SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA
Two Decades of Upheaval

Charles C. Petersen
The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author. The paper does not necessarily represent the views of either the Center for Naval Analyses or the Department of Defense.
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INTRODUCTION

Major innovations have changed the shape of Soviet military doctrine over the past decade. Their effects on the Soviet Navy's strategic employment concepts and on its "operational art"* have been discussed at length in the West for several years now. That the Soviet Navy's views on the tactical aspects of warfare at sea have also undergone major changes, however, is much less well appreciated—despite the development of new tactical scenarios and force employment principles by Soviet naval theorists, despite the existence of a large body of Soviet writings dealing with these changes, and, finally, despite the profound impact they have had on contemporary Soviet warship design. As a result, the emergence in recent years of several new classes of warships from Soviet yards has produced a good deal of puzzlement among our naval cognoscenti over why these new designs are so different from the old ones. Why, for example, do the Oscar class SSGN and the Kirov CGN both

*The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines "operational art" as "the component of the military art that encompasses the theory and practice of preparing and executing combined and independent operations...by large formations [ob"edineniya—e.g., an army, flotilla, eskadra, etc.] of branches of the armed forces. The operational art occupies an intermediate position between strategy...and tactics." Thus, in Soviet military usage, the term has a much more specific meaning than it has in ours. While Soviet officers would be comfortable with designators such as "Operation Overlord" and "Operation Sea Lion," they would almost certainly object to the U.S. Navy's using the term "operations area" to denote a place where tactical evolutions are taking place.
carry so many more missiles than their generational predecessors? Why is the latter the first cruiser since the early 1960s to carry surface-to-surface missiles? It is difficult to place any of these weapons platforms on an evolutionary continuum of Soviet warship design because of the many sharp departures they reflect. We must look elsewhere if we are to explain their significance; many of the answers to these questions can be found in Soviet writings on naval tactical theory.

This paper will focus primarily on the development of Soviet views on anti-surface warfare (ASUW). The period with which this analysis deals begins in the early 1960s, when Soviet theorists first began to weigh the implications of their Navy's acquisition of nuclear-missile weapons on its tactics. Only a thorough understanding of the issues raised in this debate will enable us to assess the meaning and import of Soviet tactical writings today.

SOURCES AND METHODS

Before we begin our analysis, a few words about these writings should be said.
Levels of Discourse

Soviet literature on naval theory contains three levels of discourse. At one level, Soviet theorists discuss the basic "forms" that warfare at sea can assume in a future global conflict. In any given historical era, say these theorists, the forms of warfare remain relatively constant, although their "content" may change (and new ones may appear on the scene). The "engagement" (boy), for example, has persisted as a form of tactical warfare since ancient times, while the methods by which it is fought—its "content"—have been completely transformed. In practice, however, these forms themselves are far from immutable—in the sense that Soviet definitions of them may change, as may Soviet assessments of how likely they are to occur in the "next" war. This is especially true for Soviet naval tactics, where the "naval engagement" (morskoy boy) in particular has evolved at the hands of theorists in significant, and revealing, ways over the past 20 years.

At another, slightly less rarefied, level these theorists discuss "principles of the art of naval warfare." These principles derive, mutatis mutandis, from those applying to the military art as a whole and may have a strategic, operational, or tactical embodiment ("surprise," for example, may be strategic, operational, or tactical, depending on the scale of its application and the scope of its effect on the enemy). Although they are said to reflect "the objectively existing
laws of warfare," their purpose is normative, that is, they "are followed when a war, operation, or engagement is prepared and conducted."

Like the forms and methods of warfare, they, too, may change: "some lose their importance; others...gain new content; and new [ones]...come into being." In naval tactics, two such principles—massirovanie or "massed action" and vzaimodeystvie or "combined action"—are of special interest here for that very reason, and this analysis will devote considerable attention to their development for the insights they provide into the present state of Soviet naval tactical thought.*

It is only at the "lowest" level of discourse that we find the Soviets writing about tactics in a way that will seem familiar to the Western reader, that is, in terms of specific means, methods, or maneuvers for achieving specific tactical objectives. This type of treatment, however, tends to be less straightforward than we might expect: Some of them will parade as descriptions of "foreign" naval

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* For reasons this author does not fully understand, these principles, along with a host of others, were at one time often called "categories of the art of naval warfare." The term "categories" originated with Aristotle, who used it to denote the ten types of logical predicates that a subject may carry. In modern times, it refers to the basic premises of some metaphysical systems, including Marx's "materialist dialectic," whence it was borrowed by Soviet military pedagogues to denote "the basic, fundamental concepts [of military science], reflecting the general, essential properties of war...and warfare." Why normative military principles achieved the ranking of "categories" in the minds of Soviet military theorists cannot be determined, but we may assume from the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia's* separate definitions of "principles of the military art" and "categories of military science" that the two terms are no longer considered synonymous.
tactics (which they may or may not really be) and others as efforts to draw lessons (which are not always made explicit) from World War II or the "Great Patriotic War." In each case, a judgment must be made as to the "real" meaning or purpose of the discussion in question. Fortunately, some rules of thumb do seem to apply here, at least where professional military journals, which provide the bulk of the source material for this paper, are concerned; for almost invariably they are divided into sections whose headings offer an important clue to the raison d'être of the articles arranged in them. If an essay entitled "Some Trends in the Development of Naval Tactics" appears in Morskoy sbornik's section on "The Art of Naval Warfare"—the journal's principal theoretical section—we may safely assume that, for all its references to "the opinions of foreign specialists," it accurately reflects Soviet (or at least the author's own) views on the subject. On the other hand, if an article on anti-ship missile defense (ASMD) appears in the "Foreign Navies" section of the journal, there is a better-than-even chance that its allusions to U.S. or NATO views are designed to be taken at face value. This does not mean, however, that no insight into Soviet views can be gleaned from articles in that section, for Soviet writers often allow their own or official prejudices to creep into their assessments of the "probable enemy." Vice-Admiral Stalbo's now-famous articles on aircraft carriers in World War II and in the postwar period illustrate the point. U.S. military doctrine, avers Stalbo, has assigned to carriers a "significant role in the protection of
strategic missile submarines and in warfare against enemy missile submarines."\(^{15}\) This, of course, is palpable nonsense and makes sense only if we take it to represent Soviet views, or at the very least Stalbo's own.

**Authoritativeness of Sources**

When assessing the writings of Soviet military theorists—whatever their level of discourse—we must also make judgments about their authoritativeness. When do they reflect "the system of views adopted by the state...on the goals and character of a possible war, on readying the nation and armed forces to wage it, as well as on the methods of waging it"?—that is, when do they reflect Soviet military doctrine?\(^{16}\) When, conversely, do they represent the individual views of a given author?

Many monographs bear the stamp of official sanction on their title pages. The *Officer's Handbook*\(^ {17}\) and the third edition of *Military Strategy*,\(^ {18}\) published as part of the "Officer's Library" series of the Soviet Defense Ministry's Military Publishing House, belong in this group.\(^ {19}\) So do books whose title pages carry captions such as "textbook for higher naval colleges."\(^ {20}\)
Some publications contain—or are associated with—what James McConnell has called "doctrinal authenticators": telltale characterizations indicating that the views set forth in them also conform to Soviet military doctrine. Reviews of Admiral Gorshkov's series of articles on "Navies in War and Peace" state that they had armed the Navy's officers with a "scientifically substantiated system of views on the development of navies and on their role and place in warfare." As McConnell argues—and the Soviet Military Encyclopedia confirms—Soviet military doctrine defines itself as a "scientifically substantiated system of views."

Soviet military doctrine, of course, does not pretend to have answers for every conceivable problem; nor by the same token do all Soviet military writings claim to be authoritative. That there is room for differences of opinion on some issues is plain from several instances of give-and-take between authors and readers in Morskoy sbornik alone during the past few years. And, as we will see below, there is much to be learned about the development of Soviet tactical thought from such debates.

The vast majority of Soviet military writings, however, cannot be pigeonholed this easily. But we need not despair of being able to assess their authoritativeness: if a given formulation or argument appears time and again, unchanged and undisowned, we may with some
confidence presume it to reflect the party line of the moment. If several writers assert, for example, that command of the sea is "unthinkable" or "impossible" (or words to that effect) without command of the air, mere happenstance will scarcely serve as an explanation for the observable uniformity. Nor is it likely, if no one deems it necessary to take issue with them, that all these writers are speaking out of turn.

Soviet professional military journals--chiefly Morskoy sbornik and Voennaya mysl', organs, respectively, of the Navy and the General Staff--were the principal sources for this analysis. A number of Soviet monographs aimed at a military readership were also consulted, as was the Soviet Military Encyclopedia.*

THE GREAT TACTICAL DEBATE, 1961-1964

The Soviet Union exploded its first fission bomb in 1949, its first thermonuclear device four years later, and by the middle 1950s had developed missiles for their delivery. The "revolution in military affairs" that these achievements heralded was slow in developing, for "some military theorists still thought that nuclear weapons could not change the basic principles of warfare and would not bring any serious qualitative changes to existing methods of warfare." But by 1959 "all

* For a complete list of sources cited in this paper, see pp. 62 ff.
the top brains of the General Staff" agreed that Soviet military doctrine needed revising and that nuclear-missile weapons must dictate the shape of future Soviet military strategy.\textsuperscript{27} Shortly thereafter, according to the testimony of Colonel-General N. Lomov, a debate began on "the character of a possible world war, the methods of warfare should nuclear-missile weapons be employed, the missions of the Armed Forces as a whole and of their individual services and force arms..., the further improvement of [its] organization and equipment..., etc."\textsuperscript{28}

And in January 1961, Rear-Admiral K.A. Stalbo fired the opening broadside of a debate on naval tactics sponsored by \textit{Morskoy sbornik}.

"One of the important tasks of contemporary military theory," he began,

"...is to develop new methods of fighting engagements [boi]...when nuclear-missile weapons are used.... As weapons and military equipment develop, the forms of warfare at sea also continually change. It is natural that...some force employment concepts and principles should change along with them.... Some concepts and principles die off and are replaced by new ones, and others change only in importance. But the old views and notions [about them] are proving very tenacious, which without doubt is hampering the development of [our] theory and the improvement of practice.

That is why an examination of various categories [principles] of the art of naval warfare as manifested today is advisable.\textsuperscript{29}

Boldly, Stalbo proceeded to question the relevance in the nuclear-missile era of two of the most deeply-ingrained principles of Soviet naval tactics: the principle of "massed action" (massirovanie), which called for the concentration or "massing" of forces when engaging an
enemy; and the principle of "combined action" (vzaimodeystvie raznorodnykh sil), according to which that enemy could be defeated only by the combined, closely-coordinated efforts of units from several naval force arms, acting thus to compensate for their individual weaknesses and at the same time to enhance their overall effectiveness. These principles had matured during World War II, when the Soviet Navy was compelled to fight an ocean-going enemy navy with forces that could not operate beyond offshore waters.

**Massed Action**

This principle, argued Stalbo, belonged to the age of shells and torpedoes, whose lethal force was "relatively small" and probability of hitting the target "negligible." What was more, this was an age—World War II—when defenses were more than a match for offensive capabilities. Thus, only a "large mass" of forces could defeat an enemy and then only by "repeatedly" firing on him.

But today, according to Stalbo, the situation had "sharply changed." The "great destructive force" of modern weapons had eliminated the need to fire again and again at the enemy in a naval engagement. One nuclear-tipped torpedo or missile could "in some conditions destroy not one major ship, but several such ships and their screening forces." Moreover, the hit probability of the new weapons had "increased considerably"; under "certain circumstances, it now
approaches unity." Finally, missiles could be fired from stand-off ranges; missile-armed aircraft, for example, could fire at surface targets "while remaining beyond reach of [their] most formidable opponents...surface-to-air missiles"—and the gap between the ranges of antiship and antiaircraft missiles was likely to grow "even larger" than that in the years to come. In view of this, it was no longer necessary to reckon on large losses of weapon platforms when determining the size of a force needed to perform a given combat mission. For all these reasons, concluded Stalbo, "the concentration of a large number of platforms in a modern naval engagement—their massing—is ceasing to be a basic principle of naval force employment." Today, an assigned task could be performed "with a single powerful shot (moshchnoe razovoe vozdeystvie) against the enemy...with a relatively limited number of weapon platforms."

Combined Action

This, Stalbo argued, was also a principle better suited to bygone days, when a mixture of platform types, mutual fire support, and concentration of forces were needed to perform tactical missions; combined action was "not just important, but essential" and "inevitably" entailed "large expenditures of time."
Given the enormous lethality of nuclear-missile weapons, however, "the problem of seizing the initiative and of decisively defeating the enemy before he fires his own weapons" was "especially acute," for "losing the opportunity to be the first to open fire will frequently mean also losing the engagement."  

Nor was the need to strike at once the only factor that "frequently" ruled out the possibility of combined action. The range and power of nuclear missiles demanded the use of formations so spread out that launch platforms would have to operate "beyond visual and electronic reach of each other," posing "extraordinarily great technical difficulties" for command and control of a coordinated effort.  

Yet the same properties of nuclear-missile weapons that made combined action impossible also made it unnecessary. The modern means of warfare, claimed Stalbo, "free the attacker's striking groups from being completely dependent on each other," enabling "a homogeneous force to carry out an attack independently." The capabilities of submarines and aircraft--the "core of the strike forces of the [superpower]... navies"--were "altogether incommensurable" with those of surface ships or of "the forces and means for combatting missiles." Thus, "the creation of mixed groups to fight an engagement at sea has ceased to be the sole possible way of performing combat missions." From all this, Stalbo concluded that combined action was "ceasing to be essential to the execution of combat missions."
Stalbo's assault on these once unquestioned principles provoked a controversy whose like has rarely been aired on the pages of Morskoy sbornik, then or since. An intervention by the journal's editors later that year failed to quell the argument, and it resurfaced the next, its scope expanded and its vigor undiminished. Because of their importance in the subsequent development of Soviet tactical thought, the arguments advanced by Stalbo's opponents ought to be summarized.

In challenging the notion that massed action could no longer serve as a basic principle of naval tactics, these opponents argued in three main directions. Some warned that the new weapons, formidable though they now were, would eventually and inevitably be countered. "Any new weapon seems to some degree 'absolute' as long as the means for fighting against it are not developed," wrote one critic, insisting that none could remain "absolute" indefinitely. Others claimed that there were ways of defending against nuclear-missile weapons already: "The depth of antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses... has greatly increased, in view of which attacking aircraft and submarines will be subjected to counterattacks at distances considerably greater than in the World-War-II period." Still others, though conceding that modern launch platforms could stand off from their targets, argued that the missiles themselves were vulnerable to enemy fire: "even a salvo of missiles if too small may fail to reach the target, since all of them may be
destroyed or shot down" by surface-to-air missiles. While this did not require that forces be massed, it did require that weapons be massed; the principle therefore lived on, although admittedly its "content" had changed.

A similar cacophony of objections greeted Stalbo's demotion of combined action. "It allows the strengths of some forces to compensate for the weaknesses of others," which "enables them overall to perform a combat mission more completely and reliably [and] with fewer...losses," said one critic. "The employment of mixed forces as well as of forces with different weapons and combat equipment allows the strengths of some forces to make up for the weaknesses of others," said another. It was therefore "wrong to cast doubt on the advisability...of combined action," concluded a third. And a fourth, while agreeing "on the whole" with Stalbo on this issue, argued that "one must not completely reject the need for mutual fire support."

Emergence of a Consensus

(U) For all the uproar that Stalbo's article provoked, however, the conservatives were fighting a losing battle, even though Admiral Gorshkov himself proffered his backing. For one thing, the views it expressed found a considerable measure of support. More important, they accorded well with the Soviet military leadership's push to "rework the theory of the military art" and "reeducate [Armed Forces] personnel,
especially officers and generals." And finally, many of Stalbo's key assumptions and arguments his opponents either acknowledged or left unchallenged.

Only one of them dared question that the principal means of tactical warfare would now be nuclear missiles; none disputed the enormous lethality of these weapons (some even conceded their present superiority over defensive systems); and no one challenged the assertion that they were so accurate their probability of hitting a target "under certain circumstances...now approaches unity." All these were central premises in Stalbo's contention that "the need to concentrate [weapon] platforms...to perform an assigned mission has now passed."

The critics found it even more difficult to refute Stalbo's position on combined action. Even as they insisted that it remained "the sine qua non of successful performance of a combat mission," they did not deny that it posed extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming command and control problems at a time when preemptive action was essential. (As one of them put it: "The threat of large losses from nuclear weapons makes preempting the enemy's strikes and minimizing the time used to perform an assigned mission an especially critical problem.")
Thus, by early 1964, when *Morskoy skornik*'s editors interceded for the second and final time to wrap up the debate, Stalbo's views had made considerable headway, and had been taken in directions that even Stalbo had not foreseen.

On the question of combined action, the editors found his arguments persuasive. "On the ocean expanses at long distances from home bases," they wrote, "it is quite difficult to organize combined action between force arms such as...submarines and aircraft." Given that "to delay in striking at an enemy grouping" was "fraught with grave consequences," it was "advisable to strike...immediately, as soon as weapon range allows." If plans for a combined air-submarine strike stood in the way of meeting this requirement, they must be abandoned; for if the submarines put off firing their missiles while awaiting the arrival of the aircraft (or vice versa), the enemy would be able "either to evade their [attempted combined] strike, or defeat them as they concentrate [together], or both...." Consequently, "combined action between groups from different force arms in forward areas must not be considered in all cases the *sine qua non* of organizing combat."  

Moreover, with his assertion that enemy forces could now be destroyed preemptively from standoff ranges, Stalbo set the stage for an assault on yet another theoretical sacred cow: that the naval
engagement was "the only way to [tactical] victory." For as participants began to point out later in the debate, if by "engagement" one meant "an organized bilateral struggle," an action where no exchange of fire took place could scarcely be called by that name.

The editors of Morskoy sbornik also agreed with this notion. "Before the arrival of long-range weapons," they reasoned, "an attacker was forced to close with the target...while under enemy fire." In those days the engagement was "the main, and in point of fact, the only" form of naval warfare. But now that nuclear-missile weapons were "in widespread use," tactical assignments could be carried out "with one or a few salvos, often even without the attacker entering the enemy's zone of defense." Today, the enemy could be "defeated and even crushed by means of a nuclear-missile strike"—an action "by no means unfailingly associated with a prolonged exchange of fire...." The "new essence" of the strike as "one of the basic forms of warfare" was "sweeping aside" the old view that the enemy could be beaten only by engaging him. Although the engagement remained an "important" form of naval warfare, it was "most likely" only when conventional weapons were being used.

It was only on the principle of massed action that the editorial board disagreed with Stalbo: Like him, they believed that the launch platforms of the day were much less vulnerable to enemy defenses, but they could not say the same for the missiles they carried. A single
cruise missile, they argued, could be shot down "comparatively easily," and so could an entire salvo if its size did not exceed "a certain minimum." This entailed a need to "mass forces and fire"—even if nuclear weapons were used—in order to "increase the assurance that the missiles will reach the target when there is strong opposition from enemy defenses."69

THE CONSENSUS

But by the eve of the Twenty-third Soviet Communist Party Congress, even this had changed, capping the debate with a total victory for the views of Stalbo and his supporters. "The main concern...in warfare at sea," wrote Admiral N.M. Kharlamov in January 1966, "is today coming to be not the massing of forces with a view to attaining the largest possible number of direct bomb, shell, or torpedo hits on enemy ships, but the organization of a small number of nuclear-missile strikes by comparatively small groups and even by single [launch] platforms."70 "The notion of 'massed use of forces' has gained new content," wrote Admiral Yu. A. Panteleev a month later. "Now, there is no need to concentrate a large number of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft in a limited area.... [The] power of a [strike]...is determined not by the number of missiles fired, but by the power of the warheads."71
As table 1 shows, these two authors all but paraphrased each other—and Stalbo—on everything else that had been at issue during the debate, and coincided at critical junctures with judgments delivered in the authoritative third edition of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy. This congruence, together with the stature of the authors, bespeaks the authoritative character of their formulations.

By the time the Soviet Navy completed its review of postwar tactical theory, therefore, it had found the principles and notions lying at the theory's very core to be significantly less relevant in the nuclear-missile era of warfare. The spectacular power, reach, and accuracy of the new weapons had put in doubt not only the need to concentrate a variety of platforms to fight the enemy, but also the advisability and even feasibility of attempting a combined effort against him in an age when immediate action had become imperative. Victory would belong not to the side that massed its forces or strove for the synergism of a carefully coordinate strike, but to the side that struck first with whatever forces were at hand. Preemption, indeed, was the key not only to victory, but to survival itself. In the past, as Panteleev put it, the first salvo—though of "great importance"—was "almost never decisive"; but today it meant "to be or not to be"; for from a failed first salvo, one must expect an answering enemy strike with a decisive result." Thus, when Kharlamov wrote that "naval
### TABLE 1
SHAPE OF THE CONSENSUS

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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>K.A. Stalo</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>N.M. Khramov</td>
<td>In a nuclear-missile war, the one who is the first to strike will prevail. Therefore, a ship with tens of missiles with nuclear warheads aboard will present a threat so long as it itself is not exposed to a nuclear strike. [Today] the belligerents will strive to employ their striking forces...before they are subjected to enemy action.</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>Yu.A. Panteleev</td>
<td>In the past...gunners [officers] fought “for the first salvo,” as it was of great importance in a naval engagement, although the first hit on the enemy...was almost never decisive. But...[today] “the first salvo” has acquired a new quality, as the very first nuclear-tipped missile hit in the target area can totally annihilate it. Now “the first salvo” [means] “to be or not to be,” for from a failed “first salvo” one must expect an answering enemy strike with a decisive result.</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>V.D. Sokolovskiy</td>
<td>[Does not mention combined action.]</td>
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I. Combined action

A. Importance of tactical preemptive:

When weapons of mass destruction are in use...the problem of seizing the initiative and of decisively defeating the enemy before he fires his own weapons becomes especially acute.... [Today] the critical importance of the fight for the first salvo reaches its culmination, since losing the opportunity to be the first to open fire will frequently mean also losing the engagement.... The need to fire immediately on the enemy not only hampers, but frequently also rules out the possibility of organizing combined action, especially...in areas far removed from home bases.... [22-23]
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<td>The modern means of warfare free the attacker's striking groups from being completely dependent on each other. What is more, these means enable a homogeneous force to carry out an attack independently. The core of the striking forces of the [superpower] navies...has become submarines and aircraft, whose combat capabilities are altogether incommensurable with the capabilities of surface ships or of the forces and means for combating missiles. Therefore, the creation of mixed groups to fight an engagement at sea has ceased to be the sole possible way of performing combat missions. [21-22]</td>
<td>Earlier the forces detailed to perform a given mission had to coordinate their actions among themselves fairly scrupulously... Now, such scrupulousness is not compulsory. The reason is that previously the lethal effects of weapons were comparatively modest and decisive results could be achieved only through the combined efforts of many [weapons] platforms. But the firepower of modern naval forces has grown many times over... [34]</td>
<td>To achieve the best results in combat at sea in the past, combined action of surface, submarine, and air forces was organized. Combined tactical action... is always desirable, although in our day not always compulsory or possible. Powerful nuclear-missile weapons now allow the execution of missions by a small, homogeneous force independently. Therefore, the concentration of a large mixed force is sometimes simply unnecessary and sometimes practically impossible...</td>
<td>[Today] a more vital force employment principle is: &quot;...no one waits for anyone&quot; [nikto nikogo ne zhdet], for time today is very costly, and if there is an opportunity to strike at the enemy, one must not fail to seize it immediately, without waiting for the arrival of [help from] one's neighbor. [29]</td>
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<td>A. Lethality of nuclear-missile weapons</td>
<td>A successfully employed nuclear-tipped torpedo or missile can in some conditions destroy not one major ship, but several such ships and their screening forces. [19]</td>
<td>Nuclear missile means of warfare make it possible with one strike to destroy not one ship, but several at once.... [28]</td>
<td>Earlier in order to destroy a major surface ship, the concentration of several submarines was required for a massed torpedo strike. Now, any surface ship can be destroyed with one nuclear-tipped torpedo or missile. [365]</td>
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<td>B. Massing of forces</td>
<td>[The] concentration of a large number of platforms in a modern naval engagement—their massing—is ceasing to be a basic principle of naval force employment. [20] [A table shown on the same page presents numbers purporting to show that a combat assignment for which 340 aircraft carrying gravity ordnance were formerly needed can now be performed by only 10 aircraft carrying missiles with nuclear or high explosive warheads!]</td>
<td>In order to effect...[a nuclear missile] strike, there is no need whatsoever to move large forces...[and] concentrate them in the combat area.... Any feasible [enemy] ship grouping can now be destroyed in short order by comparatively small groups of platforms for long-range nuclear missile weapons.... [34]</td>
<td>The notion of “massed use of forces” has gained new content. Now, there is no need to concentrate a large number of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft in a limited area. [28]</td>
<td>The employment of nuclear weapons will not require detailing a large quantity of aircraft [or submarines] to perform...the task [of crushing an aircraft carrier task force or group]. [365]</td>
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<td>[The] main concern...in warfare at sea is today coming to be not the massing of forces with a view of attaining the largest possible number of direct bomb, shell, or torpedo hits on enemy ships, but the organization of a small number of nuclear-missile strikes by comparatively small groups [of forces] and even by single [launch] platforms. [34]</td>
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III. Possibility of Engagements

A. Stand-off capability of modern weapons

[A]ircraft armed with missiles...can deliver strikes against surface targets while remaining beyond reach of [their] most formidable opponents: ...surface-to-air missiles.... Submarines employing long-range homing weapons have also to a considerable degree been freed from the need to engage the forces screening the objective being attacked before delivering a strike against it.

The availability in our Navy of missile submarines and missile-armed aircraft permits them to approach within missile-launch range of an aircraft carrier without entering the antisubmarine or air defense zones of the attack aircraft carrier task force. [364]
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<td><strong>B. Likelihood of engagements</strong></td>
<td>[Naval engagements as previously understood... have become a thing of the past. They have been replaced by powerful, momentary and highly productive strikes executed by highly maneuverable groupings of platforms for nuclear missiles and [nuclear] torpedoes. [34]</td>
<td>Not long ago the partial objective of an operation could be achieved only by means of an engagement, and an operational result was the consequence of engagements that, aggregated together, made up an operation, and a strategic objective was achieved by conducting a series of operations.... [But] if earlier the destruction of a strategic enemy target was associated with the execution of one or several relatively prolonged operations and a large number of engagements, their components, now such a mission can be performed with one nuclear-missile strike. Thus, the engagement has ceased to be the one and only means of achieving a partial operational or strategic objective. [28]</td>
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engagements as previously understood...have become a thing of the past," he really meant that they must not be allowed to take place at all, for engaging the enemy presupposed exchanging strikes with him, and an exchange of fire would inevitably prove fatal.

Thus was Soviet naval theory "freed," as Admiral Gorshkov wrote a year later," from manifestly outdated ideas," and the "gap between the combat capabilities of [nuclear-missile] weapons and the tactics for their employment" eliminated.76

Although the new tactical doctrine did not take formal effect until shortly before the Twenty-third Party Congress in the spring of 1966, at least some of its elements appear to have been implemented informally several years earlier. In April 1963, for example, one of the participants in the debate proposed that the Soviet Navy abolish its traditional distinction between "force arm tactics" on the one hand and "general naval tactics," or the tactics of combined action, on the other.77 The term "general tactics," he wrote, ought to be "abandoned altogether," since "in real life the theory and practice of waging combat both independently as well as jointly with other force arms are developed and refined by the tactics of each force arm"; that is, "the basic principles of the combined employment of naval forces are dictated not by one or another principle of general tactics, but by the tactics

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of whatever force arm is the main one when performing a given concrete
task." This suggests that as early as 1963 the importance of combined
action had sharply diminished—while that of independent action had
risen—in the Soviet Navy's everyday tactical practice.

RESURRECTION OF THE "OUTDATED IDEAS"

But the formal consensus lasted only a few short years, barely
surviving the close of the decade and giving way in the early 1970s to a
revival of the same "outdated ideas" the Soviet Navy had fought for so
long to repudiate.

The first hints that a theoretical volte-face was underway—or had
already occurred—appeared in mid-1971, when the author of an article on
Soviet naval theory on the eve of the "Great Patriotic War" observed
that the Navy's 1937 Combat Manual had "recommended that [tactical]
missions be performed by the principle of combined action and massed
action for...the fullest exploitation of the firepower and mobility of the
forces participating in an engagement." Seven months later, an
article on "trends in the development of naval forces" stated that "the
methods of operational-tactical employment of naval forces in warfare at
sea are changing," pointing to the "increasingly noticeable determi-
nation abroad to employ them jointly in a tactically coordinated way [v
takticheskom vzaimodeystvii]." And in mid-1972 Admiral Gorshkov wrote
that "the First World War clearly showed that combined action of forces and means had become the *sine qua non* of warfare at sea." By 1974, however, the Soviets no longer found it necessary to defend this volte-face with allusions to ostensible historical or "foreign" practice.

**Combined Action**

"In the military and naval art," began an article in early 1974 entitled "Combined Action—A Paramount Principle of Force Employment," "there are a number of fundamental, cardinal questions associated with the theory and practice of warfare. One of these is the combined action of forces taking part in an operation or engagement." At the tactical level, wrote the author, combined action "is designed to eliminate mutual interference" between units deploying, maneuvering, and firing their main weapons, "as well as to intensify pressure [vozdeystvie] on the enemy" such that "the results of this pressure are greater than the sum of strikes (attacks) made by individual ships, aircraft, and groups participating in an engagement." Combined action, if "correctly" organized, "enables a mixed force to attack the enemy...from different directions with a variety of means and hampers his evasion of strikes." Thus, the enemy "sustains maximum damage and the attackers a minimum of losses." In short, "combined action of all forces plays a *decisive role* in the modern naval engagement," and "is one of the basic principles of waging combat in modern conditions," without which "not one of the missions of the armed struggle can be executed."
A host of theorists have echoed these thoughts since then, including Admiral Gorshkov: "Combined action...is one of the most important categories [sic] of the art of naval warfare," he wrote in both editions of Sea Power of the State. "A rational combination of the offensive and defensive capabilities of mixed groups enables the execution of tasks which considerably exceed in scale those executed with the aggregated capabilities of homogeneous forces.... The importance of tactical and operational combined action is growing in the navy's execution of every mission."86

Massed Action

Though less immediately obvious, the changes here are no less significant.

In December 1974, Admiral Gorshkov wrote that because of the range and power of today's weapons, massed action "will no longer necessarily have to be realized in the form of participation of a large number of ships and aircraft"—not, it would seem, a new formulation, were it not for what Gorshkov added to it. Although massed action would involve only a "relatively small" number of platforms, it "will take the form of concentration of...the weapons necessary to perform a combat mission." And not incidentally, he—and others who followed—spoke not of "massing of forces," as had been the practice in the previous decade, but as "massing of forces and means."87
Since then, a number of authors have elaborated on this theme. "In order, for example, to overcome an antiship-missile defense and achieve the necessary number of hits," said one, "it is necessary to increase the number of missiles in a strike against one target.... The modern interpretation of massed action basically implies not the concentration of ships and aircraft, but of the power of a strike." The "massed use of weapons," he added, "is a characteristic feature" of tactical actions today. In other words, the emphasis has shifted to saturation of enemy defenses, overwhelming them with large numbers of missiles, if not necessarily with large numbers of platforms.

Forms of Tactical Warfare

Finally, the naval engagement has once again become the principal "form"--we would call it "scenario"--of warfare at sea at the tactical level. The engagement, wrote Gorshkov in 1974, "has always been and remains fundamental for the execution of tactical missions"--a judgment he repeats in both editions of his book. In fact, the term "naval tactics" itself is now defined as "the study and development of methods of preparing for and fighting the naval engagement." Moreover, the "modern naval engagement," says the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, entails the participation of "mixed forces" and is characterized by "combined tactical action" and "massing of forces and means."
Writing in 1977, a naval officer candidly acknowledged that the postwar development of "this part of the art of naval warfare" had been "tortuous." "With the advent of nuclear-missile weapons," he explained, "the role of naval tactics"—as opposed to force-arm tactics—"was somewhat reduced." The "qualitative leap" in the capabilities of "force arms such as submarines and aviation" engendered "a tendency to enhance the role of independent action by them, especially in forward areas." The strike became the "basic form" of tactical action for the Navy's missile forces, with the engagement remaining important "only" in "offshore areas." The role of "naval tactics" was "considerably degraded" as a result, and "attempts were even made to eliminate [naval tactics] as such from the art of naval warfare." But the "further development of the methods of waging warfare at sea" and the "experience of operational and tactical training," concluded this officer, "have changed this point of view." 94

Neither combined action nor massed action, to be sure, have regained the status they once enjoyed of "categorical imperatives" of the art of naval warfare: Departures from combined action, says Gorshkov, are possible "in some instances"; 95 and "massing of forces and means" does not—despite its name—actually imply that forces should be massed. And the strike, though no longer the "basic" form of tactical action in forward areas, 96 remains important enough for Gorshkov to imply that its effect on the outcome of naval engagements can "in certain conditions" be decisive. 97

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All the same, the 1970s have witnessed a real counterrevolution in Soviet naval tactical doctrine. Although the revolution in tactical thought has not quite come full circle, it has come most of the way; the conservative views of Stalbo's opponents, discarded only after long and contentious argument by the mid-1960s, have returned to the fore in the 1970s, as firmly entrenched as ever. Why were these conservatives wrong then, and why are they right today? What happened at the turn of the decade—what were the factors that made for this change?

CAUSES OF THE VOLTE-FACE

The evidence suggests that at least two, and possibly three, factors played a role.

Reassessment of Enemy Defenses

The first of these was a newfound respect for the strength of enemy defenses. By definition, an engagement is a bilateral contest, consisting of "reciprocal attacks, counterattacks, and their repulsion." Surely, then, the Soviet Navy's revival of the naval engagement of itself implies a loss of confidence in its ability to destroy enemy forces with a preemptive strike before they can effectively respond. But there is even more direct evidence than that.
"With the expansion of surveillance capabilities," wrote a Soviet flag officer in 1973, "the possibility of preempting the enemy in combat is becoming more and more difficult." Massed action, another flag officer has stated, "has become even more important than before" because of the "increased...capabilities of aircraft-carrier task-force anti-missile, antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses." A passage in Gorshkov's Sea Power of the State suggests that the principle of combined action was revived for similar reasons: "The striking [power] and defensive capabilities of naval forces are continually increasing, which gives grounds for asserting that in the future combined tactical action will be required in order to overpower the enemy's organized and deeply-echeloned defense in an engagement."

Reassessment of Soviet Capabilities

The second factor involved a reassessment of Soviet capabilities themselves. Only one unmistakable piece of evidence for this exists, but its remarkable candor and the stature of its author—Rear Admiral N.B. Pavlovich, a distinguished naval theorist and historian—make it powerful evidence indeed. "The peculiarities of the new weaponry's properties," wrote Pavlovich in an article published late 1974, compelled a review of a number of principles developed from the experience of World War II and to some degree from that of local wars in the postwar period. One of these principles was massed action....

The effectiveness of the new types of weapons, evinced in their increased lethal radius and accuracy, changed the estimate of the quantity of weapons and [launch] platforms needed to achieve the results
desired of a strike. But because their theoretical accuracy was somewhat overrated, the measure of weapons needed to achieve decisive results was set too low. This in turn affected the formation of views on the methods of employing forces delivering and supporting strikes.\textsuperscript{104}

The "views" to which Pavlovich referred, of course, were those voiced by Stalbo in 1961 and Panteleev and Kharlamov 5 years later to the effect that massed action could no longer be considered a "basic" guide to force employment. But actually, wrote Pavlovich, massed action "can scarcely be disregarded," even in the best of worlds, because the number of weapons employed "by each attacking group ought to guarantee a quantity of hits such as would entail achieving the results that correspond to the objectives of the strike."\textsuperscript{105}

The principle of combined action, according to Pavlovich, suffered because of the same blithe approach to the new weapons:

\begin{quote}
With the advent of nuclear-missile weapons, the accelerating development of the forces and weapons for a strike made the latter so powerful that successful delivery of it foreordained the further course of events. One would have thought, thanks to the high speed of [launch] platforms and weapons for a strike, that carrying it out had become simpler. In actual fact this is a far from simple task. Performing it requires thorough support. The efforts of mixed forces acting...in the interests of the forces delivering the strike are needed.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

Although advances in weapons technology made lags in the development of naval theory "especially dangerous," concluded Pavlovich,
it must not be forgotten that extreme judgments have at times appeared in the process of development of the military art and the art of naval warfare, [judgments] which arose because of one-sided or simply incorrect assessments of the results of a given event or of the true effectiveness of the means of attack....

The implementation of extreme views in the construction of naval forces or their reflection in naval theory—and particularly in documents that determine the forms and methods of employing these forces—can prove to be no less harmful than if the methods of warfare lag behind the capabilities afforded by the level attained by combat technology.  

* * *

**Increased Tactical Importance of Conventional Weapons**

The role played in the volte-face by the third factor—if, in fact, it really was a factor—cannot be ascertained with anything like the certainty of the other two. Because of its potential importance, however, it must be discussed here.

Since the early 1970s, a number of Soviet theorists have pointed to the growing role of conventional weapons in warfare at sea at both the operational and tactical levels. Writing in 1973, for example, a Soviet theorist stated that modern naval operations would be characterized by the "mass [massovoe] use of a variety of the latest [a euphemism for "nuclear"] and conventional weaponry," and that the navies of "the largest countries" were equipping their forces with "not only the latest weapons of great lethality, but also conventional weapons."  

In a 1977 article on the "basic features of the modern naval engagement," another theorist wrote that "the naval engagement has come to be..."
regarded primarily as a combination of conventional and nuclear strikes by mixed naval forces, coordinated as to target, place and time. Clearly, then, conventional weapons have become more than just the "auxiliary means" of warfare they were in the 1960s.

What is not so clear is whether this change was a cause (that it was the cause may be safely dismissed given the evidence that there were others involved) or an effect of the counterrevolution in tactical doctrine.

As a cause, the return to favor of conventional weapons looks plausible, for in the measure that they became more respectable, so too would force employment principles originally formulated with their use in mind. Did the Soviets conclude, for example, that nuclear weapons were not always appropriate in tactical situations--too "dirty," perhaps, for employment outside the strategic context? The references to combined use of nuclear and conventional weapons militate against this as an answer. Did they decide there were some things they could do better with conventional munitions? It is difficult to think of any, if one grants that the main purpose of warfare at sea is to destroy the enemy or at least render him impotent. Or did they decide there were some things they could do well enough with conventional weapons and therefore more cheaply? Perhaps so: fissile materials are expensive to process and nuclear warheads expensive to build and maintain.
But the renewed importance of conventional weapons is equally plausible as an effect, especially of the requirement for massed action. If one must allow for the possibility of large losses of missiles to enemy fire, saturation of enemy defenses with massed all-nuclear strikes is hardly cost effective: the aim of diluting the defensive effort is just as well served if some of the missiles have the less expensive—and more expendable—conventional warheads.

HOW IT MAY ALL FIT TOGETHER

Despite this uncertainty, the main directions in the postwar progression of Soviet naval tactical thought are plain. A prolonged debate in the early 1960s ended in victory for those theorists who believed that the arrival of nuclear-missile weapons called for far-reaching changes in some basic tenets of Soviet naval tactics. Those who defended the old views "lost" the debate primarily because they were unable or even unwilling to challenge many of the reformers' key arguments. Like the reformers, they too stood in awe of the new weapons, which made their advocacy of massed action seem pointless; none of them doubted that the time factor was critical, which made their insistence on combined action, given the time it consumed, seem reckless; and since victory—indeed, survival itself—depended on preemption, how could one speak of engaging the enemy? Almost
inevitably, therefore, independent action, especially by submarines and aircraft, became the basic principle, and the preemptive strike the basic "form," of naval tactical warfare in forward areas.

By the early 1970s, the confident outlook reflected in that doctrine—and in Sokolovskiy's claims that the aircraft carrier was "a highly vulnerable target"—was badly shaken. The Soviets realized they had underrated the enemy's ability to defend himself and overrated their own ability to destroy him quickly, cleanly, and economically. Mere preemption would not assure his elimination; the prospects of avoiding engagements with him had faded; massed action no longer was pointless, nor combined action reckless; and conventional weapons, once the stepchild of the nuclear age, found new respectability.

In varying degrees, the new generation of surface combatants and submarines embodies this counterrevolution in Soviet tactical thought, particularly where the principle of massed action—or, more precisely, saturation—is concerned. For among the many differences between the new platforms and their generational predecessors, none is so striking as the difference in number of missile launchers. The Oscar class SSGN, for example, has twenty-four such launchers—three times the number carried by the Charlie and Echo-II classes, and six times as many as the Juliett class SSG. Kirov, the new cruiser, has twenty SSM launchers, or five times the number found on the last SSM cruiser design before it, Kresta-I. 111
The revival of combined action as a "paramount" principle of naval warfare is not nearly as obvious in the new designs, nor should we expect it to be, since it is more relevant to how forces should be employed than to how they should be designed. Nevertheless, it may well have something to do with the Soviet Navy's renewed interest in building SSM-firing cruisers, perhaps for combined submarine-, surface-ship-, and air-launched strikes against enemy high-value targets.  

Finally, the return of the naval engagement—*morskoy boy*—as the Soviet Navy's "basic" tactical scenario is consistent with, and is very likely reflected in, its present reported attempts to develop a CTOL aircraft carrier to improve, among other things, its fleet air defense capabilities.
NOTES

1Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya [hereafter referred to as SVE], vol. 6 [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978], p. 53, s.v. "Operativnoe iskusstvo".


3The discussion was initiated by James M. McConnell of the Center for Naval Analyses, who suggested in a 1974 analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's "Navies in War and Peace" that the Soviets had adopted a strategy of withholding a portion of their SLBMs in a general nuclear war in order to influence the shape of the postwar peace, should both the principal belligerents involved survive the war. See "Admiral Gorshkov on 'Navies in War and Peace,'" CNA Research Contribution 257, September 1974, pp. 71-116.

4Compare the Oscar class, which carries 24 missile tubes, with the Charlie-, Echo-II-, and Juliett-class cruise-missile submarines, which have 8, 8, and 4 tubes, respectively. The Kirov has 20 SSM launchers, while the 4 Kresta-I-class ships each have only 4. See Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-1982.

5The distinction between "form" and "content" in Soviet military doctrine issues directly from that made by Marxist-Leninist philosophy, where form and content are said to "reflect the interaction of the two sides of every phenomenon." Each phenomenon's content, on the one hand, is "the sum total of all [its] component elements, characteristics, connections, contradictions, and developmental tendencies," while its form on the other hand is "the relatively stable association between [its] elements, [i.e.] its internal organization and structure...its outward expression" (SVE, vol. 7 [Moscow, 1979], p. 429, s.v. "Soderzhanie i forma"). For a discussion of the subject in its military embodiment, see ibid., pp. 501-502, s.v. "Sposoby boevykh deystviy"; and ibid., vol. 8 (Moscow, 1980), p. 305, s.v. "Formy boevykh deystviy."

6Ibid., vol. 2 (Moscow, 1976), pp. 161-163, s.v. "Vnezapnost'."

7Ibid., vol. 6 (Moscow, 1978), pp. 542-543, s.v. "Printsipy voennogo iskusstva."
About categories, Bertrand Russell once wrote: "What, exactly, is meant by the word 'category,' whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel [he might just as well have added Marx to the list], I must confess that I have never been able to understand. I do not myself believe that the term 'category' is in any way useful in philosophy, as representing any clear idea" (A History of Western Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], pp. 199-200).


10 See notes 7 and 9 above, respectively. Nevertheless, confusion persists, as witness Gorshkov's use of the terms in the second edition of Theoretical Questions of the Art of Naval Warfare" by saying "let us briefly discuss some principles of naval [force] employment," and then proceeds to call them all "categories of the art of naval warfare" (Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva, 1st ed. [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976], pp. 361-380; 2nd ed. [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979], pp. 330-346.

11 See N.P. V'yunenko, "O nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v razvitii morskoy taktiki," MS, No. 10, October 1975, pp. 21-26. A March 1978 article in the same journal commemorating the 130th anniversary of its founding supports this point. Appraising the journal's section on "The Art of Naval Warfare," the author writes that articles such as V'yunenko's help Soviet officers to "develop unified tactical thinking" and prompt them to "analyze and interpret...events arising in the course of tactical and operational training" (I. Gordeev, "Nash zhurnal," MS, No. 3, March 1978, p. 25).


14 Idem, "Avianostsy v poslevoennyy period," MS, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 91-100.

15 Ibid., p. 94.

16 SVE, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1977), pp. 225, s.v. "Doktrina voennaya."


Books published as part of the "Officer's Library" are apparently designed to serve as "textbooks for the self-education of a wide circle of Soviet officers" (Sokolovsky, op.cit., p. 4).


A. Gontaev, "Flot v voyne: opyt i uroki," MS, No. 4, April 1975, p. 104.

McConnell, op.cit., p. 611. "Contemporary Soviet military doctrine," says the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, "is a system of guiding principles, of scientifically substantiated views of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on the essence, character, and methods of waging a war that may be thrust upon the Soviet Union by the imperialists, as well as on the military...preparation of the Armed Forces and the nation to crush the aggressor" (SVE, vol. 3, p.229, s.v. "Doktrina voennaya").

Vice-Admiral Stalbo has been involved in a number of these recently. For example, (1) his article on aircraft carriers in World War II ("Aviastsy vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne") was attacked by the journal's chief editor for not giving "due attention to the vulnerability of these ships to submarine weapons" (A. Pushkin, "Boevye deyestviya amerikanskikh i yaponskih podvodykh lodok protiv avianostsev v period vtoroy mirovoy voyne," MS, No. 9, September 1979, p. 12); (2) the main points of his article on the development of views on submarines ("Razvitie vzglyadov na podvodyne sily," MS, No. 9, September 1979, pp. 81-87) were characterized by Vice-Admiral Gontaev as "insufficiently convincing," "one-sided" and even "tendentious" ("Na avansyene nauchno-tekhnicaskevoy revolyutsii," MS, No. 2, February 1980, pp. 80-90); and (3) in a two-part article published in 1981 on the "theory of the development and employment of the Navy" ("Nekotorye vzglyadya i ispol'zovaniya VMF," MS, No. 4, April 1981, pp. 20-28 and No. 5, May 1981, pp. 17-27), he asks that his thoughts (which "remain the author's opinion only") be "amplified and critically appraised by the journal's readers" (No. 5, p. 27); to date, four responses have been published (G. Kostev, "Ob osnovakh teorii Voeno-Morskogo Flota," MS, No. 11, November 1981, pp. 24-29; V. Chernenin, "O teorii Voeno-Morskogo Flota," MS, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 20-24); V. Sysoev, "Teoriya upravleniya Voeno-Morskim Flotom," MS, No. 3, March 1982, pp. 21-27; B. Makeev, "Nekotorye vzglyady na teoriyu vooruzheniya VMF," MS, No. 4, April 1982, pp. 27-31.
See Yu. Bystrov, "Zavoevanie gospodstva na more," _MS_, No. 3, March 1977, pp. 17, 20 ("The experience of [the second world] war showed that winning command of the sea is impossible without a preponderance of forces in the air"; "Command of the sea has become unthinkable without command of the air..."); A. Pushkin, _op.cit._, p. 11 ("A paramount factor of command of the sea in ocean areas [in World War II] was command of the air..."); G. Kostev, _op.cit._, p. 25 ("...winning command of the sea is virtually unthinkable without winning command of the air.")

I. Korotkov, "O razvitii sovetskoy voennoy teorii v poslevoennye gody," _Voenny-istoricheskiy zhurnal_, No. 4, April 1964, p. 44.

The Penkovskiy Papers, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 251. A 1976 history of the Soviet General Staff Academy corroborates this date in a description of a lecture delivered in August 1959 at the Academy by the then Chief of the General Staff Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy:

A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff delivered at the Academy in August 1959...acquainted the Academy's leaders, professors, instructors and students with the new views on the probable character of a future war...and pointed to the tasks of Soviet military strategy that followed therefrom.

The lecturer's basic propositions, which defined the general direction of the development and preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces for the immediate future, became the foundation not only of the [Academy's] strategy course, but of the entire training program for generals and officers at the General Staff Academy.


N. Lomov, "O sovetskoy voennoy doktrine," _Kommuwist Vooruzhennykh Sil_, No. 10, May 1962, p. 11 (Colonel-General Lomov was Chairman of the Department of Strategy at the General Staff Academy at the time. See V.G. Kulikov, _op. cit._, pp. 157, 185).


_Ibid._, p. 17.

_Ibid._, p. 18.

_Ibid._, p. 19.

Lisyutin, *op.cit.*, p. 16; see also V.T. Protsenko, cited in "O nekotorykh printsipakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennykh usloviyakh," p. 16.


Ibid., p. 23.


Svetlov, op.cit., p. 20.

Nikitin, op.cit., p. 20.

Krasnokutskiy, op.cit., p. 21.

See S.G. Gorshkov, "Kesheniya XXII s"ezda KPSS i zadachi voennykh moryakov," MS, No. 1, January 1962, p. 17: "when carrying out both theoretical and practical tasks, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that the enemy will offer strong opposition during the fight. In order to overcome this opposition, massed use of forces and combined action of all the forces assigned to perform a combat mission will be required."

On massed action: "Compared to conventional weapons, nuclear-missile weapons possess incomparably greater hit probabilities and colossal destructive capabilities. Some weapon models virtually defy shooting down with current defensive means. Of course... one should take into account the expected level of enemy resistance and the conditions that ensure hitting the designated target.... So does it follow from this that a [tactical] nuclear-missile strike... is characterized by the massed use of forces?" (Kolesnikov, op.cit., p. 23). On combined action: "Today all the conditions exist that permit abandoning the obligatory principle of combined action..." (Protsenko, op.cit., pp. 24); "the improved tactical properties of modern weapons considerably diminish the interdependence of forces in an engagement..." (Sysoev, op.cit., p. 24); "The increased combat capabilities of the modern navy's force arms in many cases also permits employing them independently in an engagement (without coordinating their actions with the striking forces of other force arms)" (Sukhodol'skiy, op.cit., p. 35).

54 Nikitin, op.cit., pp. 18-19: "It would be wrong to rule out the possibility that conventional weapons will be used...and to proceed from [the assumption] that in all cases the objectives of an engagement will be achieved only with nuclear-missile weapons"; to which Kolesnikov (op.cit., pp. 19-20) replied: "Our military science has been forced to regard nuclear-missile weapons as the main means of achieving victory over the enemy. We emphasize—the main [means], and not a reserve [means], nor an auxiliary [means], nor a means for exploiting a breakthrough obtained as a result of employing conventional weapons. Conversely, conventional weapons have become not the main [means], but a supplementary and sometimes reserve means. These premises are also, in our opinion, the point of departure when examining the forms of warfare at sea both on an operational and on a tactical scale."

55 Lisyutin, op.cit., p. 16; Protsenko, op.cit., p. 16.

56 Stalbo, "O nekotorykh kategoriakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennom ikh proyavlennii," p. 19. A belief in the fantastic accuracy of guided missiles pervaded Soviet writings of the time; references to hit probabilities of between 60 and 90 percent were common. See V.G. Rog, "Vliyanie raketno-yadernogo oruzhiya na primenenie avialtsii na more," MS, No. 6, June 1963, p. 34 ("The probability that one SAM...will hit an air target flying at an altitude of 18 kilometers is 65 percent"); P.N. Verin, K.V. Morozov, Raketnoe oruzhie protivovozdushnoy oborony na more [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964], p. 9 ("The average probability of hitting a maritime target with a guided missile and a conventional gravity bomb in the same conditions is 60-80 percent and 1-2 percent, respectively") and p. 44 ("A modern [jet] aircraft...can be shot down with one or, at worst, two surface-to-air missiles"); B.F. Petrov, "Soderzhanie i kharakter sovremennykh boevyh deystviy na more," MS, No. 1, January 1965, p. 14 ("Missiles, especially those equipped with homing devices and designed to hit sea and air targets, have a hit probability of 60-90 percent").


58 Matveev, op.cit., p. 20.

59 Svetlov, op.cit., p. 25 See also Lisyutin, op.cit., p. 20; Nikitin, op.cit., p. 20; editors of Morskoy sbornik, in ibid., pp. 24-25.

60 Svetlov, op.cit., p. 19. See also Lisyutin, op.cit., pp. 16-17; Nikitin, op.cit., p. 20; Editors of Morskoy sbornik, op.cit., p. 24.
The notion that modern weapons could be fired from standoff ranges was also echoed outside the confines of this debate in a number of articles and publications. See, inter alia, V.G. Rog, op. cit., p. 32 ("The employment of air-to-surface guided missiles can rule out opposition from shipboard antiaircraft weapons against missile-carrying aircraft, and under some conditions missile-carrying aircraft can deliver a strike without entering the area of action of fighters providing air cover for ships"); A.N. Sukhanov, "Vliyanie razvitiya tekhniki i oruzhiya na taktiku aviatssii pri deystviiakh po korablyam v more," MS, No. 4, April 1961, pp. 35-36 ("Some types of guided missiles...possess a range...that permits attacking a target from distances that exceed the combat radius of some types of shipboard fighters"). In the event that fighters were encountered, these and other writers doubted that they could provide effective opposition in anything less than optimal conditions (no ECM, good visibility, etc.). See Rog, op. cit., pp. 34-36; K.V. Morozov, Korabel'nye sredstva protivovozdushnoy oborony [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960] pp. 101-102; P.N. Verin, K.V. Morozov, op. cit., p. 122; I.I. Kolosov, "Deystviiya aviatsii po korablyam v more v usloviyakh radioprotivodeystvii," MS, No. 3, March 1962, pp. 40-42; S.A. Gulyaev, "Kol' aviatsii v boevykh deystviyakh na more v sovremennykh usloviyakh," MS, No. 6, June 1965, pp. 41-42.

N.H. Kharlamov, "Tendentsii razvitiya voenso-morskikh flotov," MS, No. 1, January 1966, p. 34.

72 See notes 18 and 19.

73 Admiral Kharlamov was formerly commander-in-chief of the Baltic Sea Fleet (1950-1954). At the time his article was published, he was involved in "responsible duties in the Navy's central apparatus"—probably its Main Staff (Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 3rd ed., vol. 28 [Moscow, 1978], p. 201). Admiral Panteleev, a former commander-in-chief of the Pacific Ocean Fleet (1951-1955), wrote as the head of the Soviet Naval Academy (SVE, vol. 6 [Moscow, 1978], pp. 206-207).

74 Panteleev, op.cit., p. 28.

75 Kharlamov, op.cit., p. 34.


79 N.P. V'yunenko, "Sovetskoe voenno-morskoe iskusstvo nakanune Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny," MS, No. 6, June 1971, p. 32. Although Admiral Gorshkov, writing in 1967 on the history of Soviet naval theory, had found much to commend in the Combat Manual's treatment of operational and tactical issues, he pointedly reproached postwar theorists for trying to apply its provisions in the nuclear-missile age, singling out for criticism their determination to make "any" tactical action against enemy surface ships a matter of "delivering the main strike in coastal waters of necessity with a combined naval force." This "could not be justified," since it "inevitably promoted the entrenchment of hackneyed methods of naval force employment in combat" and "restricted the initiative" of tactical commanders ("Razvitie sovetskogo voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 17). V'yunenko's article contained no such afterthoughts.

"Voenno-morskie floty v voynakh i v mirnoe vremya," *MS*, No. 5, May 1972, p. 24. In a later article in "Navies in War and Peace," Gorshkov wrote that during the Second World War "homogeneous naval tactical formations [soedinieniya] were transformed into mixed [tactical formations], which permitted the execution of the most probable missions of the war at sea. The methods of combined action against the enemy by different force arms and types of weapons...were developed and improved" (*ibid.*, *MS*, No. 11, November 1972, p. 32).


Ibid., p. 29.

Ibid., p. 30 (emphasis in original).

Ibid., p. 53.


89 Ibid., p. 27.


92 SVE, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1979), p. 631, s.v. "Taktika voenno-morskogo flota." See also Stalbo, "Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya ispol'zovaniya VMF," MS, No. 4, April 1981, p. 27: "The theory of naval tactics develops, studies and investigates that realm of the art of naval warfare where the highest and basic form of [naval] action is the naval engagement—the basic means of attaining victory."


94 Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," p. 24. Mamchits appears to be referring to the proposed elimination by one of the participants in the 1960s debate of the term "general naval tactics" (see above, p. 19-20): "Then [only] force arm tactics and the operational art would remain" as components of the art of naval warfare (see Emel'yanov, op.cit., p. 25).


96 See SVE, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1980), p. 305, s.v. "Formy boevykh deystviy," where the strike is listed as a form of warfare, but not as a basic form of warfare, either at the tactical, operational or strategic level.

97 Morskaya moshcha' gosudarstva, 1st ed., p. 365; 2nd ed., p. 333; "Nekotorye voprosy razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 25. Gorshkov's statement that the strike "is becoming increasingly equivalent to the engagement," however, should not mislead us into thinking that nothing has changed. Writing in 1980, Admiral Sysoev, the current chief of the Soviet Naval Academy, makes clear that the strike—though "becoming equivalent to the engagement"—remains only an "element" of it, albeit one of the "main" ones (V.S. Sysoev, "Razvitie form vooruhennoy bor'by na more," MS, No. 11, November 1980, p. 24).

Soviet statements are consistent with this inference. According to Mamchits, naval striking forces must "possess not only power enough to defeat the enemy, but also the appropriate combat stability, in order to hold out against enemy fire.... Questions of ensuring the combat stability of forces in all phases of an engagement have become especially important" ("Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," pp. 25-26).

A. Gontaev, "Vnezapnost' kak kategoriya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," MS, No. 3, March 1973, p. 35. Other examples: "As armaments develop the role of surprise is becoming even more important.... At the same time the capabilities of reconnaissance and early warning of missile attack have increased.... In modern conditions the role of surprise has become more important by far than before. But at the same time achieving it has become much more difficult" (Stalbo, "Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya i ispol'zovaniya VMF," MS, No. 5, May 1981, p. 221); "Since the advent of [fighter?] aircraft and thereafter of radar and other more sophisticated detection systems, the struggle to actualize the surprise factor in warfare at sea has intensified" (Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," p. 25).

V. Chernavin, "O teorii Voenno-Morskogo Flota," p. 23. See also Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," p. 24 ("The increased defensive capabilities of navies and the enhancement of the combat stability of ships and tactical formations have necessitated an even greater massing of forces and weapons in an engagement").


"Osnovnye factory razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 50 (emphasis mine). Pavlovich died in late June 1973 (see obituary in Krasnaya zvezda, 30 June 1973, p. 4); the article was published posthumously.

Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Ibid., p. 51.

Ibid., pp. 51-52.


Voennaya strategiya, 3rd ed. (1968), pp. 363, 364. Surely the evidence adduced in this paper suggests that such statements were not all bluff! However, for a contrary view, see Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1968), p. 118.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-1982

An apparent "fly in the ointment," of course, is the Kiev class, design work for which probably began in the first half of the 1960s, but which is equipped with eight SS-N-12 launchers. One explanation may be that the launchers were added to the ship much later in the design phase. Unfortunately, this explanation is extremely difficult to confirm, given that a full history of Kiev's design phase is unlikely to come to light.


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Sukhanov, A.N. "Vliyanie razvitiya tekhniki i oruzhiya na taktiku aviatsii pri deystvijakh po korablyam v more" [Impact of the development of weapons and technology on the tactics of air warfare against ships at sea]. Morskoy sbornik, No. 4, April 1961, pp. 31-37.


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