TITLE: THE BATTLE OF THE MALVINAS: THE ARGENTINIAN VERSION

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TRANSLATED BY: 9123

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THE BATTLE OF THE MALVINAS: THE ARGENTINIAN VERSION

[Meister, Jürg; Marine-Rundschau, March 1983, B 20113 E; Bernard & Graefe Verlag GmbH & Co KG, Koblenz; pp. 122 - 128; German]

The Swiss naval historian and long-term collaborator of Marine-Rundschau provides a first perspective on the Argentine units employed and the Argentinian losses suffered during the battles in the Falkland Islands on the basis of Argentinian publications.

The history of the "CANOPUS" battery, which consisted of two 15.2 cm guns of this old battleship and was since 1938 400 meters SW of the airport buildings of Port Stanley, which were built later, illustrates to what extent the British neglected the timely defense of the Falkland Islands. The battery was never dismantled, but gradually deteriorated and was no longer operational at the time of the Argentinian landing. The photo shows one of the guns during a practice firing in WWII.

In August 1952 a 2,000-man reinforced battalion of the 11th West Yorkshire Regiment arrived, which was relieved in 1944 by a battalion of the Royal Scots. Discipline was maintained on a particularly strict basis to avoid incidents with the civilian population.

Reporting in the neutral Western press on the progress of the battles around the Malvinas has to date been based more on British than on Argentinian sources. The reason for this was the general antipathy against the Junta, the suspicion of there apparently orchestrated propaganda and the often hysterical tenor of the Argentinian announcements. In addition, it was ignored that naturally the British reports were censored and "manicured", and certainly in completely justified national interests. As long as a conflict is in progress, it is the duty of any government to protect its own troops and its own population against defeatist publications and to deny the enemy any important information.

To date, not all Argentinian and British reports of successes and losses have been able to be reconciled, particularly in regard to aircraft losses. This discrepancy cannot specifically be referred to the fault of one party, but is caused to an extent by the nature and the circumstance of aircraft losses. Many crashes occur after an aircraft has been fired on from several weapons from various points, which can result in several reports of aircraft shot down. A famous or notorious example is provided by 15. September 1940, when the British claimed shooting down 183 German aircraft; after the War, however, from German records it was learned that actually only 56 German aircraft had been lost. This "accident" was then extensively cited by the Argentinian press, in order to discredit the British claims for Argentinian aircraft shot down. On the other hand,
in all of their statistics the Argentinians intentionally neglect to
mention their losses resulting from accidents or write-offs because
of severe damage, which, on the basis of WW II experience are often
almost as high as losses because of enemy action (air combat, anti-
aircraft, aircraft destroyed by bombs on the ground, or captured intact).

The following figures are derived from official Argentine publications*

* "Graceta Marinera" No. 10 and 11 of 13.9.1982, official post-war
records of the FAA and CNA and AEROSPACIO, September 1982.

and concern primarily the operation, the successes and losses of Naval
Air and Air Force, whereby a distinction has to be made between naval,
army and general Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Argentina = FAA).

In regard to the losses of the Army, only the statement is available
that the Army lost a total of 261 dead and MIA, whereby a list of all
Argentine Army units has not yet been published*. The extent of the

* In April the 9th Army Brigade under Americo Daher arrived on the
Falkland Islands, followed by the 10th Brigade at the beginning of May
under General Jofre, and later by the 3rd Brigade, which was stationed
at Goose Green.

Army losses appears to be low and corresponds with over 700 wounded only
approximately 10% of the Army troops committed on the "Malvinas".

General Organization: The troops were under the command of the Commanding
General of the V. Army Corps, Division General Pscalvo Garcia, who had
over 4,000 elite troops, primarily Navy troops, and 39 men of the Army
Infantry Regiment 25 for the seizure of the "Malvinas".

Task Force 40 consisted of the aircraft carrier VENINTICINO DE MAYO*,
the two Type-42 destroyers SANTISIMA TRINIDAD (flagship) and HERCULES,
the older ex-US destroyers COMMODORO PY (Type GEARING/FRAM II), GIPOLITO
BOUCHARD, PIEDRA BUENA (Type A M. SUMNER/FRAM II) and SEGUI (Type A.
M. SUMNER), the Type A-69 frigates DRUMMOND and GRANVILLE, the tank landing
ship CABO SAN ANTONIO, the icebreaker ALMIRANTE IRIZAR, the supply transport
ISLAS DE LOS ESTADOS and the submarine SANTA FÉ. The First And Second
Helicopter Squadrons of the Naval Air Force were also deployed on board.

* Actually, the VEINTICINO DE MAYO was the fleet flagship, but the
SANTISIMA TRINIDAD was used as the flagship for the amphibious phase
of the operation.

The Task Force was under the command of Rear-Admiral Gualter O.
Allara on board the SATISIMIA TRINIDAD, while Rear-Admiral Carlos
Busser of the Naval Infantry on board the CABO SAN ANTONIO commanded the
landing troops.

The landing planned for 1. April had to be delayed for several hours
because of weather conditions. The first 80 Argentines from the SANTISIMA
TRINIDAD landed with rubber boats at ca. 2100 local time in the vicinity
of Port Henriette and began the 10 km long approach march to Port Stanley.
At 0515 the CABO SAN ANTONIO launched its landing craft at Port Groussae
and the Naval Infantry landed on the beach at York Bay at 0630.
According to Argentine reports, the occupation of the "Malvinas" cost only one fatal casualty, the Lt. Cdr. of Naval Infantry Pedro Edgardo Giachino.

Task Force 60 had the mission of occupying South Georgia and consisted of the transport BAHIA PARAISO and the corvette GUERRICO and some Naval Infantry and one each Army and Navy helicopter. The Argentines concede here the loss of the Army helicopter and the death of two naval infantrymen and one fatal casualty aboard the corvette.

The Argentine aircraft carrier VEINTICINO DE MAYO was engaged only in the first operation for the occupation of the "Malvinas". It is unclear whether or not its withdrawal from further operations was the result of technical problems or operational instructions.

On 7. April Vice Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo was designated as commander of all armed forces in the South Atlantic and coincidentally initiated the reinforcement and the relief of the garrison of the "Malvinas" by Army troops; the CABO SAN ANTONIO, the transport BAHIA BUEN SUCESO and the merchant ships FORMOSA and RIO CARCARANA were involved in this operation, which broke through the partial blockade which had been established since 12. April. This operation also included the transfer of several ships of the (Argentine) Coast Guard* to the waters around the islands and of aircraft of the "Fuerza Aero Naval No. 1". The Argentine

* "Prefectura Naval Argentina" is the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard patrol ships RIO IGUAZU and ISLAS MALVINAS, the tugboat YEHUIN and the ocean tugboats ALFEREZ SOBRAL and COMODORO SOMELLERA used as patrol ships were involved in this operation.

Fleet then formed Task Force 79, which departed in three groups between 15. and 17. April from Puerto Belgrano and was at sea southeast to northeast of the "Malvinas" on 29. April. The Northern Group consisted of the aircraft carrier VEINTICINO DE MAYO with A4Q SKYHAWK aircraft and of the destroyers SANTISIMA TRINIDAD and HERCULES, which had each been retrofitted with four EXOCET missiles; the Center Group consisted of the corvettes DRUMMOND, GRANVILLE and GUERRICO each with two EXOCET, and the Southern Group consisted of the cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO retrofitted with SEA CAT and the destroyers HIPOLITO BOUCHARD and PIEDRABUENA equipped with 4 EXOCET missiles each.

During the recapture of South Georgia by the British, the Argentines lost the submarine SANTA FE, on which one man was badly injured and later a captured petty officer was accidentally shot. The British captured a total of 151 Argentine prisoners here.
After the British had initiated the recapture of the Falkland Islands with air attacks on the airfield of Port Stanley on 1. May, the Argentine Task Force 79 continued further towards the East, while allegedly the British ships coincidentally retired to the East. On the Argentine side the impression was gained from reconnaissance reports by P2 NEPTUNE aircraft that the British were receiving continuous information from American satellites on the movements of Argentine ships. Therefore the units were to have been recalled on 2. May. In this operation the cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO was torpeded by the British nuclear submarine CONQUEROR on 2. May at ca. 1600 h and sank approximately one hour later, whereby 321 of the 1,042-man crew were killed or drowned. The survivors were rescued by the destroyers HIPOLITO BOUCHARD and PIEDRABUENA, the aviso FRANCISCO DE GURRUCHAGA and the Chilean transport PILOTO PARDO.

The advance against the British fleet was then aborted and the Argentine units retired to their coastal waters, where the shallow water depth prevent submarine attack.

The Argentine submarine SAN LUIS (Class 209) fired one or more torpedoes at a range of 13,000 meters at an unidentified target northeast of Port Stanley, which was not however hit. Three British frigates and two helicopters are then reported to have hunted the submarine for at least 20 hours, but did not succeed in sinking it.

On 3. May an AERMACCI-MB-326 of the Naval Air Force crashed for non-specified reasons and the pilot was killed. In addition, the Argentine aviso ALFÉREZ SOBRAL, which was searching for the crew of a shot down Argentine CANBERRA bomber, was attacked by two British helicopters and heavily damaged, whereby one officer, one naval cadet, five or six petty officers and one conscript were killed. The ship could then be brought to Puerto Deseado with the assistance of the destroyer COMODORO PY. The COMODORO SOMELLERA is reported to have suffered no damage or casualties.

The attack by 2 SUPER ENTENDARD aircraft of the Argentine Naval Air Force of 4. May, in which the the HMS SHEFFIELD was lost, was effected with the navigational guidance of a NEPTUNE aircraft after aerial refueling from one of the two C-130 HERCULES tanker aircraft of the Air Force. On 6. May an Argentine SEA KING helicopter reported a sonar contact in position 44°33' South and 64° West approximately 45 sm east of Bahia Camerones, but the launch of several MK 44 anti-submarine torpedoes produced no results. Shortly prior to this a TRACKER ASW-aircraft of the aircraft carrier had had another radar contact.

The Argentines declared the transport BAHIA PARAISO, the survey ship PUERTO DESDEAD and the icebreaker ALMIRANTE IRIZAR as hospital ships, which in the further course of hostilities and after the conclusion of hostilities transported over 3,000 members of the Navy, Air Force and Army and civilians.

As a result of the attack of two British helicopters on the trawler NARWAL, which was being used for reconnaissance purposes, on 9. May, the Argentines reported one dead and two injured. The ship sank on 10. May.

In the night-time sinking of the transport ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS in the San Carlos Bay by gunfire by HMS ALACRITY on 10. May two officers, three petty officers, one Coast Guard personnel and 13 civilian seamen were killed. On the same day, the Argentine submarine SAN LUIS fired
torpedoes at two targets at a range of ca. 5,000 meters north of the entrance to the San Carlos Sound. According to the Argentine version, at least one of the torpedoes hit a target, but did not explode.

On 11. May the British government ship FORREST, which had been captured by the Argentines, and which was now in the service of the Argentine Coast Guard, sighted empty rubber boats of the British Commandos on Howard Bay near San Carlos Sound.

On 13. May British SEA HARRIERS attacked the Argentine merchant ship RIO CARCARANA at Puerto Rey and damaged it so heavily, that it had to be abandoned by the crew, and sank on 16. May in another air attack. There were no casualties.

On 15. May the Argentines admit the loss of 5 PUCARÁ of the Air Force (FAA), 4 T-34 of the Naval Air Force and one SKYVAN of the Coast Guard.

On 16. May British SEA HARRIERS damaged the Argentine transport BAHIA BUEN SUCESO in the Zorro Bay, but there were no casualties among the crew.

On 21. May a Naval aircraft of the type AERMACCHI-MB-326 attacked British warships in the San Carlos Sound for the first time. In the attack a Type-42 Destroyer is reported to have been hit by eight rockets and cannon fire*. In the attack on the ARDENT on the same day three Argentine A4Q SKYHAWK Aircraft were shot down by SEA HARRIERS, but two pilots survived. The Argentine destroyer COMODORO PY was released from Task Force 79.2 and patrolled along the mainland coast between El Rincon and the Claromecó light tower.

* This could have been the HMS ARGONAUT.
Two SEA HARRIERS attacked the Argentine Coast Guard ship GC No. 83 RIO IGUAZU (Type Z-38 by B + V) on 22. May in the Choiseul Bay, which was transporting an Army field piece. The Argentine claim to have shot down one SEA HARRIER, while one man on board was killed and several wounded.

In the air attack on 23. May, which claimed the British Frigate ANTELOPE, one of the three Argentine A4Q SKYHAWK aircraft was lost, who pilot on the flight back to Rio Grande had to use the ejection seat and was killed. Two of the SUPER ETENDARDS which started on the afternoon of 23. May had to return without any results. On 25. May two SUPER ETENDARDS, which were refueled in the air twice, attacked the British Fleet and hit the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. On 30. May two SUPER ETENDARDS flew attacks again together with SKYHAWKS, in which they believed they had hit the aircraft carrier INVINCIBLE; actually, they hit the wreck of the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, which thereafter sank.

The British government ship MONSUNEN, which had been captured by the Argentines on 2. April, was damaged by an attack by SEA HARRIERS on 24. May and had to be towed back to Port Stanley by the FORREST. Both ships were later recaptured by the British, were repaired, and were used as supply transports.

Three additional AERMACCHI-MB-326 of the Naval Air Force arrived in Port Stanley on 26. May, of which one aircraft was shot down on 28. May over Port Darwin; the pilot was killed. Another AERMACCHI-MB-326 suffered bomb damage on 29. May in Port Stanley.

On 2. June the Argentines claim that a helicopter landing by the British in the Elephant Bay was prevented by a platoon of Naval Infantry of the Third Battalion, and on 7. June they claim that a SEA HARRIER was shot down by concentrated infantry fire by Company M of the 5th Naval Infantry Battalion.

On 13. and 14. June the Argentines claim that the 5th Naval Infantry Battalion, probably the best unit which General Mario Menderez had on the "Malvinas", repulsed five attacks by four British battalions, whereby the Argentines in the battles at Mount Tumbledown lost only 4 men, but claim to have inflicted 74 casualties on the British.

The official Argentine casualty figures for the Navy vary between 396 and 430 dead and missing.

On land one officer and 50 men appear to have been killed*, of the

* Naval Infantry Battalion: 1: 1 officer, 1 soldier killed
Naval Infantry Battalion 2: 2 soldiers killed
Naval Infantry Battalion 5: 1 NCO, 7 EM killed, 8 EM missing
Amphibious Engineer Company: 1 NCO, 3 EM killed
Malvinas Island base: 1 EM killed
Puerto Belgrano base: 6 EM killed (accident?)
Centro de Instruccion y Adiestramiento en Operaciones: 6 EM killed
Naval Artillery Battalion: 2 EM killed
Naval Anti-Aircraft Battalion: 3 EM killed

Naval Air Force at least 4 pilots (officers) and of naval members shipped in at least 339 men, including three officers, three naval cadets and two merchant ship captains were killed*, but there are still contradictions and lack of clarification.
Submarine SANTA Fé: one NCO killed, one severely wounded casualty.
Cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO: 3 naval cadets, 217 NCO’s and deck officers, 87 sailors and 2 civilians killed, a total of 309; 12 men still missing.
Corvette GUERRICO: 1 NCO killed (South Georgia).
Patrol ship ALFEREZ SOBRAL: 1 officer, 1 naval cadet, 6 NCO’s, 1 EM killed.
Transport ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS: 2 officers, 3 NCO’s, 1 Coast Guard EM and 13 merchant seamen killed or missing.
Trawler NARWAL: 1 merchant seaman killed.
Tanker PUNTA ALTA: 1 sailor killed (accident?).
Watch ship RIO IGUAZÚ: 1 NCO of the Coast Guard killed.
In regard to the soldiers and sailors, these were conscripts; in regard to the officers and NCO’s, these were professionals. It is not known what training the soldiers and sailors had completed.

After the Argentine surrender, the British captured the following Argentine units (to an extent in damaged condition): the Coast Guard ships RIO IGUAZÚ and ISLAS MALVINAS (GC 82, Type Z 28), the transport BAHÍA BUEN SUCESO, the hospital ship BAHÍA PARAISO (released immediately) and the civilian tugboat YEHUIN, which had "been left behind in the performance of its mission”.

The Argentines denied vehemently that the sister ship of the ALFEREZ SOBRAL, the COMODORO SомELLERA and the aviso COMMANDANTE GENERAL IRIGOYEN (as stated in JANE’s 1982) were sunk.
Similarly, the Argentines deny that the corvette GUERRICO was struck by KARL GUSTAV anti-tank rockets.
A truck which had been converted as a launcher for an EXOCET MM-38 missile removed from a destroyer arrived in Puerto Belgrano by air transport on 10. June and scored a hit on HMS GLAMORGAN on 11. June.
The Argentine Naval Air Force (Commando de Aviacion Naval - CAN) was reportedly capable of committing only 6 operational SUPER ETENDARDS, 8 SKYHAWK AQ4 and several AERMACHHI-MB-326 aircraft to the battle, whereby the latter aircraft operated from landing strips on the "Malvinas". The Argentines admitted the loss of 4 AQ4’s and the death of for Naval airforce pilots, who belonged to the First and Third Squadrons of the CAN. The exact number of the AERMACHHI-MB-326 training aircraft used is not yet known, but the Argentines mention the loss of at least three aircraft of this type, whereby two pilots were killed. British reports indicate the loss of a total of five Argentine aircraft, which could perhaps be identified as AERMACHHI-MB-326. In addition to this there are the four T-34 aircraft destroyed on the ground on Pebble Island on 15. May and one SKYHAWK of the Coast Guard, so that the total losses the Naval Air Force will certainly be at least 12 aircraft. All of the 18 helicopters on the Malvinas were either shot down, destroyed on the ground or captured intact by the British*. In addition, at least one PUMA helicopter was lost on the mainland because of accident.

* Among the intact helicopters brought back to England there are a BELL UH-1H AE4-13 and a CHINOOK AE520 of the Army and a PUMA PA-12 of the Coast Guard.
One of the Argentine IA-58A PUCARA aircraft destroyed on the ground at the airfield in Port Stanley, of which the Air Force had approximately 45 units in two Counter Insurgency Squadrons.

The actual Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Argentina = FAA) should according to official figures have lost only 34 aircraft operating from the mainland of the types SKYHAWK and MIRAGE DAGGER, and one each CANBERRA, LEARJET, and HERCULES, a total therefore of 37 aircraft. It addition, it should be noted that there is already an error here, because the Argentines themselves mention the loss of one CANBERRA on 1. May and one CANBERRA on 13. June*.

* AEROSPACIO September/October, p. 57, reported the loss of a MK 62 on 1. May and page 48, where it is mentioned that the CANBERRA shot down on 13. June at 2230 h was the last aircraft lost due to enemy action.

The personnel losses of the FAA are 55 men, including 36 officers, 14 NCO's and 5 EM. Since in the FAA only officers are pilots, this means two officers who were not in aircraft were killed, and presumably were killed by bombs. Then the Argentines claim that the pilots of 14 of the 18 aircraft shot down over the sea could be rescued. This means that 34 pilots crashed with 34 aircraft and were killed, while 14 other pilots also lost their aircraft, but survived. The number of aircraft losses of the FAA is thereby increased to 34 0 4 0 14 = 52 aircraft.

Insofar as the ground attack PUCARA aircraft operating from landing strips on the "Malvinas" are concerned, the Argentines admit that five were shot down in air fights and nine others were destroyed on the ground. The five aircraft shot down probably are included in the 52 losses mentioned, but the number of total losses is increased by the nine aircraft destroyed on the ground to a total of 61 losses. In this regard, it is not certain whether or not the two PUCARA aircraft captured intact by the British are included among these 9 aircraft "destroyed on the ground".*

* The British claim to have either shot down, destroyed on the ground or captured intact a total of 23 PUCARA aircraft.
Including the helicopters, the Argentine aircraft losses are at least 12 aircraft of the CNA and 80 of the CAA, but those aircraft are not included in these figures, which succeeded in reaching the mainland, but which were put out of commission because of crash landing or because of severe damage permanently. The percentage of accident losses under wartime operational conditions can be very high; in the Royal Australian Airforce in WWII, for example, approximately 46% accident losses against 53% losses because of enemy action. It can be assumed that Argentina had more than a hundred less aircraft on 15 June 1982 than it did on 1 April of the same year, whereby any deliveries by foreign governments or Argentine firms in the particular period are not included.

In the evaluation of the performance of the FAA, it should not be ignored that their pilots, as opposed to those of the CNS, were not particularly trained for flying over the sea and for attacks on ships. Most of the Argentine aircraft operated over the Falkland Islands at the absolute limit of their range and could not allow themselves to become involved in air fights and could not afford a second approach to their targets. A number of SKYHAWKS in addition either had ejection seats or malfunctioning ejection seats*. The bombs dropped were to an extent too old and did not operate, or their fuzes malfunctioned, because the pilots flew too low on order the remain below radar detection. With the equipment in their aircraft and the training of their pilots, the FAA could not attack at night with any hope of success, which allowed the British to service their aircraft in peace and to insure their pilots the necessary sleep. The British SEA HARRIER aircraft and the SEA DART anti-aircraft missiles forced the Argentines to attack only a few meters above the sea, which made it difficult for the pilots to identify targets in a timely manner. In addition the Argentine aircraft suffered from the salt in the spray water and required, like the HARRIERS of the RAF, particularly intensive maintenance, which impacted negatively upon operational availability.

There are no day-by-day Argentine statistics on the operations and losses of the FAA available, but only total figures. According to them, in the period from 1 May to 14 June (45 days) a total of 505 combat sorties were launched from the mainland, of which 445 (88.1%) actually were implemented, and of which again 302 (68%) reached the target area, whereby, as mentioned, 34 aircraft of the types SKYHAWK and MIRAGE DAGGER and one HERCULES C-130, one LEARJET and two CANBERRA were shot down.

In the evaluation of the Argentine operations the weather conditions prevailing in the South Atlantic should not be omitted from consideration. There was daylight for only 9 hours and the minimum distance between the closest mainland airbase Rio Grande and Port Stanley is 380 sm (703 km), the greatest distance to Trelew 530 sm (981 km), while the range of the SKYHAWK and MIRAGE DAGGER were respectively 1,000/1,600 km and 1,300 km, including the return flight. Since for tactical reasons the Argentines had essentially to fly very low, the range was reduced considerably.

Flying weather was decidedly poor for 14 days over the "Malvinas"; on 6 days it was bad and good for 24 days, while on the mainland there were three bad days, two poor days and 39 good days.

According to official Argentine statistics the FAA engaged in the battle from the mainland with a total of only 82 aircraft, specifically
### Table I
Damage by enemy action to British ships during the Falkland operation

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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PLACE EAST OF</th>
<th>ENEMY ACTION</th>
<th>ATTACKER</th>
<th>LOSSES OF ATTACKER</th>
<th>DAMAGE AND LOSSES TO BRITISH SHIPS</th>
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<td>21 5</td>
<td>L5</td>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>East of San Carlos Bay</td>
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Summarizing, one decoupled by Corvus chaff off PF Pynduth, one hit on standby side armor, fire which could not be brought under control, ship abandoned after five hours, sank en route. Two bombs hit through the ship and exploded outside, 340 tons and auxiliary engine room damaged. Two hits, not detonated, did severe damage to engine room and propulsion lost for 3 days. Ship then operated at reduced speeds. One hit to detonator, hit open afterdeck, 14 hits by unguided rockets from 3 ships, fire cannot be extinguished. Superstructures destroyed, ship sunk on 12.5. 144 dead, 30 injured.

One hit, no detonation, light damage.

Two hits, not detonated, during defusing detonated one more in engine room, ship sank on 12.4. 1 dead, 4 evacuated, 92 injured. One hit, not detonated, ship damaged.

Five hits, knocked out by sea dance.

Seven hit, not detonated, ship capsized in 10 minutes. 28 injured, 1 dead.

One hit, not detonated, heavy damage to hangar, ship otherwise damaged and continued operations.

Ship was used as an auxiliary aircraft carrier for sea mines, 1 hit on hangar and caused severe fire, which forced ship to be abandoned. 15 dead, 64 injured. Ship contained to flooding, second attack on structure by another ship, hit, which caused breach to sink.

Eighty one hits caused the attack by C-130 transport on tanker. Fourteen personnel were wounded. Hit the ship just after the attack by the C-130 transport.

One hit, not detonated, fire caused explosion of a depth charge, sent ship aground after 1 1/2 seconds. One hit stack third and fourth the superstructure did not detonate. No personal losses.

One hit, not detonated, numerous hits by unguided, fire caused fuel explosion. Sank floating and was damaged. Door flaps at floating damage. After war in Port Stanley.

One hit in engine room, fire caused explosion, sank floating and was damaged. 95 dead and 10 wounded on both ships.

Sunk by bomb hit, 4 dead.

Sustained hit on hangar by fire, serious damage. Damage and fire by detonation, repaired and could operate. 13 dead, 17 wounded.
the types SKYHAWK A-4B, SKYHAWK A4C, MIRAGE M-IIIEA, MIRAGE M.5 DAGGER,
and CANBERRA MK 62, whereby only the CANBERRA had night-flight capability. Since the Argentine Airforce according to the international journals has ca. twice as many aircraft of these types, it has to be assumed that approximately half of the aircraft were either non-operational or were held back for a possible operation again Chile in regard to the dispute over the Beagle Channel.

The first attack on British ships occurred on 1. May 1982 with a total of 56 aircraft (12 A4B, 16-A4C, 12 M-5, 10 M-IIIEA and 6 MK 62), of which only 35 reached the target area and damaged* two British ships slightly for

* Actually (v. Table), the Frigate ARROW and the Destroyer GLAMORGAN were slightly damaged.

the loss of four aircraft. The Argentines, however, reported damage to "various" enemy ships, including an aircraft carrier and shooting down eleven SEA HARRIERS and two helicopters. Actually, only one SEA HARRIER received a bullet through an airleer and returned to the carrier and one LYNX helicopter was damaged by machine gun fire. The British reported one MIRAGE with a SIDEWINDER and at least one CANBERRA shot down.

For 21. May 63 sorties were planned against the British in San Carlos Bay; 54 were carried out with a loss of seven aircraft*. For the period

* On 12, May the destroyer GLASGOW (according to other reports on 25.5) was damaged (v. Table). On 21. May the frigate ARGONAUT was hit by PUCARA aircraft from the "Malvinas", the ANTRIM, BRILLIANT and ARDENT were hit by MIRAGE/DAGGER and SKYHAWK aircraft from the mainland, and the latter were also hit by AERMACCHI-MB-326 aircraft from East Falkland.

from 22. to 24. May 82 additional sorties were planned, of which 63 were implemented, whereby six additional aircraft were lost. This was the decisive phase of the campaign, and although the enemy (the British) suffered some loss*, the Argentines did not succeed in preventing the British landing or to inflict such heavy loss upon the Royal Navy that they had would have to withdraw their ships.

* On 22. May the frigate ANTELOPE was hit by SKYHAWK aircraft from the mainland (v. Table).

On 24. May the landing ships SIR GALAHAD and SIR LANCELOT received hits from MIRAGE/DAGGER and SKYHAWK aircraft from the mainland. On 25. May the destroyer COVENTRY was hit by SKYHAWK aircraft from the mainland, the aircraft transport ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was hit by SUPER ETENDARD aircraft from Rio Gallegos on the mainland, which would have had to be refueled twice in the air, and again on 30. May.

Thereafter, the numerically weakened FAA units attacked targets on Mount Kent, in Bluff Cove, at Harriett-House and the Two Sisters, at Mount London and at Estancia House*, whereby in the final phase from 11. to 13. June

* On 8. June the landing ships SIR TRISTRAM and SIR GALAHAD and the frigate PLYMOUTH were hit by aircraft from the mainland; whether or not the LCU was hit by a Falkland aircraft is not known.
55 sorties were planned, of which 42 were carried out, and for 14 June an additional 30 sorties were planned, of which 23 were implemented with the loss of one MK 62, and two flights by C-130. Five A4B were damaged by anti-aircraft carrier.

Flagship of Task Force 40, which performed the landing operation on the "Malvinas", was the sister ship, built in Argentina, of the SHEFFIELD, the SANTISIMA TRINIDAD. The ship is reported later to have lost a propeller through grounding in operations off the Argentine coast. Photo: M. Lennon

The FAA did not only fly attacks, but also performed numerous reconnaissance and transport flights. In this regard, various aircraft, including a BOEING 707, flew a total of 466 reconnaissance missions with 2,239 flight hours, whereby one C-130 was lost with its entire crew*.

* The Argentine Air Force fitted out several of its KC-130E/R transports as Provisional bombers in order to attack British sea logistics between the "Malvinas" and Ascension Island. In this regard, insofar as known, two attacks were flown (v. Table), and in addition on 1.6. north of Pebble Island, a C-130, which was possible on such a mission, was shot down by a SEA HARRIER.

The Naval Air Force also performed an unknown number of reconnaissance and liaison flights with their NEPTUNE, TRACKER and BANDIERANTE aircraft*.

* The Naval Air Force (CAN) also flew with its ELECTRA F/28 aircraft over one hundred supply flights between the mainland and Port Stanley, whereby the last flight occurred on the night of 13./14. June. This like the supply traffic of the FAA did not experience any loss by direct British action.

An FAA "Escuadron Fenix" was organized with LEARJETS of the types 24, 25, 35A and 36 and the HS-125 with civilian pilots, who flew nine missions as guidance and navigation aircraft for attack units over the sea, 27 missions as airborne communications relays and 123 missions to deceive British radar and fighters. One LEARJET 35A was shot down in these operations.

The supply of the troops on the "Malvinas" used from 2.4 to 1.5.82 a total of 2.047 flight hours of AEROS-LINEAS ARGENTINAS and 15 hours of AUSTRAL-Linie, whereby 5,442 tons and 9,729 persons were transported.
On the mainland the FAA transported from 2. April to 28. June in 7,719 /121 flight hours 35,236 passengers of the Army, 10,546 of the Air Force and 3,293 of the Navy and 9,798 tons of material. The FAA flew a total of 12,545 flight hours, of which combat aircraft flew 2,782 hours, transport aircraft 7,719 hours and various other aircraft 1,953 hours. There were 420 supply flights from the mainland to the Malvinas, of which however only 33 could land between 1. May and 14. June could land and another 21 flights could not land because of the air situation.

According to official figures, the Argentines dropped a total of 173 tons of bombs, of which according to British calculations only a third exploded, which corresponds to approximately 58 tons. The Argentines sank four frigates, one landing ship and a civilian transport, and damaged a second landing ship, which is now being used as a floating barracks at Port Stanley*, and according to their own estimates sank an additional ten ships definitely and seven other ships presumably. The Argentines also claim to have shot down 14 SEA HARRIERS and 12 helicopters definitely and another 7 aircraft and 9 helicopters presumably, almost all by their anti-aircraft defenses; this is however considerably exaggerated*. The Argentine statements in regard to personnel losses are also unreliable, which were calculated in the Gaceta Marinera of 13. September 1982 for the period from 1. to 25. May on board 19 ships as being 672 men, alone 200 of which were aboard the HERMES, as quoted from the newspaper Conviccion of 30. May. Like all Latin Americans, the Argentines apparently have considerable difficulty in distinguishing fact and propaganda.

* According to a letter of the British Ministry of Defense of 25. October to the author of this article, the SIR TRISTRAM is now used only as a floating barracks, while the heavily damaged SIR GALAHAD was sunk by the Royal Navy.

* Three private CESSNA 172's and one belonging to the governor were lost and two BEAVER aircraft used for local transportation were destroyed on the ground at Port Stanley.

Many of the attacks against the British fleet were flown by A-4 SKYHAWK aircraft of the Navy (here one of their eight aircraft) and of the Air Force.  Photo: Archiv BfZ
On the other hand, the British will also have to subject their claim of having shot down a total of 31 SKYHAWK, 26 MIRAGE DAGGER and 23 PUCARA aircraft to a revision, because these figures are a bit too high, particularly in regard to the reported 31 victories by SEA HARRIERS and 41 by anti-aircraft missiles. The British claimed further to have destroyed or found a total of 30 aircraft on the ground, and this figure is probably correct, whereas the figure of 7 aircraft shot down by various weapons requires examination.*

* An Argentine aircraft is reported to have been shot down by a direct hit from a 11,4 cm gun, two or three by concentrated machine gun fire and two or three others by erroneous firing by the Argentines.

In any event it is definite in any event that the pilots of the Argentine Air Force (FAA) and of the Naval Air Force (CNA) attacked with regard to their own losses and the Argentine defeat cannot be attributed to deficient combat determination on the part of the pilots.*

* While the FAA flew a total of 1,490 sorties with 12,545 flight hours, alone the British Fleet Air Arm flew over 23,725 hours flying time, with more than 12,757 sorties and 21,953 deck landings, whereby the figures for a detachment of 13 units of the 845th Squadron for the months May and June are not included. The SEA HARRIERS of the Royal Air Force performed more than 150 combat missions, and including the transport and aerial refueling flights of the Royal Air Force in conjunction with the three VULCAN bomber raids against Port Stanley, the RAF would probably have a greater performance than the Argentine Naval Air Force (CAN).

The SP-2E/2H NEPTUNE long-range reconnaissance aircraft were used as guidance aircraft for the attacks of the SUPER ETENDARDS; the Argentine Air Force had four NEPTUNE aircraft.