The Madras Army in the Northern Circars, 1832-1833 Pacification and Professionalism

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ABSTRACT

The Madras Army in the 1830's was a professional military force whose use in internal security campaigns was a routine part of the Madras Presidency Government's operations. The Army, supported by the civil administration, handled this campaign as a routine matter. The sources for this study are the consultations of the Madras Government, other records of the East India Company, private papers, and contemporary printed works.

The Madras Government's objectives were: collecting revenue, dispensing justice as they defined it, and maintaining tranquility. This Government was authoritarian and highly centralized while permitting and demanding initiative on the part of its civil and military servants. To achieve the Government's objectives the civil and military agencies supported one another closely.

The Madras Army was a large, modern (for the 1830's), military force organized to defend the state against external and internal enemies. This Army was professional in the sense of being composed of men who spent their adult lives as soldiers and who were consciously trying to improve the military efficiency of the Army based on their experience. The British officers were aware of the strengths and weaknesses inherent in a multi-ethnic army which could not appeal to patriotism. The Madras Army deliberately attempted to overcome the weaknesses through such programs as encouraging the study of Asian languages by the British officers and providing paternalistic care for the sepoys and their families.

The Madras Army was organized to support the civil administration in securing the revenue and maintaining tranquility. The 1832-1833 campaign in the Vishakhapatnam District included from four to eight hundred troops in the field pursuing two rebel factions, the largest reported group of
which numbered seven to eight hundred. Anytime the troops brought the rebels to battle, the superior discipline and training of the Madras Army produced a victory. Courts martial sentenced thirty-five rebels to death. Six were actually hung.

Such campaigns were a normal part of the process of governing India for the British. The image of passive Indians accepting British rule except in the Mutiny and other minor, isolated instances until Indian Nationalism erupted after World War I is untrue.
THE MADRAS ARMY IN THE
NORTHERN CIRCARS, 1832-1833

Pacification and Professionalism

by

Lorenzo Mayo Crowell, Jr.

Department of History
Duke University

Date: 
Approved:

Theodore Ropp, Supervisor

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
History in the Graduate School
of Duke University

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ABSTRACT

(History - South Asian Military)

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PREFACE

Where possible I have used the English spellings of place names as they appear on modern maps. I have not changed the spellings in titles of published works or manuscripts. It is not practical at this point to change the Anglicization of the names of the South Asians involved in this case study. I have used the spellings which appear most often in the original documents.

The debts I have accumulated in accomplishing this work are staggering. I owe the deepest thanks to Professors Theodore Ropp and John F. Richards of Duke University who guided me in launching the study, encouraged me to persevere, read the drafts, and did everything else one could ask of advisors. Without attempting to follow the systematic approach to research and writing taught by Professor I.B. Holley, Jr., also of Duke University, I would never have finished this dissertation. Without being nominated for an Air Force sponsored graduate program by Brigadier General Alfred Hurley now of North Texas State University, I could not have started this dissertation.

The bulk of the sources I have used are in the holdings of the India Office Library and Records in London. The staff there was most gracious and helpful to a visiting American in a big hurry. I wish to thank Mr. Martin I. Moir, particularly, for his help and time.

This study started in the Manuscript Division of the William R. Perkins Library at Duke University. The entire Perkins Library staff is oriented to helping their students at whatever level. Over the years, I received particularly needed help from Dr. Mattie Russell, Mr. William R.
Erwin, Mr. Emerson Ford, Jr., Mr. Avinash C. Maheshwary, Miss Gertrude Merritt, and Mr. Elvin Stroud.

When I arrived in London, Thomas Tulenko took the time to initiate me to the mysteries of reader's cards and all the other pitfalls of starting research in that marvelous place. Without his guided tours of research facilities and other important establishments, I would have lost many precious hours. From London I brought many hours of tape recorded notes, Mrs. Evelyne Skopp faithfully transcribed these tapes into useable notes.

My fellow graduate students at Duke University have been a great source of stimulation and support. In particular this manuscript has benefitted from the attention of Joseph Caddell, Dr. John Hume, and Dr. Edward Haynes.

At the Air Force Academy, two visiting civilian professors have given of their time to read and critique my drafts. I wish to thank Professor John M. Thompson of Dartmouth College and Professor Edward M. Coffman of the University of Wisconsin for their help and encouragement.

At the last moment, I gave up trying to produce the final manuscript myself. Mrs. Joy Sanderson of Executive Office Service undertook the task despite my unreasonable time limit.

My greatest debt is, of course, to my best friend and wife, Marianne. In the time I have written one dissertation she has borne four children, moved twice, and supported me. She insists that I note that five year old Anna and two year old Ruth have frequently exhorted their father to finish.

Any errors of fact or interpretation are mine alone.

L.M.C.
Palmer Lake, Colorado
November, 1982
INTRODUCTION

The Madras Army in the 1830's was a professional military force essential to the normal operation of the Madras Presidency Government. The Government's definition of normal operation included maintaining order internally and collecting taxes without using the regular troops of the Madras Army. The reality of the situation, however, was that internal security campaigns by the Army were part of the Government's routine operation throughout the nineteenth century. In this work, I have determined the details of one successful internal security campaign which was a very small part of the historical process of the consolidation and maintenance of British power in India. This process almost continuously involved the pacification of some district or another. The campaign in the Vishakhapatnam District in 1832 and 1833 on which this study focuses was an ordinary, routine operation. The historical importance of the campaign lies in its ordinariness. The Madras Government conducted this operation as a routine matter which did not visibly strain their resources and clearly demonstrated that the British had organized themselves to deal with just such a campaign. The Government demonstrated a high level of built-in flexibility in a fluid situation. I have looked at the operation of each Department of the Madras Government during the campaign and have attempted to explain which civil and military agencies supported the troops in the field and which agencies the troops supported. I have paid particular attention to the ways the Madras Government controlled its resources. To
understand how this Government conducted such a campaign, one must understand where each major agency, civil and military, fit into the Government including the agency's responsibilities for and authority in such a campaign. Because no one has written a substantial administrative history of the Madras Presidency, I have had to explain the administration of the Madras Government in detail before presenting an account of the campaign. The records associated with this campaign reflect a professionalism in the Madras Army at least equal to any other army in the world at the time. While this professionalism was not the modern military professionalism as now defined by sociologists, it was a step in the development toward this professionalism. The officer corps of the Madras Army was professional in the sense that these officers spent their adult lives earning a livelihood in a large standing military force and that, on the basis of their experience, they deliberately and rationally attempted to improve the military efficiency of that force. The Madras Army performed very well in the field and demonstrated its military efficiency and professionalism by either catching or dispersing the rebels. This Army was part of the worldwide development of the military profession in the early nineteenth century.

The Madras Army's suppression of an armed rising in the Madras Presidency in the third decade of the nineteenth century should have been an historical anomaly according to British Imperial mythology. This mythology pronounced that the Indian polity before the British established order was one of decayed oriental despotism with anarchy and chaos run rampant. In the face of this state of affairs, the East India Company in self-defense became involved politically and almost accidentally became the ruler of India. Once the East India Company established its rule, tranquility prevailed in the countryside from about 1800 except for the
almost inexplicable Mutiny in 1857. Stanley Wolpert, a modern American historian, demonstrated in 1977 the persistence of this mythology when he wrote:

But for a single abortive mutiny at Vellore (near Madras) in 1806, and localized uprisings of peasants in Northern India led by orthodox Muslim alims and mullas, who zealously sought to arouse violent opposition to British consolidation, there was nothing but passive acquiescence.

The works of S. B. Chaudhuri, A. R. Desai and others have established that the image of a perpetually tranquil Indian countryside under British rule in the nineteenth century is a myth. Violent disturbances frequently requiring military force to suppress were common. Suppression of such disturbances in internal security military campaigns was a normal activity of the various governments the British established in India. The British deliberately organized their Indian governments, including the Madras Presidency, to facilitate such campaigns as well as to achieve other objectives.

One corollary of this mythology is the denial of the seriousness of the nineteenth century internal military threat to British rule. Once the threat is denied, the military competence demonstrated by the Madras Army

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in these campaigns is automatically discounted. This Army suffers from a general reputation as mediocre which is founded more on British Imperial mythology and the condescending attitudes of those serving in Bengal than on the performance of the Army in the field. This problem of the Madras Army's reputation is part of the larger problem of the low reputation of the Madras Presidency and South India in general when compared with Bengal or North India. The low reputation of the South was developing, if not already established, in the 1830s.

I have analyzed the internal security role of the Madras Army by looking at a particular campaign which, while historically unique, is representative enough of this type of operation to warrant treatment as a case study. This campaign involved the military suppression of rebellion in the Vishakhapatnam District at the request of the Collector and Magistrate on 6 November 1832. The troops were in the field continuously from early November 1832 until early February 1833. For most of that period between four and eight hundred troops were pursuing two rebel factions of which the largest reported party numbered between seven and eight hundred. My primary interest is in the Madras Army and its workings. The Army's opponents play a role only in terms of the accuracy of the Army's intelligence and how appropriate the Army's actions against the rebels were for the achievement of the mission.

The Madras Army which conducted this internal security campaign, although both far removed from Europe and a European and Indian hybrid, was at least a tributary of the mainstream of European military developments. Michael Howard, in his book War in European History points out that in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon "For half a century... armies reverted so far as they could to an eighteenth-century pattern of aristocratic officers and long-serving professional troops kept isolated
from the rest of the community." The Madras Army at this time included 63,274 effective personnel of whom 4,378 were Europeans. Of these Europeans 749 were commissioned officers who certainly lived and acted like an aristocracy in India. With fully 95 percent of the Indian fighting men in this Army recruited from the territories of the Madras Presidency, the Madras Government was very concerned to keep the Indians in its Army isolated from the civilians living near the Army's stations. The Madras Army fit the general pattern of the European armies in the first half of the nineteenth century. The European armies were, by definition, the world's most modern at the time.

In his earlier discussion of eighteenth century armies in Europe Howard had pointed out that they were professional forces whose officers

...were servants of the state... guaranteed regular employment, regular wages, and career prospects and who dedicated themselves to the service of the state... come peace, come war...

Their [that is the forces] evolution was gradual and uneven [in time and place]... Yet by 1700, the essential outlines were there: a state machine responsible for, and capable of,

---

2 The effective personnel included: 749 European commissioned officers, 485 European NCOs, 2121 European privates, 1023 European support personnel (such as medical personnel, drummers and fifers, and conductors of ordnance), 1044 Indian commissioned officers, 5024 Indian NCOs, 39,903 Indian privates, and 12,925 Indian official followers (such as horse keepers and grass cutters, lascars, and assistant apothecaries). From: Military Auditor General, Annual Madras Military Statement, 24 Dec 1834, pp. 286-8; L/Mil/8/107.
3 Statement exhibiting the Provinces from which the Madras Native Army has been recruited, the total number of mem of all Ranks from each Province, signed T.H.S. Conway AG of the Army, 22 Mar 1834; MMDC No. 10, 25 Mar 1834; P/265/40.
4 Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 26 Nov 1832; and Ltr from H.G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act'g AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 13, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
maintaining a full time force on foot in war and peace--paying, feeding, arming, and clothing it; and a coherent hierarchy of men with a sub-culture of their own, set apart from the rest of the community not only by their function but by the habits, the dress, the outlook, the interpersonal relations, the privileges, and the responsibilities which that function demanded.¹

Close analysis of the performance and internal workings of the Madras Army in this case study reveals that it was a force of this general type. Howard further noted that

the manner in which the development of professional armed forces, itself made possible by the increasing control acquired by the state over the resources of the community, enabled the state to acquire yet greater control over those resources by serving as an instrument not only of external defence but of internal compulsion.

Howard then explained that the possible self-sustaining nature of the ability of a government to use armed force to collect taxes to support or increase the armed forces frightened the architects of the British and American constitutions "... into circumscribing most narrowly the power of the executive to maintain armed forces in time of peace."² This case study is concerned with the use of a modern (1830's style) military force to assert the authority of a central government, one of whose primary aims was to collect revenue which further strengthened the power of the government. The architects of the Madras Government did not circumscribe the power of the executive to maintain military force in time of peace and to use those forces to collect taxes; they consciously designed the Madras Army to provide the executive the means to forcibly collect taxes in peacetime as well as the means to protect the state against foreign enemies. The Madras Army's organization for and competence in an internal

¹Howard, pp. 54-55.

²Howard, p. 55.
security campaign in the Vishakhapatnam District in 1832 and 1833, while unique in time and place, was part of a general pattern of political and military development emanating from Europe.

The European army most analogous to the Indian Army in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in terms of ethnic and linguistic diversity was the Austrian or Austro-Hungarian Imperial Army. Christopher Duffy in The Army of Maria Theresa pointed out that despite, or because of, its ethnic and linguistic diversity this army achieved a significant degree of cohesion and unity "... based on a sense of loyalty to the person of the sovereign."1 The use of the person of the sovereign as a focus of loyalty in India was most obvious after 1857 and the declaration of the Empire. The officer corps in the Madras Army, however, was very conscious of being British and serving a British Government. This Britishness was focused on the person of the sovereign.

Duffy stated that "By itself a diversity of race and language does nothing to sap a sense of corporate identity in an armed force." He cited the army of the late Napoleonic Empire and the Allied Army in Italy during World War II as evidence beyond the Austrian experience.2 He also could have cited the Indian Army generally or any of its component armies such as the Madras Army. The linguistic and ethnic diversity of India did not keep the Madras Army from being an effective, professional, fighting force. This diversity sometimes enhanced the strength of the state in internal security situations by providing units ethnically and culturally


2Ibid.
different from the people to be suppressed. The British deliberately established policies and programs to minimize the adverse military effects of the linguistic and ethnic diversity of the Madras Army.

In his article "State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," Samuel E. Finer explained "...that as late as the third quarter of the eighteenth century, from one-half to one-third of the troops of any [European] state would have been foreigners. ...Wholly native armies were a product of the nineteenth century."¹ Even then they were not universal among the European states. The idea of a multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic Madras Army could not have been particularly exotic to its British officers. After all, the sovereign of their native land, whether England, Scotland, Wales, or Ireland, was of a foreign dynasty, the House of Hanover, whose army included Scottish, Welsh, West Indian, and other regiments with linguistic and ethnic differences of their own.²

It is important to remember that the British members of the Madras Government were Europeans building and operating a state in a non-European environment. While they apparently were conscious that they were working in India and not in Europe, they could be expected to have repeated, consciously or unconsciously, the same sort of processes of state-


²For a succinct discussion of linguistic, ethnic, and other differences among the regiments of the British Army that still existed at the end of the nineteenth century see: Byron Falwell, Mr. Kipling's Army (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), pp. 23-48.
building\textsuperscript{1} which had occurred in Europe and to develop institutions of government that at least looked like European institutions. The civil and military services developed were necessarily hybrids of European and Indian experience.

The British in Madras, subordinate through the East India Company to Parliament, operated a locally authoritarian regime. The paramount organ of government of this regime was the Governor in Council whose decisions and actions were, however, always subject to a delayed review in London. Two examples of relatively centralized authoritarian regimes from the relatively recent past which existed for the British in the 1830s were the ancien regimes of France and Prussia. France under Louis XIV had developed a mutually supporting state structure including a regular standing army, extraction of regular tax revenues by the intendants backed up by troops, and an authoritarian monarch.\textsuperscript{2} Prussia, faced with extracting adequate resources to sustain the forces of a great power from a much smaller resource base, had merged the civil and military administration to support the army under the authoritarian rule of Fredrick William, the Great Elector, during the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{2} The Government of Madras in 1832 was very similar to these two examples with the Governor in Council in the position of the authoritarian monarch and with the district collectors and magistrates extracting the revenues with the readily available

\textsuperscript{1}This term does not assume the state-builders are starting from scratch. It does assume they are consciously acting to strengthen the efficiency and hence the power of a political entity. The term is used to establish a contrast with the development of nation-states such as Italy and Germany during the nineteenth century and with nation-building in the third world since WW II.

\textsuperscript{2}Finer, pp. 132-4.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., pp. 139-40.
support of the Army. This Continental parallel, while useful, must be qualified with the note that at all times the British had the constraints of both their own historical experience, which included a tradition of authoritarian military government¹ as well as the evolution of Parliament, and the Indian experience within which they had to work.

CHAPTER I

THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS

The Madras Army did not operate in isolation from the civil agencies of the Madras Government. The Madras Army was an integral part of the Government and both supported and was supported by the various civil offices. Essential to understanding the operation of the Army is an analysis of the interlocking operation of the major civil and military agencies.

The Government of Madras was subordinate to the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London and to the Governor-General in Council in Calcutta. The Governor-General in Council was also subordinate to the Court. The six member Board of Control, appointed by the Crown and changed as the King's Parliamentary ministers changed, supervised the Court. The Board

... had no patronage and did not interfere in commercial matters, but it had power 'to superintend, direct and control all acts, operations and concerns which in anywise relate to the civil or military government or the revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies.'

The Board approved all dispatches from the Court to the governments in India. The India Act of 1784 established this basic governmental organization which lasted until the Mutiny in 1857.1 Parliament reviewed the India Act every thirty years, and the revision of 1834 seriously reduced the initiative of the Madras Government while strengthening the

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supervision of the Governor-General in Council.\textsuperscript{1} The Madras Government was the local agent of British Imperial power.

The Madras Government explained its objectives during this campaign when it announced that, while settlement of the immediate disturbances was essential,

\begin{quote}
\ldots the main design is by discovering the real source from whence has arisen the state of anarchy and disorder which has existed for years past, and still exists in \ldots the Vishakhapatnam portion of the Northern Circars, to establish a system which shall secure permanently the just authority of Government, the realization of its revenue, and the general tranquility of the country.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

The actions of the Madras Government throughout this campaign demonstrated repeatedly the primacy of these three objectives: justice as they defined it, revenue, and tranquility.

The Madras Government in 1832 consisted of a Governor and President (one man) ruling with three other men as the Governor in Council. These same four men sat, depending upon the matter at hand, as the various Departments of Government. The records of these meetings are the consultations of each department.\textsuperscript{3} The consultations are overwhelmingly concerned with expenditure of funds, because the Governor in Council maintained control of the Madras Government by controlling the money. The three secretaries of the Secretariat brought business before the Governor in Council. One subordinate secretary handled the Revenue and Judicial

\textsuperscript{1}See below page 17.

\textsuperscript{2}Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to G. E. Russell Sr Mbr Bd of Rev, 14 Dec 1832; EFSGRDC, 14 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56364, pp. 453-8.

\textsuperscript{3}These same records for the later nineteenth century are known as proceedings.
Departments. The Chief Secretary to Government handled the business of almost all the other departments (the Public, Secret, Foreign, Ecclesiastical, and Financial Departments) as well as supervising the Secretariat. The second subordinate secretary handled only the Military Department. Beneath the departmental level at Madras was a bewildering array of boards, superintendents, and other offices. Subordinate officers of the different departments normally sent correspondence for a subordinate office of another department up the departmental chain of authority to the secretary for the sending department who laid the correspondence before the Governor in Council. They then sent the correspondence through the secretary for the receiving department and on down to the addressee. Most of the minor offices and the Departments reached out into the hinterland, on the civil side, to the collector and magistrate (one man held both offices at this time) in his district or to the various courts and, on the military side, to the Madras Army. The collectors and magistrates and the Madras Army depended upon each other for the successful performance of their duties in the field. A key feature of this bureaucratic organization, as essential to its relatively successful operation as to an historical understanding of that operation, was the holding of multiple offices by single individuals. No thorough historical analysis of the full bureaucratic organization and workings of the Madras Government has been completed. Therefore, the detailed account in this chapter is necessary to put the Madras Army's conduct of

1The Bengal Government has been studied extensively. For a useful modern analysis see: B. B. Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1959).
this internal security campaign in context.¹

The various agencies of the Madras Government are necessarily separated for discussion and analysis. These separations reflect both the way the members of the Madras Government separated themselves in the performance of their duties and creates false separations the same members would not recognize. The most logical organization of this analysis is first to discuss the Governor in Council and the secretariat and then to deal with each department individually, keeping in mind that each department was just another name for the Governor in Council. Under each department, the boards, superintendencies, and other offices which implemented the decisions of the Governor in Council will be discussed. Finally, the duties of the collector and magistrate, upon whom all departments depended in the field, are summarized.

Governor in Council

The keystone of the Madras Government was the Governor in Council appointed by the Court of Directors.² The Governor in Council resolved questions by majority vote with the Governor having the determining vote

¹This account is based upon a thorough review of the indexes of the Consultations of the Madras Government for the years 1832, 1833, and 1834. These indexes are both voluminous and indexes in name only. The search headings are merely office names. Unless one knows which office handled what business, one is reduced to reviewing each page for relevant material. Particular documents which include descriptions of the duties of any office or board as well as documents which are used as examples of an office's activities are individually cited. To cite each entry in the indexes which aided in the development of this description is impractical.

²Proclamation, Signed by order of the Court of Directors of the said United Company by P. Auber, Secretary; 27 June 1832; at East India House, London: in Fort Saint George Gazette, 1832, pp. 792-3; V/11/1586.
in a tie. The Governor of Madras lacked the power "vested in the Governor-General, of adopting measures, or of issuing instructions to the public functionaries of the Government, without the knowledge and concurrence of his Council." The Governor in Council could issue regulations for the Presidency which were in effect, laws until passage of the India Act of 1833 when they lost that power. The signature of the Chief Secretary to Government or of the Secretary in the concerned department was required to make an "order or proceeding of the Governor in Council" valid. The result of these restrictions was to prevent personal despotism by the Governor and to require him to be at the city of Madras to perform his duties.

Control of the purse strings is the ultimate power in any government. In Madras the Governor in Council attempted to keep tight control. Public officers had to obtain prior approval from this body before spending money except in emergencies and were personally liable for expenditures made without approval. Collectors and magistrates could spend only twenty Rupees without prior approval and then could be refused reimbursement if the Governor in Council thought the expense unnecessary. This close


2See: A. D. Capbell, Code of Regulations for the Internal Government of the Madras Territories from A.D. 1802 to A.D. 1834. 3 vols. (Fort Saint George: Published under the sanction of the Governor in Council, n.d.).

3 and 4 William 4 Cap. 85, clause 54; in Capbell, Code, 3:141-2.


5FSGG 1832, p. 889; V/11/1586.
supervision meant that the Governor in Council had to spend time considering such expenses as fifteen Rupees to repair the punkah ropes at Saint Mary's Church.¹

While the Governor in Council retained the power and responsibility to review the financial dealings of their subordinates under the India Act of 1833, they lost "...the Power of creating any new Office, or of granting any Salary, Gratuity, or Allowance, without the previous Sanction of the Governor General of India in Council."² The loss of these powers in the India Act of 1833 severely reduced the initiative this subordinate government could exercise in dealing with problems within its territories. When the Governor in Council decided that the pension rules for Madras Army sepoys established by the Governor in Council in 1821 should be revised, they had to forward the draft of the revised rules they wished adopted for the Madras Army to the Governor General of India in Council.³ The Madras Governor in Council, thus, were reduced during the period of this case study to monitoring the expenses of their servants and proposing to the Governor General in Council any new ideas which entailed expenses.

During the preliminary activities of this campaign, Stephen Lushington was Governor of Madras. Just as the campaign began in earnest on 25 October 1832, Lieutenant-General Sir Fredrick Adam became Governor, and he remained in office until 4 March 1837. The other three members of the Council throughout this period were Lieutenant-General Sir Robert W. O'Callaghan, Charles Harris, and William Oliver. General O'Callaghan was

¹MEDC No's 2 and 3, 11 May 1832; P/333/60.
²3 and 4 William 4 Cap. 85, clause 54; in Campell, Code, 3:141-2.
³MMDC No's 26 and 27, 25 Jun 1833; P/265/16.
also Commander in Chief of the Madras Army and President of the Military Board; Mr. Harris was President of the Board of Revenue and the Marine Board; while Mr. Oliver was President of the Sadr Faujdari Adalat (Criminal High Court) which shared the same judges with the Sadr Diwani Adalat (Civil High Court). Thus the Governor in Council included two generals from the British Army and two members of the Madras Civil Service who between them held the most important offices in the Madras Government as well as being members of Council. Since the Members of Council were active in the affairs of the Government outside of the Council, the Council was not entirely dependent upon the Secretariat for information.

Because of the legal restrictions on the operation of the Governor in Council, the Governor could not preside in Council if he was away from the city of Madras. On 8 May 1832, therefore, the Governor in Council sitting as the Military Department consisted of Mr. Oliver alone. Governor Lushington was "on duty in the provinces," the Commander in Chief, General O'Callaghan, was "on a tour of inspection," and Mr. Harris was "indisposed." Governor Lushington minimized any difficulties these restrictions might have caused him by having the Governor in Council issue a proclamation on 19 March 1832 announcing that the Governor would be leaving Madras for the interior. They proclaimed that the administration at Madras in his absence would be conducted by the remaining Members of Council and that the resolutions of Government would...


2MMDC No's 10 and 11, 8 May 1832; P/264/80 and 81.
in Council." This proclamation required the civil and military authorities to obey any orders the Governor chose to issue while absent from the city of Madras. Sir Fredrick Adam, when he became Governor, found this restriction particularly irksome. He was convinced that the Governor must make personal inspections in the provinces to ensure good government and good discipline among the public servants. To change this rule required an act of Parliament. He requested such a measure, but no change was made before the end of this period.

Secretariat

The Secretariat handled administrative matters for the Governor in Council. This office included two subordinate secretaries and the Chief Secretary to Government as well as a staff of clerks. The responsibilities of the Secretariat revolved around receiving communications from London, Calcutta, Bombay, and the various agencies of the Madras Government and then laying these communications before the Governor in Council for their discussion. The secretaries disposed of matters as directed by the Governor in Council. The Secretariat apparently sorted the correspondence and exercised some control over what the Governor in Council discussed during any consultation. The Secretariat also seems to

1FSGG, 1832, p. 209; V/11/1586.

2Ltr from Sir Fredrick Adam Gov of Madras to his brother Charles, 29 Sep 1833; Adam of Blair-Adam Muniments, Bundle 3/288.

have been involved, at least informally, in Council deliberations.\(^1\) As mentioned above no action of the Governor in Council was valid without the signature of the appropriate secretary.

In 1831 and 1833 Thomas R. Wheatley, who had become a writer in 1817, served as Secretary to Government in the Revenue and Judicial Department. The Chief Secretary to Government was Henry Chamier who had become a writer in 1817. He supervised the Secretariat and was responsible for the business of the Public, Secret, Foreign, Political, Ecclesiastical, and Financial Departments. Robert Clerk had become a writer in 1816 and served during these years as Secretary to Government in the Military Department. These men brought extensive practical knowledge of the Madras Presidency Government to their offices.\(^2\)

Revenue Department

When the Governor in Council sat as the Revenue Department, their main business was obviously taxation. The objective was to raise enough revenue to meet the East India Company's expenses, including military expenses, and to obtain excess revenue if possible. In terms of the Company's profit motive this Department was the most important in the Government. The Board of Revenue which was also the Court of Wards conducted most of the business of the Department of Revenue at Madras.\(^3\) The other section of the Department at the Presidency was the Inspector

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\(^1\)Minute by Mr. Harris, 11 Jul 1834; MPDC No. 4, 11 Jul 1834; P/246/72. In this minute Mr. Harris made a matter of public record his opinion of the Chief Secretary's performance of duty. Included in the minute is some description of the activities of the Secretariat.

\(^2\)See the entry for each man in: Prinsep.

\(^3\)Reg. V of 1804, Para. II; Campbell, Code, 1:394.
General of Civil Estimates. All Revenue Department business in the various districts normally was conducted by the collector.

The Board of Revenue of which Mr. Harris, a member of Council, was President consisted of three members and was responsible for "... the general superintendence of the revenues from whatever source... and the recommendation of such propositions to the Governor in Council, as in their opinion may... augment or improve those revenues." The revenues included land revenues, land and sea customs, stamps, and the salt monopoly. The Board of Revenue supervised the collection of these revenues by the collectors and other members of the revenue establishment and was the body to whom any appeal against a collector's actions was addressed. A collateral duty of the Board of Revenue was the supervision of the cash or land endowments of mosques, temples, colleges, and other charitable institutions. Because he knew his primary responsibility was collection of the revenue, the collector automatically reported anything such as public disorders of any kind that happened in the district to his revenue superiors. The possible impact on revenue collection gave the Board of Revenue an interest in anything that happened in the district including the collection of statistics on economic activity.

1Reg. I of 1803, Para. IV; Campbell, Code, 1:296.


3Reg. I of 1803; Campbell, Code, 1:294-306.

4Reg VII of 1817; Campbell, Code, 2:324-31.

5Ltr from H. Gardiner Collector of Vp District to A.D. Campbell Register of the Court of Faujdari Adalat, 25 Aug 1830; EFSGJDC, 21 Sep 1830; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 142-3.
collector was their agent for all matters in his district.

This same three man board was also the Court of Wards. As the Court of Wards, they were charged with taking "...cognizance of all cases of property devolving to heirs, incapacitated by minority, sex, or natural affrimity, from administering their own affairs." The Court of Wards was to "...appoint proper persons to the custody and management of property so situated, to the education of Minors, and to the care of Lunatics and Idiots." These responsibilities and powers only applied to individuals "...paying directly rent, or revenue, to Government." The plan of the Court of Wards in each case had to be approved by the Governor in Council before being implemented. The bulk of the Court of Wards' work was with minor zemindars or those who demonstrated their unfitness by not paying the revenues. The collector was also the agent in his district for the Court of Wards.

The other office that reported directly to the Revenue Department was the Inspector-General of Civil Estimates. The focus of this office was civil, as opposed to military, engineering. The Inspector-General himself and the civil engineers he supervised were all military officers simply because soldiers were the only group of people in India and most of the world at the time with significant training in engineering. The Inspector-General reviewed the cost estimates and the actual expenditures made by the civil engineers and collectors for initial construction and major repairs on all Revenue Department buildings, some roads which were usually of low military priority, irrigation works (predominately tanks), ferry boats, and travelers' bungalows. In times of famine, they undertook

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1Reg. V of 1804, Para. II; Campbell, Code, 1:394.
many construction and maintenance projects or expanded existing ones to
provide work for the destitute. The Inspector-General of Civil
Estimates, therefore, played a major role in famine relief. He and his
civil engineers worked closely with the collector in his district who was,
essentially, the customer for their skills.

Judicial Department

The Governor in Council sitting as the Judicial Department dispensed
justice and maintained internal security. To do the former the Governor in
Council had created a hierarchy of courts ranging from the High Court in
Madras, through the four regional appeals courts, to the courts in the
various districts. At each level, the civil and criminal courts had
different names but shared the same judges. The focal point for the
Judicial Departments' maintenance of internal security in each district
was the magistrate. In each district he was in charge of the police
establishment, and in the Vishakhapatnam District he had charge of a
constabulary force. It is interesting that just as the Judicial and
Revenue Departments were the same men at the top, the Governor in Council,
so these Departments were the same men at the bottom. The collector and
the magistrate were the same man in each district while the revenue
servants of the collector were also the police of the magistrate.

1FSGG 1833, p. 370; V/11/1587.

2The Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras existed to extend the
King's law to Europeans within ten miles of Madras and as an appeals court
from lower Company courts for Europeans. This court also had admiralty
jurisdiction which Company courts did not have. For this case study this
court is irrelevant. 53 George 3 Cap. 155, clauses 105-13; in Reg. II of
1820; Campbell Code, 2:420-32.
In Madras sat the Presidency's High Courts. These were the Sadr Diwani Adalat, or Civil High Court, and the Sadr Faujdari Adalat, or Criminal High Court. These courts consisted of a chief justice who was by regulation automatically a member of Council, at this time Mr. Oliver, and three associate judges. As a body these men were referred to as the judges of the Sadr and Faujdari Adalat. Appeal from these courts was to "the King's Most excellent Majesty in his Privy Council." The criminal law enforced in the Madras Presidency was nominally Muslim criminal law which had been extensively modified to meet British concepts of justice. One contemporary commentator explained that the courts maintained an appearance of using Muslim criminal and civil law and Hindu civil law but that in reality the judges referred to the Company's regulations and "the undeviating principles of justice" when reaching their decisions. The courts below the Sadr and Faujdari Adalats were the appeals courts.

Four regional appeals courts each with three judges who traveled from district to district handled civil and criminal cases. For civil cases these courts were called Provincial Courts of appeal. For criminal cases they were called Court of Circuit. Vishakhapatnam district was in the Northern Division of the appeals courts with its headquarters at

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1Reg. III of 1807; Campbell, Code; 1:439-40.
4Ltr to the editor from Mesites, "Judicial System in India," 26 Apr 1834; Madras Male Asylum Herald, No. 76, 7 May 1834.
5Reg's IV of 1802, Para. II, and Reg. VII, of 1802, Para. IV; Campbell, Code, 1:54 and 112.
Machilipatnam. These appeals courts employed Hindu law officers who by virtue of this office held the position of sadr amin, head Native commissioner, for the district where the court was located. Suits could be referred to him for his hearing and recommended settlement. These appeals courts supervised all Judicial Department activities in the districts.

Beneath the four regional appeals courts, the Madras Government maintained courts in each district. The court for the Vishakhapatnam District sat at Srikakulam and was known as the Zillah Court for civil law and the Criminal Court for criminal law. This district court had a single European judge and also employed Hindu and Muslim law officers who were automatically sadr amin for the district where the court was located and to whom the zillah European Judge could refer suits for settlement. In a case where the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused but the judge was sure that the accused was guilty, the criminal judge had the power to "...direct that such a prisoner be detained in custody, until he shall give sufficient security for his future good behavior and appearance when required." Individuals sentenced to long terms of imprisonment could be held in the zillah jail or transported. Those transported could be imprisoned in India or transported overseas. Judges sent European convicts to New South Wales and "Native convicts" to Singapore, Malacca, and Penang. The Governor in Council could change the number of these district courts as

1Frykenberg, Guntur District, p. 74.
2Reg. VIII of 1816, Para's III and VII; Campbell, Code, 2:172-3.
3Ibid.
5FSGG 1833, pp. 140 and 287; V/11/1587.
well as the courts of appeal simply by an order in Council.¹

In 1832 the Governor in Council sitting as the Judicial Department established a Native Court at Vishakhapatnam with civil jurisdiction.² This court was also the Native Criminal Court. Other than having no jurisdiction over Europeans or Americans, the Native Judge in civil matters dealt with the same matters as the Zillah Judge for whom the Native Court was essentially an auxiliary court.³ In criminal matters, the Native Criminal Court dealt with less serious crime than did the Criminal Court of a district.⁴ The Native Judge exercised no control over the District Munsifs who were subordinate to the Zillah Court.

The Zillah Judge with the approval of the Provincial Court selected the location, area of jurisdiction, and individual appointed as District Munsif. District Munsifs handled only minor civil actions.⁵ They could, however, assemble a district panchayat to settle a dispute over property of an unlimited value if both parties to the dispute agreed. The decision could only be appealed for "gross partiality."⁶

The head of each village as recognized by the inhabitants or selected by the collector in disputed cases was the village munsif. His authority extended to petty suits, within the village, and was without appeal.⁷

²Ltr to the Judges of Sadr and Foujdari Adalat from T. R. Wheatley, 23 Mar 1832; MJDC No. 9, 23 Mar 1832; P/234/61.
⁴Reg. VIII of 1827; Campbell, Code, 2:600-4.
⁵Reg. VI of 1816, Para's V, VI, and XI; Campbell, Code, 2:130 and 133.
⁶Reg. VII of 1816; Campbell, Code, 2:156-70.
⁷Reg. IV of 1816; Campbell, Code, 2:100-15.
The village munsif could call a village panchayat to settle disputes of any amount among residents of the same village if both parties of the suit agreed to the panchayat. The decision, again, could only be appealed for "gross partiality." The same head of each village had criminal jurisdiction for trivial offenses as village head of police under the magistrate as explained below. The head of the village could confine offenders for a maximum of twelve hours or order "any of the lower casts [sic] of the people" put in stocks for up to six hours.

The central figure in the district for the maintenance of internal security and the enforcement of the criminal law was the magistrate. The same officer who was the collector of a district in the Revenue Department was also the magistrate for the same district in the Judicial Department. His charge was "...to apprehend murderers, robbers, thieves, house-breakers and disturbers of the peace, and persons charged before him with crimes or misdemeanors." To perform his duties, the collector and magistrate held extensive powers. He could issue summons, and he could attach the property of, fine, or imprison anyone who ignored a summons. When he examined a prisoner and the evidence against him, the collector and magistrate, if convinced of the prisoners' innocence, could release him. If the collector and magistrate was convinced that the crime was committed and that the accused was involved, the collector and magistrate sent the case to the Zillah Court. He could "...hear and determine without reference to any authority, all complaints or prosecutions brought before them for petty

2Reg. IX of 1816; Para. X; Campbell, Code, 2:219.
3Reg. IX of 1816, Para. III, Campbell, Code, 2:177.
4Reg. IX of 1816, Para. IX; Campbell, Code, 2:178.
offenses, such as abusive language, calumny, inconsiderable assaults or affrays...." In such cases he could imprison the guilty for fifteen days, fine them a maximum of fifty Rupees, or for a zemindar or other large landholder fine them up to 200 Rupees. The collector and magistrate could order assemblies he deemed unlawful to disperse and punish those who disobeyed with a fine not in excess of 50 Rupees or 30 days in jail. The collector and magistrate also had the power to arrest "...any vagrant, or suspicious person, or person without ostensible means of honest livelihood, or person of notoriously bad character...." The collector and magistrate could either send those arrested to the criminal judge or the magistrate could "take security" for their good behavior, i.e. release them on bond. The collectors and magistrates of the Madras Presidency thus were provided with at least adequate statutory means to control the population of their districts. They were directed, however, "...whenever their establishments may be insufficient to resist banditti or other disturbers of the public peace, they shall apply for assistance to the nearest military station...." The Governor in Council, obviously considered the resort to military force by the magistrate a common enough occurrence that provisions should be included in the regulations for the routine calling out of the troops by the local civil authority in each district.

The collectors and magistrates were subject to some supervision in the Judicial Department. They submitted to the judge of the Court

1Reg. IX of 1816, Para's XVII, XVIII, XXIV, and XXXII; Campbell, Code, 2:183-7, 191-2, and 194-5.
2Reg. III of 1831, Para. II; Campbell, Code, 3:16.
3Reg. II of 1822, Para. III; Campbell, Code, 2:466-7.
4Reg. XI of 1816, Para. XLVII; Campbell, Code, 2:...2.
of Circuit a list of persons arrested but released and a list of persons
turned over to the Criminal Court when he visited the district. In any
case of misconduct by the collector and magistrate in his capacity as
magistrate or his refusal to obey the Circuit Court, the Circuit Court
reported the problem to the Faujdari Adalat. In case of urgent business
the collectors and magistrates did not have to wait for the slow workings
of Judicial Department channels. They were authorized to "...correspond
direct with Government [i.e. the Governor in Council] in matters of police,
whenever they may deem it necessary." The Government provided the
Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam two separate coercive organizations under his
supervision in the Judicial Department to maintain internal security.
These two organizations were the police and a constabulary force.

Under Regulation XI of 1816, the police in the Vishakhapatnam
District were organized with each tahsildar, the chief Indian revenue
officer of each taluk (the primary subdivision of any district known in
North India as the tahsil) was declared head of police in his taluk. All
of his subordinate revenue servants were members of the police. For large
towns the collector and magistrate could appoint a police amin (inspector)
at his discretion. In the case of zemindars who paid their revenue directly
to the collector and magistrate, he could appoint the zemindar to be the
head of police for his own zemindary. Heads of villages were heads of
police in their own villages, were responsible to the tahsildar, and were
aided by village watchers. The head of a village was by definition in the

1Reg. IX of 1816, Para. XL; Campbell, Code, 2:198:9.
2Reg. XI, Para. LVI; Campbell, Code, 2:234.
3Campbell, Code, 2:217-34.
regulation "...the person who collects the revenue, and under whose authority the village servants act." Thus the holding of joint Judicial Department and Revenue Department offices by the same individuals extended into each village.

In 1821 a revision of the regulations gave the collector and magistrate the authority to extend the jurisdiction of the police amins beyond the towns. The police amins were subordinate to the tahsildars, and the amins with their subordinates were specifically charged to perform revenue duties under the tahsildar's orders. Heads of police at the level of the tahsildars held the authority to punish petty crimes with a maximum of six strokes with a rattan or a fine not exceeding three Rupees. The heads of villages could levy fines of one Rupee. The purpose of the police establishment, supervised by the collector and magistrate, remained the suppression of crimes such as murder, house-breaking, arson, vandalism, theft, assaults, and counterfeiting. They were, of course, to perform revenue duties also.

This police establishment was extremely ineffective. The Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam in a report considered by the Faujdari Adalat in November 1831 reported that "...it is scarcely possible to find persons either able or willing to perform the duties required of heads of villages in Regulation XI of 1816." His statement to the court confirmed the futility of the police by reporting that of 3870 persons estimated to be involved in 161 cases, 3396 had never been apprehended. The Magistrate had explained that such numbers were inflated, because they were reported by the authorities.

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1 Reg. IV of 1816, Para. III; Campbell, Code, 2:101.
2 Reg. IV of 1821; Campbell, Code, 2:441-7.
3Para's 7 and 27, Ltr from D. Elliot Act'g Registrar Foujtyree Udalut [sic] to Act' Sec to Gvt Jud Dept, 30 Nov 1831; MJDC No. 1, 10 Feb 1832; P/324/59.
of the villages where the crimes were perpetrated. Inflated or not, these number do indicate inefficient police work.

The Magistrate and Collector of Vishakhapatnam's other force for maintaining internal security was the Visakhapatnam Sibbendy Corps. This Sibbendy Corps was a constabulary force designed to deal with threats to internal security beyond the capacities of the unarmed police and to enforce revenue collection. Such corps were not established in all the districts of the Madras Presidency but were established in all of the Northern Circars. In Vishakhapatnam the Sibbendy Corps had been established in 1819. This Corps was supposed to provide employment for some of "...the fighting peons of the country..." who would not enlist in the regular army and if not employed by the Government in maintaining the public order would employ themselves in disturbing the public order. These sibbendies were supposed to be inhabitants of the hills who would be acclimatized to the hills and familiar with both the terrain and their opponents if required to suppress disturbances there. The Collector of Vishakhapatnam in 1819, 1821, 1823, 1828, and again in 1831 reported that the Sibbendy Corps consisted entirely of inhabitants of the lowlands and was quite useless in the hills. In all five instances the collector was directed to discharge the Sibbendies and enlist inhabitants of the hills as the Government had ordered in 1819. The Board of Revenue in 1831 directed that Mr. Gardiner, the Collector, personally was to ensure that the right men enlisted, because "...his native servants... will naturally be anxious to retain many of those now in employ."  

1Par. 3, Ltr from H. Gardiner Magistrate of Vp to Registrar of Provincial Court of Circuit No Div Machilipatnam, 3 Feb 1831; MJDC No. 1, 10 Feb 1832; P/324/59.

2EPBRFSG 25 April 1831, EFSGRDC, 24 May 1831; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 216-29.
Sibbendy Corps stood at 347 on 31 October 1831. At the recommendation of Mr. G. A. Smith, Acting Collector and Magistrate, the Board of Revenue on 26 July 1832 approved a reduction in the Sibbendy Corps to save an expected 1355 Rupees per month. Mr. Smith recommended retaining 200 hand-picked peons who would provide adequate means to secure the revenue, keep known trouble makers under control, and handle any other troublemakers who might appear.

The arms for the Sibbendy Corps, as well as for the zemindars' retinues, were provided from the Madras Army stores at Vishakhapatnam. Apparently there was no unofficial local source of modern weapons for either the government forces or the rebels. Before the collector and magistrate could obtain arms for his civil establishment, he had to submit his request through civil channels to the Governor in Council. If they approved the request, they forwarded it to the Military Board for action. The civil armed forces in the Vishakhapatnam District, thus, were directly dependent on the Madras Army's supply system for their arms and ammunition.

The means of coercion organized in the Judicial Department were supposed to be able to maintain internal security and could when the inhabitants behaved as the British desired them to behave. When the inhabitants went

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1Abstract of report by a Moor Civil Auditor to Chf Sec to Gvt, 17 Feb 1832; EFSJDC, No 11, 7 Mar 1832, P/324/59.
2Ltr from R. A. Smith, Actg Collector WR to G. A. Smith, Actg Collector WR to Wr. EPBRFSG, 26 Jul 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp 505-6.
3Ltr from G. A. Smith, Actg Collector WR to Bd of Rev, 13 Jul 1832, EPBRFSG, 26 Jul 1832, in Bd's Col 56362, pp 506A-504.
4EFSJDC, 29 May 1832, in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 265-67 and 273-74 and MJDC No's 10, 11, and 12, 1 Jul 1832; P/324/63.
beyond the means of coercion, which were considerable, available to the collector and magistrate in the Judicial Department, he could turn to the Madras Army for support. The Madras Government was specifically organized to facilitate the routine use of the Army for internal security in support of the collector and magistrate.

Public Department

The Governor in Council sitting as the Public Department generally dealt with activities not generating enough activity to warrant a separate department. The Public Department's activities usually were in support of the other Departments. The early consultations of the Madras Government were recorded as either Public or Secret. Basically, as the volume of business expanded, the other departments were created.¹ During the early 1830's the Public Department disposed of business concerned with the administration of civilian personnel, publication of *The Fort Saint George Gazette*, the Marine Board, the observatory, the Surveyor General, the postal service, education, convicts overseas, famine relief through the Monegar Choultry, and supervision of the Male and Female Asylums. The postal service was particularly important to the Madras Army both in cantonment and in the field.

The Public Department handled personnel administration, including actions such as promotions, appointments to offices, and retirements for

all civilians. The Military Department handled military and medical personnel. Related to the administration of personnel was the publication of The Fort Saint George Gazette. In January 1832 the Madras Government began publication to provide "...but as a medium of Official communication and for general information a Gazette in a compact form, to be exclusively appropriated to Government Advertisements and Notifications of general interest form any of the Public Offices...." The Government provided free copies to all heads of offices in the Presidency. These copies were maintained with the records of the office. Anyone who wish to subscribe privately could pay a district collector and magistrate or a military paymaster quarterly. Publication of information in The Fort Saint George Gazette constituted official notification to "all public officers." Notices from the Public Department including such items as personnel arrivals and departures at Madras, promotions, and appointments to office took up much of The Fort Saint George Gazette.

The Marine Board of which Mr. Harris, Member of Council and also President of the Board of Revenue, was President reported to the Governor in Council in the Public Department. This Board was generally responsible for supporting navigation on the coasts of the Madras Presidency to promote commerce and defense. Among their duties were the supervision of the master attendants at each port, responsibility for light houses, and ensuring that an adequate supply of lighters was available at each port. They arranged transportation, generally by contract with private ship owners, for official passengers and cargo departing Madras such as the movement of the 3rd Light Infantry to Vishakhapatnam in June 1832 for this campaign. Correspondence between the Marine board and the Commander

1FSGG, 1832, pp. 1-2; V/11/1586.
in Chief for this move was sent through the Governor in Council.¹

The Public Department administered two technical services: the observatory and the Surveyor General's office. The observatory was important to maritime navigators. The Surveyor General was participating in the trigonometric survey of India conducted by the Surveyor General of India in Bengal. The accurate mapping of the Presidency was important both for revenue collection and military action. The six officers of the Surveyor General's office were all military officers, one of whom, Lieutenant Hill, was sent to map the Vishakhapatnam and Ganjam Districts shortly after this case study concludes.

The postal system of the Madras Presidency was supervised by the Governor in Council as the Public Department and administered by the Postmaster General. Included were letter service known colloquially in South India as tappal (the North Indian dak) and parcel service known as banghy. Runners in relays carried both the tappal and the banghy. Regular service and express service, reserved for urgent public business, were carried by the same establishment of runners. Reduced rates were available for newspapers, books, and the proceedings of learned societies. The service was available for the private business of both Europeans and Indians. Military and civil officers, depending upon the office held, could frank official mail. Commanding officers could frank letters from European

¹Ltr from W. E. Underwood Sec to the Marine Bd to Chief Sec to Gvt, 13 Jun 1832; Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to Pres and Mbrs of the Marine Bd, 13 Jun 1832; MMDC No's 53 and 61, 6 Jul 1832: P264/85.

²Adjutant General's Office, A List of the Officers of the Army, Ordnance and Medical Departments, Serving under the Presidency of Fort Saint George (Madras: Asylum Pre, 1 Jan 1833), p. II. Hereafter referred to as FSG Army List.
soldiers and sepoys to their families.¹ The tappal runner establishment in each district was supervised by the collector. This service, operated in the field by the collector and supervised in the Public Department, was invaluable to all Government servants and provided an essential link in the command and control of the Madras Army in India. The Public Department was responsible for what public education existed in the Madras Presidency in the early 1830's. Their agent in the districts was, as usual, the collector. Included in his duties was supervision of the Tahsildaree Schools in the districts. The Court of Directors on 29 September 1830 explained that their purpose in supporting education was to produce "...a body of Natives qualified by their habits and acquirements to take a larger share, and occupy higher situations in the civil administration of their country, than has hitherto been the practice under our Indian Governments." The Court went on to complain that the existing educational arrangements in the Madras Presidency would not meet the objective. The solution of the Governor in Council sitting as the Public Department was to direct the collectors and their European assistants to increase the motivation of the teachers and students in the Tahsildaree Schools by personally visiting the schools, conducting examinations, distributing prizes to the best students, and appointing those whose education qualified them to minor public offices. Collectors were ...to take care that in the course of instruction observed at the Tahsildaree Schools no attempt is made to interfere with the religion of the Natives, either by inculcating particular doctrines or distributing as prizes, or in any other way, tracts or books on any subject connected with religion.

The Governor in Council hoped that this demonstration of the Government's interest would stimulate educational development.²

² FSGG 1833, p. 149, V/11/1697.
Here is an early illustration of the cross purposes of British educational policy in India. The administrators in London wanted the "habits and acquirements" they required in their public servants taught to Indians. These "habits and acquirements" were essentially European value systems and behavior patterns. The administrators in Madras saw the disruptive possibilities of teaching European value systems and behavior patterns to their subjects and expressed their concern in cautions about interfering with religion. There probably was no way that Indians could be educated to meet the requirements for public office imposed by the British without challenging Indian traditional beliefs and behavior or "religion" and thus creating social tension at the least. It was the collector's problem to find a way.

The larger educational institution supervised in the Public Department was the College of Fort Saint George. This College appears to have served two major clienteles: Hindu and Muslim law officers and Europeans studying Indian languages. The College conducted examinations in both fields as well as providing resident instruction. The College would lend language text books to both military and civil officers to use wherever they might be stationed.1

The Public Department supervised three other areas which are more or less incidental to this case study. They were involved in famine relief through the Monegar Choultry which both employed the destitute on public works and provided free meals.2 They monitored the health of transported convicts overseas and supervised the Male and Female Asylums in Madras.


2FSGG 1833, p. 370; V/11/148
which provided refuge for European and Eurasian orphans.

Secret, Foreign, Political, and Ecclesiastical Departments

The Governor in Council conducted very little business in the Secret, Foreign, Political, and Ecclesiastical Departments during this period. The Secret Department dealt with sensitive military matters such as the 1834 invasion of Coorg. The campaign in the Northern Circars was not sensitive enough to be mentioned in this Department. The Foreign Department was a legacy from the days when the Madras Presidency conducted its own foreign policy. By this time, the Foreign Department's primary concern was the frontier with Pundawees. The Political Department handled relations with independent Indian states and was the Department through which the Governor in Council supervised the residents at such places as Hyderabad. The last of these minor Departments was the Ecclesiastical which dealt with the official church, that is, the Church of England and the Church of Scotland. Most of the business in this Department involved church buildings. None of these Departments played a major role in this campaign.

Financial Department

As the Financial Department the Governor in Council controlled the funds raised under their direction in the Revenue Department. Here the Governor in Council directly supervised only the Accountant General who had two major subordinate officers, the Civil Auditor General and the Military Auditor General, and one minor subordinate
officer, the Superintendent of Family and Pension Payments. If the Civil and Military Auditor Generals did not sit at adjoining desks, they must surely have worked in adjacent offices; their work was very closely related. They generated extensive correspondence about bills paid by a civil or military officer which had to be entered in the transfer accounts to be paid under the opposite heading. The Military Auditor General was responsible for military pay and the annual estimate. On the civil side the collector and magistrate was, once again, the principal civil agent in his district where he worked closely with the military authorities. Each month the Accountant General issued the necessary authorizations to pay the Madras Army.¹

The Civil Auditor General, a civilian, had charge of all civil charges and payments. He was responsible for all pay, allowances, and pensions for civilians and supervised the operations of the Government Lottery and the Savings Bank. The collector and magistrate of each district was the district treasurer and answered to the Civil Auditor General for the performance of these duties. As a routine matter the collector and magistrate called on the Madras Army to provide troops to move treasure within the districts and enroute to Madras.²

The Military Auditor General's establishment in 1832 included a colonel with three military officer assistants. They supervised the fourteen military paymasters, all of whom were commissioned officers, and a clerical personnel.

¹Ltr from J. Prendergast Col Mil Auditor to Sir Frederick Adam Gov in Council, 21 Jan 1833; MMDC Diary for Nov. 5, Jan 1833, P26/5. The pay for the Madras Army not including "the troops to the eastward" for the month of February 1833 was Rupees 18, 39, 440.

staff. Within the regiments the actual payment of the officers and men was handled as an additional duty. One of the other major tasks of the Military Auditor General was preparation of the "Annual Military Statement of Expenses and the Estimate of the Next Years' Expenses." This estimate was "...founded, as usual, on the expenses of the preceding year..." and the anticipated "...increases and decreases...." It included a contingency fund. The "Annual Military Statement and Estimate..." submitted in December 1832 included no specific sum for the operations in this case study which were simply too small and routine to rate an entry. Because they had to keep precise track of numbers of personnel for pay purposes the Military Auditor's office also handled the invaliding committees and personnel strength reporting for the Madras Army which like the "Annual Military Statement and Estimate..." was handled by the Governor in Council in the Military Department rather than in the Financial Department.

The records reflect a great business of the transfer accounts between civil and military charges. These included numerous bills from collectors for rent payable on land and buildings used by the Army, such as, two bills for 134 Rupees submitted by the Collector of Ganjam for areas used as a drill ground and as a small arms firing range by the regiment at Srikakulam. When a military officer was employed in a civil position, the matter of whether he was paid with civil or military funds became an issue. This

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1FSG Army List, p 12.

2The estimate was 2,64,00,000 Rupees with 3,68,947 Rupees for contingencies. No indication was given of how the amount for contingencies was determined. Ltr from Thomas Maclean Lt Col Act'g Mil Aud Gen to Sir Fredrick Adam Gov in Council, 18 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 42, 18 Dec 1832; P/264/96.

3Ltr from S. Crawford Accountant Mil Dept to Chief Sec to Gvt, 2 Aug 1833; MMDC No's 3 and 4, 16 Aug, 1833; P/265/76.
issue, incidentally, was still not settled when India gained her independence in 1947. Major Nash in command of the Ganjam Sibbendi Corps was paid his basic pay from military funds while his command, regimental, and horse allowances were declared to be civil charges. The Governor in Council had to approve each entry in these accounts.

The minor subordinate officer of the Accountant General, in terms of volume of business not in terms of the importance of his work, was the Superintendent of Family and Pension Payments. The family payments were paid at the sepoy's request to families which did not accompany the sepoy wherever he was stationed. Both military pension payments and family payments were made at the military station by paymasters or at the district collector's office by the collector and magistrate nearest to the retiree's registered quarters. This office was entirely concerned with military family and pension payments. Although not subordinate to the Military Auditor General, the Superintendent of Family and Pension Payments had to work closely with the Military Auditor General.

The activities of the Financial Department were essential to the Madras Government in general and the Army in particular. For the Army to be a reliable instrument of state power, the officers and men had to be paid.

1 Ltr from W. Cullen Mil Aud Gen to Gov in Council, 11 Jun 1833; MMDC No.'s 47 and 48; and Ltr from S. Crawford Accountant Mil Dept to Chief Sec to Gvt, 2 Aug 1833; MMDC No.'s 3 and 4, 13 Aug 1833; P/265/20. The examples cited, which were declared to be civil charges, were forwarded by the Military Auditor General to the Governor in Council, approved by the Governor in Council in the Military Department, and then returned to the Military Auditor General's office for insertion in the transfer account to be paid as civil charges.

2 Minute by The Governor from Fredrick Adam, 21 Aug 1834; MMDC No. 13, 5 Sep 1834; P/265/51.
regularly no matter what the circumstances. If the sepoys were to travel willingly, the Government had to provide for their families while the Army was deployed. Reasonable forecasts of expenses and provisions to meet them, with allowances for exigencies, were critical to the efficient operation of the Madras Army.

Military Department

The only Department of Government that generated enough business to require its own Secretary was the Military Department. The Governor in Council as the Military Department directly supervised: the Garrison of Fort Saint George, the Commander in Chief who in turn supervised the combat units of the Madras Army and of the British Army in the Presidency as well as the Medical Board, the Military Board, the Commissariat, and the Clothing Board. I have discussed in some detail those parts of the Military Department which are central to understanding the Madras Army or which actively reached into the Vishakapatnam District.

The Garrison of Fort Saint George

The supervision of the Garrison of Fort Saint George by the Military Department was nominal; because, the Court of Directors specifically appointed the Governor, in addition to his appointment as Governor of the Presidency, "... to be our Governor and Commander in Chief of our Fort and Garrison of Fort Saint George and Town of Madraspatnam and of all the Forces which are now or hereafter shall be employed ... within the said Fort, Garrison, and Town." In this same proclamation "... all Commissioned
Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Soldiers, and others belong to our Military Forces and all the People and Inhabitants employed or residing in our Fort, Garrison and town... were required "... to yield you as Governor and Commander in Chief... due obedience..." This language may have been anachronistic and unnecessary in the early 1830's, but it did give the Governor of Madras both civil and military authority in the capital and precluded any disagreement about who was in charge if the French, or any other power, should appear at the gates again.

In command of the Fort Saint George garrison, the Governor had a seven officer staff. This staff included the Governor's personal staff: his Private Secretary, his Acting Military Secretary, and his Aide-de-Camp. Also on the garrison staff were the Town Major, the Fort Adjutant, and the Garrison Surgeon with an assistant. The Town Major apparently was responsible for routine military operations and discipline in the garrison and the city. His duties included supervising the Superintending Officer of Gentlemen Cadets. This officer maintained a mess where cadets newly arrived from Britain could stay until posted to a regiment or corps. By the early 1830's the garrison of Fort Saint George was primarily concerned with ceremonial duties and provided a reserve force to the police in case of riot.

General Staff
The Commander in Chief

The Commander in Chief at Madras (CIC) in 1832 was Lieutenant General

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1Proclamation, Signed by order of the Court of Directors of the said United Company by P. Aubert, Secretary, 27 June 1832; at East India House, London: in FSG, 1832 pp 793-94, V/11758B.

2FSG Army List, 30 June 1832, p 4.

3GOG 18 Jul 1820; Gordon, pp 80-89.
Sir Robert O'Callaghan who commanded the combat units of both the East India Company's Madras Army and the British Army units assigned to the Madras Presidency. General O'Callaghan exercised his command through the "General Staff of the Army serving under the Presidency of Fort Saint George" and was responsible to the Governor in Council for the efficiency, or combat readiness, of the Army. Included in the General Staff were: the division commanders, the Adjutant General of the Army and four assistants, the Quartermaster General of the Army and four assistants, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, the Persian Interpreter to Headquarters, the Military Secretary to the CIC, and the Aide-de-Camp to the CIC. Part and parcel of the General Staff of the Army were the staff members of His Majesty's Forces: a Deputy Adjutant General, a Deputy Quartermaster General, a Brigade Major, and an Inspector General of Hospitals. Most of the agencies of this General Staff worked at the Madras Army Headquarters located on the Choultry Plain near Madras. The division commanders were with their divisions in the field.

1General O'Callaghan was a royal officer. From the time Major General Sir Thomas Munro served as both Governor and CIC in 1821-21, a royal officer was routinely appointed as the CIC apparently to provide employment for generals left from the Napoleonic wars. This arrangement did make it easy for royal officers to accept being placed with their regiments under the command of the Madras CIC. Prinsep, pp xxxii-xxxiii.

2FSG Army List, 30 Jun 1832, p 1.

3The AG and QMG were the primary channel of communications for the CIC, both to the Military Department and to subordinates.

4Persian was the official language of India until "By a series of enactments beginning from 1835 English and the vernacular languages replaced Persian...." Smith, History of India, p. 649.

5FSG Army List, pp 1-2
General O'Callaghan as CIC held three major offices in the Madras Government. He was the CIC, a Member of Council, and President of the Military Board. The CIC's command authority extended throughout the Madras Presidency except in the capital and applied to both the Company's and the King's forces. The CIC was subordinate to the Governor in Council and was the second ranking individual in the Presidency. This involved bureaucracy produced an elaborate decision-making process. When the 3rd Light Infantry (LI) was moved from Pallavaram, near Madras, to Visianagaram, the Governor sent a Minute to the Governor in Council proposing the move "...at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief...." The Governor in Council as the Military Department then sent an order to the CIC to make the move "...with all possible expedition...." The field commanders were subordinate to the CIC. For instance, the Officer Commanding the Northern Division (OCND) routinely submitted reports on the military situation in the Northern Division to the CIC outlining actions taken and closing with the following phrase: "...which I hope will meet the approval of His Excellency the Commander in Chief." The organizations, on the other hand, such as the Commissariat which reported directly to the Governor in Council, even though manned with military officers and performing essential services primarily for the Army, were not subordinate to the CIC. When the CIC wanted the Commissariat to change the basis of issue of mutton for European soldiers, he had to recommend the change to the Governor in

1President's Minute 8 Jun 1832 and ltr 11 Jun 1832 from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to CIC, 11 Jun 1832; MNDC No. 53 and 54, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85. For the importance of this movement in the events of this case study see the next chapter.

2Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Adjutant General of the Army, 29 Nov 1832; EFSGRDC, 4 Dec 1832, in Bul's Col. 503/3v1, pp. 434-35.
Council. They then asked the opinion of the Commissariat staff before approving the CIC's recommended change and ordering the Commissariat to submit, for approval, a regulation implementing the new basis of issue.¹ Thus Sir Fredrick Adam's analysis of the frustration of the position of the CIC in India, that he was subordinate to the Governor-General and therefore any changes the CIC in India would like to make to increase the efficiency of the Army would be taken out of the CIC's control because money was involved², applied equally in Madras.

The CIC's responsibilities, in general, entailed the military efficiency of the Army, i.e. combat readiness, discipline, and health. He monitored the actions of the division commanders and the condition of their units. The CIC ordered, with the sanction of the Governor in Council, the publishing of standing orders which detailed the duties of each member of the Army.³ He recommended appointments to staff positions, promotions, invalidings, retirement, and other personnel actions, which, because pay and allowances were involved, required the approval of the Governor in Council. He supervised discipline through courts martial and ensured their maximum

¹Ltr from T. H. S. Conway AG of the Army to Sec to Gvt in the Mil Dept, 13 Aug 1833; Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to Dep Commissary General, 17 Aug 1833; Ltr from A. Tulloch Major Dep Commissary General to Chief Sec to Gvt, 30 Aug 1833; MMDC No's 66, 67, 68, and 69, 3 Sep 1833; P/265/21.

²Ltr from Sir Fredrick Adam Gov of Madras to his brother Charles, 7 Apr 1833; Adam of Blair-Adam Muniments, Bundle 3/284. Sir Fredrick was explaining why he was no longer interested in being CIC in India should the position become available. He stressed that he got along very well with General O'Callaghan who was a straightforward, hard working officer and not at all jealous of Sir Fredrick's position and authority as Governor.

³Adjutant General's Office, Standing Orders for the Native Infantry of the Madras Army (Madras: J. Wright at the Commercial Advertiser Press, 1848), foreword. This edition superseded the edition of 1830 which I have not been able to locate.
educational impact on the Army by routinely publishing the proceedings in *The Fort Saint George Gazette.*¹ The CIC's responsibility for the troops' health included ensuring that they were able to purchase rice in the local market while in garrison. In August of 1833 when the supply of rice was unreliable because of drought, the CIC requested that the Governor in Council authorize the distribution of rice by the Government to the sepoys at Machilipatnam and other stations further south. The Governor in Council refused to furnish rice unless the supply in the market failed completely and continued to reimburse the sepoys for their extraordinary expense above the usual price.² The CIC was responsible for the efficiency of the Army but any action which involved money, and most actions did, required the approval of the Governor in Council who did not automatically approve the proposals of the CIC. Because of the CIC's responsibility for the health of the troops and because the bulk of the official medical practice was with the troops, the Madras Presidency's medical establishment was part of the Madras Army. The CIC therefore supervised the Medical Board which is discussed after the rest of the General Staff.

General Staff
The Adjutant General

The Adjutant General of the Army (AG) was one of the two primary agencies of the General Staff which conducted the bulk of the staff actions and were the official channels of communication for routine business between

¹FSGG 1833, p 100; V/11/1587.

²Ltr from T. H. S. Conway AG of the Army to Sec to Gvt in the Mil Dept, 15 Aug 1833, and Ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Deputy Commissary General, 15 Aug 1833; MMDG No's 1 and 2, Diary, 16 Aug 1833; P/265/19. This procedure was regulated by: GOG 5 Oct 1813; Gordon, pp. 156-57.
the CIC and the Governor in Council on the one hand and the Army on the other hand; the second of the two was the Quartermaster General. During a Military Department Consultation in August 1834, the Governor in Council quoted a 26 August 1810 letter from the Court of Directors directing that these two offices should be the only channels of communication between the Governor in Council and the CIC, unless he sent a personal communication in highly unusual circumstances. The Governor in Council's complaint was that the CIC had had his military secretary send official letters to them. The Court of Directors' rationale was that: "The Adjutant General of the Company's Army, an officer of long experience and generally of distinguished character in the service, is directly accountable to us and responsible for the regularity and correctness of his conduct and opinion...."1 In 1832 the AG was Lieutenant Colonel J. H. S. Conway who had entered the Company's service in 1793 and had served as AG since 1809.2 The Company, thus deliberately arranged for a highly experienced officer of the Madras Army to be a central figure of the General Staff to provide the CIC, who could be expected not to have previous experience in Madras, with a ready source of local knowledge from a Company officer who would be well aware that his future depended upon the satisfaction of the Court of Directors with his performance.

The AG had four officer assistants on the General Staff to help him accomplish his duties. Within the AG's Department, were 21 additional officers serving as adjutants, majors of brigade, and staff officers to

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1Resolution 19 Aug 1834; MMDC No's 18 and 19, 19 Aug 1834; P/265/50.
2FSG Army List, 30 Jun 1832, p. 5 and Buckland, p. 92.
subordinate commanders of the Army; regimental adjutants were not in the AG's Department. In the 1849 edition of the General Regulations of the Madras Army, the duties of the AG were summarized:

1. The Adjutant General is responsible, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, for the discipline and efficiency of the whole Army, and for its interior economy in every branch, including all arrangements connected with the Soldiers' Equipments, Arms, Accoutrements, and Ammunition, Discharges, Transfers, Invaliding, and Pensioning, Recruiting, Clothing, Promotions and Adjustment of Rank—appointment of officers to Regiments... claims of Soldiers, Soldiers' Libraries, and Advances of Pay to Officers.

2. He is charged with the issue of all orders from the Commander in Chief, whether regarding the preparation for march or service, or the organization and discipline of the Troops in the Field or Garrison, and he attaches to them Officers of every branch as may be required.

3. All correspondence of a general or political nature not otherwise specially provided for is to be addressed to the Adjutant General.

4. Before reliefs of Regiments are ordered or when Corps are required for employment upon Foreign or other Service, he is required to submit to the Commander in Chief a report affording full information of the actual state of each Regiment and its fitness for the particular object in view. [Because these reports were not forwarded to the Military Department they are not preserved in the Consultations.]

5. It is his duty to order such Guards and Escorts as may be required, whether in the Field or in Garrison.

6. In the Field, the Adjutant General issued the orders of the day, and regulates the duties of the Troops, ascertaining that those of the Out-posts especially are carried on by all ranks with strict attention to orders.

7. He is responsible that all Troops for duty, and all Detachments are carefully inspected before being marched off, ..., and that they are provided when necessary with provisions, pay, &c.

8. He issues all instructions connected with the operations of the Army to the General or other Officers Commanding Divisions or Detachments, and receives the reports from them of their execution.

9. He regulates the duties of the Provosts Martial, and all that concerns Prisoners of War.

10. He directs all operations of the troops on the line of march, the Quarter Master [sic] General conducting the columns and regulating their route.

The correspondence preserved in the Madras Military Department Consultations

1FSG Army List, 30 Jun 1832, pp. 5 and 6.

indicates that this summary of the AG's duties was accurate in 1832. The bulk of the AG's work seems to have been concerned with military personnel administration.¹

General Staff
The Quartermaster General

The second office of the General staff which shared responsibility for the CIC's correspondence with the AG was the Quartermaster General of the Army (QMG). In 1832 the QMG was Lieutenant Colonel James Hanson who had become a cadet in the Madras Army in 1805.² He, like the AG, provided the CIC a ready source of local knowledge and provided the Court of Directors a Company officer in a sensitive position. The QMG had four officer assistants on the General Staff. His Department included seven other officers serving on the division and subsidiary force staffs where they were fully subordinate to the local commanders. Regimental quartermaster generals were not part of the QMG's Department.

The 1849 edition of the General Regulations of the Madras Army also provides a useful summary of the QMG's duties:

1. The Quarter Master [sic] General is charged with the general distribution of the Army, with the arrangement of all dispositions and plans of defense, with the reconnaissances [sic] of all routes and ground for Encampments or Cantonments, with the superintendence of all movements whether in field or Garrison.

¹Because personnel actions involve money and, therefore, required approval by the Governor in Council whose deliberations were preserved, this impression may be erroneous because of the nature of the documents preserved.

²FSG Army List, 30 June 1832, p. 7 and Dodwell, pp 84-5.

³FSG Army List, 30 June 1832, p. 7.
2. The Quarter Master General is to inform himself of the military resources of the country, in regard to provisions, labourers, horses and cattle, and the means of transporting troops and stores, &c.; he is to obtain an accurate military knowledge of the strong features of the country, of Military Depots, of all fortified places, ..., and of every particular which may increase the power of acting with advantage offensively or defensively against the enemy.

3. Under him are all Camp Equipage, Guides, Public Cattle including Karkhanas (bullocks) of Artillery, and generally everything concerned with the conveyance of the troops.

4. and 5. (Duties assigned to the QMG between 1832 and 1849 after the period of this study.)

6. He gives all the required notices of movements of Troops to the Civil and other Departments, and makes every necessary arrangement for their being put in motion, and transmits to them march routes, notifying to the Adjutant General by what route and when the movement will be made...

7. In the Field, the Quarter Master General selects all ground for encampment, determines on situations for Depots and Magazines, reconnoitres and fixes on routes of march and points out ... positions it may be necessary to occupy for the security of the movement.

8. He communicates to the Officers Commanding columns whatever topographical information may be necessary previous to their movement--he attaches an Officer of his Department as a Guide to each column. He precedes the Army with the advanced Corps for the purpose of determining on and marking out the new ground .... he arranges the stations of the various Picquets, Posts and Guards. He regulates the interior arrangement of the Camp ... He has the general supervision of all working parties, all foraging is conducted under his orders and he receives reports from and gives instructions to the Baggage master.

9. The Intelligence Department, however, formed is to be under his directions, unless assigned otherwise by the Commander in Chief.

Just as the record indicates that the summary of the AG's duties was accurate, the record indicates that the summary of the QMG's duties was accurate.

The QMG's responsibility for non-cattle, while not the most glamorous of activities, was vital to the efficiency of the Army. Based on standard loads of camp equipment and other official baggage the Madras Army official establishment was fixed at 100 elephants, 557 camels, and 4700 bullocks to support the troops in the field. An additional 3993 bullocks were hired on long term contracts. The elephants and camels were purchased from Bengal.

\[1\] AG's Office, General Regulations, p. 476.
and, with the bullocks, were kept at various stations to be used as the situation required and as the CIC ordered. The public cattle establishment had been inherited from Tipu Sultan of Mysore. There were 130 bullocks permanently stationed at Machilipatnam to support the artillery there.¹

The QMG's responsibility for camp equipment extended to civilians as well as military personnel. For example this office supplied senior civilians among whom were the Governor of Madras and the Bishop of Calcutta with tents. Prior to 1833 the Governor simply ordered his tents, but in 1833 the Governor's camp equipment was put under the care of the QMG. The QMG not only provided the Bishop of Calcutta tents for his tour to Thanjavur in 1834 but also provided elephants, camels, and lascars.² The Army had the resources, in the QMG's care, to support a large official party on the march. When senior civil officials needed those resources, they were made available.

General Staff
The Judge Advocate General

The Judge Advocate General of the Army (JA) administered marital law for the Army under the orders of the CIC. The JA in 1832 was Captain Henry P. Keating. His Department included nine other officers assigned to Districts which roughly corresponded to the divisions and field forces of the Army. The JA for each District was not a member of the local

¹Report from W. Strahan Dep QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 20 Sep 1834; MMDC Diary No 3, 23 Sep 1834, P/265/53.

²Ltr from W. Strahan Act’g QMG to CIC, 30 Dec 1834; MEDC No. 8, 30 Dec 1834; P/330/46 and Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 5 Mar 1833; MMDC No's 19 and 20, 15 Mar 1833; P/265/9.
commander's staff. District IV was at Vishakhapatnam. A JA was required to "...prosecute in the name of Government at all general courts martial." The JA performed the legal staff work for the CIC.

General Staff
His Majesty's Forces

Included in the General Staff of the Army were four royal staff officers. For His Majesty's Forces on the Madras establishment, the CIC was provided a colonel as Deputy AG, a colonel as Deputy QMG, a major as Brigade Major, and an Inspector General of Hospitals who in 1832 was a medical doctor (M.D.). Assumedly their duties paralleled those of the Company's officers with the same titles. The British Army units were integrated in the divisions of the Madras Army. A discussion of HM's Inspector General of Hospitals illustrates the relationships between the British officers on the staff and both the CIC and the rest of the Army.

In January 1826 the Madras Government complied with the Governor General's order to publish the following extract from the 3 August 1825 General Military Letter from the Court of Directors:

"His Majesty's Government having determined that Medical Inspecting Officers should be attached to the Staff of His Majesty's Army in India, for the purpose of furnishing to his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief and to the Army Medical Board, Reports on the Health of the King's Troops, and the state of their Regimental Hospitals, we have to advise you of the appointment of an Inspector of Hospitals, to the Staff of The Commander in Chief in India: and of a Deputy Inspector

1FSG Army List, 30 June 1832, pp. 8, and 13-5. The other Districts were at: Kamptee, Jalna, Secunderabad, Bangalore, Bellary, St. Thomas's Mount, Nilgiri Hills, and Cannanore.

2Reg. V of 1827, Art. II; Campbell, Code, p. 570.

3FSG Army List, 30 June 1832, p. 2.
of Hospitals to that of the Commanders in Chief at the Presidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay respectively."

Three years later with a record of "Great inconvenience and collision having occurred between the duties of the Medical Board and those of His Majesty's Inspector of Hospitals..." their respective responsibilities were defined in a General Order of the Madras Government...

...in conformity with the instruction received by His Majesty's Inspector[,] recommended by the Commander in Chief of the Presidency[,] and approved by the Commander in Chief in India.... The Superintendence of His Majesty's Hospitals will rest solely with His Majesty's Inspector as to professional practice leaving that[,] however[,] of economical concerns where it has always been with the Superintending Surgeons of the Company's Service. But that such of these Hospitals which may be out of the reach of the visits of the former may not be deprived of the advantage of personal inspection--in such case professional as well as economical points will come under the examination of the Superintending Surgeons of Divisions, under such instructions as they may receive from His Majesty's Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals and reporting solely through him on professional points for the information of the Commander in Chief, thus adopting the principle long established for the Military Inspection of His Majesty's Regiments where Officers Commanding the Divisions in which they are serving though of the Company's Service report only on Military points through the Deputy Adjutant General of His Majesty's Service.

Thus the staff officers of His Majesty's forces on the Madras establishment had a dual chain for reporting: to the Madras Commander in Chief through the appropriate channels and to the various military authorities in London. Because of the limited number of His Majesty's staff officers in Madras, some of His Majesty's regiments and hospitals faced inspection for professional competence by Company Officers. Without cooperation between all parties this arrangement would appear to be totally unworkable; it certainly was fraught with "Great inconvenience and collision."

\footnote{1}{GOG 10 Jan 1826 in R. Gordon, An Abridgement of the General Orders, Issued at the Presidency of Fort Saint George, from 1800 to 30th June 1840, (Madras: J. B. Pharoah, 1840), p. 324.}

\footnote{2}{GOG 13 Mar 1829 in Gordon, p. 326.}
The General Staff of the Army included the five division commanders of the Madras Army. The combat units of the Madras Army were organized in these divisions and the two subsidiary forces beyond the frontiers in Hyderabad and Nagpur. These commands covered the portion of South Asia assigned to the Madras Army. All of South Asia subordinate to the East India Company was divided into territorial military commands most of which were explicitly labeled divisions and all of which were assigned to the Madras, Bombay, or Bengal Armies. These divisions included the territories of the Native States which were nominally independent. The incorporation of the Native States' territories may have represented a dropping of the fiction of their independence by the military authorities or may have been simply a practical way of accepting responsibility for the common defense. These divisions were capable of conducting independent combat operations and of defending themselves against anticipated threats, internal or external, until reinforcements arrived from other divisions.

1 FSG Army List, 30 Jun 1832, p 1.
2 "Maps illustrative of the European Connection with India and of the British Administration in its several departments." London, printed by order of the Honorable Court of Directors, 1833. "Military Map of India (showing the Territories under the Armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, with their Military Divisions)." IOR 4C.120.
3 Report from Mil Bd to Governor in Council, 3 Jan 1832; MMDC, No. 37, 21 Feb 1832; P/264/75.
Vishakapatnam District was in the Northern Division of the Madras Army which included all of the Northern Circars. The Officer Commanding the Northern Division's (OCDN) staff included a Deputy Assistant AG, a Deputy Assistant QMG, an Aid-de-Camp, and a Superintending Surgeon. The forces of the Northern Division as of 1 January 1833 consisted of a detachment of artillery, one Royal Infantry Regiment, nine Native Infantry Regiments, and the Carnatic European Veteran Battalion with the necessary support elements. The government of Madras manned and equipped the Northern Division specifically to deal with internal disturbances in its own area of responsibility and to dispatch assistance to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force if required.

Ordinarily the OCDN communicated directly with the Commander in Chief of the Madras Army (CIC) through either the Adjutant General of the Army or the Quartermaster General. The CIC then forwarded items through the

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1The divisions and commands of the Madras Army in India 1832-1833 were: Southern Div., HQ Trichinopoly; Northern Div., HQ Machilipatnam; Centre Div., HQ Presidency; Mysore Div., HQ Bangalore; Malabar and Canara, HQ Cannanore; Ceded Districts, HQ Bellary; Subsidiary Force serving His Highness the Soubadar of the Deccan, HQ Secunderabad, and the Nagpore Subsidiary Force, HQ Kamptee. From: Military Auditor General, Annual Madras Military Statement, 24 Dec 1834, p 19; L/MIL/8/107.

2A Madras Native Infantry Regiment at this time was authorized 920 personnel including officials, servants, dragoons, officers, etc. From: Military Auditor General, Annual Madras Military Statement, 24 Dec 1834, p 19; L/MIL/8/107.


4Suggestion by Supreme Government extract from Mr. Secretary Clerk's letter of 30 Apr 1832; and From J. H. B. to Governor in Council, 3 Apr 1832, P/264/75.

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Secretary to Government in the Military Department to the Governor in Council sitting as the Military Department. The OCND additionally corresponded with the Military Board\(^1\) who also sent items directly to the Governor in Council.

In this case study two additional channels of communication were opened between the OCND and the Governor in Madras. In the letter authorizing the OCND to administer martial law, he was directed to submit reports of his operations for Government directly to the Chief Secretary and to send copies of these reports to the CIC.\(^2\) By private arrangement, the OCND and the Governor corresponded directly.\(^3\)

The Medical Board

The Medical Board was subordinate to\(^4\) and responsible to the Commander in Chief for the medical care of the Army but was not part of the General Staff. To accomplish this responsibility the Medical Board supervised the Presidency, garrison, cantonment, and lock hospitals\(^5\), as well as the lunatic asylum at Madras and the regimental medical establishments. The Board supervised the superintending surgeons at each division headquarters

\(^1\)Described below.

\(^2\)Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Gen. Taylor OCND, 4 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 475-79.

\(^3\)Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Maj. Hodges pvt sec to Gov of Madras, 8 Jan 1833; General Sir George Henry Andrew Taylor, Papers, 1827-1873, Unpublished manuscripts held by William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.

\(^4\)GOCC 10 Nov 1828 and GOCC 9 Apr 1831 in Gorden, pp. 326-27.

\(^5\)For the history of the lock hospitals and related subjects, see: Kenneth Ballhatchet, Race, Sex and Class under the Raj (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).
and elsewhere who in turn supervised the regimental surgeons.\textsuperscript{1} The
President of the three member Medical Board was granted the rank of colonel
by virtue of his office.\textsuperscript{2} Members served on the Board for five year terms
which could be extended only with the approval of the Court of Directors.\textsuperscript{3}
Among the duties of the Medical Board was supervision of the medical supply
system throughout the Presidency\textsuperscript{4} and "...of instruction in Medicine and
Surgery to Indo-British and Native Youths entering the medical Branch of
the Service...." By 1839, incidentally, this instruction was administered by
a Medical School whose examination had to be passed by a medical apprentice
before he could be promoted to assistant apothecary.\textsuperscript{5} Each regiment of the
Madras Native Infantry was authorized a European surgeon and assistant
surgeon and an Indian senior assistant apothecary and second dresser.\textsuperscript{6}
The Government provided hospitals "for the Native sick" at each garrison and
cantonment including a ten bed hospital at Machilipatnam and a five bed
hospital at Vishakhapatnam.\textsuperscript{7} Wherever a regiment was stationed for a long
enough period to justify the expense of permanent buildings a regimental

\begin{enumerate}
\item Gordon, pp. 323-26.
\item Ltr from T. H. Davies, J. Hay, anu J. Annesley (the Med Bd) to the
Gov in Council, 13 Jan 1834; MMDC No. 39, 7 Feb 1834; P/265/37. and GOG 20
Jan 1835 in Gordon, p. 331.
\item GOG 27 Jan 1829 in Gordon, p. 326.
\item GOG 13 Feb 1835 in Gordon, pp. 331-32.
\item GOG 16 Jul 1839 in Gordon, pp. 335-36.
\item Military Auditor General. Annual Madras Military Statement,
\item List from H. S. Fleming Sec to Med Bd, 17 Jan 1833; MMDC No. 20,
29 Jan 1833; P/265/9.
\end{enumerate}
hospital was established. The sites of permanent buildings required approval of the medical authorities.¹ Although the medical establishment was supervised by the CIC and had been created to provide the Madras Army medical care, such care was furnished to "...all classes of persons in His Majesty's and the Honorable Company's Service, whether Civil or Military..." free of charge by the officers of the medical establishment. No matter what normal duties they were assigned, medical officers had to provide emergency service when necessary for those entitled to care.²

They also provided care at civil stations and jails² The civil medical establishment was part of the Army and included among the responsibilities of the CIC but under the control of the collector and magistrate in the districts. In January 1832 the Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam informed the Judicial Department that he had sent two dressers with medicine to two villages suffering severely from cholera at the request of the villagers. The Governor in Council approved his action and stated that they would "...sanction the charge which may be incurred by forwarding medical assistance in your district to persons attacked by cholera."³ The Collector and Magistrate eventually submitted a charge for 80 Rupees six Annas against this blank check. The Governor in Council forwarded this

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¹Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 28 May 1833; and Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 22 Jan 1828; MMDC No's 37 and 39, 21 Jun 1833; P/265/15.
²GOCC 10 Nov 1828, GOCC 9 Apr 1831, and GOG 20 Jan 1835 in Gordon, pp. 326, 327, and 329.
³Ltr from T. H. Davies, J. Hay, and J. Annesley (the Med Bd) to the Gov in Council, 13 Jan 1834; MMDC No. 38, 7 Feb 1834; P/265/37.
⁴Ltr from H. Gardiner ColI and Mag to Chief Sec to Gvt, 19 Jan 1832; MMDC No's 12 and 13, 21 Jan 1832; P/324/58.
⁵Ltr from H. Gardiner ColI and Mag to Sec to Gvt Jud Dept, 30 Mar 1832, MJDC No's 11, 12, and 13, 6 Apr 1832; P/324/60.
charge to the Civil Auditor. The civil medical establishment was under the Medical Board and thus part of the Madras Army but available to any member of the Government and in an emergency care could be extended to the public.

The Military Board

The Military Board reported directly to the Military Department and was not subordinate to the CIC. He was certainly aware of the deliberations and actions of the Military Board, because he was President of the Board. The members were: the Commandant of Artillery, the Chief Engineer, the Military Auditor General, the Adjutant General of the Army, and the Quarter Master General of the Army. The Military Board was supposed to review all military expenditures, except pay, to prevent fraud. The Military Board was responsible for all fortifications, public buildings and roads except those buildings and roads maintained in the Revenue Department. Because of their responsibilities for these public works, the Military Board supervised the Chief Engineer. The Board also supervised the Ordnance

1The Regiment of Artillery of the Madras Army was organized in two battalions of European horse artillery, three battalions of European foot artillery, and one battalion of Indian foot artillery (known as Golandaz) assigned to the various divisions of the Army. A depot of instruction was maintained at St. Thomas's Mount. Promotions for artillery officers were separate from the other officers of the Army and the senior artilleryman was the Commandant of Artillery. He was responsible for the technical skill of the artillery (their proficiency and tactical doctrine) as well as their personnel administration. The Commandant of Artillery had no command authority. All artillery was under the command of the local commanders. Military Auditor General, Annual Madras Military Statement, 24 Dec 1834, p. 286; L/MIL/107; and Ltr from the Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 18 Nov 1831; MMDC No. 48; 16 Mar 1832 P/264/77.
Department and the Superintendent of the Gunpowder Manufactory.¹

The Court of Directors required that the Governor in Council refer proposed military expenditures to the Military Board before disposing of the proposal. Because of their collective skills and experience, they were expected to relieve the Governor in Council of the necessity of reviewing each item of expenditure. The Board was also designed to provide the Governor in Council a ready source of professional expertise on any military subject, such as new equipment and regulations. The Court of Directors, also, prescribed that discussion on the Board would be free and that Board decisions would be reached by majority vote. Each member of the Military Board was held individually responsible for the Board's actions to the Court of Directors.² It is interesting that with all this responsibility most of the Military Board's business was performed by the Secretary to the Board, Lieutenant Colonel Maclean. When he was ill, the Governor in Council required one of the members to appear in the Military Board's office each day to accomplish the work the Secretary usually disposed of himself.³

In the discharge of its responsibilities for the fortifications (military engineering) and other non-Revenue public works, the Military Board supervised the Chief Engineer who was a member of the Board. Subordinate to him were fourteen Superintending Engineers and their assistants.

¹Minute of the AG from T. H. S. Conway, 27 Sep 1831; MMDC No. 48; P/264/77. President's Minute from S. R. Lushington, 17 Sep 1832; MMDC No. 8, 17 Sept 1832; P/264/89 and Letter by Junius, 3 Mar 1834, Supplement to the Madras Military Asylum Herald, 17 Mar 1834.

²Minute of the AG from T. H. S. Conway, 27 Sept 1831; MMDC No. 48; P/264/77. President's Minute from S. R. Lushington, 17 Sep 1832; MMDC No. 8, 17 September 1832; P/264/89 and Letter by Junius, 3 Mar 1834, Supplement to the Madras Military Asylum Herald, 17 Mar 1834.

³Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to The Pres and Mbrs of the Mil Bd, 23 Jan 1833; P/265/5.
who were assigned to the divisions of the Army. The Northern Division had both a Superintending Engineer and an assistant.\(^1\) These engineers worked closely with the civil engineers under the Inspector General of Civil Estimates. All the engineers in both organizations were members of the Madras Army Corps of Engineers\(^2\) and moved back and forth between civil and military positions.

In August 1833 in response to a request by the Governor in Council for the preparation for standard plans "...for every description of civil and military building...," the Military Board responded that they were working with the Medical Board on such plans and requested permission for the Chief Engineer to correspond directly with the Sadr Adalat on the design of Judicial Department Buildings. The Governor in Council sitting as the Military Department approved the direct inter-departmental communication and advised the Military Board that military buildings "...should be adopted to the strength of regiments on the peace establishment, but they should be constructed on such plans as will admit of their being readily and conveniently enlarged."\(^3\) The organization of the Madras Government automatically channeled information through the Governor in Council who, when it was conducive to the accomplishment of public business, were

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1. FSG Army List, 1 Jan 1835, pp. 51-2

2. The Corps of Engineers included only 33 European officers and no enlisted personnel. This corps provided the European officers and technical expertise for the Madras Sappers and Miners who had 1048 sepoys under two subadars and eleven jemadars with no European officers assigned. Military Auditor General, Annual Madras Military Statement, 24 Dec 1834, pp 286-7; L/MIL/8/107.

quite willing to approve communication between servants of different departments and who wanted flexibility built into their military organization.

The Military Board supervised two other organizations: the Ordnance Department headed by Lieutenant Colonel William Cullen and the separate and much smaller, but related, Gun Powder Manufactory which, under Lieutenant Colonel Johnstone Napier, supplied the Ordnance Department. Lieutenant Colonel Cullen, whose full title was Principal Commissary and Superintendent Gun Carriage Manufactory, had a Deputy, seven commissaries, and four deputy commissaries all of whom were commissioned regimental officers. The commissaries and deputies were at the various depots and arsenals and were subordinate to the local division commander. The Ordnance Department included 1284 lascars and 214 artificers.1 Among the depots of the Ordnance Department positioned to support the various divisions of the Army were depots at Vishakhapatnam and at Machilipatnam for the Northern Division.2 The Vishakhapatnam depot included two eighteen pounders, two twelve pounders, one five and a half inch mortar, and regimental arms. These were the stores the Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam drew on to arm his civil peons and sibbendies. When the Military Board wanted these particular depots inspected by a lieutenant colonel of artillery in the area, they had to ask the Governor in Council, as the Military Department, who then directed the CIC to order the Lieutenant colonel to perform the inspection as the Military Board

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2Suggestion by Supreme Government extracted from Mr. Secretary Clerk's letter of 30 Apr 1830; and Para's 10, 11, & 16 of Report from Mil Bd to Governor in Council, 3 Jan 1832; MMDC, No's 37 and 38, 21 Feb 1832; P/264/75.
instructed him.¹

The Commissariat

The Commissariat, whose primary duty was to feed the Army in the field, was directly subordinate to the Governor in Council sitting as the Military Department. The Commissary General, in 1832 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Cubbon who entered the Madras Army in 1800², had 27 commissioned regimental officers assigned to the Commissariat. There were a captain Deputy Assistant Commissary General at Machilipatnam and a captain Sub-Assistant Commissary General assigned to the Northern Division³

Within the Military Department, the Commissary General had the unique position of reporting through the Chief Secretary to Government rather than the Secretary in the Military Department. The Commissary General also had the Governor in Council's permission to correspond directly with the CIC and the heads of the various boards. The subordinate officers in the Commissariat were authorized to "...correspond direct with all Civil Authorities, commanding Officers of Divisions, Detachments or Garrisons..." on Commissariat business. The officers of the Commissariat were supposed to report their movements to the commander of the division to which they were assigned. The division commanders could order the Commissariat officer to remain in the division.⁴ General Taylor who commanded the Northern Division explained that when the Commissariat was formed the members of the Commissariat had been subordinate to local commanders. One commander had assigned so many other duties to a Commissariat officer

¹Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 27 Aug 1833; Ltr from R.Clerk Sec to Gvt to CIC, 6 Sept 1833; MMDC No's 49-52, 6 Sep 1833; P/265/21.
²Buckland, p. 101.
³FSG Army List, 30 June 1832, p. 9.
that he had been unable to perform his Commissariat duties. The result was an order by Government forbidding the assignment of any other duties to Commissariat officers.\(^1\) The practical consequence of this order, General Taylor who had served eleven years in the Commissariat said, was that Commissariat officers \(\ldots\) since that period \(\ldots\) have been looked upon more as Civilians than Military men and in many instances they look upon themselves, as independent of both.\(^2\)

The Commissariat employed the bazar system to feed the Army; each unit was served by a bazar. This system probably did not seem at all strange to Europeans accustomed to open air markets and not yet accustomed to department stores. The officer commanding at each station had police authority in the bazar which he delegated to a subordinate officer. The larger cantonments had general military bazars with a Commissariat officer who also held the police authority. Bazarmen registered with this officer to open a shop or office in the bazar. As an incentive to register, they were exempt from the usual taxes on tradesmen, artisans, and professionals. The bazarmen were required to march with the units which their bazar served. Unless the units were marching or about to march, the bazarmen could withdraw from the bazar at anytime. The bazarmen, the official followers (lascars, grass cutters, and others), members of the Army, and officer's private servants were subject to the police authority of the officer in charge of the bazar and to trial by court martial.\(^3\)

Within the Madras Presidency those subject to the bazar regulations could only be tried for minor criminal acts committed within the military

\(^1\)GOG 24 Aug 1813, Gordon, p. 156.

\(^2\)Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 6 May 1833.

\(^3\)Reg VII of 1832, Para's II-IV, Campbells Code, Vol III, pp. 48-56.
bazar by military authority. The commander could impose sentences of fifty lashes and one month's imprisonment at hard labor. Individuals to be tried for crimes justifying harsher punishment and those sentenced to imprisonment were turned over to the nearest criminal judge. No individual subject to the bazar regulations could be sued in civil court for less than 200 Rupees. Such a suit could only be settled by the officer assigned the police authority in the bazar or by a panchayat he convened. This exemption from minor civil suits prevented sepoys and bazarmen being tied up in minor civil suits to the detriment of their duties particularly when the Army was in the field.

When the Army marched, the responsibility for proper operation of the bazar fell on the Commissary officer, the officer commanding, and the collector and magistrate of each district the Army passed through. The Commissary officer ensured that the bazarmen marched and maintained discipline. The officer commanding (actually the QMG), at the earliest opportunity, informed the collectors and magistrates of the route, the number of troops, the supplies required, "...where those supplies should be lodged...," where temporary bridges or boats would be required, and where and when the troops would halt. The collectors and magistrates were required to fill all the requests of the Army that the country could support. The Commissariat maintained a supply of grain at all times.


2GOCC 9 Feb 1814, Gordon, p. 317. The rules for the support by the collectors and magistrates of troops marching went through many versions in a search for efficiency. The principle involved in each version was that the collector and magistrate with his joint revenue and police establishment would mobilize whatever resources, at a fair price, the Army needed. The final version in the Madras Presidency under the Company is found in GOCC 25 March 1837, Gordon, pp. 319-20, which quotes MMDC No. 807, 11 March 1837, which in turn quotes MRDC, No. 206, 4 March 1837,
A portion of this grain was carried with the Army on the march. The Commisariat grain was a reserve in case the bazar supply failed. The Commissary officer and the collector and magistrate together provided contract transport, either bullocks or coolies, for the bazar. For the Northern Division the Commisariat maintained at Machilipatnam a standing contract for bullocks with Rajah Bommadavarra Naganah Naidoo whose father and grandfather had held the same contract. When Commisariat contract transport was not available, the collector and magistrate recruited coolies and bullocks in his district. One important source of cattle and supplies in the bazar were the Brinjaries or Lambadis who were "...the well known tribe of carriers ... found all over Western and Southern India." In the eighteenth century they had supplied all the armies of South India sometimes dealing with both sides in the same campaign.

which finally quotes a letter from the Secretary to the Board of Revenue dated 9 February 1837. In this final version developed in the Revenue Department, the collector and magistrate purchased the supplies requested by the Army and then sold them to the bazarmen at cost for eventual sale in the military bazar to the individuals marching. The Government assumed all the risk of financial loss in the district if the Army did not use all the supplies requested. The bazarmen still took their own commercial risks. This system was followed whether supplies were plentiful or scarce, because the farmers were hesitant to prepare perishable commodities for an unfamiliar and unreliable market. Similar practices were followed in Bengal and Bombay, see: H.W.C. Carnduff, Military and Cantonment Law (Calcutta: S.K. Lahiri & Co., 1904), pp. 70-5, and 81-3. Carnduff, for some reason, did not include any such law or regulation applicable in Madras.

1GOG 24 May 1820, p. 158.

2Ltr from A. Tulloch Maj Dep Comm Gen to Chief Sec to Gvt, 16 Jul 1833; MMDC No. 43, 6 Aug 1833; P/265/19.

3GOG 19 Oct 1813, Gordon, p. 316.

4Edgar Thurston, Castes and Tribes of Southern India, 7 Vols (Madras: Government Press, 1909), 4:207, 210-4. and Ltr from W. Strahan Maj Dep QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 20 Sep 1834; MMDC No. 3, Diary 23 Sep 1834; P/265/53.
The Clothing Board

The final agency of the Military Department reporting directly to the Governor in Council was the Clothing Board. The Clothing Board managed the clothing fund which had been established when the Company's Armies were organized into battalions in the mid-eighteenth century. Part of the pay of each sepoy was withheld each month to cover the cost of his uniforms.1 The membership of the Clothing Board included the Military Auditor General, the Commandant of Artillery, the Adjutant General of the Army (these three were all members of the Military Board also), and the colonel of each regiment.2 In 1832 the Board purchased clothing by contract from Arbuthnot and Company. They produced the clothing for the entire Army at Madras and sent the Northern Division's share there by sea.3

The senior officers of the Madras Army probably saw the most important product of the Clothing Board as the Off-reckonings. Each year, with careful management by the Clothing Board, there was a surplus in the clothing fund known as the Off-reckonings. The Off-reckonings were not returned to the sepoys but, in good European eighteenth century style, were distributed among the officers. The Off-reckonings, originally, were given to the captains and subalterans of the battalions; but by the 1830's after many changes, sharing the Off-reckonings was the prerequisite of retired generals, colonels of regiments, and veteran battalion commanders.4

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2FSG Army List, 30 June 1832, p. 16.
3Ltr from W. G. Pierce and B. R. Hitchins to Gov in Council, 22 Mar 1833; MMDC No. 35, 2 Apr 1833; P/265/10.
review of the Off-reckonings distribution announced on 25 January 1833 makes the importance of this fund obvious: 57 officers shared in the distribution of 251,170 Rupees; nineteen of the officers received 6,461 Rupees each. These numbers are more meaningful when it is recognized that the funds were generated by stoppages from the sepoys' monthly pay of 7 Rupees and that a colonel's full pay and allowances in the field were 1,290 Rupees per month. Reaching rank senior enough to share in the Off-reckonings of the Madras Army was important to men without independent incomes and worth staying on active duty to reach. This practice demonstrates the way in which mercenaries were developing into modern allegedly non-mercenary professionals.

Collector and Magistrate

If the Governor in Council was the keystone of the Madras Government where every department met at the top in the same four men, the collector and magistrate in each district was the foundation of the Government. He was the responsible local European officer who was the agent of every civil department that conducted business in the districts. He performed services in the Military Department for the Madras Army and in turn was aided by them in the performance of his duties.

His title, collector and magistrate, indicates the primary tasks of the office and the importance of those tasks to the Madras Government. The collector supervised the collection of all revenues in the district. To do this task, he employed the same servants with which he maintained internal security as magistrate. He worked with these servants to manage lands

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1 FSGG 1833, pp. 65-67; V/11/1587.
which had been taken into Government management by the Court of Wards, another name for the Board of Revenue. The Revenue Department buildings and some roads in the districts also came under the care of the Revenue Department and thus the collector and magistrate. Major construction was supervised by the Revenue Department's civil engineers who were officers in the Madras Army. In the Judicial Department the collector and magistrate reported using the civil medical establishment assigned to the district for the jails, to care for civil officials, and to fight cholera in the villages. This medical staff was drawn from the Madras Army. As magistrate, with full authority over the police, the collector and magistrate had the responsibility and the legal means with the support of the courts to maintain order. If all else failed the collector and magistrate could call out the Madras Army on his own authority.

In the Public and Financial Departments the collector and magistrate performed many important tasks in the districts. He supervised the tappal establishment, the tahsildar schools, and the travelers' bungalows with their invalid or retired sepoys. He was the district treasurer and civil paymaster. In this position he frequently employed the Madras Army to escort treasure and, in turn, routinely supported the Army by paying families or retirees if there was no military station nearby.

The collector and magistrate played vital roles in the Military Department in support of the Madras Army in the field. Whenever a military movement, whether of a detachment or of a column, was executed in his district, the collector and magistrate was called upon as the local representative of the Madras Government to supply the local resources and knowledge the Army needed. He provided contract coolies and bullocks. He ensured that the bazar was stocked and that ferries were at the river crossings when needed.
He extended the tappal to remote areas where the Army was engaged. The officer commanding was entitled to turn to the collector and magistrate to fill any request within the resources of the country. The support was mutual, the Madras Army provided the ultimate means available to the collector and magistrate to maintain internal security and collect the revenue and he provided the essential local contact for the Madras Army. The third chapter of this study presents in detail an internal security campaign which illustrates the operation of the Madras Government and highlights the inter-dependence of the Army and the civil agencies of the Madras Government.
CHAPTER II

PROFESSIONALISM IN THE MADRAS ARMY

The professionalism of the Madras Army was not modern military professionalism as now defined and discussed by sociologists and others in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The Madras Army's professionalism demonstrated in this case study was a step in the development of modern military professionalism. The officer corps was professional in the sense that these officers spent their adult lives earning a livelihood as officers in a large standing military force and in the sense that on the basis of their experience, they deliberately and rationally attempted to improve the military efficiency of that force within the constraints of the available resources. The personnel policies and programs of the Madras Army illustrate their attempt to improve military efficiency based on professional experience. Among the personnel policies and programs which most strongly illustrate the drive for military efficiency are those dealing with the career patterns of both British and Indian officers and those designed to promote the loyalty of the sepoys. The staff system of the Madras Army also illustrates deliberate attempts to improve the efficiency of the Army. That staff system was rationally designed to accomplish efficiently the Madras Army's anticipated missions. This Army used a full range of regulations and manuals to teach professional knowledge and standards and to enforce those standards. The British officers certainly believed that they were modern military professionals and, for the 1830's, they were. It is vital to remember while studying the
Madras Army that it is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual force which is a unique Anglo-Indian hybrid. This Army is neither European nor Indian; it is both. Without the bond of nationalism the British officers had to keep the sepoys loyal to the state and reliable for internal security campaigns.

Personnel Policies and Programs
British Officers

The personnel policies and programs dealing with the British officers are central to understanding the working of the Madras Army and its military efficiency. The accession, promotion, rewards, pay and allowances, and retirement of these officers were the most important of these policies and programs. Family and personal connections played an important role in the careers of these officers and were particularly apparent in the promotion process.

The European officer corps was limited to British men holding a commission from the East India Company. The Court of Directors appointed individuals as cadets and used this power as patronage. The Court commissioned cadets as openings in the officer establishment occurred. This process effectively restricted entry to British gentlemen. Cadets for the Madras Army either received a direct appointment or graduated from the Company's Military

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1 Raymond Callahan, *The East India Company and Army Reform, 1783-1798* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 16-17. His second chapter, "Men without Interest: The Company's Officers," makes it quite clear that the vast majority of the Company's military officers served in India during the late eighteenth century because they lacked the money and the connections to successfully pursue a public career in Britain or simply needed the money they could make in India. The same basic motivations still existed in the early nineteen century. See also: Ainslie T. Embree, *Charles Grant and British Rule in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 123-9, and 178-86.
Seminary at Addiscombe in England\textsuperscript{1}. Addiscombe graduates who stood high enough in their class to become engineers went to Chatham after graduation for a year at the "establishment of field instruction" where they studied "... sapping, mining, pontooning, and civil architecture..."\textsuperscript{2} Among each season's cadets, the Addiscombe graduates ranked ahead of the direct appointees no matter who left England first.\textsuperscript{3} A cadet mess existed at Madras under the direction of the Town Major where a cadet could reside while awaiting commissioning and posting to a regiment.\textsuperscript{4}

After arriving at Madras, the cadets were appointed as cornets or ensigns when vacancies occurred in the regiments. In 1832 the Supreme Government, to standardize the practices of the three Presidency Armies, directed the Madras Army to follow the Bengal Army practice and transfer supernumerary cornets and ensigns to regiments with vacancies in their effective strength before commissioning cadets on the effective strength.\textsuperscript{5}

In March 1833 the Madras Governor in Council at the request of the Commander in Chief ordered the Marine Board to provide transportation for five acting ensigns from Madras to Vishakhapatnam to join the 3rd LI and

\textsuperscript{1}This important institution awaits a modern historical analysis. The best account is: H. M. Vibart, Addiscombe: Its Heros and Men of Note (Westminster: A Constable and Co., 1894).

\textsuperscript{2}"The East India Company Military Seminary," United Service Journal, Part II 1829, p. 226.

\textsuperscript{3}GOG 4 Jul 1834, in Gordon, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{4}GOG 18 Jul 1820, in Gordon, pp. 98-9.

\textsuperscript{5}GOG 16 Nov 1832, in Gordon, p. 99.
By simply assigning cadets to the three Presidencies, the Court of Directors permitted each Army the flexibility of having a pool of replacement officers to assign as casualties from disease, hostilities, or retirement occurred.

Casualties generally caused that event dear to the heart of all officers, amateur or professional, promotion. Promotion in the Madras Army at this time was regimental to major and Army-wide thereafter based on seniority and merit. In 1816 the Court of Directors established the policy of promoting lieutenants to brevet captain after fifteen years of service. Officers received full promotions with pay only when someone above them died, retired, or transferred to the invalid establishment. When Major General Robert Scott died in Europe on 21 December 1832, Major William Williamson of the 3rd LI as the senior major in the Army became a lieutenant colonel thereby generating promotions to major, captain, and lieutenant in that Regiment. The rest of the Army had to wait for another casualty, and the prospects without war were not favorable. General Taylor explained to Sir Frederick Adam that majors commanded about 22 of the 52 regiments of Native Infantry. The senior captains of those regiments had little prospect of promotion and command although many of them had over 20

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1 Ltr from J. Hanson QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 12 Mar 1833; and Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to Pres and Mbrs of Mar Bd, 12 Mar 1833; MMDC No's 37, 38, and 39, 12 Mar 1833; P/265/9.

2 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Frederick Adam, 13 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers. GOG 2 May 1810; Gordon, p. 441. and GOG 8 Jun 1816; Gordon, p. 442.

3 Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Dep AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 6 May 1833; MMDC No's 16 and 17, 7 May 1833; P/265/12.
years of service.¹

Although seniority and merit governed promotions, any time the Governor in Council passed over a senior officer for a promotion in either rank or office such as the appointment of Colonel Taylor over Colonel Farran, the Governor in Council could expect an appeal to the Court of Directors such as Colonel Farran made. Seniority was in most cases the determining factor for promotion. To improve the efficiency of the Army the Governor in Council, therefore, shuffled the colonels and lieutenant colonels from regiment to regiment. General Taylor agreed with Sir Fredrick Adam that the practice was "...an evil, for the change of Commandants are [sic] much to be deprecated in Native Corps, especially, where it is so difficult to find out the character of their men, or the men to become acquainted with theirs.... General Taylor explained, however, that...unless these removals are [sic] occasionally made the service would suffer in another way, by the exclusion from command of smart and active Majors, standing high up in that rank and more competent perhaps than the Lieutenant Colonel removed to make room for them. The Major being strictly a Regimental Officer cannot be appointed to command any other Corps...²

The Governor in Council provided for Major George Muriel in this way.

On 18 April 1832 they transferred Colonel A. Monin from the 8th NI to the 47th NI "...to restore order and regularity among the European Officers." Because he traded positions with Colonel James Welch who was in Europe and because the 8th NI's lieutenant colonel was also in Europe,

¹Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 5 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.

²Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 13 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
Major Muriel assumed command of the Regiment. As the campaign in the Vishakhapatnam District progressed, General Taylor privately called the Governor's attention to Major Muriel "...as an officer worthy of encouragement." With the death at sea of a lieutenant colonel creating an opening, Major Muriel reached lieutenant colonel, and the Governor in Council transferred the absent lieutenant colonel to keep now Lieutenant Colonel Muriel in command of the 8th NI.

At this point, General Taylor suggested to Sir Fredrick that "The promotion of Major Muriel to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel presents an opportunity of furthering the public service and rewarding him for the exertions in the cause in which he has been employed...." General Taylor recommended that the Governor in Council transfer Lieutenant Colonel Bowes who, as the senior officer at Vizianagaram, served as the brigade commander. Once he left, Lieutenant Colonel Muriel would be the senior officer with the two regiments at Vizianagaram and would assume command of the brigade. General Taylor was careful to explain that Lieutenant Colonel Bowes was a friend and "...both zealous and capable of command but has [sic] not the health for active service in such a Country as this." General Taylor also explained to the Governor "...that Major Muriel was a perfect stranger to me before I came to this Division. I shall not therefore be considered (I am sure) as presuming to recommend a friend to your patronage but to be

1GOG 18 Apr 1826; MMDC No. 24, 2 Mar 1832; P/264/77. and FSG Army List, 30 Jun 1832, p. 78.

2Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 2 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.

3FSG Army List, 30 June 1833, "Alterations while Printing" and p. 78.
actuated solely by a sense of duty to a meritorious officer..."¹ On 13 July 1833 Sir Fredrick assured General Taylor that his suggestion about Lieutenant Colonel Muriel had not been forgotten, and on 22 July 1833 General Taylor thanked Sir Fredrick for complying with the Generals' suggestion.² Lieutenant Colonel Muriel achieved command of the brigade, because he had seniority, merit, and the support of the Division Commander. With his career progressing so well and with the Madras Army having clearly identified so capable an officer, Lieutenant Colonel Muriel died on a similar internal security campaign in Ganjam District in April 1836.³ Getting professionally qualified men in responsible positions is important for both professionalism and military efficiency.

With seniority as the determining factor in promotions, the Governor in Council manipulated assignments so that the senior officer who was to exercise command by virtue of that seniority was a man they wanted in command. The Madras Army thus rewarded long and faithful service with promotion and, simultaneously, protected itself against the worst effects of promotion for seniority. The overall success or failure of this manipulation of assignments to maintain the military efficiency of the Madras Army is not as important as the awareness of the problem and the attempt to solve it rationally.

Promotion as well as routine pay and allowances were certainly

¹Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 30 May 1833; General Taylor Papers.

²Ltr from Sir Fredrick Adam to Brig Gen Taylor, 13 Jul 1833; Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 22 Jul 1833; General Taylor Papers.

rewards of service in the Madras Army. An officer could, however, anticipate other rewards of money or honors during his years in the service. Officers in the 1830's could still reasonably hope to share in prize money. In 1836 when the Company defeated the Rajah of Coorg in modern Karnataka, they seized 14,96,735 Rupees. By his royal perogative, William IV was entitled to all the booty which he distributed as prize money to the men involved. Higher rank brought larger shares; for instance, the brigadier commanding received 95,168 Rupees, majors 11,171, ensigns 2,792, subedars 325, European privates 46, and Indian privates and official followers 31.\(^1\) Senior officers, of course, also shared in the Off-reckonings which were discussed earlier.

The rewards of service were not strictly financial. An officer could aspire to a knighthood which General Taylor actively sought. In July 1834 he wrote to Major Henry Hodges, Sir Fredrick Adam's private secretary, and explained that friends in England said the Madras Government must recommend General Taylor if he was to become a Companion of the Bath. He did not know how to approach the Government with such a personal request which was "...of great moment to any one loving his profession, and esteeming the slightest mark of his Sovereign's favour...." General Taylor took the opportunity of his success in the Northern Division to raise this issue.\(^2\) Two days later, General Taylor wrote directly to Sir Fredrick requesting his assistance. The General explained that his aunt, the widow of the

\(^1\)GOG 19 Aug 1836; Gordon, pp. 418-23.

\(^2\)Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Major Hodges Pvt Sec, 26 Jul 1834; General Taylor Paper.
late Lord Harris, presented General Taylor's case to the Duke of Wellington who could not help because he had "no interest" with the King's ministers at the time. No evidence exists of Sir Fredrick either recommending or not recommending General Taylor; but General Taylor did become a Companion of the Bath in 1839, the year after he retired. General Taylor was firmly convinced that his outstanding performance of duty alone would not ensure receipt of such honors as a knighthood but that he also needed the support of the right people.

The British officers' most obvious rewards of service were the pay and allowances they received regularly. Officers of each rank received a set sum as pay no matter what their assigned duties. The monthly amounts of pay in a Madras Native Infantry Regiment varied from 310 Rupees for the colonel to 49 Rupees, 9 Annas, 7 Pice for each ensign. Each officer also received a series of allowances designed to compensate them for the expenses inherent in certain duties or locations. Typical regimental allowances for officers on duty in India included 980 Rupees for the colonel and 132 Rupees for each ensign. The officers were watchful for any opportunity to draw extra allowances.

1George Harris, First Baron, of Seringapatnam and Mysore (1746-1829); CIC Madras 1796-1800 and Acting Governor Feb-Aug 1798. Buckland, p. 191.

2Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 26 Jul 1834; General Taylor Papers.

3Buckland, p. 416.

4Military Auditor General, Annual Madras Militarya Statement, 24 Dec 1834, p. 19; L/Mil/107. The colonel's allowances were: 750 Rs batta, 200 Rs tent allowance, and 30 Rs establishment allowance. Each ensign's allowances were: 45 Rs batta, 12 Rs gratuity, 50 Rs tent allowance, and 25 Rs house rent. Officers on furlough in Europe did not receive allowances.
In March 1833 Major Muriel requested that the Governor in Council permit the officers in the field during this campaign to draw both house allowance and field batta. He explained that the officers were suffering financially because, with the addition of a second regiment at Vizianagaram, housing there was in short supply. If they gave up the leases on their houses, they would be unable to find others when the campaign ended. Rent for their houses took most of their field batta and left nothing to defray such field expenses as hiring baggage coolies in the hills where Government provided cattle were useless. The Military Auditor General explained to the Governor in Council that the regulations permitted officers to draw both field batta and house allowance for three months which Major Muriel and his officers had received. He also explained that circumstances like theirs occurred frequently and advised against granting the request, because "...it might form an inconvenient precedent." The Governor in Council refused the request. Just as the officers were watching for opportunities to gain extra allowances the Governor in Council were watching for opportunities to reduce expenditures.

Officers actively sought staff and command assignments, because those assignments carried a substantial increase in allowances which the Company granted to reward those who accepted additional responsibility. Within a regiment these allowances were substantial, but the real money was in appointments outside the regiments. The officer actually commanding each regiment received a command allowance of 400 Rupees a month. The regiment's

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1 Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 24 Apr 1833; Ltr from BG Taylor OCND to AG of the Army, 15 Apr 1833; Ltr from G. Muriel Maj Cmdg Field Det to Dep AG No Div, 21 Mar 1833; Ltr from W. Cullen Mil Aud Gen to Gov in Council, 17 May 1833; MMDC No's 35b, 3b, and 37, 24 May 1833; P/265/14.
adjutant and quartermaster, who were subalterns, each received monthly allowances of 132 Rupees. The five officers of the Northern Division staff, including the QCND, shared monthly staff allowances of 6,571 Rupees. General Taylor explained that, although subalterns if careful could support themselves on their regimental pay and allowances, every subaltern who did not gain appointment as regimental adjutant or quartermaster sought appointment to the staff. They were eager both to gain the higher standard of living the staff allowances would support and to escape from isolated regimental duties to the excitements of a headquarters in a larger station or in Madras. With promotion to major being regimental by seniority and staff duty paying very well, officers had little incentive to remain with their regiment.

The East India Company did provide adequate pay and allowances to attract enough cadets to man fully the British officer establishment of the Madras Army at the levels the Company desired for military efficiency. The officers were able to support themselves on their pay and allowances, although not always in the style they desired. The way the Governor in Council, with the approval of the Court of Directors, allocated the allowances made staff duty more desirable than regimental duty. Sir Fredrick Adam and General Taylor were concerned about the adverse effect on the Madras Army's military efficiency of regimental officers serving


3Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 13 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
away from their regiments.¹

Retirement was the final reward for those who survived a career in India. Six of seven military officers in the first quarter of the nineteenth century did not survive² to enjoy retirement on the full pay of their rank after 22 years of service.³ Those officers whose health failed generally went to Europe or the Cape of Good Hope on a "sick certificate" for three years and if they did not recover resigned the service in Europe.⁴ Not until 1836 did the Court of Directors grant retirement on half-pay after three years service in India for officers whose health failed.⁵ The Company granted pensions for officers wounded in action which they received in addition to any other pay the officer was entitled to receive. In 1831 the Company changed its regulation on these pensions so that it matched the British Army regulation.⁶ The Governor in Council could transfer an officer who was no longer fit enough for active duty to the invalid establishment which manned various forts and garrisons.⁷ In April 1833 the Governor in Council transferred Major John Crisp to the invalid establishment at his own request even though he was qualified to retire having joined the Army in 1804. He remained on this establishment as a major until he died in 1870 at Calcutta. During those years, he

¹Ltr Fredrick Adam to BG Taylor, 26 Jan 1833; Ltrs from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 5 Feb 1833 and 13 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
³GOG 29 Dec 1800; Gordon, p. 257.
⁴GOG 10 Feb 1801; Gordon, p. 257.
⁵GOG 21 Oct 1836; Gordon, p. 262.
⁶GOG 29 Jul 1831; Gordon, pp. 395-7.
⁷GOG 12 Oct 1834; Gordon, p. 517.
served with both the Carnatic European Veteran Battalion and the 1st Native Veteran Battalion and was for a time the Maratha translator to the Madras Government. It is interesting that the Adjutant General of the Army rather than the commander of Major Crisp's regiment completed the certification of his character required for invaliding, because he had not served in his regiment for the preceding 20 years.1

In April 1833 a committee of officers appointed by the Governor in Council submitted their report on establishing a Military Retiring Fund for the Madras Army. The committee advocated a fund contributed to by the officers of the Army which would provide eight annuities a year. The trustees of the fund would offer these annuities to lieutenant colonels and the senior major each year if they would retire. The fund's purpose was to provide a substantial income above their retired pay for eight officers annually and thus to accelerate promotion by encouraging the retirement of those hanging on for prize money or promotion high enough to get a share of the off-reckonings.2

The Court of Directors supported establishment of such a fund for each of their three Armies. When they realized that they and the officers of their Armies could not agree on the rules for these funds, the Court of Directors instituted some changes in the retiring regulations. They granted officers the pay of each rank upon retiring after a certain period

1Ltr from John Crisp Maj 47th NI to Gov in Council, 31 Mar 1833; Medical Certificate from W. E. Conwell MD Officiating Supt'g Surgeon, 17 Apr 1833; Certificate from B. R. Hitchins Dep AG, 16 May 1833; Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Dep AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 16 May 1833; MMDC No's 9 and 10; P/265/14. and ISG Army List, 1833-61, Indian Army and Civil Service List, 1861-70.

2Report from the Military Retiring Fund Committee to Sir Fredrick Adam Gov in Council, n.d. April 1833; MMDC No. 34, 16 Apr 1833; P/265/11.
whether the officer had reached the rank or not; i.e. captains pay after 23 years, major's after 28 years, lieutenant colonel's after 33 years, and colonel's after 38 years. In 1836 and 1837 the Court of Director's obtained from the Colonial Office permission for retired Company officers to purchase land first in Australia and Van Dieman's Land and then in Canada under the same special terms offered to retired officers of the British Army and Navy. The Court of Director's objective was to make retirement more attractive to older officers and thus improve promotion opportunities. The Court, the Governor in Council, and the members of the Military Retiring Fund Committee all saw the presence of superannuated officers on active duty as reducing military efficiency, and the Court took the actions they could to solve the problem.

Personnel Policies and Programs
Indian Officers

The personnel policies and programs dealing with the Indian officers, subadars and jemadars, of the Madras Army are every bit as central to understanding the military efficiency of the Army as those dealing with the British officers. The central policies and programs were, again, accession, promotion, rewards, pay and allowances, and retirement. The British designed and implemented these for their own purposes which boiled down to ensuring enough loyal Indian officers to maintain military efficiency.

The British officers selected the Indian officers from the ranks of the noncommissioned officers. Entry level to the Indian noncommissioned officer corps was as a lance naik. The General Regulations of the Madras

1GOG 7 Sep 1832; GOG 10 Jun 1836; GOG 21 Oct 1836; and GOG 10 Oct 1837; Gordon, pp. 260-5.
Army required that "...by the judicious selection of Lance Naigues [sic] ... a proportionate influence should be preserved in the principal Castes according to the relative number of each in the Regiment." The regulations required that selection be by seniority "...except to render castes pro-
portional." The British officers could ignore seniority and caste consider-
ations in cases of "...distinguished bravery and conduct in the field, or fidelity to the Government." Lance naiks were on probation for permanent promotion to naik. The British officers could return a lance naik to private at any time. The regulations prohibited the promotion of a sepoy
to naik after he reached twelve years of service. General Taylor reported
that the Company officers were very careful in the selection of Indian
officers in the early 1830's but that they were not as good as they had
been in the eighteenth century. He was sure that "...there is a falling
off in the race: whether it be from the greater demand [for officers], in
more recent days, or from a moral degeneracy in the people..." he could not
say.

The Governor in Council routinely promoted Indian officers to the
ranks of jemadar and subadar for seniority and merit with an eye to the
balance between the castes in the regiments. The commander of the 49th NI
submitted his recommendations for promotion of two jemadars to replace two
deceased subadars on 5 September 1834. In the appropriate format, he
recommended the two senior jemadars who had 24 and 20 years service for
promotion. To fill the vacancies among the jemadars that these promotions

1AG's Office, General Regulations, p. 108.
2Ltr signed CO in the Madras Male Military Asylum Herald, 7 June 1834.
3Memorandum attached to ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam,
5 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
created, the commander passed over seventeen senior havildars before reaching
the second havildar he recommended. The recommended men had served nineteen
and sixteen years respectively, while the maximum service of a passed over
havildar was 34 years. The commander's reasons for recommending the two
havildars were, "...intelligent and of good character" and "...Smart, in-
telligent, and of very good character. Son of the late Subadar Major of
the Regiment." His reasons for not recommending the other seventeen
havildars ranged from "Before the General Invaliding &c Committee..." and
"Very old and very unfit" to "Is not a fit man having been punished for
dissipation [sic] to which he is addicted." The commander forwarded the
required certification of the truthfulness of the men he recommended. The
CIC endorsed the regimental commander's recommendations, and the Governor
in Council promoted them. On 10 September 1834 the CIC recommended that
Havildar Abdool Kader described by his regimental commander as "A particu-
larly smart[,] active[,] and intelligent Non-Commissioned Officer, an
Excellent[,] Steady[,] and respectable Character & a Man of Strict veracity
and well qualified for promotion to the Rank of Native Officer" be passed
over for promotion in favor of Havildar Heera Laul whom the commander
praised just as highly. The CIC recommended the promotion of the junior
havildar "...with a view of equalizing the Hindu Native officers with the
Mussulmans [sic]." The Governor in Council promoted Havildar Heera Laul
who had served for fourteen years and passed over fourteen unqualified
senior havildars as well as Havildar Abdool Kader. The British officers

1 Roll of Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers Recommended
for Promotion in the 49th Regiment Native Infantry signed S.I. Hodson
Lt Col Cmndg, 5 Sep 1834; MMDC No. 27, 26 Sep 1834; P/265/53.

2 Roll of a Jemadars & Havildar recommended for Promotion to the Rank
of Subadar & Jemadar respectively in the 28th Regt NI signed J. Green
Lt Col Cmndg, 29 Aug 1834; MMDC No. 36, 12 Sep 1834; P/265/52.
of the Madras Army did not blindly promote Indian officers for their seniority. The regimental commanders apparently identified those incapable of handling the responsibilities of higher rank and with the CIC and Governor in Council denied them promotion. Such a system should enhance the military efficiency of any army.

In 1819 the Governor in Council created two new ranks: subadar major and color havildar. The CIC selected and the Governor in Council commissioned subadar majors, while corps commanders appointed color havildars. The former carried extra pay of 25 Rupees a month which at the recommendation of the CIC could be continued after retirement; the latter carried extra pay of two Rupees a month. The CIC was charged to select subadar majors strictly for merit and could transfer a subadar from another unit to a unit where no subadar deserved the honor. In April 1833 the CIC exercised that perogative at Machilipatnam. After a general court martial discharged Subadar Major Veerasawmy of the 42nd NI for his part "...in the recent riot and plunder at Machilipatnam..." the CIC "...to mark his displeasure of the conduct of the 42nd Regiment..." transferred Subadar Chengleroyah from the 36th NI to the 42nd and recommended the Governor in Council commission him as the subadar major. They did so. The CIC and the Governor in Council manipulated senior Indian officer promotions and assignments to improve the military efficiency of the Army just as they manipulated promotions and assignments of the senior European officers for the same reason.

For Indian officers, no more or less than for British officers, the

1GOG 2 Feb 1819; Gordon, p. 355.

2Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'd AG of the Army to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 19 Apr 1833; MMDC No's 15 and 16, 23 Apr 1833; P/265/11.
routine reward of active service in the Madras Army was their pay and allowances. The Government provided the Indian officers a set monthly pay part of which the Government, at the officer's request, would pay to the officer's family at another location than his station. The Government provided a quarters allowance known as hutting money. When the Madras Army was in the field or marching, the Government provided batta to compensate for the extra expenses incurred by the officers. The final allowance the Indian officers routinely received was reimbursement for the difference between the cost of rice at normal prices and the inflated price when rice was in short supply. The Government provided the same pay and allowances, at lower rates of course, to the noncommissioned officers and sepoys.

The monthly pay of Indian officers ranged from 24 Rupees 8 Annas for jemadars through three subadar pay classes receiving 70 Rupees, 52 Rupees 8 Annas, and 42 Rupees respectively (a British ensign made 181 Rupees, 9 Annas, 7 Pice monthly which included his allowances). These three classes were strictly pay grades based on length of service and merit. A subadar required ten years service at that rank to be a first class subadar. The CIC explained that this arrangement encouraged "continued zeal and exertion" among subadars who otherwise would have no incentive "...but to get through the remainder of their service with as little trouble as possible." The authorized establishment of each Native Infantry Regiment with 640 sepoys included eight jemadars, two first and third class subadars, and

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2 Ltr from B.R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 29 Nov 1832, MMDC No. 8, 14 Dec 1832; P/264/96.
four second class subadars.¹

Each Indian officer and sepoy could request that a portion of his pay be paid directly to his family if they were not at his station. The Superintendent of Family Payments and Pensions in Madras administered this program. Paymasters at military stations or collectors and magistrates where there was no military paymaster made the payments.²

The Government also provided the Indians in the Madras Army with hutting money. Each sepoy received this allowance when he joined the Army and on each change of station unless he was drawing full batta. Hutting money ranged from 24 Rupees for a subadar to two Rupees for a private. The CIC explained for the information of the Governor-General of India that

...this allowance does contribute materially to the comfort of the troops, while it greatly facilitates the maintenance of discipline by providing for ... a well-regulated system for the construction and internal arrangements of regimental lines which otherwise would not be easily obtainable[...]. ...if the men received no allowance[,] they could hardly be required to conform in such a manner to any prescribed order.

The CIC then quoted the QMG's regulations on regimental lines which specified their layout in a permanent cantonment. The regulations allocated each sepoy a 30 foot by 10 foot space for his quarters with subadars


²Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 15 Feb 1833; and ltr from W. Cullen Mil Aud Gen to Gov in council, 24 May 1833; MMDC No's 49 and 50; P/265/15. Minute by the Governor from Fredrick Adam, 21 Aug 1834; MMDC No. 13, 5 Sep 1834; P/265/51. and GOG 24 Jan 1834; Gordon, p. 249. By GOG 26 Aug 1823 the Governor in Council implemented a Circular Order from the War Office by which European noncommissioned officers and privates in the British Army stationed in India could remit part of their pay to their families in Europe. The Court of Directors extended the same arrangement to the European noncommissioned officers and privates in the Mau ras Army by GOG 9 May 1826; Gordon, pp. 459-60.
allocated three and one-half of these spaces each.¹

When the 3rd LI moved from Palaveram in June 1832, Major Williamson appealed to the Governor in Council for relief from payment for the quarters at Palaveram. The Regiment had recently arrived and occupied lines vacated previously by the 5th NI which the sepoys of the 3rd LI had refurbished at great personal expense. The Government had paid the 5th NI for the quarters and expected to be repaid by the 3rd LI. Because of the short notice of their transfer to Vizianagaram and because the 3rd NI had to pay for quarters there, Major Williamson requested the Governor in Council charge the next corps to occupy Palaveram for those quarters. The Governor in Council granted the request.² Each sepoy, thus, had a financial interest in his quarters in the regimental lines.

The Government paid batta to the Indian officers and the sepoys to defray their expenses in the field or while marching. In the case of the 3rd LI's move, the regulations entitled them to batta from the time they received notification of the move until they arrived at Vizianagaram. The CIC requested the Governor in Council grant batta to them for sixty days, the marching time from Palaveram to Vizianagaram. Each sepoy had to hire a cart for his family who were marching and also had to hire a cook until the families arrived. Their batta for the sea voyage would not cover ten percent of their expenses. The Governor in Council granted the extra batta.³

¹Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt, 29 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 8, 14 Dec 1832; P/264/96.

²Ltr from J. Williamson Maj Cmdg 3rd LI and J. M. Coombs Lt Col Cmdg Palaveram, 13 Jun 1832; and ltr from anonymous Dep QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 26 Jun 1832; MMDC No's 73 and 74, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

³Ltr from W. J. Butterworth Act'g Dep QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 12 Jul 1832; MMDC No's 20 and 21; P/264/86.
The Government provided one other allowance to the Indian officers on a routine basis—compensation in lieu of rice. In 1805, the Government authorized the sale of rice from the public supplies to its sepoys at a fixed price. In 1806 the Government determined that if the price of rice exceeded the fixed price because of scarcity it might not be expedient to issue rice to the sepoys at the lower rate. The Government, therefore, decided to pay the sepoys the difference between the market price and the fixed price—compensation in lieu of rice.¹ In August 1833 the CIC reported that at Vellore, Guntur, and Machilipatnam

The supply of grain in the Bazaars is both scarce and bad and frequently fails altogether and the consequence of this if not speedily alleviated must be at least the great increase of disease and mortality amongst the troops and their families.

The CIC, therefore, requested that rice be issued by the Commissariat to the troops. The Governor in Council ordered the troops to continue to receive compensation for the high price of rice and to be issued rice only if the bazaar supply failed completely.² The Indian officers and the sepoys of the Madras Army were important enough for the Governor in Council to provide them special protection from famine.

Indian officers, like British officers, anticipated special rewards of money and honors during their careers. As mentioned earlier, Indian officers received shares of prize money. Subadars received substantially less than European officers but more than European noncommissioned officers as explained above in the discussion of the distribution of the Coorg prize money. The Indian officers certainly expected special cash awards

¹GOG 14 Oct 1805; and GOG 30 Dec 1806; Gordon, p. 151.
²Ltr from T.H.S. Conway AG of the Army to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 15 Aug 1833; and Ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Dep Com Gen, 15 Aug 1833; MMDC No's 1 and 2, Diary 16 Aug 1833; P/265/19.
under such circumstances, but probably of more importance to them were the financial and honorific rewards the Governor in Council granted to individuals.

On 4 December 1832 the Governor in Council sent to the Governor-General of India a "Statement of Honorary distinctions and Allowances which have been conferred on Members of the Madras Army during the last Ten Years." Thirty-four Indian officers had received these awards with most of them receiving a combination of the awards: eleven received an honorary sword; six received the Nowbut which was the privilege of having musical instruments played at intervals at the gate of a great man; three received a horse with a monthly support allowance of 42 Rupees; 27 received a palanquin (sedan chair) with a monthly support allowance of 70 Rupees; two received promotion to subadar; eighteen received a life pension for their nearest heir of half a subadar's pay; six received the title of khan bahadur; and one Indian officer received a grant of land for his and his nearest heir's lives. The Governor in Council granted eighteen of these awards for outstanding service during a particular campaign and the remainder for long and faithful service with the longest recorded period being 54 years. The Governor in Council apparently granted most of these rewards in response to the Indian officers' formal request when they retired. By 1834 the Governor in Council forwarded such requests to the Governor-General.


2Statement of the Honorary distinctions and Allowances which have been conferred on Members of the Madras Army during the last Ten Years, Commencing from January 1823, signed B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG of the Army, 27 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 22, 4 Dec 1832; P/264/95.
of India for approval.¹

The Governor-General of India, Lord William Bentinck, was gathering information in preparation to standardize the rewards granted members of the three Presidency Armies. The Court of Directors approved Lord William's recommendations and in 1837 the Orders of British India and of Merit were established. The Madras Government was entitled to grant 34 first class and 33 second class Orders of India to subadars and jemadars for long and honorable service. The Order of Merit was granted for combat gallantry to all Indians who earned it. The largest financial award associated with these rewards was double pay which for the highest pay grade of subadars was 70 Rupees. Only the widows of recipients of the Order of Merit could inherit these stipends, and they could receive them for only three years.² The standardization of rewards by Lord William resulted in more members of the Madras Army receiving honors of less financial worth.

The Indian officers and sepoys of the Madras Army looked forward to retirement as the routine reward the Government provided to them all after 22 years of service. Ordinary pensions were half pay.⁴ The Governor in Council frequently granted pensions of either two-thirds or full pay for long and meritorious service. The Madras Government protected military pensioners from famine just as it protected the active Indian officers

¹Ltr from T. H. S. Conway AG of the Army to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 23 May 1834; MMDC No's 13 and 15, 4 Jul 1834; P/265/46

²GOG 2 May 1837, GOG 16 May 1837, and GOG 4 Dec 1838; Gordon, pp. 367-9.

³Ltr signed CO in the Madras Male Military Asylum Herald, 21 June 1834.

⁴GOG 12 Nov 1839; Gordon, p. 252
and sepoys. All pensioners received issues of rice from the public stores or compensation in lieu of rice in times of scarcity.¹

Between 1826 and 1833 the Government reduced the Madras Army by "...more than twelve thousand men."² In January 1831 the AG for the CIC prepared lists of "Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers, the least effective of their rank, who are recommended to be transferred to the non-effective list in order to relieve Corps from the supernumeries occasioned by the late reductions." These lists included 209 men. Of the total, the CIC recommended 151 be invalided and 58 pensioned. The invalids included men with good records who were no longer fit for field duty but were fit for garrison duty. Of those retired, the CIC recommended four for full pay pensions, two for two-thirds pay, and the rest for ordinary pensions. The men recommended for full pay included a 23 and a 30 year subadar, a 42 year jemadar, and a 40 year havildar. The two men recommended for two-thirds pension were a 38 year subadar and a 24 year jemadar. The CIC cited these men's character, wounds, valor in combat, and long service to justify their increased pensions.³ There is no discernable patterns in these and other lists to distinguish between men clearly eligible for full pay and

¹GOG 16 Jun 1807; Gordon, p. 153
²Memorandum attached to ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 5 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
³Ltr from B.R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 18 Jan 1831; MMDC No. 24A, 25 Jan 1832; P/264/75. In 1831 the Governor in Council invalided Jemadar Naydoo, age 52, after 34 1/2 years of service. His commander stated that he had "...known Jemadar Naydoo for upwards of 26 years..." and that he was "Nearly worn out[,] unfit for Field but fit for Garrison duty." Ltr D.G. Newell Maj Cmdg 21 NI to AG of the Army, 15 Dec 1832; MMDC No's 17 and 18, 22 Mar 1833; P/265/9.
those eligible for two-thirds pay. The Governor in Council granted these extra rewards based on the recommendations of the corps commanders and the CIC. In the opinion of General Taylor, the "...strongest hold the Government has [sic] upon the Sepoy..." was the prospect of a liberal retirement pension.1 The Government used its military retirement system to bind those Indians with the most military skills to the state and the status quo. They were bound by their honors and prestige in the community as well as by their personal financial interests.

Personnel Policies and Programs

Loyalty

For any state the loyalty of its army is a key consideration. The military writings of British India under the Company and later under the Raj are full of discussions of just how loyal to the British regime the Indians in the Army were and of how to reinforce that loyalty. In 1834 an anonymous regimental officer wrote:

For years past, a doctrine has obtained that our Empire in this country is held by 'opinion;' but I have always considered (and I believe that I am by no means singular) that the force and virtue of that 'opinion' are derived from one great source, the Native Army. In fighting under our banners the Native Soldiery conceive they defend a good cause; that is to say support and uphold the power of a government, which, hitherto, has rewarded their services by providing for them and theirs, in every manner that is conciliating, binding and remunerating. It has been said on a particular occasion that our rule in India is a 'paternal despotism.' It may be so -- but let me ask, where will exist the paternity of it, when we cast off those, who have the first claim to be protected and cherished by it? No, Sir, these are not times to cross and alarm the already too sensitive minds of our Native Soldiers.2

The Court of Directors, the Governor in Council, and the Commander in Chief designed all the personnel policies and programs previously discussed with

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1Memorandum attached to ltr from H.G.A.Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 5 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.

2Ltr signed A Regimental Officer, Madras Male Asylum Herald, 20 Aug 1834.
enhanced loyalty as at least a secondary objective. These policies and programs, along with others dealing with such matters as quartering and feeding of the Army, medical care, and the mail, addressed problems any army has to face. The solutions of the Madras Army were designed to provide military efficiency under a particular set of circumstances. Loyalty was essential to that military efficiency. The Company's authorities designed and implemented some programs primarily to promote loyalty among the Indian officers and sepoys. Included were the deliberate isolation of the Army from the local population, the boy establishment with the regiments, regimental schools, and pensions for heirs of Indians killed on duty.

In 1832 apparently as a result of the disturbances in Bangalore\(^1\), the AG confidentially requested a report from General Taylor as OCND on "... intercourse between the townspeople of Machilipatnam, Vizianagaram, and Srikakulum, and the men of the Native Regiments stationed at them, as well as the general temper and feeling of the corps in this Division." General Taylor responded by requesting and forwarding to the AG reports from the commanders at each station.\(^2\)

Lieutenant Colonel Ross at Machilipatnam reported "...that there has been very little intercourse between the townspeople and the lines or

\(^1\)In August 1830 disturbances broke out in Bangalore and spread throughout Mysore. The primary objective of these disturbances was to install the pretender Sadar Malla, alias Budi Basavappa, on the throne of Nagar. In response, the British assumed direct rule in September 1831. The entire Mysore subsidiary force and two British regiments required until 1834 to restore complete tranquility. For secondary accounts see: Bangalore Through the Ages by M. Fazlul Hasan, pp. 131-4; Civil Disturbances During the British Rule in India, 1765-1857, by Sashi Bhusan Chaudhuri, pp. 137-41; and the 1927 edition of the Mysore Gazetteer, vol 2, part 4, pp. 2869-72.

\(^2\)Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 26 Nov 1832; and Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act'g AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 13, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
He reported that after information arrived in Machilipatnam about "...the insult offered to the Mohammed [sic] places of worship at Bangalore, [and] Arcot...[,] he had considered it necessary to keep a strict watch upon the conduct and actions of the men of the corps..."

He assigned his second in command, Major Nash, and a "trustworthy Native officer" who lived in the Muslim area of the town to monitor closely the troops. Lieutenant Colonel Ross also reported that the Persian merchants in Machilipatnam corresponded with Persia and North India. They mixed politics with their business and "...sometimes announc[d] the advance of the Russian Army, the march of the Prince Royal of Persia, with hostile movements on the part of Runjut Sing [sic]..." In Lieutenant Colonel Ross's opinion, the Muslim population of Machilipatnam was "generally hostile to the British Government." He remained vigilant but saw no reason to worry about the loyalty of his troops at this time. It is significant that the local commander had used an Indian officer as an informer to monitor the loyalty of his troops before he received the request for information from his commander. It is also significant that the Army gathered intelligence information on the loyalty of the local civilians as a routine matter.

From Vizianagaram Lieutenant Colonel Bowes submitted "...an equally satisfactory report, on the state of the 3rd and 8[th] Regiments, and their relation with the townspeople." He explained that "Nothing has appeared like a reciprocity feeling between them...[,] and there have been no meetings of any kind either in the lines or the town." He did not believe that his regiments were aware of the activities in Bangalore. The only correspondence Lieutenant Colonel Bowes reported between Bangalore and

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1 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act's AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 13, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
Vizianagaram was "...from the pensioners residing in the cantonment, and adjacent villages...." These letters, he reported, passed "...through the hands of their respective commanding officers." The implication of this report is that these commanders, or someone on their staff, read this mail. Lieutenant Colonel Bowes found assurance of his sepoys' loyalty in the "...utmost alacrity...displayed by all ranks..." and the numbers of volunteers when "...a considerable part of the brigade..." was called out for field service for the internal security campaign described in chapter three.¹

General Taylor reported that he had great faith in the report of Major Baxter commanding at Srikakulam. The General based this faith on "...the intimate knowledge he [Major Baxter] possesses from a long course of attention to their wants, their disposition and character. . . ." He reported his "...infinite concern..." about the "...portion of the Madras Native Army..." affected by the "...transactions at Bangalore...." He was, however, consoled to report that the troops at Srikakulam were

...untainted with the mania that has [sic] seized their brethren..." at Bangalore. He was "...satisfied that any attempt to tamper with his men would be voluntarily made known to him--at the same time he is [sic] sure that temptation has [sic] not been thrown in their way. There is [sic] nothing like a friendly feeling between them and the townspeople[.]. [T]he Mussulman [sic] in it being considered of an inferior caste than the sepoys, who are [sic] housed in groups in different parts of the town, but scarcely hold communion with the people.²

Major Baxter depended on his close personal relationship with his sepoys and their caste differences with the local people to keep his troops loyal and isolated from the civilian community.

¹Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act'g AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 13, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.

²Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act'g AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 13, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
General Taylor explained that he was about to make a tour of all the stations in the Northern Division south of Machilipatnam and would thus "...have an opportunity of making personal inquiry and observation without the possibility of creating suspicion." He further observed;

"My impression ... is that this Division is free from taint, but if unhappily there should be any disloyal or disaffected men among the Native troops composing it, they will be discovered or so effectually subdued by the late discovery and vigorous measures pursued at Bangalore, together with the utter hopelessness of the accomplishment of their treasonable intentions[,] they will return to a right sense of their duty, and become once more faithful to the Government."¹

The senior British members of the Madras Army had no illusion that the sepoys would for some mystical reason be loyal. These senior officers paid close attention to the attitudes of their troops and the "intercourse" between the troops and the civilian communities. General Taylor and the three field commanders cited here were very confident that no conspiracy could go undetected in their units. Their faith in the loyalty of their units was borne out by the performance of these units in the internal security campaign in the Vishakhapatnam District. The Governor in Council forwarded General Taylor's report to the court of Directors.²

In 1785 the Governor in Council established the Recruit and Pension Boys program in the Madras Army designed to promote the sepoys' loyalty. The CIC, for the information of the Governor-General of India, described this program as created "...from a principle of humanity and as an encouragement to those sepoys who have families to behave with alacrity on service...." The CIC went on to say, "There is nothing which tends more to

¹Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act'g AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 13, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.

²Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act'g AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No's 13 and 14, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
attach the men to the service than this establishment. It provides each regiment a military orphan asylum, in a manner the least expensive and affording the most profitable return.\(^1\) Each Native Infantry regiment was authorized 40 pension boys and 30 recruit boys who were each paid three Rupees and eight Annas monthly. The commander of the corps with the approval of the CIC enrolled the pension boys at any age from orphans of the corps' sepoys. If there were vacancies on the establishment, the commander could enroll either sons of sepoys with large families or other boys with some close connection with the regiment. Orphans had priority for entry and if necessary the oldest pension boy with a living father would be removed to provide for an orphan. At age eleven pension boys, if they were physically fit, transferred to the ranks of recruit boys as openings occurred. Those unfit for future service in the Army were discharged at age fourteen. Whenever recruit boys met the physical standards, they transferred to the effective strength of the Army. If they failed to meet the standards by age eighteen, they were discharged.\(^2\) The regiments trained the recruit boys in military duties and provided them education in the regimental schools. This background made the recruit boys, after they became sepoys, "...by far the most soldier-like and intelligent men in the service..." in the opinion of the CIC.\(^3\)

In July 1834 a flurry of letters to the editor appeared in the *Madras Male Asylum Herald* in reaction to a circular letter sent to each corps

\(^1\) Ltr from B. R. Hitchins to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 29 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 8, 14 Dec 1832; P/264/96.


\(^3\) Ltr from B. R. Hitchins to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 29 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 8, 14 Dec 1832; P/264/96.
commander. This circular letter requested the commanders' opinions on the idea of abolishing the pension and recruit boy establishments. One writer explained that in his regiment 60 sepoys had died of cholera in the past two years and that many of the resulting orphans were entirely dependent on the pension and recruit boy program for their living. Of the boys with his regiment 50 were orphans and fifteen were sons of sepoys. He, like the other writers, extolled the virtues of the sepoys who had risen from the recruit boys as "...the most active intelligent and zealous sepoys...; their intercourse with Europeans from childhood having sharpened their interests, and rendered them as superior to the village kind as can possibly be imagined." His conclusion summed up the arguments for retaining the program nicely; "...I know of no measure more calculated to cause universal discontent in the Madras Army, nor one more injurious to its efficiency than the abolition of the Recruit and Pension Boy Establishment; and I believe that I am not singular in my opinion." Raising the issue of eliminating the pension and recruit boy establishments brought almost as many letters to the editor in the Madras Male Asylum Herald as actually reducing the pay of regimental adjutants and quartermasters. The letters universally praised the program and predicted dire effects on the loyalty of the Indian officers and sepoys and consequently on the efficiency of the Army if this program were abolished. The program remained in existence.

In 1830 the Governor in Council established regimental schools in the Madras Army with an allowance of 21 Rupees monthly for each corps. Each regiment of the Madras Native Infantry had a Hindu and a Muslim school.

1 Ltr signed "OP" in the Madras Male Asylum Herald, 30 Jul 1834.
under the supervision of the School Committee. Either the regimental commander or the major was the president of the committee. The recruit boys were required to attend, while sepoys and the sons of Indian officers and sepoys were admitted to the schools voluntarily.\footnote{CIC declared that,} The benefits resulting from the introduction of regimental schools are considered important. They are, first, the rendering non-commissioned and native commissioned officers better qualified for the efficient discharge of their duties, and second... fostering a steady and orderly disposition on the part of the men, those amongst them of reading habits seldom are ever...found addicted to drinking or other bad practices.

To accomplish these important objectives, the CIC urged in 1832 that the Governor in Council provide more than the 21 Rupees a month allowed when the schools were founded two years earlier. He had urged that more resources be allocated to the schools when they were initially established. Now that two years' experience had shown the inadequacy of the fund allocated, the CIC appealed again for more money, because he viewed these schools as very important to the future of the Army. The Governor in Council decided that, since the Supreme Government in Calcutta was looking at regimental schools and since the Madras regulations were similar to the Bengal regulations, nothing would be done until the Madras Government "...shall have been informed of his Lordship's deliberations."\footnote{They took no action during the period of this campaign to strengthen this very weak educational effort the CIC had designed gradually to improve the efficiency of the Army.}

\footnote{JOCC 23 Apr 1830; Gordon, p. 458.}

\footnote{Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG of the Army to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 24 Nov 1832; and ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept at Fort William, 11 Dec 1832; MMDC No's 14 and 17, 11 Dec 1832; P/264/96.}
The Madras Government provided pensions to the heirs of Indian officers and sepoys who died on foreign service from any cause as well as those who died in action or of wounds received in India. While advocating reform of the Native Family Pension regulations, the CIC explained that the intention of the pensions was "...an encouragement to the soldier freely to peril himself in the service of the state...."\(^1\) In December 1833 the Madras Government published the revision to their regulation of 1821 issued by the Governor-General of India in Council. The Madras Government had forwarded a proposed revision of these regulations to the Governor-General of India in June 1833 with the comment that the Madras Governor in Council had discussed revising the regulations in 1830 but did not do so because troops were being sent overseas at that time.\(^2\) Apparently they felt that changing the rules of the Native Family Pension program just as the troops shipped out would cause unrest among the troops. Replacement of the Madras regulation with a Government of India regulation quite different than the draft forwarded to Calcutta by the Madras Government was intended to establish "...uniformity in the Regulations under which Pensions are granted to the Heirs of Native Officers, Soldiers, and others, belonging to the Armies of the..." three Presidencies.\(^3\) The existing pension regulations would continue to apply to men already in service (today we refer to this practice as "grandfathering").

The only substantive change in the new regulations was the requirement

\(^1\) Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG of the Army to Gov in Council, 5 Mar 1833; MMDC No. 26; P/265/16.

\(^2\) Ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept at Fort William, 25 Jun 1833; MMDC No. 27; P/265/16.

\(^3\) FSGG 1834, pp. 2-3; V/11/1588.
to designate the heir from the following list: 1. Son, 2. Widow, 3. Daughter, 4. Father, and 5. Mother. If no designation was made, the pension was granted "...in the foregoing line of succession..." The monthly pensions ranged from 25 Rupees for the heir of a subadar to 1 Rupee 12 Annas to the heir of a grass cutter. Female and male heirs over 50 received these pensions for life. Male heirs under six received pensions until age eighteen, and male heirs between eighteen and 50 received pensions for twelve years. The regulations restricted the amount received by Government employees based on their own wages; it simply would not do for anyone to draw both wages and a full pension from the Government.¹ These pensions provided the Indian officers and sepoys a concrete reason to give their loyalty to the Company's Armies. No programs or policies designed to strengthen the loyalty of the Indian officers could succeed unless the British officers were at least somewhat sensitive to the Indians.

Solutions to the Problems of Linguistic and Racial Differences

The multi-linguistic and multi-racial nature of the Madras Army in the early nineteenth century did not pose an overwhelming obstacle to its military efficiency. To overcome this obstacle, the Madras Army placed great emphasis on having the British officers learn Indian languages. Language training alone would not solve the problems of a multi-racial army. The British officers, also, had to develop a deep awareness and sensitivity to the sepoys' religion and culture.

The Company emphasized studying Indian languages to the British officers as an essential professional skill. Cadets at Addiscombe studied

¹FSGG 1834, pp. 2-3; V/11/1588.
Hindoostanee and "...were examined in the Persian and Nagaree characters of the language."¹ John Loch, Chairman of the Court of Directors, in his graduation address at Addiscombe in 1829 admonished the cadets to "...the perfect attainment of the Hindoostanee language as indispensable to the just and intelligent discharge of their duties in their future intercourse with the natives of India."² In 1823 the CIC had proclaimed that although "attainment of language...[was] an indispensable pretention to Regimental Staff employ; general character, exemplary conduct, and attention to professional qualifications..." were also necessary. The next year the Court of Directors declared "...that no Officers in our Service should be appointed to Staff, unless they have previously acquired a competent knowledge of the Hindoostanee Language which is the Vernacular Language of Hindoostan, and more or less spoken throughout the Deccan."³ In 1837 the Court of Directors eliminated the ambiguity of "should be" and made language qualification mandatory for staff employment.⁴ As explained earlier, the British officers very much wanted to be on the staff. In 1828 the Court of Directors authorized the payment of 30 Rupees a month for six months to any officer who passed the examination in one Oriental language and for twelve months for any officer who passed in two languages.⁵ The Governor in Council in 1830 extended this bonus to officers of the British

¹"The East India Company's Military Seminary," United Service Journal, Part II 1829, p. 226. Army Hindoostanee was a mixture of modern Hindi and Urdu.


³GOG 6 Feb 1824; Gordon, p. 351.

⁴GOG 24 Jan 1837; Gordon, p. 351.
Army also.¹

The Government provided support for the British officers in their language studies. The establishment of each regiment included a munshi to teach the languages.² The College of Fort Saint George provided textbooks in Arabic, Persian, Hindoostanee, Tamil, Telugu, "...and other Hindoo languages as spoken in Southern India..." free of charge on the requisition of a regimental commander.³ The Government set and publicized standard examinations which included written and oral translation to and from the language.⁴ The Madras Army took the study of Indian languages very seriously. In 1853 John Kaye gave the Army's language accomplishments a left-handed compliment when he said the Company's servants in the Northern Circars in 1769 "...could not talk the native languages with more fluency or correctness than a cadet in the first year of his inexperience, or a Chief Justice at the end of his career."⁵

The sensitivity of the British officers to the religion and culture of the sepoys was by no means perfect; however, for this Army to be militarily effective at all, the British officers had to be relatively sensitive. The records reflect that they manifested this sensitivity in many ways. They made repeated statements of pride in their sepoys and

¹GOG 29 Oct 1830; Gordon, p. 353.
³GOG 10 Aug 1830; and GOG 20 Feb 1835; Gordon, pp. 352-3.
⁴GOCC 25 Nov 1829; Gordon, p. 351.
paid attention to their needs and honor. The British officers demonstrated an awareness of differences between the different groups when they compared their perceptions of the martial characteristics of Hindus and Muslims. The Governor in Council took into consideration the culture and religion of the sepoys in the regulations, and the officers made operational adjustments for the culture and religion of the sepoys.

The British officers in their writings often spoke of their interest in their sepoys and often added qualifications about the imperfect understanding they, the British, could achieve. When General Taylor opened his private correspondence with Sir Fredrick Adam in January 1833, the General explained that one of his primary motivations was "to lay before Sir Fredrick Adam what I conscientiously believe to be the character of our men. I have ever been alive to the honor and credit of our Sepoys [and] have watched them with care."¹ A Regimental officer writing to the Madras Male Asylum Herald against the possible abolition of the Pension Boy and Recruit Boy program to reinforce the possible abolition of the Pension Boy and Recruit Boy program to reinforce the authority of his opinion stated:

I have felt an interest in looking into the condition of the native soldiers, formed and governed, as it is, by its various habits, prejudices and singularities. The study of his nature was the guidance of my conduct towards him, and curiosity was well repaid, when I had unravelled, to a certain extent (for all cannot be untwisted) the web which concealed the object of my search. Long association with him has kindled a friendly regard for him.²

These comments were not unique and do reflect both a professional concern on the part of the British officers for their troops and an awareness of the need by the British to take special pains to understand the sepoys.

¹ Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG to Maj Hodges Pvt Sec, 8 Jan 1833; General Taylor Papers.
² Ltr signed A Regimental Officer in Madras Male Asylum Herald, 20 Aug 1834.
The officers of the Madras Army repeatedly manifested a perception of fundamental differences between the Hindus and Muslims in the Army. The Government demonstrated this perception in the promotion policy calling for proportional representation in the Indian officers between the different castes in each regiment. The promotion of a Hindu over a well qualified and senior Muslim as a routine matter has been discussed previously. General Taylor provided an early statement of the stereotyped British military view of the martial character of Indian Hindus and Muslims. He explained that;

The smartest and most intelligent Sepoys we have are the Mohamedans [sic] and a very large portion of the Native Officers are of that caste. They are perhaps more open to evil impressions than the Hindoo's [sic] who are of a milder and less ambitious character; and have been longer under subjugation: Mohamedans are more united in their opinions and inclined to support each other, ..., and they have also modes of communication peculiar to themselves which render discovery most difficult.

The principle channel for the [dissemination?] of treason is through their Tachcers [Teachers?]. Scarcely an instance has occurred of one of these incendiaries being discovered though there is every reason to believe that a vast number have ..., been employed to tamper with our men..., but although this caste may be ... more liable to be tampered with, I do not think they are less attached to our Government or their European Officers, than the Hindoos.... We have ... innumerable instances of their devotion to the Service and their gallantry in the Field so have we also of the Hindoos--but there has generally been a bias in favor of the former and high rewards have fallen oftener to their lot than to the latter.¹

This familiar sounding account is not the writing of a paranoid Mutiny veteran, the writing of a late-nineteenth century exponent of the martial races theory, or a 1930's writer justifying British rule on the incompatibility of the Hindus and Muslims of India. This account is the writing of a man, General Taylor, who arrived in India in 1799 and fought at

¹Memorandum attached to ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 5 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
Assaye in 1803 under the Duke of Wellington against Scindiah. General Taylor was explaining his perception of the two major groups of Indians in the Madras Army and the impact of the differences on the efficiency of the Army for the information of Sir Fredrick Adam, a man who fought under the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo.

The perceptions of the British officers about the religion and culture of the sepoys was included when the British wrote the regulations. When advocating changes in the 1821 regulation governing the Native Family Pension, the CIC advocated changing the regulated Muslim line of succession, because it was "...particularly at variance with the usages of the men." The CIC also advocated modifying the 1826 regulation "...declaring illegitimate children to be ineligible as heirs for pension." He asserted that "Illegitimacy is a term of which the acceptations are widely different with our troops and with ourselves, and it is not to be expected that they will contentedly receive our definition when its consequences so seriously militate against their own interests." In September 1806 after the Vellore Mutiny in July, the Governor in Council ordered that the sepoys be allowed to wear their caste marks, mustaches, hair, or "...joys and ornaments peculiar to different families and castes..." anyway and anytime they pleased. General Taylor explained in his memoir that at the time of the Vellore Mutiny, "There had been an unpleasant feeling in the Native army of Madras, from the introduction of an obnoxious turban, and inter-

2Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG of the Army to Gov in Council, 5 Mar 1833; MMDC No. 26, 25 Jun 1833; P/265/16.
3GOG 24 Sep 1806; Gordon, p. 193.
ference with the marks of the Hindoos, clipping of beards, whiskers, &c."

The senior British officers of the Madras Army were well aware of the various cultural and religious practices of their Indian officers and men and recognized the necessity for the efficiency of the Army of taking these practices into consideration.

This awareness by the British officers extended into operational decisions. In December 1831, in response to a question from the QMG, the commander at Pallavaram told the QMG that the commander of the 5th NI had already told the QMG once that the Rajputs of the 5th NI would not drink water from the iron tanks on HMS Comet no matter who filled the tanks. The QMG then adjusted shipping plans so that the 5th NI would sail on another ship, because the captain of HMS Comet refused to take separate water casks for the Rajputs aboard his ship. The commander of the regiment knew the objections his troops would have to drinking water from the iron casks, and the QMG under the CIC's orders recognized those objections as a legitimate cause to alter their plans. These operational plans of the Madras Army were produced by the Army's staff.

The Madras Army Staff System

A modern, professional military staff's responsibilities and actions can be broken down into three areas: planning, preparing, and executing combat operations. Planning involves identifying the security needs of the state and deciding what forces are necessary to meet those needs. Preparing includes organizing and positioning the resources for the forces identified while planning. Executing involves making the necessary adjustments in

plans and preparations to enable the state's forces to defeat the enemy. All three areas overlap and in all three the staff must coordinate its actions. In each area efficiency, that is maximum military power from the resources used, is a paramount concern. The performance of military staff operations for the Madras Army involved most of the offices of the Madras Government, as described in Chapter I and illustrated in the campaign in Chapter III, under the supervision of the Governor in Council who set the priorities and policies.

The Madras Army could focus its planning on no particular scenario as the Prussian and then the Imperial German Armies did in the late nineteenth century. They had the advantage of selecting or, at least, knowing who the probable enemy was for years in advance. As part of the forces of the East India Company which by then was the paramount power in India, the Madras Army had to prepare to meet both internal and external threats. It was however, reasonable to assume after 1818 that no possible combination of other armies in the Sub-Continent could defeat the Company's armies. Because the Madras Army could not identify one particular enemy that posed a credible threat to the existence of the state, the Madras Army had to plan to meet any enemy, anywhere. They prepared to face an overland or amphibious invasion of India, to launch an expeditionary force either overland or by sea, and to suppress rebellion as in this campaign.

To accomplish these multiple possible missions, the Madras Army had to be flexible. This flexibility was based on past experience and institutionalized in various regulations and tables. On 24 January 1832 the Military Board sent to the Governor in Council a draft of regulations providing guidance for the preparation of "troops, magazines, equipment, and etc." of the Ordnance Department for foreign service. They based this
regulation on the experience of 1824, 1825, and 1826, and it was "...calculated to facilitate the preparation, and to prevent confusion in the shipment of Stores and Equipment and to enable our [the Military] Board to notify, at the earliest moment to Government the precise nature and extent of Material for Service...." The Governor in Council returned the draft to the Military Board and asked if the draft had been coordinated with the Marine Board, the Principal Commissary of Ordnance, and the other offices concerned. Here is a clear example of members of the Madras Army, while acting in their official capacity, deliberately attempting to retain the lessons of their experience as guides for future overseas expeditions.¹

The next year the Military Board submitted tables useful for allocating bullocks and ordnance supplies for a body of troops preparing to march. The table entitled "Statement Showing the Number of Cartridges Shotted Pistol, proportion of Flints, Ammunition, Barrels, and Number of Carriage Bullocks required for any number of Men from 10,000 to 100 at the rate of 24, 48, and 96 rounds per Man" quickly told the planner that to provide 600 men 24 pistol rounds each, he needed to requisition 14,400 cartridges, 1,400 flints, 18 barrels or boxes for the cartridges, and nine and one half bullocks. The Military Board forwarded similar tables with planning data for muskets and artillery. At the recommendation of the Principal Commissary of Ordnance, the Military Board recommended that because...

...these tables will be of such general utility that, besides the regulated number of copies for the several arsenals or public offices an additional number of copies should be struck off for sale to such officers of the corps of Artillery or the Army generally as may desire to have them.

¹Ltr from Mil Bd to Governor in Council, 24 Jan 1832; Order thereon, 24 Feb 1832; MMDC, No's 45 and 46; 24 Feb 1832; P/265/7.
The Governor General expressed their appreciation of the "industry of Mr. Deputy Assistant Commissary Brooks who drew-up the tables and ordered that the Superintendent of the Male Asylum Press print an extra 150 copies of these tables for sale." This example not only illustrates planning for future operations based on past experience by the Madras Army, but also illustrates the deliberate spreading of professional knowledge among the British officers of the Madras Army.

Standard loads permitted the QMG to determine how many bullocks, camels, and elephants were required by the Army in the Public Cattle Establishment. In the face of calls for retrenchment in that establishment by Lord William Bentinck, the CIC maintained that the number of animals was already below the required and authorized establishment and that

"...if allowed to be further diminished, [the situation] might be attended with great inconvenience and risk to the efficiency of the Public Service, for even in the most peaceable times, the knowledge that the Troops are at all times prepared to make a rapid and immediate movement, whenever required, may fairly be estimated, as being highly conducive to the continued general tranquility of the Country...."

The CIC pointed out that because camels and elephants were imported from Bengal for the Madras Army, the Army could not wait until they were needed to purchase those animals but must keep them on hand to be able to react when necessary. In defense of the practice of using hired cattle full time, the CIC explained that the contractor and his father had faithfully supplied sturdy cattle in previous wars and could be depended upon to deliver the contracted 1450 cattle with attendants on five days notice and more on fifteen days notice. If the Government eliminated the full-time

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1Ltr from the Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 7 May 1833; Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to The Pres and Mbrs of the Mil Bd, 4 Jun 1833; MMDC No's 40, 41, and 42, 4 Jun 1833; P/265/14.
contract, they would lose the essential reserve of cattle provided by the contractor. The Madras Army did not maintain an arbitrary number of animals on the Public Cattle establishment. They maintained, instead, the animals that careful calculations of the equipment and baggage authorized to be carried at public expense indicated were required to make the Army militarily efficient and bring its full force to bear against any enemy in India in case of war. In peacetime, this readiness by the Army maintained tranquility by deterring possible rebels and bandits.

The Madras Army continually revised its planning factors and authorized establishments in a search for military efficiency. In 1833 when the Military Board recommended that the Governor in Council add a private secretary, tent lascars, and carriage (bullocks or whatever other animals were available) to the CIC's authorized establishment both in the field and on a tour of inspection, the Governor in Council demanded an explanation. The Military Board pointed out that the CIC had in the past been provided a private secretary and cited two examples. They explained that every officer authorized Government tents was provided tent lascars to pitch and maintain those tents. They added that the carriage was for the QMG's office establishment which always accompanied the CIC. Then the Board summarized their proposals as an attempt to match the authorizations published in the tables in the QMG Department Regulations with actual practice. The Governor in Council refused to add the private secretary to the CIC's routine establishment and left the secretary to be added by them as needed. They also directed that the tables in the QMG Department

1 Ltr from W. Strahan Maj Dep QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 20 Sep 1834; MMDC No. 3, Diary for 23 Sep 1834; P/265/53.
Regulations, which had been prepared in 1800, be revised "...in reference to the improvements which has [sic] taken place in cattle, carts, roads and artificers within these last 30 years." Planning was a continual process in the Madras Army.

One problem that staff planners always face in building facilities is whether to build for a normal peacetime establishment or to build for an expanded wartime establishment. The obvious problem is that facilities for the larger wartime establishment cost more and the planner can never be positive just how large the wartime establishment will be. When the Governor in Council directed the Military Board in cooperation with the Medical Board to produce "...plans for every description of civil and military building, adapted to every variety of climate in this country," the Military Board requested "...the instructions of Government as to the scale upon which the dimensions of barracks, places of arms, and hospitals should now be calculated, whether upon a war or peace establishment." The Regiments had been larger in 1822 when the Military Board prepared the old building plans. The Governor in Council directed the Military Board design the buildings for "...the strength of regiments on the peace establishment, but they should be constructed on such plans as will admit of their being readily and conveniently enlarged." The Governor in Council thus institutionalized flexibility by ordering the Military Board to make military buildings capable of being enlarged for a wartime Army expansion of unknown proportions, because the Governor in Council recognized that the wartime

1 Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 23 Apr 1833; Report of QMG on a Ltr from Sec to Gvt of 9 Apr 1833 signed J. Hanson QMG, 22 Apr 1833; MMDC No's 22 and 23, 7 May 1833; P/265/12.

2 Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 13 Aug 1833; MMDC No's 27 and 28, 27 Aug 1833; P/265/20.
requirements of the Madras Army could not be precisely forecast in peacetime.

The second major area of military staff action is preparation for combat which includes organizing and positioning resources in peacetime and in war. The division system, described in Chapter I, with all of India subject to the Company divided into geographic military commands was part of this preparation. The Madras Army faced a nebulous threat after 1818 which did not change substantially in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Madras Government articulated their formulation of this threat in the 1849 edition of the General Regulations of the Madras Army where the CIC directed division commanders to inform themselves of the Military resources of their Divisions in regard to provisions, and the means of transporting Troops and Stores. - To obtain an accurate Military knowledge of the strong features of the Country, and of all Military Depots, all fortified places, and their means of defense, and of every particular which may increase their power of acting with advantage against an Enemy: - without information on these heads, no plan of attack or defense can be formed.1

The point of the divisions thus was to prepare to defeat "an Enemy" whoever he may be, wherever he may appear. At the same time, the planning of the Madras Army included the ability to mount an expeditionary force to carry the battle to the enemy.

The Madras Army manned and equipped these divisions to meet anticipated threats in each area in the light of past experience. The divisions included the Hyderabad and the Nagpur Subsidiary Forces2 beyond the frontier. Within these divisions were the field stations of Jalna, Kamptee (Nagpur), and Secunderabad (Hyderabad). At each of these stations the "field forces" were

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2FSG Army List, pp. 14-5
quartered under canvas and ready to march on short notice. The Army kept heavy ordnance at Secunderabad and Kamptee "...without which the Force might be set at defiance by any one of the Petty Forts with which that Country is studded." The Ordnance Department included the infrastructure of depots scattered throughout the Presidency to supply the divisions. While defending the existing establishment against retrenchment in 1832, the Military Board explained that the ordnance establishment was as small as it could safely be. When the Governor in Council set the establishment in 1828 it was "...at that time considered by some of the officers in charge ...[as] almost bordering on inexpediency if not inefficiency." In October of 1832 while this campaign was heating-up, the QMG proposing to the Governor in Council the permanent stationing of two regiments at Vizianagaram wrote that "...it is so centrically situated with respect to any disturbances that may occur in the Division and so capable of affording Military aid either north or south that the Commander in Chief..." strongly desires that Government consider the proposal as soon as possible. A month later the Governor in Council sent the proposal to the Military Board for further analysis. The Governor in Council prepared for combat by directing staff analysis of the threat and resources needed to meet the threat.

1Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 31 May 1833; MMDC No's 40 and 41, 21 Jun 1833; P/265/15. and Ltr from T.H.S. Conway AG of the Army to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept. 13 Aug 1833; ltr from A. Tulloch Maj Dep Com Gen to Chf Sec to Gvt, 30 Aug 1833; MMDC No's 66, 68 and 69, 3 Sep 1833; P/265/21.

2Ltr from W. Strahan Maj Dept QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 20 Sep 1834; MMDC No. 3, Diary for 23 Sep 1834; P/265/53.

3Report from the Mil Bd to Rt Hon Stephen Lushington Gov in Council, 3 Jan 1832; MMDC No. 38, 21 Feb 1832; P/264/75.

4Ltr from J. Hanson QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 23 Oct 1832; MMDC No's 42 and 43; P/264/94.
Experience was an essential part of this analysis. The Governor in Council then positioned their forces to attain the maximum military efficiency, again, depending largely on experience.

In the 1830's the Madras Army included routine training and inspections to ensure military efficiency in its preparation for war. The CIC directed in 1835 that division commanders perform the required annual inspection of all regiments and detachments in January and February. If any units were not inspected then, the division commanders were to inspect them between the first of August and the first of December. The CIC ordered the commanders to perform a second inspection of the mounted units and European troops. In 1836 the CIC published specific inspection criteria for the division commanders' guidance. Infantry units were to perform, along with other requirements, a route march with the inspector selecting the companies to form the advance, rear, and flank guards. The inspector was to select locations along the route where the regiment was to assume a defensive position. The regiment was to demonstrate their marksmanship individually and in volley. They were to fire from formation after marching onto the range. Light infantry and rifle companies were to fire in skirmishing order. Inspectors filed a confidential report on each unit inspected. In preparation for these inspections, the regulation required each corps to perform a route march and to fire ball at least monthly with emphasis on individual marksmanship. The artillery of the Madras Army consumed

1GOCC 30 Nov 1835; Gordon p. 293.
2GOCC 10 Sep 1836; Gordon, p. 293
40,000 pounds of gunpowder annually in practice. How effective these orders and regulations were in producing a trained, disciplined fighting force can only be determined by looking at the Madras Army in action. In the Vishakhapatnam campaign in this study, they proved themselves quite efficient.

The preparation for combat includes the selection of personnel for particular positions both to train the personnel and make an army efficient. The Governor in Council on 19 March 1832 directed that a statement of every officer's services be recorded on a form previously used by the Commander in Chief in India in 1814. The purpose of collecting these statements was "...for reference on occasions of selection for situations of important trust or remuneration for distinguished merit...." These statements were to be updated annually. The form included three categories of data: periods of service, combat experience, and special experience and skills. The periods of service included not only time in each rank and in the Army but also "...time present and doing duty with the Regt. or Corps" as well as detailed accounting of time spent on furlough. Combat experience included the obvious information such as campaigns, battles, and wounds. Most interesting in terms of evolving military professionalism is the category of special experience and skills. This category included the following headings of particular interest: "Native Languages acquired & to what extent, i.e. Reading, Writing or Speaking"; "Whether acquainted with the principles of Surveying, Military Drawing and Reconnaissance"; and "Special, Staff or Civil Appointments and whether in Peace or War and period of Service in each." The Governor in Council directed the Commander in Chief to issue the necessary orders to implement the directions of Government.

1Ltr from the Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 23 Apr 1833; P/265/14.
and to institute a similar statement for Indian Officers.¹

The Commander in Chief issued the implementing general order on 7 April 1832. He directed each officer to complete his own statement of service which was to be countersigned by the regimental commander or department head for those permanently detached from their regiment. Interestingly, the statements of medical officers were sent through the Medical Board to the Adjutant General whether the medical officers were on civil or military duty. The form developed for the Indian Officers included the same data for periods of service and for combat experience. The only noteworthy heading in the category of special experience and skills was, "What Language capable of reading and writing." All of the statements were to be forwarded to the Adjutant General.²

The systematic collection of these statements of service is important for two reasons. First, they reflect a deliberate attempt to select rationally the most qualified officers from the available pool for special assignments or at least to have the information to show the qualifications or lack thereof when considering an appointment based on interest. Secondly, the information gathered on these forms reflects the professional experience and skills considered important in the Madras Army. The emphasis on knowledge of Asian languages is striking. The staff work of the Madras Army focused on creation of a flexible, efficient fighting force.

The third area of staff work is execution of combat operations. The campaign in Vishakhapatnam presented in detail in Chapter III was marked by the flexible reactions of the Madras Army in a fluid situation.

¹FSGG, 1832, pp. 209-10; V/11/1586. and GOG 19 Mar 1832, in Gordon, p. 503.

²GOCC 7 Apr 1832, in Gordon, p. 504.
The staff rapidly moved the 3rd LI infantry from Pallavaram to Vizianagaram. During the move they easily adjusted for the higher priority assigned by the Governor in Council to the movement of troops to Malacca.¹ Four days from the time General Taylor in the Northern Division requested another regiment, the Governor in Council approved the move of the 43rd NI from Hyderabad.² At General Taylor's request the Military Board approved the use of cavalry coolies to carry spare ammunition instead of the bullocks authorized in the regulations because the terrain where the troops were actually fighting was too rough for bullocks.³ The story of this campaign is full of instances when General Taylor, Major Williamson, and Major Muriel rapidly moved their troops to counter moves by the rebels or to seize the initiative. Without flexible staff support during the execution of these combat operations to provide food, ammunition, as well as other supplies, and effective communications, this tactical flexibility would have been impossible. The key to the success of the Madras Army in this campaign was this tactical flexibility; commanders had the necessary independence, were expected to exercise their initiative, and did so in the field. The staff of the Madras Army, harnessing most of the offices of the Madras Government, generated the support that execution of this type campaign required.

Professional Knowledge and Standards

To teach and inforce the professional knowledge and standards essential to efficient military staff work and field operations, the

¹Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to CIC, 16 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 59, 3 Aug 1832; P/264/87.
²President's Minute, Resolution and Order, MMDC No's 6 and 7, 11 Jan 1833.
³Ltr from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 15 Jan 1833; MMDC No. 36, 25 Jan 1833; P/265/5.
Madras Army in the 1830's used a full range of regulations and manuals which were subject to constant revision in the search for military efficiency. Such regulations and manuals are an important step in military professionalism anywhere. An army's regulations and manuals should be a consolidation of professional knowledge, i.e. a formal institutional memory, that provides junior members of the army the information they need to perform their duties. Manuals are concerned primarily with imparting professional knowledge. Regulations, on the other hand, provide the members of the army professional knowledge while simultaneously identifying the professional standards which all members of the army must meet. These standards are formally codified so that those who fail to meet the professional standards can be professionally disciplined by courts martial. One of the principal objects of teaching military officers standard professional knowledge and conduct is to have replacements available when casualties occur.

The 1849 version of the General Regulations of the Madras Army directed commanding officers to "...give their utmost attention..." to training the officers under their command. The regulation then stated:

The character, the extent, and the detail of the instruction to be imparted are fully and distinctly established and prescribed by Regulations, with which the Commanding Officer is held responsible that every Officer of his Corps is made thoroughly acquainted.

Commanders then read that if an inspector found any officer with two years service who could not properly exercise a troop or company "...reprehension will attach to the Commanding Officer unless he has previously made an especial report on the subject."1 As the Governor in Council approved changes in the regulations and as the CIC and the various department heads

1General Regulations, pp. 99-100.
issued orders getting the new regulations and orders to offices in the field could pose a problem.

To solve that problem for both civil and military agencies in January 1832, the Madras Government began publishing *The Fort Saint George Gazette* as explained in Chapter I. The officers of the Madras Army and the British Army resisted the notion that *The Fort Saint George Gazette* applied to them. The CIC found it necessary to direct publication by the Acting Adjutant General of the Army of a notice "...that Orders from this Department, which may appear in *The Fort Saint George Gazette*, are required to be obeyed by all whom they may affect, in the same manner as if they had been communicated by order, or letter from the Adjutant General direct."¹ The matter did not stop there, a month later the Commander in Chief addressed a more specific group when he directed the Deputy Adjutant General of His Majesty's Forces to publish a notice to "the King's Troops" in the Madras Presidency that they too must comply with notices in *The Fort Saint George Gazette* "...in the same manner, as if they had been communicated by Order or Letter from the Deputy Adjutant General direct."² This publication provided a relatively inexpensive means of widely distributing information routinely once the various groups of officers accepted the idea that *The Gazette* applied to them.

The Madras Army incorporated the professional knowledge and standards of the British Army whenever possible. In January 1833 the AG writing for the CIC asked the Governor in Council to request that "...the Court of Directors ... arrange that copies of General Orders and Circular Orders

¹FSGG, 1832, p. 95; V/11/1586.
²FSGG, 1832, p. 194; V/11/1586.
may be forwarded by the Horse Guards to the Presidency." The CIC also suggested that the AG be sent "...copies of such standard military books as may from time to time be published under the sanction of the Horse Guards." In July 1833 the Governor in Council considered a July 1830 letter from the AG dealing with a 24 June 1829 Circular Memorandum from the Horse Guards. In this memorandum the General Commanding-in-Chief of the British Army, Lord Hill, prohibited the wearing of beards and mustaches by officers. The CIC of the Madras Army extended this prohibition to all European officers in the Madras Army and directed that all commanders certify within two months that their officers were complying. Officers found on leave not complying would lose their leave.

The Madras Army printed manuals for its own use. Most of them were reprints of British works. In 1832 at the request of the CIC, the Governor in Council authorized the printing of 500 copies of a book by Colonel Pasley of the Royal Engineers on escalading. The CIC wanted escalading included in the Army's routine training. The Artillery as a scientific corps had many manuals. In December 1834 the Governor in Council forwarded to the Court of Directors five works from the Artillery including The Gunner's Assistant, Braddock's Memoir on Gunpowder, and other works printed at the Artillery Depot. Not a manual, but still a vehicle for

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1 Ltr from Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt, 22 Jan 1833; MMDC No. 19, 25 Jan 1833; P/265/5.

2 Ltr from T. H. S. Conway AG of the Army to Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 5 Jul 1830; ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to CIC, 2 Jul 1833; MMDC No's 12, 13, and 14, 2 Jul 1833; P/265/17.

3 Ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 28 Mar 1832; MMDC No's 33 and 35, 3 Apr 1832; P/264/79.

4 Ltr from Conway AG to Sec Mil Dep, 26 Dec 1834; MMDC No's 22 and 23, 30 Dec 1834; P/265/60.
the transmission of professional knowledge, were the 258 copies of questions and answers on the "Practical Duties of the Artillery" printed for the AG in 1833. The Madras Army made professional manuals and other how to do it books available to the officers thorough lending libraries, one of which was at Vishakhapatnam.¹

With professional knowledge relatively readily available, the problem of enforcement of the standards of professional behavior remained. In 1833 General Taylor directed the officer commanding at Vizianagaram to reprimand Lieutenant Edwin Durant of the 3rd LI for proceeding from Vizianagaram to another station without the permission of his commander. "...Conduct which altogether exhibits a want of respect to his superiors and extreme in-attention to the first principles of Military duty very much to the discredit of an officer of Lieutenant Durant's Standing." This incident was the third in a short time of his neglect of duty and compounding his problem by arguing the point afterward with his superiors. The General trusted that this would be the last such incident "...or he will [sic] be under the necessity of taking severe steps with..." Lieutenant Durant.² Officers who made more serious breaches of professional behavior could expect court martial.

On 2 January 1832 Ensign Maurice Heirn met a court martial charged with "Scandalous and infamous behavior unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman...." In October of 1831 Ensign Heirn had met

¹Comparative Statement of the Expense on Account of Stationary Supplied from the Public Stores to the Military Department, during the years 1831/32 - 1832/33 from Mil Bd, 17 Dec 1833; MMDC No. 29, 27 Dec 1833; P/265/27.

²Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Ass't AG No Div to Officer Cmdg Vg, 15 June 1833; General Taylor Papers.
Mr. Thomas Wolfrastone of the Madras Civil Service in a duel near Srikakulam. After they fired their guns with no one receiving any wounds, Ensign Heirn allegedly called Mr. Wolfrastone a "damned scoundrel" and called his own second Lieutenant George Harrison 41st NI, a "damned bugger" or a "damned blackguard." The court, with a lieutenant colonel as president, found Ensign Heirn not guilty. On 23 January 1832 the CIC refused to sanction the proceedings and ordered the court to reconvene and reconsider its decision. The court again found Ensign Heirn not guilty. They explained that, although Ensign Heirn did call Mr. Wolfrastone a scoundrel, due to extenuating circumstances, they did not find Ensign Heirn deserving to be found guilty as charged. The extenuating circumstances were that Mr. Wolfrastone had hired away the ayah Ensign Heirn had brought to the area where such servants were unavailable and therefore probably was a scoundrel. The court did not find Ensign Heirn guilty of calling Lieutenant Harrison either name. In February 1832 the CIC outraged at the court and at Ensign Heirn again disapproved the proceedings. He ordered Ensign Heirn released from arrest and to reside at Cuddalore pending appeal by the Government to the Court of Directors. The appeal was never settled, because Ensign Heirn died on 10 November 1832.¹ All the British officers of the Madras Army did not always agree about the proper standards of professional behavior.

Staff vs Regimental Service

The Madras Army was by no means perfect and the senior officers were well aware of some imperfections. In their private correspondence, General Taylor and Sir Fredrick Adam identified the number of regimental officers on

¹MMDC No. 13, 6 Mar 1832; P/264/13. and FSG Army List, P. 150. No cause of death was listed.
staff duty as the single problem most detrimental to the Madras Army’s efficiency. The Court of Directors was also aware of the problem and tried to solve it by limiting the number of officers of a regiment who could be absent simultaneously. This solution created a personal problem for General Taylor which is illustrative of the Army’s general problem. Although they were able to identify the problem, no one had a workable solution at this time.

In January 1833 Sir Fredrick wrote to General Taylor, “The number of Officers taken from Regiments for Staff Employments and the inefficiency of the Regiments from this and other causes ... strikes me forcibly. The remedy may not be easy, but the Evil ... is great....” General Taylor replied, “The want of Officers is the greatest defect now existing, but how that want is to supplied is the difficulty.” He explained that of the roughly 1400 officers in the Madras Army 182 were on the staff while 275 were on furlough to Europe, roughly one third were absent from their regiments. The number absent was actually larger, because his figures did not include those absent in India. He identified staff allowances as the greatest attraction of staff duty. In his next letter General Taylor pointed out that because promotions were regimental through major, each staff officer had to be carried on some regiments’ rolls. He listed the number of officers assigned to each staff agency and then remarked; "In other Armies some of these Departments being civil, the General Staff may

1Ltr from Fredrick Adam to H. G. A. Taylor, 26 Jan 1833; General Taylor Papers.

2Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 5 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
not be near so large, and I am not surprised at your Excellency's remarking
the difference between Europe and India in this respect."¹ In May General
Taylor returned to this subject. He explained that the Commissariat and
Pay Department staff positions were the most sought after "...in the Army
both because they are better paid, and are more independent [sic] of
Military control, and promotion in the Regiment is looked upon generally as
a great calamity, if it causes the person to vacate the appointment in
either." He went on to assert that staff officers lose the regimental
"...esprit de corps every officer ought to possess [sic]..." and fear to
return to their regiment because of their lack of knowledge of regimental
duties.² In May Sir Fredrick found time to respond briefly. In his opinion
the exemption of Commissariat officers from command authority was a terrible
arrangement, bad for the Army and bad for the officer. "...it demilitarizes
him (excuse the word) and unfit him for the duties of his profession when
he returns to them."³ This correspondence between two old soldiers, one new
to Madras and seeking local background information from the other, clearly
defined the problem.

When the Governor in Council invalided Major John Crisp in 1833,
he had not served with his regiment for 20 years. He had left his
regiment in 1813 to be a Persian interpreter and was then employed "...in
the Mahratta Secret Intelligence Department." He was assigned to the

¹ Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 13 Feb 1833; General
Taylor Papers.

² Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 6 May 1833; General
Taylor Papers.

³ Ltr from Fredrick Adam to BG Taylor, 13 May 1833; General Taylor
Papers.
the Pioneers in 1815 and in 1817 served as an engineer in Sir Thomas Munro's seiges in the Southern Mahratta Country. After a furlough to Europe, he was "Employed by Government on a Scientific expedition to the Equator..." and then joined the surveyor General's staff. Between 1827 and 1833, he was the Mahratta translator for the Tanjore Commission.¹ At least some of the other officers of the 47th NI had to resent this stranger who held one of their two majorities; on the other hand, Major Crisp performed valuable services for the Army and the Madras Government and had to be rewarded.

The Court of Directors was aware of the problem of excessive absences of regimental officers. They had attempted to solve the problem in 1829 when they restricted the number of officers permitted to be detached from a regiment for staff or other duty to five at any one time.² This order created its own problems. In 1832 the CIC wrote a minute advocating flexible implementation of the Court of Directors' order. He pointed out that some corps had many officers in Europe on furlough or sick certificate and that other corps had all their officers present for duty. The CIC thought the staff officers should be taken from a corps with its full establishment available rather than further weakening the other. He also brought up the probability that a general or the governor might want a particular officer on his staff to fulfill "...the confidential duties of such situations in a satisfactory manner...." A strict interpretation of the Court's order might preclude selection of the desired officer.

This last situation happened to General Taylor. In February 1833

¹Abstract of Service attached to ltr from Maj John Crisp 47th NI to Gov in Council, 31 Mar 1833; MMDC No. 9, 24 May 1833, P/265/14.
²GOG 6 Jan 1829; Gordon, p. 491.
he wrote to Sir Fredrick's private secretary and requested assistance. General Taylor wanted his brother-in-law, Lieutenant Thomas Maughan of the 12th NI Bombay Army, as his aide-de-camp. Both the CIC of Madras and the CIC of Bombay had no objection except that too many officers were absent from the Lieutenant's regiment. The Bombay CIC even "...waived a claim of a young protege of his own in favor of Lieutenant Maughan...." General Taylor explained that he was "...utterly at a loss to select a person as a member of my family...." His daughter had just arrived from England, and he could not see just anyone at his house daily. Under the circumstances, he had attached Captain George Gray as aide-de-camp even though his regiment had too many absentees. Captain Gray's regiment was located with General Taylor's headquarters at Vishakhapatnam and he could take the field if needed.¹ When the formal request for Captain Gray's services reached Madras, the CIC approved General Taylor's action but the Governor in Council refused this "...infringement of the Court's Orders...."² The Court of Directors soon solved this problem.

On 8 May 1833 they approved an exception to the maximum number of officers allowed to be absent from a regiment for staff duty. They authorized the withdrawal "...of officers selected for the Personal Staff of the Governor General, The Commander in Chief, The Vice President in Council, and the Aides-de-Camp of General Officers on the Staff...." No one was to be withdrawn "to the obvious detriment" of his regiment.

¹Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Maj Hodges, 18 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.

²Ltr from Taylor BG Cmdg NO Div to AG of the Army, 13 Feb 1833; ltr from B. R. Hitchins Act'g AG of the Army, 5 Mar 1833; ltr from R. Clerk to CIC, 12 Mar 1833; MMDC No's 14, 15, and 16; P/265/9.
and officers serving under these circumstances were not to be transferred from the personal staffs to other detached duty unless their regiment had come up to strength.¹ On 28 November 1833 the Bombay Governor in Council put Lieutenant Maughan "...at the disposal of the Government of Fort St. George...."² General Taylor worried needlessly about his daughter. She soon married Mr. W. U. Arbuthnot, the Assistant Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam District.³ The Court of Directors agreed with the CIC that personal selection of their staff by senior officers was essential to an efficient Army. Although the basic problem of absent regimental officers was clearly seen to adversely affect the efficiency of the Madras Army, no one in authority had a viable solution to the problem at this time.

¹FSGG 1833, pp. 795-6; V/11/1587.
²GO Bombay Gvt 28 Nov 1833; MMDC No. 1, 10 Dec 1833; P/265/26.
CHAPTER III

THE VISHAKHAPATNAM INTERNAL SECURITY
CAMPAIGN OF 1832 AND 1833

Setting

The campaign this case study focuses on took place in the Vishakhapatnam District of the Northern Circars in 1832 and 1833. The East India Company established a factory at Vishakhapatnam in the mid-seventeenth century when the Northern Circars were part of the Moghul Empire administered by the Viceroy of the Deccan, the Nizam-ul-Mulk at Hyderabad. In 1753 the French under Charles Castelnau de Bussy obtained control of the Northern Circars to support his troops in the service of the Nizam. In 1759 the East India Company troops forced the French from the Northern Circars.¹ Then in 1766 and 1768 the East India Company negotiated a treaty with the Nizam granting them the Northern Circars for an annual payment.² The British remained the rulers of the Northern Circars until independence in 1947.

In 1834 the Vishakhapatnam District included, according to A.D. Campbell of the Madras Civil Service, 15,300 square miles and a population of 772,570.³ The dominant geographic features are the coastal

plain along the Bay of Bengal and the hills. The plain is approximately thirty miles wide and is dotted with sharp hills many of which exceed 1000 feet in elevation and some of which reach 2000 feet. On the western side of this plain the hills rise abruptly into the Eastern Ghats. Within ten miles of the plain are peaks in excess of 4000 feet. This area is blessed with an average of forty inches of rain annually. The rainy season starts in the hills in April and on the plains in June and normally lasts until mid-November when the campaigning season commences. The campaigning season ends sometime in February with the advent of hot weather when the temperature often exceeds 100 degrees Fahrenheit for weeks on end. This heat lasts until June and the onset of the next rainy season.

This physical environment imposed severe limitations on travel and communication in an age and area in which steamships were just arriving on the sea and muscle power was the only alternative on the land. In 1832 the Military Board, to demonstrate that a magazine at Machilipatnam could not properly support the troops in the Vishakhapatnam and Ganjam Districts, explained that during the northeast monsoon...

\[\text{\ldots no vessel can make her way up the coast on account of the wind incurred and must stand over to the other side of the Bay to fetch the port. By land, the communication that season is even more precarious and during the rains impracticable for loaded carts; the country along the coast (as the road runs) is quite flat and the rivers filling}\]

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1World (Asia) 1:1,000,000 series, sheets NF 44, NF 45, NE 44, and NE 45; US Army Map Service, Washington, D.C.


3Charmichael, p. 36.

4Ibid.
rise above their banks and inundate the adjoining country, frequently to several miles in extent.¹

Vishakhapatnam did not offer an ideal theater for the Madras Government to use its Army for internal security.

There was an inevitable time lag in communications between the Northern Division and Madras. The transient time for express tappal between Madras and Vishakhapatnam was five or six days while ordinary tappal took another three days.² Sailing with favorable winds took five days or less.³ With unfavorable winds the passage was much longer. These are not real time communications, yet the ability in 1833 to send a letter and receive a reply within ten days over the 350 miles between Vishakhapatnam and Madras is really quite impressive. Important letters were answered almost immediately by the Governor to permit these rapid communications. When conditions warranted the expense of express tappal and the effort of an immediate response, the Madras Government could be kept well informed about events in the Northern Division.

The conditions in the Northern Circars in the early 1830's warranted a close watch by the Madras Government. The correspondence of observers ranging from a missionary in Vishakhapatnam to the Governor in Madras

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¹Para 10, Report from Mil Bd to S.R.Lushington Gov in Coun, 3 Jan 1832; MMDC No. 37, 21 Feb 1832; P/264/75, pp. 1473-82.

²Ltr from Taylor to Adam, 20 Feb 1833; Ltr from Taylor to Adam, 22 Feb 1833; Ltr from Adam to Taylor, 1 Mar 1833; Ltr from Adam to Taylor, 22 Mar 1833; and Ltr from Adam to Taylor, 13 May 1833; General Taylor Papers.

³The Ship Neptune carried five days provisions while carrying part of the 3rd LI from Madras to Vishakhapatnam in June 1832. MMDC, No. 65, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.
indicate that drought, famine, and disease stalked the land. These natural calamities certainly were at least contributory causes to the disturbances which are the basis of this case study. Another possible cause of unrest which was explained by A.D. Campbell in 1833 was the Madras Government's policy "...for some years past..." by taking over the management of zemindaries in arrears on the land revenue...

... and all other means in their power, to extend their direct management over the Land Revenue in the Northern Circars...; in order to counteract the local influence of the hill chieftains, and to strengthen the Government, in a country where, of all others, the permanent settlement has rivetted the affections of the people for their local but turbulent chiefs. 2

This statement by a former member of the Madras Board of Revenue which also sat as the Court of Wards and, as such, supervised the zemindaries inherited by minors, demonstrates that any rebels in Vishakhapatnam who suspected the Madras Government of deliberately attempting to alter the status of the zemindars in the Northern Circars were correct.

The British should have expected trouble enforcing their rule in this area. A strong warrior/cultivator tradition existed in Vishakhapatnam

1 Ltr, author not indicated, to Directors of London Missionary Society (LMS), 5 Jan 1829; LMS/ South India/ Telugu/ Incoming letters/ Box 1/ Folder 2/ Jacket B/ p. 10.
Ltr from H. Gardiner Col and Mag Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 19 Jan 1832; MJDC No. 12. 21 Jan 1832; P/324/58.
Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG OCND to Adjutant General, 16 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 23, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG OCND to Adjutant General of the Army, 29 Nov 1832; EFSGRDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, p. 435.
Ltr from Sir Fredrick Adam Gov of Madras to his brother Charles, 7 Apr 1833; Adam of Blair-Adam Muniments (hereafter Adam papers), Bundle 3/284.
Ltr from Sir Fredrick Adam to his brother William, 9 Aug 1833; Adam Papers Bundle 3/288.
Ltr from W. Dawson missionary at Vp to Directors LMS, 24 Dec 1833; LMS/ So In/ Tel/ Incmg Ltr/ Box 1/ Folder 5/ Jacket C.

2 Campbell, Landed Tenures, pp. 35-6.
District among the indigenous people. The existence and importance of this tradition from the thirteenth through the eighteenth century among the Telugus has been thoroughly demonstrated and documented in the work of John Richards.  

In the thirteenth century, the highest nobles were the nayaks who were drawn "...mostly from the Valama and Reddi castes, ...were under the direct personal command of the king," and were granted estates with which to support specified bodies of troops. Manpower was provided by lenkas who were "hereditary military slaves." The details of thirteenth century Telugu society are not important to this study; the point which is important is that "Telugu society of the thirteenth century was clearly highly militarized."  

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Telugus were conquered, and the Bahmani Sultanate, Vijayanagar, and Orissa ebbed and flowed across the Telugu domains. Of the conquerors, the Pujapati Kings of Orissa were most important in the Vishakhapatnam area. These rulers were eventually displaced by the kingdom of Golconda "...established by the conquests of Sultan Quli, founder of the Qutb Shah dynasty" between 1491 and 1543. The area of the Vishakhapatnam District was fully incorporated about 1571 when Ibrahim Qutb Shah annexed the coastal region around Srikakulam. From that date, coastal Andhra (the


2Richards, Mughal Administration, p. 5.  


4Richards, Mughal Administration, p. 9.  

Northern Circars) was nominally ruled by Golconda or its successors at Hyderabad until granted by the Nizam for a military alliance, first to the French in 1753 and then to the British in 1766.¹

The Muslim minority which ruled from Hyderabad depended upon cooperation of Telugu Brahmins and warriors who formed the local aristocracy. This local "...aristocracy was drawn from four major castes: Razus, Valamas, Kammans, or Kapus (Reddis)." One of these castes

...formed the dominant land controlling stratum in every village (aside from the Brahmin-dominated agrahara villages). On the next upward level they functioned as local chiefs and rajas of varying importance. By their grip on land, and on surplus agricultural production, these warrior/cultivators wielded immense political, economic, and military power in the countryside.²

Their power was strengthened when "...the Qutb Shahs appointed a member of a powerful warrior family to act as (hereditary) headman or deshmukh" in each revenue subdistrict. "The primary task of the deshmukh ... was to maintain an armed body of retainers and assist in the collection of the land tax." The area of the Vishakhapatnam District was held by tributary rajas under the Qutb Shahs.³ The history of this region throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and at least the first half of the nineteenth centuries is very much a story of the assertion of authority by the central government, in Hyderabad or Madras, and the resistance of the Telugu warrior/cultivators to these assertions.

In the late seventeenth century consolidation of Mughal power after their conquest of Golconda, which they made the province of Hyderabad, the Mughals retained a indirect system of ruling the region around Vishakhapatnam. The urban centers of Srikakulam and Kasimkota were

¹Maltby, pp. 99-110.
²Richards, Mughal Administration, pp. 26-7.
³Richards, Mughal Administration, pp. 17-34.
directly administered by members of the Mughal administration. "The remaining territory, towards the interior, was left in the hands of Telugu sardars or tributary rajas. The former supplied troops ... and paid taxes; the latter simply paid tribute."¹ When the Teluga leaders defied the authority of the Mughals, they were often far more inclined than the Qutb Shahs had been to use fear to maintain power.² The use of fear backed by force, however, did not make the inhabitants of coastal Andhra loyal to the Mughals. Whenever their power was weakened, the Telugu rajas and sardars withheld taxes or actively revolted. Those who remained loyal were attacked by those who did not; and, simultaneously, personal grudges and competitions for local power were settled by force of arms when the central power was weak. The most successful competitor in the Vishakhapatnam District during the turbulent eighteenth and early nineteenth century was the Pusapati family of the Razu caste with its family seat at Vizianagram. "In the 19th century, the raja of Vizianagram, all rivals swept aside, was one of the wealthiest zamindars in British India."³ James Grant described the process as

...the universal Hindostanny [sic] maxim, that every revolution in the state, must be favourable to the lawless ambition of subjects, either in consolidating the rights acquired under the dispossessed party, with the additional concessions obtained by stipulation from the one succeeding, or at any rate, establishing former pretensions, as coeval with the date of the last conquest.⁴

¹Richards, Mughal Administration, p. 101.
²Richards, Mughal Administration, p. 301.
³Richards, Mughal Retreat, pp. 50-68.
The British in the Vishakhapatnam District were dealing with an indigenous people who had both a well entrenched martial tradition and local hereditary leaders whose families had led resistance to central governments for centuries. The British experience in the Vishakhapatnam District initially matched the experience of earlier conquerors. This case study deals with one campaign in the British consolidation of their power against this local resistance.

The British were well aware of the martial traditions of the Telugus in the Northern Circars. In 1834 thirty-three percent of the sepoys in the Madras Army were from this area.¹ Fully nineteen percent of the Indian pensioners (4491 of 23,829) of the Army resided in the Northern Circars. There were 681 pensioners receiving their pensions at Vishakhapatnam and 195 at Vizianagaram.² The British depended on the martial traditions of the peoples of the Northern Circars to man the Madras Army. That the Madras Government knew that these martial traditions combined with the rugged geography of the area meant trouble for the Government was clearly shown when the Military Board stated that the Vishakhapatnam District was "...more frequently disturbed than any other..." district.³ The need for this campaign was not a surprise to the Madras Government.

¹Statement exhibiting the Provinces from which the Madras Native Army has been recruited, the total number of men of all Ranks from each Province, signed T.H.S.Conway AG of the Army, 22 Mar 1834; MMDC No. 10, 25 Mar 1834; P/265/40.

²Statement of the Number of Family Certificates and Pensioners payable at the several Stations under the Presidency of Fort Saint George; MMDC No. 13, 5 Sept 1834; P/265/51.

³Report from Mil Bd to Gov in Council, 3 Jan 1832; MMDC No. 37, 21 Feb 1832; P/265/75.
The first of the principal rebels in the disturbances of 1832 and 1833 is Veerabudra Rauze\textsuperscript{1}. His father, Raja Bepal Rauze, had been removed as a zemindar by the father of the present Raja of Vizianagaram and was killed at Vizianagaram. After the father's death, some of his adherents carried Veerabudra Rauze into the hills. "Many depredations were committed by large bodies of marauders in the name of this boy who was eventually brought back to Vizianagaram and kept in the Fort at that place."\textsuperscript{2} When Mr. Henry Gardiner assumed control of the affairs of the Vizianagaram Zemindary in 1827, he did not learn that Veerabudra Rauze was one of the Zemindar's pensioners and therefore received no pension for two years until Mr. Gardiner learned of Veerabudra's plight and consequent flight to the hills at the head of an armed band. After a show of force by the Government, they reached an agreement on the payment of the arrears of Veerabudra's pension and two Rachawars posted 5,000 Rupees security for his good behavior on 1 January 1830.\textsuperscript{3} In August 1831, the Governor in Council reported to the Court of Directors that Veerabudra had "...again broken his faith and again fled to the hills in a state of rebellion" and that the Zemindar of Vizianagaram pleading ill-health refused to "...return immediately to his Zemindary for the purpose of restoring tranquility...."\textsuperscript{4} While the rebellion of Veerabudra simmered for a year, the other principal rebels

\textsuperscript{1}Dr. Gutala Krishnamurti explained that Rauze (modern spelling Raju) is the caste of the Raja of Vizianagaram but may be a taken name without caste indication.

\textsuperscript{2}Ltr from Mr. Gardiner Col and Mag of Vp to R.Clive Chf Sec to Gvt, 29 Oct 1829; EFSGRDC, 6 Nov 1829; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 58-9.

\textsuperscript{3}Ltr from H.Gardiner to H.Chamier Chf Sec to Gvt, 11 Jan 1830; EFSGRDC, 19 Jan 1832; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 87-94.

\textsuperscript{4}Extract Revenue Letter from the Governor in Council FSG to the Court of Directors, 9 Aug 1831; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 9-10.
rebels of this case study appeared in late January 1832.

In late January 1832 two "Rachawar Chiefs: with approximately 500 armed men established themselves in a valley near Elamanchili and threatened to plunder the nearby villages. Mr. Gardiner, the collector and magistrate of Vishakhapatnam, reported that these men claimed their cause to be the return of the Ankapalle Zemindary to the Paikrow family and had "...set up as a Pretender to the ancient Zemindary a child 6 years old who is distantly related to the old Paikrow family but possesses no claim whatever on Government or the country laid to his name." Mr. Gardiner believed that, "Their real object is doubtless to procure a lawless subsistence for the present by plunder and eventually to induce the Government to purchase their forebearance by granting them pensions." These men became known as the Paikrow rebels. The two Rachawars were Caukerlapoody Juggernautauze, the leader, and his chief sirdar and self-styled dewan Dantlah Venkataputtyauze.

Preliminary Activities

On 31 January 1832 Mr. Henry Gardiner as Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam requested the officer commanding the Northern Division (OCND), Major General Sir John Sinclair, to dispatch troops to disperse the Paikrow rebels. The next day Mr. Gardiner reported to the Judicial Department that he anticipated that a show of force would suffice. He explained

1 Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt in the Jud Dept, 1 Feb 1832; MJDC No. 11, 7 Feb 1832; P/324/58.
2 Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Mag of Vp, 30 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 30 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, P. 421.
3 Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 21 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 30 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 417-19.
that he had requested troops because his entire Sibbendy Corps was busy in
the northwestern part of the District and that he believed he "...had no
alternative in this emergency but to call upon the military for assistance."\(^1\)

On 10 Feb 1832 General Sinclair reported to the Quartermaster General
of the Army that on 2 February he had dispatched Lt Pritchard with a 74
man detachment of the 8th NI to Elamanchili in response to Mr. Gardiner's
request. This report with the accompanying copy of Mr. Gardiner's request
was submitted before the Military Department on 21 Feb 1832.\(^2\) This incident provides
a clear illustration of the unitary nature and operation of the Madras
Government as the judicial and military actions were reported up the respec-
tive chains of command until reaching the appropriate Department. Both
Departments were the same body with the same membership, the Governor in
Council.

The Governor in Council, sitting as the Judicial Department, approved
Mr. Gardiner's action but admonished him not to specify "a small detachment"
in the future; because after he, as a civil officer, had explained the
threat, "...it should be left at all times to the discretion of the
Commanding Officer to determine the strength of the detachment to be
employed." The Governor in Council further admonished Mr. Gardiner that,
"...you should abstain from any direct interference with the operations
of the troops by issuing any orders to the officer commanding them[. H]e
must be guided by his instructions from Headquarters."\(^3\) If Mr. Gardiner

\(^1\) Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt in the Jud Dept, 1 Feb 1832; MJDC No. 11, 7 Feb 1832; P/324/58.

\(^2\) Ltr from Maj. Gen. Sinclair OCND to QMG of the Army, 10 Feb 1832; MMDC No. 31, 21 Feb 1832; P/264/76.

\(^3\) Ltr from T.R. Wheatley Sec to Gvt to Mag of Vp, 7 July 1832; MJDC No. 12, 7 Feb 1832; P/324/58.
had complied with the exiting orders of the Madras Government, this admonishment would have been unnecessary. After the revolt at Kittur, about 50 miles east of Goa, in 1824 when rebels killed a collector, a captain, a lieutenant and twenty men reportedly because the men were deployed as directed by the collector against the advice of the captain, the Madras Government established a set of rules for the guidance of magistrates and military officers when the magistrates requested military aid to maintain order. These rules included the stipulation that the magistrate who requested military aid "...has no authority in directing Military operations." Once the civil authority in an emergency had requested military assistance to maintain order the forces used and the action taken was the military commander's sole responsibility.

With the mere appearance of the troops in the southern part of the Vishakhapatnam District, the "armed adherents of the Poikrow Family" dispersed. Mr. Gardiner, the Magistrate, then proposed the replacement of the troops with a small body of sibbendies and the return of the troops to Vizianagaram. No sooner had the troops returned to quarters

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2 GOG 25 Mar 1825; Gordon, p. 469.
3 Another of the key principles of "Aid to the Civil" was in place by 1849 when the General Regulations of the Madras Army specified that if troops called out to aid the civil power were ordered to fire "...their fire will be effective," because firing over the heads of mobs had caused casualties among the troops and encouraged the rioters in the past. General Regulations, p. 20. See also: Roger Beaumont, Sword of the Raj, The British Army in India, 1747-1947 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1977), pp. 90-94. This section of Beaumont's book is extracted from Sir William Slim, Unofficial History (London: Cassell, 1959), pp. 73-98.
4 Ltr from H.Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt in the Jud Dept, 9 Feb 1832; EFSGJDC, 21 Feb 1832; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 259-60.
then "...the Insurgents quickly reassembled in large bodies and began to plunder the Country."\(^1\)

On 24 March 1832 the Magistrate again requested military assistance from General Sinclair, on the grounds that "...the Insurgents have reassembled in such force as to place it entirely out of my power, with reference to the duties required from the Police Corps in other quarters to suppress the disturbances or to protect the Villages from plunder." The Magistrate requested that the detachment of troops go to Nacapilly in the vicinity of which he estimated were two or three hundred rebels. He promised that the "Heads of Police and the Sirdar commanding the Sibbendies: would be directed to provide information and assistance to the officer commanding. The Magistrate further requested that the troops be instructed to disperse or apprehend the rebels "...and to adopt such measure generally as may be deemed expedient for the protection of the Country."\(^2\)

In response to Mr. Gardiner's request Ensign Hughes led a company of the 47th NI from Samalkot on 27 March 1832.\(^3\) Their only action of which a record is preserved occurred on 17 May when Ensign Hughes marched his detachment at one o'clock in the morning from Elamanchili for a dawn attack against the rebels in the valley of Peddapilly. The troops drew fire while moving through the pass, advanced as closely as possible, and returned the fire killing several rebels. The Army's wounded included

\(^1\) Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 26 Mar 1832; EFSGJDC, 6 Apr 1832; in Bd's Col 56361, p. 261.

\(^2\) Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Maj Gen Sir John Sinclair OCND, 24 Mar 1832; EFSGJDC, 6 Apr 1832; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 263-64.

\(^3\) Ltr from Maj Gen Sir John Sinclair OCND to Qtr Mtr Gen, 13 Apr 1832; MMDC No. 51, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.
Ensign Hughes, one havildar, two sepoys, and the dresser. They were reinforced by a company of the 8th NI from Vizianagaram on 22 May 1832, and Ensign Hughes was relieved by an ensign from the 8th NI pending arrival of an officer from the 47th NI. These troops were in the field when Mr. G. A. Smith took charge of the affairs of the Vishakhapatnam District while Mr. Gardiner was sick.

Between April and August 1832, he served as the Acting Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam. He notified Government of the restoration of tranquility on 19 July and submitted a detailed report on the disturbances in the southern part of the Vishakhapatnam District. Mr. Smith explained that Juggernautrauze, a cousin of two local zemindars, had nominally led the disturbances by setting up "...a claim to the ancient Paikrow zemindaries ... on behalf of his son..., whom he said was distantly related to and had been adopted by one of the last lineal descendants of that family." Because the Paikrow family had not possessed these estates for fifty years, Mr. Smith felt this claim was not credible and should not have led to any disturbances. He reported that the disturbances were centered on "...that part of the ancient Paikrow Zemindary which forms the Estates of Goday Sooria Pracasarow and Goday Sairainrow two wealthy and respectable inhabitants of Vishakhapatnam, but unfortunately men of low caste, and of no real influence.... ...the principal supporters of..." the rebels were "...the Rajah Caste and inhabitants generally of those Estates, adherents of the Ancient Paikrow family aided in the proportion of about one third ...

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1 Ltr from Ensign J.E. Hughes Cmdg Det 47th NI to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 17 May 1832; MMDC No. 52, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

2 Ltr from Maj Gen Sir John Sinclair OCND to QMG, 31 May 1832; MMDC No. 52, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.
by hill adventurers of this and the Rajamundry districts." Mr. Smith further reported that when he took charge of the District he noticed that the Government had no support among the people of the plains and "...was contending with a handful of troops against the greater part of its own establishment...."¹

Mr. Smith explained to the Board of Revenue that after evaluating the situation he realized the existing measures would not restore permanent tranquility. His solution was to concentrate on the creation of a dependable "district Establishment" and the weakening of the opposing force. To accomplish these objectives his "...first object was to conciliate Nagana Dora the Dewan and the person possessing the entire influence of the Golgondah Zemindary which is the Hill country bordering on the disturbed parts." As soon as Mr. Smith adopted this policy, "...a great hue and cry was raised by the Proprietors that these disturbances were created by..." Nagana Dora and that the troops should be sent against him. The Acting Joint Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam Mr. W.U. Arbuthnot who had been in the field with the troops emphatically agreed with the proprietors about the complicity of Nagana Dora. Mr. Smith, nevertheless, formed his district establishment of hill peons from Nagana Dora's area for whose conduct he had volunteered to be responsible. The immediate restoration of tranquility Mr. Smith termed "most wonderful."²

While Mr. Smith was reorganizing the district establishment and declaring tranquility restored, the Government in Madras took action to

¹ Ltr from G.A. Smith Act'g Col and Mag of Vp to Bd of Rev, 24 July 1832; EFSGJDC, 3 Aug 1832; in Bd's Col 56361, pp. 283-90.

² Ibid
reinforce the Northern Division. On 8 June 1832 in a President's Minute
written at Ootacamund Governor Stephen R. Lushington proposed

...at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief ... the removal of
the Third Regiment or Palamcottah Light Infantry with all possible
expedition from Palaveram [near Madras] to Vizianagaram for the
purpose of being stationed at the latter place, and to assist in
quelling the disturbances now existing in that neighborhood.¹

This move of the 920 personnel in the 3rd LI from Pallavaram to
Vizianagaram illustrates the operation of the bureaucracy at Madras in a
routine military support action.

The move is discussed in detail only as an illustration of the routine
operation of the Government. The records preserved are the correspondence
routed through the Governor in Council as Consultations in the Military
Department. Here one finds the actions of the Governor in Council, the
QMG, the Marine Board, and the Commissariat in moving the 3rd LI. The
actions of the AG, whose duties included issuing the orders to the
Regiment, because they were internal General Staff communications not
requiring approval by the Governor in Council, were not entered in the
Military Department Consultations and thus were not recorded.

In response to the 8 June 1832 minute of the Governor, the Secretary
to Government on 11 June notified the Marine Board that the Governor in
Council wanted the 3rd LI transported by sea from Madras to Vishakhapatnam
and requested the Marine Board to "...forward on what terms tonnage for that
purpose can be procured." For planning purposes the Secretary told the
Marine Board, "The strength of the Regiment may be estimated at 600 rank
and file."² On the same day the Secretary notified the CIC that the

¹President's Minute Signed S.R. Lushington, 8 June 1832; MMDC No. 53,
6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

²Ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Pres and Mbrs of the Mar Bd, 11
Jun 1832; MMDC No. 55, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.
Regiment was to move and that the Marine Board had "...been instructed to provide tonnage..."\(^1\) The next step was the request by the QMG to the Military Department that tonnage be ordered for the required number of two poled tents, two tindals (lascar supervisors), and 20 lascars; because camp equipment could not be moved from Machilipatnam fast enough to meet the 3rd LI at Vishakhapatnam.\(^2\) The Secretary forwarded this request to the Marine Board.\(^3\)

Once the required shipping was identified, the Marine Board began the process of negotiating a contract. They proposed an offer to Arbuthnot and Company, of clothing contract fame, of seventeen Rupees, eight Annas per head. Because "...the high price of rice of the Ilse of France has [sic] created unusual demand for shipping...," this Board requested a prompt response from the Governor in Council and permission to take an option on Arbuthnot's ships dependent on "...the marine and military survey proving satisfactory."\(^4\) The Governor in Council authorized the offer, but for some reason, Arbuthnot changed their tender to seventeen Rupees per head with a charge of eight Rupees a day for feeding the officers and with the Commissariat providing rations for the enlisted personnel and official followers. The Governor in Council accepted these terms for the ships

\(^1\) Ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to CIC, 11 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 54, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

\(^2\) Ltr from Act'g QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 12 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 56, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

\(^3\) Ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Pres and Mbrs of the Mar Bd, 12 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 57, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

\(^4\) Ltr from W.E.Underwood Sec to the Chief Sec to Gvt, 12 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 58, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.
Neptune and Royal William.¹

With the contract set, the Governor in Council informed the CIC of the ships hired and requested that the CIC provide the Commissary General "...returns of the troops to be embarked on each vessel, in order that he may ship the necessary provisions for their use."² The QMG provided a copy of the allotment of troops assigned to each ship and the Governor in Council passed the information on to the Marine Board.³ With the operations running smoothly, it became necessary to revise the plan.

On 16 June 1832 the Secretary to Government in the Military Department informed the CIC that:

In consequence of the immediate demand for troops in Malacca, and of a difficulty in obtaining transports, the Governor in Council has thought it advisable to alter the destination of the 'Royal William' [sic]; and to direct that she shall proceed via Machilipatnam to Malacca with the European Infantry, ordnance and such portion of the lascars, ammunition and stores, destined for the latter port as she can convey.

In the same letter the Secretary explained that an orlop deck had been installed and cabins removed to increase the troop carrying capacity of the Neptune. He requested that revised allotments of troops be provided to the Commissary General.⁴ The QMG reported to the Governor in Council

¹Ltr from W.E.Underwood Sec to the Chief Sec to Gvt, 13 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 60, 6 Jul 1832; and Ltrs from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Pres and Mbrs of the Mar Bd, 12 and 13 Jun 1832; MMDC No's 59 and 61, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85. The records reflect that the use of contract shipping to move the troops was routine for the Madras Army.

²Ltr from R.Clerk to CIC, 13 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 62, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

³Ltr from W. J. Butterworth Act'g Dep QMG to Sec to Gvt Mil Dept, 14 Jun 1832; and Ltr from Robert Clerk Sec to Gvt to Pres and Mbrs of the Mar Bd, 11 Jun 1832; MMDC No's 63 and 64, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

⁴Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to CIC, 16 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 59, 3 Aug 1832; P/264/87.
on 18 June 1832 that inspection by a lieutenant in the QMG's Department indicated that the Neptune could accommodate the headquarters and seven companies of the 3rd LI. His figures provided 3.9 square feet per individual; not including the officers who would have cabins.1 The next day the QMG proposed to move the eighth company of the 3rd LI as far as Machilipatnam on the Royal William, but the Governor in Council declined on 22 June 1832.2 The Commissary General, meanwhile, had reported that in cooperation with the Marine board his office had shipped five days' supplies on the Neptune.3 The eighth company of the 3rd LI eventually was transported on the brig Ripley. The correspondence involved was a repeat of the correspondence just discussed indicating the routine nature of the operation.4

The civil and military offices involved accomplished the movement of the 3rd LI rapidly, flexibly, and smoothly. When it was necessary to change the destination of one of the ships, these offices easily made the necessary adjustments. Everybody involved knew what portions of the operation was theirs to accomplish and did it promptly. The Governor in Council directly controlled the actions of the various agencies by having them send their correspondence through the Governor in Council.

Beyond the surface efficiency of this operation the correspondence involved provides interesting insights into the operation of the Madras

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1Ltr from W. J. Butterworth Act'g Dep QMG to Sec to Gvt Ml1 Dept, 18 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 61, 3 Aug 1832; P/264/87.

2Ltr from Act'g Dep QMG, 19 Jun 1832; and Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt, 22 Jun 1832; MMDC No's 66 and 67, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

3Ltr M. Cubbon Comm Gen to Chief Sec to Gvt, 20 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 65, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

4MMDC No's 75-80, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.
Letters were signed by the Secretary to Government giving orders from the Governor in Council on various dates in June, but these letters were not entered in the records as a subject of a Consultation until they were consolidated on 6 July 1832. Throughout this operation the Consultations cited indicate that the Governor was "on duty in the Provinces" and that the CIC was "on a tour of inspection." Neither man was in Madras at any time. The Governor in Council actually consisted of Mr. Oliver and James Archibald Casamajor who had entered the Company's service in 1802 and who in 1832 served as an "...Occasional Member of Council and Officiating President of the Revenue and Marine Boards." These two civilians were quite effective as the Military Department. The QMG's office in Madras issued orders and received orders for the CIC without any apparent difficulties. The Madras Government worked quite well during this operation in the absence of the two principal figures in the Government, because the Government was designed to handle military operations flexibly as a matter of routine.

The 3rd LI was in place at Vizianagaram by 30 June 1832. The troops' families traveled overland, a trip which normally required 30 days. If the situation had not been urgent, the troops also would have traveled overland.

Traveling with the 3rd LI was Colonel H.G.A. Taylor who had "...been appointed to the immediate charge of the Northern Division ... in the

1MMDC No's 50-83, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.
2Prinsep, pp. 22-3
3FSG Army List 30 Jun 1832, p. 13.
4Ltr from J. W. Butterworth Act'g Dep Qtr Mtr Gen to Sec to Gvt in the Mil Dept, 12 Jul 1832; MMDC No. 20, 17 Jul 1832; P/264/86.
absence of Sir John Sinclair on sick certificate...."\(^1\) Colonel Taylor was not the senior officer available for the appointment. Colonel Charles Farran addressed a memorial to the Court of Directors protesting the appointment of an officer junior to himself. The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army explained to the Court of Directors that:

> From disturbances and insurrectionary movements existing at that time in the Northern Division it became necessary, that an officer of activity and intelligence should be appointed to succeed. My knowledge of Colonel Farran in his Command at Nagpur convinced me that he did not possess those qualities, and I am satisfied was unequal to carry on the Command so as to do justice to the Public Service in the then distracted state of the Province.\(^2\)

The Governor concurred with the CIC and stated "...that there was no officer then in India Senior to Colonel Taylor possessed of sufficient activity and intelligence for the trust."\(^3\) This appointment and the appeal demonstrate that ability as well as seniority were required at least occasionally to achieve high command in the Madras Army and that, although nothing came of Colonel Farran's appeal, decisions of the Madras Government were subject to appeal. Both the appointment of Colonel Taylor and the movement of the 3rd LI by the Madras Government were intended by the Governor in Council to improve the Northern Division's ability to perform its internal security role.

While the Madras Government was reinforcing the Northern Division, Mr. Smith attempted to restore tranquility without force of arms. In

\(^1\) Ltr from R. Clerk Sec to Gvt to Pres and Mbrs Mar Bd, 13 Jun 1832; MMDC No. 61, 6 Jul 1832; P/264/85.

\(^2\) Minute of CIC signed O'Callaghan, 16 Oct 1832; MMDC No. 8, 13 Nov 1832; P/264/94.

\(^3\) President's Minute signed Lushington, 19 Oct 1832; MMDC No. 8, 13 Nov 1832; P/264/94.
August of 1832 his proposal to negotiate a settlement with Veerabudra Rauze reached the Governor in Council. They refused any terms but "...the surrender of Veerabudra Rauze unconditionally..." and directed the adoption of "...measures to uphold the authority of Government and bring him to a sense of the allegiance he owes and which he so grossly violated." The Governor in Council asserted that "No other course as regards this individual is open without affording encouragement to open rebellion against the State." On 5 October the Governor in Council authorized a reward of 5000 Rupees for the capture of Veerabudra Rauze. Wherever the precise threshold of the Madras Government's tolerance for disorder lay, Veerabudra Rauze had clearly crossed it.

In late September 1832 soon after returning to the Vishakhapatnam District, Mr. Gardiner submitted reports on the disturbances which had occurred during his absence. He had found that the Acting Magistrate had made no report since reporting the restoration of tranquility in July. Although Mr. Gardiner did not doubt Mr. Smith's sincerity, Mr. Gardiner asserted that "...a momentary suspension of the proceedings of the Insurgents (and if there was any suspension it could have been but momentary) would scarcely justify ... the flourishing report that had been

1 Ltr from R. A. Bannerman Act'g Sec to Bd of Rev to Act'g Cf Sec to Gvt, 9 Aug 1832; EFSGRDC, 24 Aug 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 295-301.

2 Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Chf Sec to Gvt to Bd of Rev, 24 Aug 1832, EFSGRDC, 24 Aug 1832, in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 303-7.

3 Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Bd of Rev, 5 Oct 1832; EFSGRDC, 5 Oct 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 335-36. The size of this reward is impressive when compared with contemporary pay scales in the Madras Native Infantry: a colonel's full pay and allowances were 1,290 Rs per month, an ensign's 181 Rs, a first class subadar's 70 Rs, and a sepoy's 7 Rs. From: Military Auditor General, Annual Madras Military Statement 24 Dec 1834, p. 19; L/Mil/8/107.
made of the 'restoration of tranquility.'" Mr. Gardiner report six incidents after 25 July 1832 in the southern part of the District where the Paikrow rebels were operating. Bands as large as 500 committed these depredations which included the looting of four villages, highway robbery, kidnappings of ryots, the seizure of 478 Rupees of the revenue collection, and the killing of four sibbendies. Mr. Gardiner also reported seven incidents between 30 July and 17 August credited to Veerabudra Rauze's people. These incidents included the plunder of five villages, three kidnappings, one cattle rustling, and destruction of an important irrigation canal.

Mr. Gardiner went on to explain that, "Of all Mr. Smith's acts during the few months he held temporary charge of my office there is not one that I so deeply lament as his having withdrawn the troops employed in the suppression of the Paikrow disturbances." Before he arrived, the detachments of troops had successfully protected the country and pursued the rebels; and Mr. Gardiner was sure that the troops would have permanently restored tranquility if Mr. Smith had not relieved them. However, because of "...the evils which attend a vacillating policy...," Mr. Gardiner recommended maintaining Mr. Smith's policy for the restoration of tranquility, which meant giving full support to Nagana Dora. Mr. Gardiner further stated that if order was not restored in a reasonable amount of time by Nagana Dora;

...there appears to be no alternative but again to have recourse to the employment of regular troops, and I should in that case recommend not that one or two Companies should be sent out but the

1 Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 26 Sep 1832; EFSGJDC, 5 Oct 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 339-349a.

2 Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Bd of Rev, 29 Sep 1832; EFSGJDC, 9 Oct 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 371-77.
wing of a Regiment under an experienced Officer who might detach them at his discretion. There are now plenty of Troops in the District and the shortest and probably the cheapest way in the end would be to employ an overwhelming force at once. This extreme measure I still entertain hopes of being able to avoid.\footnote{Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 26 Sep 1832; EFSGJDC, 5 Oct 1832 in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 339-349a.}

Thus the Government's civilian representative in the Vishakhapatnam District intended to use the means available to him short of military force to restore order; but if unsuccessful, he intended to use an overwhelming military force which he justified as ultimately the least expensive course of action.

After receiving Mr. Gardiner's reports, the Board of Revenue requested an explanation from Mr. Smith. He pointed out that the Vishakhapatnam District was an area where gangs could be expected to commit "...acts of aggression...." If such was not the case, he asked "...Why did the Zeminder of Vizianagaram consider it necessary to grant allowances of about Fifty Thousand Rupees a year for protecting this part of the Country long before Veerabudra Rauze was heard of?"\footnote{Ltr from G. A. Smith Late Act'g Col of Vp to Bd of Rev, 25 Oct 1832; EPBRFSG, 1 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 547-8.} After review of Mr. Smith's responses to the questions about his restoration of tranquility raised by Mr. Gardiner, the Board of Revenue declared to the Governor in Council that Mr. Smith "...exerted himself zealously ... to restore order and tranquility, but ... that he was premature in reporting that desirable object to have been completely attained."\footnote{Ltr from Robert Bannerman Act'g Sec to Bd of Rev to Chf Sec to Gvt, 1 Nov 1832; EFSGRDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 423-4.} As Mr. Smith and the Board of Revenue knew quite well, the current disturbances were just one episode in a long history of such disturbances. The matter was then dropped.
The leader of one of the gangs Mr. Smith referred to was captured in early October 1832. Shortly after his capture, Lunkah Jetty Patroodoo confessed that about three years before Veerabudra Rauze had asked Jetty Patroodoo to join Veerabudra "...as I was a man of military caste...." They agreed that Veerabudra would pay Jetty Patroodoo and his brother 500 Rupees each annually. They served Veerabudra for a year and a half during which period they led their own followers and men provided by him in plundering several villages in compliance with his orders. Because they were paid wages, they "...delivered to him all booty together with different rich people." After the year and a half, Jetty Patroodoo responded to the call of Ckerlapoody Vizeagapolrauze to give up plundering and join his employ at 130 Rupees per month for Jetty Patroodoo and his men. When these wages were discontinued, he maintained himself by "...sending people to different villages and by their means getting provisions and money...." Jetty Patroodoo insisted that he neither plundered villages nor rejoined Veerabudra Rauze after leaving his employ.¹ This story illustrates the presence in the Vishakhapatnam District of bodies of armed men led, at least in this case, by men of "military caste" who were willing to serve the highest bidder and if that source of support failed were willing to extract their living from the villagers.

When reporting the capture of Lunka Jetty Patroodoo for whom a reward of 400 Rs had been offered, Mr. Gadiner asked if the Governor in Council wanted Jetty Patroodoo tried for crimes against the state by a special

¹Translation of a deposition by Lunkah Jetty Patroodoo given to W. U. Arbuthnot Act'g Joint Mag of Vp, 5 Oct 1832; EFSGJDC, 19 Oct 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 393-5.
court in accordance with Regulation XX of 1802 or tried for specific criminal acts by the normal Circuit Court. Whatever the Governor in Council decided, Gardiner recommended that if Jetty Patroodoo were acquitted in Vishakhapatnam District he should be handed over for trial to the Magistrate of Rajamundry District where Jetty Patroodoo had been a notorious leader of gang robbers for many years. Mr. Gardiner further recommended that if Jetty Patroodoo were acquitted in Rajamundry District "...he be secured as a state prisoner in some distant part of the Country according to the provisions of Regulation II of 1819, for a more dangerous and desperate character was never let loose upon a Public."¹ The Governor in Council sitting as the Judicial Department replied that rebels should be tried for specific crimes by the Circuit Courts; but, if the Court acquitted any of the rebels, they should be returned by the Court to Mr. Gardiner. In this event, the Governor in Council would provide directions for trials of the rebels for crimes against the state. The Governor in Council also requested that as statements of charges were prepared they be sent forward for their information. Upon receipt, the Governor in Council would send additional directions if necessary.² The Madras Presidency Government officials here demonstrated meticulous compliance with the letter of the law which provided them routine means of legally disposing of those they determined to be the enemies of the state with or without evidence admissible in court. As the disturbances in the Vishakhapatnam District increased, the officials of the Madras Government used every means at their disposal to maintain internal security.

¹Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to the Sec to Gvt in the Jud Dept, 9 Oct 1832; EFSGJDC, 19 Oct 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 383-8.

²Ltr from T.V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Mag of Vp, 19 Oct 1832; EFSGJDC, 19 Oct 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 397-400.
The Campaign:
Aid to the Civil

The disturbances again reached a level beyond the Magistrate's control with the civil forces when the Paikrow rebels raided Anakapalle on 31 Oct 1832. "Several houses including that of the respectable Proprietor of the Anakapalle Estate were plundered and some burnt." On the next day Mr. Gardiner requested the OCND dispatch a guard of regular troops to protect this "considerable town," because he, the Magistrate, could not do so with his available resources. General Taylor, the OCND, immediately dispatched a havildar's guard of the 3rd LI from Vishakhapatnam to protect Anakapalle and "...its inhabitants against the deprivations [sic].... He simultaneously sent orders to the officer commanding (OC) Vizianagaram to relieve this detachment with a jemadar's guard of the 3rd LI because the original troops were needed at Vishakhapatnam. This incident was the start of an internal security campaign that kept the troops in the field and produced continuous action until early February 1833.

This situation deteriorated, and on 6 November Mr. Gardiner requested military assistance to restore order in the southern part of the Vishakhapatnam District. He notified the Governor in Council and forwarded a copy of his letter to the OCND. Mr. Gardiner explained that he

1Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to OCND, 1 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, p. 469.

2Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to OC Vg, 1 Nov 1832; General Taylor Papers; and Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Adj Gen, 6 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 22, 16 Nov 1832; P/264/94.
had done everything in his power to implement the arrangements made by Mr. Smith for suppressing the disturbances but that these arrangements had failed. After Mr. Gardiner held an interview with Nagana Dora in early October, he did influence the rebels to reduce their activities; but by early November the violence was worse than ever. Mr. Gardiner reported that the rebels are at this moment absolute Masters of this Country and most of the Ryots when called upon by the land holders to pay their kists, do not hesitate to plead the necessity they are under of answering the demands of the Paikrow rebels as an excuse for refusing. They plunder as they please by day and by night and I have no means whatever of checking them. All the Sibbendies that can be spared from other parts of the District are unequal to the protection of the extensive tract of Country which they occupy.

Mr. Gardiner expressed his hope that under the circumstances the Governor in Council would approve his request for military aid and assured them that he would provide the military complete cooperation and assistance.\(^1\) Beyond the justification for requesting military assistance and Mr. Gardiner's hope for Government's approval, the correspondence at the beginning of this campaign highlights the close cooperation between the collector and magistrate, the Governor in Council, the division commander, and the OC in the field during an internal security campaign.

Mr. Gardiner in his letter to the Governor in Council outlined his actions as Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam to help the military accomplish their mission. He provided all the intelligence information he could both to the OCND and to the OC of the detachment to be deployed. Mr. Gardiner explained that he had written to the OCND and had briefed him personally on "...all that I know respecting the character, habits and

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\(^1\) Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 6 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 16 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 401-4.
number of the Rebels as well as the nature of the Country and probable
difficulties to be encountered." Mr.Gardiner also had made an appointment
to brief the detachment OC. Mr.Gardiner planned two further actions to
help the military. The first was to dispatch an "intelligent Native" with
the detachment in the field to arrange for guides and to gather
intelligence. The second was to provide the detachment OC "...the small
sum of 200 Rupees to be laid out at his discretion for the purposes of
'Secret Service'..." for which Mr.Gardiner requested specific sanction.¹

The Governor in Council's immediate response included four elements.
First they approved Mr.Gardiner's actions. Then they asserted that the
troops would be ineffective without "...early and accurate information of
the plans and movements of the rebels..." and therefore directed that his
"...best endeavours... should be directed to this end...." The Governor in
Council next invoked the involvement of local supporters by directing
Mr.Gardiner to

intimate to Nagana Dora the consequences to himself of lukewarm
cooperation with the Troops, and at the same time assure him that his
zealous exertions in aid of securing the rebel sirdars, and procuring
for you timely and accurate information of their places of retreat
which he is well able to do will be duly appreciated and will secure
to him the favor and consideration of Government.²

The fourth element of their immediate response was to forward copies of
Mr.Gardiner's request for military assistance and their response to the
collector and magistrate of both the Rajamundry and Ganjam Districts with
the admonition to "...so far as the state of your District will permit,
...use your best endeavours to cooperate within your District with the

¹Ltr from H.Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 6 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC,
16 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 401-4.

²Ltr from T.V.Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Mag of Vp, 16 Nov 1832;
EFSGJDC, 16 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 411-13.
Force which has been detached against the Paikrow rebels." The Governor in Council thus ensured that the civil establishment would actively assist the military in the field and that the rebels would find no sanctuary by crossing an administrative border.

As mentioned above, Mr. Gardiner in his request to the OCND for a military force adequate to suppress the rebellion in the southern part of the Vishakhapatnam District provided the following estimate of the situation so that the OCND could determine what force would be required. The rebels were based "...in a valley called Jeloogooraute Waunkah about five miles from Nuckapilly...." They had fortified this valley with a stockade with bushes and thorns in the entrance and had recently occupied "...another valley situated at a distance of about twelve or fifteen miles from the former called Pedapilly Wankah but not so formidable either in its natural or artificial defences." The rebel strength was reputed to be 1000 men; but "...as numbers are usually exaggerated in reports from the Country,..." the actual strength was probably six or seven hundred. After providing his view of the best way to attack the rebels in their strongholds, Mr. Gardiner expressed his trust that although he had attempted to provide "...all possible information..." about the rebels he had "...written nothing that can be considered an improper interference with Military arrangements...." He now clearly understood the position of the civil authority once the Army was called out to restore order.

In the same letter he made promises of concrete assistance to the detachment of troops sent in response to his request. He promised:

1Ltr from T.V. Stone'ouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Mag's of Ganjam and Rajamundry, 16 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 16 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, p. 415.

2Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to OCND, 6 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 16 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 405-9.
...to depute an intelligent and trustworthy person to meet the Officer in command on the road (at Kasimkota) and remain with him for the purpose of procuring information and Guides and affording any other assistance that may be required. All the Sibbendies in that part of the Country will of course be placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer.

There were approximately 190 sibbendies in the area. This number included 111 of Nagana Dora's hill men who would have to be replaced if he turned out to be unreliable. Mr. Gardiner also promised that "The Heads of Police and other Authorities will also receive orders to afford to the Commanding Officer every assistance." The Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam thus offered all the force and local area knowledge available from his revenue and judicial establishment to support the regular troops deployed by the OCND for the internal security mission at the Collector and Magistrate's request.

Based on his analysis of the threat, General Taylor prepared a force. He dispatched two companies of the 3rd LI and two companies of the 8th NI from Vizianagaram carrying spare ammunition and prepared "...in every way for active field service...." Combined with these units was a company of the 47th NI from Samalkot making a total of approximately 400 troops in the detachment all under the command of Major William Williamson of the 3rd LI. General Taylor ordered Major Williamson to seize and destroy the rebel strongholds reported by Mr. Gardiner. General Taylor provided a suggested plan of attack but emphasized that Major Williamson was to

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1 Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to OCND, 6 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 16 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 405-9.

2 Ltr from A.E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen no Div to OC Vg, 11 Nov 1832; General Taylor Papers.

3 Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Adj Gen, 9 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 15, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
use his own judgment based on the situation he found. At Anakapalle he was to meet Mr. Gardiner who was "...most anxious to render ... every assistance...." The final order to Major Williamson was "...to report every circum [sic] however minute to this department for the Brigadier General's information and when requisite to make the civil authority acquainted with your operations."1 Thus the Madras Army took the field to maintain internal security in close cooperation with the local civil authorities.

On 12 Nov 1832 Mr. Gardiner met Major Williamson. The troops then commenced operations against the Paikrow rebels who had been driven from Jeloogooraute Waukah by Nagana Dora and were concentrated at Peddapilly Waukah.2 The troops started a night march at 10:00 P.M. from Anakapalle. At 3:00 A.M. the troops split into two bodies; one moved to block the front of the valley while Major Williamson marched with the second to attack from the rear. Unfortunately for the troops, the sketch map provided by the Collector indicated a distance of three miles instead of the correct ten miles, so they were not in position to attack until 7:30 A.M. instead of at dawn. Most of the rebels escaped in the night and the rest took to the hills when the troops appeared. The defenses were "...by no means so formidable..." as Major Williamson had expected. "Having set fire to all the sheds and huts within the position and having left a havildar's party to see the fences destroyed...," Major Williamson marched the troops to Elamanchili. They arrived there at 10:30 A.M. after a

1Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to Maj Williamson Cmdg Fld Det, 7 Nov 1832; General Taylor Papers.

2Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 21 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 30 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 417-19.
total march of 26 miles.\(^1\) Although General Taylor immediately sent another company of the 8th NI from Vizianagaram to the vicinity of Gourumpettah to block the rebels path,\(^2\) they escaped to the hills in the northern part of the Vishakhapatnam District and joined Veerabudra Rauze.\(^3\)

Mr. Gardiner quickly informed General Taylor that the juncture of the Paikrow rebels and Veerabudra Rauze in the hills around Cassipurram about 20 miles west of Vizianagaram presented a threat the Government forces in that area could not handle. Mr. Gardiner requested the troops no longer needed in the southern part of the District be sent north to seal the passes into the hills, and he recommended particular posts to achieve this object. Finally he suggested "...the great advantage that may be expected, from preventing grain or supplies of any kind from being taken to the hills...." In this endeavor he had "...directed the police officers to render every assistance."\(^4\) To fully exploit the military effort Mr. Gardiner intended "...to get Nagana Dora with his forces to commence a vigorous pursuit of the Rebels through the mountain fastnesses which have always proved so insurmountable an obstacle to the progress of Regular Troops." Mr. Gardiner expected that these measures would keep the rebels "...from doing more mischief..." and combined with the reward for

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\(^1\) Ltr from Maj W. Williamson Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adj Gen No Div, 13 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 23, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.

\(^2\) Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Qtr Mtr Gen, 16 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 34, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.

\(^3\) Ltr from H. Gardiner mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 21 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 30 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 417-19.

\(^4\) Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag to OCND, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 45, 7 Dec 1832; P/264/96.
Veerabudra Rauze's capture would soon lead to his arrest. With the Paikrow rebels driven from their home territory and concentrated in one area with Veerabudra Rauze's adherents, Mr. Gardiner thought the military problem much simplified.¹

It is interesting that at this point in the campaign General Taylor asked whether Veerabudra Rauze was a common criminal to be pursued and apprehended by the civil police or was a rebel against the state and hence the responsibility of both the civil police and the Army. The OCND and the Collector were sensitive enough about this point that the Collector, after a personal conference with the OCND in the evening of 20 Nov 1834, forwarded to General Taylor an "...extract of a letter from Government to the Board of Revenue dated 24th August last, which will satisfy you, that Veerabudra Rauze is considered a decided Rebel against the state."² Both the civil and the military authorities were aware of the distinction between normal law enforcement and rebellion and the different role the Madras Army could play in these two intertwined concerns of the state.

Faced with the need to continue the internal security campaign, General Taylor praised Major Williamson for his performance in driving the Paikrow rebels from the southern part of Vishakhapatnam District and gave him the responsibility of commanding the troops pursuing the combined rebel forces on 20 November 1832. The OCND told Maj. Williamson it was important "...that the southern part of the District should not be left without Troops for some time to come for its protection and to give

¹Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 21 Nov 1832; EFSGJDC, 30 Nov 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 417-19.

²Ltr from H. Gardiner Mag of Vp to OCND, 21 Nov 1832; EFSGRDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, p. 457.
confidence to the inhabitants...." The OCND also told him to conduct his actions "...bearing in mind the first grand object of shutting them up in the Hills and preventing supplies being furnished." If to achieve these objectives Major Williamson needed more troops, the OCND informed him that "...the Officer Commanding at Vizianagaram has been instructed to furnish them on your Requisition...." The OCND did provide Major Williamson the Magistrates' list of suggested posts at which to deploy troops. The OCND, however, strongly emphasized the suggested nature of this list. Major Williamson was told that the OCND "...leaves to your discretion the system to be pursued, as each day will put you more in possession of the localities and of the different routes by which the Rebels may endeavour to carry on their course of devastation." At this point, his force included two companies of the 3rd LI and three companies of the 8th NI (about 400 troops). The OCND provided Major Williamson the objectives and the means to achieve those objectives but left the details of the achieving to him. The Madras Army achieved tactical flexibility in the field through the professional skill and discipline of its members.

Major Williamson immediately moved to achieve his objectives. He posted one company with a body of sibbendies in the vicinity of Elamanchili to secure the southern part of the District. He based the other four companies in separate posts where the main lines of communications entered the hills, approximately ten miles from the rebel base at Cassipurram. Pickets of regular troops and sibbendies were posted "...as seemed best.

1 Ltr from Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to Maj. Williamson Cmdg Fld Det, 20 Nov 1832; EFSGRDC, 4 Dec 1832, in Bd's Col 56362; pp. 459-64. A copy of this letter is also preserved in the General Taylor Papers.

2 Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to OC Vo. 20 Nov 1832; General Taylor Papers.
calculated to shut-up effectively every avenue by which the rebels could have any communication with the open country...." With his forces in position on the twenty-eighth of November, Major Williamson turned his attention to "...the attack and dispersion of the insurgents in their headquarters ... and the destruction of all their strongholds, and fortified positions lying between the entrance of the principal passes..." and Cassipurram. So that he could launch the attack without opening any escape routes, he requested that the OC Vizianagaram dispatch three additional companies. These troops reached Major Williamson on 1 December 1832.1

He intended to rest the troops and launch his attack the next morning. At 5:00 p.m. that day, however, word arrived that one of his companies "...was threatened by 700 or 800 men advancing simultaneously in several bodies." Major Williamson immediately marched with his troops and arrived on the scene just before dark. The rebels fled, and the troops camped for the night. At 4:30 the next morning, the troops "...moved forward and arrived at the pass at daylight...." At the entrance was a breastwork from which the rebels opened fire, but "...it was instantly cleared by the advance guard...." The troops then "...advanced rapidly up the pass ... carrying each successive breastwork...from each of which as well as from the surrounding heights..." the rebels fired ineffectively. Cassipurram was about four miles from the entrance to the pass and was deserted when the troops arrived. Mr. W. U. Arbuthnot, the Acting Joint Magistrate, accompanied the troops in this attack. The observed rebel casualties were twelve or fifteen. The Government's casualties included four regular

1Ltr from Maj Williamson Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 2 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 75, 16 Dec 1832; P/264/96.
troops and "some sibbendies or peons." After destroying the breastworks and burning Cassipurram as well as "...a long range of what seemed to be barracks at the entrance of the pass...," the troops returned to their camp at Gowrumpettah about 3:00 p.m. The three companies from Vishakhapatnam were ordered to return there the next day.1 This first entry of the Government's forces occurred a little over three years after the first report of Veerabudra Rauze taking refuge from the Government forces in Cassipurram which is only about twenty miles from Vizianagaram.2

After the attack on Cassipurram, Major Williamson submitted his recommended future course of action. Because of "...the facilities of escape which the country afford to the rebels, together with the obstacles it presents to the movement of a regular military force...," he recommended that the troops should tightly blockade the hills. If the blockade was tight the rebels who

...being chiefly inhabitants of the open country suffer from the fever consequent to the unhealthy climate in the hills..., will ... be reduced to the alternative of dying from starvation and disease amongst the hills or attempting to pass the troops who being in the open country will be enable [sic] to act with effect or, abandoning their chief, and dispersing gradually on their own accord. This last is the one they are certainly most likely to pursue and ... it may be fairly presumed that they will soon be reduced to the Necessity of adopting it.3

Major Williamson grossly underestimated the staying power of the rebels.

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1 Ltr from Maj Williamson Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 2 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 75, 18 Dec 1832; P/264/96.

2 Ltr from H. Gardiner Col and Mag of Vp to R. Clive Chf Sec to Gvt, 29 Oct 1829; EMRDC, 6 Nov 1829; in Bd's Col 56361, p. 62.

3 Ltr from Maj Williamson Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 2 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 75, 18 Dec 1832; P/264/96.
The Campaign: Martial Law

Although Major Williamson underestimated the rebels, the Governor in Council did not. On 4 December 1832 they conducted a thorough review of the disturbances in the Vishakhapatnam District. First the Governor in Council sitting as the Military Department reviewed the reports on the disturbances submitted by General Taylor including copies of reports from Major Williamson since the troops were called out on 6 November 1832. The Military Department ordered that copies of these reports "...be transmitted to the Revenue Department."¹ The Governor in Council next sitting as the Revenue Department reviewed the relevant reports of both the Acting Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam, Mr. Smith, and the regular Collector and Magistrate, Mr. H. Gardiner, dating from 6 May 1832. These reports were combined with the reports forwarded by the Military Department as Revenue Department Consultations of 4 Dec 1832.² Then the Governor in Council sat as the Judicial Department and reviewed, at least on the record, the same reports reviewed by themselves as the Military and Revenue Departments plus a few other reports submitted by Mr. Gardiner and General Taylor.³ After completing this review of the disturbances as reported through the various channels to the Military, Revenue, and Judicial Departments, the Governor in Council sitting as the Judicial Department

¹MMDC, 4 Dec 1832, No. 15; P/264/95.
²EFSGRDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 423-64.
³EFSGJDC, 4 Dec 1832, in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 465-71.
determined that "...parts of the Vishakhapatnam District are in a state of open and organized rebellion against the authority of Government." The Governor in Council, after reviewing the events of the preceding eight months as well as background information, determined that the situation in the Vishakhapatnam District was clearly out of hand; and, therefore, "Resolved that Martial Law be established therein under the provisions of Regulation VII 1808." A letter informing General Taylor of this resolution and a proclamation of martial law were ordered dispatched to him with copies to Mr. Gardiner.1 Hopefully, the bureaucratic exercise by the Governor in Council indicated in the records was strictly a paperwork shuffle to keep the lines of responsibility and authority straight.

In their letter the Governor in Council sitting as the Judicial Department notified General Taylor that because "...prompt and effectual measures should be taken to re-establish the authority of Government in..." the Vishakhapatnam District and that because the Governor in Council had decided that the troops under his command should take the necessary measures, he was commissioned and empowered in accordance with Section II Regulation VII of 1808

...to bring to immediate trial by Courts Martial all persons who may be found in arms against the authority of the Government and for punishing such persons with death if the offences of which they may be found guilty should be of a nature sufficiently ...graved to require that such an example should be made.

Although General Taylor's commission put the government of the District in his hands, it was not a license for personal despotism.2

1EFSGJDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 472-74.

2Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND, 4 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 475-480.
Included in the letter commissioning him were many restrictions on his power. The Governor in Council intended to monitor this situation very closely and directed General Taylor to submit reports of his operations for Government directly to the Secretary to Government and to send copies of these reports to the CIC. His instructions included the orders to "be guided" by the decision of the courts in the punishments inflicted and to refer every sentence to Government for confirmation prior to execution. If General Taylor had any doubts on any case, he was to ask Government for guidance. He was to work closely with the Magistrates of Vishakhapatnam, Rajamundry, and Ganjam and to turn over to them for trial any "...persons who may be guilty of offences of an ordinary nature not involving a connection with the Rebellion..." the troops apprehended. The final restrictions on General Taylor's powers were the limiting of martial law to the disturbed parts of the Vishakhapatnam District and the closing comment that, "Of course you will suspend the carrying into effect the powers committed to you under these instructions should the state of the District on your receipt of them no longer require the adoption of such measures." While re-establishing the authority of Government by administering martial law, General Taylor was also to "...invite those persons whose crimes may not have been of a nature to exclude them from the hope of mercy to return to their allegiance." Although General Taylor had great powers to administer martial law, he did not have authority to arbitrarily oppress the Vishakhapatnam District.

This same letter included the admonition that:

1 Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND, 4 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 475-80.
The ... Governor in Council desires that you will in all material cases act in communication with the Magistrate of Vishakapatnam whose local knowledge of affairs in that Province may be essentially conducive to the success of your operations and ... the Governor in Council is satisfied that you are sufficiently impressed with the importance of maintaining entire harmony and conciliation between the Civil and the Military authorities to render unnecessary his particular injunctions on that point.\(^1\)

This admonition may either indicate that lack of cooperation between civil and military agencies was a genuine problem for the Madras Government or, and more likely, simply may have been a polite way of telling a senior officer to be aware of the sensitive nature of his mission. Nevertheless, the point is that the civil and military agents of the Madras Government were required to cooperate with one another in the performance of their duties. It is interesting that this admonition to General Taylor was included in a Consultation of the Judicial Department.

Upon receipt of the Government’s letter, General Taylor immediately replied that "His Excellency may depend upon my using every endeavour to maintain entire harmony between the Civil and the Military authorities...." General Taylor also promised "...that with the Magistrate Mr. Gardiner and Joint Magistrate Mr. Arbuthnot of the principal Zillah concerned, there will be nothing like misunderstanding....," because they and the military both held the same zeal for the service and respected one another.\(^2\)

Cooperation between the military and civil authorities of the Madras Presidency may or may not have been common, but cooperation certainly was the official policy.

\(^1\) Ltr from T.V. Stonehouse Act’g Sec to Gvt to BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND, 4 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd’s Col 56362, pp. 475.

\(^2\) Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor OCND to T.V Stonehouse Act’g Sec to Gvt, Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 14 Dec 1832; in Bd’s Col 56364, p. 450.
The General also wrote immediately to Major Muriel who had replaced Major Williamson as OC of the field detachment because the latter's "...health ... suffered so much, from his zeal in continuing too long in camp...." General Taylor enclosed a copy of the proclamation of martial law with detailed instructions for its implementation and directed that the proclamation be given "every publicity" with emphasis on "...the consequences which follow a perseverance in Rebellion and at the same time invite all those whose crimes may not be..." too serious to "...return to their allegiance." General Taylor explained that such circumstances of capture as whether in arms or not, "...whether aiding or abetting the enemy...," or "...in the commission of any overt act..." would determine "...the degree of criminality, and the consequent punishment..." before a court martial and therefore must be recorded for each prisoner. Any ordinary criminals taken were to be "...transferred to the Civil Authority to be tried in the usual manner." The expense of caring for the prisoners was to be documented and provided to the Collector as such expenses were civil charges. All arrests were of course to be reported and no one was to be released without the approval of the Brigadier General. These instructions reflect General Taylor's disciplined compliance with the directions he received from the Governor in Council and his concern to follow proper legal procedures.

During the time the Government was declaring martial law and the proclamation was threading its way to the disturbed areas, the action

1 Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Sec to Gvt in the Mil Dept, 13 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 76, 18 Dec 1832; P/264/96.

2 Ltr from A.E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to Maj Muriel, Cmdg Fld Det, 13 Dec 1832; General Taylor Papers.
in the field continued unabated. On the night of 6 December a band of 60 or 70 of the Paikrow rebels burned most of a village. The next morning Captain George Moore led 70 troops up one pass while Lieutenant Vincent Sherard led another party up an alternate pass converging on Cassipurram. They took the rebels "...completely by surprise: but the only reported casualty was one rebel. The road had been blocked with "trees and thornbushes" since the last attack on Cassipurram. These were too green to burn, but the troops did put the torch to some new huts before returning to camp."

On 10 Dec 1832 Major Muriel, the new OC of the field detachment, joined the troops blockading the hills around Cassipurram. After inspecting his troops positions and learning that both Veerabudra Rauze and Caukerlapoody Juggernautaza, the Paikrow rebel leader, were residing at Kutturu, Major Muriel decided that the best way to become familiar with the area was to attack Kutturu. At 2:00 A.M. the troops gathered and then marched at 3:00 A.M. They were in the hills and drawing fire before dawn. After passing through "...very dense jungle and steep ascents...." they reached Kutturu by 9:00 A.M. They found it "...an open town though evidently only just evacuated. Having set fire to it and seeing it entirely consumed..." the troops returned to camp. The rebels, concealed in the jungles, maintained a sharp fire on the troops as they withdrew. The Government casualties included Mr. Arbuthnot, a havildar, and a naik of the sibbendies. The officers who had been present at the original burning

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1 Ltr from Capt G.W.Moore 3rd LI to OC Fld Det, 7 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 76, 18 Dec 1832; P/264/96.

2 Ltr from C.Muriel 8th Rgt Cmdg Fld Force to Asst Adj Gen No Div, 13 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 51, 28 Dec 1832; P/264/97.
of Cassipurram thought "...the insurgents... decreased in number although those seen appear better clothed and their communications superior." After completing his reconnaissance, Major Muriel reported:

From the density of the jungle it seems utterly impossible to close with the rebels, which is only to be done by stratagem. I apprehend regular troops would find it very difficult to accomplish. From the desolation of the hills it would seem the only method to be established is as strict a blockade as the nature of the place would admit of. Major Muriel thus agreed with Major Williamson. Although both demonstrated the ability of the Madras Army to penetrate the hills, seize the rebels' fortified positions, and thus deny the rebels sanctuary, neither saw any hope of forcing the rebels into a pitched battle in that terrain. Both saw the proper tactic as a blockade designed to deny the rebels the resources of the plains.

On 16 December 1832 a minor incident occurred which, although unimportant in itself, illustrates the superior fighting qualities of the regulars over the rebels. A large body of rebels attacked a naik and three sepoys bringing pay from Vizianagaram to Lieutenant J. Prichard's company. He reported,

...the conflict kept up for a very long time till the arrival of a Zemindar's party from Elamanchili sixty rounds of ball were expended and five of the Insurgents killed. Paikrow [Caukerlapoody Juggernautrauze] was present and abused his men for being unable to take the Treasure from so small a party. The men seem to have behaved very well. The Treasure is arrived safe....

The Government losses were three knapsacks and the troops personal property.

1 Ltr from C. Muriel 8th Rgt Cmdg Fld Force to Asst Adj Gen No Div, 13 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 51, 28 Dec 1832; P/264/97.

2 Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adj Gen No Div, 18 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1833; in Bd’s Col 56368, p. 4.

3 Ltr from Lt. J. Prichard Cmdg Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 18 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1833; in Bd’s Col 56368, p. 9.
The ability of four regulars to stand-off a larger body (at least more than six) of rebels, inflict significant casualties, and not sustain any casualties speaks well for the regulars' training and discipline as compared to the rebels.

Major Muriel on the eighteenth of December reported that after the destruction of Kutturu on the twelfth Veerabudra Rauze retreated "...farther into the interior and told Pickeraw [sic] to leave him ...," in all probability to divert troops who might be in pursuit. Major Muriel, therefore, posted Captain Moore with one company at Gopaulpilly, with another nearby, to maintain the blockade of the hills in the north and then proceeded with the other company to the south. Major Muriel sent word to Lieutenant Yarde to bring his company and meet Major Muriel at Kasimkota on the seventeenth of December. They finally met on the eighteenth after a hard march by Major Muriel's troops. Upon learning that significant numbers of the rebels were in their old position at Peddapilly Waukah, Major Muriel ordered Lieutenant Prichard with his company to block "...the two passes opposite Elamanchili..." so that the rebels could not move onto the coastal plain. With this blocking force in position, Major Muriel intended to lead his troops against Peddapilly Waukah on the morning of 19 Dec 1832.¹

In his report of 18 December, he outlined some serious problems the Army was having with local intelligence and because of the population's attitude. He asserted that the estimates of distances have "...been invariably very inaccurate being much greater than that stated by the people...." The other information the people provided was "...so vague and prevaricating as to cause a great deal of inconvenience which added to

¹Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adj Gen No Div, 17 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 3-5
the desertion of the male population of the Villages, would almost indicate a marked preference towards the Rebels." Major Muriel explained further that the sketch map he had been provided by the Collector was "...inaccurate and nothing but the names of a few of the principal Villages..." had been included. For whatever reasons the people had not rallied to the Government's standard and the troops were suffering from a lack of local knowledge.

Despite these difficulties, Major Muriel maintained the pressure on the Paikrow rebels. On the morning of 19 December, he led 100 troops of the 3rd LI and the 8th NI on the planned attack against Peddapilly Waukah. He reported that the troops fell suddenly on a large body of the enemy who maintained a brisk fire on the troops as they advanced but eventually abandoned their position, and dispersed after having suffered a loss of 6 killed. I have no doubt from the warm and close fire of the troops on a large body of insurgents during its retreat, and in a more exposed situation, it had suffered a loss of much greater number in killed than was actually counted, and a proportionate number of wounded. The greater part of the rebels being broken up into small parties and favored by the cover of an almost impenetrable jungle, were enabled to effect their escape...

His force captured four rebels, including one "desperately wounded," while suffering only one "slightly wounded" private. Once again the Madras Army was able soundly to defeat the rebels in battle while the rebels were able to take advantage of the terrain and make good their escape.

Major Muriel "...held out hopes of mercy to the Prisoners taken..." at Peddapilly Waukah "...on condition of affording ... every information tending to facilitate the suppression of the present insurrection...." The

1 Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adj Gen No Div, 18 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 4-5.

2 Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel to Qtr Mtr Gen of the Army, 19 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 53, 28 Dec 1832; P/264/97.
immediate fruit of this offer was the cooperation of Peddaul Uppenah, who accompanied the troops back to Pedapilly Waukah on the twentieth to destroy the rebels' defenses. Major Muriel sent parties of troops into the surrounding jungle "...to clear the pass of Insurgents should any still be lurking there...." Peddaul Uppenah showed one of these parties "...the retreat that the Rebel Chief had himself occupied..." where a bundle of Telugu letters were found.¹

These Telugu letters were addressed to the rebel chief "...by certain Native functionaries of the Villages in the vicinity. The letters purported that the writers ... had afforded supplies and aid of various description or held forth promises to that effect to the Rebel Chief and his adherents." Peddaul Uppenah confirmed the information in the letters. Major Muriel, therefore, arrested "...all the persons implicated by the ... letters as aiders and abettors in the insurrection...." He then forwarded the letters to the civil authorities and turned over to the police at Elamanchili the prisoners except Peddaul Uppenah, who was retained for further questioning.²

From these prisoners Major Muriel also learned that his attack had thwarted a planned raid on Anakapalle during the evening of the nineteenth. The prisoners informed him that their plan included burning and plundering the village and that "...several principle [sic] inhabitants were to have been murdered."³ The intention of the rebels to use selective terror was foiled in this case by the vigorous offensive tactics of the Army.

¹Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adj Gen No. Div, 22 Dec 1832, EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 15-6.
²Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adj Gen No. Div, 22 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 15-7.
³Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adj Gen No Div, 22 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 16-7.
Meanwhile, the troops in the north also remained active. Captain Moore learned about noon on 21 December 1832 that a band of rebels had left the hills and kidnapped two men working in the fields only about one and a half miles away from where his Detachment was stationed. He immediately marched for the nearby pass with thirty men. They sighted a party of 40 or 50 men, some of whom were armed with matchlocks, at a village where they apparently came to cook during the day. The men saw the troops in time to flee to the jungle before the troops could get in position to fire effectively. The troops pursued the men but gave up the chase, because the terrain was rough and unfamiliar, and because the party being pursued scattered. The troops failed to recover the two kidnapped men.1

Enroute back to their camp Captain Moore with his troops stopped at another village. He suspected this village was "...connected with the insurgents...," because it had been "...permitted to remain unmolested by them." A search revealed "A supply of paddy ... far exceeding the wants of the inhabitants and ... a very large chatty more than half full of rack. These articles were ..." confiscated. All but three men fled the village as the troops approached. One of the three secretly indicated that he would talk if arrested. He was arrested and confirmed Captain Moore's suspicions about the village. The informant explained that some of the men were "...in the service of Veerah Budrah Rauze [sic]..." and that the villages sold "...rack and little necessaries ..." to the rebels. The informant also explained "...that all the villages in advance of..." the Army's "...posts, belonging to the Rajah of Bobbili (near Bimlipatam) maintain an understanding with the rebels." With the informant insisting

1 Ltr from Capt. G. W. Moore 3rd LI Cmdg Det to Maj. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det, 22 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 15 Jan 1832; Bd's Col 56368, pp. 32-6.
he was "...nothing but a simple husbandman innocent of the practices of his neighbors" and offering to notify Captain Moore next time the rebels visited the village, the informant was released. The quick reaction of the troops to reports of rebel activity coupled with unpredictable movements such as Captain Moore's unannounced visit to a village suspected of rebel sympathy while he was on another mission gave the rebels and their sympathizers no chance to relax and good reason to be apprehensive.

In the south Major Muriel kept the pressure on the Paikrow rebels. On 22 December 1832 he learned that the rebels driven from Peddapilly Waukah on the nineteenth had fled south. He immediately marched in hot pursuit. Within twenty-four hours he "...came to several spots which they had only a few hours before left and must have been very close in their rear...." On the morning of the twenty-third, the trail ended in the Rajamundry District. Two days later on Christmas day Major Muriel reported to General Taylor that, "...all I can hear of them is that they are very generally dispersed, and I have not been able to succeed in obtaining intelligence sufficient of their route to warrant a pursuit." Major Muriel assured the OCND that he had spies out and would pursue any leads they provided. It is interesting that in his haste to pursue the rebels, Major Muriel had lost contact with two companies of the 8th NI.

When General Taylor learned that the Paikrow rebels would probably move south and enter the Rajamundry district, he went to Samalkot. His

1Ltr from Capt. G. W. Moore 3rd LI Cmdg Det to Maj. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det, 22 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 15 Jan 1832; Bd's Col 56368, pp. 34-6.

2Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Asst Adju Gen No Div, 22 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1832; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 17.

3Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 25 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1832; in Bd's Col 56368 p. 19.
objective was to be in position "...to adopt the most prompt and effectual measures to prevent their success in any attempt to plunder..." General Taylor reported that his intelligence sources indicated "...that the case of the rebels is becoming desperate and it may be expected they will break out in some..." new area. He scheduled a meeting with the Magistrate of Rajamundry on the twentieth of December to coordinate their activities. The OCND stayed abreast of the situation and was standing by to help the forces in the field.

Because Major Muriel had marched south from the Vishakhapatnam District into the Rajamundry District although still within the area of responsibility of the Northern Division of the Madras Army, his consideration for the letter of the law brought him to inquire: "...as the Proclamation of Martial Law does not extend here I wish to know how far I am warranted in the apprehension of any of the Friends of the Insurgents...." He did not, however, let his consideration for the letter of the law interfere with the accomplishment of his mission. In the same sentence, he reported sending a party to arrest the Rajah of Bomerrumcottah for "...having given refuge to D. Venketeputty [sic] Rauze...." Major Muriel said he was in the process of reporting to the Collector of Rajamundry the pending arrest and the presence of the detachment in the latter's District.

On 28 December 1832 Mr. A. Crawley, Collector of Rajamundry responded to Major Muriel:

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1 Ltr from BG Taylor OCND to Adj Gen of the Army, 20 Dec 1832; MMDC No. 51, 28 Dec 1832; P/264/97.

2 Ltr from Maj G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 25 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 8 Jan 1832; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 19-20.
Unless you should have received any instructions from Brigadier General Taylor I would suggest that you should send Veetsway Vencatapaty rauze of Bumarrum cottah to me with such evidence of his affording refuge to the Insurgents Sirdah Dautla Vencatapaty -auze as you may be able to afford in order that I may make inquiry and either detain him till I obtain the orders of Government or take such security from him as the case may seem to require.¹

Major Muriel's response was to forward Mr. Crawley's letter to General Taylor and request instructions. Major Muriel explained that this prisoner and three others had been arrested, because they "...were stated to have given refuge to Venkatapaty Rauze..." and that he, Major Muriel, "...was not aware what evidence there is against them but..." would find out when he returned "...to the Detachment which has them in charge."² Both Mr. Crawley and Major Muriel deferred to the authority of General Taylor in this situation.

The Collector of Rajamundry's response also informed Major Muriel, in case he ever returned to the Rajamundry District, that the Amin of Cottam had been ordered "...to afford you every assistance and information in his power, by immediately proceeding to your camp." The Amin lived at Tuni and was to be contacted there.³ This specific arrangement illustrates the collector's recognition of his responsibility to aid the Army when it was performing an internal security mission.

While Major Muriel chased the rebels in Rajamundry District, the troops he had left in the vicinity of Elamanchili took the field.

On 28 December 1832 at about 9:00 P.M. Lieutenant Walter Yarde learned from

¹Ltr from A. Crawley, Collector of Rajamundry to Maj. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det, 28 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 15 Jan 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 31.
²Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div, 1 Jan 1833; EFSGJDC, 15 Jan 1833; In Bd's Col 56368, pp. 37-8.
³Ltr from A. Crawley Collector of Rajamundry to Maj. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det, 28 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 15 Jan 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 31.
a jemadar of sibbendies and village police that 100 armed men who reputedly had participated in the plunder of Anakapalle (apparently the 31 October 1832 raid) were eighteen miles away. Lieutenant Yarde with all available troops marched about 10:00 P.M. and arrived at the rebel village about 6:00 A.M. The troops attempted to surround the village but about 100 armed rebels escaped to the nearby hills. The troops did capture 49 rebels\(^1\) including Bussidorah the leader, who escaped the next night. In his house a cache of arms, including eight matchlocks, four spears, "sundry bows and arrows," powder, and 200 bullets were found. Meanwhile, the 100 rebels armed with matchlocks who escaped "...maintained a menacing appearance on the ridge of the Hill...." Lieutenant Yarde or one of his force called to them and invited their return "...if they were peaceful inhabitants...." The response was a challenge for the troops to come and get the men on the ridge. The troops "...fired a couple of rounds of Blunt [blank?] ammunition in their direction which they returned with Ball." The troops had "...to maintain a sharp fire to keep them in check...." Because of the cover, the troops' fire did not hit the rebels.\(^2\) This incident demonstrates the effectiveness of prompt offensive action in response to intelligence by the small detachments deliberately positioned throughout the countryside to provide just this quick reaction. The troops certainly did not capture all the rebels, but the capture of 49 men was no failure, and the troops did once again deny the rebels sanctuary.

\(^1\)Obviously one or both of the estimated numbers of rebels was in error or more rebels arrived in the village after Lt. Yarde received his first intelligence.

\(^2\)Ltr from Lt. W.G.Yarde 3rd LI to OC Fld Det, 30 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 15 Jan 1832; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 25-8.
With the Paikrow rebels dispersed in the Rajamundry District and Veerabudra Rauze and his followers blockaded in the hills around Cassipurram, there was a lull in the action in early January 1833. General Taylor took the opportunity to visit his units in the northern reaches of the Ganjam District. Before traveling, he delegated to Lieutenant Colonel Fredrick Bowes, OC at Vizianagaram, the authority to employ any part of his brigade to reinforce Major Muriel’s detachment or any of the posts in the field. The OCND emphasized that promptness in reacting to information requiring movement into the hills was "...of importance to the Public service..." Lieutenant Colonel Bowes, therefore, was to exploit any opportunity without prior approval from the OCND. All movements were, of course, to be reported immediately. The OCND also directed him to take the field and leave the cantonment to the next senior officer if he supplied more than a full regiment for field duty. Thus the officer in the best position to see a need for action was given the clear responsibility and authority to do so while keeping his superiors informed of his actions.¹

During this period, General Taylor requested reinforcement for his Division and relief for his troops. In a letter to the private secretary to the Governor, the same letter incidentally with which General Taylor opened direct private correspondence with Sir Fredrick Adam, General Taylor stated,

The addition of a Regiment in this District is all I ask and all I think we can require to effect the tranquility of the Division[. O]n this point I was called upon yesterday to report my sentiments, and they have been transmitted to the Quartermaster General of the Army accordingly.²

¹Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to Lt Col Bowes, 7 Jan 1832; General Taylor Papers.
²Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor to Major Hodges Pvt Sec, 8 Jan 1833; General Taylor Papers.
Four days after General Taylor transmitted his sentiments, the Governor in Council approved the march of the 21st NI from Eluru to Vishakhapatnam when relieved by the 43rd NI from Hyderabad. General Taylor obtained another form of relief for his troops from the Military Board, who authorized the use of "...Cavalry coolies, instead of carriage bullocks for the conveyance of ammunition with the troops sent into the hills and jungles, when actually required...." The troops had suffered "great inconvenience" by being "...without any ammunition than what is contained in their pouches..." when operating in areas the bullocks could not traverse. General Taylor demonstrated personal interest in and attention to the needs of his command and, the authorities in Madras provided the resources he requested.

The lull in the action ended when Major Muriel rejoined the troops in the north on 18 January 1833 and launched the climactic operation of the campaign. The day he arrived, the Major learned that two prisoners, when offered the hope of mercy for cooperating, had independently said that Veerabudra Rauze met his principal sirdars at a spot near Kutturu about 07:00 A.M. daily. Major Muriel, therefore, launched a two pronged attack to capture the rebels during their meeting on the next morning. With Captain Moore, Lieutenant Edwin Taynton, and Ensign Henry Napleton, Major Muriel led 60 men of the 8th NI on a night march through rough country.

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3 President's Minute, Resolution and Order, MMDC No's 6 and 7, 11 Jan 1833; P/265/4

2 Ltr from J. Prendergast, W. G. Pierce, William Montieth, J. Hanson, and B. R. Hitchins (the Mil Bd) to Gov in Council, 15 Jan 1833; MMDC No. 36, 25 Jan 1833; P/265/5.

3 Does the high ratio of officers to sepoys indicate a desire by all the officers to be present for the big catch in order to share the reward and/or glory?
They departed camp at 10:00 P.M., reached the wrong side of a mountain at 07:00 A.M., and had to return to camp without seeing a soul in the hills. They were back in camp at 10:00 A.M. after a 25 mile march. Meanwhile, the second prong of the attack, a party of 40 sepoys and 40 sibbendies commanded by a subadar, had marched at 04:00 A.M. for Cassipurram. They sighted rebels but did not engage them for fear of giving away the plan. Major Muriel had ordered the subadar "...to approach any direction from whence he might hear firing...." When Major Muriel returned to camp, he ordered some shots fired, and the subadar brought his party back to camp about 01:00 P.M.¹

The troops were exhausted by both this march and another march on the same morning when Ensign Carryer Sherrard led a party into "...the Gunticonda Pass opposite Gopaulpilly and burnt four small villages within it, where the insurgents had many resources and friends and which assisted them in their incursions into the plains." Because these maneuvers had tired the troops and because of "...the unsettled state of the weather...." Major Muriel delayed his "...intended movement on Kutturu and Dunanuk."² He took the opportunity to confer with Lieutenant Colonel Bowes in Vizianagaram to make the necessary logistical arrangements to move the troops forward into the hills and establish a base of operations at Kutturu in the heart of the rebels' base area.³

¹Ltr from Maj. G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen, 21 Jan 1833; EFSGJDC, 1 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 41-4.

²Ltr from Maj G. Muriel Cmdg Fld Det to Dep Asst Adj Gen, 21 Jan 1833; EFSGJDC, 1 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 43-44.

³Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Sec to Gvt, 4 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, P. 46.
On 27 January 1833 Major Muriel, with his preparations complete, launched a 400 man operation to occupy Veerabudra Rauze's refuge in the hills at Kutturu. The troops moved in three bodies: at 02:00 A.M. one company marched directly for Kutturu "...a second strong party..." marched "...by the route pursued by the Major on the 18th..." with orders to move well into the hills and then "...to scour the Country..."; the main body of troops with the supplies marched a few hours later under Major Muriel to Cassipurram.2

While the troops were on the move, Major Muriel received a letter from Veerabudra Rauze claiming "...how foreign it was to his wish to oppose Government." In response, Major Muriel directed Veerabudra to come to Major Muriel's camp, which Veerabudra Rauze did not do.3 On 24 January General Taylor had written directly to the Governor that;

I deem it my duty to acquaint your Excellency with the feeling in the country towards Veerabudra Rauze, which I have heard so often, and from so many quarters I can hardly doubt it. In fact the impression is general that he has been harshly used from misrepresentation of his conduct and intentions by persons interested in his ruin, while he had no idea of rebelling against the Government.

General Taylor's information indicated that Veerabudra was ready to surrender "...if promised his life..." would be spared.4 The Governor's response was that any offer of terms by Government would "lead to the

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1This figure, which does not include sibbendies or unofficial followers, is from a table of the "Present state of the Troops employed at Cotoor [Kutturu] and its vicinity on the day Veerabudrarauze was captured" signed by Lt. A. E. Spicer on 10 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 26 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 74.

2Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Sec to Gvt, 4 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 46-7.

3Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Sec to Gvt, 4 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 46-47.

4Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 24 Jan 1833; General Taylor Papers.
belief that Government were [sic] growing tired of an unsuccessful activity..." and encourage more disturbances. The Governor did authorize General Taylor in his own name if approached by Veerabudra Rauze "...to accept of his surrender on the condition of his life being spared, but on no farther condition or promise of indulgence." This letter, important because it shows the Governor's attitude towards and interest in this internal security campaign, was written after Major Muriel's troops captured Veerabudra Rauze in the hills.

On the second day of the drive into the hills, the troops "...moved forward from Cassiputnum [sic] in four Divisions and arrived during that day at ... Kutturu...." The only opposition was a few ineffective shots. Once at Kutturu, "The pursuit ... was persevered in immediately but without other success than the destruction of several villages which contributed to the support of the rebels thereby crippling them very seriously." The pursuit party was fired at frequently from the jungle without suffering any damage. They found the area sparsely inhabited with all the cattle driven off. "Thus Baffled..." Major Muriel faced the question of whether or not he should keep the troops "...in the midst of Hills proverbial for their unhealthiness and in which the Sun is not visible till after 9 in the morning...." Because the troops were still in good health and because the mission of capturing Veerabudra Rauze was not complete, Major Muriel kept his force at Kutturu. From there, he sent "...small parties in every

1 Ltr from Fredrick Adam to BG Taylor, 5 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.
direction....: On the night of 31 Jan 1833, a party including 25 sepoys of the 8th NI led by Jemidar Mohamed Esoph and 40 Sibbendies led by Sibbendy Jemidar Vencapatputty Rauze guided by a prisoner captured Veerabudra Rause. He was immediately moved to Vizianagaram and arrived there on 2 February 1833.¹

With the mission at Kutturu complete, Major Muriel returned his troops to the plains to watch for Letchundorah, who had supported Veerabudra Rauze but who "...long prior to the present disturbances..." had "...been the terror of the whole Country." General Taylor reduced the field detachment by the return of the company of the 47th NI to Samalkot. He established a reserve of two companies of the 3rd LI "...stationed at central points ready for any operations that may be needed."² Thus as soon as the most important rebel, who commanded considerable public sympathy and support in the area, was captured the local commander adjusted the positions of the troops to facilitate capture of the lesser rebels.

The Governor in Council was assured that Veerabudra Rauze's principal followers would be taken soon, because they lacked his public support.³ The last report concerning Caukerlapoody Juggernautrauze, the leader of the Paikrow rebels during this campaign, left him a fugitive in the

¹Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Sec to Gvt, 4 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 47-48. and Ltr from G. E. Russell, Commissioner of Chf Sec to Gvt, 19 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 26 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 71. Russell's letter is the source of the number of sibbendies.

²Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Sec to Gvt, 4 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 49.

³Ltr from G. E. Russell Commissioner to Chf Sec to Gvt, 3 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 59.
Rajamundry District pursued by two companies. The Government forces captured his chief sirdar, Duntlah Venkat putty Rauze, on 8 February 1833 "...through the agency of the Dewan of the Golgondah Zemindar Nagana Dora...." He was turned over to Lieutenant Yarde, who sent him to Vizianagaram guarded by a havildar and twelve sepoys on 12 February 1833.

With the capture of Veerabudra Rauze, General Taylor called the attention of the Governor in Council to the efforts of Major Muriel, his officers, and men. The Governor in Council formally expressed both their "approbation" for the efforts of General Taylor and "...the warmest commendation of Government" for Major Muriel as well as his officers and men in a letter on 12 February 1833. This letter was published in *The Fort Saint George Gazette.* The Government reinforced this praise with the distribution of the 5,000 Rupees reward for Veerabudra Rauze's capture to the party who actually took him. The reward was distributed according to the rules for prize money which gave each sepoy 115 Rupees and each jemadar 345 Rupees. The Governor in Council informed General Taylor that the

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1 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 24 Jan 1833; General Taylor Papers.

2 Ltr from W. Mason Col and Mag of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 17 Feb 1833; EPBRFG, 28 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56362, p. 556.

3 Ltr from Lt W. G. Yarde Cmdg Det 3rd Lt to Maj Muriel Cmdg Fld Det, 12 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 26 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 65.

4 Ltr from BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND to Sec to Gvt, 4 Feb 1833; EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 49-50.

5 Ltr T. R. Wheatley Sec to Gvt to BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND, 12 Feb 1833, EFSGJDC, 12 Feb 1833; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 51-2.

6 FSGG, 1833, p. 100; V/11/1587.

7 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Taylor, 10 Mar 1833; General Taylor Papers.
Collector of Vishakhapatman would provide the 5,000 Rupees for distribution.¹

Disposition of Prisoners

To deal with the prisoners arrested by the troops under martial law in the Vishakhapatnam District the Government convened a Native Court Martial and a civil Special Court. The civil Special Court, presided over by Mr. J. B. G. P. Paske, first Judge of the Provincial Court, Northern Division, was established about the tenth of March 1833 under the provisions of Regulation XX of 1802. This court dealt with people arrested for offenses which did not justify trial by court martial in accordance with Section II, Regulation VII of 1808, which carried the death penalty upon conviction. The Government could have brought the people tried by the Special Court before the established civil courts.² These people, according to the regulations, were subject to normal civil judicial procedures. Thus it seems likely that the Government convened the Special Court to deal with the extraordinarily heavy case load. These cases were incorporated in the routine criminal statistics of the District.

For those prisoners whom a preliminary investigation indicated should stand trial for rebellion and, if convicted whose actions warranted the death penalty, a court martial was held. On 22 December 1832 the Governor in Council requested the opinion of the Faujdari Adalat on the procedures to be followed by courts martial conducted in pursuance of

¹Ltr from T. R. Wheatley Sec to Gvt in the Jud Dept to BG H. G. A. Taylor Cmdg No Div, 12 Feb 1833; General Taylor Papers.

²Judicial Dept Ltr, No. 7, 1833, from Governor in Council FSG to Court of Directors, 6 Sept 1833; in Bd's Col 56366; pp. 10-1.
Regulation VII of 1808. On the same day the Governor in Council informed General Taylor that the request had been made and ordered him not to try anyone until the opinion of the court had been received and further directions had been forwarded to him. The response of the Court was that Regulation VII of 1808 did not specify the procedures to be used (which was why the Court's opinion had been requested) and that they therefore could not answer the question. After giving this disclaimer, the Court provided a long exegesis of various procedures from British Law and the Madras Regulations which could be used as guides.

After receiving the opinion of the Faujdari Adalat, the Governor in Council issued General Taylor directions which both included and ignored the guidance offered by the Court. General Taylor was instructed to convene courts of nine officers who could be either all Europeans or all Natives but not a mixture. If he convened a European court, the president was to be a field grade officer or, if unavoidable, a captain but under no circumstances was the president to be below the grade of captain. If he convened a Native court, the president was to be subadar or a subadar-major. Following Article VII, Section IX, Regulation V of 1827, a two-thirds majority had to concur for imposition of a capital sentence. These instructions confirmed General Taylor's authority to approve and

1Ltr from T.V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Judges of the Faujdaree Udalut, [sic] 22 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 28 Dec 1832; pp. 83-4.

2Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to Bg Taylor OCND, 22 Dec 1832; EFSGJDC, 28 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56368, p. 85.

3Ltr from J. C. Morris Act'g Register of the Faujdaree Udalut [sic] to Act'g Sec to Gvt, 24 Dec 1832; EFSGRDC, 28 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 89-93.
execute all sentences of the courts martial.\textsuperscript{1} He also was directed to appoint a judge advocate to conduct these trials. This letter ended the suspension of the trials ordered on 22 December 1832.\textsuperscript{2}

The judge advocate appointed to conduct these trials was Lieutenant Richard Sprye of the 9th NI, who was assigned to the staff as a deputy in the Judge Advocate General's Department of the Madras Army.\textsuperscript{3} While the trials were under way, the OCND found it necessary to quote his directions from Government to Lieutenant Sprye on the differences between the regular courts and courts sitting under martial law. The OCND explained that such courts were exempt from "'the formalities'" which ordinary courts must adhere to, because "...the circumstances of a Country suffering under the dissolutions and distractions of Rebellion, make it imperative on the Government to take the most prompt measures for restoring tranquility ...." The OCND's point was that normal legal procedures would have been too time-consuming to achieve the purpose of martial law.\textsuperscript{4}

The OCND further explained that "...the Government has in its mercy directed the adoption of a less summary mode of trial than the full powers of Martial Law would justify....." The Government required that:

\begin{quote}
Every prisoner taken in Arms or in the commission of any of the overt acts contained in Regulation VII of 1808 ... (proclaimed as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1}The authority to confirm and execute sentences without reference to Government which had been specifically withheld from General Taylor in the original martial law instructions had been granted to him in: Ltr from T.V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND, 21 Dec 1833; MMDC No. 23, 28 Dec 1833; P/264/97.

\textsuperscript{2}Ltr from T.V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to BG H. G. A. Taylor OCND, 28 Dec 1832; EFSGWJC, 28 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56368, pp. 95-7.

\textsuperscript{3}FSG Army List, 1 Jan 1833.

\textsuperscript{4}Ltr from A.E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to Dep Judge Adv Gen No Div, 29 Mar 1833; General Taylor Papers.
it has been through the District of Vishakhapatnam) must be aware of the letter of the charge to be preferred against him, and in every instance, sufficient time between a Prisoner's trial and his capture has been allowed to enable him to call for and be provided with such evidence [witnesses] as he might consider necessary to disprove the charge.

Therefore, once a trial commenced it was to proceed without suspension which would "...defeat the end of justice and be productive of incalcuable evil...." The letter to Lieutenant Sprye ended with comments to the effect that he now had the considered opinion of the Brigadier General, that Lieutenant Sprye was to be guided by that opinion, and that he was to get on with the trials. The procedures utilized for the courts martial in this case study while not "the formalities" of ordinary law courts were, in principle, not without the basic elements of due process for the accused such as knowledge of the specific charges and the right to call witnesses in defense.

The Native Court Martial sentenced to death thirty-five individuals arrested under martial law. Of these thirty-five, six were hung, three had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment in the fortress at Gooty, nine had their sentences commuted to hard labor in irons for periods from three to seven years, and fourteen were pardoned. The Army either turned the other prisoners over to the civil authorities or warned and released them. The treatment of three individuals is of particular interest to this study.

Veerabudra Rauze was captured on 31 January and a Native court martial was ordered to assemble in Vizianagaram on 4 February 1833 for

1 Ltr from A.E.Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to Dep Judge Adv Gen No Div, 29 Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.

2 Jud Dept Ltr No. 7 of 1833 from Governor in Council FSG to Court of Directors, 6 Sept 1833; in Bd’s Col 56366, pp. 7-14.
his trial. On the thirteenth the OCND wrote to Lieutenant Sprye, the Deputy Judge Advocate conducting the trial, that the OCND had heard that the trial was delayed pending the arrival of Veerabudra Rauze's followers as defense witnesses. The OCND had also heard that they had been promised safe conduct while appearing at the trial. The OCND trusted that the stories were false, but if they were true;

...the assurance must be immediately revoked and the Court must reject all evidences of accomplices or participators in the crime for which Veerabudra Rauze [sic] is tried - and that no one has the authority to grant protection to the meanest of his followers save under the authority of the Brigadier General.²

Obviously the right to call defense witnesses did not extend to calling people declared to be the enemies of the Government. The trial continued but the dissatisfaction of General Taylor did not end.

On 20 February General Taylor forwarded the court's proceedings to the Governor in Council for guidance and reported that "The Court has found him [Veerabudra Rauze] guilty of the crime of Rebellion but not awarded an adequate punishment [in] fact it has not done its duty...," because the regulation clearly proscribed hanging for those convicted of rebellion. General Taylor did not return the proceedings immediately to the court, because the members of the court obviously shared the sentiments of the local people that Veerabudra Rauze, although guilty, could claim mitigating circumstances. General Taylor was not sure that he could persuade the court to do its duty³.

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¹ Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 2 Feb 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
² Ltr from A. E. Spicer to Lt Sprye, 13 Feb 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
³ Ltr H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 20 Feb 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
The Governor's response was that General Taylor was absolutely correct. The sentence was illegal and had to be revised. Sir Fredrick Adam could, however,

...perfectly understand the feelings of the Court & how they could not separate in their minds the conduct of the Accused from the motives which he assigned as having led to such conduct. But there is an end of all rule & Government if such doctrine be admitted & there is no administration of justice & of law if things so separated are to be combined.¹

It was at this point that General Taylor explained to Lieutenant Sprye the difference between the ordinary courts and courts martial under martial law cited above. On 10 March General Taylor was able to report that the court had done its duty and sentenced Veerabudra Rauze to death and that he had then followed the Government's directions and commuted the sentence to imprisonment for life.² It was the General's opinion that "...the further he [Veerabudra Rauze] goes from this [place], the better, and in the course of a year or two, he will be quite forgotten."³ On 27 April orders were finally issued for two companies of the 3rd LI to march with Veerabudra Rauze as he left Vizianagaram for Gooty.⁴

The mercy extended to Veerabudra Rauze was denied to Dantlah Venkataputtyrauze of the Paikrow rebels. General Taylor reported this man's death sentence on 6 March 1833.⁵ In a private letter General Taylor

¹Ltr from Fredrick Adam to BG Taylor OCND, 1 Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
²Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 10 Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
³Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adams, 29 Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
⁴Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to OC Vg, 27 Apr 1833.
⁵Jud Dept Ltr No. 7 of 1833 from Governor in Council FSG to Court of Directors, 6 Sept 1833; in Bd's Col 56366, pp. 8-9.
explained that the court

...recommended his being hanged in chains after execution, and it is my intention to do so, as soon as the Gibbet can be got ready. At Ankapalle this man was guilty of a deliberate murder some time back, and ... of other atrocities, there and elsewhere, that have made him the terror of the whole Country....\(^1\)

On the fifth of March General Taylor ordered the OC Vizianagaram to move Dantlah Venkataputtyrauze to Ankapalle for execution and to be careful to 

"...prevent any weapons of destruction, drugs or ought else of a dangerous nature from being allowed to the Prisoner, by which means the ends of Justice might be defeated...."\(^2\) All the troops in the area had been ordered to be present\(^3\) when his execution took place on 12 March 1833.\(^4\)

The last individual of particular interest to this study was also executed. General Taylor ordered Gundrady Mulliah's execution on 8 April 1833\(^5\) to be "...conducted with as much ceremony as possible."\(^6\) General Taylor apparently took as indicative of progress in the Army's internal security campaign the report

...that after the ceremony of hanging him in chains was over the Bramins [sic] and Bazar men of Ankapalle and other Villages came flocking round him saluting and holding up their children, whose

\(^1\) Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.

\(^2\) Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to OC Vg, 5 Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.

\(^3\) Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to Maj Muriel Cmdg Fld Det, 9 Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.

\(^4\) Jud Dept Ltr No. 7 of 1833 from Governor in Council FSG to Court of Directors, 6 Sept 1833; in Bd's Col 56366, pp. 8-9.

\(^5\) Jud Dept Ltr No. 7 of 1833 from Governor in Council FSG to Court of Directors, 6 Sept 1833; in Bd's Col 56366, p. 14.

\(^6\) Ltr from A. E. Spicer to Capt Gray Cmdg Det 21st NI, 1 Apr 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
lives they now considered safe, while before, they were in constant alarm about him.¹

Such a reaction reinforced General Taylor’s conviction that the correct policy was being pursued by the Government.

These public executions and the gibbeting of the corpses were designed to ensure that the general public knew precisely the possible consequences of defying the authority of the Madras Government. General Taylor pardoned some rebels, because they were "...poor wretches whose punishment would neither prove as examples or warning to their comrades, ...." After their release, they would "...spread the intelligence of other punishments, and thus give greater publicity then a proclamation often does."² The situation was one in which it might not be healthy to be an important person unless, like Veerabudra Rauze, you commanded enough public support to make the Government fear creating a martyr by executing you. Those who were executed were carefully selected for maximum impact on public opinion.

Many others were arrested but were neither court martialed nor turned over to the civil authorities. Before being released these people were informed of "...the danger of giving countenance or support to any person acting against the Government....." They were also told that the Brigadier General was "...inclined to believe they were in some measure forced..." to aid the Rebels but they will nevertheless be under "...strict observation of all the Public Authorities hereafter; their names, occupations, Villages etc are all registered, and they may rest assured certain punishment will follow any deviation from the observance of the most guarded propriety

¹ Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 11 Apr 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.

² Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 11 Apr 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
of conduct." The mixture of punishments, pardons, and threats administered under martial law was consciously designed to impress upon the people both the power and the magnanimity of the Madras Government. The Magistrate received a list of those the military had identified and released; although not charged or convicted, they could expect to be watched in the future.

After Action

General Taylor was well satisfied with the immediate results of this campaign. In his letters to Sir Fredrick Adam, the General called three major points to the attention of the Governor. General Taylor pointed out that before this campaign "We seem to have been in profound ignorance ... as to the Nature of the interior of this District ... [and] to have assumed..." that it was "...so unhealthy, we never would penetrate..." it. This assumption was based "...upon the assertion (most probably) of persons interested in keeping us out." The rebels in this campaign had good reason not to expect a vigorous pursuit when they fled to the hills.

In his letter of 9 April 1833, General Taylor summarized his feelings on martial law as follows:

...until a good and efficient police is established. I think the continuance of it [martial law] will be of great benefit to the country. The confidence it gives the well disposed is astonishing, and it has as great an effect on the other side. A military Police would keep up this feeling, and would be of much greater consequence than the former defective establishment, which was neither feared by the bad or trusted by the well disposed.3

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1 Ltr from A. E. Spicer Dep Asst Adj Gen No Div to OC Vg, 9 Apr 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
2 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, Mar 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
3 Ltr H.G.A.Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 9 Apr 1833, Gen Taylor Papers.
General Taylor was quite willing to use the Madras Army as a police force on a semi-permanent basis.

His third major point was the reluctance of the Government to call out troops until the situation was desperate. He trusted that, after this display of the effectiveness of the troops for internal security, the troops would now "...be made use of, for the protection of the country, and to give confidence to the inhabitants..." This reluctance did not end with the events of this case study.

These three points reflect General Taylor's conviction that "...the Rebellion ..." was "...nearly put down throughout the Division...." All that remained was a little mopping up. Operationally the Madras Army had achieved its objectives in this internal security campaign; they had captured or made fugitives of the principal rebel leaders.

The Government expressed its satisfaction with the Army's performance when, after declaring the "restoration of tranquility" in Vishakhapatnam District, they granted an extra month's pay and allowances to all the British officers involved and an extra month's pay to the Indian officers and sepoys. The Government was very concerned to ensure that when they believed that the Madras Army had performed difficult duties well, the members of the Army knew that their efforts were appreciated by the Government. For men making their livings as soldiers, this concrete expression of their superiors appreciation was important.

1 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 9 Feb 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.

2 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Sir Fredrick Adam, 11 Apr 1833, Gen Taylor Papers.

3 GOG 23 Aug 1833; FSGG 1833 p. 617; V/11/1587.
Conclusion

The Madras Army's success in this campaign was founded on the organization of the Government and the military professionalism discussed in chapters one and two. The cooperation of the civil and military authorities at both the district and the Presidency levels provided the forces in the field essential support. The training and discipline of this Army made their tactical success possible. In short, the Madras Government and its Army were organized to conduct this sort of internal security campaign on a routine basis. The British conduct of the campaign is indicative of their view of the political organization of society and rebellions. Despite the Government's satisfaction with the campaign the military solution to social and political disturbances proved only a temporary solution which bought time while the British sought to establish normal conditions.

The Government was well organized to maintain internal security. The Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam had his police and Sibbendy Corps, armed from the Army's arsenal, to handle low level disturbances. When problems beyond the civil coercive establishment's ability to suppress arose, the Magistrate could call on the resources of the Northern Division of the Madras Army. The forces assigned to the Division were deliberately tailored to suppress local insurrections and were supported on short notice by reinforcements dispatched by the Governor in Council.

The various civil and military agencies cooperated closely at all levels to ensure the success of this campaign. Once the Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam called out the troops to restore order, he put the full resources of his police and revenue establishments at the disposal of the
Army. He provided support such as local intelligence, food for the troops' bazaars, and tappal. In support of the Army's command and control efforts, the Collector hired extra tappal runners to provide rapid communication between the officer commanding the field detachment and the respective headquarters of both the Division and the Brigade. This temporary arrangement was approved after the fact by the Governor in Council as a routine matter. The close cooperation of the civil and military authorities in the field was illustrated when Mr. Arbuthnot, the Joint Magistrate, was wounded during the 12 December attack on Kutturu.

The Madras Army's success in this campaign was the direct result of their tactical competence founded on training and discipline. Their tactics included blockading the rebels in the hills with a series of small posts ready to react at a moment's notice when the rebels appeared and conducting night marches through rugged terrain to launch surprise attacks at dawn. The Army adopted these vigorous offensive tactics to solve their primary problem in bringing this campaign to a satisfactory conclusion — how to get the enemy to fight. Once the enemy was engaged the Madras Army knew precisely what to do. These tactics and this problem went strictly by the book. The book in this case is Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice, by C.E. Callwell, a manual written at the end of the nineteenth century that summed up British tactics against guerrillas. Callwell stresses that only troops "...of the highest class as regards training and discipline" can successfully conduct night operations like those of

1Ltr from William Mason Col of Vp to Chf Sec to Gvt, 17 Feb 1833; and Ltr from H. Chaimier Chf Sec to Gvt to Col of Vp, 26 Feb 1833; MPDC No's 41 and 42, 26 Feb 1833; P/246/59.
the Madras Army in this case study. The units of the Madras Army involved in this campaign were clearly well disciplined and well trained professionals.

Initiative by the responsible individuals in the field carefully combined with central control characterized the operation of the Madras Government in this campaign. The Government expected these professionals to exercise initiative and solve problems on the spot. To facilitate this process, the Government issued clear directives and provided its servants the necessary authority to take action. At the same time, the Government was well informed about the events in the Vishakhapatnam District and exercised effective control of affairs there. The Governor in Council received reports directly from the Division Commander and from the Magistrate in this situation, as well as the normal reports through the routine civil and military department channels. The Governor and other members of the central administration responded to correspondence in a remarkably short time so that a local officer could have a pressing question answered in ten days by a government that was 350 miles away. This bureaucratic system generated multiple reports from different agents of the Government about the same events which ensured that no one man controlled the flow of information to the Governor in Council. By carefully selecting disciplined and able men for responsible positions, the Government strengthened its control of the conduct of such campaigns.

The conduct of this campaign and the concerns expressed by the Government indicate that the British ruling Madras held a very elitist view of the political organization of society. As foreigners ruling through a government manned predominately by Indians, including the instruments of state power available to coerce the citizenry, the British were very concerned that some other group of foreigners would subvert the state by offering a more attractive arrangement based on religion, money, sharing of power, or some combination thereof to the Indians. Locally, the British carefully watched the relationship between the sepoys and the civilians in the vicinity of the Army's stations. Lieutenant Colonel Bowes was happy to report the "...utmost alacrity ... displayed by all ranks ..." and the many volunteers for service when "...a considerable part of the brigade..." at Vizianagaram was called out for this internal security campaign. Obviously the sepoys had not developed a relationship with the local citizens which would interfere with the Army's ability to coerce the people. The British were quite sure that "No conspiracy could be formed, at all dangerous to the State, without the participation of the Native Officers...." As long as the Army was loyal, the British knew they could suppress any local rebellion. They worked hard at keeping the Army loyal, at minimum expense of course and without any real sharing of power.

The British approach to local rebellions, as demonstrated in this campaign, was to eliminate the dissident leadership through force of arms if necessary. The superior training and discipline as well as the preponderance of resources ensured that once the Army brought the rebels to

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1 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor BG Cmdg No Div to Act'g AG of the Army, 20 Nov 1832; MMDC No. 13, 27 Nov 1832; P/264/95.
2 Ltr from H. G. A. Taylor to Fredrick Adam, 5 Feb 1833; Gen Taylor Papers.
battle the Government was almost guaranteed a victory. The real problem in
the Government's view was to capture the rebel leaders. Once this
objective was achieved the Government either executed or imprisoned the
leaders. The Government had no intention of executing or imprisoning all
of the rebels. As far as the British were concerned, elimination of the
leaders would restore tranquility. For a Government interested in revenue
based on agricultural production, elimination of a significant percentage
of the population would be self-defeating. The British were convinced that
once the dissident members of the local elite were eliminated, the rest of
the population could be intimidated or bought-off.

Despite General Taylor's and the Government's satisfaction with the
results of this campaign, the restoration of tranquility by force of arms
was not the full answer to rebellions rooted at least in part in drought,
famine, and disease. The disturbances in the Northern Division dragged on
until 1836 in the Ganjam District.¹ The troops were again back in the
Vishakhapatnam hills from 1846 until 1848.²

¹The affairs in Ganjam are the main concern of: G.E. Russell, Reports
on the Disturbances in Purla Kimedy, Vizagapatam and Goomsoor, in 1832-36,
(Madras: FSG Gazette Press, 1836).

²For this information I am indebted to Dr. David Arnold of the
University of Lancaster.
The effectiveness of the Madras Army in the Visakhapatnam District was no accident. The Army was an integral part of the security arrangements made by the Madras Government to maintain order in the state. The security of the Madras Presidency depended upon the flexible efforts of professional soldiers, not upon splendid amateurs muddling through. The Madras Government's use of the Army to maintain order and enforce revenue collection was part of the normal government operation. Despite the success of the Madras Army in campaigns such as that of 1832-1833, its mediocre reputation was reinforced, if not originated, during this period.

Security arrangements are part of state-building in any time and place. The police and the army, as well as the security policy of any state, depend on three general factors: the perceived threat; the resources available; and the historical experience of the state. The threat for the Madras Army leadership was one of either rebellion, with a combination of Indian rulers, or with foreign enemies who might invade India or threaten the vital interests of the British elsewhere and require a punitive expedition. The money allocated to the Army represented a reduction in the Company's profit which by definition was undesirable in a merchantilist enterprise. The Court of Directors had dispatched the Governor-General of India, Lord William Bentinck, with orders to economize which he did with a zeal.\(^1\) One of the largest areas of the budget where reductions could be made, of course, was the Army. The British were not

\(^1\)Smith, *History of India*, p. 587.
worried about the diversion of human resources from economically productive activities to military activities which, while providing a secure environment for profit making activities, produce no direct profits. They were worried, however, about spending any more cash than absolutely necessary for security (today's cost effectiveness). The third general factor in the establishment of security forces and policy is historical experience. The British brought theirs with them which included specifically British as well as the more general European experience they shared. In India they operated within the Indian historical experience. The institutions they produced, in this study specifically the Madras Army, were neither wholly British nor wholly Indian. These were Anglo-Indian institutions designed to build a stable state in the Madras Presidency which would permit accomplishment of the various objectives of the British in Madras. Not surprisingly, these institutions were authoritarian and hieratic.

Central to the British objectives was the extraction of the revenue. The Madras Government undertook the campaign in the Vishakhapatnam District in 1832 and 1833 to assert the authority of the Government and restore tranquility in order to realize the revenue.1 By establishing in each district a British civil servant holding joint appointments as tax collector and magistrate with the authority to call out regular troops stationed nearby for this purpose, the Government was well organized to collect the revenue. It is important to note that blind extraction of tribute which would economically ruin the people was not the British objective. Mr. G. A. Smith, while defending his performance as Acting Magistrate and Collector of Vishakhapatnam to the Board of Revenue, stated: "...I can solemnly affirm

1 Ltr from T. V. Stonehouse Act'g Sec to Gvt to G. E. Russell Sr Mbr Bd of Rev, 14 Dec 1832; EFSGORDC, 14 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56364, pp. 453-8.
that during the five months I was in the Vishakhapatnam District, I never spared myself, and had nothing at heart but the tranquility of the District and the welfare of the people...."1 Mr. Smith may or may not have stated his true motives, but he certainly stated motives he believed his colonial superiors in Madras and London would accept as proper for an official in his position. This statement is not hypocritical. The British planned to rule India for the foreseeable future and were interested in their long-term profits which depended on long term peace and prosperity. They wanted to maintain justice and tranquility so that the people would prosper and be able to pay the assessed revenue. The rulers and the ruled would grow rich together secure in person and property under a just, authoritarian, government. One of the principal instruments for the collection of the revenue in the Madras Presidency was the Army.

The Madras Army was not a national mass army motivated by patriotism which characteristics supposedly identify modern armies after the French Revolution. The Madras Army was an instrument of state power in a colonial setting quite different from both the British Army and any previous Indian Army. To ensure the power of the British, the officer corps was entirely British. The sepoys were volunteers drawn from assumedly politically reliable Indian ethnic groups.2 The British selected the hardest working and most trustworthy sepoys, with an eye on ethnic balance, to be Native Officers who could command small detachments but could not hold major command positions and thus were precluded from exercising significant power.

1 Ltr from G. A. Smith Late Act'g Collector of Vp to Bd of Rev, 15 Oct 1832; EPBRFS, 25 Oct 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, p. 536.

2 A detailed analytical study of the deliberate British use of ethnicity in the organizing and recruiting of their security forces in India needs to be done. A rehash of the martial races theory is not needed.
in the state. The British worked hard at retaining the loyalty of the sepoys by providing such benefits as pensions and the boy establishments and by deliberately isolating the sepoys from the rest of the population. British actions reflect an awareness that career soldiers, to remain loyal to the state, must perceive that their position is economically advantageous, that the people making policy decisions have the soldiers' best interests at heart, and that those people understand and appreciate what the soldiers are doing. The British officers of the Madras Army, for the most part, were aware that the loyalty of their sepoys was extremely fragile and could never be taken for granted. They were sensitive to the religious beliefs of the sepoys and concerned lest some act, such as the wrong water casks on a ship, inadvertently give offense and thus weaken the sepoys' loyalty. The Government had institutionalized strong financial and professional incentives for the study of Indian languages by the British officers to bridge the gap with the sepoys. Many of these same officers were very confident that, because of their paternalistic care of the sepoys, they would be loyal. The power of the Madras Presidency to maintain order and justice and to collect the revenue in large part depended upon the loyalty of the Madras Army's sepoys and the ability of the British officers to sustain that loyalty without being able to invoke patriotism.

The Madras Government used the Army for internal security campaigns with reluctance because of the expense and the difficulty of achieving complete success. As this campaign developed, the Governor in Council complained in November 1829 that "...an inconsiderate act of a local officer..." put "...the Government ... to the expence ([sic]) of a military
Beyond the problem of expense, members of the Madras Government were quite aware of the difficulties inherent for regular troops in attempting to suppress a popular revolt. In May 1832 Mr. Smith, Acting Collector and Magistrate of Vishakhapatnam, while writing to the Board of Revenue with a copy to the Governor in Council about the disturbances in his District remarked that calling out the troops would not be productive. In this situation, he pointed out, they would "...be employed in a service in which they never can act with effect, having no open enemies to contend with but their real opponents being no other than half the inhabitants of every Village." Just how difficult it could be for regular troops to find and engage the enemy in an internal security campaign was well known within the Madras Government and was one of the reasons why the Government exercised this option with such restraint. Earlier the Board of Revenue, while recommending to the Governor in Council what course of action to follow against Veerabudra Rauze, had expressed the opinion that the situation was "...not of sufficient political importance for the Government to commit itself by waging war with its regular troops ... and running the risk of discredit from failure in such a context." At that time, the Governor in Council concurred with "...the inexpediency of employing regular troops on an occasion of so little political importance ... and with so little

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1 Ltr from H. Chamier Sec to Gvt to George Russell, 6 Nov 1829; EFSGRDC, 6 Nov 1829; in Bd's Col 56361, p. 71.

2 Ltr from G. A. Smith Act'g Collector of Vp to Bd of Rev, 15 May 1832; EFSGRDC, 4 Dec 1832; in Bd's Col 56362, pp. 427-32.

3 Ltr from D. Eliot Sec to Bd of Rev to H. Chamier Sec to Gvt, 23 Sep 1830; EFSGRDC, 28 Sep 1830; in Bd's Col 56361, p. 162.
chance of success. The Madras Government used regular troops in internal security campaigns only after careful consideration of the expense and of the possible adverse consequences, in short, only with reluctance.

Once they saw no alternative means to maintain order and collect the revenue and once the rebels had clearly and publicly rejected the authority of the Madras Government, as in this campaign, then the Government would commit troops on an internal security campaign. Once committed, the Madras Army was very effective. These campaigns were common enough that the Government had worked out routines for the various agencies to follow and had institutionalized the routines in the various regulations. The collectors and magistrates could call out the troops in an emergency on their own authority. Such actions had to be reported immediately to the Governor in Council who then took charge and as the Military Department directly supervised the use of troops for extended periods. The Governor in Council as the Judicial, Revenue, Public, and other civil departments used the resources of these departments to support the Army in such campaigns. When the Governor in council authorized the declaration of martial law, it applied only to rebels, the Army turned over ordinary criminals apprehended in the course of such a campaign to the civil authorities. Even though rebellion was a capital offense, the British did not indulge in mass executions of those convicted of rebellion. The British executed only those leaders whose death the British calculated to impress most the people with the power of Government. The British were sensitive enough to "public opinion" to spare the lives, after ensuring that their power was broken, of leaders such as Veerabudra Rauze

1 Ltr from H. Chamier Sec to Gvt to Bd of Rev, 28 Sept 1830; EFSGRDC, 28 Sept 1830; in Bd's Col 56361, p. 1/3.
whose execution would only create more problems than it would solve. As demonstrated in this campaign, the Army, because it was an Anglo-Indian institution tailored to operate in this historically unique environment, was well trained, equipped, and organized to handle such a campaign as a routine manner. Everything they did in such campaigns was not successful, but the Madras Army deliberately learned from both their mistakes and their successes. They used the lessons of past campaigns to improve their performance. The Madras Army expected to be called upon routinely to undertake such campaigns.

Their success in internal security campaigns and thus the security of the Madras Presidency depended upon the routine flexible efforts of professional soldiers, not upon the actions of placemen muddling through. The Madras Army was led by a group of professional British officers. Their professionalism was based on spending their adult lives earning their livelihoods as officers in a large standing military force which they rationally attempted to make more militarily efficient on the basis of their experience. They continually adjusted the logistical arrangements, the personnel policies, and the training of the Madras Army in their search for military efficiency. The historical documents reflect continual professional debate among the British officers about how most efficiently to organize and operate this Army. The existence of this debate is an important indication of the British officers' professionalism. The result of this professionalism was demonstrated in this campaign where the Governor in Council provided General Taylor, the division commander, the authority and resources to accomplish the mission they assigned him; and he, in turn, did the same for Majors Williamson and Muriel, the field commanders. The authority to act and the expectation that subordinates would exercise
initiative to accomplish the mission in a manner acceptable to the higher authorities in Madras and London extended to the lowest levels of the Madras Army in this campaign. The Madras Army achieved tactical flexibility in the field because of the professional skill and discipline of its members.

The British officers at this time assumed that connections were necessary for professional advancement. While it is true that promotions were primarily by seniority, General Taylor needed support to be considered for a knighthood and provided his brother-in-law in the Bombay Army the professionally desirable staff appointment as aide-de-camp to the Officer Commanding the Northern Division of the Madras Army. The support of General Taylor was essential to bring Major Muriel's performance as field commander to the notice of the Governor in Council and to arrange the transfer of the senior lieutenant colonel from the 8th NI to keep Lieutenant Colonel Muriel in command of the field force after his promotion. Connections alone were not supposed to be enough to gain a position or hold it; the individual had to be competent. Sir Fredrick Adam as Governor was willing to find positions for friends and family but complained of the appointment of incompetents to office by his predecessor as Governor. Sir Fredrick, writing to his brother William, explained that he would not employ Henry Cashbum's brother. Sir Fredrick pitied "...the man on account of his family and ... regret [ed] it on account of his connections..." however, Sir Fredrick would not help him. Professional advancement in Madras as


2Ltr from Sir Fredrick Adam Gov of Madras to his father, 10 Mar 1833; Adam of Blair-Adam Muniments, Bundle 3/280. and Ltr from Sir Fredrick Adam Gov of Madras to his brother William, 9 Aug 1833; Adam of Blair-Adam Muniments, Bundle 3/288.
in Britain depended upon both connections and ability.

Paradoxically, despite the Madras Army's professional competence demonstrated throughout the nineteenth century in the kind of campaigns for which it was designed (internal security, Indian frontier, and Imperial expeditions1) and despite the loyalty of the Madras Army during the Mutiny in 1857, this Army has suffered from a general reputation as mediocre. This reputation is based on a curious mixture of the social snobbery of British Army officers towards all Indian Army officers and of the Bengal service against anything connected with the South2, of denial of the martial qualities of South Indians ostensibly because of their size, and of the very success of the Madras Army. They made internal security campaigns such as this one in the Vishakhapatnam District look too easy. To admit that the internal opposition presented a militarily significant threat was counter to the British Imperial mythology. These were not glorious conquests rating an entry in the London Gazette and bringing fame and fortune to the heroes involved. These campaigns were the routine price of "The White Man's Burden" and not worth mentioning in the history of empire.

Lord Roberts expressed this reputation when he wrote that while Commander in Chief of the Madras Army in the 1880's,

Each cold season I made long tours in order to acquaint myself with the needs and capabilities of the Madras Army. I tried hard to discover in them [the Madras sepoys] those fighting qualities which had distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century. But long years of peace, and the security and prosperity attending it, had evidently had upon them, ..., a softening and deteriorating effect; and I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them, ..., and that they could no longer with safety be pitted against warlike

1For the battle honors of the Madras Regiments see: Boris Mollo, The Indian Army (Poole, England: Blandford Press, 1981), pp. 76-7, and 133.

2Mason, pp. 184-91.
races, or employed outside the limits of southern India.\footnote{Lord Roberts of Kandahar, Forty-one Years in India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief, 2 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1898), 2:383.}

This view of the Madras Army was not original with Lord Roberts who was, incidently, a Bengal Army man. In 1835 Lord William Bentinck while Governor-General of India wrote

\ldots it is impossible for any dispassionate observer, who has seen the Madras sepoys, not to say that their physical defects, their small stature, and delicate frame, supposing all other qualities equal, render them inferior to the Northern Hindustanis, and that consequently, as a body of men, they are inferior to either of the other armies [i.e. Bengal and Bombay]...\footnote{C. H. Phillips, The Correspondence of Lord William Bentinck: Governor-General of India, 1825-1835, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 2:1448.}

In the same minute Lord William explained that in addition to lacking physical stature the Madras sepoys lacked "moral energy".\footnote{Ibid, pp. 1450-1.} He could deny the fighting ability of the Madras sepoys in the face of their success in such internal security campaigns as that in Vishakhapatnam District in 1832 and 1833 by discounting the opponent. Defeating a second or third rate enemy does not demonstrate military efficiency. He, in fact, could conclude from this campaign that the Madras Army was highly inefficient, because they took so long to defeat such a negligible adversary. Lord William also wrote,

Of internal danger, nobody I believe entertains less alarm than myself. In answer to those almost universal representations from public authorities of the existence of danger, and of the consequent necessity of maintaining a large native army, I have in vain asked to have pointed out to me, what the danger is. Where are the horse, foot, and artillery, by which we are to be ejected? The most recent document of this kind, that I have seen, is a minute by the commander-in-chief at Madras, who describes disaffection as everywhere prevailing,
and argues in consequence against any reduction of the army, and thinks necessary an augmentation of it. ... But in Madras, as in Bengal, there no longer exists a single chief, or a combination of chiefs, who possess even the semebalance of a military force. Nor are there any large masses of the population who have the least disposition to rebel against our authority.¹

By denying the validity of one of the perceived threats which the Madras Army was designed to meet, Lord William could deny the need for the Madras Army in its present form.

What his motives were are hard to say. As mentioned above, the Court of Directors had charged Lord William to retrench financially. Many of the documents which provide the evidence for this study were written specifically to explain why money was being spent to maintain the Madras Army as it was and why reductions would threaten the security of the Madras Presidency. If, as Lord William asserted, the internal security threat was not credible, the expenditures were unnecessary; therefore, he could make significant reductions in the Madras Army's budget. There is also the possibility of a personal motive.

Lord William had served as Governor of Madras from 1803 until 1807. The Court of Directors recalled him as a result of the Vellore Mutiny, and he apparently blamed the Madras Army. While Governor of Madras, Lord William had relieved Mr. Charles Harris from his position as Collector of Thanjavur.² As discussed above Mr. Harris, as a Member of Council and President of the Marine and Revenue Boards at Madras, was a central figure in the Madras Government during the campaign in this study. Writing in 1832, Lord William expressed the opinions that he would "...be most glad

¹Ibid, p. 1441.

of any change in the Madras councils..." and that although he expected Sir Fredrick Adam to "...make a good governor. His wife is a drawback upon his own good qualifications." Whether these personal considerations influenced his opinions or not, Lord William did hold a low opinion of the Madras Army and by expressing that opinion officially contributed to the Madras Army's reputation as not really very good. His low opinion of the Madras Army added to the difficulties of the Madras Governor in Council.

Part of the reputation of the Madras Army as mediocre was an assumption that at some point in the past the Madras Army had been a first-rate fighting force. The golden age of the Madras Army in particular and the Indian Army in general when the British officers eagerly served with their regiments, diligently learned the sepoys' languages, and cared for their sepoys while the valiant sepoys loved the British officers and marched blindly off to war appears never to have existed and yet always seems to have existed. This study reveals a professionally competent Madras Army with strengths and weaknesses during the 1830's. It played an essential role in the normal internal security operations of the Madras Government. Because the object of many of the historical documents was to make this Army more efficient and thus emphasized what the writer saw as a deficiency in the Army, it is easy for the historian to overemphasize the problems. The same documentary bias exists for the Indian Army in general. Rather than focusing on the weaknesses of the British Raj and its armed forces, historians should be trying to discover why the Raj worked so well and lasted so long. Historians might then understand the full implications of statements such as:

1Phillips, Correspondence of Lord William Bentinck, p. 472.
Never let us, in the Plentitude of Power, forget that it is to India's own sons we owe it -- that they have fought, that they have died, to establish it -- let Government, as heretofore, cherish, and, by every possible means, keep alive the zeal of the native troops and then may we defy any power on earth, to shake their fidelity.¹

¹Ltr signed QRS at Hyderabad, Madras Male Asylum Herald, 23 Aug 1834.

Mr. William Urquhart Arbuthnot (1807-1874). I.C.S.: fifth son of Sir William Arbuthnot, Baronet: educated at Edinburgh High School and Hailbury College: to Madras, 1826: became agent to the Governor at Vishakhapatnam; resigned the service and joined Arbuthnot & Co. at Madras, 1846: an original member of the Council of India, 1858: died Dec. 11, 1874. At the time of this letter Mr. Arbuthnot was a temporary sub-collector of Vishakhapatnam. He married Gen. Taylor's daughter Eliza Jane June 2, 1834.

Lieutenant Colonel Fredrick Bowes entered the Madras Army in 1800. In 1833 he was the commander of the 3rd Light Infantry, Madras Army, stationed at Vizianagaram. On February 11, 1835, he became Colonel of the 41st Native Infantry, and in 1837 was on furlough. His name does not appear on the retired list in 1851.


Charles Harris (?-1839). M.C.S. Writer in 1789: held various positions in the Revenue, Judicial, and Public Departments as well as the Secretariat 1790-1828: Removed as Collector of Thanjavur by Lord William Bentinck for having Indians flogged in 1804 (see: Rosselli, p. 132): Chief Judge of the Sadr Courts and Member of Council, 1829-1831: President of the Marine and Revenue Boards and Member of Council, 1831-1834: Senior Member of the Board of Revenue, 1834-1835.

Major George Muriel (?-1836). 8th Native Infantry, Madras Army, stationed at Vizianagaram, was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel May 5, 1833. He became the temporary brigade commander at Vizianagaram in July, 1833. He transferred to the 41st Native Infantry December 21, 1835 and served with them until he died April 10, 1836, in Goomsur.

William Oliver (?-1846). M.C.S. Writer 1800: Persian translator and held various judicial positions as well as Secretary to the Board of Revenue 1805-1830: Chief Judge of the Sadr Courts and Member of Council 1831-1836. Died 1845-46.

George Edward Russell (1787-1863). I.C.S.: son of Claud Russell, M.C.S.: educated at Eton: to Madras in the civil service, 1802; member of the Board of Revenue, 1822; first member, 1824; acting Resident at Mysore, 1832; Special Commissioner, 1832-1834, to investigate the disturbances in Ganjam and Vishakhapatnam and again in 1835 for the same purpose in Goomsor -- his reports of these missions are contained in No. 24 of the Selections from the Records of the Madras Government; Member of Council from September 1834 until retirement in January 1838; Governor of Madras from the fourth until the sixth of March 1837: died October 20, 1863.


Sir Henry George Andrew Taylor (1784-1876). General: entered the Madras Army in 1798: served at Assaye and Argaum, 1803; at Gawilghar, 1805; under Sir Barry Close, 1809; in the Commissariat, 1811-1819; under Sir John Doveton in the Pindary War: as Town Major of Madras, 1825; as brigadier at Vellore, 1828; and as commander of the Northern Division of the Madras Army, 1832-1837, suppressed rebellions in the Vishakhapatnam and Ganjam Districts: retired, 1838: C. B., General in 1857, K.C.B., G.C.B.: died on February 9, 1876, as the oldest general in the British Army.

Thomas Randall Wheatley (1799-1879). Second son of Major General William Wheatley of Lesney House; educated at Haileybury College 1815-1817: to Madras in the Civil Service, 1818: served as Secretary to Government in the Revenue and Judicial Department and in the Public Department during his career; in those posts in 1833; retired 1840: died September 1, 1879.

Major William Williamson. (?-?). Entered the Madras Army as a cadet in 1805: Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel 22 Dec 1832: On furlough for his health, 4 Jan 1833.
APPENDIX B

South Asians

Bussidorah:
Rebel leader arrested in Lt. Yarde's raid on the village of Benanum on 29 Dec 1832 who escaped that night. Bussidorah had a weapons cache (8 matchlocks, 4 spears, sundry bows and arrows, powder, and approximately 200 bullets) in his house.

Caukerlapoody Juggernautrauze:
Leader of the Paikrow rebels for whose capture a reward of 2000 Rupees was offered. Hung and gibbeted no later than November 1834.

Dantlah Venkataputtyrauze:
Chief sirdar and self-styled dewan of Caukerlapoody Juggernautrauze for whose capture a reward of 1000 Rupees was offered. Apprehended 8 Feb 1833 "through the agency of ... Nagana Dora" and turned over to the military on 11 Feb 1833. Executed 12 Mar 1833 and gibbeted.

Jetty Patroodoo or Lunka Jetty Patroodoo
Sirdar ("a man of military caste") who with his own men was employed by Veerabudra Rauze for 500 Rupees annually. Captured on or just prior to 5 Oct 1832. A reward of 500 Rupees had been offered for his capture.
Nagana Dora also spelled Naganah Dorah:

Received a pardon for his crimes of creating hill disturbances from Government because he protected part of the Vp District from the Pindarries in 1817. In February, 1833, Nagana Dora attempted to demonstrate his loyalty to the government by seizing and turning in Dantlah Venkataputtyrauze. Soon after this treachery two friends of Venkataputtyrauze broke into Nagana Dora's house, assassinated him, and hung his head on Venkataputrauze's gibbet.

Peddaul Uppenah:

One of the Paikrow rebels captured at Peddapilly Waukah on 19 Dec 1832. After being offered mercy, he cooperated with Maj Muriel, pointed out the Telugu letters which implicated numerous village functionaries with the rebels, and verified the information in the letters.

Veerabudda Rauze (also spelled Birabhadra Rauze or Veerbuddarauze)

As the descendant of a family which had lost its lands in 1764, he had been raised and supported by the Zamindar of Vizianagaram. In 1827 when the Zamindar retired to Benares, Veerabudda's allowance was not included in the list given the company's representative. In 1829 Veerabudda was granted a reduced allowance which was paid irregularly between February and October when he "...withdrew to the hills and placed himself at the head of a body of adventures, who plundered and laid waste the country...." Veerabudda was captured in late January 1833, tried by the Native court martial at Vizianagaram, and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
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I. Special finding aids

Adjutant General's Office. *A List of the Officers of the Army, Ordnance and Medical Departments, Serving under the Presidency of Fort Saint George*. Madras: Asylum Press, 30 Jun 1832, 1 Jan 1833, 30 Jun 1833, 20 Mar 1834, 1 Jul 1834, and 1 Jan 1835.

These lists, published semi-annually, included the regimental and staff positions of all commissioned officers and the name of each regiment's subadar major. Also included were the current locations of the regiments and all casualties since the previous editions were published. This work was consolidated with similar lists for Bengal and Bombay into *The Indian Army and Civil Service List* in 1861.


This work replaced the Standing Orders (SO's) published in 1830. Designated portions of these SO's were "...to be translated into plain and intelligible Hindoostanee by the Interpreters of Regiments, and each Company will [sic] be furnished with a Copy." A table of contents and a comprehensive subject index are included.

This work includes biographical data on approximately 2,600 individuals of varying importance in South Asian History.


Precisely what the title claims with a subject index.


The Madras District Manuals are gazetteers which were fore-runners of the Imperial Gazetteer. Published separately, each volume of the Madras Manual was authored or compiled by a different member of the I.C.S. who had experience in the district involved. Carmichael drew heavily on official records including Russell's Reports (see below among the primary sources). This volume includes descriptions of the District, its people and the administration as well as commercial, criminal, and educational statistics for selected years, primarily in the mid-nineteenth century.


This list runs from 1760 through 1834 with corrections to
Sept. 30, 1837. This work is difficult to use because each alphabetical list is broken into annual alphabetical lists based on the year in which an individual became a cadet.


An essential guide which provides some details of the organization and the categories of records in the India Office. It is useful on the details of chronological changes in the various governing agencies the British employed in India and subordinate areas. Separate sections are provided on "The Home Administrations," "The Administrations in India," "Countries, &c. Outside India," "Shipping," and "Personal." This guide is not particularly helpful on the content of the various records. It is most useful when used with the companion works of Joan Lancaster and S. C. Sutton.


This work includes a table of contents which provides a short subject listing and an index of orders by date of issue. The Commissariat Regulations and most of the orders on pay and allowances are not included. This work was published for the use of regimental officers.

A chronological list by Department of the Madras Government which gives the inclusive dates of each volume of the Madras Records in London. Useful for determining which of the Madras records have been preserved. Useless for determining anything about the content of those records.


This pamphlet is a brief description of the holdings with the current system of shelf marks and is most useful when used with the companion works of William Foster and S. C. Sutton.


The Madras District Manuals are gazetteers which were forerunners of the Imperial Gazetteer. Published separately, each volume of the Madras Manual was written or compiled by a different member of the I.C.S. who had experience in the district involved. Maltby drew heavily upon Ganjam District records while producing this volume. Included are political history, geography, ethnography, economic data, etc.


This work lists the service records of Madras Coverted Civilians as well as lists of Madras Governors, Commanders-in-Chief, Chief-Justices, and Puisne Judges.

This monumental reference work covers South Asian history from prehistory until the date of publication. This work includes narrative explanations and bibliographies to accompany each plate.


This guide is an excellent introduction to the organization of the India Office Library's collection of printed books, manuscripts, and prints and drawings. The brief, nine pages, note on the India Office Records is useful in conjunction with the works of Joan Lancaster and William Foster.


This work is the summary of nineteenth century ethnographic knowledge of South India. No index or table of contents is provided. Multiple names of groups are cross referenced.


Precisely what the title claims.

This Guide must be backed-up with a check of the listings in the National Register of Archives in London.


"Compiled and published under the authority of the Honorable the Court of Directors of the East India Company. It is one of the essential works for translating nineteenth century Anglo-Indian into English." Yule and Burnell's *Hobson-Jobson* is the other essential work.


This is one of the essential works for translating nineteenth century Anglo-Indian into English. Wilson's *Glossary of Revenue Terms* is the other essential work.

II. Primary sources

A. Manuscripts

Adam of Blair-Adam Muniments

Series three are the papers of General Sir Fredrick Adam (1781-1853) and his descendants.
3/280 Personal letters from Sir Fredrick Adam (F.A.) to his father, the Right Hon. William Adam: primarily written while F.A. was Gov. of Madras (13 items, 1832-38).

3/284 Personal letters from F.A. to his brother Charles (1833-34).


3/301 Photograph of F.A., wife, and son.

3/432 Misc. papers (4 items, 1793-1855). Included are: Memoir of Sir Fredrick Adam translated from the German of Alfred von Reumont (1855); and a 37 page diary "1793, Spain" with comments on the Spanish economy and F.A's travels.

3/436 Misc. letters and papers (25 items, 1835-81).

3/439 Letters, papers, and accounts (28 items, 1827-1918).

3/444 Misc. letters and papers relating to personal, political, and estate matters: correspondents include F. A., his wife Emily, and W. P. Adam (51 items, 1832-1909).

3/386 Papers relating to the operations of English and French troops in China, 1860; 2 letters dated Apr 1872 from Henry Loch to Gen. Fox plus return of troops at Pensang on 1 Aug 1860; 20 photographs of, in, and around Peking and of Prince Kung (23 items).

The Adam papers include many candid comments by Sir Fredrick Adam reflecting the difficulties of his office and
life in Madras where his daughter died and his health suffered. The papers are in the possession of the Adam Family and may be seen in Edinburgh with permission of the family. Address inquiries to: the Secretary, National Register of Archives (Scotland), P.O. Box 36, H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh EH13YY.

India Office Records (IOR); housed at 197 Blackfriars Road, London, S.E.1 and as of 1982 part of the British Museum.

Board's Collections

Whenever the Court of Directors sent a draft dispatch to the Board of Control for approval before sending the dispatch to India, background information on the subject of the dispatch was also forwarded to the Board. This background information makes up the "Board's Collections." The clerks of the India House appear to have attempted to overwhelm the Board of Control because of the large volume of these documents, selected to support the position taken by the Court of Directors in their draft dispatch. The historian, therefore, if he relies solely on these documents is liable to develop an incomplete picture of a subject, if not a distorted picture. The Board's Collections are catalogued as F/4/ in the IOR. A bound manuscript register of these Collections is catalogued as Z/F/. In the register a capital D written over the entry indicates that the particular Collection was destroyed and is no longer available.
Board's Collection 56361, F/4/1426

"Vizagapatam, Disturbances in by Veerabudra Rauze son of Bopal Rauze, a professional Chief of Freebooters: Madras Consultations, 6 Nov 1829 - 3 Aug 1832"

Board's Collection 56362, F/4/1427

"Vizagapatam, Disturbances in by Veerabudra Rauze son of Bopal Rauze, a professional Chief of Freebooters, vol. 2: Madras Consultations, 17 Aug 1832 - 28 Feb 1833"

Board's Collection 56364, F/4/1427

"Vizagapatam, Managment of Zemindary of Parlakimidi, vol. 2: Madras Consultations, 31 Oct 1831 - 14 Dec 1832"

Board's Collection 56364, F/4/1427

"Vizagapatam, Disaffected state of, necessity of maintaining a Civil Armed Police: Madras Consultations, 24 Jun 1831 - 14 Oct 1831"

Board's Collection 56366, F/4/1427

"Vizagapatam, Disturbances in, also Ganjam: Madras Judicial Letter Number 7, 6 Sep 1833."

Board's Collection 56368, F/4/1428

"Vizagapatam, Disturbances in, also Ganjam: Madras Consultations, 8 Jan 1832 - 31 May 1833"

Consultations of the Madras Government

The business discussed at each meeting of the Governor in Council as each Department is preserved in
these Consultations were known in the later nineteenth century as Proceedings. Some of the Consultations included attached documents known as Diaries, very few of which have been preserved in the IOR. The Consultations were periodically bound and copy was sent to the India Office in London.

These records generally are in the format of letters, reports, or minutes by some member of the Madras Government or of another body which one of the Secretaries laid before the Governor in Council. Following these documents are the order of the Governor in Council specifying the action to be taken in response to the original documents. Copies of material from the Consultations form the bulk of these Board's Collections listed above.

There are manuscript indexes for these consultations which are indexes in name only. The headings are very general and the subjects listed under the headings change from year to year. For 1833 the Ecclesiastical Department index is 50 pages long while the Military Department index is 1944 pages. The indexes for the Revenue and Judicial Departments, as well as the Board of Revenue, are printed.

The consultations are preserved in the IOR chronologically by department. The volumes are catalogued as: Proceeding/Range/Volume. The Madras Military
Department Consultations for 5-18 Dec 1832, for instance, are identified as P/264/96.

Consultations of the Madras Government for 1832 and 1833.

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Military Department Records.

This section of the Records (catalogued as L/MIL/number) includes the correspondence between the India Office and the Government of India at Calcutta and New Delhi. The disturbances in the Vishakhapatnam District in 1832 and 1833 were not significant enough to be discussed in detail here.

Included in this section, however, is:


L/MIL/8/107

London Missionary Society/South India/Telugu Journals 1805-1840.
These documents are primarily formal reports by the missionaries who were overwhelmingly concerned with the spread of the gospel. There are some ethnographic comments included. These documents are on semi-permanent loan to the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Library in London.

Taylor, Sir Henry George Andrew. Papers, 1827-93.

The papers of General Taylor are held by the William R. Perkins Library at Duke University. These papers include 44 items and three letter books. The correspondence deals primarily with General Taylor's command of the Northern Division of the Madras Army. Personal letters from Sir Fredrick Adam, Governor of Madras, as well as, copies of many of the divisional orders issued by the Deputy Adjutant General of the Northern Division in General Taylor's name are preserved in this collection. General Taylor appears to have saved these papers, at least in part, to be able to defend his actions as commander if called upon to do so after retiring to England.

B. Printed Works


A contemporary attack on the propriety and legality of Lushington's rule.

This paper is part of the contemporary revenue settlement debate written by a member of the Madras Civil Service and "prepared at the request of the House of Commons, in 1833." It advocates the ryotwar settlement.


"Grant's report, actually compiled in 1786, contains a summary of the territorial divisions, revenues, and important zamindars of the coastal districts of Andhra at that time. He also provides much valuable retrospective information gathered from the various zamindars about their previous relations with the dominant Muslim states in the region. This report is also reproduced in W. K. Firminger, ed., The Fifth Report on the Affairs of the East India Company, 3 vols. (Calcutta, 1918)." Quoted from J.F. Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 327-28.

Kaye, John William. The Administration of the East India Company; A History of Indian Progress. 2nd ed. London: Richard Bentley, 1853.
This classic description is focused on Bengal and London.

"Maps illustrative of the European Connection with India and of the British Administration in its several departments." London: Printed by order of the Honorable Court of Directors, 1833. Catalogued as IOR 4C.120.

The IOR collection includes very few maps in the Madras Consultations because the writers who made the copies to be sent to London could not reproduce the maps. Maps were only forwarded from India for special purposes.

Madras Male Asylum Herald, 2 January - 12 July 1834. Sometimes this newspaper is entitled Madras Military Male Asylum Herald.

Published twice weekly.

Madras (Presidency), The Fort Saint George Gazette; 1832, 33, and 34; IOR: V/11/1586, 87, and 88.

First published in January 1832 to provide "...both as a medium of Official communication and for general information a Gazette in a compact form, to be exclusively appropriated to Government Advertisements and Notifications of general interest from any of the Public Offices...." Copies were provided to all heads of offices in the Presidency and were required to be maintained with the records of the office. Publication
of information in The Fort Saint George Gazette constituted notification to all public (civil and military) officers. Information published includes general orders, appointments, arrival and departures of personnel and shipping, requests for tenders for Government contracts, etc. No index is available.


This work includes correspondence authored by and received by Lord William chronologically listed by date written.


Lord Roberts' memoirs start in 1852 and reflect the views of a Bengal Army man who by any standard was a success within the system.


Mr. Russell was the First Member of the Board of Revenue and was appointed as Special Commissioner to look into and resolve the problems in these areas. He worked in close cooperation with General Taylor, commanding the Northern Division. Mr. Russell's reports have been the central source for all later accounts of these disturbances. No index is included.

The United Service Journal which has evolved into the present day Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies included frequent articles on the East India Company's armies as well as articles by the Company's military officers on a variety of professional subjects.

III. Secondary sources
A. General South Asian History


This volume is a collection of brief summaries of assorted civil disturbances. The account of those in the Vishakhapatnam District in 1832-33 is based largely on Russell's Reports (see above among the primary sources).


These articles focus on tribal and peasant revolts as class struggles which facilitated social and political change in both colonial and independent India. These articles do demonstrate the frequency and intensity of such revolts.

This survey is the classic detailed work of imperial history which obviously does not incorporate the results of scholarship since 1929.


This work is most important to the history of the Madras Army for the explanation of how cadets entered the Company's service. It is a valuable analysis of the politics of the East India Company.


The classic study of a district administration in which Frykenberg offers the white ant thesis of South Asian History. He demonstrates that the Indian subordinate servants of the Guntur District had over a period of time unobtrusively subverted the administration for their own benefit -- robbing both the Government and the cultivators. Frykenberg provides a useful listing of the district establishment, maps, a glossary, and an index.

Lalitha discusses the evolution of the organization of the Madras Secretariat between 1752 and 1831. This manuscript was graciously made available to me by Mr. Martin Moir of the India Office Library and Records in London on 15 Dec 1978.

Richards, J. F. Mughal Administration in Golconda. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Richards here provides a description of the administration of Golconda under the Qutb Shahs within its social and geographic context which he then uses to highlight changes imposed by the Mughals in their administration. Richards includes both the theoretical and practical organization and processes of Mughal administration from their conquest to their declining years. He provides an annotated bibliography of his primary sources, an index, and maps.


Richards here shows that although the initial impact of Mughal rule in Coastal Andhra was a strengthening of central authority, eventually, the local Telugu leaders were able to take advantage of Mughal troubles elsewhere and assert local authority.

This is a very informative study of Lord William's "...career in its historical setting." (p. 11.) Rosselli organized this work topically. A thorough picture of Lord William and the problems he dealt with emerges with Lord William clearly shown as more pragmatic than utilitarian in his acts.


Here is the standard one volume history of India ending with independence and partition. This work is particularly useful on British administration.


Stokes thesis is that the British conquest had different effects on different levels of society: the rulers were replaced, the administrators prospered, and the controllers of the land retained control. His article provides a useful discussion of the historical debate, before 1973, about the British impact on Indian society.


An account of the British in India based on the inscriptions on their tombstones and monuments. The title refers to the life expectancy of Europeans in India before the development of modern medicine.

This work is an excellent one volume modern survey of South Asian History.

B. South Asian Military History


A detailed monographic study which explains why certain men entered the East India Company's service as military officers and why these men resisted attempts to modify their terms of service.


The best survey of the history of the Indian Army from the early days of the East India Company until independence written with sympathy for the Europeans and South Asians involved by a former member of the Indian Civil Service. Mason perpetuates the British Imperial mythology by dealing with internal security campaigns only between the World Wars when the security problems were created by Indian Nationalists who were ideologically acceptable to the British. He does not consider the interminable nineteen century campaigns against banditti and fanatics inside British India as an important part of "An Account of the Indian Army." Mason focuses on why in the long run the Indian Army was such an effective military force against worthy
opponents. He provides an extensive "Book List" and useful index.


A lavishly illustrated work which provides details of uniforms and the name changes of each regiment.


Drawing on the Madras Governments' Records, Colonel Wilson relates the key organizational changes and events, as he selected them without any analysis. Without knowing his criteria for including and excluding any particular data or event, this work is both interesting and of limited utility for the historian. Volume IV includes an index of the four volumes of text. Volume V consists entirely of maps.

C. General Military History


This volume is the classic summary and analysis of nineteenth century European experience in wars against irregular forces. It was used as an official handbook by the British Army.

An excellent analysis which is useful to the specialist in Imperial Austrian History or military history as well as the general military historian. This work is part of a very useful series with which all military historians should be familiar.


Farwell provides a highly readable analysis of the nature of the British Army in the latter half of the nineteenth century -- no notes.


Finer argues convincingly that the type of military organization adopted played a central role in the development of contemporary European states.


This work is a succinct survey of the subject for the knowledgeable reader which includes an excellent four pages of "Notes for Further Reading."

Webb deliberately challenges Charles M. Andrews' thesis that 1763 was a turning point in the history of the British Empire. Webb maintains that "...from the beginning, English colonization was at least as much military as it was commercial." He see "The forces fostering imperial attitudes and institutions ... most clearly visible in the political role of the English army and in the administrative careers of its officers commanding colonies - the governors-general." (p. xvi) Webb stresses the administrative experience acquired by military men in garrison governments in the British Isles and on the Continent. In his epilogue, he carries his thesis, which he promises to fully develop in a later work, forward to 1763. He provides an appendix with a sketch of the career of each governor-general and an index.

D. Other Works


Spate and Learmouth is the standard geographical work on South Asia.
GLOSSARY

Amin: "...a trustworth person,' and then an inspector, intendant, &c." (H-J, p. 17).

Ayah: "A native lady's-maid or nurse-maid." (H-J, p. 42.)

Banghy: Parcel mail moved by the same relays of runners who carry the tappal. (FSGG 1833, pp. 244-5; V/11/1587).

Batta: "...an extra allowance made to officers, soldiers, or other public servants, when in the field, or on other special grounds...." (H-J, p. 72).

Choultry: "A hall, a shed,...used by travelers as a resting place, and also intended for the transaction of public business." (H-J, p. 211).

Dak: "...transport by relays of men and horses, and hence 'the mail' or letter-post, as well as any arrangement for traveling, or for transmitting articles by such relays" (H-J, p. 299).

Dewan or Diwan: "A minister; a chief officer; and/or a financial and revenue chief minister." (F, p. 268).

Dresser: "one who dresses wounds, as an intern, nurse, or medical corpsman." (Random House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 435).

Golanduz: Indian foot artillery.

Havildar: the senior grade of Indian noncommissioned officer in the Madras Army.

Jemadar: the Junior grade of Indian commissioned officers in the Madras Army.

Karkhanna: Public draft cattle. Wilson defines karkhana as "An office or place where business is carried on...." (W, p. 261).
Munshi: a language teacher.


Naik: the junior grade of Indian noncommissioned officer in the Madras Army.

Nowbut, Naubat, or Nobit, "...instruments of music or a band sounding at the gateway of a great man at intervals." (W, p. 371).

Panchayat: "A council (properly of 5 persons) assembled as a Court of Arbiters or Jury; or as a committee of the people of a village, of the members of a Caste, or whatnot, to decide questions interesting to the body generally." (H-J, p. 739).

Peon: From the Portuguese, originally used in India for foot-soldier and then for orderly and messenger. In North India chaprassi is more frequently used. (H-J, p. 69b). Police and revenue peons in Vishakhapatnam were frequently armed in the 1830's.

Punkah: "...the large fixed and swinging fan, formed of cloth stretched on a rectangular frame, and suspended from the ceiling, which is used to agitate the air in hot weather." (H-J, p. 742.)

"Rachewars, Row-wars Telinga corruptions of Rajah, or its dimutive Rai joined with the personal or local appellation, war to express the people or descendants of chiefs of foreign extracts [sic], or of modern upstart race." (James Grant, p. 624.)

Ryot: A peasant or cultivator in South India.

Ryotwar or Ryotwari: "A revenue system in which, theoretically, an agreement is made between government officers and each individual cultivator actually tilling the soil once a year for a money tax." (F, p. 275).

Sadr Amin: Head Indian commissioner. (Campbell, Code, 2:171).
Sadr Diwani Adalat: Civil High Court, (F, p. 74).
Sadr Faujdar Adalat: Criminal High Court (F, G D, p. 74).
Sirdar: a chief or leader.
Subadar: the senior grade of Indian commissioned officers in the Madras Army. Each Native regiment had one subadar-major.
Tahsil: the North Indian term for a taluk. (H-J, p. 888).
Tahsildar: "chief revenue and police officer of a division of a district called a Taluk." (F, p. 276).
Taluk: In South India the subdivision of a district supervised by a tahsildar. (H-J, p. 894).
Tappal: South Indian word for dak or post - the mail system based on relays of runners. (H-J, p. 900).
Tindal: "...a native petty officer of lascars, whether on board ship (boatswain) or in the ordnance department, and sometimes the head of a gang of labourers on public works." (H-J, p. 923).
Zeminder: Landholders in British India who paid fixed revenues directly to the Government under the terms of the permanent settlement instituted under Cornwallis.
Zillah: The technical name or the district in British India. (H-J, p. 983).

Sources: F = Frykenberg, Guntur District. Glossary, pp. 267-77
H-J = Yule and Burnell, Hobson-Jobson.
W = Wilson, A Glossary of Revenue Terms
ABBREVIATIONS

Act'g: Acting
Bd's Col: Board's Collection
BG Cmdg No Div: Brigadier General Commanding the Northern Division
Chf Sec: Chief secretary
CIC: Commander in Chief
Col: Collector
Dept Ass't Adj Gen: Deputy Assistant Adjutant General
Dept Com Gen: Deputy Commissary General
Dept Judge Adv: Deputy Judge Advocate
EFSGJDC: Extract Fort Saint George Judicial Department Consultation
EFSGRDC: Extract Fort Saint George Revenue Department Consultation
EPBRFSG: Extract Proceedings Board of Revenue Fort Saint George
Fld: Field
FSG Army List: A List of the Officers of the Army, Ordnance and Medical Departments, Serving under the Presidency of Fort Saint George
FSGG: Fort Saint George Gazette
GOCC: General Order of the Commander in Chief Madras
GOG: General Order of the Government of Madras
Govn Coun: Governor in Council
Gvt: Government
Jud Dept: Judicial Department
LI: Light Infantry
LMS: London Missionary Society
Mag: Magistrate
Mar Bd: Marine Board
Mbrs: Members
Mil Aud Gen: Military Auditor General
MEDC: Madras Ecclesiastical Department Consultation
MJDC: Madras Judicial Department Consultation
MMDC: Madras Military Department Consultation
MPDC: Madras Political Department Consultation
NI: Native Infantry
No Div: Northern Division
OC: Officer Commanding
OCND: Officer Commanding the Northern Division
Pres: President
Sec: Secretary
Vg: Vizianagaram
Vp: Vishakhapatnam
BIOGRAPHY

Lorenzo M. Crowell, Jr., was born on 28 June 1940 in Shorewood, Wisconsin. He graduated from the USAF Academy with a bachelor of science degree on 9 June 1965 and was commissioned a second lieutenant. He was awarded the master of arts in history by Duke University on 13 May 1973. From July 1974 until August 1976, he served as a history instructor at the USAF Academy. On 17 April 1978 Duke University admitted him to candidacy for the doctorate in history. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 12 October 1980. From July 1981 until the present he has been an assistant professor of history at the USAF Academy. He is a command pilot with over 2,500 hours of flying time.
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