THE POSSIBILITIES OF USING ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGIES IN THAI CULTURE
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA P WATHANARONCHAI MAR 83
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A
THESIS
THE POSSIBILITIES OF USING ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGIES IN THAI CULTURE
by
Peerasak Wathanaronchai
March 1983
Thesis Advisor: R. A. McGonigal
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</th>
<th>READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td>40-4125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TITLE (and Subtitle)</td>
<td>The Possibilities of Using Organization Development Technologies in Thai Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TYPE OF REPORT &amp; PERIOD COVERED</td>
<td>Master's Thesis; March 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. AUTHOR(s)</td>
<td>Peerasak Wathanaronchhai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. REPORT DATE</td>
<td>March 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME &amp; ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)</td>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)</td>
<td>Diverse Force, Buddhism, Response to Modern Development, External Forces, Internal Forces, Sources of Resistance to Change, The Rural-Urban Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)</td>
<td>The purpose of this thesis is to consider the application of organization development theories and models to the organizations in Thailand, particularly in the public sector. The physical background of the country, national economy and some characteristics of Thai people, which, from the author's perspective, have significant influence on the elements of the models and theories of organization development are described. The barriers of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
planned change in Thai's public sector are also described. A recommended strategy to improve the effectiveness of the organization development process and the efficiency of knowledge utilization within the country is proposed. The anticipated improvement of organization development technique is also briefly discussed.
The Possibilities of Using Organization Development Technologies in Thai Culture

by

Peerasak Wathanaonchai
Lieutenant Junior Grade, Royal Thai Navy
B.S., Royal Thai Naval Academy, 1978

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1983

Author: Peerasak Wathanaonchai

Approved by: Richard L. Gregory
Thesis Advisor

John W. Craigton
Second Reader

Chairman, Department of Administrative Sciences

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the application of organization development theories and models to the organizations in Thailand, particularly in the public sector. The physical background of the country, national economy and some characteristics of Thai people, which, from the author's perspective, have significant influence on the elements of the models and theories of organization development are described. The barriers of planned change in Thai's public sector are also described. A recommended strategy to improve the effectiveness of the organization development process and the efficiency of knowledge utilization within the country is proposed. The anticipated improvement of organization development technique is also briefly discussed.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 10  
   A. PHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THAILAND .............. 12  

II. DIVERSE FORCE, UNIQUE SYNTHESIS ................. 15  
   A. RELIGION ........................................... 15  
   B. BUDDHISM .......................................... 16  

III. DYNAMICS OF CHANGE .................................... 19  
   A. UNIFYING FORCES ................................... 19  
   B. NEW CHALLENGES .................................... 22  

IV. RESPONSES TO MODERN DEVELOPMENT .................. 24  
   A. POPULATION ......................................... 28  
   B. EDUCATION ......................................... 31  
   C. LABOR ............................................... 35  
   D. LABOR RELATION .................................... 36  
   E. THE RURAL-URBAN GAP ............................... 37  
   F. MAINTAINING SOVEREIGNTY ............................ 38  

V. MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 40  
   A. FORCES FOR CHANGE .................................. 40  
      1. External Forces ................................ 40  
      2. Internal Forces ................................ 40  
   B. PLANNED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE .................. 41  
   C. THE PROCESS OF CHANGE .............................. 42  
      1. Unfreezing ..................................... 43  
      2. Changing ....................................... 44  
      3. Refreezing ..................................... 45  
   D. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE ............................... 45  
      1. Sources of Resistance to Change .............. 45  
      2. Overcoming Resistance to Change ................ 48  
   E. APPROACHES TO PLANNED CHANGE .................... 51
1. Interdependence of the Three Approaches. 51
2. Structural Approach. 52
3. Technological Approach. 53
4. People Approaches. 54

VI. FACTORS AFFECTING ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 55
A. DIFFERENT MEASURES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 55
B. REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS AND DIFFUSION OF POWER 56
C. CONDITIONING OF EXECUTIVES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 57
D. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC SECTOR 57
E. THE PUBLIC SERVICE 60
   1. The National Civil Service 62
   2. Personnel Management 62
   3. Rank Classifications 63
   4. Recruitment 64
   5. Promotion Procedures 65
   6. Salary Scales 65
   7. Discipline 67

VII. PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 68
A. THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PUBLIC 73

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 75
A. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR MACROSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 75
B. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL CHANGE 76
   1. Start with the Felt Need and at the Level of System Readiness. 76
   2. Working with Administrators Who Seem Favorable to Plan Change 76
3. Subordinates. ........................................ 78
4. Intrasystem Development ............................. 73
C. INTERSYSTEM PROBLEM SOLVING .................... 79
   1. OD Consultants and Intersystems. ................. 79
   2. Intersystem among Top Administrators .......... 80
D. EXPECT RESISTANCE AND BE PREPARED TO MEET IT. 80
E. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................... 81

LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................... 82
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................ 84
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................... 85
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Thailand Population Growth</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>School Enrollment at Primary and Secondary Levels</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Enrollment in Selected Public Institution</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Methods for Dealing Resistance To Change</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Map of Thailand</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Force-Field Diagram</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>The Process of Change</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Interdependent Organizational Elements</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>The Three Change Approaches</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

Organization development varies from one organization to another depending upon its own structural and procedural factors, characteristics of the country and the people. Organization development continues to gain ascendancy as a referred strategy for improving the performance of individuals, groups and organizations. It is one of many technologies of planned change, and one that is being applied in organizations around the world. Organization development is a data-based, problem-solving, system-approach process for assisting organization members to become more competent in their present work lives and also to develop the skills and knowledge to meet the future demands and exigencies competently.

This is accomplished primarily through organization members learning how to manage collaboratively the organization's culture and process. Based on theories and principles of the behavioral sciences, this applied discipline represents an important strategy for building and maintaining viable organizations in an age of increasing the goodness of fit between the individual and the organization.

Thailand is a developing country which needs an effective utilization of technologies to manage her existing resources and to develop her own organization. By the end of the nineteenth century, modern systems of education and some western cultures were introduced into the country and had great influences on the Thai people's of living and the country as a whole. The people's ways of life have been significantly changed since then the organizations within the country, from the author's point of view, have been developed ineffectively. The country's natural resources
could not be used effectively. The rapid urban population increase has caused many social problems, resource crises, "red tape" system in public sectors, and degradation in quality of life of the people.

To overcome these problems, upgrading the average level of education of the people in the organizations is a worthwhile approach. But to take advantage of education, an improvement in the organization development technologies within the organization and among the organizations seem to be an important mechanism that should be considered.

Barriers to the organization development have resulted from many causes. Physiographical aspects of the country, national economy and characteristics of the people are among the factors. Resistance to change is an important fact that seems unavoidable and needs to be somewhat overcome in order to create a successful change.

As Wendeli L. French and Cecil H. Bell, Jr.; in Organization Development state:

"In the behavioral science, and perhaps ideal, sense of the term, organization development is a long-range effort to improve an organization's problem-solving and renewal processes particularly through a more effective and collaborative management of organization culture, with special emphasis on the culture of formal work teams, with the assistance of a change agent, or catalyst, and the use of the theory and technology of applied behavioral science, including action research."

The author believes that the predictive model is properly analyzed and applied to that organization it will help solve the problems of an ineffectively organizational development within the country and especially within the public sector of Thai bureaucracy.
A. PHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THAILAND

Thailand. The word literally means 'land of the free' and popularly evokes striking image of graceful temples, emerald ricefields and lushly forested mountains. While accurate, these images represent only a tiny fraction of the composite Thai canvas.

Bordered by Malaysia to the south, Burma to the west, Laos to the north and northeast and Cambodia to the east, Thailand is approximately the size of Texas with a population of 45.5 million.

The country is divided into four regions: the mountainous North, where temperatures in the winter are cool enough to permit cultivation of temperate fruits such as apples and strawberries; the Northeast, a rolling, semi-arid plateau which was once the center of Thai agriculture; the Central region, one of the most fertile rice-growing areas on earth; and the isthmus of the South, whose heterogeneous topography encompasses hilly rubber plantations and fruit orchards, coves and bays filled with fish and rugged terrain from which high-grade tin ore has been extracted for centuries.

Climate varies widely. Generally, temperatures range from annual highs of 100 °F to low of 66 °F. The North experiences winters where thermometer readings slightly above freezing are not uncommon, whereas the far South is completely tropical, with steaming rain forests kept lush by daily thunderstorms through most of the year. This spectrum of benign regional climates allows year-round crop cultivation. Figure 1.1 shows where Thailand is located.

Almost equidistant from India and China, and historically something of a Southeast Asian migratory, cultural and religious crossroads, Thailand, known for centuries by outsiders as "Siam", has been fashioned into a modern kingdom by a unique combination of strategic location, ethnic
diversity, religious tolerance, adept diplomacy and abundant natural and human resources.
Importantly, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country never to have been colonized by the Western powers. This undoubtedly accounts for its unique character, continually developed during more than 700 years of cherished independence.

Although Thailand is perhaps best known as an agricultural country, its 460 mile Indian ocean seacoast and 1165 mile gulf of Thailand shoreline teem with marine life. Its fishing fleet is the world's seventh largest.

Home of what many experts accept as the world's oldest bronze culture civilization, Thailand has enjoyed six millennia of cultural, social and economic evolution through medieval intercourse with countries as far afield as China and Arabia, and subsequent trade with European powers.

Unhampered by racial or religious prejudice and aided by a natural penchant for eclectically adopting values and, through simplification and embellishment, making them unmistakably 'Thai', Thailand has maintained a uniformly high level of development throughout its history.

A predominantly Buddhist kingdom (with a unique style of kingship), Thailand today enjoys its own distinctive culture (drama, architecture, literature, music, painting and sculpture, basket and silk weaving, lacquerware, bronzeware, jewellery and pottery), its own language, its own cuisine, its own martial arts, its own beliefs and attitudes. Thai sculptors, architects and painters have contributed some of the world's most expressive and enduring Buddhist art and its artisans are recognized worldwide for their craftsmanship.
II. DIVERSE FORCES, UNIQUE SYNTHESIS

Throughout its long history, Thai culture has been nourished and shaped by a variety of concepts. Some, like Buddhism, have been imported and been adapted to Thai forms. Others, the routines of village life, for example, are indigenous, and as far as we know have remained comparatively unchanged from ancient times. A third group, including the Thai language itself and numerous art forms, are hybrids in which an indigenous core has been enriched and diversified by outside influences.

Over the centuries these forces have interlocked to form a powerful, individual and complex culture which retains the ability to renew itself as the world changes and new developments exert their various pressures. The central concepts of religion, family and village structure, language and artistic expression remain firm, but permit the Thai culture they support to adapt and develop into new forms and expressions. By understanding these concepts and their effect on the way Thais perceive the world, it may be possible to comprehend where the country's multi-fold culture came from, where it is now, and where it is going.

A. RELIGION

Present-day spiritual society is composed of dissimilar ingredients: thousands of Theravada monasteries and over a quarter of a million monks; an ubiquitous belief in spirits and ghosts; corresponding interest in astrology, palmistry and the occult; Brahman rites and ceremonies, confined mainly to the royal courts; and Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism and ancestor-worship associated with the
substantial Chinese population. Religious minorities of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians complete a rich variety of thought, philosophy, dogma, ritual, belief, superstition, worship and endeavour that is fascinated into a tolerant society with Buddhism as the dominant spiritual factor.

E. BUDDHISM

Buddhism first appeared in Thailand during the third century B.C. when missionaries dispatched by the Buddhist Indian emperor Ashoke (267-227 B.C.), visited Nakorn Pathom, today a provincial capital and site of the world's tallest Buddhist monument.

At its inception in 600 B.C., Buddhism had been a reaction against Brahmanism, the major contemporary Indian religion which would later be absorbed by Hinduism. Buddhism eschewed Brahmanism's emphasis on caste, on dogma regarding sacrifice, ritual and its pantheon of Brahma (the Creator), Visnu (the Preserver) and Shiva (the Destroyer). At the same time, it modified Brahmanic concepts of karma and rebirth.

Brahmanism answered the needs for formalized celebration of war as higher being. Later, associated with the monarchy, it provided ceremonies governing court etiquette, hierarchy and ritual. Important aspects of Brahmanism touch every present-day Thai. The traditional and formal Thai wedding ceremony is entirely Brahman in origin. Brahmans still preside over various royal Thai court rituals and Brahman shrines can be found throughout the country.

Buddhism also made deep inroads into the animist beliefs which had held sway in the Menam Chao Phya basin. Despite its popularity, it never entirely supplanted them. Through animism one could placate rampant, vengeful spirits.
Buddhism, on the other hand, spoke to the individual's inner being and provided him with direction in ordering his daily life. More importantly, it gave an explanation for his existence and offered hope for a better life in future incarnations.

Briefly, Buddhists believe that one's life does not begin with birth and end with death, but is a link in a chain of lives, each conditioned by volitional acts (karma) committed in previous existences. The concept of karma, the law of cause and effect, suggests that selfishness and craving result in suffering. Conversely, compassion and loving-kindness bring one happiness and well-being. Therefore, only by eliminating desire can one find peace of mind. The ideal Buddhist aspiration is to attain perfection through Nirvana, an indescribable, immutable state unconditioned by desire, suffering of further rebirth, in which a person simply is, yet is completely at one with his surroundings [Ref. 1: p. xi].

Later, the Thais moving southward from China similarly embraced Buddhism, finding it physiologically, emotionally and intellectually satisfying. Moreover, Buddhism was easily adopted because it did not conflict with animism or Brahmanic ritual but fulfilled needs not addressed by either.

Buddhism gained wide acceptance because its emphasis on tolerance and individual initiative complemented the Thais' cherished inner freedom. Fundamentally, Buddhism is an empirical way of life. Free of dogma, it is flexible moral, ethical and philosophical framework within which people find room to fashion their own salvations.

Through the centuries Buddhism has been the main driving force in Thai cultural development. Much of classical Thai art, particularly architecture, culture, painting and early literature, is really Buddhist art. Then as now, Buddhism coloured everyday Thai life.
As Buddhism's benign influence spread countrywide, Thais of all classes submitted to its moral authority. Thai monarchs subscribed to the Buddhist ideals of kingship found in the original Theravada scriptures, while farmers serenely accepted their station and fortune, or misfortune, as logical karmic consequences of previous lives.

With its emphasis on accepting human foibles and shortcomings as inevitable, Buddhism helped forge and crystallize the Thais' remarkable tolerance and lack of prejudice, a major factor which was to allow smooth, peaceful assimilation of captives during medieval Thailand's almost perpetual conflicts with neighboring countries. It also allowed the Thais to embrace diverse cultural influences regardless of origin.

Responding to this openness to new ideas, European missionaries could propagate their faiths in Thailand because Buddhism answered so many of people's needs, they found few converts.

Although Buddhism became the primary religion, Thais have always subscribed to the ideal of religious freedom. While Thai constitutions have stipulated that Thai kings must be Buddhist, monarchs are invariably titled 'protectors of all religions'. Consequently, the government, through the religious affairs department, annually allocates funds to finance religious education and construct, maintain and restore temples, mosques and churches.
III. DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

Through a millennium of evolution, from the earliest of tribal migrations up to the present, natural, physical, human, cultural, religious and spiritual forces have served as catalysts and modifiers to give Thailand its unique national identity and bring about the prosperity and security it enjoys today.

A. UNIFYING FORCES

The early inhabitants were organized along tribal lines with the headman, chosen for his leadership abilities, occupying the paramount position. As a kingdom was consolidated and expanded, the leader gathered advisors around him to administer his territory, collect taxes and organize the realm's defense. These advisors, often members of the leader's own family, gradually evolved into the officials of the Ayutthayan courts (Ayutthayan period: 1350-1767) and, eventually, into the bureaucracy of the central government as it exists today.

The sense of national unity necessary for administration to function smoothly, was enhanced by several factors. A common language and literature gave a cohesion and singularity that stamped on Thais their sense of uniqueness. A common code of laws applicable to all regardless of origin strengthened the sense of oneness already brought about by the relative racial homogeneity of the country's inhabitants and helped to eliminate the internecine rivalries which would have sapped the fledgling nation's strength [Ref. 2: p. 15].
The emergence of Buddhism in the Sukhothai period (1238-1350) as the predominant religion strengthened this unity. Thais' natural tolerance was enhanced by the Buddha's injunction to accept others' viewpoints. As a result, minority religions found fertile ground on which to grow and religious differences never became divisive.

Buddhist tolerance fostered a sense of racial unity. Many foreigners who arrived to trade, settled permanently, taking Thai citizenship and raising families. Most adopted Thai names so that by the second and third generations their children were indistinguishable from those around them. Today, it is difficult to identify a face as distinctly Thai.

It was from early leaders' understandable wish to perpetuate their rule through their descendants that Thailand's stable government emerged. The institution of Brahmanism to legitimize authority also offered appropriate symbols and ceremonies of government to which people could respond positively. The necessary accoutrements of soldiers, courtiers, a civil service and merchant class to serve them augmented this core and formed the basis for later social structure. The close association between the ruling group, commercial agents, religious leaders and military leaders continues to characterize the Thai ruling structure today.

Though most peasants remained outside the power-structure-usually by preference as their stolid nature saw politics as an unnecessary hindrance that interfered with full enjoyment of life—the policies emanating from the capitals had profound effect on their lives. The easy exchange between city and countryside persisted because it suited both groups. Because of the ease of communication between the capital and the farms there was a continual, fluid movement between the two areas so that hard lines of social democracy never evolved. The city depended on the
countryside for its sustenance and rural men dissatisfied with farm life had an outlet and a ready ladder of success in city trades.

The emergence of the cities created new jobs. Bright men, educated by village monks and seconded by headmen, could easily find employment in the civil service. Those skilled with their hands became the artisans and craftsmen who build the beautiful monuments and shrines gracing the large towns. As the system of corvee labor was eliminated, those without skills could occupy the idle farm seasons working as laborers in the cities. Today, towns continue to provide employment for country people seeking to better their standards of living.

The Thai characteristics of resilience, national pride and belief in strong leaders were put to the test with the fall of Ayutthaya (1767). Burmese armies swarmed over the city, reducing it to rubble and scattering its inhabitants or carrying off the cream of its culture class to its own courts. Yet within 15 years, Thailand, its capital now relocated to Bangkok for defensive reasons, emerged a strong, viable entity, capable of dealing with outsiders on equal terms, easily repelling external invaders and forwarding the development of its economy and society.

The Thai trust in strong leadership was rewarded by a succession of able monarchs with the vision to see Thailand as a regional power and the ideas to move it in those directions. Continuing the traditions of Ramkamhaeng, Baromtrakarnart, Narai, Narasuan and Taksin, enlightened Chakri kings introduced and modified foreign ideas in an effort to modernize the country yet retain its cultural integrity. Slavery was gradually abolished between 1874 and 1905 and a monetary reward for service was substituted. With the freeing from physical thrall came the freeing of minds. Educational opportunities were opened to all.
Schools became the responsibility of the government which recognized that only by having a literate populace able to participate in nation-building could the country prosper. An infrastructure of public roads, water-works, electricity and hospitals were constructed on a national scale of western lines.

The impetus to modernize came from the kings. Monarchs also created the administrative infrastructures necessary to develop natural resources and strengthen the economy. Though the changes at the end of the 19th century came rapidly they were initiated and implemented along orderly lines.

E. NEW CHALLENGES

The reinstitution of true representative democracy in October 1973 heralded new directions for the country. Programmes initiated during that period are still having considerable impact today. The new awareness demanded that long-standing problems be resolved equitably and that those sectors of the society formerly ignored be brought into active participation in the development process.

The main area pinpointed for improvement was the neglected farming population. Huge budgets were allocated to improve road and irrigation facilities in the villages. Development was pursued on an integrated basis with teams of experts comprised of engineers, health workers and agriculture extension agents, discussing felt needs with villagers and then tackling the problems in a coordinated fashion. For the first time, farmers were consulted at the grassroots level and their expressed needs incorporated into national planning.
A large part of the awareness of the farmers' importance was indicated by changing world economic patterns. The oil price rises had boosted the cost of development for third world countries and huge industrial complexes no longer seemed economically attractive. At the same time, world population pressures and projected food shortages had made food producing countries aware of the vital role they had to play [Ref. 3: p. 37].

In Thailand, the early 1970s saw the beginning of a shift away from the economically detrimental import-substitution schemes to agribusiness with emphasis on value-added food exports. Entrepreneurs began building processing and packaging factories in the heart of country-sides. Besides increasing the value of the area's produce, the new industries had the added benefit of employing laborers who might otherwise have gone to the city to find jobs.

The basic impetus for this drive is the same one that has been responsible for progress in the past: the sense of "Thainess" engendered by common origins, culture and aspirations. The manifestations of that spirit can be seen in the favor with which many of the problems which lie in the way of Thailand's total development are being remedied in a rational manner according to objectives laid out in government plans.

With the nation's resources being used to bridge income gaps, improve educational standards, check the birth rate and relieve the pressures on the urban areas, Thailand is on its way towards resolving the problems which have plagued it for the past two decades. And in an equitable fashion, embracing the lives of all who have shared in creating its prosperity.
IV. RESPONSES TO MODERN DEVELOPMENT

One of the phenomena of the 20th century has been the rapid social and economic development of what were classified as "underdeveloped agrarian" nations. The countries which had been colonies found themselves after World War 2 with the opportunities to shape their own destinies. Others like Thailand, were independent entities which for centuries had led quiet existences watching world affairs from afar with little concern for matters outside their immediate ken. In all of them, economic activity was geared primarily toward supplying their own needs.

But World War 2 changed their perspectives. Increased contacts between nations were creating a global community encompassing the individual aspirations of each nation. Trade was the arbiter; raw materials flowed to the developed countries in exchange for manufactured goods and new products became available in the developing countries. New ideas began to spread via radio and television. The concept of economic participation on a world scale offered new possibilities for developing a country's basic economy and with it to improve its people's standards of living.

In Thailand, as elsewhere, the alternatives to traditional life were enormously attractive, especially to those in the cities which were in closest touch with western lifestyles. Machines promised an easier life, higher productivity per man hour and higher incomes for the workers.

The first to take the initiative was the city-based private sector. Thailand's laissez-faire economy allowed private entrepreneurs the freedom to utilize Thailand's natural comparative advantages to their fullest benefit and
to build on the economic foundation established by the nation's farmers. As a result, the 1960s and 1970s were marked by rampant growth.

With the dynamic growth the cityscape began to change. More and cars appeared on the roads, new buildings sprang up everywhere and Bangkok began to spread out in all directions. The opportunities for increased income lured thousands of people from the countryside to work in the new factories and service industries. Their spending habits began to reflect the new prosperity in dress, lifestyles and in the leisure-time industries that were growing to absorb the excess wealth.

Throughout this period, government planners concentrated on channeling this new industrial growth in directions beneficial to the country. Because of the high cost of imports and the drain on foreign currency reserves they represented, the government adopted a policy of import substitution. It directed its first, second and third five-year development plans toward establishing local factories to produce items the country had formerly imported from abroad.

The new economic activity was a boon. It did much to increase the standard of living and to modernize the country at a pace that would have been unbelievable to Thailand's first reformer, King Chulalongkorn (reigning: 1868-1910) [Ref. 4: p. 137].

While the rapid growth was inevitable and a necessary step in the country's development it brought a number of new challenges in its wake. For one, it was primarily city based which meant that the central plains, always the rice-bowl of the country, was the area to benefit most. Development of other areas of the country lagged behind with the result that serious social and economic imbalances began to appear. By 1975, with the central plains economically secure, it was necessary to turn attention to the other
regions and spread the new wealth to their residents as well as make them more active participants in the development process.

The fourth five-year development plan reflected this change in thinking. Greater attention is now being paid to social development. Whereas the first three plans had been devoted to developing the physical infrastructure necessary to promote the growth, the fourth plan was concerned with correcting the gaps and imbalances that had occurred during the economic boom of the 1960s.

The plan was designed to remedy a number of pressing problems. The income and services disparities between city and rural residents had to be corrected, the population increase had to be curbed, pressure on the city had to be eased and, simultaneously, the provincial centers had to be built up. Educational facilities had to be expanded into remote areas. At the same time, higher education institutions had to be modified to train the skilled manpower needed in the new industries. To cover the expense of this accelerated social development, budgetary allocations were increased and ministerial efforts were integrated to improve the country in a coordinated fashion.

As in other developing countries, however, the challenges involved are enormous. Whereas developed nations have had at least a century to adjust to industrialization, developing nations have had an avalanche of changes to contend with in the space of a single generation. Traditional methods for coping with new ideas and technologies are inadequate. At the same time, techniques developed in the west, and applied wholesale have often proven ineffective without severe and sometimes limiting adaptation. With the inadequacy of traditional methods and of inappropriate technology imported from the west, Thailand has had to discover its own methods for implementing change.
The job of developing new strategies has also been frustrated by the complex nature of the task. Remedies must be devised for problems which are constantly expanding and mutating, often making solutions obsolete almost as quickly as they are devised.

Despite the enormity of the job, far-reaching policies have been implemented. All have been based on a number of key conclusions about the basic nature of the Thai economy and society and the directions in which it should be developed. For one, it is now accepted that Thailand is an agrarian country, rich in natural resources and that future development must be along lines that maintain agriculture as the core sector. In addition, Thailand is a cohesive nation with few divisive forces at work which means that its stability in times of stress is assured. With no factionalism or racial or religious divisions, Thai leaders can depend on unanimity in carrying out the development plans they have devised.

It is also recognized that the efforts that went into developing the infrastructure during the 1960s and early 1970s, and which are still being carried out, created a system of immediate communication and transportation with all regions of the country. Thus, when a plan is finalized, manpower can be mobilized immediately to implement it. Moreover, it means that information can be disseminated quickly and that the benefits of development are readily perceived. With a populace attuned to new ideas, progress can take place at a more rapid rate.

A closer examination of some key challenges which are currently being addressed gives an idea of how the problems emerged, and the strategies which have been developed to deal with them. It will also demonstrate how the basic attitudes brainstormed above affect the directions taken and will describe the progress that is being made in resolving the problems.
A. POPULATION

Traditionally, Thais have preferred to have large families. More children meant more hands to till the fields and harvest the crops. Also, in the days when a kingdom's strength depended on the number of men it could field in battle, it was imperative that its adult subjects have as many children as possible. The men fought and the women and children either travelled behind the lines to supply their needs or stayed behind on the farms raising the crops to feed the armies.

When a family became too large for the land to support, the landless sons could clear forest areas for cultivation. With plenty for all, the population could grow unchecked except by natural causes; extra people could easily be accommodated.

But by the mid-1960s, it became clear that the population was growing too quickly. The advances made in immunization had served to eradicate many fatal disease. Infant mortality had been dramatically lowered and with new medicines available the lifespan was being extended. In the period between 1937 and 1947 the population growth rate stood at 1.9 percent. Improvements in public health and rising income opportunities in the 1950s and 1960s raised that figure to over three percent per year. In the 30 years after World War II, the population jumped from an estimated 17.5 million to nearly 45 million people in 1979 making Thailand one of the world's 20 most populous nations. Table 1 shows the growth rate of Thailand.

Had there been unlimited tracts of land, the population could have been absorbed. But the available land was rapidly being used to accommodate the growing numbers. Virgin forests could no longer be felled without destroying valuable watersheds. For a while, cities could take in the
TABLE I
Thailand Population Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Annual Intercensal Increase (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>8,266,408</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>9,207,355</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>11,506,207</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>14,464,105</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>17,442,689</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>26,257,916</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>34,397,374</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>47,500,009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 overflow of sons without land to inherit but soon they too began to feel the pressures of overpopulation.

Clearly, large families were no longer a boon; they were a liability. Rapid population growth was erasing the advances being made by development agencies. Crop yields might be increased, houses might be built, schools might be erected in large numbers but the gains were barely keeping up with demand.

It was imperative that the government adopt a course for curbing the burgeoning population. In 1968, the cabinet sanctioned the development of family planning services on the research basis by the ministry of public health. This was followed in March 1970 by the announcement of the national population policy which led to the incorporation of family planning programmes into the third five-year social and economic plan.
The slogan "mary children make you poor" and the economic arguments for keeping the numbers of children at two, found ready reception among both city and rural populations. Parents, hard-pressed to support their families, began to go to district health centers for advice on contraceptive devices. By 1974, it was estimated that 25 percent of all fertile married couples were using modern contraceptives, one of the highest percentages for developing countries. The result was that the goal of reducing the population growth rate from over three percent to 2.5 percent was reached by the end of third plan in 1976.

The success of the programs can be attributed to a number of factors. One was the existence of a well-developed network of state health service centers, particularly in the central and lower northern regions where the programme had the highest response.

Another major factor has been the attribute of the public health ministry in welcoming non-ministry and non-governmental agencies' offers to extend the program into regions not yet covered by the government's own teams. Among the most active of the numerous public, international and private agencies are the planned parenthood association of Thailand (PPAT) founded in 1970 and the community based family planning services (C3FPS) formed in 1974. The c3fps has recently expanded its service to include family health care and education in the belief that family planning involves more than simply reducing population increases. Instead, it means ensuring that good health is maintained through teaching villagers the basic concepts of nutrition, sanitation and disease prevention.

The fourth plan gave priority to expanding family planning education and health service facilities into remote areas. By 1979, the population growth rate had been reduced to 2.3 percent toward the goal of 2.1 percent by 1981. The
end result will be a stable population that will allow the government to make headway in its efforts to bring improved standards of living to all.

E. EDUCATION

Until the 20th century, education was for royalty or for monks. Princes had to be literate to govern their provinces and communicate with the palace in the capital. Monks had to know how to read the religious texts from which they preached sermons to the laity. The rest of the society was comprised of farmers who had little need for reading skills, village lore being transmitted orally.

With the 20th century came creation of a widespread bureaucracy with a need for educated men to staff it. Young men, recognizing that the bureaucracy marked a new ladder by which they might rise in social and economic status, sought out monks to teach them the skills they would need to function as civil servants.

The second half of the 20th century has brought a new importance to education as the path to advancement. In village affairs where farmers are coming into contact with new technology—most of it written and requiring a technical sophistication beyond the ken of traditional temple schools—education has taken on a new urgency.

The government has been faced with the massive task of training these young men and women in the shortest time possible. At the same time, it has had to create institutions to teach the specialized skills required by the industry such as engineering, computer technology, environmental engineering, nursing and medicine.

In 1960, only four million children were being educated in government schools. Today more than eight million students are enrolled in government primary and secondary
schools throughout the country. As a result, Thailand can boast an adult literacy rate of over 85 percent. Nearly 80 percent of the population above the age of 11 has had some schooling and nearly 90 percent of children between the ages of seven to ten attend primary school. Table II shows the

**TABLE II**

School Enrollment at Primary and Secondary Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preprimary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Government</td>
<td>3,582,227</td>
<td>5,944,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private schools</td>
<td>310,029</td>
<td>741,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Primary</td>
<td>4,092,256</td>
<td>6,686,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>129,062</td>
<td>653,100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>141,694</td>
<td>303,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Secondary General</td>
<td>270,756</td>
<td>956,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>53,687</td>
<td>105,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>22,423</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Secondary Vocational</td>
<td>76,110</td>
<td>105,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Secondary</td>
<td>346,866</td>
<td>1,062,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,489,762</td>
<td>7,973,216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

increase in primary and secondary school enrollments while Table III shows enrollment increases in universities.

Despite the regional disparities in educational standards and facilities, the teacher-pupil ratio in primary schools has improved dramatically to one teacher for every 32 pupils in the northeast, 28 in the north and 26 in the central and southern regions.

Over the past few years, the government has also made efforts to adapt the educational system to the development needs of the country. Agricultural and technical schools to train extension workers and middle-level technicians have


### TABLE III

**Enrollment in Selected Public Institution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chulalongkorn University</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>11,465</td>
<td>15,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasetsart University</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>5,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahidol University</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>4,329</td>
<td>4,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute of Development Administration</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ram Khamhaeng University</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silpakorn University</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>2,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thammasat University</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>11,703</td>
<td>10,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai University</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>5,447</td>
<td>7,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khon Kaen University</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>2,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince of Songkhla University</td>
<td>Songkhla</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Mongkut Institute of Technology</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>3,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srinakarinviroth University</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,784</td>
<td>21,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** | | 53,467 | 136,263 |

been given priority over many other programmes in the fourth plan. Practical agriculture instruction has been introduced in a number of forms at various levels of schools to bring non-formal vocational education to rural youth have been introduced during the recent plan period.

The fourth plan also emphasized non-formal and vocational planning training to meet the needs of the labour market. Special training services have been devised to provide skills to four main groups: low income groups in urban and rural areas, new labour market entrants, the unemployed whose skills are not in demand in the labour market and the categories of people such as convicts, institutes and prostitutes who require skill to make them active contributors to society (Ref. 5: p. 303).

In the urban areas, apprenticeship and on-the-job training to develop industrial manpower resources is being encouraged. Radio and television are being used as means to
extending non-formal education. They also serve as audiovisual aids for primary and secondary schools.

Small scale, low cost educational projects are also being implemented. Old people are finding new roles as caretakers in child care centers and public libraries.

The total government expenditure on education for the fourth plan period is set at 43,975 million bath. Part of that is being devoted to university education. At present there are 12 universities and 36 teachers colleges in Thailand, three-fourths of them built since 1960. In keeping with a government plan to decentralize education, many universities have been established in provincial centers on a status equal to universities in Bangkok. Thus, besides the long-established Chiang-Mai university, there is the university of Khon Kaen in the Northeast and the prince of Songkhla university in the southern of Pattani, to name a few.

Thailand is one of the founder members of the Asian Institute of Technology whose campus is located 25 miles north of Bangkok. A number of Thai students are receiving postgraduate education in specialized subjects formerly offered only in the western countries.

At present the government is concentrating on full education for all Thais. Now that schools have been established and staffed in the main upcountry villages, efforts are being made to bring education to those living in small, remote villages far from daily contact with provincial centers. Once the educational network has been expanded to reach them, and once the population growth has been curbed to the extent that a set school population has been established, the dream of 100 percent literacy and full-range, specialized education can be realized.
C. LABOR

In accordance with the policy of broadening the base of the economy, the government has been endeavoring to expand the range of employment opportunities. With unemployment checked at five percent, the challenge is to find new jobs for a workforce which is expected to increase at a rate of 2.9 percent per year for the next decade.

In the early 1970s, the urban labor force increased at an annual rate of 7.4 percent or four times faster than the rural labor force increase of 1.8 percent. Unskilled labor in the non-agricultural sectors now accounts for 30 percent of the total working population.

Toward the end of the third plan, urban employment opportunities declined as a result of the withdrawal of the US armed forces. At that point, the rate of urban labor force increase dropped to six percent while that of the rural labor force increased to about two percent.

The problem facing the government is to find employment for urban workers. At the same time it has to create jobs in the countryside to keep the rural population from migrating to Bangkok where they depress the urban labor market by their willingness to work for lower wages. These migrants, some of them farmers seeking off-season jobs and others wanting permanent residence, also add to the urban burden as they require housing and services to accommodate them.

To meet the problem, the fourth plan has placed first priority on rural investment as a means to developing agriculture and creating jobs. Agribusiness industries which process local agricultural produce are the prime areas of concentration.
D. LABOR RELATION

Labor unions were first organized in Thailand after World War 2. Most were in the public utilities sector and state enterprises. Their principal objective was to urge the government to draw up labor legislation to protect the work force [Ref. 6: p. 281].

In 1956, the first comprehensive labor legislation was promulgated. In compliance with the International Labor Organization Convention, the 1956 labor code stipulated the working conditions and structures whereby the workers might form unions and bargain collectively to settle disputes.

In 1965, the trade disputes act was promulgated and in 1972, the labor protection, minimum wage, workman's compensation fund and labor relations decrees were brought into effect. There were limitations in each of these and the government, recognizing this, passed the labor relations act in 1975. The act provided greater freedom to organize unions and initiate action to improve work conditions.

The primary issue at the heart of labor disputes has been that of guaranteed wage increases to offset the rising cost of living. Management has generally responded favorably to workforce initiatives and in most cases, collective bargaining has brought about the desired changes.

The Department of Labor has played a major role in promoting labor relations. Not only has it successfully arbitrated disputes, it has increased the number of unions by educating workers on the benefits of union membership and showing them how to establish their own organizations.

The level of participation in unions, however, remains low. Although there are over 70,000 factories in Thailand, the 168 registered unions had a registered membership of only 80,000 workers in 1979. The number is increasing annually but it will take a great deal more organization before the majority of workers are unionized.
E. THE RURAL-URBAN GAP

Most of the economic growth of the 1960s and early 1970s occurred in the city. As a result, urban areas experienced a rapid increase in prosperity. Because industries were city-based and required large supplies of water and power as well as transportation facilities, the bulk of the government efforts were devoted to massive construction projects to support their growth. Development efforts in the countryside were concentrated primarily on construction of major arterials linking all the provincial centers and to large hydroelectric dams to power the new industries.

The result of the flurry of activity was an unbalanced development. By the 1970s serious disparities had begun to appear between the urban and the rural areas. Differences in income, public services and governmental education and development facilities became more pronounced. With the economic stability of the urban areas assured, the government began to take measures to remedy these disparities and to involve rural Thais more in the development process. This effort was to form the nucleus of the fourth plan.

The fourth plan concentration on rural development was based on several realities. One was the recognition that whatever the eventual extent of its industrialization, Thailand was and would continue to be an agrarian nation. It also recognized that for the nation as a whole to grow no sector could be allowed to lag behind but all had to be developed at a pace equal to that of Bangkok.

Most of Thailand's population is located in the countryside. Agricultural households account for 59 percent of the total households in the country, with rural households in non-agricultural activities totalling 24 percent as against a figure of 18 percent for urban families.
While the number of people in the agricultural sector is much higher per capita income is far lower. Thus, while in 1976, Bangkok incomes averaged 19,154 baht, 34 percent of the total population of Thailand was earning less than 4,000 baht per year. Though per capita figures do not reflect the produce farming families raise to feed themselves and though farm household expenses are much lower than city living costs, the disparity prompted government planners to effect measures to improve the balance.

P. MAINTAINING SOVEREIGNTY

The events of recent years in Indochina, have caused Thailand considerable concern. Two problems which have occupied the government have been insurgency and the large number of refugees who have sought sanctuary in Thailand. Insurgency has been dealt with by a tripartite policy of removing the causes of dissatisfaction, concluding alliances with neighbouring countries and by military containment in sensitive areas.

One of the detrimental effects of the development of the cities was that funds for development were concentrated on the urban areas. The result was that many of the remote areas were neglected. The people, in their sense of abandonment, were amenable to arguments by subversive elements that the government was not interested in their well-being and that more direct action was called for. As a result, a few formed themselves into insurgent bands and began attacking government installations.

The initial government response was a military one but after several years a general recognition of the legitimacy of their claims began to emerge. It was then that a policy of rectifying the reasons for dissatisfaction was adopted.
Many of the complaints centered on the villagers' feeling that they had been left out of the development process. The government's response was to build roads into their areas, bring health care, educational facilities and agriculture improvements to villages. Though the task is far from complete, the policy has reaped considerable success and insurgency has been reduced.

The government has also sought to cement alliances with several countries which had done much to remove the infrastructural support to insurgents in areas in which the government has not yet been able to undertake major development efforts.

For those insurgents that remain, the government has elected to contain them militarily in remote areas. Undertaking frequent campaigns to destroy their bases of operation and thus to weaken them. It is felt that once development projects have been implemented in all parts of the country insurgency will cease.
V. MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

As we saw in previous chapters, organizations depend on and must interact with their external environment in order to survive. Any factor in the environment that interferes with the organization's ability to attract the human and material resources it needs, or to produce and market its services or products, becomes a force for change. Any factor in the internal environment that affects the way the organization carries out its activities is also a force for change.

A. FORCES FOR CHANGE

1. External Forces

There are numerous specific types of external forces for change. Increasing costs and scarcity of natural resources, worker safety, higher levels of education, high interest rates—the list of environmental factors that have changed our lives in recent years goes on. An enormous variety of external forces, from technological advances, can pressure organizations to modify their structure, goals, and methods of operation [Ref. 7: p. 159].

2. Internal Forces

Pressures for change may also arise from a number of sources within the organization, particularly from new strategies, technologies, and subordinate attitudes and behavior. For example, a top administrator's decision to seek a higher rate of long-term growth will affect the goals of many departments and may even lead to some reorganization. The introduction of automated equipment to perform
tasks that previously required human work may call for a complete change in work routines, training programs and compensation arrangements.

External and internal forces for change are often linked. The link is particularly strong when changes in values and attitudes are involved. Persons with new attitudes enter the organization and cause it to change from within.

E. PLANNED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Some changes are unavoidable, but it is important to recognize that many forces act to keep an organization in state of equilibrium. Forces opposing change are also forces supporting stability or in the "status quo".

To understand how pressure for change and pressures for stability interact, we will present a model that describes how the level of behavior or performance in any organization is influenced by forces that push in opposing directions. Other models will show how an organization, department, or individual can be helped to change, and whether an organization is likely to mobilize the energies necessary for successful change.

According to the "force-field" theory of Kurt Lewin, any behavior is the result of an equilibrium between driving and restraining forces (Ref. 8: p. 383). The driving forces push one way, the restraining forces push the other. The performance which emerges is a reconciliation of the two sets of forces. An increase in the driving force might increase performance, but it might also increase the restraining forces.

The natural tendency for most of us, if we want change, is to push. However, the equally natural tendency of whomever or whatever is being pushed is to push back:
Driving forces activate their own restraining forces. Decreasing the restraining forces, therefore, is normally a more effective way.

![Force-Field Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.1 Force-Field Diagram.**

Lewin's model (figure 5.1) reminds us to look for multiple causes of behavior rather than a single cause. It is applicable to our purposes because it is generalized: The forces can be of many types and the behavior or performance can be that of an individual, group, or entire organization. The equilibrium concept also suggests that organizations have forces that keep performance from falling too low, as well as forces that keep it from rising too high.

Programs of planned change are directed toward removing or weakening the restraining forces and toward creating or strengthening the driving forces that exist in organization.

C. THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

Lewin also studied the process of bringing about effective change. He noted that individuals experience two major obstacles to change. First, they are unwilling or unable to
alter long-established attitudes and behavior. An officer who is told that he or she needs to learn a new analytic technique may accept this information with little or no difficulty. But if that same officer is told that he or she is too aggressive and abrasive in dealing with others, the officer is much more likely to resent and reject the information. Suggesting the need to make a change in administrative style or attitude is perceived as violation of one's self-image and an indication of inadequacy.

The second major obstacle noted by Lewin was that change frequently lasts only short time. After a brief period of trying to do things differently, individuals often attempt to return to their traditional pattern of behavior.

To overcome obstacles of this sort, Lewin developed a three-step sequential model of the change process. The model, later elaborated by Edgar H. Schein and others, is equally applicable to individuals, groups, or entire organizations [Ref. 9: p. 155]. It involves "unfreezing" the present behavior pattern, "changing" or developing a new behavior pattern and then "refreezing" or reinforcing the new behavior. See figure 8.2

1. Unfreezing

Unfreezing involves making the need for change so obvious that the individual, group, or organization can readily see and accept it. Unfreezing might be accomplished by introducing new information to pinpoint discrepancies between objectives and current performance, by decreasing the strength of old, inappropriate values, or by demonstrating their lack of effectiveness. To some extent, unfreezing occurs naturally in situations that are sufficiently unsettling, in which established modes of behavior no longer work.
2. Changing

A trained change agent can play a particular valuable role in the development of new behavior patterns. In partnership with organizational members, the changes agent helps create situations in which new values, attitudes, and behaviors will be appropriate and also provides examples of each. These values, attitudes, and behavior are acquired by organization members through the processes of identification and internalization. In identification, organization members identify with the values and attitudes of the change agent, modeling their behavior after that of change agent. In internalization, organization members learn new values, attitudes, and behaviors when they find themselves in situations which require them for effective performance.
3. **Refreezing**

Refreezing means locking the new behavior pattern into place by means of supporting mechanisms. The individual, the group, or organization that has changed experiences the benefits of the new behavior or structure. Praise, rewards, and other reinforcement by upper levels play a large role during the initial stages of refreezing behavior in individuals. More effective performance, when recognized and accepted, served the same purpose on an organizational or group level. Once refrozen, the new behavior pattern becomes the new norm.

**D. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE**

A major obstacle to the implementation of new policies, goals, or methods of operation is the resistance of organization members to change.

1. **Sources of Resistance to Change**

That an outside change agent is often necessary for the success of programs is an indication of how strong such resistance can be. There are three general sources of resistance to change [Ref. 10: p. 107].

a. Uncertainty about the Causes and Effects of Change.

Organization members may psychologically resist change because they wish to avoid uncertainty. Traditional ways of doing things offer precedents that guide members' actions, and the consequences of established procedures are at least well known and predictable. Unwillingness to give up tasks and relationships that are familiar may cause resistance to change. So may realistic anticipation of practical problems such as the need to learn new technology.
b. Unwilling to give up Existing Benefits.

While appropriate change should benefit the organization as a whole, it will not necessarily benefit typesetters replaced by computerized typesetting system. For some individuals, the cost of change in terms of lost power, prestige, salary, quality of work, or other benefits, will not be sufficiently offset by the rewards of change.

c. Awareness of Weakness in the Changes Proposed.

Sometimes organization members will resist change because they are aware of potential problems that have apparently been overlooked by the change initiators. This form of resistance is obviously quite desirable. Different assessments of the situation represent a type of desirable conflict that commanding officers should recognize and use to make their change proposal more effective [Ref. 11: p. 35].

d. Slow Government Reaction

The Thai government has responded slowly to the computer boom.

San Jose Mercury, Monday, March 7, 1983. Bangkok, Thailand—Some Thais, Western-educated and impatient, argue that the boom is being sufficed by a government indifferent to the advantages high technology can offer a developing nation. But anyone capable of seeing the jungle for the palm finds the change barely short of stunning.

In offices where less than five years ago business was recorded in hand-written ledgers and on clattering manual typewriters, the cream-colored boxes and glowing green screens of small computers and word processors are almost commonplace.
In ill-equipped university labs and in leaky stilt houses on the edge of rice paddies, young Thais tinker with integrated circuits and create software in the complex, tonal Thai language.

The new, 32-story headquarters of Bangkok Bank is completely controlled by computer-communications, air conditioning, lights, fire alarms, public address and security systems. And 90 of its 282 branches nationwide are linked by computer etc.

To encourage this increase, several powerful businessmen are pressuring the government to sharply lower import taxes. With hardware taxed at 45% and software at 115%, the price of high-tech products in Thailand are far higher than anywhere else in the region.

Businessmen and academics alike complain that top government leaders have no understanding of what computers can do for Thailand.

"The reason the duties are so high is that they treat hardware like stereos and software like foreign movies—which they are trying to suppress," said Dr. Srisakdi Charoenman, advisor to the president of Bangkok Bank.

"They fail to realize that the real use of computers in Thailand is to maximize our natural resources and our agricultural crops through the most advanced methods of exploration, management, farming and marketing."

Srisakdi, who holds a Ph.D. in computations from Georgia Institute of Technology, said that through the use of technology, "3% of the population in the United States feeds the entire country. But in Thailand, 80% are farmers and they're barely able to meet our needs."

The small community of business leaders at the forefront of Thailand's computer revolution—many of them, like Srisakdi, with U.S. education or experience—believe they can convince the government that long-term gains from
allowing high technology to flow freely into the country will far outweigh short-term tax income.

"The government is incredibly short-sighted," said Dr. Pichai Buranasombat, president of Bangkok Business College. "The people at the top know nothing about computer technology." Pichai, who holds a doctorate from New York University described etc.

Dr. Suriyan Tishyadigama, a lecturer in electrical engineering educated at the University of California at Berkeley, described himself and a handful of colleagues working in small, dusty labs on primitive, hand-made equipment as an "underground" movement.

"The government doesn't take us or our work seriously," Suriyan complained. "So in order to continue our work in microprocessor software we've got to dig into our own pockets to buy equipment."

But his outlook was tinged with optimism. "We feel that if we can produce something entirely indigenous and worthwhile, that the government will begin to take us seriously-and increase our budget," he said etc.

2. **Overcoming Resistance to Change**

Resistance to a change proposal is a signal to commanding officers that something is wrong with the proposal or that mistakes have been made in its presentation. Commanding officers, therefore, must determine the actual causes of resistance and then remain flexible enough to overcome them in an appropriate manner.

Kotter and Schlesinger offer six ways of overcoming resistance to change. Highly situation-dependent, these techniques are discussed below and summarized in Table IV
### TABLE IV
Methods for Dealing Resistance To Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Commonly used when . . .</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Education + Communication</td>
<td>There is a lack of information or inaccurate information and analysis.</td>
<td>Once persuaded, people will often help implement the change.</td>
<td>Can be very time-consuming if many people are involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participation + Involvement</td>
<td>The initiators do not have all the information they need to design the change, and others have considerable power to resist.</td>
<td>People who participate will be committed to implementing change, and any relevant information they have will be integrated into the change plan.</td>
<td>Can be very time-consuming if participants design an inappropriate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Facilitation + Support</td>
<td>People are resisting because of adjustment problems.</td>
<td>No other approach works as well with adjustment problems.</td>
<td>Can be time-consuming, expensive, and still fail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Negotiation + Agreement</td>
<td>Some person or group with considerable power to resist will clearly lose out in a change.</td>
<td>Sometimes it is a relatively easy way to avoid major resistance.</td>
<td>Can be too expensive if it alerts others to negotiate for compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Manipulation + Co-optation</td>
<td>Other tactics will not work, or are too expensive.</td>
<td>It can be a relatively quick and inexpensive solution to resistance problems.</td>
<td>Can lead to future problems if people feel manipulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Explicit + Implicit Coercion</td>
<td>Speed is essential, and the change initiators possess considerable power.</td>
<td>It is speedy and can overcome any kind of resistance.</td>
<td>Can be risky if it leaves people angry with the initiators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Education and Communication.

One of the most obvious ways to overcome resistance to change is to inform people about the planned change and the need for it early in the process. If the need for, and logic of, the change are explained—whether individually to subordinates, to groups in meetings, or to entire organizations through elaborate audiovisual education campaigns—the road to successful change may be smoother.

b. Participation and Involvement

If potential resistors are drawn into the actual design and implementation of the change, it may be better prepared as well as easier to effect. This was confirmed in a classic study by Lester Coch and John French, who found
that resistance to change could be reduced or eliminated by having those involved participate in the design of the change [Ref. 12: p. 512]. Paul Lawrence came to similar conclusions, suggesting that in order to avoid resistance, commanding officers should take into account what he called the social effects of change. For example, change imposed from above is likely to make people feel that their knowledge and skills are being ignored [Ref. 13: p. 4].

c. Facilitation and Support

Easing the change process and providing support for those caught up in it is another way commanding officers can deal with resistance. Retaining programs, allowing time off after a difficult period, and offering emotional support and understanding may help.

d. Negotiation and Agreement

Another technique is negotiation with avowed or potential resisters.

e. Manipulation and Co-optation

Sometimes commanding officers may covertly steer individuals or groups away from resistance to change. They may manipulate workers by releasing information selectively or by consciously structuring the sequence of events. Or they may co-opt an individual, perhaps a key person within a group, by giving him or her a desirable role in designing or carrying out the change process. Aside from the doubtful ethics of such technique, they may also backfire.

f. Explicit and Implicit Coercion

Commanding officers may force people to go along with a change by explicit or implicit threats involving loss of jobs, lack of promotion, and the like.
Commanding officers also dismiss transfer subordinates who stand in the way of change. As with manipulation and co-optation, such methods, though not uncommon, are risky and make it more difficult to gain support for future change effort.

E. APPROACHES TO PLANNED CHANGE

Harold J. Leavitt states that an organization can be changed by altering its structure, its technology, and/or its people [Ref. 14: p. 55]. Changing the organization's structure involves rearranging its internal systems, such as its lines of communication, work flow, or administrative hierarchy. Changing the organization's technology means altering its equipment, engineering processes, research techniques. Changing the organization's people involves changing the selection, training, relationships, attitudes, or roles of organization members. Our main focus will be on change efforts aimed at the people in the organization; in particular, emphasizing on organizational development programs, which attempt to change the ways people work together to achieve the organization's and their own objectives.

1. Interdependence of the Three Approaches.

Organizations are made up of interacting, interdependent elements under the influence of common forces; that is, organizations are systems. The three elements—structure, technology and people—are therefore highly interdependent. A change in one is likely to affect the other elements as well. Thus, an effective change program is likely to be one that acknowledges the interaction of these three elements and attempts to change all three, as necessary. Change programs that focus on only one of the three elements have low chances of success. (see figure III)
2. **Structural Approach**.

According to Leavitt, efforts to bring about organizational developments in structure can be divided into three groups. In the first group are structural changes created through the application of classical organizational design principles. The classical theorists sought to improve the performance of organizations by clearly and carefully defining the job responsibilities of organizations members. They emphasized the creation of appropriate divisions of subordinates and lines of authority.

Changing organizations through decentralization is another structural approach to change. This approach is based on the idea that creating smaller self-contained organizational units will increase the motivation of the members of those units and help them focus their attention.
on the highest priority activities. The intended result is improved performance for each unit. An added advantage of decentralization is that it permits each unit to adapt its own structure and technology to the tasks it performs and to its external environment.

The third structural approach to change aims at improving organizational performance by modifying the flow of work in the organization. This approach is based on the reasoning that proper work flow and grouping of specialties will lead directly to an improvement in productivity and are likely to improve morale and work satisfaction, as well.

3. Technological Approach

Systematic application of the technological approach to change began with the work of Frederick Taylor and his scientific management. Taylor and his followers attempted to analyze and refine the interactions between workers and machines to increase the efficiency in the workplace. Through time and motion studies, setting piece rates, and other efforts to redesign work operations and reward systems, Taylor and later industrial engineers tried to improve organizational performance.

Although technological changes are sometimes introduced into an organization without plans for changing the organizational elements, they are often difficult to implement successfully. A common problem with technological change is that it often proves incompatible with the organization's structure. This incompatibility may create resentment and dissatisfactions among organization members.

a. Combining Technological and Structural Approach

Combined technological and structural approaches to change attempt to improve performance by changing some aspects of both an organization's structure and its technology.
4. People Approaches

Both the technical and structural approaches attempt to improve organizational performance by changing the work situation. They are based on the assumption that creating an appropriate work situation will cause people behavior to become more productive. The people approaches, on the other hand, attempt to change directly the behavior of people by focusing on their skills, attitudes, perceptions, and expectations—so that they will perform more effectively.

![Diagram of Change Approaches]

**Figure 5.4** The Three Change Approaches.

*Figure 5.4 summarizes the change approaches.*
VI. FACTORS AFFECTING ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

A critical analysis of the applicability of OD in the public sector has been developed by Robert T. Golembiewski. This essay entitled "organization development in public agencies: perspectives on theory and practice" illustrates the unique character of the public sector with its legislative and institutional constraints which make it more difficult to achieve OD objectives.

We believe there is much that can be learned from OD efforts in the private sector that has applicability to the public sector. There are a number of important constraints in the public sector that create unique problems relative to the transferability of OD technology.

However, we believe there are important contingencies in the public sector that tend to limit this transferability.

A. DIFFERENT MEASURES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Although relating outcome variables such as profitability, cost reduction, turnover and the like to improvement efforts is difficult in the private sector, the problem is even more substantial in the public sector. Without profit measures in the public sector, the external change agent must learn to adapt to different measures of effectiveness. Organizations such as government agencies, hospitals and schools do not have clear-cut verifiable outputs that lend themselves to objective measurement [Ref. 15: p. 235]. Most public sector organizations are producing a product, largely intangible services, that is not only hard to measure but also restricts quantitative
feedback to the clients. It is simply difficult to demonstrate to the public that a large expenditure for an OD effort is positively related to better public service. Further, without this specific feedback from objective measurements, it may be harder for the OD consultant to facilitate adaptive behavior by the organizational participants.

Thus, a major challenge to improvement efforts in the public sector is to develop and refine hard measures of organizational effectiveness [Ref. 16: p. 35]. Examples of possible effectiveness measures for public organizations would be the level of a graduating high school class, on-time missions at an airforce base, or the state of combat readiness of an army combat unit.

E. REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS AND DIFFUSION OF POWER

In the private sector, the chief executives tend to be the focus power in the organization and the external change agent can better evaluate their need awareness and commitment to the objectives of the OD program. Although coordination and management of the OD program is difficult in the private sector, there is often even greater difficulty in the public sector because chief executives, in many cases, have limited power due to a complex system of checks and balances which make it more difficult to make commitments on long-range programs. "This difference is the traditions and/or law that require governments to define their organization structure in detail by statute. Thus, when a major change is desired, it must be done through the political process..." and effecting change through the legislative and political processes requires strategies that are different from the private sector [Ref. 17: p. 448].
Inflexible and cumbersome budgeting processes in the public sector may restrict the options of chief executives. How money is budgeted and appropriated is determined by legislative action. An OD proposal may require up to two years for coordination, staffing, and approval through designated budget channels. By the time the review process is complete, the original need awareness by the key officials of the organization for an OD program may have changed and/or there may have been major turnover in the executive ranks.

C. CONDITIONING OF EXECUTIVES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR.

Chief executives in the public sector are conditioned during their career to favor management styles that maximize sources of downward control owned by subordinates. Public executives are conditioned, by the time they become middle or top managers, to follow the smallest detail of legislation, policies, rules, and procedures. In addition to progress upward in a public institution, the executives must indicate a melding of attitudes to fit the particular agency affiliation. While this phenomenon is not unique to the public sector, the problem is intensified there. The dysfunctional consequences of this mass-conditioning process are attitudes by top executives that may be incongruent with the OD objectives of increasing the level of self and group responsibility in the decision-making process. An OD intervention must then include this factor in its strategy.

D. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC SECTOR

The formal structure of the executive establishment is similar to the classic western prototype. Official responsibilities are ranged hierarchically in a highly centralized pyramid of authority; functions and jurisdictions are
delineated in a European-style ministry structure. Within thirteen ministries at the time of this writing and at the office of the council of ministers, virtually all regular government activities are consolidated. Military, police, and judicial functions are administered by the ministries of defense, interior, and justice, respectively. Only six administrative agencies which perform minor functions remain outside the ministries.

At the apex of the hierarchy is the council of ministers. Individually, as head of their respective ministries, and collectively as the cabinet, the ministers determine national policy and direct the machinery of administration. The prime minister has frequently retained for himself one or more key ministerial posts in addition to the position of premier. In the latter capacity, he is aided by various staff agencies located in the office of the council of ministers. The staff resources of this office have recently been augmented significantly by the transfer to it of the budget function previously located in the ministry of finance.

Internally, each ministry is organized in the conventional pattern of departments, divisions, and sections, the hierarchical status of organization units is particularly significant because of the prevailing system of personnel classification, under which the organizational level of a position, rather than specific duties, determines the incumbent's civil service grade and salary. The hierarchical level of all governmental units consequently must be clearly identified. For this reason, agencies established outside the ministries generally have been equivalent to that of departments. This also generates pressure for elevating the organizational status of units and sometimes results in structural anomalies. Thus, within the council of ministers, which has the status of a ministry, two subdivisions also have ministry status.
Most ministries are of the holding-company type containing a wide variety of public functions. Within these major subdivisions of government are approximately three-score departments. The latter are the primary units of fiscal, personnel, and program management. Budgetary and organizational coherence is achieved mainly at the department level. On major policy matters; however, the department head (director-general) is guided by the desires of his superiors. General administrative rules are similarly issued as ministry regulations with cabinet approval. Auxiliary services are centralized within the major subdivisions. In each ministry a separate department, and within each department a separate division provide central administrative "housekeeping" facilities for the parent unit. In recent years, rudimentary staff organs have also appeared at the ministry and department levels.

An important share of the government's operations is entrusted to the incorporated government enterprises. Operationally independent of the regular executive establishment are a large number of "government organizations" which operate utilities, commercial and industrial enterprises and other types of business. These units receive their initial capital and other subventions from the government's capital budget, and are expected, in turn, to remit profits to the national treasury. In recent years the Thai government has relied heavily on these organizations for the conduct of economic development undertakings at present, approximately 150 such corporations administer a wide variety of enterprises, ranging from the state railways to the manufacture and distribution of glass, lacquerware, tobacco, and batteries. The decrees establishing these organizations place responsibility for each in one of the ministries. In practice; however, the enterprises exempted from the civil service laws and regular budgetary procedures are substantially independent of ministry control.
Local administration in the territorial subdivisions of the kingdom is carried on mainly by officials of the central government. Officers of the ministry of interior administer the 71 regions and approximately 450 districts into which the country is divided. A measure of local self-government is possessed by the municipalities established under national law. These have their own elective officials and civil service, but are supervised by the ministry of interior and are variously dependent upon the central government for financial support. Some decentralization of administrative authority has been effected in recent years; but only a limited measure of local self-determination has been achieved.

E. THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Thailand's public service is a product of the combined influences of foreign example, the immediate political environment, and the changing values of a rapidly modernizing society. Western concepts and techniques of personnel management are elaborated in legislation and rules governing the public service. For over a quarter century, the career service has been based on a modern civil service system. Throughout the mutations in forms of government and changes in political leadership the apparatus of a permanent professional administrative officialdom has been preserved. Indeed, the firmly established bureaucracy is one of the most stable institutions in the changing Thai society. As in numerous other countries grouping toward a viable constitutional order, the public service is in some respects still a captive of the regime. But unlike that of other revolutionary regimes, it is not directly involved in the power struggle. In the course of modern political development, Thailand's successive governments have permitted the public service to retain its separate institutional identity.
The bureaucracy's role in Thai government is unobtrusively influential. Thai administrators possess little discretionary power. They perform their tasks under close executive direction—even on matters within their legal competence. Ranking career officials are likely, for various reasons, to seek a decision from political executives. In the formulation of national policies, upper-level civil servants perform as the major source of expertise and rational standards for program development and policy determination. To a degree significantly beyond that of western bureaucracies, the higher civil service in Thailand must provide such guidance. The devolution of such responsibility to career service is dictated by various factors. In the absence of effectively independent interest groups, professional organization, or academic resources, program ideas and plans originate almost exclusively within the public sector. Inside the government, considerable dependence on the permanent corps of government official is necessitated by political instability and the resulting rotation of ministers. Moreover, the nation's commitments to modernization heighten dependence of political officials on the expertise of the civil service. Which possesses virtually a monopoly of competence in the civil affairs of government. In 1957, thirteen of the fourteen ministers in the cabinet were military men.

The public service is a profession of great prestige. The earlier tradition of respect for government officials serving the king continues to confer eminent, though not undiminished, status upon the modern constitutional bureaucracy. In modern Thailand, politics and the public service have constituted the principal vehicles of social ascendency. Thus officials in upper levels of the career service possess high social status. Over the years, careers in the government have attracted the vast majority of college
educated Thai. Until fairly recently, the sparsity of opportunity for professional livelihood outside the government offered few alternatives. In the past few years, increasing numbers of graduates have been attracted to more remunerative careers in the expanding areas of industrial and commercial employment.

1. The National Civil Service

The national civil service system is comprehensive in scope, embracing all ministries, the field service, and all career positions, including in addition to administrative employees, teachers, professors, judges, military officers, and police officials. All positions in the regular service below the rank of deputy minister are covered by provisions of the civil service laws. Only officials of governmental enterprises and of the autonomous municipalities are excluded.

2. Personnel Management

Under the civil service act, personnel management is entrusted to a series of ex-officio commission-type units composed of ranking officials at each level of the hierarchy. The act provides for a centralized review of personnel practices by a national civil service commission. This agency, headed by the prime minister, and composed of ministry representatives, promulgates government-wide civil service rules. Equipped with a small staff, it is legally responsible for supervising ministry practices. In each ministry, personnel actions are under the control of a civil service subcommission composed of the minister, his deputy, undersecretaries and the department heads. Similar staff units serve each the departments, and in each of the provinces a subcommission composed of the provincial governor and his principal subordinates is responsible for civil service matters in the field service.
Despite the legal authority given the central civil service commission, control over personnel management is largely decentralized; the ministries and department heads retain substantial operating independence in civil service matters. Classification, selection, promotion, and discipline are conducted by the ministries nominally subject to the policies and review of the commission. The latter's supervisory role, however, is impaired by various political and administrative limitations on its independence. Political pressures may compel concessions to the ministries in important instances. Deficiencies in organization and staffing of the commission also curtail its influence. In such matters as exceptions to classification or compensation rules, the commission's power to grant or withhold approval gives it considerable authority. However, much of its work consist of procedural routines and a rather perfunctory review of ministry personnel actions.

3. **Rank Classifications**

Under the system of rank classification alluded to earlier, all positions in the regular civil service are classified simply by hierarchical level and the equivalent grade rank. Only five position levels and grades are employed, corresponding to the relatively small number of organizational levels of the hierarchy. The grade and salary received by officials is thus dependent on their organizational level rather than on their duties. There is no separate classification for professional or technical positions under civil service regulations and orders; various categories of such positions are equated to particular hierarchical posts and are assigned the same grade rank as the latter. The standard grades are also employed in the military and judicial services; positions in the latter are similarly assigned grades comparable to those of
the regular civil service. Thus the career ladder follows hierarchical lines. Advancement in rank both for generalists and specialists is obtained only by promotion to supervisory posts at the next higher level of the organization.

4. Recruitment

As in many other non-western civil service systems, the qualifications for various positions in Thailand's public service are based largely on educational attainment. Admission, placement, and salary are geared to the degree and areas of formal education. In the Thai public service, two career pyramids are differentiated by educational requirements. University graduates (including doctors, engineers, and other professionals) begin their careers as third-grade officials and may aspire to the highest administrative level of a ministry. Those who have completed only secondary school enter the service as fourth-grade officers and have limited advancement prospects. Particular specializations in college training are required for posts in the various fields of government service. In the universities, all of which are public institutions, the several faculties train students for careers in specific ministries. Officials of the latter frequently serve as part-time instructors in the related faculties, and curricula are fitted to civil service examination. Possession of the bachelor's degree is required for entrance to the service as a third grade official. A postgraduate degree entitles the holders to a higher salary step within grade.

Recruitment normally is confined to positions in the two lowest grades; posts at higher levels are almost always filled by promotion. The grade distribution for the entire service has a broad base and a very narrow apex. Officials in the lowest rank comprise approximately 85 per cent of the public service; less than 2 per cent occupy the two highest
grades. Typically, the official's career is confined to a single ministry. As a result of the political separatism within the government, inter-ministry transfers are rare.

Recruitment is carried on directly by the ministries and departments under uniform rules and standards established by the civil service commission. The rules require the use of open competitive examinations for selection. Under regular procedure, applicants for fourth grade positions sit for a written test of general knowledge and clerical work, supplemented by an oral test.

5. Promotion Procedures

Promotion procedures permit executives even broader discretion. Although some type of formal examination is legally required for advancement, in practice, promotion is the prerogative of superiors. The examination is often perfunctory. Advancement to the second and first grade is obtained on the recommendation of the department head or the ministry under secretary and the approval of the ministry civil service subcommission. Advancement to the next higher rank may be achieved even in the absence of a position vacancy when an official reaches the salary bracket of the higher rank through merit salary increments. The special grade is conferred by the cabinet on recommendation of the minister. For the vast majority of civil servants, progress up the career ladder is largely contingent on the support of department or ministry heads.

6. Salary Scales

Civil service salaries consist of a base pay plus a cost-of-living allowance, both of which are legally prescribed for all grades and for the several steps within each grade. General increases of salary schedules have been effected by raising the cost-of-living allowance rather than
the base pay; as a result of successive revisions, the cost-of-living increment now constitutes the major portion of the civil servant's salary. Annual merit increases, which are virtually automatic, normally consist of salary advancement to the next step-within-grade. But the minister may approve an increase of more than one step for special reasons.

Current salary scales are quite generally acknowledged to be seriously inadequate, particularly since inflation has decreased real wages. The beginning salary for a university graduate entering the service as a third-grade official is insufficient for a reasonably adequate standard of living. Salaries of government employees are supplemented by rather considerable prerequisites. Numerous "fringe benefits" include hospital care, education allowances for one's children tuition in private schools, eligibility for public housing, generous leave privileges, and competitive opportunity for civil service scholarships abroad. A relatively liberal retirement and disability pension scheme is also an important attraction of the public service. After thirty years of service, an official may retire on three-fifths of his current salary. But these additional benefits of government employment do not, of course, compensate for inadequate salaries. "Numerous employees in the lower ranks seek additional outside employment to sustain a decent standard of living. The low income levels of civil servants and inequities in the pay differentials of lower ranks are widely regarded as a major cause of discontent and corruption in the public service."

The Thai civil service has been subjected to certain legal disabilities of public employment similar to those in American practice. Office holding in a political party, participation in campaigns, and public demonstration of support or opposition to candidates has been banned by
cabinet order. This restriction has been conspicuously ignored; however, in the case of political activity supporting the party in the power.

7. **Discipline.**

An elaborate system of civil service discipline is provided for by law. The civil service act lists specific types of prescribed conduct, and specifies the penalties, ranging from reprimand to expulsion, for infractions. The responsibility for disciplinary action is lodged with supervisory officials under rules promulgated by the national civil service commission. The latter also reviews all discipline case; but such reviews are confined to a check on the propriety of the procedure followed and the penalty imposed.

Disciplinary measures are applied sparingly. Higher officials are notably reluctant to take such action against erring subordinates, and when they do invoke such measures, they are likely to impose inordinately mild penalties. Minor offenses are often dealt with simply threats to withhold annual merit increases. Yet a total of 2,519 cases was reported in 1957. The majority of these involved local government officials. Where gross misconduct involves violation of the criminal code, the case is turned over to the prosecution department for legal action.

Disciplined civil servants have no recourse to the courts or to the civil service commission. They may appeal disciplinary action only to higher executive officials. Cases involving minor penalties may be submitted only to the next higher level of the hierarchy. In actions entailing removal from the service. The ousted official is authorized to appeal to the prime minister. But these rights of appeal are infrequently invoked.
VII. PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

In the Thai public service, both career aspirations and professional satisfaction are encumbered by limitations of the political and administrative system. Constant insecurity and recurrent frustration condition the perspectives and performance of ambitious and conscientious administrative officials. The most conspicuous problems of the public service result from the shortcomings of personnel policy, the political subversion of the merit system, and the numerous obstacles to effective performance of official tasks.

Major weaknesses in the organization and standards of the career service have been noted earlier. Inequalities and inadequacies in the classification and pay structures generate understandable dissatisfaction. Gross disparities in work loads and responsibilities at comparable grade levels unfairly penalize devoted subordinates. Discontent is heightened by the limited range of career opportunities. Since promotion normally is obtainable only by elevation to a supervisory post, advancement prospects are severely curtailed, although the proliferation of subdivisions incident to the recent expansion of government service has improved the situation in recent years. Horizontal mobility is similarly limited. Transfers to other ministries are rare, generally confining the individual's career to a single ministry in which he enters the service.

The most debilitating set-backs to an effective civil service system in Thailand are doubtless the numerous incursions of political and personnel favoritism. Legal subterfuges and extra-legal arrangements frequently
circumvent elaborately prescribed procedures for protecting the merit system in placement, promotion, and other personnel actions. Ubiquitous partisanship is a dominant fact of life in Thai public service. Although considerable professionalization of the service has been achieved, the career opportunities of the civil servant are subject to capricious political and personal influences. Recurrent subversion of the merit principle through evasion and contravention of the civil service law and rules have stunted the growth of protective traditions.

Job security for the vast majority of officials, nevertheless, has been assured up to now by the steadily expanding need for the limited number of trained personnel. But the sizeable current increase in university-educated aspirants to careers in the government has already intensified the pressure on civil service placement. Although a decline in public esteem has toppled the public service from its former heights of prestige, it remains for various reasons the career objective of the majority of college students.

Within the service, career advancement generally requires the personal support of superiors or the political leverage of influential relatives or friends. Such support is also essential to obtaining preferred assignments. Favored officials may obtain normally difficult transfers to other ministries for the purpose of advancement. In some instances, political executives may arrange through collusion for a temporary transfer of such officials to a higher-level post in another service—such as the police—with subsequent return in grade to the original ministry.

Favoratism is particularly conspicuous at the top levels of the departments and ministries where it has induced the close identification of political and administrative officials. Many civil service posts at these levels are
allocated as a reward for partisan loyalty and service. Tenure in these positions; however, is consequently somewhat precarious. A change of regime is likely to result in the removal of incumbents who are out of favor with the new leadership, or whose position is needed for another with a stronger claim of reward. In these cases the salaries of incumbents are not terminated. Replaced officials may be transferred, pensioned, or simply attached to the ministry or department without portfolio. Nor is the rotation generally government-wide. Typically, only a few crucial posts are affected initially; additional displacement takes over a long period. Thus the transfer of power following the 1957 coup d'etat resulted in the immediate replacement of only a small number of department heads, mainly in police, public relations, and army departments. Such practices, it should be noted, constitute forceful pressure for the creation of additional positions and the continuing expansion of the civil service.

The politically inspired removal of career officials is generally a threat only to those occupying top-ranking posts. But at all levels the opportunities and enrollments of civil servants are subject to uncertainties stemming from other deficiencies of the system. An individual's reclassification or promotion, however meritorious, may depend on the influence his department head or minister can bring to bear at the particular time on the civil service commission or the ministry of finance. Thus progress up the career ladder and other rewards are sometimes contingent not only on the inclination but on the varying ability and influence of the respective agency heads. Legal entitlement to certain prerequisites provides no assurance these will be received. Budgetary stringencies may result in the denial of merit salary increases in a particular ministry, or in the suspension of housing or other fringe benefits. Such
uncertainties exact a high toll of insecurity and anxiety despite a cultural predisposition against disquietude.

On the job, the civil servant’s professional stake in effective administrative performance is jeopardized by the vagaries in public policy, operating standards, and political leadership. The oppressive weight of operating difficulties stifles initiative, dissipates energies, and frustrates the hopes of conscientious careerists.

Inconstancy and ambiguity in programs and policies envelops administrative objectives and criteria in a fog of uncertainty. At best, the brief tenure of ministers gives rise to frequent change in ministry policy and direction. In the absence of a binding rule the law, the characteristic particularism and individualism of the Thai culture have free reign in the sphere of public administration. Standards of law enforcement are variable and subjective. Established rules may yield to prerogative in particular cases where political executives choose to side-step existing policy.

The sense of direction administrators entrusted with the development and implementation of government programs is similarly blunted by a lack of clarity and continuity in national goals. Consensus on such goals is impeded by the impermanence of governments and the divergent purposes of various elements within the politically fragmented leadership. Although economic development is espoused as a long-range objective, the formulation of a national economic plan has been handicapped by the competing claims of various sectors of the government for alternative development schemes.

Lacking dependable operating guideposts, civil servants cautiously feel their way, divining purpose from the immediate and often personal objectives of their superiors. The values of consistency and predictability in administration
determinations are subordinated to the necessities of improvisation. Professional norms yield to the contingent standards of transient political direction. For the ambitious, program enthusiasms are realistically tempered by personal career aspirations. The fluidity of policy and power discourage lasting personal commitments to either policy goals or particular political leaders.

For a small but growing number of achievement-oriented careerists, and particularly the western-trained contingents, such conditions pose difficult professional problems. The waywardness and feebleness of political superiors subject these officials to continuing disappointment and frustration. The strain of reconciling unstable and unsound policy direction with high administrative standards is evident in the exasperated complaints of civil servants. The floundering of successive governments in crisis situations has aggravated such concerns. Among these officials, the cultural tradition of respect for superiors has been seriously impaired. While the superficial forms of obsequious deference are retained the disaffection of responsible civil servants in a significant sector of the bureaucracy is unmistakable.

But discontented officials have virtually no recourse to means of alleviating the situation. Overt disagreement or pressure for change would be futile as well as disrespectful. Resignation is scarcely feasible in view of the limited employment alternatives. Discontent sometimes finds expression in more discreet and subtle forms. Aggrieved civil servants occasionally communicate complaints to political leaders or press in the form of anonymous letters. But, typically, the professional disappointments and dismay of administrators are suffered in silence. The result; however, is a noticeable tension in the ranks of the numerous disaffected.
A. THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PUBLIC

The subservient character of the Thai bureaucracy's role in government has been noted earlier. Confinement of the civil service to such a role is assured by both official instruments of control and unofficial mechanisms of restraint. The bureaucracy's accountability is enforced mainly by legal sections, executive controls, and the social system.

Formal legal controls are imposed on the exercise of administrative authority by constitutional and statutory strictures. The constitution explicitly prohibits any governmental restraint imposed by other than legally exercised authority. The citizen's right to sue the government for acts of its officials is specially guaranteed, excepting only the king from the legal process. Government agencies and officials are thus subject to prosecution for illegal conduct or accidentally damages. Jurisdiction over such cases is entrusted to the regular law courts, as in the anglo-american system. A substantially independent judiciary is available to the citizens for the enforcement of their rights against illegal or arbitrary official action. Interference by the government in cases before the courts is relatively rare.

These legal remedies, however, are seldom sought by private citizens. For various reasons, the latter are reluctant to file suits against government officials to restrain illegal administrative action. Such reluctance may be attributed in part to the persistence of the traditional absolutist conception of government exemption from legal process; in part it is doubtless due also to the costliness and delays of litigation. Court action against the government is confined almost exclusively to suits by foreign commercial firms. Individuals victimized by illegal or
arbitrary action sometimes informally report the case to higher officials with the hope that the latter will undertake prosecution under the criminal code. In cases of property or personal damage, the citizen typically accepts an out-of-court settlement and cash payment.
**VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

In this chapter, the possible solutions from the author's point of view concerning the organization development for use of developing the organization in the public sector are discussed.

In the previous chapter we have seen the barriers that caused the development of the public sector to move slowly and ineffectively. By considering these carefully we will know which conflicts are most likely among the systems and their interrelationships.

**A. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR MACROSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT**

In the intrasystem, OD reduces in practice to work with small units and even individuals, so does macrosystem work reduce largely to intergroup activities. The OD consultant assists members from different systems to understand the effects of intersystem stereotyping, competition, communication and eventually assisting to build collaboration based upon new images held by each system of the other. Without these clarifications in regard to goals and intentions a superordinate system could well inhibit intentions of a subordinate system to modify its efforts of a subordinate system to modify its procedures. For example, line officers as noted earlier, holding an image of personnel favoritism could continue to expect behaviors of that type.

A description of macrosystem that could be applied using with Thai's organization is that:

"The use of social science interventions both within and between the systems which clarify intersystem perceptions and relationships so that subsequent collaboration will be facilitated."

75
E. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL CHANGE

A requisite for macrosystem OD is that the consultant be constantly aware that his primary client system does not exist in isolation. It should focus on both internal system dynamics and intersystem dynamics and call attention to those areas that need to be worked on in order that the various systems can accomplish their objectives without interference and with as much synergy as possible.

1. **Start with the Felt Need and at the Level of System Readiness.**

Some OD consultants refuse to begin with the client organization unless they can start at the top, and usually with a diagnostic-feedback procedure. In macrosystem work, however, this principle may have to bend a little. Among sets of systems it may not be readily ascertained as to which constitutes the top. More important may be the understanding of how influence is exerted on a specific issue, or the ways in which coalitions are formed to achieve common goals.

2. **Working with Administrators Who See Favorable to Plan Change**

An important guideline that would benefit all change agents in the development of strategy is the principle of working with the people in the organization who are supportive of change and improvement, rather than working against those who are defensive and resistant.

As described earlier, the most conspicuous problems of personnel in the Thai's public service result from the shortcomings of administrative policy. Inconsistency and ambiguity in programs and policies envelope administrative objectives and criteria in a fog of uncertainty. In order to
overcome these problems, OD consultants should set their programs in clear relationship to stated objectives to induce administrators to create and clarify the specific objectives of the organization and show the importance of those objectives affecting the organization.

A major weakness in the organization and standards of career service, as noted earlier, is the inequality and inadequacy in the classification and pay scale structures which generate dissatisfaction among subordinates. Gross disparities in work loads and responsibilities at comparable grade levels unfairly penalize devoted subordinates. In the role of OD consultant, one should try to address of this situation as fast as possible. Inequalities in pay and workloads cause a major problems among subordinates. The subordinates who lack energy and aspiration to work cause the organization to develop with a snail’s pace. Administrators may not realize about the degree of dissatisfaction among subordinates. Consequently, OD programs should facilitate the ability of the administrator to analyze and to solve problems.

If we consider the promotion system we will often see that discontent among subordinates is heightened by the limited range of career opportunities. Since promotion normally is obtainable only by elevation to supervisory posts and advancement prospects are severely curtailed, favorism is particularly conspicuous at the top levels of the departments and ministries. Many civil service posts at these levels are allocated as a reward for partisan loyalty and service. Within the service, career advancement generally requires the personal support of superiors or the political leverage of influential relatives or friends. In order to get rid of favorism, OD consultants should try to induce commanding or chief executive officers to create the standard or criteria used as a tool to consider subordinate’s promotion with equality everyone.
As discussed in chapter 5, administrators now lack new technological knowledge causing resistance within the organization. This is the case of computer technology in Thailand. OD programs for the readiness of administrators should include training in high technology at least to the point of educated familiarity. It will help the administrator understand the importance of new technology to improve his own organization.

3. Subordinates.

In order to follow the new technologies of the world, subordinates in the organization should have an adequate standard of education and training. OD consultants should develop strategies of learning the new technology and motivate subordinates to have aspiration in working. Their role is more of facilitator than action manager.

As discussed in chapter 7, the number of western-trained careerists disappointed and frustrated in the unstable and unsound policy array is growing. Among these officials, the cultural tradition of respect for superiors has been seriously impaired. These young officers are trying to cut from the public sector to find jobs that promise better position and higher salaries for them. The OD consultant should work with them to promote their energy to work and to talk about the advantage of improvement in their organization in the future.

4. Intrasystem Development

After working with commanding officers and subordinates, OD consultants (in the author's opinion) should create opportunities for both of the groups so as to discuss the conflicts and determine their paths to common goal for the organization.
As stated in chapter 7, discontented officials have virtually no direct recourse to means of alleviating the situation. Discontent sometimes find expression in discreet and subtle forms. Aggrieved subordinates occasionally complain to political leaders or press in the form of anonymous letters.

The program of OD consultant should set the confrontation of the commanding officers and subordinate so as to state the objective of the organization, get rid of discontent feeling among them and solve the conflict at hand. This program of the intrasystem intervention should be try frequently. This process may consume time but consequent results will create understanding between subordinates and administrators and it will alleviate the tension in the subordinates too.

C. INTERSYSTEM PROBLEM SOLVING

In this way the overall effort has reached out into neighboring systems, particularly command units, at a time when they are ready. It has taken time to get to this point. In retrospect, it is doubtful that intersystem work could have been seen relevant any earlier.

In this type of change the distance between the original problem and the final solution is connected by a chain of events, with each event forging the next decision, which then becomes an event for the subsequent link, and so on from the beginning problem to a completely unanticipated final result.

1. OD Consultant and Intersystems.

In order to accomplish solving the problems in the macrosystem, OD consultants of every system should work together so as to find out the common criteria in use for
developing overall systems. The purpose of working together is focused on problems due to the lack of knowledge about the intricacies of the organizational culture and the system relationships. OD consultants, from the author's opinion, should provide time to meet occasionally and plan their own strategy.

2. **Intersystem among Top Administrators**

After OD consultants have the chance to set the common standards of procedure to develop system interventions, top administrators of the system should have programs to work with consultants.

The administrators should have common programs to discuss their own problems occurred in the system and interchange ideas of how to solve problems and how to develop the organization. It is essential that the top administrator attend the workshops and training too.

D. **EXPECT RESISTANCE AND BE PREPARED TO MEET IT.**

The larger the system, the more probable it is that there will be a number of people present for any specific intervention who do not understand why they are there and who, if they did understand, would prefer not to be. More important were the ethical issues involved. Our broad-spectrum solution has been to maintain complete openness regarding our goals and to offer participants the option of abstaining from participation if they chose. With increasing support from intrasystem and intersystems, the hostility has been reduced.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS

In the author's view there is an insufficient number of organization development consultants who are trained to work within the public sector in Thailand. Because of the formidable effects of culture and tradition it seems imperative that OD consultants be Thai, themselves. While westerners might mean well they would all too easily be put off by cultural factors.

1. It is recommended that Thai consultants be trained locally by outside consultants who would remain to be "shadow consultants" to the Thai.

2. It seems wise to draw upon the experiences of other development efforts. What is happening in Korea, Philippines and Indonesia might not work in Bangkok. On the other hand it might be modified and be made more useful than what one would find in New York or the Pentagon.

3. Someone should record the history of the use of OD in Thailand. The work of everyone in the OD field would be enriched by being told the history of OD in Thai organizations. Further research is needed to verify what parts of OD are paracultural.
LIST OF REFERENCES


BIBLIOGRAPHY


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Distribution List</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Defense Technical Information Center&lt;br&gt;Cameron Station&lt;br&gt;Alexandria, Virginia, 22314</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Library, Code 0142&lt;br&gt;Naval Postgraduate School&lt;br&gt;Monterey, California, 93940</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Department Chairman, Code 54&lt;br&gt;Department of Administrative Sciences&lt;br&gt;Naval Postgraduate School&lt;br&gt;Monterey, California, 93940</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Professor R. A. McGonigal, Code 54d&lt;br&gt;Department of Administrative Sciences&lt;br&gt;Naval Postgraduate School&lt;br&gt;Monterey, California 93940</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Professor J. W. Creighton, Code 54c&lt;br&gt;Department Of Administrative Sciences&lt;br&gt;Naval Postgraduate School&lt;br&gt;Monterey, California 93940</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Lt. Jg. P. Wathanaronchai&lt;br&gt;75 Scii Bearing, Sukumvit 107&lt;br&gt;Bangna, Bangkok 10260&lt;br&gt;Thailand</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Personnel Department&lt;br&gt;Royal Thai Navy, Headquarters&lt;br&gt;Archamanin Road, Bangkok&lt;br&gt;Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>