STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

THROUGH ENEMY EYES:
A SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
MAJ EDWARD P. O'CONNELL
1980

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# THOUGH ENEMY EYES: A SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE

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Major Edward P. O'Connell

June 1980

US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

Garmisch, Germany
FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

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JOHN G. CANYOCK
LTC, MI
Commanding
Summary

This study presents characterizations of US intelligence organizations and its operational components as they appeared in selected Soviet open source publications. These descriptions are then compared with information readily available in American publications to create an analytical framework for the discussion of the probable reasons for the discrepancies noted in Soviet sources. In the wake of intense public scrutiny, many American observers contend that US intelligence has suffered a serious blow that seriously degrades its effectiveness. The analysis of Soviet sources presented in the second section of this paper, however, tends to indicate that the Soviets in their state-controlled and censored press, do not agree that any great harm has been done to the operational or analytic capability of US intelligence, and still regards it as a formidable opponent.
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INTRODUCTION

The point to bear in mind, however, is that Soviet literature, like all Soviet literature on politics broadly defined, is written in an elaborate code language. Its purpose is not to dazzle with originality and sophistication but to convey to the initiates messages of grave importance...Buried in the flood of seemingly meaningless verbiage, nuggets of precious information on Soviet perceptions and intentions can more often than not be unearthed by a trained reader.\(^1\)

--Dr. Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War."

Dr. Pipes accurately describes a problem which eventually confronts all students of the Soviet Union—meaningful analysis of sensitive topics using open sources as a research base. For purposes of this paper, "open sources" are defined as readily available printed material (i.e., newspapers, magazines and books) which can be freely purchased either in the Soviet Union or in nations closely allied with it. The nature of the topic very often dictates the amount of ideological rhetoric which accompanies the substance of an article. In the case of articles dealing with the organization and operation of United States Intelligence (USI), the rhetorical deluge can be suffocating to the researcher. The problem is compounded by the tendency of such articles to be more descriptive than analytical, thereby requiring the student to infer actual Soviet perceptions.\(^2\) This type of exercise, however, is necessary for the student of Soviet affairs. It is the means by which the "nuggets of precious information" to which Dr. Pipes refers are identified.

In this paper, following an overview of Soviet perceptions of USI organization, Soviet characterizations of the major USI operational elements (CIA, FBI, NSA, etc.) will be examined, to include their role in the formulation and execution of US foreign policy. Soviet descriptions of USI organization and operational components will then be compared to US open source material related to the same subjects to create an analytical framework for the discussion of the significance of Soviet perceptions. Soviet views of recent USI reorganization will then be examined in an attempt to define Soviet perceptions of the significance of the changes as they pertain to the structure and operational capability of the intelligence community.
THE SOVIET VIEW OF USI ORGANIZATION

Before proceeding to a detailed Soviet view of major operational elements of the USI apparatus, it will be useful to examine their over-all description of hierarchical ranking within the system. Chart 1, "The Scheme of Intelligence Organs of the 'Cloak and Dagger Empire'" shows a schematic diagram taken from the book Front Taynoy Vony (Front of the Secret War), published in 1968. Although it is dated, some interesting observations concerning Soviet perceptions of the actual composition of the US intelligence system can be made.

The initial impression is of the large number of autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations specifically devoted to the intelligence function. Comparing this diagram to a schematic of the National Intelligence Establishment as it appeared in a US open source in 1970 (Chart 2), some distinct differences can be noted. The first, and perhaps most obvious difference is the relative simplicity of the US model. Organizations such as the US Information Agency (USIA), Agency for International Development (AID), Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and the Treasury Department, which appear on the Soviet model are conspicuously absent on the US schematic. (The Treasury Department was not made a member of the US Intelligence Board (USIB) until 1971.) A two-fold reason for this discrepancy can be presumed. First, by depicting such a great number of US organizations devoted to intelligence, the Soviets are able to distort the true size of the actual USI community for their domestic readers. In so doing, they are able to magnify the threat to Soviet society posed by such a formidable array of potential opponents, all of whom are "officially" members of the USI community. Second, by including those organizations specifically excluded in the American model, i.e., USIA, AID, etc., they are able to create the impression that any information gathering or publicity organ of the US Government is controlled by USI.

The all-inclusive nature of the Soviet model also tends to illustrate that the Soviets regard any form of information gathering, even that which is an accepted part of inter-state relationships, (e.g., State Department diplomatic reporting) as a distinct form of intelligence activity. By US definition, the information obtained by such official organs as USIA, AID, etc., is not intelligence, but is of continuing value in the intelligence process. Information per se is not intelligence until it is analyzed in a framework which will include a variety of other inputs from the various members of the intelligence community. The product which is then compiled from this analytical process is intelligence in the pure semantical sense. The Soviet observation that these information gathering organs are integral parts of USI are indicative of a Soviet appreciation for the significant contribution they make to the intelligence production process.

This belief was further substantiated by a lengthy two-part article which appeared in the weekly news magazine Nedelya in 1970. While making the mandatory charges that US intelligence is marked by its aggressiveness and cruelty, this article is interesting in that it analyzed the US use of open sources to assess the military-economic potential of a given country. The producers of this intelligence are not espionage agents in the classical sense, but scientists, working in the "technically well-equipped intelligence organization of the imperialist states", where they are "systematizing, analyzing, and evaluating a colossal amount of information without leaving the country." The article goes on to elaborate the point that the mass of information received by these scientists comes to them not be means of secret agents, but by open sources.

As open source analysis produces an intelligence product, it likewise identifies intelligence "gaps" in the total perception of a nation's military, political and
economic posture. It is filling these gaps that traditional forms of espionage play a role:

In modern circumstances, the intelligence interest of one government in relation to another becomes so all-encompassing that to satisfy it is possible only by the composite use of all means to procure information and, that is to say, of open sources.

The use of open sources frees the forces of agent-intelligence for more complex and responsible missions, the fulfillment of which is possible only with the help of illegal means and therefore justify the state risk connected with them.\(^6\)

As shown on the Soviet model (Chart 1), the defense apparatus emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is shown by direct links to the intelligence branches of the individual services. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), although not depicted on the chart, does receive special mention in the text:

Besides the CIA, many other government institutions are engaged in intelligence work throughout the world—State Department, US Information Agency, Treasury Department, Immigration Service. Among these institutions, DIA (Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye Ministerstva Obrony—RUMO) occupies a special place. This child of McNamara, established on 1 October 1962, further competes with the CIA. Currently the Pentagon, and frequently its intelligence departments, while possessing the newest technical means of espionage, artificial earth satellites included, exploits a general program of military intelligence, assigns espionage missions among branches of service, and processes and reports intelligence data of a military nature to the President.\(^7\)

The Soviet perception of DIA as a "competitor" of CIA is interesting in that this is exactly the manner in which the creation of DIA was seen by some American observers.\(^8\) The Soviets, however, did not elaborate on the major objective behind the establishment of DIA, which was to unify the overall intelligence efforts of the Defense Department with respect to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.\(^9\) It is also interesting to note the comment that DIA reports "to the President." As a primary consumer of USI products, the President may, from time to time, review DIA reports pertaining to military matters. Yet, the reporting chain is such that the Director of DIA reports through JCS to the Secretary of Defense.\(^10\) Admittedly, a probable reason for this particular description of the functions of DIA in the Soviet press was to create the impression of yet another American intelligence organ directed against the Soviet Union and, therefore, should not be read too literally. Yet, it may also be indicative of the Soviet appreciation for the DIA collection capability.

The Soviet model also includes the Counterintelligence Corps—(Korpus Voyennoy Kontrrazvedki) as a separate entity at Department of Defense (DOD) level. This entry, not further explained in the text, would appear to attribute a much greater degree of centralization to the military counterintelligence effort than actually existed in 1968. Chart 2, The National Intelligence Establishment, shows no such organization at DOD level. The Soviet text does explain that CIC was a component of the Army tactical/strategic intelligence organization (Military Intelligence Service—MIS) as of 1968.\(^11\) In reality, the CIC investigative function was delegated to a number of Military Intelligence Groups, which were joined together under
the US Army Intelligence Command in 1966. The Air Force and Navy retained the counterintelligence investigative function within the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and Naval Investigative Service (NIS) respectively. The personnel security investigation (background investigation) function was not centralized within DOD until the formation of the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) in 1972.

Again referring to the Soviet model, an Inter-departmental Counterintelligence Committee is shown as part of the National Security Council (NSC). Such a committee does not appear on the US model shown in Chart 2, nor does it appear on a schematic depicting the US organization for national security as it existed in 1959 (Chart 3). The reason for the appearance of an Inter-departmental Counterintelligence Committee is perhaps a problem of definition rather than perception. It needs to be pointed out that the Soviet definition of "counterintelligence" has both offensive and defensive connotations. As John Barron described it in his book KGB--The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, the Soviet counterintelligence service (Special Service II of the First Chief Directorate) is an "offensive operating division." Its mission is "to penetrate foreign security and intelligence services, not so much to prevent them from spying on the Soviet Union as to prevent them from interfering with the KGB." Barron goes on to explain that the defensive security missions normally associated with "counterintelligence" (i.e., physical, personnel, and document security) within the Soviet Union are performed principally by the Second and Fifth Chief Directorates of the KGB and by a number of specialized Directorates such as the Industrial Security Directorate, the Surveillance Directorate, etc. The Soviet definition of counterintelligence as cited by Barron, more closely aligns itself with the US definition of the term counterespionage—the penetration and manipulation of foreign security services. This is not to say that the difference between these two terms is universally recognized by American writers, who may use the terms interchangeably.

The inclusion of CIC as a separate DOD level entity, and the appearance of an NSC committee devoted solely to counterintelligence tend to indicate a Soviet perception of a centrally controlled US "counterintelligence/counterespionage" effort in the 1960's. While a number of reasons for this perception may be hypothesized, there is very little factual information available in the public domain to support any of them. Perhaps the real reason for this particular perception lies in the way the Soviets view their own organization for the conduct of counterintelligence/counterespionage operations. As cited earlier, counterintelligence is a tightly controlled, highly sensitive operational activity within the KGB. The exact placement of Special Service II of the First Chief Directorate must be analyzed in context with an overall appreciation of the placement of the KGB in the Soviet political hierarchy. As Barron points out:

Although the KGB theoretically is subordinate to the Soviet Council of Ministers, in practice it answers to the Politburo. Andropov (Chairman of the KGB and member of the Politburo), himself a Party Bureaucrat as well as a professional intelligence officer, reports directly to the First Secretary of the Party, Brezhnev. The Politburo approves, and in many cases initiates major KGB operations.

A graphic display of this relationship is provided at Charts 5 and 6. It must also be emphasized that there are no competing or complementing counterintelligence organs within Soviet society. The Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnnoye Upravleniye (GRU) or Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (Soviet Military Intelligence) does not even have the counterintelligence mission within the Soviet Armed Forces—this function is performed by the Third Directorate (Armed Forces Directorate) of the KGB.
Research in US open sources conducted as a background for this paper revealed neither a centralized counterintelligence/counterespionage effort directed by the NSC, nor reasons for the Soviet perception of CIC as a DOD level agency. In light of the serious reverses suffered by the KGB in their operations against the US military in the 1960's (specifically the Johnson/Mitkenbaugh, Whalen, and Drummond cases21), however, there would have been no reason for them not to suspect the existence of a centralized military counterintelligence organ. Given the availability of information on US government organization, their perception of an NSC counterintelligence committee is harder to explain,22 unless we recall the Soviet organization for such activity described earlier. It's possible that they attributed to USI an organization similar to their own for the conduct of such operations in a classic case of "mirror-imaging." This belief may have been strong enough to be accepted in Soviet circles even given the available of US open source information to the contrary.

To their credit, the Soviets scrupulously document and footnote their sources when writing articles which cast a poor light on the United States. They take great pleasure in reiterating our own author's descriptions of the nation's problems or, as a minimum, by making reference to a "foreign source" that is not further identified. The diagram from which the schematic Chart 1 is derived has no such attribution, and can be surmised to be a compilation from a variety of sources in the 1960's. Possible reasons why the Soviets constructed their model of USI in the manner described are admittedly speculative. There are indications, however, of a Soviet reluctance to rely on available open-source material concerning the organization and capabilities of USI in the 1960's.

The unprecedented investigation and exposure of USI activities in the 1970's, as might be expected, were cause for great celebration within the ranks of the KGB. Given the wealth of information available in the public domain, their characterization of the overall USI structure remained essentially unchanged. They correctly recognized that the NSC would retain its position at the top of the intelligence hierarchy and accurately described the functions and composition of the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee.23 The proposed centralization of the national counterintelligence effort, perceived to be a reality by the Soviets in 1968, was noted and duly reported:

The Special Coordination Committee, which is chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will, as before, (emphasis added) study and give recommendations to the President concerning the most important intelligence operations in the interests of national security and, on request, review activities connected with the collection of intelligence information. The committee is composed of the members of the National Security Council and other representative senior officials. The Committee coordinates all counterintelligence operations conducted independently up to this time by the CIA, Treasury Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.24

The above statement that the Special Coordination Committee would coordinate "all counterintelligence operations conducted independently" up to that time (1978) by the agencies listed is an interesting change from their view in 1968 that an NSC mechanism existed to perform the coordination/operational function. It is possible to surmise that the reason for the change may have been the information base to which the respective authors had access. The voluminous reports of the Congressional Committees chaired by Senator Frank Church and Congressman Otis Pike provided a data base from which Soviet analysts may have been able to refine their
perceptions of the USI community.

It is in the characterization of USI organs that the researcher finds the greatest amount of rhetoric. The overall impression that one is left with is that any organization or academic institution which conducts even a legitimate study of the government and society of the Soviet Union has an intelligence connection or "taint". A number of American universities are singled out as centers of "subversive" activities, namely Columbia, Stanford, Michigan State, and Harvard Universities. The Russian studies programs of these institutions come under intense Soviet attack as sources of "anti-Soviet, anti-communist" propaganda.25 It is hardly surprising that the US government would make use of the expertise of the individuals working at these universities on a variety of studies designed to develop a clearer picture of Soviet capability and intentions. Yet, the Soviets view any such connection with the US government as proof of official membership in the intelligence community. The characterization of the Hoover Institute of Stanford University is typical:

While being occupied with the theoretical research in the area of war, peace and revolution, anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda, the Hoover Institute fabricates pseudoscientific works for the USIA, CIA, special services of the Pentagon, State Department and other government institutions of the USA.26

If we accept the Soviet accusation that US universities engaged in Russian studies are really adjunct members of the intelligence community, it provides another example of the Soviet perception that information is intelligence, and an appropriate expansion of the Soviet produced USI model (Chart 1) should be made. While it is true that the US intelligence community had a number of long-standing contractual relationships with individuals and universities on a variety of projects,27 the Soviets claim the existence of "hundreds" of these anti-Soviet centers.28 It is interesting to note that even in the wake of extensive US revelations concerning the activities of its own intelligence services in relationships with the American academic community, the Soviets continued to suspect that an enormous network of anti-Soviet centers was hidden somewhere in the United States. While the claim has an intrinsic value for domestic propaganda purposes, it also may have been indicative of a Soviet tendency to suspect the surface appearance of US open source reporting on the USI community. The Soviet description of individual USI operational elements tends to reinforce this observation. The following Soviet comment on the overall USI community will provide a useful vehicle to begin this discussion:

The complicated organism of the intelligence and subversive institutions inside the United States and abroad may be compared with a gigantic octopus, the tentacles of which are the American intelligence services, and the parasitic suckers--the numerous intelligence, sabotage, criminal-insurgent special subunits located on the territory of other countries, especially those close to socialist countries.

The structure of the contemporary intelligence system of the USA is adapted, before all else, for subversive work against socialist cooperation and its primary force--the Soviet Union and also against other detachments of the revolutionary movement. The leadership of the intelligence work is concentrated at the highest governmental level--in the hands of the President and located in the high consultative organ--the National Security Council.29
The diatribe notwithstanding, this passage emphasizes an important point. It illustrates the Soviet understanding that USI organizations act in accordance with directives issued by National Command Authority (NCA) and do not act independently of this direction. While this might appear self-evident, there were numerous assertions in the American media during the early 1970's which claimed USI (CIA in particular) was a "rogue elephant," totally out of control and acting independent of direction. This attribution of responsibility directly to the "hands of the President" is admittedly self-serving from the Soviet viewpoint in that it allows them to immediately discredit and embarrass the senior level of the Executive Branch in the event of a spectacular intelligence operational failure (e.g., Bay of Pigs, U-2, etc.). Given the system of control established by the Communist Party over the KGB described earlier, it most probably is inconceivable for them to perceive of an intelligence organization which both formulates and executes policy.

As the primary USI organ, the CIA (Tsentral'noye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye) receives the lion's share of attention in the Soviet media. CIA is the center of the organization of espionage, sabotage, terror, and of bloody, punitive operations in dependent [colonial] countries; and the center for the conduct of subversive, ideological and political actions in the severest forms including conspiracies, revolts, coups, interventions and military conflicts.

In the book from which this passage is taken, the author further describes how the US Information Agency (USIA), the Agency for International Development (AID), the Peace Corps, and American trade and industrial organizations are mere "fronts" for CIA activities. The most serious accusation is the lingering Soviet assertion that the Peace Corps is an official organ of USI.

If the Soviet model of CIA depicted in Chart 1 is compared with the organization of CIA as it appeared in 1959 (Chart 4), some interesting observations can be made. First is the placement of the Office of National Estimates (ONE) as a separate operating directorate within CIA. In the 1950's and 1960's, ONE was located within the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence (DDI) and was subordinate to the Board of National Estimates located within the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. The function of the Board of National Estimates was to produce a coordinated National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) with input from other members of the intelligence community in accordance with their areas of expertise, e.g., State Department on political matters, DIA (after its formation in 1962) on matters pertaining to armed services and military technology. This process was designed to be an intelligence community function and not a purely CIA responsibility. The misplacement of ONE on the Soviet model may have been a matter of simply confusing ONE with the Board of National Estimates; may illustrate Soviet confusion concerning the dual-hatted role of the Director of CIA as head of intelligence community and head of CIA; or may be indicative of a deeper misunderstanding of the USI estimating process. The Soviet source did not elaborate on the role of ONE, nor did subsequent research in Soviet sources yield any further perceptions of the mechanisms whereby classified US intelligence estimates are made.

The departments on the Soviet model as Personnel (1st Department) and Intelligence (2nd Department) can be equated to the Directorate for Support and Directorate for Intelligence respectively on the American model at Chart 4. While it may appear logical to assign a subordinate training element to the Operations Directorate (then known as the Directorate for Plans), the Office of Training is actually a subordinate of the Directorate for Support.
The most curious entry on the Soviet model of CIA is the Department of National Security. This "department" has no corresponding element on the US model, nor was its function explained in the Soviet Source. Its very name, however, would tend to suggest that CIA had an internal security function that is specifically prohibited by the National Security Act of 1947. While it is conceivable that the Soviets perceived of a National Security Department with a foreign intelligence mission, it is far more likely that they would have believed such activity was carried out by the Operations Department. It is also interesting to note that if a CIA internal security function was perceived by the Soviets, that it appeared in a source which was published in 1968--several years before the illegal activities of CIA in the name of "national security" became well publicized in the American media. The fact that DIA does not appear on the Soviet model tends to date the chart prior to 1962, which even more strongly suggests a long-standing Soviet suspicion of an internal security function of CIA as part of the "cold war" legacy. Given the fact that the KGB performs both the foreign intelligence and internal security functions, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets perceived similar functions were performed by CIA.

DIA receives considerable attention in the Soviet media. Beyond the normal charges that DIA "coordinates and organizes all subversive activities of the US Armed Forces," there is an assertion that DIA serves the "monopolies" in magnifying an illusory Soviet threat to the Western world. The normal activity of strategic targeting, fed by an alleged DIA magnification of the threat is phrased in a typical manner:

The organs of military intelligence carry out intelligence preparation for world thermonuclear war, painstakingly selecting goals and objectives for nuclear strikes on the territory of the USSR and other socialist countries.

An analysis of the Soviet characterization of DIA's functions leads to some interesting observations. First, as mentioned earlier, there appears to be no firm understanding of the reasons for the establishment of DIA, which, in actuality, were to unify the intelligence activities of DOD; to improve the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence; and to eliminate any duplication in the intelligence efforts of the individual services. The Soviet emphasis on the positive collection role of DIA is perhaps a reflection of their own military intelligence organ, the GRU, or Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. US sources state that the GRU engages primarily in the collection of strategic, tactical, and military-technical intelligence, although it also is involved in guerrilla warfare. No US or Soviet references were found which indicated that the GRU had any organic analytic capability. Indeed, no Soviet sources used as a background for this paper even mentioned the existence of the GRU. Thus, the perception of an operationally rather than analytically oriented military intelligence agency is logical from a Soviet point of view. From an operational standpoint, however, the most notable omission is the Soviet characterization of DIA is their failure to specifically point out that DIA has responsibility for the management of the military attaché system. As overt collectors of information in the countries to which they are assigned, military attaches most definitely should have been mentioned as part of the DIA structure. A possible reason why this might not have been done is that the Soviets wish to avoid any intelligence connotation from being placed on their own attaches--virtually all of whom are GRU officers.

The Soviets appear to pay a great deal of attention to the employment of special operations forces, i.e., US Army Special Forces, Navy Sea Air and Land (SEAL) troops, and US Air Force Special Operations Units. While recognizing that these units
are not formally part of the USI structure, the Soviets nevertheless conclude that they are directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to perform sabotage and terrorist operations in support of both DIA and CIA. While this conclusion is logical based upon the Vietnam experience where such units were used to develop tactical intelligence, the Soviets ascribe a much greater degree of continuing intelligence affiliation to these forces than is warranted. The problem here is the Soviet tendency to include counterinsurgency as a unique form of intelligence operation. While intelligence is absolutely essential to a successful counterinsurgency campaign, it is not the only requirement. The Soviets, believing in the inseparable nature of war and politics, state that members of special operations units receive ideological and psychological "processing" in anticomunism which turns them into "inhuman beings." They then become ideally suited for carrying out "secret, subversive actions." For all their purported "expertise" in the field of US special operations force training, however, one Soviet source proclaimed that the "green beret" (US Army Special Forces) school was located at Fort Bragg, California, rather than North Carolina.

Although the majority of Soviet articles concerning USI describe human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, the National Security Agency (NSA) (Agentevo Natsional'noy Bezopasnosti) has received its fair share of coverage in the Soviet media. Characterized as "the most secret of secret services", there appears to be a general belief that it is only nominally subordinate to the Defense Department in order to hide its operational budget. Thus perceived as having a degree of organizational autonomy, it is further claimed that operational direction for NSA comes directly from the President and the NSC. The cryptanalytic and communications security/intelligence functions performed by NSA are accurately understood. The Soviet placement of NSA within the USI structure was perhaps influenced by the description of that Agency which appeared in US media. For example:

This (communications security and intelligence) is the principal business of the National Security Agency, a huge government intelligence apparatus, larger and more expensive than the CIA...Very likely, NSA's role in decision making is greater than commonly assumed...an agency with a $40 million building in Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, with at least 15,000 employees, and expending an annual budget of approximately a billion dollars.

The Soviets probably found it easy to accept their own perception of the placement of NSA within the USI structure because their own communications security and intelligence organ is centrally located within the Eighth Directorate of the KGB. This placement allows operational direction to be received directly from the Politburo through the Chairman, KGB.

In relating the activities of NSA during the civil disturbance era of the 1960's and 1970's, a grudging admiration can be sensed in the Soviet reporting on the volume of information that could be collected and processed by that organization:

Until May 1975, the National Security Agency was receiving copies of international telegrams. NSA analysts looked over 150,000 telegrams monthly.

NSA continually controls telegraph communications, but also listens to telephone conversations of Americans. All information received from the major American telegraph companies, from the numerous army of their radio operators who listen to other radio stations round-the-clock, and from numerous other sources,
is processed with the help of IBM, which determines whether a word or sentence of the information was earlier entered into its memory. If the message contains a sentence which mentions a particular name, address or action, IBM copies the whole text of the message, which is then analyzed in detail.31

In the Soviet coverage of such activity, however, there is no mention of the actual US motive for the actions which were taken during this traumatic period. This motive was to determine the nature and extent of any foreign manipulation of US domestic crises.32 It serves the Soviet purpose merely to recount the enormity of the "crimes" perpetrated by USI against the American people. Yet, concealed in the terms and examples used to describe these crimes is a possible recognition of American technological capability.

The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) has no independent collection capability. It is solely dependent on the diplomatic reporting channels of embassies around the world and sources from elsewhere in the intelligence community for the raw data needed to produce finished intelligence reports.33 As a secondary function, this office also acts as a liaison element between the State Department and those government agencies which actually conduct sensitive intelligence operations. This liaison function is necessary to insure that the goals of these operations are in accordance with foreign policy objectives of the United States.34 Yet, for reasons of sensationalism or disinformation, the Soviets claim that members of this organization participate "as equals in the major subver-
sive operations of the CIA and other intelligence services of the USA." They further claim that this is confirmed by a directive from former Secretary of State William Rogers to INR, stating that he expected that department to be more "effective" and "creative" in their work. A following comment, which was not printed in quotation marks, interpreted this as an exhortation not only to analyze the information provided by other intelligence organs, but to actively engage in its own clandestine collection program.35 The Soviet characterization of INR as a clandestine operational unit admittedly serves a propaganda goal for domestic readers, yet may also be a further indicator of Soviet reluctance to accept as bona fide the information freely provided in US open sources.

The Soviets appear to accurately understand the internal security/civilian counterintelligence function of the FBI (Federal'noye Byuro Rassledovaniya). However, they attribute a much greater positive intelligence collection role to the FBI than actually exists.36 This perception perhaps stems from the use of FBI agents as legal attaches in major embassies throughout the world. While the stated mission of these agents is to provide liaison with host country law enforcement agencies on routine police matters such as extradition and criminal intelligence, they inevitably must obtain a certain amount of political intelligence which then should be passed on to CIA.37 Since no such organizational distinction between Soviet positive intelligence and counterintelligence bodies exists, (both functions handled by the KGB), it would be logical for the Soviets to attribute a more active foreign intelligence function to the FBI. The Soviet characterization of alleged FBI "operations" in Latin America is typical of their view of the foreign intelligence mission of the FBI:

The FBI is distinguished by great activity in Latin America. In 1963, President L. Johnson issued an official directive for increased intelligence activities by the FBI in some Latin American countries in order to obtain an additional source of intelligence information.38

While there were unconfirmed reports that President Johnson had assigned FBI agents to specific missions in the Dominican Republic following the American intervention
in 1965, such an assignment would have been on a temporary basis. The magnification of the foreign intelligence role of the FBI serves Soviet propaganda goals and again may be indicative of the tendency to be suspicious of US open sources describing the operational jurisdictions of the various elements within the intelligence community.

With the exception of the description of the functions of the Special Coordinating Committee of the NSC presented earlier in this paper, and the characterizations of FBI and NSA, the Soviet perceptions of the US intelligence hierarchy and its operational elements are derived from Soviet sources which were printed prior to 1975. Since the 1975-1976 time period marked the peak of US Congressional investigation of the intelligence community, it also marks a logical point to ascertain whether revelations made by Congressional committees or the US media had any great effect on the manner in which the US intelligence community and its operational elements were portrayed in the Soviet media. The purpose of this investigation will be to ascertain whether any degradation of US intelligence capability was noted in Soviet open-source literature as a result of these investigations. The reorganizations of individual operational elements which, of necessity, followed these Congressional investigations are secondary to the vital question of Soviet perceptions of their impact on the national intelligence capability of the United States.
PRESENT DAY PERCEPTIONS

Of all the operations that the Soviet Union and the US have conducted against each other, none have benefited the KGB as much as the campaign in the US to discredit the CIA. In our wildest scenarios, we could never have anticipated such a plus for our side. It's the kind of gift all espionage men dream about. Today our boys have it a lot easier, and we didn't have to lift a finger. You did all the work for us.60

This quote, allegedly from a "KGB agent" raises an interesting question: To what extent do the Soviets perceive a weakening of US intelligence operational or analytical capability in the wake of Congressional investigations of US intelligence agencies. If intelligence is truly our "first line of defense", it is vital to ascertain how badly our principal adversary feels this defense has been impaired. It must be noted here, that in the Soviet open source articles concerning USI which were surveyed (1975-1979), there appeared to be no systematic coverage of the revelations of the Congressional investigating committees. The articles cited in the following discussion are representative of the type of information which appeared in the Soviet press concerning the reorganization and operations of USI during the period of its greatest public scrutiny.

The basic objectives of the successive reorganizations of the intelligence community have been to improve accountability for intelligence operations, while at the same time insuring the availability of high quality intelligence needed for national security. This movement toward the consolidation of the intelligence community and an enhanced leadership role for the Director of Central Intelligence began with the Nixon Administration, which, on 5 November 1971, announced a number of management steps to work toward this goal. This movement has been carried on by the Ford and Carter Administrations. President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 on 18 February 1976, which created the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI). The CFI, which was to be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and composed of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and the President's National Security Advisor, was charged with the responsibility to control budget preparation for the intelligence community, and to establish priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence.61 Legislation pending at the time of this writing indicates that the Carter Administration will continue this process of consolidation by granting the Director of Central Intelligence even greater powers in the budgetary controls of individual intelligence agencies.62 The attempts to centralize control of the intelligence establishment within the purview of the Director of Central Intelligence has drawn a significant amount of attention in the Soviet press. The following two excerpts are typical of the way in which this movement toward consolidation has been characterized:

Now they give to the Director of the CIA full authority for approval of budgets intended for all means of intelligence; he will bear full and complete responsibility for the results of the analysis of intelligence information at all levels.

Washington cherishes great hopes in connection with the reorganization declaration of the White House, it directly states: The placement of complete responsibility for the most important administrative functions on one person must bring foreign intelligence to greater effectiveness and profit.
It's not hard to guess what must follow behind such a declaration. First and foremost to the intensification of subversive activity against the Soviet Union and the countries of socialist cooperation by the American intelligence services.63

The theme of centralized control again appeared in 1978:

Therefore the strengthening of centralized control of the intelligence community does not by itself, of course, provide guarantees that they will not again be used in an evil manner. As a result, Admiral Turner is receiving power which none of his predecessors as Director of CIA possessed and which, in principle, must only promote the development of the so-called tendency toward "self-government."64

Soviet reporting of personnel cuts within CIA was closely allied with the coverage of the consolidation movement. Following his appointment as CIA Director in March 1977, Admiral Stansfield Turner announced the elimination of 212 personnel spaces within the Agency's Directorate for Operations.65 This move, taken to streamline CIA's analytic capability and to scale down its covert operations, was characterized as a "purge" in the Soviet press. Given the Soviet historical experience, the word "purge" would most likely connote the violent removal of undesirable elements to solidify or regain control. In an article entitled "Purge in the Camp of the Unclean," this is exactly the manner in which these personnel cuts were reported. Apparently, Turner's action was seen as a move to strengthen operational capability by removing undesirable elements. Perhaps recalling then CIA Director James Schlesinger's reduction in force of 1974, there was an indication that the Soviets expected other such "purges": "No one in the USA, even Admiral Turner himself seriously thinks that the CIA and other intelligence services of America can become clean, no matter how many purges to which they are subjected."(emphasis added)66

It is interesting to note that Schlesinger's and Turner's actions were regarded as "purges" by some American observers at the time, and characterized as the forced removal or retirement of those within the Agency who were opposed to the detente policies of the incumbent administrations.67 For the most part, however, the Soviet open source characterizations of the intelligence community's consolidation efforts and personnel cuts indicated that they were suspicious of its motives and reluctant to believe the information which was readily available in the American media at the time.

As mentioned earlier, the Soviets appear to have a great appreciation for the collection and analytic capability of American intelligence. Yet, the willingness to employ this capability is the essential ingredient of its credibility. The extent to which the Soviets believe that the highly publicized Congressional investigations altered US willingness to employ its intelligence capability is admittedly a subject for much conjecture. Yet, certain basic attitudes can be gleaned from their open publications.

There were indications that the Soviets believed the crisis within American intelligence was symptomatic of a greater crisis within American society, a crisis of will, that could be used to their advantage:

The current crisis in the activity of CIA is becoming apparent in detail, and on the volcanic Latin American continent. It is
a reflection of the deep and incurable crisis in which the whole capitalist system is experiencing in the current stage of its existence.68

Seven months after this article appeared in the Soviet media, a speech commemorating the 106th anniversary of Lenin's birth was delivered by KGB Chief Yury Andropov. While previous speakers had used this occasion to eulogize the Soviet Armed Forces, Andropov made a special point of emphasizing the inherent catastrophe of a nuclear war, and sharply criticized the share of national resources which were being funneled into the military-industrial establishment: "The new society needs peace—it is easier for the new society to build in conditions of detente and a diminished burden of armaments."69

Yet, while espousing the need for detente to accelerate the creation of the "new society" ("new" meaning "socialist"), he did not repudiate the Communist commitment to the worldwide revolutionary movement: "But let the West make no demands on our Soviet country to renounce its solidarity with those who are waging a struggle against exploitation and colonial oppression."70

If we tie these "threads" together, it is possible to make the following observations: (1) Detente is necessary in order to preclude a nuclear holocaust in which the Soviet Union itself would be destroyed; (2) It is the continuing responsibility of the Soviet Union to aid in the establishment of socialism, since a lasting peace cannot be obtained until the socialist revolution has triumphed in the world; (3) Nuclear armaments are an expensive means of ensuring only a nuclear doomsday and not the true conquest of socialism; therefore, other more cost effective means must be found. If we place the speaker (Chief of the KGB) and the content of the speech (reduction of armament expenditures in favor of "other means" of revolutionary struggle) in the proper time perspective (height of the campaign to discredit US intelligence), one could possibly conclude that Andropov was arguing for an increase in national resources devoted to Soviet subversion efforts throughout the world at a time when USI could not adequately respond.71 Obviously, if this was such an appeal, its success within the inner circles of the Communist hierarchy cannot be ascertained. Yet, the successes of the "other means" of waging class struggle can have been observed (e.g., the use of Cuban proxies in Africa, the success of a Marxist-oriented revolution in Nicaragua). While there is insufficient evidence to draw a definite correlation between Andropov's speech and any Soviet perception of operational paralysis within USI, its appearance at this point in time would appear to be too convenient for pure coincidence. Yet, if there was such a perception of a lack of will to employ the US intelligence capability to defend national security interests, it was not further developed in the Soviet media. On the contrary, a spate of articles appeared that described how the activities of CIA were being "hidden", and that there was no degradation of US capability.72 While the propaganda content of these articles must be taken as a given constant, they should still be considered during the examination of Soviet perceptions of USI during this period.

It is interesting to note that in the final report of the Church Committee, released on 26 April 1976, the majority of the criticism leveled at the intelligence community dealt with the initiation, approval and review of "covert operations" (those clandestine activities designed to actively manipulate the internal affairs of other countries.) The recommendations of the Senate Select Committee did not, as the Soviets might have anticipated, place a prohibition on all covert action projects, but proposed a greater degree of executive and/or Congressional control over them. This recommendation was a signal to the Soviets that the US had not lost the willingness to engage in covert action projects to meet "extraordinary circumstances" posing grave threats to US national security.73
On the contrary, there was now a congressional mandate to maintain the capability for future employment within a new set of guidelines. These "extraordinary circumstances" were never defined by the Committee, and the phrase reappeared in a Soviet article which mentioned the Church Committee recommendations:

The commission of Senator F. Church, which investigated secret operations abroad came to an analogous conclusion: having announced that in extraordinary circumstances (emphasis added), the United States must maintain the capability to respond with secret operations.74

The article from which the above passage is taken, published in May 1979, was preceded by an editorial in Pravda which accused the CIA and the People's Republic of China (PRC) of mounting a major covert action campaign against Afghanistan:

CIA interference is camouflaged through the use of proxies in maintaining ties with the Afghan counterrevolution and financing it.

The CIA considers the most "promising" group to be the Moslem Brothers, a reactionary Afghan organization based in northern Pakistan. It has announced its intention to form an alliance with anyone and to support any actions against the present people's regime in Afghanistan. The Moslem Brothers are in fact cooperating with Chehic Javid and Sorha, groupings of Maoist agents. Many members of these groupings underwent special training in China and, with the assistance of Chinese authorities, have been sent to Afghanistan to commit acts of subversion and terrorism.75

The timing of the appearance of these two articles is also too close to be explained by mere coincidence. It's possible that, based on any evidence of US complicity in Afghanistan, the Soviets were forced to re-evaluate the US capability and willingness to conduct covert action and re-examine the exact meaning of the Church Committee recommendations. On balance, however, one may also conclude that these articles were designed to condition the Soviet domestic readership for the invasion of Afghanistan which was to occur on 27 December 1979. While it is, of course, impossible to definitely ascertain the intent of these articles, it is interesting to note the Soviet perception that covert action is still a credible option in US global strategy.76

The other two operational activities commonly regarded as "secret operations" are the related fields of espionage and counterespionage. In spite of the overlapping nature of espionage and covert action in terms of the personnel and sources of information involved, the Church Committee concluded that it was essential to US national security planning: "The Committee believes that the United States cannot forego clandestine human collection and expect to maintain the same quality of intelligence on matters of the highest importance to our national security."77

Though they may have hoped for such an outcome, it is doubtful that the Soviets ever seriously believed the US would forego the use of "clandestine human collection" as a means of gathering information. Given the US Congressional sanction for this operational activity, the Soviet concern, of necessity, turned to the probable espionage targets within the Soviet Union and abroad. The two most publicized cases of alleged US espionage activity within the Soviet Union during this period involved the expulsion of US Vice Counsel Martha Peterson in July 1977, and
the alleged links between US intelligence and the Soviet dissident movement. While an in-depth discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this paper, the Soviet press coverage clearly stated that, in spite of CIA Director Turner's strong belief in technical means of intelligence collection, the US had not rejected the use of human sources in the service of "reactionism."\(^7\)

The conclusions which the Church Committee reached concerning counterintelligence/counterespionage were similar to those previously described which related to the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. Recognizing the threat to our national security posed by foreign intelligence agencies, the thrust of the criticism leveled at the intelligence community was directed at the lack of an NSC-level body to review sensitive counterespionage operations for their effectiveness and adherence to legal procedures. In what is perhaps its strongest pro-intelligence statement, the Committee concluded that:

A Subcommittee on Counterintelligence should be established within the framework of the National Security Council. Its purpose would be to monitor CI activities, authorize important counterespionage operations, and adjudicate inter-agency disagreements over CI policies, coordination, defector bona fides, suspected hostile penetrations, and related matters.\(^7\)

In a follow-on recommendation, the Committee suggested that a "top secret" review be conducted of the national CI effort to form the basis for a presidential statement on national counterintelligence policy and objectives.\(^8\)

While no Soviet response to this particular recommendation of the Church Committee was discovered, they now realize, as previously mentioned, that the Special Coordination Committee of the NSC will handle all matters pertaining to US counterespionage policy. An appreciation of Soviet perceptions of the capability of US counterintelligence is harder to discern. The most publicized case concerning US counterintelligence capability in recent years stemmed from the arrest of United Nations (UN) employees Valdik Enger, Rudolf Chernyayev, and Vladimir Zanyakin on 20 May 1978. The operation which resulted in the arrest of these three men began in October 1977 and involved a US Naval Officer, Lieutenant Commander Arthur Lindbergh, acting in the guise of a "traitor" to pass US submarine warfare secrets to the Soviets. As a result of this operation, Enger and Chernyayev were sentenced to 50 years in prison. Zanyakin, because of his diplomatic status, was expelled from the country. Chernyayev and Enger were later released to return to the Soviet Union in exchange for five Soviet dissidents who emigrated to the United States.\(^8\)

As might be expected, the Soviet press denounced the trial as an illegal farce and systematically discredited all forms of evidence presented. The claim of illegality stemmed from their stubborn insistence that Chernyayev and Enger were "diplomats."\(^8\) In reality, the men were UN Secretariat employees and, as such, did not have diplomatic status. The circumstances by which three presumably well-trained intelligence officers (two of whom did not have diplomatic immunity) allowed themselves to be apprehended in the conduct of an espionage mission are curious. Could it have been a matter of mere carelessness, or perhaps a perception of a weakened counterintelligence coverage that lulled them into a false sense of security? The real reasons for this apparent operational error of will, of course, never be known. Yet, the serious consequences of this error must probably caused a re-appraisal of KGB operational techniques and US counterintelligence capability.
CONCLUSION

There is a technique of land navigation known as "resection," whereby an individual attempts to locate himself in the wilderness by taking back azimuths from known points. While not meaning to imply that an attempt to discern true Soviet perceptions is by any means such an exact science, the procedure of using the "known points" of Soviet open sources is a useful means to determine placement of the subject within Soviet consciousness. Rhetoric and propaganda must be regarded as a given constant in such an exercise; however, this does not diminish the value of these sources as a means to determine the true thinking of the relatively small group of men who rule the Soviet Union. This process is facilitated by the highly centralized state control of mass media, which makes virtually every news article a pronouncement of the Soviet government--carrying with it the aura of official acceptance. By applying this frame of reference, the preceding descriptions of the organization and operational capability of the American intelligence community suggest several interesting conclusions.

There is a long standing Soviet appreciation for US technical intelligence collection and analytic capability. This perception will have strong implications in the credibility of US intelligence to verify future strategic arms limitation agreements. Their appreciation for US analytic capability may also be indicative of a lagging Soviet effort in this field. Further research should be done to determine the state of Soviet analytic capability, and its interface with the process of intelligence estimation. Western sources of information on the KGB have traditionally dealt with the operational aspects of its function and not its input into the estimating and decision-making process. This is not to suggest that a highly sophisticated intelligence estimation process will preclude intelligence failures (as our own experience tends to show), but the chances of a miscalculation are greatly increased. Such a miscalculation during a time of international crisis could have potentially disastrous results for both the US and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet perception of the intelligence community's organization and the functions of its component members is essentially correct. This should come as no surprise given the amount of relevant material available in US open sources. It is for this very reason that the misperceptions noted in this study are so curious. The characterization of all components of the community as havens for clandestine operators has an intrinsic propaganda value. Yet, from another point of view, it is possible to argue that the Soviet perception of US intelligence organization is a mirror image of their own. The KGB and GRU are responsible for the clandestine collection of information; therefore, it would only be natural for them to suspect a similar mission for any US intelligence organ—even given the existence of US open source material to the contrary. This tendency is indicative of a broader characteristic of Soviet thinking which allows an all-encompassing ideology to inhibit objective analysis. George Kennan once observed that "the Communist Party has made it impossible for the people who collect the information to accompany that with any really objective analysis of western society." This need to be ideologically correct undoubtedly distorts Soviet perceptions of American institutions and motives.

Evidence presented in this paper indicates that the Soviets do not perceive a degradation of US intelligence capability in the fields of covert action, espionage, and counterespionage as a result of Congressional investigations into these areas. On the contrary, they recognized that covert action will still remain a credible option in US global strategy, although it will be employed on a more
limited scale. They also acknowledge the fact that the US has not abandoned the human intelligence medium in the espionage/counterespionage mode in favor of total reliance on technical means of intelligence collection.

As Andropov pointed out on page 14, the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence allows for struggle on all fronts, with the exception of direct military confrontation, in an attempt to shift the world correlation of forces. In any form of struggle, it is vitally important to accurately assess one's adversary's strengths and weaknesses. In spite of the foreign and domestic difficulties which have plagued US intelligence in recent years, the Soviets still feel that it is a viable institution and a credible opponent in the world arena. This perception must be continually conditioned in a direction favorable to US national security interests.
Key for Chart 1

1. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
2. See page this text for a discussion.
3. The members were listed as follows: Chaired by the President, Members: Vice-President; Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness; and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. According to the United States Government Organization Manual--1970/71 (page 60), the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness was a statutory member of the NSC, while the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was not.
4. Shown composed of the following members: Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of Defense; Special Assistant to the President; Director, CIA; Director, Foreign Operations Department (Deputy Director for Plans, CIA). The function of this Committee was not discussed in the Russian source.
5. Counterintelligence Corps. See page this text for a discussion.
8. Department of International Cooperation. This organization is most probably the Agency for International Development.
9. Intelligence Consultative Committee. The Russian source did not elaborate on this organization.
10. The directorates shown on the schematic were as they appeared in the Russian source.
11. The bottom "layer" of the schematic, not depicted on this diagram was a listing of various emigre and other organizations. These organizations included Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Munich, Germany. While at one time they were funded by CIA, they now have no affiliation with the intelligence community. As might be expected, the Soviets have a lingering suspicion of intelligence "taint" with both of these organizations, although they have made a grudging recognition of US congressional funding. (Kratkiy Politicheskiy Slovar' (Short Political Dictionary), published 1978, p. 336).
Chart 2
National Intelligence Establishment, p. 194.

Membership on NSC
Executive Control

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H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, p. 194.
Chart 4  
Organization of CIA, 1959

- Director of Central Intelligence
  - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
    - Inspector General
    - General Counsel
    - Controller
  - Plans (DPP) Deputy Director
  - Support (DDS) Deputy Director
  - Co-ordination (IDC) Deputy Director
  - Intelligence (DII) Deputy Director


23
Chart 5
KGB Organization

Soviet Government

Council of Ministers

Central Committee

Communist Party

Nominal

Actual

Chairman KGB

Administrative Organs Dept.

Collegium

Secretariat

Chief Directorates

First

Second

Fifth

Boarder Guards

Directorates

Third

Technical Operations

Personnel

Administration

Seventh

Eighth

Ninth

Other Elements:
Archives, Operational Experience, Finance, Physical Security, etc.

J. Barron, KGB, p. 75.
Chart 6
Organization of the First Chief Directorate

FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE

Secretariat

Illegals & Technical Directorate

Scientific Directorate

Planning & Analysis

Party Committee

Information Service

Counter-Intelligence Service

DEPARTMENTS

Area Depts.: North America, China, Latin America, Middle East, Western Europe, etc.

Administrative & Operational Support Units:
Communications, Finance, Archives, Personnel, etc.

Specialized Operations Dept.:
Departments A, V,
Control of Satellite Services, Soviet Cover Units, etc.

J. Barton, KGB, p. 76.
FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 11

5. Ibid., p. 3.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


12. Ransom, p. 113.


16. Ibid., pp. 80-88.


18. Ibid.


20. Ibid., pp. 14-16.

21. Ibid., p. 189.
22. It's ironic that the Findings and Recommendations of the Senate Select Committee (Church Committee) specifically criticized the fact that no such committee to deal with counterintelligence existed at the national level. See Tvrus G. Fain, ed. The Intelligence Community—History, Organization, and Issues (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1977), p. 102.


24. Linnik, p. 78.

25. S. K. Tsvigun, Taynyi Front (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1974), pp. 49-51. Author's Note: From 1955 until 1959, Michigan State University did participate in a covert police training program for the South Vietnamese conducted by CIA. In 1959, the University refused to continue the project and it was moved elsewhere. See Fain, p. 699.

26. Ibid., p. 51.

27. Marchetti and Marks, pp. 231-235.


29. Tsvigun, p. 36.

30. For an in-depth review of USI operations which prompted the "rogue elephant" comment of Senator Church, see William R. Carson, The Armies of Ignorance--The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), pp. 381-431. It is interesting to note that while accountability for intelligence operations was sometimes lacking, there was no evidence to suggest that there was a corresponding lack of policy direction from the NCA.


32. Ibid., p. 39. While CIA has made use of these organizations in the past as cover for individual agents (see Carson, p. 400), an assertion that they are CIA subsidiaries is patently false. As part of their official function, these organizations are expected to report on conditions in the countries to which they are assigned. The Soviet charge is another example of how they equate information with intelligence.

33. "A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) presents the intelligence community's current knowledge of the situation in a particular country or on a specific topic and then tries to estimate what is going to happen within a certain period of time." Fain, p. 43.

34. Kirkpatrick, p. 19. (The ONE was subsequently replaced by a system of National Intelligence Officers (NIO) in 1973. See Fain, p. 400.)

35. Marchetti, p. 636.

36. Fain, p. 983.
37. On 14 February 1967, it was officially acknowledged that the CIA had covertly supported the National Student Association since the early 1950's. (Corson, p. 409). This revelation would have been too late to make an impact on the Soviet source.

38. Tsvigun, pp. 40-41.


40. Barron, p. 343.

41. DIA assumed managerial control of the attache system in 1965. (Ransom, p. 107).

42. Barron, p. 343.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 42.


46. While the Soviets do mention technical means of intelligence collection, such as satellites in an increasing number of articles, their treatment of HUMINT is much more extensive.


49. Ransom, p. 127.

50. Barron, p. 87.

51. Geievsky and Smelov, pp. 84-85.

52. See Fain, pp. 819-866 for a reprint of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence Report of June, 1970 which expressed a credible threat of foreign involvement in a variety of movements.

53. Marchetti and Marks, p. 91.

54. Fain, p. 440. (Statement of INR Director Ray S. Cline to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning the operations of INR within the intelligence community.)

55. Tsvigyn, pp. 44-45. (Note--no US open source corroboration of Rogers' alleged directive was found.)

56. Tsvigyn, p. 46.

57. Fain, p. 376.

58. Tarasov, p. 16.
59. Ransom, p. 145.


63. V. Berezin, "Eskalatsiya shpionazha i diversiya," Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 August 1977, p. 3.

64. Linnik, p. 76.


68. V. Khorkhordin, "Ts R U: Krizis shpionskoy imperii," Kommunist, 3 September 1975, p. 3.


70. Ibid.

71. Christian Duevel, in Radio Liberty Research Report No. 20 (2860), RL No. 262/76, reaches similar conclusions. The reader is invited to read Mr. Duevel's article for an in-depth analysis of other aspects of the speech.


74. V. F. Petrovskiy, "Silovoy factor v global'noy strategii S Sh A," S Sh A Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya No. 5, 1979, p. 23. (The Soviets duly credit Fain's Intelligence Community, pp. 121-122 as a source of this entry.)

75. A. Petrov, "Zagovor protiv Afganskogo naroda," Pravda, 29 March 1979, p. 4. (Note: For earlier examples of Soviet claims of a CIA-PRC link see "Sovpdeniye interesov Ts R U i maoistov," Pravda, 28 May 75, p. 5, which claimed that demonstrations by ethnic Chinese in Thailand prior to Thai-Vietnamese normalization talks were orchestrated by Peking and the CIA. See also "K peregovoram Dzh Ford V Pekine," Pravda, 4 December 1975, p. 5, which stated that the Chinese leadership made a "point" of congratulating G. Bush on his appointment as CIA Director.)

76. Petrovskiy, p. 23.

77. Fain, p. 112.


80. Ibid.


83. Barron's KGB indicates that there is a Department for Collation of Operational Experience (p. 89), but this Office examines the intelligence operations conducted by the Soviet Union and foreign countries for useful information. The chart at Appendix 6 shows a Planning and Analysis Section as part of the First Chief Directorate. However, this section presumably supports the clandestine operations of that Directorate. There is no indication of a centralized intelligence assessment activity.

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