THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL-TIME MANNING IN THE ARMY
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**The Importance of Full-Time Manning in the Army National Guard**

Lieutenant Colonel Wayman D. Robertson

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Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

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Full-time support personnel are essential for National Guard units if the National Guard is going to fulfill its role in the total force structure. The increase in mobilization readiness requirements have increased full-time support requirements. The full-time manning program is the only way that the National Guard is able to meet full-time support needs. Readiness goals and workload relationship must be considered in determining optimum levels of full-time manning. Full-time manning must not override the "citizen soldier" concept.
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ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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15 APRIL 1983
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL-TIME MANNING IN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest colonial days, some 346 years ago, when the militia (the forerunner of today's Army National Guard) was formed to stand watch in the Massachusetts Bay Colonies; the National Guard has been the stalwart of freedom in America. This early American Guard was made up of able-bodied men and women who came to the defense of their communities when required. This task required no greater skills than those performed in their daily lives. Hence, they could carry on their normal civilian duties, unless needed to militarily defend their community. Thus rose the "part-time soldier" method of maintaining a military force. After 346 years of proven ability the part-time soldier (National Guard) is still an important part of the United States military force. However, today with the more complex requirements that reach beyond defending local communities with muskets, it takes more than citizens filling a part-time soldiers' role.

It requires that National Guard units be properly equipped with modern equipment and adequately manned and trained if they are to meet current readiness requirements.

As the National Guard became more organized and relied on, as the reserve of the Army, it became important to have equipment and supplies available at armories, instead of each Guardsman bringing his own rifle, supplies and transportation (horse) as he did in earlier times. Thus, it became apparent that the part-timer would not be able to maintain the equipment and care, on a daily basis, for federally owned horses that were issued to the National Guard. Therefore, full-time support personnel were first introduced into National Guard units in 1916 with the passage of the
National Defense Act. The first military technicians were hired as caretakers for the horses. (Primarily because the part-time Guardsmen were not available on a daily basis to provide appropriate care.) The military technician program developed over time as modernization occurred and reliance on the National Guard increased. As the National Guard has developed from those early days to a modern force today, the full-time support personnel programs have also evolved. With the increase in equipment and mobilization requirements, additional full-time support personnel were required in National Guard units to meet workload demands.

Under the original caretaker concept, the military technician primarily maintained and repaired unit equipment or worked in maintenance pools inspecting, repairing, and reconditioning equipment. After World War II, administrative positions were added at all command echelons down through companies and batteries. Additional military technicians were employed as the reliance on the National Guard increased. They expanded into the fields of supply, training, readiness, flying, and military personnel at battalion and below. At higher levels, military technician support is provided for maintenance at unit training equipment sites, mobilization and training equipment sites, and combined support maintenance shops. Military technicians support State National Guard Headquarters in the areas of logistics, property and fiscal, technician and military personnel, recruiting and retention, plans, operations, training, military support to civil authorities, officer candidate school, equal employment opportunity, and safety. This increase and diversity of military technician duties was brought on by the mobilization requirements and the increased emphasis, Department of Defense placed on the Reserve Components.
DISCUSSION

It is an American tradition to believe that the part-time citizen-soldier is the best defenders of a free society. With the ever increasing contingencies placed on United States forces and the economic constraints on the defense budget, it's only reasonable to again turn to the Reserve Components to provide forces at the lowest possible cost. Many of American military leaders from General George Washington to General Edward C. Meyer, current Army Chief of Staff, have stressed the importance of and the reliance on the National Guard and Reserve. However, in recent times the turning point in requiring Reserve Component units to realistically fill the gap in United States military force requirements began when the "Total Force" concept surfaced with the All-Volunteer Force Policy in 1970. The Secretary of Defense, in his August 1970 memorandum to the services, said that economics in the defense budgets would require,

increased reliance on combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves. Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the selected reserve will be prepared to be the initial and primary source of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.2

This reliance on the Reserves was reinforced in August 1973 when the Secretary of Defense said: "Total force is no longer a concept. It is now the total force policy which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces into a homogeneous whole."3 The total force policy is here to stay, and it is evident through current contingency plans that Reserve Component forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces in a time of war or national emergency. This policy directs the service secretaries to provide the manning, equipment, training, facilities, construction, and maintenance necessary to assure that the selected
reserve units would have the ability to meet required deployment times and readiness levels.\(^4\)

The total force policy allows Reserve Component forces to deploy rapidly and operate side by side with Active forces upon mobilization. The current reliance upon the National Guard is emphasized in the mix of the total force as shown in Table 1.\(^5\)

**TABLE 1**

**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AS A PART OF THE TOTAL FORCE FY 82**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Unit Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>percent of Army Combat Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>percent of Army Separate Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>percent of Army Special Forces Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>percent of Army Aviation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>percent of Army Infantry Battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>percent of Army Mechanized Infantry BNs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>percent of Army Armored Battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>percent of Army Armored Cavalry Regiments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no question about the importance that National Guard units play in the force structure of any contingency plan, with the percentages of the total force that National Guard units make-up. In modern times, the National Guard has always been relied on to augment the Active force, but never to the extent of today. Without the National Guard, United States contingency plans designed to implement national and military strategy could not be supported. The National Guard must be ready to deploy within the same timeframe as Active forces to make our total force policy work. Inherent in this reliance on National Guard units is their readiness, if United States strategic objectives are going to be accomplished with today's force structure. As stated earlier, defense economics played a role in placing more reliance on the National Guard. For instance, the Army National Guard provides 46-percent of the Army's combat units for about 5-percent of the Army budget.\(^6\) It only seems natural that the Defense Department would turn toward the Reserve Components for additional troops.
to meet mobilization requirements. If the United States is going to maintain its defense posture throughout the world, with the ever increasing cost, then more reliance will be placed on National Guard units and they must maintain a even higher state of readiness in the future.

The increased readiness requirements have been met in-part by the full-time support personnel. But these requirements have grown beyond authorized levels of full-time support personnel. Furthermore, the Defense Community has perceived that readiness levels in Reserve Component units may not meet mobilization requirements. This concern came to the forefront in a 1976 Defense Manpower Commission Report to the President and Congress. The commission recommended an increase in full-time manning and also that personnel currently employed in the technician programs be converted to full-time active duty Guardsmen and Reservists in order to be more cost effective. This report led subsequently to two reports, commonly known as the "Gerard" study and the "Stroud" study. The "Gerard" study primarily looked at the cost differential between a full-time active duty program and the civilian military technician program. Whereas, the "Stroud" study looked at full-time requirements and the categories of full-time employees. These two studies are used as the current guidelines for the full-time support (especially the full-time manning aspects) of National Guard and Army Reserve forces.

ANALYSIS

This essay will attempt to take a pragmatic look at the current needs for full-time manning in the Army National Guard, utilizing these two reports as a starting point. In doing so one leaves himself open for justifiable criticism. However, traditionally the Guard is made up of
part-time soldiers and we must closely scrutinize any increase in full-time-support. To say nothing of the cost. We should be concerned about a quality National Guard not a quantity National Guard.

There is no doubt, based on previous studies, that Reserve Component units require additional full-time support personnel to meet the required readiness for current contingency plans. However, with limited budget and manpower ceilings imposed by Congress, there is a real dilemma of how many full-time support personnel are required and what category is most effective.

The following discussion will primarily deal with the full-time manning category of full-time support, but any discussion of full-time manning would not be complete without a limited treatment of the total full-time support personnel.

Limited resources and increased reliance on the Reserve Components for the total force requirements, subsequent to the All-Voluntary Force Policy, left the Reserve Components in a bind to fulfill their mobilization objectives. Furthermore, the Defense Manpower Commission Report in 1976 stated that:

The objectives of the technician programs can be accomplished at substantial savings by ultimately replacing technicians with full-time active duty Guardsmen and Reservists. The use of Guardsmen and Reservists on active duty would protect the citizen soldier concept which is basic to this nation's Guard and Reserve system. Implementation of this change would eliminate dual pay and retirement for what in essence is the same job.

Congress seeking ways to reduce the military budget without degrading military readiness, used this information attempting to convert the military technician programs to active duty military personnel support. Because Defense Department studies on the subject were on-going and the National Guard Association of the United States opposed the phasing-out of the military technician program, proposed legislation was not enacted.
There were three main studies—"The Report on Full-time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve (Gerard) Study," "The Reserve Compensation System Study (RCSS)," and "Full-time Personnel Requirements of Reserve Components" (the "Stroud" Study)—completed in 1978 that addressed the military technician programs. Each study looked at a different aspect of full-time support personnel, but all had cost of full-time support and readiness in common. They were also somewhat in conflict with the 1976 Defense Manpower Commission Report. The "Gerard" study concluded that any cost difference between a military full-time force and a technician full-time force was insignificant. Additionally, the technician program should be continued provided that three requirements were met. These include (1) changing the status of all technicians from competitive to excepted civil service; (2) granting Reserve Components exclusion of the need to bargain and negotiate with labor organizations because of the adverse impact upon military command, discipline, and organizational effectiveness; and (3) institute changes in the Federal Wage System.  

The "Stroud" study recommended that additional full-time personnel be provided Army National Guard units to quantify readiness improvements; if additional full-time manning slots are not authorized, then provide manday spaces for additional support assemblies; support legislation to fund technicians currently authorized, remove technicians from Department of Defense civilian manpower ceilings and exclude technicians from Executive Order 11491 (unionizing military technicians); and that the recommended Manning levels be tested. The RCSS findings also indicated that there were no significant differences between the cost of active duty military in a full-time support role and the civilian military technician full-time force.
It further concluded that union activity diluted military command author-
ity, and disrupted effectiveness and discipline; that the technician pro-
gram was to the detriment of the non-technician in regards to unit TOE
positions; and due to the aging technician force a questionable mobiliza-
tion posture. These somewhat diverse findings and conclusions of the
studies and reports caused the 95th Congress to direct the Secretary of
Defense to implement a test program of full-time military Guardsmen and
Reservists in the National Guard and Reserve.

The House Committee on Appropriations recommended that the Guard and
Reserves determine their ability to attract and hire personnel in an active
duty status by:

Filling all positions not manned at the end of fiscal year 1978
and all new positions added to the structure in fiscal year 1979
with full-time active duty military support (i.e., AGR).
Although dual-status technician vacancies can continue to be
filled by dual-status technicians. The Committee believes that
the Chiefs of the Reserve Forces should also attempt to fill some
of these vacancies with full-time military support.

Although, the test was conducted in the National Guard and Reserve,
both Army and Air, this discussion will primarily be directed toward the
Army National Guard. With its marching orders, the Army National Guard
started the test program called—"Conversion to Full-Time Military (CFTM)."
The program was to run from beginning of fiscal year 1979 to December 1980,
but was cut short six months by the House Appropriations Committee.
As far as the Army National Guard was concerned, the test was a complete
success with all converted positions being filled. However, due to the
small numbers involved (1,098, FY 79 and 2,120, FY 80) and the short
duration of the test, Department of Defense reported no discernible impact
on unit readiness. After extensive hearings on the Military Technician
Conversion Program by the Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropria-
tions Committee, the Committee gave the following direction to Department
of Defense: "Each Reserve Component will be free to determine the appropriate mix of full-time military (i.e., AGR) and military technicians..." So after five years of Department of Defense studies, reports, and Congressional hearings, little had changed in reducing the categories of full-time support personnel or determining which category enhanced readiness the most. It actually increased the full-time support categories creating a somewhat more diverse personnel management problem. However, the program probably had an invigorating affect on the personnel system and improved the overall personnel management. Also, another significant fallout from the scrutiny of the military technician program was the number of full-time personnel in Reserve Component units and their relationship to readiness. This observation led to the push for increased full-time manning. Therefore, while the CFTM was being launched, another program called Additive Full-Time Manning (AFTM) had commenced. As reported in the National Guard, it was not prescribed by Congress nor was it part of the Full-Time Military Manning Test, but it impacted on the full-time force. The purpose of the AFTM program was to increase unit readiness by providing additional full-time personnel to early-deploying units. These were additional personnel and did not replace military technicians. They were composed of both active duty Army and active duty National Guard personnel attached to the unit.

There has been a trend to place more reliance on Reserve Component forces to meet force projection requirements since the outset of the total force policy. One of the main reasons for this trend was the every increasing personnel cost. If national defense missions are transferred from the Army to the National Guard and Reserve, substantial savings in personnel cost would result. It's not that the Army's missions would
decrease, but as national defense missions increase—with the world situation and national strategy—the need to increase the Army would not occur, as the increase mission requirement would be assigned to the National Guard and Reserve. At the recent mid-winter Reserve Officer Association (ROA) conference, Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, told ROA that defense already has begun studying the possibility of giving the Reserve Components a much larger role in national defense. Furthermore, that defense is taking a new look at what should be the proper mix of active and reserve forces in the defense structure.

Currently, the Army is scheduled to transfer about 30,000 active duty jobs to the National Guard and Reserve over the next few years.\(^{21}\) Predicated on the ability of the Reserve Components to maintain readiness to meet mission requirements, this would be a significant cost savings without reducing the current level of national security.

The question of Reserve Components readiness and their ability to perform assigned missions has been under scrutiny by Department of Defense officials since inception of the total force policy, which requires Reserve Component units to deploy alongside Active units. If the United States is to accomplish its military strategic goals, Reserve Component units must be ready. One of the primary ingredients for insurance of readiness is people. In an article by Harold W. Chase, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs he indicated that:

An increased full-time support program is expected to be a primary resource for building readiness and manning the force. \(\ldots\) Studies of Reserve Components of all services indicate a significant correlation between the number of assigned full-time personnel and unit readiness. \(\ldots\) Progress in increasing full-time support to units will contribute to improvement in unit training and readiness. For example, the Air Force Reserve Forces (AFR) have achieved the capability to mobilize and deploy within 72 hours. This success is in large part due to the full-time force (approximately 25 percent of the AFR) and the ability of the technician to fill the dual role of conducting unit operations.
on a day-to-day basis and training part-time reservists on drill weekends.22

In a Comptroller General Report to the Congress in 1979, the Army National Guard had 9.5% full-time support of its total force and the Air National Guard had 25.9% full-time support of its total force. Comparing the readiness of the Army and Air National Guard units, the Air Guard was much more favorable by being 45% fully ready, with the Army Guard only being 6% fully ready.23 All of the indicators were signifying a need to increase full-time support to the National Guard and Reserve, if they were going to fill their role in the total force policy.

In response to the overwhelming evidence that more full-time support personnel were needed in the National Guard and Reserve, Office of Secretary of Defense directed the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to increase their full-time support personnel. The Army is considering an increase of approximately 4% for full-time support personnel to Army National Guard and Reserve units. With the civilian manpower reductions and extended hiring freezes, the Army has programmed increases in Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) end-strength since FY 1979, per following table.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY YEAR</th>
<th>GUARD AND RESERVE END-STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5,800 (Actual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10,200 (Actual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>15,200 (Actual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>17,700 (Auth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>22,700 (Projected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>38,700 (Projected)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As this program evolved from an attempt to convert civilian military technician positions in National Guard and Reserve units to active duty military positions for the purpose of saving defense money, it elucidated a much bigger problem. It was a blessing in disguise, as it brought to light
the need for additional full-time support for readiness improvement if the National Guard and Reserve were going to fill their role in the national defense strategy. Then with the authorization to add full-time support personnel there was some discernment as to the number of full-time support personnel required per unit and unit readiness correlation. If personnel were going to be assigned based on unit readiness requirements, then identifiable readiness indicators had to be quantified. The National Guard Bureau is currently evaluating the full-time manning aspects of the full-time personnel support programs to determine the effect on improving unit mobilization readiness. The evaluation is not complete; but, if readiness is the criteria for manning, then an appropriate yard stick must be developed to logically manage the full-time personnel support programs of the National Guard and Reserve. Most of the full-time active duty position were converted military technician (civilian) position or unfilled technician positions. Therefore, the additional active duty positions called Full-Time Manning (FTM) positions are not a very large portion of the overall full-time support program. But it is a highly visible program, because it is looked on as the program to improve readiness.

The FTM program is a separate and distinct program from the conversion program, which was also underway during the same time that the FTM program was effected. The conversion program did not increase the authorized full-time structure, but merely filled vacant or vacated military technician (civilian) positions with personnel in an active duty status. It is quite likely that the conversion program had a positive affect on total readiness, thereby, masking the true effect of the FTM force. The increase in active duty positions due to the conversion program will not be considered as a factor in improving unit readiness, as they only filled recognized and
authorized positions. Only the FTM program will be considered in discussing optimum levels of active duty status personnel in National Guard units to improve readiness.

The FTM program was implemented in December 1979. The purpose of the program was to provide additional full-time personnel to selected units to enhance readiness through improved training, administration, supply and maintenance. At the end of December 1982, the Army National Guard had 3,315 FTM authorized (2,476 Army National Guard and 839 Active Components). The program is scheduled to grow to a strength of 11,617 by FY 87.

Active duty personnel filling the FTM positions can be either National Guard or Army personnel. In either case, they must be qualified and competent individuals as they are charged with the responsibility of improving the unit's readiness. It is hoped they will enable the National Guard units to achieve the same readiness levels, during annual training and on weekends, that their Active counterparts are doing full-time, year around. The priority to fill the positions go to National Guard personnel. However, where qualified National Guard personnel are not available, qualified active Army personnel are assigned to National Guard units. Active Army personnel currently make up approximately 25% of the FTM positions. It is generally felt the least desirable way to augment National Guard units is with active component personnel. It's difficult for Active Component soldiers to fit in as a National Guard unit member—not being from the community. Their ties—career wise—are with the active Army; therefore, they may not feel the kinship with the National Guard as Guardsmen feel. Hence, they may not be an effective unit member. National Guard units traditionally, being made up of local citizens, which is one of its strengths—the "citizen-soldier" concept—makes it difficult for an individual from the Army to assimilate. Therefore, as qualified National
Guard personnel are recruited for these positions, less Active Component personnel will be utilized in National Guard units. It is anticipated that the current level of 839 Active Component personnel assigned to National Guard units will remain the same over the next few years.

CONCLUSIONS

Even though it is widely agreed in Army and National Guard circles that additional full-time personnel are required in National Guard units to enhance mobilization readiness; and further, the only way to get this increase is with the FTM program; it is evident that the number of additional full-time personnel to achieve maximum readiness is not an absolute. Readiness is not in direct relationship with number of full-time support personnel. They are not mutually exclusive either, but somewhere in between with each readiness improvement incentive (i.e., Capstone, Affiliation, and Partnership programs) affecting the personnel factor. Looking solely at full-time manning to increase readiness would skew the importance of additional full-time support. It definitely reduces the importance of National Guard units if they lose their "part-time" soldier concept by increasing active duty full-time personnel with the National Guard taking on a flavor of an active force (professional army instead of a citizen-soldier army). Full-time manning must be kept at an absolute minimum to maintain the personnel cost advantage of National Guard units over the Regular Army. Congress would not buy readiness of National Guard units, if cost approximated the Active Army's personnel cost. In terms of readiness improvement by increasing FTM, cost effectiveness must be superimposed in a readiness versus FTM formula to appropriately address optimal full-time manning.
Postulating that FTM has a non-linear relationship with respect to readiness as depicted in Figure 1, it would stand to reason that optimum FTM could probably be reached around the 10-15% level.

![Diagram](image)

Cost effectiveness of FTM might be defined as the points where rate of readiness improvement diminishes with increasing FTM.

**FIGURE 1**

It is quite understandable that if a National Guard unit can approach the readiness of an Active Army unit with say 10% full-time personnel, then the National Guard unit is much more cost effective. However, it's not that simple. To appropriately determine optimum levels of FTM, a program must be designed to test like units with varying percentages of FTM personnel assigned.

For National Guard units to be part of the total force and meet the national military strategy, an optimum level of FTM must be provided each unit. Also for the total force to be cost effective (as the National Guard is much more economical than the Active Army) National Guard units must play a larger role in national defense strategy.

Regardless of what the optimum level of FTM is finally determined to be, it's not difficult to conclude that additional FTM personnel are presently required in National Guard units. This can be based on the increased reliance on National Guard units in the total force over the last decade. Other readiness improvement programs (Capstone, Affiliation, Partnerships, and Key Personnel Upgrade) created an additional workload above and
beyond the normal day to day activity in most National Guard units. All of these programs were added generally without any consideration for increasing manpower authorization in the Civilian Military Technician Program. Therefore, the FTM program is essential if National Guard units are to meet the total force requirements. Workload relationships should be developed for each readiness improvement program. Thereby, having an orderly procedure for assigning FTM personnel based on mobilization readiness requirements of each National Guard unit. Increasing the FTM personnel of National Guard units must be closely scrutinized with the idea of maintaining the "citizen-soldier" concept. Full-time support personnel must be kept to a minimum with maximum readiness levels attainable.

SUMMARY

The attempt by Congress to decrease defense spending will cause the Defense Department to look for ways to get more bang for the buck in the next decade. What better way to resolve this problem than utilizing Reserve Component units in the force structure instead of Active Component units. Personnel cost is one of the main expenditures of the defense dollar. Personnel cost can be cut significantly by relying on National Guard units with less than 10% full-time support personnel. Especially, as National Guard units make up part of the total force structure scheduled to mobilize and deploy along side Active Component forces. All the more important that National Guard units effectively manage the FTM program.

Care must be taken not to lessen the significance of the "part-time" Guardsmen in improving unit readiness. Full-time manning personnel must only be utilized to accomplish those tasks that can not be accomplished on normal weekend drills. It must be emphasized in the unit that FTM is not
intended to replace the "part-time" personnel, but augment and assist in improving readiness.

Preliminary indications of the current FTM study being conducted by the Manpower Division, Directorate Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau reveals that units with FTM personnel showed a slight increase in readiness when compared with units without FTM personnel. However, the contribution that FTM personnel made in increasing readiness could not be directly determined. In all such studies, it is difficult to pinpoint the effect with the interaction of other related factors. But it's not hard to conclude, that as workload increases FTM must also increase if readiness is going to be maintained or improved.

The importance of the FTM program cannot be overstated, but until a formula is established for authorizing FTM personnel to National Guard units the controversy over FTM requirements for National Guard units will continue to be in contention.

It is the opinion of this writer, for lack of a better solution to the FTM problem, that all unit readiness requirements should be equated to workload factors. Then based on unit readiness required, FTM personnel could be assigned according to the workload factor as illustrated in the following diagram.

Mobilization Readiness \(\text{determines}\) Workload \(\text{determines}\leftarrow\) Number of FTM Required Factor Personnel

The National Guard, as a part of the total force, must be ready to defend the United States if required. The FTM program, if managed properly, can go a long way in assuring the National Guard's readiness.
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid.


27. See Appendix 2 for description of programs. (attached).
APPENDIX 1

EXPLANATION OF TERMS

1. Military technician (MT): Federal personnel of a military department serving under Title 32 USC 709 who occupy military technician positions and are members of the ARNG.

2. Competitive technician: Federal personnel of a military department serving under Title 32 USC 709 for whom military membership in the National Guard is not an employment requirement.

3. Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR): All personnel of the National Guard and reserve forces performing full-time military duty for periods of 180 days or more under Title 10 USC 265, 3015, 3033, 3496, 678, 672(d) or Title 32 USC 502(f).
   a. Active Duty Guard/Reserve-Conversion (AGR-C) (formerly referred to as "Conversion to Full-Time Military (CFTM)"): This program allows qualified ARNG personnel to be voluntarily ordered to full-time military duty in an AGR status under Title 32 USC 502(f) to fill authorized ARNG support personnel positions previously identified as military technician positions. Until such time as support positions designated as AGR on the Support Personnel Manning Document (SPMD) are all converted and new duty descriptions published, AGR-C personnel will perform the duties and functions currently described in the technician position description.
   b. Active Duty Guard/Reserve-Full-Time Manning (AGR-FTM) (formerly referred to as "Additive Full-Time Manning (AFTM)"): This program provides additional ARNG support personnel in AGR status under Title 32 USC 502(f) to the unit commander of selected round-out units; other early deploying
units; and those early mobilizing, late deploying, or nondeploying units that would directly contribute to an increased combat capability in the early stages of a major conflict. AGR-FTM personnel will perform duties and responsibilities listed in job descriptions prepared and distributed by NGB-ARM.

4. Support personnel: All full-time manpower in support of the ARNG.


7. Support personnel objective force: That force which will provide the ARNG with the appropriate number of support personnel (i.e., MT, AGR, AC, and competitive civil service personnel) to fully support total ARNG manpower requirements as determined by the mission, organization, equipment and readiness data. The exact mix of the force, (i.e., MT, AGR-C, AGR-FTM, FTM-AC) will be predicated on that which will best assist the commander in attainment of unit readiness objectives.

8. Manpower requirements: The minimum number of military and civilian personnel which the ARNG requires to accomplish its mission.

9. Manpower authorizations: That portion of the required manpower which can be supported by allocated manpower and is reflected in manpower voucher issued by NGB-ARM. Manpower authorizations appearing on manpower vouchers represent the maximum support personnel hiring authority for each State.
APPENDIX 2

READINESS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

1. Capstone. Capstone is an ongoing FORSCOM initiative which seeks to tell each commander, Active, Guard or Reserve, where he will fight, under which OPLAN he will fight and under whose command and control. It provides the means whereby headquarters and subordinate units, will know which units they will be aligned with in any wartime situation which might be envisioned.

2. Affiliation. A program designed to improve operational readiness of Reserve Component units required to support mobilization contingencies. The program established a formal relationship between Active Army and Reserve Component units whereby an Active Army sponsor organization assists and supports the training of the Reserve Component unit.

3. Partnership. All combat divisions, separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments in the ARNG are linked in partnership with like-type active units for training support, evaluation and assistance.

4. Key Personnel Upgrade. The program was initiated in FY 81 with 200 ARNG personnel from divisions and separate brigades participating in individual and unit training activities with Active Army counterpart units.