Military Representation

Mark J. Eitelberg

HumARO
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION
300 North Washington Street • Alexandria, Virginia 22314

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited

80 12 16 034
MILITARY REPRESENTATION:
THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN
THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES.

Doctoral thesis
by
Mark Jan Eitelberg

Oct 1979

A dissertation in the Department of Public Administration
submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of Arts
and Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
New York University

Approved
Frank N. Trager
Research Adviser

Dec 1 7 1980

DTIC ELECTE
S F

405264
Copyright © by
Mark Jan Eitelberg
October 1979

Reproduction in whole or in part permitted
for any purpose of the U.S. Government
LIST OF TABLES ........................................... vii
PREFACE ................................................... xiii
CHAPTER I. MILITARY REPRESENTATION AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER
FORCE: STUDY PROBLEMS, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES .............. 1
   Recent Discussions of Military Representation
   Public Attitudes and Future Issues
   The Study of Military Representation
   Scope and Objectives of the Study
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS ....................... 37
   The Concept of Political Representation
   Formulations of Political Representation
   The Representative Bureaucracy
   The Representative Military
   The "Real Nature" of Military Representation
CHAPTER III. THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY REPRESENTATION
IN AMERICA .......................................... 71
   The Search for an American Army: National Security,
      Responsibilities of Citizenship, and Control
   Recent Developments of the Concept
   The Relevane of Measures of Representation
   Summary of Representation Issues
CHAPTER IV. MILITARY REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL EQUITY:
PAST AND PRESENT EXPERIENCES .............................. 103
   Equity in the Military Melting Pot
   Black Representation in the Armed Forces:
      Historical Perspective
   Black Representation: From Segregation and Quotas
      to Equality of Opportunity
   Representation, Equity, and the War in Vietnam
   The Vietnam-Era Draft in Retrospect
   Military Representation and Social Equity under the AVF
   Measures of Social Equity
   Implications
CHAPTER V. MILITARY REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL EQUITY:
THE POLICY MAZE ...................................... 183
   Benefits vs. Burdens of Military Service
   Reconciling Benefits and Burdens in the AVF
LIST OF TABLES

1. Black Proportions of Army Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Population of the United States .......... 21

2. Army Black Enlisted Personnel and Army Reenlistment Rates ................................................. 22


4. Age of Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) at Time of Entry (1977) by Service of Accession ....... 96

5. Age Distribution of Active Duty Male Military Personnel and Male Population of the United States (1977 and Projected) .................. 97

6. Racial/Ethnic Status of Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Population of the United States (1977) .............................................................. 147

7. Racial Composition of the Armed Forces (Army and Total DoD) and Population of the United States (Employed Persons) by Occupation Group (1977) ........... 149

8. Minority Male Employment in Private Firms with 100 or More Employees by Occupation Group (1975) .... 151

9. Grade Distribution of Army Active Duty Personnel by Race (1977) ............................................ 154


11. High School Graduates and Non-Graduates Among Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) by Racial/Ethnic Status and Service of Accession .................. 159


14. Comparison of Median Family Income Distributions for All Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Population of the United States .......... 165
15. Comparison of Median Family Income Distributions for Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) by Service of Accession and Population of the United States ....... 167

16. Approximate Family Income of Army Enlisted Personnel at Time of Entry ............... 168

17. Approximate Family Income of Army Officers at Time of Entry ..................... 170

18. Educational Attainment by Median Family Income in Home of Record for Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) in Army and Total DoD ............. 171

19. Educational Attainment of the Parents of Male Non-Prior Service Accessions and Comparable Groups From the Population of the U.S. ............. 173

20. Marital Status of Male Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) by Service of Accession and Male Population of the U.S. .................. 175


22. Educational Attainment of Army Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Male Population of the U.S. by Race and Marital Status (1977) .......... 179


24. Unemployment Rates of Persons by Race, Sex, and Age: Annual Average for 1977 ................. 201


27. Perceived Difficulty of Obtaining a Full-Time Job as Reported by Male Non-Prior Service Accessions by Service of Accession (1976) ................. 206

31. Percent of Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and U.S. Population Who Reside in "Urban Areas" by Year of Entry (FY 1977) ........ 282
32. Type of Community Defined as "Home Area" For Male Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Population of the U.S. (1977) ........ 284
33. Type of Community Described as "Home Area" by Active Duty Army Personnel and Male Population of the U.S. ........ 287
34. Socioeconomic Status (SES) of Army Entrants and Military Non-Entrants From the High School Graduating Class of 1972 ........ 288
35. "Quality of Life" Perceptions of Army Entrants and Non-Entrants From the High School Class of 1972: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations ........ 300
36. Importance Attributed to Political Activities as Expressed by Army Entrants and Non-Entrants in the High School Class of 1972: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations ........ 302
37. Frequency of Actual Political Participation by Army Entrants and Non-Entrants in the High School Class of 1972: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations ........ 303
38. Index of Orientation Toward Environmetal Values for Army Entrants and Non-Entrants in the High School Class of 1972 ........ 308
39. Index of Political Activeness for Army Entrants and Non-Entrants in the High School Class of 1972 ........ 310
40. Percent of Total Active Duty Personnel Who are Women by Service for Selected Years ........ 328
41. Percent of Active Duty Officers Who are Women by Service for Selected Years ........ 332
42. Sex Composition of Enlisted Entrants by Service of Accession (Non-Prior Service) and Population of the United States (1977) ........ 333
43. Educational Attainment by Sex for Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Population of the U.S. (1977) ........ 336
44. Percent of Total Active Duty Enlisted Personnel Who are Women by Service for Selected Years ........ 338
45. Mental Category Distribution of Male Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) in Army and Total DoD for Selected Years 364
46. Mental Category Distribution of Male Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Comparison Data on Eligible Male Civilian Population (1977) 366
47. Mental Category Distribution of Male Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) in Army and Total DoD by Race for Selected Years 367
48. Mental Category Distribution of Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) in Army and Total DoD by Race/Ethnic Status (1977) 369
50. Educational Attainment of Active Duty Military Personnel (Officers and Enlistees) in Army and Total DoD and Male Population of the U.S. 373
51. Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) Who Received Waivers for Enlistment by Type of Waiver, Race, and Service of Accession (1977) 375
52. Comparison of Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) Who Received Moral Waivers by Type of Moral Waiver Received and Civilian Arrest Records for Males Under the Age of 18 377
53. Comparison of Army Identified Offenders and U.S. Population Arrests by Race and Type of Crime 379
54. Early Separations of Army Active Duty Enlisted Personnel by Type of Discharge (Other Than Honorable) and Race for Selected Years 383
55. Number and Percentage Distribution of
   Enlisted Entrants (Non-Prior Service) in
   CY 1977 by Service of Accession .............. 415

56. Number and Percentage Distribution of
   Active Duty Military Personnel as of
   FY 1977 by Service and Type .................. 417

FIGURE

1. Convergence/Divergence Model of
   Military Representation ...................... 403
Military "representation"—that is, the microcosmic duplication of the general population and variety of community interests in the armed forces—is an old idea, but a relatively new area of research and popular interest. This study of military representation evolved from a relatively small research project I developed and directed in 1976 while at the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), Alexandria, Virginia. The original project was sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, and its objectives were at once modest, somewhat indefinite, and quite sweeping in scope: research would locate and examine relevant surveys and other data sources, identify contemporary issues, develop "new techniques" for analysis, and seek to "provide a structure for future research on the patterns and policy objectives of Army representation."

The six-month project appeared at the outset to be a well-defined, strictly "objective," statistical evaluation of volunteer recruitment in the Army. After all, references to "representation" were commonplace in 1976; and the research effort was, in some measure, a reaction to the recurrent, probing remarks and critical commentary of several influential congressmen. However, the ensuing evaluation of Army representation revealed definitions fraught with ambiguity, conflicting methods, standards and measurement criteria, persistent controversies, a wide array of competing values and emotive generalities, and often contradictory conclusions derived from the same statistical
evidence. "Representation" clearly extended far beyond numbers and ratios and statistical summaries; simple comparisons of military and civilian populations were often inappropriate and generally inadequate. The analytical framework thus provided a multitude of unexplored, unresolved, nagging problems.

For the past three years since the completion of the HumRRO project I have been exploring varied aspects of "representation" in theory and in practice. I have adopted in the course of my study the analytical approach of a "generalist," with the purpose of gaining a broader perspective and insight, a better grasp or understanding of the policy concept and its practical implications for both the military and society.

In the absence of "well-trodden paths to understanding," the present study is formulative or exploratory; it entails the review of historical antecedents, the clarification of concepts, a census of problems and vital issues, a sifting of priorities, and the development of a foundation for policy evaluation. There is an intricate and tangled web of questions involved in the study of "representation"—questions which are as old as philosophy itself and, yet, as current as the All-Volunteer Force. A special attempt is made to unravel the snarl of issues and competing principles embraced by military representation. Value conflicts are described and weighed. Statements and interpretations of national "needs" are critically examined. And, in the end, of course, the study strives to provide illumination and a field of view—that is, "keen sight" and proper focus on what may be conservatively described as a very obscure question.
In the course of my research and writing, I have received the valuable support, guidance, time, and encouragement of several individuals and institutions. I wish in particular to thank my doctoral committee: Professor Frank N. Trager, Director of the National Security Program in the Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University, and my principal adviser; Professor David R. Segal of the University of Maryland; and Professor John D. Blair of the University of Maryland. I owe a significant debt of gratitude to my doctoral committee; they have my appreciation, as well as my respect and admiration.

I am also grateful to Professor Charles C. Moskos, Jr. of Northwestern University for his interest and encouragement; to Dr. Richard W. Hunter of the Department of Defense for his insightful comments and suggestions; to Mr. Richard D. Rosenblatt of HumRRO for his help in the computer programming and data acquisition; to Dr. Richard L. Eisenman for first setting me on the trail of "representation" over four years ago; and to my associates and friends who read the manuscript and commented on it (even though I did not always follow their advice).

The Human Resources Research Organization and its staff have encouraged me throughout my work, and they have provided, along the way, considerable assistance in support of my educational objectives. And I am indebted to several persons at the Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University, for clearing obstacles and helping to shorten the distance between a "long-distance" doctoral candidate and his university.
I had the good fortune to have the clerical assistance of Ms. Judith C. Pumphrey, who skillfully typed the first draft and the final manuscript.

And, finally, I express special appreciation to Ms. Deborah J. Brant for her support, understanding, and immense patience during my long hours of research and writing.
CHAPTER I

MILITARY REPRESENTATION AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE:

STUDY PROBLEMS, SCOPE, AND OBJECTIVES

In 1968 Lewis Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System, proudly asserted (though many disagreed at the time) that "[t]he System [Selective Service] is representative of the American people, as clear an example as exists today of government of the people, by the people, and for the people. . . . The system as constituted involves all economic levels, all educational institutions, all geographic areas and all ethnic groups." 1 Hershey was responding to critics of the Selective Service System who found less than an equitable distribution of the "burden of defense" among American youth. Meanwhile, Defense Department Statistics clearly showed that blacks were more likely to be (1) drafted, (2) sent to Vietnam, (3) serve in high-risk combat units, and, consequently, (4) be killed or wounded. 2 Additionally, an array of deferments and disqualifications—e.g., for getting married, having a child, enrolling in college, teaching in public school, joining the Peace Corps, or "failing" the induction physical examination—left numerous ways for those young men who


wanted to avoid the draft to do so; and those who managed to avoid the
draft, it appeared, were mainly the white, better-educated children of
comfortable families.

By 1969, the end of conscription appeared inevitable. The rising
tide of public opinion favored President Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign pro-
mise to "prepare for the day when the draft can be phased out of American
life."¹ At the same time, prevailing views of the relationship between
the military and society were undergoing significant changes. First, the
war in Vietnam (along with increased draft calls) gave the armed forces a
new and higher level of public visibility. The seemingly endless war,
casualty rates and reports of missing persons, Selective Service reform,
and the movement to end conscription were important public concerns—while,
concurrently, "quota consciousness" was becoming a major social and polit-
cal issue of the period. The civil rights movement, women's liberation,
the welfare rights movement, Supreme Court decisions, the War on Poverty,
and federal legislation to create a "balanced society" (for example, af-
firmative action) contributed to a heightened awareness of group participa-
tion and "statistical parity" within all sectors of society.

In 1970, the stage was set for serious debate concerning the prac-
ticality of an All-Volunteer Force (AVF); and not only whether the AVF was
indeed possible (i.e., quantitative requirements could be achieved at rea-
sonable cost), but whether the volunteer system could amend the social

¹Cited in Melvin R. Laird, Report to the President: Progress in
Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, (Washington,
July 1972), p. 1; see also, Richard M. Nixon, "The All-Volunteer Armed
Force," (an address given over the CBS Radio Network), 17 October 1968,
in Gerald Leinwand (ed.), The Draft (New York: Pocket Books, 1970),
pp. 96-108.
injustices of a less-than-equitable draft. Interestingly, the equity issue became a primary argument of AVF critics who claimed that abolition of the draft would only further serve to insulate the better-educated sons of middle and upper-class families from military service and the potential horrors of war.¹

Parallel to this concern for equity, there developed during the AVF discussions a middle-class fear that a strictly volunteer Army would eventually become "an Army of disciplined phalanxes of 40-year-old black men with shaved heads marching to take over the government in Washington."² The black militancy and civil disorders of the 1960s created for some a vision of racial wars and organized violence in the streets of America. It was also feared that the Army would become a haven for the disadvantaged and the mentally-incompetent unemployables of society: "... a Volunteer Army of Chesty Pullers, Pachua alumni, Hell's Angels, psychopaths, inbred albino mountain boys and 38-year-old privates dividing their time between the bayonet range and the whorehouse."³

The first negative reactions to the introduction of the plan for "zero-draft" calls, however, generally concerned national security and a


² Josiah Bunting, "Can the Volunteer Army Fight? (Don't Count On It)," Playboy, November 1975, p. 158.

³ Ibid., p. 84.
means for maintaining a mass armed force—the major reasons given for instituting conscription. There were some references to the issues of proportional "representation" in early discussions; but it was the final report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (often referred to as the "Gates Commission," after its chairman, former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates) and its treatment of "objections against the AVF" which provided the first official government recognition of possible "representation" problems. The Gates Commission report highlighted several contemporary issues which were directly related to questions of "complete" citizen participation: (1) an all-volunteer force will "undermine patriotism by weakening the traditional belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his country";1 (2) the presence of self-selected, "undesirable psychological types" (i.e., men inclined to use force and violence to solve problems)2 will isolate the military from society and threaten "civilian authority, our freedom, and our democratic institutions";3 (3) the volunteer force will be all-black or dominated by servicemen from low-income backgrounds, "motivated primarily by monetary rewards rather than patriotism";4 (4) the volunteer force will lead to a decline in patriotism, a decline in popular concern about foreign policy, and an increase in the likelihood of military adventurism;5 and (5) there will be a general erosion of military effectiveness "because not enough

2Ibid., p. 131. 3Ibid., p. 14.
4Ibid., pp. 15-16. 5Ibid., pp. 16-17.
highly qualified youths will be likely to enlist and pursue military careers"—further causing an "erosion of civilian respect for the military" and a decline in "the prestige and dignity of the services."¹

During the transitional period from draft to volunteer force, the major area of concern among most policy-makers was "quantity and quality." Issues of representation were secondary, since, in order to be effective, the AVF would first have to draw adequate numbers of qualified volunteers. However, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird did feel obliged to point out in his Report to the President: Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force that "long range ... we do not foresee any significant difference between the racial composition of the All-Volunteer Force and the racial composition of the Nation";² and, charges that the AVF will be dominated by mercenaries, or be all black, or be dominated by low-income youth are "false and unfounded claims."³ Indeed, Laird reported, "we are determined that the All-Volunteer Force shall have broad appeal to young men and women in all racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds."⁴

When it became apparent that manpower requirements could be achieved under volunteer conditions,⁵ the focus of attention shifted to the finer points of military representation.⁶ By the end of FY 1974 it was obvious

¹Ibid., pp. 18, 136-138.
³Ibid., p. 8.
that certain social groups were not enlisting in the military at predicted levels; the "broad appeal" of military service did not extend quite as far as many Defense analysts had originally predicted. The most conspicuous statistic was the sudden leap in the proportion of black enlisted accessions. During FY 1974, the proportion of black enlisted accessions in the Army increased by approximately 50 percent from the previous year, to an all-time high of 28 percent. Actually, data showed that the relative number of black enlisted accessions had increased steadily during the phasing-out of compulsory service: by FY 1974, the percentage of black enlisted accessions in the Army was double what it had been in 1969-1970, the year the Gates Commission predicted that "the composition of the military will not be fundamentally changed by ending conscription." In fact, all Services displayed increases in the number of blacks, while total black enlistments went from 13 percent in FY 1970 to 21 percent in FY 1974.

If the proponents of voluntary service had not been so emphatic in their predictions of "proportional representation" under the new AVF, perhaps the reactions of critics and skeptics would not have been so severe. But the Gates Commission had left little room for doubt. The Commission's "best projections for the future" were that blacks would comprise 14.9 percent of enlisted males in the AVF, and that the proportion of black enlistees in the Army would be approximately 18.8 percent by the year 1980.

1. U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Report, p. 15.
"To be sure, these are estimates," the Commission asserted, "but even extreme assumptions would not change the figures drastically."¹

There were also significant changes in the educational and mental group levels of the new AVF. In 1970, more than 20 percent of the active force had completed two or more years of college. Thereafter, as the Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) notes, the proportion of college-trained men in the active forces steadily decreased to a rate of 9 percent by January 1975.² During the same period, the percentage of recruits in Mental Categories I and II, the highest aptitude or "quality" levels, noticeably decreased; and the percentage of recruits in the lowest acceptable "quality" level, Mental Category IV, likewise declined—causing a proportionate expansion in the percentage of recruits in the mid-level or "average" categories.³ While these recruiting results did not particularly disturb Defense manpower strategists (since the percentage of high school graduates actually increased during this period), there were

¹Ibid., p. 15.

²Coffey, et al., "Socio-Economic Composition," p. E-10. It should be noted, however, that 1970 figures reflect the results of the Vietnam-era draft and an active duty force of approximately one million more servicemembers than in 1975.

³All applicants for enlistment are tested for their mental aptitude. Mental aptitude is determined from the combined scores on three subtests on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). These scores are then used to classify applicants into one of five "mental categories." Those in Categories I and II are above-average; those in Category III (IIIA, IIIB) are average; those in Category IV (IVa, IVb, IVc) are below average, but eligible for enlistment; and those in Category V are disqualified from military enlistment. For statistics cited see U.S. General Accounting Office, "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits," FPCF-75-170 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, February 1976), pp. 6-9; and U.S. General Accounting Office, "Problems Resulting From Management Practices in Recruiting, Training, and Using Non-High-School Graduates and Mental Category IV Personnel," FPCD-76-24 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, January 1976).
indications that shifting education and aptitude levels were symptoms of more fundamental changes in the socioeconomic character of the armed forces.

An "Issue Brief" prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress) summarized the situation in January 1975: "DoD has repeatedly stated that it is not concerned with the racial breakdown of the Armed Forces and regards any action taken to limit enlistments by race as a violation of the concept that each individual must be measured on his own worth regardless of color. Congress, however, continues to be concerned that the Armed Forces may be becoming disproportionately composed of individuals who have lower socioeconomic status or who are members of racial/ethnic minorities."¹

Congress expressed its concern at the Defense appropriations hearings in 1974 and 1975. By Act of Congress (Public Law 93-144, contained in Title VII of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1974) the Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) was created and directed to conduct a comprehensive study of the overall manpower requirements of the Department of Defense. Section 702(7) of P.L. 93-155 mandated special study of "the implications for the ability of the armed forces to fulfill their mission as a result of the change in the socioeconomic composition of military enlistees since the enactment of new recruiting policies provided for in Public Law 92-129 and the implications for national policies of this change in the composition of the armed forces."² The Department


of Defense was likewise directed by Congress to submit annual reports on "population representation in the All-Volunteer Force"—i.e., the geographic, education, economic, and racial composition of enlisted accessions and members of the active force—at the end of each fiscal year.¹

Goldich writes in a 1975 Congressional Research Service "Issue Brief" that "[t]he general level of controversy about the AVF has dropped drastically since its implementation three years ago; that discussion which does take place revolves about the socioeconomic status of volunteers and the philosophical implications of the AVF.² So, the Department of Defense started to generate more studies and discussions of "representation" issues in its various publications and reports.³ In addition, articles appeared in scholarly journals treating the "social


demography" of the AVF and "racial composition" issues; and the popular press, from Playboy to The New Yorker, began to inquire whether the volunteer Army should or could ever be a truly "representative force."

The Department of Defense maintained its official position that social composition was "irrelevant" to the goals of equal opportunity, and the controversy only grew more heated. But the Defense Department's position was more of a rationalization for its recruiting achievements (or failures) than a true statement of its policy. In reality, DoD sought to achieve a socially "representative" force—but in a highly competitive and contracting market for military-age youth, there were no means of controlling or limiting the enlistments of "qualified" persons.


In March of 1975, Army Secretary Howard H. Callaway appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee and told Congress what it wanted to hear. Callaway described the Army's manpower recruitment goals, taking the issue of "representation" to its idealistic extreme:

What we seek, and need, are quality soldiers--men and women who are representative of the overall population. Ideally, we would like to have at least one from every rural delivery route, and one from every small town. Our obligation to the American people is to strive to field an Army which is both representative of them and acceptable to them.¹

What the Army needs, Callaway explained, is "an army broadly representative of all Americans which, to the extent possible, would contain roughly the same percentages of people of all ethnic groups, and the same percentage at various income levels and education levels."² Indeed, Lt. General Harold G. Moore, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, continued, "[w]e believe that these quality personnel should be representative of all regional, economic, and racial segments of society";³ an Army which is "generally representative of the American people . . . in the racial, geographic, and socioeconomic sense," echoed Donald G. Brotzman, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.⁴

²Ibid., p. 105. ³Ibid., p. 619.
Recent Discussions of Military Representation

"Representation" has since become one of the immortal words of the military vernacular, appearing in most contemporary discussions of military manpower programs and policy. Congressional appropriations hearings and hearings on military personnel continue to cover the social demography and quality aspects of the AVF. Congressional reports, such as the much-publicized "King Report," likewise devote significant attention to the "representativeness of the AVF," since it is often identified as a "problem area."  

Special studies by the General Accounting Office, the Defense Manpower Commission, ongoing research by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office, and recent government-sponsored research evidence the general public interest in representational issues.


Independent and academic research, and articles in scholarly journals over the past few years—as well as statements by government officials, public commentary, and general literature in the Social Sciences—have also served to stimulate public awareness and discussion of military representation.

In addition to the annual "representation reports" required by Congress, the Department of Defense normally includes statistical information


on the social demography of the AVF in its status reports and documents.

In the December 1976 year-end report from the Secretary of Defense, *The All-Volunteer Force: Current Status and Prospects*, for example, a full chapter is devoted to "representation" (i.e., by income, region, women, and race). The Defense Department's *Interim Report of the Study of the All-Volunteer Force* (January 1978) focuses on "qualitative measures" (i.e., comparisons of mental aptitude and education under the AVF and the previous-AVF conscripted force) as well as "other standards . . . suggested for the AVF based on external characteristics of societal objectives" (i.e., "... racial composition, female participation, and economic background and how well this compares to the population as a whole").

*America's Volunteers* (December 1978), a two-year, in-depth study of the volunteer armed forces, further elaborates on "Trends in Quality of Accessions," and "Changes in Representativeness of Force."

---


The Army has always been the center of interest for discussions of military representation, since it requires the greatest manpower,¹ it is generally considered the least glamorous and attractive branch of the armed forces, and it is consequently the least socially "representative" Service under the AVF. The Army began conducting representation studies during the war in Vietnam—when it was discovered that blacks disproportionately filled the ranks of the combat arms and were bearing most of the "burden of defense." Since then, there have been several analyses of "equal opportunity" and "institutional discrimination"—including a very comprehensive annual assessment of Army equal opportunity programs.² The Army also issues quarterly "information papers" on black representation³ and composite summaries containing demographic data on Army personnel (e.g., family income, type of community, military family ties, age, sex, marital status, education, religious preferences).⁴

In January 1977, outgoing Army Secretary Martin Hoffman commented that the "danger" of black overrepresentation was essentially the "problem

---

¹Approximately 38 percent of all active duty military personnel are in the Army. During the peak manpower period of the Vietnam War (30 June 1968), Army personnel comprised over 44 percent of the total active duty military and about 45 percent of the total active duty enlisted force. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Directorate for Information, Operations, and Reports, May 1978), pp. 20-26.


⁴See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, Army Personnel: Composite, 76-134-13 (Alexandria, Va.: Department of the Army, Military Personnel Center, 1977).
of combat arms." Blacks maintained in Vietnam that they were "fighting a white man's war," Hoffman noted; therefore, the Army seeks an effective "mix" so that no single group can be considered dominant in the combat arms. In addition, Hoffman remarked, when the number of black volunteers began to increase, some anti-volunteer non-commissioned officers who were "hostile to the increased number of blacks entering the service" decided to leave the Army. Now the Army "must get rid of the idea that only dumb guys, black or white, serve in these arms." ¹

When Army Secretary Clifford L. Alexander (the first black appointed to the position) took office in 1977, he remarked that the number of blacks in the Army is "immaterial": "Who is going to play God and set a quota?" Alexander has continued to maintain that the problem lies "outside the services." You have to ask "why there is almost 40 percent unemployment among black teenagers before you ask why they enlist or why they re-up."² Although Alexander believes the present Army is "the best ever assembled,"³ he notes in a recent assessment of equal opportunity programs that "minority and female representation" in certain Career Management Fields (CMFs) and "high level staffs" could be improved. "We can do better," Alexander writes.⁴


³Clifford Alexander, Secretary of the Army, Interview on "America's Black Forum," Station WMAL-TV, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1977.

Despite the frequent assertions by Alexander and other civilian defense officials that the overrepresentation of minorities and "disadvantaged" individuals in the armed forces should be viewed partly as a "positive sign"—i.e., that a greater proportion of these young people are graduating from high school and qualifying for military service—there is still public and Congressional concern that the Volunteer Army "may eventually be composed of low socioeconomic levels of minority groups."¹ Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, for example, has been a stern advocate of compulsory national service for American youth, and a large part of his argument concerns the need to redress racial "imbalances" and to provide more jobs and training for unemployed youth.²

Over the past few years, there have even been occasional anti-volunteer grumblings within the walls of the Pentagon. According to Milton Friedman, many high-level military officers accepted the volunteer armed force only with great reluctance and only under stiff pressure from President Nixon. "The military, and their allies on the Hill, have been chafing at the bit ever since," Friedman observes.³ In fact, civilian leaders in the Defense Department have complained for years that certain

---


³Milton Friedman, "Don't Draft GI Joe," Newsweek, 16 April 1979, p. 76.
influential Army generals have actually sought to "undermine the volunteer efforts" through their private actions and public inactions.

By late 1978, however, it was apparent that a fissure between the Pentagon's civilian leadership and uniformed hierarchy was indeed developing over the AVF issue.\(^1\) After defending the AVF for more than five years,\(^2\) several generals and admirals began to speak out and publicly criticize manpower trends under volunteer recruitment. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending a resumption of draft registration, set themselves at odds with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, an opponent of peacetime registration.\(^3\) Similarly, Army Chief of Staff Bernard L. Rogers, calling for both a "limited draft" to fill the reserves and registration of women, publicly disputed the official position of the Army presented by Army Secretary Alexander.\(^4\)

Population representation in the armed forces (particularly the Army) along with cost and manpower strength are the usual (and more vulnerable) targets of criticism. Defense Department manpower administrators


typically attempt to skirt social demographic statistics by claiming that these numbers are "irrelevant" to the real issues of (1) whether there are sufficient numbers of volunteers, (2) whether the active forces and resources can meet wartime needs (before new recruits are delivered to the battlefield), and (3) whether military personnel under the AVF have the aptitudes, physical abilities, acquired skills, and motivation to perform adequately in their jobs.¹ But, while the Defense Department takes this official stand, generals tell Congress that the volunteer Army is hurt by poor-quality recruits, by the "increase in units without the 'mix' of people from assorted backgrounds that was evident during the draft";² Army captains tell national television viewing audiences that Army recruits under the AVF are a bunch of "losers";³ and certain security-minded members of Congress continue to assert that the American armed forces are "operating on a ragged edge."⁴

Public Attitudes and Future Issues

During the past few years, the representation issue has come to be primarily associated with the overrepresentation of blacks in the Army. In fact, as Coffey and Reeg observe, the proportion (i.e., over-representation) of blacks is probably the major issue among all expressed


⁴This particular observation was made by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. See John W. Finney, "... But the Army of Volunteers is Worried," New York Times, 6 March 1977, p. D-3; also, "Stennis Says it is Time to Reimpose the Draft," New York Times, 11 February 1979, p. 56.
concerns of military representation. Since the draft ended in 1972, the number of blacks in the Army has increased by more than 50 percent. Department of the Army figures show that over 36 percent of all non-prior service accessions during the first part of FY 1979 were black (see Table 1). And, the Army expects to have an overall black accession rate in the range of 38-39 percent by the end of FY 1979. In addition, black first-termers tend to reenlist at a rate of about 1.75 times that of white first-termers; and black careerists reenlist at a rate of 1.3 times that of their white counterparts (see Table 2). As a result of these increasing enlistment and reenlistment trends, blacks are expected to comprise between 32 and 33 percent of all Army enlisted personnel by the end of FY 1979 (see Table 2).

As long as blacks comprise a disproportionate percentage of the armed forces, criticisms of the all-volunteer concept will be voiced. And, present indications are that the proportion of blacks in the armed forces (especially in the Army) will continue to grow as (1) increasing numbers of blacks qualify for service, (2) the proportion of the military-age U.S. population who are black increases, and (3) the economic situation favors minority enlistments as the "employer of last resort." (About 17 percent of military-age youth in the nation are unemployed; over 37 percent of jobless youth are blacks between the ages of 18 and 20.)

TABLE 1
BLACK PROPORTIONS OF ARMY ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE)
AND POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES
(Percentage Black)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Army Non-Prior Service Accessions</th>
<th>Black Population of the U.S. (18-24 Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979*</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Data for first quarter of fiscal year. FY 1979 year-end projection is 38-39 percent total black non-prior service accessions.
TABLE 2

ARMY BLACK ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND ARMY REENLISTMENT RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Army Black Enlisted Personnel (Percent of Total Army)</th>
<th>Army Reenlistment Rates (Percent of Eligibles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979*</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

*Data for first quarter of fiscal year.
Newspaper articles and editorials offer some indication of the extent of public concern regarding military representation. The general public will also be influenced by the popular press, which, on matters far-removed from public visibility (i.e., military manpower), tends to set the "public pulse" as much as measure it. If the New York Times, the so-called newspaper of historical record, can be considered a barometer of attitudes, there is additional evidence that "representation" will remain in the forefront of the AVF controversy.

A review of articles appearing in the New York Times over the past two years shows a continuing interest in the status of AVF enlistments. A steady stream of articles deal with some aspect of AVF recruitment; most of these articles report perceived problems; and practically all articles deal with issues of military "representation."

In a January 1977 editorial, the Times criticized the "drift toward a heavily black Army, officered mostly by whites," and recommended the formation of a "blue-ribbon commission" to study the idea of having compulsory national service. In July 1977, the Times printed a follow-up editorial in praise of President Carter's appointment of a military compensation commission, again commenting upon the "drift toward a heavily black Army," and urging "reappraisal" of the Volunteer Army. In May 1978, the Times printed a severely critical editorial, entitled


"Can We Afford a Volunteer Army?," which singled out representational aspects of the armed forces:

It is now an Army with substandard education, heavy racial imbalance and a drop-out rate double that of the draft era (40 percent of recruits are discharged before completing their first term of service). . . . Eliminating the Selective Service System has not in fact eliminated the inequities that helped spur agitation against the draft during the Vietnam War. With the sons of the middle classes deferred for college, Vietnam became a poor man's war, with disproportionate numbers of blacks serving in the combat forces. Recruit pay was quadrupled to increase volunteers and, finally, the draft was ended, but the imbalance was only accentuated. There are more poor in the Army now, not less. The percentage of blacks among Army enlisted men in 1971 was 13 percent, about the same as in the nation; it is now double that among Army recruits. Among officers, the proportion of blacks is only 6.3 percent.

And, once again, in January 1979 the Times expressed its own grave "Misgivings About the Volunteer Army." "The strength, quality and cost of the volunteer force are all sources of worry," notes the Times; but the "more worrisome" problem involves the unrepresentative character of the military:

Apart from the lack of readiness, no problem confronting the volunteer Army is more worrisome than the shortage of middle-class, college-oriented recruits; the Army is no longer even roughly a cross-section of the Nation. Volunteers, offered civilian pay scales, are coming far more heavily from the ranks of the poor, the unemployed and the undereducated than did even the troops in Vietnam. And with unemployment among draft-age blacks at 34 percent, double the Nation's youth average, it is not surprising that almost 40 percent of the Army's male recruits this fall were black.

A standby draft and concrete proposals to attract college-oriented youths are "the minimum first steps" to face the all-volunteer problem, the Times editorial concluded. In a similar frame, a U.S. News


A World Report editorial suggested the country "buy what time we can with registration and proceed to the debate [over resumption of the draft]"—while other periodicals and popular news journals likewise chronicled the mounting controversy over volunteer recruitment and the new campaign to restore the draft. "Many critics, liberals and conservatives alike, believe that the military has become totally unrepresentative of American society . . .," observes Bernard Weinraub. "As they do periodically, these criticisms have led to discussion of reviving the draft."3

There are strong indications, however, that the latest debate over a return to compulsory service is more than just a periodic, transitory exercise in political polemics. The AVF is on trial—as it has been, continually, since its inception. But there have never before been stronger pressures, swelling pressures, which have so united proconscription forces in Congress and throughout the nation. A spate of legislative proposals, suggesting everything from universal national


service to a reintroduction of draft registration, surfaced during the early days of the Ninety-sixth Congress. Most observers do not anticipate any drastic or sudden changes in current forms of voluntary recruitment—even though it is quite apparent the new draft debate and billowing controversy over military manpower will not soon subside. "The problems of the Volunteer Army," the New York Times observed in 1978, "will increase, not disappear. Responsible study of these problems is essential."2

The Study of Military Representation

In his much-publicized study of the AVF, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, Richard Cooper devotes a chapter to "Social Representation in the Volunteer Force."3 As Cooper observes, "no other AVF issue has received so much discussion based upon so little evidence."4 In fact, comparatively little substantive research has been done on the subject of military representation. Yet, military leaders, prominent government leaders, the press, and others continually speak of the "cross-sectional character" of the armed forces and the need to have,


3Cooper, Military Manpower, pp. 204-250.

4Ibid., p. 204.
as former Army Secretary Howard H. Callaway remarked, "a volunteer from every rural delivery route and small town in America."

Although mention is often made of the social and political requirements for statistical parity, most definitions of "military representation" are vague and ambiguous. At the heart of the issue is the axiom or assumption that all citizens of a state bear an equal obligation of service (or burden of responsibility) in behalf of the state. Yet, there is a distinct lack of consistency in stated objectives and policy-maker perceptions of "appropriate" citizen participation.

This lack of consistency may, in part, reflect the fact that (1) the possible range of population characteristics for proportional measurement is virtually limitless; (2) there is justification for using a variety of groups as the national civilian standard for comparison (e.g., the civilian labor force or divisions of the labor force, the population which served during the draft, the general population of military-age youth, the general population, qualified eligibles, high school graduates, etc.); and (3) there is justification for using various aggregations and combinations of groups from the armed forces as objects of proportional measurement—anything from the entire Department of Defense on down to the smallest identifiable unit (e.g., total armed forces, separate Services, recent accessions, total force, total enlisted force, the officer corps, males only, occupational specialties, broad skill groups, the geographical distribution of personnel according to branch units and echelons, the general distribution of group members by rank within units and subdivisions of units to the smallest level of an infantry platoon or squad, and so on).
It has even been suggested that standards for comparison be drawn from the conscripted forces of earlier years—itself not a truly representative configuration of the American people. Another case is often made for using FY 1964 as a "base" year or benchmark for comparison, since it was both pre-AVF and the last peacetime year before the war in Vietnam. And, as Segal and Daina point out, the common practice of exclusively using the enlisted force builds an automatic bias into comparisons with the civilian population—since officers tend to differ markedly from enlisted accessions.

It is interesting to note that, depending on which groups are chosen for comparison, the same military demographic data can be manipulated to either defend or criticize practically any interpretation of statistical "parity." A clear example of this appears in a review of "Two Years With the All-Volunteer Force" (1975) by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) William K. Brehm. Brehm presents a table showing "Black Representation Within the Enlisted Forces" and uses, along with two other civilian comparison measures, the proportion of blacks on non-farm labor activities (principally construction and manufacturing trades) where blacks comprise approximately 21 percent of the total labor force.

---

1See Segal and Daina, Social Representativeness; Richard V. L. Cooper, "A Note on Social Welfare Losses With and Without the Draft" (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, September 1975); Coffey, et al., "Socio-Economic Composition."


3Segal and Daina, Social Representativeness, pp. 4-5.

4Brehm, "Two Years With the All-Volunteer Force," p. 4.
In fact, there are disparate ideas on the appropriateness of certain representational measures. For example, should the percentage of blacks in the armed forces (recent accessions, total force, officers only, or total enlisted force) be compared with (1) the total proportion of blacks in the population (11 to 12 percent), (2) the proportion of blacks in the general population between the ages of 18 and 22 (13 percent), (3) the proportion of blacks among high school graduates between the ages of 18 and 22 (10 percent), (4) the proportion of military-available blacks in the labor force (10 to 11 percent), (5) the proportion of blacks in the 18-22 year-old non-college male population (20 percent), or (6) the proportion of blacks in manufacturing and construction (21 percent), the total blue-collar sector (14 percent), or some other area of the labor force?\(^1\)

The "groups" or factors included in military-civilian comparisons—i.e., those most commonly cited in studies of military representation—are race/ethnic status (specifically, white versus black), geographical distribution (by region and urban/rural classification), socioeconomic status (including, for example, parents' income or family income, parents' education, marital status and number of dependents), and, more recently, gender.\(^2\) But even though the measurement of representation has usually been limited to a somewhat standardized set of variables,

\(^1\)Coffey and Reeg, "Representational Policy," p. D-20; Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 205.

there is an endless variety of population characteristics which may be said to affect the broadly-stated goals of military representation. For example, other measures may include anatomical features, crime rates, the entire range of attitudinal measures (including, for example, job satisfaction, political attitudes, aggressiveness, perceptions of life controls, self-esteem, values, quality of life perceptions, attitude changes over time, and so on), religious preferences and church attendance, physical prowess and dexterity, mechanical ability, and so forth.

Military representation studies tend to follow a conventional pattern: variables are selected and explained, numbers are compared, discrepancies are noted, and value judgments (often disguised behind vague prescriptions for "statistical parity" or its usual counterpart, "organizational effectiveness") are applied in the interpretation of results. It is noteworthy that major independent studies, covering the same basic period of time, can arrive at completely different conclusions concerning essentially the same representational data.\(^1\) It


\(^1\) Compare, for instance, King, *Achieving America's Goals with Cooper, Military Manpower*; also, Moskos, "The Enlisted Ranks" and U.S. Department of Defense, *America's Volunteers."
all seems to eventually boil down to subjective interpretations—individual values and standards, embedded in ideological assumptions and postulates.

Cooper concludes that "... the American military has not been nor is it becoming an army of the poor or black," and "... military service apparently continues to be viewed as an alternative employment option for a very broad cross-section of society, from the wealthiest to the poorest." At the same time, other social scientists find that "[i]n comparison with the peacetime draft ... today's Army is much less representative—and becoming increasingly so—of American youth"; and the New York Times reports that there are more poor and blacks in the military than ever before. And still other claims are made that it really doesn't matter anyway.

In the early days of the AVF debates, several pro-volunteer writers remarked that peacetime military service, regardless of shortcomings, would make the poor less poor and the unskilled skilled. "It is a good thing and not a bad thing to offer better alternatives to the currently disadvantaged," Milton Friedman observed. "The attraction

---

1 Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 231.

2 Moskos, "The Enlisted Ranks," p. 61. In "Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force" (Statement prepared for the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee, 20 June 1978), Moskos observes: "There can be no question that the Army has undergone a metamorphosis in its enlisted membership. The real question is how high-powered commissions and well-financed studies come up with the opposite conclusion" (p.5).


of the armed forces will end for the poor white and Negro when civilian society offers equal or better opportunities for success."¹

Many proponents of proportional representation policy believe the problem can be tamed and treated with total objectivity. Based on the notion that "there is only so much science in a given discipline as there is mathematics in it," the representational issue is viewed as a mathematical problem—an equation in which the only unknown quantities are the policy decisions necessary to achieve perfect proportionality. The great potential for disaster is in the corollary to this notion—that is, the misguided assumption that when the numbers are right, the problem is solved. Actually, representational issues interact with other social and military issues to form a set of interrelated problems or a "system" of problems. Military representation, for example, involves the race issue, the poverty problem, urban problems, employment and economic problems, sociopolitical issues, military recruitment, national security, organizational requirements and goals, and so on.

The absence of a general theoretical framework for analyzing the representational "system" impedes the development of any practical definitions or policy objectives. Consequently, for all the lip-service paid to "military representation" by Defense Department officials and others, there is no evidence that anyone has a clear understanding of what it all means—let alone any policy or strategy to effectuate statistical parity.

Perhaps when representation is evaluated within the larger "system" of problems, competing values emerge, and other, more important considerations take priority. No one really knows how to "strike a balance" between conflicting policy objectives and evaluative criteria, or how to establish some consensus on appropriate levels of representation. One must ultimately sift through a brimming grab-bag of issues and normative judgments to locate the practical significance of military representation. And the search for an exclusive guiding principle necessarily involves the explication of a gross number of policy variables.

It is possible, then, that the present failure to define the concept and to adequately articulate its purposes is a reflection of its complex and multifaceted character. There is never an absence of meaning; there is a multiplicity of meanings. Thus, to the extent that representation has no clearly exclusive denotation, the concept is robbed of its practical significance and rendered (beyond theoretical applications) meaningless.

Scope and Objectives of the Study

The primary objective of this research is to form an understanding of the numbers and mathematical formulas which are used so often without meaning in studies and discussions of the armed forces.

Military representation is a relatively new area of research. Indeed, although the term "representation" is quite common in military manpower studies, and has been used to describe the objectives of affirmative action programs, its precise definition is not clear. Most writers outside the Defense establishment continue to place representation within quotation marks—an indication that the term (and perhaps the subject) is not customarily used or understood.
Most extant studies of representation merely involve the presentation and statistical comparison of civilian and military data. Since previous research is so limited in content, the present analysis necessarily involves the clarification of certain concepts, a census of identified "problems," the search for priorities, and the development of a conceptual framework or structure for evaluation. This task is without adequate precedent or guidance; military representation is vaguely defined in previous literature, and there is no firm ground of understanding on which to stand. The major emphasis here, therefore, is the discovery of insights and ideas. This research is formulative or "exploratory" rather than conclusive; it is an attempt to develop relevant hypotheses, to build theory, and to search for understanding, rather than to "prove" or "disprove" any notions of causal relationships.

The research plan is to break military "representation" down into its conceptual components, to examine these components, and to then rebuild popular perspectives of the phenomenon. Through (1) a comprehensive review of related literature, (2) evaluation of issues, normative values, evaluative standards, historical antecedents, philosophical and practical considerations, and the various competing principles, (3) the construction of a conceptual model for analysis, and (4) the development of a practical definition which relates cross-sectional measures to national goals and priorities, this research attempts to advance current understanding of military representation.

The study first focuses on the concept of representation in democratic theory, including its origins and various applications through history. The historical antecedents of democratic representation are then used to trace the philosophical sources of military representation in the United States.
The "case" in behalf of military representation is critically examined, including an assessment of value judgments and reality judgments concerning the perceived "need" for statistical parity. Expressions and interpretations of national needs are discussed within the context of actual representation statistics. These "needs" are then employed to develop a functional definition of military representation and a conceptual model which relates representational objectives to national policy goals.

Throughout the study, representation statistics are used to illustrate and discuss various points. However, this study does not endeavor to definitively describe the composition of the armed forces. The intention is to present selected "insight-stimulating" examples of military representation—to capture certain "snapshots" of a particular time and milieu, as well as the "moving picture" of changes over time. Additionally, the study concentrates primarily on the Army, the focal point of previous literature on military representation and the apparent pressure gauge of AVF recruitment results.
CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS

Hannah F. Pitkin observes in *The Concept of Representation* that the idea of representation, particularly of human beings representing other human beings, is essentially a modern one.¹ The ancient Greeks had no concept of representation—although they elected some officials and sent ambassadors—and they had no corresponding word in their language. The Romans had a verb, "repraesentare," from which "representation" derives, but the Roman word meant simply to make present or manifest or to present again, and it was used almost exclusively with reference to inanimate objects.²

Pitkin traces the emergence of the concept to the Middle Ages and Christian religious literature, where the Pope and the Cardinals signified a kind of "mystical embodiment" of Christ: representing the personage of Christ and the apostles, not as agents, but as the image and embodiment of their mystical recreation. Medieval jurists began to use the term, and in many parts of Europe early institutions of political representation developed. The final steps toward the birth of the modern concept of representation were taken in the 17th Century


during the English Civil War period, to the rallying cry of the American Revolution that "taxation without representation is tyranny," to the French Revolution that followed: \(^1\) "Thus representation came to mean popular representation, and to be linked with the idea of self-government of every man's right to have a say in what happens to him. And that is how it became embodied in our institutions." \(^2\)

**The Concept of Political Representation**

The notion of representativeness, Samuel Krislov observes, has slowly permeated political thought; but it is neither self-evident nor universal: "Societies have functioned without it being considered a test of any institution; even when it has been accepted as applicable, differing, competing concepts of representativeness have been adopted." \(^3\)

It is clear from the reading of political philosophy, especially that which relates to democratic institutions, that "representation" means many different things to many different people. And yet, as Pitkin writes, the most striking aspect of theoretical literature in the field is "the persistence of puzzling, seemingly irresoluble conflicts and controversies: There does not even seem to be any remotely satisfactory agreement on what representation is or means. . . . Moreover, the literature contains a number of nagging, persistent controversies which never seem to get resolved or even clarified." \(^4\)

---

\(^1\) Pitkin, ed., *Representation*, p. 4.

\(^2\) Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, p. 3.


Part of the problem, Dixon continues in Democratic Representation, is that neither the content of representation theory, nor ways to implement it, have been featured in political philosophy above the level of emotive generalities.\(^1\) Krislov similarly finds that the political theory of representation is "unimpressive";\(^2\) and Pitkin notes that it presents "a disappointing picture."\(^3\)

Most theorists who have attempted to deal with concepts as familiar (and seemingly evident) as "democratic," and "representation" would agree that the definitional problem—i.e., the explanation of its essence and the nature of its consequences—stems from the inherent complexity of the concept.\(^4\) As Birch observes, there are very different meanings when one speaks of a "representative sample" or a system of "representative government" or a "legal representative," and so on; and the concept of representation in each of its various contexts is far from simple.\(^5\) Some commentators attribute definitional problems to the vagueness or ambiguity of the term "representation"; while others completely abandon the word in order to avoid entrapment in the verbal morass of complex and multiple definitions.\(^6\)

The literature of Political Science contains frequent references to "representation," but little discussion or analysis of its meaning.

\(^1\) Dixon, Democratic Representation, pp. 4–5.

\(^2\) Krislov, Representative Bureaucracy, p. 25.

\(^3\) Pitkin, ed., Representation, p. 7.


\(^6\) See Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 5–6, for examples.
Among major Western political philosophers, Thomas Hobbes is actually the first theorist to systematically study the meaning of (political) representation. Very few political theorists have attempted to pursue Hobbes's initiative. Nevertheless, issues concerning the relationship between the represented and the representative—whether in the form of Thomas Hare's or F. A. Hermens's studies of "proportional representation," John Stuart Mill's treatises on Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, writings in The Federalist, or the more recent commentary of De Grazia, Friedrich, or Long—have been a focus of attention, however ill-defined or undefined, throughout modern times.

Pitkin and Birch both have developed typologies of the major theories or usages of representation. Birch delineates four types of representation: (1) symbolic representation, to indicate that a person symbolizes the identity or qualities of a class of persons; (2) delegated representation, to denote an agent or spokesman who acts on behalf of his principal; (3) elective representation, to indicate the political process or system of authorization; and (4) microcosmic representation.


to indicate that a person shares some of the characteristics of a particular class of persons.¹

Pitkin presents a somewhat similar, though more complex, typology of representation theory which identifies four major theories (and ten subcategories) of how one "represents" another: (1) authorization, or the giving of authority to act; (2) accountability, or the holding to account of the representative for his or her actions; (3) standing for, accomplished by descriptive representation (i.e., the making present of something by resemblance or reflection) and symbolic representation (i.e., as a flag represents a nation, or a head of state represents the unity of the people); and (4) acting for, or the actual activity in behalf of, or in the interest of, some other person or group.²

Even though the concept has a number of considerably dissimilar uses—each with its own characteristic context, assumptions, and implications—there is an interrelatedness of ideas and notions located within all references to "representation." There is an essential quality or nucleus of understanding which operates to make different forms of representation aspects of the same thing—that is, the "real nature of representation."³ Pitkin finds the basic meaning of "representation" contained in its etymology: "Representation means, as the word's etymological origins indicate, re-presentation, a making present again." But, it is not a literal bringing into presence; rather, it is "the

¹Birch, Representation, pp. 15-16.
²Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 11-12, 38-143.
³Ibid., pp. 8-9.
making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact."¹

The above classifications of political representation should therefore be equally applicable to other forms or applications of representation, including military representation. The following discussion examines the interrelatedness of representation concepts, tracing the "real nature" or "core" of representation through the historical roots of representation theory in the political, bureaucratic, and military contexts.

Formulations of Political Representation

Theories of representation which reflect the "authorization" view are largely derived from the works of Hobbes and Rousseau.² According to this view, a representative is one who has been authorized to act or has the "right" to perform an action; and to the extent that one has been authorized to act, and acts within the limits of the granted authority, that person is representing. Hobbes writes: "And as the right of possession, is called dominion; so the right of doing any action, is called authority. So that by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and done by authority, done by commission, or license from him whose right it is."³ But it is important to note that every government, whether dictatorial or democratic, represents its people in the formalistic sense—i.e., by having and acting on some authority—

¹Ibid.


and the actions of governments both bind their subjects and are attributed to their subjects.¹ (The represented assumes responsibility for the consequences of action by persons to whom authority is given.)

A variation of the "authorization" theme (and one which bears particular relevance to our discussion of military representation) was developed by Max Weber and a succession of German theorists. This group of theorists centered on the concept of "Organschaft," where the representative becomes a specialized "organ" of a group. The doctrine of "Organschaft" has roots in the French Revolution and was mainly developed by Otto von Gierke and George Jellinek during the early decades of this century.² According to the doctrine, as conceived by the German theorists, all organs of state, all government officials—indeed, anyone who performs some function for the group (elected, appointed, or otherwise authorized)—are considered representatives.³

While "authorization" theorists concentrate on the formalities of relationships and precedent (i.e., to action) transactions, some other writers discuss the duties, roles, and responsibilities of the representative to the represented. These so-called "accountability" theorists hold that accountability is a response and a corrective to the "authorization" view; and they attempt to distinguish "true" representation by


²Otto von Gierke, Johannes Althusius (Breslau: M. and H. Marcus, 1913); George Jellinek, Allegemeine Staatslehre, 2nd ed. (Berlin: O. Härting, 1905); cited in Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 41-42, 259; and Kranz, Participatory Bureaucracy, p. 36. Although Weber's argument differs only slightly from that of the more conventional "organschaft" theorists, it should be noted that Weber himself never actually used the term. (See Pitkin, Concept of Representation, p. 39.)

³Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 40-41.
placing certain obligations or controls on the representative. Accountability to "society as a whole" or the governed population is what defines representation, and it can be achieved by election or by some other means.¹

Still another school of representation theorists maintains that it is the activity itself—the action of representation, the substance or content of representing—which characterizes it meaning. "Acting for" theorists thereby focus on the substantive activity, the "true" representation of the actor (as a U.S. Congressman may be said to represent the "big-money boys" or the "tobacco lobby" or the "oil interests" or the "military-industrial complex").² The agent or representative is seen as "representing" the person(s) he or she speaks for, acts for, watches over, and so on. As Kranz notes, the question of constituent-legislator relationships has dominated debate on the "acting for" concept, and a variety of positions have developed concerning the "instructed vs. uninstructed" legislator and the various shades of discretionary action (from fully-mandated action to total independence).³

"Descriptive" or "Microcosmic" Representation

Of all the various theories of political representation, it is the "descriptive" view which comes closest to the meaning and usages of

¹Ibid., p. 55-59.


"military representation" presented in the previous chapter. "Descriptive" representation (along with "symbolic" representation) is a subcategory of Pitkin's "standing for" concept. It has essentially the same denotation as "microcosmic" representation (employed by Birch). Theories of descriptive or microcosmic representation assert that "true" representation occurs only when the legislature (or representative body) is similar in composition to that which it represents: an accurate "map" of the nation, an "echo" of the public voice; a "mirror image" of the people, reflecting without distortion the state of public consciousness and the movement of social and economic forces in the nation.

The "descriptive" theory of the true nature of representation has firm roots in political literature, and is perhaps best developed among advocates of proportional representation. Simon Sterne, for example, writes that "representative government" is a "machine more or less perfect in proportion to its success in realizing the democratic idea of a government by the people for the people." Sterne proceeds to quote a "most philosophical" speech by Mirabeau before the Constituent Assembly (Estates of Provence) in 1789:

\[\ldots\text{that a representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the physical configuration of the soil: in all its parts, and as a whole, the representative body should at all times present a reduced picture of the people—their opinions, aspirations and wishes, and that presentation should bear the relative proportion to the original precisely as a map brings before us mountains and dales, rivers and lakes, forests and plains.}\]

\[^1\] Simon Sterne, "Proportional Representation" in Pitkin, ed., Representation, p. 76.

\[^2\] Quoted by Sterne in Ibid., p. 77. Pitkin and others point out that, in fact, the "famous" Mirabeau quote is quite probably an error first made by Sterne and then repeated over time. Mirabeau himself was not apparently an advocate of proportional representation. See Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 62 and 263 (note 14).
Numerous proportionalists have since invoked the metaphor of the map, apparently first articulated by Mirabeau, to advocate the goals of proportional representation. Although typically florid depictions are no longer customary, many apostles of proportional representation continue to describe the idealized composition of governing bodies in metaphorical terms. Enid Lakeman, for example, in How Democracies Vote, begins her study of majority and proportional electoral systems with a quotation from Edmund Burke's "Thoughts on the Present Discontents" (1770): "The virtue, spirit, the essence of the House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation." Lakeman then remarks that Parliament is, after all, not a mirror of the nation; and the British House of Commons is in reality a "distorting mirror": "... every feature of the reflection corresponds to something in the original, but one feature may be exaggerated out of all proportion, while another—perhaps equally important in the original—becomes scarcely perceptible."¹

John Stuart Mill, as J. H. Burns points out, favored proportional representation because he believed that "false democracy" distorted the representative system in favor of the majority.² Mill thus supported a "balance of interests," where the numerical majority would be unable to "swamp the minority"; and he advocated (at one point) the complex system proportional representation outlined by Thomas Hare as a partial solution to the problem of securing an adequate hearing for minorities and minority


points of view. Mill writes that an "ideally perfect" representative system should be in the arrangement of a representative system, "equally balanced," each influencing about an equal number of votes in Parliament. He thus perceives Parliament as an "arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion." 

For many proportionalists, the mere fact of being present, of being heard, is representation; the composition of legislatures is important because compositional elements are expected to determine legislative activities. Mill advocated proportional representation, notes Pitkin, not so much because it resulted in better representation—but rather because it yielded truer democracy. According to Mill, representation in proportion to numbers is "the first principle of democracy." Parliament should be "a place where every interest can have its cause even passionately pleaded"; and since all cannot participate, it follows that "the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative."

---


3Ibid., p. 361 (emphasis added).

4Pitkin, Concept of Representation, p. 63.

5Ibid., p. 263 (note 19; emphasis added).


7Ibid., p. 350.
Mill's rationale for proportional representation was partly influenced by the writings of Jeremy Bentham and by his father, James Mill, who helped to make Benthamism an effective political force of the period. Bentham, James Mill, and the later Utilitarians theorized the principle that people are always self-seeking. Bronowski and Mazlish observe that basic to Bentham's theory of government was the understanding that the individual is best able to decide his own interest—and the addition of such selfish interests equals "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."  \(^1\)

This balance of selfish interests is central to the thinking of Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and subsequent proportionalists. It was felt that, leaving aside temporary or peculiar interests of politicians, members of the legislative assemblies will tend to pursue their own personal interests. In order to reach decisions which will "maximize the happiness" of the community, it is necessary to assure that the members of the legislature constitute, in themselves, a microcosm of the nation.  \(^2\) The reason why justice and the general interest carry their point, Mill writes, is that "the selfish and separate interests of mankind are almost always divided. . . ."  \(^3\)

In this country, proponents of the "descriptive" or "microcosmic" view have had a strong influence on popular conceptions and interpretations of what constitutes "representation." John Adams, an outspoken

---


\(^2\) See Birch, Representation, p. 55.

advocate of community representation, noted during the Constitutional Convention that the government "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them." Indeed, Adams remarked in his "Defense of the Constitution," "the perfection of the portrait consists in its likeness."

In The Federalist Number 10, James Madison stresses the dangers of "faction" and the necessity of controlling "factions" and averting tyranny. Madison's solution lies in the nature of majority rule and in a large, diverse electorate, where selfish factions will balance each other, allowing the common good to emerge. And Madison's solution for dealing with "sinister factions" is quite similar to Mill's answer for coping with "the selfish and separate interests of mankind."

The "descriptive" view has survived unscathed through American social and political history. Both Alfred De Grazia and Harold Gosnell, for example, have elaborated the notion of having representatives who typify characteristics of the represented. De Grazia defines representation as "a condition that exists when the characteristics and acts of one vested with public functions are in accord with the desires of one or more

---

1 James Wilson also argued at the Constitutional Convention that as "the portrait is excellent in proportion to its being a good likeness," so the legislature should be an "exact transcript of the whole society" and "faithful echo" of the peoples' voices. See Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 60-61.


4 De Grazia, Public and Republic.

persons to whom the functions have objective and subjective importance."\(^1\)

While Gosnell writes that a person will "feel as though he himself were present in the seat of power" when he sees "a remarkable similarity to himself in the physiognomy and social characteristics of his representatives" (in effect, "mirroring" himself).\(^2\)

Griffiths and Wollheim, who coined the term "descriptive representation," speak of the "natural and reasonable" suggestion that "the assembly should be composed of descriptive representatives drawn from every opinion-holding group."\(^3\) Others, following Laski,\(^4\) argue that legislative assemblies should be a condensation of the whole nation, and suggest processes for accomplishing this.\(^5\) And numerous studies in this country are conducted to measure and track the social origins and professional backgrounds of congressmen. In each application of descriptive or microcosmic representation, the same basic understanding prevails: what qualifies a person to represent is his or her representativeness—not the actions or inactions of the person, but composition or appearance.

Along with "descriptive representation," there has developed a related concept or view, "symbolic representation." While both

---

\(^1\)De Grazia, Public and Republic, p. 4.

\(^2\)Gosnell, Democracy, p. 131; see Kranz, Participatory Bureaucracy, p. 38.


\(^4\)Harold J. Laski, Democracy in Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1933).

\(^5\)Discussed in Kranz, Participatory Bureaucracy, p. 38.
"description" and "symbolism" are interpreted in a similar manner (i.e., "standing for"), symbolic representation is best understood as the consent, support, or acceptance the representative receives from the represented. Thus, the representative is not "made present" by a map or perfect portrait, but, instead, by a symbol which usually does not resemble (in a real sense) that representative. It is something which calls to mind or evokes emotions or attitudes appropriate to the absent object.¹ For example, the flag represents the United States, the Pope is said to represent "Christ on earth," the British monarch stands for "the majesty and unity of the British nation," the President represents "the sorrow and appreciation of the Nation" as he places a wreath at the "Tomb of the Unknown Soldier," and so on. This usage is somewhat less common, but it can form the basis of a theory of representation,² and it does bear upon our current understanding of military representation.

The Representative Bureaucracy

Krislov writes in Representative Bureaucracy that the concept of a "representative" bureaucracy was initially developed to argue for a less elite, less class-biased civil service.³ The idea that a bureaucracy should in various ways reflect the general society of which it is a part is only about 30 years old; but it has already accumulated, as Kranz observes, "a variety of meanings and measures, probably more

¹Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 92-111
²See Gosnell, Democracy, Chapter 8.
³Krislov, Representative Bureaucracy, p. 20.
naysayers than advocates, much normative jousting, and little empirical testing."

Both the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements attempted to counter notions of hereditary rights or inherent privileges to hold public office. But the view that broad social groups should have spokesmen and office holders in administrative as well as political positions is a relatively recent phenomenon. J. Donald Kingsley is credited with coining the term "representative bureaucracy" in 1944, with the publication of his analysis of the British civil service. Kingsley's major argument was for a liberalization of social class selection for the English bureaucracy. Kingsley's analysis, as one critic writes, placed inordinate emphasis on social class per se; but he did suggest that only a "representative bureaucracy" is likely to respond to changes in political currents, and he did assert that exclusion of groups (particularly women) from public service is "antipathetic to any political democracy." The "strength of representative government," he wrote, lies in the "pooling of diverse streams of experience." 2


3 Krislov, Representative Bureaucracy, pp. 10-13.

4 Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy, p. 185. Paul Appleby writes in Morality and Administration in Democratic Government (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State Press, 1952) that "a truly representative bureaucracy is
Kingsley's concept of a broad-based heterogeneous civil service was not immediately picked up by representation theorists in this country. The main reason for this, as Krislov observes, was the fact that the administrative structure in the United States was (at the time) attempting to develop a respect which would attract elite groups.\(^1\) By 1949, however, Reinhard Bendix provided data on the representative bureaucracy;\(^2\) and in 1952 Norton Long offered his controversial, now classic, observation that "the non-elected civil service may be both more representative of the country and more democratic in its composition than the Congress."

"The democratic character of the civil service stems from its origin, income level, and association,"\(^3\) Long wrote—and equally with respect to "learned groups, skills, economic interests, races, nationalities, and religions." In fact, "[t]he rich diversity that makes up the United States is better represented in its civil service than anywhere else."

According to Long, it is the "representation of the pluralism of our society in the vitals of the bureaucracy" and the reality that the civil service is "a better sample of the mass of the people than Congress" in its various parts variously representative of special functions and interests, and highly representative altogether of the public at large" (pp. 158-159).

\(^1\)Krislov, *Representative Bureaucracy*, p. 20.


which insure the constitutional behavior and political equilibrium of the bureaucracy. And, as a "prime example of the efficacy of a balance of social forces as a means to neutralization as a political force," Long cites "that wonder of modern times, the standing army possessed of a near-monopoly of force yet tamely obedient to the civil power."  

By 1954, Gouldner, who studied the process of bureaucratization in a gypsum plant, used Kingsley's phrase "the representative bureaucracy" for the first time in *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*. The issue of a representative bureaucracy has since become quite popular, largely during the past decade. The issue was first dramatized by expressions of concern for black rights; later by the concern for the rights of other ethnic minorities, especially Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and Native Americans; and, more recently, by the concern for the employment rights of women and persons susceptible to age-discrimination. Krislov's *The Negro in Federal Employment* and Rosenbloom's *Federal Service and the Constitution* typify present-day attempts to deal with the issue of minority representation in the bureaucracy.

---


More recent and general treatments of bureaucratic representation include Niskenan's distinctive measurement-cost analysis of *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*,¹ Krislov's *Representative Bureaucracy*,² and Kranz's *The Participatory Bureaucracy*.³ In most literature on the subject, the concept of bureaucratic "representation" is used predominantly in the descriptive or microcosmic sense of the term. "Specifically," writes Kranz, "in a participatory [i.e., representative] bureaucracy, the ratios of each racial-ethnic minority group and women at all levels in a particular agency equal that group's percentage in the population in the geographic area serviced by that agency."⁴ And, "the adequacy of representation in the bureaucracy of all major racial, ethnic, and sexual groups is the significant issue today."⁵ "In short, throughout the world, bureaucracy is the blood, bone, and sinews of political power," Krislov observes: "Its composition dictates and reflects policy. And that composition cries out for study."⁶

The Representative Military

Kranz makes the following observation: "In reviewing the many meanings and usages of 'representation' . . . it was determined that the only essential difference between elected and appointed officials is the method (elections) by which they assume office. Transferring the

---

²Krislov, *Representative Bureaucracy*.
³Kranz, *Participatory Bureaucracy*.
⁴Ibid., p. 67. ⁵Ibid., p. 71.
concept from the elected legislature to the appointed bureaucracy, it is conceivable that all the accepted meanings of the word could apply."

Under the same assumption, it is possible that accepted meanings of the word could also apply to the military. The use of the term "representation" in reference to the military is fairly recent (though it will be seen in the following chapter that the idea is quite old). And the first references to the "representative military" coincide both with the surge of interest in bureaucratic participation as well as the fundamental changes in methods of military manpower recruitment. If we agree with Pitkin that all forms of representation are essentially aspects of the same thing (i.e., the "real nature of representation"), it is possible that expressions of concern over the composition of the armed forces signify a "spreading-out" of democratic ideals: from our conceptions of democratic "representation" in political institutions comes our notion of "representation" in other, non-elective areas of government service; and from our conceptions of bureaucratic "representation" follows our concern for proportionality in the military, educational institutions, and so on--indeed, all sectors of society.

The understanding that the armed forces have been experiencing a basic change in organizational structure appears to support this thesis. Moskos writes that the military can best be understood as "a social organization which maintains levels of autonomy while refracting broader societal trends." Moskos contends that the emergent trend of the

1Kranz, Participatory Bureaucracy, p. 74.

2Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," Armed Forces and Society 4 (Fall 1977): 41; see also, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military: Calling, Profession or Occupation?," paper presented at Symposium on Representation and Responsibility in Military Organization, University of Maryland,
American military is movement from an institutional format to one resembling that of an occupation. The end of the draft and advent of volunteer service, according to Moskos, carried with it changing perceptions of the citizen's obligation to service; and the "Gates Commission" final report symbolized this change by explicitly arguing that primary reliance in recruiting the volunteer force should be placed on "monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards."¹

Thus, a range of developments—the end of the draft, raises in pay and changes in compensation policy (to compare and compete with civilian occupations), reductions in benefits associated with military service, the removal of automatic assurances of representative social composition (i.e., through compulsory service), the increased separation of work and residence locales (e.g., single men living off-base and commuting to work), high rates of attrition accompanying relaxed restrictions on early release from service, increased reliance on civilian personnel ("civilianization" of certain military jobs) and the increasing tendency of servicemembers to bring grievances to litigation—marks the ascendancy of the occupational model in the armed forces.²

On the other hand, Morris Janowitz argues that there is no basis—analytic or empirical—to apply the occupational formulation, either as a short-term or long-term trend in the U.S. military organization. Janowitz contends that the concept of profession (and professionalism)

20 January 1977, (Processed); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?" Parameters 1 (n.d.). (Processed.)

¹Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation," p. 44.

²Ibid., p. 45.
continues to prevail in the military because the military has maintained a high level of skill requirements, self-regulation, and continued corporate cohesion.\(^1\) Civilianization trends are not part of a "zero-sum" game, he writes; the military can participate in the larger society and still preserve its distinctive characteristics.

It should be noted that Janowitz did observe the convergence of civilian professions with the military profession almost two decades ago in *The Professional Soldier*.\(^2\) Specifically, Janowitz saw tendencies and qualities of the military organization which resembled the (large-scale) civilian bureaucracy. And, it is apparent that the differences between Moskos and Janowitz regarding the extent of civilian influences and emerging organizational trends in the armed forces are partly due to differing perspectives: Moskos focuses on the macro-military establishment (but primarily the rank-and-file), while Janowitz tends to concentrate more on the officer corps. However, there may be an area between


the findings of Moskos and the recent rebuttals of Janowitz—a middle ground of understanding—which better describes the emergent trend in the armed forces, that is, the civilian bureaucracy.

Levitan and Alderman write that "[t]he armed forces remain, and will continue to remain, unique because of their fundamental mission . . . not withstanding recent efforts to adopt military personnel practices more akin to that of civilian employers in dealing with workers."¹ Fighting wars (or being ready to fight wars) is different from producing cars or running department stores, the authors write: "An innate dichotomy persists between the civilian and military, even though the gap is narrowing and bridges have been built to ease the crossover between the sectors."² Part of this natural dichotomy, Levitan and Alderman find, lies in the lack of a tangible output for measuring productivity in the military, particularly during peacetime. Yet, in peacetime, the line of demarcation between the fundamental mission of the military (i.e., defense) and certain social goals become blurred: "As a public agency, the military cannot ignore overall societal responsibilities" as long as these activities are not contrary to the defense mission.³

Etzioni, in a critical examination of Weber's "ideal-type" concept of bureaucracy and typology of authority,⁴ notes that peacetime armies


² Ibid., p. 197. The unique character of the military also rests on the premise that it is the only institution in an organized society which may have the express duty to kill. (Though it is sometimes claimed that certain "civilians"—for example, C.I.A. agents, law enforcement officers [and drunk drivers]—are in the "killing business.")

³ Ibid., p. 9.

are highly bureaucratic: "In times of war, especially in combat, they [armies] lose many of their bureaucratic qualities. . . . After the war, though not without crisis, the organization again shifts gears and returns to a bureaucratic structure."1 Yarmolinsky makes a similar observation of the American military establishment before and after the conflict in Vietnam. Before Vietnam, Yarmolinsky writes, the military was "a giant bureaucracy, in an expansionary phase, and focused on its own expansion." Without the prospect of war in the early 1960s, the military pursued "the natural tendency of all bureaucracies" and became preoccupied with the peaceful perfection of its parts. After Vietnam, the military once again began to show its pre-Vietnam tendencies, but it was not the same military or the same society; civil-military relations had given the military a new face.2

Technology, for one thing, has helped to transform the military into "a bureaucracy in many ways more like civilian society than the traditional military," notes Yarmolinsky.3 Servicemen work at their jobs in ways not unlike that of civil servants. (Janowitz writes that "the military think of themselves as civil servants in national service"--in the military, not only for reasons of monetary reward or employment, but

---


3Ibid., pp. 318-319; see especially Chapter 6, "The Civilianized Military Command."

---
for idealistic concerns as well. Yarmolinsky sees the convergence of civilian and military service as coming also from the changing patterns of occupational distribution in the military, the movement from military service to second civilian careers, the lessening of distinctive military ideologies, and the concurrent identification (ideological and symbolic) of the military with specialists in kindred civilian occupations.

When the modern draft was approaching its final days, Janowitz observed that three conditions would be necessary for the AVF to be compatible with American political forms. One of these conditions, stated Janowitz, is the development of a military professionalism which recognizes that the armed forces are based on contractual and public service conceptions. And in order to strengthen the civil service basis of the military career, he recommended that military service be redefined as the first step of a two-step, lifetime career in public service—where completion of a specified period of service in the military constituted effective entrance into civil service employment. In fact, the channels for movement from the military to the civil service have, historically, been aided by veterans' "preferences." Today, in the era of the notorious "double-dipper" (i.e., a person who simultaneously collects military retirement pay and a salary for civil service employment), this occupational movement appears even more natural.

1 Janowitz, "Civilian Control," p. 521.

2 Yarmolinsky, Military Establishment, pp. 81-82.

3 Morris Janowitz, "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose," Foreign Affairs 50 (April 1972): 427-443. According to Janowitz, the first "condition" is that U.S. foreign policy be "one of flexible deterrence" and the military "incorporate a 'constabulary' type of strategy"; see ibid., p. 428.
Two decades ago, Huntington identified one characteristic of the officer corps as its "corporateness" or bureaucratic nature: "Officership is a public bureaucratized profession," and "[t]he officer corps is both a bureaucratic profession and a bureaucratic organization";\(^1\) while "the enlisted men subordinate to the officer corps are a part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional bureaucracy."\(^2\) At the close of the Vietnam war, when the military was again taking on the role and characteristics of a more passive, self-directed bureaucracy,\(^3\) the civil\_ization trend\_s which Moskos describes were beginning to take shape.

Increasingly, the armed forces were identified as a source of employment for young men in a tight job market, an avenue of social mobility, an opportunity for educational advancement and skill training, in addition to citizen participation (as civil servants) in the affairs of government. It is interesting to note, with the unemployment rate among black teenagers almost three-times as high as the rate for white teenagers, the civilian bureaucracy is the only employer (in the civilian sector) besides the armed forces to consistently hire proportionately more black than white teenagers. As the armed forces assumed the "significant purposes of bureaucracy" and entered the public service limelight, the "calling" of military service was being transformed into

\(^1\) Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 16.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 17.

a "secular occupation"; there was a growing tendency to treat soldiering as equivalent to "military employment." But the military establishment maintained its professional qualities, its high technical skill levels, its relative autonomy, and its professional identity—except, now, with an added social responsibility and public-service function.

Thus, the military moved closer, not to just any "civilian occupation," but to the **civilian bureaucracy**. With the notable exception of the competitive entry standards associated with the civil service, the civilianization of the peacetime military is perhaps making it "just another government job." After all, when military salaries were raised to be "commensurate" with civilian wages, a primary model for employee compensation was the federal civil service. In December 1976, the Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (a presidentially-commissioned project undertaken every four years by the Defense Department) recommended that military pay levels be linked to a standard providing competitive levels of comparability based on the federal civil service. In fact, as the Defense Manpower Commission notes, adjustments to the general level

---


2. There are indications that entry standards are getting more "selective" as the job-market for 18-24 year old eligibles contracts. See Courtland Milloy, "Nowhere to Turn: Youths Unable to Find Work Find Army Saying No Also," *Washington Post*, 9 October 1978, pp. A-1, A-16.


4. See Ibid., p. 427. A military "salary system" has been recommended by the First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (1967), the U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (1970), a Brookings Institution study of military compensation (Martin Binkin, 1975), as well as the U.S. Defense Manpower Commission (1976),
of military compensation have been determined predominantly by adjustments in the general level of Civil Service (General Schedule) compensation since 1967, and exclusively so since 1974; while increases in Civil Service compensation have been determined by changes in private-sector white-collar wage rates since 1962.¹ (This linkage is intended to insure the "comparability" between the federal and private sectors.²)

The "Real Nature" of Military Representation

With this realization of fundamental changes in the military organizational structure and civil-military perspectives comes an understanding of the one "real nature of representation." Just as Kranz found the various denotations of political "representation" (as defined by Pitkin) transferable to the bureaucracy, we find a similar compatibility of meaning in the armed forces.

The military, for example, is representative in the sense that it has been authorized; that is, given a formal right to exercise some power and to bind those in whose name it acts. Thus, the armed forces are authorized to defend American interests abroad and to engage in combat those nations who pose a threat to American or allied security.

The military may likewise be held accountable for what it has done, said, or failed to do. Although this theory of representation is somewhat more complex than formal authority, it is concisely expressed in Charles Hyneman's terms, "direction and control."³ In the case of

the "representative bureaucracy," various theories have been developed over the years on how best to achieve this control. Essentially, as Charles E. Gilbert has written, there are five basic traditions concerning avenues of accountability and responsibility: (1) *internal-formal* (i.e., approaches stressing direction and control by the President and through hierarchical methods such as budgeting, personnel management, standards and rules of procedure, structuring and restructuring of the organization, etc.); (2) *internal-informal* (i.e., those approaches which emphasize the moral, descriptive and professional aspects of public service); (3) *external-formal*, subdivided into (a) *Congressional* and (b) *Judicial* categories (i.e., approaches which rely upon either Congress or the courts for direction and control—recognizing also that legislative-administrative relations can exhibit marked informal characteristics as well); and (4) *external-informal* (i.e., through public pressures and public opinion, interest groups, public "watchdogs," the press and popular media, informal contacts, the "rule of anticipation," and so on). ¹

While each of these traditions has received its share of attention in the literature, it is the *internal-informal* theory of accountability which focuses on the composition of the bureaucracy for control and direction. The position was first expressed in the work of Long, as previously observed. Another aspect of the internal-informal position is

the celebrated "fellowship of science" argument made by Friedrich.¹
This argument stresses the objectivity, procedures, and professional
codes of conduct—the "inner checks"—which bear upon the individual
decision or action.² Internal-informal traditions have also been cat-
egorized as the "subjective" or sociological (as opposed to "objec-
tive" or political) level of responsibility in government. As Mosher
writes, how one acts (from the "subjective" perspective) depends more
on "identification, loyalty or conscience," on who one is, rather than
on accountability or answerability to someone else. It hinges heavily
on the official's "background, processes of socialization and current
associations in and outside the organization"—the "source of origin" of
the individual (reference groups, traditions, experiences, values, char-
acteristics, group memberships, ethnic origin, sex, loyalties) and the
degree to which "they mirror the total society."³

Mosher's "subjective-objective" model of accountability in govern-
ment is essentially the same model used by Huntington to characterize
civilian control of the military.⁴ Huntington defines an "objective

¹Ibid.; and Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and

²There has been a long-standing dispute in the literature concerning
the use of these "inner checks" or external (formal-legal or "rule of law")
controls. The classic Carl J. Friedrich-Herman Finer debate, considered
the most famous single episode in the history of the "asministrative respon-
sibility" controversy, characterizes this dispute.

³Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 7-8, 12.

⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military: A The-
oretical Statement," in Organizational Leadership, ed. U.S. Military
Academy, pp. 508-517; reprinted from H. Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld, and M.
Janowitz, Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York:
developing the general distinction between "objective" functional respon-
sibility and "subjective" political responsibility in the public service.
control model" which "presupposes a sharp line between the military and society," where the military is a "tool of society"—apart, yet under concrete standards of civilian control.\(^1\) On the other hand, the "subjective control model" assumes the "absence of any clear line between military and civilian groups or between military and civilian values." Under the subjective model, the military is an integral part of the social fabric, reflecting the dominant social forces and political ideologies of society (not unlike the "descriptive-microcosmic" replica of representation theorists).\(^2\) Civilian control of the military is thus the product of the identity of thought between the military and society; it exists in the plurality of thought and conflicting interests of various civilian groups.

In addition to authorization and accountability, the military may clearly be said to act on behalf of the country (acting for the people). And, as the expressions of concern regarding the compositional aspects of the volunteer military show, the armed forces are expected to reproduce the social, economic, and ethnic characteristics of all significant population groupings; that is, provide descriptive representation in the sense of Mirabeau's metaphor of the map.

The armed forces are also expected to provide symbolic representation; that is, to emote certain feelings and responses, or to be pleasing or acceptable in its appearance. This particular view is presented by Davis and Fox, where the placement of American forces abroad is seen to "represent the United States more than do the personnel of

\(^1\) Huntington, "Civilian Control," p. 514. Huntington, it should be noted, prefers the objective model (an apolitical military which is isolated from society but responsible to a formal chain of command).

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 508.
whom we traditionally think as our military representatives." The authors define "U.S. Military Representation Abroad" as a combination of authorization, acting for, and standing for elements: for example, the representation of American interests to others through show-of-force (placement of troops for deterrence and security), psychological operations (primarily through manifestations of force), troop-community relations, coalition planning, mutual security, and military assistance.

However, Davis and Fox also note that the military serves a symbolic purpose; it is a "message" to potential adversaries of U.S. forces-in-being, an image of American power to be fixed in the minds of the world. At the same time, there is a "fundamental representation," or the influence of the soldier as an individual and the appearance of U.S. society it projects: "As a result of our overseas deployment, literally millions of foreign peoples have come to picture the 'typical' American through personal observation of our soldiers. Because of his numbers and the duration of his stay, the soldier has the potential, both for good and for bad, to create such images for more than our government-to-government representatives or our hurried tourists."1


2Ibid., pp. 140-150.

3This symbolic or psychological demonstration of power has been a part of U.S. strategy at least since President Theodore Roosevelt sent the White Fleet around the world. Today, such "symbolism" is carefully planned and created.

4Ibid., p. 141.
The composition of the American armed forces thus projects an image of U.S. society, a reflection of the basic constitution and mood of the nation. However, symbolic representation is not peculiar to the deployment of forces abroad. In this country, too, there is a symbolic purpose of projecting strength and readiness, if only to ensure public feelings of confidence and tranquility. Air power demonstrations (and, to an extent, nuclear testing), certain naval missions, parachuting exhibitions, precision drill demonstrations, parade performances, and the like are symbolic representations of proficiency and preparedness.

There is no denying that a large part of the public's "acceptance" of the military is affected by the composition of the armed forces. Kranz writes that "in theory, at least, a bureaucracy that accurately mirrored the social, economic, and ethnic composition of the nation not only would be descriptively representative, but could be symbolically more acceptable--and might be more accountable and responsive as well as functionally more effective."¹ In this country, there is a strong theoretical and historical belief that "representative" assemblies of any kind that exclude certain groups are unrepresentative in most meanings of the word. The military is no exception; indeed, it has lately become an important arena for gauging the basic principles of democratic "representation" in American society.

¹Kranz, Participatory Bureaucracy, p. 78.
CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY REPRESENTATION

IN AMERICA

Russel F. Weigley, noted military historian, observes that from the beginning of American history, part of the concern for national security took the form of a two-sided controversy: should the American military be a "professional force" modeled after the armies of Europe, or should it be a non-professional force of citizen soldiers? "The controversy of amateur versus professional soldiers," Weigley writes, "has endured as a major theme of all except exclusively naval thought about American defense."¹

The issue of structure (i.e., amateur vs. professional) is intrinsically tied to questions of recruitment. Massive citizen armies are non-professional armies, in the sense that they rely on the principle of a universal obligation to service, usually through some means of compulsion. Professional armies are "regular" or "career" or, as some maintain, "all-volunteer" armies. Indeed, how to recruit men for military service has been the subject of debate in this country since the early settlers fought with the Indians, and the issue has never been

¹Russel F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. ix. As Weigley notes, "professional" is used in this context to mean the opposite of "amateur"--that is, one who has an assured competence in the art of fighting. "Professional," in this dichotomy, thus does not refer to "profession" (i.e., the "military profession" or the "profession of officership") as distinguished from "trade." (See ibid., p. 255, note 2.)
resolved. The fact that the recruitment controversy has "persisted through the whole history of the United States," notes Weigley, is one gauge of its intractibility.¹

Issues of recruitment and structure are likewise tied to questions concerning the composition, or "descriptive" representation, of the armed forces. And, while emphases have shifted over the years and certain "democratic" values have been re-defined, the basic theme of debate about the proper composition of the American military has not changed.

The Search for an American Army: National Security, Responsibilities of Citizenship, and Control

The United States, it is observed, drew two different, often contradictory, military traditions from the War of Independence: (1) a conservative or orthodox tradition which called for reliance on "regulars" or professionals, and emphasized preparation for battle with European "regulars"; and (2) a revolutionary tradition which relied on a "nation-in-arms," and citizen-soldier army. As Weigley writes, the War of the American Revolution had been fought by a mixture of both methods, but those who especially favored one method often saw little merit in the other.²

A universal military obligation for nearly all males of appropriate age appeared in the statutes of all the British Colonies that later became the United States (with the lone exception of Quaker


²Weigley, American Army, pp. 8-9.
Pennsylvania), and this obligation was enforced in the wars against the Indians. During the American Revolution, the newly independent states perpetuated the obligation.\(^1\) At the close of the American Revolution, all eyes turned to George Washington. Washington mainly believed that a small, professional army of competent regulars would best serve the needs of the nation. However, he offered comments to support both views (professional vs. non-professional); and it was Washington's idea, proclaiming a universal military obligation as the concomitant of the ballot, which is the foundation of the modern mass Army.\(^2\)

When the Revolutionary War appeared to be ending, the Congress of the Confederation organized a special committee to consider the formation of a permanent military establishment. Alexander Hamilton was appointed chairman of the committee, which proceeded to solicit the recommendations and opinions of the leading generals of the Revolution. In May of 1783, General Washington responded to the committee's request with his famous "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment." "It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system" Washington wrote, "that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it, and consequently that the Citizens of America (with a few legal and official exceptions) from 18 to 50

\(^{1}\) Weigley, "Introduction," p. xv.

\(^{2}\) Weigley, *American Army*, p. 12. Weigley notes that Washington admired the trained, "regular" professional armies of history. The American Revolution was fought mainly by three-month volunteers who kept leaving for home to plant or harvest their crops. And they often left at times when they were needed the most. Weigley writes that "from any perspective, the creation of a regular army seemed to him [Washington] essential to the American cause" (ibid., p. 6).
Years of Age should be borne on the Militia Rolls, provided with uniform Arms, and so far accustomed to the use of them, that the Total strength of the Country might be called forth on a Short Notice on any very interesting emergency. . . ."\(^1\)

Washington's ideas were not innovative by any means. Michael Grant observes, for example, that the Army of the Roman Republic was, in theory, a *citizen militia*—levied and controlled by the state officials for a single season of service, but often extended for much longer periods.\(^2\) Citizens formed the "legions," raised if not for one given year, at least for one given war. The militia was recruited traditionally by conscription, but the levy was restricted to the possessors of a certain property ownership qualification. This restriction was deemed necessary since it was held that all who served the state should have some reason to feel the desired *emotions of loyalty* (that is, a "stake" in the defense of the state). The soldiers were paid (practice began around 400 B.C.), but emoluments were small since Rome's citizens who served as soldiers were "doing their duty."\(^3\)


\(^2\)Michael Grant, *The Army of the Caesars*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. xxxii. Grant notes that "longer periods" sometimes meant 16 years, or twenty years in a period of emergency. G. R. Watson writes in *The Roman Soldier* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969) that although recruitment to the Roman army was theoretically based upon conscription, there seems to have been little difficulty in normal times in maintaining the establishment by means of voluntary enlistment. The typical soldier was the *volunteer*, and the bulk of his military service was spent under conditions of peace (p. 31).

\(^3\)Grant, *Army of the Caesars*, pp. xxxii-xxxiii.
The great thinkers of the Enlightenment, too, had conceived of a "natural army," composed of all able-bodied citizens, equal in arms, guided by democratic principles, and controlled by "Reason." "Every citizen shall be a soldier from duty," declared Rousseau, "none by profession. Every citizen shall be ready, but only when need calls for it." And so, as Vagts writes, Rousseau foreshadowed the claims for military duty: there is but one step from the general to the specific, from the postulate that "every good citizen owes his talents and lights to society," to the first French law of conscription, proclaiming that "every Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to the defense of his country."

The basic rationale of a "nation in arms" advanced by Washington and his philosophical predecessors has supported conscription in democratic countries everywhere from revolutionary France to twentieth century United States. Yet, traditionally, Americans have resisted the idea of a standing army, seeing it as one of the vestiges of Old World monarchies and autocracies and a threat to basic liberties. In this country, the draft has received general popular acceptance for only relatively brief periods. Compulsory service is seen to run "against the Grain of the values of individualism and free choice that are far

2 Ibid., p. 77.
3 Ibid.
4 In March 1863, two years after the Civil War began, Congress enacted the nation's first draft law. It was designed to stimulate the flow of Union troops in geographic areas which did not produce their quota of volunteers. The draft was invoked again in 1917 (World War I). In 1940 (World War II) Selective Service legislation was once more enacted, and continued (with brief periods of interruption) until the last draft call went out in January 1973. The so-called "American
more deeply associated with the image of the United States among its citizens and in the world at large.\footnote{Weigley, "Introduction," p. xvii.} Nonetheless, as Weigley writes: "The thoughtful student of the history of the draft in the United States and of military history at large will find considerable substantiation for the contention that a citizens' army based on a universal obligation to serve is the most appropriate armed force for a democracy."\footnote{Ibid., p. xvii.}

But in the post-Revolutionary period and beyond, other reasons than a universal obligation to serve have been used to argue for the use of "citizen" armies. After all, the United States had originated through the overthrow of a threatened military despotism (in the form of the British Army in America) by a revolutionary uprising of the armed citizenry. It was only natural to question the power and purpose of the new peacetime military. And "professional" armies were often seen as a most likely source of military despotism. Montesquieu had expressed fears that a strong army would destroy his "balance of powers" in government; while Voltaire called soldiers "hired murderers and the scum of the nation, poor devils in cheap blue cloth at a hundred-and-ten sows en ell."\footnote{Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 75.}

Throughout history, there has been a general belief that civilian control of the military can be accomplished best by the establishment of a thoroughgoing citizen army. Subordination of the military to a military model" which has emerged is that of a small professional "caretaker" force in peacetime, and a citizen army (of some form) during periods of war.


Ibid., p. xvii.

Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 75.
national purposes is achieved, the view holds, when the military is, in structure, a "citizen's institution"—an integral part of the social fabric, rather than separated or isolated from civilian life.

It was the feeling that citizens are the best and most loyal protectors of their own interests which formed the basis of the ancient Roman system of limiting military service to property-holders. The same notion has endured throughout history, and especially in this country. Weigley points out that the founding fathers thought a career army could be readily turned into a tool of despotism; whereas a drafted army of citizen-soldiers was a truly democratic force holding no such threat. A non-professional or amateur army would not threaten the citizenry, because the citizenry themselves would be the army. As Hamilton wrote in essay number 29 of The Federalist, the best and most fundamental defense against a standing army lies in the composition of the army itself:

Where in the name of common sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbours, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen, and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests?

Hamilton's argument reflected the ingrained popular suspicion of standing armies and the opposite regard for the militia as a bulwark.

---

1Grant, Army of the Caesars, pp. xxxii-xxxiii. Watson also writes in Roman Soldier (p. 39) that the legal requirements for admission to the legions was possession of full Roman citizenship, though exceptions were commonly made for the sons of serving soldiers.


of liberty. Hamilton had always been an outspoken proponent of military preparedness. But the leeve en masse had not yet appeared in France, and he was not predisposed toward any innovative or revolutionary means of defense. As chairman of the Congressional committee investigating the formation of a permanent military establishment, Hamilton consequently advocated a "regular" military organization and a "well-regulated militia," trained to professional standards and divided into three classes (married men, single men, and a special force of highly-trained men).

Nevertheless, the strong popular distrust of standing, "professional" armies endured. The early Americans did not believe in the necessity of expensive military establishments; and they not only believed that every citizen should bear arms, Weigley writes, but they regarded arms-bearing as a right even more than a duty: "An armed citizenry, Americans believed, constituted the best foundation of military policy, for it ensured safety against foreign attack and defense against any possible tyrannical pretensions of the government at home."2

In 1840, French author and statesman Alexis de Tocqueville examined the political and social institutions in America and formed a similar opinion of the "balancing" role played by the citizen-soldier. "In times of peace," Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America,3 "the Army is always inferior to the country itself." And this is necessarily true in

1See Weigley, American Army, pp. 15-18.
2Ibid., p. 18.
democratic nations, he found, because of the absence of the "wealthiest, best-educated, and ablest men":

When a military spirit forsakes a people, the profession of arms immediately ceases to be held in honor and military men fall to the lowest rank of public servants; they are little esteemed and no longer understood. . . . [T]hen men of the lowest class enter the army [and] . . . a circle of cause and consequence develops: the best part of the nation shuns the military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored because the best part of the nation has ceased to follow it.1

According to Tocqueville, it is the conscript who must therefore be able to "infuse the spirit of the community at large into the Army and retain it there." It is he who carries "the strengths or weaknesses of the manners of the nation," and does not "contract the wants, passions, or mode of [military] life." It is the private soldier, the citizen-soldier, who displays a "faithful reflection of the community," and helps to keep "the bounds of order."2

The representation or balanced presence of citizen-soldier "types" in the armed forces is thus seen to be a sort of natural control over the armed forces—a view which, as observed, has persisted in literature (and law) for well over two-thousand years. When the Gates Commission considered the prevalent "objections" to a volunteer military, the issue of citizen control through citizen representation was again given prominent attention. A principal objection, observed the Gates Commission, is based on the premise that "the presence of draftees in a mixed force guards against the growth of a separate military ethos, which could pose a threat to civilian authority, our freedom, and our democratic institutions."3

1Ibid., p. 266. 2Ibid., p. 274.
It is interesting to observe that the theory of control through citizen participation—the first real issue of military representation in this country—is similar to the early theories of political representation popularized by the Utilitarians. In fact, both theories conceive of a certain balance of conflicting interests. For Bentham and the later Utilitarians, "the selfish and separate interests of mankind" could be brought together to assure the "maximization" of total community interests. The homogenization of varied interests would thereby cancel out any dominating influences or otherwise selfish forces.

For advocates of a citizen militia in this country, the infusion of varied citizen interests into the military has long been considered a protection or a natural means of preserving community interests. But, whereas the Utilitarian concept may be said to emphasize the negative aspects of human nature, proponents of citizen-soldiery have stressed the positive dimensions of a citizen self-interest which reflects the spirit of the community. At the same time, the melding of selfish concerns (i.e., the "canceling-out" process) it is not presumed a safeguard against military despotism; it is the diversity of values, the heterogeneity of individuals, which is seen to preserve the legitimate order.

Notwithstanding certain differences concerning the instrumentality of control, the age-old concept of citizen representation in the military also parallels the method for dealing with divergent "factions" suggested by Madison in The Federalist (Number 10)—as well as the more recent ideas of Long, Friedrich, Mosher, and several others for directing the bureaucracy. Huntington called it the "subjective control

model, and it still remains a popular topic of debate in the areas of military manpower policy and civil-military relations.

Recent Developments of the Concept

From Washington onward, the debate between the partisans of a professional soldiery and an armed citizenry characterized military manpower discussions in this country. On the professional side were Alexander Hamilton, John C. Calhoun, Dennis Hart Mahan, Henry W. Halleck, and the "prophet of professionalism," Emory Upton. On the side of a citizen army were such political and military figures as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, John A. Logan, John M. Schofield, Hugh L. Scott, John McAuley Palmer, and George C. Marshall.

Among the proponents of the citizen army concept, Leonard Wood perhaps best expressed the arguments for citizen "representation" in the military. Wood appealed to the principle which advocates of conscription had relied on since the dawn of the democratic era and the introduction of the levee en masse in France: universal citizenship implies the responsibility of universal military service. Wood, an outspoken evangelist for universal military service, campaigned vigorously for "preparedness" during the period just prior to World War I. He

---

argued that the volunteer military was *un-American* and *unfair*. It brought out the best young men of the nation, while those less patriotic could continue to enjoy the safety and comforts of home.¹ "No such system (of defense) can be established which does not rest upon equality of service for all who are physically fit and of proper age," Wood wrote. "Manhood suffrage means manhood obligation for service in peace or war. This is the basic principle upon which truly representative government, or free democracy, rests and must rest if it is successfully to withstand the shock of modern war."² "Every good American honors the real volunteer spirit," Wood continued, "but it is difficult to understand how any man who is familiar with our country's history can advocate the continuance of the volunteer system, with its uncertainties, unpreparedness and lack of equality of service. We have been warned repeatedly by the experiences of others of the folly of depending on the volunteer system."³

Even though national circumstances and sociopolitical priorities are quite different, Leonard Wood's words in support of a universal military obligation might very well have been taken from a 1979 edition of the *New York Times* or *Congressional Record*. Wood's basic argument concerning the obligation to serve and his criticism of the lack of "equality of service" in the volunteer military are virtually the same.


³Ibid., p. 213. Wood's remarks, it should be noted, came at a time when the nation faced an ever-increasing likelihood of entrance into war. But Wood's basic theme was not tied to current events: universal military service is a democratic principle, a part of the American military
arguments used today to criticize the AVF. In a 30 December 1977 article appearing in the Chicago Tribune, for example, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia considered the "alarming decline" in citizens' acceptance of the obligation to serve the nation's needs. "The fundamental question that must be answered," Nunn wrote, "concerns the citizen's duty. Neither Congress nor the executive branch nor the American people have come to grips with this question."¹ "I believe we must distinguish between a career and a citizen force in the military services," Congressman Robin Beard of Tennessee similarly observes, "... because every citizen has an obligation to devote a period of time in service to his or her country. However, such an obligation must be shared equally by all. ..."²

Actually, as James M. Gerhardt observes in The Draft and Public Policy, five major sets of issues have shaped debates and decisions on military manpower policy since 1945. Support of national security (i.e., what constitutes an effective military establishment) has always been a predominant goal. Budgetary considerations and practical expediency (i.e., compulsions) have played a major role in the formulation of manpower policy. Equity and non-military social goals have also helped to shape policy. But even though Leonard Wood was speaking about the "equitable" nature of the draft in 1916, the influence of equity issues


and related social goals is a fairly recent phenomenon—and these issues have seldom been major factors.¹

The content of debate has thus shifted several times over the years, reflecting changing perceptions, changing politics, and the particular national circumstances of the period.² Throughout the post-World War II period, for example, military requirements and the goal of national security under cold-war conditions dominated most discussions. During the Korean War, cold war national security goals became even more important, and peacetime conscription received a degree of Congressional and popular acceptance (though, as Gerhardt notes, traditional resistance to conscription remained strong).³ However, in the late 1960s, the search for a military which would both offer an effective national defense and, at the same time, harmonize with American democratic ideals led to a new recognition of the importance of equality of service.

Gerhardt traces the development of the equity issue since the early 1950s and finds that its impact on debates and decisions of military manpower procurement policy was minor and sporadic.⁴ In 1951, there was some debate concerning the equity of student deferments—but then and thereafter, policy only protected colleges and college students from the draft. In 1955, interracial equity was an issue in reserve manpower policy—but the problem was never resolved. In 1956, men over the age of twenty-five were exempted from induction by executive order, in response to the perceived injustice of taking older, more-settled men

²Ibid. ³Ibid.
⁴This historical discussion of "equity" between 1950 and 1963 is derived largely from ibid., pp. 359-360.
away from their careers and families—but few people ever considered the consequent injustices this exemption created. In 1958, there was some discussion of the way in which highly selective entry standards discriminated against less-advantaged youth—but the entry standards remained intact. And there was some discussion of selection and discharge inequities resulting from the partial mobilization of reserves in 1961. But it was not until after 1963 that political apathy toward equity-related issues began to disappear, and the protective and exclusionary features of the Selective Service System were seriously questioned.

Equality of service and the notion of numerical "fairness" became heated issues around 1966-1967, when it was suggested that blacks were shouldering a "disproportionate burden" of the war in Vietnam. Between 1961 and 1966, when blacks comprised approximately 11 percent of the general population (aged 19-21 years), black casualties amounted to almost one-fourth of total losses among Army enlisted personnel in Vietnam. Although these casualty rates were more or less in proportion to the number of blacks in combat units, civil rights spokesmen had the evidence to claim that the military system was unjustly using black youth as "cannon fodder for a war directed by whites." In advocating a boycott of the Vietnam War, Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, claimed


that blacks were "dying in disproportionate numbers in Vietnam"; while the national directors of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the National Urban League, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and other civil rights leaders spoke of the "imbalance of black Americans in Vietnam," the "racist policies of the Selective Service System," and the "disproportionate hardships" placed on young black men.¹

In February 1967, with the release of the report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (Marshall Commission), the charges of discrimination by black civil rights leaders were given official documentation. In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? was the title of the Commission report, and its conclusions were based on the premise that specified groups (racial, social, economic) should bear the risk (or incidence) of death in war and the responsibilities of service during peacetime roughly proportionate to that group's percentage in society. The Marshall Commission found evidence of the "Negro's overrepresentation in combat" and "underrepresentation on local draft boards," and it concluded that "social and economic injustices in the society itself are at the root of inequities which exist."²

Nevertheless, in 1967 there were still large numbers of reservists, students, young husbands and fathers, and marginally disqualified youths


deferred from active military service. The racial and social "imbalance" among draftees assigned to combat, rising casualty rates and reports of missing persons, the seemingly endless war along with its increasing draft calls gave the armed forces a new and higher level of public visibility. At the same time, "quota consciousness" was becoming a major social and political issue of the period. The civil rights movement, women's liberation, the welfare rights movement, Supreme Court decisions, the War on Poverty, the political institutionalization of representation-by-quota (e.g., the McGovern-Fraser quota guidelines for the Democratic Party), and federal legislation (e.g., affirmative action) contributed to a heightened awareness of group participation and statistical parity within all sectors of society.

Public perception of anomalies and inequities in the Selective Service System came to a head during this period. Burgeoning protests against the war in Vietnam focused on the machinery of the draft, and these protests intensified pressure for the reform of Selective Service. Prior to this period, the Selective Service System had operated in an environment of public and Congressional approval—and Selective Service could point to the general lack of public protest as proof that inequities, though they might exist, were not strongly felt. But it was this combination of protest, group consciousness, and a sense of inequity in the late 1960s which led to extensive reform of the Selective Service System, the institution of a draft lottery, greater reliance on voluntary recruitment, and the eventual demise of conscription. And, it was from within this sociopolitical milieu that the contemporary issue of

---

1 This observation is made by Gerhardt, The Draft, p. 361.
military representation evolved. Participation in the defense of the nation, linked with the duties of individual citizenship, was redefined as a group concept: military entrants, though not actually representing a body of constituents, were perceived as "re-presenting" (or "presenting again") the characteristics of definite groups in the community.

The Relevance of Measures of Representation

Marie Collins Swabey writes that "democracy, like science, ... seeks to obtain mastery over the external world by treating its objects numerically and as subject to determinations of magnitude." In this respect, she continues, it ranges itself on the side of an ideal—"namely, that our most adequate understanding of things is to be gained by their correlation with, or translation into, terms of commensurable quantities. Stated in extreme form, this is the doctrine that there is only as much science in a given discipline as there is mathematics in it."¹

Any discussion of "proportional representation" (a redundant term)—whether used in reference to political, civilian bureaucratic, military, or industrial sectors—is necessarily a comparison of mathematical quantities. Ratios, statistical evaluations, mathematical analyses—i.e., comparisons of numbers—are quite literally the sum and substance of "representation." As Hermens observes, it is no accident that virtually all of the inventors of the various systems of proportional representation in government have been mathematicians: "Authorities in the fields of public law and of political science have, at times, felt that this

fact alone should make everyone think twice before accepting conclusions derived from premises not related to those of political life.\textsuperscript{1}

Representation problems, consequently, are usually treated as mathematical problems. Something is considered to be representative when it contains within itself the same elements, in the same proportion, as are found in the standard or reference group.\textsuperscript{2} The representation question is therefore reduced to an equation in which the unknown quantities are the policy decisions necessary to achieve a state of proportionality. This state of proportionality, in the ideal, is viewed (in mathematical terms) as more or less a random sample of the entire population—reflecting with a certain degree of mathematical exactness the various divisions of society.

Although the ideal is often perceived in this way, that is, as a "microcosmic replica" of the population, perfect accuracy of correspondence is an illusion. Even a representative random sample, although it allows one to state with precision the mathematical probability of any amount of inaccuracy of correspondence, can yield only certain kinds of information.\textsuperscript{3} Proportionality in numbers may well yield only proportionality in numbers. Besides the myriad differences between subgroups within gross classifications of groups, and subgroups within subgroups of groups, it is assumed that a sample of individuals in a "representative" assembly would be at least biased by those who have special skills, attributes, interests, and personality traits.


\textsuperscript{2}Cf. observations of Joseph Tussman in Pitkin, ed., \textit{Representation}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{3}See Hannah F. Pitkin, \textit{The Concept of Representation}, (Berkeley:
The ideal of perfect representation within any highly specialized institution is probably not even desirable. The case of the lunatic is the favorite example used by political philosophers to illustrate this point, but there are many others.\(^1\) It has also been observed that the categories which can be used in evaluations of representativeness are virtually limitless.

Consequently, the determination of which groups or characteristics are important or "relevant" varies with time and place; and the choices are essentially products of the political environment—dependent first and foremost on political expressions and interpretations of national needs and values. If social or ethnic divisions are thought to have "political significance," they may be expected to receive attention as representational issues.

The classic example of transitory political significance is religious affiliation. Once an issue suitable for warfare and revolution, religion has since become relatively unimportant as a measure of representation.\(^2\) If anything, among the various descriptive measures in this country, religious affiliation is today the most purposefully avoided personal characteristic. In March 1957, the Bureau of the Census included a question on religious preferences in its annual sample survey.

\(^1\) There is an opposite view, strange as it seems. Senator Roman L. Hruska, for example, remarked during the confirmation hearings of a 1970 nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States that Justices on the Supreme Court should "represent mediocrity." A. H. Birch, *Representation* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 59, quotes a similar statement by a British Lord during a television interview: "Ideally, the House of Commons should be a social microcosm of the nation. The nation has a great many people who are rather stupid, and so should the House."

\(^2\) Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*, p. 87.
of the civilian population for the first and the last time. Since 1957, the Bureau of the Census has been prohibited by law from asking questions on religious affiliation.

The armed forces reflect this general avoidance of religion. Currently, only the Army maintains some statistical data on religion, gathered each year through the Quarterly (November) Sample Survey of Military Personnel. These data are difficult to compare with data on the civilian population due to differences in survey questions and, most of all, differences in the religions identified on the surveys. However, a very general comparison of the Army and civilian populations shows some remarkable and interesting differences between the two groups--differences which, if taken at face value, might precipitate some concern.

The data in Table 3, for example, show that a very high proportion of Army enlisted personnel indicate an "other" religious preference. A disproportionately high number of enlistees also indicate "no religious preference." In both groups of enlisted personnel (total enlisted and grades E1-E2), these percentages are noticeably higher than the corresponding proportions in the population of the nation. The American Institute for Public Opinion finds that, while teenagers (and younger


2There is no available method of determining why such a large percentage of enlisted personnel selected the "other" religion category in the Army survey. However, "other" religion may be something between no preference/religion-not-listed and a statement of current non-activity.


TABLE 3

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES OF ACTIVE DUTY ARMY PERSONNEL AND POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Preference</th>
<th>Active Duty Army Personnel</th>
<th>Population of the U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grades E1-E2</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other^b</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Orthodox</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religious Preference</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


^aArmy data are based on responses to a question appearing on the (quarterly) Army Sample Survey of Military Personnel administered in November 1977. U.S. population data are from national surveys conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) during 1977.

^bU.S. population data do not include subcategories of "other" religious preferences; hyphens indicate insufficient data.
Americans) are highly religious in certain key respects (e.g., belief in God, regular prayer), they are at the same time "turned off" by churches and organized religion. This understanding may partly explain the differences between Army officers and enlistees, since the group of enlisted personnel (median age of 22.5 years) is considerably younger than the group of officers (median age of 31.5 years). But age dissimilarities do not explain differences between Army enlisted personnel and the general population of persons between 18 and 24 years. Differences could be attributed to simple differences in survey questions; yet the officers and enlisted personnel were administered the same survey, and the officer population is fairly representative of the national standard. Does the comparison of Army enlistees and the general population therefore signify that Army enlistees are more inclined to be "Godless," amoral, unconventional, or just the subjects of a poor survey? Without more information, one can only conjecture.

Age is also politically "irrelevant," despite attempts by "gray panthers" to make it otherwise. The military, for example, has always been overrepresentative of the young (but not the very young) and

1American Institute for Public Opinion, Religion in America: The Gallup Opinion Index 1977-1978 (Princeton, N.J.: American Institute, 1977), p. 3. 55 percent of all those with no religious preference in U.S. are under the age of 30 years. "No preference" is also a function of education (i.e., as education increases, likelihood of some preference decreases).

2Age-related social issues--particularly problems of older Americans--have become areas of public awareness and concern in recent years. Government agencies, private institutions, special committees in Congress thus deal with long-neglected issues such as age-discrimination and the protection and rights of older citizens. However, age-related social issues are still among the "quiet concerns" of our times; they do not engender the powerful, emotional responses of, say, problems relating to racial minorities, women, or the nation's poor (including the elderly). Additionally, in comparison with other categoric "groups"
underrepresentative of everyone over the age of 40 years. Consequently, it has never been (and probably never will be) a cross section or microcosmic replica of the American people.\(^1\) Physical stamina is the most obvious reason for having a youthful military. Hunter observes that "in combat arms youth and vigor are often as important as experience in accomplishing the mission on a sustained basis in the field under combat conditions."\(^2\) Custom (dating back to the Army of the Caesars and through the earliest directives of General George Washington in this country) is also probably responsible.\(^3\) Some will claim that each generation "gets its chance." Yet, as Pauly and Willett write, (1) all individuals share roughly the same amount of national defense, and so all should pay an equal share of its cost, and (2) since defense needs and required individual sacrifices are not constant, comparisons between generations are essentially meaningless.\(^4\) The Pauly and Willett argument, originally used to demonstrate the inequity of drafting young men, is virtually the same argument used to demonstrate the inequity of minority overrepresentation in the armed forces.

(which age encompasses) there is relatively little "pressure of organized power" by either young or old Americans.

\(^1\)Another obvious limitation on full "representation" is the disproportionately low percentage of women in the armed forces. In 1978, women accounted for over 51 percent of the U.S. population. As of December 1977, there were 121,385 women in the armed forces, or about 5.9 percent of total strength. See U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Directorate for Information, Operations, and Reports, May 1978), pp. 49-50.


\(^3\)See, for example, Washington in American Military Thought, p. 23; Grant, Army of the Caesars, p. xxxii; Watson, Roman Soldier, pp. 151-152.

In 1977, the median age of all male military personnel was 24.4 years. (During the same year, the median age of males in the general population was 28.2 years.) Historically, most enlisted volunteers enter active service during their late teens; officers first enter at ages about four years older; and inductees have entered at around 20 years of age. Table 4 shows the age distribution of all non-prior service enlisted entrants to the armed forces during 1977. In total DoD, it can be seen that over 71 percent of new enlistees during 1977 were "teenagers." But the armed forces also encourage high turnover of personnel, and they seek to maintain a generally youthful composition. In fact, as Table 5 shows, more than half of all male military personnel are between the ages of 17 and 24—well above the corresponding percentage of 17 to 24 year-old males in the general population. Even in the civilian labor force, only 22 percent of all males are below the age of 25—while over half are above the age of 35.

In the 1960s, when the minimum voting age was 21 years, the youthful composition of the military was often cited to dramatize the need for voting rights reform. In 1978, Congress amended the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967 by raising the legal protection against mandatory retirement from age 65 to 70. Similar moves by states and private industry are also occurring. And, there is evidence over the

---


TABLE 4

AGE OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AT TIME OF ENTRY (1977) BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age At Time of Entry (Years)</th>
<th>ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</th>
<th>SERVICE OF ACCESSION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 and above</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age (Years)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Department of Defense Master and Loss File
### TABLE 5

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY MALE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND MALE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1977 and PROJECTED) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-19</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Over 40</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Over 50</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Projections for the year 2000 are "Series II" projections, which use mid-range assumptions about future fertility and mortality rates.*
past decade of the increased recognition of the legal rights and human rights of both the old and the young. As a measure of representation, however, age has been systematically ignored.

There are signs that age will be a major military manpower issue of the 1980s and beyond. It is evident from Table 4 that shifting population patterns are occurring. In 1977, there were approximately 4.3 million men in the primary manpower pool (i.e., men 18 and 19 years old). By 1987, this manpower pool will decrease by 16 percent to 3.6 million men. In 1992, the primary manpower pool will decrease by 24 percent to a predicted low of 3.26 million men. By the year 2000 the manpower pool will have increased again to 3.9 million men, but the age distribution of the population will be considerably different than the distribution in 1977. In the year 2000, the median age of males is expected to be over 34 years; and over 50 percent of the male population will be above the age of 35, with a quarter of the population between the ages of 35 and 50 years.¹ There are already recommendations to build a more "career-intensive" military force of new recruits needed each year—in effect, increasing the age and experience distribution of the armed forces.² Peter Drucker, a prominent writer on the problems of the elderly, recently observed that "except perhaps in the event of a truly


catastrophic depression, labor supply for the traditional blue-collar jobs will increasingly be inadequate even if present blue-collar workers are willing to stay on the job beyond age 65. . . . We will have to consider what incentives we need to encourage people . . . to postpone retirement. . . ."¹ A more "career-intensive" military force, however, will also raise costs (because of higher average rank) and tend to reduce opportunities for promotion and career incentives for new members.² It appears, then, that while age is not currently an issue of "representation," it may soon be "politically relevant."

Race issues were not considered important thirty years ago when the Services were segregated and had a combined total of 1621 black officers (four in the Navy, one in the Marine Corps, 310 in the Air Force, and 1306 in the Army).³ Today, race issues (specifically black vs. white) are among the most important representation concerns. The political and social environment and past history of discriminatory practices have made differences defined by race important considerations. During the next quarter-century—perhaps even within the next few years—age (and gender) may very well be added to the list of "politically relevant" military representation issues.⁴

²Congressional Quarterly, U.S. Defense Policy, p. 79.
⁴Some observers contend that age and sexual composition are already major military manpower policy concerns. Sex has been added to the list of "relevant" issues (see Chapter 1), and it will be considered in present analyses. However, realistic comparisons of military and civilian female populations are not currently possible since, as previously noted, women comprise less than ten percent of the total military
Summary of Representation Issues

Expressions of concern regarding the representational configuration of the American military have focused on three general areas of national policy: military effectiveness, political legitimacy, and social equity. Military effectiveness or national security (as an end or outcome of policy) has always been a foremost measure and determinant of major defense action. The concepts of political legitimacy and social equity are firmly rooted in the philosophical foundations of democratic institutions. However, only in recent years have these three categories of thought become uniquely interrelated as defense manpower policy issues.

Military effectiveness—or the creation of a thoroughgoing, competent armed force—was a primary concern of the founding fathers and all who followed. At the same time, the need to control the military establishment from potentially despotic influences, and to preserve the patriotic fiber of the nation by asserting the citizen's duty to bear arms, characterized the thoughts and policies of military planners. Legitimacy considerations—to the extent that they ensure an effective, secure, and properly controlled and directed military establishment—have played a major role in the formulation of military manpower policy. Considerations of fairness and related social concerns, on the other hand, have often been overlooked in favor of practical expediency and efficiency factors. Yet, since 1945, and especially since the late force. The theme of future representation concerns is perhaps best captured in the title of a recent monograph by Juanita Kreps and Robert Clark, Sex, Age, and Work: The Changing Composition of The Labor Force, Policy Studies in Employment and Welfare No. 23 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
1960s, equity issues and a concern for the social consequences of man-
power policy decisions have helped to re-shape methods of recruitment
and the very structure of the American armed forces.

While the end of the draft and advent of volunteer service are
not in themselves responsible for redirecting policy evaluations, these
events did establish for the first time in recent history a coactive
partnership of social, political, and otherwise strictly military goals.
The issues of military effectiveness and national preparedness became
issues connected by a common bond of concern to the basic principles of
democratic organizations. This elevated interest in the representa-
tional character of voluntary enlistments thereby created a new level
of evaluation regarding the **means** as well as the outcomes of defense
manpower policy decisions.
"Justice is the first virtue of social institutions," John Rawls writes in *A Theory of Justice*, "as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. . . . Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising."  

Rawls focuses on social justice—that is, the basic structure of society, or "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the advantages from social cooperation." And he proceeds to set forth a conception of "justice as fairness" in the social contract tradition and a "general conception" of justice for institutions: "All social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored."  

---


2 Ibid., p. 7.

3 Ibid., p. 303. "Justice as fairness," the author writes, "conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair" (see p. 12).
Actually, Plato offered the first systematic attempt to describe the ideal of a "just" society composed of "just" men in the Republic. The main question to be answered was: What does justice mean, and how can it be realized in human society? The demand for a definition of justice here, notes Francis Cornford, seems to imply that there is some conception in which the various applications of the Greek word for "just" (i.e., "observant of custom or of duty, righteous; fair, honest; legally right, lawful; what is due to or from a person, deserts, rights; what one ought to do") converge at a common point. Thus, "the justice of the society would secure that each member of it should perform his duties and enjoy his rights."¹

Aristotle, too, attempted to locate the true meaning of "justice" in Nicomachean Ethics and in Politics. He examined the various usages of the term "justice" and classified these usages—including the fair and equal distribution of political power, privilege, and status, and the matching of people to "proper shares and proportions." Aristotle also recognized that justice was only possible if it was founded on some type of equality; and the problem for him was to find the kind or manner of equality which was really "just."²


²Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, Inc., 1941), pp. 1002-1022 (Bk. V of Nicomachean Ethics); and pp. 1192-1194, 1232-1234 (Bk. III: Ch. 13 and Bk. V: Ch. 1 of Politics). Aristotle writes in Ethics that "equity" or "equitable" are neither absolutely the same nor generically different from "just" and "justice." Rather, he states, the equitable is just, "but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice." Equitable is "better than one kind of justice—not better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement; . . . a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality" (pp. 1019-1020 [Bk V: Ch. 10]).
Plato and Aristotle differed in their conceptions of justice, in their ideas of right and wrong, fair and unfair, and the distribution of rights, benefits, and privileges. Since the time of the classical Greek philosophers, man has attempted to define anew the meaning of "just" or "right" or "equitable" with each passing generation—and there has been characteristically no more agreement in abstract formulations and much less consensus in situational applications.

Rawls's contemporary conception of justice, like that of Aristotle and many others, takes into account the principle of what properly belongs to a person and of what is properly due to him. In the final analysis, then, the problem of justice (as applied to social institutions) involves problems of distribution. Since social justice is difficult to define, locate, and administer in any practical sense, governments and societies often defend and pursue it by counting heads and establishing mathematical formulas for statistical parity—the most simple and objective means for measuring "just" distributions.

Distribution problems for American political and social institutions include rights and privileges as well as certain "negative rights" or duties of citizenship. Among the duties of citizenship, as previously observed, is the assumption that all citizens share equally the burden or responsibility of military service in behalf of the nation. But military service is not only a "negative right"; there are many rewards or benefits to be obtained by individuals, in peace as well as in times of war.

In recent years, there has been a new awareness of the important role the military plays in society. It is this new awareness of the interrelationship between the armed forces and society which has marked the
military as a battleground of social concern. The military has thus become a symbol of the society, a manifestation of equity; and as a public institution, the composition of the military is seen to symbolically reflect social justice or social injustice. Even more important, however, is the realization that the armed forces have, at various times and under various circumstances, deprived certain groups from entrance into military service when it was important to serve (for example, for recognition of full citizenship) and protected other groups when it was important not to serve.

Equity in the Military Melting Pot

As social historian Oscar Handlin observes, eighteenth century Americans commonly viewed themselves as a "new stock," produced by an amalgam of many different cultural strains. And immigration policy through the nineteenth century reflected the certainty that all newcomers to the nation could be absorbed and that all could contribute to the emerging national character. ¹

However, by the time the nineteenth century drew to a close, one could find at least three distinct, rival interpretations of "Americanization" or the process of immigrant adjustment to American life. On the one hand, there was the image of the "melting pot," where all elements of the population were fused into a homogeneous mass. Alternatively, other social observers argued that each immigrant group should retain its unique traditions and particular tendencies; "cultural pluralism," reflecting harmony among diverse traditions, was thus promoted. Still

another group of American writers argued that the national character was already fixed and not to be modified by immigrants; consequently, newcomers should rid themselves of their old ways and cultures, and be "assimilated" into the dominant Anglo-Saxon standard of social and political behavior.¹

"Although the United States has been called a melting pot again and again by historians justly eager to celebrate American diversity," Bernard Weisberger writes, "there has been no time when the nation's peoples have been on the verge of wholly losing their [religious, racial, and original ethnic] identities..."² Yet, the idea of the great, bubbling "crucible"—where immigrants of all kinds are melted and fused together into a "nation of many nations"—is an idea which is close to the heart of the American self-image. It is a permanent part of American folklore.

In the armed forces, especially, the image of amalgamation, or blending of diverse traditions, has played an important role in the nation's history. The American armed forces have always emphasized certain differences, certain stereotypes; it is in the nature of the organization which consciously "brings together" persons from diverse backgrounds to serve for a common cause. It is almost as though the "bringing together" (and the conformity which the military seeks to create) itself


brings out the regional, ethnic, or other differences between people--
group or ethnic pride, or a search for individual identification, perhaps
--but whatever diversity is there often seems magnified.

The exaggeration of differences and stereotypes is practically
pro forma in Hollywood depictions of the American armed forces, and par-
ticularly during wartime. As Lawrence Suid points out in Guts and Glory,
popular literature and the mass media have a strong effect on the way
most Americans perceive the nation's military.1 The movie industry has,
historically, played a major role in creating various images of the
American military: from the image of the all-conquering and infallible
force for the good of the world (up to the early 1960s) to current, more
critical portrayals of the military. The profound effect of the Holly-
wood feature film is evidenced by what Suid describes as "a massive public
relations campaign (undertaken by the Pentagon) to reestablish a positive
perception of the armed forces as part of the nation's effort to build
an all-volunteer military."2

An important aspect of the image created by the movie industry is
that the American military is a sort of miniature melting pot, a place
where GIs representing a wide variety of distinctive social, ethnic and
cultural traditions are thrown and mixed together. And, whenever Holly-
wood portrays the military, it usually deals in stereotypes. During

1See Lawrence H. Suid, Guts and Glory: Great American War Movies
(Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978); see also
chapter on "Images of Enlisted Life" in Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The
1-36.

2Suid, Guts and Glory, p. xv.
World War II, the model for ethnic stereotypes was set in a variety of propagandistic and morale-building motion pictures. In the year 1943 alone, there were several major Hollywood productions which stressed the "representative" character of the American fighting forces.

In Air Force, a 1943 movie starring John Garfield, the crew of the bomber "Mary Ann" (upon which the movie focused) consisted of a heterogeneous cross section of the nation (with the exception of a black). The movie Battan (1943), starring Robert Taylor, concentrated on a small group of men which also included stereotypical representatives of all ethnic groups. In Battan, however, the movie industry went one step further by including a black soldier. Destination Tokyo (1943), starring Cary Grant and John Garfield, told the story of a submarine, "Copperfin," whose crew, gallantly united in its effort to end the war quickly, contained a typical (once again) mixture of ethnic backgrounds.

One of the best examples of the genre is also a 1943 film, Action in the North Atlantic. Action was essentially a war propaganda film, as well as a tribute to the U.S. Merchant Marine (starring Humphrey Bogart and Raymond Massey). It contained all the Hollywood war movie cliches, including the well-integrated crew with each member delivering a specially stereotyped ethnic exhortation. And the capper to the movie,

---

1 Ibid., p. 41.

2 Dore Schary, MGM's production chief, later admitted that "it really was inaccurate, because there were no combat soldiers who were black." Given his political liberalism, Suid notes, Schary went ahead and used a black soldier because he "felt it was right"; in ibid., p. 45. More recent examples of fictionalized integration can be found in such movies as PT-109 (1963), The Dirty Dozen (1967), and the popular American television series, "Hogan's Heroes."

a classic scene shown time and again in film anthologies, was a traditional burial-at-sea, where Humphrey Bogart reads the death roll and praises his compatriots. By happenstance, each casualty has a perceptibly ethnic name—with, of course, one representative from each of the major groups.

Hollywood is, to some extent, responsible for perpetuating this image of the armed forces as an American melting pot, but Hollywood did not create it. Michael Novak writes in *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* that the "price of being Americanized"—the "price exacted by America when into its maw it sucks other cultures of the world and processes them"—is the "blood test." You proved you loved America by dying for it in its wars, Novak writes; the message is "die for us and we'll love you." Thus, entry into the American melting pot has first meant proven loyalty, sacrifice, and, frequently, some price-in-blood. Novak observes that when the Poles were only four percent of the U.S. population (in 1917-1919), they accounted for over twelve percent of the nation's casualties in World War I. And the "fighting Irish" did not win their epithet on the playing fields of Notre Dame, but by dying in droves during the American Civil War.

Because of the fact that Americans take such pride in their immigrant heritage and alternate traditions, "representation" probably

---

1Evidence of the endurability of this image can be found in the television series "Star Trek"—whose United Federation Starship "Enterprise" had a racially and ethnically balanced twenty-third century crew.


3Ibid., p. xxii.
means more in the United States than in any other country. Points of view may differ as to what groups should be represented (and in what proportions), but there is a common understanding in this country that some type of social "mix" or "balance" of diverse groups is truly American. Nonetheless, "diversity" in this country has been time-sensitive. The American melting pot has not always been open to all ethnic or racial groups. And once group recognition has been gained in the "crucible" it usually takes social or political pressure to keep from falling to the bottom of the pot. Stevens, for example, writes in the *Air Force Times* that certain "forgotten" groups have lately claimed due recognition as separate and identifiable entities, deserving of proper representation in the military hierarchy:

> Whether the armed services correctly represent a particular racial or ethnic minority depends a great deal on a person's point of view. One group of congressmen recently asked Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to explain what they thought was a shortage of ethnic Polish and Italian officers in the general and flag ranks. Most of those members had Polish or Italian names. Perhaps the various senators and representatives of Japanese extraction will be the next to ask why there are no generals or admirals with Japanese surnames.ⁱ

It has been observed that the right to bear arms is an integral aspect of the normative definition of citizenship.⁲ Political rights are to be achieved by participation in the military, and by proof of loyalty through defense of the state. Similarly, denial of the right to bear arms is equated with a denial of full citizenship. As Dalfiume observes in *Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two*

---


Fronts, 1939-1953, it has commonly been assumed that citizens have the obligation to participate in the armed forces; and, restrictions on the opportunities of groups to fulfill this obligation have served as justification for denying groups their full rights of citizenship.¹ (This was the case, for example, in the Dred Scott majority opinion of the Supreme Court in 1857 which ruled that no black slave or descendant of a slave could be a U.S. citizen.) Thus, the military establishment which excludes certain groups no longer makes possible the test of loyalty and citizenship, and thereby excludes those groups from the American melting pot.

Although blacks had taken part in all of the nation's wars, they occupied a special position in the American military. Reflecting American society, the armed forces for over 170 years segregated and limited the participation of black Americans. Inevitably, it was the exclusionary practices and racial segregation of the armed forces which became the first major representation and equity issue of the twentieth-century military.

Ironically, while the underrepresentation and exclusion of blacks from the military ignited modern discussions of equality of service, it is the overrepresentation of blacks which today dominates most debates. "Equality of service" once meant getting blacks into the armed forces; now it means keeping blacks out. In the late 1940s and 1950s, "equal opportunity"—that is, allowing blacks to share equally in the benefits of military service—was a major policy objective. By the late 1960s

and early 1970s, however, the burdens of military service were seen
to outweigh the benefits, and equal opportunity gave way to "equal
representation"—that is, protecting certain depressed minority groups,
such as blacks, from bearing a disproportionate burden of the defense
of the nation.

Black Representation in the Armed Forces:
Historical Perspective

As noted military historian Ulysees Lee observes, the services
of blacks in armed forces from the days of the colonial militia have
been well-documented. During the American Revolution, blacks served
in varying numbers as free volunteers, as slaves serving in the hope
of gaining their freedom, as slaves serving in the places of their
masters, and, in some cases, in full segregated companies. By the time
of the Civil War and for eighty years thereafter, Lee writes, it was
ture that "Negroes must fight for the right to fight."1

Pre-Civil War America, Foner observes in Blacks and the Military
in American Society, viewed blacks as cowardly and childlike, with little
ability for fighting. So, by the 1850s, the achievements of black sol-
diers had been all but erased from the pages of history and the memories
of most Americans. A campaign was put together by black writers and
journalists in 1851 to remind the nation of the military accomplishments
of black Americans. The effort was designed to show that blacks were
entitled to equal rights in a land they had helped to defend. "It
proves," William Lloyd Garrison commented, "how ready have been the

1Ulysees Lee, "The Draft and the Negro," Current History 55
(July 1968): 29.
colored Americans to shed their blood in defense even of the country
in which they have been most atrociously treated from the beginning. ¹

During the early days of the Civil War blacks were excluded
from service for reasons of political and social policy. By the middle
of 1862, however, white volunteers were becoming scarce and some black
regiments were formed by Union generals without authorization. After
the first national draft law was passed in 1863, some states (including
Rhode Island and Massachusetts) formed volunteer black units whose en-
listees could then be counted against the state draft quotas (even when
these units were recruited in the South).

The nation's first draft law also had another, more immediate
effect on blacks. The Conscription Act of March 1, 1863 provided that
a drafted man could purchase his release from military service for a
payment of 300 dollars. Working men, Lee notes, often recent immigrants
themselves, already believing that freed slaves would migrate North and
usurp their jobs, viewed the draft law as discriminating against them in
favor of the rich and the slaves who would soon take away their civilian
jobs. ² The popular phrase of the period was "rich men's money, poor
men's blood."

Soon after the names of the first Civil War draftees appeared
in the New York newspapers, there were riots in several cities in the
East and Midwest. The New York City riot was the most severe, causing

¹Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History (New

an estimated 1200 deaths and considerable property damage. It also took the tone of an anti-black race riot, as several hundred blacks were killed and thousands fled the city. The streets were littered with the dead and dying, and the mutilated bodies of black victims were left hanging from the trees and lampposts by the time the riots ended.  

Nevertheless, it was the participation by blacks in the Civil War, according to Lincoln, which insured a Northern victory and preservation of the Union. Indeed, during the Civil War, the Bureau of Colored Troops recruited and organized over 185,000 blacks into the U.S. Colored Troops; and adding black volunteers in independent and state units, it is estimated that close to 390,000 blacks served in the Civil War. 

After the Civil War, a congressional authorization provided for black infantry and cavalry regiments—units with white officers—within the regular Army (two regiments in each branch of the Service). The existence of these regiments, however, provided assurances that no blacks would serve in any other branches of the armed forces except in time of national emergency.

During World War I, blacks comprised about 10.7 percent of the general population, and the Selective Service draft ensured that about


2Foner, Blacks and the Military, p. 48

that proportion served in the military. Ambrose notes that many blacks pinned their hopes for a better future on involvement in the War, and many black leaders hoped to use the Army as a vehicle for social change. W. E. B. Du Bois, for example, believed in 1917 that, if the black man could fight to defeat the Kaiser, he could later "present a bill for payment due to a grateful white America." But, most black soldiers were draftees, since few were allowed to enlist: and most were assigned to traditional, menial labor occupations in peripheral units (i.e., supply, stevedore, engineer, and labor crews).

In the interval between the World Wars, the Army remained segregated and adopted a policy of black quotas which again kept the number of blacks in the Army proportionate to the total population. Yet, as Moskos observes, never in the pre-World War II period did the number of blacks approach this quota: on the eve of Pearl Harbor, blacks constituted only 5.9 percent of the Army and there were only five black officers (three of whom were chaplains).

The Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 contained two provisions intended to prevent racial discrimination. The Navy and the Marine Corps avoided the race issue entirely by accepting only white volunteers (though they were later reluctant users of the draft). The Army decided to accept the race provisions; but it declared that segregated units were not discriminatory, and it announced that its black personnel would be "maintained on the general basis of the proportion

---


of the Negro population of the country" (despite its policy to "not intermingle colored and white personnel in the same regimental organizations").

Approximately three-fourths of all black personnel served in the quartermaster, engineer, and transportation corps, and at no time did the number of black personnel exceed 10 percent of total personnel. By the end of the war, blacks constituted 8.9 percent of the Army; nearly all were in segregated units. The "right to fight" eventually became a slogan of black organizations, but even black combat units were often used only for heavy-duty labor and support.

The ten percent quota system was applied throughout the World War II period; the total number of black draftees, the number assigned to the separate services (in segregated units), and the number of men assigned to the crews of auxiliary vessels and auxiliary fleet vessels in the Navy were all limited to ten percent. Stephen E. Ambrose observes in "Blacks in the Army in the Two World Wars" that, except in times of severe depression, the Army historically has been unable to enlist enough men to maintain its authorized strength. Yet, it never had the slightest difficulty in filling its assigned quota of blacks. And, even though there were far more potential black recruits during the periods of racial segregation, black strength was kept lower than even the number of blacks in the general population would justify.

---

2 Moskos, American Enlisted Man, p. 110.
3 See Ambrose, "Blacks in the Army," p. 186.
4 Ibid., p. 186.
The predominant white attitudes of the period questioned the effectiveness and "value" of blacks in the military. At the same time, the "burden of proof" rested with those who favored equal participation by blacks in the military.\(^1\) As late as 1955, studies were still being conducted on *The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army*.\(^2\) "While Negroes have served in the Armed Forces since the Revolutionary War," the authors wrote, "their utilization has varied and their value has been the subject of much debate."\(^3\) Thus, concerns about the possible over-representation of blacks in the military resulted in racial quotas, even when statutes clearly prohibited "discrimination against any person on account of race or color" (Selective Training and Service Act of 1940). And, aside from issues of desegregation, it is interesting to note that the underrepresentation of racial minorities in the military never really became a major topic of discussion.

**Black Representation: From Segregation and Quotas to Equality of Opportunity**

Stern observes that the popular motion-picture image of the black serviceman in World War II (and to some extent in the Korean War) was


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 1.
the smiling, compliant cook or supply handler in a segregated unit."\(^1\)

The changing times and changing attitudes toward black servicemen was signalled in 1949 by the release of a popular and controversial film, *Home of the Brave*. The film depicted a black soldier, bullied and threatened by white members of his platoon until his heroism won him acceptance. It was an old story; the same price-in-blood paid by American immigrant groups throughout history; the "right to fight" and, at last, the price of admission to the American "crucible" of ethnic diversity and acceptance.

At around the same time *Home of the Brave* was being filmed, various boards and commissions were meeting to consider increased opportunities for blacks in the armed forces. Finally, on July 26, 1948 President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981, declaring it to be the policy of the President that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin;" and, that promotions were to be based "solely on merit and fitness." The executive order "shook the Defense Department to its foundations."\(^2\)

Essentially, the President was saying that equality of service based on racial distinctions is not solely achieved through the establishment of pro-rata quotas. Truman followed his edict by setting up the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces (Fahy Committee). The Fahy Committee was authorized


to examine service policies, with the intention of implementing Executive Order 9981. The committee reported to the President in 1950 (in a slim report of 71 pages) that "inequality had contributed to inefficiency." \(^1\) Truman, who avoided using the words "Negroes" or "integration" in order not to provoke protests, agreed with the Committee that equality would indeed improve military efficiency. "It is right, it is just and it will strengthen the nation," Truman stated.\(^2\)

Even before the President delivered his executive order, there was strong opposition. Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia (later Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee), for example, delivered a caustic floor speech aimed at blocking the President's move. "The mandatory intermingling of the races throughout the services will be a bitter blow to the efficiency and fighting power of the armed services," Russell maintained. "It is sure to increase the numbers of men who will be disabled through communicable diseases. It will increase the rate of crime committed by servicemen." \(^3\)

When the Fahy Committee studied the armed forces it found that the Army had 490 military occupational specialties (MOSs), but that there were no authorizations for blacks in 198 of these. It also found that of 100 schools open to whites after basic training, only 21

---


\(^2\)See "Equality in the Military: 25 Year Progress Report," *New York Times*, 30 May 1975, p. 34. Interestingly, as Dalfuime notes in *Desegregation* (p. 149), "efficiency" has been the most often cited reason for segregation.

\(^3\)Congressional Quarterly, *Pentagon*, pp. 34-35.
were open to blacks. In 1950, the Army had only one black brigadier general (a political appointment), two full colonels, and twelve lieutenant colonels. Meanwhile, the Army contended that its racial policies were not dictated by racial prejudice, but by two conditions: (1) most whites would not associate with blacks, and (2) blacks, through no fault of their own, did not have the skills or education required for many of the Army's MOSs. And the Army's own "Negro Manpower" studies concluded that integration and the loosening of quotas would only impair troop morale and unit efficiency.\(^1\)

Without the Committee's knowledge, President Truman made an informal agreement with the Army. On January 16, 1950, the Army became the last service to officially submit a plan for desegregation. In return, Truman promised the Army that the quota for blacks could be reinstated if the number of black enlistees ever became disproportionate.\(^2\) Of course, the quota never was reinstated. And, as Moskos notes, the Korean conflict became the coup de grace for segregation in the Army; manpower requirements for combat soldiers resulted in ad hoc integration, and integration in Korea became standard out of sheer necessity.\(^3\) Lee writes that "by the close of the war in 1953, young Negro recruits serving in Korea found it hard to believe that an all-Negro infantry regiment had ever existed."\(^4\)

\(^{1}\)"Equality," \textit{New York Times}, p. 34.

\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 34. At the time of the Truman order, blacks constituted 8.8 percent of the Army.

\(^{3}\)Moskos, \textit{American Enlisted Man}, p. 111.

In 1950, President Truman told newsmen that, as a result of the changes he had forced upon the military, equality within the ranks would be achieved "within the reasonably near future." On October 30, 1954, the Defense Department announced that there were no longer any all-Negro units. "By 1955," Defense Secretary Clark Clifford later remarked, "all formal racial discrimination had been eliminated, although vestiges lingered into the early 1960s." The military establishment as an institution was more racially integrated than most civilian institutions, but problems did linger and the Defense Department to this day vigorously works at protecting the civil rights and equal opportunity of military personnel. As late as 1973, Congressional Quarterly reported in The Power of the Pentagon that "equality had not been achieved. "Much remains to be accomplished," Army Secretary Clifford Alexander concludes in a 1978 report on Army equal opportunity programs.

Representation, Equity, and the War in Vietnam

Modern war has generally been responsible for bringing some semblance of "equality of service" into the armed forces. It was a desperate shortage of combat soldiers during the winter months of 1944-1945 which resulted in the Army sending black volunteers (approximately 50 black platoons) to fight alongside white troops in France and Belgium.

1 Congressional Quarterly, Pentagon, p. 34.
3 Ibid., p. 274.
4 Congressional Quarterly, "Blacks in Military," p. 34.
In Korea, racial integration occurred out of necessity even before the Army fully implemented its desegregation plan. During the Vietnam War, blacks unequivocally achieved the "right to fight"—in fact, twice the right to fight, as the proportion of blacks in Army combat units was almost double the proportion of blacks in the general population.

"Representation," it has been observed, is politically determined and defined. It was the Vietnam War, the disproportionate percentage of blacks in Vietnam, the sudden visibility of Selective Service policies, and the sociopolitical milieu which combined in the 1960s to actuate a new search for "equality of service" in the armed forces. And because equity is inevitably reduced to a mathematical statement of "equal shares" in this country, "representation" and equity became synonymous military manpower goals.

Of all the social forces operating in the mid-to-late sixties, it was the collision of the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, and the Selective Service System which awakened public consciousness of military representation. As Carper notes in Bitter Greetings, between 1953 and 1963 the Selective Service System was almost a forgotten institution as it bumped along filling its small quotas in low public visibility. Indeed, before the draft extension debates of 1966-1967, the last time Congress seriously deliberated the draft law was in 1951 when the Selective Service Act of 1948 expired. ¹ And, as Davis and Dolbeare observe in Little Groups of Neighbors, for many years in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the System was more active in extending deferments than it was in obtaining inductions. ²

² James W. Davis, Jr., and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little Groups of
The mid-1960s, however, marked a turning point for Selective Service and the otherwise unquestioned procedures and purposes of conscription. The rising manpower needs of the war in Vietnam brought the Selective Service System into full public view, and, for the most part, the public did not approve. In preparation for the expiration of induction authority, the Defense Department conducted a "Draft Study" in 1964 (and later released it amid controversy in 1966).\(^1\) The Defense Department's study explored the feasibility of a military establishment based entirely on voluntary enlistments and the conditions necessary to enhance the supply of volunteers. The study, as Gerhardt notes, also reinforced skepticism toward the value of Selective Service "channeling."\(^2\)

"Channeling" became the first, and perhaps the most intensely examined, equity issue of the period. During the post-Korean War decade, the supply of military-age eligibles increased and the demand for manpower declined. In order to limit the pool of qualified eligibles (i.e., those classified I-A) and to preserve the notion of a universal draft obligation, the Selective Service System used expanded deferment powers. It defended the use of broadened deferments (e.g., student, hardship, fatherhood, and marital deferments) on the premise that a universal obligation to military service justified directing, or "channeling," those who were not needed by the armed forces into other activities deemed to be in the "national interest." It was, Gerhardt observes, a self-conceived function which had the final result of narrowing the group

---

of liable young men and ensuring that the supply of "availables" did not outrun the military's demand.¹

The Selective Service System (according to a July 1965 document entitled "Channeling") maintained that it could effectively control the civilian population and contribute to the national well-being by manipulating draft deferments. Through "pressurized guidance," or use of the "deferment carrot," the Selective Service envisioned itself "channeling . . . manpower into many endeavors, occupations and activities that are in the national interest."² Thus, the Selective Service claimed credit for the overall social effects of years of deferments, especially the increase in college-educated and technically-skilled men between 1949 and the mid-1960.

But the professed achievement of public good through the application of these draft deferments was hotly contested during the draft extension debates of 1966-1967 on several grounds.³ Some called the use of group deferments in this manner "fear psychology" and "totalitarianism."⁴ Others argued that the statutes which created Selective Service demanded a fair and impartial system of selection—an impersonal equity of uniformly applied rules—and that the use of special deferments, induction priorities, and discretionary exemptions contradicted the goals of equity.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 358.
³Davis and Dolbeare, Little Groups, p. 22.
⁴Carper, Bitter Greetings, p. 117.
⁵See Gerhardt, The Draft, p. 361.
Eventually, criticism led to the withdrawal of the document from circulation, but the structure of "channeling" and the deferments remained. "By 1967," writes Gerhardt, "there were still large numbers of reservists, students, young husbands and fathers, and marginally disqualified youths deferred from active service, most of whom would never be called; and assignment of draftees to combat, and rising casualty figures sharpened public perception of anomalies and inequities in this situation."¹

Student deferments especially enraged advocates of equal service during this period. While men are being killed in Vietnam, one critic contested, "it is morally unjustifiable for a society to shift the brunt of war duty to boys who cannot or do not wish to go to college."² James Reston of the New York Times wrote that "... poor boys are selected to go to Vietnam; rich boys are selected to go to college."³ An editorial in the April 1966 edition of Life Magazine compared student deferments to the "buying-out" provisions of the Civil War draft:

Our system [Selective Service] isn’t much different from the one that prevailed in the North during the Civil War—just more expensive. In 1863, a draftee could hire a substitute for $300. Today his family does the same, in effect, by paying college bills that can run over $3,000 a year.⁴

Even the Harvard Crimson (May 7, 1966) levelled an attack on the "II-S" student deferment provision, calling it "one of the clearest examples of class-privilege legislation in American history."⁵

---

¹Ibid., p. 363. ²Carper, Bitter Greetings, p. 86.
⁵Cited in ibid., p. 88. In 1967, when the war escalated and graduate school draft deferments were abolished, the Harvard Crimson published
At the same time, it was becoming increasingly apparent to civil rights leaders that young blacks and other minorities, comprising a disproportionate percentage of the poor, were being swept by "channeling" into the armed forces. The *New York Times* (January 3, 1966) reported: "Negroes are more likely than whites to be drafted into the Army, Defense Department statistics showed this week."\(^1\) And Army officials, such as General S. L. A. Marshall, attested that "in the average rifle company, the strength was 50 percent composed of Negroes, Southwestern Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Guamanians, Nisei, and so on. But a real cross-section of American youth? Almost never."\(^2\)

Meanwhile, popular magazines such as *Newsweek*, *U.S. News & World Report*, *Time*, *National Review*, *The Economist*, *The Nation*, *America*, and the like, reported official Defense Department statistics which showed that (1) blacks were disproportionately represented in Vietnam combat units and, consequently, (2) disproportionately represented among Vietnam casualties.\(^3\) (Among Army enlisted men, blacks accounted for close

---

\(^1\) Davis and Dolbeare, *Little Groups*, p. 128.


to one-fourth of total losses through 1966.\textsuperscript{1) Newsweek} (April 11, 1966) wrote: "But seldom has criticism [of the draft] been so vehement and so basic as at present. Most serious of the charges is that the boards have favored the affluent over the poor by granting student deferments to youths whose families can afford to send them to college. Thus, say critics, the U.S. Army has become the poor man's army, with a high preponderance of school dropouts, of the underprivileged and of Negroes."\textsuperscript{2}

The protestations over black casualties created such ferment, \textit{U.S. News & World Report} noted (August 15, 1966), that "discrimination in reverse" became a "standard procedure throughout Vietnam." Black combat soldiers in Vietnam were being spread out in component units at ratios according to the division totals. As one Army general put it: "We don't want to risk having a platoon or company that has more Negroes than whites overrun or wiped out. It's a precaution easily taken."\textsuperscript{3}

But it was not only the class-based deferment provisions to which civil rights leaders and others objected. Carper, for example, described the blatantly "abusive discrimination against black registrants" by local draft boards. "White draft officials," he contended, "are using the power of the draft to punish Negroes." Black civil rights leader Charles Evers likewise charged that the draft was being "used in Mississippi as a weapon to punish civil rights leaders and undermine the civil rights movement." In fact, in November 1966 a group of lawyers filed suit against the state director of the draft in Mississippi, claiming the

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
director unfairly attempted to accelerate the induction of a prominent civil rights worker. More to the point, the suit charged that the drafting of blacks by all-white draft boards was unconstitutional and requested that all boards be enjoined from drafting any blacks until they are "properly represented on the boards." ¹

Black militants had identified the Selective Service System as an "instrument of American racism" even before the Vietnam casualty statistics received attention in the national news media. In February 1967, critics of the draft received new ammunition for their attack on the Selective Service System. The final report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (Marshall Commission), entitled In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?, appeared to buttress the charges made by black militants. ² The Commission gave "careful study to the effect of the draft on and its fairness to the Negro." The report stated that in October 1966 only 1.3 percent of all local draft board members were black. In addition, seven states had no black representation on their local draft boards. The Commission concluded that "social and economic injustices in the society itself are at the root of inequities which exist," and recommended that local draft boards "should represent all elements of the public they serve." ³

There was much publicity surrounding the release of these findings, and the report proved to further damage the Selective Service

¹Carper, Bitter Greetings, pp. 144-145.


³Ibid., p. 80; "Summary of Conclusions" (emphasis added).
System's already tarnished public image. Conferences and symposiums concerning the draft and its alternatives were held throughout the country. Academics and journalists went to work on a variety of studies regarding aspects of conscription and the fairness of Selective Service policies. Popular books on the draft appeared in the latter part of the 1960s, and most argued the case for replacing the draft with some form of voluntary service. Jean Carper's *Bitter Greetings: The Scandal of the Military Draft*, *The Wrong Man In Uniform: Our Unfair and Obsolete Draft--And How We Can Replace It* by Republican activist Bruce K. Chapman, *Let's End The Draft Mess* by George Walton, *Why The Draft?* by James C. Miller III (ed.), *How To End The Draft* by Robert T. Stafford, et al. (ed.), and *The End of the Draft* by Thomas Reeves and Karl Hess are typical of literature which criticized the Selective Service System and the pervasive inequities of the draft.

Of course, not everyone agreed with the findings of the Marshall Commission. As Davis and Dolbeare note in *Little Groups of Neighbors*, there was considerable disagreement at the time over several matters—including such basic questions as the service rates of college students, the service rates of blacks, the incidence and recipients of occupational

---

1See, for example, papers and discussion from the University of Chicago conference (4-7 December 1966) in Sol Tax, ed., *The Draft*; Little, ed., *Selective Service and American Society*; and series of articles which appeared throughout 1968 (vol. 42) in *Forensic Quarterly*.

deferments, the role of Reserve and National Guard alternatives, and, remarkably, just which social or economic group was discriminated against the most.\(^1\)

The report of the Marshall Commission led to a second study, this one by the Task Force on the Structure of the Selective Service System. The Task Force consisted of military officers and officials from the Defense Department, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Selective Service System. The Task Force disagreed emphatically with the Marshall Commission and concluded that the draft system was highly satisfactory.\(^2\)

A third study was conducted by the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement (Clark Panel), appointed by the House Armed Services Committee, headed by retired General Mark W. Clark, and composed chiefly of retired military men. The Clark Panel rejected the conclusion that student and occupational deferments were inequitable, and it endorsed the retention of these deferments (with tightened "loop holes"). In essence, the Clark Panel unanimously supported the basic organizational philosophy of the Selective Service System.\(^3\) And Congress, rejecting the Marshall Commission conclusions, followed rather closely the recommendations of the Clark Panel in the 1967 Selective Service law.

\(^1\)Davis and Dolbeare, Little Groups, pp. 125-129.


Even though Congress defeated many of the proposed draft reforms in 1967, the draft debates nevertheless reshaped most issues of military manpower policy—especially with regard to equity and "representation." Too much ferment had been raised, notes Gerhardt, to be settled in a "single, narrow, ambiguous legislative response." Indeed, many journalists, writers, academics, and other observers were confounded by the fact that three government commissions, each composed of highly qualified and eminent members, could study the same data and arrive at completely different conclusions. Most draft critics and proponents of "equal service" only intensified their efforts to bring about Selective Service reform.

Davis and Dolbeare attempted to answer questions concerning the impact of conscription on specific socioeconomic groups in their 1968 study of the Selective Service System. In a careful analysis of "who is drafted, who serves, who does not and why," the authors concluded that "there is little evidential basis for doubting the existence of economic discrimination in deferment/induction policies." Specifically, Davis and Dolbeare found that there was a definite income-based pattern of military service, with the incidence of military service occurring most often in the lower-middle socioeconomic bracket. In addition, it was found that blacks were overrepresented among draftees, not as a function of their race, but as a function of their economic status (i.e., their disproportionate presence in the low-income strata);

2 See, for example, Liston, Greeting, p. 86.
3 Davis and Dolbeare, Little Groups, p. 129. 4 Ibid., p. 147.
men from upper income families were more likely than other men to be able to qualify for one of several deferments (and therefore control the time of their service and avoid service at times of greatest risk); and, although there was a high incidence of rejections among the poor (particularly the black poor), the poor and black men who passed their physical and mental examinations were more likely to be drafted than were men who had high incomes with similar qualifications.\(^1\)

Friedman had earlier arrived at the same conclusion in an article entitled "Why Not a Voluntary Army?" The draft, he observed, "bears disproportionately on the upper lower classes and the lower middle classes. The fraction of high school graduates who serve is vastly higher than either of those who have gone to college or those who dropped out before finishing high school."\(^2\) The real "sitting ducks," James Reston added, are those who are reasonably healthy and intelligent and graduated from high school but who did not go on to college.\(^3\)

The most distressing aspect of "economic conscription" and rejection practices for the black community was that the armed forces were sending the best young men--those who were educated and healthy but not deferred--to fight in Vietnam. Close to 70 percent of all blacks who entered the military (conscripts or volunteers) were rejected because of inadequate education or poor health. The 30 percent who were being taken, according to Whitney M. Young, Jr., were the "cream of the crop" from the black community--the "potential forces of

---

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 129-158.


\(^3\)Cited in Leinwand, ed., The Draft, p. 30.
leadership . . . in the battle cry for freedom at home."\(^1\) They were the young, income-producing, family-bearing males,\(^2\) absent from the community which so desperately needed their labors; the potential young black leaders, Bayard Rustin said, were leaving a leadership vacuum in the black community that was not always filled by appropriate substitutes.\(^3\) And, worst of all, Moskos notes, the economic and educational disadvantages which made blacks available for military service caused them to be, at the same time, unavailable for many technical job opportunities in expanding skill areas within the armed forces.\(^4\)

It was not enough to say that blacks were disproportionately represented in the military and in Army combat units because blacks were disproportionately represented among the nation's poor. The mere fact that most qualified blacks were channeled into the armed forces while most qualified whites were channeled into college was enough to provide the appearance of institutional racism. Black Congressman Augustus Hawkins thus found "massive, institutionalized discrimination" in the System in 1968.\(^5\) Others perceived the "pervasive institutional racism of the draft," and concluded that the "most persuasive" argument in

\(^1\)Whitney M. Young, Jr., "When the Negroes In Vietnam Come Home," Harper's, June 1967, p. 66.


support of abolishing the draft was "the elimination of institutional racism".¹

During the Presidential campaign of 1968, the war in Vietnam was the central dividing line between political parties. Based on the fundamental principles of individual freedom espoused by political conservatives, Republican candidate Richard Nixon promised not only a swift end to the war, but an end to the draft as well. The white middle and upper-middle classes, who could undoubtedly envisage the approaching demise of protective draft deferments, found Nixon's platform especially appealing. In addition, Nixon held that "freedom" and "equity" demanded the change. In an address on "The All-Volunteer Armed Force" given over the CBS Radio Network (October 17, 1968), candidate Nixon strongly criticized the "unfairness of the present system":

The inequity [of the draft] stems from one simple fact—that some of our young people are forced to spend two years of their lives in our nation's defense, while others are not. It's not so much the way they're selected that's wrong, as it is the fact of selection.²

"The ultimate question that military manpower policy must answer in a democratic society," Little echoed in Selective Service and American Society, "is why all who are qualified cannot serve if indeed some must serve under the threat or fact of conscription."³

¹See, for example, Paul T. Murray, "Local Draft Board Composition and Institutional Racism," Social Problems 19 (Summer 1971): 129-136.

²Entire Nixon speech appears in Leinwand, ed., The Draft, pp. 96-108; for quotation, see p. 99.

The Vietnam-Era Draft in Retrospect

During the period of the AVF debates, a student of the Selective Service System wrote that, in fact, all forms of selective service are selective by definition; and because they are "selective," they inevitably contain inequities.¹ Out of practical necessity, the conscripted armed forces draw from a limited, "non-universal" manpower pool. There is really "no way to distribute the burden of military service evenly under a selective service draft when one racial group has inferior economic opportunities," Cooper likewise concludes. "Only with a truly universal draft can an even sharing be reasonably assured. The socio-economic or racial groups that have more economic resources at their command will find ways of avoiding induction under a selective service draft. . . ."²

The failure of the Selective Service System in the 1960s, it is observed, was mainly due to confusion between the goals of equal liability and equal probability. During the post-Korean War period, Congress attempted to equalize the burdens of military service by ensuring that all qualified persons retained an equal obligation or liability of service; but through deferment policies and exemptions many individuals, while remaining liable, saw their probability of actual service during the war considerably reduced. Consequently, the entire age-cohort (excluding

¹See Gerhardt, The Draft, p. 363.

²Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, R-1450-ARPA (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 217. Realistically, any selective system will tend to favor more wealthy citizens—if only because these individuals can more easily finance legal defenses and other means to achieve exemptions.
certain individuals who failed to meet acceptance standards) was liable, only some ethnic and economic subgroupings were more liable than others.¹

The objective of equal probability was later sought through the draft lottery; but it was not a pure lottery in the sense that it ensured the universal probability and conscription of all but the mentally and physically handicapped. Only a pure lottery implies the kind of "random," objective, equal probability of service. Indeed, while "random" selection may work in the ideal sense, subjective criteria are invariably employed in the real-world induction and post-induction assignment processes.

Even in the most rigorous sense of a purely randomized lottery, the fact that some citizens must serve and others do not is fundamentally unfair; as long as only a selected few serve, there will be more than a few charges that "equality of service" is missing. Theoretically, the objective of equal probability is satisfied under the all-volunteer format—since, the probability of service is reduced to zero for all otherwise liable individuals. Yet, as long as a few serve, whether in times of compulsory or volunteer service, "representation" will be considered important.

Prior to 1964-1966, before the civil rights and antiwar movements joined hands, military "representation" was an unused term and unnecessary (so many believed) policy concept. Since the 1966-1967 draft extension debates, "representation" has become an indicator of

(in times of compulsory service) and substitute for (in times of voluntary service) the "randomness" by which we measure "equality of service" in "non-universal" armed forces. Thus, social justice for the military in society is the equal representation of identified groups—a mathematical situation—among the few who serve.

In a December 1978 letter to fellows of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Congressman Robin Beard of Tennessee stresses the need to examine "drastic reforms" to the all-volunteer concept. "The Army will be less representative of all segments of society," Beard warns; and "[w]e need a fighting force that is representative of America." There was a "general and legitimate feeling that the draft system during the Vietnam War was unfair and inequitable," he continues:

However, it was not the draft per se that the people opposed, it was the war and the inequitable burden of sacrifice and death borne by sons of poor families while the children of privileged families were protected by attending the best universities and graduate schools. Ironically, instead of bringing equity to the problem of providing manpower for national defense, the so-called volunteer Army is "conscripted by poverty" which causes the less fortunate to carry an even more inequitable burden. With the draft gone, the privileged are still permitted to escape any form of service.\(^1\)

It is often said that our models for the future are based on our lessons from the past. It is true, to some extent, that the mistakes and achievements of military manpower planning during the Vietnam era have affected (indeed, formed) popular perceptions of what a representative armed force should look like. And, it is obvious from the above remarks of Congressman Beard that memories of Selective Service inequities

during the Vietnam War have tempered interpretations of social representation under the AVF. The concern for an equal distribution of the "burdens" of defense is still strong.¹

Post-war studies of Vietnam-era draft and casualty data serve to remind of the inequities perpetuated by Selective Service and military job placement systems. Yarmolinsky, for instance, attributes the incidence of unequal casualties to the "basic technology" employed in modern war: the heaviest casualties are to be found in the infantry; and the infantry is expected to recruit the greatest concentrations of lower-status personnel, since its educational and technical skill requirements are most limited.² Thus, Badillo and Curry find, in an often-cited study of Vietnam casualties suffered by Chicago area residents, that youths from lower-income neighborhoods were more likely to be channeled into ground combat forces and, consequently, more likely to die in Vietnam than were persons from higher socioeconomic backgrounds. In addition, youths from neighborhoods with low educational levels were four-times as likely to die in Vietnam than were youths from better-educated neighborhoods. Since blacks were overrepresented in the lower-socioeconomic strata, the authors conclude, socioeconomic rather than racial discrimination was responsible for disproportionately high black casualties.³


²Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, p. 274.

³Gilbert Badillo and G. David Curry, "The Social Incidence of
More recent research on the Vietnam-era draft, conducted in the clear and objective light of the 1970s, further states the need to avoid the inequities of the 1960s. In *Chance and Circumstance*, for example, Baskir and Strauss examine the experiences of the approximately 25 million men who did not fight in the war: who they were and how they escaped the war by a variety of legal and illegal means. "The draftees who fought and died in Vietnam were primarily society's 'losers'," the authors write, "the same men who get left behind in schools, jobs, and other forms of social competition. The discriminatory social, economic, and racial impact of Vietnam cannot be fairly measured against other wars in American history, but the American people were never before as conscious of how unevenly the obligation to serve was distributed."\(^1\) And, the overriding statement made by this study of the "Vietnam generation" is, as the cover-jacket promises, "America is far from the classless society it pretends to be."

Cooper writes in *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force* that "the equity issue . . . became the single most important factor in the move to end the draft."\(^2\) "It is ironic," he observes, "that one of the key issues to emerge from the volunteer debate is whether the AVF would lead to a military composed mainly of the poor and the black. . . . The irony, of course, is that the historically unrepresentative nature of the draft was a principal reason for its termination: The draft placed a disproportionate burden on those least able to bear

---

\(^1\)Baskir and Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance*, p. 8.

Yet, it may very well be—as Congressman Beard and other legislators have lately indicated—the unrepresentative nature of the AVF, designed to reduce the inequities of the draft, may eventually contribute to its own termination and replacement by some new form of compulsory service.

**Military Representation and Social Equity**

**Under the AVF**

The social equity issues which have made military representation important in the volunteer era are basically the same issues which were used to criticize the Selective Service draft of the 1960s. The only difference is the absence of a war, and thus the absence of criticisms that the disadvantaged are being deployed as "cannon fodder."

The equity issue was used to argue against the AVF at the same time it was being used to promote voluntary service. Of course, the basic dissimilarity was that AVF proponents envisioned a higher form of equality, a freedom for all from totalitarian methods and involuntary servitude. As Senator Robert Taft expressed it in 1945, the draft "is far more typical of totalitarian nations than of democratic nations. It is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty which have always been considered a part of American democracy. ... The principle of a compulsory draft is basically wrong." ²

It is inherently wrong to force anyone into the military, as insisted AVF sponsors. Since free choice permits the individual to

---

1 Ibid., p. 204 (emphasis added); see also, David R. Segal and Bernard L. Daina, "The Social Representativeness of the Volunteer Army," Research Memorandum 75-12 (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1975).

maximize his own utility, several economists added, the volunteer system undercuts any further consideration of equity. And the argument "that a volunteer army would be a black army, so it is a scheme to use Negroes to defend a white America" is "sheer fantasy," Richard Nixon remarked in a 1968 campaign speech. \(^1\) "The frequently heard claim that a volunteer force will be all black or all this or all that simply has no basis in fact," the Gates Commission later concluded:

The argument that blacks would bear an unfair share of the burden of an all volunteer force confounds service by free choice with compulsory service. With conscription, some blacks are compelled to serve at earnings below what they would earn in the civilian economy. Blacks who join a voluntary force presumably have decided for themselves that military service is preferable to other alternatives available to them. They regard military service as a more rewarding opportunity, not as a burden. Denial of this opportunity would reflect either bias or paternalistic belief that blacks are not capable of making the "right" decisions concerning their lives.\(^2\)

Critics of the AVF, on the other hand, maintained that the volunteer system essentially would be no different from the draft in respect to its effect on minorities and the poor. "[T]he more fortunate are proposing that the less fortunate defend the nation," outspoken critic Harry Marmion claimed: \(^3\) "Among its other significant disadvantages an all-volunteer army would give rise, at the enlisted level, to a significantly high proportion of blacks, poor Appalachian whites, and other working-class groups, particularly in combat units."\(^4\)

\(^1\) Nixon in Leinwand, ed., The Draft, p. 106.


\(^3\) Marmion, The Case, p. 47.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 37.
as the draft "economically conscripted" the disadvantaged through its inequitable deferment/induction provisions, the volunteer army was expected to "economically conscript" the less-skilled and less employable members of society who had fewer civilian alternatives.¹

Depressed minorities are therefore seen to disproportionately compromise their life goals and career ambitions by "accepting" (through disguised, coercive, economic forces) an "unfair share" of the defense burden. They are "victimized by the vagaries of the economy."² And black communities (especially) are again deprived of the presence of young, aggressive black men—as the most qualified young black leaders enter the Army and leave the communities where they might have instead entered civilian careers, worked on community projects, and inspired the young.

While the armed forces increasingly become a recognized "refuge" for the poor and disaffected members of society, critics maintain, the sons of white middle-class families will reject military service as a legitimate activity. In addition, sociologists warn of a possible "tipping effect": a point at which the proportion of blacks in a particular unit becomes so high that a large number of whites are no longer


²Marmion, The Case, p. 40.
prepared to enter that service or branch. "Tipping" may occur in a gradual fashion in the military, it is hypothesized, if whites perceive status decline in disproportionately black units, or if whites fear black "hooliganism." Consequently, the more the armed forces become disproportionately composed of the poor and minorities, the greater is the likelihood they will stay that way.

Blivin writes in *Volunteers, One and All* that "the specter of an 'all-black' military is nonsense, although it was constantly raised as an argument—or as a scare slogan, at least—in the years before the all-volunteer system went into effect." The pre-AVF predictions of a predominantly black all-volunteer military did, in fact, frighten some white middle-class Americans. The late 1960s were times of collective racial violence in American cities from Newark to Los Angeles. In 1969, Morris Janowitz speculated that the mass media image of blacks projected by the riots was "explosive irrationality": "The use of sheer strength for destruction purposes rather than to achieve a goal that the white population could define as reasonable and worthwhile has served only to mobilize counter hostility and counteraggression." For some white Americans, therefore, training a heavily black army in war-making was preparing a potential enemy for battle in the streets of urban America.

---


Some black leaders preferred to think that white fears of black overrepresentation in the military were due to the inherent racism of white America. But 1967 saw entire urban neighborhoods and shopping districts virtually destroyed; and 1968-1969 witnessed organized racial violence move from commodity riots to political violence, as black paramilitary organizations such as the Black Panthers promised even greater turbulence. During the Vietnam War there was even talk of black soldiers sending dismantled machine guns home to their friends in boxes marked "stereo equipment." Caches of weapons, gathered in preparation for the next great confrontation, were reportedly turning up in the ghetto homes of black militants.

The fears of many middle-class white Americans in the late 1960s were authentic emotional reactions; they were a part of the times, a part of the threat of racial violence which surfaced in many cities each summer. Riots in the cities usually brought out the National Guard. However, on occasion the active duty armed forces were used for riot control. A heavily black unit summoned to quell a riot, some surmised, could end up joining the riot; black soldiers, feeling alienated and disaffected, might decide that they owed a higher fealty to their ghetto brothers than to the community they were sent to protect.

The times have changed (or so it appears). Today, it is less likely that as many white, middle-class urbanites harbor the same apprehensions concerning a heavily black military. Black militism directed toward political violence is apparently history, and a history which some prefer to forget. If anything, contemporary white fears of a disproportionately

\[1\text{Ibid., pp. 432-436.}\]
black Army probably focus on the presumed effectiveness or quality of the force. But "effectiveness" along with "efficiency," it is recalled, historically have been the principal concerns voiced by advocates of racial segregation and black quotas in the military. So, in the absence of a cogent, tenable argument in behalf of "equitable" representation, the shadow of racism still remains.

**Measures of Social Equity**

Race is by far the most referenced measure of social equity in military service. One reason for this is political. Another, more basic reason is simply that race in the armed forces is easily identifiable. Other measures of socioeconomic status are not readily available. Surveys have been employed to identify family income, parents' education, and the like, but data are often incomplete and inconsistent with other findings. The present research focuses on some of the less apparent aspects of manpower recruitment results as well as the more salient results commonly used to examine "equality of service."

**Race**

It was shown in Table 1 that the black proportion of Army entrants has been increasing beyond the levels predicted by most manpower analysts during the AVF policy debates. The data in Table 2 show moreover that black first-timers and careerists are reenlisting in greater relative proportions than their white counterparts.

Table 6 depicts the racial/ethnic status of enlisted entrants during 1977 and the population of the United States. The proportion of blacks entering the Army is more than double the comparable proportion of blacks
TABLE 6
RACIAL/ETHNIC STATUS OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1977)\textsuperscript{a} (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial/Ethnic Status</th>
<th>Service of Accession (Enlisted Entrants)</th>
<th>Population of the United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/Non-Spanish</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/Spanish\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{a}Data are for Calendar Year 1977.

\textsuperscript{b}U.S. population data do not separate persons of Spanish origin by Race. However, the 1970 Census shows 96 percent of U.S. Hispanic population was white, and a statistical adjustment was made to reflect this estimate.
in the male population, and over three times greater than the proportion of employed blacks in similar age groups. The Marine Corps is also noticeably overrepresented by minorities, with the largest proportion of Hispanics among all Services. The traditionally "lilly-white" Navy and the Air Force, which maintain the highest education and intelligence acceptance standards, are slightly underrepresented by minorities. Interestingly, the Army and Marine Corps distributions are closest in composition to the unemployed population of the civilian labor force.

As Table 7 indicates, the very high proportion of minority entrants is not yet completely reflected in the overall composition of the armed forces. However, the overall minority composition of the armed forces increases with each passing year. Furthermore, it can be seen that the addition of officers to total statistics lowers the proportion of blacks. (In total DoD, approximately 3.3 percent of all officers are black.)

It is sometimes said that the composition of the military should be compared, not to the general population, but to specific sectors of the civilian labor force. Advocates of this approach conceptualize military service as akin to civilian job alternatives or as "military employment." Advocates of comparisons with the general population, on the other hand, prefer to think of military service as an obligation of citizenship—where the military is perceived as an institution, or a "calling" set apart from ordinary occupations. Thus, the manner in which the military is perceived greatly affects the choice of statistics for comparison and subsequent conclusions.

In Table 7, the employed population of the U.S. is used for comparison. According to the "job market" approach, the enlisted population should not be expected to reflect the general population since it
### TABLE 7

RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES (ARMY AND TOTAL DOD) AND POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (EMPLOYED PERSONS) BY OCCUPATION GROUP (1977)

(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Employed Population of the United Statesa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Othera</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a For the armed forces, "other" races include primarily oriental (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, Asian-American) and, to a lesser degree, American-Indian. In the Army, approximately 2-3 percent are "other" races (2.7-3.0 percent of enlisted personnel and 1.3-2.6 percent of officers).

b Approximately 3.8 percent of total officers are black.
is a specialized occupational level. The "blue collar nature" of enlisted positions and the lack of lateral entry, Cooper writes, encourage certain social, economic, and educational differences.\(^1\) Supporters of the "job market" rationale take solace in results which show some basic similarities in the minority content of the enlisted force and the blue-collar civilian labor force.

Table 8 presents a further breakout of minority male employment in private firms by occupation group. It can be seen that there are very remarkable differences in the minority content of blue-collar and white-collar occupation groups. Obviously, the choice of, say, black laborers— who comprised close to 21 percent of all laborers in 1975—as a comparison measure (for the enlisted force) would result in a significantly different conclusion than the choice of any white-collar group or the combined total of employed blacks. Nevertheless, even job market analysts could not rationalize the fact that the black enlisted content of the Army (and total military) has been steadily increasing above and far beyond any civilian occupation group measure. At the same time, in comparing 1975 civilian data (Table 8) with the 1977 data (Table 7), it can be seen that the black proportion of blue-collar groups has been decreasing, as the black proportion in blue-collar occupations has almost doubled. Perhaps officer categories should then be included in comparisons of minority representation.

One very interesting aspect of the equity issue is that it usually concentrates on the overrepresentation of minorities and the poor in the enlisted ranks and frequently neglects to notice that minorities are even

---

\(^1\)Cooper, *Military Manpower*, p. 207.
### TABLE 8
MINORITY MALE EMPLOYMENT IN PRIVATE FIRMS WITH 100 OR MORE EMPLOYEES BY OCCUPATION GROUP (1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of Male Workers Who Were:</th>
<th>WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS</th>
<th>BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS</th>
<th>Service Worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** Special tabulations provided by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Information Branch, Research Division. Data from Employment Analysis Report Program (EARP), 1975 EEO-1 Report Nationwide Summary (contract compliance reports filed by private employers of 100 or more employees). Data on other industrial sectors were not available.
more underrepresented in the officer corps. 6.1 percent of all Army officers are black; 1.9 percent of Navy officers are black; 3.2 percent of Air Force officers are black; and 3.6 percent of Marine Corps officers are black. The overall proportion of blacks in the officer corps (3.8 percent) is found to be approximately 68 percent less than what would be expected from the proportion of blacks in the general population—and over 76 percent less than the expected proportion found in the total military population. The proportion of blacks in total DoD, on the other hand, is only 50 percent greater than the expected proportion in the national population.\footnote{Percentage difference is calculated according to the following formula: \((\text{actual percentage} \div \text{expected percentage}) \times 100 - 100 = \text{percentage above or below "expected" level.}}

Although black underrepresentation in the officer corps is an issue of major concern to many people, it generally receives much less attention than black overrepresentation in the enlisted force. This may reflect the fact that the proportion of blacks in the officer corps has been steadily rising (in the direction of "representation"), and it is expected to continue increasing (however slowly). Conversely, the direction of change for enlisted blacks is increased divergence from the population standard, with no dramatic reversal of direction expected in the near future. The Army also observes in its 1978 report on equal opportunity programs that affirmative action efforts designed to increase the number of minority officers are only beginning to pay dividends. The recruitment of qualified minorities has been difficult, states the Army, due largely to intense civilian competition for minority college graduates.
and recruiting efforts by competing universities for minorities otherwise qualified to enroll in precommissioning programs.¹

The fact that less attention is given to black underrepresentation in the officer corps does not imply that it is any less important as an equity concern. It does say that black overrepresentation in the enlisted ranks is the more problematic public policy issue.

Another way of looking at the equity issue is to examine the distribution of jobs and the grade distribution of minorities in Service. Since the Vietnam casualty controversy first erupted, the Army has studied the distribution of blacks in career management fields (CMFs) and attempted to manage affirmative action goals for a more "representative" distribution. The affirmative action program has not been effective, however. Between 1975 and 1978, disparities in black representation widened in 18 CMFs and improved in only 6 CMFs. More important, the Army states in its equal opportunity report, black enlistees were not overrepresented in CMF 11 (Infantry/Armor) and CMF 12 (Combat/Engineer), and only slightly overrepresented in CMF 13 (FA Cannon) and CMF 16 (Air Defense Artillery). "Soldiers in these CMFs," notes the Army report, "are more likely to bear the burden of casualties in wartime."²

The grade distribution of Army active duty personnel is shown in Table 9. One of the reasons cited by the Army for the lower representation of blacks in the higher officer grades is the lower officer efficiency report ratings that many black officers received (relative to white officers)

¹U.S. Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity, pp. iii-iv.
²Ibid., p. 45 (emphasis added).
## TABLE 9
GRADE DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL
BY RACE (1977)
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Grade</th>
<th>ARMY ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Commissioned)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.O.</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ltc.</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Lt.</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Lt.</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WARRANT OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENLISTED</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8/E-9</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ARMY</strong></td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*As of 30 September 1977 (end FY 1977).
during the 1960s.\(^1\) (The Army does not explain why black officers received lower efficiency ratings in the 1960s.) The Army does feel that promotion results for minorities have been "favorable" in the last few years—with one possible exception. The promotion of blacks to E-7 and E-9, they note, has remained slightly below white promotion rates. The Army projection for black officer entrants is greater than 20 percent by the end of 1979.\(^2\)

Perhaps the most unexpected finding in the statistics on race is that recent black accessions generally have more education than their white counterparts. It is "unexpected" because, as Moskos observes, "[i]t is a well recognized fact that the educational levels of blacks in America have trailed far behind that of whites."\(^3\) There has been a narrowing of the gap in education over recent years, but, nationally, black educational attainment is still markedly lower than that of whites. Moskos writes:

Contrary to national patterns, however, the intersect of race and education is quite different among male entrants in the all-volunteer Army. Since the end of the draft, the proportion of black high school graduates entering the Army has exceeded that of whites, and this is a trend that is becoming more pronounced. . . . In point of fact, today's Army enlisted ranks is the only major arena in American society where black educational levels surpass that of whites, and by quite a significant margin!\(^4\)

This trend may have been signalled by the high school graduating class of 1972—the last class to graduate under the transitional draft-volunteer format. The National Longitudinal Study (NLS) has tracked

---

\(^1\) Ibid., p. IV.


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 11.

\(^4\) Ibid.
the post-graduation activities of a sample of 20,872 individuals (representing over 1300 schools) from the class of 1972. Included in the NLS is an index of general academic ability for each student. As of October 1976 (third follow-up survey), it was clear that the percentage of high-ability minorities entering the armed forces was greater than the percentage of low-ability entrants; and, the exact opposite was occurring among the population of white graduates (see Table 10).

Moskos cites, in a 1978 study of the Army enlisted ranks, the comments of a longtime German employee of the U.S. Army in Europe: "In the Volunteer Army you are recruiting the best of the blacks and the worst of the whites." There is no way of determining just what "best" is or is not. An evaluation of data from the 1975 Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), for instance, showed that, among all high school seniors tested, both black and white male students who planned to join the armed forces had lower mean equivalent AFQT (intelligence test) scores than the overall average for their respective racial groups. And the scores of blacks who planned to volunteer were relatively less representative than were the scores of whites who professed a similar interest in military service. Of course, these data do not show who

---

1The index of "general academic ability" is derived from the results of a 69-minute test battery developed by Educational Testing Service (Princeton, N.J.). The test battery measures both verbal and non-verbal skills. Categories for academic composite index were: high, upper quartile; middle, second and third quartiles; low, bottom quartile.


### TABLE 10

**DISTRIBUTION OF THE HIGH SCHOOL CLASS OF 1972 BY MILITARY SERVICE, RACE AND GENERAL ACADEMIC ABILITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Academic Ability &lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Military Service Between October 1974 and October 1976 (Percent)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Reserves But No Active Duty</th>
<th>Active Duty Armed Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>91.31</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>93.23</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>94.06</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>88.80</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>89.12</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>10.58</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>88.26</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>91.96</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>92.39</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>82.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>17.83</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup>Data are from sample survey (third follow-up) administered in October 1976. Question asked: "Since October 1974, have you served in the Armed Forces, or a Reserve or National Guard unit?".

<sup>b</sup>General Academic Ability was derived from the results of a 69-minute test battery. Composite index categories include: high, upper quartile; middle, second and third quartiles; low, bottom quartile. See text for details.
actually enlisted; and it can be assumed that plans do not always coincide with later actions.

Yet, during 1977 black enlisted entrants in every Service were higher in overall educational attainment than their white counterparts. Table 11, for example, shows that the proportion of blacks with a high school diploma (or equivalent) who entered active duty during 1977 is greater than the comparable proportion of whites (non-Spanish) in each service and total DoD. In fact, as a group, blacks surpassed all other "racial/ethnic categories" (as defined by DoD) in educational attainment. Generally, all minorities were higher in educational attainment than the white majority--with the lone exception of Hispanics in the Marine Corps.

A more detailed breakout of educational attainment by racial/ethnic groups for the Army is presented in Table 12. For the population of male enlisted entrants only, the differences in educational attainment are even greater. Although there are slightly more college-trained whites than blacks, the proportion of blacks with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent) is ten percent higher than the proportion of whites with a high school diploma. Remarkably, Hispanics and other minorities, with presumably less financial capacity, even surpass the proportion of white males with some college experience.

When the educational attainment of black enlisted entrants is compared with the educational attainment of young black males in the general population, it can be seen that there are proportionately fewer high school dropouts among black enlistees. Indeed, in terms of educational achievement (as measured by high school completion), the group of 1977 black Army accessions appears to be "the cream of the crop."
### TABLE 11

HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND NON-GRADUATES AMONG ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) BY RACIAL/ETHNIC STATUS AND SERVICE OF ACCESSION (1977) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service of Accession and High School Completion*</th>
<th>N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS (January-December 1977)</th>
<th>Racial/Ethnic Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White/Non-Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHSG</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSG</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHSG</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSG</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHSG</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSG</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHSG</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSG</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total DoD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHSG</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSG</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Department of Defense Master and Loss File.

*NHSG is Non-High School Graduate. HSG is High School Graduate. High school graduates include persons who have passed the General Education Development (GED) high school equivalency examination.
**TABLE 12**
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF ARMY MALE ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND
MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S. BY RACIAL/ETHNIC STATUS (1977)
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>ARMY MALE N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS</th>
<th>MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S. (18-24 Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Racial/Ethnic Status</td>
<td>Racial/Ethnic Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below High School Graduate</td>
<td>36.4 40.1 32.7 30.0 36.3</td>
<td>38.2 21.9 63.6 36.7 62.3 45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>56.8 52.7 58.0 64.8 53.9</td>
<td>50.2 44.5 29.3 40.5 31.0 32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEDb</td>
<td>2.7 2.9 4.0 2.0 3.3</td>
<td>-- -- -- -- -- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>2.9 2.9 4.4 2.5 4.1</td>
<td>11.4 25.9 7.1 19.4 6.7 18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>1.2 1.4 0.9 0.7 2.4</td>
<td>0.1 7.7 0.0 3.4 0.0 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And Above</td>
<td>TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100</td>
<td>TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Persons of Spanish origin may be of any race. According to the 1970 U.S. Census of Population, 96 percent of all persons of Spanish origin in the U.S. were white.*

*General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency examination. Data on GED recipients are not available for the general population indicated.*
The same observation can be made regarding the educational achievement
of Hispanic enlistees; in fact, in the older age-cohort (18-24 years)
educational differences are quite conspicuous.

The data in Table 12 conversely show that white (non-Spanish)
enlisted entrants are generally lower in "quality" than the comparable
group of white males in the general population. It is notable that
the educational attainment distribution for white enlistees resembles
the distribution for whites in the 18-19 year-old age cohort. Since
the mean age of non-prior service enlisted entrants is approximately
19 years old, it may be that the Army is not getting the "worst of the
whites," but, instead, a group of white enlistees who are representative
of the population of non-college-going white males. The Army does, in
fact, see itself in competition with the colleges for high school graduates.

Moskos has suggested that black soldiers are fairly representa-
tive of the black community in terms of education and social background,
and white entrants of recent years are coming from the least-educated
sectors of the white community.\footnote{Moskos, "Enlisted Ranks," p. 13.}
In any case, it is clear that: (1) the educational levels of recent minority accessions, especially blacks, are
higher than the educational levels of white accessions; (2) minority ac-
cessions in the Army tend to raise the overall "quality" levels of re-
cent enlisted entrants (while the proportion of white enlistees who are
high school dropouts exceeds the proportion of dropouts among all 1977
Army recruits); and (3) all enlisted entrants, regardless of racial/
ethnic classification, are underrepresentative of persons with at least
some college experience. In light of the recent findings on the relative educational attainment of minority accessions, it is interesting to recall that the Army once used the "effectiveness" argument as a basis for limiting the participation by blacks.

**Family Income**

Comparative data on family income can provide a good indication of the socioeconomic representation of the military. Unfortunately, there is presently no method for gathering truly valid information on the family incomes of military recruits. The Department of Defense periodically collects and analyzes data on income from two main sources: (1) Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station (AFEES) surveys of personnel entering active duty, and (2) a merge of accession files and census files (1970 U.S. Census of Population) using Zip Code identifiers.

The basic problem with AFEES survey data is the continually high percentage of non-respondents to the questions on family income. Among those who do answer the income question, there are also probably a number of accessions who do not know their family's income; and the tendencies toward either overestimation or underestimation are not known.

According to reported family income by respondents on the 1976-1977 AFEES survey of non-prior service male accessions (the last AFEES survey at this writing), the mean family income (for the year 1975) by services was distributed as shown in Table 13.1

---

1Mean family income is used instead of the preferred median family income because the Defense Manpower Data Center used the mean in their analyses.
TABLE 13
MEAN FAMILY INCOME AS REPORTED BY NON-PRIOR SERVICE
MALE ACCESSIONS ON THE 1976-1977 AFEES
SURVEY BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service of Accession</th>
<th>Mean Family Income in 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$18,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$19,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>$19,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$18,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>$18,919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1975 Mean Family Income of U.S. Population $15,546


The data in Table 13 show noticeably higher overall and Service mean family incomes for military entrants than in the general population. However, over 36 percent of all survey respondents failed to answer the question on family income. And, although Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) analysts computed an attributed income value for non-respondents to this question, the family income means of 1976-1977 male accessions are probably not very accurate.

1Defense Manpower Data Center analysts found a higher non-response rate for individuals whose fathers had lower education levels; they also found a positive correlation between family income and father's education. They therefore used father's education to derive an estimate for the non-response groups. See U.S. Department of Defense, Results From 1976-1977 AFEES, p. 14.
The merged computer file method of determining approximate family incomes of accessions provides generally better results. The major limitation here is simply that the method only produces data on the income levels in Zip Code areas—that is, the environment in which accessions lived prior to entering the military. Cooper conducted an extensive statistical analysis of the method in 1977. He found that, although there were differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals residing in any given Zip Code area, variations of socioeconomic characteristics within the Zip Codes were relatively minor when compared to variations between Zip Codes. Thus, it is assumed that high income families tend to live in Zip Code areas with higher median family incomes, low income families live in Zip Code areas with low median family incomes, and so on.

The results of a merge of accession and Census files is presented in Table 14. Median family incomes are for the 1970 Zip Code areas used in the Census, and represent earnings for the 1969 calendar year. Since the income figures are used only for comparison, they have not been scaled to current dollar levels. The data in Table 14 indicate a common pattern since FY 1974: 81 percent of all new enlisted entrants are drawn each year from "middle-income" ($6,000 to $12,000 in 1969) areas of the country—approximately double the proportion of U.S. residents found in these income areas.

The income distribution of enlisted entrants is notable for the fact that few enlistees are from either the high income or low income

---

1Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 225; see also "Zip Code Data as a Unit of Analysis," pp. 246-250.
### TABLE 14

**COMPARISON OF MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ALL ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median Family Income(^a)</th>
<th>N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS (Percent Distribution)(^b)</th>
<th>CY 1969 US POPULATION (Percent Distribution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $6,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6,000-$7,999</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,000-$9,999</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$11,999</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$12,000-$14,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$24,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $25,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Less than 0.5 percent.

\(^a\)Median family income is for CY 1969, derived from the 1970 U.S. Census of Population Zip Code Area Distribution. Since income figures are used only for comparison, they have **not** been scaled to current dollars.

\(^b\)Data on enlisted entrants obtained by merging accession files with 1970 U.S. Census of Population File ("fifth count" file). Median income data on enlisted entrants are for the 1970 Zip Code areas used in the census (and identified as "home of record") and not actual family income.
extremes. The armed forces of recent years historically have been underrepresentative of individuals at the lowest economic levels—since few individuals from severely disadvantaged backgrounds are able to pass military acceptance standards. The virtual absence of individuals from higher income areas, on the other hand, must be explained in other ways; and, though enlistees from these areas are not unrepresented, they are remarkably underrepresented: 13 percent of new enlistees in FY 1977 come from areas with family incomes above $12,000 (1969 dollars), whereas 37 percent of the U.S. population is found in these areas; 2 percent of new enlistees in FY 1977 were from areas with family incomes above $15,000, compared to a proportion almost ten times as large in the general population.

Table 15 shows the family income distributions for enlisted entrants by Service of accession in 1977. It can be seen that the middle-income "squeeze" occurs for each Service. The "squeeze" is slightly tighter in the Army. The Army also has noticeably more enlistees from lower family income environments than any of the other Services.

Additional data on the family incomes of recent Army accessions, gathered through the Army Quarterly Sample Survey of Military Personnel, similarly show a tightening effect in the middle-income ranges and a tendency toward the overrepresentation of individuals from the lower socioeconomic strata. Table 16, for example, shows that in 1975, over 70 percent of all Army enlistees professed to have family incomes below $15,000; during the same year about 55 percent of all U.S. families were in this range. Interestingly, although dollar values have increased considerably since 1975, the proportion of enlistees from the lowest
TABLE 15

COMPARISON OF MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS FOR ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION AND POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median Family Income&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>N.P.S. Enlisted Entrants (1977)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>CY 1969 U.S. Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under $6,000</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6,000-$7,999</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,000-$9,999</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$11,999</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$12,000-$14,999</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$24,000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $25,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>*Less than 0.5 percent.</sup>

<sup>aMedian family income is for CY 1969, derived from the 1970 U.S. Census of Population Zip Code area distribution. Since income figures are used only for comparison, they have not been scaled to current dollars.</sup>

<sup>bData on enlisted entrants obtained by merging accession files with 1970 U.S. Census of Population file ("fifth count" file). Median Income data on enlisted entrants are from the 1970 Zip code areas used in the census (and identified as "home of record"), not actual family income.</sup>
## TABLE 16

APPROXIMATE FAMILY INCOME OF ARMY ENLISTED PERSONNEL AT TIME OF ENTRY (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approximate Family Income&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (At Time of Entry)</th>
<th>ARMY ENLISTED PERSONNEL (Grades E-1/E-2)</th>
<th>U.S. POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year of Entry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than $5,000</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000-$9,999</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$14,999</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$19,999</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 and Above</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> Adjustments in dollar values between 1975, 1976, and 1977 have not been made.

<sup>b</sup> Overall, there were 18.5 percent Army enlisted personnel with "Unknown" family incomes, due to non-response on survey question. "Unknowns" were for the purpose of comparison distributed among known categories on a proportional basis.
family income level actually appears to have grown. There is an upward shift in the $5,000 to $19,999 range between 1975 and 1977. It should be noted that Army survey data suffer from the same limitations as the AFEES survey data on income; and even though the Army survey non-response rates were generally lower (18.5 percent average), the net effect of non-response is probably an inflated distribution of family incomes.

The distinction is sometimes drawn, as previously noted, between the civilian blue-collar nature of enlisted-level jobs and the civilian white-collar nature of officer positions. For those who think of the enlisted ranks as "working-class" America, then, the fact that most recent enlistees come from middle family-income environments makes them "representative." (It is also true that the inclusion of officers would have the net effect of raising the family-income distribution of the military comparison group, which here shows only enlisted personnel.) Actually, according to the Army surveys, even second lieutenants tend to cluster in the middle range (see Table 17; note, however, that incomes have not been scaled to current dollars); and, while they are probably (according to these data) from families with slightly lower incomes, they appear reasonably "representative" of the U.S. population.

In terms of "quality" indicators—that is, high school completion—economic environment alone does not appear critically important. In fact, as seen in Table 18, there are relatively fewer high school dropouts among Army enlistees from areas with median family incomes of less than $8,000 (1969 dollars) than in any of the higher income categories. As expected, there is a positive correlation between college attendance and higher income. However, the data in Table 18 do suggest
TABLE 17
APPROXIMATE FAMILY INCOME OF ARMY OFFICERS
AT TIME OF ENTRY
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approximate Family Income* (At Time of Entry)</th>
<th>ARMY OFFICERS (Grade 0-1, 2 Lt.)</th>
<th>U.S. POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Than $5,000</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000-$9,999</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$14,999</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$19,999</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 and Above</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Adjustments in dollar values between 1975, 1976, and 1977 have not been made.
TABLE 18
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN HOME OF RECORD FOR ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) IN ARMY AND TOTAL DOD (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN HOME OF RECORD*</th>
<th>TOTAL ENLISTED ENTRANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Than $8,000</td>
<td>$8,000–$9,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below High School Graduate</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate And Above</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or More Years of College</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Department of Defense Master and Loss File.

that recent accessions from lower family income areas may possess considerable social mobility. The generally higher educational attainment of enlisted accessions from minority groups support this finding.

Parents' Education

Table 19 compares the educational attainment of the parents of recent accessions with the education levels of similar groups in the general population. Three family status and age cohorts were selected from the general population for comparison with the fathers of accessions in the Army and total DoD. The fathers of Army accessions are found to be overrepresentative of high school dropouts and generally lower in educational attainment than selected groups of the standard population. The fathers of all military accessions in the 1976-1977 period are reasonably representative of the general population in terms of education; but a greater-than-expected proportion of high school dropouts is likewise found for the fathers of these new recruits.

Interestingly, there are proportionately more high school graduates among the mothers than among the fathers of recent accessions. Yet, the overall impression from these data is that the parents of 1976-1977 recruits (especially Army recruits) are generally less educated than comparable groups in the U.S. population. Differences are not unusually great; but these results are consistent with other data on race and family income presented above.
**TABLE 19**

**EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE PARENTS OF MALE NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS AND COMPARABLE GROUPS FROM THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.**

(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Father</td>
<td>Army Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below High School</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate And Above</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Data on husbands with children under 18 years are for March 1975.*
Marital Status

Moskos observes in "The Enlisted Ranks in the All-Volunteer Army" that a "most dramatic change has been in the marital composition of the Army." These changes—i.e., a remarkable increase in the percentage of married enlistees since 1973—adds Moskos, run directly counter to national trends. In effect, he sees the emergence of two distinctly different youth groups within the white population: one group, with middle-class origins and aspirations, is characterized by increasing educational attainment and later marriage; the other group, headed toward a marginal class and cultural position, is characterized by declining educational levels and a propensity to enter into young marriages. "It is from this latter white group, along with racial minorities," Moskos finds, "that the all-volunteer Army has been over-recruiting."

The suggestion of a possible bifurcation of the white population on the basis of educational motivation and marital propensity is intriguing. There is some support for the theory in the results of Table 20. Young military-age males in the civilian labor force do exhibit a greater tendency to enter into earlier marriage; and the proportion of married accessions in both the Army and the Air Force parallels the population of 18-19 year olds in the civilian labor force.

A closer look at the marital status of all Army male personnel (Table 21), however, leads to a somewhat different conclusion. Married enlistees in grades E-1 and E-2 are exceptionally overrepresentative

1 Moskos, "Enlisted Ranks," p. 16.
2 Ibid., p. 19.
| Marital Status | MALE N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977) | | | | | MALE POPULATION OF US (16-24)\textsuperscript{a} | | |
| | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force | Total DoD | Total Males | Civilian Labor Force |
| | | | | | | 18-19 | 16-24 | 18-19 | 16-24 |
| Single | 89.8 | 95.9 | 96.6 | 89.4 | 92.2 | 92.4 (93.4) | 77.9 (80.6) | 89.6 (90.5) | 71.1 (74.4) |
| Married\textsuperscript{b} | 10.2 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 10.6 | 7.8 | 7.6 (6.6) | 22.1 (19.4) | 10.4 (9.5) | 28.9 (25.6) |
| TOTAL | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 (100) | 100 (100) | 100 (100) | 100 (100) |


\textsuperscript{a}Data are for March 1976.

\textsuperscript{b}For U.S. population, "married" includes all persons ever married (i.e., persons with spouse present, and persons widowed, divorced, or separated). Numbers in parentheses indicate the percent of individuals with spouse present only. For armed forces, marital status is determined by declaration of marital and dependency status at time of entry.
TABLE 21
ESTIMATES OF MARITAL STATUS OF ARMY MALE PERSONNEL AND MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S.
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>ARMY MALE PERSONNEL (1977)</th>
<th>MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S. a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlisted Grade</td>
<td>Total Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>E-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married b</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>COMMISSIONED OFFICER GRADE</th>
<th>ALL EMPLOYED MALES (16 and Over)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2LT.</td>
<td>1LT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional/Technical</td>
<td>Managers/ Admin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>E-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a Data are for March 1976.

b For U.S. population, "married" includes all persons ever married (i.e., persons with spouse present, and persons widowed, divorced, or separated). Numbers in parentheses indicate the percent of individuals with spouse present only.
of 18-19 year old males in the general population and the civilian labor force; but they are not overrepresentative of the older age-cohort (20-24 years) in the civilian labor force. The reliability of the data on Army enlisted personnel in grades E-1 and E-2 is also questionable. The Army statistics in Table 21 are derived from a sample survey, with a reported confidence level of at least 95%±5%.\(^1\) The data in Table 20 are derived from the DoD Master and Loss File, which incorporates the "official" declarations of marital status and dependency status made by all military personnel at time of entry. The remarkably large difference between the marriage rates in these two tables suggests one of three possibilities: (1) the percentage of married enlistees in grades E-1 and E-2 is overstated in Table 21; (2) the percentage of married Army accessions in Table 20 includes incomplete or missing reports; or, (3) 13-14 percent of new Army enlisted accessions marry within the first year of active duty. If either the second or third explanation is correct, there is clearly a basic difference between the civilian and military groups.

The total percentage of married enlistees, 54.2 percent, is lower than the percentage of married males in the total population between the ages of 18 and 54. However, the distribution of Army enlistees is heavily skewed toward the lower ages (e.g., the median age of all Army enlisted personnel is about 22 years), and this is probably not a valid comparison. Taking the youthful nature of Army enlistees into account, a 54.2 percent marriage rate may be substantially higher than the

\(^1\)This means that there is 95 percent certainty that if a larger number of samples were drawn from the same population, 95 percent of the ranges (confidence intervals) would include the population values.
comparable rate of marriage among age-similar civilians. The proportion of married enlistees in grades E-5 and higher is also well above the proportion of married males in either the general population or the civilian labor force.

The distribution of married males by occupational group provides another perspective of the issue. Surprisingly, males in the two white-collar occupations listed in Table 21 exhibit a greater propensity for marriage than do males in the two major blue-collar occupations. The proportion of married second lieutenants, mostly comprised of recent college graduates, is higher than the total proportion of married enlistees. And, officers in general are more likely to be married than either enlisted personnel or the civilian male population. The point to be made here is simple: while the high marriage rates common to enlistees and officers alike may indicate an unrepresentative quality based on class and life goals, there are numerous alternate explanations.  

The correlation between educational aspirations, the propensity for early marriage, and social class is not clear in these data. A first glance at the comparisons by race, education, and marital status presented in Table 22 suggests that married enlistees actually are better educated than their single counterparts. Yet, although married accessions are twice as likely as single accessions to have had some college experience before entering the Army, married accessions are also more likely to be high school dropouts (i.e., high school non-graduates

TABLE 22
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF ARMY ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S. BY RACE AND MARITAL STATUS (1977)\(^a\)
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below High School Graduate</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED(^b)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate and Above</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{a}\)For U.S. population, "married" includes all persons ever married (i.e., persons with spouse present, and persons widowed, divorced, or separated).

\(^{b}\)General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency examination. Data on GED recipients are not available for the general population indicated.
plus GED recipients). In addition, it appears that there is an age bias in the results on educational attainment: the proportionately higher number of GED recipients, college dropouts, and college graduates among married accessions suggests that they are generally older than single accessions;¹ and, males between the ages of 14 and 18 in the civilian population are predominantly single and still in high school.²

Thus, Table 22 implies that married and single Army accessions are, in terms of education, less unlike each other than they are unlike the civilian population. Indeed, both single and married accessions tend to come from the non-college population of military-age males (though one-in-ten married accessions has at least some college experience).

Implications

The "measures of equity" imply that the all-volunteer armed forces, especially the Army, are not a socioeconomic microcosm of the nation. Some serve, while others do not; and the propensity to volunteer seems related to characteristics of race and social class.

There are difficulties in obtaining adequate data on certain "measures of equity" such as family income. There are also problems

¹In an unpublished 1976 study, A Comparison of Selected Demographic Characteristics of the Army and Civilian Populations (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences) John C. Woelfel and David R. Segal postulated that age-similar civilians might show a higher propensity to postpone marriage commitments in favor of completing educational objectives.

²The 14 to 24 year-old age group is used by the Bureau of Census; data which exclude the 14 through 17 year-old group are not available.
in data interpretation and civil-military comparisons, often resulting from incompatible statistics on civilian and military groups. Some differences in socioeconomic representation are more obvious than others. But the differences which do appear are consistent throughout.

An official Defense Department report on "Population Representation in the All-Volunteer Force" makes the following observation:

For the most part, recruits come from middle income families and neighborhoods. New enlistees were representative of all economic levels except for the high and low extremes. There was a good representation of all income levels among new enlistees.¹

One may ask: How can there be "good representation" when enlistees are "representative . . . except for the high and low extremes"? How do we define high and low "extremes"? Is it equitable or "right" to summarily dismiss the representative participation of rich and poor citizens? And, how, social pundits inquire, can a democratic nation sit back and allow a disproportionately disadvantaged racial minority, such as blacks, disproportionately bear the "burdens" of national defense—especially when the armed forces are apparently "draining" the minority community of its most capable leadership?

The answers to these questions will vary in accordance with subjective criteria and normative judgments of the "proper" relationship between the military and society. When analogies are made between military rank-and-file "jobs" and the civilian blue-collar sector, social class differences are less important. When military service is defined as an obligation of citizenship, universal participation or its practical

substitute, statistical representation, is deemed a requisite gauge of social equity; and, the more perfectly represented are all social strata of society in the armed forces, more perfect is the "equality of service" and the overall system of recruitment.

Equality valuations are also greatly influenced by the perceived ratio of benefits to burdens in the military service. In cases where the benefits of enlistment outweigh the burdens, in fact, it has been suggested that the achievement of true social equity occurs through the overrepresentation of the disadvantaged poor and racial minorities. At the same time, the juxtaposition of certain military and sociopolitical priorities during peacetime offsets the achievement of statistical parity or more "perfect" representation. These issues form the focus of the following chapter.
CHAPTER V

MILITARY REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL EQUITY:

THE POLICY MAZE

Assuming that the social equity of military participation is somehow attainable, one must ultimately ask: What is social justice and/or what is equity with respect to the military in society? The answers to these questions cannot be simply discovered or stated, obviously—even though typically emotive, contemporary commentary often ventures to define "equality of service."

Socrates, in his attempt to define "the real nature of justice" (this "very obscure question") in Plato's Republic, proposed that it first be "writ large" in order to "see our way." Perhaps, he suggested, viewing justice in "larger proportions" (i.e., within the community as opposed to individuals) will help us see it more clearly.¹ In the current frame, "writing large" social equity will not resolve the military manpower policy issue, but it may, as Socrates observed, facilitate "keen sight" and proper focus on the problem.

Military service, placed in the larger setting of society, has been described as both a benefit and a burden. Equity with respect to the military is thus seen in terms of equal shares and proportions; it

is "equality of service" through the fair distribution of benefits and burdens, positive and negative rights and duties, across the whole society.

The history of class privilege in society is amply reflected in the history of the military, as it is in the history of other institutions. Racial injustice has a much shorter history than class privilege, but it was the racial equality concerns of the 1960s which ignited present-day concerns for equity in the military establishment. In recent years, "equality of service" has been placed in context with the social plight of racial minorities and the generally less-advantaged.

As Shenton writes in *Blacks and the Military In American History*, "blacks struggled to prove their worth by seeking to share with whites the risks and benefits of American society. If nothing else, their effort was to prove time and again that whites were ready to share the risks while stubbornly blocking access to the benefits." And "[n]owhere has this experience been more fully demonstrated," he finds, "than in the black experience in the armed forces."\(^1\)

Indeed, policy aimed at the achievement of social equity must take into account the larger role of the military in society. Such policy must also consider the various meanings of military service as defined by our social and political structure as well as the conditions of our life. The majority of contemporary literature on the subject of military manpower, especially that which treats "representation," fails in this respect. The task at hand, then, is not so much an attempt to set a

definite course for policy as it is an effort to gain what Socrates called keen sight of a very obscure question.

Benefits vs. Burdens of Military Service

One of the most problematic and yet least considered aspects of military representation and "equality of service" is the balance between "benefits" and "burdens." Equity arguments in behalf of social representation within the armed forces generally fit into one of two perspectives: (1) national defense (i.e., military service) is a burden which should be borne equally by all members of society; or (2) the benefits and opportunities associated with military service should be available to all individuals regardless of race, color, creed, national origin, or socioeconomic status.

Of course, changing times produce changing perspectives of military service. During war, for instance, personal sacrifice and hardship define the "burdens of defense." In times of peace, especially when peace is accompanied by high unemployment and a sagging economy, military service can mean a chance to be employed or a chance to learn a skill and receive an education. On the other hand, as previously observed, service in wartime can actually be perceived as a "benefit" by certain groups. For blacks and Nisei during World War II, for example, combat duty meant the "right to fight" and acceptance as full citizens; exclusion from combat duty was a denial of citizenship and patriotism, and, therefore, equality. During peacetime, military service may not always be described in strictly positive terms. Present discussions of military representation in the AVF have focused on disproportionate black enlistments—not because whites are being refused a fair share of the benefits—but rather
because depressed minorities are viewed as accepting an unfair share of the burdens in order to obtain the opportunities.

Thus, the way in which military service is perceived affects our interpretations of recruiting results and our prescriptions for parity. Ultimately, equity arguments hinge on the discernible distribution of rewards and responsibilities; and these perceptions involve reality judgments and value judgments which may differ across social and political lines. Some may see the traditional opportunities of military service as outweighing any negative aspects during times of peace. Consequently, the overrepresentation of depressed minorities and the poor is viewed as social welfare and an equalization of social benefits, in much the same way the graduated income tax is seen as promoting equity.¹ The armed forces represent a chance to get ahead, an avenue for social mobility. The fact that the poor and depressed minorities enlist in disproportionate numbers is a healthy sign, an indication that these individuals can and will receive help. "It is a good thing and not a bad thing to offer better alternatives to the currently disadvantaged," Milton Friedman once observed.² Regardless of its shortcomings, many AVF advocates

¹ See, for example, Mark V. Pauley and Thomas D. Willett, "Who Should Bear the Burden of Defense?", in Why the Draft?, ed. James C. Miller (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 63. Pauly and Willett also point out that "Who shall serve?" and "Who shall bear the burden of defense?" are two different questions; all "bear the burden" through payment of taxes—while "who serves" is a matter of individual, volunteer choice (p. 68). An economist similarly observes that both rich and poor can reach higher welfare positions by this division and specialization of labor (though disadvantaged have limited choices due to their economic status); see Stephen L. Canby, Military Manpower Procurement, A Policy Analysis (Lexington, Ma.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), p. 26.

maintain, peacetime service makes the poor less poor and the unskilled skilled.

In light of recent arguments to effect an "equitable" social distribution of military manpower (i.e., reduce the number of black enlistments and encourage middle-class and upper-class white recruitment), it is surprising to find that only ten or twelve years ago serious criticism was levelled against the armed forces for systematically excluding blacks and the least-educated and least-mobile young men. "History may record that the single most important psychological event in race relations in the 1960s," Daniel P. Moynihan wrote in The New Republic, "was the appearance of Negro fighting men on the TV screens of America. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is one of the oldest known routes to social equality. . . . Moreover, as employment pure and simple, the armed forces have much to offer men with the limited current options of, say, Southern Negroes. By rights, Negroes are entitled to a larger share of employment in the armed forces and might well be demanding one."¹

Moynihan's basic contention in 1966 was that the American armed forces had become "an immensely potent instrument for education and occupational mobility"; but because of certain mental and physical requirements (perhaps overstated acceptance standards), "a whole generation of poor Negroes and whites are missing their chance to get in touch with the American society."² Moynihan used as evidence the fact that blacks, high school dropouts, the unskilled, and the poor—a profile of poverty in the 1960s—were those most likely to be rejected from military

²Ibid., pp. 20, 22.
service. In fact, the Task Force on Manpower Conservation, chaired by Moynihan and mandated to study the Selective Service System, estimated in its 1964 report that 600,000 disadvantaged young men were rejected by the military each year. In all, one-third of the nation's age-eligible males would fail to meet the medical or mental standards—but there were clear ethnic, regional, and socioeconomic distinctions.

Moynihan continued:

The Selective Service Study had made it clear enough that perhaps the largest single area of \textit{de facto} job discrimination (lacking a better word) faced by Negroes is—the armed forces. . . . If, in 1964, Negroes had had their proportion of the service and the number of their males unemployed was correspondingly reduced, and had the reverse process occurred for whites, the unemployment rate for non-white males in the relevant age group would have been lower than that for whites. The argument for \textit{increasing the Negro representation in the armed forces} was immensely persuasive. . . . The next step in the logic of the task force report would have been to systematically \textit{increase the Negro's share} of military employment.

"Very possibly our best hope," Moynihan went on to conclude, "is seriously to use the armed forces as a socializing experience for the poor—particularly the Southern poor—until somehow their environment begins turning out \textit{equal citizens}.”

At the time, the Selective Service System was far from equipped to run employment or rehabilitation programs for the disadvantaged, and the Defense Department was reluctant to enter the "social welfare business" with the war fulminating in Vietnam. But the Great Society drafted the armed forces to help fight the War on Poverty, and Project 100,000 was launched. Intended to rehabilitate the nation's "subterranean poor," Project 100,000 was an experimental program for the induction of 100,000

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] Ibid., p. 21 (emphasis added).
\item[2] Ibid., p. 22.
\end{footnotes}
men who would ordinarily be screened out primarily because of limited educational background or low educational attainment. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara saw these youths as deprived of "the opportunity to earn their fair share of this nation's abundance," and he viewed the armed forces as "the world's largest educator of skilled men." Consequently, the military could provide the nation's disadvantaged youth with "an opportunity to return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes which for them and their families will reverse the downward spiral of decay."¹

Between 1966 and 1968, Project 100,000 brought into the service approximately 240,000 recruits. 41 percent of these men were black, compared to a military-wide composition of about 12 percent; almost 50 percent were from the South, in contrast to the almost 28 percent in the total armed forces. Unfortunately, not many of the Project 100,000 enlistees could qualify for military occupations which would help them in civilian life. The armed forces were processing the most incoming personnel in 15 years, and automated processing methods were used to assign new recruits. There were no special placement programs yet, so most men with poor educational backgrounds found themselves, as a matter of course (and casualties of modern computer technology), in combat jobs.² Consequently, over 40 percent of Project 100,000 recruits were


²This was the reason given by Gus C. Lee, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, in a personal interview.
given combat-related assignments, while over half of the Army and Marine Corps enlistees were sent to Vietnam.¹

By 1972, Project 100,000 was officially ended and replaced with the "New Standards" program. As Baskir and Strauss write, "many military leaders, social planners, and liberal critics" considered Project 100,000 a failure. It conveniently increased the wartime manpower pool, but it was essentially a failure for the recruits themselves. Most participants never received the promised skill-training, many were sent to Vietnam, a number received bad discharges, and many wound up with more problems in civilian society than they had when they enlisted.² One critic of the program labeled Project 100,000 merely "a method for enlarging the military manpower pool, at the expense of the poor and the black and to the advantage of the white and the affluent." "Any social benefits which may result from the program," Murray wrote in 1970, "will be completely secondary and entirely unrelated to its primary purpose of protecting the sons of the middle class from the draft and Vietnam."³

Even though Project 100,000 failed to achieve what many Great Society planners had envisioned, the basic program concept made sense. Historically, minorities have not only sought out the armed forces for


²Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 131. Project 100,000 was not designed to increase the Vietnam War manpower pool per se. Some military leaders, in fact, still claim it was "pushed" on the Services over considerable inside protest.

increased civil rights and entrance into the larger society, but also because it is often the best alternative in a restricted range of economic opportunities.\(^1\) As Moskos notes, it is actually possible for those initially less privileged to compete more realistically for advantages within the military system than in most civilian education, commercial, and industrial organizations.\(^2\) Studies have frequently shown, for example, that minorities with less than a high school education earn more in the military than in the civilian labor force.\(^3\) Research by Browning, Lopreato, and Poston, and subsequent analyses of veterans and nonveterans also suggest that military service may provide a "bridging environment" (i.e., geographic mobility, occupational training, experience with bureaucratic structures, and personal independence) for the previously disadvantaged: the armed forces prepare and certify these individuals for jobs in the civilian economy, thus enabling them (in the long term) to earn more than their peers who did not serve.\(^4\)


\(^4\)Harley L. Browning, Sally C. Lopreato, and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Income and Veteran Status," American Sociological Review 38 (February 1973): 74-85. See also, for example, Sally C. Lopreato and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Differences in Earnings and Earnings Ability Between Black Veterans and Nonveterans in the United States," Social Science Quarterly
During the Vietnam War years, many persons were concerned that blacks were shouldering a disproportionate share of the fighting. But, as several observers pointed out, it was the social and economic inequalities of civilian society which helped to push blacks into the military. Whitney M. Young, Jr. claimed in 1967 that the number of blacks and black casualties was high mainly because blacks enlisted voluntarily, reenlisted, and volunteered for hazardous duty.1 Moskos, in The American Enlisted Man, attributed the attraction of military service for blacks to the "push-pull" forces of military and civilian life. "Pushing" the young black man into the military was the general plight of blacks in American society. "Pulling" him was the understanding that the armed forces were (and still are) a major avenue of career mobility and generally less segregated than civilian society.2 Thus, it is the gap between black and white opportunities in the military and society which helps to make the armed forces an attractive

57 (March '77); 750-766; Wayne J. Villezemez and John D. Kasarda, "Veteran Status and Socioeconomic Attainment," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Spring 1976): 407-420; Michael D. Ornstein, Entry into the American Labor Force (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Melanie Martindale and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Variations in Veteran/Nonveteran Earnings Patterns Among World War II, Korea, and Vietnam War Cohorts," Armed Forces and Society 5 (February 1979): 219-243; and Roger D. Little and J. Eric Fredland, "Veteran Status, Earnings and Race," Armed Forces and Society 5 (February 1979): 244-260. It should be pointed out that research into the economic benefits of military service for veterans is not unanimous on this point. Little and Fredland ("Veteran Status," pp. 244-245), for example, refer to several economic studies undertaken in the late sixties and early seventies which found substantial costs to the individual draftee (usually over the short term).


2Moskos, American Enlisted Man, pp. 116-117.
alternative for disadvantaged minorities. Moskos writes: "It is a commentary on our nation that many black youths, by seeking to enter and remain in the armed forces, are saying that it is even worth the risk of being killed in order to have a chance to learn a trade, to make it in a small way, to get away from a dead-end existence, and to become part of the only institution in this society that seems really to be integrated."\(^1\)

For many blacks, the risk of being killed none the less had its attractions. According to Yarmolinsky, the acceptance, even the seeking, of danger and high risk is itself related to the insidious damage of racial injustice.\(^2\) It should be pointed out that during World War II, the onus of inferiority accompanied service in non-combat support units—particularly when blacks were concerned. Combat army assignments, on the other hand, provided fulfillment, status, and higher pay—especially duty in elite combat units such as the Airborne.\(^3\) Moskos finds evidence that higher prestige (but not envy) is generally accorded combat personnel by non-combat personnel. And, taken within the historical context of the "right to fight" voiced by black organizations, Moskos writes, "the black soldier's current overrepresentation in the combat arms might be construed as a kind of ironic step forward."\(^4\)

---

1Ibid., p. 133. During the height of the Vietnam War, Purnell ("The Negro in Vietnam," p. 8) similarly wrote that "many blacks agree they get better treatment" in the Army.


3Although Whitney Young remarked in 1967 that blacks volunteered for combat not for the money, but to "prove" themselves; see Young, "When The Negroes Come Home," p. 66.

4Moskos, American Enlisted Man, p. 117.
Once in the military, blacks are also more inclined to "find a home." As Yarmolinsky (who is often credited with originating Project 100,000) notes, there is opportunity for advancement, job security, decent pay and benefits, the absence of overt discrimination, and a sense of manhood which the military inspires.\(^1\) Stern observed in 1968 that the "extraordinary rate of black re-enlistment" attests to the fact that the military is, to many blacks, the only way of escaping from the ghetto; and "if there are still remnants of discrimination and racism in the military it is also the only major institution in American society that has had a thorough-going integration. . . ."\(^2\) In 1967, Young likewise concluded that blacks reenlisted in disproportionate numbers "because the Army offers more opportunity for advancement, for learning skills and using natural talents, for dignity, for self-respect and a sense of worth than does the present condition of civilian life." "For the majority of these capable young men," he wrote, "the Army is their university."\(^3\)

Reconciling Benefits and Burdens in the AVF

The image of the armed forces as a place of opportunity, equal acceptance and involvement, regardless of prior social advantage or pre-existing handicaps, has helped to make military service a traditional channel for social mobility. In fact, the Services have accepted and

\(^1\)Yarmolinsky, *Military Establishment*, p. 276.


\(^3\)Young, "Negroes Come Home," p. 66.
even promoted their role as provider of advantages for the disadvantaged and equal opportunities for all.\textsuperscript{1} According to one study, since 1970 the Army alone has probably put more energy and resources into efforts to improve race relations and equal opportunity than any other major American institution.\textsuperscript{2}

"Opportunity" is the predominant message in military recruiting advertisements, and there is evidence that many potential recruits are listening. A recent AFEES survey of male non-prior service accessions shows that, out of twelve possible "life goals," "developing your potential" was seen as more achievable through military service than civilian employment and it was the second-most attractive aspect of enlistment.\textsuperscript{3} In addition, out of twelve possible "military attributes," "opportunity to better your life" was ranked the third most important attribute by all new entrants.\textsuperscript{4}


\textsuperscript{2}Peter G. Nordlie, \textit{Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial Discrimination in the Army}, TP-270 (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1975), p. 1. As Segal and Nordlie observe, racial inequities do still exist in the Army. But there is also evidence that the Army has "made great strides in reducing inequalities in promotion rates, at most enlisted ranks, and in most specialties." And "[t]here are indications that the Army has been responsive to social research pointing out its discriminatory patterns." See David R. Segal and Peter G. Nordlie, "Racial Inequality in Army Promotions," \textit{Journal of Political and Military Sociology} (forthcoming). (Processed.)


\textsuperscript{4}Ibid.
The more pragmatic reasons for enlisting in the military today generally involve employment opportunities, skill training, adventure and excitement, and educational opportunities. In fact, since the very beginning of AVF discussions, numerous studies and surveys have demonstrated the relative importance attributed to training and education opportunities by prospective recruits.1 Results from the 1976-1977 AFEES survey show that over 60 percent of the male non-prior service respondents indicated relative certainty about plans to continue their education (on their own time) while in Service; over 80 percent said they definitely or probably would take advantage of in-Service educational benefits, while over 85 percent expressed a likelihood of using educational benefits after leaving the Service.2

Studies over the years also indicate that Army recruitment is particularly affected by the perceived value of educational benefits and opportunities. Youth Attitude Tracking Studies of military-age youth in the general population, for example, since 1975 have demonstrated that "helps you get an education while you serve" is associated more often than any other "attribute" with the Army.3 Army "recruit probe" surveys conducted by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command likewise show that "opportunity to get a college education" is among

---


the most important reasons for enlisting (ranked second on a list of 23 reasons) given by new recruits.\(^1\)

Although no actual data are available on the educational advancement of servicemembers while in service, a crude estimate of the average advancement of 1974 entrants was made by combining the results of four quarterly surveys of Army personnel and combining these data with data on median active federal military service (AFMS) for enlisted grades. The results in Table 23 show that very noticeable educational advancement occurred for 1974 enlistees during the period 1974-1977 (an average three-year term of enlistment). Advancement is most evident in the high school graduate category and (to a slightly lesser extent) in the "some college" group.\(^2\)

For blacks and disadvantaged youth, then, the military can be especially appealing. Wilson writes in a 1978 Washington Post article, "Blacks in Army: Staying and Advancing," that "the U.S. Army today may be the world's largest and most successful equal opportunity employer." "Blacks, out of frustration and pride, joined this all-volunteer peacetime Army in unprecedented numbers," Wilson states; and they are now reenlisting and rising within the noncommissioned-officer corps in numbers which will soon make black NCOs "the heart of such

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)It should be noted that the comparison of 1974 and 1977 survey samples does not account for 1974 entrants who left the Army before 1977. Current figures show that recruits who enter the military with a high school diploma have a first-term attrition rate about half as large as the first-term attrition rate for recruits who enter without a high school diploma. The first-term attrition rate for all Army male enlistees who entered in FY 1974 is 38 percent. Consequently, while the comparison of survey samples shows educational advancement, the degree of advancement presented here is assuredly overstated.
TABLE 23
ESTIMATED EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT IN 1977 OF ARMY MALE ENLISTEES WHO ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY IN 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Grade (1974 Entrants)</th>
<th>Educational Attainment (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Below High School Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 (Year of Entry)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; All Grades</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Educational Advancement (Percent Change)<sup>c</sup>

-31.4 to +16.9 to +9.7 to +0.6


<sup>a</sup>Includes enlisted entrants who have passed the General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency exam.

<sup>b</sup>Educational attainment of 1974 entrants in 1977 was estimated by combining survey data on the educational attainment of all male enlisted personnel (by grade) with data on median Active Federal Military Service (AFMS) for enlisted grades. These data do not take into account 1974 entrants who left the Army before 1977. Current figures show that recruits who enter with a high school diploma have one-half the first-term attrition rate of those who do not have a high school diploma. Thus, there is a bias in favor of "advancement" built into these data.

<sup>c</sup>Estimated educational advancement is presented as percent increase(+) for high school graduate and above and as percent decrease (-) for below high school graduate.
leadership in the future. Thus, blacks continue to find the military not only a "job," but a "job with promise." According to Army Secretary Clifford Alexander, blacks perceive the Army as a way out of the nation's economic cellar—and, for those who stay in, they "know or perceive that they wouldn't get the kind of opportunity and challenge and upward mobility on the outside that they do in the Army."  

The DoD Minority Market Study of 1976 identified several factors as being important motivators for the enlistment of black youth in the Army. The overriding factor is the perception by black youth that the Army offers a "viable career alternative"—a career which offers upward mobility, provides important benefits, teaches a valuable skill, and provides leadership experience. However, the most frequently mentioned reason or explanation given for the disproportionately high rate of black enlistments—along with the fact that there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of blacks found eligible for military service—is the widening differential of unemployment between white and non-white youth of military age.  

---


2 Army Secretary Alexander is quoted in ibid., p. A-7.


4 See Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, R-1450-ARPA (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, 1977), pp. 210-216.

participation to the fact that earned income for blacks in the civilian sector has decreased relative to the amount that non-blacks could earn since the early 1970s; at the same time, this has not been true for the military (assuming equal promotion opportunities). ¹

In 1974, the unemployment rate for non-white, 18-19 year-old males was 28.2 percent, while the unemployment rate for the comparable population of white males was 11.5 percent. By 1977, as Table 24 shows, the unemployment rate for 18-19 year-old white males had climbed only 1.5 percent. During the same period, the unemployment rate for 18-19 year-old black males increased by almost 8 percent. Even among recent high school graduates looking for work (i.e., in the civilian labor force) there are very noticeable racial disparities. Table 25, for example, presents the employment status of high school graduates (and drop-outs) looking for work approximately five months after leaving high school. Among high school graduates in the civilian labor force, 15.1 percent of the white respondents were unemployed—while 44.5 percent of the black high school graduates described themselves as unemployed.

It is apparent that young blacks and other racial minorities—regardless of high school completion—face significantly greater difficulties in the civilian job market than do their white counterparts. The 1978 Employment and Training Report of the President states that "the labor market situation of minority teenagers has eroded dramatically in the past decade, while that of white teenagers has improved in some respects. In terms of unemployment rates, participation rates,

¹Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 219.
TABLE 24

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OF PERSONS BY RACE, SEX, AND AGE:
ANNUAL AVERAGE FOR 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and Race</th>
<th>U.S. Population (Percent Unemployed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age (Years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 16 and Over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black and Other</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black and Other</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (All Workers)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 25

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND HIGH SCHOOL DROP-OUTS NOT IN COLLEGE AS OF OCTOBER OF YEAR OF GRADUATION OR DROP-OUT BY RACE AND SEX (1977) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and Race</th>
<th>Civilian Labor Force</th>
<th>High School Graduate</th>
<th>High School Drop-Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total in Labor Force</td>
<td>Employed (Percent)</td>
<td>Unemployed (Percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black and Other</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*aUnemployed is defined as all persons (percent) who were in the civilian labor force, looking for work, and were not employed by October of the year of graduation or drop-out from school.

* Data not available.
and employment/population ratios, the gap between teenage whites and minorities has widened.\textsuperscript{1}

The all-volunteer armed forces are an "equal opportunity employer" in many more ways than civilian employers. The military must struggle to meet its manpower goals each year, and there is no room for subtle discrimination in hiring practices. If you are qualified, you can join; if you meet certain specific job requirements and there are openings, you can train for that job. Interestingly, there is one notable exception to the pattern of racial parity by industry in the nonmilitary sector: the government hired proportionately more black than white teenagers in every area of the country. (The public sector engaged 1 out of every 5 employed black teenagers in metropolitan areas, for example, compared to 1 out of every 17 employed whites.)\textsuperscript{2} This may say something about the types of jobs sought by teenagers of different races—but it may also be a statement concerning subtle forms of discrimination in the private sector, where hiring practices and standards are rarely monitored or controlled.

The results of the 1976-1977 AFEES survey confirm that the armed forces fulfill the basic employment objectives of many male accessions. Table 26 shows that almost a third of all Army entrants were non-students and unemployed at the time of enlistment; in all Services combined, approximately one-in-four entrants claimed to have been "unemployed." Considering that full-time students (not working) and students working


\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 74.
TABLE 26

SCHOOL AND WORK STATUS OF MALE NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS BEFORE ENLISTMENT BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION (1976) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School/Work Status</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time Student/Not Working</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time Student/Working Part-Time</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Student/Working Full-Time</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Student/Unemployed</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

part-time may also have previously sought civilian employment (unsuccessfully), the number of true unemployed job-seekers is probably higher.

The Department of Labor states that "youth and race are significant handicaps to employment."\(^1\) The high level of possible "discouragement" among young civilian job seekers is reflected in the results presented in Table 27. Overall, only 11.1 percent of Service entrants reported "no difficulty" in obtaining a full-time job in the individual's home of record—while over 30 percent claimed that obtaining a full-time job was "almost impossible." Interestingly, 75 percent of all survey respondents did not see the job situation as getting any better over the next 6-12 months—suggesting, once again, that discouragement in the civilian job market may well lead potential enlistees to their local recruiter.

In fact, the armed forces under the volunteer format have been the indirect beneficiaries of the "slow" economy. Generally high unemployment may benefit recruitment efforts in other sectors of society; but in the volunteer military, success or failure of the fundamental concept is frequently linked to the conditions of the economy. Military manpower economists see high unemployment as a boon to the AVF; that is, otherwise negative conditions for the whole of society are at the same time positive elements for the volunteer military.\(^2\) While the "cloud with a silver lining" view may be based

\(^1\) U.S. President, Employment and Training Report, p. 72.

TABLE 27
PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING A FULL-TIME JOB AS
REPORTED BY MALE NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION (1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Difficulty&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Not Difficult At All</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Somewhat Difficult</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Very Difficult</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Almost Impossible</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Defense, Results From the 1976-1977

<sup>a</sup>Respondents were asked on a survey about their perceptions of the local job market and the perceived difficulty in finding full-time employment.

<sup>b</sup>Means were computed based on the numerical coding (in order) of perceived difficulty which appears in the table. Thus, the greater the mean, the greater the average perceived difficulty.
on an "economic truism," it also says something about the competition for qualified youth between the military and civilian employment and training opportunities—as well as the relative position of some military jobs in the general scheme of employment alternatives.

Employment is obviously a benefit, not a burden, to those who need and want it. However, so much attention has been given to the notion that the AVF depends on a poor economy—that it "feeds off" the legions of the unemployed and takes almost parasitic satisfaction in high unemployment—the volunteer military has gained a reputation as being an "employer of last resort." From the very beginning of the first discussions concerning the AVF, a great deal of importance has been placed on the economy and its effects on the "primary manpower pool." The volunteer armed forces are economy-dependent, and thus described by some as a haven for the disadvantaged and "unemployables" of society; and because they are described in this manner, they are perceived as being nothing more than what they were during the draft years, nothing more than what they were before the pay raises, before increased opportunities for personal advancement, and other changes—indeed, a burden or cost of national security which offers very little in return for the "sacrifice" of service.

"What we are really getting," one commander states, "is a better class of bad people. We are not getting a cross section of American society. They can't get a job and want that paycheck. That's why they're joining. They don't want to be soldiers."¹

Getler writes that "interviews with scores of soldiers show that many, perhaps most, never recruits joined because they couldn't get a job in what they call 'the real world' or because the jobs they had were dead ends." Blacks and Hispanics, he points out, particularly say they joined because they couldn't find a job. "The Army is my bread," remarked one formerly unemployed, Puerto Rican private. "It's a job, pure and simple," attests another specialist fourth-class, who joined during the 1975-1976 U.S. recession.¹

A portion of society has indelibly labeled the enlisted ranks of the armed forces as something between a "real job" and unemployment—something only slightly better (and in some cases, worse) than unemployment. This popular portrait of the military is the legacy of every "footslogger," "trenchdigger," and "dogface" of an earlier era, every draftee who ever complained about the conditions of military life. It is no coincidence that the word "pawn" (one that can be used to further the purposes of another) and the word "peon" (a servile, menial worker or a drudge) are both derived from the Medieval Latin word pedō, a foot soldier. The "lowly life" of a G.I. is an old story, and a story which is now being retold and reapplied to the volunteer military. So, those who join the military do so unwillingly, the argument follows, because they are casualties of social injustice and "losers." The volunteer system frees the more fortunate individuals from the burdens of military service, while it forces the disadvantaged and depressed minorities to volunteer as a last recourse. "The idea that some in the Army and outside view today's recruits as losers is a fact of life, bitterly resented," Getler writes.²

¹Ibid., p. A-14.  ²Ibid.
At the very heart of this popular image is the understanding that military service offers many more costs than actual benefits. Military service is: (1) a sacrifice of time and effort which has many negative aspects and few rewards—that is, military service involves an "opportunity cost" (time lost) and a "tax-in-kind"; (2) mainly oriented toward combat preparedness and involves a high risk for potential injury or loss of life; (3) an obligation or "calling" (which places national interest above personal interest), and an exercise in citizenship which should not be equated with secular activities; and, consequently, (4) less desirable than most alternative activities or occupations available to young men and women. And if it were not for this understanding of military service—along with the notion that the less-fortunate are compelled to volunteer by their own economic plight—the disproportionate enlistment of individuals from the lower social strata of society would not be an equity issue.

The popular image of military service thus revolves around the basic precept that the armed forces were created to benefit the state as a whole, not the individuals who comprise them. After all, the purpose of the military is national defense, not education or social welfare; the armed forces were never intended to supplant government social programs or to support social reform. If any benefits accrue for the individual, the view holds, it should be by circumstance, not by design.

Since the raison d'etre of any armed force is ultimately preparation for combat (i.e., violence), it is said that those who are
disproportionately represented in the AVF necessarily shoulder a 
disproportionate burden of defense and, consequently, face a greater 
likelihood of death. Nevertheless, Canby writes in *Military Man-
power Procurement*, the "empirical fact" is that the peacetime burdens 
of military service differ only in degree from those of civilian 
life: "Burden-shifting is a wartime argument; only in wartime are 
the serviceman's risks and burdens distinctly greater than the 
civilian's."¹

In fact, it has been argued that a volunteer military which 
enlists largely from the lower socioeconomic strata actually insu-
lates the poor and disadvantaged from the horrors of war, and sub-
jects the more privileged to a greater wartime risk. As illogical 
as this may sound on the surface, it is supported by an understanding 
of the mechanics of assignment within the military and the current 
mobilization plan. "Military history," the Defense Department notes, 
"indicates that most conflicts build over a substantial period of 
time and become wars of attrition. World War II and Vietnam are 
recent examples."² The very fact that the less-privileged opted 
for a peacetime military, observes Canby, means that during a quasi-
war or war of attrition (e.g., a Vietnam military expansion), the


more privileged social classes would be drafted disproportionately into the expansionable segments of the armed forces—that is, the ground combat forces. In wartime, it is the combat arms which require most additional manpower; and better-educated draftees and volunteers would find fewer non-combat spaces open to them. On the other hand, careerists, even those in combat skills, would probably be remote from direct fighting, in higher-rank cadre and staff positions. Canby therefore concludes:

Thus a strong case can be made that peacetime voluntarism and an equal-probability wartime draft [e.g., a lottery] in the modern dual nuclear-conventional military would disproportionately endanger more privileged, and not excessively burden the poor.\(^1\)

Of course, the above argument does not apply in cases where the conflict does not warrant a military expansion, or in any short-term war which starts at a high intensity. In these instances (and in the initial stages of a military expansion), casualties will be heaviest in the AVF and the reserve forces (which, as of FY 1977, included 14 percent black personnel [selected reserve]\(^2\)). The argument also assumes the existence of an equal-probability wartime draft, namely, a draft lottery which places severe limitations on exemptions and deferments. In addition, the "burden" placed on the more privileged socioeconomic strata increases only as the conflict expands. However, considering that the more fortunate bear most of the volunteer


\(^2\) In the selected reserve, blacks comprised about 19 percent of the Army Reserve, close to 15 percent of the Army National Guard, and about 17 percent of the Marine Corps Reserve. See U.S. Department of Defense, *America's Volunteers*, pp. 104-105.
military's financial burden in peacetime—and stand a greater like-
lihood of seeing combat in any sustained conflict (according to the 
above theory)—the burden-shifting issue takes on an altogether 
different meaning.

The case which automatically presumes a greater risk to life 
for persons in the peacetime armed forces likewise ignores the facts, 
Canby finds. Actually the peacetime incidence of death in the mili-
tary is no higher than the civilian average. Moreover, most peacetime 
volunteers are assigned to the overhead portions of the armed forces.
Only a small proportion of the peacetime military is in high-risk, 
combat-oriented occupations; and these occupations are the most ex-
pansionary components—i.e., those which will be filled by draftees 
(and reserves) during extended conflict.¹

Nonetheless, the equity argument commiserates with minorities 
and the otherwise deprived members of society who are "shunted off" 
to the military; they are "victimized by the vagaries of society" 
and unduly forced to compromise their life goals by joining the mili-
tary. "The military," Moskos observes, "will continue to draw dis-
proportionately from young blacks as long as they are victims of 
certain structural problems of the national economy. . . ."² But 
this latest version of the equity argument fails to acknowledge the 
full value of the various benefits and opportunities offered by the

¹Canby, Military Manpower, pp. 63-66.

²Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Enlisted Ranks in the All-
Volunteer Army," paper prepared for the Military in American Society 
Study, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., January 1978. 
(Processed.)
Services. It is clear that benefits are there, particularly for minorities who cannot otherwise hope to find equal opportunities in contemporary civilian society.

Oddly enough, the equity argument does not say that more whites and middle-class youth should be equally represented so that they can receive an equal share of the various opportunities the Services have to offer. The equity argument, as it usually appears in contemporary literature, states that there should be less blacks and less individuals from the lower socioeconomic strata, because it isn't fair to these groups. "Whatever may be one's view of the AVF," King writes in a Senate-sponsored study, "it is clear that blacks are now shouldering a share of the defense burden that is more than double their 'fair share' in population terms."¹ But as long as equity arguments neglect to recognize that there are valuable opportunities for some in the service—especially when weighed against the prospects of economic depression, unemployment, or the lack of educational advantage present in civilian society—these arguments in behalf of racial "fairness" (however well-intentioned) may appear outwardly unjust.

Interestingly, the equity argument concerning the overrepresentation of blacks in the armed forces has never actually been voiced by black spokesmen. During the height of the Vietnam War, when blacks comprised 14 percent of all non-prior service enlisted

accessions and over 20 percent of all combat soldiers in the Army, several black civil rights leaders objected to black "overrepresentation." But these criticisms were not directed at the composition of the armed forces per se, but rather at the system which placed disproportionate numbers of blacks in Vietnam combat units.

Black civil rights leaders, like most black young men who entered the military during the 1960s, recognized the more positive aspects of the armed forces and the practical advantages of military service. As Moskos notes in "The Negro and the Draft," surveys of the period showed that blacks were markedly more favorable in their views concerning the equity of the Selective Service draft—and more inclined than whites (by a ratio of 2 to 1) to perceive the armed forces as offering a "better chance to get ahead than in civilian life." In 1969, these survey results and other data led Moskos to draw the following conclusion: "Despite inequities suffered by Negroes both in being more likely to be drafted and once in the service being more likely to assignment in combat units, Negroes, nevertheless, are still much more likely than whites to have positive views toward the draft and military life."¹

Currently, with the proportion of black accessions in the Army over three times as large as the comparable proportion of blacks in the general population, there is likewise no outcry or feeling of "unfairness" in the black community. To the contrary, blacks see

the problem as "white concern over increased black participation."¹

"Accordingly," Schexnider and Butler write, "any attempt to define
the bases and limits of black participation in the military, even
under the guise of altruism, should be suspect on the reasonable
expectation (born of historical experience) that blacks would emerge
as losers."²

Many blacks point out that, while this country has for most
of its history relied on a voluntary armed force, the AVF represents
the first time in American history the military has operated without
racial quotas or exclusionary practices aimed at blacks.³ "Black
volunteers understand what joining the military means," states
Congressman Ronald V. Dellums of California. "If through the exer-
cise of free choice by individuals, there are more blacks in the ser-
vice than in the population, we should expect a proportionately
greater sacrifice. The whole idea of a volunteer army is that the
individual will take this risk and this responsibility on by his or
her free choice." Just because the larger society is racist, Dellums
points out, there is no reason why the military must be racist too.⁴

"All this talk about a volunteer Army being poor and black
is not an indication of 'concern' for the black and the poor," Rep-
resentative Shirley Chisolm remarked in testimony before the House

¹Alvin J. Schexnider and John S. Butler, "Race and the All-
Volunteer System: A Reply to Janowitz and Moskos," Armed Forces and
Society 2 (Spring 1976): 421.

²Ibid.

³See, for example, ibid., p. 422.

⁴Ronald V. Dellums, "Don't Slam Door to Military," Focus 3
Armed Services Committee, "but rather of the deep fear of the possibility of a black army. Individuals who are upset over black power rhetoric really shudder at the idea of a whole army of black men trained as professional soldiers." To this, Eddie N. Williams, President of the Joint Center for Political Studies, added: "But whether it is admitted publicly or not, we know that the controversy also stems from dark visions of military-trained blacks taking control of cities and by unsubstantiated notions about the degree of confidence our allies have in black troops."

"If the demand for change and equal opportunity has validity in the broader society, it has validity for the military also," Congressman Dellums observes. "The military reflects the stress and strain of the broader society, and in turn can play a role in either increasing or decreasing these strains." In fact, "affirmative action" is basically concerned with the redistribution of society's benefits, not society's costs; its fundamental objective is to compensate identified minorities and women for past discrimination. Viewed in the light of current "affirmative action" policy, the disproportionate number of minority enlistments should be judged a sign of "success." Indeed, the more minorities and disadvantaged youth

---


3Dellums, "Don't Slam Door," p. 6.
who can enjoy the opportunities of military service, the better.¹ Yet, this is not presently the outlook shared by many observers of civil-military affairs and manpower policy.

During the Vietnam war, many black leaders protested that the draft was skimming the "cream of the crop" out of the black community. When the AVF was first proposed, some critics of voluntary service similarly claimed the higher wages would draw off "natural leaders" from among blacks into the career military—thus improving a few individual positions, but retarding overall social progress for the black community. Current enlistment statistics would appear to support this so-called "top of the bottom" rationale: the general quality of black enlistees is markedly higher than pre-AVF days, and the proportion of blacks with high school diplomas is greater than the comparable proportion of whites in every Service.

For at least two reasons, however, black leaders no longer raise this issue. First, equal opportunity and affirmative action policies have operated to open many more doors for qualified blacks in higher education and industry since the 1960s. But even more important is the understanding that the military, in a society where prejudicial restrictions still exist, permits some individuals to reach the best position they can. The question to be then asked, writes Canby, is whether the long-run communal goal (an abstract, unsubstantiated notion) merits sacrificing the opportunities of some

¹Cooper makes a similar observation (Military Manpower, p. 221), i.e., that the rising proportion of blacks should be viewed as a positive sign since it means more blacks are qualifying.
individuals in the short run. And the answer ultimately depends on subjective value judgments and reality judgments of the leadership drain and the benefits of free choice.

While the armed forces strive to create for themselves an image of great opportunity, they are concurrently called a refuge for society's "losers" by proponents of "equal service." A return to the draft or some other form of compulsory service is often seen as the logical solution to equity problems. It could be said that if there was a truly "fair" system of compulsory military service, the labor supply for civilian jobs might change enough so more young blacks could obtain civilian employment. The supply and demand for young labor would then be redistributed, and civilian barriers to the employment of black teenagers would crumble. But this is analogous to saying that the problems you have been experiencing with your car will decrease if you don't drive it as often.

The equitable distribution of the "benefits" and "burdens" of military service (however weighed) will be achieved when the problems of injustice and inequality in society are resolved. When the opportunity to participate in all aspects of the community is accorded all people, it is said, the military will more than likely be representative: "In the interim, this should not just be another door slammed in the face of those blacks who seek this opportunity, for whatever reason." The "racial balance doctrine" seems to say that "since we have failed to open all doors of society at large to

---

1See Canby, Military Manpower (p. 27), for an example of the pre-AVF discussion concerning this issue.

2Dellums, "Don't Slam Door," p. 6.
the Negro, we should close the door of opportunity in the military sector also," Robert Tollison observed in 1968; but this concept is "at its roots discriminatory against the Negro."1 "Citizens who are concerned with racial imbalance," the Gates Commission thus concluded, "... must work to open opportunities for blacks in all occupations. Then, and only then, will the question of 'proportionate representation' be fair."2

In certain respects, the popular image of the armed forces as a place of opportunity for the disadvantaged eventually operates to destroy itself. As long as the armed forces are described as something apart from the "real world" and placed in the role of the welfare agency,3 persons who enter the armed forces will carry a social stigma. As long as society designates the armed forces an "employer of last resort," enlistees must be either unaware of this connotation or willing to accept the label of "loser." For some individuals, especially those who need a job and some income, labels are unimportant; they have lived with epithets of one kind or another.


for most of their lives, and the armed forces can bring only positive changes.

However, as Moskos observes, in order for the military to attract from a wider cross section of society, it must first be re-defined as a suitable endeavor for everyone. And, the re-socialization of poverty youth depends on public acceptance of the military as a legitimate activity for everyone, not just certain segments of the population. Moskos writes:

Whatever successes the military has as a remedial organization for deprived youth were largely due to the armed forces being legitimated on other than welfare grounds, e.g., national defense, citizen obligation, even manly honor. In other words, those very conditions peculiar to the armed forces which can serve to re-socialize poverty youth away from a dead-end existence depend directly upon the military not being defined as a welfare agency, a definition that is hard to escape unless enlisted membership is representative of a cross-section of youth. Present trends toward labeling the Army as a last recourse for disadvantaged youth are self-defeating for the youth involved precisely because they directly counter the premise that military participation is one of broadly based national service.¹

What has developed, then, is a kind of vicious circle. Social representation in the military can be both important and potentially damaging to less-advantaged youth. We do not want to "slam the door" on deprived youth and minorities who seek to find certain opportunities in the military. On the other hand, the military appears indelibly marked a haven for disadvantaged and unemployable youth; and as long as blacks enlist in disproportionate numbers, and class and racial distinctions are drawn concerning the legitimacy of military service, the full value of any opportunities can never be realized.

¹ Moskos, "Enlisted Ranks," p. 57.
As Moskos writes, the view that the armed forces ought to be an outlet for otherwise unemployed youth, "while seemingly persuasive in the short term, is deceptive on several grounds." First, he notes, the view fails to take into account the intra-Service distribution of jobs—that is, the preponderance of minority and other disadvantaged youth in low-skill jobs and other occupations (e.g., combat-related MOSs) which have limited transferability or commercial value in the civilian job market. In addition, if the disadvantaged enlistee fails to complete his enlistment (and attrition is high), he is no longer just a "loser," but a "two-time loser." Rather than regarding the military as part of the marketplace economy, Moskos concludes, it would be better to redistribute less advantaged soldiers into positions which require extended skill training (and longer-term commitments), and to draw middle-class youth into low-skill occupations where short enlistments are most practical.1

Clearly, the benefit vs. burden issue presents a policy dilemma which is not easily resolved. Almost ten years ago, Moskos challenged social scientists to locate a point of balance: "Is it not possible then to apply some sociological imagination to see how the positive aspects of military organization can be taken advantage of while reducing its inequitable features?"2 Yet, in the opinion of many social scientists and military manpower analysts, the AVF has only exacerbated the representation "problem." There is basic agreement that equity is an important issue, there should be an approximately "equal" distribution of "burdens" or costs, and benefits or

---

1 Ibid., pp. 55-56; see also Canby, Military Manpower, pp. 37-38.
opportunities should be equally available; but there are also distinctly different views concerning both the purposes and need for social "representation" in the armed forces. Because the issue is so susceptible to value judgments (and reality judgments), it has become the subject of one of the most heated debates since the AVF was first proposed.

Most careful observers agree that if some form of "representation" or "equality of service" is to be achieved, it must begin within the armed forces. "The real concern ought to be with equity," Schexnider and Butler write; "that is, effecting a more egalitarian system of noncombat skill training and job distribution throughout the entire spectrum of military occupational specialties. At a minimum this would eliminate the prospect of wartime casualties impacting disproportionately among any population group."¹ And this is precisely the approach the military services have taken to achieve an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens under a system of "equal opportunity."

Policy Directions: A Social Role for the Armed Forces?

It is truly ironic that, at a time when the AVF is criticized for being overly black and "poor,"² when enlistment statistics suggest the armed forces (especially the Army) are an "employer of last resort," there is a popular school of thought which urges the military to do more for the social welfare of the nation's disadvantaged youth.

¹Schexnider and Butler, "All-Volunteer System," p. 430.

For the past few years, it has been obvious to many students of military manpower that the social class composition of the AVF is slowly shifting; the growing proportion of apparently less socially-advantaged youth is signalled by race, socioeconomic, education, and other characteristic differences between the military and civilian society. At the same time, the Department of Defense has strongly denied any significant changes in either the composition of the military or the manner in which it is perceived by American youth. To the credit of Defense Department spokesmen, who vehemently hold that AVF standards are higher than ever before, is the recent wave of criticism concerning the AVF's failure to combat youth unemployment and its related problems.

Kenneth J. Coffey, for example, in a critique of military employment policy, calls the current armed forces "irresponsible" for "making every effort to exclude from enlistment those socially, educationally, and economically disadvantaged who are least likely to gain employment in the civilian sector and most likely to turn to delinquency or crime."\(^1\) Coffey's essay is virtually identical to an article by Daniel P. Moynihan which presaged Project 100,000 over a decade ago, and it parallels the liberal approach to military "benefits" which characterized the "War on Poverty."\(^2\)


\(^2\)See Moynihan, "Who Gets in the Army?" The basic argument is the same, and even the words are similar. For example, whereas Moynihan speaks of fighting the "war on poverty," Coffey speaks of using the armed forces to fight "the war on youth unemployment and
Coffey, like Moynihan and other planners of the Great Society, recognizes the benefits of military service—the opportunities for technical training, general education, social development, personal fulfillment, the general economic advantages, and, for some, a satisfactory personal experience which would lead to lower rates of deviant behavior and stable employment upon return to civilian life—and he condemns the armed forces for their "steadfast opposition" to enlisting the disadvantaged and less qualified. "The failure of the armed forces to enlist greater numbers of less privileged youth has not been due to an absence of applicants," Coffey maintains, "but to these [acceptance standards, particularly intelligence test requirements] discriminatory policies." In a recent study of 300 lower income, inner-city areas, he points out, it was found that over 43 percent of the persons examined for entry into the armed forces were rejected—66 percent of whom were black. And because of "cost effectiveness" considerations, efficiency problems, and the unstated desire to control black enlistments, the armed forces have "based their decisions regarding the use of less-privileged youth solely on self-interest and without any serious regard for the overall problems of society."

The military is "an excellent vehicle for upgrading the education, training, employability, earning power and social adaptability of a large number of the nation's youth," observes Coffey. The armed


1Coffey, "Employment Policy," pp. 122-123.
forces, as the nation's largest employer of youth, "must adopt a new personnel philosophy which includes responsibility for employment and education of many of the Nation's less privileged youth":

Thus, a reasonable balance must be struck between the national security requirements for fully trained Service personnel, the necessity for the armed forces to devote some of their resources to up-grading the skills and attitudes of less privileged youth, and the ever-present limitation on funds. Yet, the armed forces are an integral part of the American society and must be involved in all efforts to resolve major community problems, and reasonable leaders, both in the Pentagon and elsewhere, must accept that the armed forces have to assume a much greater social responsibility.1

Although the "social responsibilities" of the armed forces are not a principal concern among military manpower policy planners these days, it is obvious from the previous discussion of "benefits" and "burdens" that the armed forces do play a central role in the social welfare of the nation's less-fortunate youth. As Janowitz observes, the armed forces have long been thought of as offering a "second chance"—a fresh opportunity for education and personal development—to youngsters from lower-class backgrounds who did not have access to appropriate schools, and even to middle-class youths who had access but failed. Since its revolutionary origins, writes Janowitz, the U.S. military forces have provided these "second chances"; and the number of opportunities has increased along with the size of the armed forces since the end of World War II.2

1 Ibid., p. 128.

Today, the military is a "vast training institution." The armed forces comprise the largest vocational training institution in the United States; and, according to the Education Commission of the States, as many as one-third of all male high school graduates can expect to receive their introduction to post-secondary education through the military. The military is also a major user of unskilled labor. It is a place where prior social and personal backgrounds, ascriptive traits, and achieved disabilities are traditionally deemphasized or even denied.

During the debate over termination of "G.I. Bill" educational benefits in 1975-1976, the unofficial Defense Department position was to discourage congressional consideration of any post-service educational assistance alternative which might propel the military into the "social welfare business." Yet, the military, especially the current volunteer military, cannot set itself apart from the society it serves or the needs of those it seeks to enlist. The volunteer armed forces survive today, not because they offer an

---


3From personal observations and experiences and internal memoranda. See Mark J. Eitelberg, "Writing Off the G.I. Bill: The Quiet Death of an American Institution," February 1979. (Processed.)
outlet for patriotic duty or nationalistic fervor, but primarily because they offer attractive opportunities. Individuals are joining out of self-interest, not self-sacrifice; this is the reality of voluntary enlistment during times of peace.

The armed forces have a motivational appeal of opportunities and advantages not otherwise available in civilian society. These appeals, Roger Little notes, are most effective among those who are as yet unskilled, unattached, and unplaced in the social structure. At the same time, the military is a public institution (or, some say, public employment) which offers certain benefits to its members. It is only natural that, in a society which claims to promote equality, equal access to benefits and equal distribution of benefits to all citizens, regardless of prior social advantage, will be important issues.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the "social responsibility" argument put forth by the new wave of welfare advocates will gather political momentum. Of greater interest to Congress now are methods to reverse the declining quality and lack of representation in the armed forces. Actions to place appreciably more disadvantaged youth in the military would be opposed from both ends of the political spectrum. The Department of Defense and the Department of Labor are now cooperating on a Job Corps project which promises to place more disadvantaged youth in military jobs. However, in view of current recruiting shortfalls, the political climate, and unfortunate experiences

with similar programs, these initiatives can be expected to remain at their token levels.

In the final analysis, Coffey is correct when he calls for a "reasonable balance" of certain social and military manpower objectives. "Balance" is apparently the key to measuring benefits and burdens, as it is in solving questions over military manpower policy. The most discussed alternative to the current AVF, national service, is advanced in congressional circles because it presumably serves both the nation and the individuals who participate. In fact, national service may offer better prospects for a more "racially responsible" military. But national service involves a return to compulsory service or some combination of voluntary and involuntary recruitment. Some say, then, that national service is a way of exploiting young people in place of taxing all people.

The search for a "reasonable balance" to guide military manpower policy, even though it offers a means for reconciling differences between sometimes conflicting objectives, is ultimately an exercise in subjective reasoning. After all, how does one strike a "balance" between realistic military needs or requirements and social welfare objectives? Can one, or should one, attempt to balance and trade between separate categories of demands on the nation and the body politic? How much defense manpower "effectiveness" should be sacrificed, if at all, for domestic social improvement, and vice-versa? Indeed, what is "reasonable"?

1See King, America's Goals, pp. 85-91.

2See, for example, Nicholas Von Hoffman, "Army Recruitment: Promises, Promises," Washington Post, 21 December 1978, p. C-2; see
Before we attempt to deal with these questions, we must first explore the remaining issues of military representation. In the following chapters, political legitimacy and military effectiveness questions are evaluated with the purpose of illuminating relationships between these issues and the composition of the armed forces. In the final chapter a possible "process" for setting policy directions and achieving some type of equilibrium or policy trade-off is examined.

**Representation, Quotas, and Affirmative Action:**

**Implications for Military Manpower Recruitment Policy**

No discussion of "representation" and social equity or policy to achieve "statistical parity" is complete without some mention of the legal, moral, and political ramifications involved in the use of quotas. Recent and future Supreme Court rulings should define more clearly the legal bounds of any representational policy—whether it is called "affirmative action," as it is today in certain applications, or "discrimination." This section attempts to put "quotas" in historical perspective, briefly examine "affirmative action" and its legal and political status, and discuss the pragmatic and ethical implications of representational policy in the military.

**Quotas, Past and Present**

Charles Abrahms writes in "The Quota System" that the term "quota" had no unsavory connotation in its earliest use and simply meant a proportional part or a share, such as a quota of funds or

troops to be contributed by towns to a central government as their fair allotment. The term was also used in economic planning programs to control exports and imports in the national interest. However, in 1921 and in 1924, when new restrictive American immigration laws were passed, the term "quota" acquired an entirely new meaning. Congress authorized a "quota" system under which certain alien groups were designated a specific number of eligible immigrants. In practice, this system operated to deliberately discriminate against Eastern Europeans and Orientals, more as a ban than a so-called quota.  

The restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s "cleverly invoked a word which in other contexts had a respectable meaning for its unrespectable purpose," states Abrahms.  

The quota laws and the "national-origins" formulas they used as measuring rods provided the bureaucracy with enough ambiguities to effectively close the door (with all appearances of group "fairness") on unwanted, "inferior" newcomers.  

The quota laws were subsequently attacked by liberals as discriminatory. And the word "quota" soon took on negative connotations, associated with exclusionary practices based on race, color, creed, and national origin.

---


2 Ibid., p. viii.

The "quota system" worked its way into the American educational system when Jewish students were banned from schools (first at the professional level, but throughout the higher-education system) without regard to grades or the usual qualifications. Under these protective quotas—the notorious "numerus clausus"—the schools accepted a token number of Jewish students and thereby avoided the charge that they were banning Jews altogether; and the practice of limitation and exclusion of certain ethnic groups to schools and colleges continued under the guise of maintaining social equity. The open use of the quota system as an exclusionary practice in education collapsed along with the triumph of equal opportunity, but the odium which the system inherited still survives. The word itself has since become synonymous with "discrimination."

The framers of "affirmative action" policy in this country were aware of the connotations given certain words. Prior to the early 1970s, affirmative action meant to seek-out and prepare members

1Abrahms, "Quota System," p. x. See also Francis J. Brown, ed., Discrimination in College Admissions (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Education, 1950). Actually, as Paul Seabury notes in "HEW and the Universities" (in Reverse Discrimination, ed. Barry R. Gross [Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1977], p. 103), prestigious Yale Law School abandoned its Jewish quota for incoming students only in the 1950s. In the Soviet Union today there is an anti-Jewish campaign in education which, in the past seven years, has cut the number of Jews in Soviet colleges and universities by over 40 percent. The campaign is supposed to correct the "bad political atmosphere" created by the "concentration" of Jews in universities and other cultural institutions. The official actions by the state call for "correction of the irregular ethnic composition" found in higher education. And, parallel to the "quota systems" of an earlier period in this country, there are calls for enrollment figures limited to the percentage of each nationality represented within the total Soviet population. See "Jews and Quotas," Saturday Review, 4 March 1978, p. 8.
of minority groups for better jobs and educational opportunities.\(^1\)

After passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, it became apparent that the processes of discrimination were much more subtle and complex than originally envisioned. Seemingly neutral personnel hiring and promotion practices, on-going processes of "institutional discrimination," were seen to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. In December 1971, a revised set of guidelines was issued by the Secretary of Labor stating that affirmative action was "results oriented"; government contractors were required to establish "goals" for hiring minorities and women in each job classification and "time-tables" specifying the date when employment goals could be realized.\(^2\)

Thus, affirmative action came to mean the setting of statistical requirements based on race, color, sex, and national origin for employers and educational institutions.

However, "affirmative action" managed to avoid temporarily the ideological logomachy which would have resulted if the concept was simply described as a quota system (which, in fact, it is). Affirmative action is a positive program; it "affirms," or declares positively that benevolent quotas are good and benign racial preference assures social equality. Instead of referring to "fixed ratios" and "numerical quotas," affirmative action employs terms such as "time-tables," "goals," "proportional percentage hiring," and "corrected imbalances."

\(^1\)John F. Kennedy was the first President to call for "affirmative steps" in Executive Order 10925, issued in 1961. The Order merely instructed contractors on federal projects to actively recruit minorities and encourage their promotion.

The careful choice of descriptive and associative words should not obscure the fact that "affirmative action" (an active, positive term), "representation" (a passive, positive or neutral term dressed in logical, scientific trappings), and "quotas" (an active, negative term) are all related as the offspring of a simple mathematical conceptualization. Benign or unbenign, each of these terms suggests that the population can be separated according to specific groups, and each prescribes some perfect balance of group quantities. The purposes, methods, and applications may be different; however, the common, fundamental principle is that the general population can and should be somehow separately classified.

The "Sensory" Theory of Numerical Policy

Conservative columnist George Will writes: "Whether called 'affirmative action' or (as in the 1976 Democratic platform) 'compensatory opportunity,' reverse discrimination, and the quest for statistical parity for 'underrepresented' groups involve what Prof. Ben L. Martin calls the 'sensory' theory of representation: 'only personal qualities crude enough to be obvious to sense perception, such as skin color, language, or sex, are acceptable bases of representation'." ¹ In fact, Sidney Hook maintains, "goals" are no more than another name for quotas; and by their constant reference to racial distinctions, goals or quotas established by numerical

¹George F. Will, "Reverse Discrimination," Newsweek, 10 July 1978, p. 84.
policies for proportional representation actually promote racism, not equality.¹

An interesting aspect of numerical policy (e.g., affirmative action) is its "sensory" character; classifications used to separate the national population are determined on the basis of certain observable, distinctive group qualities. This is especially true for race and sex; and, in a sense, numerical policy which draws attention to these differences (i.e., "segregates" statistics) encourages rather than obviates public consciousness of innate group characteristics. After all, aren't current numerical policies but a movement from old-fashioned racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism to well-intentioned racialism, sexualism, and ethnicalism? Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun has stated that "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently."² The destructiveness of numerical policy, others claim, lies in the fact that it sacrifices individual primacy in favor of the group concept—in effect reinforcing racial prejudice, and dignifying common group distinctions and stereotypes in our society.


²Justice Harry A. Blackmun in Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke (Supreme Court No. 76-811, 28 June 1978), quoted in Newsweek, 10 July 1978, p. 23.
The paradox of numerical policy designed to overcome discrimination, then, is that it uses the tools of discrimination. Sensory judgments of skin color and facial features are the commonly-employed means of identification and division of the population; as it was used in Nazi regimes to distinguish Aryan ancestry, and in Southern U.S. schools and businesses to perpetuate segregation, physical appearance is used today to monitor the education and employment status of minorities. For example, federal agencies regularly compile and update secret racial/ethnic check-lists on employees in order to determine how many minorities they have. At one time, the government tried to have all employees designate their own race or ethnic background. But thousands of State Department workers, in fun or in anger, listed themselves as American Indians and Eskimos. So the government now uses supervisory identification, known in government parlance as "eyeballing." The section supervisor is the sole judge as to the race and ethnic background of each member of his or her staff.

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has also adopted a standard set of racial/ethnic categories for use by federal

1Language, speech, dress, mannerisms, and the various expressions of cultural pattern and/or socioeconomic status are also common means of identification for purposes of discrimination.

2These lists are used in several ways. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (formerly the U.S. Civil Service Commission), for example, uses these data to implement the so-called "Sugarman Plan." This plan permits agencies to hire persons outside normal civil service merit channels if they come from racial or ethnic groups that are "underrepresented" in certain occupations in government.

contractors in preparing federally-required Equal Employment Opportunity reports. These reports are used to enforce equal opportunity and affirmative action requirements. The Office explains that "the following racial/ethnic designations do not denote scientific definitions of anthropological origins. An employee may be included in the group to which he or she appears to belong, identifies with, or is regarded in the community as belonging." The unusual, "non-scientific" nature of the task of identification is perhaps best captured in the Federal Contract Office's confusing definition of "Hispanic":

Hispanic: A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish culture of origin, regardless of race. Only those persons from Central and South American countries who are of Spanish origin, descent, or culture should be included in this category. Persons from Brazil, Guyana, Surinam, or Trinidad, for example, would be classified according to their race and would not necessarily be included in the Hispanic category. In addition, the category does not include persons from Portugal, who should be classified according to race.

However, even if anthropological origins are examined, one encounters difficulty in delineating groups. Roger Brown, for instance, observes that, since there are no absolutely distinctive gene pools and no pure races, race is actually a relative concept.

Blacks in America, Brown continues, do not constitute a very isolated


or uniform mating group and are remote from being a pure race. Indeed, after three centuries of inter-group marriage in this country, 75 percent of American blacks have at least one white forebear and some 15 percent have a predominately white ancestry.\(^1\) (On the other hand, it has been estimated that "tens of millions" of white Americans today have at least one black ancestor.\(^2\)) Yet, in the popular mind, complicated genetic facts are simplified; according to the popular old Southern definition, any known black ancestry ("one drop of Negro blood"), however outweighed by white ancestry, makes one a "black."

The Present Controversy Over Affirmative Action

Affirmative action programs are supposed to compensate minorities and women for alleged past discrimination in employment practices and college admissions. The theory is that "affirmative" actions—that is, special or preferential treatment—in behalf of groups which have experienced discrimination will make restitution for past injustices while acting to correct or prevent racial and sexual bias. The thorn in affirmative action policy is that those who are not covered under the government's definition of eligible groups—principally white males—must atone for the actions of their ancestors through "discrimination in reverse."\(^3\)

---


\(^3\)See, for example, Barry R. Gross, Discrimination in Reverse:
The statistical basis for redress makes one great error, writes outspoken critic Nathan Glazer in *Affirmative Discrimination*: all "whites" are consigned to the same category, deserving of no special attention. But that is not the way all "whites" see themselves, and almost all have some specific ethnic or religious identification which (at least to the individual involved) may mean a distinctive history of past (and even present) discrimination. Indeed, Glazer further notes, "statistical representation in employment, education, and residence insist that it is possible to divide the racial and ethnic groups with precision and assign them...to a class for which strict statistical parity must be required." Yet, in fact, individuals do have choices in the way they describe themselves, and people will choose different identities in different settings. Ethnic or racial identities are thus singular, unidimensional alternatives to occupational, regional, religious, neighborhood, and many other (even sexual preference) identities.

Glazer goes on to point out that American society has developed as a nation of minorities, each of which is accepted as a social entity but none of which has been accorded legal status or recognition. In numerical policies such as affirmative action he sees a threat to the relative stability of the balance of minorities—

---


2Ibid., p. 203 (emphasis added).

3Ibid., p. 176.
not necessarily because some minorities are favored over others, but because favoritism and the designation of preferred groups are given legal status which no group has ever had before.¹

Actually, affirmative action as a policy of preferential treatment is not without precedent. Veterans' preferences in civil service employment, which, incidentally, are almost exclusively male preferences, are at least as old as the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944. In addition, aid-to-the-handicapped programs, some programs for Native Americans, and the progressive income tax all prescribe differential treatment as a social policy.

Aside from "reverse discrimination," perhaps the most hotly argued aspect of affirmative action—and that which applies to all types of representation or numerical policy—is the distinction made between ethnic qualities and individual qualities. George Will, for example, calls the current quest for statistical parity "the bureaucratic drive to transform the core concept of American justice from 'equal opportunity for individuals' to 'statistical parity for government-approved groups'."²

The case for primacy of the individual is frequently linked with the concept of "equal opportunity." "Equal opportunity" (i.e., treating everyone alike) is often perceived in context with particular


²Will, "Reverse Discrimination," p. 84.
minority groups, women, and the struggle for civil rights. Yet, 
"equal opportunity" is really an individual concept, and it is at 
odd with action directed toward proportional representation. The 
argument in support of individual opportunity (over group opportunity) 
is based on the principle that all persons should be judged solely 
on the basis of their personal qualifications. Rights attach to the 
individual, critics of numerical policy contend, not to the group; 
and public policy must be exercised without distinction of any partic-
ular group classification. Equal opportunity represents the broadest 
possible consensus in a multiethnic and yet highly integrated society, 
adds Glazer—and this consensus would be broken if requirements for 
statistical representation were to become a part of American law and 
public policy.¹

In attaching stereotypical labels to individuals (i.e., in 
groups), proponents of equal opportunity say numerical policies fail 
to take full account of such personal qualities as character, person-
ality, motivation, self-discipline, or any other trait. And when 
population percentages are attached to employment distributions, 
there is a disregard not only for these individual traits and pref-
erences, but also for a wide range of other variables: for example, 
an individual's background, wealth, parents' employment, schooling, 
intelligence, drive, goals, ambitions, interests, skills, and even 
"luck." In addition, vocational distributions of the population 
strongly depend on ethnic traditions,² shifting social values,


²Seymour B. Sarason of Yale University offers an insightful, 
largely anecdotal commentary on the influences of ethnic tradition
social and economic stimuli or opportunities, the political environment, regional situations, and so forth. The point is, argues Sidney Hook, proportional representation of various groups throughout society is a "sociological absurdity." It is completely unreasonable to assume that ratios in employment or anywhere else will necessarily reflect the general population.¹

Black economist Thomas Sowell writes in Commentary that "[t]oday's grand fallacy about race and ethnicity is that the statistical 'representation' of a group—in jobs, schools, etc.—shows and measures discrimination."² Affirmative Action operates on the premise that numbers (or proportions) provide a very clear and simple answer to the problem of locating discrimination. For example, as Nordlie observes in Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial Discrimination in the Army, "if no factors were operating to produce selectivity on the basis of skin color, then one would expect the racial composition of the Army to approximate the racial composition of the country."³ Or, similarly, if the population of a given community is 10 percent Hispanic, and the staff of a local business


enterprise is only 3 percent Hispanic, the employer is discriminating because the staff fails to "represent community ethnic patterns."

The use of such proportions to locate and treat discrimination has obvious advantages: they are concrete, simple, easy to measure, and easy to apply. The definition of a minority discriminated against is ipso facto its underrepresentation in certain jobs. (Ironically, the exact opposite—the overrepresentation of minorities—is considered prima facie evidence of discrimination or inequity in military recruitment.) It is true that groups are not usually represented in the work force by their percentage in the population-at-large, the argument continues, but certain minorities are led to certain jobs because they have been systematically excluded from "the good" places.

Of course, groups are not necessarily discriminated against simply by their apparent absence or underrepresentation in particular fields. The criterion of discrimination depends upon how groups are divided and what fields of employment are considered "logical" job alternatives.\(^1\) Statistics can show that a certain group is participating at a certain level in a certain job—but that is where the "certainty" ends. Without careful consideration of alternative, underlying explanations (demography, cultural tradition, and so forth) and the structure of intergroup relations (for example, patterns of dominance and subservience) the "reasons" for group behavior are unknown. There should be no automatic presumption of cause and effect between group representation and prejudice in the job market.

\(^1\)See Barry R. Gross, "Is Turn About Fair Play?", in Gross, ed., Reverse Discrimination, pp. 380-381.
And it is because there are so many exceptions and alternative explanations for vocational distributions that critics of affirmative action discredit its fundamental methods.¹

Perhaps the least-often expressed concern over affirmative action and other numerical policies aimed at redressing social injustice is the manner in which these policies label "disadvantaged" groups as wards of the state. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, in the majority opinion of the controversial Bakke case, remarked how "preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection."² Sowell likewise comments, "the message that comes through loud and clear [from the various numerical approaches] is that minorities are losers who will never have anything unless someone gives it to them. The destructiveness of this message—on society in general and minority youth in particular—outweighs any social gains that may occur here and there. . . . By and large, the numerical approach has achieved nothing, and has achieved it at great cost."³

The ironic potentials of the numerical approach can be found in the experiences of India, where the idea that social justice can be achieved through quotas and preferences has been pushed almost to the extremes of absurdity. Paul Seabury, in "HEW and the Universities"

¹Sowell, for example, attributes divergences in vocational distributions to basic ethnic differences in age distributions, education contrasts, and "other crucial variables" (see "Are Quotas Good for blacks?", p. 39; and "Myths About Minorities").


³Sowell, "Are Quotas Good for Blacks?", p. 43.
recounts the history of caste privilege in India and how preferential treatment eventually worked to sabotage individual rights and the principle of equality. Special privileges were first granted to communities and castes in India when it was under British rule. These privileges were given or withheld both to rectify inequities (as in the case of the Muslims) and to punish disloyalty or to reward support. The practice began in the legislatures, where reserved seats were set aside for "privileged" groups, but the principle of privileged representation soon spread to other sectors of public life.

In the early 1930s, the leader of the Untouchables demanded that the British establish preferential electoral quotas for this caste as well. Gandhi objected (without success) on the grounds that preferences would only heighten identity of the Untouchables rather than integrate them into society. When India finally gained independence, the Indian government abolished preferential treatment for all groups except tribal peoples and scheduled castes (i.e., the Untouchables), who were given preferences in government recruitment, access to schools, in government fellowships, and so on. However, the so-called "backward classes" proliferated to the extent that it was necessary to be labeled "backward" in order to become "privileged." The point of absurdity was eventually reached in 1964, when a "Backwardness Commission" was established, and it recommended that all but two groups (the Brahmins and the Lingayats) be officially designated as "backward."

1The case history of India's experiences with preferential quotas is taken largely from Seabury, "HEW and the Universities," pp. 104-105.
The Prospects of Representational Policy

The "Bakke case" (Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke) was one of the most discussed, most anxiously awaited lawsuits of the past few decades. The Supreme Court addressed itself for the first time to defining the limits of affirmative action and its complement, reverse discrimination. By a vote of 5 to 4, the Supreme Court held that "quotas" (i.e., setting aside a precise number of places for minorities in a university class) are unacceptable as a form of reverse discrimination. At the same time, the Court found (also by a fragile vote of 5 to 4) that race may be considered as one factor in a university's admission policy. Thus, in what has been called a narrow decision and a "Solomonic compromise," the Court approved the principle of affirmative action designed to improve the education of minorities and women.

Although the Bakke decision clarifies the use of racial classifications in university admissions, most legal authorities agree that it leaves considerable doubt in other areas.¹ Part of the doubt was cleared up by the Supreme Court's ruling in another, less-heralded but potentially more significant affirmative action case, Weber et al. v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. and United Steelworkers of America. The question before the Court in Weber was whether

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "left employers and unions in the private sector free to take such race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories."

In a narrow 5-to-2 decision, the Court upheld in Weber the principle of affirmative action, and it sanctioned the voluntary use of quota programs by private employers to correct "conspicuous" racial imbalances in a work force (even if the employer itself has no history of past bias). However, the Court refused to elaborate on the difference between "permissible" and "impermissible" affirmative action plans used by employers. Questions of what constitutes "conspicuous" or "manifest racial imbalances," whether government employers can impose quotas, or whether other groups (including women, Hispanics, and white ethnic minorities) qualify for preferential treatment were also left open. And, because the Court has so far managed to avoid the Constitution (in keeping with the established practice of deciding cases, whenever possible, on the basis of a statute), there are still unanswered questions on the constitutionality of affirmative action or quotas in general.


2 Interestingly, Justice Powell, in the majority ruling on Bakke, found "diversity"—that is, the goal of attaining "a diverse student body"—a matter of academic freedom and a compelling and constitutionally protected end; see "What the Justices Said," Newsweek, 10 July 1978, p. 22. In fact, as Bennett and Eastland ("Reverse Discrimination", p. 31) observe, Powell's specific mention of Italian-
The prospect of a representational policy in the armed forces raises several important issues. Various alternative directions can be taken to "control" the number of racial/ethnic minorities or other groups who enlist in the armed forces. One approach is to return to compulsory service (that is, compulsory service which is equitable and, to the greatest extent, "random" in its selection methods).

Within the current volunteer format there are two alternative forms of representational policy. Policy can set specific representational "goals," in the form of explicit or implicit guidelines and/or regulations—with the purpose of either controlling or limiting the groups who enlist. Or, policy can seek to maintain a "free-flow" of enlistees, while incorporating a combination of management actions to affect the supply and demand variables in the recruiting market.

Policy designed to limit the number of enlistments from any one group would take the form of proportional recruitment quotas. Policy directed at controlling the enlistments from a particular group is more subtle, and could be implemented through several devices—including the standards, testing, advertising, and recruitment process.

Because blacks are disproportionately represented in the Army, the logic of the pure quota system would be that efforts should still be made to elevate the status of blacks in the Army, but that the recruitment of blacks should be discouraged. However, affirmative action is based on the premise that underrepresentation is a symptom of discrimination, and overrepresentation is evidence of favoritism.

American in this context of "diversity" may open up the door for a new and wider range of ethnic minorities under affirmative action.
It should then follow that getting more whites into the military is the "affirmative" action, while discouraging black enlistments amounts to reverse discrimination. Yet, according to the "burdens" perspective of military representation, the disproportionate number of blacks in the Army is due to institutional racial discrimination: because military service is intrinsically undesirable, the real "benefit" is to stay out, to be underrepresented in the armed forces. In this sense, then, any policy to discourage or limit the number of blacks entering the military would constitute a kind of "negative-affirmative action" or "double-reverse discrimination."

Even though such an exclusionary policy would have "good" intentions, it still is nothing more than a *numerus clausus*. In fact, "good" intentions, at least from the standpoint of the policymakers, are behind all exclusionary quota systems. Who is to say the burdens of military service outweigh the benefits? How can it be said that excluding qualified minorities from voluntary enlistment is "for their own good?" Justice Powell also stated in the Bakke case majority opinion: "Preferring members of one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids."

A policy of control is similar in intent to a policy of limitation. The only difference is that control takes the form of implicit, rather than explicit, policy. Instead of directly limiting the number of black enlistments, a policy of control would seek to "rearrange" the system of manpower procurement and retention so that there is less

---

chance occurrence in military representation. Increasing quality acceptance standards (i.e., education and aptitude requirements), for example, would probably act to reduce minority enlistments and the enlistment of individuals in the lower socioeconomic strata. The problem with this approach, however, would be a resulting reduction in the number of volunteers, since the supply of available volunteers is contracting, not expanding. The recruiting system also contains numerous veiled devices to control enlistments. The more obvious areas include (1) the placement, nature, and content of advertising and publicity; (2) high school counseling and testing; and (3) the methods employed by individual recruiters in their selection and placement of new recruits.

It is interesting to note that the Army has been accused of exercising racially motivated and discriminatory policies to "control the flow of black enlistments, even though control is not the 'stated objective'." The Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) also chronicles the "Callaway shift"—when, during FY 1975, the Army redistributed its recruiting force from black to white areas (and changed its advertising campaign) with the stated objective of achieving "better geographical representation among recruits." The move did reduce the number of black enlistments, even though the redistribution was neither efficient nor cost-effective in meeting manpower requirements.

The Navy was likewise accused in 1975 of implementing "policies which directly limit the enlistment of blacks." For example,


recruiters under the Navy's quota system were allowed to sign up only one Mental Category IV (the lowest acceptable level) volunteer for every 10 whose tests indicated they could do well in technical school. Although the 10 to 1 ratio applied to whites and blacks alike, the system was actually loaded against Category IV blacks—since there were proportionately fewer blacks in higher mental categories recruited by the Navy. And during the same year the Marine Corps was challenged for giving recruiters secret racial quotas, while Service entrance and placement tests were denounced as racially biased.\(^1\)

Again in 1979, the Navy was accused of practicing "blatant" and "illegal" racial discrimination in its entrance standards for volunteers. Several congressmen along with the American Civil Liberties Union based their accusations this time on the Navy's requirement that at least 75 percent of the males in any racial category who are accepted into the Service must either have a high school diploma or achieve a certain score on the aptitude tests. (For example, 75 blacks would have to achieve acceptably high scores on the aptitude test before 25 blacks with low scores could be accepted; and so on for other races.) However, for a variety of reasons blacks and other minorities generally score lower on the aptitude tests. "Blacks and other minorities are being skillfully steered away from the military," Congressman Dellums therefore charged. This is "very definitely a quota system," Congressman Don Edwards of California added, that "discriminates against minorities" and is "unconstitutional" and "illegal."\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid.

These enlistment control devices, though less brazen than formal quotas, are no less problematic. The "Callaway shift," for example, was severely criticized as prejudicial against blacks because it denied them "equal access" to joining the military. Testing devices and the use of inappropriate aptitude requirements are, in fact, old-fashioned tools of discrimination—proven means for restricting and/or controlling participation by particular groups. Actually, policies of recruitment designed to control enlistments by minorities and the poor are merely subtle forms of bias, and the same "institutional discrimination" which led to the development of the affirmative action concept. Indeed, by their very nature, disguised methods of enlistment control are even more nefarious than formal quotas.

In point of fact, no rigid representational policy could ensure a cost-effective or efficient system of recruitment for the military. The recruiting market today is not overflowing with eligible applicants. Out of necessity, the armed forces concentrate on obtaining quantities of qualified enlistees, not quantities of representative applicants. Any system to control or limit military representation could therefore be expected to require additional efforts, increased funding, and probable decreased efficiencies in recruiting operations.

1 Literacy tests designed to restrict voting rights and the literacy tests used to limit American immigration (introduced in 1917) are some obvious examples. There are numerous other examples of "unfair" tests for admission to American institutions; and the movement to remove "cultural biases" from some of these testing devices is a reaction to this understanding.

2 Actually, "institutional racial discrimination" would apply to any system which either "pushed" minorities (or any other group) into the military or kept them out. Both systems have operated in the past, and, depending upon one's viewpoint concerning the burdens/benefits ratio, the idea may take on a different meaning.
It is within the "marketplace" perspective that the free-flow policy operates. Essentially, it does not seek to recruit or assign personnel with regard to any representational factors. Rather, it allows the supply and demand variables of the market to operate without direct control. The assumption here is that military service competes in the entire labor marketplace as a job—not as an activity greatly different from the many other alternative activities available to young people.

According to the market strategy, the chances of obtaining a representative configuration of military enlistees are enhanced when the demand for enlistees is reduced and the supply of potential enlistees (applicants) is increased—thereby allowing the armed forces to select qualified applicants from a wider pool of young people. The theory is that the current pool of high enlistment propensity young people is small and overrepresentative of certain groups; and the demand for manpower is high enough so that only a small amount of selection criteria can be applied. If the armed forces adjusted their demand factors and were able to broaden their appeal in the marketplace, the belief is that enlistment patterns would change without the sacrifice of "equal opportunity."¹

Free-flow policy is obviously a "soft" approach to the problem. But it does benefit from not creating any great value conflicts. It

¹Several actions could affect the "market" of eligible recruits: for example, increased selection of female applicants, the enlistment of individuals with prior service, changes in recruiting/advertising practices, changes in acceptance standards (e.g., physical, mental, age), increased enlistment incentives (e.g., educational benefits, bonuses), shorter first-term enlistment, increased compensation, and so on.
also fits in well with the equity criterion—at least when the issue of "fair shares" of burdens (during peacetime) is deemphasized in favor of "fair shares" of opportunities. Free-flow policy does not raise questions of subtle discrimination (although it does allow for more institutional discrimination as opposed to institutionalized discrimination), nor does it encourage group consciousness. As a soft approach, however, it is also least likely to produce any rapid or significant changes in currently established patterns of representation.

The Defense Manpower Commission made the following recommendation concerning representational policy in its final report:

Equal opportunity should be positive in nature and application. A person's race, sex, ethnic background, or national origin should not cause either disadvantage or advantage. Neither should there be any policy, practice, or lack of policy which authorizes, permits or allows to arise any form of discrimination, whether institutional or otherwise. ¹

The Commission goes on to advise, "[a]s a matter of policy, the Services should recruit and assign personnel without regard to representational factors with the exception of women where unique considerations exist as will be discussed later in this report." ²

Of course, equity issues are not the only criteria in considering military representation policy. The so-called free-flow policy emphasizes the employment marketplace and the "job" characteristics of military service. Yet, according to the political legitimacy argument, the armed forces should not be primarily perceived or described

¹U.S. Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower, p. 172; also Coffey and Reeg, "Representational Policy," the staff study upon which the Commission's recommendations are largely based.

as an "occupation." Military service, some say, is an exercise in citizenship—a "calling"—and treating military service as an alternative to civilian employment threatens the basic foundations of our society. And, moreover, what about the "unique considerations" of women? Why should women be exempted from the population of Americans which "representation" seeks to reflect; why should half of the general citizenry receive special, exclusionary treatment? These are some of the issues which must now be explored.
CHAPTER VI

MILITARY REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The basic theme of debate about the proper form of an American army, from the earliest days of American military history to present-day discussions of all-volunteer recruitment, is whether the army should be primarily filled with highly-competent, career-oriented "regulars" or citizen-soldiers who serve brief periods of military service as a duty or obligation of citizenship. Advocates of both views agree in theory that the army should both harmonize with American democratic society and offer an effective national defense. While proponents of voluntary service draw analogies between conscription and totalitarian coercions, however, advocates of compulsory service appeal to a principle of legitimate authority: universal citizenship implies the responsibility of universal military service. Indeed, an army of citizens is an adjunct and an assurance of democracy, claim those on the side of conscription; a "professional army" is a likely source of military despotism, lacking true citizen involvement and adequate means for democratic control.

The Jeffersonian-Jacksonian citizen-soldiery argument in this country states that effective civilian control over the military requires the active participation of citizens in the nation's defense. The point that civilian control of the military (and thus subordination of the military to general national purposes) can be effectively accomplished by the establishment of a thoroughgoing citizen army has been used throughout American history to argue for universal military service. Only if the army is a citizen's institution, rather than the preserve of career-oriented "regulars" who are isolated from national life, proponents of universal service claim, can the military establishment be considered a truly legitimate extension of the citizenry.\footnote{Especially vocal partisans of the citizen-soldier concept in this country have included, in addition to Jefferson and Jackson, John A. Logan, John M. Schofield, Leonard Wood, John M. Palmer, George C. Marshall, among others. Many were particularly fond of quoting Demosthenes famous call to the Athenians: "Cease to hire your armies. Go Yourselves every man of you, and stand in the ranks; and either a victory beyond all victories awaits you, or, falling, you shall fall greatly and worthy of your past." See Weigley, American Army, pp. 217, 238-239.}

An army, whether conscripted or voluntary, which does not include everyone cannot be called "universal." One way to justify non-universality is to say that the military so closely resembles the whole nation, that its true nature is virtually the same as that of the entire populace. John Stuart Mill viewed "representative government" as a next-best substitute for direct democracy (but a substitute which also needed to be justified). The "representative military" has similarly come to be seen as a next-best substitute, a practical alternative, for universal military service and universal citizen obligation.
Under the Selective Service System, representation through "randomized selection" usually was taken for granted—even though, as previously observed, deferments and acceptance standards made selection anything but random. During the AVF debates, the legitimacy of a voluntary force—bereft of an otherwise automatic system for ensuring participation by a broad cross section of young men—became a major ethical/philosophical issue. AVF proponents claimed the new military could attract a diversity of youth and re-present the variety of social backgrounds, attitudes, and values of the whole society. Yet, many concerned citizens, such as Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina, renewed the great debate of amateur versus professional by reapplying the classic argument of legitimacy:

An all-volunteer army would do serious injury to our national character because it would restrict service to those who make a career of the Army. One of the intangible things that makes citizenship understandable is that a multitude of Americans serve a short time in our military forces and then return to civilian life. This dual role places military and civilian responsibilities in a balanced perspective in our national life.1

The "Legitimacy" of the Military Under the AVF

Morris Janowitz, one of the most vocal proponents of military representation, remarked in testimony before the Defense Manpower Commission (1975) that "a representative military is the basis of civilian control and the legitimacy of the military."2 Basically, what Janowitz

---


2 Morris Janowitz, in testimony before the U.S. Defense Manpower Commission, 17 July 1975; cited in Kenneth J. Coffey, et al., "The Impact of Socio-Economic Composition in the All-Volunteer Force" in
and other military sociologists are saying is that, in a democratic society, civilian control over the military establishment is most effective when the military is an integral part of the whole social fabric—that is, a civil-military relationship which provides for informal networks carrying civilian sensibilities into the armed forces. One indicator of the extent to which the military is a part of the social fabric is assumed to be its composition (i.e., representativeness). So, it follows, a military force which resembles civilian society will be an extension of that society, tied by a common character and purpose-in-being; and, conversely, distinctive differences in composition will eventually attenuate traditional linkages of civilian control over the military.

At the heart of the legitimacy concern is the concept of "citizen-soldier" and the democratic notion of full-citizen participation in the military affairs of the community. The duties of citizenship, according to this view, require some form of military participation. Disposal of the right to defend the nation by the citizenry is perceived as an abandonment of liberty. Further, the shift to voluntary enlistment, some advocates of conscription observe, "maligns the character" of the American citizen by saying to him: "Give anything but yourself." I

---

1 See Morris Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer Military as a 'Socio-political' Problem," Social Problems 22 (February 1975): 432-449.

At the same time, those who are no longer responsible for serving their country by taking arms adopt a new and dangerous definition of "patriotism." Inevitably, widespread public apathy and acquiescence concerning the military affairs of the nation are seen to result in a relatively autonomous, monolithic, military-industrial establishment.

The major case for widespread citizen participation in the armed forces, then, is that it ensures an identity of interests between the military infrastructure and the body-politic. Janowitz observes in "The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Armed Force" that demographic characteristics of military membership play an important role in the "internal viability" of the armed forces and in civil-military relations.¹ The processes of voluntary recruitment/retention, proponents of legitimacy maintain, operate in the long-term to isolate the military from the mainstream of civilian life. For example, as Janowitz points out, an all-volunteer format can almost assuredly be expected to recruit those who are unrepresentatively positive toward the armed forces. The process of self-selection or self-recruitment (i.e., the fact that individuals who are more zealous and more pro-military are likely to pursue military careers) and negative retention (i.e., the continuous process by which those who do not "fit in" are not promoted or "select" themselves out of the military, usually after one term) will act to promote the homogeneity of military membership. And, professional socialization will further strengthen the uniformity of opinions and values held by military entrants.²


²Morris Janowitz, "All-Volunteer Military," pp. 440-444, discusses these processes in connection with the social recruitment of
Economic status is a major determinant in enlistment decisions under the voluntary format. The wellborn and the privileged, the rich and the educated—with higher-paying, more attractive career alternatives elsewhere—are less likely to enlist in the volunteer military. Those who are predisposed toward the ideals of pacifism will obviously not participate. But the lack of community representation in the armed forces among college students and individuals from the middle and upper-middle class strata of society is often considered most obstructive to civilian control objectives. The broad base of anti-war sentiment is frequently seen to arise in the middle classes. The absence of young men and women from middle-class families in the armed forces is viewed by some observers as potentially dangerous, since it effectively acts to remove the military establishment from public scrutiny.¹ By lifting the irritant or inhibition of drafting and training young men who may question the justification for entrance into war—and thereby removing the concurrent awareness and concern of middle-class parents and relatives (often referred to as the "lightning rod") officers. But Janowicz notes (p. 445) that "the cultural dimensions which motivate young men to enter the officer corps also operate for enlisted personnel. . . ." Abrahamsson uses a similar four-process description of homogenization in the professional (Swedish) military (see Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power [Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972]). In fact, the literature on homogenization reflects a general emphasis on the professional military rather than the military as a whole. And as Bachman, Blair and Segal observe, the emphasis in literature has been on the processes of "self-selection" and "anticipatory socialization"—while socialization effects have been difficult to demonstrate; see Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977), pp. 72-77, 75, 141-142.

¹See, for example, the comments of Senator San J. Ervin, Jr., in "The Question," p. 145.
of conscription)—critics of the AVF have contended that it will become easier for the military to engage in adventurism.

Of course, the corollary to the underrepresentation of individuals who might otherwise be considered "reluctant" participants is the overrepresentation of those with a decidedly militaristic bent. During the AVF debates, there were many commentators and observers of civil-military affairs who claimed that the volunteer system would attract "mercenaries," or those who took unusual satisfaction in being "professional" (as opposed to patriotic "volunteers") combatants.  

"There are men who love to kill," stated Congressman Paul McCloskey before the House Armed Services Committee, "but it seems to me the nation is far safer when its army is made up of reluctant citizen-soldiers than by men who take pride in being professional killers."  

In fact, the Marshall Commission had earlier termed a volunteer military

1Roger W. Little, in "Procurement of Manpower: An Institutional Analysis" (in Selective Service and American Society, ed. Roger W. Little [New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1969]), also observes that a broad distribution of individuals in the military membership "fosters the involvement of a corresponding range of segments of the larger society in the activities of the military organization. To the extent that the military member maintains an active affiliation with his family and civilian community, family members may be more attentive to military issues because they have a personal stake in military operations" (pp. 3-4).

2The opposite side to this issue was recently expressed by Nicholas Von Hoffman in a newspaper commentary. He writes: "Perhaps it's because we keep talking about a 'volunteer' army, thereby giving ourselves the impression that those who enlist do so not for reasons of self but for patriotism. Why should we think the next person would want to sacrifice money, career, and comfort for four years in the infantry, bored past brain rot, . . . can only be explained as fatuous selfishness . . . We would serve ourselves better if we stopped calling it the Volunteer Army and started calling it the Paid Army." See Nicholas Von Hoffman, "Army Recruitment: Promises, Promises," Washington Post, 21 December 1978, p. C-2.

3Cited in Congressional Quarterly, The Power of the Pentagon.
"a mercenary force unrepresentative of the nation." And, the Clark Commission likewise predicted that voluntarism would place "a monetary value on the lives of citizens, creating the concept of defense of the nation by mercenaries, and abandon the unifying influence of the nation placing its faith in its own citizens to rally to its defense." 

Although the mercenary issue is less discussed today, it was a major topic during the AVF debates--so much so that the Gates Commission final report devoted considerable space to the notion that an AVF threatens "civilian authority, our freedom, and our democratic institutions." Even Milton Friedman, an early and ardent supporter of the volunteer concept, agreed that "[h]owever we recruit enlisted men, it is essential that we adopt practices which will guard against the political danger of creating a military corps with loyalties of its own and out of contact with the broader body politic." There was significant public apprehension at the time that the Army could be primarily composed of "a band of professional killers," with little in common with the rest of society--an Army of "hired guns" which spent


its time "meditating on blood"—soldiers who had little stake in civilian society, working at war-making as civilians work at their jobs.

The statement of Harry Marmion, representing the American Veterans Committee before the House Armed Services Committee, was typical of this attitude during the AVF debates:

There is the danger that an isolated military establishment will be a potential political force in American life that must not be underestimated. Instead of the present picture of a mammoth military-industrial complex dominating our society, we can expect an even greater establishment which will have little stake in civilian society, and will seek a larger budget and more wars to perpetuate itself.¹

As the military turns its sights inward, proponents of legitimacy claimed, it will necessarily gravitate toward its industrial counterpart in civilian society, seeking bigger and more elaborate budgets. Eventually, the military establishment in this scenario emerges with its own professional concerns, ideology, powerful pressure groups, and brand of politics.² The "suicidalness of militarism"³ consequently takes the nation headlong down the road to endless military adventures. In the most extreme case suggested by AVF critics, the voluntary band of "hired guns," possessing a "coup mentality" and no great patriotism or loyalty, could even be manipulated in a conspiracy to overthrow the government. These "professional killers,"

¹Cited in Congressional Quarterly, Power of the Pentagon, p. 50; see also Harry A. Marmion, The Case Against a Volunteer Army (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971).

²Blair Clark, "The Question is What Kind of Military?," Harper's, September 1969, pp. 80-83.

isolated from civilian interests and values, thus become progressively less concerned about the ethics of their own use, either by the state itself or by some revolutionary faction.

The more subtle and realistic danger, as Janowitz and other sociologists observe, is not the potential for a coup d'etat, but the increased likelihood that the military will continue to operate as a powerful pressure group with a distinctive and relatively unified outlook and ideology. Janowitz writes: "A military establishment with selective linkages to civilian society, with a strong element of social unrepresentativeness, and with a presumed 'ideological caste,' is likely to be the source of political conflict and dissensus with segments of civilian society." And it is this movement toward socio-political divergence which creates, not the specter of overt military control of national policy, adds Moskos, but the more subtle danger of a segmented military establishment which allows for greater international irresponsibility by its civilian leaders.

Of course, not all writers on the topics of military manpower and legitimacy agree that civil-military convergence in all respects is necessarily advantageous. Partisans of "professional" soldiery--from Washington to present day--have consistently asserted the need to draw some line between a highly-trained military and civilian influences. The extreme view is presented in the work of Emory Upton,

---


2 Ibid.

the so-called "prophet of professionalism," and his disciples. Upton, for example, maintained that the underlying cause of the defects in the American military system was excessive civilian control, especially civilian control over strictly military matters.¹

A compromise of convergence/divergence arguments (in more recent literature) can be found in America's Army in Crisis, by William L. Hauser. Essentially, Hauser sees the need for an Army which is separated into two units: a supporting Army, closely aligned with the civilian sector, and a professional fighting force. This bilateral organization, according to Hauser, would be an integral part of civilian society which, at the same time, emphasizes its unique differences from civilian society.²

It has also been observed that the vitality of a military force depends on the delicate balance between a special sense of inner-group loyalty and participation in the larger society.³ And, as Canby writes in Military Manpower Procurement, isolation of the military from civilian society may not be unconditionally undesirable. For example, an isolated military poses a threat to the government only in alliance with some civilian group, and a degree of separation can lead to productive self-analysis by the military.⁴ Huntington similarly notes in The Soldier

¹See Weigley, American Army, pp. 110-112, 119-121.
³Bruce Blivin, Jr., "All-Volunteer I," The New Yorker, 24 November 1975, p. 156.
and The State that during the period of isolation after the Civil War, the American military achieved professional standing, becoming more militarily competent and adopting a code of ethics which prohibited military intervention in politics.¹

"The assertion that a high turn-over, socially representative military is less dangerous to democratic institutions than a volunteer force is not empirically supportable," concludes Canby.² The "realistic threat," Canby asserts, does not come from any particular mode of recruitment or isolation from civilian interests and values, but from the politicization of the officer corps.³ This is basically the same argument Friedman put forth at the University of Chicago conference on the draft in 1966: "There is little question that large Armed Forces plus the industrial complex required to support them constitute an ever-present threat to political freedom. . . . The valid fear has been converted into an invalid argument against voluntary armed forces. . . . The fallacy in this argument is that the danger comes primarily from the officers, who are now and always have been a professional corps of volunteers. . . ." "We should follow personnel policies," Friedman suggests, "that will continue to make at least a period of military service attractive to young men from many walks of life."⁴


²Canby, Military Manpower, p. 43. ³Ibid., p. 46.

One writer in *Playboy* provides a personal assessment of representation in the volunteer Army:

Certain generalizations can be made. The new Army's Willie and Joe tend to come from Louisiana instead of the south Bronx. They are somewhat younger, on the average. And yet, adding to your poor Black from Shreveport, they remain your standard Battle Cry collection of the dispossessed, the curious, the naughty, the gung ho, the indigent, the unemployable, the romantic, the shiftless. Really the only members not now present for duty are the Northeastern liberal—say, the English major from NYU—and his bemused friend from Greenwich or Grosse Point who "did not want the responsibility of a commission," who read Nietzsche at lunch and who said sentences to his sergeant that began with the words "But surely..."\(^1\)

Notwithstanding humorous stereotypes, the above evaluation of all-volunteer representation is essentially correct. Certain individuals may be expected to be absent from the enlisted ranks, while a measure of diversity will always be present. Though the ideal of a perfectly representative military is not fully dismissed, many observers today accept the fact that there are certain limitations on the extent to which the military can be truly representative of the whole society. And, under the volunteer format, most public officials are content as long as the military does not become highly unrepresentative.

Measures of Political Legitimacy

The representation of several specific social and demographic characteristics are considered important for the achievement of civil-military convergence and "political legitimacy." By far the most frequently cited measure of political legitimacy is geographical representation. The assumption here is that there are notable differences in

---

\(^1\) Josiah Bunting, "Can The Volunteer Army Fight? (Don't Count On It)," *Playboy*, November 1975, p. 614.
the values and attitudes of the American people based on geographic location—particularly between the North and South, and urban and rural areas of the country. Proponents of geographical representation, for example, point out it is in the hinterlands of the South and Southwest that the military has traditionally received greatest acceptance. Presumably, this regional bias results from: (1) a high concentration of military bases in the area; (2) the fact that military men stationed at these installations make social contacts in the same regions, evidence a high propensity to marry women from the surrounding areas, and frequently choose to retire nearby; and (3) the generally higher degree of military orientation.\(^1\)

In a similar frame, the disproportionately high representation of the children of career-military fathers is seen to affect the overall balance of otherwise civilian and militaristic attitudes within the armed forces. The assumption, once again, is that the offspring of "military families" are inclined to follow traditional occupational patterns with generally greater participation in the armed forces; and, due to social isolation of the family, these military entrants are more likely to exhibit a pro-military attitudinal homogeneity.\(^2\)

---


Although socioeconomic status is treated principally as an indicator of equity, it is also recognized as a measure of political legitimacy. As long as social class determines who shall serve and who shall not serve, it is argued, basic questions of freedom, equal protection, and civic responsibility arise. Indeed, equity issues, in theory, fit under the larger category of political legitimacy—at least to the extent that the government and its laws promise equal treatment for all citizens.

In the early days of the AVF it was suggested that the disproportionate representation of individuals from the lower socioeconomic strata might create a climate for mutiny. For example, the under-skilled and the under-trained, socially deprived or disaffected youth, and others who felt inadequate to compete in the civilian economy might additionally feel alienated and isolated from the community they are supposed to defend.¹

Today, there is probably less concern over potential mutiny and greater interest in eliminating the injustices of a military recruitment system which "feeds off" the misfortunes of the lower classes. This may be partly due to the fact that there is no history of mutiny in the armed forces; but there is a long history of unjust and inequitable recruitment policy. The basic democratic premise of equal treatment underlies many arguments for changes in the present system of military manpower procurement, as evidenced by the remarks of Moskos before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

To ask what kind of society excuses its privileged from serving in the ranks of its military is not to argue that the makeup of the enlisted ranks be perfectly calibrated to the social

¹See Marmion, Volunteer Army.
composition of the larger society. But if participation of persons coming from less advantaged backgrounds in leadership positions is used as a measure of democratic character, it is even more important that participation of more advantaged groups in the rank and file also be a measure of representational democracy.¹

"Attracting a representative, including college-bound, cross-section of American youth to serve in the military," states Moskos, "would help reinvigorate the ideal of military participation as a citizen's duty."² What Moskos and others see is a pervasive shift in the social class bases of the lower enlisted ranks—a shift which labels the Army as a "last recourse" for disadvantaged youth, rather than broadly-based national service.³ Although the distinctive quality of the enlisted ranks in modern times has been a mixing of the social classes, it appears that participation under the AVF is concentrated among individuals from lower-class backgrounds; the "leveling of the classes" aspect of military service is thus removed as the AVF continues to be underrepresentative of middle-class youth.⁴

As evidence of "non-universal" participation and class-defined enlistment patterns, proponents of representational "legitimacy" often call attention to race and education differences between military


²Ibid., p. 10.


⁴Ibid., p. 57; see also pp. 52-60.
and civilian groups. Race is more often treated as an equity measure, but it does provide some indication of the socioeconomic status or class composition of the armed forces. In recent years, considerable attention has centered on the educational aspects of military membership and the importance of educational attainment among new enlistees. A demonstrated interest in attending college by a representative proportion of new military entrants is thus viewed as a kind of "legitimacy barometer." College-bound youth are particularly symbolic of both the ideal citizen-soldier, committed to the civilian community, and the more-privileged, less-recruitable middle-class. And, as Bachman, Blair, and Segal observe, the enlistment of college-bound youth is vital to maintaining the broader balance in both ability and ideology among military recruits.

Several commentators and students of civil-military matters, in fact, have suggested that educational benefits be used particularly to attract short-term, college-bound youth for the combat arms. Johnston and Bachman first urged the use of a generous, educationally-oriented enlistment incentive program in Youth in Transition. Janowitz and Moskos similarly recommended in a 1974 policy paper

1See, for example, Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," Armed Forces and Society 1 (Fall 1974): 109-122.

2Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, pp. 144-148. This is in contrast to a finding in a 1974 study by Opinion Research Corporation (Opinion Research Corporation, Attitudes and Motivations Toward Enlistment in the U.S. Army, [Princeton, N.J.: Opinion Research Corporation, 1974], p. viii): "While college students do not express strong opposition any longer to the military as an institution, enlistment still does not appeal to them. Non-college men remain the Army's major market."

3See Johnston and Bachman, Youth in Transition, pp. 197-198, 227-229.
that the armed forces should recognize their role as a "vast training institution" and encourage single-term enlistments from youth with educational plans beyond high school: "Whatever the details of such a civilian educational program, a major outcome would be the reintroduction of white middle-class males into the ground combat forces."¹

"Even though minority groups appear prepared to accept the occupational advantages of military service," Janowitz and Moskos further state, "... the broader issue remains the legitimacy of the military for the majority and more advantaged groups."²

More recently, benefit programs aimed at attracting college-bound youth have been recommended by Eitelberg, et al.³ Moskos,⁴


²Janowitz and Moskos, "Racial Composition," p. 122.


⁴Moskos, "Recruiting," p. 8; and Moskos, "Enlisted Ranks," pp. 63-64.
Bachman and Blair, 1 Blair, 2 Segal and Bachman, 3 and others. 4 For example, Bachman, Blair, and Segal strongly urge that "the educational benefits in return for military service be retained and enhanced." 5 The authors continue: "It is fortunate indeed that educational incentives can potentially deal with these problems of race and class while at the same time helping to ensure, voluntarily, a mix of in-and-outers plus career personnel which is closer to a citizen force, not to an ideologically isolated career force." 6

Geography (e.g., region, state, type of community), family background (e.g., father's occupation), socioeconomic status (e.g., family income, education, minority status, etc.) are considered indicators, then, of the extent to which the military is a part of the whole "social fabric." The surface-level "universality" of military service is likewise estimated from these measures. But from the


5 Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, p. 148.

6 Ibid., p. 148.
standpoint of civilian control over the military, it is clear these demographic measures are only indicators of civil-military convergence.

The underlying assumption here is that certain types of people act in certain (predictable) ways. A better, and more reliable indicator of "legitimacy" is probably the attitudes and attitude changes of civilians and military entrants. Bachman, Blair, and Segal, for example, write:

Most of the debate on the representativeness of the armed forces has focused on the social background characteristics of military personnel. . . . We do not deny either the overrepresentation of blacks in the all-volunteer force or the importance of these problems; however, our own view is that the paramount issue in American civil-military relations in the all-volunteer era is the ideological rather than the demographic representativeness of the armed forces.1

The following discussion focuses on several demographic measures used to track the convergence of civilian and military structures. Attitudes and attitude changes, the subjects of increasing interest in representational studies and related literature, are treated separately. Finally, the issue of female representation—an often neglected or disregarded aspect of political legitimacy—is evaluated.

Geographical Distributions

Geographical distribution is expressed in several ways. Table 28, for example, shows the regional distribution of new enlisted entrants by service of accession. The "regions" are those used by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Each region is also subdivided into its

1Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, p. 17.
### TABLE 28

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION AND POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1977) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Region &amp; District</th>
<th>SERVICE OF ACCESSION (CY 1977)</th>
<th>U.S. Population (ages 17-21)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast</strong></td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New England</strong></td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Atlantic</strong></td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Central</strong></td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E North Central</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W North Central</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Atlantic</strong></td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E South Central</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W South Central</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mountain</strong></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pacific</strong></td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown</strong></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Includes American Samoa, Guam, Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands.
component census districts. The comparison of regional distributions for enlisted entrants and the U.S. population (ages 17-21) shows a remarkable similarity between various groups. In almost all cases, the proportion of new enlistees (all Services combined) from districts and regions never differs from the comparable proportion of the U.S. population found in these areas by more than a single percentage point. The lone exception is the over-representation of enlistees (all Services) from the South Atlantic district, where the proportion of enlistees is 1.3 percent higher than the civilian standard.

The separate Services, for the most part, also appear geographically "representative" of the civilian population. As expected, the Army draws its greatest share of enlistees from the Southern region of the nation—especially the South Atlantic district. In fact, it is the Army's share of enlistees from this district which acts to raise the proportion of total enlistees above the civilian standard. Although the proportion of Army enlistees from the South is 4.4 percent greater than "expected," however, the relative degree of divergence in other areas of the country is reasonably small. Actually, the most unrepresentative recruitment appears to occur for the Marine Corps, not the Army, in the South—where the proportion of Marine Corps enlistees is close to 6 percent less than the comparable proportion of civilians.

Table 29 presents a more detailed look at the geographical distribution of new enlistees in the Army and total Defense Department. For some reason, the totals by region for enlisted entrants presented here and in Table 28 are slightly different. Nevertheless, it can be seen that Army recruitment in the South Atlantic district
### TABLE 29
HOME STATES OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND POPULATION OF THE U.S. (1977)
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>Ages 17-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. North Central</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. North Central</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginias</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States Arranged by Census Districts</td>
<td>N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</td>
<td>POPULATION OF THE U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>Ages 17-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Includes American Somoa, Guam, Panama Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands.
(with the possible exception of Delaware and West Virginia) is uniformly overrepresentative across states. Interestingly, Army enlistees during FY 1977 were overrepresentative (in varying degrees) of 20 states in the country; of these states, 11 are located in the South and 4 are located in the West.

It should be pointed out that, as the geographical distribution is subdivided among its component parts, certain civilian-military differences appear less obvious. With the aid of statistical analysis designed to show relative divergence, however, a more meaningful comparison can be made. For example, using a simple index\textsuperscript{1} it is found that the proportion of Army enlistees coming from the South Atlantic district is between 20 and 30 percent higher than the "expected" proportion. On a statewide basis, the proportion of enlistees from North Carolina (home of Fort Bragg) is 36 percent greater than the comparable proportion of civilians; Georgia (home of Forts Benning and Gordon among others) and South Carolina (home of Fort Jackson) are each close to 30 percent greater than "expected"; and the District of Columbia is the most relatively overrepresentative jurisdiction (though actual proportions are very small) at a figure 66 percent greater than the "representative" proportion of available youth.

The Department of Defense often presents geographical distributions by states, ranked according to population, in its official reports on representation. Table 30 replicates this method of

\textsuperscript{1}Index = (Actual Percent + Expected Percent) \times 100 - 100 = Percentage Over or Underrepresented; where "actual percent" is equal to the percentage of Army (or other Service) entrants and "expected percent" is equal to the comparable percentage of civilians.
TABLE 30

HOME STATES OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Ranked by Population</th>
<th>PERCENT OF TOTAL</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ten Most Populous States</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CA, NY, TX, PA, OH, IL, MI, FL, NJ, MA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next Ten States</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IN, NC, GA, VA, WI, MO, TN, LA, MN, MD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next Ten States and Puerto Rico</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AL, WA, KY, SC, CT, IA, OK, MS, CO, KS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next Ten States</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AZ, OR, AR, WV, NB, UT, NM, ME, RI, ID)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten Least Populous States</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and D.C. and V.I. and Guam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MT, NH, SD, ND, DE, HI, NV, VT, WY, AK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

comparison. Table 30 shows that better than one-half of all enlistees come from the ten most populous states. In addition, the aggregate and cumulative proportions of enlistees found in these groups compare favorably with the proportions found in the U.S. population. Basically, Table 30 is just another way of grouping states (i.e., by size of population). Although this method of comparison is frequently used by the Defense Department to demonstrate geographical representativeness, it provides little information on the "legitimacy" of military entrants.

A far better method for evaluating geographical representation and population density is to compare civilians and military entrants by the type of community in which they live. Critics of the voluntary system have often claimed that the AVF tends to attract individuals with traditionalistic, conventional, conservative, and provincial attitudes—the politico-military perspectives and strong conservative or right-wing political ideologies which stress military objectives and isolate the armed forces from the "mainstream" of society. Assuming there is a correlation between political perspectives and community, the Department of Defense periodically strives to offer "proof" that the AVF draws proportionately from urban as well as rural areas of the country. Data on type of community is not readily available, however, so the Defense Department relies on statistics similar to those presented in Table 31.

Table 31 shows the distribution of new enlisted entrants and the general population who reside in urban areas. "Urban areas" are

1See, for example, Janowitz, "Social Demography," p. 90.
TABLE 31

PERCENT OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND U.S. POPULATION WHO RESIDE IN "URBAN AREAS" BY YEAR OF ENTRY (FY 1977) (Percent in "Urban Areas")*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Entry</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>U.S. Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1972</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1973</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1974</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1975</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1976</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1977</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Urban areas are defined as the 57 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). These 57 SMSAs have populations exceeding 600,000 (mostly urban) and together comprise approximately 50 percent of the total population.
defined here as the 57 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). Although Table 31 shows some underrepresentation of enlistees from urban areas in the early days of the AVF, the proportion of urban area enlistees has been obviously increasing each year. In fact, according to these data, urban area residents are enlisting at rates which are (or will soon be) proportionately higher than U.S. population levels.

The Defense Department uses these data in its official reports on representation, but there is conflicting evidence. Part of the problem may relate to definitions of community type, and the understanding that certain population aggregations (i.e., SMSAs) may not effectively describe internal population subgroups. It is interesting to note, for example, Moskos recently found (from stays with Army line units) that "many of our young enlisted white soldiers are coming from non-metropolitan areas." "I am even more impressed," he writes, "by what I do not often find in line units—urban and suburban white soldiers of middle-class origins."

The data presented in Table 32, though somewhat limited, suggest Moskos's observations are correct. However, it is not the under-representation of individuals from large cities which stands out in Table 32; it is the disproportionately low percentage of individuals from the suburbs and the comparatively high percentage of individuals from rural locales which are most evident. In fact, based on Table 32, more than half of all military entrants described themselves as having small-town or rural origins—a proportion which may be as much as 50 percent higher than the national norm.

### Table 32

**Type of Community Defined as 'Home Area' for Male Entrants (Non-Prior Service) and Population of the U.S. (1977)**

(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Community&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; Defined as Home</th>
<th>NPS Male Entrants (Total)</th>
<th>U.S. Population (Civilians Noninstitutional)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Total DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large City</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs (Medium City)</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small City or Town</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural/Farming</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> There are slight differences between military and civilian populations in the description of "communities." Consequently, comparison distributions should be considered approximate.

<sup>b</sup> Data are for "non-metropolitan" areas as defined by U.S. Bureau of the Census. These areas may be considered comparable to the combination of "small city" and "rural/farming" areas.
Interestingly, the results of Army personnel surveys between 1975 and 1977 (Table 33) show the same pattern. Among Army enlistees, there apparently has been some shifting of community origins, while the basic overrepresentation of rural individuals continues. Among Army officers, there is proportionately greater participation in small cities and suburbs. But if the Census data on the national population used here are approximately "comparable," the magnitude of divergence between the civilian standard and both Army enlistees and officers alike is still considerably larger than most advocates of "legitimacy" probably care to see.\(^1\)

Socioeconomic Status and Related Measures

Critics of the AVF contend that middle-class Americans are noticeably absent from the ranks of the nation's armed forces. It is remarkable that no previous or recent study of military representation by the Defense Department actually examines socioeconomic status (SES). Defense manpower analysts periodically study family income in home of record, using Zip code identifiers and income distributions from the 1970 U.S. Census (see Chapter IV); however, with the possible exception of certain Defense surveys (of questionable validity), no attempt has ever really been made to pinpoint and compare the socioeconomic distribution of civilians and new military entrants.

\(^1\)It should be noted there are slight differences in the description of communities used by the Defense Manpower Data Center and that used by the Bureau of the Census. Thus, comparison measures are considered only approximate.
### TABLE 33

TYPE OF COMMUNITY DESCRIBED AS "HOME AREA" BY ACTIVE DUTY ARMY PERSONNEL AND MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S. (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Community Described as &quot;home Area&quot;</th>
<th>ARMY ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL</th>
<th>MALE POPULATION OF U.S. (20 and Over)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large City (Pop. over 100,000)</td>
<td>23.1 23.4 18.9</td>
<td>21.5 24.0 22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs (Medium City) (Pop. 25,000-100,000)</td>
<td>29.6 29.6 30.4</td>
<td>26.6 25.1 27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small City or Town (Pop. 500-25,000)</td>
<td>33.2 32.7 34.2</td>
<td>33.4 33.7 28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural/Farming (Pop. under 500)</td>
<td>14.1 14.3 16.6</td>
<td>18.5 17.2 21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 100 100</td>
<td>100 100 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a 1975 evaluation of Army representation, the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Graduating Class of 1972 (NLS) was used to analyze patterns of military participation. Employing a composite SES index, Army entrants were found quite overrepresentative at the lower SES levels and underrepresentative at both the medium and high levels. As shown in Table 34, the comparative differences in SES representation at the lower levels are less noticeable among the longer-term enlistees; nevertheless, the Army did not draw a socioeconomic cross section of this graduating class in the early, transitionary days of the AVF. And, in the absence of data to show otherwise, some critics of the AVF maintain the middle-classes are more severely underrepresented today than ever before.

Race and educational attainment, it has been observed, are often treated within the context of socioeconomic status. Although the present study concentrates on the "social equity" implications of racial distributions, and education is evaluated as a "military effectiveness" issue, it should be noted that these two demographic characteristics frequently appear in discussions of political legitimacy—especially in reference to the perceived social-class bases of the AVF.

Father's Occupation

Concern for this representation measure relates to the presumed "militaristic" tendencies among the sons and daughters of career-military fathers. The Army Quarterly Sample Survey of Military Personnel contains a question on family ties to the military—

1The composite SES index is described in the Appendix.
TABLE 34

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) OF ARMY ENTRANTS AND MILITARY NON-ENTRANTS FROM THE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATING CLASS OF 1972 (AS OF OCTOBER 1974)\(^a\)  
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic Status(^b)</th>
<th>Army Entrants</th>
<th>Military Non-Entrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Span of Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Year or Less</td>
<td>More Than 1 Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^a\) Entrants and non-entrants as of October 1974, on the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS) Second Follow-Up Survey.

\(^b\) Socioeconomic status is a composite index of five components: father's occupation, parents' income, father's education, mother's education, and household items. The term "high," "medium," and "low" refer to upper, middle two, and lower quartiles, respectively, of the composite score frequency distribution.
specifically, whether a "family member" has had previous military service and in what branch(es) of the military. For the past five years, approximately 26 percent of all enlistees have consistently reported that no family member has had previous service; between 28 and 32 percent usually report that a family member has had Army experience, while about 20 to 23 percent report to have family ties with one of the other Services; and about 20 percent of all enlistees over the past five years claim to have family members with service in at least two branches, including the Army.¹

Army officers, by comparison, generally report less military participation than their enlisted counterparts—with approximately one out of three officers claiming no family ties to the military, and proportionately fewer with family member participation in the other Services. However, it is interesting to note that among both Army officers and enlisted personnel, family member participation in the military appears to increase as grade decreases. The only exception to this occurs in the enlisted force—where enlistees in higher grades generally report greater family ties to the Army.

The problem with the Army survey data is that there are currently no comparable data on the civilian population of non-entrants. Once again, the NLS provides some indication of early AVF representation based on father's occupation in the 1975 study of Army entrants. In the evaluation of Army representation, it was found that

about one out of every sixteen Army enlistees from the high school
class of 1972 had fathers in the military—while only one out of 40
non-entrants had fathers (at the time of the survey) in some branch
of the military. In addition, the fathers of Army enlistees were
remarkably more inclined to be in blue-collar occupations—another
possible indication of class differences between Army entrants and
non-entrants.\footnote{Mark J. Eitelberg, Evaluation of Army Representation, TR-77-A9
(Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences, August 1977), pp. 66-67, 189, 191. For comparison
data on sample of enlisted men in 1964, see Morris Janowitz, "Basic
Education and Youth Socialization in the Armed Forces," in Handbook of
Military Institutions, ed. Roger W. Little (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage
Publications, 1971), pp. 174-175. Janowitz observes here that most
enlistees were from the middle areas of socioeconomic status: the sons
of fathers in white-collar and professional groups were underrepresen-
tated, the sons of "service workers" and "laborers" were even more
underrepresented, while most enlistees were sons of "craftsmen" and
"operatives."

Even though there are some bits and pieces of information on
father's occupation, it is probably the least explored aspect of rep-
resentational "legitimacy." Indeed, it may be more appropriately a
measure of representational "equity" within the context of socio-
economic status.

Attitudes and Attitude Changes

Bachman, Blair, and Segal, in a major study of ideology in
the volunteer military, observe that the distinctiveness of the so-
termed "military mind" is generally accepted by critics as well as sup-
porters of the military.\footnote{Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, pp. 106-107; see also John D. Blair, "Civil-Military Belief Systems: A Comparison",} Abrahamsson, in Military Professionalization
and Political Power, attributes the distinctiveness of the military
mind to its "professional mind" characteristics—that is, a collective mentality which is more homogeneous and more positive in its own assessment of the military profession than is otherwise observed in the general population. ¹

The specific distinctiveness of the military belief system, Bachman, Blair, and Segal write, is based on the nature of the military and its functions. Military men are "professionals in violence"—a part of "an organizational system with the capacity to commit, and deal with the consequences of, large-scale, legitimate, collective violence."² The perspective of the military man is thus based on some initial willingness to perform the "military function," the legitimate management of violence. Despite the fact that a great deal of research has narrowly focused on military elites, the authors conclude, the argument for the distinctiveness of the belief system concerning the military found among military men is "persuasive."³


²Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, p. 106; see also Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York: W. S. Norton, 1937); Janowitz, Professional Soldier, Chapter 3 ("Professionals in Violence"), p. 3-17.

³Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, p. 197.
Janowitz and Huntington both suggested two decades ago that the professional military nucleus may be considerably more "conservative" than the population-at-large.¹ There has since been an expanding interest among scholars in the comparison of civil and military belief systems—an interest which has responded since 1970 to expressed apprehension over the social and political consequences of an ideologically isolated volunteer military. The work of Bachman, Blair, and Segal is especially noteworthy here for illuminating conceptions of ideological representativeness, the so-called "military mind," and the distinctive attitudinal breaks between those who intend to make the military a career (i.e., careerists) and those who do not (i.e., "in-and-outers" or, in effect, citizen-soldiers).

In an early study of the "military mind" and voluntary service, Bachman and Blair identified career-orientation among military entrants as the most important correlate with military homogeneity and divergence from civilian attitudes. One of the strongest and most consistent findings in this research was that career-military men were noticeably more zealous, more "pro-military," than either their civilian or non-career contemporaries; and, consequently, any significant increases in the proportion of career-oriented men make it correspondingly less likely that the values, perceptions, and preferences held by civilians will be represented in the military. "To put it another way," the authors write, "our findings suggest

¹Janowitz, Professional Soldier, especially pp. 233-256; Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 59-79.
that an enlarged proportion of career men will increase the danger of what has been called a 'separate military ethos.' "

In a follow-up analysis, Bachman, Blair, and Segal similarly found career men, both officers and enlisted personnel, consistently more "pro-military" than their civilian counterparts. Non-career men were somewhat more "pro-military" than civilians—for example, on issues of civil-military relations (i.e., military spending, military vs. civilian influence)—but non-careerists were, nevertheless, still quite similar to their civilian peers. The authors reaffirmed their previous findings: "We conclude that there is considerable evidence that the belief system of career military men, officers and enlistees, is distinctive from that found among comparable civilian groups. Career men were considerably more pro-military and also showed greater homogeneity or consensus in their beliefs." And, the danger of a "separate military ethos" or a distinctive "military mind" brought about by a military force predominantly comprised of careerists is still a true cause for concern: "To the extent that new recruits into an all-volunteer force consist more and more of the type of career-oriented personnel we have been studying here, it seems inevitable that the

---

1 Bachman and Blair, "'Citizen Force' or 'Career Force'?," p. 83; see also Bachman and Blair, Soldiers, Sailors, and Civilians.

2 Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, pp. 106-120; see especially, pp. 115-119.

3 Ibid., p. 118; see also Janowitz, Professional Soldier; Huntington, Soldier and the State.
military will become more separated from civilians, at least when it comes to views about the military and its mission."

Subsequent research likewise suggests the need for continued examination of civil-military attitudes and the ideological representation of the volunteer military. Blair, for example, has identified non-career oriented personnel as lacking the "job" (as opposed to "calling") orientation which characterizes the modern approach to the all-volunteer military—further indicating some similarity between non-career military men and the citizen-soldier of the draft era. On the other hand, Blair and Segal and Bachman also find a potential problem among the non-career types in their willingness to serve in the volunteer armed forces. And, at the same time, Segal et al. have found evidence to suggest that there is a comparatively low level of job satisfaction among soldiers of the 1970s—especially when compared to World War II soldiers—creating visions of an ideologically unrepresentative and pro-military force, disappointed in their jobs, disaffected from society, and disinclined to serve the community.

A less-studied aspect of ideological representation is the attitude changes which may or may not occur among military entrants.

1Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, p. 119.
3Blair, "Emerging Youth Attitudes"; Segal and Bachman, "Educational and Training Institution."
Christie found the process of military training and socialization increases conservatism and authoritarianism, but the bulk of evidence does not support this finding. Bachman, Blair, and Segal identified self-selection and, to a lesser degree, professionalization as responsible for the conservative predictions and homogeneity of career-military personnel. However, current evidence is far from conclusive on this point.

James A. Barber writes that both supporters and detractors of the military service see time spent in the armed forces as effecting changes in social attitudes: "The claims range from that of the Presidential Advisory Commission [on Universal Training, 1947] . . . that a period of time devoted to military service 'would present additional opportunities for inculcating spiritual and moral ideals in support of American democracy,' to fears that military indoctrination results in large numbers of violent men trained to be killers." There is little question that it is the expressed intention

---


2See Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force (pp. 17-19) for a discussion of research on the topic of conservatism and authoritarianism. Janowitz also notes in "Basic Education" (p. 197) that there are conflicting data on whether military service increases a soldier's authoritarian responses or "absolutist" military values. Compare, for example, Donald T. Campbell and Thelma H. McCormack, "Military Experience and Attitudes Toward Authority," American Journal of Sociology 53 (March 1957): 482-490; and Klaus Roghmann and Wolfgang Sodeur, "The Impact of Military Service on Authoritarian Attitudes: Evidence from West Germany," American Journal of Sociology 78 (September 1972): 418-433.

3Bachman, Blair, and Segal, All-Volunteer Force, p. 18; see also Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism.

4James A. Barber, Jr., "The Social Effects of Military Service," in The Military and American Society, ed. Stephen E. Ambrose and
of the military to inculcate certain values and to instill attitudes, responses, and loyalties (especially during initial training). Janowitz concludes, from fragmentary studies and related data on educational achievement and occupational mobility, there is some systematic evidence to support the notion that basic training and noncombat service (for limited periods) have positive effects on a portion of recruits—particularly in developing self-esteem, personal adjustment, and social maturity. And, conversely, there is also some evidence that certain negative effects (i.e., the authoritarian syndrome) do not result from limited periods of military service. Nonetheless, as Barber observes, the evidence of the past thirty years shows that "military service does not usually result in any very dramatic changes in social attitudes among those who serve." Most research on attitude changes over time has been conducted during periods of conscription—when there was strong contact between military and civilian domains, and when the pressures of military socialization were tempered by civilian community values. There has not been a sufficient passage of time for the long-range effects of service during the all-volunteer era to be evaluated in any great


3 Barber, "Social Effects," p. 163 (emphasis added).
Longitudinal survey instruments are needed to study these attitude changes, and most research in the area is still formative.

Measures of Attitudes

Attitudes are, of course, the most difficult of all measures of military "representation" to obtain and then to describe and compare. It is much easier to say that certain kinds or groups of people, because of exhibited tendencies of thought and behavior, will act in certain predictable ways; and, consequently, to draw partial conclusions regarding how many and/or what "mix" or proportion of these people should be present (in the armed forces) to achieve some desired result. And this is, in fact, the pervasive assumption of much representation theory.

It has been observed that a popular argument against the switch from a draft to voluntary recruitment concerns the degree of isolation or alienation of voluntary entrants. "True" volunteers, according to the argument, are cut from a different mold than is the rest of society. Added to the "true" military types are the disaffected and disgruntled members of the disadvantaged minorities and lower social classes—those "losers" and outcasts of the social system who are "shunted off" to the military, and compelled by "economic conscription" to serve in place of the more fortunate. So, what we have here are acknowledged "military types" and a bunch of "losers" who couldn't survive in the struggle of the fittest; volunteers who are removed from the run of society, and reluctant volunteers who may very well carry a grudge, have little stake in society, and are probably willing to sell-out to anyone promising a new social and political order.
This discussion of attitude measures attempts to briefly examine the "separation" argument by looking at a select group of individuals and some possible indicators of social conformity. Specifically, the questions are: Do military entrants exhibit tendencies of alienation and separation from the community; are they any less willing than non-entrants to "work through the system"? Do military entrants differ from non-entrants in respect to the values of work, community, environment, and quality of life; and, if so, what do these differences suggest?

The purpose here is not to draw general conclusions from the data, but to use the data for illustrative purposes—to present a few examples of attitude measures and build a backdrop for the discussion of analytical problems. The analyses themselves are therefore somewhat simple. The data present a "snapshot" of one group, the high school class of 1972, and its relation to the Army. The source of information is the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS). The NLS groups used in the analysis are (1) those individuals who never entered the armed forces (i.e., the vast majority of youth in the high school graduating class, and, for purposes of comparison, the civilian standard population), (2) those with one year or less of service in the Army and (3) those with more than one year (but not more than 2-1/2 years) of service in the Army at the time of the survey.¹

¹The classification of groups by approximate time-in-service was determined on the basis of responses to questions contained in the NLS. The period covered by the NLS is May 1972 (Base-Year Survey) through October 1974 (First Follow-Up in October, 1973, and Second Follow-Up in October 1974). It is important to note that the "More Than 1 Year" group served at least one year and one day—and as many
Four questions from the NLS Second Follow-Up were selected for this analysis. Measures of central tendency were calculated in order to evaluate areas of convergence/divergence. Measures of dispersion were also calculated to assess the level of homogeneity among civilian and military groups. The results of the weighted mean scores and standard deviations are presented in the corresponding tables.

"Quality of Life" Perceptions

A possible area of comparison between military and civilian populations is the perceived importance of certain "quality of life" variables. Do Army entrants (in the mercenary tradition), for example, place greater importance on monetary needs and less on "feeling safe from violence" or "living a life of moral integrity"?

Table 35 compares the responses of Army entrants and non-entrants from the high school class of 1972 to a question on personal interpretations of the "quality of life."

The central tendencies of all groups in Table 35 are close. The largest discrepancies between the civilian and Army populations occur in the overrepresentatively positive importance placed on "feeling free" and "having a chance for education" by the "1 Year or Less" and "More Than 1 Year" groups, respectively. The single highest percentage rating for all groups is on "loving and being loved." And, interestingly, in all cases except one ("having a chance for an education"), it is the "1 Year or Less" group of Army entrants which places the highest level of perceived importance on these "quality of life" factors.

As 2-1/2 years in the Army at the time of the Second Follow-Up Survey.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Life Factors</th>
<th>NON-ENTRANTS</th>
<th>ARMY ENTRANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Having enough money</strong></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Having Healthful Living Patterns</strong></td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection of Natural Resources</strong></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Having Leisure Time</strong></td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feeling Free</strong></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feeling Safe From Violence</strong></td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chance to Choose Work</strong></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caring and Being Loved</strong></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Having a Chance for Education</strong></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Living a Life of Moral Integrity</strong></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom to Read, Discuss Questions</strong></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS), Second Follow-Up Survey: "How well does each of the following statements express what "quality of life" means to you?" 1. Not very well; 2. Fairly well; 3. Very well; 4. Extremely well; 5. Exactly. (For purposes of conventional scoring [low to high] and uniformity, response numbers have been reversed from that of the original survey.)
Political Participation: Attributed Importance and Actual Activity

Another area of expressed interest is the extent to which Army entrants accept the "legitimate order," their involvement in political activities, and their willingness to "work through the system." Table 36 presents one possible measure of this aspect of political/social conformity—that is, the importance attributed to political activities such as "voting" or "petitioning," or "talking to government officials." Table 37, on the other hand, compares the actual participation and involvement of Army entrants and non-entrants in the political process: for example, talking about problems in the community with friends, family members, and community leaders, helping to "get out the vote," and supporting a candidate in his campaign.

For all categories of political activity listed in Table 36, the "More Than 1 Year" group of Army entrants shows the highest mean scores (i.e., attributed importance). Thus, for all but one area of politically-related participation presented in Table 37 (i.e., "talking about public problems with family members"), the "More Than 1 Year" group rates itself most active; and, in this particular instance, absence from family members may explain the slightly lower degree of actual activity. The "1 Year or Less" group follows a similar pattern in placing importance on political activity. In all but one activity in Table 36 ("voting when you are pretty sure your party won't win"), the "1 Year or Less" group attributes greater importance to political participation than its civilian counterpart.

Generally, mean scores are relatively close between all groups in both the attributed importance of political activity and the
### Table 36

**Importance Attributed to Political Activities as Expressed by Army Entrants and Non-Entrants in the High School Class of 1972:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Activities</th>
<th>NON-ENTRANTS</th>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY ENTRANTS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote in local elections</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write or talk to government officials</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote when you are pretty sure your party won't win</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend city council meetings</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign petitions to change local, state, national situations</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work to register new voters</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become an active member of a political party</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS), Second Follow-Up Survey: "Generally speaking, how worthwhile are the following activities?" 1. Not worthwhile; 2. Somewhat worthwhile; 3. Very worthwhile. (For purposes of conventional scoring [low to high] and uniformity, response numbers have been reversed from that of the original survey.)
TABLE 37
FREQUENCY OF ACTUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY ARMY ENTRANTS AND NON-ENTRANTS IN THE HIGH SCHOOL CLASS OF 1972: MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Participation*</th>
<th>NON-ENTRANTS</th>
<th>ARMY ENTRANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Yr or Less</td>
<td>More Than 1 Yr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When you talk with your friends do you ever talk about public problems—that is, what's happening in the country or in your community?</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you ever talk about public problems with any of the following people?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your family</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People where you work</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders, such as club or church leaders</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you ever talk about public problems with elected government officials or people in politics, such as Democratic or Republican leaders?</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever talked to people to try to get them to vote for or against any candidate?</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever given any money or bought tickets to help someone who was trying to win an election?</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 37
FREQUENCY OF ACTUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY ARMY ENTRANTS AND NON-ENTRANTS IN THE HIGH SCHOOL CLASS OF 1972: MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (Percent)

(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Participation*</th>
<th>NON-ENTRANTS</th>
<th>ARMY ENTRANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviation</td>
<td>1 Yr or Less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever gone to any political meetings, rallies, barbecues, fish fries, or things like that in connection with an election?</td>
<td>1.31 .55</td>
<td>1.30 .51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever done any work to help a candidate in his campaign?</td>
<td>1.27 .53</td>
<td>1.24 .52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever held an office in a political party or been elected to a government job?</td>
<td>1.03 .31</td>
<td>1.02 .14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS), Second Follow-Up Survey: "The following questions ask about your political participation." 1. Never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Frequently. (For purposes of conventional scoring [low to high] and uniformity, response numbers have been reversed from that of the original survey.)
political activity itself. The greatest differences between military and civilian groups occur in the overrepresentatively high level of importance given political activity by the "More Than 1 Year" group; and the two groups of Army entrants generally appear more like each other in this respect than the civilian standard. All groups rate "voting" as the most worthwhile activity (Table 36). And, all groups—especially Army entrants—claim to have participated relatively often in discussions with friends, fellow-workers, and family members (Table 37). Standard deviations among groups are similar, but, in almost all cases, they show greater dispersion in the responses by Army entrants.

Attitude Indices: Orientation Toward Environmental Values and Political Activeness

An attitude index of orientation toward environmental values was calculated in order to further examine any apparent tendencies toward isolation or alienation among the group of Army entrants. And an index of "political activeness" (covering awareness, positive attitudes, and actual participation) was calculated to study and compare the involvement of both servicemembers and civilians in "establishment" activities and political processes.

The attitude indices were constructed from the responses to questions contained in the NLS. The "orientation" indices are similar to those constructed by the National Center for Education Statistics to study changes in attitudes one and one-half years after graduation. The following is a description of the manner in which

1U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, Changes in Attitudes One and One-Half
these attitude indices were derived:

Orientation Toward Environmental Values was measured by the mean percentage of persons who answered "very important" to the question, "How important is each of the following to you in your life?"

Work Orientation: "Being successful in my line of work"/"Having lots of money"/"Being able to find steady work"

Community Orientation: "Having strong friendships"/"Being a leader in my community"/"Being able to give my children better opportunities than I've had"/"Working to correct social and economic inequalities"

Family Orientation: "Finding the right person to marry and having a happy family life"/"Living close to parents and relatives"/"Getting away from this area of the country" (complement used)

Other possible responses were "somewhat important" and "not important." The answer "not important" was used for the last statement under family orientation because of the way in which it was expressed.

Political Activeness was measured by the mean percentage of persons who answered "Frequently" to the following areas of political participation:

Political Awareness: "Do you ever talk about public problems with any of the following people?"/"Your family"/"People where you work"/"Community leaders, such as club or church leaders"/"Government officials or people in politics, such as Democratic or Republican leaders"

Political Participation: "Have you ever talked to people to try to get them to vote for or against any candidate?"/"Have you ever gone to any political meetings, rallies, barbecues, fish fries, or things like that in connection with an election?"/"Have you ever done any work to help a candidate in his campaign?"/"Have you ever held an office in a political party or been elected to a government job?"

Also, by the mean percentage of persons who answered "very worthwhile" to the following activities:

---

Political Attitudes: "Voting in local elections"/
"Writing or talking to representatives in government"/
"Signing petitions to change the way things are in locality, state, nation"/
"Becoming an active member of a political party"

Other possible responses to these statements were "Never" and
"Sometimes" for political participation/awareness, and "Not
Worthwhile: and "Somewhat worthwhile" for political attitudes.

Orientation Toward Environmental Values

Composite measures of orientation toward environmental (i.e., work, community, and family) values were computed for the three groups from data provided in the NLS Second Follow-Up (Table 38). In orientation toward work values and community values, both Army groups are more positive than their civilian counterparts—with the greatest difference being overrepresentation in orientation toward community values and work values by the "More Than 1 Year" group. Under family orientation, however, the "More Than 1 Year" group shows the closest alignment with the non-entrant population, while the "1 Year or Less" group is very underrepresentative (also, the greatest variance of this group from the civilian standard).

Overall, the "1 Year or Less" group is closer to the non-entrant population than it is to the "More Than 1 Year" group of Army entrants in expressing orientation to environmental values. Longitudinal measures were not developed for the two groups of Army entrants, but available data on the non-entrant population shows a tendency toward decreasing value orientation over time. For example, the Base Year composites for work orientation (60.0) and community orientation (46.0) among non-entrants are almost identical to the Second Follow-Up

\[1\] Ibid., p. 4.
### Table 38

**Index of Orientation Toward Environmental Values for Army Entrants and Non-Entrants in the High School Class of 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Entrants</th>
<th>Army Entrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Yr or Less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Orientation</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Orientation</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Orientation</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Values Index</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS), Second Follow-Up Survey.

Composites of the "1 Year or Less" group; and the civilian Base Year composite for family orientation (58.5) was also several percentage points higher than that of the Second Follow-Up. An examination of the tabular results from a previous study of the NLS shows that a similar pattern occurred in the case of the "1 Year or Less" group (i.e., decreasing orientation)—but, that orientation toward each category of environmental values increased for the "More Than 1 Year" group of Army entrants. Also similar in the earlier surveys was the generally higher orientation toward work and community values by

---

Army entrants, but a lower orientation toward family values by both groups.¹

Political Activeness

The composite Index of Political Activeness combines measures of attitudes toward the value of participation, the frequency of social intercourse (and, thereby, "awareness" through the interchange of ideas and perceptions), and actual participation in political activities. These data were taken from the NLS Second Follow-Up. There is no longitudinal reference.

The results of this composite index (Table 39) are similar to the results in the analysis of attitudes toward participation in the political system. The "More Than 1 Year" group is substantially higher than the civilian group in all categories of political activeness—with the greatest relative differences occurring in participation and awareness. The overall index of activeness for the "More Than 1 Year" group is over fifty percent greater than that of the civilian standard.

The "1 Year or Less" group of Army entrants, though higher in the categories of attitudes and awareness, exhibits less propensity toward actual participation than the non-entrant group. Nevertheless,

¹A study of personal values and aspirations of NLS respondents (Base Year through First Follow-Up), in fact, showed military entrants (all Services) had the lowest family orientation ratings of all possible "activity-state" (i.e., students, workers, homemakers, others) groups. But the items of the family orientation scale emphasize proximity to home, which may account for the low family interest shown by Army entrants. See U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, NLS Group Profiles on Self-Esteem, Locus of Control, and Life Goals, NCES-77-260 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1977), pp. 24-26.
TABLE 39
INDEX OF POLITICAL ACTIVENESS FOR ARMY ENTRANTS AND NON-ENTRANTS IN THE HIGH SCHOOL CLASS OF 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NON-ENTRANTS</th>
<th>ARMY ENTRANTS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Yr or Less</td>
<td>More Than 1 Yr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Attitudes</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Awareness</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Activeness Index</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The "1 Year or Less" group is actually closer to the civilian standard in measures of political activeness than it is to the "More Than 1 Year" group of Army entrants.

General Observations: All-Volunteer Attitudes

The tendencies of voluntary Army entrants toward isolation or alienation from society are not evident in these limited measures of attitudes. Indeed, Army entrants from the high school graduating class of 1972 apparently profess greater acceptance of civil responsibilities, community standards, and established political processes than do their civilian peers. Army entrants here place more importance
on participation in political activities than do non-entrants (Table 36), actually participate to a greater extent in political activities (Table 37, especially the "1 Year or Less" group), and place an equal or greater value on community "quality of life" factors than do non-entrants (Table 35, especially the "1 Year or Less" group). In addition, NLS Army entrants show a greater positive orientation toward environmental values (Table 38) and express an overall higher regard for the well-being of personal and community life (Tables 35 through 38). Generally, there are no outstanding differences between NLS Army entrants and their civilian counterparts—and it is not clear that the Army differences which do appear are in any way undesirable.

The computation of standard deviations was undertaken in order to evaluate the degree of homogeneity in the responses of Army entrants. If the hypothesis is made that Army entrants are more homogeneous as a group (i.e., they reflect a distinctive "military mentality") than non-entrants, the assumption is that the standard deviations on responses by Army entrants will be smaller overall. An examination of the results of the data in Tables 35 through 39 show that the standard deviations of the Army groups are, in fact, usually greater than those of the civilian standard. Where differences in the dispersion of responses are seen, it is the Army groups who are most often in wider variance. The suggestion, then, is that there

---

A recent study of NLS data through the First Follow-Up (ibid., p. 24) resulted in similar findings and the following observation: "While work goals were still important and family goals were not, community orientation now [First Follow-Up] appeared extremely important. One could speculate from these data that being in the military plays a positive role in improving self-esteem, but the increased interest in community involvement could be due to being away from the home community, as well as to possibly leadership experience."
is more heterogeneity in this Army group than in the civilian standard.

Using a similar approach to preference and perception measures, Bachman and Blair found little evidence of differences in homogeneity between civilians and non-career military men; but they did observe significantly greater homogeneity among career-oriented men than among the civilian population. And the findings of Bachman and Blair suggest that years of service experience are not required for first-term enlisted men to develop the strong pro-military attitudes of careerists. The processes of socialization and self-selection act to homogenize the attitudes of career-oriented personnel into the prevailing military belief system. Although career interest cannot be determined from the NLS data presented here, it is known that the "More Than 1 Year" group demonstrated early interest in Army enlistment. It is not possible to define the "1 Year or Less" and "More Than 1 Year" groups on the basis of career interest, but it may be assumed that the "More Than 1 Year" group also experienced the greater effects of homogenization processes by the time of the survey. It is somewhat unexpected, therefore, to find in all but one category, attributed importance of political activities, the "More Than 1 Year" group has a wider variance of response than the "1 Year or Less" group of Army entrants.

A comparison of the two groups of NLS Army entrants shows the "More Than 1 Year" group to be closer overall to non-entrants in other than political areas. (The mean values of the "1 Year or Less" group

---

1 Bachman and Blair, *Soldiers, Sailors, and Civilians*, pp. 97-100.
in Tables 36 and 37 are closer to the mean values of non-entrants in every instance.) In fact, in only the category of political participation (Table 37) are the two Army groups closer to each other than either one is to the civilian population. In one instance, importance attributed to political activities (Table 36), the "1 Year or Less" group shows greatest convergence with the civilian population (i.e., the least difference between groups on any measure); and, in all other cases, it is the "More Than 1 Year" group which displays the greatest similarity to the civilian population.

However, these data alone are at best scant measures of attitudinal representation, only suggestive of possible relationships between groups. First, the individuals studied here are similar with regard to age and education, two often powerful predictors of individual attitudes.\(^1\) Second, the data do not take into account the possible influence of background and demographic variables—for example, sex, race/ethnic group, ability levels, socioeconomic status—and there is evidence of unmodified differences between NLS demographic groups over the short-term (one and one-half year) interval.\(^2\) In addition, the data can not be described as strictly "all-volunteer"—at least in the sense that the 1972-1973 period was transitional and still reflecting the effects of the war in Vietnam. Finally, the total population of Army entrants from this graduating class (i.e., those who entered after October 1974) and the population of entrants to the other Services are not treated in the analysis.

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 39-44, 45-49.

A general conclusion concerning comparisons of attitudes and attitude changes is also difficult to formulate for several reasons. In order to translate these comparison measures into statements regarding the objectives of representation, the relationship between attitudes and behavior must first be defined—or, the relationship between expressions of certain attitudes and the personal motivations for attributing importance to these attitudes must be at least explored. That is, a particular set of attitudes may serve as dependent variables in an analysis of representation—but that doesn't mean they are necessarily useful as indicators of representation by themselves.

A first glance at the attributed importance of "quality of life" factors (Table 35) by the "1 Year or Less" group of Army entrants might lead to the conclusion that, although unrepresentative of the civilian standard, this group actually possesses a higher regard for the well-being of personal and community life. Similarly, the over-representative orientation of Army entrants toward work, community, and political values could be interpreted as evidence that service in the Army acts favorably on the development of "positive" social attitudes. When the connection is made between attitudes and motivation, however, a different image may be created.

These statements of attitudes, for example, could be guided by the complex of an individual's value system—i.e., the "enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance." As such, disproportionately positive responses by Army entrants with

respect to societal values could be interpreted as desirable. It is also possible that responses could be related to an individual's hierarchy of needs or values (that is, in a way suggested by Abraham Maslow).\(^1\) As such, highly positive responses to value-oriented questions could be interpreted as evidence of highly unfulfilled needs, and, therefore, undesirable. Or, statements by Army entrants may be somehow affected by any of a number of cognitive processes (for example, "cognitive dissonance"), and be unreliable as measures, in themselves, of true feelings.\(^2\)

The main point here is that the study and comparison of attitudinal representation measures are quite complicated. It is a short step from political legitimacy issues to attitudinal representation, just as simple logic tells us that people behave in ways which correspond to their belief systems. Yet, it is a giant leap from scientifically observed attitudes, however recorded, to actual behavior. And it is behavior (particularly that which is undemocratic, dysfunctional or politically "irresponsible"), not attitudes per se, which ignites concern for political legitimacy; attitudes are important here only insofar as they relate to the actions or reactions of the military establishment. Most current and previous studies have failed to take into account the many complexities of attitude measurement; and research on the behavioral consequences of an ideologically unrepresentative military is (fortunately, claim some) still speculative.

---


The Legitimacy of Female Representation

Plato, writing on the "equality of women" in *The Republic*, instructs that women are expected to take their full share of civic responsibilities. Men and women should receive the same education and share equally in all public duties, he argues; women with the right natural gifts should not be debarred by difference of sex from fulfilling the most important functions. Plato continues:

Can you employ any creature for the same work as others, if you do not give them both the same upbringing and education?

No.

Then, if we are to set women to the same tasks as men, we must teach them the same things. They must have the same two branches of training for mind and body and also be taught the art of war, and they must receive the same treatment. Indeed, Plato adds in a dialogue on the "usages of war," "men and women will take the field together."

Plato wrote *The Republic* in the fourth century B.C. Remarkably, over 2,000 years later, the "equality of women" is still an unresolved constitutional question; and the full participation of women in the nation's military forces is the subject of wide disagreement. In terms of military representation, women have virtually been absent from the American armed forces. No other commonly-defined group of

---


2 Ibid., p. 149.

3 Ibid., p. 169 (emphasis added). Cornford notes: "Like the Sauromatae, whose women hunted and fought on horseback with the men and wore the same dress" (p. 169).
citizens, otherwise qualified and eligible for military service, has ever been as underrepresented as women were (and still are) in the armed forces. (Of course, it is but recently that women have become "citizens.")

It has only been thirty years since women achieved permanent military status through the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. And, as Binkin and Bach observe in Women and the Military, the 1948 legislation actually sowed the seeds of sex discrimination which lasted for another two decades: (1) women under 18 years were not allowed to enlist; and all women under 21 years were required to have the written consent of their parents; (2) no women could serve in command positions or hold a permanent grade above lieutenant colonel; (3) women with children were denied dependency benefits unless the mother provided chief support or the father was deceased; and (4) women were restricted to "feminine" (supportive jobs, including health care and clerical assistance) occupations.\(^1\)

The Integration Act of 1948 also stipulated that the proportion of enlisted women could not exceed 2 percent of the total enlisted strength, and female officers (excluding nurses) could not exceed 10 percent of female enlisted strength. Binkin and Bach note that the rationale for these female enlistment ceilings, which remained in effect for twenty years, was far from clear.\(^2\) Ironically, at the same time Congress was establishing enlistment quotas and restrictions for women (1948), President Truman was issuing Executive Order 9981,

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 11.
declaring that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin." And it is interesting to note that the percentage of women in the military, including nurses, never even reached the maximum authorization between 1948 and 1969.¹

The underrepresentation and discriminatory treatment of women in the armed forces are usually considered equal rights or equal opportunity issues. Patricia Thomas, for instance, speaks of the "fight for equality."² Binkin and Bach also refer to the "full measure of equality and responsibility" which has been denied women for so many years.³ King, in his critical appraisal of the AVF, mentions the "equal opportunity" aspects of female representation and "DoD's apparent reluctance to undertake more intensive utilization of women."⁴ And Nancy Goldman explores equality for women in what she characterizes as "the epitome of a male-dominated establishment."⁵

¹In 1948 women comprised 1.0 percent. During the next 20 years, the proportion of women in the military never exceeded 1.5 percent, and averaged about 1.2 percent per year; see Dolores Battle, "Women in the Defense Establishment," in U.S. Defense Manpower Commission, Staff Studies and Supporting Papers, Vol. 4: Developing and Utilizing the Total Force and Shaping the Future Military Career Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1976), p. L-3. It should be noted, although the implication here is a lack of interest on the part of women, many other factors operated to keep the proportion of women below the maximum authorization.


³Binkin and Bach, Women, p. 2.


⁵See Nancy L. Goldman, "The Changing Role of Women in the Armed
Certainly, the representation of women in the military involves important questions of equal rights as well as questions of social equity. "Equality of the sexes is high on the nation's social agenda," Binkin and Bach write. Yet, "qualified females are not permitted to compete with men on an equal basis and, hence, women are being excluded from equally sharing a variety of economic and social benefits."¹ Moreover, for women from working-class and minority backgrounds (especially), the armed forces can offer the same "second chance" opportunities—the same "social welfare" benefits, educational assistance, vocational training, social development, personal fulfillment, economic advantages—which are now offered to qualified males with similar social origins. The armed forces are the nation's largest employer of youth; and they are often pictured as perhaps the most equality-conscious, egalitarian institutions on the face of the earth—a place where the classes are "levelled," and a place where prior social and personal advantages, ascriptive traits and disabilities are deemphasized. But for some reason, truly equal opportunity has never applied to women in the military.²

In the final analysis, there is only one explanation for unequal treatment and the special conditions of service for women: women

---

¹ Binkin and Bach, Women, p. 31. See also chapter on "Women's Rights and Military Benefits," pp. 31-38.

² According to the Army, the "appropriate use of women in the Army is consistent with the Army's primary role of ground combat." See U.S. Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity: Second Annual Assessment of Programs (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, February 1978), p. 8. "In the interest of national defense" is the reason most
are not equal to men; men are by nature better soldiers, sailors, and air(men). Of course, these are the same occupational stereotypes which feminists have been attempting to erase for years. The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s succeeded in creating a new social sensitivity and less tolerance for inequities in the employment arena. Yet, the military, a potential battleground for women's rights, has somehow managed to avoid the women’s liberation movement and "affirmative action." "Despite the far-reaching social and military implications of full female representation in the military," Binkin and Bach observe, "there has been surprisingly little public discussion on the topic."¹

"When you are thinking about women gaining places in occupations which males have dominated," states Nancy Goldman, "the military is especially interesting. . . . Women in combat assignments is a taboo, almost like incest."² Curiously, however, the women's liberation movement, "which could have been a relevant force," has largely ignored the military.³ Perhaps because the militant dimension of woman's liberation was linked to the anti-war movement of the 1960s—or because the concept of "liberation" is incongruent with military authority, regimentation, and discipline—there has been considerable

often given for limiting participation by women. The implication, however, is that women are therefore not equal to men.


²Quoted in interview in Bruce Blivin, Jr., "All-Volunteer I," The New Yorker, 24 November 1975, p. 145.

indifference about the position of women in the armed forces.¹ The motto of the Committee on Women in the Military of the National Organization for Women (NOW) is: "On land, at sea, or in the air, a woman's place is everywhere."² In any case, one is inclined to conclude, if equal opportunity in the military sector was truly important to feminist interest groups, it would be a public issue of some greater consequence.

It may be that American women in general do not accept the legitimacy of their own involvement in "this man's Army." On the other hand, as a result of social conditioning or post-Vietnam, anti-military attitudes, many young women simply may not be attracted to military service. It is worthy of note, during 1978 hearings by the House Armed Services Committee on reinstituting the draft, Defense Secretary Harold Brown recommended that any new Selective Service legislation apply to young women as well as to men. Congressman G. V. Montgomery, a member of the Committee and sponsor of a bill to bring back the draft, agreed with Brown that it "might not be a bad idea": "I don't have any problems with it. In this equal rights environment, men are going to challenge in court any legislation that drafts them and not women."³ Congressman Montgomery reasons that men

¹Goldman, "Changing Role," p. 902. Goldman also observes that women who join the military are not attracted to the militant women's liberation movement. The pattern of self-recruitment for women is such that feminist "militancy" is virtually absent. See also Thomas, "Women in the Military," p. 643.

²Thomas, "Women in the Military," p. 644; Binkin and Bach, Women, p. 73.

will file lawsuits claiming discrimination; and it would make more sense to register women in case they did have to be drafted along with men under some kind of equal rights ruling.¹

Montgomery is probably correct. Men, not women, will do most of the shouting if women are exempted from compulsory service. After all, who wants to be drafted? Who wants to give up a part of their life in order to be trained to fight and kill? Certainly there is no need for women as long as men can do a better job, the job they have always done so effectively. The military is a male bastion. Women can do what they have always done: free the men to fight, and work in an ancillary capacity.

The most perplexing facet of the equal rights revolution in this country is that women (and men who are concerned about equal treatment for women) have not been screaming any louder for the "right to fight." A handful of writers, academics, feminist leaders, and others have pondered sexual bias and social fairness aspects of female underrepresentation in the armed forces. But the real issue here is not equity. The issue is equal rights; but even more, it is equal rights and equal responsibilities. It is legitimacy—that is, the recognition of women as full citizens. Even before equal opportunity is addressed, one must ask: Is full participation in national defense a legitimate extension of equal rights (and responsibilities) for women; and if it is, can a military which does not include women on an equal basis be a legitimate extension of the nation and its citizens? If citizenship demands representation in the military, does the fact that women are legally exempted from combat and restricted from full participation

therefore imply (as logic runs) that women are not full citizens? If
the government limits participation by women in the armed forces to
10 percent, does it mean women are "partial citizens" (i.e., one-fifth
citizens, since women comprise about one-half of the otherwise eligible
population)?

Segal, et al. write in "The Concept of Citizenship and Atti-
tudes Toward Women in Combat" that for the past 200 years, the role
of the combat soldier has been integrally associated with the role of
the citizen. Janowitz, in fact, maintains that military institutions
have been of central importance in fashioning the nation-states
which emerged in Western societies:

The legitimacy of the revolutionary movements and the political
democracies they sought to establish rested on the assertion
that citizens had been armed and had demonstrated their loyalty
through military service. Military service emerged as a hallmark
of citizenship and citizenship as the hallmark of a political
democracy.

1 Segal, et al., "Citizenship and Attitudes," p. 469. See also
Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western

2 Janowitz writes: "In fact, the thrust of my analysis is embodied in the formulation of
Friedrich Engels: Contrary to appearance compulsory military service
surpasses general franchise as a democratic agency" (p. 186). The
case of Switzerland, which follows the dominant ethic of a "nation-
in-arms," is noteworthy here. Because military service is linked
with citizenship, those who do not serve do not (or should not) ex-
ercise full civic privileges. So, women in Switzerland, who are not
required to receive a military education, have not been able to vote
until only very recently. Additionally, Swiss males who are unable
to fulfill their military obligations (for physical, conscientious
objection or other reasons), are required to pay a special tax in
Moreover (as observed in the previous chapter on social equity), many immigrants historically have been "Americanized" only by first performing the civic rite of going to battle and paying the expected "price-in-blood." Blacks, too, struggled to gain their civil rights and full citizenship by demonstrating their loyalty and courage on the battlefield. Thus, finds Janowitz, "[f]rom World War I onward, citizen military service has been seen as a device by which excluded segments of society could achieve political legitimacy and rights."  

The right to bear arms is in the tradition of representative government—but a tradition which has treated citizenship and arms bearing as an exclusively masculine privilege. In effect, Feld argues in "Arms and Women," the exclusion of women from combat assignments imposes on them the overt stigma of civic inferiority:

In a concrete sense, military systems in their particular forms represent an articulated expression of specific, social value systems, spelling out in quantitative detail who is worth what to the community, what sort of sacrifices may be demanded of individuals and special groups, and what in the way of reward and recognition they can, in turn, expect. To be denied an opportunity to participate in this process is to be denied the opportunity to take part in a crucial civic rite.  


1Ibid., p. 192. One is also reminded of the case of the slave, Dred Scott—who was ruled by the Supreme Court of 1857 not to be a citizen of the United States because (among other reasons) he was not a legitimate or equally obligated participant in the American armed forces.

In addition to civic inferiority, adds Feld, the formal debarring of women from full participation in the military carries a range of inferences: it sanctions stereotypes of women as a subspecies of the human race, physically and psychologically inferior to men; it labels them emotionally unstable or unpredictable, incapable of sustained effort, and "constitutionally adverse to submerging themselves in a common cause"; it creates the image of women as "a body of social non-achievers, incapable of performing important civic duties, and therefore a disruptive communal force."\(^1\)

From the perspective of the military as a civic system and a symbol of social values, the case for female representation is difficult to refute. Notwithstanding efficiency or cost-effectiveness considerations, the fact that women have for so long been denied the civic right to play an active role in the defense of their community is somewhat incredible. Political legitimacy is usually equated with the degree to which political processes and public institutions are an expression of the popular will. As long as the armed forces relegate women to restricted, ancillary positions, women do not have equal civic and social status, and the "legitimacy" of the military establishment is disputable. For women, the achievement of full representation in the military is both the symbolic and practical analogue of enfranchisement.

\(^1\)Ibid. See also Binkin and Bach, Women, p. 38.
Military service has traditionally been a masculine calling in this country and in most other nations. With the exception of nurses, the formal association of women in the military is a relatively recent phenomenon. As Binkin and Bach point out, serious interest in defining the female role in the armed forces did not even develop until World War II.¹ During the mass mobilization of World War II, women were considered to be freeing men for combat duty by occupying support positions in the military and substituting for men in defense industries.²

For the most part, the general public image of women and military service is captured in the American war movies of World War II and the years that followed. As Suid writes in *Guts and Glory*, American combat movies have generally characterized women as the understanding wives or girlfriends who bravely remain in the background while their men go off to war. They stand by their men as willing martyrs, providing moments of tenderness, calm, and sexual fulfillment during lulls in the high-risk adventures and thrills of combat.³ But women were also sometimes an interference and a distraction. Suid observes:

---

¹ Binkin and Bach, *Women*, p. 4.


This emphasis on the male as hero also contributed to the overall Hollywood image of women as inferior, as the satisfier of man's sexual needs and, especially in combat films, as useless baggage who interfered with the men's true companions, their fellow men. Seldom has the presence of a woman in a war movie contributed significantly to the development of the plot or to the success of the military operation.

The mid-1960s marked a turning point for women in the military. In 1966, the Defense Department established a task force to reassess the role of women in the armed forces. Changing social mores, the expanding role of women in the labor force, and the manpower demands of the Vietnam War provided for the more expedient use of women. Partly as a result of the task force study, several changes were made to enhance military participation by women. Most significantly, Congress removed the 2 percent ceiling on female representation in the armed forces and transferred the authority for establishing quotas to the secretaries of the Services.

The proportion of female personnel still remained below 2 percent for five years following the repeal of the 2 percent ceiling (Table 40). By 1973, under the AVF, the proportion of women in the active duty armed forces reached an all-time high of 2.4 percent. According to the Department of Defense, the percentage of women thereafter "rapidly grew" to nearly 6 percent at the end of FY 1977.

---

1 Ibid., p. 217.
TABLE 40
PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL WHO ARE WOMEN
BY SERVICE FOR SELECTED YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Included with Army.
Binkin and Bach attribute the sudden rise (however rapid) in female representation under the AVF to the concerted efforts by Defense planners in 1972 to expand the scope of women's participation: in 1972, only 35 percent of all military enlisted occupations were open to women; by 1976 almost 85 percent were open. The proportion of females assigned to nontraditional jobs likewise increased during this period, from 10 percent in 1972 to over 40 percent in 1976.¹

Other policy changes also opened new doors for women in the military: between 1971 and 1974, the Services lifted their ban on the enlistment of married women; in 1973, a Supreme Court ruling required that married women in the military receive the same family allowances available to married men; in 1974, Congress removed the special age and parental permission requirements for young women; in 1975, the Army dropped its policy of discharging women who had become mothers; and in 1976, the minimum enlistment age for women was lowered from 18 to 17 (the same as that for men), and women were admitted to the three Service academies for the first time.²

Important changes in policy concerning the assignment and duties of Army women have also operated in recent years to open up the doors for the "weaker sex" to the combat battlefield. A September 1977 Army message on the "employment of women soldiers," for example, clarified Army policy and informed unit commanders that "the

¹Binkin and Bach, Women, p. 2.

²Moskos, "Enlisted Ranks" p. 20; Thomas, "Women in the Military," p. 643; Battle, "Defense Establishment."
intention is to prohibit the use of women in combat forces as combatants"; but "[t]hey will be trained to defend themselves individually as well as participate in the unit defense of combat support and combat service support units and should be employed by unit commanders in the same manner as male soldiers." Unit commanders, the memo continued, are "authorized to employ women to accomplish unit missions throughout the battlefield so long as the combat exclusion policy . . . is not violated. Women are not excluded from the performance of mission duty forward of the brigade rear boundary."!

Then again, in March 1978, a policy message from Army Chief of Staff Bernard L. Rogers reiterated and further stressed the "Army's commitment to the integration of women:"

Qualified women now have the opportunity to serve in all but a few specific combat units and combat specialties. In avail- ing themselves of that opportunity women, like their male counterparts, must accept the responsibility for sharing all risks and enduring all hardships.

---

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Use of Women in the Military, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, September 1978), p. F-3. As the recent Defense Department study of the AVF notes, women have served on the battlefield as nurses for more than a century, and they have even received combat decorations. In fact, at present there are no restrictions in law on the combat assignment of women in the Army. The use of women in combat is left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Army. "His policies and programs," observes the Defense Department report, "are developed, reviewed, and modified as national attitudes and circumstances change. Recently, the Army has opened all but the most hazardous and arduous positions to women." See U.S. Department of Defense, America's Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, 31 December 1978), p. 75.
"Those of us in authority," added Rogers, "must reaffirm our conviction that women are an integral part of the Army."

Since 1972 more has been done to increase opportunities for women in the military than in the entire period since 1948. In numerical terms, these expanded opportunities have mostly affected the enlisted force. Table 41, for example, shows that the proportion of officers who are women has decreased since the peak years of World War II—to the point where there are now proportionately more female enlistees in the Services than there are officers. However, in terms of population representation, the sex composition of the enlisted force hardly reflects a "cross section" of the civilian population (Table 42). The Air Force and the Army by far lead the other Services in female representation; yet, overall, women continue as the most underrepresented of all groups commonly studied in representational analyses. Furthermore, Levitan and Alderman report, women remain heavily clustered in the traditional occupational fields; and the armed forces assign women to traditional women's jobs even more than is the practice in civilian labor markets.

---

1U.S. Department of Defense, *Use of Women*, p. F-4. The situation for women in the Navy and Air Force, however, is somewhat different. Until 1978, women were barred by law from serving on Navy ships. Under the recent amendment, women are allowed to serve full-time on hospital and transport ships, but they may not serve on vessels or aircraft engaged in (or expected to be assigned to) combat missions; and they may serve up to six months temporary duty on other Navy vessels. Similar legal restraints exist for the Air Force. The Defense Department has, in fact, called for the repeal of these legal restraints on the use of women in combat, pointing out that "they are neither necessary nor appropriate." See U.S. Department of Defense, *America's Volunteers*, pp. 76-77.

TABLE 41
PERCENT OF ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS WHO ARE WOMEN
BY SERVICE FOR SELECTED YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Included with Army.
TABLE 42
SEX COMPOSITION OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION
(NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND POPULATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1977)
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</th>
<th>POPULATION OF U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service of Accession</td>
<td>Total* (17-21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Estimates of population are based on "Series II" projections, which use mid-range assumptions about fertility, mortality, and net immigration.
An especially sore point in the policy of differential treatment for women has been the use of more stringent enlistment eligibility standards for female applicants. Since the demand for females is considerably lower than that for males, the Services have used educational, intelligence, aptitude, and physical standards as a means for limiting the "available" number of qualified women. Thus, the proportion of female entrants has traditionally remained small and exceedingly well-qualified.

But even this entrenched bias against the enlistment of women is disappearing. In April 1979, Army officials announced a lowering of the minimum mental standards for women volunteers, in an effort to stimulate female recruitment and stem the unexpected downward turn in their enlistments.¹ And in May 1979, under pressure from an equal rights lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Army decided to "live up to its promises of being an equal opportunity employer by equalizing its entrance requirements" and make it just as easy for women to enlist as men.²

The "representational" effects of imposing more stringent eligibility requirements on female applicants can be seen in the educational distributions of recent recruits. During 1977, for example, less than 3 percent of all female enlisted entrants were high school drop-outs (without high school equivalency). In


contrast, 26 percent of all male enlistees in 1977 (over 36 percent in the Army) failed to complete high school (see Table 43). Although female enlistees, like male enlistees, are underrepresentative of civilians at the college level, the proportion of high school graduates among female enlistees is remarkably higher than the comparable proportion of female civilians. And the education differential between male and female enlistees is considerably greater than that between sexes in the civilian population.¹

In a December 1978 report on the status of the AVF, Defense Department analysts suggest there is a strong potential to increase the number of women in the military even further—because more women want to enlist than are now accepted and because there are numerous jobs traditionally closed to women which can be efficiently and effectively filled by women. "Expanding the role of women and the number of women in the force broadens the recruiting base for the Armed Forces," the report states. "As shown by recent experiences of the Army, women are demonstrating that they are capable of playing an even larger part in national defense."²

The Department of Defense therefore projects a steady increase in the proportion of enlisted women over the next few years. By FY 1983, it is expected that women will comprise more than 11 percent of the total enlisted force—an increase of over 70 percent from FY

¹ It should be noted also, according to enlistment statistics covering the 1972-1976 period, the average female recruit is more likely to be one year older than her male counterpart, married, and white; see Binkin and Bach, Women, p. 17.

² U.S. Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, p. 77.
### TABLE 43

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY SEX FOR ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND POPULATION OF THE U.S. (1977) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Total DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below High School Graduate</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED*</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 Years of College</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate And Above</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency examination. Data on GED recipients are not available for the general populations indicated.
1978 (see Table 44). Relative to previous years, eleven percent indicates a sizable growth rate; in terms of population representation, however, some say it is scarcely enough.

Defense Department analysts still offer the following cautionary reminder:

But too rapid a rate of growth can result in an imbalance of women in the junior ranks because it takes years for people to be trained and promoted into positions as qualified supervisors. Moreover, DoD can not be certain how many women will be attracted to traditionally nonfemale occupations, nor if they will re-enlist in those occupations in sufficient numbers to meet career force requirements.¹

Binkin and Bach, on the other hand, estimate that, "without radically departing from current policies and practices, and without disrupting the rotation and career opportunities for men," close to 600,000 military jobs (or 33.3 percent of total strength) could potentially be filled by women.² Defense Department computations show that, theoretically, there are over 860,000 positions which could be open to women; and taking into account the various exclusionary policies of the Services, there are almost 400,000 positions actually "open" to women.³ The only other question, as the Defense analysts observe, is whether there is sufficient interest among young women. Some astute observers, such as Moskos, see evidence that the available supply of highly qualified women is being tapped close to its

¹U.S. Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, p. 72.
²Binkin and Bach, Women, pp. 103-109.
³U.S. Department of Defense, Use of Women, pp. 15-17. It is estimated that there will be about 132,000 women in the armed forces at the end of FY 1979, and about 208,000 women in the military of 1984; see U.S. Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, p. 70.
TABLE 44

PERCENT OF TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL WHO ARE WOMEN
BY SERVICE FOR SELECTED YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Included with Army.

<sup>a</sup>Peak women strength in total DoD for World War II.

<sup>b</sup>Peak women strength in total DoD for Korean War.

<sup>c</sup>Last peacetime year before war in Vietnam.

<sup>d</sup>Vietnam War peak total military strength.

<sup>e</sup>Projections are made by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) as of June 1978.

<sup>f</sup>Includes enlisted personnel and officer candidates in Navy.
maximum. "[l]t is highly unlikely women will show any more eagerness than men to join the combat arms," Moskos observes. "It is likely, moreover, that the recruiting successes in attracting high quality women into the all-volunteer Army would be reversed if combat assignments were given females."2

Unfortunately, there is no reliable estimate of just how many women might be willing to volunteer if current barriers were completely eliminated. Since the queue of potential female recruits has always been assumed to far outweigh military demand, it is not surprising that most surveys on the intentions of youth to join the armed forces have concentrated on males only. But common sense seems to say, if women were "breaking down the doors" to get into the armed forces or applying greater pressure in the political front, more opportunities would be unfolding. And, as Moskos states, the real reason why women are excluded from the mainstream of military life may simply be that there is little pressure to let them into it from either men or women.3

There have been several attempts made over the past few years to accurately measure the available supply of women volunteers. One of the first studies of young women's attitudes toward the volunteer military was conducted in 1971—with a follow-up in 1974—for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and the Army's advertising agency. The findings of these two surveys revealed that only "a small minority of

2 Ibid., p. 51.
3 Ibid.
women express genuine interest in enlisting in some women's military service." It was thus concluded that military service was not something which figured prominently in the minds of young women: "Military service is simply not as consistent with the needs, expectations, and desires of most young women as the many other pursuits available to them." Women's military service to this survey sample was a "cultural anachronism"—appealing only to the narrow segment of young women who possessed "a conservative profile of beliefs" (i.e., women who believed in traditional values and structures).

The finding that women who enlist in the military are tradition-oriented has reappeared in subsequent analyses of female recruits. Thomas, for instance, paints a picture of the average female Navy recruit as being "a young women with traditional female values":

These findings may explain some of the reluctance often noted on the part of military women to go into newly-opened nontraditional job specialties. The profile of female recruits described above does not paint a picture of contemporary young women who are eager to enter new fields and compete with men. If such women are indeed wanted, the Navy will have to make a conscious effort to recruit them.

In a related study by Thomas, research findings similarly supported the stereotype of female work values—"particularly in view of their

---


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., pp. 8-9. This finding suggests another problem of "legitimacy" as well—that is, the attitudinal representation of the civilian community.

[female Navy recruits] strong desire for a clean, cheerful environment and reluctance to take physical risks."¹ Women were also found to be more negative than men toward jobs involving work with materials or machines rather than people, physical exertion, and monotony—differing, in all, from men on the two-thirds of the occupational survey items.²

However, the Thomas study was designed to examine attrition among first-term female enlistees. The sample population was, therefore, a group of recent recruits—quite different from the general population of military-age young women, and without the inclusion of hypothetical job alternatives in the nontraditional realm. Other studies of enlistment motivation have likewise resulted in similar results; but each has employed populations of female recruits which do not allow for broad generalizations regarding the total "available supply" of women.³

The "Monitoring the Future" surveys, on the other hand, have provided a preliminary description of emerging female attitudes. And


²Ibid., p. vii.

the initial results from this survey effort highlight certain gender differences in military preference. In each year of the study so far, more males (22.2 percent in 1975 and 22.0 percent in 1976) than females (8.3 percent in 1975 and 7.0 percent in 1976) expressed a preference for military service, and more males than females expressed an expectation of military service. Yet, in both years, more males expected to serve than actually wanted to, while more females wanted to enlist than actually expected to.¹ The analysts seemed to feel these findings might reflect a recognition that, because women are excluded from combat occupations and from non-combat jobs in combat units, and because armed forces selection standards are higher for women than for men, women who aspire to military service are more likely to have their aspirations unfulfilled: "The findings suggest that if combat specialties, and non-combat jobs within units, were opened to women, there would indeed be women interested in serving in the armed forces who are not currently accommodated."²

In fact, in a recent survey designed to forecast the potential supply of women for the military ("under current conditions and under alternative options providing for greater utilization of women"), it was found that the level of interest expressed by women was "remarkably similar" to that expressed by men. And, while the women who were most interested in the armed forces had somewhat different job interests and skills than their male counterparts, the overall interest

¹David R. Segal and Jerald G. Bachman, "Post High-School Drop-Outs (And Stayers)," paper prepared for the OSD/ONR Conference on First-Term Enlisted Attrition, Leesberg, Virginia, April 4-7, 1977). (Processed.)

²Ibid., p. 6.
level expressed by women increased when options involving training in non-traditional job areas were presented. The researchers therefore concluded that "there is a sizeable potential supply of women interested in military enlistment under current conditions and under alternative options involving greater utilization of women."¹

An important point which should not be overlooked here is that the current expressed interest in military service by young women (especially in the earlier surveys) may appear comparatively "low" because (1) women are not socially conditioned to accept military service as a legitimate or "proper" post-high school activity for females (thus it is not a missing interest per se, but rather an unconsidered interest); and (2) young women are not sought out through Service advertising, recruiting and high school guidance programs in the manner or intensity as are men. Additionally, as Thomas observes, perceived need fulfillment mediates occupational choice—and, therefore, it is the preconceptions about the characteristics of various jobs which are most influential in affecting enlistment decisions.² It is then quite possible that women with traditional values and perceptions are considering the military largely because the military has a reputation for supporting traditional female (sex-specific) occupational roles (i.e., individuals choose work roles which they perceive will fulfill their needs, value systems, and motivations).


²Thomas, Why Women Enlist, p. 2.
At the same time, interest in a particular military job is often affected by perceptions of that job's worth in the civilian labor market; and it is the opportunities for women in traditional "male-only" occupations in the civilian sector which may thus contribute to female preferences for non-traditional military jobs.

The point is that a considerable recruiting, advertising, and re-social-conditioning effort may be necessary to reverse the popular image of the military as "man's work." The direction of social change is toward equality of the sexes and recognition of the rights and citizenship status of women. But it would probably take a major transformation in sociocultural attitudes and normative values, or a moderate economic upheaval to create the possibility of full female representation in the AVF.

It is noteworthy that during FY 1979, the Army discovered, much to its chagrin, (1) women were not joining in desired numbers, (2) women were avoiding many of the new jobs opened for them over the previous year, and (3) women were dropping out of the service in greater numbers. "American women, it turns out after one year of experimenting," Wilson writes in the Washington Post, "are not wild about joining the Army or doing the jobs formerly restricted to men if they do sign up." "This is all new for the Army and its recruiters," observed an Army official. "The Army has been wide open for women only a year now. We've come a long way, but we still have a long way to go and a lot more to learn."\(^1\)

The goals of political legitimacy (and social equity) argue persuasively for full female representation in the armed forces. As Segal et al. point out, the issue of female representation is one of citizenship, first and above all; and citizenship is a principle, not necessarily a job.\(^1\) The prospect that many women may not "accept" military service is extraneous; lifting barriers is the cause. However, the goals of political legitimacy also stipulate that military entrants mirror the civilian community. In the event female representation becomes a policy concern, then, the same representational measures now applied to male military entrants—race, education, socioeconomic status, attitudes, and the like—will similarly extend to female recruits as well.

Epilogue: Women and the Draft

As observed in Chapter I, there are currently movements in Congress and around the nation to reinstitute draft registration and, in some cases, full-blown programs of compulsory service. Defense Secretary Harold Brown recommended during House testimony on the FY 1980 Defense budget and related issues that "registration should include registration of women if it takes place." Thus, reports Wilson in the Washington Post, Brown "has made registering of women as well as men for the draft a matter of equity," and lawmakers must now "take fresh readings of the political consequences of applying any new law to women as well as men."\(^2\)


Lawmakers did "take readings" of women and the draft in the early 1970s, during debate over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). In fact, some congressmen, speculating that ratification of the controversial ERA would result in a radically altered military, attempted to exclude women from combat and to exempt women from any future draft. Senator Sam Ervin, for example, tried in 1972 to amend the ERA into an "all-but-combat" ERA. Ervin passionately appealed to his fellow legislators to "prevent sending the daughters of America into combat, to be slaughtered or maimed by the bayonets, the bombs, the bullets, the grenades, the mines, the napalm, the poison gas, and the shells of the enemy."\(^1\)

The unsuccessful effort in Congress to limit the ERA in this manner was partly the result of several legal opinions on the possible sweeping effects of the new constitutional amendment. A 1971 opinion prepared by Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist (now a Justice of the Supreme Court) for the House Judiciary Committee hearings on the ERA, for instance, stated that Congress would have to "permit women to volunteer on an equal basis for all sorts of military service, including combat duty."\(^2\) The Central All-Volunteer Task Force on the Utilization of Women likewise concluded that passage

\(^1\)Quoted in Binkin and Bach, Women, p. 42 (from Congressional Record, Volume 118, pt. 7 [1972], p. 9337).

\(^2\)However, Rehnquist added that the ERA "would not require or permit women any more than men to undertake duties for which they are physically unqualified under some generally applied standard"; nor would it limit the power of Congress to create "legitimate sex-neutral exemptions [e.g., all parents with dependent children] from the draft." See Battle, "Defense Establishment," pp. 19-20.
of the ERA would result in a male and female draft (if reinstated),
the elimination of restrictions on women in combat, and the admission
of women to all military occupational specialties.\textsuperscript{1}

However, there are other opinions on the possible effects of
the ERA which suggest the military could sustain certain discrimina-
tory practices if sex-specific distinctions were supported by either
"a compelling government interest" or bona fide occupational qualifi-
cations.\textsuperscript{2} In fact, it was once a fairly common practice to include
"in-the-event-of" speculation on the ERA in discussions of women and
the military.\textsuperscript{3} But since the ERA has become locked in a state of
limbo, commentary has diminished.

Whatever may happen as a result of ratification of the ERA,
it is clear that women do not share "equal rights" in the military
establishment (though the present trend is clearly in the direction
of equality). Moreover, in terms of the civilian population, women
are by far the least-represented "minority" group. Indeed, during
1977 there were considerably more men over the age of 40 (126,000)
than there were women of all ages (117,831) in the active duty armed
forces.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.} \textsuperscript{2}Binkin and Bach, \textit{Women}, pp. 46-47.

\textsuperscript{3}See, for example, Cecile S. Landrum, "The Development and
Utilization of Women in the Department of Defense," in U.S. Defense
Manpower Commission, \textit{Staff Studies and Supporting Papers}, Vol. 4:
Developing and Utilizing the Total Force and Shaping the Future
May 1976), pp. M-6, 7; Battle, "Defense Establishment," pp. 18-26;
Levitan and Alderman, \textit{Warriors at Work}, p. 182; among others.

\textsuperscript{4}U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Selected Manpower Statistics}
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Directorate for Infor-
The apparent absence of more serious public discussion concerning the role of women in the military is in one sense incomprehensible—since the denial of the right to full participation is a denial of the right of full citizenship. On the other hand, because the military has always been a male-dominated organization, the concept of "military representation" (until recently) has actually been a concept of "male-military representation." The microcosmic ideal, the specular image which perfect representation seeks to recreate in the armed forces, is a "man's world." This is the way it was in 1776, and this is the way it has remained.

But the times are changing. The role of women in the armed forces is gradually expanding. The Services now have greater flexibility in admitting women and in assigning them to combat positions; and students of military manpower are beginning to take notice of the implications of unqualified female participation. In light of recent discussions regarding the "universality" (or "unisexuality") of any future military draft or draft registration system, it appears that female representation (perhaps full female representation) in the armed forces is an issue on the political horizon.

CHAPTER VII

MILITARY REPRESENTATION AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

As William King observes in Achieving America's Goals, measurements of military effectiveness are at best imprecise and subject to considerable debate.\(^1\) Yet, military effectiveness (along with its economic companion, cost-effectiveness) has always been a principal consideration from the standpoint of defense strategists in manpower policy and programs. Effectiveness, however, though intertwined with the issues of equity and legitimacy, is directly related to military representation only insofar as such representation provides the best and most capable military force. That is, the representational configuration of military entrants does not alone determine whether the armed forces can most effectively accomplish their mission—unless, of course, mission accomplishment is indirectly influenced by the negative consequences of inequity or illegitimacy. For example, the military could conceivably accomplish its intended purposes even though it was disproportionately represented by the above-average intelligence, well-educated, highly-motivated, economically-comfortable, patriotic, white sons of Oregonian tree-cutters—except if some element of this composition counteracted mission effectiveness.


349
Perhaps the best example of how composition can negatively influence military effectiveness is, ironically, **perfect representation**. Perfect representation implies that the **worst**, as well as the best, elements of society be present in the ranks of the military. This would mean, in practice, that restrictive standards on mental aptitude, moral background, and physical condition (and any other standards, such as age and gender-related prohibitions) be completely removed to allow **everyone** the right to participate. It would mean that the armed forces actively seek and recruit, not the most "qualified," but the most "representative" members of society, however defined. The point is, military effectiveness is influenced by its representational composition to the extent that its composition can be related to military **needs**.

**Military Needs: The "Quality" Recruit**

Most discussions of the relationship between representation and military needs concentrate on measures of "quality." Cooper writes: "In a general sense, quality refers to those aspects and attributes of military personnel that are deemed desirable and that contribute to a more productive, capable, and better motivated force."¹ The problem is that there is no convenient, all-inclusive, universally-recognized measure of personnel quality. So, quality has come to be interpreted in terms of certain measurable, individual attributes, such as mental aptitude and educational attainment.²

²Ibid., pp. 128-129.
The most common definition of "quality" is that used in *Defense Manpower Quality Requirements*, a comprehensive report prepared in response to the Senate Armed Services Committee's request for information on Defense manpower quality and the costs of an all-volunteer military. As the report notes in its introductory remarks, "[t]he combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces depends, to a great extent, on the competence, discipline and motivation of its members. For this reason, a quality force is a priority objective."\(^1\) The report goes on to define the basic elements of quality measurement as including: (1) Physical Condition (determined by medical examination); (2) Moral Background (determined by enlistee statements and/or checks on misdemeanors, felonies, etc.); (3) Trainability (determined by aptitude tests); and (4) Motivation/Discipline (determined by high school diploma, interviews, and training attrition).\(^2\)

The Opinion Research Corporation (ORC) offers another definition of "quality" in a market study of the attitudes and motivations of young men toward enlistment in the Army. ORC here demarcates the quality margin of prospective recruits as those who: (1) are high school graduates (or soon to be graduates); (2) have academic standing in the top two-thirds of their class; (3) have interests and attitudes "useful" to the Army and "suitable" for technical and/or combat assignment; and (4) have "desirable" moral standards and values. One-fourth

---


\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 1-8.
of all non-college men, the appropriate target population according to ORC, were estimated to meet these criteria.\(^1\)

There is obviously a great deal of subjective appraisal involved in separating quality from non-quality. Adjectives such as "desirable," "capable," "motivated," "productive," "suitable," "useful," "competent," "disciplined," and "adaptable" are all used to describe the perfect military recruit. Because of the difficulty in constructing individual profiles and predictors of performance, military quality objectives are most frequently defined in practical terms according to educational attainment and intelligence test scores. The Department of Defense, in fact, has recently come to describe quality in the shorthand terms of mental group categories\(^2\) and high school graduation or non-graduation.

Mental categories, determined from scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), are used in determining eligibility for military service, enlistment guarantees, and assignment to occupations. The ASVAB is also designed to predict performance in training for specific military occupations (i.e., "trainability"). High school graduation, on the other hand, while frequently employed as a concise measure of quality, is not used to screen entry into a skill, but rather


\(^2\)Mental Categories are described above (Chapter I). Briefly, those individuals classified in Categories I and II are above-average; those in Category III (IIIa, IIIb) are average to slightly below-average; those in Category IV (IVA, IVB, IVC) are below-average; and those in Category V are at the bottom of the scale and disqualified from military service.
to help predict the probability of disciplinary or motivational problems. Consequently, "marginally acceptable" (i.e., non-quality) applicants to the armed forces are traditionally those without high school diplomas and with aptitude test scores below the national average (i.e., Mental Category IV).

The reliance on high school graduation and mental aptitude test scores as determinants of quality and predictors of effectiveness is not just for the sake of convenience. Education and aptitude have been shown in several studies to correlate strongly with performance on the job, trainability for occupational assignment, and adaptability to military life. For instance, the recent Quality Soldier Study by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) highlighted the overall superior performance of the more-intelligent (Mental Category I-III), better-educated (high school graduate and above) individuals in the three major areas of leadership, discipline, and job proficiency. The same results generally hold true for the other Services as well. Non-high school graduates characteristically experience more disciplinary, administrative, and retraining actions--resulting in a much larger rate of early discharges. Courts martial and non-judicial punishments occurred among non-high school graduates

---

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Quality Requirements, pp. 2-5.


3 See U.S. Department of Defense, Quality Requirements, p. 5; see also U.S. General Accounting Office, Problems.
at rates 1.5 to 3 times more often than among graduates during the late 1960s. And, high school drop-outs were found 15 to 20 percent less productive on the job (according to supervisor ratings) than were high school graduates in another, more recent study.¹

Several analyses have similarly shown that Mental Category IV enlistees usually experience higher failure rates during formal training and they are not as "productive" in their occupational specialties. These individuals tend to require extra help in occupational training, and typically advance in the ranks at rates considerably slower than their higher-aptitude peers. In terms of job productivity, Mental Category IV enlistees are seen on average as 10 percent less productive than their Category I through III counterparts.²

In 1974, Defense analysts told Congress: "The more years of education, the lower the unsuitability discharge and other disciplinary action rates. For these reasons, the Army, as well as the other Services, prefers to enlist a high proportion of high school graduates."³

In 1978, Defense Manpower analysts again reported to Congress: "It is generally accepted that possession of a high school diploma is the best single measure of a person's potential for adapting to life in the military. . . . Thus, active forces recruiting programs have concentrated on enlisting high school diploma graduates . . . and for the most part have been successful."⁴

¹Cooper, *Military Manpower*, pp. 129-130. ²Ibid.
Yet, the convenient, shorthand, seemingly uncomplicated quality standards used by the Defense Department and others to gauge effectiveness and efficiency have practical limitations. Although the Department of Defense strives to enlist as many high school graduates and as many high mental aptitude individuals as possible, there is some evidence that more is not necessarily better. The Defense Manpower Commission, for example, claims "it can be shown that, in certain occupational areas, some Category IV personnel perform as well or better than a number of Category I-III personnel." Indeed, in a study of tank crew members by TRADOC it was found that the best-educated and most-intelligent students were the worst gunners. And, furthermore, Coffey et al. maintain that research has been generally unsuccessful in equating the passing of written examinations to future military performance.

In the early days of the AVF, Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson stated that, in fact, there is an optimal level of low-ability personnel needed in the armed forces:


3Ibid., p. 50.
Overall, the learning capacity of new entries is adequate in meeting job requirements when the proportion of Mental Group IV personnel does not exceed about 22 percent. Conversely, when the overall proportion of Mental Group IV personnel falls below 15 percent, there is a tendency toward many people being under-challenged by their job assignments.¹

"[A]n extremely capable individual in an unchallenging and unsophisticated job," adds the Defense Department report on quality requirements, "can create morale and motivational problems. Individuals should be matched as closely as possible to skill requirements in order to serve the best interest of both the individual and the Service."² Although all jobs "require motivation, maturity, and ability to adjust to a military way of life," there are "a number of jobs in the Service which permit a lower aptitude than others."³

Binkin and Johnston, in their discussion of manpower policy alternatives (and the enlistment "bonus") also observe that it is quite possible to "buy" more quality than is actually necessary—suggesting there are definite limitations on the relationship between quality and military effectiveness.⁴ Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in a report to the President on ending the draft, took a similar position on the matter of quality overrepresentation. "An organization composed of bright people unchallenged by their jobs," stated Laird, "would be


²U.S. Department of Defense, Quality Requirements, p. 15.


as much of a quality mismatch as an organization made up of people who lack the ability to perform their jobs. . . .\textsuperscript{1} The goal, according to Laird, "should be to obtain people who can perform the required job in a completely adequate fashion."\textsuperscript{2} And this notion of an optimal "quality mix," largely for cost considerations, remains the official Defense Department line on quality needs.\textsuperscript{3}

Some critics of the Defense Department's "quality mix" standards claim that policies which limit the number of Mental Category IV recruits and high school dropouts are equivalent to racial quotas, since blacks comprise a disproportionate percentage of disadvantaged Service applicants. Proponents of a socially-active military establishment have long criticized the armed forces for overstating their quality standards and effectively restricting participation by disadvantaged groups.\textsuperscript{4} Reginald Brown, for example, in a biting

\begin{itemize}
  \item Ibid., p. 27.
  \item Department of Defense analysts write: "Maintaining an over-qualified force may be unnecessarily expensive. Mental Category IV accessions are easier to recruit but have higher losses than do those in Categories I-III. The trade-off lies between the training cost and the recruiting cost." See U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Interim Report}, p. 9. "Training costs to replace losses must be balanced against the increased costs associated with recruiting those of the higher mental categories," Defense manpower analysts reiterate (in U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{America's Volunteers}, p. 25).
\end{itemize}
criticism of "recruitment malpractice," has charged that reducing Mental Category IV enlistments is tantamount to excluding blacks.¹

**Effectiveness and Socioeconomic Composition**

Indeed, another side to the relationship between representation and military effectiveness involves socioeconomic composition. There are many theories concerning the consequences of social demography on organizational effectiveness, but very little empirical evidence. As Coffey et al. point out, there are numerous unquantifiable variables and intangibles, internal and external to the armed forces, which complicate any assessment of the manner (and degree) in which the socioeconomic composition of a force affects performance.²

The Defense Manpower Commission did attempt to determine through an opinion survey of 154 military commanders in 1975 how (according to perceptions by the commanders) certain changes in socioeconomic composition of units may have directly affected the ability of units to perform their missions.³ The Commission found no evidence in the survey results that socioeconomic composition affects the capacity of


²See Coffey, et al., "Socio-Economic Composition."

³Survey teams visited military installations throughout the country and spoke with commanders from squadron, battalion and ship levels and above. The ranks of the commanders ranged from captain (0-3) to major general (0-8), and the average time-in-service for the commanders was 19 years; see U.S. Defense Manpower Commission, *Defense Manpower*, p. 157.
an armed force to fulfill its mission. Rather, the Commission states in its final report, performance is apparently more influenced by "dynamic factors" such as leadership, training, morale and discipline, and materiel readiness than by socioeconomic composition.¹

Nonetheless, even without hard evidence on representational measures other than education and aptitude, questions of effectiveness are sometimes raised; and these questions are often just enough to stimulate public uncertainty and anxiety concerning the capability of the armed forces. For example:

1. To what extent does racial imbalance affect the unity and morale of military units? That is, does racial imbalance exacerbate racial tensions and provoke discontent and unrest within the military?

2. Does inter-group diversity reduce or improve field effectiveness?

3. Is a military force composed largely of the poor, disadvantaged, and otherwise disaffected members of society a "reliable" force? Will racial minorities, for example, if summoned into action for civil disturbances, decide they owe a higher loyalty to their own communities than to the government?

4. Since individuals feel responsive to their own reference groups, values, group memberships, ethnic origins, and so on, how necessary is a "balance" of diversified interests?

¹Ibid., pp. 156-157. See also Coffey, et al., "Socio-Economic Composition," pp. 36-42, 48-49, 58-68, for a more complete description of the survey and results.
For example, what effect will an unrepresentative armed force have on civil-military relations? Does civilian control exist in the plurality of thought and conflicting interests of various civilian groups in the armed forces? Does an unrepresentative military therefore pose a threat to democratic government; and can the military-industrial complex be controlled? Will military homogeneity act to provide a band of professional killers, mercenaries, or "hired guns" with little stake in civilian society? Will the loss of an identity of thought between the military and society result in a self-serving army of career-minded "employees"—unwilling to pay the price of patriotism in battle?

The above concerns have all been expressed at some point either preceding or during the operation of the AVF; and each, in its own way, is enough to cast doubt upon the effectiveness of an unrepresentative military force. Another question, then, is what influence does a loss of public confidence in the military—created by public perceptions of a socially unrepresentative force—have on civil-military relations and military effectiveness? What effect will public doubt or mistrust in the armed forces have on recruitment, oversight, budgets, and other areas? Will public awareness of inequities in military participation fuel disharmony and social protest, as it did during the period of the Vietnam War?

There are possibly other indirect consequences of demographically unrepresentative military participation. Recall, for instance,
the suggestions by Janowitz and other sociologists that the over-
representation of blacks could result in a "tipping effect"--damaging, in the long run, the recruiting ability of the armed forces.1 Further recall the supposition that overrepresentation of the poor and disadvantaged can create an image of the armed forces as a "haven for society's losers"--to the extent that military service is no longer accepted as a legitimate activity by a large segment of American youth.2 The composition of the military may equally affect the image of American life and American defense capabilities abroad. It has been suggested, for example, that combat units which are overweighted with minorities and the disadvantaged will not have credibility in the world arena; and a loss of credibility limits military policy options.3 On another level, such units might not effectively project (i.e., symbolically represent) the goals of U.S. domestic and foreign policy.4

It is likely that the overall effectiveness of the American armed forces is somehow influenced by factors related to the social

1See Morris Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer Military as a 'Socio-


3See, for example, Morris Janowitz, "Blacks in the Military: Are There Too Many?", Focus 3 (June 1975): 3-5.

4Where military service is perceived as a "burden," a disproportionately large number of minorities or disadvantaged service-members is seen to reflect inequities in society and the system of government. "Human rights" and democracy in practice are thus laid open to criticism. The image of the American military and what it represents extends from the highest levels of foreign policy to troop-community relations abroad.
composition of its membership. The manner and degree of influence, the important social variables, the point at which representational divergency (however defined) creates effectiveness problems, and related issues, are still left mainly to speculation in the literature. The volunteer armed forces fortunately have not reached the degree of divergence from the civilian population where serious effectiveness problems would be apparent (though some critics of the current AVF believe otherwise).

Yet, it is important to understand that military "effectiveness" is not confined to the military. The armed forces are an agent of the national government. The effectiveness of the military is thus, above all, the ability of the military to vigorously pursue and accomplish national objectives. As long as military effectiveness is circumscribed by the higher goals of the national government and the community it serves, "effectiveness" must be regarded as interconnected with equity and legitimacy: military effectiveness is hence that which also preserves equity and that which protects, defends, and exemplifies the legitimate order.

Measures of Military Effectiveness

The previous evaluations of social equity and political legitimacy encompass several facets of military effectiveness. Attitudes, socioeconomic variables, and other demographic measures have been treated within the contexts of equity and legitimacy—the areas of debate with which these representational measures are principally associated. "Quality," as previously noted, is the focus of most discussions concerning the relationship between representation and
military needs. The following examination of measures of effectiveness concentrates on those characteristics of the armed forces which determine and reflect "quality" representation.

Mental Categories

A Department of Defense progress report on the AVF states that "the mental quality of the enlisted force . . . has tended to increase" since the end of the draft. The report points out, in FY 1964 one out of every seven active force enlistees ranked in Mental Category IV; but by FY 1977 only one in twenty enlistees was in Category IV. Indeed, if overall force quality is measured by the sparsity of Category IV enlistees, the volunteer armed forces of the 1970s have been steadily improving. As Table 45 shows, for both the Army and total DoD the proportion of new enlisted entrants in Category IV during 1977 was noticeably lower than in previous years. On the other hand, the proportion of Category I enlisted entrants during the AVF years was also lower than the comparable proportions during the indicated years of the draft; and the proportion of Category II recruits during the 1970s was similarly lower than during the 1960s.

The fact that there are relatively fewer Category IV recruits enlisting each year is not sufficient proof of higher overall quality. Actually, some critics of the AVF claim today's enlistees are, on average, lower in mental aptitude. Considering the decrease in higher mental aptitude enlistees, the average overall quality of enlistees during the 1970s is lower than that of the 1960s. In a recent study of military manpower, Cooper found neither marked improvement nor

1 U.S. Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, p. 25.
TABLE 45
MENTAL CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION OF MALE ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) IN ARMY AND TOTAL DOD FOR SELECTED YEARS (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Entry (Calendar Year)</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mental Category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL DOD |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mental Category |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| I           | 5.9 | 6.5 | 8.2 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 5.1 |
| II          | 24.0| 35.4| 38.8| 29.1| 30.8| 26.2|
| III         | 43.0| 51.4| 40.1| 50.0| 56.3| 62.3|
| IV          | 27.1| 6.7 | 12.9| 17.2| 9.8 | 5.8 |
| Unknown     | --  | --  | --  | --  | --  | 0.6 |
| TOTAL       | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |


aPeak total male enlistments for period between 1953 and 1959.

bLast peacetime year before war in Vietnam.

cYear of peak total male enlistments during decade of 1960s.
decline in the mental category distribution since the removal of the draft. Rather, mental category was seen to shift toward the center of the scale.¹

But what does this mean in terms of population representation? Table 46 compares the mental categories of male recruits during 1977 with the estimated distribution of the eligible male civilian population. There is a wide disparity between the four Services—with the Air Force clearly exceeding the other Services in high aptitude recruits, while the Army "brings up the rear." Nevertheless, it is apparent that all Services (with the notable exception of the Air Force in the higher mental categories) underrepresent the total civilian population at both the high and the low ends of the aptitude scale. Underrepresentation is greatest in Mental Category IV. At the same time, only the Army has proportionately fewer new enlistees in Mental Categories I and II than the non-college population of civilians. The Services more closely resemble the group of non-college civilians, and it appears the Services are drawing from the greater population of "average" young men: there are relatively 63 percent more enlistees in Category III (total DoD) than total civilians in this category, and 38 percent more enlistees than non-college males. Yet, the apparently high proportion of enlistees in Mental Category IIIb (i.e., below average intelligence) suggests the central tendency may not be "average," but rather "below average." The mean scores reflect this tendency—especially in the Army.

An interesting aspect of mental category distributions is the difference between races. Historically, as seen in Table 47, ¹

¹Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 132.
TABLE 46
MENTAL CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION OF MALE ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) AND
COMPARISON DATA ON ELIGIBLE MALE CIVILIAN POPULATION (1977)
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mental Category</th>
<th>MALE NPS ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</th>
<th>ELIGIBLE MALE CIVILIAN POPULATION (18-21 Yrs)a</th>
<th>Approximate IQ Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service of Accession</td>
<td>Total Civilian (Percent)</td>
<td>Non-College (Percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIa</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIb</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVa</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVb</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVc</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meanb</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a"Eligible" population is all persons scoring (or expected to score) above the range of Mental Category V (ineligible for enlistment).

bMean calculated on scale of eight, where Category I = 8; II = 7 ... V (ineligible) = 1. (Category V tabulations were subsequently included in the unknowns.)
TABLE 47
MENTAL CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION OF MALE ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE)
IN ARMY AND TOTAL DOD BY RACE FOR SELECTED YEARS
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>MALE NPS ENLISTED ENTRANTS</th>
<th>Year of Entry (Calendar Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1953-1963</td>
<td>1964&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL DOD</th>
<th>Mental Category</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> Last peacetime year before war in Vietnam.

<sup>b</sup> Peak total male enlistments during decade of 1960s.
minorities have disproportionately comprised the lower mental categories. In 1966, the peak year for male enlistments during the 1960s, close to 58 percent of all minorities (non-white races) in the Army were classified as Category IV. By 1977, 20 percent of minority enlistees were in Mental Category IV—an almost two-thirds decrease. One reason for the upward shift in minority aptitude rankings is attributed to changes made in testing procedures. In 1973 the Army switched to a new classification test (Army Classification Battery-73), which supposedly eliminated the "cultural bias" present in earlier tests.¹ However, it is remarkable that there were proportionally fewer above-average aptitude minorities (like their white counterparts) entering the Army in 1977 than in any of the previous years depicted.

Table 48 provides a further breakdown of the mental category distribution by racial/ethnic group for 1977 accessions (Army and total DoD). All minorities—especially blacks—are characteristically lower than the white/non-Spanish group on mental category rankings. In fact, according to the mean scores, black accessions are almost one full category lower than their white/non-Spanish peers.

The mental category distributions presented here imply the "average" recruit today is just that: average, or even slightly below average in mental aptitude. This may or may not hold true for minorities, since there is no comparison data on the civilian population which separates by race. But minority accessions generally score lower on the aptitude tests than their white counterparts; and policy directed at increasing the mental "quality" of the armed forces holds serious

¹Ibid., p. 213.
TABLE 48
MENTAL CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) IN ARMY
AND TOTAL DOD BY RACE/ETHNIC STATUS (1977)
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mental Category</th>
<th>ARMY NPS ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</th>
<th>TOTAL DOD NPS ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Race/Ethnic Status</td>
<td>Race/Ethnic Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White/Non-Spanish</td>
<td>White/ Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIa</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIb</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Department of Defense Master and Loss File.

* Mean calculated on scale of eight, where Category I = 8; II = 7; ... V (ineligible) = 1.
equity implications. In other words, mental category representation and "equitable" minority participation in the armed forces may be conflicting policy objectives.

Educational Attainment

A great deal has already been said concerning the educational attainment of military personnel. Next to race and certain socio-economic measures, education is a major focus of attention in representational studies. In terms of military quality and effectiveness, education only becomes an issue of "representation" when the armed forces do not achieve the minimum cross-sectional level of educational attainment found in civilian society. For reasons described above, the armed forces seek to recruit as many high school graduates as possible. The measure of success in enlisting high school graduates has always been the proportion of high school graduates in the age-eligible national population. So, when the proportion of high school graduates exceeds the comparable proportion of high school graduates in the civilian cohort, the armed forces claim triumph; when the proportion of accessions with a high school diploma falls below the comparable proportion of civilians, Defense Department critics call the recruitment system a failure.

Another area of debate is the proportion of college-trained individuals in the armed forces. A journalist for the Washington Post, for example, in a recent article entitled "Can Today's Recruits Do The Job?", poses the following question: "Is the loss of college-trained or otherwise highly skilled draftees a fatal flaw?" At the same time, Michael Getler, "Volunteer Army: Can Today's Recruits Do The Job?", Washington Post, 20 November 1978, p. A-1.
time, an Army captain claims new soldiers are "harder to train and they don't retain it." A brigade commander similarly feels quality is down from 3 or 4 years ago, levels of education are lower, and the Army is at a point where the weapons systems may be getting too sophisticated for new recruits. And, though they may be high school graduates, some recruits are only reading at the eighth grade level.¹

In fact, during 1977 all Services except the Army had overrepre-
sentatively high proportions of high school graduates enter active duty; and, considering the median age of Army enlisted entrants in 1977 (i.e., 19.3 years), the Army appears to have enlisted an approximately represen-
tative percentage of non-high school graduates (see Table 49). How-
ever, there were significantly fewer college-trained individuals among new enlistees in all Services during 1977 than in either the conscripted force of previous years,² or the general population of military-age males. It is sometimes argued that the blue-collar nature of enlisted positions and lack of opportunity for lateral entry encourage these edu-
cational differences and prevent many college-educated individuals from enlisting.³

Another approach to the study of educational representation is to examine and compare the educational attainment of all active duty per-
sonnel, not just new enlisted entrants. As seen in Table 50, this method

¹Ibid., p. 213.


³See Cooper, Military Manpower, p. 207.
## TABLE 49

**EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF MALE ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION AND MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S. (1977)**

*Percent*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service of Accession</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below High School Graduate</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED*</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency examination. Data on GED recipients are not available for the general population indicated.*
### Table 50

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL (OFFICERS AND ENLISTED) IN ARMY AND TOTAL DOD AND MALE POPULATION OF THE U.S. (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>Active Duty Military Personnel</th>
<th>Male Population of the U.S.&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (18 Years and Above)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Total DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below High School Graduate</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate and Above</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civilian Labor Force**: 22.6, **Non-Labor Force**: 55.2, **Total**: 32.4

**Civilian Labor Force**: 37.1, **Non-Labor Force**: 23.1, **Total**: 34.4

**Civilian Labor Force**: 17.0, **Non-Labor Force**: 14.0, **Total**: 16.3

**Civilian Labor Force**: 19.3, **Non-Labor Force**: 7.7, **Total**: 16.9

**Sources**:

<sup>a</sup>Derived from internal service reports through December 1977.

<sup>b</sup>Data are from the March 1977 Current Population Survey.

<sup>c</sup>Includes military personnel who have passed the General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency examination.
of comparison presents an entirely different picture of force quality. Including officers, who are virtually all college graduates (94-95 percent), enlisted personnel who have had the time to take advantage of educational opportunities while in service, and reenlistees who are generally better educated—while separating out those who leave before the completion of their initial term of service (i.e., predominantly non-high school graduates)—the active duty force appears quite well-educated and higher in overall attainment than either the pre-AVF force\(^1\) or the general population (Table 50).

**Enlistment Waivers**

The Department of Defense maintains that enlistment standards are now higher than during the draft or the early days of the AVF. Higher standards increase performance and reduce attrition, Defense analysts state.\(^2\) And, it should be added, high standards usually mean the Services are able to select from among a large supply of available applicants—that is, the Services can afford to be "choosy." One indicator of recruiting success, then, is the inflexibility of enlistment standards, or the extent to which the armed forces must dig down into the supply of otherwise unacceptable applicants in order to meet enlistment quotas.

An applicant who is found unfit for military service must first receive an enlistment waiver before he or she is allowed to enter active duty. Table 51 depicts the distribution of enlisted accessions receiving

---


TABLE 51

ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) WHO RECEIVED WAIVERS FOR ENLISTMENT BY TYPE OF WAIVER, RACE, AND SERVICE OF ACCESSION (1977) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Waiver Received</th>
<th>N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</th>
<th>SERVICE OF ACCESSION</th>
<th>TOTAL DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Persons Receiving Waivers</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Waiver Required</td>
<td></td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Department of Defense Master and Loss File.
these enlistment waivers during 1977. It can be seen that a very small percentage of individuals enter active duty with physical or mental waivers. Without additional data for comparison, these distributions are only suggestive of recruit "quality." Nevertheless, the truly remarkable result in Table 51 is the extraordinarily high proportion of enlistees receiving moral waivers. Indeed, almost one out of every six Navy enlisted entrants received some type of moral waiver; and, astonishingly, one out of three Marine Corps recruits required a moral waiver during 1977.

The Marine Corps has a reputation for toughness, for building men from boys. And the armed forces have in the past projected the popular image of being a reform school for some enlistees—a place for "straightening-out" juvenile delinquents and young men with disciplinary problems. According to this image, judges frequently exercise a discretionary power to reduce or remit a court sentence on the condition that the young criminal enlists in the military. There is no documentation on how much of this is based on fact or mythical lore; but if the data are accurate, it appears as though the Marine Corps (and, to a lesser degree, the Navy) has a direct link to the criminal justice system.

The truly disturbing aspect of these data is the understanding that the majority of moral waivers are given to applicants who have committed "non-minor" misdemeanors. Table 52, for example, breaks out the types of moral waivers for the Army and total DoD. Again, without data for comparison, it is difficult to generalize on the "representativeness" of criminal incidence among new recruits. However, a roughly comparable distribution of the arrest rates, by selected crimes, for
TABLE 52
COMPARISON OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) WHO RECEIVED MORAL WAIVERS BY TYPE OF MORAL WAIVER RECEIVED AND CIVILIAN ARREST RECORDS FOR MALES UNDER THE AGE OF 18 (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Moral Waiver Received</th>
<th>N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS (1977)</th>
<th>TOTAL ARRESTS REPORTED IN US (1976)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Total DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Traffic Offense</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Than 3 Minor Offenses (Non-Traffic)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Than 3 Minor Offenses (Non-Traffic)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Minor) Misdemeanors</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Felony</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Abuse</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol Abuse</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Moral Waivers Reported</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Moral Waivers Reporteda</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Moral Waiver Reported</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Less than one-tenth of one percent.

aTotals may differ from previous tables due to different report sources and definitions.

bArrest rate is total arrests (per crime) per total male population under the age of 18 years. Rates depicted should not be considered indicative of percentage incidence among population, since there is no control on number of repeat offenders.
males under the age of 18 is also presented in Table 52. There are certain shortcomings in using arrest data on the U.S. population; for example, there is no control on repeat offenders (suggesting inflated rates) and there are probably age differences between the civilian and military groups. Despite "comparability" problems, the data tend to confirm initial impressions: enlisted entrants during 1977, especially in the Marine Corps and in the Navy, do not reflect the overall population in terms of criminal incidence. How this particular "quality" difference may influence military effectiveness is uncertain.

Crime Rates and Criminal Confinement In Service

One possible result of enlisting a disproportionate percentage of individuals with previous criminal records is a disproportionate incidence of crime in service. Table 53 presents a comparison of identified offenders in the Army and the arrest rates for U.S. population, by race and type of offense. It should be noted that these data are only roughly comparable. Army data are the combined arrest statistics for two quarters, one in 1976 and one in 1977 (approximate year-end estimates appear in parentheses); data on male population (18-39 years) were combined from several Services, and there are probably biases built into the arrest rates.

In 1974, the Army had the following arrest rates (or so-called "indiscipline" rates) per 1,000 men: crimes of violence, 8.25; crimes against property, 89.76; drug-related crimes, 40.72.\textsuperscript{1} Table 53

TABLE 53

COMPARISON OF ARMY IDENTIFIED OFFENDERS AND U.S. POPULATION ARRESTS BY RACE AND TYPE OF CRIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crime</th>
<th>ARMY IDENTIFIED OFFENDERSa</th>
<th>U.S. MALE POPULATION OFFENDERS (18-39 Years)b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (Number R/1000c)</td>
<td>White (Number R/1000c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes of Violence(d)</td>
<td>673 (3.67)</td>
<td>417 (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yr Estimate)</td>
<td>(7.34)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes Against Property(e)</td>
<td>1,004 (5.48)</td>
<td>1,520 (2.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yr Estimate)</td>
<td>(10.96)</td>
<td>(5.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-Related Related</td>
<td>2,433 (13.27)</td>
<td>5,047 (8.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yr Estimate)</td>
<td>(26.54)</td>
<td>(17.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63,875 (15.80)</td>
<td>71,221 (2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.22)</td>
<td>(5.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56,877 (14.07)</td>
<td>168,741 (5.25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


aOffenders for third quarter, CY 1976 and 1977.

bNumbers of arrests by race, sex, and age are not available in crime report data cited. Numbers of arrests were estimated from separate data on race, sex, and age distributions, and should therefore be considered only roughly approximate. In addition, total arrests do not account for repeat offenders; thus, arrest rates are somewhat inflated.

cRate per 1,000 individuals in respective total population. Year estimate is (R/1000) X 2, and appears in parentheses.

dCrimes of violence include murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assaults.

eProperty crimes include burglary, housebreaking, all larcenies, and auto theft.
suggests that Army arrest rates have declined considerably since 1974, especially in crimes against property. The estimated year-end rates likewise suggest that Army "indiscipline" rates were lower than those which occurred in the general population for all but one type of crime: drug-related offenses.

The crime rates for blacks are higher than the crime rates for whites in both the Army and the general population. However, it is notable that differences between races are greater in the civilian population than in the Army. And, even though black crime rates in the Army are higher than white rates, the incidence of crime by blacks is relatively lower (i.e., in comparison with the civilian standard) than crime by whites. Thus, while race differences persist, the data suggest blacks are representatively higher in "quality" than whites by this measure.

Blacks and other racial minorities are also greatly overrepresented in Army prisoner populations. In September 1977, for instance, when blacks comprised about 26 percent of Army membership, the total Army prisoner population was over one-half black; during the same year, other racial minorities comprised 2.7 percent of the Army and 3.7 percent of the prisoner population. The Army points out that even though blacks are overrepresented in the prisoner population, the degree of overrepresentation is less than that in the civilian population: the proportion of blacks in the Army's prisoner population is almost twice the proportion of blacks in the Army; on the other hand, the proportion
of blacks in the Federal Bureau of Prisons' System is almost four times the proportion of blacks in the national population.\(^1\)

It has even been suggested that the overrepresentation of blacks in the Army's prison system is indirectly related to other disparities in black representation. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference lays the blame for black overrepresentation in Army penal facilities on inequities in the criminal justice system—specifically the unrepresentatively low percentage of black officers (6.1 percent) and the predominance of prejudiced white officers from the South.\(^2\) Officers make the initial decisions to either deal with problems through minor punishment, court martial, or some early discharge. Administrative discretion thus plays a large part in the initial corrective action—and the decisions are being made by mostly white officers. For example, not only are blacks greatly underrepresented in the overall officer corps, but throughout the entire justice system: (1) of the Army's 46 trial court judges, one is black (and one is female); (2) only 4 percent of the Army's lawyers are black; and (3) only 13 percent of the Army's military police force is black.\(^3\)

\(^1\)U.S. Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity: Second Annual Assessment of Programs (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, February 1978), p. 53. Moreover, the overrepresentation of blacks in the Army's prisons is a continuing trend: for example, in 1972, 17 percent of the Army was black, but 37 percent of the confinement population was black; in 1976, 25 percent of the Army was black, and 50 percent of the Army's prisoners were black. And, the proportion of blacks serving time for serious crimes is rising—while blacks have a 5 to 1 greater rate of conviction for more violent crimes than do white inmates. See Bill Drummond, "Army Concerned About Blacks' High Rates of Criminality," Washington Post, 19 November 1978, pp. G-1, G-2.


\(^3\)See ibid., p. G-2; also see U.S. Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity, p. 37.
Racial disparities likewise show up in Army statistics on early separations from service (see Table 54). Blacks are considerably over-represented among soldiers receiving punitive discharges (Dishonorable and Bad Conduct). Yet, the actual number of punitive discharges is relatively small and decreasing. Administrative discharges (Other Than Honorable and General) provided for almost 97 percent of all early separations in FY 1977. 25 percent of Army enlisted personnel receiving these administrative discharges were black, whereas blacks comprised over 26 percent of the total enlisted force in FY 1977.

Military Effectiveness and the AVF

A 1975 article in Playboy asked the question, "Can the Volunteer Army Fight?"; it replied, "Don't Count On It!". In 1976 a Washington Post reporter wrote of a "national phenomenon"--the "unprecedented number of quality young people joining the Army on their own." "Although Army leaders agree that three years is too soon to declare the all-volunteer Army an unqualified success," reported George Wilson, "they say all the recruiting indicators are pointing the right way." By 1978, a newspaper article on "the All-Volunteer Army's Bleak Future" referred to the Army's "dummies," who are "by and large the best the services can attract at a time of growing sophistication of weapons, and who are accounting for just about all of the negative statistics." And, at

1Josiah Bunting, "Can the Volunteer Army Fight? (Don't Count On It!)," Playboy, November 1975, pp. 84-86, 157-166.


3Ibid., p. A-3.

### TABLE 54

EARLY SEPARATIONS OF ARMY ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL
BY TYPE OF DISCHARGE (OTHER THAN HONORABLE)
AND RACE FOR SELECTED YEARS
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Early Separation Discharge</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishonorable&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 76</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Conduct&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 76</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Than Honorable&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 76</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Discharge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 76</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup>Dishonorable discharges and bad conduct discharges are punitive discharges, approved on the basis of a Special or General Court-Martial.

<sup>b</sup>Other Than Honorable, changed in FY 77 from Undesirable Discharge, is an administrative discharge.
the same time, a two-year Defense Department study of the AVF concluded: (1) "[c]oncerns that the active force would not be representative of the society at large have not materialized"; (2) "[t]he AVF has provided the military services with a full-strength active force of a quality equal to or superior to that achieved under the draft"; and (3) there is a strategy which will "permit us to maintain current quality well into the 1980s."1

The AVF is experiencing some problems, and many people are directing the blame at the insufficient "quality" of new recruits. Declining mental aptitude test scores,2 evidence of widespread recruiting fraud,3 rates of "indiscipline,"4 drug and alcohol abuse,5 racial tensions and polarization,6 and first-term attrition rates7 are the


7"Attrition" rate is the percent of servicemembers who are discharged from service before completing their full, initial term of enlistment. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, pp. 65-68.
"disquieting indications"¹ that quality is falling along with military effectiveness. Attrition is considered among the most problematic aspects of the AVF, since (1) attrition has risen markedly between FY1971 and FY1976-FY1977,² (2) past efforts have failed to deal adequately with the problem, and (3) attrition means more accessions to sustain force size and thus greatly increased costs (a sorepoint of the AVF). Because attrition is a hot issue, discussions of quality are generally aimed at resolving this particular problem; and nowhere is the multifaceted, imprecise, and bothersome nature of "quality" more apparent than in the various prescriptions for the most effective "quality mix."³

It is clear the "quality" issue has not been resolved. "Quality" and "effectiveness" still mean many things to many different people. The whole issue of quality is essentially a recent development, an outgrowth of the switch to voluntary enlistment. Under the draft, no one questioned "quality." It couldn't be

¹King, Achieving America's Goals, p. 29.

²For example, in FY 1971 the Army's attrition rate was 26 percent. In FY 1974, attrition in the Army reached a peak of 38 percent. Projected Army attrition rates for FY 1978 and FY 1979 are 30 and 31 percent, respectively. The other Services have similarly high rates. Defense manpower analysts now observe: "While it is important that the Services be able to release malcontents and people who do not adapt to military life, we have gone too far and are now releasing many persons who could have productive careers in the military." Therefore, the "Services are attempting to lower attrition by increasing the management attention devoted to this problem" and by improved recruitment screening to exclude "high risk personnel." See U.S. Department of Defense, America's Volunteers, pp. 65-68.

³See, for example, Cooper, Military Manpower (pp. 133, 141), for a discussion of the running argument concerning the suitability of Category IV high school graduates vs. Category I-III non-high school graduates.
questioned. The Services had to settle for whatever the Selective Service System provided and whatever they could muster through the draft spillover and their modest recruiting programs. The draft provided a share of "dummies" and a share of college graduates. Criticisms of the system were never directed at quality, though quality may have been involved; critics argued the system drafted too many disadvantaged young men, or not enough disadvantaged young men, or not enough college-deferred, middle-class whites.

When the draft ended, therefore, there was no real bench mark for measuring quality or the effects of various quality "mixes" on troop performance. The educational and intelligence distributions of the draft-era force were at first accepted as the standard criteria—mainly because the draft was there before the AVF, the draft supplied a visible reference point, and because the AVF, in order to be accepted, would first have to prove it could at least replace the draft. Eventually, the national population of military-age youth became the criterion for measuring quality, and "quality representation" was equated with minimum quality needs.

Of course, military needs may have little to do with quality representation, or social representation, or any other representation. Efficiency, performance, trainability, discipline, motivation, leadership, and so on, are the standards military managers use to evaluate force ability. The relationship between internal organizational capabilities and the microcosmic duplication of the nation is dubious at best. Military effectiveness, though it is a part of other national objectives which argue in behalf of full representation, may
thus be at cross-purposes with representation. And military effectiveness may require some compromise of national goals and military objectives—a trade-off or balance of internal organizational needs and national needs, as embodied in the military membership.
"Representation" is perhaps the most discussed and least understood aspect of the American armed forces. Yet, direct references to military "representation" appear in numerous Defense Department studies and reports, statements and testimony by government officials, congressional and executive department documents, newspaper articles and editorials, "think-tank" research monographs, popular magazines, academic journals, public commentary, and general literature in the Social Sciences. The term has become a permanent part of the military manpower vernacular, and no discussion of the armed forces is complete today without some mention of social demography and "proportional distributions."

Remarkably, there is a dearth of substantive, probing research on the topic of military representation. Research which has been conducted generally follows a conventional pattern: variables are selected and explained, numbers are compared, discrepancies are noted, and the results are simplistically interpreted. Something is considered "representative" when it contains within itself the same elements, in the same proportions as are found in the standard or reference group. Thus, when the numbers are right—when the mathematical quantities coincide—the problem is resolved. However, for a variety of reasons, variables, criteria, and interpretations often vary greatly from study to study.
Identical statistical data on civilian and military populations are found to inspire contradictory conclusions in the literature.

The fundamental problem is that the concept of representation is deceiving: it appears somewhat simple to grasp in the abstract; but as one reaches within its philosophical periphery, a webwork of seemingly irreconcilable conflicts is found. And, when placed in practical perspective, "representation" becomes even more complex and elusive. Part of the problem is that even though the idea has permeated military thought, it is neither self-evident nor universal. There is no common set of standards or consensus concerning population subgroups. There are opposing notions regarding the "appropriateness" of representation measures and normative prescriptions. There is an endless variety of population characteristics which may be said to affect the broadly-stated goals of military representation. Moreover, it is apparent that representation involves a complex "system" of related social and political issues. Consequently, there are no precise definitions of military representation in previous literature, no comprehensive theoretical framework, and no well-trodden paths to understanding.

Although the notion of representation (as applied to the military) is relatively modern, the basic concept has been a part of political thought for hundreds of years. Yet, even in the political literature, there are frequent references to "representation," but no systematic analysis. Representation theory is disappointing at best—characterized by emotive generalities, and by nagging, persistent controversies which never got resolved or much less clarified.

Throughout the literature, nevertheless, there is an interrelatedness of thought concerning representation—that is, a "real nature
of representation."¹ Indeed, in this country it has become a keystone of democracy—an assurance of constitutional behavior and political equilibrium in the pluralist society. Further, this "core" of thought has slowly spread from the political sphere throughout the social fabric of the nation. In the 1940s, representation theory was applied to the bureaucratic realm. During the 1960s, representation theory was applied within the military context. Today, representation manifests itself in "affirmative action" and related numerical policies in employment and education, in "balanced" political party tickets, in public concern over ethnic, racial, and female appointments to public office, in one-person/one-vote rulings, in the movement for direct popular election of the President, in symbolic portrayals of the American population, in minority and female rights movements, and so on.

The spread or expansion of representation theory from the bureaucracy to the armed forces has been aided in recent years by the movement of the military organization closer toward the civilian bureaucratic model. With the end of the Vietnam War, the military shifted gears and returned to a pre-war, bureaucratic structure—a passive, self-directed organization, preoccupied with preserving volunteer recruitment and with the perfection of its own parts. As the armed forces assumed the "significant purposes of bureaucracy," the organizational structure of the military experienced several "civilianizing" trends; and the military establishment, in offering government "jobs," grew to resemble the civilian bureaucracy.

Thus, the meaning and usages of "representation" are found essentially transferable from the political to the bureaucratic to the military sectors. A representative military implies that the armed forces (1) are "authorized" to act on behalf of the nation, (2) are "accountable" (requiring methods of "direction and control"), (3) "stand for" something in both the descriptive and symbolic senses, and (4) "act for" the nation. However, the "descriptive representation" or "microcosmic representation" of the American military is found to be the focus of most discussion today.

Summary of Issues and Conflicts

At the heart of the concept of military representation in this country is the classic argument: should the American armed forces be a small, highly competent force of career-oriented "regulars" or a "citizen's institution," composed primarily of duty-bound conscripts? In fact, conceptions of the responsibilities of citizenship and a universal military obligation are the blood and sinew of representation theory. From the armies of the Roman Republic through the French levee

1Interestingly, Army recruiting materials, billboards, posters, magazines and newspaper advertisements no longer urge prospective volunteers to "see your local Army recruiter." "For more information," Army advertisements currently advise, "call your local Army Representative." Army recruiters are now Army "Representatives" (always capitalized). The new title creates an entirely different impression of both the Army recruiter's role and the place of the Army in society; and the symbolic suggestion supports the transferability in the meaning and usages of "representation." A "recruiter" is simply one who engages persons for military service. A "representative," however, can be (1) a person serving as an example of something (e.g., the military), (2) one qualified to serve as an official delegate or agent, or (3) a member of a governmental body (usually legislative).

2The general typology of representation theory is from Pitkin, Concept of Representation, pp. 11-12, 38-143.
en masse and post-Revolutionary thought in America, to the present-day controversy over voluntary recruitment, it is the idea that all citizens share an equal responsibility of service to the nation which underpins the fundamental principle of proportional participation. Along with notions of "manhood obligation for service" and full citizen participation, the problem of legitimate control over the military establishment is the oldest and most ardently debated facet of military representation.

The changing perspective of discussion concerning military manpower and methods of manpower recruitment reflects the changing politics and national circumstances. Since 1945, for example, manpower issues have focused on national security, budgetary considerations, and practical expediency (i.e., compulsory service). "Equality of service" grew out of the citizen-soldier concept around the period just prior to World War I; yet, before the 1960s, equity was seldom ever a major factor in manpower policy decisions. A combination of civil rights and anti-war protests, "quota consciousness," and the public response to inequities in the Selective Service System led to extensive draft reform, the draft lottery, and the eventual demise of conscription. At the same time, as a result of these social forces, a new public awareness of the military establishment developed—an awareness and interest in the means as well as the outcomes of defense manpower policy. Moreover, it was the concern for the social consequences of manpower policy decisions which helped to re-shape methods of recruitment and to popularize the concept of "military representation."

1 See James M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971).
Prior to 1964-1966, before the civil rights and anti-war movements joined hands, military "representation" was an infrequently used term and an unnecessary (so many believed) policy concept. Since the 1966-1967 draft extension debates, "representation" has become an indicator of (in times of compulsory service) and substitute for (in times of voluntary service) the "randomness" by which we measure "equality of service" in the "non-universal" (i.e., self-selective or state-selective) armed forces. Thus, "equality of service" for the nation is the perfect representation of identified groups—a mathematical situation—among the few who serve.

Equity issues are by far the most commonly discussed feature of present AVF participation. The major reason for current interest in the "social justice" of voluntary recruitment is the highly disproportionate percentage of blacks in the Army—and, to a lesser extent, the perceived differences in the social class distribution between the enlisted force and the general population. Ironically, while the underrepresentation and exclusion of blacks from the military ignited modern discussions of "equality of service," it is the overrepresentation of blacks in the enlisted ranks which today dominates most commentary. In the 1940s and 1950s, "equal opportunity"—that is, allowing blacks to share equally in the benefits of military service—was a major policy objective. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the "burdens" of military service were seen to outweigh the benefits, and equal opportunity gave way to "equal representation"—that is, protecting the disadvantaged and certain depressed minority groups, such as blacks, from bearing a disproportionate burden of the defense of the nation. Thus, equality of service once
meant getting blacks into the armed forces; now it means (benignly)
keeping blacks out.

Concepts regarding the "political legitimacy" of the American
armed forces also involve issues of military representation. The no-
tion of a citizen's obligation to serve in the military is still a
popular and controversial topic of discussion. Borrowing from a classic
theory of accountability in government, the "subjective" (or "informal
internal") model of military accountability posits that representational
diversity, or a "balanced mix" of civilian-community values, provides
a naturally effective means of legitimate direction and control. The
"subjective" model appears as a recurrent theme in academic research, but
concepts of the "consequential" representation measures are changing.
Uneasiness over the internal mechanisms of organizational accountability
and civil-military relations has in recent years increased interest in
the study and measurement of ideological representation. Indeed, al-
though most discussions of representational issues still center on social
background characteristics, social scientists are placing greater emphasis
on the significance of attitudes.

Military representation—especially when it pertains to measures
of "quality"—is often considered in context with "military effectiveness."
The end of the draft and advent of volunteer service in the early 1970s
operated to make the education and aptitude levels of the general military-
age population the criterion of recruiting success. However, it is not
clear that "quality" representation, though often included in military
manpower analyses and public commentary, necessarily affects overall
military performance or organizational efficiency. The disproportionate
representation of certain socioeconomic variables, on the other hand,
may negatively influence the effectiveness of the armed forces. Empirical research is insufficient, but several theories of the potentially adverse effects of socioeconomic divergencies have contributed to public apprehension about current AVF participation.

Thus, expressions of concern regarding the representational configuration of the American armed forces have focused on three general areas of national policy: social equity, political legitimacy, and military effectiveness. But the various expressions of concern are not founded on indisputable, axiomatic truths. Indeed, value conflicts both within and among these three categories of thought are quite prevalent. Each theme is heavily value-freighted, containing a variety of possible meanings and measures, along with a full-range of equally justified, yet essentially opposed, arguments. The result is a hodge-podge of representation theory, a conglomeration of naysayers and advocates with no particularly distinct political or ideological linkages, much normative jousting, and little empirical evidence.

Perhaps the most problematic of these value conflicts is the "benefits vs. burdens" controversy. Equity perceptions are greatly influenced by the assumed ratio of benefits to burdens in the military service. When the "burdens" of enlistment are seen to outweigh the "benefits," attention is focused on social class distinctions; and, any overrepresentation of individuals from the lower social strata is perceived as evidence of systemic inequity. In cases where the "benefits" of military service overbalance perceived "burdens," however, it has been suggested that the achievement of true social equity occurs through the overrepresentation of the disadvantaged poor and racial minorities.
Added to this is the understanding that "benefits" and "burdens" are value-laden, culture-bound concepts, which may bear no relationship to the conditions of war or peace. For example, it is seen that American immigrants, the Nisei (during World War II), and blacks have valued the "right to fight" and wartime service; exclusion from combat duty was a denial of full-citizenship and, therefore, equality. On the other hand, even during peacetime, under the volunteer format—with opportunities for technical training, education, social development and mobility for the disadvantaged, personal fulfillment, and employment (with salaries higher than ever before)—military service is described by some in largely negative terms. In fact, present discussions of military representation in the AVF have not concentrated on disproportionate black enlistments because whites are being refused a fair share of the benefits—but, rather, because depressed minorities are viewed as "accepting" (due to hidden, economic pressures) an unfair share of the burdens in order to obtain the opportunities.

Moreover, because the voluntary military is gaining an image as "employer of last resort"—a haven for the disadvantaged and "losers" of society—it is failing to advance or improve its attraction for a wider cross section of society. The re-socialization of poverty youth depends on public acceptance of the military as a legitimate activity for everyone, not just special segments of the population. So, while the disadvantaged find certain opportunities and an outlet for unemployment in the armed forces, the full value of any opportunities for these individuals may be lost without cross-sectional representation (i.e.,
the acceptance of military participation as broadly-based national service).

Yet another area of conflict is found between the objectives of equal opportunity and proportional representation. "Equal opportunity" (i.e., treating everyone alike) and representation are often perceived in context with particular minority groups, women, and the struggle for civil rights. But equal opportunity is a concept which relates to the individual: rights attach to the individual, and individual opportunity (as opposed to group opportunity) means that all persons are judged on the basis of their personal qualifications. Representation conversely classifies individuals according to groups; it draws attention to stereotypical qualities (i.e., statistics are segregated according to "sensory" judgments of group distinctions), and it encourages, rather than obviates, consciousness of innate group differences.

"Political legitimacy" stands out as one of the oldest, most deep-rooted themes of military representation. Compulsory service follows on the heels of legitimacy arguments, since it is the only manpower recruitment system capable of ensuring "universal" citizen participation. Yet, conscription violates the precepts of free choice; and forms of conscription in this country have been characteristically unfair, drawing from limited, "non-universal" manpower pools.

Interestingly, while theories of political legitimacy date back (at least) to the birth of the nation, an array of exclusionary practices,

Inequitable standards, and quotas have historically prohibited military participation by certain segments of the population. Black Americans, for example, were restricted from full participation and subject to special enlistment quotas until only thirty-years ago. Today, participation by women is regulated for the stated purposes of military effectiveness and practical expediency (the same reasons once used for limiting participation by blacks). Nevertheless, the special exclusion of women implies that women are "second-class" citizens; and political legitimacy objectives can never be fully realized unless women are treated and accepted in the armed forces on an equal basis with men.

The sociopolitical environment and a complex of value judgments and reality judgments affect popular perceptions of representation. The manner in which the military is perceived accordingly determines the choice of statistics for comparison and subsequent appraisals of force content. The current controversy over the representativeness of the volunteer force illustrates how conceptions of the military organization may guide assessments of recruiting results. The "occupational model" of the volunteer military suggests that the distinctions between enlisted and officer positions in the armed forces are analogous to the distinctions between blue-collar and white-collar jobs in the civilian labor force. On the other hand, the "institutional model," which describes military service as a universal obligation of citizenship (or a "calling"), sets the armed forces apart from civilian occupations and

\[1\] The "institutional vs. occupational" formulation of conceptual models is attributed to Charles C. Moskos, Jr. See, for example, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces and Society* 4 (Fall 1977): 41-50.
draws no occupational or class lines. Obviously, the social demography of the labor force and its various sectors differs from the demographic distributions of the general population (especially among the younger, so-called "military-age" population). Entirely opposite conclusions can thus result in evaluations of the same military data—depending on conceptions of the military, and the selection of "appropriate" variables and population standards for comparison.

Military "effectiveness" likewise involves a set of goals which conflicts with representation. Perfect representation, for example, would necessitate the enlistment of persons now found mentally or physically unsuitable for military service. But military manpower managers seek to recruit candidates on the basis of qualifications, not representation; qualified enlistees make good soldiers, it is said, because they are qualified. Military needs are thus used to justify the "quality mix" of individuals in the armed forces as well as the standards for acceptance and placement.

But the goals of military effectiveness are tied to the goals of equity and legitimacy. As an agent of the government, the military responds to the "higher" criteria of equity, and it conforms to legitimate direction and control. At the same time, in order to effectively protect and defend these national guiding principles, the military must fulfill its own peculiar organizational requirements. Hence, there is a basic conflict of purposes, the classic problem of means versus ends: internal organizational needs (i.e., "effectiveness") require that certain standards be employed to control military enlistments and job placements; however, national principles and priorities simultaneously demand that the armed forces be a "reflection" or microcosmic image of society.
In the case of "effectiveness," as with "equity" and "legitimacy," some balance of opposing objectives is evidently needed. Balance is the key to reconciling differences between "benefits" and "burdens," internal organizational needs and external national goals, equal opportunity and equal representation, compulsions and freedoms, and other areas of discord. A trade-off or compromise is similarly needed to mitigate the fundamental conflicts between the goals of equity, legitimacy, and effectiveness.

A Model of Military Representation

From our understanding of the need for permeable boundaries\textsuperscript{1} between the military and civilian sectors of society comes a major argument in behalf of statistical parity. And, because we recognize the need for civil-military convergence, we seek to describe the outcomes and objectives of military representation in social and political as well as military terms. Assuming that it is possible to establish evaluative criteria and balance competing objectives, we can attempt to build a conceptual framework and functional definition of military representation.

Starting with the basic conceptual premise that a scale may be constructed along which the military is overlapping with civilian society\textsuperscript{2}—and building upon the synthesis of representational issues—


a limited convergence/divergence model of military representation can be developed.

The idea of perfect representation is perceived as a microcosm or specular image of the total population. Perfect representation in the armed forces is depicted in the Convergence/Divergence Model (Figure 1) as a miniature replica of the national population, located somewhere within the national population. Since the idealized state of perfect representation cannot be achieved under normal conditions, it is necessary to establish some boundary of "approximate representation" in the model. Once the notion of "approximate representation" is accepted, however, the presumed certainty of outcomes associated with perfect correspondence is lost. The problem is that "approximate" distance can mean one inch or a thousand miles—one percentage point or many more—depending upon one's point of reference. Approximate representation must inevitably be evaluated, therefore, in relation to

---


1 It is assumed that under "normal conditions," acceptance standards limit the representativeness of the military. This is true for both conscription ("selective" service) and volunteer service, though the improbability of perfect representation increases under the volunteer format (see Chapter V).
Figure 1. Convergence/Divergence Model of Military Representation
the set of "higher" goals which operate to make it a significant policy concern.

The boundary of approximate representation in the Convergence/Divergence Model is circumscribed by the national goals of military effectiveness, social equity, and political legitimacy. As long as the configuration of military participants stays within this boundary (depicted as the shaded area in Figure 1), the armed forces can be described as approximately "representative."

Government policy, social values, the economic environment, incentives and conditions for military participation, attitudes, etc., all change over time. These changes may be expected to alter the established perimeters (i.e., standards) of representation. Consequently, the configuration of military personnel may shift within and beyond the "approximate" range—while actually remaining static. Conversely, the configuration of military membership itself may shift, while national priorities reflect no change. Gravitation or stretching out of the

1 The model's use of "higher" goals or national priorities is based on the foregoing analysis of military representation. The selection of three principal themes, however, is not intended to exclude other policy concerns which may not be clearly covered by these themes. William R. King, for example, relates armed forces manpower requirements to "higher" goals and writes: "Although the U.S. has no formal process for establishing its national goals, such goals are broadly stated in the Constitution and exist implicitly in the laws passed by Congress." And King proceeds to use President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals (1960) as a specific reference. See William R. King, Achieving America's Goals: The All-Volunteer Force or National Service?, Report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1977), pp. 5-10. See also a similar approach to Defense manpower problems in Donald J. Eberly, "National Needs and National Service," Current History 55 (August 1968): 65-71. Other references to national goals can be found in reports by the Committee for Economic Development, periodic studies by the Brookings Institution and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the conclusions of President Nixon's National Goals Research Council.
bounds of representation can occur at any or all points and impinge upon the confines of equity, legitimacy, and effectiveness. (Possible configurations are portrayed with broken lines in Figure 1.)

It is also possible that divergence from perfect representation in a particular demographic category may frustrate the achievement of objectives in one policy sphere, while benefitting the accomplishment of ends in another. The point is that changes in representation and national policy goals will have different effects on the boundaries of convergence/divergence. There is some overlap of objectives; however, "divergence" from perfect representation may not be divergence from any or all of the objectives by which representational goals are defined.

The symmetry of the conceptual model is not meant to imply that the evaluative criteria are necessarily equal in value or importance. In applying the model, then, it is important to note that the establishment of limits on approximate representation requires certain assumptions regarding the meaning and relative importance of effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy. An analysis of policy alternatives to effectuate approximate representation in the armed forces would be much easier if one could definitely describe, in practical terms, the essence of these goals. The task would also be much easier if one could avoid consideration of the issues. Unfortunately, neither approach is possible.

The application of this conceptual model involves complex value judgments and reality judgments associated with representation. It may thus be criticized for using the problem to resolve the problem. Yet, in the case of representation, most arguments—most judgments made concerning the need for proportionality—have been of an abstract nature,
heavily value-laden, and loaded with references to "universal truths." Since the problem has been expressed in public forums along such lines, analysis must seek to identify the structure, components, and consequences of these normative judgments. The attempt here is to express these values in an operational format for evaluating military representation.

Translating values into "objective functions" is difficult enough. When we try to establish priorities among these values, the analytic problem seems almost insurmountable. The standards used in the model are connected by a common thread of understanding concerning the requirements for military representation; but they are not always complementary, and frequently conflict. It can be said, for example, that without "effective" armed forces it is not possible to protect or maintain legitimacy and equity in our society. On the other hand, there are those who would argue that without equity or legitimacy there is nothing worth protecting. Nevertheless, choices need to be made among competing values in any policy decision process. And, even though we are not able to rank and compare the evaluative criteria in any extreme sense, we can seek to "strike a reasonable balance."

**Application of the Conceptual Model: The Expansive Limits of "Approximate Representation"**

"Representation" perhaps means more in the United States than in any other nation. *E Pluribus Unum—From Many One—is more than just a motto on the Great Seal. It signifies and typifies the American self-image: a nation where unity can be achieved while all diversities of society (and, of course, political units) are preserved. As Herman Melville wrote in 1849, "You can not spill a drop of American blood without spilling the blood of the whole world. . . . No: our blood is as the
flood of the Amazon, made up of a thousand noble currents all pouring into one. We are not a nation, so much as a world. . . ."¹

The U.S. armed forces have always emphasized the diversity of their membership; it is in the nature of the organization which consciously "brings together" persons from varied backgrounds—the "blood of the whole world"—to serve for a common cause. Popular literature and the mass media have helped to create this image of the American military as a sort of miniature melting pot, a faithful reflection of all distinctive traditions and cultural patterns in the nation. And the recent spread of interest in military "representation" has functioned to convert the image into a national policy goal.

The irony of the situation lies in the fact that the American armed forces have never been truly representative of the civilian population. The history of inequity and inequality in the military is the history of racial injustice and class privilege in society. Thus, the armed forces have, at various times and under various circumstances, deprived certain groups from entrance into the military when it was important to serve and protected other groups when it was important not to serve. Conscription (i.e., "selective" service) has never produced representation in the American military (even though it may be capable of the task). And it is even less likely that representation can occur under the volunteer format.

There are still major dissimilarities between the military membership and the civilian population. Women, for instance, form a

relatively minute segment of the armed forces; and the reasons for this situation no longer appear as tenable as Defense policymakers once thought. In addition, there are remarkable age differences; there are moderate differences in religion, "quality" factors, and race (especially black versus white); and there are strong suggestions of representational differences in socioeconomic measures, type of community (urban versus rural), and attitudes and values. So why do we as a nation continue to pursue the illusion of perfect representation? Indeed, with the sheer complexity of the concept and its abundance of competing principles and differing views and expectations, how can we derive some sort of consensus?

Under volunteer, peacetime conditions, a national consensus on this topic is probably as unlikely as a perfectly proportional military. "Representation," because it involves so many complexities, concepts, and consequences, seems to evoke strong emotive responses from concerned observers. Opinions in Congress, for example, cross over political party lines and the usual ideological divisions.

But the Convergence/Divergence Model (Figure 1) can function as a way of sorting out, or "thinking through," the various conflicting ideas and values. An important aspect of the Convergence/Divergence Model is the idea that "approximate representation" can mean practically anything. The principal gauge or "conceptual yardstick" for "approximate representation" is not "perfect representation." The statistical data and comparisons of proportions are meaningless unless their significance can be demonstrated through the equity, legitimacy, and effectiveness criteria—the true measures of "approximate" population representation in the armed forces.
In theory, then, a highly unrepresentative (in statistical terms) force could be an "approximately representative" force. Depending on the balance of the three criteria (and the sociopolitical environment which defines the criteria), it is possible that a "representative" military could be all-white, or all-black, or all-male, or all-female, and so on. It is the idealistic objective of "perfect representation," the deeply-ingrained American sense of equal shares and proper balance, which operates to unify differing perspectives; and it is the ideal of perfect proportionality which prevents "representative" from becoming highly unrepresentative in this country.

Actually, the proposition that a highly unrepresentative military could fulfill the criteria and be "approximately representative" is not unreasonable. From the standpoint of accountability, over-reliance on internal, informal (or "subjective") mechanisms of control can be problematic. It has been noted that a great failure of many formulations of representation theory is the misguided assumption, "when the numbers are right, the problem is solved." So also, when certain measures of statistical representation are in line with expectations, civilian and government watchdogs over the military establishment may be less attentive to matters of direction and control. Lulled into thinking there is adequate convergence, we cease to scrutinize the military as much or as often, we cease to be as protective of budgets, we give in more to the military infrastructure, and we, as a society, set ourselves apart from the military. The real danger of an autonomous military may therefore lie in the statistically representative force, rather than in the statistically unrepresentative force.
The AVF, for example, though it is criticized for being unrepresentative, is probably more a part of the social fabric than was any post-World War II military. In fact, the current concept of representation has "come of age" along with the AVF. The concern over military representation issues has never been more widespread than now; and the American military has never been more studied and discussed since the founding fathers first pondered its structure. Consequently, though the AVF may be unrepresentative, it is the unrepresentative condition which has encouraged scrutiny of the military establishment.

In the case of military effectiveness, a highly unrepresentative force could likewise fulfill the requirements for "approximate representation." If all non-prior service accessions were high school graduates—and the distribution of intelligence test scores matched Service requirements—Defense Department manpower policymakers would be overjoyed; and few congressmen would question the "representative quality" of the AVF, since the minimum standard is the civilian distribution, and anything above that standard is now considered a sign of successful recruitment. In addition, if all combat soldiers had the physical prowess of a world champion pugilist and the competitive disposition of an archetypal, head-thumping pro football player (and so on), how many middle-Americans would question the combat effectiveness of the fighting force?

Advocates of an expanded social role for the armed forces would be no less pleased if the military disproportionately represented disadvantaged youth in the enlisted ranks. Many social commentators, since the days of the "Great Society," have urged that the military take a more active part in advancing the social welfare of depressed minorities. This is achieved by relaxing acceptance standards, if necessary, in order
that greater numbers of otherwise unacceptable, underprivileged youth can take equal advantage of the benefits and opportunities obtainable through military service. According to this view, the armed forces discriminate against the one segment of youth who can profit the most. Only by redistributing the "benefits" (and access to benefits) of military service, it is said, can society promote true social equity and fairness. Hence, the greater the proportion of less-privileged youth found in the military, the better.

In summary, "perfect representation" is neither possible nor desirable. So, we accept the concept of "approximate representation." But "approximate representation" is not defined in mathematical terms; it is defined in relation to the evaluative criteria which have operated to make military "representation" a national policy objective. Because "approximate representation" is subjectively determined, it may vary in accordance with changing perspectives—perspectives which, though tempered by the illusion of perfect representation, bear no particular resemblance to statistical representation. Consequently, the AVF can be "approximately representative" even though women are missing and there are obvious class differences between the military and society; the racially segregated military may have been "approximately representative" in its own time (but not by current standards); and even a highly unrepresentative military can be "approximately representative," depending upon the standards of equity, legitimacy, and effectiveness.

And there are no extremes on what may or may not be interpreted as "approximately representative." For example, an "equitable," "legitimate," and "effective" proportion of blacks or other minorities in the Army (the focus of much present-day concern) can be 30 percent, 50
percent, or even more. There are so many differences of opinion regarding the statistical measures, the vital issues, the groups, and methods of comparison, that an argument in support of practically any percentage can be developed. The percentages are basically irrelevant—unless, of course, it can be said that a certain proportion of a particular group in the armed forces fails to "strike a balance" on the value scales we have constructed.

Unfortunately, the conceptual model offers no assistance in the policymaker's task of defining national priorities and establishing practical limits on military representation. Indeed, there are no simple methods in evaluating and setting public policy. The conceptual model can only help to put the numbers in perspective and relate military representation to the full "system" of social, political, and military issues.

The foregoing analysis has attempted to reveal the complex issues, the normative values, the historical antecedents, the philosophical and practical implications, and the various competing principles embraced by the concept of military representation. It has not attempted to make the task of locating "approximate representation" any easier; if anything, it has probably complicated usual reasoning. The basic point is that there is an intricate and tangled web of questions involved in representational studies. In order to transcend sheer mathematical formulas, it is first necessary to recognize the role of the armed forces in society, and vice versa. If this approach succeeds in complicating our thinking—if it succeeds in raising issues, and in arousing disagreement, debate, and deliberation—it will undoubtedly serve to enhance our understanding.
APPENDIX
DATA SOURCES

Several data sources were used in this study of military representation. Primary sources included the U.S. Department of Defense Master and Loss File of active duty servicemembers, the U.S. Department of the Army Quarterly Sample Surveys of Military Personnel, Current Population Reports from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, and supplementary data supplied by the U.S. Department of Defense (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) and the U.S. Department of the Army (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

The following is a capsule description of the primary data sources used in this study.

Department of Defense Master and Loss File

Most demographic data on servicemembers, particularly enlisted entrants in CY 1977, were obtained directly from the magnetic tape copies of the Department of Defense Master and Loss File. The Master and Loss File contains a wide range of information on all individuals who enter the armed forces. The computer tapes are maintained and updated (at two-month intervals on the basis of information supplied by the Services) by the Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), located in Alexandria, Virginia and Monterey, California.
Some information on socioeconomic status was obtained by merging the Master and Loss File with computer tapes from the 1970 U.S. Census of Population. The "fifth count" census data files, maintained at DMDC, contain detailed information on a random subset of the U.S. population living in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). The postal Zip Code extract of the Census file was used to determine selected socioeconomic characteristics of military entrants (CY 1977) living within each Zip Code located in an SMSA.

Statistical programs developed by DMDC were used to analyze data contained in the Master and Loss File.

Table 55 shows the percentage distribution and total number of non-prior service enlisted entrants in CY 1977 by Service of accession (as extracted from the Master and Loss File).

Department of the Army Quarterly Sample Surveys of Military Personnel

The Army Sample Surveys are multi-purpose instruments, administered worldwide on a quarterly basis. The major portion of the Army Sample Survey data used in this study is from the 30 November 1977 quarterly administration. Statistics from previous administrations of the (November) Army Sample Survey were used for purposes of comparison, and these sources are referenced in the particular tables. All original tabulations and analyses of these data were conducted by the Department of the Army, Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) in Alexandria, Virginia, unless otherwise indicated.

The samples for all Sample Surveys consist of randomly selected groups of active duty officers and enlisted personnel. Data extracted
**TABLE 55**

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED ENTRANTS (NON-PRIOR SERVICE) IN CY 1977

BY SERVICE OF ACCESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service of Accession</th>
<th>N.P.S. ENLISTED ENTRANTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>149,798</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy*</td>
<td>93,327</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>41,662</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>69,309</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>354,096</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Department of Defense Master and Loss File.

*Includes 13043 "three-by-six" Navy Entrants (i.e., 3 years of active duty followed by 6 years of Naval Reserve duty).*
from these surveys generally have a reliability of 95% (or better).\footnote{1}

**Other Sources on Military Personnel**

Most data on military personnel other than CY 1977 entrants were extracted from various Department of Defense and Department of the Army reports (including reports on the Army Sample Surveys). References to these reports appear in the body of the study and in the selected bibliography.

Representation statistics, as a rule, appear as percentage distributions of populations in each category. Actual numbers usually are not depicted. Table 56 shows the percentage distribution and numbers of active duty personnel (as of the end of FY 1977). Table 56 is presented here as an aid for calculating other data on specific cell quantities in the representational categories.

**Sources on U.S. Population**

Most information on the general population of the United States was obtained directly from U.S. Bureau of the Census reports and documents. In addition, data were extracted from U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and Executive Office reports. References to specific documents are contained in the body of the study and in the selected bibliography.

\footnote{1See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, Army Personnel: Composite (November 1976), DAPC-MSF Report No. 76-134-13 (Alexandria, Va.: Department of the Army, Military Personnel Center, 1977), pp. i-iii.}
TABLE 56
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL AS OF FY 1977 BY SERVICE AND TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>97,738</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>680,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>63,312</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>462,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>18,650</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>173,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>96,256</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>469,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>275,956</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,785,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Total Active Duty military personnel as of 30 September 1977 (end FY 1977).
The National Longitudinal Study (NLS)

The NLS survey was initiated by and conducted for the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The original objective of the survey was to obtain statistical data which would permit comparisons of student educational experiences with later outcomes. The Base-Year Survey was administered in the spring of 1972 with over 1,000 in-school group administrations of survey forms to a sample of approximately 18,000 high school seniors. In the fall of 1973 (First Follow-Up), 1974 (Second Follow-Up), and 1976 (Third Follow-Up), the same individuals were contacted again along with about 5,000 additional former students from sampled schools that were unable to participate in the Base-Year Survey.

The treatment of activities and plans in the base-year and follow-up operations facilitated the construction of the three groups (non-entrants, "1 Year or Less," and "More Than 1 Year") compared in the present study. An explanation of the time periods for these groups is presented in Chapter VI.

Other measures were derived in the following manner:

Socioeconomic status (Chapter VI) was computed by the Research Triangle Institute (Research Triangle Park, North Carolina) for NCES. It is a composite of five components: father's occupation, parents' income, father's education, mother's education, and household items. Each component variable was standardized and given equal weight in calculating the composite. The terms high, medium, and low socioeconomic status refer to
subjects in the upper, middle two, and lower quartiles, respectively, of the composite score frequency distribution.

General Academic Ability (Chapter IV) was determined (also by the Research Triangle Institute) from the composite value of a series of tests designed by the Educational Testing Service (Princeton, New Jersey). Four test areas were included: vocabulary, reading, letter groups, and mathematics. The mean of the four standardized scores served as a general index. The terms high, medium, and low refer to subjects in the upper, middle two, and lower quartiles, respectively.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books, Research Monographs, and Edited Works


"A Note on Social Welfare Losses With or Without the Draft."
Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, September 1975.

---

The Social Cost of Maintaining a Military Labor Force.
R-1758-1-ARPA. Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corporation, August 1975.


Davis, James W., Jr., and Dolbeare, Kenneth M. Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System.


Dreyfuss, Joel, and Lawrence, Charles. The Bakke Case: The Politics of Inequality.


Hermens, Ferdinand A. *Democracy or Anarchy?* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1941.


Huntington, Samuel P. "Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement." 
A Study of Organizational Leadership. Edited by United States Military Academy, Office of Military Leadership. 

Janowitz, Morris. "Basic Education and Youth Socialization in the Armed Forces." 
Handbook of Military Institutions. Edited by Roger W. Little. 


Bachman, Jerald G., and Blair, John D. "'Citizen Force' or 'Career Force'? Implications for Ideology in the All-Volunteer Army." Armed Forces and Society 2 (Fall 1975): 81-96.


Blair, John D.; Thompson, Richard C.; and Segal, David R. "Race and Job Satisfaction in the U.S. Army." Paper Presented to the 1970 Southeast Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 3 June 1979. (Processed.)

"All-Volunteer II." The New Yorker, 1 December 1975, pp. 137-156.


Brehm, William K. "Two Years with the All-Volunteer Force." Commander's Digest, 10 April 1975.


Dellums, Ronald V. "Don't Slam Door to Military." Focus 3 (June 1975): 6.


________. "Writing off the G. I. Bill: The Quiet Death of an American Institution." February 1979. (Processed.)


Friedman, Milton. "Don't Draft G. I. Joe." Newsweek, 16 April 1979, p. 76.


_____ "Blacks in the Military: Are There Too Many?" Focus 3 (June 1975): 3-5.


---. "Selective Service: Are There Alternatives?" Educational Record 48 (Spring 1967).


________. "The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?" Parameters. Journal of the U.S. Army War College 7 (n.d.): 2-9. (Processed.)


________. "The Emergent Military: Calling, Profession or Occupation?" Paper Presented at Symposium on Representation and Responsibility in Military Organization, University of Maryland, 20 January 1977. (Processed.)


Segal, David R., and Bachman, Jerald G. "Post High-School Drop-Outs (And Stayers)." Paper Prepared for the OSD/ONR Conference on First-Term Enlisted Attrition, Leesburg, Virginia, 4-7 April 1977. (Processed.)


"Uncle Sam Wants Who?" Time, 2 April 1979, p. 18.

"Victory for Quotas." Newsweek, 9 July 1979, pp. 77-78.


"What the Justices Said." Newsweek, 10 July 1978, p. 22.

Will, George F. "Reverse Discrimination." Newsweek, 10 July 1978, p. 84.

Newspapers and Television


"Promise of Paid Schooling May be Crucial for All-Volunteer Military, Researchers Say." Newsletter, University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Autumn 1975, pp. 6-7.


Revell, Joseph E. "WACs in Combat." The Times Magazine (Supplement to The Army Times), 9 February 1976, pp. 10-16.


Government Publications


Borack, Jules I. Intentions of Women (18-25 Years Old) to Join the Military: Results of a National Survey. TR-78-34. San Diego, Ca.: U.S. Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, September 1978.


Quality Soldier Study. Ft. Monroe, Va.: Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Volunteer Division, 14 May 1975.


