MANAGEMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT IN WAR - ISSUES FROM THE VIETNAM WAR - ETC (U)

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**Management and Mismanagement in War - Issues from the Vietnam War**

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**Abstract:**

This essay addresses the mismanagement of the war in Vietnam through a study of the principles of management that were violated, overlooked or neglected by key military and civilian leaders in Washington and Saigon during the conduct of the war. Specifically, the paper discusses objectives and measurements, organization, bureaucracy, unity of command and unity of direction as those management concepts applied to the American involvement in the Vietnam War. Likewise, the paper provides an overview of the effects of service roles, missions, doctrine and parochialism from World War II to the
Vietnam era. Suggested management improvements for similar future conflicts are provided. This essay was selected to represent the USAWC in the Chairman, JCS Annual Individual Strategy Essay Competition.
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BY

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Numerous recognized principles of management were either violated, neglected or simply not considered during America's prosecution of the war in Vietnam. My purpose is to address several of the more significant of those principles, relate them to the conduct of the war and indicate how better management might have influenced the outcome of the war.

It is not my intent to produce a political science treatise or a history essay that deals with subjects more appropriate to either type paper, except by inference or as an adjunct to my primary purpose of discussing management issues and concepts.
I. OBJECTIVES AND MEASUREMENTS

Administration leaders persistently failed to clarify U.S. objectives in concrete and specific terms. Uncertainty and ambiguity in reports were therefore bound to emerge, for no one could be certain what he was measuring progress against or how victory would be defined.

Many sources argue the proposition that the American government did not clearly articulate our national purposes and objectives for entering and continuing to prosecute the war in Vietnam. As a result, American military commanders were subsequently unable to establish appropriate goals and objectives by which to manage the war. Accordingly, there was an inefficient and ineffective application of finite resources and an almost inevitably indecisive outcome of a war that apparently achieved neither political or military desires.

How are objectives defined? Why are they important in terms of management practices? And why were they missing from planning developed in Washington and Saigon during the war? The New American Webster Dictionary defines objective, in part, as: "a goal, aim ... dealing with external facts and not with thoughts ... unbiased." A fundamental principle of management is that a manager at any organizational level must establish objectives to enable him to accomplish requisite planning to identify and focus available resources and to permit him to measure progress. Both classical and neoclassical management theorists recognize the need for stating clear objectives. Gulick, for example, recognized that to effectively focus personnel resources through the
division of work, efforts must be coordinated by effective authority, employment of efficient command and control, and utilization of clearly defined objectives at all levels within the organization. Likewise, many other principles of management articulated by Henri Fayol cannot be effectively utilized without first establishing objectives and using them in concert. Some examples similar to the military's principles of war include: unity of command, unity of direction, subordination of individual interests to the general interest, effective understanding and use of the scalar chain, et al.

Many neoclassical theorists such as Talcott Parsons, also found the establishment of objectives at each level of organization necessary to contribute to the larger organization, their members and to insure interaction with society as a whole.

Unfortunately, the inability of government leaders to specify national political objectives for the war resulted in the subordinate levels of military management adopting what were to prove to be "artificial" or incorrect objectives. As stated, these objectives were necessarily inadequate because they weren't based on appropriate objectives stated by the superior level organization. This requirement is succinctly stated by Clausewitz:

It is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much of it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

Unlike that of the United States, the primary objective of the
North Vietnamese was simply to win; to bring the South Vietnamese government and peoples under the auspices of the government of North Vietnam. In stark contrast, the opposite was of course true concerning the purposes of the United States:

The result was that American political objectives were never clear during the entire course of the war. University of Nebraska Professor Hugh M. Arnold, examined the official justifications most often cited for America's involvement in Indochina for 1949 through 1967. Compared to the one North Vietnamese objective, he found some twenty-two separate American rationales. They can be grouped into three major categories: from 1949 until 1962, emphasis was on resisting Communist aggression; from 1962 until about 1968, the emphasis was on insurgency; after 1968 preserving the integrity of American commitments was the main emphasis.

Even more unfortunately for us, the understanding and acceptance of our support of the Vietnam war by the American body politic was to prove to be the "gordian knot" for the government. As Summers astutely notes, in previous wars of this century we had committed forces to conquer a known evil as opposed to the Clausewitzian dictate that we manage or wage war as an extension of politics with a demonstrable and accepted (by society) purpose or objective. To the contrary, the societal base of support in this country eroded steadily as the war was prolonged.

But what of our military objectives for prosecuting war? Left to their own devices, that is without a clear political objective(s) upon which to base military objectives, the following goals were adopted by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV):

To assist the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain an independent South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment.

A better statement of military objectives would be, simply put: to conquer, to destroy, to subdue, to attain, or like words that embody the techniques or principles of war. The aforementioned MACV objective was
obviously a confusion of levels (government versus military) of organizational objectives that inhibited the efficiency and effectiveness of the military. As some authors indicate, because of the confusion of objectives, the military primarily attacked the political task of nation building and secondarily addressed the military task of defeating external aggression (the Viet Cong vice North Vietnam). Likewise, an over-emphasis on measurable results obtained for use in McNamara Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) models, caused political and military leaders to develop objectives based on a "low cost, high return, low risk" strategy. Seeking to support the PPBS mentality and techniques caused many commanders to develop artificial measurements of progress such as body count, numbers of rounds expended, roads secured, percent of the population controlled by the government, and numbers of enemy base areas neutralized, which failed to relate to an organizational objective. Statistics became an end unto themselves, as did the briefings where they were aggressively and "impressively" presented, and worse, as Kinnard states: "perhaps the most serious criticism of the measurements of progress was that in the aggregate they did not really tell how the war was going." It has subsequently been shown by Kinnard that many General Officers who served in Vietnam agree that such statistics and techniques were not a valid way to measure progress in the war. It should also be noted, that this organizational dependence on statistical activity, coupled with the notable lack of clearly defined military objectives, assisted in a marked expansion of the size of military bureaucracy in Saigon. Patterns of organizational accommodation suggested by Presthus, dramaturgy, "The Peter Principle", and group-think as well, all came into play as the bureaucracy created an
environment whereby procedures complimented procedures, internalization of organizational design and growth was rapid, and there was little recourse to the objectives the organization was created to accomplish.
II. ORGANIZATION, BUREAUCRACY, UNITY OF COMMAND AND UNITY OF DIRECTION

Although we did not obtain unity of command in the Vietnam war, this failing was not the cause of our defeat but rather the symptom of a larger deficiency—failure to fix a militarily attainable political objective. Without such an objective we did not have unity of effort at the national level, which made it impossible at the theater level to obtain coordinated action among the ground war in the south, the pacification effort and the air war in the north. 'Unity of command,' our definition states, 'obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal.' But the reverse is also true. Without a common goal it is impossible to have coordinated action or to obtain either unity of effort or unity of command. Our own definition predicted the outcome. Without unity of command we could never have 'decisive application of full combat power.'

If there were no clearly stated objectives at the national or functional military command (MACV) levels for our involvement in the war, there was no less problem with the design and operation of the organization responsible for conduct of the war. A major factor that caused both Americans and Vietnamese to operate such conventional, diffuse, and fragmented management structures was our gradual involvement in the conflict.

Ambassador Komer notes that in part, especially in the period before U.S. intervention, this was a consequence of the gradualism inherent in the U.S. approach to Vietnam. We slid into Vietnam by stages, in contrast to World War II or Korea. Not until late in the day did our problems appear so overwhelming as to demand exceptional effort to deal with them. But even then we remained reluctant to take the obvious managerial steps which some advocated.

Quite obviously many of Fayol's points concerning principles of management, as well as Gulick and Urwick's notes on organization were violated in both Washington and Saigon. These points, concerning princi-
ipally unity of command, will be addressed later in this paper.

What was the structure of the organization at the national level? Difficult to define at best. As Komer notes: "The bureaucratic fact is that below the Presidential level everybody and nobody was responsible for coping with it in the round." He later adds: "Though the U.S. military at any rate was quite responsive to civilian leadership, that leadership not only lacked machinery for exerting control, . . . If anything, the problem was not overmanagement of the war from Washington, it was undermanagement." While I agree with the essence of Komer's conclusions, it should be pointed out that some key military strategic as well as tactical decisions were reserved to the President (Johnson primarily) himself, or at best to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the major portion of the war. President Johnson, in fact, took a great deal of time receiving detailed daily briefings on the war, as did his staffers in the White House, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The problem therefore was not that any official did not take time to study the war, but rather that there was no management structure created to advise and operate the war as had been the case with World War II and Korea. The peacetime management structure of the National Security Council, White House Staff, and the heads of the various agencies concerned practiced business as usual during the Vietnam episode. Komer notes that with few minor exceptions "not a single senior level official above the rank of office director or colonel in any U.S. agency dealt full-time with Vietnam before 1969." He then further notes with dismay that peacetime management structures resulted in "the use of mostly peacetime planning, programming, financial, resource allocation, and distribution procedures, . . ." There were the numerous meetings,
conferences, briefings, seminars and staff inputs that mark the operation of the American governmental bureaucracy but no central focus of Vietnam policy was vested in a single managerial staff or agency. In further addressing this process, Ambassador Komer states:

Nor was there any lack of field visits, meetings, conferences, study groups, and staff inputs. President Kennedy sent several fact-finding missions to Vietnam in 1961 alone. The periodic trips of the Secretary of Defense to Vietnam were another important device for management review and proposing decisions. They linked together Washington and the field. But such informal liaison and occasional ad hoc committees were the order of the day. The war management process was basically one of ad hoc interaction between the key agencies, with little formal machinery created, especially for systematic planning, programming, and follow-through. Below the top there was very little structure for pulling together the many strands of counterinsurgency war.

Because there was no high-level (above NSC interagency committee status) government coordinating body to manage the war didn't mean that there was a dirth of information or recommendations from agencies represented in Vietnam. Quite the contrary, the bureaucracy of each responded with ever-increasing amounts of data as our military and political involvement in Vietnam deepened. The size of the Saigon (and other in-country) staffs of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), The Agency for International Development (AID), as well as the State Department and a host of others, grew to enable each to produce more information for their parent headquarters which was then, in the main, consumed by the hierarchies of their own organizations. Parkinson's Law was evidently operative within those agencies. Admittedly "tongue-in-cheek," there remains a certain validity to Parkinson's "theory" that is difficult to deny given a post-Vietnam perspective:
The thing to be done swells in importance and complexity in a direct ratio with the time to be spent... Omitting technicalities (which are numerous) we may distinguish at the outset two motive forces. They can be represented for the present purpose by two almost axiomatic statements, thus: (1) An official wants to multiply subordinates, not rivals and (2) officials make work for each other.19

The foregoing seems all the more correct when I consider an old adage in the intelligence community that notes how fond intelligence personalities are of writing and exchanging data in lieu of providing (and justifying) it to some decision maker or to an operator within the government.

Concurrent with the development of the bureaucracies within the agencies participating in the war, some of the implications of the bureaucratic models addressed by Selznick, Gouldner and Merton, can be observed. Of special interest are Selnick's comments (model) concerning the delegation of authority and its unintended as well as its intended results.20 In general, this interaction of organizational elements likewise reiterates some of the reasons why the bureaucracies grew and prospered under the guidance of their headquarters in Washington and Saigon. Institutionalization of deviations within the unique environment of operating in one's own bureaucratic field of expertise was reinforced by the process of "co-opting" those who initially rejected new behavior, or by rejecting those who did not accept those new norms. As Selznick indicates:

Co-optation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of our organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence. This is a defensive mechanism, formulated as one of a number of possible predicates available for the interpretation of organizational behavior.21

What of the specific command arrangements for the management of American military forces in Vietnam? In May 1950, Secretary of State
Dean Acheson requested that Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall establish a small military assistance advisory group to provide economic aid and military equipment to the French and Vietnamese. The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina was organized on 17 September 1950 and military aid agreements (the Pentalateral Agreements) between the United States, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and France were signed in Saigon on 23 December 1950. This advisory effort was managed by the Headquarters, U.S. Army Pacific, the Army component of the unified command, the Pacific Command, both headquartered in Hawaii.

This management structure followed the traditional doctrine for the operation of unified (and specified) commands based on the National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1958:

> The three military departments, under their respective service secretaries, organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to unified and specified commands... Effective application of military power requires closely integrated efforts by the individual services. It is essential, therefore, that unity of effort is maintained throughout the organizational structures as well. This goal is achieved through two separate chains of command—operational and administrative. Operational control runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commands. The administrative-logistical chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments and then to the service components of the unified commands... The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have defined the duties of unified and specified commanders who use the forces provided by the military departments.

It is important to note that the foregoing concepts also apply to a "subunified command," the type of management structure which evolved in Vietnam, i.e. a headquarters and command comprised of more than one service but reporting to a unified command and not to the JCS directly.

The change in mission for U.S. forces in Vietnam, from economic to operational advice and training, is traced to an American and French
agreement of 13 December 1954, following the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 8 May and the signing of the Geneva Accords on 20 July. We were further committed to the political future of South Vietnam by the (final) withdrawal of the Headquarters, French High Command in Vietnam on 28 April 1956. On 5 May 1960, the MAAG was increased to 888 positions, the number of foreign (French and American) advisors in Vietnam at the time of the Accords and cited as the maximum number permissible at any future time. On 8 February 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam was established as a subordinate unified command under the auspices of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command. This is the point where American management structure and objectives became further clouded because the MAAG still existed to provide assistance to the Vietnamese armed forces. Finally, on 15 May 1964, the MAAG was dissolved and the MACV assumed its functions. However, the logistics support was still a nightmare of complexity and an invitation to mismanagement with fifteen separate logistics systems supporting operations in Vietnam, supplying more than 150 locations. By mid-1966, the American command structure in Vietnam had evolved into its basic configuration that would remain to manage the war, with minor modifications, until the conflict terminated, to wit: naval forces were assigned to the Hq U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam and to the Pacific Fleet; III Marine Amphibious Force to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; air forces to the Seventh Air Force and the Pacific Air Force; and ground forces to the U.S. Army Vietnam and to its higher echelon the U.S. Army, Pacific. All forces were under the operational control of General Westmoreland in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, MACV. Although apparently manageable under the foregoing structure, many issues concerning control of American and Allied efforts
were never satisfactorily resolved. Among them: operational control of all military forces, to include Vietnamese, vested in a single-manager; centralized direction of Allied logistical support; integration of American political, (represented by the Ambassador's "country team"—those agencies represented in the U.S. Mission), advisory and military efforts; and most importantly, recognition of the role of the American military commander as Chief of Mission in lieu of the Ambassador.

Now to further address the pacification effort. After various arrangements whereby pacification (or rural reconstruction or rural construction, etc., as such activities were variously titled) was managed both by the American Embassy and the military as well, it was finally placed under the single-managership of the staff of the MACV Commander. Supervised by the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Staff, this was an obvious step when one considers the benefits of unity of command concepts and inclusion within a "total" management by objectives program developed by General Westmoreland. This was obvious because the MACV Commander controlled the resources to support the program and the military forces to secure its objectives. The one fault I find with this concept was that the General remained responsible to the Ambassador; he was still only a member of the State Department's country team instead of the reverse. Another management problem never resolved was supervision of advisory elements in the field. With the ascendance of the MACV, Navy and Air Force advisors were under the operational control of their respective service component commanders. However, Army advisors did not report to their component command, Hq, U.S. Army Vietnam, but directly to the Commander, MACV—probably because he too was an Army General (actually dual-hatted). This further aggravation of span of control problems is reflected in the following
description of the situation:

During 1965 a total of nine U.S. Army advisory groups reported directly to General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, rather than to the headquarters of the Army component commander U.S. Army, Vietnam. These groups included separate advisory elements for the ARVN Airborne Brigade; the Regional and Popular Forces; the Railway Security Advisory Detachment; the Capital Military Region; the Civilian Irregular Defense Group; advisory effort of the 57th Special Forces Group; and each of the four Vietnamese Army corps.35
III. THE EFFECTS OF ROLES, MISSIONS, DOCTRINE AND PAROCHIALISM

The problems of interservice rivalries and definition of respective roles and missions have affected our ability to wage combat since the days of the Revolutionary War period. Such issues as these have even surrounded the strategies and concepts of such notables as George Washington, Nathanael Green, Winfield Scott, Dennis Hart Mahan, Henry Halleck, R. E. Lee, U. S. Grant, Pershing, Mitchell, King, MacArthur, Marshall, Forrestal, Johnson, McNamara, Wheeler and Westmoreland, to name just a few. The importance of our comprehending the application of these issues to future circumstances cannot be overstated, as our failure to deal with them effectively negated efforts at efficient management at numerous levels of command during the Vietnam War.

Following World War I, development of the roles and missions of the services can be characterized as "a rather paced and systematic evolution" in reaction to the advancement of technology in this country and Europe. During World War II we saw the rapid transition of the industrial base, fielding of vast numbers of new ships, planes, et al. Even so, roles and doctrines continued to play a rather traditional part in the development and execution of strategies. World War II witnessed mass, maneuver and tactics to exploit technology, a reinforcement of many principles of war, combined command, and the like. The aggravation and ascendance of our problems with service definition of roles, mis-
sions, doctrine as well as the parochialism of many of our leaders, and its attendant impact on national strategy can be traced to the rapid demobilization of our forces following the war, the scarcity of resources to sustain the military capabilities of the services, and the difficulties of adding the atomic bomb to the American arsenal. Weigley notes:

To shift the American definition of strategy from the use of combats for the object of wars to the use of military force for the deterrence of war, albeit while still serving the national interest in an active manner, amounted to a revolution in the history of American military policy. The revolution is easier to perceive in retrospect . . . the government and the armed forces had to digest a new view of military strategy and thus of the whole employment of military power amid the pressing issues of demobilizing the World War II armies and navies, a structural reorganization of the military establishment, and the hasty invoking of military power to buttress the containment policy.

The reordering of the service management structure referred to by Professor Weigley was the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, discussed earlier in this paper. The general provisions of that act created new roles for the civilian leadership of the military establishment as well as providing distinct operational and administrative chains of command. However, the efforts to centralize the management of the military establishment were limited by the insistence of the services in pursuing traditional perogatives and concepts. Moreover, changing capabilities and new technologies exacerbated the situation. For example, mid-air refueling techniques and the development of the long range aircraft, the B-36, upset the post war balance of power among the services by undercutting Army and Navy insistence on the value of retaining and locating new overseas bases to sustain our forces. President Truman's desire to present a balanced budget in the election year of 1948, and subsequent limits on defense spending to accommodate
that goal, increased already bitter interservice debate about roles, strategy and finance.38

The Army and Air Force had favored a relatively strong unification plan, the latter because it was confident of its future, the former because it thought it could better protect its interests against the more glamorous rival services within a centralized defense department rather than in competitive appeals to the Congress and the public. The Navy, however, feared subordination to commanders who did not understand sea power in a defense establishment which it thought an Army-Air Force partnership would dominate. Also, it did not want to lose its own air arm to the Air Force. Navy misgivings combined with Congressional fears of Prussian military centralization to produce a "coordinated" but not unified National Military Establishment under the National Security Act of 1947.39

To clarify the primary and collateral functions of our Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with the then Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, met during a four-day period in March 1948 (the Key West Conference) and again in August at Newport, Rhode Island.40 In essence, traditional roles together with some slight modifications of doctrine were reaffirmed, but the results of these conferences were characterized by John Collins as "an uneasy compromise".41

Our subsequent involvements in the Cold War, Korea, and ultimately in Vietnam and Indochina, did little to promote clarification and acceptance of solutions for these issues. One could rightly ask then, as now, why was it imperative that we continue to train and maintain a Marine Corps with its own air arm as an "elite" (albeit expensive) air-ground team, and likewise why should the Air Force continue to program, budget, train and employ air assets in support of Army tactical/operational objectives in lieu of managing strictly "strategic" forces and targets? These are quite obviously just a few of the questions and issues that are evident in an examination of service roles and missions.
and which had significant impact on the prosecution of the war in Vietnam. Careerism, loyalty and parochialism concerning the traditional roles of one's own service are consistently evidenced in a study of American involvement in that war. Command structure for the conduct of the war will be more fully addressed in Section IV and will highlight the fact that COMUSMACV lacked overall authority for the direction of the war. He had no command authority over Korean, South Vietnamese or the forces of any other allied nation, or influence over the careerism of the Foreign Service officers who staffed the CORDS, or the roles and doctrines of the Air Force, Navy or the Marine Corps. To be sure, he commanded or directed the actions of the latter services, but the record shows that he was never really able to influence the doctrines of their parent organizations, in the main. And given the organizational climate, I'm not sure that any other leader could have been successful in that regard either. Brian Jenkins recounted the following in an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) report prepared during the course of the war:

It is not simply a matter of authority in implementing changes. Changes cannot be ordered. They must be understood and accepted, otherwise only the labels change but not the actual operations... the belief that organizational changes are impossible in the midst of war; the view that the Vietnam War is an aberration and does not represent the future; the rejection of new doctrines as exotic and of marginal importance; the unaltered incentives to continue what we are doing now; the sense of institutional loyalty that rejects external pressure for change even when it coincides with private doubts; the twelve-month tour; and the lack of a single commander to impose his will on the system all have combined to keep things as they are.42

It is interesting to note that during most of the Vietnam War, the Command and General Staff College and the services' war colleges continued to teach traditional doctrine and the lessons learned from the
"big" world wars. The European scenario remained in vogue. Only recently, and perhaps only reluctantly, has discussion of the American experience in Vietnam been pursued to any meaningful degree at the Army War College. Many senior Army leaders, steeped in the traditions of conventional battles in Europe and Korea, apparently continue to view the Vietnam experience as an aberration, despite recently articulated strategic policy goals and objectives that indicate a variety of American military options will be required in the future. The Army's Strategic Studies Institute continues to pursue the study of topics such as "future availability of strategic resources," more appropriate to other agencies of the government, instead of issues more directly related to the clarification of Army or Joint roles and missions. Studies of issues such as General DePuy's concepts concerning unit sizing, the intelligence of the combatant, and the rank of leaders managing combat systems would also seem to be worthy candidates for examination.

In addition to unity of command and other management problems faced during the war, there were numerous related roles and missions issues such as the introduction of Marine units into the Northern Provinces of the former Republic of South Vietnam. Simply stated: why were the Marines there? Aside from the obvious benefits of giving their soldiers' experience in sustained ground combat operations (no small consideration and they fought well), as well as the benefit gained from increasing the size of land combat forces without resort to the recall of reservists at that point; there were few, if any, other major advantages or reasons. Although for the most part there were no problems which evolved from intermixing levels of Army and Marine commands, cross-serving agreements and like devices had to be executed because of differing service procedures and chains of command. An
example of an action taken by the COMUSMACV, an Army Officer, which ran counter to the "air support of land forces" doctrine and concepts of the Marine Corps, was the appointment of a single manager for the employment of all tactical air resources in South Vietnam. On 8 March 1968, General Westmoreland designated his deputy for air operations, General William W. Momyer, U.S. Air Force to fill that position. This action was seen as a critical management tool by General Westmoreland in the period following the Tet Offensive and the need to concentrate air assets in support of operations to relieve Khe Sanh. Lieutenant General Pearson commented on the results of that action:

General Westmoreland's decision ran directly counter to Marine Corps doctrine and tradition and was not welcomed by the III Marine Amphibious Force (senior Marine Headquarters in Vietnam). The commanding general of the Force opposed the single manager concept on the grounds that it was neither doctrinally sound nor functionally suited to his requirements.

He goes on to comment that this management tool proved to be key to subsequent efficient and effective control of air assets that permitted defeat of enemy forces at Khe Sanh.

Instances of other problems with roles, missions, doctrine and parochialism between commanders, members of the military and the State Department, between intelligence analysts of different organizations, as well as between the Organization of the Joint Chiefs, the services, and the White House's NSC Staff are replete throughout the chronicles detailing America's involvement in Indochina. I've mentioned a few of these incidents in this paper but there are doubtless many others that will continue to evolve as we further examine the roots of our involvement.

My conclusion after examining the issues detailed in the foregoing
chapter, is that we must continue to probe, examine critically, and in general revalidate service roles and missions in light of the emerging Reagan reorientation of foreign policy objectives; possible future conflicts similar to the Vietnam experience; the activation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force; and in response to recent statements by General Jones citing the need for a more viable role for the Chairman and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴⁷
IV. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

Are any management improvements necessary for the future? Clearly they are. I would argue that given the current like-mindedness of American and Soviet leaders that nuclear war is an anathema; conventional wars of limited scale, involvement in regional counterinsurgencies such as Vietnam, and continued superpower military support of third party proxies are likely scenarios for the foreseeable future.

Given the foregoing and considering that resources to support military action are finite—management is the key to success. We must initiate such a management cycle by insuring that our involvement is clearly in the national interest. Then national political objectives must be articulated to achieve requisite popular support and an appropriate base for further definition of military objectives and organization. In confusing these objectives in Vietnam, we limited our military efficiency and effectiveness as Summers has so clearly indicated. The frustration of our military managers is likewise noted by Kinnard’s surveys of key leaders:

Apparently, translating the overall United States objectives into something understandable to the general officers of two wars was not successfully accomplished by policymakers. It is possible for lower-level soldiers and officials to fight a war without being sure of their objectives, but that almost 70 percent of the Army generals who managed the war were uncertain of its objectives mirrors a deep-seated strategic failure: the inability of policymakers to frame tangible, obtainable goals. It is relevant that, on a wrap-up question asking for proposed changes if the United States were to do it all over again, 91 percent called for a better definition of objectives.
Therefore, if senior leaders are to be held accountable for their actions in future wars, they must have a clear understanding of national objectives upon which to design their strategies as the Clausewitzian dictum indicates. Vietnamese political and military objectives were never fully compatible with ours, primarily because of their leadership's concern for survival and consolidation of power. As a result, aside from the political realities of the situation, we were never able to focus available Allied resources successfully through the mechanism of a joint command in a way that proved impossible through the advisory program.

Civilian and military leaders must understand the nature of government bureaucracies, their tendencies toward group-think, co-optation, internalization, propensity for defense against external threats, and the informal as well as formal systems they apply for maintenance. Equally important, we must understand the values and behavior of our leaders as "upward-mobiles" who tend to achieve many times at all costs. As mentioned earlier, many of the products developed by various agencies ostensibly to help manage the war were not useful or never used by decisionmakers. Although this was true in part because no single element of the government hierarchy managed the war in Washington and efforts were organizationally fragmented in Vietnam, the pressures to produce "favorable" data were enormous. The people were uneasy with a war that seemed interminable and they required reassurance that the government was achieving its objectives.

The statistical approach was a way of coming to grips with a problem that by 1967 had become serious. Time was running out, not for the insurgents but for the patience of the American people, because the Administration was not able to produce a credible and coherent report on the progress of the war. Reports were, it was suspected, sometimes faked, since
certain of the reporters were grading their progress. When higher commanders rode lower ones for better statistical results, it was evident that they were going to get either the statistics or the results, and on fortunate occasions both... Perhaps the most serious criticism of the measurements of progress was that in the aggregate they did not really tell how the war was going.55

These dysfunctions of bureaucracy and rational measurements of progress can best be controlled by a single-manager who clearly understands his objectives and the measures he assigns to them.

What specifically should our military command and management organization look like in the future under similar circumstances and scenario? Whatever design, there must be one manager and one alone. One person should represent U.S. interests in an area of war such as Vietnam. I believe one can argue that it can be either a military or civilian figure with requisite training and experience but the weight of evidence indicates that the military man is the best choice. Eckhardt comments on the characteristics of future command structures as follows:

From the U.S. viewpoint, command and control must be comprehensive enough to exercise control over all military forces assigned by U.S. national authorities; flexible enough to respond to changes in the situation, such as demand for specific control of air or naval operations in support of ground forces; and able to provide national authorities with timely, accurate and complete reports. The command and control structure must also be capable of close cooperation with and constructive support of indigenous and allied military forces, paramilitary organizations, and other agencies of the host country.56

The most important principles of management that the organization should accomplish are unity of command and unity of direction. Both concepts, receiving orders from the next immediate superior in the chain of command and having a single manager and plans for a group of elements or activities having the same objective, were violated by the multiple headquarters which conducted the U.S. war effort in Vietnam.57 The proposed organization should appear as follows: be designated a unified
command reporting to the JCS directly; the designated senior officer should command and control all U.S. and Allied military and civilian agencies in the theater of war; the joint headquarters should be Allied or as a minimum contain an Allied planning staff; U.S. service component headquarters should command and operate their forces, advisors, and manage logistical activities; and corps level combined headquarters should be formed to conduct tactical missions with appropriate latitude to command and control requisite military and civilian elements. Specifically, all intelligence agencies, unconventional warfare activities, public affairs elements, research and development groups and similar special purpose military or civilian activities should be supervised by an element of the unified commander's staff. Such a supervising or coordinating staff would function in a manner similar to the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) organization of the MACV.58 Also, with a single, "supreme" commander, the Ambassador or Chief of U.S. Mission becomes a civilian member of the unified commander's staff instead of the reverse role the senior military officer normally plays as a member of the Ambassador's country team in peacetime and crisis situations. Hopefully, such an organization as is proposed would then develop its own bureaucracy (not Washingtons) with attendant loyalties, internalization of goals and objectives, more purposeful products, coordinated U.S. and allied objectives and positions, long-range versus near-term planning, as well as decision making that is both flexible to changing objectives and responsive to the national leadership.

Obviously, the foregoing organization is classical in design but would also function with some of the more enlightened philosophies and
concepts of the neo-classical school; the better features of organization development (effectiveness) to enhance staff coordination, communication and feedback; accept some precepts and management theories of the new public administrators, as well as theories of the "organization" and "professional" man as opposed to status quo leadership styles and values.

Care should be taken by the Defense Department and the President in selecting a commander for an organization with such a broad mission and extensive responsibilities. He must be a military professional who is completely versed of American government and institutions as well as familiar with national purposes and objectives. Clausewitz described the environment that produces such men as follows:

If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.

Such a leader could likely go to this proposed organization from a position as Chief of his Service, as General Rogers did when he became Supreme Allied Commander Europe—-a lesser background or General would be difficult to imagine.

To maintain the management strengths and capabilities provided by this military organization, it would be necessary to have an effective national executive element to coordinate various departmental positions concerning the war and to advise the President accordingly. Such a focus could obviously be provided by his staff, or a specifically designated special staff, and members of the National Security Council. A Special Assistant for National Security Affairs of the ilk of Henry Kissinger and like-type assistants, with the requisite operational lati-
tude and a sizeable staff, would likely be necessary to comprehensively plan and coordinate national guidance from the President. But a centralized Washington level organization is required as the Supreme Commander would accomplish functions for departments other than Defense. As such, a national clearing house to approve taskings from affected departments to the war zone would be necessary.

Although this paper cannot address the full spectrum of relationships, concepts and doctrines required to establish and operate the proposed unified command, it indicates clearly that we did not manage the war in Vietnam efficiently and effectively. In the main, our organizational problems stemmed from the omission of basic management theories and techniques. Our organizational design was historical, operated more as a "confederacy" of individual bureaucracies, was guided by fragmented leadership and was stimulated by emotions as opposed to sound management practice. Such an organization as envisioned would hopefully answer the plea of many that was articulated by Eckhardt:

In Vietnam the doctrine of command and control drew heavily on historical precedent, but its application tended to be more complex than it had been in the past and became more involved as the mission of the U.S. command expanded. Looking to the future, contingencies of the magnitude and complexity of the Vietnam War cannot be ruled out. Should the United States again feel compelled to commit military forces, the need for a simple, well-defined, and flexible command structure on the U.S. side may conflict with the intricacies of indigenous political and military institutions and customs. Therefore, any future U.S. military assistance to foreign nations must be predicated on clear, mutually acceptable agreements, on a straight and direct line of authority among U.S. military and civilian assistance agencies, on full integration of all U.S. efforts, . . .
ENDNOTES


10. Ibid., p. 72.

11. Ibid., pp. 74-75.


14. Ibid., p. 75.
15. Ibid., p. 76.
16. Ibid., p. 83.
17. Ibid., p. 77.
18. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
23. Ibid., p. 7.
24. Ibid., p. 4.
25. Ibid., p. 5.
26. Ibid., pp. 9-11.
27. Ibid., p. 12.
28. Ibid., p. 15.
29. Ibid., p. 27.
30. Ibid., p. 42.
31. Ibid., p. 43.
32. Ibid., pp. 61-80.
33. Ibid., p. 69.
34. Ibid., pp. 68-73.
35. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

37. Ibid., p. 372.

38. Ibid., p. 373.

39. Ibid., pp. 373-374.


41. Ibid., p. 178.


44. Ibid., p. 71.

45. Ibid., p. 72.

46. Ibid., p. 72.


49. Kinnard, p. 25.

50. Clausewitz, p. 87.

51. Kinnard, p. 32.

52. Ibid., pp. 81-99.

53. March and Simon, pp. 110-118.


56. Eckhardt, p. 85.


58. Eckhardt, p. 87.
59. Clausewitz, p. 608.
60. Eckhardt, p. 88.
SELECTED SOURCES


