FACTORS AFFECTING THE ROLE AND EMPLOYMENT OF
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FINAL REPORT

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ROLE AND EMPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

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Principal Researcher: Morris Davis

Faculty Participants:
Roger E. Kanet
George T. Yu
Steven Thomas Seitz
Steven P. Cohen

Other Participants:
William C. Loeffel
David T. Best
Donald R. Zoufal
John B. Howell
Albert H. Scheven
John G. Wheelock, III

University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois 61801

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Executive Summary

Although the term "peacekeeping" is often limited, in supposed accordance with United Nations practice, to internationalized third party impartial and peaceful intervention without enforcement, the plain fact is that even U.N. operations have varied considerably. In addition, many commentators admit that genuine peacekeeping tasks can also be accomplished by regional organizations, by several countries in tandem, or even by single states. It is, in fact, quite reasonable to adopt the premise of this contract and construe a peacekeeping force as "a force from one or more countries invited into another country for internal stability purposes." Such a force may, in its relationship to the target state, be pro-governmental, neutral, or anti-governmental; and its composition may be uni-national or multi-national. These two perspectives yield six categories of peacekeeping, of which the "typical" U.N. operation (multi-national, neutral) illustrates only one. The other five categories of peacekeeping are also met in sub-Saharan Africa, some with much greater frequency.

In this study, a set of events is considered one peacekeeping case if a target country is intervened upon by outside military forces from one or more countries whose interventions at least partly overlap in time and all fall within only one of the six categories mentioned just above. Events that would simultaneously fall into two categories--e.g., anti-governmental forces from South Africa and Zaire and pro-governmental forces from Cuba both entering Angola in 1975--are counted as two cases. Excluded from consideration as cases are non-official military actions by mercenaries, offenses mounted by exiles, any and all events that precede formal independence, arms shipments, the assignment of military advisers and training personnel, and such deliberately destabilizing acts as hit and run raids and attempts at forcible border alterations.
Application of these criteria to the African historical record from 1960 to July 1982 yields a collection of 50 peacekeeping cases that have occurred in one or another sub-Saharan state. Appendix A provides brief narratives for each of the cases, delineating their background, the interventions themselves, and their conclusions. More than three-fifths of the cases have been both pro-governmental and uni-national, i.e., they involve intervention by the armed forces of one country, on or off the continent, to assist the government of an(other) African country. Least commonly met are multi-national anti-governmental operations and neutral interventions by a single country or a multi-national entity. A half-dozen cases each of anti-governmental intersession by one country and of pro-governmental endeavors by two or more countries together also appear in the sample. In addition, most pro-governmental African peacekeeping cases have been addressed to primarily domestic, rather than primarily foreign, threats: of 39 cases, 18 involved counter-insurgency and 17 internal security, while only four dealt with external defense.

New cases of African peacekeeping have been initiated in every five-year time period since 1960, though they seemed to be gradually diminishing in frequency through 1974. In 1975-79, though, the case rate surged to an unprecedented height. While there is some tendency for peacekeeping cases to occur in the first few years after a country's independence, with this probably reflecting a continuation of the formally ended decolonialization process, the initiation of such cases is in fact essentially unrelated to the number of years that the target state has been independent. As many cases occur in countries 12 to 15 years after independence as 0-3 years after independence.

Individual European countries--particularly the former metropolitan centers of France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom--have been prominent in providing African peacekeeping forces. Overall, however, African countries have participated
in more such cases. Other notable participants include North African countries (especially Libya, Morocco, and Egypt) and Cuba. The trend over time has been for West European forces to become relatively less prominent in African peacekeeping operations, and for those endeavors to be increasingly intra-African. Since 1975, Communist nations—Cuba, U.S.S.R., German Democratic Republic, and South Yemen—have also contributed troops to peacekeeping endeavors in Ethiopia, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea.

While 50 cases of African peacekeeping is no trivial number, most African states have been the locus of no, or very few, such actions. Only 24 states have been the target of any peacekeeping operations at all. Moreover, even if a state has had two experiences, they both tend to have been begun in the same five-year period. Only four states—Chad, Congo (L.)/Zaire, Uganda, and Central African Republic/Empire—have witnessed more than two peacekeeping cases, the near perpetual civil war in Chad occasioning eight of these interventions.

Cases of African peacekeeping may also be evaluated in terms of magnitude. Their size may be considered a product of factors referring to number of troops involved, duration of intervention, and level of weaponry utilized. The 50 cases differ greatly in the interactive impact of these three factors, their scores (according to the code procedures employed here) ranging from 1 to 60. Most of the cases are relatively small. Indeed, only ten lasted more than a half-year, deployed more than 5,000 troops, and utilized attack aircraft; and just seven African states have been targets of these larger efforts.

A few countries in Africa have been especially affected by long chains of peacekeeping cases. As noted above, Chad has experienced eight of these operations, and no less than three of them were quite large. Congo (L.)/Zaire and Uganda have also been frequently and massively impacted. Even single pairs of peacekeeping cases, however, can greatly influence a target country, especially if those cases represent countervailing contributions to an on-going civil war. Events in both
Ethiopia and Angola illustrate the process.

Not only did African peacekeeping operations become more frequent in the period 1975-79, but also their scope generally increased. These twin trends toward more and bigger interventions appear to be continuing even at present.

In addition, peacekeeping activities have tended of late to involve neighboring rather than non-adjacent countries. Such interventions across the border have not, however, been accompanied by any marked improvement in rates of success. Indeed, the bulk of peacekeeping activities initiated since 1980 have been clearly marked by failure.

As military events, peacekeeping efforts are affected by many familiar considerations. For example, the diffusion of new weaponry such as SAM's throughout much of Africa may soon inhibit the safe and rapid airlift of peacekeeping forces into target countries. At the least, increased risk may make such endeavors politically unacceptable. Many organizational problems may also plague multi-national peacekeeping and discourage its prolongation when tasks change from symbolic presence to actual combat.

In general, the history of peacekeeping in Africa demonstrates that African armies remain weak units within weak political systems. Most armed forces in Africa are relatively small and unprofessional, yet even their sparse outfitting heavily drains the resources of the states supporting them. Moreover, the very prevalence of peacekeeping, with its derogation from sovereignty, underscores the slackness of the continent's political and governmental structures, even as the typically small scale of successful African peacekeeping cases demonstrates that the various armed forces are often not formidable elements to contend with.

Theoretical and measurement models can be developed to explain the probability of peacekeeping interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, their extent, and their likely success. Probability of intervention is approached in terms of both internal turmoil and an intervening state's perception of opportunities and risks
associated with intervention. Internal turmoil itself is measured via elite
dissensus, social fragmentation, and degree of external covert operations. Per-
ceived opportunities and risks, by contrast, involve a decision calculus that
includes the degree to which an internal event is thought of as an extension of
another country's sphere of influence, the personal ties between intervenor and
target nations, treaties, and the overall regional or global balance of influence.
An empirical test found 73 percent of the test cases (47 interventions, 50
controls) correctly classified.

Extent of intervention is explained through internal turmoil, the intervening
state's perceived opportunities and risks, and its military deployment potential.
The latter concept is derived from size of armed forces, weapons sophistication,
and GNP. An empirical test found that 25 percent of the differences in observed
interventions could be accounted for by the model. Measurement refinement should
improve the predictive capability.

Probability of success is explained in terms of internal turmoil, the extent
of peacekeeping intervention, and the degree of coordinated behavior in the
target country. Coordinated behavior is estimated negatively through the varia-
bility in the target country's rate of change in key social and economic indicators.
An empirical test of this aspect is still awaited.

The information and analyses in this study should enhance understanding of
what peacekeeping forces might accomplish as Namibia (South West Africa) moves
to independence. It is not at all improbable that a launching election will be
held there under the auspices of a large, U.N.-sponsored, multi-national and
neutral peacekeeping force. While West Europeans and North Americans seem unlikely
to serve in that force, so do troops from most Black African countries. Repre-
sentation, instead, may be from Asia and other less involved areas, with perhaps
a contingent from a conservative state in northern Africa. Such a force would
be able to operate the technical equipment necessary for surveillance of Namibia's
long border with Angola, and yet not appear too threatening to South Africa itself.

After the election, however, things are likely to fall apart. With increased fighting, the U.N. force would soon depart. Meantime, the losing side, DTA or SWAPO, would seek assistance from South Africa or Angola respectively. Governmental policies—for example, SWAPO seeking control over Walvis Bay or allowing guerrillas to harass South Africa from Namibian bases—may also attract major interventions. Peacekeeping activities on one side tend to generate peacekeeping activities on the other, and so both become adjuncts to civil war. One possible alternative is a SWAPO victory, followed by cautious and conservative behavior of that government toward its neighboring colossus.
Chapter 1
Introduction

This initial chapter discusses both the terminology of peacekeeping and the criteria to be employed in identifying peacekeeping cases. Although most writers on peacekeeping adopt a United Nations perspective and construe the word quite narrowly, as internationalized third party impartial and peaceful intervention without enforcement, the plain fact is that even U.N. operations have varied considerably. Moreover, peacekeeping tasks can also be undertaken by regional organizations, units from several countries, or single nations. It is by no means implausible, therefore, to view a peacekeeping force as "a force from one or more countries invited into another country for internal stability purposes." Cases of peacekeeping may be classified under six headings, according to whether the actions, vis-a-vis the target state, are pro-governmental, neutral, or anti-governmental, and whether each of these involves uni-national or multi-national troops. Rules also need to be propounded for deciding when a case is a case (and not for instance, part of some continuing case, or two cases) and for excluding certain events from further analysis.

Terminology of Peacekeeping

In accordance with Solicitation No. MDA 908-82-R-0209, Amendment 001, a peacekeeping force is defined, for the purposes of this report, as "A force from one or more countries invited into another country for internal stability purposes. This includes forces of non-African nations and of international organizations." Such usage is considerably broader than that in ordinary—or ordinary scholarly—parlance. As Kermit Gordon has observed
"Peacekeeping is a term that has come to be associated with the work of the United Nations." Moreover, within the U.N. context, the "true sense" of peacekeeping, one hears, refers only to "peaceful intervention, where a third party acts in the capacity of an impartial referee to assist in the settlement of a dispute between two or more other parties," while its "essence...lies in the fact that enforcement plays no part in it" (Rikhye et al., 1974, pp. 10-11).

A concern for "differentiating sharply between peacekeeping and enforcement operations" (Cox, 1967, p. 132) is prominent, too, in U.N. self-characterizations of the peacekeeping function. Thus,

A United Nations peace-keeping operation is not an enforcement action as envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter, and it is carried out with the consent and co-operation of the parties concerned...The peacekeeping operations seek to achieve their objective by negotiation and persuasion, rather than by force. The soldiers of the peace-keeping forces are provided with weapons of a defensive character, but they are authorized to use them only in self-defense and with the utmost restraint. (Department of Public Information, 1979, p.68)

Reality, however, is far more complex and heterogeneous than any such statement of central tendencies alone suggests.

Consider, for example, U.N. operations during the Korean War. To be sure, that set of events constituted an "untypical exception" (Boyd, 1968, p.7), for only there was a United Nations force employed mainly as a

*Full titles and other publishing information for works cited in the text are given in the Bibliography.
coercive sanction rather than as a non-fighting "presence" which would help sustain order simply by "being there" (Russell, 1964, p. 5). But does such atypicality suffice to demonstrate that "the international force in Korea was not a United Nations peace-keeping operation" at all (Department of Public Information, 1979, p. 68), on the grounds that the United Command was virtually a U.S. show and that its activities were not based on the consent of both parties in dispute?

Consider, too, U.N. operations within the Congo (Leopoldville) in the early 1960's where, inter alia, "During the Katanga phase the UN forces returned fire with fire under authority from the Security Council that permitted the use of force to prevent civil war and to apprehend foreign mercenaries" (Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, p. 5). Here, and throughout the Congo operation, one can, of course, assay the tenor of the fighting and claim that any activities exceeding what one thinks are properly defensive were also ultra vires. Sophisticated argumentation of this sort is extensively attempted by Rikhye et al. (1974, pp. 79-81). In their view Operation MORTHOR, or "Round ONE," by the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) can trace its origins not to Secretary-General Hammerskjöld, but to Mahmoud Khairy of Tunisia, head of the U.N. civilian operation, and to Conor Cruise O'Brien, the U.N. representative at Elisabethville. "Hammerskjöld was not to realize the full implications of Operation MORTHOR until he arrived in the Congo on September 13, by which time the operation had run into serious difficulties." In addition, a later collaboration with the Adoula government over the arrest of Tshombe and the others was a direct departure from the prescribed limits of ONUC's mandate. The use of force as a means to end secession did not accord with the instructions
governing the use of force by ONUC that were operative at the time... The UN force had gone beyond its declared principle of "force only in self-defense."*

The Rikhye (and U.N.) methods of interpretation certainly produce a more homogeneous array of case material, by excluding occurrences that do not accord with stipulated preconceptions. A heavy price is paid, however, in departure from historical fidelity. For the plain fact is that United Nations peacekeeping operations range considerably in their characteristics. Some lasted a few months; others are in their fourth decade. Some have intrastate responsibilities; others are interstate. Maximum force sizes range from a high of about 20,000 to a low of 89. The number and composition of countries providing contingents of troops also vary greatly. Perhaps most importantly for present purposes, so too do the functions to be performed. These go from observation of armistice lines and supervision of a ceasefire, on the one hand, to interposition as a buffer force and internal pacification, on the other. Picking and choosing among these activities will, of course, reduce variability, but at the cost of real-world veracity.

Not only is the United Nations record in peacekeeping complex and not always purely defensive and non-enforcing, but also it is reasonable to see peacekeeping tasks falling sometimes within the competence of other than U.N. bodies. Cox (1967) is perhaps clearest of all commentators on this point: see especially his Chapter 3, "The Alternatives to United Nations Peacekeeping." Regional organizations suggest themselves as obvious candidates, since they offer a prospect for multinational staffing akin to that of the U.N.; and Cox discusses two (though only two) such groupings, the Organization

*Further information on U.N. involvement in the Congo is given in succeeding chapters and in Appendix A, Case 3.
of American States (O.A.S.) and the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.).

In point of fact, neither entity has compiled an extensive record in the deployment of peace-keeping forces. For the O.A.S., the only instance involved 1965-66 actions in the Dominican Republic; for the O.A.U. the sole examples both occurred in Chad, between early 1980 and mid 1982.* Otherwise, initiatives related to peacekeeping performed by both organizations amount chiefly to "conciliation, mediation, and arbitration of disputes" rather than "operations involving military personnel" (p. 71).

Were multinationality of forces an essential characteristic of peacekeeping, then interventions by single countries into another country for internal stability purposes clearly would not qualify for the label. And certainly a host of countries, most often of secondary importance in world power terms, have contributed over the years to each of the official U.N. peacekeeping operations. The shortest list applies to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which has had buffering and interposing responsibilities on the Golan Heights: nations participating include Austria, Canada, Peru, and Poland. Apart from ONUC in the Congo, the longest list, perhaps because its tenure has been longest, relates to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine/Israel, with seventeen states providing personnel: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

Note however, that while countries like Canada, Ireland, and those of Scandinavia are especially prominent in these efforts, major powers are not entirely absent: e.g., the U.K. contributed men to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP); U.S.A., to the United Nations Security Forces (UNSF) in West Irian; and France, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to UNTSO. Indeed, one should be chary about elevating any descriptive attributes of these

*See Appendix A, Cases 45 and 49.
operations to the rank of prescriptive requisites. For example, of the 11 U.N. operations listed by the International Peace Academy (1978) seven are located in the Middle East, two on the Indian/Pakistan frontier, and only two others (ONUC and UNSF) anywhere else in the world. Undoubtedly, factual reasons can be found for this particular global distribution—in particular, "only when governments become more fearful of action outside the United Nations, than of acting through the Organization, can they mobilize the necessary political consensus to authorize the international use of military forces" (Russell, 1964, p. ix)—but such contextual explanations surely do not form part of the defining criteria. Neither, one may suggest, does the extent, or even the existence, of multinationality of forces. (If four countries suffice, then why not two; and if two, why not one?) Nor does the availability of international auspices or even third party neutrality. For while Rikhye et al. (1974, pp. 120-1) may assert that "Peacekeeping forces are deployed into active conflict situations to bring an end to fighting and thereafter to maintain an impartial presence between the opposite sides in the dispute, so as to prevent a renewal in the fighting," they would have done well to heed Russell's earlier cautionary judgment (1964, p. ix) that "the use of a military force will affect the political and military balance even when every effort is made to be wholly neutral."

Such reasoning helps justify Cox (1967), in his chapter on "The Alternatives to United Nations Peacekeeping" including activities by contingents from even a single nation. For example, the mutinies of 1964 in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika resulted in calls from these governments for Britain's help; and that help itself constituted peacekeeping endeavors.* And while Cox

*For further information, see Appendix A, cases 6, 7, and 8.
believes (1967, p. 52) that "these particular governments will not resort to
Britain again if a feasible alternative can be found [and] thus the role of
Britain as a substitute or partner for the United States in policing future
conflicts is declining," this (in fact, correct) assertion does not carry as
obviously over to France in former French territories, nor does it preclude
a wider cast of states, African and otherwise, from sending troops throughout
the continent in an attempt to stabilize situations within the target countries.

To sum up, "United Nations peacekeeping" covers a wide range of activities
that differ in longevity, extent of multi-nationality, explicit function, degree
of defensiveness in posture, and even adoption of neutral stance. In addition,
the United Nations possesses no monopoly on providing peacekeeping forces:
regional organizations may do that, and so may individual countries. Most
of what commentators on U.N. peacekeeping treat as defining characteristics
of the process can better be interpreted as attributes that may or may not
apply in particular peacekeeping situations. Instead of declaring that
peacekeeping is by definition a multi-national, middle-power, non-adjacent-
state activity, one can examine cases of peacekeeping that are multi-national
and compare them to cases that are uni-national; contrast peacekeeping by
major powers and lesser ones; and distinguish between intra- and inter-
regional instances of the process. Under this stripped-down conceptual
approach, a peacekeeping force, as noted at the beginning of this chapter,
is nothing other than "a force from one or more countries invited into
another country for internal stability purposes," whether or not it is
African and whether or not it is internationalized.

Criteria for Peacekeeping Cases

A broad interpretation of peacekeeping immediately suggests the utility
of dividing the cases it encompasses by categories. One classificatory
scheme, crosstabulating attitude toward the recognized government (trifurcated as supportive of that government, neutral, and opposed to that government) against origin of the intervening forces (bifurcated as uni-national and multi-national) is given in Figure 1-1. Even by itself, this array yields six "types". The most common for Africa, as the next chapter shows, are single-nation efforts on behalf of the recognized government, attempting in one way or another to shore it up against domestic or external threats. Single-nation peacekeeping forces that adopt a neutral position between a government and its competition are rarely met, while anti-governmental interventions, as by Tanzania in Uganda, are somewhat more frequent.

Overall, cases of African peacekeeping are predominantly characterized by intervention of soldiery from just a single country. Even if one extends the term "multi-national" to include both internationalized efforts, as by the U.N. or O.A.U., and overlapping (even if only loosely coordinated) activities by more than one nation, few examples in Africa are to be found. Moreover, most of these endeavors, too, are scarcely neutral in their objective. They are mainly intended to bolster the government in power, as with the United Nations in the Congo, or to enhance prospects of entities within the target country that are opposed to the government, as with South Africa and Zaire in Angola from 1973 onwards.

Cases of peacekeeping might also be classified according to whether they are brief or protracted; whether or not they are countered by efforts on the other "side"; whether they succeed or fail in their immediate objectives; whether they involve European, sub-Saharan African, North African, or other external actors; whether they occur in the early or late 1960's, 1970's, or in the 1980's; whether they take place just after independence—say, in less than four years—or later than that. Case-specific characteristics of this sort
are presented serially in the narratives of Appendix A and are probed in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 counts each case equally; Chapter 3 weights cases according to their "size". In both chapters, not only is a canvass of these attributes made for the entire sample of cases, but also tendencies over time are identified and discussed.

In Chapters 2 and 3, case data are often rearranged, coded, and aggregated, but the main intent, so far as possible, is to let these materials speak for themselves. The effort is largely descriptive: what is the body of cases like, and does it exhibit any trends? The emphasis is on what has been happening, and causal questions are raised only by implication.

By contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 interpret the cases through reflective discussion and through the creation and testing of formal analytic models. Chapter 4 treats peacekeeping operations in Africa from a specifically military perspective. For example, it comments on what past operations reveal about the weaknesses of both African armed forces and the African political systems in which they are embedded. It also takes note of the impact that new weaponry dissemination may have on the conduct of such operations in the future.

For their part, Chapter 5 and Appendix B construct theoretical and measurement models that permit assessment of the decisional process linking initiator and target countries. The emphasis here is on predicting the probability and extent of intervention as well as its relative success or failure. Besides case-specific activities, the data to which these models are applied reflect a host of variables about the political, social, economic, military, and demographic backgrounds of the countries concerned.

Finally, Chapter 6 utilizes aspects of the previous presentations to estimate how a peacekeeping force might fare in a newly emergent Namibia.
The approach follows that of the Cases in Appendix A, with information given about the ground to the present situation, various plausible scenarios of intervention, and their likely conclusions.

In the analyses and computations that follow, a set of events is considered one peacekeeping case when a target country is intervened upon by outside military forces from one or more countries, whose interventions at least partly overlap in time and all fall within one (and only one) of the boxes in Figure 1-1. The case begins with the arrival of the first of such forces. (For French troops in particular, arrival and departure may be construed to mean leaving and returning to a base within the country itself.)

If all forces have left and then, after a noticeable period of time, some are reintroduced, a second case of peacekeeping has occurred. If forces are introduced into a country such that some would fall into one box in Figure 1-1 and some into another (with, for example, anti-governmental forces from South Africa and Zaire and pro-governmental forces from Cuba both entering Angola in 1975), then the events distinguished in this classification are separately counted as one case of peacekeeping each. The entire list of African peacekeeping cases in the sample is provided in the next chapter by Table 2-1.

Several types of situations, however, are explicitly eliminated from consideration. No notice is taken of non-official military activities, whether by volunteers or by mercenaries. Offenses mounted by exiles who would normally be residents or citizens of the target country are excluded. In addition, "country" is taken to refer to independent states only; hence, interventions linked to the continuance or cessation of formal colonialism, whether by forces emanating from metropolitan centers of power or by "freedom fighters" and their allies, are disregarded. The shipment of arms into a country from abroad by itself does not amount to peacekeeping, even though it may massively impact upon stability. In addition, the sending to, or stationing in, a
country of military advisers and trainers, no matter how extensive their numbers, is omitted from consideration, since virtually every African country has been recipient of many such ministrations. Moreover, since peacekeeping, as defined in this project, is undertaken "for internal security purposes," hit and run raids and attempts at forcible border alterations (as by Idi Amin in neighboring Tanzania) are dropped from the analysis. Without question, they are better thought of as destabilizing.
Figure 1-1

Identification of Peacekeeping by Attitude Toward Target Government
and Origin of Intervening Forces Yield Six Analytic Categories

### Attitude Toward Target Government

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<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Anti-Government</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intervening Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unilateral</strong></td>
<td>e.g., France</td>
<td>e.g., Nigeria</td>
<td>e.g., Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral</strong></td>
<td>e.g., U.N.</td>
<td>e.g. O.A.U.</td>
<td>e.g., South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(and contributing countries) in Congo (1960)</td>
<td>(and contributing countries) in Chad (1981)</td>
<td>and Zaire in Angola (1975)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2
A Summary of Case Material: Rates of Incidence

In this chapter, cases of African peacekeeping go unweighted—or, put another way, they are weighted equally, no matter how long the case took and how sizeable the outside forces became. By contrast, in Chapter 3, which treats "scope of operations," efforts are made to take into account both the length and magnitude of each endeavor.

Discussion in the present chapter first provides a chronological listing of the African peacekeeping cases that we have located. These cases are then classified according to the uni-nationality or multi-nationality of the intervening troops and their attitude (pro-governmental, neutral, or anti-governmental) toward the target government. Pro-governmental actions, which comprise the most common peacekeeping examples, are then further subdivided, by purpose, into counter-insurgency, internal security, and external defense. Trends in the incidence of peacekeeping cases over time are tracked for five-year periods beginning in 1960; and the initiation of such actions is also examined in terms of number of years after formal independence of the target African country. The final analyses in this chapter deal with more detailed trends across time in both the areas of origination of African peacekeeping forces and the countries in Africa to which they have been sent.

Standards for inclusion and exclusion of peacekeeping cases were specified in the introductory chapter. Their application to a systematic search of historical material about events in independent Africa from 1960 to date yields some 50 cases. These are listed in Table 2-1, which also provides a case number to be used in subsequent tabular arrays.

[Table 2-1 about here]
and identifies initial year of such endeavors, target state, and external actor(s) (i.e., the intervening country, countries, or international entity). Further descriptive information on each of these cases is presented, in a consistent and brief format, in Appendix A.

On the basis of their manifest content, the cases can be arrayed in a matrix (Table 2-2), whose underlying logic is akin to that in Figure 1-1. Clearly, as the marginals show, peacekeeping activities have been predominantly undertaken in sub-Saharan Africa by single countries rather than by international entities or by several countries in tandem. Moreover, only in a relative handful of cases has such intercession been neutral as between the recognized government and its foes. Instead, more than three quarters of the cases have involved peacekeeping on behalf of that government while about a fifth exhibit activities that are unmistakably anti-governmental.

The cells of the matrix are even more compelling in their purport. Only two cases, both involving O.A.U. efforts in Chad during 1981-82, even approach the requirements of classical peacekeeping: i.e., neutral and non-enforcing activities in the name of a regional organization. Three other instances--two in Chad during 1979 and a hostage rescue operation by Belgium in the Congo during 1964--show single nations undertaking basically neutralist tasks. By far the commonest sort of peacekeeping involves pro-governmental actions performed by single intervening countries. Even if aggregated, cases in which multi-national forces (i.e., troops from two or more countries in concert or from international bodies) intervene in a pro-governmental manner, and in which single countries introduce forces that act against the recognized government, occur less than half as frequently. And in only one instance--where both South Africa and Zaire operated within Angola during 1975-76--was a multi-national effort directed to an obviously anti-governmental end.
Since the bulk of the cases fall in the two left-most (pro-governmental) cells, it seems advisable to consider these more closely. In Table 2-3, we distinguish three purposes for which outside military intervention may occur. The external actor may dispatch troops primarily in order to (1) help put down rather widespread manifestations of dissatisfaction with the government (counter-insurgency), (2) help withstand or immediately overthrow an imminent or actual coup (internal security), or (3) assist a government faced by a threat that is foreign in origin (external defense).*

Table 2-4 presents data on the incidence of peacekeeping occurrences by year of inception. Findings are grouped into 5-year periods starting with 1960, when the first case begins. The final period, 1980 to July 1982, of course, remains open. Note that peacekeeping activities, which do after all imply an inability of African states individually to manage their own problems, appear to be on the decline from the early 1960's through the mid 1970's. Indeed the years 1973 and 1974 saw no such peacekeeping forces starting their work. In the late 1970's, however, the count of these interactions rose to an unprecedented frequency, and their initiation has also continued, albeit at a somewhat diminished rate, to characterize the early 1980's.

*Help given to restore a momentarily overthrown government is always coded as pro-governmental. Resistance to incursions by exiles is considered counter-insurgency; and hence, to some extent, the infrequency of a purely external defense motif.
As Table 2-5 shows, peacekeeping cases do not simply illustrate the immediate carry-over of factual decolonialization processes past the date of formal independence. To be sure, about a fourth of the instances of peacekeeping occurred within three years of independence, as in Cameroun, Congo (L.), Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, and Mozamibique. But an equivalent number were also begun in the four-year period that stretches from 16 to 19 years after independence. Indeed, the main impression received from the data is that cases have continued to arise at a steady, if somewhat rolling, gait from independence up to the present. This may, of course, reflect decolonialization more broadly construed, but it may as readily be traced to more general problems of new states. All told, if one lists the number of African peacekeeping cases in which various external countries have been involved, one obtains an array like that in Table 2-6.* In gross terms, European countries certainly lead the list: in particular, France has been involved in 12 peacekeeping operations, and Belgium and the U.K. in 5 each. Even so, of the 77 actor-cases--again not counting the U.N. Congo operation--some 44 involved African countries or the O.A.U. as intervenor, though in 12 of these instances the African contribution did originate in Africa north, rather than south, of the Sahara (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco).

If, however, one further breaks down these incidences of peacekeeping activities by first year of case, one obtains a distribution of the sort

*The 1960-64 U.N. involvement in the Congo (L.) is omitted from this count. For a list of the nations, apart from the Congo itself, that contributed troops to this enterprise, see the note to Table 2-1.
presented in Table 2-7. Peacekeeping activities in Africa, true enough, began in the 1960's as an activity predominantly undertaken by European and not by African states. In contrast, the 1980's have thus far seen no new peacekeeping efforts by countries other than African ones, though 1 of 10 instances have been from North Africa rather than Africa south of the Sahara. In between, the relative presence of European countries tended to diminish and the role of African countries to increase. In the period 1965-69, there were 9 European initiators and 6 African ones (2 from North Africa); in 1970-74, the figures are 1 European state and 4 African (2 North African); and in 1975-79, 9 European states and 22 African (7 North African).

Nevertheless, one should note that African peacekeeping has not become, even at present, an exclusively intra-African endeavor. In particular, of the 4 instances begun in 1975-79 that contain "other" than just European or African forces, 3 cases (Angola in 1975, Ethiopia in 1977, and Equatorial Guinea in 1978) involve Cuban troops: and the Angolan and Ethiopian instances are still continuing. The Cubans may be considered surrogates for the U.S.S.R. in these areas; and so also may troops from South Yemen in Ethiopia. Moreover, two of the European countries listed for the 1975-1979 period are in fact the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R., both of which have been participating militarily in the Ethiopian setting since late 1977 and early 1978.

Even a quick overview of the material in Table 2-1 suggest that a relative handful of African States have been recipients of, or have generated a need for, peacekeeping forces from other countries. These
"peacekept" states are listed, by 5-year intervals, in Table 2-8 and also indicated on Map 2-1. The numbers refer to the total number of peacekeeping cases in which that state appeared as a target of outside ministrations. These numbers range from a high of 8 for Chad to a low of 0, indicated in the table by a dash, for at least 17 states.*

Some 24 countries were targets for at least one instance of peacekeeping; but of these 13 were featured in just one case and 7 in only two. Moreover, only 4 nations experienced peacekeeping that was initiated in more than one 5-year period. Looked at from the other end, of the 50 peacekeeping cases, nearly half—some 23— took place in just four states: the Congo (Leopoldville), later Zaire; Uganda; the Central African Republic, or Empire; and Chad. Clearly, for these latter contexts the occurrence of multiple "cases" chiefly implies the actual existence historically of a long and convoluted "chain-of-cases," which our analytic criteria have subdivided and separated. These clustered hyper-cases will be discussed together in the next chapter, as will cases of greater or lesser duration, to which varying numbers of forces responded, with differing purposes and differing degrees of success.

*The still formally decolonializing lands of Western Sahara, Zimbabwe and Namibia are omitted from this table, just as they are, in general, from all the analyses of this report.
Table 2-1

Fifty Cases of Peacekeeping Have Occurred in Africa South of the Sahara Since 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Target State</th>
<th>Intervening State(s)</th>
<th>Year of Inception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Congo (Leopoldville)</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Congo (L.)</td>
<td>U.N.*</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>U.K., Nigeria</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Congo (L.)</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Congo (L.)</td>
<td>Ethiopia, U.S.,</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium, Ghana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>U.K., Sweden, Canada,</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland, Ethiopia,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria, O.A.U.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>South Africa, Zaire</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2-1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country 1</th>
<th>Country 2</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Morocco, France</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>France, Belgium, Morocco, Senegal,</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Empire, Togo, Ivory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coast, Gabon, Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Tanzania, Mozambique</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Central African Empire</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Central African Empire</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Congo, O.A.U.</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, O.A.U.</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: U.N. military forces in the Congo operation originated in 33 countries (besides the Congo itself): India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Ghana, Sweden, Malaysia, Ireland, Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Canada, Liberia, Norway, Denmark, Guinea, Italy, Sudan, Egypt, Mali, Sierra Leone, Brazil, Austria, Argentina, Netherlands, Philippines, Ceylon, Iran, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, New Zealand, Ecuador.*
Table 2-1 (Continued)

Contributions, in man-months, ranged from a substantial 142,704 and 119,226 for the first two nations on the list to a token 10 and 8 for the last two. See Lefever and Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960 - 1964. Vol. 3, Appendix H, Chart B.
Table 2-2

Three-fifths of African Peacekeeping Cases Have Been Both Uni-National and Pro-Governmental

Attitude Toward Target Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of Intervening Forces</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Anti-Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uni-National</td>
<td>1,2,4,5,7,8,9,11,13,14, 15,17,18,19,21,22,23, 25,26,27,30,32,33,35, 39,40,41,44,46,47,48 (N=31)</td>
<td>10,42</td>
<td>20,29,34,37,43, 50 (N=6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-National</td>
<td>3,6,16,28,31,36,38 (N=7)</td>
<td>12,45,49 (N=3)</td>
<td>24 (N=1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in each box, except for those in parentheses, refer to the case identification numbers in Table 2-1
Table 2-3

Most Cases of Pro-Governmental African Peacekeeping are Directed to Primarily Domestic (Rather than Primarily Foreign) Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counter-insurgency</td>
<td>1, 3, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19,</td>
<td>N=18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31, 35, 36, 38, 46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security</td>
<td>2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13,</td>
<td>N=17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21, 32, 33, 40, 41, 44,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47, 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Defense</td>
<td>11, 18, 27, 39</td>
<td>N=4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Case numbers refer to the identification numbers in Table 2-1.
Case 3, the U.N. operation in the Congo (Leopoldville), initially had internal security purposes, but evolved into a counter-insurgency effort.
Table 2-4

Many New Cases of African Peacekeeping Have Appeared in Every 5-Year Time Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5-Year Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-82 (July)</td>
<td>6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Extrapolating, the estimate for 1980-85 would be 12.
Table 2-5

The initiation of African peacekeeping cases is essentially unrelated to the number of years the target state has been independent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Years after Independence of Target State that Peacekeeping Activities Begin There (By Four Year Periods)</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N=50*
Table 2-6

Individual European Countries (Especially France) Have Been Prominent in Supplying African Peacekeeping Forces; But Overall, African Countries Have Participated in More African Peacekeeping Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Cases Participated In</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.D.R.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total European</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika/Tanzania</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.A.U.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Empire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Africa South of Sahara</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2-6 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Africa North of Sahara</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total other</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The 1960-64 U.N. operation in the Congo (L.) is omitted from this table.
Table 2-7

Over Time African Peacekeeping Has Seen a Decline in The Relative Presence of European Forces, and Its Conduct Has Become More Nearly Intra-African

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa South of Sahara</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa North of Sahara</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If the 1960-64 Congo operation by the U.N. is included, the numbers would change to: Europe, 15; Africa South, 11; Africa North 3; and other, 14.

+Other includes: for 1965-69, U.S. and Canada; and for 1975-79, Cuba (thrice) and South Yemen. Also for 1975-79, Europe includes U.S.S.R. and German Democratic Republic (once each).

Note: Total N in this Table (77) exceeds 49, since in many cases troops originated in more than one country.
Table 2-8

Most African States Have Been the Locus of No (or Very Few) Peacekeeping Cases, But a Handful -- Like Chad and Zaire -- Have Been the Target of Many Such Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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Note: Numbers refer to the number of cases per period for each country. Dashes signify zeros.
Chapter 3
A Summary of Case Material: Scope of Operations

In the previous chapter, each case of African peacekeeping counted the same, whereas in the present chapter cases are distinguished in terms of magnitude. Discussion begins with a description and justification of weights assigned to three components of peacekeeping efforts: number of troops employed, duration of activities, and level of weaponry. These weights are then applied to the same 50 cases of African peacekeeping that were analyzed in Chapter 2. The product of the three weights furnishes a composite score, which permits at least rough classification of cases by size. About a fourth of the cases may be considered large; and these have occurred in a relative handful of countries, chiefly since 1975. Consideration of "chains of cases"—i.e., two or more cases with the same target country—allows recombination of previously analyzed data, and thereby measurement of which states have been most affected by African peacekeeping. Attention to magnitudes also reveals, even more clearly than in Chapter 2, the spurt in African peacekeeping operations since 1975 and their continuation up to the present at a high level. The increase in such activities does not, however, imply an augmented success rate. To the contrary, African peacekeeping efforts of late have tended to fail with greater frequency, and so their consequence may in fact be increased destabilization of the African continent.

As noted just above, in the previous chapter each case of African peacekeeping counted equally, as each state does in the U.S. Senate. In the present chapter an effort is made to assign weights to cases in accordance with their size, rather like the apportionment of congressmen in the House of Representatives. The relevant criteria for weighting states are, however, far clearer
than those for evaluating peacekeeping cases. Indeed, for congressional representation there is only one criterion, the number of persons in each state. Geographical extent, share of national GNP, and other important characteristics are simply irrelevant to the issue. Size of peacekeeping operations, by contrast, depends on no single attribute. It is dealt with here, instead, as a product of factors relating to the number of troops that enter the target country, the duration (in days, months, years) of the endeavor, and the level of weaponry utilized.

In Table 3-1, information is given on weights assigned to these three aspects of African peacekeeping. For the first two attributes, the scaling is logarithmic in spirit if not in precise detail: i.e., each code number for troops reflects approximately the same multiple of the preceding code number, and similarly for duration. The logic behind this assignment is that, for example, it takes considerably less than five times as much effort to mount a peacekeeping effort of 500 soldiers as one of 100. Doing anything at all, moving from inertia into action, requires a considerable expenditure of will; thereafter, at least until some ceiling effect is met, augmentation of troop size becomes progressively easier. One cannot swear, of course, that the provision of 10,000 soldiers involves only four times as much determination as does 100, but that does seem far more plausible than that the former requires 100 times the commitment of the latter. Similar reasoning applies to the codes for time span adopted here. It is the gearing-up that takes the most work. Subsequently, a new case-bound tendency takes increasing hold and diminishes the need for much higher augmentation of commitment.

Both numbers of troops and spans of time can be treated in this manner, since they are each readily arrayed along a single dimension. Level of weaponry
is a more jumbled and conglomerate notion, which makes application of a logarithmic approach seem dubious. This study confines itself, therefore, to a simple 1-2-3 encoding for weaponry, with all efforts scored at least "1," while assignment of a "2" and "3" depends on whether heavy armor or attack aircraft were used by the peacekeeping operators. (Transport planes do not by themselves raise the code number above "1".)

In nearly all instances, narrative accounts (See Appendix A) were sufficiently precise to permit full coding. If information on number of troops could not be obtained, the case is considered uninterpretable and is dropped from any detailed further analysis: this applies only to cases 27 (Mozambique, 1976) and 50 (Somalia, 1982). If information on length of time is missing—chiefly because, while one knows when troops arrive, their leaving is sometimes unreported by the press and uncertain in actual fact—then a nominal code of 2.5 is applied to their duration. This is in all likelihood rather on the high side, but it makes little difference, since all the cases which require this procedure—7, 9, 13, 21, 22, 23, 36, and 48—remain quite small ones. In addition, if the actual time span fell between the core values given in Table 3-1 (Column 3), the code designation was selected for which it seemed to have the greater affinity.

Application of these procedures to African peacekeeping cases yields the arrays in Table 3-2. The three scores can also be multiplied together to form a composite score for each case. This composite score can range theoretically from a low of "1"—quick arrival and departure of a handful of troops without armor or attack aircraft—to a high of "60"—more than 25,000 troops at the peak, with attack aircraft support, and lasting, though not necessarily at full strength, for more than two years.
In fact, two cases have composite scores of "1": a one-day operation by French forces in Senegal on December 12, 1969, in order to help move 1,200 Sengalese troops to border areas; and an effort by Senegal of under two weeks in the Gambia during September-October, 1980, to fend off a threatened coup. Both cases proved successful. Indeed, of the smallest peacekeeping cases (i.e., those with composite scores in single digits) 24 succeeded and only 4 failed to achieve their purpose, while for the other, bigger cases the success-failure rate was 7 to 10. (Five cases, whose size or outcome is ambiguous, are omitted from this calculation.) The mini-cases of African peacekeeping, in other words, were typically quick in-and-out operations by a few rather lightly-armed troops, that achieved their limited objective.

Theoretically, as was noted before, the largest composite score that the coding procedures could provide would be a "60", i.e. 5x4x3. Only one case (38) met these criteria: Tanzania's peacekeeping efforts on behalf of the newly restored Ugandan government of Milton Obote. At its peak this operation involved some 30,000 to 40,000 Tanzanian soldiers; it has lasted from March 1979 to the present; and it utilized heavy armor and support aircraft. There are, in addition, a number of cases that have composite scores of "48".

The more sizeable peacekeeping cases probably deserve enhanced attention. Table 3-3 gathers all the largest cases—those with composite scores in excess of 35—as well as those that almost reach this level—composite scores between 20 and 34. Some 13 of the 50 cases of African peacekeeping fall into one or the other of these categories, and mainly into the upper one. The 13, however, involve only 7 target countries, since Chad was the locus of such activities in three cases, while Angola, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, and Uganda appear in
two each. The intervening states in these peacekeeping efforts are less narrowly confined. Omission of case 3, which refers to the U.N. operation in the Congo (L.) from 1960 to 1964, still leaves 14 actor states, in part because some operations involved troops from more than one country—cases 31, 38, and 24—and in part because there was less repetition by actors in big efforts than one might have expected. Indeed, only Cuba, Libya, and Tanzania participated in as many as two of the larger peacekeeping operations. Note also the prominence, though not the dominance, in these big events of countries acting on behalf of Soviet aims, as in cases 25, 29, 31 and possibly 33. The more provocative African regimes—Libya, Tanzania, and Angola—are also active in several of the larger cases.

Except for early Congo activities by Belgium and the United Nations (cases 2 and 3), large African peacekeeping cases have been of fairly recent vintage. Some ten began during the 5-year period from 1975 to 1979, and one in the current period. In addition, several of the cases—number 25, Cuba in Angola; 31, a Communist consortium in Ethiopia; and 38, Tanzania in Uganda—continue even up to the present. In addition, six of the thirteen cases (numbers 2, 24, 26, 29, 35, and 46) ended in failure, and one (number 3, the U.N. operation in the Congo) is ambiguous in this respect. This high failure rate is plausible enough, since several of the cases—24 and 25 about Angola, 34 and 35 about Chad and 29 and 31 about Ethiopia—involved interventions on both sides of a civil dispute, and the strong tendency was for one or the other contestant to lose. Moreover, cases become large because many troops participate and the struggle takes a long time, often with weaponry supplied by the great powers, all of which enhances an inherent propensity to failure.

The analyses to this point have sometimes separated as discrete cases.
sets of events which reflective on-lookers might plausibly view as singular, but complex, events. It is as if one noticed five or six showers of an April day and discussed each one by itself, instead of observing that the day in general was a stormy one. To obviate such objections, Table 3-4 presents composite scores for all countries which contain "chains of cases." Such chains are defined here, in a highly inclusive fashion, as two or more cases occurring in any given target state. The longest chains are in Chad (8), Congo (Leopoldville) or Zaire (7), Uganda (4) and Central African Republic.

[Table 3-4 about here]

(or Empire) (3). Chains of two cases each are found in Ethiopia, Angola, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gambia, and Zanzibar and Tanganyika (or Tanzania). Several of the shorter chains (not all of which are nominal: for example, the two cases in Nigeria or in Gambia) do not involve much effort; but in two of the pairs (Ethiopia and Angola), where offsetting interventions occurred in large-scale internal wars, the high sums of composite scores reflect the severity of the struggles. Except perhaps for the Central African Republic, chains of cases larger than two also imply high total composite scores for the target country. As one might have wished the data to show, Chad possesses by far the highest target country composite score, with Congo (L.)-Zaire second and Uganda third. Uganda's total score over four cases, however, just barely exceeds Ethiopia's (or Angola's) over two, a fact which underlines the magnitude of the struggles in the Horn and in the former Portuguese territory.

Assignment of African peacekeeping cases to 5-year periods and summing of their weights by such periods, with pro-ration of cases whose span overlaps the 5-year dividing lines, produces results of the sort detailed in Table 3-5. As with unweighted Table 2-4, the trend until the mid-1970's was for peacekeeping cases to diminish and seemingly to be on the verge of disappearing.
From 1975 onward, however, a large rise is observable in the magnitude of these activities, an increase that is even sharper than the increase in number of cases and that occurs despite considerable pro-rating of composite scores for cases begun in 1975-79 to the period beginning in 1980. Moreover, the scope of African peacekeeping operations appears to be continuing nowadays at about the same level as in 1975-79.

There are other ways, too, in which these data may be approached. Table 3-6 details case-by-case pro-rated composite scores for 5-year periods, classifying these figures according to whether the case in question primarily involved a neighbor state (one with a common border) or one that was non-adjacent, and whether it ended in success or failure. These two dichotomies yield a four-fold classification, which forms the basis for the four data columns of the Table. Over time, African peacekeeping efforts have clearly tended to become activities undertaken by impinging countries. Not only have European forces largely withdrawn from such engagements, but also the impetus, with some exceptions (chiefly involving Chad), has not become pan-African either. Instead, the chief responsibility, for good or ill, increasingly falls on abutting states.

This shift has not led to any improved pace of success. To the contrary, the trend appears to be in the direction of greater failure. This is particularly evident for the time period 1975-79, where failures in interventions mounted by neighboring countries are by far the most prominent of the four types. Nor does the present seem much more hopeful. If one considers only those cases that began in 1980 or later (cases 45-49), the results are: for success/neighbor, 9.5; for success/non-adjacent, 0; for failure/neighbor, 58; and for failure/non-adjacent, 0. And the failure/neighbor score would be even higher, should case 50 (Ethiopia in Somalia) end without an Ethiopian victory.
Such "failures," of course, may well accord with U.S. policy preferences; and so might many earlier failures. Increasing propensities to failure, however, also signify a tendency for African peacekeeping efforts, whatever their purpose, to fall short of the marks they have chosen for themselves. Their result is not a confirmation of an old stability or the building of a new one, but rather a profound and continuing destabilization of the African continent.
Table 3-1
Weights are Assigned to Three Aspects of African Peacekeeping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Number of Troops</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Level of Weaponry</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-200</td>
<td>Less than 1 week</td>
<td>No more than ground troops and light support</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>201-1,000</td>
<td>1-2 months</td>
<td>Heavy armor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,001-5,000</td>
<td>1/2 year-1 year</td>
<td>Attack aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,001-25,000</td>
<td>2 years or more</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>25,000 and more</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3-2

African Peacekeeping Cases Differ Greatly in the Interactive Impact of Troop Size, Duration and Level of Weaponry

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<th>Number*</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Number of Troops</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Level of Weaponry</th>
<th>Weightings for: AxBxC</th>
<th>Composite Score</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-2 Continued

Case numbers are the same as those in Table 2-1. That Table also lists name of intervening state(s) and year of case inception.

Weightings, as explained in the text, are as follows. For number of troops: 1 signifies less than 200; 2, from 200 to 1,000; 3, from 1,000 to 5,000; 4, from 5,000 to 25,000; and 5, more than 25,000. For duration: 1 signifies less than a week; 2, a month or two; 3, a half-year to a year; and 4, more than 2 years. (Those few cases that fell between these temporal core values were assimilated to the code that they more clearly resembled.) For level of weaponry: 1 signifies ground troop with only light support; 2, heavy armor; and 3, attack aircraft. (Transport planes are not taken into consideration.)
Table 3-3
Relatively Few African Peacekeeping Cases are Large in Scope
(Lasting More Than a Half-Year, Deploying More Than 5,000
Troops, and Utilizing Attack Aircraft); and Only 7 African
States Have Been Targets of Such Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Intervening State(s)</th>
<th>Year of Initiation</th>
<th>Composite Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Largest Cases (Composite Score&gt;35)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Tanzania, Mozambique</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Congo (Leopoldville)</td>
<td>U.N.*</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Congo (L.)</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>South Africa, Zaire</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Largest Cases (Composite Score&gt;20)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For the countries that contributed men to the United Nations operation in the Congo, see the footnote to Table 2-1.
Table 3-4

A Few African States (Chad, Zaire, Uganda) Have Been Especially Affected by Peacekeeping as Targets of Long Chains of Cases; And a Few Others (Ethiopia and Angola) through Experiencing Dual Large Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Chain</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Composite Score per Case</th>
<th>Composite Score per Target Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Congo (Leopoldville)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or Zaire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>114.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-4 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(or Empire)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zanzibar and Tanganyika</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(or Tanzania)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3-5

The Magnitude of African Peacekeeping was Particularly High in the Period 1975-79, but the Pace May Be Even Greater at Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Cases During That Period*</th>
<th>Sum of Pro-rated Cumulative Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9(p), 10</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-70</td>
<td>9(p), 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16(p), 17(p), 18</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>16(p), 17(p), 19, 20, 21, 22, 23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>24, 25(p), 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31(p), 32(p), 33(p), 34(p), 35(p), 36, 37, 38(p), 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44(p)</td>
<td>330.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-July 82</td>
<td>25(p), 31(p), 32(p), 33(p), 34(p), 35(p), 38(p), 44(p), 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50</td>
<td>194.5†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cases 27 and 50 are omitted from this Table for lack of needed information. See Table 3-2.

* (p) denotes pro-rating of a case between two time periods in accordance with the approximate number of months in each.

† Extrapolating, for 1980-84, this figure would reach 375 or more.
Table 3-6

Over Time Peacekeeping Activities Have Tended More to Involve Neighboring Than Non-Adjacent Countries, But With No Improvement in the Success Rate

Pro-Rated Composite Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Success-Neighbor</th>
<th>Success-Non Adjacent</th>
<th>Failure-Neighbor</th>
<th>Failure-Non Adjacent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1960-64

| Number | 1 | 12 | | 36 |
|--------|---|----||----|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Neighbor</th>
<th>Non Adjacent</th>
<th>Neighbor</th>
<th>Non Adjacent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of Composite Scores: 2 34 0 36
Number of Cases: (1) (7) (0) (1)

1965-69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>9(p)</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16(p)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17(p)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of Composite Scores: 0 36.5 0 4
Number of Cases: (3) (7) (0) (2)

47
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Sum of Composite Scores</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16(p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17(p)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of Composite Scores</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25(p)</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>28</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31(p)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32(p)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33(p)</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34(p)</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>35(p)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38(p)</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44(p)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of Composite Scores</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48
Table 3-6 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1980-82 (July)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 (p)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 (p)</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 (p)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 (p)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 (p)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 (p)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>36</td>
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</tr>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of Composite Scores 66.5 62 58 8

Number of Cases (4) (4) (3) (2)

Note: Some six cases are omitted from this Table: Cases 27 and 50 lack composite scores. See Table 3-2. In addition, cases, 3, 20, and 23 are not readily codable as to success or failure, while case 36 is ambiguous on the neighbor-nonadjacent criterion.
Chapter 4

Military and Structural Observations

In the two preceding chapters, attention was directed to the substance of the peacekeeping cases themselves. Chapter 2 counted each case equally; chapter 3 attempted to weight cases according to size. While interpretive assumptions and procedures certainly underlie the identification, description, coding, and aggregation of the 50 cases in the sample, a conscious effort was made to burden the analysis with as little a priori theorizing as possible. The intent, in other words, was to examine what the cases contained—and to see if they exhibited any central tendencies or periodicities—rather than to use the cases as illustrations or proofs of exogenously derived conceptual schemes.

Chapters 4 and 5 proceed differently. Their aim is to probe the causal nexus, thereby making the cases more apposite to other policy determinations. In so doing, these chapters pull back somewhat from the case material and encompass a broader range of information. Data introduced in this chapter are often of a specifically military nature, while Chapter 5 treats a host of systematically gathered political, social, economic, military, and demographic attributes. The two chapters also employ rather different approaches. Chapter 3, along with Appendix B, details fully specified theoretical models and somewhat simpler measurement models in order to explicate the processes that link initiator and target countries in peacekeeping operations. The present chapter, by contrast, proceeds in a more familiarly discursive and reflective manner. As such, it provides a useful bridge between the findings on case distributions that have preceded it and the formal and applied modeling that will follow.

Two main topics are discussed immediately below. The first accepts the fact that peacekeeping operations, in Africa as elsewhere, are a subcategory of
military intervention. Their specifically military aspects deserve scrutiny. Themes briefly touched on include the potential impact of hostilely-controlled SAM's on the ability to airlift peacekeeping forces rapidly into target countries; the advantages and disadvantages of multi-national peacekeeping efforts; and the difficulty in sustaining a peacekeeping operation when tasks change from symbolic presence to actual combat.

The second topic examines the place of the African military within the overall African political structure. The basic argument is that African armies are generally weak units within weak political systems. The weakness of the encompassing structures may be illustrated in various ways: through the very prevalence of peacekeeping, with its derogation from sovereignty; through the susceptibility of African nations to military coups; and through the fact that even sparse outfitting of small military forces heavily drains the resources of most countries on the continent. The weakness of the military is evident in much the same body of data: most African armed forces, after all, are relatively small and unprofessional, while the typically small scale of successful African peacekeeping further demonstrates that those forces are not formidable elements to contend with.

Military Considerations

Many of the African peacekeeping cases discussed earlier were quick in-and-out operations. Of the 50 cases in the sample, at least ten lasted less than a week and eight others only a month or two. In such abbreviated emergency situations, and in many others of longer duration, intervening forces must be rapidly deployed. Apart from countries on the coast—and even there, only if seaborne troops are available—this implies the need for airlift. (Cf. Pickett, 1977.)

To be sure, no substantial interventionary units, whether originating within Africa itself or interceding from Europe and other distant areas, can
stay in place for long without additional sealift or ground supply. In the short run, however, airlift does exhibit many tactical advantages, even though it is both costly to sustain and increasingly susceptible to hostile attack. Costs would be particularly high if the response depended on planes based in the United States. Since few African nations possess jet fuel stores adequate to service a sudden airlift, craft originating in the U.S. would have to refuel en route if they were to carry a substantial load. Starting from bases in Egypt or Israel, or from Ascension Island, improves the situation for some parts of the continent, but distances remain immense. The cost factor alone helps explain why African peacekeeping cases have tended more and more to involve adjacent states rather than those at greater remove (see Table 3-6).*

Dependence on airlift may become riskier with the dissemination throughout Africa of light, portable, simple surface-to-air missiles. Their possession in hostile hands—those of rebels, for pro-governmental peacekeeping; those of the regime, for anti-governmental peacekeeping; perhaps those of both sides, for neutral peacekeeping—may inhibit the use of civilian aircraft, often resorted to in large-scale operations, and also require armed air cover. Small numbers of SAM's—mainly SAM-7's supplied by the U.S.S.R. or P.R.C.—are already found in Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. A few African countries also possess radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns. (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.) Elimination of SAM units by suppression fire or ground forces, and other efforts at containment, reduces the threat to the airlift, but at the price of widened political and military involve-

*Moreover, a number of the early cases, in which Britain or France was the intervening state, were populated by troops of that nationality already stationed in the target country or relatively nearby.
ment. Yet, flying in without such precautionary measures may leave the airlift open to a much higher than acceptable level of military (and hence, political) vulnerability.

Even though their participation has been requested, single nations lie vulnerable to a variety of charges whenever they undertake peacekeeping endeavors. They may be labelled "neo-colonialists," a charge often applied to France. If they are neighbors, their efforts may well raise sensitivities whenever they are interpreted as supportive or opposed to one or another domestic political faction. And, of course, all single-nation peacekeeping efforts, but especially those by neighbors, raise possibilities of absorption and ultimate loss of sovereignty. By contrast, multi-national campaigns, especially those with international or regional credentials, may wound domestic pride far less sharply. This sort of internationalized peacekeeping, however, is particularly susceptible to incoherence in defining or adhering to rules of engagement.

Consider, for example, the U.N. operation in the Congo (Case 3), which had, incidentally, the effect of disillusioning many states about the prospects of multi-national peacekeeping. The activities and attitudes of the Indian contingents there have been well documented (Chakravorty, 1976). Indian officers made it abundantly clear that they resented being constrained to serve U.N. political objectives when those objectives conflicted with (1) what the Indians believed to be good military practices or (2) the ability of Indian forces to stay together and accomplish major public goals with which the men from that country could be uniquely identified.

A chief advantage in internationalized, multi-state peacekeeping operations is that many political problems can be shared--and perhaps even shed. This may well apply in the target country as well as back within the borders of the intervening states. World public opinion may be more generous in judging a
multi-national effort, and the enemy force being contained may also find it less embarrassing to reach an accommodation. (To some extent, U.N. activities in Korea benefitted, more than a singular effort by the United States would have, from such considerations.) The record down through the years of multi-national forces is, however, decidedly mixed: some have veered toward incoherence, others were subjected to incompatible political guidance, and yet others suffered because of major differences about military tactics induced by variant systems of military training and professional values.

States contributing troops to an internationalized force may also differ in their willingness to face risk and loss of life. If the expectation is that the peacekeeping endeavor will mainly serve as a symbolic presence—testifying, for example, to United Nations determination or African unity or regional concern, it may be quite easy to find acceptable countries willing to share the load. If the probability of actual combat is adjudged higher, the list of appropriate participant nations tends to shrink.

For the same reason, an internationalized peacekeeping force assembled for a low intensity operation may prove unsuitable under higher intensity conditions. This observation certainly applies to the two O.A.U. peacekeeping efforts in Chad (Cases 45 and 49). States that are willing to provide soldiers to "keep the peace" may not want that phrase to be a code term for "watching the war" or "being combatants in the struggle." Hence, too, the eventual withdrawal of all African states from ONUC (Case 3). The problem is not unique to multilateral efforts: single countries, too, may be politically or militarily unwilling to sustain a peacekeeping endeavor that has reverted to a bellicose status; so, like Nigeria in Chad (Case 42), they may return to their home base.
Structural America.

A few figures are demonstrative that major armed forces are mainly made up within the African political structure. If they seem strong, through indicators like frequency of change or number of military regimes, that is due not to their strength but to the weakness of other political elements. Most armed services in Africa today are Sahara are, so to speak, like sheriffs of the American rural South a few years ago, who could and did over the local impoverished population. They were no match for even moderate amounts of federal authority. Nor are the many peacekeeping cases an indication of great and successful. There is little military a genuinely strong force on the continent. Military forces have been organized at least on paper to do. Nor do military forces have a genuine effect on the political structure among the peoples.

For instance in the United Nations, at the moment of 41 African states 30% of the total membership are members of just under 10,000. But there is no accountability between the members. Of those under 10,000, alone was spending alone was spending £30 million in a country. Yet on average of 91 countries were devoting £30 million to the military: £800 million for 20 or more. In the United States alone, Kenya, Guinea, Kenya, had earmarked £30 million of the military. There are four "superpowers" with a variety of other treated with

through computation.
have obtained for an effort that drained their economies was a very small, poorly equipped military. Uganda, for example, had only 0.16% of its population in the active regular armed forces and also made available only about $3,400 per man in uniform; for Chad, the comparable figures are 0.12% and $4,300. (Contrast Sweden, for example, with 1.0% and $35,900, or the U.S. with 1.36% and $37,800.)

If, as with Somalia, the number in the armed forces balloons to 0.96% of the population, the expenditure per man declines to $1,100, while for Mauritania the trade-off is $29,000 each, applied to only 0.06% of the population.

A similar conclusion emerges if one begins the analysis with military personnel. Some 18 of the 39 African states just referred to saw less than 0.10% of their population in the regular armed forces: Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Upper Volta, Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawa, Mauritania, Togo, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Gambia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, and Swaziland. Yet of these, the first 11 were giving over more than 2% of their total GNP to the military, and of those 11, the first four were still expending less than $10,000 per soldier. Clearly, in many African countries, the military seems formidable only because the rest of the politico-economic system falls so far short of being robust.

Africa south of the Sahara is, of course, not completely homogeneous in these or any other regards. Two states, hitherto omitted from this discussion, were relative colossi in their annual military expenditures during the late 1970's: Nigeria (at $2.1 billion) and South Africa ($1.9 billion), the former opting for extensive personnel and the latter for enhanced equipment and support. In addition, four states---Gabon, Ivory Coast, South Africa, and Zimbabwe---spent more than $30,000 yearly per serviceman (Gabon as high as $47,800), thus putting them in the same league as the United States, which was at $37,800. For Africa nations as a whole, though, the generalization
offered just before remains true, namely that if African armies seem to be nodes of power, that is because they exist in systems of even less power.

The prevalence of peacekeeping in Africa, particularly in recent years, underscores the inadequacy of African political situations. Peacekeeping typically involves a fundamental assault on principles of sovereignty. Most frequently in Africa, it presupposes that a state's own military forces are unwilling or unable to maintain domestic law and order (as with the first 35 cases of Table 2-3 and the four middle cases of Table 2-2). The rarity of O.A.U.-sanctioned operations--only cases 45 and 49, both of which soon failed--means that peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa has mainly expressed not continental solidarity but rather the intrusion of one state into the affairs of another in order to save the latter from its own inept or uncontrolled military.

The large number of coups that African states have experienced since independence, as well as the existence at present on the continent of more than a majority of military or military-civilian regimes, also testifies to the weakness of most African political structures.* Indeed, some African states have experienced repeated coups: Congo (B.) and Dahomey (Benin) facing five or more, while Burundi, Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria underwent at least three. Sometimes, as with Togo, these coups virtually coincided with the date of independence, while in other instances, like the Congo (L.) and Angola, states were launched under conditions of actual civil war. Most disappointing to Western observers, perhaps, were the coups (and countercoups) in Ghana and Nigeria, two Commonwealth members thought to be among the more politically elaborated African states. They were far from being Africa's poorest nations; they had British-trained armies; and

* Counts vary widely, according to the criteria for inclusion and the time period encompassed. See, for example, the data from S. E. Finer, M. Janowitz, and N. Thompson in Zimmermann (1979, p. 390).
they supposedly possessed firm traditions of civilian control. Obviously the latter characteristic had been over-rated, for the military take-overs proved quite easy to accomplish.

These coups do not, as they have in Pakistan and Egypt, indicate intervention by the military to protect its professional integrity from the detrimental policies of civilians. Although the costs of African armed forces, as noted early, may be burdensome indeed to the economically marginal states in which they reside, those forces themselves generally possess low competence. Their inadequacies can be traced in part to colonial sources. Certainly, compared to much of the Asian military, that in Africa has had little time to indigenize its officer corps. In 1956, only 13 of 250 commissioned officers in the Nigerian army were native Nigerians, and they were paid far less than their British counterparts. Even in 1960, the year of Nigeria's independence, the officer corps—including NCO's and warrant officers—remained overwhelmingly British (Welch and Smith, 1975, p. 115). Yet, compared to other colonialist rulers in Africa, the United Kingdom had been rather enlightened.

With few exceptions—South Africa and perhaps Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi—the military in the states of sub-Saharan Africa is still just marginally professional. They lack a strongly trained officer corps, are often riven by ethnic cleavages, and remain prone to political adventurism. Even NCO's and enlisted men may play political roles. All this signifies enfeebled institutional development.

The small size of so many African armed forces tends to perpetuate the problem by thwarting the development of sophisticated officer-training institutions. Because they are often used in constabulary roles, and are thus constantly confronted by the temptations of civilian life, these military units actually need more, not less, professional training. Functionally, they resemble the para-
military forces developed in India, China, and the Soviet Union, which occupy a role that lies between front-line combat force and police (Janowitz, 1977). When Asian or Communist paramilitary forces collapse, though, there is always the regular, authoritative military to draw upon. That is not true in Africa, nor does the O.A.U. seem likely to fill this gap.

Peacekeeping operations in Africa, therefore, seem likely to stay a common feature of that continent's politico-military landscape. A few of the cases will involve attempts to bring down the government; sometimes, too, there will be countervailing efforts to support both sides in a civil war. (See the last column of Table 2-2.) Most of the interventions, however, will continue to be pro-governmental, either restoring a regime that was just overthrown in a coup, or preventing an incipient coup, or helping to suppress a more widespread insurgency. Though to many observers the problems may seem small, the governments will have felt jeopardized; and in the main, the peacekeeping activities will affect short-term rescues. Over a longer span, however, resort to peacekeeping assistance may actually further demoralize the political structures, for it provides explicit proof that the governments cannot take care of themselves.
Chapter 5

Sub-Saharan Peacekeeping Operations:
Probability, Extent, and Success of Intervention

Steven Thomas Seitz

This chapter focuses upon three aspects of peacekeeping operations in Africa: their probability of occurrence, extent of intervention, and relative success or failure. Theoretical and measurement models are presented here, and elaborated upon in Appendix B. They seek to explain these aspects in terms of such independent variables as elite dissensus and social fragmentation within the target country and the balance of opportunities and risks as perceived in the intervening state. A test of the first two phases of this analytic approach demonstrates the ability of these models to discriminate interventions from non-interventions and also to predict the extent of those interventions.

Probability of Intervention

Why have peacekeeping operations occurred in some sub-Saharan African countries but not in others? What conditions or circumstances are most likely to produce peacekeeping interventions? Questions like these underlie the efforts in this chapter and in Appendix B to explain the probability of peacekeeping activities in sub-Saharan Africa. Along with a rather sparse general literature, the case studies found in Appendix A already provide some empirical clues, but both sources lack systematic explanation. By contrast, just such an explanation is proposed and initially tested here, using data compiled by the author, David Best, and Bette Hill Hughes.

Ordinarily, it is internal turmoil that generates a possible need for peacekeeping activities. That turmoil may take a variety of forms, including
elite conflicts, broader social conflicts, and covert operations designed to spawn elite or mass unrest and thus undermine public order. Manifestations of turmoil in ethnic rivalries, palace coups, or even guerrilla warfare generally provide an immediate justification for peacekeeping interventions.

Less visible but equally important in the decision to engage in peacekeeping activities is the calculus used within potential originating states to assess the opportunities and risks associated with a peacekeeping operation. Among the relevant factors in the decision-making process may be treaties obligating assistance to a regime in the event of domestic emergencies, personal ties among rulers, fears that the internal events in question may have been fomented by another country seeking to expand its sphere of influence, territorial and border considerations, ideology, economic interests in general (and in particular dependency upon the transportation structure of the affected country), the extent to which regional or world influence hangs in the balance, and even any prior condemning or condoning of the situation by the world community as a whole. Such factors, simultaneously reviewed by several countries, shape the calculus regarding a decision to intervene.

The general theory propounded here explains the probability of intervention in terms of these two components. The existence of internal turmoil provides the ostensible reason for peacekeeping intervention, but the actual decision about intervention reflects a complex balancing of its pros and cons. These in turn reflect a number of considerations, some peculiar to a given nation (e.g., treaty obligations or dependency on the target country's transportation structure), others reflecting the push and pull of competing regional or global interests.

To test this working hypothesis, data were gathered for sub-Saharan
countries, whether or not they had witnessed intervention in the period 1960 through 1982. From among the countries and years without a recorded intervention, 50 country-years were randomly selected as control cases in order to assess the model’s strength in predicting intervention. Some 97 cases (50 controls, 47 interventions) were included in the analysis.

The extent of internal turmoil was calculated by estimating the levels of elite dissensus and social fragmentation and the existence of covert operations for a given country in a given year. The first was provided by adding occurrences of government purges and crises, effective changes in the executive or cabinet, and government coups. Measurement of social fragmentation focused upon a country’s religious, ethnic, and language cleavages. Finally, a measure of covert operations tabulated the number of accusations about alleged covert activity reported by the target country.

Two indicators of the balance of opportunities and risks were also constructed. One emphasized concentration of trade between the target country and an external state. In particular, situations where imports or exports were highly concentrated among a few countries were distinguished from those in which a multitude of countries shared the target country’s exports and imports. A second measure took the sum of forces favoring intervention in the target country (e.g., treaties or infrastructure dependency) and divided this by the sum of forces dis-favoring such intervention.

All five measurement variables were used in a discriminant function analysis to distinguish countries that experienced peacekeeping intervention from those that did not. Three of the five did, in fact, prove useful in distinguishing the intervention cases from non-intervention ones: elite dissensus, social fragmentation, and the measure of opportunities and risks.
that weighted forces favoring intervention against those potentially checking such intervention. The three "explanatory variables" permitted 73 percent of the cases in the data file to be correctly classified. Such a success rate is significantly above that expected through chance alone.

The two variables that failed to contribute to the discrimination between interventions and non-interventions likely were fraught with significant measurement errors. Reports on covert operations were at best indirect indications of actual covert operations. Indeed, those allegations may have reflected "public relations" activities by target states that were trying to draw support from other countries. In addition, the measure of import and export concentration failed to distinguish the extent of paired target state/importer state dependence. Here, too, refinements might have improved reported findings.

**Extent of Intervention**

Given both internal turmoil sufficient to justify intervention and a decision to intervene, what factors influence the extent of intervention? The assumption once again is that some systematic pattern underlies the extent of peacekeeping interventions. It is that pattern which the theoretical considerations are designed to capture.

Based on the available case studies, it seems plausible to assume that the extent of intervention bears some relationship to the level of disturbance justifying intervention. Holding other factors constant, one expects the extent of intervention to vary with the level of turmoil in the target country. After all, it makes little sense to commit a token peacekeeping force if its small size condemns the operation to failure.

Other factors, however, are also important. The intervening country's
wherein all in terms of troops, weaponry, and fiscal resources help predict the amount and extent of an intervention. So too do perceived opportunities and risks associated with intervention: for if the perceived risks arising from failure are high, the intervening country will try to ensure an adequate commitment to the peacekeeping operation.

These factors have been combined to explain the extent of intervention in terms of the internal turmoil justifying a possible peacekeeping operation, and also the deployment potential available to the intervening country weighted by that country's perceptions of opportunities and risks associated with the peacekeeping intervention. A possible interaction effect between degree of turmoil and the weighted measure of deployment potential has also been examined.

As before, measures of elite dissensus and social fragmentation provide indices for the levels of internal turmoil. The measure of perceived opportunities and risks once again contrasts forces favoring and dis-favoring intervention. The measures of covert operations and of trade concentration, however, have been dropped from further analysis, given their failure to aid in the discriminant equation reported earlier.

Deployment potential is estimated through an index that reflects the size of a country's armed forces, the sophistication of its weapons, and the size of its GNP. The index provides a rough measure of a country's potential resources in any peacekeeping operation, in terms of both the amount and extent of commitment possible. The measure deliberately underweights the superiority of modern strategic weapons.

Extent of intervention for the 47 available cases was estimated through a rough measure that balanced effort and duration. (The technique differed from that in Chapter 3.) Using ordinary least squares analysis, a multiple R
was calculated for a multivariate equation in which extent of intervention was the dependent variable, and elite dissensus, social fragmentation, and deployment potential tempered by perceived opportunities and risks were the independent variables. The first-cut equation produced a multiple correlation of approximately .5. In other words, about 25 percent of the observed variation in the extent of intervention was explained by three predictive measures.

Refinement of the indicators for extent of intervention and for deployment potential likely would increase the strength of the regression. Inclusion of more valid measures of covert operations and trade dependencies should also augment the explanatory power of the present approach. Still, even as it is, the first-cut results indicate considerable predictive strength for the structural model outlined in Appendix B.

Success of Intervention

The final component of the systematic framework proposed here for analyzing peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa focuses upon their relative success. Why do some peacekeeping operations fail while others succeed in their designated task? What factors contribute to relative failure or success once a peacekeeping operation is undertaken?

The underlying rationale begins with the overt problem which any peacekeeping operation must address: namely, the degree of internal turmoil that originally justified the intervention. Clearly, the scope of the problem bears some relation to the eventual success or failure of the mission. Similarly, the extent of the intervention relates to its outcome. For example, an intervention modest in commitment and duration is less likely to succeed under conditions of extreme turmoil than under conditions of more limited internal turmoil. The relative
depends upon both suitability to the scope and complexity of the internal conflict that occurred to 

A number of factors seems important in determining a successful or failed social order and functional integration into society or violent examination apart from that context. It is true that limited coexistence or integration among its institutions and structures faces a more serious challenge when the level of solidarity and internal independence is low. In the instance, a residual of functional and structural arrangements might be more easily weathered. A country's institutional level of concert or behavior, in this sense, also contributes to 

the natural rate of success or succeeding occasion.

The level of internal conflict resolution or intervention are the same as the number of economic indicators as GNP and literacy. The level is taken to reflect a fairly constant function, with relative social fragmentation, extent of discriminators or
Chapter 6

Some Concluding Comments on Peacekeeping Forces for Namibia

Instead of just repeating the major findings of earlier chapters, it seems preferable to conclude this study by applying some of them judiciously to the present and near future in Namibia. What kinds of peacekeeping operations might one expect there while that land reaches independence? Would troops come from one state or several? Would the United Nations or some regional entity like the O.A.U. play a leading role? Would the forces be neutral as between various contending factions in the area? Would they be supportive of the new official government? Or would they, rather, seek to enhance the fortunes of that government's rival? Might countervailing peacekeeping efforts even occur simultaneously, as they have in Ethiopia or Uganda or Chad or Angola?

The approach in this chapter is to provide a somewhat expanded "Case," of the sort presented in Appendix A and analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3. First, some selective and concise background data is presented about the Namibian situation. Then, potential interventionary scenarios are briefly sketched. Finally, some plausible conclusions to this range of peacekeeping operations are drawn. While history cannot be predicted with assuredness, the analyses of the preceding chapters should make these analytic comments on peacekeeping forces for Namibia considerably more probabilistic.

Background

Namibia was brought under South African rule after World War I. At that time, the League of Nations vested the area, previously known as the German colony of South West Africa, in the British Crown. Administration, however, was placed in the hands of South Africa, which was then, of course, a prominent part of the British Empire. The intent of the League, here as in other mandates,
was that colony be gradually readied for independence.

Upon the founding of the United Nations in 1945, that organization succeeded the League as the ultimate authority over Namibia. South Africa, however, has always refused to enter into any trusteeship agreement with the U.N. As a consequence (though not until 1966), the United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution 2145, revoked the South African mandate; and in 1967, a Council for Namibia was established to govern the affairs of the territory until it achieved independence. South Africa simply ignored these U.N. actions.

Many other U.N. rulings and resolutions have been followed, all treated in nearly the same way by South Africa. For example, in 1969, the Security Council approved Resolution 264, calling upon South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. In 1971, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice declared South Africa's continued administration of Namibia illegal. In January 1976, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 385, which demanded that free elections be held in Namibia under the supervision and control of the U.N. In December 1974, the General Assembly in Resolution 31/146 declared its support for "the armed struggle of the Namibian people" and recognized SWAPO (the South West African People's Organisation, formerly the Ovombo People's Party) as their sole representative.

The only solace that South Africa could take through this long litany of criticism, besides the fact that none of it had thus far led to much concrete action, was that not all resolutions passed. As recently as October 1976, a draft resolution of the Security Council declaring "that the illegal occupation of Namibia and the war waged there by South Africa constitute a threat to international peace and security" and forbidding further arms transfers to South Africa was vetoed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Not too surprisingly, perhaps, a year later,
in 1977, the five western powers then on the Security Council—U.S., U.K., and France, plus Canada and West Germany—took it upon themselves, without Council authorization, to engage in direct negotiations with South Africa about South West Africa. Thus was born the Contact Group, sometimes called the "Gang of Five." At roughly the same time, the African "Front Line" states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, sought to persuade SWAPO, which had been fighting since August 1966 for a free Namibia, to accept the negotiations.

In 1978, both South Africa and SWAPO seemed to be accepting the arrangements being worked out. Later that year, Security Council Resolution 431 authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative and to send a team to Namibia in order to fashion a plan for internationally supervised elections. The team report soon eventuated in Resolution 435. That plan called for "the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the U.N." The terms of the plan called for a 7,500-man United Nations military presence in Namibia to oversee a ceasefire, additional staff and supply units, a 360-person police element to check on violations of the electoral process, and a team of 1,500 officials to supervise the election itself. Until the election results were determined, South Africa was to remain in complete control of Namibia.

This United Nations plan was pre-empted, however, by South Africa's decision to hold Namibian elections in December 1978 under its own auspices. (South Africa also rejected Security Council Resolution 432, which declared Walvis Bay to be an integral part of Namibia. See Map 5-1.) SWAPO boycotted these elections, which swept into office the Pretoria-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a coalition of 11 ethnic groups, with 44 of 50 seats in the Constituent Assembly.

[Map 6-1 about here]

That assembly, which was not adverse to U.N. supervisory elections in 1979 as a prelude to full independence, was eventually transformed into a National Assembly,
and in July 1980 a 12-person Council of Ministers was also created.

Meantime, in an effort to meet South African security concerns, the U.N. and the Contact Group put forward a proposal for a demilitarized zone that would extend during the transition period for 50 kilometers on both sides of the Namibia/Angola border. (This zone is indicated by hatchings on Map 3-1.) The Front Line states and SWAPO agreed in principle to the DMZ. So did South Africa, provided that prior agreements were also reached on issues like the number of South African bases permitted in the zone, SWAPO's claim to bases in Namibia, and modalities for deploying the U.N. forces. In January 1980, Lt. Gen. Prem Chand of India was appointed military commander-designate of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG, as those forces were to be styled). Unofficial word was that contingents from Sudan, Yugoslavia, Panama, Bangladesh, and Japan would be participating.

Inconclusive discussions were held in 1980 between South Africa and United Nations officials. Even in 1981, South Africa insisted that it was premature to set an implementation date. In May, discussions continued in Rome among Contact Group representatives; and in June, William Clark and Chester Crocker of the United States visited South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in search of a settlement. Diplomacy continued, but so did war. Throughout summer 1981, South African forces kept attacking SWAPO bases in Angola. By 1982, South African troop strength in Namibia was about 10,000.

During 1982, prospects also momentarily looked brighter. Supposedly, just about every detail of the Namibian independence process had been settled, including whether elections would be by constituencies or proportional representation and whether the U.N. force would monitor guerrilla bases in Angola and Zambia. Then South Africa added one more condition: it demanded the withdrawal from Angola of all Cuban troops, said to number between 15,000 and 20,000. By October
1982, the nearly universal opinion was that the search for a settlement on the Namibian issue had reached a deadlock that would not soon be resolved.

**Intervention**

By themselves, the 50 cases in this study shed little light on the peacekeeping force that would facilitate transitional elections: that involves formal decolonization, which was excluded from the terms of analysis. (See Chapter 1.) Because the patrolling of a DMZ some 100 kilometers wide and perhaps 1300 kilometers long (including the Caprivi Strip) is a requisite at this stage, the force would have to number in the thousands and be capable of operating reconnaissance aircraft, electronic monitoring equipment, and other sophisticated aids to the surveillance of larger areas. Several of the countries reported to be prospective UNTAG members, especially the two from Asia, could fulfill this need.

Despite the tendency for peacekeeping in Africa to have become more exclusively intra-African (Tables 2-7 and 3-6), it is unlikely that South Africa would agree to UNTAG having more than token Black African representation. However, some forces from moderate African states, especially those that lie at or near the Mediterranean, might be acceptable: thus Sudan (or perhaps Morocco, which has already intervened in four peacekeeping cases). Despite the prominence of the Contact Group in the negotiation process, no West European state, however willing, is likely to send uniformed personnel, nor would the United States and Canada. After all, since the early 1960's, Western Europe has gradually become less prominent in African peacekeeping, while the United States and Canada have barely sent troops at all. (See Tables 2-6 and 2-7.) As usual, the O.A.U. is also unlikely to play a pivotal role in the transition process.

Any short-run success of UNTAG, or of some entity like it, depends on many considerations that are difficult to predict. Would South African military forces in fact withdraw from the DMZ and also not mount missions elsewhere in
Namibia? Would SWAPO cease infiltration from the North? Or, if it kept up the effort, would UNTAG be able and willing to repulse it? Would enough participation in the election be manifested by major factions so that the results could be seen as a genuine and authoritative signal for the direction in which Namibia should move?

To a large extent, the future of peacekeeping in Namibia after the elections and after independence depends on who wins. A victory by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, or by some new party along similar lines, reduces the threat of hostile action from South Africa but increases that emanating from Angola. Incursions would involve Namibian exiles, token support by Front Line states, and considerable assistance from the Cubans remaining in Angola.*

Were SWAPO to win the election, the danger from the North would diminish. Exiles would return peacefully. Border raids would cease. The South African response would probably depend on the policies that the new Namibian regime chose to follow. If it attempted something more than a rhetorical attack on Walvis Bay, the South Africans might organize a major military response: Walvis Bay, however, is more likely to resemble Gibraltar than Goa, something for the surrounding state to talk about rather than act upon. Less improbably, SWAPO might permit the operation of African National Congress guerrillas from Namibian bases. Should they strike, or seem about to strike, into South African territory, the South African military might well be directed to root them out, at least on a periodic basis.

Whoever wins the election, then, whether SWAPO or DTA or some new party, the chances are that the threat level will not be diminished. To the contrary, the losing side will hardly accept the result with good grace, and cross-border

* The assumption here is UNTAG would have been put in place, even though all or most of the Cuban troops had not left.
activities will augment the violence. As a result, UNTAG, whose members came to Namibia as peacekeepers and not war-watchers or combatants, will rapidly experience force withdrawals. There will be no stomach for another ONUC-type operation. (Cf. Chapter 4.)

Under either circumstance, whether military intervention proceeds from the North against a DTA government or from the East against a SWAPO government, the jeopardized regime is likely to seek outside assistance. South Africa would respond to the former's requests and Angola to the latter's, with the result a civil war supported by countervailing outside troops. Though the scope in Namibia may be somewhat smaller, events in recent years in Chad and Ethiopia and Angola, and perhaps in the Western Sahara, suggest the general direction that the process might take. Indeed, the present stalemate might seem preferable to any such scenario.

Conclusion

Signs do not augur well for peacekeeping operations in Namibia. Even if the Contact Group or others are able to arrange for a U.N.-sponsored, multinational, neutral peacekeeping force that will oversee and facilitate an election to launch an eventually independent Namibia, that election—no matter what its results—is likely to induce further armed fighting for which the U.N. peacekeeping force is inappropriate. With some alacrity, the U.N. force would be disbanded and a new peacekeeping phase entered. The latter, more typically for Africa, would feature interventions by single nations or by small sets of nations on behalf of the recognized regime or of elements opposed to it. The precise configurations will vary according to the composition of Namibia's elected government. In general, though, one may expect South Africa to support DTA-type adherents whether in or out of power, while Angola (and perhaps a few troops from other African countries) would assist SWAPO. Indeed, peacekeeping may occur simultaneously on both sides, and so become a device for increasing
the scope and duration of civil war.

One alternative does remain. As hinted at earlier, SWAPO might, if elected, choose to act in a relatively prudent way, keeping its challenges to South Africa largely within a verbal realm. It would not try to seize Walvis Bay, nor would it give ANC guerrillas free run of its territory to harass South Africa. Statements of sentiment might be issued and SWAPO probably could not (and would not want to) utterly prevent the guerrillas from undertaking all symbolic action; but the cautious intent would still be to avoid the sorts of strong retaliatory raids that South Africa has visited upon Angola.

Such prudence on the part of a South African neighbor is hardly unprecedented. Namibia need not become a client state like Lesotho or Swaziland. Instead, like Zimbabwe or Mozambique, it may issue more or less unmuffled criticisms of practices in South Africa. Words, though, are only words, and everyone understands why the right things have to be said. It is in actions and the prevention of actions that Namibia will have to show care. If SWAPO can manage that, it may bring peace to its country, not through peacekeeping, but through discouraging those peacekeeping interventions by neighbors that are adjuncts to war.

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Chapter 5

See "Sources" to Appendix B.

Chapter 6


APPENDIX A

Fifty African Peacekeeping Cases

Case 1

Target State: Cameroun
Intervening State: France
Time Span: January 12, 1960 - December 1963
Forces Involved: Ca. 2,000
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

As a French colony, Cameroun had enjoyed limited self-rule and a vigorous multi-party system. After World War II, radicals, who were demanding immediate independence, became an important political element. Under the leadership of Ruben Um Nyobe, they formed the Rassemblement Camerounais, which was quickly banned by the French. Nyobe then founded an underground party known as the Union des Populations du Cameroun, or the UPC.

The UPC drew most of its support from dissatisfied Douala and Bamileke tribesmen, who felt that the French discriminated against them. By 1950, the UPC had instigated a number of riots. The French retaliated by removing UPC members and sympathizers from positions of power. In reaction, the UPC became a guerrilla force; and after the 1955 elections, in which the UPC was denied participation, a UPC-led rebellion began.

While the French were able to contain the UPC, they proved unable to eliminate it. Throughout the late 1950's, French forces conducted campaigns against the UPC guerrillas in the south. These efforts continued until independence.
**Intervention**

Upon the independence of Cameroun in January 1960, the new government asked the French Army to stay on until Cameroun's own army could be better organized. French regular units launched no further separate campaigns against the rebels, but French officers and NCO's did continue to lead Camerounian troops in combat with French-provided arms and logistical support.

**Conclusion**

The rebellion was gradually quelled by Camerounian forces. As of December 1963, when the situation was already well in hand, all French combat units were withdrawn, though some French advisers remained. By 1967, the last UPC resistance had been eliminated.

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**Case 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target State:</th>
<th>Congo (Leopoldville)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervening State:</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Span:</td>
<td>July 9, 1960 - September, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces Involved:</td>
<td>Ca. 10,000: At inception, four battalions of paratroopers and five infantry companies; these were later supplemented by 24 companies more of paratroopers, one commando battalion, and 26 other combat and combat support company-sized units; also at least two squadrons of planes and five naval vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Operations:</td>
<td>Internal security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome:</td>
<td>Though the military mission was accomplished, it led to heightened political instability in the target state; therefore coded &quot;failure&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before receiving independence on June 30, 1960, the Congo was a colonial possession of Belgium. No concerted attempt had been made to prepare the Congolese for self-government prior to the Belgian announcement on January 20, 1960, that the Congo would be independent by mid-year. While efforts were made to ease the transition during the six months that remained, the new leaders of this large and diverse nation proved woefully unprepared for their immense tasks.

Five days after independence, the new government faced a major military mutiny by soldiers of the Congolese Army, or Force Publique, who were stationed in Thysville and Leopoldville. Their demand was for replacement of Belgian officers by Congolese, and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba sought to appease the mutineers by ordering immediate and total Africanization of the military on July 6. This declaration failed, however, to stop unrest among the troops and the mutiny spread. In addition, tribal disorders began to flare in other parts of the country.

Despite his inability to quell the unrest, Lumumba refused military assistance from Belgium, whose troops had remained on station in the Congo in accordance with a treaty of friendship. Belgium was concerned for the welfare of some 100,000 Belgian citizens who still resided in the Congo, as well as for the failure of the new government. The unrest continued to spread and began involving Belgian nationals. Many whites were beaten, murdered or raped; as a consequence, panic flight ensued. On the night of July 7 alone, 1,300 (mostly white) refugees fled across the Congo river from Leopoldville to Brazzaville.

Despite objections from the Congolese government, Belgium sent paratroopers on July 9 to reinforce its two bases in the Congo. They joined the four para-
The next day Belgian intervention began in earnest. Troops captured their base in Katanga and seized the Lulubamba airport. Tshombe also declared the same day that he was not interested in negotiations.

To further complicate the picture, on July 13 Tshombe declared independence, whereupon he and his adherents seized the key European sectors of the country. Belgian troops, under direct control, advanced. By July 13, they had occupied the Katanga Airport and were in control of the city. Belgian elements also continued to pour in, the force a total of 15,000 men.

Tshombe, however, the Katangan leader, and the United Nations created the "Katangan Republic" in Katanga. The next day Lumumba severed diplomatic relations with the United Nations and voided the radio broadcasts of the Katangan government. The Belgians continued to advance in all areas of the country. Lumumba had prevented Tshombe from sending aid to the Katanganese. By humanitarian grounds, the situation in the country continued for years and fears were bolstered on both sides.
Case 3

Target State: Congo (Leopoldville)

Intervening States: United Nations; also see list of participating states in footnote to Table 2-1

Time Span: July 16, 1960 – June 30, 1964

Forces Involved: At one time or another troops from 34 different countries were involved; maximum troop strength was 19,825 in July 1961; this was reduced to 15,500 by November 1961, and after January 1963 only ca. 8,000 were involved

Type of Operation: At first, internal security; later, counter-insurgency

Outcome: A melange of success and failure; no code assigned

Background

The United Nations intervened in the Congo at the request of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. (See also Case 2.) While the request dwelt upon the "external aggression" of the Belgian government, Lumumba was clearly concerned as well with unrest in the Congolese Army (or Force Publique).

The initial mandate of U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was to restore order by replacing Belgian troops and bringing the Force Publique under control. The first of these tasks was relatively easy. The second forever evaded the U.N.'s reach.

Restoration of order in the Congo was particularly inhibited by continuing deterioration in the political situation there. Katanga province, under Moise Tshombe, declared its independence on July 11, 1960. On August 8, South Kasai also declared its independence. In addition, a power struggle evolved in Leopoldville between Lumumba, and a faction led by Joseph Kasavubu, Cyrille Adoula, and Joseph-Desire Mobutu. The Congolese Parliament was dissolved by Mobutu in September. Soon afterwards, Lumumba was arrested and then executed; but his followers set up a government
in Stanleyville anyway. By the end of September, four governments co-existed in the Congo.

**Intervention**

In the face of this deteriorating situation, the U.N. adopted a new resolution on February 21, 1961, expanding the mandate of its forces there to encompass re-integration of the country behind the Leopoldville government. The size of the U.N. contingent also expanded during 1961 from about 3,500 (mostly originating in Morocco, Ghana, Ethiopia and Tunisia) to nearly 20,000 in July, though the number fell to about 15,000 by year's end. At its height, the force included 20 battalions of infantry along with additional support units.

With the fall of Lumumba and the shift in U.N. mission, certain African members of the force were loathe to continue participating in it. They were particularly unhappy with the decision to intervene in Katanga. Ghana withdrew from the U.N. force in February 1961; Morocco and Sudan, in March. The first round of actual fighting in Katanga brought about another series of withdrawals, with Tunisians and the Liberians departing in August. By year's end, Ethiopia remained the sole African country present, and almost all combat units were now from India, Sweden and Ireland.

Activities of ONUC are divisible into two distinct phases. As noted before (Case 2), the first phase, which involved the replacement of Belgian troops, went quite smoothly. The second phase, which was offensive in nature, was much more variable and controversial. In August 1961, ONUC moved into Katanga in an attempt to defeat the secessionists and to expel the mercenaries who were aiding them. After some engagements, a ceasefire was agreed to in September, but this lasted only until December, when heavy fighting broke out between U.N. and Katangan forces at Elisabethville and Union Miniere. Related skirmishes persisted sporadically for over a year.
ONUC continued to number around 15,000 men through 1962. After the Katangan capitulation of January 1963, the U.N. force was gradually phased out of the Congo. By September 1963, only 7,975 troops remained. From January to June 1964, there were fewer than 5,000 troops present. All U.N. forces had left by June 30, 1964.

Conclusion

The success or failure of this intervention depends on one's view of its chief mission. If the criteria employed emphasize restoration of stability and preparation of Congolese forces to maintain order, then the intervention was certainly a dismal failure. Even as the last of the ONUC troops were leaving, the country was plunging again into political chaos. If the intent to re-integrate the country is stressed, the intervention was clearly more successful. At the least, ONUC prevented Katangan secession. Katanga was, however, to rebel again not long afterward. Finally, in terms of removing foreign military influences from the Congo, ONUC was fully successful only during the time of its presence. Once U.N. forces were withdrawn, mercenaries again appeared in the Congo, and even the Belgians would intervene again, too. (See Cases 10 and 12.)

Case 4

Target State: Congo (Brazzaville)
Intervening State: France
Time Span: August 13-15, 1963
Forces Involved: Ca. 2,000; light armor probably present
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Order maintained, though government overthrown; coded "success"
Background

President Fulbert Youlou's bid to suppress all opposition to his regime sparked the riots which were to bring his government down and result in a brief French military intervention. Youlou had sought to consolidate his hold on the country by turning it into a one-party state. In early August 1964, he also banned all political meetings.

Youlou's declaration was strongly resisted by the labor unions, whose leaders charged that Youlou had deprived the people of their U.N. Charter rights. Brazzaville was immediately paralysed by strikes and demonstrations which turned violent with the storming of the Brazzaville prison on August 13. Rioters subsequently assaulted the Presidential Palace. Since the police were unable to control the situation and the Congolese Army was unwilling to act, Youlou requested help from the French 2,000-man garrison that was permanently in Brazzaville.

Intervention

French troops responded, leaving their barracks to take up positions on the streets of Brazzaville. They concerned themselves solely with protecting public buildings and did not directly confront the rioters. In effect, they did nothing to prop up the Youlou government. Lacking support, Youlou resigned on August 15. The French returned to their barracks the same day, having been replaced by Congolese troops.

Conclusion

The French drew praise from the Congolese, and from the French and British media, for the way in which they had handled the situation. They had intervened to maintain order, but not to save the regime of an unpopular president with authoritarian aspirations.
Case 5

Target State: Zanzibar
Intervening State: Tanganyika
Time Span: January 17, 1964 - April 6, 1964
Forces Involved: 100-200 policemen
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Zanzibar gained independence on January 10, 1964. Two days later, the Arab Sultanate fell to black rebels. John Okello, who had been trained in Cuba, led 700 armed insurgents in a speedy, though sanguinary, coup. The new regime was almost immediately recognized by Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union.

Intervention

On January 17, 1964, Tanganyika sent more than 100 policemen to Zanzibar at the request of Okello and his Revolutionary Council in order to prevent looting and maintain order.

On January 28, the Soviet Union warned the United Kingdom, which still did not recognize the Okello government, that any forcible acts by those who did not wish to abandon their former colonial privileges would be full of dangerous consequences.

Conclusion

Zanzibar and Tanganyika merged on April 23, 1964, when Presidents Abeid Karume and Julius Nyerecre signed an Act of Union.
Case 6

Target State: Tanganyika
Intervening States: United Kingdom and Nigeria
Time Span: United Kingdom: January 25, 1964 – April 26, 1964
Nigeria: March 28, 1964 – midsummer 1964
Forces Involved: 600 British; 600 Nigerians
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Although Tanzania had increased its army from two battalions at independence in 1961 to about 2,000 men in 1964, the troops remained poorly paid and the officers were still British. These factors induced dissension in the ranks and helped bring on the mutiny of January 19, 1964. Soldiers of the 1st Battalion disarmed their officers and marched on nearby Dar-es-Salaam, which they easily seized. President Julius Nyerere was forced to flee. Meanwhile, other units in Nachingwea and Tabora also turned on their white officers.

The mutineers insisted that they had no desire to overthrow the government. Their sole aims were that the expatriate officers be replaced by Tanganyikans, and that the pay scale be increased. Nyerere, who was in hiding, let it be known that he would accede to these demands, but the troops refused to return to their barracks anyway.

On January 25, Nyerere requested British help.

Intervention

British reaction was immediate. Having anticipated that they would be called upon, troops of the 24th Infantry Brigade, based in Kenya, had already sailed from Mombassa. By January 25, they were waiting just off the Tanzanian coast near Dar-es-Salaam.
The 45th Royal Marines, an element of the 24th Infantry Brigade, were airlifted into Dar-es-Salaam that very day. These 600 troops met only slight resistance and quickly restored order. Rebellious troops in other parts of the country capitulated without direct confrontation.

On January 30, the 45th Royal Marines were replaced by another element of the 24th Infantry, the 41st Royal Marines. Both Nyerere and the British, however, were anxious to remove white troops from the country in order to reduce further tensions. Since Nyerere had just disbanded the Tanzanian Army, some sort of military force was needed. The Nigerian government assumed this role on March 28, and provided 600 troops until the Tanzanian Army was reorganized.

Conclusion

British troops were replaced by the 3rd Nigerian Rifles on April 6, 1964. Not long afterward, the People’s Republic of China agreed to supervise the reorganization and training of the Tanzanian military. The Nigerians left in mid-summer, upon the arrival of the Chinese.

Case 7

Target State: Kenya
Intervening State: United Kingdom
Time Span: January 25, 1964
Forces Involved: Ca. 450
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success
**Background**

On January 23, 1964, anticipating that army dissatisfaction might spread to Kenya from Tanganyika (Case 6), Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta filed a request with the British High Commissioner in Nairobi for reinforcement and deployment of troops in the event of an emergency. The 24th Infantry Brigade, Britain's Middle Eastern strategic reserve, was already stationed in Kenya; but most of its units were soon committed to restoring order in Uganda and Tanganyika.

**Intervention**

The East African mutiny spread to Kenya when about 150 troops of Kenya's 11th Battalion, stationed at Camp Lanet, near Nakuru, broke into their armory and refused to heed their British officers. The next day, January 25, some 450 British soldiers from the Third Royal Horse Artillery dispersed the rebellious troops and arrested their leaders. At the same time, elements of the Gordon Highlanders secured the airport and other key installations in Nairobi against possible trouble. There was none.

Not long afterward, Somalia charged that Kenya's request for British rather than Ethiopian troops was clear proof that the Kenya-Ethiopia Defense Agreement of 1963 was concluded "only to harm the Somali Republic."

**Conclusion**

Since British troops were permanently stationed in Kenya, it is impossible to specify precisely when the intervention came to an end. Clearly, the mutiny was minor, and the Kenyan Army was neither disbanded nor reorganized. The active phase of the operation could not have lasted more than a few days.
Case 8

Target State: Uganda
Intervening State: United Kingdom
Time Span: January 23–30, 1964
Forces Involved: 450
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Widespread, and perhaps not uncoordinated, mutiny by troops in several former British colonies in East Africa began with the uprising of the Tanganyika Rifles on January 21, 1964. Two days later, at least two units (Company A and Headquarters Company) of the Uganda Rifles, stationed at Camp Jinga on Lake Victoria, had also mutinied. Like the Tanganyikans, the Ugandan mutineers demanded better pay, and African instead of white officers. Some expatriate officers were held hostages.

Intervention

Although denying that the situation was anywhere near so serious as in Tanganyika, President Milton Obote called on the British military for assistance. In response, some 450 British light infantry elements of the Staffordshire Regiment and the Scots Guards were flown in from Kenya. The Staffordshire Regiment had previously been intended for use in Tanganyika and had been standing by aboard HMS Rhel off Dar-es-Salaam. The Scots Guards had been training in Aden. Both units were part of the 24th Infantry Brigade, Britain's Middle Eastern strategic reserve, and were normally based in Kenya.

In a radio address to the Ugandan people, Obote noted that Ugandan security forces were already heavily committed, especially along the Sudanese
border and in Toro province. Assistance could not be sought from other East African nations because of the troubles they were simultaneously experiencing. Hence, the need temporarily to seek assistance from the British.

At dawn on January 25, the Scots Guards and Staffordshire Regiment stormed the Uganda Rifles base at Camp Jinja and, without casualties, disarmed the troops. Shortly thereafter, Obote disbanded the two units that had mutinied.

Conclusion

By January 30, British intervention had come to an end. British expatriate officers were also soon withdrawn. Major Idi Amin was named commander of the Uganda Rifles.

Case 9

Target State: Gabon
Intervening State: France
Time Span: February 19, 1964 - ?
Forces Involved: 500-600
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Under the leadership of President Leon M'Ba, Gabon was France's staunchest friend in newly independent francophone Africa. Gabon was also an important source of uranium. France maintained its stake in Gabon through extensive foreign aid and the stationing of troops in the capital, Libreville.

Despite French largesse, M'Ba's situation was unstable. To counter strong political opposition, he dissolved the National Assembly in mid-February, 1964,
and threatened a "purge" of the government. Opposition leaders quickly formed a Revolutionary Committee and, led by army officers, attempted a coup on February 17. They were initially successful, capturing Mba and disarming the French officers serving the Gabonese Army.

Conclusion

On April 12, it was announced that the French troops who had flown into Gabon from Dakar and Brazzaville would remain there until the Gabonese Army had been reorganized. Moreover, because of the strategic importance of Gabon and France's stake in keeping M'Ba in power, the regular French garrison of 150 would remain indefinitely. These decisions, as well as the French determination to intervene at all, were made despite M'Ba's obviously tyrannical actions. The rationale, according to the French Foreign Affairs Minister, was that the "subversive" group which had tried to oust Mba lacked the support of the Gabonese people.

(For "Intervention" section, see page 158.)

Case 10

Target State: Congo (Leopoldville)

Intervening State: Belgium

Time Span: November 24-25, 1964

Forces Involved: Ca. 600: two battalions of paracommandos, plus air support

Types of Operation: Rescue mission

Outcome: Success

Background

Events leading to the 1964 Belgian intervention in the Congo were a continuation of the political instability that had plagued that land since
independence. The Adoula-Kasavubu-Mobutu faction, which had attained power after eliminating Patrice Lumumba in 1961, encountered increasing opposition by 1964, despite the presence of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. (See Case 3.) Even after the suppression of the Lumumbist Stanleyville government in 1962 and the capitulation of the Katangan secessionists in 1963, revolutionary fervor remained strong in the country. Pierre Mulele, formerly Minister of Education under Lumumba, instigated a rebellion in Kwilu province. Further east, in Kivu, insurgency was fomented by the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL), led by former Minister of the Interior Christophe Gbenye.

Responding to these revolts in the East, President Joseph Kasavubu declared a six-month state of emergency on September 29, 1963. By January 1964, however, the situation was well beyond the control of government forces. Even as ONUC continued to withdraw, government forces crumbled before the rebels.

In an attempt to restore order, President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula and brought former Katangan secessionist leader Moïse Tshombe back from exile to head the government. Tshombe assumed power on July 6, 1964. His greatest asset was his relationship with the Katangan Gendarmerie, which he formerly had led.

During Tshombe's first few months in office, the government's position continued to deteriorate, with Stanleyville falling to the CNL on August 4. The situation began to be reversed, however, after Tshombe introduced the Katangan Gendarmerie and white mercenaries into the struggle. By November, these forces were advancing on Stanleyville. In response, the rebels in Stanleyville took 200 Belgians and Americans hostage, whom they threatened to kill if the city were attacked.

**Intervention**

Belgian intervention on November 24, 1964, in fact amounted to a rescue
mission, conducted with the consent and cooperation of the Tshombe government. The objective was to liberate the hostages prior to an attack on Stanleyville by the government forces. The intervention began at 6:00 a.m. with the dropping of a battalion of commandos near Stanleyville airfield, which was quickly secured. Seven C-130's then landed, offloading another commando battalion and armored cars. This force entered Stanleyville by 8:00 a.m., proceeded to the area where the hostages were held, and affected their rescue.

Conclusion

The mission was an immediate success: within 37 hours, over 1500 foreign nationals and some Congolese were evacuated to Leopoldville with only 35 deaths. Government forces subsequently succeeded in both retaking Stanleyville and in suppressing the Mulelists, although another 200 white civilians were to die before all rebel-held areas were captured. It is also worth noting, however, that Tshombe's credibility and popularity in the Congo were damaged by his acquiescence in the Belgian activities. This may have contributed to his downfall in 1965.

Case 11

Target State: Zambia
Intervening State: United Kingdom
Time Span: December 2, 1965 - October 31, 1966
Forces Involved: One Squadron of "Javelin" fighters and numerous transport planes
Type of Operation: External defense
Outcome: Success
Background

In 1965, Zambia watched with apprehension as Prime Minister Ian Smith of Southern Rhodesia demanded independence for his colony on terms unacceptable to Britain. Rhodesian Railways, which might be closed if Smith's goals were not met, carried Zambian copper to South African ports for export as well as petroleum supplies and other imports on which Zambia depended. The Kariba hydroelectric plant, on which Zambia relied for power, was also controlled by Rhodesia. In addition, when the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (or Central African Federation) had broken up, its air force had been transferred intact to Rhodesia, with Zambia left vulnerable to attack.

Britain purportedly considered intervention as early as August, 1965. Direct intercession in Rhodesia was ruled out, however, since the colony was undoubtedly prepared to fight. An alternative approach involved activity within Zambia in order to protect that country from Rhodesian military or economic threats. When Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence on November 11, 1965, Britain was forced to act.

Intervention

Agreement was reached between the British Government and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia on December 2. It provided for the stationing in Zambia of an R.A.F. squadron of Javelin all-weather fighter planes and for R.A.F. security forces to guard the three airfields that the squadron would use. A military mission, led by a British general, also soon arrived in Zambia to monitor the Rhodesian situation and to help organize expansion of the Zambian military.

Following Rhodesia's UDI, Britain immediately applied sanctions which had an indirect adverse effect on Zambia. In particular, prohibitions against shipment of petroleum to Rhodesia meant disruption of Zambia's traditional petroleum supply at the same time. As a result, Britain was forced to organize
a large scale airlift of petroleum from Dar-es-Salaam to Lusaka. Beginning on December 19, 3½ million gallons of fuel and oil were delivered in this manner.

Conclusion

During 1966, tensions in the area somewhat subsided. Zambia and Rhodesia began reaching mutual accommodations. Zambia also established other supply lines through Portuguese territory. Britain, too, began to chafe at the continuing cost. On August 23, 1966, it withdrew its combat squadron from Zambia, and on October 31, it discontinued the airlift.

Case 12

Target State: Congo (Leopoldville)
Intervening States: Ethiopia, Ghana, Belgium, and United States
Time Span: July 12, 1967 – December 1967
Forces Involved: Support for Congolese air power: Ethiopia provided a jet fighter and possibly pilots; Ghana, seven pilots and two air traffic controllers; Belgium, probably some technicians; and the United States, three (C-5A?) military transport aircraft
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

On November 25, 1966, General Joseph-Desire Mobutu seized power in the Congo (L.). This coup following in the wake of political chaos that had ensued when President Joseph Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister Moise Tshombe, the Katanganese leader,
in the spring. Tshombe's dismissal in turn instigated a revolt by the Katanganese Gendarmerie in July, which further weakened the shaky government. Mobutu had put down the latter revolt, and his coup ended the intense political infighting. After he seized power, Mobutu announced that he would serve as President for only five years, and that he had no intention of setting up a military regime.

Mobutu's first few months as leader were tranquil. This period of peace ended when Mobutu undertook action against the white mercenary units which dominated Katanga. In July 1967, he ordered the disarming of the 6th and 11th Commando Companies, the two white mercenary units that were serving only nominally under government control.

Instead of complying with the order, the unit commanders, Colonel Robert Denard and Major Jean Schramme, rebelled. With their Katanganese followers, they quickly established control over Stanleyville and over Bukavu, the capital of Kivu province. Their tiny force of 161 whites and 1,000 blacks, of course, was no match for the entire Congolese Army. The mercenaries simply wished to use their temporary advantage to negotiate a settlement permitting them to remain in the Congo under arms. They also called for the return of Tshombe.

Mobutu refused to negotiate. He called on the United Nations for help and launched an offensive against the rebels. Although the United Nations did not accede to his request, two African countries as well as the United States and Belgium sent support.

**Intervention**

Since there was no widespread threat at this time to the Mobutu regime, the intervention could be of a very limited nature. Ghana and Ethiopia helped, because they sympathized with an African country disrupted by white mercenaries. The United States and Belgium also sought a stable and friendly central government in firm control of the Congo. In mid July, the United States began providing substantial logistic support to Mobutu's government. Ghana and
Ethiopia also provided planes and pilots for the Congo's fledgling air force.

Conclusion

Foreign intervention had just a minor bearing on the outcome of this rebellion. The greatly outnumbered rebels were driven from Stanleyville and Bukavu. Still, they were able to fight their way out of the country. In November 1967, 1,000 rebels and a large number of white expatriate civilians crossed into Rwanda. Direct intervention ceased with this departure. Mobutu was subsequently able to consolidate power throughout the country, and the Congo entered its first period of internal calm.

Case 13

Target State: Central African Republic
Intervening State: France
Time Span: November 11, 1967 - ?
Forces Involved: Ca. 200
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Two different theories have been propounded to explain the intervention of French troops on this occasion. One is that instability in the Congo (see Case 12) made C.A.R. leader Jean-Bedel Bokassa feel in need of security. Another, and according to French observers, more probable explanation looks to turmoil brewing within the C.A.R. itself. *Le Monde* reported differences between Bokassa and his former collaborators in the coup of January 1, 1966, which brought him to power. *Le Monde* also noted that a tract had been circulated in Bangui, condemning Bokassa to death for his refusal to liberate certain
political prisoners.

**Intervention**

Ostensibly honoring its defense agreement with the C.A.R., France agreed to send troops. A company of French paratroopers, drawn from the 11th Infantry Division (which specialized in foreign interventions), arrived in Bangui on November 11. These soldiers apparently restricted themselves to guarding the airport. There were no incidents.

**Conclusions**

It is unclear how long the troops remained.

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**Case 14**

**Target State:** Chad  
**Intervening State:** France  
**Time Span:** August 28, 1968 - November 1968  
**Forces Involved:** 200-400, in logistical support of Chadian combat troops  
**Type of Operation:** Counter-insurgency  
**Outcome:** Success

**Background**

Under a mutual assistance agreement, France continued to maintain troops in Chad even after its independence in 1960. A French force of 1,600, based at Ft. Lamy, stood ready to intervene throughout central Africa and to support the 11th Infantry Division. In return for these concessions granted by Chad, France agreed to protect Chad from both internal insurgency and external aggression.

Chad had been little prepared for independence. Its administrators were
ill-trained and inexperienced, and this tended to increase tensions between the Moslem north and the Christian/animist south. The Christian-dominated PPT party ruled Chad from the start. In January 1963, President Francois Tombalbaye sought to make its power exclusive by outlawing all other parties. Arrests of opposition leaders brought on riots around Ft. Lamy and various northern towns. Despite the turmoil experienced by Chad in the early 1960's, however, French assistance was not sought.

The government finally lost its upper hand in 1968 when the nomadic Toubou tribe revolted in March. In August 1968, the Toubou struck a major blow against Chad's 6,000 man army, when they overran the government garrison at Zouar. This event led President Tombalbaye finally to call upon the French for assistance.

**Intervention**

In response to Tombalbaye's request of August 28, France agreed to provide logistical support to Chad's beleaguered army. Some 200 to 400 troops seem to have been dispatched from the 11th Infantry Division stationed in France and flown to Ft. Lamy. From there, they joined Chadian forces in the North, where they undertook transport and supply functions.

**Conclusion**

Chad's forces in the North were able to regroup. By November 1968, the revolt had been quelled. The magnitude and duration of the French assistance remains somewhat cloudy. In all likelihood, however, no more than a battalion of troops would have been needed to provide the units of Chad's tiny army with transportation and supply. Apparently, the intervening French forces returned home in November just after the revolt had been suppressed, at least for the while. But they would soon be needed again.
Case 15

Target State: Nigeria
Intervening State: Egypt
Time Span: August 1968 - August 1969 (?)
Forces Involved: Ca. 25 combat troops, plus ground crews and technicians
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

On May 30, 1967, Eastern Nigeria proclaimed itself the Republic of Biafra and announced its secession from Nigeria. Nigeria declared a state of emergency on July 3, and fighting soon broke out. Initially, Biafra proved more than an even match for Nigeria. It was even able to develop an air force of sorts—mainly a few old DC-6's—which undertook bombing missions over Nigeria.

To counter Biafran airpower, and also to interdict supplies destined to Biafra by air from the outside, Nigeria sought rapidly to enhance its own capabilities. The weakness of the Nigerian Air Force was a cause of some embarrassment. It was the newest of the nation's armed services, inaugurated only after independence. Moreover, a flight school opened in 1963 had been abandoned after the 1966 coup; as the civil war began, Nigeria could claim not one native pilot. By contrast, due to the relative technical sophistication of the Ibo, Biafra had no shortage of pilots.

In June 1967, after rebuffs from Britain and the United States, Nigeria signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for planes and weapons. The U.S.S.R. would supply both MiG fighters and Ilyushin bombers, and it would also obtain Egyptian crews to fly and maintain those aircraft.

Intervention

The first MiG 17's arrived—crated—in August 1967, along with 200 Egyptian
technicians. While many of the technicians were withdrawn after the planes had been assembled, maintenance crews remained. Egypt also lent several of its own Ilyushin bombers and provided pilots and pilot training, although, as it happened, no Nigerian pilots saw action during the war. Along with mercenary pilots from Rhodesia, South Africa, and Britain, the Egyptians enabled Nigeria to gain and keep air superiority over the Biafrans, despite Biafran acquisition of a squadron of Swedish Minicon fighters and Swedish mercenary pilots towards the war's end.

Conclusion

It is unknown how long Egyptian pilots remained in Nigeria, though it was probably for the duration of the conflict, or at least until August 1969. As the war progressed, mercenary pilots from other countries played an increasingly larger role and eventually flew the Soviet aircraft themselves. Nigeria may also have grown dissatisfied with the competency of the Egyptian pilots.

Case 16

Target State: Nigeria
Intervening States: United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, Poland, O.A.U, Algeria, and Ethiopia
Time Span: September 1968 - January 1970
Forces Involved: 15-20, including both officers and staff
Type of Operation: Observer team
Outcome: Success

Background

During the Nigerian Civil War, the British government firmly supported Federal Nigeria. Still, stories by western reporters in Biafra of widespread
starvation and of atrocities committed by Nigerian troops did result in widespread popular sympathy within Britain for Biafra's plight. By August 1968, no fewer than three lengthy debates had occurred in the House of Commons about government policy towards that war. The general charge was that Federal Nigeria was bent on a genocidal mission, hoping to wipe out the Ibo people (who constituted the main tribe in Biafra) either through systematic starvation or through the wholesale slaughter of Ibo non-combatants and even whole towns.

**Intervention**

To counteract these charges, which were making continued military and diplomatic support of Nigeria politically awkward, the British government induced the Nigerian government to invite a small team of military observers into the country. The observers were drawn from Britain, Canada, Poland, and Sweden, and were joined by a military observer from the O.A.U. as well as a civilian observer from the United Nations.

The Team arrived in Nigeria in early October 1968, and soon began issuing reports favorable to the Nigerian conduct of the war. It found no evidence of any intent by Federal troops to slaughter Ibo civilians, and hence concluded that the term "genocide" was in no way justified. The Team was dependent on Federal transport and logistics, it made observations only behind Federal Nigerian lines, and it apparently developed camaraderie with Federal commanders.

**Conclusion**

The International Observer Team (as it was usually called) was not meant to be neutral. Its activities were undertaken on behalf of the Nigerian government. While its presence may have kept the behavior of Federal troops in check, its chief success was in helping to snuff out charges of genocide and removing moral opprobrium from Britain's continued supply of weaponry to Nigeria. Those armaments contributed significantly to the final Federal victory.
Case 17

Target State: Chad
Intervening State: France
Time Span: March 1969-September 1972
Forces Involved: Ca. 1,000: two paracommando companies from the Foreign Legion, and two infantry companies from the 11th Infantry Division
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

After the successful campaign against the Toubou (see Case 14), rebel activity in the Chadian North was silenced. With the emergence of a new liberation organization known as Frolinat, however, such activity increased in the South and East during fall 1968. Frolinat was to prove the best organized, most persistent, and most effective of the rebel factions. It established headquarters in Algiers and operated predominantly from bases in Libya and eastern Sudan. Many of its members were trained in Libya, North Korea, or Cuba.

Intervention

By March 1969, Francois Tombalbaye had again called for French assistance. Two companies of the Foreign Legion and two others from the 11th Infantry Division were flown in to Chad. In October, they went on the offensive, and by year's end reported 1,200 Frolinat guerrillas killed, at the cost of only five French and 40 Chadian troops. In line with American tactics in Vietnam, helicopters were used extensively to ferry ground forces and provide air support.

*The Chad National Liberation Front.*
By March 1970, Chad seemed so completely pacified that the French commander predicted a quick end to the French role. Thereupon, fighting once again broke out in the "pacified territory" of central Chad and the French were compelled to remain much longer, though one company was withdrawn in July 1970. On October 11, 1970, eleven French soldiers were killed in a clash with rebels in a northern area which had been designated as "pacified." Here, too, was an apparent parallel with Vietnam. The eleven deaths increased pressure from the French people on the French government to have the special force leave Chad.

Conclusion

Although France had announced in early 1971 that its interventionary troops would soon depart from Chad, under pressure from Tombalbaye it quietly rescheduled the withdrawal for 1972. No further engagements took place; by September 1972, all the intervening units were gone. Only the permanent garrison at Ft. Lamy remained.

Case 18

Target State: Senegal
Intervening State: France
Time Span: December 12, 1969
Forces Involved: Pilots and crew for six Noratlas aircraft
Type of Operation: External defense
Outcome: Success

Background

During the independence struggle of Portuguese Guinea in the 1960's, many refugees fled into adjacent Senegal. In response, Portugal claimed that Senegal was harboring rebels, who operated from bases in southern Senegal. In early
December 1969, Portuguese troops made an incursion into southern Senegal to destroy these "bases."

The Senegalese Army was unable to counter this attack because the bulk of its 5,000 troops was stationed in the North. With Senegal virtually cut in two by the Gambia River and by the nation of Gambia, it faced considerable difficulties in moving its men promptly to the border with Portuguese Guinea.

**Intervention**

Senegal solved its problem by calling on the French for help. Senegal already had mutual defense and military aid agreements with France, and Dakar was headquarters for a 2,000-man French garrison. Part of this force included a small air transport unit with six Noratlas planes. France agreed to use these planes and ferry 1,200 troops to the Senegalese airfield at Ziguichor near the southern border.

**Conclusion**

The troops were transported on December 12. Senegal needed no additional French assistance. Further Portuguese incursions failed to take place.

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**Case 19**

**Target State:** Sudan  
**Intervening State:** Egypt  
**Time Span:** March 27-30, 1970  
**Forces Involved:** Egyptian pilots and a small (squadron sized?) number of MiG fighter aircraft  
**Type of Operation:** Counter-insurgency  
**Outcome:** Success

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Background

Sudan came under military rule for the second time since independence when Col. Gaafar el-Nimiery on May 25, 1969, overthrew the Mazoub government in a bloodless coup. Deterioration in the political scene had been accelerated by an unworkable constitution, political in-fighting among sectarian groups, a troubled economy, and rebellion by non-Moslem blacks in the South.

Imam al Hadi al Mahdi, a civilian leader in the deposed government, withdrew to his estate on the island of Aba in the White Nile and began voicing his opposition to the new regime. He accused Nimiery of being a puppet of the Egyptians and denied the legitimacy of his rule. As the leader of the powerful Ansar religious sect, the Imam posed a serious ideological threat to Nimiery. Moreover, a force of several thousand irregulars had also assembled around the Imam on Aba Island.

Nimiery made confrontation inevitable when he undertook a tour of the White Nile area on March 23, 1970. Everywhere he met a hostile population. When his boat arrived at Kosti, a town near Aba Island, it was refused permission to dock. Enraged by Mahdi's followers, Nimiery ordered Aba Island seized.

Intervention

The assault on Aba Island by Sudanese troops began March 27, 1970. After two days of shelling and bombardment by MiGs, 4,000 Sudanese troops went ashore and easily took the island. At this time, Sudan had no MiG fighters of its own and no pilots capable of flying them. And while there was, to be sure, neither Sudanese nor Egyptian admission of the assistance, the Libyan Foreign Minister did confirm the presence of Egyptian pilots and planes.

Conclusion

Egyptian intervention in the Sudanese dispute was not essential to its outcome. The rebels on the island were hopelessly outgunned from the start.
Some were armed only with spears. It was later reported, though not confirmed, that Egyptian MiGs stationed at Juba also flew missions against the black rebels in the South.

Case 20

Target State: Guinea
Intervening State: Portugal
Time Span: November 22-24, 1970
Forces Involved: 250-400 Africans, with Portuguese officers and landing craft
Type of Operation: Overthrow of government
Outcome: Partial success/partial failure

Background

In 1958, Guinea became the first French colony in Africa to gain independence. Since then, it has been led by Sekou Toure. Though elected by popular vote in both 1961 and 1968, his economic policies have led to growing unrest which Toure has suppressed forcefully and often violently. In consequence, Toure has been the target of several attempted coup d'etats and assassinations. Many Guineans also have gone into exile.

Toure antagonized Portuguese administrators in neighboring Guinea-Bissau through his support of the rebel PAIGC. The headquarters of PAIGC were in Conkary, the Guinean capital, and PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral was Toure's close friend. In addition, PAIGC maintained military bases in Guinea and held Portuguese POW's in camps near Conkary.

Intervention

On the night of November 22, 1970, a force of between 250 and 400 men
came ashore near Conkary, apparently ferried in Portuguese landing craft. The force contained equal numbers of Guinean exiles and black Portuguese troops. They were accompanied by a handful of white Portuguese officers. Initially unopposed, the force moved on to its objectives: Conkary Airport, the radio station, POW camps, PAIGC headquarters, and the homes of Cabral and Toure. All targets were raided, and though unable to capture either Cabral or Toure, the troops did succeed in liberating the POWs. The Portuguese troops then withdrew to the LST's and the waiting ships, while the Guinean contingent apparently was left behind, almost surely to be killed or captured.

Conclusion

From a Portuguese viewpoint, the raid was fairly successful. For the Guineans who had been partners in the operation, the consequences were grim. Those not killed were captured, tried, and either hanged or sentenced to long prison terms. In addition, Guinean troops who had "lacked zeal in defending the regime" often met the same fate.

Case 21

Target State: Sierra Leone
Intervening State: Guinea
Time Span: March 28, 1971 - early 1972 (?)
Forces Involved: 200 troops, plus helicopter transport
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Domestic opposition led the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone to seek outside help in early 1971. Siaka Stevens had come to power in 1968 as the
head of the APC party. Despite the existence of two opposition parties, the SLPP and the UDP, the first two years of his regime were peaceful. However, opposition grew and finally erupted into violence on September 20, 1970, when supporters of the UDP rioted.

Although Stevens' soldiers were able to suppress the UDP, the situation in the country remained unstable. In late March 1971, Stevens barely survived a coup attempt led by Major Fallah Jawara. The dissident force assaulted Stevens' residence and was beaten back by the Prime Minister's guards. It then regrouped and attacked the Prime Minister's office. Fighting continued for many hours in the streets of Freetown, but by the next day loyal troops were able to bring matters under control.

Two days later, on March 26, Stevens concluded a mutual defense pact with Guinea. The pact included provisions for stationing Guinean troops in Sierra Leone in order to bolster the Stevens government.

**Intervention**

Some 200 Guinean troops arrived in Sierra Leone by helicopter on March 28, 1971. In addition, three Guinean MiG's flew over Freetown in a show of force. Since the Jawara coup attempt had been suppressed some four days earlier, little remained for the Guineans to do but set up a garrison. They were billeted with troops from the host nation, presumably to thwart any further military coups. The Guinean troops were mainly employed around Stevens' residence as a sort of Pretorian guard.

**Conclusion**

It is uncertain exactly how long the Guineans stayed. Their numbers, however, were gradually reduced and by early 1972 all their responsibilities had been handed back to forces of the host nation.

Although the Guinean troops admittedly did not take part in suppressing the
coup of March 23, no further unrest was manifested during their presence. To the extent that stability was maintained and Stevens continued in power, the intervention may be considered a success.

Case 22

Target State: Burundi
Intervening State: Zaire
Time Span: April 30, 1972 - mid-1972 (?)
Forces Involved: 100 troops and several jet fighters
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

Long-standing tensions between the aristocratic Tutsi tribe, which ruled Burundi, and the Hutu, who constituted the vast majority of its population, erupted in violence with the return of King Ntare V in April 1972. Ntare had briefly ruled the country before being ousted in a 1967 coup by Michel Micombero, an army officer. Ntare subsequently lived in exile in Europe and then in Uganda, but he returned to Burundi after Micombero had assured his safety. The assurance was worth little. Upon his arrival, Ntare was arrested and accused of conspiring with white mercenaries to effect Micombero’s overthrow.

In this context, a series of simultaneous uprisings by Hutu occurred on April 29, 1972, in the southern part of the country. Bands of Hutu, armed with machete-like "panga" knives, roamed through villages killing whatever Tutsi they could find. On the first night alone, between 500 and 2,000 Tutsi were murdered.
**Intervention**

Although this was clearly a domestic rebellion, Micombero played on the fears of Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko by claiming that his country was being invaded by "Mulelists." The Mulelists had led a rebellion in the eastern provinces of Zaire which had almost toppled Mobutu in 1964 (Case 10). Fearful of the group's resurgence, Mobutu sent 100 Zairean troops and some fighter aircraft to Burundi to help put down the uprising.

The rebels were quickly suppressed. Tutsi retaliation against Hutu civilians continued, however, until between 80,000 and 300,000 had been massacred. It is not known what role, if any, Zaire played in the genocide. Its support for Micombero, though, was unfazed by the later turn of events.

(For "Conclusion" section, see page 158.)

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**Case 23**

**Target State:** Uganda  
**Intervening State:** Libya  
**Time Span:** September 20, 1972 - 1974 (?)  
**Forces Involved:** 399 military technicians, mainly Palestinians, and five transport aircraft  
**Type of Operation:** Counter-insurgency  
**Outcome:** No obvious consequence; not coded

**Background**

Idi Amin, who seized power from Ugandan President Milton Obote in a January 1971 coup, enjoyed the support of Libyan leader Muammar el Khaddafy. Khaddafy, an enemy of Israel, promised Uganda and other black African states massive amounts of technical assistance and foreign aid in exchange for their severing ties with Israel. Amin visited Libya in April 1972 and reached an
agreement with Khaddafy in which Libya agreed to train Ugandan army and air
force personnel and to lend the country over $10 million for development.

At the same time, Ugandan relations with Tanzania declined drastically.
Obote had retreated to Tanzania with 1,500 troops after the coup; Tanzanian
President Julius Nyerere, a close friend of Obote, had granted them sanctuary.
In addition, Tanzania refused to recognize the new regime, and as Amin's
oppression became more pronounced, Tanzanian opposition grew.

Amin further antagonized Tanzania by conducting sporadic border raids
on Ugandan refugees in northern Tanzania. In September 1972, he threatened
to invade Tanzania and to seize the area of the Tagera river valley. Ugandan
refugees retaliated by striking back into Uganda. Some 1,000 rebels launched
an abortive invasion on September 17. In turn, Amin bombed towns in northern
Tanzania. Although the situation threatened to escalate into open war.
mediation by Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia resulted in a ceasefire between the two
sides as of September 21.

Intervention

Under Obote, Uganda had maintained friendly ties with Israel, so Khaddafy
had no interest in seeing him back in power. During the brief invasion of
Uganda by Obote supporters, Khaddafy decided to send Amin the military support
he had earlier promised. On September 20, five Libyan air force transports
with 399 military technicians left for Uganda. The aircraft were temporarily
detained on landing at Khartoum, but were allowed to take off after assuring
Sudanese authorities that they would return to Libya. Instead, they continued
on to Entebbe airport, where they arrived on September 22.

Conclusion

The aircraft and the technicians on board arrived too late to take any part
in this particular round of Ugandan-Tanzanian fighting. In all likelihood, the
technicians remained in Uganda as part of the assistance agreement that Amin had signed with Khaddafy. They probably left some time in 1974, when relations between Libya and Uganda cooled.

Case 24(a)

Target State: Angola
Intervening State: South Africa (for Zairean intervention, see Case 24(b))
Time Span: August 1975 - March 26, 1976
Forces Involved: 4,000-5,000, with armor and air support
Type of Operation: Support insurgents
Outcome: Failure

Background

In April 1974, when the Portuguese military regime was overthrown, three Angolan factions were already fighting for independence. The new government in Lisbon announced that it would soon withdraw from Angola; as a result, the three groups—the FNLA, the MPLA, and UNITA—began to jockey for position, each hoping to become the dominant force there. The situation soon deteriorated to intergroup violence. Hoping to escape an increasingly ugly situation, Portuguese political authorities permitted the formation of a transitional Angolan government in January 1975, and left the area entirely by March 28, not waiting for the November independence date originally specified.

South African intervention in Angola occurred a few months after independence in conjunction with Zairean intervention. Both forces sought the same objective, the elimination of the MPLA. The two efforts are reported separately in order to simplify the presentation.

*The National Front for the Liberation of Angola, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
Unlike Zaire, South Africa had no ties to any of the Angolan liberation groups before the withdrawal of the Portuguese. Upon Angola's independence, South Africa aligned itself with the moderate FNLA-UNITA factions. Besides wishing to see a friendly government in power, South Africa had two other main interests in Angola, both related to Southwest Africa (or Namibia): (1) Angola served as a base of operations for SWAPO **guerrillas** who often made raids into the protectorate; and (2) South Africa relied on the Cunene pumping station in Angola to provide electric power for the northern part of that territory.

**Intervention**

Between the time of Angolan independence and the initial commitment of South African military forces to the rebel cause, over 1,000 South African troops had already crossed into Angola in order to eliminate SWAPO bases and to secure the Cunene pumping station. Full-fledged intervention by South Africa in support of UNITA/FNLA began in early October 1975. With Angola's independence, the tactical position of UNITA and FNLA had deteriorated. Both groups had been driven from Luanda in mid-August. In addition, the MPLA had driven deeply into the South, capturing Lobita, Benguela, and other important towns.

While South Africa initially supported UNITA/FNLA with supplies and advisers, it furnished an estimated 4,000 troops on October 23. Half the South African forces were divided into two separate columns. "Zulu" operated along the Atlantic coast and "Foxbat" in the interior. Each column consisted of approximately 250 combat and 750 support troops from South Africa, along with 1,000 UNITA/FNLA. Other South African troops secured supply lines and fought SWAPO forces.

For a time, this intervention reversed the fortunes of the rebels in the South. By November 5, Benguela and Lobito had fallen to Zulu column. Foxbat

*South West Africa People's Organization.*
column advanced into the central part of the country, encountering Cuban and Katangese as well as MPLA forces.

The campaign in the East, however, bogged down in December. South Africans were wary of confronting the Cubans. In the West, the MPLA, backed by increased Cuban support, stopped Zulu's advance at the river Queve on November 20.

Conclusion

Through January 1976, Cuban/MPLA forces held their own in the South, while driving FNLA/Zairean troops from the North. By the end of January, the North was secure and the Cuban/MPLA army could prepare for a major offensive in the South.

Rather than directly fight this sizeable foe--up to 20,000 well-equipped troops--the South African government announced on February 4, 1976, that it would withdraw to within a 30-mile "cordon sanitaire" on the Angolan side of the Namibian border. South African troops remained at this distance into Angola until March 27. After that, they left the country, since South Africa had been assured by London and Moscow that the MPLA would allow the Cunene pumping station to keep supplying Namibia's needs.

South Africa has, of course, continued to interfere in Angola, providing arms and other supplies for UNITA guerrillas who continue to right in the South and raiding SWAPO bases.

Case 24(b)

Target State: Angola
Intervening State: Zaire (for South African intervention, see Case 24(a))
Time Span: September 1975 - January 1976
Forces Involved: Two commando battalions (ca. 1,000) plus armor and artillery support
Type of Operation: Support insurgency
Outcome: Failure
Background

In contrast to South Africa, Zaire had developed a close relationship with the rebel FNLA faction even before Angolan independence. It had provided arms and funds, and it had even tolerated FNLA bases on its territory since 1961. Zaire also served as a conduit through which U.S. and Chinese weapons were funnelled to the FNLA and UNITA.

Intervention

Zaire intervened in September 1975 on behalf of the FNLA, after the latter had experienced many defeats by the MPLA. The FNLA had already been driven from Luanda and had lost its stronghold at Caxito when Zaire's 4th and 7th Commando Battalions entered Angola on September 11. In combination with FNLA and mercenary forces, they retook Caxito on September 17.

Following this victory, the Zairean/FNLA force drove south. By November 8, it had fought to within 12 miles of Luanda. While this offensive was stalling, other Zairean units attempted in turn to seize the Angolan enclave of Cabinda.

Massive infusion of Soviet and Cuban aid saved the MPLA. By December, the tide had turned against the FNLA/Zairean forces.

Conclusion

Throughout December 1975, MPLA forces advanced into the North, soundly defeating the FNLA. By mid-January 1976, the remnants of the Zairean force struggled back into their homeland, thus ending Zaire's direct involvement in the conflict.
Case 25

Target State: Angola
Intervening State: Cuba
Time Span: July 1975 - present
Forces Involved: Up to 20,000, with armor, artillery and air support
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

Long before Angola's independence, the MPLA had adopted a decidedly leftist position. Its ties with Cuba go back to 1965 when Che Guevara and MPLA leader Agostinho Neto met in the Congo (Leopoldville). In 1966, after Neto visited Castro in Cuba, MPLA guerrillas began to arrive in Cuba for training. In addition, as many as 100 Cuban advisers were active at MPLA bases in the Congo.

Intervention

The Cuban presence increased dramatically upon Angola's independence, in aid of the MPLA which was fighting a civil war with two rival factions, the FNLA and UNITA. The escalation, from 250 or so military advisers to nearly ten times as many Cuban combat troops, was intended to counter South African and Zairean intervention that had put the MPLA greatly on the defensive. (See Cases 24a and 24b.) The Cubans had been specially trained in jungle warfare, and they could rely on steady and massive supplies of Soviet armaments.

Cuban combat troops first encountered UNITA forces during the battle for Lobito in August 1975. They had made their way to Angola via Brazzaville, Congo, whence they were ferried to Luanda by ship. Although they arrived substantially without equipment, they could, of course, utilize the equipment that the Soviets had already flown in.
By November 1975, an estimated 2,000 Cuban troops were in the country. With the inauguration of a direct and extensive airlift between Cuba and Angola, the number rose rapidly to about 20,000 by March 1976. At first, the Cubans fought alongside MPLA troops or provided artillery support. But as their force became more numerous, the Cubans began operating in units that were airlifted intact.

In November 1975, Cuba/MPLA turned back a Zaire/FLEC* assault on Cabinda. At about the same time, the Zaire/MPLA offensive from the North and the South Africa/UNITA attack from the South were also being blunted. By December 1975 or January 1976, the Cuba/MPLA force had secured the North, and by late February it had captured the last significant UNITA stronghold at Silva Porto. For now at least, this eliminated any widespread UNITA or FNLA opposition in the country. The FNLA, in fact, withdrew its remaining forces across the border to Zaire, while UNITA was reduced to conducting guerrilla operations in the South.

Conclusion

While Cuba apparently considered reducing its presence in Angola after the MPLA victory, its numbers may actually have increased. By the end of 1978, an estimated 20,000 Cuban troops and 6,000 Cuban civilian technicians were present in the country. Several factors account for their remaining. In particular, factions apparently defeated in 1975-76 have refused to disappear. The FLEC remains active in Cabinda. The FNLA conducts raids from bases in Zaire. (Relations between Zaire and Angola have also been strained to the breaking point by two retaliatory invasions launched into Zaire from Angola by Katangan expatriates. See Cases 28 and 36.) The South refuses to be pacified as UNITA guerrillas continue their stubborn resistance. The South African presence in Namibia is also perceived as a never-ending threat. No withdrawal or diminution of Cuban troops is, therefore, anticipated in the near future.

*Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave.
Case 26

Target State: Mauritania
Intervening State: Morocco
Time Span: December 20, 1975 - September 9, 1979
Forces Involved: 9,000 troops, with armor and air support
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Failure

Background

Although Spain in 1966 had promised its Spanish Saharan colony eventual self-determination, the state was divided between Morocco and Mauritania when the Spanish finally left in 1975. Resentful of this annexation, natives of the region formed a guerrilla force known as the Polisario. Trained in, and supplied by, Algeria, the Polisario became a potent military force in the former colony. By early December 1975, it controlled most of the territory in the Mauritanian sector and had also seized La Guera, a significant seaport. Polisario forces also crossed into Mauritania proper and attacked the vital railine that carries Mauritanian ore to harbor.

Intervention

Morocco, which was involved in fighting the Polisario in its own sector, formed a military alliance with Mauritania and sent troops to help the latter nation regain control in its area of concern. On December 20, Moroccan/Mauritanian troops began a concerted counter-offensive in the South, but the Polisario proved to have stubborn fighters and the effort failed.

Over the next three years, the situation remained fluid. Morocco was compelled to send additional troops to Mauritania's aid. The Polisario even managed to penetrate more than 200 miles into Mauritania and, in July 1977,

*Popular Front for the Liberation of Sakiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro.

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to attack Nouakchott, the Mauritanian capital. Only escalation of the Moroccan forces in Mauritania to 8,000 by February 1978 finally stabilized the situation there. During April and May, Moroccan/Mauritanian forces made one last effort to drive the Polisario out of Mauritania and Western Sahara: this last offensive, too, ended in failure.

Conclusion

A cease-fire between the Polisario and the new leadership in Mauritania was arranged after Col. Mustapha Salek assumed power in a coup on July 10, 1978. Although 9,000 Moroccan troops still remained in his country, Salek tried to distance himself from them and simultaneously improve relations with Algeria. In spite of Moroccan pressures, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the Polisario on August 4, 1979, in which it renounced all claims to the Western Sahara.

The Moroccan intervention, which had utterly failed to bring about the intended goal, had also proved to be costly indeed. Not only were Moroccan forces consistently defeated in the field, but in the process three to five thousand Moroccans were killed and many of their armored vehicles destroyed.

Case 27

Target State: Mozambique
Intervening State: Tanzania
Time Span: 1976-1979
Forces Involved: 200-1,000 combat troops, also advisers for Mozambican troops
Type of Operation: External defense
Outcome: Success
Background

After 14 years of insurgency, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) came to power with the Portuguese departure on June 25, 1975. For many reasons, the new regime was unstable. President Samora Machel was not supported by all Frelimo factions. The economy was in shambles due to the departure of the colonial bourgeoisie. A hurricane that summer had caused great damage along the coast. The biggest threat, however, was posed by Rhodesia, which conducted frequent military incursions into Mozambique in order to strike at bases of Rhodesian rebels.

Tanzania had supported Frelimo ever since its inception in 1961, and this support continued after independence. In 1976, Tanzania provided Mozambique with over $500,000 in aid, and it sent military and other advisers to help the new regime.

Intervention

In April 1976, units of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force reportedly entered Mozambique and took positions near the Rhodesian border. Their mission was to help deter border raids.

Conclusion

The presence of the Tanzanians apparently made little difference. Rhodesian forces, using airmobile tactics, continued to conduct raids. Tanzanian and Rhodesian troops may never even have clashed directly. The raids came to an end only with the potential resolution of the Rhodesian crisis. No longer needed for external defense, the combat units left in 1979, though advisers remain.

Machel has still not been able to entrench his power. Even within Frelimo, his Marxist outlook is not entirely popular. Apparently, the central government also is not in firm control of the interior. Since 1976, Mozambique has become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and East Germany for aid.
Case 28

Target State: Zaire
Intervening States: France and Morocco
Time Span: April 7, 1977 - late May 1977
Forces Involved: For France, 65 advisers, plus 11 transport planes;
for Morocco, 1,500 infantry
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

Ever since independence, Katangese secessionists posed a grave threat
to the government of Zaire. Indeed, during the early years of the Congo
Republic (as it was then known), a secessionist government headed by Moise
Tshombe controlled Katanga. Although supported by Belgium, Katanga ultimately
capitulated in January 1963 to the central government, which had received
protracted aid from United Nations forces. (See Cases 2 and 3.) Katanga
then became Shaba province.

This, however, was not the end of the Katangese problem. In 1966, and
again in 1967, Katangese "Gendarmes," who had been incorporated into the
Zairean Army, mutinied. The government was able to suppress these insurrections,
but in the process some 6,000 or so mutineers escaped into Portuguese Angola.

These exiles were organized by the Portuguese into a counter-insurgency
force known both as "Flechas" (Arrows) and as the "National Front for the
Liberation of the Congo" (or FNLC). Upon Angola's independence in 1975, the
FNLC threw its lot in with the MPLA, and took part in the civil war there.

After victory by the MPLA faction, the FNLC decided to invade Zaira, which
appeared to be faltering under the mismanagement of Mobutu Sese Seko's government. On March 8, 1977, an estimated 1,500 FNLC troops, armed and supplied by Angola,

*Prior to 1971, Mobutu Sese Seko was known as Joseph-Desire Mobutu.
invaded Shaba province. The Zairean Army disintegrated before them and within a few days they were within 25 miles of the important mining center of Kolwezi. Mobutu blamed Angola and Cuba and called for outside military assistance.

Intervention

Morocco and France answered Mobutu's plea. On April 7, King Hassan II of Morocco agreed to send combat troops to Shaba. France was to transport them and to furnish military advisers. After the arrival of these troops in mid to late April, the FNLC melted back into the forest. Its retreat into Angola was not marked by even a single major confrontation with the Moroccan/French forces. Soon Shaba was again under control of the government. The Moroccans, and perhaps the French, left the country by late May.

Conclusion

The FNLC invasion demonstrated the weakness of Zairean troops. Certainly, Mobutu's government would have fallen without outside assistance. Moreover, the FNLC had not at all been destroyed. It had retreated intact into Angola to await the next opportune moment. After all, it had been welcomed by the local Shaba population, many of whom fled into the bush upon the return of the Mobutu military.

Case 29

Target State: Ethiopia
Intervening State: Somalia
Time Span: July 1977 - March 15, 1978
Forces Involved: 17,000-40,000, according to various estimates, with armor and air support
Type of Operation: Support of insurgency
Outcome: Failure
Background

Ethiopia is virtually unique among African states in never having been a colony. It is, in fact, an imperialist power in its own right. Much of present-day Ethiopia was conquered by Emperor Menelik II in the early part of the 20th century. Rule by emperors (though interrupted by Italian conquest) lasted until 1974, when the military council and its leader Mengistu Mariam seized the country from Haile Selassie in a coup.

Not surprisingly, Ethiopia has long been seriously plagued by separatist movements. The most significant of these are based in Eritrea and also in the Ogaden, an arid region whose population consists almost entirely of ethnic Somalis. Indeed, Somalia historically considers the Ogaden one of the five constituent parts of the Somali nation.

Insurgency there became serious after the fall of Selassie. By 1977, Somalia was claiming that up to 6,000 guerrillas, known as the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), were inflicting major casualties on Ethiopian regulars, particularly in fighting around Jijiga and Harrar. In July, Somalian leader Siad Barre stated in July that Somali soldiers on leave could "volunteer" to join WSLF forces.

Intervention

In July 1977, an all-out Somali attack on the Ogaden region began. More than 17,000 invaders were well-supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft. The intervention may have been related to Ethiopia's shift from reliance on American arms to Soviet. In spring 1977, Mengistu had even ordered the American military mission out of the country. Barre may have hoped to capitalize on the vulnerability of the Ethiopian Army during the conversion process.

Conclusion

For a while after the routing of the Somali forces, an uneasy peace,
enforced by the Cubans, prevailed between the two states. Guerrilla activity, however, has continued on both sides of the border, and more recently it seems to have reached more serious proportions. (See Case 50.)

Case 30

Target State: Mauritania
Intervening State: France
Time Span: October 1977 - September 1979
Forces Involved: Air support provided for Mauritanian operations; also 60 advisers
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Failure

Background

The Mauritanian Army was a French creation, formed at independence in 1960 from Mauritanian-manned French army units. Like most other African Francoophone countries, Mauritania retained close ties to France and signed mutual defense agreements in 1961. French troops remained in the country until 1966. Ever since independence, Mauritania had, along with Morocco, claimed the Spanish Sahara. The expectation was that, when the Spanish left, the Western Sahara would be the scene of conflict between the two states. Instead, Mauritania and Morocco tried to carve up that territory between themselves. They were confronted, however, by a common enemy, the Polisario, which proved to be more than a match for both of them. Between 1975, when fighting erupted, and 1977, when the Mauritanian capital itself came under attack, the Polisario repeatedly gained ground. (Also see Case 26.)
Intervention

In October 1977, Mauritania invoked its mutual defense agreement with France. At first, aid came in the form of equipment and advisers. Later, French aircraft based at Dakar, Senegal, were used to fly air support for Mauritanian operations. In April and May 1978, French planes supported a particularly large Mauritanian/Moroccan offensive.

Conclusion

The French continued to provide support until September 1979. Although the aid contributed to stabilizing the situation in Mauritania proper, it did not lead to the Mauritanians regaining their former third of the Western Sahara.

Case 31

Target State: Ethiopia
Intervening States: U.S.S.R., East Germany, South Yemen, and Cuba
Time Span: January 1978 - present (except for South Yemen, which withdrew in late March 1978)
Forces Involved: 1,500 Russians; 1,000 East German; 3,000 Yemini; and 22,000 Cubans; with armor and air support
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success in Ogaden; indifferent in Eritrea: coded "success"

Background

The Soviet Union, which had military ties to both Somalia and Ethiopia, had tried in vain to prevent a war between the two. Cuba also was an unsuccessful mediator. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor Cuba wished to supply the arms necessary for a sustained war in the Horn. Mohammed Siad Barre's response was to move Somalia
closer to the West. This, along with Raoul Castro's pronouncement that Ethiopia was indeed a developing Marxist state, pushed Cuba and the U.S.S.R. into a role more supportive of Ethiopia.

**Intervention**

The Somali conquest of the Ogaden would undoubtedly have been successful except for foreign, particularly Cuban, intervention. Barre had seriously miscalculated in breaking with the Soviet Bloc countries, expelling the Soviet military mission from Mogadishu, and severing diplomatic ties with Cuba. Western military aid was not massively forthcoming, but communist reaction was quick. Airlift of Soviet military equipment and advisers to Ethiopia began not long after Barre's act. By February 1978, over 17,000 Cuban troops were also airlifted in, mostly from Angola.

At that time, Ethiopia, with Cuban infantry and artillery support, plus air support provided by East German and Yemeni pilots, began its counter-offensive in the area around Jijiga. By March 5, it had emerged victorious. Somali forces were completely driven from the country within the next ten days.

The Yemeni contingent left soon afterwards, but the other interveners stayed. Cuba reduced its forces to 12,000 and remained in the Ogaden region. East German advisers now assist Ethiopian units dealing with internal security. Soviet forces, however, also became active in the next phase of the Ethiopian case.

The Ethiopian decision to quash the 17-year rebellion in Eritrea followed from their victory over Somalia in the Ogaden. Massive Soviet military aid had immensely strengthened the Ethiopian Army; so did the presence of Soviet advisers in command positions. In addition, the stationing of over 12,000 Cuban troops in the Ogaden freed the major part of the Ethiopian Army for service elsewhere.
Eritrea had been a colonial possession of the Italians and later the British until 1952, when it became an autonomous state under the sovereignty of Ethiopia. In 1962, Emperor Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea and made it just another province of his empire. Thus began the Eritrean rebellion.

In the struggle, the Eritrean rebels were largely successful. By 1978, the only Eritrean territory still in Ethiopian hands was Asmara and the naval base at Massawa. The rebels controlled fully 95% of the area.

The Cubans refused to play any combat role against the Eritreans, with whom they had sympathized in the past. To them, it was strictly an internal matter to be settled diplomatically. The U.S.S.R. had more at stake. With the loss of its Egyptian and Somali naval bases, the base at Massawa was its only Red Sea port.

Conclusion

In April 1978, a force of over 40,000 Ethiopian troops went on the offensive in Eritrea. They were led, according to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (ELF), by Soviet officers. The offensive met with little success and extremely heavy casualties. In one instance, despite naval gunfire support, an Ethiopian thrust along the coast was driven back into the sea, where it was evacuated by Russian ships. By early 1980, the offensive had already stalled. The Soviet Union now urged Ethiopia to settle diplomatically with the Eritreans.
Case 32

Target State: Equatorial Guinea
Intervening State: Cuba
Time Span: 1978 - 1980 (?)
Forces Involved: 500
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Failure

Background

Equatorial Guinea, known until its independence in 1968 as the Spanish colonies of Rio Mundi and Fernando Po, suffered heavily under the brutal regime of President Francisco Macias Nguema. Between independence and Macias' downfall in 1979, an estimated 30,000 persons were murdered, and 100,000 more (or 25% of the population) went into exile. Despite the terror and the complete collapse of the nation's economy, Macias lived comfortably on Fernando Po which he renamed for himself.

Although detested by most other African states, Equatorial Guinea had the firm support of the Soviet Union, which maintained naval and communications facilities on Macias' island.

Intervention

In 1978, 500 Cuban troops arrived in Equatorial Guinea, probably on the suggestion of the Soviets. They served as Macias' bodyguard, and also took part in the training of Macias' forces.

Conclusion

Through their presence, the Cubans may have tempered the excesses of the Macias regime, but they did not prevent its downfall in the military coup of August 1979. Thereafter, Cuban troops avoided direct interference in Guinean affairs, although they may have remained for a while to guard Soviet facilities.
Case 33

Target State: Sao Tome and Principe
Intervening State: Angola
Forces Involved: 1,500 Angolan troops, with Cuban advisers
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Sao Tome and Principe, two tiny islands in the Bight of Biafra, were Portuguese colonies with no history of rebellion. Along with the remaining Portuguese possessions in Africa, they were granted independence in 1975. Two rival leaders soon emerged: Minister of Health Dr. Carlos da Graca and President Manuel Pinto da Costa. In the political struggle that followed, Da Graca was exiled in early 1978, but found his way to Gabon where (according to Da Costa) he began to organize a force of mercenaries in order to return and seize power. Fearing that invasion was imminent, Da Costa requested military assistance from Angola.

Intervention

Angola responded by sending troops to prop up Da Costa against any threats. During February 1978, 1,500 Angolan troops flooded into the tiny nation, whose total population numbered only 90,000. They were accompanied by several dozen Cuban advisers.

Conclusion

Although no invasion occurred, Angolan troops remained for over two years. They were present through 1980, but by the end of 1981 they seem to have left.
Background

After years of civil war between the predominately Muslim nomads of the North and the mainly Christian and animist blacks of the South, Chad's government lost control of the country in 1978. Besides racial and religious differences, the rebelliousness could also be traced to the antipathy of Northerners to the South's monopoly of power. (See Cases 14 and 17.)

Relations between the Chadian government and Libya had long been strained. In 1971, Chad had broken relations because of Muammar el Khaddafy's support of the Front for the National Liberation of Tchad (Frolinat). In 1975, Libyan troops occupied the Aouzou Strip, a 60-mile wide area in Chad that parallels the 600-mile border between the countries and is said to contain significant deposits of uranium. (Dispute about this area dates back to 1935, when France and Italy controlled these lands.) In July 1977, Chad retaliated by freezing all Libyan assets; in February 1978, it again broke relations.

Khaddafy's continual funneling of support to Frolinat seems to have had three objectives: (1) establishment of a weak, Muslim-dominated government in Chad, (2) attainment of autonomy by the Muslim north, and (3) formal recognition of Libya's claim to the Aouzou Strip. None of these goals would be substantially realized until the nearly perpetual conflicts in Chad were resolved.
Libya assumed the role of peacemaker in early 1978. It brought representatives of the various factions and of the Malloum government to Sabha, Libya, where a ceasefire was agreed to on March 24, 1978. A portion of that agreement permitted a Libyan military presence throughout Chad in order to supervise the ceasefire.

**Intervention**

While the agreement itself quickly collapsed, the door was now open for additional direct Libyan intervention. In August 1978, President Felix Malloum charged that Libyan troops had invaded. The Libyans apparently moved into areas already occupied by rebels friendly to them, infiltrating as far as 300 miles into the country. The main effort was to provide logistical support to rebel factions.

Not all rebels, however, were positively disposed to Libya. Indeed, its direct incursion drove some of them to support the government. Hissene Habre, leader of the largest and best organized faction of Frolinat, even joined with Malloum in a coalition government. Ultimately, that coalition proved unworkable, and fighting that broke out in February 1979 between the Malloum and Habre factions led to Malloum's defeat. Habre then formed a coalition with Goukhan Oueddei, but differences over the Libyan role caused the collapse of this government, too, in March. Chaos prevailed until November 1979, when all the factions came together and formed a coalition government known as the Transitional Government of National Unity (or GUNT). The tone of this government was clearly pro-Libyan.

**Conclusion**

Through both military intervention and political manipulation, Khaddafy finally installed a friendly government in Chad. But even this turn of events did not last long. Habre, the Minister of Defense and a fierce anti-Libyan,
withdrew from the government in early 1980. Libya soon had to be concerned with propping up a government friendly to itself.

Case 35

Target State: Chad
Intervening State: France
Forces Involved: 650, with armor and air support
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Stalemate; coded "failure"

Background

In an April 1975 coup, Felix Malloum seized power from President Francois Tombalbaye. Initially, Malloum demanded removal of all French troops from the garrison at N'Djamena, but he subsequently reconsidered his position. With civil war continuing, France and Chad renegotiated a military assistance agreement in 1976.

Intervention

In June 1977, Frolinat, with Libyan support, launched a major offensive from the North. It was blunted at Ouniango Kebir by French-airlifted Chadian troops. The French also reinforced their N'Djamena garrison with Foreign Legionnaires during 1978. French President Giscard d'Estaing stated that these troops would not take part in combat operations. Reportedly, though, it was French combat support that enabled Malloum's government to survive Frolinat's southward push in spring 1978.

In August 1978, Malloum strengthened his regime by forming an alliance with Hissene Habre's faction within Frolinat. By February 1979, that coalition
had collapsed and the civil war was on again. France now supported Habre, its former enemy, in his struggle against the Libyans and the new Southern leader, Wadel Kamougue. The French presence in N'Djamena is said to have prevented an assault on the capital by Kamougue's forces during a May-June offensive.

Conclusion

French military intervention ended in August 1979 with a ceasefire arranged by Nigeria and a call by the O.A.U. for replacement of French troops in Chad by an inter-African peacekeeping force. Initially, the force was to be composed of 3,000 troops from Benin, Guinea, and the Congo. Although Habre wanted the French to remain, they eventually followed the O.A.U. recommendation. In late January 1980, the Congolese forces arrived, though those of Guinea and Benin never did. (See Case 44.) The last French forces left Chad on May 16, 1980.

Case 36

Target State: Zaire
Intervening States: France, Belgium and others
Time Span: May 19, 1978 - ?
Forces Involved: For France, 400 paratroopers of the Foreign Legion: for Belgium, 1,000 men (one battalion of paratroopers, one battalion of marines); also see the Conclusion of this case
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success
Background

In the 1970's, Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire stumbled from crisis to crisis. After the failure of Zaire's intervention in the Angolan civil war (Case 24) and the revelation of near financial bankruptcy, Zaire approached total collapse in the Shaba insurgency of 1977 (Case 28). Mobutu, however, was saved through French and Moroccan intervention.

FNLC troops, who had retreated intact into Angola, remained a threat. In May 1978, a 4,000-man, well-disciplined force launched a second attack into Shaba province. Once again, the Zairean Army reeled before them. The important mining center of Kolwezi fell to the rebels as they routed the Kamanyola Brigade, Zaire's elite unit, with ease. Seizure of the town led to the massacre of 44 European residents by the victorious FNLC. On May 14, Mobutu formally requested military assistance from France, Belgium, the United States, Morocco, and China.

Intervention

All these nations, except China, responded quickly to Mobutu's plea. The United States began ferrying French and Belgian troops as well as supplies into the country. Meanwhile, on May 17, Zairean forces launched a counter-offensive that met with some success. They were aided by a battalion of French paratroopers, who were dropped on May 19 near Kolwezi. In the fighting to retake the town, 300 FNLC troops allegedly were killed by the French, who sustained 22 losses. The Belgian military entered the struggle on May 21. By May 23, the FNLC was in full retreat.

Conclusion

French and Belgian combat troops were withdrawn before the end of May. They were replaced by a multi-national African force of 2,684 men, which began to arrive in June. The following nations made contributions: Morocco,
1,511; Senegal, 500; C.A.E., 300; Togo, 159; and Gabon, 44. Also, the Ivory Coast sent 110 medical personnel and Egypt sent 66 artillery instructors. The date of departure is uncertain. In the four years since this case began, Belgians, French, Chinese and Egyptians have also taken an active role in training the Zairean Army.

Case 37

Target State: Uganda
Intervening State: Tanzania
Time Span: January 1979 - April 24, 1979
Forces Involved: 30,000-40,000 troops, with armor, artillery and air support
Type of Operation: Support insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

Tanzania was the first African state to condemn Idi Amin after his successful coup in January 1971 against Milton Obote. Obote, a close friend of President Julius Nyerere, was granted asylum in Tanzania, as were more than one thousand of his supporters. This force crossed back into Uganda in September 1971 in an abortive attempt to regain power. Although Tanzania and Uganda almost went to war over the incident, the situation was resolved for the while when both sides became party to the October 1972 Mogadishu Agreement, which forbade aggressive actions by the two countries. Tanzania, however, continued to harbor Obote and his supporters, who settled in camps along the Kagera river in northwestern Tanzania.

Relations between Tanzania and Uganda remained fairly peaceful until
October 1978, when Uganda launched a limited invasion of Tanzania and occupied the Kagera valley, which it claimed. Tanzania then mobilized its own army in response and counter-attacked. By late November, the 30,000-40,000-man Tanzanian force had recovered nearly half the occupied territory. By Christmas, it had driven Ugandan forces back across the border.

Tanzania also decided that month that it could no longer tolerate Amin. It decided to topple him from power by sponsoring an invasion of Obote's rebels. Tanzania did not foresee a combat role for itself in this effort. It assumed that Amin's forces would simply disintegrate when confronted by Obote's well-supplied troops.

**Intervention**

Obote's invasion proved to be a disappointment. No mass uprising occurred when his men entered Uganda. Amin's forces had regrouped and did not crumble. In addition, Libya intervened directly to shore up Amin, sending not only arms but combat troops. In order to remove Amin, Tanzania was forced to intervene directly.

Tanzanian regulars crossed the border on January 20, 1979, and began a steady advance against the Amin/Libyan forces. By February 23, they had occupied Masaka, an important town only 30 miles from Kampala. Here the Tanzanians paused, for Ugandans were using Russian artillery with greater effectiveness. The Tanzanians would also have preferred Obote rebels to capture Kampala. Nevertheless, the obtrusive Libyan presence and the ineffectiveness of the Obote forces forced Tanzania to go on the offensive again in late March.

Tanzanian MiG's put Entebbe airport out of operation, thus helping prevent additional Libyans from entering the conflict. Kampala was captured on April 10. Amin fled to Jinja, where he held out for another two weeks. But by April 24, he was again on the run. Tanzanian troops continued their pursuit
of Amin all the way to the Sudanese border.

Conclusion

With the defeat of Amin and the re-installation of Obote, the Tanzanian mission changed from support of insurgency to internal security, as it now helped stabilize the new government. (See Case 38.)

Also see the Addendum to Case 37 at the end of this Appendix.

Case 38

Target State: Uganda
Intervening States: Tanzania and Mozambique
Time Span: March 25, 1979 - present
Forces Involved: For Tanzania, initially 30,000-40,000, but reduced in 1980 to 26,000, and in 1981 to 16,000; for Mozambique, 1,500 in summer 1979 only
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Success

Background

President Milton Obote had made numerous enemies before he was overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971. Many of these enemies remained after Obote was restored in April 1979. These included some of Amin's former supporters, who turned to guerrilla actions once Amin had fled and his regular army had collapsed. Obote had no reliable troops or even police with which to maintain order.

Intervention

After they had liberated Uganda, Tanzanian soldiers were indispensible in maintaining law and order in the country. Soon, however, the 40,000
Tanzanians began to outstay their welcome. This fact, plus the heavy burden that the occupation force placed on the Tanzanian economy, led to a reduction in units.

In July 1979, some 3,000 troops returned to Tanzania. By the end of August, the force remaining in Uganda was cut to 26,000. Even while fighting continued, Tanzania announced in March 1980 that all troops would be withdrawn within two months. This goal proved to be impossible to attain, though the size of the military commitment did shrink to 16,000 men.

Some of the slack left by the departing Tanzanian troops was taken up by Mozambiquean replacements. Between 1975 and 1979, Tanzania had stationed troops in Mozambique to help the latter protect itself against both Rhodesian border raids and internal insurgency. In summer 1979, Mozambique returned the favor by flying 1,500 troops into Uganda. They probably left during the same season.

Conclusion

The cost of the invasion was heavy indeed for Tanzania. In 1979 alone, it required $500 million from that underdeveloped nation. The presence of the Tanzanians, however, did ensure the survival of the new Obote government.

Uganda has gradually been able to develop its own army and police. Sporadic fighting continues, but anti-Obote forces have been kept under control. Nearly all Tanzanian combat units withdrew by 1982, though a number of advisers remain.
Case 39

Target State: Uganda
Intervening State: Libya
Time Span: March 1979 - April 24, 1979
Forces Involved: Ca. 2,500, including Palestinian volunteers
Type of Operation: External defense
Outcome: Failure

Background

Ever since January 1971, when Amin came to power in a coup, he experienced an off and on relationship with Libya's Muammar el Khaddafy. While Libya usually supplied Uganda with foreign aid and military technicians, it twice suspended this assistance. The first occasion was in 1974; the second, in November 1978, when Uganda invaded and occupied part of northern Tanzania. Khaddafy initially sided with the Tanzanians. But after Tanzania went on the offensive in January 1979 and invaded Uganda, Khaddafy changed sides again. (See Cases 23 and 37.)

Intervention

By early March, 2,000 Libyan combat troops, who had been airlifted into Uganda through Entebbe airport, were deployed along the front lines. Although they faired rather poorly in action against Tanzanian forces, they and the Ugandans enjoyed a short respite in mid March, when the Tanzanian advance temporarily stalled. Further Libyan troops continued to arrive at Entebbe until April 1, when the Tanzanian Air Force put the base out of operation.

Meanwhile, Amin's army began to disintegrate. The Libyans, too, began to desert Kampala's defenses, retreating to Jinja along a road that the Tanzanians had deliberately left open to facilitate such a withdrawal. Khaddafy, however, did continue to support Idi Amin to the end. He even warned Tanzania that
he would formally declare war on that nation unless its forces left Uganda.

Reportedly, Libyan MiGs bombed a town in northern Tanzania.

Amin fled Kampala on April 10 and joined the Libyans in Jinja. There the Libyans defended Amin for another two weeks until they were forced to capitulate. In the melee, Amin was able to escape and eventually arrived in Libya as a passenger on a Libyan Boeing 707.

Conclusion

The Libyan military intervention in Uganda was clearly a failure. Of the troops sent, perhaps 700 were killed, and others were taken prisoner. Eventually, the new Ugandan government entered negotiations for the release of the prisoners through Algeria. Uganda's initial demand was for Amin's return, but it eventually settled just for the plane in which he had escaped and perhaps for some ransom money. On November 28, 400 Libyan survivors were released.

Case 40

Target State: Central African Empire
Intervening State: Zaire
Time Span: January 22, 1979 - January 23, 1979
Forces Involved: 200-300
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who came to power in a 1966 coup, was known as a highly repressive and pretentious ruler. So massive were his visions of grandeur that he changed the name of the country from the Central African Republic to the
Central African Empire and had himself crowned emperor in a lavish ceremony. In reality, his empire comprised a small and impoverished land, and his power depended largely on French support.

Bokassa became increasingly unpopular both at home and in the general African community. By 1979, almost the only country still friendly to him was Zaire.

In January 1979, riots broke out in the capital, Bangui. Many of the participants were teen-aged students. Dismayed at the inability, and perhaps the unwillingness, of his troops to suppress the riots and fearful that they might spread, Bokassa called on Zaire for help.

**Intervention**

Zaire came quickly to Bokassa's aid. Soldiers crossed the Ubangi river which forms the C.A.E./Zaire border, and entered Bangui. The Zairean forces, which numbered no more than 300, quickly re-established order. Within a day or two, they returned control to Bokassa and departed.

**Conclusion**

That Zaire, a nation not noted for the effectiveness of its military, could so easily contain a riot that C.A.E. forces could not handle underscored the weakness of the Bokassa regime. The brutality that it exhibited to the world as it hunted down and murdered persons involved in the riots was no mark of systemic strength.
Case 41

Target State: Zaire
Intervening State: Belgium
Time Span: February 4-7, 1979
Forces Involved: 250-300 paratroopers
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success (limited)

Background

The weakness of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime had been demonstrated in the 1977 and 1978 invasions of Shaba province by the Katanganese Gendarmerie. Both times Mobutu was saved only by the intervention by French and Belgian forces. (See Cases 28 and 36.) Even a multi-national force that had remained in the country failed to reassure Mobutu, and when he heard rumors of an impending coup in early 1979, he again called on Belgium for assistance.

Intervention

Belgium intervened once again, dispatching several companies of paratroopers to Zaire on February 4 for "training" purposes.

Conclusion

No coup or other rebellion occurred. The Belgian force, however, almost immediately made itself unwelcome by openly criticizing the condition of Mobutu's military. Insulted, Mobutu ordered the Belgians to leave on February 7, and they willingly complied.
Case 42

Target State: Chad  
Intervening State: Nigeria  
Time Span: April 7, 1979 - June 3, 1979  
Forces Involved: 1600 armored infantry  
Type of Operation: Peacekeeping  
Outcome: Failure

Background
Chad enjoyed a brief respite from its civil war after a ceasefire had been negotiated in Kano, Nigeria, between its various competing factions. To enforce observance, Nigerian troops would take positions between the front lines of the two main factions: those of southern leader Wadel Kamougue and of northern leader Hissene Habre.

Intervention
Some 500 Nigerians arrived in Chad on April 7. Accompanied by armored personnel carriers and light tanks, they assumed positions just south of N'Djamena.

New fighting broke out in May between the Habre and Kamougue forces. The Nigerians were unable to keep the violence from getting out of hand. Evidence suggests that they did not try too hard.

Conclusion
As the fighting intensified, the Nigerians withdrew. The entire force which had by then grown to 1600, left on June 2 and 3.
Case 43

Target State: Central African Empire
Intervening State: France
Time Span: September 20, 1979
Forces Involved: 648 infantry from garrisons in Chad and Gabon; 300 men of the 3rd Marines, 11th Division, from Carcassonne, France; 500 men of the 8th Marines, 11th Division, from Custres, France
Type of Operation: Coup
Outcome: Success

Background

Jean-Bedel Bokassa took power in 1966, overthrowing President David Dacko in a coup. (Dacko fled to France.) Although Bokassa's regime subsequently proved repressive, he enjoyed substantial French support until spring 1979. Many schoolchildren in the capital, Bangui, had been murdered by government forces in January because of their participation in anti-Bokassa riots (Case 40). France initially ignored reports of the January atrocities and of others in April. Only when France realized the depth of African hostility toward Bokassa during a Franco-African summit meeting in late May, did it firmly address the scandal. It cancelled all military aid, and along with former President Dacko, it began to plan a coup.

Intervention

The coup occurred on September 20, while Bokassa was in Libya seeking military assistance. Code-named "Operation Barracuda," it had required two months of planning. The operation went smoothly. A force of 648 paratroopers from French garrisons in Libreville, Gabon, and Ft. Lamy, Chad, were dropped
near Bangui and secured the airfield with no resistance. Then eight transport planes bearing an additional 800 troops from garrisons in France as well as Dacko himself landed. Bokassa's forces dissolved without a skirmish.

Conclusion

The long-range commandos of the 11th Division left the same day, taking with them compromising records about French support for Bokassa which they had found in his residence. With Dacko's consent, the French base at Bangui was reoccupied. It was here that 1,000 French troops arrived to set up a permanent garrison when they withdrew from Ft. Lamy, Chad, in May 1980.

Case 44

Target State: Equatorial Guinea
Intervening State: Morocco
Time Span: September 24, 1979 - present
Forces Involved: 200
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

President Francisco Macias Nguema's brutal regime had come to an end in the military coup of August 1979. (See Case 32.) That summer, Macias sensed disloyalty on the part of certain military officers. As a result, he ordered a number of them tortured and executed. On August 1, he recalled General Obiang Nguema from the island of Macias Nguema where he was military governor. Nguema prudently refused. Loyalist troops sent to arrest Nguema were defeated and soon driven from the island.
Fighting then spread to the mainland. By August 8, loyalist forces were routed, and Macias himself was arrested on August 18 while trying to escape into Gabon.

**Intervention**

Though Macias had been captured and his army defeated, the new Nguema government continued to fear him. Macias was even thought to have supernatural powers. In addition, a counter-coup by Russian and Cuban forces stationed on Macias Nguema was feared. As a result, the new government requested in September that Morocco also send troops.

On September 24, while Macias was on trial, 200 Moroccan troops arrived. Five days later, Macias was sentenced to death. The firing squad was composed of Moroccans, because local troops were too afraid of their former leader to carry out the sentence themselves.

**Conclusion**

Though there was some talk of replacing them with Spanish troops, Moroccan soldiers remained in the country. In 1982, about 120 Moroccans were still there.

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**Case 45**

**Target State:** Chad  
**Intervening States:** Congo, O.A.U.  
**Time Span:** January 27, 1980 - May 1980  
**Forces Involved:** 500 troops from Congo  
**Type of Operation:** Peacekeeping  
**Outcome:** Failure
Background

A coalition between the Chadian government and various rebel factions had been achieved in November 1979 (Case 34), and the country enjoyed a brief respite from civil war. The arrangement, however, was always characterized by considerable tension. Not surprisingly, by early January 1980, fighting had broken out in N'Djamena between Hissene Habre supporters and troops of the former regime.

Intervention

The O.A.U. attempted to forstall the breakup of the coalition government by sending a peacekeeping force of 500 Congolese to N'Djamena. Their arrival on January 27 did nothing to dissipate the climate of violence. Indeed, the Congolese simply let the fighting go on around them.

Conclusion

Because of continued assaults mounted by Habre supporters, Habre himself was expelled as Minister of Defense in March 1980. With this, full-scale civil war began anew. The Congolese, having failed in their task, left without firing or preventing a shot.

Case 46

Target State: Chad
Intervening State: Libya
Forces Involved: 8,000-9,000, with armor and air support
Type of Operation: Counter-insurgency
Outcome: Won the war, lost the peace; coded "failure"
Background

An agreement between the government of Chad and rebel forces to form a new coalition government brought a brief respite in November 1979 to the Chadian civil war. Known as the Government of National Unity (GUNT), this regime was both pro-Libyan and short on any lasting unity. Over the next few months, the fiercely anti-Libyan FAN* faction, led by Hissene Habre, instigated several clashes with old foes. Habre was censured by GUNT and then expelled in May.

Clearly foreign intervention would be needed to salvage the regime. After all, Habre had proved himself the most able military leader in Chad in earlier phases of the civil war (Cases 34, 35, 42, and 44), and he led the largest and best organized military force in the country.

Intervention

Libyan forces had first been in Chad in 1978. (See Case 34.) Until the establishment of GUNT, Libya had always aided northern rebels, including Habre. This time there was a friendly government that it could assist. In June 1980, President Goukhani Oueddei signed a mutual defense agreement with Libya; as a result, two hundred Libyans entered N'Djamena that month, filling the vacuum created by the French departure in 1979. (See Case 35.) Even so, Habre defeated GUNT forces easily, capturing N'Djamena in July.

To recoup its position, Libya launched a major offensive the next month. Armor, attack aircraft, and 3,000-4,000 troops moved southward. The number of Libyan troops in Chad also increased to perhaps as many as 9,000. Although the offensive progressed slowly because of skilled resistance, it did recapture N'Djamena in December 1980.

Conclusion

The Chadian government that Libya had apparently rescued was so disorganized

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*Armed Forces of the North
that the interveners felt virtually compelled to administer the part of Chad under their control. (Habre still held many of the eastern "prefects.") Soon even the facade of the Chadian sovereignty seemed to be discarded, as Oueddei met with Khaddafy in January 1981 and Libya announced the unification of the two states.

The O.A.U. quickly let it be known that such a merger was unacceptable to most African countries. International pressure was put on Libya to withdraw from Chad, and by spring it had agreed. Libyan troops, however, were to remain there in a peacekeeping capacity until an O.A.U. force relieved them.

The O.A.U. proved unable to organize this force very quickly (Case 49). Indeed, Libya's actual withdrawal in November 1981 preceded arrival of the O.A.U. units, and the situation reverted to chaos. By summer 1982, Habre seemed to be in control.

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Case 47

Target State: Gambia
Intervening State: Senegal
Forces Involved: 400
Type of Operation: Internal security
Outcome: Success

Background

Gambia is the smallest country on the continent of Africa, its population of 500,000 occupying a strip of land along the mouth of the Gambia river. During the 19th century, the British established a trading post here, and claimed the surrounding area as a colony. Since independence in 1952, Gambia has been ruled by the President Dauda Jawara. Under Jawara, the nation maintained one
of the few working democracies in Africa, with a loyal opposition and free elections.

**Intervention**

Because Gambia has no army, Jawara felt compelled to call on Senegal for help. (Senegal is not only Gambia's neighbor; it virtually surrounds Gambia.) Within 24 hours, 400 Senegalese troops had entered Freetown and quelled the riots.

**Conclusion**

Although the disturbance had been minor and the Senegalese were withdrawn on November 9, the incident had shaken Jawara's hold on power. Calling on Senegal for help did nothing to enhance his popularity.

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**Case 48**

**Target State:** Gambia  
**Intervening State:** Senegal  
**Time Span:** August 2, 1981 - present (?)  
**Forces Involved:** 2,700-5,000  
**Type of Operation:** Internal security  
**Outcome:** Success

**Background**

President Dauda Jawara's 20-year hold on power was shaken in October 1980 by an attempted coup and by the need for Senegalese intervention (Case 46). Jawara's government faced another crisis in 1981, as drought wiped out most of the groundnut crop on which the Gambian economy depends. In July 1981, the government announced an austerity budget. It provided little or no money to
help ruined farmers. Gambia's tiny Socialist and Revolutionary Labor parties opposed the budget vehemently.

On July 30, while Jawara was in London attending the wedding of Prince Charles, members of the Socialist and Revolutionary Labor parties, supported by many of the nation's 900-man police force, undertook a coup. They succeeded in gaining control of the main buildings and installations in Freetown, the capital.

**Intervention**

Although the rebels did not enjoy broad support among the people, virtually no armed force existed in Gambia to oppose them. Jawara quickly returned from London, arriving at Dakar, Senegal, on July 31. Again, Senegalese troops were asked to intervene. This time, several thousand of them moved into Gambia. The rebels were eliminated in fighting between August 2 and August 5, and about 500 lost their lives.

**Conclusion**

This time the Senegalese did not promptly leave. Although Senegal was soon viewed as an alien occupation force, plans for the unification of Gambia and Senegal were announced on August 21, 1981. It is not clear what prompted Gambian leaders to agree to this. Gambia remains independent as this case is written, but Senegalese troops are apparently still present.
Case 49

Target State: Chad
Intervening States: Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, O.A.U.
Time Span: November 15, 1981 (for Zaire) and December 1981 (for others) - June 1982
Forces Involved: For Zaire, 600; for Nigeria, 2,000; for Senegal, 600
Type of Operation: Peacekeeping
Outcome: Failure

Background

Soon after Muammer al Khaddafy had announced the merger of Libya and Chad in January 1981, the Organization of African Unity demanded the withdrawal of Libyan forces. The Libyans were, however, helping to stabilize the civil war in Chad, and Chadian leaders feared the vacuum that their departure would create. As a result, President Goukhan Oueddei of Chad demanded the arrival of an inter-African peacekeeping force prior to the Libyan withdrawal. The need was especially apparent in summer 1981, as fighting began anew between government forces and supporters of Hissene Habre.

During the summer, French Premier Francois Mitterand helped arrange for Nigeria, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast to constitute an O.A.U. peacekeeping force. The troops were to be under the overall command of a Nigerian general. (France would meet the costs.) Later Zaire announced that it, too, would join the force.

The Libyans began their withdrawal in early November, before the O.A.U. force could arrive. As feared, fighting in eastern Chad became much heavier.

Intervention

Only Nigeria, Zaire, and Senegal actually sent troops to Chad. The first
soldiers to arrive were Zairean, on November 15. Senegalese and Nigerian troops came in early December. Instead of going to the scene of the fighting, they remained in the N'Djamena area and kept out of the way. By early 1982, Habre's forces clearly held the upper hand, and President Oueddei had grown quite upset with the inactivity of the O.A.U. contingent.

Conclusion

As Habre drew closer to N'Djamena in 1982, the O.A.U. force decided to pull out rather than take sides in the approaching showdown. Departure occurred during June. By July, Habre was victorious and had assumed control of the government.

Case 50

Target State: Somalia
Intervening State: Ethiopia
Time Span: Fall 1981 - present
Forces Involved: Number unknown, probably with heavy armor
Type of Operation: Support insurgency
Outcome: Not yet certain; not coded

Background

Disaffection with the regime of Mohammed Siad Barre grew after its unsuccessful invasion of Ethiopia (Cases 30 and 31). Dissension was so rife that Barre ordered the arrest of several senior members of his government. In the Ogaden region, Ethiopia began recruiting anti-Barre Somalis.

Intervention

Dissident Somalis have been organized into an irregular unit known as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia. They are trained and paid by
Ethiopia, transported to the Somali border in Ethiopian military vehicles, and assisted within Somalia by Ethiopian logistical and artillery support.

Conclusion

Despite western aid to Siad Barre, his position has been deteriorating. In October 1981, he found it necessary to arrest another ten senior officers, and in November, five more. The purge may have triggered a mutiny of Somali troops in spring 1982, which was put down only after considerable bloodshed.
Case 9

Intervention

French military reaction was immediate. Within 24 hours, a battalion of French troops from garrisons at Brazzaville and Dakar arrived at Libreville airport to reinforce the permanent French garrison of 150. Very little resistance was encountered, and the French suffered only one fatality in retaking the capital. By February 21, Mba was back in power.

Case 22

Conclusion

Zairean intervention in Burundi aimed at fighting Mulelists. Once the situation was found to be purely internal, the troops were withdrawn. In the meantime, they had furnished assistance to the Burundi government when the actual threat to its survival was greatest.
Case Sources

Five serials were of particular value in the preparation of these cases. They are:


Other works are listed only when they were heavily relied upon in the writing of a particular case.

Case 1

Case 2


Case 3
See Case 2.

Case 4

Digest, October 1963, pp. 57-58.

Case 5
Digest, February 1964, p. 104.

Case 6


Case 7
See case 6.

Case 8
See case 6.

Case 9

*Digest*, April 1964, pp. 153-55

Case 10
See case 2.

Case 11
*Africa Digest*, June 1965, p. 151; December 1965, p. 59; February 1966, pp. 75-83; August 1966, pp. 3-7; December 1966, p. 49.

Case 12
*Digest*, October 1967, pp. 143-145.


McDonald et al. (as cited in Case 2), p. 96.
Case 13
Diary, December 1967, p. 3705.

Case 14

Case 15
Venter, Al. War in Africa.

Case 16


Case 17


Case 18


DA Pam 550-17, Appendices LLL and MMM.

Case 19

Diary, September 1976, pp. 8109-8110.


Case 20


Case 21


West Africa, April 17, 1971.

Case 22


Case 23

Case 24a
v. 9, 1976-77, pp. B788, B805.

Case 24b
Legum (as cited in 24a).

Case 25
Legum (as cited in 24a).
B445-447, B451-456, B496.


Case 26


Case 27


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Case 28

Case 29

Case 30


Case 31

DA Pam 550-17, p. 340.

Case 32

Case 33

Case 34

Case 35


Case 36
Diary, November 1978, p. 9255.

Case 37


Case 38
See case 37, plus

ACR, v. 12, 1979-80, p. B335


Case 39
Diary, March 1979, pp. 9524-9530.

Case 40


Case 41

Case 42
See case 41, plus
Ad, no 14, mai 1979, p. 23.

Case 43

Ad, no 19, octobre 1979, p. 22; no 20, novembre 1979, p. 22.

Case 44

Case 45

Case 46


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Case 47
See case 46

Case 48

Case 49


Case 50

Addendum to Case 37

A thorough canvass of the Swahili language newspaper Uhuru, published daily except Sundays in Dar es Salaam, failed to uncover additional significant data about Tanzanian participation in the peacekeeping effort that led to Amin's ouster from Uganda. Examined were all issues of the paper from July 1978 through June 1979. The basic reason for the information gap is that Tanzania officially denied that it was taking any part in that peacekeeping operation, and so there was nothing to report.

By contrast, frequent attention was paid to the preceding invasion by Uganda of Tanzania's Kagera region. These accounts sometimes contained interesting material. For example, on November 3, 1978, President Nyerere mentioned in passing that "By bad luck three of our planes were hit by our own soldiers in Musoma. The planes were supposed to land in Mwanza, but as they go so fast they needed another plan to land. Those planes passed by Musoma, where they were shot down. The [men in Musoma] followed our orders to shoot down all warplanes that came in unannounced."

The counter-invasion of Uganda, though, was reported almost entirely as the work of Ugandan exiles and rebels (1979: February 28, March 3, 27, 30, April 2, 3, 7, 12, and elsewhere). The army of the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) received considerable notice, while crucial efforts by the Tanzanian military in the campaign were simply ignored. Tanzanian intervention became a non-event, in line with earlier accurate denials by Nyerere that Tanzania had invaded its neighbor (e.g., October 14, and November 28, 1978). There were, however, some warnings that Tanzania would enter Uganda if the army of "fascist Amin" does not cease its invasion of Tanzania" (January 26 and March 6, 1979).

Coverage of the peacekeeping operation, then, stressed the role of the UNLF and of leaders like Yusuf K. Lule. It was Ugandan rebel forces that attacked
Tororo, Soroti and Jinja (March 3, 1979), that closed down and liberated Entebbe (April 4 and 7), and that captured Kampala (April 12). Indeed, not until April 14 was there acknowledgement whatever of Tanzania's role in the operation. On that day, Lule, newly sworn in as President of Uganda, thanked the Tanzanian army and expressed his gratitude "to those who gave their life and went with us as far as Kampala and Entebbe."

Thereafter, the Tanzanian victory was recognized at least by implication and the country basked in a sort of reflected glory. For example, according to Uhuru for April 25, 1979, there were six reasons why Tanzania won: the skill and wisdom of Nyerere's politics and army, the unity of the Tanzanian people, the correct way our country was protected, the just cause of the war, the fine command of our army, and our friends in the world for understanding the causes of the war. Or as Nyerere stated on June 12, "You Tanzanians, you won the war by being united. Who paid for the war? You did. But still we have many problems." And some of these problems, be it noted (June 29, 1979) involved the families of soldiers killed in this war, and those who were mutilated.

Aside from a few passing references to particular commanders or army units (April 25 and June 12, 1979), even these warm reminiscences provided little added information about Tanzania's part in Uganda's liberation. For that, the standard English-language source material is far more helpful.
I. The Probability of Intervention

A. Structural Model

Suppose that country \(j\) is the potential target of an intervention, actor \(i\) is the potential intervenor, and \(t\) is the time period under examination. Our first structural equation (1.0) explains the probability of intervention \(p(IN)\) by actor \(i\) in country \(j\) at time \(t\) as a function of country \(j\)'s internal turmoil \(IT\) and actor \(i\)'s assessment of the opportunities and risks associated with intervention (EPOR) at time \(t\). Thus:

\[
1.0 \quad p(IN)_{ijt} = f(IT_{jt}; EPOR_{ijt})
\]

Although this functional relation can be expressed in any number of forms, we first specify the function as a simple linear model with interaction. (At the measurement stage discussed below, the model is subjected to maximum likelihood estimation and appropriate variable transformations are made to capture the non-
linearity of the function. Specified in linear form (with \( \sum \) meaning the sum across all \( i \)'s), equation 1.0 becomes:

\[ P(IN)_{jt} = b_0 + b_1 IT_{jt} + b_2 \sum EPOR_{jt} \]

To fully specify this model, suppose we define:

- \( ED \) = degree of elite dissensus
- \( SF \) = degree of social fragmentation
- \( ECO \) = degree of external covert operations

Then:

\[ IT_{jt} = b_3 + b_4 ED_{jt} + b_5 SF_{jt} + b_6 \sum ECO_{jt} + \]
\[ b_7 (ED_{jt} \cdot SF_{jt}) + b_8 \sum (ED_{jt} \cdot ECO_{jt}) + \]
\[ b_9 (SF_{jt} \cdot ECO_{jt}) + b_{10} \sum (ED_{jt} \cdot SF_{jt} \cdot ECO_{jt}) \]

Interpretation for 1.0: The internal turmoil in country \( =j \) at time \( =t \) is defined as the result of elite dissensus, social fragmentation, and the cumulation of covert operations in country \( =j \) by outside countries, plus the interaction of these factors.

\[ ED_{jt} = b_{11} + b_{12} ED_{jt-1} + b_{13} SF_{jt-1} + b_{14} SF_{jt} + \]
\[ b_{15} \sum ECO_{jt} + b_{16} ECO_{jt-1} \]

Interpretation for 1.03: The amount of elite dissensus in country \( =j \) at time \( =t \) is defined as the result of previous elite dissensus, past and present social fragmentation, and past and present covert operations by other countries.
1.04 \[ S_{jt} = b_{17} + b_{18}S_{jt-1} + b_{19}ED_{jt-1} + b_{20}ED_{jt} + b_{21} ECO_{jt} + b_{22} ECO_{jt-1} \]

Interpretation for 1.04: The social fragmentation in country \( j \) at time \( t \) is defined as the product of past social fragmentation, past and present elite dissensus, and past and present covert operations.

1.05 \[ ECO_{ijt} = b_{23} + b_{24}EPOR_{ijt-1} \]

Interpretation for 1.05: The degree of covert operation by country \( i \) in country \( j \) at time \( t \) is defined as the result of \( i \)'s previous assessment of the opportunities and risks associated with intervention in country \( j \).

To specify the determinants of country \( i \)'s perceptions of opportunities and risks associated with some form of intervention in country \( j \), we define the following:

- \( SI \) = degree to which an internal event likely is attributed to an extension of \( k \)'s sphere of influence (\( k \) is any external actor except \( i \))
- \( PT \) = degree of personal ties between \( i \) and \( j \)
- \( TI \) = territorial interest of \( i \) in \( j \) (This might include territorial disputes, guerrilla bases, and migration issues.)
- \( BI \) = balance of influence by \( k \) actors regarding \( j \)
TR = treaties for defense assistance between =i= and =j=

ID = ideological investment of =i= in the affairs of =j=

IF = =i=’s interest in or dependency upon =j=’s transportation infrastructure

CL = degree of consensual legitimation (=i=’s support in world opinion)

EI = =i=’s degree of economic interest in =j=

The calculus of opportunities and risks thus becomes:

\[ \text{EPOR}_{ijt} = b_{25} + b_{26} \cdot S_{1jt} + b_{27} \cdot T_{ijt} + b_{28} \cdot L_{1jt} + b_{29} \cdot U_{1jt} + b_{30} \cdot R_{ijt} + b_{31} \cdot D_{ijt} + b_{32} \cdot F_{ijt} + b_{33} \cdot C_{ijt} + b_{34} \cdot E_{ijt} \]

Interpretation for 1.06: Actor =i=’s perceptions of opportunities and risks regarding involvement in =j= at time =t= reflects the extent to which =i= attributes =j=’s troubles to another external actor, plus the degree of personal ties between =i= and =j=, =i=’s territorial interest with =j=, =i=’s assessment of the balance of interests involving =j= (e.g. what other actors might make countervailing responses), whether =i= has treaty obligations with =j=, =i=’s ideological investment in =j=’s future, =i=’s dependency on =j=’s transportation infrastructure, the extent to which =i=’s actions would meet approbation or condemnation in the court of world opinion, and =i=’s economic interest in =j= at time =t=. 
B: Measurement Model

Internal Turmoil

Equation 1.02 defines internal turmoil in terms of elite dissensus, social fragmentation, and the level of external covert operations in country \( j \) at time \( t \). These three concepts require "operationalization" or measurement in order to index the level of internal turmoil in country \( j \) during year \( t \). The indicators discussed below eventually will be substituted into equation 1.01 to produce the measurement model tested here.

No simple measure of elite dissensus exists. Although some have used party fractionalization in the national legislature as one indicator of elite dissensus, this measure is particularly inappropriate to the Sub-Saharan countries, for most have developed totalitarian party systems banning all or most opposition parties. In the Sub-Saharan countries, elite conflict generally reflects rules-of-the-game, such as government purges of the political opposition, coups, significant changes in cabinet or executive officials, and crises that threaten to bring down the regime in power.

To measure these events, we compiled aggregate lists of government purges, coups, cabinet changes (premier and 50 percent of the cabinet change), significant executive changes
(leadership change where the successor is independent of the predecessor), and the number of government crises threatening downfall of the current regime (excluding such factors as revolutions, etc.). The data for countries in years before 1974 were drawn primarily from Arthur Banks' Cross-National Time Series: 1815-1973 (ICPSR 7412). Data for 1974-1982 were drawn from The London Times Index and The New York Times Index. Data for all years (1960-1982) were supplemented by several handbook histories of the Sub-Saharan African countries. Key sources include Arthur Banks and William Overstreet (eds.), Political Handbook of the World (1981) and Carol Thompson, Mary Anderberg, and Joan Antell (eds.), The Current History Encyclopedia of Developing Countries (1982).

A variety of factors indicate the potential levels of social fragmentation in a country. For purposes here we have settled on three: the number and fragmentation of ethnic groups in the country, the number and fragmentation of languages, and the number and fragmentation of religions. Because these cleavages can be overlapping or cross-cutting (i.e., an ethnic group might have its own language and own religion or one ethnic group might have several different religions among its members), we shall calculate each indicator separately, then average them for a composite measure of social fragmentation.

To construct these three indicators of social fragmentation, we have adapted a measure of party fractionalization developed by Douglas Rae of Yale University. His measure defined
fractionalization as $1.0 - \sum p_i^2$ minus the sum of the squares of each party's proportion in the lower house of the national legislature. This measure tends toward $1.0$ with the slightest diversity, so we have adjusted the formula to compute fractionalization as $1.0 - \sqrt{\sum p_i^2}$ minus the square root of the sum of the squares of each ethnic group's (or religion's or language's) proportionate share of the population. Thus:

$$F = 1.0 - \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum p_i^2 \right)^{1/2}$$

where $p_i$ is the proportion of the entire population belonging to ethnic group (or religion or language community) $i$. The square root adjustment used here takes into account the extraordinary number of ethnic groups, religions, and languages found in many Sub-Saharan countries. The composite measure of social fragmentation ranges between $0.0$ (complete homogeneity) to $1.0$ (complete heterogeneity).

The third component of internal turmoil (equation $1.02$) is the extent of covert operations in country $j$ at time $t$. Again we have no direct measure of covert operations, and thus we have relied upon reports found in numerous historical accounts examined, including those mentioned above. Because we are coding reported covert operations, the reader should beware of the potential difference between a covert operation's allegation and actuality. For this measure, we simply sum the reported number of covert operations in country $j$ at time $t$. 

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Perceptions of Opportunities and Risks

Equation 1.06 defines \( i \)'s perception of opportunities and risks regarding intervention in \( j \) at time \( t \) in terms of the degree to which \( i \) attributes events in \( j \) to actor \( k \), the degree of personal ties between \( i \) and \( j \), the territorial interests of \( i \) in \( j \), the balance of influence by \( k \) actors regarding \( j \), the existence of defense treaties between \( i \) and \( j \), the ideological investment of \( i \) in the affairs of \( j \), \( i \)'s interest in or dependency upon \( j \)'s transportation infrastructure, the degree of consensual legitimation, and \( i \)'s economic interests in \( j \).

Once again the information utilized here derives from a number of historical sources, particularly those cited above plus Arthur Banks et al. (eds.), Economic Handbook of the World (1981). To index the degree to which an internal event was attributed to an extension of another country's sphere of influence, we tabulated the accusations made by elites in target \( j \) about the activities or designs of external countries \( k \). Because such accusations are made public for calculated reasons, we assume that country \( i \) would be interested in such accusations about country \( k \), if \( i \) stands in some counterpoised relation with \( k \).

Reports of personal ties between \( i \) and \( j \) in year \( t \) are tabulated for all \( i \)'s, as are reports of territorial interests,
treaties, ideological investments, dependency on \( j \)'s and dependency on \( i \)'s transportation infrastructure. Assessments of regional and global power politics, particularly balances of influence regarding the affairs of \( j \) at time \( t \), similarly were tabulated. (Time and resource constraints made it impossible to assess the level of consensual legitimation, and hence this component has been dropped from the measurement model.)

An ideal measure of economic interests would assess the extent of country \( i \)'s dependency upon the goods being imported from \( j \) or the degree to which \( j \) serves as a primary market for \( i \)'s goods. Time and resource constraints made it impossible to achieve this level of measurement specificity, so we instead have utilized simpler measures. Thus, we examine the percent of \( j \)'s imports from various countries \( i \) and, conversely, we examine the percent of \( j \)'s exports to various countries \( i \). Such measures provide general assessments of \( j \)'s trade concentration and hence an idea of which countries most likely would be interested in \( j \)'s internal affairs.

Equation 1.06 defines the externally perceived opportunities and risks for actor \( i \) in country \( j \) at time \( t \). Equation 1.01 requires that these perceptions be summed across all actors \( i \) for a determination of the probability of peacekeeping intervention. Aggregating these perceptions of opportunities and risks is no simple matter, particularly absent the time and resources necessary to refine the values of perceived
opportunities and risks for each country \( i \) in \( j \) at time \( t \) and state them in comparative form. Our first approximation to the measurement of the aggregate perceptions of opportunities and risks has yielded two indicators. The first involves our indicators of economic interests. Following a procedure similar to that for social fragmentation, we use the proportion of \( j \)'s exports and imports, respectively, to calculate measures of trade fragmentation. Here we do not subtract the square root of the sum of the squares of the proportions from 1.0. Thus, the measure of concentration of economic interest averages the import and export concentrations, yielding a measure that ranges from 0.0 (little economic concentration) to 1.0 (maximum economic concentration and hence maximum economic interest in the affairs of \( j \)).

The second measure of perceived opportunities and risks aggregates the historical information about extensions of spheres of influence, personal ties, territorial interests, balance of influence, treaties, ideological investment, and infrastructure dependency. To compute a set of values here, we have summed the reported incidences of allegations regarding an extension of a sphere of influence, personal ties, territorial interests, treaties, ideological investment, and infrastructure dependency. As codes, each of these factors provides a possible incentive for intervening in \( j \)'s affairs. Because the balance of influence variable provides the only risk measure, we have summed the number of countervailing actors regarding \( j \) at time \( t \) and
then divided the sum of incentives by the sum of the countervailing actors. This measure, albeit crude, provides a relatively simple picture of the number of forces compelling some intervention tempered by the number of possible countervailing responses.

**Measurement Equation**

Consider the following operationalizations as discussed above:

- **EDM** = elite dissensus measured as the sum of government purges, coups, cabinet changes, executive changes, and government crises

- **SFM** = social fragmentation measured as the average of ethnic fragmentation, religious fragmentation, and language community fragmentation

- **ECOM** = cumulative reports of external covert operations

- **EPORM1** = economic interest concentration as a measure of perceived opportunities and risks

- **EPORM2** = perceived opportunities and risks measured by the cumulative sum of forces favoring intervention divided by the sum of countervailing interests
The measurement equation for the probability of intervention thus becomes:

\[
p(IN)_{jt} = b_{35} + b_{36}EDM_{jt} + b_{37}SFM_{jt} + b_{38}ECOM_{jt} + b_{39}EPROM1_{jt} + b_{40}EPROM2_{jt} + b_{41}(EDM \cdot EPORM1)_{jt} + b_{42}(EDM \cdot EPORM2)_{jt} + b_{43}(SFM \cdot EPORM1)_{jt} + b_{44}(SFM \cdot EPORM2)_{jt} + b_{45}(ECOM \cdot EPORM1)_{jt} + b_{46}(ECOM \cdot EPORM2)_{jt} + b_{47}(EDM \cdot SFM \cdot EPORM1)_{jt} + b_{48}(EDM \cdot SFM \cdot EPORM2)_{jt} + b_{49}(EDM \cdot ECOM \cdot EPORM1)_{jt} + b_{50}(EDM \cdot ECOM \cdot EPORM2)_{jt} + b_{51}(SFM \cdot ECOM \cdot EPORM1)_{jt} + b_{52}(SFM \cdot ECOM \cdot EPORM2)_{jt} + b_{53}(EDM \cdot SFM \cdot ECOM \cdot EPORM1)_{jt} + b_{54}(EDM \cdot SFM \cdot ECOM \cdot EPORM2)_{jt}
\]

Note that equations 1.03, 1.04, and 1.05 require time series data for full specification. Such time series information generally is unavailable or unreliable. We therefore have stated the measurement model in cross-sectional form only.
C. Results: Probability of Intervention

To provide a preliminary test of the structural and measurement models discussed above, we examined 47 cases of peacekeeping intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 1982. To provide a statistical control, we selected fifty country-years (that is, country \( =j= \) in year \( =t= \)) from the Sub-African countries that had no peacekeeping intervention in the years noted. This file of 97 cases thus serves as the empirical basis for testing our ability to predict the probability of intervention, given the variables cited in equation 1.07.

Because our primary goal was the correct prediction of peacekeeping interventions, we utilized a multivariate statistical procedure known as discriminant analysis. This tool uses a maximum likelihood estimator to predict the probabilities of group membership (in this case, whether or not the country had a peacekeeping intervention in the year under examination), based on the discriminating ability of the independent variables (in our case, elite dissensus, social fragmentation, external covert operations, and perceived opportunities and risks associated with a country \( =j= \)).

Of the five zero-order (non-interaction) variables entered into the discriminant function equation, only three proved effective in distinguishing the countries undergoing a peacekeeping operation from those that did not: elite dissensus, social
fragmentation, and the measure of perceived opportunities and risks that weighted forces toward intervention by the balance of influence surrounding country \( j \) at time \( t \). All higher-order interaction terms involving these components also were permitted to enter the discriminant equation, but none proved effective once the original three components had been used to distinguish the intervention from non-intervention cases.

The discriminant analysis provides a classification function that can be used to calculate the probability of intervention and the probability of non-intervention for each of the 97 country-years in the data file. If we assign each case (i.e. country \( j \) in year \( t \)) to the group (i.e. undergo a peacekeeping intervention or not undergo a peacekeeping intervention) with the highest probability, based on the level of elite dissensus, social fragmentation, and perceptions of opportunities and risks, we can correctly classify 71 of the 97 cases, or 73 percent. Further refinement of the measurement indicators likely would improve this predictive power.

Neither covert operations nor economic interest contributed any significant independent ability to discriminate among those countries undergoing a peacekeeping intervention and those not reporting a peacekeeping operation. In both instances measurement problems might help explain these shortcomings. The indicator of covert operations relied upon public pronouncements to that effect, and these are notoriously unreliable. That is, such reports are less likely to reflect the level of internal
turmoil than they are likely to reflect a country’s effort to mobilize additional support or aid from other “concerned” countries. In short, more concrete information on the extent of covert operations is necessary before this measure reliably might contribute to a discrimination of countries undergoing peacekeeping interventions and those not witnessing such intervention.

The measure of economic interest was, as noted earlier, less than ideal. A indicator that measures the dependency of country \( j \) on an external actor and vice versa would provide a more valid indicator of the concept implied by the structural equation. That is, a country largely dependent upon a good produced in country \( j \) would be more likely to consider peacekeeping operations, all other factors held constant, than would a country that was largely economically independent of country \( j \). The same logic applies when country \( j \) is the prime market for some key good produced by another country \( i \). Our measure was at best a poor approximation to this problem, but time and resource constraints made further refinement impossible.
II. The Extent of Intervention

A. Structural Model

We theorize that the extent of intervention by actor \( i \) in country \( j \) at time \( t \) is a function of the internal turmoil in country \( j \) and the intervenor's assessment of opportunities and risks weighted by the intervenor's \( i \) military deployment power. That is, perceptions of opportunities and risks will be weighted by the intervenor's wherewithall to engage in a peacekeeping operation. The general structural equation is:

\[
E(IN)_{ijt} = g(IT_{jt}; EPOR_{ijt}; DP_{it})
\]

Where:

\( E(IN)_{ijt} \) = extent of intervention by actor \( i \) in country \( j \) during time \( t \)

\( IT_{jt} \) = internal turmoil of \( j \) at time \( t \)

\( EPOR_{ijt} \) = \( i \)'s perceived opportunities and risks regarding intervention in \( j \) at time \( t \)

\( DP_{it} \) = \( i \)'s deployment potential at time \( t \)
We next specify this function in linear form, with interaction, and sum across all actors \(i\) to get an overall measure of the extent of intervention predicted in \(j\) at time \(t\). Equation 2.0 thus becomes:

\[
E(IN)_{jt} = b_{55} + b_{56}T_{jt} + b_{57} \sum (SPOR_{jt}DP_{jt})
\]

The only variable in equation 2.01 that has not previously appeared is deployment potential (DP). To define this variable, we take into account three factors: the lethality of weapons available to actor \(i\), the size of \(i\)'s armed forces, and \(i\)'s GNP. The first two factors give some indicators of military capability, and the third factor provides some clue regarding \(i\)'s ability to sustain its intervention. Thus:

\[
DP_{it} = b_{58} + b_{59}(AF\cdot LI)_{it} + b_{60}GNP_{it}
\]

Interpretation of 2.02: The deployment potential of actor \(i\) at time \(t\) is defined in terms of the size of its military times the lethality of its weapons and in terms of \(i\)'s gross national product.
D. Measurement Model

Deployment Potential

Three pieces of information are vital to our measure of deployment potential: the size of the armed forces in a country, the sophistication of weaponry available, and the country's gross national product. The GNP figures were gathered from a variety of sources, including the United Nations Statistical Yearbook and other similar sources. These were standardized to reflect a common currency base and common year base. Information on armed forces and weaponry were gathered from several additional sources, including T. Ivor Dupuy, Grace Hayes, and John A.C. Andrews, The Almanac of World Military Power.

Judgments regarding the sophistication of weapons created an entirely different problem. We eventually decided to use as our measure of sophistication the lethality index reported by J. P. Perry Robinson in "Neutron Bomb and Conventional Weapons of Mass Destruction," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (1978). From the weapons listed there we calculated the general range of destructive potential for the weaponry used by the army, navy, and air force (or equivalent services) for all countries in the world that appeared in our historical codings for the Sub-Saharan African countries.
We calculated the range of weapons potentials for each service in each country because a systematic effort to tabulate the all weapons and their destructive potential was beyond our resources. Instead, we calculated the geometric mean (balance point on a polynomial curve) between the lowest and highest levels of lethality for each of the services. This lethality index, in turn, was weighted by the number of personnel in each of the services and summed across the services. To put this measure into a form consistent with our theoretical expectations, we then took the log of this measure and to it we added the log of the GNP.

Although the measurement might appear complex, it has a relatively simple intuitive meaning. At low levels of weapons sophistication and at low levels of GNP, a country would have a very modest deployment potential. At high levels of weapons sophistication and GNP, a country would have considerable deployment potential. Between these endpoints, a gain in GNP or weapons sophistication would increase the deployment potential of a country, but the rate of increase would be greatest at the lower end of the scale and level-off considerably at the upper end of the scale. In short, countries with extremely large GNPs and enormous weapons sophistication (e.g. the superpowers) would have less of their resources translated into deployment potential, while countries closer to the low end of the continuum would have proportionately more of their resources translated.
into deployment potential. This pattern accords well with the observable balances between force and diplomacy in conflict resolution.

**Measurement Equation**

Consider the following operationalizations as discussed above:

\[ \text{EDM} = \text{elite dissensus measured as the sum of government purges, coups, cabinet changes, executive changes, and government crises. This variable serves as one component of internal turmoil.} \]

\[ \text{SFM} = \text{social fragmentation measured as the average of ethnic fragmentation, religious fragmentation, and language community fragmentation. This variable is another component of internal turmoil.} \]

\[ \text{EPORM} = \text{perceived opportunities and risks measured by the cumulative sum of forces favoring intervention divided by the sum of the countervailing interests. (Subsequent to the analysis reported in Part I, this is the only measure of perceived opportunities and risks that we shall use here.)} \]
DP = deployment potential, measured as the log of the product of the size of a country's armed services times the lethality of its weaponry plus the log of that country's GNP.

The fully specified measurement equation for the extent of intervention thus becomes:

\[
2.03 \ E(IN)_{jt} = b_{61} + b_{62}EDM_{jt} + b_{63}SF_{jt} + b_{64}(F \ EFORM \cdot F \ DP)_{jt} + b_{65}(EDM_{jt} \cdot (F \ EFORM \cdot F \ DP)_{jt}) + b_{66}(SF_{jt} \cdot (F \ EFORM \cdot F \ DP)_{jt}) + b_{67}(EDM_{jt} \cdot SF_{jt} \cdot (F \ EFORM \cdot F \ DP)_{jt})
\]
C. Results: Extent of Intervention

Given their lackluster performance in discriminating between countries experiencing peacekeeping interventions and those without recorded intervention, the measures of covert operations and economic interests have been dropped from analysis, as suggested in equation 2.03. We do, of course, have other measures of internal turmoil and perceived opportunities and risks still in that equation.

To test equation 2.03, we needed some measure of the extent of intervention or E(IN). The simplest measure used was the geometric mean of the relative number of troops committed to a peacekeeping operation and the length of that commitment. With three independent variables (elite dissensus, social fragmentation, and deployment potential weighted by perceived opportunities and risks), a multivariate least-squares solution produced a multiple R just under .5 for the 47 cases of peacekeeping intervention examined. No interaction terms proved significant.

A first-cut regression of this strength and significance is quite unusual, and refinement of the dependent variable and inclusion of more adequate measures of covert operation and economic interests should increase the prediction (now at 25 percent) considerably. In these first empirical tests, the elite dissensus variable proved most important, followed by social
fragmentation and the weighted measure of deployment potential. Note that the relative order of these variables likely will change with more refined measurement.

The results reported for probability and extent of intervention strongly suggest that peacekeeping intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa indeed can be modelled. Further, the results suggest that our theoretical orientation has identified variables that are relevant to explanations and predictions of the probability and extent of such interventions. Although the analyses reported here are preliminary and in some respects crude, we believe the findings and their theoretical underpinnings may provide one foundation for the systematic study of peacekeeping operations.
III. The Probability of Success in Peacekeeping Operations

A. Structural Model

The final portion of our structural model relates the probability of successful peacekeeping intervention to the level of coordinated behavior in country $=j=$, the degree of its internal turmoil, and the extent of the peacekeeping intervention. Thus:

\[ CB = \text{level of coordinated behavior in country } =j= \text{ at time } =t= \]

\[ IT = \text{degree of internal turmoil in country } =j= \text{ at time } =t= \]

\[ EX(IN) = \text{extent of the peacekeeping operation in country } =j= \text{ at time } =t= \]

And:

\[ p(S)_{ijt} = h(CB_{jt}; IT_{jt}; EX(IN)_{jt}) \]
Of the terms in equation 3.0, only \( C_u \) (the level of coordinated behavior) is new to the analysis. By coordinated behavior we mean the extent to which the basic functions of society are integrated and mutually reinforcing. Although abstract, the concept is similar to that used by Emile Durkheim in his discussion of social solidarity.

The concept of coordinated behavior plays a vital role in our conceptualization of the probability of success of peacekeeping operations. Although the extent of intervention and the degree of internal turmoil are important, these are measured against a backdrop of social order in country \( = j \). If the social fabric is thin, a number of centrifugal forces likely are at work that fuel the internal turmoil and make peacekeeping efforts less promising. If the social fabric is richly woven, socially centripetal forces silently contribute to the peacekeeping operation, making success more likely.

To express 3.0 in a linear form similar to 1.01 and 2.01, we specify the following:

\[
3.01 \quad p(S)_{jt} = b_{68} + b_{69}C_{jt} + b_{70}I_{jt} + b_{71}E(X(IN))_{jt}
\]
It remains to specify a formal definition for coordinated behavior (CB). Because our conception of coordinated behavior takes the level of social entropy as its opposite, we define:

\[ CB_{jt} = b_{72} - b_{73}SE_{jt} \]

Where:

\[ SE = \text{social entropy or the variability in the rate of change in society at time } t \]

Interpretation of 3.02: The level of coordinated behavior in society at time \( t \) is negatively defined in terms of the variation in \( t \)'s rate of social change. Note that it is not the rate of change that is important but the variability in the rate of change.

B. Measurement Model

Coordinated Behavior

Because we have defined the level of coordinated behavior in terms of the variability in the rate of social change, the measurement of this concept avoids some of the problems Durkheim encountered when he attempted to measure social solidarity. His earlier efforts to social solidarity directly through an analysis of types of law gave way to a negative measure of solidarity in
terms of suicides. Our procedure is similar, although we use so-called "negative indicators" other than suicide rates.

To calculate our measure of variability in the rates of social change, we first compute the yearly rates of change for GNP per capita, population, exports per capita, imports per capita, literacy, and urbanization. When possible, these rates are calculated for a five-year interval surrounding each intervention year for country \( j \). Overall, this procedure yields ten rate-of-change figures for each variable, and from these the variance is calculated. This becomes the measure of variability in the rate of change.

Factors such as the rate of change in GNP per capita, rate of change in exports and imports per capita, and rates of change in literacy and urbanization all index vital signs of a country's economic health and rate of social mobilization. When these rates are highly variable, the country is moving in what might best be considered "fits-and-starts". Note also that negative rates of change are possible.

The remaining terms in equation 3.01 previously have been discussed and we make no further elaboration here, save to note that further refinement is needed for our measure of extent of intervention. Similarly, the covert operations component of internal turmoil requires information unavailable to us at the present time.
Consider the following operationalizations as discussed above:

**EDM** = elite dissensus, measured as the sum of
government purges, coups, cabinet changes,
executive changes, and government crises. This
is one component of internal turmoil.

**SFM** = social fragmentation, measured as the average of
ethnic fragmentation, religious fragmentation,
and language community fragmentation. This is
another component of internal turmoil.

**EX(IN)M** = extent of intervention, measured here as the
geometric mean of number of troops committed
and their duration of stay.

**CBM** = level of coordinated behavior, measured negatively
in terms of the average variability in the rates
of change of key social and economic indicators,
such as per capita GNP, exports, and imports,
literacy and urban percentages, and size of
population.
The fully specified measurement equation, with relevant interaction terms, is:

\[ P(S)_{jt} = b_{74} + b_{75}ED_{Mjt} + b_{76}SF_{Mjt} + b_{77}EX(IN)_{Mjt} + b_{78}CB_{Mjt} + b_{79}(EDM\cdot CM)_{jt} + b_{80}(SFm\cdot CB)_{jt} + b_{81}(EX(IN)M\cdot CBM)_{jt} + b_{82}(EDM\cdot SFm\cdot CBM)_{jt} + b_{83}(EDM\cdot EX(IN)M\cdot CBM)_{jt} + b_{84}(SFm\cdot EX(IN)M\cdot CBM)_{jt} + b_{85}(EDM\cdot SFm\cdot EX(IN)M\cdot CBM)_{jt} \]
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