DEMOGRAPHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY,

by

Neil F. Hasson

Dec, 1980

Thesis Advisor: Jiri Valenta

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Demographic trends; Soviet ethnic minorities; manpower management; regional investment; Central Asian outmigration; Soviet Armed Forces; nationality policy; linguistic inadequacies.

This thesis examines the economic, political, and military implications of rapidly changing demographic trends in the Soviet Union, with particular emphasis upon manpower issues. The analysis offers a number of forecasts concerning the likely direction of future military and economic policy in the training and utilization of Soviet manpower resources. The hypothesis offered is that demographic variables will act to reduce the quality, effectiveness, reliability, and motivation of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Although reductions in the size of the military force are not forecasted, demographic realities will impose formidable constraints upon any attempts at force expansion for the remainder of the century. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of national security considerations for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
DEMOGRAPHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

by

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Captain, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1976
M.B.A., Pepperdine University, 1979

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1980

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Approved by:

Thesis Advisor

Second Reader

Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the economic, political, and military implications of rapidly changing demographic trends in the Soviet Union, with particular emphasis upon manpower issues. The analysis offers a number of forecasts concerning the likely direction of future military and economic policy in the training and utilization of Soviet manpower resources. The hypothesis offered is that demographic variables will act to reduce the quality, effectiveness, reliability, and motivation of the Soviet Armed Forces. Although reductions in the size of the military force are not forecasted, demographic realities will impose formidable constraints upon any attempts at force expansion for the remainder of the century. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of national security considerations for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The challenges facing the Soviet leadership in the remaining decades of this century will be enormous and will surely test the mettle of the Soviet political system. Increasing economic difficulties accompanied, for the first time, by short term inadequacies in oil production will limit what once seemed an endless reserve of investment capital. Traditionally, massive annual inputs of capital and labor have resulted in enviable economic growth; but these sources are drying up and productivity has failed to keep pace. Economic stagnation in the very near future is a distinct possibility.

The operation of demographic variables in the years since World War II has created a situation in which the Slavic nationalities are declining relative to the burgeoning Moslem populations of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Western republics are aging and will suffer an absolute decline in the size of the able-bodied cohorts, while the population of the "Southern Tier" shows strong demographic growth. By the year 2000, one out of every four Soviet citizens will be a Central Asian of Turko-Moslem origin, with the proportion substantially higher in the younger age groups. The continued resistance of these peoples to linguistic and cultural assimilation, migration from traditional homelands, and "Sovietization" bears enormous implications for the future of this multi-ethnic empire.

This paper will examine the economic, political, and military implications of these demographic trends, with particular emphasis upon
manpower issues. The analysis offers a number of forecasts concerning the likely direction of future military and economic policy in the training and utilization of Soviet manpower resources. The hypothesis offered is that demographic variables will act to reduce the quality, effectiveness, reliability, and motivation of the Soviet Armed Forces. Although reductions in the size of the military force are not forecasted, demographic realities will impose formidable constraints upon any attempts at force expansion for the remainder of the century.

This analysis focuses upon demographic variables because they will serve as the basic source of future economic and military strength. In numerous sectors, the demographic situation will provide constraints which absolutely limit the level of success which government programs can hope to attain. Although demographics are not likely to dictate military or foreign policy, demographic considerations will impose severe constraints which effectively limit the range of viable alternatives. It is with this consideration in mind that the author approaches the study of demographic trends and the Soviet Armed Forces.
II. DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

A. DEMOGRAPHICS

L. M. Volodarsky, Doctor of Economics and Director of the U.S.S.R. Central Statistical Administration, reported in the February 1980 edition of Economycheskaya gazeta that "There are 265 million of us," reflecting the fact that as of 1 January 1980 the population of the Soviet Union had exceeded 264.5 million. The Director goes on to note the proud achievements of the socialist state in raising the percentage of individuals employed in the national economy and in maintaining progress toward increased urbanization and universal education.¹ In discussing population structure and growth, however, Volodarsky fails to mention the degree to which the Soviet population of 1980 is the product of the violent demographic history of the young socialist state and the result of well recognized demographic processes occurring in virtually all modern, developed nations. In many respects, the demographic status of the Soviet Union is remarkably similar to that of the United States and Western Europe; while in other respects, the Soviet population is unique among the populations of the world. To understand fully the structure and activity of Soviet population and population growth, it becomes necessary to study both the impact of

historical events and the operation of the various socioeconomic variables which determine present and future growth.

Table 1-1 provides a compendium of estimated and projected population pyramids for the Russian Empire/Soviet Union during the period 1897 to 2000. The 1897 pyramid demonstrates the well balanced age-sex ratio with which the Russian Empire started the 20th Century. The pyramid which emerged by 1959, however, was severely distorted, representing the demographic impact of World War I, the Civil War and famine of the 1920's, the pre-war collectivization, the purges of the late 1930's, and the heavy losses of World War II. 2 It has been estimated that in the period 1914 to 1921 alone, the total of severe population losses inflicted upon the Soviet Union through war, revolution, emigration, and famine was 26 million. 3 The pyramids for 1970 and 2000 demonstrate the decline in birth rates which first developed in the 1960's as a result of urbanization, increases in the standard of living, and the substantial participation of women in the national economy.


TABLE 1-1

POPULATION PYRAMIDS, 1897-2000
(millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued on next page)
Table 1-2 provides an explanatory breakout of Soviet population growth in the 20th century. Most noticeable is the absolute decline in population as a result of World War II, which occurred in spite of substantial territorial expansion that tended to reduce somewhat the demographic impact of the loss of 7 million soldiers and 13 million civilians. The period 1950 to 1959 was characterized in the Soviet Union, as in Western industrialized nations, by an uncharacteristic rise in the birth rate and strong demographic growth. The chart clearly demonstrates the decline in birth rate which followed in the current period (1959-1979).

In many respects, the census results for 1970 were shocking to the Soviet leadership. The census indicated a clear reversal in the earlier trends toward rapid population growth and Russian demographic strength, touching off a national debate on regional economic and nationality policies which is still active at the current time. The gravest concerns were the apparent decline in the rate of birth and natural increase, and the clear trend toward massive regional disparities unfavorable to the Slavic nationalities. It also became apparent that these trends would accelerate, forecasting serious dislocations in the decades ahead. These trends, combined with the presence of emerging cultural and nationalistic sentiments, carry important consequences for the maintenance of future economic and military strength.

---

Table 1-2 was constructed utilizing data from the preliminary results of the 1979 census; in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 31, No. 16, p. 1 and d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 49.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Characteristics of the period</th>
<th>Population at end of period in millions</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897-1926</td>
<td>Russo-Japanese War</td>
<td>167.7</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1939</td>
<td>Collectivization</td>
<td>193.1</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-1950</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>181.7</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>Continuation of Reconstruction</td>
<td>208.8</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1970</td>
<td>Period of Complete Peace</td>
<td>241.7</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>Period of Complete Peace</td>
<td>262.4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1-3 visualizes birth rate trends in the Soviet Union since 1950, projecting beyond the current period to the year 2000. The rapid decline in the natural increase per 1000 population is alarming and results in a rate of population growth which in the year 2000 is only about one-third the rate experienced at mid century. The clear implication of this trend is that the Soviet Union, which is already experiencing shortages of personnel to maintain an adequate supply of labor, will suffer even further demographic dislocations, reducing the probability of sufficient labor resources to maintain economic growth (in the absence of uncharacteristic gains in productivity).

The decline of natural increase is clearly the result of two contributing trends: a falling birth rate and a rising death rate. The decreased rate of births per 1000 population first reached noticeable proportions in the 1960's. As in other developed nations, the decline is partially explained by the increased urbanization of society and an increased standard of living. In urban societies, shortages in living space and the desire for an increasing quality of life tend to reduce the size of family which is desired by couples in the fertile age cohorts. Urbanization is also correlated with rising educational standards characterized by increased participation of females in the work force and less traditional attitudes regarding family planning, abortion, birth control, etc. The Soviet Union has experienced a

5Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 122.
TABLE 1-3

VITAL RATES FOR THE U.S.S.R.
1950 - 2000
(Per 1000 Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
phenomenal rate of industrialization and urbanization transforming
a 67% rural society in 1940 into a modern society which is 62%
urban and 38% rural. ⁶ As a leading Soviet economist and demo-
grapher has recently pointed out, the forces affecting the birthrate
have been assisted by the removal of all restrictions on the avail-
ability of contraceptives and abortions in the country, as well as
a widespread acceptance of family planning and divorce. ⁷ Another
factor affecting fertility which is peculiar to the Soviet Union and
other socialist states is the large percentage of women employed
in the national economy. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
reports that nearly 90% of all women in the ages 16-54 are partici-
pating in the labor force on a regular basis. ⁸ (50% in U.S.)

The Soviet leadership has instituted a number of policies designed
to stimulate the birthrate such as increasing the number of day-care
facilities, providing "aid for children" payments of 12 rubles per
child per month to low income families, partially paying a woman's
salary during a period of one years maternity leave, and granting
titles such as "Heroine Mother" for mothers of large families. ⁹

⁶ U.S.S.R., Central Statistical Administration, "Preliminary
Results of the 1979 Census," Pravda, April 22, 1979, p. 4. in Current

⁷ L. Y. Darsky, "Social and Demographic Research Problems of
the Birthrate," in Sotsiologicheskiye issledovania, No. 3, July-Sep
1979, p. 10. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 31, No. 35,
p. 1.

⁸ Admiral Turner, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and

⁹ Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 122.
It is unlikely that these incentives will provide substantial input into the stream of births, and the leadership must be careful that such policies do not result in short-term labor force reductions. Also impacting upon the overall birthrate is a recent increase in the rate of infant mortality. From 1971 to 1974, there has been an unexpected, yet significant, rise in infant mortality from a figure of 22.9 in 1971 to 27.9 deaths per 1000 live births by the end of the period. This increase has yet to be explained and it is not clear if it is a temporary condition or an indication of a long term trend. Grossman indicates that overall fertility will remain somewhat stable while the number of females in the prime childbearing ages will decline as a share of the total population. This represents the conclusion that a fairly small percentage of the female population will have numerous children while the remainder will choose to have few or none. This trend takes on added significance when viewed in a regional perspective.

The rapid rise in the death rate which will contribute substantially to a declining rate of natural increase is largely a function of a shift in the age structure toward the older age groups. The aging of the population will affect the crude death rate despite the achievement of acceptable life expectancies. This substantially eliminates the achievement of increased population growth through increased life

10 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 116.


12 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 116.
expectancies as the figures in this area seem to have peaked. The rising number of deaths is taking a particularly heavy toll on the older male population. In the Soviet Union, there is a difference of 10 years in the life expectancies of males and females: 64 and 74 years respectively. In only one other country of the world is the known difference reported to be this high (Ghana). It would appear that more research is needed before substantive conclusions can be offered concerning the cause of the low male life expectancies. In addition to the lingering effects of World War II other explanations might include widespread alcoholism, poor safety environment in mining and heavy industry, and casualties during military training. Table 1-4 provides the data concerning the age distribution of the Soviet population since 1950 and projected until 2000.

### Table 1-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-15 years</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-59/54 years+</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/55 years and older+</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Reflects the difference in retirement age for men and women

---

13. Ibid.

As a whole then, the Soviet population can be described as an aging population subject to rapidly decreasing rates of growth over the next 20 years. Furthermore, there appear to be few available alternatives to halt the current trends, as they are based primarily upon complex variables which have either been determined in the past or which function in processes that are substantially independent of government legislation. In this respect alone, however, the experience of the Soviet Union will not be vastly different from that of the United States and Western Europe. It is only when demographic variables are viewed in a regional perspective that Soviet population problems take on a particularly distinctive character. The regional disparities are most notable in the areas of birthrate and migratory pattern; although cultural, linguistic, and educational differences abound.

For the purpose of demographic analysis, the nationalities of the Soviet Union may be roughly divided into two groups: the "Soviet" Europeans of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics; and the Turko-Moslem nationalities of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Caucasus. The regional distribution of the various nationalities, the current and projected patterns of migration, the birthrate disparities, and the degree of cultural/linguistic assimilation of the non-Slavic elements combine to portray the image of a rapidly changing society of a multiethnic character. In the discussion which follows, the quantitative issues will be discussed first, followed by an examination of cultural-linguistic considerations; for although Russians, Ukrainians, and other European nationalities may be grouped together by birthrate trends and historical patterns of migration, nationality differences and cultural disparities require that each be considered separately.
The Slavic nationalities of Russia (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukraine, and Belorussia comprise the vast majority of the population and have historically demonstrated acceptable patterns of demographic growth. However, the 1970 census indicated that the previous balance between Slavs and non-Slavic nationalities was in a state of rapid flux, with birthrates and increased population growth shifting markedly in favor of the non-Slavic elements. Table 1-5 lists the percentage composition of Soviet ethnic groups from 1897-1970.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turko-Moslems</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The western portion of the U.S.S.R. appears as a highly homogeneous, but demographically declining region. Characteristics of the nationalities inhabiting European-Russia are: Low and declining birthrates, a high degree of urbanization, and a propensity to migrate to other portions of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the non-Slavic regions

---

15 D'Encausse, op. cit., p. 58.
of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Caucasus demonstrate a roughly similar degree of homogeneity (predominantly Turko-Moslem), but are best characterized by a resistance to both urbanization and migration. In addition, the implementation of a federal structure along nationality lines has resulted in most republics maintaining a predominate portion of the indigenous nationality. Table 1-6 provides the ethnic breakout by republic. 16

The massive disparity between the birthrates of European-Russia and the indigenous nationalities of Central Asia is best illustrated by the fact that in 1975 the population of the R.S.F.S.R. grew only 5.9 per 1000 while that of Uzbekistan increased by 27.3 per 1000 population. 17 Similar disparities are noted throughout Central Asia and to some degree in the Caucasus as illustrated in Table 1-7. 18 Thus, the national increase for the regions of Central Asia, despite gradual reductions in crude birthrates, will continue at the rate of two-and-one-half times the national rate for Kazakhstan and the Caucasus while the figure jumps to 5 times the national average for the Core Central Asian republics. 19


17 M. Rywkin, Central Asia and Soviet Manpower, "Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb. 1979, p. 3.

18 Modified from: Murray Feshbach, "Prospects For Outmigration . . .," p.674.

19 Feshbach and Rapaway, op.cit., p.122.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Belorussians</th>
<th>Turko-Moslems</th>
<th>Tatars</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.S.F.S.R.</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian SSR</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan SSR</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz SSR</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik SSR</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenian SSR</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- not available
### TABLE 1-7A

**CRUDE BIRTH RATES IN SELECTED REPUBLICS 1960 - 1977**  
(Per 1000 Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kirghizia</th>
<th>Tadzhikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Azerbaidzhan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1-7B

**GROSS REPRODUCTION RATES OF SELECTED REPUBLICS 1959 and 1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>1958/59</th>
<th>1976/77</th>
<th>Index of Change 1958/59 = 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>127.6</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>216.9</td>
<td>156.8</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia</td>
<td>208.9</td>
<td>233.4</td>
<td>111.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>190.8</td>
<td>300.6</td>
<td>157.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenia</td>
<td>249.0</td>
<td>276.6</td>
<td>111.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>245.1</td>
<td>267.5</td>
<td>109.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>243.2</td>
<td>186.5</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These regional differentials will linger throughout the remainder of the century and will significantly affect the balance of minorities in the labor force and the military.

Information published in the preliminary census for 1979 shows that the impact of nationality on birthrate considerably outweighs that of territory, and that the effect of the Russian and Slavic populations in Central Asia has been a minor diminution of the birthrate (see Table 1-8). Also, research conducted by Helen Carrere d'Encausse shows that urbanization, education, and higher income, have had little impact upon the Central Asian birthrates. For example, a rise in urbanization in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaidzhan has done little to offset high birthrates. Lithuania, by comparison, has a similar urbanization rate with a corresponding decrease in the birthrate. Turkmenia, demonstrates a much higher rate of urbanization than the other Moslem republics, and yet, its population shows the same high level of births. Belorussia is much less urbanized, yet the birthrate is markedly low. Table 1-9 shows that family size and the average number of births per woman are only marginally affected by changes in income. The cumulative impact of the above is that the traditional variables of urbanization, income, and education which generally affect Western birthrates will have very little effect in diminishing Central Asian birthrates.

20 Darsky, op. cit., p. 1.
21 d'Encausse, op. cit., Chapter II.
22 ibid., p. 58.
23 ibid., p. 80.
### TABLE 1-8

**BIRTHRATES IN THE UNION REPUBLICS: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO AND EXPECTED BY MARRIED WOMEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavian</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkemenian</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1-9

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF BIRTHS PER WOMEN BY INCOME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Family Income (rubles)</th>
<th>Western Blue &amp; White Collar Workers</th>
<th>Republics (Kolkhoz &amp; Sovkhoz workers)</th>
<th>Moslem Republics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150 or less</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211-300</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>451-600</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601-900</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>901 or over</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This leads one to the conclusion that Central Asian birthrates are a product of cultural factors peculiar to the Turko-Moslems which stress the dominant role of the male and a smaller representation of the female population in the work force.

The consequence of the present birthrate trend is that by the 1980's, the rapidly growing population of Central Asia will provide the major increments to the working age population and will most likely serve to offset net declines (retirements and deaths minus increments) in the Western portions of the U.S.S.R. Recent Soviet sources, as reported by Michael Rywkin, estimate that Soviet Central Asia now accounts for 30% of all Soviet population growth and that by the year 2000 Central Asia will account for 50% of the total population growth. For a number of subjective and scientific reasons, it also appears that little or nothing can be done to affect these trends in the short or long term. Firstly, the cultural variables impacting upon Central Asian birthrates have shown a high degree of resilience in the face of Soviet efforts to discredit traditional values and practices as "remnants of feudalism." Secondly, nearly 50% of the Central Asian population is in the lowest age brackets indicating that birth control measures cannot significantly reverse the Moslem population explosion before the 1900's. Thus, by the year 2000, one in four Soviet citizens will be

24 Rywkin, p. 3.
25 ibid.
26 ibid., p. 5.
Central Asian with the proportions in the younger age brackets being substantially higher. Table 1-10 provides estimated and projected populations by republic for the period 1950-2000. Table 1-11, from the 1979 census preliminary report, lists population growth by republic for the period 1970-1979.

Historical differences in the pattern of inter-regional migration and urban-rural migration will also impact heavily upon the demographic structure in the years ahead. It has already been shown (Table 1-6) that the Russian and, to a much lesser extent, other Slavic nationalities have exhibited a strong tendency toward inter-regional migration, as demonstrated by the fact that in none of the Central Asian republics is the percentage representation of Russians less than 10%. Table 1-10 demonstrates that by 1990, the rapid growth of the Central Asian population will drive the Russian representation in the total U.S.S.R. population below 50%. If the Russian pattern of migration continues as in the past, it will result in a "spreading" of the Russian nationalities throughout the U.S.S.R. with the Russian representation declining relative to the indigenous nationalities. The Central Asians, on the other hand, have been very resistant to inter-regional migration resulting in a situation whereby the increasing Moslem populations will remain concentrated in the republics of Soviet Central Asia. This


28 d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 89.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. S. R.</td>
<td>180,075</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>214,329</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>242,756</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. S. F. S. R.</td>
<td>102,691</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>119,906</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>138,910</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>17,499</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>24,402</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>33,187</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>6,628</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9,850</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13,116</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,712</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,968</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,943</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenia</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>6,383</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8,704</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11,970</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>7,777</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9,921</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>12,393</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2,896</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3,894</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5,566</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4,709</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1-11

POPULATION
(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>241,720</td>
<td>262,442</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Republic</td>
<td>130,079</td>
<td>137,552</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine Republic</td>
<td>47,126</td>
<td>49,757</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian Republic</td>
<td>9,002</td>
<td>9,559</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek Republic</td>
<td>11,799</td>
<td>15,391</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh Republic</td>
<td>13,009</td>
<td>14,685</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian Republic</td>
<td>4,686</td>
<td>5,016</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan Republic</td>
<td>5,117</td>
<td>6,028</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian Republic</td>
<td>3,128</td>
<td>3,399</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavian Republic</td>
<td>3,569</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian Republic</td>
<td>2,364</td>
<td>2,521</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz Republic</td>
<td>2,934</td>
<td>3,529</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik Republic</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>3,801</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Republic</td>
<td>2,492</td>
<td>3,031</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenian Republic</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>2,759</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Republic</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population growth in most of the Union republics was due largely to natural increase.
resistance to migration has been attributed to traditional attachments to the native village, a weak knowledge of the Russian language, peculiarities of the local cultural and religious traditions, and insufficient industrial skill levels to compete with Europeans. Thus, by the mid-1970's only 3% of the Kazakhs and less than 1% of the other Central Asian nationalities lived in portions of the R.S.F.S.R. with the exception of fringe or border regions. Similarly, rural to urban migration has proceeded at a gradual pace relative to the European republics of the U.S.S.R. This resistance to urban migration occurred at a time of significant industrial investment in Central Asia and has resulted in industrial labor shortages in Central Asian cities despite an abundance of manpower resources. Table 1-12 shows the progress of rural to urban migration by republic from 1959-1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RURAL POPULATION AS A % OF REPUBLIC POPULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 - 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baltic Republics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.S.F.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transcaucasian Rep.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cumulative impact of current birthrate trends and migratory patterns will be to reverse the earlier trends toward Russian demographic strength and a rising proportion of Russians and other Slavic

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30 Rywkin, op. cit., p. 7.
31 ibid., p. 3.
**Table 1-13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities Declining in Their Own Republics</th>
<th>Nationalities Increasing in Their Own Republics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESTONIANS -6.4%</td>
<td>ARMENIANS +0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIANS -3.2%</td>
<td>LITHUANIANS +0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKRAINIANS -1.9%</td>
<td>GEORGIANS +2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLDAVIANS -0.8%</td>
<td>KAZAKHS +2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIANS -0.5%</td>
<td>TADZHIKS +3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELORUSSIANS -0.1%</td>
<td>KIRGHIZ +3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UZBEKS +3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TURKMENIANS +4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AZERIS +6.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nationalities in the outlying republics. This trend will be replaced by one in which the representation of Russian, Slavic, and European nationalities will decline, not only in the outlying republics, but in their own republics as well. Table 1-13 demonstrates this trend.33

Thus, the industrial Western regions of the U.S.S.R. can expect to suffer substantial manpower shortages for the maintenance of economic growth, while a vast pool of poorly utilized, underemployed minority nationalities will grow and remain concentrated in the "Southern Tier."

However, the implications of what appear to be distinctly unfavorable demographic trends do not necessarily raise crucial issues for the central leadership if the minority nationalities can be effectively assimilated into a "Soviet" society. Success in the area of assimilation and "Russification" could result in a Central Asian population with educational, technical, ideological, and linguistic capabilities enabling them to contribute to the future economic and social development of the U.S.S.R. The section which follows will discuss nationality policies and issues in the U.S.S.R. and will evaluate the success of Central Asian (and other minority) assimilation. For it is the degree to which the "Southern Tier" can be assimilated into the Soviet culture that will determine the advantages or disadvantages of its demographic strength.

33 d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 75.
B. NATIONALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

"As a preschooler he was an Octobrist; then he proudly wore the red neckerchief of the Pioneers and learned the rudiments of socialist morality and behavior... And now, having come of age, this citizen, in whom the regime has invested so much, spontaneously rediscovers, the authority of the Father and the Elders, the disparaged traditions, the pre-eminent solidarity of the national cultural group from which he sprang. (d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire)

This passage provides a clear explanation of what many scholars refer to as the distinct failure of the Soviet policy of minority assimilation. Inheriting a multi-ethnic empire from his Czarist predecessors, it became Lenin's task and that of his successors to somehow assimilate or control the indigenous nationalities of the borderlands. The vulnerability of the Czarist regime in World War I was greatly multiplied by its vulnerability in the borderlands. It would appear that in the 60 years which have followed the Soviet Union has done much to transform society, and yet, the nationality impasse and the insecurities which accompany it remain. 34

It can be said that the nationality policy envisioned by Lenin can be divided into a two phase process. In the first phase, the complete autonomy and integrity of the individual nations would be allowed to flourish, enabling the borderlands to apply and exhaust their national aspirations through self determination. This phase would be followed

34 Helene d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 274.
by a second in which national differences would disappear with all nationalities blending into a new, "Soviet" people.  

Rashidov, the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, describes the process in these words:

"The Program contained the first scientific formulation of the principles of a ruling Communist Party's nationalities policy. These principles included: self determination and the complete equality of nation; the voluntary political, military, and economic alliance of peoples who have embarked on a socialist path of development; the guaranteeing of their actual equality in all fields of life on the basis of fraternal mutual assistance and all-round cooperation; the combination of international and All-Union interests with national interests; and the flourishing and drawing together of socialist nations."  

Thus, a federal system was established within which the individual nations were urged to develop and assert their political and cultural demands, and over the years, conditions were established (urbanization, education, industrialization) in which integration should have taken place. However, rather than exhibiting a collective choice to merge with the socialist center, the behavior of the Central Asian peoples reflects a desire to maintain and protect a distinctly national identity. It may be that the very federal system designed to promote the initiation of the second phase has resulted in concentrated, homogeneous national bodies which have maintained their cultural heritage and have utilized the Leninist system as a focus for the articulation of their rightful demands. Their ability to do so successfully is improved with the rise in their demographic strength.

The failure of the Central Asian nationalities to be assimilated into the Soviet system is best exemplified by their refusal to migrate to non-Moslem regions, continued high birthrates, extremely low levels of inter-racial marriages, limited progress toward the adoption of the Russian language, and the continued adherence to traditional religious and cultural practices forbidden by the State. Each of these elements will be discussed individually at a later point.

The system which the Russians established to control the borderlands involved the extensive use of local Russians to occupy the most important State and Party positions. The Russians were deployed in such a way as to correlate their strength to the political importance of a particular agency or post. Those positions not occupied by Russians (the majority) were available to local nationalities, fostering the creation of a local elite with some significant access to the decision making process. This practice tended to give a surface legitimacy to the political system. At the top of the party structure, a two man system was employed whereby a local communist serving as First Secretary shared power with a Russian Second Secretary. The First Secretary practice offered "visible proof" to the local nationals that "one of their own people could attain honor, power, and prestige within the Soviet system."37 The Second Secretary was generally "alien to the country and to its people, history, needs, and aspirations,"38 serving as the eyes and ears of the Central Committee of the C. P. S. U.

38 ibid.
"The impact of Soviet rule in Tadzhikistan has had far reaching and irreversible consequences. There, as in other republics of Soviet Central Asia, modernization has been synonymous with sovietization, which, in turn, has been synonymous with Russian rule."39

It has been reported that the Russian minorities in Central Asia receive higher salaries, more housing space, better access to higher education for their children, more skills, and better positions than the natives. However, with increased development, changing population balances, and the expansion of the local elites within the bureaucracy, the gap between the "European settlers" and the Moslems has been narrowing in various areas including health, education, skill levels, housing, living standards, and jobs.40

Language has been one of the keystones of the Russian assimilation program, for it is the Russian language which

". . . plays an important role in the progressive process of the steady drawing together of all Soviet peoples and the strengthening of their fraternal friendship and unity."41

There are currently more than 100 languages in use in the U.S.S.R. Jonathan Pool predicts that Russian will remain the national "link language" for those who need it, but that it will not become the only language of the Union. He feels that the fourteen national languages (protected by the constitution) will thrive while the numerous minor tongues will eventually shrivel into extinction.42 The slow progress

39 ibid., p.269.
40 Rywkin, op.cit., p.9.
41 Volodarsky, op.cit., p.13.
of the Russian language among the Asian nationalities is amply demonstrated in Soviet as well as foreign sources. Seton-Watson reports that the Tatars and Armenians, many of whom live outside their native republics, overwhelmingly retain their own language. In the Moslem nations of Central Asia, the degree of language assimilation is even lower; in no case does the percentage of Moslems who admit to speaking Russian as a second language exceed 20%. The preliminary results of the 1979 census indicate that 93.1% of the population consider their native tongue to be their first language. Brian Silver's research indicates that the acquisition of the Russian language by minorities is most affected by the frequency of contact with Russians, but that the frequency of interaction is by no means sufficient condition since even as contact increases to extremely high levels Moslems and "ruralities" do not readily acquire Russian as the national language. Thus, the failure to achieve a high level of success in the spreading of the Russian language throughout the borderlands is indicative of the degree to which these peoples have been assimilated into a Soviet system. The survival of national languages signifies the continued vitality of the national culture and is a major barrier to intermarriage, migration and eventual integration. Table 1-14 summarizes the progress of the language program in the various republics from 1926-1970. More importantly, it appears that the failure of indigenous nationalities to

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44 Volodarsky, op. cit., p. 12.


46 d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 168.
TABLE 1-14

PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS OF NATIONAL GROUPS WHO CONSIDER THEIR LANGUAGE AS THEIR MOTHER TONGUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeris</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenians</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
acquire the Russian languages is the result of processes occurring in both urban and rural environments: in rural areas villagers cling to their traditional language because of a strong identity with the local community, while in the cities nationalistic sentiment on the part of local elites motivates them to protect the national language.

"The unique role of Russian as the language of inter-group contact and individual mobility may some day be seen as an unfair and un-Leninist privilege granted to one nationality... Soviet publications already recognize that monolingualism among Russians obstructs the development of favorable attitudes and relations between Russians and others." 47

Perhaps no single force poses greater difficulties for future integration of the Turko-Moslem nationalities of Central Asia and the Caucasus than the resilience and resurgence of Islam. For it is Islam, to a large degree, which provides traditional values unfavorable to "Sovietization" and it is the only integrative force linking numerous Turko-Moslem nationalities in the various republics. Bennigsen describes Islam in the Soviet Union as having two faces: the official Islam with 300 Mosques and 2000 registered clerics which is "essentially unimportant survival of another age now rapidly disappearing in the conditions of socialist society; "and the underground Islam of the brotherhoods and adepts which we know of because of the persistence with which they are attacked in the Soviet press. 48

"This selectivity suggests that the popular cultural, and unofficial aspects of Islam are increasingly powerful and dangerous to the regime, and that the Soviet leadership is not attacking official Islam lest it drive even more Muslims from under its direct supervision and into clandestineness." 49

49 ibid., p. 336.
Soviet sources also express the concern that there has been an increasing "confusion" in the popular mind between Islam and nationalistic ideas, and that this confusion "Has complicated the problem of fighting survivals of the past." 50 The same Sufi brotherhoods which led the Daghestani-Chechen revolt of 1920 and the Central Asian Basmachi movement lasting from 1918-1936 have reappeared and their influence among Moslems is growing strong, particularly in the North Caucasus. 51

"Soviet writers now rank the Sufi brotherhoods among the most intractible and dangerous adversaries of the Soviet regime because the Tariqas are the only authentic anti-Soviet mass organization in the U.S.S.R." 52

Bennigsen further cites three important innovations in the underground Islam: improved secrecy and less vulnerability; effectiveness in mobilizing women; and a younger membership with increasing representation by the intelligentsia. The Tariqas are now one of the main reasons why Islamic beliefs, traditions, and customs continue in the U.S.S.R. 53 These traditions include a subordinate role for women, the "sale" of brides, appeal to Islamic courts, and veneration of and pilgrimmages to "holy places." Soviet sources increasingly complain about these activities: Some religious leaders have sought to

50 ibid.
51 ibid., p. 334.
52 ibid., p. 344
53 ibid., p. 342
"... Force believers not to participate in elections to organs of Soviet power, not to receive or to destroy official documents including passports, and to refuse service in the ranks of the Soviet Army... A decisive struggle has and will continue to be conducted against such violations on the part of fanatical mullahs who created illegal religious societies, and restore the so called "holy places."\footnote{V. Kuroyedov, "Activities of Soviet Christians and Moslems," Kommunist, No. 5, 1980 in Soviet World Outlook, 15 May 1980.}

Particularly disturbing to the author of the above, a member of the Council on Religious affairs, was the proliferation of holy places which are the object of pilgrimmages including the grave of one person condemned by a Soviet court.

Critchlow sees Islam as one factor in a "burgeoning ethnicity that is increasingly adopting nationalistic forms."\footnote{Critchlow, "Minarets and Marx," in The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1980, p. 47.} Critchlow also asserts that the demographic boom and the rise of economic growth and social progress has enhanced the Moslem influence in national and international politics.

"Social cleavages are further deepened by a strong aversion to intermarriage between Muslims and Europeans, which persists despite the urgings of official propagandists to cross ethnic barriers to matrimony. This aloofness is traceable in part to the taboo on marriage between Muslim females and non-Muslim males imposed by Islamic law... Islam and ethnicity are so closely intertwined that the distinction is often blurred."\footnote{ibid., p. 51.}

Critchlow further asserts that Soviet institutions feed national awareness, internalizing nationalism among the socialized urban elites on whom Moscow depends to fill the political infrastructure.\footnote{ibid., p. 52.}
He sees Islamic nationalism as the source of a quiet resistance to "Sovietization" and demographic strength and economic importance as providing "leverage" in making justifiable demands upon the center.

A recent example of this quiet resistance and the persistence of traditional values on the part of local communist elites in Moslem areas is provided in the 1979 ouster of two prominent Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan members which received extensive coverage in the Soviet press. The local Minister of Trade and the Minister of Public Health were both ousted for "serious shortcomings in their work, perversion of party principles in the selection and placement of personnel, abuse of official positions, protection of unscrupulous individuals, and behavior unworthy of a Communist." Their crimes included "favoritism," "nepotism," abetting illegal actions by relatives and pulling wires for them, refusal to increase the number of female employees, introducing progressive methods too slowly, and failure to take decisive steps against "negative phenomena." Although nepotism and resistance to official policy may be found throughout the Soviet Union, official concern is much greater when the exhibition of these traits appears to be the result of adherence to traditional Islamic values. This example highlights the extreme difficulty which Moscow faces in opposing the very cadres which they have trained and placed in political positions.

59 ibid.
"Each nationality wants to ensure its continuance, not the destruction of the existing system, but the broadening within the system of their national privileges and the advantages that may be derived from them. The goal of every nation is the strict application of federalism, real autonomy of power within each republic, and equal participation for all the republics in decision making at the federal level." 60

"This modern aspect of nationalism and its defense by the most advanced segment of the Soviet population is what Moscow finds most disconcerting, and prompts Soviet leaders to re-examine an issue they thought should have been settled long ago." 61

This passive resistance to centralist tendencies is not limited to the Asian nationalities. Even in the Slavic Ukraine resistance to Russification and the persistence of nationalistic sentiments continue. Bilinsky argues that this resistance has taken essentially three forms. The first has been an increasing tendency to fill C. P. U. membership slots with local Ukrainians rather than Russians. This has been a long term trend. Also, Shelest resisted the Russification of elementary and secondary schools and, although he was not completely successful, in 1974 the percentage of schools using the Ukrainian language was 60%. Under Shelest, local elites were permitted to argue against the development of Siberia at the expense of increased capital investment in Ukrainian fuel industries.

"It was under Shelest that some Soviet Ukrainian administrators privately insisted, . . that the Ukraine was being economically exploited: if they had not had to contribute so much to the Union budget, the Ukraine would have . . solved the housing shortage a long time ago." 63

60 d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 268.
61 ibid., p. 270.
63 ibid., p. 123.
The same author concludes that:

"... with Russian and Ukrainian nationalism increasingly moving onto a collision course and the central government increasingly siding with the former, the end result could be a tragedy for Russia as well as the Ukraine." 64

As the Russian population falls below 50% and the demands of the periphery for more power and resources rise, one may expect Russian nationalism to rise as well. Enders Wimbush argues that economic development of the borderlands is quite often perceived by Russians as sacrifice for the benefit of others. He feels that the economic and societal difficulties of the coming decades may necessitate the mobilization of the Russians.

"In such a situation it is by no means certain that the regime, having turned to Russian nationalism for help, will be able to turn against it or even bring it under control." 65

It is also apparent that to many Russians, the term "Sovietization" has become synonymous with Russification. 66 It has been observed that more violent forms of protest by Russians living in the borderlands is possible as they come to feel increasingly isolated and affected by violence among minorities. 67

64 ibid., p. 132.
67 ibid.
"...Defensive nationalism is marked by a return to Slavophile ideals and orthodoxy. Frightened by the rise of Eastern nationalities and by an ideology that robs Russia herself of her cultural heritage, the more intellectual elements are turning back to more traditional values. 68

Thus, in a period of increasing demands from the periphery and with limited investment resources available, Russian nationalism, even in its mildest forms, will impose considerable constraints upon the leadership in granting concessionary demands to the growing minorities. It is clear that increasing demographic strength in the Southern tier combined with increasing nationalism and a divergence of cultures will hamper any near-term solution to the national question. Investment decisions and political policies will certainly take on added significance when viewed by the center and the periphery in national terms.

68d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 273.
III. THE LABOR SUPPLY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A. OVERVIEW

In the 1980's and 1990's, demographic distortions will combine with emerging economic problems to effectively reduce the potential for continued rapid economic growth. The economic difficulties with which the leadership will be faced in the very near future are enormous and will require the exercise of a certain management efficiency and flexibility which has been all too often lacking in the historical experience of the U.S.S.R. The major realities confronting the Soviet Union in the decade ahead are diminishing productivity, smaller growth in the capital stock, declining oil production, continued agricultural difficulties, unfavorable hard currency balances, and a severe labor shortage accompanied by large regional disparities in the distribution of labor. The combined effect of these difficulties will be substantial in the absence of decisive action by the leadership within the period of the next Five Year Plan (1981-1985).

This chapter will discuss briefly the major economic problems confronting the Soviet leadership, with the major emphasis placed upon manpower issues and policy alternatives. The primary purpose will be to determine the likely direction of Soviet economic policy in matters relating to manpower and the labor force, including an analysis of the potential for success. The remaining task will then be to judge the implications of these policies for the Soviet Armed Forces.

In contrast to most developed nations, the Soviet Union has maintained growth in the national income through enormous injections of
labor, capital, and raw materials; rather than improving intensive factor productivity. In part, this is the result of the leadership's commitment to rapid industrialization, and has been historically possible because of massive reserves of material and human resources. In the 1980's as labor and energy resources become increasingly scarce, the issue of factor productivity can be expected to take on an entirely new role in the process of economic planning. In fact, there are already indications that it will become the predominant variable. In the early and mid-1970's, the industrial sector maintained growth despite a slower growth in the supply of labor. But in the late 1970's, and on into the 1980's, as labor and energy shortages worsen, it is doubtful that the gains in productivity made thus far will be capable of making up the difference.

The economic strategy formulated for the 10th Five Year Plan (1976-1980) concentrates upon "efficiency and quality" as opposed to the traditional emphasis upon quantitative gains. Utilization of the so-called Shchekino Plan, which provides incentives for enterprise managers to achieve the same production levels with less labor, is encouraged along with a reduction in the vast number of Soviet workers still utilizing manual labor. To date, the effort has been half-hearted with few real adjustments in management incentives of the magnitude required. The primary emphasis has remained upon meeting production quotas. It is more likely that the next Five Year Plan (1981-1985) will undertake productivity gains in earnest.
In conjunction with the emphasis upon increased productivity, the economic plans presented to the 25th Party Congress call for a de-regionalization of investment decisions. This appears to be an attempt to lessen the political repercussions of future investment policies which may be unpopular in the growing Southern Tier. Closely related to this was the apparent shift from ideology to "scientific management" in the allocation and utilization of economic resources. The combined intention of the two modifications may be to increase the degree of flexibility and responsiveness within the economic structure. In practical terms, these proposals do not indicate a preferential switch toward a market mechanism, rather they allow the leadership greater flexibility in choosing beneficial options concerning peripheral issues such as increased bonuses for laborers and larger pension-plus-earnings ceilings for retirees.

The final reorientation evident in recent years is a lessening of the emphasis upon new construction in favor of reconstruction and repair of existing plant and equipment. This includes increased emphasis upon the rapid and efficient conclusion of construction projects already underway. This guidance may soon become crucial in the determination of the distribution of scarce investment funds under the next Five Year Plan. Brezhnev personally associated himself with this particular orientation at the 25th Party Congress as follows:


"... capital investments must not be allocated to ministries and agencies in general, nor to new projects, but rather for a planned increase in output. Material and financial resources must be directed into the technical retooling and reconstruction of existing enterprises—into the expansion of production capacities without new construction or with minimum per unit capital investments."  

Breslaur reports that Brezhnev was also very forceful in calling for: an end to resistance against basic administrative reforms; efficiency, quality, and modernization rather than increasing consumption or improving the standard of living; de-regionalization of investment decisions; development of Siberian resources; expensive irrigation systems for Central Asia; and ideological change in regional investment policy. 

Breslaur also notes the adoption of expensive measures for river projects demanded by the First Secretaries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenia; and characterizes as "overt interest articulation" the activities of Central Asian delegates pressing for greater diversification of their local economies. The ability to make such demands and to have them adopted (especially in light of the dictum against "new construction") is not surprising in relation to the previously mentioned demographic explosion in the South.

Thus, the general guidelines which are now operative, and which should serve as the basis of the next Five Year Plan, seem to be an emphasis on modernization and increased productivity; less ideology and more "science"; a low level of new construction where avoidable; little or no growth in consumption; and functional (rather than regional)

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4 Breslaur, op. cit.

5 ibid., pp. 21 and 22.
B. INVESTMENT, CONSUMPTION, DEFENSE, AND TRADE

Capital investment plays a very important role in the Soviet Economy. The centrally planned economy which emphasizes massive military expenditures and high levels of investment is virtually the only economy in the world in which the quantity of capital has grown more rapidly than the G.N.P. itself. Until recently, the clear long term economic strategy of the Soviet leaders has been to increase the rate of growth in annual investment. The leadership was quite successful with this strategy in the post-war period, but the rate of growth in investment expenditures has recently been quite difficult to maintain and the rate of growth of capital stock has fallen off. The Soviets' own plans for the years through 1980 show a reduction in the growth of investment each year. As mentioned earlier, this will most likely be achieved by holding down the quantity of new construction. In the late 70's and early 1980's investment growth will drop from the 7% average of 1971-1975 to only 3.2% per year. Also, the construction sector has been ordered to prioritize projects already underway, thereby reducing the growth in the backlog on unfinished construction. This may assist in achieving

one-time gains in productivity, but the construction starts foregone during the next several years may lead to a slowdown in capital formation in the late 1980's. 9 Abram Bergson argues that an investment economy similar to the traditional Soviet system actually requires an increasing share of output for investment to maintain economic growth. He contends that, to a large extent, the recent decline in the growth of G. N. P. is directly attributable to the deceleration of capital stock growth. 10 Another investment decision designed to increase productivity will be the increased mechanization and automation of labor intensive auxiliary processes including loading, warehousing, and materials handling which currently absorb more than 33% of the U.S. S. R. 's total industrial employment. 11

Soviet G. N. P. growth has declined steadily during the 1970's from an average 4.2% during the period 1971-1974 to a forecasted average of about 2% in the period 1979-1982. 12 Recent data shows that actual performance in 1979 may have been even worse. With a declining level of national income growth even moderate growth in investment will require reductions elsewhere, presumably in consumption or government defense spending. The decisions taken in preparation for the 25th Party Congress seem to indicate that reductions will most likely come in the production of consumer goods, rather than reducing the growth of military expenditures. Also, given the fact that consumption accounts for 57% of

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9 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 Hunter, op. cit., p. 18.
12 Turner, op. cit., p. 2.
expenditures while the military represents about 13%, consumption becomes the likely candidate to support investment growth. In fact, the rate of growth in per capita consumption has fallen substantially in the 1970's.  

Recent labor unrest in the Soviet Union and massive strikes in Poland may serve to indicate the dangers of abandoning consumer gains and may force a policy reorientation in the next Five Year Plan.

Thus, military spending is likely to continue its growth of about 4% per year in the near future. Reduction in the level of military spending would require a basic re-evaluation of the Soviet Union's recent defense posture in light of increased N.A.T.O. expenditures, U.S. strategic upgrading, continued concern about the China threat, and a period of possible political succession. With decreasing energy resources predicted for the 1980's and a re-emphasis away from new construction, the military may have to forego some of their newest programs, but modernization as a whole will continue. In the short term it is not clear that reduced military spending would actually help the economy. Diverting heavy industrial resources and retooling for consumer production would take years. Those military technologies which are most useful in the civilian sector (electronics, computer, etc.) are precisely the technologies which the military cannot do without.

The above discussion has provided the general political guidelines which appear to be operative at the present time as well as offering

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13 Berliner, op. cit., p. 95.
14 Turner, op. cit., p. 15.
the conclusion that Soviet efforts for maintaining economic growth will most likely be concentrated in the area of capital investment. Specifically, investment funds will be allocated to reconstruction and repair as well as to the modernization and automation of auxiliary processes which tie up excessive labor and lower productivity. Since Soviet industry has demonstrated a remarkably poor ability to design, produce, and apply auxiliary equipment to specific industrial uses, it seems apparent that the Soviets will seek increased foreign trade. Other motivations for increased trade are the need for high technology drilling equipment and pipeline to tap less accessible oil reserves, and high technology machinery for retooling and modernization of existing plants (also grain).

Brainard argues that the ability of the Soviet Union to obtain credit for foreign technology buys is not as limited as might be expected by their hard currency balances. \(^{15}\) The fact that the preponderant share of Soviet credit is provided by the official finance institutions of foreign governments, and the prevalent use of the compensation agreement in Soviet credit transactions tend to increase credit availability. Loans obtained from foreign governments can very often be obtained in larger mounts and with longer payback periods. Under compensation agreements, the Soviets obtain credit to purchase Western technology and simultaneously enter into contracts for the sale of the resultant product. The long term output of such projects is used for domestic

consumption, fulfillment of the pay back contract, and the earning of hard currency balances. Export earnings from compensation deals already negotiated are projected at $4 billion by 1985.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, although the ratio of Soviet debt service to exports is currently estimated at .23 (.25 is generally considered quite poor) the availability of credit should continue as long as the enterprises contemplated under potential compensation agreements are economically viable. This, again, highlights the importance of productivity and efficiency. Future constraints upon the availability to obtain credit will be predominantly domestic, not foreign.

With foreign credit and technology, the Soviet Union's comparative advantage in the production and export of raw materials will persist almost indefinitely, and will be of great assistance in industrial modernization.\textsuperscript{17} Although foreign trade will become increasingly important for the Soviets in the 1980's, it is unlikely that there will be a significant change in the degree of trade dependence.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16}ibid., p.102.

\textsuperscript{17}Hunter, op.cit., p.66.

\textsuperscript{18}ibid.
C. MANPOWER AVAILABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION

1979 appears to have been a year of particularly poor economic performance in the Soviet Union. Growth in G.N.P. was less than 1%, predicted energy difficulties developed, agricultural production was poor, and several key industrial sectors experienced an absolute decline in output as a result of manpower shortages. These manpower shortages occurred at a time of relative manpower abundance when compared to the sharply reduced supply expected through the remaining decades of the century. Labor force additions for 1979 were estimated at 2.3 million, but by 1985 the number of additions will fall off to 300,000. Thus, current economic growth is quite poor and is likely to worsen as energy and human resources become less abundant. The demographic trends discussed in Chapter I will cause a continuation of manpower shortages for the rest of the century.

Labor shortages take on a very important role in the Soviet economy because of a demonstrated inability to improve productivity and because increased labor utilization has been traditionally relied upon to improve economic growth. Efforts toward more efficient utilization of labor failed throughout the 1970's, despite substantial access to Western technology. Productivity growth fell from 0.8% per year in the 1960's

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20 Turner, op. cit., p. 7.
to 0% in the period 1971-1974 and the -0.4% in the latter 1970's. 21

Indicators for 1979 also show that more recent efforts to increase
productivity have failed to achieve substantial gains. 22 With these
considerations in mind, maintenance of an adequate labor force
becomes absolutely crucial to the future of the Soviet economy.

In the 1980's the increments to the able-bodied age cohorts will
be about 1/5 the level of increments in the early 1970's. This level
will begin to recover in the 1990's, but will still be less than 3/4 of
the 1970 figure in the year 2000. 23 This rapid decline is largely the
result of two independent processes; a decline in the number of labor
force entrants, and a rise in the number of departures as a result of
death or retirement. The demographic aging of the population dis-
cussed previously has resulted in a situation in which the number of
defpartures due to death or retirement nearly equals the number of
entrants. Table 2-1 provides the data for labor force additions from
1975 to 1990. 24

In addition to the economic impact described above, the scarcity of
manpower resources may have adverse affects on the size of the Armed
Forces. With an estimated 4.5 million men under arms in military

21 ibid., p. 10.
22 Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.
23 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 128.
in Hunter, op. cit., p. 150.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Annual Increments</th>
<th>Entrants</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Departures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>147.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>149.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>152.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>153.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>155.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>156.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>157.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>157.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>158.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>158.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>158.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>159.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>159.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>161.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and paramilitary units, and with a force that is predominantly staffed with two year draftees (75%), the Soviets require an estimated 1.68 million 18-year-old males each year to maintain its armed forces.\textsuperscript{25}

An impressive model formulated by Murray Feshbach and Steven Rapaway (1976) predicts that available manpower resources will be sufficient to support a military force of this size only until 1983, at which time, the number of conscripts needed will exceed the number of 18-year-old males available for service. Their results are listed in Table 2-2.\textsuperscript{26} However, even in the late 1980's when the shortages are at their peak, the difference between the number of 18-year-old males needed and those available in no case exceeds 200,000. (see Table 2-2) It will be argued in later sections that the Soviet leadership has already taken steps to reduce substantially the percentage of young people attending college and specialized secondary schools, as well as to keep large numbers of individuals approaching retirement age on the job. The timing of these actions along with a concerted effort to systematically place 16-year-old vocational-technical school graduates directly into industrial enterprises would seem to demonstrate a definite aversion to military force reduction. In the national press debate on manpower issues by prominent Soviet spokesmen such as Kostin, Bestuzhev-Lada and Ulanis, reduction in either the

\textsuperscript{25} Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 147.

\textsuperscript{26} ibid., p. 150, (modified)
TABLE 2-2

HYPOTHETICAL MODEL OF THE POTENTIAL SUPPLY
OF 18-YEAR-OLD MALES FOR THE MILITARY
AND FOR THE ECONOMY: 1976 TO 1990
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males, 18 years, of age as of July 1</th>
<th>Minus, educational deferment, full-time</th>
<th>Minus, male deaths</th>
<th>Minus, males with exemptions and deferments for non-educational reasons</th>
<th>Net number of males 18 years of age available for the draft and for the economy</th>
<th>Net number of males as percent of male cohort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,542</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>1,757</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2,034</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2-2
Continued...  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plus, males whose exemptions and deferments have expired</th>
<th>Total available for draft</th>
<th>Minus, conscriptees</th>
<th>Conscriptees as percent of--</th>
<th>Net number available for economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>2,008</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>106.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>112.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>112.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>105.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
size of the military or the yearly draft intake is not even considered. 27
This issue will be analyzed in greater detail later in the chapter. It
will be sufficient to say at this point that there will be intense
competition between the military and economic sectors for the shrink-
ing cohort of 18-year-old males. It is likely that the Soviets will be
able to maintain approximately the same size force as currently exists,
but further expansion would involve the direct diversion of currently
productive industrial manpower into the military sector.

Thus, the quantitative manpower issues facing the Soviet Union are
immense. But the real difficulties lie not so much in the quantitative
availability of manpower as in the regional distribution of human
resources. The projections of both U.S. and Soviet demographers
indicate that the increase in the able-bodied age cohorts in Central
Asia and Kazakhstan will actually exceed that for the U.S.S.R. as a
whole during the 1980's, while the industrially developed R.S.F.S.R.
will suffer a net decrease in labor force additions. The situation will
be essentially the same for the Ukraine and the Baltic Republics. 28
Table 2-3 demonstrates the immense disparity between labor force
addition trends in the 1970's and those in the 1980's. 29 By the end of
the century, over 1/3 of the available 18-year-olds will come from the

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27 The contribution of each of these authors will be specifically
discussed below.
28 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 128.
29 Turner, op. cit., p. 9 (modified)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.S.F.S.R.</td>
<td>+10.5</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia and Kazakhstan</td>
<td>+6.4</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcaucasus</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>+4.7</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The political, economic, and military implications of manpower distribution are enormous.

The European regions suffering the greatest manpower shortages are precisely the areas which are most industrialized and which need massive input into the labor force. On the other hand, Soviet Central Asia, which is much less industrialized, will have an abundant supply of labor resources. Solution of the manpower distribution problem necessitates either a massive influx of industrial investment to utilize surplus labor in Central Asia, or enormous migration of Central Asians to the industrial areas of the R.S.F.S.R. As discussed below, each of these alternatives will be extremely difficult to achieve, and the Soviets will have to content themselves with a satisfying strategy that accepts lower levels of economic growth.

Industrial investment on a large scale in Central Asia is essentially illogical and will not be pursued with a great deal of energy. The operational constraints are the reduction in the growth of annual investment, the need to invest heavily in the development of energy industries in Western Siberia and the Far East, the necessity of avoiding new construction to concentrate investment capital on the modernization of the most productive industries, and the poor quality and availability of urban workers in the South.

The dictum against new construction will be damaging to Central Asia, as industrial development and diversification of that region would necessarily require a great deal of new projects. It appears that those new construction projects which have been approved are

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\(^{30}\) Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 113.
"glamour" projects, such as the massive irrigation system mentioned earlier, which the Central Government can utilize to show their responsiveness to increasing Central Asian demand for more investment. Even these projects will be difficult to fund, and it is likely that dissatisfaction will exist among the local elites for a substantial period of time. Following the issuance of the Basic Directions for the 10th Five Year Plan, the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee issued its own directives ordering the construction of machine-building, light, food, mixed livestock feed, and small scale local industry in several dozen small cities and urban settlements. This move was necessitated by the fact that Central Asians have not only exhibited an aversion to inter-regional migration, but also migration from rural to urban areas.

There are numerous indications that rural to urban migration has decreased in the Central Asian republics. e.g. in Turkmenia, rural to urban migration constituted 68.6% of urban growth in 1960, 52.7% in 1965, and 27.0% in 1970. The pattern of rural to urban migration from 1959-1970 included a drain of young people from the rural population, resulting in a 33% decline in the rural population of individuals in the 20-24 age cohort. This has left behind a more traditional, older population in rural areas and may serve to slow future migration

31 Feshbach, op. cit., p. 672.
32 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 125.
33 Grossman, in Hunter, op. cit., p. 159.
to urban areas. Thus, a dichotomy has developed wherein there is an overall abundance of available manpower in Central Asia, but shortages in urban workers in the industrialized cities. Since the educational level of Central Asians falls well below that of the Europeans, the availability of highly skilled industrial workers is particularly acute. Current labor force participation in Uzbekistan is about 45%, a drastically low figure relative to the R.S.F.R. average of 90%. 34 There are also shortages of skilled agricultural workers capable of operating mechanized farm equipment. The shortages reported in Kazakhstan were 38,000 in 1966 and 85,000 in 1970. 35 Thus, investment in Central Asia is limited not only by the availability of investment resources, but also by the availability of Central Asian skilled wage-workers. The Soviet authorities seem to have developed a satisfying strategy of investment for irrigation projects to improve agricultural efficiency and to expand arable land, as well as the construction of small scale industries in semi-rural areas designed to involve rural populations in industrial production.

"Tadzhikistan's rapidly developing industry has a constant manpower shortage. Yet, the Republic also has unused labor resources." 36

The prospects for substantial outmigration of Central Asians are distinctly unfavorable. An excellent study of the question by Murray

34 Feshbach, op. cit., p.666.
35 Feshbach, op. cit., p.661.
Feshbach identifies numerous reasons why migration is not likely to increase in the near future. Feshbach cites the following explanations for his predictions:37

1. Living Standards: Income per family is higher in Central Asia and the Caucasus than in the U.S.S.R. as a whole. Although per capita income is lower, the cost of living is low enough to negate the desirability of higher wages in the R.S.F.S.R.

2. Cultural Factors: There exists a traditional opposition to the inter-marriage of Moslems with Russians. Also, "The Muslim peoples of the Central Asian Republics feel that their region is the cradle of civilization, . . . They have a deep attachment to the ancestral lands and believe that to leave the abode of Islam for the abode of war is a sin against the community."38

3. Poor educational preparation for industry: There is a definite shortage of vocational-technical schools in Central Asia and enrollment in Central Asian republics averages 7 per 1000 population vs. 15 in the R.S.F.S.R.

4. Job Opportunities and Industrial Development: There are numerous positions available in industrial centers of Central Asia for trained Moslems. Although investment has slackened, it appears that there will be ample opportunities for skilled wageworkers to remain in Central Asia.

5. Poor Knowledge of Russian Language: The inability of most Central Asians to speak Russian, even as a second language, limits their usefulness for working in industrial centers of the R.S.F.S.R.

6. Birthrates: High birthrates and large families prevent movement in general, but especially to heavily populated industrial areas.

It is clear that the Soviet leadership recognizes the unfavorable prospects for massive outmigration and has implemented a satisfying strategy designed to train young people for specific priority projects, predominantly in Western Siberia. Emphasis will be upon education in the Russian language beginning in Kindergarten and the use of vocational-technical school graduates who will work a 2-3 year "tour of duty" in Western Siberia as a pay back mechanism for educational stipends.

37 Feshbach, op. cit., p. 667.

38 ibid., p. 681.
D. MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

The increasing shortage of and regional imbalance in manpower resources has forced the Central Government to re-evaluate its manpower policies and to implement more far-reaching programs designed to achieve significant gains in relatively short order. The recent emphasis upon deregionalization of investment decisions and the downplaying of ideology relative to scientific management has established an atmosphere in which the government leaders have given themselves increased latitude for greater flexibility. Soviet efforts for improved manpower utilization concentrate upon four particular sectors of the population: auxiliary workers, retirees, Central Asian vocational-technical school graduates, and Central Asian women. Each group is discussed below.

E. MODERNIZATION AND AUXILIARY WORKERS

Soviet economists recognize that the maintenance of economic growth is most likely to be achieved through the implementation of labor-saving innovations rather than trying to increase inputs of labor and capital. It appears that this orientation has also been firmly accepted by the party leadership:

"We must take into account the fact that beginning with the 1980's we shall have to place still greater emphasis on the intensive factors of economic growth since other factors are decreasing sharply."39

The new economic plans attempt to raise productivity through a host of measures designed primarily to release the number of auxiliary workers now employing manual labor into other sectors of industry. This can only be achieved through the mechanization of auxiliary processes, a task which has escaped solution in the past. As mentioned earlier, increased trade with the West will most likely be needed to make this program a success. Even then, the beneficial impact of such programs will be minimal.

At present, 1/2 of all industrial workers in the R.S.F.S.R. fall into the category of auxiliary workers, only 1/4 of whom work in mechanized operations. 40 This has historically been, and continues to be, a very great potential source of manpower reserves, e.g. In the machine building industry, as much as 54% of the U.S.S.R.'s workers were involved in auxiliary processes. The comparable figure in the U.S. is less than 30%. 41 And yet, the percentage of auxiliary workers has been falling at a snail's pace: 55% in 1959, 53% in 1962, 52% in 1965, and 49% in 1972. 42 As late as 1975, Gosplan indicated that there was "no overall plan for the mechanization of manual work." 43 The greatest explanation for the failure of the Soviets to reduce the number of manual auxiliary laborers is their inability to develop specialized production capabilities that would design and produce equipment


41 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 140.

42 ibid.

43 ibid.
and parts for specialized applications. At this point, Western technology in large amounts will be needed to improve the situation, and even this will be a long-term proposition. Although Soviet credit may not be sufficient to purchase raw materials such as crude oil, the use of the compensation agreement can be utilized to mechanize mineral and fuel industries and to provide export earnings for the importation of specialized technology. This area remains as a vast potential source of manpower reserves. In addition to mechanization, the Soviets will implement a number of policies to improve the flow of manpower from schools to industry and to reduce labor turnover. There is also little likelihood of an extension in the length of the workweek. 44

F. PENSIONERS

The aging of the Soviet population discussed earlier has resulted in an expected doubling of the share of the over-aged population between 1950 and 2000, from 10.4% to 19.1%. Traditionally, less than 24% of the pensioners have participated in the labor force, with the average percentage of those working full time at about 16% of those available in 1975. 45 For this reason, most experts have concluded that the vast pool of pensioners represents only a minimal source of labor input. However, recent directives issued by the Central Committee are very likely to produce substantial number of individuals who are willing to postpone retirement adding substantially to the net additions to the labor force.

The reason why few pensioners have chosen to work full time is that there were legal ceilings on the amount of total income that could be obtained by a working pensioner. Those pensioners receiving the minimum pension would generally work part-time to bring their pension-plus-earnings income to the ceiling figure. Those individuals receiving the maximum pension of 120 rubles per month had little incentive to work because of the imposed ceiling. And yet, Soviet surveys have shown that 80% of pensioners are able-bodied and could serve as manpower reserves, while no less than 35% are capable of full time work. When one considers that nearly 3 million workers are scheduled to retire every year during the 1980's, any measure which could keep even a minimal percentage of these laborers working for 2 or 3 years would provide valuable additions to the labor force.

The Central Committee has recently adopted a measure which may do just that. The Central Committee has extended an offer to those approaching retirement age to continue working in exchange for an increased pension when they elect to retire. Each year of additional work will be rewarded with a pension increase of 10 rubles per month, with the maximum pension-plus-earnings set at 150 rubles per month. More significantly, the committee has established:

46 Sozykin, op. cit., p. 5.

"A list of categories of employees who are entitled to receive 50%, 75% or 100% of their designated old-age pensions while working, but no more than 300 rubles per month when combined with their earnings, and of certain employees who are entitled to their full pensions, regardless of their earnings. . ." (48) (emphasis is mine)

The new policy, which took effect on 1 Jan. 1980, also increases the ceiling to 300 rubles per month for Great Patriotic War Veterans and extends the ceiling for other servicemen. It is feasible that this policy could result in substantial increases to the labor force over the next several years, serving to offset the negative implications of reduced 18-year-old cohorts.

G. EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PLACEMENT

Soviet education policies are moving in a very clearly defined direction, concentrating upon measures designed to produce trained industrial specialists at age 16. The primary mechanisms for this will be vocational-technical schools or schools which combine general secondary education with industrial skill training. The Soviets have also implemented policies designed to reduce significantly the number of individuals attaining higher education. In 1975, the percentage of secondary school graduates proceeding to higher education was 26%. Three years later, the figure had dropped to 20%. 49 It is likely that the figure will dip even further:

48 ibid.
"We are close to totally meeting the need of our economy for diplomaed personnel... In a word, life has changed substantially. Under these conditions, could the secondary schools remain preparatory schools for engineering colleges?... For production requires persons not only of different skills but of different levels of skill. A considerably larger number of assembly line workers... is needed than engineers, agronomists, teachers, and doctors... The time has come to bring educational institutions into accord with changing times."\(^50\)

"This means specifically that at age 14 a young person can no longer remain a schoolchild who is led by the hand and whose parents are called in if the least little thing occurs. He must become a student---like, say, one at a specialized secondary school---a student attending a trade and technical school that simultaneously provides full secondary education,"\(^51\)

"In these conditions, it would seem better to provide all young people with vocational training in school, giving them both a secondary education and an occupational specialty,"\(^52\)

The use of vocational-technical schools will also be used along with increased instruction in the Russian language to increase the mobility of Central Asian youth:

"In order to increase the mobility of young people in these areas, it would be a good idea to step up the development of vocational-technical schools and other educational institutions that would train skilled personnel from among the local population and to provide production training for students at enterprises, construction projects, and farms in other republics."\(^53\)


\(^{51}\) ibid., p. 21.


\(^{53}\) ibid.
The principle vehicle for this migration will be the "Tour-of-Duty" method whereby vocational-technical school graduates will be "recruited" for work in construction projects or enterprises in Western Siberia or the Far East, presumably as a "pay-back" duty for educational stipends. This program removes the young 16-year-old from his traditional Central Asian environment and "mobilizes" him before he is likely to acquire a wife and children. Should the individual return to Central Asia following his "Tour-of-Duty" and his military service, he will have a valuable skill which will at least encourage migration to urban areas. The "Tour-of-Duty" settlements are much less expensive to operate because they can be located at remote production facilities (saving on transportation from base-cities) and because the workers live there without dependents (saving on housing and essential services). The use of "Tour-of-Duty" labor seems to be concentrating in the energy and raw materials industries of Western Siberia:

"Moreover, production units from the European part of the country, the Northern Caucasus, and Central Asia have been recruited for the construction of trunk pipelines, compressor stations, and other facilities in W. Siberia. The expedition method makes it possible to maneuver labor resources in the branch, and it is taking on an inter-regional aspect."[54] (emphasis is mine)

The use of the expedition or "Tour-of-Duty" method seems to be one of the Party's main planks for both the development of Western Siberia and the increased mobility and training of Central Asian youth. It also appears that the "Tour-of-Duty" method will assist in managing the flow of labor into new projects:

"... 73% of the workers to be hired for 313 (RSFSR) major facilities scheduled for start up in 1978 were supposed to come from outside. But training and recruitment didn't begin early enough to have them there on time... Should consider training costs as a part of construction and begin specific training programs during construction." 55

H. WOMEN

In 1959, the percentage representation of women aged 20-54 years was 77%, a figure which is very similar to that of most Socialist countries. However, from 1959-1970, the figure rose 12% to nearly 90%, providing a clear indication of the unusually high demand for labor during those years. 56 However, when viewed regionally, the representation of women in the labor force indicates that there is a potential source of small manpower reserves comprised of Central Asian women. Nearly 16% of Central Asian manpower is not employed in social production, a figure which is two times as large as the All-Union index. Women represent more than 80% of the unemployed in this group. 57 Thus, the mobilization of this sector could also be productive. The overall plan may be for Central Asian women to participate in staffing the new light industries in semi-rural areas while the trained male graduates of vocational-technical schools participate in tour-of-duty enterprises and military service. The short term impact of such a plan is likely to be minimal due to cultural attitudes and large families.

55 Sozykin, op. cit., p. 4.
I. CONSCRIPTION

Earlier, it was mentioned that the size of the 18-year-old cohorts may be insufficient to maintain the current size of the Armed Forces in the 1980's. The number of young men available for the draft (age 18) will decline from 2.6 million in 1978 to 2.0 million in 1986-1988, with approximately 1.6 million draftees needed each year to maintain the current force level. It appears at this point that the Soviets are willing to make the required sacrifices to maintain the size of their Armed Forces including a tightening of deferment policy and more frequent call-ups of reserves. The fact that a sizable portion of the draftees will come from Central Asia automatically lowers the number of educational deferments as Central Asians have historically achieved lower educational levels than their Soviet counterparts (qualitative; many Central Asians receive secondary school diplomas, but the quality is notoriously poor relative to the R.S.F.S.R.) Educational deferments can be expected to decrease among the Russian youth as well. The fact that numerous vocational-technical school graduates will have already worked for two years prior to induction, as well as increased participation of retirees, will allow the Soviets to maintain the 1.6 million draft without suffering substantial declines in the absolute size of the labor force, i.e., as 18-year-olds are inducted, there will be 16 year old vocational-technical school graduates, 60 year old workers who elect not to retire, and 20 year old men who have completed military service to fill the void in the labor supply.
There will also be little motivation for the Soviet leadership to reduce the size of the military for the purpose of injecting labor resources into the economy. With a labor force of over 130M, it would take a military manpower cut of 25% just to provide a 1% increase in the labor supply. Such a measure would also be a one time gain only, providing benefits which are dubious in light of the disproportionate reduction in military capability. Thus, the Soviets should be able to maintain the current size of their armed forces despite increasing competition with the economic sector. The likelihood of their choosing to reduce force levels under such circumstances appears to be low.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

A. PURPOSE

"Today, the Army remains a tool for the Russification of the Ukraine and for the whole non-Russian population."

It is quite natural for Western analysts to view the Soviet Armed Forces as having a predominantly external orientation. The military presumably exists for the protection of the homeland; and policies regarding size, structure, and ethnic composition are formulated with the national defense as the "number one" priority. The enormous size of the Soviet military sector is generally attributed to the Soviet "paranoia" for border defense, and its structure and armaments attributed to external threats. It is for this reason that the 500,000 man increase in the Soviet Armed Forces in the late 1960's is almost universally attributed to the rising level of hostility between the U.S.S.R. and Peoples' Republic of China.

And yet, there is ample evidence to suggest that external concerns are only one input into the decision-making process regarding military matters. The Red Army was brought into being following the Revolution of 1917 and was initially employed for the destruction of those forces resisting Bolshevik rule. In the early 1920's, Lenin and his associates forbade the continue existence of National Armies and began to use some minorities in the Central Army. In 1938, the new military law

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required all Soviet male citizens to participate in compulsory military service regardless of nationality or cultural background. The 1967 military law clearly stipulated that compulsory military service had one predominant aim: the fusion of recruits into multiethnic units for the purpose of cultural assimilation through the use of the Russian language. Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces would appear to be as much an instrument of national integration as they are a vehicle for the defense of the country. When viewed in this perspective, the organization and structure of Soviet forces becomes more logical, and decisions regarding military conscription are more easily explained.

This perspective allows us to reconsider the military expansion of the late 1960's in other than external terms. The draft law at the time specified a service period of three years, which had been the norm since World War II. In the late 1960's however, the size of the 18 and 19-year-old cohorts was extremely large as a result of increased birthrates in the early post-war period. With a length of service of three years and an induction rate of 80%, the Soviet leadership would have had to finance a 2 million man increase in the Armed Forces if military service was to provide universal indoctrination, Russification, and Leninist socialization for the majority of young males. The result was the 1967 Military Service Law which stipulated a reduced period of two years service beginning at age 18. In this manner, the Soviet

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2 ibid., p. 159.
leadership continued the policy of near-universal military training and indoctrination while having to finance an increase of only 500,000. This solution appears to indicate as much of a concern for domestic political considerations as it does for the external military threat. It is no coincidence that the propagation of the 1967 law on military service was accompanied by what appears to be a complete militarization of Soviet society, beginning with very young schoolchildren and utilizing such mechanisms as the publication of "We Pick Up New Rifles," a preschool reader containing illustrations of children being issued rifles and repelling the enemy. It was also in the late 1960's that the extensive sale of toy guns, missiles, tanks, and other military toys was begun for the first time.

In the 1962 and 1963 editions of Sokolovsky's Soviet Military Strategy a warning appears that a reduction in the compulsory period of military service would have adverse effects upon the quality of training and the level of combat readiness. The phrase was prudently omitted in the 1968 edition. It would appear that at least on some occasions, ideological and political considerations predominate, even if overall military effectiveness is impaired.

The Armed Forces have become a bulwark of the Party's socialization system and may now be intended as the primary vehicle for the political mobilization and Russification of Central Asian and other minorities.

4 ibid., p. 312.
"At present, the purpose of ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces is to mold Communist convictions and a Marxist-Leninist World outlook in the personnel."\(^5\)

The Main Political Administration is responsible for the "ideological purity" and "Leninist conviction" of the Soviet forces. Political officers are found at every level down to the individual company and receive a substantial proportion of the soldier's time for the purpose of political indoctrination. Party control of the military is complete as a result of extreme centralization, the vigilence of the M. P. A., and a disproportionate representation of military officers in the C. P. S. U. and the Y. C. L.

A great deal of attention was focused upon the reduction of the period of compulsory military service brought about by the 1967 modifications. The new military law reduced the required period of service from three years to two years (from four to three years for the Navy) and lowered the draft age to 18. Actually, very little was changed as the draft law included a number of other provisions which increased the amount of pre-induction training so that most recruits could report directly to their units upon induction.

This increase in pre-induction training was to be accomplished by D. O. S. A. A. F. (The Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and the Fleet). This organization grew rapidly after 1967, and in 1972 reportedly involved 65M persons, a figure representing

more than 25% of the entire population. 6 D. O. S. A. A. F. is staffed predominantly with retired military personnel although the Ministry of Education has a great deal of the responsibility for program management. D. O. S. A. A. F. membership includes men and women of all ages and provides recreational facilities which normally would not be available. Regulations specify that a D. O. S. A. A. F. unit must be organized in each school, and all schoolchildren reaching 14 years of age are "expected to join." 7 The purpose of D. O. S. A. A. F. include "active cooperation for strengthening the military capability of the country and for preparing workers for the defense of the Socialist Fatherland, "preparing specialists for the Armed Forces from among the 17-year-olds who register to be called up the following year;" conducting basic military training; and publishing books and fostering activities which create favorable attitudes toward military service. 8 Thus, D. O. S. A. A. F. provides political and military training to about 1/3 of the individuals inducted under the Draft. Through the extensive use of this organization, the Soviet leadership has increased its capability for political indoctrination and has helped to offset at least a portion of the reduced effectiveness which may result from the reduction in the length of compulsory service.

7 Scott, op. cit., p. 309.
8 ibid., pp. 308-309.
The C. P. S. U. is remarkably open in its declarations concerning the political utility of universal military service, especially in the socialization of non-Russian minorities. In this sense, the fact that more Central Asian youth will be filling the military roles in the near future is not necessarily viewed as a "problem" by the central authorities. Military service represents an opportunity to remove the young Moslem from his traditional family environment and to deploy him in a new environment which is predominantly Russian. The opportunity for political indoctrination is immense.

"Lenin's nationalities policy; the policy of equality and the convergence of the working people of all nations and ethnic groups of the Soviet state; their education in the spirit of friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism; is the most important source for raising the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces."  

It becomes important then, in the consideration of alternatives affecting the Soviet military, to bear in mind this dual purpose of the Soviet forces, for ideological and political concerns seem to receive as much emphasis as external military threat.

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B. STRUCTURE

The estimated number of Soviet military men under arms varies widely depending upon the source which is selected for use. There seems to be a rough consensus centering around the range of 4-4.5 million active personnel in armed units. This consensus is supported by Richard Holmes, Murray Feshbach, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Other estimates, however, are quite prevalent and range anywhere from 3 to 6 million. Table 3-1 illustrates one estimate which provides the distribution of manpower among the 5 services, the K.G.B., and M.V.D.10

The Soviet military is essentially a cadre system, 25% of which is composed of career officers, warrant officers, and N.C.O.'s.11 The remaining 75% is composed of 2 year draftees, requiring an annual intake of nearly 1.7 million new 18-year-old draftees. The same number of soldiers are released to the reserves each year, giving the Soviets a massive capability for rapid mobilization. Scott estimates that the Soviet Union could mobilize an additional 2 to 3 million men in just 48 hours, nearly doubling the size of existing forces.12

The period of compulsory service is extremely demanding for the conscripts and as a result, very few (about 5%) extend their service beyond the compulsory period.13 A conscript's pay is only 4 rubles

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11 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 147.
12 Scott, op. cit., p. 326.
13 Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 147.
### TABLE 3-1

**STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Rocket Forces</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
<td>1,825,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Forces</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Forces</td>
<td>433,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>455,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. G. B. Border Guards</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. V. D. Security Forces</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>*<em>4,088,000</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
per month, and nearly every minute of the soldier's time, from 6 A.M. to 10 P.M., is occupied with military or political training. Food and accommodations are very plain and showers are generally permitted only once each week. The Officer Corps is highly trained through a system of military academies and enjoys pay and privileges which are higher than those enjoyed by their contemporaries in the civilian sector. Approximately 90% of all military officers are members of the C. P. S. U. or Komosomol, and virtually all are members of the Slavic nationalities. 14

The ethnic structure and policies of the Soviet Armed Forces are not well understood. Czarist military policy excluded nearly 40 nationalities from participation in the military service. 15 Soviet policies reversed this situation in an official sense, but it is doubtful that substantial numbers of Central Asians and other minorities were utilized in the regular forces. In the 1940's, the Central Asian nationalities constituted only 4.6% of the draft, and by the 1950's, this figure had risen to only 6.6%. 16 Enders Wimbush maintains that Central Asians have traditionally not been trusted and, as a result, have been assigned

14 Interview with P. H. Vigor, British Defense Analyst, September 1980. Also supported by Murray Feshbach and Steven Rapaway.


primarily to construction units. P. H. Vigor maintains that some qualified Central Asians are utilized in the regular forces, but that they are distributed widely so that few will serve together in the same unit.

Recent reports in Western news sources report increased incidents of "name calling" and fights between members of the different ethnic groups. This reported increase in the level of ethnic tension may be an early indication of rising utilization of Moslem minorities in the regular forces. The structure and utilization of the numerous Central Asian minorities which will have to be brought into the regular forces in the near future will become a particularly important issue as other sources of manpower dry up. Table 3-2 recaps the regional distribution of estimated increments to the population in the able-bodied ages in the U.S.S.R., R.S.F.S.R., Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the Transcaucasus, 1971-2000.

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17 S. Enders Wimbush, as quoted in Time, 23 June 1980, p. 31.
18 Interview with P. H. Vigor, Sept. 1980.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>R.S.F.S.R.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total increase</td>
<td>Average annual increase</td>
<td>Average annual rate of increase</td>
<td>Total increase</td>
<td>As a percent of national increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>12,963</td>
<td>2,593</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6,039</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>10,378</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3,928</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-85</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-813</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-90</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-880</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>3,291</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-425</td>
<td>(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>8,101</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1,964</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x Not applicable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan period</th>
<th>Total increase</th>
<th>Average annual increase</th>
<th>Average annual rate of increase</th>
<th>Total increase</th>
<th>As a percent of national increase</th>
<th>Average annual rate of increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>3,089</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>3,444</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-85</td>
<td>2,773</td>
<td>104.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-90</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>109.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>3,361</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>4,380</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. POLICY OPTIONS

Given the extreme reduction in the upcoming size of 18-year-old cohorts in the 1980's and the disproportionate representation of Turko-Moslems from Central Asia and the Caucasus, it appears that the Soviet leadership will have to make substantial choices concerning the size, organization, and ethnic composition of its Armed Forces. The most likely alternatives are: a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces; adjustments in the length of compulsory military service; structural changes encouraging more re-enlistments following the initial period of service; or maximum use of minority elements with increased Party control. Each alternative will be considered separately.

D. FORCE REDUCTIONS

Manpower shortages and economic-military tradeoffs may force the Soviets to reduce the size of their Armed Forces for the remainder of the century. Such a reduction may be necessitated for three reasons: an absolute shortage of 18-year-old males, the desire to maintain a larger civilian labor force, and a lingering mistrust of Central Asians.

As discussed previously, Feshbach and Rapaway predicted in 1976 that unless existing policies were changed, the Soviet Union would not be able to maintain its current force level of 4.0-4.5 million. However, their calculations were based upon 1976 deferment policies which appear to have been tightened substantially in the intervening years. e.g. Feshbach and Rapaway's educational deferments allowed for as much as 26.5% of the 18-year-olds to defer service until completion of their education and assumed that medical deferments would take up another 10% of the available male youth. As discussed earlier, the leadership
appears to have tightened up educational deferments with 20% probably representing a maximum figure. The effect of this shift from 26.5% to about 20% in the year 1986, e.g., will provide more than 120,000 more males for the draft, essentially making up the small shortages predicted by Feshbach and Rapaway. Given the fact that western analysts face substantial obstacles in pinpointing the size of the Soviet military, the reductions which are likely to occur will be hardly detectable and will have little substantial impact upon the overall size of Soviet relative to Western forces.

The fact that the military will have to induct nearly all of the available 18-year-olds to avoid shortages is not necessarily viewed as a crucial problem by the Soviet authorities. The military provides the beneficial services of ideological socialization and Russification; also assisting in the development of Russian language ability and perhaps increasing Central Asian mobility. For most nationalities, the 1970 census indicated that knowledge of the Russian language was more prevalent in the 20-29 age group than in the 16-19 age group. Ann Sheehy maintains that at least part of this gain must be attributed to military service, which provides the Russian language environment that is so crucial to the development of language skills.21 The military also provides valuable technological skills which allow servicemen to perform productively in the civilian economy following their period of

compulsory service. It is clear that the Soviets are adapting educational programs and new retirement policies designed to alleviate or minimize the impact of a continued high draft upon the economy.

There are also some indications of an increase in the number of female volunteers occupying positions as nurses and clerks. Whereas Feshbach and Rapaway cited a figure of only about 600 females in the military, more current sources including Harriet and William Scott maintain that there are probably about 10,000 women in uniform.\(^22\)

The use of increased numbers of women to make up for shortfalls in military manpower is not a viable solution as women are used extensively in the labor force. And, young women completing their schooling will be one of the major sources of labor as a greater percentage of the male population is inducted for military service. There appear to be no major plans for utilization of more women in the Armed Forces.

Present educational policy for girls participating in D.O.S.A.A.F. stresses first aid rather than combat skills.

It cannot be doubted that competition for manpower will be intense and that some shortfalls may exist. However, these shortfalls will be minimal relative to the immense size of the force and are likely to have little impact upon the military capability of the nation.

Reductions in the size of the military sector for the purpose of stimulating the economy are not likely in the years ahead. Despite increased competition for limited investment funds, the military has

\(^{22}\) Scott, op. cit., p. 389.
maintained an enormous share of the economic resources of the nation. Many sources, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, indicate the military will account for 16% of total G.N.P. by 1985. This shows a remarkable commitment to the military, indicating a preference for military strength over increased consumption. It is unlikely that the Soviets would willingly reduce military manpower, as construction underway already indicates that at least the current manpower level will be necessary. Recent reports of the construction of four nuclear powered aircraft carriers for the Navy illustrate the continued demand for manpower. (U.S. Carriers maintain a crew of about 5,000 sailors).

As mentioned earlier, the military actually represents a rather small source of manpower for the more than 135 million worker labor force. Substantial reductions in the size of the Armed Forces would provide minimal increases to the labor force. Thus, any voluntary reductions do not appear likely and would require the adoption of political orientations which are wholly uncharacteristic of those observable at the present time.

Wimbush believes that Central Asians have traditionally not been trusted, and for this reason, many have been assigned to the unarmed paramilitary organizations such as construction units. With manpower shrinking and the Central Asians making up over a third of the available resources (including the Transcaucasus) this is a luxury which the Soviets can no longer afford. With the demographic explosion of the South and the apparent rise in both nationalism and economic leverage it is likely that the Soviets will upgrade the integrative function of the military, utilizing
compulsory service to improve upon Central Asian socialization and to impart skills which will be useful in the civilian sector.

All things considered, then, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces does not appear likely. Those technically skilled individuals most valuable to the economy are also essential to the military capability of the nation. Current construction and investment plans demonstrate a continued preferential position for the military relative to other sectors. Although Feshbach and Rapaway may be right in hypothesizing upcoming shortages, the shortages are likely to be quite small, difficult to detect, and will have little impact upon the overall size, strength, or capability of the military.

E. INCREASED PERIOD OF COMPULSORY SERVICE

Another available option is to lengthen the period of compulsory service so that fewer draftees would be needed each year. In 1967, when the period of compulsory service was shortened, nearly 50% fewer draftees were required each year. With a draftee force of some 3.2 million men, a one year extension of the required service period would mean a yearly reduction of some 600,000 men to maintain the current force level. This would be a substantial savings of manpower resources for the economy.

Jeffrey Record maintains that the reduction in the required term of service in 1967 was brought about principally by concerns on the part of the Party leadership for the level of technical training with which young Soviets enter the labor force. 23 The term of service was apparently

reduced to allow more manpower to be trained for the civilian economy. The Soviet press is full of literature which emphasizes the poor quality of technical training in the schools, most of which cites the waste of valuable time and resources in providing on-the-job training in the production environment. The recent drive for vocational-technical schools and general secondary schools which graduate fully trained specialists at age 16 is probably a decisive response to this situation which may eventually lessen the importance of the military's role as an "industrial trainer." In the short term, however, the leadership's desire to utilize military service for both political and technical training will probably necessitate the maintenance of the current two year period of compulsory service. By keeping the period of service at two years, the Party can not only provide political, linguistic, and technical training for young Central Asians, but it can also keep them employed, avoiding the buildup of a vast number of unemployed agricultural laborers in the Southern Tier. Such a buildup represents a potential danger to the central leadership because it may lead to increased demands for economic investment (which may not be within its capability to provide) or serve as a source of increased discontent and ethnic tension.

The simultaneous pursuit of an educational program producing technically competent workers at age 16 and an increased period of military service are essentially incompatible. A 1979 survey by N. N. Yefimov of Moscow State University indicated that attitudes toward military service varied greatly, depending upon the age of the individual
The reason given for this is that older inductees had already "mapped out" their lives and that military service was interfering with their personal career plans. To the extent that the leadership is successful in producing large numbers of competent workers at age 16, the more likely it is that military service will be increasingly viewed as a gross interference. In this atmosphere, extension of the term of service would be extremely sensitive politically and would likely result in poor morale within the ranks of the inductees. Military service is already quite unpopular, even with European youth, and may be intolerable if a lengthened period is forced upon Central Asian inductees.

A related option is to voluntarily increase the average length of service by encouraging vast numbers of inductees to re-enlist following their compulsory service. As previously mentioned, only about 6% of Soviet soldiers remain in the service following the required tour. This is predominantly the result of miserably low pay and harsh living conditions. An increase in the number of re-enlistees would require a great increase in the share of wages in the defense budget and would also require substantial investments for housing and base services. This alternative could only be considered if funds were to be drawn away from military construction, an unlikely prospect at best. Both this option and the increased service requirement would also reduce the annual input into the reserve forces, a system in which the Soviets place enormous emphasis.

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F. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIANS

The remaining alternative is the maximum utilization of the large Central Asian cohorts in the regular forces. In fact, the current force level can only be maintained with extensive utilization of Central Asians, because they will provide a major source of youthful manpower in the decades ahead. By the year 2000, nearly 35% of all available draft age manpower will be located in Central Asia and the Caucasus.\(^{25}\)

The exercise of this option would likely require increased supervision on the part of the Main Political Administration, as it would bring less socialized elements of a vastly different culture into the regular forces. The increasing references in Soviet military journals to nationality issues and the increasing importance of Party-Political work may serve to demonstrate that the current policy of the leadership has, in fact, swung over to the full utilization of Central Asian and other minorities.

"In accordance with the U.S.S.R. law of universal military service today, all male citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of racial and national affiliation, religion, education, residence, social and property status, are bound to serve the colours in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces."\(^{26}\)

Thus, one can expect to see increasing numbers of Central Asian conscripts in the regular forces in the decade ahead. The full utilization of Soviet Central Asians is necessitated by manpower shortages in the

\(^{25}\)Feshbach and Rapaway, op. cit., p. 148.

\(^{26}\)N. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 2.
regions which traditionally have provided the manpower for the Armed Forces and has numerous advantages over alternative policy options. They include:

1. The opportunity to remove Central Asian youth from their traditional environment and to subject them to an intense program of socialization, Russification, and technical training.
2. Temporarily employs young Central Asian males who may otherwise remain unemployed and unskilled in the labor-surplus Southern regions.
3. Provides useful technological skills valuable to the civilian industries of Central Asia and provides additional Russian language experience.
4. Allows the U.S.S.R. to maintain near-universal military training under a 2 year requirement and maintains the Armed Forces at 4-4.5 million.
5. May serve to increase the mobility of Central Asian youth.

This incorporation of more Central Asians into the regular forces will likely be accompanied by an increase in Party-Political work and in bureaucratic supervision of deferments, promotions, admission to military academies, and approval of requests for extended service. It is not clear how ethnic balances will be managed, but if traditional practices are followed, the Central Asians are likely to be dispersed to the greatest extent possible. Full participation in the military services combined with increasing assertiveness on the part of Central Asian elites is likely to result in a greater representation of qualified Central Asians in the Officer Corps, although it will probably be years before they obtain even a minimal representation.
G. IMPLICATIONS

If this final alternative is, in fact, the preferred selection of the Party elite, it will substantially affect the readiness and quality of the Soviet forces in the decades ahead. Increased utilization of Central Asian minorities may be beneficial from the standpoint of political indoctrination, but its impact upon the capabilities, loyalty, and motivation of the men comprising the Armed Services is likely to be negative.

It has been shown that the majority of Central Asian youth are less than adequately skilled in the Russian language, receive a poor quality education relative to their European contemporaries, and live in a more traditional and less technically oriented society. It is not, therefore, surprising to hear reports that the influx of Central Asian minorities into the Soviet Navy has been accompanied by poor relations between ethnic groups and involves a high cost in training time and effort to maintain the Navy. Although most Central Asians may understand enough Russian to decipher basic military commands, the ability of most to read and understand military technical manuals is likely to be minimal. Recent attention to this problem has surfaced in the Soviet Press, Russky yazyk v nation'noi shkole reports a speech by F. L. Saubanova at the Uzbek Teachers' Congress which deals specifically with the impact of poorly trained Central Asians entering the military:

"... But unfortunately, because they had inadequate training in Russian, not all of them can perform their military service successfully. Poor knowledge of Russian makes it difficult to learn military regulations, and acquire a military specialty, and this in turn adversely affects the combat readiness of soldiers. It takes them longer than their comrades to pass the tests to carry out guard duties independently or to obtain the certificate for maintaining a piece of equipment. It is difficult for them to acquire the skills to operate the powerful weapons and complex modern equipment that are in the arsenal of the Soviet Army."28

U.S. commanders are well familiar with the difficulties faced by soldiers who enter the service without a thorough foundation in linguistic skills. Written procedures for such simple operations as reliability tests on optical sighting instruments become extremely difficult for soldiers who have not obtained sufficient reading levels. The linguistic skills possessed by these individuals, however, are many times greater than those possessed by Central Asian minorities entering the Soviet Armed Forces. The 1972 Russian primer for soldiers with little knowledge of Russian aims primarily:

"to provide the minimum needed to understand commands and orders and the expressions most commonly used in military life, and to read and conduct simple conversations in Russian."29

When one considers that more than 1/3 of the Soviet military draftees in the 1980's will possess such poor skills in the Russian language, it becomes evident that the Soviet forces will suffer a significant decline in readiness and capability. Those areas of operations most affected

29 Ibid., p. 5.
are likely to be weapons system maintenance, fire direction, target acquisition, and flexible tactical employment in fluid situations. Many soldiers will fail to perform their military service satisfactorily, and many will leave the service without mastering a military specialty.

Increased allotments of time for more political or Russian language training represent a direct subtraction from the amount of time available for combat training. The net impact of this can only be a dilution of the Armed Forces' quality through the creation of a conscript force composed of individuals with limited technical skill. The time available may result in a soldier's knowing how to fire a particular weapon system, but the prospect of many troops acquiring an understanding of maintenance procedures or tactical employment is not likely. The combined effect of these very substantial shortcomings of Central Asian youth in the absorption of military skills will be substantial and will certainly impact upon the other members of the unit. Time spent with even a small percentage of the unit's members is time which is no longer available to the unit as a whole. Thus, Soviet officers will spend more time and energy in unit training activities, and will likely receive a poorer return in terms of combat readiness.

But lower skill levels may be only one aspect of the problems to be encountered as a result of minority integration into the Armed Forces. Serious deficiencies are also likely to be experienced in the crucial areas of loyalty and motivation.
The Central Asian recruit will find himself in a predominantly Russian environment where ethnic tensions are likely to be high. His failure to communicate well in the Russian language and his ethnic dissimilarities will serve to set him apart, eliminating the sense of comradeship which makes military burdens bearable. Abuzyarov reports that:

"This is all bound to affect the morale of servicemen; poor knowledge of Russian often leads to depression and sometimes engenders a negative attitude towards military service."30

With little access to career advancement and with military doctrine and organization geared to a "foreign" culture, it is difficult to see how these substantial numbers of Moslem recruits will remain loyal in difficult times or how they will be motivated to do anything more than is necessary to survive. Current and projected programs designed to improve the technical and linguistic skills of Central Asians prior to induction may serve to heighten the antagonism with which these minorities face military service; for it is these very programs which will allow him to establish a productive life of his own: a life which must now be interrupted for military service.

Thus, the most significant impact of demographic trends upon the Soviet Armed Forces seems to be qualitative rather than quantitative. It is the reduction in military capability and morale rather than a potential for numerical reductions which bodes ill for the future of the

30 ibid., p. 7.
Soviet forces. In the sophisticated era of the 1990's, it will still be man who dominates the battlefield and controls the destiny of nations. It will be in this essential sector, the human sector, that the Soviet Union may be weak.

At this point, it becomes necessary to consider the reliability of future Soviet Central Asian soldiers in offensive operations abroad. Not only are there questions as to the capabilities and morale of these soldiers, but also one must question the degree of loyalty which such conscripts will display in difficult situations.

It seems clear that unit cohesion will suffer as a result of increased ethnic diversity in the regular forces. A 1972 article in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil mentions the case of soldiers who began to shun their comrades as a result of ridicule inflicted upon them because of poor Russian language ability. To the extent that military service represents a recruit's first exposure to a predominantly Russian environment, compulsory service may form long term resentments which affect the attitude of Central Asian soldiers toward the Slavic center.

The obvious scenario where one might suspect a lack of reliability among Central Asian soldiers would be the use of Soviet forces in Iran or Afghanistan where ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties between Soviet Central Asians and the local population are strong. The loyalty of Central Asian soldiers placed in this situation would likely depend

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31 ibid., p. 4.
upon a delicate balance of sympathies for and identification with the local populations on the one hand, and the economic benefits and physical security of remaining loyal on the other. It is clear that the Soviet Union initially used some Central Asian soldiers in the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan for the obvious propaganda benefits (fraternal assistance), as well as the utilization of the advantages which accrue to soldiers who possess familiarity with the climate, terrain, and local language. Jiri Valenta reports that soldiers of Central Asian origin were replaced by Russians or withdrawn to barracks after the invasion because of reported refusals to fight the Afghans. Although such reports are difficult to substantiate, there is at least a basis for suspicion as to the reliability of Soviet Central Asian soldiers in combat against ethnic brothers. Of particular concern is the degree to which rising Islamic fervor in Soviet Central Asia will inhibit these soldiers from participating in combat against Moslem brethren of similar ethnic origin.

The same characteristics which make these soldiers potentially unreliable in a South Asian scenario may serve to increase reliability against N.A.T.O. (or rebellious Warsaw Pact) forces in Europe. The lack of any cultural similarities with West Europeans or Americans as well as limited knowledge (heavily colored by pro-Soviet propaganda) would tend to increase the identification with Russians rather than other

Europeans. In commenting upon the use of "a considerable number" of Soviet troops from Central Asia in the second intervention of the 1956 Hungarian Crisis, the U.S. committee which investigated the intervention stated that:

"It would seem that the Soviet authorities had more confidence in troops who had had no opportunity to be affected by European associations and who might be counted on to behave with indifference to the attitude of the Hungarian people.\(^{33}\)

However, the degree of confidence may not have been great as these Central Asian forces were led to believe that they were in Egypt, with the mission of fighting the Anglo-French imperialists.\(^{34}\) Conversely, it is precisely in this scenario where the limited capabilities of Central Asian soldiers will most likely subject them to defeat by a more technically competent opponent.

Although such discussions must remain highly speculative at this early point of Central Asian utilization, it does appear that the necessity of using more Central Asians in the regular forces provides numerous uncertainties for the central leadership in making decisions concerning their use. Not only must Soviet leaders content themselves with low technical capability and morale, but also with the potential for problems in the areas of cohesion and reliability. In those scenarios where Central Asian soldiers would be most effective relative to their opponents, their reliability is potentially low. Conversely, in scenarios where Central


\(^{34}\)ibid.
Asian reliability may be high, the ability to carry out successful military operations may be low. Although demographics will not determine the formulation of future military or foreign policy, it is clear that these variables will likely affect the achievements which such policies might hope to obtain.
V. NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

A. U.S.S.R.

The implications of demographic trends for Soviet national security policy are likely to be numerous, particularly in the decade ahead when manpower resources for the military and the economy begin a rapid decline to unprecedented levels. The major developments impacting upon the decision-making process will be intense competition for scarce human resources between the economic and military sectors, greater reliance upon less skilled Central Asian manpower for the maintenance of military force levels, and increased leverage in interest articulation on the part of Central Asian elites.

Much has been said about the effects of continued high military expenditures upon the Soviet economy. The debate has centered around the prospects for increasing military expenditures in light of decreasing levels of investment capital, increased energy scarcity, and rising demands for the production of consumer goods. In the future, development of the military sector will also require an inordinate share of available manpower resources, including over 70% of each year's cohort of 18 year-old-youths. Although short term reductions in the size of the military force are not forecasted, it seems clear that there are numerous and substantial constraints upon significant force expansion.
Current force levels will most likely be maintained at the expense of exacerbating existing manpower shortages. Force expansion created through the mobilization of reserves will draw productive workers away from industry, with extremely low availability of unused labor to fill the void.

The influx of Central Asian youth into the regular forces will certainly result in diminished technical capabilities, responsiveness, morale, and perhaps reliability in South Asian scenarios. With nearly 35% of each conscript class composed of Central Asian recruits of limited linguistic and technical talents, the ability of the Soviets to maintain a high quality, modern force capable of conducting successful operations against Western forces is diminished. Such considerations may serve to qualify the edge obtained through quantitative predominances, although the degree of diminished capability is not clear. To the extent that Soviets are able to funnel Central Asian manpower into occupational specialties requiring fewer technical or linguistic skills, and to limit the impact of heightened ethnic tension on unit morale; the resultant effect upon unit readiness may not be great. The likelihood of complete success in this endeavor would not seem high, considering the increasing complexity of weapon systems. The combined effect of these deficiencies may be to increase the uncertainties involved in the decision to use military force, particularly in large scale conflicts.

The previously noted enhancement of leverage in the articulation of Central Asian interests by local elites (as a result of the demographic explosion) illustrates the initiation of changes in domestic political balances which may impact upon national security considerations.
More so than in previous decades, Central Asia has become important to the future economic development of the Soviet state, as this region will provide the only meaningful increments to labor supplies for the development of West Siberian resource industries. As such, the central authorities are likely to pay more attention to international events which may affect the political stability of the Southern Tier.

It is somewhat simplistic to argue that the Party leadership is concerned about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism leading to counter-revolution in Soviet Central Asia. However, it seems clear that Moscow is concerned about the rising confidence and militancy of the Islamic movement, and fears that Islamic successes in the nations bordering the Soviet South could fuel Central Asian demands for greater autonomy, political participation, religious and cultural freedom, and regional investment. As the Southern Tier becomes increasingly necessary for Soviet economic development, events in Iran, Afghanistan, and other bordering Islamic nations may take on increased significance for the Soviet concept of security. Just as the emergence of nationalistic trends in the non-Russian Soviet republics contributed to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the fear of the effects of pan-Islamic tendencies in Soviet Central Asia may have contributed to the Afghan intervention of 1979. In the future, Soviet foreign policy toward South Asia will surely encounter the dilemma of posing as friend to the Islamic nations while attempting to minimize their achievements.
B. U.S.

The U.S. has entered the decade of the 80's with the clearly expressed desire of upgrading its military forces. And yet, the particular structure which these forces are to take has yet to be clearly defined. The considerations discussed above may provide meaningful input into the debate concerning the nature and structure of future U.S. military forces.

U.S. analysts have often expressed grave concerns over the enormous size of the Soviet Armed Forces. It must be remembered, however, that Soviet military forces serve domestic as well as international roles and that demographic trends are likely to produce a lower capability than would otherwise be expected of a force this size.

In assessing Soviet intentions, it must be noted that the size of the Soviet military is partly the result of the Party's desire to provide universal political indoctrination to Soviet youth. Also, increasing representation of Central Asians in the regular forces of the 1980's will most likely create morale and quality problems which will surely attenuate the combat readiness of Soviet units.

In assessing U.S. military readiness, great notice is taken of even the smallest flaws in both the quantity and quality of existing manpower resources. Recent concerns for the low educational level of U.S. recruits and the inability to fill authorized billets are said to have serious implications for the level of military capability. And yet, U.S. manpower shortages are predominantly the result of the failure to provide adequate pay incentives for a voluntary force or to undertake the reinstitution of compulsory service, and are not the
result of absolute manpower shortages. Should there be a necessity for massive mobilization, the U.S. has an enormous reserve of unused labor (primarily female) capable of assuming vacated positions. In contrast, current Soviet force levels utilize nearly all of the Soviet's available manpower, and mobilization of reserves can be accomplished only by stripping the economy bare.

This analysis would suggest that current U.S. manpower levels will be adequate to meet the Soviet challenge, provided that authorized billets are filled and modernization continues. A smaller, leaner, more capable force with excellent transport and first line weaponry will be a more than adequate deterrent to Soviet expansion. The necessity for massive regular force additions recommended by some does not appear to be acute. Furthermore, recent efforts by the U.S. Army leadership to concentrate their efforts upon measures for the strengthening of unit cohesion and morale (modified regimental system and assignment stability) may some day pay handsome dividends against a Soviet force in which good morale may be a scarce commodity.

Even a cursory review of Soviet mobilization capabilities reveals a phenomenal ability to funnel massive amounts of trained manpower into the reserve forces. Furthermore the superstructure for the mobilization may be decisive. Historically, the Soviets have not hesitated to use reserve forces as evidenced in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.

In contrast, the U.S. capability to rapidly mobilize and deploy millions of reservists appears quite limited. A clear priority for the 1980's should be the improvement of reserve forces as well as the upgrading of mobilization functions. Without compulsory service, it is
evident that the U.S. cannot hope to match the Soviet achievement in the area of reserve mobilization. However, there is much room for improvement even under the current system of voluntary service.

The recent promulgation of the Carter doctrine has committed the U.S. to the military defense of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region. In the application of this doctrine, particularly toward Iran, it must be remembered that Soviet interests are also great and will likely result in Soviet reaction to U.S. initiatives in the region. Not only are the Soviet leaders concerned about the obvious security implications for their southern border, but also they must be watchful for developments in the region which might tend to increase the assertiveness of Moslem populations in the border regions of Soviet Central Asia.

Those who insist that Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf are less intense than our own because of little dependence upon Arab oil may be neglecting important Soviet domestic variables which have historically contributed to military interventions.
C. CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has examined Soviet military manpower management in detail and has concluded that serious challenges face the Soviet leadership in the maintenance of military capabilities through the remainder of this century. These challenges include the shortage of youthful manpower for compulsory service, serious technical and morale problems as a result of the influx of poorly qualified Central Asian recruits, and the inability to mobilize reserve forces without irreversibly damaging industrial production capacity. There are significant "chinks" in the Soviet armor which the U.S. can successfully exploit in the decade of the 1980's to redress the current military balance. Serious, well planned modernization accompanied by the application of sound manpower and mobilization policies can result in the creation of a military force which is second to none. Whether or not the U.S. successfully addresses its military position vis a vis the Soviet Union will be largely a matter of commitment. The challenge posed by the Soviet military expansion of the 1970's can surely be met in the decade ahead.
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