The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official documentation.
SUBJECT: "Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000" Study

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. In the past several years, excellent progress has been made in laying the foundation upon which our future Army will be built; force modernization, AirLand Battle doctrine, the regimental system, and high-tech, light forces testing are some of the building blocks. Now, more than ever before, building that Army best suited for the future defense of our nation requires a truly long-range perspective in our current decisionmaking. As I have stated frequently, I believe striving for a clearer vision of the future must be one of the top priorities of Army leadership.

2. To support our long-range planning effort and to validate or cause us to reexamine results of our own studies, we sought an expert, non-military organization's perspective on what we should be considering now in preparing for the future. Recently, the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) completed a comprehensive futures study for the Army. It includes a perception of what the world environment may be like 10 to 20 years from now, identifies implications for the Army, develops strategic requirements, and recommends directions for meeting these requirements. As an independent view, the Army should give it open-minded, thoughtful and rigorous consideration. Along with a number of insightful and sometimes novel ideas, I found the study quite supportive of many current Army initiatives and directions.

3. Transmitted herewith are the study results consisting of an executive summary, a worldwide overview, and five regional volumes. I think your planners will find the study useful and I hope you will recommend the executive summary for reading by key officers within your organization. Only by collectively pursuing a clear vision of what is ahead can we expect to build an Army properly configured for tomorrow.

E. C. MEYER
General United States Army
Chief of Staff
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STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY TO THE YEAR 2000

LONG-RANGE PLANNING

While the ever increasing pace of world events in general, and technological developments in particular, make planning for an uncertain future difficult, the growing lead times required for complex systems research, development and acquisition make such planning imperative. As a result, the Army is placing greater emphasis on long-range planning as a means of achieving a broader, more comprehensive approach to the development of long-term goals and for assessing the future risks of current decisions. Integral to the Army's long-range planning approach is the necessity for determining capabilities and characteristics that will be required of land forces as we enter the next century. As a way of complementing, validating—or, if necessary, altering—the Army's estimates of these future requirements, competitive bids were sought from outside sources to conduct an independent and systematic analysis of the Army and the world in the year 2000. Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was selected to conduct this study, and has been engaged in this effort throughout the past year.

CSIS recently completed this unclassified study entitled "Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000." The study was commissioned to provide an "independent" view of the future demands on the United States Army. Its objectives were to identify plausible future world environments and bedrock U.S. national interests and, from these, to assess global and regional strategic requirements for the Army for the long-range (10-20 years) period. The Army leadership will use this study, along with other strategic assessments and threat estimates, to formulate doctrinal, manning, force design, and materiel requirements. While the study's views, opinions and findings are solely those of the authors, working outside of the defense community, it is noteworthy to point out the degree to which their conclusions validate or are in harmony with directions set by Army leadership.

THE STUDY

The study's five volumes, each covering a different region of the world (Europe, Middle East/Southwest Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and the Americas), provide a range of alternative futures for their respective region. A sixth volume, "The World Environment to the Year 2000," provides a vision of the global future, including projected social, economic, and political conditions for each of the five regions. In building this study of the uncharted future, the CSIS team produced over forty functional and regional sub-studies which became building blocks for the final products.
During the conduct of various phases of the study, the study team drew upon the knowledge of over 30 regional and functional experts in constructing the foundation upon which the study results stand. Study co-directors were Dr. William J. Taylor and Dr. Robert H. Kupperman. Additionally, a CSIS Steering Committee consisting of prominent international relations experts and strategists Dr. Amos Jordan, Dr. James Schlesinger and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, advised the study team and guided the project through its completion.

Regional experts and researchers reviewed historical data and environmental projections that described expected global and regional conditions in the 1990-2000 time-frame. They identified facts, trends, and phenomena pointing to plausible future developments; considered economic, political, demographic, technological, cultural, and military factors; and derived their implications for the Army by assessing these in light of likely future United States interests, defense policies, and national security objectives. From these implications, Army-wide strategic requirements were derived as the basis for recommending general directions that the Army could take to meet its future national security requirements. The study rendered key recommendations in such diverse areas as: revised Army missions, force characteristics, manning alternatives, mobility and mobilization capabilities, doctrine, and participation by Allies in regional defense arrangements.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The study’s analysis proceeds from a number of key assumptions:

- General nuclear war will not occur.

- The Soviet Union will continue to pursue its goal of world domination and will remain the major adversary.

- No unilateral technological breakthrough will occur that would provide any single nation total military dominance.

- A catastrophic breakdown of the world economic order will not occur.

THE ADVERSARY

While envisioning major changes between now and the year 2000, the study portrays an evolutionary rather than an abruptly discontinuous progression of events. Despite greater importance and influence of Third World nations, the main axis of global politics will remain East-West, and the Soviet Union will continue to present the principal threat to U.S. security. The study addresses the strategic balance of power and postulates how the Soviets are likely to view opportunities to improve their position in the Third World, without sparking a direct superpower conflict. This requires that U.S. political and military leadership be constantly attentive to Soviet grand strategy in the Third World as well as toward NATO—the ultimate goal of which is viewed as expansion of the Soviet
Communist system. A Soviet mindset is portrayed that sees this goal as contingent on two strategies: denial of the right of alternative systems to compete for existence, and surrounding itself with states of equally inflexible Communist regimes, subservient to Moscow. The result is continued world-wide competition with western free enterprise and, among other events, the invasion of Afghanistan and the suppression of Solidarity in Poland. Additionally, the Soviets seek to confront, weaken, and if possible destroy opposing alliances and to propagate Communism, or at least military neutralism, in the West and in the Third World. In essence, the study projects that the USSR "will be directly or indirectly responsible for most conflict throughout the world."

THE THIRD WORLD

The study states that "The Third World has never been riper for plucking," that the Third World will experience a depressed world market for raw materials, high oil prices, and a crushing debt service burden, while economically and culturally developed countries are preoccupied with internal problems. In addition, the developing countries will be sufficiently weak and vulnerable that in the economically and politically turbulent times ahead, investment by the developed countries will diminish. Also, several probable trends bode ill for a tranquil world as we approach and enter the 21st century:

- A potentially explosive gap between rich and poor nations, which will continue to widen.
- Middle East instability, which will be neither easily nor quickly settled.
- Important leadership succession crises in a number of key friendly countries.
- Economic, demographic, and ethnic tensions in many countries, exacerbated by global recession, population explosion, and competition for scarce resources.

NATO

The study is careful not to ignore NATO and that part of the world in which war may not be most likely to occur, but where, if conflict were to erupt, the results would be devastating and most likely spark a frightening World War. The study team sees rough parity existing between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, making war excessively costly to both sides and therefore reducing the likelihood of a Soviet attack in Central Europe during this century. In no way, however, does this mean that the U.S. can lessen its guard in Europe or that our allies can reduce their contributions to defense. Quite to the contrary, the U.S. and its allies must strive to maintain a balance of power, avoiding even a perception of imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Otherwise, the study reasons, a miscalculation could too quickly escalate to nuclear warfare.
It comes as no surprise that the U.S.S.R. is projected to remain America's main adversary in the 1990s; nor is it surprising that the U.S. can count on the Soviets to exploit each situation to serve their global grand strategy. What may not have been expected by some observers is the emphasis the study places on a new challenge to American military planners—a global challenge posed on every continent that will require unprecedented flexibility in force planning.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY**

What does this all mean for the Army? In many areas this independent study is fully supportive of initiatives already begun by the Army. In others, it recommends new directions or changes in emphasis in order to better prepare for the 21st century. Broadly speaking, the study envisions a wider global orientation for the future Army. Consequently, it recommends restructuring some forces with smaller, independent units having greater flexibility, mobility, and deployability. Such forces would be trained not only for general warfare, but for operations in specific regions of the world. In this way units would be earmarked, tailored, and immediately ready for rapid deployment to specified regions. This recommendation supports actions currently being taken, planned, or considered to strengthen our future conventional force structure with high technology light forces, special operations forces, and Rapid Deployment Forces. To meet global challenges with light, mobile, regionally-oriented forces, while retaining the powerful reinforcing capability of Europe and Korea, will require: 1) sufficient soldiers to man both active duty and reserve component units in the Total Army force structure, 2) adequate strategic mobility to rapidly deploy and sustain the forces, 3) new doctrine to improve force survivability on a more lethal battlefield where the full array of modern weaponry will be in use, and 4) a rapidly responding mobilization base to reinforce as required.

On the first requirement, the study sees a decreasing personnel pool as we head toward the middle 90s. This implies that recent improvements in recruiting and retention must continue to make a military career more attractive in competing with the civilian sector for quality people. The study concludes that this can be accomplished effectively for the short term through pay increases, bonuses, a revitalized GI bill, and other incentives. For the long term, however, the study urges the Army to plan for the necessity of alternatives to the All-Volunteer Force—especially a system of conscription for the reserve components—to meet the bedrock requirements of national defense and to prevent a return to a "hollow" Army.

As to strategic mobility, the study expresses pointed concern for current and projected future shortfalls in assets necessary to move properly configured soldiers and materiel to the required location in a timely fashion. In many of the Third World military situations posited by the study as possibly occurring before the end of this century, land forces will make the key difference. The study concludes that the U.S. is
significantly short of required strategic mobility assets, that current efforts to upgrade the capability, while laudable, are still inadequate, and that increased emphasis must be placed on acquiring the necessary lift to rapidly transport land forces to potential battle areas.

On the third requirement, there is clear agreement that initiatives taken by the Army in the areas of high-technology light forces and doctrinal concepts presented in the Army's AirLand Battle 2000 are proceeding in precisely the right direction. These new types of units fighting with revised doctrinal techniques offer a more effective force and less vulnerable target on the lethal battlefield of the future. The study also proposes some additional refinements and new perspectives in the area of force design that will be of interest to Army planners.

Finally, if it becomes necessary to activate mobilization procedures, the study cautions that mobilization will have an extremely high price tag, and will present political and military signals to friend and foe alike. In addition to its basic purpose of assembling the means to prosecute war, the study sees mobilization fulfilling three vital policy functions: 1) aiding the political process of achieving a national consensus and commitment, 2) providing a legal and procedural framework for marshalling resources, 3) conveying a message of resolve. While the study lauds recent progress in planning for the mechanics of mobilization, it recommends that a way be found to tie mobilization requirements more strongly to the budget process to ensure adequate resourcing of long-term shortfalls.

SUMMARY

This study by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies provides a broad range of assessments and recommendations, especially in the areas of strategic mobility, mobilization, and manpower planning. It supports many of the initiatives already undertaken by the Army in the areas of force design, doctrine, fundamental mission definitions, and materiel requirements. The study provides a useful, independent perspective to aid the Army's leadership in addressing those crucial decisions required today so that the Army of the year 2000 will be capable of meeting the nation's security requirements.
**Title**
Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000: Executive Summary

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Center for Strategic and International Studies
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**Abstract**
Provides an executive summary of study tasks, assumptions, statements of U.S. interests and objectives. Summary of worldwide trends, implications of these trends for the Army and a quick reference to broad Army solutions.
STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY
TO THE YEAR 2000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Army 2000 Project

NOVEMBER 1982

Georgetown University
Center for Strategic and International Studies
INTRODUCTION

We live in rapidly-changing times and one can safely predict that the pace of change will only accelerate in the years ahead. Challenges to the international security interests of the United States will grow and the nature of America's world leadership role will be tested repeatedly. Reducing the uncertainties which accompany rapid change will be a monumental task for Army planners and decision-makers. This report is a major attempt toward clarifying the challenges of the future by illuminating future requirements for the Army's Long-Range Planning System.

While the ever-increasing pace of world events generally, and technological developments particularly, make forecasting for an uncertain future more and more difficult, the increasing lead times required for complex systems research, development, and acquisition make such long-range planning all the more imperative. Efforts directed toward becoming better informed about the possibilities that lie ahead are useful in making today's decisions with tomorrow in mind, and endeavoring to obtain a broader, more consistent approach toward attaining Army long-range goals. This is not to say that the future can be predicted, nor should one attempt to do so, but one must seek to discern broad future trends and draw their proper inferences and implications forward so that decisions on concept and hardware development needed for national security tomorrow can be made on a better informed basis today. Many people, however, are simply too pressed by daily exigencies to worry about events which appear to be too far into the future. Herein lies a modern paradox, a product of the frenetic pace and the constraints on
time which characterize the decision-making system. Those policymakers whose decisions potentially will have the widest impact and longest-term consequences are also those whose attention spans are hardest driven by the daily operational demands of the present.

In an age where conflict can be manifest in a wide variety of ways, a failure to prepare ahead of time in appropriate fashion may well contribute unwittingly to the potential seriousness of a conflict, particularly if it arises suddenly and/or in a form not previously considered. Indeed, the lead time gained by the advance conceptualization of potential problems and conflicts is needed today as never before. On the assumption that the recognition of a problem can be an important first step to its solution, this report examines some of the functional and regional issues that will condition the Army environment of the 1990s.

What the U.S. Army does not need and what its leadership clearly does not want is simply one more study forecasting worldwide gloom and doom unrelieved by some semblance of a solution to future problems posed for the Army. We have borne this in mind throughout our year-long effort.

Fundamentally, our task has been four-fold: 1) project the worldwide political-military environment of the 1990s presenting a bounded range of conflict scenarios for each of the five regions of the world; 2) identify trends and phenomena likely to have an impact on the Army, and derive their implications for the Army; 3) suggest general directions for solutions to problems
identified in the form of Army-wide strategic requirements; and
4) develop, on a regional basis, potential solutions for dealing
with problems, emphasizing strategic requirements for the Army
for each region.

The study consists of the following final papers:
I. Executive Summary
II. World Environment to the Year 2000
III. The Americas
IV. Europe
V. Middle East and Southwest Asia
VI. East Asia and the Western Pacific Basin
VII. Africa

Volume II projects the world environment, addressing at a high
level of generalization trends and phenomena in each of the
five regions conforming to the Army Long-Range Planning System.
There is no attempt in Volume II to identify trends and phenomena
likely to impact particularly on the Army nor to specify problems
and solutions for the Army — tasks undertaken in detail in each
of the five regional "stand-alone" volumes. The detailed
analyses to support the conclusions which follow are found in
Volumes III through VII and in separate supporting papers written
during the course of the project.

ASSUMPTIONS

- General nuclear war will not occur.
- A catastrophic breakdown of the world economic order
  will not occur.
- The Soviet Union will continue to pursue its goal of
  world domination and will remain the major adversary.
- No unilateral technological breakthrough will occur
  that would provide any single nation total military
dominance.
STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

The United States, committed to a leadership role in the Western world, has vital interests which go beyond mere physical defense of American soil. U.S. interests are based on the maintenance of a free society which preserves our national values. Resources essential to our friends and allies become, a priori, important to us. Conflict anywhere is an object of U.S. concern, particularly if it is generated or exploited by the Soviet Union in its presumed global strategy of encirclement and interdiction. These interests can generally be defined in terms of specific bits of geography which are strategically or economically crucial, and these have been identified in the regional studies. For this summary, a more functional definition is appropriate. Vital interests include:

- American commercial access to natural resources deemed essential to the economic health and national defense of the United States.
- Continued American military access to all air and sea lanes essential to the defense of the United States, its out-lying possessions, its allies, and to the projection of military power in locales of actual or potential conflict threatening vital or important interests of the United States or its allies.
- The right to maintain and defend forward bases and depots needed for American military mobility and power projection.
- A strong mobilization base including a modern stockpile of critical and strategic materials, one that reflects
readily projectable technologies -- in contrast to the present stockpile with technologies of World War II and Korea.

- The maintenance and further strengthening of American alliance and national security systems in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia are essential to the deterrence and/or containment of hostile aggressions.

- The control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other capabilities of mass destruction.

- The containment of Soviet influence or Soviet proxy subversion of friendly governments and institutions.

- The protection of American citizens' lives and property overseas.

IDENTIFICATION OF WORLDWIDE TRENDS

Some trends will proceed without reference to conscious control by statesmen. However, the following trends and implications will develop, in some measure, as a result of alternative future U.S. courses of action.

The Soviets will gain in the 1980s and maintain into the early 1990s, a reputation for at least marginal strategic nuclear superiority. Soviet leaders, themselves, may believe that they have achieved such "superiority" -- though probably not assuredly. This will not lead to Soviet initiation of strategic nuclear warfare. Moscow will fear "unacceptable damage" from U.S. retaliatory strikes, whether counterforce or countervalue, with modestly-improved U.S. strategic nuclear systems. This will
also not preclude Soviet willingness to negotiate in the arms control or arms reduction areas, from which they may derive psychological and geopolitical dividends and economic relief. However, their sense of even marginal strategic nuclear superiority will likely tempt Soviet leaders into political-military adventures across the spectrum of low-intensity conflict which they will view as relatively low cost/risk operations with high strategic payoffs contributing to an increasingly favorable "correlation of forces."

Soviet detente with Western Europe will proceed apace, yielding political and economic dividends viewed as favorable by the Soviets. Soviet leaders will not be tempted to wage conventional war in Europe which -- given continued but modest Western defense efforts -- would entail high risks of uncontrollable nuclear escalation and which, given their progress by alternative means, would seem unnecessary to them.

U.S.-Western European relations will have undergone a generic change by the 1990s. Strong West European disappointment in U.S. alliance leadership; stark awareness of the preeminence of Soviet military power in the European region; attraction to trade with the U.S.S.R.; resentment toward U.S. pressures for greater European conventional defense contributions; strong European domestic pressures for neutralist foreign policies; all these will combine to erode by the 1990s the essential spirit if not the form of the NATO alliance. These attitudes will be encouraged and exploited by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, and by the systematic penetration of detentist movements.
The Third World will be increasingly vulnerable to Soviet political-military initiatives in the 1990s. The pressure of sky-rocketing population growth, especially in urban areas, ethnic and religious tensions, food and water scarcities, and competition by the industrialized nations for increasingly scarce energy and mineral resources, all will create conditions of intra- and inter-state violence which the Soviet Union will seek to exploit.

In the Americas, the Soviet Union, working primarily through Cuba and Cuban-supported proxy forces, will constitute a growing threat to U.S. vital interests. The most likely arenas of low to medium intensity conflict in the region up to the year 2000 are in Central America, Colombia/Venezuela, and possibly Puerto Rico. Vertical escalation of this conflict beyond the conventional level is unlikely.

Africa will be affected by Soviet attempts to improve its global status as a superpower and to create a worldwide socialist community through low-cost, low-risk operations relying principally on proxies and military assistance to liberation movements. The Soviet Navy will continue to demonstrate Soviet commitment. However, the level of Soviet effort in Africa probably will be reduced as a result of Soviet economic problems. It is unlikely that there will be an introduction of Soviet ground or air forces into the area.

The most likely alternative future for East Asia and the Western Pacific basin is a period of relative political calm and economic progress in the region. Minor outbreaks of violence both within and between some of the states ranging from
guerrilla-inspired unrest in South Korea and some ASEAN countries to sporadic low-intensity violence on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese borders. If North Korea remains deterred from attacking south in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by the latter 1990s, growing relative military strength of South Korea, a substantial increase in Japanese military capabilities, relatively stable U.S.-Chinese relations and enhanced Chinese military capabilities, and strengthened economies among ASEAN states will yield an uneasy but stable regional balance. In this regional environment, the Soviets likely will turn strategic attention to softer targets in other areas.

The Middle East/Southwest Asia region is the most heterogenous and volatile of all and our scenarios carry near equal probabilities. The two more likely futures for the 1990s involve on the one hand terrorism, fundamental local imbalances between Saudi Arabia and regional military giants surrounding it and a high level of political-military tension; on the other hand, we envision the Soviet Union increasing its influence in Iran or in the Indian Ocean by means of a "Baluchi salient" out of Afghanistan. Either of these scenarios constitutes a significant threat to U.S. interests in the region.

The world economy of the 1990s will continue to rely on petroleum for a major share of the energy mix, with Japan and the FRG most dependent on oil imported from volatile Persian Gulf and North African regions. Threats of low-intensity warfare in areas producing oil for the West will abound in the 1990s. Unstable regimes, regional wars, embargoes, terrorist attacks and Soviet
or Soviet-proxy attempts at seizures are principal problems to be anticipated.

The United States will reduce somewhat its dependence on Middle East oil as overall domestic demand stabilizes or decreases and new domestic Alaskan and offshore Arctic oil and natural gas reserves are proven and brought into production. Mexican and Venezuelan oil output will add to U.S. flexibility. Oil will continue to be the prime energy source for the Army throughout the 1990s; appropriate technology for exotic fuels (e.g., solar, biomass) will not be available until the 21st century. Unless there is an unprecedented, near-term reversal of Army procurement programs, the M-1 tank, Infantry Fighting Vehicle and like equipment will intensify the problems of fuel logistics for the 1990s.

The Soviets' active, aggressive chemical warfare programs will continue into the 1990s and will include planning for the employment of chemicals on both traditional battlefields and in Third World conflicts for both area denial and unit containment missions. Despite the Biological Warfare Convention, there is some likelihood that the Soviets will employ a spectrum of CBR agents in both conventional and unconventional warfighting scenarios in the future.

The U.S. "mood" will not pass out of the withdrawal ("isolationist") phase which began in 1970 until at least the latter 1980s. Successive budget cuts, already begun in the FY83 defense program, will mount as the thin veneer of the 1980-81 defense consensus comes unglued. Only at the end of the 1980s are the American Congress and public likely to fully realize the
significance for U.S. national security interests of slow but steady Soviet geostrategic gains during the decade. Then, America will turn to a period of "interventionism" supported by a willingness to sacrifice for defense, only to find that decisions on Army conventional weapons systems not taken in the early-to-mid 1980s will constrain mission capabilities.

LIKELY CONFLICTS DIRECTLY THREATENING U.S. INTERESTS

- A Soviet military attack on, or political subversion of, Iran preparatory to a move against Persian Gulf oil installations.
- Renewed conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
- An invasion of the Republic of Korea from the north.
- Soviet/Cuban-supported guerrilla attacks in Central America, for example, from Nicaragua against its neighbors, particularly El Salvador and Honduras.
- Cuban-supported insurrection in Colombia, possibly threatening the Venezuelan oil fields.
- A Vietnamese thrust into Thailand, probably in conjunction with a Thai Communist Party insurgency.
- Soviet-supported terrorism aimed principally, but not solely, at eroding public confidence in governments of the industrial democracies and their military establishments.
- Psychological warfare targeted on cohesion of the U.S. alliance structure and particularly on NATO.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY

Psychological warfare and terrorism will become increasingly important problems for the Army to the Year 2000. As with other unconventional warfare (UW) instruments, they can be applied by small nations as a lever against Western nations and their military forces. The Brigadier General Dozier kidnapping is an example of problems to follow. It is highly probable that serious attempts will be made in the future to steal nuclear weapons from Army storage facilities in the environment of a media spectacle. Terrorist acts could seriously disrupt future U.S. Army mobilization efforts.

Decisions on conventional weapons systems not taken by the United States in the early to mid-1980s (even if taken in the late 1980s), will leave the United States in the early and mid-1990s with conventional military forces which, though formidable, will be viewed by the Soviets as lacking adequate capabilities to deal with simultaneous Soviet proxy "interventions" of various types in Third World regions.

Buffeted by the triple impacts of improved (over the early 80s) civilian employment opportunities, the anti-nuclear/anti-draft registration/peace movements, and the contraction of the prime manpower pool in the mid-1980s, the Army will be unable to adequately man an active All Volunteer Force (AVF) of even 784,000 in the mid-to-late 1990s. Planned manpower increases, funds for which may not be authorized by Congress anyway, will exacerbate the problem. The shortfall in the prime recruiting pool of the 1990s will affect adversely the Selected Reserve as
well as the active force. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) should experience a significant shortfall.

By the 1990s, U.S. "general purpose forces" will be inadequately manned. Despite successes in recession-assisted recruiting and retention of higher quality soldiers (in terms of Army high school diplomas and mental categories) in the AVF of the early 1980s, given the problems just cited above, manpower availability and the deployment of new equipment technologies in the 1990s will likely outstrip the capacities of AVF soldiers to learn, operate, and maintain Army systems (assuming there is no dramatic improvement in the U.S. secondary education system and the Army in the latter part of the 1980s).

Some of the more likely Army missions of the 1990s cannot be carried out adequately by heavy active or reserve forces configured, equipped and trained for a high-technology European battlefield; some other likely missions would not be appropriate for RDJTF units (e.g., 18th Airborne Corps) configured for Middle East/Southwest Asia contingencies. Low-intensity warfare, sometimes in tropical climates, will demand in the 1990s U.S. capabilities beyond those the Army Special Forces and Ranger battalions possess.

PROBLEMS FOR THE ARMY AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The principal Army mission will remain strategic deterrence derived from its role in Europe. Major contingencies involving Soviet forces outside Europe, e.g., in the Persian Gulf, likely would create a situation of such high East-West tension that the bulk of NATO-Warsaw Pact ground forces would be "pinned down" opposite each other in Europe. Logically, so too would be active
U.S. units designed for reinforcement in Europe. Thus, contingency planning for the 1990s should not consider NATO reinforcing units as available for deployment in major, simultaneous contingencies elsewhere.

Mission Changes

Because of this "tie down" consideration, Army NATO reinforcement missions should in major part be shifted from active units to the U.S. Army Reserves (including the ARNG). Their peacetime organization, force structure, doctrine, and training should reflect such missions. Some active Army units now earmarked for NATO reinforcement should be trained and equipped for other missions such as power projection and low intensity conflict.

Greatest Challenge

The Army, as well as the U.S. national security structure as a whole, will require new directions to be prepared for the most likely threat to U.S. interests for the 1990s. "Low-intensity conflict" including (at the low end of the spectrum) psychological warfare targeted on the forces and publics of the industrial democracies, proceeding up through high-technology terrorism, to Soviet supported revolutions, to urban guerrilla warfare, and more "conventional" proxy-wars, will constitute the greatest challenge to the Army.

To be prepared for the increasingly diverse mission requirements of the 1990s, the Army should consider seriously reorganization to a flexible, three-tiered force. The first tier should constitute a strategic deterrent based on heavier force.
The second tier should provide active component expeditionary forces trained and equipped for specified regions. The third tier should provide expanded special operations/security assistance type forces with unique capabilities to operate in low-intensity conflict environments. It is the third tier which requires increased priority in relevant Army training, doctrine, organization, and technology in the near term to be prepared for the most likely contingencies of the 1990s.

**Unit Structure**

Interagency management of low-intensity assets will be required, but given the expected strategic guidance to "be prepared for all contingencies" and, given the predictable constraints on the size and capabilities of "general purpose forces," for widely diverse contingencies (especially with heavier Division 86 units), the Army should consider force restructuring based on specialized brigades which could be placed OPECON in tailored packages to small, flexible division headquarters. The "heavy" support functions now carried by large division headquarters would be passed to corps.

**Strategic Mobility**

Strategic mobility for rapid deployment will remain a serious shortfall affecting Army capabilities in the 1990s. Army experiments with light, high-technology force structure are heading in the right direction both in terms of adapting the structure to new doctrine (FM 100-5) and in terms of partial solutions to force mobility problems.

Division 86 reorganization creates heavier units and will exacerbate rapid mobility problems. Given continuing constrained
land and sea mobility assets, and answers to force mobility problems reside in: 1) lighter force structure; 2) prepositioning and forward basing; 3) redundant overflight rights agreements; and 4) intense interservice cooperation within and outside the Joint arena.

**Prepositioning, Forward Basing, and Overflight Rights**

The problems involved in prepositioning, forward basing, and overflight rights are well known by Army and JCS planners (e.g., dual sets of equipment; vulnerability of POMCUS sites; expense of POMCUS maintenance and upgrading stored materials; time and vulnerability problems in uniting troops with equipment and movement to battle positions; host country political uncertainties; reduced flexibility in meeting unexpected contingencies elsewhere). Management of those problems would best be facilitated by the following:

- Consider adjusting basing strategy for some RDJTF units to reflect increasing focus on NATO's southern flank (Italy, Turkey, or Spain), negotiating explicit basing and air movement agreements to permit RDJTF deployment on non-NATO missions.

- Do not consider manned forward bases and avoid extensive prepositioning in Middle East/Southwest Asia; negotiate redundant overflight and on-route access agreements if possible.

- Consider some Army deployment in Western Australia to address possible Southeast Asian contingencies and protect our eastern gateways to the Indian Ocean.
NATO

Army planners should consider the implications of the slow erosion of NATO cohesion and capabilities during the remainder of the 1980s and prepare for contingencies based on a political decision to change the nature of the U.S. commitment. The contingencies are:

- Trading increased U.S. firepower for U.S. manpower in Europe.
- Assigning to NATO/Europe a larger proportion of heavy unit missions.
- Reducing the total number of U.S. troops units deployed in Europe.

Nuclear Constraints

In view of likely increasing constraints on "non-strategic nuclear weapons," Army doctrine and force design related to the employment of these weapons should be reviewed to ensure that there is internal consistency between the requirements of strategic deterrence and operational planning for battlefield use. The problem is that planning for early use may not be supported by early release authority.

Mobilization

In the turbulent world of the 1990s, mobilization must fulfill three vital policy functions. The first will be to aid the political process in reinforcing the changed U.S. mood referred to above to achieve a national consensus and commitment to deploy ground forces abroad as U.S. interests dictate. The second will be to provide a legal and procedural framework for marshalling the resources necessary for success in combat. The
third will be to convey abroad a message of American resolve. The present emphasis on the mechanics of mobilization promises to bring about in the next several years improvements needed to ensure the competence of the mobilization process. However, a way must be found to tie mobilization more closely to the budget process if we are to enter the 1990s with an adequate mobilization resource capability.

Research and Development

Research and development has been focused on the high intensity warfare contingency. This has been appropriate insofar as it strengthens the credibility of our deterrent to NATO/WP conflict. However, new force structure and new doctrine to address the more likely Third World conflict scenarios impose a necessity for new, lighter and simpler weapon systems and tactical mobility assets which the Army has begun to recognize. If not already in an advanced stage of development, this needed technology will not be available from within the Defense establishment in the 1990s. Thus the Army must be quick to adopt useful advances made by other services and in other countries and to simplify procurement techniques.

Manpower

Given the projected shortfalls in the prime manpower pool, assuming continuation of the legal ban on women in "combat assignments," and in view of the uncertainties concerning preparedness of the young American public to countenance a peacetime draft in the foreseeable future, current Army programs emphasizing technology to replace manpower probably constitute an
appropriate hedge against uncertainty. But they are not a sufficient solution to the manpower problems of the 1990s.

The Army should press within OSD for return to peacetime conscription, starting with a Reserves draft, for the following reasons:

- Signal of commitment to allies and adversaries alike.
- Enhanced role of the Reserves in NATO reinforcement.
- A pilot conscription model will test the resolve of the American public.
- Partial solution to problems of recruitment and retention in a markedly improved economy, with declining numbers of draft-eligible males.

PROLOGUE TO THE YEAR 2000

The problems with which the Army will be confronted in the 1990s are difficult, but not insurmountable. Army decisions taken in the near term will impact heavily on capabilities during that decade. A problem will be that near-term defense budgets are likely to be increasingly constrained. Yet, our forecasts show that the most likely threats to U.S. national interests will require improved Army conventional and unconventional land force capabilities. This case needs to be developed in near term budget requests.