Civil and Military Bureaucracy in Pakistan

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The Past

Civil administration in Pakistan is a legacy of British colonial rule. As such, it is a lineal descendant of the system established to maintain control in the strategic, western borderlands of the productive Indo-Gangetic plain. During the British period, the civil administration of what is now Pakistan was required, by necessity, to work closely with military authorities to ensure that this gateway to the Empire remained secure against foreign invasion. As one of the last areas of the Sub-Continent to be secured by the British, it posed security problems which were complicated by its culturally heterogeneous population — a portion of which straddled international boundaries. The bulk of the population, however, was settled along the Indus river (in Sind) and in the irrigated areas of western Punjab.

The policy making and administrative control level of the bureaucracy was staffed by the Indian Civil Service (ICS) — a small, selective elite, originally British in the 19th Century and gradually indigenized in the 20th Century. After Independence, the ICS core maintained its important position in government policy making and administration and new members/officers recruited to the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) continued to be selected by the same rigid standards and trained for administration using the techniques developed by the British.

From 1947 to 1958, the ICS-CSP group exercised considerable influence through the vice regal system of administration whereby Pakistani national leaders (Governors-General) dealt directly with these officers, by-passing politically-appointed cabinet ministers. This pattern of direct leadership/elite civil service administration, was established by Mohammad Ali Jinnah and maintained by his successors until 1958.

During the Ayub period (1958-69), the basic framework of administration was maintained with some alteration. The principal changes were the entry of military officers into civil administration and the CSP cadre and the development of new government institutions.

Ayub's administration was based on a modus vivendi with the CSP in partnership with the military — a pattern which, with the exception of the Bhutto period, has been maintained. Ayub's policies and their implementation involved the CSP. Given his priorities in economic development, this meant the CSP also had to "retool" to acquire new skills in economic planning and development administration. During this period, however, the small, elite nature of the CSP was maintained -- the CSP never expanded beyond 300 to 400 members. The Yahya interlude did little to change this pattern with the exception of greater entry of the military into civil administration.
Bhutto, however, introduced several changes in policy making, civil administration and the role of both civil and military officers in government. The Bhutto period, from this perspective, might be characterized as the "politicization" of the bureaucracy, both civil and the military.

In 1973, Bhutto abolished the constitutionally-based guarantees of civil service tenure. He replaced them with a civil service law which abolished the use of service labels (such as CSP), combined all services into a unified grade schedule (similar to the U.S. General Schedule), and permitted lateral entry into the services. The so-called APUGS (All-Pakistan Grade System) was a modified version of the U.S. General Schedule -- a civil administrative grading system theoretically based on the principle of rank-in-position as opposed to the older rank-in-person system. This allowed Bhutto to make political appointments and promotions in the civil service, at the highest level, without regard for merit considerations. In addition to these changes, Bhutto also "purged" several thousand civil officers at the top, middle and lower ranks.

Since his appointees possessed the correct political attitude and credentials (members of the PPP), this approach to staffing key policy and management positions was designed to remove administrative opposition to his policies and to ensure political loyalty to the regime. To a great extent he was successful. He did eliminate administrative opposition and kept those who might oppose him within the civil service on "tenterhooks." The consequences also involved the voluntary departure of many civil officers who felt that they could not function under such conditions of uncertainty. The effects on the services of these changes have not been measured systematically, but it appears that after 1974, the services were no longer attracting the sons and daughters of the elite class. The Bhutto regime encouraged the influx of the middle classes into the civil service.

The composition of the officer corps of the armed services also changed under Bhutto. More middle class officers were promoted to the general rank. General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq who was promoted to Army Chief of Staff over a dozen senior generals, is the best example. Bhutto attempted to control the military by removing those general officers suspected of harboring Bonapartist tendencies. For example General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, now Defense Minister, were removed from their offices (respectively Commanders-in-CJief of the Army and Air Force). However, in retrospect, Bhutto's changes in civil bureaucracy had greater impact on that governmental institution than his changes in the military.

Bhutto's pattern of decision-making was highly centralized, highly personal and non-institutionally based. Whereas Ayub encouraged limited participation in decision making beyond the elite civil service, Bhutto restricted even this participation and was more willing to trust his political intuition than any feedback that the bureaucracy might provide. The institutionalized economic development planning process established by Ayub was dismantled by Bhutto. It was not replaced but rather economic policies were made and decisions taken in this area by the Prime Minister himself. Consequently, the role and input of the government professional was reduced considerably during the 1971-77 period.
In sum, the Bhutto period reduced the role of the elite civil service in policy making, purged the bureaucracy of potential opponents, politicized the services through the lateral entry of his political supporters, and controlled the officer corps of the armed forces by selective promotion and retirement policies. He fashioned a control system which was doomed to self-destruct once he was removed from office.

The Present

Shortly after taking power in the July 1977 coup, General Zia ul-Haq made several pledges: (1) to submit the Bhutto regime to a process of accountability for alleged misuse of power (2) to restore civilian rule through fair and unrigged elections (3) to restore public institutions to their pre-Bhutto integrity and, as part of (3), (4) to restore public confidence in civil administration. Of these pledges only the first has been fully implemented. Elections were held only at the local level (September 1979). The restoration of public institutions (with the exception of the military) has been only partially completed.

Decision making and policy formulation rests in the hands of the military (the army corps commanders, the provincial governors, General Zia and two civilians -- Agha Shahi, as Foreign Minister and, more importantly Ghulam Ishaq, as Finance Minister -- acting as a regency council). This body functions to ensure that major policies conform to the overall directions that the government should take. Domestically, the priorities involve preventing a return of the PPP and establishing and maintaining a positive economic climate for economic growth and development.

The command structure of government both within the civil and military bureaucracies is rigid with the delegation of power to provincial or district levels (civil) or military commands below the corps level severly restricted to only the bare minimum necessary to carry out policies. The autonomy of decision making which once characterized provincial and district level administration and was usurped by Bhutto has not been reestablished.

Further, General Zia has made it clear to the civil service that he will not tolerate opposition. He has demonstrated this by prematurely retiring several hundred senior civil servants and he has also appointed many military officers to civilian posts. The net result has been a further militarization of civil administration and a continued restriction of civil service input into policy and decision making. Few attempts have been made to develop government institutions. For example, Zia has not reestablished a professional, technically competent economic planning commission (the institution created by Ayub) even though long-range economic planning is a necessary ingredient for Pakistan's economic development.

In sum, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the present regime has not restored the civil service to the position of prominence it enjoyed during the pre-Bhutto period. This factor coupled with the entry of the indigenous middle class into the civil (and military) service, has changed considerably the composition, nature and role of the civil service. A new generation of civil officers more oriented toward indigenous values (language, customs, religion) with, perhaps, a more restricted world view has emerged. The military officer class also exhibits many of these same characteristics.

* Senior government professionals -- Secretaries, Joint Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Section heads, and District officers.
The Future

The class composition of members of the services has been the most important change to occur over the past decade. The entry of members of the indigenous* middle class into the civil service either through political appointment or through merit selection has and will continue to affect how the bureaucracy functions and its contribution to policymaking and administration. Likewise, the promotion of officers from middle class backgrounds to the general officer corps has altered the role and function of the military in Pakistan. The present regime draws its support from the middle class—that sector of society which initially benefited under Bhutto but became alienated from him towards the end of his regime because of his later policies. Consequently, any return to power of the PPP would endanger the values and aspirations of the middle class, especially if the PPP leadership attempted to carry on where Bhutto left off.

For the foreseeable future, the U.S. Government will have to deal with a military-dominated administrative state. At present, there is no civilian alternative acceptable to military leadership and since the military is in control and has support among the middle class, it will exercise the final veto. Any change in government within the next few years will probably involve another general replacing Zia but utilizing the existing policymaking/decision structure described earlier.

Therefore, it is important that the U.S. Government develop (or in some cases maintain) the kind of political, economic and cultural exchange policies that have and would continue to project a positive image of the U.S. In this regard, although the military portion of the proposed military-economic assistance package has drawn the most attention, the economic portion over the long run might be more important. A healthy, developing economy is a major ingredient for political stability in Pakistan. In this context, cultural exchange is also an important part of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Any reduction in these programs would seriously affect the positive image of the U.S. among Pakistanis that has developed over the past three decades. The opportunity to visit and study in the U.S. will be especially important in the future given the educational backgrounds and the limited exposure to the U.S. of many of the individuals who are assuming more important positions in both the military and civil services.

* As opposed to the refugees who came from India at Partition.

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