THE SOVIET SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM NUCLEAR TO CONVENTIONAL

The Mid-term Perspective

James M. McConnell
Work conducted under contract N00014-76-C-0001

This Research Contribution does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.
THE SOVIET SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM NUCLEAR TO CONVENTIONAL

The Mid-term Perspective

James M. McConnell
ABSTRACT

These two volumes detail the shift over time in the Soviet selection of military options. Volume I deals with changes in their long-term perspective on military development. Having achieved a nuclear counter to the U.S. strategy of massive retaliation in the early sixties, Moscow at first favored a long-term conventional emphasis as a follow-on, but abandoned this in 1965 in favor of nuclear options. However, in 1976-77, the Kremlin returned to a primary conventional orientation, rounded out recently with a declared policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. All these shifts seem to have been reflected in changes in Soviet deterrence criteria and, considering their character and timing, may perhaps best explained as asymmetrical reactions to concurrent U.S. plans.

Volume II deals with the implementation of the long-term perspective in mid-term doctrinal increments that coincide with the five-year plans. In each of the doctrinal periods since 1960, the Soviets have managed to introduce a new independent option: all-out nuclear war (1960-65), a conventional local war in the Third World (1966-70), limited intercontinental nuclear warfare (1971-75), theater nuclear war (1976-80), and protracted conventional war between the two coalitions (1981-85).
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The All-Out Nuclear Option (1960-65)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Local-War Doctrine (1966-70)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercontinental Counterforce (1971-75)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Nuclear Option (1976-80)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Shift to Conventional (1981)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Discussions of Their Own Doctrine</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Views Attributed to the U.S.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Status of Nuclear Options</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

There are two classes of Soviet statements of special interest to military analysis: one dealing with their long-range views on the development of options; and the other cued by military doctrine, which has a mid-range time-horizon. This volume is exclusively concerned with the latter.

The Soviets tell us their doctrine applies only to "the present and near future," a code expression for the period five years ahead. We understand the reason for the five-year restriction when we look at the timing of doctrinal innovations. These tend to cluster at the beginning of five-year economic plans. The "state military-policy leadership" embodied in the USSR Defense Council, which is evidently the source of doctrine, will know the schedule for hardware introductions over the next five years and can assign missions and training objectives accordingly.

Although Moscow could obviously not sustain such a record forever, the evidence indicates that, since 1960, it has managed to introduce a new military option in each of five successive planning periods. In the first half of the '60s, the Kremlin evidently felt it had only one viable option—all-out nuclear war. At the turn of 1965-66, a conventional local-war doctrine was introduced, as underpinning for a Third-World diplomacy of force. At the turn of 1970-71, evidence began to accumulate of a limited intercontinental nuclear option, involving initial counterforce strikes and countervalue withholding for intrawar deterrence. At the turn of 1975-76, statements obliquely pointed to a theater counterforce option, which eventually existed in two versions.

In the current planning period, while renouncing its theater nuclear option, Moscow has apparently settled on conventional warfare as the basic option in a coalition conflict. This is a full-blooded conventional option and not simply the previously embraced strategy of a conventional phase to a "war-by-stages" that would inevitably escalate. Our conclusion on this head is compatible with the USSR's adoption of a no-first-use formula for nuclear weapons, with recent changes in ground-force operational concepts, with what little we know of Soviet training and, above all, with Soviet statements in the open literature, esoterically expressed in highly complicated formulae comprehensible only to elites.

Before discussing the doctrinal evolution in more detail, it would be wise to dwell a moment on these Soviet communication techniques. The Russians express themselves in print like no other people; and without experience with their modes of discussion a Western reader will simply flounder. Moscow has rarely stated directly that it had any of the limited options introduced since the mid-'60s. Moscow implies; the reader himself has to infer. There are certain typical ways of implying
the option: by new estimates reducing the certainty of the option’s escalation; by reranking the basic methods, types, and forms of military action that are logically but not explicitly associated with particular options; by changing the formulae on factors influencing the war’s “course and outcome”; by subtly altering various principles of the military art; by specifying different forces that should be in the highest state of combat alert; and so forth.

We should also reemphasize the methodological aspect discussed and illustrated at length in volume I—the Soviet penchant for using historical and current foreign models as surrogates for their own views and intentions. Perhaps the classic example is from the early stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict, when Moscow used Tirana and Beijing used Belgrade as substitutes for their real targets. However, there is still a lack of appreciation in the West of the extensive employment of this communication technique. In the case of military options, the practice is deeply grounded in ideology and almost surely did not start out as a method for oblique discourse. According to Marxism-Leninism, imperialism is the only source of war and the arms race; the USSR never originates a threat. But there is a corollary: Moscow must respond to any threat. There is even a quote from Lenin that it would be “foolish and even criminal” not to acquire all the means for waging war possessed by the imperialists. This has very relevant consequences. If the Soviets have developed an option for which there is no NATO counterpart, Moscow must nevertheless attribute the option to NATO, because Marxist-Leninists never initiate, they only react. On the other hand, should the West take up an option not in the Soviet inventory, Moscow must deny NATO has the option, because it would be “foolish and even criminal,” and an intolerable confession of weakness, not to have responded symmetrically to an imperialist challenge.

The Soviets have been remarkably consistent in this; it is a pattern of behavior extending as far back as my historical memory. Garthoff reports that, for the entire period 1947-53, when the U.S. had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, there was not a single Soviet article in the periodical press on nuclear weapons. This code of silence was broken only by the Soviets acquiring their own nuclear arms, whereupon it was suddenly “discovered” that the U.S. had them, too, the American possession justifying the Russian.

Mirror-imaging is, of course, not unknown in the West. In the Soviet Union, however, the practice is neither unconscious nor tailored to the requirements of budgetary infighting; indeed, the mirror-imaging usually appears after the military-policy and doctrinal decisions have already been taken. Nor is the mirror-imaging at bottom designed for external consumption, to justify the Soviet posture to a foreign audience or to exploit divisions within NATO. As we shall see, the requirement to project intentions onto the West—and it is an obligatory requirement—has often meant foregoing a better line for exploiting NATO’s internal divisions. On other occasions, the attribution of
intentions to the West has been so subtle that it even escaped the attention of specialists. One can only conclude that the Russians engage in the practice for their own psychic health, to reinforce their own self-image. Once established as a practice, however, mirror-imaging could subsequently be exploited by Soviet spokesman for the purpose of elite communication. It is a profound methodological error to take declared Soviet perceptions of Western intentions as direct evidence, in however distorted a form, of real Soviet perceptions. Rather, we should use these alleged perceptions to gain insight into Russian intentions. Analysts who refuse to do so out of methodological scruple are renouncing an important source of intelligence.
THE ALL-OUT NUCLEAR OPTION (1960-65)

In 1960 Mr. Khrushchev himself announced the first full-fledged Soviet doctrine for the nuclear age. The fundamental premises were twofold: that any armed conflict in which the USSR participated would be a world war between the two coalitions; and that it would necessarily be all-out. The war could arise either as the result of a direct clash between the blocs at the start or through the expansion of a local conflict that infringed on bloc vital interests. In either case, escalation to the nuclear level was "inevitable" and would apparently take place immediately or almost immediately after the issue was joined.

Soviet spokesmen from Khrushchev on down were explicit: the ends and means of coalition war would be unlimited and the scope of combat action worldwide, with "simultaneous" counterforce and countervalue strikes by all three legs of the triad and the "maximum" use of nuclear warheads from the very beginning. Economy of force as a strategic principle was said to be outmoded.

It is obvious that, when the outcome of the war itself depends in many respects on the amount of effort and the effectiveness with which it is applied at the very beginning of the war, it is scarcely rational...to reserve most of one's forces for military action in subsequent periods of the war.... Consequently, general victory in war, too, is...the result of a one-time application of the state's entire strength, accumulated before the war.

To be sure, there were indications during the short period from late 1961 to late 1962 that Moscow did intend withholding some submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—those surplus to the missions of hitting naval bases, ports, shipbuilding and repair yards, etc.--from the initial strikes, ensuring their survivability with support from naval general-purpose forces. However, the project was soon abandoned and, through the device of historical surrogates, the "fleet-in-being method" and "doctrine of withholding forces" for war-termination and postwar bargaining purposes were roundly condemned.

Nuclear weapons, and their all-out use, also had a profound effect on what Soviet military art designates as the "types and forms" of strategic action. In the pre-nuclear era Soviet strategy basically recognized only two types of strategic action—the strategic offense and strategic defense in theaters of military action (TVDs). In World War II the form assumed by this action took shape as a "strategic (offensive
or defensive) operation by a group of fronts," under the direct leadership of the Supreme High Command. Nuclear warfare expanded the list of recognized types and forms. By far the "main" type was considered to be the combined counterforce-countervalue action of strategic nuclear forces against targets throughout enemy territory, which would only take the form of "strikes" directed by the Supreme High Command. The other three types were simply ranked as "important": offensive action by various branches of the armed forces in a TVD, assuming the form of a "strategic offensive operation" under the Supreme High Command (defensive action on a strategic scale in a TVD was no longer recognized); action by National Air Defense Troops for protecting the country's rear, taking the form, not of a strategic operation, but of an "air-defense operation," since control was in the hands of an operational leadership in an air-defense district rather than the strategic leadership; and independent naval action in sea and ocean TVDs taking the form of "naval operations" under the control of naval operational formations (fleets, flotillas).

It is vitally important for later analysis to appreciate that the mixed counterforce-countervalue action of strategic-missile operational formations, including those made up of ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), only took the form of "strikes"; their action, unlike that of operational formations from all other branches of the armed forces, was deemed inherently incapable of taking the form of an "operation." Uniform usage shows that the combined action of these formations did not take the form of a "strategic operation" either; the only type of action at this time taking the form of a strategic operation was that in the TVDs. True, action by medium-range strategic nuclear forces, while itself taking only the form of a "strike", was considered the main component of a theater strategic operation; but this was not the case for action beyond the limits of the theaters. Here the highest and only form was the "strike."

Moscow evidently reasoned that the results from all-out strikes were incommensurate with the results of TVD strategic operations, making a common characterization impossible. The magnitude of these results also undermined one of the fundamental Soviet war-waging principles—the principle of "partial victory." According to this principle, still adhered to as late as 1960, the piling up of tactical and operational successes would lead to the achievement of "partial" or "particular" (chastnye) strategic objectives (the objectives of strategic operations and campaigns in the theaters), the cumulative impact of which would in turn lead to the attainment of the war's "general" objectives. However, the strikes of strategic nuclear forces were themselves deemed to be of a "general" character, which could immediately and directly achieve the war's basic objectives at the very beginning, even predetermining the subsequent attainment of particular successes in the theaters.
Today partial victory—that foundation of foundations of general victory in all previous wars, including World War II—is assigned the role more of a principle of postwar operations for clearing territory of remnants of an opponent's forces than of military operations which themselves decide the war's outcome.22

As in the case of the types and forms of strategic action, a change in the 1970s in the Soviet position on the proper route to general victory would be a powerful indicator of new Soviet options.

In the USSR's view, the war could begin with a surprise attack, without a clear "period of threat" preceding it.23 From the mid-'50s into the early '60s Soviet doctrine had provided for a preemptive strike when an imperialist attack was believed imminent on the basis of strategic-warning indicators.24 However, in 1963 the emphasis in the literature shifted to a launch-under-attack strategy based on tactical warning.25 Soviet discussions of the combat objective of strategic strikes by both powers were compatible with the assessment that either side would be able to get its retaliatory strike under way before the opponent's missiles landed. The counterforce objective for the USSR as well as the U.S. was that of "degrading" an opponent's strike, a code expression evidently implying 10-15 percent attrition.26 The consequence appeared to be a Kremlin belief that surprise, if guarded against, would not prove decisive for either side in determining the war's course and outcome.27

If surprise would not be decisive, what would? The formula dealing with determinants of the "course and outcome of war" is one of the oldest and most important in Soviet literature. At least for the first postwar decade Moscow's declaratory policy discounted the impact of nuclear weapons; only the so-called "permanently operating factors" could decide the war's course and outcome.28 By 1961 radical inroads had been made on this formula. It was now argued that the first mass strategic strike in itself could exert a "substantial" (but not yet decisive) influence on the course and outcome of the entire war. At the same time this strike would pave the way for achieving the war's "immediate" strategic objectives, which I infer to be the objectives of the first strategic operations in the TVDs.29 Attainment of these immediate objectives would mark the end of the war's "initial period,"30 the results of which could prove "decisive" for the war's course and outcome.31

The all-out character of the projected war also changed Soviet views on its probable duration. In the 1950s, when nuclear stockpiles were low, Moscow still firmly posited a long war.32 By 1962, however, it was felt a coalition conflict would "most likely" be short (skorotechnaya)33 or lightning-like (molniensnaya),34 apparently defined as a war lasting no longer than a single campaign,35 measured
in days and weeks rather than the months of World War II. In the most favorable circumstances, the war might even end with the initial period. In the most unfavorable circumstances, a possibility that could not be excluded, the conflict would turn into a long (длительная) or protracted (затяжная) war, defined as lasting more than one campaign. Since the brevity of the war was attributed to its all-out character, there would be grounds for suspicion of Soviet limited options when, in the '70s, evidence appeared of a change in their views on the war's probable duration.

The strategy attributed to the West was a mirror-image of that held in Moscow. As one writer put it, there had taken place "a certain convergence of view on the part of both the potential opponents on the war's nature". As a result, "there is no serious difference in outlook between Soviet military doctrine and the military doctrine of NATO." Indeed, it was precisely because of these Western intentions that Moscow was allegedly compelled to a response in kind. The mirror-imaging was precise in all the major details: the "maximum" use of warheads in the initial strikes, simultaneous counterforce-countervalue action by all three legs of the triad, and a NATO belief in the "decisiveness" of the "initial" period, in the likelihood of a "short" war without ruling out the possibility of its becoming protracted, and in the probable shortness of the war being due to the early countervalue action. The usual Soviet tactic was simply to attribute these views to the West. On the few occasions when notice was taken of contrary Western declarations, these were dismissed as "dezinformatsiya", camouflage for the real NATO intention of all-out war.

This line, we might note, made it impossible for the USSR to exploit emerging divisions within NATO, precipitated by the decoupling implications of Mr. McNamara's shift away from the Dulles strategy of massive retaliation toward flexible response. By denying that any such shift had taken place, Moscow had to sit the whole NATO crisis out on the sidelines, helpless to intervene. Clearly, if the Soviet approach is propagandistic, it is a propaganda not undertaken for the usual motives assigned to the Kremlin; it is a mirror-imaging propaganda, designed to justify Soviet options. As we shall see later, however, the mirror-imaging does not at bottom aim at justifying Soviet options to a foreign audience; often it is so subtle that only a reader thoroughly alert to the technique will pick it up.

In the light of later Soviet military development, it is easy to see what might have been suspected from Soviet statements of the time--that the single-option strategy of the first half of the '60s was due to technological and resource constraints, not policy preference. The costs of unlimited warfare are too high to make it an all-purpose tool in power politics. Without a conventional local-war doctrine, Moscow could not credibly practice coercive diplomacy in the Third World--and
did not do so. Military action on behalf of a client state or even a "socialist" country was in no way automatic; intervention was treated merely as a possibility, not a certainty. Only in the case of a "conflict infringing on the vital interests of the USSR and the entire socialist camp" was escalation to world nuclear war deemed "inevitable." Up to the mid-'60s it was doggedly reiterated: any war in which the USSR participated would be nothing less than a "life and death struggle" between the two social systems. Because Moscow had no limited means, it could also have no limited ends.

SOVIET LOCAL-WAR DOCTRINE (1966-70)

With respect to coalition warfare, the roughly four-fold expansion in Soviet strategic capabilities over the five-year plan 1966-70 simply accentuated the doctrinal trends of the decade's first half. There were two innovations. Alongside a nuclear surprise-attack scenario, provision was made for the first time for a coalition war initiated and waged for a very short time on a conventional and then a tactical-nuclear basis, but relatively rapid escalation to the strategic level was still "inevitable." A second innovation was in the Soviet formula on the course and outcome of war. Previous doctrine had held that the first strategic strikes would have a "substantial" (but not decisive) influence on the war's course and outcome; that these strikes would make a mighty contribution to the attainment of the objectives of the war's "initial period"; and that the results of the initial period would in turn "decisively" influence the war's entire course and outcome. The doctrine of 1966-70, however, redefined the initial period to include only the first massive strategic strike and then claimed that this strike could prove to have a "decisive" (rather than merely a substantial) influence on the war's course and outcome.

Otherwise, Soviet doctrine—and the doctrine attributed to NATO—remained virtually the same. If NATO did essay a first strike, the USSR would launch under attack, the realistic combat objective on both sides continuing to be one of "degrading" the opponent's strategic capabilities, i.e., apparently causing 10-15 percent attrition. The political objectives of both coalitions would be unlimited, the scope of combat action worldwide, and the action all-out, again with the "maximum use" of nuclear warheads early on and "simultaneous" counterforce and countervalue strikes by all three elements of the strategic triad. The "main" type of strategic action continued to be the all-out action of strategic nuclear forces targeted throughout enemy territory, which still took the form only of a "strike," not the form of an "operation" or a "strategic operation." The concepts of "partial victory" and of achieving the war's "general" objectives through "particular" successes were still on the back burner, yielding pride of place to the notion of accomplishing the war's "main" or "basic" objectives via the direct route of strategic "strikes." The war would most likely be "short" (no longer than a single campaign), though the possibility of its becoming "protracted" (more than one campaign) was
still not ruled out. And once again, the war's probable brevity was attributed to the initial massive countervalue strikes.64

The fundamental innovation of this five-year plan was not in coalition warfare but in local-war doctrine. All along during the first half of the '60s Moscow had acknowledged that local wars initiated by imperialists were a feature of the era and would continue to appear in the future. Such wars, it was said, "could" escalate to world nuclear war between the blocs and were "fraught with the danger" of escalation, thereby implying that there was no certainty of this. Escalation, however, was inevitable if both superpowers became involved in the conflict.66

There can be no doubt that Soviet military writers take seriously the distinction between the mere "possibility" of escalation and its "inevitability," just as they took seriously the shift in the '50s from Stalin's formula on the inevitability of war to Khrushchev's position on the possibility (non-inevitability) of war.67 As some of the authors of the 1962 work Military Strategy put it, in taking to task a Western analyst who had allegedly overlooked the distinction in discussing their book:

In the first place, it is not stated in the book that any local war will inevitably escalate to world war. This would be an absurd conclusion....

It is stated in the book that any local war might escalate to world war.... But "might" escalate does not mean that it will inevitably escalate! Obviously, the words "inevitably" and "might" have a different meaning.

In the second place,...it is emphasized in the book that not just any war will escalate to nuclear war, but only those in which the nuclear powers become involved.68

The catch here was in the conditions for Soviet involvement. As we have already noted, Moscow would only participate in a local conflict if "vital interests" were at stake, which are surely rare in the Third World. Given this position, as well as the position on Soviet participation automatically entailing escalation to general nuclear war, it would appear that Moscow had no local-war doctrine for the limited use of force in the forward area. This was subsequently admitted by Soviet spokesmen,69 but even at the time they never claimed a policy of providing conventional military support by the Soviet armed forces to Third World regimes; the USSR's "international duty," they indicated, could be satisfied simply by providing political, economic and arms aid.70 Throughout this period all foreign-policy successes in the Third World, insofar as they involved threats of force, were attributed to the
USSR's "nuclear-missile might" and to "means for the military defense of the USSR," never to conventionally armed forces for use in the forward area.  

All this was to change at the turn of 1965-66, precisely when we have come to expect major doctrinal changes—at the beginning of a new five-year plan. Whereas previously it had been maintained that escalation of a local conflict was "inevitable" if both superpowers became involved, now it was argued that the likelihood of escalation was simply "quite high" with such involvement. Should the nuclear powers participate, escalation will be "more likely"; there is a danger of the conflict "possibly escalating"; it "threatens to escalate"; indeed, the threat of escalation is "especially intensified," but it "is not inevitable." Escalation only tended to be inevitable "in certain circumstances"—when superpower "vital interests" were infringed upon.

At the same time the Soviet political leadership added another type of support which could be given to Third World countries—"military support"—and there can be little doubt that this applied to something other than arms aid. Whereas in the first half of the '60s, the Soviets tended to talk of their use of conventional weapons only in combination with nuclear weapons, beginning in 1966 they spoke of the independent use of conventional weapons as well—and not just in the conventional phase of a war between the blocs but in the context of a whole war. On occasion the reference was specifically to a local conventional war sanctioned by Soviet military doctrine. Another impressive indicator was the enlargement of the "international mission" of the Soviet armed forces to include action on behalf of non-bloc countries; and instead of emphasizing the historical success of strategic nuclear forces in Third World crisis management, the accent beginning in 1966 was put on conventional forces. Bloc armed forces, it was now said, have "to be in readiness for repelling the aggression of imperialist states, not only in a nuclear-missile war, but also in local wars with the use of conventional means of combat." As usual, the same readiness for involvement was attributed to the West. It was alleged that in 1965 a new five-year plan for the years 1966-70 had been worked out in the U.S., aimed at "developing and training the armed forces to wage both general nuclear-missile war and limited (local) wars...."

These novel references to local war have been widely interpreted in the West to mean that Soviet doctrine now sanctioned conventional warfare between the two coalitions localized in Europe. It is true that Soviet doctrine was modified at precisely that time to include an initial conventional phase to a war between the blocs but Soviet writers were specific that the conventional action in this case could not last long and would inevitably escalate. Western analysts have simply not paid careful attention to Soviet definitions of local war, which have been consistent over the years and can in no way be made compatible with inter-bloc warfare. By definition, local wars have limited objectives.
and employ limited means but in the Soviet view the decisive political objectives of coalition war would necessarily precipitate the use of strategic nuclear weapons. By definition, too, a war can be termed local only if it involves "two or a few states" engaged in combat action on a "limited expanse of territory"; should the fighting encompass an entire "theater of war" or even a lesser "theater of military action," it is no longer local. A war between the two coalitions, on the other hand, in terms of the number of states participating, was said to be a "world" war and, in terms of the scope of combat action, "intercontinental."

Shortly before the promulgation of the new local-war doctrine, Moscow pulled off a diplomatic stroke that satisfied one precondition for airborne power projection on behalf of clients: in 1965 the Yogoslavs passed a law permitting Soviet military overflights. And along with the local-war doctrine went an expansion of the Navy's task of "protecting state interests" abroad to include securing Moscow's political, economic and military investments in Third-World client states. Thus were the material, doctrinal and diplomatic prerequisites for a diplomacy of force met—the elevation of the USSR to nuclear superpower status, which, they explain, gives one a "free hand" to participate in local wars, the development of the Third-World infrastructure (ports, airfields, etc.) for a politico-military role in the forward area, the Soviet Navy's acquisition of anti-carrier capabilities and the Soviet Air Force's attainment of a critical long-range airlift inventory, the gaining of an air corridor to the forward area through Yugoslavia, the establishment of a naval presence in the Mediterranean, the additions to the Soviet armed forces' "international duty" and the "state interests" requiring their protection, and the promulgation of a local-war doctrine. No sooner were these prerequisites satisfied than the Soviets went out to practice coercive diplomacy on the first occasion they had to practice it after the 1965 decision (the June War of 1967), and since that time, year after year, Moscow has given repeat performances. Moreover, the actual deployment of Soviet armed forces into Third-World combat zones on several occasions has credibly demonstrated Moscow's willingness, in certain circumstances, to use force prudently in the manner prescribed in doctrine.

It is hard to overestimate the value of our experience with the Soviet local-war doctrine in confirming the basic intelligibility of oblique Soviet statements and their reliability as indicators of Soviet intentions and actions. Moscow does say what it intends, and it means what it says.

INTERCONTINENTAL COUNTERFORCE (1971-75)

In the course of the five-year planning period 1971-75 the Soviet Union made two fundamental hardware innovations. One was the installation of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on a
new generation of land-based ICBMs, which radically increased the ratio of warheads to targets. The other was the Delta-class SSBN equipped with the SS-N-8 missile, whose range permitted launches against the U.S. from the relative security of home waters. The combination of these two innovations permitted Moscow to strike initially against military targets, while withholding a countervalue sea-based reserve for intrawar deterrence of U.S. attacks on Soviet cities.

In line with Soviet practice, this new option was obliquely anticipated in Soviet statements from the very start of the planning period. At the turn of 1970-71, three years before Mr. Schlesinger spoke out on the subject, the U.S. was already being charged with counterforce intentions, with the implication that the Soviet response would be in kind, avoiding escalation. In the '60s a coalition war had been depicted as inevitably nuclear, inevitably world-wide and inevitably all-out; now it was portrayed as inevitably nuclear and inevitably world-wide, but not necessarily all-out. It "might" escalate to that level; it "could easily escalate"; there was a "danger," a "real threat" of escalation; it would even "most likely escalate." But there was no certainty of this; as one Soviet put it, "all the available nuclear weapons might not be used in the war." 

At the same time Soviet spokesmen began to waffle the question of the simultaneity of counterforce and countervalue strikes. In 1971 Minister of Defense Grechko even changed the criteria for combat readiness to cover a readiness to hit only military targets. And whereas in the '60s all three legs of the Soviet triad were depicted as intended to launch on the basis of a single integrated plan, now only the Missile Troops and Long Range Aviation were listed on a common plan, with SSBNs treated separately. Curiously enough, however, the new option did not raise estimates of the targeting results that could be expected from strategic action. Although a couple of authors spoke of "substantially degrading" an opponent's strategic strikes through counterforce (i.e., 30 percent attrition), the vast majority continued to set "degrading" or "significantly degrading" as the objective of the initial strikes, both of which seem to imply the same thing—10-15 percent attrition. One would infer from this as well as numerous Soviet direct statements that both sides were still expected to launch under attack.

The new option was also reflected in revised estimates of wartime casualties. In the '60s, with few exceptions, the deaths from coalition warfare were projected as inevitably running into the "hundreds of millions." The few exceptions of the '60s—in my view, almost certainly accidents of formulation—became the rule of the '70s: casualties "could" amount to hundreds of millions. Indeed, the reader was often given a choice between the "hundreds of millions" of casualties to be expected from all-out war and the "tens of millions" specifically said to be expected from intercontinental counterforce action.
Since the short-war perspective of the '60s was predicated on the conflict being all-out from the start, it is not surprising that, from 1971 on, Soviet writers began to take issue with the previous assumption that the war would be short. The belligerents, it was explained, can use their nuclear weapons "at any moment," not just at the beginning; therefore, the war "can be prolonged an appreciable amount of time." Another indication of this was the rehabilitation of the strategic defensive operation in a TVD. In the '60s defense in the theater on a strategic scale was rejected; in the '70s it was once more legitimized.

The new counterforce option also required a new type and form of strategic action. To the four types recognized in the '60s—strikes by strategic nuclear forces, action in continental theaters and in sea and ocean theaters, and air-defense action—was now added a fifth type, designated by Chief of the General Staff Kulikov as "action for repelling an opponent's aerospace attack." Clearly this was counterforce action, with countervalue excluded. In discussions of the "strategic tasks" confronting the armed forces, "repelling an opponent's aerospace attack" now took the place of the traditional task of "eliminating an opponent's strategic means of nuclear attack"; and it was treated separately from the countervalue task of "demolishing highly important war-industry targets." The new type of strategic action did not take the form of a "strike," but rather the form of a "strategic operation," and the "strategic operation for repelling an opponent's aerospace attack" was now considered the "basic" form of combat action by intercontinental nuclear forces.

At the same time there was a change in the form taken by action of operational formations of medium-range strategic nuclear forces against targets in ground theaters (as opposed to targets in the intercontinental depth beyond the theaters). Previously this action, apparently because it had been directed against strategic (mainly countervalue) targets in the theaters, as well as operational-tactical (military) targets there, had taken the form only of "strikes," which in turn were considered part of a larger theater strategic operation. However, as early as 1973, in discussing the "operational art" (not strategy), a Soviet writer referred to "operations with the use of strategic nuclear-missile weapons" by the "Strategic Missile Troops," as well as "operations" by the Navy for hitting "targets on the continents." Although this source did not specify that the targets of these operations were in ground theaters, a subsequent entry in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia added a new type of naval operation—"operations for the destruction of important ground targets"—to the traditional list of naval operations in "ocean (sea) TVDs," which would include targets in adjacent ground theaters but apparently not targets at intercontinental range. Moreover, in discussing this naval task in the theaters, several writers inadvertently let slip the intelligence that it covers hitting "military targets" specifically and not "ground targets" in general.
The appearance of the strategic operation as a new form of action for intercontinental forces in turn had an impact on the Soviet conception of the proper route to "general victory." In the '60s, we will recall, the mixed counterforce-countervalue "strike" was said to achieve the war's "main" or "basic" objectives directly, while a strategic operation in the theaters only fulfilled "partial" strategic tasks, achieved "partial" strategic objectives, gained a "partial" victory. However, now that the basic form of action by strategic nuclear forces was no longer the strike but the strategic operation, one would expect the Soviets to revive the war-waging principle of "partial victory" as it had existed up to 1960. That is what happened. As Minister of Defense Grechko put it in 1974, "Achievement of the war's general strategic objective is ensured, as a rule, by the fulfillment of partial strategic tasks...."

At the same time, the concept of the war's "initial" period was redefined. Soviet doctrine of 1966-70 had understood the initial period as consisting exclusively of the mass nuclear strikes of the first few days of war, with Ground Troop action in the "subsequent" period. Now it was postulated, using NATO views as a surrogate, that the Ground Troops would conduct offensive and defensive operations in the initial as well as the subsequent period.

As a final indicator of the new option, we must turn to Soviet treatment of the factors determining the "course and outcome" of war. In the last half of the '60s Moscow had argued that the war's "initial period," and specifically the strikes by the Strategic Missile Troops in that period, could "decisively" influence both the course and the outcome of the war. The Navy on the other hand, even after acquiring the Yankee-class SSBN, could have a "great," "enormous," or "serious" influence—but not a "decisive" one—on the war's course and outcome, and it apparently would have this influence through its action in the theaters, not by hitting targets beyond the theaters.

But from the turn of 1970-71 an alternative formula was offered. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops, the Minister of Defense and others began to put it, the Strategic Missile Troops could decisively influence only the course of the war, not its outcome. Since the action of these troops now took an operational form, it was also said that the war's "first operations" could be decisive for its course, though, again, not its outcome. The Navy, on the other hand, after acquiring the Delta-class SSBN, whose countervalue action would still take the form of a strike, could decisively influence the war's outcome as well as its course.

Perhaps two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, if the Missile Troops no longer had a decisive influence on the war's outcome, then they must have lost some choice target array, since their missile inventory had not been reduced either in quantity or quality. And, indeed, from the turn of 1970-71 Soviet spokesmen began to indicate on
occasion that the target set for the Missile Troops included, in addition to the usual list of military facilities, "control points over administrative-economic activity" but not the administrative and economic centers themselves.\textsuperscript{104}

Second, if the Navy, on the other hand, can affect the war's outcome, its potential for this must not have been intended for use in the initial period, since the initial period was no longer decisive for the war's outcome. Moreover, the Navy must have acquired a new class of targets. As Soviet writers explained in the '70s, the Navy's newfound influence on the war's course and outcome was determined by its capacity to conduct SSBN "action against the shore," hitting economic targets "in the depth" (as opposed to military targets in the ground theaters). However, most intriguing was the revelation that the war's course and outcome could be affected without firing a shot, simply through intrawar deterrence.\textsuperscript{105} According to Colonel Shirman, for example, the bourgeois belief that the masses cannot affect the outcome of nuclear war is founded on the notion that there will be "no limitations at all on the use of the latest weapons." He has "serious objections" to this premise.

Nuclear weapons are an instrument of policy like all other means of armed combat.... The very nature of these weapons presupposes an especially strict control over their...use as instruments of policy. And a serious deterrent effect is exerted on the policy of the imperialist states by...the nuclear weapons in the possession of the USSR.

Consequently, the availability of technology making possible the extermination of hundreds of millions of people does not at all mean the inevitability of mankind's extinction in the event a nuclear war breaks out. The concept of nuclear fatalism, therefore, is faulty to the core, since it ignores a whole host of factors affecting the course and outcome of war....\textsuperscript{106}

The shift to intrawar deterrence perhaps accounted for the new stress on the unique survivability of the submarine "right up to the very last day of war," in contrast to the emphasis in the last half of the '60s on its survivability "at the beginning of the war."\textsuperscript{107} As Admiral Gorshkov blandly explained in 1973, the great survivability of modern-day SSBNs made them more valuable than land-based missiles in "deterrence"—not peacetime deterrence but deterrence specifically as a "role in modern war."\textsuperscript{108}

The withholding mission did have the drawback of protracted exposure of Soviet SSBNs to Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW), for which Moscow evidently has great respect. This almost certainly
accounts for another great theme of the '70s—the need for "command of the sea" in support of submarine operations. The previous line had been to deride command of the sea, defined precisely as in the '70s, i.e., successful combat against the enemy fleet, not as an end in itself as in the case of the anti-SSBN mission, but as a means to an end—support to forces carrying out basic tasks. Indeed, one of the objections brought in the '60s against any "doctrine of withholding forces" for the purpose of influencing "peace negotiations" was that these forces required the support of other assets drawn from axes "where there was greater need for them," thereby reducing "the impact of armed combat at sea on the course and outcome of the war as a whole." 

Moscow took a different line in the '70s: command of the sea by naval general-purpose forces was elevated to the rank of a "main" task along with SSBN "action against the shore," which it supported. As one writer explained in the Navy's monthly journal in 1972, "Specialists of many countries feel that strategic naval forces, by having a narrowly specialized mission, are unable to take an active part in accomplishing the various operational and tactical tasks." Thus, if held back from performing their specialized strategic mission, they will have to be in the reserve and, while in the reserve, protected. "If the war starts out non-nuclear, they will always be in the reserve," with the implication that all will then require protection. "Moreover, even in a nuclear war they are not capable of fully realizing their potential without appropriate support from other forces," presumably because some, but not all, will be in the reserve. "This situation has accelerated the development of so-called general-purpose forces,...above all general-purpose submarines," but also surface ships and aviation. The Soviet intention was evidently to establish SSBN patrol areas in the greater security of home waters, where covering forces would also be more viable. For over a decade this intention was indicated through the use of U.S. surrogates. Only recently has a Soviet writer acknowledged that "Soviet SSBNs are located...near Soviet shores, i.e., in areas where it is especially hard to expect success" from Western ASW efforts against them.

THEATER NUCLEAR OPTION (1976-80)

The significant innovation of this 5-year plan was not in the field of intercontinental nuclear weapons but long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF)—the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile and the Backfire bomber. The mobility and reload capability of the SS-20, and the improved accuracy and lower yields of its multiple warheads, at once precipitated a debate in the West: did the SS-20 really represent only a modernization of the Soviet LRTNF inventory, as Moscow claimed, or was it the intended foundation for an independent theater counterforce option?

In my reading of the Soviet literature, there can be little doubt that Moscow perceived itself as having a new independent theater option
as opposed to an upgraded theater component of an intercontinental option. True to form, the Soviets began to discuss this new option obliquely at the turn of 1975-76, that is, at the outset of the 5-year plan in which the hardware for the option was to be introduced. In the '60s, Moscow had contended that a war between the blocs would be inevitably nuclear, inevitably world-wide, and inevitably all-out. In the doctrinal period 1971-75, this was changed to: inevitably nuclear, inevitably world-wide, but not necessarily all-out. For 1976-80, the line was again altered: inevitably nuclear, but not necessarily all-out and not necessarily world-wide. U.S. territory—and, by implication, Soviet territory—might not be involved in the combat action.

During this same doctrinal period, the Soviet military also changed their ranking of the types and forms of strategic action. We will remember that in the '60s, of the four types of strategic action recognized, the main type was far and away the mixed counterforce-countervalue action of strategic nuclear forces, taking only the form of a "strike." Then in the first half of the '70s, Moscow introduced a fifth type—counterforce action for "repelling an opponent's aerospace attack," taking the form of a "strategic operation," which replaced the "strike" as the basic form of strategic action. There was another re-ranking in the last half of the '70s. The "basic" form of combat action at the tactical level was still the engagement (boy) and, at the level of the operational art, the operation (operatsiya). However, at the strategic level, strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters of military action were now considered a "basic" form, alongside the strategic operation for repelling an opponent's aerospace attack. The recognition of two basic forms of strategic action tended in turn to imply two basic options—a limited theater option and a limited intercontinental option. As General-Major Slobodenko of the General Staff Academy conveniently found it possible at that very time to explain about imperialist doctrine, a theater nuclear offensive at the start of a war "can be either an integral part of a global nuclear offensive or be carried out independently...."

Although both these forms of strategic action were avowedly at the head of the list, there was some evidence of a Soviet preference for the theater strategic operation. In 1976, Chief of the General Staff Kulikov blessed the statement that, at the General Staff Academy, "the central theme of all scientific research in the field of the military art has been that of preparing and conducting strategic operations in various theaters of military action with the use of all branches of the armed forces," including action by strategic nuclear forces against theater targets.

Marshal Ogarkov, Kulikov's successor as Chief of the General Staff, showed the same apparent preference for the theater nuclear option.

In evaluating the strategic content of war, Soviet military strategy figures that the war will
comprise a complex system of interconnected, large-scale, simultaneous and successive strategic operations, including operations in a continental TVD. The general objective of each such operation will constitute one of the war's partial military-policy objectives....

The following can be carried out in the framework of a strategic operation in a continental TVD: first and subsequent operations by fronts and, on maritime axes, first and subsequent operations by fleets, too; air, air-defense, air-landing, naval landing, combined landing, and other operations; and the delivery of nuclear-missile and air strikes as well. Other types of strategic operations can also be carried out....

Thus, Ogarkov's war "will" include theater strategic operations, whereas "other" types of strategic operations "can" be carried out.

Of interest, too, was his reaffirmation of the concept of partial victory, brought back into vogue by Marshal Grechko in the first half of the '70s and now supported on all sides. According to one writer:

It is customary to distinguish between the war's general strategic objective, that is, its final result, and partial strategic objectives.... The fulfillment of partial strategic objectives leads in the final analysis to achieving the war's general objective....

Soviet intentions were, as usual, also attributed to the United States, through the device of reinterpreting the selective-targeting doctrine advanced by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in January 1974. Initially, the Russians had interpreted selective targeting in a straightforward way as reflecting an intercontinental counterforce option; they could afford to tell the truth because, on this occasion, real American intentions coincided with Soviet intentions. However, beginning early in 1976—the start of a new planning period in which a new option would be introduced—Moscow gave a different interpretation of the Schlesinger doctrine.

Selective targeting, they now said, actually covered two options, allegedly dubbed by the Americans themselves as "strategic (general) nuclear war" and "limited strategic nuclear war." At first sight there seemed to be no false note here: on the surface, strategic (general) nuclear war could very well refer to all-out war and limited strategic nuclear war to intercontinental warfare limited to military targeting. However, it is clear that this was not the case; the Russians had their own definitions. Because obliquely expressed, these definitions were
completely missed in the West, evidence that, in attributing their own intentions to the U.S., Moscow is not basically trying to justify itself to a foreign audience.

In a work published in 1980, allegedly devoted to U.S. military-strategic concepts, a chapter was included on "Strategic (General) Nuclear War" and another immediately following on "Limited Strategic War." In the first of these chapters, Colonel Lev Semeyko wrote as follows:

"Strategic nuclear war" is an American term, which essentially means general nuclear war. In American military literature the terms "general war," "all-out war," "total war," and "unlimited war" are also used, and are also equivalent to the concept of "general nuclear war"....

A couple of pages later, however, without batting an eye, Semeyko explained that the Americans had, in fact, "two versions" of strategic (general) nuclear war and not just one.

The first of these (the "counterforce" version) is an exchange of massive nuclear-missile strikes only against military targets and above all against strategic nuclear weapons bases.... A limited exchange...of "counterforce" nuclear strikes for achieving political objectives is also considered possible.

The second version is an unlimited exchange of nuclear strikes against all the most important targets and with the use of all strategic nuclear weapons without exception. It is felt that this in fact would lead to complete mutual destruction.

But if "strategic (general) nuclear war" has a counterforce as well as a countervalue version, how does it differ from "limited strategic nuclear war"? We find this out when we turn to the chapter with that name, written by Colonel Semeyko and his collaborator, General-Lieutenant Mil'shteyn, but we find it out only if we are alert to the implications of one sentence—one sentence out of a whole chapter! According to the authors, the assumptions behind the Schlesinger doctrine of limited strategic nuclear war are that "neither side...will be interested in expanding a nuclear conflict and will take steps to localize it...." And there cannot be the slightest doubt that the authors meant what they said, for this particular formula—of limited strategic nuclear war as a "localized" conflict subject to a possible "expansion" and not just escalation—was endemic in the literature of 1976-80. On a few occasions the Soviets have even stated as the "accepted interpretation" that, for a war to be limited, it must be
restricted (1) in the kinds of weapons used or (2) in the area of combat action; restrictions on the target array within a geographical area is normally not part of the definition of limited war. In this case, of course, the choice of the designation limited "strategic" nuclear war indicated that the kinds of weapons used would not be restricted, only the area of combat action. In short, this sort of war would see the employment of all types of weapons, including strategic, but the targeting would be "localized."

Henry Trofimenko had already explained what this meant in an article published in March 1976. The Schlesinger selective-targeting concept, he argued, reflected the U.S. hunt for a way out of the impasse brought on by strategic parity.

As before, the American idee fixe in this hunt boils down...to a proposal to arrange a "test of strength" in a "neutral" theater without involving U.S. and USSR territory. With respect to "central war," this theater is always Europe for American strategists....

Before repeating this almost word for word in a work sent to the printer in April 1976, Trofimenko insisted, in one of the most devious expositions I have ever encountered in Soviet literature, that the emphasis in the Schlesinger doctrine of limited strategic war was not on what he called "Counterforce I," that is, "a strike against the entire set of military targets (ICBMs, airfields, submarine bases, and command and control systems)." The point turned rather on "Counterforce II" and "Counterforce III." Counterforce II he defined as "a strike against the military target set in the zone of the front," and Counterforce III as "a strike against the opponent's armed forces in the theater of military action, which is not on the territory of the prime opponent," that is, the USSR. In short, as Trofimenko explained in a work sent for galleys early in 1978, "in postulating the possibility of a 'limited' use of strategic forces" based in the U.S., Schlesinger was "including their limited use, not against the territory of the 'fundamental opponent,' but, as it were, directly in the theater of military action for operational-tactical purposes (which they say becomes entirely possible by virtue of the sharp increase in the accuracy of strategic missiles planned in the U.S.)...."

This was a widespread charge in the literature: the intended American use of U.S.-based Minutemen for counterforce strikes in the European theater, not as part of an intercontinental option but as the basic content of an independent theater option. Reflecting on the introduction of MIRV into the U.S. Minuteman arsenal, which had allegedly produced a surplus of warheads over and above those required for strikes against the USSR, G.I. Svyatov speculated that "some portion of the strategic nuclear forces will be tied in to those tasks imposed on operational-tactical nuclear forces." L.S. Semeyko treated as "a
highly dangerous symptom the attempt to tie in strategic nuclear forces
to war in a theater of military action—dangerous from the point of view
of the possibility [not the certainty] of this kind of nuclear war’s
subsequent escalation. 130

Other spokesmen gave much the same escalation odds. The limited
strategic nuclear war contemplated by the Americans “conceals within
itself the real danger of expanding and escalating into a strategic
(general) nuclear war.” It could “easily escalate” to that level,
“could easily become the prelude” to it. 131 In other words, escalation
might happen, but this is not inevitable. The only clearcut exception I
have seen to this appeared in an article for English-speaking readers by
a Soviet political correspondent. 132

Surely Moscow was here using an alleged American innovation as a
surrogate for a new option of its own, in which the USSR, like the U.S.,
would use home-based missiles for firing into the theater but avoiding
the territory of the other superpower. This, of course, was precisely
what NATO was afraid of. Although entirely unaware of the evidence we
have cited of Russian intentions, it could see the SS-20’s potential for
decoupling the theater from the intercontinental level. According to
NATO’s reasoning, it might not seem credible in Moscow’s eyes for
Washington to respond asymmetrically to an SS-20 attack on Western
Europe with the use of U.S.-based Minutemen against SS-20 sites in the
Soviet Union. This prompted NATO’s 1979 decision to deploy the
Pershing-II medium-range ballistic missile and the ground-launched
cruise missile (GLCM) to Europe. The planned level of the NATO response
did not aim at matching Soviet Eurostrategic capabilities. Rather it
was felt that the asymmetry in capabilities in favor of the Russians
would be more than compensated for by the asymmetry in collateral damage
in favor of the Americans. Should the Pershing-IIs and GLCMs return the
fire of the SS-20s, the Kremlin would hardly allow Soviet territory to
be violated without hitting the U.S. in return, and the war would become
general. Moscow could make this calculation beforehand, see that its
Eurostrategy was inherently unstable, conclude that the political
utility of the option had been neutralized, and agree to recouple by
declaring escalation “inevitable.”

However, Moscow stubbornly resisted this. If the West were to use
its medium-range nuclear forces, Soviet retaliation against Europe was
avowedly “inevitable,” but not against America. “Any nuclear
attack by one state against another would mean...the threat [but not the
certainty] of general nuclear war.” There was the “likelihood” of a
Eurostrategic war’s “rapid escalation.” It “could cause a chain
reaction and, one would think, turn a limited military conflict into a
nuclear catastrophe.” But perhaps the finest choice of words came
from the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. He did not say that
NATO use of medium-range weapons will inevitably lead to unlimited
nuclear war; rather it “will inevitably lead to the further exacerbation

-21-
of the risk of unlimited nuclear war. It is of just such subtle stuff that Soviet elite communications are fashioned.

It gradually became apparent why Moscow felt under no compulsion to comply with NATO pressure for inevitable escalation. Moscow had attempted to decouple with home-based SS-20s; NATO had then effectively recoupled with European-based Pershing-IIs; and now the Kremlin threatened—implicitly in public, more directly in private—to decouple once again by redeploying its mobile SS-20s from the USSR to Eastern Europe. Of course, redeployment would give the Russians no extra military advantage; SS-20s sited in the USSR are militarily just as effective as SS-20s based further forward. However, the potential political gain would be enormous, wiping out at one stroke the U.S. advantage in collateral damage that would necessarily have accompanied a counterforce exchange between German-based Pershing IIs and USSR-based SS-20s, but leaving intact Moscow's advantage in medium-range warheads.

As usual, of course, Moscow attributed its own decoupling intentions to Washington. Henry Trofimenko has commented on the alleged shift from the Schlesinger doctrine of "limited strategic nuclear war" to the Carter doctrine of "Eurostrategic war" or simply "limited nuclear war," that is, a conflict limited both geographically (to Europe) and in the kinds of weapons used (no intercontinental missiles).

In January of 1974 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger proclaimed...the option of selective or even massive high-precision strikes against missile silos and bombers of the opponent—or, in keeping with a variant of the same option, using U.S. strategic forces not against the territory of the main opponent but in the theater action (for example, in Europe)....

The Schlesinger doctrine can be viewed in retrospect as the final attempt of the United States to doctrinally couple the U.S. strategic deterrent with Western Europe. Because the West European members of NATO did not accept this attempt, Washington evidently came to realize that it is better to openly and officially decouple than to try to sustain the myth of continued coupling. This is what underlies recent U.S. moves to sell Eurostrategic weapons to the NATO allies....

Still, according to General-Major Sidel'nikov, if Washington wanted to decouple, Moscow was perfectly willing to follow suit, respond symmetrically "with the same weaponry" and avoid escalation.

According to the Russians, Washington's objectives for theater nuclear war will be limited along with the means for waging it. "In
contrast to all-out or general nuclear war,...a limited war involves limited tasks, and not tasks calling for the complete elimination of an opponent." It "should not put in question the very existence of an opponent's social system." The objectives would also apparently be limited in a "limited strategic war" in which the two sides would use home-based missiles for firing into the theater. After the "shootout" in such a war, "there still remains a possibility of entering into negotiations before reducing the matter to a mutual launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)."

THE SHIFT TO CONVENTIONAL (1981)

Soviet Discussions of Their Own Doctrine

In the period after the XXVI Party Congress in February 1981 it became more and more apparent that the principal military objective of the current (1981-85) planning period was the attainment of an independent conventional option for coalition warfare. By an independent option I mean an option intended for use throughout the entire war, in contrast to an option designed as an escalation bridge to some more destructive option. In the first half of the '60s, Moscow had refused to recognize even a temporary firebreak between conventional and nuclear war; escalation would be immediate or almost immediate. Then, at the turn of 1965-66, on the eve of a new doctrinal period, the concept was introduced—and attributed to NATO as well—of what General-Major Zemskov has dubbed a "war by stages" (poetapnaya voyna), that is, a war which would begin conventionally but then "inevitably" escalate, first perhaps to the tactical-nuclear and subsequently to the all-out nuclear level.

Both the conventional and tactical-nuclear phases were envisaged as very brief. Planning for each was apparently in terms of a "front operation," that is, an organized series of simultaneous and successive army operations under a front command, which in World War II lasted from 8 to 20 days. However, escalation was actually expected before the conventional front operation came to full term, "within four to five days at a maximum," except in the less likely eventuality of the two sides turning out evenly balanced. The conventional phase would not have a logic of its own; the objective, rather, was to improve one's position for the inevitable escalation that would follow. Hence, "the main attention of the parties will apparently be focused on eliminating the greatest possible number of the opponent's nuclear weapons...."

Soviet terminology in the first half of the '70s indicated continued planning for a front operation in the conventional phase of a "war by stages." In the mid-'70s, however, such planning apparently came to be based on a conventional strategic operation in a theater of military action, that is, an organized series of simultaneous and successive front operations and other forms of combat action under a
strategic command; strategic offensive operations of this kind in World
War II lasted up to 30 days. At the same time, plans were also
attributed to NATO of carrying out "a strategic operation in Central
Europe...without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons...." Toward
the end of this planning period, one set of views attributed to the
Pentagon suggested that Moscow might have been at least entertaining the
idea of an even longer conventional phase.

Other phenomena appearing during this five-year planning period
were, in my view, compatible with a greater emphasis on conventional
action—reorganizations in the Air Force and the air defense system, the
revival within the ground forces of the World War II concept of
mobile groups in the form of modern "operational maneuver groups," and
the reestablishment of "strategic high commands" in the theaters,
intermediate between the fronts and the Supreme High Command. The
latter development is especially relevant to our discussion, both as
additional evidence of the strategic character of the contemplated
conventional action and as testimony to the chain of command for
implementing this action.

In the General Staff Academy dictionary of the mid-60s, the general
definition of a strategic operation specified that it would be (1)
"nuclear" and (2) "carried out under the direct leadership of the
Supreme High Command." In other words, there was no such thing as a
conventional strategic operation, and no other strategic command for
theater combat than the Supreme High Command. This accords with data
from other sources.

In a 1979 volume of the new Soviet Military Encyclopedia, however,
the general definition of a strategic operation specified neither its
nuclear character nor its subordination. Only "in the context of
nuclear weapons use" was it stated that a strategic theater operation
could be carried out "under the direct leadership of the Supreme High
Command." The overall implication was that there could be
non-nuclear as well as nuclear strategic operations and that, since the
nuclear type was directly controlled by the Supreme High Command, the
non-nuclear type must be the responsibility of a theater high command.
Otherwise, we would have the paradox of a strategic command without a
strategic function.

The situation underwent another sea-change with the start of the
current five-year plan 1981-85, when Moscow evidently shifted from
provisions for a conventional strategic operation in a war by stages
that would inevitably go nuclear, to a coalition war that would be
fought on a conventional basis throughout. As usual, the Soviets for
the most part did not assert this straightforwardly but rather
obliquely—for example, in the guise of a discussion of the basic forms
of military action, which are, of course, associated with certain
options but not with others.
It will be remembered that, in the '60s, when Moscow had only the all-out nuclear option, the basic form of military action was considered to be the mixed counterforce-countervalue "strike" by strategic nuclear forces. With the acquisition of limited nuclear options in the '70s, the strike was dropped as a basic form of action, and the basic forms were declared to be (1) the counterforce "strategic operation for repelling an opponent's aerospace attack" and (2) nuclear strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters. In 1981, however, Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov omitted the counterforce strategic operation as a basic form, stated unequivocally on two occasions that "the basic operation" of a possible future war will be "the strategic operation in a theater of military action," and obliquely indicated that this strategic operation would be conventional, not nuclear. (In this connection, Soviet writers today do not simply imply a recognition of both types; "strategic operations," they openly maintain, "can be conducted both with and without the use of nuclear weapons.")

First of all, it seems unlikely that Ogarkov was referring to a nuclear strategic operation in the theater, since already, at the XXVI Party Congress, Moscow had dropped theater nuclear war as an independent option. During the previous five-year plan (1976-80), Soviet spokesmen had declared over and over that a theater nuclear war in both its versions—the "limited strategic" and the "Eurostrategic"—would not necessarily escalate, implying the viability of the option. Ogarkov, however, quotes Brezhnev's 1981 Der Spiegel interview: "Were a nuclear war to break out, whether in Europe or another spot, it would inevitably and inexorably assume a world-wide character." Thus, nuclear war in the theater was ruled out as an independent option, and no country is going to select as basic a form of action central only to an option that no longer exists.

Additional indications of a conventional emphasis came from Ogarkov's report that the theater strategic operation in question would be under a "command of fronts," that is, a command with jurisdiction over more than one front and hence situated at the strategic level of the hierarchy, as one would expect from an organization responsible for a strategic operation. Since no Soviet military man would refer to the Supreme High Command as simply a "command of fronts"—it is far more than that—Ogarkov must have meant the new theater high commands established in the last half of the '70s. We have already cited evidence suggesting that these regional high commands are responsible for conventional strategic operations, with nuclear strategic operations explicitly reserved for the Supreme High Command in Moscow, and this seems to be confirmed by Ogarkov's treatment. In explaining the shift from the World War II front operation to today's theater strategic operation as the basic form of military action, he referred to the greater ranges of the weapons available now to the "command of fronts," but not once did he specify their nuclear character. On the other hand, in this same context he indicated that "strategic nuclear forces" came under the "supreme military leadership," not the command of fronts.
Had Ogarkov been referring to a nuclear strategic operation, his singling out the range of today's weapons rather than their nuclear character as the differentia specifica of present-day operations would have contradicted the understanding of the previous doctrinal period. As General-Major Cherednichenko of the General Staff Academy said in 1979, a theater strategic operation in the context of nuclear weapons use, "The utmost importance in this type of operation is attributed to the delivery of mass nuclear strikes...." And according to a 1976 work edited by then Chief of the General Staff Kulikov,

the main difference between the contemplated strategic operation in a theater of military action and the operations of a group of fronts in the Great Patriotic War is that its objectives will be achieved, not by the Ground Troops in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces, but by the joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces with the Strategic Missile Troops playing the decisive role....

Ogarkov also pricks our interest with his implication that strategic nuclear forces had been downgraded in the overall Soviet calculation. Throughout the late '60s and the '70s, it was repeatedly stressed that these forces could have, not just a "significant" or "substantial," but a "decisive" influence on the war's course and outcome. Now Ogarkov was ready to state that, with the creation of strategic nuclear forces, the supreme military leadership had acquired a potential only for "substantially" influencing the attainment of the war's objectives. Since it is still maintained that, if nuclear weapons are used, the war's "first operations," "the war's first day and even the first massive strategic nuclear strike [are] capable of decisively influencing the further course of the war," with withheld SSBNs presumably decisively influencing its outcome, there are some grounds for suspicion that a non-nuclear option may have become uppermost in Ogarkov's revised estimate. The capacity for a merely "substantial" influence had not been attributed to strategic nuclear forces since the first half of the '60s, when Moscow had only limited numbers of intercontinental missiles.

It is probably in the conventional direction, too, that we should seek the explanation for Ogarkov's (in my view) unprecedented stress on rear support, mobilization capabilities, the timely shift of the armed forces and national economy to a war footing, the need, "as never before," for coordinating their mobilization development, improving ties between weapons enterprises, enhancing the self-sufficiency of enterprises in energy and water, providing them with necessary stockpiles, creating reserves of equipment and material, and raising the quality of militarily-trained reservists. Further research might link this stress in turn with the unprecedented cuts in investment growth rates in both the 1976-80 and 1981-85 five-year plans—by over
one-third and one-half, respectively. One western research team has concluded that the real winner from these investment cutbacks has been state reserves, and perhaps other analysts should check out that possibility.

But regardless of whether the conventional option is reflected in the economic sphere, it is certainly reflected in new Soviet odds on the likelihood of the option's escalating. In the '60s, Soviet writers had contended that a war between the two socio-political systems would be "inevitably" coalitional, nuclear, all-out and, in the scope of combat action, world-wide. In the decade 1971-80, they agreed that the war would inevitably be coalitional and nuclear, but not necessarily all-out and (later in the decade) not necessarily world-wide. Today it is maintained that such a conflict would "most likely" be coalitional but not necessarily, and, even if coalitional, not necessarily nuclear. The essence of Soviet "doctrine" is said to boil down to the following: "a future war can be unleashed with either conventional or nuclear weapons; having been started with conventional weapons, it might at some stage escalate to nuclear warfare...." Of course, to say that it "might" escalate automatically implies that it might not as well; and, contrary to the usual practice, the authors go on to make that implication explicit.

Conducting the armed struggle with the use of conventional means of destruction alone is also not ruled out. In these conditions, Soviet military thought has worked out methods for conducting military action both with and without the use of nuclear weapons.

This work was sent off to the printer in July 1981, two months before the Soviets conducted what appears from press data to be their first all-conventional exercise in at least two decades.

Conventional war now seems the norm, nuclear war the exception. One collective of authors asks rhetorically: "Just what could a world war of the present day be like?" Their reply: conventional weapons "will be used" in the war, whereas the employment of nuclear weapons is simply a real "threat."

This shift in the option norm may explain the recent shift in the norm for forces singled out in the performance of combat alert duty (boevoe dezhurstvo), the highest stage of combat readiness. In the 1960s, the Strategic Missile Troops and SSBNs, occasionally along with the National Air Defense Troops, were understandably singled out in this connection. In the '70s, when SSBNs seemed to have become mainly slated for deferred strike, combat alert duty for the Missile Troops alone tended to be stressed. However, as we move into the '80s, we find Minister of Defense Ustinov declaring: "The troops and naval forces stationed on the forward edges of our motherland and the socialist
community, and carrying out combat alert duty, must, above all, be in a high state of combat readiness."

Soviet Views Attributed to the U.S.

For details of the Soviet conventional option—the war's projected duration, the connection between conventional war and war reserves, the likely area of combat action, the war's objectives and the question of its winnability—we have to turn to Soviet depictions of the "threat" from NATO, it being understood that such a threat has to be met with a symmetrical Soviet response.

One of the earliest such efforts to be considered came from the pen of General-Major V.V. Larionov of the General Staff Academy, who, as a lieutenant-colonel in the early '60s, was widely credited in the West with major responsibility for drafting the Sokolovskiy-edited work on Military Strategy. Larionov and his colleagues had then presented the "threat" in the shape of all-out nuclear war; two decades later he sees it differently. The previous Carter Administration, he notes, had concentrated on limited nuclear options.

The present [Reagan] administration, without renouncing a single one of its options, has at the same time focused its own efforts on developing a strategic concept of protracted conventional war in various areas of the globe....

A "conventional-war strategy" is the next stage in the search for ways to expand opportunities for employing force as a policy instrument.... Conventional war is considered not only an acceptable substitute for nuclear war,....but also essentially an addition to it, since the latter is also not tossed out of the reckoning....

The creators of the "new strategy" also proceed from an awareness that deciding to use conventional weapons is, as they say in America, a "less agonizing process" compared to unleashing a nuclear conflict—even one on a limited scale....

V.V. Zhurkin, a Deputy Director of the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada, attributed much the same intentions to the Reagan Administration. He viewed American military policy since World War II as, by and large, oscillating between two poles:

[F]or the Republicans in past postwar years, a policy of economizing to a certain extent on military expenditures and concentrating efforts in
those sectors that, from their point of view, were most important, above all the nuclear sector, was more characteristic. The distinguishing feature of the traditional line of the Democrats...was an attempt to expand military efforts in many sectors—forcing nuclear preparations along with accelerating the race in conventional armaments and armed forces....

In this respect, the Reagan Administration has broken with the Republican tradition by emphasizing capabilities "across the entire spectrum," conventional as well as counterforce-nuclear. In the nuclear sphere, however, "it is clear that the present U.S. administration, like its predecessors and those that will follow, cannot ignore the harsh realities of the catastrophic consequences that any conflict using nuclear weapons would threaten the United States itself with." As a result,

Washington is paying great attention to conventional armaments and armed forces. An especially stubborn conceptual hunt (already actively begun in recent years by the preceding administration) for more effective ways to get ready for aggressive action in the '80s goes on precisely here. In particular, Pentagon leaders are openly proclaiming a policy of significantly improving U.S. capabilities for fighting a series of protracted wars with the use of conventional weapons....

Thus, whereas not very long ago the emphasis was put on blitzkriegs,...today the emphasis is on protracted, conventional-type wars, that is, without the use of nuclear weapons....

According to another writer, General-Major Rair Simonyan of the Frunze Military Academy, in laying out the scenario for "a protracted general war against the USSR and its allies," using conventional weapons, the American press gives evidence that "as many countries could get involved in it as in World War II, in which, as is known, 61 states took part." 177

Two points are of special interest in the Larionov, Zhurkin and Simonyan treatments. First, as late as 1980, ridicule had been heaped on alleged attempts by the Carter Administration to "camouflage" conventional war as an "alternative to nuclear war"; 178 now Larionov presents this as something to be taken seriously, though other American options are there to be concerned about as well. Second, all three depict this conventional war as "protracted," that is, lasting more than one campaign. In the West, of course, the word "campaign" simply has the meaning of a connected series of military operations making up a
distinct phase of a war. The Russian meaning is more precise. In their understanding, an organized series of simultaneous and successive "army operations" goes to make up a "front operation" (a front being the equivalent of a Western army group); a similar series of front operations goes to make up a "strategic operation"; and finally, only after a series of strategic operations do you complete a "campaign," which apparently always takes place in a single "theater of military action."

In World War II, as we have already pointed out, a Soviet conventional campaign spanned anywhere from three to five months. However, there is some very slight evidence that they may consider a present-day conventional campaign as faster-paced, with a duration of two to three months. According to Colonel Semeyko, "It was previously believed that the conventional warfare could last for two to three months," but now "Washington has, for the first time, proclaimed a policy of protracted conventional war." Since the usual Soviet contrast is between a "protracted war" of more than one campaign and a "short war" of no more than one campaign, Semeyko, in substituting a war of two to three months duration for "short war" in his contrast, may thereby have been obliquely indicating the likely duration projected for today's campaign.

It remained for the U.S.A. Institute's Yu.V. Katasonov, however, to give a more precise planning indicator for the war's length.

The Reagan Administration's most significant innovations have been made in the strategy of conventional (nonnuclear) wars, which Washington considers the most likely form for the application of American military strength in the near term. The present administration has rejected orientation on any sort of spatial limitations in its conventional wars... It has also laid stress on preparations for protracted wars, including a world war extending over many years, above all against the USSR.

Marshal Ogarkov, in turn, has given a more precise indicator of what Katasonov meant by America's alleged rejection of spatial limitations in a world conventional war. In its flexible-response strategy of the '60s, according to Ogarkov, the "central place" was assigned to general nuclear war, just as in the earlier strategy of massive retaliation. The conventional threat from the West was not in an independent option of that type, but in the conventional phase of a war by stages that would inevitably go nuclear. "It was planned to wage war against the USSR and the socialist countries in Europe initially with conventional weapons, then with the use of tactical and, at a critical juncture, strategic nuclear means as well." Today, however, the threat is of conventional action throughout the whole war.
The U.S. in its "new military strategy" also envisages preparing the armed forces for fighting a war with the use of conventional means of destruction alone... In their view, such a war could encompass not only Europe, which as before is looked on as the principal theater of hostilities, but also the Near, Middle, and Far East and all sea and ocean theaters of military action.181

Of course, preparations have to be quite different for a "protracted" as opposed to a "short" war. According to views attributed to Secretary of Defense Weinberger by General-Lieutenant Perov,

one of the errors in the previous military policy of the American government with respect to a war with the use of conventional means of destruction alone was that it was conceived as "short." He believes that the United States should get ready for a protracted conventional war....182

According to another set of authors: "C. Weinberger, in justifying his orientation on protracted military conflict, has declared that, given the correlation of forces that has emerged, the U.S. 'is not so strong, nor the opponent so weak, that one could hope to achieve a quick victory'." Therefore, steps are being taken to ensure "a further increase in mobilization readiness and the ability to expand war production significantly."183

This theme had already been advanced by Marshal Ustinov in a Pravda article of 22 June 1981. Charging that "a new military strategy is being elaborated for fighting a protracted nonnuclear conflict with the socialist countries," he hit out at Western programs for creating a new generation of conventional arms, as well as weapons of mass destruction.

Large-scale deliveries of new tanks, aircraft, artillery and other weapon systems are being made to the troops of NATO countries. The bloc's strategic reserves are being increased and intensive steps are being taken to raise mobilization potential and improve its infrastructure.

All three of the themes advanced for conventional war—its protracted character, the enlarged scope of combat action, and the need for greater war reserves and mobilization potential—were widely echoed in the Soviet press.184 According to a brochure put out by the Ministry of Defense, along with limited-nuclear protracted-war options,

the strategy of "direct confrontation" aims at preparing the armed forces to fight a war with the use of conventional means of destruction alone....
Such a war, in the Pentagon scheme, could encompass not only the European theater, which as before is viewed as the principal theater of hostilities, but also the Near, Middle, and Far East and all sea and ocean theaters. As a result, in developing its general-purpose forces, the Reagan Administration...has adopted a policy of preparing the country's armed forces and war economy for a protracted general war against the USSR and its allies simultaneously in several theaters of war and theaters of military action. This policy is reflected in the program outlined for the '80s...of increasing reserves of materiel and expanding the mobilization potential of war industry and the economy as a whole.185

The shift to a protracted conventional strategy, in which logistics assume greater importance, also seems to have revised Soviet views on the importance of interdicting enemy sea lines of communication. In the '60s, when the projected all-out war was expected to be short, the interdiction mission was accounted "secondary," especially given the ease with which shipping terminals could be knocked out with nuclear weapons. After the introduction of limited, protracted-nuclear options in the next decade, the mission was upgraded, but not markedly, and only for the "subsequent," not the "initial," period of the war.186 However, a flurry of new articles in the '80s suggests a rethinking. According to one writer, in the '70s the U.S. Navy found it hard to justify protecting lines of communication, "given NATO's doctrinally approved readiness to resort to the use of nuclear weapons at the early stage of a conflict" designed, he says, "to be limited to the European continent." However, this skeptical view lost currency when the U.S. military-policy leadership championed the concept of a protracted war, global in its spatial scope. The creation of a potential making it possible for the U.S., jointly with its allies, to conduct protracted combat action exclusively with conventional means in theaters of military action remote from one another—such as Europe, the Far East, and the Persian Gulf—presupposes a potential for ensuring the regular functioning of their own ocean lines of communication, as well as interdicting an opponent's communications.187

In this connection, Vice-Admiral Gontaev points out that the last war was "a continental war," in which the influence of the fighting in sea and ocean theaters on its course as a whole was "substantial but not decisive." Today, however, when the USSR is "threatened by a coalition
of sea powers," the oceans can, in certain circumstances, become the "main" combat sectors.

Transoceanic communications today, in the opinion of foreign specialists, are a most important factor determining the course and outcome of warfare in continental theaters of military action. U.S. and NATO military-policy circles directly tie the fate of NATO's armed forces in a future war to the security of the lines of communication joining Europe to America. They feel that the quick expenditure and destruction of part of their material-technical means will precipitate a requirement, from the beginning of the war, for large-scale shipments across the ocean....

This is a curious opinion to attribute to "foreign specialists," when these "foreign specialists" have only recently arrived at a consensus that should have been reached 20 years ago but now may be in process of becoming outdated—that maritime communications are not a matter of key concern.

The comparative method being the best, it might be additionally useful to collate the proceedings of two conferences at the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada, both attended by roughly the same set of people and dealing with the same subject—the "threat" from America—but held during different planning periods (1976 and 1982). The published results of the first conference implied that the U.S. was planning a theater nuclear war, employing U.S.-based strategic forces; the strikes would be counterforce, avoiding countervalue; U.S. and Soviet territories would be sanctuaries; and there was a "possibility" of escalation but no certainty. The 1982 conference, held fairly early in the very next doctrinal period, concluded that, "in the context of Soviet-American strategic parity, the U.S. military leadership believes...the basic type of conflict...is a nonnuclear conflict"; that, as a consequence, "the view is changing on conventional armed forces"; that, "in this sphere perhaps, at least as much as and even more than in the nuclear sphere, the Reagan Administration has gone in for forcing the arms race"; that, in U.S. thinking, "a war with conventional forces can be fought even against the Soviet Union"; that, in this connection, the call was "to be ready for protracted conventional war"; and that "the intention is to expand a military conflict from any one region of the world to all other regions and turn it into a general conventional war." The buildup in U.S. conventional forces no longer aims at fashioning a bridge for graduated escalation; the object rather is "to ensure fighting and winning the war." And no one at the conference negated the surrogate force of these alleged intentions by raising the spectre of inevitable escalation. Indeed, two conference participants indicated in subsequent articles that the Russians would defeat the U.S. in a conventional war, just as the North Vietnamese did.
Soviet discussions seem to imply that, in order to avoid giving incentives for crossing thresholds, the ends of war must be limited along with the means. Nowhere in the literature are there indications that the social system of either side is at stake. Sturua writes as if the object of conventional war is to extract "concessions." However, if Simonyan is any guide, rather extensive territorial changes could be involved in these "concessions." In preparing to fight a protracted conventional war against the Warsaw Pact, he says, "the intention is to mount large-scale offensive operations for the purpose of moving out to the borders of the Soviet Union and occupying its territory." This suggests that the entire East European buffer zone, and by implication the whole of Western Europe, are up for grabs in conventional war. Even the USSR is not off limits, though one could draw the conclusion from the wording that the Soviet territory to be occupied is in the border region.

Simonyan's treatment is a little surprising in view of the careful Soviet specifications of the area of combat action envisaged in alleged American schemes for general conventional war. The Soviets always mention Europe, the Near and Middle East (i.e., that arc of territory in Northeast Africa and Western Asia extending from Egypt and the Sudan to Afghanistan), the Far East, and all sea and ocean theaters—to which some writers add Latin America. However, gringo America is never treated as a possible battleground, an omission which is conscious and deliberate, since, as Soviet writers explain, U.S. scenarios for conventional war "represent an attempt...to deflect its destructive impact a little farther away from their own home." Surely, if American territory is not to be contested, Moscow would try to arrange roughly equal treatment for the USSR.

The Kremlin may already have made moves in this direction. In Europe it has long had an extensive zone for buffer combat action; only in the far north does the USSR abut directly on NATO territory (Norway) and neutral territory (Finland). However, until recently, with the exception of the Transbaykal region adjoining Outer Mongolia, all contiguous territory on the Asiatic frontiers of the Soviet Union was in the hands of states not securely tied to the USSR. This may not have been of critical concern as long as intercontinental-nuclear options alone were available to Moscow, since these would mean the automatic involvement of Soviet territory. However, with the shift to a long-term conventional perspective in the mid-70s, it might have occurred to the Politburo that combat buffer zones would help to realize the full damage-limiting potential of the new option. In the view of Malcolm Macintosh, it was around this time that the Kremlin added a new factor—"the domination of frontier and peripheral areas around the Soviet Union"—to the four constant factors of Soviet policy (the strategic and superpower relationship with the U.S., the confrontation with NATO in Europe, the Sino-Soviet conflict and the enhancement of Soviet influence in the Third World). As evidence of this "trend in Soviet thinking," he cites pressure put on Helsinki for joint Soviet-Finnish exercises and
the encouragement given to the Marxist-Leninist coup in Kabul in 1978
and the subsequent Soviet military intervention in 1979.\textsuperscript{194}

The Status of Nuclear Options

I want to emphasize that, while conventional war seems the basic
Soviet option, it is not their only option. The stability of the
conventional option was only a probability, not a certainty, as we have
already seen from the doctrine claimed by the Soviets for themselves and
as we can see additionally from the doctrine attributed to NATO Com-
mander Rogers by General-Major Simonyan. According to Simonyan, the
flexible-response strategy that had previously guided NATO
was based on the assumption that a conventional war
would be short and would inevitably escalate to
nuclear war with the use in its initial phase of
tactical and, in subsequent phases, strategic
nuclear weapons as well. In other words,
...Atlantic strategists had put the emphasis on
nuclear weapons. Conventional armed forces were
supposed to exploit the results of nuclear strikes....

The "Rogers doctrine" is built up on different
principles. It takes its point of departure in the
following: now that nuclear parity exists between
the USSR and the U.S., it would be dangerous in all
eventualities to bring a conventional military
conflict that might break out between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact to the level of nuclear war, with all
its catastrophic consequences. It is therefore
based on the possibility of fighting a nonnuclear
war that "would not necessarily escalate to nuclear
conflict." As a result, in determining the direc-
tion for developing the Joint Armed Forces of NATO
in Europe, the "Rogers doctrine" requires...
general-purpose forces capable of fighting a
protracted war against the USSR and its allies with
the use of conventional means of destruction....\textsuperscript{195}

This suggests that Moscow looks on nuclear war as a fallback, in
the event of an unanticipated failure of the conventional option.
However, the central emphasis seems to be on the need for a strong
nuclear posture, not so much as a fallback, but for inhibiting NATO's
recourse to the nuclear route to redress the imbalance at the conven-
tional level. G.M. Sturua has dealt with this theme, as usual putting
what I suspect is his own reasoning into the minds of Western
specialists. In the final reckoning, according to Sturua, the U.S. aims
at "complete superiority," that is, the capacity for a swift disarming
strike. Superiority in this sense, however, is not felt practicable as an objective at the present stage, and the U.S. has had to settle for gaining "advantages," that is, the potential for fighting a "protracted nuclear" as well as a "protracted conventional war." With "the U.S. alone...dominating at each new turn in the conflict,...an opponent would have to conclude that, in raising the conflict level, an even greater risk is imposed on him, and he would prefer to agree to concessions before 'crossing the nuclear threshold'...." 196

Nuclear options, therefore, are still required. The question is: what kinds? Moscow has never claimed an independent tactical-nuclear option, and it now seems to have abandoned the independent theater nuclear options advanced in the doctrinal period 1976-80. However, the USSR has by no means abandoned an independent intercontinental-counterforce option, and it can still go to all-out nuclear war if the stakes are high enough.

Whatever hopes Moscow might have previously reposed in an independent theater nuclear option based on LRTNF, its renunciation during this planning period seems without reserve. The Politburo has evidently reached the conclusion that the Pershing-II and the GLCM will be deployed, in spite of the anti-nuclear movement and accompanying Soviet threats and blandishments, and that it would not be wise, in retaliation, to carry out the decoupling threat of redeploying SS-20s and Backfires from the USSR to Eastern Europe. Perhaps, as some have suggested to me, this was a bluff all along; or they may have subsequently reconsidered, say, under the stress of events in Poland. Clearly the Soviets are uneasy about the accuracy and short flight time of the Pershing-II. It is difficult to believe they are all that exercised about 108 Pershing warheads, but, as they themselves say, the initial deployment might be only a "foot in the door," and if the politics of decoupling are pushed too far, they could end up confronted with hundreds of launchers, multiple warheads and reloads. That would have first-strike implications far beyond the Eurostrategic context. Of course, all this is contingent on NATO actually coming through with its planned deployments. If we lose our nerve, there will be no more calf-rope cries of "inevitable escalation" from Moscow.

This does not mean smooth sailing in the INF negotiations. The Russians will no doubt want to hold on to their Eurostrategic advantage as an integral part of a limited intercontinental option. Moreover, there is value even to a dependent theater nuclear option in adding another phase to a fallback nuclear "war by stages," should the Soviet conventional option fail or NATO escalate to tactical nuclear warfare.

There is evidence of this in the literature. In his report to the XXVI Party Congress, Brezhnev declared that, should a theater nuclear war break out, this would mean the extinction of European civilization "at the very beginning," but of America it was said only that she "would not be able to avoid the flames of war," implying some escalation lag
between the early extermination of Europe and the ultimate involvement of America.

The normal Soviet treatment of the Eurostrategic theme involves attributing to Washington decoupling ambitions that will inevitably be frustrated by an immanent logic of escalation. This has the advantage of capitalizing on America's evil intentions in putting Europe up as hostage, but the drawback of implying that it might be the Soviet Union which is the agent of escalation, responding asymmetrically to a U.S. initiative. That is perhaps why, when the need to influence Western Europe is not uppermost, Moscow prefers to attribute to Washington a deliberate strategy of graduated escalation once the nuclear threshold is crossed. As General Larionov has explained, U.S. talk of limiting the scale and area of nuclear conflict so as to avoid general nuclear war has "a purely propagandistic underpinning"; in the words of Brezhnev, which he cites, it "is only camouflage for far-reaching plans for unleashing a general nuclear war."

Nuclear escalation is planned by stages: preemptive intimidating selective strikes against military and other targets belonging to the European socialist countries; a local war restricted to the battlefield; a strike against launch sites for medium-range missiles; and, finally, "strategic limited nuclear war."

But, if Moscow has given up theater nuclear war as an independent option, it does not appear to have given up its limited intercontinental option. In his Der Spiegel interview in the fall of 1981, Brezhnev declared that "there can be no limited nuclear wars of any sort whatsoever," i.e., nuclear wars limited geographically and in the kinds of weapons used; they would "inevitably" assume a "world-wide character." In following this line, Soviet spokesmen in the domestic media have employed the same or similar terminology. The scope of the combat action would inevitably be unlimited—"worldwide," "global," "universal" or "general"—but nothing was said in the domestic press of the targeting necessarily being unlimited. Intercontinental counterforce is no longer a basic option, since the form of action central to that option—the strategic operation for repelling an opponent's aerospace attack—is no longer singled out as fundamental in the overall scheme. But "operations" by strategic nuclear forces, and not just "strikes," remain a recognized form of action and, if it comes down to a nuclear exchange, they can still be decisive for the war's course.

Indeed, as far as the Soviet Navy is concerned, what could turn out to be its two most significant innovations in the current five-year plan have been in the strategic-nuclear war-waging sphere. The first concerns the new Typhoon SSBN, each of which is said to have the potential for launching more warheads (240) than the entire Soviet fleet of 18 Delta-I SSBNs (216 warheads). As usual, Soviet discussions of the
Typhoon's mission are indirect and masked as discussions of the "analogous" U.S. Ohio-class SSBN with the Trident-I missile. Charging that, with the Ohio, "Washington has put into mass production another dangerous 'counterforce' weapon," the Soviets are frank in stating that, "in response to the U.S. 'Ohio' submarine, the Soviet Navy had to develop its similar 'Typhoon' system." More ominously, indications are that the SS-NX-20 missile aboard Typhoon may be designed for hard-target kill and that, as a trend, the SSBN's task of "eliminating an opponent's strategic forces" for the first time takes precedence over its countervalue role. Concern has been expressed that Typhoon's reputed under-ice capabilities, making possible a forward Arctic launch, will shorten the range arcs to target and significantly reduce U.S. warning time. When Mr. Brezhnev pledges that the USSR will field a response to the short-warning threat of the Pershing-II, it seems far more likely that he has Typhoon in mind than the risky emplacement of missiles in Cuba.

At the same time Moscow seems to have acquired a new perspective on the potential for future strategic ASW. My attention in this respect was first drawn by a 1980 brochure, in which Henry Trofimenko, anxious to demonstrate the Soviet line that neither side could gain "superiority," i.e., the capacity for a disarming strike, postulated no breakthroughs in ABM, land-based counterforce, or civil defense for the foreseeable future. However, despite the considerable incentives he had to postulate the same lack of prospects for threatening SSBNs, he refused to rule out an ASW breakthrough beyond "the current stage and near future," a code expression for the period five years away (i.e., the five-year plan 1981-1985).

As the Soviets moved into the current planning period, their discussions of the anti-SSBN threat continued to be low-key and in keeping with the lack of near-term prospects forecast by Trofimenko. However, beginning around the middle of 1982, charges began to appear of a Western threat to Soviet SSBN bastions; these have all the traditional earmarks of justifications for a similar Soviet threat. At the same time it was alleged that Washington had changed its mind about the lack of prospects for successful ASW in the "near future," that the Americans believed they were "approaching" a solution to the problem, and that Secretary of the Navy Lehman had declared his confidence in a "technological breakthrough." There was no attempt to deny the realism of this alleged American rethinking. Since Moscow normally does not attribute to Washington a potential it does not at least share, perhaps we can tentatively infer some Soviet ASW innovation, of unknown effectiveness, which will probably become operational by the end of the current planning period. If by "near future" the author had meant "by 1987" (i.e., five years ahead), I think he would have waited till the eve of the next five-year plan to make his charge.
Conventional warfare may now be the USSR's prime anchor, but Moscow is by no means ready to concede the nuclear sphere. The competition continues.
FOOTNOTES

This aspect was treated in Vol. I.


10Sokolovskiy (ed.), op. cit., pp. 20f.

12 For documentation of Soviet discussions of the types and forms of strategic action, see McConnell, *A Possible Counterforce Role for the Typhoon*, pp. 1-4.


16 Kozlov, Smirnov et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 350-354. There were several attempts to reverse this line on the form assumed by the action of strategic missile forces once it was established about 1962. See, for example, the two-part article by Marshal V. Sokolovskiy and General-Major M. Cherednichenko entitled "The Military Art at a New Stage," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 25 August 1964, pp. 2-3 and 28 August 1964, pp. 2-3, frankly labeled by the authors themselves as minority pleading for the concept of mixed counterforce-countervalue "operations by strategic nuclear forces." Obviously defeated in their try, the authors never returned to the subject but instead treated the form of the action by strategic forces in the orthodox way. It is worth noting in this connection that Sokolovskiy and Cherednichenko agreed with their colleagues that this action could not take the form of the "aerospace operation" allegedly adopted in the West. It is not clear why this distinction was made, since Soviet discussions of the U.S. "aerospace operation" show it to be virtually the same as the Soviet "strike" and the Sokolovskiy-Cherednichenko "operation by strategic nuclear forces," i.e., mixed counterforce-countervalue action; cf. P.V. Morozov, *Bor'ba s vozdushno kosmicheskimi tselyami* (Moscow, 1967), p. 7. Not until early 1971 did Moscow begin to interpret the "aerospace operation" attributed to the U.S. as basically counterforce. (See McConnell, *A Possible Counterforce Role for the Typhoon*, pp. 5-6.) Here I would also like to reemphasize what I have said elsewhere that Westerners who do not know
Russian and have to rely upon translations cannot do research in this field, because of our habit of translating as "operations" both the Russian word *deystviya* (action) and the Russian word *operatsii* (operations), whereas in fact the latter are only one special form of the former.

17 Kozlov, Smirnov et al., op. cit., p. 360.


27 Grudinin, op. cit., p. 77.


FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


36 Krasil'nikov and Yakovlev (eds.), op. cit., p. 132; Kozlov, Smirnov et al., op. cit., p. 357.


40 Zemkovoy, op. cit., p. 45.


FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


46G. I. Korotkov, op. cit., p. 633.


48Bartenev, Krasnaya zvezda, 7 July 1964.

49Ibid.; Kozlov, Smirnov et al., op. cit., p. 6; Sokolovskiy and Cherednichenko, Krasnaya zvezda, 28 August 1964.


52Ibid., p. 232; Bochkarev (ed.), op. cit., p. 64; Talenskiy, op. cit., p. 24; Fedorov, Sushko, Belyy (eds.), op. cit., p. 168.


54McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 92-95.


McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 34-35.


FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


65 Rotmistrov, op. cit., pp. 27, 29; Fedorov, Sushko, Belyy (eds.), op. cit., p. 188; Nikitin and Pankratov, op. cit., p. 12; Mil'shteyn and Slobodenko, op. cit., pp. 199-200, 308-311.
FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


69 McConnell, in Dismukes and McConnell (eds.), op. cit., p. 20.


74 S. Biryuzov, "The New Stage in Developing the Armed Forces and Tasks in Troop Instruction and Training," Kommunist vooruzhennyykh sil, No. 4, 1964, p. 21; Kozlov, Smirnov et al., op. cit., pp. 298, 389; Strokov (ed.), op. cit., p. 613; V.V. Turchenko and M.V. Fedulov, Oboronitel'nye deystviya v khode nastupleniya (Moscow, sent for galleys in November 1965 and signed off to the press in March 1966), p. 3.

FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


77 Sekistov and Matsulenko, op. cit., p. 325.


81 Ibid., pp. 6-7, 23, 25; McConnell and Dismukes, "Conclusions," in ibid., p. 309.


85 McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 44-49.

87 McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 54-55.


89 McConnell, Interacting Evolution, p. 34-35. One knowledgeable Soviet officer has, however, recently stated that the objective of a U.S. strike would be to "wipe out" (unichtozhit') the USSR's nuclear force (i.e., to cause 80-90 percent attrition) "or at least to degrade its strength to the maximum." R. Simonyan, "A Strategy of Global Aggression," Novoe vremya, No. 21 (May 21), 1982, p. 18.


FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


95. McConnell, *A Possible Counterforce Role for the Typhoon*, pp. 4-5.


102. This is suggested by the fact that the Navy's influence on the war's course and outcome was the same as the influence of the action in sea and ocean theaters on the war's course and outcome.


McConnell, in MccGwire and McDonnell (eds.), op. cit., p. 598.

McConnell, in George (ed.), op. cit., p. 61.


McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 69-70.


V.G. Kulikov (ed.), op. cit., p. 205, also p. 194.


N.N. Kuznetsov, "The Strategic Objective," ibid., p. 552.

Bogdanov, Mil'shteyn and Semeyko (eds.), op. cit., pp. 169-172.

Ibid., p. 208.
FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


128 Ibid., pp. 315-316, as clarified in the table on p. 236, to which the reader's attention is directed.


131 Surikov, Boevoe primenienie raket sukhoputnykh voysk, pp. 82-83; Simonyan, Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, No. 11, 1978, p. 22; Milshteyn, ibid., No. 7, 1976, p. 106; Milshteyn and Semeyko, op. cit., pp. 209-213.

132 Gerasimov, op. cit., p. 76.

133 M. Ponomarev, "A Reliance on Nuclear Blackmail," Krasnaya zvezda, 16 November 1980, p. 3; McConnell, Interacting Evolution, p. 81.

134 Ibid., pp. 79-81.
FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


139 McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 76-79, 82-87.


142 McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 87-88.


145 The Soviets actually specified only an "operation," which in the abstract could be a strategic operation, a front operation, or an army operation. However, General-Colonel Lomov stated that the postulated
operation was a concern of the "operational art"; this would apply to either a front or an army operation but not to a strategic operation, which is within the province of strategy, not the operational art. General-Major Zemskov, on the other hand, stated that the operation in question was "large-scale," which usage indicates could apply to either a strategic or a front operation but not to an army operation. More positively, the front operation was indicated by Colonel Samorukov's statement that the conventional phase had been tested in "operational-strategic" exercises. In the Ground Troops, only fronts (army groups) are characterized as "operational-strategic formations," designed to take action on "operational-strategic axes"; armies are simply "operational formations." See Lomov, Kommunist vooružennykh sil, No. 21, 1965, pp. 16-17, 20-22; Zemskov, op. cit., p. 23; D. Samorukov, "On Combat Action with the Use of Conventional Means of Destruction," Voennaya mysl', No. 8, 1967, pp. 30-32, 40-41; I. Zav'yalov, "New Weapons and the Military Art," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 October 1970, pp. 2-3; Kulikov (ed.), op. cit., p. 181. For definitions, see Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. VI, p. 679 and A. Markov, "Why Relocation Was Necessary," Krasnaya zvezda, 8 August 1981, p. 3.

146 A Soviet front is the equivalent of a NATO army group.


149 McConnell, Interacting Evolution, pp. 95-97.


FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


158 M.M. Kir'yan, A.A. Babakov et al., Voenno-teknicheskiy progress i Vooruzhennye Sily SSSR (Moscow, 1982), p. 315.

159 Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva, p. 16.

160 Ibid., p. 34; Ogarkov, Kommunist, No. 10, 1981, p. 86. For some reason, all Western translations of this passage that I have seen have rendered this command as a "front command." First of all, that is not what Ogarkov said. He did not say command of a front (komandovanie fronta) but command of fronts (komandovanie frontov). Second, it would make no sense to assume this was a careless slip of the pen on Ogarkov's part, since his whole point was to demonstrate why the strategic operation had replaced the front operation as the basic form of military action. A front command would be in charge of a front operation; only a command with jurisdiction over more than one front would direct a strategic operation. Had the new weapons extolled by Ogarkov been in the possession of a front command, then the front operation would still be the basic form of military action.

161 Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva, p. 34.

162 Elsewhere in the literature stress is put on the creation of new types of conventional weapons of great destructive force, which "can be used at the same ranges as nuclear weapons." V. Makarevskiy, "What is Behind the 'Rogers Plan': the U.S. and NATO Are Stepping Up the Conventional Arms Race," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 November 1982, p. 3.

163 Cherednichenko, op. cit., p. 552.


165 Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva, p. 34.
FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


181 Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva, pp. 14-17.


FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


193 Konobeev and Konovalov, *op. cit.*, p. 82.


198 Pravda, 24 February 1981, p. 3.


201 Ustinov, op. cit., p. 49; Zhilin, Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', No. 4, 1982, pp. 80-81.


204 Kir'yan, Babakov et al., op. cit., p. 315.


208 Trofimenko, Changing Attitudes Toward Deterrence, pp. 30-34.

FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)


The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional

The Mid-Term Perspective

James M. McConnell

Center for Naval Analyses
2000 No. Beauregard Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22311

Office of Naval Research
Department of the Navy
Arlington, Virginia 22317

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op91)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Conventional warfare, Deterrence, Military doctrine, Military planning, Military strategy, Nuclear warfare, USSR

These two volumes detail the shift over time in the Soviet selection of military options. Volume I deals with changes in their long-term perspective on military development. Having achieved a nuclear counter to the U.S. strategy of massive retaliation in the early sixties, Moscow at first favored a long-term conventional emphasis as a follow-on, but abandoned this in 1965 in favor of nuclear options. However, in 1976-77, the Kremlin returned to a primary conventional orientation, rounded out recently with a declared policy...
of no first use of nuclear weapons. All these shifts seem to have been reflected in changes in Soviet deterrence criteria and, considering their character and timing, may perhaps be best explained as asymmetrical reactions to concurrent U.S. plans.

Volume II deals with the implementation of the long-term perspective in mid-term doctrinal increments that coincide with the five-year plans. In each of the doctrinal periods since 1960, the Soviets have managed to introduce a new independent option: all-out nuclear war (1960-65), a conventional local war in the Third World (1966-70), limited intercontinental nuclear warfare (1971-75), theater nuclear war (1976-80), and protracted conventional war between the two coalitions (1981-85).