SECURITY DECISION-MAKING IN PAKISTAN

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This monograph has three objectives. First, it will describe the structure of and attitudes within the security policy process of Pakistan. This primarily means the military of Pakistan—-and within the military the officer corps of the Pakistan Army. This officer corps not only plays a central role in security policy making but it has been central to the politics of Pakistan. It is one of the major arguments of this monograph that the latter cannot be understood without knowing something about the former. The attitudes of the Pakistan Army will be examined in detail in Chapter III; before that, Chapter I will very briefly place Pakistan's defense structure in comparative perspective, and Chapter II will examine the broader relationship between the Pakistan Army and Pakistan society, and the ways in which the present system contains elements of British and even pre-British cultural patterns as well as post-Independence adaptations and innovations. Chapter IV will describe the decision-making system in Pakistan and focus on the question of civil-military relations. Our second purpose is to analyze the strategic choices open to Pakistan. This task will be reserved largely for Chapter V, although there are some structural and organizational issues which have strategic implications: the balance between infantry and armor, or the independence of a state in weapons acquisition, or the degree of Islamic ideological content in military doctrine. Whereas our objective in describing some critical features of the Pakistan security policy process is to lay out the problems of survival and security largely as Pakistanis see them, our goal in Chapter V will be to suggest ways in which Pakistanis might yet come to see such problems. This is of special importance and interest in the nuclear area.
Finally, and with considerable hesitation, a third purpose of this monograph is to suggest policy choices open to all of the major participants in what I see as a conflictual relationship of enormous and terrible potential. If recent indications mean anything the next few years will see the near-nuclearization of India and Pakistan, an increase in their domestic political instability, and a permanent superpower presence in the region. To my mind none of the domestic problems traditionally associated with South Asia (poverty, population growth, political instability) can be independently examined without consideration of the substructure of strategic insecurity. It is surprising, but the academic community has virtually ignored the military-related dimensions of economic, political, and social problems in the region; the decision-makers of India and Pakistan, at least, do not ignore them, or have done so to their regret.\textsuperscript{1}

A brief word is in order as to how this monograph came to be written. I have followed Pakistani security policy and the role of the military for a number of years, and have written frequently on these subjects.\textsuperscript{2} An earlier request to visit Pakistan for field research (in 1965) was turned down. However, after 1972 the attitude of at least the military towards the academic study of such problems changed dramatically, and I made three trips to Pakistan in 1978 and 1980. The latter trip was of special value; I was shown a number of military training facilities, visited several field formations, and had extensive conversations with active and retired Pakistan armed forces personnel. A number of these interviews were tape-recorded and have been transcribed. These interviews and my other field notes come to nearly four hundred pages of double-spaced typewritten text and are used extensively in this monograph.\textsuperscript{3} Although my 1980 itinerary was regulated, several changes were made in it at my suggestion. There were subjects on which my respondents were clearly more reticent than on others. Another disadvantage that I faced
was that--like all scholars--I want to return to my research area, and in
dealing with sensitive subjects there are self-imposed restraints that may be
applied unconsciously.

However, I did have several advantages in my field work. First, I have
been writing about the military in Pakistan for a number of years and it was
in the interests of Pakistani authorities that my work be as truthful as
possible, or at least not misrepresent them to their disadvantage. The
Pakistan Army is not a monolith, and there were officers who felt that
a reasonably objective outsider should be encouraged, just as there were
some reticent about my presence. Second, my work in Pakistan followed almost
fifteen years of contact with the Indian Army--beginning in 1964. I did not
go to Pakistan without familiarity about the regimental system, British-
Indian patterns of recruitment, training, and indoctrination, and without
an understanding of the relationship between a modernizing bureaucracy and a
technologically less-developed but otherwise rich and complex society.

Travel to Pakistan in 1978 was made possible by a grant from the Ford
Foundation as part of its program in international security and arms control,
and as a visitor under the voluntary speaker program of the U.S. International
Communications Agency. In 1980, support for my travel came from the University
of Illinois and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State has
provided salary support which has enabled me to write this monograph, but no
classified U.S. material has been used. My deepest gratitude is to the
officers and other ranks of the Pakistan armed forces for their hospitality
and responsiveness, I hope this monograph will represent their reality fairly
and accurately, and that they will--where they find me critical--remember
the saying of the British, which remains prominently displayed at the Frontier
Forces Regimental Training Center in Abbotabad:
Sweat saves blood,
Blood saves life,
Brain saves both,

Or, if they prefer, the Quran:

The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr.
CHAPTER I: PAKISTAN IN COMPARATIVE AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

States strong enough to do good are but few.
Their number would seem limited to three.
Good is a thing that they, the great, can do.
But puny little states can only be.


We naturally identify objects, people, and states by comparison. All people and all countries have more or less the same number and order of parts: legs, eyes, parliaments, parties, and armies. It is the proportion of each in relation to the other which creates a separate and distinct identity, and proportion can be gauged only by comparative reference. Pakistan may be unique among states in that its own reference points have shifted dramatically and frequently during the thirty-three years of its existence, and thus its identity appears to have changed during that period. These reference points are both ideological and strategic.

Perceptions of Pakistan

For many in both Pakistan and the West, it has stood as one of the natural bastions of anti-communism. Islam has long been thought to confer a natural immunity to communism and Pakistan was at once both explicitly Muslim and wedged between the world's two great communist powers. Yet, Pakistan has proven to be a disappointment to many of its conservative Western friends.
It was one of the first states to open diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and is today the largest recipient of Chinese military assistance; Pakistan has accepted Soviet economic assistance and, despite the strong-anti-communism of many officers, some military assistance as well.

The events of 1970-71, followed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's government, the discovery of a Pakistan nuclear program, the burning of the American Embassy, and the pursuit of an explicitly non-aligned policy have further diluted Pakistan's image as one of the staunch anti-communist "free world" small states of the world (some other members of the club being South Africa, Taiwan, Israel, and Thailand).

However, having moved to the left, Pakistan acquired few friends among the world's radical and left groups. Even under Bhutto, Pakistani Marxists concluded that the state was hopelessly feudal and the military hopelessly bourgeois. The struggle to retain East Pakistan split Pakistani leftists and the ties with China were of diminishing ideological importance.

The world's liberals were earlier alienated by the behavior of the Pakistan Army in East Bengal, and Pakistan's generals will carry the stigma of that episode for many years regardless of their personal or professional role at the time. Even the scholarly community has lost interest in Pakistan, forsaking it for India, where access and cooperation has been considerably greater. This is in sharp contrast to the early 1960s when Pakistan was the object of intense study as a model of economic development.

A look at Pakistan, in broad comparative perspective provides one clue to its shifting image. Pakistan happens to share a large number of characteristics with many other states; this makes it an interesting and important country, but it also encourages the casual observer to stereotype it, rather
than undertake the extra effort at understanding. For example, Pakistan is ethnically diverse, like Iran, Nigeria, and India, and one of its regions tends to dominate the others (like Iran and Nigeria). It has a substantial population, like Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Brazil, and like Korea and Iran it has several large powers (including the Soviet Union and China) as neighbors; like Israel, it was originally brought into existence to provide a religious-national home and was born in violence and partition; Pakistan is also a relatively moderate Islamic state, much like Egypt and Indonesia; it has a high level of defense spending but a relatively low per capita GNP, and like Vietnam, Israel, Cuba and Taiwan, it tries to cultivate an image of being a small but tough state; Pakistan is also acquiring a nuclear technology program, and may be one of the near-nuclear military states, like Brazil, India, Israel, and South Africa; finally, Pakistan is regarded as both a South Asian state (and is thus forever being compared with India) and as the eastern fringe of the Middle East; Pakistan shares its colonial history with India, yet it does have a pre-colonial Islamic and even Buddhist identity. The territory that is now Pakistan has been part of much larger imperial systems, the most recent being the British-Indian, but it has also been a part of imperial political structures that had their center of gravity in the west rather than to the east. Depending on the issue of the day Pakistan can be accused of being; on the verge of civil war due to regional diversity or intra-regional domination; over-populated, with a high birth rate; in the natural sphere of influence of one or more of its neighbors; a fanatic Islamic state, a nuclear proliferator, and a pale imitation of either India or the Islamic world. We hardly need to mention a final point of comparison: Pakistan has been ruled by the military for much of its thirty-three years, and its leadership has been subject to epithets ranging from "Tweedle Khan"
to the Butchers of Bengal. Pakistan is not the only state where the military have repeatedly assumed power, but—in large part because of its assumed "British tradition"—such an assumption of power has has never sat easily among Pakistanis themselves, let alone in the liberal West.

Underlying these shifts in ideological imagery were several basic changes in Pakistan's strategic position. In the 1950s Pakistan was usually characterized as a large, strategically pivotal and tough nation, which could more than hold its own with its neighbors. It had achieved this status largely through its alliances with the United States, and membership in SEATO and CENTO. These had led to a flow of weapons and to high levels of military training and proficiency. But by 1972, Pakistan was a wreck. Its army had been defeated in a war against both its own rebellious population and the Indian armed forces, and perhaps not as humiliating, but of great significance was the way in which Pakistan and Iran changed positions in the eyes of the world. Pakistan had once been Iran's tutor and military superior; with the massive purchases of American arms and the development of an expansive geopolitical vision. Iran assumed the role of superior partner, much to the chagrin of many Pakistani Army officers.

Most recently, however, Pakistan has been revived as a regional great power—at least by some in the West—which deserves military support so that it can withstand and even roll back Soviet pressures in Afghanistan. Yet there is strong opposition to this policy among those who make the comparison between Pakistan, India, and the Soviet Union: if Pakistan had trouble in coping with the Indians in 1971, how could they stand up to even a limited Soviet thrust? All of these different perceptions of what "Pakistan" is are layered over each other, and tend to confuse and blur public debate over such questions as military support for the present government. Any move to assist Pakistan can be (and has been) opposed because of variety of reasons,
some of them quite unrelated to the current strategic situation in South
West Asia.

Pakistanis themselves have been literally despondent about the decline
in their country's power and status in the international community, and the
way in which India has come to overshadow them. (It is small consolation,
but if Pakistan were today transported whole to Latin America or Africa,
it would be regarded as a regional great power: in absolute international
terms it is still a populous, militarily powerful state with a large pool
of educated and trained manpower.)

Pakistan as a Middle Power?

In the 19th Century Helmut von Treitschke argued that the real test of
a state's great power status was if it could decide on its own whether or not
it would engage in warfare. In contemporary terms, such a state would have
both a capacity to initiate war against weaker states and could deter equals
or larger states from attacking it. We have hopefully moved beyond Treitschke's
cynicism in our attempts to measure power and influence, but there are some
aspects of his definition which are not inappropriate for contemporary Pakistan,
and we shall return to them shortly. However, a fuller definition of "great"
power today in contemporary Asia is necessary.

At the minimum great power status implies regional influence, if not
dominance. It may further include continental or global influence or influence
in an adjacent region. But such influence can come about only if a number of
conditions are fulfilled. Most, but not all, pertain to the enhancement of
national capacities:

1. The capacity to manage the domestic processes of economic development
   and national integration.

2. The capacity to resist outside penetration.
3. The capacity to dominate regional competitors.

4. The capacity to deter outside states (especially the superpowers) from lending support to regional competitors.

5. The capacity to achieve autarchy in critical weapons systems, or at least to be able to bargain successfully for them when they are needed most--during wartime.

6. An awareness that the above capacities exist (or are within reach) and a strategic, vision of what influence their exercise will produce.

Great power status thus implies the existence of local military preponderance over neighbors through the spectrum of force and the means and the will to maintain that dominance. It may also imply the ability to manipulate the domestic political weaknesses of rival states, and certainly a diplomacy that places power and status ahead of other objectives. Finally, if necessary, a great power is willing and able to make external political commitments and has the resources to fulfill such commitments. These are not the commitments of the weak to the strong, but of the strong to an equal or weaker state.

In Asia, between the superpowers and the smaller (or fragile) states, there are perhaps ten or so "middle" powers. These states are substantial in terms of size, population, or economic capacity, and some maintain armies of considerable size. They would include China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Vietnam, both Koreas, Taiwan, and Pakistan. Three of them approach "great" power status: China, Japan, and India, and some would add Vietnam to this list. They fulfill most of the criteria listed above, although they differ strikingly among each other.
It is Pakistan's fate that its status as even a "middle" power is indeterminate, although before 1971 it was clearly in this category. Returning to Treitschke, it is evident that what has changed for Pakistan is its ability to manage its own fate. Pakistan has declined in status and importance for many reasons, but above all because it is perceived to have permanently slipped behind India in a regional struggle for power. As one American official who deals with the region pronounced several years ago, "there is no 'arms race' between India and Pakistan: India won it in 1971."

Since there is no international certification of great power status such judgements as to which states are more powerful than others are based on estimates of military capability, political will, and a host of other factors. From time to time this murky landscape is illuminated by a war, which provides one crude (but vital) test of relative military power, and hence greatly influences our perceptions of strategic status.

The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war was critical in shaping our perceptions of Pakistan. It showed that Pakistan was unable to control onset of war between it and India, let alone the pace of the struggle within East Bengal; nor could it deter India from attacking, and its own attack (in the West) achieved no significant political or military objective. Even apart from the incompetence of the senior military leadership Pakistan emerged as a state which, while powerful in absolute terms, lacks military capacity relative to its chief antagonist.
While the purpose of this monograph is to describe the internal structure of Pakistan’s security apparatus and military, it is imperative that we at least raise the question here of how one measures relative and absolute military capacity in the case of a state such as Pakistan. We would suggest (if the data were available) that a time-series, or trend analyses of both absolute and relative capabilities is one kind of measure largely ignored in the academic literature. These are the measures that most military planning staffs like to use when calculating their power vis-à-vis a neighbor. First however, let us look at a series of static comparative measures which point to Pakistan’s status as an intermediate power.

Tables I-A, I-B, and I-C together indicate the force levels and the defense effort which a number of Asian states are capable of achieving. They also indicate some structural differences, even where outputs (in the form of levels of weapons) are similar. India and China stand alone, as the two world giant states based on very poor peasant societies, with relatively small—\textit{but} in absolute terms, substantial—industrial sectors. Their enormous populations can be organized into huge infantry forces at relatively low cost; their industrial sector can turn out sufficient weapons for such forces. They can also produce limited quantities of heavy and advanced weapons—ships, tanks, aircraft—but often only in cooperation with a more advanced industrial state. Pakistan resembles China and India in that it is largely a peasant society, but its industrial sector, proportionately smaller, is well below any critical-mass size to allow it to manufacture anything much beyond infantry weapons; it is otherwise (as is Vietnam, Iran, Indonesia, and to some degree, the two Koreas)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (in millions)</th>
<th>GNP (billion U.S.$)</th>
<th>MILEX* (billion U.S.$)</th>
<th>Armed Forces Manpower (000)</th>
<th>Percent GNP Spent on Defense</th>
<th>MILEX Pop.</th>
<th>No. Civilians per soldier</th>
<th>18-45 in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>$75.1</td>
<td>$9.94</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>$224</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>930.0</td>
<td>10.08</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>373.0</td>
<td>40.60</td>
<td>4360</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data are for 1978 and are derived from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1979-1980* (London: IISS, 1980). Certain Figures are rough estimates (China's population, economy); others are not exactly comparable because of different measuring techniques.

*MILEX—military expenditures*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pub. Exp. per capita</th>
<th>Pub. Exp. per soldier</th>
<th>Literacy</th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
<th>calories per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
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*Derived from Ruth L. Silard, ed., *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1978* 
Based on 1975 data from 140 countries; rankings are approximations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1735</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3 1/2+</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11000</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from individual country entries in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1979-80* (London: IISS, 1980). Light tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs) are excluded, as are patrol vessels. There is a great variation in modernity and readiness of equipment.
dependent upon outside sources for critical high-technology equipment. Nor, has it—like China and Vietnam—organized its population in a large militia, which would be one way of substituting manpower for weapons.

Is the economic defense burden of these large, peasant-based, poor societies harmful to their economic growth, and thus to some extent self-defeating? India and China have come to the conclusion that an indigenous defense production capability is supportive of their goals to industrialize, and the Indians in particular defend their massive defense industry in economic as well as political and strategic terms. As we shall discuss in Chapter V, many Pakistanis have come to the same conclusion, and are rapidly building up an arms manufacturing capability. There has long been a case made for the positive economic contribution of having men under arms. In India and Pakistan the prosperity of the Punjab can likely be traced to the enormous remittances and pensions paid to servicemen and veterans as well as to Punjabi industriousness.

Astonishingly, there has been very little serious work done on this fundamental relationship between defense spending and economic development. One study by Emile Benoît concludes that in India during the 1960s there was a positive relationship between defense spending and economic growth. This was possible because in a "loose" society any efficient organization of the system makes a positive contribution even though it may draw upon resources which would otherwise be unproductively spent, or not raised to begin with. In his recent
study of the Indian economy, Lawrence Veit takes exception to Benoit's conclusions, and states his belief that even at low rates of return India's growth would have been greater had defense spending been diverted to the civilian economy.

This debate over the utility of defense spending is particularly important to Pakistan because, as shown in Table I-D, it has one of the highest relative burdens of military expenditure, well ahead of that of India. Does this mean that more spending, especially on infrastructure and defense production, will stimulate the Pakistani economy, (as some argued) or will contribute further to its present stagnation? Some Pakistani generals argue the former is true, and point to their experience in the 1950s, when defense spending, foreign assistance, and the Pakistani economy all experienced strong positive growth. But is this true today, if it was true in the 1950s? It is possible to pose this question but I must repeat my astonishment that very little attention has been paid to the question in Pakistan, other than on the level of assertion and hunch. Pakistan's present nuclear program, its continued large attempts to build a defense production sector, and the maintenance of a twenty-division army may be justifiable in strategic terms but the leadership of Pakistan has no idea of whether such a level effort may not destroy the state—or at least the present leadership—without a shot being fired.

An incomplete time-series comparison of Pakistani and Indian force levels and defense expenditure is presented in Tables I-E and I-F. Of course, while India is Pakistan's major strategic threat,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Expenditures as % of GNP</th>
<th>Less than $200</th>
<th>$200-499</th>
<th>$500-999</th>
<th>$1000-3500</th>
<th>GNP Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Iran Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4.99%</td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1.99%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHART I-E  TANK AND AIRCRAFT TOTALS, INDIA AND PAKISTAN

TANK TOTALS
(all types)

2000

India: tanks

Pakistan: tanks

COMBAT AIRCRAFT TOTALS

900

India: aircraft

Pakistan: aircraft

500

200
CHART I-F  DEFENSE EXPENDITURES PAKISTAN AND INDIA
(in U.S. dollars, 000)

PAKISTAN

61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79

3,600
3,400
3,200
3,000
2,800
2,600
2,400
2,200
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400

INDIA

PAKISTAN
India itself has fought a war with China in 1962 and has dedicated a certain percentage of its armed forces (at least six or eight mountain divisions) to their common border. Thus, the tables comparing absolute numbers of tanks, aircraft, troops, and defense expenditures cannot be read only in the context of the classic 3:1 ratio so beloved of planning staffs. Table I-G summarizes these data in ratio form. What is surprising is India's inability to achieve 3:1 superiority over Pakistan except in the category of combat aircraft and then only for a brief period of time; also of importance is the substantial relative decline in Indian defense spending after the peak years of 1972-73. However, recent major acquisitions (made possible by a surplus of foreign exchange in the case of the Jaguar deal and exceptionally favorable terms in the case of the Soviet arms deal) may once again bring both aircraft and armor ratios back up to 3:1 in India's favor in the next few years. If by that time India has normalized its relationship with China, then Pakistan will face strategic inferiority.

None of these tables tell us much about the purpose of these forces: sometimes to deter, sometimes to attack, sometimes to create a conflict so as to internationalize it, and sometimes to dampen a limited conflict by maintaining the capacity to escalate. The trouble is that military staffs and their civilian superiors cannot always be certain of the intentions of an enemy; thus, a force which is capable of and designed to deter an enemy, may—-with some slight additions and changes—-be capable of attacking and defeating it. This is the central concern of the Indian military when they look at Pakistan's inferior but still-potent forces; carried to the logical extreme, however,
Chart I-G  Ratios of Defense Expenditure and Major Weapons Systems, India/Pakistan


5:1

4:1

3:1

2:1

1:1

(a) defense expenditures
(b) aircraft
(c) tanks

(a) derived from various ACDA publications
(b) and (c) derived from annual IISS Military Balance
such a fear leads some of them to conclude that the Pakistanis should have no forces.

Pakistan's Uncertain Future

All of these points of comparison of Pakistan's status and power would be of interest but not of any pressing urgency, were it not for the fact that Pakistan shares one additional characteristic with a handful of states. Pakistan belongs to that class of states whose very survival is uncertain, whose legitimacy is doubted, and whose conventional security apparatus may be inadequate to cope with the pressures of hostile neighbors. Most of these states (Taiwan, Israel, South Africa) have or are likely to acquire some nuclear capability precisely because of their belief that neither external support nor their own security forces can ensure their survival. In the past we have seen such states sink below the waves with a whimper and a flood of refugees whose appearance is as inevitable as some kind of "tidal" wave generated by a disappearing South Pacific island. While they may leave behind a flotsam of terrorism, they are promptly swallowed up by neighbors and just as soon forgotten by the international community.

This is not likely to happen in the case of the new "pariah" states, and the international system will be subject to enormous stress and strain because of that. These states see nuclear weapons as the last chance they may have to ensure their very survival; they are acquiring such weapons outside of traditional alliance systems and outside of the central strategic balance of terror. We shall return to this issue in Chapter V, but it is important to note that in the case of Pakistan we see an essentially pre-nuclear state taking
a quite different strategic path from all previous nuclear powers, developing its own strategic nuclear doctrines drawing upon Islamic as well as neo-classical Western theories of deterrence and punishment. Pakistanis see nuclear weapons as a last-resort device which will deter an enemy from overrunning its territory; their possession may make it difficult for an enemy to risk escalation of a border conflict, and to this extent they can substitute for expensive and difficult-to-acquire conventional forces. If the strategic situation of South and Southwest Asia does lead to a point where the survival of Pakistan is in doubt, can either or both of the superpowers tolerate the use of nuclear weapons? If they are used, what will be the regional human consequences for the region, and what lessons will the other near-nuclears draw?

However, even aside from the potential use of nuclear weapons, the survival of Pakistan is of profound importance for two other reasons. First, the destruction of Pakistan would create a shatter-zone of political instability in an area between the three largest states in the world, and which overlooks the Persian Gulf. Although there is little within Pakistan that would be of value to its neighbors, Pakistan does lie at a major strategic crossroad. Second, the destruction of Pakistan—or even its enfeeblement—would have catastrophic repercussions throughout Southern Asia. Pakistan’s population is entirely Muslim but it has close ties to tribes and various ethnic groups in every surrounding country. The wave of human tragedy resulting from a new partition would be incalculable and would continue for years,
if not generations, because there is no clear way to divide Pakistan without creating dissatisfied, disenfranchised, and (in some cases) militant and armed populations. It requires little foresight or imagination, let alone a knowledge of the recent Subcontinent's history, to appreciate an American (and Indian and Chinese, not to mention Pakistani) interest at stake here.

To summarize, Pakistan shares with a great many new nations the triple crises of political institutionalization, social change and development, and strategic uncertainty. Each crisis is likely to be permanent, each stands as an interactive exacerbation of the other. What distinguishes Pakistan from many countries, however, is the unparalleled series of national disasters that have led to repeated military intervention in politics, economic stagnation, national vivisection, and the pursuit of a nuclear program. These events have taken place in an atmosphere of increasing doubt about the survival of Pakistan as a unified state, even among its own military, and that in turn raises profound strategic and political questions for the entire international community.
CHAPTER II: THE PAKISTAN ARMY AND SOCIETY

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgment Seat;
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the earth!

Rudyard Kipling, "The Ballad of East and West"

Kipling's famous ballad (of which only the first line is remembered) happens to refer to an area which is now Pakistan. It also refers to a relationship in which "the twain" do meet: two men facing each other across the barrel of a gun. Kipling saw this equalitarianism of the brave and the strong as one of the redeeming features of the British presence in India; it certainly provided material for his pen.

Today the romance of imperialism is dead, but the suggestion in Kipling that there is something remarkable about two disparate cultures finding some sense of mutual respect in the hills of the NWFP has taken an ironic turn. In Pakistan (and in India) the grandson of Kanal has put on the uniform once worn by the colonel's son, and is now an officer commissioned into a military tradition which traces its roots directly to Sandhurst. Kipling would be upset at first but—like the British officers who have returned to India and Pakistan—he would undoubtedly achieve a grudging respect for the accomplishment of the two armies in preserving a cultural gap between officer and sepoy. This has been attacked by contemporary critics in both countries as a feudal or imperialist legacy and the critics are of course correct,
but they err in underestimating the complexity of the Pakistan Army, its relationship to Pakistani society, and, perhaps, the similarity of the two armies. 2

Armies are multifulctional organizations and to some degree they resemble each other. They assume some responsibility for national defense, they spend a great deal of time on self-maintenance, they play some role in the defense decision-making process, and they usually have an ancillary domestic law and order role. Yet, especially in an era of democratic and populist ideology they also make claims to be national armies, particularly representative of their national societies.

In the case of South Asia the relationship between army and society is particularly complex, and in some ways unique. This relationship does affect the political involvement of the Indian and Pakistani armies, their military capabilities, and the way in which they perceive themselves, their societies, and the conduct of war. While it is possible to make judgments about the fighting capabilities of the Pakistan Army based upon simple numerical data such judgements can only be partial unless they are also based upon a working knowledge of an idiosyncratic military ethos.

Nor is it adequate to lump the Indian and Pakistani armies together, and assume that their behavior will be similar because they share a common origin in the old British Indian Army. We cannot discuss all of the points of difference between the two armies but these should be noted:
1) The periodic political involvement of the Pakistan Army has affected its relationship to the social system; when a uniformed army man strides into a room of civilians the latter back away. The social status and power of the Pakistan Army is radically different than that of the Indian Army. It is not at all clear, however, that its greater status has meant an improvement in fighting ability.

2) The Pakistan Army was created from scratch in 1947; it inherited very few training institutions, it was seriously deficient in most stores, supplies, and weapons, and it received far fewer officers with Staff College or advanced training than did India. This meant that the Pakistan Army was very dependent on British officers for its first four years, and led to a mixed legacy of pride and bitterness at having to virtually create a new army in the face of active Indian hostility.

3) Because Pakistan was created as an Islamic state its army had to adapt to Islamic principles and practices while the Indian Army was accommodating itself to a professedly secular state.

4) Upon partition, India shed its responsibility for the defense of the North West Frontier, changing its entire strategic outlook; it inherited the much quieter North East Frontier, Ladakh, and other areas, although both armies had to adapt to a brand new strategic problem—their common Kashmir-Punjab-Rajasthan-Sind frontier.

5) The Pakistan Army developed quite early and close ties with foreign military establishments (especially the U.S.) out of
necessity, while the Indian Army has been deliberately kept away from such contacts.

6) The Pakistan Army has been far more dependent on outside sources for equipment than the Indian Army and has come to the idea of self-reliance much later than the Indians.

7) The Pakistan Army's complete reorganization of the 1950s led to a special and distinct Pakistani approach to strategy and war; the Indian Army underwent an equivalent reorganization only in the middle 1960s after the war with China.

It is erroneous to conclude that because they paint their rocks and signboards in similar patterns, that their officers carry swagger sticks and wear the same regimental ties, and that the clipped accents bark out similar commands that the Indian and Pakistani armies are very much like each other or that they are merely the last remains of the British Raj. The changes from the British Indian Army and from each other are sometimes subtle but very important, and to speak of "the British tradition" as lingering on in India or Pakistan is to misrepresent both the degree to which that tradition was itself an adaptation to South Asian conditions, and the influence of indigenous societies over a thirty-three year period.

In this chapter we will look at three important and distinctive facets of the Pakistan Army's relationship to its society. Each is of special interest to the sociologist or anthropologist, for they show how modern organizational forms are adapted to one of the most complex societies in the world. But, each also demonstrates how
distinctive army-society relationship can have important strategic and political consequences. The three are 1) the unique rank and class structure of the Pakistan Army, and the institution of the Junior Commissioned Officer; this structure, developed by the British is found nowhere else in the world except India, and is a key to understanding the way in which modern institutions accommodate themselves to South Asian society, 2) the representativeness of the Pakistan Army, which is a key to understanding the way in which the society itself is put together, and how the military feel about their own place in society, and 3) the "aid to the civil" role of the Pakistan Army, which is a key to understanding how the military originally acquired the confidence to intervene in Pakistani politics.

Rank and Discipline in the Pakistan Army

It is widely recognized that a nation's military capabilities are dependent upon the linkage between available weapons and its strategic options. It is less widely recognized that the actual utilization of weapons is just as tightly linked to social structure. Pakistan is a society in gradual transition, and the Pakistan military has equipment which in some cases is among the most modern, yet it has a military rank structure which has its origin in the 18th Century. The nexus between military structure, equipment, and society is critical.

The distinguishing feature of the rank structure of the Pakistan Army is the existence of the Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO). This type of officer was developed first by the French and then by the British, as each power sought to consolidate and expand its position in South India. The JCO was and is a selected member in a particular
class of soldiers: he is more than a warrant officer but less than a regular commissioned officer, and his function is as much cultural as military. The British found that such an officer could bridge the gap between themselves and the other ranks; the JCO was something of an older brother or village elder, who disciplined and counseled the young peasant sepoy and served as a cultural transmission belt. When Indians were recruited to the officer corps in the 1920s and 1930s the JCO still served a useful function, for such Indian officers were typically from highly Westernized families and were trained to be perfect copies of their British colleagues. The institution of the JCO has been continued in both India and Pakistan and continues to serve an important, but diminishing role.

However, a bridge is useful only if there is a gap and if it can bear the load. The utility of the JCO is debated in Pakistan. First, the average educational level of the sepoy is slowly increasing, as is the ability of the commissioned officer to communicate with his men. More and more officers are themselves the sons of JCOs (although this process is probably moving faster in India than in Pakistan). Finally, there are some problems associated with the JCO. He tends to be older (in some cases much older) than is the sepoy. This gives him the authority of age and experience, but may make him excessively cautious and mean that he is physically in decline. He may also lack the educational qualifications to acquire new technical skills, or to adjust to new and complex kinds of equipment. In Pakistan the process of replacing the JCO with regular commissioned officers in
armor and technical units is well underway; the only major problem is cost, since the pay of three-and-a-half JCOs equals that of a single officer.

The description above of the JCO as an elder brother provides another clue to a distinctive feature of the Pakistan Army—the basis of its discipline. "Why do men fight?" is one of the fundamental questions to be asked of any army, and Pakistan has tried to evolve an answer which is both coherent and compatible with broader social goals.

The old Indian Army motivated its soldiers through a complex blend of class pride, religious symbolism, unit tradition, the ideals of loyalty and duty, and liberal pay and service conditions as well as post-service pension and land grant programs. The British deliberately sought to bind the upper peasantry to the Raj by this judicious mixture of economic incentive and appeal to traditional social values. There were a few limited opportunities for advancement and promotion for able Indians, and the entire army was divided into a series of family-like regiments which re-created and transformed traditional village and caste loyalties. The British tread carefully in religious matters. Recruits were bound to the unit through a religious oath (Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh priests and Maulvis were attached to the regiments for this purpose), but there was thought to be great danger in emphasizing religion as a motive for fighting.

Upon achieving independence the Pakistan Army moved immediately to emphasize Islam as a unifying force. There had been no all-Muslim
regiments in the Indian Army because of British fear of a recurrence of the 1857 Mutiny, the new Pakistan Army was, of course, almost entirely Muslim (a few non-Muslims have served in the Pakistan armed services, especially as officers). The professional journals of the military are filled with studies of the question of Islamicization of the military, and all come back to the question of the degree to which traditional Indian Army patterns need to be altered according to Islamic principles. We shall return to this question in a discussion of the officer corps, and will here only note that the actual changes are quite modest. In the regimental training centers and in the units, there is an "Islamic" presence, but it is traditional rather than fanatical in tone and origin.

For example, the young recruits are still treated with extreme gentleness and patience upon their arrival to the regimental training centers, a far cry from the shock tactics thought necessary in some Western armies.

When they come here [a regimental training center] they come on their own. There is no conscription, they are all volunteers. We keep them for thirty-six weeks; for a couple of weeks we clothe them, and acclimatize them. That don't even wear boots for a few weeks, we don't want to rush them along; this is a breaking-in period; first of all they get seven weeks of education, before their military training starts; some of them are illiterates, quite illiterate, so we educate them immediately to enable them to pick up the instruction here. Then they go into drill, and only then military training, and it continues for a year after they leave,
when they are in the units, where they are still known as "young soldiers." This is an investment we make.

Many of the young recruits are from remote districts and their lives have been geared to a peasant society. "They have been sitting on top of hills, watching sheep, and then they have to come here, with our regimented life. There are bathrooms, latrines, regular hours, fixed meals, perhaps not what he is used to in his village, so there is a little change, a drastic change in his life." These young recruits are also thrown together with Pakistanis from other regions and ethnic groups--Punjabis with Baluchis, different Pathan tribes, Sindhis, and even members of various Islamic sects.

In the regimental centers the recruits are given a brief history of Pakistan. They are taught that they are part of the Pakistan Army, not an Islamic army, although Islamic and Quranic injunctions are part of the training and indoctrination process. They are expected to take pride in the fact that they are Muslims, and part of a broader world community.

It has been quite easy to blend traditional Indian Army patterns with Islam. There were no all-Muslim regiments in the old Indian Army, and those raised in Pakistan have been given distinctive Islamic battle-cries: "Nadar Hazar Ali!" ("I am Present before the Almighty,"") in commemoration of the Fourth Caliph, is the cry of the Pakistan Frontier Force. Recruits are reminded by signboards in the centers, that "Life and death are the same thing: and when the experiment of life is completed, then the eternal life--which we call death--begins."
Or, that "Fighting in the name of Allah, fighting in the name of truth, is the supreme sort of worship, and anybody who does service in the armed force with the intention of doing this job in worship, his life is a worship." But they are also reminded that:

Sweat saves blood
Blood saves life,
Brain saves both,

which is hardly Islamic, but quite British.

The seriousness of the Pakistan Army's commitment to Islam does vary. Until recently the unit Maulvis were near-comic figures. But one of the first changes made by Zia-ul-Haq after his appointment as Chief of the Army Staff was to upgrade the Maulvis, improve their status, and require them to go into battle with the troops.

Those responsible for military training do not feel that any heavy indoctrination is necessary, and that Islam naturally supports the idea of the military profession. One general involved with training points out:

Islam is a religion in which a certain amount of regimen-
tation is germane. For instance, you line up for prayers. You have a man standing up before you. You have a system, a core, so basically therefore, for a Muslim, as I see it, (maybe you see it differently) he gets a certain orien-
tation, a certain organization, and a certain discipline. You have to wash your hands, your feet, your face before prayers. There is a system of prayer: you stand, you bow, then you prostrate yourself. Even when you are praying, you stand upright in dignity; even in prayer there is a discipline, God does not want you to prostrate yourself
all the time . . . So this is prayer, and soldiering; in our society it is easy to organize this way, towards the military side.

And, by inference, those who do not believe in the one true God, are both inferior men and a natural potential enemy. In the words of an officer directly involved in troop training:

Q: What do you teach them (the recruits) about potential enemies?
A: As it happens, we don't have to teach them anything, everybody in this country knows who is the enemy! The necessity, the threat, who is the enemy; somehow we don't teach them this in the syllabus but somehow they all know!

Q: But what about the Afghans, or Russian Muslim troops?
A: Oh! There's no question, we will go wherever we have to—Arabs, Iran, anywhere—they have taken an oath, that is not the problem, but of course they would more readily and happily go to the other direction. As for the Russians, well they [the sepoys] would have no hesitation, perhaps fighting the Afghans there would be some, but against the Russians there will be no hesitation. We all know they are atheists and again, we group them with the Hindus—to us they are non-religious. But the Iranians, they are not a martial race anyway.

To summarize, the Pakistan Army draws its manpower overwhelmingly from a peasant society in transition. It retains the cautious, even gentle approach to troops training, it encourages the sepoys to regard their regiment and their unit as their home, or substitute-village, and it invests a great deal of time and effort in what has historically been called "man management," hoping to compensate in part for generally
inferior military technology with very highly disciplined and motivated other ranks. Layered over this is a veneer of Islamic ideology, which complements but does not dominate the indoctrination process.

Representativeness and Recruitment

The question of the representativeness of the Pakistan Army has two aspects, symbolic and practical. The importance of symbolism is self-evident: if all Pakistanis do not equally share the obligations and rewards associated with such a central institution as the military, then they are not truly citizens in the Western sense of the word; conversely, the dominance of a particular region within the military or any other important national institution is seen by the rest of the country as a potential threat, regardless of the intentions of members from the dominant region. It is wrong to associate the process of "nation-building" with the eradication of provincial and local loyalties, and in a state as diverse and complex as Pakistan a federal system with multiple allegiances is to be encouraged, but when one province is so much more powerful than the others, then even a "fair" representation of its members in the military may give the appearance of conspiracy.

The practical aspects of representativeness are no less important. In dealing with conflict within a region (such as Baluchistan, or the cities of the Punjab) it is essential to have within the military and security forces individuals from that region; who understand local languages, terrain, culture, and aspirations. Yet there are enormous dangers associated with such a practice. First, the military trains its members in the arts and sciences of violence, and a continual flow of veterans from the army back to a rebellious area may strengthen the
capacity of the rebels. Secondly and apparently of great importance in 1977), disturbances in a particular region are quickly felt in military units drawn from there. These cannot usually be trusted to control a crowd possibly made up of their own friends and relatives.

The British (especially those who ran the Indian Army) strongly believed that "India" was a series of disparate, segmented societies, an agglomeration of "nations" with different characteristics and attributes. They concluded that not only were some ethnic groups inherently more martial or warlike than others but that such groups had to be placed in mutual counterposition to ensure that they would not unite against the British or exploit regions and castes and religious communities that were "weaker." The idea of the "martial races" had complex origins (some of them mythical) but it did partially reflect actual regional, religious, and ethnic differences among Indians. It also led to a serious imbalance of recruitment in the old Indian Army and the dominance of Punjabis in the sepoys ranks. This dominance later spread to the officer corps, and by the beginning of World War II the largest single class in the Indian Army was Punjabi Muslims (PMs), just as they had been the largest class recruited to the Indian Army during World War I.

Upon achieving independence Pakistan had to reconcile the fact of Punjabi Muslim dominance in both the officer corps and the other ranks with Islamic equalitarianism. Of the Muslims recruited to the old Indian Army, over 75% were from the Punjab before the war, and even during it, they constituted over half of all Muslims. Thus, the new Pakistan Army had something like 60% PMs as sepoys and in the officer corps, with the second largest group coming from the Northwest Frontier
Province (NWFP). There were only trace elements of Bengalis, and very few Sindhis or Baluchis at any level.

In its first few years, the Pakistan Army developed what was to be a tragic linkage of region, religion, and martial character. East and West Pakistan achieved independence as one country, but without a shared perception of the nature of role and structure of the military. The Pakistan Army, almost entirely composed of West Pakistanis (and dominated by Punjabis and Pathans) sought to establish a military identity based upon the assumptions and beliefs which were dominant in the martial provinces of Punjab and NWFP. From the beginning these officers claimed a special position in the new state of Pakistan: they stressed that the virtues of Pakistan were their virtues, that the Islamic character of Pakistan was reflected in the Islamic character of the military.

In numerous popular publications as well as in the military schools the history of Pakistan was traced to Muslim dominance in South Asia and Pakistanis were portrayed as the natural conquerors of the region by virtue of their purer religion and their martial characteristics. The British had repressed this religious spirit and these martial races, but they were once again liberated in Pakistan, and found their proper expression within the military. In brief, the history of the Pakistan Army was the history of the Punjabi Muslim and the Pathan; since there were hardly any other Muslims in the army this seemed entirely natural.

These assumptions led to the grotesquely inflated belief of the superiority of Pakistani martial classes over "Hindu India". The Indians had within their ranks some near-martial races—Sikhs, Gurkhas, and
Rajputs were shown particular respect—but the Indian Army was literally contaminated by such non-martial groups as Tamils, Telugus, Gujaratis, and—fattaly—Bengalis. 10

No regular Bengali Muslim army units were raised during World War II, although over 60,000 Bengalis had seen some service in pioneer (construction) units. 11 The Pakistan Army raised two battalions of the new East Bengal Regiment (EBR) partly from these Pioneers and partly from Muslims who had served in the Bihar Regiment of the old Indian Army. While these numbers were increased, there was strong resistance within the Pakistan Army to increasing East Bengal's representation in the military, and considerable distaste for the quality of Bengali officers and other ranks.

These Bengali units were organizationally significant because they were the only single-class units in the new Pakistan Army. After independence the Pakistanis had systematically mixed different West Pakistani Muslims (in varying proportions) in different army units—but not Bengalis.

We know the consequences of segregation and discriminatory treatment against Bengali officers and other ranks. They were the backbone of armed resistance to the Pakistan Army during the civil war; despite warnings, the Pakistan Army leadership never could make up its mind as to whether they should be expanded into full partnership or completely eliminated. Since the army was running the country, the exclusion of East Pakistanis had very broad political implications. 12
This discussion of the military origin of the old Pakistan's destruction is offered as a reminder of the central symbolic and practical importance of representativeness within the military when it dominates the politics of a country. It raises the question: could it happen again? The present Pakistan Army is hardly more representative than the old one, with a few districts of the Punjab and NWFP still as dominant.

After Independence, it was determined that over 77% of the wartime recruitment from what became Pakistan had been from the Punjab, with 19.5% from NWFP, and 2.2% from Sind, with just over .06 from Baluchistan (and of these total numbers, 90.7% had served in the army). Today, the percentages have not changed dramatically. 75% of all ex-servicemen come from only three districts in the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Campbellpur) and two adjacent districts in NWFP (Kohat and Mardan), so the army as a whole is still unrepresentative. These districts are part of or adjacent to the Potwar region of Pakistan—very poor, overpopulated, under-irrigated, and on the path of countless invasions of South Asia.13

With the departure of the Bengalis, all regular units of the Pakistan Army are now integrated in that they contain a fixed ratio of Pakistanis from several regions. The Air Force, Navy, and some scout or frontier guard units have different patterns of recruitment. Each of the four major infantry regiments (Punjab, Baluch, Frontier Force, Sind) recruits on a national basis through a central system of recruiting officers. However, because of the large numbers of Punjabis, some units (even in the Baluch Regiment) have no Baluchis and very
few Pathans or Sindhis. Since the army is volunteer there is little
that can be done to dragoon in reluctant or uninterested ethnic groups.

Some regions of Pakistan have limited military traditions; others have
cultural characteristics which are "martial," but which make individuals
difficult to subject to military discipline and routine. This is not
a new problem: the British recruited Baluchis in the middle of the 19th
Century when they conquered Sind and employed them in the Persian
Gulf, China, Afghanistan, Japan, Abyssinia, and India itself.14 They
were then de-recruited, replaced by Pathans and Punjabi Muslims, so
that by 1910 the Baluch element of the 129th Duke of Connaught's
Own Baluchis ceased to exist. Punjabis took to discipline better,
recruitment was easier, and the Baluchis had the disconcerting habit
of departing without notice.

There is some awareness now of the dangers of an unrepresentative
army. A predominately Punjabi army is particularly sensitive to
political unrest in the Punjab itself. Yet, large numbers of Baluchis,
or Sindhis (if they could be persuaded or compelled to join the military)
would eventually mean a better trained and disciplined population in
two provinces with separatist sentiment, and the memory of East Bengal
remains. And there is still Punjabi resistance to recruiting other
ranks (and officers?) from the so-called non-martial regions:

Q: Where do most of your soldiers come from?
A: [armor division commander in the Punjab]: This area
has its traditions; we are armor, and a lot of our soldiers
had their fathers, their grandfathers in the cavalry,
and they came from around here (Northern Punjab). We have
a large number still coming from Kohat, from Jhelum.
You know if you go to the South, to Multan Division,
this is the area where there were no known soldiers, but because of the war Bahawalpur State contributed some odd battalions; they were not known for their professionalism! They were known to be goody goody, or they were known to be little, weak soldiers, you get my point? But the hard core, the fighters, the obstinate, motivated ones who can take the stress and strain, the one with loyalties, a good name, certain traditions, belong to about five, six districts: Pindi, Jhelum, Attock, Kohat, Gujerat, a hundred miles around here, this is the place!

Since the disparity in recruitment within the army reflects real cultural and social differences in Pakistan, it is not surprising that the imbalance of regional representation within the army has not changed over a thirty year period, and is not likely to do so more rapidly in the future. This has given rise to some embarrassment, and suggestions for reorganizing the basic recruitment system. In a recent discussion of the fundamental structure of the infantry, one brigadier has advocated a "Corps of Infantry" which would mean the elimination of the regimental system and the present practice of maintaining quotas for different classes:

Class composition continues to sow doubts about the loyalty of men who have sworn to lay down their lives for their country; it continues to allow the inefficient and the weak to flourish under the protected garb of a quota; it continues to have large gaps in the ranks for enough numbers of a particular class are not available; it continues to deny a move directed towards national integration. It is an obvious British vestige from which we must rid ourselves.15
There have also been suggestions that the traditional, British-derived pattern of officer-sepoys be altered in Pakistan, and that the model of a mass volunteer army be followed. Akbar Khan, once one of Pakistan's most senior officers, and subsequently removed from the military after becoming involved in the 1951 Rawalpindi Conspiracy has recently proposed a Vietnam-like people's army, and the mobilization of millions of Pakistanis to once and for all recapture Kashmir and split up India. He rejects the model of dependence upon heavy, expensive weaponry, and believes that a civilian militia and an armed populace would have enabled Pakistan to both defend itself and remain free and independent of foreign powers, especially the U.S. This is not a consensus view in the officer corps. More typical would be the comment of an anonymous officer who suggests that such a Corps of Infantry is "wishful thinking," and is "bound to cause more political trouble than it is worth at this stage of our political development." But of greater importance is the fear that such steps would affect the quality of the infantry:

It is a pity that this [changing recruitment practices] was not done earlier... In our country... the general desire is to level everything regardless of merit. The good public schools have to be reduced to the level of others; efficient services have to be mixed with others so as to have mediocrity (referring to two measures undertaken by Bhutto). Standards of education are lowered, and the time, it appears, has now come for the Infantry to be levelled off.
A "people's army," which we will discuss in a later chapter, would have the effect of putting many more people under arms but might not change regional imbalances; to my knowledge, no one has suggested conscription to increase representativeness. Most officers thus seem willing to accept the present situation, for lack of a practical, economical alternative.

One final comment on representativeness is appropriate. Just as in the case of Bengali troops before 1971, there is an uneasy undercurrent in discussions of the martial or military qualities of Baluchis or Sindhis in Pakistan. If ordinary citizens, farmers and peasants from these region do not make good soldiers— or if they are not interested in participating in the defense of the country as soldiers— what does this imply about their loyalty to the state of Pakistan, and the loyalty and officer-like qualities of Baluchis or Sindhis who join the officer corps? Put another way, what lesson is to be drawn by such groups in the face of Punjabi dominance? No less a figure than a former Chief Justice of Pakistan has raised the issue in a lead article in the professional journal of the army. Justice Rahman reminds his reader that the main culprits in the corruption which led to the disintegration of the old Pakistan were invariably Punjabis, and that "this gave rise to a feeling of Punjabi domination which in its turn propelled into prominence regionalistic and parochial aspirations." The dilemma was summed up by a senior retired lieutenant-general, who had been a close associate of Ayub Khan and involved with recruitment:

The idea is to get more Sindhis in and the response is not there! It is like the Bengalis—the attempt to do it was there, the response was weak, but as I saw it, the attempt [to bring in Bengalis] was late—but there were
those who could say, "See, if you had done it earlier, see what happened later?" Had we rushed it, would things have been worse?

From Disorder to Order

A sure test of the integrity of any state is the role played by the military in maintaining law and order. If the military must be called out on a regular basis, one or both of two things will eventually happen. The first is that the population will conclude that the government is incapable of dealing with its problems in a literally civil manner (and there will either be a successful move to change the government, or the latter will go on to more efficient methods of control and suppression of dissent). The second is that the army itself will rebel at being used in this fashion, and will turn against civil authorities itself.

The British had to repeatedly use the Indian Army to maintain law and order, and developed a standardized procedure called "aid to the civil" in which authority was passed to a local military commander for the duration of the disturbance. A civil official would make the determination that force had to be employed and would formally authorize the military to restore order; when this task was completed, authority reverted back to the civil. During the British period formal drills and exercises were developed by the military to enable them to deal with violent crowds or troublesome areas; the location of Indian Army units in cantonments adjacent to major cities was certainly no coincidence. 19
With a few insignificant exceptions, the aid to the civil task had no impact on the loyalty of the Indian Army, although very few officers or sepoys relished the task. They usually tried to employ the minimum amount of force, although the occasions where things got out of hand had profound political consequences.

Because Pakistan was created in a burst of idealism and hope, it was particularly shocking to its soldiers when they were called out in aid to the civil and were required to suppress or control their fellow citizens. These aid to the civil operations probably had more to do with the disillusionment of Pakistani army officers with their own political leadership than the alleged failure of Pakistan to pursue a military course in Kashmir in 1948.

The early "aid to the civil" operations raised questions which still plague the Pakistan Army. The very necessity of calling in the military implies civilian incompetence, or a failure to apply corrective measures before things get out of hand. Is the military obligated to continually rescue civilian politicians and administrators from their own mistakes? Does the military dare pick and choose the times when it will provide support, and if it does, will it then make the government dependent upon it? Will various groups in opposition or rebellion force military intervention in the hope that this will turn the military against those in power? How much aid to the civil can the military engage in before it comes to be associated with an incompetent or oppressive regime? What is the effect of aid to the civil—or now, martial law—on the training cycle of the military, on the morale of troops, and on the integrity of the officer corps?
The army did not object to being used to deal with natural calamities, such as flood, or famine relief, and has developed a strong record in such activities. But,

The more [the Army] wanted to stand aloof and devote its energies to the real duties of any army, the more it found itself entangled in civil tasks. Hard pressed governments were forced to call for its assistance in times of grave natural and man made calamities, which became increasingly common in Pakistan.21

The natural calamities could be efficiently handled by the military; the man made ones were another story. Three of the most important episodes occurred in East Pakistan, and in each of them the army was "obliged to participate, however reluctantly."22 These were anti-smuggling and anti-famine efforts: Operation June (1952-1953), Operation Service First (1956), and Operation Close-Door (1957- ), the latter originally named Operation Stable Door by the military. The first was a limited but successful operation but the next two were to prove more important for their effect on the officer corps than anything else. In both Service First and Close Door, the military was called off the job before a thorough clean-up was made; in both cases, army officers claim, politicians who were about to be hurt forced the Government to recall the army. The leashing of the military in Close Door was particularly traumatic as Ayub Khan had asked for complete freedom of action for the army and was determined not to accept responsibility without it. Nevertheless, the military was recalled "in face of all popular opinion." Earlier, the military had been involved in the Punjab disturbances of 1953, which culminated in the imposition of
Martial Law in Lahore. This was a vital issue to the army, because it occurred near the central recruiting grounds, and ultimately the agitation began to affect the troops themselves, striking at the very heart of the principle of military cohesion. Further, the disputes involved sectarian religious differences.

Such involvement in matters which were clearly the responsibility of civilian authorities was an important factor in the eventual take-over of Ayub Khan. They persuaded him and others that they would be continually used and abused by civilians, and that their own reputation, integrity, and fighting efficiency would eventually suffer. Further, the same reasons have been used to justify subsequent periods of martial law.

One of the most senior retired Pakistan Army generals who was a key participant in these events, recounted his encounter with the politicians, an encounter which helped push the army towards direct intervention:

I went to his [Prime Minister N. A. Bogra of Bengal] office—I was only a major-general at the time [1953]. I sat down. I knew him. Young fellow, inexperienced, he got in because he was a Bengali. He turned to me and said, "General sir, general sir, do you know what happened? You don't know what happened?" I said no. "I'll tell you what happened. The Constituent Assembly has passed a resolution depriving the Governor-General of most of his powers. I have been told that when he comes back from Abbotabad he will declare a state of emergency and use the Army for intervention. Are you prepared to listen to him?"

Just think, the FM of the country, the defense minister consulting a very humble man, a major-general in the army,
with such sensitive political questions. I had no brief from the Chief [Ayub Khan]. I said, "Sir, if this order comes to the C-in-C from the proper channels, then he will obey. It will then be a lawful command. If it comes from behind your back it will be an unlawful command and he cannot obey. If you tell us, 'come in' we will obey." You know, he picked up a telephone and in my presence he talked to the Law Minister and told him, "No you can't do it, General says so." He also called the Intelligence people. I looked at this man. I thought he's like a child, and he's the Prime Minister of our country. I was so disillusioned and disgusted I went out, I went to my office and rang up the C-in-C on the securiphone and said, "Sir, see what has happened." He said, "You see, this bastard, this is what kind of person he is. You should have gone for him!" This is one of our main problems, the political chaos. The time came when we felt the Army had to be protected, they were forming groups within the army itself. This [1980] Martial Law? I was so delighted when I heard it, I called up Zia and told him, "you have saved the country and you have saved the army--by cutting him [Bhutto] you have saved the army and the country."

Unlike their counterparts in India, the Pakistan Army has not been able to let the politicians assume the responsibility for law and order, partly because they had virtually no faith in those politicians (especially after such operations as those described above), but partly because they had begun to develop their own views on the reorganization and stabilization of Pakistan. We shall return to these views in some detail in the next chapter, but it is important to note that they quickly became embedded in the very identity of the Pakistan army officer
corps. They grew out of a sense of pride in the military's own success at reorganization and integration in its first six years, and a pragmatic, technical approach to problems arising out of complex social changes and shifting ideological currents. These views are still widely shared. When, for example, a senior lieutenant-general was asked by Bhutto to assume control over the para-military Federal Security Force, he refused. "I told Mr. Bhutto that too many of our rulers have tried to rule with a stick; he was candid, he told me he wanted to use it as a stick, I said I am a professional soldier, I don't deal with these things [controlling groups such as the press and opposition parties]." And, the general warned—prophetically, as it turned out—"if you [Bhutto] use a stick too often, the stick will take over—this has always been the history of the stick."
CHAPTER III: THE OFFICER CORPS

God, give us Men! A time like this demands
Strong minds, great hearts, true faith, and ready hands;
Men whom the lust of office does not kill;
Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy;
Men who possess opinions and a will;
Men who have honour, . . . men who will not lie,
Men who can stand before a demagogue;
And damn his treacherous flatteries without winking;
Tall men, sun-browned, who live above the fog
In public duty, and in private thinking.¹

Every year, throughout Pakistan, there is a search for approximately three hundred and twenty young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two who can be taught to "live above the fog". They succeeded where almost fifteen thousand have failed: they have been chosen to attend the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul.
The selection process has several stages: an initial interview and written test narrows the field to about seven thousand hopefuls; a medical exam, a review by the Services Selection Board, and an intensive three day examination/interview procedure yields the successful candidates. In about thirty years these men will be filling the highest ranks of the Pakistan Army, and they may also dominate the politics of the state. Very few specifics are known about them. The 1979 group was about 70% Punjabi, with the North West Frontier contributing 14%, Sind 9%, Baluchistan 3%, and Azad Kashmir 1.3%. The percentages have not changed dramatically over the years although there have been slight increases from poorer provinces and districts.² The heavy representation of Punjabis reflects both the
higher educational achievements of that province and its military
traditions. There is no data on the social and class origins of
these young officers, on their political preferences, on their
ambitions and aspirations, or on their aptitude and competence.
Although they constitute one of the elites of the state of Pakistan,
virtually no scholar has studied them, in part, of course, because
military regard such information as a question of national security.

This lack of knowledge has led to considerable speculation
(and at times, misrepresentation) about the social base of the officer
corps. Eqbal Ahmed, an able left-wing scholar of Pakistani origin
now working in the U.S., divided the officer corps into two "classes."
The first, he claims, was trained at Sanhurst and the IMA before
World War II by the British, and dominated Pakistan until 1971.
"Although excessively greedy and callous in the extreme, they
were nevertheless moderate men in the sense that politically they
were neither revivalists nor zealots. Belonging to an entrenched
upper class . . . these retarded tories had much stake in the old
order; hence an inclination to eschew fascist solutions." 3 Ahmed
argued in 1974 that they were succeeded by a second generation of
"petit bourgeois origin" and "fascist outlook" who received their
incomplete education during World War II. This generation is
presumed to have been exposed to politics while they were in school
during the height of the nationalist movement, but they differ from
their predecessors:

Having been trained and socialized in the old
tradition, they share most of the authoritarian
values and elitist attitudes of the old guard. However, being less acquainted with the liberal British tradition, they are more prone to viewing the world in straight lines, in terms of order vs. disorder, discipline vs. permissiveness, strength vs. weakness.

This is a characterization which verges on caricature, although Ahmed is one of the few who have at least wondered about the origins of the officer corps.

A somewhat more modest analysis, and perhaps closer to the mark, is that of Khalid Bin Sayeed. Sayeed correctly observed (in 1967 or 1968) that the army does not seem to attract men from the upper middle class to the officer ranks. Basing his conclusion on a brief visit to the PMA and some contact with the military, he speculated that:

the great bulk of the cadets at the PMA come from either the lower middle class groups or predominately rural classes in West Pakistan. . . . The rural origin of the officer class seems to be a universal phenomenon in the army profession.

Allowing for the ambiguity of such phrases as lower middle or upper middle class in the context of Pakistani society, Sayeed's conclusion is essentially correct (and corresponds to a development which has occurred in India and in a number of Western countries). Sayeed goes on to point out some impressions that contact with the officer corps (and their writings) made on him: that they tend to be unintellectual, that they are ambivalent about religion, that they are not
from "political" families, that they generally are "modernizers" in their outlook towards technology (especially in the Air Force), and tend to be pro-Western in orientation.6

Other than such limited attempts as these, to my knowledge, there is no systematic analysis of the origin, ethos, and perception of the officer corps, although there is an enormous literature on the political role of the military. Such a proper analysis may only be possible with official cooperation, but we can here establish the parameters for such a study.

Without suggesting that "class" origins do not play an important role in the behavior of the military, I would argue that such behavior cannot be explained even in large part by a class-based explanation. The primary reason for this is that the military are an intensely bureaucratized total institution which makes an explicit effort to mould and shape the beliefs of its members according to a formal ideology. However, there are other reasons as well.

The beliefs and attitudes of an entire officer corps are the product of at least four forces. The first are generational differences. As Eqbal Ahmed suggests time does make a difference, and different age groups undergo varied and special experiences. The second is also thought to be of great importance: different officers may come from different social classes, or different regions of Pakistan (this may or may not overlap with generational differences in experience). A third influence on the officer corps is the character of professional
education and training that an individual (or an age-group) receives. Since armies are continually tinkering with their internal educational system this is also subject to change, although most of them are minor in nature. Fourth, there is a process variable at work: in Pakistan, promotion beyond the rank of major is by selection and it is obvious that such promotions are supposed to winnow out the unfit and promote the best officers: this process also gives personal, family, or other connections a chance to exert some influence, especially at the higher ranks when political considerations may be important.

A full scale analysis of these (and perhaps other) influences would require a book, even if the data did exist. It does not, and any conclusions we draw must necessarily be tentative. However, there are areas where adequate information does exist and this chapter will examine them. One important and misunderstood area is the influence of Islam on the professional orientation of the officer corps; fortunately, Pakistani officers have freely spoken and written on this question. There is also some evidence available on the professional objectives and methods of professional officer training in Pakistan, particularly the system of education at the PMA. First, however, we shall summarize the "generational" experiences of the officer corps, and discuss certain major influences on the military over time. 7

Military Generations in Pakistan

It must be emphasized that although we have divided the officer corps into three major generations—with some sub-generations—these
are not hard and fast distinctions, certain events have had a profound impact on officers of all ages and generations (the 1971 war, for example), and often an earlier generation will "share" its experiences with later generations through the recruitment, training, and promotion process. Thus, our generational classification is meant to highlight certain major trends, events, and influences which had a particularly powerful impact on one group of officers and in some cases on their superiors and subordinates as well.

The British Generations

By the time the Pakistan Army was created three distinct groups of officers had already received their initial professional training in the British Indian Army, and had served in the 1939-45 war. Two of these groups had entered the army in peacetime and received their training at either Sandhurst or the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun (after 1932). Ayub Khan belonged to the former group, his friend and successor as C-in-C, Pakistan Army, Mohammed Musa, the latter. It is commonly but falsely assumed that the Sandhurst-trained officers were better-trained; there is substantial evidence to indicate that the IMA officers were better-qualified and more professional in their outlook.

All pre-war officers have long since retired from the Pakistan Army, and very few who came in during World War II remain (Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq being one of them). But the older officers did leave a permanent impression on the present army in that they were responsible for setting up and commanding the major training and educational
facilities and served as a model for younger officers. In their own writings they have stressed the importance of both tasks.

While there is no quantitative data yet available, it is apparent that the social class origin of these three generations changed between 1930 and 1945. The British were extremely selective in whom they sent to Sandhurst and tried to choose from the most loyal, the most prestigious, and the most Westernized Indian families; but even then (especially among the Muslims) they tried to include sons of JCOs who had distinguished themselves in one way or another. The most famous of these individuals was Mohammed Musa. Musa's father was an Afghan who had joined the Indian Army and rose to be a senior JCO. Musa was selected for Sandhurst but did not go because his father had angered the British CO of his unit; Musa then spent several difficult years as a sepoy and only then went on to the Indian Military Academy. Another senior Pakistani army general (only a few years younger) commented on officers such as Musa and Yahya Khan when he categorized them as "the cruder types, unlike the more professional and rational type of officer" (in which group he placed himself). He is correct in that they are superficially more pugnacious, but they were not inferior officers because of that—except, perhaps when they were promoted to positions for which their experience and their temperament were ill-suited, as in the case of Yahya.

During World War II the British did not have a difficult time persuading young Indians to join the army. Some were opportunistic
job seekers but many were interested in the military and were sincere nationalists. The official British analysis of the quality of the Indian Emergency Commissioned Officers concluded that while on the whole they were inferior to both regular Indian Commissioned Officers and their British ECO equivalents, there were substantial numbers of very good Indian ECOs.  

Of some significance is the fact that about 12% of the Muslim officers in the British Indian Army were not from areas which were to go to Pakistan. Many Muslims from Delhi, U.P., Eastern Punjab, and Central India were in fact better educated than their Western Punjabi or NWFP counterparts, and as a group they are still a prominent (if diminishing) component of the senior ranks of the army and air force. An officer who came to Pakistan in 1947 as a young captain is today near retirement, but the sons of these officers (and other Muslims from India) constitute an important fraction of the current officer corps.

World War II was a major influence on all three sub-groups of the British generation of Pakistan Army officers. Almost all of them saw service, and even though the ECOs received a rudimentary professional education they did see combat duty as lieutenants and captains.

It has been argued that the war was the source of a division in the Pakistan Army between two schools of thought. These schools are based on whether one served in Burma or Italy: "the former believed in living to the point of discomfort and the latter to the other extreme, with the saying that any fool can remain uncomfortable." Attiqur Rahman contrasts the acquisition of comfortable caravans
for Pakistan Army generals and the consequent development of a road-bound mentality with the austere simplicity of Generals Giap or Sherman. Other Pakistani generals deny the validity of the argument, but it is evident that the Pakistan Army lives quite well in its peacetime quarters: far better than the Indian Army and possibly better than many European armies.12

My judgement is that the events immediately after the war had a greater impact on the future Pakistan Army than the war itself. When the decision to create Pakistan was taken, every Muslim officer had to choose between Pakistan and India. For some the choice was easy: their homes were in the Western Punjab or they came from Karachi, Sind, or NWFP, and Pakistan was truly home to them. But there was a group of extremely able officers of all ranks whose homes were in what was to remain India, and in their case joining the Pakistan army meant moving their families, leaving ancestral homes and properties, and starting over in a new country as well as a new army. As I have indicated, this group was probably better educated than these officers who came from what is now Pakistan, and many have been among the ablest officers of the Pakistan Army. Why did they leave, and how did this decision affect their professional and political attitude, and in turn, succeeding generations of Pakistan Army officers?

A central, recurrent theme for choosing Pakistan was a sense of injustice and fear in relationship to the Hindu majority.13 Even though religion was rarely discussed in the British Indian
Army messes, and Hindu and Muslim officers got on very well with each other (and many remain distant friends today), the overwhelming number of Muslim officers came to the conclusion that they could lead a better life in an Islamic state. One of the most senior living Pakistan Army officers (who was with Musa in the first batch at the IMA, also after first serving as a sepoy) stated this view vehemently:

I am a pure Rajput; my family has been Muslim for only two or three generations. But I felt that India had to be divided, and told Messervey [the first commander of the Pakistan Army] that I would rather live in a small country as a free man than as a sweeper in a large country: my father, my grandfather, and I have all served under Christians: I did not want to see my children serve under Hindus.

Another very senior officer, who was a lieutenant-colonel in 1946 and private secretary to Auchinleck, also had to make the difficult choice of leaving his home. He saw Pakistan as an opportunity to escape Indian domination and to build a state according to true Islamic values:

I basically belong to India, Lucknow; all the people who belong to this part of the world [Pakistan], they came here automatically. We had the choice or option: but I think more than anything else it was a desire to have a homeland of your own where you could model it according to your own ideology, your own genius.

A third senior officer--very recently retired as a lieutenant-general and deeply committed to Islamic ideological concerns, was more
vehement about his personal hatred of some Indians (or at least their attitude towards him), and told a story of his childhood to support his view:

I grew up in the Punjab. I thought Hindus were my friends. But one day I went to my friend's house, and they wouldn't let me in! They had come into our house, but I was unclean to them! Well, they are all like that; they'll take something, but they won't treat you fairly.

The experience of partition—the killing, the bloodletting, the organized as well as random cruelty—confirmed the worst suspicions of many of these officers. By all accounts the Sandhurst-trained officers, the IMA products, and even most of the ECOs were not especially communal-minded. Those who went into the army tended to be both secular and conservative in outlook, but Partition was a profound and determinative experience for most of them precisely because they all regarded themselves as above crude religious communalism. In the Indian Army they had willingly commanded Hindu troops of all castes and regions as well as Sikh and Muslim troops. While the ethos of the army encouraged competition between such units, all officers were taught that ultimately it was the soldier-like qualities of a particular class that counted, not its religion or territorial origin (in retrospect, many senior Pakistani officers claim that non-Muslim troops were less competent, but there is little evidence to support this). Partition taught the Pakistani officers one fundamental rule, a rule which was compatible with the generally pessimistic outlook of a professional soldier: trust no one in a situation of Hindu or Sikh vs. Muslim:
take nothing for granted, except when you have the force to defend yourself.  

This suspicion (but not fear) of communal enemies became engraved on the psyches of almost all officers in the new Pakistan Army. Their subsequent difficulties in obtaining their share of military stores from India, Indian behavior in Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh, and a thousand other examples of Indian duplicity—real or imagined—are part of the legacy of the present-day Pakistan Army. As we shall discuss later, those who choose could find Quranic support for their feelings, I know of no systematic attempt within the military to justify or explain relations with India on the basis of the Quran; for a Pakistani officer with personal experience of India no Quranic injunction is needed to tell him what his life has taught him. For Pakistani officers of succeeding generations, this distrust of India is a given assumption, no more subject to question than the very existence of Pakistan. As one of the Pakistan Army’s ablest major-generals stated, "had they treated us fairly to begin with, there would have been no need for Pakistan."

The three British-trained generations not only underwent the ordeal of Partition, but were also the generations which created the Pakistan Army. Partition was a bitter experience for many officers, but it persuaded them (and, I believe, especially those officers who had come from India) that their professional contribution to the new state was going to be vital. They undertook the exhilarating task of creating an army which transcended its origins in the old Indian Army, and which was to be the institutional expression of a high ideal.
While still under British tutelage, the army decided to slightly modify the basic class and regiment structure of the old Indian Army, to centralize officer entry routes in a single training institution (the Pakistan Military Academy, founded in 1948), and to postpone any radical changes in formation structure. It also moved to withdraw troops from the far-flung system of forts on the North West Frontier.

None of these steps except the last could be conceived of as a radical departure from the past. The essential structure and relatively limited social role of the old Indian Army was retained in Pakistan as most of the new Pakistani officers continued to see their British predecessors as a worthy professional model. But it was not a foregone conclusion that the army would take this path and not become more ideological and politicized. There is evidence that some Pakistani officers were influenced by other patterns of military organization; the war had brought a number of them in contact with the Indian National Army of Subhas Chandra Bose and the officers involved in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951 were influenced by more radical and socialist ideas.16

From time to time the army has discussed the question of a people's army and the utilization of the sepoy for social and nation-building tasks beyond the traditional disaster-relief role. Within limits, the officer corps was and is, prepared to consider proposals to involve the army in such "nation building" tasks, (since attitudes on this issue have not changed) but they cite their already-deep involvement in road construction, civil engineering projects, flood
relief, and other tasks, and point out that a number of firms and agencies are in effect run by the military already. These include the military farms, which are a legacy from the British Indian Army, which developed its own system of animal and grain supply.

But there is deep resistance to anything much beyond their present level of activity. They are familiar with the fate of one Indian Army general, B. M. Kaul, who used his division to build houses: Kaul claimed that the military performance of his division did not suffer, but he was afterwards tagged with the nickname of "housebuilder", and a number of fellow officers used this against him when he ran into difficulty during India's 1962 border conflict with China. Pakistan Army officers have the same aversion to any activity which might detract from the preparedness of their troops. In one analysis it was pointed out that the average sepoy is away from his unit for one hundred days on annual and casual leave; another hundred days are written off in Sundays, Fridays, and national holidays; at least a hundred days are dedicated to maintenance of equipment, festivals, ceremonial guard duties, inspections and VIP visits. This leaves sixty-five days in a year for actual hard training, "not too many to acquire instinctive, correct response to the circumstance of battle." Nor is the military profession compatible with the pursuit of another occupation, for example, having the military raise food:

There is a school of thought which wants the regular army to be engaged in the practice of agriculture during the days of peace... Of course we shall get a lot
of people carrying arms and growing turnips, but they would be nothing like professional soldiers. I have never heard someone suggesting that a barber, engineer, civil servant, stock broker or jockey devote his time to agriculture along with running his own profession.\textsuperscript{19}

Raza points out that the ancestors of Pakistan's soldiers (the Scythian, Arab, Mongol, and Turkish horsemen who roamed Central Asia) did not engage in agriculture while fighting; their way of life was hardly different from life in war, and "professional soldiering has never, never been a spare time performance. With the sophistication of equipment the skills of a professional soldier become increasingly time-consuming."\textsuperscript{20} Raza and most other generals totally reject a people's army, although they claim that Pakistan's army is a national army. There have been proposals for such a people's army, however, and we will consider the radical alternatives to the present structure when we discuss strategic options for Pakistan in Chapter V.

This concern with full-time professionalism is one of the central beliefs of the officer corps today, and is a major argument used within the army to oppose intervention in politics or the expansion of martial law activities. Officers of this generation are very sensitive to doubts about their own professional competence and the way in which they were rushed through to higher rank.\textsuperscript{21} One of them--a 1935 IMA graduate who retired as corps commander in 1971--defended his generation against the charge that they lacked professionalism:
Wait a minute. Generals are not produced overnight. Our first crop became major generals from major in a matter of one or two years. The professional grooming which an army should get wasn't there. From that point of view, yes [we weren't professional]. But so far as the attitude towards soldiering was concerned, the five years of war that we had been through counts for something.

This officer, and virtually every other member of the pre-war generation, was deeply involved in training succeeding generations in the full range of military sciences. If they had to be rushed through the upper ranks (and this meant that some were not fully qualified and that some incompetents did reach higher rank) there was an awareness that a full range of training establishments had to be created immediately and made to work:

The only institution we inherited from India was the Staff College. I have been a student, instructor, and deputy commander there, but I'd say that we have made an improvement even in the Staff College. I have been to the British and American artillery schools and I would say that our artillery school may not be among the top but it is good; insofar as the academic side is concerned, we have constantly improved.

The artillery school referred to 's at Nowshera, it is a good example of the institution-building and adaptiveness of which the Pakistan Army is justly proud.
Nowshera (about 10 miles due east of Peshawar) was a pre-war gunnery station (the Indian Army inherited the Artillery School at Deolali in Central India). The school was founded immediately after Independence and followed British doctrine and techniques for several years; its instructors were trained in Britain until 1952, after which they were trained at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, and increasingly, at Nowshera itself. The school encountered major problems of standardization of procedures and doctrine when American equipment started flowing to Pakistan. An R & D cell was established in the mid-1950s but new problems arose after 1965 when the supply of American equipment ceased and Chinese, Italian, and even North Korean artillery was acquired. Each system had a different table of ballistics, firing tables, density tables, and so forth, and each nation produced different kinds of sighting and calibration mechanisms. The Artillery School was forced to not only train its own instructors, but to undertake and create a single set of tables and firing systems peculiar to Pakistan but adaptable to a wide variety of foreign equipment. One senior gunnery officer pointed out to a visitor that:

You thought you were punishing us for going to war in 1965 but the cut-off was a big favor for us. We had to stand on our own for the first time, we couldn't tap into your supply system for parts, and so forth. It was difficult, but it actually made us better, for we had to combine all these weapons from all these countries and come up with our own system.

This view is expressed in many Pakistani training facilities, although it is often accompanied by expressions of hope that a new American
program might be started (at least in the wake of the Soviet invasion). Several cases can be cited (especially in the defense production field) where the military was hurt by the termination of major American arms shipments and has had to adapt, and in doing so may have improved its self-sufficiency if not always the quality of equipment. We shall discuss this issue later, but the theme of self-reliance and self-sufficiency was an important and difficult lesson for officers who were particularly influenced by the American relationship.

Among other things, Pakistan has expanded its program of training foreign officers at Nowshera (it has for a number of years sent training teams to other countries). At Nowshera and at other training institutions the Pakistani CO of colonel or brigadier rank—who quite often attended advanced military schools in the U.S.—is himself running programs similar to the one he attended. Nowshera, offers the full range of gunnery courses from basic through specialist and advanced instructor to foreign as well as Pakistani students. One additional comparative advantage of Pakistan is displayed on some of the classroom buildings—relevant sayings from the Qur'an. Nowshera is one example of Pakistan's success in mastering basic military technologies and in institution building: there are many others. This capacity to improvise and to build on a slender base, impressed Pakistan's allies in CENTO and SEATO. In the 1950s Pakistan was widely regarded as an extremely competent military organization, and a pillar of the Western sponsored defense alliances in Southern Asia. But in retrospect, the very success of the Pakistan Army in its early years—and in particular,
its ability to attract outside interest had its tragic aspect.

Several explosive ideas were being loaded into the mind of the officer corps, and the development of outside support postponed a critical examination of these ideas. They received their institutionalization in the next generation of officers, which I would call the "American Generation".

The American Generation

Three things seem to set apart the 1950-1965 generation from their predecessors and successors. First, they were exposed to the full weight of the American military, and many of them received some training in America or from Americans—whereas their predecessors had received most of their professional training from the British, and their successors (with scattered exceptions) have been entirely trained in Pakistan. Of course, along with American equipment and training came American military doctrines, American approaches to problem solving, and—a mixed blessing—American pop culture. Officers of this generation tended to greatly exaggerate the strength and durability of the American alliance with Pakistan, and when that alliance was broken one pillar of their profession was kicked away. Second, these officers had no direct experience with the Indian Army and came to have an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military; for such officers, the events of 1965 were puzzling (and some came to believe that a conspiracy in Pakistan was responsible for the failure to achieve a clear-cut military victory over India), and the events of 1971, utterly devastating. Even that war has given rise to its share of conspiratorial thinking. Third, these officers came to acquire an overblown estimate of their own and
Pakistan's martial qualities, and some incorporated the myth that one Pakistani soldier was equal to five, ten, or more Indians.

While there is no indication that they differed greatly from their predecessors in terms of social class origin, region, or commitment to professional duty, the generation of officers that entered the military (especially the army and air force) after independence were more intensely exposed to American influence. Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, and developed bi-lateral ties with the U.S. It received substantial amounts of equipment from the U.S. and along with the equipment came training, and most important—in the long run—exposure to the most current and prestigious military tradition. The U.S. connection led to the entire reorganization of tables of organization, the addition of several entirely American-equipped divisions (and an entirely American equipped air force); it also meant direct exposure to a lavishly materialistic society, and the presence in Pakistan of large numbers of Americans living up to an American standard of affluence.

The American alliance came at the right moment for the Pakistan Army. Two shocks had hit the army just as it was trying to nationalize its officer corps and build basic military institutions. The first was the Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951 in which a major-general, Akbar Khan, was accused of attempting to kill the British C-in-C, seize power, and institute a socialist revolution. The second was the release of about 40,000 soldiers, the veterans of World War II. According to one general closely involved with planning at the time, the American
aid program "saved" the army by allowing it to expand and absorb both restless soldiers and ambitious officers.

The American contact also had a bracing effect on professional thought in the military: As an associate of Ayub has commented:

The changes brought about in this army--few other armies went through such extensive tremendous changes. The field formations, the schools, the centers, and even GHQ. Everything was changed. The process [of planning the expanded army] was: I used to make out a report and it went to Ayub, and in the margins he would say: yes or no. Very quick. The Americans affected everything--the scales were completely different, hundreds of our officers went to America, and we had new standards of comparison. Also, the experience the Americans gained in World War II and Korea, it couldn't have been bought, it was offered to us on a plate. We wouldn't have done so well in '65 without it--not just the material aid, but the training.

On a personal level the new tie with the U.S. made a deep impression on thousands of Pakistani officers who came to professional maturity during these years; any contact with the Pakistan Army will show this. The views of a young colonel with extensive American training, including Special Forces, sums up the emotions of his generation:

Why did America let us down? We were friends--I made many friends in --------. Didn't you know we were the best friends and allies you had in the area, the only dependable one? Why don't you realize that? Our two countries are so much alike, we think alike, we
like the same things--there could be a new alliance to hold back the Russians.

Q: But Pakistan is non-aligned.
A: That doesn't make any difference; when two countries are as close as ours were, alliances don't make any difference.

This officer, and many like him, long for a lost world; they have no doubt who their enemies are but are less than certain about their friends, and feel--largely because of the disappointment of the earlier relationship--a personal interest in renewing an American connection. As realists and professional skeptics, they are consciously aware of the difficulties of the unlikelihood of a new grand alliance with the Americans; but on a private and perhaps subconscious level they retain affection for the country which was so intimately involved with their professional and personal development.

Pakistani officers even today emphasize the historical "friendship" between the U.S. and Pakistan; this friendship is based on a common belief in democracy, a staunch anti-communism, and Pakistan's reciprocal loyal support in matters such as the U-2, and in international fora. But such officers must confront the question as to whether Pakistan has changed for the worse or America has changed in such a way as to lead to the break-up of a relationship which meant so much to them; to escape such a choice, many tend to blame the devious Indians, the left wing of American politics or their own politicians.

The negative aspects of the American connection have been commented upon by several distinguished officers (who are not in any
sense anti-American). M. Attiqur Rahman observed that one institution inherited from the British, the officer's mess, was modified, not always for the better. It was and is vital in developing unit esprit and a sense of comradship in peacetime which would be invaluable during war. They also serve as the home for unmarried officers. But then, some of our messes, against clear Army orders, admitted ladies, perhaps imitating some aspects of the American Officers' clubs. From the introduction of ladies it was but a step to providing singing girls, presumably under the influence of some cultural motive. Not very edifying for the up and coming young officer. 

What in retrospect seems to have been particularly insidious was the American PR operation within the Pakistan Army, which weaned the officers away from their "old and favorite" British periodicals, only to substitute American ones:

The USIS extended its operations in Pakistan under the so-called Motivation (later Troop Information) Program. A separate cell was created in the [Pakistan] Inter-Services PR Directorate to handle the collection and distribution of American journals, books, and films throughout the Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force ... The so-called Motivation Program was an evolution of normal PR to a higher sphere of intellectual education and indoctrination. It formed an integral part of the entire military aid program.

Worst of all, the author claims (and others support the argument), that:
The American military presence somewhat compromised the purely national image of the Armed Forces. It appeared as if the Americans had taken over where the British left off. The progressive or the anti-West elements in the country did not approve of the American infiltration. Foreign hardware was one thing but foreign personnel was quite another. The attitude of the American aid personnel to an average Pakistani was anything but desirable by native standards. In the beginning the Americans mixed well with the Pakistanis; but as their numbers increased they became more aloof and distant. It seemed as if there were two military establishments in one country: one national, the other foreign. 27

Officers who make this point are neither anti-American nor Anglophiles of an earlier generation. They wholeheartedly participated in American training programs but have since come to realize the negative aspects of a relationship which has rarely been criticized publicly in Pakistan, or the military. Pakistan Army officers are on their best behavior with visiting American dignitaries and officials, and too often these Americans have been so predisposed to the idea of a staunch, vigorously pro-American Pakistan that their hosts are reluctant to disillusion them. But at least in recent years the military themselves, even those trained in the U.S., have come to a cautious and skeptical appreciation of American intentions and what a new American presence in Pakistan would or should look like. One of Pakistan's best strategists and most widely known military writers cautioned a visitor against a repetition of the 1950s and 1960s style
of American aid to Pakistan and offered what I regard as very sound advice:

When there was an aid program the Americans drove around in enormous cars, they lived apart, they had a standard of living—it was the whole "ugly American" complex. People questioned this, they thought, "what is the value of American aid if most of it is plowed back into a high standard of living for those who are dispensing it."

No, if you do come back, look at what the Russians are doing in Karachi, or even the Chinese. We don't expect you to live like them, but it is a bad influence on our own people to live the way you did.

Two other experiences of the "American" generation must be noted briefly, for they were of critical importance in shaping attitudes and beliefs. One was the evident success (until 1970, at least) enjoyed by the military in its attempt to structure and control Pakistani politics. We shall deal with this in greater length in Chapter IV. The other was the self-delusion of the military and the belief that it not only had mastered Pakistani politics but that it could master the Indians as well, despite India's size and increasing military preparedness after 1963. Pakistanis were to be told that the 1965 war demonstrated their martial superiority over Hindu Indians and some of the worst racism and cultural arrogance seen since Partition emerged under official sponsorship in a number of articles and books.²⁸

This self-delusion was fostered by a powerful and effective public relations machinery under the control of the C-in-C. This PR apparatus was aimed at the outside world—particularly at the Americans—but it
also influenced the military's judgement of their own competence and it raised civilian expectations to enormous heights. When the military did falter (in 1965) the PR programs were intensified, but when the army was broken (in 1971) it collapsed, only to be revived in modified form under Bhutto.

One very senior army PR official has written of both Ayub's and Yahya's rule:

After the seizure [of power] military image-building becomes more blatant and intensive. A sort of an image-craze grips the top military echelons and they seek to gratify it by any means, by persuasion if possible, and force if necessary. . . . PR, towards the end of the Ayub era seemed to have badly affected Ayub's perception and sober judgement. He appears to have become a hopeless addict to the allurement of his tailor-made publicity and its remarkable capacity for making the black look white . . . In a country such as Pakistan, where for many years the armed forces have been at the helm of civil affairs, the influence of adulatory publicity on them cannot be overlooked. It appears to have affected them deeply enough to change their professional attitudes and standards and to breed in them the unfortunate belief that the armed forces could do no wrong. 29

Much the same point is made by Fazal Muqeeem Khan in his semi-official study of the events leading up to the disaster of 1971. Although no friend of India, he contrasts the ability of the Indians to learn from the mistakes of 1962 and 1965 with Pakistan's deliberate suppression of public criticism of the army's performance. 30 At the time he and others were churning out a series of books and articles designed
to raise morale, not question policies; clearly, the close association
of the military to the leadership of Pakistan (in the form of Ayub
Khan and then Yahya Khan as president) had a damaging effect on the
professionalism of the military itself, and this remains one of the
major lessons for this generation of officers.

1965-1980: The Pakistani Generation

Q: Why did you join the PAF and not the army— all your
relatives are in the army.

A: [PAF flying officer] Well, I was going to join the
army, but then the war came [1971] and the army
wasn't so popular anymore I didn't want to go through
that, so I joined the air force.

Q: Go through what?

A: Oh, people laughing at you, insulting you—the army
wasn't very popular then, you know.

The outstanding characteristic of those who have joined the
Pakistan Army in the past ten to fifteen years is that they are
the most pure” "Pakistani" of all. By this I mean that they are
evidently more representative of the wider society in class origin,
that they have been subjected the least to foreign professional
influences, and that they are drawn from a generation with
no direct contact with India. More problematically, they have joined
during a period in which the reputation and prestige of the army had
plummated. None of this implies that they will not become as good
professional soldiers as earlier generations. That kind of judgement
cannot be made without more contact or without waiting for twenty years and seeing how they perform in battle and politics.

After 1970 there was a changed atmosphere in the military. The myth of invincibility of the army was shaken in 1965 and shattered in 1971 and its corollary, the corrupt ineptitude of the Indian Army, was an epithet that was increasingly applied to the Pakistan Army itself. It was also evident that Pakistan stood alone and the military had no special relationship with the U.S. nor with any other powerful outside state, with the dubious (and confusing to a young Pakistani) exception of China. The military's failure to provide effective leadership and to keep Pakistan together led to a radical deterioration in its public image. As one of the most senior serving Pakistani officers has put it, "after 1971 I was ashamed to wear my uniform, I was ashamed of my army."

The officers who joined the military after 1965 are now reaching the rank of colonel, those who joined after 1971 are now captains and majors. Very few of them have had any contact with American military personnel, although they have all attended various professional military schools with a limited number of foreign officers receiving training in Pakistan.

During early years of their professional careers (1972-1980) there has been intense self-study in the army. This critical re-examination of the principles upon which the state and the army are based may yet lead to a renewed professionalism. There were two main reasons for this critical self-study.
After the disaster of 1971 Bhutto systematically attempted to point out the failings of the senior military leadership and at times to ridicule those responsible. Yet Bhutto did not undertake a general purge of the army or even of those involved in the events of 1971. His goal was to create in Pakistan the kind of professional but docile military establishment that the Indians had by reducing the power and prestige of the army without reducing their fighting capabilities. Bhutto also emulated the Indians when he tried to build up a paramilitary force that would stand between the army and the police—the Federal Security Force—but would also serve as a counter to the military if necessary.

Bhutto's efforts were generally welcomed by the more thoughtful officers. They realized that the professionalism and integrity of the army had badly deteriorated and set about restoring it. A number of books and articles have been written since 1972 which are of a totally different character than those that appeared after 1965. One of the officers interested in the reprofessionalization of the military was General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq. While his tenure as Chief of the Army Staff has again seen the military come to power his primary military interest has been to restore the integrity of the army and improve the quality of its officer corps.

Zia has encouraged a number of reforms and changes at all levels. Some of these are minor, and perhaps more symbolic than anything else. A new camouflage battle-tunic does not, according to one source, actually conceal the wearer any better than the old tunic, but it does convey a
combat-ready attitude. But some of these changes are more basic and may have a lasting impact on the army. Nor does the circulation of "A Prayer" by the Military Intelligence Directorate ensure that God will provide men to the army who have

Strong minds, great hearts, true faith, and ready hands;
Men whom the lust of office does not kill;
Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy;
Men who possess opinions and a will;
Men who have honour, . . . men who will not lie,

and in an implicit reference to the relationship between the military and the politician—most recently, the just-executed Bhutto:

Men who can stand before a demagogue;
And damn his treacherous flatteries without winking;
Tall men, sun-browned, who live above the fog
In public duty, and in private thinking.33

None of this guarantees either that the older officers of the Pakistan Army will undergo a professional regeneration, nor that the new, post-1972 generation will somehow be men of greater integrity or competence than their predecessors. What is evident, however, is that Zia and other officers take this task of reprofessionalizing the military quite seriously, and special, if not lavish attention is being given to the selection and initial professional training of young officers as well as to the serious study of war and politics at the highest levels of military education.34 The more thoughtful officers are still aware that even if the quality of the officer
The Pakistani generation is being brought to professional maturity during a period of extreme political turbulence. Many of them were witnesses to the fiasco of military rule under Yahya Khan and the inability of the senior leadership to either run the war against India or deal effectively with Pakistan's internal political problems; this fiasco was followed by the first serious attempt in Pakistan's history to redefine and reduce the political role of the military—only to be followed by another period of military rule after martial law was declared in 1977. Not a few of the older generations of Pakistan officers are doubtful about the ability of either the politicians or the military to manage affairs in Pakistan, and some of this pessimism will be transmitted to their juniors. If the senior leadership cannot show the way, will younger officers come to an entirely new approach to the question of the military in politics? We raise the issue here and in Chapter IV, but there is little evidence one way or another. We do know something about the institutional setting in which the young officer receives his initial professional training.

The Next Generation: The Pakistan Military Academy

The Himalayan hill station of Kakul, nearly 80 miles from Rawalpindi, is and has been the setting for one of the most interesting
processes of cultural change that the world is ever likely to see.

This is the location of the Pakistan Military Academy, founded in 1948 to turn "gentlemen cadets" into junior officers modeled on their counterparts at West Point or Sandhurst. The very idea of such an institution (and others like it at Dehra Dun and Khadakvasla, in India) was ridiculed in the early part of this century. Most British generals were convinced that Indians could not become gentlemen or officers. They later recruited what they took to be gentlemen--the sons of the professional classes and landed aristocracy of India--and did turn them into professional officers--but for many years now this group has not offered itself in large numbers. These academies must therefore attempt to recreate the Western professional officer out of young men who are more truly Indian or Pakistani than they are cultural outriders of Western civilization. They do know English (or learn it) but their reference points are largely in the Subcontinent, not outside of it.

This is a critical point. Can an individual largely created by Pakistani society become a qualified professional officer, comparable to his Western equivalent? If so, through what processes, and with what personal consequences? The issue was formulated by Toynbee in the context of a discussion of the cultural origins of war:

The secret of the West's superiority to the rest of the world in the art of war from the Seventeenth century onward is not to be found just in Western weapons, drill, and military training . . . It cannot be under-
stood without also taking into account the whole mind and soul of the Western Society of the day and the truth is that the Western art of war has always been one facet of the Western way of life. Hence, an alien society that tried to acquire the art without attempting to live the life was bound to fail to master the art; while, conversely, a Russian, Turkish, or other non-Western military officer who did succeed in his profession up to the normal Western standard could achieve this only by acquiring much more of the Western civilization than was to be found in the textbook or on the parade-ground.

Toynbee is partially correct. Adopting the "Western art of war" is related to a "Western way of life", but it is possible to retain and live a Pakistani or an Indian way of life. This is partly because some of that way of life (at least for the middle and upper Westernized classes) is permeated by Western ways, but probably more because young members of the military profession have been able to compartmentalize their lives and still harmonize profession and society. Where elements of indigenous society interfere with professionalism they are often modified or abandoned. But many Pakistani officers point out the opposite danger and there has been considerable discussion of allowing practices (favoritism, using rank to extract special privileges, etc.) which are not thought to be corrupt in a traditional context harming the quality of professionalism in the army. This has been a problem for a number of years, as the officer corps has been increasingly drawn from the "same stock" as
the rest of the country; it is then subject to the same temptations and corruptions. Writings addressed to the young officer or commander are filled with such warnings and the corruption of the senior officers under Ayub and Yahya is singled out publicly and graphically:

Openings for personal aggrandisement were, of course, available only to the few, but the many used to note such things as cheap loans and cheap housing, trips overseas, availability of cars, and the provision of rest houses together with all the necessary comforts with which to pass the long night.  

At the beginning of this chapter we presented recent figures on the number of applicants to the PMA. Those responsible for recruitment and for training of young officer-cadets are satisfied with the quality of applicant. Given the relatively slow growth of the Pakistan economy in recent years, the limited opportunities open to educated young men, and the strong regional traditions of military service in Pakistan (especially in Punjab and NWFP) this comes as no surprise. Still, the present cadets are a far cry from those that entered the Indian Army in the 1930s. Their English is much worse, and they typically come from middle-class families (or are the sons of JCOs), although each class has a sprinkling of sons from the great military families of Pakistan—whose males have served in the army for two, three, and four generations and before that may have seen service in a Mughal or Afghan army.

The PMA is today undergoing a series of reforms and changes as part of the broader interest in improving professional military
education in Pakistan. Unlike India where there are several entry routes into the army, the PMA is virtually the only way to become a Pakistan Army officer, although it offers several different courses: for the few sepoys who become officers, for technical graduates as well as the main course.

The pattern of education at the PMA is quite different from that of Sandhurst (where a primarily technical military education is provided) and more like that of West Point where military and academic subjects are combined. The entrant to the PMA is a matriculate (10th year of education) and is trained up to the equivalent of the Pakistani BA or BSc degree in two years. These degrees are awarded (as in India) by a cooperating university at a ceremony held just after the cadet is commissioned.

After a series of studies the main course at the PMA has now been modified. The current plan is to emphasize academic studies for two semesters (one year) and military ones for two semesters. The idea of a semester system is a recent borrowing from the American pattern.

Those responsible for the PMA have to deal with a basic fact: their cadets come from regions and families with very low educational standards, and must be given a heavy academic curriculum.

At Sandhurst they get boys who already know English, who have had a good grounding in science, and so forth; in Pakistan we have a national army, anyone may join, and that means that we get boys who are not only from public schools, but from all over, from villages; and they have to be disciplined into a particular pattern of communication, and that is primarily English. And
English is spoken only in educated circles, so we have to bring them up educationally in the Academy, and we have to emphasize science.

Thus, more than half of the PMA course deals with purely academic subjects taught at a basic level and there are plans to extend the course by one semester to enable the staff to teach additional academic subjects. The goal is to produce an officer who is not only technically competent to handle a platoon or command a tank, but one which is able to continue his professional education in years to come, and to assume the responsibilities of an informed citizen. As one senior PMA staff member argues:

We are in some ways like a Western army, in that rigid patterns of obedience and command will not work. A change is a must, and it has to come pretty soon in view of the Russians now being on the Durand line, which is a de facto Russian-Pakistan border. There's no way to undo it: I think we have got to have more educated, widely educated officers than what we have before. A boy reads a book, or a newspaper, or even a Newsweek, and he sees something about "credible defense"; he need not know the details of it but he must know what it is: the same thing is true of "deterrence". We cannot get along with the "Koi Hai" officer type anymore.

In the past there has been resistance to lengthening the PMA course. Some officials have argued that the whole concept of isolating the young cadet for several years is wrong: that the PMA should be cut back to one year because it is producing "semi-educated and immature officers". A more widespread objection to the trend in
increasing educational requirements in the army is contained in the comment of one of its ablest young brigadiers, who served recently as an instructor at the Staff College: "the trouble with education is that it makes you see the other side of every issue," which, for a soldier, may not always be a virtue. Despite such concerns, it is likely that the trend to increased educational requirements for the PMA and for senior officers will continue.

In addition to professional military training and academic subjects, the PMA, like other total institutions (especially those serving as feeders to structured bureaucracies) attempts to mold and influence the character of its members. Personality and character account for half of the weight in an internal evaluation scheme (academic and military subjects each carry 25%), and PMA staff speak of this in terms of "leadership, power of decision, initiative, will-power, character, organizing ability, intelligence, imagination, moral courage, sense of duty, sense of responsibility, self-discipline," and so forth. In all, the personality of the cadet is broken down and evaluated on twenty or more different attributes. Further, cadets selected at random are studied throughout their academy careers. This evaluation scheme follows the cadet through his years at the PMA, and includes part-pants from the Inter-Services Selection Board (which made the original selection to the PMA) and, beginning in 1980, evaluations of PMA graduates by their unit commanders. The hope is that by gathering together the peer evaluations of PMA cadets, their unit commander assessments, and assessments made by the ISSB
and the PMA staff itself there will be a number of tests of whether the PMA is getting and producing the "right type" of officer.

Another, indirect measure of the success of the PMA in attracting and training types of individuals which fit their model is the effectiveness of the internal disciplinary system at Kakul. The PMA has a "partial" honor system, in which cadets are required to inform on those discovered cheating, or even turn themselves in to authorities. Such honor systems have not always been effective at West Point and the other American military service academies; in both cultures there is a tension between traditional and personal social ties, the fear of failure, and the injunctions of the honor code. This in turn has led a few officers to think about the meaning of a code (largely derived from comparable Western institutions) for an army which has a quite different but no less valid code available to it—-that of Islam.

Islam and the Officer Corps

The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim state, CANNOT become 'professional' if in all his activities he does not take on 'the color of Allah.'

Gen. M. Zia-ul-Haq, 1979

There is a commonly held image of the Pakistan Army as an Islamic army, or (recently) as an army ruled by Muslim fanatics who seek to impose their version of Islamic conformity upon the rest of Pakistan. This image derives from historic Western misperceptions of Islam.
and from glimpses of Islamic doctrines at work in the military. Such slogans as those quoted in Chapter II ("Fighting in the name of Allah, . . . is the supreme sort of worship, and anybody who does service in the armed forces with the intention of doing this job in worship, his life is a worship"), and the suspicion that the Pakistan Army is motivated by cries of Jehad contribute to this image.

It is true that the military uses (and has misused) Islam as a motivating force. During the fight for East Pakistan, for example, the C-in-C of local forces, Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan, quoted freely from the Quran and the Sunnah in his talks to the beleaguered West Pakistan garrison:

As Muslims, we have always fought against an enemy who was numerically and materially superior. The enemy never deterred us. It was [by] the spirit of jihad and dedication to Islam that the strongest adversaries were mauled and defeated by a handful of Muslims. The battles of Uhud, Badar, Khyber and Damascus are the proof of what the Muslims could do . . .

And, drawing from Iqbal, he recited to the troops:

Allah exalts the mujahid whether he lives or dies. He is a ghazi (a crusader) if he lives, and a shaheed (a martyr) if he dies. The mujahid seeks Allah's grace. He does not covet wealth and property.

The C-in-C and President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, urged his soldiers on with the information that in the Mukti Bahini (the Bangladesh guerilla
movement) they were fighting an anti-Islamic, "Kaffir" army, and that they (the Pakistanis) were upholding the highest traditions of mujahidin—soldiers of Islam. As one senior officer recalled, "expressions like the 'ideology of Pakistan' and the 'glory of Islam', normally outside a professional fighter's lexicon, were becoming stock phrases... The Service Chiefs sounded more like high priests than soldiers."42 Such exhortations, particularly when uttered by less than distinguished generals during a stupendous military fiasco—brought ridicule to the army and to Islam. Yet, these grandiose statements are not representative of the role that Islam plays within the military of Pakistan. Three areas are of special interest: the way the military view Pakistan as an Islamic state, the application of Islamic principles within the military, and the reconciliation of Islam and contemporary strategic doctrine.

The Army and an Islamic Pakistan

Q: What other army and country does Pakistan most resemble?
A: [a group of colonels and brigadiers] Israel!

Q: But, don't you support the Arab cause?
A: Yes, but we think the Israelis are better soldiers.

Although Pakistanis have been involved in training various Arab armies and air forces and manned some Arab equipment during the 1973 Mideast war, there is surprising but widespread agreement that Israel is an analogous state. Israel was also created by a partition, it also has a strong British military legacy updated by
extensive contact with U.S. forces, and it also exists to provide a homeland for co-religionists who fled persecution. Above all, the Pakistani military admires the tenacity and skill of the IDF and have carefully studied the major Middle East wars. Pakistanis would like to think of themselves as a form of Israeli: a tough, small, outnumbered, but ultimately triumphant army that draws its strength from a shared religion and modern military technology.

In conversations with army officers and in their writings other models have been suggested. Through their contact with the Chinese, Pakistanis have become familiar with Chinese and Vietnamese military organization and doctrine and some officers have suggested that a "people's army" model would be cheaper than the present system and more effective.

A distinguished retired army general, however, draws another parallel (possibly because he has served as an ambassador to a Middle East Arab state). "Pakistan," he argued,

"cannot have an army and a political system which is derived from secular, Western models. The comparison should be with the Catholic states of Europe: how long did they take to work out a relationship between the army and the state?"

Answering his own question, he cautioned against any expectation that Islamic principles provide firm, clear-cut guidance: they have to be developed and worked out in each Muslim nation.
A pervasive belief of the officer corps is that the average Pakistani is less than honest, less than straightforward, and does not fully possess the degree of integrity and honor of the soldier. A recurrent theme of the military literature of Pakistan is that the officer should be careful about his religion; it is one way he may preserve his honor. This view was argued by Attiqur Rahman, who, in his comprehensive critique of Pakistan's military and security policy has otherwise very little to say about Islam:

As a beginning [to framing a code of honor for the military] what better source have we at hand than our Holy Book? It should not be difficult to codify certain aspects of military honor from these sacred pages. Those verses that pertain to the duties of man to man--the treatment of prisoners--telling the truth regardless of consequences; uprightness; the treatment of women... Once these are known by all cadets passing out of their parent institutions--and if those who disregard them are punished severely--then some idea of honor will find its place in the armed forces.

There has been an attempt to introduce Islamic teachings in the PMA but as a complement to regular professional and academic subjects. The Director of Studies of the PMA has written extensively on this issue and is careful, as are most other writers, to separate the domains of military science and academic subjects on one hand, and Quranic inspiration and guidance on the other:

In the domain of [military] psychology we try to understand external behavior and in the domain of religion...
we try to find out the inner nature of that reality. The psychological and religious processes are in a sense parallel to each other . . . Both are directed to the purification of experience in their respective spheres. 44

A recently retired senior lieutenant-general, with close ties to the present government (and still active in public affairs in Pakistan) provided a full elaboration of the way the military views the weaknesses of Pakistani society and the way in which they see Islam as both a goal and a corrective:

We [the leadership] are progressive and enlightened individuals. But Islamic laws have been brought in [chopping of hands, lashes]. Are we hypocrites? Well, there are good laws, but they require a good society, the two things have to go side by side. The development of the world has not been uniform: within certain countries also the development has not been uniform. In the West, for example, a law can be enforced uniformly, it will be acceptable practically to everybody as being the law at that time, because the whole society has grown upward simultaneously. In the East it is not so. In Pakistan, for example, you find people who live in caves! You can find people living by centuries, till the 21st, leave alone the 20th. So, a law which a man of the 20th Century considers to be modern and civilized is considered to be uncivilized for a man living in the 14th Century. And there are people here living in caves, in a pre-historic period!

I think we are trying to civilize people here, whereas in the West the people are becoming animals, going towards the other direction; for me, homosexuality is such a big crime against humanity that chopping off hands for stealing
in Pakistan, I do not consider to be against humanity. You consider such things [liberalization of laws concerning homosexuality] to be a step forward, we consider it to be against human nature.

And, he concluded, expressing the view of virtually the entire leadership of Pakistan:

We do not accept that the West goes out to impose its views on us. We do not cry or shout about what Sweden has done—they have authorized their children to go to court against their parents—now this is destroying human civilization which has been developed by this race of human beings over centuries. It is wrong, totally wrong, but if we had done it the whole of the West would have started shouting "look how uncivilized and backward those Pakistanis are," you people have a friend in Pakistan. You can always find fault, but you will destroy us, with what result? The West is looking for an ideal society, but is an imitation of that ideal for us? I think it would depend on the situation: you cannot impose a proper type of culture, civilization, without considering the basic structure of that society.

The inner tensions and contradictions in this view are clear. The typical officer is highly Westernized in appearance and values, yet he is truly Muslim and Pakistani and rejects much of what he believes is the degredation of the West. Yet, Islam does not provide a complete model or pattern, certainly to these highly informed and cosmopolitan individuals. The Pakistani leadership is trying to work for a synthesis, an amalgamation of two cultures, but it is doing so under enormous
pressure and without a clear understanding of the difficulty of the task. Their approach is to draw upon their own professional experience and careers: if good government works within the military, if it can be imposed by adherence to regulations, law, and tradition, then the broader society should be amenable to the same kind of ortho-social control. But the military have been unable to get many other groups in Pakistan to appreciate the wisdom of this approach.

Islam and Military Organization

We have discussed the way in which Islam is used in the Pakistan Army to enhance the fighting spirit of the other ranks. This is hardly a Pakistani or peculiarly Islamic practice, and is merely an adaptation of the British Indian Army system of using class, caste, and religion for the same purpose (and that was a refinement of practices already existant when the British developed the armies of the Bombay, Madras, and Bengal presidencies). But what of the officers? Is their recruitment, training, and behavior regulated in some special way by Islam? There is no short answer to this question.

The officer corps cannot be characterized as "orthodox" or literalist in their view of the Quran, but individual officers can; others, however (probably the great majority), are devout Muslims and would (on a pragmatic basis) like to adapt their professional lives to Islam, and do so where it is professionally convenient—meanwhile, they live as reasonably orthodox Muslims within the military. A group of officers may be sitting in the officer's mess in the late afternoon with a guest. One or two officers out of a dozen may excuse themselves
or just slip away for prayer. Their departure is unremarked upon; they return quietly and rejoin the conversation. There is no mass compulsory praying in the military (except for one unit prayer each Friday, a practice which dates to the British). This might be just as well, for a certain percentage of officers are quite irreligious in the sense that they used to freely drink alcohol in the messes and in their homes before prohibition was imposed in 1974 by Bhutto.

Generally, however, the Pakistan Army has never been a hard drinking army, and there is evidence that—with some flamboyant exceptions—this was true of Muslim officers in the British Indian Army. As one Muslim Sandhurst KCO pointed out:

I was with the British, but I never drank, the first time was in Italy, when I asked for some water—aque—and the farmer said to me, "only animals drink water in this country." So he brought wine, and that is what we had, but the majority of us were not that type. In our people the troops don't like the officers drinking. To keep up their confidence it was essential for Muslim officers to at least not drink openly—quietly was o.k., not openly—I was commanding Muslim troops.

Pakistan Army officers regard with some derision the debates in India over supplying rum to Indian Army jawans at high altitudes. Periodically an Indian M.P. demands that prohibition be imposed on the army and that rum rations cease; the government invariably replies that because of "Military necessity" such rations must continue. Their own troops are at the same altitude, facing the Indians, and are not
supplied with liquor: one general recalls that he issued qan (raw sugar) to his troops in such a situation, and that they survived nicely. For most Pakistani officers, not drinking is a sign of self-restraint and morality, yet they are reluctant to openly condemn their colleagues who do (or did) drink.

The recent emphasis on prohibition is not unrelated to the reprofessionalization of the Pakistan Army and the disaster of 1971. It was widely known that Yahya Khan was a heavy drinker and some officers suggest the use of drugs. Their view of alcohol is derived from their broader view of religious and moral guidance: once an individual begins to deviate from the correct path he may be on a slippery downroad to moral and physical destruction, ruining his own life, and placing the lives of his men (or worse) in jeopardy. While there is a reluctance to tell a fellow officer how to live his life there is a renewed concern in Pakistan over the dangers of excess. Yet, many younger officers are enormously curious about the "evils" of Western civilization: drugs, sex, alcohol, and deviant behavior. Officers from traditional or conservative families are exposed to such phenomenon through their access to the Western press, newsmagazines, and, word-of-mouth accounts from fellow officers. When given the opportunity they demonstrate an insatiable curiosity about pre-marital encounters between boys and girls, in the West, whether Jews and Christians believe in one God (and if it is the same God that Muslims believe in) and how Westerners avoid looking at a girl who is "pushing out all over." Their failure to do so, one Pathan major concluded, was evidence of the ultimate decadence of the West. Raised in a
conservative Pathan family in Rawalpindi, he could not reconcile the obvious power of the West (and the U.S. in particular) with such decadent practices as open pornography, pre-marital sex, and homosexuality. These are evil practices (according to the Quran) and Pakistani officers who are fully Westernized in appearance, demeanor, and are professionally competent hold this to be true. But it is clear that their lack of direct contact with Western societies has led to a misunderstanding of the apparent contradiction between spiritual poverty and material power.

Islam and Strategic Doctrine

Perhaps the Islamic influence of greatest importance for Pakistan (and other Muslim states) will be in an area yet to be developed, strategic doctrine. As Muslim states have achieved independence they have invariably inherited a Western-trained military establishment; even where these armies have made adaptations in their internal organization to Islamic tradition, they have rarely abandoned the doctrines of deterrence, theories of war and warfare taught at Camberley and Ft. Leavenworth. There is an historic logic to this: the Muslim states lost their independence to the British, French, and others not because of the lack of martial qualities of their soldiers, but because they were saddled with inferior military technology and lacked a "modern" doctrine of warfare. There is considerable reluctance, therefore, to abandon the theories of Clausewitz, Liddell-Hart, and Schelling. Most Pakistan Army officers would not, but there is a movement underway to develop a synthesis of Islamic and Western theories of warfare, and some go so far as to reject or radically reinterpret basic tenets of Western strategic thought.
Such authors face several problems. The first is that Western theories of deterrence and war have worked, or at least are fully developed and thought out. The Quran's guidance in these matters is not fully elaborated in any single Sura, but must be pieced together and supplemented by the study of significant battles in the early history of the survival and spread of Islam. Secondly, it is not clear how the modern state system, in which Muslims live apart from each other with different armies, is an entirely legitimate creation. As A. K. Brohi has written,

even Iqbal . . . went so far as to suggest that Muslim states, to begin with be treated as territorial states and that too only as an interim measure since these are later on to be incorporated into [a] commonwealth of Muslim states. Each one of these states has first to acquire strength and stability before it is able to prepare the ground on which a unified state of Islam can appear on the historical scene.\(^45\)

Despite these and other problems there have been several noteworthy attempts in Pakistan to interpret the Quran to develop an Islamic doctrine of war and strategy. In the 1960s a series of textbooks were developed for use in Pakistani colleges and schools; military officers write regulary on various tactical and strategic aspects of famous Muslim battles, and occasionally on the relationship between Islam and Pakistan's strategic doctrine. These efforts are sanctioned by the Quran and have been particularly encouraged by General Zia. Nor are they entirely abstract exercises: in at least one area, the use of nuclear weapons, they may provide the conceptual framework for a Pakistani nuclear system.
One important contribution of this new literature on Islamic strategy has been to clear away a number of accumulated misconceptions about such concepts as Jehad and just war. Jehad has long been misrepresented as a "religious duty inculcated in the Quran on the followers of Mohammed to wage war upon those who do not adopt the doctrines of Islam." Contemporary Pakistani writers and most scholars reject this: A. K. Brohi stresses that the Quran commands man to struggle against forces of evil and to defend the interests of believers by Jehad, "a word which is untranslatable in English but, broadly speaking, means, 'striving,' 'struggling,' 'trying to advance the Divine causes or purposes.'" There are many aspects of Jehad, and force is only the most extreme and intense form; in fact, while urging Jehad, the Quran also pronounces that "The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr." To some Pakistanis who have written on this subject, this is an important issue because it leads them to conclude that Islam does not contain a doctrine of total war and, indeed, urges upon its followers reconciliation with its enemies. Brohi, a lawyer, stresses the limited circumstances in which a Muslim can go to war: to uphold His law and the honor of His name, and for the defense of legitimate interests of the believers; war is permitted only in defined circumstances and "is a highly controlled affair; indeed, it is totally regulated by law." A textbook (published by the Islamic Military Science Association of Karachi) stresses this point and attacks the theories of unlimited war and "pure war" developed by Clausewitz and other—especially American—military theoreticians.
The "Islamic pattern of war", however, is a humane and honorable alternative to mass slaughter and nuclear annihilation. [It] not only prohibits total war and encourages to negotiate honorable peace but makes it, therefore, not necessary as a rule to proceed to the total conquest of the enemy's territory. It thus recognizes that war is an evil which may in certain circumstances become unavoidable. Even then every effort must be made to limit the mischief and horror of war.

There are a number of passages in the Quran to support this interpretation. The believer is also instructed that enemies need not be permanent:

But if they (infidels) be inclined to peace, incline thou too: and trust in Allah. Verily, He is the One who Hears, the One who Knows. And if they should thereby intend to outwit thee, then, verily, Allah doth suffice thee!\(^5^0\)

And,

It may be that Allah will (in time) establish friendship between yourselves and those whom you now hold as enemies: Allah (over everything) hath power; and Allah is Forgiving, Merciful!\(^5^1\)

The most recent and comprehensive Pakistani study of war and Islam comes to many of these same conclusions. Written by a serving brigadier and with a forward by President Zia, it is both an analysis of Islamic strategic doctrine and a study of early Muslim battles. Brigadier Malik also concludes that
the checks and controls imposed by the Holy Quran on the use of force have no parallel. In practice, there were but few isolated instances where the Muslims transgressed these limits but the Holy Prophet (peace be upon Him) disapproved of them.

However, he adds that the exercise of restraint in war is essentially a two-sided affair:

It cannot happen that one side goes on exercising restraint while the other keeps on committing excesses. In such a situation, a time comes when the very injunction of preserving and promoting peace and justice demands the use of limited force. It would be sinful to withhold the use of force under those circumstances. Islam permits the use of the 'sword' for such a purpose. Rather than be apologetic about it, a Muslim should be proud of the fact that, when used, his sword is meant to subdue the forces of tyranny and repression, and to bring peace and justice to mankind.

Malik's emphasis is clearly that of a serving soldier with a belief in the unhappy necessity of the occasional use of force, not of a civilian looking for ways to avoid its use. His most interesting argument, however, pertains to the way force is used.

For Malik (and for many other officers) the concept of terror is central to the Islamic conduct of modern war:

Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror
is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him. 54

Malik derives this conclusion from a reading of a number of Quranic passages which use the word "terror." For example, Malik's translation of Anfal, 12, is:

Remember, the Lord inspired the angels (with the message), "I am with you: give firmness to the Believers. I will instill terror into the hearts of the Unbelievers." 55

This is not dissimilar to N. J. Dawood's translation:

Allah revealed His will to the angels, saying: "I shall be with you. Give courage to the believers. I shall cast terror into the hearts of the infidels." 56

Yet, in a recent comprehensive edition of the Holy Quran, praised by some of the most senior generals in Pakistan, the word "terror" is often replaced by "awe," or in the example of Anfal, 12, "fright", which gives the passage a different emphasis:

Remember how thy Lord (appeared to) urge the angels: "I am with you—hold ye fast the Faithful; anon, I shall instill the hearts of infidels with fright! 57

There are other examples that could be discussed, but this is not the appropriate place for a textual analysis of militant passages in the Quran. What is of interest is the linkage that Malik (and, in private conversation, other officers) make between the concept of terror and Pakistani strategy. They insist that a strategy that fails to achieve
the condition of terror in the heart of the enemy will suffer from "inherent drawbacks and weaknesses; and should be reviewed and modified." Further, this standard must be applied to "nuclear as well as conventional wars." The strategy of nuclear deterrence, "in fashion today", cannot work unless it is capable of striking "terror into the hearts of the enemy". To do this, his faith must be weakened, while the Muslim soldier must adhere even more firmly to his own religion. Neither nuclear nor conventional weapons are to be used on a random, haphazard basis, but they must support and strengthen this central objective of Islamic war. Terror will weaken the enemy's faith in himself, and that in turn will lead to his destruction. War is a matter of will and faith, and even instruments of mass destruction have a clear-cut and (in one sense) a limited, pin-point role in war. Thus, at least some Pakistan Army officers strongly object to characterizations of their nuclear program as "crazy" or irresponsible. They see a Pakistani nuclear weapon (albeit still a "hypothetical" one) in these terms:

What do you think we are? Do you think one man will make that decision? [to use a nuclear weapon] No! There is not a single person with his finger on the trigger, not for regular war or nuclear war, if that should come. Islam provides the conditions and criteria which will make it impossible to launch nuclear weapons without a just cause. Nuclear weapons are modern terror weapons, and Islam enjoins us to strike terror into the heart of the enemy, it provides moral guidance, a set of principles for waging to war—such a decision would not be irresponsible.
While one can appreciate this interest in developing a rationale for the controlled use of nuclear weapons as well as conventional force, it is not clear to me that the officers who make these arguments fully comprehend the destructiveness of even the smallest nuclear weapon. Nor have they thought very carefully about the contradiction between the use of nuclear weapons (even tactical battlefield weapons) and Quranic injunctions about sparing the lives of innocent women and children. Yet, to do so, would weaken the credibility of a strategy of deterrence based on terror or mass destruction. If Pakistani generals acquire nuclear weapons they will not be rid of the inherent dilemmas of nuclear war-fighting, dilemmas faced by all nuclear powers, present and future.
CHAPTER IV: THE ARMY, POLITICS, AND THE HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR

I have praise and respect for the Armed Forces of Pakistan. I am proud of their valor. I fail to understand why the Respondent [Zia-ul-Haq] considers himself to be the symbol and spokesman of the Armed Forces of Pakistan merely because a year ago, I made the biggest mistake of my life by appointing him Chief of the Army Staff.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto¹

I said to him "Sir"--I still called him that--"Sir, why have you done all these things, you whom I respected so, you who had so much" and he only said that I should wait, and he would be cleared. It was very disappointing.

Zia-ul-Haq²

The higher direction of war--strategic planning, preparation for war, the conduct of warfare and the highest levels of security policy and diplomacy--very much resembles the upper stories of a tall building. They exist, but not independently of the lower stories and foundation which hold them up and give them a particular form and structure. This is recognized by those responsible for a recent overhaul of the system of national security policy making in Pakistan. A new organization exists but it is in many ways quite irrelevant, given the fact that the military itself rules Pakistan through martial law. We will discuss the current and anticipated systems of decision making later in this chapter, but it is essential to first characterize the lower stories: the role the military plays in the politics of the state, their attitudes towards this role, and prospects for change.
The Pakistani Military and Politics

There are armies which defend their nation's borders, there are armies which are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are armies which defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three and this is one cause of its confused and complicated involvement in national politics. From the day Pakistan was created it has been active in helping to establish internal order and in protecting Pakistan's permeable and often ill-defined borders; during this period it has used its power and special position within Pakistan to ensure that it received adequate weapons, resources, and manpower. Finally it has always regarded itself as the special expression of the idea of Pakistan, and a few officers have argued for an activist role in reforming or correcting the society where it has fallen below the mark of excellence set by the military. The contrast with India on all three points is striking; there strategic decisions are essentially made by civilian politicians and bureaucrats; the military are under tight fiscal control, and it certainly has no sense of mission or purpose beyond the ordinary. It is the contrast between the two states and armies (which are both derived from the same source) which has attracted considerable interest and has generated a number of theories as to why the Pakistan Army has intervened in politics so often (and often with such disastrous results).

Theories of Intervention

The major study of the army's involvement in politics was written by a Pakistani scholar, Hasan Askari Rizvi. His explanation is widely
shared in Pakistan, especially within the military. Rizvi concludes that

the major responsibility [for military intervention in politics] falls on the shoulders of the political leadership. Their inability to establish and run the civilian institutions and failure to keep a balance between the diverse forces working in the political system, generates political ambitions in the minds of Generals. If the civilian institutions are not capable of asserting themselves on the military, the military by virtue of its qualities dominates the civil institutions. Therefore, it is the root which must be cured first. The sooner we realize this, the better.³

Virtually the same argument was made by a distinguished retired corps commander, Lieutenant-General Abdul Hameed Khan, writing in the popular Urdu newspaper, Nawa-i-Waqt. Hameed's interest was in the higher direction of war, but no system would work until the politicians straighten out their own affairs:

The political system cannot be run on slogans, promises, and elegantly worded statements which leave the people bewildered ... There are no Quaids or Shers among us. We are ordinary mortals. The people of our country have never expected anything very spectacular from their elected representatives. All they have asked for is honest and selfless service ... for how long more they have to wait is for the politician to answer. It is for the politician to clean and reorganize his own field to serve the people and give the country
the political stability it so badly needs. Democracy cannot flourish without norms and without discipline.

If democracy has failed in Pakistan, as it is sometimes said, it is only because it has never been tried out.

Almost all of the military agree. From Ayub on, they have explained that they have been forced to intervene in politics because of the incompetence of civilians. There are variations on this theme. A young brigadier, currently commanding an important training institution, recently drew the international comparison:

You know what has happened in the South American and African states; it is not that the political institutions have failed, it is because of ambitions of army officers to take over and rule, but this is not the case in Pakistan. Here there has been a complete vacuum—the people—I remember when I was a young officer and Ayub took over, the governments changing almost on a three-month basis, there was no economic policy, no development, in fact they had killed the speaker of the East Pakistan assembly in the Assembly itself! I was a security officer then: I saw people kissing the ground where Ayub had stood! So it was not a coup, as in the banana states, it was a coup brought about by the people, forced onto the army. "We want you to stabilize things," they said, and then the army has come in and stabilized things—it will take a little time to stabilize, institute political institutions once again.
The graphic metaphor of a political "vacuum" is widely employed among army officers. Fazal Muqeem Khan, writing in 1972, offered the semi-official statement of the process:

The Armed Forces that the country inherited and gradually built up during the first decade of Pakistan were fully professional and with their fighting qualities were rightly counted amongst the best small forces of the world. Gradually, the Government started leaning on the armed forces, particularly the army to keep peace in the country. It started entrusting some socio-economic tasks and internal security duties to the army. The more efficiently the army carried out these tasks, the more the Government depended on it at the expense of its training and the morale of the political institutions and the civil services. Later governments started looking up to the army for their survival, that naturally sucked its senior officers into politics. 5

Four years later in almost the same words, Bhutto was warned that the military was being drawn into politics in Baluchistan where he had been using them to supplement the local police and administration. His Secretariat cautioned him that this was infecting the officer corps itself:

Unfortunately the Army in this country has a long tradition of getting involved in civil administration. Power has its own taste and in course of time the army officers especially in the middle ranks start
relishing the power in form of arrests, searches and interrogation which gives them the feel of authority (sic). They also develop contempt for the ways of the politicians and the civil servants and a general impression in the army circle starts gaining ground that everybody in the field of civil administration and politics is incompetent and corrupt and only army can deliver the goods . . . In a democratic set up, the control of the army, not only at the top but at all levels when involved in civil affairs, should be that of the civilian government . . . The army should be divested of powers of arrest, house-searches and keeping civilians in military custody even for a short period . . . The withdrawal of the army, which may be gradual, might lead to more incidents but that risk should be taken . . . It is time that the experiment of gradual withdrawal of the army from the law-enforcement is given a trial. The impression amongst the junior army officers that the army is a panacea for all ills, which had received a severe blow after the debacle in East Pakistan, is again gaining ground. It can be very infectious and cannot remain confined to one Province. This infection may not be allowed to spread.6

The White Paper issued by Zia's government implies agreement with Rashid's argument:

Despite Rao Rashid's justified reservations about the role of the army in civil affairs, it is a matter of record that Mr. Bhutto's regime did not follow a
policy of gradual withdrawal of the army in Baluchistan. On the other hand, in the wake of nation-wide upheaval in the post-election period, he imposed selective Martial Law in the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore and the army was thus once again called out "in aid of civil power," in areas other than Baluchistan as well. 7

The contrast between the interventionism of the Pakistan Army and the abstention of the Indian Army is something all senior officers are aware of. Most generals, including some of the highest, have a grudging admiration for the Indian accomplishment. Typical is the comment of one armor division commander,

The thing is, India had a very big advantage [over Pakistan] in the leadership of Pandit Nehru over these 20 years. You have seen that in spite of the fact that his daughter had a reverse and the Janata Party had seen her out, the people of India, because of the outstanding leadership of Pandit Nehru, once they saw that the other party is no good, then they ran back to her. So they have a very big advantage, whereas we have been a little unfortunate. You know, at the time of Partition our political leaders—we had a reversal. The Quaid-I-Azam [Jinnah] had died, the other Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali had gone away [he was assassinated] and then the cult was mediocrity; the politicians were not trained and we had political confusion for 10 to 12 years. People thought the country is gone! And that is the reason this professional army was called in, because there was some leadership in it. These martial laws have come in and they have been very hard on the army, but there was no way out.
Gradually, now, these politicians know that to be a leader, you have to be a leader—but there have been lapses. But India has had a family; God almighty was very kind to them!

Taking a broader historical frame of reference, a senior retired lieutenant-general (who has served as an ambassador and high government official) argues there are regional and cultural causes for Pakistan’s lack of political leadership:

This area [the Punjab] has always produced great soldiers, but never any great politicians. The soldier class has the highest status in Pakistan, the trades like carpentry and politics are taboo! Part of this was the fault of the British: they encouraged the Hindus after the Mutiny of 1857 [in which Muslims were prominent], but not the Muslims, and our Mullahs kept us from learning English. There is also something in our minds which makes us unable to have a democracy—the idea of opposition is foreign to Islam.

Q: But Bhutto was a brilliant politician.

A: Bhutto! Why did he go wrong? Why do our politicians do things that fail?

Q: What about the military entering politics?

A: No, they’re no better. They fail because they do not recognize that they have to start from the bottom, not from the top. Ayub, Asghar Khan, the others, they don’t want to work their way up. There’s something about us which makes us unable to have a democracy—
perhaps the idea of opposition is foreign to Islam, probably the Turkish model would suit us better than the parliamentary model.

This, indeed, is the voice of deep pessimism, undiminished since the arrest and execution of Bhutto. Even those generals who detested Bhutto, acknowledge his capacity to inspire, lead, and give some sense of purpose and direction to Pakistan. His failure is widely thought to be a disaster for the country and it is a measure of their desperation—not ambition—that such officers supported his removal.

The argument that the Punjab (indeed, all of what is now Pakistan) is not fertile territory for politicians is not conjecture, and has some basis in history. In his careful study of Bhutto's rule, a distinguished Pakistani economist (Shahid Javed Burki) traces the incapacity of Pakistan to organize itself to the schism between "insiders and outsiders." The first were the Pakistanis living in what is now Pakistan before partition; they were a largely rural, conservative population with little interest or experience in modern political institutions, let alone democratic politics. The second group were epitomized by the generally better educated, more urban and "modern" newcomers from India, who concentrated in the great urban areas of Karachi, but also Lahore, Hyderabad, Lyallpur, and Rawalpindi.

Pakistan society was, therefore, born polarized. On the one side were the rural people with their own customs and traditions, their own history and
institutions. On the other side was an urban population with relatively more modern institutions and with goals and aspirations that were completely different . . . The conflict between these two groups determined the course Pakistani society was to take on the road to economic and political development. 8

Where did the military stand in this? My own impression is that the officer corps was just as divided as the broader society. About 12% of the army (and perhaps more) were from India, and especially from such liberal centers of Muslim thought as Allahabad and Delhi. But even within those, a number of Muslim officers from Pakistan itself were from large cities and were the sons of professionals. The question must be left open for further study, but there appears to be adequate evidence to indicate that the army was not a monolith and certainly not drawn exclusively from the conservative landed aristocracy of the Punjab and NWFP. Unfortunately, no scholar has examined this question; even Burki virtually ignores the military in his otherwise perceptive study.

These interpretations of military involvement in politics are relatively benign. They see the military as guided by its own professional concerns but drawn into politics because of the incompetence of the politicians. But there are other interpretations of Pakistan's three martial law regimes which are less sympathetic to the generals. For a number of years it has been widely believed by some Pakistanis and most Indians that the domination of the military
is closely related to their outside connections. It has been an axiom of Indian foreign policy--first expressed by Nehru and revived by Indira Gandhi--that the Pakistani generals are unrepresentative dictators who have forced their way into power in order to prevent a rapprochement with India. This is also a convenient justification for refusing to take Pakistan seriously as long as the military do hold power.

A recent interview of Indira Gandhi in Surya (her daughter-in-law's magazine) repeats the theme: "India was not afraid of Pakistan," she said, "but what is worrying is that when they receive massive arms supplies, the military gets entrenched, fortifying those people in Pakistan who do not want friendship with India or want to take revenge." India's receipt of military equipment from the Soviet Union was different as it was not "aid". Rubbing it in, she added that Pakistan had no enemies, as it was friendly with China and would not be attacked by the Soviet Union, Iran, or Afghanistan or India. It is hard to tell whether such statements are intended as a goad to the Pakistanis or reflect an astonishing naivete about a close neighbor. It is probably the former; Mrs. Gandhi must still be very angry with the generals for eliminating Bhutto (whose career paralleled hers in many ways) and for getting along so well with her own domestic political opponents, Morarji Desai and Atal Behari Vajpayee. The suspicion is reciprocated; officers in Pakistan remember Indira Gandhi as the woman who partitioned their own country; her election in January, 1980 was a difficult moment for those officers who had
supported Zia's attempt to work towards normalization between the two states. 10 There is one full-length study by a prominent Indian scholar which traces this connection between the generals, foreign policy, and military rule. 11 Dr. Aswini Ray attempts to document that unstable civilian governments in Pakistan have always turned to foreign policy as a way of shifting the context of political debate in their favor; this in turn has led some Pakistanis to argue for the serious reconsideration of a hostile policy towards India; sensing this as a threat the military has then intervened in politics to ensure that the civilians would not lead Pakistan towards rapprochement. Ray sums up his argument this way:

"It had been a series of vicious circles for successive Pakistani governments. Internal instability goaded the leadership to shift emphasis upon foreign policy, which . . . led to further instability."

But when Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon sought "to take initiatives in the direction of removing the only remaining alibi for Pakistan's military alliance [the "threat" from India], by offering a no-war alliance," Ayub intervened. Ray acknowledges the domestic disruption existing in Pakistan at the time but I think correctly identifies foreign policy concerns as one factor which motivated the military.

It is important to note that Bhutto himself made a similar argument from his death-cell. The central thesis of his last political testament is that the generals moved against him because of pressure from the U.S. to refrain from going nuclear. 12 It is the linkage between the Pakistan Army and foreign governments (especially the U.S.)
which Bhutto said was an alien force within Pakistan (if indeed Bhutto believed this: there were perfectly good reasons for the military to remove him quite independent of their allegedly anti-nuclear views; they certainly do not seem to have slowed the pace of nuclear weapons development in Pakistan after his death).

Several perceptive studies of the recent coup hold Bhutto responsible for allowing the political system to break down (and thus agree with the generals) but are doubtful about the motives, professionalism and political competence of the military. William Richter follows the suggestion of Gerald Heeger that Pakistan is a good example of a "post-military state" in which repeated military intervention has actually resulted in the breakdown of political institutions and a general deterioration of political discourse. Both characterize Bhutto's rule as "patrimonial" rather than institutional, and see this as one cause of his downfall. Heeger wrote before the 1977 coup, but was very pessimistic about Pakistan's future; Richter concludes that Pakistan has developed a "praetorian tradition" of repeated military interventionism:

The persistence of the present martial law regime thus contributes to the reinforcement and extension of Pakistan's praetorian tradition in the broader sense as well. Pakistani political parties have historically been weak; elections, when not avoided altogether, have been preludes to disaster; succession has generally come about through mass agitation and
military takeover rather than through the ballot box; and no ruler—civilian or military—has relinquished power voluntarily. The conduct and contradictions of Pakistan's third military regime point strongly to the probable continuation of this tragic political tradition. 14

It is hard to quarrel with this description, and indeed some of the generals (even at the highest level) would find it accurate. But if intervention has become a tradition in Pakistan it is not a popular one and from 1969, there has been substantial disagreement within the military about the wisdom of intervention and holding on to power. Let us turn to some of the military organizational and structural factors which have also helped determine military intervention in Pakistan.

Separate Spheres and Military Intervention

The Pakistan Army is hostage to its origins. It inherited much of the British view of civil-military relations and this view is transmitted to each succeeding Pakistani generation at the Pakistan Military Academy, the Staff College, and in informal discussions in the messes. The British (in India) liked to envision the "proper" relationship between military and civilian as that between two "separate spheres" of military and civilian influence, while acknowledging that ultimate responsibility lay in the hands of duly appointed (or elected) civilians. 15 British India was seized and originally ruled by the sword, and was governed for many years by military proconsuls. But by the end of the Raj
the role of the military had been limited and elaborate administrative
and fiscal mechanisms were devised to control them. The military's
sphere of influence was recruitment, training, discipline, and
strategic planning; the actual use of the military, from the most
minor "aid to the civil" operation up to the strategic deployment of
the Indian Army in the Persian Gulf, South East Asia, and elsewhere
was a political—and hence a civilian—decision.

The metaphor of separate spheres implies a division of respons-
sibility, and the complaint of a Pakistani general about the deter-
ioration of political leadership is also a complaint that the civilians
have failed to fulfill their responsibility to the military and to the
state. For the military this is vital, even if there was no fear
that civilians might pursue foreign policies anathema to them.

The importance of legitimate and effective political leadership
as a prerequisite for civilian control cannot be overemphasized.
Relative power is not the decisive factor. If it were, military
governments would be far more widespread than they are today.
Rather, the Pakistan military are concerned about incompetent civilian
leadership hurting the quality and sometimes the very existence of
the military as an organization and thus threatening what they think
to be the only real line of defense against India and one of the main
forces holding the state together. Continued intervention in
politics only strengthens this feeling: if they let one politician
weaken the military (or establish a para-military force such as the
FSF to balance or counter it), are they not letting down their
obligations to the state as a whole? Politicians come and go (as some of them say), but the military is permanent; damaging it damages the long term survival of the state by weakening the army's capacity to step in and set things right. Setting things right, of course, is the preferred model of intervention, and the generals would like to see their involvement in politics as a glorified "aid to the civil" operation.

They are less concerned about the initial intervention (which by definition is necessary when things have gotten completely out of hand) than hanging on to power too long. One of Ayub's close associates presented this argument, which is still widely shared:

Some people would say that the army, to save itself, wanted to come in, I would say it's not the question of the army—nobody is going to destroy the army—these people were not going to destroy their own army. It was a question of saving the country, and sorting out the situation. Now, it is different after that. When General Ayub went on for 8 or 10 years, that is different—but when he took over, the intention was to clear the mess. It must be remembered that as far as the army is concerned, it is a professional army and an ordinary officer doesn't care about politics. People have relations in politics, but it doesn't make any difference—when I commanded the PMA, we used to stress these things from the beginning, "the army is completely aloof from politics," lots of stress on this.
But there is a second, and I believe much neglected, motive for intervention at work in Pakistan which derives from the idea of separate spheres of responsibility. In addition to the practical matter of civilian incompetence hurting the military and the state, there is a moral problem here. Professional soldiers take human life and destroy property in the name of the state. They are taught in their academies that the moral responsibility for their killing lies with the government, and that decisions concerning life and death are morally neutral if they are politically legitimate. If the legitimacy of political leadership deteriorates, the officer must reassess the morality of his own actions. A government which lacks legitimacy can no longer presume to be the arbiter of morality; those who perform tasks on the margin of moral behavior—the military and police—rapidly find themselves in an untenable position. Thus, the concern of Zia and others that their seizure of power be "legal" and constitutional. They may be searching for a way out and hence do not want to abrogate the constitution, but they are also concerned about the moral and ethical responsibility for acts of violence they may authorize (including the hanging of Bhutto). This does not make their actions right—either politically or morally—but it does indicate that they are sensitive to their legal and moral status. Their training and indoctrination has emphasized the legitimacy of civilian, not military rule, and the generals therefore lack a clear-cut theory of military interventionism which would permit them to undertake sweeping changes in Pakistani society; Islam now provides some guidance but extreme
Islamic practices divides the officer corps as well as the broader population, and very few officers would be inclined to pursue a Maoist or revolutionary course of action.

To sum up our argument, the Pakistan Army is in a sense trapped by its own traditions. It tells them that intervention may be necessary but that it must be limited in scope and time; yet the problems of the diversity of Pakistani society and the slow growth of what the military would regard as a community of responsible politicians, make it difficult for them to relinquish power.

And once in power the officer corps is tempted to tinker and adjust the political system, and again one can trace this back to the British. One sub-tradition of British India was a paternalist but activist Punjab school of administration. Present-day Pakistani Army officers still sound very much like their British predecessors when they discuss the various civil works they constructed, the hospitals and medical services they provide for ex-servicemen and others and the businesses and factories they run. They are eager to prove that they are not a drain on the resources of the state and actively contribute to its modernization. Yet they are unwilling to assume complete responsibility for these larger tasks: again and again they repeat that they will do so only within their proper sphere—in this case welfare for ex-servicemen—and tasks (such as the construction of the KKH) which civilian authorities cannot handle.

The army's involvement in water works and roads would be a matter of passing interest if they were not guided by essentially the
same limited-reformist approach when they deal with Pakistan's politicians. Raymond A. Moore, one of the few American scholars to have studied the Pakistan military, concludes that while the army's contribution was "absolutely indispensable" in external defense and internal security matters,

it was peripheral rather than central in the areas of social and economic development. The country would have scarcely ceased to grow without the army's peaceful uses of military forces, but that it grew faster and more efficiently because of them is clear.16

Moore is skeptical of the army's political involvement, and urges the Pakistan Army "to strengthen the civilian sector [and] avoid the pitfalls of prolonged assumption of political power," along the lines of the Indian model. Yet, these two roles of the Pakistan army, its so-called national nation-building activities and its political involvement cannot be easily separated from each other and from the army's role in national defense. Many officers recognize this, and are aware that their integrity will be strained beyond limits if they attempt to perform economic, political, as well as military tasks at a high level of efficiency and quality. It cannot be done without the lavish expenditure of resources and the development of a doctrine of total military intervention in any "weak" sector, a doctrine which does not exist in Pakistan. My analysis of this problem in 1964 would seem to be essentially valid today:

The difficulty in defining and establishing a suitable civil military relationship is intimately connected with the military's problem of re-shaping and re-establishing
If civilian and military have their own spheres, there is as little justification in the military intervening in politics as the politicians in military matters... The justification for the breaking of this rule in Pakistan is that the politicians first broke the 'rules of the game' by meddling foolishly in military matters. Significantly, the official position is today that the military is no longer in politics: the Army is above politics and parties. The justification for [Ayub's] coup is that the army restored the balance between the military and the civil spheres by rebuilding the political structure (as one would rebuild an army after defeat or partition). But, of course, political problems are not the same as military problems.

The difference that fifteen years has made is that the solutions of Ayub and Yahya and Bhutto's attempts to normalize civil-military relations have all failed and are therefore to some degree discredited. What is striking is the loss of confidence within the military in their ability not to find a solution (there are plenty of those, ranging from reformist to radical) but to carry it out. As pessimistic as this observation may be, there are two bright spots: first, there is no illusion now within the officer corps about the difficulty of the task of restoring civilian authority—or, alternatively, of the military embarking upon a thorough reform of Pakistani society and politics. There is some debate about the wisdom of holding on to power and a number of prominent retired generals (as well as...
some still in the service) have expressed the view that only a return to the barracks will serve the interests of army and state. Second, there are no illusions among most senior officers that they can actually do very much while they hold political and administrative power. In the words of one very recently retired lieutenant-general,

This group [referring to himself, corps commander, and the senior generals at Army HQ] will not make wild promises, we will not raise expectations or hopes. We will deliver first, and then tell what we have done.

While his personal style was considerably flashier than that of his colleagues, he acknowledged the difficulty of turning Zia into a charismatic leader a la Bhutto, or even an avuncular figure along the lines of Ayub Khan.

What is of interest is Zia's own recognition of his limited appeal. In numerous public statements he has expressed modesty about his own talents (many would say that he has much to be modest about). My own view is that at least in the short run, Zia has been widely misread and underestimated by Pakistani and foreign observers.

There is a political career pattern in South Asia which Zia seems to fit. Americans would call it the "Harry Truman" syndrome, but at least two Indian prime ministers have come to power this way. Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi were both thought to be political lightweights by their colleagues and political observers.
Both came to power precisely because of this perceived weakness and pliability; neither was regarded as a threat to the "syndicate" -- powerful regional leaders who were vying for power. Once in office ambition was married to genuine political skill and both Lal Bahadur and Indira Gandhi set about to undercut the very leaders that had brought them to power in the first place.

Zia's durability has surprised many informed observers who thought he was acting as a front man for a group of corps commanders and senior generals. This may well have been true but it is quite possible that he has decided to make his own way: a series of promotions, retirements, and shuffling of offices would seem to be evidence of this.\(^{21}\) It remains to be seen whether he and his close advisors have a vision beyond that of merely holding on to power (although to do so, and to achieve some form of political stability would be a remarkable achievement). Further, the alternatives are not clear to anyone. The military certainly would not be willing to yield power to any group which sought to raise the issue of Bhutto's death; given the wording of the Pakistan Constitution this might be fatal for Zia himself. Nor does the army have a clear vision of a radically different way of organizing Pakistani life. They have been professional soldiers throughout their careers, and while most generals have learned how to "play politics" both within the military and in dealing with politicians and bureaucrats, they are notoriously lacking in speculative or conceptual skills, let alone the ability to articulate their ideas in such a way that a mass
public finds them intelligible. What is of great cause for concern is that this generation of generals (and, one might add, their civilian counterparts in the bureaucracy and the entire intellectual class of Pakistan) are barren of imaginative plans for the future. The optimism of the Ayub era was replaced by the opportunism of Yahya and the hyperbole of Bhutto; they all failed and perhaps it will be Zia’s contribution to lower expectations and merely survive until a trustworthy civilian leadership emerges or until a more ambitious group of generals emerge. I very much doubt the latter, unless the army itself is adversely affected by the continuation of its Chief as President and the perpetuation of martial law.

On this point there is some disagreement in the army. Senior officers are unsure whether or not the involvement of the military is hurt by involvement in politics (both historically and in the present). Practically speaking, can the military run a martial law regime without corrupting its officers and without a decline in military performance? Is the lure of power itself a form of corruption more serious than any bribes or gifts that may change hands? Limited evidence from several generations of commanders indicates a divergence of opinion. For example, one very senior retired officer, a very close associate of Ayub Khan) recalled the take-over rule quite favorably although with a hint of concern:

Q: Do you think that it is possible, or has it been possible, for an army to involve itself in national affairs and still retain its professional outlook?
A: As you know, it depends on the involvement. In Ayub's time the army's involvement was never very deep, the army had only professional duties, the initial period of the martial law when the army assumed direct responsibility was very short-lived. And Ayub realized that the army must go back to its old duties. Afterwards, however, the service structure was upset, because all the senior officers were involved in it and naturally, new officers have to be appointed. So you do tend to destabilize the rank structure to that extent. But personally, I believed that professional soldiers are professional soldiers, and no matter how good a head you may have, you can't wear two caps all the time, you can for a short time. Ayub was the one who kept the army out of politics and would always tell us, never interfere in politics, 'till such time as he took over, and even then he took the army back to barracks. And I feel the army should do its own job, and the sooner we establish [political] institutions the better, because eventually the army gets hurt—we are all human beings, and we come to the same temptations.

Another close associate of Ayub has no such doubts, and was ecstatic over Zia's arrest of Bhutto; because it was the only way the army could keep itself from deteriorating:

The time came when we felt the army had to be protected, they were forming groups in the army. So, martial law came in 1958. We did more training during that period, we reorganized the entire army in '58, and for four years we did more training, more reorganization than ever before. This army is highly professional, its
duty is professional. There is no political ambition, but the army gets infected by its environment, by the politics, by the chaos, by the instability. All these politicians who make statements, they are third-rate, useless. Bhutto's mission was to destroy Pakistan, Asghar Khan came to carry on with the same mission; I was so moved when Zia took over I sent him a telegram, "Well done."! I was so delighted, I called him up and told him, "you have saved the country--well done, and you've saved the Army!!"

Among the present generation of commanders there is no less a range of opinion on the desirability and effectiveness of a political role for the military. One lieutenant-general, who held martial law responsibilities, declared vehemently in January, 1980, that the two tasks could never be combined—that he had begged the President to relieve him of one or another task (but he clearly enjoyed the role of pro-consul, ruling over a quarter of Pakistan). He was (like all of the other Governors) relieved of his military responsibilities several months later. Another Governor, perhaps more forthright, claimed that the martial law responsibilities did not affect his military performance in any significant way, nor that of the various corps and units under his command:

No, it is not much of an added burden. Most of the administration remains in civil hands, with an odd military chap here and there where there might be trouble. As Governor I perform brief ceremonial tasks--the Boy Scouts, Red Crescent, and I'm chancellor of the universities--it only takes a few hours a week. The martial law system has its own people, but there aren't very many of them.
The military now officially maintain that the martial law responsibilities are not hurting their professional performance, although their own White Paper cited above provided evidence to the contrary. In briefings and conversations officers connected with the martial law system point out that very few changes were made after 1977; Chief Martial Law Administrator's Secretariat, for example, used to be the Prime Minister's secretariat, and contains a number of civilians as well as military personnel. They are, however, unwilling to discuss specific figures and numbers of persons involved in martial law duties.

The Higher Direction of War

There has long been a connection between the military's dominance in politics and its reluctance to submit itself to rigorous systems and processes of decision-making, even within its own sphere of activity. As long as the military ruled, the Pakistan Army held effective power in such matters, and army leadership had little interest in joint operations, coordinated planning, and so forth. These might have revealed weaknesses which would have reflected badly on those in power. Writing after the 1971 war in a wide-ranging critical analysis of the military's performance and organization, a distinguished retired lieutenant-general (Fazal Muqeeem Khan) characterized the lack of system in this way:

In Pakistan, at the military level, there has never been any joint planning in the true sense of the word. At best, unilaterally produced service plans have been coordinated through bilateral discussions between the services. The army, the senior service, was usually the sponsor . . . and the other two services formed
an appendage to this plan. The air support which
the navy wanted was never catered for . . . The PAF
plan was exclusively its own and did not take into
consideration its impact on the operations of the
other two services. It never occurred to the [army
or navy] to ask for the PAF plan, including the siting
of planes, deployment of radar, and activation of
airfields. They just accepted what the C-in-C, Air,
promised them vaguely. Consequently, owing to the
lack of joint planning and inter-service coordination,
there were dangerous flaws in the plans of each service.\textsuperscript{22}

Fazal Muqeem's book was the first major step towards changing this
state of affairs. Begun by Bhutto but continued under Zia, there
has been an attempt to replace strategic anarchy with a system for
higher defense policy-making. Bhutto set the military to studying
the task and eventually a White Paper was produced, debated, and
has been tentatively implemented.\textsuperscript{23} The White Paper on Defense
Organisation was part of a concerted effort to ensure that civilian
control would be a permanent feature of Pakistan's defense process.
The Constitution provided harsh punishment for challenging civilian
rule, the White Paper provided the intellectual justification for it.\textsuperscript{24}
At times the White Paper reads more like a lecture to the troops
than a government document, criticizing earlier regimes for incompetence
and mismanagement, but it makes the case for civilian control on
practical grounds:
It is only a representative Government and the exertion by the Government of supreme authority over the country's Defense Establishment that ends the separation of the Armed Forces from the people and eliminates the element of caprice from decisions of war or peace. An unrepresentative regime, lacking a perception of the national interest as distinguished from the interest of a class or group, draws guidance from subjective appreciation . . . and may have no correspondence to realities.

National defense policy is no longer a military affair alone . . . the evolution of national defense policy and its administration requires a) effective political control at the top . . . and b) a number of institutions and agencies at the base, to produce the necessary data and appreciations on which political decisions can be based.25

According to one general who helped write the White Paper, there was agreement between Bhutto and the military on the principle of civilian control. The military saw this "civilian" as restricted to the political leadership:

The first important consideration was that we must accept the principle in Pakistan--as is done in all democratic countries--that the civil supremacy must be maintained; and we still wish to and we still follow that policy that in Pakistan the overall supremacy is that of the civilian government--that is, the chief executive along with the cabinet. But it does not
mean that the rule of the civilian servants in any way, the CSP, in other words. The CSP should not boss around the service chiefs as such. We distinguish between civilian supremacy and the dominance of the civil service officers over the service chiefs.26

This is a critical and revealing point. It shows the limits that the Pakistan military were willing to go in submitting to "civilian" control even when they were demoralized and discredited. Specifically, several generals referred both to periods of their own history during which the civil service became especially powerful (under Ayub), and the example of the Indian defense policy process, where civil servants play a critical role in controlling and directing the military. One senior general recalls a conversation with his Indian counterpart, who complained bitterly that his report of their meeting (to discuss cease-fire demarcation) would be gone over and edited by a "babu" second class clerk. Such conversations may be apocryphal, but the Pakistan Army does know enough about the Indian system to be reluctant to accept it as a complete package, although they certainly have been willing to accept components of it (such as control by a political defense minister and a political prime minister).

The military also studied and rejected the Canadian model of a single armed force. The difficulty of fighting a war with three separate service plans had impressed itself on Bhutto and the military, and the White Paper makes several explicit references to the problem. But the route of unification was thought to be too extreme given the
very great differences between the armed services of Pakistan. The solution has been to achieve a greater degree of operational coordination between the services and encourage a greater degree of joint planning and training.

The structure that emerged after several years of analysis and planning is quite similar to that found in many democratic countries. (See Chart IV-A) It is entirely in place now, but because there is no effective civilian leadership has not really been tested except at the lower levels. Here there has been an attempt to combine representatives of the three services in planning and decision-making, and to develop joint training programs.

At its upper levels the system is filled with anomalies since the man who is Chief of the Army Staff (and therefore technically subordinate to the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister) is also President. The military are not technically members of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (which is responsible for determining the size, role, and shape of the armed forces) yet a military man presides over it and appoints all of its members (who should be elected civilian officials, but are not given the absence of elections). Below the DCC is the Defense Council. The military are members of this Council, which technically is supposed to advise the DCC on military matters; it is supposed to include the External Affairs Minister, Finance Minister and other cabinet members with a special interest in defense policy, and in turn receives recommendations from the
CHART V-A  HIGHER DEFENSE ORGANIZATION IN PAKISTAN, 1976*

HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

**PRIME MINISTER**

Cabinet

Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC)

**DEFENCE MINISTER (PM)**

Defence Council

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

SECRETARY GENERAL DEFENCE

Aviation Division

Defence Production Division

Defence Division

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Chairman

**MEMBERS**

COAS

CNS

CAS

(In Attendance Secretary Defence)

Aircrafts, Aerostats, PIAC ADA, and Air drones

Meteorology

Defence Production Board (Chairman, Members and Secretary)

Defence Science Organization

DG NMP

DG IDP

POPS

Supreme

DG ISI

Fauji Foundation

DMIAC

Armed Services Board

GHQ

AHQ

NHQ

Chief of Joint Plans

Chief of Joint Logistics

DG Medical Services

Dir. of Motivation, Patriotic Training and Discipline

Dir. of Inter-service Public Relations

Dir. of CPS

Dir. Joint Plans

Dir. Joint Training

Dir. Plans and Agreements

EINC

Joint Services Training Institutions

Joint Services Doctrine and Exercises

Mutual Cooperation with Friendly Countries

Inter Services Selection Board

Inter Services Welfare

Canteen Stores Department

*From "Defense Systems of Modern States..." Staff Study, printed in Defense Journal, Vol II, 7-8 (July-August, 1976), p.34*
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, patterned after both the American and British systems. The JCSC gave Pakistan—for the first time—a thoroughly integrated inter-service mechanism for the higher direction of war, and it does function now, although for some time it lacked a chairman (the chairman was a senior army general who resigned when Zia became President). Under the JCSC are a Director-General, Joint Staff (responsible for plans and logistics), and then a complex bureaucracy made up of officers drawn from all three services (but still dominated by the army). At the lower levels the system seems to be functioning but it is impossible for an outsider to speculate as to its effectiveness (indeed, several officers who are not part of this new system of decision-making and planning expressed their puzzlement as to how it actually worked).

What is evident is that for the first time in the history of Pakistan an administrative structure exists above and beyond the army's own chain of command. In military terms, this is vital for several reasons. One, noted above, is the fact that in 1965 and 1971 the three services of Pakistan went to different wars. There was no overall strategic plan and limited tactical cooperation. No one questioned the bravery or fighting qualities of the Pakistani military, but there has been concern that the military—especially the army—has lacked strategic imagination. Pakistan's new security policy making process will (if it is fully implemented) ensure that there will at least be a framework for decision-making. Secondly, it enables the military
and the state to better allocate resources for weapons acquisition and the development of Pakistan's own defense production infrastructure. Again, for the first time, there is central direction of the growing defense production system and a way to process and evaluate individual service requests for weapons. None of this guarantees good decisions but it makes them possible once the entire system is implemented. Until that time (that is, when Pakistan acquires effective civilian leadership) it is likely that the tension generated by having a service chief as head of the state will distort the process. Since officers at the level of the JCSC and the planning staff can be retired or transferred by a decision of their superiors (and at the highest level that means Zia himself) they cannot perform their military duties without calculating political and personal consequences. Unless they seek early retirement, or unless Zia himself is willing to encourage dissent, debate, and discussion between himself and his immediate subordinates, it is likely that the decision-making process will become a series of yes-men, and beneath them, the "nodders," seeking to nod their way up to higher rank.28 This may help keep the peace within the military (which is one condition for Zia's continuation in power), but it hardly resembles the tough-minded and systematic process envisioned in the White Paper.

Conclusion

In his brilliant study of the military and society, Stanislaw Andreski distinguishes between four kinds of "militarism."29 There
is idolisation of the military, rule by the military, the peacetime militarisation of society (even under civilian leadership), and the gearing up of a society for war. Pakistan has only seen the first two, and even then on a sporadic basis. There are many regions of Pakistan in which the military is an alien profession, just as there are districts in the Punjab and NWFP which send every third son into the army. Military rule in Pakistan has been fitful, and even then carried out with some embarrassment and apology. The present regime is no exception. It is a post-post-military regime, and inherits an intellectually exhausted society. Zia’s rule could deteriorate into a violent and corrupt palace politics, ruining the military and destroying the state, but it could be the first step back towards legitimate and effective (and civilian) rule. To realize how this could occur, it must be understood that there was no single cause for military intervention to begin with; there is also no single step which will restore effective civilian rule.

Some of these causes were historical: the movement for Pakistan was led by politicians who did not have a strong political base in what became Pakistan; two of the leading figures in the creation of the state died early or were assassinated. There are also difficulties in creating an explicitly Islamic state that is compatible with British parliamentary traditions and an impetus to social and economic modernization. There is also a reluctance among what the military would call "the right type" of politician to pursue his career in Pakistan, when it is subject to sudden interruption by the military.
Yet, giving history and culture their due weight, internal and organizational forces are at work which encourage the military to intervene in politics, and once in, to persist. Not only does the army believe that it defends society from external enemies, but a number of officers will argue that the military has an important role in ensuring that Pakistan society itself modernizes and yet remains pure and truly Islamic. Not only should the military defend Pakistan, they claim, but Pakistani society must remain worthy of the military. The military was the first all-Pakistan institution (indeed, it existed before the state) and there is still a belief that it is the only one that can keep the country together. A critic would point out that there is more than a little bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy in this argument, since the military has intervened on several occasions when they were dissatisfied with the power or performance of the bureaucracy or the political parties—they will not let the latter become effective national institutions.

Asking whether the military has been pulled into politics (by the incompetence of civilian leadership) against its will, or has pushed its way into politics (to ensure that civilians did not pursue policies anathema to military interests) is therefore the wrong way to approach the problem. Both processes occurred before every military intervention. The way out of this cycle of intervention, reform, demoralization, and breakdown can be specified, but may be unattainable. Many groups are involved. Pakistani civilians must realize the sensitivity of the military to domestic policies which might threaten
the integrity of the military itself; they must also be capable of demonstrating their own competence and authority to run Pakistan. The military is not blameless, and may have to accept a decline in its relative status and influence, as price that must be paid to reduce the necessity of intervention. A series of agreements, compromises, pacts, or understandings—possibly complete with timetables and election schedules—could be worked out between civil and military for the sake of national survival, if not national unity.

This is clearly the central agenda item of Pakistani politics. The military is reluctant to withdraw from power because it does not believe that any of the current civilian leaders are capable of running the state to their own satisfaction. Unsurprisingly, in view of Bhutto's fate, civilians are reluctant to come forward. There is also no assurance that the military will not try to play a critical behind-the-scenes political role even if formal power should pass to a civilian government as in the Turkish model. But the notion of partial military rule is not accepted by most Pakistanis, even in the military, whose perspective has been strongly shaped by the British tradition of parliamentary democracy and civilian control. The discontinuities between civilian and military opinion on these basic questions are enormous.

However, the generals are also aware that they cannot run Pakistan indefinitely. They have before them the example of Ayub Khan who civilianized himself but was then led into a series of foreign policy and domestic political disasters. With a few exceptions the present generation of military leaders freely admit that they do
not have the vision or ambition of Ayub—put another way, they know their limits and do not believe that they can retain political power without this affecting the quality and performance of the military itself.

The military will not satisfy the politicians unless they do allow free elections; those parties (such as the Pakistan People's Party, now headed by Bhutto's wife and daughter) with grievances against the military will probably have to promise that they will not seek retribution; at the same time the military may have to be given a constitutional voice in the making of policies which most strongly concerns them (such as defense and foreign policy). A staged withdrawal (in both senses of the word) would reassure both the military and civilian politicians that both sides were keeping their promises. Realistically, it is unlikely that this will occur. With Bhutto's death it is not clear whether any single party or individual can effectively run Pakistan even if the military remained neutral; nor are there any political figures that seem willing to serve as a front for the military, nor has the military offered a coherent, attractive alternative to some form of civilian democratic government.

However, in addition to military and civilian groups, Pakistan's friends and the states which surround it do contribute to the role that the Pakistan Army will play in politics. There is a link between the special defense and security problems of Pakistan and
the military's role; if Pakistan's neighbors (especially India) feel that the military seize power to prevent civilians from reaching a settlement (a belief which covers only part of the truth) then they have some responsibility for persuading the Pakistan Army that it can live in peace with its giant neighbor and that settlement does not mean sell-out.

So far, there is very little sympathy within India for helping Pakistan find security and then stability—India is burdened with its own problems, and the generals are hardly candidates for sympathy. And, as the Pakistan Army fears, some Indians would like to see Pakistan reduced to the weak dependency status of a Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. No Pakistani officer that I have ever met would support this, and most would agree that any political leadership in Pakistan that consented to such an arrangement would be signing his own death warrant. Thus, as long as the military fear Indian intentions they will exercise a veto over politics. Bhutto was aware of this and could be as hawkish towards India as was necessary to show the military that he was not soft on India. His failure was in managing domestic politics, not foreign policy.

The military is not of one mind on all defense policy questions. There is a range of opinion with regard to India and many Pakistanis in and out of the military do not want to see the continuation of a permanent state of hostility—periodically erupting into war—between
the two states. Far from being unyielding hardliners, many officers acknowledge Pakistan's reduced strategic status and would like to see a peaceful settlement with India. This would reduce one impediment to the permanent return of civilian rule; for without the stabilization of Pakistan's external environment it is hard to see how Pakistan can stabilize its own politics and avoid a new cycle of intervention and collapse, perhaps at increasing levels of violence. The latter is not a pleasant prospect for the army which remains—at least in the abstract—wedded to the idea of civilian control, and which has been—as a practical matter—so badly hurt by its own attempts to "straighten out" politics.
CHAPTER V: IMAGES OF WAR, VISIONS OF PEACE

Pakistan has to fight a three front war. First there are the Indians, who cannot accept our existence. Then there are the Russians, who also want to see us out of the way. Finally there is the third front: at home, against those who would destroy us from within.

retired Lieutenant-General, Pakistan Army (1990)

Pakistan only wants to live in peace, we have no designs on anyone. How could we threaten them [the Indians]? Why don't you realize that we just want to be left alone, but we must be able to defend ourselves and we will do it anyway we can.

Almost Any Senior Pakistan Army Officer (1980)

This monograph has dealt with the internal organization of the military in Pakistan, its relationship to society, and its involvement in politics. We now turn to a brief survey of some important strategic issues which face that state and the responses that Pakistani security experts have formulated. We can at best only provide an introduction to a subject which is undergoing rapid change because of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and apparent Pakistani attempts to acquire a nuclear device. We shall conclude with a discussion of the nuclear question and some general policy suggestions.
Perceptions

Pakistan's foreign and defense policy reflects a complex self-image and world view. Pakistanis see themselves as anti-colonial yet descendants of a militant, conquering religion; Pakistan is clearly located in South Asia but it is also Middle Eastern in character and tradition; until recently Pakistan was the most allied of American allies, yet it is now non-aligned; it is small, vulnerable, and surrounded, yet possesses one of the world's toughest armies and will perhaps soon have nuclear weapons. It is no wonder then that Pakistanis see their environment as threatening and reassuring, often simultaneously. This complex—if not confused—world view can be traced back to Pakistan's origins.

Pakistan was created because of the temporary conjunction of two struggles: that of Indians against British colonial rule, and of some (but not all) Indian Muslims against the domination of Indian Hindus. Many Indian Muslims saw the British as allies against Hindus, yet they also sought an independent homeland, free from British domination. The result was Pakistan. Thus, unlike virtually all other Islamic states today Pakistanis were fighting two enemies: Western imperial domination and that of a different but powerful cultural-religious system. The struggle against the British and the West is over, but almost all Pakistanis (and Bangladeshis, for that matter) still fear continuing conflict with "Hindu India."

Since the creation of Pakistan was strongly opposed by most Hindu
politicians (and a number of Muslim leaders as well, some of whom remained in India), the feeling persists that India has not reconciled itself to the permanent, autonomous and Islamic status of Pakistan. Or, put another way, most Pakistani elites are concerned that the very existence of Pakistan is a goad to India; as long as Indian leaders attempt to maintain a secular state, they claim, a truly religious state such as Pakistan is a provocation and a threat to the stability of India.

Pakistanis also retain an interest in the fate of the millions of Muslims in India (or under Indian control, as in Kashmir). Early Pakistani hopes that these Muslims would somehow develop ties to Pakistan have been tempered by the fear that Pakistan would be swamped by refugees; this, plus the fact that many millions of Muslims seem content to live in India, raises the basic question of the identity of Pakistan itself as a homeland for persecuted Indian Muslims. Should the Indian Muslims be written off? Are they no longer true Muslims—in that they are living in a state dominated by another religion and culture? Or, perhaps, in secret moments of self-doubt, was Pakistan some kind of cosmic error, and would Pakistanis be better off within a powerful, independent, and relatively secure India where they would form an enormously powerful voting bloc? Here, as in very few other areas of the world, perceptions of the international system are directly related to national identity, and may lead one to question the very existence of the state.
A second Islamic path leads Pakistan to look to their Muslim neighbors to the West, especially Iran, Afghanistan and the oil-rich Gulf states. Pakistan has been among the leaders in attempts to forge Islamic solidarity but it has often found that the Islamic world is no less fickle than the West. In times of crisis some Islamic states have come to Pakistan's assistance--but usually in token fashion--while others have been neutral. Pakistan has developed substantial economic and cultural ties with some of the Gulf states, but Islam has not bridged the differences between it and Iran and Afghanistan. Indeed, Islam now creates major difficulties in both cases: many Pakistanis are concerned about the capture of the Iranian revolution by Shi'ite fundamentalists, and Soviet operations in Afghanistan places Pakistan between their fellow Muslims, being brutally crushed, and the vastly superior Soviet occupation forces. Blunt and explicit public Soviet threats remind Pakistanis of their vulnerability.  

Layered over this belief in their special religious role are perceptions of an historically pre-destined geo-strategic destiny. Pakistan comprises the Western and Northern reaches of the old British Indian Empire. It was the last area to be conquered by the British; indeed, large parts of Pakistan were never directly ruled by them. Beyond Pakistan lies territories and kingdoms which became the modern state of Afghanistan; it was in Afghanistan that the
expanding British and Russian empires met and clashed in the "Great Game" of Kim, Kipling, and Lord Curzon. Since the old British Indian Army was preoccupied with defense of the Frontier against Russian influence the young Pakistani officers who received their training from the British came to share the view that Pakistan inherited the responsibility of protecting the entire Indian sub-continent from Russian-Soviet advances. Pakistanis took this role seriously, not least because it led them into alliance with the British and Americans in the 1950s and served as the justification for massive arms transfers from the U.S., membership in SEATO and CENTO, and a staunch anti-communism at home. It is little consolation to the present Pakistani leadership that their concern about Soviet penetration in Afghanistan was not taken seriously in 1978; Pakistan may be the country that cried wolf once too often.

A concern with Soviet influence also led the Pakistanis to a close relationship with the People's Republic of China long before journeys to Peking became fashionable. Here there were other factors: both states saw India as a security threat, as India's ties with the Soviet Union grew rapidly in the 1960s.

Pakistan's image of itself as the guardian of the Khyber Pass against Soviet expansionism implies a powerful military capability. Until recently most Indian strategists vehemently disagreed with this view. They saw a strong Pakistan as disruptive: their image
of regional stability envisioned Pakistan as an Afghanistan: a weak, not a strong buffer. A strong buffer attracts attention, a weak one can be maintained by agreement among the concerned major powers and is not likely to go off on adventurous paths. This difference in perception of what causes instability, and of whether Pakistan should play an active or a passive buffer role is critical and we shall return to it below; I believe it to be one of the most important agenda items in any discussion on how to deal with the Soviet presence in South Asia and how to curb nuclear proliferation.

To summarize: Pakistan's perception of the international environment is complex and multi-layered. It defines the world in its own terms, as do most other states: it is Islamic—it has strong but ambivalent ties to Muslims in India and other predominately Muslim states; it is astride the historic invasion routes to South Asia—but neither its neighbors nor the superpowers agree that it is necessarily geopolitically important because of that; it seeks to play a role in regional and international affairs, and has an enormous pool of trained, educated manpower—yet it is surrounded by two giant states (India and the U.S.S.R.) which make Pakistanis feel insecure and threatened. Those historic "friends" of Pakistan which have resources (the U.S., Britain, some Arab States) are distant and unreliable; nearby friends (China, Iran) are either unreliable or otherwise occupied with their own security.
Strategic Analysis

Pakistan has one of the most complex threat analyses of any state in the world. To the east is India, a state with vastly superior industrial resources and a much larger human base; to the west lies Afghanistan—never a friendly power, but now occupied for the foreseeable future by the Soviet Union. At home—the third front—there are important grievances. As we have discussed in earlier chapters, these include dislike of military rule. Further, in two of Pakistan's provinces there are important populations with strong ethnic and tribal ties across the border in Afghanistan; even on the Indian frontier there is an unresolved dispute over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. Domestic Pakistani politics remain intimately linked to political relations with Pakistan's neighbors; any analysis of threats to Pakistan's security must emphasize this overlap between internal and external problems. Additionally, many Pakistani elites, especially in the military, raise questions about the loyalty of their "intellectuals, poets, and professors" to both Islam and the state of Pakistan. A fear held by some generals is that such ideologically "impure" groups constitute a massive fifth column.

On the ground, specific conventional military threats have been identified. While civilian strategists tend to treat states as abstract statistical entities, army staffs are taught to look first to geography and terrain. One senior general, closely associated with strategic planning, sees Pakistan's geo-military problem in these terms:
Ideally, a country is safe when it has a very large area but a very small frontier to defend; on the other hand, a country that has a small area but must defend its entire frontier is very precariously placed. And Pakistan happens to be in that difficult position (although not quite so severely as Israel, another officer interjects) although we have a large surface area but we must defend our entire border, 1100 miles on the East and now [January, 1980] an equal number of miles on the West, with Afghanistan and also an unstable Iran. And we have a coastline of almost 500 miles to defend—then in the North we have a not very friendly neighbor [the U.S.S.R.]. So therefore Pakistan finds itself in a position that its geography forces it to defend almost every inch of its territory.

Further, the particular shape of Pakistan and the distribution of its population and lines of communication severely complicates the defense problem:

Pakistan is narrow, that is from north to south our lines of communication, our industrial centers, our towns, our major cities lie fairly close to a country [India] that is not very friendly with us, and with which we have a border that has no geographical impediments: no major river divides us, no high range of mountains separate us from our potential enemy. It is an area where tanks can roll easily, whether it be desert on the plains of Punjab. Our other borders are not quite so vulnerable, but they can be penetrated, even our sea coast is open.
Two major wars were fought over the Punjab-Sind-Rajasthan frontier; at its northern end there is a ceasefire line which is appropriate guerrilla territory. Parts of the cease-fire line are observed rather ineffectively by a token U.N. presence which serves no real peacekeeping function. Pakistan's only port, Karachi is close to the Indian frontier. It can be attacked by land and air, and blockaded very quickly by any state (such as India) with a moderate naval capability.

To the west is the Durand Line, the historic frontier between British India and Afghanistan. Until recently the Durand Line was publicly challenged by the Afghan government, although its legitimacy now seems to be accepted on both sides. However, as we noted, a number of major tribes straddle this frontier. Almost a million tribals have sought refuge with their kinsmen in Pakistan as a result of Soviet military activity; more will follow.

When military assistance to Pakistan was being publicly discussed in the U.S. in early 1980 it was often asserted that such assistance was useless because Pakistan was helpless in the face of the Soviet threat. In fact, this is not the view of the Pakistan military themselves. They analyze the threat from Afghan/Russian forces in the following way. 1) If for some reason the Soviet Union wanted to undertake a massive invasion of the North-West Frontier Province, there is little that Pakistan could do to stop them; however, there is little incentive for the Soviets to undertake an invasion which leads
them away from the strategic prize of the Persian Gulf. 2) A
massive Soviet push through Baluchistan, either towards the Arabian
Sea or en route to Iran, makes somewhat more strategic sense but
might precipitate American intervention whether or not there was a
Pakistan-U.S. agreement; Pakistan itself could do little that would
prevent the Soviets from achieving such an objective, but as in the
case of #1, it could (at considerable risk to itself) resist with
ground and air forces. 3) Far more likely, but far more containable,
would be direct Soviet or (Soviet-supported) Afghan attacks on refugee
camps in Pakistan—some of which are within artillery range of
Afghanistan and most of which could be struck by air or ground
raids. While Pakistan could not prevent such attacks it might
do some damage to the attackers and retaliate upon support facilities
in Afghanistan. It could also increase the flow of weapons to the
Afghans, offer training to them, and allow Pakistani "volunteers"
to join them, as the Indian Government allowed Indian Army personnel
to join the Mukti Bahini. There is no evidence that Pakistan has
done any of these things, but they could form part of a response
to Soviet-Afghan pressure on Pakistan's highly permeable border.
4) Finally, there remains the possibility of long-haul Soviet
support for Baluchi and other tribal groups in their continuing
struggle against the Government of Pakistan. Such a struggle
could probably be contained by the present Pakistani government; if
it could not, it might affect the integrity of the state, its economic
base, and the loyalty of most of its citizens.
Even before the rise of the Soviet threat Pakistani planners had to assume that a conflict with India could develop very quickly, so quickly that there would not be time to raise new forces. Further, the length and magnitude of the border means a small, fast moving mobile force would not be able to cover it. Unlike Israel dealing with several Arab armies, it is improbable that Pakistan could strike in one place, defeat an Indian force, and then rapidly re-deploy and strike elsewhere. It no longer has air superiority, it cannot raise new forces during the course of a short war, and its present army--while a strain on resources--is still less than half the size of the Indian Army. Finally it would be impossible to move large numbers of troops from north to south during a war without a considerable improvement in road and rail transport and the assurance of freedom of movement. The problem is insurmountable when one considers the possibility of simultaneous pressure on the Afghan frontier. Even the British never expected the Indian Army to hold out against a hypothetical Russian or German invasion of Baluchistan or NWFP, and imperial strategy assumed that the Indian Army would only delay the enemy until a BEF arrived.11

When considering this defense problem from the perspective of a military staff, it is clear that something must give way. A number of responses have recently been discussed publicly and privately.
1) Pakistan has tried to acquire new conventional weapons, especially high performance aircraft and armor, and is trying to manufacture some of these itself, with limited success on both counts.

2) The idea of a militia, or lightly armed defense force to defend large amounts of territory at low cost has been revived;

3) Privately, some generals will seriously discuss the possibility of rapprochement with one or more of Pakistan's more dangerous neighbors, even the Soviet Union, in order to reduce the threat of a two-front war.

4) Nuclear weapons are often talked about as a possible substitute for conventional defense forces.

We will discuss the nuclear program at greater length below but a few remarks are appropriate here. There is evidence to indicate that Pakistan took nuclear weapons seriously long before the 1974 Indian explosion. In any case, the nuclear program has apparently been continued by the military after they removed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from power in 1977. Pakistanis now assume Indian possession of several nuclear weapons. They feel that such weapons are directed primarily against Pakistan, not China. Pakistani strategists generally ridicule the idea of India catching up with the Chinese or that there are serious grounds for an India-China conflict. The military rationale for an Indian bomb is to enable Indian conventional forces to seize the rest of Kashmir from Pakistan or even to dismember all of Pakistan; nuclear weapons held in reserve as a threat against Lahore, Karachi,
Islamabad, and other vital targets would effectively paralyze Pakistan and make it unable to resist. Finally, they conclude that a modest, "limited" Pakistani weapons program is essential to deter India's nuclear forces. Thus, their pursuit of fissile material through both the reprocessing and enrichment routes, and perhaps other channels of which we are not yet aware.

Strategic Style

The preparation of strategic doctrine in Pakistan closely resembles an attempt to hit multiple moving targets from a moving vehicle. Not only are the forces and threats to Pakistan in constant flux but the capacity of the state itself to respond to such threats has dramatically changed within a short time. For example: in 1965, the decision not to defend East Pakistan was reaffirmed and only token forces were stationed there; this neglect of East Bengal contributed to growing separatism in that province; however, the units necessary to control that separatism could not be released from West Pakistan because the Indian military continued to pose a threat there. Another example: Pakistan is faced with the prospect of incursions along the Durand Line but it cannot risk a massive transfer of forces to its western frontier for fear of leaving its border with India open to attack. Yet it must not run the risk of allowing incursions to occur right now because of the relatively weak political position of the military in the country; one major military defeat might mean the end for
those responsible for strategic planning. In both of these cases Pakistan did not (or does not) have the resources to enable it to fight a two-front war, yet there were (and are) compelling political reasons to prevent it from redefining the strategic threat so that it would not have to fight such a war; one of these was and is the hope that outside powers will provide substantial military assistance to Pakistan (or, in the case of China, create a two-front problem for India), but even this outside support is unreliable and unpredictable. Despite Pakistan's essential strategic dilemma—it is a big enough state to play the game, but not big enough to win—it has evolved a strategic style, which might also be called a strategic doctrine. These are the main components of that style, which has remained remarkably consistent over the years.

Given Pakistan's size, location, and the terrain along its eastern border with India, its strategists have always been attracted to the doctrine of the "offensive-defense." That is, in time of heightening crisis Pakistan has not hesitated to be the first to employ the heavy use of force in order to gain an initial advantage. This was clearly the pattern in 1965 and possibly in 1971; in both cases it was thought that a short, sharp war would achieve Pakistan's military as well as political objectives. However, this strategy has always assumed the availability of high performance armor and aircraft and superior generalship, given India's larger territory.
and population. Looking at a map, it is easy to see why Pakistanis have always been reluctant to adopt a strategy of trading space for time.

Second, Pakistan has usually regarded war as an opportunity to bring outstanding conflicts to the attention of the international community and to mobilize its friends among the Islamic world and fellow alliance members (and more recently, the PRC). But over the years the world has grown tired of Indians and Pakistanis shooting at each other. Pakistan cannot count on anyone caring much about a new war with India, and at the same time its capacity to avoid defeat at the hands of the Indians has been sharply reduced. War for political purposes now represents an enormous risk to the survival of the state.

A third component of Pakistani strategic doctrine has been to use military force to deter an Indian attack. In recent years this has become the dominant theme of Pakistani defense planners since they realize that the risk of initiating war becomes greater. In the words of one major-general responsible for defense planning,

The posture that we have decided to adopt is a policy of "strategic defense." You can call it a policy of deterrence or whatever, but it is our policy to maintain adequate armed forces to insure that our territorial integrity and independence is assured.
And a brigadier interjected,

we think that we have a threat from India—we may be wrong, but that is what we think. To meet that what we must have is a minimum force which would be a deterrent. Now to maintain that, we have a problem of financing it, it affects our economic needs. But we want to be in a position where no adventurist feels that he is attracted to our side.

Bluntly put, some Pakistanis hope to kill as many Indian soldiers as they can, raising the cost of an Indian attack to unacceptable levels.

In view of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistani strategists have now begun to develop a strategic doctrine to deal with various kinds and levels of threats from the west. As we indicated above, present force levels are adequate to deal with insurgency and limited probes by conventional Afghan forces across the border. But no forces would be adequate to deal with a major Soviet thrust backed by the threat of nuclear attack on troop concentrations or urban areas. Pakistan is forced to play a very dangerous game: maintaining enough of a military presence to deal with (and thus deter) limited probes, but not so large a force that either the Soviets fear Pakistani intervention on behalf of the Mujahiddin or that units facing India are depleted.

Two different kinds of strategic responses have been widely discussed in Pakistan and must be noted here. The nuclear option
we have already referred to will be examined below. The other grows out of three military traditions, all of them familiar to the Pakistan Army. This may be termed a "people's guerrilla war". It argues that instead of relying for deterrence and defense upon very expensive and very high technology weapons, nuclear or conventional, that Pakistan train and arm its population so that any invader would be unable to occupy the country. The cost of victory would be so great that such an invader (presumably India) would have to retreat or would be deterred from attacking at the beginning. A variation on this people's guerrilla war involves a more activist strategy: train and arm friendly populations in the territory of your enemy, tying him down in a hundred places. This strategic doctrine borrows from American Special Forces training imparted to many Pakistanis, recent Chinese writing, and the two-thousand year old tradition of tribal guerrilla war that is found in Pakistan's NWFP and Baluchistan.

People's guerrilla war is unlikely to be favored by the current military leadership of Pakistan. It had been tried earlier in Kashmir and was not successful. Whether this was due to the un-warlike character of the Kashmiris or poor planning is not clear. What is certain is that the military of Pakistan favor regular, conventional formations, except for light patrol and police work in the tribal areas. Further, it is highly unlikely that a relatively unpopular regime will supervise the widespread dispersal of small arms and explosives to its own population. Finally, Pakistanis have the
terrible example of Afghanistan before their eyes. The Afghans have a proud and ancient martial tradition, but this has merely slowed down the Soviet military machine; the price of their resistance is fearful. Would a Pakistani accommodation—even with the Indians—be preferable to Cambodization?

The strategic choices open to Pakistan never were terribly attractive, and are now increasingly risky and limited in number. It would be suicide for the Pakistan Army to provoke a confrontation with the Indian forces today; even managing limited incursions from the Indian or Afghan frontier runs great risks of escalation; above all, there remains the new possibility of active Indian-Soviet cooperation, based on the 1971 Treaty of Friendship, which places Pakistan in a hopeless strategic position. As one distinguished retired general phrases it: "I have eaten many chicken sandwiches, but this is the first time I have ever realized what it is like to be the chicken." However, a full assessment of Pakistan's strategic problem is not complete without looking at two additional factors: the weapons and manpower that Pakistan is able to devote to its defense.

Force Levels and Disposition

A brief examination of Pakistan's defense effort further clarifies the strategic dilemma of that state. The numbers and quality of weapons held by the Pakistan military is determined by factors largely beyond
their control: the attitudes of weapons suppliers, of financial supporters, and the slow growth rate of the Pakistani arms industry. The actual disposition of forces was severely limited by geography even before the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; that event complicates even the simplest defense task. We will look at the geo-military problem in this section and take note of Pakistan's arms production capabilities in the context of a discussion of allies and arms suppliers.

When the British ruled South Asia, the old Indian Army had four major tasks. One was internal security: large numbers of troops were stationed in cantonments located outside major population centers. Another role was to patrol the long (and sometimes undefined) frontier around India. Third, the military was used intermittently as an expeditionary force. Indian and Pakistani Army units even today carry such places as Cassino, Peking, Lhasa, Basra, El Alemain, Burma, Saigon, and Japan on their battleflags. Finally, the Indian Army maintained a series of forts and posts in the Northwest, and engaged in a number of campaigns, the purpose of which was to check an advancing Russian Empire.

With some modification the Pakistan military today still carries out internal security, border patrol, and expeditionary tasks. The latter now takes the shape of thousands of officers and men serving
as pilots, gunners, advisors, and training cadres in a number of foreign military establishments, especially in the Middle East. But it has, in effect, given up the task of checking Russian/Soviet advances in exchange for a new role, that of preparing for conventional ground war against India. Most of the Pakistan Army's 400,000 soldiers and approximately 900 tanks are dedicated to the long border with India. There is a clear discontinuity between the self-image of the Pakistan military as the legatees of the British side in the "Great Game" of Central Asian politics, balancing out the Russians, and the reality of Pakistani troop dispositions. There is also a substantive reason for the discontinuity. In 1947-8 Pakistan could not afford to maintain a far-flung and costly series of forts (let alone challenge the Soviets in Afghanistan or elsewhere) without the complete backing of a major power and at the same time defend against India.

Thus, Pakistan's main-line forces, organized into approximately twenty divisions, grouped into six corps, largely face east, not west. One corps, based in Peshawar, probably has two infantry divisions; another, located in Quetta, is in the process of formation, but four major corps (containing most of Pakistan's armor) face the Indian Army in the east.

The troops that actually patrol the border, especially along the Afghan frontier and in Kashmir, are usually not regular army but belong to one of several special units. Units such as the Mohmand
Scouts, the Pishin Scouts, and the Khyber Rifles are raised from local tribes but are officered by regular Pakistan Army officers on deputation. While quite small in numbers, they effectively combine romance, firepower and mobility. Because of their local ties, their actual use is a serious political as well as military decision—they may be fighting their own kinsmen. Yet when they are used it is often seen as a "local" matter; their presence is considerably more acceptable than that of regular Pakistan Army units which may be drawn from distant provinces. These scouts thus stand somewhere between the regular army and local police units with some of the firepower of the former and the local contacts and mobility of the latter.

Pakistan did have a major urban-oriented paramilitary force—the Federal Security Force—but it was disbanded after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was removed from power. The FSF was resented by the military and hated by the population. Today regular army units stationed near urban centers have auxiliary "aid to the civil" responsibilities when the police are unable to cope.

As we have noted, there are special topographical problems associated with the defense of Pakistan. Lahore and the main north-south railway, canal, and road transportation systems are very close to India and must be protected at all costs with static formations. Pakistan's only port, Karachi, is 800 miles away from Islamabad, and far from the likely scene of major combat in Kashmir and the Punjab.
The two most rebellious provinces, Baluchistan and NWFP, do not have well developed road or rail systems (except for the Khyber-Peshawar area). Quetta (the capital of Baluchistan) is screened by a number of small mountain ranges, although it does have rail connections. But the rest of Baluchistan is both inaccessible and inhospitable. The army cannot count on quickly moving units around Pakistan during a major crisis. New threats—such as that from the Afghan border—require new units, and Pakistan would probably like to raise several new divisions dedicated to the Durand Line.

Before 1980 the Pakistan Air Force was entirely oriented towards the Indian border. The situation is now transformed. Most of Pakistan's major military airfields were placed well back from the Indian border; this now means that they are very close to the Afghan frontier and major Afghan military airports. Published reports indicate that the Soviet Union has introduced a large number of aircraft and missiles into Afghanistan, supplementing aircraft already supplied to the Afghan Air Force. Some of these aircraft are less than a minute's flying time from Pakistan, and the PAF finds itself vulnerable to a surprise attack from the west. It must assume that if there were to be major Soviet or Afghan incursions into Pakistan—in hot pursuit of Afghan tribesmen or for purposes of harassment—that PAF airfields would be under attack. This has led the PAF to generate a minimal requirement for improved advanced warning and SAM systems and substantial numbers of new high performance aircraft.
Weapons Acquisition and Arms Transfers

This discussion of the possible expansion of the army and air force brings us to one of the central constraints on the Pakistani military—their dependence upon outside sources for weapons.

Pakistan is a very large country and possesses a substantial pool of educated, trained manpower, yet, it cannot manufacture a crankshaft. Pakistan became completely dependent upon the U.S. in the 1950s for all major and most minor kinds of equipment, and it was not until 1965, when American arms transfers were practically terminated, that Pakistanis began to think seriously about building up an indigenous arms industry. Since 1965 there has been considerable progress in that direction, largely with Chinese and French help, but Pakistan is still dependent for new tanks, APCs, aircraft of all kinds, soft-skinned vehicles, artillery, electronics, radar, and fire control systems, and many other items. Pakistan does produce virtually all of its light infantry weapons (the excellent G-3 rifle and a machine gun both built under West German license), most ammunition, shells, explosives, recoilless rifles and mortars, and it has recently acquired the capacity to completely rebuild and reconstruct its 700 Chinese supplied T-59 tanks and French Mirage III aircraft. It will soon be able to rebuild the Chinese F-6 (MiG. 19) aircraft and it can undertake major repairs on most of its heavy armored vehicles.

Since a number of these projects are geared to an international market (the Mirage rebuild facility expects to handle aircraft from
all over the Middle East and Asia) it can be said that Pakistan belongs to the category of "intermediate" arms supplier. It must acquire the most advanced equipment from others yet it is also capable of supplying simpler arms. Since some of these projects have been bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, there is some truth in the claim that Pakistan hopes to become the arsenal of the Islamic world. But this is a long-term prospect, fraught with difficulties and risks, and Pakistan cannot wait until it develops an indigenous capacity to manufacture high performance weapons. For these it must turn to the commercial international arms market or its friends.

Except for the Chinese, who have earned a reputation among the Pakistanis for their steadfastness, reliability and tact—if not for the quality of their technology—the fact is that Pakistan no longer has "friends" who are reliable suppliers of key weapons—whether for cash, credit, or as a grant. The French will sell Mirage and other weapons, but for cash—which means reliance upon the states that will provide it. The U.S. has had an extremely restrictive policy of arms transfers to South Asia, since 1967—a policy which was virtually identical to that adopted by Jimmy Carter as a global arms transfer policy in 1977. The Soviet Union has provided a limited number of T-55 tanks to Pakistan, but demanded a settlement of the Kashmir issue as the price of further assistance. In almost all other cases there are special obstacles, and indeed few other states make the kinds of weapons that Pakistanis feel they must have. Pakistan has acquired a small number of weapons from a large number of states, but on an
irregular basis. This presents serious problems of compatibility. For example, the artillery comes from the U.S., China, Great Britain, Italy, and North Korea, which raises difficulties of coordination, ammunition supply, and training (although Pakistani gunners claim that because of their weapons diversity their personnel are among the most flexible and innovative in the world).\textsuperscript{23}

Two factors stand in the way of Pakistan's attempts to acquire high performance aircraft and substantial amounts of armor and other weapons. One, alluded to above, is cost. By any standards, Pakistan is not a rich country, and its economy has been in serious trouble since the 1971 war with India.\textsuperscript{24} Further, the acquisition of a modern weapon represents only the beginning of its cost: a rough figure is that 50% of the original price will have to be spent on repairs, spare parts, and replacements; in some cases this work must be done in the country of origin.

But another restriction on arms transfers is of equal importance. It is that politically many potential arms suppliers do not wish to incite India's wrath. The Indian government has long had an obsession with preventing the transfer of any weapons to Pakistan—and only the recent Soviet invasion has caused them to ak problem through. India and Pakistan are in many ways quite similar states, yet India is larger and more powerful. Very few Western and even very few Islamic states want to alienate India for the sake of an arms sale
to Pakistan. Only China (for obvious reasons) and France (which sees Pakistan as an entry route into the Islamic world, and in any case sells little to India) have recently provided major weapons to Pakistan. Until recently, Pakistan could only come out second best in such a competition with India. It remains to be seen whether Pakistan will benefit from the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan.25

The Nuclear Option

The military in Pakistan do not like nuclear weapons--no soldier really likes them. A few active and retired generals have spoken and written in opposition to a Pakistani nuclear program; most have come to accept the idea of a nuclear weapon with varying degrees of enthusiasm.26 Pakistan did not rush into a nuclear weapons program without some consideration of the relevance of such weapons to the security environment of the state. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had long been an advocate of a Pakistani nuclear option (that is, a civilian program which could be converted to military uses), but it was not until 1974 that the military seriously addressed itself to the strategic implications of an Indian--and then a Pakistani--nuclear weapon.27 Their analysis had two major points.

First, nuclear weapons are most effective in deterring other nuclear weapons, but that the only time that nuclear weapons have been used was when the enemy did not have them; thus, Pakistan was terribly vulnerable to what was assumed to be an Indian military nuclear
program. Second, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons was not only an effective deterrent at the nuclear level, it had led to the avoidance of direct war between states that possessed nuclear weapons. While it is true that the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons was not necessarily in Pakistan's interests, it did not threaten those interests since the states most likely to confront Pakistan already either had nuclear weapons or were capable of acquiring them. Nor did the behavior of Pakistan's allies do much to challenge the obvious implications of this analysis: China had long refused to transfer nuclear technology and subscribed to a doctrine of self-reliance in nuclear matters; the American government at first seemed to ignore the Indian explosion but then turned its fury upon both India and Pakistan for failing to sign the NPT. It was in any case unwilling to provide conventional weapons to Pakistan in sufficient number to balance an Indian nuclear capacity; there is some doubt whether any quantity of arms can, for most Pakistanis, balance a nuclear weapon in Indian hands.

The Pakistanis apparently reached the same conclusion that most other states would reach when faced with a growing conventional military imbalance, domestic disorder, and shaky allies. A small nuclear program would enable them to do in nuclear terms what their armor divisions and air force do in conventional terms: punish an Indian attack so severely that it will be deterred to begin with. And the bonus is that such deterrence would work against a massive conventional attack as well. One does not have to be an Indian strategist to also
calculate that a Pakistani bomb might enable Pakistan to reopen the
Kashmir issue by the threat of force: if nuclear weapons deter each
other they may also inhibit direct military conflict between states
that possess them; a Pakistani leadership that was bold enough could
attack and seize Kashmir at a time when India was in disarray.
Pakistani analysts make the opposite case: an Indian government
could do the same. Brinkmanship is not the usual style of either
state, but it has been tried by both in the past.

Possession of the bomb will entangle both India and Pakistan in
an endless series of calculations of "if I do this, he will do that,
and I will have to respond, so why don't I move first?" But in the
present state of bi-lateral nuclear options the same calculations are
necessarily carried out and this has served to increase the pressure
within the two governments to go ahead with military nuclear programs
as insurance against the other side. India's situation is complicated
by the existence of a Chinese nuclear force which might be targeted
on India itself. The fact that a Pakistani nuclear weapon would
nearly lead to an Indian one is not in itself a sufficient barrier
for Pakistan: they have probably not thought through the strategic
balance of forces that would result from unlimited proliferation in
South Asia, but they do not think that it will be more disadvantageous than
the present situation (in which they assume that India already has
a covert nuclear capacity). If Indians find this conclusion to be
in error, let them privately reassure the Pakistan government in
whatever way that will be convincing.
To sum up, there are enormously persuasive strategic reasons for Pakistan to go ahead with a military nuclear program, even if the political, diplomatic, and economic cost is substantial. Assuming then that Pakistan is going to acquire a nuclear weapon, can we speculate on its strategic role? There has been some interesting discussion of this question in Pakistan recently and a few remarks can be offered.

As in the case of India, Pakistani nuclear planners will have the choice of utilizing their nuclear force for tactical or strategic ends. That is, they can be used against massed troop concentrations or they can be dropped on urban populations as sheer terror weapons. Given the nature of both economies, there are also a range of targets which are of an ambivalent character. These would include major power production centers, dams, and irrigation projects; none of these would directly cause much loss of life—according to preliminary studies—and would thus not be "provocative" in the way that the destruction of urban areas would be; but such attacks might in the long run cause more loss of life. 29

What writing that does exist on the subject would seem to indicate that Pakistani strategists favor the most dramatic (but realistically the most conservative) use of nuclear weapons. We have discussed this at length in Chapter III, in the context of a discussion of Islam and strategic doctrine. Nuclear weapons are "terror" weapons par excellence. There is no need to use them; mere possession is
enough to frighten off the threat; the Quran, and modern deterrence theory neatly dovetail. Such a strategy would also simplify the command and control problem of Pakistan and would require the minimum number of weapons. It would also simplify targeting and delivery requirements since accuracy and timing are not crucial. If proliferation does come to the Subcontinent it is possible that both India and Pakistan would adopt such deterrence-cum-terror strategies at first, and then, when a stockpile of fissionable material is developed, consider diverting some of this stockpile to produce a few "tactical" nuclear weapons. This could well happen if Pakistan felt that it was falling further behind in its conventional arms imbalance with India, and that its stockpile of "strategic" weapons was not adequate to deter a conventional war.

All of this is grim but does not make Pakistanis irresponsible for engaging in such calculations. It is the melancholy duty of the professional soldier to think of such things. Nor is there much substance in the charge that Pakistan is somehow a candidate for "crazy" status: that it would irresponsibly detonate nuclear weapons or that it would transfer them to areas of the world where they would be likely to be used. The military of Pakistan have done self-destructive things in the past, and it cannot be assumed that they will not do them in the future. But I believe that the Pakistan Army will in its professional character; it is not likely to engage in any more irresponsibly than any other country in the same perplexing set of security constraints.
If a Pakistani bomb has some relevance to the threat of India, what relevance is it to Pakistan's new hot frontier with Afghanistan or to the turmoil of domestic politics? The same reasoning that applies to a hypothetical Indian attack upon Pakistan may be relevant to a hypothetical Soviet Afghan attack. Pakistan would be no match for an all-out attack, nor would nuclear weapons be of much practical use, but they might contribute something to the deterrent force at work: they could also serve as a plausible substitute for several new divisions; Pakistan would not be threatening the Soviet Union itself, but only a neighbor acting with clear hostile intent. Given the vulnerability of Pakistan, such a threat might be as credible as an Israeli "Masada" bomb. But there is a rub.

If Pakistan were in such dire straits that it actually contemplated the use of a nuclear weapon against an attacking enemy it might have already lost the military edge which would allow it to credibly deliver such a weapon upon enemy targets. If confronted with the Soviet Air Force (or even the Indian Air Force, let alone a combination of the two), would a handful of PAF-nuclear capable aircraft survive an initial attack or get through fully alerted and hostile air defense screens? Pakistan might well find its nuclear force both provocative and ineffective.

While a Pakistani nuclear weapon would be greeted with widespread support at home (it is practically the only issue that Pakistanis do agree on), there is some doubt that it will help any regime that does build, test, and deploy it. This is the "life insurance" facet of nuclear weapons; as the Indians have discovered a number of years
Influence this process if meant bear three points in mind. If the U.S. wishes to
means of policy and strategic discourse, to
for status and symbolic gratification, and their utility as history-
action-reaction syndrome (arms race), their relevance to a search
will (because of the presence of technology), the presence of an
is not casual. States seek nuclear weapons (and other weapons as
become more rather than less stable, and this proliferation process
South Asian states and between the region and external powers may
levels—should the region become nuclearized—relate between
nuclear material; nor is more necessarily less; at certain force
not end with a test detonation, let alone the acquisition of special
proliferation is not an equal as much as a process; the process does
understand that it is a complex affecting national attention.
whites to influence the proliferation process in South Asia to meet
of a role notes some of these other motives for Pakistan. If any state
concern for the survival of regime and state, concern one in table
it is propelled by many motives, the most important of which is a
our analyses of the drive to acquire a nuclear capability includes

Non-proliferation and Non-Proliferation Policy

barest account the need to normalize
possession creates some peace and public anxiety, but possession
ago—and all other nuclear powers have found out earlier—non-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOITO</th>
<th>SOME APPROPRIATE INITIATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deter Indian N weapons</td>
<td>freeze in Indian NW program and private demonstration of that to Pakistan (with Indian cooperation?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balance Indian conventional superiority with NW</td>
<td>Argue: dangers of action-reaction syndrome, especially one which is likely to lead to all-out Indian program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use NW to re-open Kashmir issue</td>
<td>help Pak to maintain adequate conventional deterrent (but joint Indo-Pak determination of &quot;adequate&quot;)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deter Soviet-Afghan attack, infringement on Pak territory</td>
<td>pre-empt by encouraging both states to complete unfinished business of Simla Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deter Soviet nuclear threat</td>
<td>provide conventional capability to raise cost of attack, and political support to help deter it, both with tacit Indian approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building a NW will enhance status, influence, and leverage within Islamic world</td>
<td>argue that possession may attract such threats; work towards no N use against non-N power agreement with U.S.S.R.; PRC may play a major role here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building a NW will revive flagging U.S. interest in Pak security and survival?</td>
<td>support civilian N program as sublimation, harsh sanctions for NW transfer or technology leakage where important U.S. interests at stake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prestige of N technology, desire to enhance N civilian capability</td>
<td>submit cheerfully to blackmail if it is in mutual and regional interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW as domestic political issue</td>
<td>support safeguarded expansion of Pak N power energy program, even if it does not make overwhelming economic sense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>refrain from insisting on public rejection of NW option</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, no outside state can influence Indian or Pakistani nuclear decisions without allocating resources to support its policy. A strategy of "making faces," as Hans Morgenthau terms it, cannot work when genuine interests are involved. Compare for a moment the material sacrifices and intellectual effort that the U.S. expends on South Asia with that devoted to our nuclear-strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. The U.S. builds billion dollar bargaining chips to deter a war which cannot be fought but is unwilling to do anything of proportionate dimensions to acquire a seat at the South Asian strategic table.

Second, such a seat does not mean dominance. The U.S. cannot--nor should it--become the "controller" of the arms race in South Asia. America's role in South Asia has always been marginal to its own vital interests but this marginal role has had enormous consequences for regional states. The U.S. must learn to coordinate its own limited regional interests with those common interests of regional states. This means neither attempting to impose its views nor allowing regional states a veto of its policy; several administrations have been unable to avoid either excess.

Third, our anti-proliferation policy may have to point to the next level of arms control. It is unlikely that we can get through this decade without seeing additional detonations in South Asia (partly because I do not think we will expend the resources that are necessary to persuade India or Pakistan not to weaponize their
nuclear programs). But we probably can succeed in limiting explosions to tests, or to a covert rather than overt stockpile, and to the development of regional arms control relationships which ensures some degree of stability as proliferation takes place.

Aristotle cautioned his students against pursuing the "best" state rather than the "best possible" state. In the past few months there has been a flurry of interest in the security of South and West Asian states but policy seems to have lurched from one quick fix to another. To deal effectively with the proliferation process of South Asia—and to enable the states of South Asia to deal with the more basic threats to their security—slow rates of economic development, the unequal distribution of wealth, and political order—requires more than quick fixes. The best strategy for dealing with nuclear proliferation may not be the best possible strategy if it triggers off a conventional war.

The irony is that the "best strategy" that this and the previous administration have developed to deal with the proliferation problem may also have had the result of increasing rather than decreasing the rate of proliferation. Now is the time to think about "best possible" strategies. Such strategies would have to identify the minimum security requirements of both India and Pakistan; they would also have to treat the nuclear issue as part of the security calculation of regional states, and not try to eradicate it.
Column Two of Table V-A indicates some policies relevant to various aspects of nuclear proliferation. A best possible policy will attempt to assist regional states in de-linking South Asia (or what remains of it, after the Soviet Union has finished its task in Afghanistan) from super-power conflict and simultaneously reconcile major regional disputes. If these can be dealt with at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield then much of the concern about the "threat" of Pakistan to India, of India to Pakistan, and of China to India, evaporates. The states involved can move towards their own version of a MBFR agreement and devote their resources to their permanent enemy: domestic disorder, poverty, and low growth rates. Pakistani arms can be left at a level that is adequate to deter the unlikely straight-on Soviet or Indian attack but not so large that it would enable Pakistan to successfully attack India. There is an upper limit of arms beyond which Pakistan need not cross, for to do so would be threatening to India; but there is an important lower limit. Below this mix of numbers, quality, and tactical disposition Pakistan cannot fall, India and Pakistan must jointly determine these upper and lower limits; the role of the U.S. in such an effort should be to help fill in those gaps and deficiencies so as to strengthen the security of both states. Pakistanis may have to reconcile themselves to second-rank regional status, but Indians expect Pakistan to effectively disarm and assume the status of a Sri Lanka or Bangladesh.
A regional settlement leading to a balanced imbalance of conventional arms must necessarily include the nuclear problem. It may be that the states most directly involved are willing to live with neighbors that can quickly cross the nuclear threshold; if this did not imply proliferation to other regions there is no reason why the U.S. and other powers cannot endorse such an agreement—and strengthen it with material inducements, including jointly-controlled energy generating nuclear facilities.

Conclusion

Pakistan is the only ex-colonial state to have been divided by war. The successors to the military regime that governed at the time are aware that neither the international nor the domestic environments have improved since 1971. Pakistan is now flanked by the Soviet Union and India; a million Afghan refugees have crossed the Durand Line, with more on the way; Pakistan's international friends do not match their verbal encouragement with material support; in terms of equipment the military is in relatively poorer shape in 1980 than it was in 1971; politically, it is even more unpopular, and there appears to be no civil leadership capable of assuming power. Finally, ethnic, regional, religious, economic, professional, and class groups periodically express their unhappiness with continued military rule. It is widely perceived as incompetent and some in the military feel that it may be damaging to the army itself. Many Pakistanis and
foreigners do not believe that Pakistan will survive in its present form beyond this decade. Pakistan faces the unenviable prospect of becoming a latter-day Poland, partitioned out of existence.

Without underestimating the possibility that civil war, revolution, external invasion, or some other calamity may lead to another vivisection of Pakistan, there are factors which may enable Pakistan to negotiate its present crisis. First, while they are not popular the military leadership is not irrational and is aware of the desperate predicament they are in. Zia and other generals have encouraged debate, discussion, and criticism within the military, although they have not allowed civilians to speak their mind. They are painfully aware of the technical shortcomings of the military, of the regional dominance of India, of the ruthlessness of the Russians, and of the unreliability of their American ex-allies. Nor do they think that the Islamic world will do very much to help them, let alone the non-aligned movement. They hold the stark but realistic view that they must rely upon their own resources, and forge their own path at a moment of great peril. But this path is not immediately apparent to anyone--Pakistani or non-Pakistani.

If, as seems most likely, the military continue in power in Pakistan--or retain a veto over security-related decisions, there is not likely to be a major change in the present strategic style. It represents a consensus within the military hierarchy itself, and it is not likely that there will be a change in Pakistan's attempts
to maintain a conventional retaliatory capacity (in the form of armor, air support, and mobile infantry) to punish or raise the price of invasion. Yet Pakistan finds it difficult to raise and maintain expensive armor units, it cannot produce its own high performance aircraft, and it must commit large forces to the static defense of major urban areas and lines of communication. Increasingly, the strategy of deterrence is stretched thinner and thinner and may lose credibility altogether. The solution for Pakistan may be in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They serve the purpose of forcing the enemy out of massed concentrations on the ground and may be used in a punishment strategy. Yet nuclear weapons are hardly attractive to the professional Pakistani officer and pressure for their acquisition probably came first from civilians. Pakistan will acquire nuclear weapons if it can, but it is not very probable that they will be used as a substitute for conventional ground and air force as long as the military remain in power or retain a veto over security policy.

However, should the Pakistan Army be persuaded to withdraw from power and its dominant role in defense policy making, it is conceivable though unlikely that a future civilian government would reshape both structural and strategic components of security policy. They would be following in Bhutto's footsteps, and might pursue an expanded role for nuclear weapons or attempt to create a people's army. We have discussed this above, and it is improbable that the
Pakistan Army as it is now constituted would yield power to those who would gut them. Pakistan itself would have to be on the verge of civil war and anarchy for such a radical departure to even be contemplated.

More likely would be a civilian attempt to limit the size, role, and mission of the military without altering its characteristic structure. There are a number of thoughtful officers who have argued that Pakistan could survive with a much smaller military establishment, even without nuclear weapons, and that regional stability and even Indian dominance does not mean the destruction of an independent Pakistan. Some have even argued for a "deal" with the Soviet Union. The dangers here lay not in the present but in the future. Would a Pakistan subservient to either India or the Soviet Union be required to alter its Islamic character? Would strategic dependency lead to political and cultural penetration, undoing the partition of 1947? Finally, there is the small but (in view of 1971) not incredible possibility that one of Pakistan's neighbors will seize upon its disorder and end the "Pakistan problem" once and for all. If the Pakistan Army were defeated and disarmed, Pakistan could be divided into its "natural" components, each a separate, independent state, each virtually disarmed and under the protective influence of India or the Soviet Union. It is inconceivable that India would want to reabsorb much of the present Pakistan, but it might conclude that an unstable, fragile, nuclear armed, and hostile Pakistan held greater risks than an immediate war.
Pakistan must thus search for a *via media* between concessions which would undo the state itself, and a hard-line strategic policy which threatens total war as a form of defense and in doing so leads its neighbors to conclude that it is unredeemably irresponsible. This is especially true in the case of India. Pakistan has little choice except to learn to live with its newly-powerful neighbor and to accept its *de facto* strategic inferiority. But such acceptance is in turn dependent on Indian statesmanship. If India insists that Pakistan has no legitimate defense needs, then Pakistan is in an impossible position. But if India recognizes that it has an interest in the continuing existence of a Pakistan which is capable of *defending itself*--even against India--because that capability is one, but not the only condition for the integrity of the state, then there may be an opportunity for a general regional security agreement. The terms of such an agreement can only be worked out by the states involved. Additional incentives to reach it as well as material support to strengthen it can and should come from others.
FOOTNOTES FOR PAGES 1-17

PREFACE

1. See the Bibliographic Note appended to this monograph for an analysis of the relevant academic and professional literature.


3. A few interviews with military personnel took place outside of Pakistan over the past seventeen years. In 1980 permission to cite the respondent by name was given in most cases but I have followed my normal practice of concealing identities (especially of serving officers), and indicating the level of responsibility he holds (or held) where this is relevant.

CHAPTER I

1. See the Bibliographic Note for a discussion of the literature.


6. Again, although the concept of relative ratio permeates the strategic literature of Western and non-Western civilizations (e.g. in Mao, Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Clausewitz, and Liddell-Hart) there is little scholarly consideration of the problem in the context of India-Pakistan conflict; and of course the military of these two states think of little else.


CHAPTER II

1. A good percentage of British officers of the British Indian Army did not think that "natives" could do their job and fought Indianization until the end. One of them, Enoch Powell, concluded in 1947 that British officers would have to stay on in India for twenty years; Auchinleck ignored this advice.

2. This is probably true of Bangladesh, which has retained much of the basic structure of its parent Pakistan Army and thus the old Indian Army. This adherence to traditional patterns was not unchallenged by some younger officers who wanted to develop a form of popular army. For a survey see P. B. Sinha, Armed Forces of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1979), and "Taher's Last Testament" in Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1979), especially pp. 30 ff.

3. For an elaboration of these factors in historical context see Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

4. Ibid., p. 7.
5. The British-Indian military meaning of "class" referred to a particular ethnic, religious, regional, or caste group or sub-group recruited to the military, not to the concept of "social class", e.g. upper, middle, or lower class. For the army (then and now) classes were evaluated in terms of their convenience for recruitment, trainability and fighting qualities, and many low-status groups found their way into the military. Some, such as Jats, raised their social class status through service in the Raj and some high social-status groups such as Brahmins were de-recruited for various reasons.

6. Since the JCOs are drawn from the ranks, and since in these mixed units one class or ethnic group may have a major educational advantage over another, separate promotion cadres are maintained to enable Baluchis and Sindhis to acquire commissions. However, the troops are actually mixed in the field formations and may be commanded by JCOs of another ethnic group. The mechanization of the Indian and Pakistani armies (for example, when traditional infantry units are given armored personnel carriers) presents enormous manpower problems; there are simply not enough skilled mechanics to go around and training a peasant with no mechanical background is a major investment. Older soldiers and JCOs may find their leadership skills irrelevant in an environment dominated by the need to keep complex equipment in good repair.

7. These are rough translations from the Urdu provided by officers of the PFF. At least one respected general has cautioned against dependence upon Islam as a motivating force when he noted that the "fervor in our religion" is best expressed in short bursts of offensive movement, over a bullet-swept battle-field. It is less effective in the trenches when "one is simply being shelled from afar and can do nothing to retaliate," and Attiqur warns that:

we must be extremely cautious, in our planning stages, not to make our religion our chief battle-winning factor. The under-estimation of the enemy simply because he is not of our faith can be dangerous. Of course God will be on the side of 'the true'. But we are all a long way from that. If we were all true then we need worry about nothing.
See: M. Attigur Rahman, Our Defense Cause (London: White Lion, 1976), p. 200. The last sentence is a reference to the Quran,

Count not those who die in the way of Allah as dead.
Nay, they live and are nourished by their Lord.

_Sura-Ali-Imran, 168_

8. There were no all-Muslim units in the Indian Army after the Mutiny of 1857 and Muslims were the only group in the army not to have their own regiment. The memory of this practice rankles many older Muslim officers who served with the British; they felt that their word as officers was suspect, although the British in fact worried more about Hindu officers from professional and political families.

9. In World War I over 136,000 Punjabi Muslims were recruited (18% of the total); on the eve of World War II there were almost 34,000 in the army (29%) and during World War II over 380,000 PMs came in (about 14% of the total). No other class came close to these figures: 116,000 Sikhs and 109,000 Gurkhas were recruited during the war. In addition, another 274,000 Muslims of other classes were recruited during 1939-45. Muslims as a whole constituted a quarter of the Indian Army as of 1947, but as noted above, did not have their own regiment. For detailed figures see: Army Headquarters, India, Recruiting in India Before and During the War of 1914-18 (Delhi: AHQ, October, 1919), unclassified printed volume in the Archives of the Ministry of Defense, New Delhi, and "Appendix H: Numbers of Major Classes Enrolled," in [India] War Department History, Head 2, Expansion of the Armed Forces, file in the Ministry of Defense Archives, New Delhi.

10. There were also efforts to mythologize the role that Islam has in maintaining discipline and providing a "cause" for Pakistan soldiers. This was particularly true in 1966-1971, and a number of studies of the 1965 war grossly exaggerated the difference in fighting qualities between Muslim and Indian soldiers. Some studies boasted that one
Muslim was worth a dozen Hindus, others asserted that the Indian soldiers were cowards, raised in an atmosphere of irreligion, and non-violence, and were readily "foiled" by the tradition of "Terbiyat" nurtured in the homes of Muslim families--sound moral education based on principles and tenets of Islam. Such articles and books were to have a disastrous result in that they gave false assurance to Pakistan and diverted (or suppressed) serious thought about the weaknesses that were demonstrated in the 1965 war. For samples see Lt.-Col. M. S. Iqbal, "Motivation of the Pakistani Soldier," Pakistan Army Journal (December, 1966), 6-15, Maj. A. R. Siddiqi, "The 17-Day War: A PRO's Account," Pakistan Army Journal (June, 1966), 1-13, and Brig. Gulzar Ahmed (ret.), Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge (Rawalpindi: Al Mukhtar, 1967). The latter reprints the captured diary of an Indian Army general.

11. See Cohen, Arms and Politics in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.

12. I had analyzed the problem in 1964 and came to the following conclusion:

The peculiar relationship of the Pakistan Army with East Pakistan should be noted here, for it is extremely important. East Pakistan holds a special place in the military's image of Pakistani politics. Its politicians are in some ways the 'worst' as far as the model of a neat orderly political system is concerned. Also, East Pakistan is the one area where the military is the weakest, in the sense of its claim to be an all-Pakistan organization, representative of the entire state. The military has tried to put a good face on the problem, but the fact remains that East Pakistan remains very un-represented, especially in the army, and the military seems very reluctant to materially make good the deficiency. There is no doubt that until East Pakistan can become more "trusted" the military will do everything it can to keep the East Pakistanis from acquiring the military skills and military organization which might be used against the dominance of the West wing.

13. A description of the Potwar Plateau and surrounding regions (which also provide substantial recruits for the army) can be found in O. H. K.
FOOTNOTES FOR PAGES 40-51


14. This information is from the *Historical Retrospect of the Standing Orders of the 129th Duke of Connaught's Own Baluchis* (Karachi: 129th DCO Baluchis, 1911). This is one of many handbooks published by or about various regiments of the Indian Army; they contain a wealth of information, not least about the attitudes of British officers towards their own soldiers and India.


19. Indeed, the entire architecture and city planning of British India was dominated by considerations of security.

20. The most important episode was the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, a turning point in the history of the Subcontinent. The local British commander firmly believed that a display of force would quiet down the entire Punjab.


22. Ibid., p. 167.

CHAPTER III

1. "A Prayer," issued to all units by General Headquarters, Military Intelligence Directorate, Rawalpindi, in 1946 or 1947. The origin of "A Prayer" is not known, but is probably British.
2. In 1975 applications dropped sharply because of disturbances in schools and colleges but have since returned to normal according to official Pakistani sources.


4. Ibid.


7. See Chart III-A below for a rough chronology of entry and promotion in the officer corps, correlated with some major historical events.

8. Cohen, The Indian Army, Chapter 5, "The Professional Officer in India."

9. The title was then called Viceroy's Commissioned Officer, or VCO.


12. It should be emphasized that even if the criticism is valid it is not suppressed within the army; Attiq's books are required reading in several Pakistani military schools; he has recently returned to government service as a civilian.

14. A favorite image is expressed in the comment of an air force officer: "I am standing next to my friend. But he has a gun. Now, we are friends, but I cannot feel secure unless I also have a gun."

15. It should be emphasized that this feeling exists within the Indian military as well, although it is tempered by the fact that many officers are not from areas which suffered from the violence accompanying Partition or experience communal conflict.


17. One can also cite the fate of Col. Abu Taher of Bangladesh who tried to involve his troops in food production, alienating some of his more traditional colleagues. See Lifschultz, p. 85.


19. Ibid.


21. The same anxiety existed among senior Indian Army Officers. It is difficult for an outsider to conclude whether or not the rapid promotions they experienced allowed incompetents to rise to the top. See Attiqur Rahman's forthright critique of the Pakistan Army in the first part of *Leadership: Senior Commanders*.

22. For example, on the front of Tactics Hall the following Quranic saying is prominently displayed (in English): "OH YE BELIEVERS TAKE YOUR PRECAUTIONS TACTICALLY AND EITHER GO FORTH IN PARTIES OR GO FORTH ALL TOGETHER."
23. In the long run the defeat may have had the effect of saving the army from further professional deterioration.

24. See Note 16 for recent writing on the Rawalpindi Conspiracy.

25. Our Defense Cause, p. 44.


27. Ibid., p. 45

28. See Note 10, Chapter II.


31. Bhutto discusses this at length in his death-cell testimony, If I am Assassinated . . . (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979). In it he argues that the military, especially Zia, have been "soft" on India and are incompetent to boot. The Defense White Paper (discussed in Chapter IV) clearly bears his hand; what was resented were his attempts to attack the reputation of Ayub Khan and some other generals.

32. I have cited some of these above, they will be discussed in the Bibliographic Note.

33. See Footnote 1.

34. Under Zia a program of sending combat officers to universities in Pakistan for post-graduate higher education has begun. Until recently only the Army Education Corps did this; several officers have also gone to foreign civilian institutions for such training. The National Defense College, presently located in Rawalpindi, has two courses. One is purely professional, dealing with higher military strategy; the other is the senior joint civil and military course and lasts for 10 months. The NDC is very well equipped and staffed.


37. Those involved with selection to the PMA have two criteria for determining the "right type" of candidate: whether an individual is willing to make the army his career "with determination," and whether an individual is "trainable," i.e. amenable to the discipline of the academy and the military. In their words, the recruiters are looking for a person willing to wake up early, work hard, and not complain; it is no wonder that the sons of officers and JCOs, who are already familiar with the requirements and routine of the army, are preferred; the other two armed services are perceived as less Spartan in ethos and also better places to put a technical education to work.


41. Quoted in Unpublished manuscript, p. 217

42. Ibid., p. 175.


45. In the Preface to Malik, p. viii.

FOOTNOTES FOR PAGES 101-112

47. Malik, p. ii.
48. Rangrut, p. 118. I have not been able to identify the Sura from which this is taken.
49. Malik, p. iii.
50. Rangrut, p. 160
51. See also Sura Anfal 38
52. Sura Mumtahina, 7
53. Malik, p. 49.
54. Ibid., p. 59
55. Ibid., p. 57
58. Sigvard Eglund of IAEA has proposed that the world needs a fresh demonstration of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. It might persuade some people of the inherent dangers associated with such weapons but soldiers are more likely to appreciate their destructiveness and press harder for their acquisition.

CHAPTER IV
2. The Times, September 8, 1977
5. Crisis in Leadership, p. 258.
6. Memorandum of Rao A. Rashid Khan, Special Secretary, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, July 13, 1976; reprinted as Annexure 64, pp. A-266-73,

7. Ibid., pp. 74-5.

8. Pakistan Under Bhutto, p. 11.


10. They had admired and been surprised with the efforts of Desai and Vajpayee to normalize relations with India's neighbors; they feared—but also respected—Mrs. Gandhi.


12. If I am Assassinated . . ., pp. 135 ff.


17. One of the main activities is the Fauji Foundation. When India and Pakistan were partitioned they shared in the welfare contributions donated by ORs during World War II; India distributed these to individual ex-soldiers but Pakistan used the money to capitalize the Fauji Foundation which in turn used it to develop a chain of hospitals, light (and heavy) industries, and various service facilities, largely but not entirely for ex-servicemen. The Foundation
is headed by a retired general, at the present Rao Farman Ali, and employs a number of retired officers. A detailed account of the Foundation's activities is contained in its annual calendar and several reports.


20. See the writings of Attiqur Rahman, Abdul Hameed Khan, Fazal Muqeem Khan, and others.

21. The three-fold responsibilities of the four Governors of Pakistan's four provinces (they were also Corps Commanders and Deputy Martial Law Administrators) were separated in April, 1980 and new Corps Commanders have been appointed. The latter have the DMLA responsibilities. A number of senior officers were retired and an additional general post was created.


23. The text of the White Paper and a Staff Study on higher defense organization can be found in Defence Journal, II, 7-8 (July-August, 1976).

24. In the 1973 Constitution any attempt to abrogate it by force or threat of force is treasonous (Sec. 6), the principle of civilian control is firmly laid down (Sec. 243-5), and an Oath is specified for members of the Armed Forces, which states in part that "I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever . . ." (Third Schedule).

25. White Paper, Section iii.

26. This is a common theme among serving officers; part of the legacy of the Ayub era is a belief that he was led astray and used by civilians; Bhutto also had little love for the CSP.
27. A number of Pakistani, Indian, and foreign observers have concluded that neither army has produced a generation of officers with strategic imagination, although the tactical skills of both are acknowledged. This may be because both armies have repeatedly fought wars which have been limited in the means employed and in their objectives. The introduction of nuclear weapons may transform this, making cities the object of serious attack for the first time.

28. The term "nodder" is that of P. G. Wodehouse and has found its way into the Pakistan Army.


30. See Neeger for a discussion of post-military states.

31. We shall discuss this further in the next chapter; this image of a Pakistan cut to size was widespread in RSS circles but is not absent in liberal Indian thought. For a recent example see Rohit Handa, Policy for India's Defense (New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1976), p. 38, where the author suggests Indian "paramountcy" over Pakistan and foreign recognition of India's "premier position from Aden to Singapore." p. 38.

CHAPTER V

1. The following section is a brief summary of my recent writings on perception and image. See Cohen, "The Strategic Imagery of Elites," in Roherty and "Image and Perception in India-Pakistan Relations," in Ganguly and Rajar.

3. While in India in February, 1980, Andrei Gromyko warned Pakistan that its position as an "independent state" would be undermined if it supported American and Chinese policy. The Hindu, Feb. 13, 1980. These crude threats eventually embarrassed his hosts who were trying to find a peaceful solution to the Afghan crisis.


5. For a perceptive study see Shivaji Ganguly, Pakistan-China Relations: A Study in Interaction (Urbana: Center for Asian Studies, 1971).

6. Pakistan has received some military equipment and economic assistance from the Soviet Union--perhaps a measure of how seriously the Soviets treat South Asia. It has been a useful level against the two states with close ties to the Soviets--Afghanistan and India.


8. The best study of the complex Kashmir issue remains that of Sisir Gupta, whose Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966) is a humane and perceptive analysis.


10. See Caroe for a short discussion of the Baluchis and several of the papers in Ainslie T. Embree, Pakistan's Western Borderlands (New Delhi:
Selig Harrison has recently written on the Baluchi issue in "Nightmare in Baluchistan," *Foreign Policy*, 32 (Fall, 1978), 136-160.

11. For the texts of various contingency plans see Historical Section (India and Pakistan), Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, *Defense of India: Policy and Plans (n.p.: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, distr. by Orient Longmans, 1963)*.


15. A Reuters dispatch from Islamabad indicates that General Zia is considering "a massive increase in the size of the country's armed forces to create a people's army on the Chinese model," according to official Pakistani sources. *India Abroad*, August 29, 1980.

16. Recent press reports indicate the possibility of Pakistani troops being stationed in Saudia Arabia, presumably at Saudi expense, with additional Saudi support for Pakistan's weapons acquisition program.
17. The most complete description of PAF history and operations is in John Fricker, Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965 (London: Ian Allen, 1979), which was written with the cooperation of senior PAF officers.

18. The PAF would like "air superiority" aircraft which would enable them to meet and defeat such aircraft as the MiG 21, and possibly more advanced MiG's in Afghanistan. It is highly unlikely that the U.S. will provide such aircraft. Even if given for the purpose of defending the western border of Pakistan, by their very nature they can be quickly applied to the Indian front.


20. The F-6 and tank rebuild facilities are being provided by the PAF; the Mirage rebuild facility is French-supplied but paid for by Pakistan; the repair facilities of the Pakistan Army have been built up over the years, but with a major American contribution in the 1950s.

21. This may even be true of the Chinese, who are themselves seeking assistance in defense production. It is not clear whether Western suppliers, such as the British or the U.S., would allow China to transfer either weapons or production technology to third countries such as Pakistan.

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... be the case, but it certainly is not true for aircraft...

... what it had the best trained repair crews...

... of aircraft flown by the PAF (British... this meant that aircraft were...

... maintenance crews could not be...

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
24. See Chapter I for a discussion of this problem.

25. The U.S. has provided two older destroyers (without SSMs) and a wide range of auxiliary equipment to Pakistan for cash.

26. Their motives for supporting acquisition are military and bureaucratic. If an enemy or potential enemy has nuclear weapons (or the nuclear option) they feel that Pakistan would be at a tremendous disadvantage if it did not have them, even though such weapons will make obsolete much of the present military structure. They create enormous problems of dispersion and concentration of forces and demand a greater mobility of conventional forces than Pakistan now possesses. India is mechanizing large numbers of infantry units at a rapid pace. Bureaucratically, the military (especially the army) would not want to lose control over the nuclear weapons or see a new agency established to maintain and deliver them.

27. They were asked by Bhutto to staff out the military implications of nuclear proliferation in 1974, although there is evidence that plans for a nuclear program began before that date.


29. This has been cursorily studied by several private groups, including one informal study at the University of Illinois.

30. This point is raised by Jeffrey Kemp in the context of an Israeli last-ditch nuclear retaliation in "A Nuclear Middle East," in John Kerry King, International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Ten years ago there were only a handful of books and articles dealing with the Pakistan military or with that country's security policy. There is now a substantial literature and two new journals dealing with Pakistani strategic affairs. Most of these books and articles have been written by Pakistanis; quite a few deal with the experiences of 1971, others reach back to 1965, and a few attempt a comprehensive critical re-examination of the very ethos of the Pakistan Army.

This Bibliographic Note will only discuss those books which I believe to be essential for an understanding of the military and security policy. There are many excellent studies on Pakistani history, politics, economics, and culture, but only a few will be noted below.

It should be stressed that some of the most valuable books and articles written on the military and security policy are not polished or objective studies. They are useful precisely because their authors are trying to persuade or conceal. Even some of the PR generated material is valuable when read carefully. The same comment can be made about many of the articles in such military journals as Pakistan Army Journal, Rawalpindi, published by the Inspector General, Training and Evaluation Branch, GHQ, now on a monthly basis. Some of these are staff or exercise papers repackaged for a broader audience, others appear to be wildly irrelevant to modern warfare (for example, the studies of early Islamic battles), but all are valuable when one considers the context in which they appear and the audience to which they are addressed. Such material should be taken
as seriously, in its own way, as the major full-length books written by distinguished retired generals.

Two new civilian journals have appeared in Pakistan in recent years and must be carefully followed by anyone interested in regional security affairs. One is a quarterly, *Strategic Studies*, Islamabad, the journal of the recently founded Institute of Strategic Studies. This journal is in its third year and publishes comprehensive studies of regional security and military affairs. The Institute may eventually become the most important "Islamic" strategic studies center. It also publishes the *Islamabad Papers* on an irregular basis. A move to expanded quarters and a new director has given *Strategic Studies* new weight. The second journal seeks a more popular audience and is addressed largely to Pakistanis themselves. *Defence Journal* is edited by a retired army officer once associated with military public relations; it has been in existence for several years and appears every other month, with occasional special issues. It serves as a forum in which Pakistanis can debate a number of highly sensitive issues: the military in politics, the 1965 and 1971 wars, strategy, and defense organization. It survived Bhutto's downfall and continues to be both provocative and thoughtful.

The Military

A by-product of the 1971 conflict was a burst of writing about the Pakistan military. One author in particular stands out for his lucid, perceptive analyses—Lt.-Gen. M. Attiquur Rahman (ret.). Two of his books are certainly required reading for anyone dealing with the military:
Leadership: Senior Commanders, Lahore: Ferozsons, 1973, is a sequel to his first book, Leadership: Junior Commanders, which is a widely used text on military principles for young officers. Attiq's third book is even more comprehensive and also deals with strategic issues:

Our Defense Cause, London, White Lion Publishers, 1976. Although published in Britain it is available as a paperback in Pakistan. Senior Commanders and Our Defense Cause are indispensable, but it should be remembered that no single author is "representative" of the range of thinking in the army.

An able Pakistani scholar, Hasan Askari Rizvi, is the author of the most comprehensive history of the involvement of the army in politics, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 2nd ed., Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1976. Almost 400 pages, it contains a number of useful appendices listing key personnel and containing the texts of several important documents pertaining to the role of the military in politics.


A quite different study of the 1971 war, written by a senior public relations officer who was eventually captured in Bengal, is the excellent *Witness to Surrender*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1977, by Siddiq Salik. He presents an eye-witness account of the deterioration of moral, political, and military authority in East Pakistan. There are a number of other books written by Pakistanis on events in East Pakistan but none as good.

Several books have been written about the 1965 conflict with India, some of them quite recently. Brig. Gulzar Ahmed (ret.) wrote *Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge*, Rawalpindi, Al Mukhtar, n.d., shortly after the
war itself, and while the book contains much useful information (especially extracts from a captured Indian general's personal diary) it is not an objective work. Perhaps the best account is by an American journalist, Russell Brines, in The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, London, Pall Mall Press, 1968. Also dating from about 1968 is the account of an ex-Air Marshal turned politician, M. Asghar Khan, The First Round, Indo-Pakistan War, 1965, New Delhi, Vikas, 1979. This edition contains an important recent Foreward by Altaf Gauhar, who was a key civilian advisor to Ayub Khan in 1965. Bhutto leaked substantial information about the 1965 war in the White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute, Islamabad, January 1977, some of it distorted, and several recent issues of Defence Journal (for example, Sept., 1979) have been devoted to a survey of the literature on that war. Many Pakistani authors have concluded that the 1965 war was a turning point for Pakistan, and there is justifiable interest in discovering how and why Pakistan went to war and the way it was fought. The only detailed account of the air war is John Fricker, Battle for Pakistan, London, Ian Allan, 1979, which is by a professional military writer who was given access to PAF documents. There is no Indian equivalent but useful is Air Marshal M. S. Chaturvedi, History of the Indian Air Force, Delhi, Vikas, 1978. The Indian military literature has been dominated by studies of the 1962 conflict with China (which generated some fine books), but a few Indians have written about the wars with Pakistan. D. R. Manekar is a journalist but was given official assistance to write Twenty-Two Fateful Days: Pakistan Cut to Size, Bombay, Manaktalas,
1966; Lt.-Gen. B. M. Kaul, who achieved notoriety for his part in the 1962 fiasco did write a long and confused book about India's wars with Pakistan, *Confrontation with Pakistan*, Delhi, Vikas, 1971. The 1971 war has been the subject of several Indian books among the first being D. K. Palit, *The Lightning Campaign*, New Delhi, Thompson, 1972 (which many Pakistani generals criticize strongly), and M. Ayooba K. Subrahmanyam, *The Liberation War*, Delhi, S. Chand, 1972. This is an important book, as much for what it tells us about Indian attitudes as the actual political framework and battles of the war itself.


There is not much literature on the internal organization of the military publicly available. Raymond A. Moore, Jr. provides a comprehensive account of the army's involvement in civil works, disaster relief, education, rehabilitation, sports, industry, and related activities, but not its military activities in *Nation Building and the Pakistan Army, 1947-1969*, Lahore, Aziz, 1979. There is one chapter on the armed forces of Pakistan in Richard F. Nyrop, et al. *Area Handbook for Pakistan*, Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1975, which has some useful information and a certain amount of mis-information (for example, it states that "all service Headquarters are at Islamabad" which is not true—the Army is in Rawalpindi, 12 miles away, and the Air Force remains at Peshawar).

Finally, two books by army officers deserve special mention. One is a brief study by "ex-Major-General" Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, Islamabad, National Book Foundation, 2nd ed., 1975, which not only discusses the Kashmir problem but illustrates the revolutionary and unorthodox streak found within at least part of the officer corps; the other study, still worth reading, is Ayub Khan's autobiography, Friends Not Masters, London, Oxford University Press, 1967. Written with the assistance of several advisors, it still remains a remarkable book both as a history of Ayub's involvement with the military and as a statement of Pakistan's goals and ideals. The chapters on foreign policy are especially useful.

Foreign Policy

While there is no comprehensive study of Pakistan's defense policy there are a number of excellent books dealing with foreign policy and which discuss military and security dimensions of foreign policy at length. The authoritative Pakistani accounts are probably two books by a retired Pakistani diplomat, S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, London, Oxford University Press, 1973, and Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1974. A scholarly and detailed analysis of Pakistan's borders (which

While Pakistanis might find much to object to in this book there are few other studies on this issue which match it for comprehensiveness and sensitivity.

examine the American and Soviet presence in the region in Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Soviet Moves in Asia, Lahore, Ferozsons, n. d., and Sattar Babar, U.S. Aid to Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1974. Perhaps the most interesting source for Soviet views of the region is in the March, 1974 issue of Asian Survey, which contains nine articles by leading Soviet scholars on a variety of Subcontinental problems; this has been reprinted in Pakistan by People's Publishing House as Yuri V. Gankovsky, ed., Soviet Scholars View South Asia, Lahore, PPH, 1975.

Pakistani Politics


Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's own writing are required reading for the serious student of Pakistan. He often wrote and spoke for effect, and it was always clear when he was doing so, but his speeches and writings are still vital. Two books are most readily available, *The Myth of Independence*, London, Oxford University Press, 1979, and his death-cell testament, "If I Am Assassinated . . .", Delhi, Vikas, 1979. A perceptive biography is Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto*, Delhi, Vikas, 1972.


Finally, the single most comprehensive and useful source of information about the entire subcontinent must be noted. *A Historical Atlas of South Asia,*
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, edited by Joseph B. Schwartzberg not only conveys the sweep of history through an unparalleled series of maps, but contains extensive bibliographies, photos, and a full descriptive text.