THE SYRIAN ARMY: AN ACTIVIST MILITARY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (U)
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AN ACTIVE MILITARY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
FOREWORD

This series of "Occasional Papers" provides a means for the publication of essays on various subjects by members of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

This Occasional Paper was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the Strategic Studies Institute, the US Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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THE SYRIAN ARMY:
AN ACTIVIST MILITARY FORCE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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Introduction

Syria has been a turbulent nation with uncertain political rule since its inception as an independent state in 1946. (See Map of Syria at Figure 1.) During its first 24 years of independence, Syria experienced 20 changes of government. Since 1963, Syria has experienced a pattern of civilian and military power changes, but never since then has the military retreated from the political arena despite its displacement by civilian rule. However, this period of turmoil and instability contrasts sharply with the relative stability that Syria has experienced since the coup of November 1970 that brought Syria's current leader, President Hafiz Assad, to power. In the period prior to Assad's rule, the Syrian military conducted 14 coups, nine of them successful.¹

Today, Syria has a political system that is dominated by three paramount, interlocked and mutually reinforcing institutions: the office of the President, the military, and the Ba'th Party (see Figure 2). Each institution has a degree of independence but must compromise with and accommodate the other to remain in a key position. The inclusion of the military as a foremost element in Syrian decision-making should not be surprising. In Arab nations, the armed forces form one of the major blocs of the ruling policy elite. This importance stems from numerous causes, but the prime ones are that the military serves as the protector of the independence and sovereignty of the state, possesses a legitimacy that stems from the role of the military in Islamic history, and contains the seeds of societal change that contribute
Figure 1
THE SYRIAN POWER ESTABLISHMENT: KEY POWER GROUPS
to the developmental and modernizing process. In Syria these factors add to the role of the military at the core of the decisionmaking process.

The Syrian Army evolved from the internal security forces that the French had developed for the Levant and was a combined volunteer-conscript force. Military leadership came from the key families in the country but the military was not seen as the avenue to political office. Much better opportunities for political involvement and personal achievement lay in the arenas of law, medicine, commerce and land management. However, for the middle and lower classes, military service was a promising source for prestige and upward mobility. The French policy of recruiting minorities into military service also was an important factor. Thus the despised Alawites found an avenue for advancement. As a result of this differing perception of military service, the junior leaders within the military gradually were recruited from classes other than the upper class and mainly from the minority groups (i.e., Alawi, Kurds, Circassian, Armenian) that tended to find their ability constrained in other endeavors.

Consequently, nearly all the leadership positions now tend to be held by Alawites or by individuals who will support them, i.e., submissive Sunnis or Christians.

The military's position at the core of Syrian politics and power stems from its early integration into the Ba'th Party and the fact that the party was unable to generate coups or power changes without the military's active consent and participation. Thus the military achieved an important position which it has not been willing to relinquish. Party recruitment in the late 1940's and early 1950's was focused on military personnel. The military power within party ranks became so overpowering that by the mid-1960's the party became increasingly wary of the military's preponderant position and the need to rely so heavily on it to legitimize party actions. The almost complete politicization of the military at the expense of professional military skills was the result. However, in the context of Syrian politics this course was
inevitable. Following the debacle of the 1967 June Arab-Israeli war, the Syrian power establishment realized that the lack of military professionalism had been disastrous and that a remedy to this major deficiency was essential for the maintenance of national integrity and cohesion. However, very close cooperation between the military and the Assad regime was needed following the 1970 coup to generate the conditions that permitted the military to be molded into a viable military force.

**Overview**

Syria is a land of great diversity and ethnic and religious complexity. Although Sunni Moslems comprise about 70 percent of the population, various religious minorities form significant elements within the society (Alawites [a Shiite offshoot] 11 percent; Druze 3 percent; Greek Orthodox 5 percent; other Christians ten percent). Major ethnic minorities are the Kurds (9 percent), Armenians (4 percent), Turkomans (3 percent) and Circassians (2 percent). About 21 percent (1.9 million) of Syria's population of nearly 9.15 million reside in Damascus, the capital. Included within Syria's population are almost 250,000 Palestinian refugees. The Sunni portion of the Syrian population has tended to provide Syria's economic, social, educational and entrepreneurial elite, but since the ascendency of Hafiz Assad (an Alawite) to the Presidency, growing cleavages have centered on the religious differences between the Alawites and the Sunnis, with the strength, if not total dominance, of the Alawites in the political and military spheres.5

Lieutenant General Hafiz Assad took control of the political reins in a bloodless coup. In March 1971, he was elected President in a public referendum. Assad not only is Syria's President and Chief of State, but also is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Secretary-General of the Popular Front, and leader of the Socialist Ba'th Party. Holding these offices serves to cement Assad's virtual total control of all the significant political power in Syria. Assad is the first member of the Alawite sect to hold such a position of prominence within Syria.
As a result of Assad's Alawite background, the Sunni Moslems have challenged his regime and have given vent to charges of 'impurity' of the Alawites. Implicit to these charges are demands that Assad relinquish his position, which is considered inconsistent with the Syrian Constitution prescription that only a 'true' Moslem can be President, making his claim to office invalid. And there are further reasons for Sunni scorn. Alawites historically have been close to the bottom of the social ladder, traditionally impoverished and hence exploited by the more affluent and educated Sunni upper class, and their advancement via the military route is resented greatly.

In addition to important positions in the military establishment, Alawites also have gained dominance in the Ba'th Party apparatus. Assad has consolidated his power base by insuring that all critical positions are held by his supporters, whether Alawites or not. However, since the majority of these positions are held by Alawites, credence is given to the Sunni complaint of discrimination and unfair representation. This power relationship is fundamental to an understanding of the Syrian military establishment, to the turmoil that boils just below the surface, and to the realization that the nation is caught in the inherent instability generated by historical animosities, the nature of Islamic/Arab culture, the Arab-Israeli imbroglio, and superpower rivalries.

The very nature of the Syrian political dynamic provides a very complex mosaic. Not only is there the overtone of religious cleavages, but also a wide chasm between the major religious tenets of the predominant Sunni sect and the highly secular teachings of the Ba'th Party. Superimposed on both the religious and political ideas are the concepts of Arab nationalism, the Arab nation, and Arab unity. To many in the Arab world an appeal to Arab unity and nationalism has been rooted in
the search for Islamic unity as well. However, in Syria with its large non-Moslem minority, this appeal by necessity has been based more along the secular lines of the Ba'th Party. Because the Ba'th has been able to divorce itself from the religious question, at least to an extent that does not frighten the Christian population, it has managed to co-opt some Christians and they have been among its leading exponents.

Arab nationalism, with its devotion to freedom for all Arab peoples and the elimination of foreign rule and domination, has had an almost universal appeal among Syrians. The Ba'th Party has used Arab nationalism and the idea of an Arab nation as key precepts of its ideology and has capitalized on the Syrian preoccupation with this goal. The stress on 'Arabism' at the expense of 'Syrianism' led to the rootless nature of the society. Nonetheless, attempts to forge any sort of merger either with Iraq, Egypt or some combination of Arab states have ended in futility due to long-standing animosities, revulsion by others to the Ba'th socialism, attempts of one country to dominate another, or the desire of the Syrians to assume entirely the leadership role. Thus, the very nature of an incipient Syrian nationalism has found itself at odds with the pan-Arab doctrine and with the tenets of Arab unity within the Ba'th doctrine.

The inherent contradictions of the Syrian political dynamic and the deep-seated fear of foreign domination have given rise to the need for Syria to form its own brand of indigenous ideology that can mold the Ba'th Party and provide the direction for its foreign policy. Concomitantly, Syria's external relations provide a key to how the country dynamic functions and to the role of the military within the society. The three features which form the basis for its foreign policy are pan-Arabism, enmity for Israel, and the desire to remain aloof from superpower confrontations. These three objectives often have led to conflict within Syria and to disagreement with its Arab neighbors, and have contributed, at least in part, to some of the internal destabilization since the late 1970's.
Assad's rise to power stemmed from several significant strains that had been endemic in Syria and still provide overtones within the political arena today. Prior to the 1967 war with Israel, the Army had been almost totally politicized, with military competence and attention to duty disregarded in the selection of officers for promotion or for key assignments. This led to the disastrous results in the defeat at Israeli hands in the Golan Heights in the June 1967 War. Concurrent with this trend within the military was a steady rise in the influence of the more radical civilian portion of the Ba'th Party, increased repression of dissent within Syria, and a growing abandon in international affairs. The Syrian decision to intervene in the Jordanian civil war on behalf of the Palestinians in 1970, and the likelihood that this would cause Israeli interference which could not be met by the Syrian Army, was the culmination of this attitude. Many military officers opposed the Jordanian adventure, none more than the Defence Minister Lieutenant-General Hafiz al-Assad, who was also the commander of the Air Force. His protests were overruled and the government embarked on its ill-fated campaign. Assad withheld air support and the dispatched armored formations were mauled severely by the Jordanians. Syria was forced to withdraw by a combination of Israeli feints, US and Soviet pressures and defeat on the ground by the Jordanians. Those responsible for the fiasco were completely discredited not only within the Army but throughout the society. In November 1970, the moderate military segment of the Ba'th Party seized power under Assad's leadership.

Within Syria the military forces hold a prominent position that is intertwined intimately with the fortunes of the Ba'th Party and those of President Assad. Not only does the military serve to fight foreign enemies, but it also figures prominently in internal security, and combating subversion and terrorism. One perceptive observer of the Syrian scene has noted that the stability of the Syrian regime also is inhibited by sectarianism and despotism. The view of the population is summed
up as a glaring contradiction between the principles of unity, freedom, and socialism of the Ba'th Party and the daily facts of life that are antithetical to these precepts.

Power is concentrated in the hands of a clan of minority Alawites and their trusted supporters. Freedom of expression is nonexistent. Corruption far outweighs socialism as a factor in the Syrian economy. This state of affairs is not surprising given the severe constraints on Assad's foreign policy and his apparent unwillingness to tolerate political reform at home. He has nothing to offer his supporters beyond the opportunity to advance themselves and make money.11

A major manifestation of the Syrian regime's efforts to stem the internal instability has been the rise in power of President Assad's brother Rifaat and the pervasive influence of Rifaat's Defense Forces.12 Additionally, the national intelligence organs13 have increased their activities and between the two organizations, Syrians find themselves under a very oppressive and omnipresent set of forces. It seems unlikely that the regime would not have resorted to such measures unless it was directly threatened internally, as evidenced in wide societal cleavages and problems that threaten to render the Assad coalition and reign impotent if not entirely jeopardize its future.

Assad realized early in his rule that Syria needed to purge its military forces of the large numbers of purely politicalized officers and institute a new professionalism. He also saw the need to retain his Alawite supporters in powerful positions to consolidate his own control and to permit the Syrian armed forces to regain an image of esteem. The President has 'Alawitized' the Army leadership, or has put unobtrusive Sunnis or Christians into all key positions. In addition to his attempt to improve the Army's quality, Assad has tried to protect his regime from overthrow by developing a rather sophisticated and carefully balanced security system comprising various intelligence (mukhabarat) organizations, the secret police, the Ba'th Party cadre, the Defense Forces, and a network of loyalists spread throughout the military and civilian establishments.
Yet, Syria is still beset with mounting troubles. In addition to the image of the regime as a minority government, it has lost its legitimacy due to rampant corruption and nepotism and because of the high annual inflation rate of nearly 30 percent. Additionally, the Syrian Army remains mired in Lebanon following its intervention there in 1976, with little hope for early extrication. Israel's hold on the Golan Heights has tightened in the last few years with little hope for any settlement between Israel and Syria that would be mutually acceptable under the current circumstances. The announced Israeli annexation of the Golan in December 1981 makes a peace effort seem even less likely. Syria has become increasingly isolated in its intra-Arab relations, with serious disputes with Egypt over the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and with Iraq over its war with Iran and with intra-Ba'th Party disagreements. Also, its relations with Jordan are on shaky ground and a renewal of fighting between the two countries barely was averted in late fall 1980. In essence, then, Assad and Syria have their hands full. Additionally, Syria's relations with the United States notably worsened when Syria publically supported the Soviet Afghan invasion and have been cool during the Habib mission in mid-1981.

Terrorism, sectarian killings, and political assassinations directed against the Alawites and their supporters present a serious challenge to the regime. Political and religious motivations have led to violence and numerous deaths. Estimates range from the hundreds to the thousands. Whatever the true figures, the violence has presented the regime with a severe challenge that it has been unable to quell. The Syrian Government has blamed the Muslim Brotherhood, an underground fundamentalist group active in many areas of the Middle East, which has been at odds with the secular Ba'th Party since the latter's inception. One of the bloodiest incidents occurred in June 1979, when 33 cadets were killed and 54 others wounded at the Artillery Academy at Aleppo. The most recent violence on 29 November 1981 in Damascus killed at least 64 persons.
Composition of the Army

Strengths, Expenditures (See Figure 3)

From a total population of 9.15 million, the strength of the Syrian Army in 1981 was 170,000 of whom 120,000 were conscripts. Syria additionally maintains a reservist force of 102,500 men. Included within the Army totals, but actually acting quite independently from it are the intelligence units of the Special Forces and those that belong to Rifaat Assad's Defense Forces. It is interesting to note that the strength of the Army decreased from 200,000 in 1980.

Defense expenditures in 1981 were $2.39 billion representing a per capita expenditure of $261. This represents a decrease from the $4.04 billion total defense expenditure and the per capita figure of $459 in 1980. Despite this decrease, Syria spent more in defense per capita than any other Middle Eastern country with the exception of Israel and Saudi Arabia. This figure, 30.8 percent of total government spending, was a rise from 25.3 percent in 1975, and in 1980 represented 13.1 percent of GNP. These figures correspond to amounts for the United States of 23.7 percent of total government spending, compared to 23.8 percent in 1975, and in 1980 represented 5.5 percent of GNP.

Organization (See Figure 4)

The Syrian Army is divided into the normal conventional arms of infantry, armor, artillery, engineers and support services. The Air Defense Command, which has both army and air force personnel assigned, comes under Army command. The General Staff organization is patterned after the French Army, with four chiefs of bureaux, each charged with responsibilities germane to its discipline. A special staff is responsible for a variety of technical functions and services and consists of respective directors of these activities. The chain of command extends from the General Headquarters in Damascus to the component field commanders and chiefs of the combat arms.
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Syrian Population, Armed Forces and Defense Statistics

* Include paramilitary.

Derived from The Military Balance, 1981/82.

Figure 3
SYRIAN ARMY ORGANIZATION: MAJOR UNITS

Derived from The Military Balance, 1981/82.
The Syrian Army consists of four armored divisions each with two armored and one mechanized brigades, and two mechanized divisions, each with one armored and two mechanized brigades. One of the armored divisions serves as the Presidential Guard in Damascus.\(^{24}\) Also, there are two independent armored brigades, four independent mechanized brigades, two artillery brigades, five commando regiments, one paratroop regiment, two surface to surface (SSM) missile regiments (one with SCUD and one with FROG-7), and 32 surface to air missile batteries (SAM) with SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 missiles and 25 batteries with SA-6 missiles, in addition to antiaircraft artillery and associated radar. Syria has deployed in Lebanon, as part of the Arab Deterrent Force, approximately 25,000 troops comprising two armored brigades, two mechanized brigades, and some commando battalions, as well as supporting artillery and antiaircraft artillery. Since mid-spring 1981, Syria has had several SAM units deployed in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.\(^{25}\)

Equipment (See Figure 5)

Syria's inventory consists of about 3,700 tanks, 1,600 armored personnel carriers, 2,300 artillery pieces, 1,300 anti-tank guided weapons, 24 surface-to-surface missiles (FROG-7 and SCUD), and unknown quantities of mortars, antitank guns, and antiaircraft artillery.\(^{26}\) Most of the Syrian equipment comes from the Soviet Union or from Eastern European sources. Except for purchases of MILAN, HOT ATGW, and Gazelle helicopters from western European countries, nearly all Syrian military purchases are made in the Soviet Union and Bloc states. This arrangement with the Soviet bloc probably will continue, not only because of the difficulties that would ensue from trying to revamp the military logistical and maintenance activities, but also due to the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, signed in October 1980. Additionally, the Soviet Union has been the only nation willing to provide the vast quantities of equipment and material necessary to rearm the Army following its wars with the Israelis. Since 1973 Syria deliberately has diversified
TANKS

2,200 T-54/55
1,100 T-62
400 T-72

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS

1,600 BTR-40/50/60/152, OT-64, BRDM, BMP

ARTILLERY

2,300 pieces (122 mm, 130 mm, 152 mm, 180 mm; 122/152 mm SP guns, 122 mm, 140 mm, 240 MRL)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (SSM)

15 FROG-7 SSM
9 SCUD SSM

MORTARS

82 mm, 120 mm, 160 mm

ANTI-TANK GUNS

57 mm, 85 mm, 100 mm

ANTI-TANK GUIDED WEAPONS (ATGW)

1300 (Snapper, Saggar, Swatter, HOT MILAN)

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA)

23 mm, 37 mm, 57 mm, 85 mm, 100 mm, ZSU-23/4, ZSU-57/2

SURFACE TO AIR Missiles (SAM)

SA-2 (Guideline); SA-3 (GAO); SA-7 (Grail); SA-9 (Gainful)

HELICOPTERS

40 Gazelle

ON ORDER

SP Artillery (700 pieces), FROG SSM, HOT ATGW, SA-6/8 SAM, 25 Gazelle Helicopters

Major Items of Equipment: Syrian Army

Data derived from The Military Balance, 1981/82.

Figure 5
its arms suppliers but can not change its position as a Soviet military client in favor of more fertile military suppliers due to its overwhelming reliance on its patron.

The Soviet supply connection has not always been easy. At times the Soviets have used their virtual monopoly to attempt to influence Syrian policy by slowing down the delivery of weapons and spare parts. Such was the case in early 1974 when Moscow wanted Syria to attend the Geneva conference on Middle East Peace and again in 1976 when the Soviets wanted Syria to cease operations in Lebanon against the PLO. The Soviets also demand that Syria pay cash for its military assistance, which can pose a severe problem for Syria especially when the flow of financial assistance from its Arab supporters either slows or is abruptly cut. Saudi Arabia and Libya are believed aiding Syria in meeting its $8 billion arms bill to the Soviet Union. Currently, Syria has on order about $2 billion worth of arms and equipment from the Soviets, including about 500 122-mm field guns and 200 152-mm guns, FROG SSM, and SA-6/8 SAM. Additionally, Syria has ordered 24 Gazelle helicopters and HOT ATGW from Western European suppliers. The Soviets reportedly have about 2,500 military advisors in Syria and there are some East Germans and Cubans.

If the Soviets were inclined to damage the Syrian's military capacity they could cut off the supply pipeline or slow it dramatically, causing the Syrians to turn to other sources for supplies. Probably Libya would be the most likely replacement for the Soviets due to its large inventory of Soviet supplied weapons, spare parts, and materiel. However, without the regular shipment of materiel from the Soviet Union, Syria would be sorely pressed to continue to maintain a high state of readiness and an arsenal of modern sophisticated weaponry to counter or to equate with that of Israel.

Recruitment, Training, and Reserves

The Service of the Flag Law of 1953 provides that most of the manpower in the Syrian armed forces is provided by conscription. All Syrian males are liable for
30 months of military service beginning at age 19, and then remain in the reserve for 18 years. Some individuals with special qualifications serve only 18 months, and deferments are available for university students. Call-ups are held in two annual increments in March and September. Some of the conscripts, mainly college graduates, are sent for reserve officer training. Most of those who have deferments for schooling become reserve noncommissioned officers following basic training. The rest of the conscripts serve as privates.

Military training begins before induction as a conscript. Secondary school pupils are given very basic military training that will permit them to serve in times of national emergency and also will make their transition into the compulsory military service easier. Initially conducted by regular army instructors, now this program is done entirely by full-time civilian instructors who are usually reserve NCO's or officers. All male secondary and university students also attend mandatory annual summer training camps. All graduates must pass examinations in military science and in field exercises. Army conscripts are given basic training and then receive advanced individual training on the job in their units. The units of the army operate on a regular annual cycle of field training exercises.

Officer recruitment, which still tends towards a disproportionate reliance on minorities, is based more on professional competence or projected ability than on the parochial political basis that was the case in the 1960's, but Alawite loyalty or other sect cooperation serves as a major requisite. Conscripts selected for reserve officer training attend a 9 month course at the Reserve Officers' School in Aleppo, and then are assigned to a unit, usually in the infantry as officer candidates. If successful, commissions are given as reserve second lieutenants just prior to the end of the required two year tour of duty. Regular officers undergo a two year course of studies at the Military Academy at Homs. This instruction is mainly for training infantry officers; those chosen for other branches are sent for
specialized training at other army schools or abroad. Since 1963 virtually all foreign training has been done in Soviet or Bloc institutions. Upon completion of the Military Academy, graduates are commissioned as second lieutenants. Medical officers are given direct commissions after short periods of military training. Officers may retire after 25 years service.

Professional NCO's are the backbone of the Syrian army structure. The professional NCO corps is taken from those conscripts who enlist for an initial 5 year commitment in the regular army following their obligatory service. However, full NCO status is not granted until the end of the first voluntary enlistment. Professional NCO's are retired at age 45 or at their own request after 20 years of service. NCO's have a wide range of opportunities for specialized technical instruction and advanced schooling, both within their branches and from advanced career and technical schools maintained for senior NCO's. Engineers and other highly trained technical personnel are recruited directly by the army as NCO's by the offer of high salaries and other privileges.

The general standard of individual training in the Syrian Army is believed to be relatively good. By the late 1970's the reliance on Soviet instructors for most individual and small unit training had ceased, except for some highly specialized technical subjects. Nonetheless, the Soviets insist on having one advisor per company-sized unit. However, training increasingly has become systematic and standardized along Soviet lines. Extensive Soviet training is limited to the Air Force and the Air Defense Command. During the period 1955-79, Syria sent 5,455 military personnel for training in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 33

Pay and food for the Syrian Army are commensurate with that received in the civilian sector. Officers and NCO's have separate living quarters, and there is family housing for most regular service members on many posts. Medical care is considered adequate. Regulars receive 30 days annual leave and recruits/conscripts
are given 15 days. Basic pay is supplemented by many extras, i.e., dependents' allowance, duty in a combat zone, subsistence and special qualifications pay. Depending on the mix of these supplements, a Syrian soldier or officer could double his basic pay rate. Officers also receive an allowance for servants.

The reserve total of 102,500 represents the best estimate of the number the Army could probably equip and assign into active units upon mobilization. The actual number of former army members with a reserve commitment is much higher. In reality the Army could only mobilize those former members who had had active service within the past few years, since new equipment and possibly new procedures would require much greater integration time which could be counterproductive. The Syrian mobilization organization is thought efficient enough to produce the required number of reservists for duty within 3-4 days.

Uniforms and Rank Insignia

Officers' uniforms are tailored in the British style. Uniforms are khaki in summer and olive in winter. A variety of headgear includes a service cap, garrison cap, and beret (colors vary by season and type unit). Officer insignia are gold on a bright green shoulder board. Warrant officer insignia are gold on an olive drab shoulder board. Enlisted rank is on a dark green background.34 (See Figure 6.)

Deployment

As might be expected the preponderance of Syria's Army is deployed in the southwest quadrant of the country, concentrated in the Damascus environs and from there to the Golan Heights and the Jordanian border. Additionally, Syria has about 25,000 troops deployed in Lebanon, mainly in the central Bekaa Valley along the Beirut-Damascus highway. Also, one Armored Division is located about 45 miles north of Damascus. Very limited deployments are elsewhere in Syria, and there are small concentrations at the bases, training centers and depots which tend to be located in or near large cities such as Aleppo, Hamah, Homs, and Latakia.35 Unfortunately,
little detailed information is available concerning the deployment of the Syrian Army. Rifaat Assad's Defense Companies serve as the Presidential Guard and are located primarily in Damascus.

Equally unknown is the doctrine for tactical employment of the Army. Obviously, the first aim for the Armed Forces is the defeat of Israel, but that alone does not provide many answers about how the Syrians would employ their forces. It must be assumed that after so many years of Soviet training and military assistance that Soviet tactical employment patterns, geared to high intensity warfare not generally suited to Syria's needs, are widely held. Additionally, from the mix of equipment held or on order, Syria evidently will depend on armor and supporting artillery to a very large extent. However, due to the few helicopters presently in its inventory, Syria's Army would be limited to a rather ponderous sort of movement that would rely heavily on good ground maneuverability and on overwhelming
an enemy force. Unfortunately, conjecture, the main ingredient available to assess Syrian doctrines, does not provide an adequate basis for analysis.

Syria's strategic doctrine is more visible and there seems less doubt about what it is and how Assad intends to implement it. Currently, Syria is the only Arab state that has demonstrated it can still cause the Israelis military problems. The recent moves in Lebanon, concentrating forces in the Bekaa and deploying SAM batteries there, have provided the flash point that could serve as the spark for renewed hostilities.\textsuperscript{37}

The 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union gave the Syrians the diplomatic wedge and the channel to continue to receive extensive amounts of security assistance. The message for fellow Arabs and to the Israelis is that Syria will remain in the forefront of the anti-Israeli, pro-Palestinian fight and will take steps as necessary to counter the Israelis and their allies (i.e., Egypt) among the Arab States. Syria would like to forge an alliance with its immediate Arab neighbors, Jordan and Iraq, but because of a series of rather intractable differences with them, prospects seem dim. The addition of Iraq to such a venture would add dramatically to the amount of arms available to fight against Israel, but due to Iraq's rather ineffective performance against Iran and Syria's support for Iran, it seems doubtful that the merger would provide much quality to substantially improve the odds in any projected battle with the Israelis.

Perhaps, Syria is undertaking its current military endeavors in an attempt to offset the internal turmoil besetting the country and is trying to rally causes that will permit the Assad regime to retain a sufficient basis of support to remain in power. Thus, the specter of the Israeli military threat, the need to retain the current status in Lebanon, and the requirement to strengthen ties with the Soviets are used to provide this support for the regime and to show a greater dedication to the main foreign issue, i.e., the redressing of the Israeli problem.
Scenarios of Employment

Syria's Army is configured so it can be employed most readily in conventional modern warfare roles using standard military employment doctrines. It does not seem well suited to conduct guerrilla warfare operations, which has been demonstrated to some degree by its heavyhandedness in Lebanon and its seeming inability to confront the type warfare there with anything other than siege tactics.\(^{38}\)

In addition, the Army seems configured ideally to fight in terrain that will enhance its armor capability and is conducive to a take, hold, and occupy strategy. It seems fair to surmise that Syrian commanders are not permitted to exercise much initiative due to the probable effect of Soviet training, the pervasiveness of the security apparatus, not only in the society as a whole, but in the army as well, and finally, because of the innate fear that initiative could spawn the seeds that might develop into a coup against the regime.

One prominent observer of the Syrian scene has noted that Syria does not have the force structure or sufficient support from other Arab states to undertake a major ground offensive. Present Syrian deployments appear designed to thwart an Israeli ground offensive along the main avenue of approach into Damascus.\(^{39}\) With the concentration of forces in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, Syria would appear to have several secondary motives. One is to counter an Israeli thrust that might be aimed at destroying the Palestinian forces in the country and to deter an Israeli flanking of Damascus from the west. Secondly, the Syrians do not want to permit the further fragmentation of Lebanon and their presence may serve as a deterrent in this respect. Thirdly, the Syrians might want to force Israel to allocate forces to defend against a possible Syrian attack through Lebanon.

Probable Employment

Syria faces several challenges that could result in the need for military force. The most prominent challenge is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which finds the Syrians
at loggerheads with the Israelis in the Golan Heights and in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese quagmire could easily be rekindled and might provide ample grounds for a renewed Syrian involvement. The Syrian-Iraqi feud over water rights, the intra-Ba'th Party squabble, the split over support in the Iran-Iraq war, and the internal involvement of each country in the other's affairs could deteriorate so dramatically that military action might ensue. Jordan poses another possible front due to the widening estrangement of the two countries, the gap between them over support for the Palestinian cause, and Jordan's support of Iraq in its war with Iran. The final arena for Syrian employment could come from an increase in the chaos in the country and result in the need to deploy troops to quell disturbances or to counter terrorist activities internally.

The Israeli front presents the most likely area for employment. Not only does Syria need to keep its image as the leader of the fight with Israel before the public, but it needs to have the constant spector of a foreign enemy in order to derive public support for its policies. Israel easily provides this vestige and the maneuvering that both Syria and Israel are doing in Lebanon provides the operational environment to feed the propaganda mills and engender the necessary civilian enthusiasm to keep emotions focused on the foreign threat rather than the internal dissention and dissatisfaction.

One possible, plausible scenario might find Syria deciding to conduct a fast, surgical type movement to engage Israel militarily. Syria is not strong enough to defeat Israel, but Syrian forces could inflict damage with the larger intent of drawing into the fray other Arab countries that have moved away from the Syrians and are showing some inclination for peace with the Israelis and a general rapprochement with Egypt. Syria realizes that it is no match for the Israelis. However, if the support rendered from its fellow Arabs was sufficient to offset the present isolation that Syria feels among the Arab states, then it might be able to maintain its propaganda
image as the primary Arab state in the anti-Israeli battle despite suffering some likely setbacks from Israeli military superiority.

In March 1980, in a statement that seemed to be a pre-crisis comment, President Assad claimed that Syrian troops were ready for any form of conflict with Israel. "Syria will not hesitate to confront Israel. It will also not surrender to any pressure, threats, or even Israeli military actions."40 Equally boastful was Syrian Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar when he warned that Syria "is in a good position on the way to strategic parity"41 with Israel. These warnings indicate the inflammatory rhetoric used by the Syrians to maintain the tension level. They derive from the fact that the Syrians have been recipients of large amounts of Soviet military equipment and perhaps leaned on the forthcoming agreement with the Soviets. Assad very likely had in mind his Treaty of Cooperation with the Soviets when his Information Minister spoke about strategic parity.

The likelihood of military conflict with Iraq is much less than with Israel, but it is certainly not implausible. Syria and Iraq have very serious differences concerning Ba'th ideology, are eager to supplant each other as the regional power, and have distinctly varying policies concerning relations with the more moderate Arab regimes. The Syrians, following construction of the large dam on the Euphrates River in the mid-1970's, cut water levels available to Iraq and exacerbated relations to the point that each nation deployed sizeable military forces astride their respective borders and even engaged in some limited and rather meaningless battles. Neither side was victorious, but the problem still remains to fester their relations. Additionally, both sides have taken steps to conduct large scale clandestine operations in the other country in an attempt to impose more sympathetic regimes. Iraq has been trying to forge a moderate image in the region and has been moving away from the strong Soviet embrace. Syria has gone in the opposite direction, attempting to become retrenched as the strongest opponent of Israel and moving toward the Soviets with a Treaty of
Cooperation. Any war with Iraq would promote severe problems for Syria. The fighting would require removal of some, maybe the majority, of the troops on the Golan Heights, and transporting them along rather constricted lines of communication to the Iraqi border. Whether Syria would be willing to undertake such a massive operation would depend on the degree to which it felt it could be victorious, but to an even greater extent how it felt the Israelis might capitalize on the military vacuum in the Golan Heights. Iraq would be unable to wage a war with Syria as long as it remains engaged on the Iranian front.

The situation in Lebanon provides apprehension because of its volatility and possibility of eruption. The Syrian posture in the country now seems to preclude Lebanon's total deterioration, but does not preclude the continuation of the fratricidal warfare pervading the country from a multitude of factions. Syria could be drawn in if the situation deteriorated to a point of imminent Lebanese dissolution, or if it appeared that one side, such as the Gemayalists, were on the verge of gaining ascendancy. Otherwise for the near future Syria seems committed to troop deployments of probably no less than its current commitment. However, if favorable situations on the Israeli front indicated movement toward some resolution of the problem, Syria might find itself in an untenable position, especially if it retained its intractable view toward a peaceful, compromise solution.

Jordan, another thorny problem for Syria, could provide the seeds for conflict. Ostensibly, Jordan and Syria have healed the rift that erupted in the Spring 1981 over the charges that Jordan had harbored and trained Muslim Brotherhood members. This rift caused major Syrian and Jordanian deployments along their border and, in concert with concomitant tensions in Lebanon, raised the possibility of conflict. Additionally, Jordan's strong support for Iraq, in its war with Iran, to include routing through its territory military and economic supplies to Iraq, has raised the level of tension between the two. In addition, Jordan's
attempt to seek some way out of the Palestinian imbroglio causes Assad to view warily any cooperation between them and he may find this a reasonable excuse to justify some sort of punitive action.

Finally, the internal problems conceivably could become serious enough to impel Assad to commit regular units to assist the intelligence and Defense Forces of Rifaat Assad to maintain order and keep the regime in power; for instance, if disorder were to occur simultaneously in several large cities and include significant portions of the population. A revolt could be potentially disastrous for Assad and could be the final straw in overturning his government. Quelling the disorder would certainly be unpopular and could engender opposition within the military against taking such an action against the Syrian population; however, it seems this stricture does not follow when sectarian interests are served or regime security measures are being enforced.

Conclusions

General Evaluation of Strengths and Weaknesses

The Syrian Army derives its strength from its position as one of the centers of power in the state. Along with the Presidency and the Party, the Army, the Defense Companies, and the rest of the military apparatus form the nexus of power. Assad is able to retain the Presidency now because he has emphasized the military arena and expended efforts to insure that the military enjoy sufficient perquisites to retain their loyalty to his regime. For the first several years of his regime Assad did not need to resort to this expedient because he was supported widely throughout Syria.

However, Syria is virtually alone now as a major confrontation state since Egypt's removal from the fray with its Peace Treaty with Israel. Syria's isolation erodes the potential the Arab side previously held when Egypt could be actively counted on as a combatant. Iraq is the only possible participant that could provide Syria with measurable amounts of men and materiel but the distance involved from Iraq to the Israeli front and its war with Iran will prove too much for the Iraqi logistical ability.

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The Syrian Army is not just a military force within the society but is seen by the population, or at least would like to be observed, as the sole hope to retain somehow a degree of honesty, stability, order and progress within the society. Over the past three decades, the tendency has been to subscribe to this belief. However, the army has not been completely cleansed of 'impure' elements, despite the need to insure that the regime be reinforced by having Alawites in control. Yet, the requirement for balance remains and some leaders must come from a non-Alawite background to provide the requisite diversity. But, the perception is growing that the Army no longer holds this position and that the security forces, the intelligence services and the Defense Forces provide the cohesion that maintains the regime and provides whatever stability Syria may seem to have. This image is detrimental to the military because it undermines its position and gives it a denigrating view of itself and its selfworth. Although the Army is still the primary element that must remain loyal to assure that Assad retains power, some currents seem to indicate cracks in this loyalty and that the split is occurring faster than Assad can assuage the problem.

Militarily the Army certainly is provided with the finest equipment available from the Soviet Union and from its limited arms deals in the West. Training, pay and allowances and other perquisites seem sufficient to guarantee adequate manpower. There are clouds on the horizon, however: the continuing impasse in Lebanon, the need to use the Army to assist in maintaining internal order, and from the seeming oppressiveness in the society. The Army also must chaff under the muzzle that restrains it from conflict with the Israelis, but this can probably be adduced to Assad's better judgment concerning Syria's military capabilities relative to the Israelis. Assad may, however, use the Israeli annexation of the Golan to move units from Lebanon and redeploy them facing Israel.

The serious disruptions within the society, occurring with increasing regularity, are causing tremendous concern for both regime and national stability. The undercurrents
are such that it is obvious that Assad has major problems, but the true extent is not known because of the closed nature of the society and the limited publicity that leaks out. Assad has alienated significant portions of the population, to include the majority Sunnis and the other non-Alawite minorities, and has shown a tendency to place Alawites in most significant positions and channel vast government sums to Alawite regions, serving to exacerbate already existing societal polarizations.

Potential Crises or Changes

The most serious setback to Syria's stability would be President Assad's death. Concerted attempts to grab power would ensue and the result would be a very serious splintering of the entire fabric that Assad has forged among the Office of the President, the Army and the Ba'th Party. If he were to die by assassination or from an overthrow, as opposed to natural causes, the infighting would be particularly severe. In any event Assad's death will plunge Syria into a grave crisis that will not be solved easily or quickly.

A second potential threat that could cause difficulty for Syria would be an attempt by Rifaat Assad to grab power from his brother. This could provoke almost limitless grounds for internal disturbances and possibly even sufficient impetus for opposition groups to begin large scale disturbances that might degenerate into anarchy or civil war. Rifaat Assad is so widely disliked and held responsible for so many of Syria's ills that any attempt by him to assume power would meet immediate obstacles and opposition.

The internal scene is very precarious and could erupt into civil disturbances at any time. The ability of the regime to respond to such actions will be key in determining whether they become more widespread and even more disruptive. If the Army remains free from involvement there is a greater likelihood that settlement might come sooner. If the Army is deployed and the disruptions are widespread then the society may become totally fragmented. Even the Army may come apart at its seams.
if the societal eruptions become too pronounced. If the Army becomes tainted with a large amount of antiregime sentiment, then it could become useless in internal situations and might even become so in foreign adventures.

**Future Tendencies**

Syria can be expected to maintain an increasingly hardline concerning the Arab-Israeli issue, at least so long as there seems to be little change in the present intransigence on the part of the Palestinians and the Israelis. This will mean that the Syrian Army will remain a key element in the society and will be needed to retain both a strong posture militarily as well as within the internal political arena.

The reliance on the Soviet Union for military hardware will remain a certainty for the long run. Syria will try to retain some degree of diversification of supply by looking to Western European countries, but this effort will merely be in the vein of lip service to the 'independence' idea that Syria wants to present. Syria does not wish to be viewed as a Soviet proxy, but there is a continuing mutuality of interest in their operations within the region. This is unlikely to change in the near term and will, therefore, not permit Syria the luxury of being disassociated from such a perception.

Internal instability will remain a feature of Syrian life so long as Assad continues his policy of Alawite domination and the oppressive use of the intelligence and special force units to maintain order. If Assad is to retain his position of leadership he will need to hold very tightly to the reins of power due to their limited base and to the increasing domestic dissatisfaction with his rule. This will almost certainly constrain the regime's ability to move forward with economic, social and other internal measures necessary to pull Syria out of its present stagnation. Thus, while Syria's potential for development and modernization is high, the inordinate attention paid to perceived external and internal threats and to a military approach to solutions will continue to blunt Syrian development.
ENDNOTES


2. The Military in Arab society has probably been most effectively discussed in the seminal work by Eliezar Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*. Syria is discussed on pages 55-75, 130-170, and 333-341.

3. Devlin.

4. Rabinovitch.


11. Reed, p. 179.


13. Ibid. Dyer tells us that Syria has "at least five major internal security and intelligence services . . . some of which fall under the Interior Ministry, while others are answerable to the Chief of Military Intelligence." The National Security Council Chief is, in effect, the Head of the Secret Police.

14. Reed.


18. This section was derived from *The Military Balance 1981/82*.

19. See Figure 3. This decreased figure seems highly suspect. Perhaps the figure stems from subtracting the figures for the Defense Companies from the totals. Also see Endnote #20 below.

20. Ibid., pp. 112-113.

21. Ibid.

22. This section is based entirely upon the information in *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

23. Several western military attaches believe this is in error and that the Air Force actually performs the command function. This might be another reason for the decreased total figure for the Army's strength.

24. Even though *The Military Balance* states there is a fourth armored division in the Syrian inventory, this is most probably not true. The fourth armored division is actually the Defense Forces of Rifaat Assad and these amount to the equivalent of an armored division.


26. See Figure 5.

27. Note the items in the Syrian inventory from non-Soviet sources. Also, note in *The Military Balance*, p. 57 that Syria has on order equipment from Western European suppliers.

28. Dyer, p. 693. However, this demand seems to occur only when Syria has acted independently from Soviet interests and has angered them to resort to this as a punitive measure.


32. Most of this section was derived from Dyer, pp. 691-692; and Syria: A Country Study, pp. 210-215.


35. Dyer, pp. 687-690.


40. Ar-Ray Al-Amm (Kuwait), March 8, 1980, taken from Whetten, p. 260.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


**Newspapers**

Ar-Ray Al-Amm (Kuwait)

The Christian Science Monitor

The Guardian

The New York Times

The Washington Post
This occasional paper describes the Syrian ground forces and analyses these forces' ability to perform their mission against the most likely adversaries. The discussion covers a brief historical sketch, the social conditions, the military's relationship to the civil order, and a brief assessment of the forces' most recent combat performances. A review of the forces' composition includes manpower, organization, command and staff relationships, equipment, sources of supply, vulnerability, mix of forces, deployment, and tactical doctrines of employment. Scenarios of employment are examined, such as the kinds of war the
forces can fight, and against whom and under what circumstances the forces will fight most likely. The paper concludes with an evaluation of strengths and weaknesses, future tendencies, and foreseeable crises or major changes anticipated.