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1 January 1976
BDM/W-75-188-TR

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IMPACT OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR OF 1967
ON EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. AND SOVIET POWER

FINAL REPORT

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Impact of the Middle East War of 1967 on European Perceptions of U.S. and Soviet Power


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This research develops methodologies which may help to understand how international events affect the way Western Europe perceives U.S. and Soviet power. This effort focuses on British, French, and German perceptions of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.
#19 continued

1967 Middle East War
U.K. Political/Military Policies
French Political/Military Policies
German Political/Military Policies
Quantitative Analysis of International Relations
FOREWORD

This draft final report documents a pilot study of methodologies which may facilitate understanding of how international events affect the way Western Europe perceives U.S. and Soviet power. The study focuses on a specific international crisis in order to understand:

(1) The effect of international events on perceptions of the balance of power.

(2) How the process of perception responds to international events.

This pilot study focuses on British, French, and German perceptions of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The 1967 event was chosen because of its short duration, the availability of relevant open-source data, and because the event did not directly affect military deployments which threatened or defended Europe. The 1967 crisis was important in its own right, but for purposes of a pilot study it provided a "specimen" in which the elements of U.S.-Soviet confrontation were represented.

The basic methodology is that of a case study, more precisely three case studies, from open-source documents of the three countries under study. Accompanying the case studies, however, were three supporting efforts essential to the validity of conclusions drawn from case materials. The first supporting effort was a review of literature from the fields of social-psychology, communications, public opinion, and political science to identify previous findings relevant to the perception of events in international relations. An annotated bibliography which documents results of the literature review is included as Appendix A to this report. A second supporting effort was the use of content analysis, specifically a modification of evaluative assertion analysis, to provide a quantitative basis for comparisons among the three countries. Appendix B provides an explanation of the methods used and documents evaluative statements which were collected for the analysis. The results of the content analysis are presented among conclusions in Chapter V of the basic report. Because the literature of perceptions emphasizes effects of political culture, a third supporting effort documented the basic traditions
and symbols which, in conventional wisdom, affect the international behavior of each of the three countries. Along with the case materials themselves, such long-term factors are discussed in the context of each country study. The case studies facilitate generalizations about how the process of perception worked in 1967. Taken with the supporting research such generalizations provide a basis for description and prediction of such processes as they work today.

This report is a draft for review. Comments and criticism will be incorporated in a final report and are therefore most welcome.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. TECHNICAL PROBLEM

This research develops methodologies which may help to understand how international events affect the way Western Europe perceives U.S. and Soviet power. The study focuses on a specific international crisis in order to understand:

1. The effect of international events on perceptions of the balance of power.

2. How the process of perception responds to international events.

This pilot effort focuses on British, French, and German perceptions of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The 1967 event was chosen because of its short duration, the availability of relevant open-source data, and because the event did not directly affect military deployments which threatened or defended Europe. The 1967 crisis was important in its own right, but for purposes of a pilot study it provided a "specimen" in which the elements of U.S.-Soviet confrontation were represented.

B. GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The basic methodology is that of a case study, more precisely three case studies, from open-source documents of the three countries under examination. Accompanying the case studies, however, were three supporting efforts essential to the validity of conclusions drawn from case materials. The first supporting effort was a review of literature from the fields of social psychology, communications, public opinion, and political science to identify previous findings relevant to the perception of events in international relations. An annotated bibliography which documents results of the literature review is included as Appendix A of this report. A second supporting effort was the use of content analysis, specifically, a modification of evaluative assertion analysis, to provide a quantitative basis...
for comparisons among the three countries. Appendix B provides an explanation of the methods used and documents evaluative statements which were collected for the analysis. The results of the content analysis are presented among conclusions in Chapter V of the basic report. Because the literature of perceptions emphasizes effects of political culture, a third supporting effort documented the basic traditions, symbols and political ideologies which may affect perceptions of power.

C. RESULTS

1. Substantive Results

   Perceptions of the 1967 War differed among the three countries. For the British, the event demonstrated the limits of their influence and emphasized the necessity of their associations with Europe. For the French, the event demonstrated the inherent dangers of a bipolar world and that French influence was required to mediate those dangers. For the Germans, the event emphasized questions about the credibility of the U.S. perceptions commitment to their defense. In each country, the basic assumptions which underlay these perceptions were evident in public debates which were ongoing during the period immediately prior to the war. In each country, evidence of the war was interpreted to reflect on the current fundamental concerns of its own foreign relations. These interpretations were generally in line with emerging government policy.

   The power of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union was perceived to have been diminished by their inability to influence activities of their client states or to prevent hostilities. The perceived power of the U.S. was enhanced by its diplomatic successes after the war while that of the Soviet Union was diminished by the defeat of its clients combined with diplomatic defeats at the U.N. The power of both countries was perceived to be increased immediately prior to the war and during the Glassboro Summit by perceptions that their cooperative influence was crucial to the prevention of conflict in the region. These alternations of perceived power
are evidenced in the case study but are more readily demonstrated by fluctuations in power evaluations documented by content analysis. In relation to specific aspects of power, the case studies conclude:

1. The U.S. was perceived to be the military superior power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. U.S. economic power was sufficient to relieve concerns about the oil embargo and financial crises.

3. The U.S. was perceived to be committed to Israeli survival; however, the U.S. declaration of noninvolvement caused a painful reconsideration by Germans of U.S. commitments to their defense. Soviet commitments, military and diplomatic, were perceived to be beyond their capabilities.

4. Although perceptions of strategic power were operative in many interpretations of the war, no perceived distinction between the power of the strategic forces of the two nations was evident; the strategic balance was perceived, essentially, as parity.

2. Methodological Results

A simplified method of content analysis was developed which proved capable of measuring variations in the intensity of power evaluation during the 1967 crisis period. While case study methods are essential to an inductive process which might explain and predict the origins of perceptions, content analysis improves description and increases confidence in the reliability of results. Public opinion data, though limited, substantially increased confidence in validity of conclusions. A combination of case study and content analysis methods is recommended for study of the impact of events on perceptions of power.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Five avenues for further research are indicated by this pilot study:

1. A contrasting study of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—an event which apparently substantially altered Western European opinions of the power balance.
(2) A study comparing the present case with the 1973 "Yom Kipper" war--a comparison which may reveal how perceptions are transferred to a later event as "lessons learned."

(3) An investigation of the communities of "perception leaders" and patterns of communication which may presage changes in perceptions--a longer-term study related to a specific technology is recommended.

(4) Opinion data should be exploited on a systematic basis for defense planning purposes.

(5) A study similar to this pilot project should address contemporary events.
A. PURPOSE

This research examines methods for understanding how major international events affect European perceptions of U.S. and Soviet power. The events of concern are those which potentially affect long-term competition between ourselves and the Soviet Union. The research is motivated by a concern that in an era of negotiated forces, alliance strategy, and subliminal warfare, perceived power is essential to the advancement of U.S. interests and to the stability of detente. A number of methods are used to determine perceptions which were affected by the 1967 Middle East War and to shed light on the process which gives perceptions form and substance. A considerable body of literature, surveyed in Appendix A of this report, upholds a theory that perceptions result from an individual's assumptions about the way the world is organized; information about an event is distorted and simplified to be consistent with such assumptions. It is the purpose of this research to identify such assumptions, to illustrate how they are related to perceptions of an event, and to understand how such assumptions may be changed when contradicting information is received.

Essential questions which underly the research are:

1. What are perceived attributes of power?
2. To what extent did the 1967 War affect perceived power?
3. How are perceptions of an international event formulated and communicated?
4. How quickly are perceptions formed?
5. How are specific perceptions generalized to additional issues?
6. What were specific perceptions about military power, economic power, national commitment, the balance of conventional military power, and the strategic balance?
B. RESEARCH APPROACH

Because the research questions deal with the content of European perceptions, case studies of British, French and West German documents are basic to the research approach. Case study methods rely on the inductive reasoning of the analyst to derive from case materials insights about content and process which may be generalized to other circumstances for purposes of explanation and prediction. Two problems, however, undermine case methods. First, generalizations derived from the study are case specific; unless a series of studies is conducted to verify that the same process is at work in a number of cases, there can be little confidence that such generalizations have explanatory or predictive value in other cases. That this research addresses three countries, however, serves to assure that generalizations supported by all three cases may be independent of country differences within the western European area. On the other hand, one does not have the assurance that such generalizations apply to cases other than the 1967 event. A second limitation of case methods is one of reliability. Different analysts may derive different conclusions from the same set of case materials. Although the analyst may enhance the credibility of conclusions by careful documentation and argument, the end results may still be open to question. That this research incorporates studies by three different analysts lends confidence to the reliability of overall conclusions.

In addition to the country case studies which are the basis of the research, alternate methodologies are tested for potential contributions to an understanding of how Western Europe perceives U.S. and Soviet power. In particular, content analysis techniques are developed to evaluate, on a quantitative basis, the extent to which perceived power altered during the 1967 War. The methodological objective is to develop a simplified procedure to complement basic case study methods, to provide a basis for quantitative
comparisons, and to check on the validity of conclusions derived from less objective techniques. A method based on Charles Osgood's evaluative assertion analysis is developed to quantify the intensity of power references observed in case materials. The method that is discussed and data that are collected in the course of an analysis are documented in Appendix B. The feasibility of the method is tested and the results of the analysis are considered in developing conclusions of the research.

As an alternative to case study and content analysis methods, the products of public opinion polling are also examined. Opinion data gathered by the United States Information Agency are related to the questions of research interest to complement and to check the validity of conclusions derived by case study and content analytical methods.

The research approach, then, is to compare the products of case studies, content analysis, and opinion polling to evaluate the contributions of each method to an understanding of how Europeans perceive power. The research provides conclusions about perceptions that developed during the 1967 War and conclusions about methods for understanding the process of perception.

C. CASE MATERIALS

Open-source case materials are used within this research. A principal resource is a so-called "prestige paper" from each country -- The Times from England, Le Monde from France, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung from Germany. These three papers are the object of content analysis because they are published daily and because they are readily available for analysts' use. More important, however, they may be justified as representing elite perceptions. The classic Hoover Institute Studies argued as follows:
In each major power one newspaper stands out as an organ of elite opinion. Usually semiofficial, always intimate with the government, these "prestige papers" are read by public officials, journalists, scholars, and business leaders. They seldom have large circulations, yet they have enormous influence. They are read not only in their own countries, but also abroad by those whose business it is to keep track of world affairs. They differ among themselves, but, despite national temporal differences, they are a distinct species. It is generally possible to name with fair confidence one paper in any given country which plays the role of prestige paper at any given time.1

Within the context of the case studies, however, other sources were used -- weekly news-magazines, government documents, and documentation of parliamentary debates. Also scholarly journals which represent the foreign affairs and defense policy communities of each country were screened. These sources provided alternate commentary which might represent contending perceptions and provide insights into the sources and communication of perceptions.

A basic assumption of the research is that what is published in these source documents represents, or at least bears a consistent relationship to, the underlying perceptions of various authors. An alternative to this "representational model" is an "instrumental model" which views communication as an instrument of influence and asserts that communications content may be shaped to manipulate the perceptions of receiving audiences. The two models distinguish a research focus on perceptions of the message source from a focus on perceptions of the message receiver. For the purposes of this research the distinction is ignored. The message of the source is generally taken to represent the perception of the author shared with the receiver. Where an analyst detects a difference between what is communicated and what might be perceived, such a difference is explored within the case studies.
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D. INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT

The Middle East war of 1967 began on 5 June 1967 and concluded on 10 June. During the six days of fighting the Israeli Defense Force had destroyed United Arab Republic forces in the Sinai, captured all Jordanian territory west of the Jordan river including Arab portions of Jerusalem, and humiliated Syrian forces by decisively defeating formations that might have protected Damascus. Major events that preceded the war included the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces from the Sinai on May 19 and the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping on May 23. Hostilities were followed by diplomatic maneuvering in the process of United Nations Security Council cease-fire resolutions, a U.N. General Assembly Emergency Session to assert terms for a settlement and, on June 23 and 25, meetings at Glassboro, New Jersey between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin. Major events and important policy pronouncements are summarized by a chronology of the crisis period in Table 1-1.

In drawing generalizations from the case studies, it is important to recall that Soviet and U.S. power were only indirectly involved in the war itself. Arab forces were largely equipped by the Soviet Union; but Jordan, for example, was the recipient of American military assistance. Israeli forces were equipped with a mixture of British, French, and American weapons, and the Israeli air forces which dominated the war primarily relied on the French Mirage III aircraft. The war was not necessarily one of proxy forces which tested weapons and concepts of the U.S. against those of the Soviet Union. Moreover, at the outbreak of fighting, the United States declared its noninvolvement in the conflict and asserted its nonbelligerency in direct "hot-line" communications with the Soviet Union. Even though a handful of Russian advisors were captured with Syrian forces, Soviet military support too was indirect. A significant military resupply did not begin until after the cease fires. Thus it should be expected that the power of the two countries would be perceived to be exerted in other than strictly military terms.
### Table I-1. Chronology of Arab-Israeli War 1967

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<tr>
<td>APRIL 7</td>
<td>Israel reported that 6 Syrian MIG 21s were shot down by Israeli planes. Syria reported</td>
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<td>that Israeli jets had been shot down with a loss to Syria of 4 MIG 21s. Radio Cairo</td>
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<td>announced that the Gulf of Aqaba had been mined.</td>
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<td>All UAR reserve forces were called up. The UN Security Council met. US Representative</td>
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<td>Arthur Goldberg offered to work directly with England, France and the USSR inside or</td>
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<td>outside of the UN to keep peace in the Middle East.</td>
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<td>The British Prime Minister said: &quot;It is the view of Her Majesty's Government of the United</td>
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<td>Kingdom that the Strait of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through</td>
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<td>which the vessels of all nations have a right to passage. Her Majesty's Government will</td>
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<td>assume this right on behalf of all British shipping and is prepared to join with others to</td>
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<td>secure general recognition of this right.&quot; The statement was a reiteration of a British</td>
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<td>declaration of 1 March 1967. The Soviet Government issued a Statement which said that</td>
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<td>Israeli actions presuppose direct or indirect encouragement on the part of 'certain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>imperialist circles which aspire to bring back colonial oppression to the lands of the Arabs'</td>
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<td></td>
<td>'No one should doubt that anyone proceeding to unleash aggression in the Near East region</td>
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<td></td>
<td>would encounter not only the united force of the Arab countries but also resolute</td>
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<td></td>
<td>opposition to their aggression on the part of the Soviet Union and all peace-loving States.'</td>
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<td></td>
<td>US President Johnson asserted: &quot;The United States considers the Gulf (of Aqaba) to be an</td>
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<td>international waterway and feels that a blockage of Israeli shipping is illegal and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the</td>
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<td>international waterway is a vital interest of the international community. To the leaders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three Presidents have said before -</td>
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<td>that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>territorial integrity of all the nations of the area.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAY 22</td>
<td>The UAR announced that the Gulf of Aqaba was closed to Israeli ships and all non-Israeli</td>
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<td>ships carrying strategic materials to Israel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAY 23</td>
<td>Israel's Prime Minister Eshkol announced that the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba constituted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>an act of aggression against Israel. US President Johnson asserted: &quot;The United States</td>
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<td>considers the gulf (of Aqaba) to be an international waterway and feels that a blockage of</td>
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<td>Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of</td>
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<td>free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the international</td>
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<td>community. To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three</td>
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<td>Presidents have said before - that the United States is firmly committed to the support of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 24</td>
<td>U Thant met with UAR President Nasser in Cairo. The meeting ended without any announced</td>
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<td></td>
<td>agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE I-1. CHRONOLOGY OF ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 1967 (CONTINUED)

MAY 28:
Nasser rejected British and American statements that the Straits of Tiran are international.

MAY 29:
Iraq's Oil Minister told the Consortium that the government would cancel its license if it supplied oil to any country participating in aggression against Arab States. Nasser declared that a negotiated peace in the Middle East was "out of the question" until the Palestinian Arabs "returned to their homelands." Syrian President Atasi arrived in Moscow for a conference with Premier Kosygin. Nasser announced that the War Minister "relayed to me a message from Premier Kosygin saying that the Soviet Union stands with us in this battle and will not allow any country to interfere."

MAY 30:
Eban stated that the government would open the Straits of Tiran "alone if we must with others if we can." The UAR and Jordan reached a military alliance which binds their governments to "use all means at their disposal, including the use of armed force" to repel an attack on either nation. An Israeli attempt to break the Egyptian blockade would be considered an act of aggression. The Turkish government authorized Russia to send 10 warships into the Mediterranean.

JUNE 1:
The US State Department said the government was supporting "the British initiative as announced by Foreign Minister George Brown yesterday—that is, we are consulting other maritime powers as to their views on the international character of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."

JUNE 2:
The French Government stated that: France is not pledged in any way, or in any respect, to any of the States concerned. On her own initiative, she considers that each of these States has the right to live. But she deems that the worst would be the opening of hostilities. Consequently, the State that would be the first—wherever it might be—to take up arms will not have either her approval and even less, her support.

JUNE 5:
Fighting ranged from Syria to the Sinai desert and along the Jordanian border. Israel claimed major victories in the Sinai Desert and the Gaza Strip saying her troops had taken Al-Arish and Khan Yunis. The government also reported that her planes had decimated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air forces. A 2-day meeting of the oil ministers of all Arab producing states ended in Baghdad. The meeting agreed to 3 resolutions: the suspension of oil supplies from reaching any state which "agrees or supports an aggression" against any Arab state; that any such aggression would mean that properties of that country's companies and nationals would be subject to war resolutions; and that all Arab states should hold an emergency meeting to implement the war regulations. The Egyptian Armed Forces Supreme Command charged that American and British planes provided fighter cover over Israel during raids by Israeli air craft. The Command said it has "actual proof" that American and British aircraft carriers played a role in the Israeli aggression. Both the US and Britain denied the charges.

JUNE 6:
The USSR demanded that Israel "immediately and unconditionally" halt military operations and asked that the UN condemn the Israeli aggression. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the governments concerned to take "all measures for an immediate cease fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area." The UAR closed the Suez Canal to all shipping.

JUNE 7:
Israel claimed victory in the Sinai Desert. Israel declared that the Straits of Tiran were an international waterway.

JUNE 8:
Israel claimed complete control of all approaches from Sinai to the Suez Canal and said its forces were carrying out "the total destruction of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 9</td>
<td>Israel attacked Syria</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Security Council adopted a resolution which noted that Israel and Syria accepted the UN demand for a cease fire and demand that &quot;hostilities should cease forthwith.&quot;</td>
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<td>JUNE 10</td>
<td>Cease fire on Syrian front.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE 13</td>
<td>US President Johnson affirmed the US commitment to protect the territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East and expressed the hope that a peace could be achieved which would protect the interests of both Israel and the Arab states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 14</td>
<td>The USSR called for a special session of the UN General Assembly to hear charges of Israeli aggression and to demand that Israeli forces retire from Israeli occupied territory in Syria, Jordan and the UAR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE 15</td>
<td>The US refused to concur in the USSR’s request for a special session of the UN General Assembly.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE 20</td>
<td>The special session of the UN General Assembly convened with an address by Soviet Premier Kosygin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNE 21</td>
<td>French President DeGaulle accused Israel of having started the Middle East war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 23, 25</td>
<td>US President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met in Glassboro, New Jersey to discuss the Middle East situation, among other issues.</td>
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</table>
as the ability to influence the outcome of events. Precisely how such power was perceived is the subject of inquiry in the country case studies.

E. INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

The country studies deal with perceptions observed in open-source literature. The focus of inquiry is on the six months preceding and the six months following the war. Newspaper data to support content analysis was collected for the period 8 May through 8 July 1967, four weeks before and after the war and the week of the war itself. The basic analytical model of the case studies is that perceptions of power subsequent to the event are different from those observed prior to the event and that specific difference have origins during the event itself. In addition to this basic before-during-after framework of analysis, each country study includes a discussion of long-term factors which, in conventional wisdom, may affect perceptions of power. The motivation for such an inquiry is documented by Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt.

Men conform, admire, and obey largely within the limits of the images and habits that they have learned earlier and that they have made into a part of their inner selves. Almost nothing in the world seems to be able to shift the images of 40 percent of the population in most countries, even within one or two decades. Combinations of events that shift the images and attitudes even of the remaining 50 or 60 percent of the population are extremely rare, and these rare occasions require the combination and mutual reinforcement of cumulative events with spectacular events and substantial governmental efforts as well as the absence of sizable cross-pressures. Most of the spectacular changes of politics involve a change in the attitudes of between one fifth and one third of the population.... If the external events are less sustained and less dramatic or if cross-pressures are greater, the magnitude of opinion shifts declines to between 10 and 20 percent. Cumulative or spectacular events alone often shift less than 10 percent of public opinion.

Thus, each case study begins with a substantial background discussion which addresses traditions, stereotypes, and symbols which may have dominated
perceptions of power in each country since World War II. From the background section on long-term perspectives the studies proceed to more specific perceptions prior to, during, and subsequent to the 1967 crisis. Each study concludes with an interpretation and conclusions relevant to hypotheses which may benefit explanation and prediction of perceptions derived from other crisis events.

Following the case studies of Britain, France, and West Germany a concluding chapter compares the content and process of perceptions noted in the three countries. The concluding chapter also introduces public opinion data and the results of content analysis and discusses conclusions relevant both to research questions and to the utility of alternative methods.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER I


A. **INTRODUCTION**

During 1967, Britain, under Harold Wilson's Labor Government, was undergoing a fundamental revision of its role in world affairs. Two issues dominated British concerns: the relationship to Europe, signified by application for membership in the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), and reduction of Britain's global responsibilities, signified by the liquidation of commitments "East of Suez." The events of the Middle East War were perceived in relation to these central concerns. Although initial perceptions focused specifically on the closing of the Straits of Tiran -- an issue over which the Government thought it could exercise some influence backed by naval power and maritime tradition -- the wider hostilities and subsequent diplomatic activities were perceived as indicating Britain's isolation from the global affairs of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While U.S. military power in the Eastern Mediterranean was perceived as superior to that of the Soviet Union, the Soviets were perceived as exercising greater "influence" over the event. The outcome of the war, however, was interpreted as indicating not only the common concerns of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. but also the limitations of their influence over client states. In that Moscow was unable to satisfy unrealistic demands of its clients and that its principal instrument of its influence, military assistance, was discredited, the Soviet Union was perceived as having "lost" from the war. The Glassboro Summit, however, symbolized to the British their exclusion from important decisions. By emphasizing the joint U.S. - Soviet role in eventual settlement of the crisis, the Soviet initiative in the U.N. and Kosygin's visit to the U.S. recouped, in part, the image of Soviet influence lost during the war itself.
British perceptions displayed in open-source documents focused on the diplomatic level. Except for the implications of the war on the superiority of U.S. strategic mobility, perceptions were not generalized to other aspects of the U.S.-Soviet balance. Attention rapidly returned to basic concerns about Britain's turning toward Europe and away from global responsibilities.

B. LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES

British tradition confused the nation's postwar prestige with power. Britons emerged from WWII with a Churchillian concept of international relations in three overlapping circles: Britain and the Commonwealth, Britain and the United States, and Britain and Europe. The concept preserved prestige, eased the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, and retained diplomatic flexibility -- but it also preserved commitments which were beyond the nation's capacity to fulfill. Alone among European powers, Britain managed to avoid urgent crises in its national identity, but nagging doubts remained about its role in the world. In a sense, post-war Britain was a victim of earlier international success and continuity; but with shifting focus, successive governments marched halting steps in a long recessional from the stage of global power. But the illusion of influence remained.

The year 1967 might be marked as a major step in the recessional. A consensus emerged about British entry into the European Economic Community, commitments "East of Suez" were scheduled for liquidation, defense policy was focused on Europe, and the pound was devalued. If the 1956 Suez crisis dispelled illusions of independent military power, the 1967 Middle East war served to dispel illusions of political influence.

The political culture of Britain has been characterized by deference, compromise, and the political relevance of social class. Walter Bagehot's observation of more than a century earlier still pertained:
Certain persons are by common consent agreed to be wiser than others, and their opinion is, by consent, to rank for much more than its numerical value. We may in these happy nations weigh votes as well as count them.\(^4\)

The politics of deference is reinforced by the system of education, a circumscribed political elite, and the concept of "gentleman." Politics remains the prerogative of gentlemen and, despite the Labor Party's attachment to the working class, political success is marked by accession to status and acquiescence to "good form." In the 1967 case, an often noted exception which supported the rule was the Foreign Minister's, Mr. George Brown's, reputation for blunt speech and unbecoming Parliamentary style.\(^5\)

Among the basic sources of elite identity in British politics is the shared Oxford and Cambridge background of men in both Westminster (Parliament) and Whitehall (the Government). Their education is preponderantly in classics and history; senior levels of the civil service disdain technicians in favor of generalist gentlemen. The gentlemen economist from the University of London is the exception.

The cleavage of advanced education between "Oxbridge" (and London) universities and postwar "brick schools" is reinforced by the cleavage of fundamental education between grammar schools, which are preparatory to advanced education, and separate secondary modern schools, which prepare students for direct entry into the work force. Despite a trend toward universal "comprehensive" schools, a system of national examinations generally tracks youth toward either further education or work after age 11. Epitomizing educational reinforcement of class values is the role of the public (private) schools in selecting and maintaining class identification. In 1959, Harold Macmillan, himself educated at Eton, was able to jest that "there were three Old Etonians in Mr. Attlee's Cabinet; I have six. Things have been twice as good under the Conservatives."\(^6\)

The relevance of these sociological characteristics to British foreign relations is that a generally close-knit elite with a widely shared set of expectations dominated British politics. This was socially in the realm of foreign policy. A 1966 study found "a politician had now to be, or at any rate had to seem to be a man of good will, who wished people well, but a politician who had neither gifts nor inclination for playing this role could still prove acceptable if he elected to devote his time and attention to the field of foreign policy ... an arcane area where the public did not tread. In this role a politician might confine himself to congenial relations with his colleagues in London.

The Impact of the shared background is pervasive. Philip Abrams, a professor of social theory from Durham University (a postwar "brick" school) describes the mindset as follows:

The habit of mind cultivated by reading history at one of Britain's ancient universities (as they are not misleadingly called) is a distinctive one. It has been described recently (1969) by the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, and he may be taken in this respect as speaking for one of the country's most influential groups of educators. It is essentially sceptical and pessimistic in its assumptions about human nature, committed to the view that there is nothing new under the sun, and convinced that effective guides to the understanding of present predicaments may be found by scouring the past, pragmatically, for analogies. Professor Trevor-Roper describes how he himself, faced with a doctrinaire conference on the cold war, "came home and wrote a short historical article... on the coexistence of Christendom and the Turkish Empire." And again, "Perhaps we would understand today's struggle in the Far East better if we knew less than 'all the facts about Vietnam' and at least something about the Wars of the Roses." The time dimension of this ideology is perfectly explicit: "We cannot profitably look forward without also looking back." But when the British elite looks back, what it sees is a century and a half of British international domination based on enormous imperial expansion. When it looks forward its thinking is coloured strongly by the assumption that, in however modified a form, Britain's active and influential role in the past does and should provide a norm for the future.
This historical mind set suggests that tradition plays a major role in British perception of power in international relations. Several traditions took on a symbolic importance in British responses to the 1967 war. The following seem most important:

1. **Maritime Power**
   Historically, Britain's foreign policy has been determined by its geographic situation as an island state on the flank of Europe. Its role as independent "balancer" in continental affairs was complemented by involvement as a mercantile neighbor of every country bordering the sea. Britain's survival and independence, its global role, its Empire, and its doctrine of free trade were enforced by a maritime tradition and naval supremacy.

2. **The Empire and the Commonwealth**
   Britain's imperial greatness is still recent. Her success in achieving international wealth, power, and prestige with a small island resource base is a central phenomenon of eighteenth and nineteenth-century history. The success was sustained by naval tradition and accustomed Britains to a pattern of world power which demanded relatively few men, which did not drain resources, and which emphasized cooperation profitable trade, cheap diplomacy, and peace rather than costly warfare.

   The liquidation of Empire which followed World War II represented success too. Many traditional relations remained through the devolution from Empire to Commonwealth. Such relations encouraged an extensive and complex pattern of often vague commitments and a pattern of thought which emphasized "influence" rather than "power."
3. The Special Relationship

Among the sources of influence which sustained the Empire and other foreign interests were common ties of language, law, and culture shared among what Churchill liked to call "the English-speaking peoples." Among such ties, those with the United States were most important. A habit of cooperation stemmed from wartime partnership between the two countries, but a "special relationship" was sustained by complementary postwar policies toward atomic weapons, defense of the European mainland, developing nations, and, in economics, the complementary roles of sterling and the dollar as reserve currencies. Edward Heath, in 1967, described the import of such ties as follows:

In day-to-day matters of government there is an instinctive tendency among some British officials when assessing foreign reactions to a particular situation to ask first and foremost what the United States will think and how it will react. In military matters this tendency is particularly noticeable and natural because of the history of the Anglo-American nuclear partnership and the present British reliance on American military equipment. 9

4. A Peacekeeping Mission

Aside from a special responsibility as a nuclear power and as a principal contributor to NATO, the British defense establishment following World War II took on a peace-keeping role meant to discourage subversion and aggression. At numerous points around the globe, the obligation to assist in the defense and internal security of Commonwealth members was particularly important. Instances of the successful use of limited military force included a show of strength to aid Kuwait in 1961, the contribution of small forces which crushed mutinies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1964, and deployments which discouraged Indonesian designs on Malaysia and Singapore in the early sixties.

Mr. Christopher Mayhew, a former Labor Navy Minister who resigned in part to protest the over-extension of such commitments, claimed that:

11-6
...these peace-keeping successes demonstrated the extraordinary talents of British servicemen in handling delicate operations of this kind. Our forces succeeded because of their high degree of professionalism, commonsense, restraint and good discipline.10

Residual obligations, success, and a general commitment to international stability caused Britain to retain its idealized peace-keeping role until the late sixties. A 1966 Defense White Paper states:

Britain shares with other countries a general interest in seeing peace maintained, so far as possible, throughout the world. It is this interest above all which justifies our military power outside Europe.11

5. Suez

The importance of the Suez Canal in British tradition is underscored by the fact that most commitments outside Europe were described as "East of Suez." Beside the early role of the Suez Canal in British maritime operations and sustenance of the Empire, experience of the North African campaign of World War II caused British planners to regard a postwar stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean as essential to the defense of Southern Europe as well as to the line of communication supporting Asian operations and to the flow of oil. By 1954, however, British forces at Suez became a liability. The maintenance of 70,000 troops there under difficult physical conditions became an obstacle to army recruitment and to the abolition of National Service (the draft). The base was vulnerable to local harassment and the Canal was a strategic target for nuclear weapons. Moreover, Greek and Turkish entry into NATO and an emphasis on nuclear strategies reduced the appeal of a conventional Mediterranean bastion. British forces withdrew from Suez in 1954 with token guarantees about overflight, reentry, and security of the canal.

Egyptian nationalization of the canal in 1956 set in motion a series of events which shook the foundations of many beliefs about the British role in the world.
The effect of the Suez crisis upon Britain was... lasting. It was not only that it had demonstrated that the United States was capable of flatly opposing Britain where important British interests were at stake, and that the new Commonwealth was markedly less susceptible to British leadership than the old. More significant, it had dramatized and made patent, what thoughtful men had long known, that the United Kingdom by herself could no longer claim to be a great power. Unable to rally the Commonwealth, she could be thwarted in a major enterprise simply by a United States refusal to back the pound sterling. Though the first reaction to this unwelcome discovery was merely a howl of frustrated rage, the way had been paved among many conservatively-minded people for the idea that economic union with a group of wealthy European neighbours of roughly her own size might offer Britain a greater reality of independence than her position of vulnerable eminence in the Commonwealth or her junior partnership in an American world.  

Although the 1956 Suez debacle accelerated a turning toward Europe, it did not fundamentally alter Britain's world view. Critics of the intervention seldom argued that the nation was too weak to have acted aggressively; their argument was that Britain had acted wrongly or foolishly. The partisan division caused by the war did not prevent Prime Minister Macmillan from responding to the crisis by repairing the Anglo-American relationship, perfecting an independent strategic force, and retaining commitments throughout the Commonwealth. Defense policy of the late 1950s emphasized the "special relationship."  

Dependence on the United States became most apparent in the arena of strategic weapons. Through a series of decisions, British strategic capabilities became tied to the American Skybolt program. Cancellation of Skybolt and the promise of Polaris submarines in the Nassau Agreements of 1962 differentiated British policy from that of France and contributed to the exclusion of Britain from the political development of Europe. By 1966, the dependence became more pronounced as it was announced that no more aircraft carriers would be constructed for the Royal Navy. This
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amounted to the surrender of capabilities to put troops ashore against opposition after the mid-1970's. Major amphibious landings could therefore be contemplated only in joint operations with the United States. As a substitute for carrier reconnaissance-strike capability in the Far East, the U.S. was asked also for a land-based F-111 force.

C. SHIFT IN LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES

During the 1966 election, the major parties abandoned historical British insularity. Conservatives stated the determination to lead Britain into the European Community while the Labor Party Manifesto, stated the belief "that Britain, in consultation with her EFTA partners, should be ready to enter the European Economic Community, provided essential British and Commonwealth interest were safeguarded." Despite Labor's qualifications and divisions which remain still, predominant opinion was emerging that British influence in world affairs had to be exercised through a European group of nations. Edward Heath, the Tory candidate, had adopted a concept of "balance" within the Western Alliance. The relationship between Britain, Europe, and the U.S. was described as a "two pillars" concept -- an alliance "likely to be based upon a strong American pillar and a European pillar which, if not as strong as the American...will be stronger than Britain can be by herself." Those who invoked the "two pillars" image, usually concluded that Britain should derive influence by strengthening Europe.

The shift in emphasis from three overlapping circles of British interests -- Commonwealth, Europe, and the United States -- to Atlantic Partnership or two pillars indicated a shift in priorities among British international relationships. As indicated in Figure 11-1, from four years before the 1967 war to four years after, the values that the British elite attached to various international associations changed dramatically. From being the next-to-least frequently cited as a "very valuable" international link in 1963, the EEC became the most frequently cited in 1971. NATO remained the second-most-frequently cited both in 1963 and 1971. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUPING</th>
<th>PROPORTION SAYING &quot;VERY VALUABLE&quot;</th>
<th>CHANGE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMONWEALTH</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED NATIONS</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMON MARKET</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA (EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: THE TIMES, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1971. SAMPLE POPULATION BASED ON WHO'S WHO.

Figure 11-1. Elite Attitudes Toward International Links, (in percentages)
Commonwealth and the "special relationship" were international attachments which showed the most dramatic decline. Thus, the 1967 war took place during a period when numerous traditional British relationships with the rest of the world were in a state of transition.

The most significant indicator of transition was the Labor Government's decision, just prior to the June war, to apply for EEC membership. In the words of a Times editorial:

The present situation of Britain has all the inconvenience of the temporary -- it is post-imperial and pre-European. No realistic alternative to joining Europe exists; we are not doing well enough to go on as we are: isolationism is a miserable expedient; Americanism is a subordination to a great power. Only as a European power can Britain join in a power group comparable to the great continental powers and do so on a footing of equality.

D. SHORT-TERM PRIOR PERSPECTIVES

The international issues which dominated British public debate during the late spring of 1967 centered on the transition of Britain's role in the world. Perceptions which dominated the media dealt with Britain and Europe in relation to American power. Issues related to advanced technology received the most attention and illustrate the perspective.

1. Symbols of Competition

The issue of advanced technology had been raised by Mr. Wilson in November of 1966 in a proposal for a European technological community. In the words of the Economist, "In Aircraft, telecommunications, computers and even the commercialization of nuclear power reactors, the European nations are desperately on the defensive against the United States."

"It may be good," the journal continued, "for Europe to be automated in part, or even largely, by American machinery. But it cannot afford to be overwhelmingly dependent on the Americans." Mr. Wilson's proposal evoked general support in Britain and paralleled continental concerns; but without Britain's participation in EEC planning, Mr. Wilson's initiatives seemed limited to ad hoc cooperative ventures on specific
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projects. The Economist characterized the proposal as lacking clarity and decisiveness stating that "Nobody really knows what needs doing to Europe's technological industry." The proposal, however, served Mr. Wilson's purposes in the politics of Europe:

The political advantage of showing his [Wilson's] zeal for European technological togetherness is obvious enough. So is the need to catch up to America. This is an article of faith in the six Common Market countries.... And plainly the catching up cannot be done without Britain, which in the science-based industries is very nearly the equal of the six put together. A European technological policy without Britain is the blind leading the blind: Britain is at least one-eyed.

In a period of domestic austerity, continued drains on sterling balances, and declining military credibility, the symbols of advanced technology were emphasized to enhance Britain's attractiveness to the Europeans. Four specific issues which illustrate the relationship of Britain to America were current in May of 1967. They related to "the brain drain," aircraft, nuclear reactor technology, and computers.

On May 1, 1967, amid speculation about the EEC application, the Labor Government announced plans to stem the "brain drain." Public funds would be used to support placement of technical graduates, to recruit British graduates trained in America, and to encourage the return of Britons from American industries. Cooperative programs would be undertaken with European countries, particularly West Germany. Again the program evoked skeptical commentary. According to a Times editorial:

America offers and will continue to offer for as far ahead as one can see, far greater opportunities, better equipment for those whose work depends on it, more money - or just a higher standard of living. Britain may offer, as Mr. [Wedgwood] Benn says, an exciting technological future, but anyone wanting to join will still have to make financial sacrifices.

Ironically, three weeks later, the Director of Britain's Nuclear Research Establishment at Harwell announced his resignation to take up an appointment in the United States.
Aviation appeared to be one area in which Britain and Europe competed on a world scale. With the cancellation of its TSR-2 fighter, Britain had concentrated advanced aviation development activity in joint ventures with the French, notably in the Concorde SST and a joint Anglo-French, multiple-role, variable-geometry-wing fighter. As the time of the 1967 Paris Air Show approached, attention was focused on the SST development schedule. Barring some Russian surprise, the British looked forward to seeing the joint project to be the first commercial supersonic aircraft to fly -- "The Americans, for once, following behind." Nonetheless, articles detailing the progress of the aircraft, speculated that the schedule might be victim of the Vietnam War because American subcontractors were giving priority to U.S. military production. Delays had been experienced in delivery of braced honeycomb and centrifugal pumps, while a potential problem was that information about portions of the Concorde navigation system remained under U.S. security classification restrictions. However, prospects for the Anglo-French fighter were less concrete. In May, there appeared a hint of French hesitation:

General Gallois said it was not clear that combining to build a joint aircraft was the best way of facing American competition. He instanced the complexities of a dual electronics system designed to suit manifestly different British and French requirements.22 The French withdrew from the joint fighter project in late June.

In commercial nuclear technology, a field in which some Britons felt they led the world, May of 1967 saw the publication of a monograph The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy by Duncan Burn.23 In comparing U.S. and U.K. nuclear programs, the report was highly critical of the British program of research and its management. A Times commentary on the report stated:

The United States, Mr. Burn establishes, has clearly overtaken the United Kingdom in the development of civil nuclear power--in developing competitive plants sooner, beginning to build them in large numbers and building them at much lower prices.

He concludes that the Americans have got it right while Britain has got it wrong.24
Subsequent to announcement of the EEC application, Mr. Wilson used the occasion of dedicating a National Computing Center to emphasize Britain's potential contributions to a European computer industry. Again the Times noted the practical problems:

But the main advantages from European cooperation would come with technical advances. Over the past three years, the Americans have leapt ahead with developments in machines costing between 2m and 3m. Although the market for these is small,... the development of super-computer systems lays the foundation for the design of the future small machines which can be sold in thousands. With the long gestation time between designing and commercial production of a range of machines, industry cannot afford an added delay through waiting to get second hand knowledge from the other side of the Atlantic.25

As Britain turned toward Europe, then, the most attractive symbols of its contribution in the broader community, those of technological proficiency, were interpreted in comparison with the United States. While frequently British technology was found wanting by the comparison, the symbols retained their utility, especially in the approach toward De Gaulle's France. Europe needed Britain if it were to compete successfully against "The American Challenge."26

2. Military Power

The first half of 1967 was a period of debate about British defense policy East of Suez. In general, Labor's policy had been to cut budgets and forces while retaining commitments. In October of 1966 the Labor Party Conference adopted a resolution which demanded:

...a decisive reduction in military commitments East of Suez, including withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf, by 1969-70, thus ending excessive strain on the armed forces and over-dependence on American support and making possible a defense budget well below 1,750 million.27

The debate was articulated by Mr. Christopher Mayhew, the former Navy Minister. His argument with Britain's defense policy was documented
in book form in January of 1967 and; proposed a three-stage program for Britain's Role Tomorrow. The program envisioned:

(1) A period of preparation and economic adjustment featuring the liquidation of commitments East of Suez,
(2) Entry in the Common Market, and eventually,
(3) An integrated European defense with neither American nor Soviet troops in Central Europe.

During the first half of 1967, Whitehall was occupied in the detailed studies of how to implement the Labor Party resolution as well as with security operations preliminary to British withdrawal from Aden. While the review of defense policy was being conducted within the ministries, recent issues of East-West military power failed to compete for attention. U.S. proposals for a multilateral nuclear force and the French withdrawal from the NATO military structure faded in the past as the approach to Europe and the withdrawal from East of Suez took form.

Two issues received scant notice in the month prior to the 1967 War - the announcement of a withdrawal of 35,000 U.S. troops from Europe and the adoption by the NATO Defense Planning Committee of a "flexible response" doctrine. While the news item which reported President Johnson's reduction announcement also reported General Wheeler's (then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) resistance to the cuts, the event passed without commentary by the Times. Likewise, the NATO decisions were reported with an abbreviated summary of Mr. Healy's, the Defense Minister, views. Additional press commentary did not accompany the report. In contrast to extensive commentary in Germany, for example, basic changes in NATO and the U.S. role in Europe relinquished news space to speculation about the EEC application.

E. PERCEPTIONS DURING THE CRISIS

The Egyptian demand of May 17 for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Forces from the Sinai turned British press attention toward the
Middle East. Press and Parliamentary comment castigated U'Thant's decision to liquidate the U.N. presence. Commentary on the U.N. withdrawal occupied the British press until, On 22 May, the U.A.R. announced that the Gulf of Aqaba was closed to ships carrying strategic materials to Israel. The Israeli mobilization that had intervened drew little attention in commentary. It was at this point that the Wilson Government initiated a whirlwind of activity to exert its influence through diplomatic channels. Mr. George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, after several delays, flew to Moscow, to appeal for "restraint and creative imagination" in Soviet actions toward the Middle East. Mr. George Thomson, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, flew to Washington to discuss "practical steps that now need to be taken." The Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Abba Eban, on his way to Washington, was received by Mr. Wilson to discuss the Israeli reaction to events. Members of the opposition were consulted about the necessity to recall Parliament. Finally, Mr. Wilson issued a statement on May 24th which declared:

It is the view of Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom that the Strait of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Her Majesty's Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping and is prepared to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

The Wilson commitment was a precise restatement of the position that the then Conservative Government had taken in the U.N. General Assembly on March 1, 1957.

The position taken by Mr. Wilson complemented, but was more strongly worded than a statement made by President Johnson a day earlier. The American declaration termed the blockade "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace," but made no mention of asserting a right of passage. The American statement emphasized a commitment, based on the British, French, and American tripartite declaration of 25 May 1950, to take action to prevent violation of frontiers or armistice
lines in the Middle East. The Wilson initiatives, however, implicitly acknowledged that without Soviet cooperation, tripartite initiatives were meaningless. The complementing assertion of British leadership of "maritime nations" was to a number of British commentators reminiscent of the ill-fated Suez Canal-Users' Association of 1956. The flaw in the proposal was pointed out by the Times:

All trading nations have a natural interest in keeping shipping lanes open, but only a few of them have the strength to enforce their right. It is tempting for them to leave action to America and Britain, hoping thereby to remain politically uncommitted. Even if the British Government gets the clear declaration it is looking for—that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway—this will not do much to spread responsibility. The decision would still rest with Britain and America on one side, Egypt and Russia on the other.

The British efforts to marshall the maritime nations to open The Gulf of Aqaba culminated in a meeting on 3 June between Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson. The Wilson trip to Washington had been combined with a long-standing obligation to visit the Canadian "Expo '67" in Montreal. The Times Washington correspondent, Louis Heren, summarized the proceedings as follows:

...neither President Johnson or [sic.] Mr. Wilson seems to have much idea how the crisis can be resolved peacefully.

Mr. Johnson has been content to let Mr. Wilson do all the talking.

...It is just possible that he [Mr. Wilson?] had little to say. 34

The flurry of British diplomatic activity did not have the opportunity to be proven on its own terms. The campaign begun on 5 June settled the Aqaba issue when, on 7 June, Israeli troops occupied the grounds of Sharm el Sheikh overlooking the Straits.

The British activity between 22 May and 5 June manipulated symbols of British power. Flights to Moscow and Washington were manifestations of the British claim to have influence in both major capitals. The
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attempt to lead a consortium of maritime nations, though dependent on U.S. participation, appealed to historic maritime traditions and not distant memories of naval supremacy. In the interim, more tangible military symbols were manipulated. The aircraft carrier *Victorious* was moved from Atlantic exercises to the Eastern Mediterranean and a frigate there was "held over" past its normal rotation to the U.K.  

Observations of U.S. and Soviet power in the Eastern Mediterranean were summarized by a dichotomy between political and military strength. "Events have suggested that the Soviet Union in now the dominant political power in the area, even if the United States Sixth Fleet and what remains of Britain's Middle East Command give the West a military edge." In both diplomatic and military realms, moreover, the perspective was frequently of joint Anglo-American power.

The assessment of Soviet political power appears to have been based on the assumption that Russia had substantial control over the activities of Cairo and Damascus. Subsequent to Egypt's closing of the Straits of Tiran, this assumption came to be questioned implicitly in commentary. In the military realm, Soviet power was seen to have limitations. Although ten vessels moved from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean were referred to as "large thumping Russian warships" by Lord Avon, the Times naval correspondent went to great pains to note that the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was not being reenforced. On 29 May he stated:

...the Soviet Navy has a force of six or more ships based there. They are an old pre-war cruiser, five fairly modern destroyers armed with modern SAM guided missiles, and two minesweepers. This force is consistent with the general level of activity in the Mediterranean by the Soviet Navy...and in no way represents a build-up.

On 5 June, the same correspondent reported:

The strength of the Russian fleet at this time of year usually builds to about 16 ships and the present increase will keep it about this figure. Informed sources see nothing sinister in the moves which they say are due to normal exercising in the Mediterranean water in the summer.
Thus both 6 and 16 were represented as "normal" force levels with a very thin explanation that exercises represented the difference.

Despite numerous references to the "Sixth Fleet" and to British naval capability in the Mediterranean, the Times provided no enumeration of the assets available for Anglo-American naval operations—with the conspicuous exception of aircraft carriers and the statement that 1600 U.S. Marines were embarked on vessels in the Mediterranean. There appeared to be no commentary about the effects of 16 Soviet vessels on operations of the "Fleet," vaguely described elsewhere as being composed of fifty ships. Except for the straightforward report during the war that a Soviet destroyer was harassing Mediterranean operations by dangerous maneuvers in U.S. formations, the operational implications of forces in the Mediterranean were not elaborated publicly.

F. EVOLUTION OF PERCEPTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

After the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June, British concerns focused on securing a cease fire, primarily through the instrument of the U.N. Security Council. Coordinated measures were taken to embargo arms shipments to the warring parties and to secure alternate sources of oil. Within the Middle East, efforts were made to refute charges of Anglo-American participation in the Israeli air offensive which decimated Arab air forces on the first day of the war. Hostility to Britain and the United States, dangerous enough with the association of the two nations with Israel in Arab propaganda, turned to violence when charges of participation in the attacks were aired. British military forces supported evacuation of U.K. and American nationals from the region as did American forces. Military operations which supported security forces at British and American bases in the area passed without comment.

Press attention, aside from attention to the war itself, focused on U.N. activities. The inability of the Security Council to act in face of "the obstinate attitude of the Soviet Union." was an early theme as was the inability to maintain an arms embargo without Soviet and U.S. cooperation. The Times was not reluctant to draw early conclusions on 6 June.
Whatever happens now, Britain and the United States will lose from this war because it is bound to alienate the Arab countries from us and push them further toward the Soviet Union. Both our countries are bound to be regarded as sharing Israel's responsibility for a war we have in fact done all we could to prevent.44

On 7 June, the Soviet representative to the Security Council, Dr. Federenko, acceded to the U.S. position that the Council should demand a simple cease fire. The Times U.N. correspondent noted the move as a "remarkable reversal" of the previous Soviet demands for a withdrawal to military positions of 4 June and for condemnation of Israeli aggression.45 As repeated cease-fire resolutions were voted, the Soviet Union was described as a "sudden ardent advocate of peace."46 implying that the Russian diplomatic position had been overrun by military events. The implication was made specific in reference to the resolution of 8 June calling for a cease fire on the Syrian border. "After much argument, Dr. Federenko (Russia) apparently realized that the longer he delayed the greater would be the reverses suffered by Syrian arms."47 It later became apparent that the Soviet delay at the U.N. facilitated Israel's humiliation of Syrian forces thought to be the most favored among Arab units with Soviet equipment and training.48

During the war, various comments were directed at the inability of either the Soviet Union or the United States to restrain parties to the conflict, but Russia's problem was portrayed as more acute because of the extent of its military investment. The outcome of Security Council diplomacy for the Soviets was described as "a decisive defeat" and "a most unexpected and stunning reverse."49 A report from Beirut alluded to "Moscow's palsied hand."50 The reversal was more startling when Britons found in the week following the war, that the Russians shared some of the invective previously directed by Arab propaganda toward themselves and the Americans.

Attention to the diplomatic implications of the war was sustained by Soviet sponsorship of an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly. The move was interpreted initially as an attempt to recoup credit with
Arabs and part of a pattern evidenced by anti-Israeli propaganda, the reception of President Boumedienne of Algeria in Moscow, the visit of President Podgorny to Cairo, and a mission to Egypt and Syria headed by Marshal Zacharov, Chief of Staff of Soviet Armed Forces. Louis Heren, the Times Washington correspondent, however, diagnosed the Russian mood as "one of utter bewilderment." Nevertheless, the General Assembly session was interpreted as forcing a departure from President Johnson's "slow and cautious" diplomacy.

As the appearance of Premier Kosygin at the U.N. approached, British commentary about the Soviet position mellowed. Kosygin was portrayed as beset by conflicting demands to assuage the Arabs, to maintain an anti-American line consistent with the conflict in Vietnam, to blunt Chinese criticism of "collaboration" and to maintain a position which would attract Assembly support. As Kosygin's U.N. appearance evolved to include the meetings with President Johnson at Glassboro, the impression was conveyed that the two leaders shared much more in common than diplomatic conflict would imply.

Seldom, indeed, can the leaders of two super powers have met together with quite such an acute awareness of the limits of their power—not just in the Middle East but also in Vietnam.

They are too deeply engaged to withdraw and too weak politically to take control.

It is more likely that she [the USSR] is trying to gain time while working out a way to regain her credit in the Arab countries without repeating the whole disastrous cycle again.

As Glassboro ended and the long-term diplomatic effort to resolve the aftermath of the war began, Britons were quick to draw implications in terms of their own power.

If Mr. Brown's [the Foreign Secretary's] original speech [on the status of Jerusalem] was badly phrased, the fact remains that much of the criticism has been irrational. In many cases it springs from a much deeper worry about Britain's role—or lack of role—in the whole affair. It is reasonable for
people to have some difficulty reconciling past assurances that Britain's presence in the Middle East would safeguard our oil supplies and other interests with the fact that oil supplies are now curtailed, petrol prices threatened, and trade with Arab countries damaged.

Nor has there been any sign of British influence, let alone presence, at the top table in Glassboro. Britain seems to have got the worst of all possible worlds—blame from the Arab side with very little credit or compensation from anywhere else—and all without any actual involvement. President De Gaulle, on the other hand, supplies the weapons for Israel's victory and then managed to win credit almost everywhere else with a series of lofty utterances that any parliament which was able to call him to account would justly shred into fairly small bits.

The summit has shown again where the real power lies. It was the logical sequel to the first use of the "hot line" between Moscow and Washington. It shows the folly of any more references to a "Big Four," and the need for Britain to reexamine some of the assumptions and the style of her diplomacy. It does not mean that Britain is powerless or irrelevant, merely that her power and her relevance can no longer be expressed in old ways if they are to be credible.

1. **Perceptions of Power.**

Within the context of British reportage and commentary on the 1967 Middle East War, several basic themes related to U.S. and Soviet power emerged. These themes are illustrative of basic perceptions which may have been altered by the event. As interesting as the dominant themes, however, are those "lessons" of the war which are of interest to defense policy, but which are not evident in the open-source case material analysed.

   a. **Central Perceptions.**

   The central perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. evidenced in postwar analyses related to their common interests, their common limitations, and their isolation from lesser powers. Britons saw the common interests evolving around the avoidance of direct confrontation.
Once again in the recent Arab-Israeli war we have seen how determined the Great Powers are to avoid direct conflict. In the event, [the U.S.S.R.] has shown clearly its conviction that the gains to be expected from its [Middle East] policy did not justify the risk involved in major war. And if its attitude did not suggest the imminence of Great Power war neither did that of the United States. It [the U.S.] soon made it clear that it would take no part in the fighting, it was careful to keep in close touch with the U.S.S.R. throughout the war, it showed every consideration for Soviet susceptibilities and made every allowance for the situation in which the Soviet leaders found themselves when their policy suffered its great set-back at the hands of the Israelis. This is not the manner of Great Powers when war is in the offing.

Common limitations of the two superpowers revolved around their inability to prevent war.

Once again, too, we have seen how unable the Great Powers are to prevent Small Power war. The U.S.S.R. was not, it seems, consulted before the sending of Egyptian forces to Sharm El Sheikh, the action which made war extremely difficult to avoid and perhaps inevitable. And American attempts to dissuade Israel from fighting were of no avail from the moment when she decided that this was the only way in which her vital interests could be secured. The Great Powers could not command peace when Middle Eastern conditions made war so evidently for war.

The relationship between an objective of avoiding confrontation and a limited ability to prevent conflict led to a pattern of crisis management which was unique to relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Analysis of the process was a focus of the most useful early summary of the war.

Neither of the super-powers was willing to risk a confrontation in the Middle East; at the same time, each maintained client states there, supplied them with arms, gave them diplomatic support. Each seems to have done so with the intention of maintaining the status quo but the end-result was that it was the client states themselves who took the risks and called the tune. In other words, this non-involved involvement maintained the status quo for years by applying increasing pressure to the most unstable point of the Middle East confrontations... when the crisis broke, the patent wish of the super-powers
to avoid becoming involved not only disenchanted their Middle Eastern allies: It positively encouraged them to increase the level of risk in order, so to speak, to force commitment on their protectors. When this process culminated in war, it was obvious that the old pattern could never be restored.

Nonetheless, it can be argued that, once the crisis had begun, the American Government acted very wisely. It was clear, first, that it would not allow Israel to be driven into the sea, but short of intervention to prevent a catastrophic Israeli defeat, it was determined to remain neutral. By proclaiming its neutrality and showing the good sense not to demand a similar engagement from the Soviet Union, it not only managed to persuade the Russian leaders to do the same once the Arab collapse showed that a quick peace was better than more Israeli victories: It gave those leaders an opportunity to assess the risks of direct involvement for themselves, without being presented with the culminating risk -- that of American involvement -- in advance. Moreover, this procedure inflicted an even greater diplomatic defeat on the Soviet Union than she would have suffered anyway -- for the Soviet leaders had to make it clear to the Arab states that they were not prepared to intervene, at a time when the United States had already proclaimed her neutrality and Israel alone was inflicting defeat after defeat.

In this way the US has succeeded not only in persuading the Soviet Union that it is not worthwhile to intervene; she has also made it very difficult for any future Soviet Government to offer convincing support to the Arab leaders in their confrontation with Israel. One might argue that in this respect the outcome of the crisis has been extremely fortunate not in terms of shifting the balance of power 'in favour of the West', but in terms of putting an end to that form of Soviet-American confrontation which maintained the status quo in the Middle East by pitting Israel against her Arab neighbours.

Clearly, it would be naive to say categorically that this is the outcome: the immediate situation is likely to be dominated by Soviet attempts to mend Russia's fences with the Arab States, and by Arab attempts to play the US and the Soviet Union off against each other. But in the long-term the impossibility of reverting to the pre-war situation has given the two super-powers an opportunity to work together in the Middle East.
More succinctly, the *Times* stated:

The fact of the matter is that the role of the super-powers is no longer to work out solutions to the world's conflicts. It is much more to agree on their own rules of conduct in relation to those conflicts. In future these rules will have to include a good measure of restraint and non-involvement.  

These central perceptions about the unique relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were supported by two symbols of super-power communication: the hot-line and the summit. In this respect, British perceptions were clouded by Britain's own lack of status; a comparison with the French, who had both a "green teleprinter" and a visit from Kosygin, was implicit. Commentary credited major turning points of the crisis, notably the declarations of noninvolvement and the Soviet cease-fire votes, to be a result of direct communication between Washington and Moscow. The contrast with the ineffective flurry of high-level British visits throughout the crisis was stark and served to heighten the perception of superpower efficacy. The *Times* used the imagery of a "top-table" at which Britain had no place; references to a "Big Four," it said, were "folly," Louis Heren, even suggested:

There was a time when four nations, the so-called Big Four made the ascent (to the summit), and then there were only two, the super-powers. At Glassboro there was in effect only one and a half, because Mr. Kosygin was in no position to negotiate or amend the public Soviet positions. He is a member of the collective leadership and clearly not the most influential.

Such a leadership may be slow to make up its collective mind, but it can be just as slow to revise or modify policies painfully formulated or agreed upon. The inherent dangers are obvious to the American Government, which in time of crisis can ignore its own internal disciplines and act promptly.  

b. The Evolution of Central Perceptions

The evolution of central perceptions about the Mid-East war was rapid; consensus supporting them appeared to be extensive, and they seemed to persist without extensive criticism, through 1967 at any rate. Comment which summarized the implications of Glassboro appeared the day following the second meeting between Johnson and Kosygin. The
two or three most insightful journal articles appeared in June or July. Parliamentary debate frequently addressed events on the following day and the major Middle-East debate, that which concerned measures to enforce the international character of the Strait of Tiran, was scheduled for the week following the Egyptian blockade—a week filled with diplomatic activity by government emissaries to Moscow and Washington.

The extent of early consensus was a product of Mr. Wilson's political art. It must be suspected that if the resurrection of a maritime consortium seemed more appropriate to Britain of 1956 than Britain of 1967, it was because the Labor Government's behavior was based, by design, on pledges and perceptions of 1957 Conservative predecessors. The 1956 adventure had divided British politics deeply. To preclude divisions in 1967, Mr. Wilson defended Conservative Party commitments by Conservative Party methods except he did not take action independent of the U.S. Parliamentary critics were limited to a handful of Jewish members and a similar handful, led by Mr. Mayhew, who insisted that the Arab case be handled fairly. Both sets of critics occupied back benches on Labor's side. Conservative were largely supportive; they could hardly object to an approach set by their own party. With basic political consensus assured, agreed interpretations of the situation evolved rapidly, facilitated by the institutions of Cabinet leadership, Parliamentary debate, party discipline, and London communications. Given such conditions and the domination by London of British political and intellectual commentary, lasting perceptions evolved in but a day; elaboration of perceptions depended simply on the production cycle of the medium of communication.

One of the interesting aspects of the central perceptions is that there appears later to have been very little criticism of interpretations based on early evidence. Later speculation that either side might have provoked conflict received little attention. For example, the Soviet role in relaying intelligence of an Israeli buildup opposite Syria was interpreted generally as an unintentional act which by accident set the crisis in motion. Likewise the meeting between Mr. Eban and
President Johnson was interpreted generally as one in which Israel was counseled to avoid hostilities and was assured of American support during a peaceful resolution of crisis issues. The alternative interpretation that Israel may have asked for and received U.S. assurances of benevolent noninvolvement during a limited campaign was raised by only one source late in 1967. One is left with the impression that initial perceptions of an event, if sustained by a basic consensus, may be modified by elaboration, but are seldom subject to basic reexamination.

c. Perceptions of Military Power

Militarily, the U.S., in combination with Britain, was interpreted to have a local advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean. Subsequent to the war, the Economist generalized the U.S. ability to project military power as a central difference between the global capability of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

It isn't just a little local difficulty that Mr. Kosygin finds himself stuck with after the Middle East War. When he decided not to intervene on the Arabs' side he was admitting the central weakness of Russian policy: its lack of strategic mobility. This the problem that hampers the Russians every where outside the heart of the Eurasian land mass. It showed itself with brutal clarity on 5 June. The United States could have intervened to save Israel with the Sixth Fleet in a matter of hours. Even Britain had bases and men within reach, though the British were so frightened of what the Arabs might have done with the sterling they held that they were reluctant to use the forces available to them. But the only weapon Russia had at hand in the Mediterranean was a small and highly vulnerable fleet, without the support or fire-power of a self-contained striking force, which depended on Turkey's good will in the Dardanelles for its communications. Its only function seems to have been to check that American air power was not used to support the Israelis; it thereby performed an involuntary service to the United States.

Direct comparisons of U.S. and Soviet military capabilities were, however, the exception rather than the rule within open-source documents subsequent to the war. A review of British foreign affairs
none such as the above commentary which related the evaluation of military posture to the Middle East war. Comparisons which did deal with European-theater capabilities or with strategic capabilities did not reflect evidence from the war. While commentary occasionally reflected experience during the war with specific systems or concepts, "lessons" were not generalized to apply to comparative capabilities of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. or their respective alliance systems. That such "lessons" about comparative capabilities were evolving in the areas of armored mobility, tank warfare, air defense, security of the Eastern Mediterranean, and readiness is undeniable; they were not, however, evolving within the journals which were surveyed.

d. Perceptions of Economic Power

The British relied on support of the U.S. economy to rebuff economic threats. When it became clear that oil would be embargoed by Arab countries, the threat was turned around to assert that Arab economies were dependent upon British and European oil markets.

He [Mr. George Brown, the Foreign Secretary] told [the Arab ambassadors] that they are risking one of their best markets for oil and let them know that Britain already has a team of civil servants in the United States developing contingency plans for alternative supplies that would not place an intolerable burden on the balance of payments.63

During the week following the war, the U.S. acted within the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development to implement contingency plans, drawn up after the Suez crisis, to pool oil stocks and tankers.64 Coordinated action, however, was thwarted by France. Nevertheless, the British press was sanguine about the oil threat. It was summer, stocks were high, and U.S. and Venezuelan production had considerable reserve capacity. Another alternative supply source, Nigeria, however, was at the same time being threatened by domestic upheaval.

The urgency of concern about oil seemed relieved when it was reported that Soviet oil was being offered in European markets and seemed to die altogether when Kuwait, the principal British supplier, started pumping again.65 Concerns over increased costs and limited

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tanker capacity were expressed on the business pages, but were not
generalized in assessments of Europe's potential vulnerability in a
conflict with the Soviet Union. Implicitly it was assumed that Egypt
would not endure the economic sacrifices of a closed Suez for long.
Unfortunately the signals were not interpreted to foreshadow the politi-
cal divisions and economic disruption that a similar embargo would cause

Such was the implicit confidence in U.S. economic capa-
bility that an underwriting by the U.S. of Israeli export losses due to
Egyptian action was reported without comment or critical analysis. Likewise, sterling holdings of Arab countries were not discussed at any
length; the unstated assumption seeming to be that the dollar would
defend any run on sterling.

e. Perceptions of Will

The British press accepted that a U.S. commitment to the
survival of Israel was a fact of international life. The acceptance was
based not on U.S. international behavior alone, but also on the relevance
of the Jewish community in U.S. political life. A British correspondent
related the mathematics of New York's Electoral-College votes to illustrate
the limits of U.S. "non-involvement" in the crisis. The U.S. declaration
of non-involvement was clearly seen to be "qualified by the promise that
Israel could not be allowed to be crushed and extinguished by a massive
assault." In the words of a Times editorial,

It is as well that this should be understood clearly. Neither the United States, nor Britain even without
the United States, could allow the destruction of the state of Israel, even if it proved to be the case
that this war has been started by Israel aggression in the face of Arab provocation....

The best that Israel can conceivably hope for is a
gain of a limited kind, and even that will depend on
negotiation as well as fighting. Just as the United
States has an ultimate commitment to Israel, the
Soviet Union may feel that she cannot afford to give
up the interests of the Arab powers.
Likewise when it was reported that a 1957 memorandum between John Foster Dulles and Abba Eban promised that the U.S. "is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right," it was asserted that "the United States was fully committed to keeping the Strait of Tiran open...." Thereafter reports of American contingency planning to force the blockade were frequent despite carefully worded U.S. denials. While the Vietnam War was frequently alluded to, it was interpreted generally as having diverted U.S. attentions and as limiting U.S. ability to deal with the Soviets; the war was not cited within the case materials as evidence of the U.S. will to back commitments in the Middle East.

Soviet will was portrayed as less relevant given an assumption that its capabilities to intervene were limited to harassment of the Sixth Fleet. Russian willfulness was seen as a contributing factor to the gracelessness of its diplomatic performance at the U.N. Soviet activities during and after the war were typically portrayed as intended to placate Arab opinion while real decisions were taken as a result of direct negotiations with the U.S.

f. Relationship Between Will and Capabilities

The question of "will" seemed for the British to intervene between capabilities and action. Apart from "commitment," "will" was conditioned by a sense of vulnerability to the political and economic consequences of specific action, military actions in particular. In relation to their own power, the British perspective is illustrated by the following commentary:

Even if we had the means (which is doubtful), I do not think that at Westminster there was a sufficient will to guarantee any British intervention. The tough realists in Tel Aviv seem to have had the same suspicion.

To be fair, we have had precious little encouragement from the Americans who certainly do have the means, and we are more vulnerable than anyone to the sort of economic disruption which has already begun. But in the early uncertain hours of fighting, I found many
M.P.'s quite sympathetic to Israel, who rather shame-facedly admitted that they hoped an Israel victory would rescue us from what seemed to be humiliating impotence.

Even in such a comparatively limited operation as testing the blockade of the Straits of Tiran we apparently felt unable to act without the Americans, and without moral support at least, from some of the other maritime powers. Considering the possible repercussions, this was no doubt military and political common sense. It showed however that our ability to help Israel was a good deal more circumscribed than we had implied.72

An extension of this perspective to the U.S. is not evident. Instead, the vocabulary of "commitment" was sustained coupled with the conflicting perception of a mutual U.S. and Soviet ability to avoid confrontation by direct negotiation. Moreover, the rapidity of Israeli success on the battlefield precluded extensive speculation about the U.S. will to intervene. Similarly, the extent of Arab losses coupled with limited objectives of the Israeli campaign obviated speculation about Soviet will. Further, it became evident that the Soviet will to back the Arab position fully in the diplomatic arena was obviated by the battlefield situation. Doctrinal righteousness was subverted by the necessity to cut losses with a cease-fire.

G. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCESS OF PERCEPTION IN BRITAIN

British perceptions of the U.S. and Soviet power during the 1967 Middle East War were subordinate to perceptions of British power. "Pre-existing assumptions about the way the world is organized" revolved around Britain's influence in the Middle East, in Washington, and in Moscow. Even though such assumptions were undergoing fundamental revision, as Britain was applying to join Europe and was preparing to liquidate commitments East of Suez, the process of revision itself assured that such assumptions were the basis for interpretation of the Middle East event. Complicating British perceptions, however, were the recollection of the 1956 Suez Crisis and formal commitments which derived therefrom. Behavior in the previous crisis and basic traditions dictated that the
closing of the Straits of Tiran would be initially interpreted as requiring a limited naval response in which Britain should play a leading role. When it was obvious that events had escalated beyond the Tiran issue, such perceptions required revision. The revision of perceptions about British power within the Middle East became part of a larger revision of perception about Britain's role in the world. An alternative set of assumptions was already available; its basic elements were a reduced role for Britain, the limitations of influence, and competition/cooperation with the United States. That these assumptions were so vital to Britons images of themselves may explain why the "lessons" of the war were not generalized to the realm of the strategic balance or to the situation in Europe. Government and press attention returned very quickly to politics of the EEC application and the revised defense policy which involved very similar assumptions at a more fundamental level.

This interpretation of the 1967 case raises several hypotheses relevant to perceptions of Soviet and U.S. power:

H1. A country's perceptions of U.S. and Soviet power tend to be shaped by concerns about its own power.
H2. Initial perceptions of an event are consonant with those derived from a previous similar event.
H3. A perception which enhances the country's own power is preferred over one which does not.
H4. When evidence of an event requires changes in previous perceptions, new perceptions will focus on the changes.

J. The Speed of Perception Formation

The peculiarities of the British political system facilitate the rapid formation of perceptions of international events. The stages of the process appear to be as follows:
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(1) Facts of an event are reported by the media and by the Government through the media.
(2) The Government response is formulated among members of the Cabinet.
(3) Ministers provide comment for press and opposition.
(5) Press comment summarizes the debate.
(6) Mass perceptions defer to the consensus of Parliament and press.
(7) Subsequent commentary elaborates upon the consensus.

In response to numerous events during the Middle East crisis, the basic elements of this process (stages 1 through 5) occur in a two-day period. Because of the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility, party discipline within Parliament, and domination of information and of the civil service by the majority party, perceptions independent of the Government's generally are not developed in detail. Further, because the Labor Party is synonymous with the labor movement in Britain, a separate labor position is incongruous. Seldom do separate business perceptions develop apart from the Conservative Party.

a. The Role of Government

Of particular interest is the role of government in the formation of perceptions. The Strait-of-Tiran issue became the focus of British perceptions prior to the 1967 war because of a commitment made to Israel by the Conservative Government in 1957. This specific commitment became the basis of British activities rather than the more general commitment to territorial integrity of the states of the Middle East expressed in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. While the 1950 Declaration was explained not to account for the realities of Soviet involvement in the area, it is as likely that the unilateral declaration by a Conservative Government was chosen because it precluded partisan criticism of subsequent action; the 1950 declaration by the Attlee (Labor) Government, would not. Alternatively, the 1957 commitment might have seemed more relevant simply because it was more recent or because its terms were more specific.
It is suggested that international events frequently, perhaps usually, have implications for solemn undertakings between governments. Upholding such commitments and relying on precedent serve to reduce the inherent uncertainty of international relations. Such behavior also simplifies the perception of international events by providing a structure for information. Thus, another hypothesis and some alternatives may be useful.

H5. International events are perceived in relationship to national commitments.

H5a. The most specific commitment is the focus of perceptions

H5b. The most recent commitment is the focus of perceptions

H5c. The most politically unassailable commitment is the focus of perceptions.

In the 1967 case, the 1957 British unilateral declaration satisfied the condition of all the alternative hypotheses above. A naval response to enforce free passage of the Straits of Tiran thus became the focus of Government and British press perceptions prior to hostilities on 5 June.

b. Gatekeepers and the Media

The effect of individual perceptions on news has been described as a "gatekeeper" process wherein an individual acts to exclude or include information about events. Some authors refer to a single gatekeeper personified by an editor, others refer to a series of gatekeepers in a news chain. In the case of the Times of London, an important gatekeeping role may be ascribed to the paper's foreign correspondents. The paper relies on its own people more than on wire services, and each correspondent seems free to offer comment. During the 1967 war these eyes on the world were limited in number and played an important role in interpreting events at the origin of news. Three were most important to perceptions of Soviet and U.S. power: Louis Heren in Washington, Kyrill Tidmarsh in Moscow, and Eric Britten at the U.N. in New York. Along with correspondents in the Middle East, these few provided the basic information and interpretation from the world outside London. In London, a like small
corps of political correspondents, commentators, and editors aggregated information from their foreign sources and from the Government to provide broader commentary. However, basic information, independent of the Government, derived from a very small number of sources each with his own perception of the events he reported.

c. **Generalization of Perceptions**

It was anticipated that perceptions of Soviet and American power evidenced in commentary about the June war would be generalized widely to apply to other areas where the two powers contested, particularly to the balance of power in Europe and to the strategic balance. This appears not to have been the case. The central perceptions about common interests, common limitations, and isolation from lesser powers of the two superpowers were generalized but to two issues: the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the Vietnam War. These two were related to the Middle East primarily because they happened to be subjects of reportage in the same papers. In terms of a "proximity" of issues to which similar perceptions may be applied, two issues appear to be proximate if they are "news" at the same time. Although perceptions of conventional conflict in the Middle East would seem most relevant to the balance of power in central Europe, the relationship was not the subject of early commentary. A compounding situation was that NATO problems were a complication among the major issues to be dealt with in the EEC application and the reduction of commitments East of Suez. It seemed to be the intention of the Government, particularly of Mr. Healy, the Defense Minister, to set NATO issues aside while broader European and defense policies were undergoing major revisions. This may indicate that the attention span of government as well as of the press is finite. Issues contend for limited government attention and for new space. Despite the logical applicability of perceptions to other issues, the transfer is not made until such issues become objects of policy attention or "news." This raises another hypothesis.

H6. Perceptions of an event are most likely to be transferred to other issues which are considered to be current "news" in their own right.

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H. CONCLUSIONS

Prior to the 1967 war, British perceptions focused on their own participation in power relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Britons perceived themselves as associated with the United States, but exercising a distinctly different influence in Moscow. Prior to hostilities, British perceptions focused on the specific issue of naval action to open the Gulf of Aqaba. The naval strength of Britain and the United States in combination was perceived as sufficient to accomplish the specific task. The hostilities between 5 and 10 June, however, were perceived in a wider context. Central perceptions focused on the ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to control confrontation by direct negotiation. The two major powers were perceived as having common interests, common limitations and means of communication which set them apart from lesser powers. Of the two, the Soviet Union was perceived to have suffered most because of its inability to sustain its influence in face of the demands of its client Arab states. As the Soviets lost in diplomatic opposition to the U.S. in the U.N., they gained in the appearance of common concern and responsibility that was displayed at the Glassboro summit. The perceptions of Glassboro and the lack of British contributions to those discussions dominated central perceptions of the crisis.

Except for the perceived superiority of the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and implications for the superiority of U.S. strategic mobility, British commentary on the war generally failed to evaluate implications for the military balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Central perceptions focused on U.N. and summit diplomacy and were generalized to other issues which at the time constituted "news": e.g., the nonproliferation treaty and the Vietnam War. It is not evident in sources surveyed during and six months following the war that the Middle East war altered perceptions of the balance of power in central Europe or in strategic capabilities. Instead, British public attention quickly returned to issues which had implications for their own country's power in world affairs; defense policy East of Suez and membership in the EEC. Perceptions of the
Middle East war which supported the importance of those issues remained central; perceptions related to NATO or strategic weapons which may have complicated those issues were not publicized.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER II


5. The Times (London), June 25, 1967, p. 11. Hereafter all references to The Times refer to the London paper.


REFERENCES TO CHAPTER II (CONTINUED)


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


27. Mayhew, Britain's Role, p. 7.

28. Ibid.


32. Ibid. A number of British sources reported with amusement that in his meeting with President Johnson on 25 May, Abba Eban produced a 1957 memorandum from U.S. Secretary of State Dulles which promised U.S. support to force any blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. According to the stories, frantic calls throughout Foggy Bottom, failed to
find a State Department version of the commitment. See Louis Heren, The Times, May 31, 1967, p. 4. The text of substantive portions of the memo are reported by The Guardian (Manchester), May 25, 1967, p. 2.

33. The Times, June 1, 1967, p. 1.
35. The Times, June 1, 1967 p. 1.

42. Mention was made of British reinforcements to security forces in Aden. U.S. reinforcements of security forces at Wheelus were not publicized. Neither were activities on British bases at Akrotiri, Cyprus or Bengasi, Libya.

44. The Times, June 3, 1967, p. 11.
45. The Times, June 6, 1967 p. 11.
50. Ibid.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER II (CONTINUED)

52. The Times, June 24, 1967, p. 11.


55. Ibid.


59. It is somewhat unfair to say these men occupied back benches. Mr. Immanuel Shinwell, most outspoken of the Jewish members, had just been "put to pasture" from the post of Secretary of the Parliamentary Labor Party and Mr. Mayhew had resigned the previous year from the position of Navy Minister. The statement is correct in that neither gentleman occupied ministerial or Parliamentary Party positions at the time.


65. Ibid.


67. Continued drains on sterling did lead to a "Bullion Airlift" to London within the following year.


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REFERENCES TO CHAPTER II (CONTINUED)

70. The Times, June 6, 1967, p. 11.


73. This does not deny the existence of occasional, severe disagreements between the Trades Union Congress, the Parliamentary Labor Party and a Labor Government.
CHAPTER III
FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. AND SOVIET POWER

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the impact of the Middle East War of 1967 on French perceptions of U.S. and Soviet power. Perceptions prior to the war, during the war, and after the war are examined. The approach is to consider perceptions essentially as a function of French political culture, defined as the belief system and value orientations of the nation-state. Although beliefs and values are historically grounded, for the purposes of this analysis, it will not be necessary to trace the history of twentieth-century France from one fallen Republic to the next. However, it will be necessary to examine at some length the post-World War II history of France in order to establish the background against which the political culture developed.

B. LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES

The French emerged from the experience of World War II with neither the status nor the image of a victorious power. It was Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin who were given the laurels for "waging the war and seeking the peace." The war-time leader of the French, Charles de Gaulle, was not among the Big Three. De Gaulle reflects in his memoirs that even before the war had ended, it was evident the Allies "considered themselves participants in a game to which we ourselves were not admitted, and that they maintained toward us a reserve imposed by the other players." In de Gaulle's view, the Allied Powers unjustly discriminated against France, denying his country and himself a legitimate role in the world order after the ordeal of the German occupation. "We wish to integrate ourselves into the order to be established by the Allies," said de Gaulle, "but in a manner which will take into account our efforts and our pride. For international peace to exist, it is essential that France shall participate in its organization."
The Gaullist themes of the war years were the same themes that were to dominate French political life during the official Gaullist regime from 1958 through 1969. The Gaullist vision is captured in the now-famous quotation that opens the three volumed memoirs of Charles de Gaulle:

"...All my life I have thought of France in a certain way. This is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason. The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. Instinctively I have the feeling that Providence has created her either for complete successes or for exemplary misfortunes. If, in spite of this, mediocrity shows in her acts and deeds, it strikes me as an absurd anomaly, to be imputed to the faults of Frenchmen, not to the genius of the land. But the positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless in the front rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people; that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness."

Grandeur was the dominant theme; a review of de Gaulle's Memoirs reveals other attendant themes that were to support the French call to grandeur: honor, liberation, and stature. The call to honor implied a need never to sacrifice national principles to international diplomacy dictated by countries other than France. Liberation was the sine qua non that would provide France the necessary independence for the conduct of diplomacy commensurate with the grandiose ambitions of the French nation. The requirement for status implied that France could not allow itself to be inferior to any power; France should play a major role in shaping global events. France, independent of its allies, should play a great-power role as in maintaining equilibrium between the U.S.S.R. and Europe.

When de Gaulle assumed the powers of the Presidency in 1958, he began in earnest to see to it that France would put into practice the themes of Gaullist philosophy. One of his first actions was to request of the United States that there be a Franco-British-American triumvirate to direct the NATO Alliance. The negative response from President Eisenhower led eventually
to the withdrawal of all French forces from the NATO military command in the summer of 1966.

While de Gaulle had little sympathy for the Soviet regime and its political objectives, he found it expedient to move closer to the Soviet Union in a classical expression of balance-of-power politics. At least one observer has suggested that the 1963-1968 period in French foreign policy might be characterized as a Paris-Moscow axis. Frustrated by United States reluctance to grant France the opportunity to be restored to prominence in the international order, the French sought to use the Soviet Union as a counterweight to what they felt was the American stranglehold on legitimate French ambitions. The bipolar international system in which the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international politics left no room for third country players. To become a major player, France had to "loosen-up" the international system.

C. SHORT-TERM PRIOR PERSPECTIVES

In the period immediately prior to the 1967 War, then, France was embarked on a clear policy of freeing itself from American influence. Its major instrument for realizing this objective was the Soviet Union.

One avowed reason for de Gaulle's decision to withdraw from the military side of the NATO Alliance was his perception that a new set of conditions had arisen regarding the threat from the East and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance. In a press conference on February 21, 1966, de Gaulle made the following statement:

...it is quite clear that, owing to the internal and external evolution of the countries of the East, the Western world is no longer threatened today as it was at the time when the American protectorate was set up in Europe under the cover of NATO. But, at the same time as the alarms were dying down, there was also a reduction in the guarantee of security -- one might say absolute -- that the possession of the nuclear weapon by America alone gave to the Old Continent, and in the certainty that America would employ it, without reservation, in the event of aggression. For Soviet Russia has since that time equipped itself with
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... a nuclear power capable of striking the United States directly, which has made the decisions of the Americans as to the eventual use of their bombs at least indeterminate...7

De Gaulle cited the status of the nuclear balance again, one month later in March, in the Memorandum handed by the French Government to the Fourteen Representatives of NATO: "... the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and United States, replacing the monopoly wielded by the latter, is changing the overall conditions for the defense of the West."8

From the beginning of the French experience with the NATO Alliance, the French were critical of the unequal treatment extended to members of the Alliance by the United States. With Britain, the United States had special legislative authority for sharing certain nuclear information whereas with the French no such authority existed. When the United States proposed the idea of a Multilateral Force in response to more general criticism of U.S. control of the "nuclear trigger," the French were sceptical of the feasibility of such a project and, in the end, argued that the only way out of NATO's nuclear dilemma was to ensure that France had its own, independent nuclear capability.9

Although de Gaulle was pointing to the advances made by the Soviet Union in the area of nuclear weaponry -- advances sufficient to threaten targets in the continental United States -- at the same time he remained convinced that the United States was the dominant world power enhanced by growing economic and technological strength.

The historical record suggests that the French had no specific yardsticks which they used to measure the superpower balance in the mid-1960s. At that time the French were thinking less in terms of relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union and more in terms of gaining recognition that France was also a superpower. It was clearly against the Gaullist grain to think in les grands categories without including France.

French reactions to international events in the years of the mid-1960s were perhaps inevitably characterized by (1) the question of how was the event to impact on Gaullist objectives and (2) the Gaullist predisposition to explain international crises by reciting how inevitable they...
were in view of the absence of France from the ranks of the superpowers. Implicit in the latter was the thought that both the United States and the Soviet Union lacked the necessary wherewithal to keep crises in check. If France were admitted to the game, international politics would have more stability.

The President of the Fifth French Republic enjoyed an authority over matters of foreign policy that was unique to the French experience. As explained in various interpretations of contemporary French politics, there was in the Fifth Republic a "vertical separation of powers" that gave the President almost a free hand in determining the course of the country's foreign policy. De Gaulle was most assuredly not without critics of his foreign policy, but he was able to operate without meaningful opposition. The consequence of this condition was that in matters of foreign policy the only politically meaningful perceptions in France during the period of the Fifth Republic were those of the President of the Republic. Whatever opposition existed paled into insignificance when the official line was disseminated from the Elysee Palace.

Considering the diversity of political orientations existing at the time, it is striking to see the high degree of consensus that prevailed regarding the basic foreign policy of France. Table III-1 shows French elite perceptions in the mid-1960s regarding French national objectives. Despite the diversity of interests among six major groupings within the French political elite, common interests supported a consensus on the following objectives:

1. Pride in the national effort
2. U.S. protection of Europe is lasting, but the U.S.-French relations need revision to give France status of great power
3. Belief in the advantages to be gained from demise of bipolarity
4. Priority given to European integration and West European-British entente
5. American supremacy must be challenged
6. Purpose of European unity is to gain power
# TABLE III-1. MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>CHARACTERIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAULLISTS</td>
<td>TOTAL SUPPORT FOR DE GAULLE’S POLICIES...BELIEVERS IN NATIONALISM AND VIRTUES OF MULTIPOLARITY AS OPPOSED TO DOMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BY UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION...CRITICAL OF U.S. “STUPIDITY” AND “LACK OF KNOW-HOW”...NATIONAL DETERRENT PREFERRED BUT DO NOT REJECT AMERICAN DETERRENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIDERS</td>
<td>GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH GAULLIST POLICIES BUT WITHOUT DEEP CONViction. RIDING WAVE OF REPUBLIC’S MOMENTUM...CAUTIOUS NATIONALISTS...MORE FLEXIBLE THAN GAULLISTS ON FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS...FAVOR NATO REFORMS AND BELIEVE NATIONAL DETERRENT BEST FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTABLES</td>
<td>OLD POLITICAL LEADERS, FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE WITH POLICIES OF REGIME...GENERALLY DISSATISFIED WITH GOVERNMENT SYSTEM...FAVOR SUPRANATIONALITY, EMPHASIZING ALLIANCES AND INTEGRATION...FAVOR AN ATLANTIC AND/OR EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DETERRENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPIRANTS</td>
<td>CRITICAL OF DE GAULLE’S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY...NOT FIRM NATIONALISTS, FEW BipOLARITY BREAKING INTO MULTIPOLARITY...CRITICAL OF NATO AND AMERICAN POLICY...FAVOR AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN DEFENSE SYSTEM OR AN INDEPENDENT FRANCO-BRITISH SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRECONSTRUCTED</td>
<td>MOSTLY GROUP OF NOTABLES WHO REJECT PRACTICALLY ALL REFORMS AND POLICIES OF FIFTH REPUBLIC...CONSIDER AMERICAN DOMINANCE AS NATURAL FACT AND SEE BALANCE OF TERROR AS PROVIDING WORLD STABILITY...PREFER CONTINUATION OF STATUS QUO OF NATO...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNISTS</td>
<td>HIGHLY DISSATISFIED WITH FIFTH REPUBLIC GOALS AND SPECIALLY DOMESTIC POLICIES...APPROVE OF DISINTEGRATING SUPERPOWER DOMINANCE BUT APPREHENSIVE OF DIMINISHING SOVIET INFLUENCE...AGAINST NATO TIES OR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, BUT WOULD PREFER STATUS QUO TO ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(7) Concern with France as leader of Third World
(8) Relations with East Europe aimed at a reunification of the
     European continent.13

D. EVOLUTION OF PERCEPTIONS DURING AND SIX MONTHS AFTER THE WAR

Table III-2 provides the chronology of major events and French governmental actions relating to the Middle East War. The most important of the official French actions are discussed, in sequence, below. An attempt is made in each case to explain the premise behind the action.

Prior to the actual outbreak of conflict, de Gaulle attempted to involve France in a settlement of the Middle East situation by calling for a four-power consultation in which France would play a major role. De Gaulle's initiative was clearly motivated by his concern that a conflict in the Middle East could degenerate into a global conflict involving the superpowers and France and by his suspicions that the superpowers were reluctant to include France as a party to a solution of the Middle East problem. De Gaulle's point was that the prospect of a full-fledged war in the Middle East was imminent and that France had a legitimate and necessary role to play in making sure that war did not materialize.14

Also in the pre-conflict period, de Gaulle put himself on record with both the Arabs and the Israelis that France would condemn whichever side was responsible for taking the first step toward war.

France is not pledged in any way, or in any respect, to any of the States concerned. On her own initiative, she considers that each of these States has the right to live. But she deems that the worst would be the opening of hostilities. Consequently, the State that would be the first -- wherever it might be -- to take up arms will not have either her approval and even less her support.15

This pronouncement was consistent with his attempt to maintain a position of neutrality toward the contending parties in the Middle East.

With the actual outbreak of conflict on June 5, de Gaulle's first act was to suspend shipment of all war materials to both Israel and the Arab countries engaged in the conflict. This action was significant in that it
### TABLE 111-2. CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS RELATING TO MID-EAST WAR OF 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>FRENCH ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY 24 -- ABBA EBAN VISITS PARIS 1967 TO GAIN FRENCH SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI POLICIES</td>
<td>DE GAULLE REJECTS EBAN'S CONTENTION THAT IN 1957 FRANCE COMMITTED ITSELF TO VIEW CLOSURE OF STRAIT OF TIRAN AS CASUS BELLi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 2 --</td>
<td>FRANCE CONDEMNS UNIVERSE STATE WOULD OPEN HOSTILITIES FIRST AND ASKS THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE HELD TO AVOID A CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 5 -- OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT</td>
<td>DE GAULLE SUSPENDS DELIVERY OF WAR MATERIALS TO ISRAEL AND ARAB COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN THE CONFLICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 6 -- EGYPT DECIDES TO CLOSE SUEZ CANAL</td>
<td>DE GAULLE DECLARES IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS THAT HE HAS BEEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN ON THE GREEN TELEPHONE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 7 --</td>
<td>CÔTE DE MURVILLE RECEIVES AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL; FRENCH DELEGATE TO OECD PETROLEUM COMMITTEE MAKES IT KNOWN THAT HE WILL REMAIN SILENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 12 -- HEADS OF THE ARAB DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN PARIS DECIDE TO INTERVENE WITH DE GAULLE TO URGE HIM TO TAKE DIPLOMATIC STEPS TO HALT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS IN PARIS, OECD PETROLEUM COMMITTEE MEETS AT REQUEST OF US WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING AN &quot;EMERGENCY PLAN&quot; FOR SUPPLYING EUROPE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 14 --</td>
<td>IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FRANCE ABSTAINS FROM THE VOTE ON THE SOVIET RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL AS THE AGGRESSOR AND DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 16 -- CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN STOPS IN PARIS AND TALKS WITH DE GAULLE</td>
<td>FRENCH GOVERNMENT LINKS THE SOLVING OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT TO THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR, DISAPPROVES OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES' THREAT OF DESTROYING ISRAEL AND CONDEMNS ISRAEL'S OPENING OF THE HOSTILITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 21 --</td>
<td>FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS ISRAELI AGREssion AND EXPANSIONISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 29 --</td>
<td>OFFICIAL FRENCH SOURCES STATE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULd NOT RECOGNIZE THE DECISION VOTED BY THE ISRAELI KNESSET ON JUNE 28 TO ANNEX THE ARAB HALF OF JERUSALEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER 27 --</td>
<td>DE GAULLE CONDEMNS ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND EXPANSIONISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JANUARY 3, 1968 --</td>
<td>DE GAULLE IMPOSES COMPLETE BAN ON ALL FRENCH MILITARY SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
went beyond diplomatic rhetoric and was intended to demonstrate in an empirical way de Gaulle's anxiety that the Middle East could literally be engulfed in war. The act also demonstrated de Gaulle's intention to try to maintain an even hand regarding the contending parties -- war material was shut off to both Israeli and Arab alike.

Critics of the Gaullist position, however, asserted that it was far from even-handed. Egyptian actions prior to June 2 had denied Israeli use of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Port of Eilat. The French declaration had the effect of sanctioning the Egyptian moves. Likewise, the denial of French military equipment had a one-sided effect. France was a major source of weapons for the Israelis, particularly their air forces; France had been replaced by Russia as a major supplier of weapons to Arab states.16

Two days after the outbreak of conflict, de Gaulle let it be known that since the beginning of the conflict he had been in direct contact with Chairman Kosygin in Moscow. De Gaulle was determined to let the Soviets know that France was not going to take any actions detrimental to Soviet and Arab interests in the Middle East but that France was, at the same time, intent on not taking sides in the conflict. De Gaulle did not, however, reveal to the public the actual content of his telephone communications with the Soviet leader. His discussions with Kosygin by the "green teleprinter" displayed the French leader's ability to engage in "hot-line politics" in a manner comparable to the direct communications between the United States and the Soviet Union.

1. Central Gaullist Perceptions

With the conclusion of hostilities and the decisive victory of the Israelis, de Gaulle elaborated the French view that the Israeli victory was not the final solution to the historical problems of the Middle East. A more comprehensive solution was linked to the end of the Vietnam War. The French Government registered its disapproval of the Arab threat to destroy Israel but at the same time condemned Israel for initiating hostilities.
The spirit and the fact of war are extending once again over the world. One conflict contributes to creating another.

The war unleashed in Vietnam by American intervention, the destruction of lives and property that it entails, the fundamental sterility that stamps it, however powerful may be the means employed and however terrible may be their effects, cannot fail to spread the trouble, not only locally but at a distance.

Hence, the attitude of China and the haste of its armaments. Hence, on the other hand, the psychological and political process that resulted in the struggle in the Middle East.

France has taken a position against the war in Vietnam and against the foreign intervention that is its cause. She maintains, as from the beginning, that this conflict could cease only through the commitment that America would take to withdraw its forces within a specified period.

France has taken a position against the war in the Middle East. To be sure, she deems it just that each State involved -- in particular, Israel -- be able to live. She thus censored the threat to destroy it that its neighbors had brandished and she reserved taking a position on the liability imposed on that State on the subject of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. But she condemns the opening of hostilities by Israel.

In an attempt to avoid the coming to blows, the French Government proposed that the four major powers concert their common opposition to the use of arms. At the same time, she had made known to each of the two parties that she would lay the blame on the one that opened fire first. Today, she does not consider as permanent any of the changes effected at the scene by military action. But as the war has been extended to the Middle East, France considers that there is no chance of arriving at a peaceful settlement in the present world situation, unless a new world element were to appear. That element could and should be the end of the war in Vietnam, by the end that would be put to foreign intervention.

If the occasion to re-establish peace were to arise one day, France would of course not fail to seize it insofar as she is concerned. For France herself then to be of assistance, it is necessary for her to maintain the position that she has taken in the interest of the entire world.
The linkage in de Gaulle's view between the events in the Middle East and Vietnam requires comment. The logic may appear strained to an American audience, but it made perfect sense to de Gaulle. De Gaulle believed that the United States was embarked in Vietnam on a futile course with no real prospect for a reasonable solution. Even though the Soviets were not directly involved in Vietnam to the extent of committing troops, de Gaulle viewed Vietnam as a battleground of the two superpowers. American intransigence in failing to shut down the Vietnam War, along the lines suggested by the French, revealed the structural defect of a bipolar international system. The aggressive American stance in Vietnam made impossible a meaningful solution to the Middle East conflict because U.S. pressure in one region of the globe meant Soviet pressure in another. If the Americans were to leave the war in Southeast Asia, peace in the Middle East would be possible. In this sense, de Gaulle was accusing the United States of being the bottleneck to peace in the Middle East. More fundamental, however, was de Gaulle's perception of the extremely dangerous consequences of bipolarism; in his view, Vietnam and the Middle East situation were direct consequences of an international system dominated by only two superpowers.

De Gaulle's criticism of the Arab countries revealed his long-held contention that Israel did have the right to exist as a sovereign state in the Middle East. His censure of Israeli initiation of the conflict did not affect his judgment of the basic Israeli right to survival. It should be noted that the Soviet Union held a similar viewpoint on this matter according to the public record.

In the final analysis, de Gaulle was not able to maintain a neutral stance regarding the Middle East War. Linking the Middle East to American disengagement from the war in Vietnam was evidence that he perceived the United States as responsible for the course of events between Israel and her Arab neighbors (with the caveat that the bipolar international system was basically at fault). De Gaulle did not condemn the United States directly, but indirectly he blamed the United States for the war.
On November 27, de Gaulle caustically criticized Israeli aggression and expansionism and, with the beginning of the new year, on January 3, 1968, he imposed a complete ban on all French military supplies to Israel.

2. Media Perceptions

The basic themes stressed in the media within six months after the war did not relate specifically to the global strategic or European tactical military balances nor to the economic balance, except to the extent that, as a result of the Middle East War, the French did become more aware of the vulnerability of the Western powers to Arab use of oil as an economic weapon.

Rather, the basic themes that were stressed related to the global interests of France vis-à-vis the superpowers and to the specific regional interests of France in the Middle East. The major themes elaborated in the media are schematically shown in Table III-3. They are grouped according to French perceptions of the various countries involved as actors, either directly or indirectly, in the Middle East War.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the French media saw the Soviets gaining influence with regard to specific Arab states (Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) as a result of the war.

One feels here [in Damascus] that there is the necessity to make a balance sheet of the military and civilian needs of the Arab States after the war; that there is also the need to evaluate the efforts and the economic and political options taken. More and more one gets the impression that the Soviet assistance to Arab countries, far from being unconditional, will now depend to a large extent on the firm resolution of the leaders of these States to definitely choose the socialist path...19

The Arab defeat would provide stronger Soviet control over Arab policies. Soviet prestige, however, was seen to be damaged to some extent by having supported the losing side.

The U.S.S.R. is looking first to regain the lost ground in the Arab World.
### Table III-3. Impact of Mid-East War on French Perceptions of the U.S. and Superpower Balance

**Thematic Overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Soviet Union</strong></th>
<th><strong>United States</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet influence vis-à-vis Egypt, Syria, and Iraq enhanced</td>
<td>U.S. influence vis-à-vis Israel and Jordan enhanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet prestige damaged by having supported the &quot;losing&quot; side</td>
<td>Potential of Arab economic retaliation (&quot;oil as a weapon&quot;) highlighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Soviet military presence in Mid-East expected</td>
<td>U.S. presence in Vietnam largely responsible for conflict in Mid-East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing requirement for good Franco-Soviet relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Soviet Union/United States</strong></th>
<th><strong>France</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War result of bipolar system</td>
<td>French influence jeopardized by U.S./Soviet gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. influence in region generally enhanced at expense of Soviets</td>
<td>Support of Arabs entails high cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superpower restraint in conflict</td>
<td>More discrimination required in dealing with various Arab nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>France</strong></th>
<th><strong>Israel</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French influence jeopardized by U.S./Soviet gains</td>
<td>Israeli prestige enhanced by victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of Arabs entails high cost</td>
<td>Israeli victory demonstrates their capacity for self-defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More discrimination required in dealing with various Arab nations</td>
<td>French unable to control Israeli actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French policy in Mid-East requires fundamental reexamination</td>
<td>Israelis basically under U.S. control</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Israel</strong></th>
<th><strong>Arab States</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli prestige enhanced by victory</td>
<td>Prestige degraded by military defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli victory demonstrates their capacity for self-defense</td>
<td>Militarily inferior to Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French unable to control Israeli actions</td>
<td>Control oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israelis basically under U.S. control</td>
<td>No support given to those who would exadicate Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French remain committed to Israeli right to exist as national entity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

111-13
To regain lost ground in the Arab world, to reestablish Soviet prestige and position in the 'third world', such seem to be the concerns of the Soviet leaders in the aftermath of the cease-fire.\textsuperscript{20}

In the immediate future, it is believed that the Soviet Union will strive to the utmost to reestablish her impaired positions in the Arab world, especially since Chinese propaganda did not wait long to denounce this "new collusion" with imperialism.\textsuperscript{21}

The war had no impact on de Gaulle's commitment to maintaining close relations with Moscow in an attempt to gain leverage over the United States.\textsuperscript{22}

A major reassessment of French policy toward the Soviet Union was not to come until the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The French media saw the United States as having significantly gained in terms of prestige as a result of the Israeli victory because Israel was considered the 'client state' of the United States in the Middle East. The cutting off of French military aid to the French would open the door for more American aid - Phantom jets would replace Mirages.

The media raised a number of questions about the impact of the Arab oil embargo on the Western countries. Did the United States produce enough oil itself and did it have enough other alternatives at hand not to break under the weight of an embargo? Would British dependence on Middle East oil play a role in U.S. actions in the future?

The U.S. does not have to fear from the drying up of Arab oil. The same 10 million tons that they import from this region is relatively small compared to their domestic supply which nears 400 million tons a year. Let's take note that on her side the Soviet Union is largely self-sufficient.

The situation in Britain is much less stable. Given the anti-capitalist and anti-Anglo-Saxon mood of the present Arab propaganda, it is very likely that these firms [Anglo-Saxon] will not come out unscathed, whatever the outcome [of the crisis].\textsuperscript{23}

When searching for an answer to the question of who was to blame for the war, the United States presence in Vietnam was emphasized. The United States continued to wage an Intense war in Vietnam and the Soviets had their hands tied at the time of the Middle East War. The Soviets were
unwilling to have a direct military confrontation in Southeast Asia and, thus, they had 'opened a second front' by supporting Egyptian moves in the Middle East. A true peace would be achieved only when the United States settled for a compromise in Vietnam.

If the Vietnam War had not created a deterioration in Soviet-American relations the Middle East crisis would probably not have blown up. It doesn't matter whether the Russians pushed Nasser or that he led them. The essential fact is that the Middle East crisis serves them. It allows them to open a second front in relation to the Vietnamese conflict. In Southeast Asia they cannot do anything other than increase their material shipments alongside the American escalation. To intervene more directly would mean World War. On this point the rules of coexistence still apply: the two superpowers do not fight face to face.

Thus, halfway paralyzed, the Soviets saw their influence diminish daily in the world. The Israeli dispute gives them the advantage.

One can deplore that the weak [nations] are thus reduced to pawns manipulated by the strong [nations].

One of the keys to peace in the Middle East is in Hanoi. 24

De Gaulle's longstanding criticism of the bipolar international system was frequently reflected in the media. What had begun as a localized conflict degenerated into a superpower confrontation where the superpowers could have come into direct armed conflict. The superpowers continued to seek expanded military, economic and political power at the expense of the medium powers and the Third World. While the media lauded the extent of superpower restraint, another crisis in the Middle East might not have the same result.

But it is very certain that the behavior of the Americans and Soviets during this long drama, that has shaken and continues to shake Israel and her neighbors, has been overall very prudent -- unlike their respective attitudes in the crisis in these parts of the world in 1957 and 1958. 25
Like yesterday in Cuba, the USSR has shown today in the Mediterranean that she refuses to get into a direct confrontation with the U.S. It is certainly wise. It is 'iser still for the two big powers to find the way, once and for all, to defuse the more or less explosive situations that at any time risk getting them into conflict.\textsuperscript{26}

Regarding Israel, the Israeli victory demonstrated determination and a capacity for self-defense. Israeli prestige was enhanced as a result of victory over the Arabs. The media reflected de Gaulle's view that Israel was to blame for taking the initial step toward war but that Israel did have the right to its independence. In view of Israel's decision to start the war in spite of de Gaulle's admonitions, the French were seen to have minimal influence over Israeli foreign policy. The Israelis were viewed as largely under the control of the United States.

In the case of French perceptions of the Arab States, the media reflected on the need to look with a much more discriminating eye on the Arab world and not to make the mistake of identifying Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian interests with the Arab world at large. It was not at all clear that France could have a meaningful Arab policy without having that policy tailored to the specific requirements of individual countries.\textsuperscript{27} The policy requirements for Egypt were not necessarily the same for Algeria or Morocco.

Throughout the crisis the press stressed the responsibility of the big four powers to restrain events, and after the conflict the need for them to participate in the settlement. The fact that France was not invited to the Glassboro summit confirmed the French suspicion that again a localized conflict had been converted to a superpower confrontation settled only by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

More and more this crisis seems to be losing the character of an Arab-Israeli confrontation to acquire the looks of a Soviet-American clash similar to the Cuban crisis of 1962 - the two superpowers continue to raise the stakes of this diplomatic poker.\textsuperscript{28} If a multilateral world were to exist, France as part of a united Europe would and should have made a contribution to this meeting:
All that can be said is that if Europe did exist, there would probably be a third, and very useful partner at the Glassboro table.  

The discrepancy between the official French position of equidistance and the public support for Israel was highlighted throughout the crisis. Coverage was given to the nation's top political leaders, as they criticized de Gaulle's stand, and to the spontaneous pro-Israel demonstrations in Paris and other cities. Further, in later reviews of the events, the question of French anti-Semitism was raised and France's position was perceived as tilting towards the Soviet and Arab side in spite of the "equidistant" course set by de Gaulle.

In the United Nations, it is considered now that what originally was an Arab-Israeli confrontation has become a big Soviet-American confrontation. And one notes that France who was neutral at the beginning of the crisis is progressively moving in partnership with the U.S.S.R. to occupy vis-à-vis that country a situation comparable to the one Great Britain has in relation to the U.S.

In at least one interpretation, the "tilt" was seen as compensating for Soviet losses.

For a few years, indeed, the behavior of the great powers has changed for understandable reasons that can be recalled: the balance of terror that has pushed them to limit as much as possible the occasions for a confrontation; the progressive realization of the fact that the Third World represents a burden rather than an asset; and the rapid development of petroleum resources of the Soviet Union preventing her from absorbing the production from Middle Eastern countries who, as a consequence have to essentially rely on Western countries for the sale of their oil.

But one must see in that [French attitude toward Israel] the sign of her anxiety due to the uninterrupted scoring by the U.S. at the expense of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union will find herself cornered some day and react like Kennedy did in the Cuban affair when the threat was at the doors of the U.S. From this comes an action that aims more and more overtly to come to the Kremlin's aid and help reestablish a compromised prestige.
In economic terms, several articles appeared stressing the European vulnerability to an oil embargo. The question was not alien to the French with their own oil interests in Algeria, but the potential problem had not come up yet. Although the embargo against other European nations pointed to the fact that the French might have to develop an Arab policy flexible enough to minimize the impact of future embargoes, that the Arabs did not retaliate against the French indicated that de Gaulle's policy of "equidistance" paid off in spite of the public furor.

There were few assessments in the French media of U.S. and the Soviet military capabilities in the Mediterranean area. Such assessments were made for the most part by commentators peripheral to the French defense community with a military background. For example, retired General Andre Beauffre had the following to say:

The true losers in this war, from a military standpoint, are perhaps the Russians who not only crammed the Arab armies with equipment that only weighs them down and deceives them about their real strength, but also infused the arms with a rigid defense tactic whose efficacy has not been proven.34

And A. Clemant, a Le Monde writer commented:

Washington was worried at the rising bids. Luckily, there is the other side to this enigmatic coin [Soviet naval buildup]: the sixth American fleet and its dazzling two carriers which pack, for sure, according to the correspondent speaking from one of the decks, at least several times the military potential of the Russian naval force advancing in the near waters.35

The French perceptions of the extreme limitations of the bipolar international system conditioned their view of the strategic diplomacy of the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, in some cases, French commentators viewed Soviet behavior in the Middle East as an ill-advised attempt to extend Soviet influence in areas where real success was doomed from the beginning to failure. That is, the perception was one of the Soviets attempting to match U.S. influence in the Middle East on U.S. rather than on Soviet terms without realizing that they were not prepared to fully engage the U.S. in that particular area. If the bipolar
international system were replaced by a multilateral system with more than two centers of power, the Soviets would not have undertaken such unwarranted actions.

On the question of will, the evidence indicates that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were seen by the French to be prepared to support their respective clients through military aid and diplomatic support. At the same time, however, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union was prepared to actually display their own troops in the Middle East conflict; the will to support their respective clients stopped short of actual troop commitments. The fact that the Soviet Union failed to commit troops at a time when the Arabs were facing defeat at the hands of the Israelis indicated to the French that the Soviet Union was less willing to "over-expend" itself than the U.S. The point was that Soviet will was tested more severely than that of the U.S. The Israeli victory in the 1967 Middle East War acted to bolster the image of the U.S. in the Middle East. It was probably presumed by many that the Israeli victory was due in large part to the significant contributions made by the U.S. to the Israeli cause.

3. Interpretation of French Perceptions

Despite the unique features of the Middle East conflict and a tradition of French involvement in the region, French perceptions of the 1967 crisis were conditioned by global values to which Charles de Gaulle had committed himself throughout the postwar period. Gaullist perceptions supported French honor, liberation, stature and, most of all, national grandeur. De Gaulle's interpretation of the Middle East conflict was not dissimilar from his views of other international crises during the 1960s. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the conflict in Vietnam, and the 1967 Middle East war were all symptomatic of a basic flaw in the international system. That flaw was the unnatural bipolar structure of international relations. De Gaulle's view was that only a radical restructuring of the international system would prevent international crises such as the Middle East War of 1967. A more appropriate structure would accord to France a central role among international actors. French perception of U.S. and Soviet power thus were dictated by images the French had of themselves. The crises
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reinforced the view that French participation was essential to international order and world stability.

Perceptions of Soviet power in the Middle East in 1967 were dominated by commitments which the French had undertaken earlier in the 1960s to build their own nuclear force and to disengage from the NATO Alliance. Complementary to those decisions was the French effort to better relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The fact that the French had committed themselves to this course was essentially responsible for their interpretation of the war. In other words, values associated with NATO and the Eastern European countries dominated evaluations of crisis events.

The Six-Day War did cause a reexamination of French Middle East policy. Intent on maintaining their close relationship with the Soviet Union and still unwilling to forfeit the nuclear protection of the United States, the French continued their policy of attacking the United States for perpetuating the war in Southeast Asia. French policy aimed at minimizing superpower penetration in the Middle East, but a "tilt" towards the Soviets and the Arabs was deemed necessary to offset U.S. power in Southeast Asia. As a result of the Middle East War, the French brought themselves closer to the Arab countries and moved further away from the support of Israel, stopping short of denying the Israeli right to exist. Previously, the French had been able to pursue a relatively neutral policy in regard to Arab-Israeli differences, but the war forced them to choose sides. Finally, the French had to reassess their Arab policy -- priorities had to be set among the diverse countries included under the Arab label.

France did not intend to jeopardize its relationship with the Soviet Union by supporting the wrong side in the war. French support of the Arabs was in that sense consistent with its general policy of maintaining close ties with the Soviets. In de Gaulle's view, the Soviets had more to contribute to the realization of French goals at the time than did the United States. "Recognition of the Soviet Union's legitimate presence and interests in the Mediterranean area -- what no previous French regime had ever done -- created the reciprocal expectation that the Soviet Union would acknowledge French claims."

111-20
The French tended to view the outcomes of the Middle East War in terms approximating a zero-sum game. The view was not, however, in reference to the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship, but rather in terms of the two big superpowers on the one hand and France on the other. Gains for the superpowers meant losses for less-than-superpower France.

It was beyond the capacity of France to view the Middle East events in simple bilateral terms. Any reevaluation of the superpower balance resulting from the Middle East War had to include, of necessity, consideration of France as a superpower actor. For France, the operative question was not whether the United States or the Soviet Union gained leverage, influence or power at the expense of the others, but what net impact did the event have on France.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER III


4. Ibid., p. 730.

5. Ibid., Foreword.

6. According to one observer, French policy in the sixties had three immediate objectives flowing from the global design of de Gaulle: "to prevent by all means possible the establishment of an Anglo-Saxon-Russian condominium of the World; to assure the leadership of Europe in partnership with Russia - and one day, perhaps, with Britain if she breaks away from the American connection; to spread French influence in the rest of the world through the political example of nonalignment and the attraction of French cultural rayonnement." Wolf Mendle, "Perspectives of Contemporary French Defense Policy," World Today, Feb. 1968, p. 50. One would have to question Mr. Mendle's emphasis on de Gaulle's intention to form a partnership with the Russians; rather, it appears that de Gaulle was very well aware of the pitfalls inherent in forming a partnership with an ideologically aggressive Russia. It seems improbable that de Gaulle was willing to take the risk of exchanging American dominance for Soviet dominance.


8. Ibid., p. 25.


10. The term "vertical separation of powers" is taken from H. Ehrmann, Politics in France, p. 245. It was the Algerian crisis into the Elysee Palace. There was undoubtedly general recognition in France at the time that only a strong President could resolve each external crises as Algeria. Thus, even though the Constitution of the Fifth
 Republic did not specifically provide for a strong President in matters of foreign policy, there developed the tendency to leave matters of foreign policy in the hands of the President rather than the Premier Ministre and Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

11. Alfred Grosser explains Gaullism's success in France, notably in foreign policy, by noting that, "... because it brings prestige cheap, because de Gaulle alone defines his policies, because he does not invite the participation of the French people other than by the confidence he demands of them. The result is marvelous for French citizens: they are invited to be spectators of French prestige achieved by a single man. When they are asked to participate by a sacrifice, the result is hostility to the force de frappe and 'Cartierisme'." Alfred Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, p. 143.

12. Studies of the French administrative elite show no evidence that the French bureaucratic influence on foreign policy during de Gaulle's tenure as President of the Fifth Republic was anything but minimal. A recent study emphasizes the increasing politicizing of the bureaucracy in France, particularly under de Gaulle. Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).


14. In a statement of de Gaulle during this period he expresses his fear that the Middle East conflict had the potential to lead to WW III. Le Monde, June 23, 1967, p. 2.

15. Ambassade De France, French Foreign Policy, June 2, 1967. It should be noted that the French position closely paralleled that of the Soviet Union.

16. Stanley Hoffmann notes that, in de Gaulle's view, "...the French embargo against Israel was an attempt to redress the imbalance created by Israeli superiority before the Russians tried to do it themselves." Decline or Renewal?, p. 348. Hoffmann may be partially correct, but as the evidence shows de Gaulle's action had other motives as well.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)

22. In July 1967, Pompidou and Couve de Murville visited Moscow and held various meetings with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny. A joint communiqué was issued which emphasized French and Soviet efforts to assure peace in the Middle East and denounced U.S. intervention in Vietnam.
27. French concerns and interests are spelled out by Mr. Debre in Ambassade De France, French Foreign Policy, Jan.-June 1966, p. 47-48.
29. Le Monde, June 24, p. 2.
31. Raymond Aron, France et les Juifs, is an indictment of Middle East policy. Le Monde, May 27, 1967, also raises the legal and moral commitments of France to Israel.
34. Le Monde, June 22, p. 4.
35. Le Monde, June 6, p. 4.
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CHAPTER IV

GERMAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. AND SOVIET POWER

A. INTRODUCTION

The crisis in the Middle East came at an inopportune time for German images of the superpower balance. For nearly a month, German press attention had been focusing on a fundamental change in U.S. strategy for NATO -- from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" -- which was replete with new philosophical concepts, threat perceptions, force reductions, troop rotations, and bad omens resulting from much publicized pressures from American Senators. The crisis in the Middle East literally pushed "flexible response" and all the arguments against its underlying philosophy off the front pages of the major German newspapers; treatment of the crisis in the press, however, turned out to be only a variation on the same theme -- theories underlying "flexible response" were tested against "crisis management" as practiced in the superpower confrontation in the Middle East.

B. LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES

1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to set forth some perspectives which influence West German perceptions of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. balance of power. Although it is believed that most Germans would share these perspectives, it is not to be assumed that they would necessarily derive from them the same perceptions of the superpower balance. It is more likely that these perspectives exert themselves on the consciousness of the political elites, and that the interpretations of events to which they give rise are communicated to inform and influence public opinion.

The observations in this section are intuitively based. They are aggregated from impressions gained in the course of associations with West
Germans over the years, from reading the German press and political and defense publications, and from a knowledge of German history.

The objective of this section, then, is to provide a brief, broad-stroke background of German perspectives and characteristics that may make the perception patterns found in following sections more readily understandable.

2. The Break With Tradition

For all of Europe, World War II spelled a break with the past; for West Germany it spelled a break with tradition. Among the ruins of that war was a multipolar balance of power structure in which Germany (Prussia) had been the most powerful element for almost a century. The tragedy of Germany's power was that there was always someone in a top leadership position who would use it for national aggrandizement and that those who wielded the instruments of power were trapped in a "Prussian" tradition of absolute loyalty to the State. The military, in particular, was a revered institution in German society, perpetuating this tradition with a code of discipline and obedience that had no equal anywhere except, perhaps, in Japan. This tradition has been much caricatured in American movies and satyrized in German belles-lettres. A poignant and rather well-known play, for instance, is Stefan Zweig's "Der Hauptmann von Köpenick," in which a destitute exconvict, desperate for employment, dresses himself in an army captain's uniform and finds everyone, civilian and military taking orders from him without question. He assumes command of a squad of soldiers, marches them into Köpenick, and takes all of the money in the town's treasury. This play, based on a newspaper account, was written at the turn of this century, but it highlights aspects of culture that made Hitler's actions possible more than three decades later. The Prussian tradition was also the crucial issue in the postwar Nuremberg Trials of alleged German war criminals. It was not difficult for Adolf Hitler and his propagandists to convince the Germans that they were invincible, nor to recruit loyal servants to do his bidding, because there was an honorable tradition behind all that.
This Prussian tradition virtually disappeared from West Germany after the fall of the Third Reich, though it continues to be nurtured in East Germany under a Communist regime. After the war, Germany was partitioned between East and West, and both parts, in their own ways, had to make amends for the war. In each part this meant a disavowal of Nazism and the adoption of the political ideology of its respective victor, but the processes were as different as the ideologies of the East and West. In East Germany, one dictatorship was replaced with another which found Prussian traditions very helpful to its cause. In West Germany, the tradition that had caused so much oppression, suffering, and destruction was abandoned. In so doing, the West Germans accomplished something unprecedented in German history: political stability under a popularly elected leadership.

West Germans became inward looking, asking themselves how they could have allowed the war to happen. The prestige of the German military was one of the victims of this reexamination. The Germans wanted no more military forces, except, perhaps, border guards. When they finally consented to raise twelve divisions under NATO command, it took them two years to raise the first three, and another five years to field the rest. Even so, the West German Army still suffers from a lack of noncommissioned and field-grade officers. The military profession and its uniform are simply no longer popular in West Germany.

The rejection of military tradition has to be seen in the context of the Soviet threat which manifested itself soon after the Second World War and prompted the United States to join with Western Europe in the NATO Alliance. West Germany regained sovereignty by entering into this alliance, putting its military forces under NATO command and forswearing any future intentions to build or own nuclear weapons.

3. The Threat

In effect, West Germany cannot "legally" defend itself but must depend on the alliance which commands its own military forces. Yet, West Germany is the one country that has been most threatened by Soviet aggression. Not only is the Soviet Union believed to be capable of deliberate,
unprovoked aggression -- a belief rooted in the postwar takeover of Eastern Europe and the Stalinist doctrine of the inevitability of war between capitalism and Communism and confirmed by Soviet military intervention in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia -- but also the unsettled "German questions," including Berlin, have provoked East-West conflict in the post-war era. As long as West Germany claimed the right to reunification and refused to acknowledge that territorial losses to Poland at the end of the war were permanent, it was the object of vituperous Communist propaganda. It was accused of being "militarist and revanchist" and of exhibiting other unsavory traits while the East Germans were exalted as "peace-loving" folk. It is difficult to say what impact this propaganda may have had on the German psyche; but, no doubt, propaganda introduced an element of constant tension. Above all, it let the West Germans know that, if the Soviet Union had its way, they would be "peace-loving" too.

The very fact that the Soviet Union is over a part of Germany has a somewhat frightening impact on the minds of West Germans. It brings Soviet power uncomfortably close to West Germany's border and makes Soviet oppression of Germans all too visible. In other words, West Germans are peculiarly sensitized to the Soviet threat: they not only see it, they feel it.

A. **Contrasting Images**

By and large, Germans are afraid of the Russians and fascinated by the Americans. Both feelings are deeply rooted in German history and confirmed by events during the past generation. The Russian image is that of a rugged, impetuous people with a barbaric streak, merciless to their enemies--in short, rather un-European. Of course, many Germans would qualify this image in various ways; but few would say that the Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, including East Germany, is out of the Russian character.

On the other hand, the American image is one with which Germans can readily identify. For one thing, they know America better than Russia; their relatives have emigrated to this continent and been assimilated with
variant of European culture. Most adult Germans remember hearing and believing in their childhood that America was the land of wealth and opportunity, that "money grows on trees" there. Coupled with this wealth was a sense of American generosity and magnanimity that Germans came to appreciate after the Second World War. Germans found the Marshall Plan to be very much in keeping with their image of the American character.

If this image does not exactly translate into a feeling of "love America," then it at least promotes friendship and, most of all, trust. Unlike the French, for instance, Germans basically trust the United States to use the military and economic power it possesses in a way that serves their own interests and those of Europe as well. Whereas the French have expressed fear that, one day, the superpowers may use European countries either as their pawns or their battleground to serve their own ends, Germans would encourage U.S. and Soviet diplomacy over the heads of the Europeans as a necessary means to achieving detente and settling outstanding issues in Europe.


Under these circumstances, Germans view the superiority of U.S. power as vital to their security. The most numerous and dangerous U.S.-Soviet confrontations during the postwar era have been occasioned by German issues, notably Berlin, and might have been settled differently (possibly to the West's disadvantage) if the Soviet Union had enjoyed superiority. Nevertheless, when both sides have the means of mass destruction, superiority takes on a different meaning reflected in policy and crisis management.

A German was recently asked to identify the major turning points in his perception of the balance between the superpowers. "The Uncertain Trumpet, and the advent of parity," he answered with a smile reflecting the obvious logic of his answer. "When did parity come about?" he was asked. He shrugged his shoulders: "Sometime in the Sixties." To some Germans, this strategic shift in the balance of power was already evident during the 1961 Berlin crisis, when the United States and Britain argued for some
concessions to the Soviet Union that France would not accept. The shifting balance became obvious to many Germans when, only four years after NATO's acceptance of the "massive retaliation doctrine," the United States began arguing for "flexible response."

Germans tend to view the superpower balance from their own perspectives which are conditioned by their exposure to the Soviet threat. At the same time, Germans have developed a peculiar combination of fatalism and self-confidence, without which they would not be one of the most dynamic economic powers in the world. For instance, there is a prevalent belief among West Germans that, should the Soviet Union launch a massive attack, their country would be overrun or devastated. The Germans have seen no point in planning for another long war. Whereas NATO plans call for 90 days' supplies for such an emergency, West Germany has about 30 days -- as if, in the nuclear era, a country in the front line of NATO's defenses should not need any more. While successive public opinion polls have shown dramatic ups and downs in German perceptions of U.S. or Western superiority, there does not appear to be any undue public concern arising out of these perceptions. Germans continue to work, save, invest, and build their "economic miracle" as though their country were quite safe from another war.

Germans tend to look at the balance between the superpowers not so much in terms of numbers of tanks, planes, or megatons as in terms of utility and commitment. Since Germany has no means to defend itself against the Soviet Union, the balance resolves to question of whether, when, and how the power of the United States would be used in defense of Germany should the Soviet Union attack. Mere superiority ascribed to the United States has only marginal meaning for Germans in a superpower balance characterized by "mutual assured destruction" and "overkill." The question becomes, "how does the United States plan to use its superiority (parity or inferiority) to deter the Soviet Union from attacking West Germany?" "Is it reasonable to believe that the United States would risk the devastation of its own homeland to prevent the devastation of West Germany?"

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U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union would be a reassuring element, of course. It would have deterrent value. But, in German perceptions, the United States does not enjoy military superiority along the central front of NATO; what deters is the political will to employ U.S. forces. What helps to make employment credible is a "magic number" of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. The more U.S. forces stationed in West Germany, the more likely the Soviet Union is to believe that the United States would use strategic forces in retaliation against Soviet aggression. The Germans did not define that "magic number"; it was the United States that decided how much was necessary to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. But once the United States decided what the number should be, the Germans believed that this number was essential.

U.S. force deployments are, thus, a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for essential reassurance. Germans tend to watch more closely than other Europeans the foreign policies of the United States for evidence of strengthening or weakening of the U.S. commitment to its allies. For this reason, for instance, West Germany was better disposed toward U.S. actions in Vietnam than were most West Europeans; but the Germans, too, eventually came to question the prudence of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. As domestic opposition to the Vietnam War grew in America, Germans increasingly feared that such opposition would eventually weaken U.S. resolve to come to the aid of its allies elsewhere, particularly in Europe.

In cases where U.S. policy is characterized by tergiversation or inaction, one should expect concern to manifest itself in the various interpretations that Germans give to U.S. policy. This was clearly the case in the June 1967 War, when the United States declared its "neutrality." One can find two diametrically opposed interpretations of the U.S. position in the same newspaper. One interpretation maintained that the United States could not possibly be neutral -- it was only behaving that way in the hope of getting the crisis resolved in the Security Council but would step in if Israel were threatened with defeat. The other contended that
the Israelis could not count on the West for help and, therefore, Israel would have to resort to nuclear weapons in order to avoid defeat. The former would appear to have been the dominant perception, as Germans anxiously watched what the United States would do. When, within two days, it became apparent that the Israelis were winning, the German press emphasized that Israel was making it unnecessary for the U.S. to make a hard choice about intervention.

How the United States would use its power in defense of its allies is of almost equal importance to the question of whether and when it would. Here again the perceived superpower balance is only one of several factors -- superiority presumably offers more desirable policy options than inferiority. Because of their geographic position and the potential for conflict with the Soviet bloc, Germans are vitally interested in NATO's defense concepts which are "made in the U.S.A." They have also probably given more thought to deterrence and defense in their analytical literature than most other peoples in NATO. In general, the Germans have supported U.S. concepts; they have also been critical and sometimes, to the puzzlement of their American counterparts, contradictory in their reactions to changing American strategies. What has emerged is a contrapuntal relationship in concept-building between the United States and the Germans: when, in the 1950s the United States was advancing "massive retaliation," the Germans argued for more ground forces and forward-based systems. When, in the 1960s, Americans began to argue for "flexible response," the Germans emphasized the need for strategic retaliation and toned down the necessity for conventional and tactical-nuclear options. At the same time, though, the Germans were opposed to Pentagon plans to remove nuclear weapons from forward positions and to relieve the "quick reaction alert" aircraft of their nuclear role. In the mid-1960s, Germans favored Atomic Demolition Mines (ADMs); but in the late 1960s, when the U.S. was seriously exploring the feasibility of predrilling ADM chambers in Germany, they said "nein."
One could go on to cite other examples. Suffice it to say that the contrapuntal relationship reflects a German belief that deterrence is credible only if based on risk-sharing between the United States and the European allies and a full spectrum of options. Germans are concerned about an American penchant to define, all too clearly, the options that would be used if deterrence failed -- from the strategic nuclear emphasis of the 1950s to the conventional emphasis of the 1960s. The German counterpoint always stressed the options that the United States was deemphasizing at the time.

In the mid-1950s, Germans feared that America, weary of the just-ended Korean War, would reduce its forces in Europe and rely mainly on massive retaliation. There was doubt that massive retaliation would be applied in a case of ambiguous aggression such as another Berlin blockade. Only sufficient ground forces could deter limited hostile action by the Soviets. On the other hand, deemphasizing the strategic option in the "flexible response" concept would undermine deterrence of a massive Soviet attack, Germans believed. When the Germans were advocating ADMs, the United States was espousing an emphasis on conventional strategy, the weakness of which Germans sought to redress with nuclear warheads. When the Americans sought to emplace ADMs, the Germans were concerned again about a deemphasis of conventional forces and, possibly, a reduction of U.S. military personnel in Europe.

In German perceptions there is also an apparent relationship between U.S. superiority and U.S. defense concepts for NATO. As long as U.S. superiority was absolute and the Soviet Union could inflict little damage on the U.S., a strategic emphasis seemed feasible and risk-sharing with the Europeans posed no problem for the security of the United States. As this superiority dwindled, however, risk-sharing became more problematic and a strategy of flexible response became necessary to minimize the risk of massive retaliation on the United States. For security-conscious Germans, this was an uncomfortable equation. For these reasons, however, Germans have tended to watch the balance between the superpowers with a very keen eye.
One should also note that Germans have had ample opportunity to experience, largely to their satisfaction, the U.S. performance in meeting its commitments in an arena very close to their hearts -- Berlin. They have seen the United States meet Soviet challenges with both firmness and restraint -- and, together with Britain and France, conclude a Berlin agreement in 1971 which conformed to the essential interests of West Germany in that city. It is from this testing of will, in which the United States has stood firm, that Germans draw much of their confidence in their future security. In fact, West Germans have had occasion to observe that the United States tends to approach East-West issues with a much more skeptical, hard-line attitude than would the Germans themselves, even at the risk of generating some hard feelings in the Federal Republic.

Germans are also aware that one of the primary motivations of U.S. foreign policy has been to promote Europe's confidence in the American commitment to their security -- including the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and intervention in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic. A U.S. declaration of neutrality in the Mid-East War of June 1967, where the United States had a clear commitment to Israel, therefore, caused much concern in the German press.

On the other hand, some other symbols of the U.S. commitment to which Germans have been sensitized in the postwar era have become less confidence-inspiring. Among them are: the declining morale of U.S. forces in Europe; the U.S. penchant to cannibalize these forces for war fighting elsewhere or for material aid to Israel; the conflict between the Administration and the Congress over U.S. troop deployments in Europe; and continuing U.S. pressures for more European forces and more offset payments to shift the burden of defense from America to Europe.

The most important and complex question that is in the minds of Germans, and in which all of the above considerations are combined, is whether and to what extent the U.S. commitment to their security is based on self-interest and how well U.S. interests correlate with those of the Federal Republic. Philanthropic considerations, no matter how well intentioned, inspire little confidence among the Germans.
C. **SHORT-TERM PRIOR PERSPECTIVES**

1. **Principal Political Actors**

At the time of the June 1967 War in the Middle East, West Germany was governed by the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister Party, the Christian Social Union, in coalition with the Social Democratic Party. The CDU/CSU and the SPD between them, had more than 90 percent of the seats in the Bundestag (Parliament's Lower House). This "Grand Coalition" was a strange relationship between two competing political parties which had approximately equal electoral support. They had about as much in common as they had in opposition to each other. They shared an antipathy toward and distrust of Soviet-styled Communism, but for different reasons. The Christian "Democrats/Socialists" had their philosophical roots in Catholic and Protestant ethics and subscribed to the principles of free enterprise and democratic freedoms. The Social Democrats, while rooted in Marxism, had broken away from Lenin at the beginning of the Twentieth Century and sought to achieve socialism within a democratic framework.

Both parties were faced with the same problem: a Soviet-dominated neighbor threatening West Germany with military power and subversive ideology. They differed in their approaches to this problem: the Christian Democrats felt that, on the fundamental issues, no reconciliation should be made with the Soviet Union; the Social Democrats felt that a long-term dialogue with the Communists might eventually promote a political mellowing in the East and, thus, a better East-West climate. But such a dialogue presupposed some concession, by West Germany toward the Soviet Union and its East European "satellites." Both Parties agreed, however, that alliance with the United States and membership in NATO was indispensable to West Germany's security, no matter what approaches to the East might be contemplated by West Germany.

Although the two parties differed more fundamentally on domestic issues, both regarded the interests of industry and private enterprise as the dominant influence. Though the philosophy of the Social Democrats was rooted in Marxism, they foreswore the essence of that creed, including
socialization of industry, in their ground-breaking "Godesberg Program" of 1959. Since West Germany's prosperity depends on exports, and private industry has been manufacturing the goods for exports well enough, the Social Democrats have seen little to gain by "rocking the boat." Within the framework of progressive labor legislation (under the Christian Democrats as well as under the Social Democrats), what was good for private industry was good for West Germany. Therefore, the perceptions of industrial groups concerning the balance between the superpowers should be regarded as important in the political dynamics of West Germany.

When the Social Democrats joined in the Grand Coalition, they marked their first opportunity to take a part in governing their country. Their influence on West Germany's foreign policy was felt almost immediately -- their leader, Willy Brandt, having taken charge of foreign policy in addition to assuming the office of Vice Chancellor. The Ostpolitik, which was to create so much controversy in the United States and West Germany and lay the foundation for the Berlin Agreement and the recent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was launched under Brandt's leadership. Bonn symbolically acknowledged the existence of two separate German states by allowing the appellation of "German Democratic Republic" for East Germany. Before then, East Germany had always been officially labelled as the Soviet Occupation Zone.

The Ostpolitik made its mark on East-West relations and divided the consensual politics prevailing in West Germany before 1967. The question that must be raised here is whether and to what extent perceptions of the balance between the superpowers played a role in pursuit of the policy? The balance was changing at that time in dimensions that may have had impact on the West German psyche. Although the Social Democrats had a political philosophy and rationale that would have sufficed to propel them in the direction of Ostpolitik eventually, one could still surmise that, in the context of the changing power balance, the Germans sought to remove a dangerous irritant in East-West relations while they could still do so through negotiation -- before the Soviet Union could dictate the terms. As
one Government spokesman put it before the Bundestag: "Military-technological developments have led to a double change in our security policy: militarily, from a strategy of massive retaliation to a strategy of flexible response; politically, from a strategy against the opposite alliance to a strategy against war."  

2. The Yardstick of Power

Germans tend to look at the balance between the superpowers in two ways: (1) as an existing condition, and (2) as a trend. Their focus, however, tends to be on the latter, much as is the case in the United States. In addition, from their own security perspective, they see strategic (nuclear) and theater (conventional) forces as inextricably intertwined.

It has already been noted that Germans conceded to the Soviet Union conventional superiority in the Central European theater. That perception, however, was rather academic as long as there was sufficient confidence in deterrence. It is interesting that the Germans use the word abschreckung for deterrence, whereas the French use dissuasion. The German usage can be translated more accurately into "dissuasion through terror" or frightening someone away from a course of action, whereas the French word suggests a much milder, more persuasive connotation. Certainly, the German language is rich enough to find a half dozen words for deterrence with less frightening connotations; but Germans tend to be very precise and descriptive in the words they use.

But abschreckung works both ways. By 1967, West German analysts believed the Soviet Union to have more deliverable megatons than did the United States, albeit packed into fewer missiles with less accuracy than those of the U.S. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had been contending that to strive for continuing strategic superiority would only escalate the arms race. The United States should rather aim to persuade the Soviet Union to end the arms race. Anti-ballistic missile systems were proposed, but Mr. McNamara felt that, given a continuing arms race between the superpowers, the Soviet Union would be able to launch enough nuclear
delivery vehicles to saturate any ballistic missile defense system the United States could build. So, in the mid-1960's, the Germans watched the ABM debate in the United States, a debate between those who feared that the Soviet Union was rapidly reaching strategic superiority over the United States and those who felt that superiority was losing its relevance and that the United States should settle for "sufficiency." The former hoped that the United States would continue to maintain a decisive edge over the Soviets; the latter hoped that the Soviet Union, once it had achieved a sufficient strategic capability, would be more inclined to stop the arms race and might even move toward arms control with the United States.

The pros and cons of this debate were reflected in the German press and analytical literature. Essentially, however, the Germans were bowing to the inevitable in which they had no voice. The U.S., in their view, was abdicating strategic superiority in favor of "parity." Mutual assured destruction resulted in a situation in which the United States would be just as deterred from using its nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union was once perceived to be.

The trend in this direction had begun in the first years of the Kennedy Administration, when the United States decided to limit itself to a finite number of strategic missiles on land and sea, and began to argue for a strategy of flexible response in Europe. Then also, the United States sought to persuade its allies to participate in a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) of missile-carrying surface ships. The Europeans soon dubbed this concept the "Merchant Fleet" after Ambassador Livingston Merchant who was assigned to sell the concept (quite aside from the coincidence that the ships would be disguised as merchant vessels). There was much more U.S. political pressure behind the concept than there was support for it in Europe. Germans disliked it for a number of reasons, the most important of which probably was that the United States was seeking to shift the burden of strategic deterrence away from America to Europe, thus undermining the very essence of deterrence. Unlike most NATO countries, Germany reluctantly gave the Merchant Fleet lukewarm support, anxious as always to maintain
its credentials with America but believing also that the concept would not fly or even swim. At the same time, however, it was strongly intimated that Europeans should have a finger on the nuclear trigger of the MLF -- a condition Germans believed Americans would not accept.

The United States put the MLF proposal back on the shelf in 1966, but the acrimony to which it had given rise still lingered in the German memory. In its place, the United States suggested the establishment of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in which Defense Ministers could be appraised of and consulted about nuclear employment concepts. There German officials found out for the first time what tactical nuclear options the U.S. contemplated for employment in case of war -- in effect, that America intended to exhaust conventional and tactical nuclear means to avoid defeat in Europe before employing strategic nuclear forces. In line with the then evolving flexible-response strategy, America seemed to be redefining deterrence by telling the Soviets that they could not win through aggression. Before redefinition, the Soviets had been told that aggression would be tantamount to suicide. The correlation between this development and the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to Soviet strategic weapons was all too direct in the German mind.

From the West German point of view, flexible response was disconcerting. Germany was still the most crisis-prone area of East-West confrontation. The Soviets had started two consecutive Berlin crises in 1958 and 1961, both times when they felt themselves to have at least a psychological advantage over the West in the superpower balance. It may be recalled that, for several years after Sputnik I (1957), the Soviet Union was popularly regarded as being further advanced in long-range missile technology than was the United States. If the Soviet Union were to achieve superiority over the United States, or if America were to "decouple" its strategic forces from the conventional and tactical-nuclear forces in NATO, would not the Soviets be tempted to resolve the "German problem" on their own terms?
In 1967, German overall perceptions of the Soviet Union were not as dire as views of military trends might suggest. On the one hand, the Soviet Union was seen as a ruthless power, pursuing its world goals aggressively in contest with the United States and NATO; on the other hand, it was a limited superpower, ready to back down when it could not break through. The several crisis events over Germany, in addition to the Cuban Missile Crisis, were still fresh in German memory at the time of the June 1967 War. The Soviet-dominated Communist empire was crumbling and China had broken away; Rumania was obstreperous in the Communist camp; the Italian Communists were following an independent line; and the Soviets were facing difficulties in their attempt to convvoke a conference of the world's Communist parties to reestablish their authority. Economic difficulties were plaguing the entire Soviet Bloc. The supranational authority which Moscow needed to reestablish its control over the East Europeans in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was impossible to obtain. Although East European regimes (save the Yugoslav and Albanian) were professing loyalty to the Soviet Union; with the exception of the East Germans and the Bulgarians, this loyalty increasingly appeared in the guise of a loyal opposition rather than subservience. In Hungary, a "controlled" liberalization was developing political patterns in increasingly sharp contrast to those prevailing in the U.S.S.R., while in Czechoslovakia, intellectual ferment and ethnic cleavage between Czechs and Slovaks were making it increasingly difficult for the Soviet-styled regime of Antonin Novotny to rule effectively.

Khrushchev had been deposed, charged with a variety of sins in both domestic and foreign policy. But the new leadership troika of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny soon turned out to deal in the same sins, except more cautiously and with a somewhat different style. The Sino-Soviet dispute was just as acrimonious in 1967 as it was in 1964; the policy toward East and West Germany showed the same trend as it had under Khrushchev and the emphasis on East-West detente increased. The only area in the world where the Soviets seemed to be building influence was that occupied by the Arabs where Khrushchev had long pursued an aid policy which his successors
continued. Even the North Vietnamese and North Koreans were vacillating between the Soviets and the Chinese. And when the United States injected massive combat forces into South Vietnam, the Soviets did little more than send material aid to North Vietnam.

In other words, the Germans saw that the balance of power was shifting to the Soviet side in terms of nuclear megatons, but the Kremlin could do nothing with those megatons even to counteract the military actions of the United States against its own allies. The megatons gave the Soviet Union only one option -- massive retaliation against the United States at the risk of its own suicide. So, here, the observer is confronted with a paradox in perceptions: Germans perceived the United States to be weakening, as manifested by its increasing emphasis on flexible response; at the same time they perceived the Soviet Union to be inferior to the United States because it did not have such flexible options on a global scale. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union could muster superiority in nuclear and conventional armed forces against the Central Front in Europe, but it seemed to be losing the purpose for which it could possibly be willing to risk its own nuclear devastation by waging aggression against Western Europe.

Thus, at the time of the 1967 crisis in the Middle East, the Germans perceived the balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be in a state of flux considering deterrence, NATO's defense strategy, East-West relations, world Communism, and the Soviet Union's rule in Eastern Europe. As a result, their own views of the Soviet threat to their existence were in flux also. It was a time of prosperity in the West and economic hardship in the East -- an anti-Communist economic trend in German perceptions -- a time when concerns about security were mixed with confidence in security, and a time when the European allies felt that they could argue with the United States without jeopardizing the U.S. commitment to their security.
France's departure from NATO's military structure and expulsion of SACEUR from French soil in 1966 superimposed itself upon the strategic course of events in German thinking because the United States coped with it so well. According to German perceptions, NATO could do much better without France than France could do without NATO. France was going through an expansion of its national ego and needed pampering. Once the Belgians offered real estate for NATO lodging, the only thing left to do was to rewrite the arrangements whereby France could maintain its two divisions in Germany. In the Common Market, too, France was throwing temper tantrums (boycotting the Council of Ministers) which, if treated gingerly, would eventually pass. As long as the United States could put up with France's obstreperousness, Germany had little to worry about. America's stock in the German image rose as a result; that of the French declined even among the Francophiles in the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union. France had little to add to or detract from the balance of power between East and West; the United States made the crucial difference.

France's independent nuclear forces, on the other hand, were a potential source of long-range concern for Germany. In 1967, these were still bombers, but France was already well on its way to acquiring submarine-launched missiles and was constructing two batteries of IRBMs. Furthermore, the "Pluton," a 150-mile, nuclear-tipped missile was scheduled to enter service in the early 1970's. As independent forces, they had some minor deterrent value, but if France were ever to use them without prior coordination with NATO, they would play havoc with NATO's strategy. More disconcerting was the possibility that France might use them on German soil.

What has been said so far represents what might be called the "trend-line" in West German perceptions and how they were derived in 1967 at the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war. There were, of course, many deviations among optimists and pessimists, and many of the issues described here received little public attention.
It bears noting that most of the issues that conditioned German perceptions were seen in a future context. The balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union was perceived to be still decisively tipped toward the United States; but the balance was evolving toward parity. France's exit from NATO was a condition to which the Germans had already adjusted by 1967; but France's nuclear forces were a source of concern for the future. The withdrawal of 35,000 U.S. soldiers from Europe in 1967 did not create an immediate deficit in the balance of power; but was seen as a portent of a future trend, it caused Germans to worry. And while the unpopular war in Vietnam indicated the U.S. ability and will to honor its commitments to its allies at present, the domestic turmoil it created in the United States gave rise to concern about whether America could continue to honor its commitments in the future.

Thus, in 1967, the Germans felt secure for the present but were worried about the future. Indicators of U.S. policy in the recent were now looked upon as indicators of the changing balance of power, and Germans were concerned about what effect the crisis might have on the U.S. commitment to their security. This explains why, during the June 1967 War, the German press watched the policy behavior of the United States with almost as much attention as to the course of events in the Middle East.

Finally, as has already been noted, 1967 saw the beginning of a transformation in Germany's outlook on the postwar status quo -- the division of Germany into East and West, and the relinquishment of one third of prewar German territory to Poland. For the first time, the West Germans dignified the Soviet-dominated East German regime as the Government of the German Democratic Republic, and the SPD's leadership invited East German leaders to a dialogue. Two years later, the SPD ran for elections on a platform which advocated acquiescence in the postwar status quo and reconciliation with the East, thus removing a major irritant in East-West relations. The Christian Democrats agreed that there should be reconciliation
with the East, but were vehemently opposed to "signing away" German territory to the Communists for all time. The electorate gave neither Party an absolute majority; but the Free Democratic Party (FDP) received enough votes to make the difference in a coalition government, and it chose to side with the Social Democrats.

None of the rationale offered by the Social Democrats in justification of the Ostpolitik contained any direct allusions to the balance between the superpowers or to fears about a weakening U.S. commitment; therefore, it would be difficult to make a direct connection between the two. But the chronology suggests that the impending loss of U.S. superiority and its strategic implications were among the factors that finally prompted the Germans to make peace with the East.

D. CENTRAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUPERPOWER BALANCE AND OBJECTIVES IN THE CRISIS.

The outstanding dimension of German press perceptions of the war in the Middle East was that of a superpower conflict. A reading of the German press during this period conveys the impression that the Arabs and the Israelis were viewed as the pawns of their respective superpower patrons. It was almost as though these small-power adversaries were the roosters in a cock fight in which the superpowers were the real contenders placing bets against each other -- but with one difference: neither superpower would allow its rooster to lose, and, therefore, had to face the prospect of the ultimate, deadly test of strength. It was very much like the Cuban Missile Crisis revisited; only, in German eyes, the possibility of armed conflict between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. loomed much larger in 1967 than in 1962. "Over war and peace, the great powers will decide." read a headline in
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on May 25, 1967. An editorial on the same page gave the following interpretation:

The most reliable guarantee for peace in the Middle East will have to be seen in the situation of the two nuclear superpowers. They are in this area of the world both competitors and accomplices.

Bourguiba noted some years ago, that a war over Israel could not last more than five minutes, because then the two superpowers would have to intervene.5

Another editorial put it this way in a post-mortem of the war:

Now that the fire is under control ... the world powers will have to take stock of their mistakes, not only in the Middle East, but also in their general firefighting procedures. The slogan is "Detente". Of course, this will not rest on any objective scientific examination of the lessons for world peace. On both sides, hawks and doves have been prepared since the first hours of the crisis to use its [the crisis'] fortunes and developments as the battlefields for their own conflicts.6

The superpowers wielded tremendous influence in the Middle East, but they used that influence in conflict with each other. German press opinion put the blame squarely on Soviet shoulders because, up to the eruption of the armed conflict, the Egyptians had made all of the aggressive moves to the point of threatening Israel's lifeline. The United States got some credit for trying to dampen the crisis; and it was understood that, since the U.S. had little or no influence with the Arabs, it had to apply pressure through the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the German press, therefore, peace in the Middle East depended on an agreement between the superpowers.

However, although German opinion favored the United States in the crisis, the U.S. got few medals. For instance, it was implied that the
United States was not doing enough to help the Israelis or to prevent the war. Reports of U.S. peace efforts before the war came in the context of British efforts to solve the crisis; the United States was not only accused of lagging behind, but also of letting the British take all the chances and all of the blame if their efforts failed:

In other words, Johnson [is said to have] exploited Wilson's penchant for world politics skillfully and gleefully, to put him into the forefront, so that any failures of British initiatives, which have no chance without American backing, will be attributed to the originator [Britain], not to Washington.7

The United States alone had the power to defeat the Egyptian blockade; and it had made a commitment to do so in 1957. Yet, it was asking its allies to do their part in establishing the freedom of maritime passage through the Gulf of Aqaba in a joint declaration backed up by a joint fleet.

The opponents of intervention do not deny the moral duty of the U.S. vis-à-vis Israel. The opposition is confined to the demand that the United States not be faced with unilateral intervention again.8

The United States was not prepared to honor its commitment unilaterally in the Middle East -- it was already getting burned in Vietnam without allies. Though the impression was conveyed that the U.S. should be doing more to honor its commitment to Israel, it was understood that the war in Vietnam was a heavy burden, both materially and psychologically. On the material side, Helmut Schmidt, the Social Democratic Party Whip in Parliament, made a comment paraphrased by an Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung correspondent:

Schmidt spoke of the danger of the Soviet Union being able to show that the U.S. cannot meet its obligations in several parts of the world at the same time. Here, the world political balance is in question: should it shift against the United States, the Atlantic Alliance would be without substance. The crisis affects the Atlantic system.

Bonn is looking expectantly and at the same time confidently to the American President.9
On the psychological side, the onus of unilateral intervention, already incurred in Vietnam, was said to be a difficult pill for Americans to swallow.

German perceptions of Soviet inferiority vis-à-vis the United States were most clearly expressed in the political realm. The German view was that the Soviet Union was prodding the Arabs into this war in order to redress the balance of power in its own favor. The Soviets intended to put the United States at a political disadvantage so that the U.S. would have to compromise or yield its position in Southeast Asia or the Mediterranean, or both. In both areas the Soviet Union was uncomfortably weak.

For months it has been observable how, almost daily, the temptation grew for the Soviets to use the isolation of the United States in the Vietnam War for a political coup.10

So reported Die Welt, adding that Berlin and the Middle East were the only two obviously vulnerable points of the West that the Soviets could attack. Instigating a Berlin crisis was decided against because the old relationship of trust between the U.S. and Germany then would be restored and the fissures of NATO then would be repaired.

Der Spiegel backed up these contentions with specific "facts."

Observing that the Soviets could do nothing against U.S. air raids in North Vietnam except to protest, send aid over a 9,000 mile sea route, and suffer Chinese taunting of its helplessness, the magazine went on to say:

When Britain's Foreign Minister, George Brown, ... implored Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow to influence the Arabs toward moderation, the Russian countered: that is not possible -- because of Vietnam. ... And when ... the Security Council of the UN discussed the crisis, Soviet Delegate Fedorenko explained that one of the most important reasons for this crisis is the presence of Britain's and America's fleets in the Mediterranean -- those ships with which America has hitherto maintained the balance of power in the Middle East. In other words, in order to bring the Soviet Union to the conference table over the Gulf of Aqaba, America would have to put its presence in the Mediterranean up for negotiation. America would not think of it.11

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was more critical of the U.S. in this dilemma than any other German source surveyed:

IV-23
The bad conscience in Washington is amply justifiable: it has gradually withdrawn from the Middle East and, thereby, virtually taunted the adventurism of its world-political rival. Pointing to Vietnam does not mitigate this verdict; it reinforces this verdict. The burden of world power is heavy; but inescapable.  

As if to support this view with a more authoritative statement, the paper printed in the same issue some excerpts from Prime Minister Eshkol's statement to the press:

During the night of Thursday to Friday, the Israeli Prime Minister explained in Tel Aviv that the political war was still before Israel. During the time from May 15 to June 5, he said: 'First we were asked to wait two days. Then we sent Eban to the U.S. and were called upon to wait another 14 days. President Johnson promised great things. They told us that 40 to 50 naval powers would sign a guarantee concerning the free passage through the Strait of Tiran. We analyzed the situation and found that there were only a dozen -- finally only two countries -- and after that, perhaps, only one -- Israel. I said once to President Johnson that he will be busy with other things if we are attacked, and that the nature of the guarantee is very unclear.'

Because of this view that the Middle East was only the stage for a conflict between the superpowers and that the countries in crisis there were only the pawns in a much larger game, the German press consumer was advised that a hot war was very unlikely:

What has happened in the Middle East is a test of power -- fundamentally a test of power with the United States. One would assume for now that Moscow is only prepared to run a calculable risk; that it aims at only limited objectives.

When the war did break out, the German press still counted firmly on Soviet restraint:

There is hope that the Russians are not interested in an enlargement of this war, which would be inevitable if the U.S. were forced militarily to intervene on the side of Israel. There is some evidence that Moscow does not want a big war; rather it wants a long conflict which weakens...
the political position of the Americans and eventually induces Washington to make concessions in Vietnam. These, then, were what one might call the "central perceptions" reflected in the German press -- the red thread through the crisis that would hold together a variety of divergent strains of press opinion, to be classified below under several subheadings.

1. Perceptions of Military Power

German press attention to the military balance was somewhat lopsided, perhaps because the overall view of the superpower balance so clearly favored the United States. While the overall view could be called basically correct, in retrospective judgment, more specific views of the local U.S.-U.S.S.R. balance in the Mediterranean and of the Arab-Israeli military balance were probably wrong. All three dimensions interacted in German press opinion and came back full circle to the central question of the continuing validity of America's commitment -- to Europe.

When the German press looked at U.S. power in the Mediterranean, it engaged in a numbers count, which turned out to be fairly irrelevant to the situation, but invariably wound up with the comforting conclusion of U.S. military superiority in the area:

The carrier [Intrepid] sports 70 fighter bombers. Together with two, albeit smaller, [British] carriers, the Intrepid represents a reserve capability for intervention against which neither the Arabs nor the Soviets have any counterforce.

The fact that the Intrepid was on its way through the Suez Canal to take up station somewhere removed from the crisis scene (reported in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) was not noted in this article. But the view of U.S. military superiority was universal in the sources covered, even though Der Spiegel noted in passing a report to the U.S. President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that U.S. intervention in the Middle East would require partial mobilization, in view of the troops already committed to the Vietnam War.

"Superiority over whose forces?", one might ask. "Over the Soviets or the Arabs?" From the context of the articles, one can only
infer that it was local superiority over both. When the subject was Soviet warships passing through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, posing a threat to the naval balance, the U.S. aircraft carriers were said to be capable of dealing with any military problems the Soviets could pose. In the context of the Arab-Israeli war, the Sixth Fleet was said to have an adequate intervention capability. Not counting the Intrepid, there were two U.S. aircraft carriers and other ships in the Sixth Fleet, disposing 170 fighter bombers and 2,000 'well-trained' U.S. Marines, to give the U.S. military advantage in the area. No one compared U.S. air power with that of the Arabs, nor was the vulnerability of the U.S. carriers to Soviet torpedos or cruise missiles mentioned. No one questioned how much 2,000 U.S. Marines could add to the crack brigades of the Israeli Army. Only in one article, which did not deal directly with the superpower balance, was any mention made of the German Government's concern that, if the United States were to intervene in the war, it would have to make use of its bases in Germany -- and the German Government wanted no involvement in this crisis.19 Nuclear warheads, which were known to be available to the Sixth Fleet, were not mentioned; nor was there any analysis at all of how the United States might exercise military intervention on the Israeli side against Arabs who, presumably, could count on active Soviet help.

One is struck, therefore, with a German image of U.S. military power which was far out of proportion to actual U.S. capabilities in the area at the time. Had Arab forces measured up to German expectations (to win) at the beginning of the war, it is doubtful that the Sixth Fleet would have made a significant military difference to the Israelis -- unless the Fleet could have been reinforced in time or the U.S. had decided to use nuclear weapons. No articles examining the military balance ever alluded to the latter possibility, although commentary did highlight the risk of nuclear war.

What the Germans apparently perceived in the Sixth Fleet was the 'global' power of the United States. The symbolic power of the Fleet was much more important than the actual force it could bring to bear on the situation. The United States was showing the flag -- and the German press
came out to see that flag to draw the confidence and reassurance they needed for their own security. The symbolic value was above and beyond the military capabilities that the United States had in the area at the time.

German commentary about the strategic balance was notable by its absence during the crisis. However, fears were frequently expressed that, should the United States intervene on Israel's side, the result could be nuclear conflagration between the two superpowers:

An Egyptian attack on Israel would ... Inevitably lead to a military intervention by the United States, and pose a danger of a wider conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.20

The emphasis in the German press was on superpower behavior: neither wanted to risk a nuclear war; and therefore, neither side was anxious to commit itself to military intervention. In the absence of any more explicit statement about the strategic balance, one can only infer that Germans thought in terms of "parity"; America and the Soviet Union could destroy each other and had enough nuclear warheads left over to destroy the rest of the world. But neither had a nuclear superiority that could be used without committing suicide.

2. **Perceptions of Economic Power**

Looking back at the June War from the experience of the Yom Kippur War, one obviously wants to know what effect the Arab threat of an oil embargo had on West Germany. Reading the press, one finds very scant attention having been paid to the subject. On the day of the outbreak of the 1967 War, the stock market was reported to have taken a plunge in Frankfurt and London, only to recover with some gains two days later. Oil securities were obviously the most affected. Threats of an oil embargo made little front page news. The fact that West Germany was linked by Arabs to the "Zionists" and to Western imperialists siding with Israel was given some display.

But the Germans did not think in terms of an economic threat coming from the Middle East War. The Government issued an announcement that the oil supply was secure -- there was enough to withstand even a
total embargo for months -- hence, business went on as usual. Still in the midst of their "economic miracle," surveying a huge balance of payments surplus, Germans saw their economic security threatened mainly by the diminishing credibility of the U.S. security guarantee, as reflected by U.S. behavior in the crisis.

3. Perceptions of Political Will

If there was no doubt about U.S. military superiority, there were severe doubts about the U.S. will to bring its power to bear on the Middle East crisis. This turned out to be the focal point of German press opinion, overlapping concerns about "flexible response" expressed during the previous month. When the United States declared its neutrality "in thought, word, and deed," it sowed seeds of doubt on already fertile ground. *Die Welt* displayed considerable discomfort in response to this American declaration. Having voiced a pessimistic view of the U.S. commitment to Israel only two days before the outbreak of the war, the paper treated the U.S. declaration of neutrality as nonsense. On June 3, 1967, it expressed the following view:

The policies of the Western powers in this crisis show ... that ... that Israel can no longer count with certainty on their intervention for its security. The policies of the Soviet Union [on the other hand] lead to the conclusion that the Soviets will not only support an Arab attack on Israel, but might also ward off foreign intervention.21

But then the war broke out and the U.S. declared its neutrality, the same paper printed headline articles stressing that the United States had not spoken the last word on the subject:

It would be tantamount to U.S. capitulation as a world power if it allowed Israel to be defeated by Arab forces. Therefore, Foreign Secretary Rusk hastened to correct the misleading declaration of neutrality, which the State Department issued on Monday afternoon without consultation with the White House. ... The anti-war party which opposes the Vietnam policy of the President turns out to be the war party in the Near East crisis.22
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, on the other hand, took the American declaration of neutrality more seriously and critically:

An Israeli ... looks up and says painfully: 'I am very much afraid that President Johnson will be chicken.'

The chicken-game is a test of courage (no longer played among American youth). [An accurate description followed.]

Is the American Government chicken?

Cold silence descended upon the daily press conference of the State Department as the speaker, Robert McCloskey, read a well-formulated declaration on the just-erupted war in the Middle East: 'Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed.'

Neutrality in a conflict which could cost Israel its existence -- a country which can show at least as many American guarantee declarations as can the Federal German Government and West Berlin? Neutrality in a war [involving a nation] which is as close to the hearts of Americans, especially those on the eastern coast, if not closer than the German people are?

Can the strongest power of the world be neutral when a country is threatened with extinction -- a country to whose establishment as a state it was a Godfather and whose territorial integrity it guaranteed in so many declarations that even American officials were amazed when these guarantees were brought to their attention by the Israeli Foreign Minister during his visit to Washington?²³

Having been extremely critical of America's introduction of "flexible response" into NATO's strategy, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung could be expected to made a connection to U.S. behavior in the Middle East crisis: it drew some disturbing conclusions for the security of Western Europe:

The American engagement on behalf of Tel Aviv has so far exposed a position which is more than hesitant. America's hesitation can be explained. The superpower carries a responsibility for world peace. Nevertheless,
the American policy can cause anxiety among all the friends of the superpower -- less because the President in the White House has failed to demonstrate solidarity with Israel; more because declarations and reality in American strategy are not consistent. The American policy of maintaining peace departs from the thesis that the decisive means for preventing war in the atomic age is the management of the crisis situation. By crisis management, Americans mean the ability to control dangerous political situations in time so that the crisis does not escalate into a war.24

Crisis management is seen as a permanent obligation of the world power to prevent the crisis from breaking out. This may seem to some as pure theory. But it is a kernel of the current American strategy which is also employed for NATO: the great nuclear powers deter each other with nuclear weapons. Under this umbrella of terror, they control local crises. But in two cases the model did not work according to its promise: in Vietnam and the Middle East.25

The impression was conveyed that the United States would come to Israel's aid if that country were faced with defeat -- retrospectively and intuitively there was never any question about that. The disturbing question that cut to the core of West Germany's security at that time was "when" and "how" the U.S. would react to Soviet aggression in Europe. The German press looked to the Arab-Israeli War for answers, and got heartburn from the answers it found. At the outset of the war, Germans believed that the Arabs enjoyed military superiority, and there was no doubt that the Soviet Union would aid the Arabs readily, immediately, and sufficiently, if the United States intervened. "Moscow stands on Nasser's side without reservations, according to commentary in the [Soviet] Government paper," said an editorial in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on June 6, 1967.26

Note the contrast with views about the U.S.:

As is known in Moscow, there is little inclination in the United States, after the experience in the Vietnam conflict, to take its commitments regarding another crisis situation so literally that it would lead to isolated American engagement in another war.27
German anxieties were also betrayed by the sigh of relief the press breathed when it became evident that the Israelis were winning the war and the Soviets were showing that calling the halt was the better part of valor:

Informed circles [in Washington] admit that the rapid Israeli military success was the main reason for Soviet cooperation. Moscow evidently preferred to take its diplomatic losses rather than a continuation of the war...in which Egyptian loss of territory would increase from one hour to the next.28

Having passed the "cliff-hanger," the German press was inclined to be somewhat exuberant: "Suddenly the tables are turned: Federenko loses his sarcasm as he is confronted by a happy Goldberg," exulted Die Welt in a headline on June 8, 1967. The article went on to say, "The political victory tipped the scale of power so obviously to the U.S. side that Goldberg could afford to be magnanimous.29

With an evident feeling of relief, the reporter illustrated the dilemma from which the Israelis had just extricated the United States: on the one hand, the U.S. could not get involved in another war; on the other, it could not renege on its commitment to the territorial integrity of Israel.

E. AN INTERPRETATION -- A POST-MORTEM

In the aftermath of the war, the U.S. image in Germany suffered considerably from the press post-mortem of U.S. policy. Even Die Welt, which had been stressing its faith in the U.S. commitment, published an article entitled "Lessons for Europe,"30 in which the most pessimistic views were expressed. The gist was that the Soviets are still warmongers; they wanted the war in the Middle East. The tone implied that, therefore, the Soviets might one day again want to start a crisis in Europe. U.S. policy in this crisis was not at all confidence-inspiring. The United States had a clear public commitment to guarantee Israel's freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and to its territorial integrity. Yet,
it had been slow to react to the mining of the Gulf; it simply looked on as the Arabs attacked Israel. The Israelis had to rely on themselves. Granted that the U.S. commitment to NATO might be stronger than that to Israel, nevertheless the U.S. behavior left room for doubt about whether or when the United States would honor its commitment to Europe in a crisis. "The lessons from the Middle East are also valid for Europe -- there is no detente, and self-defense could possibly be the last resort," the article concluded.

But then, neither did the Soviets support the Arabs as expected. Once the Israelis turned the tide, the Soviets had no taste for intervention which would have been met with American opposition. To this extent, the U.S. commitment to Israel helped win the war; it could not keep the Arabs at bay; but it deterred the Soviets from intervening.

The Soviet Government, itself exposed to a lack of confidence in Southeast Asia, needs, after its disaster in the Middle East, a visible and elegant gain in prestige. In this, the General Assembly of the United Nations can be useful: Moscow is going to put up a 'big show.' Israel stands before a raging defamation storm. The General Assembly serves as the amplifier.

The usually well-informed and widely read news weekly, Der Spiegel, ended this subject on a more reassuring note. In mid-June, it reported that,

On 25 May, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban was in the United States and lifted from America the worry about having to launch a second front in the Middle East: within five days, the Israelis will be able to put down their enemies -- if only they are left alone. The Pentagon endorsed this five-day estimate. With this, the understanding between the Americans and Israelis was perfect: the former could declare their neutrality without betraying Israel in the eyes of American Jews; the latter were free to attack on 5 June. As a diversion, America announced its intention to break the blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba with an armed convoy.
In reality, America did not have to intervene at all; its neutrality did not violate its commitment to Israel.

In the end, America came out ahead. After all, as Germans saw it, the June War was first and foremost a contest between the United States and the Soviet Union in which the Arabs were willing pawns of the Soviets and the Israelis were allies of the United States who happened to be enemies of the Arabs at the same time. By implication, the Israelis, too, were proxies in this context.

Said Die Welt:

The test of strength between the two superpowers, which was visible from the beginning in the background of the Middle East crisis, shows the Americans as the victors. They won not only with the art of political maneuver, but through Israeli weapons. After the restraint shown by the Kremlin in a conflict potentially more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis, one should not be surprised if the attitude of the White House toward the Kremlin were to warm up again.34

With German editorial opinion thus divided, but so obviously wanting to believe in the American commitment to Western Europe's security, the following quotation from a commentary by one of the severest critics of U.S. policy in this crisis, written during a visit to Washington, may be regarded as a post-mortem which most Germans would have wanted to believe:

In Washington there is a great deal of understanding for the anxieties which have arisen in Europe over the evident failure of the technique of crisis management in a part of the world which was fundamentally assured of international commitments.

Nevertheless, it is said by officials in America, that the guarantee for NATO states, including the FRG, is unchanged and valid; and that the European countries who could not, unlike Israel, end a local conflict successfully with their own strength, should not give any second thoughts to the consequences of a similar crisis in Europe. This assertion must stand the test of an analysis of the events in the Middle East. Washington made no illusions about the possibility of war after Nasser's first steps.
On the American side, there are emphatic assurances that the United States would not have permitted the Arab states to destroy Israel, if the course of the war had been otherwise. Such retrospective assurance may sound academic. Nevertheless, the Americans hold firmly to the thesis that they and other interested powers ... did not have the time ... to organize intervention ... which would have assured the freedom of passage and the territorial inviolability of all nations in the Middle East.35

F. CONCLUSIONS

In the upshot, the United States came out of the Middle East crisis with mixed grades, according to German perceptions. It got an unqualified "A" for having maintained military superiority, both globally and regionally. For changing NATO's strategy from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response", it earned a highly qualified "C". In the subject of meeting its commitments to Israel during this crisis, the German press verdict was tantamount to a "D minus" -- having performed much below expected capabilities. At the same time, there was much understanding in the press for U.S. efforts to deescalate the crisis by keeping a "low profile" and keeping the Soviet Union at bay with its visible superiority in the Mediterranean. For that, the U.S. earned a "B plus" from German press opinion.

Germans do not average grades the way it is the vogue in the United States. They usually attribute bad grades to extraneous preoccupations, loss of memory, lack of vigor, or simple carelessness -- all of which can be corrected. But, for the U.S. to excel in the military balance did not, by itself, set German minds at rest. Having the superpower potential, the U.S. needed coaching badly, according to German press opinion. In Germany, the press would not have spoken so boldly just to worry German public opinion; it meant to convey messages to the United States.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER IV


2. Germans still remember, for instance, U.S. pressures which encouraged them to abandon a lucrative pipeline deal with the Soviet Union in 1964, only to see the British pick it up.


5. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


REFERENCES TO CHAPTER IV (CONTINUED)


CHAPTER V
A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will compare the results of the three country studies along with the results of content analysis and opinion data to arrive at conclusions about perceptions of the 1967 event itself, to develop a set of generalizations useful for other analyses of perceptions, and to assess the utility of alternative analytical methods.

B. CENTRAL PERCEPTIONS

Central perceptions of the 1967 War differed among the three countries. For the British, the event demonstrated the limits of their influence and emphasized the necessity of their association with Europe. For the French, the event demonstrated the inherent dangers of a bipolar world and that French influence was required to mediate those dangers. For the Germans, the event emphasized questions about the credibility of the U.S. commitment to their defense. In each country, the basic assumptions which underlay these central perceptions were evident in public debates during the period immediately prior to the war, i.e., the British application for EEC membership and reduction of international commitments, the Gaullist doctrine of independence from superpower domination and German concerns about the implications of "flexible response." In each country, evidence of the war was interpreted to reflect emerging government policy. In this respect, central perceptions of the war were far from being "lessons learned" from information about the war; rather, the most important perceptions might be considered "lessons taught" in which evidence of the war was interpreted to support the underlying rationale of then-current national policy.
Within the two countries which considered themselves parties to a settlement of the war, Britain and France, a set of central perceptions also related to the distinct differences between the two superpowers and states of lesser power. In Britain, the evidence of direct U.S.-Soviet negotiation of Middle East issues was interpreted as indicating the necessity to join with Europe to regain influence. In France, such evidence was taken as indicating the logical necessity for French involvement and influence in the Middle East.

C. EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON PERCEIVED POWER

Despite basic differences in central perceptions of the war, perceptions about U.S. and Soviet power were shared among the three countries. A consensus emerged that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union suffered from an inability to prevent the crisis from escalating to full-scale warfare. A like consensus emerged that U.S. power was enhanced by the stunning victory of the Israelis. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were perceived as essential participants in a cease-fire, but the Soviet Union was observed not to be able to achieve diplomatic objectives of its Arab clients in the U.N. The perceived power of the U.S.S.R., damaged by the military defeat of its clients and diplomatic defeat in the U.N. Security Council, was restored somewhat by the Soviet initiative in the U.N. General Assembly and by the Glassboro Summit Meeting. These changes in perceptions of power are evident within the case materials, but they are more clearly demonstrated by content analysis. As illustrated in Figure V-1 through V-3, the intensity of power evaluations in the three nations' newspapers declined for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union before the war. Just prior to hostilities, references to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both being essential to the prevention of war increased the intensity of power evaluations. Negative evaluations of Soviet power increase during the war itself and continued through the period of Security Council diplomacy; a positive trend in evaluations began the week prior to the General Assembly session and the Glassboro Summit Meeting.
Figure V-3. German Evaluations of Power May-July 1967
D. SPECIFIC PERCEPTIONS OF POWER

While it was observed that perceptions of power were frequently devoid of reference to specific instruments, a number related to specific concerns of security policy planners. Perceptions of conventional military power (both in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Europe), economic power, national commitment, and the strategic balance were potentially affected by the event.

1. Perceptions of Military Power

Locally, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the United States was perceived as superior to the Soviet Union by all three countries. References to the Sixth Fleet were numerous as were references to U.S. (and British) carriers and to embarked U.S. Marines. Likewise, the movement of ships to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron was noted in all three countries. The "Fleet" remained, however, a vague notion in terms of its specific capabilities to intervene in face of Soviet naval opposition. Nor was there a careful attempt to assess the importance of the submarine forces in the area. Perceptions focused on U.S. naval elements which could project power ashore. Perceptions of Soviet forces focused on their capability to escalate the crisis to global proportions.

In England, specifically, and in West Germany, by implication, the strategic mobility of U.S. forces during the crisis was generalized to denote a central difference between the military power of the United States and that of the Soviet Union. The inability of its forces to intervene militarily was perceived as an ultimate frustration of the Soviet Union's support for its Arab clients.

2. Perceptions of Economic Power

The embargo placed on oil deliveries to Western Europe during the 1967 War was not perceived to be the threat it had been in 1956; stocks were high and sufficient reserves appeared available through the U.S. Moreover, France was exempted from the embargo. The availability of U.S. production, thus, notably relieved perceptions of an economic threat.
In addition, British perceptions of Arab dependence on European oil markets and of Cairo's dependence on Suez Canal revenues caused an underestimation of their economic vulnerability. Closure of the Canal, and resulting increased oil prices contributed to a series of events which eventuated in devaluation of the pound and the fall of the Labor Government. U.S. economic collaboration during the crisis may have obscured a clear perception of economic pitfalls.

3. Perceptions of Commitment

A crisis in commitment was a dominant theme of German commentary on U.S. behavior during the war. Concerns about the implications of "flexible response" which arose during the period immediately preceding the war were exacerbated by the U.S. declaration of noninvolvement. While the perception that Israeli success left U.S. commitments untested was apparent in all three countries, conditions under which the U.S. would intervene were central to German commentary. The war served to raise the perception that West Germany, like Israel, might ultimately have to defend itself. Although the perception was not universally the same, it seemed widely acknowledged as an alternate interpretation of events.

Within all three countries, the U.S.S.R. was perceived to have failed in its extravagant military and diplomatic commitments to the Arabs. Militarily it was perceived to be incapable of intervening in face of local U.S. naval superiority; its support of Arab diplomatic demands likewise proved impossible in the face of Israeli battlefield victories. Ironically, commitments to Arab support which enhanced perceived power prior to the war proved to detract from perceived power when they proved neither to control provocative Arab behavior nor to reduce Arab claims for diplomatic impossibilities.

4. Perceptions of the Strategic Power

The strategic capabilities of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were perceived as forces which mutually deterred the two nations, which limited the extent of the conflict and which compelled a degree of mutually cooperative behavior during the crisis. Nevertheless, a
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strategic stand-off was perceived by some Germans and by the French Government as a causative factor in the crisis; client states were more able to provoke crisis. In France, the event was interpreted to validate the necessity of a revised world order which would mitigate the dangers of bipolarity.

The crisis was more frequently perceived to have been affected by, rather than affecting, the strategic balance. Nevertheless, the British perceived U.S. and Soviet behavior during the crisis as presaging cooperative efforts which would speed agreements on non-proliferation and other arms limitation agreements.

The important perception that appeared implicit throughout the crisis was that there was a strategic balance -- the phrase used to designate equal weights rather than net difference. There appear to have been no discussions of differential capabilities, of discrepancies in nuclear damage, or of differences in inventories which related to the crisis. In none of the three countries did evident perceptions of nuclear weapons affecting crisis behavior involve an advantage for either side. Within the crisis context, the two sides effectively had achieved a perceived parity.

Perceptions of the war appear not to have been applied to assessments of the conventional military balance in Europe. "Lessons learned" which might apply to the NATO force structure did not develop clearly within six months of the war; apparently perceptions relating to European issues awaited those issues becoming "news" in their own right.

E. THE ATTRIBUTES OF POWER

In all three countries, phrases denoting states as "super powers" were in common usage; the phrase was used by the English, in French it was les supers grandes and in German it was supermacht or weltmacht. It was thus a common perception that the power of the U.S. and of the U.S.S.R. distinguished them in some way from lesser states. Although power was occasionally modified by the adjectives "military," "political," "economic,"
or "moral," usage of the word generally was devoid of reference to specific instruments. Instead there were vague references to "influence," "pressures," "dependence," and "advantages" seldom associated with specific capabilities or assets. The exceptional cases in which U.S. or Soviet power was associated with specific attributes related to the naval forces, military assistance, economic assistance, export markets, U.N. votes, and, in one instance, control of Soviet Jewry. More frequently, power remained undefined in specific terms as if it were a physical commodity in its own right.

The general lack of specific attributes associated with the word power is complicated by the variety of words which connote a power relationship. Tables B-1 and B-2 (in Appendix B) reveal the variety of phrases which implied evaluations of power in data collected for content analysis. Although the evaluative assertion technique is intended to extract connotation from "common meaning" material, application of the method reveals the variety of phrases which clearly imply a power relationship.

F. THE FORMULATION AND COMMUNICATION OF PERCEPTIONS

Perceptions may be formulated among all levels of society ranging from the individual to the international community. To discuss the formation of perceptions at the level of the nation, the level of analysis chosen for this research, one must examine the roles of the press, of government and of groups which compose a public attentive to specific issues. Formation of "national" perceptions is theorized to take place as a five stage process:

1. The media report an event
2. "Opinion makers" assert their interpretations
3. These interpretations are reported by the media
4. "Opinion leaders" receive interpretations and pass their own opinions to the general public
5. Lasting perceptions are formed and sustained within primary groups, especially among those attentive to specific issues.
The case studies enrich our understanding of this process, especially as they pertain to the roles of government and the media as "opinion makers." Both government and the media are sources of information about an event. Both rely frequently on foreign governments as sources of information. Both serve to inform, and are informed by, each other. The cases reveal that the opinion-making role in relation to international events can be dominated by government. In Britain, during initial stages of the crisis, the government dominated media attention by diplomatic activity, public pronouncements, and occasional naval movements, all focused on the Gulf of Aqaba issue. Broader issues were not raised except by foreign governments, notably the U.S. and France. In France, interpretations of the event were dominated by "Le General" and his spokesman, the Minister of Information, M. Gorce. Perceptions of the event did not stray far from the Gaullist line. In Germany, the government remained conspicuously uninvolved in diplomatic activity and the primary role of "opinion-maker" devolved to the press. The German case facilitates a possible generalization that the national government dominates perceptions when it is an active party in some aspect of the event.

Within the media, it is theorized that a series of "gatekeepers" are arranged as links in a chain that reaches from the initial news-gatherers through wire service editors, through news desks, and through editors of the final product. At each link, a gatekeeper acts to include or exclude information about an event. The case studies, combined with by-lined data documented for the content analysis, reveal that evaluative comment about an event is frequently presented intact in the media -- at least within the "prestige papers" of Western Europe relied upon in this research. Thus, other than a major gatekeeping role that might be ascribed to government, the foreign correspondent appears to be at the principal gate in the news chain. The foreign correspondent, however, is not a free agent. The cases reflect that the censorship of newsworthy material from Arab nations served to obscure clear perceptions of their interests. By contrast, accurate, and timely information from the Israeli Government facilitated perceptions favorable to their cause.
One of the "lowlights" of the present research was the inability to associate a variety of alternate perceptions to groups outside government or the media. It had been anticipated that words, concepts, or themes indicating a perception might be traced from one source to another over a period of time. Several of these traces might display a propagation pattern which would allow an analyst to identify "perception leaders" within the community of persons attentive to international affairs. But two peculiarities of the present research may have interfered with the ability to identify such "perception leaders." First, the 1967 event may have been too short and too intense to allow perception to come from sources other than government or the media. Second, perception sources may not be revealed by the open-source data used in this research.

Nevertheless, it may be speculated that such a subcommunity of perception leaders exists and that patterns of perception propagation may be traceable over a longer period of time.

G. THE SPEED OF PERCEPTION FORMATION

Having acknowledged an inability to identify sources of perceptions outside the media or government, it is appropriate to observe the efficiency and speed with which the combined resources of the two predominant institutions of interpretation formulate and disseminate perceptions of an event. The pace of developments in the Middle East crisis of 1967 precluded the analysis of long-term trends and less sensational aspects of the event; developments encouraged instant analysis. In the British case, it was observed that a cycle of simultaneous correspondent and government report and comment, Cabinet interpretation, Parliamentary debate, and press reflection could operate in the space of two days. While such reactions may be peculiar to British institutions, reference to the content analysis displays (Figures V-1 through V-3 above) indicates similar oscillations in all three countries. France, however, lagged behind both Britain and Germany -- a phenomenon that might be attributed to a dependence of press commentary on centralized Gaullist
authority. An alternative explanation of the French lag, might be that the rapidity of perception formation might have been a function of the degree of consensus attached to an issue. The French Government's statement of 2 June elicited commentary indicating divisions which may have prevailed throughout the crisis period. The comparative lag noted in content analysis of French data might be symptomatic of popular disagreement with government interpretations and policy. The contrasting case is Germany where the media played a predominant role relatively unencumbered by alternate interpretations of the government.

H. COMPARISON OF METHODOLOGIES

A primary objective of this research was to explore, in a pilot case, the value of alternative methodological approaches to the study of perceptions. In this section implications of the experience of using two methods, the case study and content analysis, are discussed along with possible contributions of opinion data.

1. The Case Study

Case study methods, as employed here, offer the potential for probing basic assumptions which determine the perceptions of events. If it is true, as the literature concerning cognition suggests, that assumptions or schemata are antecedent to events, intuitive methods which take advantage of an individual analyst's understanding of social, political, and individual behavior in a foreign culture are sources of explanation and, frequently prediction of "national" perceptions. Such intuitive methods are of clear value in describing a perceptual process that inherently relies on concept formation.

The drawback of the case study is that it is unreliable; no two analysts produce equivalent results. The evidence of different styles and approaches are evident in the preceding cases despite common outlines and common research plans used to structure this project. While individual case studies raise issues and hypotheses they do not prove them. One alternative is a series of cases, which builds experience...
and by recurring observations lends confidence to the generalizability of results. Another alternative is to employ alternate, more reliable, methods to check principal observations.

2. Content Analysis

Content analysis as employed within this study proved a useful check of the reliability of observations made within country case studies. It also proved to be a useful tool for quantifying a variable which described the principal focus of research concern the evaluation of power. Not only did it describe the variable, it allow the analyst to return to base data to tie the aggregate data to specific events by a stronger degree of association than mere correlation.

One of the principal objections to content analysis relates the labor cost involved. The cost need not be prohibitive if a research design includes austere collection rules as well as structures sampling, and forces a sharp focus. A content analysis technique merely forces the analyst to be thorough and uniform in sampling data that must be reviewed in the course of a case study. Given the collection rules used herein, approximately three person-weeks per country analysis were devoted to data collection for purposes of content analysis. But the benefit returned to the case studies was significant, as a perusal of chapter references will reveal.

One of the principal limitations of the evaluative assertion analysis method is the peculiarity of an ordinal scale tied to each country. While the scaling technique allows within-country comparisons, it provides a shaky foundation for any between-country comparison other than those inferred by correlation.

3. A Synthesis Method

The experience of this research indicate that case study benefits significantly from the additional effort involved in a simplified content analysis which addresses principal research concerns. The benefits are measured in terms of increased confidence in conclusions, increased confidence in case data, and in increased descriptive power. In research
directed at uncovering perceptions, however, content analysis without the inductive imagination of a well-trained area analyst is of little value in deriving generalizations which have explanatory or predictive value. It is suggested that the economics of declining marginal utility prevail in the selecting of analytical methods. After a certain point expenditure of additional effort on one technique is of less value than the same effort on a different technique. The optimum mix, then, would be one, which for a fixed level of total effort achieves an equal marginal utility for each method employed. Should such an economic model of analytical utility be true, a methodology which synthesizes case and content analysis techniques is recommended.

4. **Opinion Data**

Specific perceptions about power are occasionally measured by public opinion polls. Figure V-4 presents the long-term trends of mass opinion related specifically to military power. While the data demonstrate an interesting, but unproven, relationship to events of the twelve-year period from 1958 to 1970, they do not reflect any impact of the 1967 War. The reason is simply that the question was not asked between 1965 and 1968. Nevertheless, the data are useful to between-country comparisons and provide a basis for assessing the validity of analytical techniques. The data tend to confirm the implication of the assertion analysis (from an average evaluation over the nine weeks) that Germans tend to perceive the U.S. as more powerful than the U.S.S.R., that France tends to perceive the two powers as more or less equal, and that Britain, of the three countries, is most inclined to see the U.S. as less powerful than the Soviet Union. The opinion data, however, demonstrate relationships among the three countries' perceptions of the power balance, at least in its military component, to be relatively consistent over the twelve-year period. As an analytical method, polling techniques represent a powerful tool which demonstrates a high degree of validity in measuring perceptions among the mass public. Polling data on associated questions serve to confirm other quantitative data. Such data are expensive to obtain, however, and they lend themselves to retrospective research.
"ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, WHICH COUNTRY DO YOU THINK IS AHEAD IN TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH AT THE PRESENT TIME—THE UNITED STATES OR THE U.S.S.R."

Figure V-4. Public Opinion of U.S. and Soviet Military Power

SOURCE: UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, OFFICE OF MEDIA RESEARCH
I. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Five paths of future research are indicated by the above discussions of the merits and limitations of methods explored in this pilot study. First, the 1967 war produced information which related to a wide array of power instruments. A contrasting event needs to be explored which would focus more specifically on perceived military power. The research would be directed to the phenomenon revealed in Figure V-4 and explain the dramatic increase in the perceived military power of the U.S. that occurred in late 1968 or 1969. The research would involve a study of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis and other possible opinions shaping events. Second, a case study of the 1973 "Yom Kippur" War, would provide information above how "lessons learned" from one event affect perceptions of a later event. Thirdly, an activity of long duration needs to be examined to detail how perceptions are propagated among opinion leaders. Such research would incorporate features of a case study, but would identify the community of persons active in the formation of specific concepts. The intention of the study would be to clarify patterns of communication which would facilitate prediction of emerging perceptions. Moreover, studies which identify the community of persons influential in forming opinions of technological issues are recommended. Fourthly, the opportunities for systematic application of opinion data to defense issues need to be explored. Finally, techniques evolved in this research need to be applied to contemporary perceptions of power.

J. SUMMARY CONCLUSION

The experience of this pilot research project indicates that a combination of case study, content analysis, and opinion polling methods offer numerous insights relevant to the explanation and prediction of how perceptions of U.S. and Soviet power are affected by international events.
APPENDIX A
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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A. INTRODUCTION

This annotated bibliography addresses the process of perception as it has been observed in individuals, in communications media, in the institutions of government, and in international relations. Particular attention has been directed toward research which has tested specific hypotheses derived from a larger body of theory and to studies based on foreign populations. Before turning to individual abstracts, however, it would be useful to summarize briefly and informally those aspects of the literature which were found to be most useful to an understanding of the relationship between international events and perceptions.

B. PERCEPTION IN THE INDIVIDUAL

Perception is a process through which cues about the environment are translated into something meaningful to the individual. The following illustrations demonstrate the process as it applies to visual cues.

![Kopferman Cubes](image)

Figure A-1. Kopferman Cubes

To most observers, these two-dimensional drawings frequently appear in three dimensions. The two drawings on the left appear as cubes more frequently because of the greater number of cues they provide, but all four drawings appear in different orientations. The different images these drawings present rely as much on what is already in the mind of the perceiver as on the cues perceived.
An early tradition in the literature was to rely on the language of visual perception to distinguish "perception," the process, from "image," the outcome of the process. "Cognition" was another term used to describe the entire complex of issues which related perception to systems of beliefs, attitudes and values. In the mid-1960's, however, the term "image" fell into disuse. In the theoretical literature, more abstract concepts were wanted. In the applied literature, social scientists disassociated themselves from the language of advertising, and government writers avoided Congressional criticism of the role of "national images" (understood as "popularity overseas") in Kennedy Administration foreign policy. For the present, we want to avoid more esoteric terms and to sidestep political argument. Thus the word "perceiving" is used to denote the process and "perception" is used to designate the outcome of the process.

Since 1957, a focus for explanations of perceptions related to the social environment has been the theory of cognitive dissonance elaborated by Leon Festinger. In essence, the theory asserted that information is selected and interpreted to support a previous decision. During more recent years, the theory has been generalized to describe a consistency or balance within a system of beliefs. Perceptions (whether related to specific decisions or not) which contradict the system cause "dissonance" which is, in degrees, painful and is avoided.

Many of the findings of social psychology which relate to the broader approach have been summarized by Robert Axelrod in a model of the cognitive process he calls "schema theory." A diagram of Axelrod's model is presented in Figure A-2. It has been modified slightly to relate to events and to generalize the vocabulary. In particular, the figure defines "perception" to include Axelrod's schemata.

Besides a useful synthesis of research findings, Axelrod focuses attention on the accessibility and selection of "schemata"—defined as pre-existing assumptions about the way the world is organized. It is asserted that the selection of a particular schema is characterized by
"satisficing" behavior; that is schemata are sorted through until an "acceptable" fit is found. The process does not optimize the fit between information and potentially available schemata. A satisficing subroutine is represented in the lower right of Figure A-2.

In all, the findings of social psychology serve to explain that perceiving is a process of information selection and distortion in the interpretation of international events. Moreover, similar processes to that found in individuals can be found in institutions of the mass media.

C. PERCEPTION IN THE MASS MEDIA

The effect of individual perceptions on news has been described as a "gatekeeper" process wherein an individual acts to exclude or include information about events. The literature of communications, however, acknowledges that there are numerous "gatekeepers" arranged as links in a chain that reaches from the initial newsgatherer through wireservice editors, through news desks through editors of the final product. Each link is subject to the selection and distortion effects of individual perception, but is also bound by certain imperatives related to the medium involved. For daily newspapers, the frequency of their publication demands that stories rely on short phenomena which usually exclude reportage of long-term positive trends and of less sensational events. Further, a need to make vague events meaningful leads to simplified interpretation of the short-term data available. Newspapers have been found to rely on personification, elite focus, a bias toward the culturally familiar, and a negative perspective in determining what is news (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). Nevertheless, newspapers, particularly the so-called "prestige papers," are thought to be fair reflections of the prevailing attitudes of national elites. According to Pool (1952):

In each major power one newspaper stands out as an organ of elite opinion. Usually semiofficial, always intimate with the government, these "prestige papers" are read by public officials, journalists, scholars, and business leaders. They seldom have large circulations,
yet they have enormous influence. They are read not only in their own countries, but also abroad by those whose business it is to keep track of world affairs. They differ among themselves, but, despite national and temporal differences, they are a distinct species. It is generally possible to name with fair confidence one paper in any given country which plays the role of prestige paper at any given time.

This of itself, is a curious fact. There is no inherent reason why such a paper should exist. That it does is a tribute to the role of public opinion in modern culture. The elite has everywhere found it important to make full and responsible statements of policy available to wide circles, both of its own members and others.

Whose policy it is that has thus been stated is a fairly good index of who wields power.

D. PERCEPTION AND MASS OPINION

Public opinion polls present an impressive body of data relevant to perception in international affairs. Although one is careful to identify such polls as specialized manifestations of attitudes and not as the underlying attitudes themselves, the data are useful for comparative purposes and for measurement of relative change. Opinion polls demonstrate that official policy in international relations is generally supported by the plurality of opinion and that events have relatively minor effects. While cycles observed in attitudes toward the Soviet Union, for example, can be keyed to major events such as the 1948 overthrow of Czechoslovakia and the Korean war (Richman, 1972), measures of absolute change rarely demonstrate shifts of 15 percent or more (Deutsch and Merritt, 1965). Long-run trends of a societal and cultural nature appear to have an effect which dominates events or shifts in government and media policies.

The transmission of perceptions in the mass public has been described as a four-stage process wherein:

1. The media report an event,
2. "Opinion makers" assert their interpretations,
Most important, however, is the role of face-to-face, primary groups in the formation and sustenance of perceptions. A striking analogy is to the decisions of a community of doctors in prescribing a new drug. Prescriptions followed the sociometry of the professional community and seemed relatively unaffected by advertisements or reports of specialized media. Analogous patterns have been observed in voter behavior and in consumer decisions (Katz, 1957).

E. PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY BEHAVIOR

Recent political science has emphasized alternatives to viewing international relations as a series of rational acts performed by unitary nation-actors. Alternative views emphasize the role of organizational processes and of bureaucratic politics in policy formation. (Steinbruner, 1974; Allison, 1969.) Both approaches illustrate how foreign policy is affected by institutional or personal perspectives rather than an analytical optimization of clear objectives. Both approaches, however, come down to the effects of individual perceptions on policy.

A concrete demonstration of the effect of perceptions on policy, however, lies in simulation of the roles of advisors (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973). In response to a realistic scenario, three foreign affairs analysts acting as "advisor to the President" produced fundamentally different policy proposals. Recommendations were found to be related to the complexity and focus of their cognitive behavior. Analysis of John Foster Dulles' interpretation of Soviet behavior revealed a remarkable consistency in face of potentially conflicting evidence and illustrated an association in Dulles' perceptions between conciliation and weakness and between aggressive behavior and relative strength (Holsti, 1962). Analyses of crisis behavior during the origins of World War I and the
Cuban crisis illustrate how perceptions of one's own and of the enemy's options and time constraints affected the outcome of the crises. Misperceptions seemed to characterize the earlier tragic event while more salutary results were obtained when the effects of behavior on perceptions were accounted for in policy formulation (Holsti, Brody and North, 1965).

F. PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

The process of perception takes place as the result of the selection, amplification, aggregation, and simplification of information about a complex world. It works to organize and maintain order in an overwhelming amount of detail about an individual's environment. In response to international events, a chain of perceptual modification occurs to amend information about an event before it is perceived by a number of persons who themselves are influenced by institutional and personal "preconceptions." Initially, the process may work its way in a matter of days, but residual influence of an event is supported and sustained by consensus developed in primary groups. Even then, such perceptions change to maintain a consistency with new information, new perceptions, and new priorities among the entirety of cognitive elements.
APPENDIX A
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
SECTION 2-ABSTRACTS

Abstracts of related research have been assembled in reverse chronological order in the pages that follow. More recent and presumably better documented studies will be found first. A bibliography follows which allows the reader to cross reference dates.

A. PURPOSE

To present an alternate paradigm for explaining complex decision-making processes.

B. BACKGROUND

Conditions for a major challenge to the established paradigm of rational decision are present. Such a challenge is occasioned by increasing concern with complex decision problems and with government performance. John Steinbruner advances the "cybernetic theory" drawing from the fields of mathematical logic, computer design and cognitive theory.

The cybernetic paradigm holds that decision makers control uncertainty and do not attempt to calculate outcomes. They monitor feedback variables and discover the effects of their actions only as they register on the feedback variables. The learning process is not casual, but instrumental—over time the programs and standard operating procedures that persist are the successful ones, others drop out. In a collective decision situation, decisions are broken into small segments and treated sequentially.

The cognitive theory supplements the cybernetic paradigm by providing an exploration of how structures are set up within which cybernetic mechanisms can operate. Uncertainty is not resolved in most instances by probabilistic calculations of alternative outcomes (analytic paradigm), but rather it is done categorically under a single governing set of beliefs. Under uncertainty, the mind severs lateral relationships between separate values and sets up separate decision problems, each governed by a single value or set of values hierarchically arranged.
Three thought patterns emerge in organizational decision process:

1. **Grooved thinking** is the simple cybernetic process above:
2. **Uncommitted thinking** occurs when the decision maker adopts generalized concepts which are usually reinforced socially and oscillates between competing belief patterns (generally observed as the behavior of Presidents); and,
3. **Theoretical thinking** where the decision maker adopts very abstract and extensive belief patterns which are consistent and stable over time and to which he is generally committed.

C. **Method**

Applying the cybernetic model in a case study of the politics of nuclear sharing 1956-64.

D. **Findings**

The study has articulated conflicting frameworks of assumptions (analytic vs. cognitive and cybernetic) and provides an example of how they can be used to unravel complex problems.

While a general integration of the separate paradigms might be possible in the future, it is best at present to focus on the divergent hypotheses they generate and to observe which one seems to best describe actual events.

A. PURPOSE

To understand the identification of and response to international events by foreign policy decision makers, by explanation of cognitive dynamics and by ultimately developing a computer simulation of the decision process.

B. BACKGROUND

The article is based on three social-psychological perspectives:

1. Cognitive complexity versus simplicity. Complexity is reflected in the scope of a decision-maker's explanation of the international political environment. It has been related to the accuracy of prediction and to a widened range of policy behaviors.

2. The deductive structure of decision making. This reflects an internally consistent set of beliefs which serve to explain an event and to array evaluations of possible outcomes.

3. Use of analogies. Past experience is frequently used to resolve uncertainty and to structure beliefs.

C. METHOD

A crisis game involving three participants was administered to simulate decision behavior. The simulation involved reading a scenario, requesting information and "advising" the President.

D. FINDINGS

Detailed analysis of game transactions upheld the above three propositions about the relevance of beliefs to decisions. Further, the authors derived a 4-stage model of decision behavior:

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(1) **Amplification of beliefs.** Evidence of an event activates concepts of the decision-maker's belief system.

(2) **Search for explanation.** The decision-maker seeks to connect amplified concepts in a logical pattern. Usually this stage imputes intention or motivation to actors in an event. The authors use "Digraph" theory to describe the search process. In the absence of firm beliefs the decision-maker tends to rely on previous experience.

(3) **Search for an acceptable course of action.** The search is limited to alternative outcomes implied by the decision-maker's explanation of the situation. Historical experience is used to adduce acceptable alternatives.

(4) **Choice of policy option.** Choice can be represented by a procedure in which the most important foreign policy is first examined to see how alternative outcomes might affect the objective. Objectives are addressed in order of importance until an objective is reached which distinguishes one alternative as better than the other.

The authors find that basic elements of this decision process are amenable to simulation by computer.
A. PURPOSE

To integrate a variety of psychological research findings into an organized framework; to provide insights into how people cope with complex environments; and to offer an information processing model of perception and cognition.

B. SUMMARY

A schema is defined informally as a "pre-existing assumption about the way the world is organized." Having further defined schema as a subset of all possible specifications (undefined) of a case (undefined) the author presents a flow diagram of cognition. The diagram best summarizes the theory as shown in Figure A-3, below:

**Figure A-3. Schema Theory Flow Diagram**
Having summarized the overall model, Axelrod outlines each of its processes and cites supporting research. Predictive properties of the model are demonstrated and it is compared with other theoretical approaches. Additionally, the article develops concepts for evaluating the accessibility of alternate schemata and the fit between schema and specifications of the case.

C. MTHCD

Theoretical narrative supported by review of the literature of cognition and international relations.

D. FINDINGS

The author suggests that schema theory offers a framework for analysis of conceptual models, of belief systems, of the use of historical experience, and of intelligence operations.

A. PURPOSE

To examine relationships between conflict events, mass opinion and official foreign policy attitudes.

B. SUMMARY

The study examines data relevant to hypotheses about the flow of influence within the American political system. Specifically, is there a congruence between mass opinion and the opinion of a foreign policy elite which can be explained by common reaction to events? The study deals with attitudes toward and events involving the Soviet Union over a ten-year period in order to generalize observations frequently noted on a case-by-case basis.

C. METHOD

The following data were assembled to represent the phenomena in question:

1. Elite attitudes -- an annual index of attitudes expressed in The State Department Bulletin derived by content analysis of favorable, unfavorable and neutral themes.

2. Mass opinion -- an index based on 20 questions about expectation of war, estimates of the Soviet threat, and willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union. The question had been represented in opinion polls between 1955-1964. A linear regression was used to account for question variations and periodicity in aggregating the data.
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(3) Conflict Behavior -- A weighted index for both U.S. and Soviet behavior derived from 21 kinds of official acts documented in Facts on File. Three basic types of behavior were distinguished:
(a) written oral communication,
(b) negative behavior, and
(c) warning or defensive acts.
Incidents within each type were accorded weights of 1, 2, or 3 as in the above order.
The three basic indices were compared using Spearman rank correlation procedures. Lagged relations were tested.

D. FINDINGS

There is a congruence between mass opinion and official foreign policy attitudes during normal as well as crisis periods. Mass opinion regarding the Soviet Union is not at all correlated with conflictual events and official pronouncements are only weakly correlated. The data in fact suggest that a year of comparatively high Soviet conflict behavior is paralleled by a comparatively favorable American mass opinion. Although analysis of time lagged relationships indicated that elite attitudes may lead mass attitudes by a year, tests were not statistically significant.

E. GENERALIZATIONS

Ms. Peterson suggests that the U.S.S.R. and the United States respond to conflict behavior in kind, but that other factors influence American elite foreign policy evaluations. Mass opinion then adopts an evaluation similar to that of the elite.

F. COMMENT

Findings of the study rely on acceptance of Ms. Peterson's definition of events in terms of conflict behavior and of her weighting scheme which accord the expulsion of an attache one-half the significance of an armed incident. Correlations with cooperative behavior or alternative weighting schemes were not reported.
A. PURPOSE

To examine some of the effects of educational level on American attitudes about foreign affairs.

B. BACKGROUND

The relationship between educational level and foreign affairs has been characterized by a positive correlation with interest, information, complexity of opinion, opinion fluctuation, and reduced ambiguity.

C. METHOD

Analysis of 71 trend questions asked between 1942 and 1965 in the opinion polls of the American Institute of Public Opinion and the National Opinion Research Center. Data were classified by educational level (college, high school, grade school) for 45 of the questions. References were aggregated in general trends for each question which related to favorableness of attitudes toward the Soviet Union, attention to world affairs, information about foreign affairs, expectations about Soviet-U.S. relations and respect for Soviet capabilities. Each question series was fitted to a least-squares line to study opinion trends and to control trend effects. Raw data were converted to percentage deviations from trend. The procedure allowed both short-term fluctuation and long-term changes in trend slopes to be studied.
D. FINDINGS

The study finds a "definite periodicity for favorable attitudes toward the Soviet Union and expectations about Soviet-U.S. relations." Low points in these trends correspond to the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia (1948) and the Chinese Communist counteroffensive in Korea (1950). Ambiguity seemed to be an alternative to expressed hostility, although previous findings of college-level respondents were less ambiguous. Variability of opinion, as measured by standard error of estimates from individual trend lines, was greater for the college subgroup, but not statistically significant. Richman suggests that, in part, "variability" should be interpreted as responsiveness to changes in the international environment. Major changes in opinion occurred at the death of Stalin (1953) and the purge of Khrushchev (1964).

E. GENERALIZATION

Richman speculates that:

"within a week or two of major events...some degree of consensus or standardization of news and interpretations deriving from our mass media and opinion-makers can be expected to permeate American society."

A. PURPOSE

To demonstrate the advantages of analyzing foreign policy decision from three major frames of reference.

B. BACKGROUND

Although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, there is evidence that it should be supplemented by frames of reference that focus on the organizations and the political actors involved in the decision process. Three frames of reference are advanced:

1. **Model I: Rational Actor**, views the governments involved as outsized humans with rational calculations of national interests determining their behavior.

2. **Model II: Organizational Process**, focuses on the independent operations and goals of the existing organizations involved in the decision process. The outputs of these organizations generally are standardized and slow in time of crises because they are based on routines to handle day-to-day operations. This process therefore is not necessarily rational. According to Model II the U.S. chose to blockade Cuba because of confused intelligence provided by competing CIA and Air Force organizations and because of disagreement between civilians and military leaders about the effectiveness of a "massive" versus a "surgical" strike against Cuba. The Soviets chose to withdraw due to their own internal problems of communication and coordination just as Kennedy was beginning to waiver.

3. **Model III: Governmental Politics**, describes the bargaining games played by top leaders based on their unequal power positions in
government circles. Accordingly, foreign policy decisions are the result of decentralized coordination (shared power) of the various pressures emanating from representatives of interest groups both inside and outside government. Based on this model, Allison speculates that the Soviet Union placed the missiles in Cuba not so much to affect the balance of power, but more as a result of pulling and hauling among select members in the Soviet Presidium. Kennedy, on his part, was under pressure by the ExCom members to take a strong stand in view of the earlier Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Soviets probably decided to withdraw not because of the blockade or ultimatum, but rather because of a tacit understanding between Kennedy and Khrushchev who established direct communications to avoid misunderstandings. A private deal emerged, i.e., U.S. missile in Turkey and Italy would be removed shortly after the crisis was over.

C. METHOD

Applying the three models to the Cuban missile crisis of 1963.

D. FINDINGS

Allison's models bring new insights and speculation to the understanding of complex decision making. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis could have been approached more convincingly if Allison had integrated his models rather than using them as independent and discreet approaches. The analyst is ware that one sees what one looks for.

A. PURPOSE

To assess trends in support by the American people for the Korean and Vietnam Wars and to compare these two wars with each other and with earlier wars on the support dimension.

B. BACKGROUND

Public opinion data were used to measure general support for the war in question. In most cases the polling question asked if U.S. involvement was or was not a mistake. Meaningful variations in the question itself were explained and trends in the overall support were graphed and tabulated. This procedure was followed for both wars and comparisons made.

C. METHOD

A survey of opinion polls conducted during and after the war in question.

D. FINDINGS

It was found that despite popular belief to the contrary, the Vietnam War was not appreciably more unpopular than the Korean War. It proved difficult to determine exact causes for shifts in support, but there seemed to be little relation between major events in the fighting of the war and the shifting of support for it. It was noted with particular interest that the support for both World War II and the Korean War changed considerably as time passed. For instance, in 1951-52 only 37-39% of the respondents felt the U.S. to be correct in fighting in Korea (peace talks had started in June 1951). By 1953 that number had run to 50% and by 1965 to 67%.
Mueller attributes this shift in part to people's need to rationalize the losses of the war. Whatever the cause, the drastic shift demonstrates the public's ability to alter perceptions greatly over time. A less drastic shift in the opposite direction took place after World War II.
A. PURPOSE

To explore quantitative bases for defining perceived power.

B. BACKGROUND

Definitions of power in international relations are numerous, but few can be tied to "objective" factors. Further, the differences between "real" and "perceived" power have seldom been explored quantitatively.

C. METHOD

Thirty-eight Canadians with a mean age of 29 were asked to list 122 nations "in order of their power as they think of them." The ten most powerful nations were to be ranked separately while the rest were divided into four classes of descending power. The median rank of the class was assigned nations in the four aggregated categories, i.e., 24.5, 52.5, 80.5 or 108.5. A rank order of perceived power was aggregated for all subjects. Objective measures were chosen from 54 political and social indicators subjected to previous factor analyses. Stepwise multiple regression was used to identify "factors operating in the minds of the subjects."

D. FINDINGS

Canadian subjects perceive power:

"either in terms of GNP or in terms of military expenditure if the nations are not currently at war or have not been at war recently; when nations now engaged in deadly quarrels are included in the rating, our subjects seem to perceive power in terms of military expenditure."

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A. PURPOSE

To point out the lack of theories dealing with both the relationship between public opinion and the policy maker, and the political process of policy making in general.

B. SUMMARY

The author enumerates examples from historical writings which ascribe great force to public opinion. He is skeptical of their accuracy, validity and relevance for three reasons. First, despite the accessibility of government today to scholars and journalists, one knows very little about the public opinion/foreign policy relationship. He asks how it was when there was less access to government processes. Secondly, he feels that it is improbable that public opinion could have been much of a constraint in earlier times when it is not very constraining today in a period of relatively high public attentiveness. Thirdly, he states that the vast bulk of literature that mentions the force of public opinion makes no systematic attempt to prove a causal relationship between opinion and policy.

C. METHOD

A selective narrative excursion through literature that deals with the question directly or indirectly.

D. FINDINGS

The paper pinpoints causes for a general misinterpretation of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy:

A-27
First, there has been a failure of theoretical insight, specifically into the relationship between opinion and policy and into the politics of policy making in general.

Second, decision makers have used the confusion, thereby giving it extra life and credibility to pass the onus of responsibility on to a nebulous public opinion which cannot respond.

Third, there is an absence of theories of foreign policy making based on understanding of political strategy which has "allowed statesmen to get away with patently absurd remarks."

A. **PURPOSE**

To examine alternate models of the flow of news.

B. **BACKGROUND**

The origin of the "gatekeeper" concept traces from Kurt Lewin who had worked with small groups where a single participant was the "gatekeeper." His interest was the housewife controlling food purchasing channels during wartime. Lewin suggested that the pattern might describe news flow into a small group. David White applied the concept to newspaper operations and identified the gatekeeper as any person within the group who makes news choices; he studied the wire editor of a small newspaper. Other work has treated each person in the news channel as a gatekeeper. Bass criticizes the later studies for failing to apply Lewin's concept correctly, for failing to accurately identify the gatekeeper, and for failing to reflect actual operations of news organizations.

C. **METHOD**

Case study based on observation of the U.N. Radio offices and Voice of America.

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D. FINDINGS

Models of news flow should distinguish two functions: news gathering and news processing. The basic decision whether an event is news is made by news gatherers who initiate the flow with "news copy." News processors may receive copy from several sources which is aggregated and modified for a "completed product." The public receives the product. Bass calls this the Double-Action Internal Newsflow Model and suggests that research focus on news gatherers.
A. PURPOSE

To test the following set of hypotheses with data collected from the crisis leading up to World War I:

Hypothesis 1. As stress increases in a crisis situation:
   (a) time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision making.
   (b) decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

Hypothesis 2. In a crisis situation, decision-makers will perceive:
   (a) their own range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.
   (b) their allies' range of alternatives to be more restricted than those of their adversaries.

Hypothesis 3. As stress increases, decision-makers will perceive:
   (a) the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower.
   (b) the range of alternatives open to adversaries to expand.

Hypothesis 4. The higher the stress in a crisis situation:
   (a) the heavier the overload upon the channels of communication.
   (b) the more stereotyped will be the information content of messages.
   (c) the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication.
   (d) the higher the proportion of intracoalition—as compared with inter-coalition—communication.

B. SUMMARY

The author is concerned with the effects of stress upon: "(1) the manner in which decision-makers perceive time as a factor in their formulation of policy; (2) the contrasting ways in which they view policy alternatives for their own nations, for their allies, and for their adversaries; and (3) the flow of communications among them."

A-31
C. METHOD

The study employed the techniques of content analysis. The documents were coded using the Q-sorting technique and hypotheses were tested using the Mann-Whitney U-Test.

D. FINDINGS

In the case of the 1914 data, the initial hypotheses were shown to be relevant. However, the author states in conclusion that for these hypotheses to have any overall importance, they must be tested in numerous other case studies.

E. GENERALIZATIONS

As the author states in his conclusion, the precise opposite of these "common sense" hypotheses can be developed and shown applicable to different crisis situations. It would seem that such would call the validity of the original hypotheses into serious question.
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A. PURPOSE

To disprove the popularly held idea that the "attentive public" is shrinking and to demonstrate the author's theory of the continuing growth of an issue-area attentive public.

B. SUMMARY

The author states that a number of studies depict a scarcity of persons in the U.S. who consistently keep abreast of public affairs. However, he feels that the findings of these studies convey a misleading picture. His theory of the growth of the attentive public is based upon the hypothesis that attentiveness is habit forming combined with two historical trends: one, the rising level of education in the U.S. and two, the increased communication between various parts of the country.

C. METHOD

The number of letters sent to the New York Times, the New York Post, Senator Phillip A. Hart, and the White House between 1949 and 1966, were used as an index of attention.

J. FINDINGS

Over the period the numbers of letters increased faster than the number of subscribers in the case of the newspapers, and faster than the overall population in the case of Senator Hart and the White House. Thus, if one uses the number of letters written to these four sources as a gauge of the size of the attentive public, the author's theory has passed a preliminary test.

A. PURPOSE

To test alternative models of the relationship between knowledge and public opinion in the realm of foreign policy issues.

B. SUMMARY

Public opinion analysts frequently note differences between mass opinions and opinions of the more educated or more knowledgeable strata of populations tested. Seldom are causes for differences noted. This article examines three possible models of the relationship between knowledge and opinion:

1. An Enlightenment Model which holds that the greater the understanding and knowledge of foreign affairs, the less belligerence is noted in foreign policy opinions.

2. A Mainstream Model which holds that the greater the "attachment" to the mainstream of foreign policy opinion the greater the degree of conformity to official policy. "Attachment" is related to education and is reflected in factual information about foreign affairs and official policy.

3. A Cognitive Consistency Model which relates greater conceptual sophistication to an increased relationship between specific policy opinions and general assumptions. General assumptions relate to political orientation, ideology and beliefs. Conceptual sophistication is an intervening variable denoting an individual's ability to integrate specific opinions with general beliefs; it is related to education and knowledge.
C. METHOD

Analysis of 1963-64 public opinion data drawn from controlled sample of 558 Detroit residents. Data addressed knowledge, belief systems, and attitude about specific foreign policies. Models were evaluated using contingency coefficients.

D. FINDINGS

The enlightenment model was found inadequate based on previous data (Beck and Gergen) which indicate those with greater knowledge were inclined to support U.S. overseas commitments.

"[The data] are best illuminated by a combination of the mainstream and cognitive consistency models. We would suggest that two primary forces are operating, both of which tend to correlate with education and knowledge. On the one hand there is a strain toward additional consistency that increases with knowledge; this produces higher relationship between [the] belief system and policy among the more knowledgeable and on increasing polarization around different policy alternatives for those who start with different premises. At the same time, there is a greater attachment to society and susceptibility to social influences -- a force that produces support for official government policies."

E. GENERALIZATIONS

This study illustrates how facts about an event (analogous to "knowledge") may be interpreted to support official policy or divergent systems of beliefs.

A. PURPOSE

To understand whether political integration has increased or declined within the European and Atlantic communities during the decade 1953 to 1963.

B. BACKGROUND

Supranational integration is evidenced by decision patterns, international transactions, elite opinion and mass opinion. This study approaches elite orientation toward integration, by contrasting attention to national symbols versus regional symbols and by assessing the degree of similarity in basic orientations. The concepts of the study derive from Karl Deutsch, et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.

C. METHOD

Elite orientations were derived from editorials of "prestige papers" of four countries (The New York Times, The Times (London), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Le Monde) on the assumption that there is a rather high correlation between the content of such editorials and the orientation of national political elites. A sample of 192 editorials related to Atlantic community affairs was randomly selected within the following constraints: 6 editorials X 4 quarters X 2 years X 4 papers. Two subsamples were formed by halving the basic 6 editorials. The editorials were reduced to computer media and scanned for 99 categories of words, 83 of which derived from the Harvard III Dictionary. The resulting data were reduced by factor analysis to 4 basic dimensions:

(1) NATO (military) perspective versus Common Market (economic) perspective,
(2) Idealized future versus concrete interests and difficulties,
(3) Costs of supranational alliances versus Franco-German political controversies, and
(4) American pressures for integration versus legal temporizing and restraint.

D. FINDINGS

There was no significant difference in the use of country, regional, and nationalistic symbols. Unification symbols decreased but references to international institutions increased. The inference is that integration was viewed in more concrete institutional and policy terms and that supranational activities had penetrated practical day-to-day politics by 1963. Graphic plots of the four papers on the factor dimensions indicated that there was an increased similarity among the European papers while the New York Times drifted in contrary directions toward emphasis on NATO, and U.S. pressures for integration combined with an idealized future. The implication is that European papers are more concerned with European economic and institutional matters. The first dimension (NATO vs. EEC perspectives) indicates that commentators speak either about economic issues or about military matters.

E. GENERALIZATIONS

The division between economic and military issues indicates a possible effect of cognitive processes described by other articles within this bibliography. The bifurcation provides a simpler context and conserves previous beliefs or schemata. The authors suggest that the thematic differences reveal differences in ideology which may explain success or failure of specific policies. For example, the same difference between European and U.S. perspectives was much in evidence during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

A. **PURPOSE**

To describe what is meant by the concept of "images," to classify aspects of images and events, to generate hypotheses about relations between events and images and to test the theoretical relationships with case data.

B. **BACKGROUND**

"Images" are introduced as combinational constructs analogous to visual experience and characterized by degrees of interdependence, internal consistency, operational content and occasional normative or evaluation content. It is said that:

Images serve as screens for the selective reception of new messages, and they often control the perception and interpretation of those messages that are not completely ignored, rejected, or repressed. At the same time, however, new messages sometimes change the images that an individual already holds, as well as the images held in the common culture and communication system of a community. External messages then change such images...

A taxonomy is constructed which describes six aspects of images:

1. Focus,
2. Periphery,
3. Cues for orientation,
4. Cues for evaluation,
5. Image clusters, and
6. Major configurations of personality or culture.

Messages about an event are said to have six effects:

1. Reinforce the image,
2. Produce no change,
(3) Add explicit information to the image,
(4) Clarify the image by reducing uncertainty,
(5) Reorganize the image or image cluster, and
(6) Change the importance of the image.

Events too are categorized into spectacular events of specific place and duration, cumulative events which take place over a long period of time, and shifts in governmental or mass media policy.

C. METHOD

A 570-cell matrix was constructed which included six aspects of images, five effects (the no change condition was omitted) and 19 combinations of the three types of events (counteracting processes included). Predictions were made for each cell of the matrix in terms of an interval scale of opinion change from very low (less than 5%) to very high (greater than 35%). Combined events were hypothesized to have greater effects than isolated events. The authors review 18 sets of data which reflect on various aspects of the theory.

D. FINDINGS

Actual changes were within the range predicted by the model in 15 or 18 of the 18 cases. Of more significance than the statistical findings is the exposition of relevant data and narrative conclusions:

Almost nothing in the world seems to be able to shift the images of 40 percent of the population in most countries, even within one or two decades. Combinations of events that shift the images and attitudes even of the remaining 50 or 60 percent of the population are extremely rare, and these rare occasions require the combination and mutual reinforcement of cumulative events with spectacular events and substantial governmental efforts as well as the absence of sizable cross-pressures. Most of the spectacular changes of politics involve a change in the attitudes of between one fifth and one third of the population, and almost all of these involve a combination of spectacular and cumulative events, although the combined impact of these may meet with limited opposition from governments. If the external events are less sustained and less dramatic
or if cross-pressures are greater, the magnitude of opinion shifts declines to between 10 and 20 percent. Cumulative or spectacular events alone often shift less than 10 percent of public opinion.

Over longer periods of time, perhaps even a decade or more, and particularly over the succession of generations, the impact of cumulative events tends to be much larger. Here again, the impact of spectacular events and of sustained efforts of governments and media of mass communication can speed the pace of large-scale change, but even so, many attitudes and images persist, or return at least part of the way toward their previous state, once the immediate external pressures slacken and so long as the main individual personality structures and supporting social networks have remained intact.

It seems almost impossible for the impact of any combination of external events and governmental efforts to reorganize all the main images and all their relevant aspects—focus, periphery, cognitive and evaluative cues, psychological and sociocultural contexts—as they are held in the minds of most of the population. The most that spectacular events or governmental efforts usually can accomplish is to change some important aspects of some important images, and some of their relations to their surrounding cues and contexts.

A. PURPOSE

To understand how "events" become "news" and the process of selection and distribution that occurs in news media dealing with international issues.

B. BACKGROUND

Aware of the distortion inherent in cognitive processes of the individual, the authors suggest that a similar distortion and selection takes place earlier in an event -- media perception -- media image -- personal perception -- personal image chain. A series of propositions are elaborated which relate to the character of the news business. In particular, the tendencies toward personification, elite focus, and negative themes in the news are linked to a necessity for cognitive consistency and to the frequency of a mass medium. Hypotheses were formulated to embody some of these propositions and the thesis that various attributes of newsworthiness are additive.

C. METHOD

A content analysis was conducted on the reportage of four Norwegian newspapers during the Congo and Cuban crises of 1960 and the Cyprus crisis of 1964. The analysis required the coding of individual press cuttings within 5 categories of concern: nation type, status of persons, perspective on conflict, negative focus, and type (political, cultural, economic, and social) of issues raised. Some 1262 news items were so coded.
D. FINDINGS

Of the items coded, 919 were "news" as opposed to editorials or commentary. Of the news items 95% (87% of total) were derived from four international wire services -- AP, UP, Reuters, or Agence France-Presse. Thus, Norwegians were dependent on the international news system for images of foreign events.

Three of four basic hypotheses were sustained by the analysis:

1. The more culturally distant the nation, the higher the tendency to report elite action.
2. The lower the rank of persons the more negative the event reported.
3. The more culturally distant the theater, the more relevant must the event appear to be (in terms of East-West politics or relations with former colonial powers).

The authors contend that these hypotheses illustrate a complementarity of news factors and suggest additional formulations of paired relationships.

E. GENERALIZATIONS

In relation to events in culturally distant areas of the world, the authors provide the following characterization of "news."

News will have to refer to people, preferable top elite, and be preferably negative and unexpected but nevertheless according to a pattern that is consonant with the "mental pre-image." It will have to be simple and it should, if possible, provide the reader with some kind of identification - it should refer to him or his nation or group of nations. This will, in turn, facilitate an image of these countries as dangerous, ruled by capricious elites, as unchanging in their basic characteristics, as existing for the benefit of the topdog nations, and in terms of their link to
those nations. Events occur, they are sudden, like flashes of lightning, with no build-up and with no let-down after their occurrence - they just occur and more often than not as a part of the machinations of the ruling or opposition elites.

The consequence of all this is an image of the world that gives little autonomy to the periphery but sees it as mainly existing for the sake of the center -- for good or for bad -- as a real periphery to the center of the world. This may also tend to amplify more than at times might seem justified the image of the world's relatedness. Everything's relevance for everything else, particularly for us, is overplayed. Its relevance to itself disappears.

A. PURPOSE

To "examine the events of October 1962 ... to permit relevant comparison with other crisis situations, both those resolved by war and those eventually resolved by non-violent means."

B. SUMMARY

With a concern for a comparable, replicable and cumulative study, a conceptual framework was developed based upon the following two-step, mediated, stimulus-response model (Figure A-4):

**Figure A-4. Two-Step Mediated, Stimulus-Response Model**

Perceptions play a crucial role in the model because "for in political behavior, what is 'real' is what men perceive to be real... Misperceptions may have behavioral consequences as 'real' as more accurate perceptions do." Therefore, "...perceptual variables are crucial...."

C. METHOD

The method employed is the content analysis of the messages of key decision-makers. Source material included some 50,000 words of official documents and the verbatim text of all publicly available documents.
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originated by key decision-makers between October 22 and 31 of 1962. The data were subjected to analysis by the General Inquirer computerized content analysis system using the Stanford Dictionary and its semantic differential scoring.

D. FINDINGS

In comparing the actions taken in 1962 with those of decision-makers in 1914, some striking differences were observed. Most important was the desire of decision-makers in 1962 to maintain options, to keep the level of violence low and, in dealing with the adversary, to be sensitive to his position and not make demands that were difficult to understand, that could not be carried out, nor that would humiliate him.

It was found that as the violence evident in the words of one party increased or decreased, the violence in the words of the other party tended to follow a similar pattern. This was in part due to another finding: that each nation's perception of the other's actions was very close to the intention of the action, and the reaction was appropriate. This contrasts sharply to 1914 when actions were misperceived more often than not. Along a similar line the U.S. and U.S.S.R. regarded each other as well as themselves as significantly less negative in the latter stage of the crisis period.

A. PURPOSE

To report a case study of the relationship between belief systems and national images as evidenced in the public statements of John Foster Dulles.

B. SUMMARY

The study is based on analytical framework that the "belief system" may be thought of as a set of lenses through which information about the physical and social environment is received. The belief system is composed of a number of "images" which order an otherwise unmanageable amount of information about the world. The belief system has the dual function of filtering information and of setting goals or preferences.

A brief narrative reconstructs Dulles' basic beliefs about the Soviets in his own words and a basic image of the Soviets is generalized as an "inherent bad faith of the Communists" model. (From Henry Kissinger, *The Necessity of Choice*, p. 201.) From this basic image, the study hypothesizes that Dulles would associate decreased hostility with increased policy frustration and decreased capabilities, whereas increased hostility would be associated with Soviet success and strength.

C. METHOD

Dulles' public statements during the 1953-59 period were screened for assertions about the Soviet Union. Some 3,584 statements were subject to "evaluative assertion analysis" (Osgood, 1956 and 1959) in four categories: policy (friendship--hostility); capabilities (strong--weak); success (satisfaction--frustration); and general evaluation (good--bad). Hypotheses were tested using Spearman's rank correlation technique based on 3-, 6-, and 12- month time intervals.
D. **FINDINGS**

Significant correlations were found between hostility and success, and between hostility and strength. No correlation was found between general evaluation and hostility. Based on analysis of the content of Dulles statements, the author concludes that he "interpreted the very data which would lead one to change one's model in such a way as to preserve the model." Contrary information...[was] re-interpreted in a manner which did not do violence to the original image."

E. **GENERALIZATIONS**

The author postulates a two-sided "mirror image" model which, if characterized by the low-hostility/weakness correlation, leads to perpetuation or exacerbation of tension when "bids" for decreased tensions are genuinely intended.

A. PURPOSE

To examine some of the research on interpersonal perception and to suggest implications for administrative practice.

B. SUMMARY

The data on perception is of particular importance in administration, as daily interaction requires forming impressions of others. Research has brought into sharp focus some disturbing factors influencing the perceptual processes:

1. Response to cues below the threshold of awareness,
2. Response to irrelevant cues,
3. Response to emotional factors,
4. Weight attached to more favored sources, and
5. Inability to identify all factors on which judgments are based.

Forming impressions of others is also subject to the effects described in the following subsections.

1. Stereotyping
   Coined by Walter Lippman in 1922 to describe bias in perceiving people. It is described as 'pictures in people's heads, which guide (distort) their perception of others.' Stereotyping is widespread and need not have a 'kernel of truth' to be widely held.

2. Halo Effect
   First used in 1920 to describe a process in which a general impression which is favorable or unfavorable is used by judges to evaluate several specific and independent traits.

3. Projection
   Ascribing or attributing any of one's own characteristics to other people.
Influences on the perceptual processes can also be approached from the characteristics of the perceiver and the perceived. Certain conclusions are offered:

1. Knowing oneself makes it easier to see others accurately.
2. One's own characteristics affect the characteristics he is likely to see in others.
3. The person who accepts himself is more likely to be able to see favorable aspects of other people.
4. Accuracy in perceiving others is not a single skill. One's ability to perceive others accurately may depend on how sensitive one is to differences between people.

The perceived also influences the process of perception with such variables as:

5. Status -- high status persons are judged as wanting to cooperate and low-status persons as having to cooperate.
6. Categorizing -- identical to stereotyping.
7. Visibility of trait judged -- we are more accurate in judging people who like us than people who dislike us. The explanation being that most people in our society feel constraint in showing their dislike and therefore cues are less visible.

In addition the process of interpersonal perception is in part a function of the group context in which the perception occurs: e.g., in a friendly situation people will tend to see others as similar to themselves.

C. FINDINGS

There is no sure way in which training for perceptual accuracy can best be accomplished, and one of the important tasks of administrative science should be to design research to test various training procedures for increasing perceptual accuracy.
A. PURPOSE

To test the hypothesis that, in the U.S., press coverage would stress a procedural and conflict-oriented dimension while in Europe and especially in Eastern Europe, the press would stress a substantive and agreement-oriented dimension.

B. BACKGROUND

The author based his study upon the following assumption:

Mass media are cultural arms of industrial systems. In many areas of the world today, media of competing systems play increasingly important roles. Through selection, treatment, emphasis and tone, mass media (1) help define their own set of significant realities, (2) structure the agenda of public (and, increasingly, of private) discourse and (3) make available dominant perspectives from which realities, priorities, actions and policies might be viewed.

C. METHOD

The headlines of the New York Times and the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party central daily, Népszabadság, from September 18 to October 14, 1960, which dealt with the U.S. General Assembly session that fall were analyzed. The headlines were categorized on a procedural-substantive scale and a conflict-agreement scale. Differences in emphasis and treatment of events were also observed.

D. FINDINGS

The New York Times tended to emphasize procedural moves, method rather than substance, and tension arousing rather than mutually acceptable or even neutral aspects of events. On the other hand, Népszabadság tended to give priority to substance rather than procedure, and in the author's opinion, substance of issues of concern to most people around the world.

A. PURPOSE

To satisfy the 'need for a systematic and thorough conceptualization of the opinion-policy relationship, especially of the processes by which foreign policy opinions circulate in the United States.'

B. BACKGROUND

Rosenau asserts that various hypotheses relating to public opinion and foreign policy have caused confusion. He attempts to eliminate the verbal ambiguities, which he feels to be a sign of conceptual difficulties, and to formulate a 'framework through which phenomena may be examined and interpreted.'

C. METHOD

A narrative elaboration of a taxonomy of the opinion/policy relationships. Rosenau's taxonomy is outlined in Figure A-5.

D. FINDINGS

The "two-step flow" suffers from oversimplification and should be expanded to cover a third and fourth step.

(1) News and interpretation carried by media and read,
(2) Opinion maker asserts opinion on subject,
(3) Those opinions reported in media and read by opinion leaders, and
(4) Opinion leaders pass on their opinion to general public.
A. Opinion Leaders

1. Characteristics
   a. Opinion Forming
   b. Opinion Submitting
   c. Opinion Circulating

2. Types
   a. Governmental
   b. Associational
   c. Institutional
   d. Individual

3. Foci
   a. National
   b. Local
   c. Single Issue
   d. Multi-Issue

B. Media

1. Personal
   a. Exchange

2. Mass
   a. Printed
   b. Electronic
   c. Quality
   d. Popular

3. Organizational
   a. Assemblomatic
   b. Memoranduematic
   c. Programmatic

C. Public

1. Mass (Approx. 75-90%)
   a. Passive
   b. Uninformed
   c. Emotional

2. Assertive (Approx. 10%)
   a. Inclined to participate
   b. Critical Audience

Figure A-5. Taxonomy of Opinion/Policy Components per Rosenau

A. **PURPOSE**

To comment on the place of assumptions and theories about individual decision-making in models of the international system.

B. **SUMMARY**

Two simplifying assumptions about the processes by which individuals make decisions relevant to international affairs can be along the lines of non-rationality and rationality.

1. **Non-Rationality Model**

Two sets of hypothesis are presented, dealing with the conditions that affect the probability that attitudes and behaviors in relation to international affairs will represent the externalization of an individual's personality-oriented needs.

The first set deals with the relationship of the individual to the international situation:

- (1) The greater the involvement of an individual in a situation the greater will be the effect of non-logical and predispositional influences.
- (2) The more information an individual has about international affairs the less likely it is that his behavior will be based upon non-logical influences.
- (3) The higher the level of skill in handling international problems the less likely it will be that attitudes on international affairs will be free to perform personality-oriented functions.
- (4) The more an individual values rationality as a decision-making process, the less personality factors will play a role in his decision.
(5) The more influence a person believes himself to have over events, the less he will orient himself toward those events in terms of personality variables.

(6) Those who are expected to be responsible for the consequences of their decisions will be more inhibited in admitting criteria that are not supposed to be relevant.

The second set of hypotheses as to when international relations decision-making and attitudes will perform personality-oriented functions has to do with the nature of the decision:

(1) The more detailed a decision an individual is required to make, the less likely it is that personality variables will have an effect.

(2) The more ambiguous the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the decision-making situation, the more scope there is for personality variables.

(3) In group situations, there will be both internal and external pressure upon the individual to adjust his attitudes somewhat in the direction of the group.

3. Rational Model

Some characteristics of this model are:

(1) It is a process of means-ends analysis, and

(2) It requires a need for accurate information, correct evaluation, and consciousness of calculation.

The inadequacies of this model lie in the requirement that values be structured independently of the situation and that they be matched against alternatives to see which gives the best value outcome. The rational model is also limited in explaining organizational decision-making since it cannot deal with inconsistent goal structures.

Finally, two other weaknesses are that the model makes unrealistic assumptions about the way in which information (especially about alternatives) is acquired; and that it treats each decision as if it were a separate entity.
C. FINDING

One of the major values of the rationality model is that it facilitates the systematic consideration of deviations from rationality. While rationality models can give analysts only imperfect explanations and predictions of international events, their value would be greatly increased if these limitations are appreciated.

A. PURPOSE

To examine opinion reactions to early space developments and their effects on the international political system.

B. SUMMARY

This paper reports public opinion data relevant to the awareness of space developments, estimates of U.S. and Soviet capabilities, popular support of the U.S. and NATO, attitudes toward relations with the U.S.S.R., and political support for American defense and foreign policies.

C. METHOD

The paper presents data gathered by established polling organizations in the U.S. and overseas (primarily Western Europe). The structure of the study was determined by the questions asked in such polls and the author's theories as to the kind of attitudes that might be affected by developments in space technology.

D. FINDINGS

(1) Public awareness of Sputnik was extraordinary (90% or better awareness and identification of Russian origin in 5 of 11 survey countries).
Substantial shifts in opinion on U.S. versus Soviet scientific superiority as Soviets, then Americans, scored space successes. In 8 of 9 foreign countries the long-range (10-year) potential of the Soviets was assessed as superior to the U.S. by a plurality even three years after Sputnik.

A less extreme fluctuation in popular assessment of over-all military capability was associated with the popular opinion of scientific capabilities.

Except in Germany, there were shifts in opinion in favor of neutrality as a consequence of Soviet missile and space developments. Trends showed a weakening of support for the European security system.

Space developments may have caused a questioning of U.S. foreign policy and increased pressures to engage in east-west negotiations.

Overall the study concluded that the Sputnik demonstration weakened American foreign policy by reducing confidence in American technological and military strength and thereby sharpening doubts as to the wisdom of alliance with the U.S. Further, Soviet space achievements emphasized questions about the utility of conventional security arrangements, weapons, and deployments for countries which do not possess ballistic missile capabilities.

E. GENERALIZATIONS

Spectacular events can foster opinions which constrain foreign policy.

A. PURPOSE

To examine the role of images in the international system. Specifically to attempt to gauge the "impact of national images on the relations among states."

B. SUMMARY

The author states that the "behavior of complex organizations is determined by decisions." Decision involves the selection of the best alternative from a field of choices. The field of choice and the ranking of its components lie in the image of the decision maker. The study deals with the images of the powerful, the elite. The relations among states can be described on varying dimensions; the geographic-territorial, the hostility-friendliness, the strength-weakness, etc. However, whatever the dimension, national images of the decision makers, both of themselves and of others, play an important role.

C. METHOD

Two dimensional matrices are constructed in order to bring together the variables associated with each pair of nations in an international system. Concepts such as reciprocity, affectional balance, dynamics, and equilibrium are applied to the model.
D. FINDINGS

Image reorganizing events are hard both to specify and to predict. A model such as that used in this study is close to reality in the long run not the short run. Two types of incompatibility were identified: "real" and "illusory." The former exists when two images of the future occur whereby the realization of one would prevent the realization of the other. The later exists when a satisfactory condition of compatibility is available but the dynamics of the situation prevent it from being utilized.

E. GENERALIZATIONS

Boulding feels that the "national image" is the last great stronghold of unsophistication and that it is the inability to view occurrences other than from one's own viewpoint which must be overcome to open the way to a more dynamic international system.

A. **PURPOSE**

To create theoretical tools in the area of communications and social influence.

B. **SUMMARY**

The basic hypotheses addressed are:

1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance; and
2. The strength of the pressure to reduce dissonance is a function of the magnitude of the existing dissonance.

The core of the theory of dissonance holds that:

1. There may exist dissonant relations among cognitive elements;
2. The existence of dissonance gives rise to pressure to reduce the dissonance and to avoid increases in dissonance; and
3. Manifestations of the operation of these pressures include behavior changes, changes of cognition, and circumspect exposure to new information and new opinions.

Dissonance is an inevitable consequence of a decision between two or more alternatives, and individuals as well as groups will try to obtain new cognition which will be consonant with existing cognition and avoid new cognition which will be dissonant with existing cognition.

The mass media impact on the attitudes and opinions of persons will vary in effectiveness depending on whether the context is frequently discussed by the person (little impact) and whether the person is relatively isolated socially (stronger impact).
C. **METHOD**

From a vast collection of experiments Festinger integrates the material and develops the concepts of dissonance and dissonance reduction and their corollary implications.

D. **FINDINGS**

The effectiveness of efforts to reduce dissonance will depend upon the resistance to change of the cognitive elements involved in the dissonance, and in the availability of information or people who will supply new cognitive elements which will be consonant with existing cognition.

The major sources of resistance to change for a cognitive element are the responsiveness of the element to "reality" and the extent to which it is consonant with other elements.

A. PURPOSE

"To report on the present state of the two-step flow hypothesis, the extent to which it has found confirmation and the ways in which it has been extended, contracted and reformulated." Also to examine the successive research strategies developed.

B. BACKGROUND

The two-step flow hypothesis states that influences stemming from the mass media first reach "opinion leaders" who pass on what they read and hear to their associates for whom they are influential. The hypothesis was first put forth in The Peoples Choice by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, and three conclusions emerged from their study: first, that personal contacts appear to have been both more frequent and more effective than the mass media in influencing decisions; second, that opinion leaders are found on every level of society and are very much like the people they influence; and third, that compared with the rest of the population, opinion leaders were more exposed to the formal media of communication.

The chief weakness of the initial study was in its analysis of the flow of influence. Opinion leaders were located by self-designation. One gave advice or one didn't, and no study of the relationship between the leaders and followers was possible.

C. METHOD

Three studies which followed The Peoples Choice study are analyzed to note any interesting variations in approach as well as to examine the way in which each modified or refined the original "two-step" hypothesis. The approach in a study of the innovative tendencies of doctors in four cities
proved very successful. The limited size of the group involved allowed for a total mapping of the interpersonal relation among the doctors. Also, objective data were available in the form of records of prescriptions. Thus, the researchers did not have to rely on the word of the participants alone, a fact which lent credibility to the findings.

D. FINDINGS

The conclusions of the initial study were substantiated in the subsequent studies as follows:

1. The subject matter under discussion plays a role in determining who is influential.
2. Influencing appears to be done more within than between social groupings.
3. Influence is related to the personification of certain values, the competence of the person and the person's strategic social location.
4. Influence is not a simple dyadic relationship but is an ongoing chain with role interchangeability.

It was also found, particularly in the drug study, that influence is transferred and beliefs reinforced most effectively by face-to-face and primary-group relationships.

As a result of the above the "two-step flow" has been expanded to cover interpersonal relations not only as channels of information, as originally formulated, but also as sources of social pressure and social support.
A. PURPOSE

To discover "trends in newspapers attitudes," both long and short term, and to "assess the impact of events upon the general character of the prestige press." Specifically, the study attempt to measure five variables:

1. The amount of attention given to the key symbols of recent political controversy,
2. The variety of symbols used,
3. The change in symbols used,
4. The direction of judgment, and
5. The uniformity of judgment.

B. SUMMARY

The author feels that in each major nation there is one newspaper which addresses itself to the elite. These "prestige papers" have become an institution and it is the author's goal in this study to examine the relation of such papers to the elite and to the government, the impact of freedom or controls upon them, and the ways in which these papers may index social change.

C. METHOD

The author conducted a content analysis of the editorials of nine "prestige papers," one American, one British, two French, two Russian, and three German. The time period covered was 1890 to 1945. The editorial was the unit of statistical treatment. A list of 416 symbols was compiled with the assistance of Harold D. Lasswell and it was noted whether or not one of the symbols appeared within an editorial. The frequency of a symbol's appearance within the editorial was not measured.
D. FINDINGS

It was found that there was a heavy concentration on a few key symbols and that the degree of this concentration varied depending upon certain political conditions. Totalitarianism was found to "markedly impoverish its own political vocabulary." Also, the variety of a small segment of total symbolism decreased in democratic societies in time of war. Large differences were found in the frequency of explicit judgments in editorials with the totalitarian papers assuming an unsubtle didactic tone, and the London Times and New York Times very reticent to make judgments. Stereotyping of judgement of given symbols reached a high degree in Izvestia and the Nazi Volksischer Beobachter while ambivalence and uncertainty was so great in Czarist Russia's Navoe Vremia that the author feels it might have contributed to the political weakness of that day's elite. Finally, it was found that, in relation to change in political values, the British editorials changed the least while the Russian changed the most.


*Abstracted herein.
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued)


*Abstracted herein.

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*Abstracted herein.
THE BDM CORPORATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued)


*Abstracted herein.
APPENDIX B

METHODOLOGY AND DATA
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APPENDIX B

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

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<td>B-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dictionary of Negative Power Evaluation Terms</td>
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A. INTRODUCTION

A content-analysis technique, known as "evaluative assertion analysis," was modified to quantify the direction and intensity of power evaluations observed in a 'prestige paper' from each of the three countries studied. The basic format of evaluative assertion analysis was modified to code power evaluations rather than affect. Another modification introduced a "common-meaning dictionary" for each country to increase coder reliability and to allow the same analyst to both identify assertions and to code intensity. The method is relatively economical and is feasible in the administrative sense. Merits of the method as an adjunct to case study methods are discussed in Chapter V.

B. EVALUATIVE ASSERTION ANALYSIS

The purpose of evaluative assertion analysis is to extract from a series of messages evaluations being made of significant concepts, with a minimum dependence on the effects of the message on coders or the coder's attitudes. The method relies on a series of assumptions:

(1) That total messages can be analyzed in countable units - themes or assertions for example.
(2) That these units can be judged by an analyst to be relevant to the topic under study - in this instance, the power of the U.S. or the Soviet Union.
(3) That assertions can be divided into "attitude objects," "verbal connectors," and "common meaning material." Attitude objects in this study are words which represent the United States or the Soviet Union. Common meaning material carries a value associated with attitude objectives.
(4) That the connectors and common meaning material can be coded reliably on a scale of -3 to +3.

The processing of collected data generally involves four stages of analysis. First, attitude objects are isolated and masked by substituting randomly assigned letters. Second, the message is separated into a series of assertions which are equivalent to the original message but in a standard format. Third, the common-meaning evaluations and verbal connectors are coded for direction and intensity. Finally, coded values for assertions related to each attitude object are collected and averaged. Table B-1 illustrates the application of the original technique to the evaluation of the Soviet Union on an attitudinal, "good-bad," scale.

C. MODIFICATION OF ASSERTION ANALYSIS

Although the dimension most frequently used in evaluative assertion analysis is best defined by the objective pair, "good-bad," the technique is altered for the purposes of this research by a further assumption that common-meaning material can be reliable coded on a "strong-weak" dimension. Because the concept of power has a variety of meanings, a congruity check was established which substituted the words "winners" or "losers" for the attitude object. The check was intended to insure that coding conformed to a broad but consistent definition of power which inferred the ability to achieve national objectives.

In addition to the congruity check a procedure was established to insure the reliability of coding by using a dictionary of common-meaning material. Common-meaning phrases which applied to both attitude objects were arrayed on a single list for each country in order of the intensity and direction of power.

These dictionaries are displayed in Tables B-2 through B-3. Assigning weighted values from the single masked list, assured that power evaluations of either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. were consistent on an ordinal scale. The dictionary procedure also allowed a single coder to select, mask, and code collected material with consistent reliability throughout the coding process.
TABLE B-1. EVALUATIVE ASSERTION ANALYSIS EXAMPLE

Soviet rulers are ruthless, atheistic despots. These men have in the past pursued evil goals. Yet there now appears some possibility that they will agree to some measures designed to relax world tensions. Perhaps they will be more willing to forego aggressive designs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude object</th>
<th>Verbal connector</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Common meaning term</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Product</th>
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<td>1. Soviet rulers are ruthless</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>ruthless</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Soviet rulers are atheistic</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>atheistic</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Soviet rulers are despots</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>despots</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4. Soviet rulers have in the past pursued evil goals</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>evil goals</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Soviet rulers may now possibly agree to some measures designed to relax world tensions</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td></td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Soviet rulers perhaps will be more willing to forego aggressive designs</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>aggressive designs</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE B-2. DICTIONARY OF POSITIVE POWER EVALUATION TERMS

<table>
<thead>
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<th>INTENSITY</th>
<th>BRITAIN</th>
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<th>GERMANY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
<td>SHAPER OF HISTORY</td>
<td>BATTLE</td>
<td>SUPER POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ATTACKER</td>
<td>CONFRONTATION</td>
<td>OVERALL CAPACITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUPER POWER</td>
<td>GREAT POWER</td>
<td>CONFLAGRATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALL IMPORTANT LEADER</td>
<td>SUPERPOWER</td>
<td>STRONGEST POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GIANT</td>
<td>LEADER</td>
<td>DECISIVE ROLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DOMINANT</td>
<td>WINNER</td>
<td>CONFRONTATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
<td>PEACE</td>
<td>PEACE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PREDOMINANT ESSENTIAL</td>
<td>PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONFRAGMENTATION</td>
<td>INDISPENSABLE</td>
<td></td>
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<td>KEY</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTERVENER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>+2</td>
<td>PROVIDER</td>
<td>RAPPROCHEMENT</td>
<td>PROTECTOR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIGNIFICANT</td>
<td>DISCRETE</td>
<td>GUARANTOR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SUPPORTER</td>
<td>MONOLITHIC</td>
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<td>INFLUENTIAL EXPANDING</td>
<td>USEFUL PARTNER</td>
<td>MILITARY MIGHT</td>
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<td>INFLUENTIAL</td>
<td>SUPERIOR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONTROLLED</td>
<td>PREVENTER</td>
<td>CONTROLLER</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CHALLENGER</td>
<td>RAY OF HOPE</td>
<td>RESTRAINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PREVENTER</td>
<td>GOOD WILL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAMPION (OF A CAUSE)</td>
<td>FAITHFUL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REDUCER OF TENSIONS</td>
<td>DETERMINED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAMPION</td>
<td>SERVED BY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RAY OF HOPE</td>
<td>GAIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DETERMINED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>RESPECTED</td>
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<td>COOPERATIVE</td>
<td>SECOND STRONGEST</td>
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<td>SELF SUFFICIENT FREEDOM</td>
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<td>DIPLOMACY</td>
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<td>FREEDOM</td>
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<td>CALM</td>
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<td>CREDIT</td>
<td>UNDERSTANDING</td>
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<td>PRAISEWORTHY FAITHFUL</td>
<td>VERBAL SUPPORT</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NEUTRAL FAIR</td>
<td>EFFECTIVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DOGGER MORE LIMITED</td>
<td>PRUDENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUPPORTER</td>
<td>INITIATIVE</td>
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B-4
TABLE B-3. DICTIONARY OF NEGATIVE POWER EVALUATION TERMS

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<th>BRITAIN</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>HANDICAPPED DEFEAT</td>
<td>GRave SEVERE DAMAGE</td>
<td>FAILURE DISASTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HAMSTRUNG DEFIED</td>
<td>SEVERE DAMAGE</td>
<td>DIPLOMATIC LOSSES</td>
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<td>UNTRUSTWORTHY LOSSER</td>
<td>CRave INEFFICACIOUS</td>
<td>NO FORCE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FAILURE LOST</td>
<td>IMMobilIZED</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOSE REVERSAL VILLAIN</td>
<td>DOMESTIC DEFEAT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROCK BOTTOM UNSUCCESSFUL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BITTER LESSON PALSIED</td>
<td>REJECTIONIST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-2</td>
<td>TENSE FEARFUL INVALID</td>
<td>OBJECTIONABLE</td>
<td>LOST CREDIBILITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUSPECT DOMESTIC PROBLEMS</td>
<td></td>
<td>INADEQUATE RISK</td>
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<td>DISTRACTED GRAVE ERROR</td>
<td>DOMESTIC PROBLEMS</td>
<td>NOT IN CONTROL</td>
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<td>GRAVE ERROR</td>
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<td>UNWELCOME REEXAMINATION</td>
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B-5
D. DATA COLLECTION

Data were collected from The Times (London), Le Monde, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung for the nine-week period 8 May through 8 July 1967. Pilot collection efforts copied all themes related to the U.S. and the Soviet Union. A review of one week's material revealed both a wide discrepancy between the high number of references to the United States and few references to the U.S.S.R. and a very small proportion of themes which carried a power evaluation. Collection rules were modified to require that either the U.S. or U.S.S.R. appear in the same news item or that either country be related to the Middle East. The collection rule is shown graphically in Figure B-1. The procedure decreased collection time and assured that assertions were in a comparable context related to the focus of research. A problem related to the revised collection procedure was that it relied on three separate analysts to select power evaluation assertions within case material; between-country reliability was thereby reduced although within-country reliability was maintained because the same analyst collected all data from one country. The problem of between-country reliability is evident in the lack of sufficient data to establish usable trends for three weeks of the German case material.
Figure B-1. Selection Criteria for Collection of Power Evaluations
APPENDIX B, SECTION 1

REFERENCES


The remainder of this Appendix is devoted to documentation of data collected for the content analysis reported in Chapter V. The data are reproduced here to provide the reader the opportunity to appreciate their richness, to display the variety of messages which imply a power relationship, and to facilitate replication of the analysis. In particular, these data packages preserve basic case materials to assess the reliability of different coders and coding schemes. The following excerpts included one or more assertions which, to the collecting analyst, implied a power relationship and sufficient text to allow the coder (and reader) to understand relationships among international actors.

The following data packages include power assertions collected from three Western European papers from 8 May thru 8 July 1967. The packages, in order, relate to The Times (England), Le Monde (France) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (West Germany).
One of the more deceptive half-truths that help to blur the political scenery is the notion that American efforts to find areas of agreement with the Soviet Union necessarily run counter to European interests.

Britain had always been independent of America, close to her and a loyal ally, but not subservient. The only way for Britain or any other country in Europe to become subservient was to become dependent on America for the most advanced technological that by the 1980's would dominate industry.

"France and we have a real independence and real respect from American and Russia," he [(Harold Wilson)] said.

In this age of super-states, Britain by herself was no longer in a position to exercise any really effective influence in international affairs. Neither could Europe without Britain claim a seat at the top table. But together they could be one of the giants.

These crucial negotiations (He [Mr. Sandys] said) will determine whether Europe, which has so long led the world, is still to play a decisive part in human affairs or whether we are to be content to fade out and leave America, Russia and China to shape the course of history. That, and nothing less, is the issue.
Mr. Heath said that he always believed that the main purpose of European unity was to find a solution to the German problem. It helped bind the Federal Republic into a democratic Europe and to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union. An entity should be created which redressed the balance with the United States and Canada. Europe would want to contribute more to its own defense. Britain and France could hold their own nuclear weapons in trust for Europe, perhaps with a committee similar to the McNamara committee in Nato.

Mr. Healy, the British Defense Minister said after today's meeting of the Nato Defense Planning Committee that it had been marked by a greater realism in strategic planning.

The ministers took today what Mr. Healy described as the almost revolutionary steps of taking into account not only Soviet capabilities but also Soviet intentions. They agreed that the collective NATO deterrent made an attack on NATO very unlikely in the present circumstances owing to changes in the world political situation, the Polycentrism [sic.] and the Sino-Soviet Debate.
(Defense Implications of E.E.C. Application) - There was already flexibility in East-West relations. Attitudes were changing and these brought opportunities for healing the East-West Division.

This process had already started in trade, in commerce and in culture. In diplomatic links at the highest level they were coming closer together.

These first steps in improving relations between the two halves of the Continent had only been made possible by the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and by the growing realization in both countries that mutual cooperation and understanding are not only possible but essential.

To Indians, this [Sino-Soviet rapprochement] would mean a loss of Soviet interest in India's welfare and security; to the Japanese, it could mean the realignment of a traditional enemy with a tiresome neighbor. For both it would mean further dependence on the United States. In the short term both countries have a certain interest in Sino-American tension, for it makes them a point of interest to the world's most powerful country; hence the profound ambivalence of educated opinion in both India and Japan about the Vietnam War.
Russian commitment to the North Vietnamese was again emphasized by Mr. Brezhnev in Sophia yesterday when he said that military aid going to Hanoi would be "fully proportional" to the current observable rate of American escalation. Even more dangerous and depressing is the prospect that the escalation has now reached a point that it can feed on itself, leading on down an ever more inescapable course not simply to more bombs, more deaths, more suffering to all those involved but to risks of Chinese involvement in the war.

Of course it is easy to understand how seductive a course of escalation can become. Behind all American thinking about the war in Vietnam lies the awareness that militarily the United States is the world's superpower.

It must therefore be Mr. Wilson's chief concern now to reaffirm that Britain accepts the Common Market as it has been developed since the Treaty of Rome was signed ten years ago; that Britain's object in applying is to further the economic and political unity of Europe, so that the old continent can stand up to the Americans and to the Russians; and that, by putting membership in the community first, Britain can ensure that her historic relations with the Commonwealth and the United States can be brought as a dowry, not as a liability, into Europe.
[Elaboration on UNEF withdrawal] ... the possibility of inadvertent warfare has been immeasurably increased and the all-important position of the Soviet Union is unstated.

The Soviet emphasis would appear to be on peace, however, the local communist newspaper reproduced today an article by the Novosti news agency saying that the Soviet Union was prepared to extend the necessary assistance to Syria, which was defending its rights of a peaceful construction of a prosperous society.

This is perhaps a good indication of Moscow's apprehension, and a call yesterday by the Soviet Ambassador and Military Attache on the Egyptian Minister of War was no doubt of considerable significance.

But worse than these never ending Inter-Arab quarrels is the Russian commitment to what it thinks is a suitably revolutionary government in Damascus. This commitment was strong enough for the casting of a veto last autumn [on UN condemnation of Syria]. It is still strong enough to impede any kind of agreement to maintain the status quo in the area, though some states, notably Lebanon, would be happier if some such international agreement could be arrived at. Worse, the Russian commitment is strong enough to convince Israel that any attempt to get effective U.N. decisions enforced will always be frustrated.
But the U.N. can only work against odds so long as there is no [sic] common interest in the peace of the area upheld jointly in Washington and Moscow. The Russians may not care for all the Arab forces that look to them for support, but they have been backing Syria enough to arouse the utmost Israeli suspicion. Similarly the Israeli declaration that their security depends on the Sixth Fleet has been enough to enlist other Arab countries on Syria's side in treating the United States as a backer of their enemy.

Much the best damper on growing belligerence would be the admission by the Americans and the Russians that they have more to gain by seeking the peace in the area than by responding to any claims made on them.

U Thant has already conceded the Egyptian right to demand withdrawal, and although diplomatic pressure will doubtless be attempted to preserve a United Nations presence, especially from Washington, it should be recalled that the Soviet Union has always considered UNEF as illegal.

It is also a fact that Washington's influence is less in Cairo than it has perhaps ever been, although one commentator here today suggested that this very fact might ultimately result in some fences being mended.
The really alarming thing about the present situation is the weakening of the peace-keeping U.N. Forces. If America and Russia were working in concert, and if the U.N. had the moral and physical authority it should have, they would all be better placed to intervene decisively. But they are hamstrung, and for this the war in Vietnam is to a very large extent to blame.

United States action is still more severely handicapped by Vietnam. The war calls all the time for more American men and more American resources. It makes it increasingly hard for Russia and other countries to be openly associated with even the most laudable American initiative in other areas. People argue that if the American calculations went wrong over Vietnam, why should they go right elsewhere? Europe too is weakened by its own divisions. Both America and Europe should reckon again the heavy price they pay for their preoccupations.

... Everything about this [Boeing 747] aircraft is on the grand scale. It seems almost incredible that it will be able to transport its loads over distances of 6,000 miles at 625 m.p.h. What is more, its seat-mile and ton-mile costs are one-third lower than those of current civil transport.

It will undoubtedly transform the air transport scene when it begins operating on international routes early in the coming decade.

Then there will be the Supersonics, led by the Anglo-French Concord -- or could it be the Russians TU-144? -- with the Americans for once following on behind.
President Johnson has decided that the 1950 Middle East Tripartite declaration with Britain and France is a national commitment requiring American action to prevent another conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

He [Mr. Brown] will urge the Russians to use their influence with Egypt and Syria to persuade them to refrain from acts of hostility, and will seek Russian cooperation in bringing the dispute to the Security Council.

Nevertheless, both the administration and Congress are beginning to feel rather pressed.

Senator Stuart Symington said that he had asked Mr. Rusk if the United States could defend both South Vietnam and Israel, but left it to the Secretary to reply.

The question raised by Senator Symington can be easily answered in the affirmative. Apart from the Sixth Fleet, there are more than 200,000 troops in Europe, and it will be recalled that some were used in the 1958 Lebanese landings. There are also five reserve divisions in the United States.
Nasser, who, though shrewder than most of the other Arab leaders is no less convinced that a final round with Israel has to come eventually, may have calculated that on balance the present moment has a lot to be said for it. American attention is distracted; the Russians are friendly; his reputation has always grown in crises.

He [Mr. George Brown] will urge the Soviets to use their influence with Egypt and Syria to persuade them to refrain from acts of hostility and will seek Russian cooperation in bringing the dispute to the [U.N.] Security Council. Unless the Russians can be persuaded of the urgency of averting a war in the Middle East, a meeting of the Security Council would serve little purpose, as Russia would veto any western resolution calling on Egypt to allow Israel ships to use the Strait of Tiran freely.

There is a growing realization that if aircraft construction is to survive in Western Europe to provide competition to the American Giant and a Russia which is clearly going all out for overseas business, it must be by avoiding needless duplication of research and manufacture, careful selection of products likely to have the widest appeal, and by submerging petty rivalries and suspicions.

Russia stole the last Paris show in 1965 with their giant helicopter and fixed-wing transports. They will almost certainly be flat out to repeat the sensation they caused then, and there are persistent rumors that they may spring a last-minute surprise by sending their TU-144 supersonic airliner. We shall see, but if they do, it would be a world first, at least nine months ahead of the Concord and three and a half
years in advance of the American SST.

They [the Russians] have already sent a satellite launcher of such dimensions that it took 21 lorries and trailers to carry it by road from Rouen.

Of the 57 American aircraft flying, one that is bound to attract much interest is the Ling-Tempco-Vought XC 142 ... other fascinating United States exhibits will be the Martin SV 55 lifting body and a full-scale mockup of the X-15 ...

Both Russia and the United States are virtually self-sufficient in their oil supplies.

Already the Americans are heavily involved in Middle East oil as a part of the normal operations of international oil companies.

The Russian situation is more complex. Its own integrity of supply is not threatened ...

It is surprising that none of the Middle Eastern guns has yet gone off. This must be taken as evidence that none of the principals ... and none of the outside powers involved want a war ...

America and Britain take the view that the Gulf is in some true sense international, and sound as if they were prepared to use force to keep it so. This is reasonable.

The West has all the time been explicitly committed to maintenance of the status quo, and the Russians also support it.

If the United Nations is not going to be allowed by the Egyptians to operate there, the Egyptians will be faced with the powers concerned to keep the Gulf open, and those powers include the United States.
By the same token, events have suggested that the Soviet Union is now the dominant political power in the area, even if the United States Sixth Fleet and what remains of Britain's Middle East Command give the West a military edge.

In asserting the freedom of navigation of the Gulf, Israel and Britain and the United States have the merit of international law behind them.

He was also studying a letter from Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, which was delivered by the Soviets and apparently counseled a peaceful solution to the crisis in less uncompromising terms than in the past few days.

Although the Americans have much military hardware on show, including their F-111, there seems to be a conscious effort to emphasize the peaceful uses of aviation. Russia too appears to be playing up the peaceful side of its aviation and space industry....

The game of "Spot the copy of the Western aircraft" is being played here with the Soviet exhibits - the Yak 40 looks like a mini-Trident - isn't that one there the absolute double of the VC-10? But how can anybody really be cross with the Russians when beneath their gigantic rockets they have a Balalaika orchestra dressed in light blue cossack smocks and wearing astrakhan hats?
The objective of President Johnson's policy in the Middle East became much clearer over the weekend. To prevent war, with or without United Nations assistance, he has offered Israel an American commitment to maintain its economic viability.

... Mr. Johnson is understood to be prepared to guarantee the delivery of all essential imports, including oil.

... Anglo-American contingency planning for the naval escort of ships through the Strait of Tiran is still going forward, but clearly Mr. Johnson has decided against an early forcing of the passage.

Assurances [to Israel] received from Washington and from London are regarded here [Tel Aviv] as so emphatic as to be worth waiting for.

In this [Knesset speech] he [Mr. Eshkol] said that there had been firm commitments, and the Israeli Government expected effective action from the great powers in the near future. Israel was deeply impressed by the American determination to free the Gulf of Aqaba for shipping.

I went to Moscow at that time (he said) and during my talks with Russian leaders, I was convinced that the Soviet government, in spite of their public statements and one-sided approach, were very concerned about the Middle East situation and anxious to help prevent it getting out of hand.
Originator - Louis Henen - May 31, 1967 - Page 8

Keep records of every agreement, arrangement and understanding, and preferably notarized, because in this age of computer memories and microfilm files, the United States cannot be trusted to keep them - that is records not commitments.

There was no question of it - without the benefit of a treaty, and therefore without Senate approval, the United States was fully committed to keeping the Strait of Tiran open and morally committed to support Israel.

Originator - Edward Heath - June 1, 1967 - Page 16

Another danger which they [the Government] could not ignore was that President Nasser and the Arab countries would come to believe that, having got rid of the United Nations Force, completed their own build up - now very substantial - secured Soviet support, in public at any rate, and, with Great Britain apparently in the process of withdrawing from certain Middle East commitments, and the United States pre-occupied in South-East Asia, this was the moment when they should finally attempt to liquidate the State of Israel from the Middle East.

Originator - Mr. William Griffiths (M.P. Labour Left) - June 1, 1967 - Page 16

Sources in the United Arab Republic said that the Central Intelligence Agency were playing a role there and that they were encouraging Israel to "Have a Go" at Syria. He was giving the House the views he had gathered during a recent visit to one of the contending parties [the UAR].
Britain should not take sides either with the United States or the Soviet Union, but should display an independent initiative.

Mr. Sandys (Conservative) - As for the Russians, they see an opportunity to become the dominant power in the Middle East, and they have found in Nasser the perfect tool for their purpose.

The Prime Minister's language [during the Commons debate] was even more carefully chosen. Sooner or later - and the Israelis insist that it must be sooner - the implications of this pledge, with which the Americans and possibly others are associated, seem bound to be put to the test. Presumably it means that if a British or American ship trying to enter the Gulf were stopped by force, force would have to be used in its support.

All trading nations have a natural interest in keeping shipping lanes open, but only a few of them have the strength to enforce their right. It is tempting for them to leave action to America and Britain, hoping thereby to remain politically uncommitted. Even if the British Government gets the clear declaration it is looking for - that the Gulf of Agaba is an international waterway - this will not do much to spread responsibility. The decision would still rest with Britain and America on one side, Egypt and Russia on the other.

The only way to avoid a collision is to get the two essential parts of peace-keeping machinery--The United Nations and Russia--functioning effectively. Mr. Wilson accepted the sincerity of Russia's restraining influence. What is needed now is some public Russian declaration that peace in the Middle East is of universal concern....

As for the United Nations, there is little chance of anything developing there unless Russia is more forthcoming.
Arabs can scarcely be expected to acquiesce in a secret agreement between General Eisenhower and Mr. Ben-Gurion, whatever its terms may have been, and they question whether Britain should do so either.

Dr. Makhos [Syrian Foreign Minister] left for Paris today on a trip which was officially described as dealing with "Anglo-American-Zionist Plans for wide-scale aggression against the Arab people." The phrase, though typically overdrawn, is presumably designed to appeal to the General's distrust of the Anglo-Saxons, but similar Syrian efforts in the past have been cooly received.

... the most important issue seems to be whether the big four can work together to prevent an open conflict or whether Russian support for the Arab cause will go so far as to encourage belligerence, particularly in the Gulf of Aqaba.

One hopeful sign is that Dr. Fedorenko, the Soviet Representative, in all his interventions and exchanges with British and American Representatives has said not a word about the Gulf of Aqaba. If this can be taken to mean that Russia does not want sovereignty to be asserted through belligerency, there is a chance that reason will prevail.

The Soviet Doctrine on the crisis was most extravagant, when "large thumping Russian warships are at this very moment passing through the Dardanelles." If carried to its logical conclusion, Russia's Navy could be bottled up in the Gulf of Finland forever.
The Egyptians are putting difficulties in the way of Mr. Edward Springer, the United States Consul in Port Said, it was learnt today.

As for the Soviet Union's part in the Middle East crisis, he thought Moscow was just as anxious to show restraint and avoid taking any steps that would lead to another world conflagration, as the big powers. Mr. Brown had accepted Moscow's sincere desire to see the end of a dangerous flare-up in the Middle East when he visited Moscow last week.

Soviet interest in using the Anti-Western feelings, generated in Arab countries by the present Middle East crisis, to strengthen the position of Communist parties at present banned there was clearly visible today in an extensive reprint of a resolution adopted by a meeting of Communists from Arab countries.

With Cairo and Damascus now heavily dependent on the Soviet Union both for diplomatic and economic support in their confrontation with Israel, the Russians are not wasting the opportunity to suggest that the alleged common challenge ... should also lead to a recognition of Communist parties and the formation of united fronts with them.
M. Gorse, Minister of Information, said after the meeting that Russia had replied in a courteous but negative manner on the opportuneness of a meeting at which the United States would be represented. But the Russian reply was not negative in the matter of contacts.

The French proposal, informed circles maintain, was originally misunderstood by the Russians as a suggestion for a high-level conference which the Vietnam war obviously made impossible.

...She [France] does not believe in the virtue of a general declaration on navigation in the gulf along the lines proposed to her by Britain and the United States yesterday.

"A declaration ... [he] said, "does not fit into the framework of the four-power contacts we wish for, and would not help matters forward."

This grim view is not universally held, but it is gaining ground because neither President Johnson or Mr. Wilson seems to have much idea how the crisis can be resolved peacefully.

Mr. Johnson has been content to let Mr. Wilson do all the talking ...It is just possible that he [Wilson] had very little to say.

The United States and Britain continue to go through the motions of diplomacy such as seeking support for the proposed declaration.... It has occupied considerable attention, but with little success.... There are officials here who do not believe that the declaration will be of much use. This conclusion was reached after Mr. Charles Yost, the American special envoy to Cairo, reported the failure of his mission. He was not received by President Nasser and was informed that the Egyptian leader was not interested in negotiation.

A suggestion of Anglo-American differences has been officially denied. ...Mr. Johnson is not going to be rushed by Israel.
"Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed," he [Robert McCloskey] said.

This declaration of strict neutrality was subsequently weakened by Mr. George Christian, the White House press secretary, who said that it had not been cleared by the White House.

It is as well that this should be understood clearly. Neither the United States, nor Britain even without the United States, could allow the destruction of the state of Israel, even if it proved to be the case that this war has been started by Israel aggression in the face of Arab provocation....

Yet equally there would come a point at which the advance of Israel would have to stop or be stopped. Right from the beginning the influence of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain is likely to be directed to making the parties cease fire. Israel is very vulnerable to American pressure, both economic and diplomatic. It would do Israel no good to gain a victory in the war which her own friends made her disgorge as part of the price of peace. The best that Israel can conceivably hope for is a gain of a limited kind, and even that will depend on negotiation as well as fighting. Just as the United States has an ultimate commitment to Israel, the Soviet Union may feel that she cannot afford to give up the interests of the Arab powers.
Whatever happens now, Britain and the United States will lose from this war because it is bound to alienate the Arab countries from us and push them further toward the Soviet Union. Both our countries are bound to be regarded as sharing Israel's responsibility for a war we have in fact done all we could to prevent. And in all the Arab countries, the question of whether Israel is the aggressor will be settled before it is asked. This puts in political risk the whole Middle East, the vast oil investments, and by a tragic paradox the future environment of Israel.

There is finally the question of world war.... What is necessary is that the great powers should act in concert, that the United States, the Soviet Union, and ourselves should work together for peace. If that is done, there is every reason to believe that the war can first be eliminated and then extinguished.

[The Foreign Secretary reporting on arms embargo on the Middle East]

However, I [Mr. Brown] am bound to warn the House the situation at the moment is that we have had no positive response from the Russians, and we understand the Americans are not placing an embargo. In this situation, it makes it very difficult for Britain to maintain the suspension of supplies which we have already unilaterally imposed.

[In response to question]

When I came back from Moscow I did not have the impression that any differences about Vietnam were being allowed to cloud the mind of the Russians about the clear undesirability of having a conflagration in the Middle East in addition to the one in South-East Asia.

I see no reason to believe that Vietnam had anything to do with this conflagration arising, although it may have had something to do with the passing of a cease-fire resolution in the United Nations.
Russia has privately assured the United States that it has no intention of becoming militarily involved in the Arab-Israel war.

The United States has given similar assurances that it will not depart from its announced policy of non-belligerence. This explains the prompt denial this morning by Mr. Dean Rusk of Egyptian charges that American aircraft were supporting Israel forces.

The Secretary was more incensed by this [the charges of air support] than by the closing of the canal, attacks on American diplomatic offices, and reports of moves to shut off oil supplies.

The Prime Minister took notice of Sir Alec Douglas-Home's warning that an unfair situation should arise if the Soviet Union continued to ship arms to the Arab countries while no arms were going to Israel.

... A proper settlement of the arms question should be on the basis of fairness and balance between the two sides. The British Government were in the closest touch with the Soviet Union over this matter.

It is a remarkable reversal in the obstinate attitude of the Soviet Union which has been espousing the Arab cause to the extent of refusing to accept anything less than a cease-fire coupled with a call on all the parties concerned to withdraw to the positions held by them on June 4 before the present hostilities.

During the past two days there have been protracted and patient talks in private between the 15 members of the [Security] Council, with Lord Caradon (Britain) and Mr. Arthur Goldberg (United States) doing their utmost to persuade Dr. Fedorenko [U.S.S.R.] to see the need for stopping the fighting.
A measure of restraint was noticed here today in Soviet press and radio reports of the conflict....

The Soviet Union has conspicuously avoided so far reporting an allegation by Cairo that the United States and British aircraft joined Israel aircraft....

The admission of Egyptian defeat is most obviously underlined by the charge of an American and British air umbrella having been put at the service of the advancing Israelis. The charge serves as political propaganda as well as excusing unconcealed defeat. ... The charge serves nevertheless to resuscitate the facts of the Suez campaign to excuse this second and much less excusable defeat. The shout of treachery coming from Cairo may help to rally other Arab forces in their hatred of the United States and Britain.

The impact of Israel's success on the major powers involved will also be unfavorable for Israel herself; no one succours a victor. Pravda's words yesterday were little more than angry barking on behalf of the Arabs and an expected condemnation of Israel. Yet the Soviet Union may not remain as calm as at present if the fighting goes on and if the Arabs continue to be defeated. The United States, Britain and France have proclaimed non-alignment in this war, though a non-alignment qualified by the promise that Israel could not be allowed to be crushed and extinguished by a massive assault. That risk has at least been removed and non-alignment could well change to stern pressure.

... New Russian and American pressure may be tough and unwelcome.
Such was the strength of feeling about Palestine that even arch-conservatives who hated the very thought of Russia began to see in Russia their hope of "Kosygin will not let Nasser down," they said. "You pro-Israel Western countries are neutralized by Soviet power." If the original optimism has been tarnished by news from the fronts, there will be many still who look to Russia to serve them.

There could be no clearer example of the disastrous effect that the creation of Israel has had on British and American policy in the Middle East that even conservatives will turn to Russia to defeat Israel....

If now the Arabs are defeated, the disillusionment and bitterness will be intense and it will be inevitable that Britain and the United States will be blamed. The charge that they provided air cover for the Israeli forces will not die easily.

The [U.N. Security] Council reconvened this afternoon at the request of the Soviet Union, which suddenly has become the most ardent advocate of peace in the area. Dr. Fedorenko introduced a motion couched in stronger terms than in the resolution adopted unanimously last night, and urged that it be adopted without further debate.

The really surprising feature of the latest development is the way in which Russia, ignoring Arab demands for condemnation of Israel and a simultaneous withdrawal of the forces of both sides to positions which they held on June 4, has gone along with the western view that a simple, straightforward cease-fire call is the first order of business.

There can be no doubt that this amounts to a reversal of the Soviet stand of supporting the Arabs through thick and thin.
In a statement this afternoon to the National Assembly, Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister, said the agreement reached between Russia and the United States had naturally been decisive in bringing about this agreement in the Security Council.

... throughout the discussions, the President of the Republic himself and the government actively followed them and in particular kept permanent contact with the Soviet Government.

The permanent representative of France to the United Nations, working closely with Russian and American colleagues, made a contribution to the final result which, I believe, it is fair to express our appreciation.

The Russian Government's failure to report to its people that Cairo was also refusing to obey the cease-fire resolution shows concern that the enormously expensive military and economic aid programs to Egypt have not given the Kremlin greater influence with President Nasser. Just as there may be some regrets in Washington that it was unable to restrain Israel from seeking a military solution so here the silence about Arab responses to the Security Council resolution agreed to by Russia must indicate a certain embarrassment.

The fact of the matter is that, by defying the resolution agreed to by the great powers, Egypt was defying Moscow just as Israel was defying Washington.

Although the Security Council resolution was the product of Soviet-American mutual interest, the Vietnam war continues to keep relations between the two at their lowest ebb for some time. Soviet frustration
about South-East Asia and what the Russians see to be consistent intrigue by the United States colours their thinking on other aspects of Soviet-American relations....

Originator - Elizabeth Monroe - June 8, 1967 - Page 11

In political Arabic the keyword is dignity. ... That is why when dignity collapses on account of their own political or military miscalculations, they cannot credit the reasons for failure and have to blame some scapegoat; this time it is Britain and America; next time, who knows, it may be the Soviet Union.

When to these shortcomings is added their chagrin that verbal Soviet encouragement proved just as insubstantial as some of their fathers found British encouragement, it is plain that Israel's need to create some rational relation with them becomes harder to fulfill than ever before.

Originator - Correspondent - June 9, 1967 - Page 1

Two Soviet warships, a destroyer and a small patrol craft, moved into the formation of the U.S. Sixth Fleet carrier task group this morning and began systematically harassing the American ships.

This action was undertaken in spite of a warning yesterday from Vice-Admiral William I. Martin.
Even if we had the means (which is doubtful), I do not think that at Westminster there was a sufficient will to guarantee any British intervention. The tough realists in Tel Aviv seem to have had the same suspicion.

To be fair, we have had precious little encouragement from the Americans who certainly do have the means, and we are more vulnerable than anyone to the sort of economic disruption which has already begun. But in the early uncertain hours of fighting, I found many M.P.'s quite sympathetic to Israel, who rather shamefacedly admitted that they hoped an Israel victory would rescue us from what seemed to be humiliating impotence.

Even in such a comparatively limited operation as testing the blockade of the Straits of Tiran we apparently felt unable to act without the Americans, and without moral support at least, from some of the other maritime powers. Considering the possible repercussions, this was no doubt military and political common sense. It showed however that our ability to help Israel was a good deal more circumscribed than we had implied.

The level of Russian arms supplies to Egypt in the days ahead will clearly be an important factor in the judgment that is made. ... There may be another phase of the war in which Hr. Brown will feel it worthwhile to make another attempt to get Russian and American support for a multilateral embargo.

In the Commons, Mr. Heath said that the four powers must play a part in the settlement of the root problems that had disturbed the Middle East ... He has in mind a Geneva - type conference involving the contestants and Russia, the United States, France and Britain.
One of the many facts which the big powers have to face is that the old policy of preserving a theoretical balance of power in the Middle East by the delivery of arms to both sides has been proved nonsense....

There is a lesson here which has an application wider than the Middle East. The modern arms produced by countries like America and Russia need a technological base to support them which only Israel, in this particular area possesses. This is a lesson which presumably will not be lost on either the suppliers or receivers of arms.

Russia's part in all this [two unanimous U.N. resolutions] is not clear. Of course the Russians see the resolutions directed primarily at Israel, but the Arabs are not going to be convinced this was the sort of Russian backing they had been led to expect. It looks more like the first recognition by the Russians that a new power situation has arisen in the area, and that this is going to mean a drastic reconsideration of Russian policy there.

It is only if the Russians, together with the Americans and more or less everybody else, agree that their recent policies in the Middle East have been shown up as bankrupt that there could be a chance for the U.N.

Alternatively there is little doubt that the politicians will make much of "British and American intervention," although not accepted universally as many believe, Britain's reputation may not be very high at the moment, but the United States is seen as the real villain of this particular plot.

It is still too early to judge what the permanent affect will be on Anglo-American standing in the Middle East.
The Soviet Union has played the part of peacemaker so far, but this has not endeared her to many Arabs. It may be that the Russians—who will not want to lose influence here—may recoup with a diplomatic display around the negotiating table.

Originator—President Johnson—Interlocutors—George Christian and Times Correspondent—June 10, 1967—Page 3

Mr. Christian said President Johnson's commitment to support the territorial integrity of all Middle East countries remained in spite of Israel's military victories.

Joseph Clark [Senator, U. S.] said: "The Russians are disillusioned about pouring $2,000 M in arms down a rat hole in the Middle East."

Originator—Norman Fowler—June 12, 1967—Page 4

"The difference between treatment of British and Americans and French is staggering. While Anglo-American stock is at rock bottom, the French ride high and both the Lebanese and Syrians will help. The French are a great people," a Syrian at the frontier said.

Originator—U.N. Correspondent—June 12, 1967—Page 4

Repeated, but unsuccessful attempts by Russia to arraign Israel and have her convicted of aggression and defiance of the cease-fire order marked the two protracted and passionate sessions of the United Nations Security Council over the weekend.

It heard heated invective by the communist and Arab representatives directed mainly against Israel but also against Britain and the United States. The council took no action on five draft resolutions including one by Russia seeking to condemn Israel.
The Soviet resolution is given no chance of adoption.

Of the five motions still before the council, the only forwardlooking one is that tabled by the United States last Thursday.

Unless the communist countries, headed by Russia, abate their vendetta against Israel, there seems small chance the American resolution will succeed.

Originator - Correspondent (Paris) - June 12, 1967 - Page 4

The fact remains, however, that the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council was obtained by direct agreement between Russia and the United States. The green teleprinter between the Elysee and the Kremlin may have played a part, but the red telephone of the White House [sic.] was for more effective. In attempting to win the peace in the Middle East, after putting a stop to the war, the two super-powers do not need the good offices of Paris - at least not yet.

The cease-fire resolution demonstrated that a lesser power like France, however great its prestige, does not, in the last analysis, carry sufficient weight with the superpowers when it comes to decisions of peace and war.

... A political consensus of the Europe of the six ... would enable it to speak with a voice which commanded attention in both Washington and Moscow.

... [in the long term] France will be in a strong position and the influence she can bring to bear on both sides may prove decisive in applying terms of settlement.

[Russia may link Middle East and S.E. Asia settlement.]

The hope is therefore expressed here that Washington will see the light at long last and will abandon its mad pursuit of a military victory in the Far East which can never be achieved and threatens the peace of the world.
Russia, however, seems anxious to make amends for failing to come to Egypt's defense and may help with long-term credits [for military equipment].

Public anger with the Russians for not supporting the Egyptians has led to a heavy police guard being put over the Soviet embassy as well as the British and United States embassies.

Arab anger is darting out in as many directions as last week's lightning attacks by Israeli tanks and aircraft. Syria called this morning for the destruction of all things British and American. In Egypt, stern criticism of the Soviet Union could be heard.

Colonel Boumedienne ... set off for Moscow to stiffen the Kremlin's palsied hand.

The economic war was espoused in Libya where American and British oil companies were paralyzed by a strike directed at alleged collusion between the United States and Israel.

All the signs are that Russia will continue to use nuisance tactics in an intensive effort to convince the Arab world of its zeal in championing its cause.

Tanisian circles here [Paris] believe that France is the only world power able to play an active part in a settlement because she alone enjoys the confidence of both sides.
The present explosion of Russia against Israel is regarded in Paris as an understandable and inevitable attempt to recoup some of the credit she has lost in the Arab world, and likely to remain purely verbal if Israel does not overplay her hand.

There is now, however, a long row to hoe before agreement, since the Russians have clearly not decided to cut their losses and jettison their political and economic investment in the Arab states, now that their military aid has been destroyed.

The economic sanctions threatened by the Soviet block will, of course, have little effect on Israel, ... but more menacing is the visit of President Boumedienne of Algeria to Moscow.... Compared with Egypt, Syria or Somalia which have all been favored with copious Soviet military aid in the past, Algeria must look to the Russians [to be] much the most hopeful military supply base.

Soviet diplomacy has suffered a most unexpected and stunning reverse, but the Russians in similar situations have proved themselves often enough to be as dogged as anyone.

In Cairo, President Nasser received the Soviet Ambassador amid indications that he has decided to tone down criticism of Russian inaction during the Arab-Israel war. Newspaper emphasis is now on recognition that the Russians stood with the Arabs while imperialists sided with Israel.

The Egyptian allegation that British and American aircraft had helped Israel to defeat the Arabs is now widely believed.
Most observers here [New York] feel that Russia is out to make a big propaganda exercise of its espousal of the Arab cause. It may even try to convert the [U.N.] Assembly session into a sort of conference of world leaders.

These developments [call for Assembly meeting] followed hard on the heels of a decisive defeat suffered by the Soviet Union and its Arab friends in the Security Council today. The council rejected two Soviet proposals.

In Libya there has been much tension and bitterness against the United States and Britain since the start of the Middle East crisis. In normal times public opinion in Libya has come, increasingly to realize the enormous advantage to the country of independence from Egypt now that the development of the Libyan oil fields has turned it into an oil rich country. There are undoubtedly some Libyans who will think twice, therefore, before knocking from under themselves the Anglo-American prop.

Clearly at the present time violent hatred of Israel is enough to submerge normal considerations of self-interest in Libya.

For the United States, the Wheelus base, which the Libyans also wish to be evacuated is an important aspect of United States and therefore of Nato strategy in the Mediterranean so long as heavy bomber aircraft remain in service.

Whatever its practical effect, today's meeting is regarded in Paris as a spontaneous tribute by Russia to the standpoint adopted by France in
the Middle East conflict and a recognition of the possible role of mediator that it opens for her. Whether it will in fact mean more very much depends on what Mr. Kosygin actually had to tell General de Gaulle and the lessons he drew from it.

... But there is little doubt that if Mr. Kosygin revealed an intention of meeting President Johnson and if Mr. Wilson also proves ready to journey to New York, General de Gaulle could not conceivably stay away.

There can be no talk of a Franco-Russian "concert" on the Middle East.... The official Soviet standpoint on Israel is considered far too extreme.

But this afternoon's talks confirmed General de Gaulle's impression that Russian intransigence is tactical and largely verbal and conceals a genuine desire to cooperate in reducing tensions in the area.

Originator - Louis Heren - June 17, 1967 - Page 1

The imminent arrival of the Soviet Prime Minister ... naturally commanded the most attention, but a decision, on whether Mr. Johnson should meet him ... is not likely ... until more is known about Soviet intentions.

There are good reasons why the ridiculous refusal of President Eisenhower to meet with Mr. Khrushchev in 1960 will not be repeated. Mr. Kosygin is clearly incapable of buffoonery and boorishness and a meeting could be arranged without fear of damage to diplomatic niceties.

Most of all, a return to the cold war is seen probable if the two super-powers do not act in concert or parallel.

They acted promptly to avoid involvement in last week's shooting war. There is an assumption here [Washington] that the Soviet Union will try to avoid grave political crises.
The combined effect of the emergency U.N. session and the Russian visit, each momentous, has been to force the Administration to make up its mind - and quickly - on what kind of settlement it wants in the Middle East. An end to Mr. Johnson's 'slow and cautious' diplomacy is at hand.

Lesser American officials are already working in the corridors and lobbies of the U.N. rallying support to blunt the Soviet charges of Israel aggression.

Originator - Louis Heren - June 19, 1967 - Page 1

In any event a super-power summit conference will be difficult enough for Mr. Kosygin to explain when he again comes under Chinese attack for revisionism and worse.... An assumption is that a meeting later on in the week will not be as provocative.

The key to the situation [divergent objectives of the Assembly meeting] is clearly in Mr. Kosygin's hands.

Originator - Editorial - June 19, 1967 - Page 9

The Chinese have moved much more quickly than was expected [in achieving thermo-nuclear capability]. They have, in fact, upset the timetable which provided the best agreement against precipitate action that could cost the U. S. up to [$40 billion] in the next ten years.

The Soviet deployment of ABM's in the Moscow - Leningrad area and perhaps along the Tallin line cannot be ignored. Nor, for that matter, can the pressure from those American cities which will not be defended by the proposed thin line.

... the further diminution of America nuclear superiority is expected to have unusual political consequences.
When Mr. Kosygin's journey was announced it was widely assumed that he was going to use the General Assembly for propaganda purposes, and try to win back there some of the influence and initiative Russia had lost in Sinai. The hope is that they will also use it to talk constructively about the future. Mr. Kosygin's past record gives some grounds for hope.

I was assured tonight by men close to the President that Mr. Kosygin was most courteous in refusing the diplomatic approaches for a summit meeting. There was no suggestion of a larger antagonism. ... there is obvious [U.S.] disappointment, but nothing more.

Having said all this, Mr. Kosygin apparently sought to soften the impact of his charges by saying that much depended upon efforts of the big powers.

There is some apprehension here [in Moscow] lest the United States draws the wrong conclusions from Soviet restraint in face of the "decisive surgery" carried out by Israel in the Middle East campaign.

The visit [of Soviet President Podgorny] surprised observers here [Cairo] and may be one of the first fruits of President Nasser's deliberate coolness toward Russia after its doubtful behaviour two weeks ago from the Arab point of view. Mr. Kosygin's speech in the U. N. has made relations a little warmer.
Originator - Nicholas Herbert - June 22, 1967 - Page 4

The presence in Egypt already of Marshal ... Zakharov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, bespeaks the Russians' continued interest in arming the Arabs and President Podgorny's arrival is in itself a sufficient political boost to put new spring in his host's step.

President Johnson, too, seemed intent on slighting the United Nations by choosing to make his address on the Middle East outside the General Assembly, just an hour before the first session began.

There was a report today that Arab countries might club together to give Jordan the budgetary aid it has been getting from Washington so that the King [Hussein] could abandon his dependence on the United States. It will have to be seen to be believed, but the King has earned much [sic.] kudos by his conduct during the war.

Originator - Louis Heren - June 24, 1967 - Page 1

Both men [Johnson and Kosygin] looked rather tired, but the impression left in their brief appearance before the press was that the meeting had indeed been good and useful.

The President was supported by a small, but powerful, delegation. ...

One Russian official, perhaps only half in jest, said that the Americans could not win all the battles - some ought to be left for the Russians.

The remark seemed to substantiate the American official assessment of the Russian mood after the violent changes in the Middle East which I reported yesterday. It was thought to be one of utter bewilderment after the rush of events.
While the Russians are doubtless interested in harassing the imperialists' supply lines and oil interests in the Middle East, they have learnt the bitter lesson that regional passions and unpredictable allies, however small, can threaten to embroil the big powers in a conflict.

Seldom, indeed, can the leaders of two super powers have met together with quite such an acute awareness of the limits of their power - not just in the Middle East but also in Vietnam.

They are too deeply engaged to withdraw and too weak politically to take control.

The Americans are in effect committed to preventing the complete destruction of Israel.

It is more likely that she is trying to gain time while working out a way to regain her credit in the Arab countries without repeating the whole disastrous cycle again.

Mr. Zubi [Syrian Minister of Information], while praising Soviet support for the Arab cause, also included a grateful reference to China, but in general the Chinese vitriol directed at the Glassboro meeting has been played down in the Arab press. Mr. Kosygin's continued insistence that Israel withdraw within its earlier frontiers is widely welcomed, perhaps with just a slight sense of relief by Arabs who were uncomfortable aware of the pressures that must be bearing down on the Soviet Prime Minister.
On balance the Russians are seen to have the worst of it diplomatically. With the Chinese breathing fire behind his back, Mr. Kosygin could hardly be expected to tear up his United Nations resolution.

Hence the American insistence on United Nations action. But Glassboro had another lesson for diplomatists. It concerns the changing anatomy of summitry.

There was a time when four nations, the so-called Big Four, made the ascent, and then there were only two, the super-powers. At Glassboro there was in effect only one and a half, because Mr. Kosygin was in no position to negotiate or amend the public Soviet positions. He is a member of the collective leadership and clearly not the most influential.

But at Glassboro Mr. Johnson had to talk to a man who could not depart from his brief without reference to Moscow.

The assessment here is that Mr. Kosygin is distinctly dove-ish; that, with Mr. Johnson, he would much prefer to spend more on social programmes than on weapons.

A leading article in the weekly journal Abroad says that now Egypt is more dependent than ever on Soviet diplomatic, military and economic support.

Tonight this resolution was given a favourable press reaction here [Moscow], suggesting that the Soviet Union will claim the credit for securing a call for an Israel withdrawal.

Russia demonstrated very clearly during the Middle East crisis that she could not countenance another fullscale confrontation with the United States.
The withdrawal from NATO was only drawing the conclusion of the evolving international situation and anticipating the American disengagement in Europe; the improving relations with the East favored our economic interests and tended to establish between Europe and Russia normal relations; the economic policy tried in spite of foreseeable difficulties to reinforce the productive structure [of the country] and to bring business where it could compete; the European policy aimed at building a Europe acceptable to all the partners and first of all to France (and who can blame us for that?)

Today though the situation has completely changed. Thanks perhaps in great part to the power showdown in 1962 in Cuba the two greatpowers have convinced each other that the risk of a direct confrontation is too great. Although they are engaged directly or indirectly in Vietnam in a new type of showdown, they are pursuing a policy of rapprochement that they hope will culminate in a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear arms. The Sino-Soviet conflict continues to remove all likelihood of a Soviet military threat. In these conditions, the notion of a danger has completely dissappeared from the minds of Europeans and this has resulted in a slackening of self defense efforts.

The fact remains that the tests [underground nuclear tests] conducted at present are not so much to make new arms but to improve existing ones therefore, one needs a very small number of tests to obtain the results or to break the precarious military balance [between the USSR and U.S.].
The cold war between Ryad and Cairo just as the battle between Royalists and Republicans is but a secondary aspect of the conflict. It is the greatpowers who are conducting, usually through third states, the great Arab battle where the stake is the control of a region fabulously rich in petroleum.

The speech comes at the end of a week marked by sign of a certain deterioration in Soviet-American relations. In the time when America was governed by Eisenhower or Kennedy, whose belief in peace cannot be questioned, there would have been a certain advantage to see the greatpowers engaged as they are willy nilly in a direct dialogue. Didn't they always find an exit door. With Johnson, who we just learned recently confided to his daughter that he would perhaps go down in history as the man responsible for the third World War, one is less certain.

In spite of the caution shown by the Russians and Americans one still cannot see how a compromise will be reached seeing that the other members of the conference have expressed objections and reserves to certain views held by Moscow and Washington.

Washington's government is quite irked. First, because any Arab-Israel conflicts places it in front of an impossible choice. Secondly, because it would have been unthinkable until recently that the United Nations Secretary...
General could have taken as important a decision as the dissolution of the international forces [in Egypt] without first consulting the United States.

Washington is only interested in Vietnam, and for some time now has no other policy in the other regions of the world than that of avoiding conflict. Hence her present passivity.

The Soviets have shown extreme discretion, and have nothing to lose from the departure of the blue helmets whom they never helped finance nor approved in principle.

We believe [E. Rouleau] that the efforts of the four great powers aim towards the same goal [to stay calm and moderate] even though unfortunately they are not always crowned by success. In any case, we believe firmly that the participation of the USSR to all agreements is indispensable and for this reason we do not see the need to refer to the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 which is anachronistic.

Washington is beginning to worry about a possible hardening of Soviet diplomacy.

If one expects the USSR to declare herself completely in accord with Nasser's initiatives, certain diplomats, in London as in Washington, do not despair to see her exert a moderating influence on Cairo, if for no other reason than she does not wish to add to the dangers of confrontation already too numerous in other parts of the world.
The USSR's and United States's understandings of the situation are so divergent, it is almost certain they will find themselves in confrontation on this matter [definition of their roles]. It is true that Washington and Moscow are in favor of peace, and that the Kremlin, as reported to us by Henri Pierre, will act towards conciliation. Nevertheless, in the Tuesday broadcast by Tass, the USSR calls Israel and the imperialist milieu the initiators of the crisis and justifies the Egyptian decision to recall the international force [as right]. Is it not carrying Machiavelism too far and wouldn't the Soviet troika have any less dangerous means in Europe to achieve a similar result? [i.e., bring Washington to a second Yalta, to settle Vietnam]. Wouldn't the very harsh language the Russian diplomacy uses with its Western interlocutors be the counterpart of the restraining advice it showers on its Arab friends? Or could it still be another attempt to obtain recognition of the reality of its influence in the Middle East which the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 pretty well established as a western stronghold.

There is the manifestation of a general hardening of the American position. It seems the American "hardening" is in good part the result of Mr. Kosygin's refusal to participate in a joint U.S. - Soviet action proposed by Mr. Johnson in an effort to prevent a confrontation in the Middle East.

...that is, the vital interests of the United States that are today imperiled, and not only in the Middle East.
Taking into consideration the international situation and particularly the war in Vietnam, it is extremely compromising for the Russians to associate themselves with a diplomatic action together with the Americans. In particular it is not from the Soviet side that one must expect any initiative especially when American and British boats are in a state of alert in the Mediterranean. In short, an active cooperation with London and Washington at this state would seriously compromise Soviet policy in the Arab World.

As to a four party conference, the moment does not seem at hand: the Soviet Union has not yet answered the French proposal [of a four power conference] endorsed by the United States and Britain, and she [USSR] appears to be in no hurry to compromise herself by siding with the Western powers, especially when the Chinese are denouncing once more her collusion with imperialism.

Before 1914, diplomats would have despaired of a peaceful solution. For 20 years they have learned to live dangerously, to consider crises as substitutes for wars, and to trust in the (relative) wisdom of the two superpowers. In spite of everything, the reasons for their equivocal optimism have not disappeared.
Originator - Francois Mitterand - May 28, 29, 1967 - Page 2

The proposal of a four power conference has the advantage that it invites Soviet Russia to participate in the elaboration of a peaceful settlement in a region of the world where Western international accords had up to now excluded her.

Originator - Pierre Mendes-France - May 28, 29, 1967 - Page 2

The Soviet Union can do a lot to prevent the war. She has given us the example a few years ago with the spirit of Tashkent, by preventing at the last minute an acute conflict and by exerting influence where she could to re-establish the status quo ante. She can exert a positive influence on the Egyptian Government to de-activate the menacing infernal machine. She can facilitate a solution in the United Nations if she accepts in this circumstance to renounce her veto right [just as the other great powers must do too].

Originator - Andre Fontaine - May 31, 1967 - Page 1

The danger of an armed confrontation implicating at least in the background the superpowers, remains serious; and one cannot very well see what the present debates in the Security Council, marked by vain polemics, can do to prevent it.
To put an end to all these fantastic and insinuating rumors, the French representatives in Lebanon and Syria reaffirmed to these governments that it was not the intention of the French government to impose a point of view but rather, that its aim is to prevent "the incompatibility of the great powers from manifesting itself at the expense of Middle Eastern States."

The Soviet Union finally rejected Tuesday night the French proposition for a four party conference in order not to look like she is entangling herself along with the Anglo-Saxons in the local affairs of the countries [Arab, Egypt, and Israel].

The American opinion also seems to exert a great pressure on Mr. Johnson to act. Washington, though, has good reasons to hesitate considering the Vietnam War and the desire to avoid a gathering of Arabs states under Nasser's wing.

How can the USSR take part with the U.S. to protest the "strangling" of Israel by the Agaba blockade when not only Haiphong but all of South East Asia continue to be systematically destroyed? The problem of Vietnam raises in Communist countries, as well as in other parts of the world an increasing amount of emotion. It is probable that in this international atmosphere the USSR plans to tie the Israeli problem with that of Vietnam.
If the Vietnam war had not created a deterioration in Soviet American relations the Middle East crisis would probably not have blown up. It doesn't matter whether the Russians pushed Nasser or that he led them. The essential fact is that the Middle East crisis serves them. It allows them to open a second front in relation to the Vietnamese conflict. In South East Asia they cannot do anything other than increase their material shipments alongside the American escalation. To intervene more directly would mean World War. On this point the rules of co-existence still apply: the two big powers do not fight face to face.

Thus, halfway paralyzed, the Soviets saw their influence diminish daily in the world. The Israeli dispute gives them the advantage.

One can deplore that the weak [nations] are thus reduced to pawns manipulated by the strong [nations].

One of the keys to peace in the Middle East is in Hanoi.

The small ray of hope presently felt lies in the Soviet attitude. By various channels, the Kremlin indicated Thursday that it did not completely reject the French proposition for a four power meeting, but that it put aside the idea of a high level conference that is morally unfeasible due to Vietnam.

The questions in the Middle East can only be settled by an entente among the four great powers.
According to the Americans, the U.S. had become used to General de Gaulle's attempts to eliminate the American influence in various parts of the world. They also had become used to the fact that the General does not carry a similar campaign against Soviet influence because he thinks Moscow has definitively adopted a defensive posture due to her diplomatic defeats, her domestic problems and her conflict with Communist China.

Americans and Soviets are engaged, the one with Israel the other with President Nasser, to such an extent that it would be very difficult for either to accept a defeat [of their wards]. And already the Soviet Union lets it be known that if the U.S. intervenes she will too.

This taking of sides is in a way reassuring: it seems to show Moscow's desire to leave the conflict its regional aspect and prevent it from becoming a superpower confrontation.

Washington was worried at the rising bids. Luckily, there is the other side to this enigmatic coin (Soviet naval buildup): the sixth American Fleet and its dazzling two carriers which pack, for sure, according to the correspondent speaking from one of the decks, at least several times the military potential of the Russian naval force advancing in the near waters.
Those acts (closing Suez Canal; cutting off oil) are decisions that gravely affect the Western economies and that risk, if they are sustained, making it very hard for Paris and Washington to maintain an official neutral position. A move by the Soviet Union would by this fact, become critical and aggravate matters. Still, the great powers should push them [Arab and Israel] to co-exist instead of sporting their conflicts, as they too often have done.

It is possible that American diplomacy might have improvised at the last minute encompassing solutions of a "last recourse" [speculations are current that the U.S. had a plan of readjustment in the M.E.] so as to compensate by a spectacular act, the languishing attention accorded the Middle East since Vietnam had become the focus of the East-West confrontation.

The only certainty is that the American leaders continue to lag behind the events and that the Vietnamese obsession has dulled their minds more than it has immobilized their means.

Numerous diplomats from the United Nations feel that the present crises has lasted too long and that now the two big powers, conscious that events might get out of hand, have decided to settle the problem themselves.
Originator - Alain Murcier - June 7, 1967 - Page 8

The U.S. does not have to fear the drying up of Arab oil. The some 10 million tons that they import from this region is relatively small compared to their domestic supply which nears 400 million tons a year.

Let's take note that on her side the Soviet Union is largely self-sufficient.

The situation in Britain is much less stable. Given the anti-capitalist and anti-Anglo-Saxon mood of the present Arab propaganda it is very likely that these [British] will not come out unscathed, whatever the outcome [of the crisis].

Originator - Alfred Grosser - June 8 - Page 3

What good does it do to stockpile conventional [classical] and nuclear arms, what good does it do to mobilize outstanding thinkers to map out subtle strategies if one is incapable of putting an end to the resistance of an impoverished Vietnamese enemy; if one is incapable of saving the democracy or democrats of the Greek client; if one is incapable of scaring little Egypt in time? And the other greatpower - she is unable to help her Hanoi ally, and has she not been shown unable to control her Cairo protege?

Originator - News - June 8 - Pages 4-5

Now that the Soviet Union has clearly indicated her intention by her vote in the Security Council not to let herself be dragged into a direct confrontation with the U.S. over the Middle East, it is hard to see how the war can be prolonged too long, in spite of Peking's announcements of a Soviet American collusion and of the messages sent by Chou En-lai to Nasser, Atasi and Choukiri to continue the fight.
In this regard, it is no less revealing to note Moscow's silence about the Arab's accusations of aid London and Washington have supposedly given Israel's Air Force.

All seems to indicate that the USSR's policy in this region of the world has not yet felt all the repercussions of its turnabout.

Originator - Phillippe Ben - June 8, 1967 - Page 1

Soviet leaders have concluded that they were committing a grave error by supporting President Nasser - their turn about is still more radical than that of Mr. Khrushev in October 1962 during the Cuban crisis, and is the typical attitude the Soviet Union adopts to limit the damages when it appears she has bet on the wrong horse.

Originator - A. Clement - June 8, 1967 - Page 4

It would be just as presumptuous and premature to want to establish the balance sheet of the Israeli victory as it impacts on American policy. It [the victory] has shifted too many pieces on the international checker board to be able to grasp them quickly. What was expected, i.e., a reduced scale of an East-West confrontation along the Cuban lines of 1962, did not occur: the two greatpowers have come to an understanding - to amiably liquidate the consequences of a military bluff of unprecedented inconsistency.

Originator - Editorial - June 9, 1967 - Page 1

The fact that [Arabs] remained insensitive to two resolutions voted by the USSR, one of which she authored, shows that the Kremlin is far from having its way with governments that place their self esteem high enough that they don't let themselves become simple pawns.
The evolution of the military situation has forced Moscow to urgently ask for an immediate cease-fire.

Moscow certainly has brought them [Arabs] resolute verbal support but when it comes to action she tries to prevent the internationalization of the conflict and a direct confrontation with the U.S.

Like yesterday in Cuba, the USSR has shown today in the Mediterranean that she refuses to get into a direct confrontation with the U.S. It is certainly wise. It is wiser still for the greatpowers to find the way, once and for all, to defuse the more or less explosive situations that at any time creates risk of conflict.

In fact, Moscow and Cairo had other cards to play just as effective as a military reconquest. The strategic and economic importance of a united Arab world with a fierce will to resist, specifically, would have brought appreciable pressure.

In the immediate future it is believed that the Soviet Union will strive to the utmost to re-establish her impaired positions in the Arab world, especially since Chinese propaganda did not wait long to denounce this "new collusion" with imperialism.
What is to be hoped is that the greatpowers understand that they have nothing to gain from the general confusion that would inevitably follow the fall of the Rais.

But the spectacular attitude of the Romanians who refused to associate themselves with the common declaration, confirms that the Eastern bloc has ceased to be monolithic.

The question really is to secure the Soviet position in the "third world" in general. That explains the forceful talk and the firmness observed in Mr. Fedorenko at the Security Council.

Vietnam had condemned the American diplomatic imagination to a quasi lethargy.

The conflict in the Middle East forced American policy to free itself from this passivity.

The first reaction of observers was to consider that the Israeli victory, while demonstrating Arab impotence and Soviet weakness, allows the U.S. to exploit the situation in Vietnam...
But she [USSR] feared being dragged in an operation beyond her control that would have fatal consequences for world peace.

She [USSR] apparently refused to back up her accusations against the U.S. and Britain [help to Israeli Air Force] not because she believes help wasn't furnished but because such an endorsement would leave Moscow no other choice than a military retort that would launch a world conflict.

In the Middle East, U.S.-Soviet peaceful co-existence has won, five years after the Cuban crisis, a second victory. It is, in spite of what some think, good news for everyone. The situation would still be more satisfying if Europe had participated in this success. But for that, as Chancellor Kiesinger has just clearly indicated, it would have to be first united. She would then be able to balance out the action of the big powers. Washington and Moscow have for the most part good-will. But, they tend to let themselves drift in the disputes of the "small fry" and they wait until the danger of a general embarrassment to put them in place.

The shake up of the Atlantic Alliance has been one of the causes of international anarchy. It has encouraged Arabs and Soviets to take more audacious positions.

The Soviet Union has not only shown that she did not want to go to war for her Middle Eastern friends but has also tied her hands in the diplomatic game by voting in the Security Council for a resolution which ordered a cease-fire at the front lines. Of course, the Kremlin is trying by all conceivable diplomatic means to be forgiven by the Arab States.
The USSR is looking first to regain the lost ground in the Arab World. To regain lost ground in the Arab world, to re-establish Soviet prestige and position in the "third world," such seem to be the concerns of the Soviet leaders in the aftermath of the cease-fire. Thus, the evolution of the American attitude, now favorable it seems to readjustments in frontier lines [to the advantage of Israel], erases the only factor that could exert some pressure on Israel.

It is hoped that the U.S. as affected by this crisis as the Soviet Union will not see in Moscow's caution an encouragement to push their advantage in Vietnam.

The best trump card that Israel has in this business [setting frontiers] remains in the accumulated blunders of the Soviet-Arab coalition.

But the Soviets are playing for long-term stakes. Recourse to the U.N. is one of the ways by which the government in Moscow seeks to regain lost ground in the Middle East as well as its reputation as defender of the "third world."
Several among them [diplomatic observers] did not conceal that in their opinion the U.S. was a much more faithful ally than the Soviets since the 6th fleet would have intervened, if Israel had been in difficulty, while Moscow did nothing to spare them a terrible humiliation.

One of the reasons why Mr. Johnson did not jump at a meeting with Mr. Kosygin is that a "summit" dialogue between the two powers would bring up the question of Vietnam, a subject on which the U.S. has less and less to offer and not much more to gain from.

Like in the Cuban missile crisis, the Kremlin exhibited without a moment of hesitation, an imperturbable "damned egoism" from which her minor and blind allies are now going to incur the consequences.

The debate is not cut off, even if the Soviets have taken the lead, as it is believed, by installing around Moscow and Lenigrad an antimissile system.

The Chinese thermonuclear explosion complicates the Soviet task. It is a troublesome event that bounces the conflict [M.E. War] in the direction of the "third world." It remains to be seen if this [exploding bomb] will push Kosygin to a hardened line to maintain the Soviet positions threatened in Africa and Asia; or to the contrary, if it [the bomb] will incite the Kremlin leaders to consolidate a policy of coexistence with the West.
The true losers in this war from a military standpoint, are perhaps the Russians who not only crammed the Arab armies with equipment that only weights them down and deceives them about their real strength, but also infused the armies with a rigid defense tactic whose efficacy has not been proven.

But it is very certain that the behavior of the Americans and Soviets during this long drama that has shaken and continues to shake Israel and her neighbors has been overall very prudent - unlike their respective attitudes in the crisis in these parts of the world in 1957 and 1958.

It is even quite paradoxical to see that the meeting occurs while the Vietnam War goes on and amplifies, and it had been repeated hundreds of times that the war prevented such a meeting [as at Glassboro].

For Moscow, the Kosygin-Johnson meeting is a norma' manifestation of the policy of peaceful coexistence which is referred to specifically in the Central Committee declaration and which remains a pillar of Soviet diplomacy.

All that can be said is that if Europe did exist there would probably be a third and very useful partner at the Glassboro table.
THE BDM CORPORATION

LE MONDE (CONTINUED)

Originator - O. Julien - June 28, 1967 - Page 1

This [Cuban Missile] crisis and the stir it created perceptibly modified Soviet-Cuban relations. A loser in the missile crisis, the USSR shows herself more and more conciliatory with Washington. But this peaceful coexistence is more and more openly contested by Cuba.

There was a time when small nations felt the need, in order to reinforce their prestige, to go on a pilgrimage to Moscow - the great moderation of Soviet diplomacy has caused an unexpected reversal: knowing she is bitterly criticized, the USSR sends her leaders to Cairo and Havana to explain her attitude, defend her positions, justify herself to these suspicious little countries, and to try to convince them that she has no intentions to let them be sacrificed at the altar of peaceful coexistence.

Originator - Agence France Presse - July 1, 1967 - Page 3

Mr. Fidel Castro on his part will have explained to the Soviet Council the necessity of avoiding a new defeat and the damage that this loss of face, coming after the missile crisis back down, causes Latin American communism.

Originator - Philippe Ben - July 2, 3, 1967 - Page 1-3

In the United Nations it is considered now that what originally was an Arab-Israeli confrontation has become a big Soviet-American confrontation. And one notes that France who was neutral at the beginning of the crisis is progressively moving in partnership with the USSR to occupy vis-à-vis that country a situation comparable to the one Great Britain has in relation to the U.S.
One feels here [in visiting Damascus] that there is the necessity to make a balance sheet of the military and civilian needs of the Arab States after the war; that there is also the need to evaluate the efforts and the economic and political options taken. More and more one gets the impression that the Soviet assistance to Arab countries, far from being unconditional, will now depend to a large extent on the firm resolution of the leaders of these States to definitely choose the socialist path.....

In taking the initiative of this extraordinary session, the USSR has in effect put at stake her influence in the entire world. The argument that one has "to save a greatpower from humiliation" is in itself rather humiliating but it is undoubtedly intended for certain countries that are not at all communist, which goes to prove that coexistence is making progress in spite of the vicissitudes encountered in its realization. Nevertheless, this preoccupation will not suffice to save the stake for the Soviets.

At the present time it is remarkable that the Soviet Union continues to spare the U.S. [role] in the Middle East crisis.

It is incontestable that at present Soviet diplomacy is very pre-occupied by the general evolution of the situation and by the feeling, actively encouraged by the Chinese, growing around the world that she [the Soviet Union] is doing nothing to counter the rising American tide.
For a few years, indeed, the behavior of the great powers has changed for understandable reasons that can be recalled: the balance of terror has pushed them to limit as much as possible the occasions for a confrontation; the progressive realization of the fact that the third world represents a burden rather than an asset; and the rapid development of petroleum resources of the Soviet Union preventing her from absorbing the production from Middle Eastern countries who, as a consequence, have to essentially rely on Western countries for the sale of their oil.

But one must see in that the sign of her anxiety due to the uninterrupted scoring by the U.S. at the expense of the Soviet Union. According to him ... the Soviet Union will find herself cornered someday and react like Kennedy did in the Cuban affair when the threat was at the doors of the U.S. From this comes an action that aims more and more overtly to come to the Kremlin's aid and help re-establish a compromised prestige.

Without having stepped in the arena, President Johnson is the winner in the Middle East crisis.

[Ref. Glassboro meeting] In 1967 it is no longer the Russian judging the American [as in Vienna, 1961] but the opposite, and no one denies that.

The U.S., ahead of events, did not have to lift a little finger to find themselves in the winner's camp and impose themselves as the inevitable intercessor for the vanquished.
The Russians and their friends will very probably try again to put the emphasis on the evacuation of Israeli troops. But the Americans and their supporters seem more determined than ever to prevent Moscow from transforming her defeat into a semi-victory.

Once more the USSR has put her friends in a difficult position....

Once more she has given the impression of abandoning in extremis her proteges who believed, wrongly, that Soviet support was given unconditionally.

For many years we repeated that the Kremlin had its way in the diplomatic game, that the Kremlin started and stopped crises as it saw fit and that in the final analysis it seemed to benefit from the operations it had undertaken. Such an analysis was probably founded when the USSR commanded a monolithic Socialist Camp. It [the analysis] is much more questionable since the Chinese rebellion has shaken Russian authority in the international communist movement.

Perhaps she [the USSR] will now try by diplomacy to regain lost in time of danger and avoid having the Arab states pay the consequences of their military defeat.

Hasn't the moment come for her [Soviet Union] today, if she wishes, to re-examine her policy, to adapt it to the means she wants and is able to carry through?
Will Europe Become a Military Peripheral Area for Washington?

Political observers see the significance of the ministerial conference on Tuesday in that it could be decided whether Europe will continue to play a central role in American security policy or whether it might be treated just like other possible crisis areas. The leading powers of the alliance made the assumption that aggression by the East is improbable. Detente will play the leading role in the future strategic concept. The theory of Detente makes it possible for the Americans and the British not only to justify their true predilections; it could make it possible for these powers to recommend the so-called rotations of units to the alliance as the focal point of a new strategy and insist that this be accepted as binding for all NATO states.

NATO Planning Takes More Expensive Weapons Systems Into Account

It is argued in SHAPE that the possible adversary will have to avoid a mode of aggression to which the entire NATO could have to react immediately. The adversary would rather attempt a military-political isolation of the member states. Therefore, geographically advantageous areas for the adversary are most threatened. If the adversary could accomplish faits accomplis, it would be difficult to motivate the alliance in the face of a unified counter-action. The NATO headquarters concludes, therefore, that NATO needs above all the protection of its flanks.

NATO Adjustment

Detente is included in strategic concepts as an (important) element. It is no longer regarded as important to cover every contingency. This has to lead to a revision of old conceptions. The decision to rotate American troops has been silently accepted even before the politicians
recommended this motion. Does this spell capitulation to the demands of the strongest power in the Alliance, the United States? Everything happens against the background of the atomic "Overkill-Capacity" of the superpowers whose continuing friendship has to be the objective of our diplomatic endeavors.

Originator - Correspondent - May 10, 1967 - Page 1

"NATO Strategy Changed in Paris; Goodbye to Massive Retaliation."

Won't the responsible politicians opt for a more elastic strategy? Its name is to be military rotation. It is consonant with the American concept of "flexible response."

From Schroeder's remarks after the conference it is to be concluded that the German side made several concessions. Nevertheless it is recognized on the German side that a strategic redeployment of American Forces by the air [airlift] and a transfer of troops across the sea [sealift] could constitute a phase of deterrence. Thus conceived, the conference of ministers came close to the American concept in which the military instrument has to be a part of "Crisis Management."

Originator - Correspondent - May 11, 1967 - Page 1

"Belgian and Canadian Troops Also to be Withdrawn"

Without dramatizing the situation, it could be said that the United States no longer accorded Europe a special place in its military planning. The old continent will, to be sure, remain under the protection of American atomic power. However, the political use of these weapons, it is said, has become exclusively the national American task.

Originator - Editorial - Nikolas Eenckiser - May 13, 1967 - Page 1

"Equating Security"

[Post Mortem of the NATO Ministerial Meeting]. These decisions [flexible response] speak of the abandonment of earlier principles such as automatic military reaction and "forward defense." They introduced the notion of a mobilization under the concept of "rotation" - about the role of which, as a crisis depressing or crisis escalating instrument, one could debate. It
looks at the flanks of the Alliance and seems to leave the center to take care of itself. It accepts silently that in the Federal Republic of Germany there are questions of how military efforts could be diminished instead of, as was formerly the case, to think about how the resulting gap could be closed through European forces. (This, obviously, addressed to U.S. and British force reductions).

Originator - Adelbert Weinstein - May 16, 1967 - Page 2

"The 'Strategic Rotation' as NATO Strategy"

[About flexible response and U.S. troop reduction] This plan has met with skepticism among several European governments. They contend that with the reduction of conventional forces one can no longer speak about classic deterrents. The reduction of nuclear units on the continent weakens forward defense. The credibility of Western security efforts is affected. Aside from that, the nuclear reduction has a fundamental meaning. The reduction of the nuclear arsenal in Europe may be materially unimportant; however, the Americans are signifying by this the introduction of another nuclear policy.

With "strategic rotation" America has not only changed the old strategy for Europe; but in Paris, last week, a new NATO was created. We may have doubts about the effectiveness of a changed strategy. However there can be no doubt that if in this strategy, which seems to us inadequate, the promise of the United States to preserve our security cannot be lifted, we should not absolve Americans in Washington of this responsibility.

Originator - Correspondent - May 17, 1967 - Page 3

[Today in the Cabinet], Schroeder explained that he did not believe it to be sensible to transform the Bundeswehr, especially not to reduce its present strength. Any government to give up the nuclear components; he believes, should also have American assurances that the nuclear participation of the Federal Republic will be maintained. The Defense Minister also expressed
reservations which exist in Germany regarding the concept of so-called "political warning." Schroeder also wants support for the thesis that all risks for the potential aggressor must remain incalculable.

Originator - Correspondent - May 18, 1967 - Page 4

Schroeder explained to the Legislative Defense Committee that the credibility of deterrence must be maintained at all levels also at the nuclear level. The forces assigned to the NATO Supreme Commander in Europe cannot be significantly weakened. In the [Ministerial] discussions the demand for deterrence played a special role.

Originator - Otto Diepholz - May 18, 1967 - Page 4

The actual value of this measure is as yet difficult to judge. Overall one sees the practical application of these maneuvers. The fact that the Americans adopted this concept at this time is attributed principally to domestic political pressures of American Senators.

Originator - Correspondent - May 20, 1967 - Page 4

There is need for collective diplomatic action so that the Arab-Israeli conflict will not get out of control. Johnson decided to act on this report, after the Syrian government made it known that it is assured of Moscow's support.

Originator - Correspondent - May 23, 1967 - Page 4

The fact that the Soviet Union responded positively to the initiative from Washington and that it would like to avoid a new conflagration in the Middle East, was noted in Paris with satisfaction.
For the time being, all hopes for peace depend on the mission of the Secretary General of the UN in Cairo. The American Ambassador to the UN, Goldberg, there assured that the U.S. Government would not take any hasty steps which could impair the peace efforts of U Thant.

It is feared in Washington that the Security Council could easily be paralyzed by a Soviet veto, should it officially take up the conflict. A diplomatic way out in the sense of the efforts of the UN Secretary General would be the best solution to the conflict, which otherwise could set the entire Middle East aflame and could make the intervention of the superpowers unavoidable.

Should this conflict develop into a military confrontation, the United States would face a difficult problem, because they took the obligation with Britain and France in a declaration of 25 May 1950 to maintain stability in the Middle East and to intervene against any use of force between the states of this area. This complication is of course known to the Soviet Union and could create arguments on the Soviet side to prevent the situation in the Near East from coming to a head.

An Egyptian attack on Israel would, as believed in Beirut, inevitably lead to a military intervention by the United States and pose a danger of a wider conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

So far nothing argues for the case that the Soviet Union would be prepared to meet such a dangerous test of power.

One of the best British experts on the Middle East, the recently dismissed Chief Editor of the "Jewish Observer," reminded a radio audience on Tuesday
that Moscow as well as Nasser have surely been warned by Washington that the United States is obligated to defend Israel and has a detailed plan to meet this obligation, which is based on the American fleet in the Mediterranean.

Originator - Correspondant in Beirut - May 25, 1967 - Page 1

The guarantee signed by President Johnson to maintain peace and territorial security of the states in the Middle East, and the Soviet threat that any and all attackers in the Middle East would meet resistance by the Arabs and Soviet Union, have taken the crisis in the Sinai, which was started by President Nasser, out of the realm of the Middle East. However, the danger that a local problem could develop into a larger conflict is regarded as small by Arab news centers in Beirut.

Originator - Editorial - May 25, 1967 -

The most reliable guarantee for peace in the Middle East will have to be seen in the situation of the two nuclear superpowers. They are in this area of the world both competitors and accomplices. They compete for the favors of the governments they have subsidized, and, without saying so, find themselves wishing again to restrain the aggressive drives of their clients. Viewing this common interest behind their differences, Bourguiba noted some years ago, that a war over Israel could not last more than five minutes, because then the two superpowers would have to intervene.

Originator - Correspondant in Washington - May 27, 1967 - Page 1

The Israeli Foreign Minister has not said what the Israeli reaction would be to a continuation of the blockade. Washington also has not announced any concrete measures, after the fundamental declaration of President Johnson on the American commitment in the Middle East and the international character of the waterway in the Gulf of Aqaba. Units of the Sixth Fleet cruise in the Mediterranean. They have put 2,000 men, Marines, on board; without, however,
pointing to any American expressions of possibly overt pressure tactics. No American confirmation could be obtained on the mining of the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Originator - Editorial - May 27, 1967 - Page 1

Nasser is only an aide of Soviet leadership. His demonstration is the consequence of Soviet decisions, in which are combined the instabilities of the war in Vietnam, the British weakness in the Arab oil zone, and the competition with China. What has happened in the Middle East is a test of power—fundamentally a test of power with the United States. One would assume for now that Moscow is only prepared to run a calculable risk, that it aims only at limited objectives.

Originator - Correspondent - May 27, 1967 - Page 2

Washington has promised to guarantee the inviolability of the [Gulf of Aqaba] lifeline of Israel. Furthermore, America is obligated by the recently confirmed Agreement of 1950 to guarantee peace in the Middle East....

The military instrument of U.S. power is the 6th Fleet cruising in the Mediterranean. Equipped with nuclear weapons, as the strongest power in this area, it plays a decisive role.

Originator - Editorial - May 29, 1967 - Page 1

Even if one cannot see any force with which Moscow could drive the 6th Fleet out of the Mediterranean, it is nevertheless, increasingly and completely clear in this crisis that the Kremlin wants to develop systematic, firm, and lasting power political positions in the area of the Mediterranean.
and the Middle East. The public and diplomatic attacks against the 6th Fleet may, among other things, serve as justification of the entrance of Moscow into the Middle East that may be intended to solidify Moscow's position with its Arab partners.

The perspectives, which supposedly are the basis of the Soviet policy, make it improbable that the U.S.S.R. wants a war between Israel and its neighbors with all its incalculable risks. But the time has come to take a firm hand on the reigns of diplomacy.

America wants to use all political and diplomatic possibilities to diminish the danger of a conflict in the Middle East. But all the efforts would be doomed in advance if the military might of the 6th Fleet stationed in the Middle East were not in the background.

To be sure, the Soviet Union has already overtaken Britain in naval power and possesses with its approximately 2 million tons, the second strongest navy in the world. America commands over 4 million tons. But the other NATO states alone have together still a naval displacement of about 2 million tons.

...It is important for the 6th Fleet to command sea and air superiority in this critical area, so that it can impose what is momentarily its political task - to guarantee the coexistence of Israelis and Arabs and to preserve the peace in the Near East.

The Syrian President has followed the Egyptian guests in Moscow. He also will be received with demonstrative friendship. He also will presumably be advised not to drive the confrontation with Israel to a hard war. War would bring to the Soviet Union incalculable risks. It could only endanger the objective which Moscow has set for itself: as friend of the Arab states against Israel, to be perceived as a friend of the
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (CONTINUED)

Arab states against Israel and above all to impose upon Israel and its guarantors in the West a moral defeat.

Originator - Correspondent - May 30, 1967 - Page 4

Government circles in Washington announced that Soviet warships are cruising in the Eastern Mediterranean and are apparently watching the movements of units of the 6th American Fleet in this area. Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral William Martin is on board his flagship, the missile cruiser Little Rock, on the way to the area east of Crete, joining a fleet consisting of three aircraft carriers, a cruiser, and three destroyers.

The Soviet Union is reportedly, according to American naval circles, stationing two or three U-boats, a cruiser, three or four destroyers, and several spy trawlers, as well as a tanker in the Mediterranean.

Originator - Correspondent - 31 May 1967 - page 4

"Moscow alone is able to put the reins on Nasser's activities, but there are severe doubts about whether the Russians are interested in peace by which they could lose the favor of the Arabs."

The American Government has warned Israel to refrain from making its demand for free passage through the Strait of Tiran a cause of a test of strength; and the Israeli Government has exercised the recommended restraint. Now it should be, according to diplomatic circles, a matter for the Soviet Union to exercise a similarly restraining influence on the Arab states so that even without a formal declaration of the Security Council there might be more time for diplomatic dealings.
George Brown said the British Government placed its greatest weight on a peaceful solution through the efforts of the United Nations. But one must look the fact in the eye that U Thant's efforts could be blocked through a Soviet veto.

The United States is showing itself hesitant and cautious seeking to solve the crisis, if possible, within the tracks of the first round of the UN which failed. This is understandable enough considering the dangers which are present. But the world should not get the impression that Washington can watch idly the strangulation of Israel. The Soviet Union must understand the American situation which everybody knows, that America cannot afford to tolerate it [Israel's strangulation] anymore than it could tolerate a direct military attack on Israel without intervening therein.

In other words, Johnson [is said to have] exploited Wilson's penchant for world politics skillfully and with some pleasure, to put him into the forefront, so that any failures of British initiatives, which have no chance without American backing, will be attributed to the originator [Britain], not to Washington.

According to British sources, there are increasing signs that the American Government is backing away from its promise to Israel in 1957, to keep the Strait of Tiran open. If this be the case, then the Declaration, initiated by Wilson, [on the freedom of passage through the Strait] would remain a useless piece of paper.

But Moscow stands on Nasser's side without reservations, according to commentary of the Soviet Government paper. Thereby it escalates the crisis.
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (CONTINUED)

This time, the target is Washington. Moscow seems malevolently determined to go to extremes, not only with the tragedy in the Middle East, but also the tensions of the world are heating up.

Originator - Editorial - June 7, 1967 - Page 1

Since there can be no doubt regarding the American and British denial [to have militarily intervened], the allegation can only be seen as a frustrated attempt, at the last minute, to motivate Moscow to military intervention. And the exhortation of the populations of Arab states to destroy all Western facilities can only have the aim to lure the Western powers away from their neutrality....

For the Western powers, especially the United States, the success of Israeli weapons facilitates the continuation of their neutrality, the basis for efforts toward an ending of the war.


An Israeli ... looks up and says painfully: "I am very much afraid that President Johnson will be chicken." Chicken means "chicken" ... The chicken-game was a test of courage. Is the American Government chicken?

Cold silence descended upon the daily press conference of the State Department, as Speaker Robert McCloskey read a well-formulated declaration on the just erupted war in the Middle East: "Our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed."

Is this neutrality in a conflict which could cost Israel its existence - Israel which can show at least as many American guarantee-declarations as can the Federal German Government and West Berlin? Is this neutrality in a war [involving a nation] which is as close to the hearts of Americans, especially those on the eastern coast, if not closer than the German people are?

Can the strongest power of the world be neutral when a country is threatened with extinction - a country to whose establishment as a state it was a godfather, and whose territorial integrity it guaranteed in so...
many declarations that even American officials were amazed when these guarantees were brought to their attention by the Israeli Foreign Minister during his visit to Washington?

Of course, the Soviets should not have any doubts about President Johnson's determination, in view of the escalation of the war in Vietnam. But precisely this conflict, which Johnson believes he could foreclose with his detente efforts, might have prompted the Soviets to allow the escalation of the crisis in the Middle East to open war.... As is known in Moscow, there is little inclination in the United States, after the experience of the Vietnam conflict, to take its commitments regarding another crisis situation so literally that it would lead to isolated American engagement in another war.

Informed circles admit that the rapid Israeli military success was the main reason for Soviet cooperation. Moscow evidently preferred to take its diplomatic losses rather than a continuation of the war ... in which Egyptian loss of territory would increase from one hour to the next.

The bilateral [US-USSR] determination to localize the war in the Middle East and not to let it become a test of strength between the superpowers, is said to have facilitated agreement between the UN ambassadors and, therewith, within the Security Council.

The American engagement on behalf of Tel Aviv has so far exposed a position which is more than hesitant. America's hesitation can be explained. The superpower carries the responsibility for world peace. Nevertheless, the American policy can cause anxiety among all the friends of that superpower - less because the President in the White House has failed to demonstrate solidarity with Israel, more because declarations and reality in
the American strategy are not consistent. The American policy of maintaining peace departs from the thesis that the decisive means for preventing war in the atomic age is the management of the crisis situation. By crisis management, Americans mean the ability to control dangerous political situations in time so that the crisis does not degenerate into a war. . . .

Crisis management is seen as a permanent obligation of the world powers to prevent the crisis from breaking out. This may seem to some as pure theory. But it is a nucleus of the current American strategy which is also employed for NATO: the great nuclear powers deter each other with nuclear weapons. Under this umbrella of terror, they control local crises. But in two cases the model did not work according to its promise: in Vietnam and the Middle East.

Schmidt spoke of the danger of the Soviet Union being able to show that the US cannot meet its obligations in several parts of the world at the same time. Here, the world political balance is in question: should it shift against the United States, the Atlantic Alliance would be without substance. The crisis affects the Atlantic system.

Bonn is looking expectantly and at the same time confidently to the American President.

[Reportedly] American policy vis-à-vis Israel, which was confined to verbal assurances since the beginning of the crisis, but which did not support Israel with concrete measures in the question of the blockade, resulted in a loss of Israeli confidence in the United States. The main task of the new special committee, which President Johnson formed from members of the National Security Council, is to explore possibilities for an American contribution to long-term solutions of the crisis, despite the deteriorating position [of the US in the Middle East].
Now that the fire is under control ... the world powers will take stock of their mistakes, not only in the Middle East, but also in their general firefighting procedures. The slogan is "Detente." Of course, this will not rest on any objective scientific examination of the lessons for world peace. On both sides, hawks and doves have been prepared since the first hours of the crisis to use its fortunes and developments as the battlefields for their own conflicts.

An interim assessment of the crisis, however, shows both ideological extremes to be equally wrong. ...

The bad conscience in Washington is amply justifiable: it has gradually withdrawn from the Middle East and, thereby, virtually invited [taunted] the adventurism of its world-political rival. Pointing to Vietnam does not mitigate this verdict; it reinforces that verdict. The burden of world power is heavy; but inescapable. Moscow stands accused of trying to ride a tiger which it could not subdue. It tried again, after Cuba, to redress the balance of power in its own favor.

During the night of Thursday to Friday, the Israeli Prime Minister explained in Tel Aviv that the political war was still before Israel. During the time from May 15 to June 5, he said: "First we were asked to wait two days. Then we sent Eban to the US and were called upon to wait another 14 days. President Johnson promised great things. They told us that 40 to 50 naval powers would sign a guarantee concerning the free passage through the Strait of Tiran. We analyzed the situation and noticed that there were only a dozen - finally, only two countries - and after that, perhaps, only one - Israel. I said once to President Johnson that he will be busy with other things if we are attacked, and that the nature of the guarantee is very unclear.
A summary assessment, leaving aside the Israeli success in the war, shows that the rapid termination of the war in the Middle East is attributable to the joint decision of both superpowers to limit the conflict. Obviously, the language of nuclear rationality was transmitted over the Hot Line which connects the Pentagon and the White House with the Kremlin. The measured declarations of America and its non-intervention have convinced Soviet statesmen, if not the Arab governments, that Washington did not wish to intervene, but rather to localize the conflict. Moscow reciprocated American constraint (if not in its words), at least in its own actions. ... 

[But] at which time would Moscow have been prepared to support a cease-fire resolution in the United Nations if the rapid military successes had been attained by the Arab states and not by Israel? Would Washington have been able to stand [idly] by if Israel had been faced with [the end of] its state existence by Arab victories?

... During the decisive phase of the conflict, the Alliance was once the witness to collusion between the superpowers, who alone can avoid the Big War. Neither Washington, nor Moscow, wanted a repetition of the Cuban crisis.

Is it at all possible to steer a crisis or to consult an alliance such as NATO, if the interests of the superpowers are at risk? This question, too, was not clearly answered in Luxembourg [Ministerial Conference].

[Concerning Kosygin's then forthcoming visit to the United Nations]

The Soviet Government, itself exposed to a lack of confidence in Southeast Asia, needs, after its disaster in the Middle East, a visible
and elegant gain in prestige. In this, the General Assembly of the United Nations can be useful: Moscow is going to put up a big show. Israel stands before a raging defamation storm.

The General Assembly serves as the amplifier.

Originator - Editorial - June 19, 1967 - Page 1

Despite all the sharp agitations for the Arab cause, there is much to argue that Kosygin wants to avoid extreme confrontation with America.... Kosygin did not come to New York to challenge the American superpower in earnest, just to please Nasser. Extreme provocation is certainly not his intent.


In Washington there is a great deal of understanding for the anxieties which have arisen in Europe over the evident failure of the technique of crisis control in a part of the world which was fundamentally assured of international commitments (to security).

Nevertheless, it is said by officials in America, that the guarantee for NATO states, including the FRG, is unchanged and valid, and that the European countries who could not, unlike Israel, end a local conflict successfully with their own strength, should not give second thoughts to the consequences of a similar crisis in Europe. This assertion must be based on an analysis of the events in the Middle East. Washington made no alusions about the possibility of war after Nasser's first steps. ...

On the American side, there are emphatic assurances that the United States would not have permitted the Arab states to destroy the existence of Israel, if the course of the war had been otherwise. Such retrospective
assurances may sound academic. Nevertheless, the Americans hold firmly to the thesis that they and other interested powers did not have the time... to organize intervention... which would have assured the freedom of passage and the territorial inviolability of all nations in the Middle East.

Originator - Editorial - June 24, 1967 - Page 1

The Soviet Premier, Kosygin, had to overcome great obstacles before he could finally meet with President Johnson. He hesitated for days... then agreed only at the last moment to the earlier initiatives from Washington. The obstacles have at least two origins: the suspicions of the Arab governments, and the instructions of the collective leadership in Moscow.

Originator - Adelbert Weinstein - June 28, 1967 - Page 2

This view of the power struggle in the Orient would be incomplete if it did not include the reality of the atomic bomb. The great powers will not let it come to a world war. Nevertheless, it seems as though classic war has become the tragic prerogative of the small ones. The strategy of crisis management demands a sacrifice from the sacrifice. Our diplomacy has to be geared to this future.

Originator - Juergen Tem - June 30, 1967 - Page 1

One meeting does not make a peace. That much skepticism can be taken from the words President Johnson brought back from the Glassboro Meeting. Agreement on concrete questions was evidently very limited. This was particularly the case with respect to Vietnam and the Middle East crisis. There is no expectation that this could change.... The contradictions between Washington and Moscow over these two conflicts... remain deep and strong. Against those, even the "spirit of Glassboro" will be inadequate.