SALIENT MAINSTREAM AND HISPANIC VALUES IN A NAVY TRAINING ENVIRONMET

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PERSONNEL TECHNOLOGY

AN EXAMINATION OF HISPANIC AND GENERAL POPULATION PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
(Harry C. Triandis, Principal Investigator)

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 61820

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SALIENT MAINSTREAM AND HISPANIC VALUES IN A NAVY TRAINING ENVIRONMENT: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION

Louis A. Rojas
University of Illinois

Technical Report No. ONR-22

August, 1982
Salient Mainstream and Hispanic Values in a Navy Training Environment: An Anthropological Description

Louis A. Rojas

Department of Psychology
University of Illinois
603 E. Daniel, Champaign, IL 61820

Organizational Effectiveness Research Group
Office of Naval Research (Code 442)
Arlington, VA 22217

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Hispanics, Recruitment, Motivation for joining the Navy, Recruit training

see attached.
Abstract and Executive Summary

Anthropological observations, carried out during a four month period at the San Diego Recruit Training Center (RTC), centered on the experiences of 47 Hispanic recruits. Total individualized contact time ranged from two to six hours per recruit. Additionally, comparable contacts were arranged with 12 Anglo, 4 Black, and 4 Filipino recruits.

The main findings are as follows:

1. Commanders are more concerned with producing a quality recruit company than in increased sensitivity to the personal needs of each recruit (p. 9). This has the implication that culturally-based individual differences are likely to be ignored during the training.

2. Many Hispanics attempted to remain "ethnically anonymous" (p. 11), so as to avoid possible negative stereotypes about them found among the mainstream. They wanted to be treated "like all the others." Thus, the point made under (1) above is consistent with the expressed needs of Hispanics.

3. The more acculturated the Hispanics the less anxious they were about the way the mainstream will react to them (p. 12).

4. Consistent with point (2) the Hispanics did not assert themselves and did not attempt to get into leadership positions. They were seen by their fellow recruits as "nice guys," but shy and quiet (p. 12).

5. As training progressed, the Hispanics asserted themselves more, and were less anxious about the way others will react to them (p. 12).

6. Mainstream recruits are better able, than most Hispanic recruits, to see the link between specific behaviors and reaching particular goals relevant to their career in the Navy.

7. Mainstream recruits seem more able than Hispanic recruits to discriminate activities which will move them to their goals from routines and regimented duties which are of secondary importance in terms of these goals.
8. Hispanics are less familiar than the Mainstream with the Navy structure—link between particular kinds of training and particular careers in the Navy (p. 17).

9. Recruit prestige in the training center is much more a function of qualifications for an advanced training school than of ethnicity. About 2/3 of the Hispanics did not qualify for advanced training. This has obvious implications for their social standing in the training center (p. 17).

10. A recruit who fails to qualify for advanced training is often considered as lazy or insufficiently intelligent (p. 17).

11. Those recruits who had most authority among their peers were those who could claim to "know the ropes" of the Navy bureaucracy, rather than those who were most intellectually gifted, had high performance scores, or the best career ratings.

12. Mainstream recruits often hold the view that social problems in the U.S. are due to illegal immigration, and are unsympathetic to social support systems. Most Hispanics have received help from such social support systems. As a result the 60% of Hispanics who have received welfare benefits try to hide their background from the mainstream recruits (p. 20). This means that for Hispanics the RTC is in an environment that is hostile on ideological grounds.

13. Hispanic Navy recruits seem to be an unrepresentative sample of the Hispanic population. One of the clues is that 34% of those studied came from homes where one or both parents were absent (through death, divorce, or for other reasons). About 25% had parents who had divorced. Census data indicate that only about 5% of the general Hispanic population are divorced.

14. Most Hispanics had difficulty separating the office of commander from the person occupying that office. Because of this "personalismo" they resented some commanders more than the mainstream.

15. Hispanics were more likely to feel resentment when the commanding officer disciplined them, taking criticism personally (he is attacking me rather
than he is attacking my performance) (p. 28).

16. Most Hispanics were willing to extend a personal kind of respect to their commanding officers, but expected some approachability or flexibility on the part of the officer (p. 27). They also expected some mutuality in dignified respect. They often felt frustrated in these respects.

17. Most Hispanics were able to read English well, but they were slow readers. They asked for flexibility (more time) in the administration of reading tests. Their request was almost never taken seriously.

18. Most mainstream recruits were likely to link the commanding officer to the concept of a boss; most Hispanics linked it to father (p. 29).

19. Among Hispanics the most important motive for joining the Navy is economic. Few expressed a sense of patriotic responsibility.

20. About 25% of the Hispanic recruits seem to be anomic, having a weak self-image, and a few plans.
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The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of many individuals through the course of the study. Dr. Robert Hayles, of the Office of Naval Research, was instrumental in arranging the initial research contacts at the San Diego RTC. Capt. B. A. Wiley, Commanding Officer, RTC, and Lt. M. Meyers, Chief Administrative Officer, RTC, provided the necessary administrative clearances and introductions for the study. Master Chief C. Hicks and Petty Officer R. Fuquay, of the RTC classification and testing center, assisted in the accumulation of statistical information. I am particularly indebted to Lt. J. Roadinger, Commanding Officer of the First Recruit Division, and to Chief B. Burbridge, of the First Division staff, for their day-to-day interest, support, and cooperation. Mr. Carlos Castaneda, and Prof. Fernando Hernandez also contributed their time and comments to the study. My colleagues, Dr. Harry Triandis and Dr. Judith Lisansky, of the Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, offered important comments on an early draft of the report. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to the many Navy recruits who willingly consented to share their thoughts and experiences.
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This report summarizes observations, interviews, and analyses compiled during the anthropological study of the recruit training process of the Recruit Training Command, U.S. Navy Training Center, San Diego, California. This research is a segment of a larger project designed to attain a combined anthropological and psychological understanding of Hispanic cultures of North America. Generally the research focuses on Hispanic perceptions of, and performances within, various Anglo-dominated organizational environments. More specifically this study examines the behavior and experience of Hispanic recruits in the U.S. Navy.

The fundamental issues to be addressed in an anthropological approach to the RTC "community" concern the comparisons of mainstream American and non-mainstream Hispanic-American values and behavioral norms, as they relate to degrees of Hispanic acculturation, and the development and persistence of biculturalism. Theoretical questions concerning the nature of social, cultural, and psychological interactions are raised. The project's applied concerns focus on the successful social and economic adaptation of Hispanics in the U.S. This group is an increasingly significant portion of the American population and is expected to constitute close to 10 percent of the U.S. population by 1990.

Purpose

The purpose of this anthropological inquiry is to accumulate some primary data on the social context and social interaction of the recruit training center (RTC). Emphasis is placed on the description of the relevant RTC environment, on the observation of individual and interactive behaviors, and on the detailing of the cultural characteristics of the mainstream and ethnic participants in the RTC "society."

Of particular concern are the ways in which anthropological investigation and interpretation might offer some insight into the understanding of such
phenomena as idealized and actual values, behavioral norms, acculturation processes, and culture change. Triandis (1981a, 1981b), Lisansky (1981), and Triandis et al. (1982) have suggested a variety of value dimensions, or themes, which are pertinent to the understanding of Hispanic cultures in North America and to the comparison of these cultures to the mainstream American culture. Several of these themes (such as self-presentation, leadership, familism and individualism) seem to be of particular significance in the RTC setting and are treated in greater detail in this report.

The anthropological approach to the RTC "community" is itself problematic. Because of the nature of the RTC organization, some of the traditional assumptions of anthropological inquiry are undermined. While the structure of the RTC is constant, the personnel (both trainers and recruits) passing through the system is regularly changing. The recruit companies and divisions are arbitrarily formed (from the pool of arriving recruits), short-lived, and without a specific collective history. The anthropological observation of such an organization, therefore, is similarly "segmented," and dependent upon rapidly, and at times opportunistically accumulated data, supplemented by informed insight and decidedly interpretive analysis. The RTC "society" is additionally unusual, from an anthropological point of view, because both the observer and the participants are new in the interactive arena.

Methods

The anthropological investigation was carried out over a four-month period between August and December, 1981. During this time the investigator maintained regular daily contact with two consecutive divisions of recruits, each for the eight-week duration of the training. The research program began

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The process is perhaps even more subjective when the anthropologist himself shares a Hispanic identity similar to that of the sub-group under examination.
with a detailed presentation of the project’s theoretical and applied goals to the senior commanding officers of the RTC, to the commanding officers supervising the specific divisions, and to the petty officers in charge of the constituent companies within the divisions.

Data were collected through a flexible combination of day-to-day observations of the training process; extended interviews with recruits (Anglo, Black, Hispanic and Filipino) and training staff; spontaneous and informal conversations with recruits and staff; and wide-ranging discussions of Navy life in general with non-RTC Navy personnel, retired Navy men, and with civilians. Additionally, living in the city of San Diego offers a constant exposure to the very important community-wide manifestations of Navy-linked economic and political interests, military ideology, and personnel transitions to and from Navy careers.

During the 16 weeks of the RTC study approximately 800 new recruits were received into the two divisions examined, about 450 in the September-October group, and 350 during the November-December. Approximately 64 of these recruits were of Hispanic origin (this figure excludes Filipinos, many of whom had Hispanic surnames). At least cursory familiarization was established with all 64 recruits; extended contact was maintained with 47, who consented to, and seemed to enjoy, the fairly prolonged interviews and conversations (see Appendix 15). Total individualized contact time ranged from two to six hours per recruit. Additionally, comparable contacts were arranged with 12 Anglo, 4 Black, and 4 Filipino recruits. (Given time and logistic considerations, it was felt that most efforts should be focused on the target Hispanic sample.)

* It is perhaps significant that the researcher has had no personal military experience.

** At full capacity, the San Diego RTC may have 8 divisions in process.
My professional position and interests were always made clear to the recruits and training staff. I was introduced, or introduced myself, as an anthropologist working with a team of other social scientists (including psychologists) in an effort to gain both theoretical and practical understandings of ethnic diversity in the United States, in general, and of Hispanics in the Navy organization, specifically. I was careful to explain why the researchers, and the Navy, felt that such work was important, and that ultimately all segments of the American society stood to benefit by the study.¹

Note-taking and the use of a tape recorder were discriminate and depended upon the individual and the specific circumstances of the interaction. I could usually sense when my writing or recording made a recruit uneasy, so I stopped, then recorded the content of the conversation immediately afterward. Recorded interviews were transcribed to paper. All interviews were then reviewed and analyzed for patterns of responses.

While the conversations with the recruits were normally open-ended and wide-ranging, I did seek to garner some kinds of very specific biographical information (see Appendix 14) as well as impressions of the cultural and value issues being investigated. Biographical information included the recruit's specific Hispanic identity (Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, South American, etc.), the social and economic background of his family, his and his family's educational history, his parents' marital backgrounds, the number of generations that his

¹ My affiliation with a university department of psychology proved to be somewhat problematic inasmuch as many of the young recruits assumed that I must therefore be a psychologist, and many held the notion that psychologists are only interested in people who have emotional or personality problems. Additionally, I was frequently approached in my office by recruits who were distraught over their RTC experiences or who sought some other kind of personal counseling. In both divisions I required about two weeks' exposure in order for the word to get around to the recruits that an anthropologist was somehow different from a psychologist and that there probably was not any need to be concerned or intimidated by my wish to speak with them.
family has lived in the United States, and his family's experience with the military (if any).

The open-ended phases of the interviews attempted to deal with questions of ethnic consciousness, motivations for entering the Navy, aspirations through and beyond the recruit's Navy career, and impressions of his Navy life "so far": living conditions, restrictions, regulations, food, absence from his family, the treatment by the training staff and by other recruits, and so forth. Conversations were conducted in English, and in Spanish when the recruit seemed more comfortable in that language.

As the research progressed, my principal task became that of apparent consistencies or inconsistencies between the ideas expressed by a particular Hispanic recruit (or a particular mainstream recruit) and his demonstrated attitudes, performance, or behavior within the day-to-day operations of the training company. For example, a Hispanic recruit might indicate in private conversation that he felt no particular need to regularly associate with other Hispanics or no tendency to speak Spanish with other Hispanics. But it could be the case that most of his daily contacts were with other Spanish speakers. This kind of disparity might have implications for our understanding of acculturation processes.

It was, of course, impossible to track all of the Hispanics through the entire regimen. Instead I made specific choices of certain recruits whose biographical, socio-economic, and attitudinal characteristics were especially interesting or representative, and I focused on these individuals for several weeks at a time.

I was granted access to an additional source of important information, the recruit's RTC performance record, known as the "hard cards." These records contain the most fundamental vital data on the recruit: his name, age, and next-of-kin information, plus a notation of behavioral problems and assessed
demerits, and a listing of the recruit's scores on the various segments of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB; cf. Rojas, 1981) and the Bates/McGinity reading test, and his Navy vocation classification ("rate").

Environment: The Organization of the Recruit Training Command

The Naval Training Center (NTC) in San Diego (see map, Appendix 15) is the site of many of the Navy's advanced training schools and apprenticeship programs for enlisted men. The NTC is administratively separate from the surface and air operational segments of the Pacific Fleet which are ubiquitous throughout San Diego County. The Recruit Training Command (RTC) is perhaps the most obvious segment of the encompassing NTC: companies of denim-clad recruits are continuously drilling or marching through the NTC facilities, enroute to classes, mess halls, and barracks. The San Diego RTC is one of three national receiving, outfitting, processing, and training facilities for recently inducted Navy recruits. Similar "boot camps" are located in Great Lakes, Illinois and in Orlando, Florida. For the most part, the San Diego RTC receives recruits from the Western and Southwestern United States. While the training of the recruits takes place in facilities throughout the NTC, much of the eight-week process takes place in "Camp Nimitz," a water-and wire-cordoned "island" within the NTC, containing recruit barracks, testing facilities, training fields, and mess halls.

The RTC is administered by a core of senior commissioned officers who oversee the training of as many as eight recruit divisions simultaneously (see Appendixes 1-3). Each division is commanded by a permanently assigned commissioned officer (usually a lieutenant in rank) who is assisted by a small staff (2 to 5 individuals) of permanently assigned petty officers. A division is comprised of as many as eight recruit companies. Each company, of as many as eighty recruits, is commanded by a temporarily assigned petty officer (occasionally a chief petty
officer) who is specifically and intensely schooled in the training of recruits (see p. 14). Less experienced commanders may have a staff assistant to aid them in their early assignments. The company commander's job requires his near full-time presence at Camp Nimitz, seven days a week, through the eight-week training rotation. Though most company commanders normally have their families living in San Diego, the training duty usually requires their direct supervision from 16 to 20 hours per day; hence, RTC duty can be something of a strain on these individuals and their families. After an eight-week training rotation the company commanders will return to a different duty assignment in the NTC for a period of 2 to 4 months.

Recruits arrive at the RTC in varying numbers almost daily throughout the year (see Appendixes 4-7). Numbers range from only several per day during the winter to as many as 200 per day during the summer and autumn. Recruits are sequentially assigned to a company as they arrive, so that whole companies and divisions are formed consecutively.

The entire training process is arranged on a meticulously planned eight-week schedule (see Appendixes 4 and 5). Every day of the process is numbered (Week-1/Day-3, for instance) and has a detailed itinerary which includes times and locations for all activities from reveille, meals, and physical training, to showers and study periods. Typical days begin between 4:30 and 5:30 a.m., and end between 9:30 and 11:30 p.m. The entire day is a regimen of movement (marching, drilling, aerobic training) and instructional or medical appointments. Very little of the recruits' time is left unscheduled. Weekends have fewer specifically scheduled duties, but are generally filled with inter-company athletic and Navy-skills (for example, knot tying) competitions, instructional reviews, and drill practice.

Upon arriving at the RTC the recruit's identity is verified and his RTC records and files are established. He surrenders his civilian clothes, his
non-essential personal belongings, and his hair. He is issued a standard set of naval clothing, towels, and baggage. If the recruit is yet to be classified into a rating (cf. Rojas, 1981), that classification is performed during the first days of his stay in RTC. An additional battery of aptitude examinations, a reading test, and attitude surveys are given to most recruits within a few days of their arrival. Marching and drilling in company formation begins immediately; intense physical training (including calisthenics, running, and swimming) at once becomes a daily routine. Immediately there begin the processes of resocialization and familiarization with Navy rules, regulations, traditions, terminology, and decorum: skills ranging from hand salutes and folding clothes and gear, to the memorization of the Military General Orders and the name of the U.S. Secretary of the Navy.

During the full term of the boot camp training only extraordinary circumstances will justify a recruit's leaving the guarded confines of the RTC facility. All solo excursions within the NTC base require written authorization. Most recruits pass the entire eight weeks in the immediate company of their peers.

Environment: The Socialization into Military Bearing

The constant themes which underlie the training regimen are those of performance, loyalty, competition and cooperation. The general military bearing which is taught and fostered depends upon the individuals and the group's willingness to make diligent efforts in academic performance, military decorum, and physical prowess. For the recruit, the entire daily routine is subject to inspection and evaluation: the appearance of one's bunk, the stowing of one's equipment, dress, personal hygiene, and the contents of one's note pad are subject to assessment by the company and division officers. As a group, the company is held accountable for the appearance of the barracks, and for the
style with which the group marches. Companies rival each other for collective awards for academic achievement, athletic competition, and for the number of pledged salary withholdings for the United Way Campaign.

Proficient performance is expected, outstanding accomplishments are noted, and sub-standard efforts are strongly penalized. Exceptional efforts by a recruit are verbally commended, and a consistently high achiever may be designated as a Recruit Petty Officer (RPO) with particular company-wide responsibilities, or he may be awarded special recognition as an outstanding recruit in the division's graduation ceremonies.

The system of penalty demerits is continuously emphasized, and the severe consequences of non-performance, non-cooperation, or intractable behavior are constantly reiterated. While penalties in the form of extra physical training (push-ups, "short tours," running, and so forth) are everyday occurrences, more drastic measures, such as the detainment of a recruit in boot camp or even his discharge from the Navy altogether, happen with enough frequency to make most recruits wary of continued poor performance.

The expressed purpose for the continuous and rigorous evaluations is to foster an environment of discipline, obedience, teamwork, and respect for military authority. It is the task of the company commanders to create this environment, and they are trained to do it through a combined use of seemingly heavy-handed discipline and often very subtle moral suasion: blatant derision complements encouragement, public humiliation is balanced by support. As is to be expected, some commanders are more effective in these skills than others. The commanders, themselves, are also evaluated, and most are motivated more by the perceived importance of producing a quality recruit company than by whatever satisfaction might be derived from an increased sensitivity to the personal needs of each recruit.
Ethnicity in the RTC

The recruit company is a unique kind of society because its members, though living together intimately, 24 hours a day for two months, can remain rather anonymous throughout the experience. Recruits do naturally form liaisons and friendships, but they are also in a position to have a calculating control on the personal information which they wish to be known by others. Goffman's (1959) work has dealt extensively with the concepts and behaviors of "impression management" in social interactions.

In stressing the fact that the initial definition of the situation projected by an individual tends to provide a plan for the co-operative activity that follows---in stressing this action point of view---we must not overlook the crucial fact that any projected definition of the situation also has a distinctive moral character.... Society is organized on the principle that any individual who possesses certain social characteristics has a moral right to expect that others will value and treat him in a correspondingly appropriate way. Connected with this principle is a second, namely that an individual who implicitly or explicitly signifies that he has certain social characteristics ought to have his claim honored by others and ought in fact to be what he claims he is. In consequence, when an individual projects a definition of the situation and thereby makes an implicit or explicit claim to be a person of a particular kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon others, obliging them to value and treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect. He also implicitly forgoes all claims to be something he does not appear to be and hence foregoes the treatment that would be appropriate for such individuals. The others find, then, that the individual has informed them as to what is and as to what they ought to see as the "is." (pp. 12-13)

Of particular significance to the RTC discussion is Goffman's treatment of the "breakdown" of interaction.

Given the fact that the individual effectively projects a definition of the situation when he enters the presence of others, we can assume that events may occur within the interaction which contradict, discredit, or otherwise throw doubt upon this projection. When these disruptive events occur, the interaction itself may come to a confused and embarrassed halt. Some of the assumptions upon which the responses of the participants had been predicated become untenable, and the participants find themselves lodged in an interaction for which the situation has been wrongly defined and is now no longer defined. At such moments the individual whose presentation has been discredited may feel ashamed while the others present may feel hostile, and all the participants may come to feel ill at ease, nonplussed, out of countenance, embarrassed, experiencing the kind of anomy that is generated when the minute social system of face-to-face interaction breaks down. (p. 12)
An analysis of the thematic content of interviews with Hispanic in the RTC indicate a frequently stated uncertainty about the rules and expectations of boot camp, and about the degree to which they (the Hispanics) were "qualified" to successfully take part in the Navy lifestyle both during and after boot camp. More specifically, many of the Hispanics indicated that they were unsure about the manner in which their Hispanic identity—their "Mexican-ness," for example—would affect the way they were perceived or treated among their RTC peers. Most seemed to be very conscious of typical stereotypes of Hispanics, though only a few of them were able to cite recent confrontations with those stereotypes. Most of the Hispanics—a group of about 24 Mexican-Americans and 2 South Americans—described themselves as being very cautious in their attempts to not fulfill stereotypic images, and to offer only the personal information which they assumed would assist them in meeting the expectations which the RTC training program had of them. As a result of this uncertainty and anxiety about not being personally or culturally "suitable" for the Navy, many of the Hispanics seemed to adopt a self-presentation "tact" or strategy which they assumed would reveal to their peers only what they viewed to be the most fundamental information about themselves. It can be suggested that this tact was geared, first, at attempting to satisfy—to the extent possible, given educational background and language skills—what the Hispanic recruit perceived to be the most desirable recruit image, and, second, to minimize the presumed negative effect of his ethnicity on these RTC interactions. There seemed to be, in other words, a conscious effort to avoid what Goffman refers to as the "disruptive events" of interaction. By attempting to remain "ethnically anonymous," many Hispanics felt that they could avoid putting their identity into jeopardy. A consistent theme in their conversations was the concern that they wished to be known as an individual and a recruit, "just like all the others." Being Chicano, it was felt, should not be an important factor in the evaluation of one's personality and performance.
Those Hispanic recruits who could be considered more acculturated, that is, more readily in touch with general mainstream values and with the performance expectations of the RTC, seemed considerably less anxious about their self-presentation. This group (about 15 Mexican-Americans and 6 other Hispanics) was largely comprised of individuals who had an apparently middle class socio-economic background, had middle- and upper-range ASVAB scores, advanced school ratings, and who had indicated rather extensive exposure to mainstream American lifestyles. While this group was less "defensive" about ethnicity, they did remain relatively less demonstrative in leadership performance and RTC achievements than their mainstream counterparts.

Three additional observations must be added to this discussion. First, among the behavioral results of this self-presentation strategy was a readily apparent lack of assertiveness by most Hispanics. They rarely vied for the most visible leadership positions. Anglos and Blacks described them as "nice guys," but shy and quiet. Because many Hispanics chose to reveal only small details of their backgrounds, mainstream recruits often characterized particular Hispanic individuals as "odd" or "mysterious," and thus some stereotypic notions were fueled.

Second, it must be noted that as the eight weeks of training progressed, most Hispanics became notably less "defensive" about their ethnic identity and its effects on their opportunities in the Navy. Many of the less acculturated Hispanics, apparently following the models of their more acculturated peers, began to be more vocal about their pride in identity. This increased emphasis on ethnicity in self-presentation was, of course, coincident with a more effective and functional familiarization with Navy life and values, but there was not a comparably observable increase in leadership assertiveness or performance.

Finally, it is of course the case that mainstream recruits also must
consider and adopt strategies of self-presentation. As in most unfamiliar social situations, these recruits will attempt to select and control their image. What makes process distinct for the ethnic recruit is that he enters the situation to varying degrees as the cultural stranger or "foreigner." Language and stereotypes are among the obvious barriers to easy familiarization with the new social setting. Some of the more subtle factors inhibiting socialization (for example, perceptions of institutional organization) will be discussed in subsequent sections of this report.

An additional set of factors related to the manifestation of Hispanic ethnicity in the RTC is embodied in the very strong orientations toward discipline, regimentation, and deference to authority. One consequence of these behavioral orientations is a tendency toward homogenization in the expectations and conduct of all recruits. While recruits are encouraged to excel as individuals, socially demonstrative individuality is generally viewed as counterproductive at this stage of military training. Conformity is the value stressed. The RTC, as a military training institution, attempts to downplay social, cultural, and personality variables as necessarily pertinent elements in the evaluation of training performance and achievement. As well, the Navy's affirmative action programs have sought out ethnic recruits, but the testing and evaluation procedures of the RTC remain officially "blind" to ethnic diversity. Organizationally the RTC has made serious efforts to be aware of, and to avoid, possible points of prejudicial or biased treatment of recruits. In short, the organizational structures and formal policies of the RTC do not recognize ethnicity as a variable in the transformation of a recruit into a sailor.

Nevertheless, the RTC command and personnel certainly recognize that some individuals of Black, Hispanic, and Filipino backgrounds arrive at boot camp with aptitudes and value orientations different from those of most mainstream
enlistees. While the formal RTC system is not specifically geared to be sensitive to this diversity, it does attempt to compensate through the use of company commanders who are trained* to attend to the attitude and performance distinctions occasioned by ethnicity. The otherwise rigid training systems attain their most effective flexibility through the efforts of the company commanders who are directly responsible for the conduct and military adaptation of their recruits. This flexibility is accomplished by providing extra instructional time and assistance to recruits, the development of group responsibility for the success of individual members, and personal chastisement or encouragement when needed. The company commander is potentially a recruit's most important ally in matters concerning evaluation and the completion of training. The commander can petition senior training officers on behalf of the recruit for leniency in certain discipline cases, for waivers on some training evaluations, or for health related dispensations from duty. The company commander makes the most essential recommendations for performance awards and leadership positions. Conversely, the commander can see that a particularly recalcitrant recruit will endure only dissatisfaction and embarrassment throughout the boot camp experience. In as much as the division officers place their entire confidence in the evaluation abilities of the company commanders, the commander really is the recruits' most significant tie with the larger RTC system.

Because all recruits are to an important extent unknown quantities among their peers (especially during the first weeks of boot camp) it does seem to be

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* Petty officers selected for recruit training duty receive specific instructions during a 10-week course at the Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida. In the training they gain familiarization (or refamiliarization) with the fundamental precepts of military life and knowledge, and they also receive instruction in personnel counseling, motivation, and discipline.
the case that all recruits tend to rely on stock stereotypes in their assessment of the people with whom they now form a community. Whether it be Anglos referring to Blacks, or Hispanics referring to Filipinos, the negative and defensive aspects of the stereotyping tend to be exaggerated (cf. Simmons, 1961).

Again, it becomes the job of the company commander—and he is trained in this—to quell such bigotry, either by specifically discussing discriminatory problems, or by placing individuals into positions or situations in which they can provide a counter example to the stereotype.*

In summary, there are both interactive and organizational factors which seem to diminish the significance of ethnicity within the RTC environment. It is only when we begin to examine specific value orientations that we are able to appreciate the subtle relevance of diversity in cultural backgrounds.

**Achievement and Leadership**

The cognitive and behavioral orientations toward achievement, success, recognition, and leadership vary markedly between white mainstream and Hispanic recruits. Although all recruits voice a determination to learn a body of skills while in the Navy, to improve themselves professionally and personally, and to prepare for a marketable and satisfying post-Navy career, the mainstream recruits are decidedly better prepared and more pragmatic in pursuing these goals.

Most mainstream enlistees are able to articulate a specific set of training interests for the two- to four-year duration of their initial enlistment, and are able to describe a path toward their goals, including possible options and alterations. The actual success rate (measured in terms of completion of boot camp and advanced technical schools, Navy duty, and employability after discharge from the service) of the mainstream recruit was not determinable in this study.

*Interestingly, of the fourteen company commanders observed directly in this research, six were Filipino, four were Black, and four were white.*
but familiarity with active Navy and retired Navy personnel in the San Diego area, I think, justifies my belief that the white success rate is significantly higher than that of other ethnic groups.

Generally, the mainstream recruit seems to be more clearly aware of, and to stress, the importance of effective performance in training- or career-oriented tasks. Much less emphasis is placed on the need to religiously follow the dictates of military discipline, regimentation and decorum. Most do in fact follow these dictates well, but acknowledge them as being of decidedly secondary importance. Demerits and penalties resulting from things such as improper uniform care or barracks inspections are viewed by most mainstream recruits more as a nuisance than as a serious training problem. Still the mainstream recruits do tend to work hard and perform well in the day-to-day regimens, motivated to some extent by the fear of being set back in the training schedule in such a way that they might jeopardize their scheduled arrival at their advanced training or apprenticeship school (see Appendixes 5, 9, 10, 11).

Proportionately far fewer Hispanics are classified into the specialized training ratings (cf. Rojas, 1981), and few are able to easily perceive a full four years of schooling or duty options. Among all but the exceptionally talented (or acculturated) Hispanics the emphasis is on the performance in recognized routine and regimented duties. Less acculturated Hispanic recruits (that is, those with less command of English, with lower ASVAB scores, and without a technical rating classification) appear to be more meticulous in the pursuit of daily matters of military bearing, dress, physical drills, and dexterity skills. Though many Hispanics are somewhat hampered by the English language and by marginal reading and study skills, most seem diligent in their efforts to meet the demands of boot camp. Where they generally experience frustration is in their inability to foresee a course of action beyond boot camp, and thus in their inability to clearly see the practical connections
between their RTC experience and the wider Navy system. When interviewed, few
of the Hispanics could articulate what they expected to find six months, a year,
or two years further into their duty.

The expressed confusion and ambiguity over their Naval careers are, I
believe, directly related to the Hispanics' lack of familiarity with Navy duty
orders, on the one hand, and with non-assignment to a technical school, on the
other hand. Of the 47 Hispanics in the core group interviewed, 30 did not
qualify or accept an advanced technical rating. As a result, their duty orders
immediately following RTC training will be to one of the apprenticeship schools
(Airmen, Firemen, or Seamen): designations which are very general in nature
and which represent the most "menial" categories of jobs in the Navy. Indeed,
the "marker" which seems to most suggest distinctions among recruits is not
racial, socio-economic or cultural in nature. Rather it is the qualification
or non-qualification for an advanced training school (and, subsequently, the
"selectiveness" or exclusiveness of a particular school). Generally, that an
ethnic recruit does not qualify for an advanced school is viewed by most main-
stream recruits as consistent with inferior education and perhaps inferior
cultural traits. That a mainstream recruit fails to qualify is usually
attributed to laziness, or simply to a lack of intelligence.

The distinction between Anglo and Hispanic attitudes toward achievement
and success relates also to the manner in which recruits assume leadership
roles within the company. There exists a system through which, during the
entire course of the training, each company will recognize individual recruits
who are outstanding in their performance and in their ability to "take charge"
of other recruits. While most recruits, regardless of ethnic background,
learn to appreciate the importance of leadership abilities within the military
environments, only a few actually make a sustained effort to "command."

Further, it is my observation that those who do become "leaders"---even leaders
without an official designation—are those individuals who are best able to perceive and explain to others the Navy as a system, or a game, which needs to be understood if it is to be successfully used by the serious and self-concerned participant.

Those recruits who actually commanded the most effective authority among their peers were often not those who were the most intellectually gifted, nor those with the highest performance scores, nor even those with the most promising career ratings. Rather, those who could claim to "know the ropes" of the Navy bureaucracy and operations, and who thus were best able to plot their own course the next several years, were viewed as the most significant leaders.

This knowledge of "the ropes" has various sources, but among the most significant of these was actual prior service, or prolonged vicarious exposure to the Navy or other military systems through a relative or friend. Not surprisingly, it is mostly the mainstream recruit who has had access to this kind of information, and therefore, it is primarily mainstream individuals who persist in the high leadership, achievement, and success profiles of each company.

Although Triandis (1982: 20) reports that the leadership theme is complex and important in Hispanic value frameworks and self-concepts, this idealized Hispanic theme is not readily attained in the RTC environment. Two Cuban recruits most closely approximated the verbalized leadership aspirations of the mainstream (that is, "taking charge" and "actively directing"), but never gained significant recognition as leaders themselves. Mexican-American recruits (both high and low acculturated), in discussing leadership and self-presentation, indicated that leadership is more a quality of presence, consistency, and dependability, and less an ability to motivate and move followers. They felt that leadership was not necessarily a role that one actively pursued, or shrewdly fashioned from a network of acquaintances and a repertoire of talents. Instead,
many of the Hispanics felt that leadership was a personal characteristic which
some few persons are born with and have a capacity to develop. Leadership, it
was implied, is something that an individual recognizes in himself; and then
one must decide to make that quality available to others in particular contexts--
but not in all social situations. In fact several of the Mexican-American
recruits felt that they had been strong leaders in their high schools, churches,
and communities. In the RTC situation they felt that they lacked the necessary
confidence in their language abilities, in the speed of their comprehension
of RTC life, and in their ability to rapidly develop trust among so many
strangers.

These findings seem to be in general agreement with the observations of
Hispanic interaction made by other writers concerned with the Hispanic notion
of personalismo (cf. Magaffey and Barnett, 1962; Padilla, 1964; Lisansky
1981:21-26). Hispanic recruits consistently expressed a more abiding trust in
the face-to-face nature of personal relationships, over the neutral or
depersonalized organizational contacts. They felt that other individuals were
more readily knowable and understandable, and were perceived as much more
flexible than institutions. Because other recruits or company commanders were
at least potentially capable of flexibility and reciprocity in their behaviors,
sustained interaction was possible. Leadership for the Hispanic recruit was
perceived to be less a matter of achievement and competition, and more a matter
of reciprocal understanding and cooperation. Discussions with Hispanics
suggested that a leader is an individual who serves as a point of reference
around which others ("followers") function and interact. On the other hand,
the Hispanic view of a leader places less emphasis on the individual's capacity
to direct or administrate an institution.
Social Ideology and Hispanic Self Concepts

In terms of social ideology the RTC environment is rather conservative. Attitudes toward American lifestyles, economy, military posture, and national or international policies are expectedly moderate to right-wing.

Of particular significance to the understanding of Hispanic roles within this environment is the fact that the prevailing mainstream recruit populace holds adamantly to views which perceive lasting cultural and economic problems as results of uncontrolled and illegal immigration. Similarly, most mainstream recruits view as inappropriate any expanded governmental social support systems. Welfare systems, especially, are held in low regard, as are the individuals, families, or segments of society which are perceived to be dependent upon these systems. By implication this attitude places Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Filipino recruits in potentially awkward positions vis-a-vis their Anglo counterparts. Those minority group members who may have been welfare recipients are reluctant to argue a counter case, and are even more reluctant to acknowledge that they ever were such a recipient. Minority recruits who have not been on social benefit programs, and who may in fact have come from middle class families, seem to resent their assumed inclusion in such a "lower class" phenomenon.

My RTC interview data indicate that approximately 60% (23 of 39) of the Hispanics responding to questions on this subject acknowledged that their immediate family had received, at one time or another, various kinds of welfare benefits. This suggests that a significant proportion of the Hispanics (and other ethnic minorities) in boot camp may find themselves entering a socially hostile environment on yet another score, social ideology. A thematic review of the recruit interviews indicates that many of the Hispanics are conscious of

* Comparable information for Anglos or Blacks is not available in this study, but it can probably be accurately assumed that the prevailing stereotypes maintain that dependence on public support systems is greater among Blacks.
this ideological conflict. Several noted that when the subject arose in peer-
group discussions---the nightly "bull sessions"---they felt uncomfortable, or
maligned, and confirmed that this realization of hostility could have detri-
mental effects on their ability to adapt to the Navy.

For many of the young Hispanics the RTC represents their first solo
excursion out of the Latino world. Komaroff, Masuda and Holmes (1968) have
reported on the social and psychological problems experienced by Mexican-Americans
attempting to adjust to changes in living situations, and sleeping and eating
habits. Hispanic recruits had only occasional complaints about mess hall food,
but many expressed considerable uneasiness over the chronic lack of privacy in
the barracks sleeping quarters. However, I have no evidence that indicates
that these Hispanic concerns were any different from those of other recruits.
Other reports on Mexican-American social readjustment (for example, Horacio
Ulibarri, 1966) have emphasized the fear of economic marginality felt by
individuals and families who are moving into new communities or social environ-
ments. Hispanic recruits in the RTC almost invariably pointed out that their
reasons for entering the Navy were fundamentally economic. However, many
expressed a fear that their decision might not pay off, in a literal sense.
Many had doubts about the benefits of a four year obligation to the service,
and felt that they could never be sure that they had not left a more lucrative
possibility back home.

Finally, the RTC situation is particularly stressful for the Hispanic
because at a time when he is making crucial and confusing decisions pertaining
to the orientation of his own character, and to the kind of recognition he is
to give his ethnic background, he is exposed almost exclusively to a society of
similarly-aged young men, mostly Anglo and mainstream, and most brimming with
adolescent or post-adolescent confidence in themselves and in the integrity of
the Navy institution. Rather than serve as a source of guidance, role models,
or inspiration, this RTC setting seems instead to intimidate many of the Hispanic recruits.

Hispanic Academic Problems in the RTC

The single most prevalent factor in poor academic evaluations for Hispanics in the RTC is sub-standard performance on the Bates-McGinitie reading test. The test is first administered to all recruits in the initial week of training (see Appendixes 5 and 9). It is readministered as necessary to those recruits who fail to achieve a minimal reading level. (Generally an eighth grade competency is the minimum requirement.) The RTC has an Academic Remedial Training (ART) division which makes provisions for remedial education and specialized testing for those individuals who encounter problems. Among the Hispanics interviewed (including those who passed the initial examination, and those who required additional attempts) the primary objection to the test was not that the reading was incomprehensible, but rather that there was not enough time allowed to finish the reading and answer the questions. Most Hispanics felt that if the test were not administered under such strict time constraints they would perform much better. During the period of my study four Hispanics were set back in their training schedules, and one was dismissed from the Navy, due to poor reading scores.* (Only three Hispanics—1 Mexican-American, 1 Ecuadorian, and 1 Costa Rican—felt that they could read significantly better in Spanish.)

Hispanic Familial Dissolution

An unexpected observation made in the course of interviews with RTC recruits concerns the existence of a strikingly high incidence of dissolution among the families of these recruits. An unusually high 34% (17—all Mexican-American—

*I do not have data on the test results of Black, Anglo, or Filipino recruits. I understand from testing personnel that the reading scores of many Blacks and most Filipinos are generally lower than those of Hispanics.
of 47 interviewed) of the Hispanic individuals in the two divisions studied arrived from households from which one or both of the parents was absent. Death, divorce, and economic instability seem to be the main causes for the existence of these non-nuclear family units in the recruits' traditional home communities. This phenomenon may have important implications for the recruiting of Hispanic enlisted men, and is discussed in more detail in conjunction with ideas of familism in the concluding sections of this paper.

**Discrimination, Racism, and Prejudice**

Only a few of the Hispanics interviewed were able to refer to specific or vehement instances of racism or prejudice directed at them while in the RTC. Most recalled a good deal of bantering among peers in the barracks; but such verbal slurs and innuendos were generally taken in jest, and were rarely perceived as being any more significant than the kinds of prejudicial remarks that were heard in most other contexts outside of the RTC. Only in the rare instance when a racist slur was uttered by a company commander or staff member did the individuals report a particular resentment or anger.

When persistently questioned, the Hispanic recruits generally did acknowledge that they felt that the Anglo and Black recruits tended to view Hispanics as culturally (and probably racially) inferior. The Hispanics did not necessarily see this as a malevolent attitude but, rather, tended to explain it in terms of the obvious disparities in performance and achievement between mainstream and Hispanic participants. It seems, consequently, that the Hispanics do themselves take on, however unconsciously, some of the Anglo assumptions of their inferiority (cf. Simmons, 1968; Dworkin, 1965). This psychological state may well contribute to the apparent lack of assertiveness or confidence on the parts of the Hispanics in the RTC situation.
Conclusions

Hispanic Ethnicity and Values

Lisansky's (1981) extensive review of the social science literature pertaining to Hispanic cultures in North America, and Triandis' (1981a, 1981b, 1982) psychological studies on Hispanic attitudinal issues suggest a wide range of general categories and specific themes relevant to the understanding of the value orientations and value systems of this burgeoning North American ethnic population. These themes are generally presented in contrastive fashion: the Hispanic perspective compared to that of the "mainstream" (presumably Anglo). Hence, raised are issues concerning ideological (i.e., Hispanic) and pragmatic (i.e., mainstream) patterns of thought, individuality vs. individualism, being vs. doing, present vs. future time orientation, subjugation to vs. mastery over nature, and familism vs. self-dependence.

The research reported here deals with a rather unique arena of social and cultural interaction, the Navy recruit training organization. The special all-male, non-historical, arbitrarily formed, highly regimented and codified character of the recruit company offers an unusual and problematic setting for anthropological observation and analyses. While the existence of the recruit companies and divisions are short in duration, the interaction among its members is continuous and intense. Because of the inherent anonymity of the participants, they are able to control, to varying extents, their social images. Nevertheless, it seems that in such a unique environment certain social and cultural background factors (attitudes and values) become even more relevant in the perception and interpretation of the new social situation. For members of ethnic groups particularly, ideological orientations, tastes, and behavioral preferences can become manifestly at odds with the perceptions and orientations of the dominant mainstream population.

Conceivably all of the categories and themes treated by Lisansky and
Triandis might be systematically and fruitfully investigated; however in the following sections I focus on some of the more salient Hispanic value orientations relevant specifically to the RTC environment. When these themes are delivered from abstraction and viewed together within a functioning human organization, their interrelatedness becomes apparent. The themes can be more readily understood as a holistic system of values.

Cognitive Style and Perception of the Organization

The fundamental problem being addressed in this project concerns Hispanic perceptions of, and participation in, highly structured, formal, codified organizations and systems. Historically, most Hispanic Americans, particularly Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans, have had very limited participatory exposure to such environments. Further, other highly organized institutions and bureaucracies (for instance, business and education systems) normally do not share the uncompromising rigor and regimentation of a military environment, and the awards and penalties of participation are rarely meted out in such adamant style.

My field work at the RTC suggests that one of the fundamental factors influencing potential success for a Hispanic in the Navy will be the individual's ability to adopt a functioning understanding of the very pragmatic nature of the system. Particularly involved here are the ideas of "field dependent" and "field independent" cognitive styles (and the related associative and abstractive thought patterns) discussed by Lisansky (1981) and Triandis (1981b). These ideas are further related to notions of authority, respect, patron deference, and leadership.

Inherent in the field sensitive or field dependent cognitive style is the recognition that a particular person can be perceived as a social entity of more interactional relevance than a particular status, role, or rank. Contrasted to this is the field independent style which renders less sensitivity to specific persons involved in an interaction, and more attention to the
existence of certain statuses or roles, each with clear loci within an organizational framework.

The first style—the field dependent—normally viewed as a typical Hispanic mode of perception (Lisansky 1981: 18-21), depends importantly upon the biological and historical uniqueness of the persons interacting (Gillin, 1965). An individual's "worth" is largely tied to historical and lineal depth, and is rarely contingent solely upon specific task performance. Self-worth is indeed a group attribute. The family for the Hispanic, for example, is not just a social institution; it is an extension of the self, and vice versa (Wells, 1969: 34).

The second cognitive style—field independence—is assumed to be more in consonance with Anglo/mainstream interactive behavior; it places less importance on consanguineally or afinally ascribed connections, and rather stresses new beginnings and newly formed alliances based on individuals' rights, initiative, and independent accomplishments. The individual's worth is conceivably quantifiable or measurable, on various scales, and is inherently contingent upon those measurements.

The means of assessing individual worth in the Hispanic field-dependent framework assumes that a person is, by virtue of birth, deserving of the general respect accorded his parents and family (cf. Lisansky, 1981:61-86). Likewise, the individual gradually assumes the responsibility of delivering reciprocal respect and dignities (Padilla, 1964:169-70). Provided that no events jeopardize this mutuality, the respect system provides the basis for important dyadic connections more or less in the patron/client tradition, but not necessarily with the rigidly dominant and submissive orientations which have characterized other stratified social systems (cf. Foster, 1967). What is additionally important about these dyadic contacts is that they are normally quite direct. Occasionally a third party will intervene, but that is done to facilitate the
creation of a new or stronger dyadic interdependence.

In the field independent framework, on the other hand, the organizations (and to an important extent personal relations) are understood as a system of offices (and office holders), each charged with specific responsibilities and rights. Specific accountability for achievement or failure is essential to the efficient operation of the task-oriented organization.

Within the RTC environment almost all Anglo and Black recruits readily grasped and used the chain-of-command framework. Hispanics (particularly those of low acculturation levels) were less willing and less able to assimilate the chain-of-command procedure. Most were able to articulate the logic of the system, but many expressed a problem in rendering unquestioned deference to the authority of a commanding officer simply because of the position he occupied, particularly when the officer could, sometimes arbitrarily, take the liberties of derision and humiliation with the recruit. Most Hispanic recruits (regardless of acculturation level) expressed problems in receiving the verbal abuse and physical punishment from an individual who demanded, and controlled, complete deference. They tended to take the derision very personally, that is, as a reflection on their person rather than on their performance, and were unable to separate the office of the commander from the person occupying that office. The Hispanic recruits were generally willing to extend a personal kind of respect to their commanding officers, but in return they minimally expected some approachability or flexibility on the part of the officer; they expected some mutuality in dignified respect.

In fact, most Hispanic recruits indicated that they found their company commanders very willing to enhance the recruit's chances of success in boot camp. But they also expressed some frustration over the fact that they were usually restrained from making direct contact with higher echelon officers in the RTC on their own behalf. Some of the most poignant appeals for flexibility
in the RTC system came from Hispanic recruits who continually scored low on the reading tests. They read fairly well, but not quickly enough. Appeals to waive the time limits could not be made directly by the recruit to the testing division officers. Rather, the requests had to be channeled through company and division officers; and requests were generally not accommodated. Several recruits felt that they would be better off if they could make their own case before the higher-level administrators. The system of offices seemed to them to be an obstacle to self-presentation.

Another example of the distinction between mainstream and Hispanic perceptions of persons, statuses, and authority is found in the confrontational styles of each group. Perhaps because the RTC environment demands such thorough conformity from all of the participants, it is also a setting for frequent interactive hostility, between recruit peers and between recruits and officers. The mainstream interactive style often involved an open and reasoned challenge to the authority, intelligence, or correctness of a commanding officer. At times the challenge was belligerent and aggressively angry. Such outbursts were summarily penalized.

Among most Hispanic (and some mainstream) recruits, the reaction to perceived abuse or unjustified criticism was a resentful withdrawal and prolonged sulking or depression. Many Hispanic recruits stated that they understood that it was the duty of the commanding officer to obtain cooperation and discipline in whatever manner necessary, but, again taking all criticism personally, felt a deep resentment of what they considered to be a misuse of a position of authority and dominance.

The "power distance" issues involved in these RTC interactions do not seem directly akin to the social stratification concerns discussed by writers such as Clark (1959), Madsen (1973), and Grebler, et al. (1970), or summarized by Lisansky (1981:166-179). Indeed, the social and economic factors of class may
not clearly distinguish many company commanders from the Hispanic recruits. As mentioned earlier, many of the company commanders involved in the two divisions studied were either Black or Filipino. While the Anglo recruits often implied that they considered themselves to be of social and cultural status superior to the ethnic company commanders, the Hispanic recruits did not seem to view social class as an important concern. Hispanics did occasionally voice a feeling of cultural superiority to Blacks and Filipinos (vis-a-vis both recruit peers and company commanders).

Perhaps of more significance in the understanding of the power distance phenomenon related to Hispanics is the reported emphasis on obedience, respect, discipline and loyalty in the socialization of Hispanic children. Interestingly, while the Anglo and Black recruits interviewed tended to liken the company commander to an employer or boss, the Hispanics were more apt to identify him with a father image. The Hispanics noted that while they only rarely felt that they could depend upon their commander in the way that they might depend upon their father (or other senior family member), the demands for obedience made by the commanders were not unlike those made by family elders. Likewise, the relatively unquestioning deference shown by the Hispanics toward the officers can be likened to that demonstrated toward parents. The existence of this "father image" among Hispanics in the RTC might serve to further explain their largely non-confrontational interactive style.

* This kind of ethnic distribution is probably not unusual in other recruit divisions. My recent research among personnel in the Pacific Naval Air Command has revealed remarkably burgeoning cadre of Black and, particularly, Filipino middle-level petty officers in all segments of the Navy. For the Filipinos, re-enlistment in the Navy, at the petty officer levels, is an important assurance in the obtaining of United States citizenship.
Familism

The literature on Hispanic values emphasizes the importance of family ties, loyalties, and control (Madsen, 1973:19; Kagan, 1977:77; Lisansky, 1981:138-53). Other studies have focused on the tenacity of the nuclear and extended kinship systems in most traditional Spanish-speaking communities (Ulibarri, 1970:35-36; Cohen, 1979:96-97). In a previous report (Rojas, 1981) I discussed the often-cited reluctance of Hispanic youth to consider leaving a household for the purpose of seeking a different kind of lifestyle in a different setting. Interviews with Hispanics in the RTC have suggested a possible basis for rethinking the nature of familism among acculturating Mexican-Americans.

Two trends emerge from the information gathered in this study. The first, mentioned earlier in the report, concerns a surprising incidence of Hispanic enlistees coming from families which in a traditional Hispanic sense would be considered unusual. Seventeen of the 39 Mexican-American recruits (44%; 36% of the total Hispanic sample intensely interviewed, 47) reported that they had left homes in which one or both of the parental roles was not filled (either by a natural or step-parent). Of these 17 cases, 4 parental absences were due to death, 10 were due to separation or divorce, and 3 were instances in which the recruit assumed residence with an older sibling or relative for educational or economic reasons. Of the 17 cases, six of the recruits had been living with non-parental kin (siblings, aunt, uncle, or grandparents) for over a year prior to arrival at the RTC. From this Mexican-American sample, then, we arrive at a divorce/separation rate of approximately 25% (10 of 39). This is to be compared with a nationwide Hispanic divorce rate of 5.2%.*

The obvious implication contained in this data is that at least in terms

* This information was provided to me by Judith Lisansky. The data are based on a random sample of 68,000 U.S. Hispanic households, and is reported in Current Population Survey Report Series. Persons of Spanish Origin in the U.S. Marital Status and Living Arrangements, pp. 9 (P-20 series, No. 365). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, March, 1980.
of family organization the Hispanic recruits in the RTC are atypical. Ideally we would like to have access to complete family biographies from this group of recruits in order to detect attitudinal or behavioral patterns which might suggest a propensity to leave a non-nuclear family setting, on the one hand, or to be attracted to a different lifestyle or career opportunity (such as the Navy), on the other hand. A content review of the RTC interviews reveals that most of the Hispanics found the various dissolution circumstances traumatic, but not so much for themselves as for their parents and their younger siblings. Most indicated that they felt that change in family form was not directly related to their decision to leave home and join the Navy. Some noted that the family disruption made their decision to leave home easier. Others felt that with the change in family form they had to assume a greater responsibility for the group's welfare. Their decision to seek a military job was a response to the immediacy of their new economic responsibility.*

A second trend, related I think to the first, is the interesting tendency on the part of the RTC Hispanics to optimistically accept the changes and flexibilities in their family and household forms. Hispanic recruits of both low and high acculturated backgrounds noted that their decisions to leave home were almost always complicated, and emotionally difficult, but most were also emphatic in expressing that they appreciate the general idea of increased lifestyle opportunities which result from the changes in family. Many of the recruits pointed out, or implied, that it is not the actual form of the household and family that matters. Rather, what is important is perpetuation of the sentiment which normally would characterize the and support the Hispanic family.

Perhaps more importantly, the recruits—particularly the well acculturated individuals—felt that familism and mobility are no longer viewed as

* It would be additionally helpful to gain some information on the choices made by the siblings of these recruits for the purpose of comparison.
contradictory. The more acculturated recruits indicated that their own sense of familial responsibility was becoming clearer to them, especially since they had qualified for, and taken on, an "important and paid" position in the military. Many stressed that economic management and "social survival" were the attitudes that were most crucial for them today.

Only two or three Mexican-American recruits expressed a "collectivistic" or politically sensitive orientation toward the welfare of "la raza"---for most a relatively amorphous entity, even if a popular concept. Instead they were usually able to enumerate a limited number of close kin or friends for whom they wished to take on a greater responsibility. This specifically defined responsibility did not necessarily imply co-residence, or continuous proximity, and in fact allowed for extended periods of absence. The described familial support might not involve money, but certainly a strong sentiment of loyalty, dependability and primary obligation.

Attitudes Toward Work and Career

Triandis (1981:11) distinguishes four kinds of minority group reactions to a dominant culture:

1. acculturated---in which the individuals more or less adopt the norms of the majority, while also maintaining some of the norms of the minority.

2. anomic---in which the individuals reject the norms of both minority and the majority.

3. isolated---in which the minority group members maintain only their traditional norms.

4. confrontational---in which the minority individuals attempt to reformulate the majority norms.

* Indeed, at the lowest end of the military pay scale, receiving a pre-tax salary of $501 per month, the recruit may be hard-pressed to make a significant contribution to their family's welfare. Nevertheless, most Hispanic recruits expressed an intention to send home some money, sometime.
Triandis predicts that of the four categories of minority group responses, only those persons within the acculturated framework would consider the Navy as a viable working and living situation. Further, minority members "who are isolated or in confrontation would reject the Navy as something foreign to them; those who are anomic would by definition see the Navy as having nothing to do with them."

The evidence in the current research suggests that a general agreement with Triandis in most respects here, but also indicates that the Navy is attracting a significant number of Hispanics who, on the basis of test scores and RTC performances, might be characterized as anomic. Certainly, low level of acculturation does not necessarily imply an anomic characterization. Of the 24 Mexican-American recruits judged to be only marginally acculturated (based on ASVAB scores, leadership performance, and English proficiency), 15 clearly expressed or implied a long-range desire to participate more fully in the common notions of modern American lifestyle: economic stability or affluence, material acquisitions, formal education for himself and his family, and improved opportunities for his own children in the future. However, 9 of the less acculturated individuals were decidedly unenthusiastic about the possibility or the desirability of obtaining "the American dream," yet they were frustrated by the seemingly chronic economic and educational shortcomings which characterized their home communities. These problems they attributed to "being Mexican"---or more specifically, to "being Mexican in a gringo country." Behaviorally, this "anomic" group often seemed the most concerned about minimizing their ethnic identity in their self-presentation strategies. They were often the most reclusive and non-communicative of the recruits. Their primary interest in being in the Navy was to obtain a job and a salary. Their main problem in this regard is that they are not skilled in acquisition and maintenance of the technical positions which the Navy offers.
This "anomic" group, and some of the as-yet-low acculturated individuals with mainstream aspirations, seemed to carry relatively fatalistic attitudes toward work, achievement, and career. Among the unskilled Hispanics, particular jobs are usually not specifically pursued, planned for, or prepared for. Rather, jobs are taken whenever they "present themselves." Much is left to chance rather than foresight or directed effort. Due to a number of social and economic factors, and to a chronically weak self-image, most lower-class, unacculturated Hispanics do not feel that they have, or are not entitled to, a choice of work or career. Instead, they feel that they must take what work is available (even within the highly technical setting of the Navy) out of economic necessity and lack of familiarity with the tasks of systematic job-seeking.*

Few Hispanics refer to a sense of patriotic responsibility in discussing their decision to seek duty in the Navy. Their needs are quite practical: employment, salary, and training. The job is viewed as a means toward specific and fairly short term ends. Work serves to meet one's responsibilities. For the anomic and the low acculturated Hispanic, to have a career is generally viewed as desirable, but to actually obtain one is usually only incidental. The experiences and attitudes which place high value on a career are new and somewhat vague for Hispanics; the skills which will foster the values are yet to be acquired.

This research at the Recruit Training Center indicates that there are important conceptual and behavioral links between the recognition and acceptance of a set of values, on the one hand, and the acquisition of the skills necessary to realize those values, on the other hand. Idealized and abstract values only

* Research by the author is currently underway in the Mexican-American barrios of San Diego, and will hopefully offer some insight into Hispanic attitudes toward the industrial work-place and the interaction between Hispanic and Anglo employees and employers.
become believable and internalized when they seem to come within actual reach. The rewards for performance within a structured and codified organizational environment can only be gained when the requisite understandings and talents for achievement are taught and nurtured. For the majority of the Mexican-American and Hispanic recruits entering the Navy organization we can expect a continued disparity between their value system and that of the mainstream recruits. In order to enhance the performance of Hispanics in this system, the Navy will need to attract more clearly acculturated Hispanics and actively teach less-acculturated individuals some of the methods for incorporating environmentally-relevant values into their behavioral norms. Attention to effective leadership, organizational perspectives, career orientation, and strategic self-presentation in mainstream systems must be emphasized. More specifically, it seems that the RTC command might profitably expand the efforts of the Academic Remedial Training division in such a way that otherwise intellectually capable recruits (Hispanics and others) might improve the fundamental educational and organizational skills which they will need for success in the Navy.

Triandis notes that values are "conceptions of relationships among abstract categories (e.g., humans, nature, time) which have strong affective components and imply preferences for a certain kind of action or state of affairs" (1982:1). The present study reaffirms this assessment: values are guides to understanding and to behavior. But they are also tools: notions, images, symbols, and, importantly, skills to be obtained and used for expression in general and particular social situations.
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Appendix 1.

RECRUIT TRAINING COMMAND, SAN DIEGO

COMMAND ORGANIZATION

COMMANDING OFFICER
  EXECUTIVE OFFICER
  COMMAND MASTER CHIEF

TRAINING SUPPORT DEPARTMENT
  CURRICULUM SUPPORT
  MATERIAL SUPPORT

MILITARY TRAINING DEPARTMENT
  ASSISTANT MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER
  TRAINING DIVISIONS ONE THRU EIGHT
  SPECIAL TRAINING
  DRILL DIVISION

TECHNICAL TRAINING DEPARTMENT
  WATER SAFETY AND PHYSICAL TRAINING
  ORDNANCE DIVISION
  ACADEMIC REHABILITATION TRAINING
  BASIC MILITARY ORIENTATION

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT
  PERSONNEL LIAISON
  LEGAL DIVISION
  ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION
  RECRUIT AFFAIRS
  RECEIVING AND ORIENTATION
  COMMAND CAREER COUNSELOR

STANDARDS & EVALUATIONS DEPARTMENT
  COMPANY COMMANDER SCHOOL
  MILITARY EVALUATION DIVISION
  CURRICULUM & INSTRUCTIONAL STANDARDS
  TESTING DIVISION

APPRENTICE TRAINING DEPARTMENT
  ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
  STEAMAN SCHOOL
  FIREMAN SCHOOL
  AIRMAN SCHOOL

(see appendix 2)
Appendix 2.

MILITARY TRAINING DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

DIRECTOR, MILITARY TRAINING

ASSISTANT MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER

TRAINING DIVISION ONE

TRAINING DIVISION TWO

TRAINING DIVISION THREE

TRAINING DIVISION FOUR

TRAINING DIVISION FIVE

TRAINING DIVISION SIX

TRAINING DIVISION SEVEN

TRAINING DIVISION EIGHT

SPECIAL TRAINING DIVISION

DRILL DIVISION
APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING ORGANIZATION
(Training programs for enlisted men without specific Advanced School ratings)

DIRECTOR, APPRENTICE TRAINING

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, APPRENTICE TRAINING

MASTER-AT-ARMS

APPRENTICE TRAINING

LCPO

SN/FN/AN
BEQ MANAGERS

SEAMAN SCHOOL

FIREMAN SCHOOL

AIRMAN SCHOOL
Appendix 4. RECRUIT MASTER CHART

(From: Company Commander Handbook, RTC, San Diego)

Narrative:

Reference (a) is the Master Training Schedule for Recruit Basic Military Training Companies. The curriculum for each day of training is written down in this instruction. The standard recruit will remain in the same company and complete the required training schedule with only minor deviations. The non-standard recruit, however, will encounter obstacles in the training cycle which could result in his transfer to a special RTC unit, a setback to a new company, or even a discharge from the Navy.
Appendix 4 (Continued)

I. Receiving Division Schedule (0-0 DOT through 1-4 DOT)

SCHEDULE FOR 0-0 DOT (Day of Training, Holding Period)

R & O INPROCESSING (URINE TEST, CONTRABAND LECTURE)
DITTY BAG AND LINEN ISSUE
HAIRCUT #1

SCHEDULE FOR HOLDING DAYS

0400-XXXX REVEILLE
0430-XXXX BREAKFAST (AT ASSIGNED GALLEY)
0600-0630 DIVISION OFFICERS WELCOME TO NEW RECRUITS
0630-0710 UCMJ 1, 2, 3 AND 4
0720-1020 WORKING UNIFORM ISSUE, FITTING AND INSTRUCTIONS
1030-1200 NOON MEAL (AT ASSIGNED GALLEY)
1420-1730 UNIFORM STENCILING FOR FLEET AND SEA DUTY
1730-1800 EVENING MEAL (AT ASSIGNED GALLEY)
1820-1930 REMOVE/STORE UNAUTHORIZED PERSONAL EFFECTS
1930-2100 COMMENCE NIGHT ROUTINE/INSTRUCT BUNK MAKE-UP (C/C TIME)

SCHEDULE FOR 1-1 DOT (Day of Training, Week One, Day One)

0400-XXXX REVEILLE
0430-XXXX BREAKFAST
0630-0710 SHOTS #1
0715-1020 DENTAL EXAMS
1030-1130 PRIORITY NOON MEAL
1200-1240 RED CROSS LECTURE
1250-1330 CHAPLAINS LECTURE
1340-1420 SAFE GUARDING VALUABLES LECTURE BY C/C OR GRP LEADER
1430-1550 HAND SALUTES AND GREETINGS LECTURE BY C/C GRP LEADER
1600-1730 NTC/RTC RULES AND REGULATIONS LECTURE BY C/C OR GRP LEADER
Appendix 4 (Continued)

SCHEDULE FOR 1-1 DOT (CONTINUED)

1730-1800 EVENING MEAL
1820-2100 COMMENCE EVENING ROUTINE (C/C TIME)

SCHEDULE FOR 1-2 DOT

0400-XXXX REVEILLE
0430-XXXX BREAKFAST
0600-0740 REMEDIAL READING TEST
0750-1015 ASVAB AND RESEARCH TEST
1030-1210 NOON MEAL
1230-1310 VETERAN'S EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
1320-1400 ORAL HYGIENE AND PLAQUE CONTROL (NUCS, AEF, AND SUBS TO DENTAL)
1410-1730 VIDEO TAPES//C/C TIME FOR CLOTHES FOLDING AND BUNK MAKE-UP
1730-1800 EVENING MEAL
1820-2100 COMMENCE NIGHT ROUTINE

SCHEDULE FOR 1-3 DOT

0400-XXXX REVEILLE
0430-XXXX BREAKFAST
0600-0740 ORAL HYGIENE AND PLAQUE CONTROL
0800-1015 DENTAL EXAMS, DENTAL RECORD UPDATE
1030-1230 NOON MEAL
1300-1520 MEDICAL EXAM
1530-1730 COMPANY COMMANDER REVIEW NTC/RTC RULES AND REGULATIONS
1730-1800 EVENING MEAL
1820-2100 COMMENCE NIGHT ROUTINE (C/C TIME)

SCHEDULE FOR 1-4 DOT

0445-XXXX REVEILLE
-XXXX BREAKFAST
0710-0750 COMPANY COMMISSIONING AND COMMANDING/DIVISION OFFICER
Appendix 7.  

IN-PROCESSING HOLD DAYS

MAXIMUM OF 200 RECRUITS PER DAY ASSIGNED TO COMPANIES

DOT

0

1 1 1 1

1 2 3 4

STENCILING PROCESS:

(Not completed by recruits in excess of 200)

LESS THAN 80 MEN MUST HOLD ON 1-3 DAY & Await additional men from 1-2 day to form company.

STILL LESS THAN 80 MEN TO FORM COMPANY

RECRUITS IN EXCESS OF 200

1-3 1-4

1-4 (holding)

LESS THAN 80 TO FORM COMPANY
Appendix 8.

DEMERIT SCHEDULE

1. COMPANY COMMISSIONED
   DRILL & BMT

2. AWARDED 20
   DEMERITS IN
   1ST 3 WEEKS

3. RECEIVES 30
   DEMERITS BY
   8 - 3 DAY

4. 1ST TIME RECRUIT
   EARS 1/2 OR MORE
   MAX. WEEKLY DEMERITS

5. 2ND & SUBSEQUENT TIMES

6. DIV. OFF.

7. AMTO: COUNSEL AND
   RETURN TO COMPANY,
   SHORT TOUR, SET
   BACK MAX. 2 WEEKS,
   ASSIGN POSMO

8. MTO: COUNSEL & RE-
   TURN TO CO. SHORT
   TOUR, SET BACK,
   ASSIGN POSMO

9. COMPANY COMMANDER

10. DIV. OFFICERS MAST

11. COUNSEL & RETURN TO
    CO.: MARCHING PARTY,
    SET BACK MAX. ONE
    WEEK

12. SHORT TOUR

13. FALL REPEATEDLY

14. SET BACK

15. REPORT CHIT

16. 1. AMTO 2. MTO

17. SETBACK

18. WITHDRAW

19. GOTO MAST

20. R A B

*See Definition Appendix*
Appendix 9.

READING TEST FAILURE MIGRATION PATH

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

ADMINISTERED GATES - MCGRINNITE READING TEST
FAIL

RETAKE FORM TWO OF READING TEST
PASS
FAIL

SCORE 3.0
SCORE 3.1 BUT LESS THAN 6.0

INTERVIEWED BY INSTRUCTOR

* ACADEMIC REMEDIAL TRAINING. BERTHEAT AT 2441

RECRUIT APTITUDE BOARD

RECOMMEND DISCHARGE

* NAVAL APTITUDE BOARD. BERTHEAT AT 2348

* OGU AWAITING DISCHARGE

See Definition Appendix
Appendix 10.

AEROBIC TEST FAILURE MIGRATION PATH

RUN

RUN

RUN: QUALIFY

4th RUN

5th RUN GRADUATE

FAIL, FAIL

FAILS OR ON NO RUN, NO PHYS. EXERCISE CHIT

FAIL OR NO RUN, PHYS. EXERCISE CHIT

DIV. OFF. MAST COUNSEL, STAY WITH CO. OR SET BACK MAX. 5 DAYS. CONTINUE TRAINING

DIV. OFF. MAST COUNSEL, STAY WITH COMPANY

DIV. OFF. MAST COUNSEL, STAY WITH COMPANY

AMTO: COUNSEL, STAY WITH CO., SHORT TOUR, SET BACK, MAX 2 WKS.

AMTO SETBACK 2 WEEKS

PASS: GRADUATE

FAIL: GO TO R & O

FAIL: RETAKE RUN, PASS TO GRADUATE

FAIL: SET BACK 3 WKS RAB

* See Appendix 13 Definitions

** May Graduate
Appendix 12. DEFINITIONS
(Source: Company Commander's Handbook, RTC)

Introduction: The purpose of this chapter is to define the duties and functions of the various boards, departments, and divisions within the Recruit Training Command, and to index and clarify the acronyms and terms that are peculiar to the training of recruits. Each term will be discussed as to its bearing on the recruit training cycle if appropriate. References are shown where amplifying information may be obtained by the reader. Those portions herein that are underlined indicate that the underlined part is another definition within this chapter.

DEFINITIONS

ART (Academic Remedial Training): A program designed to assist those recruits who have evidenced literacy skill deficiencies to a degree that their ability to assimilate the academics of recruit training will be impeded. The primary function of the program is to increase the reading level of recruits who have demonstrated reading deficiencies.

ASMO (Assignment Memorandum Office): The office where inter-company transfers are recorded and effected. The written document used to effect such transfers are known as "Assignment Memorandums". ASMO is used extensively, as it establishes a new location for the recruit anytime he deviates from the training cycle to the extent that his original company is changed, i.e., setbacks, hospitalizations, disciplinary, etc.

AMTO (Assistant Military Training Officer): A commissioned officer who is responsible to the MTO for the planning and direction of all recruit training division operations. He assists the MTO in supervising the military aspects of recruit training, including the evaluation, discipline, and counseling of recruits. The AMTO also maintains a safe deposit system for recruits and conducts weekly Romanoff and outstanding recruit interviews. The AMTO may exercise the following actions of a disciplinary nature:
1. Counsel and return to company
2. Refer to ART for reading test
3. Assign demerits
4. Assign Short Tour (Extra Military Instruction)
5. Assign to Special Training Division
6. Award Motivational Training (POSMO)
7. Refer to MHU, Chaplain, or Medical Dept.
8. Set back recruits with excessive demerits
9. Refer to MTO with recommendations for disposition

CASUAL UNIT: A unit that administers and berths those recruits awaiting processing for discharge by reason of Fraudulent Enrollment or Erroneous Enrollment.

COMPANY COMMANDER: A Petty Officer in pay grade E5 and above who is in charge of a recruit training company for the entire training period. The Company Commander is responsible for keeping the company on schedule, adhering to the daily routine. He is first in the chain of command for recruit discipline and is the basic military instructor for the men in his charge. The Company Commander may exercise the following actions of a disciplinary nature:
1. Assign demerits
2. Award Instructional Training
3. Repeat Performance
4. Refer recruit to division officer
Appendix 12 (Continued)

DEFINITIONS

COMPASS (Computer Assisted Recruit Assignment System):
The system by which recruits are made available for assignment to their first
duty station, or school, on completion of recruit training. Pertinent personal
data is electronically transmitted to NMPC during the classification procedures
at the recruit training centers and an assignment is produced by the rating
detailers and transmitted back to the training center for execution, on com-
pletion of recruit training.

DEMERTS: A system for gauging discrepancies for recruits in the areas of
personnel lockers, and military behavior. All recruits are assigned demerits
for discrepancies beginning on the 2-1 day of training.

DIVISION OFFICER: Officer who is responsible for the administration of the
training of assigned recruit companies. The Division Officer is responsible to
the AMTO in directing the functions of the division staff in support of assigned
company commanders. Other duties are to ensure adherence to the training
curriculum and compliance with command policies regarding training of recruits.
The Division Officer may exercise the following actions of a disciplinary nature:

1. Counsel and return to company
2. Assign demerits
3. Assign to POSMO
4. Assign to Short Tour (Extra Mil. Instruction) or MHU
5. Refer to AMTO

DRILL DIVISION OFFICER: The Drill Division Officer plans, directs and administers
the training of Drill Companies when assigned. He supervises the training and
off-station appearances of all performing units. Other duties and responsi-
ibilities include the organization and training of the Recruit Drum and Bugle
Corps, the Fifty State Flag Team, Color Guard, and the Rifle Drill Team. The
Drill Division Officer reports directly to the MTO.

ERRONEOUS ENLISTMENT: An enlistment that was originally entered into in good
faith by both the Navy and the individual but that subsequently becomes invalid
due to contractual reasons, i.e., school or program guarantees that, through no
fault of either party, cannot be honored. Some physical reasons wherein the
physical defect was revealed to the AFEES, but the individual was allowed to
enlist notwithstanding, also give cause to an erroneous enlistment.

FRAUDULENT ENLISTMENT: An enlistment perpetrated by an individual wherein
information or incidents were not revealed and such information or incident,
properly disclosed, would have precluded enlistment in the Navy, i.e., criminal
records, disqualifying physical defects, extensive pre-service drug use, etc.

LEGAL HOLD UNIT: A holding unit for those recruits accused of an offense under
the UCMJ and awaiting Commanding Officer's NJP or court martial, and for those
being investigated for a possible offense.

MARCHING PARTY (Intensive Training): A motivational tool to assist the Company
Commander a means to enhance the personal development of disruptive or
inattentive recruits. Company Commanders may recommend the assignment of
recruits to one hour of Intensive training; a complete set of 13 exercises,
including stretching, bending, windmills, push ups, sit ups, and running in
place may be administered. Recruits assigned intensive training will be
screened to ensure that no one is under a "NO MARCH, NO PHYSICAL TRAINING"
restriction. Intensive Training for any group or individual must be approved
in writing by the division officer.
MEDICAL REHABILITATION UNIT: A unit to provide a suitable recruit environment for the physical rehabilitation and limited training of recruits who are incapable of participating in normal training due to temporary medical limitations.

MEDICAL SURVEY WARD UNIT: A unit established to administer and berth those recruits who are awaiting separation from the Navy due to physical disqualification.

MTO (Director of Military Training): The MTO is a commissioned Officer responsible for the management of recruit berthing, troop movements, recreation activities, and supervising the reassignment of recruits within the Military Training Department. The MTO may exercise the following actions of a disciplinary nature:

1. Counsel and return to company
2. Refer to Director, Technical Training for evaluation
3. Assign demerits
4. Refer to Academic Remedial Training
5. Assign Extra Military Instruction (see SHORT TOUR)
6. Assign to Special Training Division
7. Award POSMO
8. Refer to Chaplain, MHU, Medical - for evaluation
9. Refer to Legal, recommending C.O.'s NJP
10. Setback in training

NAB (Naval Aptitude Board): Provides for the disposition of recruits who demonstrate by their maladaptive behavior that they are not qualified for retention in the Navy. The NAB consists of three officer members. Enlisted Members in pay-grade E8 or E9 may be substituted for one of the officer members. The senior member shall be a line officer in the grade of LCDR or above. One member shall be a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist. If an officer with such training is not available, the third member shall be a medical officer, preferably one with mental health training. Minority groups will be represented on the board if requested in writing by the recruit and if such officer is reasonably available. The NAB may recommend discharge from the service if it considers the recruit unsuitable for retention. If doubt exists as to the recruit's fitness, the board may recommend additional study or return of the recruit for a further trial period of duty.

NAB HOLDING UNIT: Administers and berth those recruits waiting to appear before the Navy Aptitude Board.

OGU (Outgoing Unit): A holding unit for recruits being processed for discharge. Only those recruits who are to be discharged, and for whom authority to discharge has been established, are sent to OGU. Separation procedures are normally accomplished within four working days. Recruits from the NAB, Medical Survey Boards, and those with Fraudulent or Erroneous Enlistments comprise the input to OGU.

POSMO (Positive Motivational Unit): A unit established to rehabilitate and evaluate recruits who appear to have severe attitude problems and are having difficulty adapting or conforming to military life. Provides a suitable environment and individualized leadership to instill a positive desire to successfully complete normal recruit training through special instruction and individual counseling.
RAB (Recruit Aptitude Board): A board established to consider sub-standard recruit performance. The board consists of one officer, Ensign or above, one Warrant Officer, and one Master or Senior Chief Petty Officer. The board is appointed by the Executive Officer, RTC, and normally will convene daily, depending on the cases pending review. The RAB, by majority vote may recommend one of the following actions:

1. Counsel, warn, and return to training in a probationary status.
2. Setback to a junior company at an appropriate point in training necessary to recover that portion of the curriculum required to meet minimum recruit standards.
3. Assign to Special Training Division.
4. Refer to MHU for psychiatric/psychological exam.
5. Refer to NAB if unfit for further training.
6. Return to training and schedule reappearance on a subsequent day of training for reevaluation.

Recruits may be referred to RAB by the C.O., X.O., and SED. Medically oriented problems will be referred to MHU for evaluation and further processing. Performance oriented problems are normally referred to RAB by the MTO. All recommendations of the RAB must be concurred in by the C.O., RTC.

REASSIGNMENT UNIT: Provides supervision, instruction, and berthing for those recruits in a reassignment status, who have missed scheduled days of training and are awaiting assignment to a recruit company.

REPORT CHIT: A form used to process personnel for Commanding Officer's Non Judicial Punishment. Information that is contained on the report chit includes: Nature of offense, date of offense, name of person submitting report; names of witnesses, if appropriate, and article of UCMJ violated.

SED (Director, Standards and Evaluation Department): Responsible for the quality training of recruits through administration of a training evaluation program and development of competent Company Commanders. SED is responsible for gathering, maintaining, correlating and analyzing data regarding training of recruits. Administers the Company Commander School and Company Commander Assistant Indoctination training. SED may exercise the following actions of a disciplinary nature:

1. Refer to RAB
2. Setback in training
3. Refer to Academic Remedial Training
4. Award Motivational Training
5. Assign to Special Training Division
6. Refer to Medical for evaluation

SETBACK: A term that means removing the recruit from his company and placing him in a junior company at a point that will allow him to acquire that training that was missed or which he was unable to assimilate during the normal training cycle. A SETBACK may be effected for any of the following reasons: Non-Swimmers; Academic Failure; Disciplinary; Physical; and Aptitude.

SHORT TOUR (Extra Military Instruction): A non-punitive measure used in motivational training of reluctant or recalcitrant recruits without subjecting them to the stigma of NJP becoming a part of the individual's official record during his first enlistment. Consists of no more than 3 consecutive exercise periods administered in no more than 2 hours per day. Exercises consist of
push ups, sit ups, stationary runs, and 8 count body builders (stretching exercises). Specified maximums are provided and may not be exceeded. Not assigned prior to the recruits in-processing physical examination.

SPECIAL TRAINING DIVISION: Administers the operation of all special companies, insuring compliance with the directives of higher authority. To conduct motivational training as directed. Develop curricula for and supervise the training of Positive Motivational and Personal Development companies. Provides additional instruction to those recruits who for physical, disciplinary, motivational, or medical reasons are unable to assimilate or progress through recruit training at the normal rate, in the recruit company to which they are assigned. The instruction is individual in nature and designed to rehabilitate the recruit for a timely return to normal training or to promptly identify his inability to succeed at recruit training and his unsuitability for naval service.

TECHNICAL TRAINING DEPARTMENT: Provides a formal and practical instruction in basic Naval academic and technical subjects required by all recruits to enable them to develop knowledge, skills, and understanding which will facilitate their development as naval personnel. Technical Training Department conducts the Apprenticeship Training Program, providing additional instruction in the technical areas for Airmen, Firemen, and Seamen. Apprenticeship Training is provided to those recruits who do not get selected for Class "A" schools.

TRAINING EVALUATION OFFICER: An officer in the Standards and Evaluation Department who is responsible for the coordination of inspections of various training functions and for administering the recruit company competitive system. Assists the MTO in evaluating and testing individual recruit progress.
Appendix 13

BIOGRAPHICAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

Recruit's name.

Age

Religion

Birthplace:
   Native born?
   Foreign born?

Ethnic identity, self-described.

Father: birthplace, ethnic identity, religion.

Mother: " " " 

Family size, household form, household occupants. Nuclear or non-nuclear?
   Extended family household?

Recruit's education:
   High school, vocational, college, on-the-job training.

Work and employment history:
   Training, skills, wages, lay-offs, firings, unemployment benefits?
   Industrial work, service sector, self-employed?

Native language?
   Bilingual?

Parents' native language.
   Language used in home.

Parents' education.

Parents' work and employment history.

Economic status of family.
   Lower, middle, or upper class? (recruit's description)
   From lower, middle, or upper class neighborhood?
   Economically stable, marginal, poor?
   Family participation in social support/welfare programs?

Information from recruit "hard card" (service record):
   Mental group category
   ASVAB scores
   Advanced school rating
   Reading scores
   Demerit records
   Award recommendations

*This information was gathered through the course of open-ended conversations, not in a point-for-point systematic questioning.
SUBJECTIVE INFORMATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Reasons for entering the Navy
Reasons for leaving home.
Problems in leaving home?
Parental influence or pressure to leave or remain?
Home peer pressures?

Positive or Negative experience in the recruiting process or in the RTC programs?
Recruited by a Hispanic?
Has the recruiter's description of the RTC or Navy life proved accurate?

Attitudes toward education and schooling.
Enjoy or hate schools and study?
Ability to take timed examinations.
Ability to see connections between RTC training and the remainder of the Navy career.

Work and employment aspirations during Navy career and after discharge from the Navy.

Skilled or professional aspirations.
Can the recruit specifically outline the steps he intends to take toward achieving a particular career or employment position?

Attitudes toward RTC discipline.
How does the recruit feel about his company commander?
Is the discipline fair, abusive, beneficial, discriminatory?
Does the company commander seem like an employer or boss, or like a father?
Is the commander likely to be a dependable friend?

How does the recruit feel about his RTC peers?
Any new friends?
How is he treated by Anglos and Blacks?
How is he treated by other Hispanics?
What are the differences between various Hispanic backgrounds?

Does the recruit feel that he is personally liked, admired, envied, or pitied by other recruits?

Do Anglos feel that they are culturally or socially superior?
What do Anglos think about Mexican-Americans?

Has the recruit spent much time living or working with Anglos and Blacks?

Experience with the RTC organization.
Does the recruit know all of the segments of the RTC and NTC?
Can he explain how they are connected?

What is the purpose of the chain-of-command principle?
Does this principle seem to work?
Appendix 14 (Continued)

Where do you go when you have an RTC related problem?
Where do you go with your personal problems?

Does the recruit think that other recruits (Anglos or Blacks) understand the system better than the Hispanics? Why? How?

Attitudes toward life in the barracks.
Any problems with lack of privacy?
Sleeping problems?
Food problems?
Health problems?

How does it feel to be away from home?

Family life.
Describe the quality of home life.
Family form stable? Changing?
Separation, divorce?
How does the recruit compare his motives and his interests to those of his siblings?

Discuss economic condition of the family.
Is the recruit to some extent responsible for economic contribution to his family?

Does he intend to return to his family or community?
Does his family expect his return?

How "American" does the recruit think he is?
What is it that makes him "Mexican"?
What is it that makes him "American"?

In what ways would he like to change himself, or his family, or his community?

Does he want to be more like the Anglos, or more like the traditional Mexicans? How? Why?

Does he wish that the Anglos were more like him?

How would he help an Anglo better understand what it is like to be a Mexican-American?
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<th>Mexican-Americans</th>
<th>(%) of M-A</th>
<th>Puerto Ricans</th>
<th>Cubans</th>
<th>South Americans</th>
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<th>%</th>
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<td>II</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>IV</td>
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<td>(8%)</td>
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<td>(28%)</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td>(72%)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Socio-economic Status⁴</td>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOW CLASS</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of Acculturation⁵</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(38%)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(62%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>NUCLEAR/EXTENDED</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>(56%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Form⁶</td>
<td>NON-TRADITIONAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(44%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 15. (Notes)

1 Of a total of 64 Hispanics contacted within the two RTC divisions, 47 were extensively interviewed or observed through the course of the boot camp process.

2 The Mental Group Categories are divisions of tested intellectual aptitude, based on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery examinations administered to potential recruits considering enlistment, and to some recruits upon arrival at the RTC. The ASVAB scores and the mental group assignments are the primary factors in determining a recruit's qualification for one of the Navy's advanced technical ratings and schools. Mental group I includes the most gifted recruits, group IV the least (cf. Rojas, 1981).

3 The Navy offers over 60 different job fields (career ratings) for enlisted men. The ratings vary from clerical skills to nuclear energy technology. The qualifications and intensity of training required for each rating vary accordingly. Those enlisted men who do not qualify for, or choose not to select, a specialized rating are offered either a Seaman, Fireman, or Airman rating. The Navy Enlisted Career Guide, 1980-1981, is the most useful resource for information related to these classifications.

4 This is an admittedly subjective assessment of recruits' social class, arrived at through the self-designation of the individual Hispanic recruits and the researcher's evaluation of the family's economic position, educational background, residence conditions, and employment history.

5 The degree of acculturation into mainstream American life, based on assessments of English language proficiency, ability to articulate important mainstream values (social and economic independence, job-related achievement, facility in geographical mobility), and observable efforts toward above-average performance in RTC tasks.

6 See discussion of family form, pp. 22-23, 30-32.
The largest of the Navy’s West coast installations, the Naval Training Center, San Diego, continues to live up to its nickname “Cradle of the Navy.” Each year, as many as 30,000 Bluejackets undergo recruit training and 32,000 service school students complete advanced courses of instruction.

Naval Training Center, under the command of the Center Commander, coordinates all activities at NTC, and exercises command over subordinate activities in effecting basic indoctrination for enlisted personnel of the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve, coupled with the support of other activities as directed by higher authority. Naval Training Center consists of four subordinate commands.

Naval Administrative Command. This command is responsible for the direction, supervision and accomplishment of daily administrative support services for the Center, and for planning the Naval Training Center’s growth and modernization to meet the immediate and future needs of the Navy.

Recruit Training Command. The largest of NTC’s four component commands, RTC administers a training program best described as a “transition from civilian to Bluejacket.” New recruits come from every state in the Union, but the majority are from west of the Mississippi River.

Service School Command. This command has been assigned the mission of providing introductory, advanced and specialized skill training to meet the needs of both the Navy newcomer fresh out of recruit training and the seasoned sailor with fleet experience.

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