FRENCH NAVAL POLICY OUTSIDE OF EUROPE

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French naval policy, as outlined by senior naval officers and informed observers, is in many ways similar to French defense policy. In particular, the navy's views on strategic nuclear deterrence and the defense of metropolitan France are the logical maritime equivalent of those of the Army, Air Force, and Ministry of Defense. However, in the area of defense policy outside Europe, French naval writings go further than those of the other services or the ministry. The naval writers have defined an additional threat, "indirect strategy," that they feel France faces overseas, and they have adapted French deterrence theory in an effort to respond to it.

The term "indirect strategy" was originated by the noted French strategist General Andre Beaufre.\(^1\) It is one of two components of his concept of "total strategy," the other being direct strategy.\(^2\) Direct strategy is the achievement of a decision (or of deterrence) by primarily military means, while the essential feature of indirect strategy is that it seeks to obtain a result by methods other than military victory.\(^3\)

Beaufre's clearest definition of indirect strategy is as follows:

Indirect strategy is ... the art of making the best use of the limited area of freedom of action left us by the deterrent effect of the existence of nuclear weapons and of gaining important and decisive victories in spite of the fact that the military resources which can be employed for the purpose must, in general, remain strictly limited.
There are two aspects of this definition that are worth underlining. The first is that an actor's resources can be limited either because he is deterred from using them or because he does not possess them. Indirect strategy is thus for use by the weak as well as by the deterred. The second is that, the more complete nuclear deterrence becomes, the more prevalent indirect strategy will become. Since we have practically reached what Beaufre calls "nuclear paralysis," we can expect indirect strategy to be the dominant form of action in today's world.  

Beaufre outlines two types of maneuvers that can be used in indirect strategy, each of which uses a combination of direct (military) action and indirect (psychological) action. The first consists of 'nibbling' away at the enemy's weak point by quick, limited military actions separated by periods of negotiation. This he calls the 'piecemeal' or 'salami' maneuver. The second consists of the use of prolonged conflict combined with a psychological offensive to erode or wear down the enemy's will to resist. In this 'erosion' or 'weariness' maneuver, the military objective is not to win but simply to hold out without losing until the enemy gives up. The example of 'nibbling' that Beaufre cites most often is Hitler's actions in Central Europe between 1936 and 1939, while his 'erosion maneuver' is clearly an effort to describe the wars of national liberation since 1945, especially those inspired by the ideas of Mao Tse-tung.
Beaufre published these ideas in three books between 1963 and 1966. While his concept of indirect strategy was not immediately incorporated into official statements of French policy, it was only in the past 4 to 5 years, with the increasing activism of the Soviet navy, the development of strong regional states and, above all, the shock of the 1973 oil crisis, that the notion of indirect strategy has attracted wide attention in France. Navy spokesmen have been particularly prominent in adopting Beaufre's concept and modifying it to meet the new circumstances. In its revised form this concept now also appears in statements of the Ministry of Defense, notably in recent speeches of Yvon Bourges.

Navy spokesmen, following Beaufre, distinguish between two strategies open to France's enemies: "direct strategy" and "indirect strategy." In today's world, direct strategy used against France would consist of overt armed aggression against French territory, especially in Europe. France's nuclear deterrent force was designed to counter this strategy, and navy spokesmen agree with Beaufre that this force, coupled with the nuclear balance between the two superpowers, makes the use of direct strategy anywhere in Europe extremely unlikely. If war in Europe did occur, it would probably result from indirect causes: an accident, disruption of the East-West military balance, or the spread of conflicts that start outside Europe. The navy spokesmen also agree with Beaufre's contention that the more complete nu...
clear deterrence becomes, the more prevalent indirect strategy will become. Since we have practically reached what Beaufre calls "nuclear paralysis" in Europe, we can expect indirect strategy outside of Europe to become the dominant form of action in today's world, both for major powers and for lesser powers.\textsuperscript{10}

Of the two forms of indirect strategy described by Beaufre, the one that concerns the French navy is the piecemeal approach. (The French clearly hope that Algeria was the last large-scale war of national liberation that they will have to face.) In the navy's view the main threat is an enemy 'nibbling' away at French interests one by one when he is afraid or unable to attack France directly. He would alternate local thrusts with calls for negotiation and conciliation, in an effort to find the point of least resistance and test the will and ability of France to resist.\textsuperscript{11} At first he would try to choose forms of action that were either covert or non-violent and which therefore could not easily be characterized as aggression. He would choose as his initial targets interests which appeared of marginal importance, even if they were not. The enemy would subsequently have the choice of proceeding to more overt forms of violence if resistance was weak, or of continuing his piecemeal attacks until their cumulative effect brought France to her knees.

Indirect strategy is of particular concern to the navy, since it feels it is most likely to be exercised at sea. Naval forces can easily be moved at sea to interfere with commerce, intimidate
an opponent or protect a friend. Claims to territorial waters, to economic zones at sea and to the right to impose environmental regulations can give a pretext for harassing or interrupting traffic in straits and in coastal waters and for appropriating resources on the sea bed. Covert military actions are also possible at sea. A recent French CNO pointed out that nuclear submarines are capable of sinking merchantmen at sea, selecting them according to departure point, transit route, or arrival point, without revealing the submarines' nationality and making their government subject to retaliation. Another way to avoid retaliation is to instigate attacks by a small littoral power using fast patrol boats or land-based aircraft. Finally the deployed naval forces of the superpowers (possibly based in the Third World) and the navies of littoral states are capable of limited overt military action, which could also be part of an indirect strategy.

Indirect strategy would be of little importance to France were it not for the fact that it can endanger vital French interests without triggering France's strategic deterrent. Indirect strategy owes its popularity to the fact that the piecemeal attacks that make it up can all be kept small enough so that a strategic nuclear response to any one of them would not be credible. For example, an attack on a few merchant ships would probably not arouse sufficient public sentiment to justify a nuclear response. On the other hand, France has realized
that some of her interests that are vulnerable to indirect strategy are truly vital to her survival. It thus becomes possible for indirect strategy to "turn the flanks" of the French strategic deterrent by nibbling away at these vital interests until the cumulative damage brings France to her knees.

France has traditionally had numerous political and cultural interests overseas, but, while these are important, none of them, as they exist today, is regarded as vital. On the other hand, recent events have made her acutely aware that her economic interests overseas, which are highly vulnerable to indirect strategy, are indeed vital to her survival.\(^{15}\)

Politically, France has the obligation to protect her overseas departments and territories in the West Indies, off Newfoundland, and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These are all small specks of land, but they fly the French flag and have recently gained new importance due to the declaration of a 200-mile economic zone around all French territory. France has also accepted extra-European obligations by signing defense agreements with some of her former West African colonies. In addition France has made it known that "de-facto solidarity" could cause her to participate, if asked, in the defense of other former colonies with which she does not have formal agreements.\(^{16}\) France also wants to be able to participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of international organizations, and she wants to be able
to protect French nationals overseas wherever the necessity may arise.

The French also claim that the diffusion and welfare of French culture abroad is a French national interest. This has been a recurrent theme in French history, and today it serves to make French interests greater than they might otherwise be in certain parts of the world, notably West Africa and the southwest Indian Ocean. Cultural affinity could help bring about France's involvement in these areas under the guise of "de-facto solidarity."

France has always had economic interests overseas, but only recently has it become widely agreed that they are vital to her survival. Traditionally agriculture played a large role in the French economy and made her self-sufficient in many areas. Since World War II, however, France has experienced a remarkable economic boom that has greatly increased the relative importance of her industrial sector. This has brought great rewards but has also greatly reduced her self-sufficiency, since she does not have within her own borders either the energy resources, raw materials or markets needed to support her industrial economy. The French defense community was slow to see the significance of this change -- these economic interests did not figure at all in the 1972 White Paper on National Defense, which mentioned only French overseas political interests. In 1973, however, the shock of the oil embargo accompanying the October War and the subsequent
rise in oil prices made everyone aware of the vulnerability of France's energy supplies. 99% of France's oil and 73% of her overall energy supply come from abroad, as does 63% of the minerals used in her industry. More recent controversies, including debates over the Law of the Sea, have drawn attention to other essential resources overseas and the means by which they are brought to France. France also depends on traffic in the other direction -- her exports provide her with the funds she needs to pay for her oil and other supplies.

Senior navy spokesmen and others now argue that overseas interests are truly vital for France's economic health and standard of living, and that France could be brought to her knees in three months or less if her overseas connections were cut, even if her land frontiers were never crossed. Admiral Joybert, then Chief of Staff of the Navy, wrote in 1974 that France's nuclear deterrent force had transformed her into a mighty citadel but that "one can always reduce by famine, and without firing a shot at it, an impregnable fortress."

France's economic interests overseas are vulnerable in three places: the foreign countries that supply France with oil and raw materials and buy her products, the trade routes along which these materials travel to and from France, and the economic zones at sea where resources can be found in and under the water.

The producing countries, either on their own or at the instigation of a cartel or a superpower, could do great harm to France
by imposing arbitrarily high prices or by shutting down production. France would be equally hurt if political instability, civil disorders or a war in the producing country obstructed production. This situation is aggravated by the fact that a few individual states and cartels have a near monopoly over several natural resources that are vital to France.

The French navy is even more concerned about the vulnerability of these supplies on the trade routes. 75 to 80 percent of France's imports travel by sea, and 70% of her oil travels on one long, vulnerable trade route, the one around the Cape of Good Hope.22 The possible actions against these routes have already been mentioned -- they include legal restrictions, covert attacks by submarines or forces of littoral proxy states, or limited but damaging overt attacks. Such attacks could put enormous pressure on France and Western Europe -- one writer argues that the loss of even a few supertankers could cause the suspension of the oil traffic and a serious energy crisis in Western Europe.23

France's interests in the wealth in and under the seas could also prove of major importance to her. France followed the lead of other states and declared a 200 nautical mile economic zone around her territories, including those overseas, in 1976. Due to France's possession of numerous small isolated islands, this has raised her area from 550,000 to 11,000,000 square kilometers and
raised her rank among coastal states from 53rd in area to 3rd. She has already begun searching for oil off Metropolitan France and the Indian Ocean island of Kerguelen, and she also hopes to find manganese nodules off her Pacific Islands. France also draws much wealth from areas not under her control: her fishing fleets work the Dogger and Grand Banks among others, and she has oil survey crews at work around the world. France needs to protect her potential riches at sea from rapacious exploitation by others, and she must protect her own legitimate interests in regions not under her sovereignty.

The French do not feel that they are alone in being economically vulnerable to indirect strategy outside Europe. They feel that the other major industrial powers, including the superpowers, are all more or less dependent on overseas resources. The result is that the world is now engaged in a subtle competition in which powers, acting on their own or through interposed smaller states, are trying to gain control of these resources (or deny them to their rivals) by any means that will not lead to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. The French feel that the stakes in this competition are truly enormous -- the wealth of the whole world outside Europe, North America and Russia -- and that the redistribution of this wealth could lead to the establishment of a new world balance, despite the fact that the nuclear stalemate prevents use of direct strategy. The dangers of this situation are further increased by the number of Third-World states, the insta-
bility of many of them, the proliferation of armaments, and the increasing economic interdependence of nations. The result is that the world is in a state of permanent crisis and the interests of France and her friends are in continuous jeopardy. The French want to be able to protect their own interests in this dangerous world and also participate in the formation of the new balance, and they have made this a primary mission of their non-strategic forces.26

Having defined the threat of indirect strategy and the interests that are vulnerable to it, we turn to the strategy that the French navy has adopted to counter it. The French realize that in a world populated by two superpowers and a number of strong regional powers, some located at great distances from France, she does not have the ability to respond with brute strength. (In any case, this might not be an appropriate response to certain kinds of indirect attack.) Instead she has turned to her version of deterrence theory in an effort to develop a defensive strategy "for the weak against the strong."27

French deterrence theory of the 1960s generally resembled the U.S. doctrine of massive retaliation, which called for a massive nuclear strike as the reaction to any aggression. In the 1960s both the U.S. and France turned away from this doctrine due to its "all or nothing" character -- it was simply not credible that a nation would respond massively (and presumably absorb a counter strike) in a minor case of aggression in which its central inter-
ests were not at stake. The U.S. responded to this problem with the doctrine of "flexible response," which calls for oppressing each threat with the lowest level of force capable of containing it. This allows for a response to any threat, but, in an effort to raise the nuclear threshold, it also calls for the use of conventional warfighting against all but the most massive aggression. France could not afford to buy large conventional forces or to fight a long conventional war, and she has therefore rejected flexible response.

The French have tried to develop an equivalent to flexible response which, instead of countering each threat with an appropriate amount of force, counters it with an appropriate deterrent. France plans to respond initially to aggression with a "coup d'arrêt" -- a swift, sharp move at a level of violence appropriate to that used by the aggressor. The purpose of this move is not to defeat him militarily but to show him that France has the resolve to defend her interests, that the aggression has been detected, and that France has the ability to inflict severe pain on an aggressor. Hopefully a prompt "coup d'arrêt" would nip the aggression in the bud or "kill the chicken in the egg" before it gets too big for French forces to handle. If the aggressor defies this warning and confirms his aggressive intent by overriding French resistance at this level of violence, France would increase the level of violence (or, preferably, put the aggressor in a position where he had to do it) until he realized that the price...
he had to pay to reach his objective had become exorbitant and he backed down.\textsuperscript{30} In short, France would deter her opponents by showing her readiness and willingness to ascend an escalatory ladder, the top rung of which, in her case, is a strategic nuclear force. Hopefully the fact that the last rung in the ladder is nuclear catastrophe would give actions on the lower rungs sufficient deterrent value to cause the opponent to back down even if the French forces that were confronting him were not strong enough to defeat him militarily.\textsuperscript{31}

The original version of this concept of deterrence was first published in 1969 by General Fourquet, then Chief of Staff of the Armies, as the basis for France's response to a direct strategy applied in a European theater.\textsuperscript{32} However, the fact that it allows for an almost unlimited variety of possible actions (not necessarily violent) in response to threats means that it is also capable of responding to the subtleties of indirect strategy.\textsuperscript{33} It has therefore become the basis for French crisis management. The French feel that military forces can contribute to crisis management in two non-violent ways: through their mere existence and through their manipulation. If these fail, the French are prepared to escalate to combat in a further effort to deter their opponent.\textsuperscript{34}

Military forces can help crisis managers by their mere existence, either in general or within reach of a specific region. The presence of forward-deployed forces, either permanent or
periodic, shows French political, economic, and military power and emphasizes the interest France has in the region in which the units are deployed. It also gives solid evidence of her determination to protect her interests in the region. Presence forces can also help forestall aggression before it starts by friendly actions such as port calls, disaster relief, etc., designed to reinforce alliances and promote good will between France and the nations in the area. The French place considerable emphasis on the importance of a continuing "presence" of forward-deployed conventional forces as a means for deterring indirect strategy.

Presence forces can make a more intense non-violent contribution to crisis management if they are properly manipulated during crises. Maneuvering these forces increases their deterrent effect by making more clear the connection between their presence and specific French diplomatic objectives. Techniques often used include placing presence forces on alert, moving them closer to the crisis area, and reinforcing them. Even if not reinforced, presence forces on the scene may have the capability of resolving a local crisis through fast action before it can spread. If they do not, they can help deter an aggressor by introducing uncertainty into his calculations. They can deny him the possibility of "nibbling" without risk -- even very small forces can be manipulated so as to force him to make his act of aggression overt. They can be used to show him that France is watching him
and knows what he is doing. They can also provide Paris with
the information it needs to manage the crisis.38

The ways in which naval forces can be manipulated in response
to indirect strategy are limited only by the imagination of com-
manders -- each threat is likely to lead to a different response.
The French have given several examples of ways even weak naval
forces can respond constructively to specific threats that might
be part of an indirect strategy. One problem encountered during
the October 1973 Middle East War was that merchant ships would not
enter the danger zone declared by the belligerents, primarily
because their insurance would not cover them there or would do so
only at exorbitant rates. In 1973 the danger zones did not block
any important French trade routes, but, if they had, the navy
could have taken operational control of these ships, accompanied
them through the zone, and thus minimized their insurance pro-
blems.39 A more serious problem would arise if French ship-
ning were directly threatened by another power. In this case the
navy could again take operational control of French merchantmen
and assign them routes distant from the usual ones so as to
conceal them in the vastness of the sea. In areas such as
straits, where only one route is feasible, the navy could use its
few ships as escorts. Any action against an escorted French
merchantman would thus automatically be escalated to an action
against a French warship, which would be much more serious
politically and might deter the action altogether.40
If these non-violent military actions coupled with diplomacy fail, the next option is actual combat. This option could be used in an effort to resolve the crisis directly by force, but it is much more likely in the French case that combat will be regarded as a continuation of deterrence by other means. Following the principle of deterrence referred to above, France would use her forces to force the conflict up the escalatory ladder until the aggressor backs down. The French speak of several tactics they would use in combat: riposte, retaliation, and a combination of these.

Riposte consists of a direct parry against the enemy and refers to the situation in which French forces would be strong enough to confront him directly and defeat him on the battlefield. The French would certainly use this when feasible; but they feel that, due to the limited strength and size of their forces, they cannot count on it.

Retaliation (retorsion) might be used when riposte was not possible. It consists of striking the aggressor hard, not at the point of aggression, but where he is most vulnerable. It is a deterrent act, designed to show the enemy the French will to resist, her ability to harm her opponent, and her ability to escalate the level of violence if necessary. Its objective is to induce him to reconsider the advisability of his aggression. It is a tactic of the weak which uses shock to compensate for lack of strength, and in theory could be a brutal affair. It requires
skillful and imaginative management on both the political and military levels. Speed and surprise are necessary, and it is essential that the retaliating country have justice squarely on its side.41

Against a determined opponent, riposte and retaliation would be used together in climbing the escalatory ladder. French plans for war in Europe call for confronting advancing Warsaw Pact forces with significant resistance by conventional and tactical nuclear forces, while the more mobile French forces launch retaliatory strikes on the enemy's flank or in his rear. The level of violence would be progressively increased until the enemy backed down or was unambiguously confronted with the threat of a strategic nuclear strike.

France has made it clear that she regards some of her overseas interests (especially her SLOCs) as vital, and in principle the same tactics could be applied overseas. The only difference is that France's strategic nuclear deterrent might not be usable against aggression in the Third World. French policy is far from clear on this subject (the matter appears still to be under debate) but there are indications that France might use tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict outside Europe, either as a warning shot or as the ultimate form of retaliation.42

Current French doctrine assigns tactical nuclear weapons two functions: to do substantial harm to the enemy's military capabilities in the theater, and to serve as a penultimate deterrent
that will confront him unmistakably with the prospect of a strategic nuclear strike. Due to the escalatory nature of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and due to France's limited resources, French doctrine discourages the use of these weapons in isolated warning shots or in any conflict not directly involving the territorial security of metropolitan France.43

It has been suggested, however, that these obstacles to the use of tactical nuclear weapons are greatly reduced at sea and that the sea is the optimum environment for their use. There is, for example, practically no danger of collateral damage to civilian populations -- this could be interpreted as meaning that the danger of uncontrollable escalation would be reduced. In the context of a crisis outside Europe, even a single tactical nuclear warning shot would have an extremely high impact, both as a diplomatic signal and as a means of retaliation.44

Current discussions refer only to the use of these weapons in conflicts involving other countries whose naval forces also have tactical nuclear weapons. The French feel that possession of these weapons is required to give their naval crisis-management forces credibility against nuclear-armed opponents, and will help offset the inferiority in numbers of French forces. They are currently equipping both of their aircraft carriers with tactical nuclear weapons. Current French naval tactical nuclear weapons are gravity bombs, although there is talk of developing air- and sea-launched tactical nuclear missiles.45
In conclusion, current French defense policy calls for basing French defenses at all levels of violence on deterrence. This deterrence is achieved by demonstrating to potential opponents France's readiness and willingness to ascend an escalatory ladder which consists of three main sections:

1. French forces would first mark France's determination not to let certain limits be passed. They do this through peacetime presence and maneuvers.

2. If war breaks out, French forces would force the aggressor to pay an excessive price for his covetousness (through retaliation and escalation) in an effort to persuade him to renounce his enterprise. (If possible, of course, they would stop him by riposte.)

3. If the war goes badly, the strategic nuclear deterrent constitutes an ultimate threat designed to enable France to escape an unconditional surrender imposed by force.46

The existence of the strategic nuclear deterrent at the top of the ladder is the basis for the credibility of the whole structure -- the fact that it is directly linked to actions further down the ladder will hopefully give these actions sufficient deterrent value to stop the conflict before it reaches the nuclear level.

The navy has four missions, three of which are directly connected to this strategy. These four missions are:
1. Participating in nuclear deterrence (i.e., providing and protecting the SSBN force)
2. Maintaining surveillance over and, if necessary, defending the maritime approaches to France
3. Retaining at sea and overseas the freedom of action that is needed
4. Participating at sea in the tasks of public service (i.e., non-military Coast Guard functions).

The first two of these cover the participation of the Navy in France's deterrent strategy in Europe. The third, "retaining at sea and overseas the freedom of action that is needed" is the one that covers action outside of Europe. "Freedom of action," according to Beaufre, is the ultimate objective of all strategy. Since France has no expansionist aims, "freedom of action" means in her case having available the widest possible range of responses to aggression, in particular to indirect strategy. The navy has implemented its mission of action outside Europe in three ways. It has set up a worldwide crisis management organization that allows close control of forces overseas by political authorities in Paris, it provides presence forces permanently stationed overseas, and it has intervention forces capable of being sent from France in case of special need.

The Navy has designed its peacetime operational command structure so it can respond to crises anywhere in the world. It has divided the world into seven zones: the North Sea, the North
Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the West Atlantic and Caribbean, and the South Atlantic. Each of these is assigned to the senior naval commander in the zone. Of the four non-European zones, the Pacific and Indian Ocean are under specially designated flag officers who have fleets of roughly 10 ships each while the other two are under commanders of the French naval shore facilities in the zones. These zone commanders are responsible for keeping track of events in their zones and controlling the operations of naval forces there. During crises their actions are in turn controlled by the Chief of Staff of the Armies who in turn reports to the civilian government. During routine periods this control is delegated to the Chief of Staff of the Navy.

Naval presence is an essential part of the French response to indirect strategy, but there are severe limitations on the French ability to carry it out. France has few ships, her budget does not permit many long deployments, and she has few support facilities overseas. The result is that she cannot maintain overseas on a permanent basis forces sufficient to cope with crises. Instead she maintains token forces in her overseas zones during routine periods and attempts to anticipate crises and reinforce her forces where their psychological impact and military capabilities are most needed. This reinforcement capability is demonstrated during routine periods by periodic overseas cruises (especially in the Indian Ocean) by small task forces (usually two destroyers) drawn
from the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets. French deployments are proportioned according to French interests and political objectives in a region as well as to the potential crisis level. Aircraft carriers are only sent if the situation is particularly grave or if the French President has a particularly strong diplomatic signal that he wishes to transmit. The most recent case of this was the deployment of a carrier to the Red Sea during Djibouti's transition to independence.51

If presence forces fail to deter a crisis, France would send larger forces with the capability to intervene, either at sea or ashore. Recent African crises have involved the use of non-naval intervention forces (notably transport aircraft and airborne troops), but the navy also has a substantial intervention capability which, it feels, is far less dependent on support facilities and far more capable of sustained operations than other forms of intervention.

In the case of a crisis at sea the navy could respond with whatever type ship was most appropriate: submarines, surface combatants, minesweepers, etc. If projection of force ashore was required, the navy would probably turn to its two aircraft carriers. One of the carriers would be quickly converted to a helicopter assault ship, while the other would act as an attack carrier, providing air cover for the naval force and tactical air support ashore. A typical French naval intervention force might consist of the following:
- One carrier with 40 fighters and attack aircraft escorted by 6 to 8 AAW and ASW ships.
- One carrier rigged as a helo assault ship, one dock landing ship and several tank landing ships. This force could land and support ashore 2,300 men from the Navy's commando force and the Army's marine infantry, along with 250 vehicles including a squadron of AMX-30 light tanks.
- A logistic force, consisting of two tankers and two repair ships.52

Some of the escorts might also carry small commando groups of 20-30 men. If supplies or troops in excess of these carried in the task force were required, the navy would organize a sealift using chartered merchantmen.

The navy's ability to intervene varies according to the geographic region involved. The French have decided that they must maintain their primary naval intervention capability (including the two carriers) in the Mediterranean, since it is an unstable region where both direct and indirect strategy could do great harm to France.53 This disposition has the advantage of putting the carriers within reach of the area outside Europe that is of greatest importance to France -- the Indian Ocean. (They could also reach West Africa if necessary, although this has not occurred.) Elsewhere French naval crisis management forces would be smaller, but they would still be capable of limited combat ac-
tions, patrol of sea lanes, and support actions such as providing technical military assistance or war supplies.\textsuperscript{54}

The weakest point in the French navy's overseas strategy from the French viewpoint appears to be the defense of the sea lanes. French writers have repeatedly stated that France cannot do this alone, and that she would need allies. They believe, however, that any crisis affecting the sea lanes will affect all of Western Europe and the United States, and they seem to expect that the allies would be there when needed.\textsuperscript{55}

French naval policy outside Europe thus consists of the use of deterrence against the threat of indirect strategy using both presence forces and intervention forces. Navy writers fear that an enemy could use an indirect strategy to "turn the flanks" of France's nuclear deterrent and defeat France through a deliberate series of small actions against vital French interests outside of Europe, especially her supplies of oil and raw materials. The navy, with its ability to operate worldwide, is the logical counter to this threat; but, due to its limited resources, it would have to base its actions on the use of escalation as a deterrent. Possible actions include non-violent crisis-management techniques, riposte, retaliation, and perhaps ultimately the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The French navy maintains presence forces, intervention forces, and a crisis management organization which it hopes will enable it to respond to indirect strategy anywhere in the world.
Looking into the future, it seems that this policy will endure, although the means for executing it may change. The need to protect French territories overseas, the economic zone around them, and the supply of oil and other raw materials all seem to ensure that France will continue to maintain a naval presence overseas (especially in the Indian Ocean) regardless of any political changes that may occur in Paris. However, the disappearance of the aircraft carriers in the 1990s could cause some changes in the navy's intervention capabilities. Some indication of future French capabilities may be gleaned from the fact that the French are already talking of the retaliatory potential of nuclear submarines outside Europe\textsuperscript{56}, the possible equipping of surface combatants with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles\textsuperscript{57}, and the construction of specialized helicopter assault carriers.\textsuperscript{58} It appears that deterrent action against indirect strategy will be a major role of the French navy well into the 21st century.


7. Particularly prominent Navy writers were Admirals Joire-Noulens and de Joybert (Chiefs of Staff of the Navy) and Vice Admirals Schweitzer and Wolff (Major-Generals of the Navy). These posts equate roughly to our CNO and VCNO.


58. This ship, the PA-75 (formerly PH-75) is best described in Jean Labayle-Coubat, Combat Fleets of the World, 1976/77, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 84. This ship was to have been begun in 1975, but is currently scheduled to be laid down in 1982.
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