CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE.

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### Civil Emergency Preparedness: An Organizational Perspective

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#### 6. ABSTRACT
An organizational history of civil emergency preparedness and response activity. Author describes the many various organizations dealing with this subject from World War II to the present time, and concludes with a detailed analysis of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

BY

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CLASS OF 1982

RESEARCH ESSAY

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CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

"Conceptually, there are three major components of the total civil emergency preparedness and response activity:

(1) War related measures (or national security measures) such as civil defense, continuity of government, and resource management measures -- the latter including industrial mobilization, material stockpiling and economic stabilization planning.

(2) Disaster preparedness and response measures related mainly to natural disasters.

(3) An intermediate category of civil emergency preparedness and response measures, not necessarily related to either wartime contingencies or to natural disasters, but related to man-made situations such as threats or acts of terrorism, peacetime nuclear emergencies, or critical shortages or disruption of essential resources or services such as petroleum, electricity, or transportation. ¹

The charter of the current Federal agency charged with civil emergency preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is contained in Executive Order 12148:

The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall establish Federal policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil emergency planning, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive Agencies.
The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall determine national preparedness goals and policies for the performance of functions under this Order and coordinate the performance of such functions with the total national preparedness programs.²

In order to assess FEMA's capability to carry out its mandate, it is necessary to examine the missions and capabilities of the organizations which preceded FEMA's creation.

World War II to 1957

World War II stimulated considerable interest in creating a permanent emergency planning agency to deal with industrial and economic mobilization on a continuing basis. The Office of Civil Defense, established in 1941, fulfilled that need until it was disestablished in 1945. Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was established, reporting directly to the President. The functions of the NSRB were to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including such facets as effective use in time of war of manpower and materiel, stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, establishing reserves of strategic and critical materials, strategic relocation of industries and other facilities, and continuity of government. The Chairman of the Board was appointed by the President and was charged to utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.³

After abolition of the Office of Civil Defense in 1945, the civil defense planning function was transferred to the Army; in 1947 the function was assumed by the Secretary of Defense with the establishment of the Office of Civil Defense Planning. In 1949, President Truman transferred responsibility for
civil defense planning to the NSRB. The enactment of the Federal Defense Act of 1950 established the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) as an independent agency by statute. The intent of Congress was "to provide a plan for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack and invest responsibility for civil defense in the States and their political subdivisions." The Administrator of the FCDA was given the authority to delegate specific responsibilities to various Federal agencies. Civil defense was defined as all "activities and measures undertaken (1) to minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused by an attack upon the United States, (2) to deal with immediate emergency conditions caused by an attack and (3) to effect emergency restoration of vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by an attack." The FCDA remained a separate agency until 1958.

The NSRB, created as a planning agency, was not designed to carry out the operational responsibilities required by United States involvement in the Korean War. In late 1950, the President created the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) in the Executive Office. Throughout the war the Director of Defense Mobilization directed, controlled and coordinated mobilization activities of the Executive Branch, including production, procurement, manpower, stabilization and transport. The execution of these important functions by the ODM left the status and role of the NSRB unclear. In 1953, the President submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 to Congress. The Plan created a new ODM within the Executive Office and transferred to it all the functions of the ad hoc ODM and those exercised by the NSRB. The new ODM also assumed the responsibilities for stock-piling contained in the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act of 1946. The Director of the new ODM became a member of the National Security Council. By the mid-1950's, centralized in ODM was responsibility for the coordination of
all major Federal civil emergency preparedness programs except civil defense.\textsuperscript{7}

The division of civil defense and other emergency preparedness responsibilities was not a clear one between ODM and the FCDA and by 1957 both the Congress and the President were proposing changes to correct the overlapping of responsibilities and provide a clear legislative mandate concerning responsibility for civil defense and other emergency preparedness responsibilities. In 1957, the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations proposed a new Civil Defense Bill for the establishment of a new executive department, in place of the FCDA, to be known as the Department of Civil Defense. The new department would be headed by a secretary and have Cabinet status, thus recognizing the importance of civil defense to the Nation. The proposed new Civil Defense Bill also provided for an expanded role of the Federal government in civil defense matters; one which had not been recognized by the Civil Defense Act of 1950 that gave the impetus to the States and local units of government. The new department would be responsible for a national plan of civil defense and the execution of such a plan. It would also assume from ODM responsibility for such civil defense matters as location of government buildings and post-attack restoration of essential industry.\textsuperscript{8}

About the time the proposal was being submitted for the establishment of the Department of Civil Defense, the Bureau of the Budget contracted with a management consultant firm, McKinsey and Company, to study the whole problem of nonmilitary defense in the United States. The study concluded, among other things, that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Federal responsibility for nonmilitary defense cannot be divided effectively for organizational purposes
  \item Nonmilitary readiness is so vital, and the emergency actions so significant, that continuous Presidential action is required
\end{itemize}
Existing Federal, State and local governmental machinery must contribute the basic structure to manage available resources and provide essential services following an attack.

An organization is needed to assist the President in discharge of nonmilitary defense functions.

A staff agency for this purpose should remain in the Executive Office of the President. This agency should concentrate on planning and coordinating nonmilitary defense preparedness measures that would, by Presidential delegation, be carried out by established departments and agencies of the Government.

The director of the key coordinating agency, relieved of the burden of supervising operating functions, would be in a position to assume his proper role as principal advisor on the readiness of the nation's nonmilitary defenses.

The report concluded that:

In most areas of nonmilitary defense planning, confusion or duplication exists among the organizations involved in that planning... In total, this Nation lacks the organizational arrangements needed for developing a consistent, well-defined program for surviving and recovering from a massive nuclear attack.10

The McKinsey study also investigated the alternatives of locating responsibility for nonmilitary defense planning within the Executive Office of the President or a separate department, as had been proposed by the House Committee on Government Operations. The final recommendation was that the Executive Office alternative was appropriate for resolving the recognized "organizational deficiencies."

Acting on the recommendations of the McKinsey Report, President Eisenhower submitted Reorganizational Plan No. 1 of 1958 to the Congress.11

The Reorganization of 1958

The Reorganization Plan in essence provided for: (1) the transfer of all ODM and FCDA functions to the President, (2) the consolidation of the ODM and FCDA to form the Office of Defense and Civil Mobilization (ODCM) in the Office of...
the President, (3) empowered the President to delegate functions, (4) trans-
ferred membership on the National Security Council from the Director, ODM to
the new Director, ODM.\textsuperscript{12} It achieved a single source for guidance, assistance
and direction in the field of nonmilitary defense and provided to the President
the organizational flexibility necessary for meeting changing conditions.\textsuperscript{13} A
significant follow-on decision by the House and Senate Committees on Appropria-
tions provided for the inclusion of funds to finance functions delegated to
other agencies in the appropriation for operating expenses of the Office of
Defense and Civil Mobilization.\textsuperscript{14} As originally proposed by the House Committee
on Government Operations, the Federal Defense Act of 1950 was amended by Public
Law 85-606 to reflect "the policy and intent of Congress that the responsibility
for civil defense...be vested jointly in the Federal Government and the several
States and their political subdivisions."\textsuperscript{15}

While the Reorganization Plan of 1958 seemed to provide the needed answers
for a viable and cohesive civil defense and civil preparedness program, the
Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations
was not so convinced. In the subcommittee's view, "the plan should be considered
as a trial effort by the President in a complex and difficult area of Federal
activity. The responsibility is placed squarely on his shoulders."\textsuperscript{16} The sub-
committee stated there were several important things to watch for:

(1) Will the transfer of authority under the plan be real or
nominal, as far as the President's personal supervision is
concerned?

(2) Will this plan cause a breakdown of the organizational
base for civil defense and dispersal of these functions by
delegation even more widely than they are now dispersed?
(3) Will the new Office of Defense and Civil Mobilization, acting for the President, be able to ride herd on government agencies performing delegated functions and to bring about concerted effort and systematic progress?

(4) Will the Executive Office of the President be able to accommodate "operating" and field functions?17

The Reorganization of 1961

As early as January 1961, the issues posed by the Military Operations Subcommittee were also of concern to the new President. Upon appointment of a new Director of OCDM* on January 23, he stated, "OCDM as presently constituted is charged with the staff function of mobilization planning and, at the same time, with the operating functions of civil defense. I consider it imperative that they be organized and performed with maximum effectiveness."18 Further, he asked the new director and the Director of the Budget to conduct a "thorough-going review of nonmilitary defense and mobilization programs,"19 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials. The upshot of this review was the once again transfer of the civil defense function, this time to the Secretary of Defense. Other changes announced by the President were the reconstitution of OCDM as a small staff agency to assist in the coordination of these functions and an unofficial change in title for OCDM to Office of Emergency Planning. Executive Order 10952, issued on July 20, 1961, officially reassigned the civil defense function to the Secretary of Defense. However, some important aspects relating to civil defense were retained by OCDM. These were:

(1) advise and assist the President in:

(a) determining policy for, planning, directing and coordinating, including the obtaining of information from all departments and agencies, the total civil defense program;

* The name had been changed from Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization to the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.
(b) reviewing and coordinating the civil defense activities of Federal departments and agencies with each other and the activities of the States and neighboring countries.

(c) determining the appropriate civil defense roles of Federal departments and agencies, and enlisting State, local and private participation, mobilizing national support, evaluating progress of programs, and preparing reports on civil defense for Congress;

(d) encouraging interstate civil defense compacts and reciprocal civil defense legislation; and

(e) assisting states in arranging mutual civil defense aid between States and neighboring countries.

(2) develop plans, conduct programs and coordinate preparations for the continuity of Federal, State and local governments in the event of attack.20

The Secretary of Defense's responsibilities included the development and execution of a fallout shelter program, a chemical, biological and radiological defense program, a national warning and communications system, emergency assistance to State and local governments in a post attack period, protection and emergency operational capability of State and local governments for continuity of government, programs for making financial contributions to the State for civil defense purposes, and plans and systems for a nationwide post attack assessment.21 The President retained responsibility for medical and food stockpiles. Disaster assistance remained with OCDM. The Agency's name was changed by statute to Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) on September 22, 1961.22 It is interesting to note that OEP also had responsibility for the direction of programs under the Defense Production Act of 1950 and for determining the kinds and quantities of strategic and critical materials to be stockpiled for emergency use. The statute also made the Director of OEP a member of the National Security Council.

During the 1960s the Office of Emergency Planning executed its responsibili-
ties for civil emergency preparedness with some success. In 1963-1964, OEP issued the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness, followed by an example state plan for the emergency management of resources. In June 1964, the President approved the concept of an emergency Office of Defense Resources, to manage federal resource programs in a serious national emergency. Also in 1963/64 OEP acquitted itself well in the coordination of assistance for the victims of Hurricane Hilda and the Alaskan earthquake. Throughout this period of time national preparedness planning became a concerted interdepartmental program within the Federal Government. In a series of executive orders from 1962-1968, departments and agencies were instructed to develop preparedness plans and programs. In 1969, Executive Order 11490 was promulgated, consolidating into one document the specific emergency preparedness function of the various departments and agencies of the Federal Government. Meanwhile, the title of the Office of Emergency Planning was changed by statute, in 1968, to the Office of Emergency Preparedness.23

The change in name for OEP was not based on Presidential whim but in fact depicted the changing role of the Office. The Director was instructed to give highest priority to a revitalized National Security Council (NSC) system and a broadened disaster assistance program. In 1970, the Office received responsibility for policy direction, coordination and surveillance of the oil import program and chaired an interagency Oil Policy Committee, which led to involvement in all aspects of domestic energy problems. Problems of overlapping responsibilities with the civil defense and other emergency preparedness programs led to adjustments in OEP’s regional structure. This resulted in the establishment of 10 regions that had common boundaries with a number of agencies engaged in programs requiring intergovernmental cooperation. Additionally, in 1971, OEP
became the central instrument to administer the 90-day wage-price freeze under the policy guidance of the Cost of Living Council. In making his report to the President in 1973, concerning his service as the Director of OEP, George Lincoln stated that "In the face of these urgent demands and of budgetary and manpower stringencies, traditional civil emergency tasks could not be given as much attention as would be ideal."

During the period that civil emergency preparedness enjoyed considerable forward movement, civil defense was pursuing a rocky road within the Department of Defense. Initially, President Kennedy gave much verbal support to the program and the Berlin Crisis added the necessary emphasis. Throughout 1961 and most of 1962 Congressional support provided the funds necessary for a national shelter survey program. However the Crisis had little long-term value in terms of civil defense. Some in Congress still argued that civil defense was primarily a State and local program; the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 did little to change that perception. During the Johnson years smaller and smaller amounts for civil defense were approved by McNamara's office for OCD submission to Congress. "The OCD began to speak in terms of "shelf" programs which could, if needed, be called upon -- provided there would be enough time." During the Nixon years funds for state and local programs increased while funds for shelter programs decreased. A low point in government commitment toward civil defense came when civil defense functions were transferred to Department of the Army. A National Security Council study completed by OEP provided the impetus for a reorganization of OCD. On May 5, 1972, OCD was officially disestablished and its functions transferred to the new created Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), again within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
From 1970 to 1972 several studies were undertaken to examine the relationship between OEP and OCD, particularly at State and local levels, in dealing with disaster preparedness, and to determine how the size of the Executive Office of the President could be reduced.

The 1973 Decision and the 1970's

Early in 1973 the President announced that OEP would be abolished. His rationale was contained in Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 —"OEP's work as a coordinating and supervising authority in this field (emergency preparedness) has been so effective...that the line departments and agencies which in the past have shared in the performance of the various preparedness functions now possess the capability to assume full responsibility for those functions."27 All responsibilities having to do with preparedness for and relief of civil emergencies and disasters were transferred to the Department of Housing and Urban Development to provide for coordination of Federal disaster assistance with that provided by States and local communities. The General Services Administration (GSA) assumed responsibility for measures to ensure the continuity of civil government operations in the event of a major military attack as well as responsibility for resource mobilization and management of the national security stockpiles. Chairmanship of the Oil Policy Committee was transferred to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury; functions involving the investigation of imports which might threaten to impair the national security went to the Department of the Treasury.28 For the first time in over 20 years there was no official charge with broad civil emergency preparedness responsibilities either within the Executive Office of the President or as a member of the National Security Council. This also meant that all three of the major agencies concerned with civil emergency preparedness maintained their own separate regional offices.
Thus, State officials were required to deal with at least three sets of Federal regional officials on often closely related substantive program issues.

During the ensuing years an Office of Preparedness was established in GSA, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) was established in HUD, to carry out the functions transferred from OEP. The Office of Preparedness was later renamed the Federal Preparedness Agency.

In 1977, the Joint Committee on Defense Production concluded an extensive review of the nation's varied emergency preparedness programs. The Committee's report concluded that Federal agencies had not been able to support the States demand for emergency and disaster services; that the diffusion of the Federal preparedness effort through at least 25 departments and agencies had had a negative effect on State and local government preparedness roles; that the lack of a central coordinating authority for the Federal preparedness effort had led to the emergence of scores of interagency coordination and problem solving groups, without any appreciable improvement in preparedness measures and programs at the Federal level; and that 1973 reorganization had left Federal emergency programs without adequate visibility, without access to decisionmakers and without access to central budget and program planning.

The Committee report recommended that the emergency preparedness functions of DCPA, FDAA and FPA be combined into a single agency, the Federal Preparedness Administration. It would assign to the Director of the new Federal Preparedness Administration authority and budget control for the specific preparedness programs of other departments and agencies as were assigned to the former Director of Office of Emergency Preparedness. The committee further recommended that
the Director of the Federal Preparedness Administration be reestablished as
a statutory member of the National Security Council. The committee envisioned the
new agency's responsibilities would include programs or plans relating to
natural disasters, nonnuclear industrial disasters, economic crisis planning,
sabotage and terrorism, peacetime nuclear accidents, civil defense, U.S. assist-
ance for international disaster relief, and strategic stockpiles, as well as
overall coordination and long range planning authority for economic mobilization
for defense purposes.\textsuperscript{30}

Either in response to the joint committee's report or because of his personal
concern relative to the status of emergency preparedness functions within the
Federal Government, President Carter directed the Office of Management and
Budget to conduct a comprehensive study of the Federal Government's role in
preparing for and responding to natural, accidental and wartime civil disasters.
The requested study, completed in February of 1978, concluded that:

(1) the capability of potential adversaries to inflict casualties
on the United States has grown phenomenally during the past
three decades, but these changes have not been accompanied by
a growth in attention to war-related civil emergency pre-
paredness measures.

(2) preparedness for other kinds of civil emergencies (e.g.,
peacetime nuclear incidents, terrorism and economic disrup-
tions) is of growing concern.

(3) over the past decade, particularly, public attention to and
Congressional support for, assistance to victims of major
natural disasters have increased significantly.\textsuperscript{31}

The study went on to state that the various organizational constructs for
eMERGENCY preparedness functions during the past 30 years proved to have a
nominal effect on the visibility of and progress achieved in the various emergency
preparedness programs. The study farther concluded that, "it is very probable that there is no ideal organizational solution at the Federal level for dealing with preparedness for and response to the full range of nonmilitary crises, emergencies, and disasters that could occur in the next decade." This last conclusion, notwithstanding, the study went on to suggest some fundamental principles or guidelines to be considered in developing an organizational structure to administer emergency preparedness functions. These were:

1. The agency charged with economic mobilization and other civil emergency preparedness functions should be a civilian agency, because these are civil government responsibilities even though they affect both civil and military needs.

2. Responsibility at the Federal level for civil emergency preparedness and response should be centralized in a single agency, for administrative efficiency, to avoid duplication, to encourage dual use of available resources, and to promote better coordinated planning and programming.

3. The central Federal agency should have a very close relationship to the President, because the functions involved are sufficiently vital that they should command the President's attention. Furthermore, they cut across the functional roles of most Federal agencies, and involve extensive cooperation with State and local governments at the highest levels.

4. The single, central agency should seek to avoid involvement in operational functions.

5. The agency should be designed to address centralized Federal planning for a wide range and diversity of crises and emergencies.

6. The concept of shared responsibility in our Federal system requires that Federal and State emergency preparedness and response organizations be compatible.

On June 19, 1978, President Carter submitted to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 which provided for the extensive realignment and consolidation of Federal emergency preparedness functions. The purpose of the Plan was
to cut duplicative administrative costs and strengthen the ability of the Federal Government to deal effectively with emergencies. Key elements of the Plan included the unification of key emergency management and assistance functions to provide for direct accountability to the President and Congress, and the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, whose Director would report directly to the President. To be transferred to the new agency were the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (Commerce), the Federal Insurance Administration (HUD), oversight responsibility for the Federal Emergency Broadcast System, all authorities and functions delegated to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD)*, all authorities and functions under the Disaster Relief Acts of 1970 and 1974, and all Presidential authorities and functions delegated to the Federal Preparedness Agency, including the establishment of policy for the national stockpile. Other transfers of emergency preparedness and mitigation functions completed the consolidation: oversight of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program; coordination of Federal activities to promote dam safety; responsibility for assistance to communities in the development of readiness plans for severe weather-related emergencies, including floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes; coordination of natural and nuclear disaster warning systems; and coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents. The executive branch retained responsibility for reacting to terrorist incidents themselves. 34

President Carter's reorganization plan rested on four fundamental principles:

(1) Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for and respond to major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official responsible to the President and given attention by other officials at the highest levels.

* Because of the importance of civil defense to the Nation's overall strategic policy, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council were to retain responsibility for the oversight of civil defense related programs.
(2) An effective civil defense system requires the most efficient use of all available emergency resources.

(3) Whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should be extensions of the regular missions of Federal agencies.

(4) Federal hazard mitigation should be closely linked with emergency preparedness and response functions.\textsuperscript{35}

Essentially, the President accepted in toto the guidelines offered in the OMB study.

The Reorganization Plan provided for a Director, Deputy Director and four Associate Directors to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Ten regional directorships were also established with the director being appointed by the Agency Director. To give FEMA visibility and clout, the Plan called for a Federal Emergency Management Committee chaired by the Director of FEMA, with its membership comprised of the Assistants to the President for National Security, Domestic Affairs and Policy and Intergovernmental Relations, and the Director of OMB. In his message to Congress, the President indicated that the Committee would advise him "on ways to meet national civil emergencies," and on "alternative approaches to improve performance and avoid excessive costs," as well as "oversee and provide guidance on the management of all Federal emergency authorities.\textsuperscript{36} The activation of FEMA was accomplished in two steps. First, Executive Order 12127, issued March 31, 1979, activated FEMA; second, Executive Order 12148, July 20, 1979, provided for the final consolidation of the various functions.

The challenge which faces FEMA is a serious one. The organizational instability of the past 30 years has had dire consequences for civil emergency preparedness in the United States. Initial surveys, evaluations, and analyses conducted by independent research corporations for FEMA made the following comments.
relative to Federal emergency preparedness in the strategic wartime arena:

Industrial Mobilization Planning: atrophied almost completely over the past 15 or 20 years.37

Industrial Mobilization Capabilities: possibly the best proof that there has been no industrial mobilization planning lies in the fact that there is no current body of available information to indicate with high confidence what our national mobilization capabilities are.38

Federal Emergency Preparedness Planning Guidance: clearly, federal preparedness planning has been an important occupation for only a few dedicated people within the federal bureaucracy, and has...le-talked any high-level focus. The almost complete lack of funding is, per se, the best indicator of top level indifference to the overall problem area.39

The organizational issues which have been and are still a challenge to FEMA's ability to achieve real progress in the civil emergency preparedness planning arena are many; unity of command, unity of effort, appropriate division of labor, clear lines of authority, resource availability, coordination, control, mission and role clarification, and efficiency. How FEMA has dealt with these issues and how some of them continue to impact on FEMA's ability to successfully execute its mandate will be discussed.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

The first initiative taken by the new Agency was to attempt physical consolidation of the emergency preparedness effort. In July 1979, parts of the Agency were spread throughout the Washington, D.C. area and the country. Moreover, some of the functions were housed within the physical area of agencies to which they previously belonged. Not until September of this year was the consolidation process culminated, with most of the functional elements collocated in a single building. The only exception is the National Emergency Training Center located at Emmitsburg, Maryland. The Center is comprised of the old Staff College,
previously located at Battle Creek, Michigan, and the US Fire Academy. The new center contains the Emergency Management Institute as well as the Fire Academy. The lengthy period of time involved in the consolidation process has had an inhibiting effect on the Agency's ability to quickly achieve a unity of command.

Equally as challenging as the physical consolidation effort has been FEMA's capability to meld the inherited functional parts of the Agency into a cohesive and integrated organization operationally. When the Agency was initially established, the functional elements brought in from the previous parent agencies were kept in tact. The results were unclear lines of authority, the resentment or previously autonomous heads of functional areas and a division of labor that was not supportive of FEMA's umbrella charter.

Under new leadership appointed by the Reagan Administration, the Agency was reorganized in September 1981. Obvious benefits of the reorganization are an enhanced span of control and division of labor. Appendices I and II contain the old and new organization charts, respectively. Operating entities now focus on the four major functional responsibilities of the Agency: (1) national preparedness, (2) State and local programs support, (3) mitigation responsibilities for disasters and other emergencies, and (4) training. Major staff elements reporting directly to the Agency's leadership were reduced from 12 to 6, thus enhancing span of control. Some overlapping still persists in the national preparedness and state and local programs areas. The Agency leadership is cognizant of this and is continuing to refine functional area responsibilities. As a compliment to the functional realignment effort, the Agency leadership is in the process of conducting extensive team building, mission and task identification
and role clarification sessions with key organization personnel to resolve conflicts and affect improved intra-agency cooperation and coordination. A published by-product of the sessions will be a new organization and functions manual. Interviews with Agency representatives determined that the process is a slow but beneficial one. From another perspective, the lengthy period of time that has elapsed since the Agency's inception until the address of the above issues has had a potentially negative impact on the ability of the Agency to fulfill its mission requirements and provide an outwardly visible sign that the Agency can, in fact, do so.

In that FEMA must rely on over 25 different Federal agencies to do the bulk of the emergency preparedness programs design and planning, FEMA faces unusual external span of control problems, which have the potential to limit substantially the effectiveness with the planning and the plans are executed. In light of this, the Agency is attempting to reduce the number of plans developed. The approach being taken is the development of dual or multi-purpose plans that can be applied easily to various emergency scenarios. A key variable in this approach is the success of FEMA in eliminating the parochialism of the parent planning agencies. To this end, FEMA, in conjunction with the Department of Defense and several other agencies, has developed a definitive proposal for an interagency planning mechanism.

The mechanism has three major components: (1) an Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) composed of either the deputy or under secretary of 21 agencies, and chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; (2) an Executive Secretariat, to assist the Board (the Deputy Director of FEMA will serve as the Executive Secretary); and (3) 11 working groups dealing
with such areas as civil defense, industrial mobilization, economic stabilization and public finance, and social services. To ensure the groups retain their impetus, chairmanship is at the assistant secretary level. A more detailed explanation of the Board's composition and responsibilities is at Appendix III.

The four essential elements of the EMPB effort are: (1) it focuses on actions, not on studies; (2) the solutions accomplished will provide a basis for action in the full range of emergency situations; (3) the effort is interdepartmental; and (4) the effort involves the active commitment of senior officials, thus giving it both clout and visibility. The Board will be formally activated on December the first, although some of the working groups have already begun their planning process.

As alluded to above, FEMA must rely on over 25 various Federal departments and agencies to not only provide the planning but the technical and operational arms of the civil emergency preparedness effort. Dependent upon the type of emergency being addressed, FEMA must interact with one or more of 30 emergency organizations (Appendix IV) at the Federal level, in addition to State and local governments and numerous volunteer organizations. It is these organizations which control the bulk of the fiscal resources available for the execution of the emergency preparedness responsibilities.

An independent study recommended that "the Congress should be encouraged to provide delegate agency funding sources so that FEMA can stimulate needed research, planning and emergency preparedness without requesting that the Federal departments reprogram existing funding." After two years, FEMA is still relying extensively on other agencies for funding support. In addition, the Congressional appropriations process requires that FEMA representatives
appear before over 30 Congressional committees in the prosecution of its budget requests. It is difficult to believe that FEMA can be too successful in fulfilling its mission requirements within the current fragmented sphere of public funding.

More important than the organizational aspects of FEMA addressed above, is the continued existence of FEMA itself. During Congressional hearings on the Reorganization Plan of 1958, one of the questions asked by the House Committee on Government Operations was, "Will the transfer of authority under the plan be real or nominal, as far as the President's personal supervision is concerned?" The recent appointment of a new leadership for FEMA, coincidental with a new Administration, and the designation of the President's Advisor on National Security Affairs to chair the EMPB, suggest that President Reagan is serious concerning his responsibilities in the civil emergency preparedness arena. But will his interest last the course; what will be the position of his successor?

The Nixon decision of 1973 left this Nation without an identifiable or coordinated emergency preparedness planning structure for almost 10 years. The record of his predecessors is not much better. I don't believe the Nation can afford to or should be subject to differing political perspectives in the conduct of the emergency preparedness effort. The mechanisms for a national effort are contained in the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act of 1946, the National Security Act of 1947, the Federal Defense Act of 1950, the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Disaster Relief Acts of 1970 and 1974 and the statutes relative to the US Fire Administration and the Federal Insurance Administration, to name but a few. But what of a permanent coordinating agency such as FEMA, one which will continue to have visibility and clout. The answer, in part,
lies in the proposal made by the House Committee on Government Operations that recommended, in 1957, that a new executive department be established, headed by a secretary with Cabinet status. The establishment of such a department by statute would ensure continuity and progress in the national emergency preparedness effort. The rest of the answer lies in the relevance of such an endeavor to the American way of life.

"War related programs grew out of the World War II experience, which brought military devastation to many civilian populations in Europe and Asia, and which underlined the importance of having an economy and an industrial base that could be geared quickly to meeting emergency requirements. The Korean War reinforced the belief in the United States that industrial mobilization planning and preparedness, on a continuing basis, were essential to the Nation's security." 43

Since the mid-1950's, the capability of potential adversaries to inflict casualties and damage on the United States has grown, and in the same period likely warning time has shrunk dramatically. These changes, however, have not been accompanied by a growth in attention to war-related civil emergency preparedness measures. The resolution of both the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises without recourse to war gave impetus to this inattention. Further, the potential for total destruction from a nuclear exchange gave fuel to the futuility of energetic action. In the face of such complacency, it has become increasingly difficult politically to acquire support for a national civil defense program. 44

The opposite trend has characterized reactions to disaster assistance programs. From the Alaskan earthquake in the mid-1960's through the volcanic eruption of St. Helena, Three-Mile Island and the Cuban-Haitian Relocation Program of 1980, both Congress and the people have seen the benefits of well
coordinated and efficiently executed disaster preparedness programs. And there is genuine State and local interest in such programs, especially in areas where actual incidents have occurred. 45

Meanwhile, increased urbanization of the country, the expanding use of new technologies, an increasing demand on the country's natural resources and the growing interdependence of the world community have resulted in growing vulnerabilities to a wider range of possible emergencies. These include not only war related threats and natural disasters, but such potentialities as terrorism, nuclear reactor incidents, foreign petroleum embargoes, electrical blackouts and large scale industrial accidents. 46

The creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency records Presidential resolve to create a national capability to deal with major life-threatening emergencies in the United States. The key challenge is to convince the American people that these possibilities exist and that civil emergency preparedness can indeed mitigate their impact on the American way of life. Only then will civil emergency preparedness receive the mandate it deserves.
APPENDIX III

STRUCTURE:

THE EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD

Chair: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Membership:

Department of State
Department of the Treasury
Department of Defense
Department of Justice
Department of Interior
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Labor
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of Transportation

Department of Energy
Department of Education
Office of Management and Budget
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Personnel Management
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Security Council Staff
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of Policy Development

Representatives will be at the Deputy/Under Secretary level.

Functions:

- Formulation of recommendations concerning policy for emergency mobilization preparedness.
- Development of policy/fiscal guidance documents for working groups and agencies to implement approved policies and plans of action.
- Resolution of mobilization preparedness issues within the framework of current Administration policy.

Tasks:

- Formulation for Presidential review, a proposed statement of national policy on emergency mobilization preparedness.
- Development of a recommended plan of emergency mobilization preparedness improvements consistent with the proposed statement of policy.
WORKING GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Agency Chair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Mobilization</td>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Mobilization</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food - Agriculture</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Operations</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Communications</td>
<td>Department of Defense/Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Stabilization and Public Finance</td>
<td>Department of the Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement and Public Safety</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Department of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Membership:

Working Group membership will be determined by each Working Group Chairman, subject to approval of the board. The Chairman of each Working Group will be at the Assistant Secretary level or equivalent. Agency representatives to the Working Groups will be at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or higher.

Functions:

- Provide a mechanism for interdepartmental coordination of emergency mobilization policies and plans.
- Advise the Board on national policy for emergency mobilization preparedness.
- Advise the Board on activities to be included in the plan of action to improve emergency mobilization preparedness.
- Assist the Board in monitoring the implementation of guidance on policy and the plan of action.
- Report to the Board emergency mobilization preparedness measures undertaken by member agencies.

Policy:

Due to the fiscal constraints through FY 83 the Working Groups are to concentrate on the identification of preparedness measures that will enable the government to make more effective use of existing national resources. Therefore the Groups should give attention to the following:

- Clarification and rationalization of the emergency mobilization roles, responsibilities and authorities of Federal agencies.
Improvement in mobilization response procedures.

Development of measures to facilitate the smooth transition from routine to emergency operations.

Attainment of better coordination between civilian and military mobilization planners.

Initial Tasks:

- Identify emergency mobilization preparedness activities programmed by agencies in FY 82 and 83.
- Determine the resources devoted to these activities in FY 82 and 83.
- Prepare an inventory of legislation/regulations impacting on emergency mobilization capabilities subject to approval of the EMPB.

SECRETARIAT

Chair:

The Secretariat will be chaired by a senior official of FEMA, who will be referred to as the Executive Secretary of the EMPB.

Membership:

Members of the Secretariat will come from FEMA and other Federal agencies represented on the Board (detailees). The Executive Secretary will select the members and determine the proper mix of FEMA and other agency representatives.

Location:

It is planned that the Secretariat will be located in the Old Executive Office Building.

Functions:

- Provide staff support to the Chairman and members of the EMPB.
- Coordinate activities of the Working Groups.
- Provide a liaison between EMPB and the Working Groups.
Designated Emergency Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Organization Name</th>
<th>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of Defense Resources</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Ensure mobilization and national security</td>
<td>E.O. 12148 (Executive Order, Proposed Defense Resources Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Executive Teams</td>
<td>Individual Agencies</td>
<td>Ensure continuation of essential functions</td>
<td>E.O. 11179 (FEMA Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Executive Reserve</td>
<td>FEMA, DOC, DOT, DO1, DOE</td>
<td>Provide reserve of trained civilian executives</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency &quot;Federal Register&quot;</td>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>Ensure publication of Executive Branch documents</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Broadcast System</td>
<td>FCC, FEMA</td>
<td>Provide the President with the capability for nationwide public communication</td>
<td>Communication Act of 1934 E.O. 11490, E.O. 12127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Emergency Production Agency</td>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Coordination Production</td>
<td>Section 703 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 USC 2061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Air Transport Service</td>
<td>FEMA (ODR)</td>
<td>Provide Federal Air Transportation between emergency operating centers</td>
<td>E.O. 12148 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Resources Board</td>
<td>FEMA (ODR)</td>
<td>Advise Director, ODR, on resource management</td>
<td>E.O. 12148 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Organization Name</td>
<td>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage and Salary Stabilization and Labor Disputes Administration</td>
<td>DOL</td>
<td>Stabilize wages/salaries and maintains effective labor-management relations</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Employment and Training Administration</td>
<td>DOL</td>
<td>Develops plans and guidance designed to utilize to the maximum extent the civilian workforce resources</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Labor-Management Mobilization Planning Committee</td>
<td>DOL</td>
<td>Advise Secretary of Labor on workforce mobilization, training and utilization</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Water Administration</td>
<td>DOI</td>
<td>Priorities and allocation of water</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee</td>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Advise the President on the management of the government's use of radio frequencies, etc.</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 E.O. 12046 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Electric Power Administration</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Coordination and direction of electric industry</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Organization Name</td>
<td>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Coordinate and direct oil and gas industries</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Solid Fuels Administration</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Coordinate and direct solid fuel industry</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (FEMA/ODR Directive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Civil Wartime Agencies</td>
<td>FEMA Coordinates</td>
<td>Support NATO civil wartime activities</td>
<td>Hartman Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Central Supplies Agency</td>
<td>DOC(OIN)</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Defense Shipping Authority</td>
<td>DOC(MARAD)</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Wartime Oil Agency</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Emergency Organization</td>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Provide executive management of the Civil Transportation Resource</td>
<td>Section 4A, Dept. of Transportation Act, (P.L. 89-670), Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 301 and E.O. 11490. (Executive Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Shipping Authority</td>
<td>DOC(MARAD)</td>
<td>Direct ocean shipping, ship-building and port operations</td>
<td>Merchant Marine Act 1936 (46 USC 1101 et seq.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA Regional Emergency Staffs</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>Insure continuation of essential functions</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA State and County Emergency Boards</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>Insure continuation of essential functions</td>
<td>E.O. 11490 (Executive Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Organization Name</td>
<td>Department or Agency Responsible for Planning</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Authority for Preparedness Planning (and Activation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard to Navy</td>
<td>DOD/DOT</td>
<td>Enhance command and control of U.S. vessels</td>
<td>Inter-agency Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration to Defense</td>
<td>DOD/DOT</td>
<td>Enhance command and control of airspace</td>
<td>Inter-agency Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Supply Service/ GSA to Defense</td>
<td>DOD/GSA</td>
<td>Insure responsive supply support from FSS in an emergency</td>
<td>Inter-agency Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
END NOTES


5Ibid., p. 1263.


7Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., p. 11.


10Ibid., p. 13.

11Ibid., p. 18.


13Ibid., p. 5601.

14Ibid., pp. 5612-5613.


17 Ibid., p. 23-25.


19 Ibid.


21 Ibid., p. 1320.

22 Ibid., p. 706.

23 Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., p. 33.


26 Ibid., p. 17.


28 Ibid., pp. 3551-3552.


30 Ibid., p. VIII.


32 Ibid., p. 69.

33 Ibid., pp. 69-70.


Committee on Government Operations, 195E, op. cit., p. 23.

Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., p. 66.

James L. Holton, op. cit.

Office of Management and Budget, op. cit., p. 67.

Ibid.


Memorandum from Bennett L. Lewis, Executive Secretary, Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board, October 30, 1981, Attachment 2.

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