PROPOSALS FOR THE EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL READINESS DURING A COMPANY INSPECTION IN THE GERMAN ARMY(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA R WEBER OCT 82
PROPOSALS FOR THE EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL READINESS DURING A COMPANY INSPECTION IN THE GERMAN ARMY

by

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October 1982

Thesis Advisor: D. E. Neil

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Proposals for the Evaluation of Personnel Readiness During a Company Inspection in the German Army

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Personnel Readiness  Disciplinary Power
Physical Criteria   Personnel Turnover
Psychical Criteria Social Factors
Defense Motivation Strength

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power by the company commander and the subjects of complaints, enlistment and reenlistments. Consideration was also given to the subjects of personnel turnover, civic education and leadership and social factors. Where required, the historic and legal motivation for the criteria is elaborated and suggestions are made for determining the actual content and weight of the criteria according to their influence on readiness for different unit types.
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Proposals for the Evaluation of Personnel Readiness During a Company Inspection in the German Army

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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3
ABSTRACT

This thesis suggests criteria necessary for the assessment of personnel readiness in the West German Army. They should make the effort to achieve personnel readiness more efficient and the evaluation process more objective.

The proposed physical criteria are the degree of deviation from the authorized strength, the degree to which the military occupational specialties are achieved and the availability of leaders and rank and file for essential training. Proposed psychological criteria include handling of disciplinary power by the company commander and the subjects of complaints, enlistment and reenlistments. Consideration was also given to the subjects of personnel turnover, civic education and leadership and social factors.

Where required, the historic and legal motivation for the criteria is elaborated and suggestions are made for determining the actual content and weight of the criteria according to their influence on readiness for different unit types.
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I. INTRODUCTION

When West Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1955 it was obliged to provide Armed Forces in a total strength of 500,000 men. Of those the Army in the Field had to comprise twelve constantly ready divisions. Because of the nature of this service and its requirements (i.e. less technical than Navy and Air Force and containing a much larger amount of jobs which require only short training) about forty percent of the manpower of the Army had to be draftees [Ref. 1: p. 218].

A. TRAINING CONCEPT

1. Development

In 1973 when the draft was reduced from eighteen to fifteen months, a new concept of training had to be introduced. This required a shift of the greatest amount of training onto the regular units in order to maintain a sufficient number of regular units at an acceptable level of readiness. With the old training concept the number of training units would have had to be increased at a cost to regular units resulting in fewer immediately deployable units.
The new concept reduced the basic training to three months. It is organized into a general part common to all services and a specialized part which provides basic skills of the military occupational speciality (MOS) of the conscript. The specialized training which is spread over the remaining twelve months of service time is performed in the regular units. It is composed of individual and team training which progresses from squad level to battalion level [Ref. 2].

In 1978 after some experience with the new system improved guidelines were issued to eliminate frictions and optimize training. Objectives were (1) to harmonize the instructions for basic and specialized training, (2) to derive the training objectives for the unit from its mission and the determining elements of the individual conscript's occupational task, (3) to organize the training with respect to these learning objectives, (4) to reorganize the training material with respect to training programs, subprograms and training topics, (5) to determine a mean time for the instructions, (6) to provide all units with new, easier to use training materials and (7) to develop uniform guidelines for the checks to determine if the training objectives were reached [Ref. 3: p. 199].
2. **General Training Schedule**

As the cornerstone of the special training material the Instruction for the Troop Training Number 2 (ITT2) was issued [Ref. 4]. These ITT2s exist in about eighty different outfits according to the different company types in the Army. The selection and organisation of the training objectives in the various ITT2s is derived from the employment principles of the specific branch of the Army and should enable the respective company to participate successfully in the combined arms combat. To lead to this objective it provides (1) the topics to continue the individual training of the conscripts such that they are independently able to master their tasks and defend themselves and (2) provides the employment and operating principles for squads, platoons and the company translated into training topics [Ref. 5: p.11].

3. **Regular Unit Training**

The specialized training in the regular units starts with a two week introductory training for the newly assigned draftees to make them familiar with the regular company, their home for the rest of their service time. It is further intended to be the beginning of the integration of
the conscripts into their squad. This period is followed by individual training and by training on squad, platoon and company level.

The training schedule comprises a total of 1980 hours for the four specialized training quarters (220 days with nine hours per day). The material is comprised of seventeen percent general training, forty-five percent special training, twenty-three percent other training, and fifteen percent time for disposition of the commander.

The training topics are also organized with respect to four categories. (1) The introductory training contains about eighty hours of training presented parallel to the regular schedule. (2) The assigned training, which contains 1190 hours comprises most of the MOS specific training to be performed only in the specific quarter to which it is assigned. (3) Not assigned training consists of 500 hours with general duties and guard duty, organizing and disposition time. (4) Additional training is to be performed on orders when local conditions are appropriate such as engineer training, air defense shooting, and winter combat training [Ref. 6: p.12].
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. Instructions

The other important ITT, the Instruction for the Troops Training Number 6 (ITT6) which provided the reason for this thesis, was issued in 1981 and has the subtitle The Company Inspection in the Army [Ref. 7]. It requires an inspection of each company at least every fifteen months by its battalion commander to evaluate the training and readiness of the unit.

2. Inspection Requirements

The inspection consists of three parts.

Part one covers the inspection to be held in the barracks. It contains a knowledge test, instruction in civic education and leadership, training and drill on general equipment and weapons, maintenance, sports etc.

Part two, the inspection of the unit's combat task performance, is the most important part of the company inspection and the result cannot be compensated for by performances in the other parts.

Part three is the evaluation of the physical and professional achievements and results of other inspections since the last company inspection [Ref. 8: pp.11-13].
Design and evaluation of the inspection is the sole responsibility of the respective battalion commander. He has to combine in his final evaluation of a company's readiness the result of the company inspection with his findings of his supervision of the company over the past fifteen months [Ref. 9: pp. 14-15].

The assessment has to be stated in one of the four categories:

**FULLY READY:** The performance meets the requirements without exception.

**READY:** Performance meets the requirements.

**MARGINALLY READY:** The performance shows deficiencies but in general still meets the requirements.

**NOT READY:** The performance does not meet the requirements in general or with respect to important parts [Ref. 10: p. 15].

C. CRITIQUE

These very general guidelines for the evaluation and assessment of unit performance and readiness have several weaknesses. They are with respect to the reliability and meaningfulness of the personnel reporting system similar to the critique of the US Army Training and Evaluation Program
(ARTEP) by Medlin [Ref. 11], Golub [Ref. 12], Madison and others [Ref. 13].

The guidelines provide neither complete standardized performance variables or behavioral objectives nor effective or efficient measurement procedures which reflect readiness criteria derived from historic data, research or statistically evaluated expert opinions. Instead they rely on the subjective unaided opinion of the individual battalion commander, his choice of the readiness criteria and their evaluation and weighting in the final assessment.

The complexity of modern military units and the fact that there exist vast amounts of manuals and regulations regarding every aspect of military functioning, especially training, compounds the problem of performing meaningful assessment of performance. The training of an infantry battalion, for example, is regulated by about three-hundred manuals, fifty of which must be known in detail to the commander [Ref. 14: p. 87].

The ITT6 does not contain a part which deals exclusively with personnel criteria and subsequently does not provide guidelines for the evaluation of existing data and reports and procedures to acquire additional data. It further does
not provide procedures for measuring objectively and efficiently individual and unit performances, i.e., how to
design and set up this important part of the inspection and
how, when, and on what level to gather data. There also
exists little direction to provide effective feedback for
the unit's training.

Further does the ITT6 neither make proposals for ade-
quate changes in individual and unit training programs, nor
suggest actions to improve personnel deficiencies as the
result of an inspection while staying within the frame of
the 1980 annual training hours. This is even more important
as the actual average time a unit is on duty is about 2800
hours per year as a result of field exercises and other
additional requirements [Ref. 15: p. 255].

Finally ITT6's most important deficiency is that it does
not provide reference points or benchmarks for the battalion
commander to guide him in the determination of the readiness
category to which a unit belongs.

Because human judgement represents the decisive factor
in the evaluation process it has to be aided and provided
with efficient measurement procedures and explicit criterion
to be able to arrive at results which can be compared to the
performance standards, the performance at a different time and/or under other conditions of the same unit and with the performance of other units.

D. SCOPE OF EFFORT

In this thesis it is intended to propose criteria for the evaluation of personnel readiness during a company inspection which could aid the battalion and company commander and lead to a more standardized, objective and efficient inspection and assessment of the readiness of a unit. It may further provide basic information for a new company commander about the essential responsibilities he has with respect to personnel.

The approach is to organize the readiness factors for a company into sets of four functions. (1) personnel readiness, (2) training, (3) mission performance during a field exercise and (4) material readiness.

Criteria and procedures to evaluate mission performance and material readiness are available on NATO level in programs such as the Tactical Evaluation (TACEVAL) for the Air Force, the Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) for the Navy and the recently developed Operational Readiness Training
Program (ORTP) for land forces [Ref. 16]. Because of national differences and other problems, personnel readiness is only evaluated in these inspections with respect to personnel present for deployment.

For personnel readiness criteria have to be found which are comprehensive and simple enough to be handled with reasonable effort and with paper and pencil.

A further step has to be the definition of guidelines to aid the commander in the determination of performance standards for the time of the inspection during a specific quarter.

The final step consists of suggestions for measurement and evaluation.
II. PERSONNEL READINESS

In order to evaluate personnel readiness, criteria which are applicable to all companies must be developed. Its two elements, physical and psychological factors, are of fundamental importance.

Although one can argue that training is a logical third factor of personnel readiness, in the current effort training is separated from the other two factors and should be evaluated as a separate function.

A. PHYSICAL FACTORS

1. General Remarks

The physical readiness manifested in numbers of soldiers, plays an important role in political discussions within NATO. The number of ready troops provided for the joined defense are critically watched because of their importance for a credible deterrence against the Warsaw Pact. The nature of the threat, 400,000 Soviet troops alone, organized in twenty-five divisions of the highest readiness category are stationed within an area of 150 kilometers depth east of the boarder of NATO's central
region and the NATO doctrine of Forward Defense which means to engage the attacker at the border with own ground troops. The doctrine was developed as a result of the fact that within 150 kilometers west of the border live approximately twenty million people and twenty-five percent of the German industrial capacity [Ref. 17: p. 124].

This high readiness is even more important since the majority of the NATO forces in the central region have to move on the average more than 200 kilometers to reach their deployment positions determined in the general defense plan (GDP) [Ref. 18: p. 18]. In order to utilize the assumed sixty hour warning period before an attack [Ref. 19: p. 24] to bring the units to full war strength by reservists and to reach the GNP positions, the units have to be kept at an high level of readiness with respect to present personnel and training status.

In order to keep the regular units in an acceptable training status, compensate instantly for personnel losses and thus guarantee permanent readiness, one fifth of the personnel of an Army unit has to be replaced at the beginning of each quarter. This has the effect that about twenty percent of a unit’s personnel is in its first, second, third...
or fourth training quarter. The other twenty percent are enlisted personnel. As the draftee is not considered to be completely trained before passing through all four quarters, a company's readiness can therefore never reach the maximum level.

But the total number of enlisted men or field units alone is not sufficient to derive a deterrence value. In order to get meaningful readiness figures, the number of personnel present on company level has to be evaluated.

2. Operating Strength

a. Reporting System

The actual procedure in the German Army for reporting personnel figures concerning authorized strength, actual strength and presence for training with respect to officers, NCOs and rank and file is the report to the battalion staff every morning.

b. Table of Organization and Establishment (TOE) Strength

(1) War TOE. The basis for the number and grades of personnel available in a company is the TOE which is derived from the war mission of the unit and authorized by parliament. There are two different TOEs in the Army, a
war TOE and a peace TOE. The TOE for the war situation is intended to be brought to full strength with reservists and equipment after NATO has declared a general alert and which comprises then about one million men, which includes the peace strength.

(2) **Peace TOE.** The peace TOE is bound to the 340,000 men limit and therefore results in various degrees of cadreing depending on the required availability of forces for deterrence. Besides the cadreing, the proportion of draftees compared to enlisted is of importance. In a regular Army unit such as a communication company, it is about eighty to twenty percent.

For the Army in the Field, assigned to NATO, the brigades as the smallest formation capable to conduct the combined arms combat have the highest personnel readiness with an average of eighty seven percent war time TOE personnel while the respective numbers for the divisional troops and the corps troops are fifty-one and forty-six percent.

In the Territorial Army, which remains under national command after general alert and has the mission to secure the area behind the corps, there exist only stored equipment during peace time with the exception of some
engineer, military police, and signal units and the twelve home defense brigades which may reach a TOE strength of up to seventy percent.

c. Authorized Strength

But because of additional peace time functions for the Armed Forces such as training and administration which are not all covered in the TOE and general budget restrictions, personnel have to be deducted from the regular units' peace TOE. This shortage of personnel results not only in the cancellation of billets but also in their devaluation. Officer billets are degraded to NCO billets and draftees fill the billets of NCOs.

d. Reduction Causes

(1) Training Programs. A further reduction of a unit's available personnel is caused by an ever increasing demand for military and civilian training courses and the very limited personnel reserve of only 12,000 billets [Ref. 20: p. 13]. These billets are primarily occupied by those officers and NCOs who attend long training programs like the four year officer cadet training at Armed Forces Universities or civilian education during the last eighteen months of their tour for those NCOs who enlisted for twelve or
fifteen years. All personnel who attend training courses of less than two years duration have to remain on their TOE position in their unit and thus are not only not available for training and deployment but also block a billet for another soldier who cannot be enlisted or promoted.

All these conditions reduce the actual strength present in a company to an average of eighty percent of the peace TOE [Ref. 21: p. 16]. This number often is even smaller with respect to the leadership of a unit who are the primary participants in the longer education programs.

Some of these deficiencies have been compensated for by the deployment of civilian workers in certain areas such as administration and maintenance and a general 5.4 percent surplus of draftees [Ref. 22: p. 220]. But this surplus does not make up for the insufficient qualification of the draftees with respect to the higher valued billet they eventually occupy.

(2) Qualification. The qualification of the draftees for their MOS with respect to physical and psychological criteria and skills also creates problems. In 1978/79 the demand for draftees for the Signal Corps with the required traits could only be eighty-six percent
satisfied (Ref. 23: p. 116). This number of optimally qualified personnel for training and employment can further be reduced where these draftees are needed in sensitive areas such as communication centers, where a clearance is required before they can be trained on crypto equipment or handle classified messages. The security check is performed by the military counter intelligence and requires about two months. Because of the costs it cannot be initiated before the draftees have been assigned to their future occupation. The number of those who are screened out can be significant. Reasons, besides personal debts, are primarily frequent visits to East Germany or close relatives who live there.

(3) Transfers. Other reasons for shortfalls in draftees' strength are personnel transfers without replacement. Such transfers are mainly motivated by personal circumstances. The overwhelming number of applications for transfers is motivated by the desire to get closer to home or get back into the education process. For example a draftee's service time can be reduced when he proves that he has signed up for a civilian training program which can only be joined once a year. If this date falls within the last quarter of his tour, he may be allowed to leave the services early.
(4) **Status Changes.** Reductions in the strength of rank and file of a unit are also caused by those conscripts who sign in and enter into the officer or NCO cadet training. Additional reasons are changes from enlistment to draft or applications to be exempted from serving in the military.

Because many of these causes for reducing the respective operating strength of a unit are out of the reach and responsibility of a company commander they cannot be blamed on the unit in the readiness evaluation. However, for example, the shortage of personnel, especially in the leadership presence, will influence motivation, effectiveness of training and maintenance and can limit a unit's ability to perform assigned missions successfully.

3. **MOS-filled Positions**

a. Reporting Procedure

(1) **German Army.** The presently valid personnel reporting system in the German Army concerning the MOS positions requires a report of each unit as of the fifth of the first month of a new quarter. The most important criteria for the personnel which occupies these positions are rank, required and acquired MOSs, status and a statement about the
actual occupation of the inhabitant of each position. Deviating occupations can be platoon leader, an administrative job in the battalion staff, detachments to a basic training company or service school for a training course.

(2) US Army. The US Army MOS readiness condition (REDCON) rating system consists of four categories C-1 to C-4. Each category represents an interval between the margins of eighty-six percent of full TOE strength for category C-1 and sixty-eight percent for category C-4. This percentages of the TOE strength is personnel, who are qualified to perform the duties of the position to which they are assigned.

The deficiencies of present valid system are the possibilities to match up enlisted personnel two pay grades higher than their rank and to consider an individual in on-the-job training (OJT) capable of performing well on the MOS position [Ref. 24 p. 17].

b. Enlisted

Because the personnel management for officers and NCOs is centralized, mismatches of rank or MOS are not accepted. A corporal may have to wait for a billet to become vacant if he does not want to be transferred after
acquiring all requirements for sergeant. But it is, on the other hand, possible to keep sergeants with adequate rank in a position for which they do not have the adequate MOS when their retraining is authorized. This often happens in the case of TOE changes to keep good personnel and reduce the number of transfers.

Despite centralized personnel management within the services, there still remain the important functions of personnel selection, scheduling of training and reenlistment for the individual company commander.

c. Draftees

For draftees and short term enlisted the situation with respect to the MOS is quite different. Here the companies are primarily responsible for personnel management.

All draftees acquire the necessary first MOS for their occupation in the regular unit at the end of the three months basic training program. They may also acquire the military drivers license as a second MOS. Although their skills and knowledge are very limited after this short training there is no further MOS test scheduled during the twelve months of their specialized training in the regular units.
Besides this and the lack of OJT in units which are not performing a peace time mission close to the war mission, the US Army REDCON rating system cannot be directly applied to the German Army.

d. Parallel Training

However there are MOSs for secondary or very specialized functions which have to be acquired in the regular units. These are in cryptology, administration and maintenance. But the majority of MOS awarding is for those draftees who have to be reassigned a MOS because of shortfalls in personnel critical to a unit's readiness. It is also often practiced for example in units with a large number of the same MOSs such as teletype operator, to pick replacements for the few administrative jobs which have similar prerequisites from those teletype operators.

There are also several additional functions in a company which have to be taken care of by the existing personnel without being defined in the TDE or having an MOS. But these additional functions are essential in order to conduct an effective training program and will secure the survivability of a unit under combat conditions. Examples are the squad per platoon for operating and maintaining the
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense equipment, squads for fire fighting and salvage and rescue operations, first aid personnel or instructors for marksmanship, tank and aircraft defense [Ref. 25: p. 30].

4. Availability for Training

The decision of the Army to transfer the specialized training for the draftees into the regular units and spread it over the entire twelve months of their service time in order to reach a maximum number of available units, increased the problem of soldiers not being available for training because they were occupied with other duties.

As the overall requirements for regular units were not reduced but on the contrary a variety of peace time demands were added, this permanent problem of too few soldiers attending regular training was built into the system. It is often a favourite inspection topic during unannounced inspections by higher commanders.

a. Additional MOS

The variety of additional functions demanded by manuals and orders which are in addition to the twenty-five percent secondary functions of all TCE posts [Ref. 26]. Examples for occupations which require additional training
time are NBC defense, first aid, salvage and rescue, fire fighting, operating special equipment and administrative functions in a communication center. Most of this training has to be conducted parallel to the regular training required for the primary MOS function.

b. Administration

The administrative jobs, at least those within a battalion, are rarely adequately manned to enable the performance of regular work, not to mention those times when the occupant is attending a training course or on leave. These shortages require additional attachments of personnel from other MOSs to ensure continuous operation.

c. Inspections

The great number of inspections (about thirty per year) for a regular army unit [Ref. 27: p. 129] requires careful preparation. But the preparation time provided by the annual training schedule is not nearly sufficient. This problem is intensified by the fact that especially the exterior inspections from division or corps level have shifted from functional checks to more general checks. They include for example the finish of vehicles [Ref. 28] which increases the required preparation time dramatically.
d. Extra Duties

A further area of functions which detract personnel from training are guard duty, transfer of material, administrative matters, detachments to officer and NCO messes or attendance at sports or other competition teams during preparations or a competition which represent the unit or the battalion.

e. Medical Problems

This category comprises reasons which limit the deployability of soldiers. The exemptions which have a major impact on readiness and occur most frequently are those which are concerning outdoor training, sports, marching, carrying a helmet or weapon etc. Absence from training and exercises is also caused by those soldiers who go to see a doctor or are transferred to central hospitals or civilian specialists for treatment.

f. Additional Leave

A final category is that created by soldiers on additional leave for extra duties or outstanding performance. This problem is created by the significantly higher weekly service time of fifty-six hours for nearly eighty percent of all Army units [Ref. 29: p. 21] and the fact that
the pay for soldiers is the same as for all other civil
servants who work forty hours a week.

Because the financial resources are very scarce,
only about thirtyfive dollars per month are presently paid
for enlisted and about twenty for draftees. A common way to
make up for this extra time is to allow extra leave. But
these extra days off can only be taken during regular train-
ing, because there are many events which require maximum
personnel presence such as field exercises, inspections, the
general holiday period where a fifty percent presence is
mandatory and for phases of training considered vital.

The problem has recently been intensified by an
order of the Inspector General of the Army to reduce the
average weekly duty time by four hours in order to save com-
pensatory pay. This constitutes a great challenge for all
commanders because neither the mission requirements nor
training requirements were reduced.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

1. General Remarks

The evaluation of psychological factors determining
personnel readiness is the most difficult and controversial
part of the evaluation of a military unit. Because the
difficulties in assessing them objectively under the conditions of an inspection are so complex, even for trained personnel, they are often omitted or only very superficially addressed.

a. Historic Background

The public discussion in Germany about the military over the last twenty years was dominated by topics and problems of primarily psychological origin. The role of the Armed Forces and their integration into the democratic society has been the recipient of such discussion and critique. Phrases like 'citizen in uniform' and 'civic education and leadership' and the traits they represent were widely discussed but never found entrance into any performance evaluation for personnel.

The intensity and controversy of those discussions was caused and based on the role the military played in German History in this century. It basically caused the involvement into two world wars which ended with disastrous defeats, the death of over five million soldiers and civilians, eleven million refugees and the reduction of the free part of the nation to nearly one third of its 1914 extension. The military was further despised for its involvement in the atrocities organized and committed by the Nazis.
All these resentments had to be overcome with the reinstallation of Armed Forces in 1956. In addition the widespread unwillingness to serve as draftees, the separation from friends and families, disruption of the education and a drastic reduction in income were arguments against the services.

b. Theoretical Model

These historic and actual realities stood in sharp contrast to the model designed to establish effective Armed Forces which were capable of defending the country based on a democratic constitution. This concept required, in order to function properly, draftees which were convinced citizens and accepted the draft as a necessary contribution to their country.

In reality draftees were at best indifferent towards their duties and were widely ignorant of the basic rules of their society and their freedom because of the failure of the public school system to teach these principles and nourish an appreciation for their society and its supporting ideals.

By realizing this fact the Armed Forces received an additional mission of providing basic information about
the principles and laws of the German Constitution and providing draftees with the general defense motivation which means to be willing to fight for their country. The Armed Forces were hardly prepared for this additional responsibility. Reasons for the limited success in handling this problem were the scarce time reserved for the instructions, an environment which must be considered inappropriate for learning about rights and freedom and the generally incomplete education of officers and NCOs for this demanding task.

Nevertheless progress had to be made in this essential area of motivation. Without it, all efforts in training and drill to handle the military hardware, to create confidence in this equipment and in the validity of the military doctrine and leadership would not make much sense. There would not be the willingness on the part of draftees to apply them in a conflict without proper psychological preparation.

c. Special Considerations

Psychological factors are widely considered to be the decisive elements when analysing or comparing forces with respect to their combat value. It is always emphasized that the willingness to fight is at least as important as the capability to fight.
Napoleon was convinced that the weight of morale compared to the strength of forces are three to one [Ref. 30]. Analysts, for example, assess the morale of NATO forces higher than that of the Red Army which seems to be downgraded by the class system, ethical differences, cut off of relations with the civilian population etc. [Ref. 31]. However, there are on the other hand no studies available which analyze the effects of drug abuse, the peace movement or the nuclear freeze discussion on the motivation and morale of NATO soldiers.

To motivate soldiers is a complex and demanding process especially when they are draftees. It can be stated that to motivate services in the military in democratic societies based on the rights and freedoms of the individual is much harder to accomplish than it is in an authoritarian system which bases motivation by hatred against an enemy.

Motivation is even more important during war when stress of inexperience, intensity of action and the death of close friends require individual adjustment.

Further, it seems plausible that there is a significant difference between the situation during an announced inspection in peace time where problems are seen
as challenges which are over after a known amount of time and the uncertainties of a war situation [Ref. 32: p. 457].

A final aspect in assessing psychological factors is that the overall readiness can be far lower than the individual parameters indicate because of the effect of the mix. This means that the individual components do not simply add up [Ref 33: p. 10] or in other words the total is smaller than the sum of the parts.

2. **Disciplinary Power**

a. **Range**

The official function of a company commander is the lowest level to which disciplinary power is assigned by Armed Forces Law. It is the one area with the greatest influence and gives the inhabitant his unique, independent and 'royal' position. This position requires in return a great sense of responsibility to apply this power and to achieve the military and educational goals determined by law and by the manuals.

Primary objectives are education to faithful service, gallantry, obedience, discipline and fellowship. Some of these, as the principle of order and obedience, are characteristic of the military and have to be maintained.
faithfully in order to ensure the effective functioning of the military system.

b. Disciplinary Means

(1) Formal Recognitions. For outstanding performance or examples of dedicated service the company commander is provided with disciplinary means which authorize him to award a certificate and extra leave up to five days. The formal recognition has also to be announced in an order to the unit.

Generally it can be stated that positive reinforcement will improve motivation. When the handling of the disciplinary power is conceived as the result of sensitive supervision by the company commander, it will improve morale and increase readiness [Ref. 34: p. 457]. At the moment the proportion is significantly unbalanced to the disadvantage of acknowledgements. In 1978 there were 64 038 offences reported compared to 22 695 acknowledgements [Ref. 35: p. 199].

(2) Disciplinary Measures. The disciplinary law provides five categories of disciplinary measures to achieve the goals of enforcing orders, ensure discipline and to
They range from rebukes over curfews, fines (up to one month pay) to confinement up to seven days. When his powers are insufficient or when it is required by law, the company commander has to report those cases to his battalion commander or to military or civilian prosecutors.

3. Complaints
   a. Importance

Another aspect of the disciplinary power is the function the company commander has with respect to complaints. This subject is of tremendous importance for the defense motivation of the soldiers. Because of the reduced personal rights and the subordination under the principle of order and obedience, the procedure of experiencing legality and just, unbiased treatment becomes vital. Part of the justice and fairness of the system soldiers are committed to defend is the opportunity and procedure by which they can restore violated rights or receive their entitlements.

The company commander is obliged by law to decide about written complaints of his subordinates within certain time limits and state his findings, what parts of it he accepts and what his measures were to reestablish the rights of the complaining soldier.
b. Categories

(1) Service Complaints. The first category comprises all those complaints which have as subject events and facts of the daily service. The main topics are the behavior of leaders, given orders, educational measures and guard and presence duties. Presence duties comprise personnel for essential functions who are available during the off-duty time to ensure security and immediate reaction in case of an alarm.

(2) Disciplinary Complaints. If a soldier complains about a disciplinary measure of his company commander, the battalion commander has to decide on the merits of the complaint. In the case of a complaint against confinement, it has to be decided by a military judge who in the first place had to give his permission to execute the confinement.

(3) Administrative Complaints. A third category of complaints are those which are directed against measures of the Armed Forces Administration such as disputes about pay or benefits. They have to be reported by the company commander to the Armed Forces Administration for decision.
4. Evaluation

a. Objectives

The evaluation of his subordinate officers and NCOs is one of the most important responsibilities of a company commander and also part of his position as disciplinary leader. The objectives in applying this responsibility of evaluation are to provide means to select and advance qualified personnel and to help them in the process of self-education. Because of the great importance for the career of the respective soldiers and on their morale and readiness, the evaluations have to be drafted very carefully to maintain a climate of cooperation in the unit.

An evaluation has to be delivered every two years and consisting of about twenty individual criteria are summed up in a letter grade which categorizes the general ability and further advancement chances of the evaluated individual, and a number grade to appraise the performance of the present occupant of the billet.

b. Areas of Impact

(1) Promotion. The primary use of evaluation is to determine eligibility for promotion. The personnel offices of the services calculate out of the available data
qualification lists, which are service wide, to determine those NCOs who can be promoted if it is possible in their present billet.

(2) Career Jobs. Evaluations have a very important input into the process of selecting NCOs for a career job. NCOs can apply to enlist for a career, which means to stay until retirement at age fifty-three, after they have finished the sergeant course and received an evaluation on a sergeant billet. If they are not accepted for career they have to retire after a maximal enlistment time of fifteen years.

The letter grade of the last evaluation and the number grade of the last three evaluations, with different weights assigned, can make up to seventy percent of the points required to qualify for a career job as NCO. The remaining points are determined by the results of the sergeant course and marginal credit is also given for age, rare qualifications, fitness and the results of military competitions.

(3) Master Sergeant. A similar system exists to determine those who are eligible for master sergeant and those of the master sergeants who receive additional pay.
c. Procedures

Because of the far reaching consequences of an evaluation on the individual's career it is very important for their motivation and job satisfaction that they feel sufficiently informed and counseled by their company commander on their career and promotion chances [Ref. 36: p. 456].

(1) Information. The data which are available for the briefings on evaluations are the average figures of each branch of the Army from the last evaluation with respect to frequency of letter and number grade for each rank. Information on career chances is also available from the required point score for the preceding year's selection. With these information every NCO can evaluate his actual chances.

(2) Interview. The most important part of the evaluation process is the permanent contact between company commander and the individual to be evaluated. Only by regular evaluation interviews can one be assured that the requirements for good performance are known and accepted and the necessary feedback is available. Interviews are prerequisites for improvement of performance and can lead to job satisfaction. It should be understood that the provided
averages can serve only as a general orientation. Each evaluation has to be determined by the individual conditions and achievements.

5. Enlistment and Reenlistment

a. Situation

The majority of the enlistments take place outside the influence of the regular unit as people enlist prior to the beginning of the draft or in the basic training unit. Even though the personnel management is centralized, there remains a decisive responsibility within the units to recruit and select the proper personnel and apply in time for their training and education courses. An important number of potential volunteers are influenced in their decision to enlist by experience in their unit.

The emphasis in the regular unit with respect to enlistment has to be put into counseling and selection of those officers and NCOs who are needed to keep all billets continuously manned and who are especially qualified and willing to be transferred after enlistment.

The importance to the individual companies in reenlisting their own NCOs is further emphasized by the fact that the NCOs often stay for their total enlistment time or career with the same unit.
Therefore the emphasis in the regular unit with respect to enlistment has to be put into consultation and selection of those officers and NCOs who are needed to keep all billets continuously manned or who are especially qualified and willing to be transferred after enlistment.

b. Requirements

Because the personnel management is centralized and therefore less flexible, detailed and long term planning for cadets' and enlisted's careers is necessary. This is further emphasized by the variety of requirements for additional training and education. Every enlisted soldier has to be assigned to a training and employment category based on the demand in the unit and primarily his civilian education and qualifications.

The regular NCO candidate for the communication operating category is required to have successfully finished an apprenticeship in a civilian administrative job. This requirement is relatively easy to meet because the vast majority of the draftees in a communication operating company are out of civilian administrative sectors.

For the communication control category it is much harder to find draftees with the required technical
apprenticeship which are willing to enlist. A primary reason is that the demand for them in the marketplace is also very high and they are well compensated in the civilian community.

c. Training Offer

The willingness to enlist or reenlist is quite different between the branches of the Army, depending on its attractiveness and the type of qualifications which can be achieved during an enlistment. Because the majority of the enlistees are unsatisfied with their present civilian occupation or want to improve their education [Ref. 37: p. 82], the type and possibility of education during service time is very important.

1) Apprenticeship. The main attraction for a four year enlistment is the offer to provide the applicants with the chance to complete an apprenticeship during that time. As shown in several studies, the primary reason for sixty-eight percent of the enlistees for four or more years is the desire for better training or training at all [Ref. 38: p. 81].

While the apprenticeship for an administrative job can be completed in a three months training course, that
for the technical jobs requires a year long effort of practical and theoretical courses. This training has to be synchronized with the military NCO training which takes fifteen months.

Only if personnel selection and planning is done at the very beginning of an enlistment can candidates finish the desired education within the four years. Changes of a curriculum or inadequate planning result in delays and the necessity to reenlist for additional years which often is an obstacle for enlistment or extension.

(2) Other Training. For the NCOs with eight or more years of enlistment, there exists a variety of training possibilities. They range from licences for driving instructors through crafts training to undergraduate education. The attendance in those courses can be during the service time in connection with career courses or at the end of the enlistment time to increase the chances for a civilian career. For such training, an enlistee is eligible as a result of his commitment to the Armed Forces and training is considered a part of his service time. All those courses which are not formal training courses required by the billet, are organized by the Armed Forces vocational promotion
service. It provides about twenty model courses of initial and retraining and offers many possibilities for further education in crafts. The interested soldier can also satisfy school qualifications from secondary school to senior high school.

All these training courses can be attended after duty hours. But the successful participation of an enlisted depends in part on the support of his unit.

6. Personnel Turnover

a. Problem

The turnover rate of personnel constitutes a severe problem for the readiness of a unit and cannot be analysed from unit strength. It was observed during World War II that the readiness of units remained relatively unchanged as long as the replacements were small enough to be integrated by the 'nucleus' of a unit [Ref. 39].

There are three personnel groups to be considered with respect to the turnover problem. Each is subject to specific conditions and has its own impacts on the readiness of a unit.
b. Officers

For officers the average time in a unit is relatively short but often double the time of their US Army equivalents. In 1979 forty percent of all captains stayed for three years with the same unit [Ref. 40: p. 132]. This is also the average time desired for a company commander to be assigned to a unit.

c. NCOs

For NCOs, especially the ranks of sergeant, the time with the same unit is significantly higher than that of officers. In 1979 thirty-two percent of all sergeants remained in the same unit for four to six years and fifteen percent even longer, whereas only four percent were less than a year with their present unit [Ref. 41: p. 132]. These numbers look even better under the aspect that an enlisted needs at least four years service time before he can be promoted to sergeant. In the case of master sergeants the stationarity is even greater. In 1979 forty percent were assigned to the same unit for longer than seven years. With this information it is quite obvious the important role NCOs play with respect to continuity and solidarity. Essentially they constitute the 'backbone' of a unit.
d. Draftees

(1) **Replacement Cycle.** The draftees stay for twelve months with their assigned unit. This seems optimal with respect to the total fifteen months of their service time. However, the circumstances which detract from this positive picture are the quarterwise replacement of personnel. In order to maintain non-combat units at a high presence and at an acceptable readiness level, this procedure of exchanging about twenty percent of the personnel of each unit every quarter was established. The negative effects of this procedure are primarily psychological.

Three areas of impact can be distinguished.

A. **Group Cohesion.** The permanent turbulence created by this procedure prevent the establishing of personal and group relations within squads, platoons and the unit as a whole. The compositions of the teams within the unit is constantly changing.

B. **Social Aspects.** Another kind of effect is the building of a social hierarchy among the draftees, depending on the quarter they joined the unit. Those conscripts who are in the last quarter of their service time occupy the top position. They have the best knowledge of
procedures and persons in their unit whereas the newly attached are uncertain about the military life and therefore are at the bottom of the social hierarchy. This development is a threat to the basic requirement of establishing a sense of comradeship.

C. Training Status. Another effect of the replacement rhythm is on a unit's training status. That means it makes quite a difference with respect to performance to have in one telecommunication team four soldiers out of four enlistment quarters on a truck or four groups of ten draftees from different quarters in the platoon which run a telecommunication center. In the case of the platoon is it much easier to maintain a higher performance level, because a specialization of the MOSs is possible. Those specialized functions can be mastered in a short time. This specialization is impossible for the team on the truck because it has to operate in two shifts where both men must be able to perform all functions.

Another negative effect of the quarterwise replacement of personnel is a certain amount of repetition of instruction for those draftees in the higher training quarters. Although it cannot be totally avoided, the degree
of repetition is inversely proportional to the availability of NCOs, because the draftees cannot be split into different performance classes.

(2) Transfers. Another problem contributing to the turnover rate and also of major concern in the public discussion is the distance between the home and the assigned unit of a soldier. As the locations of the military installations do not coincide with the population centers, assignments far from home are inevitable. Furthermore the short service time and the technology level in the Armed Forces require careful personnel selection with respect to abilities and qualifications of the draftees in order to save training time and get the best qualified man in the right place. Great progress has been made over the past years and in 1978 about seventy-five percent of all draftees could be assigned to units within one hundred miles of their hometown [Ref. 42: p. 282]. But there remains a problem because this percentage cannot be further improved. Especially for those garrisons which are located in remote areas, the problem can be very pressing when the situation is further complicated by bad traffic connections. One study indicated [Ref. 43: p. 293], two thirds of all draftees recommend the
close to home assignments as the best way to increase enlistments.

The reasons for transfer applications of draftees to assignments closer to home can be subdivided into three categories:

A. Social Contacts. To maintain contacts with their friends, families and girlfriends are the primary motivation for draftees to drive home at every possible opportunity [Ref. 44: p. 911]. These same reasons were given in applications of draftees for transfers to other units. In reality these reasons are not acceptable. The far from home assignment is a reasonable hardship of the draft.

B. Family Support. The second category contains applications justified by required family support. If an applicant could prove that his presence at home after the duty hours was required because he was the only son to help his handicapped parents or to maintain the family business, he had a good chance to be transferred.

C. Marriage. Separated couples have not been an important problem because married men used to be exempted from the draft. Those who marry during the time in the services usually get transferred close to home.
D. Policy. The general policy has been for the commanders of all levels to recommend a transfer only if it would not endanger the readiness of the unit. This criteria requires the establishment of a policy, at least within a battalion, to ensure even handling of the applications. The policy may be different between the branches of the Army and even within them, for example, a communication company of a division loses with each man one out of the team of four required to employ a communication truck. In a stationary communication company on the other hand a redistribution and reassignment of functions after the loss of individuals is relatively easy and does not represent a major impact on the readiness of the unit.

But the distance to home need not have only negative effects on the readiness of a company. If, for example, a policy is maintained which makes clear what the expectations for performance and conduct are by which additional duties can be avoided and the trip home every weekend can be assured, the willingness to cooperate is widespread among conscripts.

(3) Early Release. A new aspect which reduced the readiness of a unit dramatically came with increasing
unemployment. Because of the reality that not all persons eligible for the draft were needed in the Armed Forces and the fact that several employers started training courses only once a year, a policy was established by the Ministry of Defense (MOD). It led to deny release to those draftees in the last quarter of their service time, thereby forcing them to miss a civilian training course for at least nine months, would mean an unacceptable hardship. Those draftees who could prove that they had a contract for such an apprenticeship could be recommended for early release.

7. Civic Education and Leadership
   a. Public Education

   The public education has significantly improved in Germany over the past decade with respect to education about the rights and duties of the individual in a democratic society and the necessity of contributions from the citizens to maintain this society. But despite the fact that the majority of the population has since 1949 only experienced a democratic form of state, the draft is still far from being considered a vital contribution to society. Therefore information and instructions about the functioning of the society and its basic principles with a change in emphasis are still required during the service time.
b. Civic education

(1) Knowledge. The primary aim of civic education is to provide the soldiers with the motivation for their occupation. For this knowledge of the basic facts of their nation and its constitution and laws is an elementary requirement. In the sixties the principle topics were information about the legal basis for the military, the place of the Armed Forces in the democratic society, the rights and duties of soldiers and the correct treatment of subordinates. In the seventies a shift took place from these legal aspects towards more psychological aspects such as the motivation of the soldiers for the required duties, the personal relation between superiors and subordinates and the importance of trust and group cohesion for readiness [Ref. 45: p. 25].

(2) Information. A further very important aspect for civic education is the manner, kind and detail in which information are provided and by whom. Because this problem of building confidence and trust into the leadership and the military in general is of great importance in peacetime. During a war this process is essential for maintaining effective units because the demand for information is
immense and will be satisfied with rumors if there are no established channels and confidence in the leadership during normal operations. This process has to be analyzed not only with respect to the capabilities of the company commander and the platoon leaders but in particular in terms of the corporals who maintain the closest contact to rank and file. In addition as they belong to roughly the same age group as the draftees they have a greater appreciation of their problems and needs than would be true of a thirty-five year old company commander. The difficulties of the NCOs will be with respect to articulation and argumentation because their education was different from that of high-school graduated draftees. In addition, they have the problem of maintaining their authority and a acceptable relationship with the conscripts.

(3) Experiencing Citizen's Rights. The objective here is to go beyond the improvement of knowledge and give the draftees an opportunity to experience the honoring of their rights during the everyday duties. Even though those rights are limited during their time with the services, they should get an appreciation of democratic principles as legality.
Concerning the commitment to democratic principles by the draftees, a study [Ref. 46: p. 109] suggested that it generally improved during time of service, but that the number of those who were convinced of the necessity of the draft decreased at the same time. The primary reason mentioned for this decrease was the feeling among conscripts of boredom, wasted time, unchallenging jobs, etc. To eliminate the reasons for these demotivating circumstances has to be a major concern of each company commander.

Means of accomplishing this are careful planning and organization of the weekly schedule and a permanent communication process that makes it understandable that a primary task of the military is to be present and that it is difficult with decreasing funds to organize a constantly challenging service time.

8. Social Factors

This final section contains the evaluation of all those factors which have an impact on the life of the draftee during his service time. They primarily impact on his leisure time and are within the influence of the company.
a. Living Quarters

(1) Personnel Arrangements. The primary target must be living conditions and quarters because the draftees are obliged to live in the barracks. An important aspect here is the number of occupants which normally varies between six and twelve soldiers per room. It should be a principle to locate those soldiers together who are employed in a team. This is even more important in order to make up for the negative effects of the quarterwise personnel replacement. The establishing of group cohesion and effective teams can be better supported by having its members live together. Although this may favor the building of a social hierarchy, this system ensures the quick integration of the newly assigned draftees into their team. The procedure to keep those groups together which were built in the basic training unit until the end of their service time, frequently results in vandalism directed against the furniture and the room. This release of their anger against the military usually occurs in their last quarter. This activity can be reduced by the presence of others who still have quite a time to serve and are interested in maintaining a tolerable conduct and a good condition of their quarters.
(2) **Material.** As a result of economical factors (i.e. the monthly pay for draftees is below one hundred dollars) draftees are required to remain in quarters during off-duty hours. It is therefore important that quarters be adequately maintained to make off-duty time as pleasant as possible. Measures have to be taken to improve the condition periodically and also to make the quarters more comfortable. e.g., providing paint and material for pinboards or purchasing table cloths and allowing certain arrangements of the furniture.

b. **Recreation Installations**

This category comprises mostly those installations which are provided by the MOD because of the infrastructural requirements and the costs. Examples are clubs for officers, NCOs and rank and file, autocare facilities, saunas, etc. But some of these facilities can also be installed in already existing buildings if the company commander applies for the change of utilization.

c. **Recreation Measures**

(1) **Group Activities.** In order to promote the objective of group cohesion during the off-duty time, several measures can be taken. The most common one is to
support social activities on platoon or company level or within the NCO corps by providing the facilities and/or transportation. Tours to public or other military installations as well as those of the allies are possible. Such activities are motivated by the desire to promote educational goals and improve interpersonal relations. A further area of frequent activities is the arrangement of sport activities and competitions.

(2) Individual Support. The means which are provided to help soldiers organize their off-duty time or even provide them with possibilities for activities are equally important and various. They can include the establishment of a recreation office, run by a draftee, which gathers information and organizes events and activities. Other measures are to provide books, newspapers, and entertainment electronics.

d. Funds

(1) Budget. The first source of financial resources are the funds annually provided in the military budget. These funds can only be spent for hardware which is listed in a specific regulation. The major things it can be spent for are TV and radio sets, sport equipment, and tools.
(2) **Canteens.** The second source is the money spent in the canteens inside the barracks. The lease agreement requires that a percentage of the monthly sales has to be transferred to the companies. The expenditures have to be authorized by a board consisting of the battalion commander, the company commanders, the head of the local Armed Forces Administration and the steward of the NCOs and of rank and file. This money can be spent in all those fields of recreation for which no funds are provided. This can be to buy presents for hospitalized soldiers, to honor outstanding draftees at the end of their service time with a book and to improve the dinner for those who are on duty over Christmas. Another way is to buy paint and material to improve the living quarters of the soldiers. The problem here is that there are official funds available but only in very long time intervals.

The criteria for the evaluation of the personnel readiness of a unit outlined in the previous two chapters represent those factors which are considered to be the single most important ones. Combinations of some of these factors result in readiness factors which should be evaluated in the other major parts of the company inspection. Such
combinations of personnel readiness criteria influence, for example, the performance in sports and shooting competitions and in general that during the field exercise.
III. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to achieve an adequate readiness evaluation the first step should be to determine from the mission, historical data and the experience of present and former commanders the variance of the factors, their weight and the benchmarks with respect to the four readiness categories of the ITT6 for all unit types.

An optimal design of the personnel readiness function can be determined, by developing and analysing different configurations of those criteria. This procedure will avoid the situation that where a high function value is achieved by concentration on a few lower priority areas.

A. PHYSICAL READINESS

1. Daily Personnel Strength Report

   a. Actual Strength

   The emphasis with respect to the benchmarks for actual strength is to show if the required strength for this unit type is maintained. This figure will change over the year and reach a low of fifty percent of the authorized
strength during the holiday season and the maximal value during exercises. These categories can consist of different intervals for officers, NCOs and rank and file depending on (1) formal training course requirements, (2) the mission of the unit, (3) its equipment and (4) the ratio of these three personnel categories to each other.

Further they have to be based on an evaluation of the average time a "standard" NCO is available in the unit expressed in man-weeks or man-days. That means, for example, for corporals who may have an average enlistment time of three years for this unit type, that they, by attending the required formal training courses for their MOS and those for secondary functions and their annual holidays are only available for their unit about seventeen months, about half of their enlistment time. A similar evaluation is required for sergeants and officers.

The reporting form should also show those groups or functions in a unit which are critical with respect to its deployability such as control and crypto personnel in a communication company.

These data could be analysed during a company inspection with respect to the readiness category the
unit has belonged to during most of the training or during exercises and provide the basis to evaluate the observed performance. It could for example show the effect of planning and organization within a unit to achieve a high degree of readiness with limited resources.

These readiness categories would simplify the analysis of the reported strengths and make it easier to give feedback to the unit in the form of better coordination and planning of duties and projects and eventual support for a unit which has reached or is about to reach a critical status by transferring personnel or centralizing training within a battalion.

b. Availability for Training

The proposals in this section are made under the assumption of quarterly replacement of the draftees in the platoons. Further, it is assumed that the principal level for instruction is that of the platoon with an average strength of about twenty-five men and four NCOs. The intention is to suggest organizational measures to ensure efficient training. Although organization alone does not guarantee a high degree of readiness, it is an important factor in reaching this goal.
The evaluation of a unit's performance with respect to high participation in training requires that the training material be categorized with respect to its importance for the respective MOS and the unit's mission. But the importance of attendance in, for example, the highest category for instruction may also depend on the training quarter of the draftee. For example, instructions about the use of traffic abbreviations is essential for a newly assigned soldier while it is only repetition for one in a higher training quarter.

But for other parts of the training, even though they represent repetition, complete attendance is required. Those areas are exercises and field training on the various levels of command, safety and security instructions, weapons training, sports and all other parts of training which primarily have a strong impact on group cohesion and cooperation within the deployment structure of a unit. Depending on the mission and equipment of a unit, maintenance may also be such an important category.

If these training categories are defined, the attendance can be checked by the battalion commander or his deputy over the year and these data can be evaluated during the company inspection.
The function of the company commander to achieve high attendance should be to initiate and maintain organizational measures which are able to give the draftees and the respective instructors the feeling of the importance of those parts of the training.

Because this area is also subject to outside influence such as measures of the battalion staff, the medical facilities and other companies, a policy should be adopted by the battalion which allows planning and coordination of projects. By this approach, conflicts of interest can be avoided and the number of soldiers who are withheld from important training on short notice tasks are drastically reduced.

2. Quarterly Report on MOS-filled Positions

These quarterly reports should provide the basis for the evaluation of a unit's personnel structure and its prospects for the near future.

On the basis of the information contained in these reports and the requirements concerning formal training courses and the time limits outlined in the training and employment catalog for NCOs, the personnel selection, consultation and planning within a company should be evaluated.
The billets which are vital for the mission of a unit and/or are only authorized as individuals or in small numbers have to be thoroughly checked for complete training and continuous occupation. The number of man-hours available per quarter or year compared to the scheduled 1980 annual service hours may be an appropriate basis for the analysis. It may also be adequate to check if other NCOs with related MOSs are trained for these functions in order to have them available as backups during exercises or in the case of an emergency.

An important criterion for the personnel readiness of a unit can also be the enlistment time structure of the NCOs. That means for the NCOs, how many enlisted for two, four, eight or twelve years. As the minimum time requirements to be promoted to corporal or sergeant are fifteen months respectively four years, it is important to have at least fifty percent of the NCOs in each category with enlistment times significantly longer. That is, a company where the majority of the corporals has only a service time of two years, does not have an optimal degree of readiness because of their lack of experience, even though all billets are filled. In order to define a realistic mix of
enlistment times it is necessary to know the skill level which was considered necessary when the rank structure and the ratio of leaders to rank and file for the TOE of the unit was established.

The availability of NCOs during important events such as exercises or inspections and essential training can be analysed with respect to bottlenecks and provisions made to reduce the effects of unavoidable events on readiness.

Included in this report should be all those functions which are not covered in the TOE but are necessary to provide complete training and readiness of the unit. Within a communication unit, there could be training for non-standard telecommunication, telephone and cypher equipment, NBC defense, first aid, safety and security, marksmanship, firefighting and salvage and rescue etc.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

1. Disciplinary Means

The analysis of handling the disciplinary power should be primarily concerned with general trends rather than individual cases. The annual report of the ombudsman of parliament can serve as a good reference and indicator for actual problems and trends in the Armed Forces.
concerning morale and discipline. This document is further of great importance because it contains relevant interpretations of the law and policy statements of the MOD.

Other important incidents such as objections to serve in the Armed Forces, suicides or complaints handed to the ombudsman of parliament and to its petition committee on the other hand have to be analysed with respect to their effects on the morale and motivation of the unit.

The analysis of the application of disciplinary measures should first be with respect to formal correctness. This can be done by checking the disciplinary book of the unit which consists of two parts. The first part contains all valid disciplinary measures issued against soldiers of the company and a form for each individual where date of punishment, validity and prescription are documented. For this part an actual page account of all valid measures in the book has to be kept. The second part of the book contains the formal recognitions for each individual which in contrast to the punitive measures do not become invalid after a certain amount of time. All the dates and the status of the papers have to be properly signed by the company commander or the authorized deputy.
a. Formal Recognitions

Criteria for the analysis of the formal recognitions can be the distribution between enlisted and rank and file. The leader's example plays an important role with respect to performance and readiness. This is normally documented in the high number of recognitions for them.

But there should be at least an even number of formal recognitions for draftees. The principal reason is their in general outstanding morale and readiness during field exercises despite the fact that they are drafted. A further reason is that they often have to fill in for absent NCOs and perform well despite the lack of training and experience.

Another aspect for analysis should be the events and performances for which formal recognitions are awarded. They can show the sensitivity and emphasis of a company commander with respect to performance and motivation.

This analysis can also unveil different perceptions of leadership and motivation by comparing the proportion of formal recognitions to punishments.
b. Disciplinary Measures

The analysis should primarily be concerned with general trends subject to disciplinary measures rather than individual cases.

The most important part is the analysis of the disciplinary measures since the last company inspection with respect to their kind, personnel involved and frequency. This provides good indicators of morale problems in a unit and particular problems in the military education and training or between individual leaders and their subordinates. But it may also be necessary to look into special cases if there are violations of constitutional rights or committed felonies.

The analysis cannot be extended into the chosen punishment which is the sole responsibility of the company commander and would mean an interference into his sovereignty. Nevertheless, the applied scale and the treatments provide information about the skills of a company commander and his subordinate leaders to deal with disciplinary problems and the means by which they maintain discipline and motivation.
2. Complaints

To enable an analysis of the complaints processed during the last inspection, a data gathering process of these historical data has to be authorized. Data gathered should contain information about the numbers, category (disciplinary, general service, administrative) of the complaint, its object and whether it was accepted or rejected.

General problems of importance for the analysis may be alcohol abuse, disobedience, abuse of the right to give orders, general tensions etc.

This part of the analysis should also include the number and reasons for disciplinary measures which had been invalidated during the check by the next two disciplinary leaders or the military disciplinary lawyer because of formal errors or insufficiencies in the formulation of the sentencing.

3. Evaluations

The first criteria in the analysis of the evaluations should also be their formal correctness. Errors are frequent with respect to personal and service data and mismatches between the marked personal and performance
characteristics of an individual and their free
description.

The far more important criteria are again the proce-
dure and interaction during the process in which the assess-
ments are made and perceptions of performance are passed on
from the company commander to the respective subordinate.
The emphasis here should be on the ways by which the ass-
essed are kept informed about their relative position, the
expectations of their company commander and their chances to
achieve set goals. An important procedure is a periodic
evaluation briefing for the individuals to keep them
informed of the perception of their performance and to moti-
vate them to improve it. By this, unpleasant surprises at
the day of signing the evaluation can be avoided.

Circumstances which also need to be considered in
analysing the evaluations in a company are the length of
time the company commander has known the man he has to eval-
uate. Further it is important that his own experience and
qualifications which may bias his expectations with respect
to an average performance or may result in too benevolent
evaluations if he fears the confrontation with the evaluated
be considered. The battalion commander should further
assess the objectivity of the evaluation criteria and look for evaluation errors such as the halo effect, selective recognition and generalizations.

Other criteria are the regular conditions under which the evaluatees work and factors which may degrade their performance (e.g. personnel and material shortages or the lack of adequate training) and which are not perceived as constraints by the evaluating company commander.

The final aspect in analysing the evaluation procedure is the distribution of the final grades. For every branch of the Army and even each unit type there exist characteristic distributions which can be used as orientation.

During the company inspection the battalion commander should therefore evaluate significant deviations from the average and discrepancies from his own assessment of individual NCOs.

4. Enlistment and Reenlistment

In this category the analysis should unveil the degree to which the demand for enlistments and reenlistments in the company could be satisfied. This has to be based on the overall situation of the respective branch of the Army.
and the local conditions for that unit. Further the selection and planning process of the careers for the NCOs and rank and file of the company has to be evaluated as the most important part of this analysis.

Another part of the analysis has to be the amount of enlisted and trained officer cadets for the reserve. These enlistments for two years provide the companies with personnel who do not occupy MOS positions and by this can compensate for those NCOs who are attending a training course.

There should also be an evaluation of those cases where a change of the military training and employment category was necessary in order to reenlist an NCO who belonged to one of those MOSs for which only very few sergeant billets are available.

Other points for the analysis can be the number of unfilled billets with own reenlistments or how many NCOs are applying for reenlistment but for which no billets are available.

A final point should be the number and chances of applicants for career billets. Here the battalion commander has also a significant influence because he can increase their chances by especially recommending them.
5. **Personnel Turnover**

The turnover category of a unit could be assessed as a weighting factor for the strength rating of a company. The evaluation intervals for officers and NCOs could be smaller than those of the rank and file to emphasize the important role of the leadership in a unit for its morale, training status and readiness.

For draftees the emphasis should be on the replacement rhythm, the percentages of those who are transferred to units closer to their families and of those who are released earlier. Their number and cases should be analysed with respect to those draftees who remained in the unit, the effect may be predominantly negative.

The multiplicative factor to weight the personnel strength should also be considered with respect to the unit type. It could for example be smaller for a stationary communication company than for a mobile one.

The replacement cycle of draftees has to be considered very carefully to soften its negative effects. Alternatives to the quarterly replacement can be replacements every half year or per entire platoon. But the effects of differently qualified personnel has to be considered
carefully because, for example, nearly all highschool graduates are drafted in the summer quarter and when not available to a unit could mean a considerable loss.

6. Civic Education and Leadership

The main sources of information about motivation and the climate in a unit during the company inspection can be the instructions in civic education and leadership and an interview with the elected stewards for the NCOs and for rank and file.

The instruction can show the approach and means by which the officers and NCOs work towards the primary educational objective for the Armed Forces. This is the benefit of society instead of the individual and the process of making understandable that their service is an essential contribution to this need. It will further provide insight into the ability of the leadership of the company to explain problems concerning the Armed Forces and to motivate the draftees to make up their minds in discussions with others. Besides the capability to explain basic positions the main effort during the presentation should be directed towards the way each others' arguments are handled and how a consensus is reached. To understand and respect different
opinions is the basis for trust and comradeship and
essential for motivation and successful job performance.

The important criteria of information processing and
exchange should not only be analysed with respect to the
performance during the instruction, it should also include
the observation during the field exercise where permanent
briefings are required to enable all men to participate and
contribute actively to performance of their unit.

The interview with the stewards is of importance
because they enjoy important privileges and duties within
the German Armed Forces which are determined by a special
law. They have for example to be heard by the company comman-
der about the personality of the individual accused of an
offense and their statements have to be documented. They
may further be involved in the process of setting up the
schedules for presence duties. This scheduling represents a
problem because it has a strong influence on the leisure
time of the individuals. If the foremen's position and
influence can be utilised by the company commander, they can
play an important role as intermediary between him and
their clientele.
7. Social Factors

The most important objective in this part of the analysis have to be the measures taken and the initiatives instituted to maintain the living quarters in good condition. The draftees should be able to feel at home for the twelve months of their service time.

The number of occupants, room conditions, amount of private equipment allowed etc. should be evaluated.

Another area of analysis has to be the kind and condition of facilities provided by the company such as hobby and crafts rooms, messes, tv rooms and sport installations. A further criteria should be the response to the recreational installations, which indicates whether or not the facilities meet the needs of the draftees.

Objectives with respect to the recreational activities should be the degree by which the leadership of a company initiates or promotes activities which contribute to the group cohesion and identification with the unit. It should be distinguished between the activities within the NCO corps and those for the draftees. Because of the importance of the NCOs to the readiness of a unit, efforts toward cohesion require such more emphasis than that of rank and
file for whom entertainment may be an equally important aspect.

As the funds are authorized by a committee, the analysis can focus on the procedure by which the objectives for activities were determined, that means to what degree the users were involved in the decision process.
IV. SUMMARY

The motivation for this effort was to provide suggestions for the selection of personnel readiness criteria for West German Army units. These criteria are intended to be primarily evaluated during the annual company inspection. They represent an important part in the evaluation of the overall readiness of a unit.

By suggesting these criteria it was intended to simplify and guide the efforts within the units regarding personnel readiness. If the criteria are elaborated as suggested in the previous chapter, uncertainties and misconceptions about optimal performance can be reduced resulting in a more efficient utilization of resources.

Another effect of establishing these criteria can be to provide the Army with procedures and data which enable it not only to make relevant evaluations for various branches of the Army as well as provide input to the development of TOEs, training programs, etc.

A further intention of this effort has been to provide information or guidelines for company and battalion commanders who are new in their assignment and less experienced.
Combinations of some of the personnel readiness criteria result in factors which should be evaluated in the other major parts of the company inspection. These criteria influence, for example, performance in sports and shooting competitions and in general that during the field exercise.

Certain possible factors or criteria were not covered in this effort. The primary reason being the lack of relevant data during a company inspection for a meaningful evaluation.

One such factor is combat motivation. It contains all those factors which influence the motivation of a soldier to fight during a battle. Combat motivation is considered to represent the complement to defense motivation which describes the basic motivational needs for a soldier's service and can be observed in the part about civic education and leadership.

The criterion of leadership performance is considered to be best assessed during the field exercise and the evaluation of training and maintenance and should therefore be evaluated in that context.

Overall this effort should provide sufficient criteria on which to base the evaluation of a company inspection. It
should be more realistic than the ITT6 and may result in the downgrading of units because of their personnel deficiencies.

In this procedure the inspecting commander still retains a large amount of responsibility and influence in the final assessment.
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