AT LEAST SIX SOVIET SUBMARINES PARTICIPATED IN THE
HORSEFJÆRÐ OPERATION (..(U) NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
CENTER WASHINGTON DC TRANSLATION D. K E WESTERLUND
UNCLASSIFIED  02 DEC 83 NISC-TRANS-7233  F/G 15/7

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MINDESTENS SECHS SOWJETISCHE U-BOOTE NAHMEN AN DER "HORSFJAERDEN-OPERATION" TEIL

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TRANSLATED BY: 9025

AT LEAST SIX SOVIET SUBMARINES
PARTICIPATED IN THE HORSFJÆRÐ OPERAÇION

[Westerlund, Karl-Erik. Mindestens sechs sowjetische U-Boote nahmen an
454-459; German]

Our regular Swedish contributor with this article comments on the report of the commission appointed by the Swedish government to investigate the submarine incidents in Horsfjaernd in October 1982.

That the Soviet Union has been preparing for decades to attack Sweden before or during a new large-scale war or world war has long been quite clear to the democratic countries in the West and to the Swedish military leadership and a large majority of the Swedish people as well. But that those preparations include, with the approval of the top political leadership of the Soviet Union, also exercises and provocative activities within Swedish inshore territorial waters in the most important Swedish skerry areas, that fact has now been exposed with convincing clarity by the ninety-page White Paper on April 26th by the Submarine Defense Commission.

On the same day, Social Democrat Prime Minister Olof Palme delivered to the Soviet ambassador to Stockholm the sharpest Swedish note delivered since the end of the war in 1945 by the small, neutral, non-aligned nation. The evidence handed over unanimously by the Parliamentary commission, in which every democratic party was represented and whose chairman was former defense minister, and later long-time foreign minister, Sven Andersson, was so totally convincing that the Government found that the facts as well as the conclusions were wholly uncontroversial. Consequently, the Government was able to state unequivocally that in October 1982 at least three Soviet mother submarines and three "minisubmarines" of formerly unknown design had operated (see Marine-Rundschau, No. 2, 1983) in Horsfjaernd and other waters of the inshore Stockholm skerry areas.

The tracks left by the twin-screw minisubmarine with the reinforced keel, fair drawn

Indubitably the most attention arresting aspect was the determination that two types of minisubmarines hitherto unknown even to NATO had participated,

*Numbers in right margins indicate pagination in the original text.
This photo of the sea bottom by a Swedish Navy diver shows tracks of the first type of minisubmarine. It crawled on the bottom with its reinforced keel and was propelled by two screws, which stirred up the mud on both sides.

completely new designs which had nothing in common with the midget submarines of the second world war.

One type is "conventional" insofar as it is fitted with two screws. But it has a reinforced keel and a reinforced hull bottom, so that it can crawl slowly on the ocean bottom. The video films taken by the Swedish Navy divers show clearly the tracks of the wide, reinforced keel and the mud stirred up on both sides.

The second type is of a "revolutionary" nature. It has no screw, but is propelled over the ocean bottom by means of tracks, exactly like tanks and other armored vehicles.

There are very certainly several variants and combinations of these two basic types.

Whether we were witnessing the first "full-scale test" of these new minisubmarines in Horsfjaerd in September and October 1982, or whether they had already been "tested" in Swedish waters, is not known. Among the many annual submarine "incidents" of recent years the Swedes had not as yet observed any indications of such miniature submarines.

Was Horsfjaerd only One Part of More Extensive Operations?
At least six Soviet submarines were operating in the Stockholm skerries during the approximately two-week search of the Swedish Navy. It is certain that at least three mother submarines and three minisubmarines participated in those operations. Perhaps their movements in Horsfjaerd and Mysingen are only one sector of a still larger operation—among others, on 2 October one submarine was also observed in the Oxeloesesund harbor area, far south of the Stockholm skerries.

How artist Wyn Enqvist with the help of Swedish naval engineers conceives the crawling minisubmarine

Outside of Horsfjaerd the divers were also able to determine that a minisubmarine of the second type had approached with its "mother" submarine and was shipped aboard there. Probably the "baby" is placed on the after deck of the mother submarine and is then fastened down, after which the crew of the "baby" transfers to the "mother" submarine in one way or another.

The Commission report also explains that certain observations indicate that one minisubmarine penetrated into inner Stockholm harbor during the last week of September. Probable study subject: visit of the US cruiser BELKNAP.

The Commission found that the Navy had done everything possible for it with the means available. Perhaps a minisubmarine was damaged—but in the final analysis all Swedish efforts were in vain.

By way of example, it can be mentioned that the net obstacles were never "complete"—indeed, no one believed that submarines were able to operate in depths of ten or fewer meters...but now we know they can!

But the depth charges dropped were—quite naturally—not designed for these inshore areas.

The Swedish bottom mines—some of them were even exploded—are designed for surface craft. The effect against a bottom-crawling submarine (perhaps with a titanium hull) is not the same as that against a ship on the surface.

But there were delays in the communications between the local mine station commanding officer and operations in the High Command, which were criticized by the Commission. For various reasons hold-fire orders were issued occasionally by the High Command. At least once there was an opportunity for a submarine to pass through a bottom mine zone without the mines exploding.

Skillful cooperation was to be found between the various Soviet components during the operation. Thus, for example, the mother submarines occasionally
intentionally showed their sail in order to attract the unfortunately too few submarine chasers to them and thus give a comrade in the interior skerries better chances to break out to sea from the interior zone.

Tracks of a track-driven minisubmarine in Djupkiven, a part of Horsfjaerd
Complete Proof of Nationality

A whole chapter is devoted to the nationality of "foreign" submarines--quite naturally, since this question was perhaps the most important. To be sure, there were no objects found whose origin could prove where they came from. But a good number of visual observations and other circumstances provided "important information also about the matter of nationality."

Not only clear sketches of observers, but also analyses of hydrophone noises have given convincing information on the "pact or national affiliation," as did also signal intercept. Also, the photographed tracks on the ocean bottom are evidence.

The Commission stated that "no observation was obtained which indicates a penetration by NATO submarines into Swedish territory."

The sum total of all indications and evidence makes it clear that the violations of the territorial waters in Horsfjaerd as well as the others in the years 1980-1982 were by Warsaw Pact submarines. "The fact that the Soviet Union has about 45 submarines (the majority of which are of so-called WHISKEY Class) of conventional size in operational use in the Baltic Sea, while Poland has only 4 submarines of an older class, and East Germany, none, as far as is known, is one of the several factors which point to the fact that Warsaw Pact is substantially identical with Soviet Union in this connection. After thorough examination the Commission came to this conclusion."

The tracks, fair drawn

The Sharpest Protest since the End of the War in 1945

The Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm Boris Pankin, was summoned to the Office of Prime Minister Olof Palme on April 27th, after the Commission had published the report in the morning. On the one hand, he received the sharpest note "in modern time," and, on the other, the gentlemen (according to Palme) had an "unusually serious discussion," and the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow Carl de Geer, was recalled to Stockholm "to report"--he remained there also during the period of the Revolution celebrations.
The early Soviet reaction was curious: not the Swedish government, but the Commission was attacked by TASS in the subsequent days. And from the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm came the statement that "there are circles in the Swedish military who deliberately provided false data to the Commission." Not until 10 May was there an official response: nothing in the report corresponds to reality, the claims are unproved, etc., etc.--just as if the response had been prepared from the very outset.

Tracks of a tracked minisubmarine, photographed by Navy divers

A fair drawn illustration shows that the tracked type has a periscope or some other optical device, so that the driver can detect rocks in time and avoid them.
New disclosures followed; the Commission chairman informed that a Soviet diplomat had attempted to persuade the Commission not to conduct the inquiry--the Soviet Union had the intention to continue submarine operations within Swedish territorial waters...

And at the same time it also became known that the Soviet foreign policy spokesman Georgly Arbatov had stated at the Carnegie Institute in Washington on April 25th that the "Swedes are naive if they think that their neutrality policy and sharp protests could prevent the Soviet Union from continuing submarine operations in Swedish waters. This type of activity is all part of the behavior of a superpower."

Soviet Submarines Also Off Sundsvall

That this statement was quickly to become reality had not been expected in Sweden. But the final days of April 1983 there was another item. This time it involved a third sensitive area, after Gasefjard off Karlskrona in 1981 and Horsfjaerd off Stockholm in 1982: Sundsvall, 400 km north of Stockholm.

There are found not only several good harbors and landing areas but also a series of coastal defenses, and therefore the fourth of the Swedish coastal defense areas on the Baltic Sea. (Besides the two mentioned above and Faaros and in northern Crotland).

Various boats of the Navy and of the Coast Guard as well as helicopters were employed under the command of the Commander of the "Nedre Norrland" Military Area. Bottom mines were exploded and depth charges were thrown, but all in vain.

Here, too, they were able to detect minisubmarines--one or more--as well as at least one mother submarine. Navy divers searched the entire sea bottom for several days after the mine detonations, but were able to find nothing.

This time, also, the unwelcome visitors must have escaped.

New Antisubmarine Regulations in Force on 1 July

The tightened instructions for countering foreign submarines in Swedish territorial waters prepared by the former civilian government entered into force on 1 July. The present Social Democrat government has accepted those regulations in their entirety and has further strengthened them with oral statements. Now the commanding officer of the boat or helicopter can employ live weapons without warning immediately in inshore territorial waters.

The special antisubmarine weapons described earlier, small depth charges ELMA and the MALIN homing bombs (see Marine-Rundschau No. 2, 1983), as well as a torpedo with a small charge are also ready for employment at the same time. But what the Swedish Navy lacks mainly are sufficiently large platforms for antisubmarine warfare. Only two destroyers (HALLAND and SMAALAND) are still available, but they are both mothballed in port.
In 1952 Sweden had 12 destroyers and 2 frigates. In 1964 there were 13 and 9 respectively, for a total of 22, and in 1976, 6 and 6, or a total of 12. And today, 2! Helicopters with hydrophones and depth charges are small in number. There is absolutely no more discussion of new construction of frigates or corvettes. Only two guided missile boats (STOCKHOLM and MALMO) with towed sonar and two minehunters (LANDSORT and ARHOLA) of nine formerly decided on with an antisubmarine capability are under construction.

The Swedish possibilities for protecting her territorial waters against undesirable visiting submarines are not satisfactory today, nor tomorrow, but perhaps the day after.

It is true that the government, upon a recommendation of the submarine commission, has made a few million kronar available to the commander-in-chief of the Navy. But that means that only an earlier procurement of equipment of various kinds was intended as scheduled. A thorough examination of the role of the Swedish Navy in peace and war, and therefore among other things the new construction of suitable antisubmarine warfare craft would be more appropriate.
Photos of tracks of a mother submarine and a minisubmarine show that the "baby" was shipped aboard the "mother" and thus was able to reach the open sea and its home port.