Strategic Requirements for the Army
to the Year 2000

Volume IV
Europe

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# Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000: Europe

**Volume IV**

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**Abstract:**

Provides global and regional requirements which will contribute to development of Army long-range doctrine, manning, force design and materiel requirements. Determines a range of environments which will likely confront the nation and the Army and identifies factors that will have major implications for the Army. Develops Army-wide strategic requirements and recommends general directions that the Army can take to meet strategic requirements. Analysis of the Western European region. Suggests new Army force structures for dealing with future strategic requirements.

**Keywords:**
- Long-Range Planning
- Strategy
- Strategic Requirements
- Futures Study
- Future Environment
- Doctrine
- Manning
- Force Design
- Materiel
- Europe
- Force Structure
- Deterrence
- Strategic Deterrence
- Thresholds
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EUROPE: STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY TO THE YEAR 2000

INTRODUCTION

This paper, based upon the regional and functional papers of the Army 2000 Project, examines the strategic requirements for the United States Army in Europe over the next two decades. While it does raise and examine a number of issues, it essentially represents a synthesis of earlier research which will permit a regional specialist to understand the overall conclusions of the Project as they pertain to Europe.

The Introduction consists of an inventory of key strategic concepts as they apply to the overall European confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Probable types of conflict as they could occur in Europe or affect Europe are then identified. U.S. interests in Europe over the next decades are identified. Regional analysis then proceeds a discussion of force characteristics and requirements as they apply in European scenarios.

Deterrence

Some very general points early on may help to inform discussion later on ways to approach questions of European security. First, it is worthwhile to recall that deterrence is a process designed to prevent action by threat of denial or punishment. It is a two sided process. A nation which sets out to deter has engaged in a strategy designed to reconcile ends, specifically a dynamic international stability, with capabilities
to deny or punish. As Schelling has shown in his parsimonious model, a multiplicatory relationship between capabilities and the will to use them is a helpful device in understanding the dynamics of deterrence from the standpoint of the deterer. That is, if either capabilities or will erode, the deterrent effect proceeds toward zero.

But ultimately, the second process, that in the minds of the decision-makers of a nation to be deterred, is the more important. As the variety and volume of literature on Soviet perceptions with respect to Western capabilities and intentions attest, the United States and its allies are not in a position to ascertain with any degree of certainty what transpires in the minds of leaders in the Kremlin. We in the West are therefore left to guess what level of capabilities and what degree of bellicosity in proclaimed intentions will, in fact, prevent Soviet action inimical to Western interests.

In spite of well-known pathologies in communications and decision-making, leaders in the West must attempt to inhibit Soviet tendencies toward expansion by acquiring and maintaining significant military capabilities and displaying them in convincing nuclear and conventional force postures within and without alliances while declaring intentions designed to ring true to the Soviet decision-maker as well as to U.S. allies and the rest of the world. In the process of trying to accomplish such a prodigious task, the United States and her allies wander through a morass of ambiguity, undercertainty, and paradox. Thinking productively about deterrence requires a tolerance for
paradox, and identification of some principal paradoxes seems useful here.

Paradoxes

Three considerations at the very heart of the notion of deterrence have paradoxical qualities. They involve level of threat, degree of certainty, and probability of desired outcome.

It is well known in psychology that threats have value in affecting human behavior only within certain parameters and over certain periods of time. Too high a level of threat in the environment, especially over a prolonged period of time, can provoke counterthreat or even violent, some would argue irrational, forms of action which the threat itself may originally have been designed to prevent.

There are close parallels in strategic deterrence. The high level of threat to second strike capability moved both superpowers in the direction of highly expensive, and many argue, destabilizing, programs of investment in less vulnerable but even more capable systems. Indeed, some argue a high level of threat to existing systems can reach an intensity which leaves preemption as an opponent's only viable perceived option.

On the other side, there are those who argue that the inability to punish an enemy or to prevent his perception of the possibility of victory is highly likely to provoke that potential enemy into a preemptive strike. In short, too high a level of threat is seen by some as a principal danger to stability, while too low a level of threat is seen by others as the principal dilemma. The strategists and policymakers, of course, are trying
to find that level of threat which neither destabilizes because of its high intensity nor tempts an expansionary opponent by providing an appearance of weakness either in terms of capability or resolve. It is with the latter that the Army is principally involved.

A similar difficulty exists with respect to the certainty a potential opponent might have about actions called for in an opponent's strategy. Again, as in psychology, uncertainty can breed anxiety and fear which prevent action. It can also create a situation where action of some sort is preferable to the continued intense discomfort brought on by that anxiety.

Conversely, explicit realization of the high likelihood of punishment or denial can prevent action. But clear perception of probable response can lead to a situation where costs and risks can be carefully calculated and action undertaken with determination when risks are tolerable. Again, it is the task of the strategists and policymakers to find middle ground between a level of uncertainty that prevents close calculation of acceptable risk on the one hand, and on the other, a level of certainty about denial and/or punishment which deters certain forms of action.

Thirdly, associated with the notions of certainty and uncertainty is the pull between self-negating prophecy and self-fulfilling prophecy. Again, it is the task of the strategists and policymakers to work between the horns of that dilemma and provide a force posture which is not only affordable but which
neither provokes egregious behavior nor conveys impressions of lack of capability or resolve.

Thresholds

Thresholds are a way of identifying discernable changes in patterns of behavior. Indeed, NATO strategy as outlined in MC 14/3, places a special emphasis on qualitative change in behavior between conventional defense, theatre nuclear defense, and strategic nuclear exchange.

One of the most debated elements in strategy for the next decades is the importance of the shift from conventional weapons to nuclear ones. It is a convenient point around which to organize debate because, at least until recently, there were clear qualitative distinctions between nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons. Whether that is still so, whether the nuclear threshold is the most important threshold for planners and decision-makers, and how the three paradoxical notions previously identified enter into that debate, are the points to be taken up next.

Although the threshold between conventional use of force and resort to nuclear weapons is the most discussed and although we will turn quickly to that topic, emphasis should be placed on the fact that there is another threshold which is frequently neglected. That, of course, is the threshold between violence and non-violence. Nations raise armies, equip them to be operationally viable, provide them with research and development capabilities, and support them with men, taxes, and good will primarily because armed forces serve to provide security. The
ability of forces to face potential adversaries on land, on sea, and in the air is the *sin qua non* for influence in the international community.

At the heart of the no-first-use debate is the notion that a declaration designed to strengthen the conventional/nuclear threshold must be built in turn upon more robust conventional forces in the European environment designed to confront the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat there. Critics see a combination of the continuation of the conventional imbalance in Europe with a no-first-use declaration as an invitation to the Soviets to conduct conventional conflict. Supporters of a no-first-use provision argue that it is based upon a righting of the conventional balance and that no change occurs by invoking such a declaratory posture, since the ultimate threshold of concern all along has been that between non-violence and violence in the European theatre.

Calls for improvement in NATO conventional force posture have been continual and shrill since the formation of the alliance. How to go about that in this day and age has, however, created a certain cacaphonous quality of discussion. While concerned U.S. politicians argue about redeployment of U.S. forces in the European central region, prepositioning supplies and munitions, exploiting technical advantage, and about improved warning time, others like Ambassador Robert Komer lay heavy stress on continuing the conventional patterns of diplomacy within the alliance structure. Still others, like Jeffrey Record, argue that the only solution to conventional inadequacy
is for the United States to withdraw its forces, thereby forcing Europeans to take up the slack in their own conventional defense.

Many Europeans, meanwhile, wonder that by raising the conventional force capability of NATO and thereby raising the nuclear threshold, they will not have found themselves victimized by paradoxes previously discussed. That is, they wonder how a NATO buildup cannot result in even further improvements in the Soviet/Warsaw Pact force capabilities. They wonder whether a higher probability of prolonged conventional defense might not precipitate a ghoulish recreation of the situation in World War II on the European continent. They wonder whether evenly matched Warsaw Pact/NATO conventional forces might not be more likely, rather than less likely to confront one another. And finally, and most importantly, Europeans wonder whether the NATO defense posture has succeeded only because there has been a clear link to the relatively early use of nuclear weapons which has deterred the Soviets.

Associated considerations include speculation on the Soviet propensity to preempt highly lucrative counterforce targets in Western Europe, either with modern precision guided munitions armed with a variety of highly destructive new warheads, or with either conventionally or nuclear armed intermediate range ballistic missiles like the SS-20. There is also concern about whether Soviet/Warsaw Pact leaders will be willing to remain in a conventional mode when combinations of improved manpower, weaponry, and deployment of NATO forces makes an adventure in the central European theatre more costly, time consuming and
challenging in terms of both military and political capabilities.

Before turning to the question of nuclear first use, it is worth reflecting on certain other thresholds which are products of modern technology or products of alliance relationships. Both are important and controversial.

The Soviet Union has deployed in Eastern Europe as well as elsewhere substantial numbers of troops trained to fight in biologically and chemically hostile environments, and indeed equipped to perform that function. Although NATO defensive capabilities for fighting in such environments are improving, NATO troops are far from levels of readiness that commanders hope for. This situation combined with the apparent Soviet experiments in genocide in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan point up the need for intense concern over Soviet chemical and/or biological capabilities short of the nuclear threshold, especially in high density environments like Western Europe and/or Japan.

Similarly, developments in missile propulsion technology, the accuracy of guidance systems, the array of explosive devices available, as well as microelectronic advances which facilitate target acquisition, terminal guidance, and command, control, and communications make the likelihood of successful Blitzkrieg lower while increasing the probable length and destructiveness of a conventional conflict. The impact of such conflict on the internal authority structures within Eastern and Western European countries, to say nothing of the centrifugal effect upon alliance
structures make political considerations worthy of strategists' continual attention.

In addition, the capacity of the Pershing II system and of cruise missiles to carry highly potent conventional warheads to targets in the Soviet Union raises questions with regard to Soviet threat perception, clarity of the technological distinctions between nuclear destruction and conventional destruction, and about a willingness on the part of the United States and/or its allies, especially Britain and France, to attack targets in the Soviet Union short of the nuclear threshold. Further, the growing capacity to accentuate certain weapons' effects like radiation or blast, while minimizing others, complicates the problem of establishing promptly whether a particularly destructive act is accomplished with a nuclear weapon or with a conventional weapon. The relative ease of distinguishing between nuclear and conventional weapons was one of the principal reasons for causing the break between them to be regarded as a highly influential psychological and policy threshold. The implications in terms of bilateral relations among allies, multilateral alliance decision procedures and capacity to levy culpability in case of attack all make the utility of the nuclear threshold subject to question.

First Use

With the preceding difficulties in mind the nuclear threshold would appear to have continuing psychological and political impact. Categorical arguments to the effect that the Soviets do or do not believe in the threshold beg the question of
its importance. If such a threshold has clear meaning to potential Soviet adversaries, then it must have meaning in the eyes of the thoughtful Soviet decision-maker. What levels of threat will precipitate violent, albeit self-destructive, nuclear reaction from a potential adversary? What levels of uncertainty with regard to Soviet behavior in a conventional military action will precipitate the same? What degree of Soviet bellicosity with nuclear weapons could precipitate preemptive action? All are real concerns for Soviet decision-leaders.

These same concerns must be paramount in the minds of any nuclear power contemplating military action. Whether such contemplation takes place in the pressure of a crisis in Europe or elsewhere, or whether it takes place in the more constrained and rigidified atmosphere envisioned in an alliance decision-making process is immaterial.

Another set of factors becoming increasingly important bear on the durability of a nuclear threshold. Those factors include the capacity to use the nuclear weapons in conjunction with highly refined guidance systems, very small yields, and modern delivery systems including both cruise and ballistic missiles in such a way as to produce what could be politically described as a surgical result.

Whether, when, and how to deploy modern nuclear systems is the principal bone in the throat of the NATO alliance at the present time. Two consequences of the ongoing debate are particularly important. The first is a probable, if not already realized, erosion of the ability of the United States to dominate
the allies on matters nuclear. The Nuclear Planning Group, which for several years served primarily as a schoolhouse of sorts with the U.S. as teacher and, for years thereafter, managed to skirt the most tendentious issues associated with NATO nuclear posture, is likely to be forced by the debate to become more productive, more insightful, and more specific in the treatment of nuclear policy questions.

In a related development, the ability and inclination of statesmen to face up to nuclear issues is increasing, because of an increase in the perceived Warsaw Pact conventional capability, because nuclear weapons targeted at Europe have multiplied, and because of the increasingly diverse capabilities of those weapons. Moreover, there has been a proliferation of strategic literacy, if not knowledge or wisdom, particularly in Western Europe, but also in the United States, which forces elected officials to be conversant with nuclear issues.

Theater vs Strategic Weapons

Stanley Hoffman observed not long ago that when NATO adopted the flexible response strategy articulated in MC 14/3 in 1967, the Americans favored the strategy because it was "flexible," and the Europeans accepted the strategy because of the "response." Put another way, the Europeans wanted direct, visible, credible linkage between conventional defense of Europe on the one hand, and American strategic capability on the other. The Americans, in turn, wanted a situation where they would not be provoked to a large scale attack from the United States against the Soviet Union when an eventuality arose that could be handled with a
lower level of force. The differing perspectives continue in varying degrees of intensity today.

Soviet deployment of the SS-20, as well as other longer-range Soviet systems, capable of devastating all European-NATO capitals, and the planned modernization of NATO systems with Pershing II and cruise missiles capable of striking Moscow, significantly blur the distinction between a theater weapon and a so-called strategic weapon. Some, like Donald Kerr and Robert Kupperman, argue that this blurring of theater/strategic distinctions is acknowledgment of a reality which can be used to the advantage of NATO because it would allow insertion of European based systems directly into integrated operating plans which in turn will become, because of the uncertainty they introduce, and because of the improved reliability, effectiveness, and responsiveness of modern nuclear systems, a much more potent deterrent than exists at the present. They go on to point out that systems based further to the rear in Europe are less vulnerable in time of crisis, thereby providing greater decision time, while simultaneously providing capacity to attack the SS-20. They stress that "the more modern, the more useful, and the more secure set of weapon systems" may lower the firebreak between the theater and strategic warfare, but will simultaneously allow a decrease in numbers of systems required in Europe, with accompanying decrease in costs, and thereby increase the capacity to strengthen conventional warfighting capabilities.
The dilemmas in their proposal relate back to the three paradoxes previously discussed. First, how threatening will new systems appear to the Soviet Union? Will they be so threatening as to tempt Soviets to either blackmail potential recipient countries, or in the worst of all eventualities, to threaten direct action should deployment begin? Secondly, with regard to the uncertainty argument, although the Soviets might be able to be kept somewhat uncertain (if secrecy in NATO improves substantially, that is) are the allies likely to be as tolerant of the uncertainty factor? Political pressures on leaders and states which accept the new systems will be substantial. Accountability will be at the heart of public attention to politicians' performance. That emphasis on accountability combined again with improved strategic literacy among informed and even mass publics could lead to whole new series of decision processes and institutions in the European environment. Thirdly, as others have argued in connection with the existing United States SIOP, will weaving various elements of our defense capabilities into a "seamless web" become a device which decreases rather than increases flexibility, and which increases rather than decreases the potential for escalation? In short, could what might be hoped to be a deterrent set of actions turn out to be precipitating?

Technology and Numbers

A consideration which crosses the conventional/nuclear boundary in present day plans to improve NATO capabilities involves applications of new technologies as a hedge against
superior Warsaw Pact numbers. Precision guided munitions are a case in point.

Inherent in the notion of precision guided munitions is the fact that they be deployed in such a way as to prevent concentrations from becoming lucrative counterforce targets. Dispersed deployment brings with it increased difficulty in command, control, and communication. Accompanying that are problems in regard to procedures for release of weapons, particularly if they are nuclear. Large numbers of highly potent weapons under less than tight control create uncertainty for a potential aggressor, but could as well, disabuse that opponent of any confidence in controlled escalation and, indeed, could seriously erode confidence in the conventional/nuclear threshold itself.

If, as we could a few years ago, we could continue to regard Soviet/Warsaw Pact technological capabilities with some disdain, we might have an excuse to proceed heavily with the notion that quality of weapons could make up for numbers. But Soviet/Warsaw Pact capabilities have improved substantially. Their precision guided munitions have performed well under certain circumstances. As we reach a situation where one for one kill probabilities are approached, it is clear that the side with the larger numbers will prevail. The message here is not that technological advantage should be slighted. Indeed, it should be exploited. The message is a caution against allowing preoccupation with highly capable technologically advanced
systems to the extent that the requirement for well armed, well trained, capable, and numerous forces is neglected.

That caution carries with it special urgency in an age where improved conventional accuracy and firepower combine with the evolution of small, reliable and accurate nuclear systems. Technical capacity could be seen as an alternative, indeed a "cost effective" alternative, to well-equipped troops. If that type of thinking should prevail, then blurred distinctions and reduced troop strengths could converge, especially in crisis, leaving a decision-making environment in which there must be no justification for even a pause at any nuclear threshold.

Conversely, inability to analyze origin of destruction, sure to occur in the fog of war, could combine with a highly reliable but highly rigid system to control weapons release, resulting in increased casualties, lost battles and territory, frustration, anxiety, perhaps paralysis of friendly forces and ultimately defeat. In short, technology designed to make large numbers of advanced weapons susceptible to orchestration may, indeed, strengthen a nuclear threshold to the point where political objectives in war would be unattainable.

These latter considerations have stimulated the Army, in its Airland Battle 2000 study to advocate systems in great numbers which can operate in self-contained units without the drag produced by long logistical trains or oppressive command, control, and communications. The questions raised by those suggestions have serious political dimensions beyond the cost/combat effectiveness calculus, especially in NATO in the two decades ahead. Not the lest of those concern the practicability
of "thresholds" in a relatively free-wheeling conflict with highly destructive modern conventional or small nuclear weapons.

Commitments

But perhaps the most serious challenge to thresholds comes from situations where political objectives have been clearly identified, either before or during crisis, but where conventional capabilities are inadequate in the face of challenge to vital interests. There is, as the Cuban missile crisis showed, a threshold of frustration in the decision processes of nuclear armed states when choices can appear to be limited to humiliation or escalation. The potential for such a situation is clearly present for the United States in Southwest Asia.

Naval forces with substantial conventional capabilities are seen by some as a possible hedge against such an eventuality. But those forces which steam in harm's way must be backed by some stringent assurances that any attack against U.S. warships places the perpetrator in grave danger of nuclear retaliation. Without such assurances, which could been seen as making the nuclear threshold brittle and lower than advocates of flexible response would favor, the fleet in Southwest Asia becomes more a part of the problem rather than part of the solution in a crisis.

As discussed at length in the Mobility paper in the Army 2000 Study, airlift, if range, basing, and sustainability factors are dealt with, can provide faster, and some argue much less vulnerable but clearly much more limited capabilities in regional contingencies. But airlift, until recently, has been a stepchild
in the Air Force, and lift shortfall is currently a major problem.

Although both air and sea lift capabilities and force protection capacities can provide a hedge against nuclear use, there is another critical consideration. That is the mix between commitments and capabilities. The combination of a rhetoric of determination and a shortage of lift, rather than technological convergence of conventional and nuclear capabilities, could very well be the catalyst for erosion of inhibitions against nuclear use.

The two overwhelming changes, of course, are the giant leap in Soviet/Warsaw Pact capabilities all along the spectrum of violence, and the increasing probability of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those changes intensify pressure to seek definitive solutions to persistent problems. But paradoxes don't have definitive solutions. Categorical adjuration of nuclear first use promises no near-term change in Soviet declared policy. Most observers of the Soviets appear pessimistic about the likelihood of adjustment in Warsaw Pact doctrine on the basis of a pronouncement. The ability some might derive from a no-first-use declaration to ignore the paradoxes at the heart of deterrence must be regarded as a loss rather than a gain in the credibility of Western deterrent posture.

All of these points are especially important in the European context. The process of specifying missions, force characteristics, and force requirements in the area where superpower confrontation is more intense and persistent will continue to be based on appredication of the concepts and difficulties enume-
rated. Specific attention to questions of U.S. interests, potential threats, and less general regional realities is also essential, albeit undertaken on the basis of the foregoing strategic concept. Underlying this study are certain key assumptions, outlined here, which form a basis for further consideration. In the latter part of this paper, the assumptions will be altered in order to test how our preparations for the projected case match with conditions of future uncertainty.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Appropriate Forces</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High intensity conventional war in Europe or North-east Asia (least likely contingency)</td>
<td>&quot;Conventional General Purpose Forces&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of Allied (not necessarily U.S.) conventional forces in Europe.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower mobilization capability commensurate with anticipated warning time and attrition projections.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low intensity conventional war (moderately likely contingency)</td>
<td>&quot;Expeditionary Forces&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of U.S. specialized forces for deployment based on terrain (e.g., desert, jungle, urban) and function (e.g., seizure of bases or ports, recapture or embassies, etc).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower mobilization capability adequate to sustain deployment(s) and reconstitute expeditionary forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subnational, intra-state instability and conflict (most likely contingency)</td>
<td>&quot;Nation Building/Support/Police/Security Forces&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of specially trained and equipped forces ranging in size and with limited capability for direct mission accomplishment to work with and train host country military, paramilitary, and 'nation building' elements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower mobilization achieved through recruiting for specific purposes and skills (&quot;surge&quot; requirements are not relevant).</td>
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TABLE 1
Overview of Threats and Army roles to the Year 2000
ASSUMPTIONS

The analysis proceeds from a set of assumptions regarding the world political-military situation over the next two decades:

- General war between the United States (and its allies) and the Soviet Union (and its allies) remains an exceedingly low probability that is unlikely to increase due to the threat of nuclear escalation.

- Conventional or limited war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact remains an exceedingly low probability unlikely to increase due to the threat of nuclear escalation.

- War, conventional or nuclear, between the Soviet Union and China is unlikely, as is the possibility of a full rapprochement.

- Nuclear proliferation will not reach destabilizing proportions.

- NATO, as an alliance, will continue although great strains may be expected.

- For the United States, resource constraints will continue and the economy, while never reaching conditions of full health is unlikely to collapse.

- American mood, while varying between "neo-isolationist" and "interventionist" poles will be tending toward the latter in the 1990s.

- Army strategic requirements for the future will be developed as part of and will not be separate from overall U.S. strategic requirements.
The most likely form of conflict will take place in the Third World, and consist of counter-terrorist, unconventional and limited conventional war operations.

This fact notwithstanding, the overwhelming importance of Europe and East Asia to U.S. interests will demand the maintenance of a credible deterrent, conventional, chemical, and nuclear-capable forces in-theater, or at the very least, earmarked for rapid deployment to these areas.

This demand will be further exacerbated by the growing potential for both vertical and horizontal escalation, whereby simultaneous threats of varying intensity will effectively fix forces in place and deny their redeployment elsewhere.

The Third World will be increasingly ripe for Soviet political-military initiatives in the 1990s. The pressures of skyrocketing population growth, especially in urban areas; food, water and wood scarcities, and competition by the industrialized nations for increasingly scarce energy and minerals resources will create conditions of intra- and inter-state violence which the Soviet Union will seek to exploit.

By 1990, major changes will have occurred in the Soviet military hierarchy. This next generation of military leaders will be younger, with no World War II experience. Having joined the military in the 1950s, these new leaders will only be able to relate to operations in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan
with possible experience as military advisors in Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, or Angola. As a result, in the 1990s, the Soviets will continue to support external communist parties and national liberation movements. To continue to exploit instabilities, the Soviets will rely on arms sales, military aid (little economic aid will be available), military advisors, support of terrorist activities and, above all else, the use of proxies -- Cuba, South Yemen, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and North Korea. To continue the psychological battle for the spread of its communist ideology in 1990, the Soviets will pursue detente and additional arms control agreements but only as a means to achieve their ultimate goal of domination.

While the intensity of conflict may be lower than before, the frequency will most likely increase. The Army must prepare for an era of continuing "limited" war involving ourselves and the Soviets, but more indirectly than previously experienced. This will continue largely because both superpowers are experiencing particular economic difficulties which may allow continued expenditure of resources for military purposes, but not permit any significant increases in defense budgets. Thus, it is more likely for East-West competition to be expressed by conflict in the Third World, as each power seeks to exploit (or counter the
exploitation of) the inherent instability of the developing world.

- General perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance will gradually shift towards favoring the Soviets. For the West, this will make a certain sensitivity in embarking on major foreign policy initiatives which could disrupt East-West relations. For the Soviets, increases in Western strategic nuclear capabilities will cause questioning of what leverage can really be obtained from perceptions of "strategic nuclear superiority." For states outside either alliance, the gradual shift, however imperceptible, will provide incentive to pursue individual interests disregarding constraints or influence which might be brought to bear by the superpowers.

- Detente policies in Europe will yield favorable political and economic payoffs for both the Soviets and West Europeans. Soviet leaders will not be predisposed toward conventional war in Europe which would entail high risks and which, given diplomatic gains by alternative political means, would be unnecessary, foolhardy, and incredibly dangerous.

- Third World states will become increasingly sensitive to external political-military initiatives in the 1990s. The instabilities created or exacerbated by population growth, especially in urban areas, food, water and wood scarcities, and competition for increasingly scarce energy and minerals resources will
intensify the potential for intra- and inter-state violence which can be and will be exploited by a range of states, interest groups and sub-national entities.

Decisions on conventional weapons systems not taken by the United States in the early to mid 1980s (but taken in the late 1980s), will leave the United States with conventional military forces, although formidable, viewed nevertheless by some as lacking adequate capability to deal with simultaneous "interventions" of many types in Third World regions including those sponsored by Soviet proxies.
U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE IN THE 1990s

It is clear that the overriding interests of the United States in Europe is to prevent armed conflict, especially with the Soviet Union. Two basic approaches to that goal are deterrence and arms control. Both will continue to be pursued simultaneously and with cost and difficulty. And, of course, inherent in both paths are capable forces, U.S. and allied, which provide a high level of threat. How much of that threat should be verifiable and how much should create uncertainty in a potential aggressor will remain a major strategic dilemma. Further, if both deterrence and arms control are to proceed effectively, they must be based on the good will, fortitude, and sacrifice of the United States and European populations. The security those populations seek for their persons, relationships, governments, and ways of life must remain paramount in the minds of all who drive the process of reconciling interests and capabilities.

Preoccupation with the values of our society establish the basis for the U.S. tendency to pursue, in the future, a neo-isolationist preference which will be balanced by the requirements stemming from externally focused national interests. Among those "outward" looking interests, the most significant will include:

- the fundamental and possibly overriding interest, with the Soviet Union, to prevent nuclear war or its prospect to occur between us.
to prevent or contain regional conflict which could escalate into conflict between the Soviet Union and ourselves.

to minimize or deflect the influence of potential or current antagonist states or groups from adversely affecting our relationships with friends trading partners and other vital commitments.

to maintain access, at acceptable costs (however defined) to resources, markets, trading partners and to states which we are bound by treaty commitment.

to promote basic human rights.

Vital U.S. Interests in Europe

Avoidance of Nuclear War. this includes any conflict which might involve U.S., Soviet, British, French, or other nuclear forces.


Prevention of Soviet Territorial Expansion. Even at the cost of war. This interest must be shared by our European allies and other friends.

Prevention of Soviet Progress toward Regional Hegemony. By avoiding substantial nuclear superiority and by preventing excessive Soviet economic leverage.

Refinement and Maintenance of U.S. Force Projection Capabilities into the European region.

Improvement of and Maintenance of Bases available to or operated by U.S. forces designed to deter and defend in Europe.
- Maintenance of **Clear Strategic Connection** among the U.S. strategic triad and the NATO triad.
- **Support for U.S.-European Cooperation**, political, economic, and military among populations on both continents.

**Important U.S. Interests in Europe**
- **Improved Communication**, both political and in terms of CI among NATO members.
- **Equitable Burden Sharing** of the costs of deterrence and defense in Europe.
- **Improved Standards of Readiness, Standardization and Interoperability** among the Allies.
- **Better Coordinated Research and Development** in defense and other spheres among Europeans in general and the United States.
- **Improvement in Standards of Living** in disadvantaged regions of Southern Europe.
- **Continued or improved Relative Independence of Finland and Yugoslavia** from Soviet dominance.
- **Amelioration of Soviet Dominance** in Eastern Europe in political, economic, and military spheres.
REGIONAL ANALYSIS

Despite the utility of trend analyses and future forecasting, predictive capacity is often limited. Therefore, bounding the range of likely futures and noting areas of particular uncertainty is a surer way of developing a comprehensive framework against which projected strategic requirements may be measured and evaluated. In analyzing projected U.S. Army Strategic Requirements in Europe, three cases will be posited. The first case will use the assumptions underlying the Army 2000 Project. The second case will start with assumptions which cast, from an American perspective, a more optimistic assessment of the degree to which our interests will be advanced. The third case will use assumptions which cast a more pessimistic assessment of the state of U.S. interests in the future. And, both the second and third cases will be further examined against a range of U.S.--Soviet relationships bounded by confrontation, short of conflict on the one hand and cooperation, short of condominium, on the other. The Army's strategic requirements, developed for the first case, will then be measured and evaluated against the second and third cases as well as for the primary case from which they were derived.

First Case: The U.S. and Europe as Projected by Army 2000:

Continued Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s will neither permit a full reduction in tensions between East and West nor be completely ignored or overlooked by the states in Western Europe despite whatever pressures might favor that preference. The Soviets will see, from their view, improve-
ment in certain areas such as military capability and perhaps the overall standard of living in Russia, and, simultaneously, deterioration in other critical areas such as continued irrationality in their economic system, a brittle and inflexible political system and, at least as many setbacks as advances in foreign policy, West Europe will oscillate among policies of detente and policies of aloofness.

This uneasy balance of conflicting or contradictory political, economic, social and military trends will be further complicated for Western European states by crucial economic issues largely concerned with unemployment and inflation and in many European's views, justified anti-nuclear sentiment. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, Soviet hegemony will continue along the example of imposition of Soviet control in Poland short of actual invasion. Thus, for the last part of the century, Western Europe may become less coherent and less unified around political and alliance aims while Eastern Europe, still intimidated by Soviet control will show fewer tendencies for independent actions and policies.

Several other fragmenting forces will be in play in West Europe. First, domestic pressures may produce a more introspective or intro-European attitude. Economic issues will occasion inward looking tendencies. Social-democratic rule will be based on nationalistic concerns. Further, differences between Northern and Southern NATO Europe are liable to grow as economic, social and political pressures intensify.

The center and northern part of NATO are liable to be more able to maintain an outward perspective than Southern NATO as,
inevitably, West Germany, Britain and France are perhaps closer to the U.S. and, then too, to U.S. - Soviet issues. A cleavage between perspectives of North and South NATO Europe is likely to grow with both groups becoming more introspective but the degree of introspection becoming far greater in the South. North-South differences in Europe are likely to be exacerbated by deterioration in overall U.S. relations with European allies. Further economic and political conditions are likely to cause less emphasis on defense spending.

However, while it may appear that NATO's political health is declining due to introspection and fragmentation, grave constraints will constrain the Soviets from exploiting NATO weaknesses for three reasons: 1) the Soviets will be preoccupied with their own domestic concerns; 2) the threat of military escalation looms; and 3) despite Soviet control in East Europe, national aspirations will remain strong and will require continued Soviet military presence.

Ironically, however, inherent limitations on the part of the Soviet Union, if actively recognized, could be used in the West as additional justification for declining support of the alliance.

Last, pressures for European unification given the political difficulties associated with any form of union and nationalist economic, self-interest, will diminish.

Two issues will emerge in Europe of the 1990's which, although present today and in the past, will pose far greater
complications. The first has to do with Soviet domination in East Europe and the second with the anti-nuclear movement.

Soviet domination in East Europe will continue but modified by three crucial factors. First, although the Polish example reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to control fully East Europe short of invasion, East European aspirations of independence will continue. More subtle and sophisticated tactics may emerge which diminish Soviet control without confrontation. East Europe will disguise traditional nationalistic concerns with lip service to Soviet leadership. Second, the emergence of a "new," post-Brezhnev leadership will favor policies which attempt to advance economic improvements in East Europe to compensate for Soviet industrial weaknesses and to buttress a failing Soviet economy. This trend, coupled with East European "compliance" regarding independence, is liable to develop further Soviet dependencies in East Europe which cannot be overcome by reliance on brute military force alone. Third, the genuine requirement for economic development including trade and credits, will strengthen East Europe's position vis a vis both NATO and the Soviet Union considering the enormous investments of each and the requirement to safeguard those investments by keeping East Europe from defaulting on its loans.

The anti-nuclear movement in Europe will increase especially as the nuclear capabilities of the U.S., Soviet Union, Britain and France grow. A continuous divergence between "populist" sentiment over nuclear restraint and "government" commitment to NATO nuclear policies will occur forcing, perhaps, concessions in pursuing nuclear negotiations and, indeed, strategy. The
requirement for theater nuclear forces, perhaps increasing in a military sense for the West, will be restrained politically. Depending upon the strength of the anti-nuclear movement in Europe and in the United States, the impact on NATO's military strategy could be enormous.

Eroding Soviet dominance in East Europe and the vocal anti-nuclear debates will coincide with another change in West Europe in the 1990s. Political systems that once looked unassailably right-of-center may succumb to socialist/social democratic pressures. President Mitterrand's victory in France showed traditional and historical European social democratic preferences continued. In Spain, the Socialists, after leading the ruling Union of the Democratic Center in the opinion polls for many years, may continue to control the government. In Italy, the Socialist Party, after having won the prime ministership, could lead a Socialist/Christian Democratic coalition but may flirt periodically with the idea of a Socialist/Communist coalition government.

The Social-democratic tradition will affect East-West relations both positively and negatively. French foreign policy-makers continue to ignore pleas for nuclear disarmament. France is a strong de facto military member of NATO and can act forcefully when necessary in North Africa to contain local conflict. Italian Socialists may add the defense portfolio to that of the prime ministership, and the Communists, promoting the advantages of a Socialist/Communist government coalition, will continue to offer tenuous support for Italy's membership in NATO continuing
in the Togliatti tradition of independence from Moscow. The Spanish Socialists, who will become an accomplished and legitimate force in Spanish political life, will continue with reservations about Spain in NATO, but this will amount to little more than rhetoric. Spain's socialists will come to appreciate the domestic as well as external values alliance membership provides including a role for the generals beyond Madrid's domestic policies.

The economic policies of socialist/social democratic regimes, however, will have begun to erode their previously favorable attitude towards defense. The programs of nationalization and public spending of the French Socialist government will not reduce unemployment without creating inflation. The economic populism of the Greek Socialists will not reverse the country's heavily regulated government economy. Italian Socialists' ability to provide effective national planning will prove deficient and be confounded by traditional constraints in Italy's political-economic system. And, the intention of the Spanish Socialists to implant a modern welfare state will not be fulfilling in a time of chronic recession. All the socialist governments will suffer from growing economic pressures to reduce the deficit with the defense sector proving more susceptible to reduction than more domestically important education or health programs.

The new interest in socialism in the south of Europe will be paralleled by a more complicated situation in central Europe. West Germany will move to the right, but this may not necessarily be good news for NATO. The successful effort in the mid-1980s by
the Social Democratic left to undercut the position of Chancellor Schmidt will result in the Free Democratic Party switching coalition partners and joining with the Christian Democrats to form a government. The loss of power will tilt the Social Democrats still further towards the left and neutralism, and life for increasingly right-of-center governments seeking to enforce unpopular decisions about enhancing defense, especially with opposition from a somewhat radicalized Social Democratic adversary, will not be easy.

Elsewhere in Europe, political trends in the 1990s will be mixed. Norwegian and Swedish governments will vacillate politically. Holland and Belgium will continue with government crises perhaps similar to conditions in Italy and, prior to de Gaulle, France. Britain, having been run by an unpopular but effective Tory government, alone or in coalition with the (new) Social Democrats will be opposed by a reformulated Labour Party, seeking to extricate itself from its own militant left-wing and revising its position which favored total, unilateral nuclear disarmament. While the (new) Social Democratic Party will favor defense matters, the Conservative Party's position, largely based on economic and social issues, will be losing enough support to the new party that Labor will see a chance of re-capturing the government in the 1990's.

Based on competing and conflicting perspectives, American-European relations may have deteriorated further into the 1990s. Washington continues to voice its concern about the constancy and contribution of its European allies. But the immediate issue in
the 1990s will lie within the United States. American voters will not see the need for Europe to have America defend it from "communism and socialism" when "communists" have already joined several European governments. Continued left-wing victories in European countries will affect American perceptions of Europe, which will weary of Europeans who are vocally anti-American but ignore repression in eastern Europe, while relying on the United States to secure Europe's defense and its access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

Southern Europe

The situation along the Alliance's southern flank in 1990-2000 will be characterized by three main features:

- first, a growing predominance of domestic over external issues, with traditional security concerns receding into the background;
- second, declining influence of external powers over the attitudes and policies of the countries in the region;
- third, an accelerating fragmentation and diversification of the postwar alliance system with a reappraisals ranging from *reverseeement des alliances* to isolation or closer integration.

Diversity and adaptation will be major trends in 1990-2000, and will inevitably increase uncertainty regarding politico-military commitments. These trends will likely result in the fragmenting of institutional arrangements that alliance, stability and security usually require. In short, the overall
political and social fluidity and, possibly, instability in the Mediterranean will increase further.

In particular, developments in the 1980s in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf provide diverging pressures. Despite Soviet power, the Russians will prove to be increasingly non-relevant as both Arab clients and local opponents see little leverage the Soviets can offer. But, local conflict and increased Western dependence on oil still underscore the instability of the region and its potential impact on Europe.

The Nordic Region

This region encompasses the Kola Peninsula, Russian lands west of the White Sea and its southerly canal; Finland, Sweden; Norway; the Barents, Norweigian, North Baltic Seas; the Gulf of Bothnia, Denmark, Jan Mayen Island and the Svalbard Archipelago; Greenland, Iceland and the G-I-UK passages to the North Atlantic. Increasingly important to strategies during the 1970s, the Nordic Region (or alternatively, "Northern Theater" or "NATO's Northern Flank") will become a cockpit in the 1990s where the clear, vital national interests of the East and West converge.

The Nordic region was nominally "The Quiet Corner of the World" after World War II, based largely on a "Nordic Balance" which functioned in effect as a kind of buffer to reduce the prospects of direct superpower confrontation in the region. During the 1980s, political-military trends which do not auger well for U.S. vital national interests will emerge and endure in the 1990s. First, the heightened tensions in superpower relations in the first half of the 1980s caused Central European
nations, led in this respect by the FRG, to be driven towards a mediating and perhaps neutral position between the United States and the Soviet Union. Periodic attempts by successive Administrations to regain NATO leadership served only as minor interruptions in this general secular trend. Suspicious initially that they had been promised too much by U.S. "zero-base" INF proposals and convinced by the mid-eighties that lack of progress in INF negotiations was based on American "bad faith," the anti-nuclear movement in Central and Northern Europe reemerged in the late 1980s. Various proposals with historical antecedents for a Nordic nuclear-free zone consolidated into a movement with a broad-based, Northern European, international constituency, bringing increasing pressure on governments in the region. The perception of recalcitrance in arms negotiations of two successive Republican Administrations in the United States reinforced sentiments about America's lack of sincerity.

Second, America's "massive rearmament" in the early 1980s, designed to close the "window of vulnerability," was matched by continued Soviet defense spending to insure that the window remained open. This produced increased Nordic predispositions, led and shaped by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, to blame the United States for an ever-accelerating arms race worldwide.

Third, the return of the Social Democrats to power in most of the Nordic countries in the late 1980s, combined with the failure of most of those nations (like most OECD countries) to achieve an annual 3.5 percent real annual GNP growth rate, caused
leaders to accelerate efforts designed to shore up social welfare programs. An expedient towards this goal was to cut defense spending.

Fourth, and partially in reaction to the three changes noted above, a predictable (and predicted) backlash in the "mood" of the American public occurred. Increasingly, by the mid-1980s Americans had to ask themselves (in view of continued low levels of U.S. social welfare spending) "Why should the American working class poor be forced to pay for the security of the European middle-class rich?" A strong movement, vaguely reminiscent of the Mansfield Amendment, began in the late 1980s with the objective of removing U.S. troops from Europe. Part of the underlying rationale in this respect was the increasing capability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, U.S. naval capabilities and the need to release U.S. conventional ground forces for deployment in contingences viewed as increasingly dangerous in Central and South America, Africa and Southwest Asia. Tired of its international burdens the America policy entered a new isolationist phase in the mid-1980s.

Finally, a new period of detente set in by the mid-1980s. Americans and West Europeans accepted Polish-style repression especially as there develops increasingly stable situations in Eastern Europe. American boredom and European wishful thinking converged with a Soviet interest in a period of detente so that Soviet energies could be focused on its own economic problems, those of its East European satellites and a consolidation of gains in the Third World.
**Significant Trends**

There are a number of additional but significant trends likely to emerge in Western Europe in 1990-2000 which will decisively impact on the security environment, and the East-West European politico-military balance and are summarized:

- The distance between the center or core of Western Europe and the flanks will be extended and magnified— in a sense, this will be a *de facto* quarantine that isolates the nucleus from the domestic instabilities of the southern flank. While there will be national expressions of concern, EEC Commission offers of assistance, and party-to-party declarations of support, the Southern flank may be left primarily to the United States to deal with on a bilateral rather than NATO basis.

- The intra-West European balance will undergo increasing discrimination among EEC members. If the Community is to survive, a return to a Europe of the Five or Six may be imperative. In some respects, 1990-2000 might be called the "decade of Germany," for its central role—in geographic and other terms—will be reasserted after a period in which Germany sought quite consciously to move itself to the periphery. This new role will be central in its north-south European dimension as its east-west European dimension. The critical issue between North-South Europe will be the attitude towards coalitions with Communists, which the northern group
will reject. The southern states will become ideologically more radicalized but still maintain their complete independence from Moscow and, indeed, support some form of continued alliance.

West Germany's emergence to a central position in the intra-West European balance in the 1990s will occur as West European states shift their attention away from national security problems towards preoccupation with domestic economic concerns and intra-West European relations. One result of this shift in attention will be movement to the left and political fragmentation. This move to the left will reflect expectations which have not been fully met either domestically or regarding East-West detente.

In the 1970s and 1980s, similar shifts occurred based on a weariness with the Cold War and social-democratic aspirations. Such introspective tendencies, which accept the utility in retaining formal security commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, also see utility in modifying defense positions and, more importantly, defense spending. The trends in the 1990s might include an end to conscription and large standing armies in general, the establishment of smaller or fixed budgetary levels for military spending, and perhaps retrenchment from high-technology investment to conventional equipment.

The trends in the 1990s which produce introspective movement may not, of course, result in government by and for the left. In some countries the trends may lead to governments of the right such as in West Germany. A political shift to the right in Western Europe, will produce concern over Communist participation in southern European governments and perhaps be more sensitive to
criticism if high inflation and unemployment are not reduced.

However, given the pressures for correcting economic problems the policies of a conservative government in the 1990s could be forced to assume the same cures as those of a socialist government of the left, leading principally towards reductions in defense expenditures. In sum, these differing concerns will account, in part, for the growth of increasingly divergent domestic requirements among the countries of West Europe. Their impact on security considerations will differ from country to country but generally reinforce decreases in defense expenditures.

By the early 1990s, the outlook of most West European states will shift towards introspection which can lessen physical if not rhetorical support of the Atlantic Alliance.

Each of the foregoing developments and trends will give impetus to a "grand strategic debate" within the Western alliance system. But, it will be a debate that by its very nature could exacerbate intra-alliance frictions. To the extent that the distance between the center and the flanks increases politically and economically, to the extent that "Europe" is likely to be increasingly defined as the Europe of the Six rather than the Nine, or Twelve, interest in redefining Europe may increase.

As a result, alliance members could consider as an alternative to NATO, closer bilateral relations or arrangements in the defense sphere, not only with each other, but with the United States. "Special" or preferred relationships and
"partial" memberships could result in the 1990s. Something of a two-tier system may emerge in the alliance starting with a more select or discriminating redefinition between core and peripheral powers and the differing roles and responsibilities assigned to each in this scheme. The greater explicitness of certain bilateral relationships will be no substitute for the multilateral alliance structure though such relationships would complement it.

Thus, one of the critical situations likely to arise in 1990-2000, and one which will have an impact on detente and the political balance between East and West Europe, will involve the status of European unity. West European cooperation could remain one of the only major foreign policy preoccupations with the potential to offset other negative developments. If Western Europe states were ever to make significant progress towards economic and political union, the initiative would have to be exceptional and rest on extraordinary pressures or crises. In any event, this is deemed most unlikely.

In the West, Northern Europe will be relatively stable politically, but still will be exposed to the psychological effects of Soviet military might. In the South, local instability including internal conflict and, possibly, external intervention such as between Greece and Turkey could increase. Central Europe will remain a zone of political and military equilibrium but still a function of the dominance of the FRG. A different West Germany which is considerably stronger or wealthier than today, or a Germany in which unification became a central possibility, would pose a fundamental threat to the
balance in Europe and between East and West in 1990-2000. Thus, the potential for Germany to unravel the post-war world will not decrease.

A number of major, and perhaps common, characteristics of internal events will be relevant to the overall political and strategic situations in the region:

First, in 1990-2000, the Mediterranean economic-social structure will rest somewhat between the industrial and the developing worlds. It will share some of the advantages, opportunities and many of the problems of both particularly where growing political aspirations are perceived to be irreconcilable with the pressures for social and economic change.

Second, in Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Greece a return to democracy in the 1980s was accompanied by a consolidation of internal stability. Economic problems, a growing deficit in the balance of trade, and growing indebtedness will plague Portugal as well as Turkey. In turn, Spain and Italy continue to be worried about unemployment and problems of social and institutional adjustment. Those countries, to a lesser degree, also share with Turkey the threat of terrorism, though for different reasons. While Greece develops towards greater political stability, high expectations associated with entry into the Common Market will not be fulfilled.

Domestic disorders in the 1990s will occur where local institutions are weakest, a problem common to almost all Mediterranean countries. Clearly, domestic considerations will affect foreign policy and, alliance cohesion will suffer from
this trend in the 1990s. As the perception of the Soviet military threat recedes in the countries of the Southern flank and expectations about the alliance's role in contributing to internal stability and solving economic problems are not fulfilled, alliance adhesion, certainly militarily, will erode. However, this may be based on a superficial attitude which assumes that NATO may be taken for granted—a condition which can either improve or worsen in genuine crisis.

Ironically, the only place where animated debate about the merits and demerits of the alliance remains strong is among Euro-Communists, i.e., the Communist parties of Italy and Spain. Contrary to concerns of many Western observers, Eurocommunism is not likely to become a major threat to the internal fabric of the alliance in the 1990s because of its fiercely nationalistic basis. But what will remain divisive is the controversy between Americans and many West Europeans about how precisely to handle the Eurocommunists.

Of what import, in this context, will be the attitudes of these communist parties towards the alliance and towards its role in the Mediterranean? In the 1990s both the Spanish and the Italian communist parties will undertake to reaffirm their countries' original adherence to the Atlantic alliance system and will agree not to do anything to undermine the status quo, pending an organized and consensual dissolution of both military blocs. Such attitudes will be welcome, but with reservations. However, both communist parties will continue either to defer or pass over in silence the question of what their policies would be if a global conflict were to break out. The Italian
Communists will either refuse to envisage such a possibility or will suggest that in the event of such hostilities, the Western capitalist world should not count on them to join the conflict. The Spanish Communist Party would likely continue to argue that thirty or so years of East-West relations have confirmed the defensive orientation of the Warsaw Pact.

It is against such a background of a concentration on domestic concerns and relative indifference towards external matters that the politico-military situation along the Southern flank in the 1990s must be appraised. The situation of two countries at either end of the Mediterranean--Turkey and Spain--should serve to highlight the trends that will be experienced in the region in 1990-2000.

Turkey's geopolitical situation will remain crucial for the Alliance and eastern security in the 1990s, but the country will continue to experience massive problems at home and major disappointments in its relations with its allies. In fact, the 1990s constitute a decade of substantial change with respect to the country's internal policy and its foreign policy. The reorientation of Turkish policy in the 1990-2000 timeframe described has important implications for the political and strategic situations in the eastern Mediterranean and the entire Middle East. In a way, Turkey in the 1990s will be a testing ground for alliance policy and cohesion, a symbol of the shifts and adjustments to changing power relationships in the area, and a target of events in the more social and economic issues that
will plague so many of the countries in the Mediterranean in the 1990s.

Turkey in the 1990s will likely be governed by an uneasy coalition of the military and well-educated, forward-looking younger politicians. The survival of that coalition and of a modicum of democracy will depend ultimately on the solution of major economic and social problems: inflation, unemployment, housing, external indebtedness, terrorism, and pacification of minorities. It is not surprising that Turkey's contribution to NATO in the 1990s will likely be commensurate with NATO's contribution to Turkish security. And, in a different context, the U.S. will not be able to maintain long-term agreements for military installations without a commensurate long-term economic commitment to Turkey. Given Turkey's growing strategic importance to the West in the 1990s, the U.S. will likely remain firm in its support of the military/political regime and will increase its economic and military aid. However, relations with the European allies will continue to sour in the face of increasingly strident criticism of the regime by left-leaning forces in Europe. Indeed, the West will continue to tie economic assistance to the restoration of a greater degree of democracy in Turkey. Further, Turkey's application for admission to the EEC will continually be blocked by more than simple Greek pressures.

While committed to the West, dependent on the U.S., and tolerated by the West European allies, Turkey will strive in the 1990s to develop "correct" relations with the Soviet Union. She will not be anxious to antagonize unnecessarily her northern
neighbor. But Turkey's main effort in the 1990s will be directed toward developing into something of a counterweight in the Middle East to offset over-dependence on the U.S. and isolation from West European countries. The effort to play a more active role in the Middle East will also be driven by a degree of economic realism. Turkey will find itself increasingly bound economically to the Middle East, in part because of high costs of its oil imports. In a determined effort to gain solvency with its Arab oil suppliers, Turkey will have little choice but to push diverse exports to the Middle East and develop large economic cooperation packages for the Persian Gulf that involve large Arab capital investment in Turkey. Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia are likely to become major trading partners with Turkey. The relative importance of the Middle East to the Turkish economy will also increase as European countries, confronted by domestic economic pressures, continue to reduce their imports of goods and guest workers from Turkey. In its new turn toward the Middle East, it will be important for Turkey to maintain good relations with all factions, and this in turn will impact not only on the Turkish view of U.S. policy toward the Middle East but Turkish willingness to allow the use of Turkish soil for non-NATO contingencies.

Despite growing domestic stability, a somewhat greater evenhandedness towards right and left-wing extremists, and further conciliatory gestures toward the Greeks, the central issue in the 1990s confronting the Turkish regime will remain the timing and the extent to which democracy is restored. Turkey is likely to be governed in the 1990s by a regime of the center.
But, if Western pressures to push the regime into a premature restoration of civilian rule prove counterproductive, a reorientation of the country's internal policies as well as its foreign relations cannot be ruled out. Worried about instability in the Middle East but seeing itself somewhat powerless to effect those developments and viewing itself as a bastion of strength in the eastern Mediterranean but neither properly engaged nor appreciated, Turkey could enter upon a less predictable course of economic and political development in the 1990s.

In the 1990s, the position of Greece on such issues as ties to the EEC, NATO, and the U.S., as well as the country's stance toward Turkey, will depend greatly on the political coloration of the regime in power. The intensity of the Greek position on these issues will depend as well on the policy line and stance adopted in Washington in the same timeframe, not only with respect to these specific issues but its world outlook in general. A Greek regime of the left (and perhaps the center) will likely attempt to pursue a more balanced policy toward the Soviet Union than that sought by Washington. Arms control is likely to achieve a higher priority, and the position of Greece on the role of and modernization of nuclear weapons in Europe is likely to grow more critical. Equally important, Greece will retain its concern about hardening of the blocs and increased Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia. Washington and Athens are also likely to differ considerably in their approaches toward the Third World. Greece will likely continue to cultivate ties to such countries as Libya and Iraq, and its approach toward the
Palestine Liberation Organization will be more positive than the U.S. attitude.

For Central Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, the critical issue is how NATO can evolve and respond to Soviet political military challenge without eroding the basis for cohesion among the members of the alliance. The U.S. remains confronted with maintaining effective leadership in the alliance but handicapped by the initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s which understated or miscalculated how American actions would reverberate in Europe politics. Debate over trade sanctions with the USSR was the most divisive issue of the mid-1980's. But, theater nuclear force modernization was also not well handled and holds some lessons for the 1990s. Washington learned--belatedly and again --first from the "neutron bomb" debate and then from GLCM and Pershing II programs, that firm, sustained leadership from the U.S. is highly valued among informed Europeans.

Notwithstanding TNF modernization decisions, during the 1980s there was also a need to improve NATO's procedures for making choices about nuclear weapons, and for assuming that force planning and arms control remaining on parallel and coordinated tracks. At a minimum, the NPG will be broadened and opened more to foreign policy considerations. Nuclear decisions are inevitably made by heads of governments: the problem for the 1990s will be less one of getting attention to nuclear issues at the top of government than of getting that attention in a timely manner and in the right form.
Issues outside Europe will pose another set of challenges to the decision process. Europeans will continue to worry that the U.S. will not protect their interests, yet remain frustrated at the inability to implement, independent or parallel actions. NATO's geographic limitation need not be a fatal problem, but it does mean that areas outside NATO such as the Persian Gulf, must receive more NATO consideration if not action. The danger in failing to consider these issues is that NATO could be viewed as irrelevant, especially in the U.S. That perception would reinforce any tendencies toward unilateralism.

Unilateralism is not a preferred policy among the Europeans; rather, it could emerge as a result of fragmentation and insufficient planning and leadership. Such a situation was evident during the Carter Administration, when Washington's erratic behavior led many to conclude that it was a good thing that "Schmidt is the leader of the free world." Similarly, during the 1980s U.S. Senate leaders began to publicize renewed interest in Mansfield amendment initiatives, cited as examples of how the U.S. could achieve leverage over the Europeans by pulling troops out of Europe. European officials indicated that this sort of talk was dangerous, primarily because it represented a self-fulfilling prophecy for the U.S. Europeans were consistently vexed by the discontinuity of U.S. policy toward Europe, and the threat of withdrawal fed dangerous suspicions that further undermined the cohesion of NATO. But, like planning, preventing a drift towards unilateralism was not a purely American task. It was perplexing to some Europeans to consider that the Reagan Administration did not make a greater
effort to assist Chancellor Schmidt's multi-lateral foreign policy initiatives in this regard, while Schmidt was in power. However, the issue was not completely clear cut.

Without unqualified U.S. support, Schmidt was in a weakened position and was replaced by more conservative administrations which, although ideologically closer to Washington, could still not overcome some of the U.S.'s inconsistent policy actions towards Europe. The oil pipeline sanctions, followed in the decade by other, from a European perspective, contradictory policies, eroded U.S.-FRG relations. Consequently, the Mitterand government in France moved into a more activist role designed to bring France and the FRG closer together. Dominique Moisi, as the assistant director of L'Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, observed in 1982, "Now that the Soviet Union seems to have a strategic edge and the Federal Republic of Germany, in its identity crisis, is flirting with Gaullism and pacifism, Mitterrand the realist is aware of France's new responsibilities." Under Mitterrand, France's response to NATO disunity was to take steps to prevent or at least slow down further deterioration. U.S. policy encouraged cohesive activity to emerge from Europe. Obviously, the U.S. could not afford to exceed the limit between encouraging greater European cohesion and promoting unilateralism. Neither the Mitterand government nor any French government during the 1980s could afford to allow NATO to disintegrate from within.

Specific French initiatives to strengthen ties with West Germany made up a portion of the Mitterand government's overall...
policy of consolidating the West against the principal threat to its security: the Soviet build-up. France supported better relations with the U.S., and also backed American positions within NATO. The Mitterrand government gave strong approval to NATO intermediate-range nuclear force modernization (INF), and applauded the U.S. defense program. The French sustained annual defense spending at three percent of GNP against the pressures of allocation politics and slower economic growth. In terms of operational cooperation between France and the U.S., over-flight restrictions for U.S. aircraft were relaxed and landing fees waived, while U.S. naval vessels were granted access to French ports. U.S. forces also had access to Djibouti facilities, and American reconnaissance aircraft used the Djibouti airstrip intermittently.

During the 1980s France therefore developed as a prime mover in NATO. But the French were not pleased with what they perceived to be American suspicion about establishing close working relations with a socialist government. For the Europeans, American requests for economic sanctions against the Soviet Union were not credible because they did not include alternatives, only singular prohibitions. The French, in particular, regarded economic sanctions as very serious, pre-war measures. Also, the Europeans felt that economic sanctions did not fit into a coherent U.S. foreign policy. Why, the Europeans asked, should they restrict trade with the USSR while America continued to sell Russia large amounts of grain? The Mitterrand government felt it could assist the Americans in developing strategies to deal with the Soviets. President Mitterrand was
personally opposed to the expansion of Soviet influence in West Europe. Thus, French Socialists expected the U.S. to be more pragmatic toward them and were willing to become more closely involved with the U.S. in the development of policies directed against the USSR, and to a degree these expectations were realized. Such a relationship between the U.S. and France set the stage for closer cooperation within NATO, and made it easier for the French to support American power projection and military activity outside of Europe.

Planning and consultation could play a large role in the Benelux countries as well. Consistent American leadership became particularly important, primarily due to the fact that inconsistent American policy and unfortunate impromptu public statements had broadened the anti-NATO, anti-nuclear coalitions and created new tensions in these countries. The U.S. did avoid both another gaff over NATO nuclear strategy, and the perception of deliberate delay in arms control negotiations which would have made it all but impossible for the Benelux countries to increase their participation in NATO military activities. During the 1980s in the Netherlands, the anti-nuclear weapons movement was reinforced by elements across the political spectrum. Of the European nations, the Benelux countries were most disposed to adopt a policy of Denmark-like defense: stay in NATO but prohibit specific military links, including stationing nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime. In no other countries were close U.S. consultation and planning as important as in the Benelux group. The U.S. role included close
cooperation with the French, who were willing to participate when approached as consultants rather than mere agents of U.S. intentions.

The U.K. made a thorough review of its defense expenditures in light of the Falkland Islands conflict. NATO officials also dealt with the contingency plan for one of the member country's pursuing of missions outside of the NATO theater with forces otherwise committed to NATO. One lesson of the Falklands conflict modified by French actions was that European forces could be committed outside of Europe, creating the situation where American forces hold down NATO while the European states pursued objectives elsewhere.

**First Case Summarized:**

Given the assumptions underlying Army Project 2000, the regional analysis presented concludes for the period 1990-2000, the following:

- A variety of complicated and interrelated political, economic, military, social and emotional factors will provide a more difficult but still negotiable situation in Europe for the United States.

- Politically, NATO Europe states will view the alliance as fundamentally important but perhaps in a more dispassionate way. This is due to a trend towards introspection on the part of European states based on: continued evidence of internal Soviet constraints and perceived Soviet reluctance to use war as a policy means against NATO; continuing tension and friction
over policy preferences and differences with the U.S.; and a growing conviction that flexibility and independence from both the U.S. and Soviet Union are the most effective means of advancing alliance and national interests.

Economically, conditions will not dramatically improve and, indeed, probably will worsen to the point where domestic considerations will significantly increase in overall importance to NATO members. The impact will be to reinforce political differences existing in the alliance but without requiring major changes in the alliance or negating the overall utility of NATO. Conditions in the South of NATO will deteriorate more quickly than in the center or northern region.

Militarily, defense spending will be gradually reduced although British and French nuclear forces will be improved. Despite the argument for making strategic change, revision to MC14/3 will not automatically occur unless conditions alter significantly beyond those projected. However, the U.S. will have the opportunity to take the lead in changing NATO's military strategy to reflect the new realities. This opportunity will be discussed in detail in the next section on strategic requirements.

Social. The expectations of domestic, economic improvements will increase the tendency towards socialism and state underwriting of key social programs. No other major trends which could
have major impact, socially, are forecast although, clearly, the potential exists.

Emotional. The two key emotional psychological trends likely to affect the 1990-2000 period stem from Europe's geographical position between the superpowers. First, the anti-nuclear movement will persist and grow. Second, in response to growing pressures of introspection and, in part, the result of growing selfish interests, Europeans will become unhappier with likely U.S. policies as they affect the alliance and beyond. The tendency of Europeans to perceive falsely a lack of a Euro-centered bias on the part of the U.S., when in fact that bias exists, will cause further friction with the U.S.

The Second Case: A Europe More Disposed Towards the Alliance:

What will dispose Europe more favorably towards the alliance will emerge from at least one of four possibilities: 1) increased perceptions of the Soviet military/political threat caused by military repression in East Europe or some (incredible) Soviet blunder elsewhere; 2) general economic improvement world-wide but particularly in Europe; 3) new U.S. policy initiatives toward Europe which leave no doubt as to the utility of a strengthened alliance; and 4) crisis elsewhere, with or without Soviet involvement, which demonstrates the need for greater alliance cohesion.

Short of one of these possibilities actually happening, the chances of a Europe more disposed towards NATO are enormously slim (-10%). And, given a range of Soviet actions in the past and grave crises which developed outside of Europe and, there-
fore, beyond European interests, only the second and third possibilities would seem relevant. In sum, it is very unlikely that without very major external factors, will we see a Europe more disposed towards NATO.

Nonetheless, it is important to examine this case to determine:

- The manner in which East-West relations and the prospect for conflict would be affected by a strengthened NATO
- Under what conditions a strengthened NATO would be to our (U.S.) net advantage and under what conditions it would not
- What the overall costs, broadly defined, might be including Soviet responses
- Those additional actions we should and should not take as applicable to our objectives and to our most likely projection of where Europe is headed.

If we alter our assumptions to reflect the possibility of a strengthened NATO, regional trends will take on a substantially different meaning which can be analyzed in the context of the points raised above. Supposing, first, that the Soviet Union created a crisis which mobilized European opinion to reinforce the alliance. What might occur?

Clearly, for this to happen, East-West relations would deteriorate politically although economic arrangements for cooperation could persist, especially with East Europe although economic sanctions and embargos could alter that condition.
Whether or not Europe would respond to this renewed Soviet threat with increased defense spending is decidedly questionable and probably unlikely unless the perception of threat lasted for the longer term. The alliance would be more sensitive, however, to military improvements on the margin. The nature of the crisis would affect the degree to which perceptions of the likelihood of war or peace considerations changed although these too seem relatively insensitive to crises short of chaos.

Indeed, depending on the magnitude of crisis, it may be moot whether or not a seemingly more effective alliance is in our interests. If the threat were clear and apparent as that of Hitler's Germany in 1938, the answer is a resounding yes. But, that would be a radical departure from generally accepted views of Soviet proclivities. Consequently, a short-term response by NATO without a full appreciation of the long-term implications could be in our worst interest if it required extraordinary or even additional commitments which, as time passed, became superfluous or, worse, unmanageable.

The costs, of course, could be very debilitating at least in a resource sense. Therefore, barring an exceptionally unlikely crisis perceived as such, we should conclude that major strengthening of NATO based on strictly short-term requirements or exigencies probably won't work and could cause us more harm than good.

General economic improvement is, of course, one solution to the traditional "guns or butter" debate. But, supposing economic recovery in Europe permitted higher levels of real defense spending, would this result in strengthening defense? The
response is not certain and must be viewed as a function of the issue discussed above concerning the perception of the Soviet threat.

The most likely possibility for a strengthened NATO must be based on U.S. leadership which (slowly) seeks to move the alliance along a pre-determined (by us) but generally agreed upon course. The tradeoffs between alliance requirements and conflicting policy aims and objectives are measured in terms of what priority we give to the alliance and, within that priority, how we would rank our own political, military and economic objectives. But, aside from its likelihood of success, this possibility is our only reliable means of producing positive change in the alliance.

Crisis outside the alliance which would generate cohesion is perhaps easier to conceptualize than to discover in actual fact. The October 1973 Middle East War and the ensuing oil embargo certainly did not improve NATO's strength. But, perhaps surprisingly, the Falklands episode demonstrated the possibility and reality of NATO collaboration outside NATO. The key point was the relative speed with which Britain prevailed. Had this been a lengthy (and more expensive) affair, it is conceivable NATO cohesion would have deteriorated. However, this type of situation is possible in the future and could strengthen NATO ostensibly for reasons beyond East-West relations.

Given this condition, one policy observation might be the initiative of the U.S. to support consideration of intervention forces such as those of France. This would be of enormous
political sensitivity, would smack of imperialism and the colonial heritage but would reflect the direction many observers believe international conditions are headed. That being the case, this would fold under U.S. initiatives.

The Third Case: Europe More Disposed Against NATO

This condition has a higher probability of occurring than the second case as it would require no additional outside factors to influence current trends relying instead on a general deterioration in NATO. The likelihood (i.e., the reality) this will occur, however, is reasonably low (30%). Causes of this case are nearly infinite and would range from slumping economic trends exacerbating political divisions to the conviction that a neutralized or independent Europe was in the best interests of the concerned parties.

The worst case from both the U.S. and European perspectives, would be a dysfunctional NATO in the face of growing Soviet aggressiveness. The best case would be a dysfunctional NATO leading to long-term East-West cooperation. Regrettably, the former is more likely than the latter and is indeed a function of the degree to which U.S.-Soviet relations move towards the conflictual or cooperative poles.

Thus, a Europe disposed against NATO, in either case, exaggerates the superpower relations and places western responses to these issues in terms of the conduct of bi-lateral U.S.-Soviet relations.
STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY OF 1990-2000 IN EUROPE

In responding to the "strategic" and "general purpose" issues which bound and define Army requirements for the end of the century, Army strategic requirements in Europe must be based on the ability to impose serious and immediate damage and disruption to any Soviet military incursion into Western Europe. This does not mean the U.S. Army in Europe will be able to guarantee the defeat of the entire Soviet attack if it were to occur without the assistance of our allies. But, by stressing its abilities to impose damage and disruption to Soviet attack, the Army will best be able to reinforce best deterrence and accommodate to the challenges, realities and constraints of 1990-2000. This section will first demonstrate the necessity of this approach for the Army, then outline the implications for Army force structure, deployment, doctrine, procurement, research and development, and, finally, measure that Army against the three cases posited as possible futures we face at the turn of the century.

The Argument for Strategic Deterrence

As has been reviewed, the end of the century should be a period which will considerably tax our energies, intellect, imagination and ability to innovate. It will be a period which, catalyzed by the continuing diffusion of all forms of power, will see the simultaneous de-centralization of authority in the West due, mainly, to increasing national introspection of largely economic character, and, concurrently, continuing accumulation of military power by the Soviet Union. The contradiction is that,
despite a certain political lethargy in the West and the conviction the Soviets would politically exploit any military advantages, constraints in the Soviet Union, reinforced by the additive capacity of the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides, including the U.K. and France, will limit how much more political influence the Soviet Union may derive from their military power. This curious asymmetry in Western perceptions and Soviet actions provides a highly exploitable strategic pressure point on which our strategic requirements can, in part, be based.

The prevailing Western assumption that, given a stalemate on the strategic and tactical nuclear levels between the U.S. and Soviet Union, logic would dictate increasing importance for general purpose forces seems to flow directly counter to structuring an army in Europe strictly on the basis of reinforcing strategic deterrence. However, that assumption is generally interpreted as meaning that improving general forces capabilities is a quantitative rather than qualitative issue. To make the U.S. Army a more effective strategic deterrent will require making it more combat ready and therefore more combat effective. To do that, increasing numbers are far less important than increasing qualitative strength through training, doctrine, modernization and organizational improvements. Thus, the army of the future must be more capable and more ready -- it need not, however, be any larger.

Returning to the "strategic" and "general purpose" issues, we reach two conclusions. First, the army can have increasing relevance to the "strategic" balance. Traditionally,
tactical/theater nuclear weapons have provided an escalatory link. However, while this role must continue, it is likely to be diminished due to the constraints described in the first section which will reduce Western reliance on these weapons. Where the army is more relevant stems from how its increased combat effectiveness to disrupt conventional Soviet attack will force the Soviets to link more immediately use of its nuclear weapons with any attack. To do this, the U.S. Army in Europe need not have to defeat by itself a Soviet ground attack in its entirety throughout Europe. But, the Army must improve its capability and readiness to disrupt enough of the Soviet attack to force them either to use nuclear weapons from the start of the war or to have to consider seriously their use during the early stages.

This combat ability to destroy or disrupt a significant part of the Soviet attack including rear echelon destruction is the key to this approach.

The second requirement is to balance our forces for Europe with forces for global employment. To do that, we recommend a "three army" approach with forces tailored for Europe, low-intensity conflict and nation-building supported by reserves and pre-positioned war material. However, one consideration for beyond 2000 is to explore how we might design general purpose forces which could have application to all three areas. This will be treated as a possible option in addition to the recommendations which argue for a specialization of the Army along the three requirements approach.
Therefore, the remainder of this paper will:
- first, review the overall strategic requirements the Army must meet and the configuration of the future Army to do that;
- second, review the implications of strategic deterrence requirements in Europe and the nature of the configuration of the Army to do that;
- third, review the specific implications of the Army's strategic requirements for doctrinal, research and development and force capability improvements; and
- last, the Army postulated for 1990-2000 in Europe will be measured against the possibilities of different futures as expressed in Cases II and III.

A Three Force Army

Looking at the world context of the 1990s, and the spectrum of potential conflict, it would appear that the Army needs to prepare for three possible missions which require forces considerably different in size, composition and organization.

The first force would be conventional general purpose forces designed to fight a high intensity conventional war in Europe or Northeast Asia. They would require the maintenance of sizeable Allied and American forces in theater, with sufficient pre-positioned heavy equipment, and predesignated manpower to be mobilized and deployed commensurate with anticipated warning time and attrition projections.

The second force would be expeditionary forces designed to fight low intensity conventional war in the Third World. They
would require maintenance of U.S. specialized and multi-purpose forces for rapid deployment based on terrain (desert, mountain, cold-weather, jungle and urban), with regional pre-positioned or air-transportable equipment and manpower mobilization capability adequate to sustain deployments and reconstitute or reinforce expeditionary forces as necessary.

The third force would be nation-building, security assistance forces designed to aid Allied forces in the Third World dealing with subnational, intra-state instability and conflict, countering terrorism and conducting limited, "surgical" strikes to stabilize conflict situations and protect and/or evacuate U.S. nationals from the region. They would be specially trained and equipped forces ranging in size from small teams to battalion task forces with limited capability for direct mission accomplishment to work with and train host nation military, paramilitary and civil action elements. Their equipment requirements would be minimal and manpower would be recruited for specific purposes and skills.

Matching these three force requirements with existing Army manpower and training capabilities indicates that the more traditional emphasis on heavy, conventional general purpose forces is somewhat misdirected. While the most serious threat to U.S. interests lies in that type of conflict, it is the least likely to occur. Therefore, a calculated risk must be taken in meeting that threat, while preparing for more likely contingencies of low intensity conventional and unconventional war. The most apparent direction in which to shift force
structure is therefore to assign the bulk of the reinforcing responsibility for high intensity conventional warfare to reserve units, and upgrade correspondingly their ability to rapidly mobilize and meet such a demand. Active duty units should provide the bulk of the required expeditionary and security assistance forces, requiring a reorganization and reorientation of their manning, equipment and training, making them the source of multi-purpose forces.

There are a number of very good reasons for following such a strategy. First, because active duty forces train year-round, it is more feasible for them to undertake multi-mission training and deployments. Reserve forces would do well to train for one mission to a high degree of readiness, considering the constraints on their time and the accessibility of various training centers. Second, the heavy equipment of active duty forces, once they were reorganized, would quickly become available both in CONUS and in POMCUS to meet the serious equipment shortfalls which represent the Reserve forces' most critical readiness problem at this time. Third, active duty forces will require less mobilization time than reserves, and are therefore more responsive to rapid deployment contingencies for expeditionary forces. Fourth, designating reserve forces for European and Asian contingencies will permit, once they are mobilized and deployed overseas, the freeing of existing active duty heavy forces in those theaters for deployment elsewhere as required, assuming that the situation permits. (It is highly unlikely that the U.S. will experience a situation comparable to Vietnam in which readiness in Europe will be allowed to reach an
extremely low level, without fear of a Soviet attack in theater.) Finally, and perhaps most important, the domestic political situation may not permit policy and decision-makers to mobilize fully reserve forces short of conventional war in Europe or Asia. Those threats would most likely be interpreted domestically as tantamount to direct assaults on the U.S., while limited conventional or unconventional wars may be seen as peripheral and therefore not justifying full mobilization. Thus, expeditionary forces should consist exclusively of active duty units which can be rapidly mobilized and deployed in the absence of a coherent domestic political consensus regarding the political-military situation.

This problem is worrisome considering the potential for rapid horizontal or vertical escalation, and the possibility that decision-makers could be lulled into missing an opportunity to mobilize in time to deter or counter an expansion of the conflict into more vital regions.

Resource Constraints

It would appear that the most critical resource limitations on the ability of the Army to meet the three mission requirements of the 1990s would lie in the area of manpower, equipment, training infrastructure and organization. Much of the discussion of these issues, not only in the prior studies in this project, but also in Congressional testimony and official documents is somewhat conflicting and inaccurate. Therefore, the following
facts and figures discussed below are approximations only -- but are sufficiently accurate to suggest directions or trends.

**Manpower.** No other area has been more disputed recently than the availability of sufficient quality manpower for active and reserve forces, and volunteers and conscripts to meet the needs of a fully mobilized force. Proponents of a return to the draft insist that current active forces are inadequately manned, both qualitatively and quantitatively, while supporters of the all-volunteer force suggest that all is well as long as certain variables such as the economy, military pay, benefits and the manpower pool remain stable. Reviewing much of the data and debate, it becomes apparent that more or less, the active Army will be able to remain at levels somewhat above 750,000, with matching and perhaps higher numbers in the selected and individual reserve components. That essentially means that the Army will have about 1.5 million men available to fight before draftees begin arriving as trained replacements at about M plus 120. The key to maintaining and perhaps exceeding these levels will remain with recruiting incentives and proper maintenance of a "string" on those leaving the service, and enhancing the ability to mobilize them rapidly.

**Equipment.** This factor seems to be the greatest constraint, not only for active and reserve forces, but as it affects the training base as well. Due to the Vietnam War, Army equipment modernization was retarded, and now high costs and the need to modernize many systems simultaneously will delay the process even further. As a result, two side effects of the modernization process are going to have serious impact on the Army in the 1990s
and beyond, which if not compensated for, will drastically affect readiness. The first problem is the mixing of generations of equipment and its effect on rationalization, standardization and inter-operability within the Army. The second factor is that of technology absorption — the training and retraining required when units have a variety of equipment, e.g., M1/M60 series tanks M113 series/M2 IFV personnel carriers, etc. While this problem will not be insurmountable, more attention will need to be paid to personnel assignments to ensure that a soldier trained on one piece of equipment is not assigned to a unit having another type. This slowdown of modernization will also prolong the need for duplicate training establishments and enforce an unnecessary degree of specialization of skills.

But the most critical fallout from the Vietnam War is the absolute shortage of equipment of any type — both for reserve forces and for security assistance in the form of Military Assistance Program grant-basis arms transfers. According to the latest Army Green Book, both the National Guard and Reserve suffer from serious equipment shortages. And since they constitute some 45-55 percent of the Army's combat power, these shortfalls are even more critical than the slowdown of modernization of the equipment of active units. There also are the more mundane considerations of individual uniforms and field equipment to outfit the 250,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve and National Guard, and of course those volunteers and draftees entering training at about M plus 15 to 30.
Training Infrastructure. The Army currently possesses adequate emergency and peacetime training areas and infrastructure to meet the needs of mobilization. The specialized terrain schools (e.g., Jungle School, the National Training cum Desert Warfare Center, Northern Warfare, etc.) need to be expanded to meet the needs of active duty multi-purpose training (probably others such as a Mountain Warfare School need to be added), and additional personnel and facilities developed to smooth the transition from one equipment type to another. But beyond those requirements, what is at issue is whether the Army will be training individuals as replacements, or creating new units and training them prior to deployment. While this issue will be discussed in more detail below, especially as it pertains to the COHORT and Regimental programs now underway, clearly the concept of maximizing individual training, and sending them on to units mobilized and already deployed in-theater, even if understrength, would seem to streamline the process, for several reasons. First, the "temporary" facilities built during WWII, used for Korea and Vietnam, can be used once again for individual training. Second, already within the reserve force structure are some 12 training divisions which could be more closely integrated within TRADOC now to facilitate the turnover of the training mission to them during mobilization. Existing active duty TRADOC personnel could then be identified to become the cadre for early mobilization COHORT companies of volunteers, draftees and other reserve and active duty personnel requiring retraining, which would then join their assigned regiments in deployed divisions and brigades. Third, since most equipment for already organized
units will either be prepositioned, or already enroute to areas where required, the ability to organize, train and equip a unit prior to deployment will not be possible, especially in intensive conventional war scenarios. That link up will need to be accomplished in-theater.

Organization. It is in this area that constraints appear to be least severe. Even under the most gloomy of estimates made in this project, the worst case scenario demanded 32 division equivalents (many of the shortfalls were based on mobilization times as well as the number of divisions available). While the active force remains at 16 2/3 divisions equivalents (many units require some roundout units from the reserves to become full divisions), the unit or organizational capacity of the ARNG and USAR are often underestimated. While both components include sizeable support elements essential to mobilization and deployment, they also possess large numbers of combat units. Looking only at maneuver units, the USAR includes 3 Separate Infantry Brigades (1 Mech); the ARNG, in addition to the 8 divisions commonly cited (5 Infantry, 1 Mech and 2 Armor), includes some 22 separate Brigades (10 Infantry, 8 Mech, 4 Armor and 4 armored Cavalry Regiments. Four of these brigades are already designated as roundout units for active divisions but are not counted in the 16 2/3 active duty total; others have "theater force" missions. This expands the total of available division equivalents to approximately 33, meeting or exceeding all scenarios (assuming adequate mobilization time).
The area of the greatest organizational shortfall, however, lies in the capacity of existing active and reserve command and control headquarters elements to accept and employ these units. While several of the existing maneuver commands, Army headquarters and mobilization and readiness regions could conceivably perform this function, mobilization would be enhanced if they were already organized as combat formations in peacetime. In addition, a more radical program of forward deployment and roundout units may also reduce the time required to effectively integrate these units into the active force.
If 32 Divisions Are Enough

Assuming that sufficient support elements exist to sustain 32 divisions, and that programs to man and equip them adequately already exist and are underway, how should the Army think about mobilization, conflict scenarios and resources? The following summarizes possible "Force Modes" and goals for their mobilization:

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Mode</th>
<th>Primary Sources</th>
<th>Mobilization Timing</th>
<th>Division Equivalents</th>
<th>Total (1000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active Duty</td>
<td>0-14 Days</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing</td>
<td>Selected Reserve</td>
<td>15-48 Days</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surging</td>
<td>IRR/ING</td>
<td>49-120 Days</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining</td>
<td>Draft</td>
<td>121-Indefinite</td>
<td>32+</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assumptions:

a. Corresponding Combat Service and Fire Support also provided.
b. All 8 ARNG Divisions and 22 ARNG and 3 USAR Separate Infantry and Armor Brigades included.
c. Mobilization times and manpower levels approximations of those made available through various testimony and reports.

Before discussing each of the force modes, it should be pointed out that while the probability of a no-warning, full-scale, multi-theater attack by the Soviets, their allies and proxies is highly unlikely, it is possible and therefore represents the absolute standard which all units should work. A "come as you are war" would be an even more remote possibility,
if in fact national decision-makers have the will to read the implications of intelligence indicators and take appropriate action. While "M-Day precedes D-Day" situation would be an ideal scenario, certainly preferred to a "M-day is D-day" situation, it is entirely possible, as discussed above, that M-Day could follow D-Day significantly, because of horizontal and vertical escalation. One can imagine a scenario in which the Soviets mobilize for a strike toward the Persian Gulf, only to test American willingness and ability to read the intelligence indicators, and commit resources and forces in time -- before they would cross the Iranian border, and then half short of such overt aggression. Such a game of military "chicken" could not go on indefinitely, since while once done it could be hailed as a triumph of deterrence, twice done it becomes an apparent waste of resources and political capital in the region.

The Active Mode. The first two weeks of mobilization, while they will include activation of reserve units, implementation of the draft and so on, in terms of combat power will immediately concern active duty units. Many of these will require time to move to battle positions, deploy overseas, retrieve personnel from leave and schools and so on. They will also be required to hold the line if hostilities should immediately ensue. Again the importance of M-Day timing is critical. Ideally, some designated reserve units could begin deployment overseas before some active units, to ensure the latter's availability for other contingencies as expeditionary forces.
The Reinforcing Mode. In this phase, the emphasis would be on activating and deploying the full organizational strength of the ARNG and USAR. Ideally, they would begin deployment at M plus 15 or sooner, and be fully operational not later than M plus 48. In addition, during this phase active duty personnel in staff and training assignments would either be reporting to their regiments overseas, or begin training of COHORT companies for deployment overseas by M plus 120. Their places in CONUS would be taken by MOBDES personnel, and the reserve training divisions, which would transition to full operation of the training base by M plus 120 or sooner.

The Surging Mode. Based upon the situation, this mode might be accelerated or slowed down, but would represent that period of retraining of IRR/ING personnel to fill out existing units or fill critical positions in CONUS. Obviously, if the only deployment was of expeditionary forces, this might be reduced in scale; for security assistance forces, virtually non-existent. The earlier modes would be used for both, because certain reserve component CSS, Civil Affairs and Special Forces units may be required to augment active duty units, or replace them in the CONUS or overseas base.

The Sustaining Mode. At this point, the total force is deployed as required, conflict has ensued, and individual replacements are required and available. Again this mode would be flexible, depending on the situation. However, because of the lead times necessary to train individuals, it most likely should be implemented, even if only to provide trained replacements for Selected Reserve and IRR/ING elements.
The following are some suggestions as to how to fine tune the existing force structure to meet the challenges of the 1990s. Some are obvious, based on the above discussions, some are not obvious, but pertain to basic issues that underlie the problem of many missions, limited manpower and training resources:

Create five corps in Europe: This can be done in several ways: First, one can take the existing 5 active duty division equivalents currently stationed in Europe, and create three forward corps of two active duty divisions of two brigades each, and one active duty division of one brigade each (III, V and VII Corps). These units could then be rounded out with either designated Active duty CONUS-based units, or preferably ARNG separate brigades. Additionally, an active duty nucleus should be created in Europe, of two additional corps headquarters, to which six of the eight ARNG divisions (2 armor, 2 mech [1 mech division would be a reorganization of an ARNG Infantry Division], 2 Infantry) would be assigned. These corps personnel would have operational planning responsibility for mobilization and deployment, and would be filled out with IRR/ING personnel as required. This would provide Europe with 15 1/3 Division equivalents (including the Berlin Brigade), five active duty, ten ARNG, with 3 active duty ACRs and 2 ARNG ACRs. POMCUS requirements would be 10 division sets, with sufficient limited training sets in CONUS. Additional CSS would come from ARNG/USAR, with both maneuver and support elements participating in REFORGER annually (perhaps 1 roundout brigade per corps, 1 ARNG division per ARNG Corps (2 division equivalents) per year.
Full integration of roundout units and active duty elements would be achieved -- roundout brigade for 3ID wears their insignia, active duty elements of ARNG corps wear theirs, and so on.

- Create a 3 corps CONUS strategic reserve: Having accounted for 10 ARNG division equivalents in Europe and 2 2/3 ARNG and USAR division equivalents to reinforce Korea, Panama and Alaska, approximately 3 2/3 divisions (or 11 Brigades) remain in the selected reserves. While one of these brigades will be discussed below as part of the upgrading of security assistance forces, the remaining ten, together with the 9 remaining active duty brigades form the nucleus of a CONUS-based strategic reserve of three corps. There are several reasons for adopting such a structure and organizing it with both active duty and reserve elements. First, although the individual divisions could conceivably be deployed separately (the three active divisions directly to Europe in an emergency, or to reinforce expeditionary forces), their primary purpose is to form a strategic reserve for deployment as reinforcing corps or to regions not currently anticipated as requiring additional forces for example in Korea, Panama or Alaska, and for totally unanticipated contingencies such as territorial defense, civil disturbances, etc. Second, these corps and divisions serve as the cadre and structure for the creation of additional units, if needed, and to absorb much of the IRR/ING upon mobilization -- that is, deployed and early deployment units would have priority of manning during peacetime while the strategic reserve would be understrength during periods of low recruitment, etc. Each corps would consist of one active duty mechanized division, 1 ARNG infantry division and 1 ARNG
ACR, or could be used as the controlling headquarters of 1 ACR and 6 separate brigades each, enhancing both flexibility and deployability.

- **Increase the Special Forces Units in the Active and Reserve Forces:** Due to the increased need for security assistance forces, there will be a need to restructure existing active duty and ARNG forces as Special Forces/Unconventional Warfare elements. Two additional active and one additional ARNG/USAR SF Groups need to be created. The USAR Group would be a reorganized separate infantry brigade. While this would reduce the maneuver elements available to the force, it would meet the more immediate needs of our Third World allies. Building upon the existing three active duty and four reserve components SF groups, there would exist sufficient unconventional warfare forces to permit more regional specialization, and reinforcement should more such forces be needed.

Some thought should be given to moving the ARNG SF units to USAR status if possible to speed their mobilization and preclude many of the political barriers to their deployment as discussed above. It is conceivable that there will be times when these reserve Special Forces would be activated prior to hostilities or the deployment of other active or reserve units. While it would appear that all SF should be active duty, such a proposal ignores the fact that there is wealth of area specialist expertise and unconventional warfare experience in the civilian community, which while not available directly to the active forces, is available for recruitment for the reserve components. While this
is especially true of many of the Civil Affairs, Psyops and MOBDES personnel, the members of these reserve SF units would need to recognize not only the possibility but the likelihood of mobilization and deployment during peacetime, with commensurate disruption of their civilian careers. Some special compensation schemes or legislation might be necessary to ensure that this precious resource is not only recruited, but also protected from these potential side effects of duty in a world more prone to unconventional war and low intensity conflict.

- **Integrate the USAR Training Divisions with TRADOC:** It would appear that the 12 USAR training divisions would provide the necessary organizational framework for taking over the duties of running the nine BCT, AIT, and OSUT training centers in CONUS. Perhaps personnel currently assigned to mobilization and readiness regions could be used to fill out these units with a higher percentage of active duty personnel to speed mobilization and their takeover of the training base, thus freeing remaining active duty TRADOC personnel to either train COHORT companies or to immediately rejoin their regiments. Three additional training centers might be identified for their use, to be opened now or immediately upon mobilization.

- **Rationalize the Regimental System for Active Duty and Reserve Forces:** While ARNG units have already achieved much of the stability, tradition and cohesiveness which are the goals of the regimental system, the program should be expanded throughout the entire force to promote linkages among active and reserve units. Exactly how the regimental system -- with units deployed forward while others remain in CONUS -- will affect active duty
mobilization, is not known, since its impact on the Army can only be anticipated at this time. But it is very likely that many of the TRADOC and other nominative or TDA assigned personnel will serve in these positions on a rotational basis, to return to their regiments upon mobilization. This does not mean that individuals would immediately move overseas; they too might require retraining or may be unable to move because their MOBDES replacement has not arrived. This will be a very uneven process. But the critical factor, both for active duty personnel and the IRR/ING is that they will have a unit "home" -- the AD and IRR personnel, one in which they were trained and soldiered previously, and the ING, a role to play in filling out a unit with which one trains on an annual basis. These linkages are the critical factor in rapid mobilization and deployment for all units and individuals. In fact, the Army needs to recognize the existence of the IAD -- individual active duty -- personnel, who are serving away from their units, and who have many of the same problems and requirements as their IRR and ING counterparts. The demand for these personnel in the Army to serve away from units will persist, but the regimental system, if properly implemented, will ensure that in time of war, everyone has a place to go, or is already there.
In sum, the current force can be restructured to meet the challenges of the 1990s:

The current force structure consists of:

**Active Duty** -- 16 2/3 Division Equivalents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps HQ</th>
<th>ACRs</th>
<th>ACCB</th>
<th>Bdes</th>
<th>SF Gps</th>
<th>Ranger Bns</th>
<th>Abn TF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I, III, V, VII, XVIII)</td>
<td>(2 Europe, 1 CONUS)</td>
<td>(CONUS)</td>
<td>(26 CONUS, 2 Hawaii, 1 Panama, 1 Alaska, 3 Korea, 16 Europe)</td>
<td>(CONUS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(SETAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Selected Reserves** -- 16 1/3 Division Equivalents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps HQ</th>
<th>ACRs</th>
<th>ACCB</th>
<th>Bdes</th>
<th>SF Gps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(IX)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24 in Divisions, 25 Separate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proposed force structure would consist of: a total of 33 division equivalents.

**Active Duty** -- 16 2/3 Division Equivalents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps HQ</th>
<th>ACRs</th>
<th>ACCB</th>
<th>Bdes</th>
<th>SF Gps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XVIII)</td>
<td>(Europe)</td>
<td>(Spain)</td>
<td>(9 CONUS, 2 Hawaii, 1 Panama, 1 Alaska, 3 Korea, 16 Europe, 9 Spain, 9 Australia)</td>
<td>(CONUS/FWD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81
Selected Reserves -- 15 2/3 Division Equivalents

5 ACRs

47 Bdes (Earmarked: 30 Europe, 4 Korea, 2 Alaska, 2 Panama, 9 CONUS)

5 SF Gps

Transitioning to this force would require: a total of 32 1/3 division equivalents.

- Creation of 6 additional active duty Corps headquarters.
- Reorganization of 1 ARNG Bde as an ACR, 1 USAR Bde as SF Gp.
- Creation of 2 additional active duty SF Gps.
- Deactivation of 2 active duty Sep Bde HQs and activation of 4 additional Division HQs (unless CONUS Corps will include Bdes in lieu of divisions).
- Forward deployment (if possible) of the majority of active duty conventional general purpose and expeditionary forces overseas in appropriate or adjacent theater locations.
- Activation of 1 additional ARNG Divisional HQ.
- Reorganization of an existing or "new" active duty division as an airborne unit.

Resources required to accomplish this would include:

- Slight increase in active duty end strength and doubling of personnel on jump status.
- Accelerated/increased re-equipping of ARNG, POMCUS stocks.

Upon mobilization and deployment, the force structure would look something like this (unit designations notational [indicated by **] based upon reorganization):
**TABLE 5**

**Conventional General Purpose Forces**

**Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>ACR</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Cav</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>2d</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Cav</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
<td>2 ARNG Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Corps</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
<td>2 ARNG Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Corps</td>
<td>2d</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>3d</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
<td>ARNG Bdes</td>
<td>2 ARNG Bdes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Europe (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>ACR</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Cav</th>
<th>ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps (ARNG)</td>
<td>1 ARNG ACR</td>
<td>1 ARNG AD</td>
<td>1 ARNG ID</td>
<td>1 ARNG ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Corps (ARNG)</td>
<td>1 ARNG ACR</td>
<td>1 ARNG AD</td>
<td>1 ARNG ID</td>
<td>1 ARNG ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>AD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IX Corps</td>
<td>2d</td>
<td>1 ARNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 AD Bdes</td>
<td>25th ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 ARNG Bde</td>
<td>2 AD Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 ARNG Bde</td>
<td>1 ARNG Bde</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panama**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>AD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>193 INF Bde</td>
<td>2 ARNG</td>
<td>Sp inf Bdes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Alaska**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>AD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>192 Ind Bde</td>
<td>2 USAR</td>
<td>Sp Inf Bdes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONUS Strategic Reserve**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>AD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
<td>1 ARNG ACR</td>
<td>1 ARNG ID</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th ID</td>
<td>6 Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Corps</td>
<td>1 ARNG ACR</td>
<td>1 ARNG ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23rd ID</td>
<td>6 Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Corps</td>
<td>1 ARNG ACR</td>
<td>1 ARNG ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6th ID</td>
<td>6 Bdes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Expeditionary Forces**

**Spain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>AD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XVIII ABN Corps</td>
<td>82 Abd Div</td>
<td>101st Abn Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(incl 1 ABN TF)</td>
<td>10th ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[SETAF]

83
Australia
1 Corps 9th ID 11th ABN Div 24th ID 6th ACCB
(Mech)

Security Assistance Forces

5 AD SF Gps
Africa (5th) Middle East (7th)
Asia (3d) Latin America (4th)
Europe (10th)

5 ARNG USAR SF Gps
Africa (11th) (USAR) Middle East (12th) (USAR)
Asia (19th) (ARNG) Latin America (20th) (ARNG)
Europe (9th) (USAR)

Training Base
12 Army Reserve Training Divisions operating BCT/AIT/OSUT as part of TRADOC.

Conclusion
Based upon the above analysis, it is evident that the Army should implement a number of significant, even if marginal, changes in the force structure over the next decade if it is to meet the challenges of the 1990s, to include:

o Greater reliance on National Guard Divisional and Separate Brigade units, especially for reinforcement of NATO.

o Consequent emphasis on manning, equipping and training those units for such a deployment as their primary mission, with the possibility of mobilization to replace active duty units in Europe as required.

o Build up of POMCUS stocks to ensure that mobilization/deployment of ARNG units are not delayed (equipment in CONUS would be for training only at locations such as Ft.
Drum, Ft. Irwin or Ft. Hood) with a goal of M-15 deployed based upon practice each year during and participation in REFORGER.

- Organization of Corps and Division headquarters to accept ARNG units upon deployment to Germany. This would significantly enhance the conventional deterrent capability in the theater, perhaps to the point of obviating full mobilization except as prescribed above.

- Identify remaining ARNG and USAR units for comparable deployments in support of active duty units overseas, and as part of the CONUS strategic reserve.

- Consider organizing several more active duty and reserve component Special Forces units to meet the demand for specially-trained/unconventional warfare specialists.

- Concentrate efforts on organizing IRR and draft personnel for earlier mobilization and deployment to ARNG and other reserve units prior to D-day; keep the active forces overseas at Category 1 as a top priority.

- As the manpower section of the Army 2000 Project indicated, peacetime conscription will be necessary before 1990. However, at least initially a peacetime draft should be instituted for reserve components only. This type draft could serve as a pilot model for "full conscription" if later considered politically and economically feasible and necessary.

- Do not increase the number of combat units until adequate manpower and equipment resources exist to create them; if necessary, make active duty and other units smaller to proliferate their number on the battlefield.
The concept is not to try to fight the Soviets everywhere -- simultaneously. Rather, it may be that we must be prepared to accept tactical setbacks in more secondary areas in order to concentrate sufficient military force to win in the primary theater. We cannot economically or politically afford to have an active duty force sufficiently large to defeat the Soviets on all fronts -- rather we need the capacity to surge or mobilize resources to do so when necessary. We need a sufficient force to deter the Soviets, with a credible warfighting capability based upon mobilization.

Such is the nature of expeditionary forces, and where they might conceivably be employed, that size is not as important as training, mobilization and sustainability. The examples of what one battalion or brigade sized unit has been able to accomplish to stabilize conflict situations or entirely snuff them out demonstrates that smaller, well-trained and equipped units possess more combat potential than larger, less trained and poorly-equipped units.

In this context, the "heavy" versus "light" debate is irrelevant, to a point. The key for the Army of the 1990s is to have enough of both to accomplish its assigned missions. By balancing and reorganizing the total force somewhat, it should be possible for the Army to possess adequate conventional general purpose forces to deter or win a high intensity war in Europe or Asia; to have forward-deployed light but powerful expeditionary forces to fight conflicts in the developing world; and to employ regularly security-assistance forces that are able to assist allies in the region to meet their own security needs without
expeditionary force deployments, or escalation to high intensity conventional or nuclear war in Europe.

Thus, the burden for fighting the more likely conflicts in the Third World, and deterring war in Europe, rests most heavily on the active Army, at least initially. The reserve forces would bear the brunt of fighting in Europe and reinforcing other conventional commitments, to include freeing active units to reinforce expeditionary forces. This strategy represents an attempt to "have enough" (32 1/3 divisions plus Special Forces and CSS) to do what is necessary in the 1990s.

Army Strategic Deterrence in Europe in the 1990s

War in Europe will remain the least likely and most dangerous potential conflict faced by the Army in the 1990s. The Soviet Union will face somewhat strengthened NATO nuclear deployment in Europe and continued but significant improvements in the qualitative capabilities conventional forces of the United States and the European states which, taken together, will make the costs and risks of military adventure unacceptable to the Soviet leadership. In addition, Soviet-European detente will yield political and economic payoffs likely to reduce further Soviet interest in a European war.

Army deployments in Europe -- from airborne battalions to the Pershing brigade -- will remain an important element of strategic deterrence in Europe, and a useful instrument of U.S. foreign policy in peacetime. Deployment of the Abrams and Bradley vehicles and implementation of Division 86 and Airland Battle
will improve the Army's combat power in Europe, but these initiatives aggravate, rather than resolve the Army's European force structuring dilemma of the 1990s.

The dilemma is produced by tension between political constraints and military requirements for U.S. security in the next decade. On the one hand, despite some pressures to reduce U.S. troops on European soil in the 1980s, force levels for Europe are likely to remain high in the 1990s because U.S. national interests in Europe will continue to require an explicit linkage of U.S. and European defense at every level. The implication is that significant shifts in Army force structure or posture in Europe are laden with diplomatic overtones and are unlikely to be made for military reasons alone. At the same time, the nature of the Soviet threat will continue to demand the capabilities, if not the design or tactics, of expensive, heavy divisions.

Force designers face a dilemma because they must structure an Army capable of meeting the more likely military threats outside Europe within the dual constraints imposed by NATO requirements and limited resources. Structuring separate armies is neither politically nor economically feasible, but reducing strength in Europe, or earmarking U.S. NATO units, may prove equally unacceptable.

Army force design for strategic deterrence must also cope with manpower and strategic mobility shortfalls which are likely to persist through the 1990s. Depending on the amount of strategic warning and the scope of a future European conflict, manpower shortages could require U.S. commanders to deploy two to
thirteen fewer divisions than prudent planning would require. Even if these divisions were available now, available sea and airlift could not meet NATO requirements to move 6 Army divisions, one Marine amphibious brigade and 60 tactical fighter squadrons within 10 days. Because neither the mobility nor the manpower issues are likely to be solved by or for the Army, force design for strategic deterrence must account for these complications.

A revised conceptual approach is needed to design Army forces for strategic deterrence. If, in the past, force designers have viewed the European theater as the raison d'être for Army divisions, then in the 1990s the requirement for strategic deterrence must instead be viewed as a constraint on total force design. The notion that a unit capable of European combat can fight anywhere is neither necessary nor adequate to meet force design needs in the future. Strategic deterrence as a design constraint is the leitmotiv of the following recommendations.

**Force Structure and Posture**

The Army in Europe will enter the 1990s implementing Airland Battle doctrine and Division 86 organization. Lead times and current procurement schedules will limit the Army's ability to devise and deploy fundamentally different fighting vehicles or other systems in the near and medium term. Realistic force structuring initiatives for Europe in the 1990s must concentrate
on effective utilization of the Abrams and Bradley systems to accomplish strategic deterrence.

With some important exceptions outlined below, the Army should proceed with reorganization of its NATO-designated units as heavy divisions, and should continue to exercise and test the Airland Battle doctrine. Alternative organizations for lower echelon units (platoon, company, battalion) may emerge once the new program is in place. Recommending basic organizational changes for NATO-designated units beyond those in Division 86 requires a readiness to retest and evaluate new concepts that may prove no better. More important, the combination of Airland Battle with improved weapons can make a positive contribution to strategic deterrence that should be realized as soon as possible. In Europe, where the Army's objective should be strategic deterrence, force designers must avoid allowing the "best" to become the enemy of the "sufficient."

As the current organizational and doctrinal initiatives are implemented, force designers should concentrate on improving the sustainability and readiness of the NATO Division 86 units. These ostensibly mundane efforts can have a major impact on the credibility of NATO's conventional deterrent, because they will reduce the probability that a sudden Soviet conventional effort, or a limited-objective attack following partial mobilization, could succeed. In addition to the effects of better readiness and sustainability on deterrence, efforts in these areas can improve crisis stability in Europe and may relieve some of the intra-Alliance tension likely to arise.
Specific areas likely to yield maximum benefit for force designers include upgrading pre-positioned equipment (POMCUS) stocks, expanding war-reserve stockpiles and improving the distribution of conventional forces in Europe. These program efforts are not singled out because they will be inexpensive or politically attractive. Rather, they offer positive efforts on strategic deterrence which can be obtained without diverting increasingly scarce Army manpower from other missions outside Europe. In addition, these areas offer the potential for improvement by the 1990s if program efforts begin soon.

Enough prepositioned equipment is in Europe now to support four Army divisions; two additional POMCUS sites should be completed by the end of Fiscal Year 1983. Even with the airlift enhancement program outlined in the Army 2000 Force Mobility paper, NATO reinforcement objectives could not be met without prepositioned equipment. As the Army begins to reconfigure with the Abrams and Bradley systems, maintenance of adequate pre-positioned stocks will compete with requirements to equip U.S.-based, active and reserve units with the new vehicles and related material. Army force designers should consider strict limits on training equipment (which can be shared) and domestic war-reserve stocks (which require scarce lift assets to get to the battle) in favor of fully equipping forward-based units and POMCUS sets with the modernized systems. Some systems must be provided for training in CONUS units; careful management, and possibly augmenting direct and general-support maintenance units in CONUS, can ensure that the maximum number of new systems are based in Europe. Past guidelines (at least in 1981) of 70 percent fill
for active-duty CONUS units and 50 percent fill for reserve units may need to be revised downward as the new systems are fielded.

POMCUS will be increasingly important in the 1990s because it can reduce the time necessary to reinforce NATO, and thereby reduce NATO's dependence on strategic warning and its vulnerability to conventional attack -- without expensive lift or scarce manpower.

NATO's ability to wage (protracted) conventional war is a key component of strategic deterrence. Sustainability has many components, but Army force planners should focus their attention on improving war reserve stocks. Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Warsaw Pact weaponry suggest that the Airland Battle in Europe will be intense and may be protracted. The high rates of consumption typical of engaged divisions require that force designers emphasize procurement of sufficient stocks for heavy divisions to fight until U.S.-based production can arrive -- perhaps as long as 90 days. Improved intra-theater mobility of food, fuel, and ammunition also merit detailed analysis and attention. The problem will be complicated by the lack of a NATO-wide standard for war reserve stocks and the persistence of separate national logistics systems. Nevertheless, improvements in procedures and expansion -- or consolidation -- of stockpiles promises significant improvement in the Army's deterrent posture.

As the Army reconfigures to the five European corps model, force designers should intensify current efforts to determine the potential for relocating units in Europe to improve their current value. Rearward deployment in Europe has produced a
situation in which half the divisions in Europe are at least a full day's travel from their fighting positions. While much of this problem -- for example, the rearward deployment of the French First Army -- cannot be solved by Army planners, some redeployment will increase the costs and risks apparent to a Soviet planner contemplating a limited-objective attack.

Because the Army's objective in Europe should be strategic deterrence, and because West Europeans are not likely to accept the budget costs of significantly increasing the number of heavy divisions in their force structures, major redesign of U.S. division-level units toward a "light" deployment is not an appropriate goal. Plans for such a redesign normally require substantially different resources from those available to the Army in the 1990s. For example, most "light" constructs are poorly matched to the capabilities of the Abrams and Bradley systems already being procured. Through the end of the century, forces in Europe are likely to consist of a mix of M60/M113 and M1/M2 vehicles. The Division 86 design, although harder to move fast from CONUS, and Airland Battle doctrine appear well-suited to exploit the capabilities of this material base in Europe.

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C I)

A variety of current program efforts focus on improving C I for theater nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. Goals for these programs are usually expressed in terms of added interoperability, hardness, flexibility or responsiveness. Command and control technology will become increasingly sophisticated during the 1990s as Army systems such as ASAS (All-
Source Analysis System), TACSAT (Tactical Satellite Communications Subsystem), SOTAS (Standoff Target Acquisition System) and TACFIRE (Tactical Fire Direction System) enter the force structure. Airland Battle doctrine integrates the capabilities of these systems into its operational concept, which will remain basically sound into the 1990s.

Although the direction of C1 programs is clear -- toward high technology, survivable systems -- the appropriate scope and limits for C1 initiatives in Europe are less completely articulated. In the future, allocation of research, development and procurement assets for expensive, high technology systems is likely to require an almost zero-sum approach. Resources for C1 in Europe will be committed at the expense of tactical mobility, firepower or C1 for other theaters or missions. Because the Army is least likely to fight in Europe during the 1990s, the appropriate scope of C1 improvement programs within the Army's force design for Europe must be carefully analyzed. New C3I systems are usually intended to reduce the vulnerability of existing systems to attack, or to improve the combat effectiveness of Army units through improved command and control. The extent to which a system fulfilled one or both of these purposes was a useful measure of the program's worth, when all (or most) Army units could be expected to use these systems. In the more specialized Army of the 1990s, these justifications for C1 initiatives will be insufficient.

Reduced vulnerability or improved survivability are frequently cited as program goals for C1 initiatives,
particularly those associated with theater nuclear forces. In this contest, the technical vulnerability of an existing system to some form of attack -- EMP, jamming, sabotage -- establishes requirements for improvement. This approach produces a dynamic, continuous series of CI improvements as Soviet sophistication increases.

Force designers in the 1990s can ill-afford the "technical vulnerability" approach in Europe because it fails to identify a "sufficient" level of CI to accomplish strategic deterrence. Technical vulnerability can undercut the credibility of the NATO deterrent only if the vulnerability produces a strategic incentive to attack. This strategic incentive will exist only when Soviet calculations of the overall correlation of forces in NATO appears overwhelmingly favorable. For this reason, while a particular European CI system may appear highly vulnerable, Army force designers should assess the overall impact of the vulnerability on Soviet incentives to launch an attack into Europe. No matter how significant the technical vulnerability, unless new procurement is intended to correct a deficiency that gives the Pact a decisive advantage, force designers should consider committing the resources to a region where the Army is more likely to fight.

This concept may not be well-received by traditionalists who argue that CI is not being questioned; rather, this concept emphasizes the mission of strategic deterrence in Europe in an attempt to avoid suboptimizing deployments of scarce, expensive command and control assets.
Systems intended to enhance the capability of existing C I should be subjected to similar analysis. The additional flexibility or capacity provided by new systems designed for the heavy divisions may be of little use to light, special-purpose units that will do the Army's fighting in the 1990s. For this reason, force designers should not deploy or develop expensive new C I for Europe alone. The highest potential payoffs in the future will be for systems that can be used by all types of units -- squad radios or secure strategic communications, rather than automated fire control for medium artillery. Force designers able to implement this type of analysis will have grasped the essential feature of the Army's "strategic deterrence" role.

Nuclear and Chemical Weapons

Army doctrine and force design related to the employment of battlefield nuclear weapons (BNW) -- particularly dual capable artillery, LANCE and the Corps Support Weapon System (CSWS) -- should be significantly revised, to reflect the Army's orientation toward strategic deterrence.

Current U.S. doctrinal literature generally discusses BNW in three basic roles -- as a substitute for scarce conventional forces, as a decisive (rather than demonstrative) military influence, and as a means for terminating conflict (FM 100-5, July '76, FM 100-S (Draft) January '82, FM 6-20, FM 101-31-1). Neither the current or projected force designs, nor the emerging political realities in Europe, will support these concepts in the 1990s.
Although some U.S. civilian authorities have denied that BNW provide a substitute for conventional military strength, the role of BNW as a substitute is a consistent theme in military doctrinal literature. General Bernard Rogers has testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that enhanced radiation (ER) warheads for artillery systems are essential to offset the increasing Soviet numerical advantage in conventional systems. General Roger's view is echoed in the Army's current doctrinal manuals on operations and on fire support. Both manuals present comparisons of conventional and nuclear fire support, and both conclude that a single 1 KT nuclear weapon "has approximately the same lethality against troops in the open as seven artillery battalions firing improved conventional munitions in a single volley." Although the newly-revised manual on Operations deletes this reference, it notes that when BNW are used, smaller forces may achieve the same effect as large forces supported by conventional artillery. Doctrinal statements on attacks, withdrawal, delay and exploitation refer to the potential for BNW to substitute for insufficient conventional forces.

Current doctrine does not discount the possibility of using BNW in a demonstrative "warning shot" role, but most policy statements suggest that the weapons are intended to achieve decisive military effects. During FY '77, procurement of improved 155 mm nuclear ammunition was justified by the need to provide an adequate density of nuclear firepower across NATO's entire front. More recently, the primary wartime role for BNW
has been phrased as direct support of ground forces in contact with the enemy.

Statements of military doctrine reaffirm the importance of decisive use once BNW are released. The Army's doctrinal manual on nuclear weapons employment emphasizes that BNW are to be used to positively and dramatically alter the course of battle and to preclude the enemy from achieving his objectives. Corps commanders are advised to request release of BNW only when the corps cannot accomplish its mission without nuclear weapons, or if forebearance would weaken the corps to the point that it could no longer fight. Viewed in the aggregate, current policy and force design suggest that BNW should be used as late as possible, but then as massively as required.

The final and most essential stated purpose of BNW is termination of conflict. Outright military victory is not the objective; rather, BNW are intended to demonstrate to enemy political leaders that potential losses outweigh gains if the conflict is continued. The conditions for "threat defeat" by BNW are explicitly outlined in the Army doctrine:

- A threat is considered defeated by nuclear strikes when the resultant force ratios are such that enemy forces are halted and can be controlled by conventional means throughout a sufficient pause for political channels to be utilized to terminate the conflict. (FM 101-31-3, p. 5)
- U.S. doctrine on warfighting with BNW suggests that if war in Europe were to begin with setbacks for U.S. conventional
forces, BNW would be used to suddenly and decisively halt the advancing Warsaw Pact formations. Then, war would be terminated by a negotiated settlement enforced by conventional firepower.

This doctrine requires substantial revision and modification of force design for the 1990s. The Army should reposition its small nuclear weapons in Europe to maximize their deterrent effect and minimize their potentially divisive influence within the Alliance.

Any wartime debate within NATO concerning the first use of nuclear weapons is likely to be divisive because U.S. territory will (arguably) not be at risk from an initial use within the European theater. Current Army force design for BNW will figure prominently in this debate, because corps commanders have incentives to incorporate BNW in their early operational planning, and to request release early. These incentives are not consistent with the political trends which probably will emerge in the 1990s. These trends are likely to place a premium on avoiding early first use of small nuclear systems. Trends in command and control which will increasingly allow direct control by the National Command Authority over nuclear launches by aircraft or long-range missile units may render employment of artillery-fired weapons even less appealing.

Notwithstanding the emerging limitations on nuclear artillery as a war-fighting option, these weapons have significant deterrent value. Because short-range nuclear weapons can prevent Soviet commanders from massing without risk, the technical capability of the Army to employ these weapons
strengthens strategic deterrence. Current Army force design requires revision because it poses a danger that corps commanders may plan for the release of nuclear artillery only to be denied permission to use it. This is a crucial problem and the Army must face up to it now.

One potential approach to short-range nuclear force design might include the following characteristics:

- Short-range nuclear weapons would not be included in pre-release operational planning below Army Group level. Current plans would be redrawn as required to accomplish missions without these weapons.

- Pre-release planning at Army Group level would be limited to establishment of Corps Prescribed Nuclear Loads (PNL).

- A General Release option for short-range systems would be retained.

- Requests for selective employment for short-range systems would be initiated by the Army Group commander, and release would not be delegated below Army Group level.

- Restrictions on the release request might be designed to allow short-range systems to be used only in certain tactical operations (counter-attacks, pursuit or deep attacks).

The intent to such a revision would be to remove small nuclear weapons from the planning authority of tactical commanders, while retaining the capability to use the weapons if
an unforeseen circumstance should arise. Revisions in force design for small nuclear weapons will be necessary for the 1990s. The Airland Battle doctrine does not adequately reflect the essentially political nature of a decision to employ nuclear weapons, nor does it fully capitalize on the deterrent value of the short-range systems.

Chemical weapons will continue to constitute an important element of strategic deterrence during the 1990s. Soviet military planners are likely to remain deterred from using chemicals in battlefield support roles because of the presence of sizeable U.S. Army chemical weapons stockpiles and improving individual and unit-level chemical protective measures.

The possibility that chemical weapons might be used against European population centers in an attempt to split the Western Alliance during a conventional conflict merits attention from Army planners. A pre-announced or "accidental" Soviet chemical attack against civilians could make clear to European nations the costs of continued resistance, without invoking the use of nuclear weapons. Since direct defense against such an attack is not currently possible, Army force designers can contribute to deterring use of chemical weapons by maintaining a flexible and sizeable capability to attack, with chemical agents, deep targets within Eastern Europe.

Army force design for Europe in the 1990s must emphasize strategic deterrence with heavy divisions. By concentrating on sustainability, modifying the tactical nuclear force posture and deploying adequate command and control, deterrence can be
strengthened without depleting the resources of other Army units more likely to face combat in the 1990s.

Specific Implications of the Army's Strategic Requirements in Europe

First and foremost, the Army must be prepared to invest its energies to increasing its combat readiness and effectiveness. The nature of the political realities of 1990-2000, reinforced by the low probability of East-West conflict, will clearly demonstrate that qualitative improvements to our forces is the key to meeting our requirements in Europe. The combination of innovative and imaginative doctrinal, organizational, operational and capability improvements becomes central.

Doctrine

Air-Land 2000 and the emphasis, indeed criticality, of rear echelon attack, requires two fundamental doctrinal changes. First, battlefield decentralization must become an operational reality. Second, organizational and training changes must be implemented to permit effective decentralization and greatly improve the capability of individual units down to the platoon level.

By battlefield decentralization, company and perhaps even platoon commanders will have to operate almost instantaneously and without specific authorization of higher levels of command. That has never been the standard operating procedure of the Army although we have always tried to proceed in that direction. In striking deep in a fluid, intense way, company commanders will
require virtual independence from close control. Hence, coordination and C I functions will be enormously strained. This in turn requires the most highly trained units which addresses the second point of training.

Without question, unit stability and cohesion are the most critical aspects of ensuring the immediate readiness at the highest standards of training. Current personnel turnover rates are not acceptable to maintaining unit readiness consistently at standards high enough to support the decentralization required for deep attack. The doctrinal solution is fundamental but straight-forward. As we move towards 1990-2000, we must ensure unit cohesion by keeping forward deployed units in Europe immune from personal turnover. To do that, we must adopt a regimental/brigade system wherein we forward deploy by regiments on a yearly basis or so during which time out of CONUS, we keep to the minimum any personnel turnover. By working out a rotation system for our combat brigades between Europe and CONUS, we can use unit cohesion as a means of fundamentally upgrading readiness and training.

The costs of this approach are, indeed, substantial. As the British learned, continuous replacement can save up to 30 percent of the costs of supporting the Army. It is not cheap. Nor are the personnel assignment policies easy to keep in synchronization with deployments. Further, the family pressures on long deployments must be tempered by adequate means to bring families together during the time out of country.
Expense would not permit us to deploy every combat or support brigade on a yearly basis meaning certain units would be permanently stationed in Europe on PCS orders with families. However, as a start, the Army ought to implement this regimental approach on a final basis and set its objectives towards at least half of our combat brigades in Europe in 1990-2000 being organized on these lines. The compensatory resource offsets would come, in part, in force structure on the basis that these more cohesive units actually increase the Army's strategic deterrent capacity in Europe.

If we do not make these doctrinal changes, we will not be able to support the current requirements for deep strike in Air-Land Concepts and we will be less able to support future requirements which will be even greater.

Research, Development, and Technology

The requirements for deep strike operations and the implementation of decentralization and unit cohesiveness initiatives clearly underscore the absolute need for systems to support and provide the necessary capabilities. If we use the basic elements of war as categories for organizing our requirements and research and development initiatives, the directions the Army of the future must pursue become clearer. Certainly, the categories offered here are important more for organizational structure rather than their accuracy in exactly defining the components of war over which debate will never end.

Firepower: The purpose of war is to force an adversary to accept our will that ability to influence an adversary
which ultimately rests on the perceptions of pure, unvarnished power and how it will be brought to bear. In its simplest form this is firepower. Precision-guided munitions are well known for their potential lethality. Further efforts must stress both PGM-type projectiles and cruise/rocket missiles with unity kill-probabilities. The issues are making those weapons available to company/platoon level control and controlling the costs so we can afford to field high technology systems. Thus, the direction firepower improvements will take is well understood. The crucial point is making these systems usable and deployable on appropriate levels of combat units who will need to use them. Thus, C I and battlefield coordination are, clearly, the central areas in which R&D can support the Army's future requirements, followed by mobility.

**Battlefield Coordination/C I:** There is no comparison between the battlefield coordination requirements of even World War II and a major war set in Europe today or in the future. The analogy of drowning in data while suffocating for information is too likely a prospect.

Here, several R&D areas become crucial: extremely rapid miniaturized data processing circuits, directional laser and RF communications, accurate positioning (navigation devices) and nearly instantaneous secure exchange of information capabilities. These are also areas in which the U.S. has a (temporary) lead over the rest of the world. Overarching these areas, of course, is the potential of
space for providing instantaneous surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting information. What this suggests is that company and platoon size units will have their own miniaturized command posts keyed primarily to receiving and evaluating information nearly instantaneously. This is an order of magnitude beyond JTIDS and indeed is something which is jam resistant. But, unless unit commanders can use the processed information quickly, their opportunities will be lost.

The point is that Army must coordinate its requirements for deep attack with ensuing doctrinal changes in training and deploying for decentralized war with instantaneous secure data transfer to allow relatively low levels in the field to take independent action.

**Mobility:** The Bradley FV and M-1 tank will be the primary mobility units on the ground to support deep strike requirements. But mobility requirements apply to broader categories: mobility of firepower, reserves, logistics and, in a general sense, personnel. Deep-strike emphasizes mobility of firepower and reserves, logistics and personnel to support that. We will have adequate mobility through tracked vehicles and helicopters for battlefield personnel lift in the 1990-2000 period. Where we will be lacking is mobility for our advanced PGMs. For example, the A-10 and AH-64 copter will provide close-air support. However, at this stage making cruise missiles and the "assault-breaker" type munitions more mobile requires greater emphasis. VSTOL/STOL aircraft, perhaps long-endurance, could make
excellent vehicles for improving the mobility and operational employment of these newer PGMs. But striking deep means moving quickly with our firepower. That is the key R&D area under mobility.

**Concealment and Protection:** The need for nuclear, chemical, biological defense is well understood and will not be covered. R&D is of greatest utility in efforts to protect forces from attack either by physical protection from damage through armoring and similar techniques or by concealment from observation.

Since the predominance of detection on the battlefield will be through RF energy in general and visually in specific instances, "stealth" technology or other types of "invisibility" means are probably not suitable for the battlefield where concealment should generally be gained through deception. For example, a smoke screen type of fog which perhaps could be "seen through" using special viewing devices would provide an extraordinary advantage for the possessor. There is no technological reason why this concept could not be implemented in theory. Whether or not it will prove achievable at affordable costs should not daunt us. Additionally, we should pursue other means of concealment through deception by use of battlefield decoys. One way to overcome the Soviet concentration of firepower is to provide an abundance of false targets. There is no reason we cannot use R&D to provide us these capabilities.
Logistics: It is interesting that in wartime, logistics dominates but in peacetime it is, at best, a displaced stepchild. The Wehrmacht, in World War II, purposely downgraded its logistics to ensure the front line combat troops were staffed by the very best personnel. What R&D needs to investigate is the method by which logistics effectiveness, efficiency and mobility are enhanced to keep pace with a more mobile Army. While there are no breakthroughs apparent even on the distant horizon and logistics will continue to be hard work, investigation into the procedure, methods and mechanics of how we effect logistics will prove useful. For example, improving the reliability of our logistical transport equipment, reducing in weight and volume what must be transported and pointing more towards disposable weapons are ways in which our ability to sustain and support will increase with our requirements.

Finally, R&D efforts must continue reducing, where feasible, reliance on people. Whether or not "robotics" or really smart weapons will ever replace soldiers in the field is moot. But, a reduction in personnel requirements in one area permits increases in personnel strength at more critical points. Conceptually, the 20,000 or 30,000 front line soldier shortfall in Europe might be alleviated if that number of personnel could be relieved of their duties elsewhere by R&D or technological innovation and reassigned to more combat related duties. In the past, this "tooth to tail" ratio has swung towards "teeth" often at the expense of "tail." The function of technology is to permit that swing to
favor "tooth" but not at the expense, and given future needs, probably only if we can increase the effectiveness of "tail."

The Army of 1990-2000 in Europe

In summary, the conclusions of this study, based on future projections of trends concerning the U.S.-Soviet and NATO interactions point towards the following:

- U.S. Army units in Europe of about 200,000-300,000 troops organized around a five corps concept of heavy, mobile capability.

- U.S. Army doctrine being focused on the Army in Europe as a "strategic deterrent" which, at the minimum, will severely damage, disrupt or delay any armed Soviet incursion into Europe to the point where the Soviets will find aggression completely unacceptable.

- These units will be capable of being deployed elsewhere, to areas outside Europe. In that event or in war, the primary purpose of Army reserves would be to reinforce Europe.

- The U.S. Army maneuver unit will be based on highly decentralized control. About half the maneuver brigades will be rotated into Europe for a year's tour. Their training and readiness will be of a wartime standard.

- Deep attack will receive special emphasis, supported, of course, by necessary tactical air.
Improvements in tactical nuclear weapons will be slight; however, needed emphasis in nuclear, biological and chemical war will have occurred.

The high technology and Division 86 efforts will provide an Army with far greater and more ready combat capability even though offsets will have taken place in force structure reductions.

Above all, the Army of the 1990s in Europe will base its credibility on the combination of readiness and high technology weapons and C3I systems. Those advantages must be exploited if strategic deterrence is to be maintained in Europe.

The Army of 1990-2000 in Europe: Case II

The issue of how well the Army structure recommended in Army 2000 will fare in other possible futures is important. Case II posited a situation in Europe in which conditions became more favorably disposed towards the U.S. In other words, NATO was strengthened politically and, presumably, militarily. As noted, the primary cause of this was U.S. initiatives as the other possibilities were either too remote or too unclear in their effects to produce a stronger NATO.

It would seem that a vigorous NATO would profit from a strategic deterrent posture in Europe underwritten by fewer but more capable forces. The point is that a strengthened NATO would be more sensitive to resource than manpower increases provided the aura of crisis was not present. Thus, the direction posited by this study would generally be enhanced by a strengthened NATO.
On the Soviet side, however, the response would probably be several-fold. First, increase in political-diplomatic efforts to prevent encirclement would be obvious. Second, continued military expenditures would be the order of the day. Third, reliance on integration of nuclear weapons would increase so as to overcome NATO's increased conventional capability. This would probably drive the threshold of war in Europe even higher (even less probable) but might encourage more Soviet activity outside of Europe to compensate for this shift in the political balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The impact on Arms Reduction Talks, both strategic and theater, is uncertain and cannot be predicted.

The Army in 1990–2000 in Europe: Case III

Case III posited a deterioration in NATO and in the U.S. position in Europe. The causes, as noted, would be a combination of increasing U.S.–NATO friction and a greater introspection of the part of our allies to concern themselves with internal matters. Provided we still maintained our posture in Europe as described, despite obvious pressures from the U.S. public to retract from Europe and surely a decline in our readiness due to similar factors including a reluctance to expend resources for naught, the Army structure recommended by this study may be the only way to face that condition.

Soviet concerns would probably be focused on maintaining a weakened NATO. However, a U.S. capability to destroy, disrupt or discourage Soviet military attack under those conditions would place too great a cost on a Soviet decision to start a conflict.
Thus, deterrence would certainly be reinforced even though the military balance between NATO and the Pact would swing in their favor. Consequently, while we would desperately not wish that condition to occur, should it happen, our only response, or at least our most effective and affordable one is to base Army requirements on a strategic deterrent role.

Army Requirements in Europe: Final Note

Despite all the constraints facing us, we can make more effective use of the Army in Europe in 1990-2000 provided we pattern that Army as a strategic deterrent in which capabilities of higher technology and, especially, immediate readiness enable the Army to strike deeply delaying, disrupting or destroying a significant part of any Soviet attack. Rather than sheer numbers to win everywhere in Europe which we alone cannot afford nor which technological breakthroughs cannot produce, we need to focus our efforts on building an Army which is a strategic deterrent. More capable and better trained than today, that Army will provide the stability in Europe mandated by our most vital interests.
1. Prolonged high level of perceived threat can also result in catatonic paralysis. See below


3. Political and economic differences among the Allies are intensifying with substantial recrimination from all sides about who is doing enough; on unequal benefits from procurement programs; on conscription vs. volunteer forces, and so on.


7. See Karl Kaiser op. cit.


10. Nunn, op. cit.


12. In fact, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Federal Republic, has publicly advocated mandatory inclusion of basic concepts of strategy in school and university programs.


15. Edward Luttwak, who regards the no first use proposal as "colosally insane," suggests, "If we have a supreme court to look after the Constitution, we ought in my view have a Supreme National Council to look after nuclear weapons." Newsweek, April 26, 1982, p. 29.

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