OUR MISSING SHIELD:
THE U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

BY
HARRY B. YOSHPE

PREPARED FOR:
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20472

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WORK UNIT 4342-B

APRIL 1981

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Distribution Unlimited
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OUR MISSING SHIELD: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective.

Harry B. Yoshpe

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Washington, D.C. 20472

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This volume traces the development of American CD, 1916-1980, focusing on policies, plans, programs, budgets, organization and management, and on the central problems and critical issues in planning for survival in a nuclear attack.

The study analyzes CD experience in two World Wars; planning by the Department of Defense and the National Security Resources Board after...
the events leading to the enactment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950; and the experience of successive agencies: the Federal Civil Defense Administration (1950-58); the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (1958-61); the Office of Civil Defense in the Department of Defense (1961-64) and in the Department of the Army (1964-72); the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency again under the Secretary of Defense (1972-79); and the merger with emergency preparedness and natural disaster programs into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (1979).

The study concludes that after three decades of effort, the U.S. has only a marginal CD program. Impediments to progress have been: the failure to grasp early, and to act on, implications of the experience of Britain, Germany and Japan under heavy bombing in WW II; delays in discarding outmoded concepts; difficulties in adjusting to the fast pace of weapons technology; excessive secrecy about the threat of nuclear weapons and radioactive fallout; limited Federal power in CD; confusion regarding civil-military relations in this field; ambiguity as to the strategic impact of CD; problems in designing a balanced program and strategy for survival; instability in Federal CD organization; and, of highest significance, Presidential and Congressional indifference and neglect and attendant budgetary constraints. There is an urgent need for a national commitment to a meaningful civil defense program, with strong leadership from the President to bring forth vigorous support from the Congress, State legislatures and city councils, and from the public at large.
FOREWORD

In his capacity as Research Program Manager of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (now in the Federal Emergency Management Agency), Mr. George F. Divine was acutely aware of the need for a comprehensive history of American civil defense. Such a history, he felt, should be of considerable interest and value to public officials charged with planning and administering government programs; to scholars interested in the Government's efforts in civil defense; and to the general public concerned with the performance of governments at all levels in a field which is so vital to their survival in a nuclear war.

Early in 1979, Mr. Divine asked me to develop this history, focusing sharply on the central problems and critical issues in the pursuit of the Nation's civil defense objectives. Under the terms of our agreement, I had one year in which to produce this history. The one-year deadline had to be extended several times to almost two years. Yet, I still felt persistent time-pressure in my efforts to cover even in broad scope and on a highly selective basis the main lines of development of the U.S. civil defense program.

In a real sense, this history is exploratory only. Time did not permit more than spot research in the internal working files of the agencies covered. Fortunately, however, the extensive Congressional sources brought out a wealth of essential information from the agencies on the origin, nature and consequences of their programs and policies.

The focus of this history is basically on the Federal experience,
although State and local efforts have not been overlooked. Many civil
defenders will wish that I had gone beyond the realm of policy, pro-
grams, organization and administration, and into the more technical
aspects of the problem. Hopefully the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) will set up an historical office to gather the pertinent
documentation and prepare relevant monographic and overall studies.

It should be noted, also, that the focus of this work is essentially
on preparedness for survival of the population in the event of a nuclear
attack upon the United States. Closely-related matters of economic or
resources mobilization for national emergencies, war-support and postwar
recovery are brought in, as needed, to explain changes in organizational
arrangements for civil defense. A comprehensive historical analysis of
these facets of "emergency preparedness" has yet to be made. This, too,
is an area to which a FEMA historical office can and should address itself.

The experience recounted in this history is not a happy one. The
problems of planning for survival and recovery from nuclear attack defy
full comprehension and easy solutions. Civil defense personnel at all
levels applied their fine talents with true dedication. But all too
often they found their efforts frustrated by swift changes in weapons
technology, by Presidential and Congressional indifference and neglect,
and by the attendant budgetary constraints under which they labored over
the years. Whether it was looked upon as "insurance" or as playing a
vital role in strategic deterrence, civil defense was never brought to a
level of effort that would ensure substantial protection of the popu-
lation, industry, and the economy in a nuclear assault.

When I undertook this study, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
and other emergency planning and natural-disaster organizations were in
process of relocation and integration within FEMA. For some months it was virtually impossible to talk to key people or examine their basic documentation. Fortunately, Mr. J. Thomas Russell, Director, National Defense University Library, provided desk space, the help of the library staff, and full access to the rich collections of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. I am deeply grateful to Mr. Russell, Ms. Carol Hillier, Mr. George Stansfield, and others at the National Defense University for their splendid support. I found there an embarrassment of riches; they provided the basic foundation for this history.

With the civil defense staff finally settled in FEMA, I could turn to them for interviews and for helpful documentation of near-current events—Dr. William K. Chipman, John W. McConnell, Ralph L. Garrett, Robert E. Young, William L. Harding, and George Divine. I also drew on the expertise of Walmer E. Strope and several others no longer in the Federal service.

Of special significance was the cooperation and encouragement I received from Mr. Divine. Without his interest and support, this volume could not have been produced in its present scope and depth or completed in the time allotted for the purpose. Whatever merit this book may have is due in no small measure to the assistance rendered by Mr. Divine and his present and former colleagues who reviewed draft chapters and offered many helpful suggestions for their improvement. I must emphasize, however, that I alone am responsible for the organization and presentation of the subject, for any opinions expressed or implied, and for any errors of detail or judgment.

Harry B. Yoshpe
Historian

Washington, D.C.
February 2, 1981
## CONTENTS

**FOREWORD** ..........................

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGES AND THE CONSTRAINTS .................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The New Face of War</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effects of Nuclear War</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Challenge for Civil Defense</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Constraints</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Level of Financial Support</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate Presidential Leadership and Congressional Support</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Question of Public Interest and Support</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Secrecy</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Federal Power in Civil Defense</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian vs. Military Control</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity as to the Strategic Import of Civil Defense</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems in Designing a Strategy for Civil Defense</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instability in Federal Civil Defense Organization</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. THE LEGACY OF EARLIER YEARS, 1916-48 ...........................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORLD WAR I EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Organization of Civilian Defense</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems Encountered</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean Landis at the Helm</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidation of OCD</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmortem Examinations</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POSTWAR STUDIES AND PLANNING IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ...........................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provost Marshal General Report 3B-1</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bull Report</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hopley Report</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHIFT TO NSRB OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE ..................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of the Hopley Plan</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NSRB Assignment</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. CIVIL DEFENSE UNDER NSRB LEADERSHIP .............................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSRB---A TROUBLED AGENCY</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE-KOREAN PLANNING</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESSURES FOR ACTION</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
## Key Elements of the Program

- Progress Toward Objectives ................................................. 350
- PROJECT HARBOR STUDY .......................................................... 356
- COLLAPSE OF THE SHELTER INCENTIVE PROGRAM .......................... 360
- LOWERING OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE PROFILE ............................... 376

### VII. CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT: THE DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY, 1972-79  

- CIVIL DEFENSE AT A LOW EBB .................................................. 399
- JOHN E. DAVIS AT THE HELM ................................................... 402
  - Objectives of the Nixon-Ford Administrations .......................... 402
  - The New Status of Civil Defense ........................................... 405
  - Creation of DCPA .................................................................... 405
  - Organization and Management ................................................. 409
  - Major Thrusts of DCPA Efforts .............................................. 413
  - All-Risk Preparedness ......................................................... 413
  - Nuclear Civil Protection Planning ......................................... 424
  - Low State of Civil Defense Readiness ..................................... 433
  - Confused State of Federal Emergency Preparedness .................... 438
  - Congressional Concerns ....................................................... 443
  - The Civil Defense Panel Review .......................................... 444
  - Hearings of the Joint Committee on Defense Production ................. 445
- BARDYL R. TIRANA AT THE HELM ............................................... 454
- Mounting Pressures for a Strengthened Civil Defense ...................... 455
  - Concerns About Soviet Civil Defense ...................................... 455
  - Federal Responsiveness to State and Local Needs ......................... 460
- DCPA Initiatives for Change .................................................... 461
  - Implementation of Dual-Use Concept ...................................... 463
  - Emphasis on Crisis Relocation Planning .................................. 464
  - Increased Congressional Interest .......................................... 468
  - Another GAO Report ............................................................ 469
  - The Joint Committee on Defense Production .............................. 472
  - The Armed Services Committees ............................................ 475

### Administration Studies

- Defense Department Study of Civil Defense Options .................... 476
- The NSC-Directed Study ........................................................ 479
- The President's Reorganization Project ..................................... 480
The Administration's New Civil Defense Policy 491
Presidential Decision (PD) 41 491
The Budget for FY 1980 493
Civil Defense in FEMA 496

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 501

APPENDIXES 511

A. Principal Federal Officials Responsible for Civil Defense Activities, 1941-1980 512
B. Chronology 513

BIBLIOGRAPHY 555

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures
1. The National Civil Defense Pattern 130
2. Federal Civil Defense Administration Organization Chart 207
3. FCDA Regions 208
4. OCDM Organization Chart 276
5. OCDM Regions 277
6. OCD Organization Chart, January 1963 332
7. Lifesaving Potential of Nationwide Fallout Shelter System 343
8. OCD Organization Chart, July 1964 379
9. DCPA Organization Chart 410
10. Overall Ability to Execute Emergency Plans 416
11. Comparison of Effectiveness and Cost of CD Programs (Large-Scale Mid-1980s Soviet Attack on U.S. Military and Industrial Facilities and Population) 478

Tables
1. Results of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings 5
3. Record of U.S. Federal Civil Defense Appropriations, 1951-80 16
4. Damage Zones for Various Sizes of Atomic Weapons 196
5. Emergency Assignments of Federal Departments and Agencies 279

xi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

THE CHALLENGES AND THE CONSTRAINTS

Although civil defense is as old as history, it has not until recently played any significant role in the security of the United States. Since World War II, steady growth in the destructiveness of weapons, improvements in the means of their delivery, and the aggressive actions of a well-armed and hostile Communist bloc have forced a re-evaluation of the security position of the United States. America's leaders have concluded that civil defense is an essential part of the strategic defense structure of the United States, and that without protection of the population, American losses in a thermonuclear war would be both astronomically large and unnecessary.

Yet, while a permanent civil defense effort has been in existence since December 1950, the U.S. has a long way to go in providing protection to its population in the event of enemy attack and ensuring recovery for the survivors of such attack. Except in moments of crisis and great national anxiety, civil defense has encountered widespread skepticism and reluctance to face up to the demands for effective protection against the hazards of a large-scale nuclear attack.
Such an attack would inevitably bring in its wake widespread death and destruction; this is the harsh reality of nuclear war. The indications are, however, that with proper preparations which are well within the boundaries of technical and economic feasibility, tens of millions of Americans would live to sustain the life of the Nation. Through trial and error, the essential ingredients of an effective civil defense program have become quite evident. The evolution of the U.S. civil defense program, however, has been beset by many problems. The indications are that it will be the year 2,000 or later before the U.S. will have an adequately based and sufficiently broad program in readiness for effective use in the event of a nuclear attack.

THE NEW FACE OF WAR

Wars throughout history have taken heavy tolls of human life and property. World War II and the ensuing period, however, saw an immense increase in the potency and destructiveness of weapons. The unleashing of the atomic bomb (A-bomb) on two Japanese cities--Hiroshima and Nagasaki--at the very close of that war marked the dawn of the nuclear age. The introduction, stockpiling, and continuous improvement of these atomic weapons threatened to bring death, injury, and destruction on a scale without precedent in the history of human experience. In less than ten years the incredible power of the A-bomb had been dwarfed almost
ten-fold by the awesome force of the hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) with a destructive capacity measured in millions of tons of TNT. This new weaponry, symbolized by the word "megaton" (the equivalent of one million tons of TNT), could destroy most modern cities; and the radioactive fallout from an H-bomb explosion could spread over vast areas of surrounding territory.

President Harry Truman had hoped to hold the secret of the bomb "in secret trust for all mankind." The atomic scientists, however, were not at all sanguine that this secret could long be kept. From the first they warned that other nations would inevitably acquire nuclear weapons within a few years. And through their journal, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, they sought to awaken the public to a full understanding of the reality of nuclear weapons and of their implications for the future of mankind.

Just as the scientists foresaw, the United States could not long count on its possession of the A-bomb to give its people a measure of security. In August 1949, the Soviets detonated their first atomic weapon. This shattering of the U.S. monopoly set in motion a step-up in the development of nuclear weapons. On January 31, 1950, President Truman announced his decision to proceed with the development of an H-bomb; and the thermonuclear explosion on November 1, 1952, marked the introduction of another quantum jump in destructiveness of the instruments of war. The
Soviets again were not far behind; their thermonuclear explosion came in August 1953.

Over the ensuing years Soviet advances in military technology substantially negated America's absolute superiority in strategic weapons. Both amassed sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons, including ocean-spanning missiles with thermonuclear warheads capable of massive destruction within minutes of an order to fire. A "balance of terror" emerged, with each nation realizing that neither could hope to preclude unprecedented destruction by striking first. Clearly any resort to arms by either side in pursuit of national objectives would be fraught with grave risks. Even localized "brush-fire" wars could get out of control and prompt leaders to take drastic measures. Nor are leaders immune to miscalculations of the opponent's will or capability to resist, or to irrational blunders. Thus, while "victory" might be illusive in the light of the capabilities for mutual destruction, the danger of nuclear conflict remained. It demanded serious attention to the protection of the nation's population and the survival and recovery of its social order in the aftermath of a nuclear assault.

THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR

The facts about the power of the initial "nominal" A-bomb lay in the story of what it did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Each of the bombs had the destructive power of
20 kilotons of TNT.\(^1\) The following table depicts the results of the two bombings:

**Table 1**

Results of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hiroshima</th>
<th>Nagasaki</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plante</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs loaded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density per square mile</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square miles destroyed</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed and missing</td>
<td>70,000,000</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate per square mile destroyed</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty rate per square mile destroyed</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the A-bomb with other weapons, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey team observed:

What stands out from this compilation, even more than the extent of destruction from a single concentrated source, is the unprecedented casualty rate from the combination of heat, blast, and gamma rays from the chain reaction.

To achieve the same destruction by conventional bombing, it would have been necessary to drop bomb loads of 2,100 tons at Hiroshima and 1,200 tons at Nagasaki. With each plane carrying 10 tons, a total of 210 B-29s would have been required at Hiroshima and 120 at Nagasaki.\(^2\)

\(^1\)The yield of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs has been estimated at from 12.5 to 20 kilotons (KT). Most of the documentation I have seen cite the 20 KT approximation. For a comprehensive account of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946 (hereinafter cited as *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*).

\(^2\)Tbid., p. 33.
A plausible estimate of the various causes of death, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey indicated, would range as follows: flash burns, 20 to 30 percent; other injuries, 50 to 60 percent; and radiation sickness, 15 to 20 percent. Flash burns, caused by the intense burst of heat radiation traveling at the speed of light, followed the explosion. Other injuries came from falling or flying debris and burns from blazing buildings. The radiation effects resulted from the gamma rays given off by the fission process at the instant of the explosion.\(^3\)

Inevitably the Survey's investigators pondered the question: "What if the target for the bomb had been an American city?" The overwhelming bulk of the buildings in American cities, it appeared, "could not stand up against an atomic bomb bursting a mile or a mile and a half from them." As for the people, the Survey investigators observed: "The casualty rates at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, applied to the massed inhabitants of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx, yield a grim conclusion." The same applied to other parts of New York and other American cities with their teeming populations, as evidenced from the table of population densities (Table 2) below. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki casualties, the Survey team emphasized, "result from the first atomic bombs to be used and from bombs burst at considerable distances above the ground." Improved bombs,

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 15-20.
perhaps detonated more effectively, "may well prove still more deadly." Just as the Survey team indicated, the ensuing years saw the development of more powerful atomic bombs. By 1950 these improved A-bombs increased the blast radius to 2.8 miles and the area of damage to 25 square miles.

Table 2
Population Densities--U.S. and Japanese Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population densities United States and Japanese cities</th>
<th>Population per sq. mile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>7,492,000</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan (day)</td>
<td>2,206,000</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan (night)</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronx</td>
<td>1,489,000</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>2,785,000</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens</td>
<td>1,280,000</td>
<td>121.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staten Island</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>975,000</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>7,335,000</td>
<td>224.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>7,625,000</td>
<td>137.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>534,000</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1,540,000</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center of city</td>
<td>914,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built-up area</td>
<td>725,000</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Power.
2 As of 1 Aug. 45.

The detonation of an H-device in November 1952, with an energy equivalent of 5 to 7 megatons of TNT, marked the second quantum jump in the development of weapons of mass destruction. With the appearance of this bomb, the blast radius expanded to approximately 10 miles, and the damage area to about 314 square miles.

The third quantum jump came in February 1954, as the result of the detonation of another thermonuclear device with the power of between 12 and 14 megatons of TNT. The test at the Bikini atoll of the Marshall Islands had unanticipated developments: it exposed American test personnel and Marshallese islanders to radiation. The world soon learned that Japanese fishermen at a distance of 75 miles had been showered and burned with radioactive debris. A release by the Atomic Energy Commission in February 1955 reported that 7,000 square miles of downwind territory had been contaminated by the Bikini test. A year and a half after that test, radioactive debris still circled the planet.5 There was growing uneasiness about the dangers of radiation from fallout, including the long-term effects on food and human heredity.6


The problem of radioactive fallout added a new dimension to the weapons of war. The fallout itself was not new; that was as old as the Alamogordo test. What was new was the realization that, along with enormous increase in explosive power, the H-bombs might also release many times the amount of radioactivity produced by the original A-bomb. Radioactive fallout became an immensely important aspect of nuclear warfare and, as we shall see, it had far-reaching impacts on U.S. civil defense preparations.

THE CHALLENGE FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

The developments recounted above have generated innumerable studies of the effects of nuclear war, each with its own estimates of possible casualties and prospects for survival. Estimates have been conflicting because of the many varying assumptions and the many uncertainties in the picture—the length of a nuclear war; the number, size and distribution of the bombs dropped; and other unpredictable factors.


8 Among these have been studies by Associated Universities, Inc., the National Academy of Sciences, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense, the Joint [Congressional] Committee on Atomic Energy, the RAND Corporation, the Stanford Research Institute, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. A number of these studies are cited at appropriate points in this history or in the bibliography.
factors. For all the variations, possibilities, and uncertainties, an all-out thermonuclear attack on an unprotected population in our principal cities could produce up to at least 160 million casualties.

A vast literature has emerged over the years on the question of survivability from a nuclear exchange. Some scientists, members of Congress, and a small segment of the general public have voiced grave doubts that there is any real prospect of survival. Herman Kahn, Eugene Wigner, Samuel Huntington and many others, on the other hand, have felt that while no specific counter-weapons could be expected to preclude nuclear attacks, much could be done to attenuate the crippling effects of such attacks. But, as Bardyl R. Tirana, Director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), stated in 1979, in response to the critics, "the question that needs to be addressed by the people of this nation is: Do we want to do something? If so, what do we want to do? We do nothing now." The people of this country, Tirana asserted, had made a conscious decision, with the enactment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, to do something about civil defense.

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9For a particularly strong position against civil defense, see Bernard T. Feld's statement in article, "Can we Survive a Nuclear War With the Soviet Union," BAS, Sept. 1979, p. 38.
It is the law on the books that there shall be a (civil defense) system, and I think the time has come to address the issue rationally. Do we want it or don't we want it?10

Interestingly enough, almost three decades earlier, the first Federal Civil Defense Administrator, Millard Caldwell, raised the same question. At a hearing before a Civil Defense Task Force of the Senate Armed Services Committee, after Congress had severely slashed his first budget request, Caldwell said:

There is only one way to get civil defense moving. The solution requires a reassessment by the Defense Department and by the Congress of the need for an organized public. A token and sporadic endorsement, not based upon deep conviction, can assure nothing more than lingering ineffectiveness. The public will not respond with the sacrifice of time, effort, and money unless it believes that the civil defense function means the difference between winning and losing the next war.

If civil defense is a necessity, it should be supported; but, on the other hand, if it is less than vital, it should be abandoned.11

Neither the Administration nor the Congress was disposed to abandon civil defense. But, as we shall see,

10Ibid., p. 41.

they were also not disposed to support more than a token effort in that direction.

Notwithstanding expressions to the contrary, some people held firmly to the belief that the U.S. could live through a nuclear attack and recover—provided there had been proper preattack planning and action. The nation had the technical know-how and the wherewithal to achieve protection and to recover from an attack. The number of survivors, the degree of hardship they would suffer, the rapidity of reconstruction and recuperation of the economic system, as well as the preservation of the nation's social and political institutions, would depend on the design and implementation of an adequate civil defense program.

The basic ingredients of such a program were set forth clearly and forcefully as far back as 1946. Scattered through the findings of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey were "the clues" to the measures that could be taken to cut down potential losses of lives and property. Indeed, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survey team pinpointed these clues under the heading "WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT?" The team recommended five categories of actions: (1) the need for shelters, with adequate warning to assure that a maximum number of people could get to them; (2) steps toward decentralization of our population and industries to deny the enemy attractive targets and "bottlenecks"
which use of the atomic bomb could choke off to throttle our productive capacity; (3) a national civil defense organization to "prepare now the plans for necessary steps in case of crisis," with special attention to the two "complementary programs" of evacuation and shelters; (4) "active defense," which, along with "passive defense," would prevent a surprise attack from being decisive; and (5) the avoidance of war as "the surest way" to avoid destruction. 12

Unfortunately, this advice had little impact. The legislation enacted in January 1951 left the national civil defense organization virtually powerless in its relations with the States and localities; and its acquisition of a partnership role in 1958 didn't help much to achieve the civil defense "system" expected of it. The fast pace of weapons technology overwhelmed the planners through the fifties, and strategies for survival through sheltering and evacuation were ever shifting and became entangled in sharp controversy. Funds for civil defense were kept at minimal levels, and no funds were made available for the construction of public shelters. And practically nothing was accomplished in the way of reduction of our urban vulnerability. Mr. Tirana was inclined to be blunt and dramatic, but he was not far off the mark when he observed in mid-1979:

At the present time, the United States has for all practical purposes no genuine defense against the threat of nuclear attack.

Our best estimate is that in a large-scale nuclear exchange, approximately 140 million Americans would perish, and the remaining 80 million would survive by accident. All of the civil defense efforts of the last 30 years might add six to eight million survivors, principally through public information on protection against fallout.

Whatever industrial capability survived the exchange would be coincidental and unplanned. There is no planned capability for continuity of State and local governments, and virtually none for the Federal Government. In the face of catastrophic population and industrial losses, national recovery would be at best questionable.\textsuperscript{13}

As we review the historical record, we shall endeavor to bring out in some detail the reasons why the U.S., after some 30 years' effort, has, in the words of one perceptive staffer, "only a marginal civil defense system."\textsuperscript{14} It may be helpful, however, in setting the stage for the historical narration, to put the spotlight on what appear to have been, in the author's judgment, the most serious impediments to an effective program.

**THE CONSTRAINTS**

**Low Level of Financial Support**

From its inception the civil defense program suffered from inadequate funding. Low budgets hurt the organization's image

\textsuperscript{13} Bardyl R. Tirana, *Civil Defense: The Unthinkable and the Non-doable*, June 18, 1979, pp. 7-8.

and effectiveness. They weakened the agency in its relations with other Federal departments and agencies and with State and local governments which looked to it for direction and financial support. The frustrations and dampened spirits filtered down from Washington to the State and local organizations and discouraged all in their efforts to provide for effective civil defense programs.

Table 3 depicts the record of Federal civil defense appropriations over the entire 30-year history (FY 1951-FY 1980) of the program. Appropriations, it will be noted, reached a high point of $207.6 million in fiscal 1962, in response to President John F. Kennedy's placement of the problem directly before the Nation. He got from Congress full support for at least a modest beginning toward sheltering the population from radiological fallout in the event of a nuclear attack. The momentum could not be maintained, however, even while Kennedy was still President. Legislation to authorize Federal subsidies for the construction of public shelters encountered delays, and as a consequence, the appropriation in fiscal 1963 was far below the amount requested. Rebuffed two more times in seeking the requisite authorizing legislation, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara abandoned the struggle. As can be seen, the budget for a number of years thereafter ranged somewhat above $100 million; it was below that level during the fiscal year 1969 through 1979, and got back up to $100 million in fiscal 1980.
Table 3
RECORD OF U.S. FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1951-80
(Dollar amounts in millions)

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<td>Requested</td>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>$403.0</td>
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<td>1952</td>
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1No funds granted for programs needing authorizing legislation due to lack of passage of such legislation.

2Transferred from OCDM Appropriation to OCD/DOD.

3Includes transition quarter in changeover from July 1 to October 1 as the beginning of the fiscal year.

4Civil Defense budget submitted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.


Data for the years 1976 through 1980 were provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The totals requested and voted, it should be noted, are cited in then-current dollars. Inflation over the years substantially reduced the value of the Federal program dollar. Expressed in constant 1977 dollars, for example, the $100 million appropriation in fiscal 1980 was worth only $80 million—$12 million less than the 1977 worth of the initial $31.8 million appropriation for fiscal 1951. In these circumstances there was a progressive deterioration of U.S. civil defense capabilities, even in the face of Soviet improvements in weapons and delivery systems.

Inadequate Presidential Leadership and Congressional Support

The poor track-record on civil defense funding must be attributed to the failure of both Presidential and Congressional leadership to accept and adequately discharge their responsibilities in this field. The Congress has often been accused of having a blind spot for civil defense; but the same can be said of several of the Chief Executives. Within the Congress there were some staunch supporters and even converts to the cause of civil defense, as well as tough opponents. But even the latter expected the President to provide the leadership and demonstrate his readiness to come to grips


with critical problems and win public and Congressional support for bold decisions. The record provides little evidence of Presidents, other than Kennedy, perhaps, making a serious effort to get the Nation and the Congress to face up to the civil defense problem.

The Question of Public Interest and Support

All too often official neglect of civil defense has been linked with public apathy. James M. Landis, Director of the Office of Civilian Defense in World War II, spotlighted public apathy as one of the basic difficulties likely to confront the postwar organization. There is no question that there has been widespread public apathy in the area of civil defense. Opinion research surveys have come up with a multiplicity of causes: feelings of futility; the absence of spurs to action; failure really to perceive the threat of nuclear war; a sense of "morbid unreality" and reluctance to think about the problem; the expectation that the military forces can deter Soviet aggression and prevent their atomic missiles from getting through to their targets; and many other considerations. From these polls it would also appear that the vast majority of the American people favor an adequate civil defense program, though they overestimate the extent of the national effort. The very

small percentage opposed to civil defense, however, are among the most influential and vocal Americans. 18

Some observers contend that the public's failure to demand a more effective civil defense stems not from apathy but from confusion. The average citizen has been presented with conflicting assertions regarding the nuclear threat and contradictory advice on ways to deal with it. Inadequately informed or confused, the public has left it to its elected officials to provide for their security. They haven't pressed for a really effective program. And because of this seeming lack of public concern, Congress has supported only a limited program.

In the judgment of many proponents of civil defense, it is up to the President to provide the leadership needed to cope with the threatening future. Millard Caldwell put the problem in proper perspective in his letter to the President, April 18, 1952, transmitting FCDA's first annual report: "It is idle to complain of public apathy in civil defense so long as official apathy is obvious. The public looks to its leadership for the

Students of public opinion are convinced that if this leadership should avoid explicit and continuing commitment to an adequate civil defense program, the general public will not demand such a program. Conversely, if the leaders do make such a commitment, public support would very probably be forthcoming.

**Excessive Secrecy**

Public confusion, mistaken judgments and doubts about civil defense activities stemmed in part from the Government's practice of cloaking in secrecy information about the menace of nuclear weapons and radioactive fallout. Clearly, a careless or irresponsible release of information might endanger the national security. At the same time, suspicions have been voiced that the withholding of information was more often the result of vague thinking than of needs for security. 20

Requirements of secrecy and security unquestionably hobbled civil defense planners, particularly at the state and local levels and in relations with the public. Assumptions and plans became obsolete in the face of denials or delays of information on new and potential developments in weapons technology, yield of weapons, attack patterns, warning times, and other essentials of realistic civil defense planning. Val

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Peterson, who served under President Eisenhower as FCDA Administrator, pointed to this problem in 1955, when he testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

> We were handicapped because in civil defense our law provides that primary responsibility rests with the States and localities, and we were not able to make known to those responsible authorities the extent of the fall-out problem.21

With secrecy, Peterson told the Committee, "you create a degree of public confusion in the country." For his part, he felt, there could be "a serious discussion as to whether in our attempts for various reasons to delay the issuance of information, we actually compound our difficulties rather than eliminate them."22

Until the end of 1952, all the information officially released concerning thermonuclear weapons consisted of three short sentences: the first by President Truman, January 31, 1950, announcing his directive to the Atomic Energy Commission "to continue to work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called super-bomb"; the second, a joint release of the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, May 25, 1951, indicating that the Eniwetok weapons tests, carried out between May 1 and May 11 of that year, "included experiments contributing

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22Ibid., p. 43.
to thermonuclear weapons research"; and the third, a release by the Atomic Energy Commission, November 11, 1952, advising that additional tests at Eniwetok "included experiments contributing to thermonuclear weapons research." An announcement by the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission five days later was less laconic but added nothing to public knowledge about this development.23 It was May 1953, at a special Governors' conference called by President Eisenhower, when the governors were given "the sober facts about the growing threats to our home front security."24

By the end of the summer of 1953, following announcement of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb test, the Administration came under increasing pressure to lift the veil of secrecy and tell the people the facts about the threat to their security.25 Federal Civil Defense Administrator Peterson was fully in accord with this view. In an interview with Dr. Lapp, Peterson said:

... as far as I am concerned, I think the American people should be told everything possible that we could tell them about atomic bombs and about enemy capabilities and weapons. And, in general, I believe that in a democracy, where the affairs of government are the business of the people, ... the people can be depended upon to make the proper decision—if they have the facts. I don't believe that any other position is defensible in a democracy.26

In another interview, tape-recorded on October 15, 1954, Peterson indicated that his agency was still groping in the dark; it could not plan realistically because of the secrecy concerning the facts of radioactive fallout. The dangers of

25The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists devoted its entire September 1953 issue to the subject.
26"An Interview with Governor Val Peterson," BAS, Vol. 9; No. 7 (Sept. 1953), p. 239.
fallout were slow to surface. A news statement by Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, on March 31, 1954, highlighted the explosive power of the H-bomb, but did not explain the widespread spread of radioactive fallout. The secret could not be kept long in the face of leaks to the press and the worldwide attention given to the unfortunate Japanese fisherman on the Fortunate Dragon. By mid-1954, FCDA knew the drastic effects of these developments and began to take them into account in its planning. It was not free, however, to apprise the public that plans were being changed. It was not until February 1955—almost a year after the event—that information on the pattern and intensity of fallout was publicly disclosed.

Thus, civil defense needs had to yield to other requirements for secrecy, and civil defense suffered in the meantime. Reviewing the circumstances of this delay, Congressman Chet Holifield pointed out that FCDA needed more than "general information" to convince the governors and mayors of the need for a civil defense program. Secrecy about the effects


30Sloan MS., pp. 255-256.

31Ibid., p. 256.
of nuclear weapons, the University of Maryland's Bureau of Business and Economic Research noted, was a factor that hampered efforts to achieve an effective dispersal program.

... Earlier release of current information on the power of anticipated weapons might have had the effect of achieving the location of our growing industrial potential in safe areas, rather than adding to the existing concentration around our metropolitan areas. A little less secrecy for much more security. In fact, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration to this day are severely handicapped in their operations by the failure of the Atomic Energy Commission to release the information on potential weapon size needed by these agencies in their defense planning.

As a result of these shortcomings, the accomplishments to date of our industrial dispersal program has been tragically lacking.32

The problem of secrecy and of an uninformed public and Congress did not end in the fifties; it continued in the sixties, even though the civil defense mission then rested in the Department of Defense. In connection with his ill-fated shelter construction efforts, Defense Secretary McNamara attributed Congressional hostility to the public's lack of a better understanding of the problem. He opened up a substantial body of previously classified information on the entire scope of the problem of strategic nuclear war. He did this, McNamara said, to inform the public of the advantages and contributions of a civil defense program to the damage-limiting capability of this nation.

We describe nuclear war. We describe the fundamental requirements to deter it. We indicate the likely results if it should take place and describe the contribution that civil defense would make to minimizing the fatalities to this country.

This information, McNamara hoped, would enable Congressmen to discuss the issue with their constituents. Over a period of time—"and it will take time"—he said, "the public will understand this and can make their desires known on an informed basis which they have not been in a position to do previously."\(^3^3\)

Unfortunately, as was mentioned earlier and will be discussed more fully later, McNamara could not sway the Congress; and President Lyndon Johnson, preoccupied with the Vietnam troubles, did not lend the weight of his influence to obtain the requisite authorizing legislation. To this day Federal subsidization of construction of community shelters lacks legislative authorization. And civil defense planners have had to seek less costly and less desirable alternatives for the protection of the population in a nuclear war.

Limited Federal Power in Civil Defense

The civil defense program was hampered from the first by a poor legislative base. President Truman's staff arm, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), came up with a plan entirely unsuited to the nuclear age. James Landis joined the

ranks of many city mayors and others who were highly critical of the new Federal plan for civil defense. That plan, Landis stated,

... seems ... to be more like a plan for World War II than for World War III, a plan for TNT bombs rather than for A-bombs, so far as its administrative aspects are concerned. ... The possibility of A-bomb attacks makes it much more necessary to set up over-all command of civil defense resources. ... A-bombing will require much inter-state action ... Congress should act ... to establish an operational Civil Defense Administration with broader powers than those envisaged in the legislation suggested by President Truman.34

Truman went ahead anyway and encountered little opposition from Congress in the enactment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. This Act declared the Congressional policy and intent that the responsibility for civil defense "shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions." To the Federal Government fell the task of providing necessary coordination, guidance and authorized assistance.35

It soon became evident that the Federal Government would have to play a more direct and positive role if the nation was to face up to the issues of civil defense. Mayors accused State governments of indifference and neglect, and the Federal


35Public Law 920--81st Congress, 2nd Session, approved January 12, 1951. Copies of this Act and extracts from the Congressional hearings and reports pertinent to it have been compiled in FCDA, Legislative History--Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, n.d., Vol. I and II.
Government came in for its share of criticism for its seeming evasion of responsibility for civil defense. Highlighting a White House conference, held December 14-15, 1953, with mayors and civil defense officials from more than 150 cities, Milwaukee Mayor Frank P. Zeidler voiced the belief of many mayors that "it is the basic philosophy of the defenders of the nation to consider the people in the cities as indefensible, and to write them off." He hoped that the Administration sensed from the conference "a fundamental conflict between the delegation of civil defense responsibility to the states and adequate national civil defense."

... The nation itself will be in danger if the federal government under the present law continues to avoid its direct responsibility to metropolitan centers from which it gathers its strength and which centers are the prime targets of any attack on the nation. States' pre-eminence with respect to civil defense can well mean national destruction.36

Congressional committees soon joined the ranks of those who felt that fear of infringement of States' rights and local prerogatives was only a smokescreen for evasion of Federal responsibility for civil defense. In 1955, the Kesnbaum Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, known for its traditional efforts to bolster State and local governments, recommended shifting primary responsibility for civil defense to the

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National Government, with States and localities retaining "an important supporting role." And the following year the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, under the chairmanship of Chet Holifield, similarly recommended vesting in the Federal Government "the basic responsibility for civil defense." In the face of these pressures, the Eisenhower Administration moved toward a greater Federal role in civil defense. The "exigencies of the present threat," Eisenhower advised Federal Civil Defense Administrator Peterson, "require vesting in the Federal Government a larger responsibility." There would be no preemption of all State, local, and individual responsibilities; the emphasis would be on partnership or "joint responsibility." Federal responsibility now would be direct; that of the States and their subdivisions would be to supplement and complement


the Federal initiative. The 1950 Act was amended in 1958 to reflect this concept of joint responsibility. Holifield was fearful that a "joint" or "partnership" program might weaken acceptance of direct Federal responsibility. He and others would have preferred an unmistakable placement of responsibility on the Federal Government, while still encouraging State and local operations. But they went along with the Eisenhower legislative proposal because it was an improvement over the 1950 Act.

The tasking of the job on a joint or partnership basis had the merit of involving the entire nation in the civil defense effort, but it also had its problems. It did not


permit the central direction needed to develop an effective civil defense "system," as prescribed in the 1958 Act, and to ensure its practical implementation. The participation of the States and the more than 5,000 local governments has been purely voluntary, and the Federal civil defense agency has had no command or directive authority in its relationship with them. State and local disinterest or disagreement, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported in 1976, could frustrate the accomplishment of national goals. State participation, the GAO emphasized, should be encouraged, but "the needs and interests of the Nation should be addressed whether a particular State or region desires to participate or not."42

The Federal civil defense agencies sought to elicit State and local participation by providing matching funds for some programs and by fully funding others. But these financial incentives did not always bring the desired results. The GAO found the response to national priorities "erratic." Some small communities might have effective civil defense capabilities, while large cities that were likely targets did not. On an overall basis it appeared, as late as the fall of 1976, that communities with no less than 69 percent of the national population had not even attained the "minimum acceptable"

level of readiness for coordinated operations in a nuclear war.43

Repeatedly, since the mid-fifties particularly, State and local government officials demonstrated reluctance to perform civil defense functions.44 Even the lure of Federal financial assistance often failed to elicit the advance preparations needed to cope with the effects of a nuclear attack. Reporting in August 1977, the GAO noted:

... the civil defense program, as currently contemplated, will not save the maximum number of lives unless States and communities carry out certain actions, both now and in an emergency. Many States and communities have not taken these actions. We believe that those civil defense activities which involve the national interest should not be neglected because of disinterest on the part of an individual State or municipality.45

The withholding of Federal funds until the State and local organizations took the necessary actions, national civil defense officials feared, "would establish conditions most civil defense programs could not meet in the near future"; and it would bring to a halt "much of the national program ... in many key communities."46


44 Diamond Ms., p. 201.


46 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
32

Cooperation by State and local governments was more readily forthcoming when civil defense programs were integrated into their own "all-risk" preparedness programs. State and local governments tended to plan for a broad spectrum of disasters, natural as well as manmade. As the natural disasters, like those brought on by tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, occurred frequently, the State and local governments were inclined to concentrate on these types of disasters. The national civil defense authorities, on the other hand, would have liked to see the States and localities give more attention to nuclear preparedness and to spend Federal monies and their own matching funds for this purpose.

The civil defense organizations were often asked to support preparedness for natural disasters. Indeed, early in 1972, the Secretary of Defense specifically charged the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) with helping the State and local governments to prepare for natural disasters and, thus, hopefully also fostering preparation for nuclear attack. The States and localities welcomed this "dual-use" approach; and legislation enacted in July 1976 established as a matter of national policy that resources acquired and maintained under the Federal Civil Defense Act should be utilized to minimize the effects of natural disasters when they occurred.47

Subsequent efforts to narrow the scope of Federal funding support to nuclear concerns met stern resistance at the State and local levels, and Mr. Tirana decided administratively to support "total preparedness" or "dual use" emergency planning at these levels. In this way, Tirana hoped, DCPA would utilize strong State and local interests in preparedness for peacetime emergencies to build a base for an effective civil defense capability. Yet, the plain truth was that preparedness for civil defense and natural disasters were mutually supportive only to a degree. Fallout protection and measures for national survival clearly were vital for civil defense, but had no place in planning for natural disasters. Thus, as the GAO observed, the dedication of civil defense personnel to local disaster preparedness could divert their attention from "the more difficult and demanding preparedness for enemy attack."48

Problems of intergovernmental relations prompted the GAO to put forth for consideration the option of making the entire civil defense program a Federal responsibility. With a federalized civil defense, the GAO noted,

... national priorities could more easily be accomplished. Many State and local officials would agree that civil defense is properly a Federal responsibility. The matching funds previously used to support State and local civil preparedness organizations, could be redirected toward readiness in the high-risk and densely populated areas. Emergency operating centers could be built and upgraded on a priority basis ..., and shelters could be constructed with Federal funds in those areas which have shelter deficits.

The GAO realized, however, that this option would pose problems. Without State and local involvement in nuclear preparedness, the plans "might not be as quickly and effectively carried out." Moreover, the funds contributed by the States and localities would be lost, with resultant increased Federal outlays for civil defense.49

It seemed highly doubtful that Congress or the President would seriously consider shifting the partnership concept to a unilateral Federal arrangement. The States and localities can be a great element of strength, and their resources would have to be harnessed in defense operations. For all the problems entailed, joint, cooperative planning appeared to be the only feasible course.

Civilian vs. Military Control

In the history of American civil defense the concept of civilian control stands out strongly, but not without evidence of considerable confusion regarding civil-military relationships in this field. The emphasis on civilian control of civil defense surfaced soon after the close of World War II, as part of a general postwar reaction against undue military influence over the nonmilitary aspects of national security. Hanson Baldwin brought the issue into focus when he said:

Civilian, not military, control must guide economic mobilization in war and peace . . . because economic

--- 49Ibid., pp. 64-66.
readiness and economic mobilization touch at least the periphery of every phase of national life, and democracy is built upon the fundamental principle of civilian supremacy.50

In the absence of a civilian agency at the close of World War II, the military undertook studies and developed a civil defense program which, they were disturbed to find, met with a cold reception.51 The plan recognized that the carrying out of civil defense measures must be primarily a civilian responsibility effected through a civilian organization. Recognizing the need for a close tie with the military, however, the planners favored the placement of the organization under the Secretary of Defense. Disinclined to move that fast toward operations anyway, President Truman implemented the concept of civilian control in March 1949, when he assigned to the NSRB the responsibility for civil defense planning.

By the end of 1950, as the pressure of events forced a shift from a planning to an operating program, the matter of civilian vs. military control again came up. But by then, as we shall see in our discussion of the deliberations on the 1950 Act, the Defense Department no longer wanted the civil defense responsibility. The nation had come to accept the concept that the best defense was a good offense; and, unlike the immediate postwar years, the Defense Department was having


little trouble with its image and appropriation requests. The overwhelming sentiment was that the major responsibility for this "homefront defense" against nuclear and other modern weapons "must be civilian." When requested, the military would assist the civilian authorities to the extent that such commitment would not interfere with the armed forces' primary military missions.52

Over the following decade the Defense Department seemed generally quite satisfied that the planning and policy responsibility for civil defense rested with FCDA and later OCDM. Nonetheless, the Defense Department recognized that it was still one of the major agencies around which the civil defense program developed. Under the concept of making maximum use of existing Government resources, the civil defense organizations leaned heavily on the Defense Department. The latter issued policy pronouncements designating the Department of the Army as coordinating or executive agent on civil defense matters and spelled out procedures to be observed in a civil defense emergency.

OCDM devoted one annex of its national plan to spelling out the scope of military support in civil defense operations in an emergency, to the extent that essential military requirements would permit. Military assistance, the annex made clear, was to complement, but not to substitute for, civilian participation in civil defense. Upon Presidential direction to assume

52FCDA, Annual Report for 1952, p. 3.
responsibility for the restoration and maintenance of public order, the military were authorized to "do all acts which are reasonably necessary for this purpose until such time as it is determined by the President that appropriate civil authorities are able to operate and function adequately." Such military assistance was deemed to be "a temporary measure" to be terminated as soon as possible "in order to conserve military resources and to avoid infringement on the responsibility and authority of civil government agencies."\(^5\)

Of continuing concern was the possibility that requirements of public order and recovery would create a demand for large numbers of military personnel, and might even bring on martial law. In a civil defense exercise (Operation Alert) in 1955, President Eisenhower, to the surprise of everyone, invoked martial law, stirring up sharp controversy.\(^4\) The military neither desired nor were prepared for this assignment. Nonetheless, in view of Eisenhower's action, they felt impelled to plan for such a possibility. The civil and defense mobilization agencies in turn were spurred to devote more thought to the avoidance of martial law by planning in peacetime for the maintenance of effective civil government and the performance by civilians of the functions needed to help survivors, sustain


\(^4\) Cliffe MS, pp. 89-92.
restore the economy, and resume production in essential industry.

When President Kennedy decided in 1961 to put civil defense in the Defense Department, he was careful to emphasize the retention of civilian control by the head of the Department—the civilian Secretary of Defense. At the same time the civilian Office of Civil Defense (OCD) could draw on the strength of the Defense Department for much-needed help. Army and Navy engineers did help materially in surveying the nation's existing structures and assessing their potential use as public fallout shelters. Civilians received training in the use of radiological monitoring instruments. Army units toured the country with exhibits of techniques for protection against radioactive fallout. National Guard units helped local civil defense agencies in moving supplies from warehouses to fallout shelters. And in June 1964, the Secretary of the Army approved a plan to establish a military headquarters in each State for planning and controlling the use of the State's military resources to support civil defense in emergencies. The plan reinforced the DOD policy that military assistance would complement, but would not be a substitute for, civil participation in civil defense.55

The Defense support during the first half of the sixties helped OCD make dramatic progress toward achieving a meaningful lifesaving capability. But that progress showed signs of deterioration over the next decade as civil defense budgets dwindled and top-level interest waned. A review of the situation in the mid-seventies prompted a Civil Defense Panel of the House Armed Services Committee to observe:

... Through the years, civil defense concepts and programs have been influenced by changes in defense strategies, the state of international affairs, and budgetary pressures. ... [The] United States never has mounted the level of effort in shelter systems and rigorous training disciplines that would maximize the life-saving potential of civil defense. Cost considerations have been the main obstacle. Whereas billions of dollars are spent each year even for single weapon systems, civil defense counts its appropriations in the tens of millions. Civil defense is the orphan in the Department of Defense.56

In its 1977 report on civil defense, the GAO came up with another option that was not likely to win much support—to "make civil defense part of the military defense." By tying civil defense more closely to military defense, the GAO asserted, the National Guard and Reserves could provide "a cost-effective bridge between peacetime and wartime readiness." And civil defense considerations could get "closer consideration" in the location of defense installations and in decisions on the closure or transfer of military bases and depots. The

GAO recognized, however, that this option, while probably involving the least cost, "might present problems to the States and communities which have developed their own emergency organizations and could conflict with the contingency military deployments of the National Guard and the Reserves." 57

In December 1977 Defense Secretary Harold Brown decided on a five-year program to improve the image and life-saving capabilities of the civil defense organization. President Carter endorsed Brown's program and made a policy pronouncement in September 1978, stating in essence that civil defense is an element of the strategic balance in conjunction with our offensive and defensive forces and could serve to enhance deterrence and stability. DCPA viewed these developments and the Administration's request for a modest increase in its budget for fiscal 1980 as marking "a turning point in U.S. civil defense." 58 Congress was not convinced, however, that a good case had been made for the proposed program, and its appropriation of $100 million, after taking inflation into account, set "yet another all-time low record" in funding for civil defense. 59

Even while Secretary Brown was thus striving to strengthen the image and role of civil defense, a move was under way to pluck the "orphan" out of the Defense Department. Notwithstanding

Brown's strong opposition, President Carter put into effect a plan that lifted DCPA from the Defense Department and consolidated its functions along with those of other agencies in a sweeping reorganization of the emergency management apparatus of the Federal Government. The States and localities, the Administration and Congress generally saw in the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency a good solution to the prevailing fragmentation of authority and responsibility for civil defense, emergency preparedness, natural disasters, and other functions. There were others, however, who voiced concern that in this move to FEMA, civil defense would suffer a lowering in stature and a weakening of its credibility as an integral part of the U.S. defense program.  

As will be pointed out later, links of coordination were established with the National Security Council and the Department of Defense to ensure that FEMA's civil defense programs were attuned to military needs and over-all national security policy. While admittedly civil defense had been de-emphasized since the mid-sixties, Congressional hearings, assessments of Soviet efforts, and top-level government studies in the late seventies demonstrated increased concern for "attack preparedness." With the activation of FEMA at the end of that decade,  

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one couldn't help but wonder how civil defense would fare under a single-agency approach to planning for all disasters, natural and manmade, in peacetime as well as in emergencies.

Ambiguity as to the Strategic Import of Civil Defense

Throughout the period under review there have been many expressions from Presidents on down to the effect that civil defense is an integral part of our total defense. The literature abounds with images of civil defense as one of the means by which the nation resolves to stand up to any nuclear threat. An inadequate civil defense, we are told, would raise doubts as to the nation's ability to hold casualties within tolerable limits and achieve the rapid restoration of the economy. Such doubts would undermine public confidence in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Our allies might doubt our willingness to come to their aid if attacked, for fear of risking nuclear war. Soviet leaders might doubt that the U.S. would really stand firm against their aggressive designs, thus encouraging them to aggression and nuclear blackmail.

Yet, in the shaping of national security policies in the four decades under review, the Administrations and the Congress gave civil defense a low profile and meager funds. President Kennedy in 1961 won Congressional support for a "allout shelter program not in the context of defense strategy, but simply as an "insurance" policy
in the event deterrence failed. Viewed as "insurance," civil defense was envisioned as a comparatively small effort. Later efforts, however, to depict civil defense in a "strategic" context, with the implication of a large-scale program, met with negative Congressional responses.

Judging from the resources allocated to it, civil defense has been treated as a minor element in our over-all strategy. Civil defense has been, and remains what President Kennedy called it--an insurance policy serving as a hedge against failure of our policy of deterrence. In a sense, investment in all defense efforts, military as well as civil, is "insurance" for which the nation hopes it will never have to put in a claim. Mutual assured destruction may continue to ward off a nuclear exchange, but there is always danger of a failure of deterrence by reason of an accident, a miscalculation, or an irrational act. With the balance of terror seemingly becoming less stable, many feel that it would be foolhardy in the extreme not to take out the "insurance" needed to protect our totally exposed population in the event deterrence fails.

Problems in Designing a Strategy for Civil Defense

In March 1953, Mayor Frank Zeidler, who headed a vigorous civil defense program in Milwaukee, witnessed an atomic test with a burst of 15 kilotons--about the same size as the burst at Hiroshima some eight years earlier. Zeidler's reflections on the experience well illustrate the problems besetting the planners in
designing a strategy for survival for persons living in densely populated cities. Zeidler listed in order eight choices available to a person unfortunate enough to be in that situation:

(a) It is safest not to live in a target city at all.

(b) If a person lives in the city, it is safer to evacuate on a pre-warning notice than to remain in the city.

(c) If a person can't evacuate, it is safer to be in an underground shelter, many scores of feet down than to remain in any other shelter or building.

(d) If a person does not have a deep shelter, a simple earth shelter perhaps in the backyard may be next best expedient.

(e) If a person does not have a simple earth shelter, then a backyard slit trench (covered) may provide the next best protection.

(f) If a person does not have a backyard slit trench, then a fortified basement may be next choice, provided this fortified basement has two outlets.

(g) If a person does not have a fortified basement with two outlets, a fortified basement with one outlet must do.

(h) If a person does not have a fortified basement, then he may be forced to choose one of the following very unpleasant alternatives: (1) being trapped in a basement and being burned; (2) being outside flat on the ground behind some hillock or rise and being charred by great heat and suffering a severe degree of radiation; (3) being in his auto and taking his chances there.

Choices (e), (f), (g), and (h) aren't much in the way of choices in view of the power of the bombs, because they mean exposure to blast, radiation, and burning. Yet, they are by force of circumstance the principal choices of people living in the greatest American cities.
For the long run, Zeidler stated, civil defense authorities should advocate a replanning and rebuilding of our cities, and demand a coordination of Federal and State policies to this end.61

The massing of 40 percent of the total population and more than 50 percent of manufacturing employment in the top 40 metropolitan areas obviously was a hazard the nation could not risk in the atomic age. In one of their early discussions of the "implications of atomic bombs," scientists on the Manhattan project in 1945 jotted down on the blackboard a three-point program: "World government; if no world government, international control of atomic energy; if no international control of atomic energy, dispersal of cities." Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, reflected on this discussion some nine years later. With a seemingly hopeless prospect for the first two alternatives, he observed, metropolitan cities clearly become "death traps, and invitations for attack or blackmail."62 Since 1945 these scientists have been calling for dispersion—"defense through decentralization"—as the only real protection against nuclear weapons. They saw dispersion as "the core" of the nation's industrial


and civil defense. "No preparation," in the words of Dr. Leo Szilard, "makes any sense without it."63

This, too, is an area of strongly divergent views. Of necessity the reduction of urban vulnerability would be a slow, gradual process; it would be expensive and it would encounter serious economic, political, and sociological problems.64 Urban planners, architects, scientists, and some representatives from industry were convinced that over the long run, progressive steps could be taken within realistic plans to break "the Gordian knot of metropolitan disorder."65 But accomplishments were unimpressive. Hanson Baldwin likened the progress with industrial dispersion to "the frog trying to get out of the well--one jump up and two down."66 All reports pointed to problems of getting people, builders, investment houses and industry to depart from the inertia of their accustomed ways. In his final report as director of OCDM, covering fiscal 1961, Frank B. Ellis candidly observed:

63 Roland Sawyer, "It's Up to You, Mr. President," BAS, Vol. 9 (Sept. 1953), p. 246.

64 For a good analysis of the subject, see Ansley J. Coale, The Problem of Reducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs (A Report Prepared for the Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Atomic Energy of the Social Science Research Council), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. FCDA had virtually no role in this field; the problem fell within the mission of NSRB and later OCM. The Cliffe MS provides a comprehensive account of the history of the dispersal program into the late fifties. See also Lyon G. Tyler, Jr., "Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945-1950," Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (hereinafter cited as Tyler MS), chapter IV.


Application of dispersion policy continued to be plagued with limitations. Few facilities can be relocated outside vulnerable areas in peacetime without excessive costs and reduction in efficiency. Some dispersion has resulted from the Nation's economic growth, but continual growth of major metropolitan areas and the interdependence of the Nation's complex economy has neutralized most dispersion activity. And the situation appears to be no better today.

The civil defense planners sought to protect the population in two interrelated ways: sheltering them in place; and evacuating them in advance of an attack. Determination of a shelter policy was no simple matter; and implementation of a nationwide shelter program, if done right, would not come cheaply. The cost of construction of shelters to protect against the blast effects of large nuclear weapons was deemed prohibitive. The emphasis, therefore, was on providing fallout shelters everywhere and to accept the losses from the blast and thermal effects at or near the points of weapon impact. With shelters of reasonable strength and durability and in readily accessible locations, the people would have some place to go when the missiles started raining upon them. Those in the area of blast and fire damage most likely would perish, but many millions would be saved in the surrounding areas of heavy fallout.

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Planning for evacuation also was by no means simple. To be practicable, evacuation of densely populated areas would require adequate advance warning. It would be necessary to set up housing arrangements outside the target areas; provide for the orderly exodus of the people within the warning period; arrange for sustenance during the extended period when the economy may be paralyzed and disorganized; and still shield the evacuees against the spread of radioactive fallout. The evacuation approach has been the subject of sharp controversy. Still, if one could count on a strategic alert extending for days or weeks, evacuation can outdo shelters in numbers of survivors.

The civil defense leaders repeatedly appeared to shift ground in their quest for a strategy for survival. The first FCDA Administrator, Millard Caldwell, sought large appropriations to launch a shelter protection program, which Congress refused to vote. His successor, Val Peterson, initially had no interest in shelters. He gave primary attention to evacuation; but as he came to appreciate the dangers of widespread radioactive fallout from H-bombs and the possible dwindling of warning time with the impending introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Peterson gradually abandoned "survival plans" based on the evacuation concept. He recommended a large shelter program, and several important studies lent support to his proposal. But President Eisenhower turned a deaf ear to these recommendations, and presented no shelter program for Congressional action.
In response to a question from Dr. Ralph Lapp, "What is the (Eisenhower) Administration doing?" Congressman Holifield replied:

Frankly, I've asked that same question repeatedly. The Administration's answer has always been, in effect: "We are encouraging the states and localities to build civil defense organizations and study possible ways in which to protect their people. We are financing survival planning studies. We are stockpiling medical supplies. We are furnishing advice and guidance to the States and localities."

Even if these functions were worthwhile, Holifield continued, "they are at most peripheral. They do not go to the heart of the problem. There is at present no national plan for survival and there is nothing I can see that will ensure the survival of any major segment of our society in the event of an enemy attack." Holifield had sought to bring the problem to the attention of the American people and the Congress, "in the hope that the executive branch might wake up to its responsibilities before it's too late." He wasn't sure that it was not already too late.

The next move is up to the President. He is the Commander-in-Chief and charged by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our nation against a foreign foe. I earnestly hope he acts quickly.

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71 Ibid., p. 134.
But Eisenhower would not embark on a Federal shelter program. He chose instead to promote individual shelter construction, and to merge the civil defense and defense mobilization agencies into one organization—the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization—as a staff arm of the President.

President Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, lost no time in launching a nationwide fallout shelter system. A newly created Office of Civil Defense directly under the Secretary of Defense embarked in fiscal 1962 on a major effort to identify shelters in existing buildings, mark them, and stock them with food, water containers, sanitation kits, and other survival supplies. The program looked to the identification by the early seventies of some 225 million spaces with a protection factor of 40 or more (that is, the radioactivity level would be no more than 1/40 of that outside the shelter). The program further contemplated construction of additional public shelter capacity in shelter-deficient areas, for without this increment more than half of the U.S. population would lack ready access to surveyed shelters.

As was indicated earlier, Congress would not authorize this incremental construction, and the continuous reduction of civil defense funding to the lowest possible sustaining rate weakened the shelter survey, marking and stocking efforts. By the mid-seventies the National Shelter Survey had identified 231 million spaces, but only about 100 million were readily accessible to the population in an "at-home" posture.\(^\text{72}\)

Testifying before the Proxmire Committee in January 1979, DCPA Director Tirana stated:

It would take at least a year of intensive effort and large expenditures, during a period of heightened international tension, to bring the current in-place protection system to full effectiveness, by improving or rebuilding Direction and Control, Radiological Defense, and other needed systems and capabilities. In that case survival might total some 110 million in a large-scale attack.73

DCPA's budget had forced it increasingly to depend on "surging" in a period of intense crisis to plug gaps in civil defense readiness. As part of this approach, DCPA in mid-1975 initiated planning for "crisis relocation" to ensure survival of a majority of the population. This approach, DCPA estimated, had the potential of saving 100 million people in a heavy attack—in addition to the 80 million who would survive if there were no civil defense preparations. Under the sheltering-in-place approach pursued since 1962, the survival potential would be only 30 million—in addition to the 80 million mentioned.

Of course, as Tirana indicated before the Proxmire Committee, this substantial increase in lifesaving potential would require much more than just paper planning.

... The plans, as they are developed, must be exercised with the State and local officials who would be responsible to carry them out. ... Supporting operational systems must also be developed, such as Direction and Control, Communications, Warning, Radiological Defense, and Emergency Public Information. Current DCPA analyses suggest that "paper plans only" for relocation, without such supporting systems and preparations, would result in about half the total survival potential of a full system—about 40 percent survival in a heavy, mid-1980's attack, rather than the 80 percent survival potential of a full crisis relocation system.74

The crisis-relocation approach raised questions about its credibility. Senator Proxmire shared with others the feeling that a modest program might make sense. What bothered Proxmire particularly was that the conflicting testimony of the expert witnesses and Government spokesmen "points out very clearly that the United States still does not have a coherent, understandable civil defense program." To be sure, President Carter had issued a policy pronouncement "of the most general type," but his Administration had not translated this policy into "a recognizable budget commitment." Bandying about an annual budget figure from $114 million to $145 million, Proxmire asserted, "does not lend much confidence to the policy itself."

What we have here is a lack of leadership. We need a clear unambiguous statement of facts from this administration. We need someone to stand up and say, this is what our civil defense policy is, this is how much it is going to cost, and this is why we need to do it.

74 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
... a prudent policy demands a prudent follow-through, and to date that has been lacking.\textsuperscript{75}

Instability in Federal Civil Defense Organization

In the civil defense field it may be an oversimplification to tie shortfalls in preparedness to organizational and administrative problems. Far more pertinent are the overwhelming challenges in planning for national survival and the lack of adequate presidential, Congressional, and public support of this planning. Nonetheless, the lack of organizational stability was an impediment. Over the 30 years of its existence the civil defense organization was subjected to repeated shifts in structure and relationships, making it difficult for the agency to take root, grow, and establish for itself the status and prestige it needed to thrive in the Washington environment.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 reportedly called civil defense "one of the most difficult things to put together in administrative form that I have yet had."\textsuperscript{76} The long series of reorganizations since then, listed below, demonstrate that Roosevelt's successors also found it difficult:

- From the Department of Defense to the National Security Resources Board (1949);
- From NSRB to the Federal Civil Defense Administration (1950);

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., p. 91.
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., p. 54.
From FCDA to merger with the Office of Defense Mobilization in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (1958);

- From OCDM to the Office of Civil Defense under the Secretary of Defense (1961);

- From OCD under the Secretary of Defense to OCD under the Secretary of the Army (1964);

- From OCD under the Secretary of the Army to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency back under the Secretary of Defense (1972); and


All past organizational changes, as we shall see, had their well-reasoned and forcefully stated rationale, their supporters and their critics, their high hopes and frustrations. FEMA is new, and so any judgment on FEMA must await the passage of time.

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CHAPTER II
THE LEGACY OF EARLIER YEARS, 1916-48

Many of the problems highlighted in Chapter I had their roots in experience with civil defense during the two World Wars and in the post-World War II years of planning that led to the enactment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Civil defense was something new to American experience. As a result, there was confusion as to what it should embrace. In both World Wars, protection of the population against attack was only part of the job; there was also substantial concern with projects aimed at boosting morale and getting the people behind the mobilization effort. Fortunately, the United States was not seriously attacked, and so it never had to cope with the reality of civil defense. But this gave a sense of aimlessness and wastefulness even with respect to the protective aspects of the program.

Toward the end of World War II, with increased knowledge of the experience of Britain, Germany, and Japan under heavy bombing, there emerged a clearer picture of the true ingredients of civil defense. It was evident to some, at least, that the nature of the problem would change radically with the introduction of the A-bomb. Yet patterns of thought and action developed in these earlier years
persisted and hampered the design of a civil defense program appropriate to the atomic age. The post-World War II planning first in the Defense establishment and then under NSRB leadership ended up with a plan and legislation hardly calculated to provide a meaningful civil defense program. As one close student of the subject observed:

... Instead of being launched with a vote of confidence, the civil defense program was burdened with a history of skepticism, inter-jurisdictional rivalries and animosities, lack of top-level executive support and a legislative authorization that could easily be considered a natural barrier to an effective program.¹

WORLD WAR I EXPERIENCE

Civil defense had its origins in World War I, when warring nations had developed the capability of using aircraft for direct attacks upon targets behind the forces in the field. Non-combatant civilians manning the industries that supported mass armies came to be viewed as the "home front," and therefore a proper target for enemy attack. Great Britain experienced this phenomenon to some degree: German Zeppelins and aircraft subjected Britain to 103 aerial raids. They dropped 300 tons of bombs, causing

4,820 casualties, of which 1,413 were fatal. These losses were not formidable, but they foreshadowed the development of this new form of attack as a significant factor in general war.

For the U.S., World War I posed no real threat of air attack; and civil defense could hardly be said to have existed during that war. Nevertheless, some of the steps taken in that period provided a foundation for activities that came to be associated with civil defense. In August 1916 Congress established a Council of National Defense, consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, to direct and coordinate the mobilization effort. The Secretary of War, as Council Chairman, supervised the council's civil defense functions. These involved direction of the activities of State and local defense councils which, in turn, directed volunteer activities in such fields as public health, morale, conservation, economic stability, and Americanization.

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2 Terence H. O'Brien, Civil Defense (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), p. 11. This is one of the "Civil Histories" in the series constituting the History of the Second World War edited by Sir Keith Hancock, in which the authors had free access to official documents.

A total of 182,000 State and local defense councils thus directed "home-front" activities deemed important to the war effort but which had virtually no relation to civilian protection. These councils were rapidly dissolved at the end of the war. But the ideas of massive involvement of volunteers at the local level in economic mobilization problems and the three-tier structure of organization from the Federal level through the State and down to the local levels were not lost. They had a definite bearing on the development of civil defense in World War II and on the subsequent efforts underlying the enactment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.4

WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE

The early twenties saw the conceptual elaboration by the Italian theorist, Guilio Douhet, of the idea of using aerial weapons to attack population and production centers as a basic instrument of war policy.5 Such attacks by the Japanese in China, by the Italians in Ethiopia, and by the Germans and Italians in Spain gave practical support to Douhet's strategic doctrine. In light of these developments and the potential threat to its own security, Great Britain initiated civil defense preparations in the thirties. And

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4 Jordan Study, p. xii.

5 Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1943; Sloan MS, pp. 2-5.)
as the war in Europe developed, Britain accelerated its preparations and came up with a program which enabled it to pursue the war effort without undue dislocation and intolerable losses.

These developments, however, had no impact on the American people. American policymakers and planners gave little thought to questions of civil defense in the interwar years. There seemed to be no point, therefore, in planning for such a contingency. There was little knowledge of civil defense as it had been developed in Europe. At the time of Pearl Harbor, no significant research had been done on sheltering, warning devices, blackout and camouflage, control centers, and other tactics in defense against enemy weapons.6

The Organization of Civilian Defense

With the coming of war in Europe, the U.S. embarked on a rearmament program. As a first step on the administrative side, President Roosevelt issued an order, May 25, 1940, establishing an Office of Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President, which served as the incubator for many defense and war organizations. On May 28, the President announced the reestablishment of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. The Council

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itself remained dormant, but the Advisory Commission, with its subsidiary organizations, contained in embryonic form many of the agencies that were to be developed more fully later. Among these subsidiary organizations was the Division of State and Local Cooperation, established late in July 1940. 7

Headed by Frank Bane, Executive Director of the Council of State Governments, the Division functioned as a channel of communication between the Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission on the one hand, and State and local defense councils on the other. The Division directed its energies primarily to the amelioration of problems stemming from the rearmament effort, such as the impact of rapidly expanding defense industries in congested areas. It encouraged the creation of State and local councils and, through them surveyed industrial facilities and manpower, as well as community needs. Bane interpreted his mission to be "simply to clear the tracks ahead for government agencies and for private industry." 8

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8Kerr MS, p. 27; see also Frank Bane, "The Organization and Administration of the Office of Civilian Defense," Lecture at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, June 9, 1947 (L47-145).
The Division gradually turned to matters of civilian protection, but it was abolished before it could make much headway. From the first, there was mounting pressure, particularly from local government officials led by New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, for the establishment of protective services. In October 1940 La Guardia sent a committee of firemen to London to observe the city under the "blitz." In his preface to the committee's report, La Guardia stated:

Modern aerial warfare has placed tremendous responsibilities on the cities and their civilian populations. On the shoulders of local authorities has fallen the whole burden of 'passive' or civil defense—the protection, medical and hospital services, restricting of lighting, protection of transport, armament producing plants and utilities, evacuation and housing, clearance of debris, and other non-combatant tasks.

Responding to this concern for protection, the Division of State and Local Cooperation put out guidance on such matters as blackouts and shelters.

The mayors kept up the pressure for expeditious action to provide protective services and reorganize the Federal

9Mauck, op. cit., p. 266. Mauck's article is a summary of his more detailed study, "Civilian Defense in the United States, 1940-1945," which served as the basis for Dr. Kerr's discussion of the subject. The Jordan Study, in its treatment of this subject, drew on a "Narrative Account of the Office of Civilian Defense," by Robert McElroy, an official of that office, prepared in 1944. McElroy's manuscript is in the National Archives. In his research and writing on the World War II experience, the writer benefited from these works.

10Quoted in Kerr MS, p. 29.
civil defense effort. At the conclusion of a Conference of Mayors in Ottawa, Canada, early in 1941, La Guardia wrote to the President:

... I find that the general agreement among the mayors is that there is a need for a strong Federal Department to coordinate activities, and not only to coordinate but to initiate and get things going ... Please bear in mind that ... never in our history (up to this war) has the civilian population been exposed to attack. The new technique of war has created the necessity for developing new techniques of civilian defense. It is not just community singing and basket weaving that is needed ... What is needed is to create a home defense among the civilian population, to be trained to meet any responsibility of an air or naval attack in any of our cities ... It is not an easy job to educate, train and prepare cities to meet a situation where bombs explode in their midst, destroying buildings, with hundreds killed and thousands injured. That is the job ahead of us.11

This growing concern for civilian protection, combined with defense-related problems of production and community facilities requiring cooperation with State and local governments, brought an Executive order, May 20, 1941, by which the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) replaced the Division of State and Local Cooperation.12 OCD was to:

Serve as the center for the coordination of Federal civilian defense activities which involve relationships between the Federal Government and State and local governments. ... Keep informed of problems which arise from the impact of the industrial and military defense effort upon local communities, and take necessary steps to secure the cooperation of appropriate Federal departments and agencies in dealing with such problems and in meeting the emergency needs of such communities.

11Ibid., pp. 29-30.
12Bureau of the Budget, The U.S at War, p. 59.
Assist State and local governments in the establishment of State and local defense councils or other agencies designed to coordinate civilian defense activities.

With the assistance of the Board of Civilian Protection (which was established within the OCD by the Executive order), study and plan measures designed to afford adequate protection of life and property in the event of emergency.

With the assistance of the Volunteer Participation Committee (also established by the Executive order) consider proposals, suggest plans, and promote activities designed to sustain the national morale and to provide opportunities for constructive civilian participation in the defense program.

Mayor La Guardia was appointed director on a volunteer basis. He received no salary and operated directly under the President.

OCD set up two operating branches: a Civilian Protection Branch to deal with the protective phases of the mission; and a Civilian War Service Branch to deal with the nonprotective phases. To decentralize supervision, La Guardia established nine Regional Civilian Defense Areas (later called Civilian Defense Regions), coterminous in their boundaries with the Army Corps (later Service Command) Areas. Regional offices were set up in each of these areas, with Regional Directors appointed by the Director of OCD with the President's approval. The regional offices served as links in transmitting information to the States.¹³

¹³Executive Order No. 8757, May 20, 1941, 6 Federal Register 2517.

¹⁴American Bar Association, Committee on Civilian Defense, Civilian Defense Manual on Aspects of Civilian
State defense councils developed along two basic lines. In some States, like New York and Massachusetts, the councils had wide powers, with a direct line of control over the operations down to the volunteers under the local defense councils. In other States the councils acted only in an advisory capacity, advising the Governors, local councils and community leaders on matters pertaining to the defense effort.

The local defense councils were the primary echelon in the organization of civilian defense. These councils included appropriate public officials, such as the mayor or head of the county government and the heads of the police, fire, health and welfare departments, as well as chairmen of principal committees and community leaders. They were structured, like the Federal OCD, with two basic branches: one concerned with the organization and training of forces to protect against enemy action; the other promoting salvage, housing, health, nutrition, and other community activities. By August 1942, approximately 11,200 local defense (war) councils had been organized.15


A number of metropolitan areas, often embracing several counties, sometimes in different States, required special administrative arrangements. To ensure effective implementation of measures in these cases, the OCD Director established Metropolitan Civilian Defense Areas. In all cases but one, the OCD Director appointed the Coordinator of Defense, but the Coordinator was usually subject to the State director's policies and orders. The Coordinator drew advice and assistance from an Advisory Council of Defense, consisting of representatives of the State or States and the local defense councils embraced in the Metropolitan Area. Such coordinating activities made it possible to enter into mutual agreements for the exchange of personnel, equipment and services, the synchronization and uniform observance of blackouts and air raid drills, and the adoption of integrated evacuation plans covering a wide territory.

Problems Encountered

OCD management and operations were marked by considerable conflict and confusion. Whereas Bane had put the focus

16Ibid., pp. 6-7. By early 1943, 15 Metropolitan Civil Defense Areas had been established: Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland, San Francisco Bay, Seattle, Toledo, and Washington.

on the State level, La Guardia made the local level the primary unit in the civil defense organization. This resulted in a by-passing of State organizations, with attendant confusion and sharp protest by State officials.\textsuperscript{18} Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts brought up this problem in the course of deliberations on the proposed civil defense legislation in December 1950:

One of the great problems which developed during World War Two was brought about by the Federal Administrator, the late Mayor La Guardia of New York, who, when called upon by a municipal, or other local official, would sometimes say things and make understandings and agreements which would completely upset the whole program developed with the State. The result was that one community would get one idea, another community would get another idea, and at the same time the State would be trying to encourage still another idea through municipalities and communities.\textsuperscript{19}

Similarly, James Landis, La Guardia's successor as OCD Director, later reflected on the confusion caused by bypassing the States, however necessary it might have been in some cases. And he expressed the hope that the NSRB, in its planning, would avoid a repetition of that "disorganizing feature of civil defense in the last war."\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18}Kerr MS, pp. 32-33; Brewer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 12.


Further, La Guardia gave primary emphasis to the protective aspects of the OCD mission. To him the "volunteer participation" portion was "sissy stuff."21 A dynamic leader, La Guardia made rapid progress with the protection program, but he ignored urgings from the Budget Bureau and others to carry out the non-protective aspects of his assignment. The Budget Bureau threatened to withhold funds from OCD until the total program was implemented.

In the face of these pressures, La Guardia, in September 1941, appointed Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt as Assistant Director in Charge of Voluntary Participation. Mrs. Roosevelt spent five turbulent months with the agency. She did much to promote community needs; but some of her appointments, especially Mayris Chaney, a professional dancer, and Melvyn Douglas, a movie actor, evoked criticism and ridicule. Referring to the activities under Mrs. Roosevelt's direction, Dr. Kerr observed:

... Terms such as "boondogling," "fan dancers," "strip-tease artists," "picolo players," "parasites," and "leeches" were liberally used to describe Mrs. Roosevelt's personnel and programs. In the case of Mr. Douglas, some members of Congress hinted that his "leftist leanings" were turning the OCD into a "pink tea party."22

21 Mauck, op. cit., p. 266.

22 Kerr MS, pp. 33-34; see also Tyler MS, p. 11; Jordan Study, pp. 46-48.
The Chaney-Douglas incidents, Mr. Mauck believed, "caused OCD to lose prestige which it never fully regained."23

With America's entry into the war, the President decided to put the civil defense program under full-time leadership. In January 1942, the President brought in James M. Landis, Dean of the Harvard Law School, as a special assistant, for full-time duty on the executive work of OCD. La Guardia resigned on February 10, and Mrs. Roosevelt's resignation soon followed. Upon La Guardia's departure, Landis took the reins, although he was not formally vested with the directorship until mid-April.

Dean Landis at the Helm

Landis took over as Director with a new Executive order. The dual mission remained, but the order streamlined and strengthened the agency. It omitted the OCD responsibility "to sustain national morale." Also, it provided for only one advisory body--a "Civilian Defense Board"--in lieu of the two groups (the Board of Civilian Protection and the Volunteer Participation Committee) prescribed originally.24 Further, the President broadened OCD's role with respect to plant protection; he charged OCD with the responsibility of establishing, in conjunction with and subject to the approval

23 Mauck, op. cit., p. 266.

24 Executive Order No. 9134, April 15, 1942, 7 Federal Register 2887.
of the Secretary of War, "a program for the protection of essential facilities from sabotage and other destructive acts and omissions."²⁵

Dean Landis abolished superfluous activities and brought in new people for key positions in Washington and in the regions. He shed the agency of some of the programs which had been subject to severe criticism. Under Landis, the Citizens Defense Corps of approximately 10 million volunteers provided a wide range of protective services.²⁶ Over 8.5 million of these volunteers had specific assignments under the protective services programs.

With regard to the facility security program, the President's order of May 19, 1942, directed OCD to:

(a) Serve as the center for the coordination of plans in this field sponsored or operated by the several Federal departments and agencies;

(b) Establish standards of security to govern the development of security measures for the nation's essential facilities;

(c) Review current and future plans and require the adoption of necessary additional measures; and

(d) Take steps to secure the cooperation of owners and operators of essential facilities, and of State and local governments, in carrying out adequate security measures.

Separate Presidential orders issued earlier gave the military departments and the Federal Power Commission specific responsibility for protecting vital war facilities.

²⁵Executive Order No. 9165, May 19, 1942, 7 Federal Register 3765.

Under this program, Federal participating agencies dealt directly with the facilities or with State or local authorities controlling action therein. Coordination was maintained at the Federal, State and local levels. Liaison was also maintained with the military departments, the Federal Power Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Within OCD, a Facility Security Division administered the program with the help of OCD regional, State and district facility security officers.27

Finally, it should be noted that Dean Landis early expressed the desire to run his own information office instead of being part of a centralized information service in the Office of Emergency Management. Because information was so basic to the OCD mission, Landis believed that the promotion of OCD programs should be handled within his own organization. After some negotiation with the Budget Bureau, OCD set up its own information office.28

Liquidation of OCD

Dean Landis directed the OCD until August 1943. By then, the possibility of an air attack on the U.S. had long since passed, leaving little prospect of using the civilian protection forces. Landis felt, too, that the State and local units were then sufficiently developed to enable them

27 American Bar Association, op. cit., pp. 7-9, 105.
28 Bureau of the Budget, The U.S. at War, pp. 213-214
to discharge their responsibilities with minimum guidance from Washington. He recommended, therefore, the abolition of OCD, and the transfer of the protective services to the War Department and the mobilization services to the Federal Security Agency.\(^29\)

This proposal, also made by La Guardia upon his resignation, met with resistance from the War Department, despite the fact that it had assisted significantly in organizing the protective services. The reasons for this opposition are not clear, although the realization that the danger of enemy attack had passed and that there was still a war to fight entered the picture.\(^30\) The Director of the Budget also objected to the Landis proposal, and President Roosevelt decided to keep the agency going.

For the next six months, John Martin, Deputy Director of OCD, served as acting director. "Again," Mauck noted, "morale in the agency suffered because of uncertainties regarding its continuance and because of complete silence throughout the six months regarding the authority, powers, and future status of Mr. Martin."\(^31\) In the meantime, upon advice from the War Department to OCD, the protective

\(^{29}\) Mauck, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 266; Kerr MS, pp. 35-36.

\(^{30}\) Tyler MS, p. 12; see also \textit{Jordan Study}, pp. 50-51.

\(^{31}\) Mauck, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 266-267.
services in the States and localities were placed on a stand-by basis. Martin left in February 1944 for Navy service, and the post of director went to Lt. General William N. Haskell.

Over the ensuing sixteen months OCD cut back its operations in preparation for early termination. Presented with the question of the timing of the termination, the new President, Harry Truman, directed the abolition of the OCD effective June 30, 1945. OCD's protective property and records were assigned to the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury Department was directed to "wind up the affairs of the Office." The state and local organizations disbanded soon thereafter.

Postmortem Examinations

Virtually all reviews of the OCD experience have drawn the same conclusion: that the agency's image and record left much to be desired. In the absence of an enemy attack, even the protective aspects of the program became the objects of criticism and ridicule.

... The civil defense worker was depicted as an air raid warden equipped with an arm band, tin helmet, bucket of sand, and a flashlight whose foremost duty was to get people to pull down their window shades during an air raid drill.  

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32 Ibid., p. 267.  
33 Executive Order No. 9562, June 4, 1945.  
34 Maxam MS, p. 13.
Testifying later before the War Department Civil Defense Board, former OCD Director Landis observed: "There's a limit to the business of being an air raid warden, especially when no bombs are dropping." And in the same vein, DeWitt Smith, speaking for the American Red Cross, testified that his organization had found it "very difficult to keep an alive, active local disaster relief organization functioning in communities where there have never been civilian disasters."36

A report by the War Department's Provost Marshal General soon after the war, which we will take up in the next section, included a discussion of OCD's organization and performance during World War II. The report pointed up three major shortcomings: the lack of advance planning; the absence of unified command and authority; and the assignment to the agency of responsibilities extraneous to civil defense.37

35Quoted in Tyler MS, p. 54.
36Ibid.
37See "Summary Conclusions of Study 3B-1, Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians, Report by the Provost Marshal General, April 30, 1946" (hereinafter cited as PMG Study 3B-1), Appendix A to Jordan Study, p. 166. One of the 14 exhibits backing up this report was devoted to "The Organization and Performance of the OCD During World War II"; it is summarized in the Jordan Study, pp. 60-64.
A second study by a War Department Civil Defense Board also reviewed the World War II experience. It summed up the strengths and weaknesses with the following observations:

a. OCD accomplished a volunteer mobilization of great magnitude, but its capabilities were untried by even a minor enemy attack.

b. Operation at local levels by augmenting existing means was sound.

c. Regional control, sound in principle, was weak in operation due to lack of authority.

d. No clear delineation of civil defense responsibilities existed.

e. Activities in conflict with the operation of the protective services diverted effort from the primary mission of civil defense.

f. There was no advanced planning. Hasty organization became necessary.

g. There was little experienced leadership.

h. Adherence to the principle of States' rights and traditional municipal individuality blocked standardization of plans in certain instances.

i. Due to the lack of authority in the Office of Civilian Defense, State and local leaders frequently looked to the Army for command decisions.

j. Mutual aid as planned and arranged by agreements, had no backing by Federal legislation and seldom by State legislation. It is doubtful that mutual aid would have functioned under heavy and repeated air attack.

There were no mass enemy raids to put OCD to the test. But the Board left no doubt as to its own view: the wartime civil defense apparatus would have been inadequate to cope with a heavy attack.38

On one point there could be no doubt: the dismantling of the organization before the close of the war made it evident that the Administration did not then consider civil defense as part of the permanent national security structure. No provision was made to continue the function even on a planning basis. In its history of the wartime administration, the Bureau of the Budget cited OCD and the President's Committee on Congested Production Areas as the specific examples of agencies "terminated well before the end of the war when it was apparent that there was no longer any need for their functioning." This left a vacuum which, as we shall now see, the military sought to fill.

POSTWAR STUDIES AND PLANNING IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

It became evident even before the end of World War II that civil defense should have a place in planning for future conflicts. Even while planning for demobilization, the military gave thought to the implications of atomic weapons and of the potential range of aircraft and missiles for the future defense of this nation. In another war with a major power, the U.S. would have to be prepared to reduce to a minimum the damage, casualties and dislocation resulting from enemy attack on American cities,

39 The U.S. at War, p. 498.
factories, and military complexes. Whatever the ultimate decision on the locus of responsibility in these matters, the military could not tolerate a lapse of the civil defense effort with the impending or actual cessation of hostilities.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, established by the Secretary of War in November 1944, had a staff of 1,150 military and civilian personnel studying the effects of World War II military operations, the extent of civil defense preparations in Britain, Germany and Japan, and the success of these preparations under conditions of attack. The Survey teams produced many studies with a wealth of information relevant to future planning.

Their report on the effects of the atomic bombs in Japan, as we indicated earlier, provided "signposts" for action on civil defense measures--action that should be taken swiftly.

The danger is real--of that, the Survey's findings leave no doubt. . . . These measures must be taken or initiated now, if their cost is not to be prohibitive. But if a policy is laid down, well in advance of any crisis, it will enable timely decentralization of industrial and medical facilities, construction or blueprinting of shelters, and preparation for life-saving evacuation programs. . . . If we recognize in advance the possible danger and act to forestall it, we shall at worst suffer minimum casualties and disruption.

. . . In our planning for the future, if we are realistic, we will prepare to minimize the destructiveness of such attacks, and so organize the economic and administrative life of the Nation that no single or small
group of successful attacks can paralyze the national organism. 40

Provost Marshal General Report 3B-1

On July 16, 1945—the day of the detonation of the A-bomb at the Alamogordo test site, the Army's Office of the Chief of Staff approved the initiation of War Department planning for postwar civil defense. In response to this decision, the Office of the Provost Marshal General (PMG) was directed on August 4 (two days before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima) to study the problem of civil defense in light of recent experience and make recommendations regarding the assignment of responsibility for future planning and operations in this field. 41 Lt. Colonel Barnet W. Beers, who was to play an important role in this postwar planning period, directed the PMG study. 42

40 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, p. 38.

41 This discussion of the PMG report is based largely on Dr. Tyler's fine treatment of the subject and on the analysis and documentation in the Jordan Study: Dr. Kerr has also treated the subject well. All have eased the writer's task.

42 Col. Beers, a former Illinois National Guard officer, was with the War Department Plans and Operations Division. During World War II, Beers had direct contact with the civil defense organization in his capacity as G3 at Governors Island, New York. He later directed the civil defense team of the Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany. After the completion of the 3B-1 study, Beers served as Recorder of the War Department Civil Defense Board, and subsequently played an active role in the planning under the Secretary of Defense and the NSRB.
Under no pressure to support any preconceived solution, the PMG planners embarked on a "brainstorming exercise." The dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima added to the seriousness, as it did to the complexity, of their task. From their review of the wartime experience, they came up with five principles which, in their judgment, would have to be followed in the development of a civil defense program:

1. Civil defense must be planned in advance.
2. Civil defense must be recognized as important and essential.
3. The federal government must be able to command the civil defense organization.
4. The federal government must provide trained, mobile forces for assistance to stricken areas.
5. The public must not be involved until plans are laid and there is something for each person to do.

"Few people," Dr. Tyler added, "would disagree with most of these premises. Yet each of these premises was all but ignored in the planning and in the operation of the civil-defense program."43

The PMG team chose the British term "civil defense" in preference to the American term "civilian defense." The word "civilian," Dr. Kerr noted, "apparently conjured up visions of La Guardian chaos and Rooseveltian dance instructors," whereas British "civil defense" had been "all business--its only purpose to protect people from air attack."

43Tyler MS, p. 342.
Furthermore, the term "civil defense" implied concern with the entire civil sector including the economy and the government, not just the people.  

The PMG study emphasized the concept of self-help, that is, the individual was basically responsible for protecting himself and his property. At the same time, however, it recognized that a number of government programs would be needed to make this concept operative. Postwar civil defense, the study asserted, would require: a national shelter policy; reserve stockpiles of survival items; an attack-warning system; plans for industrial dispersal and for evacuation of people from likely target areas; individual training in civil-defense techniques; instruction of all military personnel, including the National Guard and State militias, in aiding the civil population; and establishment of a national agency to inventory and evaluate resources for use in civil defense.

While State and local governments would have important roles, the PMG study stressed the importance of a national organization with strong central control and direction. "Only a unity of command," the study asserted, could produce "a unity of people." The national organization would have to be under one command "with complete directing and coordinating authority" over all civil defense activity from top to bottom.

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44 Ibid., pp. 32-33.  
45 Ibid., p. 35.  
46 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
The PMG team anticipated that the military would have to shoulder much of the burden of civil defense, including the provision of outside help for stricken communities. It thus appeared to the PMG team that civil defense was a "natural function" of the War Department. The team therefore recommended that a permanent civil defense agency be established as a division of the War Department General Staff. On this point, however, regular officers, perhaps more than the reservists who prepared the 3B-1 study, were cognizant of the delicacy of civil-military relations and were also perhaps more concerned about possible effects upon the fighting mission. They suggested further study to determine the organizational positioning of the proposed civil defense agency.

**The Bull Report**

In August 1946, Secretary of War Robert A. Patterson urged the Budget Bureau to consider the problem; the primary responsibility for civil defense, he stated, "very much needs to be fixed in some appropriate agency." The Director of the Budget agreed on the need to move promptly on this matter, but he thought that this might appropriately be a responsibility of the proposed National Security Resources Board (NSRB). As he put it:


My main question is whether this phase of national preparedness planning should be considered by itself or whether the organization of all phases of the broader problem have to be considered together. We are now giving some attention to the whole question of how a National Security Resources Board, as recently endorsed by the President, should be organized. We have tentatively been looking on civilian defense planning as one aspect of the general problem with which that Board should be set up to deal.49

Budget Bureau officials were favorably disposed, however, to letting the War Department initiate civil defense planning pending the establishment of NSRB.50

Accordingly, on November 25, 1946, the War Department Civil Defense Board was established under the Presidency of Major General Harold R. Bull, General Eisenhower's wartime chief of operations. The Bull Board was charged with formulating War Department views upon, and policies in connection with the following:

(a) Allocation of responsibilities for civil defense in existing or new agencies of the government.

(b) The responsibilities which should be handled by the War Department and the allocation thereof to existing or new staff agencies.

(c) The structural organization, from the national level down to the operating groups, and the authority which must be vested therein for the adequate discharge of its responsibilities.

(d) The action in matters of civil defense which should be undertaken currently by the War Department pending the foregoing determinations.

49Quoted in Jordan Study, p. 79.

50Tyler MS, pp. 45-46
The Board had two months to do its job; its charter called for its dissolution by February 28, 1947, "unless otherwise directed." 51

President Truman was not fully satisfied with the Board's composition. He felt that it should have representation from the National Guard and the Organized Reserve, and "an experienced civilian or two" who had helped in the wartime industrial mobilization. In expressing these thoughts to Secretary Patterson, Truman further added:

I have some strong ideas on the subject of what should be done in the decentralization of industry and the protection of our great cities, and the formulation of complete plans for immediate action if the emergency should occur.

Some time after the first of the year, the President continued, "I'd like very much to have a conference with you and the Secretary of the Navy (James V. Forrestal)." 52

Truman did not follow up on this suggestion. Just the same, Secretary Patterson did broaden the composition of the Board to provide for two more general officers as members—one representing the National Guard Bureau and the other the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. 53

61As thus established, the Board consisted of five general officers and eight officers of lower rank. Of the latter, six were to serve in an "advisory capacity," one as Recorder, and one as Secretary. See War Department Memorandum No. 400-5-5, November 25, 1946, JCAE Preliminary Data, pp. 49-50.

52Quoted from Letter, Truman to Patterson, Dec. 17, 1946, in Tyler MS, p. 50.

53Changes No. 1 to War Department Memo 400-5-5, Dec. 30, 1946, JCAE Preliminary Data, p. 50.
no doubt sensing the President's thinking, Patterson had earlier instructed the Board to shy away from "problems of such great national importance as decentralization of industry, evacuation of large masses of people and future community planning"—matters which obviously were "far beyond the sole responsibility of the War Department." 54

The Bull Board interviewed many high-level civilian and military witnesses. Many important matters came up for consideration: the need for long-term planning, research and development; the organization of mobile reserves; mutual aid agreements; the extent of Federal direction; the problem of sustained public interest, especially in peacetime; recruiting qualified staffs and volunteers; the feasibility of establishing a civil defense program in peacetime; the role of the National Guard; and the vesting of responsibility for civil defense.

On the last point, there was substantial support for placing in the military establishment the responsibility for peacetime planning. Both La Guardia and Landis favored this approach. There were witnesses, however, who felt strongly that the civil defense agency should be in the civilian part of the Executive Branch. Others favored peacetime planning by the military, but turning operations over to civilians in wartime. And one witness put it the

54 Quoted in Tyler MS, p. 51.
other way—let civilians operate the program in peacetime, but have the Army take over in an emergency.\textsuperscript{55}

The Board completed its work and adjourned as scheduled, on February 28, 1947, although its report was not released until a year later. Like the PMG study, the Bull report stressed "self-help" as the fundamental principle of civil defense. The municipalities would organize to provide protective services in situations where local groups couldn't help themselves. The States would still be the basic operating units; they would establish mobile teams for firefighting, rescue and medical services. In cases where urban areas crossed State lines and the States refused to act, the Federal Government might be forced to assume control. State and local units, the Board further noted, might help out in natural disasters, thus giving them something to do in peacetime and practical experience in meeting emergency-relief needs. The Federal Government would provide overall guidance and coordination, take the initiative in over-all planning and in organizing mutual aid, and ensure desired uniformity through decentralized regional offices.\textsuperscript{56}

The Bull Board saw the military role in civil defense as more limited than that envisioned in the PMG study. The Board stated:

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., pp. 56-58.\textsuperscript{56}Bull Report, pp. 10, 13-14.
The armed forces' primary mission requires devotion of their efforts to active measures, both offensive and defensive. They must avoid diversion of efforts and means to civil defense, except to meet Federal requirements and dire emergencies, beyond the capabilities of the states when the national interest is involved.\footnote{Ibid., p. 10.}

Nonetheless, the Army's role in civil defense would still be substantial. It would provide protection for Army installations and areas under military control. Military personnel would be trained in passive air defense. Aid would be extended to civilian communities "in the event of a disaster beyond their capabilities." The Army would conduct studies of the use of dispersion, underground sites and other measures "for the safety of military resources." It would inform civil defense agencies about the nature and demands of modern warfare and the location of strategic or critical areas or activities. It might also help with civil defense training, and would remain responsible for furnishing technical data concerning shelters, camouflage, control of lighting, and other protective measures.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 18-19.}

Knowing the sentiments of the President and the Budget Bureau, the Board sought to tread lightly in the matter of over-all responsibility for civil defense. The major civil defense problems, the Board asserted, "are not appropriately military responsibilities"; such problems "are civilian in
nature and should be solved by civilian organization."59

The Board's recommendations for the allocation of civil defense responsibilities within the Federal government were as follows: (1) A national policy group, such as the proposed NSRB, to be responsible for the formulation of over-all policy; (2) the Secretary of the "Department of the Armed Forces" (later designated Department of Defense) to be responsible for "over-all coordination of civil defense"; and (3) a Civil Defense Agency to be created separate from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, under a civilian director, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and charged with the responsibility for "planning, organizing, operating, coordinating, and directing civil defense activities."60

The Board recognized objections to adding this non-military job to the Defense Secretary's already heavy responsibilities. The public might think that funds voted for civil defense "are for the support of the armed forces." Further, placement of civil defense under the Defense Department might be viewed as "too great concentration of power in one department." The Board saw, however, the offsetting advantages of direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the assurance of close cooperation with the military forces which was so essential to an effective civil defense program.61 Thus, under the Defense Secretary, the task would

59Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 20. 60Ibid., p. 22.
61Ibid., p. 16.
be kept "civil" in nature, but it would be closely associated with the nation's defense activities and forces.\textsuperscript{62}

The Hopley Report

The Bull Board had asked that the Secretary of War recommend to the President an early decision to establish the Civil Defense Agency and, as an interim measure, that the War Department be charged, by Presidential directive, with developing civil defense plans.\textsuperscript{63} The President took no action, however; he was preoccupied with the design of the postwar national security structure, including the thorny problem of unifying the armed forces—a task finally accomplished, legislatively at least, with the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947.\textsuperscript{64}

By then the Cold War climate had aroused increased public interest in national security affairs, including renewed preparations for civil defense. Through the efforts of Army Secretary Kenneth Royal and Colonel Beers, James Forrestal, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, was impressed with the need for civil defense planning under his cognizance. Ever on the alert to plug gaps in the national security structure, Forrestal placed the matter on the agenda of the War Council in November 1947. The Council,

\textsuperscript{62}Sloan MS, pp. 131-132; Maxam MS, pp. 19-20.

\textsuperscript{63}Bull Report, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{64}Public Law 253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., approved July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 495.
with the President's approval, agreed on the establishment of a civil defense planning organization, locating it, for the time being, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.65

Pressed from many sides to move ahead on civil defense, Forrestal early in January 1948, ordered the declassification of the Bull Report. With the release of this report to the public on February 14, 1948, Forrestal announced that he would soon establish a "civilian unit to plan a comprehensive civil defense organization and program."66 To head this unit, he recruited Russell J. Hopley, a highly capable Bell Telephone executive from Omaha, Nebraska. Impressed with the importance of the job and the challenge, Hopley agreed to serve, with the proviso that Beers be assigned to him as personal assistant.67 These, in brief, were the events leading up to the establishment of the Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on March 27, 1948.68

65 Tyler MS, pp. 79-82.
66 Ibid., p. 85. 67 Ibid., pp. 87-88.

The Forrestal memorandum of March 27 spelled out in great detail the nature and scope of OCDP's mission. Quoted below are the first two paragraphs of this lengthy memorandum, which contain the essence of its provisions:

1. In order (a) to provide for the development of detailed plans for, and the establishment of, an integrated national program of civil defense; (b) to secure proper coordination and direction of all civil defense matters affecting the National Military Establishment; and (c) to provide an effective means of liaison between the National Military Establishment and other governmental and private agencies on questions of civil defense, an Office of Civil Defense Planning is hereby established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This Office will be headed by a Director who will, at the same time, serve as personal advisor and deputy to the Secretary of Defense on civil defense matters.

2. The Office of Civil Defense Planning will have the following functions:

(a) To prepare, and to submit to the Secretary of Defense, a program of civil defense for the United States, including a plan for a permanent federal civil defense agency which, in conjunction with the several States and their subdivisions, can undertake those peacetime preparations which are necessary to assure an adequate civil defense system in the event of a war;

(b) Within the National Military Establishment, to coordinate all current activities in the field of civil defense;

(c) On matters of civil defense, to provide liaison between the National Military Establishment and other governmental and private agencies;

(d) To the extent which is possible and desirable before the actual adoption of the permanent program of civil defense referred to in (a) above, and consistent with the probable character of any such program:
(1) To initiate interim measures which may seem necessary or appropriate in furtherance of an adequate system of civil defense;

(2) To provide the several states and their subdivisions with guidance and assistance in civil defense matters; and

(3) To furnish necessary information and assistance on civil defense matters to the departments and agencies of the National Military Establishment, to other agencies of the Federal Government, and to private individuals or organizations concerned with civil defense matters.

(e) To draft any legislation required to implement the civil defense program developed under (a) above.69

Clearly, this was to be no broad-brush treatment of problem-areas or the pros and cons of alternative courses of action. The Forrestal directive called for specifics in sufficient detail to serve as a blueprint for action that might have to be taken promptly, not in some distant future.

The Forrestal directive defined civil defense as "the organized activities of the civilian population (1) to minimize the effects of any enemy action directed against the United States and (2) to maintain or restore those facilities and services which are essential to civil life and which are affected by such enemy action." Problems of internal security and active defense measures, such as aircraft warning, were considered to be more properly of concern to the armed forces, although Forrestal did not preclude OCDP attention to these

matters, in conjunction with appropriate agencies. Similarly, the directive excluded concern with "the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities"—matters encompassed in the NSRB charter. At the same time, Forrestal expected OCDP to advise NSRB "of the relation of such matters to a civil defense program" and, to the extent requested, to "work closely with such Board (1) in the development of policies and the solution of problems having to do with strategic relocation, and (2) in the implementation, where appropriate and when requested by the Board, of any such policies which may be directly related to a civil defense program."

Hopley assembled a high-caliber staff for OCDP. They examined pertinent materials; studied the findings of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and the PMG and Bull reports; consulted many experts throughout the country; and organized advisory panels for medical, radiological, fire and other technical aspects of civil defense. Within six months OCDP completed its work. Its report, submitted to Forrestal on October 1, 1948, was a 301-page document, very much like a manual, detailing and recommending the adoption of a plan for the organization of a national civil defense program. The plan was described as one which would provide "a sound and effective peacetime system" which could be readily
expanded in an emergency--"a program that will bridge the gap by providing the link that is missing in our defense structure."\textsuperscript{70}

The proposed program encompassed civil defense organizations at all echelons--Federal (headquarters and regional), State, local, and metropolitan area. Included in the program were six major groupings of civil defense operations and services: (1) medical and health service and special weapons defense; (2) technical services including communications and radio broadcasting, police, fire, warden, engineering, rescue, transportation, and civil air patrol; (3) plans and operations including, among other matters, mutual aid and mobile reserves, plant protection, evacuation, control centers, and air raid warning; (4) training; (5) public information; and (6) research and development. The report spelled out the tasks, the positions of the organizations at the State and local levels, and manpower requirements in peace and war.

Unlike the PMG brain-stormers, OCDP sought to design a program that would be acceptable to the States. There were OCDP staff members who plugged for a strong central organization, but the State governors apparently prevailed on Hopley to give the command responsibility to the States.\textsuperscript{71} The

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{71}Tyler MS, pp. 99-100, 114, 146-147, 150.
dictates of expediency thus prompted OCDP to adopt the outmoded World War II patterns of thought and operation. The organization and operation of civil defense, the Hopley report stated, "must be the joint responsibility of the federal government, the states and the communities." It would be the job of the Federal Government to "provide leadership and guidance, set patterns and lay down principles." But the "primary operating responsibility for Civil Defense must rest with the State and local governments." Control of civil defense organizations and activities within a State, the report specified, "shall rest with the Governor of the State." Further, communications from the Federal organization to the local governments would have to flow through the State governments. 72

Thus, the entire plan was predicated on the basis of placing full responsibility for operations on the States and communities. The Federal government would furnish the leadership and guidance in organizing and training the people for civil defense tasks, coordinate efforts, supply training materials, and provide necessary advice and counsel. Maximum use would be made of volunteers, existing agencies and organizations, public and private, and all available skills and experience. Units would be organized in communities throughout the country, trained and equipped to meet the problems of enemy attack. Intensive planning would be conducted to meet the particular hazards of atomic and

other destructive weapons of modern warfare. Furthermore, a small nucleus organization in peacetime could be used in natural disasters, such as fires, floods, explosions, tornadoes, and similar catastrophes, and could be quickly expanded to meet the exigencies of war.

On the federal level, the Hopley report recommended the establishment of an Office of Civil Defense (OCD) either within the Executive Office of the President or within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The latter alternative was deemed preferable since "a very large part of the civil defense program will require continuous coordination with all agencies responsible to the Secretary of Defense." OCD would be responsible for:

Establishing and administering, as an integrated part of the over-all strategic plan for the defense of the United States, the national program for civil defense and estimating the total civil defense manpower and material requirements for carrying out the program.

Coordinating and directing all civil defense matters affecting the National Military Establishment and other governmental agencies, developing the most effective means of accomplishing the mission of civil defense and allocating responsibilities, manpower, and equipment among the participating agencies and political subdivisions.

Developing a coordinated program of research into problems pertaining to the civil defense of the Nation.

Providing effective liaison between other governmental and private agencies and the National Military Establishment through serving as a central source of authoritative information on questions concerning civil defense.
Developing and supervising a program for training the participants in civil defense.

Guiding and assisting the several states, territories, and possessions in working out operating procedures and arrangements for mutual assistance and directing civil defense operations in the event of a national emergency.\textsuperscript{73}

The Director of Civil Defense would establish regional offices, paralleling the Army Area Commands, to coordinate the civil defense plans with military command and State and metropolitan areas, particularly where these areas involved two or more States.

At the State level, responsibility for civil defense would rest with the Governor, aided by an advisory council of representative citizens of the State, and by a State Director of Civil Defense, an official of cabinet rank on the Governor's staff. The role of the State headquarters was seen as primarily of a "staff supervisory and technical advisory nature," since many of the field operations "will take place in the local organization." The State headquarters would "direct and coordinate all civil defense activities within the State, promulgate methods and techniques in accordance with established policies, and evaluate all civil defense needs within the State in relation to each other."\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., pp. 18-19.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 25.
Addressing civil defense at the local level, the Hopley plan visualized first the individual and the family trained to take care of themselves. The community would organize itself to handle any emergency. Should a community be overwhelmed, reserve battalions would be moved in to deal with the emergency. If these mobile reserves still did not meet the need, the military would come to the aid of the civil authorities. As a last resort, civil defense would continue operations under military control. Broadly speaking, the administrative structure at the local level would be similar to that envisioned for the State level, with the mayor or comparable official as the active head of civil defense, discharging his functions through a local Director of Civil Defense who would be a member of the Mayor's staff.

With respect to metropolitan areas, such as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, the Hopley report stressed the need, under emergency conditions, to avoid "delays in crossing municipal, county, or State lines because of differences of governmental entity in an area where municipalities are contiguous, boundary lines artificial, and the populace united in concert of purpose and need." The report urged that such communities be provided a uniform guide, and that resources and facilities be pooled and integrated so that operations for the entire area could be carried out "as in one municipality." 75

75 Ibid., p. 47.
Forrestal's assignment to OCDP, as indicated above, included the drafting of "any legislation required to implement the civil defense program." The report included "a model State Civil Defense Act," intended only to suggest legislative provisions and language based upon the Hopley plan. OCDP also drew up draft legislation for implementation of the Hopley plan on the Federal level.

SHIFT TO NSRP OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

Rejection of the Hopley Plan

Unfortunately, the Hopley team gave little thought to involving other agencies of the Executive Branch in their work or getting the views of these agencies, the Budget Bureau, or the President on their product prior to its publication and dissemination. The public release of the Hopley report on November 13, 1948, caused quite a stir both within and outside the Government. Reactions from the press generally, with some exceptions, were quite favorable. The New York Times wrote:

... We commend it to Congress and to all citizens as a reasonable and important document.

Because this country was spared attack in the war—except for a little ineffective shelling from submarines—some fun was made of the block fire wardens, air spotters, and other civil defense volunteers. It would have been a different story, as it was in England, had the war actually come to our shores. Everyone is largely agreed that if there is another war neither this country nor any other that is engaged will be spared aerial attack. To minimize the danger, or to
ridicule the civil defense volunteers, would be as stupid as refusing to pay taxes for a professional police or fire department.

To take action now to set up a civil defense organization would be only common prudence. It is not a project that can be conjured up overnight. Nor can the organization now of civil defense be called a war measure except by those who wish to make propaganda of it. It is only the construction of what the committee calls in its report the "missing link" of national security. The British already have a civil defense plan, which is to be put into operation immediately, said a report last week from London, with the establishment of four training centers for instructors. The sooner a Civil Defense Act is passed here and put into effect the better it will be. This is an act of prudence that should not be long delayed.

The Boston Herald similarly observed: "In an atomic age some such agency (as recommended in the Hopley report) is, regrettably, an imperative necessity, and the new Congress should lose no time in studying these proposals and providing legislation to put them into effect." The Idaho Statesman considered the formulation of a national civil defense plan a long-awaited step, and the Manchester (New Hampshire) Union deemed the plan "a most important adjunct of our national defense system."

Along with the bouquets, however, came the brickbats.

The New York Daily Worker, a Communist paper, vigorously attacked the Hopley plan, referring to it as Forrestal's "'cold war' dream for the American people." No less virulent was Walter Winchell. In his Sunday radio

78 Idaho Statesman, Boise, Idaho, Nov. 15, 1948, Ibid., p. 60.
79 Manchester Union, Nov. 17, 1948, Ibid., pp. 60-61.
80 Daily Worker, Nov. 16, 1948, Ibid., p. 61.
broadcast on November 21, Winchell called the Hopley plan "the greatest internal threat to our liberty since the British burned the White House in 1814." He called on "Mr. and Mrs. United States" to "wake up" and awaken the Congressmen they had just elected, "because this is a far more dangerous attack on your Constitution than either Hitler or Stalin ever attempted." The following Sunday he again took off on the Hopley report, urging the public to buy a copy from the Government Printing Office "and have yourselves a nightmare." 81

Adding salt to the wounds, Drew Pearson congratulated Winchell for his attack on the Hopley group. 82

Copies of the Hopley report were sent to the NSRB and other agencies only a few days before its release to the public, with requests for comments by mid-December. The Presidential staffs resented the failure to achieve prior coordination within the Executive Branch. Staff reviewers complained of the short deadline which precluded careful study and thoughtful comment on this bulky document. Some complained that the plan leaned too heavily on World War II experience and would not be suitable for the type of war anticipated in the future. There was strong feeling that the proposed civil defense agency should not be in the Defense


Department—a feeling also shared by the Navy, Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{83} Most of the replies were to the effect that further study was needed and that such study should be conducted by the NSRB.\textsuperscript{84}

Hopley returned to Omaha; and Forrestal, early in December, appointed Aubrey H. Mellinger, also a telephone executive, as OCDP director. Sounding out Dr. John R. Steelman (who wore two hats, one as The Assistant to the President and the other as Acting Chairman of NSRB), Mellinger and Colonel Beers got the word: the civil defense agency should be under civil authority.\textsuperscript{85} Forrestal pressed on for legislation, with a draft that did not specify the location of the office in the Executive Branch. At the same time, a report by a task force of the Hoover Commission on national security organization, headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, recommended prompt action to fix responsibility for civil defense and to locate the civil defense office in the NSRB. In light of the Eberstadt report, Forrestal recommended the statutory

\textsuperscript{83}Tyler MS, pp. 154-156, 168-169. Dr. Tyler cites correspondence from two top-level Budget Bureau staffers to the Director, written before the release of the Hopley report, which were not as concerned about military control over civil defense. Elmer E. Staats thought that the placement of the civil defense agency under the Secretary of Defense would not be "fatal by any means," because civil defense, stripped of "its war services concepts" becomes very largely "a military matter." Charles B. Stauffacher believed that, to avoid "statutory rigidities," the civil defense function should rest with the President, who might then want to delegate the responsibility to the Secretary of Defense; ibid., p. 169.

\textsuperscript{84}Jordan Study, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{85}Tyler MS, p. 162.
establishment of a civil defense office under the NSRB, but separate from the Board staff.86

The NSRB Assignment

Forrestal's plea met with a negative response from the White House: the civil defense responsibility would go to the NSRB, and the establishment of an independent agency would be put off until the Secretary of Defense and NSRB submitted further recommendations on requisite legislation.87 On March 3, 1949, the President asked Forrestal to submit an analysis of the Hopley report with recommendations for future action.88 That same day, however, in a memorandum to the NSRB Chairman, Truman made clear his rejection of the proposal to establish an operational civil defense organization.

In this memorandum the President indicated: "I have recently given considerable attention to the question of the appropriate organization of the executive branch for civil defense." It was his feeling that under conditions prevailing at the time, "the essential need . . . is peacetime planning and preparation for civil defense in the event of war, rather than operation of a full-scale civil defense program." The President saw, however, an immediate need to fix

86Ibid., pp. 162-164

87Ibid., pp. 170-171. The Budget Bureau's position was that civil defense, like other mobilization concerns of NSRB, should remain in the planning stage. The view of John Chly, Executive Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was that such a course would "result in the scuttling of any effective civil defense program"; Ibid., p. 172.

88Ibid., p. 173.
in a responsible agency definite leadership for such continued planning. "Peacetime civil defense planning," Truman reasoned, "is related to, and part of, overall mobilization planning," and since it was NSRB's job to advise him concerning the coordination of such planning, NSRB "is the appropriate agency which should also exercise leadership in civil defense planning."

Accordingly, the President directed NSRB "to assume such leadership in civil defense planning and to develop a program which will be adequate for the Nation's needs." He expected the Board to call upon other agencies and consult with State and local governments in the detailed planning of the various aspects of civil defense. On the basis of the Board's "considered analysis of how best to undertake this responsibility," the President asked for its "recommendations concerning necessary actions, including any legislative proposals which may need early attention."

A copy of this memorandum went to Forrestal "so that he may be informed concerning the conclusions" set forth therein. Forrestal was soon to leave his post, but he did send to Truman the analysis of the Hopley report and a new legislative proposal which he had asked for. Forrestal again recommended the establishment of an independent operating agency, to be accomplished by amending the National Security

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89 Memorandum, President Harry S. Truman to Chairman, NSRB, March 3, 1949, subject: Civil Defense Planning, reprinted in JCAE Preliminary Data, pp. 55-56.
Act of 1947. With the March 3 decision, there was no longer any basis for the continued functioning of OCDP. Louis Johnson, Forrestal’s successor as Defense Secretary, abolished the office on August 1, 1949, and appointed Colonel Beers to the newly created position of Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison.

The episode was an interesting case in post-World War II civil-military relationships. Unfortunately, it added to the tensions in these relationships. At a time when the NSRB was going through the agony of birth and development, the military had given the impression of grasping for power. This was so not only in respect to civil defense, but also in other areas of economic-mobilization planning.

The OCDP experience, it must be emphasized, was by no means a wasted effort. The Hopley report had its shortcomings and could benefit from further study, but it was a fine product. It stimulated most of the States and many localities to enact or initiate legislation and establish civil defense organizations. The push for an operating

90 Tyler MS, p. 177.

91 Memorandum, Johnson to Secretary of the Army et al., Aug. 1, 1949, Subject: Establishing an Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reprinted in JCAE Preliminary Data, pp. 53-54.

agency was set back a year and a half or so by the Truman decision; and the continued planning under NSRB, to which we will now turn, relied heavily on the work of OCDP. It took critical turns in the international climate—the Soviet explosion of an A-bomb in August 1949 and, more particularly, the Korean outbreak in June 1950—to provide the sense of urgency which moved the President and Congress to shift gears from planning to operations. In this atmosphere, NSRB was fortunate, indeed, to have had the Hopley work before it and the expertise of Colonel Beers in preparing its "September (1950) Plan" and designing the statutory base for the creation and operations of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.
CHAPTER III
CIVIL DEFENSE UNDER NSRB LEADERSHIP

NSRB--A TROUBLED AGENCY

Under normal circumstances, placement in the National Security Resources Board of responsibility for civil defense would have been an entirely logical and appropriate move from the inception of the agency in 1947. NSRB was one of the top-level mechanisms of coordination conceived by Ferdinand Eberstadt in the course of the postwar debate over unification of the armed forces. The National Security Act of 1947 had visualized over-all economic mobilization planning as a government-wide effort under Presidential direction, with NSRB carrying out the job as a staff arm of the President.

In this staff capacity, NSRB was expected to advise the President on the coordination of planning for national mobilization, on the readiness measures essential to the national security, and on the resources-mobilization implications of major current programs and policy decisions. As a member of the National Security Council (another coordinating mechanism, chaired by the President, charged with advising him with respect to "the integration of domestic, foreign,
and military policies relating to the national security"),
the NSRB Chairman, it was thought, would bring the re-
resources aspects of national security to bear on the Council's
deliberations. At the same time, the broad national policies
emerging from the Council's efforts would provide the pat-
tern which could be realistically translated into government-
wide planning for national mobilization under the leader-
ship of NSRB.

NSRB's expressed mission was "to advise the President
concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and
civilian mobilization, including--

(1) Policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization
in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum
utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war.

(2) Programs for the effective use in time of war of the
Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian
needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian
economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to
war needs and conditions.

(3) Policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of
Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with
production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of mili-
tary or civilian supplies, materials, and products.

(4) The relationship between potential supplies of, and
potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive
facilities in time of war.

(5) Policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic
and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves.

(6) The strategic relocation of industries, services, Govern-
ment, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is
essential to the Nation's security.

In performing these functions, NSRB was directed by the act
to "utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and
resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.*

By March 1949, when President Truman requested NSRB to assume leadership of civil defense planning, the agency had already undertaken numerous projects which were relevant to its new assignment. Testifying a year later before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, William A. Gill, who had been serving temporarily as Coordinator of Civil Defense Planning, cited the following as pertinent examples:

(a) Manpower studies, including rosters of physicians, nurses, sanitary engineers, dentists, et cetera; (b) studies of strategic relocation, including industrial dispersion; (c) resource studies on water, power, housing, transportation, and communication facilities; (d) inventories of health and medical supplies, facilities, and equipment—all important and basic to realistic planning for a civil defense program adequate for the Nation's needs.

In its approach to the broader aspects of mobilization planning, NSRB drew on the capabilities in other departments and agencies. It seemed logical, therefore, especially in the absence of expertise among the NSRB staff, to undertake the execution of the civil-defense planning assignment by utilizing the capabilities then existing in other agencies.

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The problem was, however, that NSRB in the spring of 1949 was in deep trouble. It had not measured up to its expectations. From the first the agency was plagued by confusion and conflict over its mission. Beginning in the spring of 1948, in the face of international tensions and threatening war clouds, the NSRB Chairman, Arthur M. Hill, and his top aides sought for the Board an operating role in respect to current security programs. Repeatedly, however, and quite firmly on May 24, 1948, President Truman rejected NSRB's bid for operating authority in the current scene. The effort to alter NSRB's Presidential staff advisory role thus came to naught.3

This was a major blow. Hill resigned in mid-December 1948. Senatorial confirmation of the President's choice of a successor, former Senator Mon C. Wallgren, could not be obtained; and the Board was without a full-time chairman until the appointment of Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington in April 1950. In the interim, Dr. Steelman, the Assistant to the President, served as Acting Chairman. The assignment to NSRB of the civil defense responsibility thus came at a bad time—when the agency was skating on thin ice, seeking to redirect its energies and interagency relationships so as to bring it into line with the President's

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conception of its role. Under Steelman's leadership, the Board functioned strictly as a Presidential staff. A broad planning program was laid out, with many agencies cooperating and with encouraging results. Nonetheless, the long-continued vacancy of the chairmanship was the subject of much criticism in the press and substantially impaired the prestige of the Board.4

PRE-KOREAN PLANNING

This was the atmosphere in which NSRB undertook to implement its newly-vested responsibility for leadership in civil defense planning. Steelman asked Gill, on March 29, 1949, to take stock of the planning accomplished by OCDP and recommend steps to carry forward the Board's responsibility. A good management specialist who had been director of NSRB's Mobilization Procedures and Organization Division, Gill proceeded under the impression that the President was in no hurry to move toward operations. This was to be a study and planning effort. NSRB would draw up a planning program. Other agencies would be invited to participate, and a small unit in NSRB would monitor the planning and keep in touch with the States and localities.5

4Ibid., p. 34.
5Tyler MS, pp. 181-183.
In little more than a month, NSRB prepared the report which Steelman had requested. The report presented the current status of work and thinking in the civil-defense area; the scope, content, and relationship of necessary future work programs; and the organizational and staffing requirements for launching these programs. Steelman approved the report in principle and proceeded to make two broad planning assignments as recommended in the report. The General Services Administration (successor to the Federal Works Agency) was asked to assume primary responsibility for "wartime civil disaster relief." This program area embraced planning with respect to "fire fighting . . . , medical services and supplies, rescue, evacuation, demolition, regulation of transportation and communications, restoration of order, and other related subjects."  

The second delegation was to the Department of Defense. Steelman assigned to the Defense Department primary responsibility for those phases of civil defense "which involve the participation of civilians in military defense." Included in this program area were "such items as detection, observation and identification of aircraft, air raid warning systems, 

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7Quotation from Address of William A. Gill before 76th Annual Conference of the International Association of Fire Chiefs," Sept. 28, 1949, in JCAE Preliminary Data, p. 15.
border patrol, antiaircraft defenses, civil air patrol, camouflage and protective construction.\(^8\)

These assignments involved extensive coordination of activities of other agencies. In response to Steelman's request, GSA submitted to his office, on August 23, a prospectus setting forth in detail its plans for collaboration with other agencies in carrying out the "Planning for Wartime Civil Disaster Relief."\(^9\) In terms of planning, the approach seemed sound enough; but it was clear that in this process of delegation and redelegation, much time would elapse before a national civil defense plan could emerge.\(^10\)

Along with these broad delegations of planning responsibility, NSRB carried forward OCDP's efforts to stimulate civil defense activities at the State and local levels. The Board developed a 10-point statement of policies for relationships with State and local governments in civil defense planning.\(^11\) In brief, the policy pronouncement was that the Federal Government would deal directly with the States and with the various political subdivisions of the States only through State authorities. The States were

\(^8\)Ibid. \(^9\)JCAE Preliminary Data, pp. 15-16.

\(^10\)Mr. Stauffacher of the Budget Bureau voiced concern that in this elaborate planning process, civil defense might be "buried"; Tyler MS, p. 183.

\(^11\)These policies were set forth in NSRB Doc. 121, October 5, 1949, which Steelman transmitted to the State governors. See Appendix to JCAE Hearing, Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack, Part I, pp. 9-10.
encouraged to establish civil defense planning organizations, and were requested to initiate plans for the transmission of appropriate information to their political subdivisions.

NSRB followed up on this policy pronouncement (NSRB Doc. 121) with a series of bulletins which it transmitted to State governments for information and guidance in civil defense planning. Through these media, NSRB advised the States of Federal objectives in civil defense planning; outlined activities undertaken and made recommendations for State and local civil defense planning groups; requested specific information from the States; made available basic reports; and directed attention to other useful sources of information. The first of this series, NSRB Doc. 121/1, dated December 1, 1949, is reprinted in JCAE Hearing, Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack, Part 1, pp. 11-14. The second, transmitting a report, "Medical Aspects of Atomic Weapons," prepared for NSRB by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, is reprinted on pp. 14-15 of the aforecited hearing. NSRB Doc. 121/3, dated February 3, 1950, announced arrangements with the Atomic Energy Commission for the conduct of training courses in radiological monitoring and the medical aspects of civil defense, and requested the States governors to appoint qualified persons to take this training (Ibid., pp. 15-17). Two additional bulletins came in May 1950: one suggesting to State governors a course of action and an approach to civil defense; the other defining the role of the national American Red Cross in the planning and operation of civil defense programs.
equipment standards, and similar matters. A Board repre-
sentative, Eric Biddle, visited Great Britain to study its
civil defense activities, and plans were laid to send U.S.
personnel to civil defense staff schools that had been
started up in England.

PRESSURES FOR ACTION

Gill was chalking up a good record, in conformance with
the President's directive and NSRB policies, in defining
the scope and substance of a civil defense planning program.
The Defense Department, GSA, the Public Health Service,
the Atomic Energy Commission, and the NSRB itself were at
work on a number of projects. Policy decisions had been
reached on Federal-State-local relationships. In his
"Report on Civil Defense Planning," Gill had called the
Hopley group's work "an invaluable aid" and "a desirable
base" for State and local efforts.14 By the Spring of 1950,
he could report substantial progress in the States: civil
defense or disaster preparedness laws in effect in 17
States and the territories of Hawaii and the Virgin Islands;
"Civilian" civil defense directors appointed in 16 States;
and State Adjutant Generals directing civil defense in 25
States.15

15JCAE Hearing, Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack,
Part 1, p. 7.
Until the summer of 1949, the world situation seemed relatively calm. The war clouds of the year earlier had dissipated. The Berlin blockade had been lifted, the NATO treaty signed, and "economy" was the watchword handed down by President Truman and Defense Secretary Johnson. NSRB was still under Steelman's part-time leadership, and was trying to clarify its role and inter-agency relationships to conform with Truman's conception of its job as a Presidential staff instrument.\textsuperscript{16} The assignment of civil-defense planning to NSRB, it has been suggested, was designed to slow down the impetus provided by the Hopley group, perhaps even to "bury" civil defense as a significant element of national security policy.\textsuperscript{17} In any case, Gill is reported to have had the feeling that he was not to make "a big splash" with civil defense planning.\textsuperscript{18}

Events starting in the summer of 1949, however, forced a reversal of attitude on civil defense. On September 23rd, President Truman shook the American people with the news that the Soviets had produced an A-bomb--several years earlier than had been anticipated. This announcement brought considerably increased pressure for action on civil defense--concrete action, not more planning. This pressure came

\textsuperscript{16}Tyler MS, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{17}Kerr MS, pp. 48-50; Tyler MS, pp. 180-181; \textit{Jordan Study}, pp. 87-94.

\textsuperscript{18}Tyler MS, p. 195.
from all sides. State and local authorities and private citizens sought guidance from the Federal Government over and beyond the handouts of advisory bulletins; they wanted more definite advice and counsel. Testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, early in 1950, San Francisco Mayor Elmer E. Robinson referred to the NSRB materials and said:

... this literature is all very nice. ... But it doesn't tell the mayor of large cities ... what to do and how to proceed ... I challenge any man to take the literature ... and show us where there is any direct instruction for planning for civilian defense, except to lick your wounds, nurse your injuries, and die. ... 

Our civil defense, he complained, "seems to be nothing more than a buck-passing operation of the first magnitude between top Federal agencies." In the five years since the bombing of Hiroshima, Mayor Robinson complained, the Federal government had been doing little more than "fumbling the ball of civilian defense."19

The Administration came under criticism, even from Democrats, for delays in planning and for lack of results from the NSRB assignment. On October 8, 1949, Congressman John F. Kennedy wrote to President Truman, expressing amazement that GSA had only one person, on detail only the past week from NSRB, for full-time work on its wartime disaster-relief assignment. The United States, Senator Kennedy

warned, was inviting an "atomic Pearl Harbor" by its continued neglect of civil defense.\textsuperscript{20} Bernard Baruch, the Elder Statesman and adviser to Presidents, urged immediate enactment of a standby mobilization plan, including "a thoroughgoing civil defense.\textsuperscript{21} And David Lillienthal, in a letter to Steelman, November 17, 1949, pointed to the nation's "lack of a civilian defense policy at a time of mounting fears over the possibility of atomic warfare."\textsuperscript{22}

Further, Truman's announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion evoked demands for Congressional hearings. On October 10, 1949, Senator Brian McMahon, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, announced plans for public hearings on civil defense, and such hearings, as we shall soon see, were initiated in March 1950. Later, in the course of hearings on the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, McMahon observed that the purport of the Soviets' A-bomb explosion "was not lost" among the members of Congress. He doubted that Congress would then be considering the legislation were it not for the fact that the Russians had broken the U.S. monopoly of this weapon.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{23}U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950}, Hearings before
It seemed clear that the public and Congressional response to the Soviets' atomic explosion would have to be met by accelerating the pace of planning and perhaps even moving to operations. In January 1950, Dr. Steelman announced that Paul J. Larsen, then director of the Sandia Special Weapons Base Laboratory at Albuquerque, New Mexico, would assume the directorship of an expanded Civilian Mobilization Office in NSRB. Larsen's appointment brought hopes of a new vigor and greater realism in civil defense planning. Larsen reported for duty on March 1st; Gill stayed on as his deputy.

Larsen's immediate task was to prepare for appearances before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Armed Services Committee. His testimony, presented on March 23, reflected full acceptance of the philosophy and approach which NSRB was pursuing. What was then needed, he asserted, was "intelligent basic planning" to provide the foundation for operating programs that may be required at some future time. "Premature action, based on ill-considered plans," Larsen cautioned, "could prejudice the effectiveness of our civil defense in time of enemy attack." He offered


24 Tyler MS, pp. 217-218.
little encouragement to those who were concerned with the question of the nation's readiness "if bombs should fall tomorrow." To Larsen, readiness was "necessarily a relative matter." Absolute security, he said, was unattainable; and any attempt to achieve it could lead to a "garrison state." Larsen defended the existing assignments of responsibility for planning under NSRB leadership. He favored the continued stimulation of State and local planning. And he saw the development of effective programs of cooperation in dealing with peacetime disasters as "an important step toward achieving adequate civil defense."25

Local officials, representatives of the American Legion, and other witnesses, on the other hand, generally criticized the Federal Government for its failure to exert more leadership in civil defense. They pointed to the absence of a sense of urgency, the need for further guidance on the nature of the dangers and the protective measures needed, the lack of forward movement at all levels, and the need for the Federal Government to assume much of the cost of protective measures. Yet, despite the expressed dissatisfaction with the existing state of readiness, these hearings brought forth no strong pressures for action. The Administration wasn't ready to propose an operating program, and no Congressional recommendations to that end were forthcoming. In the current

state of the international situation, it appeared, NSRB would continue to focus on study and planning.

While these hearings were in progress, word came that W. Stuart Symington, popular and dynamic Secretary of the Air Force, would soon assume the chairmanship of NSRB. Senate confirmation came on April 10, and Symington reported for duty on April 26. The following month, in an effort to make NSRB a more effective instrument, President Truman transmitted to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 25 of 1950, transferring the functions of the Board to the Chairman and making the Board advisory to the chairman instead of to the President, as had previously been the case. By this reorganization, Truman stressed, the difficulties of Board action would be overcome. The knowledge and judgment of other members of the Board would still be available to the Chairman, and the departments and agencies would continue to participate at working levels in the preparation of the Chairman's recommendations to the President. Actually, in his dealings with the Board, Symington solicited the comments of members on matters of major policy, such as a civil defense plan and emergency mobilization legislation.27

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26 The Board had previously served as a multi-headed operation. The Board members included, in addition to the Chairman, the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. Under Reorganization Plan No. 25 of 1950, provision was made for a Vice Chairman who would also serve as a member of the Board.

For some time prior to his appointment, Symington had become convinced of the need for adequate defense preparations. In a talk in Texas early in 1950, he presented six points regarding Russia's military strength with its implications for U.S. defense. Containing "the best thinking of our own intelligence agencies and those of our allies," Symington later noted, these points were:

1. Russia now has a ground army greater in numbers than the combined armies of the United States and its allies.

2. Russia now has an air force whose strength in nearly all categories is the largest in the world and growing relatively larger month by month.

3. Russia now has the world's largest submarine fleet and an intensive submarine development and construction program.

4. Behind the Iron Curtain there has been an atomic explosion.

5. Behind that Curtain is the air equipment capable of delivering a surprise atomic attack against any part of the United States.

6. We have no adequate defense against such an attack.28

In an address several months later in his capacity as NSRB Chairman, Symington paid tribute to the late Russell Hopley and "his famous report" in which he said that civil defense was the "missing link" of our military armor. As presented by Mr. Hopley, Symington observed:

there is no question of the primary importance of civil defense planning, for at least four reasons:

1. The fire power of modern weapons equipped with atomic bombs changes all previous concepts of offensive and defensive warfare;

2. Instead of years to mobilize for victory, as in the past, there may not be hours;

3. For the first time in the history of the United States, there is now an enemy capable of attacking our homeland at any time; and

4. As his strength grows, the chances also grow that the original attack might be fatal.

Efficient civil defense planning, the new NSRB Chairman emphasized, "could well make the difference between a serious and a fatal disaster"; it might be "the deciding factor in our ability to get up off the floor and fight back." In this address before the annual convention of the American Red Cross in Detroit, June 26, 1950, Symington said: "This whole complex question of civilian defense is being worked on, and it is our hope to present an over-all plan this fall." The previous day had marked the outbreak of the Korean War.

A NATIONAL CIVIL DEFENSE PLAN UNDER PRESSURE

The World in Crisis

Even before the Korean outbreak, observers of the world scene urged a step-up of U.S. military and civil

29Ibid. 30Ibid., p. 232.
defense preparations. Hanson Baldwin, military analyst of the New York Times, saw the end of the American monopoly of A-bombs and Truman's go-ahead instructions on the H-bomb as advancing "the timetable of the world crisis." He complained of the lag in preparing for the day when there would be "two atomic worlds." Much of our former sense of urgency, Baldwin noted, "seems to be gone." There had been little progress, except on paper, toward the development of an adequate civil defense program. The States were snarled in their efforts by bureaucratic red-tape, procrastination, and the absence of central direction or coordination. The President had emasculated the Hopley plan and, on advice from Steelman, had spread various civil defense functions among a number of different agencies. Little could be expected from NSRB which had been largely "shelved because of the jealousy of established government agencies." The military and civilian mobilization systems alike, Baldwin asserted, were still based on pre-atomic concepts—"mobilization potential" rather than "readiness potential." 31

About the same time, in response to a request from President Truman in August 1949, a State-Defense study team came up with a report that sought to provide a consensus for a complete reversal of the Administration's postwar policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union and corresponding accommodation with the Soviet Union and corresponding

economies in defense spending. The study, which came to be known as NSC-68, reflected the broad perspective that was to govern the major policy decisions of the Korean War period, including the character of the mobilization buildup that was initiated at that time. NSC-68 recognized the need for close and continuing coordination between civil and military defense programs, and the contribution which civil defense could make to "a reasonable assurance that, in the event of war, the United States would survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives."\textsuperscript{32}

The Korean War was seen as an overture to a large-scale conflict. In these circumstances, civil defense became a matter of the utmost seriousness. The outbreak of the fighting in June 1950 generated great interest in civil defense, but there was no program in effect which could be useful in the event of a Soviet attack. Looking at the picture in mid-1950, Eugene Rabinowitch, eloquent editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, noted despairingly that "we have wasted five precious years." People in authority

\textsuperscript{32}"NSC-68--A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950. The general argument and broad conclusions of the study were soon leaked to the press and were referred to in public statements of officials concerned. NSC-68 was declassified in February 1975; it is reprinted in Naval War College Review, May-June 1975, pp. 51-108; see also Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling and others, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 267-378.
were speaking of civil defense "in vague terms, and in future tense."

An immense gap remains between the well-understood extent of the national catastrophe which an atomic attack on the U.S. may produce five years hence, when the Soviet Union will have, in all likelihood, acquired an atomic arsenal of significant dimensions, and the parochial organization which is being planned to deal with it. It seems as if the planning starts with what can be done without too much expenditure and too much dislocation of peacetime big city life, rather than with a realistic estimate of the dimensions of the problem.33

In the same vein, Ralph Lapp summed up accomplishments between 1945 and 1950 by saying: "we have toyed with the problem by writing a few reports on civil defense administration. Nothing of any substance has been accomplished in the past five years."34 Nor was Dr. Lapp particularly hopeful about the NSRB plan that was due in September.

. . . It is highly probable that this plan will be a new edition of the Hopley report, revised and enlarged and with something for everyone in it. I suspect that it will be a very detailed treatise listing what the police, firemen, mailmen, and doctors should do. By its very bulk it will show that official Washington is hard at work on civil defense. It will satisfy the politicians and the non-critical civic leaders, for there will be a wealth of fairly inexpensive and not too annoying projects which the cities can undertake.35

A National Plan Hammered Out

In these circumstances Symington put the pressure on Larsen to come up with the national plan as promised--in


35Ibid.
September. Larsen's staff was augmented, and his office was redesignated "Civil Defense Office" in July 1950. The office encountered problems in getting information on weapons effects and in agreeing on underlying concepts and the form of the proposed plan. GSA was floundering and had to give up its assignment. It looked as if the September deadline could not be met.

At Symington's request, Colonel Beers and his staff in the Department of Defense were brought in to participate in the work. Beers set up an executive board of this working group which decided on a format along the lines of the Hopley report. Indeed, the body of the report as well reflected much of the thinking in the Hopley report. Larsen and Beers did not see eye-to-eye on all things. While Larsen favored a strong Federal role and Federal funding, Beers pressed for the Hopley concept of self-help and local action. Symington preferred the Beers approach because he thought it would be more acceptable to the States and

36 The office had grown from 10 in March to 84 in September when work on the plan was completed. Symington's brother-in-law, James J. Wadsworth, had been brought in early in June to work with Gill and others in expediting the task. Upon completion of the plan, both Larsen and Gill resigned, and Wadsworth assumed the acting directorship of the Civil Defense Office, which came to be conceived as the nucleus of the proposed Federal Civil Defense Administration; Tyler MS, pp. 247-248, 176.

37 Ibid., pp. 237-239.
localities and to the Congress. The deadline, the pressure, the soaring demands for action after the Korean outbreak—all ruled out any hopes for a carefully considered product. The Civil Defense Office, Dr. Tyler noted, "settled on the one approach which seemed the most doable and acceptable"—the Hopley report, but with features of other approaches "grafted on to it."

On September 8, Symington submitted the plan to the President. In his letter of transmittal, Symington said that the document outlined the organization and techniques "which should be developed by the States and local communities on whom rest the primary responsibility for civil defense." Until effective international control of modern weapons could be established, it would be both wise and prudent to "put into action those precautionary measures which past experience and new tests have shown would save thousands of lives in case of attack." Such a program, Symington asserted, "is needed" and "will be expensive." He expressed the hope that the steps recommended—a basic civil defense law, the establishment of a Civil Defense Administration, and the appointment of an Administrator—would be taken promptly, "in order that the Federal Government may exercise strong and effective leadership in acquainting the

39Ibid., p. 283.
people of the United States with the great and growing import-
ance of this branch of the national security program--
Civil Defense"--a program which, to be successful, "will
require the cooperation of every man, woman and child in
this Nation." 40

Highlights of the NSRB Plan

The plan, embodied in the report entitled "United
States Civil Defense"--often referred to as the "Blue Book"
or "September Plan"--was offered in three parts: (1) pre-
sentation of overall policy, basic concepts and basic
responsibility; (2) outline of the individual services
necessary to the operation of civil defense; and (3) trans-
lation of policy and concepts into operation, including the
establishment of an independent agency of the Government.
The plan is presented as "the culmination of extensive think-
ing and planning for civil defense that has been going on in
the world for the past 10 years." It distilled the lessons
learned from study of the experience in the countries that
were "the practical laboratories of civil defense during
World War II," and from "the postwar planning of scores of
other nations." And as for sources within the U.S., the
authors asserted in true scholarly fashion:

40 NSRB, United States Civil Defense, NSRB Doc. 128
iv (hereinafter cited as NSRB Doc. 128).
Full use has been made of the experiences of the Office of Civilian Defense and State defense organizations during the past war, and of the work of the Office of Civil Defense Planning in the Department of Defense. Much valuable material has been drawn from the War Department Civil Defense Board report, and the later and more comprehensive report "Civil Defense for National Security (Hopley Report) issued in 1948 by the Office of Civil Defense Planning.\(^4\)

The Blue Book starts out with a word of caution: plans for civil defense "must be made with full recognition of the importance of maximum economy in the use of the available supply of men, money, and materials." It predicated civil defense on the principle of "self-protection on the part of groups and communities." Civil defense services would be manned "largely by unpaid part-time volunteer workers"--all belonging to "a national team--The United States Civil Defense Corps." The authors invoked a quotation from Hopley's letter to Forrestal, forwarding "his excellent report," to back up this concept.\(^4\) A figure, set as a frontispiece for the Blue Book, depicts graphically "the national civil defense pattern." As will be noted (p. 26), it shows four concentric circles: the first encompassing the individual ("calm and well trained"), the family ("the base of organized self-protection"), the neighborhood, and the community (which "puts civil defense into action immediately"); the second, the nearby cities, which "move in mutual aid as

\(^{41}\) NSRB Doc. 128, p. 6.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., pp. 3-4.
needed"; the third, the State, which "will furnish aid in the form of mobile support and supplies as needed"; and the fourth, the Federal Government, which "furnishes aid and supplies as needed."

Thus, in keeping with this pattern, operating responsibility was placed upon the individual and his local government. The States would coordinate and direct civil defense operations within their own boundaries, and the Federal Government would deal directly with the State or territorial governors or their own civil defense directors. For its part, the Federal Government would be responsible for establishing "a national civil defense plan with accompanying policy," and for issuing "information and educational material about both." It would "provide courses and facilities for schooling and training, provide coordination of interstate operations, furnish some of the essential equipment, and advise the States concerning the establishment of stockpiles of medical and other supplies needed at the time of disaster."

The plan emphasized civilian control. The military's primary mission in war, the plan recognized, is to prosecute the war. Nevertheless, the military would have some responsibilities in civil defense. Among these would be guidance to

43Ibid., pp. 4-6.
Figure 1.

the Federal agency as to potential enemy activity; decisions on such passive defense measures as blackout, dimout, and camouflage; disposal of unexploded enemy weapons; and technical assistance in training activities. Upon request, the Armed Forces might assist State and local authorities in planning and developing their civil defense programs "in accordance with the Federal pattern." Application of martial law would be "a last-resort measure in any civil defense plan," and even under martial law, "the machinery and personnel of the existing civil government and civil-defense organization should be maintained and utilized to the fullest practicable extent."\textsuperscript{44}

Included in the Blue Book was a discussion of "initial steps" in civil defense planning, which emphasized the need to plan practical methods for using existing public and private resources to best advantage. The plan suggested that the civil defense director of each State arrange for one designated critical target area or one of its large cities with surrounding communities, to undertake a plan as a step toward the development of State and other municipal programs. After coordinating such a plan, it should be presented to conferences of State and local officials, with Federal representatives in attendance, if desired, and making appropriate

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., pp. 15-16.
comments. The greater part of the Blue Book was taken up
with a detailing of the services that would be needed in
an attack.\footnote{Included are chapters on: air raid warning service;
shelter protection; evacuation; warden service--organized
self-protection; mutual aid and mobile support; fire ser-
vices; emergency welfare service; engineering service;
rescue service; communications; transportation; plant pro-
tection; supply service; civilian auxiliaries to military
activities; and personnel service; NSRB Doc. 128, pp. 33-103.}
Organization charts provided guidance for the
establishment of State and local civil-defense agencies,
and model bills were included to guide the preparation of
requisite legislation. Included also were legislative pro-
posals to be submitted to Congress for the establishment of
a Federal Civil Defense Administration.

Reaction to the NSRB Plan

Local civil defense planners all over the U.S. studied
the plan closely. It figured in discussions at civil de-
fense exercises in Chicago, September 25-29, and at a meet-
ing of the U.S. Conference of Mayors in Washington, D.C.,
October 5 and 6. The first impression gained was that
the plan was "simply a scissors-and-paste job on the Hopley
report,"\footnote{Frank P. Zeidler, "Civil Defense: Community Problems
and the NSRB Plan," \textit{PAS}, Vol. 6, No. 11 (Nov. 1950), p. 337.}
and that the situation was "little advanced beyond
that existing before the NSRB began its consideration of the
Local leaders had looked for answers to such questions as the magnitude of preparations needed, timing of plans, cost and methods of financing, and urgency of the plans for defense against various types of weapons; but these questions remained unanswered. Apparently the national planning was "still in the paper stage"; indeed, many felt that their plans had already progressed "quite beyond the point where the NSRB report will be useful."

At the mayors' October meeting, San Francisco Mayor Robinson voiced their general opinion when he said: "We feel that civil defense is the step-child of the government." He wanted to know why the Government hadn't decided how much it would spend on civil defense; the States and municipalities needed this information to plan their budgets. Vague wording in the plan, such as the statement that the Government would supply "some equipment," Robinson complained, raised questions as to meaning, and left much doubt in the minds of local planners as to procedural details. Symington retorted that legislation then in process of enactment would provide necessary Federal powers and that sound cost figures would be ready in time. He told the mayors:

Planning is the most important thing. Nobody could start spending heavy money in these next two months because a report couldn't be gotten together and there couldn't be a plan in that time.

The local governments, however, appeared to have progressed beyond the stage envisaged by Symington; and they were moving ahead regardless of what Federal aid might be forthcoming.48

Still more criticism came from the American Municipal Association. Its Civil Defense Committee raised particular objection to the statements in the Blue Book that primary responsibility for the program rested with State and local governments. The need for civil defense, the committee declared, is "created by the state of our international relations, and the probabilities and possibilities which require civil defense organization can be known only to the federal officials." NSRB actions since the issuance of the plan, the committee complained, were not consistent with the urgency of the situation; and the Board had failed to set up a timetable for the actions needed then and those that could be developed over a period of months or years. The committee stated:

The greatest single failure of national civil defense leadership arises out of their unwillingness to state these hard facts in unequivocal fashion to the American people. There is no valid justification for the reluctance of the federal authorities to be as realistic and as plain-spoken about the magnitude and complexity of the task of organizing an adequate national civil defense as they have been and are about the problem of national military defense and security.49


Three-Year Cost Estimates

By December 1950, when Congress set out in earnest to provide the enabling legislation, NSRB was ready with estimates of the cost of financing the program, including the proportionate share of that cost that should be borne by the Federal Government. In a statement before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on December 4, James Wadsworth, then serving as Acting Deputy Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, spelled out both the underlying concepts and the specifics of the contemplated financing.

"Our approach to financing," he said, "has been the same as our approach to planning, namely, that adequate preparation against the loss of life and property is of primary concern to the affected community. Our plan, therefore, requires substantial financial outlays by State and local governments." At the same time, it was recognized that the program "is Nation-wide in scope." In an attack, certain strategic areas would be hard-hit, while other areas might escape entirely. "It would be economically unsound," Wadsworth asserted, "to take all possible precautionary measures in all possible target areas at once." In some aspects of the program, however, "a uniformity of approach throughout the country is not only desirable but necessary, if we are to avoid confusion and delay."

Therefore, Wadsworth indicated,

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As is indicated below, President Truman set up the Federal Civil Defense Administration by Executive order on December 1, 1950.
the Federal Government should assume the responsibility for providing regional stockpiles of some types of supplies. It should also share the financial burden imposed by the need for special equipment.

In defining this responsibility we have attempted to avoid, on the one hand, Federal aid which would destroy a sense of local responsibility. On the other hand, we have tried not to make our financial aid so small and restricted in scope as to stunt the growth of the program.

In keeping with these aims, NSRB presented to Congress the following plan for financing:

(a) That the cost of local personnel and administration be the financial responsibility of the States and local communities, together with the cost of supplies and equipment of a personal character needed by volunteer workers. Our preliminary estimate is that such expense over the next 3 years would amount to approximately $200,000,000.

(b) That the Federal Government share with the States and local communities the cost of procuring such heavy equipment as may be necessary for augmented fire services, engineering services, transportation services, communications services and rescue services. It is estimated that over a 3-year period the cost of such equipment to the Federal Government would be about $100,000,000, and to the State and local governments an equal amount.

(c) That the Federal Government match equally the expenditures of the States and cities for the construction of communal-type shelters. To do less, in our opinion, might well result in no shelters, or in shelters completely inadequate to cope with the atom bomb. It is estimated that the Federal share of this program, over the 3-year period, will be $1,125,000,000, with an equal expenditure by the State and local governments.

(d) That the Federal Government provide regional stockpiles of critically needed materials, particularly of those types which would not otherwise be available in the event of an emergency. This program, embracing engineering supplies, blood plasma, medical supplies and evacuee supplies, would cost an estimated $400,000,000 over the 3-year period.
(e) That the communications and communication control centers necessary to distribute timely and adequate warning of an enemy attack be provided by the Federal Government. It is estimated that such a system would cost about $32,000,000.

Thus, NSRB estimated the total cost over the 3-year period to be about $3.1 billion. The Federal Government's share would be approximately $1,670,000,000, or 54 percent. The outlays by the States would be approximately $1,430,000,000, or 46 percent of the total cost.\(^5\) It should be noted that of the $3.1 billion total, the great bulk—$2,250,000,000—was to be spent on the construction of "communal-type shelters," with the Federal Government matching the expenditures by the State and local governments.

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS

In his December 4 statement, Wadsworth called attention to a variety of steps taken by the Civil Defense Office, following completion of the National Plan, to guide and help the States and cities in their planning of integrated programs. Among these were the following:

1. **Participation in Civil Defense Conferences.**—To provide leadership for States and local efforts, the Civil

Defense Office participated in "a rapidly increasing number of meetings and conferences with State and local civil-defense directors, as well as with governors, State legislators, mayors, and other officials who have taken an active interest in civil-defense activities." Six field representatives of the Civil Defense Office engaged in field conferences with State civil-defense directors, "helping to work out local legislative policy and planning problems." Backing this type of assistance was "a constant flow of bulletins and other communications" between the Civil Defense Office and the State directors who were handling day-to-day problems of organization, financing, and operation.

2. Additional Publications.--A number of additional manuals and other compilations were developed, with the assistance of other agencies, to inform the public and guide State and local planning. A booklet entitled *Survival Under Atomic Attack*, telling in simple language what the individual should do for self-protection, received wide distribution. Each State governor and civil defense director received a restricted map detailing critical target areas within the State and suggesting mutual aid and mobile support patterns for these areas. The publication, *The Effects of Atomic Weapons*, prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission with the help of the Defense Department and released earlier (in August 1950), still assumed effects of the "nominal" 20-kiloton bomb, but it did provide "scaling laws" that could be used in calculating
effects of more potent bombs. An additional manual, scheduled for release in December, was entitled "The Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks." Prepared for NSRB by the Office of Civil Defense Liaison of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, this manual outlined the fire effects of various types of modern weapons, cited the "fire history" of Germany and Japan, and outlined a method by which American fire experts might evaluate the potential fire hazard in their cities. This manual and another in process, a comprehensive "Civil Defense Health Services Manual," Wadsworth stated, were "only the forerunners of many others to come," designed to "answer in detail many of the questions being asked by State and local civil-defense officials."

3. **Guide to Citizen Participation.**—For the individual citizens asking "What can I Do?" Wadsworth reported, the Red Cross, in cooperation with the Civil Defense Office, had undertaken three major activities "in which everyone can take part": a first-aid program "in which some 20,000,000 people should be trained as rapidly as possible"; a national blood program, in which the Red Cross would coordinate the efforts of all interested agencies "in developing a realistic program of mass blood procurement"; and nurses' aide and home nursing training, "which will be carried out on a large scale."

4. **Liaison with Britain and Canada.**—Cooperative relations were established with the British and Canadian
Governments in planning for civil defense. Wadsworth considered their help "most valuable" in the development of the U.S. program and in the quest for solutions to complex problems, such as shelter design and construction. The NSRB and Canadian civil-defense staffs met with State Department representatives in November, to establish a working group to seek solutions to joint problems, including mutual aid with respect to border areas.

5. Surveys and Tests of Potential Shelters.--Plans were under way for field testing of "potential shelter types" with a view to providing specifications for individual and community use. "Surveys of potential existing shelters," Wadsworth indicated, "are now being made."

6. Model Interstate Compact.--The Civil Defense Office released a suggested model for an interstate civil defense and disaster relief compact, prepared jointly with the Council of State Governments. It provided "the legal answers to many questions which have been troubling the State civil-defense authorities who are now in process of making such agreements."

7. Training Courses.--NSRB expanded its program, initiated early in 1950, of training in techniques for dealing with the effects of atomic attack. These courses were developed with the cooperation of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense, the Public Health Service, and other agencies. They were designed to lay the groundwork
for the development and operation of State training programs. Such courses covered radiological monitoring and the medical and nursing aspects of atomic warfare. The Civil Defense Office furnished the States descriptions of these courses, as well as criteria for the selection of State participants.

8. Air Raid Warning Service.--The Civil Defense Office recognized the crucial importance of advance warning, together with a well-organized and well-trained civil-defense organization, in saving lives in an atomic attack. An air-raid warning program was then operated on an interim basis by the Defense Department through the Continental Air Command. Efforts were directed toward "the continuous expansion and improvement of the air raid warning service."

9. Planning Exercises.--Of special significance was the NSRB sponsorship, in cooperation with State and local authorities, of tests or "planning exercises" in Washington, D.C., Seattle, and Chicago, which afforded realistic, on-the-ground illustrations of problems of preparing for atomic attack. The Chicago test in September assumed an attack with three atomic bombs, killing or injuring 250,000 persons and damaging an area of 28.7 square miles. Some 800 civil defense leaders from 20 States, Alaska, Hawaii, and the United Kingdom met in Chicago to discuss the results of this
third exercise. 52

The Chicago test, Mayor Zeidler noted, demonstrated that "there is no easy answer" to the question of how to organize an effective civil defense program. Some major difficulties were encountered.

It is natural that some defects in judgment should have appeared, such as in the operation of a warning system, in the estimate of the psychological ability of people to respond to the disasters, in the composition, disposition, and operation of certain forces, such as medical teams and rescue squads.

Zeidler emphasized, however, the principal value of the exercise in illustrating "the immense amount of detailed work" required to prepare an effective plan and put it into effect quickly.

There is no escape from detailed study, from discussing and coordinating the many items involved, and from making pioneer judgments on civil defense in each local community. Every community presents a problem different from every other community. Generalized solutions to specific civil defense problems set down in the Hopley report and in United States Civil Defense must be adapted to fit local capacities.

As a result of this exercise and of the mayors' meeting in Washington, Zeidler noted, most local officials "went away with the realization that they must solve their own problems." 53


Wadsworth's observations were along similar lines.

These exercises did not solve all civil-defense problems for the cities involved nor answer all the questions of those who participated as observers. By going at it the hard way through these test exercises, however, the cities are now well along in the grim job of planning for an attack, and the observers who sat in are better informed as to the actual conditions that might be expected in the event of a bombing of their own communities.

The NSRB plan, it will be recalled, had strongly recommended that every State director select at least one city for a test exercise. NSRB repeatedly urged the conduct of such exercises as "an absolute must for any metropolitan center." As of early December, Wadsworth observed, "only a few cities have tackled this job of getting first-hand information regarding their civil-defense needs."\(^5\)

10. Progress at the State and Local Levels.--By early December, Wadsworth could report significant progress in civil-defense organization at the State and local levels. By then all States except one, the District of Columbia, and the Territories had appointed civil-defense directors. The larger metropolitan centers also had full-time directors, with active programs in various stages of organization. Eight States in recent months had appropriated funds for civil defense, the amounts ranging from $10,000 in North Dakota to $600,000 in New York. Most States were planning

programs for mutual aid agreements between their political subdivisions, with extension to communities in other States, as well as between States. On an even wider basis, a number of States provided for regional interstate defense plans. At the local level, progress was uneven; but responses from 139 cities to a survey by the American Municipal Association, Wadsworth observed, reflected stages of organization which, for the most part, "were in sharp and gratifying contrast to the situation only six months ago."

THE STATUTORY BASE FOR OPERATIONS

On September 18—ten days after Symington had submitted the NSRB plan to him—President Truman transmitted it to Congress for consideration. In his letter to Congress, the President said:

I believe this report presents a sound and workable outline of the civil defense problems we face, and what the Federal, state and local governments should do to meet them. I urge the members of the Congress to consider this report carefully over the next few weeks as


a basis for the enactment of legislation in the near future.

He urged the State governors and the mayors of the larger cities to give the report their early attention "so that the states and local communities will be prepared to move ahead rapidly with their own plans." In the meantime, Truman indicated his intent to establish "a Temporary Civil Defense Administration" to carry forward the work pending enactment of authorizing legislation, and to provide "a central point of leadership for the state and local efforts."\(^5\)

That same day the Federal legislation suggested in the NSRB plan was introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 9689), and the following day in the Senate (S. 4162). The proposed legislation had not been fully coordinated before its introduction in Congress. Over the ensuing two months, suggestions were received from various State and Federal agencies, the Council of State Governments, and others. The bill was rewritten late in November, and the revised legislation was introduced in the House on November 30 (H.R. 9798) and in the Senate the following day (S. 4219).\(^5\)


Congress was quick to consider and enact the enabling legislation. International tension had mounted with the Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict in late November. The President, on December 16, proclaimed the existence of a national emergency, and created the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), under the directorship of Charles W. Wilson, in whom was vested the full responsibility for carrying forward the objectives of the rearmament program. Congressional hearings on the proposed Federal civil-defense legislation began December 4. The entire legislative process was completed in little more than one month, with the President signing Public Law 920, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950—on January 12, 1951. The tensions of the Korean situation in late November and during the month of December accounted in large measure for this accelerated legislative action.59

Issues Encountered in the Congressional Deliberations

Although Congressional deliberations on Public Law 920 were surprisingly smooth and rapid, a number of significant issues did arise for consideration. The decisions on these issues were of fundamental importance to the future course and effectiveness of the civil defense program.

59Maxam MS, p. 43.
1. Placement of Primary Responsibility for Civil Defense.--One basic policy issue had to do with the scope of authority and modus operandi of FCDA vis-a-vis the States and their political subdivisions. There was a strong feeling in Congress that the authority of FCDA should be very much restricted in peacetime to guiding the State and local governments and coordinating their efforts. Major reliance, it was felt, should be placed on State and community responsibility. Drawing on their recollections of World War II experience, they wanted to strengthen the organization and operations of civil defense at the State and local levels and avoid the buildup of a large and costly Federal bureaucracy. Senator Leverett Saltonstall, who had been Governor of Massachusetts and worked closely with civil defense during World War II, voiced this prevailing sentiment at the December 1950 hearings.

Primarily the thought that I would like to leave . . . is this: Emphasize the importance of keeping the responsibility at the local level, of having the work done primarily by volunteers, of giving the feeling to people in the various municipalities and States that they are primarily responsible for the safety of their own civilians. 60

Senator Kefauver, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Civil Defense, was entirely in

accord with Saltonstall's view of this matter. "Of course," he said, "the desire of the Federal Government is to co-ordinate and direct and to leave the chief responsibility of actually carrying out the program with the State and with its political subdivisions without us getting into everybody's hair and in everybody's way." 61

The Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 came out firmly for this concept and allayed any fears of extensive Federal authority or financing.

... It is not intended that this program will be operated and controlled by the Federal Government, but rather that the Government furnish the necessary guidance and coordination along with certain assistance in financing this program. While some have argued for considerable Federal financing, the committee believes that no amount of money could insure our civilian population being prepared to meet the problems of civil defense. That insurance can only come through a carefully coordinated, well-organized program implemented by properly trained, equipped, and organized workers at the local level. Almost without exception these workers will be volunteers. 62

In light of this prevailing sentiment, Congress would not allow language in the draft "Declaration of Policy" that would have specified a sharing of responsibility by the Federal Government with the States and their political subdivisions. As we shall see later in this history, Congress

61 Ibid., p. 197.

would have reason to regret this decision and change it in 1958, after it had become evident that the program was not making the progress expected. But the language as enacted into law in January 1951 declared the policy and intent of Congress that the responsibility for civil defense "shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions."

While there were few to challenge the principle of State and local responsibility, a number of municipal officials had some qualms about the proposed policy of having the Federal government deal directly only with the States. They were fearful of delay and of being cut off from Federal aid by reason of State action or inaction.63 On this issue, Senator Saltonstall, whose experience and views carried much weight with Senator Kefauver and his subcommittee, recalled the World War II problems attendant upon the bypassing of the States:

One of the greatest difficulties . . . that Mayor La Guardia was in . . . was that as civilian director at times he tried to deal directly with the cities. The mayor's organization and the Governor's organization, of course, differed essentially on that. But our experience was that when they went over the head of the director of civilian defense in Massachusetts

and went directly into the municipalities, it caused jealousy, it caused difficulty and misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{64}

Other governors similarly supported the established chain of command, and the Administration accepted this position. In the words of Acting Deputy Administrator Wadsworth:

\begin{quote}
It is of paramount importance to remember that the chain of command starts at the state level. The Federal Government in its capacity will and should deal only with the State Governors and State civil defense directors. It cannot (bypass) and has not bypassed them to deal individually with cities and voluntary groups.\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

At the same time, Wadsworth made clear the intent to deal with the localities, when necessary, through their respective State governments. "There is no prohibition against direct contact of the Federal authorities with individual cities," he said, the only condition being "that the States be kept advised of such contacts."\textsuperscript{66}

2. \textbf{Location of the Civil Defense Agency in the Executive Branch.}—A second basic question posed at the Congressional hearings had to do with the proper location for the new agency: Should it be under the Secretary of Defense, with the Administrator on the same level with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, or should the

\textsuperscript{64}Senate Armed Services Subcommittee Hearing on S. 4217 and S. 4219, Part 2, pp. 177-178.


\textsuperscript{66}Ibid., p. 205.
Administrator head an independent agency reporting directly to the President? Actually, the question was academic; the President had already activated FCDA as a separate agency in the Executive Office of the President, and the proposed legislation would establish FCDA as an independent agency in the Executive Branch. But the debate on the issue was spirited, and the ideas set forth were significant in terms of their implications for the future.

The major opposition to the establishment of an independent Federal civil defense agency came from the American Municipal Association (AMA). In a policy statement adopted by its Twenty-Seventh Annual Congress on December 6, coincident with the Congressional hearings, the Association recommended the establishment of the agency "within the Department of Defense with a civilian Secretary of Civil Defense." The Association reasoned:

"... It is imperative that at the Federal level there be complete coordination of the military and civilian defense and security effort. This can best be accomplished by vesting the Federal responsibility in the civilian Secretary of Defense and a civilian Department of Civil Defense in the Defense Department. In these circumstances, civil defense is no less important than military defense. This is the best available method of accomplishing the necessary result."

Such an arrangement, the AMA believed, would hold out better prospects of success than having an independent civilian

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agency rattling around in the Government, even though it might be directly responsible to the President. Military and civilian security, the AMA believed, are inseparable and require "an absolute coordination" which can best be achieved by placing the responsibility on the Defense Department.\(^{68}\)

The Defense Department, however, was then inclined to let FCDA go its separate way. Colonel Barnet Beers, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense Liaison, advised the Kefauver Subcommittee:

... The feeling in military circles ... is that they have got enough to do as it is. ...

It is based on a strong feeling that their primary mission should be as nearly as possible their sole mission and that is the military defense--the idea of going out and devoting their entire energy and facilities for the successful termination of a war.

... ... ... ... ...

It is considered entirely appropriate that being strictly a civil responsibility, its leadership and supervision should be. It is quite true that there is a great deal of coordination necessary with the military, but we think it can be achieved.\(^{69}\)


\(^{69}\)Beers did recognize "a definite responsibility" of the military to be prepared to support civil-defense activities, "within the means available and without jeopardy to that primary mission," in cases of great and widespread disaster; see Senate Armed Services Subcommittee Hearings on S. 4217 and S. 4219, Part I, pp. 80-81.
Sounding out the Governors, Senator Kefauver received expressions of concurrence in the military view of the matter. Governor Val Peterson of Nebraska, who was later to serve as Federal Civil Defense Administrator, responded that, from conversations he had with governors at a meeting in Chicago, "we prefer to have civil defense under a civilian and divorced entirely from the Military Establishment." 70 Governor Frank Lausche of Ohio took the view that "this is a home-defense problem," with each person taking care of his home and helping his neighbors, and it ought to be kept separate from the military forces. "They have a job big enough for them to do with the assignment that is theirs now," Lausche stated, "without taking care of civil defense." 71

Senator Kefauver thought that most members of the Senate were inclined to agree with the military position that they had enough to do already and that a separate independent agency should be established without military control. 72 Although it was clear that Congress would establish an independent agency outside the military line of command, the Administration felt impelled to submit for the record a statement from Wadsworth, rebutting the AMA position.

70Ibid., p. 164.
71Ibid., pp. 164-165.
In respect to the recommendation that there be established within the Department of Defense a civilian department for civilian defense, we believe that Colonel Beers has answered thoroughly and well. One thought occurs to us from the civilian standpoint: If you make Civil Defense a part of the Department of Defense, that means that it is merely one of four segments of that Department and, as such, will be competing directly with the regular armed services. Mayor Robinson of San Francisco who signed the policy statement has repeatedly stated his belief that Civil Defense has been and is the stepchild of the Federal Government. If Civil Defense should be placed within the Department of Defense, it would be a stepchild indeed. On the other hand, set up as an independent agency with the Administrator reporting direct to the President, Civil Defense will have far more stature and prestige than if it were submerged in the Department of Defense.73

Basic Provisions of Public Law 920

Despite the above-described issues and other expressions of concern, the civil defense bills moved rapidly through Congress. House approval of its bill came on December 20, 1950, with only one opposing vote, that of Congressman Clare Hoffman of Michigan. The Senate approved its bill by a voice vote. Differences in the House and Senate bills were largely technical in nature and were quickly resolved. Agreement was reached in both Houses on January 2, 1951, and on January 12, President Truman signed H.R. 9798 as amended into Public Law 920—the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.74

73 Senate Armed Services Subcommittee Hearings on S. 4217 and S. 4219, Part II, p. 205.

74 Public Law 920, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., approved Jan. 12, 1951, 64 Stat. 1245.
Because this act with some amendments has provided to this day the statutory base for Federal civil defense operations, we will highlight some of its basic provisions.

1. Declaration of Policy.--Public Law 920 set forth an important statement of Congressional policy and intent:

   It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a plan of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide necessary coordination and guidance; shall be responsible for the operations of the Federal Civil Defense Administration as set forth in this Act; and shall provide necessary assistance as hereinafter authorized. 75

Thus did Congress subscribe to the concept of self-help, with State and local initiative in civil defense. Each State was expected to plan, organize and operate its own program, with FCDA providing coordination and guidance and certain financial assistance. The legislative history of this "Declaration of Policy," as well as of provisions for the maximum use of the facilities of Government and private organizations, made it quite evident that Congress expected FCDA to be and to remain a relatively small Federal agency.

2. Definition of Civil Defense.--The Act gave civil defense a strictly protective character. The term "civil defense" was defined to mean "all those activities and measures designed or undertaken (1) to minimize the effects

75Public Law 920, Sec. 2.
upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an attack upon the United States, (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack, and (3) to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack."

The term was deemed to include, but not to be limited to, the following activities:

(A) measures to be taken in preparation for anticipated attack (including the establishment of appropriate organizations, operational plans, and supporting agreements; the recruitment and training of personnel; the conduct of research; the procurement and stockpiling of necessary materials and supplies; the provision of suitable warning systems; the construction or preparation of shelters, shelter areas, and control centers; and, when appropriate, the non-military evacuation of civil population);

(B) measure to be taken during attack (including the enforcement of passive defense regulations prescribed by duly established military or civil authorities; the evacuation of personnel to shelter areas; the control of traffic and panic; and the control and use of lighting and civil communications); and

(C) measures to be taken following attack (including activities for fire fighting; rescue, emergency medical, health and sanitation services; monitoring for
specific hazards of special weapons; unexploded bomb recon-
yaissance; essential debris clearance; emergency welfare
measures; and immediately essential emergency repair or
restoration of damaged vital facilities). 76

3. Organization: FCDA and Civil Defense Advisory
Council.--The Act established a Federal Civil Defense Ad-
ministration (FCDA) in the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, headed by an Administrator appointed from civilian
life by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The
post of Deputy Administrator was also established. 77

A Civil Defense Advisory Council was also created to
"advise and consult with the Administrator with respect to
general or basic policy matters relating to civil defense."
The Council would consist of the Administrator, as chair-
man, and 12 others chosen by the President—three repre-
senting State governments, three representing political
subdivisions of the States, and the remaining six to be
selected from "among the citizens of the United States of
broad and varied experience in matters affecting the public
interest." 78

76Ibid., Sec. 3. 77Ibid., Title I, sec. 101.

78Panels of names for the representatives of States
and their political subdivisions were to be submitted by the
Council of State Governments, the Governors' Conference,
the American Municipal Association, and the United States
Conference of Mayors. The President would select individu-
als from these lists to serve for three-year terms. The
Council would meet at least once each year; ibid., Title I,
Section 102.
4. **The Administrator's Powers and Duties.**—The Act spelled out in considerable detail the Administrator's responsibilities for coordination, guidance and assistance. Briefly, the Administrator was authorized to:

(1) prepare, sponsor, and direct national plans and programs for civil defense, and request reports on State activities;

(2) delegate appropriate responsibilities to other Federal agencies, and review and coordinate the activities under these delegations with each other and with the activities of the States and neighboring countries;

(3) provide for necessary civil defense communications and for the dissemination of warning of enemy attack;

(4) study and develop civil defense measures;

(5) operate training programs;

(6) disseminate civil-defense information to the public;

(7) assist and encourage the States to enter into interstate compacts, and "aid and assist in encouraging reciprocal civil defense legislation by the States which will permit the furnishing of mutual aid for civil defense purposes in the event of an attack which cannot be met or controlled adequately by a State or a political subdivision thereof threatened with or undergoing attack";
(8) procure, construct and lease materials and facilities for civil defense;
(9) arrange for the sale or disposal of surplus civil defense materials; and
(10) make financial contributions to the States on the basis of approved programs or projects.

Except as otherwise specified for periods of emergency, there were to be no contributions "for State or local personnel and administrative expenses." Contributions to the States for organizational equipment were to be on an equally matching basis. The Act authorized the Administrator to develop shelter designs and protective equipment and facilities. He could make financial contributions to shelter projects. Federal funds could not be spent, however, for the acquisition of land for shelters or for projects designed for use for purposes other than civil defense or for projects which would be self-liquidating. Federal funds for shelter projects were to be on a matching basis with the State or local governments. Such funds would be apportioned among the States "in the ratio which the urban population of the critical target areas . . . in each state . . . bears to the total urban population of the critical target areas of all of the States."79

79 Ibid., Title II, Sec. 201.
5. The Administrator's Emergency Powers.--The legislative history depicts some concern in Congress over the proposed exercise by the Administrator of sweeping powers in an emergency. The drafters of the Act allayed Congressional fears by breaking these powers out into a separate title (Title III) and by strictly delineating the circumstances under which these emergency powers could be invoked. Congress also set a terminal date for the provisions of this title--June 30, 1954 "or on such earlier date as may be prescribed by concurrent resolution of the Congress." The Title III authorities were extended in 1966 and in 1970, but were not renewed in 1974.

The Act specified that the emergency authority would be operative only during the existence of a state of civil defense emergency proclaimed by the President or by concurrent resolution of the Congress. This would be done in situations where the President or Congress found that an attack upon the United States had occurred or was anticipated and that the national safety required invocation of the provisions of this title.

We will not be particularly concerned with this part of the Federal civil defense mission in this history. It may be of interest, however, to note the nature and scope of the powers which the Administrator was authorized to exercise during such an emergency:

(a) exercise the authorities contained in section 201 (h) [procure by condemnation or otherwise, construct, lease, transport, store, maintain, renovate, or distribute materials and facilities for civil defense, with the right to take immediate possession thereof] without regard to the limitation of any existing law . . . ;

(b) sell, lease, lend, transfer, or deliver materials or perform services for civil defense purposes on such terms and conditions as the Administrator shall prescribe and without regard to the limitations of existing law . . . ;
(c) coordinate and direct, for civil defense purposes, the relief activities of the various departments and agencies of the United States as provided in section 302 hereof;

(d) reimburse any State, including any political subdivisions thereof, for the compensation paid to and the transportation, subsistence, and maintenance expenses of any employees while engaged in rendering civil defense aid outside the State and to pay fair and reasonable compensation for the materials of the State government or any political subdivision utilized or consumed outside of the State, including any transportation costs, in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Administrator . . . ;

(e) provide financial assistance for the temporary relief or aid of any civilian injured or in want as the result of any attack; and

(f) employ temporarily additional personnel without regard to the civil service laws and to incur such obligations on behalf of the United States as may be required to meet the civil defense requirements of an attack or of an anticipated attack.

During the period of any such emergency, the Administrator shall transmit quarterly to the Congress a detailed report concerning all action taken pursuant to this section.80

FCDA IN PLACE

By the time of the enactment of Public Law 920, FCDA had been in operation for some six weeks. By Executive Order 10186, December 1, 1950, Truman had established FCDA temporarily in the Executive Office of the President, in anticipation of early Congressional agreement on the Administration's proposed legislation. For the post of Administrator, the President brought in Millard F. Caldwell, Jr.,

80 Ibid., Title III, Sec. 301, Sec. 307.
former Governor of Florida and former Congressman from that State. Senator Kefauver applauded this "very outstanding appointment."

Mr. Caldwell was one of the ablest Members of the House of Representatives. He served capably as chief executive of the State of Florida. He is a man of great intelligence and calm judgment and a great deal of perseverance and understanding, which are greatly needed in this position which he has undertaken.81

Wadsworth was named Deputy Administrator. Under the terms of the Executive order, the NSRB civil defense staff was transferred to FCDA; it served as the nucleus for its operations.82

From a review of the legislative history, it is clear that Congress was not fired up by Public Law 920. Congress accepted the Act with little enthusiasm and surprisingly little debate. For many members of Congress, civil defense seemed like a necessary evil—perhaps a temporary phenomenon. Even Caldwell construed his assignment as one of short duration. Clearly, Congress would look askance at any efforts toward bureaucratic aggrandizement. Nor would it tolerate "boondoggling" proposals for Federal funding of pet local projects, such as the construction of highways, subways, and underground garages, on the pretext that they would help meet the need for shelters in an emergency that may never occur. Representative Dewey Short sensed the dilemmas and uncertainties ahead when he said:


82 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
The thing that makes this legislation extremely difficult is that we are taking more or less a leap in the dark, but there is no way to avoid it. We have no yardstick; we have no standard; we have had very little experience ourselves to go by. We are entering a vast unknown and unexplored field.  

As he embarked on his task, Caldwell faced a rocky road ahead.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION
1951--1958

A GLANCE AT FCDA FUNDING AND OPERATIONS

The ready acceptance by Congress of Public Law 920 in a moment of national crisis was in marked contrast to its subsequent actions on funding for civil defense. President Truman requested over $1.5 billion for fiscal 1951-53, with more than half of the total earmarked for a shelter program. He had to settle for $150.1 million, with "not one thin dime for shelters." President Eisenhower's budget requests for the ensuing five years (fiscal 1954-58), without any provision for shelters, totaled only $564.3 million; and yet Congress chopped that down to $296.1 million.

The financially austere treatment accorded FCDA is a real puzzler. To some extent it may have been a reflection of certain reservations by Congress regarding the agency's effectiveness. Certainly there was ample justification for this view, especially in the absence of well-defined and fully substantiated programs that had strong support from the Chief Executives. A truly workable program would require the reduction of target vulnerability by industrial
dispersion or the construction of mass shelters. Such a program would be costly and was inconceivable under conditions where the brunt of responsibility for civil defense had to be borne by the States and localities. And there was no disposition on the part of the Chief Executives or Congress to have the Federal Government underwrite these outlays. One finds in the record many descriptions of civil defense as a basic component of national security. The meager Congressional appropriations and the Chief Executives' acquiescence in them would seem to suggest that civil defense was, in fact, considered marginal--something to be tolerated as long as it did not entail large expenditures.

Thus, for the full eight fiscal years of its life, while more potent weapons and radioactive fallout were constantly extending the range of danger and aggravating the problems of civil defense, FCDA operated on appropriations totaling only $446.2 million--about 20 percent of the level of funding ($2.1 billion) recommended by the Chief Executives. Of this sum, $212.5 million, or 48 percent, was spent on stockpiling medical and other emergency supplies and equipment for use immediately after an enemy attack. Through fund-matching contributions, totaling $116.6 million, FCDA helped the States and their political subdivisions to acquire civil defense materials and equipment and to carry on educational and training programs. Of the remainder, $84.5 million were authorized for the administration and operation of Federal civil defense programs.
With this $84.5 million, FCDA paid its staff; guided civil defense planning; administered and supervised research projects; designed a nationwide attack warning system; developed operational plans for postattack management of resources; conducted educational, training, and promotional activities; maintained its field operations; and bore the administrative costs of its emergency stockpile operations. In mid-1958, FCDA had 1,460 employees on its rolls, with a yearly average of 884 for the eight-year period.¹

One function that was not reflected in FCDA funding had to do with natural disasters. By Executive Order 10427, dated January 13, 1953, President Truman conferred upon FCDA the authority to direct and coordinate Federal assistance in major natural disasters. Reimbursement for assistance directed by FCDA would be made from a Federal disaster fund after a declaration by the President that a "major disaster" existed and upon determination by the President that such reimbursement was warranted.²


In its annual reports to the President and Congress, FCDA highlighted its accomplishments, and it made special note of "milestones" in its development. To be sure, FCDA could point to many encouraging signs of progress. There was no denying, however, that civil defense preparedness was far from adequate. In the absence of a genuine shelter program, much of what FCDA was doing could rightfully be categorized as being merely on the outer fringes of preparedness for national survival. In its assessment of the situation in mid-1958, the Joint Committee on Defense Production reiterated an observation made a year earlier: that there were many problems relating to the national security still unsolved and requiring intensive study. What was true for mobilization preparedness and military planning was even more true for civil defense--that in 1958 the big preparedness job for the nuclear age still lay ahead. Indeed, the Committee was not too sanguine about the prospects of finding early solutions to the problems ahead.

... While this country has the benefit of increased productive capacity and a large stockpile of materials to assure a more rapid mobilization for limited scale war, mobilization to achieve preparedness for a nuclear attack on this country remains largely in the organizing

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planning, and development stage. At the current rate of progress it would be difficult to predict the time which would be required to achieve preparedness to meet the effects of a nuclear attack on this country.4

In a prepared statement to the Committee, the Department of Commerce alluded to the problems of planning for "the type of war which has never been fought," and candidly noted:

. . . There remains a serious question as to whether human beings have the capacity to think through the awesome consequences of a nuclear attack and develop the most effective means of dealing with them.5

This feeling of hopelessness was not at all uncommon. At the same time, as we shall endeavor to bring out in this chapter, a number of landmark hearings and reports by Congressional committees, and studies by private research institutes, agencies under contract with the Government, foundations and universities rejected this despairing view of the problem. All were highly critical of the ongoing efforts and attainments. But all were sympathetic to the need for civil defense, and all pointed to constructive solutions to the problems besetting the program.

MILLARD CALDWELL AT THE HELM

In the first two years of its existence, FCDA, under the leadership of Millard Caldwell, embraced the concept of

4Joint Committee on Defense Production, Eighth Annual Report, p. 4.

5Ibid., pp. 18-19
shelters as the cornerstone of its program. NSRB, its antecedent agency, had emphasized shelter protection for the population in critical target areas and the maximum possible use of existing structures. It did not contemplate or plan for the extensive use of evacuation before attack.6 In anticipation of early adoption of its plan, NSRB transferred funds to the Army Corps of Engineers for a contract with the Lehigh University Institute of Research to conduct studies upon which to base a shelter program. This research was still in its early stages in the spring of 1951, when Caldwell was called upon to justify President Truman's first budget request for FCDA. It turned out to be a harrowing experience.

Confrontations with Congress

During the Congressional hearings on the 1950 legislation, it will be recalled, the Administration contemplated a shelter program, with a Federal contribution of $1.125 billion over a three-year period. On March 1, 1951, Truman asked for $403 million for FCDA. Of this sum, $250 million was for protective shelters. In his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee on March 16, Caldwell indicated that the agency had no plans for large, deep community shelters. The emphasis, he said, would be on the use of existing structures. Caldwell cited three reasons why the

6NSRB Doc. 128, pp. 35, 37.
Federal Government, the State Governors, and many responsible people, after much thought, "have concluded that any large, deep community-shelter program is not feasible."

In the first place, we will probably not be able to give adequate warning to all the people who could get in such shelters. In the second place, it will take too long to construct them. In the third place, they will use too much in the way of labor and critical materials, steel, and concrete.

The emphasis, therefore, would be on "making the most out of whatever we have whenever we find it, identifying those places that are relatively safe such as the basements of reinforced concrete buildings, and then identifying those places which can be made fairly safe by shoring up." 7

Caldwell's approach to the shelter problem and his proposed outlay of $1.25 billion over a three-year period, though substantial, were by no means unreasonable. But the presentations and responses to queries from the committee members left much to be desired in clarity, conviction, and specific backup. The House first cut the budget to $186.8 million, leaving in $75 million for shelter purposes. In his appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee, April 23, Caldwell argued that the House action had left FCDA severely crippled. But he fared even worse at the hands

of the Senate committee; it further cut his request to $84 million, completely striking off funds for the shelter program. After the budget process had run its full cycle, FCDA found itself with an appropriation of only $31,750,000—a cut of 92 percent from the $403 million requested.\(^8\)

For fiscal 1952, Truman recommended $535 million, of which $250 million would again be used for protective facilities. In his letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, June 21, 1951, the President alluded to the Soviet Union's capability of delivering atomic bombs on our cities, no matter how good our defense might be. He made a strong pitch for civil defense readiness to meet such an attack:

... As long as there is a chance of any kind that atomic bombs may fall on our cities, we cannot gamble. We cannot be caught unprepared.

Truman pointed to the imbalance in the development of the Nation's preparedness when the strengthening of our Armed Forces was not also accompanied by provision of "the means to minimize civilian casualties, to deal with emergency conditions, and to restore vital facilities in the period immediately following attack." The civil defense program, the President emphasized, "will not only protect the civilian population, but will also help to maintain the industrial productivity necessary to support our military forces." The

\(^{\text{8}}\)For an account of the FY 1951 appropriation history, see Blanchard MS, pp. 50-66.
proposed $250 million appropriation to match State contribu-
tions for protective shelters, he indicated, "is a substan-
tial start on a program to protect the public in congested
areas." And the planning for the program, he added, was
well along:

... The standards and criteria for evaluating exist-
ing structures have been developed and surveys are
being carried out in cities to determine (1) the exist-
ing buildings usable as shelters, (2) the existing
buildings which can be modified for use as shelters,
and (3) the amount of new construction required. Work
on the modification of existing structures will be given
first priority and can be started as soon as funds
are made available.9

But Congress again slashed the FCDA appropriation and
again voted no funds for a shelter program. Appearing be-
fore the House Appropriations Committee, Caldwell and his
deputy, James Wadsworth, again met with a negative reaction,
directed not only to the shelter program but to the entire
civil defense effort.10 Apparently still unconvinced that
FCDA had the requisite supporting information, the House
Appropriations Committee denied the request for shelter funds.
Appealing to the Senate Appropriations Committee on Septem-
ber 12, 1951, Caldwell tried to explain the shelter program
which, he said, "has been the subject of a great deal of
misunderstanding and misinterpretation."

9U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Budget for the Federal
Civil Defense Administration, House Doc. No. 175, 82nd Cong.,
1st Sess., June 21, 1951 (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1951).

10For the events surrounding the FY 1952 appropriation,
see Blanchard MS, pp. 69-78.
... It has not been, and will not be, the intent of this Administration to invest shelter funds in a program of deep holes in the ground.

The shelter program presented by this Administration is economical because it is devoted to making use of existing facilities.

Caldwell set out a three-phase approach for the program:
(1) surveys in target cities to identify buildings which were suitable for shelter; (2) making some of the unsuitable buildings suitable "with minor alterations"; and (3) providing technical assistance for building "a limited number of group shelters in those areas where skilled industrial personnel have absolutely no shelter in case of attack."

With respect to the House committee action, apparently based on the belief that further study was needed, Caldwell said:

... It is true that the Administration does not have every answer to every possible question that may be raised regarding shelters. However, there is sufficient information available to establish certain minimal requirements, and when followed, would produce some shelter for the masses of people found in the population density centers within critical target areas. This is an area where we can all learn by doing, and no amount of drawing-board technique is going to provide better answers than those gained in experience through application of present knowledge.11

11 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for 1952, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 662, 664. Subsequent discussion indicated the cost of the total program over a three-year period would be $1.73 billion, with the Federal portion amounting to $865 million. A breakdown of the program in three categories showed: (1) Minor modification to existing structures to provide shelter for 6 million people, $60 million; (2) Major modification to existing structures to shelter 8 million people, $320 million; and (3) New construction required to shelter 15 million people in critical target areas, $1.35 billion; ibid., pp. 671, 678; Blanchard MS, p. 77. It should be noted that at this point, radioactive fallout had not yet
Caldwell's appeal was in vain. The Senate sided with the House in knocking out funds for shelters. The FCDA appropriation for fiscal 1952 was not much better than it had been the year before—$75 million—as against a request for $535 million—a cut of 86 percent. These funds, President Truman observed, were "tragically insufficient." Upon signing this appropriation bill, he felt impelled to say: "It is reckless to evade, under the pretense of economy, the national responsibility for initiating a balanced Federal-State civil defense program."\(^1\)

A Reassessment of the Need for Civil Defense

In part at least, FCDA budgets were being slashed because of a feeling in Congress, generated by testimony and press reports, that the military could repel any attack upon the United States, thus obviating the need for civil defense. On July 24, 1951, Caldwell wrote to Defense Secretary George C. Marshall, requesting his opinion of the importance of civil defense to the national defense effort. In his typical style, General Marshall was brief but he was clear and direct in endorsing the civil defense program.

loomed large, and the emphasis was on shielding the population in critical target cities where the atomic bombs would most likely be dropped.

I am glad to reiterate the position of this Department which has consistently advocated a strong civil defense for this Nation as an urgent and continuing necessity. My personal convictions are strong that we must have a competent civil defense system in being.

He considered the buildup of civilian capabilities in this field "essential, not only from a humanitarian standpoint, but as a military necessity." He knew of no way to dispel the "great skepticism" then prevailing "except by forthright, plain, concise statements, not made once, not made twice, but made over and over again."

Senator Kefauver, who had much to do with the establishment of the program, was also deeply concerned about the "cold damper" that was being put on civil defense. He staged a hearing of his task force, September 5, 1951, and invited Defense and FCDA officials to present their views on "the predicament." Quite candidly, Kefauver was seeking answers to two questions: first, was there a need for the program? and second, if the program was not justified,

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14 Ibid., p. 12.
wouldn't it be wise to abandon it and not provide window dressing for something that was not needed? His own feeling was: "we should either support civil defense or we should quit it."\(^{15}\)

Mr. Caldwell agreed with Kefauver's statement of the problem. Civil defense, he contended, was not moving satisfactorily "because the States, the cities, and the public are not convinced of its necessity." The failure of Congress to provide the necessary funds and its reversal of the principles of the 1950 Act, Caldwell said, were the "immediate and tangible cause of the prevailing attitude." Congress acted as it did because there appeared to be a conviction among the members "that a strong military organization is all that is needed to assure victory in a major conflict." And this conviction, Caldwell further asserted, was attributable to the fact that the Defense Department had not emphasized that civil defense was "an integral and essential part of over-all defense if such be the case."\(^{16}\)

Robert A. Lovett, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, emphatically asserted that the Defense Department "has consistently felt that the Civil Defense was a partner and a coequal partner in national defense." He reminded Kefauver of the work of the military in this field before the establishment of FCDA, and of the continuing feeling that civil defense

\(^{15}\)Ibid., pp. 1-3. \(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 3.
defense "is a necessary and vital part of national defense."

He differed with Caldwell about the forcefulness of General Marshall's endorsement, but he put into the record a more detailed statement dated September 4, giving the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in strong support of the civil defense mission.

... If war should come, the entire military effort will be concentrated upon the primary mission of defeating the hostile armed forces. In the event of an attack upon the United States by enemy aircraft, our military forces will do everything in their power to shoot down enemy planes. However, it is the opinion of the Air Force that should such an attack come, a large percentage of enemy aircraft would probably be able to penetrate our defenses. In that event a competent Federal Civil Defense Agency must be prepared to function in order to return our workers and our factories to maximum production and restore communications in the shortest possible time. The military will be unable in such a contingency to direct this effort.

There exists, then, a requirement for an organization, planned and staffed beforehand, to take over in the event of an emergency of this nature. We understand that the Federal Civil Defense Agency is preparing the plans, setting up the organization, and acquiring the necessary resources to do this essential job. If civil defense does not function effectively, our defense efforts will be very adversely affected.\(^{17}\)

Lovett also took exception to the notion that the Defense Department construed the military buildup as adequate insurance of security or as a substitute for civil defense. The military, he said, had consistently pointed up the dangers of atomic war. On the matter of air defense, Lovett had informed the Senate Appropriations Committee only a week or

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 6.
so earlier, in response to a direct question, that "if we got a third of the invading planes, we would be shooting par for the course." Indeed, it was General Vandenberg's judgment that "if we got 25 percent or thereabouts, it would be more than we had a right to expect."\(^{18}\)

It was Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on August 21, 1951, which apparently had been taken out of context and had contributed to the damaging blow at FCDA. Finletter used the Kefauver forum to set the record straight. He had mistakenly used the word "attack" when he really meant "invasion." His intent was to say that while the United States was reasonably safe from "direct invasion," an enemy had the capability of a direct attack by air. Finletter then proceeded to express exactly his thought as to "the desirability of preparing now against atomic attack on this country."

... Possible enemies of this country, according to our best information, now have a substantial number of atomic weapons and also have the planes to carry these weapons in an attack on this country. The potential violence of such an attack will increase as time goes on.

Whether or not such an attack will in fact be made can only be guessed at, but for the purposes of our planning, we must assume that it may and must make our plans accordingly. This is the policy which Congress has approved for the Department of Defense by its appropriations of large sums of money to establish radar

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 7.
installations and to provide interceptor planes and antiaircraft artillery.

This radar and these interceptors and antiaircraft are indispensable now. They cannot, however, as has been said so often, assure us that an atomic attack upon us will be turned back. A determined bomber assault, experience has shown, will get most of its planes through, even as against an alerted and efficient defense. An attack without warning would be even more successful.

we should ready our civil defense as we are readying our radar, interceptor, and aircraft defenses. Our policy as to civil defense, I believe, should follow the same policy, and this should be based on the sound assumption, namely, that an attack may come and that whatever the proper measures are to provide for the civil defense of the Nation in the event of such an attack should be put into effect as soon as possible.19

Continuing Pressure and Continuing Frustration

It was clear from his testimony before the Kefauver task force that Caldwell's sense of frustration was beginning to show. He now had unequivocal endorsements from the top echelons of the Defense Department. But even these endorsements and repeated expressions of support from President Truman proved unavailing. Another round with Congress and still another disappointment were before him.

In his "State of the Union" message to Congress, January 9, 1952, Truman made a point of the inadequate progress in civil defense during 1951--"a major weakness in our plans for peace . . . an open invitation to a surprise attack."20

19 Ibid., p. 9.

20 Quoted in FCDA, Annual Report for 1951, House Doc.
Three days later, on the anniversary date of the signing of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Truman made reference to the recognition by the Nation's top military leaders of the importance of civil defense in planning for national survival; they had rated civil defense "a coequal partner with the military in our security program." He could point to "substantial progress in civil defense throughout the Nation"; but he recognized that it was "far from enough."

Those responsible for civil defense preparedness throughout the Nation have worked hard against considerable odds. They have sometimes fought apathy in their own official circles, particularly in our own Congress. They have worked diligently to interest the public in self-protection and the necessity for volunteering for service in civil defense. But as effective as their efforts have been, they must be redoubled in the coming months.

Truman again warned: "there is no such thing as bargain basement preparedness or escape from the hard realities of the time." There were "no short cuts to civil defense preparedness," he added; it was "a tough, unpleasant but grimly necessary job."21

Caldwell echoed these thoughts in a letter to the President, April 18, 1952, transmitting FCDA's first annual report. Its cold facts, he stated, confirmed the President's


repeated warnings to the Congress and the Nation. "We have made some progress," Caldwell noted, "but far from enough." He pointed to both public and official apathy in civil defense. While recognizing "notable exceptions" at both the national and local levels, he saw "little real understanding of the need for a balanced defense, composed of the civil and military serving in a co-equal partnership." ²²

And in his own letter of transmittal six days later, President Truman criticized Congress for starving the civil defense program. He was asking for $600 million as the Federal share "in speeding our civil defense work for the coming fiscal year." He urged Congress to provide "the full amount this time"; it was essential, he added, "if we are to get the job done right." Truman left no doubt that he considered it important to move forward on this program:

I want to be as clear about this as I can. We simply cannot afford a penny-wise and pound-foolish attitude about the cost of adequate civil defense. Everyone in this country--all of us--must face the fact that civil defense is, and will continue to be, just as vital to American security as our Armed Forces, our defense production, and our aid to allies and friends abroad. Civil defense is another indispensable part of our total security program. I really believe that anyone who reflects upon this matter will understand why that is so. Every weakness in civil defense increases an aggressor's temptation to attack us. Every weakness in our civil defense adds to the strength of a potential enemy's stockpile of atomic bombs. ²³


None of this pressure, however, impressed the Congress. Of the $600 million requested for fiscal 1953, only $43 million was provided, and none of that for shelters. On the matter of shelters, Caldwell reported to the House Appropriations Committee, on June 12, 1952, on his plans to complete shelter surveys in major cities and match funds with the States for "the minor modification of existing structures to provide shelter for more than 15 million people." He restated his proposal for a three-phase program, with the recommended $250 million of Federal matching funds covering the first two phases—the engineering surveys and the modifications indicated by them. The third phase would involve construction of simple group shelters—not mass shelters—to meet the deficiency. Again the justifications and responses lacked the precision one might have expected in a third go-round on the problem, and Congress would not budg from its previous decisions.24

For Caldwell the $43 million appropriation for 1953 was the last straw. Congress, he said, "has again ignored ... repeated warnings" by voting what he called a "pittance." By voting $46 billion for military defense and only $43 million for civil defense, Caldwell maintained, Congress had taken a "strange approach to the common defense program

24 For an analysis of the House and Senate hearings on the Administration's request for 1953, see Blanchard MS, pp. 81-87.
needed for this atomic air age."\textsuperscript{25} Truman felt impelled to chastise Congress for repeating "the gross error of the last two years" by postponing again the construction of shelters in the target areas and the stockpiling of adequate medical and other supplies "to save and sustain life in case of attack."\textsuperscript{26} One might have expected a much sharper attack from a scrapper like Truman; he could only hope that FCDA would get a larger appropriation the following year.

Caldwell resigned in mid-November 1952, and Deputy Administrator James Wadsworth was designated Acting Administrator. On January 10, 1953, Truman asked for only $153 million for FCDA in fiscal 1954, but this was a matter for consideration by the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his FCDA Administrator, Val Peterson, former Governor of Nebraska, who was sworn in on March 4, 1953. Before the takeover by Peterson, Acting Administrator Wadsworth had an opportunity to transmit FCDA's second annual report. The report pointed to "real progress" despite the agency's "newness, lack of funds, and other handicaps." Milestones noted for 1952 included: advances in operational readiness of FCDA and of the States and cities; a doubling of capability


for giving public alert of warning; completion of the
CONELRAD system for continuity of public emergency radio
broadcasting; increased public knowledge of the need for
survival measures; attendance of more than 1.1 million
people at traveling exhibits ("Alert America" Convoys); a
two-fold increase (to some 4 million) in the number of
people serving in the local and State Civil Defense Corps
(collectively known as the United States Civil Defense
Corps); more than 110 national organizations cooperating in
45 States and territories in a "Pledge for Home Defense"
campaign; some 200,000 specialists and instructors graduated
from 650 schools in courses sponsored by States and cities;
3,218 instructors and 581 officials graduated from FCDA
schools; and a Federal contribution to the States, on a 50-
50 matching basis, of some $45 million for essential
supplies and equipment.27

"Yet," Wadsworth noted, "those who live with Civil De-
fense are acutely aware of how much more remains to be done
before America has the kind of civil defense that will be a
formidable force either to keep the peace or to help win a
war." He pointed to the lack of "adequate tools to do the
job" as the area in which the national civil defense program
"falls far short of its minimum readiness goals," and where

27"A Few Civil Defense Highlights of 1952," in FCDA
the greatest imbalance existed in relation to other national
security goals.

... The Nation's civil defense forces cannot cope
with atomic warfare without adequate supplies any more
than our military forces can. To deny the public adequate
shelters in case of attack, and adequate warning
systems to get the air-raid alert is as illogical as to
deny the Armed Forces radar and interceptor planes.28

Wadsworth concluded the report with a rousing statement
titled "Civil Defense in Our Future National Security."
Clearly with an eye on the incoming Administration, he set
out "the grim realities which demand far greater progress in
homefront preparedness." He cited the following reasons why
civil defense was not developing fast enough to meet the
threat then facing the Nation:

1. The enemy's ability to launch devastating
attacks on America with weapons of mass destruction is
growing.

2. The destructive effects of the enemy's weapons
are being increased much faster than our means of de-
fense against them.

3. The current capabilities of our sea and air
defenses simply cannot prevent, by any stretch of the
imagination, a mass penetration of those defenses by
enemy bombers, submarines or guided missiles.

4. Today 100 bombers can carry as much destruc-
tion in their bomb bays in one flight as was carried by
the entire bombing effort of the British and United
States Air Forces throughout all of World War II.

5. The United States Air Force has reported that
the Soviet Union has produced five times as many planes
as the United States during the last 5 years.

6. Russian attack capabilities in terms of long-range submarines and guided missiles are known to be on the increase. Atomic attacks can be launched against American cities by these means as well as by enemy aircraft.

7. Congressional and military support for the building of our civil defense program has been far less than was originally required to meet the enemy threat that existed 2 years ago, let alone the increased threat today.

Reflecting the findings of "Project East River," a 10-part study of nonmilitary defense (to be taken up later in this chapter), Wadsworth set forth "some of the basic requirements" for an effective civil defense:

1. Leadership in civil defense at all levels of government must be made more real and more effective.

2. Civil defense must be given more aggressive, intelligent, wholehearted official support in day-to-day cooperation and participation. Civil defense also must receive adequate national investment. The token support to date gives false hope and false promise of adequate protection to the American public.

3. The civil defense job must be made more manageable by continued improvements in the sea and air defenses of the North American Continent, in order to ensure the advantages of earlier warning and to reduce the weight of successful attacks.

4. The vulnerability of our target cities must be reduced through a practical step-by-step, dispersal program for industry and a realistic protective shelter program for the people in our highly congested industrial areas.

5. There must be fuller recognition that the spiritual unity of civil defense is an important factor in the survival of our American way of life.

6. The release of information essential to public safety and real national security must take precedence over other considerations. Civilian self-reliance can be aroused only by full knowledge of the facts and
the dangers we face. National and public preparedness cannot be achieved under the faint-hearted concept that the people should be told as little as possible because the truth might disturb them, or because prompt release of the full facts might aid the enemy in some vague manner. . . .29

There was much in these observations and in the Project East River report for Governor Peterson to ponder as he took up his duties as FCDA Administrator.

VAL PETERSON AT THE HELM

In many ways Peterson's lot was worse than Caldwell's. In a period of war and mobilization buildup, Caldwell could at least get President Truman's approval of sizable budget requests, though he couldn't get Congress to accept them. Caldwell's task seemed fairly manageable: he concentrated on sheltering the target-area population against the blast and thermal effects of A-bombs of the size used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and dropped from high altitudes. The radius of destruction from such bombing would not be too large, and the dangers of radioactive fallout would be minimal. It was not until November 1952 that the U.S. first tested an H-bomb in the Eniwetok Atoll.

In the four years of Peterson's incumbency, the facts of the thermonuclear age came to roost. Atomic weapons were coming into the Soviets' inventory with destructive power

29Ibid., pp. 115-116.
believed to be 25 times that of the original A-bombs. The Soviets soon broke our monopoly of the H-bomb; and more tests of that bomb brought out the full dimensions of the threat of radioactive fallout. That, together with the prospect and reality of Soviet success in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, wrecked whatever hopes Peterson had for his strategy of survival through dispersal rather than by sheltering.

Moreover, Peterson considered himself a "States-righter"; he shared with President Eisenhower the original concept of civil defense as primarily a State and local responsibility. Only reluctantly and under heavy pressure did they move toward a broadened Federal role in civil defense. While Eisenhower was more disposed than Truman to inform the public of the growing menace of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, he was committed to "security with solvency." Under Eisenhower, budgetary considerations were reasserted as the controlling element in defense planning.

This did not augur well for civil defense programs, like sheltering, which might entail significant Federal outlays. In these circumstances, Peterson found himself in the unhappy position of having to come in with low budget requests which Congress still cut deeply, and being criticized on all sides for failing to develop an adequate civil defense posture for the Nation. He gave up the struggle in mid-1957 for the less hectic life of Ambassador to Denmark.
A Legacy From Caldwell: Report of Project East River

Perhaps the most significant legacy of the Caldwell Administration was its sponsorship, together with NSRB and the Defense Department, of a study to determine the best combination of nonmilitary measures needed to defend the continental United States against attack by atomic, chemical, and other weapons. Initiated in June 1951, the study was conducted by the Associated Universities, Inc., a research organization of nine eastern universities. The sponsoring agencies established a policy committee, chaired by General Otto L. Nelson, Vice President of the New York Life Insurance Company, to direct the project.

After 18-months' study by working panels of scientists, educators, businessmen, and government experts, the project, titled "Project East River," came up with a 1,000-page report in ten parts. The report made three overall, 15 general and 286 specific recommendations, together with detailed analyses of a number of civil defense problems including concepts, principles and organization; health and welfare; information and training; enemy capabilities for atomic attack; warning and communications; measures to make civil defense manageable; the destructive threat of atomic weapons; civil defense aspects of biological, chemical and radiological warfare; reduction of urban vulnerability; and disaster services and operations. Project East River's overall

30 Associated Universities, Inc., Report of the Project
recommendations called for the vigorous execution of a three-pronged program:

1. Development of a national program to reduce urban vulnerability through decentralization and replanning of cities and industrial areas, with new standards of construction, shelters, and wide spacing.

2. Continuing improvement in the effectiveness of continental air defense to the point where at least an hour's advance warning was provided, where a "saturation" attack would be impossible and a "crippling" attack highly unlikely.

3. Construction of a permanent civil defense system capable of minimizing the loss of life and destruction of property, with civilian volunteer groups organized around a permanent core of policemen, firemen, and other regular city employees.

Along with general principles and concepts, Project East River set forth many specific recommendations for building an adequate civil defense system. The existing organization at all levels of government, Project East River observed, was loosely knit and not equal to the job that had to be done. While ruling out a major overhaul that would violate the deep-rooted American Federal system, the report did recommend mobilizing the resources of the Federal

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Government and developing its operational potential to the fullest. It called for clear-cut and agreed-upon division of work at all levels of government, and a command and staff relationship that would effectively coordinate Federal, State and local resources in an emergency.32

Among the organizational and management adjustments recommended were the following:

(1) That emphasis be placed on the programming function and that agency-wide planning assumptions be carefully developed and clearly delineated;

(2) That the agency be oriented to Federal responsibilities;

(3) That the agency avoid organization on the principle of occupational specialties;

(4) That added organizational emphasis be given to permit greater use of existing agencies and personnel under effective supervision and coordination by Federal Civil Defense Administration;

(5) That maximum operational responsibilities be delegated to the regional offices; and

(6) That the Federal Civil Defense Administration improve the organizational means of coordinating the use of Federal resources and of facilitating the development and use of mobile support forces across regional boundaries.33

Project East River provided FCDA invaluable guidance in developing its plans and operational programs. It didn't make the impact expected, but it did give some impetus to later proposals to strengthen the civil defense program.


33Ibid., p. 40.
Peterson's View of the Problem

In an interview with Dr. Ralph Lapp in early July 1953—some four months after taking office, Peterson expressed enthusiasm for the Project East River report. He considered it "an excellent job"; he found in it no areas of substantial disagreement. He agreed fully with Project East River in its emphasis on the urgency of reducing urban vulnerability and of beefing up the Nation's air defense and other countermeasures in order to make the civil defense job more manageable. Peterson deplored the fact that "nothing effective" was being done to reduce urban vulnerability. He recognized that it was "an extremely tough job." Nonetheless, he told Dr. Lapp:

... because it is tough does not mean that we mustn't be getting at it, even though it is going to take some time. ... we should be getting busy at that job. And there are many things that the federal government can do through its lending agencies, through tax preferences, through the letting of contracts. Where we let great defense contracts involving the construction of new facilities, the provision could be made as a part of the contract that the new plant must be located outside the urban area. Otherwise, we are just setting up fatter targets for attack. 34

Peterson similarly welcomed Project East River's great emphasis on increasing military defense and early warning. In mid-1953, the Air Force could not guarantee any specific warning time, he told Dr. Lapp; it might be "up to fifteen

34"An Interview with Governor Val Peterson," BAS, Vol. 9, No. 7 (Sept. 1953), p. 239.
minutes" or "no warning at all." He hoped, however, that in time the buildup of "an arctic radar fence . . . would give us, in view of the present speeds of airplanes, from two to three hours of warning, and maybe a little more for airplanes that were attacking deep inland or the extreme southern part of the United States." Peterson deemed it of tremendous importance to have early warning because it was so crucial to his strategy for the survival of the urban population.

early warning would permit us, where feasible, to carry on an orderly dispersal of the population in the vulnerable areas of our cities. If we do not have early warning, then the only alternative is to go underground. With the increasing destructiveness of the bombs--and we must assume the Russians will soon have such bombs--shelter becomes a very difficult matter. And, in civil defense, we should like to see a chance of taking advantage of the opportunity to disperse portions of our population, and to provide a reasonable degree of shelter for those who must remain. In other words, we would like to make a balanced approach to the problem.³⁵

Budgetary Constraints

On the matter of funding, Peterson felt the constraints implicit in the Eisenhower Administration's "New Look" at defense planning. The new administration rejected its predecessor's "period of greatest danger" ("Mobilization day--M-day") approach to readiness planning as to static, expensive, and conducive to the pileup of obsolete equipment.

³⁵Ibid., p. 237; see also FCDA, Annual Report for 1953, pp. 4-5.
In place of a predetermined "M-day" target for the accomplishment of a level of preparedness appropriate to total mobilization, there was substituted a "floating D-day" concept whereby the buildup was to be evenly paced for an indefinite period. In essence, what this meant was that defense expenditures and the Armed Forces were to be reduced.

Thus, in response to Dr. Lapp's query, "how much money do you think we ought to be appropriating this year for our civil defense?" Peterson said:

... that is an extremely hard question to answer, because if we were to assume that the attack might come next week, then we should have spent one amount of money. If we were to assume it were to come next year, we would spend a large amount of money.

But he did think that the amount the Eisenhower Administration requested for fiscal 1954—$125 million ($25 million less than the Truman request for that year)—"would have permitted us to make reasonable progress toward the preparation of the United States, assuming that none of us are smart enough to know the time when the attack may come." In other words, civil defense planners were faced with an unknown attack and an unknown time; and Peterson asserted in all candor:

... I don't know whether it is a sound concept ever to attempt to be completely prepared for an attack. As a matter of fact, I don't know that you can be completely prepared for attack.36

36 Ibid., p. 240.
But the moneys voted for fiscal 1954--$46.5 million--were far below the amount requested. Asked how Congress could be induced to increase appropriations for civil defense, Peterson replied: "That, of course, is the sixty-four-dollar question." He did feel, however, that once Congress got "the story . . . the complete facts on the situation which America faces," it would provide the funds needed for civil defense. Civil defense, in his judgment, "has fallen down in respect to selling itself to the Congress." Over the ensuing years, Congress and the public got to know more about the destructive power of A-bombs and H-bombs, and yet Congress continued to deny Peterson the funds he deemed necessary. The Administration's budget requests, as was indicated earlier, exceeded one-half billion dollars over the five fiscal years 1954-58, but appropriations for those years totaled only $296.1 million. From the size of the cuts in requests that were modest in comparison with those of Truman for fiscal 1951-53, it could only be surmised that the Eisenhower Administration was no more successful than the Truman Administration in getting across to Congress the need for a proper balance of civil and military defense in the total defense of the Nation.

Growing Threats to Home-Front Security

The deep cuts in the Eisenhower budgets are all the more surprising in light of the increased menace of the vastly
accelerating weapons technology. The year 1953 found President Eisenhower speaking in the "new language of atomic warfare." In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953, he pointed out that atomic bombs then in existence were "more than 25 times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned." 38

Table 3 shows the extent of blast damage by zones for various types of atomic bombs. Using the 1(X) bomb as the standard for comparison—the size of bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we can see the greater areas of damage that would be encompassed by these more powerful bombs. The 25(X) bomb mentioned by President Eisenhower would cause a three-fold increase in the radius of destruction and a nine-fold increase in the area of destruction. A 25(X) bomb would be felt nearly six miles away from ground zero, and would cause varying degrees of damage over more than 100 square miles. 39

Table 4

DAMAGE ZONES FOR VARIOUS SIZES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bomb size</th>
<th>TNT equivalent (tons)</th>
<th>Zone A—virtually complete destruction</th>
<th>Zone B—severe damage</th>
<th>Zone C—moderate damage</th>
<th>Zone D—partial damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radil miles</td>
<td>Area square miles</td>
<td>Radil miles</td>
<td>Area square miles</td>
<td>Radil miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(X)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.0-0.5</td>
<td>0.6-1.0</td>
<td>1.0-1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25(X)</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>0.0-0.5</td>
<td>0.6-1.0</td>
<td>1.0-1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50(X)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0.0-0.9</td>
<td>0.6-1.7</td>
<td>1.0-2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25(X)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>0.0-1.3</td>
<td>0.6-1.7</td>
<td>1.0-2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50(X)</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>0.0-1.6</td>
<td>0.6-1.7</td>
<td>1.0-2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 FCDA, Annual Report for 1953, pp. 4-5.
39 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
The year 1953 further saw the first official disclosure of the existence of the H-bomb with its multimegaton range, which made the civil defense job all the more difficult. Previous assumptions of the destruction of relatively small areas by low-yield atomic weapons were no longer particularly relevant. The damage from one bomb with only one million tons of TNT equivalent would now extend over 170 square miles. And, on August 8, 1953, the Russians left no doubt that they had broken the U.S. monopoly of the H-bomb. The following year, somewhat belatedly, came revelations not only of the immensely destructive power of the H-bomb by blast and fire, but also of its by-product—radioactive fallout. In the absence of preventive steps, radioactive fallout was capable of settling in lethal concentrations over thousands of miles beyond detonation sites.

Initial Emphasis on Evacuation Planning

The accelerating weapons technology inevitably brought confusion and delays in planning an effective civil defense program. The adjustment of concepts and the remedies sought against the nuclear threat lagged seriously behind the need. Like his boss, Peterson took a "new look" at civil defense and made a shift in emphasis in basic policy—from the earlier "duck and cover" concept to evacuation. Though fraught with difficulties, the evacuation concept, Peterson
believed, offered the most practical way to save the maximum number of lives.

The assumption that most American cities could not count on more than 15-minutes' warning time remained throughout 1953. But approval of the construction of distant radar networks prompted the agency to encourage States and cities in the latter half of that year to begin planning for evacuation of their densely populated areas. In his "Review of 1954 Civil Defense Accomplishments," Peterson discussed his advocacy of evacuation planning:

A year ago, one of the first things we needed in civil defense was a detection system that would permit us to get up to 4 to 6 hours of warning time. Today, plans for such early detection have been made and the detection systems are being constructed. . . .

Some people ask why civil defense talks about evacuation today when we do not yet have warning time. It is true we don't have the warning time today. We might have, depending on where you are located, an hour or an hour and a half today--maybe less in some places in the United States. We talk about evacuation now because it will take the best brains in our cities to work out plans between now and the time we get the warning time. . . .

Admittedly, evacuation was "a tough thing." Peterson doubted that anyone knew of "anything tougher than to evacuate millions of men, women, and children from 100 or more

40It should be noted that the "duck and cover" concept was not completely abandoned in 1953 because the longer warning time to be afforded by the radar networks was then a probability rather than a certainty. FCDA releases in 1954, however, placed strong emphasis on evacuation; see FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 158, January 18, 1954, and Supplement No. 1, Sept. 23, 1954.
American cities in the face of a bombing raid--get the people out, get them out safely, get them out on time, and feed them, clothe them, shelter them, give them whatever they need in the way of medication, reunite families, and take care of them following an attack." But a number of tests conducted over the first year of his stewardship, however preliminary, Peterson asserted, bolstered his conviction that "it can be done."

As early as June 1953, Peterson made known to the House Appropriations Committee his hearty endorsement of its rejection of his predecessor's repeated requests for funds for a Federal shelter program. He cited what he thought was "a very sound reason" why there was not such request in the new Administration's budget proposal for 1954:

... The vast improvement in the destructive power of nuclear weapons could turn such public shelters into death traps in our large cities. Our research in this whole public-shelter area is inadequate and too incomplete at this time for me to ask you to invest that kind of money in large public shelters.

At the same time, he noted that the individual and family shelters had been "solidly proven" in recent tests. He didn't want to close the door to a public-shelter program, because "time may indicate ... the necessity for some activity in this field"; but as of the time of his testimony, Peterson believed, the action of the House Appropriations

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Committee, in cutting out the shelter program "has been well substantiated."\textsuperscript{42}

In April 1954, Peterson again told the House Appropriations Committee that his budget for 1955 was based on the evacuation concept, while recognizing the need for 2 to 6 hours warning time.\textsuperscript{43} Construction of underground shelters along the lines of Sweden and Switzerland, he told the Senate Appropriations Committee, though "a perfectly feasible approach," would involve enormous cost—"untold billions" if comparable shelters were to be built for the entire population. His evacuation strategy, "now ... approved by the highest authorities in the executive branch," was still predicated on having adequate warning time. "We hope," he said, "that within 24 to 30 months, the Air Force will have completed the detection system that it is now working on, to the point that it can give us warning of 2 or 3 or 4 hours, of approaching enemy airplanes."\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Shift to a Balanced Program of Evacuation and Shelter}

In subsequent appearances before Congressional committees, Peterson continued to emphasize evacuation as the


\textsuperscript{44}U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations,
only alternative in coping with the jump in the destructive power of the H-bombs. Recognizing the need to contend with radioactive fallout, however, he proceeded to advocate evacuation in combination with shelters— evacuation to escape blast, heat, and initial radiation in the immediate target areas; and shelters to enable evacuees to escape fallout beyond the immediate target areas and to protect those people who would have to remain in the target areas. For fiscal 1966, Peterson requested $10 million to test the "feasibility of "survival plans" featuring evacuation from critical target areas and to determine the need for shelter incident to such plans. He recognized that development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) would present a wholly different problem. But this, he thought, was in the uncertain future. 

... if we could work out plans which would stand firm for a period of years, until the time that an intercontinental ballistic missile possibly comes into being, we would have made a gain.


He would not ask Congress to vote any money for a shelter program, Peterson said, until FCDA had made these survival plan studies and was in a position to justify a logical request.48

Congress in July 1955 approved a supplemental appropriation of $10 million, of which $8.3 million was to finance survival plan studies. FCDA entered into contracts for such studies, starting with surveys to obtain basic information and then proceeding to the development of operational survival plans. Planning was conducted in some cases on a single-city basis, and in others on State-wide and target-complex bases. The aim, Peterson indicated to the Holifield Subcommittee on Military Operations, was to design "custom-made" plans for specific communities which would provide for the "optimum combination of evacuation and shelter."49

The end-product of this Survival Plan Program would be a complete operational plan that used the personnel and resources of a State and its political subdivisions for evacuation, shelter, reception and care of survivors, and any other feasible protective measures. The role of support areas under this program would no longer be limited to aiding target


areas and receiving and caring for evacuees. Support areas would have to consider shelter against fallout, not only for their own people but also for evacuees. Target and support areas, therefore, could not plan or operate independently of each other; operational survival plans would have to be coordinated or worked out jointly on an overall area basis.

The first contract was drawn October 1, 1955, with Louisiana, for the New Orleans metropolitan area. By mid-1956, FCDA had approved 31 agreements, mostly for interim or preliminary plans; 26 of these covered critical target and support areas representing over 70 percent of the U.S. population. In its fiscal 1958 report--its eighth and last--FCDA indicated that, under the Survival Projects Program, 45 States, three Territories, and 173 metropolitan areas were conducting studies leading to the development of detailed operational plans. The basic operational plans of 26 States and one Territory had been approved. FCDA expected most of the plans to be completed in the following year, though operational planning at the State and local levels "will continue long after the basic plans are developed." One important offshoot of the program, FCDA reported, was "the development of small but competent staffs for State and local civil defense operational planning." 50

50 Throughout the Nation, FCDA indicated, more than 1,000 persons were working on these State and local operational plans; see Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization,
Renewed Focus on Shelters

While the Survival Plans Program was thus being carried forward, FCDA was under heavy pressure, notably from the Holifield Subcommittee, to come forward with a Federally financed program of shelter construction throughout the Nation. Moreover, in light of reports of the impending development of ICBMs which would reduce the warning time to a few minutes, Administrator Peterson conceded by the spring of 1956 that there would be no choice other than to rely on shelter for protection. In testimony before the Holifield Subcommittee, May 19, 1956, Peterson indicated a complete reversal regarding his predecessor's shelter proposals. Mr. Caldwell, he said, had presented "sensible plans" to Congress which were rejected, and if he had to judge who was more right, Peterson indicated that he "would be inclined to go along with Governor Caldwell rather than the Appropriations Committee."51

On December 21, 1956, Peterson presented to President Eisenhower and the National Security Council a proposal for a nationwide shelter program with an estimated price tag of $32 billion. The great bulk of this money, $22 billion or

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$23 billion, would shelter 100 million people against blast and fire, and some $6.8 billion would provide fallout shelters for 68 million people in rural areas. Assuming that it would take 10 years to build these shelters, the program would require an outlay of $3.2 billion a year—a burden which the Nation could probably carry but which the Administration could hardly be expected to take on lightly.52

While this shelter proposal was under consideration, the Administration came in with a budget request for $150 million for fiscal 1958. In his supporting statement, Peterson indicated that preliminary planning for a national shelter program, already under way, would be intensified in fiscal 1958. Congress, however, chopped the budget down to $39.3 million. The debate on the budget indicated dissatisfaction with the FCDA program and with its Administrator.53 Peterson resigned June 14, 1957, and was succeeded five days later by Leo A. Hoegh, former Governor of Iowa.

FCDA Milestones, 1953-57

While recognizing that much needed to be done to achieve an adequate level of readiness, Peterson did feel that FCDA had laid a solid foundation. Charges that the country had


53Blanchard MS, pp. 199-204
no civil defense, he told the Holifield subcommittee in April 1956, should be summarily rejected.

... the plain fact is that national civil defense exists. It did not exist five years ago. There is scarcely a city, county, or hamlet which does not have a civil defense director. All states now have civil defense laws and organizations.

Together [Federal, State and local civil defense workers] have acquired an operational capability; they have established an emergency communications system that reaches every part of America; they have installed the main elements of an attack warning system, working in close cooperation with the Air Force; they have stockpiled appreciable amounts of emergency supplies; and they have alerted a large part of the American public to the nature of the dangers we face and to the need for taking steps to survive these dangers.\(^5\)

Actually, Peterson could look back over his years as Administrator and check off many more solid accomplishments. He could, for example, point to:

--A reorganization of FCDA in 1953 along more functional lines, with an attendant 10 percent reduction in personnel.\(^5\)


---One unfortunate step taken in mid-1954 was the move of the National Headquarters to Battle Creek, Michigan, featured as part of a dispersal program for key Federal agencies. The Administrator, the Deputy Administrator, and certain staff assistants remained in Washington to facilitate contact with other Federal agencies at the seat of government. Nonetheless, FCDA lost many qualified people with high security clearances in the move. These had to be replaced, and the staff in Battle Creek had to plan and administer by phone, letter, or by constant commuting. The staff, numbering about 800 at the beginning of 1958, was brought back to Washington in mid-1958, with the merger of FCDA and the Office of Defense Mobilization into the Office of Defense and Civil Mobilization (later redesignated Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization).
Source: FCDA, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1956, p. iv
209

--Rearrangement of the nine Federal Civil Defense Regions to make seven Regions, conforming more closely with the field organizational pattern of the Armed Forces.

--Establishment in 1955 of a Civil Defense Scientific Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. Merle Tuve, Carnegie Institution physicist, to assist FCDA with technical and scientific problems and recommend lines of investigation.

--Delegation of some two-score civil defense programs to seven Federal agencies, and the establishment by Executive Order 10611, May 11, 1955, of a Civil Defense Coordinating Board to facilitate integration of civil defense into the Federal establishment and to assure maximum coordination of the Federal civil defense effort. A year later FCDA established Regional Civil Defense Operations Boards as comparable mechanisms for coordination in the field.

--Work with other agencies and research institutes in developing a damage assessment system whereby an electronic computer could rapidly estimate the effects of nuclear detonations on people and resources.

--Designation of "target areas" and "critical target areas" on the basis of population and industry criteria, and the design in 1957 of a new "Aiming Area Concept" as a more realistic basis for planning in light
of the growth of the destructive power of single nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{56}

--- Annual civil defense exercises (Operation Alert) beginning in June 1954, which tested operational capabilities, pointed up deficiencies, and gave valuable training to hundreds of thousands of civil defense workers.

--- Publication in 1956 of a \textit{National Plan for Civil Defense Against Enemy Attack}, and its subsequent expansion to emphasize the use of Federal resources and incorporate the principles of a "Basic Responsibilities Paper"\textsuperscript{57} as the basis for a Federal operations plan.

--- Development, as a corollary to the above-mentioned Federal plan, of an operations plan for a hypothetical metropolitan target area. Entitled \textit{Battleground, USA}, the plan showed how the principles and concepts of national civil defense planning could be applied at the local level.

\textsuperscript{56}For definitions of the concept and guidelines for its use, see FCDA Bulletins 214 and 215, both dated August 15, 1957.

\textsuperscript{57}This document outlined the roles of the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and FCDA after an attack on the United States. The paper was first ratified by the three agencies for planning purposes, in January 1956, as a classified document. It was revised and given unclassified status a year later. The paper and an accompanying Memorandum of Understanding on the regional roles of ODM and FCDA in an emergency were distributed as FCDA Advisory Bulletin 210, March 1, 1957.
211

--Increasingly closer working relationships with Canada and NATO countries in civil defense matters.

--Participation of local civil defense organizations in rescue and relief operations in natural disasters. In highlighting the progress of civil defense in 1953, Peterson considered such support as "one of the most practicable and forward-looking acts of the new administration."58

--Work with the Atomic Energy Commission in testing shelters and radiological defense measures at the Atomic Proving Grounds in Nevada, with particular emphasis on blast and overpressures.

--The December 1956 proposal for a national shelter program, discussed earlier, and continued emphasis on shelter research pending a decision by the Administration.

Proposals to Strengthen Civil Defense

Yet, for all the attainments of FCDA, Administrator Peterson was frank to admit in 1956 that civil defense was still far from adequate. He had striven hard to achieve greater public awareness of the nuclear threat, of the need for civil defense, and of the actions the individual could take for self-protection. "Operation Doorstep" in March

1953, "Operation Ivy" in April 1954, "Operation Cue" in May 1955,\(^{59}\) and numerous national, State and local exercises—all had dramatic impact on the public. This was not readily translated into bigger budgets and vastly more improved programs for civil defense. The quickening public interest, however, did stimulate serious study of the civil defense problem. Various Congressional committees, "operations research" groups, foundations, and universities subjected the civil defense program to intensive review and criticism. They served a real purpose in stimulating the actions needed to strengthen the civil defense program.

**Val Peterson's Self-Appraisal and Recommendations.**—
By 1955, when these reviews and studies were first launched, Peterson himself had come to recognize some of the obstacles which impeded the efforts to prepare the Nation for the shock of atomic war. At a Conference of Governors in Washington,\(^{59}\)

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\(^{59}\)In "Operation Doorstep," the entire Nation could witness on television and newsreel films the actual detonation of an atomic bomb; its effects on homes, cars, and house furnishings; and the shelter precautions which could increase one's chances for survival. "Operation Ivy," the public showing of which began in April 1954, was the official film of the thermonuclear explosion at Eniwetok in November 1952. "Operation Cue," which took place at the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada test site, also afforded millions of Americans a chance to view on live television a nuclear explosion and its effects on test homes, commercial buildings, communications, shelters, vehicles, food, clothing, and other items. FCDA issued early in 1956, full details on "Operation Cue" in a publication titled *Cue For Survival.*
May 23, 1955, he pointed to the shortcomings of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Looking at that Act in 1955, he said, there "is no denying . . . that it was written in terms of World War II concepts . . . in terms of the era of the blockbuster." As one of the spokesmen for the Council of State Governments, he had a part in the Congressional deliberations on the 1950 bill. He and other proponents of the legislation, Peterson said, "should have realized more clearly the implications of the World War II atomic bombings."

The Act as it stood in 1955, he now conceded, "sets up an ideal buckpassing situation" between the Federal Government and the States, and with some city mayors contending that neither had done their job. He recognized that the Federal Government would have to assume more of the financial burden. At the same time, he didn't believe that the Federal Government, and specifically the military, should take over the whole responsibility for civil defense. In the long run, he asserted, civil defense "must be in a large measure a responsibility of the cities, counties, and States." Peterson invited the Governors Conference to form a committee to meet with him and determine what changes in the 1950 Act appeared desirable.60

In a report to the Kefauver Subcommittee some two months later, Peterson indicated general acceptance of the need for greater Federal authority in civil defense.

FCDA is without authority commensurate with its responsibilities. Authority only to advise, guide, and assist the States is not enough to support positive leadership in a field where direction and control are essential.

The development of megaton weapons requires the creation of a governmental device that will permit a civil-defense organization in keeping with the regional problems created.

He cited as an example the blast and fire effects of the explosion of a megaton weapon over Metropolitan Philadelphia, which would involve three States, 11 counties in those States, and 39 municipalities of over 10,000 people. If any one State or county or several of the municipalities refused to cooperate, Peterson stated, "the lives of all the people in the metropolitan area can be placed in jeopardy."

Furthermore, problems resulting from evacuation would require arrangements for support "up to distances of 100 miles surrounding Philadelphia." 61

Recognizing the merit of Peterson's position and of similar conclusions of various study groups, President Eisenhower moved toward a "strengthening and modernizing" of the civil defense effort. In a letter to Peterson, July 17, 1956, the President stated: "It is evident that the exigencies of the present threat require vesting in the Federal Government a larger responsibility in our national

61 Exhibit 17, ibid., p. 920.
plan of civil defense." Making specific proposals to that end, Eisenhower declared:

... Plans to meet postattack situations are, of course, essential, but the Federal Civil Defense Administration needs authority to carry out necessary preattack preparations as well. It must be enabled to assure adequate participation in the civil defense program. It must be empowered to work out logical plans for possible target areas which overlap State and municipal boundaries. It must have an organization capable of discharging these increased responsibilities. Moreover, the prestige and effectiveness of the Federal Civil Defense Administration must be equal to the heavy responsibility it holds.\(^\text{62}\)

Besides considering a modernization of the 1950 Act, FCDA came up with a "Study of Future Organization," which recommended combining all elements of nonmilitary defense, including civil defense, in a new department with Cabinet status—a proposal which also figured prominently in the reports of the study groups. This recommendation was considered by the Cabinet and the President's Committee on Government Organization in 1955 and 1956,\(^\text{63}\) and, as we shall see in the next chapter, figured in continued deliberations leading to the merger of ODM and FCDA.

In the meantime, Peterson went ahead on the legislation, transmitting to Congress, on February 8, 1957, a number of proposed amendments to the 1950 Act. Among the changes recommended were: (1) To restate the policy and


\(^{63}\)Executive Office of the President, Office of Civil Defense Mobilization, Legislative History--Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, n.d. ("Advance Copy"), p. XII.
intent of Congress so that the responsibility for civil defense would be vested jointly in the Federal Government and the several States and their political subdivisions; (2) To remove the prohibition against making financial contributions to the States and cities for civil defense personnel and administrative expenses. The authority to make such payments was deemed necessary "in order that the States and cities be enabled to adequately develop their civil defense capabilities"; (3) To authorize Federal procurement, maintenance and distribution to the States, by grant or loan, of radiological instruments and detection devices, protective masks, and gas detection kits for civil defense purposes. This was deemed necessary "to permit the effective implementation of a nationwide program of defense against the hazards of radioactive fallout." 64

These changes were incorporated in Public Law 85-606, signed by the President on August 8, 1958. 65 Supporters saw these 1958 Amendments as "a major factor in promoting unified civil defense planning and action." 66

64 For Peterson's letter and draft legislation, see enclosure to FCDA General Counsel Release #432, Feb. 15, 1957.

65 72 Stat. 533.

1955 Review of Project East River.--Peterson's legislative proposals and other improvements in the FCDA program had their impetus and support from the studies to which we referred. One of these was a review and re-evaluation in 1955 of the earlier report of Project East River in light of subsequent developments. The task was undertaken by a 14-member committee, again chaired by General Nelson. The Committee's report, submitted in October 1955, was essentially an updating of the earlier report and a re-emphasis of original recommendations which had not been followed. The Committee called attention to the striking advances that had been made in weapons and delivery systems and the lag in the Nation's nonmilitary defenses, including civil defense. Its recommendations, in brief were:

1. Organization and operation of nonmilitary defense on the basis of metropolitan target zones. "Anything less than this," the Committee said, "is inadequate and obsolete" in light of the devastation to be expected from high-yield nuclear weapons.

2. Continuous revision of Federal civil defense plans, policies and operating procedures to take into account the rapid improvements in weapons and delivery systems.

3. A material increase in Federal leadership, authority, and operational control of nonmilitary
defense, "while retaining the essential elements of State and local participation and responsibility."

4. Incorporation and integration of existing military disaster plans in the overall nonmilitary defense plan for each metropolitan target zone.

5. Use of military personnel and units to strengthen mobile support units of the local, State and regional civil defense organizations.

6. Re-emphasis of industrial dispersion and of reduction of urban vulnerability, and use of additional implementing techniques on both the Federal and metropolitan target zone levels.

7. Improvement of the organizations and increase in the status, prestige and funds of FCDA and ODM.

8. Pursuit by FCDA of more effective public information and education programs.

Like the 1952 report, the 1955 report offered many constructive criticisms and suggestions for improvement in the management and operations of the civil defense program. Also, in putting the spotlight on overlapping roles and functions of FCDA and ODM and the need for the improved status of these agencies, the review report contributed to continued investigations that led to a merger of the two agencies in 1958.67

67A copy of the "1955 Review of the PROJECT EAST RIVER REPORT," submitted October 17, 1955, with covering letters and a list of the Review Committee members, was attached to FCDA Education Services (Public Affairs) Release #245, Nov. 10, 1955.
Report of Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.--
The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, more widely known as the Kestnbaum Commission after its chairman, the late Meyer Kestnbaum, included in its wide-ranging studies the intergovernmental aspects of civil defense. Though the Commission leaned generally toward a strengthening of State and local governments, its report on civil defense stressed the need for an enlarged Federal role. The Kestnbaum Commission's basic conclusion was that the responsibility for civil defense had been inappropriately defined and assigned by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. The Commission deemed it not at all surprising that the States and localities were not enthusiastic about the assignment to them of the primary responsibility for civil defense. This, the Commission noted, was evidenced in a deterioration in the civil defense efforts at the State and local levels.

To improve the situation, the Commission made the following recommendations:

1. That Congress amend the 1950 Act "(a) to reallocate responsibility for civil defense from a primary State and local responsibility to a responsibility of the National Government, with States and localities retaining an important supporting role; (b) to provide that the National Government will be responsible for overall planning and direction of the civil defense effort, development of civil defense
policies and technical doctrine, and stimulation of interstate cooperation; and (c) that States and localities will be responsible for day-to-day planning operations and the adaptation of National policies and doctrines to local situations."

2. That the 1950 Act be further amended "to liberalize the financial participation of the National Government in State and critical target area civil defense administrative, planning, and training costs."

3. That the current practice of conducting civil defense relationships mainly through the States be amended to permit direct relations between the Federal Government and critical target cities and their support areas.

4. That the appropriate Federal agencies take action to obtain the direct participation of State and local governments in national planning "aimed at reducing the vulnerability of our cities." 68

The recommendations of this prestigious commission were especially helpful to FCDA in obtaining the enactment of

Public Law 85-606, which, as indicated earlier, won for the Federal Government a partnership role in civil defense and extended the scope of Federal financial support of State and local efforts.

The Kefauver Subcommittee Report.--On January 18, 1955, the Senate Armed Services Committee appointed a Subcommittee on Civil Defense, under the chairmanship of Senator Estes Kefauver, to examine the policies and operations of the civil defense program. In a series of public hearings, the Kefauver Subcommittee obtained the views of officials at all levels of government and of private organizations on the current state of the civil defense effort. It focused on problems which demanded immediate attention to ensure necessary progress in the Nation's civil defense plans. Only a greatly intensified effort on all levels of government and on the part of the general public, the Subcommittee believed, would enable the Nation to cope with the problems of a thermonuclear attack.

The Kefauver Subcommittee pointed to FCDA's "relatively insignificant place in the Federal Government; its lack of sufficient staff to do its job; its insufficient use of the Civil Defense Advisory Council; the need for Presidential leadership; and the lack of adequate plans for the evacuation of target areas, for the feeding and medical care of evacuees, and for sheltering the population from radioactive fallout."
Among the Subcommittee's recommendations was a call for the assumption by the Federal Government of "a drastically increased responsibility for the Federal civil defense program," including primary responsibility for planning in areas where interagency or interstate coordination was required. At the same time, the Subcommittee recommended leaving with the States and cities much of the operational responsibility after an attack. Other recommendations included the broadening and extension of delegations of civil defense responsibilities; increased activity on the part of the States; clarification of the role of the military in the civil defense program; and the resolution of problems in respect to fiscal responsibility in case of attack, the sharing and allocation of resources, the dispersal question, and other policy areas.69

National Planning Association's Statement on National Policy.—Among the critics from outside the Government, perhaps the most significant was the National Planning Association, a nonprofit, nonpolitical organization in existence since 1934. On May 9, 1955, it released "A Program for the Nonmilitary Defense of the United States," setting forth

"A Statement on National Policy" by its Special Policy Committee on Nonmilitary Defense Planning. The policy statement was supported by a comprehensive report, prepared by William H. Stead, which discussed the role of nonmilitary defense, the dimensions of the problem, the actions required to protect the population and industrial resources, and the postattack problems of managing a damaged economy.\(^{70}\)

The committee pointed to the threat of war hanging over the world "like an ominous cloud" and the far too little concern with the nonmilitary measures "that hold out possibilities for increasing our ability to survive atomic attack, to rebuild our production capacity rapidly, and to support our drive to victory." The failure to consider and adopt an integrated and adequate program of nonmilitary defense, the committee emphasized, "is a dangerous weakness in the Nation's security effort." Among the problems noted was the fragmentation of nonmilitary defense activities under various pieces of legislation which caused confusion and precluded effective coordination and direction of the program.

To deal with the critical issues in nonmilitary defense, the committee recommended:

1. Provision for program coordination and direction under centralized responsibility within the Federal Government, with appropriate modification of underlying legislation.

2. Creation of a temporary "Nonmilitary Defense Commission" to formulate the basic requirements of a comprehensive program; define a basis for integrating such a program with the military program both before and after attack; recommend an appropriate organizational structure in the Federal Government for the coordination and direction of the program; and specify the changes in legislation, appropriations, and Federal-State relations that would be needed to carry out the program.

3. Creation of a Nonmilitary Defense Council, under the sponsorship and financial support of one or more endowed foundations, to promote public understanding of the nature and requirements of nonmilitary defense; encourage and coordinate private research in this field and the assumption of appropriate roles by all segments of society without Government assistance; help Federal agencies in working out cooperative arrangements with private and community groups "to test and appraise particular features of the program before final adoption"; draft model legislation to facilitate nonmilitary defense activities at the local level; and,
perhaps of greatest importance, "serve as a center of constructive thought and planning by nongovernment groups, to look ahead and anticipate the changing nature of the nonmilitary defense program as the nature and extent of the threat changes." 71

The National Planning Association's reports bore down on problems not only of FCDA but also of ODM and other agencies engaged in "nonmilitary defense" work. These problems were, nonetheless, so intertwined that new organizational machinery was clearly needed to deal with them effectively.

The Holifield Hearings—1956—Of the many studies and proposals to bolster civil defense during Val Peterson's incumbency, the most significant were the hearings and report of the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, under the chairmanship of Congressman Chet Holifield. In mid-1955, this California Democrat took up the cause of civil defense. He chided the Administration for placing economy ahead of protection of the population in critical target areas, and proposed legislation to upgrade FCDA into a Cabinet department. To consider the merits of this and other proposals for organizational change, the Holifield Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations broadened its

71 The "Recommendations of the Committee" are set forth in Exhibit 11, ibid., pp. 815-816.
inquiry to encompass a comprehensive review of the civil defense program. Its staff spent the last six months of 1955 studying the problem. The public hearings ran through the first half of 1956 and produced over 3,000 pages of testimony from 211 witnesses, together with an overall summary with recommendations.

The Holifield inquiry covered a broad range of civil defense problems. Witnesses from virtually all walks of life testified on the magnitude of the threat from blast, heat, prompt radiation, and radioactive fallout; Soviet capabilities; America's vulnerability to nuclear attack; shortcomings of the civil defense efforts; problems of achieving industrial dispersal; the role of the military in civil defense; and many other matters. Along with charges of Congressional indifference, there were criticisms of FCDA failure to present a realistic program; the lack of national leadership by the Administration; fragmentation and overlapping of responsibilities; the atomic Energy Commission's long display of easy optimism about the effects of nuclear explosions; and public complacency or sense of futility.


Peterson himself was not too sanguine about getting the people to accept on a day-to-day basis, in peacetime, the prospect of a miserable life under conditions of a nuclear attack.\textsuperscript{74}

The Holifield Subcommittee, on the other hand, took a hopeful view of the problem. Advice from many experts convinced Holifield and most members of his Subcommittee that constructive measures could be taken. A program of properly constructed shelters, the Subcommittee believed, would be well within the Nation's economic capacity, and could bring a drastic reduction of the blast, burn and radiation effects of high-yield weapons. The Subcommittee charged FCDA with neglecting shelter and putting all its eggs into the evacuation basket.\textsuperscript{75} Holifield was persistent in his criticism of the evacuation concept. The Subcommittee got the impression that Peterson was hedging on the commitment to shelters, and that the Survival Plan studies, which FCDA was stressing

\textsuperscript{74}See Holifield Subcommittee Hearings--1956, Part 4, p. 1313. For good accounts of the Holifield hearings and findings, see Mary M. Simpson, "A Long Hard Look at Civil Defense: A Review of the Holifield Committee Hearings," BAS, Vol. 23, No. 9 (Nov. 1956), pp. 343-348; Blanchard MS, 147-162; Maxam MS, pp. 79-87; and Kerr MS (particularly on the shelter-evacuation issues), pp. 178-199.

\textsuperscript{75}Actually, this was not a fair assessment. Peterson, it will be recalled, had moved from evacuation to a balanced application of evacuation and shelter. Holifield never saw the FCDA study prepared for the President and the National Security Council, and its existence was hardly more than a rumor throughout the period of the Holifield hearings and follow-up studies on the civil defense program; Letter, Carey Brewer, President, Lynchburg College, Lynchburg, Va., to George F. Divine, Program Manager, FEMA, Jan. 12, 1981.
since 1955, were in essence little more than evacuation feasibility studies.

In his own testimony, Peterson recognized FCDA shortcomings, but he also emphasized its accomplishments and its problems. He was convinced that there were no "magic solutions" to the grave problems of civil defense. FCDA, he contended, was doing the best it could in the face of the restrictions under which it operated, notably its lack of authority over State and local civil defense efforts and the lack of sufficient Congressional support. On September 24, 1956, Peterson sent to the Regional Administrators analyses of the thirteen recommendations in the Holifield report.\(^7\) These are presented below; they indicate agreement on many principles, while differing with some of the conclusions and methods of treatment.\(^7\)

**FCDA ANALYSIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOLIFIELD SUBCOMMITTEE**

Since most of the recommendations derive, at least in part, from testimony given by the Administrator before the subcommittee and from the Administrator's public statements,

\(~7\) These are set forth in the Holifield Report, *Civil Defense for National Survival*, pp. 4-5.

there is little reason to disagree in principle with most of the recommendations. However, a detailed analysis of the specific wording of the recommendations suggests that our total point of view should be made clear. Fundamentally, it is the specific implementation of the principles which is troublesome.

**Recommendation**

1. Federal civil-defense legislation should be redrafted to vest the basic responsibility for civil defense in the Federal Government, with States and local units of government having an important supporting role.

**Analysis**

There is almost universal agreement that more Federal responsibility is needed. Many of the claimants for basic Federal responsibility appear to mean that the financial responsibility should be Federal but desire to retain operational responsibility with the States and cities. "Joint" is perhaps a more suitable term than "basic." Whatever change is made it is of paramount importance that adequate financing be assured. An increase in Federal responsibility accompanied by the same magnitude of appropriations as FCDA now has might be worse than sticking with the present law. For FCDA direct testimony on this, see Hearings, Part 4, Page 1189.

2. The new legislation should create a permanent Department of Civil Defense, combining the civil-defense functions (broadly defined) of the Office of Defense Mobilization and those of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

The President's invitation to the Administrator to attend Cabinet meetings is a large and progressive step toward the solution of this problem. As we understand, the specific matter is still under study by the Rockefeller Committee. The point of view of
the minority report deserves consideration in this regard. This suggests that the preferable procedure would be to improve the legislation of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 without throwing away its recognition of the important role that State and local units of government must play. Item 6 on Page 1191 of Hearings, Part 4, indicates our agreement in principle.

3. The Department of Civil Defense should consult with the Department of Defense and be required to formulate a master plan for nationwide civil defense. Plans for each target area should be made and protective measures initiated after careful determination of their respective priority importance to national defense and survival.

4. The master plan for civil defense should be pointed toward the establishment of an integrated nationwide civil-defense system based on the key civil-defense measures of shelter protection against the blast, heat and radiation effects of nuclear explosions. Sounds simple and plausible. However, the unitary implications are disturbing as is the assumption that there is a magic formula which might be called a "master"plan. Our National Plan goes a long way toward meeting this objective. It will be improved as rapidly as possible as we learn more through survival studies and other on-going research. It will be modified to account for any legislative changes.

FCDA has said repeatedly that there are only two means of protection--movement and shielding--and that the objective is the optimum combination of the two. No one disagrees with the concepts of shielding. The disagreement arises from the application--and the fact that, without the most intensive practical study, billions upon billions could be wasted on shelter without measurably adding to national survival. It must be the right kind. It must be in the right location. It must be accessible. In rejecting movement as a
defense, the subcommittee overlooks the fact that there are several kinds of evacuation—strategic, tactical, remedial, and what Ralph Lapp called "evacuation to shelter."

5. Studies under the survival planning contracts should be suspended, pending a reformulation of the criteria for the expenditure of the funds Congress authorized and appropriated for this purpose. A local or regional survival plan study should be concerned only with the adaptation and application of the national plan and of basic studies, to a local situation.

We totally disagree with this recommendation. When we are being criticized for lack of action, it seems odd to see a recommendation that the most dynamic and promising action program that FCDA has yet undertaken be suspended. The problem is unprecedented; therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the course of these studies will not run smoothly. If it did, we would have been guilty of pre-judgment and oversimplification.

The thought that the local survival plans should be derived from a national magic formula also appears fallacious. It suggests that the skill and brains existing in our States and cities should be written off and ignored. The FCDA has no monopoly on civil defense know-how. Many States and cities have much to contribute from their background of operational experience.

6. The Department of Civil Defense should be authorized to finance the construction of shelters in all target areas, with the cooperation of State and local authorities.

It does not seem desirable that the Federal Government assume the responsibility for all shelter costs. All elements of society should participate in such an investment. In limiting the idea to target areas, the subcommittee appears to dismiss the radiological hazard.
Means should be found to assure appropriate shelter (or cover) for all of our population. Certainly, the citizen, the community, the State, and the private enterprise must share in this provision for shelter.

7. The Department of Civil Defense should be authorized to institute all other measures necessary to establish an integrated nationwide civil-defense system, and to utilize toward this end such available resources and facilities of the Federal departments and agencies as are necessary.

FCDA is already doing a great deal in this area. The words "institute all other measures" should be far more explicit. The FCDA's responsibilities in this area have been gradually broadened by Executive decision.

8. The Department of Civil Defense should be authorized to strengthen State and local civil-defense organizations by contributing equipment, supplies and funds for administration, training, stockpiles and other necessary civil-defense uses, subject to the supervision, inspection and approval, by the Secretary of Civil Defense, of the civil-defense programs of State and local authorities.

The FCDA agrees fully. It is Item I on Page 1190, Hearings, Part 4. However, this is another case where a paper change in law unaccompanied by truly adequate appropriations could be a boomerang.

9. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Civil Defense, should establish and implement an effective program of training active and reserve military personnel in civil-defense duties as a defined part of regular military training.

The FCDA has been active in pushing for such programs on the part of the Department of Defense. In the past year a great deal of progress has been made and we expect considerably more. This is generally covered by Item 5 on Page 1191 of Hearings, Part 4.

10. The Secretary of Civil Defense, in behalf of the president, should have defined statutory powers to act in an emergency and to mobilize all civilian resources for minimizing the effects of enemy-caused disaster.

The FCDA concurs. As has been pointed out in testimony, much of this authority already exists under Title 3 of Public Law 920 and another portion has been assigned through the
upon the national economy and the people of the United States.

11. The Secretary of Civil Defense, in behalf of the President, should have statutory authority to carry out plans and operations in peacetime, under preattack situations, particularly before declarations of emergency have been made, in order to minimize the effects of enemy-caused disaster upon the national economy and the people of the United States.

12. The role of the military forces in civil defense should be clearly defined. State and local officials should be fully informed as to the terms and conditions under which military assistance to civil-defense authorities will be rendered in the event of widespread disaster and the breakdown of civil government.

13. The studies of martial law conducted by the Attorney General, the Department of the Army, and other Federal agencies should be made public promptly upon completion, to assist the Congress and the public in understanding the contemplated role of the military forces in civil defense.

The assignment of basic responsibilities as discussed by Director [of Defense Mobilization] Flemming.

The principle here is strongly favored, as the Administrator testified before the subcommittee. A proper civil defense involves authorization to do certain things in advance of attack. The emergency powers of Title 3 are not fully useful if many of those actions cannot have been practiced in advance. The language here is broad and general. It is not clear whether it involves the power to draft or the power to requisition or the power to enforce decisions in other ways.

Through the various Operations Alert and other negotiations, we are gradually achieving definition appropriate to the threat of nuclear war. As with many aspects of the problem, the solution is an evolutionary one. Only in retrospect does it appear simple.

The FCDA agrees in principle and is encouraged by the new approach made public in Operation Alert 1956. At the same time the point should be obvious that premature publication of tentative findings would serve to confuse rather than illuminate.
Though its criticisms of Peterson and FCDA were sharp and not always justified, the Holifield Subcommittee contributed significantly, as we shall see, to the Eisenhower Administration's acceptance of a greater Federal responsibility for civil defense, what promised to be an improved organizational structure, and at least a step toward a national shelter policy.

LEO A. HOEGH AT THE HELM

Despite the views expressed by the Holifield Subcommittee, Mr. Peterson felt that his testimony and prepared statements made "a reasonable record--one that recognizes that present civil defense is far from adequate, but one which also recognizes the specific accomplishments of civil defense at all levels which have already strengthened America's ability to survive."\(^78\) As he turned over the reins to Governor Hoegh, several vital matters remained for resolution, notably a decision by the President on his shelter proposal, draft legislation to strengthen the hand of the Federal Government in civil defense, and a proposal to bring the various elements of nonmilitary defense into one Cabinet-level department. Fiscal 1958--FCDA's final year--saw continuing progress on all fronts.

\(^78\)Office Memorandum of Sept. 24, 1956, cited above.
A "New Look" for Civil Defense

Hoegh was not long in office when the Soviet Union confronted the world with a number of remarkable technological achievements—the first successful firing of an ICBM on August 26, 1957, followed on October 4 by the first successful launching of an earth-orbiting satellite (Sputnik-1). The United States seemed to lag behind in these fields, and there was much concern over the implications of the Soviets' technological breakthroughs for American security. From the point of view of civil defense, the emergence of ICBMs meant that FCDA could no longer pin its hopes on sufficient warning time to implement evacuation plans; shelters seemed to be the only remaining alternative.

In testimony before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in February 1958, Hoegh indicated his approach to the civil defense job. He would give more emphasis to the formulation and management of a rational plan for civil defense, to programs to ensure continuity of government, and to radiological defense. He would de-emphasize stockpiling pending improvement in the warehousing and rotation of stocks. With ICBMs coming into the picture, greater emphasis might have to be placed on shelters. His 1958 budget—the $39.3 million voted earlier—precluded work on shelters, and Hoegh didn't ask for shelter funds for fiscal 1959. Nonetheless, FCDA planning in 1958 did focus on a consideration of shelters
and other steps to protect the population from radioactive fallout.\textsuperscript{79}

To implement its plan to build an operational capability at all levels of government, FCDA effected a reorganization in November 1957. An important feature of this reorganization was a strengthening of staff and responsibilities in the agency's seven regional offices. At the Federal level, delegations of civil defense responsibilities continued as part of the plan to make full use of government personnel and facilities. A Federal Coordination Office was established in November 1957 to continue and facilitate participation of Federal departments and agencies in civil defense planning and in meeting emergency situations. The same idea of using government personnel, facilities and equipment was recommended to the States and localities, including the use of volunteers as auxiliaries to existing government departments.

FCDA gave high-priority attention to a program looking toward the preservation and strengthening of civil leadership in the event of a nuclear attack. Entitled "Continuity of Government," the program sought to reach out to more than 100,000 governmental units in the United States--units which

FCDA considered "the keystone of civil defense." An- 
nounced at a meeting of the United States Civil Defense 
Council, September 5, 1957, the program encompassed the 
designation of emergency lines of succession for key people, 
the preservation of essential records, the establishment of 
emergency locations for government operations, and, as indi-
cated above, full use of government personnel, facilities, 
and equipment for emergency operations.

Plans for dealing with the threat of radioactivity also 
received special emphasis. The problem of radioactive fall-
out, a matter of concern to FCDA since mid-1955, was singled 
out for intensified effort in fiscal 1958. It touched virtu-
ally every FCDA program--operational planning; shelter; 
instrumentation; monitoring; training; public education; and 
research and development, including improvement of radi-
ological warning and reporting. Program efforts focused on 
the two major goals: (1) the immediate development of at least 
some protective measures through use of existing resources; 
and (2) a major increase in capability for radiological de-
fense during the next few years. Although FCDA fell short of 
its goal of a national capability for radiological defense, 
it could take credit for progress on several fronts in deal-
ing with this most serious problem.

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81 The program was outlined in FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 216, Continuity of State and Local Government, Sept. 19, 1957.
More Support for a Shelter Program

The Gaither Report.--To assist him in evaluating Peterson's shelter proposal, President Eisenhower in April 1957, set up a Security Resources Panel under the leadership of H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., chairman of the boards of the Ford Foundation and the RAND Corporation. The Panel broadened the scope of its study to a review of both active and passive defense measures in terms of their contribution to deterrence and their protection of the civil population if a nuclear attack should come by accident or design. The Nation's deterrent military power, the Panel observed, was not sufficient to protect the civil population "unless it is coupled with measures to reduce the extreme vulnerability of our people and our cities." Among the measures recommended to reduce this vulnerability was a nationwide fallout shelter program.

... This seems the only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation. The Panel has been unable to identify any other type of defense likely to save more lives for the same money in the event of a nuclear attack.

The construction and use of such shelters must be tied into a broad pattern of organization for the emergency and its aftermath. We are convinced that with proper planning the post-attack environment can permit people to come out of the shelters and survive. It is important to remember that those who survive the effects of the blast will have adequate time (one to five hours) to get into fallout shelters. This is not true of blast shelters which, to be effective, must be entered prior to the attack.
We do not recommend major construction of blast shelters at this time. If, as appears quite likely, an effective air defense system can be obtained, this will probably be a better investment than blast shelters. However, because of present uncertainties, on both active and passive fronts, it appears prudent to carry out promptly a research and development program for such blast shelters, since we must be in a position to move rapidly into construction should the need for them become evident.82

Measures to protect the civil population, including "a strengthening of active defenses, a fallout shelter program, and the development of a defense system to protect cities from missile attack," the Panel indicated, would require an expenditure of some $25 billion over the next five years. Measures to strengthen the Nation's deterrent and offensive capabilities, which the Panel considered "of highest value," would entail an estimated cost of $19 billion over the same period (1959-1963). Thus, the total of five-year costs of the added measures of both "highest" and "somewhat lower than highest" value (the second category applied to the protection of the civil population) would be approximately $44 billion. As for the economic consequences

82 Security Resources Panel, Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, Nov. 7, 1957, p. 8. A more detailed statement of the Panel's findings on "passive defense" will be found in Appendix B (pp. 18-22). The Gaither report was long withheld from the public. It was declassified in January 1973, and was published three years later for the use of the Joint Committee on Defense Production; see Joint Committee Print, Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The "Gaither Report" of 1957), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). All page references are keyed to the 1957 report, not the 1976 Joint Committee Print.
of undertaking the whole program, involving "outlays of $4.8 to $11.9 billion per annum over the next five years, and further unestimated expenditures thereafter," the Panel observed:

Large additional expenditures of this sort are still within the economic capabilities of the United States. They would necessitate, however, an increase in taxes, a somewhat larger Federal debt, substantial economies in other government expenditures, and other curbs on inflation. Additional private investments would be required, especially to carry out the shelter program which would impose heavy requirements for steel, cement and labor. In all probability, this program would necessitate some slow-down of highway construction and other postponable public works.\(^{83}\)

The National Security Council considered the Panel's findings in a meeting held November 7, 1957. FCDA Administrator Hoegh argued that the proposed outlays for a fallout shelter program would be a good investment; it might save 50 million lives. Other Council members, especially Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, raised a number of arguments against the proposal. A massive shelter program, Dulles cautioned, might frighten the NATO countries into thinking that the U.S. was preparing for war. Other arguments presented were that it would be hard to sustain simultaneously an offensive and defensive mood in the population; we should stick to our policy of retaliation; and we should not "over-devote" resources to defense "only to lose the world economic competition." In this period of

\(^{83}\)Ibid., p. 12. More detailed cost estimates are shown in Appendix C, pp. 23-24.
concern for economy, the military could scarcely view with enthusiasm so large an investment in shelters, especially if this might cut into spending for the armed forces. And there were clear indications that Congress would not be disposed to support a large shelter program. Whatever the reasons, Eisenhower's rejection of the fallout shelter proposal, as one student of the subject observed, "was clearly a major setback for the FCDA."84

The Rockefeller Panel Report.--While the Gaither report was under consideration, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund had under way a study which was also highly supportive of a shelter program. A panel, chaired by Nelson Rockefeller, assessed the military aspect of international security and the most appropriate strategies for the ensuing decade. The panel report, released in January 1958, stressed the importance of "a combination of power and will" in an attempt to deter Soviet aggression.

... The factor of power requires a retaliatory capability sufficient to overcome an enemy defense, and as unvulnerable as possible to surprise attack. The factor of will may hinge importantly on a reasonable combination of active and passive defense measures. An enemy who felt confident that he could disrupt and disorganize our society while preserving the substance of his own might be tempted to launch an all-out blow. Conversely, the ability to afford reasonable protection to our population may enable us

to act with firmness and resolution in times of crisis. In the age of the ballistic missile the known capability of a society to withstand attack will become an increasingly important deterrent.\footnote{Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security: The Military Aspect, Panel II of the Special Studies Project (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., 1958, p. 46.}

In the absence of reasonable protection of our people and resources, the enemy would inevitably discount our threat of nuclear retaliation. Our strategy of deterrence thus might fail, and if nuclear bombs were to be dropped on our unprotected people, the Nation would be destroyed, regardless of the damage we might inflict on the enemy.

Thus, like the Gaither Panel, the Rockefeller Panel called for a "passive defense system" to afford some measure of protection for "this Nation's riches--its people and its resources." Among other ingredients of an "effective civil defense system," the panel recommended a system of fallout shelters. Like the Gaither panel, also, it showed enthusiasm for blast shelters because of the complexity of the subject and the costs, but it did "commend such a program for careful study."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 69-70.}

The RAND Report.--FCDA also got heartening support from a group of RAND Corporation researchers, led by Herman Kahn, who began about 1957 to probe into the possibilities of defense against nuclear weapons. By mid-1958, they came up
with a study, supported entirely by RAND Corporation funds, an advance copy of which got into the Holifield Subcommittee's 1958 hearings record. Like the other studies, the RAND report stressed the importance of civil defense first in alleviating the effects of a nuclear attack and assisting in efforts at recovery, and second, with the population no longer in open hostage, serving as a more credible deterrent to aggression and permitting pursuit of a flexible foreign policy. 87

Assuming a massive 150-city attack against the United States, the study pointed up the lifesaving potential of various shelter programs running the gamut of simplicity and high complexity. Its major conclusion was that there were more promising possibilities for alleviating the disaster of a nuclear war than had been generally recognized.

. . . There appear to be possibilities of providing inexpensive fallout protection for people outside blast areas, of constructing blast shelters capable of standing up to thousands of p.s.i., of carrying out strategic or tactical evacuation if sufficient warning is available, of limiting the long-term biological damage to the population resulting from total radiation, of adopting countermeasures to contain the strontium 90 problem even after very large attacks, of assuring a minimum supply of food immediately after the attack, of reconstructing destroyed industrial capital within much less than a generation, and of integrating non-military defense measures with other aspects of national defense. Moreover, some hypothetical nonmilitary defense systems which have been examined appear to be capable of saving tens of millions of lives in the face

of conceivable enemy attacks, and of preserving a foundation for meeting long-run radiation hazards and for postattack economic recuperation.\textsuperscript{88} The tenor of the report was upbeat: survival and recovery were feasible, but much careful planning was needed to determine the proper program and make it effective.

In view of the uncertainties surrounding the above-cited possibilities, both as to performance and cost, the report recommended evaluation of alternative nonmilitary defense systems "in conjunction with other elements in the United States national-defense posture." It recommended that "a serious research, development, and planning program" in nonmilitary defense be undertaken, and that such a program be sufficiently detailed and concrete so that a comprehensive system, if later decided upon, could be initiated quickly.\textsuperscript{89} An outlay of about \$500 million over a year or two, the RAND group believed, could do much to strengthen and change the focus of current civil defense programs, permitting consideration of the use of existing structures for fallout protection, building large and family-type prototype shelters, and additional research on a spectrum of shelter programs and other aspects of nonmilitary defense.

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid., p. 43.

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., pp. 44-46.
National Academy of Sciences Report.--Still another significant critique came from the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council. The Committee, chaired by Dr. Lauriston S. Taylor of the National Bureau of Standards, had been asked to make "a rapid evaluation" of government research programs relevant to non-military defense. The principal considerations were: "the adequacy of present research information as a basis for shelter construction; gaps and deficiencies in current programs; coordination and exchange of information between agencies; and security and administration problems."

Time limitations precluded in-depth study and evaluation of many details, but the Committee had "full confidence" in the validity of its findings on the adequacy of current knowledge as a basis for action. The Committee drew the following conclusions:

1. Adequate shielding is the only effective means of preventing radiation casualties.

2. Postponement of basic shelter construction is not warranted . . . by any lack of essential technical knowledge.

3. There is need to investigate many details in order to provide a more effective and coordinated shelter system.

4. Although a shelter system is the essential core of an effective nonmilitary defense system, it cannot of itself be regarded as sufficient to assure our survival as a nation.
On this point, the Committee stressed the need for investigations into the problems of post-attack recovery.

5. Much existing information and some resources are not now effectively utilized. . . .

FCDA, the Committee observed, "lacks the authority, prestige, and manpower resources to coordinate and integrate properly all the programs of other agencies that have application to non-military defense."

6. The special security status of FCDA results in withholding some information that is necessary for the full productivity of physical science and engineering studies, and for realistic operational planning.

In addition to the usual "need-to-know" limitation, there were five categories of classified information which "must not be transmitted to FCDA." The Committee considered this "a severe handicap"; it introduced "serious delays in the transmission of documents and in obtaining security clearances for meetings and personal discussions between scientists."

7. An effective nationwide non-military defense awaits one principal ingredient: the assignment of proper status in relation to military defense.

The Committee came down hard on this point.

... We consider that the current low priority of civil defense, the lack of positive federal leadership, and public apathy, make it extremely difficult to enlist the services of scientists with the stature and capabilities required to conduct productive research programs. Most needed is a strong structure of federal policy, including adequate federal leadership and support. We believe that the over-all cost of non-military defense, though it seems great, is small in relation to the potential saving in human life. We recognize that a decision must weigh the saving of lives against the danger of budgetary deficit and inflation and, in
the last analysis, must be based on a judgment of the seriousness of the threat and the available lead-time. The decision will be based only to a minor degree on technical considerations, but the technical accomplishment cannot be achieved until the policy decision is made.\textsuperscript{90}

A Step Toward a National Shelter Program

Despite the criticisms from the Holifield Subcommittee and others, FCDA, with help from various agencies and organizations, had been developing the scientific and technological base for a shelter program. Indeed, from the outset in 1951 and through 1958, FCDA joined the Atomic Energy Commission in tests to gather information on shelters and other protective equipment and measures.\textsuperscript{91} When Administrator Peterson presented his shelter proposal to the President in December 1956, it reflected extensive research support. Eisenhower rejected that proposal and that of the Gaither Panel, but, as indicated in the studies highlighted above,


\textsuperscript{91}FCDA had observers and other participation in the following series of atomic tests: Greenhouse and Buster-Jangle (1951), Tumbler-Snapper and Ivy (1952), Upshot-Knothole (1953), Castle (1954), Teapot (1955), Redwing (1956), Plutobob (1957), and Hardtack (1958); see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Civil Defense, Hearings, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, and Report, Atomic Shelter Programs, 1958.
there was general agreement by 1958 that the key to survival lay in shelters rather than in evacuation. The only problem to be resolved was getting the President and Congress to agree on a national shelter program—their scope, the level of funding to be applied to it, and by whom. The closing months of FCDA's history saw a very modest step in this direction.

On May 7, 1958, Administrator Hoegh announced before the Holifield Subcommittee the President's approval of a "National Shelter Policy." The policy statement recognized that in a nuclear attack, fallout shelters "offer the best single nonmilitary defense measure for the protection of the greatest number of our people." But it marked little departure from existing practice. The Administration's policy, Hoegh indicated, would now be to include shelters for protection from radioactive fallout, in addition to planning for evacuation if time permitted. And he further asserted: "There will be no massive federally-financed shelter construction program."

In essence, what Hoegh announced was a series of steps involving a minimal role by the Federal Government and seeking to encourage through stepped-up information and education programs, self-help by individuals and communities. To carry out the policy, Hoegh stated, the Administration would undertake the following measures:

1. More fully acquaint the people with the possible effects of nuclear attack and the measures which
they and their State and local governments could take to minimize such effects.

2. Initiate a survey of existing structures on a sampling basis to determine their capabilities for protection against fallout, particularly in larger cities.

3. Accelerate research and perfect designs for incorporating protection against fallout in existing and new buildings.

4. Construct a limited number of prototype shelters in underground garages, subways, school buildings, and other structures and institutions for testing and demonstration, and with "practical peacetime uses."

5. Provide leadership and example by incorporating fallout shelters in new Federal buildings designed for civilian use.

The statement also ruled out blast shelters. With respect to these, Hoegh said:

... There are still difficult questions, having to do with the amount of time that would be available to enter the shelters, the uncertainty of missile accuracy and the effectiveness of our active defense. There is no assurance that even the deepest shelter would give protection to a sufficient number of people to justify the cost. In addition, there may not be sufficient warning time in view of the development of missile capabilities to permit the effective use of blast shelters.

Highest priority, Hoegh further indicated, would continue to be placed on the Nation's "active military defense," which
"may eventually have the capability of effectively preventing an enemy from striking intended targets." The national shelter policy, Hoegh asserted, was founded on the principle that the Federal Government would "take steps to assist each American to prepare himself—as he would through insurance—against any disaster to meet a possible—although unwanted—eventuality."

The Holifield Subcommittee and other champions of an effective program voiced bitter disappointment with this policy pronouncement. This was not the program which Hoegh's predecessor, Val Peterson, and the various study groups had recommended; the Eisenhower policy, the Holifield Subcommittee observed, was a "demonstration program, not a shelter construction program." Putting the burden on the individual, Holifield asserted, was not the answer; only Federal leadership and Federal funding could meet the need. He faulted the President on his failure to offer a meaningful program to Congress. If Congress rejected such a program, Holifield said with strong feeling,

... then I say the blood will be on the head of the Congress. But until it is offered, until that leadership is offered, the blood is on the hands of those responsible under the Constitution for the protection of the lives of the people in case of war.93


In its August 1958 report on atomic shelter programs, the Subcommittee stated emphatically that it "will not lend its endorsement to any pretense that this policy promises nationwide protection against nuclear weapons effects in the foreseeable future." In its customary forthrightness and concern about "the grim, brutal reality of the nuclear threat," the Subcommittee observed:

... An ostrichlike policy will not save American lives and property. Self-help cannot provide nationwide protection against the deadly effects of exploding nuclear bombs any more than self-help can build the bombs. Unless the Federal Government accepts the major responsibility for planning, financing and building atomic shelters, we will have no effective civil-defense program.94

The Eisenhower policy, it should be noted, did have its supporters. The Governors' Conference, at its annual meetings in May 1958 and August 1959, heaped praise on their former colleague, Governor Hoegh, for his efforts.95 And there were members of Congress, like Albert Thomas and Joe L. Evans of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, who thought Eisenhower had gone too far or that this was but a first step toward a larger program. And, as we shall see, Congress gave Hoegh much less money than he requested to carry out even this minimal program. But this problem and other concerns beyond mid-1958 are part of the history of FCDA's successor agency, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, which we will review in the next chapter.


95Kerr MS, pp. 242-243.
CHAPTER V

CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE OFFICE OF CIVIL AND
DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
1958--1961

Although it was set back by President Eisenhower's rejec-
tion of proposals for a large-scale public shelter pro-
gram, civil defense got a good boost from two events in the
summer of 1958: (1) the merger of FCDA and ODM into the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) as a Presi-
dential staff arm, with Governor Hoegh moving up to head
the new agency and gain a seat on the National Security
Council; and (2) amendment of the Federal Civil Defense Act
of 1950, on August 8, 1958, which, as was indicated in the
preceding chapter, enlarged the Federal role by having the
Federal Government share with the States and localities
"joint responsibility" and by authorizing increased Federal
assistance to State and local governments in order to in-
crease their civil defense capabilities.

In his new post as Director of OCDM, Hoegh moved ener-
getically within the constraints of Administration policy
and Congressional appropriations. He quickly formulated a
national plan encompassing the basic elements of civil and
defense mobilization. He carried forward a number of programs looking toward the protection of life and property, with at least some progress in the design of prototype fallout shelters. And there were continuing preparations for the mobilization and management of resources in emergencies, with particular focus on nuclear attack.

Yet the marriage of civil defense and defense mobilization was short-lived. The main problem seemed to be OCDM's inability to obtain the funds needed to move ahead on a total program. A contributing factor was the lack of full Presidential support to obtain the public and Congressional backing which was so vital for a program of nonmilitary preparedness. The election of President John F. Kennedy brought a "New Look" for civil defense, with an increased commitment of funds and a reorganization, effective August 1, 1961, which brought the three-year marriage to an end.

In place of OCDM, the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) came into being as a small Presidential staff element concerned with the broad and long-range policy and planning aspects of the total nonmilitary defense program. And the operational and "hardware" aspects of civil defense devolved on the Secretary of Defense who would preserve the "civilian character" of the program and, at the same time, harness the prestige and resources of the Defense Department to make
possible greater progress in the implementation of an invigorated program.¹

The 1958 merger, the efforts of OCDM, and the 1961 reorganization are the themes of this chapter.

MERGER OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Background of the 1958 Reorganization

The merger of FCDA and ODM, July 1, 1958, sought to put an end to organizational difficulties caused by overlapping responsibilities of the two agencies, and thus bring about an organizational base on which a unified nonmilitary defense program could be built.² A variety of duplications set in almost from the inception of FCDA in December 1950. At that time, NSRB began to undergo disintegration with the activation of the Office of Defense Mobilization and its supporting agencies to meet the requirements of the Korean War. NSRB was in no position to give strong and meaningful leadership or guidance to continued planning for war mobilization. With a much reduced staff and budget, NSRB directed its efforts to problems of strategic location, early warning, port capacity protection, postattack rehabilitation of


industry, control of electromagnetic radiation-emitting
devices in the interest of national security (CONELRAD),
and other matters closely related to the work of FCDA.³

With the changeover to the Eisenhower Administration,
the decision was made to consolidate the central manage-
ment aspects of the current defense effort (the job of
ODM) and the planning for the future (the job of NSRB).
This was accomplished under Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1953. In a statement accompanying this plan, April 2,
1953, President Eisenhower affirmed the concept, strongly
espoused by some but officially rejected early in NSRB's
history, of combining within the same institutional frame-
work the planning and direction of both current security
programs and of readiness for any future national emergency.
"The progress of the current mobilization effort," the Presi-
dent observed, "has made plain how artificial is the present
separation of these functions." NSRB was absorbed by a "new"
ODM which emerged, effective June 12, 1953, as a single staff
arm responsible for assisting the President in carrying out
the central leadership, direction, and coordination of the
readiness and mobilization programs of the Executive Branch.⁴

Determined to remain a small staff agency, the new ODM
made broad delegations of defense mobilization responsibil-
ities to various other agencies, and concerned itself with

⁴Ibid., p. 71.
policy guidance to the delegate agencies and with a general review, control, and coordination of their efforts. These efforts were directed along two interrelated lines—the maintenance, expansion, and protection of the "mobilization base" built up during the years of the Korean War and planning for full mobilization. From the outset the new ODM was well equipped with broad experience both in limited mobilization such as that triggered off by the Korean War and in general mobilization within a secure homeland as was the case in World War II. Accordingly, it saw the importance of giving expanded emphasis to the "defensive measures" and many other totally new problems which the Nation would face in the event of a thermonuclear attack. Ongoing mobilization-base programs came increasingly to be viewed in light of such a contingency.  

ODM efforts in this latter field, however, inevitably overlapped and duplicated those of FCDA. Many ODM activities, especially those related to the protection of the Nation's production capability and continuity of government, were closely related to the civil defense functions prescribed for FCDA. Increasingly, ODM brought nuclear attack considerations into its programs. It devoted considerable effort to

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planning for the physical security of the most vital facilities, for the reduction of vulnerability of the population and industrial centers, and for post-attack rehabilitation. ODM designed and tested methods for rapidly assessing the probable damage to the economy that would result from enemy attack. In mid-1956, ODM instituted a program for regional coordination of mobilization activities.

"The need for a clear delineation of functions between ODM and FCDA," the legislative history of the 1958 reorganization indicated, "became daily more evident." Efforts were made to clarify the appropriate roles of the two agencies, and in January 1956, they reached agreement, together with the Defense Department, embodied in a paper entitled "Basic Responsibilities After Attack On the United States." Uncertainties remained, however, and brought still another memorandum of understanding the following year. But before the

year's end, it had become apparent that "all of these efforts to delineate the appropriate areas of activity of ODM and FCDA had been something less than completely successful." 7

Proposed Solutions

The several reports and Congressional hearings, which we discussed in the previous chapter, pointed to the overlapping responsibilities and functions of FCDA and ODM and to the need for corrective action. FCDA, it will be recalled, had itself recommended that the functions of the two agencies be combined and administered by a Cabinet department. The President's Cabinet and Committee on Government Organization considered this proposal in 1955 and 1956, but no action was taken. 8

The Holified Subcommittee also took note of the divided and conflicting functions of ODM and FCDA, and recommended their merger into a permanent new department of Cabinet rank. In its 1956 report, Civil Defense for National Survival, the Holifield Subcommittee recognized that "Cabinet departments are hard to establish in our scheme of government; that usually the creation of a Cabinet department . . . represents a gradual development of Government functions which by public acceptance acquire the degree of importance that warrants an established place in the traditional structure of Government."

7 Legislative History--Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, pp. x-xi, 39-45.

8 Ibid., p. xii.
Nonetheless, the Subcommittee believed, "the emphasis in civil defense must be placed on future need rather than on past experience."

Civil defense . . . is here to stay . . . It requires the solution of complex, new problems by the best scientific, engineering, and administrative talent that the Nation can provide.

A regular Cabinet department may serve to give the civil-defense effort the status and prestige and recognition that it deserves. The Nation should not be caught in the vicious cycle that until a function of Government has historic experience and acceptance, it will not be made into a department, and conversely that creation of a Cabinet department is necessary to confer such status and acceptance.

The subcommittee hopes that this vicious cycle will be broken by a positive expression of executive leadership and by appropriate action in the Congress to establish a Department of Civil Defense.

It drafted legislation to this end. 10

In hearings on the proposed legislation (H.R. 2125) early in 1957, the Bureau of the Budget signified opposition to vesting the civil defense agency with departmental status. Assistant Director Robert E. Merriam passed on the determination "from the executive standpoint" that this step was not then necessary.

. . . The problems and inadequacies of civil defense appear to stem largely from those factors such as dramatic development of weapons capability . . . rather than from organizational difficulties. As a result the President does not propose at this time that the Federal Civil Defense Administration be made an executive department.

Civil defense, Merriam emphasized, "is a program under constant and rapid change in an effort to keep abreast of the changes in modern warfare." The Administration, he said, "will propose additional changes in our nonmilitary defense structure if circumstances appear to make such changes desirable." 11

The Bureau of the Budget soon recognized that a change was needed to overcome problems of confusion and overlap in nonmilitary defense preparations. Later that same year, the Bureau contracted with McKinsey & Company, Inc., a management consultant firm, to study alternatives in reorganization in this area. McKinsey & Company presented its findings in two parts. Part I, "A Framework for Improving Nonmilitary Defense Preparedness," was submitted by the year's end; Part II, "Organization for Nonmilitary Defense Preparedness," was submitted in March 1958. 12

The McKinsey group considered the strengths and weaknesses of three main organizational alternatives: the existing "dual command" concept; the "executive department" concept recommended by the Holifield Subcommittee; and the "Executive Office" concept. It came out in favor of the last. The study


12 The McKinsey Report may be found as Exhibit A of the Appendix to the Holifield Subcommittee's 1958 hearings on civil defense. For a summary and analysis of the McKinsey Report, see Legislative History—Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, pp. 17-22.
emphasized the need for continuous Presidential attention to the vital problems of nonmilitary defense readiness and emergency action. From an organizational standpoint, Federal responsibility for nonmilitary defense could not be divided effectively on the basis of time phases, geographical areas, subject or items, or types of wartime assumptions. A sudden attack would not afford time to develop new wartime agencies. Reliance would, therefore, have to be placed on organizations in being, and plans for continuing operations after an attack would have to be made in advance.

In light of these considerations, the McKinsey report recommended that the basic responsibility for Federal civil defense and related nonmilitary defense programs rest in the President himself, and that these programs be conducted through Presidential delegation of authority to existing Government departments and agencies. Plans would be built upon the existing Federal, State, and local governmental structure and relationships. At the same time, the McKinsey report stressed the need for flexibility in organizational arrangements, to permit prompt adjustment to changes in concepts of war, enemy capabilities and intentions, and in the technology of defense.

The President would, of course, need assistance in the discharge of his nonmilitary defense functions. This would be the job of a staff in the Executive Office of the President. In this staff role, it would help the President formulate policy, provide leadership, evaluate the adequacy of
planning and readiness programs, and guide and coordinate the total nonmilitary defense efforts of the Federal Government. Relieved of the burden of supervising operating functions performed by established agencies under Presidential delegations, the Director of this staff in the Executive Office would be able to perform his proper role as principal adviser to the President on the readiness of the Nation's nonmilitary defenses.¹³

Part I of the McKinsey report, submitted in December 1957, included a recommendation that the President, in an early message to Congress, recognize the overlap and duplication in existing organizational arrangements, the vital importance of nonmilitary defense functions, and the need to develop new concepts and to have complete authority vested in himself. President Eisenhower gave expression to these thoughts in his fiscal 1959 budget message which he transmitted to Congress in January 1958:

The structure of Federal organization for the planning, coordination, and conduct of our nonmilitary defense programs has been reviewed, and I have concluded that the existing statutes assigning responsibilities for the central coordination and direction

¹³There was some ambiguity as to the extent to which this Presidential staff agency would shed operational functions. As we shall see, the President appeared to view the Executive Office agency as becoming a truly "staff" arm, and others, including OCDM Director Frank B. Ellis in the early months of the Kennedy Administration, shared that view; see Ellis's report to President John F. Kennedy entitled "Basic Report of Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization: Roles, Organization and Programs," Feb. 1961 (hereinafter cited as Ellis Report), Section 5.
of these programs are out of date. The rapid technical advances of military science have led to a serious overlap among agencies carrying on these leadership and planning functions. Because the situation will continue to change and because these functions transcend the responsibility of any single department or agency, I have concluded that they should be vested in no one short of the President. I will make recommendations to the Congress on this subject.  

Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958

Following completion of Part II of the McKinsey report, the President, on April 24, 1958, transmitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 to the Congress. His transmittal message incorporated the substance of the McKinsey report in setting forth the purpose and anticipated effects of the Reorganization Plan. First, he said, the plan would transfer to the President the functions then vested in FCDA and ODM, "for appropriate delegation as the rapidly changing character of the nonmilitary preparedness program warrants." Second, ODM and FCDA would be consolidated to form a new "Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization" (ODCM) in the Executive Office of the President. In support of this move, the President stated:

... I have concluded that, in many instances the interests and activities of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration overlap to such a degree that it is not possible

to work out a satisfactory division of those activities and interests between the two agencies. I have also concluded that a single civilian mobilization agency of appropriate stature and authority is needed and that such an agency will ensue from the consolidation and from the granting of suitable authority to that agency for directing and coordinating the preparedness activities of the Federal departments and agencies and for providing unified guidance and assistance to the State and local governments.

Third, the membership of the Director of Defense Mobilization on the National Security Council would be transferred to the Director of ODCM; and FCDA's Civil Defense Advisory Council would also be transferred to ODCM.

Further, the President indicated his intent to broaden the participation of the Federal departments and agencies in nonmilitary defense planning, with ODCM ultimately left with the principal responsibility of directing and coordinating "the civil defense and defense mobilization activities assigned to the departments and agencies." This last statement evoked a good bit of discussion in the Congressional deliberations on the Reorganization Plan. It left in many minds the question as to whether it was intended that ODCM would in time give up the operating functions to which it fell heir by this reorganization.


16 Maxam MS, pp. 102-103. No such divestiture occurred during the three-year life of the new agency but, as we shall
Congressional Deliberations on the Plan

The Budget Bureau, ODM, and FCDA endorsed the basic findings and recommendations of the McKinsey study, and vigorously supported the President's plan. Testifying before the Holifield Subcommittee in May 1958, William F. Finan, Assistant Director, Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget, Gordon Gray, Director of Defense Mobilization, and Leo A. Hoegh, Federal Civil Defense Administrator, all stressed the urgent need for adoption of the plan. The vital powers relating to survival in the event of a nuclear attack, they contended, should be lodged in no officer of the Government short of the President himself. The greatest flexibility of delegation was deemed imperative for adequate adjustment to the rapid changes in weapons technology. Further, these witnesses contended, placement directly with the President of authority for nonmilitary defense would greatly improve interagency cooperation.17

Points of controversy relating to the plan that were raised at the Holifield hearings revolved around the following premises:

see later, it did occur in the 1961 reorganization. It should be noted that the staff of the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations took the view that the main concept of the McKinsey report was that most Federal civil defense programs should be conducted through Presidential delegation of authority to existing Government agencies, and that the functions envisioned for the new agency in the Executive Office of the President would be limited to overall planning, administration and coordination, and public information, education, and training programs; see Staff Memorandum No. 85-2-17 SR, May 12, 1958, in Appendix to Legislative History--Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, p. 209.

17 See Civil Defense, Hearings cited in n. 6 above.
(1) That the vesting of authority for nonmilitary defense directly in the President might clothe the Nation's civil-defense program in an area of "executive privilege."

(2) That the plan in reality was a blank check to the President, giving him unlimited authority to reorganize nonmilitary defense functions of the executive branch, through the delegation of the authorities vested in him, without further congressional approval.

(3) That Administration witnesses before the subcommittee could give no indication as to what nonmilitary defense functions would be delegated by the President or to what executive agencies of the Government the functions would be delegated.

(4) That if appropriations for civil defense were made en bloc to the President, he could allocate them to the operating agencies of the executive branch as he desired without additional congressional authority or control.

(5) That the plan would not materially augment the Nation's civil-defense program, except by elevating its prestige in the Government structure by lodging it in the Executive Office of the President.18

The responses of the witnesses to these points were to the effect that:

(1) The director of the new agency in the Executive Office, as well as other officials to whom delegations of authority might be made, would be directly accountable to the Congress.

(2) It was essential the President be given the widest latitude to organize or reorganize the Government's nonmilitary defense functions as he deemed most appropriate to meet the constantly shifting requirements of the nuclear-missiles age.

(3) Future Presidential delegations of authority could not be determined at that time.

(4) No decision had been made as to whether civil-defense appropriations would be made to the President or directly to the various agencies which would operate the programs. Funds were then appropriated directly to FCDA for allocation to the various operating agencies.

(5) The act of raising the prestige of the Federal Civil Defense Administration by placing it in the Executive Office of the President alone would materially strengthen the Nation's civil-defense program.\(^{19}\)

Although it preferred its own legislative proposal (H.R. 2125), the Holified Subcommittee recognized that there was little likelihood of its enactment in the face of the

\(^{19}\)Ibid.
President's opposition. "The plain facts of life," the Subcommittee noted, "also suggest that civil defense is in so low a state that nothing could make it worse and something could make it better." For these reasons, the Subcommittee continued, it "dares hope, despite its doubts and reservations, that some improvement might be effected by this reorganization plan." The Subcommittee expressed its full endorsement of one feature of the plan:

... It promises to put an end to the bickering and confusion caused by two competing Federal agencies, the FCDA and the ODM. These two agencies would be merged. The subcommittee made a recommendation along this line 2 years ago.

While thus supporting the plan and hoping for some improvement, the Holifield Subcommittee pointed to a number of "things to watch for":

(1) Will this plan be used as a precedent for similar transfers of authority to the President?

(2) Will the transfer of authority under the plan be real or nominal, as far as the President's personal supervision is concerned?

(3) Will this plan cause a breakdown of the organizational base for civil defense and dispersal of these functions by delegation even more widely than they are now dispersed?

The subcommittee's experience to date is that delegations are means of avoiding responsibilities or burdening departments and agencies with unmanageable tasks.

... The subcommittee is satisfied that there are enough important tasks in civil defense and

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mobilization to justify a strong organizational base for these activities, even while other governmental resources are utilized. Certain of these tasks, such as radiological defense and shelter planning and construction, are so unprecedented and difficult that they justify a special entity of government planning and working on its own as well as in cooperation with other government agencies.

(4) Will the new Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, acting for the President, be able to ride herd on government agencies performing delegated functions and to bring about concerted effort and systematic progress?

(5) Will the Executive Office of the President be able to accommodate "operating" and field functions?

If the new agency in the President's Executive Office fails, as ODM and FCDA have failed, to effectively harness government agencies for the tasks of civil defense and mobilization, then it will be obligated to assume many such functions itself. Thereby the President's Executive Office would spawn a great "operating agency" performing tasks that appear unsuited to that Office and more suited for a separate agency or department.

Clearly, these were highly significant and provocative questions. The Holifield Subcommittee indicated its intent "to follow closely the developments resulting from this plan and to report to the Congress at a later date." 21

No resolution of disapproval of the reorganization plan was filed in the House of Representatives. In the other Chamber, however, Senator Charles E. Potter, Michigan

21Ibid., pp. 23-25. Three members of the Subcommittee--Congressmen R. Walter Riehlman, Glenard P. Liscomb, and William E. Marshall--filed a "Minority Report." They did not oppose the Reorganization Plan, but they took exception to some of the statements made by the majority of the members, and objected to "the general tone of its analysis of the plan"; ibid., pp. 26-30.
Republican, filed a resolution (S. Res. 297), on April 25, 1958, to establish Senate disapproval. His purpose, he said, was to obtain a careful review by Congress which might prove "that it is unwise to place an operating agency under the arm of a Chief Executive, particularly when the Presidential Office is already burdened with such tremendous responsibilities." The matter was placed with the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations.

The Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, held public hearings on June 9, 1958. At these hearings, Messrs. Finan, Gray and Hoegh reiterated much of their earlier testimony before the Holifield Subcommittee. The Humphrey Subcommittee had a chance to review and analyze various objections to the plan—that it (1) subordinated civil defense; (2) gave blank-check authority to the President to reorganize nonmilitary defense without further Congressional review; (3) inappropriately assigned operating functions to the President; (4) overburdened the President or the Director of the new agency; (5) would create a possible claim of "executive privilege"; and (6) failed to produce savings.  

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22Legislative History—Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, pp. 203, 211. Many civil defense officials reportedly believed that Senator Potter's purpose was to prevent the reduction or transfer to Washington of the FCDA headquarters staff in Battle Creek; Maxim MS, p. 109.

The first point—the possible subordination of the civil defense program—was a matter of some concern to the Humphrey Subcommittee. A letter from Finan, June 11, 1958, provided further clarification and assurances that civil defense would not be relegated to an insignificant place in the new agency. A major objective of the plan, Finan wrote, was to integrate civil defense and defense mobilization activities. The designation of a subordinate official or unit as a "home" for civil defense, he asserted, "would have the effect of downgrading the entire civil defense program." Retention of an internal distinction between civil defense and defense mobilization in the proposed ODCM would result in the continuance of the many existing defects of divided responsibilities and conflicting leadership and guidance.

We strongly believe that the desirable organizational objective is not to retain separate and identifiable civil defense and defense mobilization activities, but rather to recognize that they are inseparable. To this end, we believe that the best organization is one that would fully integrate the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration activities with the objective that civil defense will be elevated to the level of and incorporated with other aspects of nonmilitary defense.

No person short of the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization should be considered by the President, the Congress, and the public at large as the official responsible for civil defense.

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On the strength of the advice of the Humphrey Subcommittee, the Senate Committee on Government Operations recommended against passage of the resolution of disapproval. In its report on June 17, 1958, the Committee made several significant points. First, it requested that the new agency report during the first session of the next Congress on the organization established for nonmilitary defense functions, on improvements in the conduct of these functions, and whether additional statutory authority was needed to strengthen the overall program.

Second, the Committee pointed to dissatisfaction expressed during the hearings over the name selected for the new agency--Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. The first part of that name, "Office of Defense," might be confused with Defense Department operations, and the words "Civil Defense" did not appear in the title. It was too late to amend the name without rejecting the plan. The Committee, therefore, recommended that the agency be given a more appropriate name by legislation after the effective date of the Reorganization Plan. The Committee also objected to the relocation to Washington of some 800 FCDA employees in Battle Creek, unless complete justification was presented to Congress.25

The Senate took no further action on S. Res. 297; and, so, the Reorganization Plan became effective July 1, 1958. The same day, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10773, delegating to the Director of ODCM all functions transferred to the President by the Reorganization Plan, and vesting the Director "with power of redelegation."\(^2\) And legislation was quickly enacted, August 26, 1958, changing the name of the new agency from "Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization" to "Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization."\(^2\)

Thus, in the summer of 1958, the Director of OCDM was in the position of exercising single direction of nonmilitary defense on behalf of the President. In effect, he was the President's "Chief of Staff" for all nonmilitary defense activities. Because of the nature and importance of his duties, he was to be a statutory member of the National Security Council, and he also served as a regular member of the President's Cabinet. All this, together with a broadened legislative mandate, held out high hopes for strong leadership of Federal, State and local nonmilitary defense activities.

\(^{26}\)The Executive order is reproduced in the Appendix to Legislative History--Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, pp. 215-219, and as Appendix 2 to OCDM, Annual Report for FY 1959, pp. 61-63.

\(^{27}\)Public Law 85-763, approved Aug. 26, 1958; see Legislative History--Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, pp. 198-202. Executive Order 10782, issued September 6, 1958, amended Executive Order 10773 to reflect this change; ibid., p. 221; Appendix 3 to OCDM Annual Report for FY 1959, p. 65.
In expressly authorizing the establishment of Regional Offices, the 1958 Reorganization Plan provided a device for central direction and leadership of the field establishments of the Federal agencies which would be called upon to perform emergency functions throughout the country. Operating under delegations from the Director of OCDM, these Regional Offices could be expected to plan effectively for, coordinate and direct Federal assistance (including such military support as could be rendered) to stricken areas in an attack. The States and localities could now look to one organization for guidance and assistance in planning for the effective use of their skills and resources, along with those of the entire Federal Government, in meeting emergency needs. Pointing to these and other benefits, OCDM concluded its analysis of the 1958 reorganization on a hopeful note:

Thus, organizational arrangements were provided which could assure that the problems of overlapping jurisdiction, duplication of effort and conflicting direction and guidance which had plagued both the civil defense and defense mobilization activities would, in one sweep, be wiped away.28

CIVIL DEFENSE IN OCDM

In the 1958 reorganization, FCDA Administrator Hoegh was named Director of OCDM, and ODM Director Gordon Gray was named Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. OCDM saw fiscal 1959 as marking "a new era" for

28Legislative History--Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, p. xvi.
civil defense and defense mobilization. Their merger into OCDM and the establishment of the new agency in the Executive Office of the President, OCDM stated in its report for that year, "gave increased stature and unity to our nonmilitary defense effort." The Nation, OCDM asserted, now had "a solid organizational base for building a unified national nonmilitary defense program." Hoegh expressed the same thoughts in the fall of the following year. Although the Nation had only begun to realize "the true magnitude of the change," he said, the reorganization could be expected to "continue to pay multiple dividends in improved operations in the future." 

Organization and Management

With a staff originally totaling some 1,400 people, OCDM proceeded to coordinate and direct nonmilitary defense activities throughout the Nation. In response to the concept of an integrated program, Hoegh set up OCDM's internal organization along functional lines (see fig. 4, p. 76). The agency's national headquarters was in Washington; Battle Creek continued as the "operational headquarters." An eighth regional office was established in March 1959 (see fig. 5, p. 77). OCDM undertook to strengthen the regional capability in fulfillment


30 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Ninth Annual Report of the Activities of the Joint Committee
Figure 4 -- OCDM Organization Chart

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

of the broadened responsibilities resulting from the merger. Plans were approved to establish protected operating sites at the eight regional offices, to enable them to carry out Federal responsibilities if the central Government were lost. One, at Denton, Texas, was under construction early in 1961.31

A central feature of OCDM operations was the delegation of emergency preparedness responsibilities to existing Federal departments and agencies. By the end of fiscal 1961, 14 Emergency Preparedness Orders had been issued, 16 were pending approval, and three were in preparation (see Table 5, p.199). Under these assignments, 10 Executive departments and 23 independent agencies had primary or support responsibilities. OCDM retained primary responsibility for communications, transportation, stabilization, damage assessment, and for monitoring radiological defense. State and local governments had primary responsibility for maintaining law and order, with support from the Justice Department.

The Director chaired two advisory boards: the Civil and Defense Mobilization Board established by Executive Order 10773 of July 1, 1958 (amended by Executive Order 10782 of September 6, 1958, and the Civil Defense Advisory Council established under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

31Ellis Report cited in n. 13 above.
### Table 5—Emergency assignments of Federal departments and agencies

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<th>Education and Welfare</th>
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<th>Labor</th>
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**Legend:**
- **P**—Primary responsibility
- **S**—Support responsibility
- **E**—Emergency preparedness order issued
- **F**—Emergency preparedness order pending approval
- **C**—Emergency preparedness order in preparation

1. FEMA has primary responsibility for communications, transportation, stabilization, damage assessment, and radiological defense (radiological monitoring).
2. FEMA has primary responsibility to develop and direct nationwide programs for the prevention, detection, and identification of human exposure to BW and CW agents, including that from food and drugs. FEMA has similar responsibility in the area of animals, crops, or products thereof.
3. State and local governments have primary responsibility for maintaining law and order.

The American National Red Cross extended its liaison representation to the OCDM regional offices. As in earlier years, numerous other groups and committees provided advice and counsel in the development, planning and execution of specific nonmilitary defense programs.

**Forward Thrusts of Civil Defense**

OCDM got off to a good start. Hoegh and Peterson before him had been pressed by the Congressional committees to develop an overall preparedness plan to ensure that all efforts were directed toward established objectives. Expanding on Peterson's 1956 plan, Hoegh and his staff proceeded to develop a comprehensive program to ensure the protection of the population and the survival of the Nation in the event of an enemy attack. In his testimony on the 1958 Reorganization Plan, Hoegh told the Holifield Subcommittee that this plan (then still a working draft), in conjunction with the FCDA-ODM merger and the broadened Federal responsibility and authority to support State and local efforts, would do much in providing the leadership, direction and coordination needed for an effective civil defense.\(^{32}\)

In October 1958, President Eisenhower promulgated this plan, entitled "National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization"—a comprehensive blueprint with some 40 annexes

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\(^{32}\) *Legislative History--Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958*, pp. 183-189.
setting forth nonmilitary courses of action by governments and citizens at all levels and guiding further program development to enable the Nation "to survive, recover, and win." In essence, the plan was a statement of principles, responsibilities, requirements, and broad courses of action. The supporting annexes covered the entire range of civil defense and mobilization functions under three principal contingencies: international tension; limited war situations in which the armed forces were engaged overseas with no "immediate expectation" of a nuclear attack on the United States; and general war, including a massive nuclear attack. OCDM considered the completion and issuance of this plan as "foremost" among its accomplishments in its first year of life.

By the end of its second year, OCDM pointed with optimism to the "firm foundation" which it had built for nonmilitary defense. "Some major basic elements of this foundation," OCDM reported, were:

1. The increasing stature and unity of the effort resulting from the creation of OCDM in the Executive Office of the President.

2. The National Plan, with supporting plans in each State, 240 metropolitan areas, and some 50 percent of the counties.

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3. Broadened Federal responsibility and greater latitude in supporting the States in their implementation of the Plan.

4. Flexible plans for use in a limited war ("plan C") and in the event of a devastating attack upon the United States ("plan D-minus").

5. Prosecution of major OCDM programs throughout the Nation "with increasing vigor and support."

OCDM recognized that "foundations" and "plans" were of value "only to the extent that they are instrumental in producing action." Accordingly, much of the fiscal 1960 report related how plans "have been and are being converted into action on all fronts of civil defense and defense mobilization programs." OCDM highlighted principal results of these actions in 10 categories, as follows:

1. An excellent warning system.--Warning can be sent to 377 points in 15 seconds and 5,000 local points in an average time of 7 minutes.

2. An excellent communications network.--Wire communications connecting OCDM's relocation site, Operational Headquarters, regional office, and State civil defense offices are being backed up by a radio network.

3. Successful preparations for the continuity of governments.--The executive branch of the Federal Government has active programs in all phases of these preparations. Most States and many local governments are following this example.

4. An expanding radiological defense monitoring system.--An estimated 1,500 Federal and 10,000 State and local monitoring stations are in existence.

5. Strong field organization.--The eight Regional Offices of OCDM have been strengthened with the help
of other Federal departments. Protected sites have been planned for all Regional Offices and construction on one site is to begin in December of 1960.

6. The National Shelter Policy.--Through the Federal role of education, example, and leadership, the National Shelter Policy has generally been accepted. A recent Gallup Poll reported that 71 percent of the population favor fallout shelters. Thousands of persons are building shelters, and many industries are providing shelters.

7. Civil defense stockpile.--The stockpile of survival items contains medical supplies and engineering equipment, including approximately 1,400 prepositioned emergency hospitals.

8. Stockpiles of strategic and critical materials and food.--Government inventories of specification-grade strategic and critical materials stored for emergency use totaled more than $7 billion at June 30, 1960, market prices. In addition, the Commodity Credit Corporation stockpile contained sufficient food supplies for postattack recovery.

9. National Defense Executive Reserve.--Approximately 2,250 leaders from industry, labor, business, education, and various organizations are prepared to help carry out the emergency mobilization functions of the Federal Government.

10. Industry readiness.--Many industries are prepared for emergency operations and are leading the Nation by example and accomplishments in their preparedness programs.

The above-cited actions and accomplishments, OCDM believed, demonstrated the soundness of "the foundation and the plans for the Nation's nonmilitary defense." The building and strengthening of these action programs on the basis of this foundation and these plans, OCDM emphasized, "must continue, with unceasing vigor, to correct deficiencies as they arise and provide dynamic leadership for the future."35

35 Executive Office of the President, OCDM, Annual Report of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for
Deficiencies in OCDM Efforts

Commendable as Hoegh's efforts were, OCDM was not destined to survive in the change of Administrations from Dwight D. Eisenhower to John F. Kennedy in 1961. The agency's track record with Congress on funding was no better than that of its antecedent agencies. Even from the vantage point of the Executive Office, OCDM could not elicit the vigorous Presidential leadership needed to wrest from Congress adequate appropriations or to propose a meaningful shelter program. It was only after two turndowns and a strong message from the President\textsuperscript{36} that Congress voted money in January 1961—$6 million—for Federal contributions to the States for civil defense personnel and administrative expenses. In the meantime, in the absence of financial assistance, State and local governments continued to lag in their civil defense preparations.

Alluding to this problem, among others, besetting OCDM, Frank B. Ellis, the new OCDM Director in the Kennedy


\textsuperscript{36} In this message to Congress on August 25, 1959, President Eisenhower asked for $12 million to match funds spent by State and local governments for personnel and administrative costs under authority of the 1958 Amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act. Such matching funds, he said, were needed to strengthen civil defense at the State and local levels—"the very heart of civil defense"—and to "give tangible evidence of Federal leadership in encouraging
Administration, made a special point, in his advice to Kennedy in February 1961, of the need for Presidential leadership in getting across to the public the importance that the Federal Government, especially the military, placed upon civil defense.

... There must be a clear and unequivocal explanation by the President of the essential role that actually is assigned to civil and defense mobilization in the total defense program and the national strategy. The conclusion that this program is not important to the President must be dispelled first, so that Congressional support can be obtained.

To erase public apathy and gain public support, Ellis said, there was need for a judicious message from the President, putting over three principles:

(a) Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization are vital to National Defense; without them, deterrence is endangered.

(b) Survival of the immediate effects of the attack is possible under a sensible civil defense program; the program is technically and financially feasible.

(c) A fruitful and productive life is possible in the years after the war; emphasize that the better the civil defense measures taken, the quicker we can return to our high standard of living.\(^37\)

There were other shortcomings in the OCDM program. The National Plan was criticized for not being more definite. While OCDM made substantial improvements in integrating its own planning, much more remained to be done to extend this

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\(^37\)Ellis Report, pp. 120-123.
integration to all other Federal agencies, the States, and the local governments. There were gaps in State and local survival plans and in Federal plans for providing resources for national security, especially in respect to the management of resources and the re-establishment of the economy after an attack. Blast and fallout protection of most of the operating sites of the OCDM regional offices was still in the planning stage, and few emergency seats of the States and larger cities had protected facilities.

Perhaps more than any other factors explaining the early demise of OCDM was the lack of sufficient progress in implementing the President's National Shelter Policy with its emphasis on the self-help principle. Studies by OCDM, the RAND Corporation, the Stanford Research Institute and others had shown that fallout shelters could reduce casualties by 50 percent or more. OCDM tried to implement the National Shelter Policy with information programs; guides on techniques for conducting shelter surveys, modifying structures to provide better shelter, and equipping shelters; initiation of a $4.3 million, two-year prototype shelter construction program expected to produce 935 shelters (78 community-type, 257 family-type, and 600 demonstration units); a directive requiring Federal departments and agencies to include shelter in new Federal buildings beginning in fiscal 1960; and encouragement of shelter planning in considering Federal loan and grant programs. All these activities helped to
stimulate public interest, but they did not lead to the construction of many shelters. Clearly, the "do-it-yourself" program could not be counted upon to produce the fallout shelters needed to protect the population in a nuclear war.

Continuing Pressures for Protection from Radioactive Fallout

The Holifield Special Subcommittee on Radiation.--In the summer of 1959, a Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, under the chairmanship of Congressman Holifield, completed a series of public hearings on the biological and environmental effects of nuclear war. This was in the nature of a step-by-step examination of the all-important question—What lies beyond the brink of a nuclear war? The Subcommittee assumed that 224 targets were hit with nuclear weapons having the destructive power of 1,446 million tons of TNT. It also assumed that an additional 2½ billion tons were dropped on targets in the attacking country and in Western Europe. Thus, the scenario assumed the detonation of approximately 4,000 megatons for purposes of calculating worldwide fallout.

This was seen as a "moderate" attack against the United States, and the Nation's foremost experts were called in to analyze the consequences of such an attack. While the Subcommittee's main focus was on the biological and environmental...
effects, the hearings brought out important testimony on the technical possibility of reducing those effects through "non-military protective measures" or what Holifield considered more appropriate "survival measures." On August 27, 1959, Holifield gave his House colleagues a preview of the Subcommittee's findings which were then in press. Witnesses stressed that man and nature would ultimately recover, but they did not minimize the effects of such an attack. These experts, Holifield reported, found that while the blast and thermal effects caused the greatest physical damage and the largest number of human casualties, "the most important hazard faced by survivors of the attack was that posed by radioactive fallout, which gradually enveloped a large part of the total national area."39

In the absence of adequate protection, Holifield indicated, the impact of this assumed attack would have been catastrophic.

Under conditions existing today, more than one-fourth of the dwellings in the United States would have been destroyed and damaged beyond repair. Another one-fourth would require major repairs.

Outside the areas of blast and thermal damage, another one-fourth of our dwellings would have been

so severely contaminated by radioactive fallout that they would require major decontamination. Of these, some 2½ million dwellings would have to be abandoned for periods of extending up to several months.

Of far greater importance, this attack would have cost the lives of approximately 49 million Americans and would have caused serious injury to another 20 million.

In addition, certain genetic hazards, about which a great deal remains to be learned, and various problems resulting from the environmental contamination would have been produced by this attack.

And yet, the expert testimony presented to the Subcommittee indicated that moderate shelter protection against fallout under conditions of the assumed attack "could reduce the number of fatalities from approximately 25 percent of the U.S. population to about 3 percent." The cost of providing this moderate protection for 200 million people was estimated at between $5 billion and $20 billion, depending on the use made of existing facilities—a one-time expenditure approximating, at the most, one-half the yearly expenditures for military defense. 40

Continuing his remarks as a member of Congress, and not as chairman of this Special Subcommittee, Holifield presented his personal view of the requirements for survival. On the basis of his 10-years' observation of "the grim and brutal facts of weapon technology," he said:

... I have been shocked and appalled by our failure—or I should say, our refusal—to do anything to protect

our people from the devastating effects of nuclear weapons in the event this Nation is attacked. The executive branch has refused to develop an effective national program for the protection of our people, and the Congress has not been willing to appropriate large funds for civil defense in the absence of a realistic Executive plan.

As a consequence, the people of America now stand unshielded from the horrifying effects of a possible nuclear attack.41

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, he went on to say, "was outmoded upon enactment." The 1958 change to "joint" responsibility was meaningless because the term was undefined, and no one in the Executive Branch could tell him exactly what that meant. And as for the 1958 reorganization, elevating FCDA "to a privileged place in the President's office," the program and policy of Federal civil defense had not changed.

The need for shelter, Holifield conceded, was getting increasing recognition as the necessary starting point of an effective civil defense. OCDM was no longer advocating "mass evacuation to the open countryside." Instead, OCDM was advising people to build their own shelters. Holifield noted, however, that despite OCDM's "do-it-yourself" exhortations, "few if any home shelters are being constructed."

Once again, he pointed to the failure of national leadership.

The largest single obstacle to effective civil defense in this country has been a pointblank refusal by the national leadership to recognize the civil defense problem as one that can be solved. Lip-service has been given within the executive branch and in Congress, but no positive action has been taken.

41 Ibid., p. 17234.
Every year OCDM conducts an Operation Alert exercise which demonstrates our complete inability to cope with the effects of a possible nuclear attack without the provision of shelters. But an executive branch recommendation for a national shelter construction program has not been forthcoming.

The National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been briefed time and time again on this problem, and I think it is one of the great tragedies of our time that these two important bodies have not properly advised the President of our civil defense requirements.

One fundamental fact that has not been faced is that the protection of our people from the devastating effects of a possible enemy attack is a constitutional responsibility of the Federal Government. Whether the enemy strikes at our military forces or at Keokuk, Iowa, or at any other point in the United States, the defense problem is national in scope and must be dealt with by action of the Federal Government.\(^42\)

Governors' Conference Report and Resolution on Civil Defense.—A call for immediate action on a nationwide fallout shelter program also came at the 51st Annual Governors Conference at San Juan, Puerto Rico, August 5, 1959. Its Special Committee on Civil Defense, chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, took note of the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, developed under the leadership of their former colleague, Governor Hoegh,

\(^42\)Ibid., p. 17235. Holifield took note of the President's special message of August 25, mentioned above, to demonstrate the difficulty of obtaining even modest appropriations for civil defense, and to point up some of the language which clearly acknowledged—for the first time in Holifield's recollection—the vital relationship between military defense and retaliatory forces and nonmilitary preparedness in the Nation's total defense. Holifield was encouraged by these words, but felt that "the programs the President is supporting fail to meet the civil defense requirement which his words acknowledge"; ibid., p. 17236.
indicating the responsibility of every individual to be prepared to exist in a fallout shelter area, without outside help, for at least two weeks following a nuclear attack. Few families in any State, the committee noted, were so prepared. Unless prompt steps were taken to protect the people against fallout, the entire national defense effort could be rendered meaningless. The committee saw "reason for optimism" in the studies which indicated that protection from fallout could be achieved at a cost that "need not be prohibitive." 43

On the basis of this report, the Governors' Conference unanimously adopted a resolution calling, among other things, for responsible government officials at all levels--Federal, State, and local--to "take immediate steps to assist and encourage the people of this country to prepare themselves successfully to survive radioactive fallout and other aspects of an enemy nuclear attack . . ." They called for an early meeting of their Committee on Civil Defense with the President, the Nation's military leaders, and other representatives of the Executive and legislative branches "for an intensive review of the nature of the nuclear hazard and the cooperative steps which are available to government--Federal, State, and local--for the nuclear protection of our people." 44


44 Ibid., pp. 17366-17367.
The Governors' program was based on a plan developed for New York State by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. That plan proposed mandatory construction of shelters by citizens, modification of existing structures to provide fallout protection, and stockpiling of emergency supplies by individual citizens to enable them to exist during an attack. In effect, the New York State plan would have made mandatory the Eisenhower Administration's voluntary shelter program.

The Rockefeller committee met at the White House with Eisenhower, Hoegh, and other Administration officials, January 25, 1960, "to review the nature of the nuclear hazard and the steps which should be taken for protection from fallout." Participants generally agreed on the need for an improved civil defense, including a program of fallout protection for the Nation's population. Upon completion of the conference, the Rockefeller committee issued a statement stressing various reasons why "fallout protection for our citizens is imperative"—the credibility of our foreign policy; success of our efforts to assure peace; the effectiveness of our military deterrence; our capability to resist nuclear blackmail; and our national survival "in the event some aggressor should do the unthinkable and unleash a nuclear attack upon us." Based on the presentation it heard at the conference, the committee expressed the belief

... that fallout protection for our people is essential, that, while there will be many problems, a very high degree of protection from fallout can be achieved, that it is achievable now and achievable at a cost within the reach of our people and nation. We also believe that the Federal Government should participate more actively in providing the leadership, the financial support and the inducements which must be forthcoming if an effective program of fallout protection for all our people is to be achieved in the near future.  

President Eisenhower, however, continued to oppose large Federal outlays for a fallout shelter system, and he rejected the Rockefeller proposal. And soon thereafter, the New York State Legislature turned down the Rockefeller shelter plan for that State.  

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey's Critique.--Senator Hubert H. Humphrey agreed with the basic concept that civil defense was a joint responsibility of the Federal Government and the States and localities and that the full potential of all three levels of government had to be mobilized to withstand the widespread destruction of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Humphrey believed that the Federal Government "must bear the primary responsibility for our nonmilitary defense, and demonstrate that it is prepared to discharge it." Addressing the Senate on August 31, 1959, Humphrey called attention to the findings of the Holifield Special Subcommittee on Radiation. The

Ibid., p. 3.

For a good discussion of these and ensuing developments in what Dr. Blanchard categorized as "The Politicization of Civil Defense," see Blanchard MS, pp. 237-242, and supporting documentation.

latter's "harrowing projection" of some 50 million deaths in "a limited to medium range attack," Humphrey said, "illustrates the appalling nakedness of America's defenses against nuclear weapons" and "makes clear the urgent need for a fresh, critical appraisal of the Federal Government's civil defense program."

If, after almost 10 years of civil defense planning, the Government's capability to protect the population of the United States is as ineffective as these officials [who testified at the Special Subcommittee hearings] indicate, it is high time we face the problem of survival in the thermonuclear age squarely—and do something about it.49

Humphrey was aware of the advances that had been made in civil defense—in communications, shelter research, radiological monitoring, maintenance of government in emergency, stockpiling, and many other areas. He knew of the national plan, the nationwide exercises, the command centers established for emergency operations, the detailed "survival projects" that had been developed, the assignment of responsibilities for the conduct of the Nation's civil defense, and the extensive efforts to inform the American citizens of actions they should take before, during, and after a nuclear attack. Despite all this, Humphrey asserted, the Nation's "actual defenses" against a massive nuclear attack were largely in the "blueprint" stage.

... Incredible as it is, after 10 years of planning and study, there are still not even the beginnings of

49 Ibid., p. 17364.
a shelter program which could protect millions of Americans beyond the blast area from a nuclear explosion, and which could assure that the Nation would be able to pick itself off its feet and restore at least vital services within a reasonably short time.  

The finest long-range plans, survival projects, and blueprints for civil defense, "without the resources, operational capability, and facilities to implement them on a moment's notice," Humphrey emphasized, provided no more than "a paper defense" against the dangers of nuclear warfare.  

... realistic protection from radiation, rehabilitation of communities, restoration of the economy--these are the indispensible fundamentals of defense against nuclear weapons.  

These observations, Humphrey indicated, were not made in criticism of OCDM, nor of civil defense officials or workers at any level. "The default in civil defense," he said, lay "in the Congress, at the White House, and in the Government's highest strategy councils." As he saw it, the appropriation of $45 million to $50 million for civil defense--"less than a tenth of 1 percent of our total military budget"--was, Humphrey asserted, "nothing more than a gesture." There was sufficient evidence that with adequate protective measures taken in advance, "the Nation could sustain itself, the Government could continue to function, and the great majority of the population could be saved" even under massive nuclear attack. What was urgently needed, Senator Humphrey concluded,  

50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid., p. 17365.  
52 Ibid.
... is a complete recasting of Federal policy, a cold, calculating reassessment of the inadequacies of our present defenses against nuclear weapons and establishment of a Federal program which will provide realistic defense against them.

The cost may be great compared to present expenditures, but the cost of continued default by the Federal Government in this vital area of national security, could, by comparison, be of incalculable consequence should a nuclear strike against this country ever be made.53

Holifield Hearings in 1960.--Back again in 1960, this time wearing his hat as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Military Operations, Holifield investigated OCDM's shelter policy, post-attack planning, and the relation of civil defense to the missile program.54 Responses to a Subcommittee questionnaire sent out to the State Governors and mayors of the largest cities gave no cause for optimism about the President's National Shelter Policy. Hoegh struck a more hopeful note, but the Subcommittee voiced the conviction, held even before the hearings began, that civil defense throughout the Nation was "in a deplorable state."55 Nor was the Subcommittee satisfied with what was being accomplished in post-attack planning, especially under the philosophy that the individual would have to provide for his own

53Ibid., p. 17366.


55Hearings, Civil Defense--1960, Part I, p. 3.
shelter and supplies for perhaps as much as four weeks after an attack. 56

The third part of the hearings, on the relationship between civil defense and the missile program, brought out some significant testimony. Holifield and others voiced the fear that an enemy assault on the missile sites might subject the entire population and much of the Nation's food resources to radioactive fallout. They suggested moving the missiles out to sea, like the Polaris on Navy submarines. But a number of reasons were cited why such small missiles would not suffice in a counterforce strategy. At these hearings, several high-ranking military officials expressed reluctance to support an expenditure of $20 billion on a nationwide shelter program. 57

The Holifield Subcommittee's report on these hearings was highly critical, and it made clear that this was not a personal criticism of Governor Hoegh or any other individual. The issue of survival, the Subcommittee asserted, was "too grave and too compelling" for personal and partisan commentary.

... Governor Hoegh has acted with commendable zeal and energy to "sell" civil defense to the American people.

56 Ibid., Part II; Blanchard MS, p. 245.

57 See Blanchard MS, p. 247, for quotations from testimony of General Curtis LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. The testimony will be found in Hearings, Civil Defense--1960, Part III.
If films and lectures and bales of bulletins and "alert" exercises were enough, we would say that Governor Hoegh had brilliantly succeeded. Unfortunately, these activities, however important some of them may be, will not of themselves provide shielding from deadly radiation in case of enemy attack. 58

The Subcommittee was not disposed to denigrate "the homespun, self-help virtues and the importance of local initiative," but it was "coldly realistic" about the achievement of nationwide shelter protection.

. . . There is no sense in living in a world of make believe. If the Federal Government doesn't supply the funds and direct a construction program for communal shelters, there will be no national shelter program. 59

THE 1961 REORGANIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE

In view of the heavy Congressional fire directed at OCDM and its antecedent agencies, it was clear that civil defense organization and operations would be closely scrutinized by the Kennedy Administration. Upon due consideration, President Kennedy accepted the basic premise on which the OCDM had been founded, namely, that the responsibility for Federal leadership and coordination of nonmilitary defense was inescapably his. Specific assignments of responsibility for the several elements of the program would be


59 Ibid., p. 5.
made to the departments and agencies best able to give them vigorous support.

In the process of applying these concepts, OCDM was dismantled. Kennedy placed on the Secretary of Defense the basic responsibility for developing an overall national civil defense plan and program. Other agencies would be used in carrying out this assignment and in planning related nonmilitary defense activities. A much-reduced Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), largely freed of operating responsibilities, would continue as the President's instrument of advice and assistance in setting policy and in coordinating the performance of delegated nonmilitary defense functions with the total national preparedness program. For a short time, at least, as we shall see in the next chapter, this revamping of the nonmilitary defense structure brought for civil defense strong leadership and a larger commitment of Federal support than had been made in the past. Our concern now is with the events of the 1961 reorganization.

Advice to the President on Reorganization

As was to be expected, advice on reorganization came to President Kennedy from many sources. One proposal came before his inauguration as President. While he was still a presidential candidate, Senator Kennedy appointed a committee, chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, to study the organization and management of the Department of Defense and its related agencies. The Symington report, released December 5, 1960, recommended sweeping changes in Defense
organization. From the point of view of this history, it is interesting to note that the Symington committee took cognizance of the importance of civil defense by proposing that it be made the responsibility of a Unified Command in charge of the National Guard and Reserve units of the services.\textsuperscript{60} President-elect Kennedy apparently preferred to wait until after the new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, was on board and had a chance to look into the situation before deciding on a course of action.

Congressman Holifield lost no time to urge the new President to act on civil defense. One of Holifield's colleagues on the Military Operations Subcommittee, R. Walter Riehlman, announced on the floor of the House, in early May 1961, that he was introducing a concurrent resolution which would express the sense of Congress that the President "should prepare and submit to the Congress a positive program for placing full civil defense responsibility in the Department of Defense."\textsuperscript{61} On the other hand, one Democratic Senator, Stephen M. Young of Ohio, repeatedly characterized the civil defense effect as a "boondoggle," and urged curtailment if not abolition of the program.

\textbf{The Ellis Report.--From the time of Kennedy's inauguration until May 25, 1961, when he made his decision public,}


\textsuperscript{61}Quoted in Blanchard MS, p. 275.
the reassignment of the Federal responsibility for civil defense was the subject of active discussion by officials of the Executive Office and the Defense Department. One very pertinent report was submitted to the President in February, by Frank B. Ellis, a New Orleans attorney whom Kennedy had named to succeed Hoegh as OCDM Director. The concepts of the 1958 reorganization, Ellis stated, "represent a sound foundation upon which to build a strong national program." But several deficiencies had to be overcome.62

First, Ellis noted, nonmilitary defense "has not had the Presidential sanction and leadership so essential to its success." As a consequence, "satisfactory gains have not been made in clarifying and expanding the roles of the departments and agencies." Efforts to obtain direct Presidential delegations of preparedness functions got bogged down in delays, and the agencies performing nonmilitary defense functions "have felt they have been doing something for OCDM rather than carrying out their own responsibilities in a total national security preparedness program." The full development of the capabilities of the departments and agencies was urgently needed, with more assignments and all by Executive orders "carrying the full force of Presidential direction, rather than Emergency Preparedness Orders issued by OCDM."

A second problem related to the funding of delegations. The Congress and the Executive Branch had disagreed on the

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62Ellis Report, pp. 54-61.
approach to such financing. First the agencies sought funds for delegated functions in their own budgets, and later OCDM presented a consolidated budget for all delegated programs. Both approaches had met opposition in Congress. Ellis urged resolution of this problem, to enable the delegate agencies to budget for their assigned functions "just as they budget for their other responsibilities." The notion that they were doing something for OCDM, Ellis stated, "must be dispelled," and this required that the agencies consider nonmilitary defense functions as part of their normal responsibilities.

A third problem had to do with the relationship of military and nonmilitary defense. Although many authoritative studies had established the vital contribution of a strong nonmilitary defense to the deterrence of enemy attack, this fact, Ellis asserted, "has been too often overlooked." There was need, he said, for an effective arrangement within the Executive Branch "to properly relate nonmilitary to military defense, and to other elements of national strategy in developing the national budget."

Furthermore, there was the problem of funding for State and local government operations. A major impediment to progress at the State and local levels, Ellis reported, was the lack of funds to implement plans and programs. Public Law 85-606 in 1958, amending the 1950 Act, permitted for the first time the outlay of Federal funds, on a 50-50 matching basis, to assist State and local governments in financing their civil defense personnel and administrative costs. Yet, it
was not until January 1961 that any funds were made available. Such support was deemed essential if the State and local governments were to move forward in their nonmilitary defense activities.

As a fifth and final point, Ellis stressed the need for OCDM to "divest itself of all operating functions that can be performed by other agencies." Only thus, he said, could OCDM assume its proper role in the Executive Office, concentrating on the direction and coordination of the total non-military defense effort. OCDM staff apparently had been preoccupied "with the conduct of civil defense operations programs, and with determining the Agency's role in directing emergency operations." As a consequence, Ellis observed, there was a strong tendency to subordinate OCDM's basic planning and coordinating responsibilities. In his judgment,

... OCDM should plan and develop new programs as required by changing concepts in nonmilitary defense, but should develop or operate them ONLY until they can be delegated to other departments and agencies.63

Ellis made various tentative suggestions of how the operating activities might be reassigned. It should be noted that under his concept, only some civil defense activities would have devolved on the Department of Defense.64

Advice from Other Sources.—Kennedy also asked Carl Kaysen, a member of the White House staff, to take a close

63Ibid., p. 58.
64Ibid., pp. 58-61.
look at the entire question. After a month's study, Kaysen reported that OCDM was functioning under outmoded concepts, with attendant waste of its limited budget. The civil defense problem, he suggested, should be addressed seriously or simply forgotten. Should the President decide to proceed with civil defense, Kaysen suggested that the budget in the shelter field be increased and that direction of the program be assigned to the Department of Defense.  

Others close to the President held diverse views on the problem. David Bell, Director of the Budget, and McGeorge Bundy, National Security Policy Advisor, opposed substantial increases in the civil defense budget on the grounds that other programs were more urgent. On the other hand, Defense Secretary McNamara came out strongly for increased funding, especially for fallout shelters. When he came to office, McNamara initiated a series of studies on various defense programs, including civil defense. These studies showed that a shelter program would complement several active defense systems and would add to the Nation's deterrent capability. McNamara was convinced that the Defense Department could make substantial contributions to an effective civil defense.  

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The President's Decision

The question was still under discussion within Administration circles when the President decided, May 25, 1961, to revamp and expand the civil defense effort. In a special message to Congress on "Urgent National Needs," Kennedy pledged a new start on civil defense. Our retaliatory power, he indicated, must continue to be our primary shield against aggression. But a comparatively modest investment in community fallout shelters, he felt, was the minimum "insurance" which the Government should give its people in the event of a nuclear attack resulting from "an irrational act, a miscalculation, an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred."

... It is insurance we trust will never be needed—but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

Once the validity of this concept is recognized, there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of a large-scale nuclear attack.

To implement the program, the President said, several steps would be taken. First, he was assigning responsibility for the program to "the top civilian authority already responsible for continental defense, the Secretary of Defense." He deemed it "important that this function remain civilian in nature and leadership; and this feature will not be changed." Second, OCDM would be reconstituted, with its title changed to the Office of Emergency Planning, "as a small staff agency
to assist in the coordination of these functions." Third, requests would soon be transmitted to Congress for "a much-strengthened Federal-State civil defense program." Such a program, Kennedy indicated,

... will provide Federal funds for identifying fallout shelter capacity in existing structures, and it will include, where appropriate, incorporation of shelter in Federal buildings, new requirements for shelter in buildings constructed with Federal assistance, and matching grants and other incentives for constructing shelter in State and local, and private, buildings.

Federal appropriations for civil defense in fiscal 1962 under this program will in all likelihood be more than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase sharply in subsequent years. Financial participation will also be required from State and local governments, and from private citizens. But no insurance is cost-free; and every American citizen and his community must decide for themselves whether this form of survival insurance justifies the expenditure of effort, time, and money. For myself, I am convinced that it does.67

**Proposed Realignment of Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization Programs**

In his message of May 25, the President presented only the general picture of the contemplated reorganization. The

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67 "The President's Civil Defense Message" to Congress, May 25, 1961, in U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, *Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961 (hereinafter cited as *Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense*), pp. 1-2. Reflecting on the President's decision despite divergent views of White House staff members, Steuart Pittman, first director of the Office of Civil Defense in the Defense Department, later observed that Kennedy preferred not to wait for full agreement for fear the program might not have gotten launched. Also, according to Pittman, the President made the case for shelters on the basis of "insurance" rather than deterrence because he
details came in July from two sources: a memorandum from Ellis, dated July 7, 1961; and a study by McKinsey and Company submitted about a week later, under another contract with the Bureau of the Budget. Both followed closely the concepts and organizational pattern generally set out in the President's message.

The Ellis Memorandum.--In his memorandum to the President, July 7, 1961, Ellis reasserted the concept of Presidential leadership and responsibility in the nonmilitary defense field. OEP would furnish staff assistance to the President in connection with his responsibilities "to plan, determine policy for, direct, coordinate, and exercise continuing surveillance over the total nonmilitary defense program."

Specifically, Ellis stated, OEP would:

A. Represent you in your dealings with State Governors to stimulate vigorous State and local participation in civil defense and resource management planning and to make adequate preparations for the continuity of State and local civilian political authority in the event of nuclear attack.

B. Assist you in achieving a coordinated and harmonious impact on the States and localities on the part of the several Federal departments and agencies to which specific nonmilitary defense program responsibilities have been assigned.

C. Assist you in determining the appropriate nonmilitary defense roles of Federal departments and agencies, enlisting State, local, and private participation, mobilizing national support, evaluating

progress of the program, and preparing reports to the Congress.

D. Assist you in planning for the management of national resources in an emergency, including, but not limited to, the postattack period.

E. Assist you in making plans to deal with the overall effects of enemy strikes on human and material resources.

F. Assist you in the development of policies concerning the strategic use of national resources during the cold war, or in the event of limited war, and appropriate economic warfare matters such as restrictions of imports threatening the national security.

G. Advise you on the need for Presidential declaration of major natural disasters and coordinating on your behalf Federal operation in connection therewith.

H. Develop plans for the continuity of Federal operations in the event of nuclear attack, and for the performance, as necessary, of such emergency activities as the evaluation of remaining resources after an attack, their allocation, the control of transportation, the maintenance of economic stabilization, and censorship.

I. Serve as telecommunications coordinator for the executive branch.

J. Assist you in determining policy for, and supervising the maintenance of, the strategic stockpile.

In carrying out these functions, the Office of Emergency Planning would make fullest use of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government in order to maintain a minimum staff both centrally and in the field.

To enlist the vigorous support of the many talents and resources of the Defense Department, Ellis recommended that the President make the first specific assignment to the Secretary of Defense of responsibility for "the total civil defense program." Specifically, this would involve:
A. The development and execution of a fallout shelter program.

B. The development and execution of a chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare defense program.

C. The assumption of responsibility for transmitting warning of impending attack to civilian authorities and to the public, in accordance with policies determined by you.

D. The maintenance of a national communications network for use by civilian authorities of Government postattack.

E. The development of planning guidance for, and emergency assistance to, State and local governments in such postattack community services as health and sanitation services, maintenance of law and order, firefighting and control, debris clearance, traffic control, and the provision of adequate water supplies.

F. The collection of data on location and strength of enemy strikes and such assessment of their damage as is required to minimize such damage.

G. The administration of Federal matching funds programmed for the strengthening of State and local civil defense capabilities.

H. Assistance to the States and localities in the provision of protected facilities to serve the requirements of damage control operations and to facilitate the OEP plans for the continuity of State and local government.

I. The development and execution of plans for making available to State and local governments such surplus Federal property as will enhance their civil defense capabilities.

J. The development and maintenance of a capability to direct, both nationally and in the regions, the movement from unattacked areas to attacked areas of such aid and resources as can be made available for civil defense operations.

In the fulfillment of these responsibilities, it is contemplated that the Secretary of Defense would
avail himself wherever feasible of the capabilities of other Federal agencies, as determined by you, by contractual or other agreement.

Ellis further recommended assignment to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of the responsibility for developing and maintaining a National Emergency Medical Stockpile, and to the Department of Agriculture of responsibility for a National Food Stockpile. The proposed assignments, Ellis concluded,

... offer promise of an invigorated, meaningful, non-military defense program, if supported by a larger commitment of Federal resources than has been made in the past, and buttressed by a continuation of the Presidential concern, leadership, and support which you have demonstrated.

To this end I pledge my full support and that of the staff of the new Office of Emergency Planning.68

The McKinsey Study.—A week following the Ellis memorandum, McKinsey & Company submitted its study to the Bureau of the Budget. Its purpose was to suggest what responsibilities should be transferred to the Defense Department to accomplish the President's stated objective of launching a more vigorous and effective program to defend the civilian population.69 Drawing from the experience of 15 years in

68 Memorandum of July 7, 1961, to President Kennedy from OCDM Director Frank B. Ellis, in Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense, pp. 3-5.

69 Maxim MS, pp. 133-139. The study, entitled Transferring Greater Responsibilities for Nonmilitary Defense to the Department of Defense, is reproduced as Appendix 12 to the Holifield Subcommittee hearings in 1961 on civil defense; see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Governmental Operations, Civil Defense--1961, Hearings before Subcommittee, August 1-9, 1961, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961.
nonmilitary defense activities, the study listed seven principles as important guides for the reorganization. In brief, these were:

1. The Nation must be prepared for three different kinds of warfare: an all-out nuclear attack, limited war, and the continuing cold war. OCDM, the study indicated, had neglected preparations for the last two contingencies.

2. There is increasingly more overlapping between military and nonmilitary preparations for war. Full cognizance had not been taken of this factor because of the traditional fear of military domination of the civilian populace.

3. There is no longer time to prepare for war after hostilities have started.

4. OCDM has not made maximum use of existing governmental machinery at any level of government.

5. The OCDM regional offices provide a reasonably good line of communications between Federal, state, and local officials. However, the existing arrangement would not be equal to an attack situation. So, this matter should be given proper attention in future considerations.

6. The President needs a staff organization that can assist him in the over-all formulation of nonmilitary defense policy, in providing leadership for carrying out this policy, and in guiding and coordinating the nonmilitary defense efforts of the Federal departments and agencies. OCDM has not been able to effectively provide the President with this
kind of assistance because of its heavy involvement in operating activities.

7. The Federal nonmilitary defense organization must have sufficient flexibility to meet the rapid technological changes in enemy capabilities with which it is constantly confronted. Vested interests have grown up in OCDM which have prevented it from adapting itself to such changes.  

In line with these principles, the McKinsey study presented various alternative organizational arrangements, including the transfer of virtually all civil defense functions to the Defense Department. It indicated preference for the last-mentioned option, although it posed questions as to the desirability of having responsibility for military defense and civil defense assigned to the same department.  

Assuming the responsibilities fell to the Defense Department, the study considered various options for handling the civil defense activities: assignment to an administrator for civil defense ranking equally with the three service secretaries; assignment to the Secretary of the Army who could delegate the operating functions to the continental armies; or assignment of civil defense activities throughout the Defense Department, wherever appropriate, to ensure their proper execution.

Of these last three options, the McKinsey study expressed preference for the third, as most likely to provide

70 Ibid., pp. 508-510.
71 Ibid., pp. 510-514.
the greatest use of the Department's capabilities in strengthening the civil defense program. In connection with this third alternative, the study recommended assignment to an assistant to the Secretary of Defense or one of the existing Assistant Secretaries of over-all responsibility for civil defense activities, in order to keep them from getting lost in the Department. 72

A New Look for Civil Defense

Executive Order 10952, July 20, 1961.--With both the Ellis memorandum and the McKinsey study in hand, President Kennedy proceeded to give civil defense a new look, which hopefully would be more effective and also more acceptable to Congress. Executive Order 10952, dated July 20, 1961, charged the Secretary of Defense with supervision of the Federal programs for the protection of the civilian population against nuclear attack. 73 Specifically, he was charged with the development and execution of:

(i) a fallout shelter program;

(ii) a chemical, biological, and radiological warfare defense program;

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72 Ibid., pp. 516-517.

73 For the full text of Executive Order 10952, see Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense, pp. 6-8. Certain functions were reserved to the President. The most important of these related to the medical and food stockpiles, the Civil Defense Advisory Council, the delegation of civil defense responsibilities to Federal agencies, and the so-called "Title III" emergency authority of the Federal Civil Defense Act.
(iii) all steps necessary to warn or alert Federal military and civilian authorities, State officials, and the civilian population;

(iv) all functions pertaining to communications, including a warning network, reporting on monitoring, instructions to shelters, and communications between authorities;

(v) emergency assistance to State and local governments in a postattack period, including water, debris, fire, health, traffic, police, and evacuation capabilities;

(vi) protection and emergency operational capability of State and local government agencies in keeping with plans for the continuity of government; and

(vii) programs for making financial contributions to the States (including personnel and administrative expenses) for civil defense purposes.

In addition, he was to develop and operate a nationwide postattack damage assessment program and make necessary arrangements for the donation of Federal surplus property.

The Director of OCDM (later OEP) was charged with advising and assisting the President in the following matters:

(a) determining policy for the total civil defense program, including the obtaining of information necessary for such policy determinations; (b) reviewing and coordinating the civil defense activities of the Federal agencies, including their relations with each other and with the States and neighboring countries; (c) determining the appropriate civil defense roles of Federal agencies, securing nationwide support for and participation in the civil defense programs, evaluating progress of programs, and reporting to Congress on such programs; (d) assisting and encouraging the States
to enter into interstate civil defense compacts and enact reciprocal civil defense laws; and (e) providing assistance to states in negotiating mutual civil defense arrangements with other States and neighboring countries. In addition, the OCDM Director was to develop plans, conduct programs, and coordinate preparations for continuity of government at all levels in the event of attack.

Related Statements.—Accompanying the President's Executive order was a White House press release highlighting the 1961 reorganization and some of the philosophy underlying it. In issuing the Executive order, the President said:

More than ever, a strong civil defense program is vital to the Nation's security. Today, civil defense is of direct concern to every citizen and at every level of government.

Civil defense, under the charge of the Secretary of Defense, the release reiterated, "will remain civilian in nature and leadership." The Executive Order, Kennedy was convinced, constituted "a step toward achieving, in the form a realistic, strengthened civil defense program, the survival insurance and the increased defensive strength so vital to the Nation's security."

The President instructed the Secretary of Defense, the White House indicated, to give "urgent attention" to surveying shelter facilities in existing structures—a task on which McNamara had already embarked. Furthermore, the President anticipated the early submission to Congress of a request for increased funds "for an invigorated civil defense program."
Kennedy made it clear that civil defense preparations would be a governmentwide effort in carrying out a responsibility that rested in him as President:

In calling upon the resources of the Department of Defense to stimulate and invigorate our civil defense preparations, I am acting under the basic Federal premise that responsibility for the accomplishment of civil defense preparations at the Federal level is vested in me. In the States and localities, similar responsibilities are vested in the Governors and local executives. It is my hope that they, too, will redouble their efforts to strengthen our civil defense and will work closely with the Department of Defense in its new assignment.

Because civil defense reached into virtually every phase of government and the national life, Kennedy indicated that he would be actively concerned with "the problem of coordinating our civil defense preparations with other nonmilitary defense preparations required to achieve a strong position for our Nation." In this, the President said, he would be represented and assisted by the Director of OCDM.

Kennedy played up the OCDM Director's Presidential staff role in the civil defense effort and the remaining functions relating to the postattack and the "defense mobilization" programs. He made a special point of complimenting Ellis and the OCDM organization on "their vigorous and successful efforts since shortly after Inauguration Day to focus national attention on the critical gaps in our civil defense preparations." The President, the release indicated, "particularly congratulated Mr. Ellis on his constructive attitude in
consultations leading to agreement on the new program direction. 74

On that same eventful day--July 20, 1961--both Ellis and McNamara issued statements concerning the reorganization of civil defense. The President's actions, Ellis said, "are indeed encouraging developments" to those leaders, officials, and stout supporters "who have labored these many years against such discouraging odds to bring about a state of civil defense preparedness in this country." The President, he continued, "has recognized clearly the importance of civil defense preparedness to our national security," and assigned major responsibility to "that department of Government which can commit the greatest resources to its execution." All citizens and particularly the six and one-half million persons who had been devoting their efforts to the cause of civil defense, Ellis was confident, "will redouble their efforts now that the prospects are so favorable for an invigorated program under the President's leadership." 75

74 White House Press Release, July 20, 1961, in Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense, pp. 9-10. Apparently Ellis and McNamara did not see eye-to-eye on the scope of the assignment to the Defense Secretary. Ellis wanted to hold back certain functions, while McNamara insisted on an all-or-none approach. The President sided with McNamara. Ellis stayed on for a while as OCDM-OEP Director and resigned to accept a Federal judgeship. See Sorenson, op. cit., p. 614; Blanchard MS, P. 278; Kerr MS, pp. 252-253.

75 For the text of "The Director's Statement," see Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense, p. 11.
McNamara directed his statement to the task at hand.

He set forth four "major considerations" by which the Defense Department would be guided in undertaking its assigned responsibilities:

(1) The Civil Defense effort must remain under civilian direction and control, involving, as it does, the survival of every citizen. It requires the closest and most sympathetic cooperation between the federal civilian authorities and state and local governments.

(2) In the age of thermonuclear war, civil defense must be integrated with all aspects of military defense against thermonuclear attack.

(3) The Civil Defense functions of the Department must not be permitted to downgrade the military capabilities of our armed forces.

(4) Whatever expenditures are undertaken for Civil Defense projects must be directed toward obtaining maximum protection for lowest possible cost.

The civil defense function, McNamara said, would be organized within the Defense Department as "a civilian function," drawing where necessary on the military departments for available support. A special group, McNamara further indicated, was preparing a budget for "the new and accelerated Civil Defense program outlined by the President." Thereafter, the group would address itself to the organizational problems posed by the transfer of the functions, "including operations in Washington, in Battle Creek, Michigan, and in the field." 76

The brightest moment in the history of American civil defense seemed to be at hand.

76 For the text of "The Secretary of Defense's Statement," see Documents on Reorganization of Civil Defense, p. 12.
President Kennedy had no trouble getting Congress to accept his administrative reorganization of the civil defense effort, and Congress readily voted the full amount of his supplemental request for fiscal 1962 ($207.6 million) to embark on a nationwide fallout shelter program. Under the leadership of Defense Secretary McNamara and Steuart L. Pittman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense), the new Office of Civil Defense (OCD) put forth a prodigious effort over the next several years to establish the program, with fallout shelters for all Americans as its basic goal and with various complementary and supporting systems. It was a modest program, minimal in cost and in degree of protection. Even so, it held out the prospect of high returns in lives saved under a nuclear attack. For those in the civil defense program, it seemed to mark a turnabout—a new start, a reversal of past frustrations.

Unfortunately, the impetus of the Kennedy initiative in 1961 was short-lived. Necessary legislation and funding for Federal support of shelter construction to fill gaps in the
program met with repeated rebuffs—a severe jolt attributable perhaps more to the lack of Presidential support than to Congressional opposition. Disenchanted with this turn of events, Pittman returned to his law practice in April 1964. Under his stewardship, OCD chalked up a truly remarkable record of accomplishment; but the ensuing years of OCD's life were years of lowered prestige, declining budgets, and erosion of basic programs. After that fiscal 1962 surge, appropriations dropped steadily to a low of $60.5 million in fiscal 1969; they averaged about $91 million annually over the ten fiscal years 1963-72. Pittman's successors—William P. Durkee and Joseph Romm in the Johnson Administration and Governor John E. Davis in the Nixon Administration—sought to make the best of a deteriorating situation. For all the continued rhetoric about the role of civil defense in the Nation's overall defense posture, OCD, like its antecedent agencies, found itself leading a "thin," "low-profile," "back-burner" operation, maintained at the lowest possible sustaining rate as a matter of prudence in an uncertain world.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

Underlying Conditions and Concepts

In his May 1961 message to Congress, President Kennedy had committed himself to an accelerated civil defense
effort. It was to be a moderate effort, designed to shield the population from radioactive fallout, not from the blast, heat or fire effects at the points of nuclear bursts or impact. The President's message, followed two month later by the Berlin crisis, generated much public interest and touched off heated debate over the need for shelters, their effectiveness, and the psychological and social effects of such a program. Within Kennedy's inner circle there was no unanimity on the merits of the commitment, and Kennedy himself soon had qualms about it. But he decided in the latter half of 1961 to go ahead with the program, pointing principally toward community rather than individual shelters and a comparatively low level of Federal spending.  

This concept was predicated on Defense Department studies. These indicated that existing buildings and homes could shield large numbers of people—perhaps more than one-third of the population—at little cost. Maldistribution of shelter spaces in relation to the population, however, would inevitably create a shortfall, and this deficit would have to be overcome if the population was to be adequately protected. Meeting this deficit would require community shelter construction with Federal incentives. This would necessitate authorizing legislation and an outlay of some $3 billion over a four- or five-year period, with the Federal

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share about $1.8 billion. Without this Federal subsidiza-
tion, the fallout shelter program would bring a saving of 30
million lives in a heavy attack in the early seventies; with
it, 50 million lives would be saved.\(^2\)

In addition to shielding the total population from
radioactivity, the Kennedy program placed great stress on
building up the emergency operating capabilities of the
local communities. During a nuclear attack and for some
weeks thereafter, these localities would have to stand on
their own feet; and this placed special obligations on their
officials just as it did on the President himself. As Pitt-
man put it,

\[\ldots\text{The capacity to survive this ordeal would depend}
\]
largely on previous organization, planning and prepara-
tion to save lives and restore services. This work
must be done now, not during an emergency, and it must
engage the energies of those of you who would carry out
these plans if our country were ever attacked.\ldots\]

\[\ldots\text{Ordinary individuals may have a personal option to}
\]
ignore the problem of self-preservation in a nuclear
attack; but Government officials do not. Leadership,
from the President on down, have little choice but to
carry out this difficult task of building protection
into the life of the country.\(^3\)

\(^2\) U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963, Hearings of
Subcommittee, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington: U.S.
Steuart L. Pittman, "Government and Civil Defense," in Who
Speaks for Civil Defense? Eugene P. Wigner, ed. (New

\(^3\) U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the
Office of Civil Defense for Fiscal Year 1962 (Washington:
Components of the Program

The President's new civil defense program was a balanced one. Its principal component was the location or development of fallout shelters for the entire population. Studies of possible patterns of nuclear attack on the United States indicated that fallout shelters had greater lifesaving potential than any other feasible protective measure, and that the number of people saved would decrease only slightly as the power and number of weapons increased. Along with the location and licensing of public shelter space, it would be necessary to mark them with distinctive signs and to stock them with food, water, medical items, and other equipment required to sustain life and make shelters livable.

The program included a number of complementary systems deemed necessary to make effective use of shelters and to conduct emergency operations. Under a nationwide warning system, the people would be informed of impending attack and when to go to shelters. A communications system would disseminate information on what was happening during an emergency, the nature and extent of damage, and on lifesaving measures. Nationwide monitoring and reporting systems would be used to collect, evaluate and disseminate information on radioactive fallout. Through a damage assessment system, preattack estimates and postattack assessments of damage would be developed—to help determine what
courses of action could best assure survival and recovery.

An essential ingredient of the program was Federal assistance, encompassing a number of activities--technical guidance, training and education, financial assistance, and donations of surplus property--designed to gain active participation by all levels of government, by all types of private organizations, and by individuals responsible for the safety of others. Especially significant in this regard was the provision of Federal matching funds for three grant-in-aid programs: (1) State and local personnel and administrative expenses deemed essential to provide the organizational and operational capability at State and local levels upon which the Federal Government depended to translate Federal programs, plans and guidance into protection for people at the community level; (2) The necessary "hardware"--communication, warning, and other supplies and equipment and training to meet the needs of local civil defense organizations in implementing operational plans peculiar to their local situations; and (3) Protected emergency operating centers (ECOs) to serve as the focal points of emergency activities.

The program also encompassed a number of supporting activities including the dissemination of information to the public on plans, programs and progress in developing a shelter-oriented civil defense program and on life-saving actions in time of emergency; gaining participation of industry
and national organizations; maintaining the liaison with international civil defense programs; and obtaining guidance and recommendations from experts. A carefully organized research program would give perspective to the development and stocking of the shelter system and to all complementary systems so as to make fallout shelters practicable and habitable in an emergency. Such research would include work on shelter design and construction; ventilation kits; means of providing protection from blast and thermal effects as well as radiation effects; fire resistance; and requirements for protection from biological agents and toxic chemicals.

Ranging over the entire program structure, of course, was management—a small item in terms of overall cost but of critical importance to the success of the effort. At the national level, the Office of Civil Defense would be expected to monitor and administer the total effort. A professional, disciplined civil defense staff with requisite technical skills would be needed to plan and direct emergency operations. It would focus on national objectives, and establish and maintain cooperative relationships with other Federal agencies and with State and local governments which had to share the management burden in the planning and execution of prescribed programs.

Effective direction and control under emergency conditions would require a nationwide network of Federal, State and local operating centers capable of performing essential
governmental functions. It was visualized that Federal direction and control would emanate from eight Federal regional Emergency Operating Centers. These would have a capability of operating independently under emergency conditions. They would serve as focal points in directing the immediate survival operations and the subsequent recovery effort in their respective geographical areas. The EOCs at the local level, as indicated earlier, would also have pivotal roles in emergency operations. They would concern themselves with such emergency activities as issuing attack and radiological warnings to the people; directing movements of people to shelters; conducting damage assessment; informing the public of the emergency situation; and directing emergency operations of the organized forces of government.  

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

Defense Secretary McNamara moved quickly to establish the Office of Civil Defense under his immediate direction.
and mobilize the vast resources of his department in support of OCD programs. Federal civilian agencies were drawn into civil defense operations by virtue of Presidential assignments. Non-governmental organizations also helped in preparing for emergency operations. And, of special importance, close working relationships were maintained with State and local governments to develop their capability for effective action in an emergency. Distinctive features of OCD management were the large number of organizations involved, the diverse disciplines required, and the depth of participation by Federal military and civilian elements and by State and local governments in the total program.

The Headquarters and Field Establishment

A task force was assembled early in fiscal 1962 to complete the 1961 reorganization of civil defense and develop and launch the new program. On July 31, 1961, pending the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense), McNamara charged his Special Assistant, Adam Yarmolinsky, with the task of organizing and establishing an Office of Civil Defense within the Department.5 A

month later an Office of Civil Defense was formally established under an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense), a post assumed by Steuart Pitman. To him were re-delegated the responsibilities of the Defense Secretary. In carrying out these responsibilities, the Assistant Secretary was enjoined to "utilize to the maximum extent the existing facilities of the Department of Defense in lieu of duplicating such facilities within his office."  

From its inception OCD was organized on a functional pattern. For greater effectiveness, OCD effected several major organizational changes in the second year of the program. These included:

1. Establishment of the Directorate for Technical Liaison to assure that OCD policies, plans, programs, and executive actions were consistent with and predicated on sound technical and scientific concepts.

2. Elevation of the Office of the Regional Coordinator from division level to staff status in the Office of the Assistant Secretary.

3. Formation of two separate divisions, Communications-Electronics and Warning, in the Directorate for Technical Operations. These were formerly one division.

4. Consolidation of responsibilities for coordination of supply requirements, procurement, contracts, and inventory and supply management. A

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6DOD Directive No. 5140.1, Aug. 31, 1961, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense) and enclosure, Appendix 3 to OCD, Annual Report for FY 1962, pp. 89-93.
new Materiel Office in Management was established to handle this function, formerly organizationally diversified.

OCD's initial personnel ceiling was 1,148 positions, of which 448 were authorized for the headquarters in Washington, D.C., 600 for the eight regional offices, and 100 for field training centers and warning offices. Effective management required the relocation of the headquarters staff from Battle Creek. The move, announced on December 5, 1961, brought a heavy attrition of personnel; but the vacancies created in the process permitted recruitment of new talent to help strengthen the headquarters staff. 8

An important feature of OCD management was the effort to handle most operational activities with States through the eight Regional Offices. These offices were put in readiness to handle commitments of Federal matching funds to the States and for the proposed shelter incentive program. They were given technical staffs to support State and local survival planning and participation in shelter survey, radiological monitoring, warning and communications systems. To ensure continuity of Federal field emergency operations, plans were laid for the construction of underground emergency operating centers in each of the regions. By the end of fiscal 1972, such centers were operational in six of the

7OCD, Annual Report for FY 1963, p. 8. See Figure (p. 12) for a chart of the OCD organization in January 1963.

8OCD, Annual Report for FY 1962, pp. 8-12.
eight regions; centers for the remaining two regions were then still in the planning and design stages.9

In directing the national program, OCD with its eight regional offices dealt with the 50 States, five outlying areas and the District of Columbia, more than 3,000 counties or parishes, and more than 17,000 incorporated local governments.10 At the State and local levels, it should be noted, the civil defense system was a dual-purpose system, with organization, planning and training to deal with natural as well as nuclear disasters. To assist in the direction and control of this far-reaching program, OCD trained its personnel in the new Defense management techniques, relying upon the use of automatic data processing equipment and the application of program evaluation and review techniques. Through these and other management techniques, OCD sought to control program scheduling, provide information for decisions on the allocation of resources to meet program objectives, and promote greater efficiency and economy of operations.

Marshaling Federal Support

Use of Defense Resources.--A key factor in the acceleration of the civil defense program with increased economy


Figure 6--OCD organization chart

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (CIVIL DEFENSE)

DEPUTY

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS

DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION

DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH

DIRECTOR FOR TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

SURVEY DIVISION

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS DIVISION

PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES DIVISION

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING DIVISION

WARNING DIVISION

ARCHITECTURAL & ENG. DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

REGIONAL DIRECTORS

TRAINING CENTERS AND STATE COLLEGE

STATE AND LOCAL DIVISION

STATE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE DIVISION

DEPARTMENTAL FIELD

WARNING CENTERS

STATES AND SUCCESSIONS

and efficiency was the support rendered by many elements of the Defense establishment. In its report for fiscal 1963, for example, OCD cited the following uses of Defense resources in giving strong impetus to its program:

1. The Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks continued to carry out a major portion of the National Shelter Program by surveying the entire Nation for available fallout shelter space. In addition, they assisted this program by using existing architectural and engineering talent for shelter planning and designing, by conducting engineering case studies, and by constructing, managing, and operating a protective structure and development center.

2. The Defense Supply Agency managed the logistics of all OCD supplies; e.g., procurement, receipt, storage, and issuance to State governments of all shelter supplies, management of OCD emergency supply inventory, and use of technical military capability for food and container research and development of procurement specifications.

3. The Defense Communications Agency integrated the civil defense communications system with military communications systems to improve emergency capability, provide greater reliability and flexibility, and reduce vulnerability by using more dispersed facilities.

4. The Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, performed major OCD publication services such as procuring printing and binding, distributing new publications, maintaining reserve stocks, and filling requisition requests from State, local, and public sources.

5. The Army Finance Office performed all OCD payroll and disbursing services.

6. The military departments made Standby Reserve officers available to State and local governments for assignment of civil defense duties.

7. The U.S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC) trained State and local civil defense personnel in explosive ordnance reconnaissance and radiological monitoring.
8. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) maintained an integrated military and civilian warning system providing warning service to all OCD warning centers.

9. Arrangements with the Air Force provided for the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) to perform aerial radiological monitoring in 48 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, the Weapons System Evaluation Group, and the National Military Command Systems Support Center were chief participants in studies of attack patterns analyzing military strategy and evaluating weapons systems and civil emergency planning. These studies established need for the nationwide shelter system, the principal part of the civil defense program. In addition, continuing information and evaluation studies from this source are essential for maintaining the OCD damage assessment system and for determining the adequacy of OCD operational plans.

11. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) furnished OCD legal and legislative liaison services.

12. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) continued to perform certain civil defense public information functions to assure coordination of public information common to both military and non-military programs.

Pittman's charter, plus the top-level emphasis on the complementary relationship of civil and military defense, prompted him to push to the full this interweaving of Defense resources with nearly all OCD operations.

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Military Support of Civil Defense.--Besides helping OCD in its current efforts, the Armed Forces were specifically charged with the performance of certain civil defense functions under emergency conditions involving nuclear attack or preceding such attack. A departmental directive, April 23, 1963, prescribed such military support of civil defense. The directive recognized "the essential interdependence of the civil and military defense efforts of our Nation in achieving the total posture of national security." Military support to civil authorities in civil defense operations was recognized as "an emergency task within the mission of all Federal active duty and reserve units of the Military Services." All units, with minor exceptions, were, therefore, required to maintain the capacity to assist civil authorities in restoring Federal, State and local civil operations. The amount of military support of the civil defense mission during and after the attack would depend upon the extent and degree of damage suffered, and upon the military operations in process or required.

The directive made clear that military assistance of civil authorities would complement and not be a substitute for civil participation in civil defense operations. Such assistance was seen as temporary, to be terminated as soon as possible in order to conserve military resources and avoid infringement on the responsibility and authority of
civil government agencies. To preserve the integrity of the military chain of command, a military commander, in making his resources available to civil authorities, the directive asserted, "is subject to no authority other than that of his superior in the military chain of command."\(^{12}\)

Preparations for this type of assistance for civil defense were hindered, however, because no military liaison point existed at the State level to plan for, and coordinate, such assistance. This condition was corrected under a plan to use State Adjutants General and their headquarters to plan for military support of civil defense and to direct military forces committed within the State for civil defense assistance in the event of a nuclear attack. The plan was placed in operation in accordance with a revised directive issued March 29, 1965.\(^{13}\)

Support of Other Federal Agencies.--OCD also pursued to full advantage the opportunity afforded to coordinate civil defense operations of Federal civilian agencies. A


series of Executive orders early in 1962 and in 1963 prescribed emergency preparedness functions to various Federal departments and agencies. The assignments encompassed all emergency conditions, and involved activities closely related to the normal functions of these departments and agencies. Most of these Presidential assignments included to some degree civil defense functions; these aspects required OCD coordination to ensure their execution in consonance with the national civil defense plans, programs and operations of the Secretary of Defense.

While it did not fund the performance of functions assigned by Executive order, OCD negotiated contractual arrangements with the departments and agencies as a means of achieving necessary coordination. OCD also contracted for special talents in these agencies in carrying out its own assignments in such areas as research, damage assessment, and rural civil defense.\textsuperscript{14} An Interagency Civil Defense Committee was established in April 1964, to strengthen contacts and working relationships among personnel of Federal agencies pursuing related civil defense objectives.\textsuperscript{15}

More than a year earlier, Regional Civil Defense Coordinating Boards were established to coordinate the civil


defense planning of Federal civil and military departments in the field with State and local governments. The OCD Regional Directors chaired these boards, which included representatives from the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), the three military departments, and various departments and agencies which held assignments of emergency preparedness responsibilities. Under the terms of the Defense Department instruction establishing these boards, the OCD Regional Directors could look to them for advice and assistance in a wide range of functions including, but not limited to--

1. Coordination and correlation of civilian and military civil defense planning at regional, state, and local level.

2. Review of policy guidance governing implementation of plans and operational procedures on the following priority programs:

   a. Identification, Licensing, Marking, and Provisioning of Shelters, in consonance with the National Shelter Program.

   b. Increasing of Shelter Capability, by modification of existing buildings, providing shelter spaces in certain new construction, identification and utilization of shelter spaces in existing buildings, identification of the best available protection space for temporary use until full shelter capability can be achieved, development of home shelters, and development of community shelters by industry, state, and local governments, and other institutions.
c. Development and execution of Plans for Utilization of Shelter Space, including:

(1) Movement to shelter plans.
(2) Internal shelter management.
(3) Acquisition of approved civil defense provisions and equipment required for shelters over and above that furnished by the Federal Government.
(4) Training.

d. Development and execution of plans for:

(1) Warning the public.
(2) Radiological monitoring and reporting.
(3) Informing the public with regard to civil defense activities and plans.\(^{16}\)

Even at this early stage in the history of OCD, these efforts to promote understanding and cooperation attested to the problems of separating "emergency preparedness" and "civil defense," and of placing in one agency (OEP) the job of Presidential staff advice and assistance regarding the total civil defense program and in another (OCD) the basic responsibilities for civil defense operations. These problems, as we shall see, defied effective resolution until the summer of 1979, when the "Federal preparedness" and "civil defense" functions were brought back together again.

within the newly created Federal Emergency Management Agency.

State and Local Participation

Support from State and local governments and from industrial and community leaders was deemed extremely important to the success of the President's program. Over the years OCD reports pointed to considerable evidence of cooperation in the national survey of public fallout shelters, in licensing shelter spaces, in stocking shelters, in establishing radiological monitoring stations, and in training shelter managers and radiological monitors. Building owners, industry and other private groups in many localities indicated a willingness to develop or upgrade shelter spaces, often without Federal subsidies.

Emphasis on the buildup of EOCs brought encouraging results. By mid-1965, 623 State and local centers had been financed by Federal matching funds; and more than 1,000 had been established without the use of Federal funds. Six years later, OCD's successor, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) reported a total of 3,820 EOCs in being or in process of establishment--1,129 with Federal assistance and 2,691 without Federal assistance. The operational readiness of many State and local civil defense

18 DCPA, Annual Report, FY 1972, p. 11.
organizations often was tested in dealing with the effects of natural disasters. There could be little question that the efficiency of these organizations increased substantially after the launching of the new program in 1961. At the same time, there was even less doubt that the progress achieved would have to be multiplied many times before the Nation could expect to attain even a reasonably adequate capability of saving lives and surviving nuclear attack. It was also clear that continued progress at the State and local levels would be in proportion to the leadership shown by the Federal Government in continuing the initiatives of 1961.

THE NATIONWIDE FALLOUT SHELTER SYSTEM

The Choice

The programs initiated in September 1961 had three immediate objectives: (1) to locate suitable fallout shelters in existing facilities; (2) to mark them with specific signs; and (3) to stock them with food and water, medical and sanitation kits, and radiation measuring instruments. Longer-term objectives were to update and maintain the validity of the shelter data and to locate additional shelters in shelter-deficient communities. Selection of this program was predicated upon the same careful study and analysis as had applied to the development of new weapons
and strategy. The approach chosen seemed to meet the requirements which McNamara had established in August 1961 that any expenditures for civil defense projects must seek maximum protection for the lowest possible cost.\textsuperscript{19}

Probability studies of the effects of various patterns of nuclear attack demonstrated that an effective fallout shelter program had a significant lifesaving potential. From composite results of the studies, shown in figure, it appeared that:

1. A nationwide fallout shelter system would save many millions of lives in any attack.
2. The number of people surviving because of fallout shelter would double or even triple under heavier attacks.
3. At lighter attack levels, 25 to 40 million persons would be saved by a fallout shelter system; a saving of 40 million lives would increase total survivors from 80 million to 120 million.\textsuperscript{20}

Further reviews of the various postures brought down to 65.7 million the number of people who would survive in the absence of any protection, and brought up to 48.5 million the number of people who would be saved by a full fallout shelter program. Thus, of a projected 1970 population of 210 million, the surviving population would total 114.2 million.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{20}OCD, Annual Report for FY 1963, p. 4.

Figure 7
LIFESAVING POTENTIAL OF NATIONWIDE FALLOUT SHELTER SYSTEM

The studies indicated that it would be technically feasible to shield that portion of the population subject to blast and thermal effects of a nuclear attack. Such protection, however, would be several times more costly than the fallout shelter program; and a ballistic missile defense would entail still higher costs. Besides, fallout protection would account for almost twice as many lives saved as either of the other two systems. Thus, from the standpoint of both costs and lifesaving potential, the case for a nationwide system of fallout protection along the lines then planned seemed indisputable.  

Shelter Requirements and Sources

On the basis of an estimated 1970 population of 210 million and an analysis of the daytime and nighttime distribution of the population, OCD established a national requirement of 240 million shelter spaces. Federal policy emphasized public shelters as the most appropriate approach.

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to fallout protection.\footnote{U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, \textit{New Civil Defense Program}, House Report No. 1249, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 58.} This did not rule out family shelters in instances of individual preference, especially in rural areas. But the public shelter approach had the advantages of better protection inherent in structural features of larger buildings; economy; better state of readiness; and diversity of skills among occupants that would be required for survival and in the postattack environment.

The initial plan contemplated meeting a requirement of 235 million shelter spaces by the end of 1967. The nationwide survey launched in fiscal 1962 was expected to produce at least 70 million shelter spaces. Incorporation of fallout shelters into Federal buildings would provide an additional 5 million spaces. Private initiative by homeowners, industry and others would yield approximately 60 million spaces over the five-year period. The proposed shelter incentive program, contingent upon future legislation and appropriations (which, as we shall see, never materialized), would produce approximately 100 million spaces in the same five years.\footnote{OCD, \textit{Annual Report for FY 1962}, pp. 6-8.}

Requirements and sources for meeting them were adjusted over the years in response to population growth, slippage in the shelter development program, and continued improvement...
in survey techniques and management. In fiscal 1963, for example, the projected plan called for obtaining 240 million shelter spaces as follows:26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Millions of spaces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National shelter survey</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter in Federal buildings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Shelter Development Program</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private initiative (industry, homeowners and others)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key Elements of the Program

The National Shelter Program initiated in September 1961, had six basic objectives: (1) locating suitable shelter space in existing facilities; (2) securing license agreements from owners of facilities to permit use of acceptable space; (3) marking shelters with distinctive signs; (4) stocking shelters with survival supplies; (5) locating additional shelter spaces where needed; and (6) keeping shelter data current. Initially, the determination was made that public fallout shelters to be marked and stocked would have to contain space for at least 50 persons, allowing 10 square feet per person in adequately ventilated shelters and 500 cubic feet in unventilated space. There was to be one cubic foot of secure storage space per person.

And the shelters were to have a protection factor of at least 100.27

Under OCD procedures and techniques, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks contracted with architect-engineer firms to make the surveys and supervised their work. The job was done in two phases. In Phase I, potential shelter areas in all public and private buildings with a fallout protection factor of 20 or higher, and with capacity for at least 50 persons would be identified. This would be followed by detailed, on-site surveys of the buildings identified as suitable for fallout shelter. Means would be devised to improve the shelter potential of buildings with a fallout protection of less than 100. Phase II would also include surveys of selected special facilities, such as caves, mines and tunnels, to determine their suitability for shelter.

In Phase II, contractors would inspect buildings to verify fallout protection factors and space estimates, and to analyze them for shelter habitability and ventilation needs. For shelters with protective factors between 40 and 100, records were made of requisite improvements and estimated costs to upgrade the fallout protection factor to 100. The Bureau of the Census tabulated and summarized the information, and made it available to local governments and

shelter owners. Property owners had the option and bore the expense of upgrading substandard shelters.

In October 1962, the protection factor requirement for shelters was reduced from 100 to 40, which more than doubled available shelter space. This change was a direct result of the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy personally took the initiative during the week of the Cuban missile crisis to question what civil defense could do if the decision was made to dismantle the missiles in Cuba, particularly whether Miami could be evacuated. Pittman, called into the "Executive Committee" meeting, said there were no reliable plans for total evacuation of Miami and that it should not be done without a plan to guide the behavior of the rest of the population, which had just heard the President say on television that any Cuban military action would provoke a U.S. response as though it came from Russia. Pittman proposed a plan for extending the civil defense program, but it was understandably ignored during the crisis. Two days after the crisis had broken, the President called Pittman, inquiring about the proposal. It was thus brought to the President's attention and was quickly approved. This decision, in addition to downgrading and extending fallout protection, upgraded and extended other program components and generally gave temporary new life to the declining priority for civil defense.²⁸

With the surveys came shelter license agreements by building owners for use of acceptable shelter space. These agreements authorized: (1) temporary access by the public to specified shelter space in emergencies; (2) posting and maintenance of shelter signs; (3) maintenance of shelter supplies and equipment on the premises; and (4) inspection by the Federal and local governments. No monetary outlays were involved in these agreements.

Licensed shelters were stocked with essential survival items—food rations, water containers, and sanitation, medical and radiological kits. The Federal Government procured the items and distributed them to local governments. The latter requisitioned the provisions, placed them in licensed shelters, and ensured their security, maintenance and availability for emergency use.

The National Shelter Program included various support activities. Federal funds were used for the construction of protected emergency operating centers for OCD regional offices and for State and local governments. Prototype shelters were designed to stimulate shelter construction. To avoid the abuses experienced in the early months of the program, OCD encouraged high-quality standards among family-shelter dealers and the elimination of deceptive advertising. Protective structures and associated equipment
were subjected to continuing development, testing and evaluation. Other support programs included provision of fallout protection for selected radio stations; publication and dissemination of technical information on shelter engineering design; specialized assistance to professionals engaged in protective design and construction; and the professional development of architects and engineers to qualify them for the survey work and ultimately for the planning and design of protective structures.

Progress Toward Objectives

By mid-1967 the program had been in operation almost five years, and the progress was truly impressive. At that point, the national inventory of surveyed space totaled 160.2 million. Space had been licensed for 98.7 million persons, and marked for 92.7 million. Survival supplies stocked were sufficient to take care of 47.1 million persons for 14 days, or 78.4 million for eight days. 29

A Community Shelter Planning (CSP) Program, initiated a year earlier, sought to develop practical procedures in localities to make efficient use of the best available fallout protection in the event of attack. Each citizen would

be kept informed, and each department of local government would be prepared to support the plan and meet the expanded responsibilities in time of disaster. CSP came to be considered as "the foundation of local emergency readiness." OCD made available funds for the services of qualified State CSP officers and for technical assistance to local non-urban governments in developing community shelter plans. Larger communities could draw on local urban planners or professional urban planning firms to develop plans for emergency use of shelters.

After several years of development and testing, OCD in early 1966 also embarked on a "home fallout protection survey" program. This survey identified and inventoried the amount and quality of fallout-protected space in home basements. This was deemed significant because of the shortage of acceptable shelter, particularly in residential areas, in many parts of the country.

Other shelter expansion techniques were used in areas of unfilled requirements. Shelter designs and techniques were incorporated in new construction at little or no additional cost. Special surveys were conducted to locate protection in small buildings. Ventilation increased the capacity of inadequately ventilated shelters already located. In addition, the military departments surveyed their own installations to determine the amount of fallout protection provided in basements of military homes.
OCD disseminated among architects and engineers information on design techniques ("slanting") developed in fiscal 1964, which made it possible to enhance inherent fallout-protection features with little or no increase in cost and without sacrificing the normal functional qualities or appearances of buildings. Toward the end of fiscal 1967, OCD initiated a "Direct Mail Shelter Development System," an advance information system designed to increase fallout shelter in new construction at the design stage. Use of Packaged Ventilation Kits made possible a substantial increase in the fallout shelter inventory. Military construction legislation and directions called for inclusion of fallout protection in defense installations.

Effective use of the nationwide fallout shelter system required protective structures for people responsible for warning the public, carrying on emergency communications, and directing and controlling emergency operations. In fiscal 1964, OCD began to provide financial assistance to State and local governments, as necessary, for furnishing fallout protection and emergency power generators for warning points. OCD also provided financial assistance for the fallout protection of radio stations. As indicated earlier, OCD developed and implemented plans for permanent, protected
underground sites for its Regional Offices. Federal matching funds were made available to State and local governments to assist them in the establishment of protected EOCs. As of mid-1967, a total of 2,858 protected EOCs had been established; of these, 969 were "federally funded," and 1,889 "non-federally funded." 30

Contributing to a book published in 1968 under the title, *Who Speaks for Civil Defense?*, Steuart Pittman detailed the progress made during these first five years in creating "an operating civil defense capability to deal with fallout radiation." He felt bitter, as we shall see, about the collapse of the shelter incentive program, basically, he contended, for lack of Presidential backing. The operational progress in civil defense, he observed, "is not inherently impressive—it has been much too slow; but it is extraordinary against its background: low-key or negligible leadership; the vulnerability to a bad press of a program of such necessarily mixed responsibilities; its uncertain base of federal policy; the absence of legal authority for federal direction of state and local civil defense; and the distaste of sensitive thoughtful persons for problems which assume failure to avoid nuclear war." 31

30 Ibid., p. 41.

Recounting OCD's accomplishments over the five years, Pittman alluded to the lifesaving potential of the program. As it stood in the latter sixties, 15 million to 20 million lives might be saved. With over 200 million shelter spaces surveyed and equipped by the early seventies, the currently authorized civil defense system (which did not include Federal incentives for shelter construction to overcome deficits) had a potential for saving 30 million lives. With the shelter construction program, involving a Federal outlay of less than $2 billion over five years, 50 million lives would be saved in a heavy attack in the early seventies.\(^3\)\(^2\) The civil defense organizations kept plugging away and adding to their accomplishments, but the collapse of the shelter incentive program stood out clearly as marking the erosion of priority of civil defense, signs of which really appeared almost from the very inception of the Kennedy program.

Despite its tremendous progress, OCD lacked sufficient friends in the Executive Branch or in Congress on whom it could rely to sustain the momentum unleashed in the summer of 1961. A major portion of the shelter spaces inventoried were concentrated in downtown urban areas, usable only for the daytime, working population and out of reach of the nighttime residential population. However meritorious, fallout shelters would not be effective shields

\(^{32}\)Ibid., pp. 60-61.
against the effects of blast and fire in important sectors of likely target areas. In such circumstances, there was some doubt that the minimal program launched under President Kennedy, even if implemented in full, would suffice to permit national survival and recovery.

Administration policy was to move cautiously—a step at a time without rocking the boat. But the question persisted: Why should the Nation settle for anything less than a high degree of protection from all the effects of nuclear attack? OCD data indicated total Federal costs for improved strategic defense as follows:33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total cost ($ billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. National fallout protection . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Blast shelter in 100 cities with fallout protection elsewhere . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Ballistic missile defense with nationwide fallout protection . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Ballistic missile defense with blast protection for 100 cities and fallout protection elsewhere .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were very few voices in the mid-sixties or since to speak up for greater protection against nuclear attack.

33Shotts, op. cit., p. 33.
Pittman recognized that a major threat to the program's credibility with the public came from the conflicting and frequently emotional participation of scientists in the continuing civil defense controversy, which was well covered by the media. Accordingly, he asked the National Academy of Sciences in mid-1963 to bring together leading scientists of many disciplines to resolve the conflict among scientists to the extent possible. The result was a six-week conference and study known as Project Harbor. The group was under the directorship of Dr. Eugene P. Wigner, Professor of Physics at Princeton University and Nobel Laureate in 1964.

Six panels were formed to examine the problems of:

1. Acceptance and Impact.--The basis for attitudes on civil defense, the reasons for objections, and whether and how they could be met.

2. Education and Training.--The problems of (a) educating civil defense officials, (b) keeping the national and local leadership informed of the problems and status of civil defense, and (c) educating and training the public in consonance with the civil defense programs discussed by the other panels.

3. Strategy and Tactics.--The circumstances surrounding the outbreak of a nuclear war, the probable course of events during hostilities, and the
circumstances leading to their cessation. The other panels would thus have visualizations that would be useful to them in carrying out their assignments. This panel also examined a number of studies and calculations on the degree of civil defense protection achievable at various costs under a range of probable attacks.

4. Future Weapons and Weapons Effects.--The possible directions in which the development of future weapons may lead in order to determine the range of threats that should be considered.

5. Immediate Survival.--The problems of protecting the populace during nuclear attacks and of ensuring their survival for a period of about two weeks following the last attack. Included in this assignment were the problems of warning, shelter construction, supplying the essentials of life, communications and control, morale, and preparation for recovery.

6. Postattack Recovery.--The problems, after the people's emergence from shelter, of providing them with the immediate necessities of life, informing them of the state of their surroundings, and, with minimum delay, starting the work of reconstruction and the restoration of social, economic, and governmental structures.
The reports of these panels constituted the official, full-length Project Harbor Report; a "Summary Report" appeared in the spring of 1964.34

The Harbor Study Group's general conclusion was that any failures to assure a higher degree of survival and a more rapid rate of recovery from attack by strategic weapons of that time and of the foreseeable future, were not the result of deficiencies or gaps in our technical knowledge. If the United States was to obtain a higher degree of survival and ability to recover from attack than was contemplated by current defense planning, the primary needs were more money for passive defense measures, wider application of existing technical knowledge, and more intensive research in support of planning and program design.

Most members of the Harbor Study Group believed that the fallout shelter program then advanced by the Office of Civil Defense provided somewhere near the optimum protection that could be achieved under the proposed budget. This program, however, was considered to represent a minimum

level of significant protection below which a national effort might not be justified at all. A more adequate program, generally favored by the participants in the study, would include: (1) shelters in target areas that were capable of protecting against blast and fire; (2) stockpiling of necessary supplies and hardening of critical facilities, along with intensive planning to accelerate recovery; and (3) substantially greater federal involvement in the program in an effort to improve professional competence and coordination of operations.

A civil defense program along the lines described in the panel reports and the Summary Report, the Project Harbor study concluded, would not seriously interfere with the normal functioning of our institutions nor of our democratic society. It would create no serious problems of acceptance or impact, at home or abroad. In the opinion of many, it would reduce tension and would further constructive thinking.

Further, whether or not an increased level of civil defense effort was undertaken, the group concluded, the program then projected by the Department of Defense at relatively low cost could contribute significantly to increased survival under nuclear attack. Moreover, this program would provide a necessary base for any increased effort toward improvement of our defenses and our ability to recover from major attack. The group accepted this
program as being based on sound technical considerations, and it directed most of the attention of the study toward the opportunities and difficulties of providing further civil defense capability.

The Project Harbor study lay dormant for several years. It provoked some controversy in the scientific community and got press attention in 1966. At the request of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Academy updated the study in 1967, with conclusions generally the same as in the original.\textsuperscript{35} It had little or no impact; few people seemed to be interested in anything more than a minimal program. Indeed, by the mid-sixties, it had become evident that neither the Administration nor the Congress was disposed to carry through even on the modest goals which President Kennedy had established in 1961.

**COLLAPSE OF THE SHELTER INCENTIVE PROGRAM**

While the shelter surveys proceeded with results even greater than first estimated, the proposed shelter incentive program needed to meet the deficit met with delays and ultimate collapse. Basically, the proposed program would have

permitted the Federal Government to provide a maximum of 66-1/2 percent of the cost of new fallout shelters ($25 per shelter space) constructed by nonprofit health, education and welfare institutions. Most of these shelters, it was anticipated, would be located in the schools. These institutions would build the shelters in their facilities with a protection factor of at least 100 and a capacity of at least 50 people, and they would agree to make the shelter immediately available to the public in case of need. Authorizing legislation would be needed, since the terms of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and as amended permitted only matching funds for this purpose.36

As was indicated earlier, Mr. Pittman resigned when the legislation failed of enactment. The unhappy fate of the shelter incentive program brought into sharp focus the quick erosion of the civil defense priority. Reflecting later on the experience, Pittman voiced the opinion that it was the lack of firm leadership from the Executive Branch, not opposition from Congress or the public, that impeded the development and implementation of an adequate civil defense program. As Pittman put it:

Since 1961 when President Kennedy briefly stirred the nation on civil defense, policy makers and opinion makers have shared the belief that this difficult issue can be reasonably avoided on the grounds that the Congress, reflecting public attitudes, will not accept any significant civil defense oriented towards nuclear war. A close reading of the evidence suggests the opposite, namely that Executive Branch indecision has accounted for the doldrums on this subject and that Congress and the public are prepared to follow firm leadership from the Executive Branch if the proposal is moderate and the need is clearly presented.37

The hopes of OCD officials had been raised in 1961 when their budget was assigned to a subcommittee of the House Defense Appropriations Committee under the chairmanship of Congressman George Mahon. Mahon was sympathetic, and he easily steered through the $207.6 million supplemental appropriation by which the shelter survey program started. Unfortunately for OCD, Committee Chairman Clarence Cannon announced in January 1962 that he was reassigning the civil defense budget to the Independent Offices subcommittee, headed by the "doubting (Albert) Thomas," with his long reputation for a meat-axe approach to civil defense appropriations. Some Congressional friends of civil defense complained, but there was no word of protest from the Administration.38 Kennedy, it appeared, was no longer disposed to push the program with the same forcefulness that he displayed the year earlier.


38Kerr MS, pp. 270-271.
In February 1962, McNamara submitted draft legislation to authorize the shelter incentive program. His budget request for fiscal 1963 was for $695 million, with $460 million earmarked for the shelter incentive program. Thomas set aside the $460 million item on the basis that there was no legislative authority for it, and recommended that OCD's total fiscal 1963 budget be reduced to $75 million. When the House upheld Thomas in this deep cut, President Kennedy wrote to the chairmen of the various Congressional committees concerned, August 3, 1962, again setting forth his view that "in these times, the Federal Government has an inescapable responsibility to take practicable and sensible measures to minimize loss of life in the event of nuclear attack, to continue the essential functions of the Government, and to provide a base for our survival and recovery as a nation." The information he received from McNamara and other senior advisers, Kennedy asserted, established conclusively the lifesaving potential of fallout shelters; and he saw no merit in proposals to defer action on the basis of "the inevitable imponderables and the continuing need for greater research."39

The Senate Appropriations Committee was more responsive than the House; it raised the total for civil defense to

$185 million. At finally agreed to in conferences, Congress voted only $113 million, plus a $15 million supplemental for food stock procurement. Besides eliminating the $460 million for the subsidization of shelter construction, the 1963 budget reduced OCD's operation and maintenance support from the $126.2 million requested to $75 million—a cut hardly calculated to help move the program forward.40

As for the shelter subsidy legislation, McNamara's draft bill had been presented to Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; but Vinson kept deferring action. At its 54th annual meeting at Hershey, Pennsylvania, in July 1962, the Governors' Conference voiced support of "the proposed federal program for a more effective civil defense, with its vital emphasis on fallout protection for all of our people." As Governors, they said,

... we share a primary responsibility for the safety and well-being of our people. As Governors we shall continue to do all that is within our ability to protect our citizens from the hazards of nuclear attack. Our success in this task, however, will be greatly determined by the quality and firmness of the leadership at the national level.

They recommended that the President send a special message to Congress emphasizing the continued urgency of the

proposed shelter incentive program and urging its enactment. The following month, in response to a letter from Kennedy asking him to hold hearings, Vinson announced: "I do not believe that this country is at this time ready for the shelter incentive program."

During 1963, there was reason to hope that the shelter incentive program would win Congressional approval. For fiscal 1964, OCD requested $346.9 million, of which $195 million was for the shelter incentive program ($175 million for shelters in facilities of nonprofit institutions and $20 million for shelters in Federal buildings). Hearings on this budget request were deferred pending deliberations of the Armed Services Committees on the shelter incentive bill.

Despite the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, and the resulting increased public and government concern about civil defense readiness, the Administration did not press for authorization of its shelter incentive program. The Thomas Appropriations Sub-committee in the House, still hostile to civil defense, used the lack of hearings on the shelter incentive legislation to cut back and delay action on the civil defense appropriation. Faced with a letter

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41 For the Governors' Conference Report and Resolution, see Appendix 7 to OCD, Annual Report for FY 1962, pp. 101-105.

from Carl Vinson to Secretary McNamara saying the public was not ready for the shelter incentive program and McNamara's unwillingness to press the matter, Pittman persuaded Congressman Hebert, a former newspaper man, that his subcommittee should undertake well publicized hearings for the announced purpose of finally killing or saving the civil defense program, giving all concerned a chance to speak. Congressman Hebert had no difficulty in obtaining Vinson's permission and started hearings with the candid intention of shooting the program down.43

As a prelude to the hearings, Hebert had the Committee Counsel, Phillip W. Kelleher, draw up a litany of virtually every criticism that had been advanced against civil defense, largely for the purpose of seeing whether these arguments could be refuted.44 The early civil defense effort, the staff paper noted, had been deficient in funds, leadership, and direction. It questioned whether engineering knowledge was adequate for a major shelter program. Fallout shelters, even if built, were at best a partial answer as they would not protect from fire, blast or biological and chemical weapons.

Further, a postattack environment might well be too hostile to support life since medical personnel and facilities would be grossly inadequate, utilities of all kinds


disrupted or destroyed, and the land itself damaged by the serious ecological effects of bombing. The Soviet Union could, indeed, bypass a population in shelters by high altitude bursts which would not produce fallout but would lead to great fires. The schools which under the bill would be used for shelter purposes were hard-pressed financially and couldn't afford to pay for shelter protection. Moreover, children were not in school most of the time.

The report further contended that the public itself was opposed to shelters and that their construction and use might be attended with many forms of discrimination. Conceivably such a program might be a boondoggle in which every city would compete for Federal handouts. Fallout shelters were in themselves alien to the American psychology of standing up and facing problems. Some persons feared that shelters could have a bad psychological effect by making nuclear war seem acceptable and by showing that survival was possible, thus diverting efforts from the only real answer, the quest for peace. Finally, would not an American shelter program endanger peace with the Soviet Union by indicating the likelihood of a preemptive strike?

Though predisposed to be negative on civil defense, Hébert and his colleagues conducted impartial hearings. Over a period of six weeks beginning May 28, 1963, the Hébert Subcommittee heard 108 witnesses on the pros and cons
of civil defense in all its ramifications. Pittman, supported by his staff, various scientists and other experts, effectively countered the arguments posed by opponents of civil defense. Admittedly, fallout shelters were not the complete answer; but they could save 25 million to 65 million people in a nuclear war. There were other approaches, but full fallout shelter protection was a relatively fruitful method of preserving life and was more cost-effective than any other likely method.

After answering the negative case point by point and treating many other topics, Pittman summarized his testimony with the following observations:

1. Regardless of how one rates the chances of a nuclear war, the stakes are too high to ignore any practical measures to minimize the destruction.

2. Tens of millions of Americans would be out of reach of the blast, heat and fire of nuclear explosions but subjected to intense sickness and slow death from overexposure to radiation if they have no shielding from the gamma rays coming out of fallout particles and are unable to stay under cover for a period of days.

3. The tens of millions who would survive without shelters, added to the tens of millions who would survive because of shielding from radiation, would be enough of a survival base to assure national recovery, and I think that is the main point of this program.

4. There would be no second wave of fatalities from radioactive contamination, shortage of critical resources, or any other cause, which would begin to compare with the destruction suffered in the

45*Hebert Subcommittee Hearings, Parts I-III.*
first few days of an attack. Intelligent preparations, costing very little, can assure the survivors of a nuclear attack every opportunity to reconstruct a life worth living in the surviving communities. To the extent that there is data from which to predict the conditions of a post-attack world, it supports this general conclusion. The more dire predictions that have such broad currency are the result of lack of an opportunity to study what is now known, or the result of the belief that peace can best be preserved by propagating faith in the myth that nuclear war would totally destroy our country and our civilization.

5. Finally, a great achievement in civil defense over this last year has been the uncovering of opportunities to provide effective protection under nuclear attack at very low cost. The results of getting down to brass tacks are in such sharp contrast to the theoretical studies and debates of the past that there is a tendency to discount the current program as deceptive.  

Congressman Holifield added the weight of his experience in support of the shelter incentive program. Though he personally believed that a system of blast shelters was needed, he defended the shelter incentive bill as "a partial answer to urgent national needs." Civil defense, Holifield conceded, "is a massive and complicated problem--there is no perfect solution."  

As the witnesses presented their testimony, the Hebert Subcommittee reported, the attitude of the House Armed Services Committee changed. Opposition to the program melted away and then hardened into an attitude of firm belief in,

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46 Hebert Subcommittee Hearings, p. 3087.

47 Ibid., p. 3130.
and support of, the fallout shelter program. On August 27, 1963, the full Armed Services Committee reported a clean bill (HR 8200) to authorize $175 million in fiscal 1964 for payments of up to $25 per shelter space provided in nonprofit institutions, and another $15 million for shelters in Federal buildings.

In a dramatic debate on the House Floor, the Hebert subcommittee described the reversal of their attitude in the face of weeks of intensive hearings and persuaded the full House to vote 2 to 1 for the shelter incentive bill. This clearcut setback to Congressman Thomas by the full House depended on comparable Senate action on the shelter authorizing bill. In the absence of enactment of this law, Thomas was free to continue chopping away at civil defense.

The attitude of Congressman Thomas posed the greatest single problem in obtaining funds for civil defense from the inception of the Federal program in 1951 to the mid- or late sixties. He adamantly opposed spending for civil defense. At the time of the large supplemental request in 1961, the civil defense program had been removed from the Thomas subcommittee's

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49 Letter, Pittman to Divine, March 11, 1981.
jurisdiction. But Thomas somehow managed to recover jurisdiction over
the program. Over the ensuing years continuing efforts were made to
circumvent Thomas's death grip, but it was impossible to shake him loose
and overcome his negative attitude toward civil defense. Almost in-
variably the Senate Appropriations Committee was willing to increase
the amount appropriated by the House, but the total funds needed were
never appropriated.50

With the Kennedy assassination, November 22, 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson
assumed the presidency. At this juncture, also, a special subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by Senator Henry M.
Jackson, had begun hearings on HR 8200 which extended into early 1964.51
The lead-off witness before the Jackson subcommittee, Pittman stressed the
responsibility of leadership to make the necessary decisions and communi-
cate them to the public, rather than use their misconceptions of public
attitudes (so-called "public apathy") as an excuse for inaction.

A majority of the subcommittee appeared to be positively
disposed toward HR 8200. Upon the close of the hearings,
however, Senator Jackson said that he would defer action on
the grounds that McNamara had associated civil defense and
decisions on the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Program, un-
less he had a clear signal from the President that the Admini-
tration wanted the shelter incentive legislation.
Pittman sought to get this signal, but without success, and

50 Ibid; Letter, Brewer to Divine, Jan. 12, 1981.

51 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Service,
Hearings, Civil Defense Fallout Shelter Program, 88th
Jackson put the bill aside. Later, Pittman recounted this development in these words:

I asked Secretary McNamara to send a short memorandum to the President urging him to sign an attached note to Senator Jackson. The memorandum went to the White House, but I was unable to determine what had happened to it for several crucial days. At the Subcommittee meeting at which Senator Jackson intended to defer the matter, I was allowed 15 minutes to report on the President's position. My telephone calls to Mac [McGeorge] Bundy the night before and outside the hearing room established that there was doubt about whether Secretary McNamara really meant what he asked the President to do. In response to my last call from outside the hearing room, Bundy said he would talk to McNamara and call back. There was no call. I appeared empty-handed and Senator Jackson deferred action as he said he would. On returning to my office, I was given the explanation that the President appreciated the effort but that there was not enough time to resolve the matter.

Pittman returned to his law practice two weeks later, distraught over what he later described as an "abundantly clear" reversal of the Administration's public commitment to a complete fallout shelter protection system. This decision, Pittman emphasized, "was made by the Executive Branch and not by the Congress and . . . it was done in the face of an apparent willingness of Congress to join the commitment by funding the first year of a five-year program."52

In a letter to Pittman, March 4, 1964, Senator Jackson commented on the decision to defer action on HR 8200. The decision, he said, "was based on several factors not necessarily related to the substance of the bill."

Principal among them "is the fact that ballistic missile defense and the shelter program have been closely related and it is believed that a decision as to both should be similarly related." Jackson also made reference to the need for closely reviewing all programs involving Federal expenditures "in the light of the current program of economy."

He further added: "It is believed that all civil defense organizations will be fully occupied during the coming months with their current efforts to organize a working shelter program under your present ground rules."

Civil defense officials found Jackson's linkage of ABM and shelter programs somewhat baffling. To be sure, McNamara repeatedly stressed the complementary relationship of civil defense and the Nation's strategic offensive and defensive forces. In his posture statement before the House Armed Services Committee in January 1964, McNamara emphasized the high priority which the Administration attached to civil defense in relation to the Strategic Retaliatory and Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces.

... a well planned and executed nationwide civil defense program centered around fallout shelters could contribute much more, dollar for dollar, to

53OCD, Information Bulletin No. 105, March 12, 1964, p. 2; OCD, Annual Report for FY 1964, p. 2. In an interview with Pittman in the summer of 1979, Dr. Blanchard gathered that Pittman drafted this statement for issuance by Senator Jackson, in an effort "to mitigate the effect on OCD morale that revelation of the President's lack of support for civil defense would create"; see Blanchard MS, p. 369.
McNamara was inclined to move slowly on an ABM system, and he indicated the need for adequate shelters with such a system. In the absence of such shelters, he indicated, the enemy could easily target its missiles at points outside the defended areas and thereby "achieve by fallout what otherwise would have to be achieved by blast and heat effects." For this reason, McNamara added, "the very austere civil defense program recommended by the President... should be given priority over procurement and deployment of any major additions to the active defenses."54

At no time had the suggestion been made that the fallout shelter programs be delayed until after the ABM system was in development. At a news conference, March 4, 1964, McNamara stated:

"... A fallout shelter program can stand alone and be justified independently of an anti-ballistic missile system, and we believe should be given priority over such a system. But an anti-ballistic system cannot stand alone without a fallout shelter system."

The reasons for Jackson's action are not entirely clear; but whatever the reasons, it had the effect of again deferring if not scuttling the shelter incentive program on which OCD counted so much to overcome the anticipated shelter deficit.

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Commenting on a draft of this chapter, Pittman expressed the view that the lack of Federal leadership could have been cured if McNamara had believed in a nationwide fallout shelter program. In Pittman's judgment, McNamara did not believe in it.

When President Kennedy's civil defense decision was made in November 1961 at Hyannis Port, the proposal signed by McNamara was to provide fallout protection for the entire population within 5 years through a continuation of the program to utilize existing shelter space and the proposed new shelter incentive program. Nonetheless, at the meeting McNamara expressed his preference for stopping at the surveying, marking and stocking program, as did many others present. The President went ahead against this advice, apparently because of what he had said in his May 1961 speech. Shortly thereafter, a disturbed McNamara charged Pittman with keeping the Federal Government out of operational responsibilities, leaving civil defense to the operational capabilities of state and local governments.

The conflict between the McNamara and Pittman view of civil defense, Pittman observed, was never resolved. The McNamara support, he said, was confined to the shelter survey, marking and stocking program; only lip service was given to support of the shelter incentive program which Pittman and his staff thought vital to make the program credible to the public. To be sure, McNamara was always willing to express strongly to Congress the logic of fallout protection as the most cost-effective damage-limiting program in defending against nuclear attack. However, Pittman asserted, this must be understood in the context of his growing hostility toward ABM and commitment to the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction." 54

56 Letter, Pittman to Divine, March 11, 1981.
The shelving of HR 8200 marked the great divide in the fortunes of OCD—in terms of stature, funding, and program effort. Over the ensuing eight years, Pittman's successors—William P. Durkee, Joseph Romm, and John E. Davis—sought to preserve the advances achieved in the early sixties. Budget reductions, however, required major program adjustments and forced abandonment of "any pretense of maintaining the momentum of prior years." Increasingly, OCD (and its successor, DCPA, as we shall see in the next chapter) was forced into the position of having to curtail the development and maintenance of needed life-saving capabilities or project them for "crisis activation," and to seek "double-duty" by greater involvement in natural, continually-recurring disasters.

Placement of OCD under the Secretary of the Army

On March 31, 1964, coinciding with Mr. Pittman's resignation, Defense Secretary McNamara assigned his civil

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defense responsibilities to the Secretary of the Army. A Defense Department release issued that day gave the following rationale for the switch:

Secretary McNamara stated that the civil defense functions are being transferred to the Army because they are essentially operational and therefore should properly be administered by one of the Military Departments. These functions originally were assigned to the Secretary's immediate office in order that he might exercise personal supervision while the program was first getting started under Defense Department direction. The Secretary pointed out that the initial shelter program is now well underway.60

The following day, the Secretary of the Army, Stephen Ailes, established the Office of Civil Defense within his office, and re-delegated the functions to a "Director of Civil Defense," a post assumed by William P. Durkee, who had been one of Pittman's top executives.

Statements in the press to the effect that this was a downgrading of civil defense met with strong denials by the Defense Department. This action, Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance told the House Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee, "constituted recognition of the progress already made and a belief that the programs, now essentially operational, should be located in that office already having principal responsibility for coordinating military support of civil authority."61 In its annual report for fiscal 1964, OCD similarly referred to its new

60OCD, Annual Report for FY 1964, p. 2.
61Quotation from Subcommittee hearings in Blanchard MS, p. 371.
status in the Defense establishment as "a recognition of its operational maturity." And it described the job of Director of Civil Defense as "equal to that of an Assistant Secretary of the Army." \(^{62}\)

OCD's authorized personnel ceiling for that year was 1,062 positions--445 at the departmental level, 476 at the eight Regional Offices, and 141 at the training and warning centers and other field locations. Functional assignments and the organizational structure, OCD reported, were realigned during fiscal 1964, "to accommodate the increasing operational nature of civil defense activities." \(^{63}\) OCD's primary focus continued to be the development of a nationwide fallout shelter system. In the absence of legislative authority to subsidize shelter construction, OCD sought other means to help offset the shelter deficit. All three directors--Durkee, Romm and Davis--could point to continued progress; but inevitably, as we shall see, important elements of the shelter program and its allied emergency systems could not be further developed for lack of funds or legislative authority. The early seventies found the lifesaving potential of the national civil defense program seriously eroding.


\(^{63}\) Ibid. The organizational structure at the end of fiscal 1964 was as shown in figure 8.
Downward Trend of Appropriations

The OCD budget request for fiscal 1965--$358 million--included $118.9 million which required authorizing legislation. Since the Jackson subcommittee deferred action on HR 8200, the $118.9 million budget-item was scratched, still leaving $240 million for Congressional consideration. The amount voted was only $105.2 million--$6.4 million less than the amount appropriated the year earlier.

Although he continued to stress the importance of a full fallout shelter program, McNamara would not come back again with a request for the shelter incentive authorization. The budget request for fiscal 1966 was for $193.9 million, but the House Appropriations Committee recommended only $89.2 million--a proposed cut of $104.7 million. Appealing to the Senate Appropriations Committee to restore the cut, McNamara indicated that he was emphasizing "the primary importance of fallout shelters in any sound damage-limiting program," and suggesting that it be given priority over any other element of such a program, such as the production and deployment of a new manned interceptor or of a NIKE X anti-missile system. Yet he was not repeating his earlier requests for the shelter incentive program. In a letter to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Independent Offices Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, May 11, 1965, McNamara wrote:
For three years we have failed to obtain congressional approval of proposals of a dual-purpose shelter subsidy proposal. Currently, we are determining the precise nature of the shelter requirement for that portion of the population without adequate protection before deciding whether to renew our previous proposal or to make some alternate recommendation. In our fiscal year 1966 program we continue to concentrate on exploiting fully all of the existing resources in the country for fallout protection. The budgetary cuts made by the House would seriously curtail our efforts to do even this. This does not appear sensible to me, if the country is to have any meaningful capability to limit the damage of a determined enemy attack on the United States which requires an integrated, balanced combination of strategic offensive forces, area defense forces, terminal defense forces, and passive defenses. I emphasize again fallout shelter should have the highest priority in such a balanced system because they decrease the vulnerability of the population to nuclear contamination under all types of attack.

I am particularly concerned about the drastic slashes made by the House in the funds for management and administration of the program; i.e., the 30-percent cut in Federal management funds and the 50-percent cut in the matching funds for State and local civil defense organizations. These two cuts are inseparable in that they both strike directly at the small, professional staff organizations jointly managing the civil defense effort at Federal, State, and local levels. The issue is simple—if the country is going to have a small, disciplined cadre of trained professional personnel to direct civilian emergency operations, whether during nuclear or natural disaster, then these cuts must be restored.\textsuperscript{64}

The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended some $35.2 million more than the House Committee. The final action brought the fiscal 1966 budget to $106.8 million, with an authorized personnel ceiling of only 800—a reduction of 200 from the fiscal 1965 level.

\textsuperscript{64}\textit{U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations, 1966 Hearings before Subcommittee on H.R. 7997, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 6-7.}
Again, with respect to the fiscal 1967 budget, McNamara presented Congress with the anomaly of emphasizing the value of a full fallout shelter program in enhancing the Nation's defense posture in relation to a Soviet nuclear attack, but not asking for the money needed to accomplish this. In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, in February 1966, McNamara put the onus on Congress and the public for having turned down such a program in three years running. Congressman Glenard P. Lipscomb of California did not think that justified "not trying to sell an adequate civil defense program." In response, McNamara said:

We have made strenuous efforts in the past to obtain larger appropriations and have been unsuccessful. I think it is wise, instead of wasting our time continuing to press for something we cannot accomplish, to spend our resources on other more fruitful areas of activity, and that is why we are submitting a budget again higher than the Congress approved last year by some 25 percent, but still lower than we requested in the past.

... I think we could efficiently use funds in excess of those requested. I will be quite frank with you, I do not think the Congress is going to appropriate the funds we have requested. ...

The amount requested was $134.4 million--$59.5 million less than the fiscal 1966 request. This time the Senate endorsed the House recommendation, and the appropriation for fiscal 1967 was $101.1 million--$5.7 million below the fiscal 1966 appropriation.

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In September 1967, Mr. McNamara announced a decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM system, which raised some question about the impact of that decision on the civil defense program. The decision was the subject of considerable public discussion, and some people construed the ABM decision as carrying with it a decision to construct a massive shelter system. The explanation put forth was that the Sentinel program was intended to be a "light" system directed at the Chinese Peoples Republic with its potential for a relatively small nuclear missile attack on the United States by the mid-seventies. The civil defense program, it was indicated, had been keyed to protection in much more severe Soviet attacks; and neither expansion nor acceleration of the current fallout shelter program was deemed necessary because of the deployment of Sentinel. 66

In his "posture" presentations early in 1967, Defense Secretary McNamara dropped his customary assertions of the importance of civil defense in the total defense effort. OCD's proposed budget for fiscal 1968, he indicated, was $111 million--$22.4 million less than the amount requested the previous year. In a follow-up statement, Army Secretary Stanley Resor stated that this budget would permit

66See Statement of Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, presented at Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, April 24, 1968, in OCD, Selected Excerpts on Civil Defense from Published Congressional Documents, 1968, pp. 2-3.
continuance of the civil defense program "at approximately its current level." This same approach, Resor advised the Subcommittee on Independent Offices of the House Committee on Appropriations, applied to all other Defense budgets "not directly related to Southeast Asia." Defense of this budget request fell to Joseph Romm, former Assistant Director for Policy and Programs, who was named "Acting Director" (later Director) with Mr. Durkee's departure in January 1967. The $111 million request, Romm indicated, represented a minimum program level, which he hoped would be fully supported. But Congress voted only $86.1 million.

The Administration's budget request for fiscal 1969 was lower still—only $77.3 million—more than 30 percent below the fiscal 1968 request and 10 percent less than the amount appropriated that year. A prepared statement by Mr. McNamara (who had left the Pentagon for the job of president of the World Bank), incorporated in the record of the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, April 30, 1968, noted that the OCD budget was being held to "the lowest possible sustaining rate, pending the end of the Vietnam conflict." Army Secretary Resor gave the same reason for the reduced budget request.


68Blanchard MS, p. 393.

69OCD, Selected Excerpts on Civil Defense from Published Congressional Documents, 1968, p. 50.
In his presentation, Mr. Romm indicated that major program activities would have to be deferred and rephased, but there would be no change in the basic program objectives "designed to carry out the orderly development of our low cost fallout shelter civil defense system." Congress voted only $60.4 million--the lowest figure since the Defense Department's assumption of the civil defense mission in 1961.

This sharp drop in the civil defense budget brought a strong rebuke from the former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense), Steuart L. Pittman. In an "Afterword" to the book, Who Speaks for Civil Defense?, Pittman observed:

It does not take an expert to see that something is wrong with this picture. The war in Vietnam, with all of its risks of escalation to a larger war, is a strange reason indeed for turning back the limited progress of civil defense which has been so painfully accomplished to date. If we are unable or unwilling to prepare our defenses against an attack on the continental United States, while fighting an overseas war, we are peculiarly vulnerable to the shifting strategy of our potential enemies. The future of civil defense no longer depends on whether the public will accept leadership; we have now reached the point when the government must hear the concern of the people outside of the Federal Government, who believe national defense is a first responsibility of all of us. The critical long-term task of improving our chances of survival in the nuclear age may be too important to be decided exclusively in the closed chambers of a government so pinned down by today that the problems of tomorrow must be set aside and assigned "the lowest possible sustaining rate."  

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70 Ibid., pp. 3-6.  
Soon after taking office, President Richard Nixon took several steps which seemed to signal a possible resurgence of the civil defense effort. In March 1969, he announced a decision to deploy a modified ABM system (Safeguard) against a Soviet strike, and he directed that a study be made of the Nation's shelter program to see what could be done to minimize casualties in the event deterrence failed. Under the terms of Executive Order 11490, signed on October 28, 1969, Federal agencies engaged in building construction were asked to encourage the incorporation of shelter in construction projects involving Government assistance with grants or loans.

Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, voiced the conviction that "the Civil Defense system is a vital part of our over-all strategic posture and essential to the protection of the people..." And in July 1969, the following statement by the Secretary of the Army, presented to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, similarly emphasized the importance of civil defense in the over-all defense planning of the Nation:

While it has been necessary to limit our civil defense budget request to a minimum level, in view of

72 Blanchard MS, p. 415.
74 Ibid., p. 6.
the higher priority Southeast Asia oriented requirements, we believe an effective civil defense program is an essential and prudent element in our defense planning. It would make a major contribution to the protection of the population in the event of a large scale nuclear attack. Accordingly, the major objective of the civil defense program continues to be the development of a nationwide shelter system to protect the population from radiological fallout. 75

OCD finished out fiscal 1969 with its $60.4 million appropriation. But after detailing substantial achievements, Governor John E. Davis, who succeeded Mr. Romm as Director of OCD in May 1969, felt impelled to note: "program momentum has declined with serious impact on the efforts of State and local governments." He cited the following examples of "program backlogs": 76

1. The survey of new buildings for fallout shelter capacity is more than one year behind schedule.

2. The rate of marking of public shelters has fallen below prior year rates.

3. Warehouse stocks of shelter supplies will be exhausted by the end of fiscal year 1970, and while improved supplies have been developed, none have been procured.

4. Over $2 million in matching funds was not available to match State and local government funds for proposed emergency operating centers.

5. $1.3 million in matching funds was not available to match State and local government funds for emergency communications and warning equipment.


76Ibid., pp. 119-120.
6. 105 qualified local jurisdictions have been unable to enter the matching funds program for civil defense personnel and administrative expenses.

7. Deployment of the Radio Warning Decision Information Distribution System (DIDS) has been delayed.

8. Research necessary to define optimum solutions to problems of protection against direct effects of nuclear weapons and of the immediate postattack period has been deferred or curtailed.

Davis closed the fiscal 1969 report with the plea: "The current civil defense capability should not be permitted to deteriorate. Much work has been done, a great deal more remains to be done, but the ultimate goal of providing protection for everyone cannot be achieved without adequate funds to eliminate the backlogs and reinstate the program to effective performance levels consistent with new technological advancements and the national population growth rate."

Budgets awarded to OCD in its remaining years under the Secretary of the Army edged up a bit—$70.6 million in fiscal 1970; $73.5 million in fiscal 1971; and $78.3 million in fiscal 1972. This was hardly enough to have a meaningful effect in terms of improved readiness to meet the effects of nuclear attack. With encouragement from Defense Secretary Laird, OCD under Davis turned increasingly to greater involvement with State and local governments in coping with natural as well as man-made disasters. This direction of civil

77 Ibid., p. 120.

defense to this dual-use capability, as we shall see in the next chapter, became the central thrust of OCD's successor, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, which was brought back up to the level of the Secretary of Defense in May 1972.

A FORTHRIGHT REPORT FROM THE GAO

Some six months before this reorganization, the General Accounting Office came up with a well-researched and penetrating analysis of U.S. civil defense, focused particularly on the nine years from the inception of the Kennedy program in fiscal 1962 through mid-1970. In its report, completed in the fall of 1971, the GAO took note of the steady decline of civil defense appropriations, both in dollars and in the percentage of total appropriations for defense:

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<th>DOD (in millions)</th>
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This pattern of funding and the attendant deterioration of OCD's lifesaving capability prompted the GAO to observe that, despite the emphasis in Administration pronouncements on "the complementary relationship between active and passive defense measures," civil defense in practice "does not seem to be regarded as a primary element of national defense."\textsuperscript{79}

Commenting on a draft of the report forwarded in December 1970, the Defense Department expressed its appreciation and thanks to the GAO for its "thorough in-depth objective study" of the structure, activities and status of U.S. civil defense. In general, the Defense Department considered the report "a realistic analysis of the current civil defense posture, its capabilities and its limitations." It took note of the report's implicit recognition of "the need for and value of the civil defense program" and its pointing up of the shortage of program funds to accomplish "the recognized requirements."

While acknowledging the shift in budget emphasis in recent years, however, the Defense Department objected to the implication that there had been a reduction in priority and emphasis on civil defense preparations. The Department attributed the shift in budget emphasis to two factors: (1) the national involvement in military operations in Southeast Asia

in the mid- and late-sixties which "created overriding
requirements" necessitating budget increases in active
forces and "tighter fiscal constraints on all non-Southeast
Asia programs of the Department"; and (2) the reluctance of
Congress to approve appropriations for civil defense in the
amounts requested by the Administration. For the nine-
year period analyzed, the Defense Department indicated, "the
Congress has been willing to appropriate only 43% of the
funds requested," with the result that there was "a growing
tendency in the Executive Branch to limit budget requests
to lower levels."\(^8\)

In its final report, the GAO took note of these points, but it did not alter its observation on
this matter.

The tremendous power and multiple effects of nuclear
weapons since 1945, the GAO report noted, "have not rendered
the cause of survival hopeless." A full-scale nuclear war
would cause many casualties, but "effective protection
against some of the effects of nuclear attack is available."\(^1\)

OCD, the GAO analysts observed, had developed "a substantial
life-saving capability"; between 18 million and 30 million
lives of projected 1975 fatalities of 104 million could be
saved, according to OCD calculations, "with the 160 million

\(^8\)Letter, Philip A. Odeen, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), to C. M. Bailey,
Director, Defense Division, GAO, March 5, 1971, GAO Report--
1971, pp. 50-51.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 10.
fallout shelter spaces existing as of January 1, 1969."
Continuance of the fallout shelter surveys and consideration of alternative combinations of fallout and blast protection could save additional millions of people who would otherwise be lost in a nuclear attack.\footnote{\\textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.}

But the GAO pointed to some gaps and serious problems in the current civil defense program. While recognizing the potential deterrent of effective damage-limited measures (which included civil defense), Defense program justifications in January 1969 concluded:

\begin{quote}
. . . on the basis of our present knowledge of military technology, we still see no practical way in which to do this [taking damage-limiting measures--the ABM system and civil defense programs] against the kind of attack the Soviets could potentially mount in the 1970's. Accordingly, our best alternative is to continue to base our policy of deterrence on our Assured Destruction capability.\footnote{\\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.}
\end{quote}

With this primary emphasis of the U.S. military program on assured destruction, OCD could hardly expect serious support of its efforts to reduce the potential damage of a nuclear attack. Although the direct effects of nuclear weapons--blast, heat, and shock--were recognized as major elements of the threat, the civil defense program included no specific activity to mitigate these effects. Nor were there any civil defense programs, other than research, to protect people from the effects of attack with chemical or biological weapons.
To make matters even worse, the fallout shelter system which accounted for OCD's life-saving capability was not complete. The OCD shelter surveys, the GAO analysts believed, "disclosed an imbalance of existing protection between major cities and other population areas and a shortage of shelters in meeting its goal of providing protection for all persons."\textsuperscript{84} No authority existed "to construct or pay for the construction of special-purpose public fallout shelters in any location, including areas with a deficit of shelter spaces." In the absence of incentive construction authority, OCD could not hope to add significantly to the Nation's shelter capacity. "Our review," the GAO reported, "indicates that the Nation lacks, and under current programs will continue to lack, a sufficient number of properly dispersed, adequately equipped fallout shelters in homes, schools, and other buildings and facilities to accommodate the population in the event of nuclear attack."\textsuperscript{85}

In its comments on the draft report, OCD detailed the funding constraints on its program activities--the repeated denial of legislative authorization and consequently of appropriations for the shelter incentive program; denials of requests for limited funds to test shelter incentive payments, or to procure and distribute portable ventilation kits to

\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 23.
increase the capacity of many below-ground shelter areas in existing buildings. Limited funds forced OCD to restrict its National Fallout Shelter Survey to areas engaged in Community Shelter Planning. Fund limitations further precluded procurement of needed shelter supplies and stocking them in identified facilities, as well as the replacement of items that had deteriorated because of age. 86

On the basis of its analysis, the GAO recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Defense "provide additional justification to the Congress concerning the part which civil defense plays in the U.S. overall national security posture." 87 And it placed before Congress the following "matter" for its consideration:

In view of the issues concerning (1) the imbalance of fallout protection, (2) the potential for expanding fallout protection by using best available shelter space, and (3) the limited progress of the civil defense program in meeting its objectives as dealt with in this report, and in view of two special studies recently made by the administration pertaining to civil defense policies, to the shelter program, and to the relationship between natural disaster assistance and civil defense activities, appropriate committees of the Congress may wish to review the reports on these studies for use in any consideration of civil defense requirements. 88

86 Ibid., pp. 52-59.
87 Ibid., p. 29.
88 Ibid., p. 35.
The Administration studies to which the GAO referred, it developed, set the course for civil defense through much of the seventies; it was not "the future direction" which the GAO and OCD had anticipated. Early in 1969, President Nixon directed George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), to conduct a study of the civil defense program. The GAO did not have access to this study because it was then being prepared for review by the National Security Council. In a report to the President on his stewardship of OEP, in January 1973, Lincoln made the following observation regarding this study:

... This study drew on the analytical talents and experience of many agencies and covered the broad spectrum of considerations involved in the formulation of civil defense policy. The completed study served as the basis of your decision that the United States shall maintain the current level of effort in its civil defense activities.

The President, Lincoln noted, further directed that "there should be increased emphasis, within the limitations of existing authority, on plans, procedures, and preparedness activities that may also be applicable to peacetime emergencies."

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89 Under the terms of the 1961 reorganization, it will be recalled, the Director of OEP had the responsibility for advising and assisting the President in determining policy for planning, directing and coordinating the total civil defense program.

Also early in the Nixon Administration, Lincoln undertook to effect a closer relationship with OCD (later DCPA) and to use its capabilities more effectively in support of OEP's responsibilities with respect to natural disasters and crisis management. At Nixon's direction, an interagency study was undertaken of the relationship between the Federal disaster assistance and civil defense activities as they related to the work of State and local governments in these areas. In a comprehensive report to Congress, in January 1972, OEP identified actions and additional steps that could be taken to improve the Nation's capability to avert, mitigate the effects, and meet the challenges of natural disasters. The findings of this study, entitled Disaster Preparedness, served as a blueprint for the further development of a concerted disaster preparedness program.\textsuperscript{91} One facet of this effort was the assignment to OCD, in February 1972, of the following tasks:

1. Fostering local government organizations and plans for coping with major disasters; and

2. Providing advice and guidance to local governments on organization and preparedness to meet the effects of major disasters.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., pp. 21-22.

Furthermore, OCD was one of many agencies encompassed in a comprehensive study of Defense organization and management by a "Blue Ribbon Defense Panel" constituted in mid-1969 under the chairmanship of Gilbert W. Fitzhugh of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. The Panel noted that except for a period in 1962-63, when the fallout shelter program held a high priority, the civil defense function "has apparently been given little emphasis."

Since the 1961 reorganization, the Panel further observed, the effects of dividing the civil defense responsibilities between the Executive Office of the President (OEP) and the Department of Defense had been the subject of "considerable discussion." This matter and the OCD mission were then under review.

If, as a result of this review, the Secretary of Defense continued to be delegated responsibilities for civil defense, the Panel suggested, OCD "should not continue as a part of the Department of the Army Secretariat." OCD, the Panel reasoned,

... is primarily a line, not a staff, activity. Further, its mission is sufficiently different from and independent of the missions of the Military Departments that it should be established as an independent agency reporting to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Accordingly, the Panel recommended that, in the event of its retention in the Defense Department, OCD "should be converted into a Defense Agency (the Civil Defense Agency),
and the Director thereof should report to the Secretary of Defense through the [proposed] Deputy Secretary of Defense (Operations)."  

It was these Administration initiatives, rather than the GAO report and other signs of renewed Congressional interest, that prompted Defense Secretary Laird, in May 1972, to bring OCD back up to the Defense Secretary's level, give it a new name, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and accent its broadened mission. In his words:

... the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency can make a significant contribution to total civil disaster preparedness. Civil defense preparedness planning and natural disaster planning are often similar if not identical. This new Agency will stress the dual capability and utility of civil defense preparedness and natural disaster preparedness at local government level in the broader term of civil preparedness as depicted in the Agency title.  

This new agency will occupy our attention in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER VII

CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT:
THE DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY, 1972-79

CIVIL DEFENSE AT A LOW EBB

The deterioration of the U.S. civil defense posture that set in about the mid-sixties continued through the seventies. This was so even as the Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the United States and intensified their civil defense activities. In their efforts at detente and control of the nuclear arms race, both the Nixon-Ford and Carter Administrations chose to avoid a buildup of active air defense and civil defense capabilities. America’s population in the high-risk counterforce and urban areas were left hostage in the hopes that the Soviets would do the same and thus avoid mutual assured destruction.

The Soviets, however, would not accept the logic of mutual deterrence; they kept up their arms buildup and would not downgrade their civil defense preparations. Indeed, there was reason to believe by the mid-seventies that the "balance of terror" which had characterized the two earlier decades had begun to tilt in the Soviets' favor. In lieu of
strategic superiority, American defense secretaries used terms like "realistic deterrence" and "essential equivalence" of strategic forces; and they came to see the possible usefulness of civil defense in the "perception" of such equivalence by the Soviet Union, the American people, and all parties around the world.

The literature of the seventies is replete with interesting assertions and disputations regarding the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Did the greater emphasis on civil defense in the Soviet Union, indeed, enhance that nation's war-fighting and damage-limiting capability? Did it signal the Soviet Union's readiness to venture and determination to survive a nuclear exchange? Studies by the Carter Administration prompted a Presidential decision in September 1978, which, among other things, recognized the role which civil defense could play in contributing to deterrence.

That decision carried with it the assumption of at least a doubling of the current $100 million level of annual spending for civil defense in the mid-eighties. The President's $108.6 million budget request for fiscal 1980, however, was construed in the Congress as a failure by Carter to demonstrate a clear commitment to a restructured civil defense policy with a multi-year requirement which his own Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, and National Security Council had espoused. The Congressional pegging of the budget at $100 million left DCPA with but a fraction of what was needed to
breathe new life into an agency which, in the words of its Director, Bardyl R. Tirana, "has been dead in the water since about 1969."

In the midst of all this—the strategic debate, the Administration studies, new GAO and Congressional reviews, and Presidential decisions on policy and reorganization—DCPA struggled along. With its austere budgets throughout the Nixon-Ford and Carter years, DCPA could barely meet its recurring and maintenance expenses. It continually deferred critical program elements. It explored the practicability of evacuation in crises and other low-cost approaches to the problems of population survival. And, with all these problems, DCPA still had to give its limited funds and resources the dual value which Carter, like Nixon, sought in support of preparedness for both nuclear and natural disasters.

As it approached the 1980's, the United States had, as it did since the mid-sixties, to quote Professor Samuel P. Huntington (who had directed a National Security Council study on the subject for President Carter), "only a skeleton civil defense program."¹ In his remaining two years in the White House, for all the fanfare about the September 1979 decisions on policy and reorganization, President Carter did

little to add flesh to this skeleton. It remained to be seen whether the incoming Administration of Ronald Reagan would move more energetically to develop an effective civil defense program for the 1980s.

JOHN E. DAVIS AT THE HELM

Objectives of the Nixon-Ford Administrations

Emphasis in the Federal Government on civil defense diminished considerably during the Nixon-Ford years. Upon extricating U.S. forces from Vietnam, President Nixon formulated what he called "A New Strategy for Peace" in the seventies. He sought a framework for "a durable peace" with three pillars: a partnership with friendly nations; sufficient strength to deter would-be aggressors from dangerous miscalculations; and "a willingness to negotiate" with communist countries to accommodate conflict and overcome rivalries. On the last point, Nixon noted in a report to the Congress early in 1970:

This is the spirit in which the United States ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and entered into negotiation with the Soviet Union on control of the military use of the seabeds, on the framework of a settlement in the Middle East, and on limitation of strategic arms. This is the basis on which we and our Atlantic allies have offered to negotiate on concrete issues affecting the security and future of Europe, and on which the United States took steps last year to improve our relations with nations of Eastern Europe. This is also the spirit in which we have resumed
formal talks in Warsaw with Communist China. No nation need be our permanent enemy.  

The Nixon Administration thus ushered in a period of "detente" in Soviet-American relations, marked by a relaxation of tensions and by agreements to limit the deployment of antiballistic missiles, avoid the buildup of ABM defenses, and collaborate to ensure that crises in other parts of the world did not bring confrontations that increased the risk of war between the two superpowers.

Along with his foreign policy, Nixon's domestic policies had an important bearing on the level and direction of civil defense activities in the seventies. Nixon made a strong commitment to streamline the functions of government by cutting the size of the Executive Office of the President and redirecting its efforts to policy making and overall policy direction, and by decentralizing out of the White House to the line agencies and to the States and localities. This policy was a factor in the decision to abolish the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) in 1973, and assign its responsibilities to the General Services Administration (civil defense policy, continuity of government and other nonmilitary defense programs), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (natural disaster programs), and other

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agencies. The same policy prompted moves to make the Federal government more responsive to the needs of State and local governments, with high priority to improved preparedness for natural disasters as well as to disaster relief. It was in this context that DCPA was vested with its dual-purpose mission—to help the State and local governments develop an operational capability for natural as well as nuclear disasters.

DCPA was in existence only a few months when it learned that, despite its dual mission, its program would have to remain at the then-current level of effort. Its appropriation for fiscal 1973 was only $83.5 million. Thanks to Congressional intercession, President Ford's fiscal 1977 budget request of only $71 million was raised to $87.5 million; and even that, in constant 1977 dollars, represented a decrease of about 30 percent from the fiscal 1973 appropriation. Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger and his successor, Donald M. Rumsfeld, sought larger outlays for civil defense, but they could not dissuade President Ford from his budget-cutting stance.

Defense policy and planning guidance issued November 4, 1975, recognized civil defense as "essential to our deterrent posture," but held out little prospect for program vitality.

. . . The primary objectives are to enhance the survival of the U.S. population and to assist in reconstruction of national capabilities in event of nuclear war. Because of limited resources our current Civil
Defense planning should provide for a basic peace-time posture which can be surged to provide an increased and highly effective Civil Defense capability in times of crisis [i.e., by actions taken during a crisis to improve deficient capabilities]. Planning for crisis relocation and for protecting the population against nuclear fallout should be stressed. A secondary but important objective is to improve the readiness of state and local governments to respond to peacetime emergencies.\(^3\)

Efforts by the Ford Administration, in the face of these budgetary constraints, to reduce or eliminate support of programs required for natural rather than nuclear disasters encountered strong protests from State and local governments. It took legislation in July 1976 and administrative action by DCPA Director Tirana early in the Carter Administration, as we shall see, to clear up the ambiguity that developed regarding "dual use" preparedness. To most observers it appeared that, from political and practical considerations, the dual-use concept would have to be applied if nuclear preparedness was to be accomplished at the State and local levels.

The New Status of Civil Defense

Creation of DCPA.--In his Defense report for fiscal 1973, Defense Secretary Laird highlighted the changes which the Administration proposed for the civil defense program in that year. These, Laird said, included:

--enhancement of state and local capability in attacks and other disasters;

--reorientation of the program to emphasize, whenever possible, available protection from nuclear weapon effects and natural disasters;

--shifting of some on-going programs to systems that would only be implemented in a crisis in order to reduce peace-time costs and prevent rapid obsolescence.

Major elements of the new program, Laird indicated, would include:

(a) maintenance of the current shelter system, but reorienting marking, stocking and home survey programs toward crisis implemented activities; (b) for shelter survey, creation of State Engineer Support Groups to give participating States the in-house capability to replace Federal Engineering Support currently provided; (c) use of analytical techniques to determine the most likely hazards for each community in the event of nuclear war, e.g., blast, fire, fallout; and (d) development of guidance for local governments based on risk analysis, to include evacuation planning guidance for high risk areas. 4

Since coming to office three years earlier, Laird asserted, he had "studied in some depth our civil defense functions as related to our various state and Federal activities in this complex and important field." The real strength of this nation, Laird emphasized, lay in the States and their political subdivisions. With proper organization and preparedness planning, he was convinced, the Nation could survive any disaster. It was Laird's belief that the Defense Department "can and should contribute to total civil disaster preparedness--civil defense and natural disaster."

As "a major step in this direction," Laird announced on May 4, 1972, the establishment of DCPA. The DCPA Director, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, would assist State and local governments in natural disaster preparedness planning, consistent with OEP policy guidance, and would discharge the Defense Secretary's assigned civil defense functions. The two tasks--civil defense and natural disaster preparedness--were thus blended into one.

DCPA will stress the dual capability and utility of civil defense preparedness and natural disaster preparedness at local government level. In carrying out this task, we will provide preparedness assistance across the entire disaster spectrum tying in closely the many similarities of nuclear attack and natural disaster preparedness planning, a concept long recognized and accepted by State and local government authorities. The States and localities provide resources equal to or greater than those made available to State and local authorities through the Federal civil defense program. While these assets are applied primarily to civil defense efforts against the effects of nuclear attack, they also enhance the capabilities of State and local governments to deal with peacetime disasters. Our assistance in total civil disaster preparedness will improve civil defense preparedness by making the dollars we invest do double duty.

DCPA, Laird believed, "can make a significant contribution to total disaster preparedness." To carry out these responsibilities, he requested $88.6 million for DCPA for fiscal 1973; Congress appropriated $83.5 million.

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Thus, effective May 5, 1972, Laird abolished the Office of Civil Defense, which had operated under the Secretary of the Army, and established DCPA as a new, separate Defense agency within the Defense Department. John E. Davis, director of the former OCD, was named Director of DCPA, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.6

A Defense Department directive, issued July 14, 1972, detailed DCPA's responsibilities for both civil defense and natural disaster preparedness. The "Civil Defense Preparedness" functions continued unchanged. The new "Natural Disaster Preparedness Assistance" functions were set forth as follows:

1. In accordance with agreements between the Director, DCPA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OEP, and subject to the policy guidance of the Director, OEP, DCPA shall:

   a. Advise and assist State and local governments in their development of dual purpose disaster preparedness plans (enemy attack and natural disaster).

   b. Provide detailed assessment of the status of local government emergency preparedness to respond to major disasters and other local emergencies.

   c. Assist State and local governments in their training of State and local officials for disaster emergency operations.

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2. Make available and utilize the civil defense communications system for the purpose of natural disaster warning pursuant to Executive Order 11575 [providing for the Administration of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970].

3. Assist State and local governments in times of emergency through loan of DCPA stockpiled supplies and equipment.7

Organization and Management.—In organizing DCPA, Davis made some changes, including an upgrading of training and education and emergency information. In addition to the existing eight Regional Offices, DCPA on February 1, 1973, established two Regional Field Offices—one in New York City and the other in Kansas City, Missouri, each functioning under its parent DCPA Region.8 This move was seen as an interim adjustment to a 10-region concept adopted by the Administration.

The two Field Offices, however, were not adequately staffed to function as operational entities in a manner similar to DCPA's Regional Offices. The different regional patterns caused confusion at the State level and impeded Federal interagency and intergovernmental coordination. In December 1977, Davis's successor, Mr. Tirana, sought to establish 10 DCPA regions to provide interface with the

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Figure 9

DCPA Organization Chart

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR | DEPUTY DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT

ADVISORS
- MILITARY ADVISOR
- LAW ADVISOR

PROGRAMS OFFICE

DEPARTMENTAL FIELD

REGIONAL OFFICES

DIRECTOR DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

REGION 1

BAYPOINN, MISS

REGION 2

ELIZABETH, VIRGINIA

REGION 3

MIDWAY, ILL

REGION 4

BATTLE CREEK, MICH

REGION 5

MILTON, FLA

REGION 6

BATTLE CREEK, MICH

REGION 7

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

REGION 8

SALT LAKE CITY, UT

REGION 9

RICHMOND, VA

REGION 10

DENVER, COLO

REGION 11

SANTA BARBARA, CALIF

REGION 12

BATTLE CREEK, MICH

REMOVAL / INSTALLATION DIVISION

ENGINEERING DIVISION

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

TEST & RESEARCH DIVISION

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIVISION

FY 1972, P. 51.
Federal structure. The proposed expansion was put aside, however, on the basis that the reorganization study then under way might bring changes that would obviate the need to increase the number of DCPA regional offices.

With its limited funds, DCPA strove throughout its existence to introduce program priorities—to develop those systems and capabilities with the greatest lifesaving potential for the funds invested. Its review of past efforts at population protection led DCPA to the following conclusions in the early seventies:

- If an attack should occur, the primary enemy targets probably would be U.S. missile sites, and other military installations.

- An attack very likely would be preceded by a period of international tension. This could constitute "strategic warning," and provide time for protective actions.

- A great deal of protection against radioactive fallout already exists in the United States, and more is being identified as time goes on. Attention should now be given to protection against nuclear blast and fire.

- Blast and fire would endanger mainly people living or working near military targets and large metropolitan areas. These two types of location may therefore be called "High-risk" areas.

- It is not financially feasible to build special underground blast-and-fire shelters in these high-risk areas.

- It may be feasible, however, when an international crisis threatens to result in a nuclear attack, for residents of high-risk areas to be temporarily relocated in small-town and rural
areas, where nuclear weapons probably would not be targeted, provided these people could be sustained and protected against radioactive fallout. 9

The priorities approach extended to "disaster management" in the broader context, encompassing the most likely hazards resulting from natural disasters as well as protection from nuclear attack; and it took account of systems that would be implemented only in a crisis "in order to reduce peacetime costs and avoid rapid obsolescence." 10

Because of uncertainties with respect to budgets, however, DCPA could not always follow through on its program priorities. A case in point was a program decision by Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger in August 1975, by which some $100 million was to have been allocated over a five-year period to enhance the level of civil defense readiness in the so-called "counterforce areas"--areas deemed to be at highest risk because of their proximity to bomber, ICBM and other strategic offense force installations. President Ford's sharp cuts in DCPA's fiscal 1977 budget, however, eliminated all special programming for these areas. 11

As a general proposition, DCPA tried to get local governments to bring all their emergency capabilities to the


10Ibid., p. 2.

11Chipman, op. cit., pp. 35-36. --
"minimum acceptable level," rather than to concentrate on one or two areas at the expense of the rest. And it sought to increase capabilities in being and minimize dependence on surging in crisis. Because of the uncertainties surrounding particular program elements, DCPA believed that its "program-mix" approach was sound. Dr. William K. Chipman explained the underlying rationale as follows:

Clearly, everyone associated with the civil defense program would like to have a high-confidence method to determine the optimum application of the next $10 million or $100 million. As with other Defense programs, however, optimum application of effort is highly scenario-dependent, and is attended by uncertainties.

If it were clear beyond peradventure of doubt that only US strategic weapons installations would be attacked in a nuclear war, after a period of crisis bargaining, a highly effective but not highly expensive civil defense system could be designed and deployed in a short time. Or if it were certain that US cities would never be attacked without 7 to 14 days of unambiguous warning, and that the US President at the time would without fail call for crisis evacuation of US risk areas, then all efforts could be directed to developing plans and allied capabilities for crisis evacuation, with no resources devoted to in-place protection in cities. Unfortunately, such certitudes are not readily to be had, and DCPA therefore believes it must include in the civil defense program a reasonable mix of capabilities, consistent with total resources available, to hedge against the many uncertainties unavoidably connected with protecting life and property against attack.12

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DCPA introduced Standards for Local Civil Preparedness, and a Program Management Information System to encourage State and local governments to review their readiness status and project actions to increase their capabilities. A key instrument in determining whether States or localities would receive Federal matching funds or other aid was a so-called "program paper." This document described plans for the coming fiscal year and the funds and number of employees needed to carry out these plans. By mid-1975, 54 State-level and 4,865 local program areas had submitted "Program Papers" to DCPA. At that point, DCPA had obligated a total of $266.7 million for Personnel and Administrative Expenses since the inception of the program in fiscal 1961.13

After a full year of development, DCPA introduced in fiscal 1975 an "objectives oriented" management system, "based on a good, firm foundation of finding out local needs in relation to the overall objectives of the national program." The system encompassed not only the establishment of objectives, but also programming, budgeting, reporting, and evaluation. The dual mission continued, but at that point, as we shall see, the objective focused primarily on nuclear readiness:

. . . To make the community, and citizens within the community, better prepared to deal with the effects of nuclear attack. Such readiness meets an important secondary objective: an improved readiness to conduct coordinated local emergency operations in peacetime emergencies or disasters.\textsuperscript{14}

An important feature of this system was a provision for qualitative assessment of readiness of each participating locality with respect to over 50 specific areas. A DCPA Program Evaluation handbook defined five levels of readiness for each element rated—-from "A" (fully qualified) to "E" (no capability), with a "C" rating representing the minimum-acceptable level of readiness. Attainment of about one-half of the capability needed, along with a reasonably effective base for expansion in a crisis, represented the "minimum" level. Each community was also rated on its overall "Ability to Execute Emergency Plans for Disaster Operations." To a large extent this rating was based on performance in exercises, or in the event of a major peacetime disaster, the locality's demonstrated ability to control coordinated operations from the Emergency Operating Center. As of the fall of 1976, it appeared, only a minor fraction of the national population lived in localities that had achieved a "fully-qualified" level of readiness.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{15}Chipman, \textit{op. cit.}, Appendix 2, pp. 10-11, and figures 2-6.
Figure 10

OVERALL ABILITY TO EXECUTE EMERGENCY PLANS

PERCENT POPULATION* AT/ABOVE MINIMUM STANDARD

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**EMERGENCY READINESS FOR PEACETIME DISASTER**

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**EMERGENCY READINESS FOR NUCLEAR WAR**

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*BASE POPULATION OF REPORTING UNITS (206,000,000)

** Solid portion indicates population of communities at "Fully-Qualified" level of readiness.

Major Thrusts of DCPA Efforts

All-Risk Preparedness.--The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and its amendment in 1958 specifically authorized the development and implementation of programs to prepare for an enemy attack upon the United States. There was no mention of Federal support of State and local programs to prepare for peacetime disasters. DCPA's antecedent agencies held the view, however, that the funds authorized by the Federal Civil Defense Act could be used while developing a capability for nuclear attack to benefit and support complementary efforts of State and local governments to develop readiness for peacetime (natural) disasters or major emergencies. This "dual use" concept was reflected in the Defense Department directive of July 14, 1972, which created DCPA and defined its responsibilities and functions.

This dual-capability approach became the watchword of DCPA operations. Virtually all DCPA programs, in one way or another, came to reflect this emphasis on dual-use of emergency systems: the States and localities would be helped to develop their capabilities to prepare for, and cope with, peacetime disasters as well as the effects of nuclear attack. There were few to question the benefits to be derived from this linkage of civil defense and natural disaster preparedness planning by State and local governments. It was hoped, of course, that this would encourage State and local governments to address themselves to the nuclear attack as well as
the natural disaster aspects of civil preparedness. As Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger observed early in 1975,

Civil defense readiness generates, as a bonus, an improved capability on the part of a State or local government to conduct coordinated operations in the event of peacetime emergencies. If State and local governments are prepared to deal with the worst of all possible situations—a nuclear emergency—it is a reasonable assumption that these governments can handle lesser emergencies—hurricanes, floods, etc.—effectively and efficiently. But should a State or local government turn a blind eye to the nuclear attack aspect of civil preparedness, its ability to respond to a lesser disaster becomes questionable. 16

Until December 1976, DCPA carried on many emergency assistance programs with State and local governments, focused at improving preparedness for nuclear attack and, at the same time, supporting planning for all-risk emergencies. Among these programs were: matching funds to support salaries and administrative costs of State and local personnel engaged in emergency planning; the national warning and emergency communications systems; the State and local emergency operating centers; and the national network for emergency public information designed to acquaint officials and the citizens at large on the steps they should take in an emergency to reduce loss of life and property. Also, through its "Standards for Local Preparedness," DCPA provided guidance for the development of improved emergency

operations by State and local police, fire, welfare, rescue, medical and other emergency services.

To promote this preparedness for all disasters, "natural and man-caused," DCPA established "On-Site Assistance" (OSA) as its "top priority activity." The program was a joint Federal-State effort to assist local governments on-site in enhancing their capabilities to cope with peacetime as well as nuclear emergencies. The heart of the process was an on-site survey of the local preparedness situation. Local needs would thus be determined, and action-plans would be drawn to overcome deficiencies. Help would come through grants of surplus and excess property, loans, and from DCPA planning, training and technical assistance. As of mid-1975, DCPA reported,

- 1,043 or 28 percent of the required 3,767 local program areas designated for OSA had been surveyed; 28 percent of the U.S. population is located in these program areas.

- 809 or 21 percent of the required 3,767 local program areas designated for OSA had an adopted action plan; these plans covered 22 percent of the U.S. population.17

In the course of a review and projected slashing of the civil defense budget for fiscal 1977, the Ford Administration directed a refocusing of DCPA effort to functions related to nuclear preparedness. Guidance to this effect came from the Defense Department in November 1975. Defense

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Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who replaced Schlesinger in that post, announced the change in approach.

... Rather than continue Defense Department funding in support of the common total peacetime State and local preparedness base, through funding provided in the civil defense program, the FY 1977 budget request reduces those elements of the program which should be supported by State and local governments. An example of funding that will be eliminated are those State and local programs primarily required for natural rather than nuclear disaster preparedness. We will continue to provide resources which are necessary to nuclear disaster preparedness.

Under this concept, reductions will be made in 'matching funds' assistance to State and local agencies, staff personnel in State and local emergency preparedness agencies, procurement of emergency vehicles and equipment which are used for peacetime community rescue operations, and construction funds for Emergency Operation Centers in areas which have a low probability of being directly affected by nuclear attack. Headquarters staff and activities will also be reduced in line with the revised scope of the program. The Department will continue to assist activities at the State and local level which other Federal, State and local agencies would not be expected to support since they relate to nuclear preparedness.\(^1\)

The turnaround on the dual-use policy brought strong protests from the States and localities. Late in January 1976, Congressman F. Edward Hébert, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations, designated a panel to look at the objectives, administration, and operation of the national civil defense program and report back to his subcommittee.\(^2\) Testifying before


\(^{19}\) Members of the Civil Defense Panel included Congressman Robert L. Leggett of California, chairman, Donald J. Mitchell of New York, and Bob Carr of Michigan.
this panel on February 9, 1976, DCPA Director Davis voiced the fear that the move would set back planning for nuclear preparedness.

... the active participation of State and local governments, and an effective emergency operations base at those levels of government, are essential ingredients of nuclear preparedness. To the extent that the States and/or the local governments do not fund their portion of the effort, under the ground rules specified for fiscal year 1977, the nationwide civil defense posture will be weakened.

The two associations of local and State directors have jointly indicated that the revised concept is unacceptable, and, based upon this attitude, we are concerned that a significant percentage of States and localities may terminate their cooperation and participation in the nuclear-oriented preparedness activities. The rationale most commonly given is that providing for the "Common Defense" is a Federal responsibility, and that State and local governments are unwilling to provide their funds for purely nuclear preparedness.²⁰

DCPA, Davis indicated, would do its utmost to make this arrangement work, "but of course cannot require State or local governments to participate." The final outcome of the 1977 budget decision and policy change, Davis told the Civil Defense Panel, "remains to be seen," but it was his thought that "the premise that State and local governments will respond fully to all natural disaster preparedness needs" and allow the Federal attack preparedness programs to be built on that base "may not prove valid."²¹

²⁰Civil Defense Panel Hearings, p. 36.
²¹Ibid., p. 35.
In the face of this threatened removal of DCPA from peacetime disaster preparedness and the prospect of State and local neglect of nuclear preparedness, the House Armed Services Committee moved quickly on two fronts--financial and legal. The DCPA budget for fiscal 1977 was raised from the $71 million requested by the Administration to $87.5 million. The Committee also made the following observation regarding the discontinuance of the dual-use policy:

The Administration unwisely placed a restriction on the use of Federal civil defense funds which would preclude State and local agencies from using such funds for natural disaster as well as nuclear-attack preparedness. Most State and local governments cannot afford to maintain separate organizations for peacetime and wartime emergencies, and dual-use preparedness has been an accepted practice for some years. The intent of Congress in the Federal Civil Defense Act should be clarified to comprehend the dual-use concept without impairing the basic civil defense mission.

The Committee approved such clarifying language and reported it out in a defense appropriation authorization bill, enacted July 13, 1976 as Public Law 94-361.


23 Ibid.
Section 804 of this Act amended the Congressional statement of policy in the Federal Civil Defense Act by adding the following sentence:

The Congress recognizes that the organizational structure established jointly by the Federal Government and the several States and their political subdivisions for civil defense purposes can be effectively utilized, without adversely affecting the basic civil defense objectives of this Act, to provide relief and assistance to people in areas of the United States struck by disasters other than disasters caused by enemy attack.

In addition, Section 205 of the Act, authorizing financial aid to the States, was amended by adding the following subsection:

Funds made available to the States under this Act may be used, to the extent and under such terms and conditions as shall be prescribed by the Administrator, for providing emergency assistance, including civil defense personnel, organizational equipment, materials and facilities, in any area of the United States which suffers a disaster other than a disaster caused by an enemy attack.

The legislative history of these amendments made it clear that Congress intended to authorize dual-use of DCPA funds. It also furnished some guidance concerning the proper use of these funds in fulfilling this "secondary mission" (assisting States and localities in preparing for, and responding to, natural disasters) of DCPA. Part of the rationale for such expenditures was that the State and local organizations were responsible for both civil defense planning and natural disaster relief, and many of their preparedness activities and resources were essential for response to both enemy attack and natural disasters. In its
enactment of Public Law 94-361, Congress recognized the mutual
benefits to be derived from the common elements in the
natural-disaster and attack-oriented missions, and the
impracticability of separating these function administra-
tively at the State and local levels.24

Nuclear Civil Protection Planning.--In the early and
mid-fifties, it will be recalled, FCDA Administrator Val
Peterson had placed great stress on evacuation to deal with
the threat of nuclear attack. The idea was to get people
out of the cities insofar as possible in the few hours that
might be available between the detection of a manned bomber
attack and the actual arrival of the bombers. With the new
threat of radiation fallout and with ICBMs contracting
warning time to a matter of minutes, the emphasis shifted
from evacuation to fallout shelters as the basic approach
to population survival. The shelter program, it will also
be recalled, was seriously impaired for lack of legislative
and financial support; and as things stood at the dawn of
the seventies, the lifesaving potential of the program was
estimated at 30 million, at best, and most likely much less

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24 Memorandum, Dennis H. Trosch, Assistant General Counsel (Logis-
tics), Office of General Counsel, DOD, to Bardyl R. Tirana, Director,
DCPA, Oct. 19, 1977, Subject: Use of DCPA Funds for Peacetime Disaster
Assistance. Mr. Tirana obtained this legislative review because of per-
sistent confusion even after the enactment of Public Law 94-361. Mr.
Trosch’s memorandum is reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Armed Services, Subcommittee on General Legislation (Senator John C.
Culver, Chairman), Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations
for Fiscal Year 1979, Hearings, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: U.S.
cited as Culver Subcommittee Hearings).
(over and beyond the 80 million persons who would survive even in the total absence of a civil defense program).

The idea of evacuation, however, was not abandoned entirely even in the sixties. As early as 1964, the Strategy and Tactics Panel of the Project Harbor study had expressed hope that the probable period of tension preceding a nuclear war would provide "days to months of strategic warning" and so would permit "crisis actions, such as strategic evacuation and improved shelter construction." It urged that planning to render such crisis actions effective be carried out "as soon as possible." 25

With the knowledge in the late sixties that the Soviet Union's civil defense program provided for evacuation as well as in-place sheltering in a crisis, U.S. planners felt that they should have similar flexibility. Such flexibility, they believed, would make it possible to respond in kind should the Soviets seek to intimidate the U.S. in a crisis by evacuating their urban population. Moreover, DOD estimates indicated that evacuation could save 100 million lives (over and above the 80 million who would survive in any event) if a massive attack on the cities did occur. In the face of fiscal constraints, plans for crisis relocation could be developed at little cost, with

the large outlays deferred for the time, if ever, when these plans had to be implemented.

Thus, the idea emerged in the early seventies that there was a need for a capability to respond to "a spectrum of possible contingencies." In his posture statement in mid-February 1972, Defense Secretary Laird unveiled this "new program" which would include not only "maintenance of the current shelter systems," but also the development of guidance to local governments concerning "evacuation planning . . . for high risk areas." This program, which came to be called "Nuclear Civil Protection Planning," DCPA Director Davis believed, provided a perspective and balance "well-suited to the needs of the times." In accenting "flexibility of response," it would seek to protect the American people from "a variety of possible attacks, delivered either rapidly or after a period of crisis."27

Nuclear Civil Protection had two ingredients: (1) relocating the population from high-risk areas during a period of severe crisis; and (2) sheltering the population in-place, in situations where warning time or other circumstances would preclude crisis evacuation. The two were seen as complementary objectives. Both would have to be developed and


maintained, along with the shelter surveys and supporting systems and capabilities, as effectively as resources would permit.

Shelters were basic to both in-place protection and crisis relocation planning, and meeting shelter needs seemed like a never-ending task. Continuance of the National Shelter Survey through mid-1975 had brought the inventory up to 230 million public fallout shelter spaces. Yet these spaces were so located that they could "accommodate only about one-third of the population under an in-place shelter posture."29

With about two-thirds of the total population—between 135 million and 140 million people—living in the so-called risk areas, their relocation in a crisis would pose formidable problems. They would still need fallout protection in the host areas. Billeting in private homes was ruled out, though many people in host areas would be disposed to provide temporary lodging for evacuees. The policy was to use non-residential space in schools, churches, college buildings, armories, motels and commercial structures. Federal Host Area Surveys would identify fallout protection in existing structures and buildings in which such fallout protection


29See Director Davis's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee's Civil Defense Panel, February 9, 1976, in Civil Defense Panel Hearings, pp. 40-41.
could be substantially improved during a crisis. This could be done, the planners said, by adding earth or other shielding at the sides or in some cases on top of existing structures and by constructing "expeditious shelters" of door-covered trenches and above-ground A-frames.  

Along with housing and sheltering, there were formidable problems of moving millions of people out of the cities and providing them with food, medical care, and sanitation facilities. At the same time, plans would have to be laid to keep essential industries operating in risk areas throughout the relocation period. Key workers would be moved to host areas nearby and would commute into the risk areas on a shift basis. In time, key workers remaining in risk areas would be provided with the best available or upgraded blast protection.

No one, of course, could guarantee that the time would, indeed, be available to relocate the population. But it was the judgment of Herman Kahn and other analysts of strategic warfare, and of the Defense Department, that if a nuclear

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30 This was why DCPA staffers were wont to say, somewhat facetiously, that "fallout protection is dirt cheap." For comprehensive coverage of all aspects of Nuclear Civil Protection, particularly crisis relocation planning, see "Nuclear Civil Protection," Apr. 6, 1979, DCPA Information Bulletin No. 306, Apr. 25, 1979; "Questions and Answers on Crisis Relocation Planning," DCPA Information Bulletin No. 305, Apr. 20, 1979. Highly useful information on the subject can be found in the hearings of the Civil Defense Panel cited above and of the Joint Committee on Defense Production in 1976.

war were to come, it would most likely follow a period of intense international tension rather than occur as a surprise attack "out of the blue." It was assumed that as the Soviets were seen to be evacuating their cities—a process that would take a week or so, the President would signal U.S. evacuation in sufficient time to execute relocation plans.

The most likely targets, the planners believed, would be the so-called "counterforce" areas—communities located near key military bases with their bombers and ICBMs. And, along with these, the great metropolitan centers were deemed high-risk areas. Evacuation of the population in these areas, the planners believed, could be accomplished generally in three days or less, perhaps four days in the case of New York and as much as a week for Los Angeles and San Francisco. It was clear that the Northeast Corridor (from Washington, D.C., through to Boston), California, and a few other highly urbanized sections of the country would pose special problems and require specially-tailored solutions. Initial analyses of special feasibility studies, Director Davis indicated, suggested that viable solutions for crisis relocation could be developed.32

Work on crisis relocation planning began in 1973, with a prototype project in San Antonio, Texas. This pilot work

led to the development of a manual for the first phase of 
crisis relocation planning, during which people in the 
high-risk areas would be allocated to "host" jurisdictions 
and standby information would be developed to advise the 
people "where to go and what to do" in the event relocation 
was directed. Follow-on planning (Phase II) would involve 
working with host areas to develop plans for lodging, feed-
ing, and sheltering evacuees, and working with risk areas 
for movement and traffic control and for keeping key in-
dustries and security services in operation.

With this manual as a base, DCPA trained Federal-
State teams; and these teams proceeded with pilot work in 
other areas. Nine such projects were in process during 
1974-75. On the strength of these pilot projects, DCPA 
proceeded in fiscal 1976, at the direction of the Defense 
Department, to work with the States on crisis relocation 
planning. By the spring of 1979, all States were involved 
in this planning, although the total effort, DCPA indi-
cated, represented only "a beginning"--a "modest start" on 
crisis relocation planning.

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33 The participating communities were Utica/Rome, N.Y.; 
Dover, Del.; Macon, Ga.; Duluth, Minn.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; 
Colorado Springs, Colo.; Tucson, Ariz.; Great Falls, Mont.; 
and Springfield, Mass.; see DCPA Annual Reports, FY 1974 
(pp. 13-14) and FY 1975 (p. 17).

34 See Q&A 45 in "Questions and Answers on Crisis Re-
location Planning," DCPA Information Bulletin No. 305, 
At that point, the crisis relocation planning effort was beginning to produce what DCPA called "fairly good paper plans." The quality was improving as the planners gained experience. DCPA recognized, however, that "there is a lot more that could and should be done to improve confidence that the plans would be workable should they ever be put to the test." With an expanded program, for example, work could proceed in depth with local industries and services. Host-area school officials could be working to set up the actual cadres of the organization needed. Planners in both risk and host areas could be brought into exercises of the plans. And help could be extended to local governments in updating plans for in-place protection and related operations.35

In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee's Civil Defense Panel in February 1976, Davis voiced his conviction that crisis evacuation of most high-risk areas was feasible. It would be a difficult and long-term undertaking. The planning might be relatively inexpensive, but the execution of the plans could be very costly, indeed. Given the potential payoff in saving up to 100 million lives, however, evacuation in an extremely severe crisis, for all its massive costs and dislocations, would be worthwhile. At the proposed fiscal 1977 level of funding, Davis

35See Qs & As 49 and 50, ibid., pp. 27-28.
indicated, it would take seven or eight years to develop a credible evacuation capability; and even this was contingent on the willingness of State and local governments to participate in the face of reduced assistance and the "nuclear-only" scope prescribed for the civil defense program. Current budget plans, Davis added, called for still another deep cut in fiscal 1978. Additional funding would be sought; but if this were not approved, Davis asserted, "there can be no realistic expectation of developing a credible crisis relocation capability." 36

Increased funding might shorten the time required to complete the planning, but it seemed doubtful that a nationwide capability for crisis evacuation could be developed before the mid-eighties; if then. For the years immediately ahead, it appeared, the program would continue largely in a paper-planning stage, with the counterforce areas receiving priority consideration in in-depth preparations. Many concerns were expressed regarding crisis relocation--its feasibility; its costs; uncertainties as to whether the national authorities would, in fact, call for evacuation; the massive disruptions that would result; the reaction of the people in risk and host areas; the level of fallout protection and the effectiveness of radiological defense and other support operations in host areas; and other

36Civil Defense Panel Hearings, p. 35.
considerations. DCPA conceded that there were a number of "ifs" connected with crisis relocation. It was determined, however, to proceed with the planning, confident of its viability and hopeful that, time and circumstances permitting, execution of the plans, even if not done perfectly, could save 100 million lives in a large-scale attack.

**Low State of Civil Defense Readiness**

In no small measure, crisis relocation planning reflected effort to find a low-cost approach to population protection in the absence of funds for in-place protection with fallout or blast shelters. The Nixon-Ford budgets for civil defense were higher than the low-point budget of 1969 ($60.5 million). They rose to some $87 million in fiscal 1976. Discounting for inflation, however, they represented little increase in real terms. And even as the Defense Department's posture statement for fiscal 1977 noted population protection and recovery in the aftermath of war as key elements of America's strategic defense, the Ford Administration planned a drastic cut in the scope and funding of civil defense. Indeed, the $71 million projection for fiscal 1977 was but one step in a five-year plan looking toward still further cuts, possibly to $40 million for fiscal 1978 and beyond. "Necessarily," DCPA Director Davis told the Civil Defense Panel in February 1976, "budget reductions of this magnitude do cause
concerns in my mind as to the future effectiveness of America's civil defense programs."  

The Administration's $71 million budget for fiscal 1977 would really have been a bitter pill to swallow. Davis recognized that the tax dollar "must be spent wisely," and that the President and his advisers and the Congress "have a broad picture of priorities and are in best positions to determine how public funds should be spent." He pledged to do his best to adjust DCPA programs in line with the recommended budget, so that funds and manpower "will continue to be applied most effectively in the further development of civil defense as an essential element in the overall U.S. strategic deterrent and defense."

At the same time, Davis minced no words about the effects of the reduced budget on DCPA activities. DCPA would have to discontinue training and education programs, making available stockpiled emergency engineering equipment, quality checks of shelter stocks, and matching funds for procurement and maintenance of equipment for State and local emergency services. Significant reductions would have to be made in matching funds for State and local personnel and administrative (P&A) expenses, Emergency Operating Centers, and procurement and maintenance of property; in State and local training and education; in granting or lending property;

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in providing information and engineering support services; in research; and in DCPA staffing, personal services, and travel.  

As was indicated earlier, the House Armed Services Committee came to the rescue and helped negate much of the cut which the Administration had proposed. This still left DCPA with less funds than it had the year before, since it now had to defray the costs of selected warning and communications functions previously carried in the Army's budget. In 1977 dollars, the $84.5 million voted for DCPA in fiscal 1977 were worth $12 million less than the $31.8 million appropriation to FCDA for fiscal 1961, and $24 million less than the low Johnson budget of $60.5 million in fiscal 1969.

Actually, program cutbacks began in the Johnson years; but they became more pronounced in the Nixon-Ford years. Civil defense activities continued on a very modest scale. Some areas received only limited coverage. Others were discontinued entirely or marked for "crisis activation." Increasingly, fiscal constraints necessitated deferment of development of needed capabilities, with the hope that they

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39 DCPA's appropriation for fiscal 1977, including a $4 million supplemental, totaled $86.5 million, which in 1977 dollars was level with the $85 million voted for fiscal 1961. (That amount was raised to $105.1 million to cover a transition quarter in the changeover from July 1 to October 1 as the beginning of the fiscal year.)
would be made good on a crash basis during a period of international crisis, time permitting. Such "surging," or crisis-buildup, actions were contemplated, for example, with respect to the marking and stocking of shelters; training Shelter Managers, Radiological Defense Officers, and Radiological Monitors; improving existing fallout protection; training and educating the public with respect to survival actions; and further enhancing local readiness for emergency operations.

Such dependence on crisis activation, Davis candidly told the Civil Defense Panel in February 1976, "is not a high-confidence approach." To be sure, substantial capabilities had been developed, with "tangible assets" such as EOCs and warning systems and "intangible assets" such as increased readiness resulting from On-Site Assistance and exercises. But on an overall basis, Davis told the Panel, "it is not possible to state that the United States is 'well prepared'."

On a scale from "A" to "E" (with "A" representing excellent preparedness, "C" representing minimum level preparedness, and "E" representing none), DCPA's management and evaluation systems show that for most significant program elements, the median U.S. local jurisdiction is somewhere between "D" and "C".

If "well prepared" is taken to mean at least the "C" level, and desirably "B" or "A", the U.S. falls short of being well-prepared."40

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The precarious situation at the State and local levels threatened to get worse in the face of the Ford Administration's projected budget cut and its restriction of Federal support to "nuclear-only" programs. Davis was very much concerned that the partnership relationship established through the dual-use concept would be dissipated if Federal funding was to be channeled only for nuclear preparedness. A viable population protection program could not be achieved without major participation by the States and localities. This required the development of capabilities "where the people are--in communities throughout the United States"--warning, shelter, radiological defense, emergency public information, protected control facilities (EOCs), procedures for direction and control, and a capability for evacuation should time and circumstances permit. The concern and interest of State and local officials with respect to nuclear preparedness, Davis advised the Civil Defense Panel, "is affected substantially by their perception of the importance attached to civil defense by the Federal Government."

... if the Federal Government says that development of civil defense capabilities is important and provides a significant amount of support and assistance to State and local governments to develop these capabilities, State and local officials for the most part will follow this Federal lead. If, on the other hand, the Federal program erodes and support for States and localities is reduced, most State and local officials conclude that a program which does not
Confused State of Federal Emergency Preparedness

Adding further to the problems besetting DCPA and the State and local agencies was President Nixon's dismantling of the Office of Emergency Preparedness in mid-1973, and the resultant emergence of three instead of two Federal agencies with primary responsibilities for various aspects of nuclear and natural disasters. In implementing Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, Nixon moved OEP's functions to various line agencies. The General Services Administration (GSA) fell heir to OEP's civil defense, continuity of government, resource crisis management, and other emergency preparedness functions; and OEP's disaster preparedness and relief functions devolved on the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Other functions relating to the investigation of imports and oil policy were assigned to the Treasury Department. These actions were taken as part of a plan to reduce the size of the Executive Office of the President and reorient it to its basic purpose of assisting

41 Civil Defense Panel Hearings, pp. 36-37.


43 For details of these delegations, see Executive Order No. 11725, June 1973.
the President in top-level policy and management matters. They were, in the judgment of Mr. Fred Malek, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), "consistent with the President's broader intent to strengthen and upgrade the managerial capacity of our line departments and agencies, and to press for further decentralization of Federal activity to field offices and even to the communities themselves, wherever we can bring the Government closer to the people."44

Members of the House and Senate Government Operations Committees raised a number of questions regarding this reorganization. Some questioned whether HUD and GSA would have the prestige of OEP as a Presidential staff arm and with its director's membership on the National Security Council. Some saw no merit in bringing HUD into the disaster preparedness and response picture; they felt that the function should be assigned to DCPA inasmuch as that agency was already deeply involved in this area and civil defense and disaster activities were generally integrated at the State and local levels.45


The rationale for moving the disaster preparedness and response function to HUD, Mr. Malek indicated, was that "it was felt that there was a stronger relationship between the community programs," and that "there was so much in the housing area that had to be addressed in most of these disasters." Malek further added that with civil defense in the Defense Department, "We thought it important for the maintenance of civilian control for that to be done by a civilian agency." No thought was then given to bringing into a single agency all the functions dealing with different types of emergencies. Mr. Dwight Ink, Assistant Director of OMB, conceded that there "may be . . . better working arrangements" that needed to be, and could be, developed, "particularly between the Civil Defense in the Defense Department and the functions that are being transferred from OEP over to HUD." Placement of civil defense policy and also emergency preparedness functions in GSA, a housekeeping agency, legislators also feared, would downgrade the status of the staff and their capacity to carry out their tasks. OMB spokesmen sought to ease concerns on this matter by indicating the President's intent to upgrade GSA and to establish liaison between GSA and the National Security Council,

47 Ibid., p. 32.
so that preparedness activities would be carried on within the framework of national security objectives.\textsuperscript{48}

DCPA worked out its relationships with the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) in HUD. The two agencies recognized "the commonality of their programs" to guide and assist State and local governments in their preparedness against disasters. An understanding was reached, November 6, 1974, identifying activities of common interest and describing measures for mutual relationships in the conduct of those activities "so as to achieve maximum mutual benefit and avoid duplication of effort."\textsuperscript{49}

An Office of Preparedness (later redesignated Federal Preparedness Agency) was established in GSA, July 1, 1973, to carry out the responsibilities assigned to it. The Office of Preparedness (OP) saw its role as one concerned primarily with "national policy and program development" and with "providing guidance and coordination to other Federal agencies relative to their emergency preparedness programs." In October 1973, Leslie W. Bray, Jr., Major General, USAF (Ret.), was appointed Director of OP; he sought to carry out his duties with a small staff organized

\hspace{2cm}\textsuperscript{48}Holifield Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, pp. 86, 92, 94.

\hspace{2cm}\textsuperscript{49}DCPA Civil Preparedness Circular No. 74-7, Dec. 13, 1974, and attachment, "Statement of Understanding Between the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency."
at the headquarters into "conflict preparedness" and "civil crisis preparedness" offices and functioning in the field through ten Regional Preparedness Offices.\(^5\)

Funds available to OP in its first year totaled only $8.6 million, of which over $5 million was for salaries and expenses, $3.3 million for the defense mobilization functions of Federal agencies, and $215,000 for State and local preparedness.\(^5\) With these funds, OP laid out an ambitious program to:

. . . assure Government leadership, authority, and operational capability in emergencies. . . .

. . . improve operational readiness through assignment of emergency responsibilities to Federal agencies for development of the necessary preparedness plans and program within their respective area(s). . . .

. . . provide the Federal Government with dispersed, protected emergency facilities having logistic support, and communications and data processing capabilities. . . .

. . . achieve field operating capability in time of emergency. . . .

. . . provide assistance and guidance to State and local governments in providing for succession of key officials, relocation of government operations and preservation of vital records.


\(^{51}\)Ibid., p. 86.
recruit and train a corps of qualified executives to serve the Nation in emergencies.

... develop a comprehensive readiness for the application of emergency, economic and resource measures to meet a wide range of crisis situations as they emerge.52

From the above recitation of objectives, it was clear that a number of activities complemented and overlapped those of DCPA. Efforts were made to bring the related activities of the two agencies closer together, but problems persisted. As we shall see, the Joint Committee on Defense Production voiced strong concern about the fragmentation of organizational arrangements for Federal emergency preparedness.

And the existence of three agencies with major responsibilities for civil emergency preparedness, each with its own regional offices, became a matter of increasing dissatisfaction and complaint at the State and local levels.53 There was a strong belief that a more effective structure was needed to plan, direct and coordinate the Nation's total civil emergency and disaster preparedness effort.

Congressional Concerns

The Civil Defense Panel Review.--The deteriorating state of the civil defense and related programs became the subject

52Ibid., pp. 89-180.

of close Congressional scrutiny in 1976—the last year of
the Ford Administration. In the first comprehensive review
in over a decade, the Civil Defense Panel of the House
Armed Services Committee examined a wide range of issues
bearing on U.S. civil defense needs and capabilities: the
adequacy of the basic civil defense legislation; the ra-
tionale and impact of the Administration's proposed cut
in the civil defense budget and its restrictive policy on
the disbursement of matching funds to the States; the ex-
ist ing Federal civil defense organizations and their inter-
action with State and local agencies; whether or not civil
defense had a significant role in strategic deterrence of
nuclear war; Soviet civil defense and its implications for
the U.S. defense posture; the need for better planning and
new programs in civil defense, and the prospects for Con-
gressional and public acceptance of increased civil defense
efforts.54

In tens days of hearings, in February and March 1976,
the Panel took testimony from 35 witnesses in three general
categories: nine from the Federal agencies engaged in civil
defense, disaster relief, and emergency preparedness ac-
tivities; 19 representing outside civil defense organizations
and State and local agencies, who stressed "the potentially
disastrous impact" of the severe budget cut and policy

54 Civil Defense Panel Hearings, p. 1.
restriction proposed by the Administration; and eight with "special knowledge or expertise derived from governmental, academic or industrial experience," who discussed "the role of civil defense in the national defense posture and the significance of the serious and sustained Russian civil defense effort."55

The Panel's report highlighted a number of significant findings and recommendations. The U.S. civil defense program, the Panel asserted, "does not get enough attention from the Congress." While it recognized that judgments differed on what constituted an adequate program, the Panel made clear its own conviction that "the program today is under-funded." As indicated earlier, it recommended a boost of $39 million over the $71 million recommended by the Administration for fiscal 1977, and it called for reinstitution of the "dual use concept" by legislative fiat.

The Panel took note of the extensive criticism by witnesses of the fragmentation of Federal responsibilities for emergency preparedness and of recommendations of a single-agency approach "to conform more closely to the State and local practice and to provide a central source of leadership

and policy guidance." On this point, the Panel made the following finding and recommendation:

Multiple Federal agencies perform emergency preparedness functions. The shifting around of civil defense, natural disaster, and other preparedness functions suggests that a sounder organizational base needs to be developed. The President should direct the Office of Management and Budget to study this problem area and should then submit recommendations to the Congress. The panel submits for consideration by the study group the establishment of a small unit in the Executive Office of the President to coordinate emergency preparedness (including civil defense) functions and to advise the President in the execution of these several functions, which are vested in him by law.\(^5\)

Further, the Panel saw the need for a sounder policy base for the civil defense effort. "Civil defense," the Panel asserted, "is important in strategic deterrence but heretofore has not had sufficient attention and support, either by the Congress or the Administration." It suggested that the President direct the National Security Council "to study the strategic significance of civil defense and develop recommendations for a five-year program of upgrading civil defense." Such recommendations, the Panel felt, would be helpful to the Armed Services Committee in assuming its new responsibilities for the annual authorization of all national defense (including civil defense) programs.\(^5\)

Hearings of the Joint Committee on Defense Production.—

The Joint Committee on Defense Production probed even more deeply into the Nation's emergency preparedness efforts. In

\(^{56}\)Ibid., p. 12. \(^{57}\)Ibid.
three sets of hearings in April, June, and November 1976, the Committee, chaired by Senator William Proxmire, assessed the broad significance of civil preparedness under conditions of limited nuclear war, a new strategic concept introduced by former Defense Secretary Schlesinger; Federal, State and local emergency preparedness; and issues related to the defense of industry against nuclear attack. In its stock-taking of the emergency preparedness program, June 29-30, 1976, the Committee received testimony from the directors of DCPA, the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA-formerly the Office of Preparedness) in GSA, and the FDAA in HUD, as well as from State and local organizations. In this facet of its investigations, the Committee drew support from the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. Its own staff reviewed specific aspects of the preparedness system and analyzed reports from 36 Federal departments and agencies and from State and local preparedness authorities.

The Proxmire Committee set forth its major findings and recommendations in a report published early in 1977, soon after the Ford Administration had given way to that of President Jimmy Carter. With respect to Federal organization for preparedness, the Committee pointed to "the welter of organizational changes over a 30-year period, resulting in
a history that resembles an alphabet soup. It characterized the current state of the Federal preparedness organization as "A Body Without a Head," with the effort since 1973 divided primarily among "three units in larger departments of the Government"—FPA in GSA, DCPA in the DOD, and FDAA in HUD. The Committee blamed the Nixon Reorganization Plan for "this fragmented arrangement," the effect of which was "to impair severely the ability of the Federal Government to coordinate not only its own preparedness plans and programs but also those of State and local governments." 59

The Committee also criticized the Office of Management and Budget for terminating the "delegate agency funding" concept, under which "the central emergency preparedness authority [the former Office of Emergency Preparedness] had central control over the emergency preparedness budgets of the several departments and agencies which carried out activities on behalf of the federal preparedness effort." These two events, the Committee asserted, sharply reduced the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness system at a time when demands on that system increased steadily. Specifically, the Proxmire Committee stated, these changes:


59 Ibid., p. 11.
1. Submerged all preparedness activities in larger departments with different responsibilities and priorities.

2. Effectively removed all central review and control over the entire range of emergency preparedness programs and budgets.

3. Fragmented the capability for coordinating preparedness efforts among Federal, State, local and private agencies.

4. Removed from the National Security Council the only voice speaking specifically on behalf of the requirements for preparedness to assure the security of citizens and their property against nonmilitary threats.

5. Reduced the prominence and authority of the several remaining emergency preparedness agencies and their directors, thus making even more difficult their crucial role in obtaining adequate resources and coordination for preparedness programs.

6. Created a series of competing and often overlapping preparedness agencies with an attendant increase in overhead or administrative expenses, a diminution in the preparedness effort, an opportunity for neglect of certain functions, and a potential for conflict for jurisdictional authority and bureaucratic power among the several agencies.

7. Imposed on the President and the Executive Office alone a series of emergency authorities and responsibilities unlikely to receive adequate advance attention and thus susceptible of precisely the kind of ad hoc and improvised treatment that emergency preparedness is designed to avoid.60

Like the Civil Defense Panel, the Proxmire Committee criticized the Ford Administration's deep cuts in the DCPA budget and its efforts to restrict funds for State and local programs "solely for nuclear attack purposes." The Congress, the Committee noted, "was only partially successful in warding

60 Ibid., p. 11
off these blows to an already neglected and weakened disaster preparedness system." Under the philosophy advanced to justify limiting DCPA's funds and grants, the Committee noted, DCPA would be confined to assistance for nuclear attack preparedness, while FDAA would have sole responsibility for assistance with recovery after natural disasters had occurred. In the judgment of the Proxmire Committee,

This simplistic formula ignored not only the entire evolution of the Nation's emergency preparedness effort and the wisdom thereof but also the many advantages and benefits that accrue to the preparedness effort from multipurpose contingency plans and programs. It sought to shift to the States all responsibility for disaster preparedness other than nuclear attack planning, overlooking the fact that such planning is but one facet of emergency preparedness, that it is improved in proportion that total emergency planning is improved, that disasters cut across State boundaries, and that, to the extent preparedness programs are made effective, then the Federal Government can reduce the amount of the aid it must provide for disaster relief.61

These changes, the Committee contended, reflected neither "a real concern for protecting the populace against disasters" nor "a strategic understanding of the national emergency preparedness effort." Rather, the changes wrought between 1973 and 1976, in the Committee's judgment, represented "the politicizing of the preparedness effort."

All of these changes were instigated by individuals in the Executive Office of the President and in the Office of Management and Budget who cared little for the objectives of preparedness and understood not at all the wisdom inherent in the partnership system that has grown up.

61Ibid., pp. 11-12.
over the years. The Office of Emergency Preparedness was disbanded because its director had been predicting future energy shortages prior to the 1972 election and because President Nixon desired to make the White House staff appear smaller. The effect of a similar action on the Office of the White House Science Advisor is well known and equally decried. Likewise, the 1976 cuts in DCPA funds and programs stemmed largely from bureaucratic rivalry among the preparedness agencies, rather than from a desire to improve a badly neglected preparedness effort.

The current state of the preparedness effort, the Committee stated, could be summed up in four words: "dilution, proliferation, duplication, and neglect."  

In light of its extensive review and findings, the Proxmire Committee came up with highly significant recommendations in all the areas of its investigation. An "Executive Summary" included the following recommendations with respect to "Preparedness Organization":

1. Combine the emergency preparedness functions of DCPA, FDAA, and FPA into a single independent agency, the Federal Preparedness Administration, so as to provide centralized control and coordination of the many civil preparedness responsibilities of the Federal Government.

2. Assign to the Director of the new Federal Preparedness Administration authority and budget control for the specific preparedness programs of other departments and agencies such as were assigned to the former Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness under the "delegate agency funding" concept.

3. Abolish DCPA, FDAA, and FPA except for liaison offices in relevant departments to provide for effective program coordination.

62 Ibid., p. 12.
4. Reestablish the Director of the Federal Preparedness Administration as a statutory member of the National Security Council.

5. Provide for the Director of the Federal Preparedness Administration to report to the President through the Domestic Council for other than national security matters.

6. Establish a single category in the Federal budget for all emergency preparedness programs of the Federal Government.63

With respect to "Preparedness Programs," in view of the "programmatic problems" then encountered with their consequences in terms of effectiveness and cost, the Committee recommended "serious consideration" to:

1. Assigning to a newly created Federal Preparedness Administration the responsibility for all preparedness and relief programs or plans relating to natural disasters, nonnuclear industrial disasters, economic crisis planning, sabotage and terrorism, peacetime nuclear accidents, civil defense, U.S. assistance for international disaster relief, and strategic stockpiles, as well as overall coordination and long-range planning authority for economic mobilization for defense purposes.

2. Establishing in this Federal Preparedness Administration a single point of contact with the Federal Government for all State, local and private preparedness and/or relief organizations in order to facilitate the provision of Federal services to those needing them, as well as to provide for improved coordination of programs, standards, et cetera, among different levels of government and types of organization.

3. Combining the regional offices (and perhaps emergency relocation centers) of DCPA, FDAA, and FPA into single offices in each region in order to improve the provision of services and to improve liaison with State and local government.

63 Ibid., p. viii.
4. Developing, under the leadership of the new Federal Preparedness Administration and in coordination with State and local agencies and other Federal organizations, a total preparedness plan or program that will, inter alia, clarify roles, functions, and missions of the various preparedness-related institutions; for developing criteria for establishing and evaluating preparedness priorities and programs; and for concentrating preparedness resources against the most common and costly threats.

5. Creating disaster assistance response teams at Federal regional offices capable of providing immediate administrative or operational assistance in cases of local, State, regional, national or international disasters.

6. Adopting a Government-wide program that will more effectively provide notice to State, local, and qualifying private agencies of the availability of Federal surplus equipment that is now being sold as surplus or otherwise being disposed of instead of being channeled to the emergency preparedness effort.

7. Developing model preparedness programs and standards for State and local governments, capable of adaptation to differing requirements and of minimum to maximum implementation, as a means of eliminating the disparities between existing programs which prevent equal protection for all citizens against the entire range of crises or disasters.64

As they took up the reins of office, President Carter and his DCPA Director, Bardyl R. Tirana, could find in these recommendations much food for thought and hopefully for constructive action.

64Ibid., pp. viii-ix.
Testifying in January 1979--some two years after the release of the Proxmire Committee's report, DCPA Director Tirana indicated that its message had not gone unheeded. Looking back over those two years, Tirana told Proxmire's new committee, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, "I think . . . we have made substantial progress." This committee's predecessor, the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Tirana said,

. . . was very helpful and pointed out that, indeed, civil defense was a mess, organizationally as well as policywise and programwise, and I think that you showed us the light in early 1977 on a reorganization which has, in fact, come to pass. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, which abolishes my agency and several others, and consolidates their functions into a new agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The work of that agency, Tirana emphasized, "will have value, dual value--both civil defense and application to peacetime disasters, both man-made and natural." President Carter, Tirana indicated, had made a policy decision in September 1978, which, in essence, endorsed a modest civil defense program emphasizing crisis relocation and dual use, "so that whatever capability we are developing could have a peacetime application." And Tirana hoped soon to see a budget decision which would permit the program to move forward. He concluded his "opening remarks" before the Proxmire Committee on an optimistic note:
... Hopefully, we are moving in the right direction. I would hope that, with this committee's help and in the authorization and appropriation process this winter and spring, we will get a clear policy and program decision, and a direction which will resolve civil defense as an issue for the coming years.65

This, in essence, is the thrust of the discussion which follows.

Mounting Pressures for a Strengthened Civil Defense

Concerns About Soviet Civil Defense.--Like Nixon, President Carter started out with hopes for agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce, and perhaps ultimately eliminate, nuclear weapons. He would seek security through dependable arrangements for the control of armaments, while at the same time assuring U.S. military capabilities, matching any threatening power, and preventing any other nation from gaining military superiority. As for civil defense, Carter was not at all disposed toward a beefing up of the program. In his quest for agreements with the Soviets, he hoped that, in the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), ways would be found to forego major efforts in civil defense.

65 Proxmire Committee Hearing, p. 50.
Press reports, Congressional testimony, and expressions of Soviet leaders indicated, however, that the Soviets were not disposed to place limits on their civil defense. It was the Soviets' contention that their civil defense efforts had nothing to do with the strategic balance. They rejected the notion of "mutual assured destruction"; for them civil defense was a means of survival. As long as the arms race and preparations for war continued, the Soviets felt impelled to strengthen their civil defense--to protect their people and economy. In February 1978, General Altunin, Chief of Civil Defense in the Soviet Union, put the matter squarely when he stated in the Red Star:

it would be strange to deny that certain measures to improve [Soviet civil defense] are being carried out.

The main purpose of our civil defense is, together with the armed forces, to ensure the population's defense against mass destruction weapons and other means of attack from a likely opponent. By implementing defensive measures and thoroughly training the population, civil defense seeks to weaken as much as possible the destructive effects of modern weapons.

We state unequivocally . . . the USSR's civil defense has never threatened anybody and threatens nobody, poses no danger for Western countries and moreover does not and cannot upset the Soviet-American balance of forces. 66

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66 Quotation in William K. Chipman, "Civil Defense for the 1980's--Current Issues," July 13, 1979, pp. 61-62. In this paper, Dr. Chipman reviews the civil defense debate in some detail, as well as the course of events that led up to the Presidential Decision (PD 41) of September 1978 on civil defense policy, and the ensuing program and budget proposals looking toward the implementation of that policy.
Soviet assurances, however, did not dispel prevailing concerns about the seeming disparity between Soviet progress in civil defense and the low-profile program in the United States. Various studies and testimony before Congressional committees supported the contention that the Soviets had been forging ahead toward clear superiority in nuclear power and were constructing a civil defense capability as a strategic companion to this power. They pointed to a large Soviet civil defense organization, emphasis on reduction of urban vulnerability, plans for sheltering and evacuating the population, and a strategy of industrial defense.

Others, however, contended that accounts of Soviet advances in civil defense were groundless. The Soviet program, they claimed, existed largely on paper. These critics pointed to ineffectual training programs, severe limitations of shelter protection and evacuation plans, and the vulnerability of the Soviet economy. There was, in the judgment of the critics, little basis for a major buildup of American civil defense. Soviet leaders, they believed, would be loath to risk war with the U.S. on the basis that civil defense could be counted upon to limit the damage wrought by a U.S. nuclear attack.

For a time Defense Secretary Brown voiced doubts regarding the effectiveness of the Soviet program; he saw no merit in emulating the Soviets in this regard. Testifying
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1978, Brown said:

... I have grave doubts about the efficacy of the Soviet civil defense program in protecting the bulk of the population or protecting industry. I think they may be able to protect industry, the leadership, and some of the Soviet elite in a short period during a general nuclear war. I don't think that the appropriate response for us to what I think is a relatively ineffective Soviet move is to duplicate that move. I don't rule out some additional emphasis on U.S. civil defense in the future, but I don't think that it is a right response at this point.67

Nonetheless, the Defense Department began to voice concern about perceptions of Soviet superiority based on "marked asymmetries" in civil defense efforts. Testifying before the Culver Subcommittee, April 18, 1978, Brigadier General James M. Thompson, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), addressed this matter at length. Included in General Thompson's testimony were the following thoughts:

... we recognize that an increasingly effective Soviet civil defense program, in conjunction with other Soviet strategic military programs, could in time cast doubts upon our ability to meet our strategic objectives. Moreover, whatever the actual or potential effectiveness of the Soviet program, we must be concerned about perceptions of Soviet superiority based on marked asymmetries in civil defense efforts.

This does not necessarily mean that the appropriate response to the Soviet program is to imitate it, although we may find that an enhanced program emphasizing crisis relocation and fallout protection would be a prudent step to take. But it does mean that our weapons acquisition policy, our employment doctrine, and our SALT policy must be sensitive to Soviet civil defense efforts.

67Culver Subcommittee Hearings, p. 7203.
In sum, although civil defense in the past has not played a major role in national strategic policy, it certainly does deserve our attention. Civil defense policies need to be considered in the context of their peacetime effect on perceptions, possible deterrent effect, real dollar costs, and of course, possible effect on reducing casualties and enhancing recovery in the event that deterrence should fail. Civil defense programs thus cannot be considered as independent of the rest of our strategic nuclear programs.

Indeed, some two weeks before General Thompson's testimony, Secretary Brown had written a secret memorandum to the President, which the New York Times made public, April 7, 1978, in which he urged an annual increase of $50 million for the civil defense budget, at least until 1984. Brown said:

As you know, the Soviets have shown great interest and considerable activity in this [civil defense] field. While I do not believe that the effort significantly enhances the prospects for Soviet society as a whole following any full-scale nuclear exchange, it has obviously had an effect on international perceptions, particularly in contrast to our small and static civil defense program. For that reason alone I believe at least modest efforts on our part could have a high payoff.

Clearly, the Soviet civil defense effort was bringing the Carter Administration to the point of decision to upgrade the U.S. program. That decision, as we shall see, awaited completion of an interagency study, directed by the National Security Council, on the strategic implications of civil defense. But, with Secretary Brown's backing, it appeared

68Ibid., pp. 7180-7181.

as early as the spring of 1978 that U.S. civil defense could expect increased funding. It would be for the President to decide on the extent of the increase. Upon that decision would hinge the scope and direction of the U.S. effort to establish a more effective base for operations.

Federal Responsiveness to State and Local Needs.-- Another factor contributing to a strengthened Federal preparedness effort was the perceived need at the State and local levels for a unified approach to the problems of civil defense, natural disasters, and emergency preparedness. As a former governor, President Carter was especially attuned to State and local needs. Throughout his election campaign and the transition period, Carter made a firm commitment to State and local officials that they would be involved in the development of his Administration's policy, budget priorities and programs. Such involvement, Carter told the heads of executive departments and agencies, was critical to the ultimate success of his Administration because:

- State and local sectors constitute the delivery mechanisms for most of the actual services the federal government provides;

- State and local concerns, as well as their expertise, should be considered as programs are being developed in order to ensure the practicability and effectiveness of the programs;

- Such early participation by state and local officials in our planning process will help ensure broad-based support for the proposals that are eventually developed;
It will ensure that priorities developed at the federal level will work in conjunction with, and not at cross purposes to, priorities at the state and local level.\(^7\)

Civil preparedness matters, of course, involved close and continuing intergovernmental relations. State and local authorities were quick to make known to the Administration, as they did to the Congress, their concerns about the earlier disruption of the dual-use concept and their dissatisfaction with the fragmented organizational arrangements for Federal emergency preparedness. These State and local reactions had an important bearing on Carter Administration initiatives and decisions in these areas.

**DCPA Initiatives for Change**

A young Washington attorney, Mr. Tirana set out to infuse new life into the civil defense program. When he took office in April 1977, he later told the Proxmire Committee, he "barely knew what the words 'civil defense' meant and had to ask the question, "What am I supposed to do?'"\(^7\) But he soon learned that he had formidable problems on his hands.

He found the U.S. civil defense programs stagnant and ineffective. In a large-scale nuclear exchange, approximately one-half of the population could be "prompt casualties." For all

\(^7\)Memorandum dated February 25, 1977.

\(^7\)See Statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Jan. 8, 1979, in Proxmire Subcommittee Hearing, p. 49.
their efforts over a period of some 30 years, DCPA and its antecedent agencies might take credit for adding eight-to-ten million survivors. Tirana found confusion in laws and regulations relating to civil defense and emergency preparedness, bureaucratic in-fighting, and reluctance on the part of many Federal agencies to discharge their supportive roles in civil defense.

State and local officials, Tirana found, were willing to carry their oar if there were strong national leadership and a coordinated Federal supporting effort. Their contribution to nuclear preparedness, it was clear, hinged on Federal acceptance and pursuit of an integrated, all-risk preparedness program already in-being at the State and local levels. The States and localities wanted further clarification on this dual-use issue, one Federal agency to administer all disaster programs, specific priorities, a cutback in reporting and paperwork, a revitalization of training and education programs, more effective public information, and adequate funding to support a sound, total emergency preparedness program.

Tirana was acutely aware of the groundswell of support from the Congress and at State and local levels for an integrated and more rational Federal program. He claimed no expertise in defense strategy. Nor did he seek to influence Administration and Defense Department decisions in this regard. Tirana did try, however, to focus attention on the Nation's shortcomings in civil defense and related emergency preparedness efforts, with the hope of getting the powers-
that-be to make honest decisions. He sought more funds for DCPA so that it could move forward to fill serious gaps in the Nation's civil preparedness. Civil defense was languishing in the Defense Department; and unless greater support was forthcoming, Tirana foresaw, DCPA would surely be plucked out from that Department in the seemingly irrepressible drive to consolidate all aspects of Federal emergency preparedness. In his appearances before Congressional committees on DCPA budgets, Tirana was subject to Defense Department and Administration constraints, but he left no doubt that, in his judgment, the current level of spending would bring little or no real defense against the threat of nuclear war.

Implementation of Dual-Use Concept.--Initially, Tirana was disposed toward a strict application of DCPA funds to the support of nuclear rather than natural disaster planning. He quickly realized, however, that such efforts in the Ford Administration had threatened to undermine the strength and support needed from State and local civil defense organizations. Tirana found that even after the enactment of Public Law 94-361, July 13, 1976, civil defense policy at the national level in support of preparedness for natural disasters was unclear and was causing confusion at the State and local levels. In appearances before Congressional committees and discussions with Governors and representatives of State and local civil defense associations, Tirana realized that the full intent of the legislation was not being carried out.

Tirana moved promptly to correct the situation. A meeting with representatives of the State and local governments in the areas of civil defense and disaster preparedness, May 16, 1977, brought agreement on support of all-risk planning. Under the agreement, entitled "Statement on Civil Defense," the governors accepted their share of the responsibility and burden for attack preparedness as part of their States' all-risk disaster preparedness capability. DCPA in turn recognized variations in the resources, needs and capabilities of the several States, and undertook to work through programs specifically tailored to individual States and localities. The State and local governments and DCPA together would work out appropriate guidelines so that the President, Congress, and the citizens of the States "can be assured of progress in achieving attack preparedness on a State-by-State basis."

Emphasis on Crisis Relocation Planning.--In his meetings with representatives of the press and the Congress, Mr. Tirana did not hesitate to voice his conviction that, in the absence

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of a commitment to a long-term program with annual outlays at least twice the current level, a $100 million budget was money "down a rathole." The question for the Congress and the President, Tirana told the Proxmire Committee in January 1979, was:

... "What do we do now? Do we continue to do what we have been doing in the past, which is, in essence, to spend $100 million a year, so that we can say we have a civil defense program, when, in reality, we don't? Can you provide a defense against the bomb, knowing, as we should, that the bombs can melt cities, and what people used to perceive safe shelter is no longer shelter?"

The capabilities of the shelter program developed through the sixties, Tirana indicated, had deteriorated significantly; it would take at least a year of intensive effort and large expenditures during a period of heightened international tension "to bring the current in-place protection system to full effectiveness." A high-performance system, with blast shelters in cities and fallout shelters elsewhere, would cost on the order of $60 billion—an approach deemed unacceptable "economically or politically . . . , although a number of countries have been constructing blast shelters over a period of years." The best solution, Tirana believed, lay in developing "a genuine civil defense capability through relocation."

74 Proxmire Committee Hearing, p. 79.
75 Ibid., p. 49.
At the end of 1977, Defense Secretary Brown indicated his approval of this approach as an objective. At this point, crisis relocation planning was still in its exploratory phase, seeking to go beyond the prototype projects of the earlier years. DCPA had developed maps of some 400 likely targets, grouped into priority levels on the basis of expected risk and indicating areas which might receive heavy fallout. Under DCPA contracts, the States would carry out the planning. This would include allocating risk-area population to appropriate host-areas; assessing the areas' warning and communications systems; identifying fallout protection in host areas; planning logistic support for the evacuees; and outlining measures to maintain essential operations in risk-areas and to provide adequate protection for people remaining in such areas. While working in terms of individual target-areas, DCPA recognized that planning for relocation of people in densely populated areas, like the Northeast Corridor extending from the District of Columbia to Boston, would have to be approached on a regional basis.

Studies by the Systems Planning Corporation, prepared for DCPA in 1978-1979, lent further support to relocation as an alternative to protection in-place under the assumed crisis-conditions. The 1978 study estimated that a five-year investment of about $2 billion, plus some $200 million annual operating costs, would be required to develop a credible nationwide relocation organization and plan for
implementation in at least one week during a crisis buildup. Actions envisioned during this surge period would include the evacuation of 110 million people, or 80 percent of the population, from the risk areas; adjusting food distribution patterns in host-areas; upgrading fallout protection for the evacuees; stocking shelters; training shelter managers; and providing some in-place sheltering in the event that full evacuation could not be effected.76

As we shall see, President Carter gave relocation planning due emphasis in his policy decision of September 1978. And in his testimony before the Proxmire Committee in January 1979, Professor Samuel P. Huntington, Director of Harvard University's Center for International Affairs and consultant to the National Security Council, voiced his support of evacuation with its promise of reducing significantly casualties and fatalities resulting from an all-out nuclear exchange. "Debatable assumptions and uncertainties" abounded, Huntington said; but estimates did suggest that "effectively implemented evacuation programs could cut in half the immediate fatalities on both sides." The enemy could target the relocated population and thus increase immediate fatalities, but it would not eliminate entirely the savings in lives achieved under the evacuation program.

76Roger J. Sullivan et al., "Candidate U.S. Civil Defense Program," Technical Report 342, March 1978, cited in Sidney D. Drell's testimony, Proxmire Committee Hearing, p. 60. The Systems Planning Corporation's 1979 study was addressed to the civil defense needs of the first-priority counterforce areas. It described the current programs as "extremely austere" and unable to function well under crisis or attack conditions.
These considerations led Huntington to the conclusion that an evacuation program "is a necessary and desirable component of U.S. defense posture in the 1980s." The development of an evacuation capability, he believed, would require "an increase in our average annual civil defense expenditures between now and 1985 from the current level of about $100 million per year to slightly over $200 million per year."

To Huntington this would be "a modest insurance premium," indeed, in return for enhanced deterrence, provision of additional options and time in a period of crisis and escalation, and, most important, in saving tens of millions of lives if war came. Huntington closed his testimony with an interesting parallel between an evacuation capability and lifeboats on an ocean liner:

... The mere fact that the lifeboats exist will not lead the ship's captain to take additional risks with his ship in bad weather or treacherous seas. Nor will the lifeboats prevent the ship from being totally destroyed by collision with a reef, iceberg, or other vessel. Nor will the lifeboats necessarily insure even the immediate survival of all the people on board. Nor will they necessarily insure the prolonged survival of those who do successfully abandon the ship in them: the lifeboats themselves may be swamped; supplies may give out before the survivors are rescued; exposure, injury, and exhaustion may take their toll. Nevertheless, the lifeboats do offer the prospect that, in the event the ship sinks, at least some people will survive for somewhat and that with luck a good number may survive to sail again in another vessel. In any event, no one would want to cross the oceans in a ship without lifeboats. In parallel fashion, simple prudence dictates that the United States should not attempt to cross the uncertain and troubled waters of the 1980s without the capability to evacuate its urban population in the event of catastrophe.77

77 Proxmire Committee Hearing, p. 35.
It was now up to the President, Tirana advised the
Proxmire Committee at that same hearing, to make the budget
decision "which will determine whether we, in fact, move
forward with the program to develop relocation capability."
While crisis relocation was "a moderate-cost approach,
... with large lifesaving potential," Tirana emphasized,
it required much more than just "paper plans."

... The plans, as they are developed, must be exer-
cised with the State and local officials who would be
responsible to carry them out. ... Supporting opera-
tional systems must also be developed, such as Direc-
tion and Control, Communications, Warning, Radiological
Defense, and Emergency Public Information. Current
DCPA analyses suggest that "paper plans only" for
relocation, without such supporting systems and prepara-
tions, would result in about half the total survival
potential of a full system---about 40 percent survival
in a heavy, mid-1980's attack, rather than the 80 per-
cent survival potential of a full crisis relocation
system.78

Increased Congressional Interest

Another GAO Report.--In response to increasing Congres-
sional interest in the U.S. civil defense posture and the
Federal organizational structure for preparedness, the General
Accounting Office in 1977 produced a sequel to its 1971
report. The GAO reviewed the civil preparedness activities
of Federal, State and local governments; it subtitled its
report with a question: "Are Federal, State, and Local Govern-
ments Prepared for Nuclear Attack?"79

78Ibid., pp. 49-53.
79Civil Defense: Are Federal, State, and Local Govern-
ments Prepared for Nuclear Attack? Report to the Congress by
The GAO was not sanguine about the situation. The U.S., the GAO reported, lacks a comprehensive civil defense policy"; and civil defense "has not been a high-priority or high-dollar program." As it extended its reviews to FPA and FDAA as well as to DCPA, the GAO found potential problems in coordination and duplication of functions at Federal, State and local levels. For all these agencies, priority-setting under conditions of limited funding posed a major problem.

To achieve the objective of protecting the civilian population, the GAO found, both the shelter program and the relocation program required more attention and better planning at all levels. The problem of uneven distribution of shelters, noted in the 1971 report, still existed. About half of the identified shelters had not been licensed, and many buildings had not been marked with shelter signs. The shortage of shelters outside major cities, the GAO cautioned, could cause critical problems in the event of a decision to implement relocation plans. It anticipated formidable problems in moving 134 million people from the 400 high-risk areas to host areas which had barely enough shelter spaces for their own people.

The joint responsibility which the States and localities shared with the Federal Government, the GAO recognized, the Comptroller General of the United States, Aug. 8, 1977 (hereinafter cited as GAO Report—1977).
brought them into the civil defense program. The program was weakened, however, when State and local governments disagreed or showed little interest in DCPA goals for nuclear preparedness. In the absence of directive authority, the Federal Government could only encourage State and local participation and could not ensure a fully effective program. Under the dual-use concept, State and local governments could channel Federal funds and property to their primary concern with natural disasters rather than attack preparedness. From a practical standpoint, however, the GAO conceded that the dual-purpose concept remained the best means of developing the State and local organizational structures.

The GAO made a number of suggestions to improve the U.S. civil defense posture, including the Federalization of the program and making civil defense an integral part of military defense. But even within the scope of the current program with its limited funding, the GAO saw opportunities for improvement. It recommended closer coordination between FPA and DCPA in civil defense planning. Although the two agencies were working together on several projects, there was need for improved efforts, particularly in planning for continuity of government, coordination of plans, and the proposed use of Federal Regional Centers. With regard to DCPA, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the agency to:
Review State emergency operating plans for nuclear attack more thoroughly before providing financial assistance and spot check local plans to be sure that they meet each community's needs.

Eliminate inconsistencies in plans for immediate-response use of shelters.

Place more emphasis on relocation planning based upon the total geographical area as opposed to evacuation of cities within the area.

Encourage communities to participate in the onsite assistance program by emphasizing the benefits that can result, and follow up on the status of onsite assistance recommendations.80

The GAO also had a recommendation for legislative action:

The Congress should enact legislation which would allow graduated Federal funding according to an area's expected risk, population, and national civil preparedness needs. Such legislation should be enacted because the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is having difficulty in providing funds for national priorities due to its limited funding levels.

The Defense Department saw merit in this proposal: "a discretionary sliding-scale matching fund program," it believed, "could help encourage a greater civil defense effort in high-risk nuclear target areas."81

The Joint Committee on Defense Production.--We discussed earlier the 1976 hearings of the Joint Committee on

80Ibid., p. vi.
81Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
Defense Production and its recommendations regarding the structure of Federal emergency preparedness. The Committee's "Civil Preparedness Review" also took up the problem of protecting industrial and economic targets against nuclear attack and examined the feasibility and the strategic implications of this type of defense. The Committee saw formidable problems in this area, less manageable than the problems of sheltering or evacuating the population. Along with technical limitations, the Committee pointed to difficult operations problems "in terms of timing, weather, fallout patterns, coordination of protective operations, duration of attack, adequacy of communications, adequacy of warning, survival and availability of trained personnel, availability of power, availability of heavy-lift equipment, foreknowledge of targeted facilities, and the like." These constraints, the Committee indicated, "do not totally vitiate the utility of passive defenses," but "they restrict its industrial damage-limiting potential in a determined attack and limit its use primarily to an option of last resort, rather than a method for assuring the survival of vital economic assets and war-making potential or for 'winning' a thermonuclear war." 82

For all the problems, however, the importance of preserving a viable industrial base and planning for the post-attack recovery of a severely damaged economy could hardly be overestimated. Little was being done in this respect. The Defense Department did have a facilities protection program, but it was not pointed significantly to minimizing damage from nuclear attack. The Boeing Corporation conducted a study on the survival of equipment that would be required for recovery of the aerospace industry, but it did not extend to supporting industries and the workforce which would be required for industrial recovery.

In its surveys, the GAO noted this gap in civil defense planning and in Defense Department planning for defense production. DCPA Director Tirana tried to stimulate interest and research in techniques for the protection of industries essential to national survival and recovery. DCPA joined the Defense Nuclear Agency in funding tests of the feasibility of protecting industrial equipment patterned after approaches used in Soviet civil defense. Subject to the availability of funds, Tirana hoped to get more deeply into this area, with study of techniques for hardening small industries, protecting management and essential employees, and generally bringing industrial survival into the planning for crisis relocation.83 Clearly, a vast research and planning

83 Culver Subcommittee Hearings, pp. 7221-7222, 7227-7228.
effort would be needed to deal with the massive problems involved in ensuring the survivability of the Nation's industrial capacity in a nuclear war.

The Armed Services Committees.--Charged with responsibility for authorizing funds for civil defense, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees took a particularly strong interest in DCPA's problems. Their interest ranged widely—the nature and extent of the Soviet program and the organization, budget and functioning of U.S. civil defense. They were strongly disposed toward an enlarged U.S. program, and on several occasions they were prepared to recommend substantial increases over Administration budgets. The funding for fiscal 1978 and 1979, however, when factored for inflation, was worth less than that for earlier years; it didn't even permit the maintenance of the existing level of emphasis in civil defense.

The Armed Services Committees were aware, of course, of the "internal bureaucratic rumblings"—the reassessments of the strategic implications of civil defense and the policy and organizational developments. Through their hearings, they sought to make sure that their views were known and considered in the decision process. With the Executive Branch studies completed and the President's policy promulgated, the Committees would have a hand in the budget
decisions whether the civil defense program would, indeed, be revitalized.

Administration Studies

With the coming of the Carter Administration, civil defense became the subject of active debate and study with respect to its scope and focus and its relationship to other aspects of emergency preparedness. Within the Administration, three studies were particularly pertinent: (1) a Defense Department study to define credible options for population survival; (2) an inter-agency study under NSC leadership with a broader orientation, taking into account the Soviet efforts, among other factors, and considering the strategic implications of civil defense; (3) a White House study of Federal organization for preparedness for, and relief from, both peacetime and attack-caused disasters. President Carter's policy, budgetary, and organizational decisions were to be based on these studies.

Defense Department Study of Civil Defense Options.--In mid-August 1977, Defense Secretary Brown directed DCPA to support the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) in a study of alternative civil defense programs. The purpose was to develop credible options, so that taxpayers' funds would not be wasted. It would be left to the President, of course, to decide among these options in light of attendant costs or other considerations.
The DOD study considered six alternatives, ranging from essentially no program ("A"), through the current program ("B"), and on out to a blast shelter program involving a cost of some $60 billion. Ellipses, or "Blobs," showed the approximate performance or effectiveness of each program (see Figure #). Under option "A," a large-scale Soviet attack in the mid-eighties would wipe out all but perhaps 20 percent of the population. The current program ("B") might raise the survival rate to 30 percent. In contrast, under program "D," with reasonably effective (not perfect) crisis relocation, survival would be over 80 percent. With the infinitely more costly, in-place blast shelter program ("F"), the range of survival wouldn't be much higher, perhaps 90 percent.84

On the basis of this study, Defense Secretary Brown decided to implement the program D alternative, starting in fiscal 1980, subject to budget and program review. Costs were estimated at about $230 million a year (in fiscal 1979 dollars) in the fiscal years 1980 through 1984.85 The study


85 "Questions and Answers on Crisis Relocation Planning," DCPA Information Bulletin No. 305, April 20, 1979, pp. 2-3; Culver Subcommittee Hearings, p. 7182. Originally it was thought that implementation of program D would start in fiscal 1979. No funds were made available, however, and so it was decided to get the program started in fiscal 1980, still subject to policy and budget review.
FIGURE 11. COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVENESS AND COST OF CD PROGRAMS 
(Large-Scale Mid-1980s Soviet Attack on U.S. Military 
and Industrial facilities and Population)

Source: Presentation, "Nuclear Civil Protection," April 6, 1979, in 
was submitted to the National Security Council for consideration in its own study-project. In the meantime, DCPA would live within its $96.5 million fiscal 1979 appropriation, conducting research and planning for an orderly start the following year on the approved DOD program, unless that program should be modified by Presidential decision based on the broader issues addressed in the NSC study.86

The NSC-Directed Study.—Professor Huntington joined the NSC staff to lead the inter-agency task force in its study of the issues related to U.S. civil defense, directed by the President in September 1977. The group worked for almost a year, and it drew support from the DOD study and a study developed in the intelligence community on Soviet civil defense. The NSC study (PRM-32) accepted the basic analysis and conclusions of the DOD study regarding the range of options for a future civil defense program. These were presented to the President, with an analysis of their potential effectiveness and associated costs.87 This study provided the basis for the President's

86 Culver Subcommittee Hearings, p. 7182.
policy decision in September 1978, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The President's Reorganization Project. -- Along with concerns about civil defense policy and program options, there was strong sentiment in the Carter Administration, as well as in the Congress, the States and the localities, that all primary preparedness, response and recovery responsibilities concerning both peacetime and nuclear disasters should rest in one agency under the President, as was the case before the 1961 reorganization. While State and local governments had, for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency, developed a single-agency approach in this field, the Federal effort was fragmented among DCPA in the Defense Department, FPA in GSA, and FDAA in HUD. Having been governor of Georgia, President Carter had a strong affinity for the problems of the States having to deal with a multiplicity of agencies; in fact, he was among the first Governors to adopt a consolidated approach to nuclear, natural and accidental disasters. Many bills in the Congress and advice from Governors and Federal agency officials, like GSA Administrator Joel W. Solomon, indicated that support for such an initiative could be expected.

Accordingly, on August 25, 1977, President Carter asked the Reorganization Project staff in OMB to carry out a comprehensive study of the Federal Government's role in preparing
for, and responding to, natural, accidental, and wartime civil disasters. Mr. Greg Schneiders, then White House Director of Special Projects, directed the study. He brought together officials from various agencies, borrowed professional staff from outside the Federal Government, and drew advice from an informal group of "senior consultants." Included in this group were Otto Nelson, Leo Hoegh, Joseph Romm, Edward McI...mott, Anthony Bertsch, and others with strong backgrounds in the field of emergency preparedness and operations. Mr. George W. Jett, DCPA General Counsel, was detailed to the President's Reorganization Project as one of its professional staff members.

From its wide-ranging study and consultations, the Project team identified a large number of problems. It found severe indictments of the Federal organizational structure, focused particularly on the low visibility attached to emergency planning; duplication of programs and contacts at the State and local levels; confusion on jurisdiction, priorities, and responsibilities; and lack of accountability, below the level of the President, for policy-making and needed management improvements. Despite the Federal Government's growing involvement and dollar commitments, the Project


89 See "Notes on Meeting of Senior Consultants," Dec. 12, 1977, George A. Divine Files--"Reorganization--DCPA."
team found extensive criticism centered on organizational issues. Responding to a Congressional inquiry, 43 State Governors, the Project team learned, contended that fragmentation at the Federal level impeded them in the performance of their preparedness roles. And Senators William Proxmire and Charles Percy and 20 House members of both parties had introduced legislation to consolidate DCPA, FPA, and FDAA into a single independent agency with budget control over emergency activities of numerous other agencies.

While the Project team was thus exploring the issues, the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided to support the project forthrightly. At the same time, through its options study, it sought to crystallize a DOD position on civil defense, so that it could properly be considered by the President in his reorganization decision. Even before the Project team had completed its work, there were expressions of concern both within and outside the Defense Department that civil defense might get less attention in a new agency strongly focused on non-nuclear disasters. 

In December 1977, it will be recalled, the OSD had completed its options study and had decided to support an enhanced civil defense program. That decision was being reviewed by

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90 Memorandum, John G. Kester, Special Assistant, OSD, to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff et al., Jan. 12, 1978, Subject: Presidential Reorganization Project on Civil Defense/ Natural Disaster Preparedness, Divine Files.
the NSC study group, as part of PRM-32, which was to be submitted to the President for consideration in connection with the reorganization study.

Several basic policy concepts lay at the heart of the reorganization study. Emergency preparedness, the Reorganization staff believed, was an important Executive responsibility which deserved greater attention at the highest level of government. As things stood in law and practice, it did not appear feasible to separate the peacetime disaster and attack preparedness missions; emergency resources, therefore, should have "dual use," that is, they should be applicable to natural, accidental, and wartime emergencies. The Reorganization staff also adopted the principle of "hazard mitigation" or "hazard reduction"—reducing vulnerability to disaster before it takes place—as a new thrust and a matter of central focus of Federal disaster policy. The new agency, the Reorganization staff further believed, should have independent status, and not be buried in an old-line department. It might be given delegate-agency funding to ensure participation by other Federal departments. And at its head should be a person with extensive background in national security, thus indicating that the President was serious about the subject of preparedness.

The thrust and shape of the reorganization became quite clear by February 1978. As it took definite form in the winter and spring of 1978, the Secretary of Defense took strong exception to it. Between them, Secretary Brown and
Deputy Secretary Charles W. Duncan, Jr., wrote four letters to OMB Director James T. McIntyre, Jr., vigorously opposing the merger of DCPA into the proposed agency. In essence, their views were to the effect that civil defense was related to our strategic posture of deterrence and essential equivalence. Planning for civil defense should, accordingly, be considered in the context of its peacetime effect on perceptions, its deterrent effect, and, of course, its possible effect on reducing casualties and in recovery. For these reasons, the Defense Secretary felt, civil defense should not be consolidated with other emergency programs in a new, independent agency, but should rather be kept within the Defense Department.91

With its unimpressive, "step-child" record on civil defense over the years, however, the Defense Department was in a poor position to argue convincingly for maintenance of the status quo. To meet Brown's concerns, McIntyre suggested the design of procedures whereby the Defense Secretary would provide guidance to the head of the new agency on civil defense policy and related budget development, and have the opportunity to review the agency's budget before it was forwarded to OMB. In addition, McIntyre suggested, the civil defense portion of the budget would be presented and

justified to the Congress by both the Defense Secretary and the director of the new agency.\textsuperscript{92}

The Defense Secretary doubted the practicability of this proposal. The suggestion that he provide "guidance" on civil defense policy and that he "review" and then defend the new agency's budget, Duncan indicated, "would seem to put the Department in the unenviable position of being held responsible for a program over which it has no real authority or control." The proposed structure, Duncan contended, was premised on "the erroneous assumption that civil defense and natural disaster preparedness activities must be operationally linked." He questioned the wisdom of adopting a new organizational arrangement "that promises to submerge civil defense in an agency with a natural disaster focus, while simultaneously creating a new set of organizational deficiencies to replace the ones 'cured' by this reorganization."\textsuperscript{93}

The Defense Secretary's strongly-held views were made known to the President, but the move to bring civil defense into this all-hazard agency could not be thwarted. On June 14, 1978, John G. Kester, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, indicated that

\textsuperscript{92}McIntyre, Letter to Brown, Apr. 28, 1978, Divine Files.

\textsuperscript{93}Duncan, Letter to McIntyre, May 4, 1978, Divine Files.
the Defense Department was interested in maintaining a
policy-oversight role for civil defense. Appropriate lan-
guage to establish this role and linkage of overall strategic
nuclear planning with nuclear attack preparedness plans
was recommended for incorporation in the President's re-
organization message. It was Brown's intent to make the
office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) responsible
for working out permanent liaison arrangements between the
Defense Department and the new agency.\textsuperscript{94}

With agreement on links of coordination, the reorgani-
зation plan was ready for unveiling. On June 19, 1978,
the President submitted Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978,
and indicated his intent to issue related Executive
orders.\textsuperscript{95} By this Plan and allied Executive orders, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was to come
into being. The following agencies were to be consoli-
dated into FEMA: DCPA (from the Defense Department), FPA
(from GSA), and FDAA (from HUD); the Federal Insurance
Administration (then in HUD) and the National Fire Preven-
tion and Control Administration (then in the Commerce Department).

\textsuperscript{94}Kester, Letter to Peter Szanton, Associate Director
for Organization Studies, President's Reorganization Project,

\textsuperscript{95}Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, Message from the
President of the United States, June 19, 1978, House Doc.
No. 95-356, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1978); White House Fact Sheet, June 19,
1978.
Other functions marked for transfer to FEMA included the community preparedness program for weather disasters, administered by the National Weather Service (Commerce Department); coordinating responsibilities for earthquake hazard reduction and dam safety programs then in the Executive Office of the President; oversight responsibility for emergency warning systems and the Emergency Broadcast System; and Federal response to the consequences of terrorist incidents.

To give the agency clout and visibility, the plan called for an Emergency Management Committee chaired by the Director of FEMA, with its membership comprised of the Assistants to the President for National Security, Domestic Affairs and Policy and Intergovernmental Relations, and the Director of OMB. In his message to Congress, the President indicated that the Committee would advise him "on ways to meet national civil emergencies," and on "alternative approaches to improve performance and avoid excessive costs," as well as "oversee and provide guidance on the management of all Federal emergency authorities."

On the matter of linkage of civil defense strategy, the President's message stated:

... civil defense must continue to be fully compatible with and be ready to play an important role in our Nation's overall strategic policy. Accordingly, to maintain a link between our strategic nuclear planning and our nuclear attack preparedness planning, I will make the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council responsible for oversight of civil defense related programs and policies of the new Agency.
This will also include appropriate Department of Defense support in areas like program development, technical support, research, communications, intelligence and emergency operations.

At the same time, the President emphasized the "all hazards" readiness and response role of civil defense.

... an effective civil defense system requires the most efficient use of all available emergency resources. At the same time, civil defense systems, organization, and resources must be prepared to cope with any disasters which threaten our people. The Congress has clearly recognized this principle in recent changes in the civil defense legislation.

The communications, warning, evacuation, and public education processes involved in preparedness for a possible nuclear attack should be developed, tested, and used for major natural and accidental disasters as well. Consolidation of civil defense functions in the new Agency will assure that attack readiness programs are effectively integrated into the preparedness organizations and programs of State and local government, private industry, and volunteer organizations.

Thus, the President hoped to see a dual linkage for civil defense: one with strategic policy, and the other with all efforts at hazard mitigation. The Federal Government, he felt, should follow the lead of the State and local governments, most of which "have consolidated emergency planning, preparedness and response functions on an "all hazard" basis to take advantage of the similarities in preparing for and responding to the full range of potential emergencies." Consolidation of headquarters and regional facilities and staffs involved in this reorganization was expected to bring cost savings of "between $10 to $15 million annually" and the "elimination (through attrition) of about 300 jobs."
Subcommittees of the House and Senate committees on Government Operations promptly held hearings on the plan. Some legislators were concerned that a large portion of FEMA's authorities were to be transferred by Executive action and not through the legislative review process. Others raised questions regarding procedural matters and the failure to address substantive issues brought out in recent GAO reports. Resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both Houses, but these were effectively defeated. Administration testimony and other supporting materials held out assurances that effective linkage of civil defense with strategic nuclear planning would be worked out and that, far from being buried, civil defense would be at the heart of the new agency's responsibilities. In general, the committees felt that a compelling case for the reorganization had been made. 96

The plan became effective September 16, 1978, after Congress declined to reject the proposal. Although the plan got through Congress with relative ease, its implementation encountered delays and problems. These stemmed from a long, drawn-out search for FEMA's leadership and from complexities in processing the transfers of the many functions involved in the reorganization. The effective establishment of FEMA took almost a year—a year of problems in selecting the new management; finding space to house FEMA's national headquarters; and working out the details of the transfers of functions, organization of programs, consolidation of regional offices, DOD-FEMA liaison on civil defense, and allocation of overhead positions from the parent agencies to FEMA.

The activation of FEMA was accomplished in two steps. First, by Executive Order 12127, issued March 31, 1979, the President activated FEMA, effective April 1, 1979, and provided for the transfer of the Federal Insurance Administration, the U.S. Fire Administration, and the Emergency Broadcast System functions. The President also designated Mr. Gordon Vickery, then Administrator of the U.S. Fire Administration, to serve as Acting Director of FEMA pending the appointment and confirmation of a Director. For that post the President nominated Mr. John W. Macy, Jr., then President of the Development and Resources Corporation and former chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission.97

A second Executive order, dated July 20, 1979, and effective five days earlier, implemented the remaining transfer of functions to FEMA consistent with the President's Message of June 19, 1978, transmitting the reorganization plan to Congress. Among these remaining functions were those of DCPA, FPA, and FDAA, which comprised some 80 percent of FEMA's personnel strength, regional structure, and budget. The Executive Order made provision for the Federal Emergency Management Council and for the oversight of civil defense planning as contemplated in the President's Message.98

The Administration's New Civil Defense Policy

Presidential Decision (PD) 41.--On September 29, 1978, some three months after transmitting his reorganization plan to Congress, President Carter directed implementation of a new civil defense policy (PD 41) along the following guidelines:

- that the United States civil defense program should enhance the survivability of the American people and its leadership in the event of nuclear war, thereby improving the basis for eventual recovery, as well as reducing vulnerability to a major Soviet attack;

- that the United States civil defense program should enhance deterrence and stability, and contribute to perceptions of the overall U.S./Soviet strategic

balance and to crisis stability, and also reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in times of increased tension;

- that the policy not suggest any change in the U.S. policy of relying on strategic nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence; and

- that the program include planning for population relocation during times of international crisis as well as be adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies. 99

There was much enthusiasm within DCPA about the President's decision. True, no new crash program or sharply increased funding would be required. But DCPA did see in the decision at least the prospect of a gradual enhancement of U.S. civil defense capabilities. The tie-in of civil defense with the strategic balance and its potential role in enhancing deterrence and stability held out the promise of a new rationale, in contrast to the "insurance" approach of 1961. This marked "the first time in United States History," DCPA Director Tirana observed, "that a President has given civil defense a role in strategic policy." An important step, together with nuclear arms limitation, had been taken, Tirana noted, toward redirecting national policy toward survival, "rather than one dependent on Soviet (and mutual) destruction." 100

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100 Bardyl R. Tirana, Civil Defense: The Unthinkable and the Non-doable, June 18, 1979, p. 9.
There were many, however, who did not share DCPA's enthusiasm for the President's policy pronouncement. Although PD 41 did not expressly contain any program details or associated budget decisions, it did seem to support the program recommendation in Defense Secretary Brown's study, discussed earlier. PD 41, with its accenting of crisis relocation as a program option, touched off a lively debate. The press played up reports of projected outlays of some $2 billion over the ensuing seven years; and critics were quick to point to the fruitlessness of a program involving population relocation and related surging actions during a period of crisis.101

The Budget for FY 1980.---The DOD study, it will be recalled, had estimated the annual cost of implementing its recommended program option D at about $230 million in the fiscal years 1980-84.102 The President's budget request for fiscal 1980, however, was only $108.6 million.


102Program D costs (in fiscal 1981 dollars) over the five fiscal years 1981-85 were estimated at approximately $2 billion. Under a modification of Program D, called "D-Prime," estimated costs were cut back to about $1.3 billion by deferring to the fiscal years 1986 and 1987 substantial expenditures for shelter stocking, ventilation kits, Emergency Operating Centers, radiological defense, and emergency public information; see Chipman, "Enhanced Civil Defense Program to Implement PD 41 Policies," Dec. 3, 1979, pp. 1-2.
In his testimony before the Congressional committees, Tirana tried to put this request in the most favorable light; it represented, he told Congress, "the initial step toward implementing President Carter's policy and Secretary Brown's program decisions." Although the budget proposal contained a real program growth of about six percent over the fiscal 1979 spending level, Tirana deemed it "a turning point in U.S. civil defense." Yet, he had to admit that a budget of $108.6 million would permit the enhancement of only a few program elements: intensification of the Host Area Shelter Survey; pilot projects to construct austere Emergency Operating Centers with associated communications; and continued emphasis on research "to refine the details and costs of a more effective civil defense program emphasizing crisis relocation." He was realistic enough to recognize that the pace of program implementation "will ... depend upon future budget decisions." Clearly, the five-year time frame in the DOD study would now have to be stretched out. "By using a building block approach," Tirana asserted, "it is feasible to develop and strengthen the relocation capability over a five year, seven year, or longer period of time."\(^{103}\)

Congress reacted negatively, however, to the Administration's approach, and it voted only $100 million. The House

\(^{103}\)See Tirana's statement of March 22, 1979, in "Presentations on Civil Defense at Congressional Hearings, DCPA Information Bulletin No. 303, Apr. 5, 1979."
Appropriations Committee, in recommending reduction of the
Carter request to $100.6 million, gave the following rationale
for its action:

Agency officials, in testimony before the Com-
mittee, stated a funding level of $140,000,000, or even
the requested $108,600,000, is not warranted unless
there is a firm commitment to a costly, multi-year
redirection of the program. The Committee does not
believe that either the Congress or the Administration
has yet demonstrated adequate support for a restructured
civil defense policy. In the absence of a multi-year
authorization or significantly increased budget request,
the Committee recommends funding civil defense activi-
ties at the 1979 level.104

Actually, the $100 million appropriated, after accounting for
inflation, was below the fiscal 1979 level. Indeed, in
constant dollars, it represented the lowest funding for civil
defense since the inception of the program in 1951.105 A
program at that level, Dr. Chipman observed,

... cannot provide any meaningful "insurance," let
alone contribute at all to the strategic balance--
enhancing deterrence and stability, or reducing the
possibility that the Soviets could coerce us during a
crisis. In short, a $100M [million] program sets at
naught the PD 41 policies.106

104U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Housing and Urban Development--Independent
Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1980, Report, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., House Report No. 96-209, June 1979, p. 33, Tirana,

105Chipman, "Civil Defense for the 1980's--Current

106Ibid., p. 2.
Civil Defense in FEMA

Under the terms of Executive Order 12148, effective July 15, 1979, the Director of FEMA assumed the responsibility for civil defense held by the Secretary of Defense since 1961. This Executive Order prescribed the "oversight" functions of the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council:

In order that civil defense planning continues to be fully compatible with the Nation's overall strategic policy, and in order to maintain an effective link between strategic nuclear planning and nuclear attack preparedness planning, the development of civil defense policies and programs by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall be subject to oversight by the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.107

The forging of strong links of coordination with the Defense Department to implement the expressed intent of the Executive Order was one of the key items on Macy's agenda when he assumed the directorship of FEMA.

Macy undertook to build in FEMA "a new focus" and to provide "a new impetus to emergency management for attack preparedness." DCPA and FPA functions were substantially integrated under Frank A. Camm, Associate Director for Plans and Preparedness. In line with his charter, Macy emphasized the enhancement of multiple use of resources in preparing for, and responding to, emergencies, and the provision of a single point of contact on emergency matters "both at the

107Executive Order 12148, July 20, 1979, Sec. 2-204.
national level and, in particular, for our State and local
governments. 108

As for the civil defense budget for fiscal 1981, the
Administration requested only $120 million—a real growth
of about 12 percent over the fiscal 1980 program. The same
was expected for fiscal 1982, with an adjustment for infla-
tion. 109 This projected level of spending, obviously, was
still far short of the level proposed in the DOD study. Nor
did it encompass the comprehensive, multi-year program which
Congress had sought in the prior-year budget cycle.

At the $120 million level, FEMA hoped to accelerate
the development of relocation and supporting capabilities
for the population in the "counterforce" risk-areas. Pilot
deployments of elements of an enhanced program would be con-
ducted in and near these counterforce areas. Macy cited
the following reasons for focusing on the counterforce areas
rather than covering the largest cities where most people lived:

- The relatively modest FY 1981 increase should be
  concentrated in limited areas, where clearly
discernible results can be achieved.

- The counterforce areas provide a well-defined set, with total
  population of about 7.5 million (about five percent of the
total U.S. risk population of some 140 million).

- It is generally conceded that should deterrence
ever fail, the counterforce areas would have a

108 Macy, "A New Impetus—Emergency Management for

109 Chipman, "Report for Department of Defense on Por-
tion of proposed FY 1981 FEMA Budget Relating to Civil
Figure 12

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Office of the Director
Public Affairs
Regional Coordinator
Equal Opportunity Off.
International Affairs
Congressional Relations

INSPECTOR GENERAL
GENERAL COUNSEL
PERSONNEL
FINANCE & ADMINISTRATION
PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
OPERATIONS SUPPORT
(Operations Center)

FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATOR
U.S. FIRE ADMINISTRATOR

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR TRAINING & EDUCATION
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR MITIGATION AND RESEARCH
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR PLANS & PREPAREDNESS
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

REGIONS

APPROVED
August 1, 1979
high probability of being attacked, as the strategic offensive forces in these areas have potential to cause great damage to the USSR by retaliatory attacks. Additional U.S. cities might not be attacked, depending on the success of escalation control. Thus, the counterforce areas are seen as facing higher risk than other U.S. risk areas.

The intent of the FY 1981 program is not to test crisis relocation planning, which has been underway since 1977, with all States now participating. Rather, it is to demonstrate deployment of an enhanced program, as a basis for later nationwide deployment. Over 85 percent of the expenditures associated with counterforce areas are not for crisis relocation planning, per se, but rather for the initial deployments of supporting systems noted above (EOC's shelter management, planning for crisis production of shelter, and others).

Contrary to some impressions, the counterforce areas include cities of substantial size, even though there are none in the multimillion range. There are 13 counterforce areas with population over 200,000, the seven largest being Columbus, Ohio; Sacramento, California; Tampa, Florida; the Wichita, Kansas area; Fort Worth, Texas; Dayton, Ohio; and Springfield-Chicopee, Massachusetts. Both Columbus, Ohio, and Tampa, Florida, are part of metropolitan areas of over one million and plans must obviously be developed for the entire metropolitan area, as well as for the associated host areas.

The FY 1981 emphasis will build a foundation for future nationwide deployment of an enhanced program. Thus, the other U.S. risk areas--including our largest cities--will benefit in the future from the FY 1981 emphasis on initial deployments in counterforce areas.

FY 1980 levels of activity will be maintained in noncounterforce areas and States in FY 1981, so they will not be penalized by reason of the concentration of new initiatives in the counterforce areas and States.
As a hedge against the possibility of a serious deterioration in the international situation, fiscal 1981 would also see planning and limited preparations for a civil defense buildup "in a period of about a year of markedly increased tension."\textsuperscript{110}

We leave to the future a recounting and analysis of the activation of FEMA and its new thrust for civil defense for fiscal 1981—a thrust which FEMA Director Macy characterized as "a rifle instead of a shotgun" approach to U.S. civil defense programs.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Thirty years have now elapsed since the establishment of a permanent civil defense program in the United States. Yet, a vast gap exists between the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and the Nation's readiness to absorb a full-scale attack. Unlike other countries—the Soviet Union, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—the U.S. has barely scratched the surface in instituting programs to minimize the destructive effects of nuclear weapons upon its population and industry. Despite the growing recognition of the extreme vulnerability of large metropolitan areas, the concentration of this country's population, industries and resources has continued unabated. Indeed, it is doubted that inducements to relocate industry and people to less vulnerable areas under conditions of peace can proceed far enough to be of much help if war were to come in our time.

The phenomenal growth in numbers and lethal power of nuclear weapons was not foreseen at the time of the enactment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. It was not until about the mid-fifties that we realized that we had a major civil defense problem. It took time to discard outdated concepts and to keep pace with the threat of increasingly devastating weapons and improved means for their delivery.

By the end of the fifties, however, the essential ingredients of a strategy for survival had become apparent.
Moving the populace out of the target areas—an approach strongly espoused in the early fifties—no longer seemed feasible with the emergence of new threats from radioactive fallout and from intercontinental ballistic missiles which reduced warning time to a matter of minutes. The only hope for survival then appeared to be in sheltering the population essentially in-place, at or near their homes, schools, and places of work.

Such sheltering could take two forms. One was by constructing blast shelters capable of resisting the direct blast and heat effects of a nuclear detonation. Provision of blast protection, however, has been deemed prohibitively expensive, although other countries have been building such shelters over a long period. The other form of protection was by a fallout shelter system which could be put in place at a comparatively modest cost. Such a program would not protect the people at or near the direct blast and heat effects of bomb hits over targets, but it could save many millions from the hazards of radioactive fallout that would blanket much of the country. Some 30 million people would be saved (over and above the 80 million who would survive even if there were no civil defense program) by use of existing fallout shelters; and the figure could rise to 50 million if the Federal Government were willing to subsidize construction of additional shelters to meet anticipated deficits.
In 1961, President Kennedy signaled a greatly accelerated fallout shelter program and placed on the Secretary of Defense the primary responsibility for its implementation. Unfortunately, that program never came to full fruition. The incentive construction part of the program fell through for lack of clear Presidential support of Congressional initiatives in that direction. The initial survey, marking and stocking part of the program went forward, but even that fell into disarray in the face of dwindling budgets. The survival potential of the shelter program had dropped to little more than eight million. It would take about a year of intensive effort during a period of markedly increased international tension and an expenditure of between $1 billion and $2 billion to get this in-place protection back up to the 30-million mark.

Over the past several years, the civil defense authorities have revived the evacuation concept, but in a changed context. The populace would be evacuated from high-risk areas within a few days, a week at the most, during a period of intense crisis preceding a nuclear attack. Such a crisis, it is now assumed, is far more likely than a "bolt from the blue." Defense Secretaries and the National Security Council have recommended crisis relocation planning, and it received the endorsement of President Carter in a civil-defense policy pronouncement in September 1978. The U.S. counterforce areas have been earmarked for priority attention in crisis relocation planning in fiscal 1981.
Crisis relocation has the advantage of being a deferred-cost system; the planning costs relatively little, and large costs would be incurred only if the crisis develops and evacuations are carried out. Also, assuming time and circumstances permit, crisis relocation could bring the saving of lives up to 100 million. Furthermore, the capability to evacuate the population is deemed important in deterring an attack as well as in reducing casualties if deterrence fails. The problem is, however, that one cannot be certain that the time needed for evacuation, together with all the supporting requirements, including fallout shelters, in host areas, would be available. Planning for in-place protection must continue in any case, both for the dispersed population and for the population in the cities in the event relocation plans cannot be implemented.

At the current level of funding, the U.S. can expect to have only "paper plans"—"initial" by 1983 and "fully detailed" by about 1987—for the crisis relocation of about 7.5 million people in the counterforce areas. This represents only about five percent of a total of some 140 million people at risk. For this total risk population, these two levels of planning—"initial" and "fully detailed"—would not be attained until 1988 and 2003, respectively. Dependence on blueprints and on surging in crisis hardly makes for a credible readiness posture. Our strategic striking power would be in sad shape without the capability in being
and in readiness for implementation on a moment's notice. Civil defense has similar needs.

Civil defense has quite properly been keyed to the linkage of Federal-State and local operations. The 1950 Act, unfortunately, placed the primary responsibility on the States and localities. This was changed in 1958 to provide for joint responsibility of Federal and State and local governments. The States and localities, however, have also had their budgetary constraints. Quite naturally, the primary interest of these jurisdictions lies in the more immediate threats of natural disasters. Their cooperation in civil defense has a direct relationship to the amount of funding provided by the Federal Government and to particular peacetime disaster concerns. Federal matching funds have often not been enough to elicit from the States and localities the fulfillment of nuclear readiness requirements. Significantly higher levels of Federal funding for civil defense are needed, and the Federal inputs may have to exceed the 50-50 matching arrangement for various programs, to provide the impetus for necessary participation at the State and local levels.

The record over the thirty years attests to hard work and significant accomplishments by civil defense workers at all levels throughout the country in the face of low budgets and apathy in high places. Impressive statistics abound on the establishment of warning and communications systems, radiological defense monitoring stations, and emergency
operating centers; on the development of a damage assessment capability; on the purchase and stocking of radiological instruments and other survival supplies and equipment; on the survey, design, and prototype construction of shelters; on the testing of evacuation of high-risk areas in a period of intense crisis; on the sponsorship of extensive educational programs; on the conduct of exercises; and on the employment of a variety of public information media to inform the people of essential survival measures. All this and more had been accomplished with Federal expenditures of only about $2.5 billion over the entire 30-year period—an outlay representing scarcely one-tenth of one percent of the total military budget.

Yet, the accomplishments in civil defense through 1980 afford scant protection of the population, industry and the economy against the dangers of nuclear warfare. A surprise, grand-slam blow with thermonuclear weapons would bring appalling destruction and chaos in a large part of our Nation. Estimates in the late seventies indicated that in such an attack, between 125 million and 140 million Americans would be killed. Practically no capability exists to protect Americans from the blast, heat and fire effects of direct hits by nuclear weapons. The nationwide fallout shelter program has been allowed to run down, and relocation planning, with its "iffy" assumptions and overwhelming
challenges, seems destined to remain long in the pilot or demonstration stages. Thus far, virtually all the emphasis has been on population survival; very little attention has been given to the preservation of vital industries, equipment, and services, and to the restoration of a severely damaged economy within a reasonable time.

Unlike military readiness, civil defense has been a difficult program to maintain solely on the basis of the threat of nuclear attack that hopefully would not occur. Much effort has been put into informing and educating the public about the nuclear threat and what civil defense can do about it. Still, except in moments of crisis, there appears to be little public concern about the danger; or, at least, the public seems to think that the Chief Executive and the Congress can be counted upon to take the appropriate preparedness actions. Yet, over virtually the entire life of the civil defense program, there has been little evidence of readiness by U.S. Presidents or the Congress to espouse any kind of major steps to protect our population and productive capacity from the enormously increased destructiveness of nuclear weapons.

The public takes comfort in the knowledge that over the past 30 years, the U.S. has been singularly successful in preventing nuclear war. This Nation will strive to ensure its continued success in the decade ahead. But, as Professor Samuel P. Huntington, consultant to the National Security
Council, recently observed, that success cannot be guaran-
teed. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, January 8, 1979, Huntington 
stated:

. . . as Soviet military power has grown relative to 
our own, our abilities to deter war, to influence 
the probability of nuclear war, and to limit the 
destructiveness of nuclear war to American society 
have all declined. While people may differ as to the 
probabilities of their occurring, no one can guar-
antee that the United States and the Soviet Union 
will not be involved in a nuclear crisis, a limited 
nuclear exchange, or even an all-out nuclear war 
sometime between now and the end of this century. 
The possibilities of these events happening are all 
too real.

These real possibilities do not, moreover, neces-
sarily rest on the assumptions of evil, reckless, 
or aggressive leadership in the Kremlin--or in the 
White House. . . . Some combination of miscalcu-
lation, communications failure, inability to understand 
the other side's motives, a little political short-
sightedness, and some bad luck can all too easily pro-
duce a pattern of action and reaction from which neither 
side can escape and which leads to disastrous conse-
quences neither side wants. . . .

The chances of nuclear catastrophe are low, but 
they are far higher than the chances that anyone of 
us will be in an airplane accident, aboard a ship that 
founders, or in a school factory, or office that is 
destroyed by fire. Yet we insist on emergency exits 
on our planes, lifeboats on our ships, and firestairs 
in our buildings. All these are simply designed to 
increase survivability in the event of disaster. So, 
too, is civil defense.

The danger of nuclear war, whatever the cause, has 
prompted other nations to make significant investments in 
civil defense. Thus, Switzerland, Norway, and Israel all 
spend more than $10.00 per capita per year; Sweden spends 
about $8.80; the Soviet Union, $7.72; Finland and Denmark
each about $4.30; West Germany, about $3.45; and the Netherlands, about $2.50. In contrast, U.S. annual spending for civil defense amounts to about 42 cents per capita; and if all civil emergency preparedness activities are included, the cost would be only about $1.04. "Given the uncertainties and conflicts which are likely to exist in the 1980's," Huntington asks, "who can argue that these expenditures [by the other countries] do not represent a prudent course of action? Is it wise for us to assume that we have some special immunity not vouchsafed to other nations?"

As we enter the 1980s, the U.S. is in the position of having to catch up. The best that can be said of its civil preparedness is that it is at a relatively low level. This state, as we have tried to bring out, results from many factors. Of these, the most important has been the failure of Presidents, Democratic and Republican alike, to provide the necessary leadership, and of Congress to supply the funds, to ensure the proper place for civil defense in the national security structure. Even today, when civil defense has been recognized in a Presidential policy pronouncement as a link in defense strategy, a comprehensive, long-term program for an enhanced civil defense, with sufficient funding to implement it, has yet to be presented. As Dr. Leon Gouré, eminent authority on Soviet civil defense, observed at the same hearing before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee,
Civil defense is not a gimmick and will not achieve its purpose either of strengthening deterrence or as insurance in the event deterrence fails if it is treated as such.

A meaningful U.S. civil defense program requires a long-term commitment of efforts and funds. It will not achieve its purpose if it becomes an annual budgetary football.

What is urgently needed is a national commitment to a meaningful civil defense program, with strong leadership from the President to bring forth vigorous support from the Congress, State legislatures and city councils, and from the public at large.
APPENDIXES

A. Principal Federal Officials Responsible for Civil Defense Activities, 1941-1980

B. Chronology
### Appendix A

**PRINCIPAL FEDERAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVIL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES**

*1941 - 1980*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Fiorello LaGuardia</td>
<td>May 41-Feb. 42</td>
<td>OCD Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James N. Landis</td>
<td>Feb. 42-Sept. 43</td>
<td>OCD Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John B. Martin</td>
<td>Sept. 43-Feb. 44</td>
<td>OCD Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William H. Haskell</td>
<td>Feb. 44-June 45</td>
<td>OCD Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>Harold R. Bull</td>
<td>Nov. 46-Feb. 47</td>
<td>War Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Board (ac hoc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russell J. Hopley</td>
<td>Mar. 48-Oct. 48</td>
<td>DOD/OCD Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William A. Gill</td>
<td>Mar. 49-Mar. 50</td>
<td>NSRB CD Co-ordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paul J. Larsen</td>
<td>Mar. 50-Sept. 50</td>
<td>NSRB CDO Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James J. Nadsworth</td>
<td>Sept. 50-Dec. 50</td>
<td>NSRB CD Director</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nillard Caldwell</td>
<td>Jan. 51-Nov. 52</td>
<td>FCDA Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>James J. Nadsworth</td>
<td>Nov. 52-Mar. 53</td>
<td>FCDA Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frederick (Val)</td>
<td>Mar. 53-July 54</td>
<td>FCDA Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hoegh</td>
<td>July 54-July 55</td>
<td>FCDA Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leo A. Hoegh</td>
<td>July 55-Jan. 59</td>
<td>OCA Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy-Johnson</td>
<td>John J. Patterson</td>
<td>Jan. 21-28, 61</td>
<td>OCD (Acting)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lewis E. Berry</td>
<td>Jan 29-Feb. 62</td>
<td>OCD Acting Director</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Frank B. Ellis</td>
<td>Mar. 62-Feb. 63</td>
<td>OCD Acting Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Steuart L. Pittman</td>
<td>Sept. 63-Mar. 64</td>
<td>ASO (CD) DOD</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>William P. Durkoe</td>
<td>Apr. 64-Dec. 66</td>
<td>DA-OCD Director</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Romm</td>
<td>Jan. 67-May 68</td>
<td>DA-OCD Director (Acting)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Romm</td>
<td>May 68-Nov. 69</td>
<td>DA/OCD Director</td>
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<td>Nixon-Ford</td>
<td>John E. Davis</td>
<td>May 69-Sept. 72</td>
<td>DA/OCD Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John E. Davis</td>
<td>May 72-Feb. 72</td>
<td>DOD/DCPA Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>Randy R. Tirana</td>
<td>Apr. 77-Nov. 79</td>
<td>FEMA Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John W. Macy, Jr.</td>
<td>Aug. 79-Jan. 81</td>
<td>FEMA Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY

This chronology is designed to highlight, for quick reference, significant events in the history of American civil defense. It draws, for the most part, on a compilation, Significant Events in United States Civil Defense History, in February 1975, by Mary U. Harris, Information Services, DCPA, with the help of Carol Wanner, White House Office Library. A number of key developments have been added for the period covered in the Harris compilation, as well as for the ensuing years (1975-80).

1916

August 29 Council of National Defense created by act of Congress (39 Stat. 649). Composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, Council was charged with coordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare, and with creation of relations rendering possible in time of need immediate concentration and utilization of resources of the Nation.

October 11 Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense appointed by the President; composed of seven members, each chosen for special knowledge in one of the following fields: transportation and communications, manufacturing and industrial relations, supplies, raw materials, minerals and metals, engineering and education, labor, medicine and sanitation.

1917

April 6 Congress declared war. Council of National Defense established State Council Section to guide growth and work of State defense councils.

April 9 Council Chairman requests all State Governors to establish councils of defense. Such councils organized in every State; by November 11, 1918, local units numbered 182,000.

April 29 Council appoints a Woman's Committee to coordinate and stimulate war activities of Nation's women.

October 1 Council establishes a Field Division to coordinate the activities of State, local and community "local defense" units which had sprung up during the war.
November 11  Armistice signed. Resulted in rapid dissolution of State and local defense councils.

December 2  In response to the United States Employment Service, Council of National Defense adopts resolution asking State and local defense councils to keep organizations intact to assist Federal agencies in meeting postwar adjustments.

1940

May 25  Office for Emergency Management established within the Executive Office of the President. OEM was primarily a framework within which various civilian war agencies were established.

May 29  President approves regulation of Council of National Defense establishing Advisory Commission provided for in sec. 2 of act of Aug. 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 469). Government's defense actions in 1940 limited to the establishment of partial administrative machinery for partial industrial mobilization. Nevertheless, the Defense Advisory Commission and its subsidiary organizations contained a nucleus for many of the beginnings of the agencies which were more fully developed later. Among these organizations was the Commission's Division of State and Local Cooperation, which became the basis for the Office of Civilian Defense.

July  Division of State and Local Cooperation established.

August 2  President appoints Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. State Governors advised to reestablish defense councils.

November 1  First regional conference on civil defense held in New York City; followed by conferences in New Orleans, Salt Lake City, Chicago, and Memphis.

December  Drafts of model law sent to States for consideration of legislation with a view to securing uniformity of civil defense organization on the State level.

1941

February 24  President asks Congress to appropriate $150,000,000 "for the purpose of providing community facilities made necessary by defense activities." Division of State and Local Cooperation helped to sponsor the community facilities bill, which became known as the Lanham Act.
May 20
Office of Civilian Defense established within Office for Emergency Management by EO 8757, to assure effective co-ordination of Federal relations with State and local governments engaged in furtherance of war programs, provide for necessary cooperation with State and local governments with respect to measures for adequate protection of civilian population in war emergencies; and to facilitate participation by all persons in war programs. . . . Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New York City named as Director, serving on volunteer basis without compensation.

June 20
Executive Order 8799 amended EO 8757 to provide for a wider and more effective functioning of the Volunteer Participation Committee by increasing its membership from 20 to 45.

June 30
First training course given at Edgewood Arsenal, Md. (These courses continued weekly thereafter.)

July 5
Emergency Medical Services established with representative of U.S. Public Health Service as Chief Medical Officer. EMS was responsible for establishment of necessary emergency medical facilities in communities throughout the country, including organization of emergency field units and casualty stations.

July 10
OCD established nine regional offices: Boston, New York City, Baltimore, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago, Omaha, San Antonio (later Dallas), and San Francisco.

July 16
Executive Order 8822 amended EO 8757 to include American Red Cross among organizations invited to designate representatives to serve as members of the Board for Civilian Protection in OCD.

July 24
Official CD insignia adopted by OCD; included the basic CD insigné and 15 distinctive identification symbols for volunteer workers: Air Raid Warden, Auxiliary Police, Bomb Squad, Auxiliary Firemen, Fire Watcher, Road Repair Crew, Decontamination Corps, Staff Corps, Rescue Party, Medical Corps, Nurses Aides Corps, Messenger, Drivers Corps, Emergency Food and Housing, Demolition and Clearance Crew. The insignia were developed by Charles T. Coiner, consultant on design to Division of Information, Office for Emergency Management, in collaboration with Col. Walter B. Burn, an OCD staff member.

August
Publication of "The United States Citizens Defense Corps." Gave the first complete and coordinated plan for local organization of civilian defense, and was the prototype of all following CD organizations.
September 22  Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt appointed Assistant Director, OCD, heading Volunteer Participation activities, to administer the nonprotective aspects of civilian defense. She reported November 1, 1941, and resigned February 20, 1942.


October 15  Physical Fitness Division established under direction of John B. Kelly, with headquarters in Philadelphia. Also during October, OCD initiated active program of training Citizens Defense Corps personnel in every State and city.

November First consolidated reports from States showed over one million volunteers trained, or in training; first regionwide test blackout was held in OCD Region 1 (New England); final definitive test of warning devices was held at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and selection of approved type was made.

December 7  Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

December 8  Director La Guardia announced establishment of Civil Air Patrol (CAP) under OCD. (In April 1943, CAP was transferred from OCD to War Department and operated as an auxiliary of the Army Air Force.)

January 3  Boy Scouts of America accepted assignment of messenger training; over one million messengers were trained for CD. American Water Works, American Hotel, and National Retail Dry Goods Association accepted assignments from OCD to recommend protection programs for their member institutions.

January 6  Special 10-day course for 150 Reserve and National Guard officers, assigned to regional and State offices, began at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; conducted by Chemical Warfare and OCD officers.

January 12  James M. Landis, Dean of Harvard Law School, appointed Special Assistant to the President to devote full time to executive work of OCD.

January 27  Congress approved act to "provide protection of persons and property from bombing attacks in the United States." The Act authorized an appropriation not to exceed $100,000,000 to enable the Director of OCD to provide such protection.
January 28 First schools in emergency CD duties of regular police and duties of auxiliary police opened in 46 cities by FBI in cooperation with OCD.

January 31 Melvyn Douglas (Hesselberg), actor, named Director of OCD Art Council, to mobilize volunteer activities of Nation's writers, artists, musicians, and actors for Division of Civilian Participation Program; served without compensation; resigned December 5, 1942, to enter Army.

February 4 Joint Committee on Evacuation (interdepartmental) created. (Apparently abolished prior to July 1, 1944.)

February 10 La Guardia resigned as Director of OCD.

February 12 James M. Landis took over as Director of OCD.

February 21 Congress approved act appropriating $100,000,000 to OCD, specifying that no part of the money be used for "the employment of persons, the rent of facilities or the purchase of equipment and supplies to promote, produce or carry on instruction or direct instruction in physical fitness by dancers, fan dancing, street shows, theatrical performances or other public entertainment."

April 15 Executive Order 9134 expanded functions of OCD Director by authorizing him to maintain a clearinghouse of information on State and local defense activities in cooperation with appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and replaced both the Board of Civilian Protection and the Volunteer Participation Committee by a single Civilian Defense Board to advise and assist the Director. . . . James M. Landis received official appointment as Director of OCD at a salary of $10,000 a year.

May 19 Executive Order 9165 established Facility Security Division for protection of essential facilities from sabotage and other destructive acts, and placed responsibility for facility security program upon OCD.

May 28 War Emergency Radio Service (WERS) authorized by Defense Communications Board (name changed to Board of War Communications by EO 9183, June 15, 1942) for civilian defense, Civil Air Patrol, and State guard systems, to permit licensing for defense purposes limited number of amateur shortwave stations, all of which had been closed the first of the year for security reasons. By the end of 1944, 250 licenses (covering 5,213 radio transmitters) were issued to civilian defense stations.
June 17  Conference on emergency CD Driver Training at Yale University launched program in which American Automobile Association trained 800,000 drivers for CD.

August 25  Landis named Liaison Officer to Civil Defense of Canada for coordination of policies, air raid signals, equipment, etc.

1943

September 8  Director Landis resigned and recommended abolition of OCD. John B. Martin, deputy, became Acting Director.

October 4  War Department announced that Aircraft Warning Service would be placed on standby basis.

October 18  Executive Order 9389 expanded authority of OCD Director to permit him to provide for the internal organization and management of OCD, and to delegate authority to carry out his powers and duties to such agencies and officials as he might designate.

December 30  Six Army officers who had been section or unit chiefs in Protection Branch relieved to go overseas to organize Passive Air Defense for the invasion of Normandy, under SHAEF. Left in February 1944.

1944

February  Lt. Gen. William N. Haskell (Retired) assumed duties as Director of OCD.

April  Gradual liquidation of OCD began.

April 18  Executive Order 9437 abolished Facility Security Program assigned to OCD by EO 9165.

July 1  OCD regional offices abolished.

November 3  U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey established, pursuant to Presidential directive, to study effects of air war over Germany with two objectives: help plan impending expansion of air war against Japan, and help assess and evaluate air power as a military instrument in the interest of future planning for national defense.
May 4  President Truman signed Executive Order 9562 calling for termination of OCD on June 30, 1945.

May 8  Victory in Europe (V-E Day).

June 30  OCD abolished under the terms of Executive Order 9562. This action was followed by the disbanding of most State and local civil defense organizations.

July 16  U.S. tests the world's first atomic bomb at Alamagordo, New Mexico.

August 6  Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

August 9  Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.

August 15  Victory in Japan (V-J Day). . . . President Truman requested U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey to study effects of air war on Japan, particularly the effects of bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

1946

April 30  Provost Marshal General Study 3B-1, "Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians," concluded that atomic warfare did not eliminate the possibility of effective civil defense but, rather, increased its importance; that civil defense be considered an integral and essential part of national defense; that a national shelter program and other passive defense policies must be planned at once and continuously studied and updated; and that advance planning include: updated inventories of essential materials and facilities available, maintenance of reserve stockpiles of critical materials, studies of dispersal of facilities as well as emergency evacuation of civilians, and development of intelligence detection systems as well as warning systems.

June  U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey issued special report: "The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Report is one of the earliest descriptions of the atomic bomb--how it works, its main effects (heat, radiation, blast), and how it compares with conventional weapons; suggested immediate planning for action in four areas: (1) shelters and construction, (2) decentralization, (3) civilian defense, and (4) active defense. "Shelters and construction" envisaged not only a national shelter program, but also modification of new construction to make buildings more blast- and fire-resistant.
November 25  War Department Memorandum 400-5-5 established WD Civil Defense Board (Bull Board, headed by Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull) to study problem of civil defense.

1947


July 26  National Security Act of 1947 (Unification Act) signed (Public Law 80-253). The law established the National Security Resources Board (NSRB).

August 29  National Convention of American Legion at New York City adopted report of Legion's Civil Defense Commission, urging the President to establish a civil defense planning agency under direction of a civilian, and outlining minimum requirements for civil defense. This report, when presented to the President, became the basis for establishment of the Office of Civil Defense Planning.

1948

February 13  Bull Board report released to the public.

February 22  Defense Secretary James Forrestal asked Russel J. Hopley, President, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, to organize and direct committee to plan for establishing civil defense organization for the Nation.

March 27  Mr. Forrestal created Office of Civil Defense Planning, with Mr. Hopley as director, within National Military Establishment (predecessor to the Department of Defense).

December  Arthur M. Hill resigns as chairman of NSRB; Dr. John R. Steelman, The Assistant to the President, serves as Acting Chairman until April 1950.

1949

March 3  In memorandum to Acting Chairman John R. Steelman, the President assigned to National Security Resources Board primary responsibility for civil defense planning.

March 29  Acting Chairman of NSRB requested Director, Office of Mobilization Procedures and Organization, NSRB, to initiate a study of problems and submit a report.
May 1  NSRB staff prepared "A Report on Civil Defense Planning."

June 3  Acting Chairman, NSRB, requested: (a) Administrator, Federal Works Agency (which became General Services Administration July 1, 1949), to assume responsibility for "wartime civil disaster relief planning," including activities and supplies, rescue, evacuation, demolition, regulation of transportation, communications, and restoration of order; (b) Secretary of National Defense to assume responsibility for planning civilian participation in active defense, including detection, observation, and identification of aircraft, air-raid-warning systems, border patrol, anti-aircraft defense, civil air patrol, camouflage, and protective construction.

June 6  Acting Chairman, NSRB, submits "A Report on Civil Defense Planning" (NSRB Document 112) to Federal departments and agencies for comment.

August 1  Secretary Forrestal abolished Office of Civil Defense Planning and established Civil Defense Liaison Office. Lt. Col. (later Col.) Barnet W. Beers named as Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison.

August 10  President Truman signed the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (PL 81-216), amending the National Security Act of 1947 and reorganizing the National Military Establishment into the Department of Defense.

August 23  General Services Administration submitted planning prospectus to Acting Chairman, NSRB.

September  Department of Defense held "Operation Lookout" in 10 northeastern States to test air-defense plans. Exercise was sponsored jointly by Air Defense Command and Civil Defense Liaison Office (formerly Office of Civil Defense Planning).

September 23  President Truman announced that Russians had exploded their own atomic bomb in the Soviet Union.

October 5  Acting Chairman of NSRB transmitted to State Governors a statement of policy for relations with State and local governments (Doc. 121).

October 10  Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, announced that public hearings on problem of civil defense would be held early during next session of Congress.
December 1  NSRB Civil Defense Bulletin (Doc. 121/1) sent to all State Governors. Bulletin outlined Federal Government's objectives in planning, set forth information on planning activities in progress, made recommendations for State and local action, and requested information on specific questions relating to State civil defense programs.

1950

January  Dr. Steelman announces appointment of Paul J. Larsen as director of Civilian Mobilization Office in NSRB; reported for duty on March 1.

January 13  NSRB Doc. 121/1, "Medical Aspects of Atomic Weapons," sent to all State Governors.

January 31  President directed Atomic Energy Commission to study possibilities of building thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs.

February 3  NSRB Doc. 121/3, announcing training courses in radiological monitoring and medical aspects of civil defense against atomic attack, sent to all State Governors.

March 1  Paul J. Larsen appointed Director, Civilian Mobilization Office, NSRB.

March 3  Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and Senate Armed Services Committee began hearings on civil defense.

March 27  Courses on radiological monitoring and on the medical aspects of atomic weapons, under NSRB sponsorship, were begun; continued through July 1950.

April 10  Nomination of W. Stuart Symington as Chairman of NSRB confirmed by the Senate. (Took oath of office April 26.)

April 15  Report by Senate-Defense study team on U.S. objectives and programs for national security (NSC-68) triggers decision on defense build-up; accelerated by Korean War.

May 1  NSRB Doc. 121/4, transmitted to State Governors, suggested course of action for States, described radiological and medical training activities, suggested approach to civil defense, and defined responsibility for civil defense planning.

May 18  NSRB Doc. 121/5, defining role of American Red Cross in civil defense, transmitted to all State Governors.
June 25  President Truman announced invasion of South Korea by North Korea.

June 29  Atomic Energy Commission disclosed that "great steps" had been achieved in developing the hydrogen bomb.

July 1950  NSRB's Civilian Mobilization Office redesignated Civil Defense Office; considered the nucleus of FCDA.

August 8  AEC issued "The Effects of Atomic Weapons," predecessor to "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," which was issued in 1957 and revised in April 1962. (Book was prepared by Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies.) An authoritative compendium of information on effects of atomic weapons.

September 8  NSRB Doc. 128, "United States Civil Defense" (Symington Report), proposing a national civil defense plan (then referred to as the "National Plan" or "The Blue Book"), transmitted to the President. (Exhibit C of Doc. 128 is proposed bill "To authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program and for other purposes.") Paul J. Larsen resigned as Director of NSRB's Office of Civil Defense (formerly Office of Civilian Mobilization); succeeded by James J. Wadsworth.

September 18  President Truman sent Symington Report to Congress for consideration. H.R. 9689, "To Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program," introduced in House of Representatives.

September 19  S.4162, "To Authorize a Federal Civil Defense Program," introduced in the Senate.

September 30  Federal Disaster Act of 1950 (Public Law 875, 81st Congress) authorized Federal assistance to States and local governments in major disasters; vested in President authority to coordinate activities of Federal agencies in providing disaster assistance. NSRB Document 128/1 outlined the civil defense concept of critical target areas. State maps detailed critical target areas and suggested, on a circular pattern, mutual aid and mobile support systems around each of the critical target areas.

October 18  NSRB Doc. 121/6 announced training courses for professional nurses.

October 29  NSRB Doc. 130, "Survival Under Atomic Attack," published; first of a series designed to instruct the public in individual protection against special weapons.
November 30  Revised bill (H.R. 9798, "To Authorize a Federal Civil De-
defense Program") introduced in House of Representatives; revised civil defense bill (S. 4219) introduced in Senate the next day.

December  NSRB estimates total cost of civil defense program over three years to be $3.1 billion, with the Federal Government bearing 54 percent of the cost.

December 1  Executive Order 10186 created Federal Civil Defense Adminis-
tration (FCDA) within Office for Emergency Management, Execu-
tive Office of the President. On same day President Truman appointed Millard F. Caldwell, Jr., former Governor of Florida, as Administrator, succeeding James J. Wadsworth, Acting Director, Civil Defense Office, NSRB. (Mr. Wadsworth was named Deputy Administrator.)

December 4  Hearings on proposed civil defense legislation were begun by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee.

December 12  FCDA announced that model interstate civil defense and dis-
aster compact had been submitted to all State Governors and civil defense directors as a legal basis for mutual aid and mobile support among the States in the event of enemy at-
tack. It applied particularly to use of fire, police, medi-
cal, and rescue personnel and equipment.

December 13  NSRB Doc. 132, "Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks," released. Prepared for NSRB by the Civil Defense Liaison Office and Office of the Secretary of Defense, booklet sent to all State Governors as background information on fire problem.

December 15  A basic code of public air raid warning signals, to be used by all States and cities in event of attack, announced by FCDA. The two-stage warning code—"Red Alert" and "All Clear"—was developed by a panel consisting of representa-
tives of FCDA, the Department of Defense, State and city civil defense authorities, and sound engineers.

December 16  Executive Order 10193 established Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion within Executive Office of the President to direct, con-
trol, and coordinate all mobilization activities of the Govern-
ment, including production, procurement, manpower, stabiliza-
tion, and transport activities. President Truman proclaimed the existence of a national emergency (Proclamation 2914); cited the need for strengthening civilian defenses and for greater coordination with State and local governments on civil defense matters.
December 28
FCDA released a 248-page volume on "Civil Defense Health Services and Special Weapons Defense." Prepared for FCDA by Health Resources Office of NSRB with assistance and technical advice of number of Federal and private agencies, booklet gave detailed information required by State and local planners for civil defense health services against atomic, biological, and chemical warfare.

1951

January 12
President Truman signed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Public Law 920, 81st Congress), establishing FCDA as an independent agency in the executive branch of the Government.

January 17
Designation of certain amateur frequencies for civil defense use by licensed amateur radio operators, after any suspension of normal amateur activity, announced jointly by FCDA and Federal Communications Commission; made possible for State and local civil defense authorities to plan for utilization of Nation's amateur operators for civil defense purposes.

February 12
FCDA announced at a national meeting of State civil defense directors that matching Federal funds would be made available for construction of individual or family-type shelters, but that no contributions would be made for shelters outside critical target areas.

February 21
Meeting of United States and Canadian civil defense officials in Ottawa for further informal exploration of possible agreements on mutual civil defense problems. Discussions covered interstate-provincial and international mutual aid agreements, exchange of medical services, and standardization of civil defense supplies and equipment; also possible exchange of civil defense personnel between United States and Canada.

March 1
President Truman asked for $403 million for FCDA ($250 million of this sum intended for shelters); Congress, on June 2, voted only $32 million.

March 2
Executive Order 10221 authorized Housing and Home Finance Administrator to act for President in carrying out provisions of P.L. 875, to assist States and local governments in major disasters.

March 27
Canada and United States effected a civil defense mutual aid agreement.
April 5  First issue of THE CIVIL DEFENSE ALERT, official monthly publication of FCDA, distributed to all FCDA personnel and all CD staff members in States, cities, and territories to keep them currently and uniformly informed on civil defense activities, plans, and programs; and to help maintain the teamwork and morale essential to the FCDA program.


April 28  First meeting of Joint United States-Canadian Civil Defense Committee held in Washington, D.C. Eight Canadian representatives, headed by Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare, and six U.S. officials took part in conference.

April 30  National Civil Defense Training Center opened at Olney, Md., consisting of Staff College for training in civil defense administration and operations, and Rescue School for training in rescue operations and related skills.

May 5  First FCDA Advisory Council (12 members) appointed by the President. Appointment of Council members was in accordance with section 102 of the Federal Civil Defense Act.

May 7-8  Civil Defense Conference, Washington, D.C.; called to mobilize organizational leadership of Nation for survival; attended by some 1,200 leaders of State and local civil defense organizations and representatives of about 300 national associations whose membership numbered over 50 million. A series of forums on civil defense organization, volunteer technical services, public education, health and welfare services, shelters, attack warning and communications, training, and other program activities were held during the conference.

May 12  Eniwetok Atomic tests completed. One purpose was to test kinds of protective construction. Representative Jackson reports (on May 13) that some structures can withstand atomic blast.

May 25  Defense Department and Atomic Energy Commission reveal that Eniwetok tests of May 1-11 included experiments relating to thermonuclear weapons.

May 24-25  First meeting of FCDA Technical Committee on Street and Highway Traffic held at Evanston, Ill., home of the Traffic Institute of Northwestern University, which FCDA had selected to develop the traffic training program. Matters concerning regulation and control of traffic in relation to CD were considered.
May 25
Joint release of DOD and AEC announced conduct of Eniwetok weapon tests which "included experiments contributing to thermonuclear weapons research."

June
Associated Universities, Inc., initiates study (Project East River) to determine best combination of nonmilitary measures for defense against attack by atomic, chemical and other weapons.

June 6
FCDA Eastern Training Center established at Olney, Md. This was in addition to Staff College and Rescue School established April 30, 1951.

June 14
FCDA released summary of system to be used for determining amount of shelter from atomic attack needed in a given area and amount of suitable shelter space available in existing buildings in that area. A conference to discuss system was held at FCDA Staff College, June 14-15, 1951. Release of system for determining shelter in existing buildings marked the first phase of the shelter program.

June 21
President asks for $535 million for FY 1952; Congress on Nov. 1 votes only $75 million, of which $56 million was to stockpile medicines and other emergency supplies.

June 22
FCDA announced distribution to state and local directors of an illustrated bulletin containing a suggested organizational pattern for the communications section of municipal control centers, to be used as official guide.

June 27
FCDA, NSRB and DOD initiate Project East River to evaluate the nonmilitary defense program and recommend optimum combination of nonmilitary measures.

July 2
Second meeting of FCDA Technical Committee on Street and Highway Traffic held at Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. Committee reached agreement on overall objectives of traffic handling during CD emergencies.

July 3
FCDA announced distribution to State and local directors of bulletin covering plans and specifications for civil defense attack warning systems. Bulletin set forth specifications and methods for installing well-engineered and economical attack warning systems, and included tables and charts for determining area coverage of sound devices, with map showing layout of a public sound warning system for a typical city.
July 13  First course for local civil defense instructors in midwestern States opened at Oklahoma A&M College, Stillwater, Okla. This was the first training center for local instructors in the country, and continued operating for about one year. (Closed August 15, 1952.)

July 27  Manual on "Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing Buildings," sent to State and local civil defense directors; provided method for determining census of persons in given locations and uniform evaluation of shelter space in existing buildings.

August 2  James J. Wadsworth, Deputy Administrator, announced that St. Mary's College of California, strategically located about 20 miles east of the San Francisco Bay area, had been selected as the Western Training Center of FCDA. (Center opened Sept. 4, 1951; discontinued Sept. 1953.)

September 5  Kefauver Task Force of Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearing on civil defense program.

September 9  FCDA Emergency Welfare Services Advisory Committee concluded its first meeting, a 2-day session. During meeting Committee reviewed welfare problems before and after an attack, including emergency shelters, food supply, emergency mass feeding, personal identification, notification of next-of-kin, and post-disaster legislation.

September 13  FCDA announced that five States (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New York) would share in the initial allocation of funds from a $20,000,000 Congressional appropriation for civil defense first aid stations and stockpiling of medical supplies and equipment.

September 20  FCDA released Advisory Bulletin No. 69 to furnish advice and guidance to States regarding a uniform method of issuing identification tags for civilians.

October 26  Initial meeting of new group, Advisory Council for Women's Participation, held at FCDA building (Gelmarc Towers), 1930 Columbia Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. Its mission was to assist Mrs. John L. Whitehurst, Assistant Administrator, in alerting and organizing American women for civil defense.

November 2  Beginning of Massachusetts Regional Project, a laboratory study of urban area target analysis and State and regional plan, cooperatively undertaken by FCDA, City of Boston, State of Massachusetts, and the Armed Forces.

November 9  FCDA published Advisory Bulletin No. 79, informing State directors of location and geographic boundaries of nine regional offices.
November 15 FCDA announced the original cartoon character "Bert the Turtle" as the "star" of "Duck and Cover," an FCDA cartoon film produced by Archer Productions, Inc., New York City, in cooperation with the National Education Association and FCDA. A turtle was chosen as the star of a children's civil defense campaign because his ability to duck and cover into his shell illustrates the basic principle of self-protection.

November 29 America's butchers, bakers, grocers, and milkmen called upon by FCDA and the Department of Agriculture to help set up immediate plans for nationwide emergency civil defense feeding in event of attack. Call for help was in form of an announcement that FCDA and USDA had reached agreement on detailed plans to provide adequate food for the Nation under emergency attack conditions.

December 2 A 16-page illustrated booklet, "Duck and Cover," issued by FCDA for distribution by the States and territories. Three million copies were sent out.

December 9 FCD Administrator Millard Caldwell, on completion of his first year in office, announced that over a million and a half volunteers were on guard as part of the growing homefront army for civil defense.

December 10 Communications experts from throughout the Nation joined FCDA officials in a 6-day session to discuss technical details of a communications system for civil defense in a national emergency. The meeting, devoted chiefly to use of radio facilities, was held at FCDA Staff College, Olney, Md. Among the 120 delegates were representatives of 19 associations and such organizations as the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Western Union, Motorola, General Electric, and Radio Corporation of America.

December 16 FCDA established new office of volunteer manpower for recruiting. Mrs. John L. Whitehurst of Baltimore, Md., appointed Assistant Administrator in charge of its activities. Previously, Mrs. Whitehurst had served as Assistant Administrator in charge of Women's Participation. Purpose of new office was to "afford the necessary impetus and coordination essential to increase public participation in recruitment of additional volunteers for the growing U.S. Civil Defense Corps."

January 5 FCDA launched series of nationwide radio programs to promote civil defense organizations in the country, featuring officials of FCDA, Atomic Energy Commission, and top senatorial and military leaders.
January 7  "Alert America" Convoy Exhibit opened to public at Inter-
departmental Auditorium, Constitution Ave., Washington.
Exhibit presented various aspects of civil defense and
reasons why America needed a well-trained civil defense or-
ganization. After Washington showing, "Alert America" toured
major U.S. cities to encourage public support and participa-
tion in civil defense. . . . National Civil Defense Advisory
Council, created by President Truman, met in Washington to
attend exhibit, to review first year's progress of FCDA, and
to discuss plans for 1952.

January 9  State, territorial, and FCDA regional directors held 3-day
conference at Wardman Park Hotel (now Sheraton Park), Wash-
ington, D.C., to map 1952 program. About 65 State repre-
sentatives, 7 State deputies, 3 territorial, and 9 regional
directors participated in discussions designed to present
current policies of Atomic Energy Commission, Department of
Defense, and FCDA. The 3 territorial directors represented
Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico; Guam and Virgin Islands did not
send representatives. Foremost on agenda were discussions
on civil defense volunteer recruiting programs, which called
for 17.5 million workers, or one out of every 12 Americans,
to meet minimum manpower requirements throughout country.
Top consideration also was given to grants-in-aid, fiscal
relations between Federal and State governments, public in-
formation, and training and education of civil defense volun-
teers. Conference was open to members of press and radio.

February 4  FCDA Technical Training School opened at Ogontz, Pa.; reduced
funds forced closing and move to Olney, Md., July 28, 1952.

April 17  Executive Order 10346 enjoined Federal departments and
agencies to develop, in coordination with FCDA, civil de-
fense emergency plans pursuant to sec. 302 of Public Law
920, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

April 24  President Truman scores Congress for starving the civil
defense program started in 1951.

July 1  FCDA takes over from the Air Force the responsibility of
warning the civilian population of an enemy attack.

July 7  Congress votes only $43 million for FCDA in fiscal 1953,
as against a request for $600 million.

October  Report of Project East River completed; submitted in Janu-
ary 1953.
November Group of city and county civil defense directors organize U.S. Civil Defense Council; served as clearinghouse for city and county civil defense problems and as medium for exchange of civil defense information.

November 15 Mr. Millard F. Caldwell, Jr., resigned and Mr. James J. Wadsworth, formerly Deputy Administrator, designated Acting Administrator, FCDA.

November 16 Chairman of AEC announces conclusion of the third series of weapons development tests at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The tests, in furtherance of the President's announcement of January 31, 1952, "included experiments contributing to thermonuclear weapons research."

1953

January Project East River report, with more than 200 recommendations for civil defense, submitted to sponsors.

January 16 Executive Order 10427 gave FCDA responsibility for providing assistance to localities stricken by major disasters under Public Law 875, and revoked Executive Order 10221, which had assigned responsibility to Housing and Home Finance Administrator.

February 11 FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 138 announces formal understanding between FCDA and the American National Red Cross, identifying the respective responsibilities of governmental authorities and the Red Cross in disaster operations.

March 4 Mr. (Frederick) Val Peterson, former Governor of Nebraska, sworn in as Administrator, FCDA.

March 13 Executive Order 10438 transferred certain functions of the National Security Resources Board to the Office of Defense Mobilization.

March 17 "Operation Doorstep." Television broadcasts and newsreel films show detonation of an actual atomic bomb and its effects on sample American homes, etc.; show explosive power of such a bomb and tests of shelter precautions which could increase chances for survival.

May 15 CONELRAD broadcast system, developed jointly with FCC and the USAF, to assure continuity of public emergency radio broadcasting for civil defense purposes under attack conditions, became operative.
May 22 Val Peterson approved a new organization plan for FCDA—organized functionally and with greater authority to regional offices (reduced from 9 to 7).

June 12 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 established a new Office of Defense Mobilization which assumed functions of former ODM, the National Security Resources Board, and critical materials stockpiling functions formerly vested in the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Interior, and of the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

June 18 Executive Order 10461 redefined functions of ODM, as provided in Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953, including functions of original ODM and those under the Defense Production Act of 1950.

August 5 FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 146 announced revision of regional areas. For economic reasons, number of regions reduced to seven.

August 8 Russia announced that the U.S. no longer possessed a monopoly on the hydrogen bomb.

1954

January 18 FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 158 outlines to State and local CD directors a forecast of policy with respect to early warning of air attack and dispersal of population.

March 1 "Castle Bravo" detonation of thermonuclear device at Eniwetok brought the first realization of the magnitude of the problem of residual radiation fallout.

April First public showing of "Operation Ivy," the official film of a thermonuclear explosion at Eniwetok in 1952.

April 22 Executive Order 10529 authorized FCDA to coordinate participation by Federal employees in State and local civil defense preemergency training programs.

April 26 Mass evacuation test exercise held in Spokane, Washington. Followed by exercises in Shreveport, La. (June 11), Mobile, Ala. (June 14), and Bremerton, Washington (June 20).

May 7 Val Peterson requests National Research Council of National Academy of Sciences to set up a Scientific Advisory Committee to FCDA. Office set up in July 1954 under direction of Dr. Willard Bascom.
FCDA Release No. 410 sets forth civil defense planning assumptions in light of rapid developments in modern weapons.


June 16 FCDA issues planning assumptions for FY 1955 for guidance of all agencies concerned with non-military defense requirements. Revised by Scientific Advisory Committee to FCDA in statement in January 1955.

September 1 FCDA moved to Battle Creek, Mich., leaving only a small liaison staff, including the Administrator, in Washington, D.C. Move included Staff College from Olney, Md., except Rescue School, which continued at Olney until its closing in 1958.

September 8 FCDA delegated civil defense programs to Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and Labor, and to Housing and Home Finance Agency.

September 28 FCDA issued facts about radioactive fallout and information on civil defense measures to cope with the threat.

October 1 Except for Region 6, which remained near Denver, Col., FCDA regional offices moved to safer locations in keeping with national policy of locating civil defense headquarters outside areas of expected heavy damage: Region 1, Newton Center, Mass.; Region 2, West Chester, Pa.; Region 3, Thomasville, Ga.; Region 4, Joliet, Ill.; Region 5, Denton, Tex.; Region 6, Denver, Col.; Region 7, Santa Rosa, Cal. There were no changes in regional boundaries. (During 1955 Region 2 was moved to Olney, Md., and Region 4 to Battle Creek, Mich.)

November 8 FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 178 furnished information and assistance in connection with the problem of predicting the probable area of radiation fallout resulting from nuclear explosions.

November 19 U.S. and Canada announce agreement to build a third screen of radar stations from Alaska to Greenland--the distant early warning or DEW-line).

January 18 Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Civil Defense appointed to examine the policies and operations of the civil defense program.
February-June  Kefauver Subcommittee of Senate Armed Services Committee conducts hearings on civil defense program.

February 9  FCDA issued Advisory Bulletin No. 179 on Residual Radiation in Relation to civil defense—summarized current information on residual radiation, with particular reference to fallout. Stated interim FCDA policy recommendations in regard to civil defense plans and operations.

February 15  In response to growing public demands, Atomic Energy Commission issued a press release describing fallout from a multimegaton thermonuclear device exploded by the United States at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954.

February 22  In light of newly disclosed fallout problem, the Subcommittee on Civil Defense (Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman) of the Senate Armed Services Committee began a series of major hearings on the operations and policies of the Federal Civil Defense Program. (Hearings were continued through June 20.)

March 23  "Operation Cue" atomic test at Nevada proving ground, observed by Federal and local civil defense representatives.

May 4  FCDA, ODM, and DOD establish a Review Committee to re-evaluate the recommendations of Project East River in light of developments since the report was issued; submitted its report in October 1955.

May 9  National Planning Association releases "A Program for the Nonmilitary Defense of the United States—A Statement on National Policy" by Special Policy Committee on Nonmilitary Defense Planning; also accompanying report by William H. Stead, "The Tasks of Nonmilitary Defense and the Present Status of Planning."

May 11  Executive Order 10611 establishes Civil Defense Coordinating Board, to assist in the development of an orderly, integrated plan for participation of all Federal departments and agencies in the civil defense of the Nation, and to report to the President on progress of such plan.

May 20  Kefauver Subcommittee asks President to assume personal responsibility for adequate program of civil defense; interim Senate report warns of heavy casualties in event of attack, urges widening Federal role in mass evacuations, feeding, and medical care.
May 23

June
U.S. Weather Bureau establishes a fallout forecast program, resulting from a delegation by FCDA to the Department of Commerce.

June 3
Dr. Willard P. Libby, Atomic Energy Commission, in a speech delivered at a University of Chicago alumni reunion in Chicago, provides an authoritative description of the progress in developing megaton bombs; pays particular attention to the virtually unlimited size, low cost, and large fallout of the most recent nuclear weapons.

June 15-17
During a major test of the Nation's defenses (the second "Operation Alert") President Eisenhower "declared" martial law, precipitating a reassessment of military-civilian relations in civil defense.

June 28
President transmits to Congress the report of the Kesnbaum Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, urging increased level of support for civil defense by the Federal Government.

July 1
Start of work on pilot survey in Milwaukee to come up with a pre-attack population dispersal plan that could serve as a model for other critical target cities.

October 1
FCDA draws first contract with Louisiana for a survival plan program for the New Orleans metropolitan area.

October 17

1956

January-June
House Subcommittee on Military Operations (Chet Holifield, Chairman) of the Committee on Government Operations, holds major hearings on "Civil Defense for National Survival."

January 3
ODM, FCDA, and DOD agree on "Basic Responsibilities After Attack on the United States," revised in 1957 for issuance as an unclassified document.

January 11
Defense Mobilization Order 1-19 issued to encourage and, when appropriate, to require dispersion and protective construction of essential industry.
May 14  FCDA General Order 235 establishes a Regional Civil Defense Operations Board in each Region to accomplish field coordination.

July 3  Federal Property and Administrative Services Act amended to authorize donations of Federal surplus property for civil defense purposes.

July 17  President Eisenhower, in letter to Val Peterson, points out the need for "both strengthening and modernizing" the civil defense efforts, with greater responsibility vested in the Federal Government.

July 20-26  *Operation Alert 1956*--the country's third annual civil defense training exercise.


August 11  FCDA releases "The National Plan for Civil Defense Against Enemy Attack," outlining Federal responsibilities and programs and suggesting plans for State and local organizations.

September 4  FCDA releases new planning assumptions.

December 21  FCDA proposal for national shelter program presented to the President and the National Security Council. Proposal was for a combination blast and fallout shelter system.

1957.

January 28  Memorandum of Understanding by ODM, DOD, and FCDA to clarify "Basic Responsibilities Paper" on regional role of ODM and FCDA in an emergency.

February 8  Val Peterson transmits to Congress proposed amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

March  Command post exercise, "Operation Sentinel," held at FCDA National Headquarters to test staff procedures.

March 1  FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 210 includes text of "Basic Responsibilities Paper" outlining the roles of the DOD, ODM, and FCDA, and an accompanying Memorandum of Understanding as revised Jan. 12, 1957.
April
President Eisenhower establishes Security Resources Panel (Gaither Committee) to consider measures to protect the population in a nuclear attack and its aftermath.

May
National Warning System (NAWAS) was established with three warning centers and 200 warning points.

June
AEC publishes The Effects of Nuclear Weapons; includes comprehensive discussion of nuclear radiation and fallout.

June 14
Val Peterson resigns. Lewis E. Berry designated Acting Administrator.

July 19
Mr. Leo A. Hoegh, former Governor of Iowa, sworn in as Administrator, FCDA; served in that capacity until July 1, 1958, when he was named Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, later redesignated Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM).

August 15
FCDA Advisory Bulletins describe "Aiming Area Concept"--a new planning concept of area vulnerability.

August 26
Soviet Union fires first successful ICBM.

September 19
FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 216 outlines program for continuity of State and local governments in nuclear emergencies.

October 4
Soviets' first successful launching of an earth-orbiting satellite--Sputnik-I.

October 11
Gaither Report completed.

October 29
Executive Order 10737 expanded functions of FCDA in administering disaster relief under Public Law 875.

November 1
Federal Coordination Office established to continue and facilitate participation by Federal departments and agencies in civil defense.

November 1
Continuity of Government Office established in FCDA to administer and promote Continuity of Government program.

November 7
Gaither Report (NSC 5724) urges vast network of fallout shelters at a cost of $22.5 billion for fallout shelter program, including research and development for blast shelters.

November 22
Defense Mobilization Order I-26 provides for the establishment and coordination of a National Damage Assessment Program.

January  Rockefeller Brothers Fund report stresses the need to consider civil defense as part of our overall strategic posture, with a program including a warning system and fallout shelters.

April 24  President Eisenhower sends Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 to Congress, transferring all responsibilities of the Federal Civil Defense Administrator and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to the President, and consolidating FCDA and ODM into a new Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President. Plan was to become effective July 1, 1958.

May 7  FCDA announces five-point national policy on shelters: (1) disseminate public information on effects of nuclear attack; (2) survey existing structures, mines, subways, tunnels, etc., to determine protection factor; (3) accelerate research to determine how fallout protection might be incorporated in existing and new buildings; (4) construct limited number of prototype shelters; and (5) incorporate fallout shelters in appropriate new Federal buildings designed for civilian use.

June 9  FCDA Eastern Instructor Training Center opened at Manhattan Beach, Brooklyn, New York.

June 30  Rescue Instructor Training School, Olney, Md., closed; training in rescue operations transferred to Eastern Instructor Training Center.

July 1  Executive Order 10773 delegated to the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (later renamed the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization), all functions transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958.

July 1  Leo A. Hoegh named Director of OCDM.

August 8  Public Law 85-606 amended Public Law 920 to vest responsibility for civil defense jointly in Federal Government and the States and their political subdivisions, and to authorize: (1) financial contributions to States and their political subdivisions for necessary and essential personnel and administrative expenses, commonly referred to as the P&A program; (2) reimbursement toward expenses of students attending civil defense schools, known as the Student Expense Program; and (3) distribution of radiological defense instruments to State and local units.
August 26  Public Law 85-763 redesignates the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization as the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (ODCM).

September 6  Executive Order 10782 amends Executive Order 10773 by deleting the words "Defense and Civilian Mobilization" and inserting therefor the words "Civil and Defense Mobilization," as authorized by Public Law 85-763.

October 24  ODCM issues National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, setting forth principles, responsibilities, requirements, and broad courses of action. To be supported by annexes extending the subject matter of the plan.

1959

March 1  By Interim Directive No. 45, dated February 27, 1959, ODCM established Region 8, Everett, Wash., with jurisdiction over Alaska, Wash., Oregon, Montana, Idaho. (Region 8 was moved to Bothell, Wash., in December 1968, upon completion of underground facility.)

August 31  Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, in address to Senate, presents a critical appraisal of the civil defense program.

August 31  Congressional Atomic Energy Committee Study estimates 50 million deaths, 20 million injuries from surprise nuclear attack on 224 metropolitan and industrial sites; held operational civil defense system could cut toll sharply.

November  ODCM Western Instructor Training Center established at Alameda, Cal.

1960

February 13  France tests the first atomic weapon in the Sahara Desert.

July 1  Holifield Subcommittee presents critical report on shelter policy and post-attack recovery planning.

December 5  Symington Committee, appointed by President-elect John F. Kennedy, recommends sweeping changes in defense organization, including responsibility for civil defense.
January 20  Leo A. Hoegh resigns as Director of OCDM. (For about one week after resignation, John S. Patterson, former Deputy Director, served as Acting Director; then Lewis E. Berry was designated Acting Director and served as such until appointment of new Director.)

February  Frank B. Ellis, prospective OCDM Director reports to President Kennedy on basic organization and programs of OCDM.

March 9  Frank B. Ellis, former Governor of Louisiana, takes oath of office as Director, OCDM.

May 25  President Kennedy, in a special message to the Congress, announced that under authority of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, he was assigning responsibility for civil defense to the top civilian authority already responsible for continental defense, the Secretary of Defense; and that the OCDM would be reconstituted as a small staff agency to assist in the coordination of these functions, under the name of Office of Emergency Planning (later redesignated Office of Emergency Preparedness).

May 31  Bureau of the Budget engages McKinsey and Co. to prepare a study to guide the assignment of responsibilities and functions to the DOD and the proposed new OEP.

July 7  OCDM Director Ellis prepares recommendations for assignment of responsibilities and functions then in OCDM along lines set forth in President's message of May 25, 1961.


July 20  Executive Order 10952, effective August 1, 1961, transfers to the Secretary of Defense certain civil defense functions under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, and retains in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization functions which had formerly been assigned to the Office of Defense Mobilization, along with natural disaster functions under Public Law 875.
President Kennedy addresses Nation, describing threat of war brought on by Berlin Crisis, calling up certain reserve units to cope with threat, and asking Congress for $207 million for group fallout shelters that could save 10 to 15 million Americans who would otherwise perish in a nuclear attack. The President stressed need for civil defense, and ordered a full-scale step-up in efforts to inform and aid the public on methods of protection.

July 31 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announces interim organization of the Office of Civil Defense, effective August 1, 1961, within the Department of Defense; names Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as head of OCD until such time as a qualified successor could be named to assume that responsibility.

August 11 Congress approves $207.6 million shelter program.

August 14 Executive Order 10958 delegates responsibility for civil defense food stockpiles to the Secretary of Agriculture, and for civil defense medical stockpiles to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

August 30 Mr. Steuart L. Pittman named by President Kennedy to be Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense); confirmed by Congress September 15. DoD Directive 5140.1 covered functions of ASD(CD).

August 31 Soviet Union announces resumption of nuclear-bomb testing; a 57-megaton "shot" October 31 the largest ever recorded.

September 17 Civil Defense Committee of the Governors' Conference meets with Secretary of Defense McNamara and Assistant Secretary Pittman to discuss plans for a nationwide survey of fallout shelters.

September 22 Congress approved Public Law 87-296, changing name of OCDM to Office of Emergency Planning.

December 1 Department of Defense announces initiation of National Fallout Shelter Survey (NFSS) to identify, license, mark with distinctive signs, and stock with essential food and other supplies suitable public fallout shelter space in existing structures, mines, caves, and tunnels throughout the United States. Directed by OCD and supervised by Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, work was done under contract by local architect-engineer firms.
December 5  Assistant Secretary of Defense Pittman announces that the former staff of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization which had been transferred to the new Office of Civil Defense would be moved from Battle Creek back to Washington, D.C.

December 14  DOD press release outlines "the next phase" of the President's civil defense program, with emphasis on community shelters.

December 31  OCD issues handbook (H-6), Fallout Production--What to Know and Do About Nuclear Attack. Millions of copies distributed.

1962

February 16  President Kennedy signed various Executive orders assigning to other departments and agencies certain emergency preparedness functions in fields related to their activities:
EO 10997, Secretary of the Interior
EO 10998, Secretary of Agriculture
EO 10999, Secretary of Commerce
EO 11000, Secretary of Labor
EO 11001, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
EO 11002, Postmaster General
EO 11003, Federal Aviation Agency
EO 11004, Housing and Home Finance Administrator
EO 11005, Interstate Commerce Commission

March 2  President Kennedy announces that Soviet progress forces the U.S. to resume above-ground tests of nuclear weapons, unless the Soviet Union agrees to a test-ban treaty; U.S. tests began April 25.

March 12  A DOD National Emergency Alarm Repeater (NEAR) System Industry Advisory Committee established to advise the AS/D (CD).

April 27  Advisory Committee on the Design and Construction of Public Fallout Shelters established to advise the AS/D (CD).

June 13  Civil Defense Advisory Committee on the Medical Self-Help Training Program established to advise the AS/D (CD).

August 15  Memorandum of Understanding between American National Red Cross and the DOD concerning responsibilities in the national fallout survey, marking and stocking program.

September 27  Executive Order 11051 prescribed responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Planning in the Executive Office of the President.
September 28  DOD instructions issued for guidance in implementing established DOD shelter policy at military installations.

October 22-27  Cuban missile crisis. Public media center on crisis and civil-defense related measures. Civil-defense awareness, and particularly the need for shelter in the event of nuclear attack, reached its zenith during the Cuban Missile Crisis. . . . Shelter survey, marking, and stocking accelerated by OCD.

October 30  DOD instructions issued for guidance in marking and stocking fallout shelters within military installations.

1963

January 22  Regional civil defense coordinating boards established to coordinate CD plans and action of all military departments and Federal agencies with State and local CD operations.

February  President signs nine additional Executive orders generally prescribing emergency preparedness functions of the several departments and agencies under all emergency conditions.

February 1  ASD (CD) assigned additional responsibility of coordinating military aid in civil and domestic emergencies.

April 23  Secretary of Defense establishes certain civil defense functions as a mission of the Armed Forces to be performed during emergency conditions involving nuclear attack or preceding such attack.

May 28  A Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services (Edward Hebert, Chairman) begins major hearings on the fallout shelter program and on proposed amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, including authority to subsidize construction of public shelters in new buildings. Hearings concluded August 27, 1963. Amendments passed the House (H.R. 8200), but the Senate did not act.

November 22  President Kennedy assassinated; Lyndon B. Johnson assumes presidency.

1964

March 2  Senate Armed Services Committee shelves H.R. 8200, the House-passed bill to authorize a shelter subsidy program.

March 27  Alaskan Earthquake provides a classic operational exercise, with extensive involvement of civil defense officials and services.
March 31

Mr. Steuart L. Pittman resigned as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense).

April 1

Secretary of Defense transfers all functions assigned to him by EO 10952 to the Secretary of the Army, with authority to re-delegate. (DoD Directive 5160.50, March 31, 1964.)

Concurrently, Secretary of the Army establishes in his immediate office an Office of Civil Defense, headed by a Director of Civil Defense, redelegating to the Director of Civil Defense all functions assigned to the Secretary of the Army by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. William P. Durkee named to serve as Director of Civil Defense; sworn in by Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes on April 7, 1964.

April

Interagency Civil Defense Committee officially established to promote working relationships of Federal agencies pursuing related civil defense objectives.

December


1965

March 29

DOD Directive 3025.10 defines the civil defense roles of the Military Services and the civilian sector. Describes the importance of the civil defense function and its essential character as a part of the national security posture.

November 1

Eastern and Western Instructor Training Centers closed; activities combined with OCD Staff College, Battle Creek, Mich.

1966

October 11

Executive Order 11310 (sponsored by Office of Emergency Planning) assigned emergency preparedness functions to the Attorney General.
December 28  American Association for the Advancement of Science holds symposium on Harbor Study Group recommendations for vast shelter program.

December 31  Mr. William P. Durkee resigns; Mr. Joseph Romm designated Acting Director of Civil Defense, effective January 1, 1967.

1967

August 26  Shelter occupancy test (12th since 1962) conducted by University of Georgia under OCD sponsorship. Tests provided extensive survival data.

1968


May 20  Mr. Joseph Romm named Director of Civil Defense; sworn in May 22.


1969

March 14  President Nixon announces decision to deploy a modified ABM system (Safeguard) for defense against a Soviet first strike, thus "safeguarding" the retaliatory capacity of the U.S. Also orders study of U.S. shelter system to see what could be done to minimize casualties should deterrence fail.

May  President direct OEP to make a study of the civil defense program, with particular emphasis on the status and effectiveness of OCD's fallout shelter program.

May 20  Mr. John E. Davis, former Governor of North Dakota, sworn in as Director of Civil Defense.

May 21  Presidential directive announces adoption of concept of 10 Standard Federal Regions.

October 28  Executive Order 11490 (sponsored by Office of Emergency Preparedness) assigns emergency preparedness functions to various Federal departments and agencies; superseded previous Executive orders on subject.
February 18  President Nixon reports to Congress on "A New Strategy for Peace."

April  President, in message to Congress, suggests careful review of the relationship between Federal disaster assistance and civil defense activities.

October 13  House Armed Services Committee starts hearings for a general review of developments in the civil defense program since 1963.

December 31  Disaster Relief Act of 1970 revised; Federal programs for relief from the effects of major disasters extended.

1971

March  Otto L. Nelson, Jr. submits report of inter-agency study of alternative organizational arrangements for dealing with disaster assistance and civil defense responsibilities.

October  General Accounting Office issues a critical study of the activities and status of civil defense in the U.S.

December 9  In letter to Secretary of the Army Robert A. Proehlke, OEP Director George A. Lincoln outlines plans for OCD participation in disaster operations.

December 23  OEP circular 4000.10A sets forth guidance to Federal departments and agencies regarding the President's Disaster Assistance Program.

1972

January  OCD task force starts work on planning for population relocation in periods of increased threat.

January 5  OCD Director John E. Davis replies to December 9, 1971, letter from OEP Director Lincoln; agrees to plan proposed in letter to the Secretary of the Army.

February 18  Lincoln writes to Davis in furtherance of proposal discussed in previous correspondence; encloses a paper setting out "Policies and Procedures for Performance of Civil Defense Related to Local Government Preparations for Major Disasters."

March 8  Director Davis acknowledges assignments made to OCD in paper forwarded by OEP Director with letter of February 18, 1972; assures full cooperation with OEP in carrying out mutual responsibilities.
April 10  OEP submits to Congress a comprehensive, 3-volume report, *Disaster Preparedness*, which analyzed the causes and effects of natural disasters and offers findings and potential solutions to prevent or minimize loss of life and damage to property.


July 14  Defense Department directive (No. 5105.43) details DCPA responsibilities for both civil defense and natural disaster preparedness.

August 14  Presidential guidance with respect to U.S. civil defense policy. Directs increased emphasis on dual-use plans, procedures and preparedness within the limitations of existing authority, including appropriate related improvements in crisis management planning.

November  Presidential policy that CD program should be continued at then-current level of effort, and should increase emphasis on preparedness activities applicable to peacetime as well as attack emergencies.

1973


January 1  OEP Director Lincoln forwards to Senate a report on the disaster program prepared by a Disaster Study Task Force which he and Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, headed.

February 1 Two DCPA Regional Field Offices established in New York and Kansas City (Mo.) in attempt to provide interface with two of the 10 standard Federal Regions.

June 27 Executive Order 11725, effective July 1, 1973, transferred functions of the Office of Emergency Preparedness to HUD, Treasury, and GSA. All delegations previously issued by President to OEP were to remain in effect until superseded or canceled by succeeding agencies.

July As authorized by Executive Order 11725:

(a) Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) established by Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to administer natural disaster functions.

(b) Office of Preparedness (OP) established by Administrator, General Services Administration, to develop and coordinate civil preparedness policies and plans. (Note: Effective July 1, 1975, name of Office of Preparedness changed to Federal Preparedness Agency.)

1974

January First issue of FORESIGHT, a bimonthly news magazine, published by DCPA; served as a forum for exchange of information on preparedness for all types of emergency situations.

March 4 Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger begins emphasis on the need for crisis relocation capabilities.

April 4 Office of Management and Budget formally established 10 Standard Federal Regions with uniform regional boundaries and common regional office headquarters locations.

July 1 Transfer of National Civil Defense Computer Support Agency from Corps of Engineers to DCPA; DCPA Computer Center established at Olney, Md.

November 6 Statement of Understanding between FDAA and DCPA; continues assignments previously made by OEP to OCD. Programs for which they were individually responsible to be conducted with the greatest possible mutual benefit and with continuing emphasis on the dual use nature of emergency plans, procedures and preparedness programs developed by the States and local governments.
1975

January  
Defense Secretary Schlesinger, in article in *Foresight* (January-February issue), stresses role of civil defense in the total national security effort; urges support at all levels.

March 18  
President Ford, in letter to President of U.S. Civil Defense Council, voices satisfaction in dual-use concept of civil defense planning.

July 1  
Office of Preparedness in GSA renamed the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA).

September  
Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee issues report analyzing the effects of limited nuclear war; holds hearings on the subject.

November  
Defense Department policy for DCPA to plan on "surging" or build-up in crisis for effective capability; also stresses crisis relocation and protection of the population against fallout.

November 2  
President Ford dismisses Defense Secretary Schlesinger, who pressed for increased spending for defense (including civil defense).

December 24  

1976

January  
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, in report to Congress, indicates that with the reduced budget request for fiscal 1977, civil defense funding and efforts would be limited to nuclear disaster preparedness.

February-March  
The Civil Defense Panel of the House Armed Services Committee's Investigations Subcommittee holds hearings on civil defense.

March 30  
Representative Brinkley (D. Ga.) introduces H.R. 12899 to allow Federal civil defense funds to be used by local agencies for natural disaster relief/peacetime disaster preparedness and relief. This bill and identical bills obtained over 50 co-sponsors in the 94th Congress.
April 1  House Committee on Armed Services releases Civil Defense Review, recommending increased spending on fallout shelters, better coordination among emergency preparedness agencies, and study by the National Security Council of the strategic significance of civil defense.

April 28  Joint Committee on Defense Production holds hearings on civil preparedness and limited nuclear war.


June 28-30  Joint Committee on Defense Production holds hearings on Federal, State and local emergency preparedness.


September 17  Defense Department guidance to DCPA that Public Law 94-361 authorizes preparedness-type assistance to State and local governments where this would benefit both Defense Department and State and local preparedness programs.

October 28  Dr. William K. Chipman presents DCPA staff study on the current status of the civil defense program.

November 17  Joint Committee on Defense Production holds hearings on industrial preparedness and survival in nuclear war.

December  Defense Department recommends that the U.S. adopt, as its civil defense objective, enhancing postattack survival and recovery and focus on developing a "one-week surge" program, including a capability for crisis relocation coupled with a capability for nationwide fallout protection.

December 31  Decision by President Ford to restrict DCPA's support of all-risk preparedness at the State and local levels despite the enactment of Public Law 94-361.

January 3  Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., retired Air Force Chief of Intelligence, in interview with New York Times, indicates belief that the Soviet Union has achieved military superiority over the U.S.
January 17 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld outlines fiscal 1978 program for civil defense, with provision for surge capability for crisis relocation and for fallout protection in-place and at relocation sites. Federal assistance to State and local governments for emergency preparedness may include activities relating to readiness to deal with peacetime disasters when the facts demonstrate that such assistance benefits both attack and peacetime preparedness objectives.

January 28 In response to a letter from Senator Proxmire, the Joint Chiefs of Staff refute General Keegan's claims that the U.S.S.R. has achieved military superiority over the United States in part through expanded passive defenses.

February 25 President Carter calls on Executive departments and agencies for genuine and timely consultation with State and local representatives in any major policy, budget or reorganization proposal which has significant State and local impact.

March President Carter indicates agreement with the Soviets, in the context of SALT, to discuss areas of possible future agreements, including foregoing major efforts in civil defense.

April 1 Senators Proxmire and Percy introduces "Federal Emergency Assistance and Preparedness Administration Act of 1977" (S. 1209) for the purpose of reorganizing the executive branch of the government by consolidation of functions and to increase efficiency and coordination in the area of disaster assistance, emergency preparedness, mobilization readiness and programs.


May 16 DCPA Director Bardyl R. Tirana enters into agreement with representatives of State and local governments to implement the Congressional intent (Public Law 94-361) to apply civil defense systems to preparedness for both nuclear attack and peacetime disasters at the State and local levels.

May 20 Tirana writes to Members of Congress, Governors and State and local civil defense directors announcing the policy to implement the "dual-use" authority prescribed by Public Law 94-361.
August 8  GAO report to Congress is highly critical of civil defense program.

August 25  President Carter directs his Reorganization Project staff at OMB to carry out a comprehensive study of the Federal Government's role in preparing for and responding to natural, accidental, and wartime civil disasters.

November  Defense Department completes study on civil defense, presenting cost and effectiveness of different programs and suggesting crisis relocation planning as a reasonable option for enhanced population survival.

December 20  Defense Secretary Harold Brown approves option (D) contemplating substantial boost in civil defense funding.

1978

April  Defense Secretary Brown recommends to President Carter a program for enhancing U.S. civil defense posture with an expenditure of $2 billion over a seven-year period.

June 19  White House announces President's Carter's proposed reorganization of the Federal Government's emergency preparedness and disaster response programs. The reorganization provides for the consolidation of five existing agencies and six additional disaster-related responsibilities into a single structure.


June 20-21  Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs holds hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.

June 26 and 29  Subcommittee of House Committee on Government Operations holds hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.

July 1  Central Intelligence Agency report, Soviet Civil Defense, stirs debate in effectiveness of U.S. and Soviet civil defense.

August 21  House Committee on Government Operations submits report on Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.

August 23  Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs submits report on Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.

September 14  House rejects resolution of disapproval (H.Res. 1242) of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 16</td>
<td>Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 goes into effect.</td>
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<td>September 29</td>
<td>Presidential Decision (PD) 41 enunciates new policies for U.S. civil defense; PD 41 based on interagency study conducted in 1977-78 by the National Security Council (PRM-32).</td>
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<td>December 1</td>
<td>President Carter, in press interview, denies that he had approved a $2-billion civil defense program.</td>
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**1979**

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<td>January</td>
<td>Carter budget message accepts OMB recommendation to raise DCPA budget to $109 million for fiscal 1980, rather than the $140 million proposed by Defense Secretary Brown. Congress set the mark at $100 million.</td>
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<td>January 8</td>
<td>Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, chaired by Senator Proxmire, holds hearings on civil defense; opposing views aired on relationship between civil defense and the strategic balance.</td>
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<td>Professor Samuel P. Huntington, Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, testified before the Proxmire Committee in support of an enhanced civil defense program based on crisis relocation.</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee report calls for continuing and close relationship between the Director of FEMA and the Secretary of Defense &quot;to ensure that civil defense programs are developed in full coordination with military needs and with overall national security policy.&quot;</td>
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<td>May 3</td>
<td>White House release announces appointment of John W. Macy, Jr., as Director of FEMA.</td>
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<td>July 13</td>
<td>Dr. William K. Chipman presents the issues in civil defense anticipated in the 1980s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>Executive Order 12148 effects transfer of responsibility for U.S. civil defense functions from the Secretary of Defense to the Director of FEMA; assigns a civil defense policy and program &quot;oversight&quot; function to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1</td>
<td>FEMA Director John W. Macy, Jr., approves headquarters organization of the new agency.</td>
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December 3  Dr. William K. Chipman details the ingredients of an enhanced civil defense program to implement PD 41 policies.

December 21 Dr. William K. Chipman reports for the Defense Department on portions of proposed FY 1981 FEMA budget relating to civil defense.

1980

April  FEMA Director Macy outlines to the Congress the agency's plans to accelerate the development of relocation and supporting capabilities for the population in "counterforce" areas; also emphasizes enhancement of multiple use of resources in planning for, and responding to emergencies at all levels of government.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The underlying sources bearing on civil defense over the past sixty years, and particularly since the end of World War II, are of massive proportions. Agency and Congressional materials were the principal sources of information for this history. Virtually all of these materials are unclassified; they can be found in any of the larger public and university libraries that serve as repositories of Federal documents. Along with pertinent U.S. Federal documents, the reader will find below a listing of several guides to sources and of a wide array of books, studies, articles, and unpublished doctoral dissertations and other manuscript materials. A number of the secondary sources cited are polemic in nature, but all help to provide valuable insights and background information on the history of American civil defense.

Bibliographical Guides

Over the years, researchers and bibliographers have compiled guides to the literature on civil defense, some classified by subject and annotated. Among these are the following:


Reports, Studies, and Other Documents of Federal Agencies


Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. DCPA documentation includes:

- Annual Reports, 1972-75.
- Information Bulletins.
  - Statements by DCPA Directors at Congressional hearings, cited in text.
  - *Foresight,* a bi-monthly magazine which served as a forum for the exchange of information on preparedness for all types of emergency situations.

Office of Civil Defense. OCD documentation includes:

- Annual Reports, 1962-71. Provide specific information on various aspects of the civil defense program. Appendixes often include texts of basic documents.
- Annual Statistical Reports.
- *Federal Civil Defense Guide,* 1965. A major source of information prepared for guidance of State and local civil defense personnel. Along with basic documentation, the Guide includes useful summaries of the background, direction, and scope of OCD programs in the sixties.
- OCD Instructions and Manuals. OCD documents for guidance of national and regional personnel on various aspects of the program.
- Excerpts from Congressional testimony on civil defense, 1965-68.
- Selected Statistics on the Fallout Shelter Program. Monthly progress reports.

Information Bulletins.

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U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration. FCDA documentation includes:

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- *Hearings on Military Posture* ... (1962--). Include testimony on civil defense.


- Hearings, Civil Defense, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958. The McKinsey & Co. report (cited below) is reproduced as an exhibit to these hearings.
- Hearings, Civil Defense, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960. Three-part hearings review the status of shelter construction under the National Shelter Policy, planning for post-attack operations, and civil defense implications of missile base location and hardening programs.


_____. The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957; also Summary Analysis of Hearings.

_____. Hearings, Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959; also Summary Analysis of Hearings.


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