THE NATO ALLIANCE: US CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVEL OPTIONS TOWARD 1987

D. G. KRYNOVICH

SFID SEP 81

F/6 15/3

UNCLASSIFIED

AD-A199 074
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CA 93940

THE NATO ALLIANCE: US CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVEL OPTIONS TOWARD 1987

D. G. KRYNOVICH
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

THE NATO ALLIANCE:
US CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVEL OPTIONS
TOWARD IT BASED ON US NATIONAL INTERESTS

by

Daniel George Krynovich

September 1981

Thesis Advisor: Frank M. Teti

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
The NATO Alliance: US Conventional Force Level Options Toward it Based on US National Interests

Daniel George Krynovich

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

Unclassified

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

US Options, NATO, Warsaw Pact, history, economics, national interests, political will, comparisons.

NATO has proven itself to be a most stable and successful organization for peace. However, the world today is far different from when the alliance was formed thirty-two years ago, and many relationships have changed. As Western Europe has developed from World War II, it has attained a large measure of economic and political stability. It has evolved into a major power center. The US, meanwhile, has seen a decline in its ability to defend its
changing national interests. Therefore, the central objective of this thesis is to analyze the relationships between NATO and Western Europe and relate those findings to an assessment of current US national interests. The thesis will propose four US conventional force level options toward NATO in the 1980s and will conclude with the recommended implementation of one of the four options. The ultimate question asked by this thesis is: "Could the US better insure militarily the defensibility of its current overall national interests by redefining its current role in NATO?"
The NATO Alliance: US Conventional Force Level Options Toward it Based on US National Interests

by

Daniel George Krynovich
Captain, United States Army
B.S., University of Wyoming, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 1981

Author

Approved by:

Thesis Advisor

Second Reader

Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences
ABSTRACT

NATO has proven itself to be a most stable and successful organization for peace. However, the world today is far different from when the alliance was formed thirty-two years ago, and many relationships have changed. As Western Europe has developed from World War II, it has attained a large measure of economic and political stability. It has evolved into a major power center. The US, meanwhile, has seen a decline in its ability to defend its changing national interests. Therefore, the central objective of this thesis is to analyze the relationships between NATO and Western Europe and relate those findings to an assessment of current US national interests. The thesis will propose four US conventional force level options toward NATO in the 1980s and will conclude with the recommended implementation of one of the four options. The ultimate question asked by this thesis is: "Could the US better insure militarily the defensibility of its current overall national interests by redefining its current role in NATO?"
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. NATO HISTORY

A. BACKGROUND .......................... 9
B. NATO’S DEVELOPMENT AND EARLY YEARS (1945-1967) .................. 15
C. THE LOST DECADE .................. 21
D. THE CARTER INITIATIVES ............. 23

II. US NATIONAL INTERESTS ............. 30

III. WARSAW PACT ASSESSMENT .......... 60

IV. NATO ASSESSMENT .................. 83

V. NATO EUROPE’S ECONOMIC POWER POTENTIAL .............. 102

VI. CURRENT US OPTIONS TOWARD NATO .......... 125

A. OPTION I .......................... 125
B. OPTION II .......................... 127
C. OPTION III .......................... 131
D. OPTION IV .......................... 136
E. COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS .......... 137
F. COMPARISON OF OPTION I .......... 138
G. COMPARISON OF OPTION II .......... 140
H. COMPARISON OF OPTION III .......... 142
I. COMPARISON OF OPTION IV .......... 144

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ............. 147

LIST OF REFERENCES .................. 151

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......... 163
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. COMPARISON OF US DEFENSE OUTLAYS AND ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAMS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ENERGY VULNERABILITY</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. US OIL IMPORTS BY SOURCE MAY 1979</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. R.E. FLATHMAN'S THEORY OF PUBLIC INTEREST</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. GROUND FORCES AVAILABLE WITHOUT MOBILIZATION</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. MAIN BATTLE TANK COMPARISON</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. WESTERN REINFORCING FORMATIONS AVAILABLE</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. WARSAW PACT REINFORCING FORMATIONS AVAILABLE</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. WARSAW PACT LONG AND MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS FOR THE EUROPEAN THEATER</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. NATO LONG AND MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS FOR THE EUROPEAN THEATER</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. AVERAGE PRODUCTION RATES</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. COMPARISON OF DIVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MODE RELIABILITY OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. MONEY SPENDING TRENDS</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. BASIC NATO ECONOMIC COMPARISANS</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>BASIC NATO ECONOMIC COMPARISONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>COST SHARING FORMULAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUMMARY 1951-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>LIKELY IMPACT OF THE FOUR OPTIONS ON THE OVERALL ATTAINMENT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a great deal to the military professionalism and overall political knowledge of US Army Lieutenant Colonel Albert J. Folcher, who graciously gave me many of his thoughts concerning US options toward NATO while we were assigned at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. LTC Folcher is currently the Assistant Chief of Staff G3, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

I certainly could not have completed this work without the precious freedom from routine pressures made available by my wife Eva. I am indebted to her for her help and encouragement.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to my first reader, Professor Frank M. Teti, who rendered support, and sometimes criticism, far greater than I had a right to expect.

I wish to thank especially three of my professors at the Naval Postgraduate School, Stephen S. Garrett, Jiri Valenta, and David S. Yost, without the knowledge I gained through their classroom expertise this thesis could not have been brought to completion.
I. NATO HISTORY

A. BACKGROUND

The central objective of this thesis is to analyze the relationships between NATO and Western Europe and relate those findings to an assessment of current US national interests. The thesis will propose four US conventional force level options toward NATO in the 1980s and will conclude with the recommended implementation of one of the four options presented herein. The ultimate question asked by this thesis is: "Could the US better insure militarily the defensibility of its current overall national interests by redefining its current role in NATO?" The following quotations introduce and establish this work's fundamental tone:

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must emerge in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in ordinary vicissitudes of her policies or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities.

George Washington
Farewell Address, 1796

You cannot ask us to take sides against arithmetic.
You cannot ask us to take sides against the obvious facts of the situation.

Winston S. Churchill
Speech, 1929
The commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcasses of dead policies. When a mast falls overboard you do not try to save a rope here and a spar there in memory of their former utility; you cut away the hamper altogether. And it should be the same with a policy. But it is not so. We cling to the shred of an old policy after it has been torn to pieces; and to the shadow of the shred after the rag itself has been thrown away.

Lady Gwendolen Cecil
Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, 1921

The United States, prior to World War II, was an isolationist nation. Except for a brief interlude in World War I and its subsequent disarmament conferences, the US remained isolationist until its entrance into World War II. However, this prolonged US isolationism was selective in nature as it did not apply to the international economic arena. An example of this was the US's opening of relations with Japan in the 1860s. While on the surface this event may appear to have been non-isolationist, it was executed solely to open a new economic market for the US. The actual reasons for US isolationism are deep-rooted within the history of the United States. Washington's Farewell Address attempted to instill in Americans a sense of pride in being American and that all Americans should consider themselves a part of a unique nation that was not tied to the banners of any other nation, yet always prepared for war. [Ref. 1] Additionally, other founding fathers stressed that future generations of Americans should resist the efforts of any and every nation to intermingle in the
internal policies of the US. In addition to Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, and Thomas Jefferson's "Doctrine of Two Spheres" are examples of our founding father's attempts to influence future American thought. [Ref. 2] Further, John Adam's work as the chief architect of the Model Treaty was of particular importance as it allowed the US to initially establish a policy of isolationism that was selective in its nature. This was because the treaty stated that "America's contacts with outside powers should be limited to trade relations." [Ref. 3] Thomas Paine's pamphlet *Common Sense*, published in 1796, was also of particular importance as its acceptance in America signified America's want to establish a unique isolationist foreign policy. Paine's work was based on his criticism of the English Constitution of the time and his desires for America not to inherit the monarchial constitution's faults. [Ref. 4] Therefore, largely because of our founding father's efforts, America remained isolationist for 169 years.

Until World War II, the worldwide view of the US was that it was not a regular participant in world affairs and that it only intervened in great emergencies. Although President Wilson attempted, after World War I, to change this view by attempting to engage the United States into a dominant role within the international arena, he was ultimately defeated by the traditional view. [Ref. 5] Therefore,
during the twenty year hiatus between world wars, the US seemingly jeopardized its national interests by opting not to join the League of Nations, not forming alliances, and not extending aid to friendly foreign nations. The US entrance into World War II reversed all of these trends.

During the thirty-six year period after World War II, the Western nations, led by the US, adopted a foreign policy doctrine based upon three formulas: opposition to aggression, containment of communism, and defense of free nations. [Ref. 6] The major factors that led to the adoption of this policy doctrine were the breakdown of the wartime alliances, the rapid expansion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and the perception of communism as being a monolithic world movement. These factors were quickly encouraged by a changed American attitude toward international relations and the international environment that stressed the overall equality of domestic and international politics and that there was truly a lack of a logical sequence between war and peace. [Ref. 7] This new attitude signaled the first real change in US public opinion concerning the US's role in the international arena. Because of this, US isolationism has seemingly become a policy of the past. US policy, since World War II, has been anything but isolationist.

As part of the containment policy doctrine of limiting communism within the boundaries of those nations that were
under communist leadership immediately and shortly after
the conclusion of World War II, the US opted to link its
national security to Western Europe by expanding the March
1948 Brussels Treaty into the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in April 1949. [Ref. 8] While the US
remains an integral part of the NATO Alliance, three
fundamental changes in the past thirty years have been
critical as we enter the decade of the 1980s. The first
change, which deals with nuclear weapons, had three separate
aspects. These are: the technological changes which have
resulted in improved nuclear weapons and delivery systems;
the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and the parity of
nuclear weapons' capabilities between the US and the Soviet
Union (USSR). Second, the emergence of other power centers
such as Western Europe, Japan, and the People's Republic of
China (PRC) which challenged the previous bi-polar structure
based on the US and USSR. And finally, the perception of
communism as not being monolithic, which was highly influ-
enced by Soviet actions against its satellites in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, open hostilities with the PRC, and the
recent rapid growth of the Eurocommunist movement in Western
Europe. [Ref. 9] During this same period, the US has
witnessed the dissolution of alliances such as the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO), internal problems within the
NATO Alliance, and a growing acceptance that National Wars
of Liberation, such as Vietnam, are more nationalistic than
communist. [Ref. 10]
The Western Europe of today finds itself tied to the NATO Alliance, facing a military opponent whose conventional superiority is seldom questioned, worried about a possible Finlandization in its territory should the military balance further erode, and plagued by a political unwillingness to make the sacrifices necessary to potentially correct the situation. Western Europe's natural relationship to NATO is the single most important reason for Western Europe's current, and past, political passivity. [Ref. 11] As argued by Francois Duchene, an entire generation of West Europeans has not been exposed to or accepted the responsibilities associated with an independent security policy and this same generation sees the Soviet threat as progressively diminishing. [Ref. 12] William Pfaff states: "Europeans do not quite believe that the Soviet Union poses a very serious threat to them; since the Americans are still in Europe they can also excuse themselves from worrying over the consequences of being wrong." [Ref. 13] This European attitude is conditioned by the fact that, since the 1840s, they have grown accustomed to the traditional Russian tactic of maintaining ground forces, deployed towards Western Europe, that are far larger numerically than past, or present, situations would seem to justify. [Ref. 14]. Because of the different perspectives, strains have been occurring in the Atlantic Alliance which undermine the political, social, economic, and military ties between the US and Western Europe.
B. NATO'S DEVELOPMENT AND EARLY YEARS (1945-1967)

The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco, shortly after the collapse of Nazi Germany, by the representatives of 50 nations on June 26, 1945. Two assumptions provided the foundation for the charter. First, that China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, who had the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council, would be able to agree on matters of importance. Secondly, that none of these five powers would attempt to increase its present territories. [Ref. 15]

It was quickly shown that neither of these assumptions was correct. The Soviet Union almost immediately took advantage of the post-war power vacuums, utilizing the Red Army and the power of world communism, by continuing expansionist policies. The Western Nations, basically because of wartime pledges and domestic pressures, decided to disarm. [Ref. 16]

On the day that Germany surrendered, the American armed strength in Europe amounted to 3,100,000 men: within one year it had melted to 391,000. On VE Day the British armed strength in Europe was 1,321,000: one year later there were only 488,000 left. On VE Day Canada had 299,000 men in Europe: within a year they had all gone home. How futile the good faith of the Western powers and their sincere efforts to cooperate with Soviet Russia were to prove. [Ref. 17]

By 1949, the Soviet Union had increased its wartime expansion, which had included outright annexation of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and areas of Finland, by adding Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to the Soviet bloc satellites. These countries were firmly bound to Moscow by a series of political, economic, and military agreements. To stem this tide, the US Congress responded in June 1948 with $400 million for aid to Greece and Turkey. This was done under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine, which called for the US to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." In the face of the threat of an expansionistic Russia and its 4,500,000 man armed forces, the free Western countries of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Brussels in March 1948. The treaty set up a joint defensive system and proposed the strengthening of the signing countries' economic and cultural ties. From this treaty, and encouraged by the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1948, the Western Union Defense Organization was created in September 1948. Its peacetime existence was proof for the US and Canada that the member countries were determined to combine to resist aggression. Meanwhile, the Canadians, led by Canadian House of Commons member St. Laurent, and the Americans, led by Secretary of State Marshall and Senators Vandenberg and Connally, had constitutionally freed their respective governments to join collective arrangements in the interest of national security. These events climaxed on April 4, 1949, when the Brussels Treaty was simultaneously included and
superseded with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. [Ref. 18]

In NATO's first 15 years, US hegemony was undisputed in the conduct of NATO military affairs. Military force improvements and modernization occurred only because of US leadership and generally after the Korean War had concluded. The Korean War acted as an accelerator for NATO's early development as the war's implications as to Soviet intentions helped to speed up the appointment of the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Eisenhower, and according to others, helped "put the O into NATO." During this same timeframe, our West European allies were primarily concerned with legitimatizing their respective governments, rebuilding their nations' social fabric, and establishing their place in the world economy. Because of US superiority in strategic nuclear capability and the perceived technological qualitative edge over the Soviets in conventional military equipment, the allies were willing to place increasing reliance on the US for their security. Yet at the same time they felt obligated to contribute a fair share of their economic resources to defense in order to retain a maximum US presence. [Ref. 19]

NATO's first strategy was based solely on nuclear deterrence as the US's sending of B-29s to Britain during the June 48 to May 49 Soviet blockade of West Berlin illustrates. In April 1950, National Security Council Document Number 68
(NSC-68) called for an extensive buildup of US military capabilities. However, the document's overall acceptance was not obtained until after the June 1950 invasion by North Korea into South Korea. This document, assisted by the Korean War, not only became a "call to arms," it sped up the appointment of General Eisenhower as the SACEUR and forced NATO, for the first time, to develop some concrete military strategies. [Ref. 20] This need for a cohesive NATO military strategy resulted in three highly criticized 1950 plans. The first of these, the Short-Term Plan, was the plan for the immediate future. When SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) was established in 1951, the plan was apparently ignored though it undoubtedly remained available for a short period as a contingency of some sorts. The plan's general outline follows:

The Short-Term Plan was an emergency plan and its purpose was principally to save as many of the troops as possible in the event of war. It amounted to little more than assignments to withdrawal routes, the authority to commandeer ships in British and Allied ports to be used for evacuation, and perhaps a desperate hope—which was never expressed—that Franco might let the Allied troops pass through Spain or even stand with them in an attempt to hold at the Pyrenees. [Ref. 21]

The Medium-Term Defense Plan was hampered by the conventional force posture of the period and a lack of an adequate logistical infrastructure. The lack of adequate armor or heavy artillery forces was further exacerbated by ammunition shortages and British and American supply lines that ran parallel to the front from Hamburg to Bremerhaven.
These supply lines were, in many instances, within a few miles of Soviet armor. The plan's general outline follows:

The Medium-Term Defense Plan was a battle plan, looking forward to the day when the Allies would have some portion of the troops they needed and, more importantly, when they would have the logistical back-up to permit deployment as a fighting force. Before the attack on South Korea in 1950, NATO had only twelve divisions, 400 airplanes, and a very small number of naval vessels. Most of these troops were poorly equipped and trained. They were deployed not for defense, but for occupation. The British and Americans were scattered in penny packets in Northern and Southern Germany, respectively, and the French were far to the rear, in the Rhineland and the Black Forest. [Ref. 22]

Finally, the Long-Term Plan was based on the premise that the war would be won or lost on the old traditional Western Front, which extended from Basle to the mouth of the Rhine-Ijssel. The plan's general outline follows:

The Long-Term Plan was not a battle plan, but one of requirements, an analysis of the forces needed to defend Europe in a major war. In such a war, the main Soviet thrust would have to come as all attacks on Western Europe had come—across the North German Plain. A secondary attack could be expected on Italy, in the Brenner-Trieste area, as well as on Scandinavia. [Ref. 23]

Largely because of these plans, NATO attempted to "close the gap" between the roughly 100 divisions required to defend itself and the total number of divisions that member NATO countries were willing to put up. This attempt came in the form of the 1952 Lisbon Conference which called for NATO to organize upwards to 96 divisions. However, this requirement was dropped the following year to roughly 35 divisions in order to rely more heavily on the use of tactical nuclear weapons if the conventional forces could not "hold the line."
The failure to "close the gap" conventionally was a major military consideration in the rearming of the FRG and their entrance into NATO in 1955. However, the major political considerations were the real determining factors involved in the FRG's joining of the alliance. These were the unwillingness of the other NATO members to carry the conventional burden by themselves and their conviction that it was the prudent thing to do at the time. [Ref. 24] During this period, the alliance came to rely on a "forward" defense composed of regular forces that formed a "tripwire," which still exists today, that could launch NATO's nuclear weapons if the conventional forces proved to be ineffective. At the same time, NATO's overall strategy switched from one of matching the Warsaw Pact man-for-man into one of deterrence, relying on the "tripwire" type forward defense and the threat of nuclear war.

In 1961, the Kennedy Administration attempted to change this by seeking to further control the nuclear mode and building up the conventional mode. After establishing in its minds that the Soviet threat was overstated, the Kennedy Administration introduced the "firebreak" concept (The "firebreak" concept is the same as the nuclear threshold and both refer to that point in modern warfare where nuclear weapons are introduced.) which implied that there was a definite step required by decision makers in the introduction of nuclear weapons that would make nuclear wars far
more complex than conventional wars. Therefore, the US idea was to defend NATO conventionally for a protracted time with the help of conventional reinforcements from the NATO members who would beef up the conventional forces prior to a Warsaw Pact invasion. The reinforcements would be effective because of the belief, at the time, that NATO would have a 23 day warning prior to attack. Because of this, the 1960s NATO troop conventional force levels fell from approximately 400,000 to less than 300,000. In 1967, the NATO Council approved the "firebreak" concept and the much publicized and still current "flexible response" doctrine. The "flexible response" doctrine is based on the NATO conventional forces fighting until defeated after which NATO's theater nuclear weapons will be employed, to include the first use of nuclear weapons, to restore the alliance's credibility.

C. THE LOST DECADE

General Alexander M. Haig and others have described the period 1964-1974 as NATO's "Lost Decade." [Ref. 25] The reasons for this are basically threefold. First, the US belief that Vietnam was vital to our national interests caused the US to surrender its leadership role in NATO. The majority of US forces, resources, and above all leadership was dedicated to the Vietnam Conflict. This relegated the operation of the alliance and the maintenance of US forces in Europe to a secondary position. During the
conflict, US force improvements were made unilaterally and with an emphasis on procuring materials that would enhance our success in Vietnam. Second, our Western European allies were facing growing social demands at home. This caused them to reduce defense expenditures (See Table 1) and force commitments wherever possible and to rely on US strategic nuclear forces and a perceived qualitative superiority in conventional weapons.

TABLE 1
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Europe</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total North America</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NATO</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Third and finally, the USSR, not hampered by large commitments to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), continued to improve its force modernization to close the qualitative
technological gap with the West. At the same time, they drastically increased their emphasis on force modernization and increased the quality of weaponry. [Ref. 26] Table 2 vividly reinforces these points. Meanwhile, the NATO Alliance neglected much needed force modernization programs. Neither the allies nor the US predicted such a dramatic Soviet improvement in the qualitative or quantitative status of their conventional forces. [Ref. 27]

Table 2 shown on page 24

D. THE CARTER INITIATIVES

As the Vietnam Conflict came to its conclusion, the US military focus once again returned to Europe. The assignment of General Alexander Haig as the SACEUR in 1974 began a period of alarming pronouncements concerning the status of the NATO conventional force posture. Two themes were evident. First, the continuing increase in Soviet modernization especially in the degree of qualitative improvements in their conventional forces. Secondly, the deteriorated state of Western conventional forces in relationship to the Soviets due to the failure of the allies to take the lead while the US was involved in Vietnam. [Ref. 28]

In order to seize the initiative and to re-assert US leadership in the alliance, General Haig initiated the SACEUR Flexibility Studies in 1976. [Ref. 29] These studies were to review the current status of forces and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>U.S. Outlays</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>W/O SEA</th>
<th>WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA (SEA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. U.S. outlays exclude retirement pay, include Department of Energy and Coast Guard defense outlays.
2. Estimated Soviet costs are based on what it would cost the U.S. to produce and man the Soviet military force and operate it as the Soviets do.
3. Projections are based on 3% annual real growth for USSR, for US real growth in outlays as projected by FYDP.


equipment in each of the NATO regions and to determine the appropriate actions necessary to improve the alliance's war fighting capability. This was done to bring the alliance's conventional forces to a credible level to meet the
requirements of the flexible response strategy. Most of the studies' recommendations were considered to be "low" or "no cost" by US definition while others, such as the increased prepositioning of equipment (POMCUS), carried a "high" cost. [Ref. 30] General Haig stated that "it was these studies which enabled us in the short period of a year to bring together what I call a very cohesive, long range requirements plan." [Ref. 31] SACEUR's findings were endorsed by President Carter and confirmed by three additional studies (Nunn-Bartlett Report, Hollingsworth Report, and the Close Study) which emphasized the need for increased defense expenditures on conventional force modernization to raise the nuclear threshold. [Ref. 32] While the different studies may have produced a military consensus, they did not apparently produce a political one as Table 3 illustrates.

TABLE 3
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Attempting to obtain a political consensus to increase defense expenditures, the Carter Administration at the May 1977 London NATO Ministerinals Conference and again at the May 1978 Washington Ministerials Conference urged the adoption of a three-part program, which had been approved previously by the NATO Military and Defense Planning Committees to correct current force imbalances and to set the trend for the 1980s. The program called for the adoption of three short-term measures in readiness, anti-tank ammunition stocks, and reinforcement, the development of a ten-part Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) to meet the needs of the 1980s, and commitment of each member nation to an annual increase in defense spending of three percent in real terms. [Ref. 33]

The increasing need for a political consensus was reinforced in January 1980, when the former President issued the Carter Doctrine in response to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The doctrine commits the US to the use of military force, if necessary,
to repel "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region." [Ref. 34] With the majority of US conventional forces, both in Europe and the US, committed to NATO or Korea, the remaining army and marine corps divisions, certainly less than six, available for commitment to meet the requirements of the Carter Doctrine seems to be inadequate. Combined with available US Air Force and Navy transport assets, these remaining units appear to be totally inadequate at the present time to counter any massive Soviet move to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. As defense analyst F.D. Ikle stated little over a year ago: "If push came to shove, we would lack the forces to 'repel' any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf region as the President... said we would." [Ref. 35]

Therefore, the military planner is faced with a serious problem. The one and a half war strategy developed in the early 1970s virtually ignored the Middle East by concentrating on improving NATO's conventional force posture. [Ref. 36] However, the current and projected US reliance on Middle East oil (See Tables 4 and 5), as well as our increasing need for imported raw materials, when combined with the Soviet move into Afghanistan and increasing Soviet presence worldwide has forced the US to redefine its one and a half war strategy with the half war now being the Persian Gulf area. [Ref. 37]
## TABLE 4

### ENERGY VULNERABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>CANADA</th>
<th>EUROPEAN NATO</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil as a percent of domestic energy consumption.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil imports as a percent of total oil consumption.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Vulnerability Index.</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## TABLE 5

### US OIL IMPORTS BY SOURCE MAY 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the Reagan Administration is serious about having a credible one and a half war strategy, it may be time for the US to rethink its commitment to NATO. With the declining US birthrate, general public opposition to conscription, and the increasing cost of maintaining the defense establishment, the US will be hard pressed to meet the half war strategy that the Persian Gulf dictates.

Having now briefly looked at the necessary background required for an analysis of The NATO Alliance: US Conventional Force Level Options Toward it Based on US National Interests, the remainder of this thesis will focus on US national interests, Warsaw Pact and NATO assessments, NATO Europe's economic power potential, current US conventional force level options toward NATO, and a conclusion recommending the implementation of one of the options presented herein.
II. US NATIONAL INTERESTS

Today, the question of US national interests is a dilemma. This is due to both the complexity of the subject and the fact that US national interests represent the ultimate belief standard of the US populace. Because of the latter fact, US national interests have appeared to be quite loosely defined in recent years. Therefore, this chapter's effort will be directed at thoroughly defining the concept of US national interest. From this definition, I will define what I consider to be the six most important current US national interests. These six prioritized US national interests will be derived at fully realizing that some of the identified interests may only be temporary due to changing US executive branch policy goals and/or differing perspectives on the future assessment of the worldwide threat.

One cannot intelligently define the concept of national interest without first discussing and defining the concept of public interest. Although the public interest is normally only relevant to the domestic sector and the national interest normally only relevant to the international sector, it is generally believed that they are part of the same process in democratic countries. Therefore, the public interest cannot be separated from the
national interest in democratic countries like the US. Because of this, the first step in defining the concept of US national interest is to define the concept of US public interest. The published works of Richard E. Flathman and Glendon E. Schubert will be utilized as the primary sources in defining the concept.

Richard E. Flathman, who I will use as the cornerstone of my definition of the concept, in his book *The Public Interest*, states that the concept of public interest is at the center of the value dimensions of politics and is, therefore, of primary importance in political theory. The concept also performs a specific function in political discussion and possesses a logic which places definable constraints upon public policy. Flathman's definition of public interest is that it is a normative standard and because of this simple definition it raises "the whole panoply of problems associated with standards in general." [Ref. 38] He also reflects on the origin of the term "public interest" as follows:

"Public Interest" is now commonplace in political discourse, but it is a relatively recent innovation, earlier writers having preferred such terms as "public good" or "commonweal." The replacement of "good" or "weal" with "interest" is of more than linguistic importance. In significant respects alloying "public" with "interest" rather than with "good" reflects substantive changes in political thinking which alter the problems surrounding the selection and justification of public policy. Writers such as Jeremy Benthan (around 1847) adopted "public interest" as the standard of public policy and drew the predictable inference concerning its content. That is: "The interest of the community then is, what?" Answer:
(The sum of the interests of the several members who compose it). From this point of view there is little in political life that does not revolve around the concept of interest. [Ref. 39]

Although Flathman's basic definition of the concept appears to be quite simple, the procedures he proposes for determining "what is" and "what is not" in the public interest is anything but simple. The starting point, in the determination of the public interest, is the individual interest, which is divided into two groups (self-regarding interests and other-regarding interests). Self-regarding interests, which can be either subjectively or objectively defined, refer to an individual's own profit or advantage and do not fit into Flathman's definition if they are for the selfish pursuit of one's own welfare. Other-regarding interests refer to an individual's interest in the profit, advantage, or welfare of others. [Ref. 40] From this, individual interests that are non-selfish in nature must further prove that they are moral and rational before they can be defined as being in the public interest. These rules are:

1. Fundamental Moral Rules--are comprehensive, general, not dependent upon specific contexts, and so important that "without them no civilized society would survive and few goods could be achieved." Examples are the rule against breaking promises, lying, stealing, and killing.

2. Local Rules--apply fundamental rules to specialized contexts or regulate aspects of specialized situations, for example, business or professional communities.
3. Neutral Rules—occur where behavior must be regularized but where there is little or nothing to choose between various possible rules. Example is that it would be just as well to drive on the left if everyone else did. [Ref. 41]

The final proof that an individual interest is in the public interest, according to Flathman, revolves around two concepts of reason and value that determine whether a non-selfish and morally sound individual interest is rational in its application. Flathman lists two principles that are applicable when testing whether non-selfish and morally sound individual interests are in the public interest. These principles are:

1. The Principle of Consequences (PC)—If the consequences of A doing X would be undesirable, then A ought not to do X. Or in its positive formulation, if the consequences of A's not doing X would be undesirable, then A ought to do X.

2. The Universalizability Principle (U)—If A claims that it is right for him to do or have X, he must agree that it is right for BCD..N to do or have X unless he can show that he or his circumstances are different from BCD..N or their circumstances in a manner relevant to the justification of his being an exception. In political terms, if government A treats BCD in fashion X, it is obligated to treat EFG in the same way unless it can show differences between BCD and EFG which justify different treatment. [Ref. 42]

In summation, Flathman's theory of public interest does not describe all of the dimensions of political or private behavior for the excellent reason that such is not the purpose of any theory of public interest. It does, however, assist in informing us about aspects of political and private behavior by calling attention to discrepancies and/or political tradeoffs between the norm (which most theories
of public interest are based upon) and the actual practice
Flathman's overall theory of public interest is further
summarized and illustrated in Table 6.

**TABLE 6**

**R. E. FLATHMAN'S THEORY OF PUBLIC INTEREST**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Interests</th>
<th>MORAL RULES</th>
<th>RATIONALIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>interests</td>
<td>2. Local Rules</td>
<td>2. Principle of Universalizability (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Neutral Rules</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjectively defined</td>
<td>Justified</td>
<td>Justified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
<td>Not Justified</td>
<td>Not Justified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;PUBLIC INTEREST&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective defined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glendon A. Schubert, in his book *The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept*, is critical of the concept of public interest, which he feels is "nothing more than a label attached indiscriminately to a miscellany of particular compromises of the moment." He continues this critique by adding that "if the public interest concept makes no operational sense, notwithstanding the efforts of a generation of capable scholars, the political scientists might better spend their time nurturing concepts that offer greater promise of becoming useful tools in the scientific study of political responsibility."

Yet within the author's overall critique of the concept he classifies the field of writings on the public interests into three theories. These theories are the rational (referring to the general public), the idealist (referring to political parties), and the realistic (referring to interest groups).

The rationalist theory of writings view the public interest as evolving from a nation's people. The role of government in this theory is to carry out the dictates and submit to the will of the people. The theory assumes a democratic type of national unity and an overall concern for the common welfare of the nation's people. It is in direct opposition to the realist theory as will become apparent when it is discussed. The rationalist theory of writers on the public interest generally feel that the most useful
method of determining what the public wants is the concept of majority rule—utilizing elections and the results of public opinion polls. [Ref. 44]

The universal concepts of justice, liberty, and freedom are the cornerstone of the idealistic theory of writings on the public interest. In this type of theory, the public is viewed as being inadequate in determining what is in its own good. Idealists argue for strong government leaders who are able to act as their conscience dictates rather than to submit to pressure from individuals or interest groups. Therefore, the public servant, acting as an elite, is the very heart of the system and articulates, as an individual, the public interest to the people. [Ref. 45]

The realist theory assumes the public interest to consist of numerous special interest groups that are in perpetual conflict against one another. Therefore, the realists do not view majority rule like the rationalists. They view it as "pluralistic elements banding together in temporary alliance to create a one-time majority." Therefore, the public interest is the outcome of these alliances and public officials need only to "resolve in their own mind the variety of choices and make implications of the decision--and make a final determination." [Ref. 46] In summation, Schubert's principle strength appears to be his discussion of different views of public interest theory that all rely on a tight and highly structured political system.
With the completion of Schubert's definition, I have looked at two fundamentally different definitions of the public interest. What do they mean? Which one is valid today? Could the public interest still be undefined as suggested by Arthur S. Miller? Miller postulates in a legal journal "that one of the basic reasons for the oft asserted current marasmus [wasting away] of the administrative agency (and perhaps of much of public administration generally) is the failure to develop acceptable and workable criteria by which the public interest may be judged and evaluated. [Ref. 47] He adds to this overall ambiguity of the concept with statements such as: "The public interest concept is to the bureaucracy what the due process clause is to the judiciary." [Ref. 48] Yet other writers, such as Peter L. Berger, suggest that the public interest was ultimately powerful enough to change US foreign policy as to the continued conduct of the Vietnam Conflict. He has stated that the public interest, being represented at the time by a new intellectual elite, was probably instrumental in the US withdrawal from Vietnam and represented "a great victory for the forces of morality in American public life" as well as "a decisive defeat" for espoused interest groups. [Ref. 49] Therefore, my discussion on US public interest means that: "If the question of US national interest is a dilemma, and the US public interest is part of that same process, the question of US public interests is also a dilemma for the same reasons."
These reasons revolve around the subject's general ambiguity, the complexity of the subject when applied to a democratic country such as the US, the fact that the US government has not defined the concept, and the fact that it attempts to identify and label the overall US public value. Because of this, numerous definitions of the concept have been postulated for general consumption and they are normally all valid in their given context. Consequently, I have no qualms about formulating my own definition of the US public interest. This definition is based on the existing literature in the field and summarized in the following six points:

1. The public interest is a valid, although sometimes ambiguous, concept that attempts to represent the ultimate belief standard of the US populace.

2. The public interest and the national interest are part of the same process in pluralistic (democratic) societies.

3. The public interest must continually place constraints on public policy or the democratic process will fail and possibly lead to violent disorder.

4. The public interest as a concept must be based upon non-selfish individual interests, justified moral rules, and rational thought. This concept is exacerbated by political tradeoffs, interest groups, and philosophical theories that are non-democratic in nature.

5. Non-governmental indicators of the public interest are political election results, published opinion polls, the size and frequency of civilian demonstrations and/or civil disorders, and published statements by religious and/or influential personalities.
6. Governmental indicators of the public interest are foreign and domestic policy decisions, judicial (especially Supreme Court) rulings, the budget, enacted legislation affecting industry, individual income tax rates, the amount of special states legislated to certain professions and occupations and the writings of this country's forefathers (i.e., Preamble, Common Sense, and the writings and speeches of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams etc.) that continue to influence public/political thought.

Having discussed and defined the concept of US public interest, it is now appropriate to take the information gained in discussing the US public interest and put this information to work, when applicable, in defining the concept of US national interest. The definition of US national interest, like the definition of US public interest, and the prioritized listing of overall US national interests are considerable matters of debate among scholars, students, governmental officials, and political scientists. As stated earlier, the concept's definition is quite simply a dilemma. This fact is generally attributed to the complexity of the subject, the fact that US national interests represent the ultimate belief standard of the US populace, and, most importantly, the fact that US national interests oversee a vast category of desires from sovereign states that vary enormously from state to state and from time to time. The textbook-type definitions of national interest by Frederick H. Hartmann and W.P. Gerberding provide a useful service in introducing the concept, although they are generally considered to be only the initial steppingstones in a thorough definition of the concept. Hartmann defines
national interest as "what states seek to protect or achieve vis-a-vis other states." He extends this by stating that national interests may be further categorized into vital and secondary interests. Vital interests are a product of the current situation and are those interests that a state will normally immediately fight to protect. Such vital interests, as a minimum, include the protection of existing territory and the preservation of a nation's ideals from a massive "loss of face." By contrast, secondary interests cover a wide range of goals a state would prefer to attain but not to the extent of fighting in order to achieve them. [Ref. 50] Gerberding states that the definition of national interests is simply the "security and well-being of a nation." Whatever protects or promotes these conditions is said to be in the national interest. [Ref. 51] These simple definitions of the concept will now be expanded upon by utilizing the writings of James N. Rosenau, Warner R. Schilling, Martin E. Goldstein, William P. Bundy, and Hans J. Morgenthau to illustrate some of the more complex and current problems associated with the concept. Upon completion of this step, the model formulated by Donald E. Neuchterlein will be used to assist in the formulation of the six prioritized US national interests required for the successful attainment of my overall thesis effort.
Rosenau feels that the concept of national interest is primarily used by political analysts to describe, explain, or evaluate the adequacy, or lack of adequacy, of a nation's foreign policy. The concept is used by political actors as a means of justifying, renouncing, or proposing foreign or domestic policies. Because the concept of national interest is vague, it complicates the analyst's task whereas it increases the utility of the concept to political actors. [Ref. 52] Therefore, according to Rosenau, it is a nebulous concept of little real utility that political actors use to their advantage whenever possible.

The historical usage of the term "national interest" has been traced to both sixteenth century Italy and seventeenth century England. However, it was not until this century that the term came into use as an analytical tool. [Ref. 53] Rosenau has divided analysts and political actors who use the term as an analytical tool into two categories: objectivists and subjectivists.

Objectivists, such as Hans Morgenthau, concern themselves with evaluating the worth of a nation's foreign policy. They state that what is best for a nation is a matter of objective reality (realpolitik) and that by describing this reality analysts and political actors are able to utilize the concept of national interest as a basis for evaluating the appropriateness of a nation's policies. Since national interest is based on reality, objectivists
normally do not explain how or why something is considered to be in the national interest. Morgenthau states that the national interest is also effected by a nation's relative power during a particular period of history and that this power, in relation to other nations, is an objective reality for that nation to consider in its domestic and foreign policy decisions. [Ref. 54]

In comparison, subjectivists are concerned more with explaining why nations do what they do when they engage in international affairs. They define the national interest as not being a single truth that exists in the real world, but as a pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change whenever the requirements and goals of a nation's members change. Basically, the subjectivists feel that the national interest is based upon whatever a nation's leaders seek to preserve and/or enhance. [Ref. 55]

Although it may be easy to criticize these two schools of thought as being simplistic in nature, I feel that they adequately represent two definitions of national interest that illustrate adequately the extent of disagreement in defining the concept. Therefore, these two schools of thought should not be regarded as being too nebulous—but regarded as two simple and rational viewpoints that represent the overall feelings of some social scientists and politicians today as well as illustrating the vagueness of the concept.

42
In a 1956 article, Walter R. Schilling discusses the concept of national interest by reviewing the books *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* by Robert Osgood and *Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis of Foreign Policy* by Thomas Cook and Malcolm Moos.

Osgood, according to Schilling, analyzes US foreign policy from 1890 to 1941 and judges it to be unsatisfactory because Americans "were largely ignorant of the actual ends of motives of nations, including their own." Consequently, US national interests, defined by Osgood as "a state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to a nation" were ignored during this period as the US remained basically isolationist in nature except for its brief interlude in World War I. [Ref. 56] He lists self-preservation of the nation, self-sufficiency, national prestige, and national aggrandizement as the basic interests which benefit a nation and states that for the US, the Christian, liberal, humanitarian, and traditional Western ideals upon which it was founded complicate the process of evaluating national interests when these ideals interfere unrealistically with real world problems. Osgood feels that Americans, prior to World War II, overestimated the importance of certain ideals to the detriment of its national interests. Because of this, US policies were typified as being full of "drift, bewilderment, improvisation, and disillusionment." However, World War II did much to force Americans into realizing that US
self-preservation is dependent, to a great degree, on overseas power and that ideals, by themselves, will not stop bullets. [Ref. 57]

Cook and Moos, who deal specifically with the post-World War II Cold War and Korean Conflict period, evaluate the effects World War II had on policy makers and state that America should not discard the principles of its good society because the ramifications of doing so may be adverse to the overall international arena. [Ref. 58] In many respects, Cook and Moos are in direct disagreement with Osgood over the moral conflict the concept of national interest presents decision makers daily. US national interest must be justified, to some degree by morality. Because of this, problems continually surface when foreign policy decisions do not conform to some individual's or group's definition of morality. In many respects, this is an everpresent problem that is at the heart of the basic problem and creates a dilemma that the concept has not been able to shake itself free from. Therefore, Cook and Moos' attack on Osgood's realistic position is entirely understandable and legitimate in their eyes as: "Universally applicable moral principles are vital to the generation of national power and influence." [Ref. 59] Although Schilling felt that this idealist-realistic conflict was fading in the mid-1950s, he was obviously mistaken as the 1980 Presidential election victory of the realist Ronald Reagan over the idealist Jimmy Carter has clearly proven.
Martin E. Goldstein, another realist, must certainly feel that the primary objectives of US foreign policy is national security. Consequently, criteria must be established as to which portions of the globe must be defended in a conventional military manner. For the US, according to Goldstein, the portion of the globe that is critical to US conventional mode security includes Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean area. [Ref. 60] To assist decision makers in deciding which areas of the globe must be kept out of enemy hands due to national interests, he has established nine fundamental and logical indicators. These are:

1. Geographic proximity so that friendly nations are on the periphery;
2. Strategic location including control over external land, waterways, and geographic configurations;
3. Sources of scarce and vital resources;
4. External economic markets;
5. Supplies of scarce and vital finished goods;
6. Repositories of the countries private investment;
7. Friendly countries with influence potential based on population;
8. Friendly countries with a highly industrialized level of economy;
9. Friendly countries with military power. [Ref. 61]

William P. Bundy suggests additional objectives of US foreign policy, in addition to the primary objectives of national security, that revolve around the maintenance of an international community and the encouragement of
representative (democratic) governments. [Ref. 62] He feels that idealism has a valid place in pragmatic US foreign policy and that this often creates a problem that affects foreign policy decisions and/or decisions that affect the national interest. He states: Conservatives and liberals alike have been readily subject to delusions about particular regimes abroad. We have a strong tendency to set up our own white and black hats...we are often harder on authoritarian regimes where there is still a measure of freedom, but its sins are visible, than we are on regimes which extinguished freedom totally long ago and so have no visible sins." [Ref. 63] In simple terms, it is probably inappropriate to support any political leader or system on purely ideological grounds. Stressing idealism, Bundy's five recommendations follow:

1. In assessing undemocratic regimes, let us judge those of the Right and those of the Left on the same scales, and let us recognize that there are important differences of degree;

2. Our power to influence resides overwhelmingly in our example;

3. The US should remain strongly committed, loyal and supportive of "core area" allies i.e., Western Europe and Japan. The defense of Japan and the avoidance of serious great-power conflict in Northeast Asia, still require in my judgement our strong support of Korea despite the deplorable excesses of its leadership;

4. If one accepts the new degree of American involve-
ment in the Middle East as inevitable--both for the sake of Israel and for the sake of our oil supply--one must accept the ambiguities that go with it.
5. Our concern for democracy, and our distaste for dictatorship, should have much clearer weight in our total policies than they have had for some years past; among other things it matters that we say frequently what we stand for. More of our policy, and much more of our public posture toward other nations, can tilt in the direction of democracy and against dictatorship of any stripe. [Ref. 64]

There is, perhaps, a nearly perfect example of how US foreign policy objectives interact with the national interest and idealism to create a dilemma that, in many ways, typifies decision makers problems in this area:

Overriding the objections of some scientists, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt made the decision not to share atomic secrets with the USSR. Henry Stimson considered promising such secrets in return for an opening of Soviet society, and had FDR lived he might quite possibly have used "atomic diplomacy" to ease America's postwar role. President Truman later saw the US as a trustee of the awesome weapon. Although at times he seemed disposed to listen to Stimson and Acheson who suggested a more open and direct approach to the Soviet Union, he was averse to sharing secrets that might end America's nuclear monopoly. [Ref. 65]

Although Hans J. Morgenthau's definition of national interest, which is based on national power, has been discussed previously, his views on morality within the concept have not been discussed. Morgenthau describes his views by addressing two opposing schools of thought. He labels these as the utopian and realist view. The utopians believe "in a rational and moral political order based on the essential goodness of human nature" whereas the realists (which includes Morgenthau) address the world as "consisting of opposing interests generating conflict and where moral principles can at best be approximated." [Ref. 66] He
states in exacting terms the large degree of disagreement between the two schools of thought. For example, the utopian view charges the realist view as being "contemptuous of the simple benefits of honest men, [it] jeers at the sentimentalism of those who believe that man may strive for peace among nations." In comparison, the realist view charges the utopian view as not being scientific because of their dismissal of certain concepts the realists view as being extremely relevant, such as the principle of "balance of power." Morgenthau states: "Nothing more needs to be said to demonstrate that facts do not support a revision of American diplomatic history which tries to substitute humanitarian and pacifist traditions for power politics and the balance of power as the guiding principles of American foreign policy." [Ref. 67]

Because of his realist leanings, Morgenthau lists only two basic elements required to be addressed by policy makers in their formulation of foreign policy. These are:

1. National survival is the most basic, necessary element and when two or more nations have common survival interests bipartisanship in their foreign policies is easily achieved;

2. Variable elements complicate the alignment of interests as personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral tradition are brought to bear upon their determination. [Ref. 68]

If foreign policy decisions are addressed within the above two elements, the legitimacy and compatibility of these decisions with national values (i.e., public interest)
and the national interests of other nations can be addressed in terms of subnational, other national, and supra-national group interests, as well as scientific analysis and the interests of other nations. He feels that scientific analysis is useful in weeding out national objectives that are unattainable in terms of available resources and that the interests of other nations, in a multinational world, are critical in an age of potential total war. [Ref. 69] This latter idea proposes that there is a natural international aspect within the concept of national interests that must take place before specific policies can be addressed. These specific policies, even for a realist such as Morgenthau, certainly include morality and he lists five points in regards to moral implications that he feels national actors must follow. These are:

1. To know that states are subject to moral law is one thing; to pretend to know what is morally required of states in a particular situation is another;

2. Care must be taken in either overrating the influence of this on ethics on international politics or of denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything but considerations of power;

3. Moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states without considering the situation in which they are taken;

4. The realist recognizes that a moral decision, especially in the political sphere, does not imply a simple choice between a moral principle and an action which is morally irrelevant or immoral;

5. The political realist distinguishes between his moral sympathies and the political interests he must defend.
Having reviewed the concept of national interest as described by the likes of Rosenau, Schilling, Goldstein, Bundy, and Morgenthau, it is now time to summarize their thoughts and move to the more immediate goals of my efforts, which is to define the six most important US national interests. To assist me in this more immediate effort, I have decided to utilize, to a great degree, the model proposed by Donald E. Neuchterlein, in his 1978 book entitled *National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities*, because it is relatively new and it is one that I feel comfortable in using. However, before the Nuechterlein model is utilized, the previous discussion of the concept by the aforementioned six authorities is summarized by the following seven points:

1. Although the concept of national interest appears quite vague, it has political use in justifying, renouncing, or proposing foreign and/or domestic policies. In this light, the public interest is a factor in determining the national interest;

2. There are numerous definitions of the concept and these definitions tend to fall into two distinct categories: Realists who feel the national interest relies on realpolitik and the ability of a nation to meaningfully interject its military power, if required. Idealists who feel that a rational and moral political order based on the essential goodness of human nature is a possibility that can be achieved;

3. All definitions of national interest are justified, to some degree, by morality;

4. Various methods of assisting decision makers in establishing the national interest have been formulated. These methods revolve around geo-strategic considerations, resource acquisition, maintenance of the international system, encouragement of democratic processes,
ideological issues, and the ability to extend national power militarily, if necessary;

5. The question of national interest is ultimately based upon its most basic goal of national survival. All other goals are secondary and normally temporary in their international application;

6. If foreign policy decisions are addressed within the concept of national interest, the legitimacy and compatibility of these decisions with national values (i.e., the public interest) is open to question by various political and non-political interest groups, and/or influential individuals;

7. The concept of US survival and vital interests loses some of its international validity because many identified national interests appear to be non-defensible militarily.

Donald E. Neuchterlein offers a new approach to defining the national interest based on his study of presidential decisions on US involvement in foreign wars. The basis of his definition stems from his belief that there are four basic US national interests: protection of American lives (defense); protection of US shipping (economic); protection of humanity and civilization (world order); and protection of fundamental human rights (ideological). [Ref. 71] His belief in these four basic US national interests is to a great degree, based upon the public speeches of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately prior to US involvement in World Wars I and II respectively. Wilson's message on April 2, 1917 is an excellent example of how these four basic national interests were addressed immediately prior to US involvement in World War I. Wilson's statements about these basic national interests were as follows:
Defense interest: "There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs: they cut to the very roots of human life."

Economic interest: "I am not thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is... Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be."

World order interest: "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world, as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles."

Ideological interest: "We are glad, now that we see the facts without a veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its people, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be placed upon the tested foundations of political liberty." [Ref. 72]

Roosevelt's arguments, during a radio address to the nation on December 29, 1940, address the same basic points less than a year before US involvement in World War II. They are summarized, in the same format as Wilson's below:

Defense interest: "Germany has said that she was occupying Belgium to save the Belgians from the British. Would she then hesitate to say to any South American country, 'We are occupying you to protect you from aggression by the United States?' Belgium today is being used as an invasion base against Britain, now fighting for its life. Any South American country, in Nazi hands, would always constitute a jumping-off place for German attack on any one of the other Republics of this hemisphere."

Economic interest: "If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers...will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere."
It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military."

World order interest: "The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world... In other words, the Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government."

Ideological interest: "The history of recent years proves that shootings and chains and concentration camps are not simply the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a 'new order' in the world, but what they have in mind is only a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope. The proposed 'new order' is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a government based upon self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and self to dominate and enslave the human race."

[Ref. 73]

The four basic US national interests described earlier in the speeches of Woodrow Wilson and FDR are beneficial in creating a simple definition of US national interest. However, they need to be expanded upon if they are to assist in providing decision makers with any guidelines to help identify such US national interests. In expanded form, Nuechterlein offers these definitions:

Defense interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state or against an externally inspired threat to its system of government. Defense interests entail only the protection of the homeland, the citizens, and the political system of the nation-state; they do not include alliances with other states, although they may include strategic bases whose primary function is the protection of the homeland.
Economic interests: the enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being in relations with other states.

World order interests: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.

Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values that the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good. A nation's ideology is an important part of its national interest--although it may not be adhered to as strongly as the other three, it is nevertheless important in determining how a nation reacts to international issues. [Ref. 74]

Therefore, the four basic national interests outlined above should be considered as dynamic factors that condition the behavior of nation states. Consequently, changes in their overall priority are usually measured in years, rather than in months. Realizing that this is the basic framework for Neuchterlein's definition, it is now possible to more fully understand what is meant when he states: "The national interest is the perceived needs and desires (based on the four basic national interests) of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising its external environment." [Ref. 75] Before discussing the additional factor of intensities and interest, it must be stated that I agree with all but one aspect of his definition. Simply put, this aspect is my belief that the public interest and the national interest are part of the same process in democratic countries. In contrast, Neuchterlein states: "This [my] definition also draws a
distinction between the external and the international environments of states; the way in which a government deals with the internal environment of the state is usually referred to as the public interest, but the way it deals with the external environment is the national interest."

[Ref. 76]

The identification of the basic national interest, or interests, is but the first step decision makers must make in the establishment of overall foreign policy. The second and final step is to assess the intensity of that interest which the decision makers of a country believe is involved. In order to analyze the differing degrees of intensity, Nuechterlein has developed four categories of differing intensities to assist a government in establishing what it should do and what policies it should adopt. These categories follow:

1. Survival issues: when the very existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy, as a result of overt military attack on its own territory, or from the threat of attack if an enemy's demands are rejected.

2. Vital issues: when serious harm will very likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military forces, are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation.

3. Major issues: when a state's political, economic, and ideological well-being may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment and thus requires corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues).

4. Peripheral issues: when a state's well-being is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but when
the interests of private citizens and companies operating in other nations might be endangered. [Ref. 77]

Based primarily on the Nuechterlein model but taking into account all of the preceding information, a variety of US national interests might be listed and assigned priorities. It is obvious to this writer that any such list would certainly include within it: the preservation of the nation; the belief in peaceful change; the rule of law; the principle of majority rule; the effort to assist in the development of weaker nations; and the belief in the freedom and rights of the individual man. In this light, I define the six most important survival and vital US national interests in 1981 as being:

1. the permanent maintenance of US national survival;
2. the permanent maintenance of US domestic order;
3. the temporary maintenance of friendly political, economic, and military ties with West European countries, individually and collectively, with particular emphasis on the NATO alliance;
4. the temporary maintenance of the present Middle East balance of power with particular emphasis on Persian Gulf oil routes and supplies;
5. the temporary maintenance of the continued flow of raw materials, oil, and goods from Africa and South America;
6. the temporary maintenance of Egypt, Israel, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Spain's existence and security.

The US national interests defined above are also prioritized as they were listed based upon Neuchterlein's national interest matrix [Ref. 78] and my own subjective
evaluation of each identified national interest. Table 7 illustrates numerically, by showing where the identified and prioritized interests fall into Nuechterlein's matrix, how the six identified US survival and vital national interests are categorized in my thoughts:

**TABLE 7**

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SIX IDENTIFIED AND PRIORITIZED 1981 US NATIONAL INTERESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic interest at stake</th>
<th>Intensity of interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of homeland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic well-being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable world order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note (*)-Vital interests 3 and 4 are considered to be a factor of equal importance in both of the identified basic interests.

It must be strongly stressed that the above list of US national interests is worthless unless it is backed by a favorable US national will. As previously discussed, national interests in democratic countries rely on elements of national power, and national power relies on the domestic sector. Therefore, in real terms, it is impossible to separate public from national interests. This is particularly true in the US where national interests must satisfy internal legitimacy (i.e., US Congressional power of the
purse) and the external demands dictated by the current overall situation. [Ref. 79] For the purpose of this thesis, however, I have only concerned myself with what I consider to be associated with the most fundamental survival national interest of the US—that of the permanent maintenance of US national survival. The six US national interests that I have previously identified readily fall into, or could affect this most fundamental interest. I consider all other US national interests to be built around these six identified interests.

Translated into military terms, this most fundamental national interest requires the US, with its military forces, if necessary, to prevent or thwart any hostile attack on the American states or on the basic elements of its economic and security systems. While these latter systems are subject to change over a period of time, the defense of Western Europe, the ability to counter conventional Soviet expansionism or aggression, the ability to counter strategic Soviet forces, the free access to goods and markets, the maintenance of other allies existence and freedom, the ability to meaningfully influence the world balance of power, and the maintenance of US domestic order are all easily classified as survival or vital interests of the US.

In the 1980s, only the Soviet Union will have the capability of launching an all-out attack on the US homeland. The problem in dealing with Soviet power today and in the
next decade is twofold. First, it calls for continuation of the maintenance of American strategic nuclear parity with the Soviets. Secondly, and more importantly from my viewpoint, it also requires that the US, in conjunction with its European allies, has the ability to counter any conventional Soviet aggression that threatens the world balance of power. Strategy for the nation's long-term defense focuses attention on the peaceful evolution of the two superpower worlds into a true multipolar world (i.e., the US, USSR, European Community, Japan, and China) and a greater interdependency of national economies. In this situation, the US will best assure its security by maintaining a nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, and in concurrence with its Western allies, by evincing a credible conventional military force. Therefore, a foreign policy emphasizing the dynamics of the NATO Alliance to preserve the balance of power in Europe must be continued in the 1980s. It is definitely a vital US national interest. However, the nature and extent of US participation in NATO is subject to debate, dependent on other requirements to insure the achievement of our other survival and vital national interests. Looked at in this manner, the concept of national interest may be used as a tactic to assist in the redefining of current domestic and foreign policies.
III. WARSAW PACT ASSESSMENT

This chapter will assess the current advantages of the Warsaw Pact, stressing the Soviet dominance of Warsaw Pact troops over NATO troops in selected categories that would have an influence on today's European battlefield. It will also incorporate current regional issues, political and military, that could affect the outcome of any future conflict(s).

The following excerpt sets the tone desired for the Warsaw Pact of the 1980s and although it is fictional, its facts and figures are extraordinarily accurate today:

Of immediate concern to NATO were the thirty-two Soviet divisions—sixteen tank, fifteen motorized, with at least one (and perhaps more) airborne, all in Category I—stationed in European countries of the Warsaw Pact. These formed four groups of forces—army commands, in effect—one each in the German Democratic Republic (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), Poland (the Northern Group), Czechoslovakia (the Central Group) and Hungary (the Southern Group), containing in total over half a million men and 11,000 tanks, with some 8,000 artillery pieces and over 1,000 integral aircraft. The Sixteenth Air Army, also deployed in the GDR, represents no more than the spearhead of the available tactical air resources. In the western USSR are seventy more divisions (a third of them tank), of which only a few are kept in Category I, but from which further reinforcements are readily available. In addition to the Soviet forces in Central Europe, the Warsaw Pact countries of the Northern Tier (the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland) can deploy a dozen tank and a score of motorized divisions of their own, all organized, armed and trained on the Soviet model, while in the Southern Tier (Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania) the one tank and five motorized divisions of the Hungarian Army are also available. [Ref. 80]
The "Agreement on Friendship, Coordination, and Mutual Assistance" was concluded in Warsaw on 14 May 1955. The designation "Warsaw Pact" was given to the organization at a subsequent meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The formation of the Pact was completed in 1957 with the conclusion of bi-lateral agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary concerning the stationing of Soviet troops in those countries. A similar agreement was reached with Czechoslovakia on 16 October 1968, after the intervention and occupation by Soviet forces. The formal justification for concluding the treaties was the rearming and admission of the FRG into the NATO Alliance on May 5, 1955. [Ref. 81]

On September 13, 1968, Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, contending that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was a breach of the conditions as to Warsaw Pact membership. [Ref. 82] During a recent election speech, Andrei Gromyko commented on the current Warsaw Pact role by stating: "The Organization of the Warsaw Treaty reliably protects the security of its members and there is no doubt that the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty, due in May [1980], will become a demonstration of cohesion of fraternal countries and of their resolve to firmly pursue the policy of peace and counteracting the forces of aggression." [Ref. 83]
Although the combined NATO countries' GNP is over twice that of the combined Warsaw Pact countries' ($3.7 and 1.6 Trillion respectively) and total NATO countries' population is almost 200 million people more than the Warsaw Pact member countries' (564 and 371 million respectively), the Warsaw Pact's total military manpower is approximately 350,000 men higher than that of the NATO Alliance's [Ref. 84] Tables 8, 9, and 10 simplify and numerically illustrate the current Warsaw Pact advantages in ground forces, tactical air forces, and main battle tanks. From these tables, one can readily quantify Warsaw Pact advantages in these critical areas as they relate to the two opposing military alliances.

**TABLE 8**

Ground Forces Available Without Mobilization* (div equivalents)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Northern and Central Europe³</th>
<th>Southern Europe⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO Warsaw (of which USSR)</td>
<td>NATO Warsaw (of which USSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armd</td>
<td>Mech/inf/other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes: NATO ready forces, Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, and non-Soviet Pact divisions in Category 1 (see note on p. 15).

³ Divisions, brigades and similar formations aggregated on the basis of three brigades to a division.

⁴ NATO figures are for AFTR and AFNORTH combined. Since neither of the commanders of these forces can be assured of the support of ground forces in Portugal or Britain, these are not included. By the same criterion, French forces are also not included, although three divisions are currently deployed in Germany. Forces in Berlin are also excluded. Warsaw Pact forces include all Category 1 divisions of East Germany (2 tk, 4 mech), Czechoslovakia (3 tk, 3 mech) and Poland (5 tk, 3 mech), and Soviet divisions deployed in those countries in peacetime.

⁵ NATO forces include Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces and, on the Warsaw Pact side, the Category 1 land forces of Bulgaria (1 tk, 5 mech), Hungary (1 tk, 3 mech), and Romania (2 tk, 5 mech), together with 4 Category 1 Soviet divisions (2 tk, 2 mech) stationed in Hungary.

### TABLE 9

**Tactical Aircraft**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactical Aircraft in Operational Service</th>
<th>Northern and Central Europe*</th>
<th>Southern Europe*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Warsaw Pact (of which USSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/ground-attack</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interceptors</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>2,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The area covered here is slightly wider than the one described in note c to Table 1. Many aircraft have a long range capability and in any case can be redeployed very quickly. Accordingly, the figures here include the appropriate British and American aircraft in Britain, American aircraft in Spain and Soviet aircraft in the western USSR. They do not, however, include the American dual-based squadrons, which would add about 100 fighter-type aircraft to the NATO totals, nor French squadrons with perhaps another 400 fighters. Carrier-borne aircraft of the US Navy are excluded, but so are the medium bombers in the Soviet Air Force, which could operate in a tactical role, and also several hundred heavily armed helicopters which pose a considerable threat to ground forces. Overcrowding of forward airfields could prove a limiting factor in the amount of air power NATO can deploy.*


### TABLE 10

**Main Battle Tank Comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Northern and Central Europe</th>
<th>Southern Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Warsaw Pact (of which USSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main battle tanks in operational service*</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>19,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These are tanks with formations or earmarked for the use of dual-based or immediate reinforcing formations (some 600). They do not include those in reserve or small stocks held to replace tanks damaged or destroyed. In this latter category NATO has perhaps 2,500 tanks in Central Europe. There are tanks in reserve in the Warsaw Pact area, but the figures are difficult to establish. The total Pact tank holdings are, however, materially higher than the formation totals shown in the table and are presumed to be held in stockpiles or in independent units.*

Besides having a numerical advantage in personnel and major items of combat equipment, the Warsaw Pact may also be benefiting from today's world scene. The Soviet Union is currently occupying its southern neighbor Afghanistan in what is seen by many as the initial step to gain control of Middle East oil and lands. In Europe, NATO appears years away from countering the ominous Soviet buildup of medium and long-range missiles as well as conventional forces. [Ref. 85] President Carter's 1980 State of the Union Address proposed to use military force to repulse any Soviet attempt to seize control of Persian Gulf oil, negotiate for use of naval and air facilities near the Persian Gulf, expand permanent US military presence, particularly naval, in the Indian Ocean and supply a trillion dollars over five years to beef up US defenses. [Ref. 86] These events, combined with the Reagan Administration's redefining of US foreign policy (discussed in Chapter II) and even further increased defense budgets, clearly indicate that the US's foreign policy priorities, at least temporarily, may have shifted away from NATO. US Army Chief of Staff, General E. C. Meyer, in his 1980 white paper addresses this by stating: "The most demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 1980s is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe." [Ref. 87] During a recent speech at the US Naval
Postgraduate School, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, commented on the same general theme. The admiral stated that "If we are the leader of the free world, we have global responsibilities, and we have to face up to them." He continued by stating events in Iran and Afghanistan have shifted American policy away from a "NATO First" priority. [Ref. 88]

The Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union in particular, can also much more readily accept an overall change of mission when compared numerically with NATO and/or US military forces. This is because the Soviet Union has a total of 167 active army divisions. Although these divisions are not all at the one hundred percent level in terms of personnel and equipment, they represent a substantial force for enforcing overall Soviet foreign policy goals militarily, if necessary. Only 30 of the 167 Soviet divisions are directly assigned to the Warsaw Pact. [Ref. 89] These Soviet divisions, combined with the other 56 Warsaw Pact divisions, all of which are deployed in Eastern Europe, make it apparent that the Soviet Union can readily accept multiple missions utilizing assets from Warsaw Pact or non-Warsaw Pact units without greatly decreasing its Warsaw Pact commitment. [Ref. 90] The deployment of approximately 100,000 troops into Afghanistan beginning in December 1979 is an excellent current example of this capability. Could the US deploy 100,000 troops into Mexico and still support
NATO as it has in the past considering that the US has a total of only 19 active duty army and marine corps divisions? As discussed in the remainder of this paragraph, this would be difficult. NATO's major commands, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), consist of 27 divisions, committed by Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States. [Ref. 91] Four of the 16 active duty US Army divisions are physically deployed with AFCENT and the majority of the CONUS based US Army divisions are "earmarked" under classified contingencies to Europe. It is therefore obvious that any broadening of present US military non-NATO roles would adversely affect the present US role in NATO. Unfortunately, it appears that the current world situation may lead the US in that direction. Tables 11 and 12 illustrate the current reinforcing capabilities of Western and Eastern military forces.

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, General Bernard W. Rogers, recently related a US problem that compounds the NATO reinforcement problem further. Rogers told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that the US Individual Ready Reserve, the pool of trained reservists who would be NATO replacements, is at least 250,000 troops short of what he would need for a war in Europe. He said that the US Army Reserves are in such bad shape that "I don't have a
### TABLE 11

Western Reinforcing Formations Available (div equivalents*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active</th>
<th></th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armd</td>
<td>Mech</td>
<td>Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US*</td>
<td>2½</td>
<td>4½</td>
<td>2½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7½</td>
<td>4½</td>
<td>3½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 52½

* Including light divisions (infantry and airborne) and armoured cavalry regiments.
* Some countries, particularly Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and France have plans to mobilize battalion-sized units in some numbers in addition to the formations shown here. France also has formations earmarked for territorial defence.


### TABLE 12

Warsaw Pact Reinforcing Formations Available (div equivalents*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Category 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Category 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Category 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armd</td>
<td>Mech/inf/other</td>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Armd</td>
<td>Mech/inf/other</td>
<td>AB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 113½

* Based in Western and Central Military Districts (excluding Leningrad, 2 divs in Transcaucastus MD). Forces in Afghanistan are believed to have come from divisions east of the Caspian, although the possibility that one or more of the reported 5 motor rifle divisions and one airborne division may have been deployed from Western Military Districts cannot be ignored.

very high sense of confidence that I can accomplish my mission--as far as US forces go." [Ref. 92]

One of the Warsaw Pact's most important current goals is to obtain a more flexible response. Within the past few years, the Soviet Union has dramatically improved its theater nuclear capabilities, which is a key element in its flexible response. For example, one of the new Soviet missiles, which can reach all countries around the USSR but under the exclusive rules adopted by the US and the USSR in SALT cannot be termed "strategic," is currently pre-occupying NATO military staffs. It is the SS-20 missile. This missile has a range of approximately 5000 kilometers and is capable of carrying three independently targetable (MIRV) nuclear warheads. The launch system uses solid fuel and, unlike the other silo-based Soviet intercontinental missiles, is mobile. According to US sources, the Soviets have already deployed approximately 200 of these systems in Western Russia and are adding a new one every week. [Ref. 93] By 1985, it is estimated that between 400 and 600 of these systems will be operational and capable of striking at Western Europe, the Mediterranean region, and the Middle East from either Eastern Europe or Russian soil. [Ref. 94] Therefore, this new missile gives the Warsaw Pact/Soviet Union an unmatched capability of striking deep into NATO's heartland with highly accurate theater nuclear weapons that are survivable, because of their location, against NATO's
current theater nuclear weapons. Tables 13 and 14 depict the current Soviet advantage in long and medium-range nuclear systems within the European theater.

Perhaps the most glaring tactical discrepancy between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is in the chemical warfare arena. Although Soviet political leaders are continuing arms limitation talks on the prohibition of chemical warfare development, there is no evidence of Soviet restraint in efforts to maintain superiority in combat operations involving the use of chemical weapons. Warsaw Pact forces regularly train with great realism in toxic environments. A large, well-equipped and well-trained chemical, biological, and radiological organization is organic to the Warsaw Pact service support infrastructure. The Soviets continue to incorporate nuclear, biological, and chemical filtration systems in various combat and combat support equipment. A variety of modern agents, delivery systems, and tactical doctrines necessary for large-scale use have been developed. Whether the Warsaw Pact, more specifically the Soviets, would initiate chemical warfare in a nuclear or non-nuclear war is not certain. However, their capability to do so is undeniable as they are the world's most fully trained and equipped chemical warfare force. [Ref. 95]

The lack of NATO standardization, although efforts are being made within NATO to help diminish the effects of the problem, presents significant difficulties in terms of
| Category and type | Range/ combat radiusa | First deploymentb | Inven-
toryc | Warheads per systemd | Utilizationd | Service-
ability | Warheads available (approx.)(e) | Surviv-
abilityf | Reli-
abilityf | Pene-
trationg | Arriving warheads (approx.)(h) | Operating commu-
nication and notes |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WARSAW PACT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(USSR unless noted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRM1</td>
<td>(nm/km)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-20</td>
<td>2,700/5,000</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.66f</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-5 Scavan</td>
<td>2,200/4,100</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9f</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-4 Sandal</td>
<td>1,000/1,900</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRLBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-12 Scud A</td>
<td>490/900</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-12 Scud B</td>
<td>160/300</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>GDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-12 Scud C</td>
<td>200/400</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0f</td>
<td>0.45m</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>On 3 G-I, 7 H-I subs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-12 Scud D</td>
<td>200/400</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0f</td>
<td>0.45m</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>On 3 G-I subs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic missile sub-totals</strong></td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>540 (52% of available warheads)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-22M/26 Backfire</td>
<td>4,025</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4**</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-16 Badger</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-22 Blinder</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-24 (Su-19) Fencer</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mig-23/27</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flagger B/D</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-17 Fitter C/D</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-7 Fitter A</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mig-21 Fishbed J-N</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air-delivered weapon sub-totals</strong></td>
<td>3,993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>955</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>729 (29% of available weapons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warsaw Pact totals</strong></td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>819</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** The Military Balance 1980-1981, p. 118
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Long and Medium-Range Nuclear Systems for the European Theater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SLBM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBBS S-2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SLBM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic missile sub-totals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land-based aircraft</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VULCAN B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-111F, F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAGE IV A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC TERRIER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAGUAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAGE III E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier-based aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-6E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-7E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPER ETENDARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air-delivered weapon sub-totals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO totals (excluding Poseidon)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
cost, military effectiveness, and political conflict. This creates an advantage for the Warsaw Pact because virtually all Warsaw Pact equipment is obtained from the Soviet Union's military industrial complex. Standardization is best understood as the effort to adopt common doctrine, procedures, and equipment within NATO whenever major economic, military, or political benefits can be gained. [Ref. 96] The lack of standardization introduces so many complexities into military logistics, operations, and training that the domino-like chain reaction of inefficiency is hard to measure. The US Senate Committee on Armed Services has estimated that NATO loses 30 to 40 percent of its combat effectiveness because of inadequate standardization. [Ref. 97] A former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, has stated that increased standardization could have improved the military effectiveness of his ground units by 30 to 50 percent and of some of his tactical air units by 300 percent. [Ref. 98] Since the Warsaw Pact has achieved nuclear parity with NATO, the problem of standardization of conventional NATO forces has become even more important. In addition to this, NATO is doing less than anticipated in the area of standardization. Because of massive costs and a feeling of US self-interest by some of the European NATO Alliance members, NATO leadership has seemingly placed interoperability (interoperability is defined as making dissimilar arms and
equipment work together by means of adaptive devices or special training) ahead of standardization. This is the critical feature of the problem today. NATO leadership would like to standardize, but cannot because of member nations' desires to act as independent entities, and is hoping that interoperability will help to eliminate some of the basic problems.

The Warsaw Pact governments (the Soviet Union in particular) have a distinct advantage over the US and other NATO countries in their ability to pay a smaller amount of their total defense budgets for military manpower. During the past decade, Soviet tank forces, artillery forces, and fixed-wing tactical air forces have been enlarged by 35, 40, and 20 percent respectively. [Ref. 99] To a great degree, this has been possible because of Warsaw Pact ability to conscript youth at virtually no cost. Soviet spending for military manpower accounts for less than 30 percent of total defense spending whereas US defense spending for manpower last year accounted for over 53 percent of its total military budget. [Ref. 100] In the Soviet Union, for example, every Soviet male must register with his local draftboard at age seventeen. The following year, under the auspices of the Universal Military Service Law of 1967, he is obligated to appear at an induction center. If he is accepted for military service as a Soviet draftee, he will earn four rubles a month (approximately six dollars).
Those who fail to comply with the 1967 law are subject to arrest and face a possible prison sentence of ten years. [Ref. 101]

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact neighbors also possess an advantage over the US and its NATO allies in the area of weapons production. The following comparison (See Table 15) was declassified by US defense officials in 1977 and depicts the current Warsaw Pact advantage in six of the eight weapons categories which Western intelligence experts regularly monitor on a continual basis. Since then, additional intelligence estimates show that the USSR is now out-producing the US in helicopters. Table 15 depiction of the US and NATO having an approximate 30 percent advantage in this category is therefore not accurate. [Ref. 102]

TABLE 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Production Rates</th>
<th>1972-1976</th>
<th>1972-1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>1,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>27,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/Attack/Trainer Aircraft</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the most recently publicized problems that NATO, the Reagan Administration, and Western politicians are now discussing is the status of European NATO countries' overall political will to defend Western Europe. Although this subject has been briefly addressed in Chapter I and is not necessarily a distinct advantage for the Warsaw Pact, considering their current and past problems in this same general area, it does warrant further discussion. The Reagan Administration has now inherited the touchy problem about whether the European NATO countries are doing enough for Western defense (for a further discussion on the financial aspects of this problem see Chapter V). [Ref. 103]

Today, this stems from developments in Afghanistan and Iran which opened a political gap between the US and its NATO Allies and the token support that the US was given by its allies concerning economic sanctions against Iran and the Soviet Union. These responses, coupled with an equally token European response concerning the US boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, have offended American public opinion. [Ref. 104]

Because of this, published reports stating that the Europeans were not going to meet their promised three percent increases in defense budgets have become headline news in the US [Ref. 105] The West Europeans have responded to this by insisting that President Reagan can squeeze social programs to assist the US defense budget because of the
size of his November 1980 election victory. However, the current West European politicians have no mandate from their voters to do the same and therefore must show restraint when dealing with Washington on controversial matters. [Ref. 106] Former US Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor recently stated: "In NATO, the immediate question is how to offset the increase in strength of the Warsaw Pact and, in so doing, how to obtain a larger military contribution from our allies. Our military chiefs need to know to what extent, if any, they should plan to modernize NATO weaponry despite allied coolness to the idea and whether to consider a further increase in our own forces currently deployed there." [Ref. 107] The current high level surfacing of this problem does not mean that it is a new one. There has been, since 1970, an entire generation of West Europeans who have not been exposed to or accepted the responsibilities associated with an independent security policy. In 1974, William Pfaff made a statement that typifies the thoughts of many influential Americans today by stating: "Europeans do not quite believe that the Soviet Union poses a very serious threat to them; since the Americans are still in Europe they can also excuse themselves from worrying over the consequences of being wrong." [Ref. 108]

The final Warsaw Pact advantage this chapter will assess pertains to the possible impact upon NATO of the
current Eurocommunist movement. Eurocommunism, which has gained great momentum in the past five years, is defined by Jiri Valenta as being "a trend or process leading to an independent, pluralistic concept of socialism, embracing respect for individual liberties and developed primarily within the unified framework of the democratic countries of Western Europe." [Ref. 109] This trend is currently impacting on three Western European nations (France, Italy, and Spain) that have, or are attempting to establish, links with NATO.

The French, who since 1966 have had a special relationship with NATO, possess major military forces and add a factor of uncertainty to Warsaw Pact planners. Although they have left the NATO command structure, some of their overall European military plans are coordinated with NATO; those involving French nuclear weapons are autonomous. The French Communist Party (PCF) currently attracts approximately 16 percent of the French populace's vote (16 percent figure obtained from April 26, 1981 French presidential election). Currently, the PCF accepts NATO as part of the existing equilibrium in Europe and advocates the simultaneous dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Their current stance is to attempt to weaken the US role in NATO by emphasizing their country's "tous azimuts" defense strategy and continued refusal to integrate into the NATO command channels. [Ref. 110]
Italy, a member of NATO, provides forces that are helpful to the defense of Italy and air, ground, and sea bases for 12,000 American soldiers (to include home ports for the US Sixth Fleet). In addition, the peninsular country possesses a uniquely useful geographical position. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) currently attracts approximately 30 percent of the Italian populace's total vote. The PCI gives qualified support to NATO as it may see NATO as useful in being an instrument of national security and even protection against Soviet influence. At the same time, they are opposed to American hegemony and are seeking ways to reduce American influence if it is compatible with domestic political realities. The PCI would ultimately like to dissolve the alliance. [Ref. 111]

The Spanish, who are not NATO members, have been seeking to join NATO since the death of Franco. They currently possess a 300,000 man military and a dominant geographical position with respect to the Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean, and the Straits of Gibraltar. Their geographical location could play a strategic role in NATO for air, land, and sea staging operations if they joined the alliance. Because of this, NATO planners have long considered Spain to be key terrain. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) currently attracts approximately ten percent of the Spanish populace's total vote. The PCE does not want to debate the NATO issue until 1986; however, they have
stated that they would support NATO Membership if the Spanish Parliament approved it or if the Spanish people approved it by referendum. [Ref. 112] Although the PCE is a factor against Spanish entry into NATO, other factors such as the US-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (which expires in September 1981), the Gibraltar question, the Socialist Party's (PSOE) opposition to NATO membership, and Spanish entry into the EEC compound the issue into a highly complicated political question.

Robert Osgood summarizes the three Eurocommunist's goals concerning the NATO question as follows:

**PCI and PCF**

Eurocommunists know that their party must be strategically correct and tactically wise in its pursuit of political power, which alone permits attainment of their ultimate goals. Therefore, the PCI and PCF, in adjusting to the environments in which they seek power, have renounced the "dictatorship of the proletariat." They have also embraced democratic pluralism, free elections, and Western liberties, although they continue to govern themselves by "democratic centralism." They are also anxious to avoid assuming full power and responsibility prematurely. The ultimate test of the effect of the PCF and the PCI on NATO would be their reaction to a Soviet or Soviet-supported aggression against the NATO area. Insistent questioning by the press since 1976 has elicited scattered concessions by PCI and PCF spokesmen that they would oppose aggression from the East if it should occur. [Ref. 113]

**PCE**

Under their leader, Santiago Carillo, the PCE has been more outspoken than either the PCI or PCF in rejecting Soviet leadership of the Communist movement and in criticizing the East European as well as Soviet regimes for their lack of democracy and their transgression of human rights. Its support for both the
EEC and an European Defense Community goes farther than the PCE or PCF toward endorsing a West European block that would be an alternative to either Soviet or American dominance. Pending the creation of this bloc, however, it supports US bases in Spain but opposes Spain's entry into NATO, although it promises to accept this event if the Spanish Parliament were to vote for it. The importance of the PCE to American interests springs not from its domestic power but from its prominence among Eurocommunist parties by virtue of Carillo's defiance of Moscow. [Ref. 114]

The overall Eurocommunist movement's influence on NATO therefore is a function of their current national policies, which could change drastically if one, or any, of the Eurocommunist parties gained political control of their respective countries at the polls. Because of this, NATO would be faced with a moral question should Eurocommunists attain seats of power in Italy, France, and to a lesser degree (because of current non-NATO membership) in Spain. Can the NATO countries, who are pledged to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law" maintain their alliance with countries that share governments with communists committed to an antithetical political order? [Ref. 115] When asked about this question, Henry Kissinger commented:

While the United States can never be indifferent to the extension of Soviet hegemony to Western Europe, the permanent stationing of American forces in Europe could hardly be maintained for the object of defending some communist governments against other communist governments. Such a deployment could be justified only on the crudest balance of power grounds that would be incompatible with American tradition and American public sentiment. [Ref. 116]
Therefore, the bottom line appears to be that the formal acquisition of power by one or more Eurocommunist parties would most probably compound the current problems of eliciting support in the US and Western Europe for financial and other measures necessary to sustain the military, economic, and political cohesion of the alliance. Because of this, the US and NATO have more to lose (in comparison with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact) than to gain from the potential effects of Eurocommunists in power. However, the losses are neither so obvious or so great to necessarily exert a drastic effect on American interests in NATO or in NATO in general. In conclusion, the possible effects of Eurocommunist movements, according to Osgood, on the NATO Alliance are:

1. The effect on allied defense contributions and policies where Communists are in positions of influence;

2. The effect on the response or anticipated response of these allies to Soviet aggression against members of NATO and adjacent countries, such as Yugoslavia, and to crises short of war;

3. The effect on the US military role in NATO, particularly on US troops in Europe and American use of naval and air bases;

4. The effect on US military and economic support of allies with Communists in their governments;

5. The effect on the military balance and political cohesion among all the allies;

6. The direct effect on Soviet policy toward the West through the impact on Soviet policies and actions and on the quality of allied relations with the Soviet Union;
7. The indirect effect on Soviet foreign relations through the impact on relations between the East European Communist governments and the Soviet Union;

8. The effect on democratic institutions and processes in allied countries with Communists in their governments. [Ref. 117]
IV. NATO ASSESSMENT

Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the US signed the North Atlantic Treaty and thus formed NATO on April 4, 1949. As discussed in Chapter I, the North Atlantic Treaty may be seen as supplementing the Brussels Treaty of March 1948. The signing nations of the Brussels Treaty, which now include Belgium, the FRG, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK, are committed until 1998 to give one another "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" if a signing nation is the recipient of armed aggression in Western Europe. Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty unites Western Europe and North America in a commitment to consult together if the security of any one member is threatened. Because of this, armed attacks against member nations are to be met by such actions as each of them deem necessary, including the use of armed military forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic region. Greece and Turkey joined the NATO Alliance in 1952. [Ref. 118] A protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty was added by the Paris Agreements of 1954 which aimed at strengthening the structure of NATO and revising the Brussels Treaty of 1948. Briefly, the provisions of the Paris Agreements were as follows:
France, the United Kingdom and the United States terminated the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and recognized it as a sovereign state. The Federal Republic of Germany undertook to authorize the maintenance on its territory of foreign forces at least at the strength obtained at the date the agreements came into force.

The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy acceded to the Brussels Treaty and the Western Union became the Western European Union (WEU). There was to be extremely close cooperation between the WEU and NATO.

The Federal Republic of Germany was invited to join NATO, contributing a national army to be integrated into the forces of the alliance. Machinery was set up to limit the strength of forces and quantities of armaments which could be created within the WEU.

The United States and the United Kingdom undertook to maintain for as long as necessary their forces on the European continent. A unified military formation was to be established by assigning to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe all member countries' forces, with certain exceptions, stationed within the area of his command.

In 1955, the FRG formally accepted the invitation offered by the Paris Agreements and joined NATO. In 1966, France formally withdrew from NATO's integrated military organization. This was primarily because of former French President Charles DeGaulle's desires for an independent French security system and the French leader's perception of NATO relying too excessively on the US nuclear umbrella. The French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military organization did not, however, signify a total break from the alliance, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Also in 1966, the fourteen-nation NATO Defense Planning Committee was formed with France being the only member.
nation deciding not to join. In 1974, Greece left the Defense Planning Committee because of internal problems and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. [Ref. 120] However, it gained full reinstatement to the committee in October of 1980. Spain, which has wanted to join NATO since Franco's death, is hoping to join the alliance this year. According to Prime Minister Sotelo, Spain will formally apply for NATO membership after the successful renegotiation of the current US-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is completed. [Ref. 121]

The North Atlantic Council is the governing body of the alliance. Its headquarters is in Brussels and it consists of ministers from the fifteen member countries, who normally meet twice a year, and of ambassadors representing each government, who are in permanent session. Since 1969, members can leave the alliance by giving a one-year notice to the council. [Ref. 122]

Although NATO is obviously outnumbered in terms of personnel and equipment by the Warsaw Pact, it is a common misnomer (which I heard on numerous occasions from US and West German soldiers during my forty-month tour of duty in the FRG) to label NATO forces as "losers." In the first place, the common comparison of divisional size units is deceiving. For example, a typical Soviet division (Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions are organized alike) has approximately 35 percent less personnel and equipment than
its US or NATO counterpart. [Ref. 123] Its combat support and combat service support, except in the area of bridging, is also less sophisticated. [Ref. 124] Table 16 further illustrates this by comparing Soviet armored and mechanized divisions with like divisions of the US, FRG, and UK.

Table 16
Comparison of Divisional Establishments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armored Divisions</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Tanks</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitank Guns</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Mortars</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med. Artillery</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Artillery</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mechanized Divisions</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>16,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitank Guns</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Mortar</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med. Artillery</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Artillery</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondly and more importantly, the real reason the "losers" syndrome is a misnomer lies within NATO itself. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who has always been an American because of US nuclear weapons, has approximately 66 division-equivalent units available in peacetime. This figure is significantly higher after mobilization. NATO has some 3,100 tactical aircraft, based on about 200 standard NATO airfields, backed up by a system of jointly financed storage depots, fuel pipelines, and signal communications. The 2d French Corps, which consists of two divisions and is not integrated into NATO forces, is stationed in southern Germany under a status agreement reached between the French and German governments. Cooperation with NATO forces and the French command has been agreed to between the commanders concerned. In addition, the 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads that the US maintains in NATO Europe should also be noted (in comparison to the estimated 3,500 like Warsaw Pact warheads). [Ref. 125]

The Warsaw Pact may well be an alliance based upon friendship, coordination, and mutual assistance; however, it is not an alliance that is problem-free. One of its greatest problems, the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members, deserves further discussion. Rumania is an excellent initial example both politically and militarily of this problem:

In the area of foreign policy, Rumania has openly defied the Soviet Union or taken an independent stance
on a number of important issues over the last decade. For example, Rumania refused to sever relations with Israel in 1967, normalized relations with the West despite misgivings by the Soviets, and openly condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Further, the Rumanians have not only refused to support Moscow in its conflict with Peking but have maintained close and extensive ties with China. Lately, in yet another challenge to the Soviets, Bucharest has come out strongly in favor of Eurocommunism and along with foreign political and economic aspects, which by now have been well documented in numerous Western studies, the Rumanian deviation exhibits a significant military dimension, which has some important implications for the Warsaw Pact, both of a military-political and military-strategic nature. For the pact, as well as for East-West relations, these go well beyond Rumania's nominal and political weight. [Ref. 126]

The sole objectives of the Rumanian concept of defense are the preservation of national independence, state sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the country. [Ref. 127] Rumanian military writers make almost no attempt to disguise the identity of their expected aggressor. This expected aggressor, in their eyes, is the Soviet Union. The writers further calculate, for example, that to totally control the country's territory, an aggressor would have to maintain an occupation force of up to one million soldiers. This is not due to Rumania's standing army. It is due to Rumania's compulsory Patriotic Guard, which could total six million upon mobilization. [Ref. 128] Given the circumstances of their continuing membership in the Warsaw Pact, the Rumanians have practiced what they preach to a remarkable degree. Since 1962, they have refused to allow foreign troops on
Rumanian soil for maneuvers and have themselves not participated in exercises outside their country since 1969. [Ref. 129]

Although Rumania is an excellent example, in terms of reliability, of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, Professor Jiri Valenta has stated in clear and concise terms his thoughts concerning overall Warsaw Pact reliability. As Table 17 illustrates, this creates an advantage, although it is extremely hard to measure quantitatively, for the NATO Alliance.

The importance of the discussion on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces' reliability is that it supports a widely held contention that any Warsaw Pact attack into Western Europe would be executed primarily by Soviet ground forces. Because of this, the remaining non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces would probably assume combat support and combat service support roles in the assisting of Red Army offensive actions in Western Europe. If this contention were to prove itself true, it would create an advantage for NATO forces in that they would not be directly defending against the maximum potential forces of the entire Warsaw Pact.

The NATO of the 1980s is being restructured because of political decisions made, in the mid-1970s, to emphasize a more flexible response. Although nuclear forces remain a key element in the deterrent, a more credible level of conventional defense is being adopted. [Ref. 130] This flexible response restructuring is based upon critical short-term defense improvements and a specific long-term defense program to meet the NATO defense needs of the 1980s. As discussed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MODE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
<td>Based on traditional ties and similar language with Soviet Union, a backward country possessing a large army that is not considered to be decisive in any future European conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1968 intervention by Red Army changed country's perception of Soviet Union as inferior, possibly reliable in offensive mode only in Warsaw Pact operations directed against Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Country has anti-Russian tradition but current leadership is pro-Soviet, supports Soviet Union as proxies in Zambia, strong army that may not participate in offensive actions directed against the FRG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1956 intervention by Red Army changed country's perception of Soviet Union, ties with Catholic Church assist in fueling anti-Russian sentiments, country's army possesses a bad military reputation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Country's ties with Catholic Church and current actions of independent labor unions fuel anti-Russian sentiments, considered 2d most important army in Warsaw Pact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>Unreliable</td>
<td>Country's unsimilar language with Soviet Union fueled large cultural gap, army possesses little modern equipment and is not in command infrastructure of Warsaw Pact, may be reliable in offensive mode in Warsaw Pact actions directed against Hungary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jiri Valenta, the author received this information during a class at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, on February 18, 1981. Professor Valenta is an Associate Professor in the school's Department of National Security Affairs and is the author of the Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968. For further information on this subject, see the Voigys-Herspring article in Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1980).
earlier, the short and long-term defense programs were a result of former SACEUR Alexander Haig's 1976 SACEUR Flexibility Studies.

The short-term defense improvements, which for the most part were completed in 1978, are geared to give NATO an enhanced capability for meeting a short notice attack by the Warsaw Pact. The short-term actions are centered around antitank measures, war reserve stocks, readiness, and reinforcement. In the area of antitank measures, NATO has increased its holdings of antitank weapons, modernized range-finding equipment, and introduced other weapons, such as TOW Cobra gunships, capable of countering Warsaw Pact armored forces. War reserve stocks in selected categories were upgraded, improving not only quality but also quantity and availability for early utilization. Readiness and reinforcement measures dealt with such items as early passage of command, higher manning levels, training, and actions designed to facilitate the movement of reinforcements from US, Canada, and Great Britain. [Ref. 131]

The long-term defense program (LTDF) is of far more importance to NATO as it aims at effectively improving NATO's overall deterrence by improving the conventional force structure throughout the 1980s. If the program is implemented as proposed, it may give NATO an overall advantage over the Warsaw Pact in a conventional conflict. The current Director of the British Atlantic Committee, Brigadier
Kenneth Hunt, has clearly stated his views concerning the

LTDP as follows:

We have it within our capacity, because of Western
technological skills, to open up this quality gap
again—if we spend the money. This is what the NATO
LTDP is about—but it is long term, and some of it may
never happen. Until the LTDP measures take hold, our
conventional defenses are not likely to be able to
maintain the integrity of NATO territory with any
certainty and will have difficulty in buying enough
time for negotiation from any position of strength.
[Ref. 132]

The LTDP is based upon ten separate task forces, each
analyzing a specific high priority program area, each under
a Task Force Director. The Task Force Directors recommend
whatever seems essential to carrying out the programs
efficiently. The ten high priority task force areas and
some of their more important aspects are:

The Readiness Task Force, building on the short-
term readiness measures, aims at increasing the responsi-
veness of standing forces, selected reserve units and
civil support in time of tension, crisis, or early
hostilities. It is focusing on improving NATO's alert
machinery, including early commitment of NATO forces,
orienting the NATO exercise program more heavily to
readiness and interoperability and improving armor/anti-
armor capability and defense against radiological,
biological, and chemical warfare.

The reinforcement Task Force is also building on the
short-term measures to further improve the movement and
allied reception of strategic reserves from the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. In this connec-
tion, the US has already accelerated the reconstitution
of prepositioned overseas material conscribed to unit
sets (POMCUS) stocks and will probably propose further
enhancement of badly needed strategic airlift capabilities.

The Reserve Mobilization Task Force is recommending
the quickest and most effective means of mobilizing
assigned, earmarked and other reserve forces. It also
deals with rapid mobilization of reservists to bring
standing forces up to wartime strength.
The NATO Maritime Posture Task Force seeks to increase the capability of allied navies to operate as a joint, collective fighting force, including greater interoperability and standardization in communications, munitions, logistics and tactics.

The Air Defense Task Force is reviewing land-based air defense. Its goal is to achieve the making of an integrated complex of weapons, organization and air command and control systems that is needed to deal effectively with the increasing Warsaw Pact air threat.

The Communications, Command and Control Task Force is aiming at an integrated command and control system with greater commonality in doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and standardization communications. This is a top priority goal of both SACEUR and SACLANT.

The Electronic Warfare Task Force is reviewing priorities for practical long-term improvement in the entire EW spectrum of concepts and procedures, intelligence, equipment and systems, standardization and interoperability, manpower, teaming, management, and funding.

The Rationalization Task Force is developing plans and procedures for harmonizing allied R & D and armaments production, as is essential for achieving standardization or at least interoperability.

The Consumer Logistics Task Force proposes an improved NATO logistics structure, including steps for better common logistical support of operational plans, and for better civil support of military operations.

The Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Task Force is developing a long-term program to insure that theater nuclear forces continue to perform their key role in deterrence, and are adequately stable and survivable. [Ref. 133]

NATO is also a relatively strong and healthy political alliance. This does not mean that the alliance had no problems in this area. The NATO problems of European political will and Eurocommunism were discussed extensively in the previous chapter. However, NATO's political problems (i.e. Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and the
current Polish crisis) are definitely not of the same political magnitude or type as the Warsaw Pact's.

In the US, a substantial majority of Americans accept the fact that the cornerstone of US foreign policy is its commitment to European defense. Sixty-two percent of Americans believe the US should come to the assistance of its European allies in the event of their attack by the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, Americans oppose any reduction of US forces in Europe, by a margin of three to one. [Ref. 134] The alliance also has taken a political stand as to the Soviet Union's 1979 occupation of Afghanistan. The following statement reflects the consensus of the members of NATO's North Atlantic Council:

The North Atlantic Council, joined by senior representatives from capitals, met on 15 January 1980 as part of the alliance's continuing consultations on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its consequences for East/West relations and for the alliance. They expressed full support for the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 14 January last and denounced the Soviet action. The Soviet invasion contravenes fundamental principles of international behavior and represents a serious blow to alliance efforts to build a framework of constructive relations with the Soviet Union. The situation created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan will remain at the center of allied concern and consultation. [Ref. 135]

NATO is also healthy enough to tackle broad political problems. NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), which was established in 1969, is working on environmental affairs. The committee has produced computer-based information systems relating to geothermal energy, a memoranda of understanding that obligates members to share a new documentation as to solar energy, periodic
symposia information on high temperature engine ceramics and international technical meetings on air quality modeling. [Ref. 136] In comparison, the Warsaw Pact has no known organizational infrastructure to address broad political problems such as the environment.

The next NATO advantage addressed in this chapter deals with the current and future aspects of the newly emphasized Sino-NATO relationship. In a recent lecture at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Professor Parris H. Chang referred to the PRC as being "the 16th member of NATO." Professor Chang further explained this by emphasizing that it is in China's benefit militarily to assist in the promotion of a united and strong NATO. Furthermore, the newly found Chinese ideology, which stems from the failures of the Cultural Revolution and China's recognizing of the failures of the Soviet system, has created a new Chinese attitude which is seeking new ties with Western Europe and the US. [Ref. 137] The China factor has already benefited NATO. This is because the Soviets and Chinese share a long border, ideological disagreements, and territorial differences. The territorial differences are real enough to have already resulted (primarily in the late 1960s) in armed clashes, and Soviet concerns are deep enough to have deployed approximately 45 divisions on its Eastern flank. Because NATO's Western flank is the Atlantic Ocean, NATO obtains the obvious advantage of not having to prepare or potentially contend with a two-front war when the China factor is considered.
According to US Army Lt. Col. Al Eiegel while he was assigned to the US Army Russian Institute, Garmish, FRG, the Kremlin also considers the PRC figuratively as the 16th member of NATO. This is illustrated by Western European arms sales to the PRC and the US's refusal to halt the flow of arms and technology to China. [Ref. 138] By analyzing the Soviet media, Lt. Col. Biegel has identified perceptions of the Kremlin concerning the Sino-NATO military connection. These perceptions, according to the Kremlin, are a result of the following anti-Soviet Chinese goals:

- Weakening the relative power of the Soviet Union and its leadership role in the socialist bloc.

- Increasing the level of tension between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to justify increasing arms expenditures and to divert the USSR's attention from the Sino-Soviet border by encouraging the enhancement of NATO's military potential.

- Supporting the consolidation of West European unity, politically, militarily, and economically to confront the Soviet Union.

- Undermining Moscow's attempts to promote detente, reduction of armaments and other proposals to reduce tensions in Europe, i.e., MBFR and the Helsinki Agreement.

- Creating a "two-front" threat against the Soviet Union by means of a formidable anti-Soviet alliance structure consisting of the US, Japan, China, and Western Europe. This new form of containment policy would enhance the PRC's ability to pursue its own expansionist goals in Asia.

- Seeking to gain access to Western arms and related technology in order to modernize its armed forces and modify its military strategy. [Ref. 139]
For years, Western spokesmen have felt that NATO could counter the Warsaw Pact's advantage in sheer numbers by stressing other factors which equalized the equation. The most important of these other factors was NATO's perceived superiority as to its overall quality of equipment. [Ref. 140] Simply put, Western technology has, since the early 1970s, seldom been questioned in its overall ability to field clearly superior military equipment. A US Congressional Inquiry on American and Soviet Armed Services Strength Comparison established in 1977 that the US was clearly technologically superior in the following 23 areas:

1. "Black box" electronics
2. Computers
3. Integrated circuits
4. Microtechnology
5. MIRVs
6. Missile accuracy
7. Night vision
8. Small turbofan engines
9. Space technology
10. Submarine noise suppressants
11. Target acquisition
12. Terrain-following radar
13. Aircraft
14. Air-to-Air missiles
15. Artillery ammunition
16. ECM and ECCM
17. Look-down shoot-down systems
18. Precision-guided munitions
19. Remotely piloted vehicles
20. Satellite sensors
21. Strategic cruise missiles
22. Survivable submarines
23. Tactical nuclear weapons [Ref. 141]

However, the current advantage NATO possesses over the Warsaw Pact in weapons quality appears to be rapidly
declining. The Warsaw Pact, most noticeably the Soviet Union, is making rapid improvements in the performance of almost all of their weapons, and are rapidly overtaking NATO's superiority in technological excellence. The reason for this drastic technological improvement by the Warsaw Pact is that the organization, most noticeably the Soviet Union, is spending more money more efficiently than the NATO Alliance. [Ref. 142] Table 18 illustrates the current growing discrepancies of spending in selected military areas:

**TABLE 18**

**MONEY SPENDING TRENDS**

![Graphs showing money spending trends](image)

In the forthcoming book *NATO's Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense*, Thomas Callaghan will state in his chapter that "successive American Secretaries of State have estimated that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are devoting approximately the same resources to the development, production, training, maintenance, operation, and support of general purpose forces. What do these roughly equal resource commitments produce?"

For the Warsaw Pact it produces a massive, standardized collective force, capable of operating effectively together.

For NATO it produces a de-standardized and non-interoperable collection of national forces, qualitatively uneven, quantitatively inferior, unable to fight for the same period of time at the same munitions expenditure rates, and with only a limited ability to rearm, refuel, repair, reinforce, support, supply, or even communicate with, one another. [Ref. 143]

To stem the current trend in this area, Callaghan suggests a new treaty, originally within the NATO Alliance, which would revive the spirit of the Marshall Plan. This agreement would deny the Soviets Western technology as long as the Soviets continue their current expansionistic policies and force the Western nations to collectively and rationally pool their technological and industrial wealth. If implemented, the plan would, for the first time, force NATO to pursue "a coherent and mutually reinforcing strategy of collective defense, deterrence, and detente." [Ref. 144] Regardless of whether Callaghan's or a similar plan is implemented, the NATO Alliance's qualitative edge
in weaponry will become a thing of the past within this
decade if the status quo in this area remains unchanged.

The final current NATO advantage this chapter will
assess addresses NATO's enhanced nuclear decision making
capability in comparison with the Warsaw Pact's. In
simple terms, NATO's three (US, UK, and France) nuclear
capable members are better able to represent the feelings
of the entire NATO Alliance than the Warsaw Pact's one
(USSR) nuclear capable member in matters dealing with
nuclear release. NATO considers this three-pronged
capability to be one which complicates the efforts of
Warsaw Pact planners and increases NATO's overall deter-
rent. This feeling was reinforced by the approval of the
1974 Ottawa Declarations on Atlantic relations. Article
One of the declaration states:

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance declare
that the treaty signed 25 years ago to protect their
freedom and independence has confirmed their common
destiny. Under the shield of the treaty, the allies
have maintained their security permitting them to
preserve the values which are the heritage of their
civilization and enabling Western Europe to rebuild
from its ruins and lay the foundations of its unity.
[Ref. 145]

Articles Five and Six of the declaration touch on, in
unclassified terms, NATO's perceived enhanced nuclear
decision making capability. These articles state:

The essential elements in the situation which gave
rise to the treaty have not changed. While the
commitment of all the allies to the common defense
reduces the risk of external aggression, the contribu-
tion to the security of the entire alliance
provided by the nuclear forces of the United States based in the United States as well as in Europe and by the presence of North American forces in Europe remains indispensable. Nevertheless, the alliance must pay careful attention to the dangers to which it is exposed in the European region, and must adopt all measures necessary to avert them. The European members who provide three-quarters of the conventional strength of the alliance in Europe, and two of whom possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent role of their own, contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the alliance, undertake to make the necessary contribution to maintain the common defense at a level capable of deterring and if necessary repelling all actions directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the members of the alliance. [Ref. 146]

The Warsaw Pact and NATO assessments, outlined in the form of advantages in this and the preceding chapter, are not the only ones each side possesses. They are, however, some of the most current and controversial issues plaguing, in one way or another, both sides today.
V. NATO EUROPE'S ECONOMIC POWER POTENTIAL

NATO Europe's economic power potential is a critical and current question as it relates to desired increased NATO defense expenditures, new NATO missions, and, most importantly, NATO Europe's ability to offset, in economic terms, the potential future withdrawal of a portion of the present US troop commitment in Western Europe, if necessary. This chapter will reinforce, but not repeat, Chapter I's previous findings in regards to NATO's decreased defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP and NATO vulnerability in terms of oil imports. The chapter will briefly discuss each NATO country's current economic posture in macro terms, declining European and North American birthrates, and NATO's current and past cost sharing formulas. From this discussion, a conclusion will be presented to summarize overall economic viability within the alliance with particular emphasis being placed on NATO Europe's economic power potential. The ultimate question this chapter proposes to answer is: "Could the European NATO countries devote an increased amount to the defense sector of their respective governments in the future if events indicated the necessity to do so?" In order to answer this question a brief outline of each individual NATO country's economy is needed.
Before starting a country-by-country outline, it must be stated that there is an initial problem in terms of how to measure the performance of an economy. This chapter's attempt will focus primarily on selected key indicators of the supply and demand sides of macro-economic performance such as GNP, GDP, per capita income, employment characteristics, inflation, indicators of living standards, and foreign trade. [Ref. 147] The difference between GNP and GDP is that Gross Domestic Product at market prices is the market value of a country's output attributable to factors of production located in the territory of the given country. It differs from Gross National Product by the exclusion of net factor income payments, such as interest and dividends, received from, or paid to, the rest of the world. [Ref. 148] At the conclusion of the country-by-country outlines, statistical tables will be formulated to highlight key NATO country economic indicators.

Economic activity in Belgium recovered, from a sluggish 1978-1979 period, in the latter part of 1979 as a result of the favorable economic situation of Belgium's main customers and an upturn in household consumption. GNP grew at a rate of just under 3 percent in 1979. However, this recovery did not improve the employment situation, despite governmental support measures, and unemployment has reached the 7 percent level. In the second half of 1979, inflation was relatively modest at 4.7 percent with
wages increasing at a figure just under the inflation rate. Because current expenditures have grown more than expected, a budget deficit of approximately 10 percent over receipts has become the norm. Monetary policy has become progressively more restrictive and interest rates have risen substantially because of international constraints and exchange rate pressures. The country is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 144/152. [Ref. 149]

Canadian GDP, at market prices, grew by an average rate of 3.4 percent between 1973 and 1978. It is currently rising at a slightly higher rate due to an increase of exports. The country is helped tremendously by its oil supplies and known reserves. Inflation, in 1979, was at the 10 percent level with wages increasing at a 12.2 percent rate for the same period. The unemployment level is currently less than 5 percent. Canada is a net exporter of goods with an export to import ratio of 46/43. [Ref. 150]

Denmark is just beginning to recover from the two oil price increases of the mid-1970s. This is due to a large number of measures that have been taken over the past few years which have included substantial tax increases, public expenditure cuts, and two adjustments of the exchange rate in late 1979. The steady rise in unemployment was reversed in 1979 and presently stands at 5.3 percent of the labor force. The rate of inflation, which had abated in
1978 due to a decline of import prices, reaccelerated in 1979. At the end of 1979, inflation was running at 11.5 percent which was less than the 13.5 percent increase in wages throughout the same period. Denmark is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 146/184. Prospects for the future point to a slight fall in real GDP, a deterioration of labor market conditions, and no easing of domestic inflationary pressures. [Ref. 151]

France's economic successes and failures are built upon three decades of French economic planning that attempts to combine the dynamic forces of a market system with explicit consideration of the ways in which markets can be used to serve collectively determined social goals. In principle, it works to create the sense of direction that would make economic growth more constructive. [Ref. 152] GDP in 1979 increased at a rate of 2.9 percent which reflects a slight slowdown in reference to the 1972-1978 period. Inflation is steadily increasing and was approaching the 11 percent level in October 1979, however, wages have, since 1975, continually increased at a slightly higher rate than the rate of inflation. France is a net importer of goods with an import to export ratio of 76/81 and has an unemployment rate of approximately 4 percent. [Ref. 153]

1979 was a highly satisfactory one economically for the FRG. Demand expanded strongly and unemployment fell.
Rapid growth in Germany's imports also boosted activity in other European countries. In 1979, GNP increased by 4.4 percent which was somewhat higher than expected. Total employment increase was somewhat higher than the growth of the labor force which resulted in a decline in unemployment from 3.8 percent in 1978 to 3.3 percent in 1979. The inflation rate, which had fallen to nearly 2 percent in 1978, just exceeded 5 percent in 1979. Germany's import growth further accelerated the past deterioration of price competitiveness due to exchange rate developments. The FRG is a net exporter of goods with an export to import ratio in 1979 of 142/120. For the future, business investment should remain reasonably strong and help to limit the rise in unemployment, 1980 and 1981 tax reduction should also help to keep up demand and unemployment, and the rise of import prices will help put only moderate pressure on the domestic price level. [Ref. 154] At this time, it is necessary to discuss the FRG further. Its economy has been called the "economic miracle" because of its vast growth and productivity, yet it would be unrealistic to assume there are no economic problems. Long-term private investment suffers from an excessively high rate of interest and a lack of confidence by the investors. The FRG, like most developed countries, also faces the problems of a high wage country that is called upon to open their markets to the products of less
developed countries. These problems revolve around the export of unfinished goods and the import of cheap goods which compete with domestically produced goods. And finally, the economic growth of the FRG is dependent upon the innovative spirit of the business community and the cooperation of the labor unions. [Ref. 155]

Greece's economic performance in 1979 was, in particular, characterized by an acceleration in the rate of inflation to the 25 percent level. 1979 showed a marked slowdown in the expansion of the economy largely attributable to escalating oil prices. 1979 GDP grew by just over 3.5 percent compared with 6 percent in 1978. This decline is largely explained by the sharp 1979 decline in agricultural production. Personal income rose, during the same period, at a rate of 22.5 percent. The slowdown in economic activity has not noticeably affected the unemployment rate, which has remained fairly constant for the past three years at approximately 7 percent. Greece is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio in 1979 of 38/96. For the future, demand and activity are expected to remain weak with unemployment moderately rising but remaining at a fairly low level. [Ref. 156] Greater long-term improvements may also occur as a result of Greece's recent joining of the European Economic Community.
Italy's economic recovery, which began at the end of 1978, continued in 1979 and 1980. This was sustained by a marked growth of private fixed investment and private consumption. GDP increased by nearly 5 percent and this brisk rate of activity has added some growth in employment although the rate of unemployment, currently at 7.7 percent, has increased slightly from 1978. Wage growth far exceeded the rate of inflation with wage earners receiving increases of approximately 20 percent compared with an average increase in consumer prices of 15 percent. While the economy's growth performance in 1979 was satisfactory, its ability to fight inflation has been unsatisfactory. Italy's inflation rate for the last half of 1979 was 16.8 percent. The rise of oil prices, naturally, has played a major role in the accelerated inflation rate. Italy is just barely a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 56/55. For the future, a more marked downturn in activity and/or a stronger acceleration of inflation are anticipated. [Ref. 157]

An upswing in Luxembourg's economic activity, largely attributable to the steel industry, began in 1978 and continued throughout 1979. Rising steel orders have stimulated an upturn in production and growth of steel exports. GDP growth of 4.3 percent was achieved in 1978 as compared with 1.7 percent in 1977. This stabilized the employment situation resulting in a 1978 unemployment rate of 7 percent. From July 1978 to July 1979, wages
increased at a rate of 5.7 percent compared with an inflation rate of 4.5 percent. Luxembourg is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 86/90. Its economic growth rate is expected to ease in 1981 with GDP growth only estimated at 1.25 percent. Inflation is also expected to be more rapid than the previous two years, reaching approximately 5 percent. [Ref. 158]

After the 1975 world recession, the Netherlands experienced an upswing in domestic demand, which culminated in an investment boom in 1977. At the same time, exports were depressed by a substantial loss in market share. The result of these trends was a weakness in overall output growth and continuing high levels of unemployment. In 1979, domestic demand weakened, while the general European upswing, especially in terms of the FRG, led to a strong recovery of exports. Because of this, 1979 GDP rose by almost 3 percent. Also during this timeframe, inflation remained at a moderate 4.5 percent, unemployment stood at a relatively high, but stable, 5.1 percent, and wages increased by 6.5 percent. The Netherlands is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 50/52. Forecasts for 1980-1981 suggest an unsatisfactory low rate of growth. Oil price increases are expected to lead to a sluggishness of foreign markets and to an erosion of real personal income. GDP growth is forecast to fall from 3 to
1 percent and inflation is expected to increase from 4.5 to 7 percent. [Ref. 159]

1978 and 1979 witnessed a marked improvement in the Norwegian economy. Because of a tight credit policy and a sixteen month wage and price freeze, which ended December 31, 1979, wage and price increases have decelerated to a yearly rate of less than 5 percent. The consequent improvement in competitiveness, on the international scene, coupled with a strong foreign demand have resulted in a significant decline in the country's external budget deficit. 1978 and 1979 growth of GDP was 3.5 and 3 percent respectively. The half percent deceleration in GDP growth is entirely attributable to higher oil prices. In 1979, the rate of Norwegian unemployment averaged 1.4 percent, compared with an average rate of 1 percent over the four previous years. Although inflation is rising, the 1979 inflation figure was only 4.75 percent. Wages, for the same period, only increased at a rate of 4.5 percent as wage earners have suffered a small decrease in disposable income for the past two years. Norway is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 10/11. The Norwegian outlook is clouded by more uncertainty than usual, and real GDP growth for 1980-1981 was expected to accelerate only slightly. Higher oil prices coupled with increased Norwegian oil and gas output
could bring the current external balance into a slight surplus during this period. [Ref. 160]

The Portuguese economy, in 1979, witnessed a number of positive developments centered on the brisk advance of exports, due to a slower growth of wage costs and currency depreciation, and the recovery of output, which was particularly impressive during the second half of the year. GDP growth in 1979 was 4 percent compared to 3.5 percent the previous year. Prices and incomes also showed some positive features and although inflation remained at the 24 percent level for 1979, it has recently slowed down due to price controls and the slower depreciation of the escudo. Real wage increases declined in 1979 to the 20 percent level. Portugal's unemployment rate failed to increase for the first time since 1974, in 1979, and has stabilized at the 8.2 percent rate. The country is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 34/65. Forecasts for 1980-1981 are clouded by uncertainties and exacerbated by the lack of information on current economic trends. It is particularly difficult to tell to what extent the Portuguese economy will be affected by higher oil process and the world's economic slowdown. However, GDP is expected to grow by approximately 3 percent with inflation easing slightly to the 22 percent level. [Ref. 161]
The Turkish economy has passed through a very difficult period in the past four years. The inflation rate has been the highest of all NATO countries, reaching 80 percent on a yearly basis by the end of 1979. At the same time, GDP growth came to a virtual standstill and although structural unemployment did not worsen as much as might have been anticipated, industrial capacity fell sharply because of the country's growing difficulties in earning or borrowing enough foreign money in order to pay for imports of oil, raw materials, and spare parts. During this same period, Turkish real wages increased at a rate of only 50 percent which was approximately 30 percent below the rate of inflation. GDP increased at a rate of 1 percent in 1979 compared to 4 percent in 1978. The country's unemployment rate is fluctuating between 12-16 percent. Turkey is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 22/45. For the future, Turkey is implementing new policy approaches that represent a realistic approach to a difficult problem. Initially, the impact of new measures may accelerate inflation and unemployment may rise even higher. However, in the long run, the economy is expected to respond assuming no drastic oil price increases. [Ref. 162]

In contrast to 1978, Great Britain's economic performance in 1979 was characterized by little growth, accelerating inflation, and a sizeable current external
deficit. Because of a new government being elected in May 1979, the direction of governmental policy has changed towards a greater reliance on the control of the money supply. Although it may be too early to judge the government's policies in this area, the policies are controversial current-day topics in the United Kingdom.

The rate of inflation in 1979 was 16 percent which was double the 1978 rate of 8 percent. Disposable income rose by only 7 percent and 5 percent respectively during the same period. GDP rose at a rate of 3.25 percent in 1979 which is considerably higher than the average rate over the last ten years. Unemployment figures are rising steadily yet remain fairly modest with a figure of 5.4 percent being reported in January of 1980. Great Britain is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 71/78. With market activity turning down after mid-1979, a 1980-1981 fall of about 2 percent is expected in GDP along with considerable rise in the unemployment figures. However, a weakness of domestic demand and expected self-sufficiency in oil should moderate the rise in imports, leading to a small surplus in future external account balances. [Ref. 163]

Economic activity in the United States has been generally buoyant to 1980 following the 1975-1976 recession. 1980 unfolded a mild recession which produced higher interest rates, inflation, and a rise in the unemployment
rate. In the first half of 1979, the oil situation led to a deterioration in the US's overall balance of payments. The country's poor inflation record over the past few years is the latest state of an acceleration which began in 1976. 1979 inflation was approximately 13.6 percent with wage increases lagging significantly behind inflation at 9.1 percent. Unemployment has remained, since 1978, at approximately the 6 to 7½ percent level. It is currently above this level but not expected to go above 8½ percent.

The US is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 143/173. For the future, the magnitude and duration in the drop in US activity, the degree to which it may be exacerbated by energy problems or reactions that jeopardize progress in reducing inflation and the ability for US policy to respond correctly, are open to doubt. Forecasts for 1981 indicate a higher level of unemployment (in the 8½ percent area) and an underlying rate of inflation of approximately 10 percent. The major policy problem for the Reagan Administration therefore, may be to assess how inflation and inflationary expectations can be reduced, and what are the potential costs and benefits of alternative policy options. [Ref. 164] Tables 19, 20, and 21 further illustrate selected economic indicators for the NATO countries.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>1978 POPULATION IN THOUSANDS</th>
<th>1978 CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN THOUSANDS</th>
<th>1979 UNEMPLOYMENT (% of total)</th>
<th>1978 GDP IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9841</td>
<td>3711</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>23499</td>
<td>9972</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5105</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>53302</td>
<td>20921</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>470.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>61310</td>
<td>24679</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>639.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9360</td>
<td>3167</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>56697</td>
<td>19932</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13937</td>
<td>4569</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>130.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4060</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9820</td>
<td>3808</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>43144</td>
<td>14151</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>55895</td>
<td>24610</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>308.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>218548</td>
<td>9473</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2098.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# TABLE 20

**BASIC NATO ECONOMIC COMPARISONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>1978 PER CAPITA INCOME IN DOLLARS</th>
<th>PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN DOLLARS FOR 1977</th>
<th>PASSENGER CARS PER 100 INHABITANTS IN 1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9818</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8766</td>
<td>4870</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>10872</td>
<td>5080</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8827</td>
<td>4450</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>10426</td>
<td>4690</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3358</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4180</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>9859</td>
<td>4760</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4480</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>9778</td>
<td>4940</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5514</td>
<td>2580</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>9602</td>
<td>5600</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** OECD Economic Survey Italy, Table of Basic Statistics and past text.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>1979 ANNUAL RATE OF INFLATION</th>
<th>1978 EXPORT OF GOODS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS</th>
<th>1978 IMPORT OF GOODS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>44808</td>
<td>48360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46152</td>
<td>43560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11844</td>
<td>14760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>76464</td>
<td>81684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>142092</td>
<td>120672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3336</td>
<td>7560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>55956</td>
<td>56394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>50016</td>
<td>52872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>10044</td>
<td>11424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2436</td>
<td>5172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td>4548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71676</td>
<td>78588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>143664</td>
<td>173292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** OECD Economic Survey Italy, Table of Basic Statistics and past text.
There is another statistical group of facts that are seldom discussed with economic indicators. This is the birthrate, which directly affects the manpower available as a resource of countries with relatively large military industrial complexes and organizations. Its lack of large scale discussion is most probably, especially in Europe and North America, due to the fact that it appears to be affecting the countries in these geographical areas similarly and in a manner conducive to further non-military governmental planned development. Basically, this means that European and North American birth rates are declining in a manner that appears to be advantageous in terms of future planned development considering the world's overall depletion of many of its non-renewable natural resources. For countries in these areas with developed militaries, the declining birthrates are more significant as they indicate to military planners that future resources, in terms of military manpower, will become more scarce. Some examples of the declining European birthrate include: the FRG's decline from 1,050,345 in 1966 to 582,344 in 1977; Greece's decline from 1,016,120 in 1964 to 781,638 in 1976; Norway's decline from 63,005 in 1959 to 50,877 in 1977; and finally, Poland's decline from 790,547 in 1955 to 520,383 in 1967. [Ref. 165]
The main significances of the European birthrate figures are that they appear to be uniform in nature throughout most of Europe and that they indicate future potential military manpower levels will be obtained from a smaller total available pool of men and women. Therefore, the availability of military manpower will become more scarce and the price of maintaining that manpower in the future will naturally increase. Table 22 indicates that the US, like Europe, is currently experiencing the same phenomenon.

**TABLE 22**


The final economic aspect this chapter will discuss is the US share of the current and past NATO budgets. The cost of NATO projects is currently shared by all of the 13
NATO countries having committed military forces (excludes Iceland). When France participates in programs such as air defense, the figure is increased to 14 members. NATO international staffs and permanent national representatives manage the programs. Actual procedures are carried out under the auspices of NATO's most recent (May 1979) cost sharing formula. [Ref. 166] The following table and chart (See Tables 23 and 24) indicate the current and past breakdown of the cost sharing formulas and the US share of total NATO funding. From this table and chart, one can readily establish US current and past generosity, in fiscal terms, toward the Atlantic Alliance.

In conclusion, the fifteen countries presently in NATO represent an economic environment, amongst its members, that illustrates extreme good to extreme bad in terms of various economic indicators. The countries, from top to bottom, show a remarkable difference in economic development. Simply put, some NATO countries have strong economies whereas others have weak economies. Simple geography, it appears, plays an extremely important role regarding these countries' economic wherewithal. The "have" countries are located in North America and continental Europe whereas the "have not" countries are located on the Iberian Peninsula or the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The "have" countries include Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
### TABLE 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SLICES</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II-VII</th>
<th>VIII-XI</th>
<th>XII-XV</th>
<th>XVI-XIX</th>
<th>XVI-XXV 1/</th>
<th>CURRENT 2/XXVI-XXV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COST SHARING FORMULAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>MAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Special</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Special</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>13.18</td>
<td>5.462</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>5.5520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.021</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>6.3132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.767</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.7012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>45.46</td>
<td>15.061</td>
<td>11.87</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>13.16</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.7932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.681</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>7.9313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.2115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.820</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>3.1197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.3701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.3238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>12.750</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>10.62</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>11.9950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>43.679</td>
<td>36.98</td>
<td>30.85</td>
<td>25.77</td>
<td>29.67</td>
<td>27.2279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Inclusion of U.S. Special Program reduces U.S. Share to 21.56 percent.
2/ This formula replaces the shares previously applied in Slices II, III, IVA, and IVB to VII.
3/ With France.
4/ Without France.

TABLE 24

INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUMMARY 1951-1984
PROGRAMS THROUGH SLICE XXXV; AUTHORIZATIONS AND
EXPENDITURES
(IN $ MILLIONS)

PROGRAMS
(ACTUAL AND PLANNED-TO END 1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL NATO</th>
<th>U.S. SHARE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$12,413</td>
<td>$3,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AUTHORIZATIONS
(31 DEC 1980 EST)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL NATO</th>
<th>U.S. SHARE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$7,346</td>
<td>$2,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXPENDITURES
(31 DEC 1980 EST)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL NATO</th>
<th>U.S. SHARE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$6,310</td>
<td>$1,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries all have solid industrial economies with only minor to moderate economic problems. The "have not" countries include Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Turkey. These countries all have serious economic problems, with one in particular, namely Turkey, currently on the verge of economic collapse. In reviewing and analyzing the fifteen member countries, it is now more apparent why increased defense spending is such a hot political issue in many of the member countries, to include some of the countries I have placed in the "have" category. In the "have" countries, increased defense spending obviously is a tenable possibility that revolves more around the political will of the countries than economic considerations. In the "have not" countries, increased defense spending, without a serious domestic outcry, is probably out of the question. Additionally, the alliance's overall economic situation is, to a great degree, dependent upon the availability of Mid-East oil supplies as discussed in Chapter I.

The additional problems involving declining European and North American birthrates, the history of NATO cost sharing, and the current US share of total NATO spending further complicate the situation on both sides of the Atlantic. However, this chapter's original question on
In a nutshell, NATO Europe's ability to increase defense spending is influenced by geographical location and political will more than economic motives. Additionally, the US appears to be footing an excessive proportion of the total NATO bill considering several of NATO Europe's members have economies that are equal to or surpass the US's in several established economic indicators.
VI. CURRENT US OPTIONS TOWARD NATO

This chapter will look at four US options towards NATO. Option I would increase US conventional troop presence in NATO by 10 percent. Option II would withdraw all US conventional troops in NATO. Option III would withdraw 25-50 percent of all US conventional troops in NATO. Finally, Option IV would maintain the status quo. While there are innumerable other options, as well as other options within the options presented, it is my intent only to determine some parameters affecting basic policy regarding conventional force levels. The details of this basic policy could be worked out at a later date.

A. OPTION I

In this option, the US would increase its conventional troop presence in Europe by 10 percent in accordance with a carefully planned timetable if a similar increase was implemented by the other NATO members. While this may be the best overall solution from an European point of view, it would further paralyze the US in trying to meet the requirements of the one and a half war strategy, thus exacerbating the US problem of projecting forces into areas to attempt to insure the continued availability of petroleum and raw materials which the Europeans and
ourselves will so desperately need in the future. It would also require our European allies, to substantially increase their own force levels and, more importantly, their defense budgets. As mentioned earlier, the Carter Administration found that this was a virtual impossibility. However, the new Reagan Administration has made it clear that our NATO allies should not expect the US to continually add to its force posture in Europe if other NATO nations do not increase their own. [Ref. 167] This was probably a reaction to recent British defense cuts and the rumors of a partial troop withdrawal of British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) forces. In an effort to reduce defense spending, Britain's new Secretary of State for Defense, John Nott, recently announced FY 1982 defense cuts of $484 million. [Ref. 168] To further reduce spending, rumors are circulating in both Brussels and London that the new defense minister may scale down (withdraw) a portion of the 55,000 troops currently deployed with the BAOR. This withdrawal would be done under the auspices of placing more emphasis on the UK's future planned nuclear strike force (Trident and SLCM), providing the Royal Navy with more assets, and saving a portion of the $1.7 billion the BAOR is currently costing the Crown annually. [Ref. 169]

A British defense correspondent has recently written that NATO should extend its own area of operation into areas such as the Indian Ocean in order to better defend US
and other NATO countries' national interests. Yet he concludes, under the option that calls for increased troop strengths, that it is probably not realistic as it is "difficult to persuade the allies to provide sufficient resources for the area that already exists, let alone press them for more." [Ref. 170] Former British Chief of Defense Staff (Lord) Carver stated that such a proposal would threaten the cohesion of the alliance. [Ref. 171]

Although this option could be construed as a show of force against the Soviets and raise the current nuclear threshold, it would also probably free the Soviets from considering this to be a price to pay for future aggressive actions (i.e., Poland) in the East European arena.

In general, this option appears to be unrealistic from a US perspective as it would further obligate resources required to meet the one and a half war strategy and would also obligate the other NATO members to increase troop levels and defense budgets along the same lines as US increases. Given the current and past history of NATO defense expenditure increases, I feel safe to say that the political will to accomplish such increases does not exist.

B. OPTION II

In Option II, the US would withdraw all of its conventional forces from Europe in accordance with a
carefully planned timetable. This would leave the remaining fourteen NATO members to assume all of the conventional roles. The US would then join with the United Kingdom and France, assuming France would agree to such a proposal, to provide NATO's strategic nuclear umbrella. In all likelihood, the French would probably take a much more active role in the alliance. Although the French left (labor unions in particular) would oppose such a move, it is extremely difficult to foresee the French government giving de facto NATO leadership to the FRG. This option would not be a feasible choice from the European viewpoint. Presuming that the Western allies retained the will not to submit to Soviet domination, NATO would have to be restructured or a new defensive military organization utilizing the present NATO infrastructure, minus the US, would have to be created. This reorganization or restructuring could be handled under the auspices of the Eurogroup, which was formed with NATO approval in 1968 after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. [Ref. 172] Composed of eleven members (the US, Canada, France, and Iceland are not members), the Eurogroup's basic aim is to strengthen the NATO Alliance by seeking to ensure that the European contribution to the common defense is as strong and cohesive as possible. It annually develops a program of force improvements and mutual assistance with individual nations contributing infrastructure funds.
This organization seems particularly well organized and structured to define new roles and missions assuming this option was implemented.

This option, however, would have a significant impact on the Europeans as it is doubtful that European political consensus could be reached with Eurogroup assistance. This would be an absolute necessity before any agreements in the political arena could be considered. To do this, the present differences in language and culture, which were not a major problem under US leadership, would have to be overcome to some degree and historical antipathies would have to be dispelled. However, the most obvious impact would be the loss of US military forces. Although the US provides only 10 percent of NATO ground forces, 25 percent of NATO air forces, and 20 percent of NATO naval forces, these US forces are well-equipped by European standards. They are also regarded by most military observers as the best trained and organized forces in NATO today. [Ref. 174] West European replacement of manpower alone would be a severe political problem. Increased European conscription would be political suicide unless detente totally collapsed. Even more importantly, replacement of the sophisticated technology removed by the US would be extremely expensive and more than likely beyond the present capability of the European military industrial complex's ability. However, at this
moment in time, considering Soviet problems in Afghanistan, China and Eastern Europe, it simply does not seem likely that the Warsaw Pact is planning to attack Western Europe in the immediate future.

This option also envisions some sort of US, UK, and French strategic nuclear umbrella and there is an obvious question that springs from this. Would the US portion of the umbrella be perceived as being credible if there were not any in-place US conventional forces? Under these conditions, a war in Europe may not be perceived as a direct threat to the American homeland. Therefore, our political elite may not be willing to risk the loss of Washington in retaliation for a Soviet nuclear attack on Frankfurt, London, or Paris. Thus while the stated goal of this option would be to retain the strategic nuclear umbrella over Europe, it is very doubtful that either the West Europeans or the Soviets would view this as a valid deterrent upon the completion of the US withdrawal. At a major conference, which was held in Brussels in September of 1979 and co-sponsored by the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs and NATO, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a statement concerning the overall strategic nuclear balance which seemingly supports the above thoughts concerning US credibility. Dr. Kissinger's controversial statement, which does not represent current US policy, follows:
And therefore I would say—what I might not say in office—that our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization. Our strategic dilemma is not solved by verbal reassurances; it requires redesigning our forces and doctrine. There is no point in complaining about declining American will, or criticizing this or that American administration, for we are facing an objective crisis and it must be remedied. [Ref. 175]

In addition, the implementation of this option would force the US to completely re-evaluate its military strategy and requirements for defense. Once the vast majority of the approximately 300,000 [Ref. 176] US troops were withdrawn from Europe, it is doubtful that the US government, over a lengthy period of time, could maintain continued public support for a large defense establishment in the absence of European ties and ever-competing domestic demands. This may even be true if over half of these soldiers were re-deployed to areas such as the Persian Gulf, Egypt, or Israel.

C. OPTION III

The third option has the US remaining in a NATO conventional role while at the same time significantly reducing current US conventional force postures. This US reduction could be extremely flexible, ranging anywhere from 25 to 50 percent, over a period of up to ten years in consonance with increased European force modernization and the progressively greater Europeanization of the alliance's
infrastructure. The actual number of troops to be withdrawn would naturally be dependent on the perceived worldwide Soviet and/or Warsaw Pact threat, potential European force modernization, and the requirements to meet the half war strategy. The current NATO strategies of forward defense and flexible response would be retained. The strategic nuclear umbrella would again be provided by the US, UK, and France.

The West European outcry to announcement of plans for a partial withdrawal of US conventional forces would not be as deafening as the previous option's. Nevertheless, it would still be deafening. Yet while this option suffers from some of the same problems as Option II, it does have distinct advantages for both the West Europeans and the US in four specific areas. First, the US would continue to play a significant role in NATO. France would be more inclined to participate in NATO military planning and the European nations would provide replacements for US military leaders in the more significant NATO military positions. Secondly, the credibility of the US strategic nuclear capability would be greatly enhanced over Option II's due to the continued presence of US conventional troops on European soil. It would also help to reduce European fears concerning US willingness to respond strategically in the event of a Soviet attack. Thirdly, the European nations' defense expenditures would not have
to be increased as significantly as in the second option. While they should in all likelihood be greater than presently planned, the Europeans could conceivably opt not to increase defense expenditures at all because of US forces and a credible nuclear capability. It would be their decision. Fourth and finally, since many of Europe's national interests are similar to US national interests (particularly in the Persian Gulf area), a partial US conventional force withdrawal to better protect US interests would have the same beneficial effect on European national interests.

The idea to reduce US troop strengths in NATO is not a new one. The most celebrated attempt, the Mansfield Amendment, would have required large-scale troop withdrawals in 1968. However, the then Senate Majority Leader decided not to culminate the amendment process after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. He stated on August 22, 1968, that: "Because of this invasion, it appears to me that we have no choice but to maintain our present position." [Ref. 177] In 1961, the Kennedy Administration also sought to decrease the NATO troop commitment in an effort to alleviate a growing balance of payments problem. However, this troop reduction did not take place either as the FRG agreed to help reduce the deficit by annually purchasing $600 million worth of military equipment from the US. [Ref. 178] In the late 1960s, NATO troop
reductions were rumored, although they never took place, because of the Nixon Doctrine which called for reduced foreign commitments. [Ref. 179] In an effort not to reduce NATO troop levels, the 1973 Jackson-Nunn Amendment made it law that: "The President will seek through negotiations with US allies direct payments to the US to offset the yearly balance of payments deficit caused, in part, by the cost of overseas troops. If the cost of stationing US troops in NATO countries amounted to 10 percent of the balance of payments deficit, the President would be directed to ask for contributions equal to 10 percent of the deficit." Five hours after this vote, the US Senate, amid one of the most intensive administration lobbying efforts of the 93d Congress, voted down Senators Cranston and Mansfield's efforts to reduce the US overseas troop commitment by 40 percent over a three year period. This is one reason for the substantial arms sales from the US to West European countries in recent years. [Ref. 180] More recently, the Director of the Center for Defense and Strategic Studies in Paris, Jean-Paul Pigasse, has suggested a recasting of the Atlantic Alliance and the dissolving of NATO in its present form. His suggestion, which would remove all US forces if implemented, certainly implies that NATO Europe has the potential to accomplish more in the area of defense and reinforces my previous statements pertaining to European political will. Briefly,
Pigasse's case for a truly European defense system is summarized below:

Alone among the world's centers of power, Western Europe has failed to muster a common defense commensurate with its needs and with the prize that it represents in the international arena. This failure is in large part the legacy of three decades of security dependence, as well as a sense of resignation spawned by keen consciousness of vulnerabilities and the power equation on the continent. Yet, given the political will, Europe's assets could be assembled into an impressive defense posture— one that could be enhanced substantially through a rational integration and coordination of relevant resources. Needed also is a unifying concept of European strategy keyed to a changing scenario of salient threats, particularly with respect to vital European interests in the broader global domain. [Ref. 181]

This option would continue the public perception of the US historical and cultural ties with Western Europe while at the same time allowing defense expenditures to stay within the realm of reality when matched with available manpower, production capability, and competing domestic requirements. Because of this, the US would be able to modify its conventional force posture more in consonance with its one and a half war strategy. At the present time, the US could credibly increase its presence and role in other areas of the world deemed critical because of their possession of much needed petroleum or natural resources. The one and a half war strategy, under this option, could become a reality.
D. OPTION IV

Option IV would continue our present policy with the same level of force commitments emphasizing the Carter goals of increased defense expenditures in conjunction with our European allies. While this would also be a satisfactory option from an European viewpoint, it would not solve the basic problem. The US would remain virtually paralyzed to meet the requirements of the one and a half war strategy further exacerbating future efforts to insure the availability of petroleum and raw materials. It is also unrealistic, even under the Reagan Administration, to assume that the American public or congress would respond to the gargantuan defense budget required to have a credible one and a half war strategy as that strategy is enunciated today. Although President Reagan has called for an increase of $4.3 billion in the FY 1982 Defense Budget (up from the Carter proposal of $181.5 to $185.8 billion), he is a firm believer that the government must spend and tax less. He recently told the US Congress: "The taxing power of government must be used to provide revenues for legitimate government purposes. It must not be used to regulate the economy or bring about social change." [Ref. 182] Although implementation of this budget will make it easier for the new administration to meet its NATO commitment for a three percent increase in real terms, it may not provide the funds necessary
to fully allow the one and a half war strategy to become a reality. The more important hidden problem is that future US Defense Budgets, which are now forecasted to increase by $63.1 billion in FY 1986 (primarily for new equipment), [Ref. 183] could bring about a return to the social unrest witnessed in the 1960s. The key, therefore, may be to bring about a solution utilizing both increased defense expenditures and a reallocation of present resources to limit defense expenditures below the social boiling point.

E. COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS

It is now possible to look at how the four options presented would impact on our predominant national interest to prevent or thwart any attack on the American homeland or the basic elements of its economic and security systems.

I have previously defined the six most important US national interests as being:

1. the permanent maintenance of US national survival (i.e., territorial integrity);

2. the permanent maintenance of US domestic order;

3. the temporary maintenance of friendly political, economic, and military ties with West European countries, individually and collectively, with particular emphasis on the NATO alliance;

4. the temporary maintenance of the present Middle East balance of power with particular emphasis on Persian Gulf oil routes and supplies;

5. the temporary maintenance of the continued flow of raw materials and oil from Africa and South America;
6. the temporary maintenance of Egypt, Israel, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Spain's existence and security.

What would be our capability to meet the requirements of these overriding national interests should we follow one of the four presented options as national policy? The following matrix (See Table 25) depicts the impact of these options on the six mentioned US national interests.

F. COMPARISON OF OPTION I

Implementation of this option would most assuredly increase the allies and our capability and political will to defend Western Europe. This would be especially true if the Soviets only attacked with conventional forces. It would also send a clear message to Moscow that the current conventional force imbalance is no longer to be tolerated by the NATO Community and raise the nuclear threshold.

In terms of other American interests, this option leaves much to be desired. The increased efforts in Western Europe would logically detract from most of our other interests unless NATO assumed, which it is unlikely to, new roles in other geographical areas. The number and type of options available to the US National Command Authorities in the event of a global crisis would also be reduced. The current quantitatively unacceptable assets available to maintain the Mid-East balance of power, resource flow from vital areas, and other allies existence
### Table 25

Likely Impact of the Four Options on the Overall Attainment of US National Interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Option I</td>
<td>Reduce 10 percent conventional withdrawal</td>
<td>REDUCED</td>
<td>INCREASED</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option II</td>
<td>100 percent conventional withdrawal</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED IF DOMESTIC SPENDING ALSO INCREASED</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option III</td>
<td>25-50% conventional withdrawal</td>
<td>INCREASED</td>
<td>AFTER INITIAL SHOCK. NO CHANGE</td>
<td>SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED</td>
<td>INCREASED</td>
<td>INCREASED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option IV</td>
<td>no change</td>
<td>NO CHANGE</td>
<td>GRADUALLY REDUCED</td>
<td>NO CHANGE</td>
<td>GRADUALLY REDUCED</td>
<td>NO CHANGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*US National Interest #1 (i.e., the maintenance of US national survival only considers the physical territory occupied by the 50 US States. Therefore, it is not assumed that US forces stationed overseas are a direct asset in the defense of the United States.*
and security, would be significantly reduced numerically. It would also reduce US capabilities to defend its own territorial integrity and freedom by attack from areas other than Europe. The increased budget required to station additional troops and equipment in the NATO area would also decrease the amount available to the domestic sector thus reducing the likelihood of maintaining domestic order at home significantly considering the current proposed FY 1982 US Budget cuts and future proposed defense budgets.

G. COMPARISON OF OPTION II

Implementation of this option definitely would limit our capability and political will to defend Western Europe, especially if the Soviets attacked only with conventional forces. There is no evidence to support a US first use of nuclear weapons, especially if there is no threat to the American homeland. Consequently, our strategic nuclear umbrella credibility is questionable at best. French and British use of nuclear weapons most likely would be thwarted by the USSR's tactical and strategic nuclear capability.

This option would significantly increase our capability to maintain free access to goods and markets throughout the world. Once the US conventional forces were withdrawn, our efforts could be focused on a series of regional alliances.
backed up by rapidly deployable forces located in the US or in non-European overseas areas. The number and type of options available to the US National Command Authorities in the event of a global crisis would be significantly increased.

Under this option, I have listed our ability to maintain other allied existence and security and the Mid-East balance of power as being significantly increased. While we would be able to respond globally, several other factors enter into the equation. The withdrawal of our conventional forces from Europe along with our previous policy failures in Iran and Vietnam may create a global impression that the US is willing to allow our present as well as former allies to "die on the vine" in the face of any significant threat requiring a conventional US force presence. On the other hand, if the world was truly multipolar in nature, other power centers as well as the nations of the Third World might see our withdrawal as logical as well as representative of a US willingness to reorganize to meet our worldwide commitments. A final factor in this equation has to be the US Congressional and public response were this option to be implemented. Given the US's current and projected military shortfalls in manpower and equipment as well as future continued pressure for greater governmental spending on internal domestic programs, would the US Congress and American public not argue for a
reduced military strength if our conventional force commitments to NATO were eliminated? Even if a majority of the withdrawn troops were redeployed to other overseas locations?

H. COMPARISON OF OPTION III

This option would still provide a credible US conventional force commitment to the defense of Western Europe, even if reduced by as much as 50 percent. European defense integration would be enhanced. France would in all likelihood rejoin the military side of NATO and as a minimum the FRG would feel the need to increase defense expenditures for conventional forces. The strategic nuclear umbrella provided by the US, UK, and France would be no less credible than it is today.

This partial US withdrawal from NATO would increase the US ability to maintain the flow of resources, other allies security, Mid-East balance of power, and US territorial integrity and freedom. The presence of the withdrawn forces on US soil, earmarked as "possible" reinforcements for NATO, but also earmarked to meet other worldwide requirements of the one and a half war strategy, would provide the National Command Authorities needed flexibility to maintain our access to all areas of the world, to include the Persian Gulf.

While one could suggest that implementation of this option would run the same risks as Option II as regards to
our ability to meaningfully influence the world balance of power. I believe the exact opposite to be true. The retention of significant US conventional forces in Europe (50 percent of today's commitment is still significant), backed by a strong strategic nuclear force, would act as a stabilizing factor to world order. While the European nations would go through an initial shock period, the retention of at least 50 percent of our forces would still convey our willingness and concern to Europe. Remember, we have only one troop division in Korea presently. Other nations, especially the People's Republic of China (PRC), knowing that the partial US redeployment was accomplished to meet worldwide requirements and to stop Soviet expansionism, would probably continue on their present course. The availability of additional US troops for worldwide deployment, while still maintaining forces in Europe would cause Soviet planners to rethink any possible thoughts of meandering into those areas defined as vital to the US. I doubt that this is the case today even in the light that neither Egypt or Israel has cleared the way for permanent US base rights on their soils at this time.

[Ref. 184]

Thus this option possesses a high degree of potential if the US is to implement the one and a half war strategy. Defense expenditures could remain relatively stable by redeployment of fixed conventional troop assets and our
conventional forces could be reorganized to meet the requirements of the strategy. Therefore, because of reduced defense expenditures, the likelihood of maintaining US domestic order would be increased.

I. COMPARISON OF OPTION IV

Option IV, which envisions continuation of the present policy, simply means "more of the same" in all respects. Our European allies, despite relative core NATO countries' economic self-sufficiency and power potential, would not be required to increase their defense expenditures or commitment of forces any more than is presently programmed.

Our interest in maintaining the Mid-East balance of power, resource flow, and other allies existence and security would continue to decrease. Enhancement of this need can only be accomplished by having readily deployable forces capable of meeting any contingency. Neither these forces nor the necessary command and control elements are presently in existence. The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, has estimated that the US Air Force alone would need an additional $10 billion above current budget projections to meet its portion of the requirement. [Ref. 185]

Maintaining the US's current force commitment in Europe, tied with increasing domestic pressures and the current
financial crisis, will prevent us from meeting the requirements of the one and a half war strategy, reducing the flexibility of the National Command Authorities and consequently jeopardizing our ability to maintain our other national interests throughout the world.

Finally, continuation of the status quo would produce no change in our ability to meaningfully influence the world balance of power. There is little doubt that we are moving into a multipolar world. With our current commitment to Europe, we are seemingly unable to influence a large percentage of the nations of the world. The recent crises in Afghanistan, Iran, and Angola have provided testimony as to our lack of influence. The failure of even our West European allies to support US economic sanctions against the USSR or our proposed boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow is further evidence of our declining status.

There is nothing in the geographical catalogue for 1979...that would suggest the status quo could begin to meet our needs as a democratic nation dedicated to the ideals of freedom. [Ref. 186]

This trend of declining US influence in the world can be predicted to continue if we continue our present commitment of conventional forces to Western Europe, while at the same time pronouncing our willingness to protect other areas of the world. And it is highly unlikely that we will have the necessary manpower, equipment, or
financial resources to meet that two-pronged capability in
the immediate future if we continue our present course.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

NATO has proven itself to be a most stable and successful organization for peace. However, the world today is far different from when the alliance was formed thirty-two years ago, and many relationships have changed. The likelihood of war in Europe is considered to be low. The Finlandization of Western Europe could probably only occur if our current allies felt totally isolated from the US economy and its military might. Strategic nuclear parity is a reality. World requirements for petroleum and other non-renewable raw materials have steadily increased with industrialization. This has created an extremely volatile sphere of competition between the world's industrialized nations. And finally, the military conventional force technological gap between the US and USSR has narrowed significantly due to the USSR's increased defense spending.

While the world has changed dramatically, I believe our primary national security goal (which revolves around our permanent and temporary national interests), to prevent or thwart any hostile attack on the American mainland or the basic elements of its security and economic systems, has remained basically unchanged. I also feel that the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine with
its requirements to pursue a credible one and a half war strategy makes it mandatory that we reanalyze our conventional force commitment to NATO.

President Reagan's Administration has brought to the surface a powerful groundswell of US public opinion that the US must reassert its power. Yet even with this powerful groundswell, it is doubtful, in my opinion, that the US currently possesses the resources necessary to meet the worldwide commitments of the one and a half war strategy. In plain English, the capability to credibly meet any half war strategy with noncommitted NATO forces does not exist. Additionally, as US Army enlistments continue to fall short of their goals and the cost of military equipment and salaries rise, the proposed Reagan Administration's increased defense budgets (which may certainly help to meet the requirements of the half war strategy) will probably, if they haven't already, face a stiff challenge from competing domestic needs in the future. It is developing into a classic example of guns versus butter and forcing the current administration to make some extremely hard decisions.

A solution to part of the problem exists. The withdrawal of 50 percent of our in-place conventional forces from Western Europe, if accomplished within ten years in accordance with a carefully planned timetable and coordinated fully with our allies, would provide both
military planners and the National Command Authorities with additional and possibly sufficient resources to provide the necessary options and flexibility needed to credibly put the one and a half war strategy into operation. It might also allow the government to reduce additional unplanned defense spending by simply giving new roles to already fixed assets. While an initial European outcry against such a move would certainly occur, I think General George S. Brown has put the problem into proper perspective when he stated:

It is difficult to quantify the stabilizing influence cur (in-place) forces have in Europe or the destabilizing influence which would result from their absence or appreciable reduction. [Ref. 187]

As Western Europe has developed from World War II, it has attained a large measure of economic and political stability. It has evolved into a major power center. The US, meanwhile, has seen a decline in its ability to defend its changing national interests. This thought was recently reinforced by General Volney F. Warner, shortly before he retired as the Commanding General of Readiness Command, when he stated: "The forces (now available) are committed. We simply can't continue to draw circles on the map, wish that we had a command that could deal with it and hope that it can get there when...perhaps it can't." [Ref. 188] A 50 percent reduction of US conventional forces presently stationed in Europe would not lead to a conventional war with the Soviets. This is because a
considerable number of US conventional forces (approximately 150,000) would still be present on the continent acting as a "tripwire" to activate US nuclear weapons, if necessary. An attack on Western Europe would still be considered an attack on the US. Best of all from a West European standpoint, the West Europeans would have a choice. They could further upgrade their present conventional force posture or they could continue with the presently planned modest improvements. Best of all from a US standpoint, the withdrawal would allow the US to reorganize its present assets to meet the requirements dictated by our national interests and save monies that would have had to come from the domestic sector if additional assets were required and no US conventional troop withdrawal executed.
LIST OF REFERENCES

2. Ibid., pp. 149-169.
3. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
4. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
10. Ibid., p. 9.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., pp. 3-11.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., pp. 16-17.


26. Ibid.


31. Ibid.


40. Ibid., p. 27.

41. Ibid., p. 146.

42. Ibid., pp. 106-111.


44. Ibid., pp. 31-40.

45. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

46. Ibid., pp. 136-137.


48. Ibid., pp. 187-188.


53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., pp. 35-38.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 567.

58. Ibid., p. 573.

59. Ibid.


61. Ibid., p. 160.


63. Ibid., p. 58.

64. Ibid., pp. 59-60.


67. Ibid., p. 965.

68. Ibid., p. 973.

69. Ibid., p. 977.

70. Ibid., pp. 986-987.


72. Ibid., pp. 47-48.

73. Ibid., pp. 55-56.

74. Ibid., pp. 4-6
75. Ibid., p. 3.
76. Ibid., p. 4.
77. Ibid., pp. 8-10.
78. Ibid., p. 11.
79. Frank M. Teti, the author received this thought concerning US national interests during a lecture on national security policy at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 20 November 1980. Dr. Teti is an Associate Professor in the school's National Security Affairs Department.
82. Ibid., p. 13.
92. Jay Finegan, "NATO Chief Paints Grim Picture," 
Army Times, (March 1980), p. 3.

p. 66.

94. Christian Kind, "Nuclear Menace," Swiss Review of 

95. United States Military Posture for FY 80 (Washington: 

96. Dewey F. Bartlett, "Standardizing Military 
Excellence," AEI Defense Review, (September 1977), 
p. 3.

97. Senate Committee on Armed Services, DoD Appropriations 
Authorization for FY 77 (Washington: US Government 

98. Report to the US Congress by the Secretary of Defense 
on Rationalization/Standardization within NATO 
p. 53.

p. 30.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid., p. 31.

102. "NATO, Warsaw Pact Weapons Production," Armed Forces 

103. Robert Ball, "Getting Our Friends to Flex Their 

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Bradley Graham, "West Europeans Cool to US Call for 
Increased Military Spending," Washington Post, 

Monterey Peninsula Herald, (March 22, 1981), p. 3D.


111. Ibid., pp. 276-277.

112. Ibid., pp. 275-276.

113. Ibid., pp. 276-280.

114. Ibid., pp. 283-284.

115. Ibid., p. 287.


123. Soviet and United States Division Comparisons (Arlington: Department of the Army, 1977), Sections I-III.

124. Ibid., Sections IV-V.


129. Ibid., p. 16.


131. Ibid., pp. 6-7.


137. Parris H. Chang, the author received this information during a lecture by Professor Chang on 27 February 1981 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Professor Chang is a Professor of Asian Studies at Pennsylvania State University.


139. Ibid.


142. "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Good-Small vs Good-Big," p. 35.

144. Ibid.

145. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 342.

146. Ibid., p. 343.


171. Ibid., pp. 9-10.


173. Ibid., pp. 9-10.


179. Ibid., p. 978.


183. Ibid., p. 13.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Copies</th>
<th>Initial Distribution List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.  | 2      | Defense Technical Information Center  
                  Cameron Station  
                  Alexandria, Virginia 22314 |
| 2.  | 2      | Library, Code 0142  
                  Naval Postgraduate School  
                  Monterey, California 93940 |
| 3.  | 2      | Professor Frank M. Teti, Code 56Tt  
                  Department of National Security Affairs  
                  Naval Postgraduate School  
                  Monterey, California 93940 |
| 4.  | 1      | Professor Stephen Garrett, Code 56Gr  
                  Department of National Security Affairs  
                  Naval Postgraduate School  
                  Monterey, California 93940 |
| 5.  | 1      | Professor David S. Yost, Code 56Yo  
                  Department of National Security Affairs  
                  Naval Postgraduate School  
                  Monterey, California 93940 |
| 6.  | 1      | Professor Jiri Valenta, Code 56Va  
                  Department of National Security Affairs  
                  Naval Postgraduate School  
                  Monterey, California 93940 |
| 7.  | 2      | CPT Daniel G. Krynovich  
                  100 Moreell Circle  
                  Monterey, California 93940 |
| 8.  | 1      | LTC (R) George Krynovich  
                  383 Salem  
                  Aurora, Colorado 80011 |
| 9.  | 1      | CPT Randy Anderson  
                  3427-A Sabourin Drive  
                  St Ann, Missouri 63074 |
| 10. | 1      | COL Fred Kulik  
                  4301 San Juan Drive  
                  Fairfax, Virginia 22030 |
11. CPT David E. Lenz  
    1904 Old Post Terrace  
    Woodbridge, Virginia 22191

12. CW2 (R) Grover A. Cyrus  
    31751 Bock  
    Garden City, Missouri 48135

13. LTC Eugene N. Russell  
    Box 326  
    APO Miami, Florida 34008

14. COL Lyman G. White  
    627 Grant Avenue  
    Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

15. LTC Carl Ernst  
    1217 North Texas  
    DeRidder, Louisiana 70634

16. CPT Herbert M. Carr  
    107 Malloway Lane  
    Monterey, California 93940

17. CPT Douglas A. Fraze  
    1279 Spruance Road  
    Monterey, California 93940

18. Professor Claude H. Buss, Code 56Bx  
    Department of National Security Affairs  
    Naval Postgraduate School  
    Monterey, California 93940

19. CPT James R. Martin  
    1 Surfway #203  
    Monterey, California 93940

20. COL Allen R. Borstorff  
    306 Fitch Avenue  
    Presidio of Monterey,  
    Monterey, California 93940

21. CPT William T. Dexter, Jr.  
    201 Glenwood Circle  
    Apartment llC  
    Monterey, California 93940

22. LCDR Roger Connell  
    102 Morell Circle  
    Monterey, California 93940
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>LTC Albert J. Folcher</td>
<td>HHC, 25th Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attn: G3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 96857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CPT Charles A. Hurd</td>
<td>151 Hawthorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>LTC Paul Kalowski</td>
<td>14 Mervine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Department Chairman, Code 56</td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>