THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FIFTH MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM
USAFA ACADEMY

5-6 October 1976

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THE MILITARY AND

SOCIETY
The Military History Symposium is sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates, United States Air Force Academy.

1972 Military History Symposium Steering Committee
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THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY

The Proceedings of the
Fifth Military History Symposium
United States Air Force Academy
5–6 October 1972

Edited by
Major David MacIsaac, USAF

Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF
and
United States Air Force Academy
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The papers of 1968, together with those participated in the Academy in 1969. The success of this History, in conjunction with a regular publication, as follows:


By the time of the publication, and the views or opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the authors and are not to be construed as carrying official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of the United States Air Force Academy.
The series of United States Air Force Academy military history symposia began on 4 and 5 May 1967 with the first symposium devoted to an examination of "Current Concepts in Military History." From that early beginning, several things emerged that were to be of great importance to the success of the series. First and foremost, perhaps, was the level of interest that was generated among top scholars in the field. Participating in the initial symposium, for example, were such established scholars as Theodore Ropp, Michael Howard, Harry L. Coles, Richard D. Challener, Louis Morton, Walter Millis, Peter Paret, and Frank Vandiver. The proceedings of that first symposium, regrettably, were never published, the disparate nature of the discussions leading potential publishers to shy away from the project and the significance of the event not having yet been fully comprehended, even by those responsible for the inception of the series.

The papers delivered at the second symposium, held on 2-3 May 1968, together with the subsequent comments of several officers who had participated in the events discussed, were published privately by the Academy in 1969 as Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare. The success of this initial publishing venture led the Office of Air Force History, in conjunction with the Government Printing Office, to begin regular publication of the series. Volumes that have appeared to date are as follows:


By the time of the fourth symposium in October 1970, the series had come to enjoy the reputation of being the pre-eminent regular gathering of military historians in the western world. Publication of the various proceedings played a major part in this developing reputation. The present volume consists of the papers, revised and annotated for publication, and the discussion sessions of the fifth symposium, held on
5–6 October 1972. As these lines are written, planning for the sixth symposium in the series, “The Military History of the American Revolution,” 10–11 October 1974, is well underway. Publication of the proceedings of the Sixth Military History Symposium is scheduled for 1976 as a contribution to the celebration of the nation’s bicentennial.

The symposia are intended to serve a number of purposes. First, they provide a forum for scholars in military history and related fields, subject matter in which the Academy obviously has a special interest. Second, by bringing distinguished scholars to the Academy, the symposia provide a link between the scholars and the military professionals not only of the Academy faculty but of the faculties of the other academies, staff colleges, and war colleges who regularly attend. More prosaically, the members of the Academy’s humanities and social science faculty are kept abreast of developments in their fields of special competence, while cadets are encouraged to a continuing interest in the background of their chosen profession. Finally, with the participation of scholars who do not look upon themselves primarily as “military historians,” but who are competent in fields that impinge on military affairs, the field of military history is itself enriched. Achievement of this final goal may well be the gauge against which the success of the present volume may be judged.

Those who participated in the symposium are identified in the final section of this volume. The Department of History and the Association of Graduates, USAF Academy, thank them, once again, for their individual and collective labors. In addition to the participants, the symposium required the combined efforts of a number of individuals and organizations. The active participation of the Superintendent of the Academy, Lieutenant General A. P. Clark, and of the Dean of the Faculty, Brigadier General William T. Woodyard; the warm encouragement of the Commandant of Cadets, Major General Walter T. Galligan; the logistical miracles of the Academy staff, under the Chief of Staff, Colonel Mark E. Wilt; and the financial support of the Association of Graduates are gratefully acknowledged. Within the Department of History, the symposium was truly a departmental undertaking: everyone was involved, directly or indirectly, with the countless administrative and logistical details. The Executive Director for the symposium, Major Donald R. Fogleman, and his able deputy, Captain Donald W. Nelson, carried the brunt of the load, aided immensely by the secretarial staff of Miss Marjorie Burton, Mrs. Carolyn A. Stamm, and Mrs. Virginia Hill, without whose patience and many kindnesses this volume could not have appeared.

The 15th Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History, The End of Militarism, by Professor Russell F. Weigley of Temple University, has been published separately by the Academy. Because it did double duty as the keynote address for the symposium, it is reprinted here.

D. M.
March 1974
CONTENTS

Preface ............................................................. i
Introduction .......................................................... v
1st Session: THE 15th HARMON MEMORIAL
LECTURE IN MILITARY HISTORY .......................... 1
Welcoming Remarks, Lieutenant General A. P. Clark,
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy ........ 1
"The End of Militarism," Russell F. Weigley .......... 3
2nd Session: THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY: THE IMPACT
OF THE MILITARY ON DEVELOPING AND
DEVELOPED SOCIETIES .................................. 15
Chairman: Frank Vandiver
Introductory Remarks ...................................... 15
"Military Leadership and National Development,"
Cyril E. Black .............................................. 16
"Chrysanthemum and Star: Army and Society in
Modern Japan," Alvin D. Coox ................................. 37
Commentary, William H. McNeill .......................... 61
Discussion ..................................................... 66
Banquet Session:
   Introductory Remarks, Lieutenant General A. P. Clark,
   Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy ....... 70
   "The Military in American Society Today: The Questions
   an Old-timer Might Raise," Major General Haywood S.
   Hansell, Jr., (USAF, Retired) ......................... 72
3rd Session: THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY:
CURRENT CONCEPTS IN THE STUDY
OF MILITARY AFFAIRS .................................. 85
Panel "A": The Study of Military Affairs on College Campuses
Chairman: Louis Morton
Introductory Remarks .................................. 85
"The Odd Couple: Liberal Arts Colleges and the Military
Historian," Dennis Showalter .............................. 86
"Teaching Military History in a State University,"
Gunther Rothenberg ..................................... 89
"Military History at West Point," Colonel Thomas E. Griess....
"Military History in the Air Force ROTC Program,"
Colonel C. R. Carlson .................................. 93
"The Military and the Civilian: Is there a Difference?"
Berence A. Carroll ....................................... 97
Discussion .................................................. 102
Panel "B": The Writing and Publication of Military History
Chairman: Theodore Ropp
Introductory Remarks  .............................................................. 104
“Writing for the Air University Review,”
Colonel Eldon W. Downs ........................................ 105
“Writing for Military Affairs and Aerospace Historian,”
Robin Higham ................................................................. 106
“Resources of the National Archives,” James E. O’Neill ........ 108
“Ballantine’s Illustrated History of World War II,”
Barrie Pitt ...................................................................... 109
Discussion ........................................................................ 111

4th Session: THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY: THE
MILITARY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY ...................................................... 113
Chairman: Edward M. Coffman

“Ethnicity, Race, and the American Military: From Bunker
Hill to San Juan Hill,” Bruce White .................................... 113

“Armed Forces Integration: Forced or Free?”
Morris MacGregor .............................................................. 131
Commentary, Charles C. Moskos, Jr. .................................. 139
Discussion ........................................................................ 142

Wrap-up Session:
Chairman: Louis Morton
Panel: Frank Vandiver, Colonel Eldon W. Downs,
Edward M. Coffman, Russell F. Weigley ............................. 145

The Participants .................................................................. 155
Index .................................................................................. 161

What a society is more and no less
When a country’s mirror is a true one
—General Lees K.

By January of whose proceeding uniform as well as in the mirror. They statement attributed “a democracy can—loosely defined—war and the military fight on many campaigns of the Morril bother ing them: in rooms they listened scientists call into since 1945, in some

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1 See Soldiers and Symposium, edited by Lt. USGPO, 1973. (For s DC 20402. $1.60, sto
INTRODUCTION

What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror: if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own.

—General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, Lees Knowles Lectures for 1962

By January of 1971, when planning got underway for the symposium whose proceedings are reproduced in this volume, many Americans—in uniform as well as out of uniform—weren’t liking what they were seeing in the mirror. The war in Vietnam was taking its toll, reminding one of the statement attributed to General George C. Marshall to the effect that “a democracy cannot stand a Seven Years’ War.” The younger generation—loosely defined as those born after Hiroshima—was “turned off” on the war and the military establishment alike. Those attending college led the fight on many campuses to disestablish R.O.T.C. programs. The implications of the Morrill Act of 1862 (let alone its terms) were not what was bothering them: it was the war, My Lai, and The Draft. In their classrooms they listened to the revisionist, New Left historians and political scientists call into question the entire basis of American foreign policy since 1945, in some cases since the founding of the Republic.

The middle generation—those born during the Great Depression and with sharply etched memories of life in this country during World War II—was not immune to the general feeling of despondency. The older generation—those who were adults at the time of the Munich settlement—seemed least affected, if only because it was they who were being blamed for everything that seemed to have happened. Within the professional, long service officer corps there was more hard thinking going on than most civilians would have thought.

The immediately previous Military History Symposium, held at the Academy on 22 and 23 October 1970, had already begun to address themes touching on the relationships between soldiers and civilians, in the specific case between soldiers and statesmen.¹ In the keynote address of that symposium General Sir John Hackett, who had journeyed all the way from London, may well have planted the seeds in the minds of symposium planners that would lead to a decision to devote the next symposium to soldiers and civilians, or “The Military and Society.” Speaking of the moral strains likely to be induced in modern societies undertaking limited wars for political ends, Sir John, perhaps only inadvertently, seemed to

stress a point already causing grave concern to many serving officers—that a growing danger seemed to exist that the military and the society it served were headed for an emotional and intellectual divorce, in this case one that could hardly benefit either party.²

During the spring and early summer of 1971 the Symposium Steering Committee came more and more to feel that the time had come for a major symposium devoted to an investigation of “The Military and Society.” Various members of the committee prepared a series of position papers outlining a recommended approach to the topic. Perhaps the best way to illustrate both the concern referred to above as well as the rationale behind the way the symposium was finally structured is to quote two paragraphs from one of those papers.

The study of the relationship between professional military establishments and their parent societies is an aspect of military affairs which has acquired new significance in comparatively recent times. Before World War II, the role of the military man, in both liberal and authoritarian societies, was more or less clearly defined. For the most part in liberal societies the professional military man’s role was episodic. When called upon he performed the role of defender of the society he represented; but on the whole he remained forgotten and isolated. In the more authoritarian societies, and to a certain degree in the developing nations of the world, the opposite was true; the political and social position of the military was nearly impregnable. In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the traditional role of force in international relations is no longer automatically accepted. Perhaps more than ever, the position and role of the military in society, most notably American society, is being questioned. It would seem that in this changed environment much could be gained by studying in perspective the relationship between the military and society not only in this country, but also in other selected areas of the world. Toward this end, the 1972 Military History Symposium will focus on an analysis of the impact of the military on developing societies as compared to its impact and influence upon developed societies. Within the context of this larger question, we hope to look at the role of the military as a pacesetter and catalyst in social experimentation. Hopefully from this type of an examination we can arrive at some conclusions about the role of the military in a changing society.

Perhaps the most critical element in this rationale, from the point of view of the success of the symposium and whatever success this volume may enjoy, was the conscious decision not to limit the investigation to American society alone. Had we done so we should have been almost immediately

³ Sir John’s address, the 13th Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History, is included in the volume cited in the preceding footnote. It was also published separately by the Academy as The Military in the Service of the State. USAF Academy, 1970. Copies are available on request. Write the Department of History, USAF Academy, Colorado 80840.
many serving officers—military and the society it serves—immediately upstaged by a series of articles and books bearing the specific title, “The Military and American Society.”

First in the lists came Colonel [now Brigadier General] Robert G. Gard’s widely noticed article in the July 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs asserting that the armed forces of the United States were in the throes of an identity crisis. Then, in fairly rapid order, came three different books of readings bearing the same title. As the time for the symposium approached it became more and more apparent that the decision to adopt the comparative approach was the right one. This decision, ardently sponsored in the Steering Committee deliberations by Major Ronald R. Fogleman, carried the day and Major Fogleman was “rewarded”—as often happens in military circles—by being appointed Executive Director for the symposium, the first graduate of the Academy (Class of ’63) to be so designated.

The symposium began on schedule on the morning of 5 October 1972. The audience included more than 300 visitors from throughout the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, along with interested members of the Cadet Wing and Academy staff and faculty. The proceedings opened with Colonel Alfred F. Hurley, Professor and Head, Department of History, introducing the Academy Superintendent, Lt. General A. P. Clark, who began by welcoming all and commenting upon the vast array of visitors. His remarks, though brief, are reproduced herein because they state the case so eloquently for why the Academy “goes to all the trouble” to convene these symposia in military history. Following his remarks, Colonel Hurley introduced Professor Russell F. Weigley of Temple, the 15th Harmon Memorial Lecturer in Military History. (Biographical notes on the participants precede the Index.)

The First Session

Professor Weigley begins by questioning the popular misconceptions and emotion-stirring connotations that the terms “militarism” and “militaristic” were by then capable of conjuring up in the body politic. These, he suggests, confuse thought about the various predicaments facing us in military and foreign policy by confusing us about the sources of our prob-


5 Only three days later, in The Denver Post edition of 8 October 1972, Barbara W. Tuchman concluded an article on “The Citizen Versus the Military” with this thought: “I know of no problem so subject as this one to what the late historian Richard Hofstadter called ‘the imbecile catchwords of our era like ‘repression’ and ‘imperialism’ which have had all the meaning washed out of them.’ Those who yell these words, he wrote, ‘simply have no idea what they are talking about.’ The role of the military in our lives has become too serious a matter to be treated to this kind of slogan-thinking, or non-thinking.” The words might well have been those of Professor Weigley referring to “militarism.”
lems. He then reminds us of the real meaning of militarism as defined by Alfred Vagts and demonstrated in the Prusso-German experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pausing along the way to question the idealized picture of the Prussian officer corps presented by Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the State. While militarism contributed to World War I, the militarism of quasi-sovereign professional officer corps was also among the war's casualties. After commenting on the experiences of Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States in World War II, he argues that we have witnessed the end of traditional militarism and now face a new danger—the politicization of the officer corps in circumstances where they no longer enjoy "the kind of autonomy that pre-World War I soldiers enjoyed to protect their interests."

Professor Weigley concludes with the controversial suggestion that the model for the future might well turn out to be the Chinese People's Liberation Army rather than the old Prussian Army. Amid much stirring in the audience, he concluded with the thought that "the increasing concern of future symposia [might well be] with a politicized military in a militarized politics and society."

The Second Session

The afternoon session on 5 October opened with Professor Frank Vandiver of Rice in the chair. The first paper to be read was Professor Cyril E. Black's "Military Leadership in National Development," addressing the impact of the military in developing, or emerging, societies. Beginning by noting that 36 of the 144 governments in the world are under direct or indirect military rule, Professor Black takes as his task to explore the extent to which such governments can make a contribution to national development and thereby qualify for the support of democratic governments. After defining terms and commenting generally on several "patterns of civil-military relationships," he notes that of 122 military regimes in the twentieth century, 96 have been concerned primarily with order and unity and only 26 have made a significant effort to transform their societies. The 26 regimes are identified, followed by a long discussion of their effectiveness in promoting national development.

Noting that military intervention is often accompanied by sharp divisions within the armed forces, and by reduced levels of military professionalism tending toward bureaucratism, Professor Black concludes that the record is muddy—that those regimes most successful in adopting to modern conditions have been those that evolved effective political systems before the modern era began. And what of those not so lucky? For them military leadership is certainly one possible answer, a normal alternative form of authoritarian government in many countries. The United States should discriminate neither in favor of them nor against them simply because they are military; we should evaluate them and offer or withhold support in terms of the contribution they are making to national development, being at the same time cautious against rewarding them solely on the basis that they are anti-communist or generous to American investors. Any other approach, he concludes, "may bring short-term gains at the risk of losing the respect not only of the future leadership of these countries but also of informed persons in other parts of the world." All in all a plea for enlightened interest.

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The Banquet S

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militarism as defined by the German experience of the First World War. He along the way to question the role of the military in a developed society, that of Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. He begins by treating the end of the Samurai as a class, following the Meiji Restoration beginning in 1867. He recounts in detail the problems encountered by the Meiji conscription policy, with its equalitarian goals, and the effects of military services on the peasantry. There then follows a long discussion of the social effects of the Russo-Japanese War and the techniques employed by the Emperor Meiji whereby the government and high command were enabled to bind the military to the patriarchal monarch.

Noting how the succeeding Taisho and Showa emperors lacked the charisma and power of Meiji, Coox explains how the Japanese army began to exploit rather than foster the Imperial institution. The unpopularity of World War I and the Siberian Expedition was followed in the twenties by a period of antimilitarism and small budgets, the so-called Liberal Decade, which led in turn into “the Dark Valley” of the thirties when Japan became a “government by assassination.” The emerging “military fascism” of the period between Mukden in 1931 and final defeat in 1945 is then analysed, followed by concluding generalizations on the impact of the Japanese army on society over an 80 year period. The paper concludes with brief observations on the final irony: the attainment by postwar Japan of the Meiji’s goal of national prosperity in the absence of the paired requisite of military power. Professor Coox, wisely I think, then ends by observing that the postwar experience “might deserve another symposium, and [I] have already travelled rather far with you today, in history and in time.”

Professor William H. McNeill of Chicago then commented on the papers of both Professor Black and Professor Coox. His main concern with Professor Black’s paper is the latter’s “suggestion that military regimes can perhaps sometimes serve as a make-do bridge for peoples who lack an inherited pattern of... effective government.” The secret of what allows effective democratic or effective authoritarian government to arise in some places and not in others, he notes, continues to escape even the best-meaning social engineers and developmental reformers. It is primarily accompanied by sharp levels of military professionalism that worry McNeill, who states the case for “the expectation of individual idiosyncrasy” and uses examples from Professor Coox’s paper on Japan to illustrate his contention. Professor McNeill’s commentary (reproduced in full in the text) was followed by a 40-minute question and answer period directed by Professor Vandiver (and summarized in its essential points by the editor).

The Banquet Session

After the banquet on the evening of 5 October, Lt. General Clark introduced Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. (USAF, Retired) who took as his topic, “The Military in American Society Today: The Questions an Oldtimer Might Raise.” General Hansell opens with a discussion of the military profession based on his own experiences covering a span of forty years. The peak of true professionalism, he suggests, was reached during World War II and most particularly in the person of General
George C. Marshall. General Hansell recounts several personal experiences with General Marshall and then turns to a discussion of the status afforded military advisors by Presidents from F. D. R. to Nixon. Except for a slight improvement under President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird, he sees this status as having undergone steady deterioration since World War II.

This worries General Hansell a good deal since the problems of military policy today, he asserts, exceed those of World War II by a full order of magnitude. Here, reverting to his wartime role as high-level strategist, General Hansell comes to the point that concerns him most—the defenseless posture of the United States today in the event of nuclear war, so defenseless, he suggests, as to raise the fearful question of the nation’s response to attempted nuclear blackmail. The policy of “mutual assured destruction” means that we have chosen to “offer our cities as hostages to enemy power,” a posture that General Hansell suspects our society, accustomed to military protection, is ill suited to sustain. His talk concludes with a ringing plea for renewed efforts to find a sure means, perhaps with laser technology, of protecting our cities.

Invoking Clausewitz, General Hansell reminds us that military power is a product of military capability and will; if either factor is missing, the product equals zero, there is no power. Questioning the willingness, indeed the ability, of the nation as a whole to stand up to a nuclear threat, he goes on to examine the effects of this possibility on foreign policy, concluding that it is the business of professional military advisors to be certain that political leaders fully understand the military implications of national policy. As the argument comes full circle, General Hansell offers his interpretation of how General Marshall would have viewed the challenges now facing the leaders of the armed services. We must, he insists, address ourselves to providing appropriate power and realistic defenses. “I do not,” he concludes, “hear the problem debated in those terms... It may well be that wiser heads have considered these ideas, and have dismissed them as simply ‘the questions an oldtimer might raise.’”

The Third Session

At first glance, the record of proceedings for the morning session on 6 October might seem to fall out of sequence with other sessions in the symposium. The session consisted of two multi-member panel discussions, the first, chaired by Professor Louis Morton of Dartmouth, treating the study of military affairs on college and university campuses, and the second, chaired by Professor Theodore Ropp, examining current trends in military workforce and management.

Perhaps not. As these lines are written in March of 1974 it would appear that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and his staff are attempting at least a partial answer to some of the questions raised by General Hansell. While there is no outward indication of new work in missile defenses, a shift back towards “counterforce” (as opposed to “countercity”) targeting appears to be in the works. See the report by John W. Finney in The New York Times for 11 January 1974 and subsequent commentary in the same paper on 13, 19, 25, and 27 January and 22 February; Christian Science Monitor, 24 January; The New Republic, 19 January and 23 February; and Air Force Magazine, February 1974, p. 52. And March 1974, p. 2. A slightly revised version of General Hansell’s remarks later appeared as “The High Command: Then and Now,” in Strategic Review, 1. 2, (Summer 1973), 44-52.
of World War II by a full-time role as high-level military advisor to the President, a role that concerns him most—the event of nuclear war, the question of the nation's policy of "mutual assured destruction," and the possibility of our cities as hostages to the advent of a nuclear war. The problems of military history, or the lack of them, were certainly relevant aspects of the general theme for the symposium. As will be seen herein, the decision was certainly justified by the enthusiastic response to both panels.

Taking part in the panel on teaching military history, in addition to Professor Morton, were: from a liberal arts college, Professor Dennis Showalter of The Colorado College; from a state university, Professor Gunther Rothenberg of the University of New Mexico; from the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, Colonel Thomas E. Griess, Permanent Professor and Head, Department of History; from Air Force ROTC, Colonel C. R. Carlson, Vice Commandant to Brigadier General Benjamin B. Cassidy, Jr., who was prevented at the last moment from participating; and, from the anti-war movement and the women's movement, Professor Berenice A. Carroll, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Campus.

The presentations of each panel participant, complete with documentation, are reproduced in the text and will be of special interest to all who have taught or will ever teach a course in military history. A lively discussion ensued, chaired by Professor Morton, who had by then recovered from the state of shock induced in him by the 8:00 A.M. starting time. The discussion has been summarized by the editor.

Following a short break, the second panel discussion got underway with Professor Theodore Ropp in the chair. Professor Ropp opened the discussion by reminding the audience that they would find few such opportunities to get so many editors and other publishing arbiters together in one place, a situation of which advantage ought to be taken. Taking part were: for the official historians, Dr. Thomas G. Belden, Chief Historian, Department of the Air Force; for the official journal of the U. S. Air Force, Colonel Eldon W. Downs, Editor, Air University Review; for the journals featuring military history, Professor Robin Higham, Editor of Military Affairs and Aerospace Historian; for the popular magazines, John F. Loosbrock, Editor, Air Force Magazine; for the archivists who control access to materials, Dr. James E. O'Neil, Deputy Archivist of the United States; and for the book publishers, Mr. Barrie Pitt, Editor-in-Chief, Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II.

The remarks of each participant are reproduced in the text and will be of special interest to all who are inexperienced in placing manuscripts for publication. Virtually every possible topic is addressed, ranging from access rights to sources all the way through the politics of dealing with editors to the final problems of layout and design. The discussion period that followed, summarized by the editor, centered on the audience for work in military history, which to a greater extent than most seemed to realize is centered among young people between the ages of 15 and 35. The general effect of both panel sessions was salutary in the sense that...
questions were opened up for discussions which continued in various smaller conclaves for the remainder of the symposium.

The Fourth Session

The afternoon session on 6 October, with Professor Edward M. Coffman of Wisconsin in the chair, had as its theme, "The Military as a Social Force in American Society." In the first paper Professor Bruce White of Erindale College, the University of Toronto, traced "Ethnicity, Race, and the American Military" from Bunker Hill to San Juan Hill.

Professor White opens with a discussion of the U. S. Army and the Indian problem, reminding us of the important part played by Indians serving with, as opposed to against, the army, and leading the army to favor integration in its ranks for Indians during an era when it was adamantly resisting the integration of Blacks. The discussion then shifts to the treatment of Blacks by the army in the nineteenth century, generalizing that Blacks came to be looked on as valuable in some ways—but just so long as kept in segregated units commanded by white officers. He sees a change after 1898, by which time racial lines had noticeably hardened, “reflecting both current civilian trends and the decreased need for black labor after the end of the Indian Wars.”

In a series of speculations unlikely to be welcomed in many circles today, Professor White suggests that for Blacks in the nineteenth-century army, segregation was a better policy than integration, providing them with both visibility and a cause. In the long run, he argues, that policy benefited Blacks who, unlike the Indians, were not absorbed but unnoticed into widely dispersed units of the army. Finally, the discussion shifts to the part played by European immigrants in the army of the nineteenth century, particularly the Irish (whom the army needed too much to impose restrictions upon, even despite their rowdymism and religion) and Germans. On the whole, he concludes, the immigrants benefited from military service. Just as in the movies, he seems to say, the only real losers were the Indians.

The second paper was presented by Morris MacGregor from the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, and addresses the question of whether armed forces integration in the post-World War II period was forced on the services or freely adopted by them. MacGregor begins by citing the views of several famous World War II leaders on the subject of the employment of black troops, views that some official historians today find very embarrassing indeed when they see them laid out, as it were. And yet, in the 25 years between 1941 and 1965, the services moved from outright rejection of integration to the point where, under Secretary McNamara, they found themselves actively challenging racial injustices deeply rooted in American society.

MacGregor credits demands for military efficiency, at whatever costs, more than the momentum generated by the civil rights movement with bringing about change. The following discussion is then treated in two phases: (1) the first culminating in 1954 with the final integration of all military units, and (2) the second centering around the decision in 1963 that “the guarantee of equal treatment must follow the serviceman outside the gates of the base.” The experiences of the Navy, Air Force, and Army are treated in turn by Secretary McNamara.

Although acknowledgment on the part of the Department of the Army is paid to the U.S. Army’s role in military efficiency, to the unplanned and perhaps even unwanted beneficial effects of integration on both the military and Civilian societies, his conclusion is that “the guarantee of equal treatment must follow the serviceman outside the gates of the base.” The experiences of the Navy, Air Force, and Army are treated in turn by Secretary McNamara.

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which continued in various symposium.

The discussion then shifts to the principle of military efficiency, even, to a great extent, “a parochial response to special internal needs.” Now that the goal has been realized there will undoubtedly be those, including some official historians, who will want to credit higher motives on the part of the services. If that should turn out to be the case, they shall have to face up to MacGregor’s thesis first.

Professor Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Northwestern, then commented on the papers of White and MacGregor, allowing by way of a preface that he felt somewhat out of his element in casting “a little sociological oil on these august waters of history.” Moskos asks whether MacGregor’s thesis might not “need some modification in describing where the pressures really came from” during the early sixties, citing the insurrection of young Blacks coming into the services from a highly militant black culture. White’s comments about the beneficial effects of segregated units for minority groups leave Moskos “somewhat uneasy and queasy,” and lead him into a discussion of the rapidly changing role of women in the armed services. Who is to say, he asks, whether service needs in the era of an all volunteer force or the women’s liberation movement is the primary generating force behind change? The discussion that ensued is reproduced in the text.

After a short break the symposium reconvened for a wrap-up session chaired by Professor Louis Morton with the assistance of the chairmen of the various sessions and the Harmon Lecturer. Professor Morton, now traditionally the Devil’s advocate at these gatherings, opened the discussion (which is reproduced in full herein) by questioning the degree to which the various sessions had attained the goals laid out for them by the planners. He was followed by the other session chairmen—now placed by Morton in a defensive position—each of whom briefly summarized the results of the session of which he was chairman. Comments from the floor followed until time ran out. Colonel Hurley then called attention to the work of those who had made the gathering possible and brought the symposium to a close.

* * * * *

One other aspect of the symposium may be of special interest to teachers as well as to administrators of undertakings similar to the Military History Symposium. History 495, Special Topics, is the rubric under which the Academy’s Department of History offers a different course each semester. Available expertise and cadet response enter into the selection of topics to offer. For the fall semester of 1972 it seemed particularly appropriate to offer a course tied directly to the subject of the symposium. Not least of our goals was to create more interest in and a wider appreciation of the significance of the symposia series among cadets. Lt. Colonel Monte D. Wright, co-editor of the two preceding volumes in this series, volunteered to design and conduct the course. The following comments—again, primarily for the benefit of teachers—are from his final report.
Organization of the course presented some difficulties. 'Society' is an imprecise term and can be defined as virtually all-inclusive. For organizing the course, these aspects were considered: economics, education, public opinion, the obligation of military service, the employment of the military for non-military purposes, and the general conflict between 'military' and 'civilian' values. Second, there is much more material available for the study of these various topics for periods of war than for periods of peace, yet the latter are possibly more important. Finally, a conscious effort was made to avoid those areas that are ordinarily dealt with in such courses as Civil-Military Relations: constitutional relationships, civil control, policy-making apparatus, and the division of national resources.

While a number of books and articles were assigned for reading, of more importance were the large number of oral reports prepared by one or two cadets. Some of these reports were converted into short papers, after the oral report had been presented and criticized in class. The reports provided a means for bringing a very large number of questions before the class. Some of the more productive reports were on religion as a military motivation, the appearance of civilian administrators in European armies, the profits and losses of 18th-century warfare, economic effects of the American Revolution and Civil War, the unexpected results of the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz on the relationships between warfare and society, the US Army as strikebreaker, why the Reds won the Russian Civil War, the reconversion of the US economy after World War II, the military and the relocation of the Japanese-Americans, the growth of the welfare state in Great Britain during World War II, Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker, and the role of military academies.

With students responsible for so much of the material presented in class, the instructor felt obligated to insist on from one to three planning sessions with each student, to get him started in a profitable direction in preparing his report and to be certain that he would not waste the other students' time. Hopefully, a satisfactory balance was struck between guidance and individual work. The divergence between the reports prepared by cadets in different sections would indicate that individualism was not squelched, that the students were not mere mouthpieces for the instructor.

Finally, a high point of the course for the cadets enrolled was the opportunity, during the symposium itself, to meet with the various participating scholars with whose previous work they had already become familiar. All in all, the experiment achieved the ultimate goal: the instructor, although in a different way, learned as much as the students.

* * * * *

Within only a few months following the symposium a negotiated settlement was worked out with the North Vietnamese and shortly thereafter the prisoners of war were returned to their homes. These events, along with the emerging energy crisis and the political problems besetting the Nixon administration, served to push into the background—in the minds of most civilians at any rate—the problems to which this symposium addressed itself. Whether in foreground or background, however, the
problems remain. It is with the hope that the efforts made to address them will be of value to the soldiers and scholars of the future that this volume is offered to the public.

D. M.
March 1974
The First Session

THE 15th HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURE
IN MILITARY HISTORY

Each year since 1959 the United States Air Force Academy has sponsored the Harmon Memorial Lecture Series in memory of Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon, the first Superintendent and "Father" of the Academy.

This lecture, the 15th in the series, served as the keynote address for the Fifth Military History Symposium.

WELCOMING REMARKS

Lieutenant General Albert P. Clark
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; and welcome to our Military History Symposium.

Among the pleasant tasks associated with my tour as Superintendent is the opportunity to extend an official welcome to such distinguished groups as yourselves. This Military History Symposium, the fifth in a series that began in 1967, has evoked more widespread interest than any of our previous efforts.

Perhaps some of you do not realize just how wide a spectrum of interests and experience you represent as a group. We have in the audience today, for example, representatives from more than 60 colleges and universities throughout this country (in fact from 39 of the 50 states including Alaska and Hawaii), as well as from Canada and the United Kingdom. From the professional military we have the chief historical officers of all the services, representatives from the staff and war colleges of each service as well as from every service academy—West Point, Annapolis, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine—and a large number of ROTC and AFROTC instructors. (I might interject that we are particularly pleased to host such a large contingent of Army ROTC instructors representing the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Armies of the Continental Army Command.) The turnout, overall, has surpassed all our expectations—and it would appear now to be true beyond any doubt that this series of symposia has become a major event for all of us who share a deep and abiding interest in military affairs.

Some of you might wonder why we go to all the trouble. In suggesting why, I would offer two thoughts. One is that we feel a responsibility here at the Academy, in those academic disciplines in which we may have a special interest and competence, to contribute—if only as a catalyst—to their advancement. There are a number of such fields, and
military history is certainly one of them. Even more important, however, is my firm conviction that such programs as these play a large part both in widening the experience and knowledge of our cadets and faculty, and in demonstrating by example that the age-old problem of civil-military relations is one that can be solved only by our joint efforts.

Our theme this time is "The Military and Society." I need hardly remind any of you, in uniform or out, that the symposium committee has selected a theme that is at the same time current, relevant, and controversial. The place of the American military in society is widely questioned across the country. Some see the country marching down the road to militarism. Others look about them and decide that war appears to have become a thing of the past and wonder aloud whether we even need a military. The current debate over proposals for an all-volunteer force raises questions among traditionalists over whether the people of the nation any longer would feel obligated to come to the defense of our long-cherished liberties and freedoms.

In short, not only the uniformed military, but the civilians they serve, are once again facing a crisis of confidence in one another. If this symposium, either in its formal or informal sessions, can help in the smallest way to define the issues or suggest paths toward solutions, it will have performed a public service.

Finally, I would remind all of you that our mission here at the Academy is a public service mission. And I would hope that you would take advantage of your stay here to try to see the whole picture of what we do here. That total picture for us means but one thing: To provide the nation with a steady flow of officers educated and motivated for a lifetime of service to their nation. Seek out the cadets; talk with them. They’re a grand group of young men.

Once again, welcome to the United States Air Force Academy. We see in your presence here a testimonial both to the success of these symposia and to your interest in a provocative and timely topic.
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Air Force Academy. We to the success of these and timely topic.

THE END OF MILITARISM

Russell F. Weigley
Temple University

General Clark, Colonel Hurley, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

When this past August Muhammad Ali went to West Point to be an analyst for the American Broadcasting Company's telecast of the Olympic boxing trials held at the Military Academy, sportswriter Dave Anderson wrote in the New York Times about the ironies that placed Ali, "once a symbol of antiwar sentiment . . . on a campus dedicated to a militaristic philosophy." By implication, presumably we are meeting today on another "campus dedicated to a militaristic philosophy." If that be true, however, then apparently one of the features of a militaristic philosophy is that it permits and encourages a critical examination of the nature of militarism and of the relations between the military and society, for such is the purpose for which the Fifth Military History Symposium of the United States Air Force Academy has assembled.

We can no doubt assume that Dave Anderson wrote with no clear idea of what he meant by "a militaristic philosophy." But more serious writers have not always been clear either about what they intend when they write about militarism and things militaristic. Even among the most careful analysts of American military problems, those words carry with them a train of historical associations and connotations that may obscure our understanding of the principal problems of the military and society today.

Popular and also serious usage of the words "militarism" and "militaristic" seems to have been stretched a long distance away from the precision with which Alfred Vagts tried to endow the terms in his now classic History of Militarism, first published in 1937. In that book Dr. Vagts drew a careful distinction between the legitimate "military way" and the "militaristic way." "The distinction is fundamental and fateful," said Vagts. In Vagts's view, it is a distortion that overlooks the needs for and legitimate uses of armed forces to regard everything military as militaristic. In Vagts's terms, the military way exists when armed forces seek to win the objectives of national power with the utmost efficiency; the militaristic way appears when armed forces glorify the incidental but romantic trappings of war for their own sake and often to the detriment of efficient pursuit of legitimate military purposes.\(^1\)\(^2\)"An

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\(^1\) New York Times, August 6, 1972, Section 5, p. 4.

army is built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic,” in
Vagt’s definition. “so is everything in an army which is not preparation
for fighting, but merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims
like the long-anachronistic cavalry.”” But in Vagt’s analysis, the appro-
priate military activities of armed forces are not militaristic, and “mili-
tarism is thus not the opposite of pacifism . . .”

In American usage today, such distinctions have virtually dis-
appeared. Even in such a relatively serious, albeit polemical, book as
Militarism U.S.A, by Colonel James A. Donovan (U. S. M. C., Retired),
almost everything connected with the American defense establishment
is not simply military but militaristic, and “America has become a mili-
taristic and aggressive nation embodied in a vast, expensive, and burge-
noning military-industrial-scientific-political combine which dominates
the country and affects much of our daily life, our economy, our international status, and our foreign policies.”

Perhaps so; but here the word militarism is intended to encompass
so wide a range of problems, and the emotion-stirring connotations of
the word have so much dissolved its specific denotations, that with usage
such as Dave Anderson’s and Colonel Donovan’s we might well argue
for the end of militarism as a term to be employed in discourse and
debate, simply on the ground that it has been stretched so far that it
no longer means anything in particular.

But indiscriminate tarring of the American military system with
the brush of militarism hinders understanding of the present military
policy and problems of the United States in a deeper way. It confuses
thought about the various predicaments facing us in military and foreign
policy by confusing us about the sources of our problems. It implies
that the blame for our predicaments lies with a kind of institution that
no longer exists anywhere in the world and never existed in the United
States. It sets up a scapegoat for blunders shared by the whole American
nation, and it suggests that there is a relatively easy way out of the diffi-
culties imposed on us by the burden of arms that we carry, when un-
fortunately no such easy way out exists.

When the word retained enough specificity of meaning to foster
understanding, “militarism” described the phenomenon of a professional
military officer corps not only controlling the armed forces of a state
but existing as a state within the state, an officer corps existing as an
autonomous sovereignty separate from the other institutions of the state
and likely in a difference of opinion with those other institutions to have
its own way, because the officer corps possessed a monopoly of the armed
force on which the state depended.

The classic instance of militarism is of course Prussia and then the
Prussian-dominated German Empire, from the Napoleonic period through
the First World War. The classic Prussian type of militarism did not
appear until the time of the military reforms that followed Napoleon’s

a Ibid., p. 15.
"Ibid., p. 17.
defeat of Prussia in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt in 1806, because only then did the first truly professional officer corps begin to develop, as Samuel P. Huntington has made well known in his book *The Soldier and the State*. Before the Prussians invented the professional officer corps, no distinctively military interest existed in the European states. Previously, military officership was an appurtenance of aristocracy. Previously, the officer did not possess a military education that in any way can be called professional, he was typically an aristocrat first and then an officer; and his political interests were not distinctively military ones but primarily the class interests of the aristocracy. Without a distinctively military interest and influence to work upon the policies of the state, there could be no militarism.

By creating the first professional officer corps as a means of offsetting the individual genius of Napoleon with an educated collective intelligence, the Prussians took the first essential step toward nourishing a distinctively military interest within the state and thus militarism. Because Prussia was a state uniquely dependent upon its military, it soon moved into the other essential step as well, that of allowing the professional military interest to become an autonomous sovereignty within the state. Modern Prussia had always been uniquely dependent on military power to maintain its claim to great-power status and its very existence. Though the Prussian reformers of the Napoleonic era hoped to bring the army closer to the people at large than it had been in the time of Frederick the Great, in fact the newly professional officer corps was able to exploit Prussia's extreme dependence on the army to make the army more separate from the rest of the state and the nation than before, and more autonomous. The professionalization of the officer corps gave the army leadership a special expertise to enhance its claims to freedom from control by the civil state. The conservative stance of the army against the middle-class liberals who in the mid-nineteenth century hoped to transform Prussia into a parliamentary state widened the gulf of suspicion and misunderstanding between the army and the nation at large. Yet, because the Prussian liberals were also nationalists, the decisive role of the army in placing Prussia at the head of the German Empire in the wars of 1864–1871 also left even the middle-class liberals reluctant to challenge the increasingly autonomous and privileged position of the army.

In the midst of the wars for Prussian hegemony over Germany, the officer corps quarrelled with the great Chancellor Otto von Bismarck himself, asserting the independence of the army from all direction by the civil government and the independence of military strategy in wartime from the Chancellor's efforts to bend it to national policy. On 29 January 1871 the Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, responded to Bismarck's charges that the army was both indulging in political activity of its own and denying the Chancellor information about operations, Moltke writing to the only superior authority he acknowledged, the Emperor:

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I believe that it would be a good thing to settle my relationship with the Federal Chancellor definitively. Up till now I have considered that the Chief of the General Staff (especially in war) and the Federal Chancellor are two equally warranted and mutually independent agencies under the direct command of Your Royal Majesty, which have the duty of keeping each other reciprocally informed. 7

This declaration of the independence of the German army from the rest of the state except for the Emperor had already been preceded by a number of specific efforts by the army to override Bismarck's policies in the name of the autonomy of military strategy, as for example when the army had wished to complete the military humiliation of Austria in 1866 at the expense of the Chancellor's efforts to lay the foundation of future friendship and alliance, and as when the Army obstructed Bismarck's efforts to negotiate an early peace with France to head off possible foreign intervention in the Franco-Prussian War. It required all Bismarck's political astuteness and power, and the Chancellor's persuasive influence with the Emperor William I, to keep the army in harness with national policy through the wars of 1864–1871, and at that Bismarck did not succeed in every detail.

When Bismarck was succeeded by lesser German Chancellors, the officer corps and especially the General Staff emerged not only as a state within the state but able to challenge with frequent success the independence of the civil state from army dictation in behalf of army interests. Because Chancellor Leo von Caprivi sponsored a Reichstag bill to reduce compulsory military service from three to two years—albeit increasing the peacetime strength of the army in the process—the army undermined Caprivi's standing with Emperor William II so badly that the Chancellor concluded he must resign. Under the next Chancellor, the army at various times forced the removal of a War Minister, a Foreign Minister, and a Minister of the Interior who displeased the officer corps.

Here indeed, in Germany after the Franco-Prussian War, the phenomenon of militarism existed: the professional officer corps, a distinctively military interest, had become virtually a sovereignty unto itself independent of the civil state, and it exploited its sovereignty to bend the whole policy of the civil state to the interests of the military whatever might have been the interests of the nation at large. Here in fact was a militarism whose power exceeded the implications of Alfred Vagts's definitions in his History of Militarism. Here was a German officer corps whose abuse of its power to reshape national policy to its will far belied Samuel Huntington’s idealized depiction of the German officer corps, in The Soldier and the State, as practically the embodiment of the model type of the professional officer corps bound by "objective civilian control." Here already was plainly foreshadowed the dictatorship of the army over the civil state that led Germany to disaster in World War I.

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World War I.

But in 1871 Germany’s disasters of 1914–1918 were far in the

future, and for the present the most conspicuous feature of the German

military system was that the skills of a professional and autonomous

officer corps had transformed Prussia from the least of the great powers

into the center of a unified German Empire whose strength approached

military hegemony in Europe. If the Prussian officer corps, headed by

its General Staff, could accomplish so much beginning from a base that

afforded them limited resources, what could they not accomplish now

that they could draw on the most populous state in Europe outside Russia

and upon an industrial system rapidly moving toward European pre-

eminence? All the rival powers concluded that in self-defense they must

emulate the Prussian-German military system, including the profession-

alization of the officer corps and the granting to it of a considerable

measure of autonomy.

In victorious Germany in the 1870s, the army was the darling of

the nation because it had won; even most of the previously disgruntled

liberals joined in the national love affair with the army. In defeated

France in the 1870s, the army was almost equally the darling of the

nation because it had lost: the army must be pampered and cultivated

so that it would not lose again. The French Third Republic was con-

siderably quicker to pass the basic laws creating a military system re-

modeled after the Prussian example than to adopt the basic constitutional

laws settling the decision between republicanism and a restoration of

the Bourbons or the Bonapartes. By the turn of the century, the Dreyfus

affair revealed to France some of the dangers inherent in cultivating a

military interest powerful and arrogant enough to set itself up as a judge

not only of the policies but of the moral fiber of the nation at large; yet

for all the acrimony of the Dreyfus case, as soon as the affair seemed to

endanger the efficiency of the army—when the public learned of anti-

clerical spying against Catholic and conservative officers and the keeping

of files concerning such officers in the headquarters of French Free-
masonry—the voters and government once again rallied behind the army.

The last ten years before 1914 saw any intention to curb the autonomy

and pride of the French officer corps dissolved in the effort to strengthen

the army against the increasingly restless rival across the Rhine.

Great Britain and the United States did not feel obliged to follow

the Prussian military example so thoroughly as the continental powers.

In the wake of 1870, neither of the Anglo-Saxon powers abandoned its

traditional volunteer armed forces to adopt the Prussian system of re-
cruitment and training, the cadre-conscript system. Neither created an

army large enough or became dependent enough on its army to foster

the continental pattern of militarism. But even in the Anglo-Saxon

powers, the officer corps had to be remade into a body of professionals

where previously there had been a relatively easy interchange of military

and civilian roles. The consequent creation of a distinctively military

interest created unprecedented tensions between the military and the

rest of the society even in Great Britain and the United States.

In the United States, the military scholar and writer Emory Upton

both contributed greatly to the professionalization of the officers and

nourished within the officer corps a distrust of American civilian values
and of democratic government. In Great Britain, where for all its abuses the system of purchasing commissions had kept the interests of the officer corps in harmony with those of the civil leadership, the abolition of purchase as one of the responses to the rise of Prussia opened the way to that military contempt for civilian leaders exemplified by the young Douglas Haig when he said: "I would disband the politicians for ten years. We would all be better without them." Until the professionalization of the officer corps, British soldiers habitually had been politicians themselves, the leading soldiers frequently sitting in Parliament; there had been no clear separation of military and civil interests. When the Great War of 1914–1918 at last compelled Britain to build a mass conscript army, military professionalism's creation of a distinct military interest separate from and hostile to the politicians brought militarism even to Britain, as the soldiers sought and through much of the war won a quasi-sovereignty, and in the crises of the war an ascendancy over the civil government.

By that time, militarism on the European continent had reached the climax of its history, as a decisive influence among the forces that plunged Europe into the Great War. In Austria, Russia, and Germany, the quasi-sovereignty of the military, their ability in a crisis to bend the policies of the civil governments of their countries, and the insistence of the general staffs that diplomacy and national policy must be sacrificed to the expediencies of military strategy and the military mobilization plans ensured that there would be no escape from the Sarajevo crisis without material collision.

Militarism contributed decisively to the coming of the First World War; but historical militarism, the militarism of the quasi-sovereign professional officer corps, was also among the casualties of the war. Each of the European states had favored its officer corps with the power and privileges of a state within the state because after the wars of 1864-1871, each state believed it needed to do so in order to protect itself against the fate of Austria in 1866 and of France in 1870-1871; and each state at the same time hoped that by doing so it might win from its military a repayment in the form of swift, decisive victories comparable to those of Prussia. But despite the sacrifice of diplomacy to the mobilization timetables, none of the armies, including Germany's, was able to reproduce the quick triumphs of 1866 and 1870 in 1914. None of the armies was able to win a better result than bloody stalemate as recompense for the privileges it had enjoyed. The diffusion of military professionalism among all the great powers contributed to the stalemate by tending to give all the armies a command system competent enough at least to avoid the most egregious blunders of the kind by which France had played into Prussia's hands in 1870. The lavishness with which all the powers had offered their resources to the military similarly assured a standoff in men and matériel.

In the outcome, failure to redeem their implied promises of swift and decisive victory in the Great War of 1914–1918 cost all the armies of the European great powers the special privileges that had made them

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in, where for all its abuses of the interests of the officer leadership, the abolition of Prussia opened the way to the massive power of the young and the politicians for ten years. Until the professionalism of virtual sovereignties. In all the powers, a disillusioned citizenry moved to restore the military to civil control. In France, General Joseph Joffre began the war by almost sealing off the Zone of the Armies from the rest of the country and from the scrutiny of the Ministry and the Deputies, while he exercised wide military powers under a state-of-siege decree in the Zone of the Interior as well; but Joffre's failure to follow up the miracle of the Marne with additional and more positive miracles that would have released northeastern France from the grip of the invader emboldened the Chambers to revoke the state of siege in the Zone of the Interior in September, 1915, and the Ministry at length to badger Joffre into retirement at the end of 1916. The removal of Joffre opened a gradual process of restoration of parliamentary control over the French army. Hastened by the army mutinies of 1917, the process culminated in the thorough subjection of the army along with all the rest of the apparatus of the state in 1918 to Premier Georges Clemenceau, who put vigorously into practice his famous principle that war is too important a business to be left to the generals. Less forthrightly than Clemenceau, David Lloyd George in Great Britain similarly terminated the independence that the military had enjoyed at the opening of the Great War: first whittling away the powers of the War Minister, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, then breaking the alliance between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig at the head of the B.E.F. in France, and finally leaving Haig still powerful but much hedged about by the Prime Minister's recapture of control over the machinery of military administration and command in the capital.

In Russia the end of military autonomy came dramatically, with the Bolshevik Revolution, the dissolution of the old army, and the careful binding of the new Red Army to the political control of the Communist Party. In Germany the end of military autonomy came gradually; in the birthplace of modern militarism the army seemed to be able to ride out its failure to repeat the victories of 1864–1871. The war years brought not a recapture of parliamentary power over the military in Germany as in France and Great Britain, but the military dictatorship of Ludendorff and Hindenburg; and after the Armistice the old army was able to remain a state within the state by holding at arm's length the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, even in Germany the inability of the army to rescue the nation from the terrible strains of four years of indecisive war could not but undermine confidence in the wisdom of the military and in the necessity to go on granting the army immunity from civil interference. Nor could the stab-in-the-back legend altogether save the army from the consequences of finally losing the war. The German army of the Weimar Republic was still powerful enough to assist in Adolph Hitler's rise to the Chancellorship; but when Hitler chose to reduce the army to the same uniform subserviency to his will and the same nazification that he decreed for all the institutions of Germany, the army proved no longer powerful enough to resist. By the time World War II had developed far enough that much of the German military command would have liked to get rid of Hitler because they could now recognize he would bring them not endless victories and more and more marshals' batons but ruinous defeat, they could no longer do anything
effective against him. They no longer had their own autonomous network of command; against the *Waffen SS* and the nazified *Luftwaffe* with its own ground troops, the army no longer possessed a monopoly of armed force; the army itself was too permeated with Nazism. By the time the military command became disillusioned with Hitler, the *Führer* had so reduced the professional soldiers to his will that he was not only in possession of political mastery but himself giving operational and even tactical orders to the troops.

In none of the great powers in the Second World War did there exist a quasi-sovereign military influence upon the policies of the state comparable to the militarism with which all the European great powers had entered the First World War. In Germany, the army was the pliant tool of Hitler. In Japan, a professional officer corps in the Western sense had never existed; there were always plenty of military officers in the civil government of modern Japan, but they habitually fitted back and forth between military and civil capacities, the role of the soldier had never been clearly differentiated from that of the politician or statesman, and thus the soldiers in the Japanese government represented not the distinctive military interest characteristic of militarism but a jingoist nationalism that they shared with other government figures who rarely or never wore a uniform. In the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin had assured the docility of the military just before the Second World War by purging the principal leadership of the army. While Stalin felt obliged to grant some concessions to military professionalization during the crisis of the war, he demonstrated his continuing ascendancy over the soldiers by appropriating to himself the public glory of being Russia’s principal strategist of victory, while significantly pushing his most successful soldier, Marshal G. K. Zhukov, into the obscurity of a provincial garrison command as soon as the war was over.

In Great Britain, Winston Churchill never had to maneuver deviously as Lloyd George had done to assure the compliancy of the military to the civil power; instead, any suggestion of military autonomy was so discredited by the memories of the Somme and Passchendaele that from the moment he combined within himself the offices of Prime Minister and War Minister, Churchill commanded outright, even to the point of carrying the British armed forces into essaying the application of some of his most quixotic flights of strategic fancy.

In the United States, whose remoteness from the center of world politics had previously denied militarism even so much of a foothold as it had gained in Britain in the early years of World War I, there was no belated surrender in 1941-1945 to an autonomous military able to shape the decisions of the state. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to be sure kept his military advisers close to his side during his war years as Commander in Chief, but the President remained very much the Commander in Chief—witness Kent Roberts Greenfield’s now familiar refutation of the old canard that only twice did Roosevelt overrule his military advisers; Roosevelt’s overruling of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was relatively frequent. And the Command, suit of the pol of American m

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frequent." And Roosevelt remained very much the President as well as the Commander in Chief; that is, he kept his attention fixed on the pur-suit of the political goals which in his judgment should be the objects of American military strategy in the war. The idea that President Roose-velt and the United States habitually sacrificed political aims for military expediency in World War II is another canard.*

All of which is hardly to deny that in the United States, the military factor in decision-making during World War II weighed heavily enough to be a reasonable cause of discomfort among men anxious about the preservation of America's generally unmilitary traditions. And in the Cold War and Indochina War years the military factor in American policy has often weighed more heavily still. But it is not militarism of the historical type with which we are dealing in the contemporary United States or in any of the great powers since World War II; an essential ingredient of historical militarism, that of the military as an autonomous state within the state virtually immune from the ordinary processes of civil power, is missing.

Thus it would seem advisable to focus our studies of the military and society increasingly upon the combinations of ingredients that actually prevail in the great powers today. Historians and political scientists have been diligent in investigating the pathology of the tradi-tional militarism of the Prussian Kingdom and German Empire and of all the European states in the First World War. No historian would deny the general value of the past toward illuminating the present. But recurring investigation of traditional militarism is likely to yield diminishing returns toward illuminating the place of the military today in the United States and in the other contemporary military powers. Whether the role of the Great General Staff in Germany and thus European history is to be regarded as primarily that of a sinister influence, as it is in the most prevalent democratic view, or as a model of military professionalism under "objective civilian control," as it is in Samuel P. Huntington's view, the circumstances of civil-military relationships in all the powers today are so different from those of 1914 that using the Great General Staff as a model for studying the soldier and the state is not likely to have much more to tell us, either as warning or encourage-ment, about our own situation.

Having witnessed the end of traditional militarism, we need to begin studying more carefully the military systems in which a professional officer corps akin to that of the old Prussian model in its professionalism

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* Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsid-eration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), Chapter III. For an expression of the idea that President Roosevelt rejected the advice of the Joint Chiefs only twice in the course of World War II, see Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 322.

remains, but in which the autonomous separation of the military from the civilian state is gone. Clearly, this different combination of ingredients is likely to produce consequences different from those of traditional militarism.

We can suggest at least one possible tendency. When Hitler destroyed the historic privileges of the German army as a state within the state in the birthplace of traditional militarism and put the army in thrall to the civil power embodied in himself and his party, one striking effect was to politicize the members of the officer corps. It was implicit in the quasi-sovereign status of the old German army that the officers remained aloof from the politics of the civil state and the civilian parties, except when they intervened institutionally in behalf of the interests of the army. Hitler, however, so closely identified the army with Nazism that it became almost impossible for an officer to continue being politically uninvolved. Either the officer had to embrace Nazism, or he had to become a political opponent of Nazism, as did those officers who, deprived of the German army’s earlier means of asserting itself, resorted to assassination attempts against the Führer.

The effects of the efforts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to assure the subordination of the Soviet Army to doctrine and party have been similar. Merely for the officers to retain the measure of military professionalism they believed essential to military efficiency, Soviet officers have had to become politicized. They have had to participate actively in the internal politics of the Soviet state, not in the manner of traditional militarism as a quasi-sovereign power operating outside the arena of civilian politics, but as one of a congeries of interest groups vying within the Soviet political arena.

While Stalin lived after World War II, the Soviet military saw their advancement in professional doctrine and even in military technology impeded by the official myth that Stalin was the great military genius of the war and that the generalissimo’s methods—the methods of World War II—were sacrosanct. To regain enough influence in the state so that professional judgment could again control professional decisions, the military plunged into political activism following Stalin’s death. They aligned themselves with the party apparatus led by N. S. Khrushchev and the state bureaucracy led by G. M. Malenkov to destroy the effort of L. P. Beria and the secret police to win supremacy in the regime; the armed secret police represented a special threat to the ability of the military to control their own professional destiny. After the fall of Beria, the army remained in partnership with Khrushchev against Malenkov. Khrushchev rewarded the army and the rehabilitated Marshal Zhukov by arranging for Zhukov to become the first professional soldier to receive candidate membership in the Party Presidium. In 1956 the Central Committee of the Communist Party elected six professional soldiers to its full membership and twelve others to candidate membership. The military in turn rewarded Khrushchev by saving him from the attempted coup d’etat of June, 1957; but Khrushchev’s consequent dependence on the army made him uncomfortable, and in his latter years in power he attempted gradually to restore the military to the discipline of the party. Khrushchev’s humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 weakened his hand enough for military over both party predominant to Khrushchev leadership and the state, but for the military claims at least.

In sum, how active politicians, beginning to take power. In both the 1940s and 1950s, the French army and the French state have been similar. Merely for the officers to retain the measure of military professionalism they believed essential to military efficiency, Soviet officers have had to become politicized. They have had to participate actively in the internal politics of the Soviet state, not in the manner of traditional militarism as a quasi-sovereign power operating outside the arena of civilian politics, but as one of a congeries of interest groups vying within the Soviet political arena.

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In sum, however, the post-Stalin Soviet military have emerged as active politicians, following the same path the German generals were beginning to take after Hitler deprived them of their old-fashioned kinds of power. In both these instances, the professionalism of the officer corps has been no guarantee against political involvement; on the contrary, with the loss of old-fashioned military autonomy, the very need for protection of military professionalism has offered a motive for officers to politicize themselves.

In all the great powers, the politicization of the military is likely to prove an outstanding tendency of the new combination of a professional officer corps, with its distinctive military interests, but without the kind of autonomy that pre-World War I soldiers enjoyed to protect their interests. It is not only the armies of totalitarian states that have displayed the growing tendency toward a politically active military. After the French army lost its privileged status of 1871-1916, it became by the 1940s and 1950s perhaps the most politically activist of all major armies save the Chinese Communist army. In the United States, it distorts matters to regard the post-World War II armed forces as “militaristic” in the historic, Prussian sense; but it is a critical element in our current military-civil relations that the Defense Department as a whole and the armed forces severally have become centers of actively mobilized and manipulated political influence and power on a scale altogether without precedent in our history. The theme of the politicization of the American military, the transformation of the military into an active contender for spoils within the arena of American politics and of soldiers into active political figures, may suggest the shared roots from which spring both so obvious a phenomenon of the current military scene as “the selling of the Pentagon” and events more puzzling in the light of older American military traditions, such as the apparently independent policy-making of General John D. Lavelle.

It would no doubt be going too far to suggest that in the future the model to which we should look for guidance toward an understanding of dominant tendencies in military-civil relations should be not the old Prussian army but the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Nevertheless, the immensely politicized PLA, in which military and political roles blur indistinguishably together, may represent in an extreme form the tendencies developing in all major contemporary armies. On the one hand, the “civilian militarism” about which Alfred Vagts wrote in the two chapters appended to the 1959 edition of his History of Militarism points toward a blending of civilian and military attitudes and values; much might be said about civilian militarism in recent American administrations as a primary cause of the expanding war in Indochina. Meanwhile, the politicization of the military which I have suggested as a
likely sequel to the end of traditional militarism points toward another blending of the civil and military elements in the contemporary powers. The future development of the military in society may witness the blurring of all the boundaries that symposia such as this one have hitherto marked. The increasing concern of future symposia may be with a politicized military in a militarized politics and society.
The Second Session

THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY: 
THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY ON 
DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED SOCIETIES

Introductory Remarks

THE CHAIRMAN (Professor FRANK VANDIVER, Rice University): Displaying typical Confederate logistics, I was late this morning. Perhaps if we just could have been later more often it might have turned out differently.

I thought on the general subject of the military and society it might be well to open with that most awkward of all stylistic gambits: two quotations. To start with, John Winthrop Hackett's remark that what a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. Follow that up with a rather loose paraphrase of a remark of Clausewitz's that a nation's way of waging war is determined by its social system. Bear those two statements in mind, if you will, while we think about the role of the military in society.

Democracies in this day and age, it seems to me, appear to tolerate armed services as kind of tawdry necessities. Most armies suffer from what might be called the Tommy Atkins syndrome. They are very fine when they are needed, but instantly forgotten when they are not. And what effect indeed have armed services had on creating our modern society? Is militarism a recurrent threat? Is it an extension of nationalism or is it a vanishing aberration?

Professor Weigley suggested this morning the end of modern militarism or the end of militarism as we have known it (or of classically defined militarism) but pointed as well at the possible emergence of other militaristic symptoms with possibly, I gather, dire overtones. The papers at this session will focus on facets of both old and new militarism or manifestations of the military's impact on society.

[The Chairman then introduced Professor Black.]
We are a domestic roles in use of force in military leadership and national development, and other related war. The domestic role—intervention of its forces, and part allocation of resources in time of civil strife is in politics at the either indirectly.

We are concerned with the role—intervention of military leaders acting co-extension of the police, whose purpose is to preserve order and unity at the expense of change. The preservation of order and unity normally involves the support of interest groups that benefit disproportionately from the existing economic and social system, and the repression of those elements of society that seek rapid economic and social development with a view to a more equitable distribution of income and a wider participation in political decisions.

Is this widely held view correct, or can the personnel and resources available to military leadership also be used to promote economic and social development leading toward redistribution of income and political participation? We know that rapid change is possible, in developing as well as in developed countries, under both authoritarian and democratic civilian governments. To what extent is it also possible in regimes under military leadership?

The Problem

Today no less than 36 countries, a quarter of the 144 of those that govern the peoples of the world, are under direct or indirect military rule. Of these, 13 are in Africa, 7 in Latin America, 7 in the Middle East, 7 in Asia, and 2 in Europe.

The number of such military regimes has been growing steadily throughout the twentieth century. Four such regimes were established between 1900 and 1914, 14 in the 1920's, 19 in the 1930's, 14 in the 1940's, and 46 in the 1960's. Of these, 30 survived into the 1970's, and 6 new ones were added. Military leadership in civilian roles is thus a common phenomenon in the last third of the twentieth century, and countries that practice constitutional democracy are divided as to how they should relate to them.

The central problem of this paper is to explore the extent to which governments under military leadership can make a contribution to national development, and to this extent at least deserve the support of democratic governments.

It is widely believed in this country that military regimes are an extension of the police, whose purpose is to preserve order and unity at the expense of change. The preservation of order and unity normally involves the support of interest groups that benefit disproportionately from the existing economic and social system, and the repression of those elements of society that seek rapid economic and social development with a view to a more equitable distribution of income and a wider participation in political decisions.

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Dimensions of Military Leadership and National Development* Cyril E. Black Princeton University

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We are assuming that the military may have both foreign and domestic roles in a society. The foreign role is that of administering the use of force in relation to other countries, including both intelligence and other related peacetime activities, and overt use of force in time of war. The domestic roles of the military may include those directly related to its foreign role, including the training and equipment of armed forces, and participation in the formulation of foreign policy and in the allocation of resources for the military establishment through the national budget; and those that are only indirectly related to its foreign role, such as civic action programs, broadly defined, ranging from various forms of participation in local affairs, to large-scale engineering and medical programs of national significance; maintenance of domestic order in time of civil strife or of a national calamity; and, finally, intervention in politics at the national level for a shorter or longer period of time, either indirectly or through direct military rule.

We are concerned in this essay primarily with this last domestic role—intervention in politics at the national level. These domestic roles are of course not entirely unrelated to the foreign roles, because the stability and vigor of a country are always significant factors in its relations with other countries, whether in war or in peace.

By military leadership, we mean members of the professional military establishment of a country, acting in an institutional rather than a personal capacity. We are thus not concerned with cases where a military hero becomes the leader of a political party or a head of state, whether Grant or Eisenhower in the United States, DeGaulle in France, or Svoboda in Czechoslovakia. We are also not concerned with revolutionary leaders who assume military roles, such as Tito in Yugoslavia and Boumedienne in Algeria. We are concerned with groups of military leaders acting collectively as an expression of their professional concern to preserve order and unity normally relatively short-term, and indirect military intervention, which may become institutionalized over a long period of time. The cases of longer-term indirect intervention should not be minimized, however, for they frequently have a more profound effect on the political system than occasional shows of military force.

In practice, in the principal cases with which we will be concerned, these two degrees of military influence are intermingled or alternated. The direct military rule that is imposed in a time of crisis more often than not has a background of long-term indirect military influence that has become an established characteristic of a political system.

Dimensions of Military Regimes

Patterns of Military-Civilian Relations. Western commentators frequently take the ethnocentric view that, since armed forces in the West are normally subordinated to political authorities, this is a universal norm any departure from which makes a country in some way deficient in the
qualifications for nationhood. These commentators fail to take into account the fact that countries in other parts of the world are not only several generations behind in level of development, but also have different traditional heritages as regards military-civilian relations.

Three features of the role of military leadership in these other countries are particularly noteworthy. The first is that the later-modernizing societies that possessed sufficiently effective traditional governments to prevent the West from colonizing them—Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, Japan, and Thailand are typical of these—confronted the West with policies of defensive modernization. They sought to defend their traditional systems by modernizing their armed forces and bureaucracies as a means of holding the West at a distance, and thus preserving the rest of their society from radical change. An important consequence of this policy was that the armed forces in these countries became the first segments of society to be modernized, and their training and equipment, and hence also their outlook on modernizing change, were modeled on the West. In this sense, then, the armed forces were the cutting edge of modernization in many of these countries. To some extent that was true in this country, for example in the field of medicine.

Another feature of the role of the military in these countries is the fact that in many states—notably the African—the higher ranking military personnel received their military training abroad—predominantly in England and France. Although most members of the other professional elites of these countries also go abroad for their education, the armed forces have been among the first to have this experience and were the only group that received its education abroad as a corporate body, rather than as individuals going to diverse institutions.

Finally, some of the countries under consideration have tended to institutionalize the influence of the military establishment by attributing to it an exceptional political role in their constitutions. The Brazilian constitutions of 1891, 1934, and 1946, for example, charge the military establishment with maintaining law and order in the country, and require it to obey the executive—but only when the latter is acting “within the limits of the law.” This latter restriction is naturally open to a variety of interpretations. It was apparently the unwritten rule in Brazil until the 1960’s that the proper role of the military was to intervene to transfer political power from one civilian group to another, but not to undertake direct rule. This situation has now been removed. The Peruvian constitution of 1933, to cite another example, states that “the purpose of the Armed Forces is to guarantee the rights of the Republic, the fulfillment of the Constitution and the Laws, and the conservation of public order.”

In a less formal sense, other military establishments have also played a traditionally important civilian role. In the Ottoman Empire, and to a significant degree in the Arab successor states (especially Iraq and Syria), the military profession was the most honored, and ranked above scholars (including religious leaders), as well as merchants and peasants in the traditional social hierarchy.

Greece was also a successor state of the Ottoman Empire, but there the role of the military derived more from modern political history than from the institutional heritage. Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821. From 1960. From England, France, to intervene to military in Green of wars and resulting from years (1924-36) turbulent, civil war. That is “democracy.”

In Latin America, the military role has also been influential. The Peruvian constitution of 1933, to cite another example, states that “the purpose of the Armed Forces is to guarantee the rights of the Republic, the fulfillment of the Constitution and the Laws, and the conservation of public order.”
Ottoman Empire in successive territorial stages between its initial independence in 1821 and the establishment of an independent Cyprus in 1960. From 1827 to 1923 Greece was also under the protection of England, France, and Russia under circumstances that permitted them to intervene competitively in Greek affairs. In evaluating the role of the military in Greece since 1967, one must take into account the 26 years of wars and successive military interventions (1909–24, 1936–47) resulting from this territorial and political instability, as well as the 32 years (1924–36, 1947–67) of relatively democratic, although frequently turbulent, civilian rule. Greece is often said to be the birthplace of democracy. That is not true, of course; it is the birthplace of the word "democracy."

In Latin America it has been estimated that, since independence from Spain and Portugal, there have been no less than 350 military coups, of which 100 have occurred since 1930. These cases of military intervention have with a few exceptions served the purpose either of supporting rival cliques in a perpetual game of musical chairs or of preserving the status quo against threats to the interests of the economic and social elites. In these cases the role of the military is not that of a traditional political or social elite, but rather an extension of the police or national guard. Of the 100 recent coups, only those of Toro and Busch in Bolivia, of Peron in Argentina, and of the current regimes in Peru and Brazil may be considered as cases of military leadership relevant to national development.

This widespread tradition of military leadership in politics provides the setting for the prophetic statement of Chief H.O. Davies of Nigeria in 1960 that: "A large and efficiently equipped army constitutes an alternative ruling elite to the politicians, and the army is as much interested in stable government as any political party. If the government is threatened with collapse through maladministration of the politicians, the army cannot be expected to endure the ensuing chaos passively. It is ready and eager to step in and fill the vacuum."

The "chaos" that Chief Davies referred to can take many forms, but in the perspective of comparative modernization these can be summarized in terms of two basic patterns: military intervention for the purpose of (1) maintaining order and unity with a view to preventing radical change in the allocation of political power, economic resources, and social status; or of (2) initiating radical change as a means of transforming societies from a traditional agrarian to a modern industrial way of life. To oversimplify even further, military intervention may be conservative or radical. The chaos from which it seeks to rescue a country may be the chaos of change or the chaos of backwardness.

The basic generalization to which the evidence points is that military intervention in politics can be motivated by any program or ideology. The range of examples extends from a reactionary desire to return to an idealized agrarian past, through various types of liberal monarchy and liberal and radical republicanism, to Marxism-Leninism in its Maoist version. Military establishments are an integral part of a society, and reflect the entire range of ideological commitments characteristic of modern societies.
Military establishments have certain characteristic capabilities—training in the use of instruments of force, discipline, administrative skills, and a commitment to national interest (however defined) that tends to be relatively more disinterested than that of most political parties. These common professional characteristics may be used for as many diverse purposes, however, as a layman’s, an economist’s, or a historian’s.

A review of the 123 military regimes in the twentieth century (see appended list) leads to the conclusion that 96 were concerned primarily with order and unity, and that 26 military regimes in 19 countries made a significant effort to transform their societies. It is on the basis of this second group of military regimes that the case for military leadership in national development must rest.

These 19 countries and their military regimes are: Argentina (Peron, 1945-55); Bolivia (Toro, 1936-37; Busch, 1937-39); Brazil (Castelo Branco, 1964-67; Costa e Silva, 1967-69; Medici, 1969—); Bulgaria (Georgiev, 1934-35); China, Nationalist (Chiang, 1924-28); Cuba (Batista, 1940-44); Egypt (Naguib, 1952-54; Nasser, 1954-70; Sadat, 1970); Greece (Papadopoulos, 1967—); Guatemala (Arbenz, 1951-54); Indonesia (Suharto, 1966—); Iran (Reza Khan, 1921-25); Iraq (Kassim, 1958-63; Arif, 1963-66; Bakr, 1968—); Korea, South (Park, 1961—); Libya (Kaddafi, 1969—); Pakistan (Ayub, 1958-69); Peru (Velasco, 1968—); Syria (Shishackli, 1951-54); Turkey (Kemal, 1919-23); Yemen (Al-Salal, 1962-67).

Effectiveness in National Development. There is no simple, generally acceptable, or statistically accurate way to measure the effectiveness of a government, whether military or civilian, in solving the many complex and interrelated problems involved in national development. In this as in so many other matters, there seems to be no adequate substitute for informed judgment. So long as the criteria for such judgments are set forth in a manner that others can test them, it seems better to give a general evaluation than to attempt a quantitative analysis.

National development is one of the central features of modernization—the most general term used to describe the impact of the scientific and technological revolution on individuals, on groups of individuals at all levels, and on the international system of states and transnational relations.

National development is concerned with the process of modernization at the national level—its implications for nationbuilding, and the ways in which it can be fostered by national policy. The nature of this process, and the criteria by which the role of military leadership in relation to it can be evaluated, can best be summarized in terms of a series of indicators.

Underlying national development is the capacity of a society to respond to the challenges of the scientific and technological revolution, which in turn depends on the ability of its leaders to understand the nature of this process and to formulate and implement policies designed to advance their society toward the levels of achievement that are possible in the modern era. An ideology relevant to modernization is thus an indispensable precondition for a political elite with aspirations to furthering national development. In regard to groups of military leaders, this is the critical test force at their disposal that they have a genuine stake in how it can be achieved.

The level of economic growth is the primary among the many factors that determine the rate of change. Political power is more significant in institutions (as national productive forces); and the decision-making nature of the political economy is its justification. In this respect, its importance is its government.

Economic growth is priority among the factors that determine the rate of change. However, it may be assumed that economic growth will not be made to contribute to economic growth by a sector of modern industry. Their problem is not the level of capital investment, but the extent of social services. For example, it is the achievement of economic growth in the long run that is significant. In regard to groups of military leaders, this is the relation of social mobility, labor force engagement, and other primordial resources.

A brief review above in terms of the social change, the effectiveness of the project, and the resources involved in account the relation of
characteristic capabilities—the discipline, administrative st (however defined) that that of most political istics may be used for as er’s, an economist’s, or a the twentieth century (see were concerned primarily times in 19 countries made. It is on the basis of this for military leadership in nes are: Argentina (Peron, 1937–39); Brazil (Castelo Medici, 1969–); Bulgaria Chiang, 1924–28); Cuba Nasser, 1954–70; Sadat, mala (Arbenz, 1951–54); (1921–25); Iraq (Kassim, ea, South (Park, 1961–); 1958–69); Peru (Velasco, Kemal, 1919–23); Yemen here is no simple, generally sure the effectiveness of a solving the many complex development. In this as no adequate substitute for or such judgments are set it seems better to give a analysis. features of modernization impact of the scientific and groups of individuals at all and transnational relations. the process of moderni or nationbuilding, and the policy. The nature of this military leadership in relation ed in terms of a series of capacity of a society to technological revolution, leaders to understand the implement policies designed improvement that are possible modernization is thus an with aspirations to further- of military leaders, this is the critical test of whether they are capable simply of exercising the force at their disposal to maintain order and security at the expense of another group that they regard as a threat to national security, or whether they have a genuine understanding of what national development is and how it can be achieved.

The level of political development of a country, and the direction and rate of change. may be judged by such indicators as the degree to which political power is centered in regional and national, rather than local, institutions (as judged, for example, by the proportion of the gross national product expended by the national government), the extent and nature of the participation of individuals and interest groups in political decision-making (whether through a democratic party system or by other means), and the extent to which a government employs violence against its opponents as a reflection of the degree to which it is not accepted as legitimate. In the case of a military regime, a consideration of particular importance is its effectiveness in preparing the way for a return to civilian government.

Economic growth is usually considered to have a particularly high priority among the initial tasks of national development, although in the long run it is secondary to the ultimate objective of a society-wide consumption of goods and services at a high, stable level. In the short term, however, it may be necessary to delay, or even reduce per capita consumption in order to accumulate the necessary savings needed for economic growth. The countries with which we are concerned typically devote some 80 percent of their manpower to agriculture employing the traditional technology, and have a negligible industrial capacity. Their problem is to accelerate the traditional economy, without increasing the level of consumption, to produce a surplus for the development of modern industry. It is anticipated that in due course the industrial sector will not only become self-supporting but will eventually sustain extensive social services and a high level of per capita consumption. The essential element in this process is the increase in per capita output, but its achievement in most countries involves in effect forced savings—the postponement of increases in the distribution of goods and services—often for several generations. To a certain extent this postponement of the benefits of economic growth can be achieved voluntarily, but in many cases it also involves the use of compulsion. The employment of instruments of force within a society is thus an important aspect of economic growth.

Social mobilization is reflected in the growth of the proportion of the labor force engaged in industry and the services, as opposed to agriculture and other primary occupations, the extent of urbanization and literacy, and the resources devoted to higher education and research.

A brief review of selected military regimes in the 19 countries listed above in terms of ideology, political development, and economic and social change along these lines will provide a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of these regimes in national development. To the extent possible within a very brief space, this evaluation will also seek to take into account the varying levels of development of the countries in question, the relation of the military regimes to preceding regimes in the same
countries, and also their performance in relation to civilian regimes in comparable countries.

Military regimes are not noted for the originality of their ideological concepts, but a few have elaborated distinctive programs of development. Perhaps the most influential of these programs has been that of Kemal in Turkey, which is admirably summarized in Article 2 of the Turkish constitution of 1924 which describes that state as "republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionary." The essence of his program was modernization through state initiative, which may sound trite today but was quite original as a practical program in 1920. Kemalism had a profound effect on Reza Khan in Iran and later on Nasser in Egypt and Kassim and his successors in Iraq, and is in most respects the prototype of a modernizing military ideology.

The short-lived regime of Georgiev in Bulgaria had a similar program, leaning somewhat more toward a technocratic approach, but likewise stressing the role of the bureaucratic elite in national policy-making. Among contemporary military regimes, only that of Peru seems to be approaching its task in terms of a systematic program of economic and social development, although it has tended to neglect political aspects of development to which Kemalist Turkey devoted significant attention.

In regard to the specifically political aspects of development, the example of Kemalist Turkey may again be taken as the benchmark. It is important to note that Kemal Ataturk carried through a genuine political revolution, which not only changed the personnel of the government but also its structure and program. Of the other military regimes with which we are concerned, only those of Reza Khan in Iran, Nasser in Egypt, Kassim in Iraq, and Al-Salal in Yemen made, or have the potential for making, a contribution of similar magnitude to the transformation of their countries from tradition to modernity. It remains to be seen whether Kaddafi in Libya and Velasco in Peru will rate inclusion in this list.

It is also significant that, from the start, Kemal Ataturk employed his military authority to establish a civilian government. As soon as peace had been secured in 1923, he forbade the participation of active officers in politics and established the Republican People's Party as the link between state and society. The subsequent civilian governments under the administrations of Kemal Ataturk (1923–38) and Ismet Inönü (1938–50) represented a form of indirect military rule in the sense that former officers served as president of the republic for 17 years, and as prime minister for 16½ years, as minister of defense for 16½ years, of public works for 15 years, of communications for 9 years, and in various other positions. It is also significant that, although the governments of Ataturk and Inönü were authoritarian, their program of economic and social change was widely accepted in Turkey as legitimate and their record of respect for human rights and dignity was good. The fact that the further development toward multi-party government after 1950 was not successful is apparent from the renewed military intervention since 1960, but the transformation from tradition to modernity is a long and agonizing process and the achievements of the Kemalist revolution are not dimmed by subsequent developments.

Among the other military regimes under consideration, only those of
Renza Khan in Iran and Nasser in Egypt can be said to have made comparable efforts to evolve toward a civilian government. Of the others, Peron was overthrown by more conservative generals, Georgiev's power was undermined by the king within a few months, and Chiang never gained effective control over China, although he inherited a revolutionary program of sorts from Sun Yat-sen. Lin Piao appears to have headed an indirect military regime in the later stages of the so-called "cultural revolution," but he seems to have overreached himself when he sought to gain full power in 1971. Batista's first regime in Cuba (1940-49), and those of Arbenz in Guatemala and Ayub in Pakistan collapsed for a variety of reasons. Of the remaining military regimes that are currently in power, Suharto in Indonesia and Park in South Korea have moved toward greater civilian participation, but without any credible plan to establish the foundations of long-term civilian government. Velasco and his colleagues in Peru concentrated initially on planning, and in the economic and social sphere, only 3 years later sought to mobilize public support for their program. The military regimes in Greece and Brazil, on the other hand, have been recklessly indiscriminate and brutal in dealing with their relatively sophisticated civilian rivals, and run the risk of alienating able civilians—especially the rising generation of educated civilians—that their programs and their foreign supporters may both suffer grievous long-term defeats.

In considering the economic and social achievements of military regimes, one must distinguish not only between those before and since the 1950's, when massive assistance of a relatively sophisticated nature became available from the developed countries, but also the short-term prosperity resulting from foreign investment, land reform, improvements in agriculture, transportation, and education, that are more significant in the long run even though they may temporarily restrain the rate of growth of per capita GNP. Fundamental economic and social transformation—from a society that is 80% rural to one that is 80% urban—is rarely achieved in less than a century. In evaluating the record of current military regimes, one must deal primarily in potentialities rather than in achievements.

To return to the Turkey of Kemal Ataturk for the last time, it would be fair to say that his military regime set the country on the path to a genuine long-term economic and social transformation, starting from a rather primitive agrarian base. Again, Turkey has few competitors among more recent military regimes. Toro and Busch in Bolivia had a conception of what was necessary, but their program was premature in the local setting. Peron certainly jolted the Argentinian middle class, and the country has not been the same since, but he can hardly be said to have inaugurated a farsighted program of change. Nasser and his colleagues have faced problems that have often seemed almost insoluble, but his programs of land reform, irrigation, industrialization and education stand out as among the most effective. Similarly Suharto in Indonesia, in a much more stable international environment and with sophisticated foreign advice and assistance, has taken effective steps to clear away the wreckage left by his predecessor and to start building a modern economy and society.
The Peruvian military regime has undertaken a fundamental land reform without interrupting the expansion of agricultural production, and the rate of growth of GNP has been significantly raised within the framework of a nationalist program that has relied more on fundamental structural reforms than on foreign investments. The economic success of the Brazilian regime has been even greater in terms of overall growth rate, although it has relied much more heavily on foreign investments and on the exploitation of its natural resources. The Greek regime of Papadopoulos, on the other hand, has been significantly lacking in dynamism. Its growth rate is not as rapid as that of earlier civilian regimes in Greece, and its social policies tend to hamper the mobilization of the resources and the skills that are available.

There is a sense in which no military regime can demonstrate its effectiveness, since national development is a long-term process and the regimes in question are all of rather recent origin. It is for this reason that programs and potentialities must loom larger in any evaluation than quantifiable short-term achievements. The military regimes in Turkey and Iran in the 1920's clearly set their countries on a revolutionary and modernizing course, although it was 30 or 40 years before this transformation began to affect a significant proportion of the population. Of the contemporary regimes we have been examining, only Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Indonesia, and Peru seem to have such a potentiality.

It should also be noted that the records of these military regimes do not stand up very well in comparison with contemporary civilian authoritarian regimes—whether the Party of Revolutionary Institutions in Mexico, the People's Action Party in Singapore, the National Liberation Front in Algeria, or some of the more successful Communist regimes. It would be interesting, for example, to see a detailed comparison of national development in North and South Korea over a 20-year period.

Aftermath of Intervention. One of the underlying problems confronting military leadership in national development, as already noted, is that military regimes are by definition temporary while national development is prolonged. It is for this reason that military regimes should be judged less by their achievements in physical construction and economic growth than by their success in launching a long-term civilian program of national development. The successful military leaders in civilian roles are those who have used the instruments of force at their disposal to effect a break with a traditional past and to set a course toward a modern future that can be followed by civilian leaders.

Once military leadership in political roles becomes prolonged, whether from failure to pass the torch of national development to civilian leaders or because their only purpose is a relatively static order and unity, they run a serious risk of sacrificing their professional military qualifications. They become, at best, bureaucrats, if they are in power because there are no civilian bureaucrats competent to do the job; at worst, policemen, capable of using greater brutality than the regular police in repressing rival interest groups.

This discussion has been concerned with military leadership in national development, and military leadership devoted to order and unity has been relegated to a limbo of static regimes not deserving of serious consideration. Many countries are making equally well. I ever, the quest national civilian a different lid Ottomans janis: military and c.

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military leadership in evoto order and unity is not deserving of serious consideration. This evaluation is doubtless justified in the case of the many countries in Latin America and Asia where military bureaucrats are making no contribution that civilian bureaucrats could not make equally well. In the case of the thirteen military regimes in Africa, how- ever, the question should be raised whether the absence of a tradition of national civilian government does not place the military bureaucrats in a different light. Is it not possible that, like the feudal knights or the Ottoman janissaries, there is an early phase of nation-building in which military and civilian roles are normally shared by the same individuals? Is it possible that there are not enough trained personnel to fill all specialized roles, and that the few available must play several roles?

In either case—whether military leaders are playing vital roles in national development, or occupy a distinctive position in a very small elite of trained personnel—the question should be raised as to the implications for the effectiveness of the military as an instrument of national defense. More often than not, military intervention is accompanied by sharp divisions within the armed forces, and is followed by purges when the winners divide the spoils. In Argentina, Greece, and other cases, the military establishments have become riddled with factions that have periodically seized power from each other, or else we may find as in Turkey and Morocco the air force seeking to overthrow the government while the army defends it. Indeed, many of the armed forces in question fight each other more than foreigners, and are in effect national guards (in American terms) rather than armies.

The ultimate test of the effect of military intervention in politics on the fighting qualities of armed forces would be a foreign war fought after several years of military rule. There are few such cases, but one is that of Metaxas in Greece (1936–40). It was not a very popular or widely supported dictatorship, but when the Italians struck in October 1940 the Greek people rallied behind the army and they defended the country successfully until overwhelmed by the Germans the following April. Chiang in China, Nasser in Egypt, and Ali-Salal in Yemen were also tested by war after a period of domestic rule. None of them fared very well in this military role, but the reasons for failure were not directly related to demoralization or purges resulting from their domestic civilian roles. The evidence is certainly not conclusive, but armies as fighting forces are not necessarily weakened when a few of their officers engage in politics.

Conclusions

The comparative study of modernization is still at an experimental stage, but one conclusion on which there is a fairly wide consensus is that the complex task of adapting a traditional society to the levels of achievement made possible by the scientific and technological revolution requires effective political performance.

The countries that have been most successful at political development, economic growth, and social mobilization have been those that had effective political systems before the modern era. The early-modernizing societies—the English-speaking and West-European countries—and those
which give promise of achieving a comparable level of development within the twentieth century, especially Japan and Russia, had such governments before the modern era. Feudal Europe, Tokugawa Japan, and Muscovite and Imperial Russia were similar to the extent that they had effective governments capable of responding when the time came to the political challenges of modernization. These governments could collect taxes on a nationwide basis; stimulate economic growth; and both regulate and significantly alter the relations between social groups, before modern times.

No doubt the existence of an effective traditional government is not in itself enough to guarantee successful modernization, for China stands out as a case with a long (if cyclical) tradition of a well-organized central bureaucracy and a very poor record of development in modern times. This is, however, a special case that deserves separate attention. Perhaps Spain and Portugal also belong in this category, although probably for different reasons. Among others with a relatively effective traditional government, however, Turkey Iran, Afghanistan, and Thailand have done well in the modern era in comparison with most of the countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The Arab states, despite the arbitrary division of their territories in the colonial era, possessed in Islamic law—and also in the Ottoman administrative system, in the cases of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—a heritage of political institutions that had a much better than average capacity to adapt to modernity.

Countries without a political heritage of effective government are normally those that have been created in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from diverse principalities and provinces. In some cases the constituent territories may have had effective political systems, and their main problem in the modern era has been to create unity out of diversity. In Subsaharan Africa, the formation in the 1960’s of states by assembling the territories of numerous tribes without effective political systems resulted in much more difficult problems. To be sure, the European colonial regimes which originally organized these territories provided some degree of effective government before the Second World War, but it was imposed and relatively superficial, and was not internalized to any great extent by the indigenous peoples with the exception of a small elite. They therefore entered the modern era with a double burden of the absence of both a heritage of political effectiveness and of political unity.

If a heritage of effective government is necessary for successful national development, and if most countries enter the modern era without such a heritage, to what extent can a substitute for this lack be created? Can an effective political system be developed where none existed before, with the capacity to undertake the tasks of national development?

Military leadership is certainly one of the answers. An arguable case can be made that the 26 regimes discussed above have contributed to national development, and the 13 military regimes in Subsaharan Africa may possibly represent an acceptable temporary solution to an underlying shortage of trained personnel at the national level. Of the 144 independent states in the world today, some 57 are under one form or another of libertarian governments.
another of liberal government and the remaining 87 are under authoritarian governments. Of these, 36 are military, 14 are Communist, and 37 have a variety of other forms of civilian authoritarian governments.

What conclusions can be drawn for U.S. foreign policy from this brief review of military regimes? Three suggest themselves:

1. Military regimes represent a normal alternative form of authoritarian government in many countries, and should not be judged solely in terms of the Western tradition of civil-military relations. We should discriminate neither in favor of them nor against them simply because they are military. We should evaluate them in terms of the contribution they are making to national development—and in terms of specific needs of U.S. security where these arise—just as we would any civilian government. This evaluation should include not only their contribution to economic growth and their sympathy for U.S. economic and security interests—criteria that we are not likely to overlook—but also their attitudes toward the long-term development of civilian governments and toward human rights and dignity.

2. To the extent that U.S. foreign policy can affect military regimes through awarding or withholding aid and support, the military regimes deserving favorable consideration are those that (1) are making distinctive contributions to political, economic, and social development (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Indonesia, and Peru, as already noted), and (2) are in power because of an absence of qualified civilian personnel at a national level (in Subsaharan Africa). It is more than likely that some of these regimes will discriminate in a variety of ways against U.S. interests, but nationalism is essentially a healthy symptom at their stage of development and should be treated with understanding.

3. By the same token, we should be cautious in rewarding military regimes simply because they are anti-communist or generous to American investors, if their policies (because of their inhumanity or for other reasons) are alienating the rising next generation of educated national leaders. To do this (Brazil and Greece come to mind in this connection) may bring short-term gains at the risk of losing the respect not only of the future leadership of these countries but also of informed persons in other parts of the world.
## Military Regimes in the Twentieth Century

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CHrysanthemum and Star: Army and Society in Modern Japan*

Alvin D. Cox

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California State University, San Diego

Introduction

Japanese scholars today accept a typology of modernization of their society best described as self-modernizing and extra-European, although they question a classification of autochthony. Professor Maruyama, for one, calls Japanese modernization "a conscious process of Westernization," while Professor Fukushima asks whether, instead of "being something inherently Japanese, it was [not] a form of modernization consisting in the acceptance of the results of modern European society, but an acceptance in which the Japanese had applied selection on the basis of their own judgment." This is another way of saying, "Japanese Spirit and Western Learning," as true today as a hundred years ago.¹

In the absence of a universally accepted definition of modernization, experts have been concerned with such problems as nation-building and government-building, processes of societal differentiation, and technological control of natural resources and environment. While all of these factors, and more, are involved in the study of the Japanese model, I shall be drawing upon a broad definition which sees modernization in general as "a type of social change directed by a rational belief system, whereby new social roles and new interrelationships among roles emerge."² My emphasis will be the first six decades of the eighty-year period under examination. I am also going to emphasize the Crown (the chrysanthemum) and the army (the star in the title of my paper), not the navy (the anchor).

The End of the Samurai as a Caste

Armed forces, De Gaulle once said, constitute the "most complete expression of the spirit of a society." The Japan which emerged from 250 years of seclusion, under great duress, in the 19th Century was the heir and product of seven centuries of domination of society by warrior-administrators. It had long been decreed that "the samurai are the masters of the four classes. Agriculturists, artisans, and merchants may not behave in a rude manner towards samurai." While exhorted to pursue the high standards of duty, fidelity, and righteousness inherent in Bushido, the Way of the Warrior, "should there be someone in the ... classes

* [Abreviated forms are used in the footnotes. For full citations, see the bibliography that follows. Ed.]
of the common people who transgresses against these moral principles, the samurai summarily punishes him and thus upholds proper moral principles in the land. It would not do for the samurai to know the martial and civil virtues without manifesting them."

The more astute Japanese leaders, however, were aware of the nation's weaknesses by the time that Commodore Perry's flotilla of Black Ships anchored off Uraga in 1853–54. As a Japanese police official reported on the landings, "[We] knew we could not control these people. We had to hold our anger. . . . A decade later, when Japanese hot-heads at the "impregnable" forts of Shimonoseki and Kagoshima dared to engage foreign warships, they felt the edge of Western military technology in the breech-loading British naval cannon, and their xenophobia was converted into mimetic admiration.

Once the last Shogun gladly surrendered his secular powers to the boy emperor in 1867, there ensued the vital phase known as Meiji Ishin—the Meiji Restoration, Renovation, Revolution, or Quasi-Revolution, depending upon the point of view. The motto of the nation-makers and rapid-fire modernizers was Fukoku kyohei—Military Strength and Prosperity, the latter clearly presupposing the former.

The first order of business was to centralize and solidify the political system by demolishing the system of the fiefs and replacing them with prefectures—a dangerous business when the government could rely upon an Imperial Guard made up of no more than 8,000 loyal clansmen, in an ocean of perhaps 400,000 dispossessed samurai. During the delicate process of this revolution from the top, the exclusive military class and the vestiges of feudalistic prestige-ranking were extirpated systematically and "order was brought out of confusion." In due course, the samurai's hereditary pensions were commuted (in favor of bonds) and he lost the social privileges of wearing the two swords, waging vendettas, engaging in duels, or cutting down commoners for real or imagined insults. While the warriors were being transformed from a leisure class to a productive class, the commoners were granted new rights. They were allowed (and eventually ordered) to take family names for the first time, to travel on horseback on public highways, to manage their own farms, to intermarry with nobility, and to wear garb hitherto reserved for the warriors.

Upon this revamped sociological base, achieved by legal equalization of classes, the Meiji government erected a new, uniform, national military establishment, disbanding the clan armies of feudal retainers, taking over the castles, and substituting country-wide conscription. "First [we must] prepare against civil disturbances; later, prepare against foreign invasion." As the planners saw it, they would have to complement their "ancient military system with the excellence of the Western, in order to meet the national emergencies with a proper army and navy." 5

Takasugi, a close student of Western military science, could see, as early as the 1860's, that fire power was based on training in groups; the fighting prowess of the individual had become meaningless. Those who ought to excel in man-to-man combat, the samurai, had been spoiled and nullified by a tendency toward softness and elegance engendered by the long period of peace. Yet, argued Takasugi, "we find high esprit and strong physiqu
inst these moral principles, thus upholds proper moral the samurai to know the them."3

However, were aware of the Perry’s flotilla of Black Japanese police official reld not control these people. later, when Japanese hot-seki and Kagoshima dared of Western military techm, and their xenophobia he secular powers to the base known as Meiji Ishin—n. or Quasi-Revolution, de- of the nation-makers and Military Strength and Pros-

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strong physiques among merchants, farmers, and the lower samurai. If we were to select the best of them, provide them easy-to-use weapons and equipment, and give them group training, they would do well against foreign enemies.” To these considerations should be added the fact that a conscription system was seen by the hard-pressed government as far less expensive than that of a permanently subsidized armée de métier made up of former samurai.6

But when the French-tinged conscription law of 1873 was promul-
gated, opposition raged on several sides. Certainly obligatory national service would undermine or at least prove incompatible with the legacy of elitist Bushido. Many of the proud samurai had expected that national defense would rest on their shoulders, even under the new system. To these arrogant, self-interested warriors and to not a few government official: it seemed ridiculous, naive, and blasphemous to entrust vital military duties to “lowly clods” of dubious loyalty, bravery, and ability. As one Japanese said, “It was as if dogs and cats were to become the equal of humans.”7

The Imperial mandate had asserted boldly that an era of freedom was “now gradually dawning” for the people and that, since all classes belonged to the same Empire, “in their service to their country . . . there should be no difference between them.” Nevertheless, the long-despised commoners themselves were not ready or convinced. Some equated military service with penal servitude. Many shared the samurai’s doubts about their own capabilities, were awed by the new and unexpected responsibilities, and believed that their labor was indispensable in the paddy fields. But one of the matters which disturbed them even more was the portion of the mandate which referred to a “blood tax,” so-called among the Western peoples, [meaning] their living blood offered to their country.”8

Since there was still no system of popular representation and since the government did not bother to “sell” its program at the beginning, the first anti-military movement in modern Japanese history erupted. Draft riots broke out nation-wide, and there were some 15 peasant uprisings in the next four or five years. Draft dodging was rampant. Those who could afford it took advantage of a monetary provision for lifetime exemption from service. Others used the loopholes, such as study in professional schools at home or abroad, service as an official, or exemption as an eldest or only son or head of household. The less favored maimed themselves or made themselves ill. A favorite ploy among students was to develop a sham cardiac condition by imbibing bottles of soy sauce on the morning of the draft physical. Others tried to read themselves into myopia. Many more fled from home. By 1889, it is estimated, 35,600 men were running away per year, or about 10% of the draft-eligible males. Pamphlets appeared on the subject of draft evasion, and it is said that some individuals began to pray to gods who possessed the supposed capability of “saving” them from military service. Rumors that unmarried women would also be subject to the draft caused a large-scale rush into marriage.9

The authorities were determined to inculcate loyalty and discipline in the conscripts once they were in the army. When one elite artillery
battalion evinced "spiritual weakness" during the serious Takebashi mutiny of 1878, 53 soldiers were executed and 210 were jailed, flogged, caned, or banished. In part because "the movement for popular [rights] is spreading," the army in 1881 organized a military police force (kempei) to keep service thought under administrative surveillance. The power to enforce controls on criticism of the government and to combat "high-sounding ideas and empty theories" was transferred from the Education Ministry to the Ministry of Home Affairs, with a strong civil police force organized along paramilitary lines. These organs were buttressed by the issuance of Admonitions to the Armed Forces (1878) and of the famous Imperial Precepts of 1882. Based on these moral concepts, the army provided intensive "spiritual training." The effects of such indoctrination upon society were not lost on the military authorities: "The spiritual nature acquired in the army becomes a model for the civilian spirit. This is because it achieves elevation of the national prosperity and paves the way for firmness of character. We believe that any person in charge of training cultivates good soldiers; also he makes good citizens . . . model, representative citizens."  

In addition to the written precepts and training exercises, the authorities called upon the institution of the Crown. The Emperor Meiji was easily prevailed on to go out into the country, widely and often, for what we would call "P.R." purposes. Meiji was the first reigning monarch to travel personally from one end of the realm to the other. Starting in 1872, the tours numbered 88 by reign's end in 1912.  

At the same time, the government relaxed some of the more unattractive features of the conscription law. In 1882, the old exemption rules were abolished, and neither official duty nor monetary payments were accepted in lieu of service. Despite several changes, the basic draft laws of 1872-73, institutionalized by the constitution of 1889, remained the law of the land until the overhaul of 1927. The governors were directed to explain the "object and import" of conscription, but unhappiness lingered among draft eligibles and their families, especially among those lads who would have to interrupt an apprenticeship or leave an undermanned farm, or who were trying to pass the entrance exams for secondary school or the university. It is said that a certain college in the Tokyo area became a sanctuary for far more students than its capacity, if only the young men paid the tuition and enrolled as applicants in the prep school, preferably without attending any classes.  

Nevertheless, although some deplore the fact that a British-style volunteer system was never seriously considered for the army, Japanese scholars generally agree that the Meiji policy of conscription was a great success. "Our country would never have been able to accomplish the process of modernization so rapidly," wrote Professor Matsushita, "without the establishment of the draft system." Not the least of the benefits, from the point of view of the government, was the "partial solution to the problems of excess population and unemployment."  

Certain intentions of the Meiji planners were apparent in the stipulations of the old draft law. At first, conscription was restricted to the Tokyo area; in 1874, the draft was extended to Osaka and Nagoya. The smallness of the original army (about 32,000 men in a standing force of six garrisons (they, indeed?) of chivalry, clans of K) But while, from the point of view of the government, was the key to the leading figure of public opinion it was unhappily the soldiers who had resigned ministers for the performance of their and the second rank, the administration of the Prussians, the success over the Prussians, the (1900), and T

The New Militia

The burden of the poverty-stricken farm was on the shoulders of 400,000 who revisions for the success in the ability of middle-class general officers, the military academy in the process of modernization so rapidly," wrote Professor Matsushita, "without the establishment of the draft system." Not the least of the benefits, from the point of view of the government, was the "partial solution to the problems of excess population and unemployment."  

Certainly the leading figure of public opinion it was unhappily the soldiers who had resigned ministers for the performance of their and the second rank, the administration of the Prussians, the success over the Prussians, the (1900), and T
the serious Takebashi of six garrisons (by 1876) would prevent most of the samurai (who but they, indeed?) from enrolling for life, while the great military but parochial clans of Kyushu, western Honshu, and Shikoku would be shut out. But while, from the outset, it was asserted that the officer corps was open to all men of ability, this was long as much a principle as a practice. Certainly ex-samurai, with their tradition of learning, were not excluded from officering the new army. Clansmen from Choshu and Satsuma (the most important ancient provinces) and from Tosa and Hizen (next in importance) staffed the highest military positions, rather carefully balanced in the early days. Nor should it be forgotten that Yamagata Aritomo was the key personage in the Meiji military, while Ito Hirobumi was the leading figure in the civil government. Both came from Choshu, and it was unthinkable that, whatever their differences in opinion, they would allow the army to break away from its cooperation with the government. "This is probably one of the reasons," asserts Fukushima, "why no consideration was given to 'civil-military' relations" at the government level. We know that, during a cabinet crisis in 1891, when Ito (who was not disinterested) was asked about finding successors for the service ministers who had resigned, he refused, thus preventing the possibility of civilian ministers for the armed forces.14

In any case, whatever doubts had remained concerning the capability of the peasant conscripts were extinguished by their battlefield performance and especially their use of fire power against two major rebellions by disgruntled, aggrieved, and ultimately discredited samurai remnants in 1874 and 1877. Still, it took all of the Meiji government's military strength; 18,000 of 60,000 loyal troops fell in suppressing the Satsuma revolt in 1877, although the rebel Saigo was always outnumbered. Building on the military advice provided by the French and later the Prussians, the reorganized national army proceeded to win enormous successes over foreign foes: Imperial China (1894–95), the Boxers (1900), and Tsarist Russia (1904–05). All of these remarkable victories occurred only 40 to 50 years after Perry landed in Kanagawa.

**The New Military and the Soldiery**

The burden of conscription was borne, in practice, mainly by impoverished farmers and the urban poor—10,000 men of the 300,000 or 400,000 who reached draft age each year. As Takata has said, the provisions for deferment and exemption became almost empty words, so far as the destitute were concerned. But the Meiji leadership insisted that success in the army, as in other national pursuits, would depend solely on ability and effort, regardless of social origin. Thus the offspring of middle-class farmers might rise to become high school principals or general officers, by means of government-subsidized normal schools or military academies.15

In addition to these socializing factors, military duty was expected to improve character, provide knowledge necessary for the livelihood of illiterates, cultivate physical strength through "wholesome training," and contribute indirectly to the prevention of disease. The more sanguine spoke of transforming weaklings into strong men, and idlers into good
workers. To the founders of conscription, military service was regarded as “an integral part of the national educational process”; “... in the end all will become soldiers and no one will be without education. In due course, the nation will become a great civil and military university...” To the citizenry, induction into the armed forces marked a boy’s coming of age, while honorable discharge meant achievement of full adulthood.16

There can be no doubt that military service exerted remarkable effects on the Japanese recruit, especially the peasant introduced suddenly to the urbanized garrison town. The first national soldiers were dressed in narrow-sleeve kimonos and loose trousers, wore the topknot, and carried swords in their sashes. By the late 1870’s and 1880’s, Western-style uniforms were introduced. Some of the early recruits regarded the barracks stoves as gods of fire, and bowed to them each morning. Others thought the electric lights were ignited by kerosene. A goodly number from rural areas were bewildered by such Western accoutrements as army cots, chairs, desks, toothbrushes, forks, and knives.

Soldiers consumed 50% more rice (mixed with barley) than civilians, and this must have enhanced the country’s emphasis on rice as the staple food. By 1907, the army was eating about 18 times as much meat as did the civil population. A poll of recruits conducted in 1892 disclosed that 70% called army food better than what they were accustomed to at home. In 1909, at a hospital for disabled soldiers, the weekly menu consisted of eggs (8 times), beef (3 times), pork and pork cutlets (once each), and fish (8 times), in addition to liberal helpings of rice and vegetables. Many farm boys called their rations “treats,” “worthy of a banquet.” During the Sino-Japanese War, meat was canned for the army and the navy, which were the main consumers. Hokkaido whale meat was also canned, with the added inducement that it was reputedly good in combating lung troubles. The huge needs of the Russo-Japanese War stimulated the development of the canning industry, which was by now processing fruit, vegetables, milk, and seafood, salmon and trout being the most popular fish fare.17

For better or for worse, most Japanese youth learned to smoke and drink in the army. Of a recruit sample polled in 1892, 8% smoked and 12% drank when they entered service; but, from the same group, 90% drank and 80% smoked when they left the army. Cigarette smoking spread throughout Japan, mainly because of the influence of the military. Soldiers also stimulated a taste for beer, although the majority of the populace had found the drink to be bitter. German technicians were hired to improve the brew. A local breakthrough was achieved during the army maneuvers of 1892 at Utsunomiya, when a brewery from Yokohama “rushed to the spot with its wears [sic],” in the words of a chronicler, “and reputedly made a killing.”18

Many of the recruits learned to read and write in the army. Although the soldiery were allegedly affected adversely by the “unwholesome” and “extravagant” life in the cities, a few somehow managed to save money in postal accounts. This, despite the fact that in 1899 even a noncom’s monthly salary was only ¥1.80, from which he had to pay for towels, socks, toothpaste, and soap. Still, it was probably the first monthly pay-
ment the men had received in their lives. In appraising the early impact of the Meiji military upon society, it may be straining matters in a quest for significance to speculate, as one Japanese historian has done, that "the walking habits of soldiers very likely caused many ordinary people to walk in a more orderly fashion." But Professor Shibusawa is quite right in concluding that, "For a great number of men, army duty offered their first chance of approaching the new culture, visiting the cities, and becoming a part of the enlightenment movement."

Military requirements underlay the development of clothing industries to furnish uniforms, underwear, socks, boots, shoes, belts, and caps. For example, knit socks had to be imported in huge numbers and at great expense until Japanese makers could produce them. Eventually, Japanese cotton spinners ousted Indian cotton yarn from external Asian markets as well, and the Japanese spinning industry became the most prosperous in the world. It has, in fact, been said of modern Japan that, without exaggeration, "all factory industry was built with a military significance."

As Professor Fujii asserts, "The fact that the government itself implanted, promoted, and managed modern manufacturing and mining industries was a very outstanding feature of industrial development, which has an important significance in the history of the building of Japan's modern industry and economy." In a very real sense, a Military-Industrial Complex was created in Japan, centering on government dealings with favored political merchants evolving into industrial capitalists (the Zaibatsu combines), all within the context of military and naval preferences, desires, and objectives.

Societal Effects of the Russo-Japanese War

Standard accounts of the Russo-Japanese War stress the economic and political effects on Japan of the acquisition of overseas territories. While these influences cannot be denied, study of Japanese sources reveals internal ramifications profoundly affecting Japanese society.

The first point to be made is that the tightened military conscription law had wiped out the traditional safeguards of the family system. Then came the all-out demands of the war of 1904-05, which devoured ¥1.73 billion (8.5 times greater than the cost of the Sino-Japanese War) and 115,000 casualties. Patriotic duty was understandable, in defense of the principle of Chu (Imperial loyalty); but something had to yield in case of conflict between allegiances. It was Ko (filial piety) which had to be sacrificed. Thus was created a deep, never-healed scar in Japanese society. Some Japanese scholars believe that interest in the country was shaken by individualistic thinking which stemmed from this period.

Inside the army there had been many unpleasant developments. Impersonal military service was marked by iron discipline and cruel physical punishments for the smallest infractions, especially on the part of new soldiers and "misfits" such as physically and psychologically weak intellectuals. Critics spoke of the "mechanical, isolated life of the army," which stifled originality, ruined initiative, and was characterized by unreality and nonsense. Although, naturally, most of this talk was voiced sub rosa and the resistance was passive, in the Taisho period...
entering recruit had to sign and stamp an oath of absolute and unquestioning obedience to superior orders. The few who attempted to refuse were always “convinced.” Sakai speaks of noncoms who were “absolute tyrants” and “sadistic brutes” who “made human cattle of every one of us.”

One version of “protest” was suicide. According to the Niroku newspaper in 1910, the reported military suicides per year had increased from 75 in 1900 to 92 in 1907. The number of army suicides had now reached 10% of deaths from illness; the cause was usually given as “mental derangement.” The Japanese army, in fact, was second only to the Austro-Hungarian army in the number of suicides by the end of the Meiji period. Short of suicide, self-mutilation was not rare, a favorite target for so-called accidents being the soldier's right thumb.

Another “escape” from the rigors of duty in the army after the Russo-Japanese War was by desertion. According to one newspaper in Aomori, figures for the Hirosaki Division in 1905 revealed that 1,521 soldiers had fled in the homeland, and 170 overseas. Not only were individual desertions on the rise, but there were also cases of mass flights. In March 1908, 32 men of the 1st Division, resenting “excessively hard training” by an acting company commander, brazenly marched out the barracks gate, saluted by unsuspecting sentries. The government, not entirely incorrectly, saw the hand of socialists behind the waves of antimilitarism and draft dodging. But there is no doubt that the worst antagonisms developed after the Russo-Japanese War, between the civilian populace and the “returning G.I.’s” (heitai gaeri). Rough and brutalized, many of these veterans were disliked and feared by the townsfolk and villagers as “disturbers of the peace.” Alarmed by the deepening chasm in society, a number of army leaders, particularly General Tanaka Gi'ichi (then of the 1st Division), tried to foster a “homelike atmosphere” in the barracks. “True military discipline cannot be sustained,” argued Tanaka, “unless the surroundings are warm and fraternal.” He likened company commanders to fathers, NCO's to mothers, and drill instructors to older brothers. Certainly this must have been the most enlightened period in the history of the modern Japanese army.

Further on the positive side, it is apparent that the outlook of the soldier was broadening, as he started to read magazines and books, including controversial items, and to record ideas of his own. According to Toyama Sho'ichi, the soldiers were becoming vigorous supporters of the popular rights movement and of individualism. Shibusawa suggests that “the severity of army life probably made [the men’s] reaction to control by authorities that much the stronger,” and that many “ceased to take such interest in digging potatoes back on the farm.”

The army could bind [the troops] up in a strict inflexible organization, but it could not remove them wholly from Japanese society. It is certain that the army and the veterans’ organizations, which expanded tremendously after the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, played a large part in the modernization of national life.

Generation of Military

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1. An Imperial
2. Imperial period
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Generation of Military Loyalism

Janowitz has observed that the military establishment not only reflects the large society but is also "an institution with its distinctive environment and ethos." That the Emperor Meiji was supposedly "martial-minded" has been called "in no small degree responsible" for the outstanding development of the Japanese armed forces during the formative period. The rapport between Throne and services contributed greatly to the strengthening of the Imperial system of government, as did the insulation of the army from activist ideologies. A number of devices were contrived whereby the government and the high command could bind the military to the patriarchal monarch, as "His army":

1. An Imperial Guard (later division-size) was organized.
2. Imperial princes were to serve in the armed forces.
3. Membership in the Imperial Family was made prerequisite to high appointments, such as Chief of General Staff (1886).
4. Through economies in the Imperial Household, special Imperial grants were made to the armed forces, even to the extent of assisting the navy with warship construction when the Diet would not allocate the desired funds to the navy (1887, 1893).
5. The basic Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors was issued in 1882, interpreted to mean that the military were Imperial favorites. Thus:

... although We may entrust subordinate commands to Our subjects, yet the ultimate authority We Ourself shall hold and never delegate... Soldiers and Sailors, We are your supreme Commander-in-Chief. Our relations with you will be most intimate by the deepening chasm between the waves of anti-military and patriotic sentiments. Rough and brutalized, deafened by the townsfolk and officials, yet by the deepening chasm General Tanaka Gi'ichi interpreted "homelike atmosphere" in the sense that the worst must be sustained," argued He likened the Emperor to one of his own. According to vigorous supporters of militaryism. Shibusawa suggests that the reaction of the men's reaction to the farm."

6. The Emperor, as Generalissimo, was by law the locus of the Supreme Command Prerogative, placing him personally at the apex of the chain of command, parallel to but outside of the civilian hierarchy. According to the Meiji Constitution, the "sacred and inviolable" Emperor determined the organization and peacetime standing of the armed forces, and possessed sole power to declare war, make peace, and consummate treaties.
7. The armed forces were especially pleased by the fact that the Emperor reviewed the troops, attended all field maneuvers (in the worst of weather), often visited military schools and installations, and awarded prizes to honor graduates.
8. Meiji exhorted the peerage to volunteer for military or naval duty. Generals were appointed to the presidency of the Peers School.
9. Yamagata instituted the system whereby Imperial operational orders were not countersigned as were civil cabinet orders. Therefore military orders from the Palace were regarded as absolute and personal instructions from the sovereign in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.
10. The Emperor Meiji penned many excellent poems (waka) reflecting his concern for the troops.
There is another side to the coin. All of this inculcation of the mystical piety that the armed forces were a private army of the Crown, entailing blind, religious obedience to the Son of Heaven was an extremely important tool in the hands of military leaders who regarded themselves as outside the control of party organs. Fukushima aptly suggests that "it was a case of a monarchy which could not fit into the system of constitutional government, and armed forces which could not modernize themselves, existing in a relation of mutual dependence."27

Meanwhile, with the painful clash of interests between "family egoism" and Imperial fealty engendered by the Russo-Japanese War, the government and high command sought to demonstrate that no contradiction existed in society. Semantic ingenuity was employed to show that the nation was but an extension of the hearth; Chu and Ko were inseparable and concentric: "Precious are my parents that gave me birth/So that I might serve His Majesty." The new textbook on Ethics emphasized the Imperial Rescript on Education more than ever. It was hoped to siphon off individual dissatisfaction through executive opportunities, and to emphasize Japan's unique nationality (kokutai), "which excels that of all nations in the world." Nevertheless, as Professor Maruyama shows in a brilliant analysis, "National consciousness did not result from the conquest of traditional social consciousness, but was implanted by a systematic mobilization of traditional values. Consequently, Japan did not produce citoyens able to bear the burden of political responsibility in a modern nation-state."28

Since the succeeding Taisho and Showa emperors lacked the charisma and power of Meiji, the Japanese army now began to exploit rather than work with the Imperial institution. What was useful to the armed forces was retained and expanded; what was restrictive was ignored or discarded.29

... the Senior Retainers and Japan's other "liberal" leaders [writes Maruyama] were afraid that the Emperor or they themselves would be saddled with political responsibility and accordingly they did their best to remove the absolute aspect from the monarchy; on the other hand, the military and the rightists, wishing to "protect" the prestige of the Emperor and thus to have things their own way, brandished the theory of divine right. In consequence the Emperor not only lost his charisma as an absolute monarch but was steadily divested of the role of constitutional monarch who is close to the people.

In particular, the Supreme Command Prerogative proved to be one of the strongest forces exploding military interests away from the civilian government embodied in the cabinet system. This peculiar but complete autonomy of authority, Colonel Hayashi believes, came to underlie "the predominance of national defense in the country's politics." "Thus did the military gain an overweening ascendancy and a springboard for their own developing political interests." The larger tragedy was that, while the army was striving to subordinate or dominate the Showa Emperor (as they never could have done with Meiji), the ruling monarch came to distrust the army but could not control it. "Just whose army do they [the issuimos?] snort in 1938."30

**Toward the "Liberal"**

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Evidence of civilian opposition to the military accumulated after the Russo-Japanese War. The National Association of Chambers of Commerce, for one, criticized the scale of military budgets and termed the armed forces a nonproductive element in society. In the Diet interpellations of December 1911, a Representative pried the government with 17 detailed and critical questions ranging from the need for military secrets to the strategic plans of the armed forces. Three months later, he received some answers, some generalizations, and five pleas of "regrettable" secrecy. The navy also attracted criticism for indulging in the very expensive dreadnaught building race. Such feelings came to a head during Saionji's second cabinet (1911-12), when retrenchment was attempted in every area—a policy which collided with the army's demand for two new divisions to garrison recently annexed Korea. When the cabinet turned down the army's plan, elder statesmen Yamagata helped to bring about the fall of the government. Drawing on the armed forces' unique right of direct appeal to the Throne, the war minister reported to the Emperor Taisho that national defense was at stake and that, under the circumstances, he must resign. Neither Yamagata nor the army would encourage a general to replace the resignee. Hence the cabinet had to resign en bloc. Some fumed that the army was out on strike. "From newspapers and public platforms came cries against the concept of government which . . . allowed a service minister to topple a Cabinet in which he was a minority of one."

Among the reforms of the next (Yamamoto) cabinet of 1913-14, achieved against strong opposition, was the civilianization of the governors-general of Korea and Taiwan, and the cancellation of the requirement that the army and navy ministers must come exclusively from the active duty lists. In practice, no war minister was chosen from among the reserve or retired generals, yet at least the services could not (until 1936, when the active duty requirement was restored at army behest) ruin a cabinet by refusing to provide a service minister. But Yamamoto's cabinet was plagued by cases of contractors' corruption and by popular opposition to clan ties and to the fact that, despite the vaunted retrenchments, the navy alone was getting 30% of the national budget. A battalion of regular infantry had to be called out in February 1914 to help sabre-wielding policemen put down mobs estimated in the tens of thousands demonstrating in downtown Tokyo. Yamamoto fell a month later.

Domestic civil-military problems were swept under the rug in World War I, and the long-standing army and navy expansion plans came to fruition rather easily. The platonic military operations against Germany in the Far East were swift and inexpensive. Economic effects, however, were appreciable, the huge demands in this case deriving from the Allied Powers' needs and not mainly from the Japanese armed forces. The
foremost "golden profiteers" (narikin-nouveaux riches) were to be found in mining, shipbuilding, and shipping, as well as trade.33

Questions of Consensus

In general, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars received enthusiastic and patriotic support in Japan. Even today, on the Ginza in Tokyo, one can buy records or sheet music which date back to 1895 and 1905. Still, some audacious literature had appeared even during the halcyon days of General Nogi and Admiral Togo. Yosano Akiko's sensational verse, "Please Do Not Die" [Kimi shinitamookotonakare], scandalized portions of the general public and earned a ban by the military. "Ah, my young brother, I cry for you. Please, do not die," wrote Miss Yosano. "Did your parents teach you to kill men with a sword?... Whether Port Arthur will fall or not, is a matter of no importance to you... [Mother's] gray hair is getting grayer, though they say all is well with the Imperial reign..." And Shiratori Seigo wrote that "... neither a medal nor a citation can truly reward the men who braved the shower of bullets, who shed their own blood for justice," while "stupendous bloodsuckers [the landlords]... took cover with impunity behind their whitewashed walls..." Concluded Shiratori: "I hear the faint battle-cry in the wind blowing across the green rice-field. I can hear the murmur of grievance against their unreasonable society." And, only a few days after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, a short-lived socialist weekly appealed to troops going to the front "to refrain from acts of violence."34

There is no evidence that World War I was popular in Japan. One novelist, Mushanokoji, wrote that, "This time, the war had begun before the government could work up the people." The populace remained cool, argued Mushanokoji, because they resented the authorities and the profiteers who made fortunes in a war caused not by demands of honor but by egoism and a materialistic society. Another famous novelist, Shiga, decried the "anachronistic" concepts of Nation and of Loyalty. Nogi's classic suicide on the death of his "master," the Emperor Meiji, caused Shiga to say: "... I felt, 'What an ass!'—the same thing I'd feel when a maidservant did something foolish."35

If World War I was not popular in Japan, the Siberian Expedition was even less so. Inflation and serious increases in the price of grain were afflicting the common people, and rice riots erupted spontaneously throughout the country in 1918. We can guess at the scale of the movement from the fact that more than 25,000 people were arrested. While their countrymen were thus distracted by what we would call gut issues, the Japanese expeditionary force was off on the anti-communist crusade in Siberia. On the first celebration of May Day, held in Tokyo in 1920, 4,000 laborers added to their economic demands, the call to "Get Out of Siberia!" Criticism of the intervention from domestic and foreign quarters only accelerated the troops' own doubts. The high command adopted the unusual practice of rotating the expeditionary divisions several times to prevent further deterioration of discipline. Ten divisions and 240,000 men eventually saw service during the four years in Siberia.

By the time the latest over 5,700 men...
were to be found in trade.\textsuperscript{33}

By the time the last Japanese troops were pulled out in 1922, they had lost over 5,700 men, and the exchequer was ¥1 billion poorer.\textsuperscript{36}

This is a period, however brief, marked by the influx and spread, through society and military to a certain degree, of ideas stimulated by the War to End All Wars: socialism, communism, unionism, religious idealism, democracy, pacifism/anti-militarism. According to Kempei Headquarters records, the following numbers of "subversive" and "anti-military" cases of all kinds \textsuperscript{[hanguk sakudo]} were investigated by the military police: 1920-118; 1921-162; 1922-159; 1923-207; 1924-73 (after the repressive measures taken during the Great Earthquake, I might note); 1925-241; 1926-150; 1927-238; 1928-1,294. Ohtani, a kempei colonel, insists that the army endeavored to "bend with the wind," through such measures as allowing the submission of formal recommendations and grievances to superiors. Even in the always strict military academy, a brass band and baseball and tennis teams were formed; a canteen was opened, where one might smoke; passes were made more available; and one might even wear kimono off-duty. In the mid-1920's, lectures on social thought were given at the military academy, while the officer education program included instruction in the theories of socialism, anarchism, and communism.\textsuperscript{37}

But, during the era of peace and disarmament which followed the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the League of Nations, as well as the elimination of the Russian "menace," the Japanese armed forces, like those of other powers, tended to shrivel up. It was a time of economic recession and narrowing foreign markets. The budget of the armed forces became the likeliest candidate for paring. During 1921, the year of the Washington Conference, even pro-navy papers began agitating for a cutback. The example of naval disarmament naturally affected the army. In parliament, hostile Dietmen disconcerted the war ministry by pointing out that the number of full generals had doubled from 15 to 29 since the supposed peak years of the Russo-Japanese War, through abuse of the right of direct access to the Throne. In a famous two-hour speech, Ozaki Yukio asked the Diet why arrows were needed when there were no targets. In peacetime, healthy men were more necessary than healthy soldiers.\textsuperscript{38}

Under Premier Kato Tomosaburo (1922–23), 7,500 navy personnel and 14,000 workers were discharged, while the army lost about 2,000 officers and over 56,000 soldiers to the austerity campaign. That the cutback did not go farther derived in part from the rather unexpected opposition of the people who lived in the regimental towns, and from the counterattacks generated by Rightist elements. But although the equivalent of five army divisions had been eliminated, the public—and the political parties—noticed that the 21 divisions were still on the books, and the period of military service had been reduced only by 40 days. In 1925, War Minister Ugaki bravely wielded a heavier axe, disbanding four divisions and eliminating 34,000 men. The ¥60 million saved was to be applied to the mechanization and modernization of the army.\textsuperscript{39}

Inevitably, public disinterest in or hostility to a so-called useless army mounted. In the cities, military men dreaded wearing the uniform on the streets. Officers who lived outside the barracks put on kimono,
formal garb (*hakama*), or a business suit when they were in public, in rural areas, regiment and brigade commanders who were invited to official local functions attended in morning dress. Even the troops were not immune from laborers’ jeering as “tax robbers.” Many a platoon leader, marching with his men in summer heat along the streetcar tracks in the heart of a great city, was called, “You son-of-a-bitch!” by tram conductors. Veterans of the period recall the era of the Takahashi cabinet (1921–22) as a special “time of crucifixion” for the Japanese army. One of my interviewees, a field-grade officer, vividly recalled some words he had read as a cadet: “God and the soldier we adore/In times of College of Commerce, a scenario involving fascists’ manipulation of laborers at the port of Otaru—shades of the still-unconquered spread throughout Japan.

To make the best of an unhappy situation, the army tried to set up an “R.O.T.C.” program at Waseda University, in early 1923, by loaning officers, surplus weapons, and horses to the equestrian club at that campus. If the idea worked, it might be expanded to all universities. But when the vice minister of war (Shirakawa) and the faculty adviser (Professor Aoyanagi) rose to address the opening ceremonies, students hooted at them and placards went up, saying “Don’t sell out Waseda to the militarists!” A week later, when students pressed forward with the anti-R.O.T.C. campaign, *judo* and *sumo* team members joined with Rightists to seize the stage by force. The police agreed that the anti-R.O.T.C. group was communist-inspired, and it was recommended that four Waseda professors be fired. But, for the time being, the R.O.T.C. idea collapsed.

So far as the Japanese army was concerned, the Great Earthquake of September 1923 brought certain psychological benefits vis-à-vis the populace. At the peak of the catastrophe, when the terrified citizenry even feared an invasion by Koreans, the Tokyo garrison command declared martial law and rushed out cavalrymen to spread word that two Japanese infantry divisions were moving into the capital by nightfall. Civilian spirits soared as army horsemen galloped by and files of infantrymen marched through the gutted streets. Similar scenes took place in Yokohama, where the destruction—and the fears—were even worse. General Kawabe remembers the “overnight” reversal in public opinion: the detested uniform now attracted appreciative greetings and kindly acts.

The R.O.T.C. issue came to the fore again when Ugaki was stressing quality over quantity, after his retrenchment went into effect. For students who did not go to high school, youth training institutes, with a strong military curriculum, were established in 1926; while, at the high school and college level, active-duty officers (who would otherwise have been victims of Reduction in Force) were assigned from 1925 to conduct military training programs. Concerned over the spread of Marxist thought and anxious to restore obedience and discipline, the Education Ministry concurred fully. As they had at the time of the R.O.T.C. trial balloon affair at Waseda University, military professors. By carrot and the stick of the term of obligatory the R.O.T.C. program which had spearheaded.

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affair at Waseda University, the students resisted, supported by anti-
military professors. But the army and the Education Ministry used the carrot and the stick to undercut the opposition this time: They reduced the term of obligatory active service to ten months for those who passed the R.O.T.C. programs, while they suppressed the social science league which had spearheaded the resistance.

One cannot leave this subject, with its interesting parallels today, without mentioning the case of a Japanese R.O.T.C. instructor, a Major Suzuki, who created an uproar in 1927 at his campus, the Otaru Higher College of Commerce. For his unit’s field problem that year, he wrote a scenario involving a major earthquake in Hokkaido followed by anarchists’ manipulation of lawless Koreans to destroy the cities of Sapporo and Otaru—shades of the White Terror of 1923. Three thousand Korean laborers at the port of Otaru rose in protest, joined by Japanese labor unions and study groups. Although hapless Major Suzuki apologized, no satisfaction was forthcoming from the Education Ministry. Fanned by the still-unconquered press, anti-R.O.T.C. and anti-military sentiment spread throughout Japan.43

Military Fascism from the 1930’s

The Suzuki/R.O.T.C. case, made up of various conflicting elements, comes at a watershed in history: the end of the so-called Liberal Decade of the 1920’s, the approach of the Dark Valley of the 1930’s when Japan became a “government by assassination.” As the new decade dawned, some observers professed to see, “in the close-knit fabric of Japanese society and the efficiency and honesty of the bureaucracy, taken together with the strength of the cult of devotion to the emperor and the progress of literacy,” possible safeguards against the dangers of extremism, at least from the Left, in a country of “unrevolutionary his-
tory.” It was said that “no people were more keenly sensitive than the Japanese to the attitude of other nations toward their institutions, or more desirous of a respected place in the van of progress. No other

country possessed more alert newspapers, a wider reading public, more conscientious and able judges, or more penetrating and enlightened juristic minds in the ranks of scholarship. Japan might yet make her contribution to the annals of true constitutional government.” Many of the preceding points are entirely valid; but there is one glaring omission from the precis: the role of the Japanese army and the growth of military fascism in the 1930’s, which disabused the fondest of hopes.

To all intents, World War II began for Japan in 1931 at Mukden. To the officers of the Japanese army, and most particularly of the Kwantung Army, the situation in Manchuria had grown unbearable. The rights and privileges paid for by the blood of fathers and brothers during the Russo-Japanese War were in the process of being squandered. Patriotism and idealism cried for Japan’s destiny in Manchuria to be taken away from the hands of “weak-kneed, opportunistic” diplomats and poli-
ticians. Looking back on the 1920’s, the army saw all of its misfortunes deriving from these old enemies—and the resentments were cumulative. Arbitrarily and unilaterally fomenting a crisis in Manchuria, the Kwan-
General Kawabe provides a corrective to the oft-heard statement that the army's actions were universally abhorred in the homeland. With news of success in the field and a "solution" by force, there arose a tendency to cheer on "our mighty struggle against the restrictions imposed on us by foreign countries" and the League of Nations. Significantly, disgruntled politicians began to seek a rapprochement with the military. Staff officers were now accorded the highest of esteem, and were encouraged directly and indirectly. "Even as humble a person as I experienced such things on a number of occasions," mused Kawabe, "and I felt a kind of displeasure about such a trend in society. . . ."

Few other army officers were similarly displeased. The next decade was characterized by the following elements:

- Discrediting of the political parties; degrading of academic freedom; military interference in politics.
- Monomaniac concentration on Country and Race—byproducts of the spiritual training.
- Dual government—the civil regime and the military camp. As Konoye later put it, "... the affairs of state were completely in the hands of the Supreme Command. And so was the life of the entire nation and diplomacy."

Fuzzy talk of National Reconstruction, especially after economic depression and deflation threw the populace into dire straits. Unemployment had soared, small and medium enterprises collapsed. Hardest hit were the agrarian communities, where the "bottom fell out" from the price of agricultural products, silk, and fruit. Among the military, the ones who were driven almost to distraction by the heart-rending problems of the farm and urban youth were the junior officers, who dealt most directly with the conscripts.

Among these junior and mid-range officers [chukun shoko] blossomed a tendency toward insubordination—domination of seniors by inferiors, the rule of the higher by the lower [gekokujo], a complex and baneful phenomenon. By the mid-1930's says Maj.-Gen. Sato Kenryo, the army had modified the training program to a basis of "self-awareness." "This had had something in common with democracy, but the 'indigestion' experienced during the period of excess caused the later 'cramps' of insubordination." Now the fait accompli came to be extolled. Once, during a War Ministry dispute over the matter of occupying French Indo-China, a staff officer remarked: "There's a stiff penalty for outright robbery. Let's see if we can't manage it by fraud this time."

In the era of the new war against China from 1937, the scene in Japan was marked by crippling intra-service and inter-service factionalism; a general lack of coordination between the civil and military branches of government; parliamentary irresponsibility and domestic discord. We can say that the impact of the military upon society between 1937 and 1945 is all-encompassing, for it was, after all, a period of Holy War. But the matter, as I have attempted to demonstrate, goes far deeper than the loss of that war by Japan; while one army can be defeated and still be loved by the people (as in France after 1871), another defeat in Japan, partly long antedated the problem as establishment, v changed to Ko-Kosun charges in law: the Mi Nation to regu asks Tanaka.

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prospective a corrective to the in Japan, partly because of the cleavage between army and society that long antedated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. General Tanaka Ryukichi sees
the problem as the deterioration in the concept of the national military establishment, whose name itself—Kokugin or National Army—had been changed to Kogun or Imperial Army, by “misguided” General Araki. Kogun, charges Tanaka, is a sheerly literary designation without basis in law: the Meiji Constitution clearly employed the term Kokumin or Nation to regulate the military establishment. Why change to Kogun?

The redesignation had a serious effect on sensitive young officers, who now felt that they were serving the Emperor directly and were thus only responsible to the Throne. This fostered the military’s tendency to be insulting toward non-military people, and the evil habit of feeling superior to the common man. It is undeniable that the military and their employees, as a particularly “privileged” class, looked down on people, from the middle of the China Incident throughout World War II. Such attitudes elicited the antipathy of the populace.

Major Horie, a military historian, concurs. The unlimited power of the armed forces, he feels, tended to make the officers “self-willed, overbearing, and obstinate.”

They held civilians in disdain. Merchant suppliers of the services practiced flattery on officers of both the Army and Navy, which made some [of the officers] all the more arrogant and overbearing. Average citizens not in intimate touch with officers of the services gave outward respect . . . but at heart disliked them.

As the Pacific War proceeded to its climacteric, the results of troop dilution and general deterioration were being felt throughout the country at large. There were many who grumbled that the army seemed to be perpetrating atrocities in the “occupation zone” of the homeland itself. Others remarked that the military had degenerated into riffraff wearing the respected Imperial uniform. The constantly exhorted national unity between civilian and soldier was proving to be divisive in practice, even in the final crisis. “The worsened military circumstances, coupled with intensified air raids, lack of food, etc.,” Colonel Hayashi admits, “increased the nation’s distrust of the armed forces and gradually gave rise to country-wide war weariness . . . . The army chieftains were sorely distressed in coping with such an atmosphere.”

The president of the privy council admitted at an Imperial conference that public morale had been lowered and that public willingness to glorify the best traditions of the ancestors might suffer “under certain circumstances.” Of equal significance, at a meeting of all deputy chiefs of staff of the armies in the homeland (July 25, 1945), an army general staff planner stated frankly that the intelligentsia were “anti-war, anti-military, and anti-government.”

These were some of the internal conditions which form a backdrop to the Showa Emperor’s brave decision to close out the catastrophic period by recording the rescript of capitulation, effective August 15, 1945.
By Way of Conclusion

When the 19th Century Japanese leaders instituted the Meiji reforms, they rigorously pursued their two-pronged objectives of Prosperity and Military Power. The role played by the Japanese military is stunning: In only 77 years, between the arrival of Perry and the signing of the capitulation instrument in World War II, Japan had engaged in four major wars and many smaller clashes. For about one-third of the period, her military forces fought to maintain internal order, to protect the Court, to carve out an overseas empire, to defend spheres of influence, and to defend the homeland against invasion. After eradicating the specter of internal instability (“maintaining the social order,” General Kono put it), Japan based her military claim to great power status on climactic triumphs over major foes at the turn of the century, which guaranteed that the country would not suffer the fate of India or China. But, living with a constant sense of real or supposed crisis, “Japan’s character as a military state,” writes Professor Fukushima, “gradually became an end in itself, and its defensive character at length transformed itself into something of an aggressive character.”

The instrument for these policies was the new national army of conscripts, forged since the 1870’s on an underpinning of professional military education, a literate populace, and a strong economic foundation “nurtured in a virtual state incubator.” While Western practices and concepts were important,

... there is, of course [suggests Janowitz], no guarantee that democratization of social origins (the broadening of the bases of recruitment) produces democratization of professional attitudes and a strengthening of the willingness to submit to civilian controls. ... Of significance are the process and content of professional socialization, and the nature of the sociopolitical institutions for administering and controlling the military establishment and the organizational tasks of the military.

To develop the typology of civil-military relations sometimes called authoritarian-personal, the Meiji leadership sought social unity, through “loyal subordination of all classes to the Emperor ... by a process of transference.” Under the Emperor Meiji, the eliteness of the army in the body politic was established firmly. Careful studies have shown that, between 1885 and 1945, approximately 28% of all the civilian cabinet posts were headed by military men; and that, of 30 different prime ministers, exactly half were generals or admirals. As Lockwood says, the military, “always on the side of autocracy, bred division in politics and dyarchy in administration.”

In its formative years, the development of the army structure was fostered along highly professional lines. Contributory factors included the establishment of a substantial system of military education, the evolution of a sense of mission which “defined the purpose and justified the existence” of both services.

Military and naval budgets in the early days consumed 1/4 or 1/8 of the national budget (and reached 3/4 by 1938). But in the process
Western technology and organization were imported and diffused, together with "motives for modernization and a new ladder of social mobility." Japanese scholars agree that the transformation of industry from small handicraft-like enterprises to giant factories, the Industrial Revolution of the West, took place from around the time of Japan's first foreign war in modern times—the conflict against China, and then the Russo-Japanese War. This would be Japan's "take-off" stage, to borrow the Rostow metaphor describing stages of economic growth. As in the decades that followed, it was a period usually characterized by inflation, high taxation, labor shortages, urbanization, weakening of agriculture, and grievous national debt. Military influences were pervasive in a society almost always in a state of national emergency.

Professor Ropp has shown the importance of civic education aspects of conscription, while Professor Janowitz stresses that such an emphasis must be supported by some sort of national consensus. In Japan, manifestations of civilian discontent with the military establishment appear at the time of the enactment of the conscription law of the 1870's. They are partly veiled during the periods of victorious, all-out overseas wars, 1894-1905; reappear after the limited-for Japan—first World War and the Siberian Expedition; are suppressed during the period of aborted democracy and national crisis decreed after the Manchurian Incident; re-emerge in known but largely impotent fashion toward the end of the Pacific War, when the Imperial forces are finally discredited but the royal house is retained as a "security blanket." Overt expression of conscientious objection, of course, had to await the postwar period.

Meanwhile, the army itself, "double patriots" claiming to be the secular and sacred Champions of Throne and society, and untrammeled by Diet control or surveillance, had become involved increasingly in domestic political affairs (the so-called "Showa Restoration") and in arbitrary external adventures, despite superficial adherence to the 19th Century constitution. The disciplined, chivalrous, apolitical military forces of the Meiji period were not mirrored in the army that marched to national catastrophe, preceded by celebrated cases of insubordination, plots and intrigues, accomplished facts, economic imperialism and political assassination. General Matsui called the last military generation, "cut-throats and highwaymen" (Sugamo prison, 1948).

From the Restoration of Meiji, through Taisho demokurashii, and on to the "100,000,000 hearts beating as one" of Showa, threads run constant: the direct or indirect, positive or negative impact on society of a military espousing the non-negotiable quasi-religious dictum of "for the sake of the country"; and the irreconcilability of the tensions between the military bureaucracy and representative government. Several points deserve final emphasis in considering the impact of the Japanese army on society:

The importance of the conscript army as a school for modernization.

"The deliberate manipulation of inaninate and of social energies" as the master theme (to quote from Professor McNeill's The Rise of the West).
The speed and telescoping nature of the modernizing process in Japan.

The early evidence of societal challenge to the *raison d'être* of the armed forces, as being inconsistent with national purpose—a phenomenon which appeared most visibly after limited, not all-out wars.

Today the Diet Building still stands in Chiyoda ward. The Showa Emperor survives at 71, amidst the longest reign in the history of the Imperial Family. Japan's Gross National Product was never higher, and Ina a

Emperor survives at war Japan has brilliantly achieved Meiji's goal of National Prosperity according to the No-War Constitution. Is it not ironic, in fact, that post-Showa period till 1945—a reign name still curiously in effect? But the liberal Taisho decade of the 1920's far more closely than that of the trophic defeat in World War II upon society today resembles that of the liberal Taisho decade of the 1920's far more closely than that of the Showa period till 1945—a reign name still curiously in effect? But the reverse subject of the impact of a developed modern mass society on a demoted, insecure military establishment, although certainly worthy of examination, might deserve another symposium, and I have already travelled rather far with you today, in history and in time.

**FOOTNOTES**

1 Fukushima, pp. 516-17.
2 Adams, p. 3. For the historian's approach, see Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, 1967); and Ward & Rustow, pp. 3-7.
4 Hall, pp. 62-63; Horie Yasuzo, pp. 411-12.
5 Takata, pp. 5-6; Crowley, in Silberman & Harootunian, pp. 267-68, citing Ito Masanori.
6 *Izumiyama*, III, 143-44; Fukushima, p. 524.
7 *Matsushita*, *Sowa*, pp. 273; *Izu & Matsushita*, III, 146-47.
8 *Takahco*, pp. 4; Fukushima, pp. 524-25.
10 Japanese War Ministry field operations regulations of Sept. 1939, cited by Buck, ms. Also see Boeicho, pp. 13-14.
11 Hackett, *Yamaqata*, p. 85, citing *Matsushita*; and in Jansen, p. 258, also citing *Matsushita*. See also Ohtani, pp. 1-7; Nakamura, pp. 50-51; Fukushima, p. 538; and Irokawa, XXI, 27-29.
13 *Izu & Matsushita*, III, 147. Also see Shibusawa, V, 305; Takata, ch. 3: Fukushima, pp. 528-29; Hackett, in Jansen, p. 253.
14 Crowley, in Silberman & Harootunian, pp. 270-71; Fukushima, pp. 530, 536; 538-39, citing Ilyji Tsunekichi; Silberman, ch. 8; Hackett, in Ward & Rustow, pp. 341-43; citing *Matsushita*, and *Yamaqata*, p. 89.
15 *Sumiya*, XXII, 353; *Takahco*, pp. 235-37.
modernizing

To the raison d'être of the national purpose—a phenomenon after limited, not all-out

Thiyoda ward. The Showa

The modernizing Process

Shibusawa, XXII, 346-47.

Ohtani, p. 14; Sato in Ward & Rustow, pp. 50-51; Fukushima, p. 537; Matsushita, Zatsuwa, p. 89; Imai, XXIII, 174-84, 216-18, 286.


Imai, XXIII, 371-72.

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**INTERVIEWS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Final Rank in Japanese Army</th>
<th>Interview Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horie Yoshitaka</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imaoka Yutaka</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Tokyo and Tsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inada Masazumi</td>
<td>Lt.-Gen.</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katakura Tadashi</td>
<td>Maj.-Gen.</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sumi Shin’ichiro</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Nagano</td>
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I have a difficulty differentiating temporary and new governments really haven’t and to me very instructive-civil-military relations fore that I will separate to cross-over.

The point of his suggestion that a make-do bridge for called effective government or dominant, easiest, viable political transition to “modern” form of interesting idea. It government in our stood. Even the *arcana imperii,* “secret and others to obey government or governmenr But we really do no times and places a war or some less standing problem I do not have a satisfied such things with as see that age) the authoritarian government continues to escape mental reformers.

It remains to Black’s paper suggest will turn out to be government or who indefinite periods sovereignty and to am impressed by things have been th
I have a difficult task this afternoon commenting on the two fine papers that we have just heard which, however, address themselves to sharply differentiated themes. Professor Black’s observations about contemporary and near contemporary developing states under military governments really have only tangential points of contact with the learned and to me very instructive paper that we have just heard about the Japanese civil-military relations in the 19th and early 20th century. I think therefore that I will separate my remarks on the two papers rather than trying to cross over.

The point of Professor Black’s paper that struck me most forcibly is his suggestion that military regimes can perhaps sometimes serve as a make-do bridge for peoples who lack an inherited pattern of what he called effective government. He suggests that these regimes may offer the dominant, easiest, and most obvious way to go from a condition lacking viable political traditions to some unforeseen, and as yet unforeseeable, “modern” form of government. Now this strikes me as a persuasive and interesting idea. It is certainly true that the prerequisites of effective government in our age are now legion and they are not all well understood. Even the most probing inquiry soon runs up against various arcana imperii, “secrets of empire,” that permit some men to command and others to obey. In any society without such patterns effective government or government of any kind of course quickly becomes impossible.

But we really do not know what makes such coherence voluntary in some times and places and what sometimes breaks the consensus so that civil war or some less drastic breakdown of public peace ensues. This is a standing problem for historians and social scientists for which we really do not have a satisfactory answer. And until men know or can manipulate such things with assurance (and I am not entirely sure I wish to live to see that age) the secret of what allows effective democratic or effective authoritarian government to arise in some places and not to arise in others continues to escape even the best-meaning social engineers and developmental reformers.

It remains to be seen, though, whether the scenario that Professor Black’s paper suggests is going to hold. That is, whether military regimes will turn out to be bridges toward some modernized and civilian forms of government or whether they may not prolong their hold on power for indefinite periods into the future, or until existing patterns of state sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction are somehow radically altered. I am impressed by the fact that through most of human history governments have been the heirs of military cliques, ruling initially by conquest.
Soon such things settle down toward traditional regimes in which the military element is not perhaps primary or always to the forefront. But the assumption that civilian government is somehow normal, as Professor Black was at pains to say, is a bias of the western world. To assume civilian government as normal everywhere and always is, perhaps, a mistake. There is nothing which requires military regimes in Africa or in a country like Greece or any other part of the world to fade away and turn into civilian governments necessarily.

There is, I think, reflecting upon the possibility or plausibility of long range visibility for military forms of administration in what we politely call developing but what I would rather call backward nations, this advantage for the military: the chain of command pattern is a straightforward one and can be easily understood by anyone; and military professionals, as Professor Black very nicely pointed out, are likely to have much more systematic exposure to modern techniques and ideas than any other segment of such developing societies simply because in our age the arrangements for schooling foreigners in the mysteries of new weapons and military administrative methods, etc., are very much more highly developed than other types of schooling available to such peoples. In any consideration of the role in developing lands of military and civilian components, careful consideration and study of military education and training patterns therefore assumes the greatest importance. Such patterns had much to do with shaping the governmental regimes that exist and are likely to exist for some time into the future in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.

I would draw the practical conclusion (and I think this is not differing with Professor Black at all) that military courses available to foreigners ought to be broadened, if they have not been already, to take serious account of administrative, legal, economic, sociological, and even historical topics. I know this exists for our own military men and is very important for our common affairs at home. For all I know such courses may exist for foreign military as well, but in the recent past at least I know that it was possible for officers trained in this country to take a series of courses and achieve high technical expertise while still retaining exceedingly naive sociopolitical ideas. This is true for example of the present head of the Greek government who was highly trained in communications, a fact which in no way affected the attitudes and expectations which he derived from a provincial childhood in a remote part of Greece.

Thinking more generally of what Professor Black said to us I have some reservation about the bi-polar typology of military regimes which he proposed. The distinction between law and order regimes and developmental regimes seems a little bit fuzzy to me. I take it that the basis of his classification is primarily what the respective leaders say; i.e., their ideology. In his paper, on page 17, he says that you must have an ideology and professional foundations for effective development. But the distinction is not necessarily so. You may have an ideology which is going back to some assumed primitive purity, as is more or less the case in Greece today, which is yet reconcilable with or has the effect of promoting industrial and other forms of development. Now some of the most powerful radical regimes of the historical past have been efforts to go back to what was believed to be the example of the mixture, such elements, far from life. Consequently into those areas of heritage, to apply in practice to expect.

I don't suggest does very well in backlash, feedback the Greek case. Professor Black deals with any sense so, the efforts to military regimes.

As I turn the particular case more unique, rather the Japanese and it and for me, as I found pointed out the I grew up in the警示教育 of Jápane The reinforced, with the Japanese sociocultural harsh and over passionate ant recent decades attitude have amazing.

How does Japanese history from one culture as age student and profession ruthless assert these and make a stranger ve society.

Now I a and I am not
regimes in which the was believed to be a purer or better state in the past. That was true for example of the Protestant Reformation in European history. Such a mixture, such discrepancy between professed goals and actual achievements, far from being exceptional, seems to me quite the rule in public life. Consequently, the effort to niche a tidy division of military regimes into those attempting to defend what exists, and those attempting to alter inherited conditions is probably not as straightforward or simple to apply in practice as the listing that Mr. Black attempted might lead one to expect.

I don't suggest that he doesn't realize these facts. I know that he does very well indeed. But there are intermediate cases, and, as it were, backlash, feedback patterns. In general I think that the peculiarities of the Greek case (which was the only case amongst those with which Professor Black deals that I have any personal acquaintance with or can speak with any sense of security about) are probably paralleled elsewhere. If so, the effort to apply a general scheme of interpretation to particular military regimes becomes very difficult indeed.

As I turn to the second paper, with its description and analysis of the particular case of Japan, it seems to me this expectation of individual idiosyncrasy is very much confirmed. What could be more remarkable, more unique, more idiosyncratic than the Japanese path to modernity?

Now I must hasten to point out that I am not an expert in matters Japanese and must simply take Professor Coox's data as authoritative, and for me, as I trust for you, revelatory and instructive.

I found particularly novel and interesting the manner in which he pointed out the early manifestations of anti-militarism in Japanese life. I grew up in the 30s when we were to some degree, I suppose, brainwashed against the military regime of Japan at that time, and I was unaware that what I had read before listening to this paper had failed to point out the manifestations of anti-militarism in the modern history of Japan. The story that Professor Coox presented to us leaves me with reinforced, vivid appreciation of the extraordinary polarity built into Japanese society and Japanese psychology. The polar opposition between harsh and overbearing militarism on the one hand, and extreme and passionate anti-militarism on the other, seems to alternate throughout recent decades of Japanese history; and shifts from one to the other have occurred more than once, and with a suddenness that is amazing.

How does one account for such transformations? Other facets of Japanese history also exhibit similar changeability and very rapid fluctuations from one extreme to another. For example, the imitation of Chinese culture as against the imitation of western models; or the rebellion of student generations as against the conformity of young business executives and professionals once they launch upon a career. The prevalence of ruthless assertiveness and the prevalence of self-deprecatory politeness, these and many other polarities can be detected everywhere. They impress a stranger very strongly on first coming into contact with Japanese society.

Now I am not going to try to psychoanalyze the Japanese nation; and I am not going to try to explain, being too ignorant. But I do observe
that the fluctuations in behavior traced for us in this interesting paper must represent attitudes and capabilities peculiar to Japan. This makes the successful modernization of that nation less a practicable model for others to follow than an extreme and exceptionally interesting case of rapid and extraordinary social change.

I think, too, the same could be said of Turkey from the time of Ataturk, or even earlier than that time. That is to say, the effort Ataturk made to establish civilian government was rooted in the experience that he had in his own generation, and that Turks like him, modernized and modernizing army officers like him, had had in their repeated collisions with the western powers during the previous century. Therefore I wonder whether the affiliation or the professed affiliation between say Nasser and the Ataturk experience, or between the Reza Khan and the Turkish revolutionary movements of the 1920s means much more than a verbal acknowledgement of a sense of solidarity. I do not know what transfer really is possible from the peculiar conditions of Anatolian Turkey to Iran or to Egypt or to any other part of the world.

This tends to leave me then in reaction to both papers with what may seem like a negative view, saying that every case being unique cannot really be understood except in its own particular terms. And in a sense I do want to say that. I rather distrust typologies and generalizations that fuzz over local and what are essentially historical differences. Professor Black, as a fellow historian, will probably not disagree with me. Yet I am prepared to believe and I wish also to defend the proposition that the historical importance of military regimes as they exist in the world today arises from what they do have in common, and what that may be is a result I think of the superior transferability of military command structures and of military technologies and military psychological attitudes from westernized communities to others. An inquiry directed to these sorts of transfers might, I think, be richly rewarding.

It is not a new phenomenon. It is not a phenomenon limited to the 20th century. Russia modernized by remodeling its armed establishment along western lines not only in the days of Peter the Great, but before that in the days of Ivan the Terrible, and before that even in the days of the grand duke Ivan III. The Turks began a process of military modernization in the 18th century, and I suspect that collisions along other civilized frontiers may have led, for example, barbarians along the Chinese frontier to have learned to match Chinese military equipment and organization before they learned much else about Chinese civilization. I would suspect—in fact I do suspect very keenly—that such may have been the secret of the meteoric career of Genghis Khan in the 13th century.

Now this is the direction in which I would like to go: to seek to try to understand the role of the military in modernization, looking for the paths, perhaps mainly educational and through formal educational institutions, by which army and navy and air force personnel acquire familiarity with modernity (whatever we take modernity to mean), and to look to the features and the facets of military organization, custom, and life style that make it possible for men who come from very narrow and infinitely diverse rural backgrounds to become effective army officers and commanders, or military discipline.
in this interesting paper familiar to Japan. This makes it a practicable model for normally interesting case of Turkey from the time of to say, the effort Ataturk led in the experience that like him, modernized and in their repeated collisions injury. Therefore I wonder if between say Nasser and a Khan and the Turkish much more than a verbal did not know what transfer of Anatolian Turkey to world.

Both papers with what my case being unique canular terms. And in a sense is and generalizations that real differences. Professor disagree with me. Yet I tend the proposition that s they exist in the world, and what that may be utility of military command psychological attitudes fairly directed to these sorts

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I would like to go: to seek to modernization, looking for rough formal educational force personnel acquire modernity to mean), and ary organization, custom. o come from very narrow me effective army officers

and commanders, or as enlisted men to live in barracks and conform to military discipline. Because it is this capacity to take raw peasant boys, raw boys off the farm, and turn them into officers or turn them into enlisted men, that gives the military its point of leverage within backward societies. It seems clear at least to me that there are facts about military life and custom and habit that do make it relatively easy for such institutions to take root among the most diverse and mutually alien types of society, whereas civilian institutions and attitudes seldom can effectively be transferred; or if they can be transferred, it takes a much longer time, and the process of transferrence is far less certain of achieving results that are comparable to the model upon which the process is predicated.

I have some hypotheses here—really I have one hypothesis, one bright idea—but I don’t think this is the place for me to try to trot it forward. My role is not to offer a paper of my own, but to comment upon those we have heard and start your minds working toward the question period which is now upon us.

I hope that my remarks might have stimulated some such questions. Now it is your turn. Thank you very much.
Discussion

A 40-minute discussion period followed the papers of Professors Coox and Black and the commentary of Professor McNeill. It opened with a question directed to Professor Coox concerning David Bergamini's *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1971), a question answered by Professor Coox in *The American Historical Review*, 77, 4 (October 1972), pp. 1169–70. Professor Berenice Carroll then queried Professor Coox about the nature of his sources, a question whose answer is now evident in his footnotes. Colonel John Napier of the Air War College then questioned Professor Black about his omission from his paper of any extended comment on civic action programs. Professor Black replied at length, citing instances from Turkey, Russia, and the United States, concluding that military or militarist regimes have no special claim to engaging or not engaging in military civic action programs. Professor Coox contributed data concerning the work of the Japanese Army in railroad building. In return for funding and materials provided by the civil government and private companies, the military acquired large-scale practical experience.

Lieutenant Ronald Hood, U.S. Marine Corps Education Center, Quantico, questioned the application of some of Professor Black's generalizations to the experience in Senegal. Professor Black acknowledged his point, adding only that "even given some such exceptions, generalization is still possible and often fruitful. So I'm going to persist."

Professor Barton Hacker, Iowa State University, addressed a question to Professor McNeill, asking why it seems that military techniques and organizations are more readily transferable between societies than other aspects of social organization. Professor McNeill suggested tentatively that the transfer of Western military techniques in the past may simply have resulted from non-Western perceptions of Western success. Professor Black joined the discussion, suggesting that the question of transfer is perhaps a function of the number of people who must become involved in the effects of the transfer. "Transferring the British Parliament would take generations, possibly centuries. Transferring a civilian airline system, with assistance, can be done in a much shorter time, perhaps only a decade or two. The armies of most underdeveloped countries are quite small, numbering *in toto* perhaps a smaller group than the Cadet Wing enrolled here; hence change can occur much more rapidly. Also, with military organization and the kind of control such organization makes possible, it takes a relatively small number of people to exert control and thus impose change."

The Chairman concluded the discussion period by commenting on the relevance of some of the questions raised to the American experience: "There are a good many examples of the effects of military institutions on developed and developing nations within the circumference of United States history itself, and of course cite toward nation, American military and civil government in Cuba in the Gulf, in Cent. was the cr itself a fascinating of all this mixture of you might come up v new areas and set u with relentless purp. "What about t This is something I was concerned with in the Showa era, Germany in the Hit in Jefferson Davis's agony of Vietnam, more or less diss suspicion between a our democratic sy anachronism, more Vietnam? Or is ther ing of seeds for an Professor Weigley t you very much for
States history itself. I would cite the Civil War as one specific example, and of course cite the Confederate States as an underdeveloped or backward nation. Americans have had many examples of involvement with military and civil government, as well as mixtures of the two. The question of transferring institutions might be examined by looking more closely at our career in Cuba, at our career in the Philippines and round about in the Gulf, in Central America. One of the institutional methods that was used was the creation of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, which is in itself a fascinating governmental agency worthy of attention. I think out of all this mixture of experience in civil-military relationships, if you will, you might come up with one generalization: that as we went forward into new areas and set up military-civil government, we achieved two things with relentless purpose: suffrage and sanitation!

"What about the question of military leadership toward disaster? This is something Professor Coox talked about (and Professor Black was concerned with as well). But in addition to the experience of Japan in the Showa era, one might want to contemplate the experience of Germany in the Hitler years, the experience of the Confederate States in Jefferson Davis's time, and possibly the United States throughout the agony of Vietnam. Have these episodes of defeat, disastrous defeat, or more or less disastrous defeat, permanently altered the balance of suspicion between a democratic people and its military institutions? Does our democratic system now see the military as even more of an anachronism, more of a fading embarrassment, than it did before Vietnam? Or is there in the clamor for an all volunteer army some planting of seeds for another quasi-autonomous military clique suggested by Professor Weigley this morning? With that I will leave you and thank you very much for attending this afternoon."
The Banquet Session

THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY TODAY:
THE QUESTIONS AN OLD-TIMER MIGHT RAISE

Address by

Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.,
USAF, (Retired)
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Lieutenant General Albert P. Clark

Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy

Good evening Ladies and Gentlemen:

Over the years it has become almost a tradition to invite a distinguished former military officer to deliver the banquet address for the Military History Symposium. These officers have ranged from Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, military historian and commentator, to General Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Europe, to General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, now Principal of King's College in London.

Tonight we are privileged to have as our speaker a man who not only served the United States Air Force with great distinction, but whose contributions to both the theory and employment of air forces have earned for him a distinct place in the history of our service.

Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., comes to us tonight from Hilton Head Island in South Carolina, where he and his lady now live in retirement. The son of an Army surgeon, and the father of an Air Force officer now on the faculty at the Air University, General Hansell entered the Air Corps as a Flying Cadet in 1928, four years after graduating from Georgia Tech. By the late 1930s he had become an instructor in the Bombardment Aviation Section of the Air Corps Tactical School. In that position he was among those who formulated the theories of Air Force employment that were to be applied so successfully in World War II. In fact, on the eve of war, he was called to Washington to join the team of men in the Air War Plans Division who put together the plan for the strategic bombardment of Germany that was adopted by the Joint Chiefs and the President.

When the Eighth Air Force went to war, General Hansell went along, moving up to command first a Bombardment Wing and then a Division. Returning to Washington, he once again became one of our nation's top military planners before moving on to the Pacific Theater when he was to be the first commander of the XXI Bomber Command on Saipan. Although retired for disability in 1946, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force called on his talents once again with the outbreak of war in Korea. Since his second retirement in 1955, General Hansell has remained very active in military affairs and has been especially helpful to us with our History Program here at the Academy and in the various programs of the Air University at Maxwell Field. He is the author of a book which will appear momentarily, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, an account of the development of the strategic bombing concept.
I am sure you will agree that the levels at which he has served, when taken together with his lifelong association with military affairs, uniquely qualify him to address his chosen topic of “The Military in American Society Today.”

(I shall remain, as behooves a youngster like myself, discreetly silent about his chosen subtitle: “The questions an old-timer might raise!”)

Ladies and Gentlemen . . . Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.
THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY TODAY: THE QUESTIONS AN OLD-TIMER MIGHT RAISE

Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., USAF, (Retired)

General Clark, Colonel Hurley, honored guests, ladies and gentlemen: I feel doubly fortunate to be speaking to you tonight.

First, because I feel honored to appear before this prestigious gathering of professional historians and professional military officers.

Second, because General Clark has kindly permitted me to limit my remarks to the narrow field of my own experience. I am acutely aware that this room is filled with professional historians, and I know that they are far better informed than I. So, it is with relief that I address myself to observations based on my own experience. They cover the past 40 years, including active participation in the military scene and continued interest as an inactive observer.

That span of 40 years has witnessed fundamental changes in war and in peace. It provides a wealth of interest for the historian, and a rich field for examination by the military analyst and the military strategist.

It witnessed the birth, development, and application of air power. Air warfare tested and proved the precept which was proposed by von Clausewitz and specified by Liddell Hart that the "will of the people" is the fundamental objective in conflict between nations.

In World War II air power brought the people of Europe and Japan directly into the combat zone throughout the length and breadth of the land. Nuclear missiles and the high-speed bomber have multiplied that power a thousand fold, and have brought the threat to the people of America as well.

For a part of this 40-year period America was safe at home and needed only offensive forces. But we continued to concern ourselves entirely with the offense, and to neglect our defenses, long after the situation had changed.

The period has ended on a new military challenge to American society and to the profession of arms. It is a challenge which will need prompt assessment in terms of current events, but we must include the lessons of history when we seek to achieve sound judgment and balance.

I have been invited to offer comments on "The Military in American Society Today," and to pose "The Questions an Old-Timer Might Raise."

I would like to touch first on the relationship of military leaders whom I have known to their bosses, in American society, and to speak about the military profession itself—which has varied so widely in the brief span of my own observations.

I have seen military professionalism and its relationship to the President at a peak of mutual competence and respect. I have also seen
SOCiETY TODAY: Old-Timer Might Raise

Hansell, Jr.,

I guests, ladies and gentlemen, you tonight, before this prestigious gathering of military officers, I freely permitted me to limit my experience. I am acutely aware of the historians, and I know is with relief that I address them. They cover the past military scene and contemporary changes in war and the historian, and a rich field the military strategist. The application of air power, which was proposed by von Tresckow the "will of the people" nations. The people of Europe and the length and breadth of the U.S. have multiplied the threat to the people of the U.S. was safe at home and we must concern ourselves with defenses, long after the

old challenge to American offensives which will need more judgment and balance. The Military in American Old-Timer Might Raise. The ship of military leaders is an old vessel, and to speak of it varied so widely in the

its relationship to the respect. I have also seen competent military leaders humiliated by politicians till they wondered if they were professionals at all, or members of a blue collar trade association which lacked even the power of a workers union. It seems to me that I see now a new challenge that will demand of the man in uniform an order of professionalism which must equal or excel that of any other profession in our society—including even the medical profession. It remains to be seen how the military professional in uniform will meet that challenge, or whether it will be met by highly schooled military professionals in civilian clothes. One way or the other it must be met if our country continues to seek a position of leadership and respect in the world.

To my mind the peak of the military professional relationship was reached in World War II. The President came to trust and respect his Chiefs of Staff and to deal with them directly. The Chiefs were all exceptionally competent and capable men, but to my mind, General Marshall was the outstanding member of the group and the one to whom the President listened with the most care.

I was never privileged to attend one of the small meetings of the Chiefs with the President. But I worked for General Marshall for a while and I got a very vivid understanding of his ways and his procedures. I think it provided an insight into his relations with the President.

General Marshall was a strict disciplinarian, in terms of thought processes as well as conduct. He was completely intolerant of any fault or failure in the area in which the staff officer was expected to be expert. And he was equally intolerant of bias or parochialism. He expected intellectual integrity.

General Marshall himself maintained an open-minded, even-handed impartiality that was inspiring to behold. Often he took the side of the Navy if he thought it was right; often he supported the Army Air Forces.

Once, on the battleship Iowa, enroute to the Cairo Conference, he took a position that left me in astonishment. We were sitting around a table over a cup of coffee and the subject of the Normandy Invasion came up. The Army members expressed doubt and concern about the feasibility of such an operation. They also said that even if the invasion and liberation of France went well, the German army could fall back upon the Siegfried Line where they would be almost impregnable. We would be faced with the prospect of monumental losses in trying to break through it.

General Marshall said, "Perhaps so. But, we would acquire air base areas from which our fighters could support our bombers and the air offensive could destroy the war-making vitals of Germany."

I was astounded to hear the Chief of Staff of the United States Army contending that the massive invasion of France would be justified, even if it failed to penetrate into Germany, because it would make possible a vigorous and decisive air war against the interior of Germany. It was an open-mindedness that I came to associate with General Marshall. In my opinion, he contributed more than anyone outside the Air Corps itself to the creation of the United States Air Force.

Working for him was a very broadening experience.

Once in awhile, when you brought a recommendation to General
Marshall he would lean back in his chair and say, "If you were sitting here in my place, would you sign these papers?"

The effect was sobering! It was one thing to come in with a paper and a zealous conviction that "The Chief ought to do something about this."

It was quite another to be invited to accept responsibility for the action as a whole, including all its effects. Disturbing questions came instantly to mind.

What would be the effect on other services? On the State Department? On the budget? On diplomatic relations? On the Congress?

General Marshall didn't expect you to be expert in these other fields. But, he did expect you to think about them and to have a reasonable opinion to offer if you were asked.

If he discussed a recommendation with you, and disagreed with your conclusions, he didn't object to your defending your opinion, but, if he overruled your arguments, he did expect you to fully accept his decision and wholeheartedly to carry it out.

I think that General Marshall looked upon his own relations with the President in a similar light. I think he might have listed four principles to govern his relationship with the President.

First, I think he recognized a compulsive obligation to present military matters in terms that faced up to the military issues. In this he would be unsparing of himself in all aspects of military expertise, and he would insist that the President fully understand his military reasoning, even if this insistence evoked Jovian wrath. With assurance that this obligation had been met, his duty in the field of military recommendations had been fulfilled.

Second, I think he felt a responsive obligation to develop a reasoned understanding of areas outside his military field. In response to inquiry, he wanted to be prepared to discuss the impact of his military recommendations on other fields which might be affected. In General Marshall's case I think that this covered all the other fields except domestic politics. He avoided participation in domestic political matters if possible. It was not important. He was dealing with a master in that field, who needed little advice. And General Marshall reflected the prevailing belief that military professionals should stay out of politics.

Third, he was prepared to provide unstinted and wholehearted acceptance of the President's decision, even if it was adverse to his own arguments. He was not faced with this condition often. In the most famous case he led the opposition to the invasion of North Africa, and was overruled, and then bent every effort to assure success of the operation. In another case he acknowledged the President's overriding political necessity in seeking a second front in France in 1943. He supported that position even though his military judgment told him that such a venture would probably lead to local disaster; and he did his utmost to convince his British counterparts to undertake such an invasion lest the Russians collapse and the situation become far worse.

Fourth, he expected to accept responsibility for operational control of the military forces and operations involved in carrying out the President's decision. It simply never occurred to any of the Chiefs that the President would ordinate military control to the President or the President's military proposal.

The President's political matters were directed and almost entirely limited to the military proposal. The President's military proposal was sometimes as a consequence of his political necessity in seeking the second front in France in 1943. He supported that position even though his military judgment told him that such a venture would probably lead to local disaster; and he did his utmost to convince his British counterparts to undertake such an invasion lest the Russians collapse and the situation become far worse.

The advent of the McNamara Defence Act of 5. In the moment, he should have known that the Army was successful in working within the point that the President was right.

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The Navy was successful in working within the point that the President was right.
President would by-pass them and issue military instructions to subordinate military units. There is no reason to believe that it ever occurred to the President either.

The President often expressed his views to the Chiefs of Staff on political matters that had a bearing on military strategy.

The President in turn was consulted by the Chiefs on all major military proposals. His views were carefully weighed and incorporated in strategic military plans. He was kept fully informed. The relationship was direct and almost continuous.

The relationship was, in my opinion, very nearly ideal.

This direct relationship between the President and his Chiefs of Staff continued after the war through the presidencies of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower.

President Truman met frequently and informally with the Chiefs, sometimes as a committee, sometimes as individuals.

When President Eisenhower came to office the direct relationship was extended to include the Secretary of State.

The advent of the Kennedy Administration marked an end to all this.

The potential for change had existed for some time.

When the idea of reorganization of the nation’s defense establishment had come up after World War II, the Army and the Army Air Forces had supported the concept of a single Department of Defense, with three co-equal subdepartments. The Navy, led by its Secretary, Mr. Forrestal, opposed. The Navy finally took the position that if the Army chose to lose its air arm, it was free to do so, but the Navy was not going to do anything of the sort.

The Army and the Army Air Forces had supported the idea that, if there was going to be a single Secretary over all the military departments, he should be given ample authority to carry out his job.

The Navy Department had continued to fight the idea and was successful in watering down the authority of the Secretary of Defense to the point that he was described as a “Coordinator” in the National Defense Act of 1947. It was not until 1958 that the Secretary got the full authority which he has today.

There were two serious pitfalls that would be created by this concentration of authority in the Secretary of Defense, but the military protagonists never thought that they would become traps.

First, command decision in the hands of the civilian Secretary of Defense might result in severing the direct channel between the President and the Chiefs of Staff.

Second, a vigorous and ambitious Secretary might choose to use the authority vested in his office to exercise operational command over military forces. He was not constrained by law to use the Chiefs as his executive agents. He could relegate the Chiefs to the role of counselors whose counsel might or might not be sought, and he could set up whatever command channels and agencies he might desire, using either military personnel or civilians at his discretion.

When President Kennedy came to power and brought in Mr. McNamara as Secretary of Defense the cord between the President
and the military Chiefs was severed and the uniformed services were reduced to minions of performance rather than respected counselors and responsible advisors to the President, confirmed in this role by the Congress.

The fundamental decline in the status of the Joint Chiefs came a few months after Mr. Kennedy's inauguration.

The Bay of Pigs crisis brought into sharp focus a fundamental change that had been developing for a decade. We were no longer alone in the field of nuclear power, and we were no longer secure at home. What should have been a minor policing action in our own backyard suddenly turned out to have ugly possibilities of escalation into nuclear war with the Soviets. Even though the Soviet nuclear threat was small at that time, we temporized and backed away— and the first indication of deterrence in reverse made its appearance. Military policy suddenly became a matter of primary national concern and, again to harken back to von Clausewitz, the proper concern of national politicians. The Bay of Pigs experience was humiliating and frightening to the President. He vented his wrath on the professional military leaders, who actually had been bypassed and bore little of the direct responsibility, to provide the proper concern of national politicians. The President reasserted the demand for civilian control of the military.

The Secretary of Defense recognized the authority which had been provided him, and took the occasion to seize the reins himself and to establish a civilian staff which would replace the military staff in almost every aspect of military administration, equipment, and control.

It must be acknowledged that this recession in military status was partly the fault of the professional military corps. As Professor Charles Ackley has pointed out, the military had become so obsessed with the technical potentials and tactical applications of the new weapons that they neglected the field of national military strategy. The void was promptly filled by civilian military experts.

The Secretary seems to have been genuinely surprised at the reaction and resentment of the senior military officers. He is reported to have commented once, "I don't know what they are complaining about. They are perfectly free to carry out the orders that they receive from me or through me."

When the next crisis arose, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Chiefs of Staff did not even enter into the councils which debated in such secrecy the military potentials, military implications, and military capabilities related to the recommendations to the President. Advice on details of tactics was sought from subordinate commanders.

Finally, when the war in Vietnam reached high intensity, we had the astonishing picture of the President of the United States seeking to hold a personal telephone conversation with the Skipper of a destroyer which was under attack in the Gulf of Tonkin. As the war progressed, the President and his Secretary of Defense issued detailed instructions to individual pilots of combat aircraft, prescribing such minutiae as the method and direction of attack and withdrawal at their targets and the type and size of weapons to be carried. This exercise of combat control emanated directly from a command post twelve thousand miles from the scene of combat, and it completely bypassed the military chain of command that was particularly if the

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tainly they inhibited initiative that could have been helpful.

With the departure of Mr. McNamara and the advent of the Nixon
Administration the situation is greatly improved. The situation will not,
of course, return to the idealistic relationship between the military pro-
essionals and the President that existed in the 1940s and 1950s. Too
many things have changed. But, there is a clear call to restore the respect
and dignity in which the professional military man formerly was held
in high levels of government. The challenge now rests in large measure
upon the degree to which the professionals can meet the demands of
today and of the future.

I would like to give my personal opinion on these challenges which
face the military professional in today's situation and on the new
relationship between the military and American society. I make no effort
to provide the answers, only to describe the problems as I see them, and
to raise the questions of an old-timer.

The military problems of today exceed those which were faced
by General Marshall and the other Chiefs—and by the President—by
a full order of magnitude. There is literally no comparison.

The development of nuclear power, coupled with the speed of
intercontinental missiles and the Mach Two airplane, have changed the
very foundations of American military policy. For two hundred years
we have relied upon the broad reaches of the ocean and the tremendous
military potential lodged in our industrial structure to provide the basis
for our military policy, and hence the support for our national foreign
policy. In all our foreign wars since 1812 we have been secure at home
and have fought abroad. Now the broad reaches of the oceans can be
spanned in half an hour to bring destruction to the very sources of all
our national power—our citizens massed in our cities. Security at home
has vanished and potential military power has lost its meaning.

As a consequence, military capability has become wedded more
closely than ever to national policy.

To my mind these changes, bringing a defenseless American
society into the combat zone of international conflict, point up the
truly significant relationship of the military and American society today.

Our society is accustomed to military protection. Now our society
has no physical defenses and it shares with the military the risks involved
in military decision and military action.

Shorn of defenses, I suspect that our society is ill-suited to this role.

Now, for reasons which escape my comprehension, we have chosen
to offer our cities as hostages to enemy power. Under these circumstances
we embrace a policy of limited military capability that restricts our
national operations to defense of ourselves. Our present policy of "Assured
Destruction" will probably stave off direct nuclear attack upon the United
States. But it will do nothing else, and if we embrace it exclusively it will
prevent our even attempting to do anything but assure our own survival.
"Mutual assured destruction" by nuclear strategic arms would seem to deter both sides equally and hence provide a precarious but reasonably stable deterrent against any form of overt aggression by either of the two great super powers.

But is this really so? The sources of our military support are the citizens of our country, and it is they who are massed for the slaughter in our great cities. In our democracy our whole national policy rests upon the will of those urban citizens. Their "will to resist" is not well organized or unified. If they are threatened directly with annihilation when our country is faced with a real confrontation, they will assuredly be loud in their demands that we do not approach the potential holocaust. This state of affairs, which practically eliminates any military action on our part, is welcomed by many of our people. They profess to rejoice in this limited safety and will say that this is exactly what they want. But there are very serious consequences which they prefer to ignore.

This condition which constrains all military options in America does not exist to the same degree in the Russian Soviets. Their people are not intimately associated with the national decision process, and they can be kept in ignorance of potential disaster. The governing decision will be reached by a small group of very tough-minded leaders, not by the fearful demands of millions whose lives are in jeopardy.

The relationship is somewhat like that of the passengers in a sky-jacked air liner. The sky-jacker threatens to blow up the airplane with bombs if his demands are not met. In theory the sky-jacker has no advantage over the hundred odd passengers. His life will be ended, like theirs, if he carries out his threat. But the passengers are concerned primarily with preserving their own lives, and they are afraid that the tough sky-jacker might be just insane enough to carry out his threat.

There is no contest. The passengers are concerned only that the demands of the sky-jacker be met.

Unless we can find a sure means of protecting our cities, there will really be no contest in national sky-jacking either, so long as people can save their lives by conforming to demands.

I realize that there is a widely held conviction that the era of military solution to international conflict has passed, and that we are now in the era of negotiation.

This is beyond the scope of my talk tonight, but I should like to offer these brief observations:

The Western democracies, led by Messrs. Kellog and Briand, embraced this thesis in the 1920s. It didn't last out the decade.

It still takes two to tango. Others must also embrace the thesis, if it is to have substance.

The Russians have never renounced their declared intentions to follow policies which are aggressive, acquisitive, and domineering. And they have provided themselves with the means to do so.

The Russians have projected themselves into the position of the world's greatest military power today.

The Russians are, above all, pragmatic. They do not spend enormous sums for armaments to no purpose.

Whether these Russian forces are meant for military aggression or not, they are enormous and they are a constant threat. I think it would be a mistake for American society to believe that the current restraint is sufficient to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

The current restraint is tending to improve the prospects for negotiations.

The constraints for each side are not yet sufficient to assure that the constraints will be sufficient to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

General von Coen speaking in mathematics capability, and the capabilities of our missile defense systems as providing some assurance to American nation against nuclear attack.

Our military is based upon Soviet capability, and the current restraint is tending to improve the prospects for negotiations.

When we had the threat of nuclear deterrence efforts in the interwar period, we did not disband our conventional forces, but we did not actually modernize them.

We respond to the Russians to field, without sovereignty, conventional forces, and we impose our people we are not seaworthy.

The Russians are, above all, pragmatic. They do not spend enormous sums for armaments to no purpose.

Whether these Russian forces are meant for military aggression
or not, they are enormously influential when it comes to negotiation.

I think it would be very dangerous indeed to base the future of American society on what may be a one-sided euphoria.

The current results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are not tending to improve the psychological imbalance.

The constraints placed upon the number of offensive nuclear missiles for each side (assuming we replace our aging bomber fleet and hence preserve some semblance of parity) and upon the implacement of anti-missile defense systems (leaving them practically at zero) may be touted as providing some sort of nuclear equality. But the constraints placed upon American national policy and upon Soviet national policy are by no means equal.

General von Clausewitz observed that power is a product. He was speaking in mathematical terms. It is the product of two factors: Military capability, and the will to use it. If either factor is lacking, the product equals zero; there is no power. The will to respond if we are actually attacked may be automatic. But the will deliberately to take grave risks in support of our rights and aspirations abroad, or of our allies and friends, will be subjected to vigorous dissent. If the confrontation threatens to bring down the holocaust upon our undefended cities the dissent will probably prohibit any vigorous military action—and we have just had a demonstration of the disastrous effects of half-hearted military action, even against so weak a nation as North Vietnam. Without the will of our people we are militarily powerless.

Our military policy over the past two decades presents an interesting anomaly.

When we had enormous nuclear superiority, and security at home, we used the threat of nuclear retaliation to inhibit Soviet aggressions based upon Soviet conventional forces. The Lebanon Affair and the various Berlin Crises are cases in point.

The Russians set in train a massive effort to meet and cancel our nuclear deterrence by nuclear forces of their own. And they turned their efforts in the interim toward subversion and limited actions. But they did not disband their powerful conventional forces. Those forces were actually modernized against the time when they would no longer be constrained by our nuclear deterrence.

We responded in peculiar fashion. We permitted—even encouraged—the Russians to reach parity—and missile superiority—in the nuclear field, without seeming to notice that this would release the Russian conventional forces from the constraints which we had been able to impose.

Now we have lost our leverage for constraining the Russian conventional forces, and we must expect to be almost without influence in the contested areas of the world which are the most important for Western civilization.

Now we are doubly handcuffed. Our strategic nuclear threat, which we employed to hinder all forms of aggression, is now triggered to respond only to a nuclear attack on the United States. For all other purposes it is impotent. And our conventional forces are hopelessly
inadequate in any important area abroad when confronted by the conventional forces of Russia. We probably will lack the will to face up to a Soviet confrontation based upon aggression by Soviet conventional forces.

We lack the military capability effectively to oppose Soviet conventional forces in Europe or the Middle East (with or without our Allies) unless we resort to local use of nuclear weapons. With the sword of Damocles hanging over our defenseless cities will we be the first to risk nuclear war?

In the early days of President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara—after the Bay of Pigs—there was loud complaint at the highest levels that there must be change in our military capabilities and in our military posture. The President said that we could not be bound to the options of humiliation or holocaust.

The Secretary produced the National Strategy of "assured destruction and flexible response." But "assured destruction" was not accompanied by an all-out effort to find a real defense for our cities, and without it there is no real flexibility, and there probably will be no response, flexible or otherwise.

Our cities have literally no physical defenses—only psychological defenses based upon a balance of offensive threats. This national strategy of reliance entirely upon the psychological effect of offensive forces for the defense of our people is not a strategy produced by arrogant military professionals and crammed down the throats of civilians. It is a military strategy propounded by a civilian Secretary of Defense and imposed upon the military and American civilian society. It does not bear the stamp of the military professional steeped in military history. Military professionals would have known the need to provide defenses for the people. They would have remembered only too well how a defenseless Carthage responded to Roman threat. Hannibal's victorious armies were forced to abandon their successful offensive in Italy and rush homeward for the defense of their people. Where the defenseless source of wealth that existed in Carthage is of wealth that is threatened, there is no effective offense and no significant military posture.

The developments of the last few years have expanded the spectrum of options demanded by President Kennedy, but the additions are hardly welcome.

What choices do we now have in any major confrontation beyond:

Retreat in our foreign policy;
Humiliation;
Holocaust; or
Defeat in conventional warfare?

Under our present strategy and military posture the burden of choice among these options is being shifted onto American society itself. Will the people in our cities be strong enough and brave enough to face down the Soviet threat if the Russians are using only conventional forces and the use of nuclear weapons is up to us?

Is "Retreat in our foreign policy," the widest choice in today's situation? It seems so, and it will take a decade to provide urban defenses as a basis for other options. But we need to make a sober appraisal of our needs in terms of security, prosperity, tradition, and national ideals. We need sober evaluation cost and feasibility of the viability of the nation's weakness; and of the others for us, if we had to. It could be that retreat is the most cost-effective the only sensible possible solution; the decay of our nation, the corruption of other options.

We hear much about the first to risk nuclear war? would have known the need to provide defenses for the people. They would have remembered only too well how a defenseless Carthage responded to Roman threat. Hannibal's victorious armies were forced to abandon their successful offensive in Italy and rush homeward for the defense of their people. Where the defenseless source of wealth that existed in Carthage is of wealth that is threatened, there is no effective offense and no significant military posture.

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need sober evaluation of the effect of retreat upon our economy: of the cost and feasibility of real defense for our cities; of the long-range survivability of the nation under a policy of isolationism dictated by military weakness; and of the impact upon our self-respect, and the respect of others for us, if we have to abandon the support of liberty and freedom. It could be that retrenchment may be the most immediately beneficial—the most cost-effective—option available to us now. It may be that it is the only sensible policy. But it may also be that it will lead to slow decay of our nation, and it may be that provision of defenses and restoration of other options is worth any cost. The one thing that is surely wrong is to pretend there has been no change.

We hear much talk that war is now too costly to be undertaken by anyone. It is quite probable that massive nuclear war has been eliminated because it does invite mutual suicide. But there are other forms of war which have brought great nations to defeat, and can do so again. All the Russians have to do is preserve the nuclear stalemate. As long as our cities are frozen in fear and are concerned only for survival, our government will be helpless to substantiate our policies abroad and we will have no influence whatever outside our own precincts. It is likely that we will pay any ransom.

Build-up of our offensive forces will not solve this problem, although we must replace our bombers to preserve even the present situation. Only a new and effective anti-missile and anti-space defense system for our cities will make it possible for our military forces to exert influence uninhibited by restrictive fear. New technologies, including powerful lazers, offer hope of developing such defenses. The development and provision of such defenses is the sine qua non of all effective military policy and national policy.

A great deal depends to be sure—perhaps everything depends—upon the image in which America sees herself—upon the destiny which we perceive for ourselves. We have established living standards and levels of wealth that exceed our nearest competitors by a large margin. Presumably we will want to maintain these standards and continue this trend. This prosperity stems in some measure from foreign trade. But this is certainly not all that motivates America. We have been able to indulge a deep-seated idealism that has been accompanied by materialistic generosity. We have shown an inclination to help those who are oppressed, even without expectation of reward or even gratitude. Two Presidents have established as national policy the determination to support those who are willing to fight for their own freedom against communist imperialism, whether it be overt or subversive.

Both these American aspirations and ideals—toward preservation of international trade on a basis of favor or equality, and toward succor for the weak who are oppressed—seem to me to be beyond our means to support under the limitations we are about to embrace. The brave policy of saving the weak—which probably was an impractical ideal anyway after we failed to develop a defense to meet the Russian ICBM—is a vain mouthing so long as our cities are naked and defenseless. Impractical though it was, the death of that idealism will bring America to a
lesser stature. It may bring panic to the rest of the free world which knows that America is the only bulwark of Western freedom.

I do not suggest that we will suddenly acknowledge our weakness. I think it unlikely that we will openly espouse an isolationist policy. But under the new conditions our actions should, I believe, be very prudently cautious outside the Western Hemisphere. It will certainly be unwise to attempt to meet any serious confrontation abroad. An enforced back-down would bring not only humiliation but very real danger to the precarious balance of world power.

The accommodation of military capabilities and response to our new situation will demand all the judgment and wisdom which experience and the study of history can provide. The problem is unprecedented for America. But the situation is not hopeless. Britain was also defenseless against an uncertain threat of German air power in 1936. By 1940 she had found a defense. But the delay contributed to the agonies of the Sudetenland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, and Greece.

Perhaps it is not unreasonable to compare the disgraceful capitulation at Munich, when Britain was defenseless in the air, to the firm resolve with which she supported Poland after the air defense of Britain had been installed.

Incidentally, here is another magnificent example of mutual respect and confidence at the top: Air Marshal Dowding, the military strategist, demanding air defenses for Britain; Watson-Watt the scientist, inventing radar to meet Dowding’s demands; Churchill the statesman-politician supporting both when out of office, reaping the rewards as Prime Minister at the Battle of Britain.

The example even has an outcome that smacks of Marshall’s principles: Dowding did indeed evoke Jovian wrath with his blunt insistence on recognition of military realities. After the crucial victory he was discarded for his temerity. But there is no evidence that he regretted his action. He had saved Britain and the Western World in the nick of time.

Ultimately the combined air offensive proved decisive against Hitler, but it would never have been launched from Britain if the air defenses had not provided for the survival of Britain’s population and the support of Britain’s will.

There is serious question whether we will be granted the decade which will be needed to provide defenses for our own cities against the threat of missiles and high-speed bombers. In the meantime it is likely that we will have no will to meet a serious confrontation abroad.

These problems must eventually be faced by our political leaders. Let us hope that they will meet them wisely. But those political leaders are entitled to expert and enlightened counsel on the military aspects, and it is the military aspects which make our foreign policies supportable or infeasible when faced by opposition.

Here is a problem of staggering proportions. Many will say that this problem is not the business of professional soldiers; that it is in the province of statesmen and politicians. I think we must agree that it is in the province of statesmen and politicians. But, to return to the principles of General Marshall, which I believe to be sound, it is the business of professional military national security, and policy; and it is the that political leaders, professionals they should not shirk this, the decision must be resort with the mass

Here is a challenge military profession of a solution aspects of technology and position. In terms of an. men on the moon effort to solve that

As for America, having an effect with importance. We have a minor theater to turn to. I think it would be wise if we have not not confined to ten extensive and last looked to us and appraise the situation and their pacifistic the capability to equations in Viet because we dread its toll. Now that the defense of our cities we are closing all.

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Recognize our weakness.

An isolationist policy, I believe, is very dangerous. It will certainly be an isolationist policy that political leaders understand these military implications. To these ends, professionals in uniform should receive the help of scientists, but they should not shift military responsibility to their shoulders. Beyond this, the decision must and should rest with the politicians, and in the last resort with the mass of our citizens.

Here is a challenge to the intellectual stature and integrity of the military profession and to military leadership in proposing the military aspects of a solution. This solution will be terribly difficult in terms of technology and perhaps even more difficult in terms of national inclination. In terms of technology the problem is comparable to that of putting men on the moon and bringing them back. It took a massive national effort to solve that one in ten years.

As for American inclination, the impact of Vietnam is, I think, having an effect which is quite out of proportion in terms of real importance. We have permitted frustration born of indecisive policy in a minor theater to turn us away from the really important issues abroad. I think it would be well to examine our current dilemma in Vietnam. I think we have not faced up to the import of our experience there. It is not confined to temporary dissent in our country. I believe it will have extensive and lasting traumatic effects. The weaker nations that have looked to us and our vaunted policy of defense for free peoples will appraise the situation anew, and many of them may place their reliance—and their peacetime preferences—with the side that has the desire and the capability to exert its military power. In my opinion we chose to equivocate in Vietnam rather than use our military power successfully, because we dreaded escalation. Deterrence in reverse has already taken its toll. Now that we are voluntarily giving up the pursuit of effective defense of our cities we are even more vulnerable to deterrence in reverse; we are closing all our options.

I repeat that I do not contend that these matters are the exclusive or even the principal province of the professional military man. But I do contend that they are military matters and the professional military man cannot escape the obligation to have expert knowledge of them and to make competent recommendations concerning them.

These are areas in which General Marshall would have felt a compelling obligation to face up to the military aspects of the issues. He would have been insistent that military professionals grapple with all aspects of the changing military problem. They are areas in which he would have sought, himself, to be expert.

In terms of General Marshall's approach to the requirements falling upon the modern military professional, the demands have grown tremendously:

The military professional must be the leading expert in the technical and tactical aspects of an immensely complex group of weapons.

He must be the master expert and advisor in the most deadly of all strategic games, played in peace as well as in war.

He must be a competent advisor in the military aspects of all the
country's problems affecting its internal and external prosperity and security.

And he must gauge expertly the implications of forceful excursions in pursuit of the country's inclination toward moral goals.

These military problems assert themselves without introduction. Someone must meet them. In their lesser denominations, the problems can be met by many minds. But as they approach the summit of military decision or recommendation all their facets must be gathered up into the minds of a very few responsible leaders. That leadership at the top must be of superlative caliber and condition.

Those top military leaders need not be military men in uniform. It is quite conceivable that they might be singularly brilliant and gifted civilians who have devoted their lives to the attainment of military knowledge and leadership. It is quite possible—but I think it is not probable. Military command and combat experience, so important to sound military judgment, are difficult to obtain by civilians. The real challenge, as it pertains to military recommendations, is directed toward the uniformed military professional. And the execution of the nation's military decisions also would be best discharged by professionals trained to the task.

Clemenceau's famous remark that war is too important a business to be entrusted to the generals is surely true. But it invites a corollary. Determination of the dimensions and capability of military power to support national policy, and the actual conduct of military operations, are too complex and too dangerous to be left entirely to politicians. A partnership—with a senior partner and a junior partner—is needed. If the military professional is able to meet the new demands placed on the junior partner, he will need an order of professional competence that is exacting beyond all other professions. Not only does the profession embrace learned arts as well as sciences, but the consequences of error are beyond calculation. I sincerely hope that the attainment of those specifications for military professionalism will bring with it the dignity and respect that it so richly deserves in the structure of American society.

I think we must find anew the relationship between the American military and the needs of American society for security, prosperity, freedom from fear, and capability to discharge our moral obligations to the rest of mankind. And I think we must address ourselves to providing appropriate power. I do not hear the problem debated in those terms.

Should not the counsels of military professionals again be heard in the formulation of military policy in support of national policy reflecting the will of American society?

It may well be that wiser heads have considered these ideas, and have dismissed them as simply "The Questions an Old-Timer Might Raise."

Thank you.
The Third Session

THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY: CURRENT CONCEPTS IN THE STUDY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

PANEL “A”: THE STUDY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

and

PANEL “B”: THE WRITING AND PUBLICATION OF MILITARY HISTORY

PANEL “A”

THE STUDY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

[Ed. Note: In what follows the material included between brackets has been supplied by the editor. Panels “A” and “B” were essentially working sessions, the presentations varying from very formal to quite informal. Colonel Hurley opened the proceedings by noting that the Symposium Steering Committee had been looking for several years for an opportunity to devote a session to subject matter of immediate practical concern to everyone engaged in either teaching or writing military history. He then introduced the chairman of Panel “A,” Professor LOUIS MORTON, Daniel Webster Professor and Chairman, Department of History, Dartmouth College. Professor Morton began by noting his astonishment at the size of the audience given the 8:00 a.m. starting time. “I would like to attribute it to the interest that you all have in the subject, but I rather suspect it was the bus schedules and the military efficiency of our hosts that got you here.” Prior to introducing the first speaker, Professor Morton noted the enforced absence, at the last minute, of Brigadier General BENJAMIN B. CASSIDAY, JR., Commandant, USAF ROTC, and the presence in his place of Colonel C. R. CARLSON, Vice Commandant, USAF ROTC. He then introduced Professor DENNIS SHOWALTER of The Colorado College.]
Professor SHOWALTER: For a title to my remarks this morning I have chosen: “The Odd Couple: Liberal Arts Colleges and the Military Historian.” The title of this essay acknowledges a truth: the relationship between its subjects resembles in many respects that between the heroes of the popular television series. Military history, like Oscar Madison, is untidy. It scatters the cigar ashes of its focus on human violence across the trivium and quadrivium. Its existence is a reminder of aspects of man’s experience which poets and philosophers often consider better forgotten. On the other hand, like the punctilious Felix Unger, the liberal arts college tends to see itself as a guardian of the good, the true, the beautiful, and the gracious. It is often prudish in its approach to the study of military affairs. Theoretically the endeavor may be necessary, even desirable. But it should be kept as far away from the college as possible—preferably confined to a university, like the other arcane and grubby specialties spawned by the modern era. Yet closer examination suggests that this apparently ill-matched pair can not only coexist with at least as much harmony as our comedy heroes demonstrate weekly; they can cooperate for their mutual profit.

The initial problem facing the military historian in the liberal arts college is securing employment at such an institution. Its job descriptions will almost never specify a vacancy in military history. This, however, should not discourage the candidate. Liberal arts history departments are victims of an increasingly restrictive double bind. Limited in manpower, they are nevertheless under pressure from deans and students alike to expand their horizons and freshen their course offerings. The standard semester schedule for junior faculty in the 1950s and 1960s was two or three survey sections and an upper-division specialty—the specialty usually depending on the instructor’s interests and preferences at least as much as the department’s concern for a balanced curriculum. In the present decade, however, the history department of the liberal arts college expects, and is expected, to offer a wide variety of innovative courses in themes and areas previously ignored. As a result they seek faculty who are intellectually flexible, with teaching and scholarly interests ranging beyond traditional boundaries—or at least sufficiently wide to offer more than one teaching field.\(^1\)

To the well-trained military historian, these requirements should pose no overwhelming obstacle. Increasingly, his traditional emphasis on campaigns, battles, and strategy is giving way to a broader interdisciplinary approach, incorporating mathematical analysis, psychological insight, and social science models.\(^2\) We seem indeed on the verge of the emergence of war studies (or peace studies) as a viable academic field, similar in concept to Asian studies or international relations. The advantages of these developments to the study of military history itself may be questionable. The process does, however, make the military historian a highly suitable candidate for a liberal arts department. At the very least, he can usually offer courses in related national areas, such as Germany and France, or possesses interest and competence in the history of science or economic history in addition to his main field.

The challenge lies in convincing deans, chairmen, and interviewing committees of this fact. Opinions change slowly in academia. Particularly within the liberal arts, a barely-tolerated military independence, its image of battles and sieges taint and terminal M.A. spending, and the military historian’s reluctance to demonstrate their loyalty, militarily, to the college, is not infrequently the reason they are refused even closer examination suggests that this apparently ill-matched pair can not only coexist with at least as much harmony as our comedy heroes demonstrate weekly; they can cooperate for their mutual profit.

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Within the liberal arts college, military history is too often connected with a barely-tolerated military science program. When the field is conceded independence, its image tends to be that of a desiccated chronology of battles and sieges taught by a retired lieutenant-colonel with an ancient and terminal M.A. Moreover, 7 years of debate on Vietnam, defense spending, and the military-industrial complex have scarred the campus. Not infrequently the military historian provides a target for those seeking to demonstrate the purity of their hostility to such evils. The scholar is identified with his theme; the study of war is taken to imply its approval. The military historian becomes a scapegoat. Laden with a generation's sins, he is refused entry into the liberal arts community and is driven instead into the moral desert of the state university system.

But as my own status demonstrates, the hurdles are not insurmountable. The attitudes described above tend to be reflex responses rather than deep-seated hostility. They seldom reflect profound intellectual or moral conviction. When the candidate demonstrates that his teeth are not filed, when he does not report armed for an interview, his chances for employment depend primarily on his ability to demonstrate specifically the generalizations about military history suggested earlier in this essay.

Once hired, the military historian can find ample opportunity to utilize the versatility and flexibility inherent in his discipline. Though the college almost certainly will not offer a course in military history before his arrival, he should have little difficulty introducing one. Departmental preconceptions and commitments tend to be looser, administrative bureaucracies less oppressive, in a liberal arts college than in larger institutions. The prevailing climate of opinion favors curricular innovation. And since the faculty is small enough to be generally acquainted, opposition and criticism can often be dealt with on a personal basis, averting long ideological debates before full faculty meetings. It requires no more than ordinary powers of persuasion. The military historian, moreover, is sure to find colleagues with related interests offering related courses. Informally-exchanged lectures, joint courses, inter-departmental programs in war and peace studies—all can be realized in a liberal-arts environment.

Introducing courses in military history, however, is only a first step. In an era of vanishing requirements and curricular smorgasbords, with courses judged by enrollment as well as content, student interest is crucial. No liberal arts college enrolls a cross-section of American youth. Rising costs alone have forced most of them to draw an increasing percentage of their students from a limited milieu: the suburban, professional upper middle class. Will they register for such a course? More importantly, what will they expect from it?

Here experience brings surprises. And none is greater or more significant than the enthusiastic response of liberal arts students to precisely the kind of old-fashioned battle history the professor now seeks to minimize. A course can be titled "War and Society." Its main emphases can include military-political relationships, the influence of armies on social structures, the psychology of violence—all issues extremely pertinent, if research and opinion polls are believable, to both the military historian and the undergraduate. But the class is never more alive than
when discussing Operation Barbarossa or the Vicksburg campaign. Technology, operations analysis, tactical doctrines—all the miscellaneous nuts and bolts of war interest the liberal arts student at least as much as the themes he is expected to enjoy.

It would be easy to accept Peter Paret's suggestion that this attitude reflects "... a demand for colorful gore and for the vicarious experience of crime and punishment." No doubt such elements are present—a hypothesis substantiated by personal experience of teaching a similar course in a branch of a state university. That class, which included a large number of Vietnam veterans, showed little interest in battle history. The students were far more interested in understanding the forces which had put them into uniform and sent them into combat. Nevertheless when conscientious objectors, avowed, intellectually-aware pacifists, and students actively involved in anti-war causes since their days in junior high school manifest a deep interest in subjects which might be considered more pertinent to military cadets, the phenomenon deserves further investigation rather than dismissal.

To some extent, interest reflects ignorance. Students generally deny that their previous academic work ever dealt with such themes. This in turn suggests that the historical profession has moved far from the days when a high school course in U.S. history could be little more than a chronology of America's wars. But there is a deeper contributing factor. A disproportionate number of liberal-arts students have been raised in an environment stressing proper thought and proper behavior. They have absorbed correct, modern attitudes towards conflict. As a result, violence is for many of them what sex was to their Victorian grandparents: something fascinating but forbidden, involving emotions nice people do not feel and actions nice people do not perform.² War is a bogey, a Principle of Evil wholly immoral and wholly irrational. When first confronted with the possibility that it can be a subject for dispassionate analysis, the liberal-arts student may be shocked. Shock, however, rapidly gives way to pleasure at the officially-sanctioned breaking of taboos—particularly if the instructor can refrain from playing the role of liberator.

Seen in this context, the initial interest in the technical details of military history is both logical and useful. It reflects a natural desire to explore an area previously not only unknown, but surrounded with a delicious aura of wickedness. More importantly, it is a step in approaching the study of military affairs as a scholar instead of as a moralist. Students who analyze the use of muskets instead of rifles by eighteenth-century infantry, or the rationale of close-order drill, find it easier to believe that military establishments are not always strongholds of stupidity. Students exposed to the principles behind tactical doctrines of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are less likely than their fellows to suggest casually that soldiers are indifferent to human life. And eventually they find themselves discussing such previously unthinkable concepts as the moral appeal of militarism, or war as a socially profitable enterprise.

If the military historian is willing to abandon some of his preconceptions, he will find most of his liberal-arts undergraduates ready to abandon theirs, to appreciate a "more realistic attitude toward the problem of warfare... really valuable for any conscientious objectors." They
find, as one evaluation declared, the subject “really has screwed up my ethic, my approach to my fellow man, and my thoughts on war—i.e., it has certainly made me think more than I really wanted to.” But perhaps the best demonstration of the compatibility between the military historian and the liberal arts college came from a student who suggested that for him the course in war and society was like sex: “when it was good, it was very good, and when it was bad, it was still pretty good.”

FOOTNOTES


6 The quotations are taken from anonymously-completed student evaluations of a course titled “War and Society” taught at The Colorado College during the spring semester, 1970–1971.

[Professor Morton commented briefly on Professor Showalter’s remarks, noting from his own experience since he first started teaching at Dartmouth that so-called “battle history,” the doubters notwithstanding, has always attracted liberal arts students. He then introduced the second panel member, Professor GUNther ROTHENBERG of the University of New Mexico.]

Professor ROTHENBERG: In view of Professor Showalter’s remark about state universities, I had better start on a note of apology. You see, I do teach at a state university, in a very arid environment—in fact, in the desert!—and while I cannot match the eloquence, the wit, the wisdom of my predecessor, perhaps I can make a contribution to the nuts and bolts of the situation as it pertains to my experience “Teaching Military History in a State University.”

A few years ago Professor Allan R. Millett delivered a paper on the state of military history at a meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Despite the existence of a great many obstacles, he argued that American military history research was “on the objective reorganizing and consolidating, not struggling on the line of departure.” And yet, after marshalling an impressive array of scholarly research, published and unpublished, he concluded that “a general understanding of military history does not exist in our universities.”

This, of course, was a familiar appraisal. Since 1899, when Charles
Adams made his “Plea for Military History” to the American Historical Association, numerous scholars, including Charles Oman, Oliver L. Spaulding, Liddell Hart, Alfred Vagts, and Samuel Eliot Morison, have argued the case for military studies, but with indifferent results. In 1912 Professor R. M. Johnson of Harvard noted that he taught the only course in the country outside the military academies and 60 years later there still are few university positions open to military historians and the field has yet to achieve the legitimacy of general acceptance as an academic discipline.

There exists substantial agreement on the causes of this state of affairs. In 1939 Charles Oman explained that “both the medieval chroniclers and the modern liberal historiographers . . . strove to disguise their personal ignorance or dislike of military matters by deprecating their importance and significance in history.” In 1962 the chairman of our session, Professor Louis Morton, reached similar conclusions. He ascribed the weakness in military studies to the “strong anti-military tradition of the late nineteenth century.” American academicians, generally of the liberal persuasion, retained a distant, often hostile, attitude to military affairs. Moreover, there was the view that it had become unacceptable, not a problem to be examined, but an evil to be shunned. “Regarding war as an aberration, an interruption to the normal course of human progress,” Morton observed, “historians have generally avoided it as a subject unworthy of study, if not downright dangerous.” According to Alfred Vagts some 25 years earlier, they proceeded on “the curious assumption that by ignoring realities the realities themselves will disappear.”

World War II, of course, had brought the realities closer to home and even in the late 1930s and during the following decade there appeared a number of major works such as Quincy Wright’s A Study of War and John U. Nef’s War and Human Progress. Although these works still tended to regard war primarily as a disruption in the normal progress of society, they opened the way to serious examinations. In addition, the war stimulated the production of a number of extraordinarily well-balanced and objective military histories; it brought historians into closer contact with the services, and it was followed by a continued, and often close, relationship between academics and the services during the decade of the Cold War. But this was an uneasy relationship and during the last few years the hostilities in Southeast Asia have reawakened the old dislike of academicians to things military. Some, so Robin Higham claims, even express grave concern about the morals of those who occupy themselves with the teaching and study of military history. Yet, Michael Howard noted that the same academics are not necessarily opposed to violence if it has the correct and fashionable label.

But all this is but one aspect of the problem. There also is the change in military history itself. The subject has now become so complex and diffuse that the military historian today may well wonder whether his field still exists as a distinct study in its own right or merely as a compendium of particular aspects of other disciplines. “Traditional” military history, developing in the nineteenth century, concentrated on operational history—the analysis of campaigns, battles, and leadership—as well as institutional, sometimes “regimental” history. Its purpose was to strengthen martial and to aid in the education and training of military personnel.

This type of military history that by the current sociocultural climate of history as an academic discipline. Outside of courses in the military history within the entire range of the social sciences, the military historian was often left to attempt to educate his students, but also the history of international alliances, of technology, and the general understanding of the world. This apologetic stance of the military historians that there misconceptions have “emerged into the open” upon the label of war as an aberration.

I have not found university courses taught because of student interest, as science courses are. Nonethele the Military ROTC, the Evolution of Amendarable number of courses are not offered at all, but rather have been created to enroll a large number of students and not just those designed for civili
The American Historical Charles Oman, Oliver L. Samuel Eliot Morison, have indifferent results. In 1912 he taught the only course and 60 years later there would appear to be grossly exaggerated. The suitability of this type of history as an academic field remained open to question, but in any case, outside of courses taught by military instructors in the ROTC programs, it never found much favor in the universities. The new approach to military history was more broadly based. It concerned itself with the entire range of organized conflict in human societies, a subject which as Clausewitz pointed out is primarily political. Following the lead of Hans Delbrück's "Military History in the Context of General History," it attempted to encompass not just military campaigns, leaders, and institutions, but also the causes and characteristics of war, the conduct of alliances, the interaction of diplomacy and military power, science and technology, and many other aspects.

Even in this new broader form, a form which I have often found confusing and lacking a clear focus, military history has usually been brought into the university curriculum with an air of apology. Its justification was no longer in the future applicability of its teachings, but rather in the premise that it would help to "promote peace by an understanding of the realities of war." (Which was, of course, baloney!) This apologetic stance has been in part taken because of the fears of military historians that there would be no demand for such courses. "All the misconceptions hovering about the subject," Professor Mahon wrote, "emerge into the open as soon as students, in the act of choosing courses, come upon the label "Military History" or any variation of it."

I have not found this to be the case. On the contrary, in a state university courses usually are placed and maintained in the curriculum because of student demand. I teach military history at a university dominated, as most institutions, by doctrinaire liberals averse to violence. Nonetheless, during the last decade the University of New Mexico has introduced a curriculum in military history consisting of three-seminar. These courses are in addition to the usual courses on the French Revolution, the Civil War, and others like it. Also, there exists a fairly strong ROTC Marine Option conducts its own course on "The Evolution of Amphibious Warfare." I hasten to confess that this considerable number of courses in military history which are regularly offered are not the result of any sudden conversions among my colleagues, but rather have been the result of the empirical fact that the courses enroll a large number of students, usually 100 or more per course. It seems that in academia as well as on the battlefield, God is often on the side of the big battalions.

These are standard courses with no special inducements. It seems likely, however, that the fact that they are surveys, open to all junior students and not just to history majors, adds to the enrollment. They are designed for civilians with some knowledge of history. The emphasis is...
on methods and techniques (which includes weapons), means of raising armies, strategy, tactics, and leadership. There is no attempt to "civilianize" the courses or to diffuse the subject matter. The only general historical matters discussed are those which had a particular and definite influence on the development of warfare. The seminar, of course, is more specialized and deals with the history of World War II, a topic chosen because of the wide availability of research materials for papers.

The makeup of the students shows no particular bias towards ROTC cadets. Men outnumber women 2:1 and many, if not most students, take the entire undergraduate sequence. A smaller number go on to take the seminar and others take advanced work for a graduate field within an advanced degree. Additional work in military history can be done by taking independent reading courses and special projects.

My experience has been that there exists a strong demand for these courses, especially the surveys, which is not just limited to "buffs" but exists among a truly representative cross section of the student body. The survey courses provide not only the numbers, but they also constitute the base on which more advanced work is possible, and I would urge that more courses of this type, rather than more limited offerings, be stressed. As military historians, I am sure, all of us feel the obligation to educate our students about the character of war and military institutions. Survey courses provide the necessary audience and the best justification for our teaching in most state institutions. Beyond that I would like to urge the: we abandon our defensive posture. There is no need to camouflage our courses as something they are not. Military history is an important. I would say an all important, specialty field within history. I would argue that the time has come to abandon our defensive apologetic posture and justify our field by teaching and writing.

FOOTNOTES

4 On the Writing of History (New York, n.d.), pp. 159-60. The same prejudices existed in non-English speaking countries. In Germany Hans Delbrück found his advancement to tenure and a professional chair delayed because of his "insistence that the history of war was just as important as the deciphering of Roman inscriptions," Gordon A. Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian," in Edward M. Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N. J., 1943), pp. 282-83.
...means of raising weapons), means of raising is no attempt to “civilian- matter. The only general particular and definite seminar, of course, is more War II, a topic chosen materials for papers. particular bias towards ROTC if not most students, take number go on to take the graduate field within an history can be done by... strong demand for these st limited to “buffs” but on of the student body, but they also constitute le, and I would urge that ed offerings, be stressed. the obligation to educate literary institutions. Survey best justification for our t I would like to urge no need to camouflage of history is an important, within history. I would... 


Sir Frederick Maurice cited in Howard. Studies, p. 198. 
Mahon, p. 175. 
History 339. Military History of Europe to 1790; History 340. Military History of Europe since 1790; History 375. Military History of the United States, and History 569; Seminar in the Military History of World War II.

[Professor Morton then introduced the next panel member, Colonel THOMAS E. GRIESS, Professor and Head, Department of History, US Military Academy. Colonel Gries began by reminding the audience of the special task of West Point—not at all the same as that of the private or public university—to produce enlightened military leaders with the background requisite to service as career officers in the Regular Army. “Any university,” he agreed, “must have among its objectives the personal and social growth of its students; otherwise the public is cheated of the fruits of its endowment.” For West Point and the other Academies, he suggested, an emphasis on self-discipline and dedication of self to service is at the very heart of their reason for existence. He then went on to describe and comment upon the military history portion of the West Point curriculum.]

Colonel GRIESS: The West Point program in military history comprises both required and elective courses. The limited time at our disposal dictates that we select the chronological and substantive scopes of all our courses with great care. Unlike Bacon, we cannot afford to take all knowledge, or even all of history, as our province. This being the case, we must emphasize those segments of the past, a knowledge of which will best prepare the cadet for his roles as soldier and citizen in the service of the Republic.

The required, two-semester, senior-level course, presently under long-term revision to stress the goals enunciated herein, examines man in his application of military power and traces the evolution of the art of war. To achieve this general purpose, the department stresses factors which have affected warfare. But it emphasizes breadth of coverage and breadth of thought as contrasted to familiarity with minute details. We are interested in sufficient data and details only to enable the cadet to assimilate the background for critical, logical, and supported analysis. But the course involves more than just an account of purely operational military history. There are too many external, impinging factors affecting the evolution of the art of war to permit adopting this limited view. And it is because these factors are generated in the social, political, and intellectual life streams of a nation that general history is such a vital supporting element. In one sense, this required course is both a capstone course in the cadet’s four years of professional military studies as well as an experience in the humanities. Through historical example the future
officer studies the aspects of his own profession; he sees how the art of war has evolved, how technology and logistics, for example, have refined the practice of the art. At the same time, he is examining man, his efforts in waging war, and his actions under acute stress.

Our one-semester elective courses include some which are taught each year and others, under the rubric of a “Topics in Military History” entry, which are offered periodically. In the first category are “History of Revolutionary Warfare” and “20th Century Warfare.” The former course is gradually evolving into an intellectual history approach to the theory and characteristics of modern revolutionary violence; the latter course combines a study of the military systems of the major powers, civil-military relations, and the influence of theorists to provide an understanding of the way wars have been waged in the 20th Century. Topics courses have been presented on Airpower, on Seapower, on War and Its Philosophers, and on War and Society. As the department gains experience, additional topics will be offered and the older ones will be refined and taught again.

At West Point we view military history in its broadest terms and offer courses which contribute to developing such an outlook. If the subject embraces preparation for war, waging and terminating war, the societal impact of both, and the peacetime functions of the armed forces, it should include categories articulated as operational, administrative, and technical, and the military and society. As I have implied earlier, we believe that military history derives its pertinency from acceptance of the validity of studying history as a discipline. If the specialized field has both an educational and utilitarian value, the individual must study it in depth, breadth, and context—to use Michael Howard’s phrase—if he expects to reap its full advantage.

We believe that military history involves more than just purely operational accounts although we appreciate that operational history can become a partial foundation for that critical analysis, or conceptualization, which the innovative officer later develops and requires in a professional sense. But the educated officer must also read and think about the military as an institution and the relationship between the civilian and the soldier. He particularly needs to milk history of all its wealth of material concerning the development of the American military system within the society which fosters it. He can learn much of how military freedom of choice, an assumed dictate in war, can be severely constrained by tradition and the constitutional system. Studied in such broad context, military history can tell the careful student much about what Sir John Fortescue characterized as the supreme test to which war subjects a nation.

We also believe that military history can provide perspective for critical examination of current problems. This perspective develops a sense of proportion and encourages the soldier to take the long view rather than to be attracted by short-term advantages or disadvantages. Because it contributes to an awareness that life moves in a channel of continuous change, it can counter excessive optimism or pessimism. Moreover, it will flesh out an individual’s sense of values which he uses to weigh achievements, methods, and decision. For example, detailed study of American w well as the practical c forces to civilian dire passion of temporal p

In summary, we upon war as a whole upon to the periods: inevitably returns. A among the most val individual teaches hi study of the subject proportion to the c encompasses bringing his study and asking material he is investi

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tion; he sees how the art of war, for example, have refined to their highest degree, and he is examining man, his genius, his foibles, for example, have refined to their highest degree, and he is examining man, his genius, his foibles, his passion, his stress, his passion, his stress, for example, have refined well as the practical difficulties in our system of subordination of military forces to civilian direction—and it does this shielded from the heat and passion of temporal partisan argument.

In summary, we want our students to cultivate the ability to look upon war as a whole and learn to relate its activities as a social phenomenon to the periods of peace from which it rises and to which it inevitably returns. And we hope that they begin to understand that among the most valuable lessons military history offers are those an individual teaches himself. The teacher can present an approach to the study of the subject but the individual gains from such efforts only in proportion to the degree of self-involvement. And such involvement encompasses bringing a critical and disciplined but impartial attitude to his study and asking the correct questions of the problem or research material he is investigating.

[The Chairman next introduced the fourth panel member, Colonel C. R. CARLSON, Vice Commandant, USAF ROTC. Colonel CARLSON opened by passing on the apologies of his Commandant, Brigadier General BENJAMIN B. CASSIDAY, JR., whose presence at the meeting in Florida of the American Council of Education had been required at the last minute. His remarks, which follow, stressed the place of military affairs and the study thereof in the AFROTC curriculum.]

Colonel CARLSON: The Air Force ROTC program is presently conducted on 186 college and university campuses across the nation. Our broad goal is to conduct a campus program to commission second lieutenants for active duty in response to Air Force requirements. Our more specific course goals are directed toward enabling AFROTC students to transfer the maximum amount of their knowledge, skills, and attitudes acquired through four years of formal education, to those junior executive duties encountered during their first several years as Air Force officers. We are also concerned, however, that we assist in the development of citizens and future leaders of our society.

The Air Force ROTC curriculum reflects an underlying theory that experiences in our sequence of courses are cumulative in nature. These clusters of experiences, if you will, affect the way students think, feel, and act. These experiences help mold students' attitudes toward objects and events in their environment.

The students' attitudes toward the role of the military in American society is one of our principal concerns. We recognize the importance of an exposure to a balanced and blended mixture of experiences in an academic setting where students deal with a wide range of views of the military profession. Our curriculum planners strive to accomplish this blend and balance by complementing other portions of the students' formal education.

We have made a recent decision to modify and update the curriculum. This modification, which I will say more about later, was designed to place greater emphasis on the role of the military, and more speci-
ically the Air Force, in American society. First, however, I will discuss how our curriculum is presently arranged.

Within our headquarters, we have a small group of officers serving as Course Directors, responsible for curriculum development. The Course Directors prepare and distribute course materials to our instructors on the college campuses. The instructors are encouraged to use these materials, but our guidelines are not specific or mandatory. Our instructors are afforded considerable latitude to choose from a variety of course materials and methods. The only mandatory portion of the curriculum is a listing of from four to six broadly stated course goals for each of the four academic years.

Now I would like briefly to describe our present course offerings which deal with military affairs, omitting the last year dealing with leadership and management in an Air Force environment. During the first three years of our academic curriculum AFROTC students receive instruction designed to acquaint them with the mission and roles of the Air Force as a part of the American defense establishment.

In the first year, students learn the organization, mission, and functions of the various operational commands within the Air Force. They are also introduced to the proud heritage of the Air Force through a study of some of the more colorful pioneers of aviation.

During the sophomore year, students are introduced to the considerations and processes involved in the formulation of defense policy. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of air power as an instrument of national policy.

During the junior year cadets study in greater depth the development of aerospace power into a prime element of national security. Here emphasis is placed on the development of ideas, concepts, and Air Force doctrine as related to national strategy. As you probably know, the junior and senior level courses carry three credit hours with only one credit hour per term in the first 2 years.

We have consistently sought to maintain a respectable academic content level in our courses. Our students receive academic credit for our courses from nearly all of our host schools.

Within the next 2 years we will change the placement of, and put greater stress on, military history. We will also expand treatment of the theme of this symposium—the military in society.

The study of Air Force history will be moved from the junior to the sophomore year. The emphasis on development trends in the employment of aerospace power will continue to be the principal theme of this course. A new textbook on Air Force history is presently being written, using the resources of the Air University and periodic consultation with the History Department here of the Air Force Academy.

The junior year curriculum will deal with the military in American society. The principal emphasis of the course will center on the role of the military in the formulation and implementation of defense policy, as well as the military as a social institution. Our curriculum planners are currently working with the faculty of both the History Department and the Political Science Department of the Air Force Academy to develop quality course materials. The forthcoming textbook, American
First, however, I will discuss
the group of officers serving on the development. The Course
materials to our instructors on this encouraged to use these materials. Our instructors are from a variety of courses. A significant portion of the curriculum is focused on the development. The Course portion of the present course will be greatly reduced in order to provide increased time for the changes I have described.

The freshman and senior courses are not being changed. We intend to maintain various enrichment options within our new curriculum. For a number of years we have called upon distinguished faculty members on campus to participate in our education program through guest lecture arrangements, in many instances using corps training time as well as regular class time to hear distinguished speakers from the host campus or from other campuses. We have also called upon many to participate in the development of various portions of our curriculum. We will continue to encourage this type of working relationship with resident experts on campus.

It is not my purpose to describe the specific course content of our Aerospace Studies courses. I would like to conclude, however, by reemphasizing that our curriculum is oriented toward complementing the curriculum of the host university to develop better prepared citizens as well as Air Force officers. We expect that our planned new course offerings will not only stimulate AFROTC cadets to take more history, political science, and international relations courses, but will also contribute to the total campus dialogue on the subject of the military in our society.

[The Chairman next introduced the fifth and final panel member, Ms. BERENICE A. CARROLL of the Department of Political Science, University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign Campus. Ms. CARROLL addressed her remarks to the question, “The Military and the Civilian: Is there a difference?”]

Ms. CARROLL: When I set out to prepare this paper, I chose to address it to a question posed for our panel by Professor Morton: “Should we teach military history in civilian institutions?” The question begs for an answer in the negative. For one thing, it would be boring, at least in this setting, to answer in the positive. For another thing, the question itself implies that there must be something wrong with military history, or anyway something about it which might make it unfit to be taught at civilian institutions of learning (and considering all that is taught there, that must be very bad indeed!). But before answering the question either way, I think now that I should state some things about myself which do not appear in my professional vita, but which I regard as pertinent to the theme of the symposium, as well as to the subject of this panel.

On May 18 of this year, I was arrested with a group of 38 persons who were attempting to sit down in the road in front of Chanute Air Force Base in a symbolic blockade of US military operations, as a protest against the US blockade of Haiphong Harbor. Prior to that time, I had never personally engaged in a considered act of civil disobedience, though I had for some years supported such actions in principle, in the classroom,
and by tangible assistance. I have also long been opposed to granting any form of University credit to ROTC courses; to the acceptance of military contracts by university personnel; and to granting university facilities to military recruiters or recruiters for civilian corporations heavily involved in military production. I was strongly opposed to acceptance by the University of Illinois of a contract with the Department of Defense to build a supergiant computer, the Illiac IV, to the tune of about $24 millions. Though the University's connection with this project was not completely terminated, I was pleased that opponents did succeed in blocking the plans to locate Illiac IV on the campus of the University of Illinois, or indeed—if I am not mistaken—on any civilian university campus.

All this is said to make clear two points about my position here today: first, that it is somewhat anomalous for me to be here at all; second, that my views on the representation of military history are shaped by a more general conviction that the military presence on civilian campuses should be sharply reduced.

I have been surprised to find that many people fail to see the anomaly in my being here, despite the positions described above. It is not primarily that I should expect to find myself unwelcome here. Perhaps I am, but I imagine that the gentlemanly traditions of the Air Force and of the Academy would combine to dictate a polite reception, and that there might also be some open-minded interest in an exchange of views with someone who takes such positions. Nor is it that I see Air Force personnel as "the enemy," with whom it is either dangerous or undesirable to consort. On the contrary, for example at Chanute Air Force Base on May 18, the military police guarding the base were restrained and humane in their behavior, while the civilian Sheriff and his deputies behaved like hoodlums. Moreover, I fully agree that "When a country looks in its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror." Nevertheless, it does seem inconsistent, if not downright hypocritical, to have been trying on May 18 to "stop the Air Force"—however symbolically and without expectation of success—and then on October 6, to accept Air Force hospitality. Why then did I accept?

The question is one of personal ethics which I will not pursue fully here, but one point is relevant to the general question to which this paper is directed; i.e., military affairs on the civilian campuses. It is that the blurring of the lines of distinction between the military and the civilian in this society has grown to such proportions that the problem of accountability for any given institutional acts—such as the bombings in Indochina—becomes almost impossible to resolve.

That people are personally, individually responsible for the actions of their institutions I fully believe. From that point of view I do hold every member of the US armed forces here present personally, individually responsible for the destruction and social disruption which their institutions are wreaking in Southeast Asia (and, in different ways or lesser degree, in other parts of the world). But whether the military men whose institutions carry out such actions are to be held more accountable for them than the civilians, whose political, economic and educational institutions order, direct, legitimize and support them—that is by no means so clear to me as highly complex, as many others in my profession know who are more "innocent." Clearly the women—equally privileged which in this case means the men—must show themselves equally innocent.

In 1959, I was strongly opposed to the acceptance by the University of Illinois of a contract with the Department of Defense to build a supergiant computer, the Illiac IV, to the tune of about $24 millions. Though the University's connection with this project was not completely terminated, I was pleased that opponents did succeed in blocking the plans to locate Illiac IV on the campus of the University of Illinois, or indeed—if I am not mistaken—on any civilian university campus.

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opposed to granting means so clear to me. I draw my salary from an institution which I regard as highly complicit in the perpetuation of the war, as do most of the people I know who oppose and protest the war. Those whose institutions are more “innocent” with respect to the war in Indochina sometimes show themselves in other ways—for example discrimination against women—equally committed to the values of domination and elite privilege which in my opinion lie at the root of militarism and war. From this point of view it is much less clear that accepting Air Force hospitality at this symposium is any more inconsistent than my position, and that of many other civilian opponents of the war, in our daily lives.

In 1959, I wrote of General Georg Thomas that he represented a paradox,

... dreadfully symptomatic of military leadership in the Third Reich: the conspirator against Hitler who from day to day “at the office” served his despised master with unwavering diligence, competence, even loyalty.

I did not imagine then how uncomfortably close, in principle and if not in detail, these words would come to describing my own situation, and that of many others in this country, both military and civilian, in 1972.

In taking the position that the military presence should be reduced as much as possible on civilian campuses, I am not under any illusion that this will solve the general problem of confusion and overlapping between the civilian and the military in this country. That problem is much deeper and broader, and rooted in other long-term 20th-century developments such as the introduction of peacetime conscription, the growth of standing armies, the enormous expansion in size and wealth of the “Defense” establishment since World War II, and the spread of the idea that “modern war means total war,” with the corollary belief that there is no difference between what is military and what is civilian for the purposes of making war or preparing for it. Peacetime conscription and large standing armies provide a pool of skilled and mobile but essentially idle personnel and equipment which is quite naturally put to use for such non-military purposes as disaster relief, public engineering, and other functions which give the military forces a benevolent air and divert attention from their central functions of warmaking. Mass conscription and changes in the technology of warfare have also led military establishments increasingly into the business of civilian education and research, both as provider and consumer. The wealth of the Defense Department today is so great as to make it one of the greatest (perhaps the greatest single) employers of civilian personnel and a major component of the civilian economy in many parts of the nation.

All these developments tend to mix the military and the civilian together, giving the military forces “constructive” civilian functions and educating military personnel to conform to civilian standards of academic or technical performance, with the effect of gaining greater acceptance and respect for the military in society at large—an acceptance and respect rather scarce in the earlier history of this country. Above all, the daily association of military personnel with civilians in ordinary activities of civilian life, economic and educational, tends to make us
all forget that the central warmaking functions of military institutions are killing and destruction.

Reducing the military presence on civilian campuses would not change all of that, but it might provide a kind of intellectual space for honest, critical analysis, which is extremely difficult under the present conditions of entanglement between civilian institutions of learning and military establishments. This point calls for considerably more discussion, but in the remaining time and space available to me here, I want to turn to some remarks more specifically about the teaching of military history.

In the controversy over ROTC and the teaching of military affairs on civilian campuses, the primary objections raised against military history have been: (a) that military history tends to be militarist history, glorifying or at least magnifying military traditions and exploits, uncritical of the basic premises and values of military establishments; (b) that military history is often narrowly conceived and taught as a form of military training, a source of “lessons” on how-to-do-it (or not do it) in terms of strategy, tactics, and even weaponry, rather than as a field of historical or social analysis.

The response to these objections has been twofold: reassessment of the content and character of military history itself; and institutional reorganization of the ROTC programs.

Efforts to refine and improve the writing and teaching of military history, to bring them more in line with scholarly disciplines in the social sciences, antedate the struggle over ROTC, but have taken impetus from it in recent years. Peter Karsten, who was to have been with us today, has argued explicitly for “demilitarizing military history.” Karsten’s proposals are perhaps not new, but he states clearly the need to turn away from the militarist and training aspects of past work in the field, and calls for studying war and military systems “from the wide-ranging, open-ended perspective of the social scientist,” for “research into the nature of such institutions and of their relation to social process, social change, and social control.” He also urges that military history be used for purposes of self-criticism by military personnel:

The military community ought to be directed to examine historically the limits and abuses of military force. They ought to compare their values to those of the rest of society. They ought to engage in more analysis of themselves and their institutions (such as that achieved recently by Colonels James Donovan and William Corson, and General David Shoup). We should insure that they use history to “understand,” not simply to “arm.” themselves.*

Similarly, the institutional response to attacks on ROTC programs has been an effort to modify the militaristic and training aspects of the programs. This trend is well represented by a statement of the Association of American Universities, in conjunction with other major associations of civilian colleges and universities, issued in April 1971. The statement recommended that the programs be renamed “Officer Education Program” (dropping the “1” and programs should be the participating agreement”; that credit be based as is credit for other courses conform to should seek “the course instruction” and that “technical” be shifted as much as a military environment.

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Moreover, the “civilianizing” of blurring boundaries history improves acceptance among civilian curricular civilian institutions influence of the more widely in the large. I would su
(dropping the “Training” emphasis from the old name); that the programs should be developed as a “joint and mutual responsibility of the participating academic institution and the respective military department”; that credit for courses in the program be granted “on the same basis as is credit for other courses offered by the institution” (i.e., that courses conform to civilian academic standards); that the programs should seek “the maximum appropriate use of civilian faculties in course instruction” (presumably, to “civilianize” the course content); and that “technical-descriptive material and field-type work” should be shifted as much as possible to summer or other training periods “in a military environment”—i.e., away from the civilian campuses.

From the viewpoint of the Armed Forces, these recommendations probably seem desirable, in the interest of gaining acceptance for the programs and perhaps genuinely improving them with the help of civilian faculties. From the viewpoint of the civilian institutions, they probably seem desirable first, in the interest of understanding protests against the programs, and second, in the interest of “humanizing”—or at least civilianizing—the programs (and thus it is hoped the military institutions themselves) by placing them more under civilian control and direction. If these were indeed the considerations in mind, then I would suggest that the calculations of the military services were correct—that is, that the recommendations will serve to improve the programs and make them more acceptable—but the calculations of the civilian institutions were illusory.

To begin with, it is not clear that “the civilian” is necessarily more humane than “the military”. Professional military forces have certainly committed their share of stupendous crimes, not least of which are those which US military forces are committing today in Vietnam. But many—perhaps most—of the worst crimes in history, including this war, have been committed at the orders of civilian governments or parties, and many have been carried out by non-military or paramilitary groups (Gestapo, SS, secret police, concentration camp guards and trustees, lynch mobs, etc.) rather than by professional military forces. The growing dehumanization of warfare today, moreover, seems more due to the work and influence of civilian technologists and social scientists than to that of professional military personnel. It seems therefore quite unfounded to imagine that giving civilians greater control over programs of military education will serve to humanize military institutions or warfare—the contrary seems at least equally likely: that is, that the effect will be to make both more inhumane.

Moreover, these trends—both “demilitarizing military history” and “civilianizing” military programs—only intensify the more general problem of blurring boundaries between civilian and military spheres. As military history improves in content and sophistication, it gains as a field in acceptance among civilian historians and strengthens its position in the civilian curriculum. As military programs are integrated more into civilian institutions they not only gain in acceptance but diffuse the influence of the military institutions, and responsibility for their actions, more widely in the educational system and the civilian population at large. I would suggest, too, that the teaching of military history as a
major subject, even if somewhat "demilitarized," tends in itself to reinforce the value system which attributes high importance and widespread acceptance (or at least resignation) to war. The corresponding absence of courses in "peace history" reinforces the nebulous, weak, and even negative image of the nature, conditions and prospects of peace.

I am too much the wishy-washy liberal to give a firm negative answer to the question posed at the outset: should we teach military history at civilian institutions? I have a strong aversion to "exclusionism," and given my own past work in the field, it would be hard for me to maintain that military history, suitably demilitarized in orientation, cannot make a valuable contribution to historical studies and even, perhaps, to peace. But I have come to feel that it is time we have less military theory and more peace theory, less military research and more peace research, less military history and more peace history. We have so little indeed of those three—peace theory, peace research, and peace history—that I suspect many of you have no conception at all of what they might be. I hope that we will have time to speak to that point in the discussion period.

Discussion

The discussion period that followed centered primarily around the remarks of Ms. Carroll. Colonel Theodore Roth (ROTC, Colorado State University) addressed the first question to her, asking if she would expand on her reasons for feeling that ROTC courses should not be awarded academic credit by host schools. Ms. Carroll replied that "it has to do with my feelings that there should be distinctions between what is civilian and what is military, so that the lines of accountability will become clearer. ROTC programs are institutionally related to military forces in such a way that it does not seem to me to be proper that civilian credit should be given for those courses. There should be clearer institutional distinctions, especially in matters where we can see implications in terms of personal responsibility."

Jay Luvaas (Visiting Professor of Military History, U. S. Military Academy), citing his experiences on the question of academic credit for ROTC courses at Allegheny College, wondered whether the whole question might not be "a tactic with some and a philosophy with others. If you get rid of academic credit you void the government contract and thereby get rid of the ROTC detachment, which is indeed the objective of most people who want to do away with credit. I take it that is not your [Ms. Carroll's] main objective. When the issue came before the Instruction Committee at Allegheny, where the students have a larger voice but equal numbers with the faculty, a very interesting thing happened. Instead of doing away with credit, the committee discovered that the students much preferred the ROTC course in management to the ones taught in the Economics and Political Science departments. As a result the ROTC course is now given credit for our distribution evaluation as well as academic credit."

"I don't quite understand," Luvaas continued, "where we gain by drawing clearer lines of distinction. I would prefer to go the other way. It seems to me every time we get a

John Mahon (Chairman, history, commenting contributed to the peace feeling is that you don't understand the anatomy of history—not a romp against war as it was)

Ms. Carroll that causes of war can lead the Chairman, must when she referred to the question, Ms. Carrol that we really have been done under the questions. History—the history and instances where social change. Draw women's movement has been a demand hardly any history, but peace also

"But that," the question. My guess have been resolved that led to war. W were therefore thetion."

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John Mahon (University of Florida) joined the defense of military
history, commenting that “if I thought the teaching of military history
contributed to the perpetuation of war, I would stop tomorrow. My own
feeling is that you cannot advance toward peace unless you first under-
the anatomy of war. I believe a well-presented course in military
history—not a romanticized course—would be as inclined to turn people
against war as it would to turn them in favor of it.”

Ms. Carroll then questioned the theory that understanding the
causes of war can lead to an understanding of the causes of peace. Peace,
she contended, must be studied more explicitly on its own grounds. This led
the Chairman to ask her to define more explicitly what she meant
when she referred to courses in “the history of peace.” The Chairman's
question, Ms. Carroll responded, was a confirmation of her main point—
that we really have no image of what peace is. She went on to cite work
being done under the auspices of the Conference on Peace Research in
History—the history of the peace movement, pacifism, non-violent action,
and instances where non-violent means have been used to bring about
social change. Drawing comparisons with the Black movement and the
women’s movement, she noted how one outgrowth of both movements
has been a demand for Black history and women's history. “Women have
hardly any history, certainly no history they know about; and it seems to
me that peace also has been deprived of its history.”

“But that,” Ms. Carroll continued, “is only one aspect of the
question. My guess is that by far the largest number of conflicts in history
have been resolved without war, and yet we seem to remember only those
that led to war. We then go on to assume that conflicts that led to war
were therefore the most important conflicts. I would reject that assump-
tion.”

Gunther Rothenberg, interjecting a comment upon a comment,
worried that “we are not getting involved in a degree of semantic
confusion. We talk about the peaceful resolution of conflict, but we often
forget that peaceful resolution has often been achieved by the presence
of force on one side and its absence on the other; one can always achieve
peace by surrender. This is one item that is often forgotten. We talk
about the peace movement and its peaceful methods, but I for one do not
find 500 students armed with sticks, stones, and assorted other equipment
particularly peaceful. Their sign may be peace, but it does not give
me great confidence.”

Following Rothenberg, Dennis Showalter suggested that Ms. Carroll’s
remarks on the absence of peace history might be taken as a slight by
diplomatic historians, but his main point was to question whether “there
might not be a problem in this emerging discipline of peace studies—
namely, a tendency to turn it into indoctrination rather than an academic
subject. I wonder if the tendency here might not be to establish a goal, an
end, and then hammer the evidence to fit it.”

As time was running out, the Chairman briefly summarized the issues
raised and called the session to a close.
PANEL “B”

THE WRITING AND PUBLICATION OF MILITARY HISTORY

Colonel HURLEY: Ladies and gentlemen, the topic for our second panel this morning is one many of you have asked that we devote a session to at one of the symposia in this series. Our chairman is Professor THEODORE ROPP, presently Visiting Professor at the US Army Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks. Most of the time he is Professor of History at Duke University where he has trained several of the men in our Department here at the Air Force Academy. Like Professor LOUIS MORTON, he has been a constant source of encouragement and good advice in the development of these symposia, and again I feel especially fortunate having him with us.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, one of the bits of good advice that I hope I gave to the organizers of this session was to have a session with no theme whatsoever, but with, rather, a group of resource people. In my present job, which is answering the phone at the Military History Research Collection, where I normally answer with the words, “Clio speaking,” I am a kind of middle man between the producer and the consumer of historical material. The first question always is, “What do you have in the basement vault?” The second question is, “I have this (and fill in here any manuscript, article, or idea) and who is a likely publisher?”

The aim of our panel here this morning is actually audience participation. Our hope is that you will ask our distinguished resource people the kinds of questions I know all of you have when you come here, but which are so seldom asked at such meetings as these. What kind of a periodical is yours? Is there a market for my stuff? Do we really need a 1400 page study of four days in the Battle of Petersburg? These and other questions of the sort that constantly occur to those of us in the profession.

Each of these distinguished experts has three minutes to make his pitch, and he can say anything he wants to say; but mostly he will explain to you the kinds of questions he will agree to answer. [Professor ROPP then introduced the first panelist.]

DR. THOMAS G. BELDEN (Chief Historian, Office of Air Force History): The primary purpose of the Air Force History Program is writing history to be stolen from. The thieves fall into four general groups. First are the members of the Air Staff who steal our classified products, usually without attribution as to source. The second category belongs to the professional officer who is doing a study on a particular problem, usually classified, and often in the end without attribution. (Perhaps he wants to share the responsibility if he is wrong.) The third group is heavily represented here today, and this is the outside world of the academicians who use our product after it is declassified, usually with attribution, though often not, and of course we are unprotected by the copyright laws. In the fourth category are the popular military writers who usually use the material without attribution.
Now each of these different "thieves" has different requirements as to the format he would like to see our work in. The busy Air Staff member would like to have it if possible on a single sheet of foolscap, maybe even typed on a speech typewriter. The professional staff officer likes the footnoted details, particularly if they reflect his position. The academician wants great detail and exact sources. The popular writer, of course, wants to find a story, regardless of sources.

This diversity of audience that we write for places certain requirements on us in the creation and publication of our product. First, our rule is to write without regard to security classification. The reason for this is that if an author thinks about the classification process his tendency is to say, "I will not put this in because it won't get cleared." This approach distorts history. Declassification is a completely separate process.

Our second rule, or better question, is are the major controversies found and are all sides of the argument presented? This is terribly critical, and it relates to our third goal, which is to try to be objective. Now there are lots of good words about objectivity and how to achieve it. The only rule we have is that once an author gives all sides of the argument, and then wants to make a judgment on his own, that he label it as such.

Finally, we try to give all practical assistance to those outside researchers who are going further into a subject, and to help them find what they are looking for. This is the function of our Archives at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. So, to sum up, in the arena of academic warfare, particularly in the military history world, we don't mind historians destroying each other's theses—provided they get most of their ammunition from us. Thank you very much.

[The Chairman then introduced the next panelist.]

COLONEL ELDON W. DOWNNS (Editor, *Air University Review*): The purpose of our bi-monthly is to provide the best professional thoughts on global concepts and doctrines of air strategy and tactics. More specifically, articles written for us should deal with topics of widespread current professional interest—such as aerospace-related doctrines, strategies, tactics, plans, weapons, policies, etc.

Several of you have examined our *Air University Review*. (In fact, some 300 copies left this building yesterday!) You will know after examining those that we divide our journal into departments. You should also know that we have a checklist by which we measure articles for any department. We require, for example, that the manuscript have much new information, or new interpretations about a subject if it has been addressed before in our pages. Articles must be published first by us. We are not interested in reprints or condensations. Articles should be written by specialists, either by education, training, or experience. Finally, we desire articles that are written primarily for the senior military or civilian professional. We assume that the reader knows something about the topic, so a lot of background information can be omitted, thereby giving the author an opportunity to narrow the topic and treat it in depth.

In the last 8 years several historical articles have been published in
many of the *Air University Review* departments, even though our interest in history is rather limited. We publish historical articles revealing potential lessons that might help the military professional in our own day, but we are not a journal of history. Like the Army's *Military Review*, the Naval Institute's *Proceedings*, and other service publications, we have published historical articles through the years and will continue to do so. Just remember that historical papers directed our way should contain lessons of use to today's professional airman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Colonel DOWNS. Most of you know our next panelist, Professor ROBIN HIGHAM, who wanted 6 minutes because he has two periodicals. I think, nevertheless, that we'll try to hold him down.

PROFESSOR ROBIN HIGHAM (Kansas State University and Editor of both *Military Affairs* and *Aerospace Historian*): What we are looking for in an article for *Military Affairs* is a significant contribution to military history that either uses new sources or comes up with new interpretations. As far as subject matter is concerned, we have no limits geographically or chronologically. In other words, the sky is the limit, but we *would* like to see some imagination.

I would like to see some people looking, for instance, in the area of historical demographic studies. Other possible areas in need of work are: the relationship of military recruiting to society; a reappraisal of the role, place, and development of fortifications, perhaps, or the introduction and development of calculus and the computer where naval tactics have been concerned. Also, not very much has been done so far with military literature, despite all Ted Ropp's urging to the contrary. The opportunities still open, I would submit, are boundless.

For *Aerospace Historian* we want some of the same kind of articles, but we have a rather different audience, attuned more to aviation history. Under that broad rubric, the opportunities are similarly boundless. Where articles are concerned I would note that in both cases, in both *Military Affairs* and *Aerospace Historian*, interested authors will find a short blurb in each issue giving "instructions to authors." These instructions include limitations in the length of articles, limitations brought on by financial considerations that restrict the space we can use. I should also note that with both journals we use editorial advisory boards and referees to whom we send articles to be reviewed and criticized. We nearly always are able to return those referee reports to the author, whether the article is accepted or rejected. Finally, before sitting down, I would like to squelch the rumor going round that somebody is going to offer me a third journal. Thank you.

[The Chairman then introduced the next panelist.]

MR. JOHN F. LOOSBROCK (Editor, *Air Force Magazine*): I was very flattered when Colonel Hurley asked me to participate in an academic discussion because I have only one degree, a bachelor's degree in the dubious field of journalism. Then I discovered in the second
even though our interest in historical articles revealing professional in our own Army’s Military Review, service publications, we learn and will continue to direct our way should be.

DOWN. Most of you GHAM, who wanted 6 , nevertheless, that we’ll

s State University and historian): What we are significant contribution or comes up with new thing, we have no limits on, the sky is the limit.

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list.

Force Magazine): I would participate in an event, a bachelor’s degree offered in the second

letter that I was going to be on a panel with a bunch of other editors, and I was very much deflated. It was sort of like dressing up for a blind date and finding out it was your sister.

I look on editing a periodical as one of the last refuges of personal journalism in this country—and it is nice to be in a job where you have the very last say. I think it was Adlai Stevenson who said that an editor is a man who sorts the wheat from the chaff and then prints the chaff. Most of my authors, or at least a number of them, describe it in a little different way: they describe an editor as a guy who doesn’t know what he wants, but as soon as you give it to him he doesn’t like it.

Air Force Magazine is a small market for military history. We would like to get some good history, but we do turn down a great deal more than we print, averaging only about eight to ten articles a year. Our article length is a rather short 2,500 words. Whenever we get a manuscript longer than that there is a sort of standard rubber stamp message that we put on the cover and send it back to one of our in-house editors with instructions to cut it in half and give it some wallop. If, indeed, we do not send it back directly to the author, similarly stamped.

Our audience, incidentally, is not as homogenized as you might think. We have a total circulation of 115,000, about 40 percent of whom are Air Force people on active duty. We also have a lot of what I would call “Air Force alumni,” people who served in the Air Force during World War II or Korea, to many of whom that period of service is still the highlight of their lives. And, of course, we have readers in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve; we even have some 5,000 cadet readers, both from the Academy here and the Air Force ROTC program.

Years ago I made what I laughingly call a living as a free lance writer, and I still have a sign on the wall in my den that says anything worth doing is worth doing for money. I say that to indicate to ambitious authors that we do pay. We run from 7 to 10 cents a word, depending primarily on how much of our own time must be spent on the manuscripts. (Before your eyes light up I should perhaps make clear that we pay this amount after, not before, the manuscript is edited!) We do not have a board of editors; in fact, we really have no set pattern for reviewing articles. Most unsolicited manuscripts are circulated through our editorial staff, working their way towards me with the appended comments of the various editors. We are very democratic about it. The editorial consensus always rules—unless I overrule it.

In conclusion I jotted down a few trade secrets for authors One is to read a few issues of the publication before you submit a manuscript. We get all too much that has been sent in by an author who obviously has not even a clue as to what we are trying to do. Number two is to take rejections gracefully, remembering that they are not always personal, that the editor’s main constraint really is space, and that he has to turn down a lot of stuff he would like to publish if he could. Point three is never deliver a manuscript in person (not to me, anyway!) and then sit there and expect me to read it while you are staring at me eyeball to eyeball. And my last recommendation is never ask for constructive criticism, because you just might get it. Thank you very much.
THE CHAIRMAN: And now we switch to the question of sources, and what, sir, is in your basement?

DR. JAMES E. O'NEILL (Deputy Archivist of the United States): Well, being neither a writer of military history nor an editor of a journal, I was wondering what I was doing here until I discovered this basement problem. We have a good many basements.

I am an archivist, a mere archivist, and it occurred to me that as an archivist I might simply raise several issues pertinent to the writing and publication of military history. I put them into two key words: bulk and secrecy.

As an archivist I am in the documents business and share responsibility for vastly more documents than most people can even imagine. We don't even count them; we simply measure them by the cubic foot, and at last count there were 13 million cubic feet in the National Archives proper, in the six Presidential Libraries we operate, and in the fifteen Federal Records Centers scattered around the country. Conservatively, that is about 30 billion pieces of paper.

I cite these figures to remind you that the twentieth century has produced so much documentation that any researcher is in danger of being overwhelmed by it. We are here in Colorado at the edge of these beautiful mountains and, if I may borrow an image therefrom, somewhere in all those mountains of paper are the nuggets of gold that an individual scholar wants, and it is very difficult for him to find them. He is certainly not going to get much of an answer if he asks me what's in the basement!

A few practical suggestions. The first is to try to learn how the professional archivist handles records. While riding in on the bus this morning the gentleman next to me asked if archivists were trained in at least the position of a library school. The answer is no; they are not librarians. Only a handful have ever gone to a library school and most wouldn't even be caught dead near a library school. They are largely historians, almost to a man, who have drifted into archivy, if you will, not as an original choice but usually as a result of some historical accident. The archivist approaches his material, then, with certain basic principles in mind. Mostly, he leaves it alone.

He doesn't try to reorganize in the ways a book librarian does, or in the way that certain of the classical archivists of medieval Europe did. He doesn't do so because he has learned that when you are dealing with masses of material such as I described earlier, any kind of reorganization into subjects inevitably breaks down. The more familiar, the researcher is with the way the archivist works, and especially the more familiar he is with the organizational structures related to his topic, the greater are his chances of finding what he really needs, of finding the nuggets. I would add that if he learns to use the peculiar kinds of finding aids that archivists produce he will go a long way towards solving his problem.

The other problem is that of secrecy, or classification as it is sometimes called. Since World War I most military documents have at some time in their lives been classified; a few still from World War I, and most since World War II, with Weigley called ye military and political researchers go there are some grisly problems.

In March of Order that provide for classified documents for a system for a time, once classified, some person in a system tries to get it after a given period of time, we may individually, we in National Archives many years to meet the process we will go marching into.

For those of order, the material which may be of any classified researcher. Then, the material which may or finding aids. At least the possession of that material much of the problems, a new psychology.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN promises for a professor—rightfully an editor, but I...
to the question of sources, I think went all the way through the second World War and possibly are sources are still coded. We have about one billion pages of permanently valuable classified documents, essentially dating since 1940, with an occasional one prior to that time. When Professor Weigley called yesterday for more research on the interaction between military and political leadership, he posed a problem. How in the world are researchers going to do this if all the stuff is closed to them? I think there are some grounds for hope.

In March of this year [1972] the President issued a new Executive Order that provides a new approach to the problem of obtaining access to classified documents. Its most fundamental provision is the creation of a system for automatic declassification. Under the old system a document, once classified, went on being classified almost indefinitely, unless some person in authority took a positive action to declassify it. The new system tries to reverse this by providing for automatic declassification after a given period of time, except of course that persons in authority may individually reclassify documents in certain categories.

We in the National Archives have been given funds to declassify all the World War II material. We will do so in the next three and a half years to meet the new 30 year automatic declassification rule. In the process we will declassify at least 160 million pieces. By 1976 we will go marching into the postwar era.

For those of you who can’t wait for this mighty mountain-leveling machinery to operate, there are other provisions of the new Executive Order that may prove helpful. The order requires the mandatory review of any classified material at least ten years old upon the request of a researcher. There are many problems in this area, problems of identifying the material when you can’t see it to begin with, or can’t see the indices or finding aids. But this particular provision does give to researchers at least the possibility of gaining access and perhaps declassification of material much earlier than 30 years. My own feeling is that despite all the problems, and despite a certain degree of delay in accepting all the new psychology involved in this approach, that it is going to be a success. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Our panelists really have lived up to their promises for a change, and we now have, in effect, our star performing artist—rightfully so called because not only is he a military historian and an editor, but his books sell!

MR. BARRIE PITT (Editor in Chief, Ballantine’s Illustrated History of World War II): I would like to talk with you about a problem I first became aware of when doing research for a book on one aspect of the First World War, and one which has been brought increasingly to my attention in my capacity as the editor of a series written by authors of many different nationalities. In his commentary on the papers of Professor Black and Professor Coxx, Professor McNeill spoke of the allowances which must be made for local and peculiar differences in attitude resulting from differing traditions in history. I would like to suggest that the same kinds of allowances must be made when carrying out historical research in countries foreign to the researcher. And part of the trouble
is that it is very often difficult to discover the differing traditions because very often the natives themselves are as unaware of them as a healthy man is of his bloodstream.

I first became acutely aware of this difficulty on my first visit to the United States many years ago. I had been invited to lunch at the Army and Navy Club in Washington. I arrived a little early and as I waited for my host I became conscious of a group of people standing a little way away surrounding a tall, distinguished figure whom they addressed as "General." In due course he embarked upon a story they all found amusing and I, indeed, found most relieving. It appeared that a young boy had asked his father the meaning of the word "tautology," and he had said that if he were to refer to a stupid Army general, then that would be a tautology.

Now as I say I found that a great relief. There was in Europe at that time a distinct feeling that the United States military were taking themselves a good deal too seriously. The general's telling of the story, and his attitude to it, at least indicated that we had not got a completely true impression. The general and his party then went in to lunch and my host arrived and so did we and then it happened we found ourselves at adjoining tables. By coincidence my host was known to all the members of the general's party and in due course the conversation became general and later we all got together over coffee and cigars, the general paying great courtesy to this visitor from Britain. "What," he inevitably asked, "are your immediate impressions?"

Well, my reaction was the normal one: the clarity of the skies, the beauty of the cherry blossoms, the height of the buildings, the length of the girls' legs—the normal reactions, the first exposure to the American wonder. And then I remembered the story I had heard him tell and I told him of the relief I had experienced. He was rather intrigued by this and I told him the conclusion I had drawn was that an organization in which the high command could tell jokes against itself was obviously in no danger of monomania. This little sally of mine into Anglo-Hitlerian understanding was met, to my surprise and consternation, by a stunned silence in which I was interested to note that the general's coloring turned from a fairly light tan to a dark plum. I thought at first that this might be owing to his having swallowed his cigar, but I found this was not the case. He got rid of the cigar, hammered his fist on the table, and said, "God damn it, Sir! I am a Marine Corps general!"

Now there was then no published work which could reveal to the foreign student that this state of affairs existed. And I had not then of course had the pleasure of listening to Professor Black's discourse yesterday, specifically the part where he pointed out that there are in developing countries [!! Ed.] particular phases when the armed services fight against each other. Now there are few people here, I am sure, who would deny that matters of military history are rarely quite so simple as they appear. I would just like to point out that when carrying out research in a foreign country you will probably tend to see everything through the distorting glass of local tradition.
DISCUSSION

The Chairman opened the discussion with two questions directed to Mr. Pitt: “Is there a military history boom? Who buys your books?” Mr. Pitt replied that surveys conducted in England revealed that 85% of subscribers to the earlier Purnell series on the Second World War were between the ages of 15 and 35. Further, that older people who had served in the war themselves, when asked why they had subscribed, replied that they had done so for their children. And finally, that in connection with the Ballantine series, the vast majority of the correspondence emanates from the age group of 15 to 30. Later in the discussion Professor Brian Bond of King’s College, University of London, asked Mr. Pitt if he would care to speculate further on why, in view of widespread anti-war feeling among the young in both Britain and the United States, such an apparently large number of young people find war, particularly the two world wars, so fascinating. “Do you think this interest is largely antiquarian, perhaps, or romantic, or more nearly technical?” Mr. Pitt replied at some length.

“I think there are perhaps two sides to my answer; indeed, to your question. One is that there is an interest among young people in warfare. There is an interest in everybody alive in conflict, whether it is the conflict of getting a job, or of persuading one’s girlfriend to say yes. Any story has to have conflict to hold attention, the vast majority of people inevitably asked, being more interested in conflict than in entertainment per se. And war is basic conflict.

“Secondly, we have at this moment in time a very large generation of highly intelligent and very well educated youngsters who want to know why the world in which we live is as it is. And, so far as Europe is concerned at any rate, the two great shaping events of the world of today were the two world wars. I have also found in my travels to various university campuses that many of these young people, certainly more than I had been led to think, agree that the Second World War was a war that had to be fought and had to be won— that a world in which Hitler had had his way would not have been a worthwhile world for them to be living in now.

“Finally, I think a third reason for the success of the Ballantine series—and believe me, I don’t mean this as a commercial—is that we have tried very hard to live up to the age old adage that one good picture is worth a thousand words. This is true, of course, only if it is in exactly the right place—so you don’t have to turn to page 324 to look up the name of a place which doesn’t appear there anyway, in order to find out what is happening. I think, for example, that it is genuinely possible for somebody to buy an account, say, of the Battle of the Marne in our series in New York and to arrive in Washington having read the book and having a pretty good idea of what actually happened. I think this has much to do with why that particular series has proved so popular.”

Professor Harold C. Deutsch of the National War College and the University of Minnesota then commented on his own findings that interest in World War II among young people may stem in part from the fact that “poppa and uncle, who were there, are getting nostalgic and are
creating more interest just by talking more about those years than they might once have done a few years back.” He then asked Dr. O’Neill whether there wasn’t some means by which occasionally to prod those persons in authority (as Dr. O’Neill had termed them) who seem bent on holding things back from qualified researchers. He then related an experience at the Public Record Office in London shortly after the British government had retreated from the 50 Year Rule to the 30 Year Rule. Having located a document deftly described in the index from which he was working, Professor Deutsch found the document marked “not available until 2015.” Dr. O’Neill again referred to the new Executive Order and its provision that the refusing agency must provide a reason for its refusal to release a document; also, that even when the prod is unsuccessful, “there is nothing to prevent any researcher from coming back in 5 years, or indeed even in 1 year, and prodding again.” Unsatisfied, Professor Deutsch asked why the National Archives administration did not see it as their duty to do the necessary prodding. Dr. O’Neill, experienced in the ways of bureaucracy, replied that “we have not done so yet because we are waiting for things to shake down a bit. We do have a few things we are going to pull out and urge upon appropriate agencies in good time. But we do not want to frighten them just yet.”

William Carstetter of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service then asked Mr. Loosbrock whether he, as an editor, was interested in receiving personal letters outlining article ideas. Mr. Loosbrock suggested that such letters of inquiry are more than welcome, just so long as they clearly indicate the proposed length, scope of coverage, and probable range of conclusions. “It saves our time and in many cases will save yours. It may even be that we can suggest a reorientation of the proposal that would make it more suitable to our needs.”

This discussion period concluded on a question raised by Brig. Gen. Noel F. Parrish (USAF, Ret.) of Trinity University. Noting that good illustrations and maps are often missing from books published in this country, he asked Mr. Pitt where he manages to find all his illustrations, where any writer can do so. Mr. Pitt emphasized that it was not easy at all, that he has had a team of three people looking all over Europe for about 6 years now, and that even when they are found, “someone has to pay for them.” Vice Admiral Edwin Hooper (USN, Ret.), Director of the Naval History Division, reminded the audience that his office maintains an extensive photographic archives where reproduction costs must be absorbed by the would be user, but that there were no copyright problems. Dr. O’Neill also cited the photographic resources of the National Archives and Library of Congress. The general, if unstated, conclusion of this discussion seemed to be that good illustrations and maps can be found, but that it is (1) hard work, and (2) liable to be costly, if not for using rights then for reproduction costs.
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military and society: the military as
a social force in american society

The Fourth Session

Ethnicity, Race, and the American Military:
From Bunker Hill to San Juan Hill

Bruce White
Erindale College, University of Toronto

When small bands of English colonists first braved the rigors of the
new world, the terms "military" and "social" were often indistinguishable.
In Jamestown, colonists were marched to church twice daily for nine
years, and each was assigned a military rank with corresponding duties by
the colony's marshal. A corporal, for example, was "to provide that none
of his Squadron, be absent, when the drumme shall call to any labour, or
Dosbrock suggested worke, or at what time soever they shall be commanded thereunto for the
service of the Collonie . . . ." 1 Citizenship was synonymous with soldiering.
As the Indian menace receded, however, a more complex social order
evolved, with a multiplicity of roles, in which making sergeant in the
Virginia Company had a low priority indeed.

North Americans, unlike Latin Americans, possessed the numbers,
technology, and motivations to exclude the Indian from the class structure
of their society. 2 From the earliest settlements until the Battle of Wounded
Knee, however, Indian relations affected the institutional life of the
military establishment. There was no peacetime army until the 1890s, and
in its operations against its most persistent foe, the army, unlike civilian
society, needed the Indian, both as a raison d'être and as scouts, guides,
allies, and soldiers (as individuals and in organized units) to oppose an
enemy who had not read Baron Jomini on strategy and the art of war.
Red was thus a primary color on the nineteenth century military canvas.

As an institution, the army was never able to respond appropriately
to the differing techniques and aims of Indian warfare, although a number
of individual officers, through their employment of Indian scouts, learned
a good deal about tribal habits, organization, and antipathies. Army
officers were at least as repulsed as civilians by what seemed a barbaric code
of ethics, but at the same time many officers could appreciate and under-
stand a code in which status was gained through martial exploits, and in
which courage, stamina, and keen senses were honored traits. Consequently,
some officers could perceive, as even eastern humanitarians could not,
what was to become the primary social and psychological problem for
Indians—the debilitating effects of reservation life as wards of the govern-
ment. George Crook wrote perceptively on this subject, but even a less sensitive officer such as George Armstrong Custer could realize that the Indian would be “only a pale reflection of his former self” on the reservation.

The basic motive in the employment of the Indian as a soldier was always a pragmatic one of subduing hostile Indians to make the frontier safe for the white emigrant, but the concept of the military as a civilizing force was often intertwined. Beginning in the 1870s, a number of army officers and civilians suggested that a more permanent employment of the Indian as a soldier might have social as well as utilitarian value. Although the army successfully opposed a Senate proposal in 1883 for an Indian military academy, 7 years later Indian troops and companies were being organized in regiments west of the Mississippi. The chief initiator of the plan was Major General John M. Schofield, who became Commanding General of the Army in 1888, and who explored most fully the concept of the military as a melting pot for Indians. Enlisting Indians, Schofield argued, would provide a natural and legitimate outlet for the aggressive drives of young braves, thus easing the transition into white society. As soldiers they could learn trades, the English language, and habits of obedience, cleanliness, punctuality, and order. The Indian soldier or ex-soldier would be an effective missionary for the uplift of his tribe. Thus the army would become a social agency transforming “wild” Indians into solid citizens.

The experiment failed within 5 years for a number of reasons, but chief among them was the fact that the Indian wars were over. Military need had fostered tolerance and flexibility, but with the coming of peace, combined with the new enlisted status of the Indian, the army demanded a conformity which resulted in disillusionment on both sides. The routine of peacetime army garrison life was certainly less than appealing to the Indian soldier, who was soon seizing on any pretext to obtain a discharge. One group requested to be released because they were not receiving as many pies and cakes as the other companies, and in another instance an Indian bugler claimed that blowing his bugle made him chronically ill.

The experiment with Indian troops and companies did have two important results, however. First, the Indian escaped the restrictive legislation of 1894, which prohibited aliens from enlistment who could not speak, read, and write English. Second, the failure of the plan convinced the army that the Indian must be individually integrated as thoroughly as possible into white units; henceforth the military through World War I would reject all proposals for separate Indian units during an era when it was just as adamantly resisting the integration of blacks. From the Indian’s standpoint I think this was a mistake, for Indians needed visibility in an increasingly apathetic society, and segregated units with Indian officers could have furthered a sense of racial pride, stimulating in turn the confidence and respect of others.

Army control of Indians and involvement in Indian affairs was intimate and varied throughout the nineteenth century, even after 1849.
when supervision of Indian relations was transferred from the War Department to the newly-created Department of the Interior. When army officers controlled reservations, Indian agencies, or Indian prisoners, the best results were a diminution of fraud and graft and a concomitant increase in the quantity and quality of food and supplies, and, among some officers, a sensible flexibility in encouraging herding, cattle-raising or fishing instead of the often misguided panacea of farming. As a group, officers who served as Indian agents were clearly superior to their civilian counterparts—more honest, better educated, and usually with more experience and interest in Indian affairs. The worst aspects of military control were a frequent paternalism which stifled progress, or, on the other hand, a dehumanizing regimentation and overly harsh discipline, particularly among those officers who neither understood nor sympathized with the plight of their charges. After serving as agent for the Mescalero Apaches, for example, Lieutenant Victor Emanuel Stottler wrote that the Apache was “ignorant, cruel, superstitious, cunning, filthy, lazy, stubborn, treacherous, immoral, intemperate, mendacious, and an inveterate beggar besides ...”. Stottler’s tactics as agent included withholding food for disobedience of his demanding orders, and when an Indian child was not attending school, he not only cut off supplies to the child’s parents but also jailed the grandmother until the hapless student returned.

The cynosure of army Indian policy was the conviction that the Indian must be defeated militarily through the application of resolute force before he would respect whites and appreciate kindness and generosity. It was but a corollary to the belief that war was an inevitable and, to some officers, desirable component in human relations, which could solve societal problems, or at least morally regenerate the vanquished. “War,” wrote one officer in 1883, had “led the way to civilization.” This was rather distinctively a military view, but in most other respects the military echoed civilian attitudes and solutions, with a certain lag befitting traditionalists. Although charged with being exterminationists, most officers, like most civilians, believed that the Indian was doomed by natural processes, and none consistently advocated genocide. For many officers, as for many other Americans, the word “extinction” really meant assimilation or amalgamation. Unfortunately, with a few notable exceptions, military men were just as obtuse as civilians in their lack of appreciation of Indian culture and in their inflexible conviction that tribal organizations should be summarily dissolved. An army officer formulated the concentration policy, and army officers generally supported the reservation policy and land in severalty after these had become popular panaceas.

Like most other Americans, army officers naively believed that the rule of law would protect the rights of all. The individual must be the responsible economic unit, and, of course, “responsible” people were those who owned private property. In power, however, the army often found paternalism a less demanding role than the attempt to implement these ideals and took the latter course, as in the quarter century of military control of Geronimo’s band of Chiricahua Apaches. Army officers were at their best in pointing out the inadequacies and inequities of civilian or divided control. They could often be sensible and sometimes
trenchant, as, for example, when General Jesup appealed to the War Department in 1838 not to remove the Seminoles from their lands. There is little to indicate, nonetheless, that given permanent control of Indian affairs, the army would have compiled an enviable record. The army had neither the means nor the will to effect or direct the accultur- 

ation and assimilation of the Indian. The white man's world in which the Indian would be living, moreover, would be a civilian one in which the soldier himself was often ill at ease.

In one area, however, the views of an army officer reigned supreme in late nineteenth century America. Richard Henry Pratt, the founder of the Carlisle Indian School at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, was more re- 
sponsible than any other individual for the increasing interest in Indian education during the 1880s and 1890s, and his success at Carlisle encouraged government management of Indian schools, which before 1870 had been almost entirely in the uncertain hands of religious denominations. Carlisle was soon followed by a number of similar schools, some of them conducted by army officers, and Pratt's formula of one-half day of work and one-half day of study was copied throughout the Indian school system, as were his military organizational techniques and methods of discipline. This was unfortunate, because in many cases superintendents had neither Pratt's skill nor his sincere desire to prepare his charges for the outside world. As a result, many schools became characterized by a spartan, routinized daily life that killed resourcefulness and initiative. Pratt's system of student government was studied and copied by other educators, and his outing system, whereby students at Carlisle were apprenticed to homes and businesses during the summer months, left a permanent mark on Indian education. His philosophy of removing the Indian child per- 

manently from his environment was a most unfortunate ethnocentric re- 

sponse, and led to government support of non-reservation boarding schools until the 1890s, when their limitations and the advantages of day and reservation boarding schools began to be appreciated. Pratt's influence on the course of Indian education was thus a mixed blessing.

Pratt was also interested in the welfare of the black soldier, and tried to be scrupulously fair. On one occasion, for example, when selecting the orderly for the post commander while inspecting the guard, he found one white and one black soldier to be superior to the rest but seemingly equal in appearance. To resolve the dilemma, he took both of them into another room and made them strip to their socks and shorts. The Negro had on cleaner ones, so Pratt selected him. Few military men were this committed to equality for black soldiers; the army, from the colonial militia through the formation of the black regiments after the Civil War, accepted only reluctantly the military service of blacks because of need. Although slaves and free Negroes, like Indians, were excluded from the militia by legislation in almost every colony, they served in substantial numbers during the colonial and Indian wars. Fear of arming blacks and of losing labor services was periodically eclipsed by military need. The same pattern appeared during the Revolution; the Continental Congress initially refused to sanction black enlistment, but by the end of the war an estimated 5,000 Negroes had served in the revolutionary forces.
In 1792 blacks were prohibited from serving in state militias,\(^7\) a measure generally effective until the Civil War, although they fought in militia units during the War of 1812, and served in Louisiana throughout the ante-bellum period and in independent companies in northern states during the 1850s.\(^8\) Despite the substantial service of blacks in the War of 1812, the army prohibited their enlistment in two ways—by a general order in 1820 specifically barring “Negroes and Mulattoes,”\(^9\) and, in the same year, by limiting eligibility to “free white male persons.”\(^10\) The labor of blacks was nonetheless needed by the army. In response to a Congressional inquiry in 1842, the War Department reported that almost 700 slaves and 25 free Negroes were employed as “mechanics, laborers, and servants,” and court martial records show that black volunteers served in the Mexican War.\(^2\) The story of massive black participation in the Civil War, grudgingly accepted, is well-known,\(^2\) and it is now generally accepted that it was military need, more than Radical idealism, that prompted the authorization of the black regiments in 1866.

The social attitudes of army officers toward Negroes, like those concerning Indians, rather closely paralleled civilian views. A substantial minority, mostly Southerners, were proponents of slavery, but very few were dedicated abolitionists, which seemed to army officers to point toward violence and anarchy. The majority probably believed slavery to be an evil, but one which must be eliminated only gradually as the Negro was educated to assume his role as a citizen. This group included Southerners such as Winfield Scott and George H. Thomas and Northerners like George B. McClellan. What those officers who did not join the Confederacy had in common was, of course, a devotion to the Union and also a desire to maintain the status quo. Their ideal, at least at the outset of the war, was epitomized by the inscription Lieutenant Anson Mills had engraved on his sword—“No abolition, no secession, no compromise, the Union as it was from Maine to Texas.”\(^24\) Once the South had seceded, however, most officers agreed it must be brought back by force, for it flaunted legally constituted order. For most officers it was a struggle to preserve the Union, not to abolish slavery, and officers accepted the latter course only to weaken the South and shorten the war. Such views were unexceptional, but the pragmatism of military men did put a number of them in advance of public opinion and its master barometer, Abraham Lincoln. Secretary of War Simon Cameron was more anxious than Lincoln to use the Negro as a soldier, and his successor, Edwin M. Stanton, was also considerably more receptive to the idea. In addition, abolitionist career officers, such as David Hunter and John W. Phelps, may have been few in number, but they were in strategic positions as army officers and were instrumental in arousing public sentiment. In a few instances army officers advocated the enlistment of Negroes as a means of uplifting them. Such a course, argued George H. Thomas, would provide a transition from slavery to assumption of the social and economic responsibilities of freedom.\(^25\)

At the close of the war most officers were decidedly tolerant toward the defeated South, and looked forward to a rapid restoration of the southern states to the Union; thus it is a mistake to picture the army during Reconstruction as the mailed fist of Radical policy in the South,
although some did embrace Radicalism during and after the war to further political careers. It was a frustrating situation for the army; on one hand, army officers firmly believed in law and order, and for that reason almost all of them argued that the army must remain in the South until this was established. By doing so, however, they were carrying out Radical reconstruction policies. Many officers were sensitive to the fact that Southerners' property was not being returned to them, and, in addition, their strong belief that all Americans should be engaged in productive activity worked to the disadvantage of the Negro and to the benefit of the southern planter. Furthermore, as strong believers in classical economics, many of them pointed out that there was a natural harmony between capital and labor which would reach its own equilibrium. The best thing Congress could do, General Sheridan advised the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, was to pass as little legislation as possible regarding the Negro "beyond giving him security in his person and property. His social status will be worked out by the logic of the necessity of his labor." Thus, Sheridan concluded, blacks would be protected by the law of supply and demand.26

Black soldiers were employed in the South for utilitarian rather than ideological reasons. White units were rapidly being demobilized, while most blacks had one year of service remaining. Blacks, moreover, were generally more willing to remain in the service, and, at any rate, lacked the requisite political connections whites were using to obtain early discharges. In addition, it was generally held that black troops were better adapted to warm climates.27 The army reacted defensively to southern opposition to black troops, as when General Grant ordered their removal to seacoast garrisons to avoid "unnecessary irritation and demoralization of labor."28

The same considerations prompted the authorization of the black regiments in 1866, and the western service of blacks, like that in the South, produced frustrations for the army. On the one hand, army officers and NCOs were guided by the ideal of strict equality for all under military regulations and by a natural desire to protect "their own" against outside attacks. On the other hand, they were convinced, as were almost all Americans, that the Negro was inherently inferior to the white man, and they deemed it necessary to respond to civilian reactions to the nearby presence of black troops. Before 1890, however, civilian pressures were muted by the stationing of black units at small, isolated frontier posts and by their frequent transference. In addition, most military men rationalized that blacks possessed qualities, such as obedience, docility, and loyalty, which were valuable military assets so long as blacks were officered by competent whites and confined to those branches not requiring a high degree of competence or intelligence.

The strongest proscription was against the Negro becoming an officer, a prospect which discomfited military men; how could Negroes, newly emancipated from slavery, know anything of honor, the social graces, or ancient (and essentially Anglo-Saxon) traditions? Radical hegemony in Congress made the appointment of black cadets to West Point inevitable, however, and the resulting furor over their treatment there was equally predictable. The army insisted, with some justification,
that black cadets received equal treatment from the West Point cadre, and also defended the Academy against charges of social ostracism of Negro cadets by the others. West Point, army officers explained, merely reflected the social sentiment of the nation; it was unfair to blame the army for the prejudices cadets had learned in their homes and communities. It was not an entirely convincing explanation; the army did generally represent the social sentiment of the nation, but it also maintained that West Point was a true melting pot, which took boys from a great variety of backgrounds and molded them into officers and gentlemen. If West Point built character and instilled moral concepts, why could it not ameliorate social prejudices? At West Point legal rights and social obligations were too intertwined for the army to make this fine distinction.

Discrimination against the black soldier existed in all areas of military life in the post-bellum period, but more striking was the upward revision of the army's estimate of the Negro's military performance. By the late 1880s the black regiments were recognized as elite units, effective militarily and with a high esprit de corps and reenlistment rate, as well as the lowest rates of desertion and alcoholism in the army, at a time when these were the army's main internal problems in the West. In the 1880s a few blacks were admitted to branches of the army other than infantry and cavalry, and a few officers even suggested they be permitted to become artillerymen, which supposedly necessitated a higher degree of competence. In 1891 a black troop was sent to Fort Myer, Virginia, the first such unit to be stationed in the East.²⁹ Black cavalry units increasingly attracted better officers,³⁰ although this was probably as much because of their desire to serve in the cavalry and to engage in combat as it was enthusiasm for service in black units as such. Service in black units did generally result in increased appreciation of and affection for the Negro soldier.

These were far from halcyon days in military race relations, however, and they were short-lived. By 1898 the racial lines had noticeably hardened, reflecting both current civilian trends and the decreased need for black labor after the end of the Indian wars. The return of southern officers to the army may also have been a factor. In such an atmosphere, black service in the Spanish-American War produced only a short burst of general enthusiasm, followed by harsher treatment than before, including the deterioration of any semblance of equal military justice for blacks and renewed efforts to eliminate them from the army.³¹ As one scholar has noted, with need not a critical factor, “no contradictory ethical issue emerged during the Spanish-American engagement; it was not possible to halt further subjection of Negroes while subjecting millions of nonwhites thousands of miles from the continent.”³²

Before San Juan Hill and what it symbolized, nevertheless, America's wars were of significant benefit to blacks. The Revolutionary War stated the doctrine of equality and the Civil War included blacks in its promise, if not its immediate rewards. A number of blacks gained their freedom for bravery during the colonial wars and for service during the Revolution, which led to renewed efforts in the North to abolish slavery. The Civil War was an emancipating influence in more ways than one, and military
service was one of the most important. The American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, for example, reported in 1864 that “the display of manhood in negro soldiers” had been the primary factor in creating a more favorable impression of the Negro among whites. “Though there are higher qualities than strength and physical courage,” the commissioners reported, “yet, in our present stage of civilization, there are no qualities which command from the masses more respect.” The Union army became, as one historian has put it, a “school for Negroes,” with a remarkable number of schools being established for the Negro soldier and the freedman, conducted not only by northern civilians but also by army officers and their wives, chaplains, and enlisted men. Comprehensive educational systems were established in several military departments, which, in intent and scope, often went beyond the later Freedmen’s Bureau, and which were an important precedent for the development of a public school system in the South as well as for special emphasis on black education in the postwar army school system. In the Department of the Gulf, for instance, thirty regimental schools were operating before the end of the war, and it was estimated that during the war fifty thousand Negroes in that Department learned to read and write.

Many of the concepts attributed to the Freedmen’s Bureau were, in fact, first instituted by army officers during the war. The army settled blacks on plots of land and established all-black settlements (such as Mitchelville, South Carolina), aided them in harvesting and marketing crops, supervised the relationships between tenant farmer and plantation owner, and acted, on occasion, as a banker. In addition to such organized programs, the army also spontaneously supplied food, clothing, shelter, tools, medicine, and other supplies to Negro refugees during the war. The Freedmen’s Bureau itself was legally a branch of the War Department, run according to military procedures and headed by a career army officer, Oliver Otis Howard. Practically all of Howard’s immediate assistants were army generals, and half of them were career officers. At first, the majority of subordinate positions were filled by army officers and enlisted men.

Thus, the army was a social force of considerable importance during the Civil War and Reconstruction, and its impact was primarily a positive one. There was one important countercurrent, however, the anthropometric tests conducted by the Provost Marshal-General’s Bureau and by the United States Sanitary Commission on black soldiers during the war. The results were cited for several decades following the war to perpetuate the stereotype of black inferiority by presenting “scientific” evidence, unmarred by pro-slavery arguments, and the program set a precedent for the equally harmful psychological testing program in World War I.

For blacks in the nineteenth century army, segregation was a better policy than integration, although, ideally, they should have been able to choose either. It was helpful during the Civil War, when attention was focused on blacks in a situation where their services were sorely needed. In the post-bellum army, the black regiments not only created a favorable impression among army officers, but also helped to raise black self-esteem. As C. V. F. H. 

...
American Freedmen's Bureau were, as C. Vann Woodward has commented, black possession of weapons in highly visible groups "symbolized the fact that they could exercise power and authority and responsibility." Integration might not have resulted in the complete elimination of blacks from the army after the Civil War, but it is instructive that the movement to integrate the army, which resulted in the Panning Bill of 1876 and the Burnside Bill of 1878 (both of which were unsuccessful), was undertaken for precisely this end.

Military need for blacks paralleled that of American society; the same was true of the need for immigrant labor in the military and civilian worlds. Attempts were made in the colonial period to exclude recent immigrants from the militia for social reasons, out of fear of arming "the worser sort of people of Europe," or of losing their labor (when immigrants were indentured servants), or of defection to the enemy, especially when the immigrants were Catholics. On the other hand, the service of indentured servants was generally required in the seventeenth century, fear of or antagonism toward immigrants sometimes led to their impressment for military expeditions, and colonies often imported immigrants for frontier defense or encouraged their settlement there by various means. Ethnic considerations by the British Parliament also affected the colonial military situation, as when Parliament in 1756 decided to recruit a new regiment among the Pennsylvania Germans, not only to solve the perennial problems of Quaker reluctance to defend the frontier, but also to assure the military loyalties of the Germans and promote their integration into American life. On this and other occasions colonists resisted impressment of servants into the British army, although this sometimes led to their impressment into the militia as a preventive measure. Also, as the militia itself was increasingly transformed into a social institution from which immigrants were often excluded, much of the actual fighting was done by recent immigrants on the fringes of or outside of the social order, a practice encouraged by citizens of "respectability."

Need again determined military policy toward immigrants in the Revolution, heightened, as with blacks, by the military use of ethnic groups by the British. Restrictions on the service of servants were ineffectual, and actions against Catholics were restrained because of the desire for French assistance. Prejudices were readily apparent within the colonial forces, where immigrants were called "old countrymen" who, it was commonly assumed, would readily desert if the opportunity presented itself. Washington himself had some suspicions although his views changed as the need for troops increased, and some ill-feeling resulted from the flood of foreign adventurers seeking military posts, from discontent in identifiable ethnic units, such as the revolt of the Pennsylvania Line in 1781, and from incidents involving national feeling, such as the brief furor over the effigy labeled "Paddy" strung up by the Pennsylvania Germans on Saint Patrick's day at Valley Forge. Such incidents were minor, however, compared to the increased good feeling toward immigrants supporting the revolution. It can even be argued, despite the fact that the proportion of Tories was greater among cultural minorities than the general population, that the revolution could not have been success-
ful without the combined support of the Pennsylvania Germans and Scotch-Irish. Not only was this vital in Pennsylvania, but their influence (both clerical and through personal ties) was strongly felt in dozens of communities in other colonies.

Ethnic tensions growing out of American reactions to the French Revolution dissipated much of this good will during the 1790s, although the curtailment of immigration from Europe during the Napoleonic Wars delayed a military reaction to the presence of recent immigrants until the 1820s. In 1825 the army specified that special permission was needed before foreigners could enlist, but restrictions were not only progressively weakened but also widely ignored. By the 1850s, a clear majority of enlisted men were recent immigrants, with Irish and Germans predominating. In spite of a continuing regulation that recruits be able to speak English, moreover, there is ample evidence that many could not. The army simply could not persuade enough native Americans to enlist. As Francis Paul Prucha has concluded, it "could hardly have survived without this heavy non-American infusion," and this caused the largely white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant officer corps to modify or conceal its prejudices.

Need for the immigrants' labor also cushioned the effects of nativism, as a comparison with immigrant militia companies illustrates. Such companies were primarily social, and often drew the fire of native Americans. Irish militia units were disbanded in New York City in 1795, in Massachusetts in 1839, 1853, and 1855, and also in 1855 in Connecticut. To some extent this repression was directed against political activities of ethnic militia units not occurring in the army; the 69th New York Regiment, for instance, was formed for the stated purpose of aiding Irish liberation, and Italian companies in large cities were affiliated with the "Young Italy" movement. Nativists found ample fuel for their propaganda fires in the Catholicism of many immigrant soldiers, particularly during the Mexican War, when dark rumors circulated about the desertion of Catholic soldiers and of "popish plots to poison native American soldiers." The discovery that the San Patricio Battalion of the Mexican Army was composed entirely of American deserters, who were assumed at the time to be almost exclusively Irish Catholics, caused a stir, but an evanescent one. The army needed Irishmen too much to impose restrictions. The Irish were also politically motivated during the Civil War, entertaining hopes of a war with England stemming from England's initial sympathy with the South. Fenian "circles" were formed within the Union Army, but now, as Oscar Handlin has pointed out, Irish nationalists and American unionists shared a mutual Anglophobia. "Group consciousness," Handlin concludes, "now proved no barrier, but actually an aid to united action." Immigrants encountered little hostility during the war. Those in the North responded enthusiastically to the call to the colors, and an aggressive recruiting campaign was begun, both in the United States and Europe. In general, the talents of the alien soldier were appreciated by the army, although West Pointers were naturally favored over immigrants as well as other volunteer officers, and there were the usual instances of ethnic hostility.

During the Civil War, the proportion in the frontier army. The post-bellum arm it had been before although there were The army even enli was unhappy with the co of the various nation was a common mili had previously deser again. Statistics in the great many former problmatic, but it if the Englishman did or shirking his duti the immigrant sold Anglophobia, which prompted most of The Irish were superstitious. They a horse with one w legs were on the strayed as trustwort disciplinarians ther man non-commissi of most immigrant Sheridan, for exar always be superior training might be manner. Native control, but these Irish-Americans v similarly convince Merritt concluded in the Anglo-Saxon the best soldier for Unti the 1 continued to ass the American society total exclusion o Eugene A. Carr amalgam of the t foreigners migrat was commonly as "we are a comp and will double waned, as the
During the Civil War, as well as the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, the proportion of aliens in the army was considerably lower than in the frontier army, but the ante-bellum pattern soon reasserted itself; the post-bellum army was no more attractive to young Americans than it had been before the war. Irish and Germans again predominated, although there were now a greater variety of nationalities represented. The army even enlisted a company of Mexican-American scouts, but was unhappy with the results. Military opinions as to the relative merits of the various nationalities also generally followed pre-war patterns. The deepest and most continuous prejudice was against the English soldier; it was a common military complaint that many Englishmen who enlisted had previously deserted from the British army in Canada, and would desert again. Statistics in the ante-bellum period do not bear out the charge that a great many former British soldiers were enlisting, although there was obviously a good deal of falsification of background. The desertion charge is problematic, but it is instructive that one writer who complained that if the Englishman did not desert, he was constantly complaining, drunk, or shirking his duties, also admitted that few aliens deserted, and that the immigrant soldier was generally well-behaved. It was probably Anglophobia, which the military shared with other Americans, that prompted most of the bitterness.

The Irish were generally depicted as resourceful, if turbulent and superstitious. They reportedly considered it unlucky, for instance, to ride a horse with one whitestockinged foreleg and hind leg unless those two legs were on the same side of the horse. Germans were usually portrayed as trustworthy, professional, and amenable to discipline, but stern disciplinarians themselves; there were a disproportionate number of German non-commissioned officers in the frontier army. The good behavior of most immigrant soldiers, nonetheless, was disturbing to some officers. Sheridan, for example, concluded that native American soldiers would always be superior to German recruits because the latter, though their training might be excellent, would act in a mechanical and spiritless manner. Native Americans might be more boisterous and difficult to control, but these qualities were indispensable in battle. Presumably, Irish-Americans were more to Sheridan's taste. General Sherman was similarly convinced that Americans were more aggressive, and Wesley Merritt concluded that the "pluck, intelligence, and self-reliance inherent in the Anglo-Saxon are the qualities which, properly handled, must make the best soldier for the modern army." Such confidence waned, as the military, like Americans generally, viewed the "new
immigration" from Southern and Eastern Europe with growing apprehension. In 1888, despite the fact that the proportion of immigrants recruited was smaller than in many previous years, Inspector General Roger Jones was alarmed, and recommended in his annual report that a "strong effort" be made to enlist native Americans. Other military authors spoke of this need, and the standard manual for recruiting officers, issued in 1890, warned that foreigners who could not speak English were usually inefficient.

The culmination came with the 1894 law prohibiting the enlistment of non-citizens (except American Indians) who could not speak, read, and write English. The impetus for the legislation came from Congress, but the military concurred in its desirability. The law did not proscribe the reenlistment of alien soldiers who had left the army, it was pointed out in a circular, although they were not "the class of men now wanted for the service." There had, of course, been such a restriction before, but now, for the first time, it was effective. By 1903 the Army and Navy Journal found it amusing that foreign authors imagined the American army contained many immigrants, calling it "the most inexplicable of European fallacies . . ." The Journal could not imagine how such a notion originated.

For immigrants, the benefits of military service during the nineteenth century were substantial. Thousands found employment and an opportunity to learn the English language (or at least the army version) and American customs. To some extent, as a comparison of pension applications with enlistment records shows, the army functioned as a safety valve, recruiting immigrants in eastern cities and transporting them to the frontier, where many settled. Immigrants also gained geographical and vertical mobility through wartime service, often returning to places they had been during the war and improving their social and economic position. Louis A. Gratz, for example, arrived in America in 1861 as a penniless, non-English speaking, teenage German Jewish immigrant, and enlisted as a private in the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Infantry. By December of the following year he was a regimental commander, and in 1863 was appointed to the personal staff of General Samuel P. Carter, who was headquartered in Knoxville, Tennessee. He not only learned English during his military service, but also studied law. After the war he settled in Knoxville, becoming a successful lawyer and city attorney, and in 1889 was elected Knoxville's first mayor. Wartime service often meant freedom from indenture in the colonial and revolutionary periods, and land bounties granted to Scotch-Irish and German veterans of the Revolutionary War resulted in a westward migration from the Shenandoah Valley. During the Civil War citizenship was offered as an inducement for enlistment.

It is possible that integration in the frontier army may have protected the immigrant somewhat against recurring nativistic attacks, but during the Civil War, when attention was focused on immigrant groups in a favorable situation, segregation was decidedly the more beneficial policy. It seems reasonable to conclude that a more thorough-going segregation by nationality in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War would have aided ethnic groups. War, of course, has benefits of increased group gains in prestige losses for immigrant detrimental to culture nineteenth century furthering the acceptance.

The view west century America military small and society, yet in constant wars. In such a situation from military need, an army rifle. The in segregated units, liberals who have seen (which most America way. The social attitude reflects a change for the twentieth century America pi
d practical programs the thesis of Allen apart, reflects a challenge for the twentieth century. Hill was, however, rather than a continues promise and peril of and racial minorities for the first time, bility and possibilities. Crook was am

1 Quoted in Sign Seventeenth Century 457-475.
2 See the discussion in 1964), 94-99.
3 Crook was an officer of scouts would be for "civilizing and of 1781, John M. Sch Adjutant General. M Archives, Record G Received [hereinafter Problem," Journal Crook, "The War with Indians (Nor
4 For military Jan. 10, 1876. Ric Library, Yale Univ
War, of course, has been a strong Americanizing force, although the benefits of increased acceptance in American society, of individual and group gains in prestige and status, must be weighed against the cultural losses for immigrants. Integration in America has been notoriously detrimental to cultural pluralism, while service by nationality in the nineteenth century army was, and could have been more of a force furthering the acceptance of cultural diversity.

The view westward from Bunker Hill was toward a nineteenth century America preoccupied with continental development, with its military small and generally isolated from the mainstream of American society, yet in constant demand to police the frontier and fight America's wars. In such a situation ethnic and racial minorities generally benefited from military need, except, of course, those Indians at the wrong end of an army rifle. The benefit was generally greatest when minorities served in segregated units, thus confounding the arguments of twentieth-century liberals who have seen integration as a panacea, not only as a final goal (which most Americans would applaud) but also during each step of the way. The social attitudes of military men concerning ethnic and racial problems usually reflected the prevailing social and intellectual currents of American thought throughout the nineteenth century, as well as the practical programs to which those ideas have pointed, thus supporting the thesis of Allen Guttmann that the military, far from being a caste apart, reflects a changing American society. This thesis is as accurate for the twentieth century as for the nineteenth; the view from San Juan Hill was, however, a different one in two respects. It was toward a global, rather than a continental landscape, adumbrating both the unparalleled promise and peril of international conflicts and service abroad for ethnic and racial minorities. A peacetime army, in the interludes, would exist for the first time, but peacetime military service, with its relative obscurity and possibilities for heightened ethnic and racial tensions, would prove no boon to the military or to minority groups, at least until mid-century.

FOOTNOTES


3 Crook was ambivalent about the issue, however, for he also believed the use of scouts would be effective in breaking up tribal organization and making way for "civilizing and christianizing influences." Crook to John M. Schofield, Sept. 1, 1871. John M. Schofield papers, Library of Congress; Crook to the Assistant Adjutant General, Military Division of the Missouri, October 30, 1876, National Archives, Record Group 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office. Letters Received [hereinafter cited as NA, RG 94, LR], 4163 1876; Crook, "The Apache Problem," Journal of the Military Service Institution, VII (Sept., 1886), 263; Crook, "The War in Arizona." in Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo (Chicago: Lakeside Press edn., 1951), 337-343.


5 For military proposals, see William T. Sherman to Richard Henry Pratt, Jan. 10, 1876, Richard Henry Pratt papers, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University; Pratt to Philip H. Sheridan, Jan. 17, 1876, quoted in

Benjamin Harrison to Robert T. Lincoln, Jan. 29, 1884, NA, RG 94, LR, 716 1884; Senate Report No. 348, 48 Cong., 1 Sess.


Victor E. Stottler to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, June 30, 1896, in Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1886, 211; Stottler, “Pressure as a Civility of Wild Tribes,” Outlook, LVI (June 12, 1897), 397–400; Charles L. Sonnichsen, The Mescalero Apaches (Norman, Okla., 1958), 220–226.


Theophilus F. Rodenbough, comp. From Everglade to Cañon with the Second Dragoons (New York, 1875), 33–34.

Army officers generally supported Pratt’s views on education, or seemed indifferent, except for those who criticised him for his perpetual detached service at a time when more officers were badly needed on active duty. Indian education, Sherman complained, was “old woman’s work.” Pratt to E. D. Townsend, Dec. 5, 1878, 1st endorsement by Sherman, Dec. 9, 1878, NA, RG 94, LR, 8402 1878, filed with 6238 1878. The army itself became involved in Indian education in minor ways. Indian children attended post children’s schools in many instances, and occasionally separate schools were established for them. Schools were sometimes set up for Indian prisoners, and regular schools were established for the Indian units during the early 1890s. The army’s commitment to Indian education was not very deep, however, as was evident in the opposition of the army to compulsory Indian education. Army officers serving as agents were usually more aware of the need for compulsory education, and were ahead of most civil reformers in seeing the potential in reservation and day schools.

Pratt, Battlefield and Classroom, 28–29.


U. S. Statutes at Large, II. 271–277.

The Massachusetts legislature did vote in 1859 to permit blacks in the militia, but it was vetoed by the governor. Rhode Island, in 1835, allowed an independent black company to use state arms.


General Regular graph 13.

“Colored Person” (1877). 2nd Sess.


See Dudley Taylor Jacoby, Army, 1861–1865 (Nashville, 1968), 34.

Anson Mills, Man in the Civil War, 1861–1865 (Nashville, 1968), 34.


Marvin Fletcher, Military Affairs, XXXII (1965), 220–226.

Adjoint General

A good summary of the period between Two Wars: 141–144.

Marvin E. Featherstone, 1891–1917, unpubl. 156–158.

Ibid., passim.


“Final Report of the Secretary of War,” i

Records of the Union D.C., 1900, 369.


Chaplains, with other regiment. Elsewhere.

Bahney, “Gene

Army officers,” Bureau, Howard’s belief that force was no longer enough to

Joint Committee

more difficult. There were other, and some of the

1865–1877 (Baton Rouge), Committee, see Hon. John S. Hall, Inferiority, 1859–1913.


335.

Foner, The Infantry in the W.
American Indian, 1867-1886," unpublished but microfilmed manuscript, National Archives, 348.

34 General Regulations for the Army, 1821 (Phila., 1821), Article 74, Paragraph 13.


37 See Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York: Norton edition, 1966); Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War (Boston, 1953); Berry, "The Negro Soldier Movement."

38 Anson Mills, My Story (Wash., D.C., 1918), 390.


40 House Report No. 30, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., Part IV, 123.


43 A good summary of this trend is in Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 1865-1898 (New York, 1970), 141-144.


45 Ibid., passim.


49 Chaplains, whose duties included education, were provided for each black regiment. Elsewhere, there was only one chaplain for each post.

50 Bahney, "Generals and Negroes," 227-228.

51 Army officers were divided in their estimation of both Howard and the Bureau, Howard's religious enthusiasm, his self-righteousness, and his growing belief that force was not a necessary or helpful component in human relations did not endear him to his fellow officers. Almost all the army officers questioned by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction who expressed an opinion favored the continuation of the Bureau, but many complained that the Bureau made their task more difficult. There were continuous conflicts resulting from overlapping jurisdictions, and some of the hostility of Southern whites against the Bureau was vented on the army. See James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge, La., 1967), 41-42. For officers responses to the Joint Committee, see House Report No. 30, 39 Cong., 1 Sess.

52 John S. Haller, Jr., Outcasts from Evolution: Scientific Attitudes of Race Inferiority, 1859-1900 (Urbana, Ill., 1971), 19-34.


54 Foner, The United States Soldier, 138-139; Arlen L. Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West, 1869-1891 (Westport, Conn., 1971), 117-125. General
Sherman was a prominent supporter of the Burnside Bill for this reason. It is true, though, that a few officers, such as Richard Henry Pratt and James H. Carleton, advocated integration to benefit blacks.


42 The Virginia House of Burgesses gave this reason in opposing Governor Nicholson's proposal in 1699 to enlist indentured servants in the militia. The Burgesses especially feared the "sullen and unruly" Irish, former soldiers who had been recently transported to Virginia, whom they feared might kill their masters if armed. Philip A. Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols. (New York, 1910), II, 6-7.


45 A group of Palatine Germans in New York, for example, were forced to join an expedition against Canada in 1711.

46 South Carolina, for instance, purchased a number of Highland Scot prisoners to defend the frontier against Indian attacks. Warren B. Smith, White Servitude in Colonial South Carolina (Columbia, S.C., 1961), 29. See also Erna Risch, "Encouragement of Immigration as Revealed in Colonial Legislation," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XLV (Jan., 1937), 1-10. "Encouragement" sometimes meant impressment for frontier service, as often happened to young Scotch-Irishmen in Maine. The situation regarding the military service of immigrants was complicated by a number of other factors, including the skills of immigrant artisans (which sometimes excluded and sometimes assured their inclusion in the militia), fears raised by immigrant participation in colonial rebellions, real or fancied need to help put down slave uprisings, and dislike if matters of furnishing arms and equipment for their servants and bearing the responsibility for their attendance at musters.

There is a substantial literature on the Royal American Regiment, as it was later called, but on this point see Lewis W. G. Butler, The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, 5 vols. (London, 1913-1932), I, 16-17; Jean N. McLwraith, Sir Frederick Haldimand (London and Toronto, 1926), 9; Henry Harbaugh, The Life of Rev. Michael Schlatter (Philadelphia, 1857), 323. Schlatter was asked to be a chaplain in the regiment because he was the leading German Reformed clergyman in Pennsylvania.


47 George Washington's urging of impressment of servants in Virginia, however, evoked complaints such as that of James Maury that "raw, surly and tyrannical Scots" were filling the companies. James Maury to John Fontaine, June 15, 1756, in Ann Maury, Memoirs of a Huguenot Family (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co. edition, 1967), 404-405.


49 By the close of the war, Washington was even urging the enlistment of Hessian prisoners, and was served by an all-German guard.

50 Harry Emerson Wildes, Valley Forge (New York, 1938), 224-225.

51 William H. Nelson, The American Tory (London, 1961), 89. Immigrant motives for supporting one side or the other, unlike those of Indians and Negroes, were quite complex; the relevant factors include east-west sectional conflicts, economic fears and ambitions, religious and secular inter-colonial and intra-colonial ethnic ties and conflicts, fears of native cultural imperialism, hopes for greater acceptance and advancement, cultural or geographic isolation, and recency of immigration. Religious (of them) was an important factor, as was war, religious pacifism, economic fears raised by immigrant participation in colonial rebellions, real or fancied need to help put down slave uprisings, and dislike if matters of furnishing arms and equipment for their servants and bearing the responsibility for their attendance at musters.
immigration. Religious and secular old world antipathies and affinities (or the lack of them) was an important factor, as was old world military service or exposure to war, religious pacifism, the impact of the Great Awakening and the French and Indian War, the conditions of frontier life, class conflicts and motivations, disestablishmentarianism, and individual and ethnic personality traits. On balance, those factors growing out of ethnic experiences in America were more important than those related to European experiences and ties.

"General Regulations for the Army, 1825" (Wash., D.C., 1825). Article 74, Paragraph 1287.

As one might suspect, this could cause problems. George Ballantine, an Englishman in the American army, wrote that he was continually awakened at night by musket firing while in Mexico during the Mexican War. The reason, he discovered, was that German sentries were "not sufficiently acquainted with the English language to clearly comprehend their orders," and were giving false alarms. George Ballantine, Autobiography of an English Soldier in the United States Army, 2 vols. (London, 1853), II, 12-13. If another observer can be believed, other soldiers were in little danger. Rodney Glisan, an army surgeon, maintained that most immigrants had had no previous experience with firearms, and "could not hit a man at the distance of thirty yards, in a dozen trials." Rodney Glisan, Journal of Army Life (San Francisco, 1874), 55.


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Cunliffe, Soldiers & Civilians, 94. Many immigrant units were formed, of course, simply because they could not gain admission to existing ones.

Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 238.


Cunliffe, Soldiers & Civilians, 209.

For immigrant participation in the war on the Union side, see Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge, La., 1951).


Carl C. Rister, Border Command, General Phil Sheridan in the West (Norman, Okla., 1944), 164.


Sherman to E. Edward Lester, Oct. 28, 1878, William T. Sherman papers, Library of Congress. See also Sherman to John Sherman, Sept. 6, 1887, in Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed., The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman From 1837 to 1891 (New York, 1894), 377.

Report of the Adjutant General to the Major General Commanding the Army, 1888, 73; Report of the Inspector General, 1888, 101. Out of 6,693 recruits enlisted in 1888, 2,557 (less than 40%) were of foreign birth.


U.S. Statutes at Large, XXVIII, 215-216.
"Circular No. 11, Adjutant General's Office, Oct. 3, 1894. The depression of 1893 had caused increased enlistment by native Americans; this was undoubtedly a factor in the army's readiness to accept restrictive legislation. In 1894 the number of alien NCO's was about 22% and that of privates approximately 25%. New York Times, Dec. 12, 1894.

"Army and Navy Journal, XLI (Dec. 5, 1903), 344.

To cite two examples. James Allen, a laborer from Bristol, England, enlisted in Boston in 1872, and was discharged the same year at Fort Dodge, Kansas, for disability after being kicked in the chest by his horse. In 1890 he filed for a pension from Missouri, where he had been living since his discharge. Joseph August, a former German farmer, enlisted in New York City in 1873 and was discharged for disability the following year at Camp Wright, California. He was still living in California when he filed for a pension in 1892. Register of Enlistment entries and Pension Records of James Allen and Joseph August, National Archives.


The attitude of the Armed Forces since World War II can be seen in weeks after Pearl Hart was wounded. Their desire to enter the club that doesn't want them was dealt with the following estimation of the question of having a corps of black officers serving over white officers: "Rather have the Whites be used in our present Corps. Rather have them integrated than segregated."

Integration was part of this discussion. "When Mr. Truman asked him if he was serious about integrated service, Truman said let's go easy—as long as they don't have to serve with the white men."

In 1949 the story was as follows: "When Mr. Truman had difficulty in getting integrated service for the armed forces, he said, 'We've got to work on this problem, but let's do it slowly.'"

In the 25 years of 1941 and the services moved from a segregated service to a generally integrated service. Before it all worked out, it was an obligation to guard..."
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ARMED FORCES INTEGRATION—FORCED OR FREE?

Morris MacGregor

Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army

The attitude of the nation’s military leaders toward black servicemen
since World War II can be conveyed in a series of quotations. A few
weeks after Pearl Harbor, for example, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps described the possibility of black enlistment as “absolutely tragic.
Their desire to enter the naval service is largely an effort to break into a
club that doesn’t want them.” 1 This came from a man already on record
with the following estimate of the value of black marines: “If it were a
question of having a corps of 5,000 Whites or 250,000 Negroes, I would
rather have the Whites.” 2 Speaking for many of his fellow Army officers,
General Henry H. Arnold put it more succinctly: “Negro pilots cannot
be used in our present Air Force since this would result in having Negro
officers serving over white enlisted men. This would create an impossible
social problem.” 3

But serve they did, and in the wake of that wartime experience the
nation’s military leaders began to change their minds. Here is General
Omar N. Bradley on the situation in 1948: “As you begin to get better
educated Negroes in the service, you have more reason to integrate. We
can accept integration, but let’s not force it on people down South. I
say let’s go easy—as fast as we can.” 4

Integration proved somewhat easier than General Bradley anticipated. In 1949 the first Air Force Secretary had this to say on the change:
“When Mr. Truman issued an order to integrate the Air Force, I asked
him if he was serious. He said he was. Accordingly we did just that. It
all worked out routinely.” 5

Integrated service quickly became routine throughout the armed
forces, but the story does not end there. Finally, and most important for
this discussion, we have Robert S. McNamara’s forceful claim: “Five
more years as Secretary of Defense and I could have integrated the
nation.” 6

In the 25 years, then, that separate the beleaguered commandant
of 1941 and the socially concerned Secretary of Defense of 1965, the
servicemen moved from a nearly outright rejection of black fighting men
through a period of accommodation in a rigidly separate-but-equal system
into a generally integrated military society. Nor, witness the McNamara
statement, did the evolution stop at integration on military and naval
bases. Before it all ended, the armed forces had redefined their traditional
obligation to guard a serviceman’s physical welfare to include a guarantee
of equal treatment for black servicemen wherever they found themselves. In the name of equality of treatment and opportunity, the Department of Defense began in the sixties to challenge racial injustices deeply rooted in civilian society.

There is an obvious correlation between this shift in racial attitudes and the development of the modern civil rights movement, and any assessment of the military as a social force in this century must consider the relationship between the two. Some analysts have tried to explain the services' racial reform as a simple reaction to the political pressure exerted by the civil rights activists, but the parallel between the racial progress of the Department of Defense and developments in the civil rights movement is not so exact, and the influence of the civil rights activists was not so overwhelming. While no one can deny the very real contribution made by the civil rights activists, it seems to me that much of the racial reform occurring in the armed forces between 1941 and 1965 was primarily an inherent reaction to a problem of military efficiency and, especially in the last decade, a self-generated effort by some senior defense officials to reform the civilian community.

This conclusion is justified if we consider the quest for racial justice in the armed forces in two distinct phases: the first culminating in the integration of all military units in 1954; the second centering around the decision in 1963 that the guarantee of equal treatment must follow the wartime provision for a serviceman outside the gates of the base.

It is not my intention to rehearse here the lengthy history of integration already made familiar through the studies of Ulysses G. Lee and Richard Dalfiume, but I would like to underscore a few conclusions that can be drawn from the story up to 1954.

First, let us look at why the Navy, generally acknowledged the pioneer in this field, chose to integrate its men. The decision to mix black and white sailors was not substantially influenced by the civil rights activists, although Secretary James V. Forrestal did rely on his friends in the Urban League to teach him the techniques of integrating a large organization. Nor was the decision influenced so much by the racial reformers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, although this small group of social engineers was undoubtedly responsible for carrying out the racial reforms instituted in the wartime Navy. The fact is that the Navy integrated because segregated service had proved incredibly inefficient. What brought this on was the largely impersonal operation of the Selective Service law. Thanks to the efforts of Representative Hamilton Fish of New York and several others, the 1940 law contained an amendment that guaranteed a color-blind draft. Although imperfectly applied during the war, the antidiscrimination provision of the Selective Service Act still caused a massive influx of blacks into the armed services. With its larger manpower base and expandable black units, the Army was able to evade the implication of a nondiscriminatory draft law; but more than any other single factor, it was the pressure of this draft-influenced black infusion that breached the walls of segregation in the Navy. The Navy experiment with a vessel manned entirely by blacks proved unsatisfactory, and there were only so many shore-based jobs that segregated blacks could perform. Bowing to the argument that two navies—one black, the other white—were militarily inefficient, the Navy began to experiment, and finally announced its policy of integration.

Next let us look at the Air Force's initial discussions of the subject of racial barriers in the military as a social force in this century must consider the relationship between the two. Some analysts have tried to explain the services' racial reform as a simple reaction to the political pressure exerted by the civil rights activists, but the parallel between the racial progress of the Department of Defense and developments in the civil rights movement is not so exact, and the influence of the civil rights activists was not so overwhelming.

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they found themselves, were militarily inefficient and economically unfeasible, Secretary Forrestal began to experiment with integration during the last months of the war, and finally announced a policy of full integration in February 1947."

Next let us look at integration in the Air Force. Despite the timing of the Air Force’s integration order and Secretary Stuart E. Symington’s discussions of the subject with President Truman, the decision to drop racial barriers in the Air Force was already under way at the time of the President’s 1948 integration order. Nor is there any evidence of special concern among Air Force officials for the increasingly strong criticism of their segregation policy by the civil rights activists. The records do not clearly reveal, however, that by late 1947 the Air Staff had become quite concerned with the manpower implications of the Gillem Board Report, that is, the postwar racial policy that the Air Force shared with the Army. The report would hardly be classed as progressive by today’s standards; its provisions for reducing the size of black units and integrating a minimal number of black specialists were, in a way, an effort to make segregation more efficient. Yet civil rights leaders of the time generally endorsed the new policy, and their endorsement is understandable because the Gillem Board Report, with all its shortcomings, contained the germ of integration. It committed the Army and Air Force to total integration as a long-range objective, and, more important, it made permanent the wartime provision of a 10 percent black service. Later branded by progressives as an instrument for limiting black enlistment, the racial quota nevertheless committed the two services not only to maintaining at least 10 percent black strength but also to assigning these men to all branches and all job categories, thereby significantly weakening the segregated system. While again the Army could postpone the logical consequences of its new policy, the new Air Force immediately fell victim to the imperatives of its self-imposed quota system. It was impossible, the Air Force quickly learned, to maintain 10 percent of its strength in a separate-but-equal system. It was impossible to insure a quota of blacks in every military occupation and in every school. It was impossible, in short, in a time of shrinking budgets and manpower cuts, to operate two air forces. On the basis of these conclusions and the Navy’s postwar experience with integration, the Air Force began serious discussions of integration in 1947, months before the President issued his order."

Finally, let us see how integration came to the Army. There is little doubt that President Truman’s 1948 integration order and the Fahy Amendment that guaranteed during the war, the Selective Service Act still caused a larger manpower black infusion that the Navy experiment with, and there were blacks could perform. The other white—

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President. Randolph dropped his opposition to the 1948 Selective Service bill and his call for a boycott of the draft by black youths, and some weeks later, in the wake of the passage of the new draft law, Mr. Truman issued his integration order.

Given this influence of the activists on Truman's order, it is worth noting that the order itself and the Fahy Committee had, contrary to much of the popular literature on the subject, little direct influence on the integration of the Army that actually followed some 4 years later. When wide-scale integration finally came to the Army, first in the hills of Korea and then quite rapidly in Europe and in the United States, it came not because of the agreements forced on the Army by the White House committee, not in fact because of pressure from any outside group, but because the Army had finally learned a lesson in military efficiency. Specifically, the Army integrated its units in the Far East because General Matthew B. Ridgway faced a severe shortage of replacements for his depleted white units while accumulating a surplus of black replacements. So pressing was the need that even before permission was received from Washington there was considerable large-scale integration on the battlefield. The reason for the rapid integration of the rest of the Army was more complicated. There was, of course, the example of Korea and the need for a uniform policy, but beyond that was the rapid modernization of the Army that had made obsolete the large-scale labor units traditionally used by the Army to absorb much of its black quota. With these units disappearing the Army had to find new jobs for the men, a task hopelessly complicated by segregation.

To sum up this first period, there were several reasons behind the services' decision to integrate their units. Pressure from the civil rights movement was one factor, but, more important, each service had proved conclusively to itself that segregation was an inefficient way for the armed forces of a democratic society to use its manpower.

Segregation of the armed forces officially ended with the Secretary of Defense's announcement in October 1954 that the last all-black unit had been disbanded. In the little more than 6 years since the promulgation of President Truman's order, some quarter of a million blacks had been intermingled with whites in the nation's military units worldwide. For the services, the turbulent era of integration had begun.

The new era's turbulence was caused in part by a decade-long argument over the scope of President Truman's order, which had guaranteed equal treatment and opportunity for servicemen. On one side were ranged most service officials, who argued that integration, now a source of pride to the services and satisfaction to the civil rights activists, had ceased to be a public issue. The essential elements of the Executive Order, they claimed, had been fulfilled, leaving only those increasingly rare vestiges of discrimination within the armed forces to correct. Others, at first principally those critics in Congress and the civil rights organizations but later and more significantly some leading officials within the Department of Defense itself, argued that the Truman order committed the Department of Defense to far more than the integration of military units; that off-base discrimination, so much more apparent with the improvement of on-base conditions, seriously affected the morale and efficiency of the services; and that the department they discriminated against.

This latter inter-Defense during the Kennedy administration equal treatment with regard to racial ref-

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1948 Selective Service took youths, and some draft law, Mr. Truman's order, it is worth noting that the department should interfere with local laws and customs when they discriminated against black servicemen.

This latter interpretation made little headway in the Department of Defense during the first decade of integration. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations made strong commitments to the principle of equal treatment within the armed services and both admitted the connection between military efficiency and discrimination, but both perceived severe limitations to their power to change local laws and customs. The services constantly referred to these limitations, arguing that their writ in regard to racial reform stopped at the gates of the military reservation. "The Air Force cannot intervene in local custom," Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert said, "Social change in the local community must be evolutionary." 11 Such confessions of helplessness in dealing with off-base discrimination continued well into the 1960's. Even the Secretary of Defense's racial counsellor came to accept the official explanation. "Community mores vary," Mr. James C. Evans wrote in 1960, and "such matters are largely beyond the direct purview of the Department." 12

Despite the Department of Defense's hyperactivity in racial matters during the early months of the Kennedy administration—there were, for example, fourteen major racial directives issued by the Secretary's office in the first 2 years—the Department continued to limit its actions to matters obviously and directly within the purview of the armed forces, observing the same self-imposed restrictions on community action that had kept Secretary McNamara's immediate predecessors from responding to the reform demands of black servicemen and civil rights leaders. But by 1962 there were signs of a coming change, for what had been for almost a decade a low-keyed argument between service officials and civil rights leaders became during the second year of Secretary McNamara's administration a serious debate among defense officials.

Chief among those calling for the services to intervene in local laws and customs on behalf of their black members was the Secretary's special Assistant, Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky. Mr. Yarmolinsky had few supporters for his views in the Pentagon, but enjoying extremely close ties with Secretary McNamara, he was arguing from a strong position. 13 Unlike those of earlier social engineers in the department, Yarmolinsky's reasons for pushing for a strong departmental initiative in racial equality were not based primarily on the concept of military efficiency. Mr. Yarmolinsky was a member of an informal circle of New Frontiersmen that included the President's special counsel on minority affairs and the President's brother, the attorney general. These men were convinced that civil rights legislation was impossible to achieve in 1962, given the mood of Congress, and they wanted the services to spearhead a civil rights program for the Kennedy administration.

Yet if Yarmolinsky's motives differed from those of his predecessors, his rhetoric did not. He and his allies argued that racial discrimination had created a serious morale problem among black GI's and hence a problem in military efficiency. They could point to at least 27 major military installations in the United States situated near communities where in 1962 segregation was still established by law or custom. Housing discrimination near these bases had become a major source of complaint...
among black servicemen. With limited income, under military orders, and often forced by circumstance to reside in the civilian community, these men were, in McNamara's words, "singularly defenseless against this bigotry." And while the services had always denied any responsibility for combating this particular form of discrimination, Yarmolinsky's group knew that segregated housing and the related segregation of places of public accommodation were particularly susceptible to economic pressure from military authorities. They were confident that the connection between this discrimination and military efficiency could be demonstrated, and Yarmolinsky approached the Secretary on the idea of forming a committee under Attorney Gerhard Gesell to survey the problem.

These arguments failed to move the Secretary's manpower assistant, his general counsel, and his principal adviser on racial affairs—roughly speaking, the Department of Defense's civil rights bureaucracy. These men and their allies in the services pointed first to a political fact of life: to interfere with local segregation laws and customs, specifically to impose off-limits sanctions against southern businessmen, would pit the administration against powerful Congressmen, calling down on it the wrath of the defense and appropriation committees. The recent integration of units, this group argued, was largely an executive function with which at least some members of Congress only reluctantly went along. Sanctions against local communities, on the other hand, would be considered a direct threat to scores of legislators. "Even one obscure congressman thus threatened could light a fire over military sanctions," Mr. Evans, the Secretary's racial adviser, later remarked, "and there were plenty of folks around eager to fan the flames."

Even more important, this group argued, was the need to protect the physical well-being of the individual black soldier. In a decade when civil rights beatings and murders were common occurrences, they knew, again in Mr. Evans' words, "by the time Washington could enter a case the young man could be injured or dead." Operating under the principle that the safety and welfare of the individual transcended the civil rights of the group, these officials wanted to forbid the men to disobey local segregation laws and customs.

Finally, the opponents of intervention argued that until the reforms begun under Mr. Truman were completely realized inside the military reservation, the services would be ill-advised to push for changes outside that reservation. Ignoring the argument that discrimination in the local community had a profound effect on morale, they wanted the services to concentrate instead on what they considered were the necessary reforms within their jurisdiction, especially questions of promotions and assignments. The administration's civil rights campaign, they argued, should be led by the Department of Justice and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and not by the Department of Defense, which had other missions to perform.

Secretary McNamara, unaware of the debate, had convictions of his own. "If I had been aware of it," he said later, "it wouldn't have made any difference. This task was not something to leave to the courts. It was an executive job directives. I don't agree to the appi department's racism and efficiency of and made the lo however, he soft-economic sanctions of base a compliance.

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under military orders, the civilian community, already defenseless against liability, denied any responsibility, Yarmolinsky's segregation of places unacceptable to economic andض confidant that the conception of efficiency could be defended by the Secretary on the idea that segregation was pl:onic and efficiency of the black soldier. His racial directives of July 1963 ordered the services to launch such a program in the civilian community. He made the local commanders responsible for its success. At first, however, he soft-peddled the committee's provocative call for the use of economic sanctions against recalcitrant businessmen, stressing instead the duty of base commanders to fight discrimination by urging voluntary compliance.

His efforts achieved gratifying results in the next few years, quickly opening thousands of theaters and bowling alleys, restaurants and taverns to black servicemen. But segregated housing remained impervious to voluntarism, and later McNamara explained his failure to move quickly with sanctions against this important holdout. "It would have been easier to impose sanctions in 1963," he admitted, "but I was not aware of the need for such forceful action. . . . I was naive enough in those days to think that all I had to do was show my people that a problem existed, tell them to work on it, and that they would then attack the problem. There were plenty of things the commanders could do. The problem was leadership. I just didn't stick to it and insist that things get done."

Taking stock of this second part of the integration era when the services began to influence local laws and customs on behalf of black servicemen, we find that the principle of military efficiency was still a motivating force. Military efficiency was the rationalization used by the Gesell Committee, and it was certainly McNamara's reason for issuing his 1963 directive from which all the department's later racial reforms flowed. Yet there was a further motive for the reforms of the mid-1960's. The fact that the department's decision to intervene in the community came only after the social engineers in the Kennedy administration convinced that the services could be an effective instrument of social change, overcame the opposition of the department's civil rights bureaucrats and launched the services on their new course. It also seems evident that McNamara himself adopted the arguments of these social engineers in his last years in office, beginning with his open-housing campaign in 1967.

But to refute the exaggerated claims of the civil rights activists is not to deny the powerful impact of the civil rights movement on the Department of Defense. Secretary McNamara, for example, readily acknowledged the influence of the movement, particularly the new civil rights techniques developed by the demonstrators and freedom riders in the late 1950's, on his own thinking. In the last analysis, even though racial reform in the armed forces was to a great extent a parochial response to special internal needs, it developed in the milieu of a civil rights revolution that had been stirring the country for some time. Finally, no student of the subject would deny the essential wisdom of General Bradley's 1954 statement that "the armed forces . . . are a mirror that, held up to American society, reflects the impulses of that society."
eral Bradley's imagery, appropriate for the innovative era of integration, is perhaps even more apt when applied to the armed forces in the turbulent times of the 1970's.

FOOTNOTES

1 USN General Board, "Enlistment of Men of Colored Race," 23 Jan 42.
3 Memo, Cof AC for G-3, 31 May 40.
4 Interview, Gen. Omar N. Bradley with Lee Nichols, 28 May 53, Nichols file, OCMH.
5 Ltr, Stuart E. Symington to author, 6 May 70.
6 Quoted by Counsellor to the Secretary of Defense in interview with author, 11 May 71.
9 WD Circular 124, 28 Feb 46.
10 At the request of the Air Board a committee under MGen R. E. Nugent studied the subject in May 1947. See summary sheet, DC/P to CSAF, 29 Dec 48, sub: Air Force Position on Negro Personnel.
11 Quoted in Memo, Asst. ExOfficer, Office of the Asst SecAF, for Colonel Barnes, OSAF, 9 Jan 51.
13 Unless otherwise noted the remaining paragraphs are based on the author's interviews with Robert S. McNamara. James C. Evans, Gerhard Gesell, and Benjamin Muse and correspondence with Alfred Fitt and Adam Yarmolinsky.
15 Interview, Gen. Omar N. Bradley with Lee Nichols, Nichols file, OCMH.

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Commentary
Charles C. Moskos, Jr.
Northwestern University

I feel somewhat out of my element; a little sociological oil on these
august waters of history. It is important to note, however, that both of the
papers we have just heard have obvious sociological as well as historical
relevance. Each in its own way tends to support the basic hypothesis that
the manner in which the American armed forces have dealt with their
minority groups has largely been a consequence of internal military needs
rather than a consequence of outside liberal or civilian pressures. Thus
both papers confront the fundamental issue of how much the internal
social processes of the military are autonomously engendered versus how
much is a result of outside pressures from the civilian society. Although
the papers emphasize the autonomous role, it is also made clear that the
relationships are sometimes alternating, and on occasion even dialectical.

MacGregor's paper describes how the move toward integration in the
armed forces in the late 40s and early 50s was largely internal and some-
what independent of the civil rights forces. You do have a variation on
that mode, however, when you get civil rights activists within the DOD—
like those who centered around Adam Yarmolinsky in the effort to put
an end to off-post discrimination—but such variations still fall within the
basic theoretic framework of saying that changes were internally en-
gendered rather than having been imposed from the outside. White as
well, covering an earlier period, shows how the military was to some
degree independent of the prevailing nationalist and racist sentiments of
19th-century America. Indeed one can compare these two papers by
saying that where MacGregor stresses the autonomy of the military from
the liberal left of civilian society, White shows the autonomy of the
military from the nativistic or racist right.

I think, however, MacGregor's thesis may need some modification
in describing where the pressures really come from. It may be true that
the formal impact of civil rights and liberal organizations has been over-
stressed. But in recent times another kind of pressure has entered the
military from civilian society, not so much from the vantage point of
NAACP or Urban League types of organizations, but more from the
dissidence of black youth coming out of a highly militant black culture,
particularly since Martin Luther King's assassination. What this has meant
is that the military is now having to handle a civilian problem not from the
top but from the bottom; that is, black troopers are no longer as acquies-
cent or as passive to discriminatory practices as they were in a previous
time. So I think there is another kind of civilianizing influence affecting
military racial policies, coming largely from the enlisted ranks rather than from the notable black community leaders.

White's paper on the 19th century ends with a kind of plea for a form of cultural pluralism and in a way comes down rather hard on the integrationist, Anglo-conformity model which has generally been the American experience. Perhaps this reflects his recent stay in Canada where of course cultural pluralism is much more in fashion than it is here in the United States. However, even in the United States it is interesting that perhaps some kind of neocultural pluralism seems to be gaining ground and who knows, the Canadian model may become even more appropriate to the United States in future years.

However, I am still somewhat uneasy and quesy over his statements about the beneficial effects of segregated units for minority groups and I think he should stress the implications of that a little more clearly than he has here. What are the beneficial effects of segregation for nationality or racial groups? Particularly, how much of the 19th century experience really applied to the 1970s? What comes out of these papers, as well as other writings on this topic, are about four alternative models or "ideal types" showing how the military relates to its minority groups.

One model might be that the military is truly representative of the larger civilian society; in this case those groups in civilian society that are less skilled and less educated would then naturally occupy lesser skilled and less educated positions within the military. The military is truly representative if it is a mirror; therefore the minority groups which are impoverished and poorly educated will therefore be assigned to poorer positions within the armed forces. This can occur in an integrated setting as well as in a segregated setting. That is one kind of a model that one might view.

A second kind of a model occurs when you have separation but equality, and this is somewhat hinted at in White's discussion. His discussion of the role of elite black units and Indian units during the 1870s and 1880s is illustrative of the minority groups that, though segregated, nevertheless had relatively high morale and relatively high esteem within the armed forces. So you have that as a second model, a separate but equal kind of notion; indeed, a notion of separate but better!

A third kind of model is still the official one of the current armed forces—the equal opportunity model. This is well documented in MacGregor's paper. Here the goal is full integration with the presumption that this will result in an equitable distribution of blacks throughout the military system. But, in fact, the problems of institutional racism won't go away. This results from the persistencies of white racism, the new challenges of black separatism, and, most important, the continuing overproportion of blacks coming from less educated social levels. In turn, blacks, despite the equal opportunity model, tend to be disproportionately assigned to combat arms and less skilled positions in the military occupational system.

But the fourth model, and this seems to be the one that the armed forces is now sort of grudgingly moving into, is one I think neither of the two papers has taken into consideration (except MacGregor at the end treating the role of the civil rights activist as a force for social progress).
kind of plea for a rather hard on the generally been the stay in Canada idea is something beyond equality; that is, sheer equal treatment, kind of plea for a beyond sheer equal opportunity. This model would hold that the military should engage in basic skill education, basic formal education, perhaps even by adopting a quota system. Indeed it might be argued that the military's next leap forward (just as it led the nation in integration in the late 40s and early 50s) might be the provision of means whereby people can advance within a formal organization without conversion to white Anglo-Saxon middle class values. If the military can get to the stage where people don't all have to behave and talk alike, and even perhaps dress alike, that would be the next stage of using the military as a force for social progress, and in a sense would go beyond the goal of equality.

Returning to the basic hypothesis of the two papers, how would one predict what is going to be the military's treatment of women? Is the greater utilization of woman power in the armed forces to be explained as an outcome of the female liberation movement? Or is it to be explained as an outcome of the need for personnel in an all-volunteer system? The difficulty of either hypothesis—the military's internal needs versus outside civilian pressures—is that the two forces tend to run together. Thus, at the same time the military is reevaluating the role of women because of all-volunteer force problems, it is also the case that at the same time the women's liberation movement is ascendant in the larger society. Who is to say, definitely, wherein lies the generating force?

Other kinds of analyses may be appropriate to test the basic hypothesis. Very few people are probably aware that 1/6th of the American 8th Army in Korea is now made up of Koreans. They are called KATUSAs, an Army acronym for Korean Augmentation to the United States Army. These are actually Korean national soldiers occupying e separation but discussion. His dis- during the 1870s ough segregated, th esteem within, a separate but better! e current armed mented in Mac- presumption that throughout the militar- acism won't go, the new chal- continuing over- levels. In turn, proportionately military occupa- that the armed t neither of the gor at the end-
of the Institute for Defense Analysis and low and behold IDA hired its sociologists and economists and social scientists and it said no, an all volunteer force will be poor, or all black, or all hillbilly, or all stupid, or something of that sort. Here was an example of two agencies, each reviewing the same data in the same time frame, coming up with the conclusions that their sponsoring agencies expected. What does this tell us? Besides telling us that you can find a social scientist who will tell you what you want to hear, I don't know that it tells us much about the composition of an all volunteer force. Most likely it will probably fall somewhere between the all poor, the all black, the all hillbilly projections of IDA and the everything-will-be-peaches-and-roses projections of the Gates Commission.

Most likely, we will see the end of the college-educated enlisted man, except for idiosyncratic cases. There will be a rise in the proportion of minority servicemen with a concomitant lowering of the educational level. Figures for 1972 show 17 percent black among Army enlisted men, a significant increase from the 12 percent figure of 1970. At the same time, only about three percent of all officers are black. In fact, there are proportionately more black majors and lieutenant colonels than there are black lieutenants. This is a very revealing statistic because it means the bulk of present black officers are 5 or so years short of retirement. The emerging picture is one of even fewer black officers in the foreseeable future than at present; at the same time the proportion of black enlisted men is increasing markedly. Such a scarcity of black officers combined with a growing overproportion of black enlisted men means the military will be faced with social dynamite in the near future.

Let me close, then, by saying that the papers presented by White and MacGregor have much more than an historical or antiquarian interest. The ongoing thrust of America's minorities for equality and dignity—within and without the armed forces—is an issue which will remain too timely both today and tomorrow.

Thank you.

Discussion

The CHAIRMAN (Professor EDWARD M. COFFMAN, University of Wisconsin): Thank you Charlie. We now have a few minutes for questions.

Professor DENNIS SHOWALTER (The Colorado College): My question is directed to Professor White, and in particular to the idea of segregation having provided a positive value to Indians, blacks, and other minority groups. I'd like to raise the question whether the value of this kind of segregation does not really hinge on the military efficiency of the segregated unit. For example, in the Civil War the Army of the Potomac had a Corps, the XI Corps, with a disproportionate number of German regiments and, at least in the eyes of much of the army, a disproportionately bad fighting record. The image of the German-Americans as fighting men seems to have suffered accordingly. On the other hand, the smaller Irish brigades from New York and Massachusetts established
IDA hired its the image of the Hibernian as a good fighting man (as well as street brawler!) and at least some historians have suggested that their record did quite a bit to enhance the image of the Irish generally. You mentioned the Indian scouts. Isn't it possible that the Indians in regularly organized units lost a great deal of the efficiency they might have had as regularly organized scouts? I guess what I am asking is this: doesn't the value of segregation hinge on the way in which the segregated unit is looked upon by other units in the field, to include other members of the minority group differently assigned?

Professor BRUCE WHITE: In general I would agree with the points you have raised. In the case of the Indian units I did point out that it was most unfortunate that the formation of Indian units came at a time after the end of the Indian wars. I think that if organized Indian units had been used during the time the scouts were used, things might have turned out differently. Generally, over the nineteenth century the record of immigrant and black units was very good. In fact, in most cases where such units behaved badly, a case can be made that they did so because they were not entirely segregated; that is, they had white officers who paid the price in battle for their constant denigration of their troops.

Major ALAN L. GROPMAN (USAF Academy): I'd like to give Bruce White a chance to carry his story into the twentieth century. Had the Niseis not been segregated in World War II, had they instead been scattered throughout the Army, it seems unlikely they would have gained the same fame, and therefore the same gains for the Niseis in America at that time. In other words, from that example and some of your own, can an argument be made that integration is always harmful to ethnic minorities? This question is important because the idea is attractive to many blacks in the armed services today.

Professor BRUCE WHITE: Well, the question of integration vs. segregation would seem to be a function of time and place, and I certainly wouldn't advocate segregation in the armed forces as the correct answer for twentieth-century America. The relevant question is probably "integration into what?" In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, America was still living with a series of stereotype images. These tend to break down over time. Indeed they must, because you've got to integrate people into a society that has a decent appreciation of the cultural dimensions of ethnic minorities before that society can indeed be free.

Professor BERENICE CARROLL (University of Illinois/Urbana-Champaign): The question of the usefulness of segregation to minority groups would seem to be a function of whether segregation is imposed upon them or voluntarily chosen by them. I am a rather strong believer in segregation when voluntarily chosen—both by blacks and by women and by other groups, because I think there are situations in which it is a very important thing to segregate oneself thereby to develop a certain sense of identity and other conceptions of self that are otherwise not clear to us. Segregation imposed from the outside is always undesirable.
Professor BRUCE WHITE: Before we get too far from the point, let me just suggest that, at least between 1866 and the 1890's I don't think many blacks thought about the possibility, even, of serving in integrated units.

Professor CHARLES C. MOSKOS, JR.: May I make an addendum to that? Both the White and MacGregor papers reflect some form of elitist notion—that changes in racial policy came about because of outside elites of the minority groups influencing the military establishment, or the elites of the military establishment itself making new decisions based on manpower requirements. Today, on the other hand, I think we are witnessing a great more popular pressure for redefining racial roles of the services. I think the issue in the armed forces today is the changing consciousness, particularly of blacks but including other minorities as well, that is making the services react with the creation, for example, of the Defense Race Relations Institute.

[The discussion concluded with an exchange between Colonel O. W. MARTIN, JR., Editor, Military Review, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Professor BRUCE WHITE concerning differing styles of segregation among blacks and Indians in the later nineteenth-century cavalry units. In Colonel MARTIN'S view, the blacks of the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments made out generally better, being segregated into independent regiments and being better officered. Professor WHITE agreed in part, demurring only on Colonel MARTIN'S point that the Indian companies got poorer officers generally. "Some of the best officers in fact commanded them, including Hugh Scott and John J. Pershing." Time having run out, THE CHAIRMAN asked that any further questions be put off to the concluding session that would follow a 10-minute break.]
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THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF
THE MILITARY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY:

[In the chair for this the concluding session of the 1972 Military
History Symposium was Professor LOUIS MORTON of Dartmouth
College. Joining him around the table were the Harmon Lecturer, Pro-
fessor RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY of Temple University, and the chairman
of each of the preceding sessions: Professor FRANK VANDIVER of
Rice University; Colonel ELDON W. DOWNS of the Air University
Review (substituting for Professor THEODORE ROPP of Duke Univer-
sity and the U.S. Army Military History Research Collection); and
Professor EDWARD M. COFFMAN of the University of Wisconsin.
The goals for the session were explained by Professor MORTON in his
opening remarks.]

THE CHAIRMAN: While I am not exactly sure just what it is we
are to “wrap up” here, I do have a few thoughts that have occurred to
me and that I’d like to leave you with. Above my head here [pointing]
is the theme or title for this symposium, “The Military and Society.” As
I was sitting up in the back during the previous session I kept staring
at that sign, and I guess if you stare at something long enough it begins
to assume all sorts of odd shapes. And it struck me—I hadn’t thought
about it before—that our theme could be taken to imply that we are
dealing with two separate, independent, autonomous parties—the military
and society.

Now I don’t think that is what we have intended to imply, but in a
way it is almost exactly what we have been talking about and is perhaps
worth thinking about for a moment. There are many people outside this
audience, I suspect, who do view the two bodies as distinct and separate and
almost autonomous, and who regard this situation as a very dangerous de-
velopment in our society. I have been struck, for example, by the fact that in
many of our sessions here we have been sort of mutually reinforcing each
other’s prejudices and beliefs. There has been only one sharp challenge to
this tendency [a reference to the remarks of Professor BERENICE CAR-
ROLL during Panel “A” of the Third Session] and I’m very glad we had
that challenge. Some things were said that are worth thinking about, even
if one doesn’t agree with them instantly.

For another example I think we have been rather smug among one
another about the present state of military history as a discipline, and
patting ourselves on the back about how well it is going. My own experi-
ence is that it is not now going anywhere. True, there are a few of us
who teach the subject in academic institutions. But I’m afraid that if any
military historian now teaching in an academic institution were to be transferred, or to leave, or to die, he would probably not be replaced. But if a medievalist or an historian of nineteenth-century Germany, for example, were to leave, immediately there would be a search for a replacement. Those of us who do teach military history get the opportunity very rarely because we are military historians. Rather, the way one gets to teach military history is as Professor SHOWALTER explained: you hire a historian and he turns out to be interested in military history and when he feels secure enough and safe enough (and maybe if he gets tenure) then he begins to offer courses in military history. But until then he had better be damn careful! For over 10 years now I've been in the academic recruiting business, and it has been very rarely that I have come across openings for military historians per se.

Well, I'm still not quite sure whether I'm wrapping anything up, so let me go on to explain the procedure for this session that we worked out over lunch. Essentially, I shall call on each chairman in turn to speak briefly about his session, to say what he thinks was significant about it, and from there we'll open the floor for questions. By way of introduction I should perhaps make clear that I agree that the impact of the military on developing and developed societies, the topic of Professor VAN-DIVER'S session, is and has been profound in many ways. In our own case, the American military, naval, and air establishments taken together in all their parts may well represent one of the most powerful institutions in the world. What it does is tremendously important for all of us. During the last session we treated in particular its role as an instrument of social change. I must admit I worry some about that, believing as I do that there are other instruments, or there ought to be other instruments, for social change than the military. We should perhaps ask ourselves if this is the institution we want for social change. That it can be so used is fine. We all know the military as an institution can be extremely efficient, can do all kinds of jobs and do them well. But that doesn't mean that we necessarily should want the military to do certain things, any more than, for example, we would classify Mussolini's as a great regime just because the trains ran on time. Efficiency may not be the only value or the best gauge by which to judge how well we achieve social change. Well, with those argumentative beginnings we'll go now to Professor VANDIVER. Frank.

PROFESSOR FRANK VANDIVER: Thank you Mr. Timekeeper. THE CHAIRMAN: Please, take as much time as you like. [Laughter.]
PROFESSOR VANDIVER: Thank you. Well, I think ours was a splendid session and said a lot! [Laughter.]

Speaking of efficiency as a way of judging social change, I speak from some experience, Lou, and tell you that inefficiency is no way to bring about social change, either. Having had my office occupied, I can attest to that. It brought about social change, but it was awfully inefficient, not to say downright irritating!

The session I had the great pleasure of chairing was one that offered two papers, rather disparate—I did not say desperate—in nature: Professor CYRIL BLACK'S "Military Leadership and National Development" and Professor ALVIN COOX'S "Chrysanthemum and Star: Army and Society in Modern Japan," and he startled a few people by asserting that he thought he might have to shut up. Mr. COOX, in Japan, traced the evolution of military and he then pointed out that in some areas, some situations, military functions of social control. He also argued that the Army achieved its purpose well in some ways a kind of national leadership. Mr. COOX, in Japan, traced the evolution of military and he then pointed out that in some areas, some situations, military functions of social control. He also argued that the Army achieved its purpose well in some ways a kind of national leadership. Mr. COOX, in Japan, traced the evolution of military and he then pointed out that in some areas, some situations, military functions of social control. He also argued that the Army achieved its purpose well in some ways a kind of national leadership.
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and Society in Modern Japan.” Professor BLACK startled me, and I sus-
pect he startled a good many in the audience, by citing the numbers of
modern nations which fall under the category, “military regime.” And
then he examined the question of whether or not military regimes as we
know them are necessarily all bad. I am of that generation that was
brought up to believe that a military regime is a bad thing. And although
this is probably a terribly unNATO thing to say, I still think things like
Franco’s Spain are bad things. But he pointed out that there were some
areas, some situations, in which military regimes may perform vital
functions of social change, particularly in emergent nations. And he also
pointed out that in some of these cases, some of these nations, the military
represented really the only trained manpower pool from which to draw
national leadership.

Mr. COOX, in his examination of the role of the military in modern
Japan, traced the emergence of the modern Japanese Army from the
feudal conditions of the Tokagawa era through the Meiji restoration, or if
you will, the Meiji awakening, into the Showa era of the present time. He
then pointed out that the Samurai tradition was allegedly broken by the
Meiji’s hegemony over all of Japan. This did not break the traditional
reputation of the Samurai, and one of the things that carried over from
this tradition, or this reputation, was the sense of honor in the officer
corps. He also argued that in the Russo-Japanese War, where the Japanese
Army achieved its first modern dimension and power, and was indeed in
some ways a kind of mirror image of German infantry tactics, the officer
corps was extremely apolitical—was a group devoted to upholding the
honor of the empire and the person of the Emperor and allegedly did not
get into political activities. Many of these officers were Samurai, and were
indeed politicians. But they somehow managed to rise above this and
achieve the role of statesmen which is one step above politicians, as you
know.

Professor COOX went on to point out that the modern Japanese Army
going into the pre-World War II era did become increasingly political
after the 1931 watershed year, and then argued that the role of the military
was central in bringing about Japanese commitment to total war in 1941.

Professor WILLIAM McNEILL, in commenting on both of these
papers, did a splendid job of separating them and yet, in a way, connect-
ing them. His major comments on Professor BLACK’s paper centered
around a disagreement on his part. He dissented from Professor BLACK’S
generalizations. Professor BLACK defended himself by saying he really
didn’t care; he was going to generalize anyway.

Professor McNEILL was as surprised as I was to discover the rather
wide-spread antimilitary feeling in Japan. I had also been brought up to
believe that every Japanese was in some way or another a son of the
Samurai.

Both of these papers, it seems to me, suffered from a wretched and
hardnosed chairman. I didn’t give them enough time to develop what
really they had to say. And so, in attempting to add a few suggestions as
to what might have been said, I should say in their defense that they
probably would have said the things that I’m about to say if I had just
shut up.
But it does seem to me that both of them were implying, COOX more directly than BLACK, that governments, modern democratic governments, have been fairly effective in controlling the military, in subordinating it to civilian control. But as you consider their use of the term military I think it's increasingly clear that they mean armies (although it was pointed out that in some cases the armies and the air forces have been at one another's throats in some of these countries). I did notice also that neither one of them came out strongly to discuss navies. Whether this was caused by a service rivalry or by a belief that the era of the battleship had long passed and that the navy was really a vestigial service, I don't know. But it does seem to me that navies have often been mentioned more prominently than they were here yesterday.

I'd like to suggest, too, that another area might be thought about in considering military leadership in national development. I think in discussing military leadership we have been in a way too narrow here. We tend to think of a man commanding troops in the field, pushing buttons and sending off missiles, or cocking cannons. But it seems to me that we are in an era now where this kind of leadership is increasingly less important than logistical leadership, management leadership, administrative leadership. And as LOU MORTON said a while ago the military are known for their efficiency and he wonders if efficiency is necessarily the best way to achieve social change. I think that logistics is an area that you really have to consider, because supporting a large national military force creates a logistical circumstance that affects the national economy directly.

Finally, I would like to suggest the consideration of a new definition for military success. Albert Sidney Johnston—and you will pardon me for mentioning a Confederate general, I trust—after all he had the good sense to get killed early—Albert Sidney Johnston once said, "The only test of ability in my profession is success." But is this really a proper definition for military success now? Is it proper to say that a general is a success only because he wins a battle or wins a campaign in Vietnam?

I think if that were true I'd pick just one example off the top of my head—I'm sure all of you can fill it in with hundreds of others—one famous general in the British Army in the First World War would have been eliminated from any chance of success after Gallipoli. Sir John Monash would have been thrown out after his collapse at Gallipoli—but he went on from there. He was a failure in command in the field. He went on to be a brilliant corps and army commander.

But I think in our present time we may have to define success differently. We may have to train people differently. And the kind of thing that is being talked about in ROTC programs around the country—the broadening of the curriculum—both in ROTC programs and in the service academies is essential, I think, in turning out a new kind of commander—a man who is not merely a technocrat, but is a politician, a statesman, a philosopher, and God save the mark, a humorist.

I think it's really essential that we do not do what Jubal Early once said had been done to him at West Point. He said West Point and service on the frontier had taught him one thing. He was certainly glad he had been taught this, but this was all he'd learned—how to command forty dragoons. I think that is no longer or to turn out in the the role of the military. I think we can see that I made much long

THE CHAIR: time Frank! I suspect I chaired on the session of the serious omissions talk about the the old China hat of the panelists

What we tried and to try to make the same for a ROTC; and then the teaching of there were some

The whole clearly enough. They should, what for never really face some very imp expected—have that the session who will commit don't have as m

COLONEL touch on a few writing and was quite imp to do with subidea. It can say simply not rele

Which br something about an article. My discussion per illustrations as nonetheless we read the pictu to do with sty it true that Air JACK LOOS that vigorous
implying, COOX dragoons. I think forty dragoons can be equated with forty missiles and that is no longer enough. We need to turn out the kind of person we used to turn out in the days when there were not such frenetic discussions of the role of the military. We turned out people under the general rubric—the old China hand—and they did their learning the hard way. And I think we can speed it up and do it better. So much for that session which I made much longer-winded than it should have been.

THE CHAIRMAN: I didn't mean for you to take all that much time Frank! I suspect I am perhaps the strongest critic of the session that I chaired on the teaching of military history. First of all, there were some serious omissions from that session. Secondly, there was a good deal of talk about the new military history and the traditional military history, but these terms were never very well defined. It may very well be that all of the panelists were speaking about different things.

What we tried to do, as you recall, was to set up a liberal arts college and to try to make some generalizations about teaching there; then we did the same for a large university, one of the service academies, and for the ROTC; and then we brought in a strong critic who didn't believe at all in the teaching of military history. That much we accomplished, I think, but there were some important questions that were not raised.

The whole issue of ROTC, I thought, was not really brought out clearly enough. Should ROTC units remain on college campuses? If they should, what form should they take? What changes might be made? We never really faced the basic question of why so many campuses—and some very important ones given the level of graduates that might be expected—have dropped ROTC. So in some ways, at least, I'm not sure that the session I chaired achieved all the objectives that I had hoped we could achieve. I'd like to turn the session over now to Colonel DOWNS who will comment on the session of which he was a member. (And you don't have as much time as he [VANDIVER] did!)

COLONEL ELDON W. DOWNS: I understand, sir! Let me just touch on a few points that came up this morning during our session on the writing and publication of military history. One of the points I thought was quite important and that came up during the discussion period had to do with submitting letters of inquiry to editors. I heartily endorse this idea. It can save all of us a lot of time, if only because some topics are simply not relevant for some journals.

Which brings me to my second point, which is to try to find out something about the readership of a particular journal before submitting an article. My third point is to endorse the suggestion made during the discussion period this morning about trying to find and submit good illustrations along with article manuscripts. This can be difficult, but nonetheless very helpful, as every journal must have some readers who read the pictures! A fourth general area touched upon this morning had to do with style and particularly with the length of articles. While it remains true that *Air University Review* will sometimes go somewhat beyond JACK LOOSBROCK'S rigid limit of 2500 words, it is an old truism that vigorous writing is concise writing. So I think we can all agree that
if you tighten up your material it does make it easier to read—even for editors.

Finally, with reference to our discussions centering on classification and security review processes, I would urge you not to be scared away too easily. The material you want may not be as classified as you think, or it may have been recently downgraded or even declassified. Even if that is not true in a given case, it is possible in the security review process to run across a reasonable man now and then! Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: We move now to the fourth session and its chairman, Professor Coffman.

PROFESSOR EDWARD M. COFFMAN: Bruce White and Mark MasGregor were both dealing with the military, which they consider on the one hand autonomous, but at the same time not completely autonomous, being influenced by society; and they have varying opinions as to how it is influenced. Bruce White, of course, was talking about how the attitudes of the military reflected general social attitudes, and how these attitudes might change and vary in regard to the particular minority or the particular times or the particular situation. He also pointed out how the military at times, the army in particular, attempted to serve as a bridge into society generally. And of course he brought up the controversial point that at times in the past segregation might have served the purpose of the particular racial or ethnic group.

Mark MasGregor was dealing with a very different era, when the military was in a much more powerful position in regard to American society; in fact, in a strong enough position that Secretary of Defense McNamara could speak of the military as a means to bring about great changes in society internally. One might well ask, "whither militarism?" at that point. And, of course, he brought up the controversial point that the recognition of the requirements of military efficiency was actually more crucial than social agitation generally.

But I thought Miss Carroll did make a very good point about something that interests me. And that is that there wasn't much of what Jesse Lemisch calls history from the bottom up—you know, what were the troopers doing, what were they thinking about? Several years ago I ran across a letter that General MacArthur wrote to Peyton March when MacArthur was Chief of Staff in the early thirties. And in the letter he said something to this effect, "The more I read history, the more I believe it is the man and not the men." While no one should denigrate leadership, still I think it is time we start studying the men—for without the men the man is nowhere. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: We now arrive back where we began. Professor WEIGLEY had the first word, and I propose to give him the last word as well.

PROFESSOR RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY: When the people sitting up here were hastily planning this wrap-up session over lunch today, Professor MORTO summary of my ses myself! And I was yesterday morning and an oversimplifi here not so much few fragments of a in favor of the on I want to go things that have be back to mind. And concerned that we of its parent societ I say this because often as they are kind of military it cop out, an effort wrong with the m systems that mana were serving were First World War stamina and res anticipated, judg I think it can eas I was impro afternoon by the oly been able to do about the ove issue. And while like LOU MOR says “The Militai the end a re-em boundary line be and society are and one purpose military values.

THE CHA pose a question: PROFESSO Naval War Coll way you would you alluded to seem to see as d a little more, gi any?

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Professor MORTON and I were both inclined to feel I should not offer a
summary of my session because that would amount simply to summarizing
myself! And I was especially reluctant to do that because what I said
yesterday morning was a summary anyway of a lot of complex matters
and an oversimplification at that. But I’ve decided I should say something
here not so much in summary of my Harmon Lecture as an offer of a
few fragments of a Harmon Lecture that got started and then got scrapped
in favor of the one I delivered yesterday.

I want to go back to some tentative thoughts I had because certain
things that have been said the last two days have brought them very much
back to mind. And the general idea of this fragment is that I’m somewhat
concerned that we might be overdoing the idea that the military is a mirror
of its parent society, that a society gets just the kind of military it deserves.
I say this because it seems to me that for the military to be saying as
often as they are starting to do nowadays that a society gets just the
kind of military it deserves, that what we have is almost a kind of military
cop out, an effort to pass back to society the buck for things that are
wrong with the military. After all, you could cite examples of military
systems that managed to retain considerable vigor when the societies they
were serving were in deep decay. The Austrian and Russian armies of the
First World War come to mind. Both those armies showed much more
stamina and resilience and fighting capacity than you would have
anticipated, judging by the decrepitude of the empires they served. So
I think it can easily become just a cliché and not a very meaningful one.

I was impressed in the WHITE and MACGREGOR papers this
afternoon by the degree of autonomy that our armed forces have apparently
been able to maintain in determining for themselves what they’ll
do about the overwhelming social issue of the whole country—the race
issue. And while listening to those WHITE and MACGREGOR papers,
like LOU MORTON, I sat up there, too, looking at this sign that
says “The Military and Society,” and it seemed to me that we needed at
the end a re-emphasis of the idea that while there may be a blurred
boundary line between them, these are two distinct entities. The military
and society are two different things; there are distinct military values
and one purpose of this kind of symposium especially is to explore those
military values.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is there anyone now here bold enough to
pose a question? There’s always one in the crowd! [Laughter.]

PROFESSOR PHILIP CROWL (University of Nebraska and The
Naval War College): Russ, I know you don’t have the time to do it the
way you would want to do it, but at the end of your talk yesterday
you alluded to the politicization of the military, a phenomenon you
seem to see as developing currently. Could you develop that thought for us
a little more, giving some precise examples, perhaps—if there really are
any?

PROFESSOR WEIGLEY: Well, what I was trying to say yesterday
was that in the era of classical militarism soldiers didn’t really need to be
politicians—at least not of the sort who got themselves involved in the
politics of the civil state—because they were so well protected. Their interests were protected by the isolation of military systems from the civil state. Now that kind of isolationism has broken down everywhere. But because of that very breakdown of military isolation soldiers can't protect themselves from the civil society—and can't guard their special interests the way that they did in the nineteenth century, and the tendency that I see is that they are becoming politicians, active in the internal civil politics of their states in one way or another. Sometimes, of course, pushed to become so, but essentially because they have now got to do this. They don't have the immunity from control by the civil state that the German general staff used to have.

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM E. CARRAWAY, USA, RET. (Colorado Springs): As I told Colonel Hurley when I heard of this symposium, there was one thing I just had to say as an old foot soldier and infantryman. And that is that in 1934 a book was written by a chap named Silas F. McKinley called *Democracy and Military Power*. McKinley went back into history and showed how democracy flourished while the citizen infantry fought its country's battles. But when mercenaries came in, when war weariness developed, and when new weapons came along, democracy went down and dictatorship took over. I could only wish that some historian here present could take that point and carry it on from 1934 to the present. I say this because I am very much worried about certain current trends, like so-called "all volunteer forces," in this country of ours. And I certainly hope that those in the armed services today will be very careful to see that they do not destroy democracy either at home or abroad any more than they can help it.

PROFESSOR MICHAEL C. REYNOLDS (Loretto Heights College): My frustration in attending history conferences is that I observe a great number of intelligent and very concerned people—this audience—spending most of their time listening to the experts read papers and then reply to a few questions. I wish that it were possible for all of us to share our ideas and prejudices with one another but the format does not enable us to do so.

After listening for 2 days here, I very much want to share two major observations which I have made, and I trust I won't seem presumptuous in reading to you what I have written down:

Both points come essentially from Professor Weigley's opening lecture on "The End of Militarism," a title which he told me should more appropriately have been called "The End of Traditional Militarism"—traditional militarism defined as military personnel acting as a separate caste in society, aloof from politics and merely carrying out the orders of a civil government.

Professor Weigley, I think, correctly identified the problem of a new militarism in terms of the blurring of lines which has occurred between civilian and military groups.

From my study of history I believe that civilians can be militarists and have been for at least several generations. When civilians decide that the only way to resolve a problem is by force, I submit that they are militarists. Thus it first as Premier, then supported the view, such a menace to Fr with war could Franc taking a point of view this country about co and 1960s.

Such a perspective before World War I policy acceptable—if that those who advocate or negotiations—were disloyal or guilty of tr communicated with the Poincare context own peaceful process. Of course the unique but as is often in our own times.

Thus, Henry St book, *Roots of War* after 1945 but a w of war, the prospect of war." And he notes t
are militarists. Thus in France from 1911 to 1914, Raymond Poincaré, first as Premier, then as President of the Third Republic, consistently supported the view, both in public and privately, that Germany was such a menace to France that only by meeting the German challenge with war could France ultimately be protected from that threat. He was taking a point of view similar to the one civilian cold warriors took in this country about communism—first Soviet, then Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s.

Such a perspective on the part of civilian leadership in France before World War I not only made war as an instrument of national policy acceptable—if not inevitable—but this viewpoint also insisted that those who advocated other ways to settle differences—by compromise or negotiations—were either naive or ignorant on the one hand, or disloyal or guilty of treason on the other. Even when diplomatic personnel communicated with their counterparts, as long as they operated within the Poincaré context of fear and perceived threats, they doomed their own peaceful processes to failure.

Of course the French political situation from 1911 to 1914 was unique but as is often the case in the affairs of men, there are echoes in our own times.

Thus, Henry Steele Commager notes in his recent review of a new book, Roots of War, "it was not only war economy that flourished after 1945 but a war psychology. War had taken command—the fear of war, the prospects of war, the requirements of war, in the end the ardor for war."

And he notes two dramatic changes in United States practice:

First: That in our relations with Vietnam we have ignored our traditional principle of negotiation and instead have resorted to force and "frustrated all meaningful negotiation by insisting that we negotiate on terms palpably unacceptable to North Vietnam, based on the premise that we have defeated it."

Second: That the constitutional principle of the supremacy of the civilian over the military authority has been "circumvented by the willing acquiescence of two successive Commanders-in-Chief in the exercise of independent authority by the Pentagon and the CIA in areas heretofore thought to be the domain of civil authority."

My first point is, then, that all of us here should examine closely not just military attitudes and actions but especially those of civilian leaders. In the latter area, I contend, we shall find the most serious and frightening aspects of militarism.

I believe that a symposium on that subject would provide some important insights and understanding about our present dilemma.

My second point can be made more briefly.

Professor Weigley may have given the impression that under traditional militarism—only just ended—military personnel did not act in the political arena. I think that they did but won't take the time to document that claim. More important is my contention that our aware-
ness of what is political has broadened dramatically in the course of this century—perhaps because of the extension of the principle of democracy and citizenship—broadened so much that we now realize that any act an individual commits may be seen as political.

If an airman pours sand in the gas tank of a B-52, we are fully prepared to label such an act political. But if he pours gas in that tank—never mind dropping bombs—most of us have not been prepared to call that political.

I do.

[Professor REYNOLDS had earlier commented to the Chairman of the Steering Committee that he was displeased with the format for the symposium. It was explained that question and answer periods would follow each session save the first and that it was rather too late to make any basic changes in format. Nothing daunted, Professor REYNOLDS delivered a mini-paper from the floor. The Editor, who was in the audience, found himself rather non-plussed when Professor REYNOLDS took to himself what remained of the discussion period. Nonetheless, after the session concluded, he asked Professor REYNOLDS for a copy of the notes he had been reading from, being firmly convinced that the best interests of scholarship would be served by allowing all who chose to speak to be accurately recorded.

Following Professor REYNOLDS'S remarks, Professor MORTON then turned the meeting over to Colonel HURLEY who thanked all the participants and called special attention to the planning and administration of the Symposium Steering Committee and its Executive Director, Major Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF. He concluded with an announcement that “the Good Lord willing, we hope to host the sixth symposium in this series in the fall of 1974.” The Editor can note in closing that the Sixth Military History Symposium is now scheduled for 9–11 October 1974 and will treat “The Military History of the American Revolution.”]
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The Participants

[Note: Biographical data on the participants are current through October 1972 when the symposium was held.]


C. March, 1966; and The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I, 1968.


HANSELL, Haywood S., Major General, USAF (Ret). Born in Fort Monroe, Virginia, 28 September 1903. B.S., Georgia Tech, 1924. General Hansell’s distinguished military career began in 1928 when he signed on with the U. S. Army Air Corps as a flying cadet. Following prewar assignments with Claire Chennault’s “Men on the Flying Trapeze” and a tour on the faculty of the Air Corps Tactical School, he became one of General H. H. Arnold’s top planners during the early stages of World War II. He later commanded the Third Bombardment Wing in Europe and the XXI Bomber Command in the Pacific. Retired for disability in 1946, he was recalled to active duty during the Korean War, reverting to retired status again in 1955. He is a frequent lecturer at both The Air University and the USAF Academy. His book, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler, was published in 1972.

HIGHAM, Robin. Born London, England, 20 June 1925. A. B., Harvard, 1950; A.M., Claremont Graduate School, 1953; Ph. D., Harvard, 1957. Professor of History, Kansas State University, where he has taught since 1963, and Editor, Military Affairs (since 1968) and


LOOSBROCK, Ph. B., College of Staff Historical Forces Magazine, rising from Private Bronze Stars and Pu Space Weapons (coordinating

MacGREGOR, Department of Staff Historical on “The Integration Defense Studies Series


MacGREGOR, Morris J. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Formerly for nine years with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division. Presently completing a book manuscript on "The Integration of the Armed Forces," for the Department of Defense Defense Studies Series, with publication expected in 1974.


WHITE, Bruce. Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, 1968. Has taught at Stanford, Michigan, and the University of Toronto where he is Assistant Professor of History. U. S. Army Infantry, 1959-61. Currently working on a history of the military’s involvement with ethnic and racial minorities.
INDEX

[Not included in this index are authors and works cited in footnotes or bibliographies provided by the various participants, or material included in the Appendix (pp 28–31) to Professor Black’s paper. Ed.]

Adams, Charles Francis, 89–90
Aerospace Historian, iv, xi, 106
Afghanistan, 26
Africa, 16, 18, 25, 26, 27, 62
Air Force Magazine, iv, xi, 106–107
Air University Review, iv, xi, 105–06, 149
Air Warfare, 70–73, 82–84, 94
Algeria, 17, 24
Ali, Muhammad, 3
Anderson, Dave, 3–4
Argentina, 19, 20, 25
Arnold, Henry H., Gen., 131
Asia, 16, 25, 26
Austria, 6, 8, 82, 151

Ballantine’s Illustrated History of World War II, iv, xi, 109, 111
Belden, Thomas G., iv, xi, 104–05, 155
Beria, L.P., 12
Bismarck, Otto von, 5–6
Blacks [in the Armed Forces], xii, 116–144, passim
Bolivia, 19, 20, 23
Bond, Brian, 111
Bradley, Omar N., Gen., 131, 137–38
Brazil, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27
Bulgaria, 20, 22, 23
Bushido, 37, 39

Canada, 1, 140
Caprivi, Leo von, 6
Carlson, C.R., Colonel, USAF, iii, xi, 85, 95–97
Carraway, William E., Brig Gen, 152
Carroll, Berenice A., iii, xii, 66, 97–103, 143, 145, 150, 155

Carstetter, William, 112
Challener, Richard D., i
China, viii, 13, 18, 20, 23, 25–6, 41, 52–5, 63–4, 149, 153
Churchill, Winston S., 10, 82
Civic action programs, 17, 66
Civil rights [movement, activists, reforms, etc.] 131–42, passim
Clark, A.P., Lt General, USAF, iii, vii, ix, 1–3, 70–72
Clauswitz, Karl M. von, x, xiv, 15, 72, 76, 79, 91
Clemenceau, Georges, 9, 84
Coffman, Edward M., iv, xii, 142–45, 150, 155–56
Cold War, 11, 90
Coles, Harry L., i
Commager, Henry Steele, 153
Coox, Alvin D., iii, ix, 37–60, 63, 66–67, 109, 146–48, 156
Crook, George, Gen., 114
Cuba, 12, 13, 20, 23, 67, 76
Custer, George Armstrong, 114
Cyprus, 19
Czechoslovakia, 17, 82

Delbrück, Hans, 91
Department of Defense, xiii, 13, 75–6, 98–9, 131–39, passim
Deutsch. Harold C., 111–12
Donovan, James A., Col., U.S.M.C., 4
Downs, Eldon W., Colonel, USAF, iv, xi, 105–06, 145, 149–50, 156
Dreyfus, Alfred, 7–8

Egypt, 20, 22–7, 64
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 75, 135
England, See Great Britain
Europe, 16, 26, 72, 80, 110–12, 121–22, 124, 134
Evans, James C., 135–36
R.O.T.C. (Reserve Officer Training Corps) v, xi, 1, 50-51, 91, 92, 95-98, 100, 102, 107, 148-149
Roth, Theodore, Colonel, USA, 102
Rothenberg, Gunther, iii, xi, 89-93, 103, 158
Russia, viii, ix, xiv, 8-10, 12, 18, 19, 26, 41-4, 46-9, 51, 55, 64, 66, 74, 76, 78-81, 88, 147, 151, 153
S.A.L.T. [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks], 79
Samurai, ix, 37-41, 147
Schofield, John M., Gen., 114
Scott, Winfield, Gen., 117
Segregation [and integration] in the Armed Forces, xii, 113-44, passim
Sheridan, Philip H., Gen., 118, 123
Sherman, William T., Gen., 123
Showa [Emperor, period, etc.] ix, 46, 53, 55, 56, 67
Showalter, Dennis E., iii, xi, 85-89, 103, 142-43, 146, 158
Siberia, 48, 55
Singapore, 24
Sino-Japanese War, 42, 43, 44, 48
Spain, 19, 26, 119, 124, 147
Spaulding, Oliver Lyman, 90
Stalin, Joseph, 10, 12, 13
Stevenson, Adlai, 107
Symington, Stuart E., 131, 133
Syria, 18, 20, 26

Taisho, [Emperor, period, etc.], ix, 43, 46, 50, 55, 56
Taiwan, 47
Thailand, 18, 26
Thomas, George H., Gen., 117
Truman, Harry, 75, 131, 133-34, 136

Tuchman, Barbara W., vii (fn)
Turkey, 18, 20, 22-6, 64

United States, 7, 10, 13, 17, 27, 66-7, 72-84, passim, 88, 91, 110, 113-44, passim
U.S. Military Academy [West Point], 1, 3, 93-95, 118, 119, 122, 148
U.S. Naval Academy [Annapolis], 1

Upton, Emory, 7

U.S.S.R., See Russia

Vagts, Alfred, viii, 3-4, 6, 90
Vandiver, Frank, i, iii, iv, viii, ix, 15, 66-67, 145-49, 159
Vietnam, see Indochina

Walker, Edwin A., Maj Gen, USA, xiv

Weigley, Russell F., ii-iv, vii, viii, 3-14, 15, 67, 109, 145, 150-53, 159
White, Bruce, iv, xii, xiii, 113-30, 139-40, 142-44, 151, 159
World War I, viii-ix, 4, 6-11, 13, 47-9, 55, 91, 108-09, 114, 120, 148, 151, 153
World War II, v, vii-ix, xii, xiv, 9-13, 26, 51, 53-6, 70, 72-5, 82, 90, 92, 99, 107, 109, 111, 131, 143

Wright, Monte D., Lt Colonel, USAF, i, v (fn), xiii, xiv

Wright, Quincy, 90

Yarmolinsky, Adam, xiii, 135-36, 139
Yemen, 20, 22, 25
Yugoslavia, 17

Zhukov, G.K., Marshal, 10, 12
END
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