THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATE GOVERNMENTS: IMPROVING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS
This paper explores problems related to emergency management in the United States since the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), particularly concerning relationships between FEMA and state governments. A questionnaire concerning various facets of these relationships was forwarded to all state emergency managers. Thirty-six responses were received and evaluated, with the author then providing his conclusions and recommendations concerning the subjects covered in the questionnaire. The author then discusses the larger policy problems in emergency management, and provides his personnel broad recommendations for the
future of emergency management as a profession.
THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

MOBILIZATION STUDIES REPORT

THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY'S
RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATE GOVERNMENTS:
IMPROVING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

by

CURTIS GRIFFITH JR., LTCOL, ANG

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REQUIREMENT

RESEARCH SUPERVISOR: DR. HARRISON FOX

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Problem Statement: This paper explores problems related to emergency management in the United States since the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), particularly concerning relationships between FEMA and state governments. A questionnaire concerning various facets of these relationships was forwarded to all state emergency managers. Thirty-six responses were received and evaluated, with the author then providing his conclusions and recommendations concerning the subjects covered in the questionnaire. The author then discusses the larger policy problems in emergency management, and provides his personal broad recommendations for the future of emergency management as a profession.

Findings/Conclusions: Evaluation of responses to the questionnaire led to conclusions that relatively serious problems exist in the following areas relevant to FEMA's relationships with state governments: Emergency Response Team (ERT) plans (including the planned National Joint Public Information Center (NJPIC), security clearances, the "state" mission of the National Guard upon mobilization, terrorism and continuity of government plans, repatriation of U.S. citizens living abroad during war, assignment of National Defense Executive Reserve (NDE), emergency communications, and the competence and attitude of some FEMA officials and employees.

Recommendations: FEMA should consult and communicate with state governments more fully and freely concerning all the above topics, and take necessary steps to make state emergency managers full partners in the improvement of national emergency management preparedness.

Broader recommendations for the future of emergency management include:

1. Agreement should be reached concerning terms, definitions and organization purposes in the field of emergency management.

2. An agreed joint policy concerning coordination of public information during disaster should be developed.

3. The issues underlying terrorist and security clearance problems must be addressed - specifically the problem of deciding what sensitive federal information should be shared and when. Further, emergency managers should take pains to assure that they offer no competition in the field of law enforcement.

4. Foster concept of emergency manager as a "professional."
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper reviews briefly the recent history of emergency management in the United States, including the creation and development of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with a particular view as to how such developments have affected the states and their relationships with FEMA. (The author was formerly in charge of emergency management for the State of Ohio.)

Based upon his own experience as well as upon discussion with former colleagues who are still state emergency managers, the author developed a questionnaire touching several subject areas which have been important to some state emergency managers during the past few years, and forwarded it to all state emergency managers. Returned questionnaires seemed to confirm that most of the subjects raised in the questionnaire are still relevant, if not burning issues, among state emergency managers, and that state emergency managers seem to generally see their relationships with FEMA as somewhat troubled.

Thirty-six responses to the questionnaire were received and evaluated, with the author then providing his conclusions and recommendations concerning the specific issues raised in the questionnaire. These conclusions were:

1. State emergency managers were not adequately consulted or considered in development of FEMA's Emergency Response Team concept. Without state support, such plans will not work. Further, the National Joint Public Information Center envisioned in the plan will not work as expected.

2. The issuance of security clearances to state emergency managers and Governors is a problem. Few receive any classified information, and few have any instructions from FEMA for handling classified information.

3. Most states are not adequately prepared to handle the National Guard's "state" mission upon mobilization of the Guard.

4. Most states do not receive adequate information concerning the terrorist threat, and have inadequate plans for Continuity of Government.

5. State and local governments were not adequately consulted, and are still inadequately aware of their respective missions in the repatriation of American citizens in the event of war.

6. State officials are not adequately involved in assignment of National Defense Executive Reservists, or otherwise in the process of preparing for industrial mobilization.

7. Emergency communications are not adequate at the state and local level (with some exceptions).

8. A significant number of state emergency managers express some concern about the level of competence or the attitude of some FEMA personnel.
The author's recommendations concerning the above conclusions were:

1. FEMA should consult with state officials concerning the ERT plan, and the operation of the National Joint Public Information Center.

2. Security clearances should be issued to state emergency managers and Governors, and classified information provided as appropriate. FEMA should prepare instructions for handling of classified material, and disseminate it to state Governors and emergency managers who have security clearances.

3. FEMA and National Guard officials should assure that state emergency managers and Governors are fully aware of the problem of handling the Guard's "state" mission in the event the Guard should be mobilized for a federal mission.

4. Information concerning terrorist threats should be shared with state emergency managers as necessary, and states should be encouraged to develop workable Continuity of Government plans.

5. State and local governments should be fully consulted concerning plans for repatriation of U.S. citizens in wartime.

6. Governors and state emergency management officials should be involved in recruitment, assignment, and training of National Defense Executive Reservists, and should be made more fully aware of their duties related to industrial mobilization.

7. Emergency communications should be improved at the state and local levels.

8. FEMA should stress competence and cooperation in its internal training programs, and its employees should be encouraged to treat state and local emergency management personnel as colleagues and fellow professionals.

In addition to the above conclusions which were based generally upon S. responses to the questionnaire, the author then offered the following broad recommendations for the future of emergency management:

First, to the extent possible, FEMA, states, and local governments should reach agreement concerning terms, definitions, and organizational purposes in the field of emergency management.

Second, the same entities plus significant private entities which might need to cooperate in public information activities during disaster, should seek an agreed joint policy concerning coordination of public information during disaster.

Third, FEMA should face and wrestle with the issues underlying the terrorist and security clearance problems - specifically what federal sensitive information should be shared and when. Emergency managers should not compete with law enforcement.

Finally, all concerned should foster the concept of an emergency manager being a "professional" coordinator, rather than a "director." Emergency management should develop as a true profession.
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Effective disaster preparedness (also commonly referred to as civil defense, emergency management, or civil preparedness) is not easy, especially in a decentralized, federal system of government. It is presumably difficult enough even under a strong authoritarian central government system such as that in the Soviet Union; it is extremely complex in the United States, where ambiguous and sometimes overlapping responsibility is more often the rule than the exception, and these problems are often exacerbated by human organizational behavior.

In response to these problems, and to the general clamor from state and local government leaders for correction of the former fragmented system involving numerous federal agencies, President Jimmy Carter in 1979 created the Federal Emergency Management Agency, believing no doubt that in so doing he was resolving the Riddle of the Sphinx. This paper will consider the extent to which he and many others may have, in the words of Sir Winston Churchill, "misconceived the meaning of her smile."^{2}

BACKGROUND

Several factors sed to the historic decision to create the Federal Emergency Management Agency, including:

1. A hopelessly fragmented federal system for dealing with emergency management issues, including:
   a. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), under the Department of Defense (DOD), charged with responsibility for civil defense (i.e. nuclear attack preparedness),
   b. The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), under the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), dealing with disaster response and recovery activities related to Presidentially declared major "natural" disasters

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1In the interest of consistency, the author will endeavor to use the term "emergency management" throughout this paper.

or emergencies, and
c. the Federal Preparedness Administration (FPA), under the
General Services Administration (GSA), a super-secret doomsday
planning and resources management preparedness agency.
(Each of these agencies had its own bureaucracy, regulations, priorities,
and jargon. This organizational nightmare created monumental confusion
at the state and local levels of government, and some bureaucratic
irrationalities worthy of the satiric pen of a Swift or an Art Buchwald.
Perhaps discussion of one example will be useful. Early in
the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, which provided partial fu ng
for personnel and administrative expenses and training of state
local disaster (i.e. "emergency management") agencies, faced with
budget shortfalls, determined that such funding could only be provided
for that portion of state and local activity and those mandays specifically
dedicated to nuclear attack preparedness — in spite of the fact that
the agency had for years provided such funding based on a much broader
criterion, generally allowing most emergency preparedness expenses,
whether or not primarily related to nuclear attack. While arguendo, this
new position was a valid interpretation of the Civil Defense Act of
1950, the practical result was absurd. State and local emergency
management agencies were without exception involved in "all-hazard"
disaster preparedness, i.e. being prepared to cope with a full
range of catastrophic events, whether natural or man-made, and whether
resulting from acts of war or otherwise. On any given day, such an
official might be involved in a wide range of activities including,
for example, meeting with senior elected or appointed officials
concerning emergency plans, working on budgets, dealing with public
media concerning emergency management matters, meeting with school
officials in development of tornado or other safety plans, or being
involved in a host of other emergency management matters. While most
such activity could (with a lively imagination) be argued as at
least indirectly related to nuclear attack preparedness, such arguments
could be defended only on the basis that they were no less specious
than the artificial time divisions which provided their genesis. The
difference, after all, between a "natural" and a "nuclear" manday
was sometimes difficult to discern, even at the end of the day.
2. Pressure for reform by state and local governments.

3. Perceived weakness in national civil defense capability (e.g., attack preparedness).

4. The widely-held concern that some crucial missions, e.g., terrorism, "fell through the cracks" of the bureaucracy, and as a result were not being addressed adequately.

5. Apparent poor management of federal emergency management resources.

6. No standardized terminology or definitions in the field of emergency management (perhaps best dramatized by strong disagreement as to whether "emergency management" was the proper term).

During the period since the Federal Emergency Management Agency rose, phoenix-like, from the ashes of its predecessor agencies, its leaders have in succession pledged to solve the problems noted above, and like Moses of old, lead the children of the various federal, state, and local bureaucracies out of the wilderness of confusion to a Promised Land where goals are shared and understood, everyone speaks the same language, and the System works. It is the perception of this writer that, although substantial progress has been made in specific areas (e.g., relationships among federal agencies), other areas have proven more difficult, and neither the Agency nor our nation is yet out of the wilderness. Because of the author's background as a state-level emergency manager for seven years, this paper will center on one such troublesome area: the relationship between FEMA and state government officials.

II. SCOPE OF PAPER; METHODOLOGY

This paper endeavors to outline the current perceptions, concerns, and opinions of state-level emergency managers concerning a variety of issues central to the relationships between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the states, as well as significant to national security.

Methodology employed was simple: a questionnaire was forwarded to all state directors (including emergency management directors in the territories and the District of Columbia). Thirty-six responses were received and evaluated. (A copy of the questionnaire and a listing of relevant responses is attached as Appendix A.) Where appropriate, general and specific conclusions were developed and are presented.
Based upon these conclusions, and upon his own experience as a state level emergency manager, the author finally offers some recommendations and suggested approaches for improving national preparedness.

III. THE QUESTIONNAIRE: ISSUES AND RESPONSES

This chapter will discuss the specific topics addressed in the questionnaire, and the apparent significance of the responses. Major conclusions are for the most part allowed to speak for themselves, although they will be briefly restated prior to the author's specific recommendations concerning each. An honest effort is made to avoid the kind of rigorous over-analysis of limited data which could lead to flawed conclusions.

A. FEMA'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT) CONCEPT

Of the thirty-six responses received, three state emergency managers indicated no familiarity with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Emergency Response Team (ERT) Concept. Nineteen were not consulted by FEMA during the development of the plan, while seventeen said they provided input to the plan. Seven of those responding believe that state concerns were adequately considered by FEMA planners, as compared with fourteen who feel that such concerns were not adequately considered and twelve who checked "don't know" on the form.

Only one of the state officials responding felt the centralized FEMA-directed Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) in the Washington, D.C. area would work, while twenty-four felt it would not work, and nine were "not sure." Eleven indicated they would cooperate and participate in such an approach to public information; four said "no," and twenty were "not sure." When asked their opinions as to whether their Governors' offices would cooperate fully with such a system, only three said "yes," ten said "maybe," eighteen were "doubtful," and five said "no."

Eight respondents had been briefed concerning federal communications capabilities which might be made available to state officials upon the establishment of need during an emergency; twenty-seven had received no such briefing.
CONCLUSION: States were not adequately consulted regarding the development of the Emergency Response Team plan. Without enlisting the active support of state emergency managers and Governors, the plan will not work. Further, serious doubts exist as to the workability of the Joint Public Information Center envisioned in the plan. Governors' offices generally have inadequate information concerning the Emergency Response Team concept.

RECOMMENDATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency should begin actively consulting with state emergency managers concerning the Emergency Response Team plan, and the concept in general. In addition, FEMA should consult with state directors and public information professionals concerning coordination of public information activities, and should conduct symposia and other meetings involving public information personnel as well as state emergency managers. Finally, FEMA should take appropriate steps (in consultation with state emergency managers) to assure that Governors are aware of such plans.

B. SECURITY CLEARANCES

Seventeen respondents said they have a current security clearance issued or recognized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency; nineteen do not, although some are in process. One commented "been trying to get one for eight months."

Four said they have Top Secret clearances; thirteen Secret.

Three have received a classified briefing or some classified information during the past twelve months. Twelve acknowledged receiving such a briefing or information at some time in the past; fourteen indicated that they have never received any such data.

Only four said they have official instructions from the Federal Emergency Management Agency concerning safeguarding and handling of classified material.

The state emergency managers responding indicated that six of their Governors have security clearances (including one Top Secret). Two state directors did not know.

Only one respondent was aware of his Governor ever receiving a classified briefing or any classified information.

No respondent had any knowledge of his Governor's office having available any official instructions from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency concerning safeguarding and handling of classified material (although one questionnaire had an unexplained notation "nuclear shipment only.")

Nineteen state emergency managers responding indicated that staff members or other state emergency management officials have security clearances, or are in process for such clearances.

CONCLUSION: Security clearances are a problem. More than half of those surveyed have no security clearance. Few receive any classified information, and few have any instructions for safeguarding such materials if they received it.

RECOMMENDATIONS: First FEMA should take prompt steps to issue appropriate security clearances for all state emergency managers and all Governors.

Second, if members of the FEMA Emergency Response Team have Top Secret clearances, appropriate state personnel must have a similar clearance.

Third, classified briefings should be held from time to time, as appropriate.

Finally, FEMA should issue standard guidance for safeguarding classified material, and arrange procurement of appropriate safes for this purpose.

C. FULFILLING "STATE" MISSIONS OF NATIONAL GUARD UPON ITS MOBILIZATION

Of twenty-two responses indicating that the respondent's state has a plan for fulfilling the Guard's "state" missions upon its mobilization, only four believe their plans will work. Ten checked "maybe;" three said "not well;" two said "no;" and five said "don't know." Most states with plans have some variation of "state militia" or "home guard" - some organized, some on paper only.

Only three of the state directors responding had received any information from FEMA concerning this subject. Thirty-one felt that briefings should be conducted (two said "no"). Of the thirty-one favoring briefings, seven believed they should be conducted by National Guard officials, three favored briefings by FEMA, and twenty-two believed a joint presentation would be appropriate.

CONCLUSION: States are generally inadequately prepared to handle the "state" mission of the National Guard upon mobilization of the Guard
RECOMMENDATION: FEMA should work with National Guard officials and state emergency managers to assure that Governors and state planners are aware of the problem, and should encourage contingency planning to fill the need.

D. TERRORISM AND CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

Only five of the state officials responding indicated routine receipt of any information from FEMA or from any other federal source concerning the potential for terrorist or other anti-government action in their states. Eighteen, however, said that other state agencies received such information (two respondents did not know whether other agencies within their states received such information).

Ten of the state emergency managers responding expressed confidence that their Governors and the offices of other high elected and appointed officials received reasonably accurate and timely information from federal sources concerning such possibilities. (Five did not know.) Only four indicated that the Federal Emergency Management Agency was aware of their state plans. Five states responding contemplate physical relocation of high level officials when appropriate for their personal safety.

Thirteen respondents indicated that their states have no plan for Continuity of Government. Of twenty-two who said they have a plan, seventeen indicated that FEMA had been briefed concerning the plan. Eleven indicated that they or their Governors' offices had received at least some information or inquiry concerning this subject during the past year. Twenty-three had not.

Twenty-eight of those responding felt this should be a high priority for FEMA involvement. Six disagreed; one was "not sure."

CONCLUSION: In general terms, states receive inadequate information concerning terrorist or other anti-government activities. States have not generally pursued Continuity of Government planning with sufficient vigor. They seem generally unaware of unimpressed by the threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS: First, FEMA should improve the briefing process for Governors' offices and for those offices designated by the Governors in each instance (law enforcement and emergency management officials).

Second, FEMA should encourage realistic Continuity of Government planning at the state level.
E. STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN REPATRIATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS FROM OVERSEAS AS PART OF A WARTIME SCENARIO

Thirty-one respondents were aware that a plan exists for repatriation of U.S. citizens during war; five were not. Nineteen had not been consulted during development of the plan; fourteen said they had no copy of the plan.

Twenty-four indicated that, so far as they know, their Governors are not aware of any such plan.

Only seven of the state officials responding had advised any local government leaders concerning the plan.

Twenty-one of those responding have not discussed this plan with anyone from the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the past year.

Of those responding, twelve consider the burdens imposed on state and local governments by the plan to be fair and reasonable. Eighteen disagree.

Eighteen were not aware of approximate numbers of repatriate citizens who might be delivered to their states, and which local communities would likely suffer the greatest impact.

Seventeen, however, said their state governments could handle the mission. Ten said they could not, and six indicated they did not know. One who said "unknown" went further: "this is not a state mission."

Fourteen responding felt their local governments could handle the mission. Thirteen disagreed; seven did not know.

CONCLUSION: State and local government officials are inadequately aware of repatriation plans in the event of war, and were not adequately consulted.

RECOMMENDATION: FEMA should consult fully with state emergency managers, and work with them to develop advice for local officials.

F. STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH PRIVATE SECTOR IN PLANNING NATIONAL MOBILIZATION

Twenty-eight respondents indicated that they were not consulted concerning the appointments of members of the National Defense Executive Reserve. Five said their Governors were consulted; twenty-three said their Governors were not consulted. Seven answered this question with a question mark.
Only four responding receive any regular briefings or information concerning the National Defense Executive Reserve.

Eleven know the names of the National Defense Executive Reservists in their states; six had met them (or some of them).

Only four of the state emergency managers responding receive regular briefings or other information from FEMA concerning their responsibility as state-level emergency managers in dealing with national industrial mobilization. Thirty-one indicated they receive no such information; one said "very little."

Only three responding knew the individuals appointed as state liaison for their respective states for Economic Stabilization and Industrial Mobilization. Two of the three had met these individuals.

CONCLUSION: Neither state emergency managers nor Governors are adequately involved in recruitment of National Defense Executive Reservists and the process of preparing for industrial mobilization.

RECOMMENDATION: Governors should be briefed concerning the program, and should be consulted concerning future assignments of reservists. FEMA should sponsor joint conferences of state emergency managers with National Defense Executive Reservists. State emergency management officials should assist in training programs for reservists, and vice versa.

G. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION

Seven respondents have been briefed by FEMA concerning this subject. Only two indicated that their Governors had been briefed.

Thirty who responded indicated that their states have facilities protected against electromagnetic pulse (EMP).

Twenty-six have direct radio contact with contiguous states. (One respondent, presumably from Alaska or Hawaii, has no contiguous states.)

Thirty-one have radio contact with their FEMA Regional offices.

Five consider their states' current communications capability with local governments adequate for a war or emergency scenario. Thirty consider their communications with local governments inadequate for such purposes.
Overall, state emergency managers graded their states' ability to handle communications needs in such a scenario as follows:

- entirely satisfactory: 0
- generally OK. No significant problems: 5
- marginal: 18
- serious problems. Generally inadequate: 11
- totally unsatisfactory: 2

CONCLUSION: Emergency communications need to be improved at the state and local government levels.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide federal funding for such improvements as soon as possible. In the meantime, encourage state and local governments to develop at their own costs compatible systems to the extent possible.

H. FEDERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS

Twenty-one of the state emergency managers responding to the questionnaire have heard complaints from staff members or from local officials concerning employees or officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Eight said such complaints generally related to a federal official's competence; eleven said such complaints related to attitude. Seven said complaints were heard concerning both competence and attitude.

Nineteen have personally been troubled by the level of competence of FEMA employees; eighteen of these have complained to someone in FEMA concerning this.

Nineteen have been personally offended by inappropriate attitudes or behavior of FEMA officials or employees. Interestingly, although only nineteen had been offended, twenty-one indicated that they had complained concerning such attitudes or behavior. Eleven of these believe this to be a serious problem. In response to an invitation to discuss this further, the following comments were received (other comments are listed in Appendix A):

"The problem stems from the creation of FEMA itself and the resultant 'infighting' between personnel of the old agencies for management and program control. This coupled with the problem of continued reorganization and lack of continuity of contracts has worked to the detriment of the overall program - if anything gets done it's generally too little or too late to impact on problems."
"FEMA does not live in the real world."

"(1) that FEMA (Uncle Sam) knows best.
(2) that states and locals are incompetent.
(3) that we don't need to know why something needs to be done.
(4) complete disregard for the workload impact on local directors."

"The usual complaint regarding some individuals in a higher headquarters: they are under qualified and overpaid and attempt to cover their inadequacies with superior and condescending attitudes."

"Rotation of personnel within FEMA as soon as they are trained. Especially radiological."

CONCLUSION: State and local officials too often (i.e. even occasionally) perceive FEMA employees or officials as incompetent or as having bad attitudes. Based upon his own experience, the author believes these perceptions to be correct in many instances. (Even if the perceptions were incorrect, of course, the fact of their existence presents a problem of substantial proportions requiring some action.)

RECOMMENDATION: Enhance sensitivity and other training for FEMA employees to improve their understanding of problems and perceptions of state and local government officials. Impose discipline, if necessary.

IV. THE FUTURE: IMPROVING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

The specific conclusions and recommendations outlined in the previous chapter are analogous to medical symptoms and their recommended treatment. Treatment of symptoms often provides temporary relief; it seldom cures the disease which caused the symptoms. In this chapter, the author wrestles with what he perceives as the "disease" or root causes of many of the noted problems and weaknesses, and offers, if not a cure, at least some general recommendations for improving the health of the system. Some of the recommendations are trite; perhaps none are entirely original. This does not trouble the author, however. After all, "get plenty of rest and eat a balanced diet," while both trite and unoriginal, is still good advice. The author presents the following suggestions in the hope that they will be received as "good advice:"

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A. AGREEMENT CONCERNING TERMS, DEFINITIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSES

Agreement should be sought concerning emergency management terms and definitions, as well as concerning organizational purposes or missions. Few fields of human endeavor are so plagued with such a variety of terminology and such widespread disagreement concerning its meaning. Even the term "emergency management is the subject of hearty and sometimes heated debate, with many in the field still preferring (and using) "civil defense," "disaster services," "disaster preparedness," "emergency preparedness," "emergency services," or similar terms. Job titles for individuals involved in emergency management vary almost as widely. Concepts of mission and philosophical approaches to mission accomplishment also vary widely among the many responsible emergency management officials at the federal, state and local levels of government.

While agreement concerning such matters is difficult to attain (perhaps impossible in some instances), it must be sought. Dialogue should be kept open among all concerned at all levels of government.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT (FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICY CONCERNING COORDINATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION DURING DISASTER

Officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency apparently expect to exercise control (i.e. approval authority) over news releases at all locations during a major emergency in which they are involved, and assure that all decision-makers shall "be saying the same thing at the same time." While this is an admirable goal (and one at one time shared by the author), it simply will not work in the way that FEMA officials expect.

It is impossible to control from one location geographically removed from the disaster scene, the detailed information which can be released from the scene (or various scenes, as is more often the case), by the various interested entities who are the subject of press inquiry. The official in charge of the National Joint Public Information Center (NJPIC) has no authority to direct the activities of state or local officials in this regard. Even if he had such authority, he would have great difficulty in exercising it effectively. He would have even more difficulty in controlling information released by private individuals or corporations. One of the so called "lessons of Three Mile Island"
was that "most officials, when a microphone is stuck in their face during an emergency, will say something — usually more than they know about the subject." An appropriate goal in the area of public information is to educate such officials concerning the dangers inherent in this type of behavior, and to generate the kind of enlightened self-discipline which can minimize this aspect of the problem.

Much valuable insight in the area of public information was gained by emergency managers in the wake of the Three Mile Island incident, and further in the subsequent exercise of Radiation Emergency Response Plans for fixed nuclear power stations. Time and again these exercises confirmed to state and local officials the wisdom of assuring to the extent possible that information issued by different officials at different locations were in agreement, or at least not inconsistent. Also confirmed time and again was the conclusion that it was impossible to exercise directive control over this area during an emergency. Certainly, full agreement among the various participants is desirable, if possible. Such agreement in practice, however, is usually impossible simply because there is insufficient time, and also because not always can all the actors reach agreement as to what decisions each should make, or what each should say about such decisions. An example may be useful:

In an exercise of emergency plans for the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station at Moscow, Ohio (across the Ohio River from Kentucky), several independent entities were involved: the State of Ohio, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, five counties (one in Ohio, four in Kentucky), and the power company. (Interestingly enough, FEMA was not a player in such exercises at that time, although it was involved in grading the exercise. The author has been advised that FEMA subsequently decided to become involved in such exercises as a participant.) At one point during the exercise, simulated technological data concerning the radiation hazard resulted in Ohio making a decision concerning protective action to be taken by area residents which was inconsistent with action taken by the Kentucky authorities in an area just across the river. The decisions taken were independently reached, and based upon the conscientious view taken by the responsible state authorities in each case. Fortunately, the emergency managers involved communicated frequently concerning the matter, and each was fully aware of the other's position, and the rationale being followed to support the decision. They could not reach agreement,
and it would have made no sense for public announcement of the decisions to be delayed while agreement was sought, since protective actions, to be effective, must be announced and acted upon promptly. When members of the media noted the differing approaches, each state emergency manager was able to explain, in effect, "yes, the other state made its own judgment which was different from ours. Their decision was certainly reasonable, but we think ours was right for our citizens." It worked well. Similarly, instances can arise in which state officials are compelled to issue public advice contrary to the wishes of private entities, such as power plant officials (who also have the ear of media representatives). Again, agreement is desirable, but not absolutely necessary. The essential ingredient is fair notice - assuring that other actors who have responsibility for public safety, and who are in the public spotlight, are not surprised by a public announcement.

Another aspect of public information coordination which must be remembered is that different officials speak to different audiences, and most such officials are quite busy during emergencies, and need not clutter their minds with non-essential information. For example, in the example cited above, the author was in Columbus, Ohio (approximately one hundred miles from the power plant), running the state Emergency Operations Center on behalf of the Governor. Technicians had agreed that evacuation of the civilian population was necessary within a certain pie-shaped sector, out to a radius of five miles from the plant. Local officials agreed, and were interpreting the sector to be evacuated in terms of county roads, creeks, and other local landmarks, for inclusion in radio and television announcements. All this was, of course, appropriate. In the conscientious pursuit of "full coordination," however, local officials were seeking concurrence from Columbus concerning these details as to local landmarks, when clearly no one in Columbus had either the time or sufficient information to challenge them. Further, information concerning specific county roads and other landmarks, and routes of egress, were of no public information value to the media in Columbus. It would have been absurd for the author to try to exercise control, even if he had authority to do so, over the local issuance of such press releases.

All the above, in the opinion of the author, reinforces the position that no one official can or should try to control the release of information
at more than one location (exercising effective control over even one location is sometimes a tall order). The essential ingredient is the prior notice to colleagues involved in the same emergency, so that there are no surprises.

C. TERRORISM, SECURITY, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

The law enforcement and security issues underlying questions concerning terrorism, security clearances, and sharing of sensitive information should be aired openly and candidly, and resolution sought.

The issue of sharing sensitive federal information concerning terrorist activities (or other potential anti-government action) with state and local emergency management officials is particularly difficult. Secrets sometimes cease to be secrets when told to a politician (especially during a re-election campaign) - or at least this is the apprehension of many law enforcement officials. The issuance of security clearances to emergency management officials (mentioned earlier in this paper), with its concomitant imposition of federal penalties for disclosure of federal secrets, should reduce this probability substantially, if not obviate it entirely. Leaks of classified information occur all too frequently even now, and any expansion of the number of people with access to such information will obviously increase measurably the risk of further disclosure. The author is convinced, however, that some means of sharing such information (when it is needed for emergency planning) must be devised. Federal law enforcement authorities have, after all, somehow long since resolved such questions as they relate to sharing information with state and local law enforcement authorities concerning such matters as narcotics, organized crime, etc., even without the security clearance process. Federal intelligence concerning criminal activities is in fact usually usually shared with state and local law enforcement officials who need to know. (It is presumed that, on an occasional case-by-case basis, such information might be denied.) Similar data can, with reasonable controls, be shared with state and local emergency management officials with relative safety.

Finally, it is the author's perception that the reluctance of law enforcement officials to cooperate fully with emergency management officials is directly related to their perception that emergency manage
compete with traditional law enforcement authorities. The author has
seen examples of this problem at the local government level, and has
heard such concern expressed by state police officials. It is not
unreasonable to expect a similar reaction by federal law enforcement
officials to the extent that they see FEMA as seeking to invade their
"turf." Indeed, one state emergency manager, in discussing this concern
with the author, referred to the Emergency Response Team as FEMA's
"S. M. A. T. Team," directly in competition with the FBI and other
federal law enforcement agencies.

D. ROLE OF EMERGENCY MANAGER AS "COORDINATOR" RATHER THAN
"DIRECTOR," DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The author believes that neither the Federal Emergency Management
Agency nor the state and local agencies engaged in emergency management
will fully succeed in their missions unless and until the role of
emergency managers is seen as one of "coordination" rather than "direction."

At all levels of our national system of emergency management, some
see their positions as primarily directive in nature, at least during
emergencies. When an emergency occurs, they fully expect to "take charge"
of major activities not normally subject to their control. Such people
are very fond of the expression, "when the balloon goes up," and their
faces often flush with excitement when they discuss the power they will
have on such an occasion. Others see the emergency manager as a planner
and coordinator - one who identifies available resources for coping with
emergencies, and seeks prior agreement as to their use and as to the
involvement of various organizations in disaster response activity.

The first personality type described above (i.e. directive, authoritarian)
is most often caricatured as the maramilitary local civil defense director
(one dare not call him a "sissy" name such as "emergency manager"), fully
equipped with military-style uniform, rank insignia, gun, armband, helmet,
and other such accoutrements. (Badges and identification cards are
especially dear to such individuals.) Indeed, some local emergency managers
are like that, but the author has observed the same personality characteristics
in people at the state and national levels of emergency management.
Perhaps the description of one such individual known by the author will
be instructive: A local "civil defense" director, he wore a black military
style uniform of his own design, complete with ribbons, shoulder-braid, the rank of Colonel, and (usually) a sidearm. When asked about his rank insignia, he would explain that he had earned that while "in the Sheriff's service," where he had "once killed a man." Whatever else may be said about him, however, he certainly recognized merit: during the time the author knew him, he promoted himself to Brigadier General. This was shortly before he lost his job - ostensibly because of some irregularity in management of money and equipment, but in fact (according to some accounts) because he did not get along well with other local officials, including the local Prosecutor, Sheriff, and County Commissioners. It seems that, in his obsession for preparing for World War III, he failed to develop the political skills requisite for survival in local government. The author is advised that the community is somehow surviving his loss.

The author hastens to point out that the above example is the most egregious one to come to his attention in seven years as state emergency manager for Ohio, and does not fairly represent the mass of local government emergency managers. In fact, many local and state emergency managers are more capable in coordinating inter-governmental matters during crisis (particularly involving human relations) than some of their federal counterparts. Since most such positions in state and local government are filled by political appointment, success and often survival often depend at least to some extent on personality, skill in human relationships, and political sensitivity (usually in the non-partisan sense). These attributes appear not to be uniformly developed or reinforced in federal employees in either the appointed or career services.

In any event, the devotion to badges, hard hats, and "military" style paraphernalia does much to degrade what the author like to envision as the emerging profession of emergency management.

If the concept of emergency management is to work, it must become a "profession," and its practitioners "professionals" in the traditional sense. Sadly, most of the attributes of traditional professions are not immediately evident in the realm of emergency management. Such attributes include:
- a common organization, with a standard of behavior and a code of ethics.
- specialized education programs, with special diplomas or degrees which are generally recognized and admired by the community.
- power of the membership to exercise control over entry of others into the profession.
- community recognition, prestige, and pay.
- opportunities for a lifetime career in the "profession."
- a commonly-understood, recognized specialized language or jargon unique to the profession.
- a sense of fellowship, belonging, and purpose among all practitioners at all levels. A sense of mission, and pride in dedicated service for the benefit of others.

Upon examining the above list, it is apparent that none of the listed attributes can fairly be applied at the present time to the field of emergency management, except perhaps the last one. The author submits that this attribute, the sense of shared mission with other dedicated professional public servants, is at the very center of any true profession, and is the very essence of true professionalism. Where it exists, it should be nurtured carefully and cherished. To the extent that authoritarian or non-cooperative attitudes hinder its survival and growth, such attitudes should be eliminated.

V: SUMMARY

Many dedicated people currently work in the field of emergency management at all levels of government, dealing patiently and adroitly with extremely difficult situations. Most are underpaid, under-appreciated, and too often ignored. While the focus of this paper has been the relationships between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and state governments, the lessons learned and insights gained seem just as applicable to emergency management at the local level.

If the overall system of emergency management (under the leadership of FEMA, but with the collegial involvement of state and local emergency managers) can devise means to reward "professional" emergency managers (as described above) while at the same time discouraging those at all levels of the system who see themselves as Patton reincarnate (or at the very least as Sheriff Lobo), the vocation of "emergency manager" will emerge as a real "profession," and our nation will become a better place to live.
LETTER TO ALL STATE DIRECTORS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS:

I need your help. I am conducting a study for the National Defense University concerning relationships between FEMA and the states. I have a particular interest in this subject because of my experience the past several years running the Ohio Disaster Services Agency. The tentative title of my paper is: "Relationships Between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and State Governments: Improving National Preparedness."

Your thoughtful responses to the attached questionnaire are urgently solicited.

In addition to the questionnaire, I am attaching a portion of my Initial Research Design, in the hope that this will tweak your interest and motivate you not only to answer my questionnaire, but also to give me the benefit of your counsel and any suggestions you may have to help me make my final research product more useful. If you feel sufficiently motivated to address any or all the subject areas (or related topics) in a letter, please do so.

National Emergency Management Association Erie Jones has confirmed that I will be on the agenda for the Spring NEMA Conference in Washington. I hope to share the results of my research with you at that time.

In order to meet my deadlines, I must ask you to respond as soon as possible. I will appreciate receiving your response by 7 February (earlier if possible). I am sorry for the short deadline, but hope you will make the effort necessary to address this important subject.

I am enclosing a return envelope. My office address is: LTCOL CURTIS GRIFFITH JR., Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D. C. 20319. My home phone number is (703) 250-4832. Please feel free to call or write, and let me know if you plan a trip to this area, so that we can try to get together.

I appreciate your help. I look forward to seeing you in the Spring.

Sincerely,

CURTIS GRIFFITH JR., LTCOL, Ohio ANG

P. S. You may wonder how I ended up here, doing this. I came here as an Air Guardsman on active duty (on leave from my state job), for a one-year academic program. As such things happen, Ohio's new Governor has decided he will not need me in my old job, so I will be moving on to greener (or at least different) pastures next summer. This does not, of course, diminish my enthusiasm for my subject, which I see as very important.
TITLE: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) AND STATE GOVERNMENTS: IMPROVING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

SCOPE: The relationship between FEMA and state governments (and, indeed, between state and local governments) is beset by the myriad problems inherent in the U.S. federal system. These problems center around the capabilities, awareness and attitudes of state officials toward federally-required emergency state actions. Since war or other major emergency will require significant positive actions by state officials, it is imperative that such officials have the necessary capability, be aware of the need, and be willing and prepared to act in the national interest (which, presumably, will coincide with state interest). In the absence of such capability, awareness, and willingness (or any one or more of these), there should at least be an immediate ability on the part of federal officials to brief state officials, seek their cooperation, and supplement their capability at the time of emergency. This approach may presume too much, not only in terms of present state capability, but also in terms of the willingness of state officials to enter the arena after such an important and demanding game has already started.

The attitudes of many state officials is already less than optimal due to the commonly held perception that their management authority or even their Constitutional authority is progressively undermined by ubiquitous federal officials and programs. State officials often see their priorities for resource allocation and program development driven by federal dollars, under the principle described by one federal official as the New Golden Rule, to wit: "He who has the Gold makes the Rules." It seems safe to assume that such attitudes would deteriorate even further at the sudden revelation in the midst of an emergency, of new federal requirements for state action.

This paper will explore the current level of awareness of state officials regarding their national mobilization responsibilities, and suggest ways of enhancing their awareness, thereby improving probability of mission success. The primary relationship to be addressed by this paper will be that between the states and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT: National response to any major emergency (including war) depends upon rapid and effective mobilization of all levels of government, as well as various entities in the private sector, including business and industry, financial institutions, labor, trade associations, etc. The full cooperation of state governments is essential to the successful accomplishment of such a massive undertaking. Such cooperation cannot be reasonably expected if state officials are left unaware of the need for mobilization planning. If state governments cannot or will not perform necessary functions during a mobilization emergency, the federal mission cannot be successfully accomplished.

PROBLEMS:

a. Are appropriate state emergency officials currently aware of their responsibilities during a national emergency mobilization emergency?

b. Are current procedures for sharing of classified or other sensitive information with state officials adequate to meet mobilization preparedness needs? Need it be improved?

Appendix A
c. Even if fully advised of federal expectations of state performance in an emergency mobilization crisis, can the states do what is expected? Are there any specific areas in which FEMA incorrectly assumes that all states will be both willing and able to meet federal expectations?

d. Are current federal expectations realistic and reasonable?

e. How can states be more fully integrated into the emergency mobilization preparedness process?

f. Are conclusions concerning state government capabilities, perceptions and problems applicable also to local governments? Can the national emergency mobilization preparedness mission be accomplished without significant local government involvement?

KEY SUBPROBLEMS:

a. Should security clearances be provided to Governors and state emergency managers? If so, how many and at what level? Who should pay for such clearances?

b. What is the level of readiness of state governments generally in each of the following functional areas (all of which are important during national emergencies)?

(1) Continuity of government

(2) Emergency communications

(3) Resources management

(4) Crisis management and coordination

(5) Emergency response (including fire, emergency medical services, and law enforcement)

(6) Peacetime nuclear incidents (including planning and response to incidents at fixed nuclear power stations, highway accidents, etc., involving some probability of public radiation hazard)

(7) Nuclear attack preparedness

(8) Hazardous materials preparedness and response

(9) Evacuation planning

c. What can the federal government do to improve or supplement state capabilities in these areas?

HYPOTHESIS: National emergency mobilization preparedness programs cannot be successfully implemented without full cooperation of state governments. Such cooperation can be assured, and the mission capability enhanced, by a fuller sharing of relevant federal information with appropriate state officials.
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS:

FEMA'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM CONCEPT:

1. Are you familiar with the FEMA "Emergency Response Team" Concept? (If "yes," answer the following)  
   a. Were you consulted by FEMA during the development of the ERT Plan?  
      Yes 33 No 3  
   b. Did you provide any input, recommendations, or comments to FEMA concerning the ERT Plan?  
      (Note: If possible, attach a copy of your input to your response.)  
      Yes 17 No 17  
   c. Do you believe state concerns were adequately considered by FEMA planners as the plan developed? Yes 7 No 14 Don't know 12  
   d. Do you believe that the "ERT" scheme for coordinating all news releases through a centralized FEMA-run Joint Public Information Center in the Washington area will work?  
      Yes 1 No 24 Not sure 9  
   e. Would you cooperate and participate in such a system?  
      Yes 11 No 4 Not sure 20  
   f. In your judgment, would your Governor's office cooperate fully with such a system?  
      Yes 3 Maybe 10 Doubtful 18 No 5  

2. Does your state have an agreement with FEMA concerning colocation of its Emergency Response Team with state response personnel, and possible joint use of communications facilities?  
   Yes 11 No 25  

3. Have you been briefed by FEMA concerning federal communications capabilities which may be made available to state officials if the need is established?  
   Yes 8 No 27  

SECURITY CLEARANCES:

4. Do you have a current security clearance issued or recognized by FEMA? (If "yes," answer the following)  
   a. What is the level of your clearance?  
      Top Secret 4 Secret 13  
   b. Have you received a classified briefing or any classified information from FEMA during the past 12 months?  
      Yes 3 No 24  
   c. Ever?  
      Yes 12 No 14  
   d. Do you have available to you any official instructions from FEMA concerning safeguarding and handling of classified material?  
      Yes 4 No 24
5. Does your Governor have a security clearance issued or recognized by FEMA? (If "yes," answer the following) Yes 6 No 25 (2 wrote in "unknown.")
   a. What is the level of his or her clearance? Top Secret 1 Secret 6
   b. To your knowledge, has he or she received a classified briefing or any classified information from FEMA during the past 12 months? Yes 1 No 19
   c. Ever? Yes No 18
   d. So far as you know, does your Governor's office have available any official instructions from FEMA concerning safeguarding and handling of classified material? Yes 0 No 21

6. Do any other members of your staff (or other state emergency management officials in your state) have a FEMA-recognized security clearance? (If "yes," please list their position titles and levels of clearances: (use "Remarks" section or attach sheet if necessary) Yes 19 No 12
   (NOTE: listings provided by individual respondents are omitted as not directly relevant to overall study. The numbers of additional staff personnel having clearances or in process for clearance ranged from one to eight persons.)

FULFILLING "STATE" MISSION OF NATIONAL GUARD UPON ITS MOBILIZATION:

7. If a national mobilization emergency were to result in the call to federal service of all your state's Army and Air National Guard forces, does your state have a plan for fulfilling the Guard's "state" missions? (If "yes," answer the following) Yes 22 No 13
   a. In your opinion, will it work? Yes 4 Maybe 10 Not well 3 No 2 Don't know 5
   b. Outline briefly below (or on an attachment, if necessary) how the Guard's traditional "state" mission would be performed in your state under your current plan:
   (NOTE: detailed responses omitted for the sake of space. Most states responding described a militia or "home guard" organization, or a plan for one.)

8. Have you or any other officials in your state received any briefings or information from FEMA concerning your responsibility to address the "state" missions of the Guard during its absence on federal duty? Yes 3 No 30
9. Do you believe such briefings should be held? Yes 31 No 2
   If "yes," should such briefings be conducted by National Guard officials? 7
   or FEMA? 3

   (22 wrote in "both".)

TERRORISM AND CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT:

10. Do you receive routinely any information from FEMA or other federal sources concerning the potential for terrorist or other anti-government action in your state? Yes 5 No 31

11. So far as you know, does any other state agency in your state (including law enforcement agencies) receive such information? Yes 18 No 17 (2 wrote "don't know.")

12. In your opinion, does your Governor's office (and the offices of other high elected and appointed officials in your state) receive reasonably accurate and timely information from any federal source concerning such possibilities? Yes 10 No 22 (5 wrote "unknown.")

13. To your knowledge, does your state have an active plan for increasing security precautions for senior state officials during times of perceived increased threat to their personal safety? (If "yes," answer the following)

   a. Are FEMA officials aware of your plan? Yes 4 No 17

   b. Does the plan contemplate physical relocation of such officials for their personal safety (as opposed to merely moving them to an Emergency Operations Center location, for example, to facilitate decision-making)? Yes 5 No 12 (3 wrote "unknown.")

14. Does your state have a plan for Continuity of Government during war or other major emergency which might disrupt all normal government functions? Yes 22 No 13

   a. If so, have FEMA officials been briefed concerning this plan? Yes 17 No 16

   b. Have you or your Governor's office received any information or inquiry concerning this subject during the past year? (copies of relevant documents would be appreciated) Yes 11 No 23 (1 wrote "?")

   c. Should this be a high priority area for FEMA involvement? Yes 28 No 6 (1 wrote "not sure.")
**STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN REPATRIATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS FROM OVERSEAS AS PART OF WARTIME SCENARIO:**

NOTE: There is a federal plan for repatriation of thousands of American citizens who happen to be in a war zone (e.g., Europe) at the outset of a war (or when war appears eminent). In simple terms, this plan contemplates transporting such citizens (whose number may include American military dependents, businessmen, students, deserters from U.S. military forces, and Vietnam-era "drop-outs" from our society) from their overseas locations to various U.S. locations where, after customs processing (which may be cursory at best), the entire problem of care, feeding, and administration of such people will be turned entirely over to state and local officials. The following questions address this plan:

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<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<td>15. Were you aware that such a plan existed?</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>16. Were you consulted during this plan?</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>17. Do you have in your office a copy of this plan?</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. So far as you know, is your Governor aware of this plan?</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>19. Have you advised any local government leaders in your state concerning their potential responsibility in implementing such a plan?</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>20. Have you had a conversation with anyone from FEMA concerning this issue during the past year?</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>22. Do you consider the burdens imposed on state and local governments by the plan outlined above to be fair and reasonable?</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>23. Are you aware of the approximate numbers of repatriate citizens which might be delivered to your state, and which local communities in your state would likely suffer the greatest impact?</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>24. Can your state government handle the mission?</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Can your local governments handle the mission?</td>
<td>14</td>
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Appendix A
STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH PRIVATE SECTOR IN PLANNING NATIONAL MOBILIZATION:

NOTE: The federal government is involved in several initiatives involving various entities in the private sector, including business and industry, financial institutions, labor, trade associations, etc., as well as various individuals from these various fields. The following questions address the level of involvement of state governments in this process:

26. Are you consulted concerning the appointments of members of the National Defense Executive Reserve? Yes 8 No 28

27. Is your Governor consulted concerning such appointments? Yes 5 No 23 (7 wrote "?")

26. Do you receive any regular briefings or information concerning the National Defense Executive Reserve? Yes 4 No 32

29. Do you know the names of the National Defense Executive Reservists in your state? Yes 11 No 25

30. Have you ever met them? Yes 6 No 29

31. Do you receive any regular briefings or other information from FEMA concerning your responsibility as a state-level emergency manager in preparing for national mobilization? Yes 4 No 31 (1 wrote "very little.")

32. Without asking someone, do you know the individuals appointed to the positions as Liaison for your state for Economic Preparedness and Industrial Mobilization? Yes 3 No 33

33. Have you ever met them? Yes 2 No 33

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION:

NOTE: Certain national wartime or emergency scenarios involve the breakdown of national communications and the scattering of some national government operations. A disruption of the normal flow of centralized guidance from the federal government might necessarily force decisions concerning national security matters to be made in certain instances at a regional level, and leave very significant matters of great importance to the states, or to the local governments - particularly those matters dealing with the health and safety of citizens, and matters of local law and order. The following questions deal with these issues:

34. Have you been briefed by anyone from FEMA concerning the issues raised in the above paragraph, or any contemplated adjustment to the normal apportionment of decision-making authority during a national emergency? Yes 7 No 30
33. Do your knowledge has your Governor received such a briefing? 
   Yes1 No4

36. Do you have a communications facility protected against electromagnetic pulse (EMP)? 
   Yes9 No6

37. Do you have direct radio contact with contiguous states? 
   Yes26 No7

38. Do you have direct radio contact with your FEMA Regional Headquarters? 
   Yes31 No3

39. Do you consider your state's current communications capability with local governments adequate for a war or emergency scenario such as discussed above? 
   Yes5 No30

40. Evaluate on the following scale your state's ability to handle communications needs in such a scenario:
   0 Entirely satisfactory. No problems.
   5 Generally O. K. No significant problems.
   18 Marginal.
   11 Serious problems. Generally inadequate.
   2 Totally unsatisfactory.

FEDERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS:

NOTE: From time to time, state and local officials have lodged complaints concerning attitudes of FEMA or other federal officials in their dealings with state and local officials. These complaints arise from various situations, including a training environment (state or local official being trained by someone from FEMA), during response and recovery to a major disaster or emergency, during Radiation Emergency Response Planning and exercises, and in public fora. The following questions address this issue:

41. Do you often hear such complaints from your own staff members, or from local officials? 
   Yes21 No15

42. Do such complaints generally reflect more concerning the federal official's 
   _competence? 
   _or attitude? (7 wrote in "both.")

43. Have you personally been troubled by the level of competence of FEMA employees with whom you have worked? 
   Yes19 No17

44. Have you ever complained to anyone in FEMA concerning the low level of competence of such employee? 
   Yes18 No17

45. Have you personally been offended by inappropriate attitude or behavior of a FEMA official or employee? 
   Yes19 No17
REMARKS:

NOTE: Several significant areas are not addressed directly in the questions above. Also, you may wish to expand your answer or offer comment on some of the issues raised. Please use the space below for this purpose, and feel free (indeed, please feel encouraged) to attach any appropriate documents, copies of correspondence, or other attachments which will help express your positions concerning these important matters.

NOTE: Following relevant comments were received:

(1) "In general - FEMA does not operate in a support to state government mode but rather in a direction and control mode. This attitude is apparent in most of the FEMA programs areas - Emergency Operations Planning - esp. NCP(CRP) & Fixed Nuclear Facility RERP. The alleged Federal-State-Local "partnership" is a fiction. FEMA apparently expects state and local to comply with FEMA directives in a subordinate role, rather than as competent players on an emergency management team."

(2) "Get off the nuclear war kick! It will not sell."

(3) "The FEMA regions do not have the necessary authority from FEMA National to adequately accomplish their mission. All actions are centralized at FEMA National - Regional Director should have more authority."

(4) "FEMA needs more emphasis on hazardous materials training for state and local governments."
BIBLIOGRAPHY
