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The Pros and Cons of National Defense: A Study of the Proponents, Opponents, Issues, and the Public Affairs and Public Relations Programs Surrounding the B-1 Strategic Bomber.

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THE PROS AND CONS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:
A STUDY OF THE PROONENTS, OPPONENTS, ISSUES, AND
THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMS
SURROUNDING THE B-1 STRATEGIC BomBER

BY

Maj. James H. Ragan, USAF

The thesis outlined here was written as part of the candidacy requirements for a Masters of Science Degree in Public Relations at the American University, Washington, D.C. in August 1979. Length is 203 pages.

Written as a broad overview of the public affairs and public relations efforts surrounding the B-1, the paper contains an historical chapter on how the B-1 developed as an issue and the public affairs/public relations programs devised in support of the aircraft. Air Force public affairs activities and Rockwell International public relations efforts are reviewed separately and are discussed using the four-step public relations problem solving process found in Effective Public Relations by Scott Cutlip and Allen Center.

A content analysis of a New York Times abstract of B-1 stories reported in that paper is included in a separate chapter. The analysis was designed to determine what issues were raised, both pro and con, about the B-1; the month in which the stories were printed; their page placement within the paper; and the spokespersons for the issues. The abstract was obtained from the New York Times Information Bank.

Based upon the reviewed material and the content analysis, conclusions and recommendations are offered in the last chapter.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

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A STUDY OF THE PROONENTS, OPPONENTS, ISSUES, AND
THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMS
SURROUNDING THE B-1 STRATEGIC BOMBER

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS GRADUATE PROGRAM
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF SCIENCE

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

BY

JAMES H. RAGAN

WASHINGTON, D.C.

AUGUST 1979
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An effort such as this paper is not the result of one person's work alone. There are really too many individuals whose help and advice made this possible to list them all at one time. It is significant at a minimum to cite the following individuals without whom this paper could never have been accomplished.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Overview of B-1 Issue

On 3 November 1969, the United States Air Force formalized eight years of studies, debates, options, and planning when they issued requests for proposals to aircraft manufacturers for the development of the B-1 Bomber.¹ This began not only a search for a new manned strategic bomber capable of replacing the B-52, but also started "one of the most hotly debated and intensively lobbied defense projects of the 1970's."²

The B-1 was the only weapon system in modern memory ever to have a national coalition of twenty-five labor, church and environmental groups unite against it.³ During the time, 1969-1977, the B-1 was a premiere topic of discussion throughout the country, many issues were raised both for and against the plane.

This paper will attempt to review the issues which developed around the B-1 and explore the public affairs and public relations efforts put forth by the Air Force and Rockwell International, the prime contractor, to respond to those issues.
Research Questions

Specifically this paper examines the research, planning, communication, and evaluation efforts both agencies put into their programs. We will review those issues both forecast would be raised and through a content analysis of the New York Times for this period (1970-1977), what issues were raised in the press. As the issues are solidified over time, we are also going to check what changes or modifications both the Air Force and Rockwell International made, if any, in their efforts.

Delimitations

The research for this paper has concentrated on the B-1 bomber exclusive of other weapons systems. The paper will concern itself with the public affairs activities of the Air Force and the public relations activities of Rockwell International in support of the B-1 program.

An in-depth look at the activities of the Coalition to Stop the B-1 and its Congressional allies will not be undertaken except to recognize their existence and highlight some of their activities. Also, the policy and decision making systems of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, the Congress, and the White House will not be examined except to note the final outcomes of those deliberations.

The basic research materials were made available to me from official Air Force files and from personal interviews I conducted with key participants who worked closely with the
B-1 program. Because the program was cancelled in 1977, the files and the memories of my interviewees were probably not as complete as they once were. I hope that what I have been able to discover will prove informative in the whole and enlightening at least in part.
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I


CHAPTER II

A HISTORY OF THE B-1 PROGRAM AND ISSUES

Why the B-1 was Felt Necessary

What would eventually become the B-1 bomber program began in 1961 when the Air Force undertook its first formal exploratory studies on a new generation of aircraft called SLAB—Subsonic Low Altitude Bomber. This initial effort was followed by many other studies of different types, but the most important one for the B-1 was the four-year study of AMSA, the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft, begun in 1965.

Based on that study, the Air Force determined that it would need a new bomber in the 1980's designed to do three basic things. First, it would be needed to modernize our strategic forces based on the concept that bombers are one of three elements of such forces. The other two being land-based missiles and sea-launched missiles.

The TRIAD of bombers and missiles is a defense strategy of deterrence which was developed in the 1950's. The reasons for its success in deterring a direct attack on the United States were best described by Dr. James R. Meyer in a letter to Sen. Robert Taft:
The TRIAD continues to deter major aggression against the United States because the three components of this synergistic system cannot be simultaneously destroyed. Attack against one component gives warning to the others. Timing and complexity of the enemy's overall targeting program are so complicated by the TRIAD that even a reasonably successful first-strike is considered to be virtually impossible.

The TRIAD components are further advantageous because they can penetrate the most sophisticated defense known today. They also provide a hedge against technological breakthrough in the development of defenses or offenses against an individual weapon system. The latter is important because the Soviet Union theoretically could be capable of destroying the entire US ICBM force by first-strike attack in the 1980's. In addition, the TRIAD denies a potential adversary the opportunity to concentrate his defense resources against a single type of strategic weapon.

Secondly, the Air Force needed a manned bomber designed for survivability in the 1980's and beyond. On 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers' U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by the Soviet Union. Following this incident, military planners had to rethink the concept of high altitude, daytime bombing which was not vulnerable to an extensive Soviet system of high-altitude antiaircraft missiles.

Military strategists turned their thinking to a concept of low altitude penetration. Bombers would fly at medium altitudes to just outside enemy radar detection range, then descend to below radar detection altitudes (literally at treetop levels) and penetrate enemy airspace to within striking range. The aircraft would then climb to weapon
delivery altitude, release weapons and fly supersonically back to "friendly" airspace. A new bomber to meet these requirements would have to be able to withstand the enormous air pressure and maneuvering stresses of low altitude flight, while retaining the ability to fly at high speeds and altitudes for long ranges with large payloads.4

The third requirement for the new bomber was for it to be a counterbalance to the projected Soviet threat in the late 1980's.5 As the B-1 Concept Paper attached to the B-1 Information Plan said:

The Soviet Union is expanding her strategic nuclear capabilities. They have more ICBM's than the United States, and are still building. In total land and sea-based missile payload, the Soviets have more than a two to one advantage.6

After extensive evaluation of the contractor proposals for the aircraft, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans announced on 5 June 1970 that North American Rockwell Corporation (today Rockwell International) and the General Electric Company had been selected as the airframe and propulsion contractors for the engineering development of the B-1 Advanced Strategic Bomber.7 For the next seven years, the B-1 would be the center of the most continuous and wide-ranging debate ever generated by a major weapons system as supporters and detractors joined in an extensive public review of several issues surrounding the aircraft.
Public Affairs Planning For the B-1

From the beginning, the Air Force suggested several "themes" or basic topics and sub-topics that need to be logically presented in fostering understanding of the Air Force position on the B-1. These were originally outlined in the Concept Paper attached to the May 1971 B-1 Information Plan (See Appendix A of this study). These themes would be the issues about the B-1 the Air Force would stress throughout the program, allowing for variations of emphasis on particular issues at different times.

The first theme the Air Force believed should be presented was the requirement for the manned bomber. This subject encompassed such topics as the B-1's importance to the TRIAD, how the TRIAD has been developed, the bomber's unique characteristics which it brings to the TRIAD, and how the manned bomber, as part of the TRIAD, promotes deterrence against enemy threat.

Having hopefully established the requirement for the manned bomber, the second theme suggested by the Air Force was why the B-1? This theme outlined the arguments in terms of the B-1's capabilities to do better the job foreseen for it than the aging B-52. The topics covered by this theme included a reference again supporting the manned bombers's importance to the TRIAD which stated that "modernization of our forces is essential if strategic forces are to
portray a credible deterrent to our enemy." Other topics centered on the fact that the B-52 was aging and would be 17-20 years old in the early 1980's, that refers to the newest models in operation.

Further comparisons were made to the capabilities of the B-1 over the B-52. For example, it was noted that the B-1 would be faster, carry more payload, and have a smaller radar cross section than the B-52. Also, in comparison to the B-52, the B-1 would have higher penetration speeds, quicker reaction time, and could be based with less sophisticated support equipment, allowing for wider dispersal at more bases.

The third theme was to be sure the public was aware of the various milestone accomplishments surrounding the B-1. These events included such items as the completion of the full scale mock-up, the awarding of various contracts, major technical accomplishments, roll out of the first aircraft, the first flight, the testing program's progress, and the production decision.

The fourth theme suggested by the Air Force was to provide information to the media, and through them the public, on the associated systems which would be a part of the B-1. These systems included the short-range attack missile and the electronic countermeasures systems which would be used by the B-1 to protect itself.
Current analyses of the Soviet threat would be the fifth theme suggested. This topic would relate Soviet strategic advancements to the need for the B-1.

It should be noted here that throughout the B-1's developmental stages, the Air Force's basic public affairs philosophy and policies did not change. In 1971, the B-1 Information Plan stated:

Based on the national importance of the B-1 and probable increased public attention to the program, it is essential for the B-1 public affairs program to be well coordinated, timely and factual.

The plan further said that the public affairs guidelines for the B-1 program would be:

* To keep the publics (internal and external) informed on the progress of the B-1 program through factual, timely and frank release of information;

* Avoidance of appearance to publicize the program unduly;

* Emphasis on program performance, development progress (milestones) and good management practices; and

* In all cases, it is essential that we respond to the public with an unimpeded flow of accurate and timely unclassified information.

Since that 1971 plan was drafted, the only change noted to the directed philosophy and guidelines was a sentence in a revised 1976 plan which said "provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552) will be supported in both letter and spirit." (See Appendix A for a copy.
of this plan.) The act had been passed after the start of the B-1 developmental program.

Based on the 1971 plan, the initial effort by the Air Force and Rockwell International in addressing the issues of the B-1 was to stress the requirement for the plane in terms of its needed defense capabilities. Colonel Robert Hermann who was director of the Air Force public information program during the aircraft's development said effort was directed to explain "where it (B-1) fits into the overall defense structure. The B-1 was an upgrading of one leg of the TRIAD. It was deemed by the Air Force to be the number one priority system."17

His comments were echoed by Mr. Jerry Syverson who was Rockwell's director of B-1 public relations for five of the program's seven years:

I think one of the main things we were trying to do early in the game was to let the public know a manned penetrating bomber was a real requirement. That you couldn't rely strictly on missiles.

That was sort of our general theme to start with--Why the B-1 and why it was needed. Not necessarily why Rockwell was a good builder of it, but primarily that the machine itself was a definite requirement for defense.18

Changes in B-1 Public Affairs Strategy Over Time

As the B-1 developed from plans to mock-up to rollout to first flight, so too did the main issues change, waxing and waning as the public debate continued. Colonel Hermann
recalled that other issues from the period included the overall Department of Defense budget and how it fits into the national budget, social versus defense needs of the country, and less pessimistic analyses of the military and political threat posed to the United States by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{19}

Mr. Syverson remembered another issue:

I think of the basic issues from start to finish, there was at least one common one throughout—why do you need a manned bomber in the age of missiles? That seemed to be one that kept popping up.\textsuperscript{20}

Another issue which both men remember 'popped up' continually was cost of the B-1, even though Colonel Hermann felt the B-1 program "was probably one of the best managed ones so far as remaining within original cost estimates." He said one of the real problems in discussing the B-1 costs is that the Air Force and Rockwell had to talk in "then-year dollars:"

We always had to present the B-1 cost in the projected then-year dollars which is very complicated to understand. When we went in with budget requests and budget estimates we would have to give B-1 program estimates in terms of what the dollar would be worth in 1980 when the plane was coming off the line, not in terms of '74 or '75 dollars. This of course made the cost of the program look much larger than it was.\textsuperscript{21}

Mr. Syverson agreed that the cost issue was an important one during the B-1 debate and that having to speak in then-year dollars didn't help his efforts:
The cost of the B-1 was always there. We tried to explain inflation factors quite unsuccessfully. People would sort of ignore the fact that the dollars we were talking about in the B-1 were future dollars, not today's. But this was a requirement that we had to speak in then-year dollars and I think this was something that really hurt us all the way through.

In fact that is something that was very hard to explain. We did at times try to guess what a Chevy or a loaf of bread would cost in 1982, but it was all guess work. It was a very difficult obstacle to try to overcome.

As inflation rates increased in the mid-1970's, the projected costs for the B-1 in the 1980's also went up, sometimes significantly. Jerry Syverson knew what that meant:

"Overrun is how it always came out in the press. Well, not always, there were some (reporters) who understood, but not many."22

In the final analysis, Mr. Syverson remembers three issues which were most significant to him:

"I think again the need for a manned penetrator, the cost and then just the general theme of disarmament were the issues, and they stayed pretty much constant."24

As the issues and subissues surrounding the B-1 changed in prominence over the years, so too did the Air Force and Rockwell have to change and address the new or revised issues. A 1976 Air Force Fact Sheet on the B-1 not only touched on the themes mentioned in the 1971 Information Plan, but also mentioned the B-1's environmental impact and its
funding and cost data. It is interesting to note that the 1971 plan had specifically said to "avoid cost predictions and leave these discussions in Congressional hearings." Similarly, a B-1 Background Information sheet drafted in 1977 addressed additional issues not foreseen in 1971 such as the B-1 versus the cruise missile, alternatives to the B-1, and the adequacy of the B-1 testing program.

Rockwell International also responded to the new issues environment in its public relations program. Its news releases developed from fact sheets on B-1 research and development to statements by their president and chief executive officer on the misunderstanding about the costs of the B-1. (See Appendixes B and C of this study.) Rockwell also produced a pamphlet entitled "Point of Fact" which discussed many of the charges leveled against the B-1 by its opponents. The pamphlet discussed such issues as alternatives proposed for the B-1, environmental impact, need for a new fleet of tankers to service the B-1, and the longevity of the aircraft.

The issues surrounding the B-1 were generated by people, both singularly and in groups, who formed around the B-1 in either support or opposition to the aircraft. It is probably fair to say that the main issues debated were raised primarily by the people and groups opposing the B-1, but the dissent and controversy took time to develop.
Opposition to the B-1

A congressional group, Members of Congress for Peace through Law, whose membership included Sen. William Proxmire and Sen. George McGovern, was the first to question the need for a new bomber in a 1969 report. From that time on, throughout the B-1 debate, that organization served to orchestrate within Congress the efforts of members opposed to the B-1. It also acted as a liaison between those members and outside groups opposed to the bomber by providing a channel for exchanging information and plotting legislative strategy.\(^3\)

It is interesting to note that possibly the time itself was right for a concentrated debate on a major weapon system. In the period 1969-1972, several controversies made news: weapon cost overruns, the ravages of the Vietnam War, poor morale in the ranks and Army spying on civilians. Both the public and the press, tired of the Vietnam War and of the inflation triggered in part by expanding defense budgets, took aim at the Pentagon. As other defense issues became defused, the B-1 project stood out as promising to be the most costly single weapon system yet built.\(^2\)

As Colonel Hermann accurately said:

They hit on the idea of not trying to attack the entire defense budget, but that they would be more successful if they picked out one system or program. Everybody concentrated on the B-1. The B-1 was a very visible target from a cost standpoint and it had a lot
of appeal too because fresh in the minds
of people when we started was the Vietnam
War and the concern raised over the B-52's
bombing there.\textsuperscript{33}

The effectiveness of the B-1 opponents took years
to get organized and did not really begin to come together
until October 1973 in Germantown, Ohio. There the American
Friends Service Committee held a convocation of peace organi-
zations, including members of Clergy and Laity Concerned.
Representatives at the meeting decided to mount a national
campaign against the B-1 by attempting to build on the old
anti-Vietnam War coalition. The new campaign, however, was
to differ from the Vietnam protest movement, downplaying
mass demonstrations and emphasizing instead an intense and
persistent educational campaign at the grass-roots level.\textsuperscript{34}

At first, the Germantown group spent much of their
time building up support of the cause and establishing
anti-B-1 units around the country. At the same time, they
were also talking with other citizens' groups who opposed the
B-1 for one reason or the other.\textsuperscript{35}

A major result of their efforts was the February 1976
announcement by Sen. Proxmire of the National Coalition to
stop the B-1 bomber:

Among those national organizations
committed to opposing production funds
for the B-1, in the budget for the first
time this year, are Common Cause, Friends
of the Earth, National Taxpayers Union,
Environmental Action, Federation of American
Scientists, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
Union and the International Longshoremen and
Warehousemen's Union.\textsuperscript{36}
In that same news release, Sen. Proxmire listed several reasons the coalition had found for not funding the aircraft. These reasons, in one form or the other, would provide the bulk of the issues used against the B-1:

--It is extraordinarily expensive for a small number of aircraft--$21.2 billion for only 244 planes.

--It encountered significant cost growth from an original planning estimate of $9.9 billion to the current $21.2 billion.

--More cost growth is on the way. Soon to be released Selected Acquisition Cost reports from the Department of Defense will show the B-1 costs going up even higher than the $84 million current price per plane.

--Performance characteristics of the aircraft have slipped as it has grown heavier.

--The mission of the B-1 makes no sense. The USSR is the most heavily defended air space in the history of the world. Why should we produce a weapon which goes against the teeth of the enemy's defense?

--The same mission can be accomplished more effectively and at far less cost by a long range stand-off missile platform that does not penetrate the air defense of the potential adversary. This position has been documented by the Brookings Institution.

--Bombers on hand at the present time, the effective and updated B-52 G's and -H's will last into the 1990's, according to the Air Force. A new bomber simply is not necessary at this time.

--Committing $21 billion into a new bomber program in the missile age is an anachronism--a military system that time has passed by.

--Production of the B-1 will force a commitment to a new multi-billion dollar tanker fleet for the B-1.
An asset which grew out of the coalition was that the issues could be pitched in a variety of ways, according to the particular interests of each group. Thus, Environmental Action became interested in—and thereby played up—what it saw as the adverse environmental impact of the B-1 as a supersonic and "fuel hungry" plane. The National Taxpayers Union focused on the economic impact of the bomber—what it would cost in tax dollars. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom stressed the 'guns and butter' questions concerning the new bomber. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees placed ads in newspapers and magazines pointing out what the cost of one B-1 could do to meet domestic needs—how many hospitals could be built, policemen paid, and so forth.38

One of the coalition's groups, Clergy and Laity Concerned, developed an anti-B-1 campaign tool called the "92 Billion Dollar" which could be ordered by local groups at two dollars per thousand. The items were a bit larger than a dollar bill, colored green and full of emotional anti-B-1 information which solicited a response from the recipient:

The Air Force and three of the Nation's largest corporations want $92 billion of our tax money for a supersonic swing-wing swindle.

The corporations are Rockwell International, General Electric and Boeing. The swindle is the B-1 bomber. The decision is this year.
The B-1 is a manned nuclear bomber proposed as the replacement for the B-52. It is expensive and "a public works project for the aerospace industry rather than a needed weapon for the defense of the United States," according to Senator William Proxmire.

The fleet of 244 B-1 Bombers will cost the average wage earner $1108.43.

I don't want my tax money spent on the B-1.

The money for one B-1, currently $84 million, could fund 25 health care centers, each treating 40,000 people annually. The U.S. is 1st in military power but 18th in doctor-patient ratio.

I'd rather have my tax money spent for things I need than for a fleet of bombers I don't need.

I understand from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that $1 billion spent on human needs would create at least 30,000 more jobs than if the money were spent on the B-1.

I want my tax money spent for jobs and people, not for a flying pork barrel for the weapons industry. Put me on record against the B-1 Bomber.

The B-1 opponents received assistance in their effort to get issues before the people from sources outside the coalition. One well known agency, the Brookings Institution, lent support to the anti-B-1 effort when they published a study entitled Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: How and Why. The publicity announcing the study by Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood stated:

In their view, a decision not to proceed with production of the B-1 would not mean that the bomber force would rapidly become obsolete and ineffective; an orderly modernization program could be completed by the mid-to late 1980's and there is little risk that hostile
action could threaten the military effectiveness of the B-52 force before then.

The authors conclude that a standoff bomber force would be more economical than a B-1 force of equal effectiveness. They recommend that production of the B-1 not be approved and that the B-1 research and development program be ended as soon as its technological potential has been fully exploited. In place of the B-1 program they advocate studies and preliminary development of a standoff bomber designed to emphasize economic efficiency and survival against attack.40

Another anti-B-1 report helpful to the opponents was released in mid-1976 by the Council On Economic Priorities. Written by Gordon Adams and entitled The B-1 Bomber: An Analysis of Its Strategic Utility, Cost, Constituency, and Economic Impact, the study found:

* The military rationale for the B-1 can be seriously questioned.

* The B-1 is proving to be a very costly program.

* The B-1 program is an example of the close relationship that often exists between the DOD and its major contractors, and of the political impact such firms can have on American government and American life.

* The B-1 will not be beneficial to the American economy, compared with alternate government expenditures.41

The B-1's opponents, then, worked to set the issues against the bomber using essentially an "outside" campaign, pressuring Congress through outside channels, although lobbyists for the groups worked directly with interested
members of Congress and their staffs. They used friendly Congressmen and columnists to get their message into print and other media which helped reinforce their grass roots efforts.

Mobilizing Outside Group Support for the B-1

The preceding discussion should not leave you with the impression the B-1 had no friends. It did, and plenty of them. Totally committed to the plane were the Air Force; the 1,544,850-strong United International Union of Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW); the prime contractor . . . Rockwell International--and other contractors and subcontractors, a large contingent of members of Congress, including high-ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees--and the (Nixon and) Ford administrations.

Air Force public affairs programs and Rockwell International public relations projects accomplished in support of the B-1 will be discussed in more detail in later chapters of this report. I do want to provide some examples here of the kind of efforts which were made on behalf of the B-1 outside of those groups.

Sen. Barry Goldwater was one of the principal, and the most knowledgeable, proponents of the B-1. A major general in the Air Force Reserve, Senator Goldwater was a staunch supporter of military programs in general.
Following an opportunity to fly in the aircraft early in the test program, Senator Goldwater made the following observations in a letter he wrote to all the House and Senate Armed Services Committee members:

The purpose of this letter is not to try to impress you with the strategic value of the B-1, but rather to give you an impression of a person, a pilot, who has flown this aircraft. In fact, I think I can say that I am the first non-Air Force and non-test pilot to fly it. Please keep in mind that my observations are restricted in expertise, but also at the same time keep in mind that aviation has been my life. I know that some of you who will receive this letter really don’t care a lot which end of the airplane goes up first, just as long as the damn thing flies. So if you will permit me, let me give you the impression I gained in flying the B-1 from the left seat—that's the pilot's seat—on the 15th of April at Edwards Air Force Base, California. This is just a factual, two-plus-two-equals-four description of a flight by a first-time pilot...

I can promise you that, on the Floor of the Senate before the authorization process gets too far along, there will be a detailed report answering the recent criticism of this aircraft.

In mid-1976, Rep. Melvin Pric.. chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, wrote an open letter to all members of the House of Representatives. He was concerned about the issues being raised at that time about the B-1:

I am very concerned and distressed over recent allegations offered against the B-1 manned strategic bomber...

My purpose in writing is to convey to you the facts relative to the B-1 issues and trust that you will reach a decision on this program
accordingly. The entire strategic posture of this nation, as many of you know, is built around a triad that consists of an ICBM force, a submarine force and the manned strategic bomber.

If we as a nation hope to deter war, it is imperative that we have the tools to discourage any adversary from launching a pre-emptive first strike against us. The B-1 is one of these tools.

In summary, I urge you to consider the facts that I have presented and trust you will distinguish them from the emotional allegations that may be used as a basis for amendments intended to delete or defer funds for this important and essential weapon system. The decision-making process is better served by the agreement or disagreement with the facts than it is by the belief of ill-founded allegations.

Proponents also had the support of citizens' groups which had members at the grassroots level. The Air Force Association, with 150,000 members and chapters in every state, was one of the most loyal supporting organizations. So were the Veterans of Foreign Wars who addressed the issues and passed a resolution of support for the B-1 in 1976. That resolution said in part:

WHEREAS, anti-defense forces in the Senate are still seeking to delay the budgeted purchase of the replacement of the B-1 bomber until the next President can verify its need despite contrary advice from the House and the House-Senate Conferees; and

WHEREAS, the Senate position, described above, is a transparent "ploy" aimed at denying the U.S. forces the demonstrably needed replacement bomber as set forth in the succeeding paragraphs; and . . .
BE IT RESOLVED, by the 77th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that (a) the United States promptly purchase and deploy, as available, the long overdue 244 B-1 replacement bombers; and (b) that this V.F.W. position be pressed home to the entire membership of the 94th Congress and to the contending Presidential candidates. 48

At least initially, the strategy of Rockwell, the Pentagon and the UAW was an "inside" one, relatively low-key, focusing on direct contact with influential senior members of Congress. The (anti-B-1) campaign was broad-based and tried to increase its strength by being wide-spread, highly visible, vociferous, and persistent. 49

The success with which the opponents had initially set the issues was perhaps indicated by Senator Goldwater's remarks at the Collier Trophy presentation ceremonies. He said:

As it (B-1) grew from only a concept to a mature design to an actual flying prototype, it became apparent to me that the B-1 was destined for great things. But great things are often accompanied by controversy. And the road has not been an easy one in spite of the B-1's superior technical qualifications and its need in our Strategic Triad.

Controversy has come from the small, but vocal, anti-B-1 group who have literally been unable to accept the true facts about the capability and need for the aircraft. And every time one of their unsupported assertions was refuted they came up with another one just as unsupported. Not a single one of their charges stands up under even the most shallow scrutiny . . . but that does not deter them from attempting to kill this program any way possible. 50
The sides were chosen; the issues fluid. The next two chapters will investigate how the Air Force and Rockwell International organized to advance their propositions and respond to the opponents.
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II


2. Ibid.


4. Donald H. Brownlee, "A Discussion of President Carter's Decision to Halt Production of the B-1 Bomber" (Class paper, Central Michigan University, 1978), p. 3.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 15.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 16.
13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 13-14.


19. Interview with Col. Robert Hermann.

20. Interview with Jerry Syverson.

21. Interview with Col. Robert Hermann.

22. Interview with Jerry Syverson.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


32. Ibid., pp. 192-193.

33. Interview with Col. Robert Hermann.

34. Ornstein, Interest Groups, p. 195.

35. Ibid., p. 196.


37. Ibid.

38. Ornstein, Interest Groups, p. 198.


42. Ornstein, Interest Groups, p. 195.

43. Ibid., p. 194.

44. Brownlee, Discussion, p. 13.


CHAPTER III

THE AIR FORCE B-1 PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM IN DEPTH

This chapter will discuss the efforts of the United States Air Force to forge a public affairs program equal to the issues surrounding the B-1. First, we will review the legislative and traditional restrictions on government public affairs programs and also try to understand why the government public relations has historically been called public affairs.

Our study of the Air Force public affairs program follows as its outline the four-step public relations problem solving process of research, analysis-planning, communication, and evaluation-feedback. This is the process recommended by Scott Cutlip and Allen Center in the fifth edition of their book, Effective Public Relations. Cutlip and Center's four-step process will also be the basis for the analysis of Rockwell International's public relations program in the succeeding chapter.

Constraints on the Effort

To understand the Air Force public affairs program which supported the B-1 bomber development, it is important
to briefly review the legal restrictions and the biases under which all government information programs, including the Air Force, work.

Government public affairs programs are part of the administrative system which has evolved over the years designed to bridge the gap between the citizen and the bureaucracy. The justification for these programs rests on two premises: a democratic government is obliged to report to its citizens and effective administration requires citizen participation and voter support.¹

The Office of Management and Budget defines government public affairs as:

Those activities which serve to publicize or promote the objectives, operations, facilities, or programs for which the agency has responsibility or in which it has an interest. These include but are not limited to activities concerned with press contacts, broadcasting, advertising, exhibits, films, publications and speeches.²

A more functional analysis prepared for the Brookings Institution found that government public affairs contributed to:

* The implementation of public policy.
* Assisting the news media in coverage of government.
* Reporting to the citizenry on agency activities.
* Increasing the internal cohesion of the agency.
* Increasing the agency's sensitivity to its publics.
Mobilization of support for the agency itself.\textsuperscript{3}

Legislative restrictions on government public affairs were first inacted in 1913 when Rep. Frederick H. Gillett had an amendment to an appropriations bill passed which provided that no money could be spent for publicity unless specifically authorized by Congress. The Gillett Amendment, as it became known, was proposed after the Civil Service Commission advertised for "a press agent to help boom the good roads movement" in the Office of Public Roads.\textsuperscript{4}

In 1973, Congress reaffirmed and strengthened a 1919 law which prohibited using any part of an appropriation for services, messages, or publications designed to influence any member of Congress in his attitude toward legislation or appropriations. The revised law stated:

\begin{quote}
No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act, or of the funds available for expenditure by any corporation or agency shall be used, other than for normal and recognized executive-legislative relationships, for publicity or propaganda purposes, for the preparation, distribution, or use of any kit, pamphlet, booklet, publication, radio, television, or film presentation designed to support or defeat legislation pending before the Congress, except for the presentation to Congress itself.\textsuperscript{5}
\end{quote}

Within these traditional and legal imparsatives, the Air Force conducted a public affairs program for the development of the B-1. Throughout the program, the policy guidance remained constant:
To keep the publics (internal and external) informed on the progress of the B-1 program through factual, timely, and frank release of information. (1971)6

The American public will be provided maximum information on B-1 program progress through the factual, timely, and frank release of information. (1976)7

It is probably safe to theorize that as the anti-B-1 campaign increased in force and pitch the external public became an ever increasingly important audience.

Throughout this paper the reader will notice that activities undertaken by the Air Force in support of the B-1 are referred to as public affairs. Those initiated by Rockwell International are identified as public relations. The reasons for this difference are mainly historical.

At the time the Gillett Amendment was passed, the public relations business was not regarded with great favor. People who made their living at the trade were often thought of as publicity seekers, flacks, or worse. Public relations did not have a sterling reputation.

Partially because of the reputation, and Congress's disdain for public relations, government agencies blurred the public relations efforts of their units by assuming non-controversial designations for their offices dealing in such matters. Their public affairs offices, information offices, and community relations divisions are still with us and doing a steady, if confusing, business.
Thus, as the public relations field has had to live down the excesses of the early years, so too have those who perform similar functions in the federal government. Therefore, discussions of Air Force efforts on behalf of the B-1 will be referred to as public affairs activities, because that is the way the service and its publications mention various programs.

On the other hand, Rockwell International's exposure efforts for the B-1 will be referred to as various public relations programs. In private enterprise, "the public generally accepts the right and propriety of business to publicize and advertise." However, as we shall examine later, when a company is doing business with the federal government, the "right and propriety" of its public relations efforts can fall into serious question.

But first, a review of Air Force B-1 public affairs in comparison to the four-step public relations process will be given.

**Research**

Research, the first of Cutlip and Center's four-step problem solving process, is defined as "probing the opinions, attitudes, and reactions of those concerned with the acts and policies of an organization, then evaluating the inflow." There was no evidence I could find of the Air Force information people conducting any such survey projects in the case of
the B-1, but that may not be because they didn't want too or feel the effort was worth it.

Surveys and opinion sampling by federal agencies are controlled by the Federal Reports Act of 1942. This Act was passed by Congress to keep the collection of information from the public at an absolute minimum. There was not to be any large burden placed upon the public by too many forms and too much government which today, more than then, is a very sensitive issue with many people.

The Air Force does conduct some surveys of the public, in the areas of medicine and the environment for example. According to the people who monitor these efforts for the Air Force, the Office of Management and Budget tightly regulates how many surveys are done on which subjects each year. There is probably reason for strong doubt that the Management and Budget people would have approved a public opinion poll for a politically controversial project like the B-1. Also, there was probably even less chance the Air Force would have been able to do the continuous surveying necessary to really accomplish their public affairs plan.

With no in-house survey authority, the Air Force had to resort to secondary methods to obtain some feel for the public's opinion on the B-1 program. One way they did this was to monitor the wire services and other news outlets for reports of surveys taken by commercial polling companies like Harris and Gallup. An Opinion Research Corporation
survey reported by the Associated Press wire service found that 64 percent of those polled favored the 1976 B-1 production decision.11

Analysis - Planning

As mentioned in Chapter II, the Air Force did prepare a Public Affairs Plan which was used as guidance for the B-1 program. It was a broad outline of the information activities which were to be undertaken and was flexible enough to accommodate changing outside influences. It was not, however, prepared with the depth and detail recommended by Cutlip and Center in their book *Effective Public Relations*, but there is some question that it could have been.

The plan was developed "based on national importance of the B-1 and probable increased public attention to the program," and did have specific objectives for the information program:

a. Establish a single working system which outlines basic information actions and responsible agencies during the development phase of the B-1.

b. Using this management tool as a guide, acquaint the general public with the progress and milestones of the B-1 development program.

c. Insure the expeditious, well-coordinated flow of information to the public which keeps pace with program developments and which will enhance the development phase of the B-1.

d. Establish B-1 Program Director as center for information activity associated with the B-1 program.12
Like the objectives, the information policy which the Air Force information structure would follow was general:

a. An unimpeded flow of accurate and timely unclassified information is essential.

b. Anticipation of B-1 information milestones and proper preparation for them is required to prevent the need for continual defense of the program in the form of reaction to query.

c. The public has a right to know the progress of a major defense development program.\textsuperscript{13}

The remainder of the plan outlined broad tasks and coordination procedures for which the entire Air Force information structure would be responsible. There is a recommended list of themes or messages which should be stressed, but no real discussion of the media to be used at each information echelon. Such decisions and implementing actions are left to the ingenuity and competence of the information offices at various levels:

Each action agency may add information activities as the development program progresses in real time. . . . Tasked agencies are encouraged to conduct additional information actions as required.\textsuperscript{14}

As will be noted in the communication section of this chapter, various types of media, both personal and mass, eventually were used in this information program, but the information plan leaves one with the feeling this was a reactive effort more than a planned one, which was just what the plan was supposed to prevent.
Missing from the plan was any discussion of the audience or target publics who would receive the messages or issues. The only references are to the "public" or "general public" with no distinction of how various sections of the public would be communicated with so they would understand the issues on their own terms. This may have been an omission which resulted from a lack of survey data on who the publics were and what their opinions were on the B-1. Lack of data could also explain in part why the plan did not identify those groups who were supportive of the B-1 and the Air Force's position on the issues.

There are also two other possible reasons why the "public" could not be better enumerated. One is the long-standing Congressional restrictions on government agency, which the Air Force is, "publicity" mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

Closely allied to the legal restraints is the Air Force public affairs philosophy as applied to the B-1 and expressed by Maj. Don Brownlee, who was the information officer at Edwards Air Force Base during the plane's flight testing:

The ground rules were not to flack the program, not to sell the B-1.

Unfortunately, our critics criticized us for selling the B-1 and yet our ground rules were not to sell it, but to make available to everybody how the B-1 program was going. We did that through news releases,
fact sheets, speeches, or whatever, but essentially, don't flack it--just make information available when it comes.\textsuperscript{15}

Given also the emotional environment of the time, Vietnam War unrest and suspicion of the defense community, the best that could probably be developed was what Colonel Hermann described as:

\textbf{... an outline of standard public affairs type activities, based primarily on milestone events developed by the information officer at the systems program office.}\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Planning Organization}

The B-1 Systems Program Office information officer was a key element in planning activities which would take place under the overall information plan with its given limitations. Located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, where the B-1 aircraft was being primarily developed, the B-1 information officer's duties were:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Monitor all planned management actions from a public affairs viewpoint and provide system program director with appropriate guidance and recommendations.
  
  \item[b.] Prepare releases and responses to queries on all milestones and significant events affecting the system and its development.
  
  \item[c.] Provide SAF/OI with factual information on the progress of the system with appropriate recommendations on public affairs action that should be initiated.
  
  \item[d.] Advise and assist program director in preparation of briefings, speeches, and other materials which are to be made public.
\end{itemize}
e. Provide public affairs planning guidance on all special events affecting the B-1.¹⁷

As it developed, the B-1 Systems Program Office information officer became "the Air Force's B-1 information focal point."¹⁸

There were three activities the B-1 information officer was involved with which I think are worthy of special note. One was a project which dealt with media feedback on the B-1; the other two highlight additional planning activity within the information effort.

One section of the 1976 B-1 Public Affairs Program Plan states that a "master B-1 clipping file will be maintained by the B-1 information officer."¹⁹ This clipping file contained inputs from Air Force information offices involved with the B-1, contractors, and sub-contractors. All the clippings sent to the B-1 information officer were compiled each month by Flight E of the 9010th Air Reserve Information Squadron and distributed to Air Force and contractor offices which had sent in the original clippings.

Many of the offices receiving the clipping compilations were also members of the B-1 Information Working Group which met quarterly. Formed in 1974, the working group became both an information sharing and a planning unit to anticipate milestone events and prepare for them. An Air Force memoer of the working group expressed it this way:

"We saw it as a way to get the major contractors together with Air Force public information officers who represented..."
organizations which would be affected by the aircraft and discuss common public affairs problems.

Essentially, it was a sharing of ideas, being aware of the common problems, being aware of the common objectives down the road that we should work toward... Through the information working group we were all pulling together.\textsuperscript{20}

One of the contractor representatives who attended the working group meetings felt one important aspect was:

... looking ahead to milestones, figuring out-OKAY--now we have some milestones happening--What is Rockwell's role in this? What's the Air Force role? What's GE's role, and Boeing's, etc.?\textsuperscript{21}

It was the B-1 information officer's responsibility to "prepare, maintain and monitor"\textsuperscript{22} charts of the B-1 milestones. These charts were one-page planning guides which listed the activity (milestone), date on which it would occur, the person responsible for accomplishing the public affairs activities necessary for the milestone, and the media determined best to support the event, news release, photo/cutline, film, interview/briefing, speech, booklet/handout, plan, article, or special event.\textsuperscript{23} A copy of one of the milestone charts for June 1977 is Attachment D.

The Air Force planning for the B-1 public affairs activities was broad and general at the Secretary of the Air Force level and became more and more specific as authority to conduct the programs descended the command structure. Not all the elements in Cutlip and Center's ideal planning scheme
were there; some because of statutory constraints or perhaps because of better judgement based on historical considerations of government public affairs sensitivities.

At the B-1 information officer level, there appeared to be the planning capability for a flexible, responsive information program. Activities which could be planned for, were, and they were managed throughout the program.

**Communication**

As mentioned briefly before, the Air Force used various media to relate their side of the B-1 story and, as the opponent's campaign increased in volume, more and more information was demanded of the various levels of command. Colonel Hermann recalled the basic Air Force thrust:

> What we tried to do was to counter more directly some of the misinformation that was appearing, in stories and editorials primarily.

> We found that we had to be more responsive than we had been in other programs.

> We tried very hard to get our side of the story presented to editorial boards whenever we could and through speaking engagements of (Air Force) Secretary Reed.²⁴ [Thomas C.]

Sometimes, however, trying to be forthcoming and doing the job accurately resulted in additional problems:

> All too often we tried to explain too technically what was actually going on and in the technical explanation, we lost the grass roots meaning, thereby kind of muddying what really happened.
At the same time, I thought we were very objective in the type of information we went out with in that we were quick to respond to problems. We did not try to cover them up.

In fact, our being candid with our problems gave a lot more focus to the anti-B-1 people because we were open with the problems.25

Air Force communication activities included working directly with the news media who were the forums for the issues, responding to numerous queries and requests for assistance.26 Periodically, memos were issued to all correspondents in order to clarify an issue or update their knowledge base.27

All levels of the Air Force information efforts issued news releases covering such topics as the Secretary of Defense flying the B-128 to the filing of the final B-1 environmental statement.29 (Copies of these materials can be found in Appendix E.) A film release was made through the Department of Defense Public Affairs Office about the B-1 flight testing in California.30

Speeches, not only by Air Force Secretary Reed but by other uniformed and civilian members of the Department of Defense, gave each speaker an opportunity to address the B-1 issues in a very personal and direct manner. In a 1975 speech to the Commonwealth Club of California, Maj. Gen. H.M. Darmstandler confronted not only the issues but the opponents:

In my job, I have become very sensitive to public attitudes and to the perceptions one finds on the B-1 bomber. I track pretty closely what the media is disseminating on
the B-1. From a factual point of view, I think the B-1 has received adequate and accurate coverage of such public interest milestones as contract award, rollout, first flight, and the like. But for a host of other important considerations—such as the need for a manned bomber, the cost of a new bomber, and even its effects on the environment—I think the coverage is poor and, even worse, frequently abounds in misinformation. The editorial treatment is almost uniformly negative.

Then, there are the adversary groups who openly and aggressively campaign against the B-1 bomber. Whatever their motivation, they mix a modicum of fact with a vast array of unsupported assertions and a seemingly endless supply of lurid adjectives. From these they then draw conclusions to fit their motivations...

... the unfortunate truth is that there is no easy way for the public to discern what is fact and what is myth. Moreover, there seems to be a great American proclivity to believe anything that is in print...

Now, in an effort to set the record straight, I would like to identify some of the more prevalent myths about the B-1 bomber and explain why they are just that—myths.

While speeches allow a spokesperson to take the debate and issues directly to the public, news conferences are formed when a spokesperson wants to get wide distribution of an issue through the people's intermediaries, the working press. Secretary of the Air Force Reed conducted a news conference on 2 December 1976, using that forum to announce the initial production contracts for the B-1. His opening statement and
documents supporting the decision were made available to
the press for background information:

The Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Committee completed its review of the
program this morning and made its
recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense. The resulting memorandum from
the Secretary of Defense is at Attachment
A.

In preparing for this decision, I
assembled an independent committee to
review the technical aspects of the B-1
development program. They were to report
directly to me on any technical risks
they might foresee in entering production.
The chairman of the committee was Professor
Courtland Perkins, President of the National
Academy of Engineering.

The committee was unanimous in its view
that a production decision could be made
with real confidence from the point of view
of technical status. They noted that there
are no apparent technical problems that would
preclude production as planned.

At the same time, I asked three knowledge-
able 'outsiders' to review all reasonable
alternatives to the B-1. In particular,
I asked whether 'forces which include some
B-1's ... impose the greatest target damage
per dollar expended.'

The panel concluded 'that the B-1 should
be procured for inclusion in the force.'

I believe the decision to produce the B-1
is sound.32

Secretary Reed's statement, the attachments to that statement,
and the results of the question and answer period following
the statement contained a great amount of information about
the B-1 issue—more than one could normally expect to find
in newspapers and magazines.
In tune with Colonel Hermann's public information program to get the B-1 issues presented to editorial boards, efforts were also made to provide the "pro" side of a "pro-con" article to the Radio/TV Editorial Journal. This publication is distributed to 10,600 radio and television editorial writers nationwide and has a potentially great impact on public awareness of the issues.

While these and similar efforts were being made at the Headquarters Air Force level, other Air Force units and agencies were also communicating the B-1 issues. In a 1976 report to the public by the Strategic Air Command, Maj. Gen. Andrew R. Anderson addressed the B-1 issues from the viewpoint of the agency which would fly the aircraft:

The Department of Defense and Air Force are providing us with a series of 'make do' modifications which will keep the B-52 competitive as a penetrating bomber into the 1980's for nuclear or non-nuclear wars. But the B-52 is a concept of the first half of the 20th century. It is old and aging. In a time of continual weapons sophistication, it must some day reach the point that no amount of strengthening, fixing or adding on will make it combat able.

The B-1 is the considered result of much designing, planning and solid in-flight evaluation. If it lives up to expectations--its advanced systems and its ability to adapt to the everchanging combat environment--it will make the most capable strategic bomber ever built...34

The report ended with these words: "The B-52 will not fly forever. For this reason the Air Force is testing the B-1 as the logical successor."
The B-1 information officer at the systems program office, "the focal point for B-1 information," was also involved in various communications activities. From August 1976 to March 1977, for example, he worked in support of: speech/media interviews at Chicago, Las Vegas, Albuquerque, Columbus, Amarillo, and Milwaukee; a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Security Committee; B-1 television film clips; events such as the first drop of MK-82 bombs and the Secretary of the Air Force's first flight in the B-1; revision of the B-1 fact sheet; contract award for B-1 training simulators; B-1 feature, CBS Evening News; B-1 Documentary, CBS Special Reports; and articles on the B-1 for the Boston Sunday Globe and the Detroit News.35

Distinctive Communications Opportunities

As a government agency, the Air Force depends on Congressional funding for its programs. This circumstance affords the leadership an opportunity to present responses to questions which will be made part of the Congressional Record. Few civilian companies ever have the opportunity to respond to the issue of cost as Secretary of the Air Force Reed did in answer to a question from Senator Goldwater during a meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee:

Management of the B-1 is one of the best in major weapons system development. The real cost of the B-1 is under control. In constant 1970 dollars, the program has increased only about 12% since the development effort began in 1970. Although there
have been some minor fluctuations within the estimate, there has been no total growth in real cost since December 1973. Since last year, the then-year dollar estimate of total program costs has increased due to re-estimation of the inflation rates in the out-years and the effects of Congressional funding reductions. . . .36

Air Force responses to various issues were most often included in the Record, where enterprising journalists and opponents alike could find them.

Sen. William Proxmire, one of the most dedicated B-1 critics, also inserted Air Force views on the plane into the Congressional Record in what was one of the more unique offers of the entire debate. He was planning a series of speeches against the B-1 in 1976 and invited Air Force comments on the issues he raised. His invitation letter to Secretary Reed stated:

Beginning Monday, April 26, I will be making a series of six speeches in the Senate on the issue of the B-1 bomber. My objective is to present the concept of the supersonic manned bomber and the alternatives to it before the American public in such a form that enlightened decisions can be made.

I know you share these objectives, although you undoubtedly would disagree with my conclusions with regard to specific B-1 arguments.

In order for the public to have all sides of the issue discussed, I invite you to respond to my speeches in writing. I will then put your response in the Congressional Record so that it has the same exposure as my remarks.
It is my intent to carry out this public debate in an objective manner based on facts available in the open literature. There may be items on which I am mistaken. Likewise I may disagree with Air Force conclusions or data. But the point is that a rational debate would serve the purposes of all parties. 37

Senator Proxmire also released the fact of this invitation and the text of his first speech to the press.

Secretary Reed accepted the senator's offer and his responses to the speeches were issued as memos to the press.

The issues debated in this forum were very wide-ranging.

For example:

Proxmire--The B-1 has increasing reliance on tankers; therefore, survivability will depend even more on survivability of tanker.

Air Force--The statement is incorrect. The B-1 can deliver its payload on most critical targets without refueling - refueling provides better tactics and deeper penetration. Tankers are important but their loss doesn't make B-1 ineffective. 38

Discussions of the issues raised in all of Senator Proxmire's six speeches were most often frank and candid as exemplified by this passage from Secretary Reed's cover letter on Air Force reactions to the senator's fourth B-1 speech:

You cite 'Air Force testimony' to the effect that the B-52 will 'last' into the 1990's. What the Air Force has said is that the B-52 fleet will be structurally safe to take off, fly and land until then. However, a bomber's combat mission is not safe transportation but reliable penetration of enemy defenses and assured weapons delivery. 39
It is interesting to note that here again some of the best debate on the B-1 issues was to be found in the *Congressional Record.*

Another distinctive communication opportunity with Congress developed as flight tests of the aircraft continued. Various Congressmen requested orientation flights in the B-1. The Air Force developed policy guidelines concerning such flights and one of the policies was "flights will not be offered, we will respond to new requests only."40

Quanbeck and Wood's B-1 study for the Brookings Institution provided the Air Force with another interesting challenge. One day after the Brookings study was announced, Secretary of the Air Force Reed released the service's comments on the findings. Those comments said in part:

The conclusions of the study are not supported by the body of the study:

a. A hard, fast aircraft, their label for the B-1, is acknowledged as clearly superior in surviving a surprise enemy attack. But the study tries to dismiss this fact by labeling as implausible the response postures that SAC has already demonstrated.

b. Cruise missiles are acknowledged to be ineffective against terminal SAM's without prior suppression. Further the study admits that such suppression cannot be assumed if SAM's are mobile. But even today the Soviets have mobile low altitude-capable SAM's.

c. Ballistic missiles are suggested for the suppression role even though the cruise missile concept is designed to insure against
failure of ballistic missiles. Furthermore, air-launched ballistic missiles are mentioned for the suppression role even though the 600 KM limit on such missiles in the Vladivostok understandings is admitted by the study to virtually preclude the use of these missiles for defense suppression.

d. Looking at cost on a per unit basis, the wide-body cruise missile carrier preferred by the authors is a more costly alternative than the B-1.41

Internal Air Force Communications

Throughout the B-I development program, the internal Air Force member audience was kept apprised of the B-I’s progress and achievements. Various media were used in this part of the effort: news releases and photos for base newspapers, fact sheets, Commander’s Call film segments, lithographs, and different pamphlets and booklets.

Following cancellation of the project, one of the important messages to get to the Air Force person was why the change in direction after seven years of work. One way this was communicated was through a message from the new Secretary of the Air Force, John C. Stetson, who had replaced Mr. Reed. His statement in the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders said:

The President has decided to discontinue production of the B-1 and to begin deployment of cruise missiles. Accordingly, the Air Force is accelerating development of cruise missiles for use with the B-52 force.

The decision to stop deployment of the B-1 was a matter of relative effectiveness and costs of two different systems under certain sets of
wartime attack conditions. In itself, the B-1 performance has been excellent and it has met or exceeded all Air Force requirements and is fully capable of performing its intended role. However, there obviously are alternative approaches to meeting threats to national security. Choosing between these alternatives involves a total analysis and appreciation of national priorities. It requires a balance between cost and prudent risk that can only be made at the highest levels of the government. The President has weighed all factors very carefully. He has concluded that emphasis on existing and other aircraft carrying cruise missiles will support the effectiveness of the bomber component of the Triad in the 1980's. The Air Force fully supports that decision.  

The men and women of the Air Force Systems Command had been the ones who were primarily responsible for moving the B-1 from blueprint to flight. A special message of appreciation was sent to them by Gen. David C. Jones, then the Air Force Chief of Staff. In a letter to the Systems Command commander, General Jones said:

I am proud to join Secretary Stetson in commending the Air Force response to the B-1 decision. We can hold our heads high on this one. The B-1 program was, in my judgment, among the best managed in the history of modern weapons. We brought a superb system to the point of fruition. When the President decided against production, we moved smartly—in a positive, attentive spirit—to carry out his guidance. That spirit is, in large measure, what makes our civil-military system work so well and what gives me the deepest sense of pride as I look at the Air Force today. I commend and thank you for your professionalism.
Changing Information Directions

This has been one of the most difficult decisions that I have made since I have been in office. During the last few months, I have done my best to assess all the factors involving production of the B-1 bomber. My decision is that we should not continue with deployment of the B-1, and I am directing that we discontinue plans for production of this weapons system. The Secretary of Defense agrees that this is a preferable decision. . . .

With those words, President Carter halted all but modest testing of the B-1's in service and settled the years of debate on the issues surrounding the B-1. Months after this 30 June 1977 announcement, Congress would still try to vote production money for the plane, but the President's decision prevailed in the end.

Cancelling the B-1 posed an interesting challenge for the Air Force information people. As Colonel Hermann remembered:

All of a sudden that goal was removed and you've got to come up with alternate plans. You've got to undo a lot of things you've been doing.

. . . reassure the American people that, OKAY, this decision has cancelled this program, but the B-52 with various modifications and upgrading is still a vehicle we can depend on.

That wasn't our original plan [upgrading the B-52's capabilities] but it is now and we'll get on with it and do the best we can.
Evaluation - Feedback

Throughout the B-1 public affairs effort there was no identifiable effort made to gain any sustained feedback on how the program was progressing. In part, one can conclude that the limitations on government agency surveys had a great deal to do with this.

It is probably fair to say that there was a continual crossfeed of information throughout the Air Force public affairs structure, but one of the few physical feedback mechanisms was the newspaper clipping compilation done by the B-1 information officer. Evidence was found of an attempt to do a content analysis of newspaper editorials during April-June 1976. This effort, however, offered little hard analysis of what the publics were thinking or of the efficacy of the communication programs.

Reflections

From the beginning, the purpose of this paper has not been to answer the question why did we lose the B-1. The scope of that question goes far beyond what we are attempting to do here.

Still, it is an intriguing question which probably has caused a great amount of reflection within the Air Force public affairs community. The perspectives of the Air Force information officers interviewed for this paper may give future investigators a place to begin their thinking.
Maj. Donald Brownlee reviewed it this way:

If we failed in one public affairs aspect, I think we failed in proving the average person in the street that the B-1 was even required. It's very hard to justify a major weapons system like the B-1 when you are not fighting a nuclear war.

Consequently, we failed to convince the American public at the grassroots level on what deterrence is all about, that we had a need for the B-1 . . .

I think the key issues at the onset, and remained the key issues to the end, were do we really need the bomber and is it worth the cost we're paying. That became more and more a political issue . . .

We won the subissues. Ninety percent of the cost over estimate was due to inflation, less than ten percent because of an increase in funds needed to run the actual program. Of course, the plane did prove that it could do things no other plane could do before.

We won those issues. We lost, I think, in the political arena.47

Since the beginning, our nation was founded on the principle of a military force outside the political system and responsive to civilian command and control. If it is someday determined that politics overrode all other issues, then Col. Robert Hermann's observation will be all the more true:

I don't think it would be fair to say we lost the B-1 program because of ineffective public affairs work.48
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 504.

5. Ibid., pp. 504-506.


9. Ibid., p. 139.


13. Ibid., p. 4.


19. Ibid., p. 11.

20. Interview with Maj. Donald Brownlee.


22. "B-1 Public Affairs Program," p. 3.


24. Interview with Col. Robert Hermann.

25. Interview with Maj. Donald Brownlee.


38. Ibid., p. 23.


45. Interview with Col. Robert Hermann.

46. Memorandum on Content Analysis, undated (approximately 8 July 1976), Secretary of the Air Force Office of Information, Public Information files, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

47. Interview with Maj. Donald Brownlee.

48. Interview with Col. Robert Hermann.
CHAPTER IV

THE ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL B-1

PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAM

As the prime contractor for the B-1 bomber, Rockwell International was the "daddy rabbit" for pure public relations activities surrounding the aircraft. Before taking an in-depth look at their B-1 public relations program, it may prove profitable to know something about the company:

Rockwell International is a multi-billion dollar business which employs 120,000 people. The company is well diversified and is widely known for its industrial power tools and electronic equipment. While a significant share of its total business is derived from the government, less than one-third of that portion is aerospace-oriented. A contract to produce the B-1 would have represented less than ten percent of Rockwell's total sales.1

These statements were confirmed by Mr. Jerry Syverson during an interview:

I think the B-1 opponents would contend that we were trying to sell the B-1 to the public not because of its requirements from a defense standpoint, but because it was a money maker for us at Rockwell.

We countered that by pointing out what a small percentage of profit we made on a program like the B-1 as opposed to some of our commercial programs at Rockwell. And
it wasn't that big a chunk out of the total sales by any means.

We had been selected by DOD and the Air Force to build the B-1 and, by God, we were going to do it and we were going to do it the best way we could. That was it. We believed in the requirement.2

This chapter will review Rockwell International's public relations program which was part of the requirement for seven years. As in the previous chapter, our study will be based on Cutlip and Center's four-point public relations problem solving process: research, analysis - planning, communication, and evaluation - feedback.

Because the Rockwell B-1 public relations files are in California, there was no opportunity to review them for this paper. The observations in this chapter come from an interview with Mr. Jerry Syverson who was the head of B-1 public relations for five years and secondary sources found in other parts of the research.

The first area we will review is Rockwell's research.

Research

As a private corporation, Rockwell International was not limited as the Air Force was in its public opinion surveying. They had two opinion surveys done on the subject of national defense and the B-1, one in 1975, the other in 1976.
Scientific Opinion Surveys conducted the 1975 poll which was more limited in scope than the 1976 one. The report on the survey stated:

This report documents the results of a telephone survey of 1000 West Virginia households, to assess the attitudes of West Virginia toward national defense in general, and the B-1 bomber in particular.

The main objective in conducting the survey of West Virginia households was to assess the attitudes and opinions of West Virginians toward the B-1 bomber. The survey was conducted just prior to the inception of a public information campaign conducted by Rockwell International to inform West Virginians about national defense and the need for the B-1 bomber. Although the current survey was conducted too late for the results to be used in the design of the information campaign, it is planned to conduct a second follow-up survey to assess changes in attitudes that may have occurred over the time period during which the information campaign was conducted. The magnitude of the observed change in attitudes may be interpreted as an indicator of the effectiveness of the campaign.3

There was no evidence available to indicate the existence of a follow-up survey after the information campaign.

The questionnaire was composed of 23 questions which are designed to elicit responses in four different areas:

* questions related to national defense (5 questions)
* questions related to particular weapons systems (5 questions)
* questions related to the B-1 bomber (6 questions)
* questions related to the characteristics of the respondent (7 questions)

A summary of the survey's analysis revealed:

* A majority of the survey respondents (71%) believe that the U.S. has a stronger overall military capability than Russia.

* An overwhelming majority (91%) believes that national security is very important.

* Only 12% of those responding believe that the U.S. investment in defense programs is too heavy. Forty-one percent believe it is about right, and 32% believe it is not enough.

* The population surveyed have most confidence in the U.S. Congress (26%), the President of the U.S. (24%), and the Department of Defense (23%), concerning what they say about national defense. They had least confidence in defense contractors (1%).

* Of the five news sources (local TV news, network TV news, daily newspaper, radio, and news magazines), 45% of the respondents indicated that they trusted the network TV news most to report national defense information impartially. Radio was least trusted.

* Missiles were favored three-to-one over bombers as being most important to preserving peace.

* A large majority (87%) believed that we should base defense on all three of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and manned bombers.

* A majority (63%) believed that we should have a newer, more advanced bomber than the B-52.

* Fifty-five percent of the respondents reported having heard or read no information about the B-1. Only 4% reported considerable information.

* Of those who had heard or read something about the B-1, 58% believed it to be capable of doing its job, and 33% were not sure that it was capable of doing its job. (This high percentage of "not sure" could indicate that many people are not sure what its job is.)
* Of those who had heard or read about the B-1, about half of the respondents (51%) were unaware of the current B-1 controversy.

* Of those who had heard or read about the B-1, a majority of the respondents (71%) favored production of the B-1.

* Of those respondents who indicated "favor production of the B-1", 5% changed their minds when it was indicated that the B-1 has been described as a very expensive weapon.5

Overall, the survey would indicate support for the B-1 and its production. Rockwell was cautioned by the survey company that "the survey results reflect West Virginia attitudes at the time of the survey; these attitudes obviously change over time."6 It would have been interesting to know of any changes in opinion after the Rockwell information campaign and even more, a year later when the B-1 debate on the issues was even more intense.

Roger Seasonwein Associates did conduct their nationwide B-1 survey during the height of the B-1 debate in 1976. They survey covered:

1. Knowledge about the B-1 bomber program.
2. Attitudes toward continuation of the B-1 program.
3. Attitudes toward postponement of this program until February 1977.
4. The level of acceptance and rejection of the basic arguments in support and opposition to the B-1 bomber program.
5. The level of acceptance and rejection of the basic arguments in support and opposition to the postponement of this project.7
A summary of the survey shows certain similarities to the one conducted in 1975:

The survey was conducted among a probability sample of some 1350 adults, 18 years of age or older, between August 10 and August 18, 1976.

Twenty-five minute interviews were conducted by telephone from the Seasonwein offices in New Rochelle, New York. Rigorous supervision was provided with a ratio of one supervisor to five interviewers maintained throughout the survey. Interviews were continuously monitored, and questionnaires were edited as soon as each interview was completed. All questionnaires received a second edit the day after interviews were finished as an additional quality check.

Interviews were conducted in some 150 counties in between 600 and 900 communities across the United States.

A 69% cooperation rate among households was obtained, substantially above the 50% norm for the industry.8

Both the 1975 and 1976 surveys had similar statistical margins of error for their figures. Scientific Opinion Surveys stated that their sample size "will produce estimates whose error will rarely exceed + or - 3%."9 Seasonwein Associates estimated that their "sampling error does not exceed plus or minus 2.2 percentage points for any figure based on the total sample."10

While the questions asked were not the same in both cases, the Seasonwein survey made an interesting counterpoint to the 1975 poll:

1. The public evinces concern that the United States is not as strong militarily as it should be. While 56% of the public feel
this country should be stronger than the Russians and Chinese, only 28% feel that this is the case. In 1975, 71% of West Virginians felt we were stronger.

2. In line with concern about U.S. military strength, the public tends to favor increased spending for defense. Forty-four percent of the public favors increasing the defense budget while only 17% want it reduced. Twenty-nine percent feel the defense budget should be left where it is now. In the 1975 sample, 32% said defense spending was not enough, 12% said it was too much and 41% believed it to be about right.

3. The public favors basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent on both missiles and bombers by a 70% to 14% majority. Eighty-seven percent of the people believed in basing defense on missiles and bombers in 1975.

4. Awareness of the B-1 was a relatively high 72% but only 23% of the public had heard or seen or read anything about the program within two or three months of their interview. In 1975, 55% of West Virginia respondents had neither seen or heard any information about the B-1.

5. The public favors the B-1 bomber program by a 57% to 16% margin. Seventy-one percent of the 1975 respondents who had heard or read about the B-1 favored its production.

6. Among socio-economic groups, strongest support for the B-1 comes from blue-collar and lower-middle income households with 65% in favor in each case. However, in upper-income households, 60% favor the program and among executive/professional households, the "favor" figure is 56%. No comparable 1975 data.

7. A majority of the public supported each of five basic arguments in favor of the program that were read to them. Winning the most support, with two thirds of the public saying each is a valid argument in favor of the B-1 are the assertions that the B-52 is becoming obsolete.
and an argument based on the claim that a bomber, unlike missiles, can be ordered back after having been sent toward enemy territory. While not as encompassing as this survey, the 1975 poll found that 63% of the respondents believed that we should have a newer, more advanced bomber than the B-52.

8. In sharp contrast to the acceptance of the arguments in favor of the B-1 program, only two of the five arguments against the program won the support of the public. In each case, this was by a 1-point margin. One of these arguments was based on the assertion that there are less costly alternatives to the B-1. 38% said this was valid, 37% said it was invalid and the other proposed spending money saved by not building the B-1 on the nation's domestic problems. 44% valid, 43% invalid.

10. Almost half of those who favor postponement also favor the project, which clearly implies that favoring postponement is not necessarily a vote to kill the project.

11. After hearing arguments on both sides, respondents were asked again their opinion about postponing the B-1 program until February.

The margin against postponement rose to 15 points with 50% against, 35% in favor, and there was solid evidence that attitudes had solidified.

Thus, it is likely that opposition to postponement would increase if the public becomes more knowledgeable and interested in this issue.

12. As with the program itself, the public is willing to give its elected officials considerable leeway to base their vote on postponement on their own judgment and conscience.

62% of the public either has no opinion about postponement or has an opinion on the program but is willing to let his Congressman vote on this issue as the Congressman sees fit.
13. The public was asked whether or not they would be inclined to believe a statement about the B-1 by some 14 different people and types of groups.

The public seems most inclined to believe those with technical knowledge. Leading the list is an engineer who designs airplanes with a 68% "believable" score. Next came the Air Force at 65%, followed by the Secretary of Defense and a leading physicist at 57% and 56%, respectively.

Walter Cronkite and President Ford were tied for fifth place on the list at 52%, closely followed by the "company responsible for developing the B-1" at 49%.

Winning least support were a union leader with a 22% believability score and a citizens group opposing the B-1 bomber at 25%. [No 1975 data]

[NOTE: On this question, Jimmy Carter had a 40% believability score and 'a liberal Senator or Congressman' received 32%.]

14. While a majority of the public is unable to give an overall opinion of Rockwell International, the company wins approval among those who have an opinion.

Forty-two percent of the public said their overall attitudes to Rockwell were favorable while 6% said their overall attitudes were unfavorable.

15. Rockwell International is perceived to be a capable defense contractor by a 61% to 5% vote.11

Less than six months after the Seasonwein survey was taken, Opinion Research Corporation conducted a smaller poll on the B-1 issue. Their December 1976 survey revealed:

The American public wants a stronger defense and supports the recent decision to produce the B-1 bomber according to
results of a national survey released today [15 December] by Opinion Research Corporation.

The survey indicates that 65% of the public believes that the U.S. should be militarily stronger than Russia, but only 29% feel that we are. Twenty-six percent of those polled think we should be equally strong and 30% believe we actually are.

One percent of the Opinion Research Corporation poll says the U.S. should be weaker than Russia, but 27% say we are.

Questioned on the December 2 Department of Defense decision approving initial production of the B-1 strategic bomber, 64% said they agreed with the decision, 18% disagreed and 18% were undecided.

Forty-two percent of those polled said the present U.S. defense budget should be increased, 29% favored leaving it where it is now, 16% favored decreasing the budget, and 13% had no opinion. Or, of those polled, about two and a half times as many said the U.S. defense budget should be increased as said it should be decreased.

At the beginning of 1977, all the figures in the surveys and polls, both private and public, looked good for the B-1. Jerry Syverson analyzed the eventual outcome this way:

I heard one explanation one time that probably makes sense. All the surveys indicated that the majority of the people were in favor of the B-1 once they heard about it or were asked specifically about it.

I don't remember the percentages exactly, but you'd see results something like 67% in favor of it, in that scale. It's the vocal minority that did it and not the silent majority.
According to Mr. Syverson, one part of the Seasonwein survey which lead to some public relations rethinking of the program was the part that identified aircraft designers as "believable" spokesmen for the B-1:

I think that surprised us a little bit. Another source that was very believable was the Air Force.

I think many of us had the feeling that the two least credible sources for the B-1 would be Rockwell, because we built it, and the Air Force, because they wanted it. So a lot of the time we were thinking we needed a third party to promote this program, an industry trade association or something else.

I guess a lot of us thought that maybe the public didn't look at it that way. We were wrong and I hope we made some changes after that. Just a little bit more aggressive as far as using Air Force people to testify, to make comments. Our own president and chairman of the board became a little more active.\(^{14}\)

One must admit, that is a main purpose of survey research in public relations, understanding what your publics think and then planning or rethinking your program accordingly.

**Analysis - Planning**

It was confirmed that Rockwell International did have a public relations plan for the B-1 program. Unfortunately, a copy was not available to use in preparation of this paper. Jerry Syverson remembered the plan this way:

I think maybe instead of having a five-year plan, we had a six-month plan that we followed. We didn't adhere to it to the "n"th degree.
Part of it was reactive, maybe too much. In fact, I think we found as the program went on and on that what we had planned to do we might have been able to do, but no to the degree we wanted to because we were reacting so often to the opponents. 15

During the interview with Mr. Syverson, he said the B-1 public relations staff was actually small for a project that size. He had the help of two assistants and two secretaries. One assistant was responsible for the news bureau and the other worked with the internal public relations for the division.

He also recalled two of the publics they planned to communicate with:

I think there were two basic publics. Mass media, daily newspapers, television and radio, were used to make the general public aware of the B-1, its need and what it was doing.

The other public would have been the decision makers. Not that you would take a different approach to them, but we did want to make sure that members of Congress were aware of the successes of the program. 16

Rockwell International's B-1 public relations division was a member of the B-1 Information Working Group previously mentioned. As such, they had a distinct part to play in the group's meetings and were responsible for accomplishing certain B-1 milestones, a planning function maintained and monitored by the Air Force B-1 information officer. The Rockwell B-1 public relations people did work and plan within the guidelines of the B-1 milestone chart.
Communication

As indicated earlier in this paper, Rockwell International communicated their issues in a variety of ways from standard news releases to the release of a video tape cassette of the B-1 firing a supersonic missile at low altitude. As Jerry Syverson related, their media did not stay static:

I think it would change. In the earlier days of the program, up to rollout and first flight, your media would be certainly some of the trade magazines as well as the daily newspapers.

Then as the program moved into flight status, the visual effects of the airplane flying were really quite tremendous, the television media picked it up. The B-1 was quite artistic. I think they became more and more important as the airplane started flying.

Admittedly, after its made half a dozen flights, it's no longer news. But the first few flights were well covered.

Examples of Rockwell B-1 public relations projects listed on a B-1 Information Accomplishments report included: a film, "B-1's on the Move;" B-1 program brochure; and support of an article in Countermeasures Magazine. Based on this limited information, one could logically extrapolate that Rockwell accomplished many public relations communications activities in support of the D-1 program. It is difficult to absolutely determine whether or not Rockwell always followed Cutlip and Center's advise "to target specific messages to specific audiences to achieve specific results."
One area where there was some indication they attempted to follow this guidance is their public relations work with the decision makers. Mr. Syverson recalled that:

We were not a politically oriented public relations group. We didn't and were not lobbyists. Certainly when we had a successful first flight, we wanted to make sure the people on the "hill" were aware of it.

How did we do that? Well, you hope to get something in the Washington Post or in Aerospace Daily or Aviation Week. Occasionaliy, we would make sure that our own Congressmen were aware of the coverage. We might say: Hey, did you see this clip?

It was very minor. We were not specifically geared to be political.

The Rockwell public relations people also responded on occasion to requests from various Congressmen for information. Jerry Syverson recalled there were inquiries about costs of the B-1, its effect on the environment, and one topic which became a very big issue at one time—job creation. At the request of a Congressman, Rockwell produced a state-by-state analysis of the jobs the B-1 program would create. This was one of the sections in the critical report on the B-1 issued by the Council on Economic Priorities, and was one of the major B-1 issues used by the opponents. One can suspect it became hard for people to understand that:

A weapons system is there for deterrence, not primarily to create jobs. The B-1 was not designed to be a WPA project.
Internal Communication

As production of the B-1 progressed, various programs were undertaken by the public relations office to keep the Rockwell International employees informed of activities. Mr. Syverson mentioned the plant newspaper and this report has already cited the "B-1 Team Report" news sheet as two of the internal programs. There were also efforts made to involve the employees in selected milestone events:

As the time would draw near for a significant event like the rollout of the first aircraft, which was a big internal deal and a big public publicity program too, we would have signs put up in all the working areas, "X number of days to go," and we'd change them daily. I think it picked up the spirits of everybody.

We tried to have as many of our own employees as possible come out for these events. Unfortunately, it was about 80 miles away from our main plant in Los Angeles, so we couldn't have the whole crowd come on out. We did have a few buses to take some of the people up.

Rockwell also had programs designed to highlight the efforts of the individual sections working on the B-1 and report to those who could not attend the main events:

We had our own mini-newscast that we had our motion picture department draw up. They'd take photos of the main things that happened, like the mating of the wings to the main fuselage. Then, we'd show the film at lunch time and after work to people who wanted to come in and see the latest newsreel.

Obviously, on some of the first flights they couldn't take the people up for that and there is not too much you can see except
takeoffs and landings. But we'd get some of the aerial footage taken by the chase planes and put together a 10 or 15 minute newsreel. This was extremely popular among the employees. It was standing room only to watch their project.

Internal Efforts at Grass Roots Communication

Rockwell International also conducted its own grass roots information program among its stockholders and employees, urging their support in the B-1 issues debate:

In an August 1976 letter signed by W.F. Rockwell, Jr., the firm's 140,000 shareholders were urged to contact their senators and representatives. Rockwell warned that the B-1 opponents were confident that, if they could delay the program in 1976, they could kill it entirely in 1977. Stockholders were told how to telephone or telegraph officials in Washington. A brochure was also prepared entitled "Wake Up, Citizen! Your National Security Is At Stake."

Within the company, an "urgent" internal letter went to supervisors on August 17, 1976, asking them to hand B-1 information packets to each worker and to make available stationery, envelopes, and stamps for those who would like to send a letter to a senator or representative. "The B-1," the letter said, "is a program of utmost importance to all of Rockwell and the security of our nation. It is the hope of Rockwell management that all employees who support a strong national defense system, including the B-1, will make their opinions known."

In addition, a special August 1976 B-1 edition of the company newspaper carried an appeal from Robert Anderson, the company president. "Your help is needed to support a program that is vital to the nation," Anderson said. By the end of August, after
Congress had voted to continue B-1 funding, a notice went up on the company's bulletin boards that said, "Thank You." More than 80,000 letters had gone out, the notice said.26

The "Wake Up" brochure attempted to stimulate action by stating the B-1 issues for Rockwell employees this way:

"With the B-1 strategic bomber production decision now before Congress, an extremely determined, well-financed campaign has been launched throughout America to halt its production at all costs despite the fact our nation's defense leaders agree the airplane is vitally needed to insure U.S. security."

Rockwell International President, Robert Anderson, made that statement in urging all employees to contact as many congressmen and senators as possible by mail, telegram, or telephone and express their own views on a matter which affects every citizen in this country.

Said Anderson:

"High vocal groups are totally dedicated to halting the B-1 program. These small, disciplined, strongly directed groups have massed their efforts under a common banner called the 'National Campaign to Stop the B-1 Bomber.' They have attacked the B-1 program with misleading statements, innuendoes and half-truths. Their current effort is a nationwide letter writing campaign to congressmen and senators. They are asking that the B-1 program be scrapped or at least delayed, even though a delay could cost the nation's taxpayers as much as a half billion extra dollars to fund the program."

"I strongly believe that Congress during this debate should hear from all the people, not just those who would weaken our defenses by scrapping the B-1."

"That is why I urge you to contact your Congressional representatives now and also ask your friends, your neighbors, and members
of your family to do so too. The why of the B-1 is very clear. It is being developed by the Air Force to modernize the bomber force of the Strategic Air Command, now equipped principally with the B-52. Almost half of the B-52's built are already retired from service, and even the newest models would be nearly 20 years old before the first B-1's could be delivered to the Air Force."27

One could conclude that Rockwell's efforts at grass roots support for the B-1 were due, at least in part, to the success the opponents were perhaps enjoying during this period.

Congressional Interest in Rockwell Communications

Coincidental with the Rockwell grass roots B-1 support effort, Sen. William Proxmire became interested in Rockwell's public relations program and "requested Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld to determine if tax funds were being used by Rockwell International in support of their massive nationwide campaign for the B-1 bomber."28 The news release which announced the request specifically stated:

"Within recent weeks," Proxmire said, Rockwell International has accelerated an already massive public relations campaign in support of the $22 million [sic] B-1 program. Advertisements have been placed in major newspapers throughout the country including the Wall Street Journal (4 times), the New York Post and Seattle Post Intelligencer (6 times), Seattle Times (6 times), Providence Evening Bulletin and Providence Journal, Wilmington Morning News and Wilmington Evening Journal (3 times), the Atlanta Constitution and Atlanta Journal (6 times), St. Louis Post-Dispatch and St. Louis Globe Democrat (6 times), Springfield, Illinois Journal Register, Chicago Daily News (13 times), and many others.
"In addition, there are a number of other Rockwell practices which may have been written off for tax purposes as business expenses and, thus, borne by the American taxpayers. For example:

-- Rockwell employees touring the country to speak with newspaper editors encouraging support for the B-1.

-- Major advertising in aerospace publications such as Aviation Week and Space Technology and the Air Force Magazine.

-- The payment of dues or membership fees to organizations which actively encourage support for the B-1 and/or lobby for the B-1, such as the Air Force Association, the American Security Council, Aerospace Industries Association, Council of Defense and Space Industry Association, Electronic Industries Association, National Aeronautics Association, National Security Industrial Association and the National Aerospace Service Association.

-- The production and distribution of slide shows and films extolling the B-1. For example, the production of a film on the Rockwell Chief Test Pilot and his first flight in the B-1, as distributed by Paramount Pictures Company.

-- The costs of Rockwell's Washington office, including overhead personnel, travel, publicity, and consultants, if any such funds were used for lobbying activities or in support of pro B-1 forces during periods of legislation dealing with the B-1.

-- The sponsorship or financial support of research organizations or public relations firms which then either publicize the merits of the B-1 and/or encourage lobbying in behalf of the B-1 program.

-- The establishment and funding of Operation Common Sense by Rockwell International in 1974 as an internal lobbying organization designed to influence veterans organizations, provide pro B-1 speakers to citizens groups, counter
anti B-1 activities and combat public relations in support of the B-1. (Minutes of a Common Sense meeting are being sent to Secretary Rumsfeld.)

--Letters to all Rockwell stockholders and employees recommending that they write to Congress in support of the B-1.

Public relations and lobbying activities by themselves are a normal part of private enterprise and contribute to a healthy debate on national issues.

Under no circumstances, however, should such activities be supported by tax funds or claimed under government contracts. That results in the taxpayer financing a lobbying campaign against himself.

The Defense Contract Audit Agency conducted a review of program relations and other expenses incurred by Rockwell from 30 September 1974 to 30 September 1975 and submitted their report 24 November 1976. The report, stamped "For Official Use Only," is prohibited for release to the public according to 18 USC 1905.

Regardless of the report findings, the Proxmire allegations and the conduct of the audit itself were enough to plant perceptions of wrongdoing in the minds of the public. From that point on, any Rockwell activities in support of the B-1 may actually have had a negative effect on the program.

One might conclude from this event that one man's public relations is another man's propaganda.

Evaluation - Feedback

In addition to the newspaper clipping compilation Rockwell's B-1 public relations division would receive as a
member of the B-1 working group, they also had a private firm, PR Data, providing them a media analysis of their communications efforts. Jerry Syverson explained the PR Data program this way:

The idea was to more or less check the effectiveness of our public relations efforts to see how many messages were getting across to "X" number of people.

I don't recall exactly how they worked it, but they would take and study various newspapers. A story from the Washington Post would be worth more, a lot more, than a 24-inch story in the Antelope Valley Weekly Gazette, for instance.

It was a pretty inclusive clip gathering operation in New York. They would go through all the different stories about the B-1 and find out how many times a positive message— it's a good airplane, it's supersonic, it's on schedule, it's not too much over cost— appeared. It was a check to see if the right messages were getting into the public eyes.

We had the positive and negative number of inches and number of messages for all this measured by PR Data. We got up into the millions and millions of messages.

We had no way of knowing if people actually read these stories or saw them on television but, at least, they were there. The information provided by PR Data was found to be helpful in adjusting Rockwell's public relations efforts.

Mr. Syverson explained how it helped:

Occasionally it did cause us to change some of our emphasis. One of our goals might have been to really get the story across that the B-1 was more than a supersonic aircraft, that its real mission was extremely fast low-level flight.
If that wasn't being picked up frequently enough as a result of our press releases and interviews and so forth, well, OKAY, maybe we ought to start emphasising that more. You'd see a slight change.

Maybe we'd put a lead on it or emphasize it more in face-to-face interviews with newsmen. So, it helped in that respect, changing emphasis slightly. 33

Reflections

In reflecting on the B-1 public relations program, Jerry Syverson had some firm ideas on what the most costly issue was for the debate:

Cost, I think. The performance of the airplane fortunately was never a factor because it flew and it flew beautifully. The schedule was pretty much on. I would think it was the big dollar expenditure of the program that probably hurt us more than anything else.

It's not always a matter of how you approach it. It's how the media people pick it up and use it. 34

He also thought there were some handicaps to the public relations effort and some things he would do differently if he were to do it over again:

We did not have unlimited funds. We had a very small staff and really no advertising budget.

It probably would have helped if we would have had a bigger operation. We might have been able to get more national media out on a one-to-one basis rather than relying on press conferences where you invite several.
I think maybe more of that would have helped and going along after the key columnists and giving them something, not necessarily exclusive but pretty close to exclusive within the bounds of security.

And I think possibly go into a little bit more plain old advertising. You buy space to get your message across.

You know, sometimes that's the only way you can do it. It's terribly expensive, but maybe for critical times, it's worth it to go the paid advertising route.35

When asked for his recommendations to whoever would have the public relations responsibility for a like program in the future, Mr. Syverson said:

I think one of the first things you would have to do is to establish the absolute requirement for the program. In fact, that it is really an absolutely, definitely needed system. You've got to get that across first. It's not a profit making thing for the contractor; it's not a toy for the Air Force.

Public relations can't control what the costs and schedules are like. That's another thing to counsel your own management on: the importance of staying within costs and staying within schedule.36

Jerry Syverson still has some questions in his mind about the B-1 public relations program and even now he contemplates how it could have been better:

When you get some very active opponents, such as the Coalition to Stop the B-1 Bomber, how do you handle a situation like that? Do you debate them publically? Do you ignore them? What do you do?

We tried both approaches. Sometimes we'd dignify it by sending in a very articulate
person to debate at a college or whatever. Sometimes you ignored it because if you called in somebody, it would call more attention to their particular motive.

I don't know the best way of handling your very, very vocal organized opposition that bases their arguments on emotion and half-truths. It's damned difficult.

I think maybe we underestimated the strength of our opposition.
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. Donald H. Brownlee, "A Discussion of President Carter's Decision to Halt Production of the B-1 Bomber" (Class paper, Central Michigan University, 1978), p. 8.


4. Ibid., p. 4.

5. Ibid., p. 5-6.

6. Ibid., p. 2.


8. Ibid., p. 3.


11. Ibid., pp. 7-14.


13. Interview with Jerry Syverson.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

18. Interview with Jerry Syverson.


21. Interview with Jerry Syverson.


23. Interview with Jerry Syverson.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.


29. Ibid.


31. Ibid.

32. Interview with Jerry Syverson.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.
CHAPTER V

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES
REPORTING OF B-I ISSUES

This chapter will be a review of findings which resulted from a content analysis of the New York Times (as abstracted in its Information Bank) as it reported the developments of the B-I issues. If, as Abraham Kaplan contends, "content analysis is the statistical semantics of political discourse," then it can be hoped that this effort will result in a better understanding of the debate which surrounded the B-I, its vocalizers, and its unfolding over time.

Bernard Berelson has defined content analysis as:

... a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.2

This definition is compatible with Richard Budd's:

Content analysis is a systematic technique for analyzing message content and message handling--it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt content communication behavior of selected communicators.3

One of the first tasks faced was deciding on the categories into which the information gleaned from the abstracts would be put:
Because content analysts are not generally agreed on standard categories, even for given classes of problems, the investigator often finds himself in the position of having to develop his own for the question at hand.  

The categories selected for this analysis were: B-1 issues, pro and con; dates of publication by month; page of appearance; and spokesperson for the issues. Thought was given to analyzing the adjectives used to modify the pro and con issues and also determine if the stories contained mention of contradictions in them to the issues presented, but the material did not provide enough depth to adequately cover these categories.

Each story was analyzed and assigned to the various categories by the author of this paper. No attempt was made to use screening boards or to provide severely detailed analysis of each item. The purpose of this analysis to gain some idea of the breadth of the B-1 debate over a period of seven and a half years and perhaps draw some tentative conclusions on that debate:

In one sense, a great number of content studies—certainly the majority of them—can be considered propaganda analyses; if by propaganda is meant the deliberate attempt to influence attitudes or behavior on controversial public issues.  

**Procedure**

This analysis was done from an abstract of all B-1 news articles which appeared in the New York Times from 1970 to 1 July 1977. The New York Times was selected because it
is a newspaper of record and would logically be expected to have carried the significant B-1 stories as they developed. Also, it is recognized as one of the leading newspapers in the country and B-1 items which appeared in it might logically be expected to have appeared in many other papers across the country. The time period reviewed coincides with the period from the announcement of the selection of the contractors to build the B-1 through President Carter’s announcement to cancel the program. The abstract was obtained from a computer printout by the New York Times Information Bank.

Only general news stories were analyzed because they were believed to provide the best day-to-day development of the B-1 issues and could generally be expected to be objective in their reports. Editorials were considered but were not counted for the main body of this analysis because they are not continually produced over time which would result in "spotty" coverage of the B-1 and editorials reflect the bias of the newspaper on the subject. Similarly, in-depth articles were not reviewed because they combine too many issues into one story and they are not printed as frequently as "breaking" news stories.

Issues discovered in the news stories were categorized as either "pro", "con", or neutral. Pro articles were those which advanced those arguments identified as necessary reasons for the B-1 or those sentiments which advanced, or
were positive factors, in the development, production, or funding of the aircraft. Conversely, con articles were ones which cited a negative argument on the B-1 or presented negative sentiments or actions which would not further the development, production, or funding of the plane. Neutral articles were not counted for this paper.

It was initially thought, and later generally confirmed, that the pro and con issues surrounding the B-1 would be the opposite sides of the same argument. For example, the pro side of the issue Soviet threat, as applied to the B-1, would be such items as massive Soviet buildup, B-1 counters the threat, or fear of Communism. Con arguments of the Soviet threat issue would be detente makes the B-1 unnecessary or the Soviets are not as big a threat as portrayed by the proponents.

Prior to the content analysis, the major issues surrounding the B-1 were thought to be: national defense need for the B-1, Soviet threat, U.S. social needs versus defense needs, the B-1's performance, costs, polls, and the environment. These were partially borne out in the analysis when the most discussed issues were found to be funding for the B-1, the B-1's performance, costs, the need for the B-1, and its development. There were also a host of lesser issues which were not even conceived of prior to the analysis. These will all be discussed in greater depth later in the paper.
The number of issues raised pro or con were also analyzed by how many were raised in each year. It was thought this would give an idea of the trend in the importance of the issues or the emphasis the proponents and opponents would place on the issues. An analysis was also made of the months in which the issues were raised to determine if there was a time frame when either the pro or con side would expend more effort than others.

Page placement of the stories in the newspaper was also reviewed to determine where within the news hole of the New York Times the issues, pro and con, were presented.

Specific issues are not cited by page, month of appearance, or year of appearance in the total review of the eight years, but are categorized only as pro or con. It was not determined for the purposes of this paper that such a minute breakout was necessary. However, some comments of this nature are mentioned in the year-by-year reviews in this chapter.

Similarly, an attempt was made to determine who the spokesperson was who raised each pro or con issue. While a few citations mention certain individuals by name, most refer to only an agency or legislative body. Therefore, in attempting to analyze the spokesperson, only their agency of affiliation was considered and recorded. The main categories of spokespersons were Congress, the Department of Defense (including the Air Force), the Administration in office at the time, and
citizens groups. There were also lesser spokespersons who are noted later in this chapter.

A section on minor findings concerning the pro and con letters to the editor, editorials, and other expressions of opinion is included at the end of this chapter. Before this analysis was begun, there was thought given to listing the adjectives used in the discussion of the B-1 issues. Unfortunately, the abstract did not provide enough of this information to lead to a meaningful result.

Appendix F contains copies of the worksheets used for the content analysis for 1976. A page from the Information Bank abstract is also included in that appendix.

The first section of this chapter will review the B-1 content analysis on a year-by-year basis and discuss some of the significant results for each year.

1970

Only one issue was mentioned in the New York Times in 1970. It was a pro issue on B-1 funding where the House of Representatives defeated an attempt to cut $100 million for the B-1 from the defense authorization bill. This issue was reported on page 12 of the 1 May paper.

1971

Interest in the B-1 increased markedly in 1971 when there were seven pro issues mentioned in the Times and only one con issue. Of the 87% of the issues mentioned that were pro, three dealt with B-1 development, one with cost, one with
builder performance, one with funding, and one with the Soviet threat. The one con mention concerned B-1 funding.

None of the mentions made page one, with the closest item being the con issue which appeared on page six. Half the issues (three pro, one con) appeared in June of 1971 and others were mentioned in February, July, August, and September of that year.

Three of the pro issues were addressed by the Department of Defense, two by the Congress, and one by the president of Rockwell International. The lone con issue was raised by Representative Pike of the Congress.

The only adjectives associated with the issues were on the pro side. Refinements to the B-1 development program were said to "save" money, and supporters of the B-1 called it "critical" and "vital" to deterrence and postulated that it would be a "credible" deterrent.

1972

This year continued the pace of 1971 in that there were nine pro issues (81%) reported and only two con issues (19%). Two-thirds of the pro stories dealt with funding for the B-1, one addressed costs, one other mentioned B-1 development, and the other dealt with the B-1's capabilities. The two con issues raised concerned costs and an alligation that the B-1 violates the Soviet-U.S. arms agreement.

Three of the pro mentions dealing with funding made page one of the New York Times. However, the first B-1 mention
to make page one was a con discussion of the B-1 costs in May. The other con mention appeared in September. Seven of the pro mentions appeared in June 1972 and the other two appeared in September.

Over half of the spokespersons on the pro side of the issues came from the Congress (5) and exactly one-third (3) of the pro issues were raised by the Nixon Administration. The other pro spokesperson was from the Department of Defense which also addressed one of the two con issues. Interestingly, the other con issue was mentioned in a report from the USSR.

1973

This was only one of two years studied when the number of con issues reported (6) outnumbered the pro issues (2). Both pro mentions categorized dealt with B-1 funding while the opponents doubled up on only one issue, B-1 development which was one-third of their mentions. The other con mentions were: need for the B-1, B-1 funding, management of the B-1 program, and curtailment/elimination of the program.

None of 1973's mentions made page one of the Times. Both of the pro items appeared in November. There was one con mention printed in April, two in July and August, and one in October. It is interesting to note that the spokesperson for the October con issue was the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research which, in that same article, was linked in agreement with the Brookings Institution about the
questionable necessity of the B-1 program.

Two notes of interest on the con spokespersons are worthy of citation. First, as a government agency charged with reporting its affairs to the public, the Department of Defense was responsible for two con issues, B-1 development program problems and a review order for the B-1 program's management. This situation of appearing to work against yourself would appear again in later years. Second, there were two con issues raised in Congress during 1973; one of them was raised by Sen. William Proxmire. Even though he has been rated as a highly vocal opponent of the B-1, there were only two instances in the entire abstract analysis where his name was directly linked to con issues.

The remaining con issue was raised by a citizens group and both the pro mentions were attributed to the Congress.

1974

There were almost twice as many pro issues raised (7) as there were con issues (4) in 1974. Two of the pro stories dealt with B-1 funding; two with B-1 performance (including the first flight); and one each with B-1 development, the Soviet threat, and the Triad. Three (75%) of the con mentions dealt with the costs of the B-1. The other con item was a mention of the picketing of the General Electric (B-1 engine builders) stockholders meeting by members of the American Friends Service Committee and Clergy and Laity Concerned. This was the first
indication in the abstract of an organized group demonstrating against the B-1.

Two of the pro mentions, discussion of the Triad and the B-1's first flight, made the front page of the New York Times. None of the con mentions made page one. The pro items were spread throughout the year in coverage with one story appearing in each of the months of May, June, July, October, and November. Two pro mentions appeared in December and were the ones which made page one. There was one con mention printed in both March and April with two items appearing in October.

A majority of the pro issues were addressed by the Congress (2), the Department of Defense (2), and the Administration (1). A citizens group addressed one other pro issue and one story had no definable spokesperson and was categorized as a news story. The Department of Defense again was a spokesperson for the con issue side (2) and both mentions dealt with the B-1's costs. A citizens group was the spokesperson for another con item and, like the pro side, one story contained no definable spokesperson and was categorized as a news story.

During the analysis of 1974, the first contradiction was noticed in a report on the pro issue of B-1 performance when "a handful of demonstrators picketed" a display of the aircraft in California.
This was the second year where the number of con mentions (11) outnumbered the pro B-1 mentions (6). It was also the first time where issues not directly related to the B-1 were raised by the opponents. Four of the con mentions concerned B-1 costs or cost overruns while three others were about funding. In all, 64 percent of the con items dealt with money in some fashion.

Two other con issues cited were B-1 production and B-1 performance. One of the con mentions found to be tangent to the B-1 issue was a news story on the arms lobby. Both Senator Proxmire and Rep. Les Aspin were quoted in the story but it could not be determined that they were the primary spokespersons. The other con item related indirectly to the B-1 concerned the Rockwell International Corporation entertaining Pentagon civilian and military "brass" at their Maryland hunting lodge. These stories did not attack the B-1 directly, but it is conceivable the con mentions raised against the builder had some coloration on the aircraft.

Fifty percent (3) of the pro mentions concerned B-1 funding. The other items were on B-1 development, B-1 performance, and B-1 capabilities. For a smaller number of mentions, the proponents did well in receiving page one coverage of two of their issues. Con mentions were on the front page of the New York Times on three separate occasions.
All the pro issues were raised during the first half of 1975 with one each in February, March, and April; two in May; and one again in July. Three con mentions appeared in February; one in March; two in May; one each in July, August, and September; and two issues in October.

Spokespersons for both sides of the B-1 story were fairly conventional during this year. Pro issues were articulated by the Department of Defense (2), the Congress (2), and by news stories (2). Five of the con issues were addressed by the Congress, two by the Department of Defense, and four by news stories. It is perhaps significant to note that two of the Congressional spokespersons who raised con issues about the B-1 production and costs were Senator Jackson and Senator Stennis who have frequently been advocates of a strong defense establishment.

1976

In 1976, there were 28 total mentions recorded, 16 pro issues (57%) and 12 con issues (43%). The variety of issues, both pro and con, expanded but, as in 1975, there were three con issues raised which did not directly center on the B-1.

Multiple pro mentions included B-1 funding (4), B-1 performance (3), attacks on the B-1 production delay idea (2), and the Soviet threat (2). B-1 ads by Rockwell, B-1 production decision, B-1 support by the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, B-1 incremental production funding, and the Triad were all single pro mentions during the year.

One-third of the con mentions (4) concerned the B-1 production delay. Two issues each were raised concerning the need for the B-1 and B-1 funding limitations. It was interesting to note that the issue of B-1 costs was mentioned only once during the year.

Three of the con mentions (25%) did not center directly on the B-1 but, rather, drew the B-1 into them. The issues were Air Force Association funded B-1 briefings, the Rockwell International grass roots program, and admonition letters for the defense personnel who used the Rockwell hunting lodge in 1975. From a public relations standpoint, it can probably be suggested that these are the kinds of issues that the opponents could use to make the proponents "shoot themselves in the foot."

For all the issues raised in 1976, only one, a pro citation on B-1 funding, made the front page of the paper. This was probably a logical situation in that 1976 was a presidential election and a Bicentennial year.

Both the pro and con mentions were spread out over eight months. There were four pro items printed in April, one in May, four in June, one in July, two in August, one each in October and November, and two in December. Con issues were mentioned in February (1), April (2), May (1), June (1), July (2), August (2), September (2), and November (1).
Sixty-two percent of the pro issue spokespersons came from two sources, the Congress (5) and the Department of Defense (5) of which three were Air Force people. There were two pro issues each addressed by Rockwell International and news stories. A citizens group and the Ford Administration both raised only one pro issue apiece. The Ford-attributed issue was spoken about during a speech the President gave at Rockwell's plant in California.

Fifty-eight percent of the con issues were raised by one spokesperson category, the Congress (7 out of 12 issues). Three con issues (25%) were addressed by the Department of Defense, of which two were Air Force spokespersons. Citizens groups were the spokespersons for the other two mentions.

1977

The content analysis for 1977 only covers half the year, until 1 July which was right after President Carter decided to cancel the B-1. Even at that the proponents and opponents managed to generate 15 reported issues in only six months. The nine pro mentions were clustered in three categories while the six con mentions were each separate and distinct in their own right.

More than half of the pro items (5) concerned B-1 funding while three more dealt with the B-1 production decision to be made by President Carter. The only other pro B-1 mention was on the plane's performance.
The con issues mentioned were B-1 production, the manned bomber concept, a "tax day" anti-B-1 demonstration, the arms race, B-1 funding, and social ("public") needs versus the B-1. Reason does not suggest a solution as to why there were such widely disparate con mentions in the year when the B-1 production decision was to be made.

There was an interesting mix of spokespersons for the pro issues: four came from Congress; two from news stories; and one each from the Department of Defense, the AFL-CIO, and the Carter Administration. If the pro issue spokespersons were interesting, the con issue spokespersons were fascinating: two were from Congress; one from the Department of Defense; one was a news story; one was from the Carter Administration; and one was Pravda, the Soviet newspaper.

The following tables and discussion summarize the analysis referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

In Sum

Table 1 summarizes the number of pro and con mentions found in each year and also indicates their percentage of the respective efforts.
It is interesting to note that 69 percent of the con issues were mentioned in the 1975-1977 time frame. From 1974-1977, 67 percent of the pro issues were raised. One could conclude the opponents saved their issues for the finish of the debate.

A listing of the pro and con issues categorized, the number of times they were raised, and the percentage of their importance to the pro or con effort is shown in Tables 2 and 3. The percentage may add up to more than 100% because of rounding.
### TABLE 2

**PRO ISSUES CATEGORIZED, 1970-1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Times Mentioned</th>
<th>Percent of Pro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Funding</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Development</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Threat</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Decision by President Carter</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Capabilities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Production Delay (attacks on)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder Performance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockwell B-1 Ads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Production Decision</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Support by VFW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Need</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 14 pro issues categorized over a seven and a half year span, four of them, funding, performance, development, and the Soviet threat, account for 72 percent of all the issues mentioned. It is also interesting that there were no issues raised which were thought to be categorized as "B-1 Need." This is not to say that "need" issues were not included as a part of the other issues. They may have been but the abstract was possibly not detailed enough to make that distinction.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Times Mentioned</th>
<th>Percent of Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Costs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Funding</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Production Delay</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Neeč</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Production</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet-U.S. Arms Agreement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Program Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Elimination/Curtailment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Lobby</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manned Bomber Concept</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Race</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Needs vs. B-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1 Performance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues Not B-1 Centered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picketing of GE by AFSC and CLC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockwell Hunting Lodge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded B-1 Briefings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockwell Grass Roots Campaign</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admonition Letters on Rockwell Hunting Lodge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-B-1 &quot;Tax Day&quot; Demo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Threat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triac</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that though the con side of the B-1 debate raised their issues a fewer number of times than did the pro side (42 to 57), the opponents had 20 issues they put forward to the proponent's 14. If one were to discount or not count the con issues in which the B-1 was not the centerpiece of discussion, picketing of GE, the Rockwell Hunting Lodge
incident, the Air Force Association funded B-1 briefings, the Rockwell grass roots campaign, admonition letters on Rockwell Hunting Lodge event, and the anti-B-1 "tax day" demonstration, the total number of con issues would be 14 or the same number as the pro issues. These tangential issues accounted for only 12 percent of the opponent's efforts while three issues, funding, costs, and production delay, were 50 percent of the con issues raised.

Also, no issues were raised in the New York Times abstract which could be categorized as Triad or Soviet threat con issues. Perhaps these issues were considered as playing to the proponent's strengths in the debate, and were, therefore, untouched. One could theorize that the opponents, by raising such an extended number of issues but concentrating on only a few, were attempting to force the proponents on the defensive and dilute their efforts to inject more pro issues into the debate. Also, the opponents could have been using the con issues which were not directly centered on the B-1 to promote an overall negative impression while vaporizing the public's concentration on the central issues in the B-1 debate.

An analysis of who the spokespersons were on the issues for the proponents and opponents and their percentage of participation in each side is charted on Table 4.
TABLE 4

SPOKESPERSONS FOR PRO AND CON B-1 ISSUES, 1970-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spokesperson</th>
<th>Number Pro</th>
<th>Percent of Pro</th>
<th>Number Con</th>
<th>Percent of Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Story</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Groups</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockwell International</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pravda</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that both sides of the issues had almost the exact same percentage of spokespersons in the first three categories and that, in total, these categories represented 79 percent of the pro spokespersons and 81 percent of the con.

Of the Department of Defense category, the Air Force was a spokesperson for six pro issues (11% of total pro) and a spokesperson in three con issues (7% of total con). Senator Proxmire was identified as a Congressional spokesperson for only two con issues or four percent of the total con debate.

It seems also clear that the opponents were more successful in the raising of issues through citizens groups
than were the proponents.

Table 5 is a summation of the months in which the pro and con issues were published and their respective percentages of the total pro and con effort.

TABLE 5

SUMMARY OF MONTHS WHEN PRO AND CON MENTIONS APPEARED, 1970-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Pro Mentions</th>
<th>Percent of Pro</th>
<th>Con Mentions</th>
<th>Percent of Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that over the span of seven and a half years, 60 percent of the pro issues were raised within four months, April, May, June, and July. This may reflect the necessity imposed by Congressional activity on the B-1. However, 63 percent of the con issues were raised
over a six-month period, March through August. One would be interested to know if this was by chance or if the opponents had planned to make the best use of the available con issues by keeping them in the news the maximum months of exposure possible.

Winter also does not appear to be a good time to debate issues as there were no pro issues mentioned in any January and there were no con issues raised in any December.

An analysis of page placement in the New York Times for the pro and con mentions during the seven and a half years of the debate is contained in Table 6. According to a staff member of the New York Times Washington News Bureau, the reporters consider it better placement for their stories the closer they are pagewise to page one or the outside of the section. Stories printed on, for example, page 56 are "considered buried" according to the staff member.  

For this part of the analysis, the first ten pages, starting with page one, were considered as separate units. After page ten, the pages were grouped together for analysis in clusters of tens, 11-20, 21-30, etc.
### TABLE 6

PAGE PLACEMENT, NEW YORK TIMES, PRO AND CON
B-1 MENTIONS, 1970-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Pro Mentions</th>
<th>Percent of Pro</th>
<th>Con Mentions</th>
<th>Percent of Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>71-80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a review of these figures, it is interesting to note that 25 pro mentions (43%) were printed on the first ten pages versus 14 con items (33%). The biggest advantage to the pro issues was in the first five pages where 28 percent of the mentions (16) appeared. Only seven (17%) of the con mentions were printed on the first five pages.

The percentage of coverage of the pro and con issues appears to be more evenly distributed over the other categories, except for the 14 percent placement the con mentions received on pages 51-60.

During the review of the New York Times abstract, it was requested that a cursory audit be made of the number of pro and con editorials, letters to the editor, and columns
or commentaries which were printed during the time span investigated. The results of that investigation are contained in Table 7.

### TABLE 7

**PRO AND CON B-1 EDITORIALS, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR, AND COLUMNS, NEW YORK TIMES, 1970-1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pro Item (Date)</th>
<th>Con Item (Date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Article (28 June)</td>
<td>Letter (8 July)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentary (5 September)</td>
<td>Editorial (14 September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Letter (30 April)</td>
<td>Letter (21 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (9 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Letter (3 May)</td>
<td>Letter (19 January)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (23 June)</td>
<td>Editorial (26 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (12 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Editorial (22 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (25 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (28 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Column (12 July)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Editorial (12 August)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (22 August)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (22 August)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Editorial (3 September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Editorial (8 November)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (20 November)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Letter (12 February)</td>
<td>Letter (20 January)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (15 March)</td>
<td>Letter (19 February)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (26 June)</td>
<td>Letter (2 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (23 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Advertisement (9 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Editorial (29 June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter (30 June)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 35 editorials, letters to the editor, articles, columns, commentaries, and advertisements discovered in the
New York Times abstract, the con comments noted (27) were more than three times the number of pro comments (8). One could conclude that either the opponents were more passionately against the B-1 or they were better organized or both. If this three-to-one ratio was reflected across the country, it could be theorized that Mr. Syverson's "silent majority" didn't have much of a chance.

As could probably be expected as the debate intensified and President Carter's production decision drew near, the number of items appearing in print increased. Between 1976 and the decision in 1977, 63 percent of the pro items (5) were published. During that same time span, 70 percent of the con items (19) appeared, almost four times the number of pros.

Reflections

There may be those who would have wanted additional tabulations of information other than the ones provided in this chapter. Not all the questions could be answered and it is believed that the objectives of this analysis were achieved.

Still, others may have heard about or been involved in issues which appeared very significant at the time. They may have been and were perhaps included in the stories reviewed and not directly reflected in the abstract. It might also be that the issue was not deemed significant enough
to be printed by the New York Times.

What has been attempted here is an overview of what the newspaper reported about the public debate which surrounded the B-1 bomber.
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V


ABSTRACT ISSUES OF NEW YORK TIMES REVIEWED
FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS IN CHAPTER V


1971:  12 February, p. 14, 6 June, p. 23, 7 June, p. 33, 10 June, p. 31, 17 June, p. 6, 9 July, p. 28, 5 August, p. 11, 31 October, p. 71


CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

More than seven and a half years of debate, countless manhours of effort by both proponents and opponents, and a wide spectrum of communications methods, all were expended because of a machine, the B-1 strategic bomber. This paper has attempted a broad overview of as many of the aspects of the B-1 controversy as possible. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief review and general impressions of the public affairs and public relations programs developed in support of the B-1 program. Some thoughts are also presented on how future programs might be made more efficient and, perhaps, more effective.

Major Findings

Because of legal and traditional limitations, the Air Force was unable to conduct any research surveys of the public to discover their ideas and feelings about national defense in general and the B-1 in particular. This lack of knowledge about the public affairs landscape probably made the drafting of a public affairs plan more difficult.

The "standard public affairs plan" issued by the Air Force was broad and general in its scope and direction.
As a management device, it probably provided as much detailed guidance as one could for an entire service.

Five themes or issues were identified in that plan and these were believed to be the topics which needed to be presented in fostering understanding of the Air Force position on the B-1. These themes were: the requirement for the manned bomber, Why the B-1?, various milestone accomplishments surrounding the B-1, the B-1's associated systems, and the need for the B-1 in light of the Soviet threat.

As the debate progressed from the date of the public affairs plan, 1971, it seemed harder and harder to distinguish in the content analysis of the New York Times abstract the foreseen themes as distinct issues. It appeared that rather than being separately addressed, these issues were blended, or homogenized, into many of the others which rose around the B-1. For example, in more than seven years of debate on the B-1, the issue of the Soviet threat was categorized as being distinctly raised only four times. The fact that detente was a national foreign policy at this time may have had an impact on this issue.

News releases, film releases, briefings, speeches, and several additional forms of written communication were all undertaken by the Air Force at various times for various audiences. Many intelligent, sincere, earnest messages were transmitted by different media. It was beyond the scope of this paper to
determine whether or not the right messages were being received by the right audiences. Based on the information available and the interviews conducted in support of this paper, there were few indications that there was any constructive feedback provided for the Air Force public affairs managers. The B-1 clipping files compiled by the B-1 information officer and a single, brief content analysis were the only feedback mechanisms discovered.

Rockwell International, the prime B-1 contractor, had greater flexibility to survey the public attitudes on the B-1. Research indicates that the only national random sample survey done by Rockwell on public attitudes toward the B-1 was conducted in August 1976. This may have been a contributing factor to the reactive nature of their public relations program which was not able to adhere to their public relations plan as much as the public relations director would have liked.

Rockwell also used many conduits for their B-1 messages to both their internal and external publics. A public message analysis program conducted for Rockwell by a company called PR Data was the only feedback program discovered during the research for this paper. There were indications that Rockwell did make modifications to their public relations program based upon this feedback information.

The content analysis indicates that the conclusions of those involved with the Air Force B-1 public affairs program
and Rockwell's public relations efforts were correct: the cost of the B-1 was the most frequently raised con issue against the program. This study cannot conclude that this was the main reason the B-1 program was cancelled, but money issues were raised against the B-1 in 50 percent of all the cases. It is also worthy of note that the B-1 opponent's cons were raised/pro or positive issues, 42 to 58 incidents. However, the opponents had a larger range of categorized issues to raise than did the proponents, 20 separate con issues to 14 pro.

In a majority of the stories analyzed, the most spokes-
persons, both pro and con, were found in the Congress and the Department of Defense. The defense spokespersons found them-
selves in a unique situation not necessarily shared by the other categories. As a public agency, the Department of Defense had a responsibility to both defend the B-1 as a necessary strategic weapon and also report those events, such as cost estimate increases or test program difficulties, which could be used as issues by the opponents.

Secondary Findings

In the "quick and dirty" count of the editorials, letters to the editor, and columns which voiced a pro or con sentiment, it was interesting to note that, at least in the New York Times, the con voices outnumbered the pro by more than three to one overall and four to one in the eighteen months prior to the cancellation. There was not enough information to say
absolutely why this was so, but one could theorize that the opponents of the B-1 were either more vocal, better organized, or better letter writers. All three may be correct.

The opponents did not fair as well in the placing of their con issues on the news pages of the New York Times. Almost twice as many pro issues were reported in the first ten pages of the paper as were con issues. The content analysis showed exactly twice the number of pro mentions made page one as did con items. The one place where the con mentions were significantly more placed than the pro mentions was between pages 51-60.

**Recommendations**

There are three basic recommendations which will be drawn from the preceding text. The first is for the Air Force to continue the program of assigning an information officer to be the "information focal point" during the development phase of new weapons systems. This arrangement seemed to work well with an information officer working directly for the director of the systems program office.

That this situation enhanced the management of the B-1 information effort appeared generally supported by Air Force and contractor people. It is also advisable that this information person have freedom of action to the maximum extent possible and that he or she work directly for whoever is in charge of the development program. The information
officer should also consult regularly with the Department of Defense analysis personnel, if there are such, who monitor and forecast the long range trends which develop and change within society.

Secondly, if the public affairs and public relations efforts are to provide the necessary information to the audiences who need it to develop reasoned opinions on the issues, it is recommended that early and continuous opinion surveys be taken. Such a program could prove to be beneficial in that it would be of assistance in the planning process and would aid in the efficient distribution of informative messages.

In consideration of this recommendation, one must recognize the statutory restraints upon the Air Force ability to conduct public opinion surveys. It would perhaps prove more appropriate for the contractor to undertake such a project. A survey program would provide a solid, factual basis for decisions and remove the need to rely on national opinion surveys for information of this nature. National surveys are normally not gathered in as much depth and in as regular intervals as needed.

Such a survey effort could also provide feedback on the efficacy of the information program, which is a part of the third recommendation. One could conjecture that an effort such as the one performed by PR Data for the B-1 would be beneficial for almost any program. It is conceivable that a contractor might desire to avail itself of such a service or
retain public relations counsel from an outside firm in order to achieve maximum effectiveness of the information program.

The Air Force could also consider instituting a program similar to the clipping compilations done by the Air Reserve Squadron for the B-1, but carrying the program one step further and including a content analysis of the clippings catalogued. Such a program could provide direct and current feedback on how the news media is reporting and reflecting the issues surrounding a particular weapons system or any other project deemed important enough. A yearly summation could be easily prepared from the monthly or every other month compilations.

A content analysis system similar to the one used for this paper could be applied to the project, or any other system could be developed to meet specific objectives. In addition to providing a worthwhile project for Reserve information personnel, a content analysis feedback compilation could provide better information in greater depth than would be available two years after the fact or is devisable from an abstract. Such a program would provide the information when it is needed.

A Final Comment

Anyone reviewing this paper who expected to discover a complete, in-depth review of the B-1 issue is destined to be unsatisfied. The issues were too broad, the participants too many, and the time span too great to cover all in this thesis.
It was unsettling to the author to review this work and realize there were so many questions here which have gone unanswered. It is hoped that in the future, there will be those who will attempt to answer those questions and provide more focus for the discussion.

The B-1 was one of the biggest Air Force public affairs subjects of this decade and there is so much research to do. It is hoped, those who study this volume will pay it the least, and yet greatest, of compliments--it was a start.
APPENDIX A

AIR FORCE B-1 INFORMATION PLANS
B-1 INFORMATION ACTIVITIES PLAN

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

TITLE: Information Activities Plan, B-1 Bomber, RDT&E Phase

REFERENCE: AFR 190-12 (Release of Information to the Public) (This plan supersedes all previous B-1 information plans)

1. TASK ORGANIZATIONS:
   - Secretary of the Air Force (OI)
   - Air Force Systems Command (OI)
   - Strategic Air Command (OI)
   - Aeronautical Systems Division (OI)
   - Arnold Engineering and Development Center (OI)
   - North American Rockwell (LAD) (PR)
   - General Electric (Evendale) (PR)

2. PURPOSE:
   a. To provide information policy guidance and an information planning vehicle for the effective accomplishment of Air Force information objectives during the development, test, and delivery phase of the B-1.
   b. To delineate Air Force Policy and procedures regarding clearance and release of information on the B-1 to the public.

3. PHILOSOPHY:
   a. Reference: (1) SAF/OI B-1 concept paper dated 2 Nov 70 (Annex 1)
outlines requirement for manned bomber, threat, the need for the B-1, and major milestones, in addition to information actions to avoid.

(2) Chief of Staff talking paper "B-1 Strategic Bomber" presented at February 1971 USAF Commander Conference outlines philosophy of manned strategic bomber. This paper was distributed to MAJCOMS by SAF/OI in March 1971.

b. Based on national importance of the B-1 and probable increased public attention to the program, it is essential for the B-1 public affairs program to be well coordinated, timely and factual. Teamwork is essential to the B-1 information program which should be positive and selectively aggressive to prevent situations which require short-notice reaction to media or other agencies.

4. **OBJECTIVES:**

   a. Establish a single working system which outlines basic information actions and responsible agencies during the development phase of the B-1.

   b. Using this management tool as a guide, acquaint the general public with the progress and milestones of the B-1 development program.

   c. Insure an expeditious, well-coordinated flow of information to the public which keeps pace with program developments and which will enhance the success of the development phase of the B-1.

   d. Establish B-1 Program Director as center of information activity associated with the B-1 program.

5. **POLICY:**

   a. An unimpeded flow of accurate and timely unclassified information is essential.
b. **Anticipation of B-1 information milestones and proper preparation for them is required to prevent the need for continual defense of the program in the form of reaction to query.**

c. **The public has a right to know the progress of a major defense development program.**

6. **SITUATION:**

   a. **Background and Facts:**

      (1) First requirements for an advanced bomber were identified over a decade ago. High level government and Defense Department officials have committed the Air Force to the development of the B-1.

      (2) Since June 1970, Air Force-contractor efforts have been conducted to develop a replacement bomber for the aging B-52, a mainstay in our deterrent force concept. The B-1 has been named as this replacement. It will be two-thirds the size of a B-52, will carry a greater payload, fly faster, and have a greater penetration capability.

      (3) The B-1 will be developed on a "fly-before-buy" basis with the production decision being made after first flight.

      (4) In line with Secretary Packard's concept of efficiency in defense procurement, the B-1 program has taken an innovative management approach which will reduce initial costs by deferring some development efforts until after production decision. As a result, the development program has been reduced to three flyable aircraft and 27 engines.

   b. **The B-1 is a program of national urgency to sustain our national policy of a flexible and credible strategic deterrent.**
7. **IMPLEMENTATION:**

a. Since public exposure of the B-1 and its components reflecting on-schedule development serves to increase both public understanding and confidence in the system, certain development milestones have been identified as newsworthy. These milestones and related information actions are provided in attachment 2 to this plan.

(1) Milestone charts are meant to serve only as a foundation for the B-1 information program during development. Each action agency may add information activities as the development program progresses in real time.

(2) Aeronautical Systems Division, Office of Information (OI) will maintain the master information milestone charts. All tasked agencies listed on charts will conduct information action tasked to them after appropriate coordination. Tasked agencies are encouraged to conduct additional information actions as required.

(3) Each agency will forward information materials to support a listed milestone to ASD/OI at least 21 days prior to expected release date for Program Director's approval and higher headquarters' clearance when required.

b. Based on the national urgency of the B-1 program and high-level support of an active and efficient information program to complement the B-1's development, an innovative public release clearance procedure will be used on B-1 material to expedite the clearance and flow of information. Contractors will continue to transmit releases to ASD/OIP. After Program Manager review and approval, information requiring higher headquarters
approval will be transmitted from ASD/OIP direct to SAF/OI in 5 copies. Four copies will be direct to SAF/OIS, and one copy to SAF/OIP. One copy will be forwarded simultaneously to AFSC/OIS for review. Changes and comments will be coordinated with SAF/OIP. Information materials generated by other commands will be submitted to ASD/OIP for review by the Program Director before forwarding to SAF/OI. In this way, credibility will be insured by Air Force initiation of timely and factual news releases on this fast moving, innovative program.

c. All tasked agencies will maintain current files of B-1 materials including concept philosophy, current releasable information, and photographs. Speechwriters at all echelons should be encouraged to use existing cleared background information supporting the B-1 development.

d. Routine information activities to support the B-1 will be conducted on an "as-it-happens" basis with documentation of queries, interviews, etc. on quarterly information report to the Program Director. (Attach 3)

8. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Secretary of the Air Force Office of Information will:

   (1) Designate Air Force Systems Command as task force agency for B-1 information actions through delivery of first operational article.

   (2) Designate Strategic Air Command as action command for subsequent information actions in coordination with Air Force Systems Command, as appropriate.

   (3) Expedite security review process of all B-1 information material.
(4) Provide continual flow of B-1 philosophy information, background material, and policy guidance to major commands, as necessary, to insure concerted efforts by all information personnel involved.

(5) Arrange for appropriate Air Staff participation in major milestone events.

(6) Produce Command Services Unit Fact Sheets on the B-1 and keep current as changes occur.

b. Air Force Systems Command will:

(1) Provide policy and manpower support as required for implementing information tasks.

(2) Designate agency to prepare appropriate annexes to this plan covering information activities for key major milestone, i.e., rollout, first flight.

(3) Prepare photographic appendices as required covering information activities for these major milestone events.

(4) Keep AFSC Commander and B-1 program monitor assessed of information activities associated with milestone chart and other releases.

c. Aeronautical Systems Division will:

(1) Be responsible for maintenance of master B-1 information milestone charts until delivery to using command.

(2) Monitor preparation of information material by tasked agencies in support of each major milestone and, after coordination with the System Program Office, forward it to Secretary of the Air Force
Office of Information with information copy to Air Force Systems Command for review and clearance through USAF and DOD.

(3) Implement and manage information activities related to milestone events, working directly with contractors and other commands, as necessary.

d. Strategic Air Command will:

(1) Publicize progress and need for B-1 throughout Strategic Air Command.

(2) Be action command for all information activities relating to B-1 operational matters after delivery of the first operational aircraft.

(3) Prior to delivery of the first operational aircraft, coordinate information material with Aeronautical Systems Division, Attention: OI, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433, except those items that normally would not require SPO coordination.

e. Each agency will:

(1) Assure information action is prepared, coordinated, and approved so as to be effected on a timely basis when the B-1 milestone occurs.

(2) Forward a quarterly information activity summary to Aeronautical Systems Division, Attention: OIP for consolidation for the Systems Program Office Director in the format of attachment 3. Report should arrive at Aeronautical Systems Division, OIP no later than ten days following close of quarter. Reports will be maintained on file by Director of Program Control, B-1 System Program Office.
(3) Insure expeditious handling of all B-1 information materials.

9. **ADMINISTRATION:**

   a. Additional milestones of other information actions will be forwarded to Aeronautical Systems Division, OIF, as they occur for inclusion in the master milestone chart and notification of other agencies.

   b. The Secretary of the Air Force Office of Information will assume responsibility for Air Staff, Secretary of the Air Force and DOD coordination.

   c. Annexes will be published and distributed by the Secretary of the Air Force Office of Information.

2. Atch

1. B-1 Concept Paper

2. Milestones, B-1
B-1 CONCEPT PAPER

ATTACHMENT 1
B-1 CONCEPT PAPER

PURPOSE: The purpose of this paper is to outline Air Force objectives, make general policy statements and establish themes on the public affairs aspects of the B-1 development program. It is, by necessity, concise and general in nature because it is intended to provide a broad guideline for future public affairs planning as the B-1 Engineering Development Program evolves.

SITUATION: The Source Selection of North American-Rockwell (NAR) and General Electric (GE) to initiate advanced engineering development of the B-1 signals the first of many critical decisions that Air Force and Industry face in the fight to win approval of the B-1 as an operational weapons system. Already, we face tough sledding in the requested Fiscal Year 1971 funds for the development program. In an assessment of the threats and arguments that face the B-1 development program, NAR noted the following as some of the most formidable:

a. Requirement for a manned bomber.
b. Cost estimate credibility
c. Associated Strategic Demands (New Tanker, AWACS, SRAM, SCAD, EDM, etc.)
d. Threat realism
e. Pressures from Congress/Bureau of Budget/DOD to:
   (1) Reduce requirements
   (2) Reduce avionics
   (3) Reduce RDT&E
   (4) Stretch schedule.
If the Air Force is to creditably present its rationale for the B-1 program, then it is necessary that guidelines are set on how Air Force and Industry should conduct their public affairs actions during the development program.

OBJECTIVES:

a. Provide Air Force and Industry with a basic philosophy and general guideline for future public affairs actions.

b. Establish priority on major themes which can be developed in internal information programs.

CONCEPT/POLICY:

a. To keep the publics (internal and external) informed on the progress of the B-1 program through factual, timely, and frank release of information.

b. Avoidance of appearance to publicize the program unduly.

c. Emphasis on program performance, development progress (milestones) and good management practices.

d. Both in-house and contractor information proposed for open publication and/or public release will be forwarded through established information channels for review and clearance.

e. Avoid discussion on Soviet Bomber philosophy, i.e., "Soviets are or are not building one, why should we or shouldn't we?" U.S. strategic requirement is not predicated on Soviet Bomber development.

f. Air Force and Industry must avoid statements/releases that might directly or indirectly affect the United States' position at the SALT talks.
g. In presentations, speeches (internal and external), major emphasis should be placed on explaining:

(1) The Need for the Manned Bomber
(2) The Threat
(3) The Total Strategic Deterrent (TRIAD)

Themes should be developed. However, the above themes are the least understood and represent the essence of our case for the B-1.

h. In all cases, it is essential that we respond to the public with an unimpeded flow of accurate and timely unclassified information.

i. Avoid cost predictions. Leave these discussions in Congressional hearings.

THEMES: (Basic topics and sub-topics that need to be logically presented in fostering understanding of the Air Force position on the B-1.)

a. Requirement for the Manned Bomber.

(1) The requirement for the B-1 is based on our concept of maintaining our deterrent posture with mixture of all three elements of our strategic force, i.e., bombers, land-based missile, and sea-launched missiles.

(2) The mixture (TRIAD) compounds the enemy's defense problems. It gives him multiple threats to prepare for,

(3) The TRIAD concept forces the enemy to spend more and divert resources that might otherwise be spent on offensive systems.

(4) The bomber poses an entirely different threat than the missile.
(5) The bomber is more flexible than the missile. It can be deployed in a variety of ways:
   (a) Launched without final commitment
   (b) Show of force
   (c) Recallable
   (d) Usable in different levels of conflict
   (e) Omni-directional deployment.

(6) TRIAD concept continues to provide best deterrence against enemy threat through:
   (a) Assurance that compromise of any one element (ICBM, SLEBM, or bombers) won't negate our other strategic capabilities.
   (b) Each element of TRIAD presents different defense problem to an aggressor and would tax his resources to the maximum if he tries to counter all simultaneously.
   (c) Any one of our offensive force elements (ICBM's, SLEBM's or bombers) could, under certain circumstances, possess the capability to inflict a very high or unacceptable level of damage upon an enemy's forces or population centers.
   (d) Our policy has been to maintain our ability to penetrate enemy defenses through the capability to attack from all altitudes and azimuths with ICBM's and SLEBM's that have a mix of trajectories and reentry vehicle characteristics, and bombers that attack with differing speeds and that are equipped with air-to-surface missiles and decoys.
b. Why B-1?

(1) The B-1 will replace the aging B-52. Modernization of our forces is essential if strategic forces are to portray a credible deterrent to our enemy.

(2) The B-1 will be primarily designed for low altitude, high subsonic penetration. It will also have high altitude supersonic capability.

(3) The B-52 service will extend into early 1980's at an age of 17-20 years.

(4) Development of new bomber takes about eight (8) years. If major structure fatigue is detected in B-52 by late 70's it may be too late to produce timely replacement aircraft.

(5) It would be unduly expensive to make the B-52 faster, carry more payload or have smaller cross section.

(6) Compared to B-52, B-1 will:
   (a) Have higher penetration speeds
   (b) Have larger payload capacity
   (c) Have quicker reaction time.
   (d) Have austere basing, wider dispersal.

(7) Comparisons to FB-111.

c. Milestones:

(1) Full scale mock-up (fall 1971)
(2) Contract awards
(3) Major technical accomplishments
(4) First flight (April 1974)
(5) Production decision
(6) Testing program
(7) Production decision, etc.

d. Associated Systems. SRAM, SCAD, EDM, Advanced ECM to aid penetration

e. Threat. The Soviet Union is expanding her strategic nuclear capabilities. They have more ICBM's than the United States, and are still building. In total land and sea-based missile payload the Soviets have more than a two to one advantage.
Updated 28 April 1971
(with G. E. Changes)
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Major B-1 Information Milestone Schedule

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**MAJOR B-1 INFORMATION**

**SCHEDULE**

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**NIIOR H-1 Information Milestone Schedule**

**CF 1975**
B-1 INFORMATION PLAN

ATTACHMENT 3
B-1 PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM

Policies, Objectives and Procedures

Prepared By:
Special Assistant for Information
Deputy for B-1
Aeronautical Systems Division
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433

9 August 1976 (Revised)
B-1 PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM

Policies, Objectives and Procedures

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to define the policies, objectives and approach of the B-1 Public Affairs Program, and to provide information planning guidance during the development, test and acquisition phase of the B-1 program.

POLICY

The B-1 development program will be conducted in an open manner, consistent with the need for security.

- The American public will be provided maximum information on B-1 program progress through the factual, timely and frank release of information.
- Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552) will be supported in both letter and spirit.
- All B-1 information proposed for publication and/or public release will be forwarded through established information channels for review and clearance.
The B-1 System Program Director's Special Assistant for Information (B-1 SPO 10) will be the Air Force's B-1 information focal point.

OBJECTIVES

Objectives of the B-1 Public Affairs Program:

- A continual, well-coordinated flow of timely information to the public which keeps pace with B-1 program developments.
- Continued emphases on the need for the B-1, particularly at the grass roots level.

APPROACH

Key element in the successful execution of the B-1 Public Affairs Program is maintenance of the fully-coordinated Air Force/contractor information team effort. The B-1 Information Working Group will continue as the means to achieving this team approach. Air Force Systems Command Office of Information (AFSC/OI) will convene and chair quarterly working group meetings; the B-1 SPO IO will coordinate the group's day-to-day activities.

Anticipation of information milestones and proper preparation for them is required in pursuing the objectives of the B-1 Public Affairs Program and will reduce the need for defense of the program.
through reaction to news media queries. Milestone charts -- prepared, maintained and monitored by the B-1 SPO IO -- will be utilized by all working group members in supporting the B-1 program.

EXECUTION

1. B-1 Information Working Group. The working group will meet quarterly at a location and time selected by AFSC/OI. Each meeting will be chaired by AFSC and governed by an agenda prepared in advance by the B-1 SPO IO with working group member inputs. Each agenda will include, as a minimum:

- B-1 program progress update
- Current public affairs problems
- B-1 information planning

Working group membership will be limited to the following:

- Secretary of the Air Force Office of Information (SAF/OIP) - 2
- Air Force Systems Command Office of Information (AFSC/OI) - 1
- Strategic Air Command Office of Information (SAC/OI) - 2
- Aeronautical Systems Division Office of Information (ASD/OI) - 1
- B-1 System Program Office (ASD/YH) - 1
- Air Force Flight Test Center Office of Information (AFFTC/OI) - 1
- Air Force Test and Evaluation Center Office of Information (AFTEC/OI) - 1
- Arnold Engineering Development Center Office of Information (AEDC/OI) - 1
- Air Force Acquisition Logistics Division Office of Information (AFALD/OI) - 1
- Rockwell International Corporation, B-1 Division - 2
- General Electric Company, Evendale Plant - 1
- The Boeing Aerospace Company - 1
- Cutler-Hammer, Inc., AIL Division - 1

Members of the working group are authorized direct communications on informal matters relating to the B-1 Public Affairs Program. Formal communications should follow established information channels with the B-1 SPO IO serving as the Air Force B-1 information focal point.

A directory of current working group members is included as Attachment 1.
2. **B-1 Public Affairs Milestone Charts.** Milestone charts will be used in the B-1 Public Affairs Program to identify and plan for significant information actions. Monthly charts will be prepared, monitored and updated by the B-1 SPO IO and will reflect each working group member's current and future plans for support of the B-1 program.

   - Information milestone actions should be accomplished in a timely manner with the B-1 SPO IO being kept aware of each item's status as work progresses.
   - Milestone charts will be updated and distributed monthly to all working group members; items for addition or deletion should be provided by telephone as they occur.

3. **B-1 Information Clearance Procedures.** Department of Defense and Air Force directives, as reflected in the provisions of Air Force contracts, require that all B-1 information proposed for publication and/or public release be reviewed and cleared by appropriate Defense authority. This process is not designed to impede the flow of information to the American public; it insures that the proposed information is consistent with national security and established Air Force, Defense
Department and government policies. Information already in the public domain need not be reviewed unless it contains updated or revised material, or is presented in a new context.

The highest Air Force priority will be assigned B-1 public release materials proposed for review and clearance. The B-1 SPO IO is responsible for expediting review within the SPO, securing approval of the System Program Director and assuring for the expeditious handling of that information requiring review at a higher level.

- **Procedures for clearance of contractor-generated materials**
  - Information materials proposed for release to the public will be submitted directly to the B-1 Special Assistant for Information, ASD/YH, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433, by the most expeditious manner, preferably facsimile transmission or priority mail. Products with local or regional release potential should be forwarded in three copies; those with national or international release possibilities should be forwarded in seven copies. The B-1 SPO IO should be contacted if there is any doubt about a particular product's release potential. Each proposed release should also include a
cover letter indicating that the contractor has reviewed the material and considers it to be unclassified.

- Photographic materials submitted for review and clearance may be good quality Xerox copies except in those cases where they are proposed for release to national or international news media. These should be forwarded as original black and white prints in 4x5 or larger format. All photography should be complete with attached cutlines.

- Procedures for clearance of Air Force-generated materials

  - B-1 information materials, both written and audio/visual, will be forwarded for review and clearance through normal information channels in accordance with Air Force Regulation 190-17, "Review and Clearance of Department of the Air Force Information."

  - One copy of all material being submitted for review and clearance should be forwarded simultaneously to the B-1 SPO IO. This will enable the SPO IO to monitor the total B-1 Public Affairs Program and to arrange with the
originator for simultaneous release by other members of the working group when appropriate.

- **Procedures for handling news media queries and interviews**

  - Routine news media queries will be answered immediately if responses can be made within the context of previously cleared information.

  - Non-routine queries (which would include those concerning program cost and schedule, and those from representatives of the national or foreign media) should be answered only after coordinating with the B-1 SPO IO. A proposed response should be prepared, coordinated within the organization involved and then provided the SPO via telephone or by facsimile transmission. Assistance in preparing the answer and/or further coordination will be provided on an immediate basis by the B-1 SPO IO.

  - Requests for interviews from local media may be granted by individual members of the working group provided the interviewee keeps his comments within the context of previously cleared information.
Requests for interviews from regional, national or foreign media should be coordinated with the B-1 SPO IO. The subject of the interview should be ascertained, along with proposed interview guidelines, before contacting the SPO. Guidance and/or further coordination will be provided on a priority basis by the SPO IO.

4. Procedures for Release of Information. Every effort will be made to maximize utilization of each B-1 information product, with simultaneous release being made by all members of the working group where appropriate.

- Final release timing will be determined by the originator of each information product in coordination with the B-1 SPO IO. In the case of contractor-proposed material, the Air Force may assume responsibility for release timing if the story has national appeal or is being proposed for release in Washington.

- Media distribution of release material will be determined by the individual working group member when such material is of local interest. The B-1 SPO IO will coordinate the media distribution for regional and national releases, thus reducing chances for duplication.
Thirty copies of every significant story released by members of the B-1 Information Working Group will be forwarded to the B-1 SPO IO for distribution to other working group members and for permanent SPO retention.

5. Communications. Since effective communications involves a two-way flow of information, working group members are encouraged to continue and improve the professional dialogue which now exists. Maximum use should be made of informal communications with primary emphasis being placed on achieving B-1 Public Affairs Program goals.

The B-1 SPO IO will publish a periodic policy advisory letter for distribution to members of the working group. Mailed with the monthly information milestone chart updates, this letter will cover:

- Current public affairs policy
- B-1 program status
- Congressional activity report
- Information milestone achievement report
- Public affairs ideas/innovations
A master B-1 clipping file will be maintained by the B-1 SPO IO and should include as many working group inputs as possible. Clippings which represent current media treatment of the B-1 program will be distributed to working group members on a monthly basis.
APPENDIX B

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL B-1

R&D FACT SHEET
Flight Test Program: Research and development effort continues concerning the U. S. Air Force B-1 strategic bomber. Flight testing began in December, 1974, and the B-1 has demonstrated its ability to carry out its demanding primary mission of low-altitude penetration time and again, as test pilots have flown as low as 200 feet above terrain at just under the speed of sound (650 miles an hour). The alternative high-altitude, supersonic mission of the B-1 has been demonstrated in many hours of test flying, including Mach 2.22 flight at 50,000 feet.

B-1 Prototypes: Four B-1 prototypes have been built for the flight test program. No. 1 B-1--First flight December 23, 1974 (flying qualities airplane); No. 2 B-1--First flight June 14, 1976 (structural loads airplane); No. 3 B-1--First flight April 1, 1976 (offensive avionics airplane); No. 4 B-1--First flight February 14, 1979 (defensive avionics airplane).

Aircraft Data: Length--151 feet; height--34 feet; wingspan (forward)--137 feet; wingspan (swept)--78 feet; crew--four; tanker support--compatible with USAF KC-135; maximum gross takeoff weight--395,000 pounds; engines--four General Electric smokeless turbofans (30,000-pound-thrust class); range--intercontinental (unrefueled).

Associate Contractors: Rockwell International--Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); General Electric--Engines; The Boeing Company--Avionics system integrator; AIL (division of Cutler-Hammer)--Defensive avionics.

###
PITTSBURGH, Pa., June 28, 1977 -- Robert Anderson, president and chief executive officer of Rockwell International, today expressed concern that there is an apparent misunderstanding about the cost of the B-1 strategic aircraft.

Anderson said that the actual real costs of developing and beginning initial production of the B-1 have been closer to the initial estimates than perhaps that of any weapons system heretofore developed. The Air Force has stated, he added, in testimony before Congressional committees, that the B-1 development program is "one of the most successful, well-managed programs in Department of Defense history."

Anderson, whose company is the B-1 prime contractor, said he fears the American public may be confusing today's unit cost of the airplane with the cost of the airplane taking estimated inflation into account.
The official Department of Defense figure of $101.7 million per plane includes estimates of inflation through the entire production cycle, which continues until 1987, he explained. "Actually, in today's dollars as estimated by the Air Force, the 'flyaway cost' of a single B-1 is $57.7 million, and if initial spare parts, ground support equipment, crew training, and technical data costs are included, the figure is $66.7 million. This figure does not include amortized costs for research and development, aggregating $3 billion, which have already been spent."

Mr. Anderson said he was certain that the effects of inflation could be appreciated by the American public who have experienced the cost of their homes, food and automobiles rising from 50 to 100 per cent through the past ten years.

Anderson also referred to government estimates, contrary to the suggestions of some B-1 critics, that state that a 747 with cruise missile carrying capability, would be more costly than the B-1.

The Air Force has recently stated that: "The current B-1 unit flyaway cost in 1977 dollars is $57.7 million for a highly sophisticated military aircraft with complete offensive and defensive avionics systems. The current cost for an unmilitarized, less sophisticated commercial 747 model is $43.8 million. Militarizing the 1977 model 747 would add considerable cost, yet it would be a less flexible and capable system than the B-1."

Representative Charles H. Wilson (D.-Cal.) has informed his colleagues that the cost of a militarized 747, in terms of 1977 dollars, would be $75 million, considerably more than the cost of the B-1.
Rockwell International is a major multi-industry company applying advanced technology to a wide range of products in its aerospace, automotive, consumer, electronics and industrial operations.

Phone: A. W. Dawson
(412) 565-7176
APPENDIX D

AIR FORCE B-1 MILESTONE CHART,
JUNE 1977
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APPENDIX E

AIR FORCE B-1 NEWS RELEASES
EDWARDS AFB, CALIF., Apr. 19--Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld personally assessed the performance of the Air Force's new B-1 bomber today during the first aircraft's 30th test mission. The Secretary was at the controls as the plane reached a top speed of 0.3 Mach (approximately 900 m.p.h.).

A former Navy pilot with extensive experience in high performance aircraft, Secretary Rumsfeld participated in a test flight which demonstrated the B-1's mission flexibility.

During the flight, the plane completed both supersonic tests at altitudes up to 26,000 feet, and high speed, low altitude penetration maneuvers at 500 feet above the ground. All testing was conducted over the Edwards' test range.

Crew members for today's flight were Air Force Colonel Ted Bura, the pilot; Rockwell International's Charlie Bock, instructor pilot; and Pat Sharp, Air Force flight test engineer.

During a planeside news conference following the flight, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld commented, "I came out today having spent a good deal of time in the Pentagon visiting with the people who are principally handling this particular system. Visiting with people in Congress about
the need for a follow-on to the B-52, it struck me that it would be useful to have an opportunity to actually see the plane and to visit with some people who are working on the test program.

When asked about the status of the B-1 program, the Secretary said, "This country is not going to make an error with respect to the strategic nuclear balance. There is also no doubt in my mind that to have that balance assured—and the deterrence that it provides—will require that there be a follow-on to the B-52 bomber. And any estimate would be that the Congress and the country will recognize that, and they will proceed in an orderly way to see that this country has the strength it needs to assure the peace."

"There are currently two B-1 prototypes undergoing flight testing at Edwards. The second B-1, an offensive avionics test aircraft, made its first flight April 1."

Including today's flight, the two B-1 aircraft have completed 149 hours and 52 minutes of successful flight testing. Five hours and 38 minutes of that time has been at supersonic speeds.

Air Force Systems Command's Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, is responsible for overall B-1 system development and procurement. Major General Abner B. Martin is the B-1 Program Director.

| Total Flight Hours, Aircraft #1 | 104 hours, 58 minutes |
| Total Flight Hours, Aircraft #3 | 4 hours, 30 minutes |
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, Ohio, Sept. 24, 1976--The Air Force filed its Updated Final Environmental Statement for B-1 aircraft development and procurement with the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) today. Continued development and procurement of the B-1 bomber will involve continued design, development test and evaluation of four aircraft, associated subsystems and equipment, and proposed procurement and production of 240 aircraft between 1977 and 1986.

The statement shows that the primary areas affected by the B-1 Program are test facilities at Edwards AFB, Calif., and Eglin AFB, Fla.; and manufacturing facilities at Los Angeles and Palmdale, Calif., Evendale, Ohio, Seattle and Deer Park, N.Y. Also affected are operational facilities at other bases in the United States.

The B-1's engines incorporate new technology which makes them among the cleanest and most efficient ever built. The B-1 will produce noise levels similar to current comparable bomber aircraft. Engine emission tests indicate that the plane's F101 engines have a combustion efficiency of 97.4
percent at idle and are virtually smokeless. Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx) emissions are extremely low with respect to emissions previously thought to be obtainable in this type of engine. Both noise and engine emission effects will be localized in the areas where the aircraft will be deployed, and will be considered in the selection of operating bases. No significant adverse effects are anticipated on the United States, or on a global basis.

The B-1 is capable of flying at supersonic speeds and, therefore, can cause a sonic boom. Such impacts are expected to be minimal, however, since only a small percentage of the B-1's flight time will be at supersonic speeds and at a nominal flight altitude of some 30,000 feet. Supersonic training missions will be necessary and will be flown over approved water or land corridors to further minimize disturbance.

Designed primarily as a low altitude aircraft, the B-1 will spend minimal time in the stratosphere. Cruise and refueling altitudes will be similar to those used by civil airliners and as assigned by air traffic control facilities.

Copies of the Updated Final Environmental Statement for B-1 development and procurement may be obtained by writing to Headquarters, United States Air Force (SAF/ILE), Washington, DC 20330.

-30-

Contact: Major Mike Terrill, (202) 697-7817

Best Available Copy
APPENDIX F

CONTENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS, 1976 AND
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<td>9 April 1976</td>
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<td>Sen. Goldwater flies the B-7</td>
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<td>recommends &quot;immediate building ( \text{of B-7} ) bombers&quot;</td>
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<td>9 FEBRUARY 1976</td>
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<td>No urgent, military need for B-1; costly mistakes, proposes standoff bomber</td>
<td>&quot;costly&quot; mistake=B-1</td>
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<td>B-1 may be one of &quot;least necessary&quot; weapons</td>
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<td>Rockwell Geez</td>
<td><strong>Attacked</strong></td>
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<td>B-7 Spending Limitation 7.7 million a month through 788-77</td>
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<td>Senate</td>
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<td>B-7 Costs Increase</td>
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Air Force discloses that it did not tell Senate aides who received breakfast briefings on B-1 bombers that briefings were funded by Air Force Assn, private orgn which does not, in principle, engage in lobbying; aides in attendance rept that Air Force Sec Thomas C Reed extolled virtues of B-1 bomber; Air Force arranged for private financing of briefings so as not to violate law which prohibits Govt agencies from using Fed funds to lobby Cong; in separate incident Air Force orders Defense Contract Audit Agency to investigate whether Rockwell Intl and other major B-1 contracters were improperly charging Govt for costs of promotional advertising on B-1 bomber; photo of Reed

NEW YORK TIMES JULY 30, 1976
PAGE: 6 COLUM: 4 PICHE: 211-76-81

Sen passes $104 billion defense appropriations bill that defers purchase of 1st B-1 bombers until after Feb 1; legis is $3.9 billion less that Pres Ford requested and $1.4 billion less than HÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s measure; Sen rejected amendments to delete $350 million for advance procurement items for 4th Nimitz class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and $75 million for 360 non-nuclear Lance missiles; provides $6.2 billion for Navy shipbuilding, including funds for Trident submarine, 3 nuclear-powered attack subs and 8 guided-missile frigates; also funds conversion of nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach into strike cruiser equipped with Aegis defense system (M)

NEW YORK TIMES AUGUST 10, 1976
PAGE: 8 COLUM: 3 PICHE: 222-76-6

views favorably Sen's postponing decision on B-1 bomber; holds no responsible judgement can be made without further testing of prototypes and completion of arms limitations talks with USSR; notes delay until '77 sought in Sen would place decision upon next adm, and adds that Dem Pres candidate Jimmy Carter is less enthusiastic about plane than Pres Ford; concludes that only reason for Pres Ford's eagerness to press ahead with B-1 is to enhance his position over challenger Ronald Reagan

NEW YORK TIMES AUGUST 12, 1976
PAGE: 30 COLUM: 1 PICHE: 224-76-2
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