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MOBILIZATION STUDIES PROGRAM REPORT

THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
IN MOBILIZATION

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This research report represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the Commandant, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319.
Problem Statement: This paper considers the role of the executive office of the president (EOP) in emergency mobilization preparedness. This study includes: (1) an assessment of presidential decision making styles; (2) a review of the organization of the Executive Office of the President since 1939; (3) examples of presidential involvement in crisis resolution; and (4) a coordinative role model for the EOP.

Findings/Conclusions:
1. All presidential decisions, including those related to emergency mobilization preparedness, are heavily influenced by presidential style. A president may use one or more styles in a crisis.
2. In addition to presidential style, successful emergency mobilization preparedness must fully address the types of probable emergencies, the categories of response and the timeliness of decision-making.
3. The emergency mobilization preparedness effort has been handled effectively in many different ways. No single model offers a panacea to the mobilization planning problem.
4. To be effective, whoever has the emergency mobilization preparedness function should have:
   a. clear personal endorsement from the president.
   b. access to the president.
   c. a well defined coordinative role.
   d. a corporate memory (i.e. some permanent staff).
5. The transition period from one administration to another is extremely important because:
   a. the nation would be in grave danger during a crisis if an incoming president was unprepared and lacked access to the best advice.
   b. an incoming president's decision making style and his priorities are established during the transition period. It is highly desirable that the emergency mobilization preparedness function be established as a high priority during this period and the emergency mobilization preparedness decision making process be established.
6. Mobilization planning must function along the spectrum of possible emergencies, ranging from domestic to "brushfire" emergencies, to general or nuclear war. Such planning should directly involve the agencies and departments which have performance responsibility during a crisis.
Recommendations:

1. The emergency mobilization preparedness function should be institutionalized in the Executive Office of the President to ensure continuity of effort and resource management. The specific assignment of the function should rest with the president in power.

2. Since each president retains some flexibility in the staffing of the EOP, the emergency mobilization preparedness function needs some permanent staff who will transcend presidents. These professional staff positions could be located in the NSC, the Office of Policy Development, and/or other suitable locations within the EOP.

3. The planning component should not be divorced from the operational function, the latter is found usually at the department or agency level. Plans should be coordinated at the EOP level.

4. Exercises should be scheduled regularly to evaluate the validity of the plans, as well as the adequacy and timeliness of decisions concerning response. All federal agencies should take part and state, local, and private sector interests should be encouraged to participate as well.

5. The emergency mobilization preparedness function should be a priority point of discussion during presidential transitions, and the Vice President should be included in all developments to assure his ability to step in during a crisis. This early emphasis will avoid preparedness gaps which could threaten the nation and leave it vulnerable during an early administration crisis.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study examines the issue of mobilization preparedness within the Executive Office of the President. To gain a better understanding of presidential decision making and to relate these to emergency mobilization preparedness (EMP), the authors examine presidential leadership styles; focusing on the models presented by Alexander George. He identified three basic presidential management styles—competitive, formalistic, and collegial. The nine presidents from FDR to Reagan are categorized by their management techniques using the George models. A president may use one or more styles in an EMP crisis.

The study investigates how presidents perform in the resolution of crises. Specific examples taken from the spectrum of crises facing the United States in the past half century are considered. The effectiveness of presidential emergency preparedness activities is analyzed. The resolution of crises provides an excellent setting to examine the emergency preparedness function, and to compare and contrast the responses to the spectrum of crises ranging from the domestic emergency, the mid-level international "brushfire" crisis, and the ultimate all out war.

Exploration of the information available to the authors reveals the lack of a single approach to planning for emergency mobilization. Each newly elected president comes to the White House with the challenge to establish his administration's approach to emergency mobilization preparedness and he must
build or rebuild the infrastructure to support the policy planning effort. This has resulted in an uneven approach to the emergency mobilization preparation challenge.

The following summary presents some of the significant conclusions and recommendations of the study:

1. There has been no discernable institutionalization of the emergency mobilization preparedness function within the EOP.

2. Presidential transition periods offer an excellent opportunity for shaping each new administration's emergency planning policy.

3. Mobilization planning must address a spectrum of crises.

4. Agencies responsible for performance during an emergency provide the appropriate setting for the planning function; however, plans require top level coordination to insure performance.

5. Crisis management responsibilities often are shared among several agencies; this requires an "independent" EOP level coordinator to resolve differences and to assure timely performance.

6. The emergency mobilization preparedness responsibilities within the EOP must be placed with a person who has:
a. Clear personal endorsement of the president.

b. Access to the president.

c. A well defined coordinative role.

d. Access to a corporate memory (permanent staff).

7. Exercises should be scheduled to test and evaluate EMP plans.

8. The Vice President must be involved in the EMP process to assure his ability to function effectively during a crisis.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The buck stops here."

--President Harry S. Truman

The President of the United States has several major responsibilities, including setting priorities for his administration, managing the bureaucracy, maintaining relationships with foreign nations as well as with state and local governments, Congress and the courts, and (intertwined among all these), emergency preparedness and response. This paper deals with the President's responsibility in the area of emergency preparedness and response.

The Problem

As executive head of government, the President must be prepared to respond to three broad types of emergencies:

1) domestic emergencies or disasters, including natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods and tornadoes, and man-made problems such as hazardous materials incidents of great magnitude, radiation emergencies at fixed nuclear power stations, resource shortages—oil rationing or major domestic disorders such as terrorism, sabotage, or riots.
2) "brushfire" incidents worldwide perceived as requiring U. S. response, such as the Mayaguez incident, an Arab-Israeli war, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the deployment of AWACS to Egypt to deter initiation of war by Libya;

3) general war (whether conventional, strategic nuclear, or some combination), or other major national emergency of sufficient magnitude to require long-term full mobilization of the U. S. economic, military, industrial, and/or government resources.

Preparing for the first two categories above (i. e. domestic and "brushfire" emergencies) is obviously easier than preparing for the third (war or its equivalent), for several reasons:

1) domestic and "brushfire" emergencies occur more frequently,

2) damage from them is more predictable, and is generally manageable with reasonably available resources,

3) the preparedness effort for such emergencies is less rigorous than that necessary to prepare for war, or long-term mobilization, and

4) thus, there are more opportunities to evaluate the quality of the preparedness effort and appreciate its utility.
Since most Presidents must deal with domestic and "brushfire" emergencies with some frequency, preparedness activities appropriate to these emergencies capture the attention of most incoming administrations. Furthermore, these preparedness, or "emergency management" activities usually involve interface not only among federal agencies, but also with state and local governments and the private sector.

Since the effort or resources required to deal with these events, is usually minuscule when compared with the aggregate capability of our society to respond, real coordination is often minimal, even among federal agencies. Although, federal officials and politicians enjoy talking about the ongoing federal, state and local "partnership" in emergency management, evidence indicates that this "partnership" if it ever existed, has at least faltered, and perhaps even failed. Indeed, a majority of state-level emergency managers has expressed dissatisfaction with federal coordination and information-sharing in the area of emergency management, and conclude that "little more than lip service has generally been paid to the notion of coordination with state and local governments and with the private sector."¹

What, then of the "other" category - that so-called "unthinkable" event: general or nuclear war? What level of planning and coordination activity is appropriate in order to adequately prepare for an event more traumatic and devastating than anyone in our present government has ever experienced? Whatever the finite answer may be to this question, it certainly seems safe to say that a major war demands more extensive preparedness than a tornado or
short-term military incident. Since a major war would almost certainly result in at least some breakdown of civil order and disruption of normal governmental operations, cooperative ties among government agencies at all levels and with the private sector become critically important as war is contemplated. Yet, our examination does not disclose what one might rationally expect. Instead of more effort and resources being expended in planning for war than for the more frequent and familiar, small incidents, we discovered less. Instead of greater cooperation and information-sharing by the federal government with state and local governments in this area, we discovered almost none.

There are reasons, of course. First, state and local officials are themselves usually much more interested in being prepared for the events they see as most likely - tornadoes, floods, fires, etc. - not nuclear war. Their financial resources are usually limited, and while they may be willing to spend a modest amount to prepare for a fairly probable disaster, they are generally unwilling to spend much for nuclear attack preparedness. Many state and local officials would probably cooperate with such a program, as long as they did not have to pay for it, and as long as they thought "it made sense".

Second, it is unreasonable to expect that state or local officials (or members of the private sector, for that matter) will take such matters very seriously when they perceive major failures of data-sharing and cooperation among federal agencies. A number of examples of such failures were found in the course of our research and inquiry. For instance, the Department of Defense plans during mobilization to move troops in one direction along a major highway,
while the Federal Emergency Management Agency Crisis Relocation Plan calls for that highway to be one-way going the other direction as an evacuation route. In another state, National Guard troops during such an emergency designated to assemble at a public hall which, although probably large enough to accommodate this purpose, was certainly inadequate to simultaneously house the thousands of evacuees from a high-risk nuclear target area who were to use the facility as a FEMA-designated congregate care facility. In each of these examples [which have now been resolved], the problem was initially discovered by state-level planners, rather than through any coordinative activity with the federal government.

Finally, there appears to be a reluctance on the part of DOD to become involved seriously in population protection programs, such as those managed by FEMA - probably because of a well-founded concern that such involvement might lead inexorably to requirements for defense dollars which DOD policy-makers would rather spend elsewhere.

Based upon all the above, it appeared clear that, if there is to be meaningful national preparedness for nuclear war or its equivalent, it must be directed by the President for the simple reason that no single agency outside the White House can provide the necessary effective leadership or power to direct the entire bureaucracy, and coordinate allocation of resources and emergency preparedness at all levels of government as well as within the private sector.
In an article for *Phalanx*, John R. Brinkerhoff, Acting Associate Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, outlined several categories of response appropriate to various types of emergencies: military mobilization, industrial mobilization, economic mobilization, infrastructure mobilization, human resources mobilization, civil defense mobilization, and government mobilization. While his categorization of emergencies is substantially different from the one adopted for this paper, we accept his "mobilization categories" as a useful catalog of responses to emergency.  

The President, however, cannot be satisfied with only a sense of the types of emergency and the range of available responses; he must also be sensitive to questions of timing and timeliness. A well-considered decision too late may be far worse than an ill-considered, hasty decision by an inept and uninformed decision-maker, since there is at least some chance in the second instance of the decision accidentally being the right one. The answer, obviously, is for the President to have in place a mechanism for considering the full range of probable emergencies, and for thoughtful and timely consideration of the various responses, so that final decisions can be made wisely and promptly.

Following is a suggested matrix addressing the relationship between the types of emergency (as adopted for this paper) with Mr. Brinkerhoff's "mobilization categories." Such a matrix is inadequate, of course, since it does not include the crucial factors such as Presidential style or timeliness which are essential to any accurate perception of the full dimensions of emergency mobilization preparedness. These other aspects of EMP are more fully developed in Chapter 2 and elsewhere in this paper.
Our approach has been to review the experience of the modern Presidency as follows:

1) Assess the decision style of each modern President, beginning with President Roosevelt, and in turn relate to implications for EMP.

2) Consider from an historical perspective the development since 1939 of the Executive Office of the President, as a frame of reference for the EMP function.
3) Review examples of resolution of domestic crises, "brushfire" problems, and consider approaches to major war or other unprecedented emergencies.

Finally, we will present alternatives and recommendations concerning institutionalizing emergency management and emergency mobilization preparedness within the Executive Office of the President.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

1This is one of the conclusions reached in an independent study conducted under the auspices of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces by LTC Curt Griffith (one of the co-authors of this paper). In the course of that study 36 state-level emergency preparedness officials responded to a survey concerning relationships between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and state governments. Of this number 24 expressed significant dissatisfaction with the quality of federal coordination and information sharing.

CHAPTER 2

PRESIDENTIAL STYLE AND DECISIONMAKING

The United States Constitution vests responsibility for the Executive Branch in the President. The President's power, however, is not absolute, since detailed departmental organization within the Executive Department is controlled by Congress, as are appropriations for their operations. The exercise of these powers blends the style of the president, the timing of actions relative to a decision, the type of decision required and the spectrum of responses available. We are mainly concerned with presidential style and decision making as they relate to domestic, brushfire or general war emergency situations.

Until the era of the New Deal, Presidential power was generally limited, and no one seriously doubted the wisdom of such limitation. Any attempt by a Chief Executive to presume substantial powers would have almost surely generated strong voter disfavor. Only when war was imminent or in progress was any president able to safely assume broad powers, and these were usually either relinquished voluntarily by the President or sharply curtailed by Congress when the crisis had ended. It is said that Woodrow Wilson worked only three or four hours per day prior to World War I and that Calvin Coolidge slept an average of eleven hours each day. All this changed however, with the election of Franklin
Roosevelt during the Great Depression. The notion that a powerful president should take the lead in curing the economic ills of the country seemed an idea whose time had come.¹

The methods of decisionmaking through which modern presidents have dealt with the problems they have faced and the organization of their offices to assist in the decisionmaking process have in large measure been a reflection of their personal style. In order to understand the evolution of the Executive Office of the President, some discussion of presidential style is appropriate. Alexander George's presidential management styles and models offer an excellent base for such a discussion.²

GEORGE'S PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STYLES AND MODELS

George identifies three basic presidential management models—competitive, formalistic and collegial. The competitive model represents one end of the spectrum and in its purest form was the decisionmaking style used by Franklin D. Roosevelt. This style requires a chief executive who is comfortable with conflict, confident of his own competence and skills, savors political give and take and is willing to accept the fact that inter-departmental conflicts will often end up in his lap for resolution.

Although much simplified, one can delineate several features of this style. First, the President encourages conflict among his agency heads and cabinet officers. He does this by deliberately assigning overlapping responsibilities and conflicting jurisdiction. Second, little communication or collaboration
among advisers is practiced or sought. Third, he occasionally communicates directly with subordinates of cabinet heads seeking advice and information. Fourth, relevant information on important policy decisions is forced up to the President himself for resolution. Finally, he avoids becoming overloaded by operating the system selectively. He occasionally refuses to become involved and forces subordinates to reach agreement without his participation.³

The formalistic approach has been favored in one form or another by most modern presidents. The prototype is probably best exemplified by Eisenhower. President Eisenhower brought to the office his many years of experience as a senior military commander. It is only logical that he would favor and install a system with which he was familiar and which resembled the structured military staff system. Within the military, authority and inherent responsibility are delegated, problems and conflicts resolved at lower levels, and well turned alternatives succinctly presented to the commander for final decision. It was this influence which most shaped Eisenhower's decisionmaking style in the White House.

Important features of the Eisenhower formalistic approach include that specialized information flows to the President from each cabinet head and adviser. Second, the President tends to define the role of each adviser as a functional expert. Third, the President sticks to channels and seldom bypasses a cabinet head. Fourth, the President assumes responsibility for synthesis of specialized inputs from his advisers. Fifth, a "chief of staff" position is created to act on demand as a buffer between cabinet heads and the President and
to prepare formal recommendations to the President on policy matters. Finally, overload is prevented by urging subordinates to resolve conflicts among themselves whenever possible.4

The collegial model is associated with the style of John F. Kennedy. It sets at the opposite end of the spectrum from the competitive model. A president who is not comfortable with highly formalized procedures and deplores the risk of the disorder and strife of the competitive mode would likely opt for the teamwork and group approach referred to as the collegial model. The characteristics of this model include the President at the center of a wheel with spokes connecting to individual advisers/cabinet heads. Second, advisers form a team and engage in group problem solving. Third, information flows upward to the teams. Fourth, advisers do not funnel information to the President, rather the team serves as a 'debate team' on given policy actions. Fifth, advisers are encouraged to act as generalists rather than functional experts. Sixth, discussions are kept informal enough to encourage frank expression of views and avoid impediments generated by rank and status. Finally, the President occasionally gives an overlapping assignment and bypasses department heads to seek information and advice.5

PRACTITIONERS OF COMPETITION

Roosevelt's management style used competitive conflict in seeking out diverse ideas and granted overlapping delegations of authority—much like a feuding fraternity. He also demanded absolute centrality. These innovative aspects of his style were generally effective during his first two terms where
the New Deal programs used bold new experimentation to break the economic stranglehold of the Depression. However, his style encountered more difficulty when faced with wartime requirements for clear priorities and orderly administration.6

Roosevelt's managerial methods caused serious faults in emergency mobilization. His need for centrality, his fear of delegation and tendency to listen to anyone drove his aides and appointees to establish their indispensability. "He blunted his aides' capacity to work collectively on good ideas and staff them out."7 Rather, he encouraged competition through conflict.

Roosevelt's wartime organizations followed his style of competitive conflict and centrality. He created boards and commissions of multiple membership. Members of such boards and commissions often represented divergent views or were advocates for particular interest groups. Such boards or groups had multiple "directors" or none at all. Their charters were unclear and often overlapping.8

Roosevelt was comfortable in the presidency believing that his skills and competencies fit well the challenges of the times. He liked the political game and savored the conflict and chaos his style often caused. He fomented the conflict but carefully orchestrated it to gain the information he desired and profit from the competition among advisers.
Lyndon Johnson came from a background as a United States Senator and power broker in the Congress. Almost all his earlier experience had centered on domestic policy concerning which he was an expert. He moved comfortably in the domestic arena, knowing the value of and being an acknowledged master at "taking the temperature" of every interested party before moving ahead on any particular issue. He was intimately involved in the highly personal and combative style of leadership which gained him fear and fame as majority leader of the Senate. He tried to emulate FDR in presidential style, however, he moved toward a more formalistic approach as his term of office wore on. He fits the competitive model better than most recent presidents and the chaos that surfaced in his administration is indicative of this tendency.

Johnson inherited the collegial system of Kennedy but was by nature and training uncomfortable with such a system. The various crises visited upon the Johnson era demanded a rather structured system or at least a consistent system for managing and implementing presidential decisions. Such a system did not develop, however, for the Johnson personality and style and indeed his training for such management tasks were ill suited for a Kennedy style approach to crisis management. Accordingly, the Kennedy system withered and died during the Johnson administration as the President tried to mold his style to that of his hero-FDR. Because Johnson was unable to control the chaos he created, his policy making apparatus essentially disintegrated.
Johnson did, however, perform well in the domestic arena for he understood the domestic issues well. He lacked experience in foreign issues. He found it more useful to call in a handful of top advisers, confidants and close friends than to restore a completely formal policy making system such as Eisenhower's. Foreign policy became the focal point of the "Tuesday Lunch" held weekly with the Secretaries of State and Defense and his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The closed circle of the "Tuesday Lunch" offered security for the policy decisions on Viet Nam, however, it is clear that such limitation on advice to inner circle generalists prevented him from the much needed advice of experts of specific areas.

President Johnson's uncertainty with foreign policy made it very difficult for him to convey a sense of purpose and direction for his administration. His lack of direction and use of secrecy encouraged confusion in policy implementation. The use of an informal ad hoc policy making system coupled with the confusion in implementation and the uncertainty as to who was doing what on any particular issue resulted in an incoherent, ineffective Executive Office of the President and a divided and demoralized administration.

FORMALISTIC PRESIDENTS

Most presidents have used some form of the formalistic model as the basis of their decisionmaking policy. In every case, the President has placed his own stamp on the model.
Harry Truman is quoted as saying about Roosevelt, "He did it, tried to do it all by himself, which was one of his troubles." Obviously, Truman was willing to delegate authority. Further, he wanted to stop the bureaucratic bickering which Roosevelt had encouraged. To this end he constructed a more formal structure with well defined lines of communications. Truman did not use the chief of staff approach in the way in which Eisenhower later would. His "buck stops here" approach meant that many problems which could have been solved at lower levels were allowed to percolate to the top.

Like most presidents, Truman relied on some individuals more than others. The President's personal staff became an institutionalized power in itself under the tutelage of the unofficial kingpin of the White House Clark Clifford. The President valued and sought the advice of long time associates leading some to accuse him of "cronyism". Whether or not such charges had any basis the Truman administration generally reached timely and well-considered decisions based on the appropriate factors. It was primarily a cabinet government.

No president has entered office in modern times with a background which more strongly indicated the probability of success than Richard Nixon. He had impressive academic credentials and background as a bureaucrat, Navy Officer, Congressman, Senator and eight years as Vice President. The eight years as Vice President under Eisenhower provided Nixon an excellent opportunity to understand the structured decisionmaking process favored by that administration. It appears that Nixon observed the process with some care and intended to emulate it to a large extent when he began his first term in 1969. However,
Eisenhower's "notions of staff... were based on the military model, but only as a professional soldier fully understood, they were adaptable to the fortuities of circumstance. They worked for him; later they would not work for Nixon who did not understand their subtleties."

The real changes from the Eisenhower model were primarily a result of Nixon's personal characteristics. He relished a certain amount of aloneness and time for private contemplation. He wanted staff options provided in detail with plenty of time for reflection before decisions were due. Most importantly he chose close subordinates to be people who offered order, loyalty and were willing to band together against what was perceived as the hostile environment outside the White House.

At least one thoughtful scholar, Hedley Donovan, sees Nixon's choices of staff as extremely important in why his administration ultimately failed in so many respects:

A crucial executive ability, above all for the Chief Executive of the United States, is perceptiveness about people. This will bear heavily on the quality of his appointments and his ability to mold his people into an effective administration. He must be shrewd enough to see when infighting is unavoidable, even useful, and when it is destructive. Nixon's management methods brought us Watergate.
Most observers of the Nixon presidency felt that the staff dominated the cabinet. Chief roles on the Nixon staff went to H. R. Haldeman as Chief of Staff and John Ehrlichman as the guiding force of the Domestic Council. The staff-cabinet and staff-bureaucracy relations were oftimes difficult ones. The evidence indicates that the staff usually won such clashes. William Spragens points out that Nixon's staff served him too greatly as a shield and thus did him a disservice; also that the Nixon staff included some talented individuals but that regardless of capability, some if not all of the staff functioned without an effective moral compass.

In the area of foreign affairs and National Security, Henry Kissinger served as essentially a second Chief of Staff. All activity in those areas was funneled through a very structured NSC channel to Kissinger thence to Nixon. This apparently worked reasonably well—witness the secret negotiations on Vietnam and the "opening" of China.

Following the trauma of Watergate and the resignation of President Nixon, the nation sorely needed reassurance. Thrust into the spotlight of history at that time was veteran Congressman and short term Vice President Gerald Ford. He had neither the charisma of a Kennedy or the background in executive management of an Eisenhower or Nixon, yet he displayed the kind of stability that the nation needed.

Gerald Ford's presidential style was formed less during his brief tenure as Vice President than by his long service in the House of Representatives. Ford's
time as Vice President provided little opportunity for creativity, however, it
did introduce him to the myriad duties and issues facing the President. It
appears clear that Nixon had made a good choice and that Ford took full
advantage of his time in the Vice Presidency to learn as much about the job as
he could.

The resignation of Nixon placed Ford in a unique place in history, the first
President who had not been elected to either the presidency or the vice
presidency. He recognized and appreciated the need to restore public confidence
in the Executive Branch while demonstrating to world leaders that the United
States Government had met a supreme challenge and had survived intact.14

President Ford had to consider the viewpoints of all sectors of the
political spectrum. By doing this and displaying an open receptive style of
leadership, he was able to restore confidence in the presidency. Ford retained
essentially the same staff setup as Nixon although at first he resisted the
designation of a Chief of Staff. Essentially his approach was a looser form of
the formalistic model deliberately modified to indicate openness and a collegial
bent—qualities required by the circumstances of his elevation to the Office of
President. Cautious deliberation became the key to his style. He accepted full
responsibility for the tough decisions which he made; however, such decisions
were made only after he was convinced that he had received the best analysis of
all facets of the matter at hand.

While no issue during the Ford administration required mobilization of the
nation's resources, several crises occurred any one of which could have led to
significant international involvement. It is worth noting that in facing these issues, Ford continued to use the general policy formulation process initiated by Nixon—a structured decisionmaking process which depended on a thorough review of all policy options and included the process of consensus building within the bureaucracy.  

Ronald Reagan's decisionmaking process resembles that of Eisenhower perhaps more than that of any other modern president. Like Eisenhower, Reagan prefers that his staff boil down the issues to short memoranda. Unlike Eisenhower, however, Reagan seems to depend less on his cabinet officers and more on his own staff. He appears uncomfortable with open confrontation or dissent; he generally seeks consensus and resists consensus only when he sees his own political principles or promises being violated.

Decisionmaking and policy related to emergency mobilization preparedness or other emergency matters are generated by two executive groups which can, when appropriate, present alternatives and recommendations. The first group is the Domestic Crisis Group, chaired by Vice President Bush. Members include Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese and appropriate cabinet officers and department and agency heads e.g. FEMA, Commerce, Transportation, Justice, etc. The other crisis group, also chaired by Bush, is the International Crisis Group. Membership includes Mr. Meese, the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and others.
COLLEGIAL STYLES

The formal organization of the Executive Office of the President or, indeed, of the entire administration was less important during the Kennedy Presidency than personal relationships with the President. President Kennedy would casually ignore an organizational chart to seek an opinion from some he trusted; no other U. S. Chief Executive has chosen the U. S. Attorney General (who happened to be his brother) as his chief adviser and confidant on nearly all matters. It is probably accurate to say that little, if anything, was "institutionalized" during the Kennedy administration except the overwhelming importance of the President's personality, personal energy and style. Organizational structure if not nonexistent was at least largely irrelevant.

Jimmy Carter was elected as an "outsider" untainted by Watergate style corruption and unsullied by even marginal familiarity with federal government operations. Perhaps picturing himself as a latter-day Kennedy, Carter initially eschewed the use of a chief of staff, deciding instead to adopt the collegial "spokes of the wheel" concept Kennedy used. Carter had nine assistants all with direct access to the President. As indicated earlier, this approach had worked well for Kennedy largely due to his personal involvement and openness to dissent and the sophistication of his advisers. The "spokes" of the Kennedy "wheel" included such men as Ken O'Donnell, McGeorge Bundy, Larry O'Brien, Pierre Salinger, Ralph Dungan, Arthur Schlesinger and of course, Robert Kennedy. In comparison, Carter usually remained aloof, disliked dissent and six of his "spokes" were fellow Georgians equally unfamiliar with the inner workings of the federal government. Carter used a formal structured NSC whereas Kennedy largely
ignored the NSC, thence Carter in some ways mixed the formal and the collegial.17

When Carter finally recognized the need to introduce some formality to his policy making process, he added a chief of staff. His appointee, Hamilton Jordan, had neither experience nor aptitude as an administrator. Finally with only about six months remaining in his term of office, he appointed the able Jack Watson as chief of staff. Watson dramatically improved the operation during the last months of the Carter administration and according to Edwin Meese was instrumental in effecting an extremely smooth and productive transition between the Carter and Reagan teams.18

SUMMARY

While presidential decisionmaking is largely a function of personality and personal style, the George models assist as a starting point in understanding the differences among the modern presidents. Expanding on this categorization, Joseph Califano has summarized, for the last five presidents, the influence of personal style on decision making.

The personality differences between Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford are pointed out sharply in their different styles of conducting business of the Oval Office. Eisenhower's staff system was military; his appearance fatherly. Kennedy's staff system was
less structured; his appearance exuberent and energetic. Johnson’s staff system was frenetic, seeking a cure for every ill; his appearance one of indefatigable perpetual motion, in constant conversation and consultation. Nixon’s staff system was elaborately structured; his personal style one of lonely contemplation and suspicion, speaking to an unprecedently small number of aides. Ford’s staff system is middle-America, a group of the boys trying to work things out; his personal style neighborly, sincere.  

Though each president can be generally categorized within one of the George models, it will also become apparent as we discuss specific cases that a given president can react with differing style to differing crises. Roosevelt was the perfect competitive model in domestic matters but was most formalistic in military matters. Ford, normally formal, tended to the collegial especially in domestic affairs due to the unusual circumstances of his assumption of the presidency.

Our categorization of the modern presidents between style and category of crisis is shown in Figure 1. How each president has considered the problems of emergency preparedness appears to be related to his tendency toward the formalistic approach. The formalistic presidents have generally maintained a more formal mobilization apparatus and personal interest in its operation.
## TYPE OF EMERGENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Brushfire</th>
<th>General War</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Roosevelt Johnson</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collegial</td>
<td>Kennedy Ford Carter</td>
<td>Kennedy Carter</td>
<td>Kennedy Carter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1**

25
Chapter 2


3 Ibid., p. 149-150.


5 Ibid., p. 157-158.

7IBID., p. 158.

8IBID., p. 160.


10George, Decision Making, p. 154-155.


12IBID.


17 George, Decision Making, p. 159-160.


CHAPTER 3

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: 1939-1983

"The Presidency has been in existence for 150 years,
but not until the summer of 1939 was there an
Executive Office of the President."¹

The official staff with which Franklin D. Roosevelt began his tenure
consisted of the Secretary to the President and a three member secretariat. This
small staff traditionally authorized for the President proved no longer adequate
for the greatly expanded responsibilities that Congress gave to the President,
nor for the peoples' escalating demands for presidential initiatives. Prior to
the Great Depression, the American public had generally feared excessive
government power; now, a frightened populace was willing to vest great power in
a leader who could confidently proclaim that "there was nothing to fear but fear
itself."²

Roosevelt: Creation of the Executive Office of the President

Roosevelt created the President's Committee on Administration (better known
as the Brownlow Committee, since it was chaired by Louis Brownlow), to devise
ways to increase administrative help for the presidential staff. This effort
finally resulted in the Reorganization Act of 1939, which authorized the
creation of the Executive Office of the President (Figure 2).

While not in the original chart, the administrative order creating the Executive Office of the President provided for establishing an Office of Emergency Management (OEM) whenever the President decided that an event or threat of national emergency made its creation necessary. Such a Presidential decision was not long in coming; the functions which would fall under the Office of Emergency Management were transferred to the Executive Office of the President on September 8, 1939, seven days after Hitler invaded Poland and started the world on the path toward World War II. This transfer of functions was formalized when in May, 1940, the Office of Emergency Management officially became a separate office within the Executive Office of the President.3

Throughout the war years, the face of the EOP changed as agencies were created (and discarded) to better meet the emergencies of the times. At times the Office of Emergency Management had as many as fifteen active agencies under its direction. By 1944 the EOP was organized as shown in Figure 3.4

The Truman Years

Roosevelt's immediate successor, Harry Truman, faced transition from global war to peace to cold war to limited war. During this time the Executive Office of the President underwent continual change. The President's personal staff grew but more importantly there developed a further institutionalization of the EOP. The most significant changes were the addition of the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers and the National Security
Executive Office of the President—1939
Figure 2
Resources Board. By 1948 the Executive Office of the President was organized as depicted in Figure 4.5

To handle emergency mobilization matters, Truman placed the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) in the EOP. The NSRB was advisory to the President on the "Coordination of planning for military, industrial and civilian mobilization, especially all-out mobilization, the development of policies and programs affecting the adequacy of the nation's natural, industrial and human resources for military and civilian needs, and the stabilization of the economy under war or near war conditions."6

In 1947, the National Security Council was established as part of the EOP with the President as its chairman. Included in the original NSC was the Chairman of the NSRB who insured continuity with a mobilization focus.7

The Office of Emergency Management became largely dormant and the need for the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) disappeared as World War II concluded. In its place the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) was created within the EOP and was responsible for the direction, control and coordination of all domestic and foreign economic mobilization programs of the Executive Branch. The Director of the ODM was charged with the direction and coordination of all federal agencies and activities during the Korean War. The ODM could assign functions, issue directives and require reports from any federal agency, including cabinet departments, on mobilization matters. The broad powers of the ODM could have allowed its director, Charles Wilson, almost to become an
Executive Office of the President--1944
Figure 3

The President

The White House Office

Bureau of the Budget

Office of Emergency Management

Liaison Office for Personnel Management

Committee for Congested Production Areas

War Refugee Board

Executive Office of the President--1948
Figure 4

The President

Bureau of the Budget

The White House Office

Council of Economic Advisers

National Security Council

National Security Resources Board

Liaison Office for Personnel Management

Office of Emergency Management

33
"Assistant President". Instead he followed the OWMR pattern of becoming involved in the conflicting operations of different federal agencies.\(^8\)

The Executive Office of the President as constituted when Truman handed over the reins of government to Eisenhower was organized as shown in Figure five.\(^9\)

**Eisenhower**

An Eisenhower trait that greatly influenced the Executive Office of the President was his perspective of system. He relied on good organization thorough staff work and an orderly structure upon which important issues were sounded out and eventually resolved.

Eisenhower maintained the Office of Defense Mobilization and its director, Arthur Fleming, was included in the cabinet. The ODM director was also made a statutory member of an expanded National Security Council. The NSC was remodeled into a senior EOP policy planning and formulation body concerned with the whole field of national security. Thus the ODM was included and actively participated in EOP policy groups.\(^10\)

The ODM established a Committee on Manpower Resources to reshape a new reserve system to replace a large standing armed force. The President supported the committee efforts as expressed by the ODM: it became law. The President even took advantage of a civil defense test while in an emergency national command post to broadcast his personal support for the reserve manpower legislation. Such personal presidential endorsement of its emergency
Executive Office of the President--1952
Figure 5
mobilization policies, coupled with its direct access to the President when necessary, combined to assure that the Office of Defense Mobilization enjoyed a significant position in the EOP and a level of respect never reached by advocates of strong mobilization policy either before or since.\textsuperscript{11}

During the Eisenhower administration, the Office of the Director of Mutual Security and the National Security Resources Board were eliminated from the EOP resulting in the structure shown in Figure 6.\textsuperscript{12} Probably the greatest contribution of the Eisenhower administration was the development of a coordinating function within the White House which worked very well and assured thoughtful consideration of all issues prior to decision. Papers from the departments came to the White House where they were studied by competent staff people, discussed by various cabinet officials (who were themselves quite capable and knowledgable) and finally acted upon from an overall perspective.\textsuperscript{13}

**John F. Kennedy**

President John F. Kennedy had a style dramatically different from that of Eisenhower. Kennedy's style emphasized personal management. He dismantled Eisenhower's hierarchical staff organization and replaced it with a more collegial organization wherein the President surrounded himself with trusted principle advisers. To operate under such a concept the Executive Office of the President required a small staff well known and trusted by the President. The National Security Council was reduced in size and function and seldom met on a formal basis. The Cabinet rarely met as a body. The Director of the ODM still
Executive Office of the President—1954
Figure 6
remained a member of the NSC but had little influence with the other agencies. Kennedy used ad hoc advisory groups to meet crisis or conflicts—during the Cuban Missile Crisis a group called Excom, an executive group for the National Security Council made up of trusted staff advised the President.\(^{14}\)

Despite the approach which Kennedy took, the Executive Office of the President expanded during his tenure. This was a reflection of his broad interests and activities especially in the areas of science and space. The organization of the EOP is reflected in Figure 7 for the Kennedy era.\(^ {15}\)

LBJ

During the tenure of Lyndon Johnson, although the EOP staff grew in size only two major changes took place. In support of his Great Society programs the Office of Economic Opportunity was created in 1964. Its purpose was to strengthen, supplement and coordinate efforts to further the policy of the United States to "eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity for work and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity." Additionally, the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 established the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering as part of the EOP. The EOP at the end of the Johnson administration was organized as shown in Figure 8.\(^ {16}\)
Executive Office of the President--1963
Figure 7
Richard Nixon

President Nixon moved promptly and aggressively to establish a carefully structured and systematic decisionmaking process. When he became President in January 1969, he began with a White House staff of 250. He soon doubled it in size and also substantially increased major elements of the Executive Office of the President including the National Security Council and the Office of the Budget. The latter was reorganized as the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the recommendations of the President's Council on Executive Reorganization. This Council, headed by Roy Ash, had also recommended the establishment of the Domestic Council to parallel the National Security Council. Its advocates had hoped that the Council would help restore the cabinet to a position of vitality. Regrettably, it did not work that way, as the Nixon staff became more and more dominant.17

In 1969, the Office of Intergovernmental Relations was created to strengthen federal, state and local relations. The Reorganization Plan of 1970 included the creation of the Office of Management and Budget, the Domestic Council, the Council on Environmental Quality and the Office of Telecommunications Policy.

In 1971, the Council on International Economic Policy and the Office of Consumer Affairs were added to the EOP. The following year the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention was added and the Office of Emergency Preparedness was eliminated. In 1973 the Council on Economic Policy, the Federal Property Council and the Energy Policy Office were created. The tenure of Richard Nixon was one of significant change and growth in the EOP with
special emphasis placed on the National Security Council and its role in international policy making. The Nixon reorganization resulted in an Executive Office of the President as outlined in Figure 9.18

Gerald Ford

The decision making process inherited by President Ford was marked by its inherent structure for coordination and its dedication to contingency planning. Placing the responsibility for crisis planning solidly in the NSC highlighted the necessity for coherent advance planning by the highest levels of the Executive Branch. Figure 10 shows the NSC structure as it existed during the Ford presidency. This structure placed the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or his deputy on each of the committees, groups or panels. Henry Kissenger and his deputy, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft thus became Ford's closest advisers, and their impact was not limited to international security matters. Ford's reliance on this system can be seen in his response to several domestic and international crises.

During the Ford administration the Council on Economic Policy was eliminated and a Council of Wage and Price Stability activated. The Energy Policy Office became the Energy Resources Council and the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention became the Office of Drug Abuse Policy. The EOP as turned over to Jimmy Carter was as shown in Figure 11.19

Carter

President Carter came to office as a proponent for what has become a familiar approach--he would return to cabinet government and reduce the size of
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STRUCTURE

FIGURE 9

FIGURE 10
the White House staff. Neither of these was accomplished. His Reorganization Plan of 1977 considerably changed the makeup of the EOP by eliminating four agencies—the Office of Telecommunications Policy, the Energy Resources Council, the Council on International Economic Policy and the Office of Drug Abuse Policy. Further many functions were transferred and redefined. The Domestic Policy Staff replaced Ford's Domestic Council but it remained essentially the same. An Office of Administration was created which provides administrative support services to all units of the EOP except those in direct support of the President. The results of the Carter reorganization are shown in Figure 12.20

The Current EOP

President Reagan has made only minor changes in the overall structure of the Executive Office of the President. The Council on Wage and Price Stability was eliminated and the Domestic Staff was reorganized into the Office of Policy Development with an expanded role. Additionally, Mr. Reagan considers the Office of the Vice President to be a part of the EOP. The current organization of the EOP is depicted in Figure 13.21

Summary

Over the forty plus years of the existence of the Executive Office of the President, it can be said that each President has placed his own stamp on the organization and the direction of this section of government. Some have made drastic changes in structure and use of the EOP others only superficial
adjustments. Over the entire time period the total size of the EOP has grown steadily perhaps as the complexities of the demands on the presidency have grown. Those programs which are to be emphasized by any particular President have invariably appeared within the EOP either as a separate and highly visible entity or as redirected and strongly emphasized priorities within one of the existing agencies.

FDR created the Office of Emergency Management and a myriad of subordinate agencies which provided the mobilization impetus for World War II. During the Truman administration the function of emergency management preparedness was spread throughout several agencies—the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Office of the Director for Mutual Security. Eisenhower pared down the agencies involved putting the responsibility in the NSC and the ODM. The terms of Kennedy and Johnson nearly saw the death of formal mobilization preparedness within the major staff elements of the White House. The domestic issues of emergency were stripped one by one from the various agencies and returned to the department from which they came. The Office of Emergency Preparedness was a weak follow on to the ODM and the NSC was relegated a back seat during this time.

President Nixon continued to strengthen the NSC and to weaken the role of the OEP. Under Ford the OEP was allowed to wither and die with all functions transferred back to original agencies. Carter working with a strong NSC late in his term of office, noted the need for a stronger arm dedicated to mobilization and designated the Federal Emergency Management Agency as his agent for pulling
together the various resources of the country and planning for their use in war or other major disaster. FEMA provided the roof under which the various agencies could gather. President Reagan has strengthened FEMA and superimposed the Emergency Planning Board as a cabinet level planning committee overseeing the FEMA's work. We can see that although the thread of continuity has been maintained in dealing with emergency mobilization matters the actual agencies involved have moved out of the EOP and into other staff agencies.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 3


6 Hess, Organizing the Presidency.
7IBID.

8IBID.


11IBID., p. 188-201.


13Pusey, Eisenhower the President, p. 188-201.


17 Nash, Organizing and Staffing the Presidency, p. 44-45.


CHAPTER 4
RESOLUTION OF DOMESTIC CRISES

Dealing with domestic emergencies is a Presidential responsibility which is simple in concept but extremely complex in application. The complexity centers around the constantly changing and sometimes troubled relationships between the Executive Branch and both the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the federal government, between the presidency and the various departments, agencies, bureaus which comprise the federal bureaucracy, and finally, the relationships between the "federal" or national government and state and local governments.

This chapter discusses two presidential approaches to specific domestic crises during the past half century, pointing up differences in presidential style and organizational structure as well as illustrating some of the troubled relationships mentioned above.

FACING A HOSTILE STATE GOVERNMENT: EISENHOWER'S FIRM HAND IN LITTLE ROCK SCHOOLS CASE

President Eisenhower faced a classic Constitutional confrontation with the government of Arkansas in the wake of the historic U. S. Supreme Court school desegregation decision of May 1954.
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided the previous "separate but equal" public education policy was no longer consistent with the guarantee of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Later, the Court placed the primary responsibility for desegregation "with all deliberate speed," under supervision where necessary of federal District Courts. Pursuant to this policy, the Little Rock, Arkansas school board developed a Court-approved plan for the desegregation of the senior Little Rock high schools with integration starting in the fall of 1957.

Integration of the Little Rock schools was not going to be easy, however. The State Chancery Court, on August 29, responded to the expressed concern of Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus that desegregation would lead to violence, entered a restraining order preventing the plan from going into effect. The next day the Federal District Court responded to a petition from the Little Rock School Board by issuing an order forbidding anyone from interfering with the planned high school integration.

On September 3, Governor Faubus directly defied the federal court order by ordering the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the black students from entering but demanded enforcement of federal law and court orders. Sherman Adams, a presidential aide, prepared a telegram for Faubus to send to Eisenhower specifying the Governor request the meeting and his intention to obey the federal law. Even though Faubus sent a slightly altered request indicating his "desire" to obey the law, Eisenhower agreed to a meeting on September 14 at Newport, Rhode Island, where he was on a working vacation. Faubus and
Eisenhower met privately for twenty minutes and then were joined by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Adams, and Gerald Morgan, Special Counsel to the President. Eisenhower wanted Faubus to change the orders to the National Guard to allow the Negro students to enter school while still preserving law and order. The Department of Justice could then recommend that the Governor not be brought into Court. After the meeting, Eisenhower had the understanding that Faubus would not prevent entry of the black students; however, Hays called within a short time saying that Faubus was refusing to make a clear commitment. On September 19, Faubus attempted to have the federal judge disqualified for prejudice and then the next day at the hearing, the Governor's lawyers walked out. As expected, the Court issued an injunction against Governor Faubus and the National Guard commander. Faubus immediately removed the National Guard and left Arkansas to attend a Southern Governor's Conference in Georgia. At this point, President Eisenhower faced a very substantial challenge: not only did he face a monumental Constitutional confrontation and the prospect of domestic violence over the increasingly volatile issue of race relations; in addition, the world was watching. Throughout the world, those who customarily viewed the United States as the shining exemplar in the area of human rights were now beginning to look askance at President Eisenhower, some of them wondering aloud why the conqueror of Europe could not more easily and effectively assure the safety of a small number of black students entering a school. Friends of the United States were becoming openly critical; its enemies were revelling in the obvious propaganda windfall, portraying the U. S. as a hopelessly bigoted, violent, and racist society. The decision was issued on Friday; the world waited with bated breath to see what Monday would bring.
Monday brought trouble. A large mob overwhelmed the local police in Little Rock, and prevented the black students from attending school. Governor Faubus made no efforts to maintain law and order. Seizing upon the Governor's failure to take action, Eisenhower issued a proclamation as required (Number 3024), indicating that he would use the full power of the United States to put down the mob violence in Little Rock. The following day, the mob was even larger and uglier. The Mayor of Little Rock appealed to Max Robb in the White House for federal assistance.

It was clear that the White House had to do something. Eisenhower and Brownell discussed several options, including the use of the F. B. I. or having the U. S. Marshall for the district enlist the support of citizens to help him put down the disorder. Neither of these were considered feasible. Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor discussed the wisdom of sending in the Arkansas National Guard, not from Little Rock prior to the dispatch of regular federal troops. Shortly after noon, Eisenhower called Attorney General Brownell and advised that he was about to sign Executive Order 10730 which would both federalize the Arkansas National Guard and send regular federal troops into Little Rock. Then, at 12:15 p.m., Eisenhower called General Taylor and directed him to dispatch the troops. By the end of the day, 1,000 troops from the 101st Airborne Division were in Little Rock. Eisenhower then returned to the White House and made a radio-television broadcast to the nation explaining the circumstances and action he took to insure the Court's orders suffered no interference. The next morning, the violence had ended and the black high school students of Little Rock attended school under the protection of the United States Army.
The Southern Governors' conference proposed a committee of its members meet with Eisenhower to seek withdrawal of the troops. Governors Hodges (North Carolina), Clement (Tennessee), Collins (Florida), and McKeldin (Maryland) met with Eisenhower on October 1 and tried to mediate a solution but Faubus would not carry out the court order requiring the integration of the high school. The situation in Little Rock cooled off and by the end of October, half of the regular Army troops had left and 80 percent of the Guard were released from federal duty. By the end of November, all regular troops had left and only twenty-one Guardsmen remained at the high school.

MOUNT ST. HELENS AND THE CARTER WHITE HOUSE: MICROMANAGING A MAJOR DISASTER

The eruption of the Mount St. Helens volcano is the best example of the Carter White House involvement in a major domestic emergency. As a reflection of the Carter style of management, the disaster provides direct evidence of his apparent compulsion to be involved directly in the most minute details of planning and execution. While other chief executives might have sent emissaries to the disaster region, and limited direct presidential involvement to a symbolic visit or fly over (such presidential visits are much sought after by state emergency managers, since they usually assure a presidential disaster declaration), President Carter assembled an entourage of high ranking department and agency heads. Together they traveled to the devastated area, and met with local, state, and county officials. Then they reported directly to the national and regional press on progress and plans.
Speaking to reporters in Portland, Oregon on May 22, 1980, President Carter identified the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Administration, John Macy, as the federal official responsible for coordination of the entire federal effort in the disaster area. The President then introduced the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Interior, Secretary of the Army, Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the Presidential Science advisor, emphasizing that they all shared responsibility for insuring rapid federal response. Throughout his tour of the area, Carter stressed the shared responsibility of federal, state, and local governments, as well as the need for private sector representatives to become involved in the recovery activity.

To facilitate allocation of federal funds to the problem, President Carter quickly approved requests from the governors of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho for major disaster area designation. This immediate action made available the full range of the disaster recovery programs under Public Law 93-20 including aid to individuals and families as well as governmental units. It also permitted extension of crop storage deadlines, and allowed extended terms on government insured financing in the agricultural community.

Because the eruption and subsequent ash flow disrupted so many facets of daily life and commerce in the Northwest, FEMA had a gigantic task to coordinate the needed recovery activities. To assist in this effort, President Carter appointed Bob Stevens as his personal representative and based him in the region during the primary clean up and recovery activity. Stevens became the principle liaison between Washington and the state and local representatives in
the Northwest.

It is interesting to note that Carter took personal interest in the problems of federal and state cooperation. His experience as governor of Georgia and his perceived inability to communicate with the Nixon White House during his gubernatorial term, led, no doubt, to the empathetic concern he demonstrated in the handling of this crisis. To his credit, federal resources were mobilized quickly, and determination of specific state or federal responsibility took a back seat to the need for immediate action to resolve suffering and distress. Within hours of the explosion and eruption, President Carter, through the Secretary of the Army, dispatched the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers to reopen a channel in the Columbia River, and within a few days, several dredging operations were underway, restoring the vital commercial value of the Columbia River.4

In spite of presidential involvement, however (indeed, perhaps because of it), there remained some ambiguity as to who was in charge. While identifying the director of FEMA as the responsible official for coordination of all federal efforts, Carter placed direct responsibility for specific action in the hands of those department heads and cabinet officers whose agencies were involved.5 Thus, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior, and the Army each had specific responsibilities in the recovery activity. Federal funds to support these activities came through traditional departmental budgets.
Further, the President's initial/laudable disregard for determination of state and local share of costs was later viewed less favorably by state officials when they were forced to agree to pay 25% of the cost. Speaking to state and local officials in Spokane, Carter emphasized the role of the local individuals and the local agencies in the recovery and clean up. While committing the federal government to providing additional funds, President Carter made it clear to the Governors of the region that they would be expected to share the cost of recovery. He mentioned no specific share.\textsuperscript{6} There had been no "formula" or percentage share policy before the disaster. State and local share of costs were traditionally negotiated with regional federal officials after the fact. Policy shift was announced to the states either in the federal register or otherwise. FEMA held fast. The states had no viable choice, even though there was no clear statement from President Carter saying he personally directed this cost sharing ratio. In any event, whether or not he was fully aware of state objections, the new formula was sufficient to lead the State of Washington to the edge of bankruptcy. It also helped to end the political career of Governor Dixie Lee Ray. In the end, Washington's share of disaster recovery costs was approximately $25 million. If, in fact, President Carter was unaware of the devastating impact of this new policy on state governments in this disaster, the irony is overwhelming. While paying careful attention to relatively unimportant details, he lost sight of a major issue of enormous importance to the states involved.

One potentially dangerous side affect of the initial eruption was the influx of curious tourists. This posed new problems of control and complicated the
already confused lodging and feeding situation. Recognizing the uniqueness of the natural disaster, President Carter correctly predicted that one serendipitous result would be the increase in tourism for the area, a factor which would have a positive affect in the out years.

President Carter's highly personal style of management of details, his carefully developed image of being accessible to all the people, and his experience in the Georgia state house all helped to shape his presidential style.

Summary

These two examples of domestic crises help to define the role of presidential style in crisis settings. The formalistic style of Dwight Eisenhower could be seen in his use of the formal organization within the executive branch. His decisions during the emergency in Little Rock were based solidly on the foundation built in forming his executive organization. His use of the military was an example of government resource employment and was based on sound planning for the mobilization and employment of federal forces.

President Carter, on the other hand, displayed less of his collegial style in his response to the Mount St. Helens incident. While his FEMA director had nominal responsibility for a domestic emergency such as the volcanic eruption, Carter weakened his authority by visibly involving other department heads in the decision process. The initial quick response was less a factor of prior
planning than an ad hoc intervention by the chief executive. It is obvious that presidential style plays a large role in all aspects of emergency preparedness, but that role becomes even more significant when hostile military force is involved. The following chapter looks into the next level of crisis—the international brushfire incident.


3IBID., p. 956.

4IBID., p. 951.

5IBID., p. 956.

6IBID., p. 957.
Since World War II there have been numerous international crises which involved the United States. None of these have approached the level of global war and thus have not involved total mobilization. A sampling of these crises allows the opportunity to observe the decisionmaking process as well as some phases of mobilization activities. For our purposes four "brushfire" incidents have been chosen for brief treatment. These include the invasion of South Korea, the 1958 Lebanon crisis, the Cuban missile crisis and the Mayaguez incident.

HARRY TRUMAN'S HANDLING OF THE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA

On June 24, 1950, the North Koreans launched an attack on South Korea across the 38th Parallel. Secretary of State Dean Acheson advised President Truman of the attack by telephone, since Truman was in Missouri. It was decided to refer the matter immediately to the United Nations Security Council. On the 25th of June the security council passed a resolution requesting the North Koreans to stop the attack and return to their country. Also on the 25th, Truman returned to the White House to meet with several of his civilian and military advisors. Attending this meeting were members of the State Department, Secretary Acheson,
Undersecretary Webb, Assistant Secretaries Hickerson and Rusk, and Ambassador Jessup, and from the Department of Defense, Secretary Johnson, Navy Secretary Mathews, Army Secretary Pace, Air Force Secretary Finletter, JCS Chairman Bradley, Army General Collins, Navy Admiral Sherman, and Air Force General Vandenberg. The attack was interpreted as part of a general offensive, not just a civil war. It was decided that the attack must be stopped in order to deter other Communist attacks elsewhere in the world.

It was assumed the Soviet Union was behind their attack and had worldwide aggressive intentions. The discussions held on June 25 were outside the National Security Council formal structure. Significantly, no member of the emergency mobilization office was included. The Soviets had supplied the North Koreans with planes, tanks, and heavy artillery. Apparently the Soviets assumed the North Koreans were strong enough to win militarily since the South Koreans did not have either the training or the equipment to stop them. Even though the United States did not have a mobile combat force available and the troops in Japan were not combat ready, Truman directed that air and naval forces assist the evacuation of Americans and that ammunition and equipment be sent immediately to Korea. On June 26 the same group met again and directed that air and naval forces attack the North Koreans south of the 38th Parallel. At the same time, in anticipation of a spreading conflict, the Seventh Fleet was sent to Formosa and increased military aid was directed toward the Philippines and Indochina. On June 27, Truman personally approved a United Nations resolution, which was passed the same day, recommending that other nations help repel the North Korean attack.
Truman was concerned with Congressional response to the commitment of U. S. forces. He met with Senator Tom Connally who considered the President's actions proper and appropriate. On June 27 and 30, Truman met with Congressional leaders and briefed them on Korea and U. S. actions but elected not to ask for a resolution endorsing his actions.

Army Secretary Pace advised Truman on June 30 that General MacArthur recommended introduction of ground forces as a necessary stopping force. After conferring with the same State and Defense officials, Truman authorized American combat ground forces. However, the political objectives were not addressed. This subsequently caused considerable disjointed actions on priorities and requirements. As a result, confused signals were sent to our allies, the Soviets, and the Chinese.

President Truman was soon confronted with mobilization and its nemesis, economic stabilization. The armed forces, especially the Army, had been decimated after World War II and required additional people and equipment. However, once the Korean War objectives were placed in context the need to quickly mobilize was diminished. Defense expenditures rose to 15% of Gross National Product, and did not significantly strain the U. S. economy which demanded both "guns and butter." The Office of Defense Mobilization did not create excessive burdens to support defense spending. Emphasis was placed on increased industrial production, expanded agricultural programs, stabilizing labor force, defense housing, and increased medical personnel.
While the decision process worked rather well during this crisis, it is clear emergency mobilization planners should have been actively involved much earlier—probably at the first White House meeting after Truman's return from Missouri. Had a more significant mobilization proved necessary, the failure to engage the services of mobilization planners as soon as possible would have been a serious flaw.

EISENHOWER: USING THE "MILITARY STAFF" APPROACH IN DEALING WITH THE LEBANON CRISIS OF 1958

During February, 1958, Egypt and Syria united to form a new nation, the United Arab Republic. President Nasser of Egypt was supported by the Syrian Army which feared a growing Communist influence. In response to the United Arab Republic's stronger union, Jordan and Iraq formed a federation, the Arab Union, just two weeks later. In March, King Saud of Saudi Arabia was forced into virtual abdication and his pro-Nasser brother took control. In Lebanon, an increasing number of Arab nationalists began crossing the border from Syria to Lebanon and joining the previous influx of militant pan-Arabist refugees from Palestine. Early in May, when Arab-Christian rivalries overflowed into an armed uprising in Beirut, President Chamoun approached Eisenhower for possible military support. Eisenhower discussed the inquiry with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles. They discussed the major adverse reaction in the Middle East, Soviet response, and conditions necessary to commit U. S. forces. After discussions with the National Security Council, preliminary actions were taken to move amphibious elements of the U. S. Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and alert U. S. Army airborne battle groups in Europe. The rebellion was slowly repelled and upon Lebanon's request in June, the United
Nations sent a military observation team to ascertain UAR involvement. By early July, the requirement for U. S. Military assistance had lessened.

On 14 July 1958, a coup in Iraq by pro-Nasser elements of the Iraqi army took place. Eisenhower quickly gathered a group of advisers (mainly NSC members) and examined the Middle East crisis and its impact on Lebanon, the overbalance of pro-Nasser factors, and possible U. S. action. In the afternoon, Eisenhower held a bipartisan meeting with 22 Congressional leaders, providing them with the latest intelligence and lines of action under consideration. As a result of this generally constructive meeting, Eisenhower learned that Congressional support would not be forthcoming for any extensive action in the Middle East other than in Lebanon. After further consultation with Secretary of State Dulles, Eisenhower directed General Twining (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to land three Marine battalions in Lebanon at 3 p.m. the next day. He also directed United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to call an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Later in the evening, Eisenhower called Prime Minister Macmillan recommending British forces in Cyprus remain in reserve and not participate in the initial landing.

After the first battalion landed, Eisenhower discussed with General Twining the readiness and increased alert posture of U. S. military forces. Several units were moved to forward positions in Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. Eisenhower personally remained in contact with British Prime Minister Macmillan and supported the move of British military forces into Jordan on 17 July, making possible the subsequent withdrawal of American troops and the relative stabilization of the situation.
While a significant mobilization was apparently not seriously considered during this crisis (indeed, it was apparently ruled out from the outset by the establishment of political parameters developed in consultation with Congressional leaders) a review of this crisis does provide some valuable insights into the decisionmaking style of President Eisenhower, and his strong faith in his "military staff" type system. With the exception of the emergency meeting held on July 14 (which, apparently due to the immediacy of the crisis, included only those advisers quickly available) all meetings were held and all decisions made within the carefully structured system using previously determined process approved by the President. It appears likely that, had a fuller emergency mobilization developed Eisenhower would have assured that emergency mobilization expertise was involved to the extent appropriate.

DECISIONMAKING UNDER KENNEDY: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Whether considered from a clinical, academic viewpoint or from the perspective of a novelist or movie producer seeking an exciting scenario, the Cuban Missile Crisis has everything. It has the dashing young Chief Executive, relatively inexperienced, thrown up against the wily, evil, and ambitious Nikita Kruschev. The confrontation could very well result in either Armageddon or the permanent shift of the balance of power in favor of the forces of evil, world communism. There is conflict and confrontation within the Administration, as, indeed, there must have been within the soul of the young President. There is intrigue, as Soviet agents confer with American newsman John Scali, who acts as
an unorthodox conduit for negotiation between the posturing superpowers. And, finally, like any good American-made movie, it has that most important ingredient - a happy ending.

During August 1961, U. S. reconnaissance of Cuba revealed a buildup of Soviet-made surface to air missile (SAM) sites. Further overflights during September and early October confirmed a continuing military build-up which, however, appeared to be primarily defensive in nature. Finally, on 14 October, the information gathered from an overflight established the construction of ballistic offensive missile facilities. The Central Intelligence Agency advised McGeorge Bundy, Assistant for National Security Affairs, of this discovery. The following morning, Bundy advised Kennedy and then set up an ad hoc meeting of top officials for later that morning. This group, later known as ExCom included the "executive committee," of the National Security Council, included Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Defense Secretary McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Treasury Secretary Dillon, United Nations Ambassador Stevenson, Bundy, Special Counsel Sorensen, Undersecretary of State Ball, Undersecretary of Defense Gilpatrick, Llewellyn Thompson, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, and CIA Director McCone. Neither the National Security Council nor the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) were formally involved in this crisis. Kennedy preferred dealing with people he knew and trusted, especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Kennedy encouraged a sense of urgency, active consideration of novel approaches, and the continuous examination of the crisis from multiple angles, but with the unchanging bottom-line goal of removing the offensive weapons.
The members of the ExCom Group continued to meet their other individual commitments but met every day concerning the developing crisis. Military preparations were immediately implemented under the cover of a previously scheduled Caribbean exercise. This quick military mobilization of mainly active forces concentrated combat units in the southeast United States to be prepared to invade Cuba and knock out the offensive weapons in a swift devastating strike.

On 17 August, Secretary McNamara had suggested a naval blockade rather than a military strike, and this option was developed simultaneously with the plans for the stronger alternative. On Thursday evening, Kennedy tentatively decided on a naval blockade, but allowed discussion to continue through Friday and into Saturday, when he finally became firm in his decision.

Throughout this period, the ExCom would often meet without the President, search for alternatives, and debate their merits. Later they would brief him on all the alternatives considered and the advantages and disadvantages of each.

On 21 August, Kennedy briefed Congressional leaders concerning the crisis, and his approach to resolving it. They generally favored the invasion/military strike approach. Following this, the crisis was quickly placed on the United Nations and Organization of American States (OAS) agendas, as part of an American effort to favorably influence world opinion. Kennedy consulted European allies during the weekend, sending Dean Acheson to Paris, and calling MacMillan personally.
Throughout the crisis, Kennedy used his personal style of reaching out to trusted individuals to develop varying approaches to the problem. He relied heavily on his brother Robert for advice throughout the crisis, and particularly for information concerning the clandestine and unorthodox contacts being made by news correspondent John Scali. Finally, Kennedy and Kruschev exchanged letters which allowed them to communicate directly with no intermediate interpretation. This exchange resulted eventually in the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.

Within the Executive Office of the President, the NSC system did not function as a formal entity during this crisis; however, most of its members and staff were fully involved in the ad hoc structure. It is probably not fair to fault Kennedy for his failure to include national mobilization planners, since the immediacy of the crisis removed from consideration any mobilization other than ordering the increased readiness posture of currently available active military forces.

GERALD FORD: THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT

During the first nine months of the Presidency of Gerald Ford, incidents throughout the world created a scene of international chaos. In April 1975, American supported governments in Phnom Penh and Saigon fell to Communist forces, Israel and Egypt were on the verge of resuming fighting in the Sinai and a world-wide recession, brought on in part by rapidly escalating oil prices, was evolving. Into this international setting sailed the American registered merchant ship the Mayaguez.

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The Mayaguez set sail on May 7, 1975, from Hong Kong loaded with commercial goods bound for Sattahip, Thailand, and Singapore. Early on the Monday morning of May 12, at a point 60 miles off the coast of Cambodia, the Mayaguez was stopped and seized by Cambodians who spoke no English. The ship's captain was able to transmit a MAYDAY message which was intercepted by a Jakarta office of an American trading company. This information was relayed to the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia, and promptly dispatched by unclassified wire to the military and diplomatic command posts in Washington. The receipt of the message triggered a series of military and diplomatic events which have become known, collectively, as the "Mayaguez Incident." This incident provides an excellent vehicle to examine the decisionmaking process of the Ford White House as it relates to emergency preparedness.5

All available documentation indicates that the National Military Command Center (NMCC) reacted immediately upon receipt of the notification of the seizures at 5:12 a.m. Washington time, May 12, 1975. Within the next three hours, LTG Scowcroft, Secretary Kissinger, and President Ford were briefed, and the President decided to call the National Security Council into session to deal with the matter. Prior to the noon meeting, the National Military Command Center through the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated reconnaissance action, and the intelligence community went into action to confirm the status and location, if possible, of the Mayaguez and its crew. The noon meeting of the NSC, the first of four held during the crisis, provided the President with the opportunity to receive in-depth briefings from military, intelligence, and diplomatic representatives. From this interchange, President Ford developed the
first of his decisions, namely to publicly renounce the Cambodians for their actions, while issuing a strongly worded diplomatic protest, and assembling an amphibious task force in the Phillipines.6

Between the first NSC meeting and the fourth some 60 hours later, the President received detailed information from his principal advisors, engaged in discussions of all diplomatic and military options, and finally issued the orders which implemented his decision to take military action to retake the ship and free the crew. While the outcome of the action and its perception by world leaders was of utmost concern to the Ford White House, the process is of primary interest to this study.

The entire decision process during the Mayaguez incident depended heavily on the chief executive receiving information and recommendations from top level personnel - political, bureaucratic and military. Ford's use of the formal NSC structure emphasized his leadership style. The key players represented the most trusted of the President's top echelon of advisors; they were also the individuals called for in the formal structure for crisis decisionmaking. As Evans and Novack note in their May 19, 1975 Washington Post column, Mr. Ford "...asserted his own will in a crisis that, with only a little mismanagement or a bit of bad luck, could have escalated to extremely dangerous proportions."7 Using his style of consensus building by analysis and coordination, the President was able to reach a decision that, while clearly his own, was supported by the weight of fact, and was generally acceptable to his primary advisers.
While it did not impede the decisionmaking process during this crisis, a side issue of major importance was raised during the process: the War Powers Resolution.

Passed over President Nixon's veto in 1973, the War Powers Resolution was an attempt by Congress to force the executive branch to share, openly, its policy making concerning the use of armed force. During the final hours of the Mayaguez incident and for several months thereafter, the House Committee on International Relations convened to consider all aspects of the incident. Several observers noted that while Congress acted quickly to ratify the actions of the White House, the issue of compliance with the consultation requirements of the War Powers Resolution was ignored. Clearly, Gerald Ford was in command of the situation, and through his leadership and use of the NSC structure, the demands of an international security crisis were met effectively.

Summary

Brushfire international incidents which potentially pit the U.S. military against a hostile force of another nation tax America's mobilization preparedness. Certainly President Truman did not envision a prolonged conflict in Korea. His actions reflected a formalistic style of presidential management; reliance on military leaders for conduct of the war while following the advise of domestic counsellors on the home front. Since Truman was the first of the cold war Presidents, his incomplete emergency preparedness planning was
understandable, however, a decade later John F. Kennedy acting in classic collegiate style scrapped the formal decision making structure and seized personal control of the Cuban Missile incident. His eclectic approach to management, while often criticized, provided him with the necessary tools to reach a decision which avoided war. Faced with lower threshold situations, both Presidents Eisenhower and Ford reacted along more formalistic lines, using the formal organization and excellent plans in a rational straight forward manner. Again, emergency mobilization planning and execution can be seen to depend on the style of the leader. Regardless of prior preparation, the incumbent president's leadership style has a significant impact on the national response to a crisis.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 5


6IBID., p. 116.

7Head, Crisis Resolution, p. 111.


CHAPTER 6

DEALING WITH ALL-OUT EMERGENCIES: HOW DO YOU COPE WITH ARMAGEDDON?

"We have met the enemy, and he is us."

Pogo

No modern President has actually dealt with an actual emergency of the profound magnitude suggested by the chapter title. This is not to say, of course, that all Presidents since Truman have not occasionally lain awake at night haunted by the spectre of nuclear holocaust with its resulting unimaginable cost in human life and suffering. We suspect they have.

A nuclear war is not the only event which could present a supreme challenge to our national ability and will to survive. History is replete with examples of such "all-out" national or societal emergencies. For the ancient city of Troy, the Trojan Horse was Armageddon. The feudal society of the Dark Ages faced Doomsday via the Black Death, their only defense seeking refuge in fatalistic worship of a demonstrably angry God, or in witchcraft. In 1916, France was bled almost dry of its manhood holding the pass at Verdun. During the period covered by this study, the only emergency even approaching any of these historic events was World War II. Accordingly, since the Executive Office of the President was not around to wrestle with the Trojan Horse, the Black
Death, or the Battle of Verdun, we will begin by examining President Franklin D. Roosevelt's approach to World War II— in terms of both war-fighting and managing the home front. Following this, we will examine other potentially monstrous emergencies which would require a near-maximum national commitment. Finally, we will discuss the advent of the nuclear dimension, ushered in by the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and causing an ever-mushrooming fear and almost paralyzing public paranoia. The President, including the Executive Office of the President, has no choice in the matter. As an institution, the Presidency must be prepared to cope with not only garden-variety natural or man-made disasters and brushfire wars; it must think about the "unthinkable," and at least make an effort to be prepared.

**FDR: Managing the Homefront**

As World War II approached and U. S. involvement became inevitable, President Roosevelt faced the enormous tasks of mobilizing the entire nation and its resources to wage general war. While waging war and managing the homefront were in fact closely related, they were separately managed. Accordingly, we begin by discussing FDR's managing of the "homefront" during the war years.

Roosevelt's Presidential style, developed during the Great Depression, naturally determined his approach to the problems of World War— at least in dealing with the myriad problems on the homefront. As we shall see, his approach to actual war-fighting was somewhat different. Faced with monumental problems in coordinating industrial mobilization and economic stabilization while simultaneously fanning the flames of public opinion in favor of war, FDR
employed the same "alphabet soup" organizational approach he had used to attack the economic problems of the Great Depression. One of the most important such organizations was the Office of Emergency Management (OEM).

It appears that in creating the Office of Emergency Management, the President's intent was not to create a new operating agency, but rather merely to provide a device for allowing himself a level of administrative flexibility roughly comparable to that normally afforded corporate management.

During the "defense" period prior to U. S. entry into the war, and even after Pearl Harbor, the Office of Emergency Management was used by Roosevelt to house and foster the growth of literally dozens of defense and war agencies. Had Roosevelt been forced, like Wilson, to go to Congress for statutory creation of each new defense or war agency, the war effort would almost surely have been delayed and perhaps at times defeated. A further benefit of the OEM arrangement, as compared to a statutory basis for such war agencies, was that the President could try out a new agency and if it did not work, abolish it and set up another.

"The President was greatly aided in his tremendous task of coordinating the diverse elements involved in the mobilization of the national resources for a total war by the device of the Office of Emergency Management." The Office of Emergency Management had no director perhaps the best evidence that Roosevelt did not intend it to become an independent operating agency, as indicated earlier. But instead a position of "acting secretary" filled by a veteran government official, Mr. William McReynolds, who was an Administrative Assistant
to the President. It is probable that President Roosevelt by this time perceived that anyone charged with such a function could not carry it out effectively without ready access to the President. As we have seen, each of Roosevelt's successors have wrestled with questions of Presidential access, albeit, with varying results.²

Roosevelt also established in May 1940 the Advisory Commission on National Defense (ACND) to coordinate defense matters regarding industry, transportation, labor, finance, and the consumer. The ACND had no chairman, evidence perhaps that Roosevelt, ever the master politician, did not really intend it to be very effective, but merely a device for placating powerful constituent groups. Members were responsible in an advisory capacity only for their specific areas. Being leaderless, the ACND did not provide the broad, overall kind of planning of defense production envisioned by its own membership, if not by the President.³

In January 1941, Roosevelt established another organization called the Office of Production Management (OPM), but made the fatal error, if, indeed, it was an error at all and not an intentional move by the President of putting two men in charge, Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Hillman, both members of the ACND. This diffused the power of OPM and caused confusion and dissension. Undismayed perhaps delighted, the President continued to set up new agencies to handle specific areas, often vesting them with overlapping responsibility and little authority.⁴
Finally, in 1943, Roosevelt elected to relinquish some of his own power and set up a Chief of Staff empowered to compel competing agencies to work together. The OWM, directed by James F. Byrnes, evolved into the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) in 1944 as the war was coming to an end. This agency was effective since it possessed direct Presidential authority, did not have to compete with other agencies, maintained a wide jurisdiction over the operations of other agencies, operated from the Executive Office of the President, and retained direct access to the President. As we have seen, most successful emergency decision processes in the EOP have had some or all these factors in common.  

The Office of Emergency Management was to maintain liaison between Roosevelt and the agencies administering the defense program. The regular departments and agencies were to handle crisis matters insofar as they were capable; otherwise, the matters would be handled by new agencies specifically created for the crisis. The new agencies would be part of the EOP, such as the Office of Production Management (OPM), or be independent. OEM would manage through liaison representatives to defense organizations in advisory capacity or when determined by the President, in direct supervision within a limited or prescribed area. Roosevelt's war government has been described as a collection of action agencies dealing with such matters as rubber, selective service, prices and coordinating agencies which keep the action agencies from getting in each other's way. The coordinating was arranged in a series of layers with first-step coordinators, regional coordinators, second step coordinators, and at the White House, the supercoordinator, the Office of War Mobilization.
Thus, by the time of his death, President Roosevelt had fulfilled in his time, the notion supported by this paper: he had in his own inimitable fashion, after much experimentation during war and other national trauma at least temporarily institutionalized Emergency Mobilization Preparedness in the Executive Office of the President. Most of his successors have at some point recognized the importance of this issue, and have continued the process of experimenting and wrestling with this difficult subject.

The Military Side of World War II: Letting the Generals Fight the War

Roosevelt's approach to actual prosecution of the war was substantially different from his approach to managing the homefront. While matters of grand strategy were handled by the President (and apparently with little involvement of the EOP or civilian advisers), FDR made the decision early in the war to trust his generals and admirals to fight the war. Whether he consciously decided to delegate the fighting to men schooled in the business of war because he thought they could do it better or simply because he felt more comfortable dealing with domestic problems is unclear, and not worth pursuing, at least for our purposes. The important fact is that he did it. Fortunately for the Allied War effort, his generals included men like Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley, "Hap" Arnold, and MacArthur, who managed the war rather well. We doubt these same generals would have done as well if subjected to the direct control of a multiplicity of FDR-type boards and commissions with overlapping or vague authority. What Roosevelt was able to make work rather well in the domestic arena would not have worked well in fighting the war. A rigorous examination of subsequent history might disclose that a few of Roosevelt's successors.
(including Johnson, Nixon, and Carter) were wrong in attempting to micromanage far-flung military operations from the oval office. In war, the President and his policy advisers should certainly be kept as fully advised as possible concerning developing events, using the almost miraculous communications capability not routinely available to the White House; the White House should not, however, dictate daily target decisions which field generals or lieutenants, for that matter, are paid to make.

Other Catastrophic Emergencies Requiring Preparedness for Major Mobilization

The casual assumption is too often made that the only significant threat to modern civilization lies in a nuclear holocaust. This type of vacuous thinking, "thinking" is perhaps too generous a word for the process, also requires a complementary conclusion that more traditional types of destructive elements e.g. barbarians, natural disasters, internal chaos, terrorism or other forms of criminal violence, to name a few are no longer operational, and pose no profound threat. This, we believe is nonsense. Significant evidence for each of these "non-nuclear" destroyers can be cited within the past 20 years. During the University riots of 1970, a distinguished law professor at Ohio State University said "Rome at least had to import its barbarians. The United States has carefully cultivated and nurtured its own."*

*Professor Earl Finbar Murphy made this statement about midnight evening in 1970, to law student Curt Griffith (one..."
We believe that any one of the factors enumerated above could bring about an emergency of such magnitude that national survival would require full mobilization of all available resources, and the best possible emergency management capability. Since such catastrophic events by their very nature are unpredictable, they require generic response plans, which are arguably even more demanding than plans for coping with a nuclear attack scenario.

Summary

Franklin D. Roosevelt coped with threat at its highest level. Our society was threatened and full mobilization was required. As we have seen, FDR's competitive style, so evident on the domestic front, was shelved and the military effort was conducted in a classic formalistic style. While it is difficult to separate the domestic from the military in an all out war, Roosevelt clearly made policy decisions from different models during the war years. His competitive approach to agency formulation and economic planning, was visibly different from his formalistic approach to war planning. Since this nation may face crises of gigantic proportions in the future, it is important to recognize how presidential style affects planning for emergency mobilization preparedness.

paper), in the cluttered office of the Dean of Law. The College of Law had been attacked that day, and Professor Murphy and Griffith were part of a small fire watch monitoring the building through the night. Professor Murphy, a fastidious person, had to sweep glass from the shattered windows and other rubble from the Dean's handsome desk before placing both his feet and his paper coffee cup on it.
Chapter 6


3 *IBID.*


6 Koenig, *The Presidency and Crisis*.

CHAPTER 7

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE EMP FUNCTIONS

We have established that every Presidential administration since Roosevelt has sooner or later become concerned with the EMP process for both pre-planning and during the operational phase. Where should primary responsibility lie, and who should have the authority to utilize resources of various governmental agencies? Should one cabinet level agency assume authority during times of emergency, or should such matters be run entirely from the White House by senior aides to the President, or from the EOP? Is the function to be performed one of direction, or is it primarily coordinative? Various Presidents have wrestled with these questions, and have come up with various approaches.

The problem is centered in the nature of the emergency itself, as well as in the nature of the organizations involved, and the ebb and flow of power within the Executive Branch. Decisions made concerning EMP necessarily impact upon various cabinet-level agencies, senior White House officials, and the Executive Office of the President. Spirited cooperation of those agencies and individuals losing real power by allowing such decisions to be made elsewhere could hardly be expected - nor is it generally forthcoming, absent some clear, unequivocal guidance from the President himself. Even with such guidance, full cooperation often is not achieved.
A State Government Example

An analogous problem exists at the state and local levels of government, where varying programs have also been tried, with spotted success, often depending upon the personality of the individual performing the coordinating function. Indeed, it appears that such efforts are more often successful when some person or some office is officially given and willingly accepts the title and function of "coordinator" for such matters. And it is made clear to elected and appointed officials with major responsibility for public safety that the authority will not be diminished during times of emergency. The "coordinator" keeps aware of available resources for use during an emergency, and seeks pre-emergency agreement concerning the use of such resources, how they will be deployed, and under what conditions. The "coordinator" frequently locates a central place for emergency operations, where adequate communications are available, and where the decision-makers for the various participating "cabinet-level" agencies or their equivalent can assemble and coordinate emergency response through direct contact with one another, and communications with the human resources they direct.

For this system to work well, the "coordinator" must have the recognized endorsement of the chief executive, or head of government, and access to him when necessary. This is not to say that the endorsement must necessarily be repeated continually, or that the access need be either frequent or public. The important thing is that the other actors whose cooperation must be attained are aware of the coordinator's standing with the head of government. The most effective coordinators seldom flaunt their endorsement or their access to the
chief executive. After all, the coordinator is usually appointed or hired; the chief executive and perhaps some of the other actors must be elected, and may resent the coordinator receiving any headlines. In sum, while a "coordinator" need not necessarily cultivate a passion for anonymity, he or she should be sensitive to this issue, and allow others to receive the credit they seek and perhaps deserve.

It will be useful to describe how the "coordination" process works in a particular state. For our example, we have chosen the State of Ohio, where coordination is done by the Ohio Disaster Services Agency.¹

Like most states, Ohio has a cabinet-type executive branch. Cabinet officials, who head major departments, are appointed by the Governor, and serve at his pleasure. Each cabinet officer has broad authority to manage his own department, subject only to direction from the Governor or (with varying frequency) from high-level aides to the Governor who are presumed to be speaking for the Governor. Up to this point, the analogy between the Ohio and federal executive branches seems near-perfect. Substantial differences exist, however, in the coordination of emergency decision-making.

In Ohio, the primary coordinating agency for dealing with emergencies is the Ohio Disaster Services Agency, the nominal director of which is the Adjutant General. The Adjutant General is a member of the Governor's cabinet, and a Major General in the Ohio National Guard. Since most generals are more
comfortable managing military matters and directing the activities of others (as opposed to merely "coordinating" matters), and because the management of the Ohio National Guard is a very sizeable undertaking, the critical function of coordinating emergency preparedness and response in the State of Ohio falls to a civilian Deputy Director of Disaster Services, who has the day-to-day management responsibility for the agency and all its activities.

An Ohio Governor's executive order establishes the coordination "authority" of the Ohio Disaster Services Agency. Experience has taught, however, that it is no simple matter to "coordinate" the emergency use of personnel and equipment of another state agency without establishing extensive credibility with each department head, becoming aware of his or her problems, demonstrating sensitivity to power relationships and, above all, doing a good job of planning in advance. In the final analysis, being able to maintain the Governor's personal endorsement and to demonstrate access to the Governor when necessary are absolutely essential to a successful effort.

Thus, in Ohio, the coordination function has been managed by an official of less than cabinet rank and not an Aide to the Governor. His ability to function effectively rests in continued endorsement by and access to the Governor, as well as in his personal credibility; rather than in any directive authority he might have or attempt to presume over the resources of other agencies.

While the above-described "Ohio" program for coordination does subject the "coordinator" to certain frustrations of stress, and clearly requires a
high tolerance for ambiguity, it has one substantial merit: can work where the following conditions prevail:

1. "The Coordinator" has the personal endorsement and support of the Governor and the cabinet knows it.
2. The Coordinator has personal access to the Governor when necessary.
3. Cabinet officers and others with power perceive no threat from the coordination process as managed by the "Coordinator".
4. Planners and workers at all levels in various departments work jointly, and come to know one another personally.

One other aspect of Ohio's emergency coordination approach is worth considering: the state's relationship with local governments in the area of disaster preparedness and response. Here, too, "coordination" rather than "direction" is the technique used, and it works very well. To the extent that the federal relationship with the offices of the various Governors may be involved in EMP matters, we suggest that a collegial, "coordinative" approach may be far more successful than a directive approach.

It is interesting to note that one of the predecessor agencies to the current Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (an agency of the Department of Defense) taught thousands of state and local officials the principles discussed above in a course called "The Role of the Coordinator." Unfortunately, few federal officials took the course (or, if they took it, learned little).
Thus, the coordinator model is an important point to build on. One of our major recommendations centers on this point. Please see the conclusion at the end of this chapter for specific recommendations.

The Impact of Presidential Transition

As noted in other sections of this paper, various decision making models can be discerned by studying the issues faced by any administration, and analyzing the key policy makers roles in the decision process. One important area of concern is the transition period during which one administration passes the reins of government to another. The formulation of emergency mobilization preparedness policy should take place during this early stage of an administration's growth.

Henry Laurin, in a study released by the Brookings Institution, identified three distinct types of presidential transitions: (1) Party turnover, (2) continuation by election, and (3) vice presidential succession. Since the passage of the Presidential Reorganization Act of 1939, there has been no instance of continuation by election of another candidate from the party in power. There have been three cases of vice presidential succession, but the norm seems to be emerging as party turnover, a situation that has occurred five times since the election of Harry Truman in 1948.

The party overturns in 1952, 1960, 1968, 1976, and 1980 reflect the political realities of American democracy. With new teams of presidential advisors moving into the White House, and with outgoing political appointees usually
disenchanted by their loss of office, continuity in the decision making process suffers. Richard Neustadt asks rhetorically, "Can a president keep the essential knowledge that keeps the government going, and hand both on reasonably intact to his successor?" The answer seems to be a qualified yes. From a review of the party turnovers it can be seen that even in the smoothest of transitions, the style and structure of the decision making process changes. In his study of the 1960 and 1964 elections done for the Brookings Institution, David Stanley noted that the Eisenhower administration transferred presidential accountability smoothly to the incoming Kennedy administration, aided by outstanding counsel and assistance by the outgoing group. However, Kennedy immediately scrapped the National Security Council based decision process used by Eisenhower, and adopted a more eclectic model with heavy reliance upon close personal advisors.

With strong backing by President Kennedy, Congress tackled the issue of presidential transition and, in 1963, passed the Presidential Transition Act. This act, intended to enhance the process of changing administrations, institutionalized the roles and functions of the transfer procedure and legislated fiscal support needed to perform the transition. As a beneficiary of this action, Richard Nixon, in 1968, built a highly structured transition team to prepare for his assumption of the presidency. Nixon's close advisors, drawn from government, private industry and academia assisted his transition with little regard for the advise and counsel of the Johnson White House team. Johnson's conversational, consultative style differed greatly from Nixon's structured hierarchical approach to policy formulation and decision making. Nixon preferred analysis and review of options to be conducted at a level below
his top advisers, with only the final viable options being presented to him by his personal staff or key EOP operatives. It has been suggested, however that this elaborate staff system may have so insulated Nixon from the realities of the political process that an incident like the "Watergate" scandal could occur.6

With Jimmy Carter's assumption of power in 1976, a new era of presidential transition began. Having adequate funds, and building on his anti-Washington establishment campaign, Carter gathered a transition team which operated largely independent from the Ford White House. This probably added to Carter's problems since he made little use of the talents and resources of the Ford team which had been directed to positively assist in the transition, and he virtually ignored Congress. This independence during the transition carried over into the appointments to the top executive office position. His leadership style and decision making methods so alienated much of official Washington that within the first year of his presidency, Carter was branded as inept, unimaginative, and lacking the aura of leadership needed to forge a definable decision making style.7

The relatively smooth transition from Carter to Reagan can be explained, again, in terms of presidential style. Ronald Reagan came to Washington with a defined plan, goals, and a team of experienced managers ready to implement his plans. The Carter transition team headed by Jack Watson was willing to assist and in large measure within the EOP that assistance was accepted. Reagan selected for the personal staff and for key EOP positions many former government professionals who knew their way around Washington. While railing against the
bureaucracy, Reagan showed an ability and willingness to work with senior bureaucrats, and he certainly enhanced the ability of the administration to move quickly to his agenda by bringing on board many former Nixon and Ford staffers who brought continuity to the government.

Transition and EMP

By providing the president with the necessary analysis and policy options during his first few months in office, a continuing problem such as emergency mobilization can receive top level attention. Donald Stone, addressing the 13th annual Leadership Conference of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, noted that the executive office must have analytical staff who analyze and manage long term complex problems, and that the results of this analysis must be presented to the president for key policy decisions. This approach permits issues such as emergency mobilization policy to surface and be dealt with in the proper forum. New models for accomplishment can be unveiled and the locus of planning and implementing the policy can be identified. During this early phase in the life of an administration, emergency mobilization preparedness can be emphasized in the budget preparation cycle, congressional support can be courted, and grass roots public support can be gained. Each president's unique leadership style will certainly shape the direction of any of these early policy efforts.

While emergency mobilization preparedness is only one area of important decision making, its importance must be emphasized during the transition period.
so that the administration can imprint its stamp of approval on a specific direction to be taken in this vital area. How the new executive chooses to deal with mobilization preparedness issues will be determined by his personal style and the decision making mode in which he operates. Where he places the responsibility for a coherent mobilization preparedness effort will determine the viability of the process. If the issue of emergency mobilization preparedness has gained the president's serious attention, then his best efforts will be expended to assure early action to build the base for the future.

It has been said that "The planning function without operational responsibility becomes purely an ivory tower organization." Within the hierarchy of government and particularly within the Executive Office of the President, this phrase rings true. The pure planner who has no operational responsibility from day to day will probably not have access to the President or to anyone who talks to him. Accordingly, the efforts of such an individual would be in vain. The recognition of the importance of emergency mobilization preparedness dictates that the subject be addressed during presidential transition. The information passed from the old administration to the new can help guide the new president in his EOP staffing. If both administrations recognize that EMP is vital to national security, then the preparedness function can continue unbroken. While new personnel can be expected to fill key EMP positions, it is important that the functions be visible and that the person selected to perform these functions has the necessary skills to coordinate all of the government resources for EMP.
Summary of Alternatives

We believe that the function of Emergency Mobilization Preparedness should not be assigned to someone who is just a planner any more than it should be assigned to an authoritarian personality in a senior position. Rather, we submit that the function must be seen as one requiring the skills of a "coordinator" who does not function from an ivory tower.

Such a "coordinator" to be successful should be at a relatively high level in the EOP, and should have the clear endorsement of the President, and visible access to the President at least until his credibility is firmly established among those whose cooperation he must seek. The individual or individuals selected for this function should have persuasive skills, a high tolerance for ambiguity, and (perhaps most important) a sense of humor. With the foregoing in mind, the following alternatives should be considered:

1. Creation of an Assistant to the President for Mobilization Policy.

2. Placement of the EMP function in the Office of Policy Development creating a Deputy Assistant for Mobilization.


4. A combination of 2 and 3, placing domestic emergencies within the Office of Policy Development, and National Security emergencies within the National security Council.
5. Creating within the EOP an Office for Emergency Mobilization Preparedness, served by career specialists in emergency mobilization matters, whose loyalties would be to the Presidency rather than to a particular President, thus assuring the survival of a corporate memory from one administration to the next.

The first alternative, the creation of an Assistant to the President for Mobilization Policy has the advantages of insuring access to the President, and providing high visibility concerning this very important topic. This alternative requires the creation of additional staff in an already bulging White House which has an abundance of Assistants to the President, such a position could be eliminated by Executive Order at the whim of the President, and it is likely that a requirement for such a new position would face strong OMB resistance.

The second alternative, placing the EMP function in the OPD, has the advantages of placing the function in an existing agency within the EOP, being logical since this is an office for policy formulation, and being in OPD should be close enough to the President to guarantee access. Disadvantages include the absence of a direct tie to the Department of Defense.

The third alternative, placing the EMP function in NSC, has the major advantages of assuring access to the President, maintaining ties to the Department of Defense, and avoiding the "ivory tower" syndrome. Disadvantages include the loss of "civilian" flavor, and the fact that the NSC has a great deal to do already, and EMP might be relegated to a secondary role.
The fourth alternative has the advantage of overcoming most of the disadvantages of the second and third, but the decided disadvantage of splitting the functions and the mission, thereby creating coordination problems.

The fifth alternative, creating within the EOP an Office for Emergency Mobilization Preparedness, has the advantages of guaranteeing a corporate memory, and assuring that the President will receive creditable advice concerning this important area even during transition. The major disadvantage is that there is no way to build in access to the President. If access is denied, the effectiveness of the office would be emasculated.

Chapter 8 will focus on specific recommendations which the author feels will strengthen the EMP in this Nation, and will facilitate both planning and execution in the mobilization arena.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 7

Ohio was chosen for two reasons: First, the Ohio example illustrates conveniently the points we seek to make and secondly, the research group has some direct knowledge concerning emergency coordination in Ohio. One of the members of our group, LTC Curt Griffith, served six years as Deputy Director of the Ohio Disaster Services Agency, managing the coordination function for that state. Since he served under Governor James A. Rhodes, who left office in January 1983, we will describe the Agency's function under the Rhodes Administration rather than that of his successor.


5IBID., p. 133.


7Neill, Presidential Power, p. 211.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS:

This study has focused on the historical growth of the Executive Office of the President since its inception in 1939, focusing on the movement of the emergency mobilization preparedness function in and out of the EOP. The study of various emergencies and how they were handled has provided insight into the management styles of the Presidents, and a review of the Presidential style models has enabled the authors to reach some conclusions regarding EMP decision-making in the White House. In addition, we have explored a state's cooperative approach to emergency preparedness. This review has added perspective to the EMP function. As a result of our study, we have reached the following conclusions:

1. All presidential decisions, including those related to Emergency Mobilization Preparedness, are heavily influenced by presidential style. A President may use one or more styles in a crisis.

2. In addition to presidential style, successful emergency mobilization preparedness must fully address the types of probably emergencies, the categories of response (or "mobilization categories," as Mr. Brinkerhoff would call them),
and the timeliness of decision-making.

3. The Emergency Mobilization Preparedness effort has been handled effectively in many different ways. No single model offers a panacea to the mobilization planning problem.

4. To be effective, whoever has the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness function should have:

   a. clear personal endorsement from the president.
   b. access to the president
   c. a well defined coordinative role.
   d. a corporate memory (i.e. some permanent staff).

5. The transition period from one administration to another is extremely important because:

   a. the nation would be in grave danger during a crisis if an incoming president was unprepared, and lacked access to the best advice.
   b. an incoming president's decision making style and his priorities are established during the transition period. It is highly desirable that the emergency mobilization preparedness function be established as a high priority during this period, and the emergency mobilization preparedness decision making process be established.
6. Mobilization planning must function along the spectrum of possible emergencies, ranging from domestic to "brush fire" emergencies, to general or nuclear war. Such planning should directly involve the agencies and departments which have performance responsibility during a crisis.

It is significant to note that President Reagan perceived a weakness in the planning and execution phases of emergency mobilization preparedness and moved quickly to correct this. He established the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board with direct access to the White House. The board was empowered to formulate policy and planning guidance, coordinate planning, resolve issues, and monitor progress, while the federal departments and agencies were directed to take necessary action, within existing laws to assure the development of required capabilities. By naming his National Security Advisor as Chairman of the EMPB, and by tasking each agency to provide key personnel for EMPB working groups, the President dramatized his personal interest in emergency mobilization preparedness. The new visibility engendered by President Reagan's approach to mobilization planning and decision making has reawakened enthusiasm for the subject in some civilian agencies where previous plans had been put aside without examination for many years. A major weakness remains, however, there is a lack of coordination with state and local governments and the private sector including business, labor, trade associations, and interest groups.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The emergency mobilization preparedness function should be institutionalized in the Executive Office of the President to ensure continuity
of effort and resource management. The specific assignment of the function should rest with the president in power.

2. Since each president retains some flexibility in the staffing of the EOP, the emergency mobilization preparedness function needs some permanent staff who will transcend presidents. These professional staff positions could be located in the NSC, the Office of Policy Development, and/or other suitable locations within the EOP.

3. The planning component should not be divorced from the operational function. The latter is found usually at the department or agency level. Plans should be coordinated at the EOP level.

4. Exercises should be scheduled regularly to evaluate the validity of the plans, as well as the adequacy and timeliness of decisions concerning response. All federal agencies should take part and state, local, and private sector interests should be encouraged to participate as well.

5. The emergency mobilization preparedness function should be a priority point of discussion during presidential transitions, and the vice president should be included in all developments to assure his ability to step in during a crisis. This early emphasis will avoid preparedness gaps which could threaten the nation and leave it vulnerable during an early administration crisis.
While the authors do not presume to tell the President how mobilization preparedness should be approached, we believe our study has revealed certain historic weaknesses in the ability of our nation to react in a crisis. Our vast national resources, including the skills and talents of the federal bureaucracy are available to the chief executive. These resources should be channelled in such a way as to ensure adequate planning and response capability to meet the contingencies facing the United States during the last two decades of the twentieth century and beyond. We urge that our recommendations be considered as a constructive approach toward achieving institutionalization of emergency mobilization preparedness - the first step toward achieving the kind of planning and response capability needed to insure national survival.
APPENDIX A


Military Mobilization is the process of bringing units of the Armed Forces to full wartime strength in people and equipment, and providing the ammunition, POL, and other supplies needed to sustain them in combat. Military mobilization is a process of claiming resources from other mobilization categories. There are three military mobilization cases:

Full Mobilization involves bringing to wartime strength the peacetime approved force structure; full mobilization is a planning case and is the single boundary condition for military mobilization.

Partial Mobilization is less than full and implies either bringing the entire force structure to an increased state of readiness or bringing part of the force structure to full readiness. The exact size and nature of a partial mobilization will be dictated by the emergency for which the mobilization is ordered. Partial mobilization is likely to be a stage in the transition from peacetime to full mobilization.

Total Mobilization is more than full and implies creation of additional force structure units over and above those in the peacetime force structure. The size and nature of a total mobilization will be limited by one or more resources depending on the emergency for which the total mobilization is ordered.

Industrial Mobilization is the process of marshalling the manufacturing sector to produce the goods and services required to support both military operations and the civil sector. The priority of effort in industrial mobilization is to support military operations, but essential civilian needs must be met. Industrial mobilization involves producing more goods,
either temporarily by means of a surge, or permanently by means of expanded capacity. It involves also the allocation of raw materials, labor, and plant capacity on a rational basis among competing claimants. It will involve the diversion of production capacity from civilian goods to military goods. Industrial mobilization also includes the requirement that adequate supplies of raw materials be available when needed.

Economic Mobilization is the process of marshalling the money, credit, and taxes needed to finance the mobilization and war effort, maintain a stable economy, and stimulate key sectors of the economy. Economic mobilization facilitates the transfer and/or creation of capital to support other mobilization categories.

Infrastructure Mobilization is the process of marshalling the output of infrastructure systems to support the entire mobilization. The infrastructure systems are transportation, communications, energy, construction, and agriculture. These infrastructure systems all provide services or goods which are essential to the effective operation of all other systems. The mobilization process involves bringing these systems to full capability and allocating their outputs to meet the requirements of the mobilization.

Human Resources Mobilization is the process of marshalling people to provide the labor needed to perform all of the other work. Human resources mobilization involves identifying human resources and allocating them among different demands. Human resources mobilization also includes ancillary services which are designed to foster and maintain continued effectiveness of human beings. These include health care, human services, training and education, and maintenance of law and order.

Civil Defense Mobilization is the process of marshalling resources to provide protection for the people, industry, and institutions of the United States against the effects of a nuclear attack. Civil Defense mobilization involves creation of a large group of trained emergency managers to prepare and execute the
Civil Defense Program including stockpiling and distributing large quantities of survival supplies, planning and constructing shelters, and moving of people to these shelters prior to the attack. It involves also the taking care of people while they are taking shelter, and provides for recovery and reconstitution following the attack.

Governmental Mobilization is the process of marshalling the resources of local, State, and Federal governments to carry out the tasks required to respond to a particular emergency. Responsibility for management of domestic emergencies rests primarily with local and state governments. Responsibility for management of national security emergencies rests with the Federal Government.
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