HUMAN SEA: THE EVOLUTION AND VIABILITY OF THE CHINESE STRATEGY OF PEOPLE'S WAR (U) ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL
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A thesis submitted to the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Asian Studies.
**Title:** The Revolution and Viability of the Chinese Strategy of People's War

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**Abstract:** Mao Zedong's people's war has been a much-studied but ill-understood strategy. Political scientists, journalists, and military analysts have easily revealed its strengths and readily identified its weaknesses. But few have adequately explained its military fundamentals or its surprising persistence at the center of Chinese military thought. Looking at it from an historical perspective, we see that it has evolved from a strategy of revolution, to a strategy of national defense, and finally to a sophisticated system of nuclear and conventional deterrence. Military men in China have shown a remarkable unity in their (over)
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loyalty to the military principles of people's war.

THOMAS G. WALLER JR.
HUMAN SEA

The Evolution and Viability of
The Chinese Strategy of
People's War

By

Thomas G. Waller, Jr.
15 December 1980
The military strategies of nations are often assumed to differ only by relative numbers of particular weapons systems and by a nation's ability and propensity to employ firepower to a greater or lesser degree. Military strategy, however, is only one part of the greater national strategy, which can be defined simply as the employment of the human and material resources of a nation to secure national objectives. The military function of national strategy can only be addressed after those objectives have been defined in terms of national interests. This process is the political function of national strategy and involves the orchestration of resources of the state, exploiting such assets (or liabilities) as geographic peculiarities, tradition, and spiritual attitudes and in consonance with such factors as politics, economics, and the perceived threats to national interests. Military strategy is not an autonomous part of national strategy and cannot be understood in its full implications for policy by adopting the "purely military viewpoint". It is not surprising, then, that discussions of the development of military strategy of the People's Republic of China have been complex and have approached the basic concept behind Chinese strategic thinking, that of the strategy of "People's War" from various angles. One approach is to look at "People's War" in terms of the inherent weaknesses of the man-over-weapons theory. Another popular theme is the detrimental effects of the lack of professionalism caused by involvement of the military in politics, or the involvement of the military in non-military activities. A theme that is, indeed, relevant is the Catch-22 situation of military modernization, the problem being that China is in mortal danger until she modernizes her military, which cannot be done until full economic modernization takes place, meanwhile the technological gap between China
and her potential enemies appears to be widening rather than narrowing. The view that underlies many of these discussions of Chinese defense strategy and is most clearly exemplified by Jonathan Pollack's "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy" (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January, 1979) is that "People's War" as a strategic concept has been in the process of decline since liberation, because it is fundamentally unsound, was born of necessity, and stands no realistic chance against a modern, sophisticated enemy. Notwithstanding the problems of the Chinese economy and the immense task of defending 3.7 million miles of territory, the continuity of the "People's War" concept of strategy cannot be solely explained using a "no other choice for the moment" assumption. A cursory look at the strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union will reveal vastly different approaches based on their respective geo-political, economic, and traditional peculiarities. So too have the Chinese formulated policies to maximize their strengths and minimize their weaknesses, and have produced an approach that has been successful for them and one which they have continuously sought to improve upon.

This paper suggests that the strategy of "People's War" was, is, and will remain at least for the foreseeable future the basic concept behind defense strategy of the People's Republic of China, and progressive refinement of strategic policy can be interpreted as a means to enhance its viability rather than to achieve some more "modern" strategic approach. In this approach we will first examine the formulation of the strategy of "People's War" by Mao and then look at its changes over time.

Two more common assumptions should be addressed here. The first is that "People's War" is a "Maoist" concept, that is, it was one of those issues that rose and fell in importance with other "Maoist" issues such as private plots,
wage incentives, and revolution in the Peking Opera. While it is true that it was used as an issue in some political conflicts, these uses were usually out of context with military preparedness. Mao himself, after 1949, rarely intervened in military affairs, indicating that for the most part his theory was accepted. Further, some of the basic tenets of "People's War", upon which we will soon elaborate, were oftentimes debated but never seriously challenged. The second assumption is that "People's War" is relatively inflexible. While Mao was opposed to bureaucratism and elitism in the army, and resolutely maintained that weapons are only as good as the men who used them, he never opposed procurement of newer and better weapons, or improvement in military training. The tendency has been to generalize about individuals who advocated modern weaponry or more "professionalism" as being against "People's War". This tendency is understandable since Red Guard publications are full of invectives against "revisionist" military men who were taking a "purely military viewpoint." Yet many of the motives behind such attacks were politically motivated and not representative of military realities. Once we have defined and examined the changes to the strategy of "People's War" over time, we will examine the manifestation of "People's War" strategy in current force structures and weapons systems, suggesting thereby that "People's War" is not only alive but well in Chinese defense policy.

The Evolution of Chinese Defense Strategy

Pre-1949.

Illustrative of this flexibility in the strategy of People's War is its refinement from its initial formulation until the Communist victory in 1949. After the failure of the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, the embryo
of the Red Army took refuge in the Chingkang Mountains. While Chu Teh was the military commander of the 4th Army of Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army, as political commissar Mao had an important voice in decisions regarding military operations. In November, 1928 he submitted a report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party entitled "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains" in which he began by stressing the desirability of flexibility in Communist strategy:

An independent regime must vary its strategy against the encircling ruling classes, adopting one strategy when the ruling class regime is temporarily stable and another when it is split up.8

In this same report he addressed military questions specifically and began to lay the foundational tenets of People's War. One of these is the aforementioned superiority of men over weapons. Mao seldom used the word morale, but essentially the man-over-weapons theory advocated policies directed toward increasing the morale of his troops, in the belief that internally motivated troops could overcome the inequalities in weaponry that the Red Army faced. Recruits received immediate political instruction so as to create class consciousness which could be invoked in battlefield motivation. Much attention was paid to meeting soldiers' needs for food, money for cooking oil, salt, firewood, and vegetables, and land redistribution for local peasant recruits became common practice. Commenting on the effectiveness of these policies, Mao reported that the men felt that they were no longer fighting for mercenaries (warlords or the Kuomintang) but "for themselves and for the people". Being politically conscious, "they can endure the hardships of bitter struggle without complaint".9 The party played a crucial role in this morale building process, but another important policy was the relations between officers and men:
The reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of poor material conditions is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men, officers and men receive equal treatment; ...[The soldiers] feel spiritually liberated, even though material conditions in the Red Army are not equal to those in the White Army. The very soldiers who had no courage in the White Army yesterday are very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy.\textsuperscript{10}

In December of 1929, Mao elaborated on the role of politics in military strategy with his "On Correcting the Mistaken Ideas in the Party". In addition to building morale within the armed forces through political leadership, the army would become at one with the masses. The very reason for existence of the Red Army was to help the masses "establish revolutionary political power", and its every action, military and non-military, had to be directed to that end. Any other approach would be no different than the warlords or the KMT, and thus doomed to failure. Being at one with the people would give the army mass support and would be the factor that would make the Red Army invincible; thus this factor too became a fundamental tenet of "People's War."

Another basic tenet of People's War is that, in addition to regular forces, regional and local paramilitary forces play an integral role in defense strategy. Warfare in the Chingkang Mountains was total - everyone was involved in one way or another. Mao reported that troops from outside the area were formed into regular formations to oppose enemy main force thrusts, while villages or local areas organized armed detachments of Red Guards for local order, logistical and intelligence support for the main forces, and local "insurrection".\textsuperscript{11} This force organization and the insurrectionary character of local forces, combined with the footmobile, light infantry nature of main force tactics has led to distortions in the study of Chinese Communist
military strategy. From the beginning Mao argued against reliance on guerrilla war as an effective strategy: "The principle for the Red Army (main forces) is concentration, and that for the Red Guards (local forces) dispersion... In our experience the dispersion of (main) forces has almost always led to defeat... The Central Committee has instructed us to develop guerrilla warfare in much too large an area..."

In 1930 the Kuomintang began a series of extermination campaigns which provided much experience for the further refinement of Chinese Communist military strategy. The Communists defended against five furious assaults over a four year period, attempting various concepts from pure guerrilla to pure conventional warfare until their positions became untenable, forcing them to depart on the epic Long March to the northwest. Once they were secure in their Yenan stronghold, they had time to reflect on their fifteen years of struggle, and the years 1936-38 were to be a watershed in the development of the strategy of "People's War". Although the Maoists would emphasize the fact that it was Mao himself who produced the doctrine in the form of his series of writings and lectures ("Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War", "On Protracted War", and "Problems of War and Strategy") for students at the Red Army Academy at K'angta, it must be realized that although Mao had been the leader of the Party since the Tsunyi Conference during the Long March, his power was not at this point absolute; therefore we can expect his expressed views to be the products of at least some political consensus, and that he could not have departed radically from the views of a majority of the powerful military leaders of the Party. In summary, Mao believed that war should be protracted
on the strategic stage, but brief at the campaign and tactical levels. He argued that future operations should have a "guerrilla character", i.e., they should avoid fixed battle lines, absolutely centralized command, and the purely military viewpoint. Instead, they should stress fluid lines and the annihilation of the enemy army by concentrating the main communist thrust against only one "front" at a time, while relying on only a very small rear-service organization. Analyzing the largely successful efforts of the Red Army in the first four encirclement campaigns and the failures of the fifth, Mao developed the "People's War" tenets of strategic defense in which the enemy would be "lured in deep", thereby over-extending his lines of communication, strategic stalemate, in which the enemy offensive strength would be sapped by combined action of local and main forces, and the strategic offense where the main forces would annihilate the enemy armies and achieve final victory. With the ultimate objective of a war being to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy, Mao's strategy was in fact meant to be highly flexible, with guerrilla war playing a role primarily in the strategic stalemate stage of the war. During the height of the need for guerrilla-type survival operations, Mao cautioned against excessive "guerrillaiasm":

As the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously eliminate [guerrilla features] so as to make the Red Army more centralized, more unified, more disciplined and more thorough in its work - in short, more regular in character...We are now on the eve of a new stage with respect to the Red Army's technical equipment and organization. We must be prepared to go over to the new stage.10

Going from a guerrilla stage to a regular stage, then, was not a departure from the strategy of People's War, but an integral part of it.
By 1937 the foundations of the strategy of People's War were laid. Mao's writings, speeches, and orders on strategy from that time through the Anti-Japanese War and the Revolutionary War until final victory in 1949 reflected this unique break with traditional and conventional military strategy. By becoming one with the people, that is, by consciously adopting policies that would assist the mass of citizens in their day to day plight, the Red Army was one of the few in Chinese history to enjoy widespread popular support in its area of operations. By concentrating on the welfare and political education of soldiers, the high morale of the Red Army became a formidable weapon. By adopting a flexible approach of "luring in deep" and defense-stalemate-offense, using both guerrilla and regular forces, the PLA could neutralize enemy technical advantages.

Once the enemy had been destroyed, however, and the new Communist state was proclaimed in October of 1949, a new dimension was added to the mission of the Communist armed forces. The PLA now had to assume the responsibility to guard the motherland against all threats, and the strategy they had used so successfully in winning victory in 1949 would soon be challenged by the most sophisticated foe in the world. 1950-1959.

With the consolidation of revolutionary victory and the assumption of responsibility by the CCP as the new central government of China, a more fundamental approach to strategic thinking had to be taken. It is appropriate to discuss at this point what, in the Chinese case, might be considered "givens" to any coherent central defense strategy. The first of these is geography. Two-thirds of China's borders have natural barriers of mountains and
sea that in part account for the traditional isolation of China from most of the world. The major geo-strategic vulnerability lay to the north, where for centuries that great "menace from inner Asia" would periodically move south and raid or occupy the core area of Han China, the Yellow and Yangtze river valleys. No military capability could reach far enough into the Mongolian steppes to neutralize this threat, which resulted in China living for centuries under the perpetual threat of invasion. In addition to the major river systems the Tien Shan, Kunlun, and Himalaya mountain ranges have combined with the vastness of Chinese territory to inhibit north-south communications and strategic movement of centrally controlled armies, which has resulted in a natural politico-military regionalism. The second given, a distinctive military tradition, was an outgrowth of the first, and has had tremendous staying power as evidenced by the heavy influence of the great strategist Sun Tzu (450 B.C.) on the military writings of Mao Tse-tung. In brief summary of the effects of these "givens" on strategic thinking, this perpetual threat has fostered a defensive outlook by Chinese strategists, and has had a significant effect on the desire of any pretender to rule to unify the diverse regions into one political entity, by force if necessary, in part, to deal with this more alien and unpredictable threat. Thus from the earliest times there has been a political character to military conflict, as Sun Tzu antedates Clausewitz by 1900 years in postulating war as an instrument of national policy. This overlaps with the tradition of regionalism resulting in a strong tradition of regional military forces organized for many purposes: local protection, interregional political conflict, and national defense.
A few senior leaders and many younger leaders learned that the best trained and best indoctrinated infantry soldier, lacking properly coordinated air and artillery support, is a poor match for massed modern firepower, coordinated by a single staff through sophisticated communications. They learned other disheartening lessons about the efficiency of guerrilla warfare, Mao's thought, and "People's War." Whitson goes on to interpret the impact of the Korean War on military strategy as a movement away from People's War and toward a more "professional" approach as these "lessons" were "relayed to senior military commanders attending Liu Po-Ch'eng's Nanking Advanced Military Institute, which was founded in 1951." Whitson, however, has confused military strategy with the use of force in national strategy. People's War is a strategy of total war with the ultimate goal being to preserve oneself (now the Communist regime) and destroy the enemy (any force threatening the survival of the regime). The Korean War from the beginning was a limited war, with limited objectives, and should be viewed not as an exercise of People's War, but as an exercise in the limited use of force in national strategy. China set a precedent in Korea, giving clear signals of her intentions that she would employ force to safeguard her national interests in peripheral or traditional Chinese areas. Allen Whiting indicates a similar use of force for politico-strategic interests in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and Edward Ross traces the extreme similarities of the Korean War and the Sino-Indian conflict to the Chinese invasion of Viet Nam in 1979. While military "lessons" were learned in each of these conflicts, one cannot view them as a test of strategy of People's War. It remains our purpose to see what effect such lessons had on the military strategy of national defense.

In this regard we cannot dismiss in toto William Whitson's insistence on the growth of military professionalism in the 1950's. Two years after the
end of the Korean War the PLA adopted the "Regulations on the Services of Officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", which classified officers by field of specialty and rank into the army, navy, and air forces. That same year universal military conscription was adopted. Western analysts view the impact of these developments on military strategy, as an expression of a desire to build a national defense force on the professional model. Such an evaluation underestimates (and at the same time overvalues) the impact of Soviet military assistance on Chinese strategic thinking and organization in the latter part of the Korean War and after. We are unable to document the extent of Soviet aid, yet in just two years the PLA air force started with virtually nothing and become the third largest air force in the world. U.S. accounts trace the drastic growth in numbers of Chinese artillery. Without a doubt, Soviet advisors had to accompany this equipment, and it is safe to say that advice was given on how to organize one's forces in order to use the equipment to best advantage. It is not surprising that in the midst of other pressing problems, consolidation of power, and economic and material reconstruction, that the Chinese leaders accepted much of this Soviet advice at face value. The question is, did it suit China's needs in accordance with an evolving military strategy?

The question of military professionalism in China has been one of controversy, and in this period the controversy perhaps reached its height in the PLA. After a brief flirtation with Soviet style professionalism, tension over applying this new system to Chinese conditions mounted quickly. In the middle of February, 1956, the General Political Department began an education campaign for the entire officer corps, the major subjects being political and economic theory. Ranks and professionalism notwithstanding, relations
between officers and men were still to be democratic, and between army and people close. In May of 1957 General T'an Cheng of the PLA GPD announced a rectification campaign in the army to criticize and self-criticize errors in this regard. By 1958 the reaction to the dangers of trying to apply the Soviet model caused a virtual crescendo of campaigns against it. These campaigns appear to have been successful in attacking Soviet dogmatism within the military. It was suggested earlier that Mao rarely intervened in military affairs, perhaps indicating his satisfaction. It is particularly revealing that after three years of organization under the Soviet system, Chairman Mao would make the following comment about military work:

In the period following the liberation of the whole country (from 1950-1957), dogmatism made its appearance both in cultural and educational work. A certain amount of dogmatism was imported in basic military work, but basic principles were upheld, and you could not say that our military work was dogmatic.

Before summarizing the changes to the strategy of People's War during this period, it is important to recognize that Chinese perceptions of the Red vs. Expert issue were, I suggest, different from those of subsequent Western analysts who studied it. Western presuppositions of military professionalism are generally along the lines of Huntington's definition in Soldier and the State. Briefly, the elements include expertise, or "the management of violence" in the most efficient manner possible. Huntington says that "The peculiar skill of the military officer is universal in the sense that its essence is not affected by changes of time or location". Responsibility to society is a second element in which the military man is a technician with a skill requiring that he professionally subordinate himself to the benefit of society. Finally, there is a corporate character to
a professional military and its bureaucracy, in which the military lives and works totally apart from the rest of society in order to fully develop its peculiar technical skills. The Chinese "expert", however, had to look at professionalism from a different perspective. The military had to be organized in accordance with the "givens" of Chinese military strategy, geography and tradition, and after 1949 a new given, resources available. The Western definition of professionalism assumes the availability or at least the prospect of adequate sources of hardware. China did not have the indigenous capability to produce the required hardware to build such a force, and to try to buy it would on one hand be too expensive for the Chinese economy in terms of the size of the force needed, and on the other would violate the Communist tradition of self-reliance and the interest of national independence for which the Communists had been fighting since the early 1920's. The Western definition also drew on western (including Russian) military traditions of civil-military relations, which immediately prejudices the western observer against practices that may be fully legitimate even to the Chinese "expert". This difference of perspective can be seen most clearly in the different roles of the political commissar in the Soviet and Chinese armies. In the former the commissar's primary duty has been party control of the military, while in the Chinese case his first duty has been to build political awareness (and therefore morale) in the soldier.

Thus the legacy of the Korean War was not an awareness of the need for a "professional" army. The major legacy was that the Chinese were made fully aware that warfare had changed since the Pre-1949 era, and that a
military strategy of People's War would have to be adapted to "modern conditions". Strategists would have to weigh the national interests of security and independence against geography, military tradition, and resources available, and build a new strategy of People's War by incorporating the changes in the nature of war. This included a growing appreciation for the threats of modern technology to the viability of People's War: ground force mobility, concentrated armor, tactical air power, and nuclear weapons. The changes that would begin to be made in the strategy would be toward reducing not the technological or organizational differences between Chinese and other armies, that being impossible, but the threat to their only attainable force structure that could hope to accomplish their national objectives. The new approach of adapting People's War to modern conditions is best summed up in a Liberation Army Daily article of January, 1958:

The new program of combat training is based on our strategic policy, the peculiarities of our terrain, the glorious traditions of our army, the experience of training practice of the past few years, and the development of modern military techniques and military science. Soviet advanced experience in this field is also incorporated... The new program also gives clear and definite directions as to how the historical experience of the people's revolutionary wars of our country should be learned, how to maintain the glorious traditions of our army, and how to study Comrade Mao Tse-tung's writings on military matters.33

This report reaffirms each and every tenet of People's War, while stressing the focus of each should be toward adapting to modern conditions of warfare. The words "new" and "modern" are used some 38 times in three pages, yet never once does the report advocate acquiring modern weapons or changing professional orientations. There seemed to be a realization in the late
1950's that the reliability of Soviet aid and the inherent weakness of over-dependence on it had put China in a vulnerable position. The strategy of People's War had to be reasserted under new conditions. When P'eng Te-huai, national defense minister, was purged in 1959 for taking the "purely military viewpoint", it seemed logical to western analysts who saw Chinese military professional needs from a western military point of view.

Strategy and the P'eng Te-huai Affair. A brief consideration of the strategic issues involved in the P'eng Te-huai affair will clarify the assertion that People's War was an approach to strategy that was distinctly Chinese and one that sought to exploit or to minimize peculiar Chinese strengths and weaknesses. An examination of P'eng's views on three crucial tests of the concept of People's War will reveal what, in reality, he was seeking in his controversial views on military modernization.

The first test is planned reliance on the Chinese superiority of numbers. Here we go beyond the mere use of reserves in war, for which all armies have plans, and stipulate that in the Chinese case, People's War calls for the exploitation of China's manpower strength by assigning a crucial role to non-regular forces in Chinese national defense. John Gittings asserts that expansion of the militia would "naturally be resisted by the professional element in the army", and indeed was by Marshall P'eng Te-huai. What is often overlooked, however, is what P'eng advocated as an alternative to massive expansion of militia. In promulgating the Draft Service Law of 1955, P'eng explained that the use of conscription would enable the army to continuously demobilize servicemen and build up a large reserve system. In a speech to the 8th National Party Congress in September 1956 he reiterated the need for a large and capable reserve:
In respect of manpower, we must have besides the standing army, prepared a great number of officers and men as reserves. We have changed the volunteer service system into the compulsory military service system and have already begun to register and train officers and men for preparatory service.36

A year later in an Army Day speech P'eng's view came to include the experience and training factor of reserves with the manpower aspect of the militia:

To solve the contradiction of maintaining a small force in peace while having a larger force in time of war, we have improved our military service work and are ready to put in effect the system of militiamen combined with reserve service... Taking into account China's characteristically large population our country can always maintain a militia force of tens of millions.37

P'eng Te-huai, then, referred to militia as a "heap of gooseflesh" when it was untrained and ill-organized. He did, however, advocate maintaining a large force of reserves and militia to be relied upon in time of war. It is significant that he expressed these views over a four year period, 1955-1958, and particularly over the period that was the height of Chinese military "professionalism" and expectation of continued Soviet assistance.

The second test required a recognition of the relative permanence of Chinese technological inferiority, and involved a reliance on two elements, which we will use as subtests, to overcome or minimize this Chinese weakness: men over weapons, and being "at one" with the people. It is important to note that the first of these is not men or weapons. New weapons are desirable as a means to narrow that technological gap, but recognizing that it cannot be breached, we can expect a People's War strategy that relies on high morale of troops and high quality training in the use of existing weapons and "unconventional" tactics. Key indicators of a People's War approach to the man over weapons test, then, would be party involvement with political
indoctrination of troops and "democratic" relations between officers and men. A high grade on each of these indicators would mean sacrificing "professionalism" for high morale. P'eng Te-huai's speeches in the 1955-58 period reveal that he fully supported the man-over-weapons approach to People's War by giving great emphasis to these key indicators of political indoctrination of troops and democratic relations between officers and men. His sense of how crucial morale was to combat capability can be assumed to have been great in that, as many have asserted, it was the deterioration of morale in the army that inspired his criticism of the Great Leap Forward.

Being "at one" with the people is not a nebulous concept in the Chinese context. In People's War the army would depend on the people to support them not only in moral, but in concrete military terms: logistical support, intelligence, manpower for engineering projects or replacements, self-defense and "rear area security", in short to be fully and vitally involved in the war effort in the literal face of the enemy. One would expect a People's War advocate to promote policies endearing the army to the people and enlightening the people through education and propaganda to their vital role in national defense. Such an endearment goes beyond the western professional concept of good civil-military relations, and, in this regard, morale of the people takes on military significance. This theme is constant throughout P'eng speeches, coming out clearly in his speech to the 8th National Party Congress:

The People's Liberation Army of China gained victories because of the support of the broad masses and because of the close unity between the army and the people whose interests are completely identical with those of the army.39

He goes on to list the ways in which the army depends upon the people: for
manpower in militia, self-defense corps and replacements, and for supplies and service by "turning every family into a factory, depot or hospital". In affirming this second subtest, in spite of his desire to modernize, P'eng recognized that the Chinese armed forces had to be organized to overcome a technological inferiority. Further, he was aware that China had to modernize its economy before fully modernizing its armed forces. Although he sought to bridge the technological gap as far as possible, he recognized that to breach it China must rely on a People's War approach.

The final test calls for an assimilation of all the strategic givens we have examined thus far, geography, tradition, and resources available, and asks the question, is the strategy advocated purely for defense? While posing a great strategic problem, the vastness of Chinese territory is a strength in the strategy of People's War that can be used against the enemy. Any strategy that called for an employment of force in something more remote than a limited employment in territorial peripheries (which can be viewed as defensive strategy), is beyond the realm of People's War. This question becomes tricky when discussing naval, air force, or nuclear strategy, and thus we will deal with it in detail in subsequent paragraphs. For the moment it is enough to know that P'eng Te-huai never advocated a force that violated this strategic principle. In fact he regarded the suggestion by "imperialists" that China was building up an offensive capability as slanderous and as a cover for their own aggressive pretensions. In his speeches that we have mentioned he reiterates many times that "We have never thought of and will never think of encroaching upon other nations."
In sum, in evaluating P'eng Te-huai's or anyone's inputs to strategic thought as to its congruence with the strategy of People's War, the crucial tests are: does the input assign a vital role to mobilized non-regular forces, thus maximizing Chinese numerical superiority; does the strategy enhance morale of the troops and the unity of army and people, and thereby help minimize the effects of the technological gap between China and her adversaries; and finally does it constitute a purely defensive strategy? Desire for modern weapons, desire for regularization of forces, and desire for more and better military training are not in themselves antithetical to a People's War strategy, and, in many cases, have been erroneously applied as tests on the "Redness" or "Professionalism" of particular individuals.


The period that followed the change of command from P'eng to Lin Piao, then, was not a reassertion of the Red over the Expert model of national defense organization, but was rather a period of continued refinement of the concept of People's War. It was a period marked by a concentration of effort to put "politics in command" in the army, by the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, and by China's entry into the nuclear club. Discussion on this latter development will be deferred to subsequent paragraphs, but consideration of the former two will reveal that, while they marked a significant change from the immediate past, in terms of national defense strategy they reflected a continuity and further development of the strategy of People's War.

This problem of morale which had so concerned P'eng Te-huai seems to have been the object of the first efforts of the new Minister of National
Defense. Lin Piao discussed political work in the PLA at a conference of "high ranking PLA functionaries" in September of 1960. The report of this conference indicates that "...since May of this year... 120,000 army functionaries went to work in the companies and at the grass roots levels..." to do "extensive political and ideological work". This massive program, coming just a few months after Lin took over, was not a rectification of the officer corps, but was clearly directed at the individual soldier, which can be interpreted as a program to raise morale. In his comments Lin declared:

Political work in the army is the Communist Party's mass work in the army. It is similar to the work of mobilizing the masses in all the various localities; we are mobilizing the armed, uniformed masses. There is strength when the masses are mobilized and when there is integration of ideas and people.

Indeed, Lin viewed this political work as the key to success in all other areas of military work, rear services, military training, educational, cultural, and headquarters work. Out of this conference came the four essential points that were to be the basis of the "four good movement":

Superiority of men over weapons, the relationship of political work to other aspects of political work, and the relationship between practical experience and book learning. This movement was set forth along with the "five good movement" (excellence in political thought, military training, style of work, achievement of missions, and physical education) at the enlarged session of the Military Affairs Committee which met in September and October 1960.

Together these programs were directed at raising the morale in company level units, but also reflect a balanced approach to training that still had as its object the improvement of the combat capability of the armed forces. This
balance is further reflected in a telephone conference conducted by Hsiao Hua with members of the Administrative Council of the Military Affairs Commission on 30 December 1960 in which he transmitted the instructions of "Chief Lin" concerning work priorities for 1961. The priorities for the coming year were to be political work ("living ideology"), working style (that is, the three-eight working style), training ("mainly military training"), and livelihood of the soldiers. In military training, he recommended eight to nine months of the year and seven to eight hours a day during that time to be spent on purely military training. This seeming paradox in work priorities tells us something about the man who was acclaimed for his great achievements of political work in the army and about the relationship between political and military training. Lin Piao could on the one hand say that political work was the "key link" in all military work while on the other give ultimate priority to military training because the two were not incompatible in the People's War approach to army building. Political work mobilized morale so that other training activities would be successful. Lin summed up this view best in comments to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Chang Tsung-hsun after the latter's report on the poor state of military training in December 1960:

We must stress the principle that politics comes first, and politics is the commander. But, in terms of time consumed, political education should not take the first place, and still less time should be occupied by cultural activities and physical labor, as the first place should be given to military training.46

The development of the three-eight working style as one of the priorities for 1961 indicates Lin's emphasis on drawing the army and the people close together. Drawing its inspiration no doubt from the success of the three rules of discipline and eight rules of attention that had led to such
popular enthusiasm and support for the PLA in the revolutionary war (and which had just been published in Mao's Selected Works, Volume IV), this workstyle was designed to go hand in hand with political work to enhance the morale and combat capability of the army. It specifically addressed the objective of unity, and in his promulgation speech to PLA Cultural-Educational Activists, Hsiao Hua stated that unity "...aims at carrying out mutual respect, mutual assistance, and close cooperation between our army on one hand, and the masses of the people, the local government organizations, and people's organizations on the other." Development of this work style became the task of party cadres at all levels in the army. From June to December, 1960 Liberation Army Daily published eight special editorials on the three-eight worksytle. It became the basis of training for the early 1960's and was so successful in raising morale in the army that Lin was further encouraged in the efficacy of political work in the army. It also drew the attention of Chairman Mao, who held the army up as an example to the masses in the "Learn From the PLA" campaign of 1963-1964.

Thus we can see that Lin had addressed himself very early to one of our fundamental tests of the strategy of People's War, that of morale of the troops and unity of the army and the people, ostensibly to restore the combat power of the PLA in its man-over-weapons approach. Like P'eng, however, Lin did not rule out acquisition of modern weaponry. This all seems a bit out of focus in the western perspective, but Lin himself can perhaps clarify the meaning of his and the People's War approach to men and modern weapons:

In army construction on the one hand, we should carry out material construction by continually improving the technical equipment of our army to strengthen its fighting
power, and on the other hand carry out spiritual construction. Once a spiritual thing is turned into a conscious act of the great masses, it will become a great material force.49

Lin Piao also continued to develop in the early '60's the militia movement begun during P'eng's tenure as national defense minister. He, in fact, leaned more to the militia method rather than P'eng's reserves, but since the "Everyone a Soldier" movement was well under way when he took over, we have no gauge to measure the degree of difference between the two. He did assign the militia a vital role in national defense strategy immediately after taking over in 1959:

In addition to having a standing army which is politically firm and equipped with modern technical equipment, our national defense might also include a militia force of several hundred million people. With such an army, it will be possible - if imperialism dares to launch an attack on our country - to sound the call of "everyone a soldier" and activate all the people to fight in coordination with the standing army, drawing the enemy into the inferno of an all-people's war.50

Indeed, it seems that mid-1960 was the time to read the new defense minister's priorities, for in very close succession he emphasized the four-good and five-good movements, the three-eight working style, and in April he called a National Conference of Militia Representatives, which was attended by representatives from all over China and by most central military leaders. In the closing speech Lin assigned a coequal role of militia forces with regular forces in national defense construction, and further charged the delegates with a vital role for militia in socialist construction of the nation's economy.51 Emphasis on militia work, the four-good and five-good movements, and the three-eight workstyle was regularly reported in the Chinese press until the opening of the Cultural Revolution.
As we consider our final test of the strategic thinking of the 1960's, whether it was purely defensive or not, one might protest that with the withdrawal of Soviet aid the Chinese had no other choice but to have a defensive strategy. We must recall that during the height of Soviet influence on Chinese national defense, strategic thinking remained centered on defense of the Chinese homeland. The prospect of building an offensive-capable force even with Soviet aid had never been a realistic possibility in light of Chinese strategic "givens" and national interests. It is the level of modernization of the Chinese economy that gives the Chinese no choice, not the availability of aid from the Soviet Union or any other country. The withdrawal of Soviet aid then changed the strategic picture by withdrawing the Soviet nuclear umbrella and forcing the Chinese into a position of self-reliance not only in hardware but in expertise of organization and strategy. Their immediate response was to develop their own nuclear arsenal. The "Everyone a Soldier" movement of 1958 and Lin's previously cited comments on the role of the militia in national defense take on added significance in this light as does Lin's 1965 speech "Long Live the Victory of People's War". The meaning of this speech has been widely debated with a general consensus in recent literature that it was a statement to most countries engaged in socialist revolution, especially Viet Nam, that they would have the moral, but not material, assistance of China. What cannot be discounted, however, is that it was also a statement to both the United States and the Soviet Union that China had developed the strategy of People's War to such a degree that to conquer the Chinese homeland would be an impossible task, therefore why attack it at all? Before reviewing the
historical experience of the "great victory of people's war in China", Lin
points out that

In every conceivable way U. S. imperialism and its
lackeys are trying to extinguish the revolutionary
flames of people's war. The Khrushchev revision-
ists, fearing people's war like the plague, are
heaping abuse on it. The two are colluding to pre-
vent and sabotage people's war.52

The year 1965 was one of drastic change in military organization as
well as in strategic thinking. Ever since the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1958
the Chinese had begun to distrust the Soviets, and with the withdrawal of
Soviet aid and advisors in 1960, the Soviets took an adversarial position
to the Chinese, thus a distinct military threat quietly began to grow to
the north. In 1964 the Chinese exploded their first atomic bomb, which in
some ways can be viewed as the final cutting of the now useless Soviet
umbilical cord. With the American threat growing in the South, the Chinese
had to face a perceived dual threat alone.

The abolition of the system of ranks on May 22, 1965 has often been
associated with the Red vs. Expert debate and as a signal event that heralded
the Cultural Revolution. In actuality the system had been dying a slow death
since its inception in 1955, as campaigns against the harmful effects of it
had begun almost immediately. That it lasted for ten years can be attributed
to the fact that close relations between soldiers and officers and between
the army and the people had been carried out in spite of ranks and badges.
With the Soviet advisors gone and China standing alone, the system's inappli-
cability to Chinese conditions became fully revealed. Contrary to the impor-
tance that has been attributed to this event, in the Chinese press it passed
rather quietly into oblivion. A short announcement was made by the New China
News Agency on May 24th and Chieh-fang-chün-Pao carried an editorial on it the next day. In the next few months other articles followed on the democratic traditions of the PLA, but articles on the same subject had been constant in the Chinese press for years. The editorial summarizes it best:

This system came into effect from 1955 onwards, after victory throughout the country. Ten years of practice has proved that it is not in conformity with our army's glorious tradition, with the close relations between officers and men, between the higher and lower levels, and between the army and the people.53

Perhaps more significantly, it points out that "The lower levels submit to the higher levels and the fighters respect the cadres; this is done consciously by every soldier for the needs of the revolution and does not depend on the operation of military ranks or grades."54 This change, then, was not a highly significant one in terms of organizational practice, nor was it the outcome of the ascendancy of the Red over the Expert. It was significant in that it was a rejection of the Soviet system and a statement that the Chinese had their own system that had worked well in the past and their own strategy that would be sufficient. It was an affirmation of the concept of People's War for national defense.

The purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing has often been regarded as the opening event of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It has also been viewed as a rejection of military professionalism, as Lo has been associated with pursuing more hardware from the Soviets in the face of the American threat in Viet Nam, favoring an all-out thrust in nuclear weapons development, and challenging the authority of political commissars. Like P'eng Te-huai, however, none of Lo's recommended policies advocated a scrapping of the People's War approach to military strategy. Modern weaponry, as has been stated, was also favored
by Lin Piao, and nuclear weapons development continued throughout the Cultural Revolution. Lo's objection to political commissars was in their abuse not their use. He viewed the commissar role not as a political watchdog but as a political leader within the military, i.e., he favored their use in morale building. In this regard, Lo can be viewed as a Chinese "expert" but not a western-defined professional. Thus Lo Jui-ch'ing's greater mistake was probably his Soviet sympathies, and his fall should not be attributed to his objection to People's War.

There was, of course, a great number of military issues involved in the Cultural Revolution. For the most part, however, these issues were internal political issues and only marginally related to national defense strategy. It should not surprise us that the concept of People's War was exalted during the great campaign, but such exaltation was usually within a political rather than a strategic context. It is not our purpose to explore issues outside of national defense; therefore we will avoid the turbulence in the military from 1965 to 1968 and move to the official closing of the Cultural Revolution due to the growing threat of the Soviets on the northern border, dramatized by the armed clash of Russian and Chinese troops on the Ussuri River on March 2, 1969. The fall of Lin Piao in 1971 will mark the beginning of our next period of strategic development, but in actuality the summary point for the previous period comes with the drastic change in the threat to Chinese national security. 1971-Present.

Party leaders at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP in 1950 laid down a fundamental principle of strategic policy of the People's Republic of China: In order to modernize the military, China
would have to first modernize the economy. The policy was buffeted by the
Korean War and the massive influence of Soviet military assistance and
advice, but was reaffirmed in Mao's famous 1956 speech, "On the Ten Major
Relationships":

In the period of the first Five-Year Plan, military
and administrative expenditures accounted for 30
percent of the total expenditures of the state bud-
get. This proportion is much too high. In the
period of the Second Five-Year Plan, we must reduce
it to around 20 percent, so that more funds can be
released for building more factories and turning out
more machines... We must strengthen our national
defense, and for that purpose we must first of all
strengthen our work in economic construction.55

After Mao's death this principle was reaffirmed by the republication of Mao's
speech in the January 1, 1977 Peking Review. This relationship between mili-
tary and economic development has never been challenged by any of the major
military leaders of China. It forms the backdrop for all discussions of
military modernization, the theme of defense building in the period following
the fall of Lin Piao.

This period, which we now consider, is the contemporary one and will
lead us into a discussion of contemporary force structures and how they
reflect Chinese strategic policy formulation as a continuing effort to main-
tain the viability of People's War as the basis for national defense strategy.
William Whitson introduces the 1970's as the "The Revolution Betrayed", citing
the ascendancy to Party and government positions of professional military
men.56 Ellis Joffe states that after almost 20 years of wavering, "the PLA has
returned to professionalism",57 and Jonathan Pollack sees in the 1970's "The
Decline of People's War" asserting that "it has always remained an improbable
form of conflict", since it is "...a form of warfare that no rational adversary
would possibly want to encourage".58 To western analysts it is logical to
interpret changes in strategy and emphasis on modern military structures and institutions as an expression of "professional" intent. It is also logical to question the rationality of a particular form of warfare. Yet few would argue that any form of warfare in the nuclear era is rational, but nuclear weapons retain a very real and vital role in the military strategies of the Soviet Union and the United States. Similarly, although the Chinese had developed the deterrent aspect of People's War to the point of confidence that it accomplished its intended purpose, it would be absurd to suggest that they would relax in that confidence in the belief that a war with the Soviet Union would not be fought. The Soviets had begun to deploy large forces along the Sino-Soviet border during the Cultural Revolution, and by 1969 they had 21 divisions in place, two of which were in Mongolia. Soviet force build-up continued at the rate of about five divisions per year until by the end of 1974 there were 45 divisions deployed, 8 of them tank divisions. This was around 14 divisions more than the Soviets had deployed in Central and Eastern Europe. One quarter of the Soviet Air Force was deployed in the Far East and included their latest, most sophisticated designs in aircraft. One could better ascribe what Pollack calls the "absence of undue anxiety" on the part of the Chinese leaders to a resignation that they had optimized their defense strengths and minimized their weaknesses and were moving on to other pressing matters rather than to a "confidence which mystifies external observers." The major events that affected Chinese strategic thinking in the 1970's were the increased Soviet threat and the gradual warming of relations with the United States and the West. While the fall of Lin Piao and the death of Chou En-lai and Chairman Mao in 1976 had drastic effects on the military and its political role in China, the effects of these events on strategic policy
have been minimal. Even the change in threat perception has not had drastic
effects, for the Chinese had developed their strategy under a dual threat
in the 1960's, and by the 1970's had developed a credible strategic nuclear
force. At the height of the Soviet buildup in 1973 the Party reshuffled
regional military commanders for the first time in the republic's young his-
tory. With the country heading toward its fourth decade, the Chinese, in
order to establish conditions of growth, placed modernization of national
defense behind modernization of agriculture and industry when they announced
their now famous "Four Modernizations" in 1975.61 Alone these events mean
little, but combined with an endorsement of Mao's strategy on People's War
under modern conditions by civil and military leaders throughout the 1970's,
they indicate that the Chinese were satisfied that their military strategy
was not only sufficient for the moment, but would have to do at least until
the overall modernization of the economy was accomplished.62 Their target
date is the year 2000, but knowing the history of campaigns in China, the
Chinese themselves probably anticipate an extremely long-term process of
modernization, meaning that the strategy of People's War is likely to be
their basic approach to national defense for the foreseeable future. Perhaps
the most telling statement on the approach to defense strategy in the 1970's
comes from an article entitled "Integration of 'Millet Plus Rifles' With
Modernization" published by the National Defense Scientific Commission, an
organization with probably the strongest interest in modernization of defense.

weaponry:

In waging war, we have relied and will continue to rely
on people's war. However, we must realize that any
future war against aggression will be a people's war
under modern conditions.62
The entire article attacks the "Gang of Four" notion that "when the satellite went up the Red Flag came down", and that advocacy of modern weapons was fully within Mao's teachings and not an expression of "weapons decide everything" or the "purely military viewpoint". It sets the tone for defense strategy of the post-Mao era = Revolutionization and modernization.

In sum, while there have been variations in approaches to defense force building from the Pre-1949 period through the decade following the Cultural Revolution, basic strategic defense theory has remained consistent. While new modernization themes have been introduced in recent years, and the opening of relations with the west has allowed Chinese defense officials to go shopping in European arms markets, a close examination of the resulting force structures will reveal that they clearly and intentionally conform to the People's War model.

People's War and Force Development

Changing Views on the Ultimate Weapon.

It is at the obvious paradox of the coexistence of "millet plus rifles" and nuclear weapons that western analysts of Chinese force structures first raise their eyebrows. Before we examine Chinese conventional force strategy let us look at the second half of this paradox to determine the relationship between People's War and Chinese nuclear strategy. This we will accomplish by scanning the changing Chinese view of nuclear weapons, examining nuclear hardware development and deployment, and finally concluding with a proposition on the meaning of nuclear weapons and warfare in Chinese strategic thinking.
In trying to determine what the Chinese consider their gravest strategic threats or at least serious concerns, one could productively begin by looking at what they seem to disparage the most. Along with "U. S. Imperialists" and "All Reactionaries", nuclear weapons were at one time labeled "paper tigers" by Chinese leaders. But the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki posed a serious challenge to the efficacy of People's War as a national defense strategy. In the post-World War II period the official position taken by Mao and the communists was that no new weapon could "prevent the triumph of people's revolution". By 1950 and the eve of committing troops into battle against the nuclear armed United States, they retained the same position, now rationalizing naively that the explosives dropped on Germany, "equal to 450-675 atomic bombs", did not bring surrender, but in the final analysis it was necessary for the ground forces to gain final victory. They also suggested several drawbacks to the military use of the weapon which, they conjectured, would inhibit its use by the U. S.: too expensive, too destructive for battlefield use, ineffective against a scattered population, subject to retaliation by the Soviet Union. Yet a propaganda exposition of the weaknesses of the United States indicates an uneasy concern, which would further suggest confusion on the part of the Chinese. In the twelve page report they explained the counter to the nuclear threat to be "the democratic camp with the mighty Soviet Union at its head", with whom China has "already formed an alliance". Considering the relative inequality of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950, this suggests that the Chinese from the beginning were sensitive to the serious threat that nuclear weapons posed to their type of defense strategy.
As the 1950's wore on the Chinese, through their contact with the Soviets, began to be more fully aware of the implications of nuclear war and especially to U.S. superiority in numbers and delivery capability of atomic weapons. Alice Hsieh indicates that the Chinese entered into a "new and confused stage in 1954". They had felt secure with the Soviet alliance that their defense forces could cope with any conventional threat, and that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons against them due to the threat of Soviet response. They had no doubt developed an early appreciation for nuclear deterrence in the Korean War, as the United States had clearly considered and rejected using the weapons against Chinese bases in Manchuria. By 1954, however, they were aware that the Soviet retaliatory capability was questionable, that the United States was continuing a buildup of-bomber forces in the Far East, and that they were issuing serious threats to use nuclear weapons in a conventional, tactical sense (meaning that they possibly were disregarding the threat of Soviet retaliation for this "tactical" use of the bomb) to guard Taiwan.

Chinese response was on one hand to become very cautious to the point of calling off action in the Taiwan straits in March of 1955 and calling for negotiations with the United States at the Bandung Conference, while at the same time they began to brandish threats of retaliation against the U.S. and its ally Japan. In issuing such threats, however, they seemed careful to refrain from using the Soviet name as the agent of retaliation. That they were thrust back into confusion and obviously groping in the dark is seen in the speech of Yeh Chien-ying at the second session of the First National People's Congress on July 27, 1955:

...The Chinese People...in preparation against sudden attack by the aggressor, must adopt all possible measures
to strengthen the Chinese People's Liberation Army...

However, measured with the standards of modern warfare, it must be admitted that in the grasping of modern military technique, and the employment of modern combat skills, our Army is still in a relatively backward position... Only with our understanding of the art of directing operations and combat skill demanded by modern warfare, and only with adequate ideological and material preparations to cope fully with a sudden incident (nuclear attack), shall we be in the position to deal a vital blow to the enemy attacking us at any time and any place."

Statements such as this have fueled the "Red vs. Expert" debates in China and the "politician vs. professional" debates in the West, yet they more poignantly reflect the confusion and vulnerability felt by Chinese military leaders who realized that their mainstay strategy, that of People's War, was fatally flawed. We have seen that all had agreed from 1950 that economic modernization was the only realistic hope for military modernization, and that reliance on Chinese strengths of terrain, numbers, and morale was a necessity, not a choice. And the ultimate question that lurked behind the People's War in the nuclear era was, what if the enemy attempts to eliminate China as a serious threat or at least inflict severe damage by means of mass nuclear attack without attempting a follow-up ground force invasion? People's War, in that instance, would be a useless concept. Our interpretations of their military-strategic actions after 1955, then, take on a somewhat different light than that suggested in the Red-Expert debates.

In order to have confidence in their military strategy, nuclear deterrence of potential enemies was an absolute must. It follows, then, that the Chinese began in 1955 to seek assistance from the Soviets on developing their own nuclear deterrent. It is significant to note that in this period all military leaders, Red and Expert, agreed that China needed "the most modern equipment".
On the 15th of October, 1957, the Chinese concluded an agreement with the Soviets purportedly to supply them with the technology for an atom bomb.\textsuperscript{75} That same month saw the launching of the Sputnik, widely hailed by the Chinese to the point of revealing some degree of relief that their ally had now regained a credible deterrent posture over the U. S.\textsuperscript{76}

With renewed confidence they resumed operations in the Taiwan Straits, yet in the process and in discussion of other anticipated actions in Asia they found themselves limited by the approval of Soviet counsel. Furthermore, by 1958 it became clear that the Soviets were reluctant to hand over advanced weapons technology to the Chinese, while at the same time pressed them for "joint defense commands" which would in practice put Chinese forces under Soviet control.\textsuperscript{77} It would seem that in the Quemoy crisis of the late summer of 1958 was when the alarm bell sounded for defense strategists. With questionable guarantee of Soviet backing revealed, and with the Soviets declining to assist China in building their own nuclear weapons, the Chinese became more vulnerable than ever. They had stirred the United States, and now their ally was failing them. This realization explains, in part, the vehemence of their reaction against Soviet "revisionism", which culminated in the total withdrawal of the Soviets in June of 1960, and the frantic efforts of the Chinese to build their own nuclear capability. Also in the fall of 1958 came the decision to implement the "Everyone a Soldier" and "Officer's to the Ranks" movements which, I suggest, were efforts to reassert People's War not for political purposes, but for military strategic ones: China was perceived to be in danger, was without a nuclear umbrella, and had to prepare for the worst with her existing resources. Insignificantly, "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger" began to reappear in the Chinese media.\textsuperscript{78}
Thus the Chinese began the 1960's with the view that they had to develop their own nuclear strategic force as soon as possible in order to deter any aggressor from taking advantage of this ultimate weakness in their national defense strategy. Exploding their first bomb in 1964 was a milestone, but did not solve the problem, for they had to develop a thermonuclear capability and adequate delivery systems to make their deterrent credible. Their urgency is exemplified in that they set a record for nuclear powers in exploding their hydrogen bomb just two years and eight months after their first atomic test, on June 17, 1967. Feverish activity on the ultimate weapon had been carried on during the Cultural Revolution with success coming at its height, a time when a "weapons decide everything" approach was political dynamite. A Chieh-fang-chun Pao editorial in the month following this event entitled "Hold Aloft the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung Thought and Thoroughly Criticize and Repudiate the Bourgeois Military Line" attacked P'eng Te-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing both noted for their pursuance of nuclear technology from the Soviets, with these words:

"Political-ideological work is the lifeblood of our army. This is the diametric opposite to the bourgeois, military line, to the bourgeoisies purely military viewpoint and the theory that weapons decide everything..."

Yet the official Chieh-fang-chun Pao announcement of the H-bomb test, carried in all Peking newspapers, states that Chairman Mao had issued a "great historic call... in 1958 concerning national defense science: I think it is entirely possible for some atom bombs and hydrogen bombs to be made in ten years' time". As reflected in army and civilian press, the whole country was ecstatic over the accomplishment of Mao's call. The necessity for the confusing view of the importance and urgency of development of this particular weapon is partially revealed in an NCNA release:
The successful hydrogen bomb (test) marks the entry of the development of China's national defense science into an entirely new stage. It has dealt another telling blow at the nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail of the two nuclear overlords — the United States and the Soviet Union.82

The contradictory exaltation of the strategy of People's War that followed was not entirely political. This event restored the viability of China's only attainable defense strategy by giving China a credible nuclear deterrent capability. It remained for the Chinese in the 1970's to develop a nuclear force structure and strategy that would maintain this viability while at the same time not detract from other national objectives.

**Chinese Strategic Force Development**

There is no confirmed doctrine for Chinese employment of nuclear weapons. Our premise is that the Chinese have developed their nuclear systems in order to restore the viability of their general defense strategy of People's War. In order to fulfill this purpose and at the same time maintain national priorities, we would expect the Chinese to expend only the assets necessary to deter the strategic use of nuclear weapons while at the same time keeping the forces developed in harmony with their overall military policy based on geography, tradition, resources available, and the threat. From prior experience the Chinese had reason to believe that mere possession of nuclear weapons had an adequate deterrent effect. The United States refrained from using them in the Korean War, even though the Soviet Union developed no long range delivery system until five years after exploding their first fission device in late 1949.83 Throughout the period of the cold war there were many threats, Taiwan Straits - 1958, Berlin - 1958-59, Cuba - 1962, but both the U. S. and the Soviets backed down before taking the ultimate conventional step that would
challenge a nuclear response. While this is an oversimplified conjecture of the military input to the decision of what type of nuclear force to build, due to economic arguments and technical limitations the Chinese had little choice but to make some gross assumptions about the efficacy of a small scale deterrent. Furthermore, in keeping with their overall People's War tenet of a purely defensive strategy, we would not expect them to attempt to build an offensive-capable strategic force.

The program of development of the Chinese strategic force can be characterized as rapid but steady with an early haste to demonstrate both adequate warhead technology and diverse delivery system capability (see appendix A). From their first nuclear test in 1964, the Chinese have averaged almost two nuclear tests per year, with at least one test every year from 1964 to 1979. After the first warhead test, they conducted their next three tests using separate delivery mechanisms, the TU-4 and TU-16 bombers, and on October 27, 1966 they delivered a warhead about twice the size of the Hiroshima bomb to a target at the Lop Nor test site using a Soviet-type SS-4 missile at a range of 600 miles. Thus China had conducted a progressive series of test from a tower mounted detonation through tests using three delivery systems, demonstrating to the world that she could not only build numbers of warheads, but could deliver them with precision and diversity.\(^{84}\) Map No. 1 shows possible deployments of the road-transportable SS-4 and corresponding range fans. At that time no country had an antiballistic missile system deployed, thus China had the capability of hitting most of Japan, U. S. bases at Okinawa, northern Luzon, and Da Nang, Taiwan, and most of Southeast Asia. The very important Soviet cities of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk,
and Tashkent were all within missile range. The TU-4 bomber was obsolete (but not ineffective) by 1966, but the TU-16 was still a competitive strategic bomber with a 1600 mile radius capability. Map No. 1 also shows that the Ural industrial areas were brought within range by the TU-16 bomber. China had achieved an absolutely credible regional nuclear deterrent, and the Chinese press reflected the same elation that had been reported after the 1957 Sputnik launching. They also very carefully announced their purpose and intentions for their nuclear development program:

China's purpose in developing nuclear weapons is precisely to oppose the nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail by the United States and the Soviet Union acting in collusion... The conducting of necessary and limited nuclear tests and the development of nuclear weapons by China are entirely for the purpose of defense, with the ultimate aim of destroying nuclear weapons. We solemnly declare once again that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The next step in development was that of a thermonuclear capability. Western scientists detected elements of Lithium 6 after the third test, and its yield was significantly larger than previous tests, indicating they were working on a hydrogen bomb. By mid-June, 1967 they began the same pattern of tests they had previously used. On the 17th they exploded their first H-bomb from a tower mounted configuration, and followed with three tests using the TU-16 bomber. Press coverage also followed the previous pattern, specifically adding "China has got atom bombs and guided missiles, and now she has the hydrogen bomb." After the third thermonuclear test, of which two of the three were at least three megatons, the Chinese had reached the upper level of their technical capability until a heavier pay-load, longer range missile could be developed.
At this point they changed the thrust of warhead research and continued to work on improving missile delivery capability. The next test was an underground low-yield test followed by two thermonuclear tests. Throughout the 1970's they continued to test low-yield fission devices, at least two of them being underground, which may indicate that they were attempting to develop a tactical nuclear warhead. Specialists disagree on this point, but both the old IL-28 medium bomber and the new, Chinese-designed, Shenyang F-9 fighter-bomber could deliver tactical nuclear warheads, and atomic demolition munitions (ADM's) could be placed or SS-4 missiles launched to cover strategic invasion routes. I suggest that the Chinese have deliberately shown this capability through testing in order to deter use of tactical nuclear weapons by the enemy, thus further causing the enemy to fight on Chinese conventional terms.

Work on delivery systems continued in the late 1960's at a steady pace. In 1970 a new Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, the CSS-2, was tested by firing it from Manchuria to the Lop Nor area. The payload of this missile is enough to carry the larger, thermonuclear devices. Thus China entered the 1970's by adding a new dimension to their nuclear force, a greater range missile delivery system. This event was heralded by the launching of China's first satellite, believed to be by means of the same CSS-2 missile, on April 24, 1970. The event received unprecedented coverage in the Chinese press. With the range of this missile being 1500-1750 miles, new important areas were brought within striking distance of this weapon. (See Map No. 2)

For most of the 1970's China's nuclear strategy was based on a highly credible regional deterrent capability. Work on ICBM's continued but at a
Map 2: Chinese Strategic Nuclear Force Target Capability, 1976

© Possible IRBM Launching Sites — Range Fan
△ Possible Launching Sites ICRM (CSS-3)
slow pace and limited priority. The use of nuclear weapons strategically would negate the efficacy of Chinese defense strategy, but by the early 1970's China had achieved what she needed to restore the viability of her approach to national defense based on People's War. The fact that after almost every nuclear test announcements reiterated that China's nuclear program was for defense purposes only and that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, combined with the seeming satisfaction with a regional deterrent capability, indicates that China's nuclear strategy was consistent with the traditional defensive posture characteristic of the grand strategy of China's military forces.

In terms of projection for the future, China has gone on to develop and deploy in small numbers a limited range (3000 - 3500 mile) ICBM, the CSS-3, and in the fall of 1979 tested a full range (7000 mile) ICBM, the CSSX-4. The CSS-3 brings within range all of the Soviet Union and Western Europe, (See Map No. 2) and when the CSSX-4 is deployed the continental United States will be within range. Additionally, the Chinese possess submarines with missile launching tubes and have been working on solid fuel propellents, and if they complete work on a submarine missile system, they will further diversify and enhance the strategic force credibility.

In sum, the Chinese strategic nuclear force was hastily developed after the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960, but their quick success in warhead construction and development of delivery system capability gave them a credible regional nuclear deterrent by the late 1960's. While further development has been constrained by resources, the slow pace of more advanced systems development can be attributed also to their disinterest in anything but a defensive force, as well as the belief that a regional deterrent, with a slow but
determined effort to build a global deterrent, will be adequate to preclude any enemy from initiating a nuclear exchange. Western experts belittle their chances in a nuclear war, citing Soviet "survivability", ABM's, air defense systems, etc., yet, in the final analysis, China's defensive tradition and inability to project their power abroad offers little strategic military threat. No matter how superior one's systems are, the danger that even a few opposing nuclear strikes will be successful demands that the gains be well worth the risk. China is steering a moderate and cautious course, consciously trying not to threaten any nation strategically, thereby removing any real reason why anyone would want to risk a nuclear war.

Conventional Forces Under "Modern Conditions".

Francis J. Romance in his paper "China's Military Modernization: Major Impediments" calls People's War an outmoded theoretical impediment to modernization of Chinese conventional strategy. For support he quotes a Soviet critic's assessment of the PLA:

...It is absurd to suppose that a war of attrition will favor the weak and harm the strong. In such a war, the weak will be exhausted by the strong.92

Apparently, this critic failed to recall the strategic situation in 1941 when the mighty German Wehrmacht struck the then weaker U.S.S.R. Perhaps in the light of his own army's present day difficulty in Afghanistan he would rethink this view. But perhaps not - Col. William V. Kennedy, U. S. Army, in his two pieces in the Chinese War Machine adopts primarily the same viewpoint, even after the U. S. experience in Viet Nam. 93

For China, who, as a major power in a military sense, has viewed the United States and the Soviet Union as the major threats to national security,
the strategy of People's War has been as much a necessity as it was for the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. But they have certainly made a virtue of it, and once reducing the prospect of a future war to the conventional stage with a credible nuclear deterrent, in the late 1960's they fully developed the deterrent aspect of a People's War to any invasion of the Chinese homeland. One could argue that for them to try and move away from that model would seriously undermine this aspect of conventional deterrence which, in the final analysis, is probably what has guaranteed the national security of China from the beginning. The success of a People's War strategy in conventional deterrence, moreover, may guarantee its survival even after China becomes a fully modernized economic and military power.

It should not be read as a devaluation of People's War that the Chinese are trying to move toward military modernization and the ability to deal with any aggressor on the borders. No country, including China, would construct a strategy that would easily give up strategic invasion routes, industrial areas, or their capital city. The Chinese, however, have since the Chingkang Mountain days in most instances soberly assessed their military capabilities at a given moment and have chosen to defend or withdraw based on the principle (which all military men have learned is correct) that there are two major objectives in war: to preserve one's own forces, and to destroy the enemy.

Since a strategy of People's War is still an economic necessity and is likely to remain so for some time, we could expect that conventional force development in recent years would have been directed toward enhancing its viability and not toward moving toward some other model. In these last paragraphs we will briefly look at conventional force organization and development to show that the Chinese are still attempting to maximize their strategic strengths and minimize their weaknesses.
Organization for National Defense. The People's Liberation Army is the collective name for the regular forces in the defense structure, which includes the three services: army, navy, and airforce. Of the total number of around four million men in the PLA, 80 to 85% of them are in the ground forces which, qualitatively, are more closely equal, or even superior, to those of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. than are the technologically inferior air and naval forces. The ground forces are primarily light infantry, and are supplemented by a large paramilitary force structure and by the PLA Production and Construction Corps. This force structure has obvious weaknesses, and enemy massed armor, ground force mobility, and tactical air superiority pose serious threats to it and thus to the viability of People's War. Recent development of the PLA has conspicuously addressed these weaknesses.

The Army. The ground forces in the Chinese defense structure are divided into three groups: the main forces, regional forces, and the militia. The main forces are made up of some 40 "armies" or army corps size units of three divisions each, ten to twelve armored divisions, three airborne divisions, as well as artillery, engineer, and railway troops. The main strength of the PLA is in excellent individual and small unit training and high morale. They attempt to optimize this strength in weapons mixes and tactics and minimize its weaknesses by organization. Recently they have begun to conspicuously address weaknesses in new weapons systems procurement.

In order to optimize the firepower of light infantry, emphasis in weapons selection is usually on a preponderance of automatic weapons, light mortars, and individual or team served anti-tank weapons. On glancing at a table of personnel and equipment in a Chinese infantry division, the first striking
figure is that organic to the division are 516+ 40mm anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. These individual weapons are supplemented by 54 recoilless rifles, all team served anti-tank weapons, of three different calibres. This number is larger than that of the typical western division, as is the number of mortars, with 54 60mm and 81 82mm mortars being organic to the division. In machine guns they show an obvious preference for light over heavy guns, having 339 of the former and only 72 of the latter. They also manufacture five different types of light machine guns and only two ground force heavy guns. The standard PLA rifle is the Type-56 or Chinese version of the Russian AK-47, which is generally acknowledged to be the finest infantry assault rifle made, having both automatic and semiautomatic capability.

Emphasis on close support weaponry also reflects weapons selection to enhance infantry fighting capability. The Chinese are coequal to the Soviet Union in only one area of weaponry, that being close support field artillery. The PLA has 17,000 guns, over three times that of the U. S., and all in relatively small calibres. This means that they would be used primarily in close support of the infantry and in counterbattery fire. Additionally they have over 10,000 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns, a large number in comparison to other weapons types. While these figures are not conclusive in themselves, they do show that the Chinese in weapons selection are attempting to maximize their strength in large numbers of high quality light infantry. There are, however, still serious weaknesses in confronting a foe of superior armor, mobility, and tactical air support.
Another key to optimizing this strength is in the area of tactics. A U. S. Marine Corps history of the Korean War vividly describes the uniqueness of Chinese tactics:

The Chinese coolie in the padded cotton uniform could do one thing better than any other soldier on earth; he could infiltrate around an enemy position in the darkness with unbelievable stealth. Only Americans who have had such an experience can realize what a shock it is to be surprised at midnight with the grenades and submachine gun slugs of gnomelike attackers who seem to rise out of the very earth.

Press correspondents were fond of referring to "the human sea tactics of the Asiatic hordes". Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality the Chinese seldom attacked in units larger than a regiment. Even these efforts were usually reduced to a seemingly endless succession of platoon infiltrations. It was not mass but deception and surprise which made the Chinese Red formidable...

A generation of warfare against material odds had established a pattern of attack proved effective against armies possessing an advantage in arms and equipment. One Marine officer has aptly defined a Chinese attack as "assembly on the objective".

With the increasing sophistication of aircraft, weaponry, and the threat of battlefield use of nuclear weapons, the Chinese have further emphasized in recent years infiltration and night operations. Much of their training is done in close combat, bayonet drill, in uncomfortable conditions, and in terrain hugging, night attacks. In attempting to take advantage of the high morale, bravery, and skill of the infantry soldiers, the Chinese endeavor to get as close to the enemy as possible before initiating attack, thereby limiting or negating the enemy's use of his more advanced fire support weaponry.

There are limits to the ultimate efficacy of the man-over-weapons approach, however, and the Chinese have shown through their force organization and weapons procurement that they are aware of its weaknesses and are
attempting to do something about them. This is where the reliance on the numerical superiority of the Chinese defense force becomes important. In the People's War approach to strategy the Chinese have organized a large portion of the military age segment of the population into a huge force for national defense. The four million soldiers of the regular PLA are divided between the main forces and the regional forces. Supplementing that is the militia which is further subdivided. The armed militia, numbering somewhere between 7 and 12 million, receive pay and several weeks of training per year. The basic militia has 20 to 30 million and conducts periodic drills. Finally the common militia has on its roles between 100 to 200 million individuals. Close relationships between local government, party organizations, and military units are designed to enhance cooperation between these three forces during wartime. The theme of the 1970's and especially the post-Mao period has been to improve the combat capability of the militia, seemingly to get it out of politics and into a dual role of socialist construction and combat readiness. Of signal importance is the July-August 1978 Conference on Militia Work which, in essence, called for a better organized militia with better training and better arms. Deputy Chief of Staff Yang Yung said in an address:

In these new historical conditions (post-'Gang of Four'?)... the broad masses of militiamen are our army's strong assistants in defeating the enemy and strengthening militia building is an important part of our preparations for a future war against aggression.98

In the past year a program to upgrade militia weapons was begun.99 With increased combat capability, the militia will help to overcome inherent weaknesses in infantry mobility and massed armor. Fast movement of enemy forces can be slowed down by large, well organized and armed guerrilla forces.
Emphasis has also been placed in recent years to development of large numbers of anti-tank teams from militia and regional forces. The prospect of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of anti-tank teams spread all over invasion routes would have to have an effect on the ability and propensity of enemy armor to roam at will all over north China. The road bound nature of mechanized infantry and massed armor can be turned into a weakness by large numbers of terrain mobile infantry equipped with individual anti-tank weapons. As "unprofessional" as it sounds or appears to western analysts, the close cooperation of regular forces and local militia would enhance the combat power of regular forces through the extensive intelligence, terrain familiarity, and harassment activities of irregular forces. Such training and cooperation between the PLA and militia has been marked in the 1970's.

Perhaps the most obvious expression of the Chinese efforts to enhance the viability of People's War approach is in weapons procurement. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft capability has been the long standing weakness of the PLA. The obvious counters to tanks and planes are tanks and planes, but the priority list for weapons procurement has had what Angus Fraser calls "an impressive logic of its own". He points out that more than half of newly acquired weapons look directly to defense against an invader, the most obvious being anti-tank guided missiles, anti-aircraft surface to air missiles, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology, and aircraft with a dual close support, tank killing capability. These types of weapons, he concludes, were obviously chosen over armored infantry fighting vehicles or tanks. China has concluded deals with France to purchase the Milan short range and HOT long range anti-tank guided missiles and the Crotale and Roland surface to air anti-aircraft missiles.
The British vertical takeoff capable Hawker Harrier has been purchased, which not only will assist in defense against tanks, but allows air support to come to areas of China that do not have adequate airfields. These purchases show that China is not adopting a "quick-fix" to military modernization, that is, they are not buying the same types of weapons systems that are likely to be used against them by a more modern enemy. What they do reflect is that China is attempting to purchase weapons that reduce the vulnerability of a People's War infantry force to the mobility of mechanized infantry and firepower of massed armor and tactical aircraft.

The Air Force. The paradox of "millet plus rifles" and nuclear weapons is further reflected in the Chinese Air Force. In terms of manpower, it is the smallest of the three services with approximately 250,000 men, but in size its 10,000 pilots and 5,000 aircraft make it the third largest air force in the world. A cursory look at aircraft types brings out that over 4,200 of the 5,000 are fighters or fighter trainers, and The Military Balance, 1979 points out that at least 4,000 fighters (including 575 fighters of the naval air arm) are deployed in an air defense system guarding key urban and industrial areas, military installations and weapons complexes. The obvious conclusion about the primary role of the air force can be drawn: The PLA Air Force is organized and equipped in a strategic air defense role. One can view this as an attempt to deal with a threat with which People's War is helpless to deal. Like a nuclear attack, a strategic air attack of China poses a serious threat to the viability of People's War in defending the homeland. As previously mentioned, China has supplemented air defense with 10,000 anti-aircraft guns, and they have about 85 CSA-1 surface to air missile launchers.
This limited air defense capability is strengthened by an extensive civil defense system, which includes elaborate underground shelters in several major cities. While the air force possesses mostly obsolete aircraft, it must be remembered that the Chinese fighter force would heavily outnumber any major attacker. The Chinese would obviously prefer a fully modernized air force, but in terms of national priorities they have attempted to build an airforce that complements their overall strategy of People's War.

The other side of the paradox is that the remaining aircraft are almost totally bombers, which are most probably organized for the most part in nuclear armed strategic bomber forces. This leaves a major gap in close support aircraft and tactical air defense, which, it has been pointed out, the Chinese realize is a major weakness which they are attempting to correct with purchases of the Harrier. The other weakness is in transport aircraft. In comparison, the Soviet Union has a regular force of 1,800,000 men and 1,700 transport aircraft, nearly 900 being medium and heavy transports. China's air force has just 500 transports, of which 300 are small bi-planes and another 100 are the LI-2, the Soviet copy of the old American DC-3 of WW II fame. The weakness of the transport force indicates another factor forcing reliance on People's War in terms of logistics and mobility. It should be pointed out that war measures would call for supplementation of air transports with over 500 aircraft of the Civil Aviation Administration, which in 1980 now includes five Boeing 747's.

The PLA Air Force, then, is constrained by assets, perhaps more than any service, and therefore options available for force organization are limited. Aircraft types are obviously prioritized to play an air defense role, thus
attempting to reduce strategic threats to a strategy of People's War. Thus, as a service arm the PLA Air Force's role would seem to be directed toward enhancing existing strategy, and organization within the air force reflects the defensive character and weapons dichotomy of the ground forces.

The Navy. Bradley Hahn, in his essay "The People's Republic of China - The Next Maritime Superpower?", discusses the drastic growth of the PLA Navy and Chinese Merchant Marine in the decade of the 1970's. In a sentence, however, he tells us the nature of this growing force: "Today the PRC possesses the largest small ship navy in the world, ranks second in numbers of anti-ship missile platforms, and third in submarine strength". The fact that the PLA Navy has no ship larger than a frigate tells us that is is not a blue water force, and that we can trust that the Chinese doctrine of coastal defense only is still in effect. The Navy's ability to perform the mission of coastal defense is impressive. Western accounts typically discuss the obsolescence of the primary anti-ship missile, the Styx, but when one considers the absolute numbers of small, fast (many hydrofoil) patrol craft, destroyers, frigates, and submarines that could be launching missiles, torpedoes, or firing guns at any invading force, this equipment obsolescence shrinks in significance. This force includes 93 submarines (one of them nuclear), 11 destroyers, 14 frigates, and 9 patrol escorts, all armed with the Styx missile, and some 826 fast attack craft of varying sizes, all armed with torpedoes, depth charges, and small cannon, and in-shore over 1,000 coast and river defense craft. The lack of any submarine tenders precludes any real strategic offensive capability of the submarine force. Supplementing naval craft are about 800 shore based aircraft composed of 575 fighters and 150
torpedo carrying IL-28 and TU-16 bombers, and 50 anti-submarine helicopters. The stated policy is to turn the Chinese coastline into a "great wall of iron", and the U. S. Defense Intelligence Agency assesses their capability to do so in this way: "It is clear that the Chinese could inflict substantial damage on the forces of would be invaders from seaward, including those of the superpowers". Deployment of these forces is in three roughly equal groups in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.

The PLA Navy, then, in doctrine, in weapons systems, and in deployment, is totally dedicated to the denial of any successful landing of an enemy force or of attack of coastal cities by naval gunfire or air attack. Its role is therefore complementary to the overall Chinese strategy of People's War.

Conclusion

All Chinese armed forces, ground, sea, and air, main, regional and local are coordinated through eleven military regions. Region commanders exercise command and control of forces within their regions, and are subordinate to the General Staff. The General Staff performs its command function in coordination with the General Political Department and the General Rear Services Department, under ultimate orders of the Central Military Commission. This military region system makes the People's Liberation Army a force system organized for defense on the grand scale. The organization of the ground forces, weapons, and their tactics are all geared for defense. The strategy they employ seeks to minimize the Chinese weaknesses in economic and therefore military
modernization and sophistication and to maximize the Chinese strength of numbers and vastness of terrain. Since the development of this strategy by Chairman Mao and its testing and perfection in the days before liberation, the PLA has been a technologically inferior force and has consistently relied upon the great mass of the Chinese people, the superior morale and spirit of men rather than the sophistication of weapons, and has sought to threaten no one, except those who would encroach upon Chinese soil. This deterring prospect of an invader drowning in a sea of mobilized humanity is a picture that has been deliberately printed, and has more significance than is generally assumed. The United States and the Soviet Union have generally concluded that due to the vast population, large size, and formidable nature of the PLA conventional and strategic forces that an attack on the People's Republic of China should be avoided. Deterrence is the ultimate result of a successful strategy, and with this criteria we cannot but conclude that China has developed a highly successful strategy in keeping with peculiar Chinese conditions. In order to maintain a credible deterrence, they have consciously sought to repair the cracks caused by continued technological development in the West. The strategy of People's War was a strategy of the past, is the strategy of the present under modern conditions, and will be the strategy of the future until such time as the Chinese industrial economy stands coequal with China's adversaries. But it is not a strategy without teeth. Should the Chinese deterrent fail, her enemy would find, perhaps to their professional surprise, that the armed forces of China can, indeed, be both "Red and Expert".
Appendix A: Development of China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>Delivery System Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Oct 64</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>20 KT</td>
<td>Ground (Tower Mounted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 65</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>20-50 KT</td>
<td>TU-4 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May 66</td>
<td>Fission*</td>
<td>200-300 KT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Oct 66</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>20-30 KT</td>
<td>CSS-1 Missile (MRBM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Dec 66</td>
<td>Fission*</td>
<td>300-500 KT</td>
<td>Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 67</td>
<td>Fusion</td>
<td>3 MT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Dec 67</td>
<td>Fission*</td>
<td>20-25 KT</td>
<td>Underground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Dec 68</td>
<td>Fusion</td>
<td>3 MT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Apr 70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSS-2 IRBM Tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Apr 70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satellite Launched Using CSS-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Oct 70</td>
<td>Fusion</td>
<td>3 MT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Nov 71</td>
<td>Fission**</td>
<td>20 KT</td>
<td>Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jan 72</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>20 KT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Mar 72</td>
<td>Fission*</td>
<td>20-200 KT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jun 73</td>
<td>Fusion</td>
<td>2 MT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Oct 75</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>10-20 KT</td>
<td>Underground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Oct 76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSS-3 Limited Range ICBM Tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sep 76</td>
<td>Fission*</td>
<td>200 KT</td>
<td>TU-16 Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct 76</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>20-50 KT</td>
<td>Underground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Nov 76</td>
<td>Fusion</td>
<td>4 MT</td>
<td>TU-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sep 77</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>20 KT</td>
<td>TU-16 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Mar 78</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td>20 KT</td>
<td>TU-16 (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After March 1978 there were at least two more warhead tests, bringing the total by late 1979 to 25, but details of these tests are not available at this time.

*Possible attempted fusion
**First use of plutonium

Notes


6 The Military Balance, a yearly publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, has specific comparisons of Soviet and U. S. conventional and nuclear forces, which show great differences in force structures and weapons systems, revealing the differences in an approach to strategy in accordance with national peculiarities - Soviet mass versus U. S. capital intensive precision.


9 Ibid., p. 81.

10 Ibid., p. 83.

11 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
Notes (cont'd)

12 The Chinese Armed Forces Today, a U. S. Defense Intelligence Agency Handbook on China's current force structure (Englewood Cliffs, 1979), has an extensive discussion of main and local force tactics, the doctrine for which, in summary, indicates why there is a tendency to confuse "People's War" and guerrilla war: "It must be realized that the PRC Army, being essentially an infantry force, has tailored its tactics to maximize these capabilities. The Chinese endeavor to get as close as possible to the enemy - 'to embrace the enemy' - believing that in close combat they are superior to all other armies. They are also convinced, from their years of guerrilla warfare, that infiltration is most important and should be reflected in all their tactics. In addition, all movement and the majority of operations should occur at night".


16 Mao, SMW, pp. 139-140.


18 Samuel B. Griffith has an excellent discussion of this point in his translation, Sun Tzu The Art of War, Chap. VI, (New York, 1978).

19 The actual circumstances leading up to the outbreak of the war are still obscure. Some feel that it was a Soviet inspired action [for example see Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, (Stanford, 1960), Chap. III., or John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York, 1971), Chap. IV]. Others, such as Franz Shurmann in The Logic of World Power (New York, 1974), pp. 239-240, indicate that it was more a locally inspired conflict based on the desire of both the Kim II Sung and Syngman Rhee regimes to be undisputed masters of the entire Korean peninsula. There is little argument, however, that China had not intended in 1950 to get involved in another war. Alexander George states that "The Korean War, coming closely on the heels of the Chinese civil war, had caught the PLA in the midst of a transitional period", op. cit., p. 5. Perhaps more surprising to the Chinese was the massiveness and swiftness of the U. S. response to the opening of hostilities. (On the 26th of June, the day after the war began, the U. S. began employing air and naval units against North Korean Army units below the 38th parallel. By the 29th U. S. ground forces began landing.)
Notes (cont'd)

20. See the Michael Loewe, Frederick Mote, and Charles Hucker contributions to Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, 1974).

21. Certainly their conduct of the war did not fit a People's War scenario: Without a strategic defensive or stalemate stage, the "Chinese People's Volunteers" launched a massive offensive against a better-armed enemy. Half-hearted attempts to "become one" with the Korean people were ineffective. Therefore the local force, guerrilla input to the effort, was minimal. Suffering constraints to maneuver by the terrain, the Chinese were forced into the antithesis of fluid battle lines, and claims to victory notwithstanding, the Chinese losses in the spring of 1951 were frightful. The U.N. Eighth Army counterattack that followed the stalled Chinese offensive promised to turn into a rout before political developments forced a ceasefire. The Chinese took advantage of the lull to dig, and the opposing lines remained for the most part unchanged until the final days of negotiation in July of 1953.


23. Ibid.

24. Allen Whiting, in China Crosses the Yalu, discusses the complexity of motives behind the Chinese intervention. Politically, the intervention was to preserve the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a political entity, thereby preventing a U.N. (U.S. in Chinese eyes) controlled border from threatening their vital northeastern industrial area. Total U.N. victory would also facilitate a U.S.-Japan-Korea alignment, thus making the dominant force in Asia avowedly anti-communist. China additionally hoped to be a leader in Asia, and an unchallenged imperialist victory in Korea would be a severe blow to a growing Chinese prestige. Finally, intervention in Korea would provide clear signals to the United States and to Chiang Kaishek that China would not idly tolerate adventures in areas of its territorial interest. In contrast to Whitson, Whiting concludes that the intervention, while failing to accomplish some of the military objectives, succeeded in thwarting the declared U.N. objective of unifying Korea and in ousting U.N. forces from almost all of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The political consequences of the intervention, he said, were of broader import than the military ones. pp. 154-165.


26. Indeed, he enjoys a lot of scholarly company. In his introduction to The Role of the Chinese Army, John Gittings says, "The Korean War speeded up the process of modernization and encouraged the drift away from the revolutionary model". p. xiii. Ellis Joffe, in "The Conflict Between Old and New
in the Chinese Army”, China Quarterly No. 18, April-June 1964, had this to say about the PLA experience in Korea: “It hammered home the fact that their army had to undergo a thorough transformation before it could lock horns with a modern military force. It exposed them to the manifold problems of modern warfare for which their vast storehouse of experience provided no solutions. And it dramatically demonstrated the limitations of their hitherto successful strategy and tactics.”

27 Current Background (CB), No. 312, pp. 1-11.

28 CB, No. 344.


293 "General T'an Cheng on Questions of Rectification in the Army", NCNA, Peking, May 12, 1957, SCMP, No. 1547, p. 27.


35 "Reports on the Draft Service Law", July 16, 1955, SCMP, No. 1090

P'eng viewed conscription as a way to reduce standing army manpower levels through the buildup of reserves, thereby maintaining the capability to mobilize for a People's War while at the same time saving money that could be spent on developing an industrial economy. This summarizes the precarious
position of the Chinese in the late 1950's. They realized the need for modern weapons, but would be unable to rely on them until the economy was sufficiently industrialized and productive, which would enable them to arm their forces in a manner in keeping with independence and self-reliance. We can thus understand the lack of emphasis on weapons in the "New Training Program..." of 1958.

36 CB, No. 422, p. 7.

37 CB, No. 1584, pp. 9-10.

38 All three of the above speeches clearly show this view. The last speech is particularly significant. Fully one-third of the speech is devoted to "The several systems essential to building up the army...", which are: 1) The system of Party leadership of the army; 2) the system of political work in the army; 3) and the democratic system of the army.

39 CB, No. 422, p. 4.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 6.


43 Ibid., p. 2.

44 Ibid.

45 Whitson, op. cit., p. 609.


47 SCMP, No. 2270, p. 3.


49 SCMP, No. 2270, p. 4.
Notes (cont'd)


51. SCMP, No. 2252, p. 18.


53. SCMP, No. 3466, p. 2.

54. Ibid.


59. Figures taken from The Military Balance, op. cit.


64. The article quotes Mao extensively and not out of context. See for example, Mao, SW, p. 288 on China's need for planes, artillery, and the atom bomb, quoted in the article on p. E-1.
Notes (cont'd)

65 Ibid., p. E-4.
68 Mao, SW, Vol. IV, p. 100.
69 CB, No. 210, p. 11.
70 Ibid.

74 CB, No. 347, pp. 29-31 cited in Hsieh, p. 36.

77 Thatch, op. cit., p. 85.
78 Ibid.
79 The U.S. took 7 years and 3 months, USSR-4 years, UK-4 years and 7 months, France-8 years 6 months. S. K. Ghosh "China's Nuclear Weapons Programme and Strategy", S. K. Ghosh and Sreedhar, eds., China's Nuclear and Political Strategy (New Delhi, 1975), p. 17.
Notes (cont'd)

80 SCMP, No. 3994, p. 7.
81 SCMP, No. 3965, p. 13.
82 SCMP, No. 3964, p. 2.
83 Spanier, op. cit., p. 155.
84 Information on Chinese nuclear tests is taken from an external study of Chinese arms by John Lewis for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 1979 (Unclassified), and The Military Balance, issues from 1969-1979.
85 "Peking Rejoices Over Successful Guided Nuclear Missile Test", SCMP, No. 3812, p. 2. Chinese press coverage of highly significant tests began a pattern that became familiar in the later milestones of strategic force development: An official press communique would announce the event, would be followed by editorials in Jen-min Jih-pao and/or Chieh-fang-chun Pao, and accompanied by a battery of congratulatory messages from all over the world, all hailing this great accomplishment in the fight against imperialism and revisionism.
88 The press also reflects this change by publishing an NCNA article that is almost a historical summing up of the nuclear program to date entitled "Great Achievements of China's Nuclear Testing", which related accomplishments to Mao Tse-tung Thought, self-reliance, and the continued reliance on People's War, SCMP, No. 4094, pp. 1-4.
89 The Military Balance, pp. 40-41.
90 In the two months following the event some 70 announcements were made of congratulations received from foreign governments. For three days the Central People's Radio Station rebroadcast the music of "Tungfanghung" ("The East is Red"), and telemetry signals received from the satellite on domestic and overseas radio programs, and on the 25th they published a timetable for the passage of the satellite over most of the major cities of the world, SCMP, No. 4648, pp. 13-21.
Notes (cont'd)

91 During the 1970's the Chinese began to deploy the CSS-1 and CSS-2 in both hard, semi-hard, and soft sites, that is, in steel-concrete silos, caves, or fortified installations. While unclassified sources do not reveal actual deployment locations, I would surmise probable locations to be in the Tien Shan mountain areas of Sinkiang east or west of Urumchi, and in the western K'unlun Mountains west or south of Kashgar. In the northeast the Hsiao-Hsing-An-Ling and Ta-Hsing-An-Ling mountain areas northeast and northwest of Harbin would make secure hiding areas, as well as the areas to the east of Shenyang. While population density in the south and southeast make deployment there dangerous, there are probably some sites in Kwangtung, Fukien, or Chekiang, while Yunnan, Tsinghai, and Tibet are more ideal locations.


95 L. Montross, et. al., U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, the East-Central Front (Washington, D.C., 1962), Vol. IV, p. 35, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 1957, Vol. III, p. 92, as quoted by George, op. cit., p. 3. This assessment of the inaccuracy of the term "human wave" assaults is also reflected in U.S. Army accounts, described in Vincent J. Esposito's West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York, 1959), Vol. II, Section III, p. 10: "Stories of CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) 'human sea' attacks were largely the products of rear echelon imaginations. Normally the CCF attacked on a platoon or a company front, reinforcing any prospect of success with great determination in an effort to split up the U.N. force under attack and then destroy it in detail. Experts at camouflage, scouting, and cross-country movement, they made habitual use of surprise and night attacks. Such tactics had great psychological effect. The road bound U.N. forces, a modern army in a primitive mountain wilderness, sometimes found themselves as handicapped as Braddock at Monongahela".

96 Harvey Nelson, "The Organization of China's Ground Forces", de Lee, op. cit., p. 84.
Notes (cont’d)

80 SCMP, No. 3994, p. 7.
81 SCMP, No. 3965, p. 13.
82 SCMP, No. 3964, p. 2.
83 Spanier, op. cit., p. 155.

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Harvey Nelson, "The Organization of China's Ground Forces", de Lee, op. cit., p. 84.
Notes (cont'd)

97 The Chinese Armed Forces Today describes current tactical principles which reflect extreme continuity with those of the Korean War era. Indeed, they are now at the second generation of enduring a threat of war "against material odds", and these tactics have no doubt been scrutinized and refined even more carefully.


100 Nelson, op. cit., p. 80

101 This is the suggestion of Col. Kennedy in his "The Perceived Threat to China's Future", de Lee, op. cit., but is also implied by more conventional scholars of the Chinese military to include Pollack, Joffe, Nelson, and Whitson.

102 The Chinese War Machine is filled with excellent photographs of the PLA in training maneuvers, and the striking feature is that in almost every photograph of the regular force PLA, militia forces are shown training with them. "Professionals" would recoil at the sight of civil-clad women and old men in fox holes next to regular troops, manning machine guns and anti-tank weapons.


105 Both the U.S. and the USSR have global defense requirements causing them to divide their air forces in various theaters. At the height of Sino-Soviet tension, 1973, the Soviets only deployed one quarter of their tactical aircraft in the Asian theater, around 1100 planes, meaning that the Chinese would outnumber them about 4 to 1. The Military Balance, 1973-1974, p. 10.

106 The numbers being mentioned for purchase of the Harrier are 120-300, which would significantly upgrade the quality of the PLA Air Force. Bill Sweetman, "The Modernization of China's Air Force", de Lee, op. cit., p. 143.

107 From personal inquiry while traveling in the People's Republic in July-August, 1980.
Notes (cont'd)


109 The Chinese Armed Forces Today, op. cit., p. 129.
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