaders have generally preferred equal reductions which affect all the forces of both alliances. Moreover, while the ever increasing power of forces in the East seems destabilizing to the West, the threat of ever expanding and improving Western technology may seem destabilizing to the East. "O wad some power the giftie gie us, To see oursel's as ethers see us." If opposing sides could, they might be able to agree on what constitutes stability.

Consensus Achievement. The European arms control negotiating process is complex. It is dealing with an array of different types of force systems—both conventional and nuclear. It must wrestle with force levels and deployment patterns, with the asymmetries in force structures, and with diverging military missions and options. It is a multilateral process in which many countries are involved, creating a requirement for continuous consultation, at least on the NATO side (not a great deal is known about what goes on inside the WP). The interests of the various parties within and between the states involved are multifaceted and frequently divergent and stakes and risks are often too high for bold initiatives or clever proposals to emerge. As a result, initiatives as well as agreements in many instances reflect the lowest common denominator.

Linkage. Perhaps some of the more perplexing problems confronting those who have sought to pursue arms control efforts over the last few years has been the problem of linkage. Linkage refers to the deliberate or nondeliberate linking of events outside of the arms control arena to efforts of arms control. It is a psychological phenomenon, especially in democracies where the consent of the governed is an important part of the political process, as much as it is an act of deliberate political choice. As a psychological phenomenon, it is linked to trust and involves calculations about the intentions of the other party and about the relative merits of proceeding with arms control efforts. Thus, for example, whatever merits of the SALT II treaty, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it was unlikely that the treaty would have received the necessary support in the US Senate for ratification. Likewise, Soviet actions in Poland, Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere have complicated efforts to move toward negotiations on arms control issues in Europe. On the question of linkage, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig noted:
... we seek arms control bearing in mind the whole context of Soviet conduct worldwide.

Such 'linkage' is not a creation of US policy; it is a fact of life. A policy of pretending that there is no linkage promotes reverse leverage. It ends up by saying that in order to preserve arms control, we have to tolerate Soviet aggression."

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was not an arms control conference in the specific sense of the word, in that it did not address a particular weapon system or type of weapon. Nevertheless, to understand European arms control efforts and negotiations, one must have an appreciation of CSCE, how it came about, and what it has accomplished. CSCE can be seen as a treaty settlement of outstanding European issues unresolved since World War II. Rather than focusing on specific weapons' systems, the idea was to create an atmosphere conducive to the resolution of specific issues separating East from West. In a sense, it was a broad umbrella under which assurances given would allow concerned parties to later address particular cases.

Motives. For reasons explained here, the Soviet leadership was the driving force behind CSCE. The vulnerability of European Russia to invading armies is a security concern that has occupied every Russian ruler since the earliest days of the Kievan and Muscovy city-states. The importance of the lands adjacent to Soviet territory as jumping off points for brutal invasions have been lost neither to the Csars or Commissars. As a result, rebellions in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968) against Soviet occupation; the rearmament of West Germany and entry into NATO in 1955; and continued Western rhetoric during the 1950's promising to roll back Soviet influence from Eastern Europe produced what appeared to be genuine fears among Soviet leaders and national security analysts. Although failure by the West to aid the Hungarian and Czech bids for freedom proved that Western rhetoric had been hollow, the prospects for continued unrest in Eastern Europe and the potential for Western interference caused the Soviet leaders to push for Western recognition of a divided Germany and a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, without which "fraternal assistance," à la the Brezhnev Doctrine, could be interpreted as aggression. The
Soviet leaders had justified their intervention in Czechoslovakia as a "socialist duty." They claimed they had a legal right to intervene based on ideology. That was essentially what the Brezhnev Doctrine was all about. While recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence was the political impetus behind CSCE, there were military considerations as well. Warsaw Pact mobilization under the auspices of the Brezhnev Doctrine could be misinterpreted by NATO and viewed as a threat to Western Europe. While the West might disapprove of such mobilization, the mobilization would stand less of a chance of being misinterpreted if the West had acquiesced to the Brezhnev Doctrine by agreeing to spheres of influence.

The Soviet leaders, however, had other concerns. A primary one was the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations which culminated in the 1969 clash along the border on the Ussuri River. This raised the spectre of having to support two widely dispersed armies. Their push for CSCE was an attempt to bring more equanimity to the situation in the West, so they could direct their attention to the East.

Another Soviet concern was the West German Army, the Bundeswehr. During the 1950's, the Soviet-led East proposed a series of European arms control packages, which were designed to forestall the rearmament of West Germany and obtain Western recognition of the division of Germany. The West refused to give serious attention to the proposals, and in 1955, West Germany joined NATO. Even with this, the East did not give up hopes of bringing about some sort of neutralized Germany. However, by the mid-1960's, Soviet leaders had to face up to the fact that they had failed to curb the development of the Bundeswehr. Without a World War II peace treaty, without formal recognition of the international boundaries in Central Europe, and without formal recognition of the two Germanies, the Bundeswehr stood as an instrument for turning back the clock 25 years. This, to the Soviet leaders and analysts, created a destabilizing situation.

The United States and Western Europe were also concerned about stability in Central Europe, but they viewed the problem from a different perspective than did the Soviet Union. The West's greatest concern was the continuing expansion and modernization of the Soviet forces. By 1968, both blocs had proposed conferences to negotiate stability in Central Europe. However, the respective
proposals reflected different points of view. The East discussed security from the standpoint of recognition of the status quo and the West discussed it from the standpoint of force reductions. This disjointed dialogue continued for several years. The East wanted a politically oriented conference that would settle the issues left unresolved in the absence of a peace treaty. The West wanted a conference that dealt with the technical aspects of arms reductions. Neither side was initially interested in the other's pursuit. NATO, however, finally recognized some merit in the East's proposal in that a stable situation could not exist in Europe without a solution to the German question. NATO recognized that a lack of stability and uncertainty brought about by the irresolution of this problem precluded a balanced reduction of opposing military forces. Some Western states saw CSCE as supporting detente. And while it might give some recognition to the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe, that situation was in any event a fait accompli which, as demonstrated as recently as 1968 in Czechoslovakia, was not about to be unsettled by active Western intervention. So recognition of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe might not be all that important if the West could get something in exchange. But an enhancement of detente was not the primary reason the West agreed to CSCE. The West wanted MBFR and an agreement on access routes to Berlin. That would be the quid pro quo for CSCE. Initially, Soviet leaders showed no interest in a conference on arms reduction, because presumably they judged the weaker West would attempt to negotiate for parity. After the intervention in Czechoslovakia and its staining of detente, Soviet leaders apparently came to realize that if they were to get the West to agree to a security conference, the Soviet Union would have to agree to force reduction negotiations and make concessions on the Berlin access question.

In 1970, however, it appeared that the Soviet leaders would get much of what they wanted from CSCE without a conference. Under his policy of Ostpolitik, Willy Brandt concluded two treaties with the East. On August 12, West Germany signed a treaty with the USSR recognizing the frontiers of all states in Europe as being inviolable including the Oder-Neisse line between East Germany and Poland and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. On November 18, West Germany signed a treaty with Poland recognizing the Oder-Neisse line. This whole process added up to nothing less than de facto recognition by all parties that the Federal Republic was the
real Germany—which meant that East Germany was separated from West Germany;" a realization that may have caused the West German Parliament’s delay in ratification. These treaties were not ratified until May 1972. On June 3, the USSR signed the Four Power Agreement on Berlin which had been negotiated in September 1971. The USSR had withheld its signature until the 1970 treaties had been ratified. It should be noted that a third treaty was signed between East and West Germany on December 21, 1972, formally confirming the existence of two German states—the FRG formulation was two states, one nation.) Through one concession on the Berlin access routes, the Soviet leaders had already gained much of what they wanted from a security conference. Why then would they continue to push for CSCE? One typically Western view was that they wanted a broader spectrum of recognition of their hegemony over Eastern Europe than the German treaties gave them. As a result they ultimately agreed to the MBFR talks in exchange for CSCE.

The Conference. CSCE opened in Helsinki on July 3, 1973, continued in Geneva from September 18, 1973, to July 21, 1975, and was concluded in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. The declaration signed in Helsinki was divided into categories called baskets. These are summarized as follows:

- Basket 1 called for refraining from use of force, plus respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of existing borders and advance notice of military maneuvers.
- Basket 2 expressed the resolve to expand cooperation in trade, industry, scientific and technological areas and environmental problems, and in promotion of tourism.
- Basket 3 emphasized "free movement and contacts, individually and collectively," between countries, including help in uniting families, nonhinderance to marriages between citizens of different countries, wider dissemination of printed, filmed and broadcast information, and acceleration of cultural and educational experience exchanges. (This is the human rights basket which has been an issue between East and West ever since Helsinki.)
- Basket 4 provided for follow-up measures to check on how agreements negotiated are being carried out.

The provisions of the Helsinki final act have important implications for European arms control. The confidence-building
measures (CBM) of Basket I relate most directly. There was an agreement that notification would be given 21 days in advance of maneuvers exceeding 25,000 troops. Prior notification of smaller maneuvers and of major military movements and the exchange of observers for maneuvers were encouraged. Thus, CSCE recognized the threat posed by opposing forces and the need for precluding misunderstanding regarding their dispositions.

The follow-up measures provided for by Basket 4 have resulted in two subsequent conferences, one in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978, and one in Madrid, which began in October 1980. There was disappointment on the part of many of the Western states with the meager results of the Belgrade Conference. This has made security issues loom larger for Madrid, where expanding the CBM in the Helsinki final act was to be a primary objective. However, the air in Madrid has been so heated from recriminations over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and martial law in Poland that little of a substantive nature has been accomplished.

The Contributions of CSCE. What has CSCE contributed to arms control? As has been pointed out, it was a major factor in getting MBFR started. It established CBM which, as we have already seen, is an issue in MBFR. In MBFR, the West considers CBM as part and parcel of any arms reduction agreements. In his January 1980 testimony to the US Congress, Matthew Nimetz, State Department Counselor, stated that “in the area of security... CSCE has established a means of creating a regime of confidence-building measures which has the long-term potential for enhancing warning time of a surprise attack...” Mr. Nimetz may have overstated the case. However, a concept had been agreed upon that could be important in reading subsequent agreements to any freezing or reducing of arms. It had the implication of eventually being extended to MBFR and expanded to include verification.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS (MBFR)

The previous section described how the MBFR talks were linked to the motives and strategies pursued by each bloc in the CSCE negotiations. However, the MBFR agenda, which focuses specifically upon the number of troops and conventional weapons systems in Central Europe, is much more complex than that considered in CSCE. Whereas, CSCE was concerned largely with
principles and political stability to which all can agree in theory, the focus of MBFR has been quantitative, and agreement becomes largely a matter of definition and accounting. Since the forces of East and West emphasize and perform different missions, the establishment of mutually acceptable balance has proven elusive.

Motives. Many of the motives underlying the CSCE negotiating objectives of the East and West exist in MBFR as well. Both sides appear to be dedicated to the moderation of what they see as a potentially dangerous situation, and of the relaxation of East-West tension which could foster the expansion of economic and cultural ties between blocs. In MBFR, both see an opportunity for a reduction of manpower and economic national defense burdens at a time of declining numbers of 17-19 year old youth in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe. Increased demands for consumer spending in both blocs and opposition by increasingly vocal peace movements to military expenditures, particularly in the West, also create pressures for MBFR. Within the East, desires to achieve troop reductions are heightened by general economic malaise.

In MBFR, the West has sought to reduce the asymmetry of conventional forces which favors the Warsaw Pact. These NATO efforts became particularly pronounced in the middle of the last decade with the disappearance of the West’s tactical and theatre nuclear superiority. In spite of this conventional asymmetry, there was a threat of a unilateral withdrawal of US ground forces from Europe, the fear of which may have been the driving force behind the initiation of MBFR. The West saw a need to use these forces as a bargaining chip, therefore unilateral force reductions (UFR) would have removed Soviet incentives to negotiate. The Allies also feared a US withdrawal would be perceived by the East as a reduction of the US commitment to Europe and thereby cause a destabilizing effect on the West’s deterrence. There are opinions that the Mansfield “Sense of the Senate” resolution in 1971 on unilateral US troop reductions in Europe may have also pushed the Soviet Union into agreeing to MBFR. Soviet leadership may have concluded that a unilateral US withdrawal might result in stepped up efforts for Western European political unity and common defense. They may have also feared it would cause Western Europe to assume a more militaristic posture. It is doubtful that the Soviet leaders wanted US withdrawal without constraints on West
This may be one reason why the Soviet Union was willing to enter MBFR even after the Ostpolitik treaties with West Germany had given the East much of what it wanted from CSCE.

**Issues and Prospects.** MBFR talks have been in progress since 1973. In spite of numerous proposals and counterproposals by both sides (see chart), the extent of agreement has been one in principle to a first phase US-USSR troop reduction followed by reduction of forces of other nations stationed in the area. There are still major areas of disagreement on both sides.

An issue of major importance to the East is the establishment of national ceilings as a means of putting a legal ceiling on the Bundeswehr. The East remains opposed to a collective ceiling within which national ceilings can fluctuate. While the West, especially the FRG does not want to give the Soviet veto power through negotiations over the size of their national forces, there has been some interest in the Eastern proposal to set limits so that no single national force will exceed 50 percent of the troops of the bloc. However, any reduction formula must be considered carefully. Reductions and limitations, particularly for the West, tend to have a finality about them that must foster a very cautious approach to ensure that security will not be jeopardized. Consider the following. The Bundeswehr constitutes the bulk of the NATO ground forces in the area, whereas the Soviet forces constitute the bulk of the Warsaw Pact. Each side views these forces on the other side as the major threat. But consider the difference in reducing these threats. A Soviet reduction constitutes a withdrawal whose troops could be reintroduced quickly from Western Soviet military districts in the event of hostilities; a Bundeswehr reduction entails deactivation of units—a considerable difference with broad security implications. Further, the withdrawal of US forces to the continental United States would reduce their utility to Europe in any scenario other than a very protracted conventional war.

While the East agreed early on to the West’s data on Western forces, Eastern data on its own forces was judged by Western intelligence to underestimate the actual force levels by about 150,000 men. This has been an intractable issue since mid-1975. While the East has agreed to a common ceiling of 700,000 ground force personnel for either side, the agreement is contingent upon the use of eastern data. Based on their data, the East rejects asymmetric
reductions of Warsaw Pact manpower of the magnitude demanded by the West. There is little indication the East will ever agree to such reductions in the future, since the West demands an Eastern reduction of a magnitude unacceptable in relation to the political and military objectives of the USSR.16

Another major issue is verification. The East's fundamental approach is to agree to limitations first and verification means later. The West's position is that it is essential to accomplish these concurrently. To the West, this is a fundamental confidence-building measure. Soon after the much publicized departure of the first of the 20,000 Soviet troops from East Germany, under the Soviet unilateral reduction announcement of October 1979, suggestions were made in the press that the USSR was filtering men back to increase the strength of Soviet units in Eastern Europe. Whether true or not, the fact is that without reliable verification means, neither side can have confidence in the others.17 National Technical Means are the only means the Soviet leaders have accepted for verification. These, however, are limited to monitoring troop movements and in determining the number of troops.

The apparent Warsaw Pact objective is to maintain its advantage in manpower and armor and to reduce and place limits on the Bundeswehr's size. Any Warsaw Pact advantage in manpower and other ground forces is clearly incompatible with the West's idea of stability in Central Europe in an age of theater and strategic nuclear parity. Some have argued, however, that given the Soviet experiences in past wars they may not consider themselves at an advantage despite the unequal manpower levels. Nevertheless, the Western approach to MBFR has sought to reduce the threat of a surprise attack from the East. This goal would be accomplished through "associated measures" which would establish specified and monitored passage points for troop exercises and movements, and through the disengagement of certain military formations (e.g., tanks) in certain areas (e.g., a specified distance from the inter-German border). The West also seeks a large reduction of Warsaw Pact forces since such a reduction would require the Pact to effect a large buildup of forces which the West could detect long before the actual attack. To date, however, the West has been unsuccessful in these initiatives because of its lack of sufficient bargaining strength. The West's principal concern is Soviet troops
and tanks. The Soviet Union, which has little reason to fear massive conventional rearmament by the NATO European allies, has little incentive to reduce its strong capabilities in the absence of an appropriate Western quid pro quo.

There is little by way of tangible results to show for the thousands of manhours and words expended in Vienna. The two sides have not been able to agree on an arms control scheme congruent with one another's political objectives and security concerns. For instance, the Soviet Union is not anxious to undertake large troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe given the volatile situation in Poland. Another contributing factor has been the heightened US distrust of Soviet intentions due to the shadow thrown over detente by Soviet strategic and conventional arms acquisition and modernization, its policies in Afghanistan, its alleged use of chemical warfare in Asia, and its increasing presence throughout the Third World. The persistence of the problems resulting in the inability of the negotiators to reach an agreement has caused critics to label the MBFR talks as failures.

While MBFR talks have not resulted in significant negotiated arms reduction, they have succeeded in preventing US unilateral reductions that would have jeopardized the solidarity and military capability of Western Europe and the stability of Central Europe. Also, the conference serves as a de facto multilateral standing consultative committee within and between alliances to exchange information and query suspicious deployments. Thus, it may have virtue in its potential to defuse destabilizing situations. The MBFR talks well may become a forum for providing reassurances about East and West force deployments in Central Europe.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES/THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES REDUCTIONS

Of the three sets of European arms control negotiations explicitly addressed in this essay, those pertaining to intermediate-range nuclear/theater nuclear forces (INF/TNF) have been the most widely debated and the most publicized. Such exposure is hardly surprising given the catastrophic consequences that would result from a nuclear war in Europe and the rapidity with which these consequences could occur.

Viewed through the prism of their mutual economic, social and political vulnerabilities which reflect their complex societies'
interdependences, the Europeans contend with genuine and understandable zeal that the distinctions between limited and total war, spasmodic and protracted war, theater and strategic war and, ultimately, winning and losing, are more apparent than real. Yet, despite the Europeans' certain abhorrence of the consequences of nuclear weapons, the NATO allies maintain that their very horror and the uncertainty attending their use are the best deterrent of war. Consequently, the Western European governments, while pursuing efforts to improve conventional defense capabilities, generally have eschewed a massive conventional rearmament and no first-use initiatives that would raise the nuclear threshold and contribute to the belief that war in Europe might remain conventional. They fear that under certain scenarios, the Soviet Union might become inclined to exploit conventional superiority to achieve certain political or economic objectives, especially if Soviet leaders thought that a war would not escalate to a nuclear exchange with the Americans and that only European territory would be destroyed. In short, many Europeans, while unhappy living in the shadow of nuclear obliteration, believe that the Soviet people harbor similar fears, and, thus, a low nuclear threshold remains the best deterrent to Armageddon. West European confidence in this proposition is supported further by their general belief that war in Europe is neither inevitable nor imminent.

The Soviet Union and their East European Pact allies part company with NATO regarding the utility of American nuclear weapons in maintaining a credible deterrent and peace in Europe. Because Soviet leaders see little difference in the effects of American missiles deployed from the continental United States or from European territory, they contend that the "theater/strategic" labels the United States uses to categorize much of its arsenal are not relevant. It is not surprising that the Warsaw Pact and the Western Europeans have named such European based systems as "gray area" or "Eurostrategic" weapons. In fact, long before the current INF/TNF debates regarding the deployment of Soviet Backfire bombers and mobile Soviet SS-20 with MIRV, and the proposed NATO deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing IIs, "gray area" aircraft and missile systems were already at the center of the East-West debate. Arguing that the NATO Forward Based Systems (FBS) such as its shorter range Pershing I missile, its nuclear capable F-4 and F-11 aircraft and its
submarine launched ballistic missiles were destabilizing and deadly additions to the US strategic arsenal in every sense except in name, the Soviet leaders attempted to incorporate these weapons first into the SALT I negotiations and later into the MBFR talks and then into SALT II. The United States refused to include these weapons in the above negotiations, however, maintaining that apart from supporting the NATO general nuclear strategy, these weapons balanced Soviet/Warsaw Pact systems such as the SU 17-20 aircraft and the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

While the goals of INF/TNF arms control are attractive, they have proven elusive. In general, the US positions are: (1) any agreement incorporate equal ceilings and be verifiable, (2) the SS-20 and Backfire systems constitute an unwarranted buildup against US FBS, designed only to counter Pact conventional superiority, (3) US dual purpose aircraft not be counted in the agreement lest the Soviet advantage in aircraft be increased further, and (4) the modernization of NATO's nuclear arsenal should proceed at the end of 1983 if progress in the US-USSR INF/TNF talks (which convene October 16, 1980 in Geneva) is not forthcoming. The Soviet Union counters that theater nuclear parity now exists and that as a result the "zero option" proposed by the United States on November 18, 1981, for attaining equal ceilings is unacceptable. It further argues that the US/NATO FBS constitute a strategic threat and, therefore, should be negotiable, as should be the 162 British and French nuclear tipped missiles. The Soviet leaders have made various offers for a moratorium on deployments, one being no additional Soviet deployments for no US deployments of the 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles. This is unacceptable to the West because it leaves the Soviet Union at an advantage in INF/TNF deployment. Soviet leaders have also made an offer to withdraw their 350 plus SS-20s east of the Ural Mountains. This, too, is unacceptable because the missiles could still hit Western Europe; could be reintroduced, because of their mobility, during a time of crisis; and, from their eastern position, would increase the threat to the Peoples Republic of China and US Asian allies.

Different definitions of security, divergent classifications of weapons, the unwillingness of each bloc to trust the other or take at face value its adversary's stated peaceful intentions, and contention within the West about the "zero option" all have mitigated against the conclusion of a successful treaty. The March 1983 election of
Chancellor Kohl and the willingness of the Reagan Administration, first expressed publicly in the Spring of 1983, to opt for a partial deployment of GLCM and Pershing II missiles in return for a partial reduction of SS-20 targeted against Europe* may be the two ingredients necessary to breathe new life into the realization of Western arms control objectives. These show greater Western European determination to support the 572 missile deployment decision and greater American flexibility to seek the middle ground. Until early 1983, the positions were reversed. The United States was determined and inflexible in its insistence upon the zero-option, while Western Europe was ambiguous in its support. As such, intra-NATO consensus and consequently, inter bloc agreement were rendered highly unlikely.

A CONCLUDING NOTE

While, in theory, an alliance’s military strategy should drive the members’ conventional and nuclear development and deployments, the casual link between strategy and forces in-being is not always so unambiguous. Current forces in-being set limits to the strategy one can pursue and the goals that can be achieved. For instance, the unwillingness of NATO to maintain conventional forces in-being to match those of the Warsaw Pact forced the former to adopt a nuclear strategy that promised early use and rapid escalation in the use of nuclear weapons in the event of conventional hostilities.

Sovereign states bring different perceptions, experiences and goals to the matters of arms control and national security. The US pursuit is to reduce risk and, it sees reduced relative quantities of forces and weapon systems as being a key to this. Its European allies, however, perceive the problem more as one of reducing tension, thereby alleviating the consequences of the division of Europe. While relative quantities of forces play a role in this, the quality of the political environment is probably more important. The Soviet perception of the Bundeswehr as a threat and the implementing of the Brezhnev Doctrine as a requirement not to impede are the forces driving the Soviet arms control negotiations. What this amounts to is that all are interested in stability, but all view it from a different background. Herein lies a major reason why the establishment of consensus within and between alliances on issues pertaining to survival, the most fundamental requirement of national policy, has been and will remain so difficult to achieve.
Another observation which can be drawn from the analysis above is that distinctions between strategic and theater nuclear systems and therefore regional and global security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are more artificial than real. Such an acknowledgment is consistent with the assertion that the world is shrinking in the economic and political senses and that the course of "Spaceship Earth" is crucial to us all. To the extent that such linkage exists in the area of arms control, it means that CSCE, MBFR, and INF/TNF are integrally linked to other regional arms control (e.g., chemical disarmament) and superpower strategic (e.g., START) efforts. Indeed, President Reagan's "Berlin initiative" of June 1982 contained linkage elements which embrace START, INF/TNF, and MBFR aspects and, as such suggests that only one East-West military balance exists. Inasmuch as such an interpretation of the nature of arms control is realistic, it does, however, complicate the procedure and potentially retards the quest for progress. It presents negotiators with more parameters than they can readily handle and impedes efforts to divide problems into subcomponents so as to deal first with those most amenable to resolution.

What can be concluded from these observations? Certainly one should not expect that the military and political issues dividing the East and West in general, and the USSR and the US in particular, will be solved easily or quickly. We have seen the thorny obstacles to man's efforts to beat his swords into plowshares and should not be surprised that these efforts, though well-intended in many instances, have not taken root. Therefore, prudent leaders are well advised to maintain credible defenses consistent with the threats to their national interests.

Nevertheless, the elusiveness of progress in arms control does not render it a goal unworthy of pursuit. In addition to the previously described motives of the superpowers and the Europeans to realize such progress, one should understand that arms control and limitations contribute elements of certainty and calculability to the strategic calculus of the players. It has been noted earlier that to retain confidence in the survivability of the MX missile in any mode will remain impossible in the absence of any constraints upon Soviet missile development and deployment." As such, arms controls is correctly viewed as the "fourth leg" of the US strategic triad and is destined to remain a future quest.
ENDNOTES


12. Winkler, p. 4.


14. In early 1952, the Allies set about the task of fashioning conventional forces to offset Soviet conventional capabilities in Central Europe. The final alliance decision announced in Lisbon in February 1952 by the North Atlantic Council set forth an ambitious set of conventional force goals for NATO. Member states agreed to contribute to the joint defense a total of 50 divisions, 40,000 aircraft, and "strong naval forces" by the end of 1952 and, provisionally, 75 divisions and 6,500 aircraft by 1953, and 96 divisions and 9,000 aircraft by the end of 1954. Despite considerable progress in improving the NATO conventional capability, however, the alliance was either unwilling or unable to meet the force goals set at Lisbon and continued to rely on the superior US strategic and theater arsenal to deter conflict in Europe. For a sampling of the European debate on defense expenditures during this period see Leon D. Epstein, *Britain - Uneasy Ally*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954, pp. 240-241; and Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, Chicago:

15. For a thorough review of some of the factors which contributed to allied uneasiness over the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe see Rober Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context" in NATO and American Security, ed. by Klaus Knorr, Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 24-29.


25. While the Soviet Union posed as a leading advocate for disarmament from 1955 to the early 1960's, some have argued that its advocacy was merely a device to manipulate world opinion. For example, see Dougherty, pp. 69-71. Others contend that today the Soviet Union is merely using arms control to divide the West.


33. Ibid., p. 24.

34. From "To A Louse," a poem by Robert Burns.

35. Winkler, pp. 2 and 8.


37. There are good background discussions on the East and West agreeing to CSCE and MBFR by Ranger, pp. 187-192; Barton, p. 178; and by Kelihers, pp. 16-33.


39. This was not the FRG's view at the time. Ospolitik was seen as a way of developing closer ties with the GDR and ultimately loosening Soviet-GDR economic ties and, over many years, political ties.


41. Kelihers, p. 145.


45. Nimetz, p. 44.

46. Brezhnev's commitment to detente with the West was a means of easing Soviet economic woes.


49. Kelihers, p. 41.


52. Ibid.


Note the Soviet leaders were arguing that parity existed even before they deployed their 350 plus SS-20 missiles.
