STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY TO THE YEAR 2000
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STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY

TO THE YEAR 2000

THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT TO THE YEAR 2000

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Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000: The World Environment to the Year 2000

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Provides global and regional requirements which will contribute to development of Army long-range doctrine, manning, force design and materiel requirements. Determines a range of environments which will likely confront the nation and the Army and identifies factors that will have major implications for the Army. Develops Army-wide strategic requirements and recommends general directions that the Army can take to meet strategic requirements. This paper is a broad overview based on the conclusions of the supporting papers.
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OVERVIEW

The international system may be defined as the constantly evolving infrastructure of bilateral and multilateral arrangements by which the nations of the world seek to protect themselves. Most of these groupings have loftier common goals, such as the preservation of peace and the promotion of prosperity, but the deeper motives of the individual members are usually more parochial and related to their self-preservation in a dangerous and often violent world. Self-preservation, of course, transcends mere physical defense. Groupings which strike at the root causes of conflict, e.g., economic and social imbalances, are as important to world tranquillity as are mutual security arrangements aimed at a balance of power between antagonistic political systems.

This paper will first examine the frailties of the existing international system from a world-wide perspective and the manner in which the Soviet camp, which we see as bent on changing the system to serve its global grand strategy, will exploit those frailties in the 1990s. Still from a world-wide perspective, we will comment briefly on the capacity of major components of the system to meet the Soviet challenge. Finally, the main body of this paper will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the system and how it will function under alternative scenarios of conflict in each of the five regions of the world delineated for this Army 2000 study.

The fundamental underlying assumption of the study is that the Soviets will challenge the system where it is weakest. What
does that imply for the focus and nature of conflict in the
1990s?

The good news is that World War III is unlikely to break out
in this century. Nobody wants it, the strategic balance is too
even, and the Soviets see too many opportunities to improve their
position in the Third World without sparking superpower conflict.

The bad news is that the Third World has never been more
vulnerable to competitive superpower blandishment. High oil
prices, a recessed market for raw materials, and a crushing debt
service burden have badly squeezed most less developed countries
(LDC's). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries, and especially the United States, are
preoccupied with their own economic problems, and seem to have
put North-South relations on the back burner. Third World ex-
perimentation with radical socialism has generally proved a
costly failure, but now some LDC's are too weak to have entice
new private capital. Who will invest in what appears to be an
economic disaster? So the explosive gap between the rich and
poor nations continues to expand.

This poverty problem is most acute in Black Africa, Latin
America and parts of South Asia, notably in Bangladesh. There,
economic prostration is compounded by a growing population-
resource imbalance. Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil have serious
foreign debt problems which limit their flexibility in addressing
pressing social needs. Soviet proxy parties, usually with Cuban
help, have actually assumed power in Ethiopia, Benin, Angola,
Mozambique and Nicaragua, and virtually every country in these
regions has overt or covert communist organizations seeking to
use economic desperation and political chaos as springboards to political control.

Whether Israel and its Arab neighbors will be able to find a formula for enduring peace over the ashes of Lebanon remains to be seen. It will take more political will than either side has shown to date. But now a new and volatile ingredient has been added to the Near Eastern brew: Islamic fundamentalism. Overlaid on an existing array of geopolitical tensions in the Moslem world, this Khomeini-inspired revival of holy war among the sects of Islam bears the seeds of both international and internal violence from Morocco to Indonesia. Most vulnerable are the princely regimes of the oil rich states on the Arabian Peninsula, whose opulent western life style so infuriates the Shi'ite imams. If they should fall, the availability of Mideast oil to the West will be more tenuous and the voices of Arab moderation on the Israeli issue will be stilled.

In East Asia, the situation is better, but not much. Here, after all, is the home turf of Moscow's most powerful proxies - North Korea and Vietnam - both eager to expand their turf by military force, if they can. There are incipient succession crises in South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, and all the Southeast Asian countries have economic, demographic and ethnic tensions that are currently exacerbated by the global recession. The independence of Hong Kong as a dynamic trade, financial, and industrial center may not survive the century. The Soviet Union, also an East Asian power, is expanding its already substantial
naval presence in the region, with the help of Vietnamese bases. Nevertheless, there are positive signs:

- The Korean situation remains a standoff, albeit fragile, and despite the fact that North Korea's military strength is growing faster than the South Korea's.

- The Chinese leadership, though distancing itself from both superpowers, remains "pragmatic", anti-Soviet, anti-Vietnamese, and reasonably patient about Taiwan.

- The Vietnamese are hard-pressed in Kampuchea by well-financed guerrilla armies, both communist and non-communist. The danger to Thailand has receded.

- The Japanese appear to be moving toward some strengthening of their national defense effort. Their increasingly constructive economic relationship with China and the ASEAN countries is also a stabilizing force in that region.

The U.S.S.R. will remain America's main adversary in the 1990s, and will be directly or indirectly responsible for most conflict throughout the world. Where conflict is not fundamentally a manifestation of the superpower confrontation (e.g. Arab-Israeli tensions and irredentism in South America), the Soviets may still seek to exploit each situation it to serve their global grand strategy.

The main thrust of this study is that rough parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will obviate a Soviet attack in Central Europe, i.e., World War III, during this century. Thus what conflict erupts will emerge in the Third World. The NATO
Alliance is largely irrelevant in that world. Some of its members may cooperate with us in peacekeeping efforts there if their own national interests are at risk, but this will be rare and can never be assumed.

Whether we choose to intervene militarily in a Third World conflict will depend on the extent to which U.S. vital interests are threatened. Not all threats to U.S. interests will arise from the Soviet grand strategy, but when they do, it adds a new dimension to the contingency. Thus, in a conflict between two powers, friendly to us, over a strategically vital island, for example, we might offer our services as mediator. We might even send in a force to evacuate American citizens. But we would rarely participate in the conflict on one side against the other. On the other hand, if Nicaragua, a presumed Soviet surrogate, should move against Costa Rica, we could reasonably judge it as part of a longer range Soviet strategy to neutralize the Panama Canal. In such a case, active U.S. intervention in support of Costa Rica would be indicated.

It is therefore essential that both our political leadership and our military planners have a solid understanding of the Soviet grand strategy in the Third World, to the extent that one exists. This is necessarily conjectural, but it can be extrapolated to some degree from such indicators as the deployment of Soviet and Soviet proxy forces and the direction of Soviet economic and military aid.

An appreciation of Soviet strategy must start from one central fact: The overriding objective of every Soviet regime
since Lenin has been the preservation of the Soviet Communist system. The first corollary of this is that serious internal debate over possible alternative systems cannot be tolerated. The second corollary is that the Soviet Union must be surrounded as far as possible by a buffer of states with equally inflexible Communist regimes subservient to Moscow. Hence the invasion of Afghanistan, the suppression of Solidarity in Poland, Soviet paranoia about the Chinese heresy, and the enforced political neutralization of democratic Finland. A third corollary in the Soviet mind is the need to confront, deter, and if possible, disintegrate all hostile alliances.

The fourth corollary, less compelling than the other three but still important to the long-term survival of Soviet Communism, is the need to propagate Communism, or at least militant neutralism, in the Third World. This Third World goal is motivated less by missionary zeal than by a desire to engage proxy states on the Soviet side of the superpower struggle and to deprive the hostile West of key raw materials and strategic geography. It also has the incidental, but highly useful, effect of neutralizing the UN and certain regional international groupings as factors in the East-West confrontation.

Corollary 1, the suppression of internal debate, will certainly be pursued in the 1990s. As a practical matter, this is beyond our capacity to prevent, though recent satellite technology may make it possible to force provocative Western ideas through the Iron Curtain. This is not, however, an Army responsibility.
Corollary 2, the domination of buffer states, will be a major preoccupation for the Kremlin in the 1990s. Continued repression in East Europe can be assumed and the Russians are already trying to reverse the defection of China, both by diplomatic blandishments and by the projection of enveloping power in East Asia directly and through proxies. Nurturing Soviet/Chinese hostility is outside the Army's terms of reference, but the Army's presence in South Korea plays a vital role in containing the envelopment.

Corollary 3, the defanging of hostile alliances, is proceeding apace against NATO and the OAS, and will continue on the Kremlin's agenda for the 1990s. U.S. Army deterrent firepower in Central Europe is a unifying force, but alliance cohesion is basically a political and diplomatic challenge.

Corollary 4, communizing or neutralizing the Third World, will be high on the Soviet agenda in the 1990s. The wide spectrum of low to medium intensity conflict foreseen for the 1990s in this study is largely a reflection of this segment of Soviet grand strategy. Violence in the Third World is seen by Moscow not only as a means to the end of overthrowing anti-Soviet governments by force, but also as an end in itself. Even if anti-Soviet governments can succeed in containing insurgency, the very presence of conflict discourages fixed investment and thus economic development. It dramatizes and provides a focus for popular discontent. It forces target governments to be more authoritarian, thus engendering new discontent. It consumes budgetary resources in the target country which might otherwise be devoted to essential social progress. It interdicts free
world access to strategic resources and geography. In this Soviet strategy of mischief-making in the Third World, we can be reasonably confident that Soviet power, *per se*, will rarely if ever, be directly applied. That would risk a direct conflict with the United States for which the U.S.S.R. is not yet prepared. Moscow will prefer to act through proxies, either communist states like Cuba and Vietnam or communist-supported subversion movements. If the United States responds prematurely, unnecessarily, or ineptly with its own direct power, we will lose points in the continuing East-West competition for Third World "hearts and minds". We must seek to support, advise and encourage our friends and allies under Soviet and Soviet proxy pressure, inserting direct power only if and when vital U.S. interests hang in the balance.

This, then, is the Soviet strategic challenge to American military planners in the 1990s. It is not a localized but a global challenge. It will be posed in every continent.

We cannot hope for improvement in the international system before the year 2000. Indeed the present "system" (the word seems a misnomer) looks increasingly inadequate to meet the emerging challenges.

In a scenario of Third World conflict ignited by economic desperation, the most relevant system is the so-called North-South dialogue, i.e., the relationship between the developed world, represented by the OECD, and the developing world represented usually by the "group of 77." This dialogue is not going well. In the simplest possible terms, the group of 77 wants a
"New Economic Order", featured by massive transfers of OECD country resources, guaranteed high prices for their raw materials, and preferential access to OECD markets for their manufactured products -- all without OECD interference in the LDC politico-economic policy process. This will probably not happen in this century, at least on the scale needed. The developed countries are too preoccupied with their own survival in the inflation-ridden nuclear world.

The only hope for the kind of resource transfer the group of 77 demands appears to lie in global disarmament and stable economic growth in the developed countries. Otherwise the resources will simply not be available. Though the global economy will probably rise out of the current recession, and the disarmament dialogue may bring some minor achievement, it is unlikely that real breakthroughs will be recorded in time to ease Third World problems in the 1990s.

The United Nations system, which seeks to keep the peace through a multilateral consensus backed, where necessary, by a multilateral military force, appears increasingly ineffective. Superpower confrontation across the Security Council table renders that body impotent on the basic issues, and Third World politicization of the UN has had the same effect in the General Assembly. The UN can still serve a role in separating hostile forces in a static situation, as in Southern Lebanon, but it will be rare that a conflict in the 1990s will bring the necessary Security Council unanimity for a peacekeeping force.

That leaves us with the alliance system which, failing all else, seeks to keep the peace by ensuring a balance of power and
deterrence in a given world region. On the Western side, the major multinational alliances involving the U.S. are NATO, the OAS and ANZUS, but the U.S. also has bilateral alliances of varying specificity with countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Israel and a measure of implied commitment to other Asian and African countries receiving U.S. military assistance.

The NATO alliance is clearly the most important; it keeps the Warsaw Pact at bay in Central Europe. Its conventional vulnerability and its disarray on the tactical nuclear issue are well-known to Army planners. It is enough to say here that it will be under serious centrifugal pressure in the 1990s, assiduously fostered by Soviet diplomacy. European and Canadian perceptions of vacillation in Washington between extremes of detente and confrontation will help the Russians. The probability is that the alliance will lose some of its cohesion. There will be a tendency for the European members to group around poles (e.g., U.S., UK, FRG, and France) with differing approaches to the East-West relationship. U.S. influence will be a function of the plausibility of its strategic umbrella and its military presence in Europe. In this atmosphere, the likelihood of an expansion of NATO's terms of reference to incorporate Southwest Asia is small.

The OAS is also fragmented by regional animosities and by differing perceptions of threat. Most Latin Americans cannot understand why Washington does not seek more actively to woo Cuba and Nicaragua from the Soviet embrace, which they consider a
viable course. We can expect some OAS support in smothering open international aggression, but less in suppressing internal subversion by avowedly nationalist factions.

The Asian alliances are in better shape and may actually become more potent and cohesive in the 1990s if the communist threat persists.

All the foregoing suggests that the international system in the 1990s will be structured essentially as it is today; but will be, if anything, more conducive to conflict and less effective in containing it. The most violence-prone regions will be Southwest Asia, the Caribbean basin, Southeast Asia and Black Africa, but U.S. and friendly deterrent pressure must be sustained against North Korea and Vietnam to keep their ambitions under control.

The ensuing regional analysis may appear imbalanced in terms of the amount of detail devoted to each region. It should be understood that this is a function of complexity, not importance.
Europe

Historical Precis: Essential to Understanding the 1990s.

Since its inception in 1949, NATO traditionally has had to confront a rather unique challenge. As an alliance, defensive in nature, it has had to provide a certain degree of protection for its member states from what was perceived to be the Soviet threat of overrunning Western Europe; but it also has had to do much more than that. NATO was supposed to repudiate the traditional norms of balance of power politics, for the Soviet Union was denied influence in West European capitals which was commensurate with its military, political and economic might as the greatest power on the Eurasian landmass. For the first time in history a distant power, the United States, was supposed to have its power permanently committed and determine the equilibrium in a territory thousands of miles away from its shores. The unique nature of these developments stemmed from several factors. First, the European powers were laid economically and militarily prostrate after the end of the Second World War and only American atomic, political and economic might could offset their combined geopolitical weakness. Furthermore, the danger of Soviet expansionism seemed clear and imminent enough to unite the diverse West European nations despite nationalist, cultural and political differences. To an extent, the association was eased by the fact that the U.S. assumed a predominant role in the alliance, thus not coercing the European nations into choosing a leader from amongst themselves -- a process which could have easily become suicidal for the alliance.
Over time the alliance has undergone a variety of both internal and external changes. Most importantly, the external environment in which the alliance has had to operate has changed dramatically. The most significant changes have had to do with the European reappraisal of the Soviet threat, the shift in the strategic nuclear balance and the profound transmogrification in the nature of the international system. The previous divisive issues such as the Suez crisis, the Multilateral Force debate, the French withdrawal from NATO's military organization etc., have shaken the delicate structure of the alliance, but have not impinged upon either the basic rationale for the alliance's existence or its fundamental backbone -- the credibility of American extended deterrence against Soviet imperialism in Europe.

From NATO's inception, the West Europeans perceived U.S. strategic nuclear power as the only suitable counterweight to geopolitical asymmetries favoring the Warsaw Pact. Lacking the operational depth and outclassed in conventional military power, the rimland powers of Western Europe had to rely on American strategic-nuclear superiority to equalize the heartland power of the Soviet Union. However, there is inherent difficulty in permanently compensating for geopolitical asymmetries, especially since the American strategic edge has been long dissipated.

It would be one-sided and incorrect to claim that the evolution of the central strategic balance is solely responsible for present alliance difficulties. Countless other factors such as the loss of American economic preeminence, divergent views on North-South issues, as well as the differing perspectives on how
to resolve regional crises in such areas as the Middle East, Latin America and Asia are also relevant. In addition, the alliance is burdened with the out of phase swings in domestic moods on both sides of the Atlantic and genuine disagreements on the nature of the Soviet threat and how best to handle it. Nevertheless, all of these factors, important as they may be, pale in comparison with the significance of the European perception that the U.S. has lost its strategic nuclear superiority and has suffered a series of reverses, seriously weakening its overall power.

Throughout the alliance's lifespan, European anxiety has typically fluctuated between the two extremes. At times, the Europeans feared that the U.S. would drag them into an unwanted confrontation in the wrong place and at the wrong time. At other times, the Europeans were concerned lest the U.S. would fail to respond properly in a time of crisis. This failure to respond could have taken the form of either doing nothing on behalf of the Europeans in a genuine emergency or alternatively turning Europe into a nuclear free fire zone.

Curiously enough, all of these anxieties now seem to exist simultaneously. Given the mutually contradictory nature of European concerns, there is no single policy which the U.S. can adopt to diminish them across the board. It is symbolic of NATO's present maladies that the German Chancellor has been on both sides of the tactical nuclear weapon issue in the course of four years.
To be sure, the whole philosophical controversy surrounding European security is not new. In essence, the alliance never fully recovered from the trauma of flexible response. The adoption of MC 14/3 concealed a fundamental ambiguity that was actually reflective of the more fundamental difference in the security dilemmas facing the Europeans and the Americans. For the Europeans, the failure of deterrence represented a total and absolute loss. For the U.S., Europe, however strategically important, is only the first line of defense. Therefore, the Americans always sought to introduce as many intermediate stages as possible between the outbreak of hostilities in Europe and the initiation of an all-out strategic exchange. The U.S. emphasized limited nuclear war in the early 60s when overwhelming American strategic superiority made the option of conflict escalation quite unappealing for Soviet decision-makers, and thus provided a good chance of observing limitations in the nuclear exchange. Even though the American strategic surplus has long been dissipated, the U.S. retains an interest in waging limited nuclear war, if deterrence in Europe fails. Developments in warhead design, accuracy, and new delivery means, which permit the execution of extensive strategic operations without resorting to central strategic systems (i.e. LRTNF), make limited nuclear war practically easier to conduct than ever before. Thus, the U.S. emphasis on the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war in Europe is predicated on both the U.S. desire to avoid subjecting the American homeland to the fierce destruction of a general nuclear war for as long as possible, and the increase in practical feasibility of waging nuclear conflict below the
apocalyptic level. Furthermore, it is an American view that the introduction of valid options between the conventional level and general nuclear level is likely to enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrence overall, since in the era of nuclear parity the credibility of an immediate all-out nuclear response to a non-nuclear aggression is inherently implausible.

The general opinion of the European allies is rather different. They are concerned about the weakening of overall deterrence as a result of the limited nuclear war posture, for according to European strategies the risk to the Soviets of initiating an aggression would be significantly reduced if the all-out strategic response against the Soviet Union is ruled out as an immediate prospect. The Soviets might decide that if limited nuclear war were to become too onerous, they could always back out since a limited nuclear war offers this option. However, given the geographic predicament of Europe, most European strategists are not content with the prospect of the U.S. and the Soviet Union reaching a nuclear ceasefire over the ashes of a destroyed Europe. In fact, given the degree of urbanization in Western Europe, not only a limited nuclear war but even a prolonged conventional conflict is likely to be extremely destructive. Thus, in the opinion of our West European allies, the nature of linkage of U.S. strategic forces should be unmistakably lucid to the Soviet Union, the nuclear firebreak may be ambiguous but should be kept quite low and quick escalation should replace a limited war posture.
The NATO strategy has always been sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate both American and European viewpoints. However, one might question the value of deliberate ambiguity in the current environment. It is important to realize that the essential security dilemma of deterrence vs. defense is not new. In fact, as many commentators point out, it is as old as the alliance itself. Nevertheless, one cannot find much comfort in this fact. Since we live in a subjective world, the appearances and perceptions frequently matter as much or even more than reality. Thus, the change in the European perceptions of NATO's security dilemma is crucial. What is new about the situation is that instead of a few strategic cogniscenti arguing about strategic-nuclear issues amongst themselves, the broad masses are zeroing in on the same topic. This popularization of NATO's problem does not augur well for NATO's integrity. Furthermore the realization of the unsatisfactory state of current European defense has not been translatable into a new defense consensus. Any large scale improvement in European defenses is ruled out, since the European governments dare not dismantle their welfare programs and do not wish to upset the "delicate" structure of Eurocentric detente to which they have grown increasingly attached. Thus paradoxically, NATO, while clearly acknowledging the unsatisfactory state of its current doctrine and posture, is unlikely to implement any major changes. While some military improvements might take place, the posture of stagnation is the most likely prognosis for the next 20 years.
Central and Northern Europe: Conflict Potential

Basically, three alternative conflict scenarios can be envisioned. All of these scenarios will trigger essentially identical NATO responses, since all politics in Northern and Central Europe are likely to be conducted in the setting of domestic "softness." The tide of consumerism will increase even further and the anti-American, anti-nuclear, anti-defense sentiments will be shared by a large minority of the European population. The majority, while not subscribing to these extreme views, will be extremely apathetic and unwilling to sanction any major changes in domestic priorities. The lingering economic difficulties will provide West European governments with a convenient excuse to continue their present or slightly increased defense spending levels. Politically, neither the West Germans, the French, the British nor any of the North European governments are likely to act from a position of domestic strength in the 1980s or 1990s. This implies first and foremost that they will be unable to effect any drastic policy changes, even if they are convinced of their desirability.

As opposed to the Third World, the future European scenarios are finite in number and much more predictable, given the relatively structured nature of European conflict. All three scenarios discussed basically depend upon Soviet policies in the area, with little dependence upon U.S. actions and little difference in European responses.

Future of Increased Tension. Such a scenario will be triggered if an outright Soviet repression befalls Eastern Europe. The most immediate candidate for such Soviet treatment
is Poland, but given the general conditions in Eastern Europe, a number of other candidates can emerge in the 1990s, including East Germany.

The bloody repression in Eastern Europe, circa Hungary 1956, will obviously affect Western European governments. Embargoes against the Eastern bloc might be introduced, strong rhetoric will be utilized and modest increases in defense effort will follow. Yet, no conceivable Soviet activity in Eastern Europe is likely to produce a permanent abrogation of Eurocentric detente or a major bolstering of European defenses. Under the scenario of increased tensions the Europeans might be more willing for the time being to follow the U.S. "hard" line, but this spirit of Atlantic harmony is unlikely to endure.

Future of Decreased Tension. To promote their goal of Eurocentric detente, the Soviets might go beyond negative inducements such as threats, coercion and blackmail. In fact, there are various means by which the Soviets may earn Western Europe's goodwill. The Soviets recognize the significance which the West Europeans attach to Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe. Thus, while the Europeans are prone to minimize the importance of Afghanistan, an outright Soviet invasion of Poland or any other East European country is likely to trigger public indignation and worsen Soviet/European relations. Conversely, Soviet restraint is likely to be greeted by the West Europeans as a tangible proof of the viability of Eurocentric detente. In fact, a number of Europeans have claimed soto voce that Soviet "patience" in
dealing with Poland is a sign of Soviet moderation, induced by Soviet adherence to detente.

The Soviets also have at their disposal a number of positive, direct inducements in their dealings with Western Europe. These inducements entail economic, political and military tradeoffs.

Economically, West European countries welcome the opportunity to export to the Eastern bloc as it has provided a multitude of jobs. The Soviets are also attempting to supplement their trade relationship by encouraging the West Europeans to share energy resources with the Soviet Union.

Politically, the Soviets might be willing to gradually decrease the level of their control in Eastern Europe and permit greater inter-European integration. Given the fact that the current problems in Eastern Europe are not resolvable by military solutions, the Soviets might not object to West Europeans providing the bulk of economic aid to Eastern Europe even if they have to compensate for it by permitting closer contacts between East and West Europe. Under this scenario the Soviets will press for the neutralization of Western Europe, while indicating that a weakening of European-American ties need not impair the European way of life. The Soviets will strive to explain that they do not wish to alter domestic aspects of European life.

To reassure the Europeans, the Soviets might demonstrate some signs of moderation in the disarmament talks. They can also show that they are not necessarily adverse to improvements in indigenous West European military capabilities. For example the Soviets vigorously protested the American decision to deploy the
neutron bomb, but manifested considerable restraint (by Soviet standards) in reacting to the similar French decision.

If the Soviets should decide to pursue a course of relaxing their control over Eastern Europe, at least cosmetically, it will be a long-term process. Nevertheless by the year 2000 enough progress can be made to seriously impair the fabric of European-American cooperation.

NATO, while still formally existing, will have lost much of its raison d'être and its very survival will depend upon an American willingness to accommodate European desires.

Whether the Soviets would prefer a future of increased or decreased tensions would essentially depend upon the willpower and daring of the new Soviet leadership. The second course, while risky in some respects, might look attractive if the Polish experience is duplicated in another East European country by the late 80s.

More of the Same. This scenario entails neither renewed Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, nor a relaxed Soviet control. In essence, it features a "muddle through" policy. This may look attractive to the conservative Soviet leadership, yet the very real question remains whether developments in Eastern Europe would permit Moscow to practice such a policy in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, if such a policy is pursued, European-American relations and the health of NATO will fluctuate between moderate improvements and moderate downturns. Under any of the three scenarios the American hopes for extending NATO's sphere of
responsibility or formalizing the coordination of Western European and American foreign and economic policies are unlikely to be realized. Moreover, the extent of Soviet aggressiveness in the Third World is unlikely to seriously influence West European attitudes. In essence, this effectively insulates Eurocentric detente from Soviet/American confrontation in other areas.

Northern and Central Europe: Military Environment

It may appear paradoxical that the military dimensions of the European balance appear to be largely independent of the political conflict scenarios outlined above. Nevertheless, this tentative conclusion is based on the fact that under all three scenarios the extent of NATO's defense effort will vary only marginally, and the Soviet buildup will continue essentially unabated.

Thus in the 1980s and 1990s we can continue to expect a steady growth in Soviet theater nuclear capabilities, including the continuing modernization of MR/IRBMs, improvements in battlefield nuclear systems, the enhancement of nuclear capable artillery and improvements in the Soviet conventional posture. The major expansion of Soviet naval power along the northern flank will also ensue. The U.S. undoubtedly will continue to devote a major share of its defense resources to NATO-related contingencies. This share, predominant now, might decline as a result of systematic domestic debate on a suitable national strategy. However, the U.S. commitment to Europe has influenced the American military establishment to a much greater extent than a simple examination of the defense budget might suggest. The
U.S. Army in particular, since the end of World War II, has been largely configured, trained and optimized to fight on the European battlefield.

For the remaining 1980s and for the 1990s, barring a limited or general nuclear war due to miscalculation or as a result of acute Soviet domestic instability (either in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union proper) the probability of a conflict in Europe will be very low. Given the generally glum nature of projected Third World political scenarios, the U.S. cannot safely place all its eggs in the NATO basket. Insofar as the army is concerned, this implies greater attention to other areas of responsibility, with concomitant changes in force structure, doctrine and contingency planning. The U.S. cannot permit any dramatic changes in its relations with the Western Europeans, but clearly it cannot reestablish the military balance in Europe on its own, given the projected lackluster European performance.

Southern Europe: Conflict Potential

This sub-area is discussed separately from Northern and Central Europe, since its regional dynamics present a peculiar set of problems.

The following assumptions can be tentatively made about the prevailing political atmosphere in Southern Europe in the 1980s and beyond.

The perception of the Soviet menace as a main regional security concern will decline dramatically. The growing predominance of domestic problems over external ones, with
traditional security concerns receding into the background, is likely to accelerate. In general, Southern Europe will continue to lie somewhere between the developing and industrial worlds. This implies that problems of domestic instability in such countries as Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal can be severe enough to seriously affect their respective external policies and yet no major change in superpower alignment can be expected.

The extent of American control over the actions of the regional powers is likely to decline. Turkey, while retaining basically a pro-Western orientation, will be governed by an uneasy alliance of the military and reeducated younger politicians. It is likely to pay increasing attention to its position in the Islamic world and maintain correct relations with Russia. The availability of U.S. economic and military aid will improve U.S.-Turkish relations, but the return to the days when Turkey was a faithful stalwart of the Atlantic alliance is unlikely. Turkey, in particular, would be very sensitive to the possible use of its military facilities for American actions outside of Europe, and the U.S. cannot count on easy Turkish acquiescence to U.S. requests. The Turks did agree on October, 1982 to the construction of third NATO airbase in Eastern Turkey, this one at Mus about 500 miles from Tehran, but denied us the right to use it for the RDJTF.

Greece may be expected to continue its present role as the black sheep of the Southern flank. In the 1990s, it might slip even further toward a leftist and anti-American posture if Papandreou or his supporters retain power. Greece would continue to view Turkey rather than the U.S.S.R. as the main threat to its
security. The Turkish military presence in Cyprus, which blocks reunification of the island and eventual "enosis" with Greece, is especially galling to Athens. The possibility that Greece might follow the French example and withdraw from NATO's military structure cannot be excluded, although Papandreou announced on October 15, 1982, that he would defer any drastic moves on the NATO issue on the ostensible ground that he still needed U.S. and West German arms to build up Greek defenses against Turkey. Under the most likely scenario Greece will remain in NATO, since it perceives its NATO membership as the best possible guarantee against Turkish "aggression." Similarly, despite its leftist rhetoric, Greece is unlikely to move into the Soviet orbit.

In Spain, under the more optimistic scenario, Basque terrorism and domestic instability will diminish. In fact, Spain's entry into NATO can be expected to diminish the chances for a possible military putsch. Under a more pessimistic scenario, instability and terrorism will run high, paralyzing Spain's ability to provide a meaningful contribution to NATO. The Spanish Socialist Party, which is ambivalent about NATO, will probably be in power for much of the rest of this decade, if not longer.

Italy and Portugal are unlikely to undergo any major changes, be it internal or external, by the year 2000. Italy, in fact, despite having one of the weakest governments in Europe, will continue to successfully insulate its defense policy from domestic events.
The potential for conflict on the Southern flank in the next 20 years is likely to be low to moderate. Depending upon the domestic developments in Greece and Turkey, a new outbreak of hostilities cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, neither the Greek-Turkish confrontation, nor the intrastate violence in various Southern flank countries is likely to significantly change the area's political landscape.

Southern Europe: Military Environment

By the year 2000, the balance on the Southern flank will be further tilted in the Soviet favor. The Soviets are likely to augment their naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and dramatically increase the capability of their naval air power. The large scale deployment of Backfires with the Soviet Black Sea Fleet can be confidently expected by the late 1980s. Another important development that will bear on the military balance in the Southern flank is the continuing expansion and modernization of Soviet land and air forces. This will serve to maintain and enhance both a numerical and technological advantage of Soviet forces. For example, in northern Greece and Turkish Thrace, the Warsaw Pact/NATO division ratio is likely to further tilt in the Pact's favor. Further East, Soviet forces stationed in the Caucasus and oriented towards Turkey will attain an enhanced air mobile capability by the 1990s, which along with other technological advances, could change the character of war in the area to NATO's disadvantage.

NATO member countries in the area will continue to possess large manpower pools, but will suffer from lack of adequate
training and equipment obsolescence. U.S. aid will be clearly inadequate to implement large-scale modernization of Greek and Turkish forces. The situation might be partially offset if the U.S. decides to increase its allocation of airpower and naval assets in the area. However, the probability of such force augmentation appears slim given other pressing military priorities.
EAST ASIA AND WESTERN PACIFIC BASIN

Overview

This area includes the Pacific islands and insular states west of the international date line and the land masses in or contiguous to the Pacific Ocean from the Bering Strait through Thailand. U.S. vital interests in the area include the territorial integrity of our East Asian allies (South Korea, Japan and the Philippines) and our Pacific Islands and the maintenance of base rights and other facilities necessary to ensure free U.S. access to the natural resources and strategic air and waterways of the region.

Given the cultural, ethnic and geographic heterogeneity of the Pacific Basin countries it is hardly possible to come up with a comprehensive overview of the area as a whole. However, before examining the conflict potential and military environment of the Pacific Basin's key states, several brief observations can be made.

First, a large number of the area's states are essentially Third World countries which will continue to experience strong demographic pressures. Therefore, accelerated economic development continues to be a must, though only a few countries in the area possess sufficient economic infrastructure, skilled labor, and raw materials to sustain an impressive rate of economic growth. They will need external aid and investment.

Second, a number of the area's states, presently characterized by ethnic and communal heterogeneity, will face severe internal tensions. Such developments as the resurgence of militant Islamic fundamentalism in some of the area's countries
will further contribute to these tensions.

Third, in the next 20 years many Pacific Basin countries will experience leadership succession problems, endemic to poorly institutionalized political systems. Economic problems may result in the accession to power by radical regimes.

Fourth, the existing territorial disputes and resource rivalry will be further intensified in the 1990s.

Fifth, the area will continue to suffer from the destabilizing and expansionist policies conducted by the Soviet Union, North Korea and Vietnam with their de-facto vassal states of Laos and Kampuchea.

Overall, in the next 20 years the Pacific Basin will present a rich menu of conflict choices, ranging from conventional warfare between pro-West and pro-Soviet governments (e.g., Vietnam and Thailand) to internal subversion and counterinsurgency operations. Many of these potential conflicts have important implications for U.S. vital interests and may require some form of American military response.

**Philippines**

The availability of military facilities in the Philippines (primarily consisting of Subic Bay Naval Base – 7th fleet and Clark Air Force Base – 13th Air Force) significantly enhances American projection capabilities in the Pacific Basin. Conversely, the loss of these facilities will result in the major degradation in American military power in the area. Moreover, the U.S. presence in the Philippines has major political value,
quite independent of its military importance. A U.S. departure from the Philippines would be widely interpreted as a sign of major U.S. disengagement from the Pacific, resulting in the significant increase in the area's instability trends.

The original 1947 bases agreement will expire in 1991 and after that date each party is free to terminate its obligation on a one year notice. The agreement was amended in 1979, recognizing the immediate Philippine sovereignty over all U.S. military facilities. The 1979 amendment also established a 1984 review of the entire agreement.

The current prospects of losing access to our Philippine bases appear quite slim. The decisive determinant will be the attitude of the Philippine government. In the next 20 years (and probably in the next 10 years), the Philippine political leadership is certain to change. Following Marcos' death or departure from office an uncertain succession struggle would be played out against the backdrop of sluggish economic growth and the continuation of two major insurgencies (Muslim and communist).

While most of the likely Marcos successors are quite conservative and basically pro-American, the possibility of chaos and a prolonged succession struggle cannot be excluded. Under these conditions, the U.S. must be prepared to use force to protect its bases in the Philippines from insurgency attack. On the other hand, the use of force to defy a Philippine government order to give up the bases is probably not a viable option. Thus we should have contingency plans for comparable alternative bases in the ASEAN region.
Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam

These three communist powers will continue to present the main threat to U.S. interests in the Pacific area. The Soviet Union already possesses a formidable capability to project power into Asia and the Pacific. This capability is expected to grow further by the year 2000. The Soviets presently deploy considerable naval and air forces in the Sea of Japan and in the East and South China Sea. The Soviet Pacific fleet is their largest and most modern. The Soviet air force in the Far East numbers over 2000 operational aircraft, including the latest Floggers B and D and Fencers. In addition a large component of Backfires and about 1/3 of the Soviet SS-20 inventory provide a major in-theater strategic capability. Soviet ground forces in the area number over 46 divisions (6 tank 40 motorized infantry) and are deployed primarily along the Sino-Soviet border. There are also large scale Soviet troop contingents on the occupied Kurile Islands, which are extensively fortified.

However, the tally of Soviet forces, impressive as it may be, does not sufficiently underscore the extreme importance which the Soviets attach to the Pacific region. A major organizational change in the Soviet Armed Forces, specifically designed to enhance Soviet capabilities in the Pacific Basin, is reported to have taken place.

Until recently, a Military District comprised the main organizational unit of the Soviet military establishment. The 16 military districts encompass geographically all of the Soviet Union. Military districts are geographical commands and most
military units and installations located within a particular military district are subordinate to its headquarters. In wartime, however, the main organizational unit of the Soviet armed forces would be called a Theater of Military Operations (TVD). A TVD is a geographical area within which Soviet armed forces are supposed to accomplish their "strategic missions", and it is comprised of one or several military districts. It appears from recent evidence that the Soviets have organized a Far Eastern TVD absorbing several existing military districts. The last time the Far Eastern TVD existed as a separate operational entity was from 1947 to 1953 (coincidental with the Korean War). The Soviet have thus activated a wartime management structure in peacetime primarily to facilitate the move from peace to war given vast differences and time constraints to imposed by geography.

In addition to the threat presented by the Soviet forces, the U.S. is confronted with two Soviet proxies -- North Korea and Vietnam.

The Korean peninsula represents a zone with high conflict potential in the 1990s. Several factors will determine the probability of such a conflict. First, South Korea may experience a new round of internal instability, reminiscent of turmoil following President Park's assassination. The current President Chun Doo Hwan, upon assumption of power in 1981, promised to step down in 1988. Hwan's voluntary departure may trigger an acute leadership crisis. Conversely, the failure to
carry out his pledge might result in popular discontent and an intensification of anti-governmental activities.

Second, the situation in North Korea itself may prove conducive to the initiation of aggression against the Republic of Korea. Kim Il-Song has been in power longer than any other contemporary communist leader. Unless heroic assumptions about his longevity are made, North Korea will face a succession struggle by the 1990s if not earlier. Succession struggles have almost invariably been tumultuous in communist-run systems. The North Korean situation will be all the more precarious, since Kim Il-Song has been grooming his son, Kim Chong-Il, as an heir apparent. Such a family dynasty is unprecedented in communist countries and is reported to have caused discontent among North Korean elites. Even if Kim Chong-Il succeeds in formally assuming power, he would have to deal with a powerful domestic opposition. Given the quasi-religious overtones of the unification question in North Korea, the temptation to attack the ROK might prove irresistible, especially against the possible background of political instability in South Korea. Clearly, an isolated attack against South Korea is not likely to succeed. However, if such an invasion is launched at a time when the U.S. is involved in another conflict (e.g., the Philippines, Southwest Asia or Central America); and if instead of direct attack along the Seoul corridors it takes the form of light infantry or terrorist infiltration along the entire DMZ, it has a good chance of destabilizing the ROK government.

It is presently hard to imagine Soviet acquiescence to such a scheme. Nevertheless, given the likely evolution of U.S.-
Soviet relations, the future Soviet leadership might be more receptive to such an idea. Moreover, despite the growing North Korean dependence on the Soviet Union (in the years ahead North Korea is likely to move closer to the U.S.S.R. and distance itself from the PRC) the North Korean government might be willing to act without soliciting Soviet approval.

Southeast Asia represents another regional theater with tremendous built-in conflict potential. In the last five years alone, the area has been rocked by two medium intensity conflicts—Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and the Sino-Vietnamese war. The aggressive and expansionist Vietnamese policies are likely to remain unchanged, providing the major source of conflict in the area.

Hanoi currently presides over a stagnating economy in which internal contradictions are barely held in check by a severely repressive and militaristic government. Nevertheless, it is likely to continue the struggle to fully integrate Laos and Kampuchea. Given the tremendous costs of the Kampuchean war, Hanoi will have a great incentive to strike at Thailand from time to time, in order to discourage its support of Kampuchean rebels. Undoubtedly the Vietnamese will also strive to support the longstanding Thai insurgency, directed by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). The flare-up of Thai insurgency in the next 20 years is a very likely prospect and Vietnamese border raids can easily grow into a full scale war with Thailand. The most likely Vietnamese scenario would be quick grab of a 5-10 kilometer-wide stretch of territory along the Thai-Vietnamese frontier. Without
substantial and swift American military support, and probably Chinese support as well -- in the form of diversionary activity on Vietnam's northern border -- Thailand could be easily dealt a demoralizing blow by the Vietnamese forces. Such an aggression, if unpunished, could weaken the will of ASEAN and force some of its members to seek accommodation with Hanoi.

It is arguable that Vietnam is too hard-pressed in Kampuchea and too worried about PRC retaliation across the border to risk a move on Thailand. That may be so. But it is a contingency which Thailand must address, preferably in consultation with the PRC, her ASEAN partners and the United States.

Japan, PRC and Taiwan

Japan has been the most important American ally in the Pacific and is likely to retain this role in the next 20 years.

The record of Japanese-American military cooperation, however, leaves much to be desired. Japan has consistently refused to increase its defense budget beyond 1 percent of GNP, pleading constitutional constraints and hostile public opinion. This rationale is not very persuasive and there is reason to believe that the Japanese government is moving toward a stronger defense posture.

Several factors are likely to precipitate a greater Japanese defense contribution in the future. First, Japan is keenly interested in the Korean peninsula's stability. Any signs of heightened tensions in this area are likely to increase Japanese apprehensions. Second, the evolving turmoil in East Asia threatens Japanese commercial interests who have opposed
accelerated rearmament, arguing that it would hurt the Japanese economy. However, with East Asia looming more important as a source of vital raw materials, as an export customer and as a locus for Japanese investment, Japan cannot remain indifferent to turmoil in such countries as Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines or South Korea. Given this congruence of commercial and military interests, the Japanese business community is now likely to argue for an enhanced defense effort.

Thus, in the next 20 years and starting perhaps in 1984, we may expect a significant upgrade of Japanese defense forces. Japan will assume a greater role in defending maritime lines of communication around Japanese islands and may potentially provide large-scale military assistance to select Pacific Basin countries. There is even a possibility of some relaxation in Japanese inhibitions against nuclear weapons.

The Peoples Republic of China will remain an important regional power in the Pacific Basin as well as a progressively growing global power. In the next 20 years China is likely to pursue a steady domestic course, characterized by leadership stability and a continuation of the "four modernizations." This course of action is expected to transform China, in the words of Party Chairman Hu Yaobang, into a "modern and powerful socialist country which is prosperous, highly democratic and culturally advanced." The "four modernizations" envisioned an orderly improvement of Chinese military capabilities, ruling out, however, the prospect of rapid military modernization. Yet,
the Chinese will continue to place strong emphasis on an accelerated strategic weapons program.

By the 1990s the Chinese will have a respectable strategic force, which, while clearly inferior to Soviet capabilities, would nevertheless exercise a powerful deterrent effect on Soviet actions. The Chinese also appear to be accelerating their naval investment. The expanded range of Chinese naval activities will include the Yellow, East and South China Seas.

Politically, China will continue to provide a strong counterweight to Vietnam, support the countries of ASEAN and oppose Soviet activities in Asia. A Sino-Soviet rapprochement, while possible, appears unlikely. In order for any meaningful improvement to take place, the Soviets must not only resolve bilateral Sino-Soviet problems, but also be willing to significantly moderate their support of the Vietnamese and keep North Korea in check.

The United States and the PRC have some highly important common strategic goals. We both seek to contain Soviet imperialism in Asia. We both want to keep the Vietnamese out of Thailand and to eject them from Laos and Kampuchea. We both aspire to a peaceful and developing Asia, though perhaps for different reasons. There is, and will remain, an ideological barrier between us that will preclude (at least from the PRC standpoint) a really close politico-military relationship, but that does not appear urgent as long as we are not working at cross purposes.

A more corrosive U.S./PRC issue is Taiwan, and it will remain so as long as we continue to provide military and other
support to that island. At some point we must decide between the two Chinas. Recent trends suggest that despite contrary rhetoric we are gradually moving toward an abandonment of Taiwan. If that is to be the course, then we should pursue it in such a way that we do not give an opening to the Soviets or the Vietnamese. We may find ourselves, toward the end of this decade, serving as a kind of amicus curiae in brokering an interim relationship between the PRC and the ROC that will satisfy all but the hard-liners in Beijing without entirely sacrificing the freedom of Taiwan to govern its everyday affairs and prosper in the international economic community. Preferential Taiwan access to the potentially massive mainland market for its manufacturers might be worth the surrender of titular sovereignty. We may thereby lose any prospect of using ROC bases in an emergency, but their availability even today is open to serious question; and it seems clear that it is better from our standpoint for those bases to be in Chinese, rather than Russian or Vietnamese, hands.
Overview

For the purpose of the subsequent analysis the Western Hemisphere is divided into Latin America (i.e., Central and South America), the Caribbean basin, and Canada. All of these areas are characterized by considerable cultural, political and ideological diversity. Nevertheless, the countries of the Western hemisphere also share a number of common values and perceive themselves to some degree as a single geopolitical unit both in relation to the outside world and in intraregional affairs.

Our vital interests in the Americas include unrestrained access to the region's natural resources and logistical avenues to them, including the Panama Canal, the continued availability of our few bases in the Caribbean, and the containment of Soviet proxy threats to regional stability.

The most likely conflict scenarios that will impel U.S. force deployment are 1) an outward spread of communist subversion and main force military violence from Nicaragua threatening Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize and southern Mexico (and the oilfields of the latter three) to the north, and Costa Rica and the Panama Canal to the south, 2) civil war in Colombia threatening the Venezuelan oilfields and possibly also the Panama Canal, and 3) an insurgency in Puerto Rico. Some low to medium-intensity violence in the first two scenarios is considered a better-than-even chance. Conflict in Puerto Rico is less likely, but is a serious enough contingency to justify careful forward planning. There may be conflict in Canada over
Quebec separatism and in the Southern Cone of South America over territorial issues, but that is unlikely to justify U.S. military involvement.

**Latin America: Historical Background**

Latin America does not belong to the same sociopolitical category as the essentially traditional societies of Asia and Africa. For more than four and a half centuries Latin America has been an integral part of Western civilization. Despite certain elements derived from traditional Indian societies, Latin America's social institutions, cultural values and norms, and its economic and political systems have been Western in character. They have been derived directly from Western antecedents and are continuously influenced by developments within other parts of Western civilization, notably Western Europe and the United States. Until recent decades Latin America has also demonstrated a remarkable degree of stability. Notwithstanding frequent occurrences of violent upheaval within individual Latin American countries, and some intra-regional warfare, the institutional patterns of Latin American society have remained essentially unchanged for centuries.

This pattern of social stability, while not precluding all conflict, helped mitigate its consequences and was responsible for the maintenance of the largely static regional landscape.

In recent decades the status quo in Latin America has come under increasing attack as traditional societal patterns proved insufficient to mitigate conflict. Violence was prevalent in the
1960s and 1970s, and is expected to increase even further in the 1980s and 1990s.

This gloomy forecast is based on the unfortunate congruence of three major factors: 1) the high potential for social and economic unrest brought about by rapid modernization 2) the lack of responsible elites or organizations which are able to manage the growing conflict potential, and 3) the presence of Soviet proxies (Cuba and Nicaragua) eager to exacerbate and exploit regional conflict.

The rapid economic growth of Latin America in recent decades has brought about a drastic increase in the volatile, politically-conscious, and disenfranchised urban population. This population is still largely an atomized mass of illiterate, poorly paid, and, in many cases, underemployed or unemployed individuals, many of whom are recent arrivals from the countryside.

The situation is further taxed by the lack of an identifiable national consensus in a number of Latin American countries and a growing decline of traditional elites. Even the military organizations have not been immune to discontent, as there are signs of growing conflict between the more traditionally oriented conservative senior officers and more technically inclined junior officers, who are potentially less hostile to leftist ideologies. Moreover, the church, which traditionally played a moderating role in Latin American politics, has increasingly begun to identify itself with anti-establishment forces.
At the same time, the widespread availability of relatively sophisticated military technology to the numerous rebels and insurgents has made the task of controlling and extinguishing such movements much more difficult. Finally, the decade of the 1970s witnessed a decline in U.S. ability and willingness actively to influence developments in the region. In the past, while the number of actual U.S. military interventions was relatively low, the prospect of U.S. involvement served as an ultimate reassurance to the beleaguered governments and as a deterrent to radical regional powers. Today, U.S. military intervention is rendered less viable as a policy option by a combination of the American domestic mood and the prevailing hostile Latin American attitudes, which question the legitimacy of any U.S. military venture in the region.

The already delicate and tense social and regional balance is further destabilized by the steadily growing Soviet-Cuban offensive in Latin America. This is likely to increase in the 1980s and 1990s. The Soviets clearly hope to utilize Latin America as a low cost strategic diversion. They have publicly acknowledged that in strategic terms Latin America is a hinterland on whose stability the freedom of U.S. action in other parts of the globe depends. Thus the chief Soviet objective in the region is not the Sovietization of Latin America but rather the promotion of a state of turmoil which would divert American resources and permit the Soviets a freer hand in other vital areas of the world.

While a Soviet strategy of gradually expanding its naval presence in the Caribbean, promoting subversion, harassing
American interests in Latin America, and maintaining a low-key presence in several Latin American countries is the most likely one, a more ambitious design cannot be excluded. Under such an alternate scenario, the Soviets might consolidate several of their present Latin American clients (Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua) and possible future ones (El Salvador?) into a regional security grouping. This has been the pattern of Soviet activities in other areas, e.g., in Indo-China and Southeast Africa. Under Soviet thinking, a regional security arrangement among Soviet clients presents a number of potential advantages. From this secure foundation, the Soviets might potentially try to gradually change the Latin American political landscape. As was mentioned earlier, the implications for U.S. foreign policy of a hostile presence south of its border are likely to be considerable. Yet, however tempting this classic strategy of indirect approach may be, the Soviets are unlikely to seriously pursue this option. Its implementation would face formidable regional obstacles and would require a fundamental restructuring of Soviet-American relations to the point where the Soviets show no regard for U.S. sensitivities and simply open the door for U.S. meddling in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, vulnerable buffer states of central importance to U.S.S.R. security.

Central America is likely to present the most varied menu of conflict choices, compared with either South America or the Caribbean. Despite a genuine domestic opposition, the Sandanistas in Nicaragua will probably succeed in establishing a Cuba-like regime. Simultaneously with imposing "genuine"
socialism at home, they have commenced an accelerated arms buildup, which will transform Nicaragua into one of the militarily strongest Central American powers. Cubans provide combat training for the almost 50,000 man Nicaraguan army and as many as 2,000,000 are expected to join the paramilitary militia.

The present governments in El Salvador and Guatemala are confronted with a serious challenge posed by indigenous rebel movements supported by Nicaragua and Cuba. The potential victory of pro-Soviet forces in both countries is a real possibility (El Salvador is presently much closer to the critical stage than Guatemala). There are reports of stepped-up Cuban activities in Honduras and economically ailing Mexico. In addition to revolutionary violence, there is also a rich panoply of traditional inter-state conflicts. Disputes over territorial matters, ideological differences and conflicts over resources pit Nicaragua against Honduras, Honduras against El Salvador, Costa Rica against Nicaragua, and Guatemala against Belize. This is fertile ground for Cuban subversion under Soviet prodding.

Most countries in the area have nominally formidable military establishments which are undergoing a process of modernization. In addition to Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are seeking to obtain advanced military equipment.

Thus, the most likely form of U.S. military involvement in Central America will be the provision of military assistance, training and furnishing of intelligence information. The U.S. army is expected to play a major role in this activity. The
dispatch of a limited number of military advisors is also a possibility. To some extent our future actions in this regard will be affected by our current experience in El Salvador. The actual dispatch of American troops to Central America is a less likely contingency, but must be planned for.

South America

In analyzing the conflict potential in South America it is important to distinguish between the Andean region and the Southern Cone.

The Southern Cone region, (i.e., Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile) despite the continuation of certain intraregional and intrasocietal tensions, will remain politically stable. The Southern Cone nations by the late 1990s are likely to emerge as modern and competitive economic actors on the world stage. Such countries as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay will continue to enjoy varying, but impressive, rates of economic growth.

Politically, the Southern Cone countries are likely to maintain essentially authoritarian regimes, with perhaps enhanced civilian participation and improved civil-military relations. Of all the countries in this subregion, Argentina is likely to experience the greatest difficulties in both the political and economic realms and will probably be haunted for many years by the Falkland fiasco. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the essentially conservative nature of Argentinian regime will remain unchanged.
Paraguay and Bolivia will continue to lag in economic development compared with their more prosperous Southern Cone neighbors. Nevertheless, radical changes are unlikely in either country and if the present regional trends continue, Paraguay and Bolivia will for all effective purposes become Brazilian clients by the 1990s.

The development of a number of Southern Cone nations into major regional powers, especially Brazil, Chile, Argentina, will not only serve to mitigate potential conflicts but will also provide a base for intraregional military cooperation. The conservative countries of the Southern Cone can be expected to provide military assistance, training and under some conditions direct military support throughout South America. Their involvement in Central America and Caribbean, while not assured, is also likely to increase by the late 1980s, especially if the extent of Cuban and Soviet interference in Latin American affairs visibly rises.

The U.S. can confidently expect to continue military cooperation with conservative South American countries. Such cooperation will take the form of military training, some grant aid and sales of advanced military technology (i.e., high performance aircraft, naval vessels, tanks and armored vehicles). The dispatch of U.S. military advisors to South America is a more distant possibility by the 1990s, but it cannot be ruled out. Given the regional dynamics the introduction of U.S. combat troops is an unlikely contingency in the Southern Cone.

The conflict potential in the Andean region (i.e., Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela) is and will remain much
higher than that of the Southern Cone. It is in fact conceivable that if left to themselves, by the mid 1990s the internal situation in a number of Andean states will resemble the current turmoil in Central American countries. Most of the Andean economies would present a mixed and modest performance, stemming from lower initial levels of development, more scarce resources and considerably greater political and economic difficulties experienced during the 1980s.

Such countries as Ecuador, Peru and Colombia will experience severe societal pressures for greater political participation and enhanced economic well being. All of them are likely to face growing social unrest combined with escalating terrorism and incipient guerrilla insurgencies.

The most ominous conflict contingency in South America centers around Colombia, which has a long tradition of organized insurgency in the countryside, an explosive disparity between the rich and poor, and widespread disaffection with the government in Bogota. The Cubans are known to be working actively in support of left-wing rebel guerrillas using, in part, funds from illegal marijuana exports. The chances are considered better than even that this volatile situation will erupt into a medium-intensity civil war toward the end of this decade. If so it could spill over into Venezuela to the east and possibly Panama to the west. The threat to the Venezuelan oilfields in the Maracaibo area (close to the Colombian border) is obvious. Less obvious, given the unhospitable jungle terrain of eastern Panama, is the threat to the Panama Canal; but it is clear enough that if Colombia
should become a Soviet/Cuban proxy a la Nicaragua, it would be
within 400 air miles of the canal and could dominate its Atlantic
and Pacific approaches. That would be strategically intolerable
to the U.S. If the Colombian and Venezuelan forces prove unequal
to this challenge, the likelihood of U.S. and possibly other OAS
military intervention would be high.

Caribbean

The Caribbean islands will continue to be plagued in the
1990s by population pressures, unstable resource prices and
oppressive or incompetent governments. With the exception of
Trinidad and Tobago (minor oil producers), the Caribbean is made
up of poor nations, ill-suited to cope with growing social
demands, rapid demographic change, likely urban riots, terrorism
and military coups. Cuban provocateurs and client political
elements are active throughout the sub-region. Thus the
potential for low-intensity conflict is considerable, including
our Territory of Puerto Rico.

One is entitled to assume that our British, French and Dutch
allies, all with dependencies in the Caribbean, will contribute
military power to peace-keeping in the area, but this is far from
certain. By the 1990s it is unlikely that any of these allies
will have locally based forces of any significance in the area.
They might, and probably would, deploy naval contingents from
Europe to counter external aggression against a dependency and/or
to evacuate endangered European nationals, but they will have
next to no capability (and a questionable will) to reinforce

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local internal security forces in putting down an insurgency, which is the more likely contingency.

American vital interests are unlikely to be seriously compromised by successful left-wing insurgencies in the foreign-owned or independent Caribbean islands. They could hardly project the necessary power to interdict our shipping in the basin, and their strategic resources, if denied to us, could be replaced from other suppliers. The loss of the Aruba oil refineries would be inconvenient but probably tolerable.

The fact remains, however, that the Caribbean basin is our strategic backyard, and the progressive takeover of Caribbean island states or dependencies by forces responsive to Soviet or Cuban political influence would strike at the credibility of American leadership in our own hemisphere. Under these circumstances, some violent contingencies in the Caribbean, where clearly Soviet or Cuban-inspired, would become a challenge to our prestige and thus a threat to our vital interest. We thus may have to act, though preferably with the sanction and support of our OAS allies.

In the meantime, we should seek to arrest the causes of unrest in the islands through imaginative programs of economic aid and technical assistance and the exercise of political leadership. President Reagan's Caribbean Development Plan, if vigorously pursued, will be an important first step.

Puerto Rico is, of course, a special case. While we might, before the year 2000, be called upon to honor our commitment to grant the territory its independence if the islanders should so decide democratically, we cannot tolerate an invasion or
insurgency by force. Some level of internal conflict in Puerto Rico before 2000 is considered a 30 percent contingency and we must be prepared to meet it.

Canada

In the 1990-2000 time frame, a Canadian government will likely find itself beset by more fundamental policy problems than at any other time since World War II. Historically, Canada has faced four major policy problems:

- the economic future and problems of the Canadian industrial society: i.e., economic prosperity, trade and commerce, equality of opportunity, and civil and political liberties;
- the Quebec problem and English-French relations to general;
- strains in the Canadian federal structure and federal-provincial relations;
- Canadian-American relations—particularly the political, socioeconomic, and strategic implications of the separatist debate.

In the 1990s all four policy problems will plague Ottawa and three of them: economic prosperity, English-French relations, and federal/provincial relations will present vexing dilemmas for Canadian policymakers. In turn, the three problem areas will hold major implications for U.S. domestic and foreign policy in general and U.S.-Canada relations in particular.
Among Canada's internal and external dynamics and characteristics which will greatly influence Canadian policies in the up-coming decades are an enormous and relatively unexploited resource potential and a strong nationalist sentiment that cuts across most domestic lines of division. This nationalist sentiment is presently expressed in a general wish to seek greater independence from the U.S. (culturally, economically, politically, and to some extent strategically), and at one and the same time, to retain all of the beneficial aspects (in Canadian eyes) of the U.S.-Canada relationship without making any sacrifices.

The changing nature and strength of Canada in North America, Canadian economic problems in the 1990s -- high unemployment, inflation, a declining Canadian dollar, a weak manufacturing sector, poor balance of payments, declining productivity -- combined with possible radical solutions to these problems, and the implications for U.S. political economic and security interests will produce a heightened awareness of our resource-rich northern neighbor. Economically, the U.S. will have to react to a probable rise of Canadian economic nationalism. Politically, the U.S. faces the prospects of a separatist debate that may presage the birth of two or perhaps an American-Canadian, Francophone-Canada, and perhaps an American-Canada). Consequently, Canadian political and socioeconomic developments pose major ramifications for U.S. strategic planning, both in terms of North American security and of Canada's changing role in NATO.
It is possible that a world economic revival, combined with a more pressing Soviet threat against NATO Europe, would reverse these introspective trends in the Canadian defense posture, but we should not count on it. The economic revival will certainly come, but a heightened Soviet threat against NATO is not projected for the 1990s. Thus we must plan on the assumption that Canada's role in the NATO deterrence array will continue to decline. To balance that, we can find solace in the probability that Canada's contribution to the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the patrolling of our northeastern sea approaches will continue undiminished.

There is likewise no reason to believe that Canada herself will become an arena of conflict requiring a U.S. Army response. There may be isolated instances of low-intensity violence over the Quebec separatism issue, and these could threaten U.S. lives and property, but it should be well within the capability of the Canadian military and police forces to contain.

The fundamental Canadian defense goal in the 1990s will be the surveillance and protection of Canadian sovereignty against foreign incursions. This is of course the basic defense goal of any nation, but an overly concerted Canadian emphasis in the 1990s on national surveillance, given limited resources, may preclude any meaningful defense contribution to the Western alliance. Indeed, American defense officials in the 1990s are likely to grow increasingly concerned that Canada's preoccupation with national surveillance, which might be welcomed to the extent it enhanced North American defense, will come at the expense of Canada's other contributions to the alliance. Those
contributions likely to receive even less attention in the 1990s will include Canada's NATO inputs to the central region and Europe's northern flank and its maritime role of shipping protection in the North Atlantic. It is also likely that little progress will have been made by the 1990s in re-equipping Canada's forces. If Canada's approach in the 1990s toward deterrence is likely to have an inward orientation rather than a greater European emphasis, Canada's approach to detente will be distinguished from that of the U.S. by her effort to use detente as a counterweight to U.S. influence. The political and military issues affecting Canadian security are largely external and to a considerable extent outside Canadian influence. Canadian policy is best characterized by a lasting and increasing reduction to questionable levels of Canadian capabilities: 80,000 men and women in uniform, a defense budget in the early Eighties some two billion dollars below the amount allocated by the U.S. for its anti-submarine warfare program alone, and representing expenditures of $177 per head or 1.7 percent of Canadian GNP, second to last within the alliance after Luxembourg. These numbers reinforce the Canadian view that world security trends are barely affected by her actions.
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA

This region is not a geographic entity. Rather, it is a geostrategic zone treated as an entity because of somewhat overlapping conflict scenarios. We have divided it into two parts for discussion purposes because the central focus of conflict in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli confrontation, whereas the focus in Southwest Asia is on the threat to the Persian Gulf from Soviet imperialism and Islamic fundamentalism. Each of these contingencies has its own dynamics, but each could engender conflict over the same geography (e.g., Iraq) and there could be a synergistic relationship between the two.

The Middle East

For the purpose of this paper, the Middle East is taken as comprising Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and North Africa. The Middle East is one of the world's most volatile and unstable areas, and this situation is likely to persist in the next 20 years. The Arab-Israeli conflict provides only one of the many sources of tension and instability in this area. Even if a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian problem could be reached and the Camp David framework expanded to include Jordan, the Middle East would remain a proverbial powder keg.

In addition to Arab-Israeli tensions, the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa face two more serious challenges to their stability. Almost all Arab regimes suffer from varying degrees of domestic instability. The sources of this instability are manifold and include resurgent Pan-Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism, conflict between different brands of Islam, left-wing
radicalism, and finally the deep-rooted animosities among various national factions frequently grouped together in a single Arab state. The next level of conflict is intra-Arab relations. Such nations as Syria, Egypt and Iraq all have aspirations for a leadership position within the Arab world. Libya is actively committed to the overthrow of almost all other Arab regimes. Algiers, Tunisia, Mauritania and Morocco are divided over the Spanish Sahara issue, the list can go on indefinitely.

Despite these three fundamental sources of instability, it would be wrong to conclude that most regimes in the area will be overthrown in the next twenty years. The stability of Arab countries has been enhanced by their learning experience of coping with numerous challenges to their security and through observation of their less fortunate neighbors. The present group of Middle Eastern leaders have learned much about organization and survival during the turbulent years of the 1950s and 1960s and have carefully absorbed the lessons of the Iranian revolution.

**Egypt:** Egypt is today perhaps the most institutionally stable Arab country in the Middle East. It has a relatively homogeneous population (even though some sectarian strife between the Muslims and Copts is present,) which is proud of its ancient heritage and intensely nationalistic. However, Egypt is not free from potential problems. There is some extremist religious opposition (Muslim Brotherhood) to the present secular government, as well as some indigenous radical forces. Economic development is sluggish and the scarcity of capital remains a major problem.
At the same time these problems are likely to be manageable and do not threaten a radical transformation of the Egyptian political system in the next twenty years. Externally, Egypt will maintain correct, if strained, relations with Israeli, good relations with the West, and much improved relations with the moderate Arab regimes. Barring any major escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt is unlikely to formally repudiate its normalization of relations with Israel. In fact, even the abandonment of futile Palestinian autonomy negotiations need not result in the demise of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. The Egyptians may simply choose to announce that given Israeli intransigence, they do not consider Palestinian autonomy talks promising at this time; but continue to recognize Israel. Obviously, the dependence of Egypt on U.S. economic and military will help to keep the "spirit of Camp David" alive in Cairo.

In terms of military conflict, Egypt's two most likely adversaries are Libya and Syria. In both cases, Egypt should be able to handle these opponents with American diplomatic support and sufficient military aid. The dispatch of large numbers of U.S. advisors or combat forces would be unacceptable to the Egyptians, given the bitter legacy of the Soviet presence, and unnecessary, given Egyptian military power. In addition, Egypt may decide to send its armed forces in support of a friendly Arab or African regime. Given the Egyptian deficiencies in projection capabilities, the U.S. may be called upon to provide the airlift/sealift and help with logistics. Egypt will continue to be a beneficiary of American military aid supported by a modest
amount of training. It is unlikely to require a major commitment of American military resources.

**Jordan:** The Jordanian regime is relatively weak and potentially suffers from acute instability. King Hussein is an astute politician and has been pursuing an extremely delicate balancing act, emphasizing domestically his native Bedouin base, and externally seeking to maintain at least one major Arab protector at all times. Nevertheless, his problems remain acute. The Palestinians of the East Bank feel little loyalty for Hussein, and Jordan is more sensitive than any other Arab nation to the potential mode of a Palestinian settlement. Man for man, Jordanian forces are some of the best in the Middle East, having retained the excellent English training of the former Arab Legion. However, under some circumstances Hussein may require outside support. Jordan nearly went to war with Syria twice in the last 12 years, and actual shooting conflict between the two countries can easily occur in the next 20 years. Given the fragility of his domestic situation, Hussein has been wary of too close a relationship with the U.S. Even if confronted with a Syrian attack, he would prefer to call on other Arab states to help. However, if pressed hard enough, he may actually call for a U.S./Israeli intervention.

**Syria:** Syria is presently the closest Soviet ally in the Arab world, but it is not a Soviet puppet, and its aims in the Middle East differ significantly from those of the Soviet Union. Syria, while more stable internally than Iraq or Jordan, still suffers from serious domestic instability. It has an extremely heterogeneous population with a large anti-semitic
minority. Recent bloody clashes between government troops and radical Islamic fundamentalists visibly confirm the depth and intensity of anti-establishment feelings. However, the present Ba'ath regime has a large popular base and is sufficiently institutionalized to survive Assad's ouster. Moreover, conceivable changes of regime in Baghdad in the next 20 years will do little to alter Syrian policy. Syria is rabidly anti-Israeli and even the creation of a West Bank-based Palestinian state is unlikely to bridge the Syrian-Israeli gap. After the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights and the Israeli displacement of Syrian forces from Lebanon, Syria is unlikely to alter its stance on Israel in the foreseeable future. The Syrian Ba'ath regime also appears to take its ideology more seriously than their Iraqi ideological brethren and will continue to be intensely anti-American. The extent of Soviet influence in Syria may potentially increase, but a full-scale client relationship similar to the one between the Soviet Union and South Yemen is difficult to envision.

Syria possesses formidable military forces, with the most impressive inventory of Soviet weapons in the Arab world. Its ground forces are good and tenacious, though inferior to the Jordanians. The Syrian air force, however, despite the plethora of Soviet aircraft and Soviet training, remains distinctly second-rate.

Syria will most likely remain the strongest anti-American state in the Middle East and may conceivably be involved in
conflict with pro-American Middle East countries, such as Israel, Jordan or Egypt.

**Lebanon**: Lebanon has been a regional anomaly, an Arab state with multiple religious communities engaged in power-sharing that left Christians democracy and showplace of private commercial enterprise until its descent into a savage, recurrent civil war, which erupted in 1975. There are 17 recognized religious and sectarian communities in the country, of which five are particularly important:

- The Maronite Christians are particularly concentrated in the central hills ("The Mountain") and, though nominally Arab in language and culture, have had strong affinities for and extensive commercial and political contacts with the West. As a practical matter, Maronites dominated Lebanese politics from 1944 until 1975, but their numbers have shrunk through emigration while the Moslem population has expanded through natural increase and higher birthrates, leading to challenges to the original congressional powersharing compact. Maronites have been ambivalent about Arab nationalism and have been responsible for a Lebanese foreign policy that was militarily neutral on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

- The Sunni Moslems who are native to Lebanon tend to be concentrated in the coastal cities and in the eastern strip of the country. They are generally more responsive to Arab nationalism, the Palestinian cause,
and the pull of the rest of the Arab world. Traditionally, Sunnis have been the main forces of the Lebanese "left," although few are expressly Marxists. In large part, their knowledge of the population shift from a majority of non-Moslems to a Moslem majority in the country, which probably occurred in the 1960s, prompted the challenge to the Maronites.

- The Shi'ite Moslems tend to be concentrated in the south, though many have moved northward to escape the fighting in southern Lebanon. Generally, the poorest of Lebanon's social groups, and the last to become politically active, they have finally become organized in the Amal movement, which sympathized with the Khomeini regime in Iran, but are distrustful of the Palestinians.

- The Druze are a distinct religious sect which has some Islamic derivatives, and are concentrated in the south-central mountains. Tribally-organized and reclusive in their mountain redoubts, they have a reputation for military ferocity. Though socially conservative, their political leaders have tended to cooperate with Sunni and, therefore, leftist forces in Lebanese domestic politics.

- Orthodox Christians are concentrated in the north and in the main eastern city, Zahle. Having been relatively scattered throughout the country, they sometimes have attempted to bridge the sectarian political conflicts. The northern group has also
sometimes collaborated with the Ba'athists in Syria, and a number of the orthodox leaders are Marxist radicals.

Syria's intervention in Lebanon may have placed certain bounds on the disintegration of Lebanese politics, but it has also had its own divisive effects. The effects of the more recent Israeli intervention are difficult to discern at this point, but it is doubtful that Syrian or Israeli influence will or can be used to reconstitute anything resembling the pre-1975 normalcy of Lebanese politics. The Maronite/Sunni conflict, with its range of complicating factors, has created a whole new set of vested interests which thrive on the country's de facto partition, and which are being supported by Israelis and Syrians. In the near-term, a tripartite Lebanese state with Israeli, Syrian and "free" sectors is likely and this arrangement may have a surprisingly long life. Even a Syrian and Israeli withdrawal is likely to mask continuous covert intervention by both countries in Lebanon. This may lead to "stability" but not of a sort enforced by the Lebanese themselves. Lebanon thus is likely to be a tinderbox throughout the rest of the century.

Small and isolated to one side of the region under considerations in this paper, Lebanon, nonetheless, may be the scene for U.S. military action. Historically, including during the very recent Beirut crisis, U.S. ground forces, generally U.S. Marines, have gone into Lebanon in short-term "peacekeeping" roles. Israel has suggested that the U.S. might provide peacekeeping forces of a more durable sort in southern Lebanon.
and were the U.S. to agree to this idea, the U.S. Army might have to man part of an "MLF" like the one in the Sinai today. This would be a more dangerous and demanding assignment, however, for the presence of Palestinians and Lebanese factions plus the possibility for renewed fighting between Syrians and Israelis would confront these units with the possibility for intense, if brief, fighting.

Conflict Potential in the Middle East

The most likely future developments include an increase in Syrian domestic instability with the replacement of Assad's government, one or more Jordanian crises, with the possible demise of Hussein's regime, and only minor changes in Egyptian and Israeli policies. The fate of Lebanon is less clear. While the return to pre-1975 relative harmony may take considerable time, a reasonably stable Lebanon can be recreated if Syrian and Palestinian influences are no longer operational in Lebanese politics.

As far as the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian problems are concerned, two basic scenarios may take place.

Under the first scenario, the creation of a moderate Palestinian state will lead to improved relations and tacit cooperation among Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and isolate pro-Soviet Syria. The more pessimistic scenario features the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and no solution of the Palestinian problem. Such a state of affairs may trigger a change in Egyptian orientation, make the demise of Hussein's regime much more likely, and significantly worsen American rela-
tions with Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab states. The least likely contingency in the next 20 years is the introduction of Soviet combat troops into the Middle East. We may witness a large-scale Soviet advisory presence in Syria, resembling the Soviet position in Egypt during the War of Attrition. Nevertheless, any actual Soviet combat deployment is extremely unlikely. Aside from obvious political restraints, the Soviets would not perceive the warfare environment to be propitious. Under current Soviet military thinking, they are unlikely to deploy forces in a situation in which they lack a decisive edge.

Southwest Asia

Southwest Asia is itself an area of strategic focus, not a region in the conventional sense. For the purpose of this discussion, it includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula.

The area has been rocked by a number of turbulent events in the last several years. An overthrow of the Pahlevis in Iran placed an implacably anti-American regime in power and compromised a major regional barrier to Soviet expansion. Large-scale hostilities between Iran and Iraq brought to life one of the former more dreadful scenarios -- a war between two major oil-producers, featuring attack on oil installations. Finally, the invasion of Afghanistan brought Soviet military power within range of the Persian Gulf and enabled the Soviets to exert direct pressure on fragile Pakistan.
These events have created tremendous regional instability. They also have made plausible such formerly incredible scenarios as a Soviet move against the Gulf oilfields or a Soviet-American confrontation over Saudi Arabia, though these are still not probable contingencies.

Iran

The victorious conclusion (or even a stalemate) of the Iran-Iraq war is likely to partially stabilize the Iranian political situation. The present regime apparently has seen the worst of a brutal assassination campaign waged by leftist forces, although the level of terrorist activity may be expected to climb, once the patriotic euphoria is over. Clerical rule is sufficiently institutionalized and supported by broad Iranian masses to survive Khomeini's death. Nevertheless, the problems facing the post-Khomeini leadership will be monumental.

A significant and vocal minority of Iranians, comprised of Western-educated middle class and numerous radical groups, will continue to actively oppose the clerical rule. The regime should survive throughout the '80s. By the mid-1990s, however, its popularity with Iranian masses might considerably wane, especially if economic development remains sluggish.

Under these conditions an all-out civil war is a distinct possibility. The chances of a military coup will depend upon the post-war attitude of the Islamic regime toward the armed forces. A limited Soviet intervention might follow to either aid the leftist forces in overthrowing the government or at least to secure Soviet control of Azerbaijan province.
The Islamic regime is likely to maintain a strained relationship with the West and improve somewhat its ties with the U.S.S.R., without developing an extremely close relationship. It will also pursue an uneasy coexistence with its regional neighbors. Future military confrontations with Iraq and other Gulf States are possible, and attempts to revolutionize Gulf-based Shi'ite communities will continue. The Iranian military, while not a first-class military machine, will remain the region's best. Its ground forces would be especially impressive in any long, drawn out conflict. The U.S. might be conceivably called upon in the future to assist the Gulf states (excluding Iraq) attacked by Iran. Given the deficiencies of Iranian air and naval forces, the U.S. should be able to successfully render such assistance. U.S. participation in the defense of Iran against Soviet attack is a less likely contingency. Anti-American feelings will likely continue to run high even by the early 1990s, making an appeal for American help and joint U.S.-Iranian operations unlikely.

Lastly, despite continuing local tensions in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Baluchistan, no spontaneous fragmentation of Iran is to be expected.

Iraq

The less than glorious outcome thus far of the Iran-Iraq war has tarnished Iraq's image as a formidable military power and seriously ruptured Soviet-Iraqi relations. It has also had the positive effect of forcing the Iraqis to be more forthcoming in
discussions with Jordan and the Gulf States about joint action against the Iranian threat. Nevertheless, the Iranian military threat has not been neutralized. Given the likely absence of any real settlement between the two sides, as well as constant Iranian subversion efforts, the warfare will probably persist sporadically for years.

Iraq also suffers from acute internal instability. The Kurdish problem remains unresolved and a new flare-up will severely tax the government's resources. The Sunni-run Ba'athist regime is basically suspect in the eyes of Shi'ites and Sunnis alike for its semi-secular nature—an unforgivable sin to Islamic fundamentalists. Confronted with these problems, Iraq is perhaps the most upheaval-prone and unstable country in the Gulf. Nevertheless, given the generally anti-Western nature of Iraqi policies and the primarily internal nature of challenges to its stability, the potential for U.S. military involvement is very low.

Afghanistan

The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has radically altered the balance of power in Southwest Asia. The control of Afghani real estate enables the Soviets to exert direct pressure on fragile Pakistan and enhances Soviet leverage on Iran. Moreover, the invasion, far from rupturing Soviet-Indian relations, actually drove India closer to the Soviet Union by intensifying Indo-Pakistani rivalry. It is essential to realize that whatever the original Soviet miscalculation and attendant occupation costs may be, the Soviets will persevere in
Afghanistan and will eventually establish a tolerable level of internal security. The demonstrated competence of Soviet power will also impress regional states and enhance the Soviet reputation for success.

There are presently no conceivable scenarios which would feature direct American involvement in Afghanistan. If, however, the Afghani and Soviet forces begin cross-border incursions into Pakistan, U.S. military personnel might be involved, (dependent upon the level of American involvement with Pakistani armed forces.)

**India and Pakistan**

India clearly ranks as the region's foremost power. Despite its slow tempo of economic growth, India is the only country in the area which possesses a large and diversified economic base with a large military sector. Its military capabilities are formidable. India's forces are superior to those of any of its potential rivals, with the possible exception of China, and it is the only regional power able to project forces into the Indian Ocean. Despite continuing tension in some of its states, India does not suffer from large-scale domestic instability and is likely to continue adhering to a democratic system of government.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has had a turbulent history, alternating between civilian and military rule. Its conflict-ridden relationship with India culminated in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. The war resulted in effective dismemberment of
Pakistan. Despite the removal of East Bengali problems, Pakistan continues to suffer from acute domestic vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include the presently muted dislike of Zia's regime, secessionist sentiments in Baluchistan, and other centripetal provincial pressures.

These internal problems are aggravated by the appeal of radicalized Iranian Islam and the combined pressure of India, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. All of these outside forces have been rendering, and will continue to render, support to anti-governmental forces in Pakistan. The Soviets may consider bargaining with the Zia regime in order to induce it to abandon its support of Afghani rebels. Yet, these attempts would not preclude full Soviet exploitation of Pakistani internal problems. Under the combined weight of these problems, Pakistan is an extremely vulnerable and fragile state, second only to Iraq in potential for violent upheaval.

Bangladesh

Although India helped Bangladesh achieve independence, its relations with Bangladesh have deteriorated. Disputes over riparian issues and demarcation of offshore territorial boundaries have been sources of friction. Internally, Bangladesh has experienced a series of violent political changes which have shattered the legitimacy of the Awami League, undermined respect for parliamentary institutions. Although the leadership of Ziaur-Rahman offered a glimpse of something better, his assassination in 1981 suggest that recurrent breakdown of domestic political order is likely to be a continuing affliction.
India's underlying concern in 1971 was to head off the development of a revolutionary East Bengali movement that might stimulate appeals in West Bengal for greater autonomy or even secession to join a larger, independent Bengali state -- a concept that could invite Chinese interference in the subcontinent. Serious long-term difficulties in Bangladesh may still present difficulties for India in resisting external influence in the subcontinent, and this source of tension could be pronounced in the next two decades.

**Saudi Arabia and the States of the Lower Gulf**

Saudi Arabia is increasingly assuming a leadership role in the area. After the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980, Saudi Arabia led the way in establishing the Persian Gulf Joint Council for Cooperation in March 1981. The Council is designed to pool economic resources to help protect stability in the region and is made up of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. The aim of the Council is to develop economic, political and security cooperation to enhance the group's ability to resist domestic and external dangers. The plan is based on the recognition that its members are not individually powerful enough to guarantee their own security. Iraq was the only Arab Persian Gulf country that was excluded because the Council did not want to appear to be taking sides in the ongoing war. However, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which was in pre-Iranian revolution days perceived as the main threat to regional stability, have greatly improved in the last year. The borders between the two countries
were finally established by a treaty signed in January 1982. Once the Iran-Iraq war is officially over, Iraqi admission into the Council is quite conceivable.

The prospects for the internal stability of Saudi Arabia in the next twenty years are better than commonly believed. Despite the well published Grand Mosque seizure by the band of Moslem heretics on November 20, 1979, there is no identifiable popular discontent in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Iranian model of a self-styled Islamic revolution is hardly applicable to Saudi conditions. The Saudi regime is resilient, courts the tribal and merchant elites, fully incorporates Islam and adopts comparatively prudent approaches to social, economic and military modernizations.

The internal stability of Lower Gulf States is much more precarious. Oman is faced with the prospect of the newly active Dofar rebellion, and almost all Gulf States have large foreign communities, in some cases even exceeding the native population. The local Shi'ites will continue to provide an easy target for Iranian subversion.

Despite these unsettling prospects, Saudi Arabia is not likely to welcome more direct American involvement in the Gulf. Recently, the Saudis worked behind the scenes to discourage U.S.-Oman agreement on the use of Omani military facilities. The reason for this Saudi policy is Jeddah's longstanding preference to serve as an exclusive conduit for Western aid and protection. The Saudis prefer that the Lower Gulf States deal with the West through them. In fact, most of the recent U.S. emergency mili-
military aid to North Yemen was channeled through Saudi Arabia. If necessary, the Saudis would prefer to enlist the services of Egyptian, Jordanian or Pakistani armed forces. Given Saudi sensitivities, an outright call for U.S. military intervention will be made only in the most dire circumstances.

Any drastic change in Saudi alignment in the next twenty years is unlikely. However, the eventual erosion in the U.S.-Saudi special relationship may take place. Such a change may occur as a result of an unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and/or a growing Saudi perception that Soviet power in Southwest Asia requires some sort of counterweight.

The Saudi caution will be enhanced by the perception that they will always remain militarily impotent against any conceivable aggressor (Soviet Union, Iran, Israel, Iraq). Even the Saudi ability to handle South Yemen, beefed-up by East European and Cuban mercenaries, is open to doubt.
CONFLICT POTENTIAL IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

There are essentially three basic South Asian scenarios, all of which are quite likely to occur in the next twenty years.

The first scenario is a new Indo-Pakistani conflict, culminating in Pakistani defeat, ouster of the Zia regime or his successors, and large-scale anarchy. The most likely outcome of this scenario is the dismemberment of Pakistan, with India absorbing a significant part of Pakistani real estate and the creation of Soviet-sponsored Baluchistan.

The second scenario envisions the gradual escalation of Soviet-Afghani pressure, featuring pursuits of Afghani rebels, bombing of refugee camps, and cross-border attacks on Pakistani military installations. Under this scenario, the Soviets will also provide massive and open support to the Baluchis and other secessionist movements in Pakistan. If Soviet pressure is kept up for a considerable period of time, the pro-Western government in Islamabad is likely to be overthrown and replaced with a regime willing to accommodate basic Soviet concerns.

The third scenario features a joint Indo-Soviet dismemberment of Pakistan.

The U.S. ability to influence the outcome of these three scenarios is quite limited. The bolstering of the Pakistani army is likely to be a cumbersome and time consuming process. Presently, the Pakistani forces rely on obsolete American and Chinese equipment, such as the T-59 tanks and the Chinese version of the MIG-19 aircraft. Projected U.S. equipment supplies, including some F-16s, will permit only a limited modernization of
the Pakistani military. Critical gaps in such areas as armor, artillery, infantry mobility and air defense will remain.

India, by contrast, sports the fourth largest military establishment in the world. Its army has over 2,000 main battle tanks, including T-72s and over 700 APCs. The Indian air force has about 560 front-line aircraft. Its present mainstay is the 300 MIG-21s, but it is being re-equipped with MIG-23s, Jaguars, and the Mirage-2000s. The Indian navy is equally impressive for a regional power and includes a small aircraft carrier, a dozen submarines, cruisers, destroyers and frigates.

The imbalance of military power between India and Pakistan is considerable. Nothing short of introducing American combat troops is going to alter this fact. Such a move, however, appears unfeasible, given any conceivable American domestic mood. Therefore, if the Soviets were to assume a low-key role in the fighting, with the Indians carrying out the bulk of military operations, the U.S. would be presented with an extremely difficult choice.

Pakistan is the only country which both the U.S. and China officially regard as an ally. The loss of Pakistan to the Soviets would considerably sour Sino-American relations. In the aftermath of such a conflict, India would move even closer to the Soviet Union and newly formed Baluchistan would become an outright Soviet client. As a result of these developments, the Soviets would assume a recognized regional leadership role and would be in a position to impose Brezhnev's oft-mentioned Asian collective security system. This, in turn, would enable them to complete the encirclement of China and might subsequently
generate significant changes in Chinese policy. Until now, the level of Chinese anxiety about Soviet attack has been low. A real feeling of danger might prompt the Chinese to seek some sort of accommodation with the Soviets.
AFRICA

In this section, we will include North Africa (discussed above as a part of the Middle East) in its role also as a part of Africa itself and as an important factor in peace and war on the continent.

The continent's fifty-some political entities are the product of arbitrary decisions made at European bargaining tables in the 19th century, and the resulting African political map does not well correspond to geographic, ethnic, linguistic and economic considerations. Almost every African regime has claims of some sort against its neighbors. Internally, most regimes suffer from acute instability. Tribalism, a low level of political participation, popular cynicism and widespread elite corruption have made coups a semi-legitimate procedure in most African countries.

The existence of the Organization of African Unity mitigates somewhat the likelihood of intra-African conflict. The majority of OAU members agree on the inadvisability of altering colonial boundaries by force or actively intervening in the affairs of other African states, however just the cause for intervention may be. This unanimous OAU consensus on the sacrosanct character of the national sovereignty and borders of African states will continue to serve as a brake on irridentism and cross-border war in the next 20 years. At the same time, the OAU has prudently not attempted to challenge the frequent internal coups and extra-constititutional methods of dealing with political opponents. Thus, it has regularly turned a deaf ear to the most inhumane
domestic policies of its member states and has not censured governments established by extra-legal means.

Another important factor fostering overall systemic stability is the weakness of all black African states. Even the more stable and developed African countries lack sufficient resources to absorb their neighbors or engage in major force projections. Therefore, most inter-state conflict is inconclusive and rarely results in major systemic changes. Moreover, the level of external involvement in African affairs is likely to remain constant or even decrease in the next 20 years, further contributing to the overall stability of the African state-system.

The recent Soviet successes in Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia) are more a function of a power vacuum and the lack of suitable opposition than a sign of major Soviet resource commitment. The Soviets apparently do not view Africa as a crucially important geopolitical area. It falls below Europe, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East in the Soviet geopolitical hierarchy and in Soviet resource allocation priorities.

We should also not underestimate the deterrent effect of the growing OAU's consensus on the undesirability of large-scale Soviet presence in Africa. In fact, after being forcibly ejected from a number of African states, the Soviets seem to have adopted an approach of backing such weak and unpopular governments that the latter completely depend for their survival on Soviet support. The major disadvantage of this Soviet strategy is that
it can support only a limited number of clients at any given time.

It appears that the Cuban presence in Africa has reached its zenith and will most likely diminish well before the 1990s. Cuba's perception of emerging opportunities in the Western Hemisphere is likely to precipitate a shift in Cuban priorities. Moreover, given Castro's claims to the leadership of the non-aligned movement, he is extremely sensitive to the OAU's mood. The latter appears to be moving toward the position that Cubans have overstayed their welcome. An eventual Namibian settlement, for example, will probably precipitate large-scale Cuban withdrawals from Angola.

A number of European states are pursuing policies promoting African stability. France, in particular, enjoys a strong position in Africa, buttressed by the presence of over 14,000 troops in the continent. The continuing French and other European involvement is likely to add to the climate of relative stability described above.

There presently exist four major potential trouble spots in Africa — Western Sahara, Namibia, the Horn, and South Africa. Two of them (Western Sahara and Namibia) have good prospects of being resolved well before the 1990s.

South Africa and the Horn will continue to function as the main arena of superpower competition. The Soviet Union will attempt to pursue its policy of cooperation with Libya and Ethiopia, though they may prove increasingly unenthusiastic clients, while the U.S. will continue a policy of cooperation with Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Somalia. Given the existence of

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severe regional polarization and highly visible superpower commitments, renewed warfare in the Horn is likely in the 1980s and the 1990s. Such future conflicts would pit Somalia against Ethiopia, and Libya against Sudan and possibly Morocco and Tunisia. Libyan-Egyptian fighting also cannot be excluded. Given the weakness of indigenous military establishments, the fighting is likely to be inconclusive. The most potentially contentious trouble spot is South Africa. With the Namibian problem settled, the only remaining divisive issue would be the nature of the apartheid regime itself.

The adoption of progressive reforms, with the eventual culmination in a fundamental restructuring of current color-restriction political system cannot be excluded, but judging by the glacial pace of measures adopted so far, the more likely contingency is the stubborn refusal of an Afrikaner government to share political power with blacks, coloreds and Asians. Clashes between the increasingly frustrated black population and the government security machine will increase. Militant black political forces operating under the umbrella of the African National Congress (ANC) will intensify the guerrilla activity. Yet, truly effective resistance movement can be expected to emerge given the extremely effective nature of the government's security apparatus.

Intermitent clashes between the South African government and the front-line states, whose territory would be used as staging areas by guerrillas, would ensue. The U.S.S.R. will probably seek to exploit the strong anti-South African mood of the front-
line states. Nevertheless, open warfare between South Africa and Soviet/Cuban forces is an extremely remote contingency. The Soviets in the foreseeable future will be unable to project sufficient proxy military forces in the area to effectively compete with the formidable South African military.

We see no likely scenario that would call for American military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa before 2000. There is, however, always the danger that a breakdown of public order in one country or another will threaten American lives and necessitate an emergency evacuation mission. If the Army had a suitable commando-type force for such an undertaking it might get the assignment, though a USMC operation is probably more likely.

Given the importance of Morocco, Kenya and Somalia as contingent transit based for the RDJTF, situations could arise in one or more of those countries which would threaten this alternative LOC to Southwest Asia. In that event, the countries concerned would probably seek help from the OAU or France before looking to us. Invoking American intervention would be politically embarrassing. On the other hand, this is a contingency which would be addressed by Army planners.
In sum, in the next 20 years, the African continent may be plagued by unrestrained intra-state and moderated inter-state conflict, but is unlikely to trigger any major superpower confrontation. Moreover, the African political map will remain largely unchanged and neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. will make (or seek to make) major inroads in the African power balance. These African developments will not make a major claim on U.S. military aid or be likely to necessitate the commitment of U.S. combat troops.
SYSTEMIC FRAILTIES AND EXPLOITATION

It is an assumption of this study that the superpower confrontation will continue up to the year 2000 and beyond. It is a conclusion of this study that the dynamics of that confrontation will be manifest largely, if not exclusively, in the Third World. It will be a political struggle to sway minds, but the underlying and overriding goal will be geostrategic advantage. The contestants will be less interested in the acquisition of territory than in the freedom to use it— to move through it, to draw resources from it—and in the denial of this freedom to the other side.

The competition will be waged chiefly with political, economic and psychological weapons. Each contestant will project military power in the Third World, but more for its psychological and deterrent effect than to lock horns on a remote battlefield. There will be violence, because the gentler weapons of diplomacy will not always prevail and because deprivation, jealousy, ambition and religious zeal beget violence. But the violence, barring catastrophic miscalculation, will not be between the principals but between proxies, clients and client factions. Occasionally, one of the principals may find itself on a battlefield against an opposing proxy or client, but both superpowers will seek to avoid this.

The objects of all this geostrategic attention, the Third World countries themselves, will resist clienthood. Most will seek rather to flirt episodically with both suitors, governing sorely-needed economic aid in the process. Neutrality is usually seen nowadays as more profitable than clienthood; and the more
ambitious countries in the Third World community who aspire to its leadership, e.g., China, India, and Libya, are willing to share their own resources, if necessary, to keep the bloc intact. There is, after all, not only an East-West confrontation but also a North-South confrontation. If the South, i.e., the Third World, is to achieve its goal of wealth-sharing with the North, it must hang together.

Nevertheless, it seems likely that with superpower attention focused so squarely on the Third World, there will be an erosion of neutrality before 2000. To the superpowers, fickleness is not a virtue. When a vital LOC or natural resource is assumed in strategic planning, it can be upsetting to see if suddenly move to the other side of the table. It is expensive and time-consuming to shop for alternatives. Thus, the superpowers will seek to nail down their more important clients with whatever combination of economic and military support appears necessary to that end. They will be selective. Neither the United States nor, still less, the Russians can afford to buy up the whole Third World, and that would not be necessary. But both will seek to assure themselves access to those choice pieces of real estate vital to their global strategic designs. For both the purpose will be global mobility - the capacity to project force anywhere in the world at any time - strategic positioning for a possible World War III and access to vital resources.

Both sides will be exploiting their own array of systems in this struggle for position, and both will seek to exploit common global systems, such as the UN.
On our side, the key systems are Western economic cooperation, both intra-West and in dealings with the Third World, our military alliances, and the UN complex. All three of these systems are frail and under centrifugal pressure. The economic cooperation system, focused in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, is strained by internal discord over competitive trade practices (e.g., subsidies and non-tariff trade barriers), competition for communist markets, conflicting national economic priorities, a competition for scarce resources, and differing concepts of how to deal with the Third World. These tensions are exacerbated by the current recession, but will not all disappear with economic revival. Our leadership position in the OECD is affected by European and Japanese perceptions of our posture as a superpower. When they see that posture as threatening to their security, whether because it is too belligerent or too weak, our influence wanes. Our defense posture cannot be dictated by such Western perceptions, but they must be taken into account if we aspire to exploit Western economic cooperation as a strategic instrument. A coordinated and forthcoming OECD position in the North-South dialogue, with the U.S. seen in a position of leadership, will immeasurably improve our prospects of using vital Third World geography.

Our alliance system is also under strain. Our NATO partners are put off by the suggestion that we might be prepared to fight a limited nuclear war on European soil. They are concerned about popular reaction to the planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles starting in 1983. They insist on
treating NATO as exclusively a deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe, turning a deaf ear to the nation that Soviet-inspired aggression elsewhere in the world, e.g., Southwest Asia, could be just as damaging to European vital interests in the long run. They are worried that we may use the RDJTF in support of Israel, thus threatening the flow of Arab oil to Europe. There is no NATO consensus on who is friend and who is foe in the Middle East, or indeed in other parts of the world.

The OAS alliance is still more fragile. There is a general consensus that Cuba is a Soviet proxy facilitating a rapidly expanding Soviet military presence in the Caribbean and bent on destabilizing the region, but a direct U.S. military attack on Cuba would bring a very equivocal reaction from our Latin-American allies. Their remarkable gestures of support to unloved Argentina in the Falklands crisis was a demonstration of hispanic solidarity that will inevitably recur if American forces encounter Latin Americans on a battlefield, whatever the circumstances. This suggests that whenever possible we should encourage the Latin Americans to address conflict scenarios with their own forces, looking to us solely for essential logistical support.

The weaknesses of the UN system as an instrument for U.S. policy are obvious. The General Assembly is not often responsive to U.S. leadership on contentions issues. The specialized agencies and affiliated financial institutions are more pragmatic and effective in addressing their responsibilities, and their overall impact on North-South tensions is essentially positive,
but they will not perform U.S. strategic errands. Our task in the UN up to the year 2000 will be to keep it from becoming an instrument of Soviet policy. Our principal ally in that endeavor will be the Peoples Republic of China with its pretensions to Third World leadership, and our ability to influence developments in the Third World will depend to a measurable degree on the depth of U.S./PRC understanding.

The international systems available to the Soviet Union are equally frail, and perhaps more so. Their central economic system (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA]) and their central military system (the Warsaw Pact [WP]) are both beset by internal contradictions of national self-interest. The overarching objective of both systems - the preservation of the Soviet regime - is not one with which the average man in the street in the communist world can readily identify.

The CMEA today consists of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Mongolia, East Germany, Cuba, and Vietnam. Yugoslavia is an "affiliate" and a number of non-communist countries, including Mexico, are "cooperants". The CMEA is supposed to coordinate the 5-year plans of the Communist member states and foster intra-CMEA trade and investment, but this is inhibited by the lack of a convertible bloc currency. In its dealing with Third countries CMEA is still less effective. Each member country follows its own course and some (notably Poland and East Germany) are now deeply in debt to the West. Third World disillusionment with the Soviet foreign aid program, which is conducted outside of CMEA, has been growing. Recipients which are not military proxies like Cuba and Vietnam find Soviet
aid capricious, often niggardly, and expensive in terms of mortgaging the countries' export potential.

The Army is well aware of the Warsaw Pact's strengths and weaknesses. It is perhaps enough to note here that the WP, like NATO, is largely committed to the deterrence of a major war in Central Europe. The alliance, per se, is of little value in communist power projection elsewhere in the world. For this, the Soviets must rely on their own forces and those of their non-European proxies, such as Cuba and Vietnam.

The evolution of the Soviet alliance structure out to 2000 is difficult to project with confidence. The Warsaw Pact system will presumably remain intact. This is fundamental to Soviet strategy and incipient revolt in Eastern Europe will be crushed by Soviet intervention if necessary. Soviet support of North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba should continue as long as these proxies continue to serve the global Soviet strategy, and there are no grounds today to assume that they will cease doing so. On the other hand, there will inevitably be changes in Soviet client state relationships. The Soviet position in Angola and Ethiopia seems to be eroding, but new relationships may be formed with Iran and possibly in East Africa. South Yemen should continue under Soviet influence. The Caribbean will be a prime target for Soviet politico-military links, and countries like Nicaragua and Grenada may move more clearly into the Soviet camp if U.S. policies fail to provide a hemisphere alternative. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Thailand are potentially vulnerable. A
Soviet/PRC rapprochement would, of course, bring the most decisive change, but that seems highly unlikely in this century.

On balance, it appears that the main focus of Soviet strategic attention over the next 20 years will be Southwest Asia, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia in that order. These areas are politically vulnerable and of high strategic importance to the U.S. and the West. Improved Soviet strategic access to any of these areas would have significant, and probably unacceptable, impact on U.S. security interests.
NOTES


5. There is however a distinct minority of defense analysts who claim that a robust conventional defense of Europe can be achieved through a suitable restructuring of European and American defense establishments, without incurring any additional fiscal expenditures. For a succinct exposition of this view see
Canby, Steven, "Military Reform and the Art of War: Military
Superiority Worldwide at FY82 Budget Levels," paper presented at
the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Seminar, May 1982.

6. For an excellent projection of Soviet military posture
into the 1990s see Whetten, Lawrence, ed., The Future of Soviet

7. Jeffrey Record, U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads: Two Views,
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982, pp. 2-36.

8. For a somewhat dated, but still useful account of U.S.-
Turkish relations, see Harris, George, Troubled Alliance,


10. Erik W. Haycen, "The Post-Marcos Political Fight," The


12. For a description of Soviet military structure and
organizations see Scott, Harriet, et. al., The Armed Forces of

13. Robert A. Scalopino, "Current Dynamics of the Korean
XXX, pp. 16-31.

14. "North Korean Chief promotes Son Into Succession Slot,"
The Washington Post, October 15, 1980; also see Kim, Yong C.,


21. The most recent example of such a rift between senior officers and the rest of the military establishment, which resulted in the complete military paralysis, occurred during the Iranian revolution.


33. For a discussion of India's history see Brown, Norman W., The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Harvard University Press, 1972.


35. There is a distinct minority of Middle Eastern scholars who argue that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are extremely fragile. The best known proponent of such a view is G. B. Kelly, see for example, G. B. Kelly, "Great Game or Great Illusion," Survey, Spring 1980, Vol. 25, No. 2.

36. For a discussion of Soviet attitudes on this subject see Harrison, Selig S., "Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy, No. 32, Fall 1978, pp. 136-160.


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