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MICHAEL HOWARD:
MILITARY HISTORIAN AND STRATEGIC ANALYST

BY

DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS, JR.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, FIELD ARTILLERY

10 JUNE 1983

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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Report Document Page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT NUMBER</th>
<th>2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<th>4. TITLE (and Subtitle)</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<th>10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA &amp; WORK UNIT NUMBERS</th>
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<thead>
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<th>12. REPORT DATE</th>
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<th>15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)</th>
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<th>15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE</th>
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<th>16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
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<td>Abstract: The paper deals with the employment of military history in educational institutions. It is a critical review of the field, an eight- and fifteen-year writing, and an attempt to introduce a new perspective. The study argues that military history should not be seen as an isolated or secondary subject, but as integral to the overall understanding of history.</td>
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Brodie, Howard has been one of those whose critical insight and command of historical procedures and strategic issues have provided intellectual rigor, a sense of realism, and broad comprehension to military-political analysis, applied to the study in an essay on the "Founding of the Institute for Strategic Studies" with which Howard has been associated since its inception.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

MICHAEL HOWARD:
MILITARY HISTORIAN AND STRATEGIC ANALYST

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel David Curtis Skaggs, Jr.
Field Artillery

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
10 June 1983

Approved for public release
distribution unlimited.
"Michael Howard: Military Historian and Strategic Analyst" assesses the role of the distinguished Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford University in the development of military history and strategic studies since World War II. Data was gathered using a literature search of Professor Howard's historical, strategic, and popular writings and personal interviews and correspondence with persons associated with him in his various academic and public roles. The format chosen was an historical narrative which begins with an overview of his career, continues with a description and critique of his historical and strategic writings, and concludes with an assessment of his contributions, especially those as a "strategist." The study argues that although his writings may not have been as influential as those of Sir Basil Liddell Hart or Bernard Brodie, Michael Howard has been one of those whose critical insight and whose command of historical precedents and strategic issues have provided intellectual rigor, a sense of realism, and broad comprehension to military-political analysis. Appended to the study is an essay on the "Founding of the Institute for Strategic Studies" with which Howard has been associated since its inception.

The author is a professor of history in Bowling Green State University, a member of the consulting faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College, and a reserve mobilization designee to the US Military Academy.
The genesis of this individual study project resulted from a typical US Army War College writing requirement. This one called for a short essay on a "strategist." Before the sign-up sheet was passed around the table to my seat most of the "choice" topics were taken—A. T. Mahan, Henri Jomini, Giulio Douhet, "Billy" Mitchell, Henry Kissinger, and so forth. Of those remaining only one struck my fancy—"Michael Howard"—a fellow historian about whom I knew little except for his Studies in War and Peace and War in European History, copies of which were in my library. After the completion of this 2000-word requirement came the desire to expand it into a more thorough analysis.

The object of this study was to provide an analysis of Michael Howard's role in his dual capacity as an historian and as a contributor to strategic studies and thought. The initial hypothesis was that as a member of the history and war studies departments in London and Oxford Universities; as a leading figure in the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Royal Institute of International Affairs; and as an advisor in various capacities for the Ministry of Defence, Michael Howard has played a significant role in the development and analysis of strategic thought and military developments in the European past and in the contemporary world.

The method of study was to read Howard's published writings, to interview Howard and a number of persons in both North America and England associated with Howard's career, to correspond with a number of other individuals and to review manuscripts at both the International Institute for Strategic Studies (by now the Institute had added "International" to its name) and the University of London which impact on this inquiry. The design was to present an analysis based upon an integration of evidence derived from these various sources into a narrative assessing Howard's influence and importance. It is my regret that the hoped-for indepth study of Howard and the founding of the ISS has had to be reduced to a short Appendix due to time constraints.

* * * * *

This study could never have been undertaken without the cooperation of Professor Howard. He not only consented to an interview in his quarters at Oriel College, Oxford on 11 March 1983, but also provided the author the names of numerous individuals who might assist in providing both background and critical commentary on his career.

A number of persons consented to personal interviews. In keeping with War College tradition, a policy of non-attribution has been followed in all but a few instances. Several of the interviewees provided exceptional hospitality to me and, in most instances, my wife: General Sir John and Lady Hackett of Coberley Hill, Gloucestershire; Lady Liddell Hart of...
Medmenham, Buckinghamshire; Mr. and Mrs. Richard Goold-Adams of Bath, Avon; Major General Anthony Trythall, Director of Army Education, Eltham Palace, London; and Mr. Joseph Fromm of the US News and World Report in Washington, DC. Their kind hospitality was not only greatly appreciated but will be fondly remembered by both of us for years to come.

Others who graciously provided time from their busy schedules included Professor Peter Paret of Stanford University during a brief visit to the University of Richmond; Dr. Jay Luvaas of the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Dr. Richard N. Haas of the Department of State, Washington, DC; Dr. Robert O'Neill, Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, Colonel Jonathan Alford, Major Arthur Majendie, and Mrs. Patricia Evans of the International Institute for Strategic Studies staff; the Right Hon. Fred W. Mulley, M.P.; Sir Arthur Hockaday, formerly of the Ministry of Defence; and Dr. Laurence Freedman of London University. There were also several telephone interviews with Dr. Adrian W. Preston of the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario; Sir Patrick Nairne, formerly with the Ministry of Defence and now master of St. Catherine's College, Oxford; Dr. Wolf Mendl of King's College, London; and Dr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Bookings Institution, Washington, DC. Correspondence was exchanged with Dr. Paul Guinn of the State University of New York at Buffalo; A. J. P. Taylor of London; E. P. Thompson of Wick Episcopi, Worcester; Dr. Laurence Martin of the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Lord Dacre of Glanton (formerly Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper of Oxford) master of Peterhouse, Cambridge; and Mrs. Alastair Buchan of Brill, Oxfordshire.

To all these individuals I wish to express a deep appreciation for their cooperation with a perfect stranger to whom in most cases they opened their hearts and minds in support of a project they considered worthwhile. I hope the results are worthy of their efforts.

Of course this project would have not been successful had it not been for the support of many others. Librarians at the Army War College, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives in the University of London, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies provided efficient service with smiles and energy often well beyond that required of them. Similar untiring efforts were made by the women of the Word Processing Center at the War College for their typing of my manuscript. Captain J. R. "Buzz" Greenwood, USN, and Lieutenant Colonel John Votaw of the Carlisle Barracks faculty were helpful in many ways. I am particularly grateful to Colonel William Witt, Director of the Military Studies Program, whose support of both the study proposal and of the funding for a two week research trip to England contributed significantly to the completion of this project. Finally, Dr. Harold Deutsch of the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations has been unstinting in his encouragement and criticism. In particular he felt a study of Michael Howard's role in the development of military history and defense studies over the past quarter century was worthy of both my study and his advising.

***

Any study of this sort has a number of weaknesses. First and foremost is the time constraints that the War College academic calendar imposes upon
such a study by an Army Reserve officer used to the less rigorous schedules of his civilian professorship. Second, any attempt to impose order upon another's thought suffers from the student's misperceptions of the subject's intent, emphasis, and design. Third, Howard has never given a complete, single statement of his historical and strategic ideas, hence any attempt to create a cohesive whole distorts reality. Finally, there are those problems of interpretation which are based upon incomplete information, misanalysis, and inadequate synthesis.

Whatever the errors that appear in this paper, they are entirely my own. Despite these mistakes of omission and comission, it is hoped that a modest addition has been made in this paper to the world of strategic studies.

David Curtis Skaggs
Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery
US Army Reserve
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<td>DNB</td>
<td>Dictionary of National Biography</td>
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<td>Michael Howard</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. THE MAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second World War</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King's College</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Figure</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE HISTORIAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of History</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military History in General</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age of Moltke</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age of Churchill</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age of Clausewitz</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard the Historian</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE STRATEGIC ANALYST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Strategic Approach to World Politics</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Causes of War</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dimensions of Strategy</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Double Deterrent</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Controversy</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE ASSESSMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Personality</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Strategist</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX—FOUNDING THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE MAN

"I am a devotee of Michael Howard," the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom told a reporter recently, "A very, very penetrating mind on military history." Nothing better indicates that the Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford University is considered one of "the Great and the Good" in British society. This certification of his membership in The Establishment constitutes a recognition that this scholar is more than a mere academic. He is truly a man of affairs and a leading luminary in his country's public life in the latter portion of this century. But his reputation is worldwide. When *Time* magazine commented on the Report of the European Security Study by twenty-seven authors, Professor Howard was only one of three writers mentioned by name.¹ The attainment of this position of mastery constitutes an important beginning to an understanding of his role as historian, military analyst, and commentator.

HERITAGE

The prominence of his branch of the Howards begins with Luke Howard (1772-1864) who founded the family pharmaceutical business in the late eighteenth century. Luke Howard was more than a chemist and businessman, he was also the pioneer in modern meteorology and named the principal cloud formations—Cirrus, Cumulus, and Stratus. Both Luke and his son, John Eliot Howard (1807-1883), were elected members of the Royal Society as a recognition for their scientific contributions. John Eliot was not only connected with the family chemical manufactory in Stratford, but also
authored numerous scientific papers, mostly relating to quinology. Both he and his father were members of the Society of Friends and strong advocates of various charitable, philanthropic and moralistic causes. By all odds, Luke Howard was the most important scholar in the family before his great-great-grandson Michael Eliot Howard achieved a position of preeminence in the academic world in the last third of the twentieth century.

Most important in this legacy of respectability in upper middle class Britain was the Howard's Quaker tradition. Long time acquaintances of Michael Howard know little about this aspect of his life, but all who know him understand the strong sense of morality that permeates his activities. Certainly Luke Howard's interests in the anti-slavery cause, in the relief of German peasants whose lives had been ravaged during the Napoleonic wars, and in the Bible Society have echoes in the life and writings of his descendant. While Michael Howard obviously dropped the pacific tradition of the Quakers by the time of the Second World War, the ethical approach to war and diplomacy that dominates his writings constitutes a variation on a theme harking back to his best-known ancestor.

A second, and also virtually unknown, event in Michael Howard's lineage occurred when his father Geoffrey Eliot Howard married Edith Edinger, daughter of a German-Jewish stockbroker whose family migrated to England in the late nineteenth century. This somewhat unusual alliance brought a strong academic tradition into the Howard family. Edith Edinger Howard had a cousin marry a Prague professor named Victor Ehrenberg. Ehrenberg's family fled to England during the 1930's and their son Geoffrey (who changed his family name to Elton during the Second World War) eventually became a leading scholar of Tudor history at Cambridge. In 1983 Geoffrey Elton was elevated to the Regius Professorship of Modern History at Cambridge, giving the family a "double first" with the two premier history chairs in England.
Undoubtedly this Jewish background also affected Michael Howard's conduct during the Second World War. The fate of the Ehrenbergs and his other less fortunate cousins left behind in the Nazi Empire not only influenced his attitudes toward the morality of that conflict, but has ever since affected his attitudes about the concept of the "just war."

The third son of the marriage of Geoffrey and Edith Howard was Michael Eliot, born 29 November 1922 in London. Although most of his youth was spent in the capital, the Howards also had an estate called Ashmore near Salisbury. Howard describes his youth as typical of the English upper-middle-class. He prepared for the university examinations at Wellington College, an English "public" school established as a memorial to the first Duke of Wellington and originally intended to educate the orphaned sons of military officers. Although it was one of the more military-oriented of such schools, this was not the rationale for sending him there. Rather it was because of Michael's musical talents and the fine reputation the school had in this regard that led to the decision by the Howards to send their precocious younger son to Wellington, located not far from Ashmore.

Howard now finds being bred to such "privileged establishments" provided his generation with an upbringing totally inadequate "to the world in which we were . . . required to take our places." Sexually isolated at all boys' schools, most of them emerged finding "it difficult to develop an adult relationship with the opposite sex," on the one hand, and, on the other, because of the class orientation of their education, finding it virtually impossible to have, "except on a totally bogus basis," a satisfactory relationship "with someone from another class." Whatever the social inadequacies of Wellington, Howard busied himself with music, academics, drama, and other activities, except sports, which he detested then and continues to so regard. Wellington prepared him well for history and he
entered Christ Church, Oxford, on a scholarship in that discipline, intending to make a career in academe.

SECOND WORLD WAR

Oxford of 1940 could not exist in splendid isolation from the political and military ferment of the world outside it. The disruption that Hitler wrought upon his mother’s family intruded itself upon the studious young scholar. One who merely tolerated the military discipline of his preparatory school now found himself required to enter the Officer Training Corps. Years later he recalled,

crouching in a wet ditch somewhere on Cumnor Hill on a wet autumn afternoon . . . with a burly young man in the uniform of a subaltern of the Rifle Brigade standing over me shouting, ‘On, on, on! Kill, kill, kill! Remember Hong Kong!’

(That young lieutenant would eventually become Major-General A. J. Wilson and preside over thirty years afterward at the Royal United Services Institute Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture given by his former OTC cadet.)

His wartime deferment required that he engage in OTC training which took two days a week. After two years at Oxford he decided to participate more actively in the war and sought a war emergency commission. In the British Army one has to be admitted into a regiment. For young Howard this was facilitated by the adjutant of the Oxford OTC who was a member of the Coldstream Guards. Howard claims that he knew next to nothing about the reputation of this regiment except that its march was composed by Mozart and that seemed as good a reason as any to join the Foot Guards. One finds this alleged naivete by a Wellington man a bit hard to accept since even an American knows that the guards regiments attract sons of the British Establishment and that even in wartime such a commission was an indication of one’s social respectability.
Virtually all who know Michael Howard remark on the importance of the experience in the Brigade of Guards to his subsequent career. The Guards officers were the pick of British society. Future bishops, ministers of state, generals, members of Lords and Commons, magnates of business and molders of public opinion were among its junior officers.

After officer training at Aldershot, Lieutenant Howard joined the Third Battalion of Coldstream Guards in North Africa in September 1943. He initially saw combat at Salerno. In the "close and terraced" fields above that city Captain A. F. Davidson and his Second Company were sent to take a hill as part of a feint towards Avellino. Although heavily attacked by the Germans, "Lt. Howard's platoon charged up the hill with bayonets to settle the matter." For his actions at Salerno, the young lieutenant received the Military Cross, his country's third highest award for valor and he would thereafter be known as Michael Howard, M.C. As he would later write in the regimental history:

The Third Battalion had played an outstanding part in the battle of Salerno, but the cost in casualties was exceedingly heavy. In three weeks of fighting eight officers and sixty men had been killed, and ten officers and 163 men had been wounded. . . . It was a sad introduction to the campaign in Italy and a bitter foretaste of what lay in store for the battalion in the mountains that barred the road to Rome.

For Lieutenant Howard it was a sad introduction to a long campaign that would see him wounded twice before the German surrender in 1945. Undoubtedly this frustrating campaign in the Apennines affected Howard's attitudes toward war and influenced his concepts of military strategy in the contemporary era. His humanity and his understanding of human weaknesses and strength were shaped in the year-and-a-half march up the Italian peninsula. Moreover, that record has given him a credibility in military circles that marks Howard as someone other than a mere academic interested
in warfare. He has tasted the boredom, the suffering, the terror, and the frustrations of combat unlike most who write military history.

Part of his suffering came during the Salerno operation. Billeted in swampy countryside he contracted malaria, a disease which affected him for a decade afterwards. This meant that at each change of the season throughout the campaign up the peninsula there was a recurrence of the chills and fevers associated with that illness. As unpleasant as this was, it meant that he was constantly being readmitted to the hospital and relieved from combat duties. He now believes this saved his life in a regiment that lost over a third of its officers during the war. He oscillated between hospital and front line throughout the year of 1944 thereby missing some of the regiment's hottest actions.

Promoted to captain in December 1944, he transferred to the Second Battalion just before the war's end. Attached to the 91st US Infantry Division near Trieste, that battalion found itself "surrounded by national rivalries and ideological hatred" that caused the guardsmen, "to realize that, though the war might be over, the world was yet far from the peace for which the battalion had fought since it had first embarked for France in September 1939."

The prestige of a Guards commission would remain with him the rest of his life. On appropriate occasions he wears with pride the regimental tie. Knowledge of this association provides him with admission into the elite of his country's society. Howard has argued that the Brigade of Guards "was probably the most civilized way of getting through a period of life which most of our contemporaries found disagreeable and depressing. Adolescence could, in that tolerant company, be indefinitely prolonged." Whatever may be his disparaging remarks about aspects of that service, it marks an
important feature of his career that separates him from most of his aca-
demic contemporaries. Moreover, it provided him a presence, an aura of
command that is immediately noticed by all who meet him.

A small glimpse of that life is found in the memoirs of C. R. S.
Buckle of the Scots Guards, one of the regiments in the Brigade. Captain
"Dicky" Buckle, was described years later by his wartime friend as "a
dandy, flamboyantly outrageous in behaviour, utterly fearless, meticulous
in taste. impressively learned, master of a wide range of life-enhancing
talents, a wit, dilettante, on occasion, when discoursing about his ances-
try, a ponderous bore." Captain Buckle and Lieutenant Howard became close
friends and, as Howard would later write, that "friendship was a consola-
tion beyond measure in times when such privileges were hard to come by, and
has remained a precious memory ever since." Others in this small group
were Captain Simon W. Phipps, M.C., later Bishop of Lincoln, and Major
Andrew Cavendish, M.C., who became Marquis of Hartington when his older
brother was killed while serving with the Coldstream, and who eventually
became the Duke of Devonshire.

Life with Buckle was indeed interesting: "There was . . . the ever-
present possibility that he would probably end up facing a court-martial or
earning a posthumous Victoria Cross." As the war wound towards its event-
tual conclusion Dicky Buckle wrote and produced a revue for the Guards
Brigade at Spoletto, Italy. entitled: "As Improperly Dressed." Harking
back to his days at Wellington, M. E. Howard served as assistant producer
of this farce which had, according to its author, "three riotous perfor-
mances." With the conclusion of the war, Buckle and Howard went on leave
to Lake Maggiore. were shown the hanging gardens of Isola Bella by Countess
Borromeeo, and, in an irony that would only later seem important, heard the
aged Archbishop of Milan preach against "la_bomba_atomica."
The end of the war brought change to the world of those of Michael Howard's generation and social class. "Up till now the thick cocoon of personal relationship which protects the normally gregarious young had filled the foreground of our lives." Suddenly there were no more schools, the Guards were demobilized, and "gradually the group dispersed; married, travelled, even, astonishingly, died. We were left on our own." Those who read Howard's non-historical reviews of the memoirs and letters of Buckle, John Gale, and Evelyn Waugh will find his critique of a generation which was unable to cope with the post-war world. Waugh, for instance, remarked that all his friends had been made at Oxford or in the Army. As Howard expressed it:

As with so many of his brilliant and unhappy generation, his time at university was not, as it is with most young people, an adolescent preliminary to a life of ever deepening maturity and enjoyment. Rather it was an experience of total self-fulfillment to be prolonged if possible throughout life.

Waugh made no new friends after the war and a survey of his correspondence "chronicles with melancholy but typical ruthlessness the aging and disintegration of the Bright Young People he did so much to make famous, their decline into drunkenness, disease, senility, and all too frequently suicide."

Howard rejected their lifestyles and continued his quest for an academic career. He returned to Christ Church to complete the degree in which he had received a coveted "first" in history before his departure in 1942. He was active in a variety of Oxon societies and held the prestigious position as president of the Junior Common Room of Christ Church. His academic performance was not up to his pre-Coldstream standards and he acknowledges that "I hadn't really gotten my act together" in time for his final examinations. As a consequence, his hopes for an Oxford fellowship
were "disappointed" and he took instead a position at the bottom rung of the academic ladder as an assistant lecturer in history in King's College of the University of London.

KING'S COLLEGE

Many might have taken "what seemed at the time a very grave setback" as an excuse to settle down into the routine of academia, to live off his family wealth in a suitable London neighborhood, and to dissipate himself in idleness. Others with even less of an excuse had done just that. But Howard was ambitious and determined to make his mark even if he had to start lower on the ladder than he had earlier hoped. Encouraged by his Oxford mentor Hugh Trevor-Roper, Howard looked forward to researching early seventeenth century English constitutional history. "Republican Ideas in the Long Parliament" was the proposed subject of his thesis.

Then fate intervened. In the year between completion of his degree at Oxford and the beginning of the position at King's Howard was invited to assist in the writing of the World War II history of his regiment. He started by assisting Lieutenant-Colonel John H. A. Sparrow, O.B.E., a distinguished attorney who had spent most of the war as a member of the office of the Adjutant General while assigned to the Coldstream Guards. Because Sparrow was so busy with his various tasks, most of the work fell upon Howard. When it finally appeared in 1951, Michael Howard received first place on the title page of a book by Howard and Sparrow. No one will make an academic career out of a regimental history, even one of so illustrious a regiment as the Coldstream Guards. As Howard would admit in a review of another such volume: "regimental history, immensely fruitful though it is as an approach to the study of the pre-Crimea Army, is of more limited value to the student of military history of the past hundred
years. But for Howard the Coldstream Guards, 1920–1946 provided an important entree to a hitherto ignored post at King's College.

Coincidentally with this publication, the University of London decided to revive a lectureship in military studies which had gone unfilled since the Second World War. Rather than appoint a retired soldier to the position, the administration decided to acquire a fully-qualified academic. Finding a person posed a quandary, since the study of military affairs was not one actively pursued in university circles in Britain. Since Howard was already on the payroll appointing him to the post would not entail more funding; consequently he received the lectureship in war studies beginning in 1953. It provided a chance for him to escape from the increasingly less interesting field of the Long Parliament and allowed him the opportunity to enter uncharted waters.

Simultaneously the first tests of thermonuclear weapons. Soon journalists began asking the young lecturer in war studies what the implications of this were for defense policy. Suddenly he found himself in demand as a commentator on contemporary strategic policy without having made any serious study of it. (Here one begins to see one of the advantages of being a London don, the ready availability of such scholars to the press and the broad dissemination of such scholars' opinions through the print and broadcast media.) Howard's availability to the press and his exposure thereby created tensions within a history department whose members were interested in affairs of the past and who had a professional reluctance to comment on contemporary public policy. It would take a decade for Howard to assert his independence of the history department and establish himself as a professor of war studies in a totally independent academic program.
That he was able to do so constitutes a remarkable testimony to his persistence, his patience, and his growing reputation in an area outside military history.

One of those arenas of public commentary where he expressed his opinions was the leading liberal journal The New Statesman and Nation. Beginning in 1953 his reviews appeared with increasing frequency and in at least one household they attracted a sophisticated audience. One can only imagine how pleased the young lecturer was to open a letter in November 1954 and read:

I have read with great interest for some time past, reviews by you in the "New Statesman," and have several times intended to write and tell you how good I thought they were.

Your latest review of the two books on Gordon comes both as a reminder and as a spur to fulfil that intention. I much admired its depth of thought and understanding.

I would enjoy meeting you.

Signed by Captain Basil Liddell Hart, this letter opened a friendship that lasted until the famous British military commentator and historian died in 1970. Nothing better marks Howard's modest notoriety and the isolation within which military historians operated in the early fifties than that Liddell Hart addressed his missive to Howard in care of the New Statesman.

In a carefully worded reply, Howard opened their acquaintance:

You can imagine how much pleasure your letter gave me. It is only some eighteen months since I began to take interest—a professional interest that is—in military affairs, and I have felt rather guilty that in my reviews I have laid claim by implication to an expertise which I am far from having acquired. It is a very great encouragement indeed that you should not merely not [sic] have found them pretentious but positively enjoyed them.

My reviewing is in fact a side-activity, connected with my main work, which is as Lecturer in Military Studies in the University of London. I was given this post, not as a military expert or military historian, but as
a professional historian interested in the general problems which war raises for society.

Within a few days they had lunch at the Athenaeum and before the first month of their friendship was out Howard had visited the Liddell Harts at their home in Wolverton Park, Buckinghamshire.\(^{14}\)

In less than six weeks after Liddell Hart’s first epistle, the famous military analyst asked his younger colleague to comment on a draft of an article for the *Times*. Within four days Howard dispatched a two-and-a-half page commentary on the draft. This reply of 4 January 1955 was the ninth letter of their correspondence that had begun only on the 20th of November.\(^{15}\) Thus began Michael Howard’s long friendship with both the Captain and his charming wife Kathleen. To this day Lady Liddell Hart treasures the kindnesses Professor Howard extends to the widow of the man he describes as one of the two most important influences upon his career as a military historian and commentator.

The weekend encounters at Wolverton Park and later at States House in Medmenham, Buckinghamshire, were major intellectual exchanges. The gregarious, amiable, journalist-historian was a considerable contrast to the withdrawn, almost diffident London don. At the Liddell Hart home Howard and dozens of other guests enjoyed excellent food and wine, numerous refills of whiskey glasses, stimulating conversation, "everything the heart of man could desire except sleep."\(^{16}\) Whenever he went to a major conference, Liddell Hart held court at the best available hotel; whisky in one hand, pipe in the other, the one warm, the other unlit; his spare figure set off by a gorgeous brocade waistcoat; beaming benevolently, talking endlessly, until his long suffering wife sent him to bed.\(^{17}\)

Howard described him as "a Sage," an independent thinker who supported himself through his journalistic endeavors and whose pleasant country house
attracted scholars, journalists, politicians, students, and military officers from all over the world. States House became a virtual seminar each summer as doctoral students from dozens of colleges spent time at the feet of the master. Liddell Hart was a professor without a university, a scholar without the normal sheepskin credentials associated with academic achievement. Such a Sage, wrote Howard, "is a monarch, not a member of a republic. Above all the Sage, however deeply his roots may be sunk in the expertise of a single subject, billows uncontrollably outside it." 

But Liddell Hart did more than teach and write. Wolverton Park and States House guests were introduced to each other and exchanged their views. For the younger guests, as Howard was in the 1950s, one of the treasures of a weekend visit with the Liddell Harts was to meet the other guests. These introductions proved invaluable to Howard and this tradition of shepherding one's students to the right affairs and introducing them to the right people is a habit Howard continues to this day. His students recognize how much it has helped their careers, even though most of them do not realize that in this respect he follows a master of the right introduction.

While his bachelor's apartment was never the social center that Kathleen Liddell Hart made States House, Michael Howard's reputation for candor and insight provided his students that first position upon which all subsequent career development depends. Most of Howard's former students recount with pleasure the helpful introductions, the gracefully written letters of recommendation, the kind comments to persons they had not previously met that opened the doors to future careers.

A classic case involves Peter Paret who made a major change in his career in the mid-1950s when he decided to become an academic after years as a journalist. "You must," Howard wrote Liddell Hart, "meet Peter Paret. Let me know when you are coming up, and we shall have lunch." Shortly
afterwards, Liddell Hart found himself in a nasty historical controversy with a former official British historian. When Liddell Hart requested Paret's assistance in this project the busy graduate student reluctantly accepted with the intention of doing only a minimal amount of research. Howard warned his pupil to do the best job possible. This led to a number of published exchanges defending Liddell Hart. The conscientious job Paret did resulted in a warm friendship with Liddell Hart and subsequent support which Paret treasured.

The mid-1950s mark a critical point in Howard's career. He could well have basked in the respectability of a tenured position at King's College, written literate book reviews for leading periodicals, delivered stimulating lectures to admiring undergraduate students, relaxed in his South Kensington flat and country cottage, and never worried about economic problems while living off his family inheritance. Instead, reflecting the industry of ancestors on both sides of his family, he plunged into a variety of activities that would gain for him the attention of a prime minister. To achieve this position of eminence he began activities in the three basic areas that mark his importance to this day.

He first started research on a major historical work. Not published until 1961, The Franco-Prussian War would become a classic analysis of not merely the conflict it portrayed, but also a model for analysis of any military campaign with its thoroughness, insight, and literary grace. "I am heavily involved in reading . . . about the French Army before 1870," he wrote in early 1957. By that summer Howard agreed with observations Liddell Hart made in his study of William T. Sherman and the importance of railroads in nineteenth century campaigns. But even as he was deeply involved in this research he could not keep from being involved in other projects. He agreed to write a chapter on "Military Affairs" for the New
Cambridge Modern History volume dealing with the period 1870-1898, to write a paper on "Wellington and the British Army," to edit a series of papers concerning the Iron Duke on the centenary founding of Wellington College, and to be author of a volume on Grand Strategy in the official history of the United Kingdom during the Second World War. On top of all this he was considering a new translation of Clausewitz. Such an industrious commitment by a man who had yet to produce a significant article or book of history was indeed ambitious and showed a generous opinion of his unexhibited abilities by a number of people. It is no wonder that the last of these obligations would not be published until 1976.

Were this not enough, Howard's involvement in the War Studies program required him to become increasingly interested in contemporary military policy. This concern for the broader aspects of defense policy expanded his associations with two organizations devoted to these areas: the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Studies. It would be with these two institutions that Michael Howard would become closely associated and with which his name would be perpetually tied.

Chatham House, as the RIIA is known, usually was a principal agency for the discussion of foreign affairs in the kingdom. Here academics, journalists, and foreign office bureaucrats exchanged ideas both in informal conversations and through various formal conferences and study groups. One such Chatham House Study Group discussed "Disengagement" in early 1957. Headed by F. J. Bellenger, M.P. and former Secretary of State for War, this group included Michael Howard, who served as its rapporteur. Howard found himself associated with a number of men of prominence, to include the general representing the British on the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an air vice-marshal, and the president of the Western European Union Assembly. Above all, as far as Howard's career was
concerned, it included Alastair Buchan, defense correspondent for the Observer.

As rapporteur, Howard produced a concise digest of the options of military withdrawal in Central and Eastern Europe which was at the time considering disengagement proposals by Hugh Gaitskell and Denis Healey of Great Britain. Published as a Penguin special in Britain and distributed worldwide, this paperback was Howard’s first widely circulated publication. While a long way from history, it represented his first foray into the arena of strategic policy making and it brought his name for the first time to a wider public audience.

More important was the impact this study group had upon another aspect of his career—the founding of the Institute for Strategic Studies. The Disarmament Study Group was one of several such discussion sections meeting at Chatham House in the mid-50s. During 1956, a similar group concerned with limiting nuclear warfare included Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Professor Patrick Blackett, Mr. Denis Healey, M.P., and Mr. Richard Goold-Adams. The results of their discussions dealing with strategic nuclear weapons and the new tactical nuclear weapons were contained in a pamphlet On Limiting Atomic War drafted by Goold-Adams, the group’s rapporteur. Sir Anthony, a former director of Naval Intelligence who was deeply concerned about the problems of nuclear war, became a prime mover of this group.

The Bishop of Chichester eventually placed Sir Anthony in touch with Sir Kenneth Grubb, one of the leading laymen of the Church of England and an important figure in the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs. In the early Autumn of 1956 these two met with Messrs. Healey and Goold-Adams and drafted a list of approximately seventy persons to be invited to a conference held in Brighton in January 1957. One of the invitees was Michael Howard, then a relatively unknown lecturer at King’s
College. Howard's willingness to work and his comprehension of strategic problems, plus his obvious erudition, caused him to be named to a standing committee of the Brighton Conference Association which one delegate, Lord Salter, suggested be formed to help continue the study and discussion of strategic problems. From this small beginning would grow the Institute for Strategic Studies with Alastair Buchan as its director. While this organization will be discussed in greater detail later, suffice it to say here that Howard became increasingly involved in its founding and would for the first twenty-five years of its existence be one of the major forces in its development. For much of that time he was a member of its Council and for many years he chaired its Executive Committee.

Although these associations would take considerable amounts of his time, Howard's primary duty relating to strategic analysis concerned his role as the Lecturer in and later Professor of War Studies in King's College. To a large extent he would create a program and later a department out of whole cloth. By the fall term of 1955, Howard had secured the necessary approval for a program in "War Studies" at King's College to replace the "Military Studies" program that existed. Unlike the older program with its semi-technical orientation for students interested in an Army career, the "War Studies" B.A. general degree program was designed to appeal "to all serious students of history and politics--especially to those who wish to study these subjects in their more recent and contemporary aspects." He divided the course into three basic fields: one covering the impact of democracy and industrialization on warfare from the French Revolution to World War I; another concerning defense problems from 1914 to the present; and a third concerning such special problems as the economic, legal, and diplomatic factors affecting the use of military force.
Those who read the first syllabus will notice the genesis of his *War in European History* (1976).23

Although he tended to maintain these basic features of the undergraduate course thereafter, subsequent syllabus indicate a growing sophistication in the instructions to prospective students and an ever-lengthening bibliography. The instructions for 1961 noted:

This subject embraces considerably more than a study of the nature and development of military techniques, and those who have already made a study of military history from a mainly technical point of view may find their experience of limited value. Military organization and technical developments arise out of a certain social and economic structure of society and can be properly studied only in relation to that background. . . . The student must therefore take care not to isolate the history of war from its context and consider it simply in terms of "Great Captains," "Decisive Battles," or even "Principles of War." Like economic or constitutional history it is an aspect of social development as a whole and must be studied as such.24

For the study of developments since 1914, he warned candidates of the controversial nature of the readings and that "none of the works listed should be regarded as entirely authoritative." Since such controversies remain unresolved, the student was advised "to cultivate a keenly critical attitude towards his sources and realize that no authority, however eminent or official, is to be regarded as final." Such a caveat contained a final warning that candidates would be "assessed rather for their critical objectivity and understanding of all sides of any given issue than for their ability in resolving questions to which no solution may yet be possible." Then, in a final aside that would warm the heart of any graduate of Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff College, Howard added: "There are no 'school solutions.'"25

Along with the introduction of this baccalaureate program were included a series of lectures. Even before the "War Studies" program
replaced the older one, Howard held a series of six lecturers in "Military Studies" at King's College for the Lent (Spring) Term of 1955. Entitled "War and Society" they began with a lecture on that topic by N. H. Gibbs, Chichele Professor of the History of War, Oxford, and included a number of prominent persons from a number of academic institutions whose careers would be linked to Howard in subsequent years. Among these were Martin Wight, Reader in International Relations, University of London, and Patrick Blackett, Professor of Physics, Imperial College of Science and Technology. The next fall Air Marshal Sir John Slessor delivered two lecturers. For Michaelmas Term 1956 the topic was "Soldiers and Governments" and it included Hugh Seton-Watson, Professor of Russian History, University of London, and D. W. Brogan, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge University.26 Howard edited these latter lectures for publication and they have been twice reprinted in the United States, a solid indication of the quality of presentations Howard's annual series attracted and the continued relevance of the subject matter included therein.27

Howard's introductory lecture-essay on civil-military relations concludes with a statement that typifies the characteristic insight and grace of his writings:

The dialectic between freedom and security lies at the basis of all political society, however often it may change its form; and the problems which it raises, both for soldiers and for governments, are likely to remain with us until society itself is dissolved.28

It is with Soldiers and Governments more than either regimental history or his rapporteurial Disengagement in Europe that Michael Howard achieved a place in the scholarly world. While he still needed an important historical contribution of his own to merit a significant place in the academic firmament, he was by the end of the 50s putting the final touches on the manuscript that would remain his magnum opus to this day. The
publication of *The Franco-Prussian War* in 1961 marked the great divide in Howard's career. The acclaim accorded this work raised him to a position of importance and a place of significance providing him with respect in the historical community that led to his promotion to professor. It is ironic that this promotion also led to his final independence of the King's College history department. He now became head of the newly formed Department of War Studies in King's College, University of London. Strategic studies in Britain now had its first department and it was on its way to becoming an important part of the British collegiate curriculum.

Professor Howard became an increasingly important spokesman for academic analysis of defense issues. In a 1963 letter to *The Times* he argued cogently that the "absence of serious study of strategic questions at graduate level is not only a factor in creating 'tired pragmatism' which has so depressingly distinguished our defence policy" but it also accounts for the undisciplined emotionalism which otherwise intelligent and educated citizens too often display when defence questions are under discussion: an emotionalism which political parties are naturally tempted to encourage and exploit.

He urged British universities "to create a tradition of scholarly, precise and constructive dialectic, which disciplines the thinking of expert and laymen alike." 29

There were those who denounced such programs as sinister intrusions by the military into academe. Anthony Arblaster, a founder of the Campaign for Academic Freedom, was a leader in this opposition which for a decade kept Cambridge University from accepting Ministry of Defence money for the appointment of two defense fellows at that institution. As part of one of those "Letters to the Editor" exchanges that only devoted readers of *The Times* can follow, Howard found himself denounced by a London School of Economics faculty member as a Uriah Heep involved in the "spectacle of a
man who has held a Ministry of Defence fellowship, for which candidates
cannot be appointed by the university unless they are acceptable to the
Defence Ministry, wringing his hands over the fate of academic freedom."30

For the most part there has been an increasing willingness to accept
military studies as part of the British collegiate curriculum. By the
early eighties it became obvious that "the growing acceptability of mili-
tary studies" was a consequence of a careful nurturing during the embryo
stage by such men as Howard of London, John Erikson of Edinburgh, Martin
Edmonds of Lancaster, and David Greenwood of Aberdeen. These schools plus
accepted these programs and gradually they gained respectability and estab-
lished an institutional base. At Aberdeen and Edinburgh the universities
went beyond the mere acceptance of the programs and established centers of
defence studies with Greenwood and Erickson as their directors. There were
of course problems as to the direction such programs should take. Many of
the senior civil servants at the Ministry of Defence saw them as evangeli-
cal outposts designed to keep the public aware of defence problems while
many of the academics developed an interest in policy-directed problems
along the lines of American defense studies centers, such as those at
Harvard and Stanford.

Howard's role in the evolution of these programs is significant. His
close connections to Denis Healey, who was a leader in their establishment
during his tenure as Minister of Defence and his desire to see such pro-
grams maintain proper academic distance from the defense ministry assisted
in their expansion and in their academic credibility. There are those who
will argue that Howard's most important and long lasting contribution will
be his role in the university strategic studies programs.31
There arose an academic opposition centered in the School of Peace Studies in Bradford University. What began as a program closely tied to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament gradually drifted towards concern with social and economic conflict and inequalities that made it more a school of social change than of peace studies. With the revival of antinuclear protest in the 1980s, Bradford's program found itself returning to its original intent. The existence of this activist program within the academic community constitutes a reasonable indication that considerable distrust of the strategic studies programs and Ministry of Defence financing still exists in British academe despite all the efforts of Howard and others. The study of war still so affronts the liberal sensibilities of many academics that it immediately elicits the riposte that such activities constitute an endorsement of militarism.

In the midst of these efforts to create an academic discipline almost out of nothing, Michael Howard also had to teach. By the late 1950s he had established enough reputation to attract a number of talented students, Brian Bond and Peter Paret among them. One of their contemporaries, Paul Guinn, now of State University of New York at Buffalo, writes of those days through a haze of nostalgia: "Military history itself had at the time a lure of forbidden fruit." These graduate students were to become his apostles and many of them were to either establish or expand military studies programs in Britain, the Commonwealth nations, and the United States. Others entered or continued in government service both as serving officers and bureaucrats.

One aspect of Howard's teaching all comment upon is the high standards of expectation he had of his students. These standards encompassed not only depth of research, but also elegance of literary style. Even a skilled journalist like Paret learned from Howard in this regard. For the others,
Howard's editorial pen and verbal criticism helped to mold dry prose into effective analysis. One of his officer students noted a decided improvement in his writing as a result of Howard's influence and as a consequence the student's manuscripts began to receive acceptance notices from journal editors. One of his former Oxford students remarked how Howard removed the sarcasm that previously characterized his prose style and thereby made his contributions more effective.

Above all the students recognize Howard's willingness to take an interest in them and their ideas. He seldom belittled their contributions, but sought to make them see the errors of their ways and improve upon the humble beginnings. Sometimes his high standards could be intimidating and spurred his students to an excellence they never thought of achieving. On the other hand, he would not tolerate self-important fools and could deliver a devastating criticism when the situation seemed to require it.

In his seminar at the Institute of Historical Research at the Senate House of the University of London his students presented their papers for the criticism of their peers and their professor. These became stimulating sessions in which student and scholar exchanged views. Howard once said he was a "university learner" more than a "university teacher," and most certainly he could listen to the normal seminar exchanges and not dominate them. Howard's ego was not such that he had to stifle others. On the other hand, when the appropriate opportunity presented itself, he could talk for twenty minutes in peerless prose. One awed veteran of these sessions observed: "Some people speak in partial sentences. Some in full sentences, a few speak in full paragraphs; Michael Howard speaks in full articles."
PUBLIC FIGURE

While engaged in the production of scholarly history and in the development of contemporary studies in Britain, Howard also concerned himself with a third role that has encompassed an increasingly important aspect of his place in the world—he is a communicator of ideas to a wide public through his broadcasts, lectures, reviews, and letters to the editor. Here he follows his mentor at Oxford, Hugh Trevor-Roper, who argued that historians had an obligation to a wider public, that their ideas and perceptions of the world should not be confined to the scholarly world, but rather should be presented in a manner that would attract the interest of the wider public. This means that the humanities must speak to contemporary problems to be, for lack of a better word, "relevant." If history lost touch with the lay public it would be condemned to irrelevancy and would rightfully perish as a academic discipline. much the way the classics have gone.\footnote{34}

One way by which Michael Howard began his communication to the wider public was in the area of radio and television commentary. In October 1955 he undertook his "maiden voyage both as broadcaster and military commentator... talking about 'The Future of War'" on BBC radio.\footnote{35} Increasingly his radio comments were printed in The Listener, a weekly BBC publication containing some of the more important contributions to British airways.\footnote{36}

His penetrating reviews appeared with increasing frequency in the New Statesman and the Nation and in the Observer. Beginning in 1962 Encounter published his literary critiques regularly and in recent years that journal plus The Times, the Sunday Times and the Times Literary Supplement have solicited his commentaries on new books. The total number of reviews is in the hundreds and the bibliography attached to this essay contains only a
partial listing. Sometimes the reviews become commentaries on wider subjects, such as "Bombing and the Bomb" published in Encounter in 1962.

In this review he made his personal statement on deterrence which has remained a major feature of his thought to this day:

The balance of nuclear terror may seem a terrifying basis for peace; but the only alternative basis, short of the multilateral disarmament for which we are striving, would be the self-restraint of a power with a monopoly of nuclear weapons which it could use without fear of retaliation.37

Two decades later Harper's commissioned a review of a "spring bouquet of books about the unthinkable" in which he concluded:

Our leaders must continue to conduct our affairs with the statesmanlike quality of prudence, but this prudence must be exercised as much in appreciating the dangers inherent in our own defense posture as in assessing those posed by a potential adversary. Further, they need to show a quality in which they have hitherto been notably deficient: compassion, the capacity to see the world through the eyes of others, even through those of our adversaries. Finally, their decisions must be based on simple realism, the understanding that we share with the peoples of the Soviet Union, as we do with the whole of mankind, a common interest in survival.38

Such comments which go far beyond a precis of the books under review increasingly characterize the expository style displayed by Howard. His reviews are also directed toward an increasingly wider and more public audience. Thus his 1983 review for Harper's expanded his commentary through a largely American forum in which he is not nearly as well known as in Britain. As he went from the New Statesman in the 50s to Encounter in the 60s to The Times in the 70s, Howard increased the importance that his opinions commanded.

By far the widest audience he attracted came from his increasingly popular lectures and articles. Michael Howard is the consummate lecturer. Urbane, witty, insightful, suggestive, and provocative, his lectures and essays constitute the most widely distributed of his publications. Two
collections of these writings complied into anthologies entitled *Studies in War and Peace* (1970) and *The Causes of Wars* (1983) contain the best known of these writings. But since he is a well-known and much-sought public speaker, numerous other collections of his eloquent and elegant lectures have been published. Perhaps the best known of these are the Lees-Knowles Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, issued as *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War* (1968), the Ford Lectures in the University of Oxford published as *The Continental Commitment* (1971), the Radcliffe Lectures in the University of Warwick entitled *War in European History* (1975), and the George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures in the University of Cambridge printed as *War and the Liberal Conscience* (1978). Many of the others have been either privately printed or published in such periodicals as *Foreign Affairs*, *International Security*, *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, *Parameters*, *International Affairs*, *Encounter*, and *Round Table*, or published as contributions to *Festschriften* and anthologies.

Thus it is the lecture and the published essay that provide Howard leverage and influence. Margaret Thatcher, for instance, is a devotee of the lecture because it condenses considerable wisdom. It is in this context that she spoke so favorably of the man she nominated for the Regius Professorship. But it is propensity for the lecture that worries many of Howard's associates. They see him as a first rate historian distracted from the scholar's study and the library by such commitments. One long time colleague is deeply disturbed that Howard's sense of public responsibility has made him particularly vulnerable to the entreaties of the media and various forums for his time and talents. The consequence is that the number of his scholarly contributions have suffered.

Actually Howard has recognized this for a long time. As early as 1958 he wrote Liddell Hart that the "danger of being a London don is that one
tends to overload oneself leading two separate full-time lives." It is this dual life as scholar and commentator that caused Howard to make a major career change in the late sixties. First he spent a year at Stanford University as the Kratter Visiting Professor of History. Thus he was able to eliminate not only the demands of the media, but also to eliminate the multitude of administrative tasks that accumulate upon a senior faculty member. Even though he could not resist the temptation to lecture at Harvard, Princeton, the Air Force Academy, U.C.L.A., and the Rand Corporation, for Howard the year marked a relaxing interlude before he returned to England and undertook a new position as a Defence Fellow in All Souls, Oxford. 40

The shift from a tenured professorship at King's to an untenured fellowship at Oxford shocked many of his friends. In the academic pecking order such a move would at best be considered a lateral one. But for Howard the move allowed particular advantages. First, he would be able to devote more time to study since fellows of All Souls have neither students nor the administrative obligations of a faculty member. Second, while for a family man the position's economic insecurity and its quarters in All Souls might prove inadequate, for Howard with his independent means and bachelor's life neither of these proved an impediment; in fact, the ready location in the midst of a bustling campus was a distinct advantage. Above all, he was away from the corps of journalists and the various institutional obligations which took so much of his time in the capital.

He rather deftly summarized the situation in a 1978 lecture commenting on his thirty years in academe:

Twenty of them were spent in the University of London, where I clawed my way up the academic ladder from Assistant Lecturer to Professor. For four of these I was Warden of a Hall of Residence, for five Dean of a Faculty, and by the end of my time there I was sitting on
committees without number, barnacles which had accumulated round my hull in such quantity that they had brought me to dead stop and threatened to sink me, as they have sunk so many much better men and women. without a trace.

So he returned to Oxford and began "to get on with my work; reading, writing, teaching, even thinking." But Michael Howard would not be Michael Howard without additional obligations. In 1977 he accepted the Chichele Professorship of the History of War in Oxford and three years later succeeded his mentor Hugh Trevor-Roper (recently elevated to a life peerage as Lord Dacre of Glanton) to the most prestigious history chair in the kingdom, Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford. But, as he so delightfully recounts it,

The warning signs have begun to appear of the onset of the secondary and terminal stage of the malignant disease. I have been made a Professor again. I have been appointed a University Examiner. I have been elected to the Faculty Board. I have been elected to the Council of the British Academy. The tentacles are closing around me. 41

Certainly the period of All Souls witnessed a flood of publications to include a second major historical work, Grand Strategy: August 1942-September 1943 and what may constitute his most lasting contribution to historical and strategic thought, an edition of Carl von Clausewitz's On War co-edited and co-translated with Peter Paret. But most commentators would argue that the tentacles of academic obligations since the return to a professorship have not closed so tightly as to stifle his continued output of superb prose and analysis in books, papers, and lectures. Completed in manuscript, but as yet unpublished is his study on deception operations as the fourth volume of the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War. Moreover, he has written a series of lecture-essays that have more than ever marked him as a pre-eminent thinker in strategic analysis under such titles as "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," "War and

Besides, in a essay entitled "Empire, Race and War in pre-1914 Britain," we may be glimpsing the beginnings of a new volume, a successor to The Franco-Prussian War. Howard has recently undertaken the task of assessing social attitudes toward military conflict in the years before the outbreak of the Great War. If he can keep those tentacles and barnacles from pulling his ship of scholarship too deeply into the water, we can look forward to continued major contributions from Oxford's Regius Professor of Modern History.
CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES


15. BLH to MH, 31 December 1954, MH to LH, 4 October 1954, LHP.

16. *Causes of Wars*, p. 198. Throughout these endnotes those Howard articles reprinted in this book or in *Studies in War and Peace* will be referenced to these anthologies rather than to their original publication. A full listing appears in the Bibliography.

19. MH to BLH, 22 December 1957, LHP.
20. MH to BLH, 7 January 1957, & 25 June 1957, LHP.
21. MH to BLH, 17 August 1958, BLH to MH, 4 September 1958, LHP.
31. See such articles as David, "Winning the military studies war." THES, 1 August 1980, p. 8; Zoe Fairbairns, "University liaison, the army for the use of," THES, 16 May 1975, p. 15; David, "Out of the classroom and into the battlefield," THES, 11 July 1980, p. 9; Peter Harvey and Hew Strachan, "Arms in Academe: War Studies at Universities," JRUSt, 124 (June 1979): pp. 39-45.)
33. Guinn to Skaggs, 28 November 1982, Skaggs files.
34. "Historians may claim to teach lessons--history as such does not," The Listener, 12 March 1981, p. 333.
35. MH to BLH, 18 October 1955, LHP.


40. MH to BLH, 25 September 1958, LHP; Sandy Shapiro, "A visiting British professor brings "a bit of civilization to Serra."

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORIAN

First and foremost, Michael Howard is an historian. The other major aspects of his career, those of strategic analyst and of public policy commentator, flow from this central fact. To understand this Regius Professor one must comprehend both his philosophy of history and the manner in which this is expressed in his historical writings.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

The most essential feature of Howard's philosophy of history is that it has utilitarian value. In his inaugural address for his most recent position, he described how early in his career he lectured to a class of young army officers on the Italian campaign of 1944-45. "At the end," he told his Oxford audience, "there was a silence which I correctly gauged to be disapproving: it was broken by a tough young man in the front asking impatiently 'But what were its lessons?'"1 This demand by his students for practical utility in historical writing brought him to the conclusion that "one of the major functions of the historian [is] to explain the present by deepening our understanding of the past."2

Historians "have a social function--indeed, a social obligation" to communicate their findings to the world at large. "Far more than poets can historians claim to be the unacknowledged legislators of mankind; for all we believe about the present depends upon what we believe about the past." Since a society's perception of the past shapes its present conduct, if
historians do not provide an input to the process of historical awareness, "others less scrupulous or less well qualified will."\(^3\)

This belief in the utility of history does not mean that it must serve didactic purposes that awaken religious, patriotic, or ethnic emotions. While such "myth-making" serves useful social functions, the professional historian must go beyond such simplicities to the discovery and recording of the complicated and disagreeable realities of the past regardless of their implications for the social myth.

This is one of the critical features of Howard's writing. Time and again one sees him demolishing the myths of the past even when such conclusions clash with British national legends. For instance, his *Continental Commitment* essays constitute a challenge to Liddell Hart's "indirect approach" thesis and reinforce Howard's justification of British involvement in the World Wars of this century and in the continuation of the British Army of the Rhine. The gist of his *Grand Strategy* volume and of its distillation in *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War* is a direct attack on Chester Wilmot's thesis that the post-war superpower confrontation was a result of "American short-sightedness and doctrinaire stupidity" in face of Winston Churchill's "subtle, far-sighted and politically motivated" strategy which would "not only have won the war with a minimum of bloodshed, but have placed the West in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union after it."\(^4\) In other words, there was no "indirect approach," no "soft-underbelly of Europe" that would have lead to an earlier defeat of the Nazi empire and a post-war reconstruction of the Continent more favorable to the West than the one which resulted from the Normandy invasion and the march across France into the center of Germany.

34
This utilitarian approach to history does not mean that there are
direct, practical relationships between historical presentations and con-
temporary policy. Nowhere has he presented a more direct attack on the
presentism even of professional historians than when he wrote: "I do not
myself believe in any simple 'lessons of history,' and I have learned to
mistrust historical analogy as a lazy substitute for analytic thought."5
One must be most cautious about analogies because they mislead in various
ways. First, there is the distortion of time and context; for, no matter
how two events may appear similar, because of altered circumstance, there
will not be a repetition of the event. Second, there is the distortion of
incomplete evidence; a phenomenon that encompasses all historical events is
compounded in military ones by the infinite number of "facts" that may
exist and the distortion that also results from the attempt to arrange them
into coherency. Third, while most historians deal with "continuing and
constantly developing processes, war, on the other hand, is intermittent,
clearly defined, with distinct criterion for success and failure."6 Thus
the sheer infrequency of combat requires the soldier
to steer between the danger of repeating the errors of
the past because he is ignorant that they have been made,
and the danger of remaining bound by theories deduced
from past history although changes in conditions have
rendered these theories obsolete.7

Historical examples may result in "hasty conclusions" being drawn from an
event which are given "a universal validity which subsequent experience
will show to be entirely spurious."8

If there are such dangers in making history utilitarian, then why
study it? Because there is probably no better way to comprehend the prob-
lems of the present. A recurring theme in Howard's writing is his criti-
cism of the technological presentism in the policies of many social science-
oriented strategic commentators. Their doctrines depend upon technological
advantages and refuse to acknowledge that the ultimate strategic objective is neither armies nor geography, but the national will.\(^9\) In effect, strategy has become divorced from the historical and political context within which it must operate.

It is with this objective in mind, that Howard prescribed three "general rules" of historical study in a famous address to the Royal United Service Institution in 1961. While they were particularly designed to guide the officer in the study of military history, their application to any form of historical analysis is obvious. First, one must study history in width. Only by reading history in the broad context can one deduce what is common and what is not about the past. To concentrate one's reading on a single era dilutes this comprehension of how distinctively different time periods can be. Moreover, historical knowledge "must be tempered by a sense of change, and applied with a flexibility of mind which only wide reading can give."

Second, any utility that history can provide requires that it must be studied in depth. The serious student must not merely read secondary accounts of events, but study in detail "memoirs, letters, diaries, and even imaginative literature, until the tidy outlines dissolve and he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of the real experience." Only by reading in such detail can the omnipresent chaos of reality be comprehended.

Finally, history has little utility unless it is studied in context. "Wars are not tactical exercises writ large." Just as one cannot divorce political changes, religious movements, or economic disruptions without understanding the social community in which they operate, so military operations are a reflection of the society in which they occur. Without this broader background one cannot effectively deduce how the present is
affected by the interaction of various contemporary social, political, intellectual, and economic events.¹⁰

Implicit in this emphasis on the utility of history is the second aspect of Howard's philosophy. History must deal objectively with the past. While acknowledging that written "history" and past reality do not concur because "History is what historians write, and historians are part of the process they are writing about." the historian has an obligation to insure, "even within the limits imposed by his own cultural environment, that our view of the past is not distorted by fraud, by evident prejudice or by simple error."¹¹

It is the religious, nationalistic, ethnocultural biases that bother Howard the most. Acknowledging that even the best historical writing, "if it survives at all. will be read as evidence about our own mentality and the thought processes of our own time, rather than for anything we say about the times about which we write." the historian has as his "primary professional responsibility" an obligation to keep as "clear and untainted" as possible "those springs of knowledge that ultimately feed the great public reservoirs of popular histories and school textbooks and that are now piped to every household in the country through the television screens."¹²

Howard finds Western Europeans particularly vulnerable to a belief that the values they share are universal. This is not true: for instance, societies have existed in the recent past which have regarded war and violence not simply as acceptable but as positively desirable social activities, and the condition of the world is not yet such that the permanent disappearance of such attitudes can be taken for granted.¹³

Given this condition, the historian must remove himself as much as possible from his contemporary values and immerse himself into the values of the community he is studying. Ethnocentrism in historical studies "is likely
to feed parochialism in societies which those historians serve; and such parochialism can have pretty disastrous results.\textsuperscript{14}

The essential ingredient in achieving objectivity is an historical imagination, for, as he said in his Regius Professorship inaugural address:

\begin{quote}
the past is a foreign country; there is very little we can say about it until we have learnt its language and understood its assumptions, and in deriving conclusions about the processes which occurred in it and applying them to our own day we must be very careful indeed. The understanding of the past, particularly of the beliefs and assumptions that held societies together and determined those activities on the level of high politics that are normally regarded as 'history,' is the most rewarding, as it is the most difficult, of the historian's tasks.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

In his desire to achieve such objectivity the historian is one of the most vulnerable of academics. Even in the Western world there are those in power and with influence who wish the discussion of the past to reinforce contemporary religious, political, and social values and to endorse the community's cultural myths. The "bourgeois objectivism" of modern historians contrasts not only with the past where they "received official countenance only on condition that they subscribed to and reinforced the reigning dogmas," but also in most modern countries "where it is precisely the duty of historians to abolish the past" and to erect "in its place a socially convenient myth of which it is their function to defend, embellish, and generally to keep up to date."\textsuperscript{16}

Far more implicit than explicit in Howard's philosophy of history than either utility or objectivity, is his belief in its literacy. In an age of historical quantification when many practitioners seem more concerned with numbers than words and in an age when most non-quantified academic history is written in a prose style more characteristic of social science jargon than effective prose, Michael Howard sees his profession requiring him to
write with elegance and eloquence. In neither of his two major historiographic essays on "The Use and Abuse of History" and the Regius Inaugural address, does he mention this feature of historical style. But in one of his earliest book reviews he commented on the dichotomy between the literary and analytic historical traditions:

Side by side with the sober academic tradition of analytical history . . . there survives the literary school . . . of the men who approach the past not as a series of intellectual problems to be resolved but as a source of aesthetic delight. For their devotees the academics are dry as dust professors reducing the vigorous life of the past to an arid set of abstract propositions. The academics in return suspect the literary men for the superficiality of their treatment and the unsoundness of their judgement, and advise their pupils to put them away as childish things. 17

No one would ever accuse Michael Howard of being either a sober academic scholar without aesthetic interests or a devotee of history as literature without any significant scholarly substance. It is definitely clear that he aspires to both camps, but because of his interest in the lecture and the essay as mediums of expression, his best known contributions are in the literary camp. Thus while scholarship is clearly a significant feature of his prose style, his literary gift may be his most obvious trait.

Certainly it was this clarity and charm that first attracted Liddell Hart to him, and certainly it was this aspect of him that sustained his reputation in the many years before the publication of The Franco-Prussian War.

Throughout that deeply researched and effectively analytical study one finds significant examples of the literary school of history. For example, seldom can one find a more subtle combination of the attributes of historical utility, objectivity, and literacy than in a perceptive paragraph analyzing the actions of Leon Gambetta who sought to continue the conflict after all hope of victory was gone:
Success would have justified Gambetta, as it justified the inflexibility of George Washington, of Danton, of Trotsky, or, to choose a closer analogy, of Charles de Gaulle. Failure places him in the same category as Hitler or Napoleon or Charles XII of Sweden, sacrificing the lives of his people and embittering posterity in the pursuit of an impossible ideal which most of his fellows did not share. At what point does nobility become inexcusable pride? Should it not be the duty of the statesman to represent the immediate desires of his people for security to till their land and bring up their families rather than to force them to endure sacrifices whose benefit, if any, will be felt only by generations long after theirs? It is impossible to frame an answer to these questions which would be valid for both Washington and Jefferson Davis, for both Churchill and Hitler, for both Gambetta and de Gaulle. The quality of historical action cannot be judged in isolation; even a decision correct in terms of isolated individual morality may be disastrous for a nation.

Politics, in war as in peace, is the art of the possible, and the great statesman, like the great soldier, discerns or creates possibilities unseen to the general eye, and can detect with abnormal acuteness the weakness of the enemy and his own nation’s latent sources of strength. He is not an irrational hero who, guided by absolutes alone, challenges fortune without weighing the odds and drags down a whole people in his own dramatic ruin.

Whatever his eloquence and persuasiveness in the grand summary paragraph, it is in the acute anecdote, the picturesque phrase, the incisive sentence that Howard best demonstrates his literary skills. “After 1866 the French were in that most dangerous of all moods; that of a great power which sees itself declining to the second rank.”

“The greater the power, the greater its responsibilities and the greater its fears. The rulers of great powers are seldom confident men; more often . . . they are exceedingly worried as to how to preserve the structure they have created.”

“[T]he strategist, like the economist, has to assume a degree of rationality for his calculations which is not always met with in the real world.”

“Nothing has occurred since 1945 to indicate that war, or the threat of it, could not still be an effective instrument of state policy. Against peoples
who were not prepared to defend themselves it might be very effective
indeed."

Perhaps it was in a lecture now over twenty years old that he best
analyzed the enigma of his discipline: "The lessons of history are never
clear. Clio is like the Delphic oracle: it is only in retrospect, and
usually too late, that we can understand what she was trying to say." For those who seek truth through the study of the past, Michael Howard's
philosophical trinity of utility, objectivity and literacy constitute crit-
cical dimensions essential to the understanding of Clio's riddles.

**MILITARY HISTORY IN GENERAL**

From the beginning of his War Studies curriculum at King's College
Michael Howard has seen military history as an aspect of the totality of a
social chronicle. Previously, the history of human conflict was seen as an
abnormality, something beyond the pale of scholarly notice. Part of this
was undoubtedly due to the didactic and normative nature of most military
studies which were more concerned with the immutable laws of warfare or
with the direct application of combat studies to current doctrine. So long
as this remained the case, military history would remain, as Professor
Guinn described it, a "forbidden fruit" not worthy of serious consideration.

Michael Howard was one of a handful of British scholars in the 1950s
who sought to elevate the study of warfare to something more than this. He
noted in the introduction to *War in European History*, that:

to abstract war from the environment in which it is
fought and study its technique as one would those of a
game is to ignore a dimension essential to the under-
standing, not simply of the wars themselves but of the
societies which fought them. The historian who studies
war, not to develop norms for action but to enlarge his
understanding of the past, cannot be simply a 'military
historian,' for there is literally no branch of human
activity which is not to a greater or lesser extent
relevant to his subject. He has to study war not only
in the framework of political history, but in the
framework of economic, social and cultural history as
well. War has been part of a totality of human experi-
ence, the parts of which can be understood only in rela-
tion to one another.

This is merely an expansion of sentiments expressed in an Historical
Association paper in 1956, entitled "Military History as a University
Study." The young lecturer in war studies understood that the area remained
peripheral to the broader aspects of historical endeavor largely because
its practitioners concentrated on the technical aspects of combat and the
lessons-learned that could be applied to future operations. Unless such a
limited concentration of military history was "informed and directed by
humane curiosity about wider issues and by a sense of its relevance to the
nature and development of society as a whole, it will appear ... as a
desiccated and insignificant by-way leading to a dead end." The military
historian's basic problem was the investigation of "how and perhaps why
societies organize themselves for and conduct war" and, if this were prop-
erly pursued, the natural result would "contribute directly to the general
understanding of the nature of historical development and of the past at
which all historians ultimately aim."25

But War in European History provides a more extensive, mature, and
coherent overview of Howard's ideas of the role of military history to the
comprehension of the human predicament than any of his earlier writings.
His synthesis in these 1975 University of Warwick lectures in neither
particularly novel nor is it thoroughly developed. Essentially it reflects
two decades of reading and teaching in the area and merits close attention
less because it is comprehensive or innovative and more because by its
brevity it provides an important introduction to a most complex subject.
Beginning with the medieval age, Howard portrays the history of warfare as
a constant struggle between the forces of massed, democratic offensive 
operations and those of small, professional, and technologically-oriented 
defensive ones. This oscilliation is seen as both imitative and accelerative; on the one hand copying the changes already in the social system and, 
on the other, forcing society to modify itself more rapidly than it would otherwise. He deftly traces these developments through knights to merce-
naries, from merchants to professionals, from revolutionaries to national-
ists, and eventually to the technologists who dominate modern military 
establishments.

Howard's concept of the symbiosis between war and society is most 
emphatically described in his introductory paragraphs on the wars of the 
revolution. His description of the professional armies of the eighteenth 
century found them "intimately bound up with the nature of the society" and 
any disruption of that social system "was bound to cause a revolution" in 
the way wars would be fought.

Once the state ceased to be regarded as the 'property' 
of dynastic princes... and became instead the instrument of forces dedicated to such abstract concepts as 
Liberty, or Nationality, or Revolution, which enabled large numbers of the population to see in that state the 
embodiment of some absolute Good for which no price was too high, no sacrifice too great to pay.

Once, in other words, the professional armies of Europe were replaced by 
the levée en mass, then the moderated and inconclusive contests of the age 
of Louis XIV "appeared as absurd anachronisms." Moreover, warfare became 
more than the competition for dynastic crowns or territorial additions, it 
became a quest for ideals and was fought for some higher good. For such 
concepts one could compel total obedience of all citizens, male and female, 
young and old, rich and poor, in behalf of the new God—the Nation-State. 
"War was beginning to become total—a conflict not of armies but of popula-
tions."
Such a summation of one of seven lectures constitutes only a partial review of the whole. But it does provide a reasonable insight into Howard's overall rationale for the study of war. Nowhere is there a description of a particular battle, rather here is the panoramic view of warfare. Far more important than descriptions of chaos, terror, and futility on the banks of the Marne, along Passchendaele Ridge, or in the forts of Verdun was his conclusion that "the Great War, by destroying so much of the traditional framework of European society, had greatly strengthened the evolutionary forces both of the Left... and of the Right."²⁸

THE AGE OF MOLTKE

As has been noted previously, Michael Howard first achieved important notice in the world of historians with the publication of The Franco-Prussian War in 1961. That seminal work, seminal not merely in its study of that particular conflict but also in its effect upon the study of military history, must be seen as part of several related pieces dealing with the late nineteenth century. Besides this tome, there are two important essays, one on "William I and the Reform of the Prussian Army" which expands upon an incident only slightly developed in the book and the other on "The Armed Forces" which is in the New Cambridge Modern History volume dealing with "Material Progress and World-Wide Problems, 1870-1898." The latter essay is particularly important for its observations on the consequences of the Franco-Prussian War upon military developments until the end of the century. Moreover, Howard saw this period as one from which his scholarly career might move in two directions—either back toward the Napoleonic era, or forward into the twentieth century.

Some of Howard's earliest commentaries on the era arose in a review of Gordon Craig's Politics of the Prussian Army which appeared in 1955. Early
in his research for his own book, Howard observed two basic features of the
nineteenth-century German army that he emphasizes in great detail later--
(1) that the army considered itself "the real Germany" which not only had
to protect the state against foreign invasion but also to preserve it from
the liberalizing tendencies of democracy and socialism and (2) the army
expected to prosecute wars without any interference from the political
leadership, whether that be the Crown or the Chancellor. In effect the
generals felt themselves to be the true guardians of the national interest
and by 1914 the younger Moltke had arrogated unto the General Staff the
right to begin wars as well as to wage them.29

Obvious to most readers of this review was that the Prussians ignored
Clausewitz's admonition that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy
with other means." Howard emphasized this point in a BBC broadcast a few
months after the review appeared in which he argued that "Clausewitz' heirs
. . . shamefully betrayed his central teaching." Even though the first
Helmuth von Moltke "asserted that no man had done more to influence him
than Clausewitz," during the 1870-71 war he quarrelled with Bismark over
the conduct of the war while the Iron Chancellor "upheld the supremacy of
the demands of state policy, and Moltke . . . strove for that predominance
of the military interest which Clausewitz in explicit terms had con-
demned."30

Implicitly, but not explicitly, this theme of Moltke's idea being at
variance with Clausewitz's teaching is found in Howard's Franco-Prussian
War. One does find it strange that although he emphasized this five years
earlier in a radio commentary that he did not choose to accentuate the
point in his magnum opus.

45
There is little doubt that *The Franco-Prussian War* constituted a significant addition to historical literature. Seldom before had the interaction of weaponry, mobilization policies, tactical dispositions, generalship, strategic policies, internal politics, and the industrial revolution been so effectively integrated into a single study of any conflict. The praise it received in the popular press was overwhelming. *The Times* reported that Howard "has analysed the origins and the events of this great war with thoroughness, clarity, and high narrative skill."\(^{31}\)

There can be little argument that Howard achieved the three major criteria of his historical philosophy. While the narrative traces in considerable detail the causes and course of this conflict, it does so with the object of utility always in view. The long discussion of Gambetta's desire to continue the conflict in spite of the impact upon his people and Howard's comparison of him with Jefferson Davis, Hitler, and Napoleon as contrasted with Washington, Trotsky, and de Gaulle has been previously noted. This is but one of several examples of Howard's inclination to provide relevance to his contribution. Such direct comparisons are contrasted with less obvious but equally universal commentaries as:

Regular soldiers are inclined to underestimate, as amateurs to overestimate, the value of irregular forces in the conduct of war. At best they consider them erratic, uncertain, and expensive, and dismiss their spectacular achievements either as otiose, or as accidental, or as achieved at far too great a cost.\(^{32}\)

Objectivity continues to be a Howard hallmark. Perhaps for the first time, someone studied this conflict without traditional national biases. His impartiality allows effective criticism and praise to generals and statesmen on both sides. For instance, the initial French dispositions scattered their corps "in a cordon along the frontier, watching every avenue of approach, but too widely scattered to give mutual support."
Under these circumstances, Howard dryly observes "it hardly required an ability so transcendent as Moltke's to gain an overwhelming victory." The great difference between the two armies lay not in weapon technology, not in numerical superiority, not in generalship, but in the chaos of the French mobilization planning, or rather lack of planning. Yet despite poor disposition, despite inadequate preparations, the Germans attacked at the only point in the French defenses where they would encounter a serious risk of defeat. Nothing so demonstrates Howard's objectivity in the midst of the general adulation of the Prussian than when he concluded: "It was Moltke's good fortune . . . throughout the campaign that he did not have to deal with an adversary capable of profiting by his mistakes." That objectivity is especially seen in his analysis of the abilities of several French commanders. Howard feels General Antoine Eugene Chanzy's operations in the Loire valley deserve considerable credit. Chanzy was one of the few regular officers who "neither tried to fit his untrained citizen-soldiers into the mould of the regular army nor give them up in despair." While he demonstrated his capabilities as an effective combat leader, "his full genius was to show itself in the patience, resolution, and fighting capacity with which he led his armies in unbroken retreat, in the dead of winter, for seven terrible weeks." In the final analysis "Chanzy deserves better of his country" than many of its more famed commanders; "but it is habitual for nations to give exaggerated glory to generals who lead them to victory, and forget those whose talents merely stave off or mitigate defeat." On the other hand, Howard mercilessly condemns a commander like General Bourbaki whose actions exhibited "a listless, almost masochistic fatalism . . .; the acquiescence of a man who knows himself impotent to control events, able only to watch their unfolding in hypnotized passivity."
It is probably in his discussions of French strategic options after the disasters at Sedan and Metz that Howard exhibits his most effective analysis. Previous writers concentrated on the defeats in the north and the siege of Paris and failed to concern themselves with the numerous possibilities that confronted the beleaguered nation in the fall and winter of 1870-71. The great strategic advantage that mobilization had given Moltke was predicated upon a quick victory. By October the Prussians and their German allies found themselves confronting a long war involving not merely the seizure of the capital, but also guerrilla operations along vulnerable supply lines and three newly-formed armies to the northwest, southwest, and southeast of Paris.

One strategic option was to concentrate forces along the Loire and to wage a war of attrition against the invader. But, as Howard astutely notes:

If military considerations alone dictated strategy it would always be wise for French armies, once beaten back from their frontier fortifications, to abandon Paris and the North and fall back on this strong inner defence-line. possibly preserving also a redoubt in Brittany to take the enemy in the flank.

This was an option never taken. instead the inexperienced and ill-equipped provincial armies were to be frittered away in vain attempts to relieve the capital.

An under-exploited option was the use of guerrillas or francs-tireurs along the German rear, especially in Alsace and Lorraine. While such operations would never have defeated the main enemy army, they constituted a potentially effective means of manipulating the weakness of the German lines of communication and utilizing manpower in the occupied provinces to the best advantage. Instead, Minister of the Interior Gambetta and the
Republican Delagation that had seized power after the fall of Napoleon II at Sedan, focused their strategic attention on Paris.

A final option entailed an attack against the German rear from the Franche Comte region into Alsace. Unfortunately not only was the force available fairly small and filled with novices, it was expected to move in mid-winter supplied by inadequate railroads towards a confused objective under the command of "the pessimistic and unimaginative Bourbaki." The result was another French disaster.

Certainly one can see that Howard incorporated into The Franco-Prussian War the utility and scholarly objectivity that he felt to be essential features of historical writing. Moreover, as the numerous quotations illustrate, he definitely exhibited the literacy that he also expected of historians.

That does not mean that the almost universal acclaim that greeted its publication was without criticism. Douglas Johnson of the University of Birmingham unleashed a critique in the English Historical Review that should have been particularly galling to Howard because it cut at the heart of the King's College professor's concept of what defense studies were all about. Despite Howard's belief that military history must reflect the economic, social, and political environment of the times, Johnson notes that although Howard suggests several times that the military incompetence of the French generals could be laid at the feet of the fact that "they were the products of the military system, and the military system is an aspect of a society," these suggestions are not followed up. While Howard devoured the military literature relative to the period he "uses none of the recent investigations into the social history of these years" that could have helped to explain the French collapse. "In short," Johnson concluded, "Mr. Howard gives only backward glances at the social and political scenes."
There is also no grand summation of the significance of the war. Too often brilliant conclusions are lost in the mass of detail involved in over 450 pages of text. While similar criticisms may be leveled at his Grand Strategy volume, at least in that case he summarized and expanded upon his observations in the lectures published as The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War.

The closest Howard comes to such an overview of the 1870-71 conflict are found in his New Cambridge Modern History essay. Here, more than in the book itself, one can ferret out Howard's major conclusions and their implications for the future of warfare. First are the tactical consequences. While there is some debate over whether French superiority in rifle design did or did not compensate for German superiority in artillery design, Howard comes down solidly in favor of the latter. The importance of fortifications and entrenchments to the modern battlefield first noticed during the American Civil War, received additional emphasis as a consequence of this conflict and of the Russian experience at Plevna in 1877. All of this impacted upon infantry tactics since the lethality of the battlefield made the frontal assault virtual suicide. A final tactical observation was that cavalry became obsolete as an effective attack arm against large infantry formations. Unfortunately, no cavalrymen accepted this conclusion until long after 1914.

Second are what one might call the administrative and logistical consequences. As noted previously, Howard feels the Prussian success was largely the consequence of superior mobilization policies. This required three basic components: effective pre-war staff planning; a supportive railway system that brought large numbers of troops and supplies to the front quickly; and a system of conscription and training that created mass armies with all their logistical support systems on relatively short notice.
The key to the new system was the corps of approximately 30,000 men which became the smallest, self-sufficient military unit containing all necessary combat arms and ancillary support services. The net consequence of all this was that by the end of the century in "organisation, as in armament, the European armies grew to resemble each other more closely as the conduct of military affairs approximated more and more to an exact science."39

Needless to say, these conclusions are echoed in War in European History.

Because The Franco-Prussian War is considered by most admirers to be Howard's most significant contribution to military history it has been discussed in extended detail. There are those, however, who feel he has made more important historical efforts in other fields. One of them most certainly involves several works dealing with the first half of the twentieth century.

THE AGE OF CHURCHILL

By far the largest number of Howard's historical writings concern the first half of the twentieth century. This involves not only several essays, but also three major books, The Continental Commitment, Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, and Grand Strategy.

Several military officers and Ministry of Defense bureaucrats argue that The Continental Commitment constitutes Howard's most important work. Certainly it more than any other epitomizes the author's devotion to the utility of history. Subtitled "The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars," this short volume consists of six Ford Lectures delivered at Oxford University in 1971. The thesis of this book is that British defense policy has oscillated between a peacetime Imperial Commitment to the Empire and Commonwealth and a wartime Continental Commitment to one or more allies on the landmass adjacent to the British Isles.
It involves the great paradox of a nation which was drawn into European wars since the Norman Invasion and which continually resolved at their conclusion "never again" to do so. Howard concludes by proclaiming that the Second World War, the loss of Empire, and the North Atlantic Treaty combined with the permanent establishment of the Army of the Rhine constitute a peacetime reaffirmation of the Continental Commitment that was heretofore absent in national strategic policy.

The expansive ambitions of three empires, the Second Reich, the Third Reich, and the Soviet Union, have inexorably drawn the British to Europe despite that nation's desire to remain aloof. "In exactly the same way as in the years before the First World War, political and military logic had forced the reluctant British Ministers" in the spring of 1939 "to the conclusion which they for so long had tried to evade: that the British Isles could only be defended on the Continent of Europe, and that in consequence a firm commitment to continental allies was inescapable."40 By the mid-1950s, "neither the political nor the military leaders of the United Kingdom shrank any longer from a continental commitment. They had learned their lesson."41

These conclusions have particular significance in the context of British military historiography. Sir Basil Liddell Hart had long contended that the "indirect strategy" combining naval blockade with peripheral attack and a continental ally could achieve victory in Europe by strangulation rather than by direct British Army intervention. The central argument of the Continental Commitment attacks this proposition by indirection with its contention that Britain's security is better maintained by an army along the Rhine or the Elbe than by a fleet in the Channel.
A frontal assault against the Liddell Hart thesis came three years later in the Neale Lecture in English History before an audience at University College, London University. Here he takes off the kid gloves and explicitly confronts the "captain who taught generals." Liddell Hart symbolizes those veterans of World War I who saw that tragic conflict as the consequence of mistaken strategic policies which distorted the traditional British avoidance of land combat in central Europe. Both Sir Basil and his predecessor as a military commentator, Sir Julian Corbett, are seen as too simplistically applying eighteenth-century solutions to twentieth-century problems. Their solutions "seem like anachronistic survivals from some earlier and happier age."

Howard reviews British policies from the age of Elizabeth I to that of Churchill and articulates two conclusions in direct contradiction of those of Corbett and Liddell Hart: "First, a commitment of support to a Continental ally in the nearest available theatre, on the largest scale that contemporary resources could afford, so far from being alien to traditional British strategy, was absolutely central to it." Were this not enough, secondly, he finds "a purely maritime strategy" or an "indirect approach" as the "result, not of free choice or atavistic wisdom, but of force majeure. It was a strategy of necessity rather than of choice, of survival rather than of victory." 42

The conclusion of this lecture honoring Sir John Neale, a distinguished Tudor historian, draws a typical Howardian utilitarian comparison between the ages of the two Elizabeths:

then as now, England was a small country with almost insoluble internal problems and very slender resources—of which only a small portion could be spared for military purposes; enmeshed, as rather a minor actor, in a world of power politics in a new age of tantalizing possibilities and appalling dangers, in which all traditional landmarks were being eroded; an age where only
the skilful, the resolute and the devious seemed likely to survive. Above all, it was a country in which there were no cheap or easy answers; neither for statesmen or for strategists.

The "skilful, the resolute and the devious," these imaginative statesmen and commanders Howard appreciates most. Nowhere is this better stated than in his study of Lord Haldane who almost singlehandedly sought to create a new modelled reserve army for the United Kingdom early in this century. As Secretary of State for War, Lord Haldane sought the creation of a Territorial Army embodying the continental nation-in-arms while incorporating peculiar British voluntary institutions. The Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill of 1907 never quite achieved Haldane's desires primarily because it remained "a reservoir of manpower to supply and supplement the Regular Army rather than a force capable of taking the field in its own right" as well as "a collection of very good clubs" whose ambitions were not quite those of the war minister. However inadequate it was, the Haldane reform broke up an antiquated pattern of military organization on the eve of the Great War and, thereby, contributed significantly to manpower the Empire could contribute to the anti-German effort.

Less skillful, but certainly as resolute and devious, were the efforts that led to the outbreak of war in August 1914 and plunged the continent into conflagration. We have yet to receive Howard's final statement on the First World War. But there are indications of the directions of his thought in several publications. First, the length and intensity of the conflict can be partially explained by the popular emotions generated in behalf of the war effort. For each side the war became a crusade for those ideals each nation cherished. Second, the social attitudes toward military activities were not condemnatory but rather saw particular virtues in military service and in war itself. British writers may have been less inclined
than their Teutonic cousins to glorify warfare, but they were "conscious of the need for the martial virtues and spasmodic efforts were made to inculcate them."\(^4^5\)

A third factor was the military theory of Clausewitz with his emphasis on the climatic battle which would decide the destiny of the nation. If the machine gun and the artillery piece meant the "battle went on for longer than expected; the casualties were higher than expected;" the resistance was more stubborn than expected; the "greater the ultimate victory" would be for the nation and commander with the moral fiber to endure such costs.\(^4^6\)

While there were obvious political and economic consequences of the war, Howard is particularly disturbed by a fourth conclusion concerning the broad application of attack in future wars. World War I was essentially a war of logistical and personnel attrition. Therefore:

If the centre of enemy power lies, not in his armed forces, but in his civilian population, then that population must be attacked directly. It must be softened and subverted by propaganda. It must be starved and enfeebled by blockade. It must be remorselessly bombed from the air. Its morale must be undermined to a point where its capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. Only then, with swift armoured thrusts, can the coup de grace be delivered. .

The art of war had outgrown Passchendaele. It was almost ready for Hiroshima.\(^4^7\)

This drift towards absolute war in the Clausewitzian sense causes Howard considerable concern. While the ethical dimensions of combat, especially nuclear combat, will be discussed in a later chapter, suffice it here to note that by the twentieth century the Regius Professor finds that warfare has changed: modern wars have irreversible consequences which incline participants to conduct them without restraint. Even when their as well as their opponents civilian populations are endangered. The rise of
mass societies has necessitated that the elites of such communities mobilize not only the manpower and the industrial capacity of the state, but also the national will through propaganda. Consequently, there is created an image of total alienation between the belligerent communities in which the opposition is made to appear the personification of evil bent upon destruction of the values of the community if not its national existence. The First World War, essentially another balance of power and boundary readjustment conflict along the eighteenth century model, "became seen, because of mass participation and mass propaganda, as a total war between incompatible and mutually exclusive cultures, when in fact it need have been nothing of the kind."**48**

Not only did this democratization of war contribute to its potential destructiveness, concurrently there arose a technology which created weapons of mass and indiscriminate killing power. The submarine torpedo and aerial bombardment were the harbingers a more horrible future for armed conflict, a future which in the minds of many necessitates a totally new outlook on warfare which had heretofore been viewed as an inevitable, if undesirable, form of human activity. "Both on moral and on prudential grounds," Howard concludes in a recent essay, "it has seemed increasingly clear, as the twentieth century has pursued its course, that war should not simply be limited; it should be abolished, outlawed."**49**

And it is because Michael Howard is a humane, liberal scholar that he feels compelled to describe the dilemma of liberalism in the face of modern war. The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures in Cambridge University for 1977 provided him the opportunity to articulate his position in a collection entitled *War and the Liberal Conscience*. By his definition, "liberals" are "those thinkers who believe the world to be profoundly other than it should be, and who have faith in the power of human reason and human
action so to change it that the inner potential of all human beings can be more fully realised. By "conscience" he means an "inner compulsion" to act upon a particular belief or attitude.

While these six essays concern the entire period of modern history, the last four cover this century and two of those concentrate on the period 1914-45. They contain the core of Howard's thesis of how the fundamental mistake of liberal thinkers is that they deal with abstractions while ignoring experience and when confronted with policy decisions they are as prone to military action as their conservative opponents; all for a just cause of course. For instance, a commitment of the British Expeditionary Force to France in August 1914 could be justified on the grounds that peace depended upon the expansion of democracy which could not expand without the elimination of German militarism. And by the spring of 1939 "the liberal conscience endorsed a national struggle as a just war." Five years later English liberal thinkers embraced the doctrine that "the Germans must be forced to be free and compulsorily educated in how to be so."

"What conclusions are we to draw from this melancholy story of the efforts of good men to abolish war but only succeeding thereby in making it more terrible?" asks Howard. First, he finds no validity in the argument that wars were caused by a militarized ruling class. Nor could he. second, find justification wars were the result of the ambitions of the governing capitalist interests. Finally, he rejects the argument that war is the consequence of the clash of power politics that could be overturned by the sacrifice of the element of national sovereignty to some international body. Here we meet the unrealistic vision of the liberals in the face of the national, ethnic, and cultural pluralism of the modern world.
If wars are not caused by the traditional liberal bugbears, then what are their causes? While such concepts fall into the realm of policy determination and international relations more than history, Howard does comment on these problems in several important lectures. As always, he does so from an historical perspective.

Nations fight "in order to acquire, to enhance or to preserve their capacity to function as independent actors in the international system." While liberals find war to be a "pathological aberration from the norm," Howard counters with a doctrine that international warfare has "normally arisen, not from any irrational and emotive drives, but from almost a superabundance of analytic rationality." But one must always remember that "the record shows that states, especially powerful states, have seldom calculated their self-interest so coolly and correctly as political scientist could do on their behalf."

Whether the motives for war are coolly calculated or irrational, the mission of the military is to prepare for the national defense. The interwar years saw many veterans of that conflict devising methods to avoid the slaughters they encountered in Flanders fields. Led by Charles de Gaulle, Heinz Guderian, J. F. C. Fuller, and Basil Liddell Hart, that generation whose military experience had been shaped by the Great War sought to change the nature of land conflict with tactical innovations emphasizing maneuver, shock action, and peripheral attack. Above all, the most outspoken exponent of new doctrines and strategies was Liddell Hart who in the 1930s was at the peak of his influence.

As Liddell Hart's perspective had been shaped by his experiences in France, so Howard's were molded by his in Italy. Liddell Hart desired to avoid continental conflicts and concentrate on imperial and home island defense with a strong navy and air force. The army would be concerned only
with its function as an imperial police force and, above all, conscription should be avoided. The problem with this strategy was that it "did not dispense with hard fighting on the Continent: it only meant that the British got their allies to do it for them. And if their allies were defeated, what then?" Since World War II terminated on a more hopeful note and seemed justified when the concentration camps were discovered during its final months, Howard disagrees with his confidant on both the conduct of strategic policy in both World Wars.

But during the thirties, Liddell Hart's influence was at its peak. The Times military correspondent's advocacy of strengthening the naval and air components of the military was detrimental to the army which was reduced to an imperial constabulary role increasingly became British policy. The limited resources of the depression era, the primacy of aerial and naval defense of the Home Islands, and the requirement to defend the Empire, then at its zenith, all combined to eliminate any serious contribution to the Continent until April 1939. By then it was too late to assist Holland, Belgium, and France against the German blitzkrieg. Men like Liddell Hart failed to see that the defense of Britain could be better achieved by land forces on the Rhine than by the RAF based in the United Kingdom.

With the outbreak of the Second World War we confront another extensive period about which Michael Howard has written. A commentator on his writings is faced with a problem similar to any discussion of his World War I writings. Nowhere has he fully articulated in a single source his final conclusions thereon. Yet, from a survey of his essays and books relative thereto, one can arrive at a number of conclusions pending the publication of definitive study.

First, there is an extraordinary close coordination between military and political policy. However obvious this might be to a student of
Clausewitz, too often historians, statesmen, and flag officers forget it. The essence of Howard’s *Grand Strategy* and *Mediterranean Strategy* volumes concerns this interrelationship. Churchill becomes not so much a prescient forecaster of the post-war world but rather a sometimes brilliant, often stubborn, always nationalistic leader of his nation in a grand coalition in which Britain’s role was becoming increasingly less important.

This "social dimension" of strategy is effectively articulated in one of his essays in which Howard argues: "No amount of skill in German generalship can explain the events of May and June 1940 if one leaves out . . . the political and social confusion of French society." Even more graphic is his recounting of the way the Germans squandered the political advantages they had at the onset of their invasion of Russia.

One might have considered it difficult to present the peoples of the Soviet Union with an alternative more disagreeable than the regime which they had endured for the past twenty years, but it was a difficulty which the Nazi leadership very successfully overcame.

A second factor affecting Howard’s discussions of this period is the impact of personality. The dominating one in his writings is, of course, Winston Churchill. While he acknowledges that British society was probably more cohesive at the outset of war than it is today, he finds it hard to find anyone else that could have forged the national will to the task better than the Prime Minister:

If Churchill had not been available one can rack one’s brains in vain to think of one of its [the Conservative party’s] members who could have provided a focus for national consensus. That Churchill was there was providential, and on his role as a charismatic national leader, his remarkable capacity for blending the aristocratic with the demotic, one hardly needs to dwell.

This does not mean that his Churchill is without warts. The vindictiveness, pettiness, the excessive nationalism he epitomized is particularly emphasized in the conclusion of a book review: "Churchill could be a
horrible old man when he chose." 61 Churchill's tendency to dramatise and to personify," he observes in his essay on Montgomery. "often distorted his judgment." 62

A far more acute portrait appears in his essay on Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein a man "known, admired, feared, not very well liked" in the British Army. For all faults, Howard's Montgomery is an eccentric in the pre-war army who refused to engage in clubbable "soldiering" and rather prepared himself for war and command responsibility by developing "a self-reliance and a self-mastery with which went a total imperviousness to the opinions of others." Montgomery took an Eighth Army in North Africa and turned it from several regimental duchies into "an Army, and he made every member feel part of it." 63 (Coming from a member of the tradition-bound Coldstream Guards, this is a compliment indeed!) Like his Churchill, Howard's Field Marshal is not without flaws; he had a "total absence of generosity" towards others, he underestimated both his own logistical problems and the capacity of his enemies to react to his plans. And, while he "excelled in the set-piece battle," he could not adjust himself "to the needs of that most difficult and necessary of military operations, the pursuit." 64 And yet, his charismatic image, his capacity to control chaotic situations and to impose his will upon such occasions, and above all his ability to command large formations, made Montgomery the foremost commander of the British Army since Wellington.

A final example of Howard's discussion of the impact of personality appears in his "Hitler and his Generals," a magnificent review of documentary evidence published in the early 1960s. Howard uses these records to provide a penetrating analysis of the decline of Hitler's positive contributions to strategy until his rantings were devoid of "any clear strategic concept based on a thorough appreciation of well-authenticated facts, of how
the war was to be waged and won.\textsuperscript{65} Hitler stifled the "principle of flexible operational independence on which the whole structure of the Army had rested since the days of Moltke and which was more perhaps than any other element the foundation of its success."\textsuperscript{66} Howard correctly notices how the Fuhrer saw more clearly than the General Staff that modern warfare "was a conflict of rival economic systems, which the side with access to the fullest economic resources was virtually bound to win."\textsuperscript{67} And there was another aspect of the conflict which his generals failed to perceive; for Hitler military "victory was a mere preliminary to social and political transformation, and the Army was only one instrument among many in the hands of the political surgeon." And when Hitler sought to implement this aspect of his policy, Michael Howard unleashes one of the most furious moral indictments of his career:

\begin{quote}
The German military code permitted vigorous and prolonged protest when Hitler dared to violate orthodox principles of strategy: when he declared his intention of violating the fundamental moral and ethical codes which hold human society together, it permitted an acquiescent silence.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

Such ethical condemnations of Nazi Germany appear frequently in his early reviews. For instance, "As the enormity of the national crime grew, so each member of the nation buried himself more deeply in his own speciality, drew the dividends but disclaimed responsibility." On another occasion he wrote, "Do German generals ever wonder what would have happened if they had won the war? If they do, perhaps they will understand why we find it so difficult to accept them as partners in . . . western civilization."\textsuperscript{69}

An equally important ethical consequence of the war was the problem of war termination. A theme appearing in his Harmon Memorial Lecture at the US Air Force Academy in 1967 and the subject of a major address to the US Army War College sixteen years later, Howard finds the enormous difficulty
of bringing war to an end one of "the most distinctive and disagreeable characteristics of twentieth-century warfare." The mobilization of the economic, manpower, and psychological resources of a people in behalf of total war has made it difficult for statesmen to terminate a conflict short of total defeat of one side or the other.

This is, of course, not a new theme in Howard's historical writing. The case of Gambetta's continued resistance in face of certain defeat during the Franco-Prussian conflict has been previously mentioned. But today the consequences of continued resistance are more profound. Howard's writings offer little in the form of a solution and constitute more a warning than a policy.

The ambiguity of war termination is best examined in his discussion of the "unconditional surrender" policy arrived at the Casablanca conference in January 1943. Was it wise or unwise? Did it prolong the war or provide a unifying objective for the desperate nations in the Allied coalition? Did it soften or stiffen the enemy's will to resist? Did it hinder the German generals' plots against Hitler or not?

Howard begins his discussion of the "unconditional surrender" announcement with a statement on objectivity that characterizes his philosophy of history: "The historian must be careful to apply a realistic standard in judging the actions and decisions of the past, and make full allowance for the limits set by contemporary circumstances to any course of action."

First, one must consider the Allied attitudes. Peace with Germany and Japan, whose regimes seemed the personification of evil, was both politically unwise and psychologically inconceivable. "A post-war world in which a Nazi Germany and a militaristic Japan, however chastened, continued to exist on terms of parity with the Western democracies . . . seemed, at this critical stage of the war, to be entirely out of the question."
Second, even though there appears to have been no serious consideration of the consequences of such an announcement upon the enemy or the Soviet Union, Howard doubts that had such advice been sought that there would have been any reason to assume it would have contradicted the decision made. Had such advice been available, Howard cautiously concludes, "the Allied leaders might have reflected a little more deeply on the question, whether total victory is necessarily the surest foundation for a lasting peace."\(^{72}\)

A final characteristic found in Howard's judgments about World War II is the impact of technology. What is involved is not a mere cumulative addition of inventive genius, but a revolution in warfare as significant as the democratic revolution of the age of Napoleon. Military professionals had adapted to technological innovations from the age of steam to the age of the atom with increasing versatility. At the same time they created mass armies and reserve forces and conscript forces that utilized these inventions. But the nuclear revolution with its seaborne, airborne, and rocketborne delivery systems marked more than a mere accumulation of weaponry and support systems. The new technological sophistication demanded expertise that depended more upon weapon power than manpower for effectiveness and thereby reduced the requirements for mass service while increasing the demands for professional military service. The consequence of this was a decreasing dependence upon conscription thereby divorcing the military from the general populace.

The reliance on skilled professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen was exceptionally costly not only in monetary expenditures but also in social alienation of the young. Particularly disturbing to Howard is the emerging generation of European youth bred in a time of peace threatened by nuclear holocaust who are sceptical of military virtues, who regard the armed
forces "with a mixture of suspicion, incomprehension, and contempt," and who fear the presence of nuclear weapons more than Soviet domination. To date he finds these attitudes of "scepticism, indifference, and hostility" have had little impact on the military strength of Europe itself. But in the long run such social attitudes are bound to influence public policy and they are "likely to undermine the self-confidence of the military themselves" and reduce the monetary commitment to military forces that the combination of sophistication and professionalism demand. As he concludes in *War in European History*:

> One may feel some gratification that, after a thousand years of armed conflict within Europe, a society has developed which feels itself sufficiently secure to turn its back on the traditional military virtues; but this must be tempered by apprehension that, in a world so heterogeneous and unpredictable as that in which we live, such confidence may prove premature.73

As any reader of Michael Howard grows to appreciate, such utilitarian comments are commonplace. So also one is also impressed by the objectivity that continues to characterize his writings. Nowhere is that best displayed than in the *Grand Strategy* volume. He denies there was any coherent British strategy for the Mediterranean or any grand design for the defeat of Germany through the "soft underbelly" symbolized by the Ljubljana Gap. British operations were essentially opportunistic, symbolic of both Liddell Hart's "indirect approach" and the military weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the British Empire. The depth of research and analysis presented in this official history volume describes the critical period when the initiative in the war was wrested from the Nazis. His acute and lucid insights into the interworkings of the minds of George Marshall, Alan Brooke, and Winston Churchill are both perceptive and convincing. No British commentator has provided a more impartial exposition of the strategic controversies of this critical period in the Second World War.
In all of this one is impressed with his conclusions being seen in the context of the times—not in reminiscences tempered by post-war developments. He conclusively demonstrates that there was no coherent British strategic alternative to the cross-channel invasion and that it was not until after the Normandy assault that Churchill viewed with alarm the Soviet menace to the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Throughout the book one finds articulate summaries of policy development such as this observation on a staff memorandum prepared aboard the Queen Mary enroute to the Washington Conference of May 1943:

This document . . . breathed a spirit of resolute optimism and determination more typical of the Prime Minister’s own memoranda than of the papers he was accustomed to receive from his service advisers. It is clear that the victories, first at Alamein and then in Tunisia, had raised all spirits and stimulated all imaginations. It was the spirit of the chase and not any dedication to a ‘peripheral strategy’—much less any calculation of postwar political advantage—which led the British to urge impatiently that their recent victories in North Africa should be exploited to the full.

Similar incisive conclusions dominate his brief discussion in The Mediterranean Strategy such as this summary of policy issues a year later:

History might at this point remind the reader that the whole dispute, bitter as it was, had nothing to do with any conflict between a ‘Balkan’ and a Western Strategy. The object of the British commanders at this state—March to April 1944—was still limited, short-sightedly perhaps, to breaking the German winter line through Cassino, capturing Rome, and pursuing the Pisa-Rimini line. The possibilities beyond that—a breakthrough into the Po Valley, a landing in the Gulf of Genoa, a landing in Istria, a massive switch of forces to the south of France—still lay in the realm of speculation.

And, as usual, all of this was written in Howard’s traditional literate style. No scholar could seek a better compliment regarding his achievements than Michael Howard received in Lord Chalfont’s review of Grand Strategy:

66
He has organised the great mass of material with confident mastery, and used it to tell his story in characteristically spare and economical style. This kind of writing, free from fuss, gimmicks and jargon, its judgments arrived at with care and meticulous objectivity, is a great refreshment after the flashy excesses of some of the new generation of instant historians. While lesser practitioners manufacture lions and donkeys to fit their own prejudices, Professor Howard's cool insistence on 'telling it like it really was' allows both the giants and the dwarfs of history to emerge unmistakable from his pages.76

By the early 1970s Michael Howard was established as the premier military historian in the British Isles. Having completed this major project on the Second World War, he turned to the enterprise which had long intrigued him, the definitive translation of Carl von Clausewitz's Vom Kriege.

THE AGE OF CLAUSEWITZ

Michael Howard's interest in Clausewitz began with his appointment as Lecturer in War Studies in 1953. Very quickly he discovered that not only was there no thorough translation of the famous Prussian military philosopher but also there was little critical commentary concerning him in English. As noted previously, Howard obligated himself to remedy these deficiencies early in his career. But for many years this project remained dormant as he concentrated his main scholarly efforts on The Franco-Prussian War and Grand Strategy manuscripts. As these projects reached or neared completion, Howard found time to return to this effort.

Meanwhile, his most cosmopolitan pupil, Peter Paret, began his own study of Clausewitz, first in lectures at Oxford in 1959 and later in an essay in the festschrift honoring Liddell Hart. Eventually the two decided to combine their talents in an effort to produce a definitive modern translation of Vom Kriege.
Originally their idea was to supervise a new translation by Angus Malcolm, a retired British Foreign Office official, and merely write various interpretative essays. However the death of the translator forced the whole burden of the project upon the two already busy professors, one at King's College and the other at the University of California at Davis and later at Stanford. No wonder it was not until the mid-1960s that the two were able to seriously begin this work.

Professor Paret initially translated each section of the book and forwarded that contribution to Howard for his commentary and modifications. Their object was not a literal translation but rather a "re-creation," as Paret puts it, of the original intent. The procedure was to "read an entire paragraph; think it through; understand it; and then render it in English, of course staying as close as one reasonably could to the original." However, if they felt that moving somewhat away from precise rendering of a word or phrase allowed them "to gain a clearer or sharper sense," then that is what they did. They would sacrifice the verbatim translation for the sake of the overall sense.

For instance, when Clausewitz used the word "Seelenarzt," Paret says, "neither Howard nor I were to translate that passage saying the "doctor of the soul or the mind." Instead they used the word "psychiatrist" which did not exist in the German language of Clausewitz's day. But Howard and Paret were convinced that one must translate *Vom Kriege* into modern English or Clausewitz would go unread.

The subjectivity of such a translation immediately becomes apparent to the reader when on the first page the best known passage in the book is rendered "war is nothing but the continuation of *policy* with other means." Traditionally "policy" has been rendered "politics." The German
felt that the broader meaning of "policy" more correctly conveyed Clausewitz's intention. Such interpretations occur throughout the entire Howard-Paret edition.

For a long time the effort went slowly. The two saw each other every two or three years and then everything began to fall into place so that by 1973 they completed the translation and were ready for the introductory essays. Meanwhile they had invited Bernard Brodie to write an essay. They expected a brief commentary on "The Continuing Relevance of On War" and received not only this but also a booklet (160 pages in the printed version) guiding the reader through Clausewitz chapter by chapter. One can only imagine Paret's surprise when Brodie brought him a massive manuscript which seemed capable of overwhelming a reader before he ever read a single page of Clausewitz.

Howard and Paret then had to decide what to do with this enormous mass of material. Obviously they could not print the entire commentary in front of the text as originally intended; so they split the Brodie manuscript into a brief introductory essay and added the remainder as an appendix entitled "A Guide to the Reading of On War." All this required some rewriting by Brodie which he somewhat reluctantly consented to do. The guide became a very useful portion of the final product and achieved its author's purpose of enhancing "the reader's comprehension of the text at first reading."79

Howard's introduction entitled "The Influence of Clausewitz" constitutes an expansion both in detail and insight of a 1956 BBC address on "Clausewitz and His Misinterpreters." It was in this talk that Howard noted how Moltke strove for military predominance over the civil authority in direct contradiction to what Clausewitz explicitly condemned. What the nineteenth century "misinterpreters" concentrated upon was the Prussian
general's emphasis on battle while ignoring the over-arching concept of war as an instrument of public policy. Howard concludes with the injunction that "it is salutary to re-read Clausewitz and to learn again that, though victory may be the proper object of battle, the proper object of a war can only be a better peace."80

"The Influence of Clausewitz" concludes that not only were Moltke's ideas "totally at variance with Clausewitz's teaching about the relationship between the military and political authorities." but a balderizd version of Vom Kriege on which earlier English translations were based also reversed the Clausewitzian emphasis on "the cabinet's participation in political decisions."81

But Howard goes far beyond his 1956 observations and shows how such ideas as the strength of the defense were ignored, how annihilation was emphasized over attrition, and how the concept of the moral forces in combat led to a stress on the offensive spirit that sent thousands to the grave between 1914 and 1918.

Howard concludes with a discussion of Clausewitzian influence since 1918, especially noting the impact on American military thought. Possibly more important than these observations is his caveat that "Too much should not be read in Clausewitz, nor should more be expected of him than he intended to give."82

The reception of the Howard-Paret edition of On War coupled as it was with the almost simultaneous publication of Paret's Clausewitz and the State was favorable in both popular literary journals and in academic periodicals. If, as Stanislav Andreski wrote in Encounter, Paret's book "is an erudite work of high-powered scholarship, full of recondite references and quotations," then the Howard-Paret translation with its "superb introductory essays" and "excellent translation" provided, as Phillip Windsor
said in *Millenium*, for the first time a "lucid rendering of that extraordinary work, and one which has gone back beyond the corrupt or distorted later texts to establish as nearly as possible what Clausewitz originally wrote."83

There were criticisms, of course. Charles Reynolds attacked the philosophical basis of Clausewitzian thought and, thereby, the omission of such an insight in the introductions. Group Captain R. A. Mason correctly noted Howard's failure to discuss the Prussian's influence on Marxist military doctrine. Windsor argued that Clausewitz's method was not dialectical but rather occupies a more ambiguous place in philosophical thought.84

But all agreed with Geoffrey Best's conclusion that "if people were to go on quoting Clausewitz, at least they should have a wholly correct text to quote from, and that, if they were to go on arguing about him, it should be under the discipline of the best modern scholarship." Such a text was now provided in English in part by Howard, described by Best as the "king of war studies" in Britain, who had "been pressing Clausewitz upon his spreading circles of students and readers ever since his days in King's College, London."85

This would not be Michael Howard's last commentary on Carl von Clausewitz. Early this spring Oxford University Press published his 73-page essay in that publisher's "Past Masters" series. Unlike the introductory essay to *On War*, this provided Howard the opportunity to comment on Clausewitz's philosophy as well as his legacies. The short chapters on "Theory and practice in war," "Ends and means in war," and "Limited and absolute war" contain the most detailed analysis Howard has ever written concerning Clausewitzian doctrine. While this brief work in no way develops in depth the ideas more fully explored in Parets *Clausewitz and the*
State (1976) or Raymond Aron's *Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz* (2 vols., 1976), it may be the most readable introduction to the master philosopher of the art of war available. Undoubtedly the officer and the graduate student will find no more concise and precise discussion of Clausewitz anywhere. Howard's *Clausewitz* does not have the idiosyncratic commentary found in Anatole Rapoport's introduction to a 1968 abbreviated edition of an corrupt 1873 translation. Howard's little book is rather a lucidly written, objectively analyzed, highly practical guide to the philosopher of military thought most worth extended analysis. For this reason alone, in its hardback and paperbound versions this thin volume could be the biggest seller of all his writings. Besides it should become a companion piece to the forthcoming second edition of the Howard-Paret translation containing not only a few corrections to the first edition but also Howard's comments on Clausewitz's influence upon the Russians and a much-needed index.

**HOWARD THE HISTORIAN**

Considering the historical contributions of Michael Howard one has to differentiate between those which contribute considerable new information to the field, involve new historiographic techniques, and/or make so significant an analytical contribution that it immediately attracts attention outside the limited field of scholarship for which it was written. Since he writes traditional narrative history, none of Howard's writings involve any novel historiographic techniques.

No one would suggest that *The Coldstream Guards* meets such criteria. A solid piece of research, its subject area in too limited to create a significant reputation. However important it may have been in the selection of Howard for the lectureship in war studies, its impact on the historical profession was minimal. However subtle and even profound *War*
in European History might be, it is not what one would describe as a first-rate piece of historical scholarship. It is primarily a text and a treatise without the depth of research and analysis normally associated with seminal works.

The collections of lectures such as Mediterranean Strategy, Continental Commitment, and War and the Liberal Conscience contain essays of considerable erudition and insight, but do not involve the depth of scholarship necessary to attain a premier position in the historical profession. The same may be said of the single lectures and essays such as "The Armed Forces as a Political Problem" (1956), "Lord Haldane and the Territorial Army" (1966), "Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare" (1967), "The British Way in Warfare" (1975), and "War and the Nation-State" (1978).

This means that Howard's reputation as a historian primarily rests on his three major works—The Franco-Prussian War (1956), Grand Strategy (1972), and On War (1976). In each of these works Howard symbolizes the transformation of military history that occurred after the Second World War. Prior to that conflict this portion of Clio's realm concerned itself primarily with descriptions and explanations of what happened rather than becoming critical in the evaluation of strategies pursued with strategic options not taken. Moreover it tended to ignore the political, economic, and social factors affecting military policy.

One is particularly taken by Howard's discussions of strategic options missed, inadequately reinforced, or ineptly executed that contributed to the French defeat in 1870-71. While this is not to say that such considerations were unknown to previous historians, what Howard did was far more important than attempts to assess what would have happened if James Longstreet had attacked earlier on the second day at Gettysburg. More to the point is the historical controversy over Robert E. Lee's decision to
march north in the summer of 1863 and an evaluation of the strategic options available to him. The type of questions Howard asks concerning the actions of Gambetta, for instance, are of a new order of magnitude in historical analysis. While no one would argue that Howard was the first to broach such questions, seldom has anyone done so with so much insight and sensitivity.

While the criticism that The Franco-Prussian War fails fully to explore the social and political influences upon military actions has some validity, no one will argue that a significant number of the political factors are addressed. Undoubtedly Howard would have liked to examine in greater detail such factors, but for a manuscript already reaching 500 printed pages, such additional remarks would tax both a publisher’s budget and a reader’s endurance.

In this work one is particularly entranced by the deft and incisive personality sketches that Howard creates. Howard is not afraid to go beyond the dry, dusty manuscripts and come to his own conclusions relative to the accomplishments and failures of commanders and statesmen. This is, of course, a continuing characteristic of Howardian scholarship. The Winston Churchill of Grand Strategy is a complex, fallible, but perceptive statesman whose vision, however limited or impossible, always forced his adversaries within the Grand Alliance to counter him with vigorous arguments of their own. Howard penetrates beneath the surface of human conduct to discover new and convincing motivations for behavior and to note the ordinariness of men often given outsize parts on the stage of history.

Grand Strategy constitutes what may be his most significant historical work to date. It is official history in a manner matching the perceptive volumes in the American official series written by Maurice Matloff. Like
the former US Army Chief Historian, Howard has an expansive vision of what he was to study.

Grand strategy... consisted basically in the mobilisation and deployment of national resources of wealth, manpower and industrial capacity, together with the enlistment of those allied... powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy.

This thick volume may cover only fourteen months of actual operations, but it considers some of the most critical high level decisions of the entire war and concerns itself with global problems as the British and Americans try to coordinate their joint operations as well as their support of such critical allies as the Soviet Union and China. The result is a thorough, readable, and analytical tome spanning perhaps the most interesting part of high level decision making during the entire war. Considering the quality of Grand Strategy we can anticipate similar research and writing quality in the deception volume of the official history of British intelligence activities which is now in press.

In the final analysis both these books are conventional narrative history. The combination of research, analysis, and writing place them both in the class with such classics of military history as Garrett Mattingly's Spanish Armada and Maurice Matloff's Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare. They are particularly distinguished by their range, subtlety of judgment, power of observation, and brilliance of expression. In the end, however, they are all traditional in approach and style and while they mark their author as a first rate historian they do not make him a seminal one.

Normally, reputations for professional historians are not made in editorial positions. Certain editors like Julian Boyd of The Papers of Thomas Jefferson achieved eminence in the field for his editorial procedures which went beyond the mere mechanical aspects of the craft. Boyd's long introduction to the first volume is a magisterial statement constantly
referenced by subsequent editors and is a classic in itself. Nothing of this stature occurs in the Howard-Paret edition of *Vom Kriege*, in fact there is no explanatory essay of editorial procedures. On the other hand, there is no doubt that this edition of Clausewitz is the finest ever done in English and that it will remain the standard translation for years to come. In the final analysis, *On War* may remain the longest lasting of Howard’s legacies to historical thought.

If this is true, then how did Michael Howard become the Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford? The answer to this requires an understanding of his contributions outside the area of traditional history.
CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid., p. 336.
3. Ibid., pp. 334-5.
5. Causes of War, p. 132.
7. Ibid., p. 195.
8. Ibid., p. 45.
9. See particularly. Ibid., pp. 87-9, 107-15, 140-1.
10. Ibid., 195-7.
12. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 334.
18. Franco-Prussian War, p. 373.
19. Ibid., p. 40.
22. War in European History, p. 143.
24. War in European History, pp. ix-x.


27. Ibid., p. 93.

28. Ibid., p. 119.


32. Franco-Prussian War, p. 409.

33. Ibid., p. 88.

34. Ibid., pp. 164-5.

35. Ibid., pp. 382-3.

36. Ibid., p. 422.

37. Ibid., p. 413.


40. Continental Commitment, p. 128.

41. Ibid., p. 146.

42. Causes of Wars, p. 186.

43. Ibid., p. 187; see also pp. 203-6.

44. Studies in War and Peace, p. 97.

45. "Empire, Race and War in pre-1914 Britain" in Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl and Blair Worden, eds., History and Imagination, p. 353.


47. Ibid., pp. 108-9.

48. Restraints on War, p. 7; see also Clausewitz, p. 68.

49. Restraints on War, p. 8.
50. War and the Liberal Conscience, p. 11.
51. Ibid., pp. 108, 110.
52. Ibid., pp. 130-2.
54. Ibid., pp. 11, 14.
55. Ibid., p. 81.
56. Ibid., p. 205.
59. Ibid., p. 221.
60. Ibid., p. 222.
62. Causes of Wars, p. 211.
63. Ibid., pp. 213-4.
64. Ibid., pp. 216-7.
66. Ibid., p. 115.
67. Ibid., p. 119.
68. Ibid., pp. 120-1.
72. Ibid., p. 285.
73. War in European History, pp. 142-3.
77. The quotations from Paret come from an interview with the author 28 February 1983 at the University of Richmond, Virginia.
78. *On War*, p. 69. While the translation was in progress, Howard also wrote his "Jomini and the Classical tradition in Military Thought," *Studies in War and Peace*, pp. 21-36.
79. Ibid., p. 641.
81. *On War*, pp. 31, 608n. This misinterpretation of Clausewitz is developed again in "War as an Instrument of Policy" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations*, pp. 193-200.
82. Ibid., p. 44.
CHAPTER III

THE STRATEGIC ANALYST

In a review of Michael Howard's latest collection of essays, one of the most prominent of British military historians--John Keegan of The Face of Battle fame--wrote that the Regius Professor of Oxford had achieved an influence in the public arena that equaled that of Basil Liddell Hart in his heyday.1 Undoubtedly, part of this influence is the consequence of the practicality and realism that characterizes Howard's writings in contrast to those of many modern strategic commentators. For, as Howard's longtime friend Bernard Brodie, late professor of political science in the University of California at Los Angeles, wrote a decade ago:

Writers on strategy, and certainly its practitioners, have almost always rejected from their conscious concern those characteristics of war that to ordinary folk are most conspicuous ones. In the treatises on strategy, battlefields rarely have the smell of death. Weapons produce "fire-power," but no searing din and uproar. Men in battle and on the march feel triumph and sometimes panic, but rarely are they described suffering pain, cold, sweat, exhaustion, and utter misery. Certain standard and conventionalized euphemisms conceal or dissipate the cruder, unhappy images.2

Lieutenant Howard, M.C., knew the terror, mud, roar of guns, the death that characterizes combat. Professor Howard, C.B.E., seeks the preservation of those values he holds so dear through a public involvement that distinguishes him from most of his academic colleagues. It is in his role as a strategic analyst that he has achieved his greatest degree of influence and fame.

Because he has never codified his strategic thoughts into a cohesive whole, this chapter attempts to integrate a variety of Howard's ideas from
various publications covering the past thirty years. Obviously such an organization both distorts the ideas and compresses the time sequence so that the Regius Professor's views may not be accurately portrayed. For the purposes of this paper, Michael Howard's strategic constructs are subdivided into four sections covering a strategic approach to world politics, the causes of war, the dimensions of strategy, and the double deterrent. We conclude with a discussion of the dispute between Howard and E. P. Thompson of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament that raged in print and in the halls of the Oxford Union.

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO WORLD POLITICS

Howard admits that the core of his personal opinions appears in a 1976 essay entitled "The Strategic Approach to International Relations." It is from a thorough analysis of this paper that one can then evaluate his opinions and sense how they build toward or build upon the ideas expressed therein.

By "strategic approach" he means the "part which is played by force, or the threat of force, in the international system" or "the extent to which political units have the capacity to use or to threaten the use of armed force to impose their will on other units."

Given these parameters (and one must note that he excludes therefrom the role that other ingredients in national power such as economic policy, social factors, and political systems play), and given the fact that he sees the strategic approach played within the existing nation-state system, Howard's thesis revolves around two characteristics of international interaction.

The first is that the system is itself unstable. Nation-states are fragile institutions and there is nothing in the world system that can
either create or preserve them. War has, therefore, played a critical role in both the establishment and the preservation of national identities and he finds "little reason to suppose that this process ... belongs to a bygone era from which no conclusions can be derived applicable to the contemporary international system." As he told a University of Sussex audience in 1979, "whether one likes it or not, war has played for better or worse, a fundamental part in the whole process of historical change" and one's evaluation of whether the results are positive or negative "depends on the kind of alternative possibilities, inherently unverifiable, that one cares to substitute for the historical record."

Howard acknowledges that the military has become one of the critical symbols of nationalism wherein state power "was seen more than ever as military power; but military power involved the effective indoctrination of the entire population in a religion of nationalism." But he will not accept the doctrine of Rousseau and his liberal successors who considered the State to be the root of war and world problems. They may be correct in noting that except for national identities there would be no wars, but this is only conceptually correct if one accepts the definition of "war" as conflict between states.

Creation of the European state system in the late Middle Ages and beyond brought with it "the legitimization of violence in the hands of political authorities" a delightful alternative to the previous social environment where "the use of violence as an instrument of daily intercourse [was] in the hands of anyone strong enough to use it."

In what may be his most creative and original insight regarding World War II, he notices the declining monopoly on violence held by organized or aspiring political entities and the gradual emergence of violence in the hands of those not constrained by the traditional military ethic. Although
a state monopoly can be and often is abused, its erosion "can lead to nothing but a return to barbarism." While certainly the use of violence to achieve political objectives may eventually lead to the successful establishment of a nation state (witness the American Revolution), Howard feels that the "generalized use of violence in the pursuit of such objectives recognizing no legitimacy save that created by their own aspirations can only create such disorder, such fear, such resentment, and such vindictiveness" that even the most liberal of citizens demands police conduct otherwise objectionable in Western democracies.  

The barbarism and counter-barbarism that characterized the conflict between the Nazis and the partisans—whether in Russia, the Balkans, or France—tore at the heart of one of the cohesive elements of social control that has been a factor in the world political system since the later middle ages. The decay of the concept of state monopoly of violence since 1945 and the resulting justification of savagery in the name of "wars of liberation" constitutes one of the more tragic consequences of Hitler's war: "If one had no sovereign states one would have no wars, as Rousseau rightly pointed out—but, as Hobbes equally rightly pointed out, we would probably have no peace either." And the loss of such domestic tranquility means "that even the most Whiggish of us finds a Tory inside him, kicking and screaming to be let out."  

Obviously Howard's defense of the nation-state runs counter to much modern liberal thinking which sees such political entities as contrary to international peace and harmony. Such a "utopian" outlook contrasts with the "realist" viewpoint Howard advocates. The "utopians" have created a desirable model which bears little relation to power realities. "Realists," like himself, pursue world peace within the context of the international system as it currently operates, not as we would like for it to operate.
If one comes from the latter perspective, war cannot be discussed "in terms of good or evil, normality or abnormality, health or disease." War, he told an audience at his inaugural address as Professor of War Studies in King's College, "is simply the use of violence by states for the enforcement, the protection or the extension of their political power." Power, in and of itself, is neither good nor evil, it is "something morally neutral, being no more than the capacity of individuals or groups to control and organize their environment to conform with their physical requirements or their code of moral values." 11

This idea of power as a morally neutral force in a fragile nation-state system, leads naturally to the second aspect of the strategic approach to international politics which argues that it is the function of the State to serve as the guardian of its cultural value systems. The irony of much of the agitation by the peace movement in the West is that its ability to engage in such activities is guaranteed by the heavily armed, nuclear tipped military machine against which they protest. All this harkens back to Howard's Second World War experience and his conclusion that "the very survival of a value-system may depend on the capacity of the political community which has adopted it to maintain its independence in the face of outside attack." 12

To serve in this guardian function, to preserve the value system of its people, to enable its citizens to maintain their ethical values, a nation-state may have to engage in war and thereby deliberately inflict the horrors, the endurance, the suffering that is "the ultimate test of the validity of human institutions and beliefs." 13 One of the obvious consequences of World War II was the "realization of the impotence of ethical principle to operate unaided in a world of power." 14 For that reason he told an audience at Chatham House in January 1977, we need to understand
that international relations take place "in a two-dimensional field—a field which can be defined by the two co-ordinates of ethics and power."\textsuperscript{15} No statesman, diplomat, or soldier will operate successfully unless he can combine in his policy decisions the ethical and power considerations that face his State.

The tedious and clouded problems of ethical policy implementation require power mechanism to attain them and nations whose values stress peaceful resolution of conflict are vulnerable to seeing these ideals disappear through "violent intimidation, dispersal and physical destruction."\textsuperscript{16} But there is more to the preservation of ethical systems than merely power protection. Before entering into any universal state designed to protect the world from war, one must recognize two important consequences: (1) the very values that endorse such action are not universal and much of the world still believes that war and violence are socially useful activities; and (2) the very political system which now supports such moral ideals is just as vulnerable as any in history to both internal or external power plays that could eliminate any national entity.\textsuperscript{17}

Most men know Lord Acton's aphorism that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Howard turns the metaphor on its head. "To concern oneself with ethical values to the total exclusion of any practical activity in the dimension of power is to abdicate responsibility for shaping the course of affairs." Turning to traditional Christian theological arguments, he notes that obsessive concentration on moral values "with no concern for their implementation is ultimately unethical in its lack of practical concern for the course taken by society."\textsuperscript{18}

It is this practical concern for political action on the world scene that dominates Howard's writings on international policy. Whether he is reviewing Leonard Beaton's \textit{The Reform of Power} (1972),\textsuperscript{19} assessing liberal
attempts to limit war,\textsuperscript{20} describing the place of Henry Kissinger in the
diplomatic affairs of the Nixon-Ford administrations,\textsuperscript{21} or attacking the
shibboleth that arms races and peace are mutually incompatible,\textsuperscript{22} Michael
Howard becomes increasingly concerned about the failure of civilian author-
ity to appreciate the problems of the military and of the military to
understand the limits of force in achieving national objectives.

Central to these assessments is the twin problem of how the interac-
tion of history and the future impinge upon the validity of his conclu-
sions. On the one hand there is his fear that the use of force since 1945
has increasingly involved the use of subversion, insurrection, and civil
war and thereby negated his lessons of the past since war is no longer
state monopoly; and on the other is the conclusion by many that nuclear
weaponry has made all observations based upon past experience invalid.

Concerning the first of these conclusions is Howard's contention that
"the distinction between war and peace has become so blurred" that perhaps
Korea was the last "conflict with clear-cut fronts conducted by organized
and uniformed military forces depending on regular lines of supply."\textsuperscript{23}
Peace in the modern world is threatened by groups whose total armament is
quite negligible. These

non-state actors . . . have the greatest incentive to
disturb the existing order, and the greatest ability to
do so; and the greater that ability, and the less the
capacity of the defenders of the status quo to deter
them, the more precarious peace is likely to be.\textsuperscript{24}

Advocates of revolutionary war corrode the power and authority of either an
invading force or of an existing government and develop a novel technique

of growing from weakness to strength, of erosion from
the periphery to the centre, of the use of violence to
discredit and humiliate authority where it could not be
overthrown directly, of substituting an alternative hier-
archy of government with patently effective sanctions and
rewards.\textsuperscript{25}
The crucial question emerging from such a conclusion is whether history can contribute to any analysis of how to cope with the disorder resulting from such a disintegration of socially cohesive values. Howard has been able effectively to articulate the problem but has not found any solution thereto.

On the one hand, the complexity of modern society makes it vulnerable to the violence of ruthless minorities, and, thereby, tends to invalidate the effective contribution that history might make to policy making. On the other hand, there is the contention that the technology of nuclear warfare invalidates the role that historical examples might make and that classical strategic concepts might contribute to decision making. Here Howard confronts an issue that divides historians. Men like Walter Millis felt that nuclear weaponry destroyed any social usefulness that war might have. There appeared, he wrote in 1956, almost no way "the deployment of military force . . . could be brought rationally to bear upon the decision of any of the political, economic, emotional or philosophical issues by which men still remain divided."26 Seventeen years and another American war later, Russell Weigley concluded: "At no point on the spectrum of violence does the use of combat offer much promise for the United States today. . . . The history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end."27

To the contrary, the world since Hiroshima provides for Howard little encouragement that the "use of force or the immanent threat of force" will disappear "so long as the international community consists of sovereign states." Under those circumstances, "war between them remains a possibility, of which all governments have to take reasonable account."28 He concludes by opposing those writers who feel the technological challenge of world holocaust requires a supernational control of nuclear weaponry. Such idealism disintegrates in the face of the reality of the nation-state system. The withering away of this system "remains a dream and, in the
eyes of the masses of the peoples of the world, not even a beautiful
dream." The practicality of recognizing this fact, of realizing the
impression of the past upon the present, means that historical examples,
astutely analyzed, are relevant to the world after 1945. History illumina-
tes modern strategy, but cannot determine it.

Thus it is a philosophy of realpolitik that dominates Professor Howard's
analysis of the strategic aspects of international relations. He articu-
lates this in a typically erudite 1967 address at the US Air Force Academy:

The role of military power in international order is in fact as difficult to define as the role of gold in
economic transactions; and the controversies in the economic sphere parallel very closely those in the
military. Those who believe in the primacy of military considerations in international affairs have their
parallel in those economists who insist that a sound currency is the only basis for a healthy economy and
who pursue policies of sound finance at whatever short-
term cost in social distress. Those who deny the need
for military power at all have much in common with the thinkers who would maintain that the gold standard is a
shibboleth contrived by financiers for their own profit,
and that a workable economic system, based perhaps on
some form of social credit, if not on simple inflation,
can be devised without reference to it at all.

Or, as he writes in the essay which introduced this section, "how, if one
foreswears the use of nuclear weapons, does one avoid being at the mercy of
those who do not; and if one abandons the game of power politics" then "how
does one in the long run preserve, against those who do not share them, the
values which led one to abdicate in the first place?" We must understand
that "war is an inherent element in a system of sovereign states which
lacks any supreme and acknowledged arbiter" and that the more

states by reason of their democratic structure embody
indigenous and peculiar cultural values and perceptions,
the less likely are they to sacrifice that element of
sovereignty which carries with it the decision if neces-
sary to use force to protect their interests.
THE CAUSES OF WAR

If one cannot avoid the necessity of preparing for war in order to preserve national values, then one of the most important elements in the world political scene one needs to understand is the causes of wars. Not only does this topic dominate the article of that title, but it also permeates much of Michael Howard's writings in the past twenty years. First and foremost among his arguments is an attack upon the traditional list of causes.

Central to War and the Liberal Conscience is that those who think they know how to abolish international conflict always find the wrong rationale as a cause for war and their solutions are no more a prescription for peace than those of traditionalists that oppose them. Howard is deeply sympathetic for their idealism but he finds them ignoring experience while dealing in abstractions. For instance, when they thought war was perpetuated by feudal survivals and that republics would end such strife, they only helped to unleash conflicts more terrible in their effects than the limited wars of the monarchial era. When they blamed capitalism and imperialism as the villains of peace, most of them supported their "reactionary" governments against Wilhelminian Germany. When they endorsed the League of Nations as the solution for the bugbear of power politics, they weakened their own military and opened the opportunity for Adolph Hitler. When they believed proletarian socialism would usher in peace, they found Soviet Communism suppressing the desires of all who opposed them in the name of socialist idealism.

And when in the contemporary world they blame arms races and technology, they find themselves faced with an opponent with a compelling urge for more armaments than the most reasoned observer feels necessary for national
defense. In fact, it is this last argument, articulated in an address last January in London, that Howard presents some of his most effective observations on the current world scene. In "Weapons and Peace," he attacks two of the most prevalent assumptions of the modern "Peace Movement:" (1) arms races are a cause of war; and (2) technological modernization of weaponry is destabilizing.

There is no indication that numbers of weapons are in and of themselves a threat to peace. "Stability comes from the relationship between forces: not from their overall numbers." The maintenance of stability comes from a relative equality of weapons and the level of that parity is a secondary consideration when compared with the threat that dominance of one side may have over another. Others argue that the momentum of research creates continuing instabilities that must be controlled if we are to avoid nuclear holocaust. In the first place, we cannot divorce weapons technology from the general run of scientific progress, however attractive such a proposition might be. Second, so long as the technological advantages that one side might have over another are kept brief, the incentive to exploit them by revisionist powers is not great.

If militaristic elites, capitalism, power politics, and arms races are not the causes of war, then what are? This is a question Michael Howard’s practical realism seeks to answer in a series of essays, but which is best examined in "The Causes of War."

Originally delivered as the Creighton Lecture in the University of London in 1981, Howard distills therein the basic analysis of the origins of international conflict. Since he had dismissed much of the traditional rationale for the outbreak of wars in War and the Liberal Conscience, he uses this opportunity to articulate a simple, but reasoned explanation: "States . . . fight . . . in order to acquire, to enhance or to preserve
their capacity to function as independent actors in the international system. War is not an irrational act, but rather the product of deliberate consideration by the actors on both sides. War is an instrument of policy by both sides in any conflict. Furthermore, there are no single explanations that illuminate the conflict between nations, rather wars occur for a variety of reasons and any categorization that fails to consider this multiplicity of motives will prove inadequate.

Late in this address he hints at a theme that will emerge more fully elsewhere, especially in his "Weapons and Peace" lecture of last January. This is the psychological attitude he calls the "bellicist" temperament. The emergence of this concept arises out of his study of the origins of World War I. "Bellicism" is defined as "the belief in the inevitability of and the social necessity for armed conflict in the development of mankind." This cultural predisposition to war prevailed in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and is seen by Howard as the principal causal factor in the two world wars.

Those of a bellicist temperament regarded armed conflict as "natural, inevitable and right." Bellicism is not merely something shared by elites, but especially in today's mass societies, can be accepted as a positive value by peoples on both sides. Failure to comprehend this factor, Howard argues, was instrumental in the origins of World War II. The cultural ethnocentrism of French and British liberals who believed everyone shared their passionate dislike for war blinded political leaders to the reality "that Hitler and his associates actually wanted war: not necessarily the war that they got at the moment when they got it, but war in general, in which the German people could prove its claim to be the Master Race."

Besides bellicism, Howard divides the nations of the globe into two types, the revisionist powers and the status quo powers. Status quo powers
regard the existing world order as something to be preserved and will, when sufficiently threatened, go to war to maintain that situation. The revisionists regard the present situation as unacceptable and are willing to use force to change it. Howard expresses the differences in a particularly poignant personal illustration:

Were I a homeless Palestinian, or an intelligent young black South African, or an exploited peasant in Central America, my sympathies might well lie with the latter. As it is, I myself am one of those fortunate people for whom the existing order is tolerable, and I want to maintain it. For me, 'Peace' means the maintenance and wherever possible the incremental improvement of the existing international order, its preservation as a framework for continuing non-violent intercourse.\(^{37}\)

Given this framework for causal factors leading to international conflict, Howard analyzes the world situation as he presently sees it. What, in other words, are the greatest threats to peace in the world?

First and foremost, he believes that Japan and Europe, including the Soviet Union, have "been thoroughly debellated by the experience of two world wars." The loss of 25 million people in these conflicts constitutes a deterrent to Soviet expansionism in Central Europe.\(^{38}\)

This does not mean that the Russians have renounced the revisionist objectives inherent in Marxist doctrine. They have not. But, it is this absence of bellicism which, from Howard's point of view, makes comparison of 1983 with 1914 or 1939 so misleading. In fact, "its disappearance from the philosophies of the great nations of the world makes the conduct of international relations infinitely more manageable." In a most upbeat conclusion, Howard notes: "Mutual fears of revisionist ambitions may make the maintenance of deterrent armaments a continuing necessity; but there is no evident enthusiasm on either side about using them."\(^{39}\)
The major threats to world peace come from revisionist and not status quo powers. The Soviet Union and the United States fit into both categories. The Russians are status quo in regards to Europe but revisionist relative to the rest of the world. The Americans want to contain the expansion of Communism and, many of them at least, want to revise the World War II solution which gave the Soviets domination over Eastern Europe. Both powers wish to avoid direct confrontation so, when they fight, they use surrogates such as the North Vietnamese and the Afghans. The biggest threats to peace come not from the nuclear armaments of the major powers, but rather from revisionist elements in the world community who have little to lose and much to gain from a drastic shift in the local, regional, or world power structure.

**THE DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY**

If the world order does break down, Howard does have four dimensions of strategy that form the core of his thought in this area. According to Howard, "Strategy concerns the deployment and use of armed forces to attain a given political objective." Given this limited definition (one notes his avoidance of "Grand Strategy" in the context of economic, political, and social factors), Howard divides strategy into its operational, logistical, technological, and social aspects.

Most military commentators, to include Clausewitz, concentrate on the operational dimension, the movement of armed forces in the field, the allocation of troops to particular theaters, and their direction in battle. The concern for operations dominates most military analyses from Clausewitz through Liddell Hart. The rewards system in most armed forces is based upon operational performance to the detriment of the other factors. All of this runs counter to actual experience which shows that the logistical
dimension has proven more a factor to military success in recent conflicts than tactical finesse. Certainly the American Civil War and the world wars of this century demonstrate that the factor of greatest importance was that the side capable of delivering the largest and best equipped forces for the longest time was the victor. The North wore down the South, the Allies overwhelmed the Germans rather than outmaneuvered them.

A new dimension, not considered by Clausewitz, is the emergence, especially since 1939 of the technological dimension. In the Franco-Prussian conflict Howard noted that the dominance of German artillery provided an important, but not decisive element in the outcome. In the end, it was the superior logistical system that proved the most critical factor. Yet ever since 1870, both sides have sought some peculiar technological advantage that will provide the decisive element—toxic gas, armored vehicles, airplanes, submarines, rockets, and nuclear weapons have all been seen as constituting a potentially revolutionary dimension that would transform combat.

In fact, Howard argues, the West has sought to counterbalance its numerical inferiority with a technological superiority in the NATO versus Warsaw Pact confrontation. Howard warns that this is a slender reed upon which to pin one’s hopes of military success since such "windows of opportunity" last only a short time and eventually the traditional elements of logistical and operational dominance win out.

In his "Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," Howard remains disturbed that the technological element has become of such predominant importance since 1945 that we have neglected the most critical aspect of warface in the last half of the century—the social dimension. It was Clausewitz who drew attention to the fact that it was on the attitude of the populace for
in the self-denial necessary for military success that victory ultimately depended.

It was the inadequacy of the sociopolitical analysis of the societies with which we were dealing that lay at the root of the failure of the Western powers to cope more effectively with the revolutionary and insurgency movements that characterized the post-war era, from China in the 1940s to Vietnam in the 1960s.41

It is the failure of modern nuclear strategists to recognize this factor of national will that has resulted in condemnatory rhetoric in all of Howard's writings.

When I read the flood of scenarios in strategic journals about first strike capabilities, counterforce or countervailing strategies, flexible response, escalation dominance and the rest of the postulates of nuclear theology, I ask myself in bewilderment: this war they are describing, what is it about? . . . Has not the bulk of American thinking been exactly what Clausewitz described--something that, because it is divorced from any political context, is 'pointless and devoid of sense?'42

This particular comment is part of an extended critique of the writings of Dr. Colin Gray, Director of National Security Studies at Hudson Institute. It is the central portion of an exchange of articles and letters that appeared in International Security in 1979-81. Howard contends that Gray's advocacy of a nuclear "war fighting capability" borders on insanity since "there is no way in which the use of strategic nuclear weapons could be a rational instrument of State policy." Since taking a Clausewitzian approach to the rationale for war, "Mr. Gray is unable to provide nuclear strategy with a positive political object," then "for strategic planners to prepare to fight a nuclear war on the firm assumption" that they could win "would be criminally irresponsible."43 What we need, says Howard, is a war-fighting capability that will deter aggression and, if we have such a capability, it will be convertible into a Clausewitzian political influence.

96
Gray's short reply to this attack strikes at the heart of their disagreement:

Professor Howard endorses the concept of "victory denial," but does not appear to endorse the logically sequential concept of "defeat denial" for the United States. If an American policy of "victory denial" does not, in prospect, deter Soviet action, the overwhelming interest of Western policymakers will be to attempt to preclude Western defeat. In practice, the achievement of "victory denial" is fully compatible with Western defeat--i.e., we both lose!... The point of stressing the need for a theory of victory is to provide some overall political integrity to strategic planning--in short, we need a vision of the end game as well as of the opening moves.... The issue is not whether or not a nuclear war could be fought and won.... Rather, it is whether defense planners have any prudent option other than to try.

As Howard well knows, the dilemma of the social dimension of strategy is that a status quo power must plan and prepare to fight a war of potential national suicide in the hopes that such preparation will deter a revisionist power from aggression. The crisis of national will under the nuclear threat is the critical element in the formulation of strategic policy. How to accomplish an effective Alliance defense posture under these circumstances is the focus of much of Michael Howard's most recent writings.

THE DOUBLE DETERRENT

Whatever his thoughts on the causes of conflict and the dimensions of national strategy, Howard's major emphasis is on the prevention of war.

Wars are not simply acts of violence. They are acts of persuasion or of dissuasion; and although the threat of destruction is normally a necessary part of the persuading process, such destruction is only exceptionally regarded as an end in itself.

In fact, if one can avoid conflict, one is obviously better off than if one has to engage in it.
Central to Howard's hopes for the avoidance of war is the idea of deterrence. While most strategic thinkers describe deterrence in the context of nuclear war, Michael Howard has, since he first entered the strategic analysis arena, argued for a two-sided deterrent policy and has particularly chided his fellow Europeans for securing peace on the "cheap" under the American nuclear umbrella while refusing to provide adequate conventional defense forces for themselves.

As early as 1957, he noted the necessity of Britain to have a conventional armed force. If the nation became dependent upon the strategic bomber force, it might shortly find itself in possession of "a non-negotiable asset, and live like the heirs of an entailed estate in genteel poverty for lack of a more negotiable form of wealth." He was clearly among those critics of defense policy who regarded "with such disquiet the emphasis which" the famous British Defence White Paper of 1957 laid "on the continual strengthening of an already massive deterrent, rather than on the provision of enough conventional forces to increase the flexibility of western defence and thus the improbability of global war." Or as he concluded a letter to the Times: "Military inflexibility destroyed the German Empire: it may yet destroy mankind."

Similar sentiments appear in the Disengagements in Europe treatise where it is argued that massive retaliation coupled with Anglo-American withdrawal from the Continent would "imperil the whole structure of Western strategy," while strong NATO conventional forces and more flexible strategy (possibly including tactical nuclear weapons), would be a more effective deterrent to Soviet ambitions. However, his commitment to a strong conventional force was not as strong in these years as it would become later. In a 1958 BBC broadcast he seemed more at ease with massive retaliation and the security it offered which would reduce the necessity of "the
piling up of huge armies and navies which bedeviled international relations before the first world war, and from the great armoured and air forces which preceded the second." He foresaw the creation of nuclear-powered submarine and accurate land-based missiles as an antidote to the "large scale diversion of men and resources from civilian purposes" that dominated twentieth century military thought. In subsequent years there would be a considerable shift from these sentiments.

His criticism of British defense policies reached a new peak in his first article for *Foreign Affairs* in 1960. Clearly meant to move Howard into the forefront of strategic commentators as one of the leadership group of the newly established Institute for Strategic Studies, "Britain's Defenses: Commitments and Capabilities" argues that the military obligations of the United Kingdom to become a nuclear power, to retain her obligations east of Suez, and to remain on the Continent created a situation which the nation could no longer afford. Instead of the breadth of vision and ruthless departure from traditional procedures that the situation demanded, Howard found his country "courting disaster by assuming responsibilities far beyond her capacity to sustain."

A dozen years later he would warn not just his own countrymen, but all Europeans, that they must become increasingly self-reliant in their defense policies. Howard foresaw, incorrectly thus far, that American discontent with the Europeans could result in a major withdrawal of ground forces on the Continent. Howard urged European reliance on American tactical and strategic nuclear weaponry and the erection of a "second pillar" of European conventional forces that would indicate to both Americans and Russians the willingness of the Europeans to defend themselves.

These twin pillars of strategic policy emerge a decade later in an address to the annual meeting of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies on the subject of "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s." The defense of Europe rested on a deterrence policy designed to persuade an adversary of the excessive costs of warfare should he contemplate it and on a reassurance policy which sought to persuade one's followers that the benefits of military preparation outweighed the costs, both financial and psychological. In the age of nuclear parity, he argues, "reassurance cannot be reestablished by any improvement in the mechanism of deterrence, certainly not of nuclear deterrence." We have reached "a point beyond which the elaboration of nuclear arsenals ceases to bear any evident relation to the real problems faced by political communities." We can achieve a reduction of European dependence on American nuclear weapons only "by enhancing, so far as is militarily, socially and economically possible, our capacity to defend ourselves." Thus, harking back to his earlier pronouncements, we need "a change of emphasis from nuclear deterrence to conventional, or even unconventional, defense."52

A review of books related to nuclear warfare provided Howard the opportunity to suggest three principles of strategic policy that ought to dominate present defense policy. First, we should not create an image of the Soviet Union that suits our preferred program: to view it neither as a blankly hostile embodiment of malignancy bent on world conquest, nor as a purely peace-loving, defensively inclined society that has been forced, in spite of itself, to respond to the provocations of the West.

Howard sees the Soviet Union "not a society with which it is realistic to expect friendly relations, but it is one with which it should be perfectly possible to maintain dialogue, and certainly avoid war." His second principle is that any dialogue must take place within a framework that recognizes that military "power is a necessary factor in international stability, setting clear limits to the unilateral attempts to change the world order."
Finally, we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons. They are part of an existing nation-state system that cannot eliminate them. Consequently we must make sure that all sides comprehend that the consequences of their use would be "so appalling that no political or ideological objective could ever justify such use." On the other hand, we must recognize that "the possibility that they might be used in extremis, however irrational and counterproductive that might be, remains a valuable disincentive even to conventional aggression against a power possessing them."  

PUBLIC CONTROVERSY

Given the prestige of his new Regius professorship and his reputation as an outspoken advocate of defense policy (however much it might from time to time disagree with that of the British government or of NATO), it is no wonder that Michael Howard became increasingly the target of public criticism. This reaches a new peak in the 1980s when he takes on the twin poles of the Committee on the Present Danger and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The result is not only his previously mentioned argument with Colin Gray, but also the more public debate with the CND's acknowledged head, historian E. P. Thompson. Prior to the past few years most of Howard's contributions had been either on radio or television where few could dispute him, in addresses before either scholarly or defense-oriented audiences where few disagreed with him, or in the genteel columns of the Times or other public journals where few dared attack both his erudition or sarcastic wit. All this came to an end with a somewhat innocent letter to the Times advocating a revived civil defense policy for the British isles as a necessary adjunct to the nuclear deterrent doctrine.  

Three months following this exhibition of the Regius Professor's "senile itch" to write Letters to the Editor, Professor Thompson countered
with pamphlet entitled *Protest and Survive*, a polemical retort to a British government civil defense brochure entitled *Protect and Survive*. Jointly sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the CND, *Protest and Survive* quickly went through 86,000 copies and infused new blood into the so-called Peace Movement. A few months later a slightly revised version appeared in the United States.

Edward (E. P. in his publications) Thompson is one of the best known and most eccentric historians in recent English history. Son of a Methodist missionary to India, Thompson grew up in a household that frequently had as its guests both Gandhi and Nehru. Two years Howard's junior, he, too, fought in Italy during World War II and lost a brother fighting with Communist partisans in Bulgaria. After completing his studies at Cambridge, he taught in Halifax as an extramural tutor for Leeds University for seventeen years. During this period he wrote two books, *William Morris* and *The Making of the English Working Class*. Until 1956 he was an active member of the English Communist Party and he has always been a leading figure of the libertarian Marxist left in Britain. The excellent reception of his second book provided him the opportunity in 1965 to enter the mainstream of academia with a position as Reader in Social History and the founder of a center for its study in the University of Warwick. His tenure at Warwick was short and stormy and terminated shortly after a polemical expose of the close ties between the university and Coventry business leaders resulted in mutual antagonisms between Thompson and his academic superiors. Today he remains outside the scholarly mainstream residing in a village near Worcester and resenting the fact that no other British university has offered him a chair. While there are some similarities in the career progress of these two men, it is obvious that Howard chose to work within the Establishment and Thompson to work not just outside it, but against it.55
Universally recognized as "the intellectual mainspring of the current unilateralist resurgence," Thompson's *Protest and Survive* begins with a blistering attack on Michael Howard that both fails to comprehend the concept of deterrence and Howard's argument for civil defense. Howard found himself drawn into the vitriolic arena of polemic controversy, but refused to back down. In a somewhat unusual deviation from academic norms, he wrote two reviews of the book, one in the *Sunday Times* and another in an essay for *Encounter*.

While everyone acknowledges that Michael Howard is not an expert in the technical aspects of nuclear armaments and targeting policy (a fact, he revels in attacking the various scenarios such technocrats develop), no one would deny that he is far more versed than Thompson in the nuances of the nuclear policy debate. Howard charges the CND in general, and Thompson in particular, of failing to think "patiently through the complex political and military problems involved" in the deterrence debate. Replying in kind to Thompson's rhetoric, Howard accuses his Marxist opponent of developing a "bizarre scenario" that charges "that the whole nuclear confrontation has been deliberately contrived by the Establishment, spearheaded oddly enough by myself, in order to provide an excuse for supressing such voices of domestic discontent as Mr. Thompson's own."

At the end of the *Sunday Times* review, Howard places himself at the rational center of the nuclear policy debate:

> When one finds oneself in the middle of a minefield, it is seldom wise to get up and run, and the recipe of the CND doves seems likely to provoke exactly that catastrophe that we are all of us trying to avert. The advice of the hawks that should develop a capacity to fight a nuclear war, based as it is on a worst-case analysis of a kind bordering on fantasy, is no more attractive. There remains no way to save the unspectacular programme of what I would term "the owls": the patient negotiation of multilateral arms control, based on a sympathetic but reciprocal understanding of the
Concurrently in *Encounter* appeared Howard’s “Surviving a Protest: A Reply to E. P. Thompson’s Polemic” in which a much more detailed criticism of *Protest and Survive* allows the Regius Professor to fully vent his wrath. With a wry sense of humor, Howard acknowledged that he felt himself “matched against the polemical equivalent of Bjorn Borg on the Centre Court” at Wimbledon. (This may be the only athletic allusion in the entire canon of Howardiana.) But there was at least some compensation for all this, since he was now assured of immortality "as the dim Professor plucked from deserved obscurity to be transfixed with a single contemptuous shaft by the formidable Thompson."58 (There are many of Howard’s associates who feel that Thompson has been saved from deserved obscurity by the vehemence of this reply.) Howard feels the two are "desperately worried about the state of the world, casting about for some means to improve it, and lamenting that this proper concern prevents" them both "from getting on with serious historical studies." Howard begs Thompson "to stop being silly; to cease attributing malignancy to those with whom he disagrees; and to try to discuss these matters in the adult fashion that their deep seriousness demands."59

Howard finds the arms race acquiring a momentum of its own "fuelled by scientific ingenuity, by bureaucratic inertia, by inter-service rivalries in the USA and by the worst-case analysis of the military planners on both sides, that has made a mockery of arms control negotiations." But he sees little logic in the Thompson argument that cruise missiles are "more immoral than an earlier generation of nuclear weapons because they are more accurate and can be targeted against military rather than civilian objectives"
and its postulate that these missiles "are intended not for deterrence, but for use." His Thompson is an incurable romantic in the tradition of Thomas Paine and Jeremy Bentham who (harking back to his analysis in *War and the Liberal Conscience*) believe that "wars are caused by the forces of the Establishment for their own short-sighted and self-interested purposes."

He returns to what may be entitled the "owl" or the "realist" point of view which holds that international conflict is an ineluctable product of diversity of interests, perceptions, and cultures; that armed conflict is immanent in any international system; but that war can and must be averted by patience, empathy, prudence and the hard, tedious, detailed work of inconspicuous statesmanship—qualities which are notably absent from populist movements whose universal characteristic is a desire for the instant and total satisfaction of their demands. The appalling consequences of failure in the nuclear age make the exercise of these prudential qualities more vital than ever before. Romantic gestures will do nothing to help.

If Howard is noted for his acerbic pen, Thompson is reknowned for his charisma and personal magnetism, especially from the public platform. A mere three months after these reviews appeared, the two met in verbal combat at a crowded session in the Oxford Union. Howard held his own against the "hurly burly" of Thompson's philippics in an exchange that lasted several hours. The reporter for the *Times Higher Education Supplement* concluded that the "majority in the Oxford Union, it must be said, came already convinced of the correctness of Edward Thompson's views. They cheered him like a football star. But at the end... they were left questioning their assumptions on disarmament."

If he had not triumphed, certainly Howard had scored significant hits on Thompson's position.

The arguments raised in this controversy are far from over. Howard took the opportunity to attack for a third time the Thompson argument in
his review for Harper's earlier this year of his opponent's Beyond the Cold War in which he finds himself not knowing "whether to laugh or to weep" over "the absurdities of the strategic analysts [Thompson] so brilliantly excoriates, or over the sheer insanity of the analyses he puts forth himself." 62 Although Howard has remained on the sideline, the drift towards a new election this spring has brought out heavy guns against Thompson and the leadership of the CND. Lord Chalfont took off the gloves in an article in which he not only noted the Marxist orientation of much of the CND leadership, but also refused to accept the argument that he was guilty of "McCarthyism" in so doing. Such a "self-denying ordinance seems curiously naive" to him because "the unilateralists and their collaborators have no such inhibitions," on the one hand, and, on the other, they are so unwilling to engage in rational discourse in matters which run contrary to their predetermined mindset. 63

Whatever the outcome of this debate, it is clear that over the last thirty-five years Michael Howard has been able to achieve a position of considerable importance in British national life as an analyst of strategic policy. For the most part he has been remarkably consistent in his views and has spent most of the past few years merely refining and honing his arguments. Certainly his most mature writings such as "On Fighting a Nuclear War" (the attack on Gray's arguments for a war-fighting capability), "Surviving a Protest" (the reply to Thompson), "Reassurance and Deterrence" (the latest summary of his attitudes on NATO defense policy), and "Weapons and Peace" (the assault on the arms races-mean-war shibboleth) collectively constitute a formidable array of arguments placing him at the center stage in the arena of defense policy debate. Combined with his distinction as an historian, the strategic analyses provide sufficient justification for his appointment to the Regius chair. They do not answer
the question around which this whole study began: Is Michael Howard a strategist?
CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 37.

5. Ibid., p. 151.

6. Ibid., p. 162.

7. Ibid., p. 154.

8. Ibid., p. 34.

9. Ibid., p. 11.

10. Ibid., p. 34. See also, *Restraints on War*, p. 13.


13. Ibid., p. 50.


15. Ibid., p. 61.

16. Ibid., p. 48.

17. Ibid., pp. 61-2.


25. Causes of Wars, p. 89; see also Studies in War and Peace, pp. 179-82.


29. Ibid., p. 33.

30. Studies in War and Peace, p. 211.


34. Causes of Wars, pp. 13-4. The careful reader will note that the title of the book uses "war" in a plural sense while that of the article is in the singular.


38. Ibid., p. 7.

39. Ibid., p. 8.


41. Ibid., p. 108. Professor Howard privately admits the validity of Dr. Harold Deutsch's criticism that an even more "forgotten dimension" of strategy is "military intelligence."

42. Ibid., p. 141.


47. *Times*, 27 February 1958, p. 9e.


CHAPTER IV

THE ASSESSMENT

Any evaluation of Michael Howard's contributions to contemporary histori- torical and strategic thought must begin with a look at the dominant character- acteristics of his personality that have affected his influence in contemporary British intellectual life.

THE PERSONALITY

The first feature that strikes all who know the Regius Professor is his intellect. As a young lecturer in King's College he achieved an impor- tance far surpassing his credentials primarily because his acquaintances respected his intellectual abilities. His sharp mind quickly grasps the essence of an argument and he quickly strips away the pretence and obfuscation inherent in the polemical discourses of generals, statesman, and scholars. One longtime associate described him as "a pricker of baloons" and another said his principal role was "to puncture the illusions" of others and force them to see "realities and to question accepted shibbo- leths." Part of this intellect is his combative temperament, which combined with his quick mind, sharp wit, and iconoclastic outlook, brings him into the vortex of controversy. His is a case of a man who lead a bayonet charge at Salerno being willing to enter the lists against the formidable forensic talents of the leader of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. He does not hesitate to call statesmen and generals on the carpet for short- sightedness, incompetence, or ineptness. This intellect makes him the ideal chair at international conferences where he is able to summarize
situations, devise alternatives, and deftly critique position papers. As a longtime friend says, "If I wanted to borrow someone else's mind instead of my own, his would be one of a handful that I would choose from."

A second feature of his personality is intellectual and moral integrity. Howard provides a detached, non-political, liberal academic conscience to the debate over defense policy. No one seems to know, or to care, about Howard's political preferences; they make no discernable difference in the quality of his evaluations of policy matters. Although one may say he has been more critical of Tory than of Labour defense programs, his arguments constitute one of the most effective supports to the nuclear strategy of the Thatcher administration, even though he may oppose it for its neglect of the conventional component of armed power. As an academic he is not trammeled by partisan policy considerations. Howard has long been sensitive to preserving the political independence of the IISS and consistently has served as a guardian of institutional morals.

This integrity also appears in an agony dealing with ethical behavior and the use of force in international relations. The statesman, like the moralist, is confronted with the familiar dilemma of the conflict between means and ends when confronting these issues.

There is on the one hand the view that the infliction of suffering and death, by whatever instrumentality and on whatever victim, is an absolute evil which cannot be legitimised by any 'good' end. On the other hand is the view that war legitimises all means, and that suffering, whoever the victims and whatever the scale, must be accepted as inevitable. Both positions have disagreeable implications. . . . The statesman is unlikely to share either of these extreme views. Both involve for him, to a greater or lesser extent, an abdication of responsibility. He is more likely to operate in the wide middle area between the two. The criterion which he is likely to apply is the purely pragmatic one: what measures are necessary to attain his objective; that is, an outcome to hostilities which will not result in any reduction of the security of his state?
Howard's statesmen cannot abdicate the problem of decision making, they must recognize that the safety of the community for which they are responsible "cannot be safeguarded without the use of means which, in terms of individual ethics, would be considered immoral."

One can avoid these moral dilemmas if one accepts two political philosophies that Howard finds repugnant. The first is the Hegelian claim that service to the state constitutes the highest morality. The second involves an obligation self-righteously to expand one's moral values in a crusade throughout the globe. Neither of these has contributed to world stability in this century. Howard advocates a third, narrower viewpoint of international relations which involves the "traditional concept of national self-interest, with its modest ambitions and demands" which has contributed significantly less to world conflict but which involves a moral relativism which is objectional to the absolutist solution inherent in the other two outlooks.²

Such dilemmas are even more severe when faced with the possibilities of nuclear war.

The dilemma does not lie in a simple choice between, on the one hand, using nuclear weapons, and on the other risking the extinction of one's cultural pattern by political subjugation or nuclear destruction; though that choice in itself would not necessarily be an easy one to make. It lies rather in the choice--one open to very few states--between possessing a nuclear armoury and the evident determination to use it, if only to deter such attacks against oneself; and deliberately depriving oneself of such a possibility, irrespective of what the effect of such self-denial might be on the plans and attitudes of other, potentially hostile states which might not be interested in following one's example. . . . The moralists who consider the choice to be a simple one are greatly to be envied.³

At least one former soldier argues that this integrity dimension is a result of the future professor's formative experiences on the battlefield. In the Apennines Howard found a compassion he did not know he had; he
"realized that integrity is what really makes a unit tick, that there is absolutely no way you can put up with a guy who is not trustworthy." This basic lesson any combat soldier learns and is one which permeates the personality of Michael Howard to this day.

As one can see by reading these excerpts, this integrity dimension of his personality is combined with the intellectual one. They jointly meet in a third facet, literary ability. According to one former IISS official, Howard has "an unparalleled facility for the analysis of topical questions and for putting them into splendid language." He is the master at using history to illuminate contemporary events. As one of his Oxford colleagues expresses it, Professor Howard has "a rather striking breadth of knowledge together with the capacity for pithy expression of it." What is particularly intriguing about his literary talents is that Howard demonstrates them in a field known for its incomprehensible sets of initials and jargon. That he writes with such elegance and comprehension sets him apart from the "acronymphomaniacs" that dominate modern strategic studies.4

Another key characteristic of Howard is his realism. For this Regius Professor history provides a basis for the analysis of the past by allowing realistic comparisons with past events. This practicality that dominates his writings means that he often contradicts the received wisdom of both the academic and defense establishments. Instead of advocating impractical, utopian schemes, Michael Howard deals in the art of the possible. He admires the pragmatism that dominated the writings of Martin Wight, Alastair Buchan, Herbert Butterfield, and George Macaulay Trevelyan. Howard's approach involves a similar reality-based problem analysis. One longtime associate at IISS contends that this realism combined with his knowledge of war made Howard the quintessence of what a member of the Institute should be. He may not be the most knowledgeable member about a single subject, but
he knows more about more subjects than almost any member and no other is able to more effectively to apply such knowledge to a precise conception of power. Almost all his acquaintances comment on his common sense approach to defense policies and international relations that deviates from the impractical remedies sought either by the far right or the far left.

Equally important in assessing Howard's impact is his professionalism. Those who know him as a teacher, advisor, and scholar all comment on the way in which he by his personal conduct and example exhibits the finest characteristics of academic conduct. One particular example concerned a University of London colleague with whom he had disagreed for years over campus problems. But when asked to review his opponent's book Howard gave one of the most perceptive and sympathetic reviews it received. Former students and colleagues at both London and Oxford acknowledge that this professor was a master lecturer, reviewer, committee member, scholar, and chairman. Not all would agree with his opinions, decisions, and attitudes, but all recognize that they came from a man in full command of the situation. In another context, Howard has a reputation for tough mindedness when it is necessary. He has antagonized many because his incisive comments about colleagues and students which, however truthful, and not designed to win friends and maintain friendships.

Several other personal characteristics have been ascribed to Howard. First is his ambition. As a young man Howard was out to make a name for himself and to make a discipline for defense studies. At the time of the founding of ISS, Michael Howard was one of the few academics in England with a serious interest in military history and strategy. Both his own career and the war studies program he directed received positive benefits from his association with this new Institute. Like most British gentlemen he undoubtedly appreciates those honors of distinction which only the Crown
can dispense. A first step in this direction was the awarding of the rank of Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1977. This ambition is closely linked with his propinquity which meant that his position as a London don provided him with the opportunity to assist in the leadership of the Institute and to answer the questions of the media. Most of the other academics interested in this area were located outside the capital and lacked this availability that added to him importance. A third dimension is his urbanity. Howard’s tastes include literature, music, and the other fine arts. He is conversant in a variety of fields that make him the ideal dinner guest. He is the epitome of the cultivated British gentleman. Additionally there is his industry. Howard is willing to work in behalf of those causes and institutions with which he is associated; they are not secondary additions to his vita. This industry combined with his bachelor status provides him more time than most men his age to devote to various activities.

Finally there is the obvious personal remoteness which isolates him from close friendships with his intellectual associates. A man with a forceful personality, a sometimes biting wit, and a driving ambition, he lives in an academic environment where backbiting is endemic and at both London and Oxford he has been in the center of controversy. Even with the two men Howard claims had the most important influence upon his career, the relationship was an intellectual friendship, not a deep personal one. Or as one friend since the 1950s says:

To me, Michael is an intriguing and rather enigmatic character. Although I’ve known him for a long time, I wouldn’t say that I know what makes him tick. Very good company, with always an apt and entertaining story to tell, but there is an inner reserve which is hard to penetrate. Strong feelings are there, I’m sure, but kept well under control.
Some of the disappointments in Howard's career may be partially explained by this distance and reserve that characterizes his personality. He has, for instance, served as vice-chairman of the councils of both the IISS and the RIIA, but never as the chairman. He sought the wardenship of All Souls, Oxford, but was not selected for what many consider to be the most prestigious academic position in England. There were, of course, many other influences in these decisions besides Howard's personality traits, but this lack of personal friendships among those most closely associated with him constitutes a factor worthy of consideration. One is brought back to his upbringing in the "public" schools where, as Howard himself admits, he was so isolated that he could neither make friends with the opposite sex nor with someone from another social class.

In essence, Michael Howard is a man of numerous extraordinary positive characteristics with a few of the imperfections that mark all personalities. There can be little doubt that on the whole he has been a constructive influence in both the academic and strategic studies arenas of modern British intellectual life. His sharp mind and hard work have placed him at the fringes of policy making in England in a way none of his family has been before. But none of this really attacks the basic question for which this study was begun in the first place. Is Michael Howard a strategist?

THE STRATEGIST

When asked if he were a "strategist," Professor Howard only briefly hesitated before confidently replying, "No. Strategy is what generals do. Obviously I am not a general." Needless to say, this Clausewitzian definition of "strategy" seems strangely constrictive given the much broader context Howard uses in such writings as War in European History and "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy." Such a response ran counter to the
original intent of studying Howard’s contributions to modern strategic thought.

In fact, this somewhat disingenuous definition falls far short of the more encompassing one Howard used to begin *Grand Strategy*:

Grand strategy . . . consisted basically in the mobilisation and deployment of national resources of wealth, manpower, and industrial capacity, together with the enlistment of those allied and, when feasible, of neutral powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy in wartime.  

Rather, Howard’s restrictive terminology more closely parallels the official United States Department of Defense meaning of "military strategy:"

“The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force."

Such limits exclude the economic and demographic factors mentioned in Howard’s definition of "Grand Strategy" during World War II. Obviously the acceptance of such restrictions on the term would totally exclude Michael Howard from the classification as a "strategist." A much broader approach to the problem came when General Sir John Hackett was asked to define strategy.

Economics is what professors of economics teach and that is why no economist ever agrees with another economist.... In the same way, it might be possible to say strategy is what generals peddle. But of course it isn’t. Strategy really has very little to do with generals. Strategy is the whole business of so preparing and positioning large masses of warlike capability so that in an emergency they can be disposed of to the best advantage.

In his own inimitable style, Sir John accepts a more encompassing English and American definition of "strategy." As the Department of Defense lexicon states, "strategy" consists of the

art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary

119
during peace and war, to afford the maximum support of policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. 1

One quickly notices the more expansive concept which includes military and non-military factors. Under such a rubric, many of Howard's associates would feel "strategist" would be an appropriate appellation to give him.

A missing element appears in the official definition of "national strategy" which refers to the "art and science of developing and using" the political, economic, psychological, and military powers of the nation towards the securing of national objectives. 6 The key point revolves around the policy making implications of the phrase "developing and using."

Many would argue that Howard is not a "strategist" because whether one sees strategy as a science or art it involves policy making and Howard's writings do not make policy. He is rather an historian who analyzes topical questions using an historical perspective but who does not direct policy solutions. As one longtime associate says, despite his acknowledged gifts as an author and analyst, Michael Howard "is not the man I would choose to make policy, because he would get bored with it. His forte is not policy making. . . . Michael's analysis is better than his prescription." A matter of some interest in this respect revolves around a recent proposal that the Regius Professor made to a number of Europeans prominent in strategic studies soliciting their joint authorship of a paper opposing the deployment of cruise missiles to Britain, Germany, and Italy. Designed to compliment the famous McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith article in Foreign Affairs which urged NATO to initiate a "no first use" policy regarding nuclear weapons, 9 the Howard proposal failed to secure the support from the appropriate people primarily
on the grounds that its policy implications were too momentous to advocate. As a consequence Howard did not publish such a paper.

Such observations do not mean that Howard does not influence strategic decisions. His analyses and critiques do affect the policy directives of those who hear or read his writings. Moreover, since many of his former students occupy positions of influence in British and foreign governments, it may be argued that he has an impact far beyond the confines of the Universities of London and Oxford.

But one must be cautious, for as one former colleague says, it is a mistake either to overestimate or underestimate Howard's influence. While a younger man like John Keegan may feel Howard's role corresponds closely to that of Liddell Hart in the 1930s, those who lived in that time generally report that the sage of Mendenham was far more a force in British public life than is Howard. Most agree that some of his more important contributions to official policy have been neglected or ignored. The Howard-English report designed to reform British officer education ran into the delays imposed by bureaucratic inertia, inter-service rivalry, budgetary constraints, governmental changes, and low priority and was eventually shelved. On the other hand, his long service on several Ministry of Defence advisory boards relative to officer education have impacted upon that policy, although not in the drastic manner advocated in the report. His activities on the administrative councils of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Imperial War Museum have been quite useful to all agencies, but in none except the IISS could he be classified as a prime mover and shaker of policy. Most will credit Howard as the true founder of academic defense studies in the United Kingdom and the man who gave the subject considerable
legitimacy in both scholarly and military circles. In this context his legacy will long outline the relevancy of most of his lectures and essays.

But does all this make Michael Howard a "strategist?" For those who feel such a figure must directly impact upon policy formation the answer is probably "no." Certainly no one would consider him a "military strategist" inheriting the mantle of Napoleon Bonaparte or George C. Marshall. In no way would he be considered a "strategic innovator" in the tradition of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Giulio Douhet, or Herman Kahn. Nor is he the implementator of "grand strategy" in the manner of Otto von Bismark or Henry Kissinger.

What strategic influence Michael Howard has comes both through the "indirect approach" of his writings and students, on the one hand, and through a "direct approach" mostly as a consequence of his lectures and conversations before and with the influential, on the other.

Perhaps last September at the International Institute for Strategic Studies annual meeting in The Hague where he delivered an address to the plenary session one can see an excellent example of Michael Howard and his direct influence. Here were gathered the leading strategic studies scholars and practitioners from around the globe to hear Howard lecture on "Defence and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security." Subsequently published as "Reassurance and Deterrence," this paper has been listened to and read by the men and women of influence on national strategic policy throughout the world. No one can say in what manner Howard affected the opinions of those in attendance or those who subsequently read his words in Foreign Affairs. There can be little doubt that his words carry weight; what one can never know is to what degree they affect policy decisions. But, as one of Howard's longtime friends from the IISS says, these people constitute a "force multiplier" for the Regius Professor's ideas. They are
the shakers and movers of ideas, they make policy; and if in some way Michael Howard either "pricks the balloon" of one idea or "inflates a balloon" carrying his own idea, he has impressed others.

In this manner Michael Howard has made a real contribution to the study and consideration of strategy. In the final analysis it must be acknowledged that his comprehension of the fundamentals of strategy and his ability to present them in a particularly clear form may constitute a more important contribution to strategic understanding than the writings of some of the most original thinkers.

As an historian, Michael Howard has helped to broaden the scope and insights of what has often been a sterile field of historical writing. Here he has been one of less than a dozen major contributors to military history in this century whose writings will have a lasting significance. As an educator, Howard has been one of a handful of scholars who made defense studies a respectable scholarly discipline in Britain.

Howard's strategic contributions may be grouped into three areas. First, he provides insight into and a critical command of the strategic issues confronting the contemporary world. He often does this in combination with his excellent command of history which allows him an opportunity to use the past to effectively illustrate the folly and the wisdom of modern security policies. Second, he is an effective critic of strategists and strategy. Whether it is with the policies of historical figures like Leon Gambetta and Winston Churchill or with his contemporaries like Colin Gray or E. P. Thompson, the Regius Professor astutely comments upon their contributions to the defense debate. Finally, he is a thinker and writer on strategy whose opinions are regarded with respect throughout the world.

Truly there is little reason to decide whether Howard is or is not a "strategist." While he may not have been as creative as some strategic
thinkers, there can be little doubt that his ideas influence opinions. In the grand strategy of the Western Alliance, Michael Howard is one of those providing historical background to defense studies and, more importantly, the discipline of intellectual rigor in military-political analysis. He may not provide innovative strategic thought but he does criticize the ideas of others with a sense of realism born both of his combat experience and historical training that makes him a figure of importance. Although he may not be as influential as either Basil Liddell Hart or Bernard Brodie--two men whose careers are linked to his--Michael Howard's historically-based commonsensical approach to international relations and strategic policy constitutes an important factor on the intellectual scene of the late twentieth century.


MICHAEL HOWARD

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130
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APPENDIX

FOUNDING THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Today journalists, scholars, military men, statesmen, parliamentarians, churchmen, "hawks," and "doves" take it for granted. They treat its current issue of *The Military Balance* as virtual gospel from which they make decisions and argue many sides of strategic questions citing the same figures. The conclusions of *Strategic Survey* are analyzed by all as a basis upon which to argue any side of questions confronting defense decisionmaking throughout the globe. Its periodic *Adelphi Papers* and bi-monthly journal *Survival* are considered among the most authoritative statements about defense problems confronting nations. Its annual meetings feature representatives of the international defense community who gather to exchange information and to listen to papers by renowned experts concerning strategic policies. Its Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture features a speaker of worldwide reputation talking on a subject of concern to anyone interested in security problems and international affairs. Its director and staff are cited in popular journals as authoritative but neutral sources of defense information. Its staff and research associates are engaged in the study of numerous security-related issues. All this is accomplished by an organization barely twenty-five years old, known now as the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its place in the arena of international affairs is such that its origins merit a brief inquiry.

The fundamental basis of the founding of what was originally known as the Institute for Strategic Studies is the consequence of several factors which impacted upon a small group of British citizens in the late 1950s.
First was the growing need for a center for the study of strategic policy issues outside the United States where centers at Harvard, Princeton, and Stanford as well as the RAND Corporation provided American dominance of all defense related issues. The monopoly over such matters constituted a control over the debate over security policy not merely in the US, but throughout the Western world. Second was the internal British debate over the Defense Minister Duncan Sandys' 1957 Defence White Paper which proposed the creation of the United Kingdom's nuclear bombing fleet. Discontent over this issue was twofold--was an atomic bomber force morally correct and did such an expensive duplication of American atomic power place the country at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its conventional force commitments to the Alliance and the Empire? A third problem concerned the need to discuss the implications of tactical nuclear weapons being developed and whether such an arsenal could be controlled should war break out on the Continent or would its use naturally escalate to a thermonuclear exchange. Fourth, the British were particularly concerned about the Suez incident of 1956 and the public discontent arising over a democracy entering a war without parliamentary approval. Finally, there was in Europe virtually no forum for the discussion of such problems nor was there any source of defense information outside that filtered through the military bureaucracies into the public arena. Many interested citizens felt the need for some non-governmental security policy information center.

Virtually the only available forum for discussion was the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London. Its discussion groups sometimes focused on defense-related issues and it is from two of these groups that the founders of the Institute emerged. One was concerned with the problem of disengagement of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. Headed by F. J. Bellenger, a former Secretary of State for War in the British
government, this eight-man panel contained two critical founders of the Institute—Alastair Buchan, foreign affairs correspondent for The Observer, and Michael Howard, lecturer in War Studies in King's College, University of London. The critical feature of this discussion was less the report which it filed than the interaction between Buchan and Howard which would continue for years to come.

Far more critical for the founding of the Institute was a second panel concerned with limiting atomic warfare. Containing Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, former chief of naval intelligence, Denis Healey, a coming young Labour Party member of parliament with a deep concern for defense and foreign affairs concerns, Professor Patrick Blackett of the Imperial College of Science and Technology of the University of London, and Mr. Richard Goold-Adams, a young member of the editorial staff of The Economist. These four—Buzzard, Healey, Blackett, and Goold-Adams—constitute the critical fulcrum around which the first efforts for the establishment of the Institute revolved. Especially important was Admiral Buzzard who was becoming more of a churchman than a sailor and whose concern for the future of atomic warfare led to his appointment as a delegate to a proposed 1956 meeting in Switzerland concerned with these matters. The other British representative was a leading businessman and Church of England lay leader Sir Kenneth Grubb, Chairman of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs. Grubb was a particularly effective organizer whose close association with the Anglican Church contributed to his desire to make sure any organization he was connected with did not have a warmongering reputation, but who at the same time wanted to keep peace in a realistic way.

Sir Kenneth combined with Admiral Buzzard, Mr. Healey, and Mr. Goold-Adams to draw up a list of seventy persons to invite to a conference to be held at the Bedford Hotel in Brighton.

136
The Brighton Conference held at that famous seaside resort during the off-season time of 18-20 January 1957, marked the true beginning of the Institute. Representatives of the armed forces, the universities, the press, and politics from Britain as well as the Continent and the United States attended this conference during which Sir Kenneth and Mr. Healey played critical roles. This event marks for the first time the entrance of Michael Howard into the inner circle of participants. After hearing various reports and on the verge of breaking up, Lord Salter, a former cabinet minister and Oxford don, rose to interrupt the chair and to argue that defense policy was too serious a business to be left to politicians and service men and to recommend that some manner be devised to allow such discussions a continuing basis. From this came a recommendation to form what was called the Brighton Conference Association. Initially they hoped for a small grant to establish an institute associated with some existing body like a university or maybe with Chatham House. At the core of the group was an executive committee, chaired by Goold-Adams, that would develop a proposal. On this committee were Grubb, Healey, Salter, the Rev. Alan Booth, a Methodist minister who served as secretary of the conference of which Sir Kenneth was chairman, and Mr. Howard of King's College.

A year and a half of delicate negotiations ensued with Healey playing an important role in securing the interest of the Ford Foundation in funding the proposal. With the prospects of a large initial fund the objectives increased with the idea of a large international organization which would hold small seminars, call occasional conferences, and influence policy by allowing for the greater understanding of strategic problems. Such an organization would not advocate specific policies and would not be associated with any national government.
Sometime in the spring of 1958 prospects seemed appropriate to consider a director and a small group consisting of Messrs. Booth, Healey, and Howard suggested Alastair Buchan. The latter indicated his interest and the Ford Foundation representatives concurred in this selection. Meanwhile there also occurred a debate over a proposed name. For all his literary talents, Professor Howard proposed the somewhat awkward title of the Institute for the Study of International Security. Eventually Buchan suggested the Institute for Strategic Studies which was finally agreed to after a considerable discussion over whether to use the preposition "of" or "for." The final resolution was based upon the supposed American preference for the latter word.

In July, Buchan outlined his concept of the aims of the Institute as fourfold: (1) to provide a reference library on contemporary international security problems; (2) to initiate from two to four major studies per year; (3) to launch a quarterly similar in quality to Foreign Affairs; and (4) to hold at least one annual conference on a specific theme. With the approval of Mr. Goold-Adams these ideas were incorporated into a proposal to the Ford Foundation that September.

At Mr. Goold-Adams' office in Jermyn Street, London, was held a meeting on 16 September 1958 between the Brighton Conference Association Executive Committee and Buchan. Articles of incorporation were drawn up with Messrs. Pealey, Crubb, Booth, Buzzard, and Howard, along with Christopher Woodhouse, Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Donald Tyerman, editor of The Economist as subscribers.¹

It had been a long road to this point and it was somewhat doubtful if the Institute would be successful. An exchange of letters between Howard and Basil Liddell Hart during the interval between the Brighton Conference and the final incorporation provides some insight into the issues raised.
A few days after the Brighton meeting Howard wrote his friend that the new association was "going to concern itself primarily with the political and economic implications of 'Grand Strategy' in the atomic age." Toward the end of the first year Howard felt the continuing discussions to be "an intensive and stimulating meeting of minds. If we are to get any further, it must be with a detailed consideration of certain areas—we have talked about principles for long enough, and examine the subject." After the meeting that established the ISS in October 1958, Howard solicited Liddell Hart's membership on the Council. He outlined the objectives:

It is proposed to found an institute . . . resembling in certain respects Chatham House. That is to say, it will be a centre for conferences, information, and possibly research, committing itself to no specific doctrines of defence but providing a milieu where informed discussion can take place.

Immediately there were those who did not like the Institute. Liddell Hart learned through one of his friends at the Ministry of Defence that a "jaundiced view of the new Institute" prevailed and that Liddell Hart's friend "vehemently complained that" he "was doing a 'dangerous and unpatriotic' thing by lending" his "name to the support" of the ISS. Howard sought to reassure the "Captain" that his informant's comments were not typical and that Defence Minister Duncan Sandys had "ordered the Ministry to give" Buchan "the same facilities as the F[oreign O[ffice]. gives Chatham House. But," he cautioned, "it is as well to know that there are pockets of opposition."

Of course, there was opposition to the new organization from the other side of the spectrum which suspected it would become the tool of the defense establishment. Howard pointed with pride to a *New Statesman* comment that the presence of Howard, Blackett, and Liddell Hart on its Council
would provide some guarantee that the ISS does not fall into the pocket of the Ministry of Defence."

Actually it would be many years before the Ministry of Defence would be as cooperative as the ISS desired and to this day the organization is suspect in many leftist circles.

In selecting the first Council the opinions of Lord Salter, Sir Kenneth Grubb, and Alastair Buchan carried much weight. Careful consideration was given to persons of various political viewpoints, defense policy outlooks, professional interests, and service orientation. The result was a Council of twenty that included four career officers, three scholars, two clergymen, three journalists, two members of the House of Commons, three members of the House of Lords, and a variety of other distinguished personages. The Council elected Sir Kenneth as its chairman and Mr. Goold-Adams as vice-chairman with Messrs. Grubb, Howard, Buzzard, Healey, Blackett, and Tyerman as members.

Mr. Buchan had the difficult chore of locating adequate quarters and staff for the fledging Institute. Eventually Professor Blackett found a site between Fleet Street and Westminster at 18 Adam Street. For a while the whole operation was housed in one beautiful Adam-style room with three small adjoining rooms. The large room served for meetings, conferences, and the director's office. Gradually the quarters expanded into adjoining floors and rooms of that building until 1979 when the Institute moved to its newly acquired building at 23 Tavistock Street near Covent Garden.

Staffing an institution with no past, little money, and few prospects tested Buchan's skills of oratorical ability and breadth of vision. As assistant director he acquired Commander H. E. B. Jenkinson, one of the several officers displaced in the Sandys cuts at Whitehall. He lasted until June 1960 and it took several attempts before Brigadier Kenneth Hunt
assumed the post of Deputy Director in 1967 and gave the position a sense of permanence. For a while there emerged two intermediate administrators under Buchan, Major Arthur Majendie who served as director of administration and Leonard Beaton who was director of studies from 1963-65. Beaton had a particularly original and creative mind and his efforts were important in establishing the reputation of the Institute as an intellectual center. Majendie was an important force in bringing administrative order and financial stability to the young organization and he remained on the staff until 1980. Up from the ranks came Mrs. Patricia Evans, who joined the staff in late 1963 because her excellent command of French assisted in the growing internationalization of the Institute and who has since become the staff director.

The key to the Institute was Buchan. Born in 1918, he was the younger son of the novelist John Buchan and his wife Susan Charlotte Grosvenor. Through his mother's family he was related to some of the best known English aristocracy and through his father's he inherited a Scottish Calvinist morality and industry. Alastair came of age in the 1930s when his father, elevated to the peerage as Lord Tweedsmuir, was Governor-General of Canada. He received his BA from Christ Church, Oxford in 1939 and soon joined the Canadian Army where he participated in the famous and disastrous raid on Dieppe, became a member of the Order of the British Empire, and received promotion to lieutenant colonel. He joined the staff of *The Economist* in 1948 and subsequently became the Washington correspondent of *The Observer*. Later the defense and diplomatic correspondent of that paper, Buchan was looking for a new opportunity to exercise his talents when he undertook the position with the ISS in 1958.

Intellectually gifted, a writer who quickly grasped the essence of an argument, imaginative in outlook, well acquainted with the political,
intellectual and social leadership in Britain, Canada, and the United States, Alastair Buchan was the ideal man to head the new Institute. A natural born aristocrat who preached democracy while running the ISS with an autocratic hand, Buchan was sometimes condescending and arrogant but had enormous rectitude and strong moral principles. Goold-Adams wrote in an obituary that

the touch of aristocracy in his background blended with a deep understanding of North America and a radical nature to give him an assurance which overcame whatever inner doubts he may sometimes have felt. ... And, while he had a lucid and absorptive mind of his own—which those who disagreed with him sometimes felt could be almost arrogantly assertive when it had reached its conclusions—he took the greatest pleasure in bringing others together, and drawing out their views, reactions and experience.

An unknown part of him character was the ability to raise funds. Although the Ford Foundation continued for many years to be the major source of economic support, various appeals to Continental European firms and to British sources remained modest until the Institute internationalized itself in the mid-sixties. Nearly half of the budget for the first decade was from the Ford grants and funding from other American sources amounted to between ten and seventeen percent of the total. A growing source of income came from the sales of publications, especially *The Military Balance*, which by 1963 was a strong money-maker for the Institute.

This particular publication provided the ISS with almost instant recognition throughout the world. Originally entitled *The Soviet Union and the NATO Powers: The Military Balance*, Buchan edited this short pamphlet almost totally by himself. With the second issue appearing under the title of *The Communist Bloc and the Free World: The Military Balance 1960*, one can begin to see the expanding interest of this periodical in worldwide
strategic conditions. In the fifth edition, *The Military Balance, 1963-1964*, the more comprehensive editorial procedures were described as being expanded to not only include "the Communist bloc and those countries with which the United States has mutual defence treaties," but also to include "a number of important non-aligned countries." By 1970 a new format was adopted which not only added Latin American countries for the first time, but also expanded the African listings.

Through all the years the preface included a cautionary note to the effect that what was reported was a quantitative assessment of the current military situation which "should not be regarded as a comprehensive guide to the balance of military power; in particular, it does not reflect the facts of geography, vulnerability or efficiency." A more qualitative analysis began with the publication of *Strategic Survey* in 1966. This counterpart to *The Military Balance* filled a void in ISS analysis that provided an opportunity to assess the strategic relationship between nations which was not otherwise addressed. Among other topics besides weapons and manpower statistics were such related factors as "Disarmament and Arms Control," "Economic Policies and Security," and "Aerial Piracy."

Were these annual publications not enough, the energetic Buchan made himself the general editor of a series of "Studies in International Security" which began in 1960 to explore "the role of force in international politics . . . intended to pioneer original thought in novel, contemporary problems of defence and world order." Beginning with Buchan's own *NATO in the 1960s: The Implications of Interdependence* (1960), this series soon attracted authors making a name for themselves in the international security policy scene such as Hedley Bull, Peter Calvocoressi, Leonard Beaton, Philip Windsor, Laurence Martin, and, above all, Sir Robert Thompson whose
Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (1966) became almost a bible for American officers in Southeast Asia.

The irrepressible Buchan would not be stopped with just these publications. He edited the Institute's journal *Survival* (Goold-Adams devised the title which he felt best represented the ISS objectives) which had to resort primarily to reprinting articles since it could not pay authors in these early years. Of all Buchan's ventures this was probably the least successful and *Survival* never became the strategic studies counterpart to *Foreign Affairs* he sought.

The final publication series were the *Adelphi Papers* (the name does not represent any particularly Delphic character of these pamphlets but rather the section of London in which the ISS offices were located), a series of studies too long for *Survival* and too short for inclusion in the "Studies in International Security." Here are included some of the best essays by modern scholars dealing with particular problems. After twenty-five years of the Institute we are approaching the 200th such pamphlet. One of the most popular was *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967*. Commissioned by Buchan as the Third Arab-Israeli War ended in June of that year, Michael Howard wrote the 50-page pamphlet in less than three months with the assistance of a young graduate student at the University of London, Robert Edwards Hunter. (It says much for Howard's magnanimity that he allowed Hunter's name to appear on the title page with his own. For Hunter, now with the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, this represented an opening for his career for which he has been continuously grateful.)

Nothing so emphasizes Buchan's breadth of vision, Hunter's quick research skills, and Howard's grasp of the broader implications of this conflict than in the conclusion.
Wars, it used to be said, settle nothing. Unfortunately this statement was untrue: they can settle many problems, and are sometimes, regrettably, the only way of settling them. But they also create new ones, sometimes so grave that one may look back to the old almost with nostalgia. Israel’s victories have eliminated many of the points in dispute over the past twenty years.... But the Israelis may well look back with regret to the days when Israel was almost as homogeneous a Jewish State as its Zionist founders intended; for it will never be that again.... If Israeli statesmanship does not match up to her military achievements, her victories may, like so many victories in the past, bear very bitter fruit.

It was Buchan’s ability to choose those scholars most capable of making astute observations like these, which are as applicable today as they were over fifteen years ago, that brought great success to the Institute. Other than the continuous search for funding, only one ingredient remained to make the ISS what its founders intended—its internationalization.

Initially the Council of the Institute was entirely British. Although its membership was from many countries, foreigners did not serve in the Council. The Ford Foundation pressured the ISS to either internationalize its Council or to see that philanthropic organization fund other national strategic centers which were then seeking support. The other option was to become a more British organization perhaps funded from grants from the Ministry of Defence. Some Council members disliked the alternatives since they felt a move toward internationalization was being dictated by the source of funding, Buchan concluded after an acrimonious meeting with Ministry officials that no effective, independent contractual arrangement could be made with that element of the British government. Meanwhile, Professor Howard was negotiating with the Royal United Service Institution to see if that body could be transformed into an independent British security policy institute. (It has slowly tried to become this type of agency,
but has never quite succeeded in becoming what Howard sought.) Howard's report along with Buchan's belief that the Ministry was inhibited in its attitudes toward outsiders led to the Council decision to internationalize its membership. This required several longtime Councillors to step down before their terms expired, but the Council membership was raised to 25 with no more than eleven British and five Americans allowed at any one time. Eventually the total Council membership was raised to thirty where it now stands.

The internationalization process has continued in other ways. Several members of the staff were non-British beginning with Leonard Beaton of Canada as early as 1962. When Buchan left the directorship in 1968, he was succeeded by Louis-Francois Duchene of France, whose successor was Dr. Christoph Bertram of Germany, and his successor was Dr. Robert O'Neil of Australia. Moreover, in 1971, the Institute added "International" to its name which merely codified an already existing status. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it continues an important factor in defense studies as it enters its second quarter century.

When Alastair Buchan stepped down from the ISS directorship in 1969 to become commandant of the Royal College of Defence Studies (a unique position for a civilian), he left an organization that was mature and changing. Many of the original founders were already gone, lost by reason of death, infirmities, and other interests. Sir Kenneth Grubb retired from the Council Chairmanship and Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard from the Council in 1963, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor withdrew as a consequence of infirmities and the distance of his country home from London, Professor Patrick Blackett and Denis Healey became increasingly involved in the Labour Party and its governance of the nation. The Reverend Alan Booth was drawn more into his other activities.
Of the "old guard" only the two younger founders remained—Richard Goold-Adams and Michael Howard. Goold-Adams succeeded Grubb as Council chairman while Howard became chairman of the executive committee. In these capacities their influence grew and they became the elder statesmen of the Institute. While Howard had the more acute and creative intellectual powers, Goold-Adams lent dignity, presence, tact, and patience to the complicated and often divisive council meetings. Both were formidable figures in the continuity of the IISS and were frequently consulted by the subsequent directors and senior staff members. In all matters their opinions were given great weight but their positions had to carry not on the basis of their author but on the strength of their arguments. With Goold-Adams retirement in 1973, and Howard's stepping down in 1980, the founding generation of the IISS had passed from the scene. By that time it may be said that the Institute had come of age and had in fact become institutionalized.
1. This Appendix is primarily based upon two sources for which the author is pledged not to give specific attribution. The first is "History of the ISS, 1958 to 1968," a typescript in the files of the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The second is a series of personal interviews conducted in Oxford, Bath, and London, 11-24 March with Michael Howard, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Hunt, Jonathan Alford, Robert O'Neil, Fred Mulley, Richard Good-Adams, Arthur Majendie, Patricia Evans, and Laurence Freedman and interviews in Washington, DC, on 6 April 1983 with Joseph Fromm and Robert Edwards Hunter. The conclusions expressed in this Appendix are the subjective evaluations of the author based upon a variety of different and divergent sources and opinions.


3. MH to BLH, 9 November 1957, LHP.

4. MH to BLH, 16 October 1958. See also MH to BLH, 19 October 1957, 14 May 1958, and BLH to MH, 12 May 1958, LHP.

5. BLH to MH, 11 December 1958, LHP.

6. MH to BLH, 13 December 1958, LHP.

7. Ibid.


