PSYCHOLOGICAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 1941-1952: ORIGINS OF A "SPECIAL WARFARE" CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMY

by

Colonel Alfred H. Baddock, Jr. Infantry

[Signature]
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 1941-1952: ORIGINS OF A "SPECIAL WARFARE" CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Nov 1979

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JUL 17 1980

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This study examines the United States Army's activities in psychological and unconventional warfare during and after World War II to determine the impetus for, and origins of, the formal special warfare capability created in 1952 with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Research for the study was conducted at the Duke University library, the archives and library of the US Army John P. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, the US Army Military History Institute, the US Army War College library, the US Army Center of Military History, the Federal Records Center, and the National Archives. Emphasis was placed on original documents in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and War Department General Staff/Department of the Army files for the 1941-52 period. Personal interviews were also conducted with selected individuals at the Center for Military Assistance and the Army War College.

With the impetus of the Korean War, heightening cold war tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., the Army created an unprecedented staff organization in early 1951: the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). Under Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the OCPW guided the build-up of psychological warfare and formulated plans for the creation of an organization unique in the Army's history: the 10th Special Forces Group. Designed to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities to retard a Soviet invasion in Europe, the Group's true historical forerunner—contrary to the official lineage of Special Forces—was the Office of Strategic Services, not the Rangers or the...
1st Special Service Force. To provide the necessary training, material, and doctrinal support for both unconventional and psychological warfare, McClure convinced the Army to establish the psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Because psychological warfare had a formal lineage and therefore greater acceptance by the Army—which unconventional warfare did not enjoy—Special Forces was brought into existence under the auspices of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare. From World War II to early 1953 McClure provided the continuity, expertise, and vision that was so essential to creation of the OCFW, Special Forces, and the Psychological Warfare Center. McClure's contributions have gone unrecognized, but his legacy is clear: the foundation that he laid was built upon in the 1960's when "special warfare" was expanded to encompass counterinsurgency, and the Center at Fort Bragg remains to this day. His achievements were not easily attained: in addition to rivalry with the Air Force and CIA, psychological and unconventional warfare were relatively new, "out-of-the-mainstream" activities that encountered resistance and lack of understanding during a period of budgetary and manpower constraints. The manner in which psychological and unconventional warfare evolved from 1941 until their union as a formal Army capability in 1952 suggests a theme that runs throughout the history of special warfare: the story of a hesitant and reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature.
My original intent with this study was to analyze how the United States Army, which was developed to fight conventional wars, evolved institutionally after World War II to cope with the demands of low-intensity warfare. The primary focus for this investigation was to be the evolution of the Army's John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from its inception in the early 1950's through the Vietnam years. I still intend, as a follow-on project, to accomplish that original goal; my preliminary research, however, revealed that the story of how and why the Army decided to undertake such a quest in the first place has not been adequately told. This study is intended to fill that void in our military history.

Specifically, it examines the Army's activities in psychological and unconventional warfare during and after World War II to determine the impetus for, and origins of, the formal "special warfare" capability created in 1952 with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center (later the Center for Military Assistance). An understanding of these historical roots should provide a more enlightened perspective from which to assess the subsequent evolution of "special warfare" in the Army.

I am indebted to Professor I. B. Holley of Duke University for initially suggesting this topic and for his constructive advice, particularly during the conceptual phase. The comments and insights provided on the outline and manuscript by my mentor, Professor Theodore Ropp of Duke, were invaluable. The long talks with Professor John K. Mahon, University of Florida, during his year with the US Army Military History Institute, were most appreciated.
were the comments on the manuscript by Professor Harold Deutsch of the Army War College faculty. For their expert, willing assistance during my research, I am particularly indebted to William Cunliffe and Ed Reese of the National Archives, Miss Hannah Zeidlik of the US Army Center of Military History, Miss Joyce Eakin and Dr. Richard Sommers of the Military History Institute, and Mrs. Beverly Lindsey of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. My sincere gratitude goes to my wife, Theresa, for her patience, initiative, and thoroughly professional typing of the manuscript. Mr. Paul Tabor, The Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, was most understanding and helpful in the interagency processing of my personal notes and documents taken from the National Archives, and of the final manuscript. In the final analysis, timely completion of the study would not have been possible without the encouragement, assistance, and environment needed for a serious research effort which were provided by the Army War College and Strategic Studies Institute.

Finally, this study is dedicated to my wife and three children, who know better than anyone what sacrifices have been required.

A. H. P., Jr.

Carlisle, Pennsylvania
November 1979
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PSYCHOLOGICAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 1941-1952:

ORIGINS OF A "SPECIAL WARFARE" CAPABILITY FOR

THE UNITED STATES ARMY
In the first half of the twentieth century, American leaders employed United States armed forces in support of American foreign policy in "conventional warfare" against the organized, uniformed forces of enemy nations. Although the size and nature of the forces so employed varied in two world wars and Korea, the United States Army in all of these conflicts performed its role with regularly organized divisions and without the use of nuclear weapons. Whether infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, or airborne, the division was the basic formation of the Army, the key organization in terms of which strength was measured in conventional war. After World War II, political and military leaders began to consider other forms of conflict in which American forces conceivably might be engaged. Organization, equipment, and doctrine were reexamined in view of the possibility of a nuclear war, but in this process the division remained a fundamental military organization. Simultaneously, a few thinkers began to consider the possibility of having forces capable of operating at the opposite end of the conflict spectrum from nuclear war, below that of conventional war; a capability, in short, to conduct guerrilla, or "unconventional warfare." Regular divisions were never designed or equipped for unconventional warfare; special units, training, and doctrine would be necessary for such a task.

In 1952 the Army created the first formal unconventional warfare force in its history, the 10th Special Forces Group, assigned to the Psychological
Warfare Center, an institution created that same year at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. From that year to the present time, this institution, known consecutively as the Psychological Warfare Center, The Special Warfare Center (1956), and finally the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (1969), constituted the headquarters for Army schools and units oriented toward "special warfare."

Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., defined "special warfare" in 1962 as "a term used by the Army to embrace all military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare."¹ Unconventional warfare primarily encompassed guerrilla type operations and subversion, to be carried out within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominately indigenous personnel, but supported and directed by U.S. forces. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, included all actions, military and political, taken by the forces of the United States alone or in conjunction with a legal government to prevent or eliminate subversive insurgency. Finally, psychological warfare dealt with communication, both spoken and written; it encompassed those activities planned and conducted to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the enemy, the indigenous population, and neutral or friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of United States objectives.²

Unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare, then, comprised the key elements of special warfare, a concept succinctly stated by


Secretary Stahr as including the capability to fight "as guerrillas as well as against guerrillas and also involves the employment of psychological devices to undermine the enemy's will to resist."  

Secretary Stahr's words were spoken in the early 1960's when special warfare, then symbolized by the Special Forces "Green Berets," reached its zenith under the Kennedy administration. In the late 1960's and 1970's, special warfare changed somewhat in form and emphasis, and receded in importance within the Army. The student of special warfare history might be excused for noting that the more recent period is reminiscent of the 1950's, when special warfare as a concept struggled for survival. The story of special warfare is a story of the Army, hesitantly and reluctantly, groping with concepts of an "unconventional" nature.

To understand the evolution of special warfare, particularly its embryonic existence in the early 1950's, one must grapple with the questions of how and why it all began. An examination of the organization of the Psychological Warfare Center upon inception in 1952 reveals that its major subordinate elements—the Psychological Warfare School (divided into psychological operations and special forces instructional departments), the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group and the 10th Special Forces Group—all involved two of the three components of special warfare; that is, psychological and unconventional warfare.\(^2\) The third component, counterinsurgency, did not join the lexicon of special warfare until the 1960's and United States involvement in

\(^1\)Special Warfare, U.S. Army, p. 5.

Southeast Asia. Apparently, in the 1952 organization of the Fort Bragg center, psychological warfare occupied a position of ascendancy over unconventional warfare; after all, it was the Psychological Warfare Center and the Psychological Warfare School. This suspicion of the apparent dominance of psychological warfare is strengthened by a perusal of the official unclassified literature of the day, particularly the semiannual Department of Defense reports for 1952-52. The January 1 to January 30, 1952, report, for example, while highlighting the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center, makes no mention of the concomitant creation of the 10th Special Forces Group, the first unit of its type in the Army's history.  

These observations lead to some perplexing questions concerning the origins of special warfare which are not adequately answered by starting one's investigation with the year 1952. Why, in 1952, did the Army decide, for the first time in its history, to develop the formal beginnings of a special warfare capability by establishing the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg? What were the roots, or historical antecedents, of psychological and unconventional warfare in United States Army service, and why were these concepts physically embodied in the same location in 1952? Finally, why, in terms of priority and emphasis, was psychological warfare apparently ascendant over unconventional warfare? In short, what were the pre-1952 roots of the Psychological Warfare Center and, concomitantly, the origins of special warfare in the United States Army? In order to suggest a more complete answer to these questions than presently exists, this study will trace the historical

roots of psychological and unconventional warfare from World War II to creation of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.
CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II

With the outbreak of World War II, the United States had virtually no organized capability to conduct psychological and unconventional warfare until President Roosevelt established the Coordinator of Information (COI) on July 11, 1941, and at the same time designated Colonel William J. Donovan as the first director. Thus was begun a bold idea, for through COI and its successor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the U.S. began "its first organized venture into the fields of espionage, propaganda, subversion and related activities under the aegis of a centralized intelligence agency."1

The Coordinator of Information

Ironically, the creation of COI was in large measure due to recommendations stemming from Donovan's fact-finding trips to the Middle East and Britain, where he had been impressed by the British method of combining (in agencies called the Political Warfare Executive [PWE] and the Special Operations Executive [SOE]) propaganda efforts and the "unorthodox" operations of sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. He had been impressed as well with the British system of intelligence and counterintelligence, as conducted by their Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and their ability to coordinate

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intelligence activities with psychological warfare and special operations.
Donovan thus proposed to Roosevelt the creation of a single agency in which
to centralize the intelligence gathered by several uncoordinated offices in
Washington, as well as combining the functions of psychological warfare and
special operations, on the British model.¹

According to Donovan's biographer, Corey Ford, the President welcomed
"the suggestion of a single agency which would serve as a clearinghouse for
all intelligence, as well as an organ of counterpropaganda and a training cen-
ter for what were euphemistically called 'special operations.'" As so often
happens to those who recommend measures of a far-reaching nature, Donovan was
"invited" by the President to head the agency which he had proposed.² Ini-
tially COI contained two major divisions, Research and Analysis (R&A) and the
Foreign Information Service (FIS), plus secret intelligence and sabotage
branches that were of a training nature only prior to U.S. entry into the war.

Dr. William L. Langer, a Harvard historian, became director of R&A, an office
designed to evaluate all incoming intelligence. The psychological warfare
division of COI was FIS, headed by Robert E. Sherwood, a playwright and confi-
dant of President Roosevelt.³ As William F. Daugherty has written, the FIS
"undertook to spread the gospel of democracy . . . and to explain the objec-
tives of the United States throughout the world except in Latin America."⁴
To carry out these aims, FIS selected information from the wire services to be
used as propaganda on its eleven commercial short-wave stations that

¹Ford, Donovan of O.S.S., pp. 91, 106f., 110. ²Ibid., p. 108.
⁴William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological War Case-
transmitted in several languages. After Pearl Harbor, Sherwood's organization broadcast more than three hundred fifteen-minute programs a week in Europe and Asia.¹

Donovan's all-encompassing concept of psychological warfare was of crucial importance. The first stage was to be "intelligence penetration," with the results processed by research and analysis made available for strategic planning and propaganda. Donovan called propaganda the "arrow of initial penetration," and believed that it would be the first phase in operations against an enemy. The next phase would be special operations, in the form of sabotage and subversion, to be followed by commando raids, guerrilla action, and behind-the-lines resistance movements. All of this represented the softening-up process of an area prior to invasion by friendly armed forces. Donovan's visionary dream was to unify all of these functions in support of conventional unit operations, and thereby "forge a new instrument of war."²

To carry out this concept effectively, Donovan felt that the COI should be made a supporting agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the latter having been created in February 1942. First of all, the military services' de facto control over personnel and material resources made it necessary, he believed, to place COI under JCS authority. Pragmatically, he realized that the COI's varied secret activities could not be carried out without concurrence and support from theater commanders, and also that these activities should be closely coordinated with conventional military operations. Unsuccessfully, he argued for several months with Roosevelt for COI to be brought

under the JCS, and for FIS foreign propaganda to be more closely coordinated with intelligence activities of the military services.1

OSS and OWI.

The comprehensive nature of Donovan's concept of psychological warfare was not shared by everyone, however, for less than a year after COI's creation, on June 11, 1942, President Roosevelt ordered the FIS be transferred to the newly established Office of War Information (OWI). By the same executive order, Roosevelt also dissolved the COI and supplanted it with a new organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), with Donovan continuing as its head.2 The change, however, did include putting OSS under the JCS, as recommended by Donovan on June 8.3 In effect, as Edward Hymoff succinctly states, "COI became OSS and FIS became a division of the Office of War Information."4

Roosevelt's decision to reorganize the psychological warfare effort apparently had several motivations. First, the increasing number of government information agencies created problems of overall coordination, so that there was a need to consolidate wartime information and psychological warfare activities.5 There was also growing recognition that COI had become unwieldy, and the President preferred that United States wartime propaganda be separated

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5 Ford, Donovan of O.S.S., p. 176.
from strategic intelligence and subversive operations, rather than combined.¹
Then there was the problem of personalities, for Donovan and Sherwood had dif-
ferent views on the proper role of FIS as a part of COI. According to Corey
Ford, "Colonel Donovan believed that, once a state of war existed, the propa-
ganda arm should be exploited as a weapon of deception and subversion, and
should be under military supervision," while Robert Sherwood, Chief of FIS,
"held that propaganda broadcasts should stick scrupulously to the facts, and
let the truth eventually prevail." Sherwood, who believed that "the American
image overseas would suffer . . . if we emulated Axis methods and resorted to
lies and deceit," also thought that FIS should remain under civilian direction,
and clashed with Donovan over his proposals to put COI and FIS under JCS
jurisdiction. These differences of views were hardening into personal
animosity between the two men, and since both Donovan and Sherwood had the
respect of the President, he evidently felt that it would be wise to separate
their responsibilities.² Perhaps the most important factor, however, was the
opposition of Harold D. Smith, the Director of the Budget, who submitted a
memorandum to the President on March 7, 1942, proposing a reorganization of
war information services which resulted in the formation of the OWI.³ Thus,
for a variety of reasons, the President shifted the major responsibilities for
psychological warfare to the newly created OWI.

Establishment of the OWI, however, neither solved all the problems of

¹Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, p. 70.
²Ford, Donovan of O.S.S., pp. 124f.; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS,
p. 19; Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, p. 183.
³Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, pp. 26-28; Corson, The Armies of
Ignorance, pp. 184-186.
coordination nor delimited responsibilities for psychological warfare, even with a highly respected CBS reporter like Elmer Davis as its first director. Though most of the existing information services were transferred to CWI, Donovan's agency continued to keep its fingers in the propaganda pie. Donovan had fought to keep FIS under his direction in COI, but, having lost that battle, he continued to assume some psychological warfare functions for the OSS. Eventually, however, the lines of responsibility were more clearly drawn and accepted by the two agencies. In addition to its intelligence and special operations activities, the OSS retained responsibility for "black" propaganda operations (i.e., information issued from a concealed or falsified source), which were essentially covert activities designed to lower the enemy's morale.\(^1\)

The OWI, on the other hand, controlled all propaganda in the United States, and all "white" propaganda (i.e., information, official or otherwise, plainly issued from a known source) outside the United States, with the exception of the Western Hemisphere, which remained a responsibility of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) in the State Department.\(^2\) In March 1943, another presidential executive order more clearly identified OWI's responsibilities for conducting foreign information and overt propaganda operations, and also decreed that its activities be coordinated with plans of the military services.\(^3\)


\(^3\) Daugherty and Janowitz, *Casebook*, p. 129.
The Army's Psychological Warfare Branch

When the European war broke out, the Army, like other agencies, was ill-prepared to understand, much less plan for and conduct, psychological warfare activities. During World War I, it had given token recognition to the importance of this field by establishing the Psychological Warfare Sub-Section of G-2 in the War Department, and the Propaganda Section, G-2, GHQ, AEF, but from 1918 to 1941 no psychological warfare office existed at the War Department, so the lessons of experience were lost. By 1941 there was only one officer on the War Department staff with psychological warfare experience from the previous war. This was Colonel Charles H. Mason who, as Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division (MID) from November 1940 to July 1941, attempted to reestablish a branch within the division for psychological warfare planning and operations. His attempts were in vain, however, and Mason "complained that his efforts were met with indifference and opposition within the War Department."^1

The first positive steps toward creation of a psychological warfare capability came about as a result of the personal interest of Mr. John McCloy, recently appointed Assistant Secretary of War. Influenced by the effectiveness of German propaganda, he suggested in June 1941 that a special study group be organized by Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to plan for future psychological warfare operations.\(^2\) Mr. McCloy's action is illustrative of a theme that recurs at critical points throughout the


^2Ibid., p. 290.
history of special warfare—the intervention by important governmental civilians to prod hesitant and cautious Army uniformed leaders into taking action on concepts of an "unconventional" nature.

The special group suggested by Mr. McCloy was established on June 25, 1941, as the Psychologic Branch, with Lieutenant Colonel Percy Black as its chief. A great deal of secrecy surrounded its creation, but, curiously, Colonel Mason, the only officer with World War I psychological warfare experience, was not even informed of its existence. Black's initial study examined all agencies—official and private—engaged in psychological information or propaganda and concluded that "there was no effort to study the effect of propaganda on various groups, or relate propaganda plans to the plans of the military high command." Some of the activities of this embryonic office included: liaison with the Foreign Monitoring Broadcast Service, FCC, to obtain daily and weekly summaries of foreign broadcasts; the completion of surveys for the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations, and for the Council for Democracy; initiation of a weekly telegram service to military missions with a brief summary of national defense progress; and a purchasing of copies of Newsweek and Life for distribution to selected missions in Europe to counteract the pictorial propaganda of Germany. As can be seen, these initial efforts by the Army in psychological warfare were rather modest in scope.

Shortly after its inception, the name of the Psychologic Branch was changed to the Special Study Group, primarily because of the strict security concerning existence of the organization. An advisory committee of civilian professional psychologists felt that it was inadvisable to use terms like

\[1\text{Ibid., pp. 291f.}\]
"propaganda," "control of opinion," and "psychiatry," thus the name Special Study Group "would be far less revealing than any references to psychology or propaganda." Again, in March 1942, the name was changed to Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, primarily because the growing number of personnel involved made strict secrecy difficult and because this same secrecy impeded coordination with other offices. Colonel Black was succeeded by Colonel Oscar M. Solbert, who remained chief of the branch until July 26, 1942. His successor was Colonel Charles C. Blakeney, who continued as chief until dissolution of the branch in December 1942.1

The Special Study Group/Psychological Warfare Branch continued and expanded upon the type activities begun under the Psychologic Branch. One of its most important and tangible projects was the production of a daily analysis of Axis propaganda, of which over 300 issues were circulated for guidance to the Office of Facts and Figures, Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, National Broadcasting Corporation, and the Bureau of Public Relations. Since the War Department did not control radio broadcasting, the Branch was limited to making suggestions. These varied from items to be included in speeches by the Chief of Staff to broadcasts with a definite objective, the latter being given to COI. The Branch also participated in planning of leaflet operations in strategic and combat phases, and developed the Combat Propaganda Bulletin to record lessons learned and recent activities for distribution both in Washington and to the military theaters.

In December 1942, the first psychological warfare units were created, with the formation of the 1st and 2nd Radio Service Sections, each with an

1Ibid., pp. 293f.; Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, pp. 93f.; "A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare," p. 29.
authorized strength of three officers and thirty-nine enlisted men. Together the two formed the 1st Combat Propaganda Company. When the Psychological Warfare Branch was dissolved on December 31, 1942, the company was transferred from the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) to OSS, then back to MIS on March 2, 1943. At this point, the company was reorganized into combat propaganda teams with radio transmitters, sound trucks, and language personnel, then sent to Europe for utilization.¹

Concurrent with, and related to, the activation of the Combat Propaganda Teams was the development of a Draft Training Manual, "Combat Propaganda Company," in the autumn of 1942. An existing pamphlet, "Military Intelligence Propaganda--Confidential," written by Major P. M. Robinett in December 1940, was used as its foundation. The manual proved to be quite useful in providing organizational principles for the propaganda companies formed in Europe during 1943 to 1945.² The activities of the Special Studies Group/Psychological Warfare Branch during 1941-42, then, were varied but relatively low-level in nature, and certainly were not considered "center stage" by the War Department.

**Dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch**

Dissolution of the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch in December 1942 was inextricably tied to the problem of defining psychological warfare—which persisted throughout the war—and to the interagency battles and confusion over responsibilities in this relatively new field. JCS had created a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JFWC) in March 1942 (JCS 12), to plan psychological


warfare in combat theaters and enemy-controlled areas. This committee was reconstituted on June 21, 1942 (JCS 68), after the OSS and OWI were established as two separate agencies. Membership was made up of general and flag officers from the Army's G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the War Department General Staff (WDGS), the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Donovan as chairman. Established at the same time was a Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee (JFWSC), a Supporting Committee on Psychological Warfare within OSS, and a Joint Psychological Warfare Advisory Committee (JFWAC), with Donovan as chairman. The latter committee was formed for the specific purpose of coordinating the activities of other agencies outside the jurisdiction of the JCS which were involved in aspects of psychological warfare, such as Nelson Rockefeller's Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), Henry Wallace's Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), the OWI, and the State Department.1

One of the first tasks of these various committees was the problem of defining psychological warfare, and to that end a "Basic Estimate of Psychological Warfare" was prepared by the OSS Supporting Committee and ultimately approved by the JPWC on September 7. The fine hand of Donovan may be seen in the definition contained in this Basic Estimate, for according to it warfare was

the coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which the end is attained--other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions--which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance, or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of

our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or to increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.

The Basic Estimate further specified propaganda, subversion, combat propaganda companies and intelligence secured by research and espionage as the tools necessary to carry out this broad concept of psychological warfare. Although the OSS Supporting Committee had spent six months trying to develop a saleable definition, the JPWC, after having approved it, did not forward the Basic Estimate to the JCS for approval as a doctrine statement.

This difficulty over arriving at an acceptable definition of psychological warfare was also linked to the problems OSS encountered while trying to find its niche as a new agency. As the War Report of the OSS states: "A contributing factor to the whole situation was a definite resentment of OSS, as such, which found its strongest expression in Donovan's colleagues on the JPWC. This resentment seemed to be based, in part, upon the fact that OSS was a civilian agency, and, in part, upon the position of OSS as an agency of the JCS and fear that it might encroach upon the functions of G-2 and/or ONI." At any rate, the existing psychological warfare committee system proved to be ponderous, confusing, and generally unworkable.

Finally, on December 23, 1942, the JCS moved to improve the situation by issuing JCS 155/4D, which abolished the JPWC and designated OSS as being responsible for "planning, developing, coordinating, and executing the military program of psychological warfare," and for "the compilation of such political, psychological, sociological and economic information as may be required by

2Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 200f.
military operations.\textsuperscript{1} Concur-
ting with the reorganization of the psycho-
logical warfare machinery of the JCS was a decision by the Army to abolish
its Psychological Warfare Branch, as announced by Military Intelligence
Service Memo 147, 31 December 1942, for "since the Office of Strategic Ser-
vice was responsible for propaganda, there appeared to be no need for the
Branch."\textsuperscript{2} Later, as will be seen, a need was found for a psychological war-
fare branch on the Army Staff, and it was reactivated. But at this point
the Army's participation in psychological warfare, at least in the Washington
arena, appeared to be minimal.

Such was not the case overseas, however, for the JCS 155/4D, which had
precipitated the demise of the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch, also gave
Theater Commanders control of psychological warfare in their jurisdictional
areas.\textsuperscript{3} In effect, the War Department, as Paul Linebarger states, considered
"the theaters in this respect as autonomous, and [left] to the respective
Theater Commanders the definition of their relationship with OWI and OSS, and
their use of each."\textsuperscript{4}

\subsection*{Theater Psychological Warfare}

Most of the Army's operational work in psychological warfare was there-
fore done at the theater level, where the responsible organization was normally
designated as a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB). The largest of these, the
PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (AFRY/ARMY), was activated in North Africa in
November 1942, at the orders of General Eisenhower, then later expanded in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 103.
  \item \textsuperscript{2}"A History of the Military Intelligence Division," p. 317.
  \item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{4}Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 97.
\end{itemize}
February 1944 to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). General Eisenhower created PWD because as Supreme Commander for all allied military activities in Western Europe, he desired to bring under his control the myriad of American and British agencies attempting to conduct psychological warfare activities in the theater.¹ As for a definition of psychological warfare, PWD/SHAEF described it as "the dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters."² With this definition, then, and the overall objective of controlling and coordinating psychological warfare in the area of Continental Europe controlled by the Supreme Commander, the specific missions of PWD were:

(a) To wage psychological warfare against the enemy. 
(b) To use the various media available to psychological warfare to sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander. 
(c) To conduct so-called consolidation propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries. [Consolidation propaganda was that directed toward a military force and designed to insure compliance with the instructions promulgated by the commander of the occupying force.] 
(d) To control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.³

To carry out these tasks PWD had a number of psychological warfare tools at its disposal. Transmitters of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)


²Historical Records Section, AGO, Reference Aid Number 7, "Records Pertaining to Psychological Warfare in Custody of Historical Records Section," 8 November 1949, p. 5, RG 319, P60 091.412 (7 October 1949), P/W 25/2, National Archives.

and OWI were important, particularly after D-Day when FWD prepared directives for both BBC and the OWI stations known as the American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE). Large-scale leaflet operations were carried out by the use of aircraft and artillery skills, and propaganda was also disseminated to enemy front-line units through loudspeakers.¹

The basic Army field operating unit for psychological warfare was the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company. As will be remembered, the nucleus for this type of units was formed by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) in December 1942 and, after being transferred for a brief period to the OSS, they went back to the Army in March 1943. The equipment for these units was unlike anything most conventional soldiers had seen. Included were such items as public address systems, radios, monitoring sets, loudspeakers, typewriters, mobile printing presses, and leaflet bombs. Normally they were broken up by the separate Army groups and field armies into small teams, often to work in direct support of front-line conventional combat units. One MRB Company commander, Major Edward A. Caskey, described his responsibilities as being concerned primarily with tactical, or combat, propaganda. His company used short-range radio broadcasts and tactical leaflets printed on the spot, then delivered to enemy lines through the use of modified artillery smoke shells. He also maintained prisoner-of-war interrogation teams who worked with G-2. As Caskey explained: "Both Germans and Italians [prisoners] stated that the content of the leaflets had greatly influenced their decision. They all insisted that they were mostly impressed with the veracity of our leaflets."²

¹Ibid., p. 17.
²Allied Force Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Branch, Memorandum prepared in Washington, D.C., 26 November 1943, by Major Edward A. Caskey, Commander, 1st MRB Company, RG 165 (WACS), MID (G-2), Propaganda Branch Correspondence, 1939-44, RG 69, Box No. 333, National Archives.
Eventually five such companies were formed in the United States and sent to Europe to serve under FWD/SHAEB. Although these units were the result of rather hasty improvisation in 1943 and 1944, the doctrinal and organizational concepts that they embodied were to reappear in the psychological warfare units formed later, during the Korean Conflict.  

Taken together, then, there were a number of diverse organizations in FWD, civilian and military, that somehow had to be fused into a common psychological warfare organization. According to an account prepared by the FWD staff, FWD/SHAEB "was the first agency, military or civilian, to coordinate successfully in Western Europe the efforts of the numerous military and civilian agencies which had waged Anglo-American psychological warfare since the beginning of the war." The Chief of FWD, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, was assisted by four deputies, each representing one of the respective civilian agencies which contributed personnel to FWD. Two of these agencies were American—the OWI and the OSS; and two were British—the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office (PID), and the Ministry of Information (MOI). General McClure's name bears remembering, for, as will be shown later, he was to figure prominently in establishing the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in 1952.  

Not everyone was enamored with FWD operations, of course. After all, it was a rather strange collection of personnel, equipment, and activities by conventional unit standards. Perhaps illustrative of this was a survey report

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2Psychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western Europe," pp. 13-17; Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. 131.
in August 1943 by the Inspector General, Major General Virgil L. Peterson, in which he described the PWB in North Africa (forerunner of PWD/ShAEF) as "a heterogeneous group of some 468 writers, psychologists, economists, linguists, and world travelers," whose efforts "were somewhat lacking in coordination and control, until they were all assembled in one building and placed under command of an American Army officer." General Peterson went on to conclude his remarks with the compliment that his Survey Group "was much impressed with the industry and enthusiasm of the people engaged in these psychological warfare activities," but added a caveat that displayed ambivalence toward a new and different organization: "but does not feel qualified to arrive at any conclusions regarding their value to the Theater, or the Army as a whole."\(^1\)

Professor Paul K. Sadover, a PWD combat intelligence officer, recalled that "at first PWD was not much appreciated; hard-bitten regular Army men referred to the psychological warriors as 'feather merchants.'" But later in the war, the organization's effectiveness received more respect from "formerly suspicious commanders," particularly at the tactical level, where at the end even gung-ho generals like George Patton asked for front-line support because "it was definitely recognized that the loudspeakers helped to persuade the enemy to come over with arms in the air."\(^2\)

The Propaganda Branch, G-2

In many respects, the activities of the PWB in North Africa (PWB/AFHQ) provided much of the impetus toward eventual reestablishment of a psychological

\(^1\)War Department, Office of the Inspector General, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff from Major General Virgil L. Peterson, 17 August 1943, subject: Survey of Organizations, Administration, Supply and Procedures of the North African Theater of Operations, National Archives.

\(^2\)Sadover and Lesswell, "Psychological Warfare," Headline Series, p. 16.
warfare branch at the War Department. General McClure's deputy, Mr. C. D. Jackson, OWI, returned to the United States for a visit in June 1943. During his trip he talked with Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, who in 1941 had displayed the interest in psychological warfare that resulted in establishment of the Psychologic Branch. Still deeply interested in the subject, Secretary McCloy proceeded to staff some papers left with him by Mr. Jackson which contained a proposal that a central psychological warfare branch be established at the War Department to direct and coordinate the work of the theater PWB's. 

The seed had been planted.

Prior to this, on 9 March 1943, as a result of the continuing difficulty of trying to delineate clearly the responsibilities of OSS and OWI with respect to propaganda, Presidential Executive Order 9312 was issued. This order gave OWI responsibility for planning, developing, and executing all foreign propaganda activities "involving the dissemination of information," which applied to open, or "white," propaganda. This action necessitated a revision of JCS 155/4/D, which had given OSS responsibility for military propaganda in December 1942 and which had been the major reason for dissolution of the War Department's Psychological Warfare Branch. The revised directive, JCS 155/7/D, was issued on 4 April 1943 and simply omitted any reference to OWI and propaganda. Thus a major constraint was lifted, albeit one that had been largely self-imposed, that allowed the Army to recreate a psychological warfare branch in Washington.

By August 1943 the papers Mr. Jackson left with Secretary McCloy were

1"A History of the Military Intelligence Division," p. 316.

beginning to have an impact. In addition to proposing that a central psychological warfare branch be established at War Department level, the papers also described the system in which propaganda planning and control were carried out in the North African theater. In an interesting memorandum to Colonel Otto L. Nelson, Secretary to the General Staff, Brigadier General J. E. Hull, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans Directorate (OPD), commented that "although the value of propaganda may not be as great as its proponents claim, it is a recognized instrument of modern war which can be useful." After this rather ambivalent endorsement, he went on to state that the principles contained in the PWB North Africa papers were sound, and recommended that they be circulated to theater commanders. This, in fact, was accomplished with a letter dated 20 August 1943 to all major commanders that forwarded the papers "in the event you desire to establish similar agencies." Interestingly, one of the papers signed by Colonel C. B. Hazeltine strongly advocated a mixed civilian-military team as "a must for maximum results in a PWB organization." It was this very civilian influence and interface that made psychological warfare and unconventional warfare suspect to many conventional-minded Army officers.

In the meantime, the previously mentioned report by the Inspector General, Major General Peterson, was released on 17 August 1943, and contained


a complaint from General McClure "that there was no corresponding agency es-
tablished in the War Department, through which he could channelize his cor-
respondence." About this time, the JCS began to get into the act by consider-
ing plans to improve coordination at high levels, and to require theaters to
submit definite plans on psychological warfare. Both of these matters were
discussed at the August 23, 1943, meeting of the Army's General Council.

General McNarney, the Deputy Chief of Staff, recognized the responsibility of
OWI "for most of this work," and was not prepared to decide "whether or not
the War Department should establish an agency primarily for dealing with
these matters or attempt to coordinate by liaison with OWI," thus "di-
rected the Operations Division and G-2 to "get together and submit recom-
mendations." ¹

The immediate result of this directive was a report to the Joint Intel-
ligence Committee on 8 September 1943 signed by the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, which outlined all the agencies
primarily responsible for preparation and dissemination of foreign propa-
ganda, and concluded that a War Department agency for control of propaganda
should be established and have a direct channel through JCS to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Recognizing the Army's deficiencies in this area, the
report also noted that "the abolition of the Psychological Warfare Section of
G-2 [in December 1942] has seriously reduced the War Department's ability to
supply appropriate material to propaganda agencies." Finally, the report also
included a rather curious assessment of the value of psychological warfare:

¹WDGS, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, extract from minutes of
General Council Meeting, 23 August 1943, OPD 000.24, Sec. II, Cases 40-61,
National Archives.
Although the proponents of psywar are prone to exaggerate its importance, the military value of propaganda in recent operations involving American forces has been clearly discernible and propaganda has also been used by our enemies with marked success. It is a powerful weapon for influencing men's minds and, therefore, cannot be neglected.¹

Again we see a somewhat lukewarm acknowledgment of this new field, but it did represent an endorsement, albeit begrudging, and the momentum for a new psychological warfare branch in the War Department was gathering.

By the middle of October, Major General Handy, the G-3, and Major General Strong, the G-2, had submitted a more detailed study to General McNarney recommending the establishment of a central authority within the War Department for formulation and dissemination of propaganda plans, policies, and releases. This report was approved by General McNarney and the Secretary of War on 26 October.² The matter appeared to be settled.

However, there then ensued a period during which both General Strong and General Handy strenuously avoided acceptance of the new function. In a memorandum to General Handy on 6 November 1943, General Strong attached a study prepared by G-3 which concluded that the new branch should be in the Operations Division because it "has the greatest interest in operational propaganda and a direct channel to the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff on all operational subjects."³ Not to be outdone, General Handy acknowledged on

¹WDGS, Memorandum to Joint Intelligence Committee with inclosed report by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, subject: War Department Propaganda Control Agency, 8 September 1943, OPD 000.24, Sec. II, Cases 40-61, National Archives.

²WDGS, Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, subject: Psychological Warfare/Establishment of Agency for Dealing with Problem of Psychological Warfare, 16 October 1943, OPD 000.24, Sec. II, Cases 40-61, National Archives.

³WDGS, MID, G-2, Memorandum for Major General T. T. Handy from Major General George V. Strong, G-2, 6 November 1943, OPD 000.24, Sec. II, Cases 40-61, National Archives.
10 November that G-3 did have an interest in operational propaganda, but that the new branch should be under G-2's direction because his positions as a member of the Emergency Combined Propaganda Committee and as a Joint Chief of Security Control gave him close touch with War Department coordination and control of propaganda. The matter was finally resolved by referral back to the original recommendations approved by General McNarney on 26 October, which had specified the new propaganda agency would be established in the Military Intelligence Division (G-2).

This attention to the dialogue between G-2 and G-3 over a new function may appear inconsequential, but it provides some insight into attitudes toward psychological warfare. General Staff divisions normally do not avoid or give up a function considered to be important—if it has "high visibility." The reluctance displayed by both General Handy and General Strong to accept an activity that was new, perhaps difficult to understand, and considered by many officers to be merely a minor side show in the war effort, is illustrative of a theme that recurs continually throughout this study—the story of a hesitant and reluctant Army, when faced with concepts of an "unconventional" nature.

Creation of the new Propaganda Branch in G-2 was formally announced on November 15, 1943, by Military Intelligence Division Directive Number 78. During the General Council meeting held the same day, General Kroner, the G-2 representative, pointed out that the head of psychological warfare activities

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1WDOS, Operations Division, Memorandum for Major General George V. Strong from Major General T. T. Handy, Subject: War Department, Propaganda Branch, 10 November 1945, OPD 000.24, Sec. II, Cases 40-61, National Archives.

in North Africa, Brigadier General McClure, had indicated that there was no

corresponding agency in the War Department to consider psychological warfare

problems "at the proper level." General Kroner concluded his remarks by stat-

ing that "this is indicated as a need for this very important branch." The

seed planted six months earlier by General McClure's deputy in his discussions

with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and by General McClure's own personal

statements during the intervening period, had finally borne fruit.

Broadly speaking, the new branch's primary responsibility was to co-

ordinate all propaganda functions for the War Department. More specifically,
it would prepare and disseminate propaganda items for use of the OWI, CIAA,
and other nonmilitary organizations. The G-2 would be advised by the branch
on all propaganda problems presented by theater commanders, and propaganda
matters brought before the JCS and CCS would be coordinated by War Department
action. Propaganda plans of the OWI and CIAA would be processed through the
JCS by the branch. It would coordinate with similar branches in the Navy,
State Department, and other government departments. Finally, the branch chief
was to serve as the Army member of the JCS liaison with OWI and CIAA.2

The branch chief selected for this fledgling office was Lieutenant

Colonel John B. Stanley, who was transferred from the Special Services Divi-
sion. Initially only four officers staffed the branch, but eventually more

1Ibid., p. 318.

2WDGS, G-2, Memorandum from Major General Strong for Commanding General,
Army Air Forces; Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division; Chief, Civil
Affairs Division and Director, Bureau of Public Relations, subject: Propa-
ganda Section, MID, 23 November 1943. Memorandum attaches copy of MID memo-
randum number 78, 15 November 1943, establishing a Propaganda Branch in the
MID, and requests cooperation and coordination of all addressees. Filed with
OPD 000.24, Sec. II, Cases 40-61, National Archives.
were assigned, to include some who had been associated with the old Psychological Warfare Branch before its dissolution. Internally, the branch was organized into Operations and Research and Analysis Sections, and remained basically in this configuration until May 1945. At this point, upon the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel Stanley, the function of preparing intelligence reports based on the analysis of foreign propaganda was transferred to the Sociological Branch, G-2. With this function went most of the Research and Analysis Section.1

At the end of the war, a few senior officers recognized the need to build upon the Army's experience and retain a capability for psychological warfare. In a December 1945 letter to the War Department, Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, then head of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS, stated:

To avoid a repetition of the PWB mistakes we made in World War II and to take full advantage of the experience gained in that war, I recommend that a comprehensive study be made of this subject at an early date with a view of:

a. Analysing [sic] all available PWB material of World War II, including particularly the PWB reports from the various theaters of operations to establish sound PWB principles, techniques, organization, equipment and procedures for future employment of this weapon.
b. Establishing short courses in our staff schools to provide future commanders and staff officers with a general understanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare.
c. Examining the feasibility of establishing a small PWB section in the War Department to provide continuing study of this subject, or failing that, to assign this responsibility to an existing section or agency best prepared to assume it.2

The Propaganda Branch had foreseen the need for such a study. In May

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1"A History of the Military Intelligence Division," pp. 318f.
2JCS, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Letter from Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, USA, to Lieutenant General J. E. Hull, Operations Division, War Department, subject: Research and Analysis of PWD Activities in World War II, 22 December 1945, OPD 000.24, Sec. III, Cases 62-
1945 letters had been sent to theater PWB's requesting the appropriate historical materials. The branch continued in existence until January 1947, when the responsibility for psychological warfare activities was transferred from G-2 to the Plans and Operations Division.

Appraisal

It is difficult—if not impossible—to discuss the evolution of Army experience in psychological warfare during World War II without taking into account the impact on it of the major civilian agencies that had an interest in this activity. First, the Coordinator of Information, then its successor, the Office of Strategic Services, and, finally, the Office of War Information—all had an influence on the Army's development of a psychological warfare capability as they engaged in their interagency struggles to sort out responsibilities in the new field. In many respects, it was the confusion and lack of coordination generated by the profusion of agencies that forced the War Department to reestablish a Propaganda Branch in November 1943. Through this office and the theater Psychological Warfare Branch, the Army found it necessary to work closely with these agencies, and in particular the OWI, for the duration of the war.

This reliance on civilian agencies did not sit well with many professional military men. An illustration of this attitude can be found by quoting from the unsigned letter of an officer with Headquarters, Western Task Forces, in 1942:

I still believe we could get along far better without the OWI. The psychological situation is far too complex to be handled by poets and gentlemen of the press in Washington and even the German Propaganda Machine worked in reverse in the face of actual military

1Ibid.
operations. The only propaganda which can achieve results is the propaganda of deeds not words. One U.S. medium tank has proved far more effective than all the bag of trick gadgets, which merely offend good taste and give nothing concrete where want is great.

This officer ended his letter with the conclusion, "I believe that such agencies as the OWI and OSS can be profitably eliminated in the future."\(^1\)

Ironically, it was a civilian--Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy--who pushed the Army into developing a branch at the War Department for the planning and coordination of psychological warfare activities, initially in June 1941 and again in November 1943. And it was a civilian--Mr. C. D. Jackson of the OWI--who, as General McClure's deputy, provided Secretary McCloy with the PWB/AFHQ organizational papers that were in turn used by him as a stimulus to resurrect a psychological warfare branch in 1943. The initiative demonstrated by influential civilian officials to prod somewhat conservative Army leaders into venturing forth in a new and uncertain field is a theme we shall see throughout our investigation of the origins of a special warfare capability for the Army.

Certainly Brigadier General McClure was an exception to this theme. The civilian-military team that he headed first in North Africa in PWB/AFHQ, then later in PWD/SHAPE, served as the model for successful Army psychological warfare operations during the war. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) companies employed in Europe were the first tactical propaganda units of their type in the Army's history, and were to influence the development of similar units during the Korean War. And McClure himself had a strong hand in urging that a central psychological warfare agency be established in the War

\(^1\)WDQS, C-2, unsigned letter from individual with Headquarters, Western Task Force, 26 November 1942. Apparently the writer was previously assigned to C-2, RG 319, G2 322.001 (1 October 1942), Box number 576, National Archives.
Department. All in all, General McClure must be considered the most important Army officer to emerge in this new field during World War II.

Although small throughout the Propaganda Branch, G-2, and its predecessors, the Psychologic Branch, the Special Study Group, and the Psychological Warfare Branch, performed a low-key, but valuable service. Its "principal success," states "A History of the Military Intelligence Division," "was in the guidance it gave to operational units in the field, and as an agency for the coordination of propaganda activities with military operations." While the extent of this success may be somewhat overstated by the MID history, nonetheless the fact that such an agency was found to be necessary was demonstrated by the creation of the Propaganda Branch ten months after dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch.

Army personnel employed in psychological warfare in all theaters probably never totaled more than 2,000 at any one time, a minuscule number when compared to many other activities. Despite the often less-than-enthusiastic manner in which the Army embraced it, however, gradually psychological warfare gained greater respectability. Formal organizations and procedures were developed—painfully and begrudgingly at times, to be sure—that eventually bestowed this new endeavor with a degree of legitimacy.

The impact of psychological warfare is always difficult to assess. But General Eisenhower, at least, thought the European experiment useful.

In this war [he wrote in the FMID/NAEF's account of its operation], which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great


2Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. 114f.
changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of
these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific
and effective weapon.

The exact contribution of psychological warfare toward the final
victory cannot, of course, be measured in terms of towns destroyed
or barriers passed. However, I am convinced that the expenditure of
men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an impor-
tant contributing factor in undermining the enemy's will to resist
and supporting the fighting morale of our potential Allies in the oc-
cupied countries.

Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a
place of dignity in our military arsenal.¹

Thus, World War II saw the nation—and the Army—develop the foundation
for a modern psychological warfare capability. What it would do with this
foundation, so painfully acquired, would remain to be seen.

¹Letter, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Headquarters, U.S.
Forces, European Theater, Office of the Commanding General, in "The Psycho-
CHAPTER III

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II

Activation of the 10th Special Forces Group in May 1952 completed the original group of organizations which comprised the Psychological Warfare Center, and supposedly provided the United States Army with the first unit in its history formally organized to conduct "unconventional," or guerrilla, warfare. A logical question, therefore, would concern the Army's rationale for embarking on this new venture, so alien to its more traditional role of conventional warfare. One also wonders if there had been any previous experience with unconventional warfare in the Army's history that may have served as a forerunner for its desire to create such a capability in 1952. Then there is the question of why the Army decided to combine unconventional warfare with psychological warfare in 1952. As with psychological warfare, we must begin our search for the answers to these questions by examining American experience during World War II.

"Official" Unconventional Warfare Units

The task of tracing the origins of unconventional warfare in the United States Army is complicated by the fact that in the early 1960's a number of World War II "elite" units were included in the official lineage of Special Forces. One of these was the First Special Service Force, a joint American-Canadian unit formed in 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana, and commanded by Major General Robert T. Frederick. Also included in the official lineage were United States Army Ranger Battalions, the first of which was
formed on June 19, 1942, at Carrickfergus in Northern Ireland, under the command of Colonel William O. Darby. A similar organization, Brigadier General Frank Merrill's 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), better known as "Merrill's Marauders," was not officially a part of Special Forces lineage but has been informally adopted by Special Forces.  

Whatever the "official" lineage, however, using these units as lineal antecedents of unconventional warfare is misleading since none of them, by definition, was an unconventional warfare organization. According to the Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms, unconventional warfare "includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion ... conducted within enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominately indigenous personnel usually supported and directed by personnel from an outside country." The First Special Service Force, the Ranger Battalions, and "Merrill's Marauders" did not fit this description; they were primarily long-range penetration organizations that specialized in reconnaissance, raiding, and commando operations. British Royal Marine Commandos and Orde Wingate's Raiders performed similar tasks for the British throughout the Second World War. Yet the author himself remembers standing in a mass formation with the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg in early 1960 when the First Special Service Force was reconstituted and consolidated with the Ranger Battalions.

1 "Lineage of Special Forces," undated mimeographed fact sheet located in G-1 archives, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Department of the Army Directive AGAO-322, October 18, 1960, consolidated the various Ranger Battalions with the First Special Service Force and redesignated them all as the 1st Special Forces--which became the parent unit of all Special Forces Groups.

then activated as the parent unit of all Special Forces Groups. And a memorable day it was, as retired Major General Frederick came down from Canada to preside over the conferral of First Special Service and Ranger unit colors, lineage, and honors to the Army's Special Forces.

Looking back upon that scene, one wonders today why Special Forces felt it necessary to adopt the lineage of units that were not true forerunners of unconventional warfare. An argument could probably be made that a few individuals from these units became early members of Special Forces, and that some of the tactics and techniques of their former organizations were incorporated into Special Forces training, but these alone are insufficient explanations. Apparently the answer was simply that the Army had no true unconventional warfare units of its own to draw history from, therefore someone in authority decided to take the next best alternative of borrowing the lineage of some of its better-known "elite" special-purpose units of World War II fame. While the lineage of these units undoubtedly adds to the luster of Special Forces, very little is served by dwelling on their history as forerunners of a United States Army unconventional warfare capability.

OSS and Unconventional Warfare

Personnel of the Office of Strategic Services, however, did participate in unconventional warfare activities during World War II, and the United States Army contributed officers and men to this unique organization. The OSS, transformed from the Coordinator of Information Office after the formation of the Office of War Information in June 1942, bore the stamp of William Joseph Donovan, an imaginative, forceful man of 58, who had been known since his youth as "Wild Bill." Donovan was a highly decorated World War I hero who became a millionaire Wall Street corporate lawyer before being chosen by
President Roosevelt, as one critic of OSS expressed it, "to direct the New Deal's excursion into espionage, sabotage, 'black' propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and other 'un-American' activities." Under the leadership of such a dynamic personality, another scholar described the OSS as "a combined research, foreign espionage, and special operations agency" through which the United States "became engaged for the first time in intensive strategic intelligence research and extensive espionage and political action operations on a world-wide scale."

As an agency established to meet the special conditions of World War II, the OSS "was the first of its kind in the history of the United States."

Largely because of the imagination and foresight of General Donovan, who had the ability "to visualize an oak when he saw an acorn," the OSS "undertook and carried out more different types of enterprises calling for more varied skills than any other single organization of its size in the history of our country." Such disparate tasks required a veritable potpourri of talent with Americans from all walks of life participating. Writers over the years have varied widely with their estimates of OSS strength, with figures of between 12,000 and 30,000 offered. However, the recently released official War


3OSS Staff, Assessment of Men, pp. 64-65.

4See, for example, the variance of figures in Ford, Donovan of OSS; Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security; Hymoff, The OSS in World War II; Smith, OSS.
Report of the OSS placed that agency's maximum strength in December 1944 as 13,000 personnel, with approximately 7,500 of that number stationed overseas.¹

Donovan's organization was basically broken down into three main functions: intelligence, special operations, and training. Intelligence and special operations were each further subdivided into several branches, with research and analysis, secret intelligence, and counterespionage, for example, under intelligence, while encompassed by special operations were activities such as sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and psychological warfare. Interestingly, the psychological warfare capability was known as "Morale Operations" (MO), a branch responsible for creating and disseminating "black" or covert propaganda.²

During one of his several reorganizations of OSS, Donovan, in January 1943, established the post of Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Operations (PWO) to supervise and divert the activities of both the Special Operations (SO) and Morale Operations (MO) branches. In May 1943, a third branch specifically organized for guerrilla warfare--the Operational Group (OG) Command--was also placed under the Deputy Director, PWO. Still later, this title was changed to simply Deputy Director, Operations, with SO, MO, and OG as subordinate branches.³ Although one can easily become confused by the myriad of seemingly interchangeable organizational titles and activities in OSS, the main point to be made here is that Donovan, even after having lost the responsibility for overt, or "white," propaganda to OWI in March 1942, continued

throughout the war to think in terms of a close interrelationship between psychological warfare and what in later years became known as unconventional warfare.

Although its role in strategic intelligence was important, that aspect of OSS most applicable to this discussion of unconventional warfare was "special operations," a term which covered, according to Harry Howe Ransom, espionage, counter-intelligence in foreign nations, sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla and partisan-group activity . . . and in various other forms of psychological warfare and underground operations. In essence, OSS assumed operational responsibility in a field previously ignored and scorned by many diplomats and military professionals.1

OSS and the Army

The last point is significant; the OSS was not a military organization, but personnel from the military services—along with civilians—did participate in its activities. Among the military services, the Army contributed by far the most personnel during the war. In November 1943, the number detailed to OSS by the Army stood at 4,097 persons; by May 1945, that figure had more than doubled to 8,360.2

As early as October 10, 1941, when he created a "Special Activities" section in COI, Donovan was seriously considering the idea of special operations, to include the formation of guerrilla units. Many of his ideas had been obtained from a study of the organization and methods of Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE). Moving quickly, by December he had proposed to the President that the United States organize "a guerrilla corps,

1Ransom, Central Intelligence, pp. 64-65.

independent and separate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a maximum of the offensive and imaginative spirit." By the early part of 1942 he was requesting training areas from the Department of Interior, and instructor personnel from the War Department. Lack of a War Department allotment, however, impeded initial recruiting efforts for the projected guerrilla organizations.1

Predictably, the military services had some misgivings about a guerrilla corps "independent and separate from the Army and Navy." In the first place, during this period after Pearl Harbor, United States forces were in disarray and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had yet to be organized. Furthermore, Donovan's proposal was perhaps not very wise as a bureaucratic maneuver, as William R. Corson has observed: "For Donovan to think, even with FDR's endorsement, that such an organization could be brought to pass in the face of the military's obvious objections was, charitably, an act of lunacy on his part."2

Aside from the bureaucratic sensitivities involved, many senior military leaders had serious reservations about the practicality of Donovan's ideas. Major General Strong, Army G-2, in commenting on a memorandum from the COI in June 1942 (by this time COI had been dissolved and Donovan was Director, OSS), on "Organization of Guerrilla Warfare Command," regarded the proposal as "essentially unsound and unproductive." He believed that most of the operations envisaged by such a force could and should be carried out by specially trained regular troops; therefore, "to squander time, men, equipment, and tonnage on special guerrilla organizations and at the same time to complicate the command...

1Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, pp. 70, 72, 80-82.

2Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 177. In a bit of understatement in War Report of the OSS, Roosevelt commented that "there seemed to be a deep-seated disapproval of the organization of independent military forces on the part of the War Department" (p. 223).
and supply systems of the Army by such projects would be culpable mismanage-
ment." While recognizing the value of sabotage and subversive activities as
an aid to military operations, Strong questioned the feasibility of directing
such forces from Washington. Guerrilla warfare, if conducted at all, was a
function of regular Army task forces whose operations would "take the form of
raids and are practically identical with commando operations."1 This last
statement revealed a fundamental, but not uncommon, misunderstanding of the
true nature of guerrilla warfare.

Despite the reluctance of the military services, however, one of the
benefits of OSS being brought under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
was the issuance of JCS 155/4D on 23 December 1942, which gave OSS responsi-
ability for the organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare. Personnel em-
ployed in this function would be limited to "organizers, fomenters and opera-
tional nuclei of guerrilla units."2 Thus OSS had a charter. While Donovan's
initial ideas for a "Guerrilla Group," comprised of ten "Guerrilla Battalions,"
did not survive intact, he did ultimately create a variety of unconventional
warfare activities that depended heavily on the participation of personnel
from the Army.

Probably the best known unconventional warfare operation in which United
States Army personnel contributed significantly was that of Detachment 101 in
Burma, commanded by Colonel W. R. Peers. Detachment 101 organized and trained
native Kachin tribesmen to conduct successful guerrilla warfare operations

1 WDGS, G-2, Washington 25, D.C., Memo for the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-1, subject: Comments on Memo from the COI re Organization of Guerrilla War-
fare Command, June 23, 1942, from Major General George V. Strong, RG 319,
Army Intelligence, 370.64, Box Number 874, National Archives.

against the Japanese in 1943-1945. One former OSS member suggested in a conversation with the author that 101 "represented a sort of microcosm of the entire range of OSS capabilities.\(^1\) The Kachins, led by 101, performed a variety of unconventional warfare missions: They gathered intelligence, aided in escape and evasion efforts for downed United States fliers; they undertook espionage and counterespionage missions, the attacking of Japanese lines of communications, and other such activities in support of allied conventional operations.\(^2\) Almost 700 United States Army officers and enlisted men contributed to 101's operations in Northern Burma over a three-year period. Total guerrilla strength reached something over 10,000 by February 1945. After the completion of its mission in Burma, Detachment 101 received the Presidential Unit Citation.\(^3\) According to one student of OSS history, Detachment 101 performed "the most successful OSS guerrilla operations of the war."\(^4\)

While Detachment 101 may have enjoyed the most spectacular tactical combat success, the major OSS effort during the entire war was directed at France.\(^5\) Here, United States Army personnel made a significant contribution

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\(^1\)Hugh Chandler, private interview held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, March 8, 1973.

\(^2\)U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Readings in Guerrilla Warfare, December 1, 1960, p. 29.


\(^4\)Smith, OSS, p. 248.

to the three groups of OSS operational units that worked behind enemy lines in direct support of the French Resistance. The first group consisted of 77 Americans who worked in civilian clothes as organizers of secret networks, as radio operators, or as instructors in the use of weapons and explosives. Thirty-three members of this group were active in France before June 6, 1944 (D-Day). The second group consisted of 78 Americans who were members of the "jedburgh teams," which were organized in Britain or Algiers and parachuted into France beginning with D-Day. Jedburgh teams consisted of a British or American officer, a French officer, and a radio operator. These teams operated primarily in uniform, and were to coordinate and legitimize Maquis activities under the aegis of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, to obtain supplies for the Resistance groups, to report significant intelligence, and as a secondary role to engage in guerrilla warfare and attacks on German lines of retreat or communication.1

The largest group in France consisted of some 356 Americans, who were members of OSS "Operational Groups" (OG's). Recruits for the OG's were all French-speaking volunteers from United States Army units, primarily infantry and engineer (for demolition experts) outfits. Medical technicians were procured from the Medical Corps, radio operators from the Signal Corps.2 Working in uniform, these teams were parachuted behind the lines after D-Day to perform a variety of missions, including cutting and harassing enemy lines of

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communication, attacks on vital enemy installations, organization and training of local resistance elements, boosting of morale and sustaining local resistance elements, and furnishing of intelligence to the Allied armies. Interestingly, Donovan drew a distinction between the mission of Rangers and Commandos and those of the OG's, although some aspects of their tactical operations were similar. The crucial difference in his mind was that the OG's "fitted into the pattern of OSS activities behind the enemy lines."\(^1\)

Actually, the mission of the Operational Groups was not only distinct from that of the Rangers and Commandos but also from that of other OSS activities. The OG Branch had been established on May 4, 1943; then on November 27, 1944, the Operational Group Command was activated as a separate entity within OSS. In addition to basic military training, OG recruits received more specialized instruction on such subjects as foreign weapons, operation and repair of enemy vehicles, enemy espionage organizations, communications, demolitions, organization and training of civilians for guerrilla warfare, parachute jumping, and amphibious operations. Their basic function was to organize resistance groups into effective guerrilla units, equip them with weapons and supplies, and lead these units into attacks against enemy targets, in concert with orders from the theater commander. As for how the concept of their employment differed from other Special Operations activities, an OSS general orientation booklet published in 1944 described it thus: "OG personnel activate guerrillas as military organizations to engage enemy forces. They always operate in uniform as military units and are not primarily concerned with

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individual acts of sabotage." Clearly, the OG's were primarily designed for guerrilla warfare, and the principles that they embodied were to have a significant influence on the Army's effort to form a similar capability in later years.1

Another interesting and pertinent aspect of the OG concept was its basic operational unit, the section, composed of two officers and thirteen enlisted men. Eight years later the first formal unconventional warfare unit formed in the United States Army—the 10th Special Forces Group—was to adopt this same structure for its basic operational detachment. Also significant is the fact that the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group was Colonel Aaron Bank, an Army officer who had served with the OSS in France. Even the name "Special Forces" is reminiscent of the combined headquarters formed in 1943 by the OSS and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) which in 1944 was renamed "Special Forces Headquarters" (SFHQ).2

"Throughout France," states the War Report of the OSS, "before and after D-Day, SFHQ supplied, directed, and communicated with the Maquis in the largest resistance uprising in history."3 A less enthusiastic analysis of the role of SFHQ, and in particular the OSS, was rendered by the G-2 Division, War


Department General Staff in a "Summary of French Resistance, 6 June - 31 August 1944," and the following opening paragraph is quoted from the introduction to that report:

It must be borne in mind that so-called resistance activities in France were the combination of the efforts of the local French themselves under the organization and direction of American, British, and French agents of SFHQ infiltrated from the United Kingdom and North Africa. In the majority of cases, the specific acts of sabotage were committed directly by the local French; and it is to them, for their courage and daring, that the greater portion of credit for the end results accomplished must be given. However, it is not at all out of place for OSS in general, and SO particularly, to take credit for its share in the planning and directing of the overall scheme of sabotage. 1

This rather interesting evaluation probably tells us more about the low regard with which unconventional activities in general, and the OSS in particular, were held by many Army officers than it does about the value of the Resistance itself.

While the success of OSS and SOE efforts in France is difficult to estimate, in commenting on the effectiveness with which the Maquis cut enemy lines of communication in support of the Normandy landings, General Eisenhower stated that the French Resistance forces were worth fifteen divisions to him in his invasion of the European continent. 2

Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines

One large unconventional warfare operation that was not OSS-directed, but one in which United States Army personnel played a key role, was the Philippine Campaign, 1941-1945. There a number of Army officers escaped to the mountains

1Department of the Army, General Staff, G-2, "Summary of French Resistance, 6 June - 31 August 1944," USAMHI.

when the Japanese overran the islands, to establish extensive intelligence networks and guerrilla forces. In Northern Luzon, Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann equipped, trained, and commanded five Filipino regiments that successfully engaged the Japanese in combat both immediately before and during the landing of U.S. forces at Lingayen in January 1945. On Mindanao, Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig eventually consolidated some 37,000 guerrilla troops, and held 90 percent of the island until the end of the war. Both Volckmann and Fertig were to figure prominently in the activation of the Army’s Special Forces in the early 1950’s.

Attitudes Toward Unconventional Warfare

At the end of World War II hostilities, President Roosevelt foresaw the need for a permanent strategic intelligence organization for the postwar period, and asked General Donovan to give some thought to its possible structure. Replying with a "Memorandum for the President," Donovan proposed the "establishment of a central intelligence authority," which would report directly to the President, "with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy." Donovan also urged the President to keep the trained and specialized personnel of OSS from being dispersed after the war so that they could help contribute to this proposed organization.2


Someone in the federal bureaucracy leaked a copy of Donovan’s memorandum to the press, and the resultant public furor over what the Chicago Tribune called a proposed “Super-Spy System for Postwar New Deal” forced Roosevelt to tell Donovan that he “would wait out the storm and submit the proposal at a more propitious moment.” That was in February 1945. In April the President died, and with his death the fortunes of OSS were dealt a severe blow. While Donovan had enjoyed the confidence of FDR, the situation was considerably different with President Truman, who, charges Edward Hymoff, “had no concept of OSS as an organization nor what it represented for the future of American foreign policy decision-making.”

President Truman ordered that the OSS be disbanded on October 1, 1945. One scholar has suggested that Truman was motivated apparently because of pressures from the armed services, the FBI, the Department of State, and the Bureau of the Budget. Another influence was undoubtedly Mr. Truman’s own apparent prejudice against the cloak and dagger operations by the United States. To continue an international spying organization in peacetime seemed somehow un-American in the atmosphere of the immediate post-war period.

It would perhaps be instructive to dwell on this analysis for a moment. In the first place, one must not fall into the trap of exaggerating the success of OSS unconventional warfare operations. It may well be true, as one historian has suggested, that the most significant long-range work was done in strategic intelligence by the much less publicized and romanticized “college professors, lawyers, and others who worked tirelessly in the research units, in the analysis of economic objectives, and in other operational analysis and technical groups within OSS,” for it was these groups who contributed

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1Ibid., pp. 303-304.  
3Ransom, Central Intelligence, pp. 71-72.
much data on which successful wartime operations were based, and developed techniques useful to contemporary intelligence research and analysis.\textsuperscript{1}

Moreover, unconventional warfare operations of the OSS actually constituted a rather small portion of the overall United States war effort, and many of these resistance activities were haphazard, poorly organized, and uncoordinated with the overall operations. And yet, one World War II participant has written that "unconventional warfare operations [not necessarily those sponsored by OSS] during World War II reaped a substantial strategic harvest," citing as examples the accomplishments of Russian, Yugoslav, Albanian, and French partisans in immobilizing large numbers of German and Italian divisions.\textsuperscript{2}

The point of this particular discussion, however, is not to attempt to judge the relative success or failure of OSS unconventional warfare operations, but rather to illustrate—as another resistance participant, Charles Thayer, has done—that the first American experience with modern, sophisticated and large scale guerrilla movements took place during World War II. More importantly, it was basically a civilian-led United States agency—the OSS—and not the military services, that stepped in to attempt to capitalize on the potential for guerrilla warfare.\textsuperscript{3}

In providing leadership in this area, General Donovan's infant organization apparently incurred the wrath of other governmental agencies, including the military services. Opposition toward the intelligence and special

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 62-63.


operations efforts of OSS was so intense that Dr. William Langer, head of Re-
search and Analysis, later observed that "perhaps Bill Donovan's greatest
single achievement was to survive." Even after being placed under the direc-
tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1942, Donovan insisted on OSS inde-
pendence and freedom from subservience to any single agency or military serv-
ices. It was this independence of OSS that was especially resented by "the
traditionalists in the armed forces," claims journalist Edward Hymoff in The
OSS in World War II, primarily because "they had been plagued during the
war by citizens in uniform who had become officers only because they were in OSS," and in addition, "even more frustrating for the military professionals were
the irreverent individuals in OSS who constantly flouted both authority and
standard operating procedures." Hymoff himself was a member of OSS, and per-
haps best typifies the attitude of many Donovan "operatives" by his statement
that one of the things he liked most about the unorthodox agency was that "it
was so unmilitary." Donovan always protected his "irreverent individualists,"
however, by reportedly often saying, "I'd rather have a young lieutenant with
guts enough to disobey an order than a colonel too regimented to think and act
for himself."

One of the most consistent and outspoken opponents of OSS was Major
General George V. Strong, Chief of Army G-2 (Intelligence), who felt from the
beginning of OSS's existence that Donovan's organization conflicted in in-
terests with the Army, and also offered the argument that "Wild Bill's" inde-
pendence would make him ineffective as a "team player." Later, when OSS was

1Ford, Donovan of O.S.S., p. 131.
2Hymoff, The OSS of World War II, p. 341. 3Ibid., p. 2.
4Smith, OSS, p. 6.
initially struggling for survival after having come under the direction of
the JCS, General Strong, according to Corey Ford, "refused to exercise his au-
thority so that OSS could obtain the supplies and personnel of which it was
desperately in need." In fact, for six months after OSS came under its direc-
tion, the JCS failed to give Donovan's organization any operational instruc-
tions or official directive as to its responsibilities. This logjam was
broken only after President Roosevelt learned of the delay and told General
Marshall, Chairman of the JCS, to "give Bill Donovan a little elbow room to
operate in."

In the face of such determined opposition to OSS, it appears that the
most significant factor in the survival of Donovan's unconventional outfit was
the personal backing of FDR. As Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden noted in
Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage, the major OSS adversaries were the
Army, Navy, and FBI, but these services "were fully conscious of Donovan's
close friendship with Roosevelt," and therefore were aware that "if it came
to a showdown, the back door of the White House was always open to William J.
Donovan and a special plea." The interesting parallel between Roosevelt's
support of OSS and John F. Kennedy's vigorous promotion of Special Forces in
the face of reluctant foot-dragging by some senior military leaders will not
be lost on students of special warfare history, particularly when one con-
siders the subsequent loss of influence by both organizations after the deaths
of the two presidents.

1Ford, Donovan of O.S.S., pp. 109, 129, 162.
2Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American
3Herbert Riffkind, "From Rockets to Rifles: The President's Guerrilla
Although the services—and particularly the Army—contributed personnel to OSS, some commanders were reluctant to utilize OSS teams in their areas of responsibility. Detachment 101, for example, was initially prevented from operating in Burma because General Joseph Stilwell, commander of American forces in China, Burma, India (CBI), was "fervently prejudiced against the 'irregular' military activity proposed by OSS," and "disparaged guerrilla tactics as 'illegal action' and 'shadow boxing.'"\(^1\) Stilwell eventually relented and later praised the contributions of 101, but General Douglas MacArthur absolutely refused to permit OSS to operate in the South Pacific throughout the war, even when General Donovan offered a plan to support guerrilla operations in the Philippines.\(^2\)

It would appear that in addition to the personal rivalry, bureaucratic antipathy, and jealousy which were provoked by General Donovan's organization, the operations of OSS may have antagonized military leaders of the "regular" United States Army who, by their training and experience, were conditioned to think primarily in terms of conventional warfare. Some of these leaders, therefore, may well have looked askance at what they considered to be the unorthodox and unnecessary OSS guerrilla warfare activities. As an example, Charles Thayer in his book *Guerrilla* claims that many general officers "harbor a deep-seated aversion to guerrillas, apparently because they fit no conventional pattern and their underhanded clandestine tactics have little in common with the military code of honor and chivalry which career soldiers . . . like to associate with their profession."\(^3\) In yet another attempt to explain

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\(^1\)Smith, *OSS*, pp. 243-244.

\(^2\)Ransom, *Central Intelligence*, p. 66; Smith, *OSS*, pp. 34, 250-251.

\(^3\)Thayer, *Guerrilla*, pp. xvii-xviii.
the reason for the aversion of many United States military leaders to unconventional warfare, Franklin Mark Osanka, a student of guerrilla activities, has offered this perhaps more convincing rationale:

Guerrilla warfare has not been an American forte (because) in most of its wars . . . the United States has not had to rely upon guerrilla warfare. American experience with guerrilla warfare has been limited by the strength of American arms. The United States has been able to mobilize overwhelming economic and military power and to bring it to bear directly on the enemy, attacking him not where he was weakest but where he was strongest, because we are stronger still. American military doctrine has reflected this experience. ¹

Even in the face of opposition from the military, however, by the end of the war a nucleus of officers trained and experienced in guerrilla warfare had been developed by the OSS. According to Thayer, serious efforts were made at that time to persuade the Pentagon that this nucleus be retained in some form for future potential war, but "these recommendations were to no avail on the ostensible ground that such 'elite' groups were incompatible with the democratic tradition." ² While this explanation of the Pentagon's refusal may seem a bit extreme, a respected military historian, Russell Weigley, states in his History of the U.S. Army that there has been a "long-standing suspicion of elite forces" by the Army.³ Certainly this "suspicion" may well have been an important factor in the Army's reluctance to create an "unconventional warfare" capability in the immediate postwar period, particularly with the still-fresh memories of OSS-Army rivalry during the war. Interestingly enough, Thayer also points out that while most of the guerrilla-warfare-

²Thayer, Guerrilla, p. 180.
trained personnel were discharged, a nucleus of psychological warfare experts was retained, "largely as a result of the newly acquired respectability of this technique in the course of World War II."\textsuperscript{1} Consider for a moment this latter statement in light of what has been previously discussed. Psychological warfare gained "respectability" during World War II, but what Thayer fails to point out is that there were formal staffs and units within the Army charged with the responsibility for psychological warfare. In other words, psychological warfare had an identity, however tenuous, \textit{within the Army}, an identity that guerrilla warfare did not share, since most of the officers and men who operated in this environment were assigned to the OSS—an organization that was certainly not considered to be part of the Army. At any rate, psychological warfare "survived" in the immediate post-World War II Army, although just barely, while the Pentagon apparently gave little consideration to building upon the nucleus of OSS-trained officers to create a formal unconventional warfare capability.

\textbf{Dissolution of OSS}

Dismemberment of the OSS took place quickly with President Truman's order dissolving the agency in October 1945. By this time General Donovan had retired to civilian life, and the remains of his former organization were dispersed to somewhat unreceptive State and War departments. Many of the carefully trained personnel gradually drifted away to other jobs outside government. Portions of the Secret Intelligence and Special Operations Branches were assimilated in the War Department's newly established Strategic Services Unit (SSU), which, according to Corey Ford, "was nothing more than a caretaker

\textsuperscript{1}Thayer, \textit{Guerrilla}, p. 181.
body formed to preside over the liquidation of the OSS espionage network."

Brigadier General John Magruder, formerly Assistant Director of OSS, was head of SSU, but by February 1946 he had resigned in protest over the agency's continuing loss of highly trained personnel. For all practical purposes, any type of formal United States capability for guerrilla warfare disappeared. What little remained of OSS consisted primarily of some secret intelligence and analysis personnel. Seemingly, there was little desire or need in the immediate postwar period for the types of skills and services that had been offered by OSS during the war.¹

**Appraisal**

The only true unconventional warfare organization in the United States during World War II was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a civilian agency. Although a few Army officers participated in non-OSS directed guerrilla operations in the Philippines, most of the Army's experience in unconventional warfare came from providing personnel to serve with the OSS. Of particular note were the OSS Operational Groups (OG's), which were recruited entirely from the Army and employed extensively in Europe. In terms of organization, training, and concept of employment, the OG presaged the basic operational detachment to be adopted by the Army's 10th Special Forces Group.

¹Smith, OSS, pp. 364-373; Ford, Donovan of O.S.S., pp. 314, 343; Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, pp. 341-342; Alsop and Braden, Sub Rosa: The O.S.S., p. 233; Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 43; OPD Memo Number 6168, 30 September 1945, states General Magruder was instructed "to continue liquidation of activities and personnel not needed for peacetime purposes," CCS 385 (2-8-42), Sec. I, Pt. 10, Box No. 87, National Archives. A memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, as part of JCS 965/2, 28 August 1945, "Withdrawal of All Service Personnel With OSS," indicated approximately 8,000 U.S. Army officers and enlisted men on duty with OSS in July 1945, CCS 385 (2-8-42), Sec. I, Pt. 10, Box 37, National Archives.
upon its creation in 1952. Thus, for the Army the true roots of a modern unconventional warfare capability lay in its association with the OSS.

Clearly, the central figure in unconventional warfare during World War II was Major General William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services. Edmond Taylor, a former member of COI/OSS, vividly describes in his book *Awakening From History* Donovan's fascination with the potential that he thought unconventional warfare offered:

The paramilitary and guerrilla aspects of the OSS mission probably interested him more than any other. By combining unlimited nerve, Yankee ingenuity, and self-reliance, the American tradition of frontier warfare, and the most advanced twentieth-century science or technology, Donovan believed that effectively unconventional solutions could be found to almost any strategic problem. Above and beyond his other, sometimes mutually incompatible goals, Donovan, I think, hoped to demonstrate through OSS that the normally untapped reserves of individual courage and resource, and the dynamism of the individual will to win constitute the basic raw materials of victory, and that in an increasingly mechanized world, human dignity is still not only a moral but a strategic quantity.1

Taylor, an unabashed admirer of Donovan ("I stayed in OSS--though sometimes attached to it by nothing more tangible than the invisible presence of Donovan in my mind . . . "), offers a personal conclusion of the General's dedication to unconventional warfare in an eloquent, yet moving passage: "As far as I was concerned General Donovan's demonstration was conclusive, and it made an abiding contribution to the development of my personal outlook on the unending struggle for survival among nations and civilizations, institutions and ideologies, that we call history."2

Without question, Donovan inherited many of his ideas from the British. But only a man of his stature, perseverance, and personal dynamism could have

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2Ibid., p. 346.
successfully applied these unorthodox concepts in the face of the intense opposition and competing bureaucratic interests that marked United States inter-agency efforts during the war. Thus, while some of the Army officers detailed to OSS were to use this experience and play important roles in the creation of the 10th Special Forces in the early 1950's, surely William J. Donovan must be considered the "spiritual" father of Army unconventional warfare.

Actually, Donovan's influence on the Army extends beyond that of unconventional warfare; it also embraces psychological warfare. As discussed in chapter II, the initial idea behind formation of the Coordinator of Information (at least as conceived by Donovan) included combining intelligence, special operations, and propaganda functions in the same agency. Indeed, as will be recalled, his all-encompassing concept of "psychological warfare" included all the elements—and then some!—of what the Army was later to call "special warfare" (with the exception of counterinsurgency). Probably Donovan's greatest disappointment was to lose the responsibility for open, or "white," propaganda, to the Office of War Information in 1942, when OII was reconfigured into the OSS. Even after this setback, Donovan never lost his insistence on the close interrelationship of psychological warfare and special operations (UN), and continued to stress this throughout the war. It is the author's belief that this interrelationship, so firmly believed in by Donovan, had an influence on Brigadier General McClure's ideas about combining psychological and unconventional warfare functions at both the Army Staff and the Psychological Warfare Center in the early 1950's. The Coordinator of Information, then, can be considered a common point of origin for both unconventional and psychological warfare in modern American experience. In a very real sense, William Donovan can also be legitimately considered the spiritual father of a "special warfare"
capability for the Army.

In comparing the experience of the Army with psychological and unconventional warfare during World War II, one is struck by the similarities in institutional responses to these two relatively new activities. To many professional military men, both were unorthodox, untried activities, heavily influenced by civilians. Together, they never involved more than 10,000 Army personnel at any one time—a minor sideshow, thought many, in comparison to the overall "conventional" war effort. The response to both was often hesitancy, skepticism, indifference, and even antagonism.

Psychological warfare, however, gradually gained greater acceptance and respectability within the Army. The crucial difference was that formal staff sections and units were developed by the Army to employ this weapon. Yes, there was still a heavy reliance on civilians, but military men were in command and made the final decisions as to its use—particularly in the virtually autonomous theaters. Thus, psychological warfare gradually acquired a measure of legitimacy within the Army, and survived as a formal activity after the war.

Unconventional warfare, on the other hand, remained the province of a civilian agency, the OSS. Although Donovan's outfit relied heavily upon personnel from the Army, and was subject to JCS direction, it nonetheless remained a separate and distinct organization. The tensions created by this independent, "unconventional" posture were perhaps best described in the final portion of the War Report of the OSS:

An agency engaged in secret and unorthodox activities is peculiarly susceptible to difficulties in its relations with other agencies and departments of its government. Secrecy inevitably creates a psychological attitude of distrust and suspicion on the part of others. In many instances, this attitude is aggravated by the clash with established procedures and regulations which the performance of
irregular and unorthodox activities often entails.¹

As a result of this independence, OSS—and unconventional warfare—did not attain the degree of acceptance within the Army ultimately enjoyed by psychological warfare. Lacking solid institutional roots, OSS failed to survive with the war's end. Its demise meant the disappearance of any formal United States capability for unconventional warfare. Only the legacy of William Donovan and the experience of the OSS personnel who remained were left to build upon for future development of a similar capability. Both would be drawn upon with the coming of the Cold War.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Impetus of the Cold War

"It is hard now to remember how menacing the Soviet encroachments appeared," wrote Ray Cline in 1976.¹ Cline, a former deputy director of the CIA, was speaking of the 1947-48 period, during which American concerns about Soviet intentions were gathering in intensity. The situation was such that in March 1948 the Commander in Chief, European Command, Colonel Lucius Clay, cabled Washington: "I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it [war] may come with dramatic suddenness."² The Soviet Union's expansion into Eastern Europe; pressures on Greece, Turkey, and Iran; the Berlin Blockade; the fall of China to the Communists and the USSR's detonation of an atomic device in 1949; and the Korean War in 1950--these were just some of the developments that gradually hardened the attitudes of U.S. policymakers and shattered American dreams of a post-World War II peace.

These attitudes emerged from what Daniel Yergin has called the "two commanding ideas of American postwar foreign policy--anti-Communism and a new doctrine of national security." The results, says Yergin, were policies that

²Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, p. 302.
"included containment, confrontation and intervention, the methods by which US leaders have sought to make the world safe for America."¹ As our policymakers struggled to find effective means to respond to the perceived military and ideological threats, they examined ways to improve U.S. capabilities in intelligence and psychological and unconventional warfare. The initial result of this quest was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but it was also to have an impact, ultimately, on the military services, particularly the Army. To understand the origins of a special warfare capability for the Army, we first must briefly sketch the early history of the CIA, for the two are inextricably interwoven.

**Creation of the CIA**

Three months after he disbanded the OSS, President Truman, on January 22, 1946, created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)--the direct predecessor of the CIA. He had realized the need for a centralized body to collate and coordinate intelligence information and to eliminate friction among competing military intelligence services. By the spring of 1946, the War Department's Strategic Services Unit (SSU) was transferred to the CIG, giving it the remnants of an OSS clandestine collection capability. This resulted in the establishment of the Office of Special Operations (OSO), responsible for espionage and counterespionage. By June 1946, the Central Intelligence Group had a strength of approximately 1,800, of which about one-third were overseas with OSO.

With the passage of the National Security Act in July 1947, the CIG became an independent department and was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency

The major tasks assigned to the Agency were: (1) to advise the NSC on matters related to national security, (2) to make recommendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the departments, (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination, (4) to carry out "services of common concern," and (5) "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC from time to time direct." Functions of the CIG--clandestine and overt collection, production of national current intelligence, and interagency coordination for national estimates--were continued by the new agency.

While the original discussions which centered around the creation of both the CIG and CIA focused on the problem of intelligence coordination, within a year of the 1947 Act the CIA was charged with the conduct of covert psychological, political, paramilitary, and economic activities. On December 14, 1947, the National Security Council adopted NSC 4/A, which gave the CIA responsibility for covert psychological operations. Shortly thereafter, on December 22, the Special Procedures Group was established within the CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out psychological operations. By June 1948, this authority for covert operations had been broadened by NSC 10/2 to include political and economic warfare, and paramilitary activities (such as support to guerrillas and sabotage). To replace the Special Procedures Group, the Office of Special Projects was created and shortly thereafter renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Its head was Frank Wisner, the former OSS station chief in Rumania. By the end of 1948, the CIA had a limited covert action capability.

This capability for covert action was expanded significantly as a result
of the Korean War and the CIA's participation in paramilitary activities in
the Far East. OPC's personnel strength went from 302 in 1949 to 2,812, plus
3,142 overseas contract personnel, in 1952; its budget, from $4,700,000 to
$82,000,000; and its overseas stations, from seven to forty-seven during the
same period. Another stimulus for CIA/OPC's expansion had been NSC 68, issued
on 14 April 1950, which called for a nonmilitary offensive against the Soviet
Union, including covert economic, political, and psychological warfare to fos-
ter unrest in her satellite countries. Similarly, NSC 10/5, which on October
21, 1951, replaced NSC 10/2, again called for an intensification of covert ac-
tion and reaffirmed the CIA's responsibility for its conduct. Finally, in
August 1952, the clandestine collection, secret intelligence functions of the
Office of Special Operations (OSO) were merged with the covert action capabili-
ties of OPC. The resultant amalgamation was called the Directorate of Plans
(DDP), with Frank Wisner of OPC in charge and Richard Helms from OSO as his
second in command. Thus by 1953 the CIA was six times the size it had been in
1947, and the clandestine services had become by far the largest component in
the agency.1

This necessarily brief overview of the CIA's early history has covered
only the highlights, but there are a few points that should be emphasized for
the purposes of this study. First, there was the influence of OSS. Corey

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1 For a concise summary of the early history of the CIA, see U.S. Congress,
Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to In-
telligence Activities, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Mili-
tary Intelligence, Book IV (94th Cong., 2d Sess., Senate, Report No. 94-755,
Also, see Tyrus G. Fain, ed., The Intelligence Community: History, Organiza-
6-18, and Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, pp. 99-110. For a more detailed
examination, see Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 221-329.
Ford, William J. Donovan's biographer, states that the CIA "was the direct outgrowth of Donovan's World War II organization, and was based on fundamental OSS principles."¹ Allen Dulles, first civilian director of the CIA, states in his The Craft of Intelligence that Truman based his establishment of the CIA on the controversial recommendations offered by Donovan prior to Roosevelt's death in 1945, and also that "much of the knowhow and some of the personnel in OSS were taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency."² In fact, in 1949 one-third of the CIA's personnel had served with OSS.³ In its first year, however, the Agency was primarily intelligence-oriented, so people with World War II "special operations" experience were not recruited. By the latter part of 1948, a growing number of former OSS personnel with guerrilla warfare experience began to join the intelligence agency. This influx continued in the later 1940's, and, when the Korean War broke, even more former OSS personnel joined the CIA.⁴

Second, the preoccupation of U.S. policymakers with the Soviet threat during this period would be difficult to overestimate. The impetus of the Cold War provided an environment of fear that allowed a resurgence of interest in psychological and unconventional warfare. As stated by the Senate Select Committee report on intelligence activities, "Decisions regarding U.S. sponsorship of clandestine activities were gradual but consistent, spurred on by the growing concern over Soviet intentions."⁵ Finally, the growth of the

¹Ford, Donovan of OSS, p. 316.
²Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, p. 45.
³Senate Report No. 94-755, Book IV, p. 28.
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was important, for it was this part of the CIA with which the Army would have the greatest interaction as it groped to develop its own capability for psychological and unconventional warfare.

**Army Demobilization**

During the period 1945-46, Army psychological warfare staffs and units were dissipated rapidly in the general demobilization of the wartime military establishment. To be sure, a few senior officers recommended that the Army profit from its experience in this relatively new field. As will be recalled, in December 1945 Major General Lemnitzer urged that the Army determine its lessons learned in wartime to develop psychological warfare principles, organization, and procedures for the future. He also recommended that instruction be included in the service schools "to provide future commanders and staff officers with a general understanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare."  

Brigadier General McClure echoed the sentiments expressed by General Lemnitzer with a letter to the Propaganda Branch, War Department, in early 1946: "I urge that a comprehensive document on the subject of psychological warfare be produced and used in the National War College and the Command and General Staff School." McClure pronounced his own verdict about the level of knowledge in the Army on this subject by concluding: "The ignorance, among military personnel, about psychological warfare, even now, is astounding."  

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1Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Lieutenant General J. E. Hall, Operations Division, War Department, Subject: Research and Analysis of PWB Activities in World War II, 22 December 1945, from Major General Lemnitzer, USA; RG 319 Army Operations, P&W 091.412 (22 August 1946) (P/W #7), National Archives.  

2Office of Director, Information Control, Office of Military Government
And at a higher level, the Chief of the JCS Historical Section, Major General E. F. Harding (USA), recommended in February 1946 that the JCS employ a civilian professional to write a history of World War II psychological warfare. To make his point about the necessity for such a study, Harding noted that the Army's World War I experience in this activity was not recorded, and argued the importance of psychological warfare in modern total war.¹ Despite these entreaties, the nation longed to return promptly to normalcy, and the military services were faced with managing the problems of rapid demobilization, so not much attention was given initially to the relatively minor subject of psychological warfare.²

Not that there were not some in the Army who early on had grave reservations about the intentions of the Soviet Union, a major ally in war. As a Senate report on U.S. intelligence activities states, "American military intelligence officers were among the first to perceive the changed situation."³

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Section, Memo for the JCS, Subject: History of Psychological Warfare During World War II, 8 February 1946, from Major General E. F. Harding, Chief, CCS 314.7 (2-8-46), Box No. 39, National Archives.

²A perusal of the Army General Council Minutes for the immediate postwar period provides one with the flavor of the mindboggling problems faced by the Army during the rush to demobilize. The General Council met weekly, was composed of the senior War Department leadership, and chaired by either the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff. Minutes in U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

In a lengthy letter written in January 1946, Major General W. G. Wyman, the G-2 of Army Ground Forces, presented his views on the ideological threat—both domestic and international—posed by the USSR. Entitled "Project to Combat Subversive Activities in the United States," Wyman began by stating: "The confusion of mind and the inconsiderate thinking of the soldiers of the Ground Forces in the United States is illustrative of similar thought which exists amongst troops of occupation and the civilian population of the United States." Obviously alarmed about the problems associated with demobilization, he asked rhetorically, "[W]here is the mental penicillin that can be applied to our loose thinking to insure the wholesome thought that is so urgently needed in our country today?" Launching into a comparison of communism and democracy, he outlined several areas of the world under Soviet domination or pressure ("the tentacles of communism"), then addressed the domestic scene: "Our troubles of the day—labor, demobilization, the discontented soldier—these things are the sores on which the vultures of communism will feed and fatten."

Having given an overview of the ills, Wyman then turned to his prescription:

There must be some agency, some group either within or outside our national security forces, which can interest itself in these matters. There must be some weapon by which we can defend ourselves from the secret thing which is working at our vitals—this cancer of modern civilization . . . . A new government policy is desperately needed to implement the psychological effort indicated . . . . We must combat this creeping shadow which is in our midst.

General Wyman concluded his letter by urging that the War Department, "in the interest of national security," recommend to the President that:

a. Federal intelligence agencies concentrate on collecting information on activities subversive to our government at home and abroad.

b. A government agency be selected to wage a psychological war against these activities.
c. A policy be established to publicize such subversive activities and expose them to our people.¹

This rather remarkable analysis vividly portrays the mood of the times. While General Wyman’s views may appear somewhat extreme today, they represented the genuine concerns and fears of a segment of American society, both in and out of uniform. A larger portion of the population, however, desired peace and a return to normal, and it was these conflicting pressures that policy-makers struggled with in the immediate postwar period. These same conflicting pressures impacted upon the evolution of psychological warfare in the Army.

**Psywar to Plans and Operations Division**

In May 1946 a recommendation was staffed by the Intelligence Division, G-2, that War Department responsibility for psychological warfare be moved from G-2 and that a special staff division be created for this activity. However, both the Chief of Information and the Director, Plans and Operations Division, felt that such a special staff division was not justified in peace, so the recommendation was withdrawn in late June. General Norstad, the Director, Plans and Operations, did express the view that planning and policy guidance for psychological warfare should be the responsibility of his division, but only if the Propaganda Branch personnel from G-2 were transferred to him with the function.²

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²WDGS, Intelligence Division, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet, 22 May 1946, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412, Section IA, Case 7, National Archives.
At the same time that this paper was being staffed, General McClure—who was in Germany as Director, Information Control—responded to a request from Colonel D. W. Johnston, Chief, Propaganda Branch, for his recommendations as to the proper place for psychological warfare agencies “within the staff structure of all appropriate echelons.” Using his wartime experience as an example, McClure argued strongly that psychological warfare should not be under G-2:

A great part of my difficulty in carrying out what I felt was my mission was with G-2. The G-2’s all felt that they had a monopoly on intelligence and were reluctant in the earlier stages to give any of that intelligence to Psychological Warfare knowing that it would be broadcast or used in print.

He believed that an association of psychological warfare with G-3 was more productive: “My greatest contacts were with G-3 and it was with the operational phases and even long range operational plans . . . that I feel we did our best work.” McClure’s clear preference, however, was for a separate, special staff section:

I am firmly convinced that an activity as important and as ramified as Psychological Warfare is one which should have the personal attention of the Chief of Staff and that the Director of Psychological Warfare should likewise have access to the Chief of Staff and even to the Commander himself.

And here General McClure found the opportunity to put in a plug on a favorite theme of his by stating:

I had that relationship with the Chief of Staff and the Supreme Commander [Eisenhower] throughout the war and even then it was not as satisfactory as it should have been because of our failure in peacetime to indoctrinate Commanders and Staff Officers with the capabilities and limitations of Psychological Warfare.

He concluded his remarks by recommending again that "Psychological Warfare be a separate Staff Section reporting directly to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff with the closest liaison with the G Sections as well as with other
Special Staff Sections. 1 It was to be another four and a half years before the special staff section that McClure recommended would come to fruition on the Army Staff, and he would be its first head.

Realizing that any attempt to create a special staff section for psychological warfare at that time would be futile, Colonel Johnston nonetheless proceeded with an attempt to move the function out of the Intelligence Division. On August 22, 1946, he submitted a lengthy memorandum for the Chief of Staff recommending the establishment of a "Psychological Warfare Group" under the Plans and Operations Division, in the WDGS. Relying heavily on General McClure's arguments in his 21 June letter, Johnston emphasized that psychological warfare was "primarily operational in nature and does not fall readily within the scope of the Intelligence Division." Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Johnson's rationale for making psychological warfare a Plans and Operations Division responsibility was his belief that it would eliminate future interference by civilians in this field:

In the event of a future emergency, while overall political and psychological warfare policies will stem from the White House and the State Department, the existence of a nuclear organization within the War Department possessing a complete plan for military psychological warfare and the technical means for implementation, would avoid the situation of World War II, wherein theater commanders had thrust upon them civilian agencies to conduct psychological warfare within their theaters, with resultant conflict of authority and lack of control over training standards and performance. 2


2 WDGS, Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C., MID 912, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Group, Plans and Operations Division, WDGS, 22 August 1946, RG 319, Army Operations, P&O 091.412 (22 August 1946) (FW #7), National Archives.
Here again we see evidence of the resentment of many regular officers toward what they considered to be unwarranted civilian interference. It is unlikely, however, that General McClure shared Johnston's view on this particular issue, in light of his experience as Chief of PSyl/SHAPE during the war. Nonetheless, the view prevailed among many in the Army.

In any event, a decision was not made on Colonel Johnston's recommendations until October, and the results were probably somewhat different than he had envisaged. The original paper had picked up some additional facets, and what the Acting Chief of Staff approved on 3 October 1946 was a series of War Department recommendations to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) "to give early consideration to, and make prompt recommendations concerning Psychological Warfare Policy," and also to "consider informing the U.S. public of foreign subversive activities within U.S."1 In these recommendations, particularly the latter concerning subversive activities, the influence of General Wyman's January letter can be seen. With regard to the initial recommendation to establish a Psychological Warfare Group in the Plans and Operations Division, however, the decision was to decentralize certain psychological warfare operations to other divisions and agencies, but with Plans and Operations providing overall planning and policy guidance.2

Some foot-dragging then ensued until, during an informal conversation on November 6, 1946, between General Hodes and General Lincoln, General Hodes agreed to take over immediately the psychological warfare functions of G-2

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1WDGS, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memo for Record, Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Group, P&O Division, WDGS, 4 October 1946, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (27 September 1946), National Archives.

2Ibid.
and to absorb its Propaganda Branch.\textsuperscript{1} The Propaganda Branch was formally discontinued by Intelligence Division Memorandum No. 100 on 29 November 1946, and the Branch personnel assigned to the Policy Section, Plans and Operations Division.\textsuperscript{2} A minor era in the evolution of War Department bureaucracy was thus passed. Psychological warfare, which from 1941 had been a G-2 responsibility, was passed to the operations side of the house.

Actually, the responsibility for psychological warfare had been diluted in the process. While War Department Memorandum No. 575-10-1, issued on 10 January 1947, charged the Director of Plans and Operations with the responsibility for general supervision of Army psychological warfare activities, several other War Department agencies were given pieces of the pie. These included the Director of Intelligence, who retained the responsibility for collection, evaluation, and interpretation of sociological and psychological information, and the analysis of foreign propaganda—as well as the Director of Organization and Training; the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement; the Director of Research and Development; and the Chief of Public Information.\textsuperscript{3} Real centralization of psychological warfare activities was not to occur until later, when the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare was formed in January 1951, with General McClure as its head.

\textsuperscript{1}WDGS, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., handwritten notes dated 6 November 1946, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412, Section IA, Case 7, National Archives.

\textsuperscript{2}WDGS, Intelligence Division, Memorandum No. 100, Subject: Discontinuance of Propaganda Branch, I.D., 29 November 1946, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (29 November 1946), National Archives.

\textsuperscript{3}WDGS, War Department Memorandum No. 575-10-1, Responsibility of War Department Agencies for Psychological Warfare Functions, 10 January 1947, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (18 December 1946), National Archives.
Eisenhower and McClure

About the time that responsibility for psychological warfare was being passed to the Plans and Operations Division, some interest in the field was being exhibited at a higher policy level. Discussions of the subject of covert operations as a future form of war—apparently initiated because of the interest of Secretary of War Robert Patterson—took place in the SWNCC. As an offshoot, in December 1946 a SWNCC subcommittee formulated guidelines for the conduct of psychological warfare in peacetime and wartime. Then, in April 1946 a SWNCC subcommittee was formed to consider and plan psychological warfare; in June 1947 it was renamed the Special Studies and Evaluation Subcommittee.  

Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower entered the psychological warfare arena at this point. In a memo dated 19 June 1947, Eisenhower indicated to the Director of Plans and Operations his desire for the War Department: "to take those steps that are necessary to keep alive the arts of psychological warfare and of cover and deception and that these should continue in being a nucleus of personnel capable of handling these arts in case an emergency arises." At the same time the former World War II Supreme Allied Commander asked his old Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAPE, for comments on the subject.

McClure emphasized in his reply that "psychological warfare must become
a part of every future war plan," lamented the dispersion of people with World
War II experience, and specifically recommended that:
a. A mixed civilian-military group, on a voluntary basis, be
charged with studying psychological warfare policies and practices
during this war.
b. Research be undertaken, at once, into the effectiveness of
PW [psychological warfare].
c. A PW Branch of the Director of Information be established.
d. A PW Reserve, of limited number, be established.
e. Training for PW be undertaken at the General Staff College
and the National Defense College.

In light of the strong views that he expressed earlier concerning the
desirability of a Special Staff section for psychological warfare, McClure's
recommendation to put this function under the Chief of Information appears
strange. Perhaps he had decided that such a proposal was futile, in view of
the previous resistance to this idea shown by the War Department Staff. Per-
haps it was simply because his post-World War II experience in Information had
convinced him that this was the proper course. As he explained in his memo-
randum to Eisenhower: "It [psychological warfare] is more than intelligence;
it is more than operations ... it is information--secured and disseminated
to friend and enemy."2

Very little resulted from General McClure's recommendations. A civilian
historian, Dr. E. P. Lilly, had been employed by the JCS to write a history of
psychological warfare for World War II, so that took care of the first two
recommendations, according to the Director of Plans and Operations in the

1WDGS, Plans and Operations Division, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,
Subject: Psychological Warfare, 21 June 1947, from Brigadier General Robert
A. McClure, P60 Staff reaction, and Director, P60 Memo for the Chief of Staff,
29 July 1947, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box #9, P60 031.412 (21 June
1947), National Archives.

2Ibid.
staff reaction requested by Eisenhower. It was not believed that psychological warfare should be a function of the Chief of Information, but, rather, the responsibilities in this field should remain as outlined in War Department Memo 575-10-1. Nor was the establishment of a psychological warfare reserve believed to be practical. With regard to McClure's final recommendation, the Director of Plans and Operations, Major General Lauris Norstad, simply replied that the subject of psychological warfare was included in the curriculum of the National War College, the Command and General Staff College and the Air War College.1

Another senior officer who was unhappy with the progress of U.S. psychological warfare was Major General W. G. Wyman. He wrote to General Norstad on 14 June, and, with his usual intensity, declared "I believe that the SWNCC group that has been set up is not sufficiently powerful to accomplish the urgent national requirement in this field. Such a group must have no diverting duties to take them away from this very extensive subject which is so important to us." He went on to state that a national psychological warfare objective must be established, and the Army needed an interim directive so that it could "bring an aggressive program to bear on appropriate objectives without further delay." He concluded by reaffirming the necessity for action at the highest level: "I am convinced that a national agency must be set up, using SWNCC perhaps, but stirred up and goaded far beyond any present concept to immediate action."2

1Ibid.

Norstad’s reply indicated agreement on the need for a national agency, but he reminded General Wyman that the overall direction and control of peacetime activities was primarily a State Department function. He informed Wyman that two officers from the Plans and Operations Division were members of the SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare, which was primarily a contingency planning organization that should not engage in the day-to-day business of “selling democracy.” He went on to draw a distinction between the peacetime activity of “selling democracy,” an information function, and “psychological warfare,” which “should apply only to wartime or prebelligerency and have as its frank objective the coercion as well as the provision of thought.” Wyman agreed with Norstad’s shying away from the term “psychological warfare,” but felt that there was “a great need for a synonym which could be used in peacetime that would not shock the sensibilities of a citizen of democracy.”

The problem was not a new one. During World War II, agency differences over “open,” “white,” or “overt” as opposed to “closed,” “black,” or “covert” propaganda, had been a source of continuing difficulty. In fact, it had been one of the primary factors that caused dissolution of the Coordinator of Information, and the division of psychological warfare responsibilities between OWI (overt) and OSS (covert). But this was a new kind of war—a “cold war”—in which most Americans desired peace. Many military men wanted to have


nothing to do with psychological warfare in the first place; it was not "real soldiering." Even those who felt that psychological warfare was important were understandably perplexed as to the proper role of the military in this multifaceted and unorthodox activity. The correspondence between General Norstad and General Wyman mirrored the dilemma faced by concerned professionals.

Norstad asked the Chief of Information, Major General M. S. Eddy, for his informal views on this sensitive subject. Eddy's reply, in a lengthy memorandum written in October 1947, provides us with some valuable insights. He began by concurring "in the need to undertake without delay an extensive campaign of psychological warfare, in both overt and covert phases, as a matter of national necessity to offset the effectiveness of the growing PW campaign launched against the United States by [the] U.S.S.R." But then he discussed the absolute importance of carefully presenting such a campaign to the American public, and the role of the military in such an effort:

Although the success or failure of such a PW campaign will be of the most vital military concern, the political structure of the U.S. precludes making PW a military effort. In fact, the political considerations are so sensitive in this field that the whole program may be defeated at its inception—no matter who assumes the initiative—if the entire question of ways and means of broaching the subject to the President, the Congress, the people—particularly the press—is not minutely examined by the best brains available and handled with the utmost tact, finesse and discretion. Otherwise, the American people and the Congress will misunderstand and disapprove the project at the outset.

He believed that covert psychological warfare would probably not be accepted by the American people "without a great deal of preliminary education and groundwork," and emphasized that it should be conducted "under the aegis of an agency not directly connected with the armed forces." The public and Congress, on the other hand, would probably accept overt psychological warfare, but only if they were fully informed as to its need and methods. This would
necessitate the voluntary cooperation of the information media. Terms like "psychological warfare," "propaganda," and "subversion" must be carefully explained "so as not to arouse public indignation or fear of 'gestapo-ism' and authoritarianism in our own country." And as for the role of the military in this endeavor, Eddy thought that "the entire subject should be sponsored by civilians--not members of the military establishment--both in and out of the government. Publicly recognized military participation should be limited to advice, concurrence and such performance as may be delegated to it."¹

General Eddy's views provide a vivid portrayal of the murky and politically sensitive area that was psychological warfare in the early Cold War period. The extreme caution he advocated undoubtedly contributed to the ambivalent attitudes of many senior Army officers toward this "grey area" activity during the interwar period.

General McClure, however, was not ambivalent, and rarely missed an opportunity to press for a strong Army role in psychological warfare. Responding to a request from Eisenhower for a small number of civilian candidates for a psychological warfare reserve, McClure in early November 1947 recommended a group of eight for policy planning purposes and outlined how they could be used. He then added:

Although activities of this group would have to be coordinated with other armed services and with the State Department, it appears to me that the Army is privileged to take the initiative in securing U.S. Government coordination of Psychological Warfare activities since the Army is the principal implementing agency in four occupied countries and a contributing agency through its Military Attache and

¹Department of the Army, Chief of Information, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Director, Plans and Operations Division, Subject: Psychological Warfare, 31 October 1947, from Major General M. S. Eddy, RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, 1946-1948, 091.3 - 091.7, Section I, Box #28, P&O 091.412 T8 (31 October 1947), National Archives.
Military Mission systems. 1

McClure was correct; the Army was heavily involved in civil affairs, information control, and "reorientation" activities in several occupied countries. No one was more aware of this than this former Chief of PWD/SHAEF, who left that position after the war to become Director of Information Control in Germany, and at the time of this memorandum to Eisenhower was Chief of the War Department New York Field Office, Civil Affairs Division. General McClure was to sound this theme many times during the next few years.

One of the men recommended by McClure for the psychological warfare reserve group was William S. Paley, Chairman of the Board of the Columbia Broadcasting System. Paley came to see General Eisenhower shortly after the McClure memorandum and expressed his willingness to help in psychological warfare planning, but preferred to do so as a civilian consultant rather than in uniform. In a memorandum to Secretary Forrestal on the subject, Eisenhower agreed with Paley's preference "inasmuch as the sense of the discussion among interested agencies has been to effect that civilians should control and predominate in the current organization and planning."

Thus having established his acceptance of civilian leadership in psychological warfare planning, the Chief of Staff then made a pitch for a strong role for the military in the ongoing process:

I realize that there are high-level committees considering the subject, but it seems to me that the military must give continued impetus to the organization and realistic functioning of this important activity. Further, the Armed Services should prepare plans now involving enunciation of policy and methods applying to actual war.

1 War Department - Special Staff, Civil Affairs Division, New York Field Office, Memorandum for General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Subject: Candidates for Psychological Warfare Reserve, from Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief, New York Field Office, 5 November 1947, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (5 November 1947), National Archives.
The argument for military participation in psychological warfare planning made, Eisenhower tactfully put a plug in for Army leadership, using his old PWD/SHAEF chief and his association with Paley as a sweetener:

I do not know whether the responsibility for this planning should be referred to the JCS or to an ad hoc committee under your immediate supervision. In the latter event, I could, if you so desire, detail as the head of a combined committee, a brigadier general (Robert A. McClure) who had extensive experience in his field during the war in Europe. He was closely associated with Bill Paley and others of similar qualifications. He is therefore in a position to crystallize the experience and knowledge acquired during the past war and should facilitate the development of a workable plan for the future employment of psychological warfare under conditions of actual war.

Ever the diplomat, Eisenhower closed his memorandum to the Secretary with supreme tact: "This note has no other purpose than to express readiness to be helpful. If the matter is completely in hand through the processes of the high-level committees, my suggestions may not be pertinent." ¹

The Chief of Staff's offer was not acted upon; McClure stayed at his post in New York. Nonetheless, Eisenhower's interest in psychological warfare was evident and it was equally evident that Robert A. McClure carried some weight with the Chief. But the Army continued to feel its way gingerly in this ambiguous and politically sensitive field.

The Army's Reaction to NSC-4

The task of delineating agency responsibilities for psychological warfare proved to be difficult. In early November 1947, the secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the JCS determined that propaganda of all kinds—overt and covert—was a function of the State Department, in consultation with

¹Department of the Army, The Chief of Staff, Memorandum for Secretary Forrestal, Subject: Psychological Warfare, from Dwight D. Eisenhower, 17 November 1947, RG 319, Army Operations, National Archives.
the CIA and a military representative. Accordingly, President Truman assigned psychological warfare coordination to the Secretary of State on November 24, a decision that was reversed within three weeks. Secretary of State George Marshall opposed taking responsibility for covert actions that might embarrass the Department and discredit U.S. foreign policy. He favored placing such activities outside the Department, but still subject to guidance from the Secretary of State. Similarly, the military wanted to maintain some control over covert psychological activities, but they did not want to assume operational responsibility. Unwilling to risk association with covert activities, the Departments turned to the CIA. The result was NSC-4, entitled "Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Information Activities," a directive that in December 1941 "empowered the Secretary of State to coordinate overseas information activities designed to counter communism," and an annex, NSC-4A, which "instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake covert psychological activities in pursuit of the aim set forth in NSC-4." Shortly thereafter, on December 22, the Special Procedures Group was established within the CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out such covert operations. Thus responsibility for covert psychological warfare was fixed, or so it appeared. But much needed to be done to pin down agency responsibilities for the overt side.

The Army's initial reaction to NSC-4 was an attempt to get its own house in order. A study was initiated in January 1944 "to determine what steps are required to strengthen and coordinate all domestic and foreign information

\[1\] Senate Report No. 94-755, Book IV, pp. 27-29.
\[2\] Ibid., Book I, pp. 48f.
\[3\] Ibid., Book IV, p. 28.
measures of the Department of the Army in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives in compliance with NSC-4 and existing regulations."
The study discussed the "insidious and destructive" Communist propaganda which "directly threatened" U.S. national security, advocated strong counterpropaganda measures, both foreign and domestic, and declared that "inasmuch as the use of propaganda as a weapon of either war or peace is of fundamental concern to the Department of the Army, it is believed imperative that Army efforts in this field be coordinated and directed."

Then, with regard to the sensitivity of psychological warfare, an assertive posture:

The fact that the American people and Congress do not like and/or are afraid of domestic propaganda, is no excuse for us to sidestep our responsibility. The responsibility of accepting the consequence of doing nothing is far greater. The American people have proved too many times that they can "take it" if they are told why.

There was a lengthy discussion of opinion surveys from World War II—a cause for concern since they indicated "a lack of psychological conditioning of the soldier's mind before going to war." Thus the wish: "If the Army could engage in 'white' propaganda for civilian consumption, it would be beneficial as prior indoctrination of the future power of Army manpower."

The study emphasized that three Army Special Staff Division—Civil Affairs, Public Information, and Troop Information and Education—were engaged in dissemination of "white" propaganda, but that it was uncoordinated. Furthermore, there was "little or no policy guidance on general supervision from P&O Division," as specified by the War Department Memorandum No. 575-10-1 issued in January 1947. Since the study was prepared by Colonel Yeaton of the Plans and Operations Division, this latter conclusion was a rather candid and surprising admission.
In any event, to remedy the situation described, the study recommended:

That the Chief of Information be directed to supervise all current operations of the Department of the Army in the field of information, public relations, or education which have psychological or propaganda implications.

That all "white" propaganda, domestic and foreign, implemented by the Department of the Army and disseminated by the three (3) Special Staff Divisions (Civil Affairs, Public Information and Troop Information and Education) be coordinated by the Chief of Information.

That for psychological warfare or propaganda purposes, the Chief of Information receive policy guidance from the Director of Plans and Operations Division through appropriate and continuous liaison.

The Chief of Information concurred with the recommendations, but felt strongly that the Plans and Operations Division should coordinate the overall psychological warfare effort. Understandably, he also cautioned against painting the Chief of Information with the psychological warfare/propaganda brush. The P&O Division concurred with this, but saw "no danger if handled as suggested." On December 18, 1948, the study recommendations were approved by the Secretary of the Army.1

As we have seen, the Army's initial reaction to NSC-4 produced very little in the way of far-reaching measures, but rather an attempt to improve its internal coordination of psychological and information activities. These steps were rather modest in scope, but indicative of the cross-currents of uncertainty and caution, on the one hand, and a desire to "do something" about a perceived condition of national malaise and weakness, on the other. They reflected not only a sense of frustration by some with the lack of strong national direction in psychological warfare, but also

1Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet and Study to Chief of Staff, Subject: A Study of Psychological Warfare, from Lt General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, 10 February 1948, RG 319, P&O Division, 1946-48, 091.3 - 091.7, Section I, Box No. 28, P&O 091.412 TS (15 January 1948), National Archives.
uncertainty about the Army's role in providing the leadership needed in such a politically sensitive area.

Another interesting facet of this action was General McClure's role.

The officer who prepared the study for P&O Division--Colonel Yeaton--apparently felt that it was important to note for the Chief of Staff that the paper had been presented to McClure, "who gave complete concurrence." ¹ Even from his office in New York, General McClure continued to influence the Army's thinking on this subject.

McClure's influence continued to be felt--at all levels of psychological warfare. A memorandum for the new Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, written in March 1948 by Lieutenant General J. C. Wedemeyer (who had replaced Norstad as Director of Plans and Operations), gave some indication as to McClure's stature:

In the last war this activity [psychological warfare] was not promptly or efficiently developed. Organization and functions were accomplished under duress. During the course of the war, many men became quite proficient in this unusual, but very vital work. I believe that Brigadier General Robert A. McClure should be brought to the War Department for consultation in the premises.²

The follow-up memorandum to this paragraph by the Assistant Chief, Plans and Policy Group, of the Plans and Operations Division, simply confirms the key role of McClure in policy matters:

General McClure visited Washington before and after his trip to Europe. On the occasion of each visit, he spent considerable time in

¹Ibid.

²Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 18 March 1948, from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director, Plans and Operations, RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.3 to 091.7, Section I, Box No. 28, filed with Pw 091.412 (30 November 1948), National Archives.
Policy. He was consulted on the provision of SANACC 304/6 and his recommendations are embodied in JCS 1735. He edited and approved our psychological warfare study now in the hands of the Joint Planners.

General McClure now feels that close liaison has been established between P&O and himself. He has been of great assistance in the past, and his opinion will be sought in the future on all major psychological warfare issues.

Further evidence of McClure’s stature—and his close relationship with General Wedemeyer—was a June 1948 “Dear Bob” letter by Wedemeyer, who wrote General McClure thanking him for his comments on an Army pamphlet entitled “Tactical Psychological Warfare” to be used at the Ground General School at Fort Riley:

Your constructive views make it possible to improve these training publications. I hope that we can send similar material to you in the future, in order to obtain the continued benefit of your knowledge and experiences. Furthermore, I trust that you can find time to put down on paper more of your experiences and reflections on the broader aspects of psychological warfare, because we find ourselves short of seasoned, mature Army writing in this field.

Switching to a higher policy level, McClure—in a “Dear Al” letter to General Wedemeyer in July 1948—laid out in considerable detail his concerns and recommendations on psychological warfare. He began by addressing a recent conversation with General Omar Bradley, who appreciated the value of psychological warfare during wartime, but apparently felt that the Army should

1Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Director, Plans and Operations, Subject: Proposed Trip of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, 30 March 1948, from Colonel William S. Biddle, Assistant Chief, Plans and Policy Group, RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.3 to 091.7, Section 1, Box 28, P&O 091.412 (30 March 1948), National Archives.

confine itself to planning and leave the overall responsibility to the State Department. McClure had some misgivings about this approach:

I am sure few people realize that today the Department of the Army is the foremost U.S. propaganda agency of our Government. Why, and how come, would require involved explanation to the uninformed. You and I know the answers. By default State Department has not taken over its responsibilities in this field for many reasons—particularly appropriations.

Having stated his major theme, McClure then supported it by presenting a tour d'horizon of the Army's activities. The Armed Forces Radio networks, the Overseas Stars and Stripes newspaper, the Troop Education and Information program in Europe and the Far East, the Army's "complete responsibility for the propaganda to four occupied countries," the fact that the Army controlled more radio broadcasts than State world-wide, the U.S. Military Government newspapers published in three foreign countries, the 50 to 75 documentary films distributed each year, the world newsreels made in three languages each week, the control of all U.S. commercial films shown in occupied countries, the cultural centers established in 60 cities of the occupied areas, the magazines published for foreign distribution ("we, the Army, publish five while State publishes one"), and the millions of pamphlets and leaflets printed for educational purposes in four occupied countries—of this, and more, prompted McClure to declare, "I should say today that the Army has five times the outlet for projection of America than State has and probably a greater audience for its propaganda."

Furthermore, the Army should not take a head-in-the-sand attitude on these activities, because, "Call it what you may, international information, propaganda, or Psychological Warfare, the responsibilities still rest with us." The responsibility for directing and coordinating propaganda that was in line with clearly established U.S. Government objectives could not be ignored, but
there was "no Army or National Defense Agency doing so." To illustrate his point, McClure used his own office—which was responsible for a sizeable portion of the program in occupied areas—as an example of the lack of central direction and coordination: "In the year I have been in charge of the New York Field Office of Civil Affairs Division there has never been a conference outside of my own office on propaganda policy." Apparently this last statement startled someone—perhaps General Wedemeyer—for the handwritten exclamation "Wow!" appears next to it.

Continuing to beat the drum, McClure acknowledged that NSC-6 was a step in the right direction toward the coordination necessary, but "a great need for unity of purpose and central direction remained." Then, a touch of assertive pride: "The Army has taken a major interest in this field and should be privileged to take the lead, if necessary."

Having laid his foundation, McClure then summarized his plea to the Director of Plans and Operations by stating:

The whole purpose of this letter to you is to urge:
   a. recognition of the responsibility of the Army;
   b. an organization in being within the National Defense setup to carry on the operations which the Army has assumed;
   c. an organization to plan for and further psychological warfare;
   d. a study of Psychological Warfare—its capabilities and shortcomings;
   e. utilization of those willing, experienced civilians, who are anxious to help a future Psychological Warfare organization.

This was followed by two pages of specific recommendations, to include a national organization to handle both black and white propaganda ("the present separation of black and white propaganda between State and CIA is basically unsound") and a number of others addressing technical research and various studies needed, psychological warfare instruction for service schools, ways to improve the Reserve program for psychological warfare officers, and an old
theme: "indoctrination of commanders in the capabilities and limitations of propaganda in warfare."

Apologizing for a lengthy letter, McClure closed by stating that he had made it a personal, rather than official, communication since "much of this is outside of the field of my official responsibility."\(^1\)

It was, in fact, a rather amazing letter, particularly so since it was written by a man who admitted that much of what he wrote about was outside his "official responsibility." In terms of breadth, scope, and imagination, it must be considered one of the most comprehensive personal communications on the subject of psychological warfare written by an Army officer during the interwar years. McClure's letter has been dwelt upon at some length because of the insights that it provides to the thinking of a man who later was to play such an instrumental role in the organization of the Army for psychological and unconventional warfare.

General Wedemeyer acknowledged McClure's dedication and expertise with a thoughtful--but delayed--reply in September: "I am deeply grateful, Bob, for your fine letter and the inclosures. I realize that you are unquestionably our outstanding authority on this very important subject, psychological warfare, and feel deeply indebted for your contribution." In an interesting side note, he mentioned that Frank Wisner, Director of CIA's newly created Office of Special Projects (later renamed Office of Policy Coordination), had recently inquired about the possibility of McClure "joining up with his team" because he recognized that "you are perhaps the most knowledgeable and

\(^1\)Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, New York Field Office, Letter to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Director, Plans and Operations Division, from Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief, New York Field Office, 8 July 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, P&O 091.412, National Archives.
experienced officer in the game. McClure did not do so, however, and there is a certain irony in this minor episode in view of the conflicts that were later to arise between Wisner's "team" and that of General McClure as Chief of the Army's Office of Psychological Warfare in the early 1950's.

The essence of Wedemeyer's response to McClure's principal argument concerning recognition of the Army's responsibilities and also the need for a national psychological warfare organization was basically that the situation was out of the Army's hands. Until the NSC made a decision on a number of proposals before it for such an organization, he replied, not much could be done at the policy level, nor could Army plans for psychological warfare be firmed up.2

Actually, Wedemeyer had given the subject more thought than might have been indicated by his response to McClure. In early August he had written a memorandum to General Omar Bradley, the Chief of Staff, to offer "a few of my thoughts" on psychological warfare:

Thus far in our planning, both within the Joint Staff and in P60 Division, we have been inclined to think of psychological warfare as a means which we should develop for giving further effect to strategic plans already developed. That is, we have considered it desirable to draw up a "psychological warfare annex" to each strategic plan. I am now inclined to think that this may be an unsound approach. It restricts psychological warfare activities within the narrowed limits of the strategic operations already determined without due consideration of the psychological problem.3

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2Ibid.

3Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Bradley, Subject: Psychological Warfare.
This was an important insight. What Wedemeyer was suggesting was that psychological warfare should be considered as an integral part of the strategic planning process, rather than as an afterthought to those plans. The lack of understanding by senior commanders and staffs of the crucial distinction between these two approaches has historically plagued the efforts of psychological warfare planners. The tentative recognition of this by Wedemeyer represented an important philosophical advance, but one that was not always adhered to by his successors.

With this as background, Wedemeyer went on to outline to Bradley "a new approach" which the Plans and Operations Division was prepared to initiate:

a. We will select a small group of experienced, forward thinking, young planners and assign them the task of developing in broad outline a war plan based on the following single war objective: to cause the people of Soviet Russia to overthrow their present totalitarian government and to render them maximum practicable assistance in this undertaking.

b. It is expected that such a plan will develop to the greatest possible extent the full capabilities of a psychological warfare approach. It may produce a radically different scheme of military operations from that contemplated under the HALFPEN concept.

c. When this plan is developed, if it appears to have sufficient merit, we will then suggest that you present it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for joint consideration.

Despite its somewhat grandiose objective, Wedemeyer's proposal did indicate the importance of assessing, and perhaps acting upon, the potential psychological vulnerabilities of a society—another important insight.

Bradley's response was guarded, indicating that while the proposal was "a good idea," it "might be impracticable as a line of action, but on the

9 August 1948, by General A. C. Wedemeyer, filed with RG 091.412 TS (1 September 1947), RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.3 to 091.7, Section I, Box No. 28, National Archives.

Ibid.
other hand it may not." He conceded that, in any event, "it would furnish some ideas for modification of HALFMoon," the general plan for Europe. There is little indication, however, that much resulted from Wedemeyer's proposal, partially due to the fact that he was unable to pry away from other divisions the caliber of planners needed for the task envisaged.1

While not enough to satisfy some like General McClure, some work had been done in Army psychological warfare, both at the staff level and in the field. In June 1947, on the basis of a directive from the Director of Organization and Training, WDGS, a pilot "Tactical Information Detachment" was activated at Fort Riley, Kansas, as an experimental unit. This detachment sent teams, utilizing loudspeakers and leaflets, to participate in Army field maneuvers in the continental United States, the Caribbean area, and Hawaii. The Tactical Information Detachment was to be the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the United States Army when the Korean War erupted in June 1950. Studies were started by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, for a combat propaganda unit of a cellular type to replace the mobile teams of the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies used in World War II. Psychological warfare extension courses were prepared by the Army General School at Fort Riley primarily for specialists in the Military Intelligence Reserve.2

At the Department of the Army, the Plans and Operations Division—in September 1948—prepared a "tentative Psychological Warfare Plan (Army)" for wartime, which included estimates of Special Staff personnel required at

1Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Schuyler, Subject: Lt. Col. William H. Baumer, 16 August 1948 by Lt. Col. Robert M. Cant, Chief, Personnel Branch, P60 Division, filed with P60 091.412 IS (1 September 1948), RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.3 to 091.7, Section I, Box No. 28, National Archives.

2Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 301.
theater, Army, and corps levels, as well as operating personnel to serve tactical units down to the level of Regimental Combat Teams. Staffing of this tentative plan followed, but in late December 1948 it was determined that "no action is required or possible since, until higher authority has determined the degree of Army responsibility in PW [psychological warfare], the degree of Army need for T/O&E units cannot be determined."\(^1\) At the end of 1948, then, the Army was still gingerly feeling its way, waiting for "higher authority" to decide the extent of its role in psychological warfare.

In early 1949 some movement was seen toward providing for national-level overt psychological warfare planning. In February, the National Security Council agreed that an organization for the peacetime planning of overt psychological warfare should be established within the State Department, and directed the NSC staff to prepare a proposed directive on the matter. The directive established an organization consisting of a director appointed by the Secretary of State, consultants from the same agencies, as well as liaison from the CIA. This organization was to be charged with planning and preparation "for the coordinated conduct of foreign and domestic information programs and overt psychological operations abroad in the event of war or threat of war as determined by the President." A similar planning function previously assigned to the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations was to be terminated, according to the directive. While there was some disagreement among

\(^1\)Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., DF to Director, Organization and Training Division, Subject: T/O&E for Psychological Warfare Units, from Director, Plans and Operations, 20 September 1948; also Memorandum for Record, Subject: T/O&E for Psychological Warfare Units, 22 December 1948. RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, 1946-48, 091.3 - 091.7, Section I, Box No. 28, P&O 091.412 TS (20 September 1948), National Archives.
the military services as to certain revisions to the proposed directive, they were resolved—at least initially—in the interest of expediting the action. As General Haddocks (who had replaced General Wedemeyer as Director of Plans and Operations) penned on a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations, General Wedemeyer: "P.S. The important underlying factor in this matter is to get started. The directive can be amended as need therefor arises, after the group starts work."¹ To this epistle, General McClure undoubtedly would have added, "Amen!"

The Carroll Report

One of the reasons the Army moved rather hesitantly in psychological warfare was Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall's concern about Army involvement in this activity. He definitely opposed any association with covert operations, stating in June 1948 that he did not want the Army "even to know anything about it."² However, through the combined efforts of two civilian members of his staff--Under Secretary Draper and Assistant Secretary Gray--and General Wedemeyer, Royall gradually relented at least to the point of allowing more participation by the Army in overt psychological warfare.

Mr. Draper started the ball rolling by employing a civilian consultant, Mr. Wallace Carroll, to prepare a study concerning the Army's role in current


²Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Briefing on NSC Meeting, 3 June 1948, RG 319, Army Operations 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, National Archives.
psychological warfare activities. Carroll's study, forwarded to the Under Secretary on February 24, 1949, recommended that a separate "unit" be established to take charge of the Department of the Army's psychological warfare responsibilities. The "unit" would be headed by a general officer or qualified civilian, who would coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (who at this time was General Wedemeyer).  

Apparently, the Under Secretary made the results of Carroll's study available to Royall, because in a subsequent discussion between General Wedemeyer, the Secretary, and Mr. Gray, Wedemeyer reported that "Mr. Royall has changed somewhat in his view in that he accepts that we in the Department of the Army must participate a little; in fact, it was pointed out to him by Mr. Gray that we are actually participating in Europe. Mr. Royall wants this activity under a civilian Secretary and has designated Mr. Gray to supervise same."  

In this report to the Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, Wedemeyer stated that Mr. Gray subsequently asked him (Wedemeyer) to speak to the Secretary with a proposed organization that would have Gray as head, a civilian assistant for psychological warfare, and a group of eight to ten officers in the Plans and Operations Division. Wedemeyer concluded by reminding the

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2Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Extract on Psychological Warfare from Deputy Chief of Staff's (Combat Plans and Operations) Diary of important events occurring during Chief of Staff's recent absence, 15 March 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, CSUSA (15 March 1949) TS, National Archives.
Chief that "Mr. Royall is very desirous that the uniform services should not be involved too much in psychological warfare, but he does accept certain limited responsibilities in the Department." The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations apparently thought that even this lukewarm endorsement represented progress since Royall had told him a year earlier that "the Army would have no part in psychological warfare and he admonished me definitely not to participate in such activity."  

Responding promptly to Gray's request, on March 17, 1949, General Wedemeyer forwarded to Secretary Royall the following memorandum:

1. Mr. Gordon Gray asked me to discuss Psychological Warfare with Mr. Carroll, a civilian consultant, whom Mr. Draper employed to investigate realistic and minimum Army participation. Mr. Carroll prepared a study which I have analyzed carefully. Further, I talked to officers who have had experience in the psychological field.

2. Last Saturday Mr. Gray and I had a discussion concerning Army participation that would be acceptable to you, and also that would insure a realistic and yet not embarrassing role for the Army.

3. I recommend that Psychological Warfare be supervised by Mr. Gray as a responsibility of his office. A small group of officers could be located in PSO where they would coordinate with the International Group and the Strategic Planning Group of that Division of the General Staff. Mr. Gray should have a civilian assistant whose primary function would be to handle all psychological warfare matters for him and to maintain appropriate contacts with the State Department. This latter Department in the final analysis should be responsible for all Psychological Warfare matters of policy and for the coordination of Psychological Warfare activities. The Army should do nothing except with the cognizance and at the request of the State Department. I had hoped to talk to you personally about the above matter; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in almost continuous session and it has not been possible to do so. Mr. Gray asked me a few days ago to express my views to you concerning this subject; hence this memo.2

1Thid.

2Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Secretary Royall from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, 17 March 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, CSUSA 385 (17 March 1949) C, National Archives.
It was a masterful example of bureaucratic persuasion. Using the recommendation of an outside civilian consultant to pry an opening in Royall's opposition, Draper, Gray, and General Wedemeyer worked together effectively to tactfully nudge the Secretary toward accepting some increase in Army psychological warfare planning. Royall's sensitivity on the subject undoubtedly was a factor influencing the Army's ambivalence toward psychological warfare. His resistance is the one notable exception during the period of this study of an important civilian Army official who adamantly opposed Army activity in psychological warfare. Indeed, the converse was more often the case; civilian officials frequently found it necessary to prod uniformed Army leaders into a greater effort in psychological warfare. Such was to be the case with Gordon Gray, who succeeded Royall as Secretary of the Army on June 20, 1949.

Gordon Gray--Revival of Interest

Not surprisingly, the emphasis on increased Army participation in psychological warfare urged upon Kenneth C. Royall near the end of his tenure was continued by his successor. And with this apparent upswing in interest by the Army, again the advice of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure was sought. "Dear Bob," wrote the new Director of Plans and Operations, Major General Charles L. Bolte, on July 7:

You will recall that some time ago we talked briefly about the dissolution or disappearance of adequate planning or other measures in the field of psychological warfare, since the war. I recall that you expressed some concern over the fact that this matter was not receiving adequate, if any, attention on the part of the appropriate authorities, at least in the Military Establishment.¹

¹Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure from Major General Charles L. Bolte, Director of Plans and Operations, 7 July 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P60 091.412 S (7 July 1949), National Archives.
In view of McClure's consistent criticism in this regard since the end of World War II, this latter assertion smacks of considerable understatement.

Bolte continued:

I think that you will be relieved to know that the matter is being revived and that some measures are to be taken to restore us to a more adequate position. In that connection I have been asked to suggest, or secure the suggestions of, some names of possible candidates for appointment to a civilian position in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. I thought possibly you might have in mind the names of some appropriate individuals.

McClure, who by now had moved from New York to Fort Ord, California, to be the Assistant Division Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, answered promptly. Grousing about having received unexpected orders transferring him to the Northern Military District of Vancouver Barracks ("The orders gave me only one week to pack up and move which shows the consideration which the Army usually gives to the domestic side of life"), McClure nonetheless applauded the apparent resurgence of interest: "I am very pleased with the contents of your letter and to realize that the D of A [Department of the Army] is at last working up to the importance of one of its major weapons—a weapon which can be used without repercussions of an atomic bomb category."

He then went on to recommend several potential candidates for the civilian position, providing a thumbnail sketch of each person's qualifications.¹

McClure's letter was en route to General Bolte when, on July 11, a meeting was held in the Secretary of the Army's Office to report on the progress of psychological warfare organization within the Department of the Army. This much was clear: (1) a civilian "supervisor" for psychological warfare would

¹Headquarters, Fort Ord, California, Letter from Brigadier General Robert A. McClure to Major General Charles L. Bolte, Director of Plans and Operations, Department of the Army, 12 July 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Ltr No. 10, Hot Files, 091.412 S (7 July 1949), National Archives.
be located in the Office of the Assistant Secretary, (2) a small working group for psychological warfare would be established in the Plans and Operations (P&O) Division, and (3) a nucleus of information operators would be formed in the Office of the Chief of Information.

What was not clear, however, was the relationship between the civiliam "supervisor" and the team of officers in P&O. General Wedemeyer's understanding was that the civilian "should not be in a position of authority within P&O nor violate the chain of command . . . but should merely 'monitor' the PW functions of P&O along with PW functions of other components of the Department of the Army." The Secretary's understanding on the matter was quite different, as reported in Wedemeyer's memorandum for record:

Mr. Gray stated the matter more forcefully . . . [he] specifically indicated that the civilian "supervisor" was not merely to monitor but was to take a real part in the work concerning PW and he said, in essence, "if, as things develop, we run into a difficulty six or eight or twelve months from now, and if we do operate we are sure to run into a difficulty sooner or later, I want to be able to say that it was not just a military matter but that it was a fool civilian mixed up in it. I am thinking this way for the protection of the military." ¹

Another interesting aspect of this meeting was the input provided by Professor Paul Linebarger, a civilian consultant and author of a recently published book on psychological warfare. Linebarger offered his views on desirable qualifications for the civilian "supervisor" and suggested that the Plans and Operations Division could not fulfill its psychological warfare responsibilities unless the officers designated were assigned full-time and given the opportunity for travel. General Bolte, Director of P&O, was somewhat...

¹ Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record. Subject: Meeting With Secretary Gray Concerning Psychological Warfare, 11 July 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, CS USA 385 C (11 July 1949), National Archives.
reluctant to endorse this latter suggestion, and "indicated, as he had indicated from time to time at other points in the Conference, that the responsibility should be written out for P&O in full but that any external attempt to freeze or commit P&O personnel or structure would be unfortunate."

This meeting provides a valuable snapshot of the state of psychological warfare at the Department of the Army in mid-1949: Gordon Gray, only a month into his new office, intensely interested in psychological warfare and forcefully exerting his authority in terms of organization, yet also alert to the political sensitivity of the subject; General Wedemeyer and General Bolte, interested in the subject but vary about its effect on traditional concerns of chain of command and lines of authority, and perhaps just a little resentful of the civilian influence in this field, particularly when a myriad of other, more familiar "purely military" problems undoubtedly competed for their attention (as, for example, General Bolte's resistance to "external" pressures on him to dedicate officers solely to psychological warfare); Professor Linebarger, the civilian consultant, naturally anxious to see this specialized subject receive greater attention, and perhaps just a little impatient with the less-than-total endorsement of psychological warfare by military leaders. Such was the range of emotions and attitudes on psychological warfare, all of which combined to portray a total picture of hesitancy and slow progress within the Department of the Army eleven months before the Korean War would erupt.

Part of this hesitancy can be attributed to the fact that many Army leaders still considered psychological warfare to be a new development.

1Ibid.
Despite its use by the Army in World War II, the Director of Organization and Training in May 1949 lumped psychological warfare together with atomic warfare, radiological defense, biological warfare, guided missiles, and subversive warfare as "new developments [of warfare] or modifications of previous developments." General Bolte, Director of Plans and Operations, thought it premature to parcel out responsibilities of these topics to specific General Staff agencies until their role and employment were better understood. Instead, he recommended that all General Staff divisions designate contact officers for discussions of the developments under P&O monitorship.1

Furthermore, the subject of psychological warfare was receiving little attention in military service schools. A student committee report done at the Armed Forces Information School, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in June 1949 concluded that there was no adequate course in psychological warfare at any service installation that would provide the necessary knowledge for an Information and Education officer.2 The Ground General School curriculum at Fort Riley showed nine hours of instruction, there was one hour at the Command and General Staff School, tentative and draft field manuals were being used in schools and for extension courses, and there were no training programs for Reserves available or planned—all of which led to the admission in a Plans and

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1Department of the Army, Army Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum by Major General H. R. Bull, Director, Organization and Training Division, Subject: General Staff Responsibility for Planning Pertaining to New Developments in Warfare, 12 May 1949; also Memorandum by Major General Charles Bolte, Director, Plans and Operations, commenting on above subject, RG 319, Army Operations, P&O 331 (12 May 1949), National Archives.

2Armed Forces Information School, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Student Committee Report, Subject: Psychological Warfare and Propaganda Analysis, 9 June 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, P&O G91.412 (8 September 1949), National Archives.
Operations Division memorandum on 4 October 1949 that "much remains to be done if the Army is to be ready to fulfill its operational and mobilization responsibilities in the field of psychological warfare."\(^1\)

By early 1950, Secretary Gray was beginning to suspect the same. He decided to query the Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins (who had succeeded General Bradley in August 1949), with a memorandum on February 7:

> As you know, I am keenly interested in the prompt and effective development of psychological warfare within the Army. I should like to have a report on the status of this matter by February 15th. In this connection, I am particularly interested in what consideration has been given to psychological warfare in conjunction with the current reorganization within the General Staff.\(^2\)

There was not much progress to report to the Secretary of the Army. The opening paragraph of "Report on the Army Psychological Warfare Program," in fact, was a classic example of the type of bureaucratic gobbledygook often used to obfuscate an issue:

> While definite progress has been made in the last six months in the development and execution of a psychological warfare program within the Army, much remains to be accomplished. The establishment of a sound, comprehensive program and the effective carrying out of the many tasks and activities under such a program includes the solution of many problems which are interrelated and the solution of which is dependent upon the sequential and systematic development and completion of the more fundamental aspects of the overall program. An effort has been made, however, to meet the higher priority requirements in all important areas of the program as developed to date.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Organization and Training Division requesting information on psychological warfare training in being or planned, 19 August 1949; also P&O Division memo on subject, 4 October 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, P60 091.412 (19 August 1949), National Archives.

\(^2\)Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum from Gordon Gray to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 7 February 1950, RG319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Hot Files, Box No. 10, P50 091.412 (7 February 1950), National Archives.

\(^3\)Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25,
Gray undoubtedly had to read that paragraph more than once, and even then probably wondered exactly what he had been told. In essence, some progress was reported in operational planning, in the preparation of draft Tables of Organization and Equipment for troop units, and in nonmateriel research. Progress had been slow, however, in staff organization for psychological warfare, doctrine and techniques, personnel and unit training, training literature and training aids, materiel, and intelligence requirements. Most of the report, in fact, discussed problem areas and things that needed to be done. One interesting item in this last category was the expressed need for a "school center for psychological warfare at which tactical doctrine, techniques, training literature and tactical studies can be prepared." 1

The Psychological Warfare Center, created almost two years later at Fort Bragg, was eventually to fill this void.

Probably of greatest interest to the Secretary, however, was a statement in the report to the effect that an increase in organization and staff personnel for psychological warfare would shortly be recommended. Of interest, no doubt, because Gray had been waiting patiently since March 1949 for progress on this score.

Finally, the report tactfully asked the Secretary to be patient and recognize the difficulties inherent in dealing with a new function: "For an appreciable period of time, the development and execution of a psychological warfare program will be essentially a 'pioneering' effort and will depend

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1 Ibid.
primarily upon initiative, constant direction, and follow-up provided by the
General Staff and by Plans and Operations Division in particular. The
North Korean invasion was a little over four months away at the time of this
report, and Gordon Gray was to leave his office within a month.

"Only a Start": Prelude to Korea

If the Army Staff thought that the new Secretary of the Army would let
up on the pressure for more progress in psychological warfare, they were soon
disabused of that notion. Within five weeks of replacing Gordon Gray, Frank
Pace, Jr., sent the Chief of Staff a memorandum clearly outlining his interest
in the subject:

1. On 7 February 1950, Secretary Gray requested a report on the
status of psychological warfare development within the Army with par-
ticular reference to what organizational provision had been made
within the Department of the Army for the direction and development
of Army capability in this field. It is my understanding that a plan
to authorize the establishment of a Psychological Warfare Branch in
G-3, Operations, and to provide adequate staffing was approved on the
condition that spaces be provided from within G-3's current personnel
ceiling.

2. Like Mr. Gray, whose views on the subject of Psychological
Warfare are similar to mine, I believe the prompt development of the
capabilities of the various responsible agencies and departments of
the government to execute Psychological Warfare operations under terms
of reference established by the National Security Council is vital to
the national security. The Department of the Army, of course, has a
definite responsibility for psychological warfare development insofar
as it affects national security and the conduct of military operations.

3. Please keep me advised on the progress being made in the es-
tablishment of the contemplated branch to handle this activity for the
Department of the Army and in the procurement of necessary personnel.

Some, but not much, progress had been made. Shortly after the status

1Ibid.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington
25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Army Organization for
Psychological Warfare, 29 May 1950, from Frank Pace, Jr., RG 319, G-3 Opera-
tions, March 1950-51, 091.412 Case 1-20, Box No. 154, National Archives.
report to Secretary Gray in mid-February, a study had been forwarded to the Chief of Staff recommending the allocation of additional personnel for further development of both psychological warfare and special operations, and that a separate branch, designated the Subsidiary Plans Branch, be established in the Plans Group, P60 Division for that purpose. Additionally, certain psychological warfare functions charged to the Chief of Information had previously been transferred, with personnel, to the P60 Division in an attempt to improve the organizational problem. ¹

A requirement had been established for approximately sixteen officers with specialized qualifications in psychological warfare and special operations for assignment to Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army, Europe, Army Field Forces, and the Command and General Staff College, with the first five to be available July 1951. The G-1 was requested to provide a civilian graduate course in International Relations to furnish supplemental background in psychological warfare and special operations for the officers selected. A job description was designed, stating that the officers to be selected "must have had direct experience in, or be thoroughly familiar with, the conduct of psychological warfare or of clandestine and paramilitary operations in support of military operations." Letters were sent to major subordinate headquarters announcing the program. ²

¹Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Bolte, Subject: Army Organization for Psychological Warfare, from General Schuyler, 13 February 1950, RG 319, Army Operations 1949-52, Hot Files, Box No. 10, P60 091.412 TS (7 February 1950), National Archives.

²Department of the Army, G-3, Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Personnel, Subject: Requirement for Officers With Specialized Training, 13 March 1950, OPS 091.412 (13 March 1950); Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington 25,
A series of conferences was initiated by G-3, Operations (the redesignated Plans and Operations Division), with Headquarters, Army Field Forces in Fort Monroe, Virginia, to discuss delineation of responsibilities for psychological warfare. The first was scheduled for March 29, 1950. One of the proposed items for discussion at this conference is worthy of note: "Preparation and conduct of specialized school courses for Psychological Warfare student personnel, and of general indoctrination courses for all students, including consideration of the desirability of establishing a 'school center' (preferably as a part of, or as a section in, an existing Army school)." While agreeing that psychological warfare deserved greater emphasis, Army Field Forces pointed out that personnel and fiscal limitations presented "a perplexing problem." An encouraging start had been made with the Tactical Information Detachment (two officers and approximately twenty men), the psychological warfare extension courses "now nearing completion," and with the limited but valuable training material assembled. "But we admit that this is only a start," wrote Major General Robert Macon, Deputy Chief of Army Field Forces, to the G-3.

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1 Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum, Subject: Army Program for Psychological Warfare, 13 March 1950, RG 319, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412, Case 1-20, Box No. 154, National Archives.

2 Army Field Forces, Office of the Chief, Ft. Monroe, VA, Letter to Major General R. E. Duff, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, from Major General Robert C. Macon, Deputy Chief, 7 June 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, G-3 091.412 (Section III) (Cases 41-60) (Case 50 withdrawn filed in Section III A), National Archives.
"Only a start" also accurately described the situation at Headquarters, Department of the Army. In answer to Secretary Pace's primary question in his 29 May memorandum, the G-3 replied that the Psychological Warfare Branch would be activated "about 1 August" if necessary personnel savings were effected as a result of an ongoing G-3 survey.¹ Fifteen months and two secretaries of the Army after Kenneth Royall's instructions to establish such a branch, the Army Staff searched for the necessary personnel spaces.

Thus, four and a half years after General Lemnitzer and General McClure had urged continued development of psychological warfare, the Army was ill-prepared in terms of personnel, equipment, and organization. On the eve of the Korean War, "only a start" had been made toward development of a psychological warfare capability.

¹Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, Subject: Psychological Warfare Organization in the Department of the Army, from Major General Charles L. Bolte, G-3, 13 July 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, OPS 091.412 (Section II) (Cases 21-40) (Case 26 withdrawn filed Section II A), 091.412 (5 July 1950) S, National Archives.
CHAPTER V

THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

If the Army's capability to conduct overt psychological warfare was meager in June 1950, its unconventional warfare capability was nonexistent. It was not supposed to have such a capability in peacetime--NSC 10/2 gave the responsibility for covert paramilitary activities to the CIA in June 1948. This is not to say, however, that the Army did not consider developing such a function. It did--and the story of the Army's initial tentative steps in this field during the interwar years is an important link in the decisions that ultimately led to creation of the 10th Special Forces concept in early 1952.

The Airborne Reconnaissance Units

As we have seen, the impetus for the initiation of covert activities after World War II did not originate in the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunner of the CIA. Rather, it came from Secretary of War Robert Patterson in late 1946, prompting discussion among agencies initially on the subject of psychological operations. Within the Department of the Army, Patterson directed in August 1946 that a SECRET letter be sent to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces (AGF), indicating that "airborne reconnaissance agents" were successfully employed during World War II under the supervision of the

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Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Since the inactivation of OSS, no branch in the War Department was taking an active interest in the development of "airborne reconnaissance," stated the letter. Army Ground Forces was therefore requested to prepare a study and submit recommendations on the desirability and organization of such a unit. The study was received by the War Department General Staff in February 1947. Included in the recommendation was a request for an experimental unit of six officers and thirty-five enlisted men. The Military Intelligence Division (MID) recommended approval of the study, noting:

The airborne reconnaissance units are of a special type which is essential in war time and is one of the type developed by OSS. It is essential that such a unit be maintained in peace time to develop techniques and doctrines of employment and that the knowledge of this doctrine and technique be made known by teaching in appropriate schools.2

Concurring with MID's recommendations, the Director of Organization and Training approved the study in April and directed the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, to develop tactics, techniques, and training for the proposed unit. A Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) was also to be prepared and submitted to the War Department, after which the necessary personnel spaces would be provided at the time activation of the unit was directed.3

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1WDGS, Military Intelligence Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to the Adjutant General, Subject: Airborne Reconnaissance Units, 19 August 1946, from Major General S. J. Chamberlain, Director of Intelligence, RG 319, Army Intelligence Decimal File, 1941-48, from 370.5 to 1-31-42 to 373.2, 373.14, Box No. 874, Washington National Records Center (WNRC).

2WDGS, Military Intelligence Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Director, Organization and Training Division, Subject: Airborne Reconnaissance Units, from Colonel M. A. Solomon, Assistant Executive, Director of Intelligence, 6 March 1947, RG 319, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, 1941-48, from 370.5 1-31-42 to 373.2, 373.14, Box Ko 874, WNRC.

3WDGS, Military Intelligence Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, VA, Subject: Airborne
Events of the next eighteen months, however, showed the difficulties which a military bureaucracy faces when attempting to create a new entity, particularly during periods of fiscal and personnel constraints. By the middle of 1948, staff officers from Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, were corresponding with Colonel Ray Peers, former commander of Detachment 101, OSS, to seek advice on organizational concepts for "the Airborne Recon Company, or as we have named it, the Ranger Group."¹ The title "Ranger Group" demonstrated the not uncommon confusion that often occurred when the Army tried to grapple with creation of an "unconventional" organization, particularly one with no formal predecessors in Army history. This is borne out in Major Ernest Samussen's letter to Colonel Peers, in which he noted that "we have strayed in many respects from your recommendations. This is largely due to our efforts to make a military organization which can be composed of cells of minimum size, and is thereby capable of being made into a TOE."²

The confusion over what to call the new unit reflected differing ideas as to its concept of employment. A War Department paper that discussed adding one "Ranger Group" to the General Reserve Troop Basis noted that the proposed unit would not accomplish the purpose its author (apparently a Colonel Conrad) envisaged, "if approved from an OSS point of view." This was in September 1948; Army Field Forces (formerly Army Ground Forces) was still working on a

¹Army Field Forces, Office of the Chief, Fort Monroe, VA, letter from Major Ernest Samussen, Jr., to Colonel W. R. Peers, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 24 June 1948, RG 319, Army Intelligence Decimal Files 1941-48, 373.14, Box No. 874, WNRC.

²Ibid.
TOE for the Ranger Group that was not expected to be approved prior to January 1949. ¹

Circulation of the proposal among the staff at Army Field Forces (AFF) did not clear up the confusion—the unit being developed was slowly turning into a hybrid organization that combined Ranger and OSS concepts. This was apparent in the proposed Ranger Group mission, which was to "organize and conduct overt and covert operations behind enemy lines thereby assuming functions formerly performed by units of the OSS." The Group of approximately 115 officers and 135 enlisted men would be attached to Army Groups and/or Armies to perform tactical missions. Its capabilities would include the conduct of sabotage and surprise attacks in the enemy's rear areas; "black" psychological warfare and propaganda; the collection of information by reconnaissance and espionage; the development, organization, control, and supply of resistance groups; the recruitment, training, and direction of foreign civilian agents; the control of captured enemy agents and assisting intelligence staffs in counterespionage; and the organization and control of escape systems in enemy-held territory. ²

From an "OSS point of view," this organizational concept should have been unacceptable. It attempted to lump together missions and capabilities

¹WDGS, Organization and Training Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Director of Intelligence, Subject: Ranger Group (Old Proposed Airborne Reconnaissance Company), from Major General R. R. Bull, Acting Director, O&T Division, 13 September 1948, RG 319, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, 1941-48, 373.14, Box No. 874, WNRC.

²Army Ground Forces, Intelligence Section, Fort Monroe, VA, Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Roland N. Glesser, Intelligence Division, WDGS. Memo was sent by an officer named "Farris," with a copy of paper on the Ranger Group that the Intelligence Section was submitting to the Plans Section for forwarding to the WDGS. RG 319, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, 1941-48, 373.14, Box No. 874, WNRC.
of rangers and commandos with those of Special Operations and Operational Group elements of the OSS. It combined the tactical with the strategic. The mission statement said OSS, but the title was Ranger Group; the mission statement also said tactical, but the capabilities belied OSS precepts—and Donovan himself drew a distinction between the missions of Rangers and Commandos and those of the OSS, as we saw in chapter III.

Eventually Ranger units were formed and utilized in Korea, but they were not the OSS-type "unconventional warfare" organizations that Secretary of War Patterson probably had in mind when he first surfaced the issue in 1946. The dialogue that took place on the "Airborne Reconnaissance Units/Ranger Groups" during 1946-48 clearly showed the influence of OSS on Army thinking, and presaged similar discussions in the early 1950's prior to the formation of the 10th Special Forces Group.

Another example of early Army thinking on the subject of unconventional warfare was a study of special and subversive operations, done in late 1947 by the Organization and Training Division, Department of the Army Staff. Its stated purpose was "to study special and subversive operations to determine the desirability of including instruction and study of such operations in the school system." Special operations were considered to be the activities of U.S. troops to activate and/or support resistance groups behind enemy lines, as well as small unit operations behind enemy lines. Not included in the study were secret intelligence, morale operations ("black" propaganda) or psychological warfare.

Relying heavily on OSS historical data, to include the seven volumes of the official War Report of the OSS, which had not been approved for release at that time, the study concluded that "special operations of a subversive nature" offered great potential that "no commander should ignore" in their support of wartime military operations. The study's recommendations included providing four to six hours instruction on the subject in appropriate service schools, continued study of the capabilities and desirable organization for special operations, and the creation of a "special operations company." The interesting point about the latter recommendation was a further comment that "this notion should be deferred pending receipt of recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding a proposal to establish a guerrilla warfare corps." ¹

**JCS and NSC Activities**

The JCS proposal referred to was actually a series of studies on guerrilla warfare that culminated in JCS 1807/1 on 17 August 1948, a memorandum forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Pertinent aspects of that memorandum were as follows:

a. The United States should provide itself with the organization and the means of supporting foreign resistance movements in guerrilla warfare to the advantage of United States national security during peacetime and war.

b. Guerrilla warfare should be supported under policy direction of NSC.

c. Agencies for conducting guerrilla warfare can be established by adding to the CIA's special operations functions the responsibility for supporting foreign resistance movements and by authorizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage in the conduct of such operations.

d. Primary interest in guerrilla warfare should be that of CIA in peacetime and NME [National Military Establishment] in wartime.

e. A separate guerrilla warfare school and corps should not be established [emphasis added]. Instead NME, in coordination with State Department and CIA should select personnel, give them necessary training in established Army schools, supplemented by courses in

¹Ibid.
other military and State Department schools.

f. The trained personnel should not be permanently separated from their original service. They should be available on call for introduction into countries to organize, direct, and lead native guerrillas.¹

The JCS was clearly backing away from the idea of establishing a "guerrilla warfare corps" within the military services. Why? Because during this same period the CIA was beginning to establish its position in the field of covert activities. Driven by the impetus of the Cold War, the National Security Council in December 1947 gave the CIA responsibility for the conduct of covert psychological operations (NSC 4/A), and in June 1948 expanded that charter with NSC 10/2 to include:

Any covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.²

To carry out these activities for CIA, initially the Special Procedures Group was established in December 1947, which was replaced by the Office of Special Projects after NSC 10/2 was issued, then shortly thereafter renamed the Office of Policy Coordination.³ Apparent in all of these JCS and NSC actions during the late 1947-early 1948 period was a perceptible shifting of responsibility for covert activities to the CIA.


²Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Director of Special Studies (NSC 10), from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, 19 May 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, P&O 092 TS (12 May 1948), National Archives.

³Senate Report No. 94-735, Book IV, pp. 28-30.
The Army Staff's reaction to this shift was an interesting combination of Cold War enthusiasm mixed with caution concerning jurisdictional prerogatives. For example, in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army on NSC 10, the Plans and Operations Division commented:

P&O considers that there is an urgent need for a Director of Special Studies [eventually the Office of Special Projects in 10/1 and 10/2] under NSC who has a directive to strengthen and extend covert operations with the objective of defeating communism in the present "cold war." A coordinated national effort can win the "war of words" by proving that our American way of life is approaching that ideal desired by all mankind. However, it is believed that the authority of this Director should not infringe on the wartime prerogatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning plans for the conduct of a war.¹

And in a subsequent memorandum to the Secretary, P&O suggested changes to a CIA report on NSC 10 that were designed to correct portions "which appear to infringe upon the JCS responsibilities concerning training and war plans," as well as "the implication that similarity in operational methods in covert intelligence activities and covert operations makes the CIA the sole agency to conduct such operations."² This latter point reveals just a touch of resentment concerning the CIA's movement into the covert operations field.

There was little doubt in Secretary of the Army Royall's mind on this subject, however. On the following day, he emphatically stated "that despite the recommendations of the Army staff, he did not want a representative of the Army to be a member of the special services group [eventually the CIA's Office of Special Projects], and further that he does not want the Army to get into

¹P&O Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Director of Special Studies (NSC 10), 19 May 1948, P&O 092 TS (12 May 1948), National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Director of Special Studies (NSC 10), from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, 2 June 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, P&O 092 TS (12 May 1948), National Archives.
covert activities or even to know anything about it."¹

Despite Royall's reluctance, the Army provided an officer--Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton--to be the representative for both the JCS and the Secretary of Defense to the CIA's Office of Special Projects, in accordance with NSC 10/2.² The new office was to plan and conduct covert operations, "in time of peace," under the policy guidance of an operations advisory committee composed of representatives from the State and Defense Departments. Such plans and operations would be "coordinated with and acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for wartime covert operations."³

The responsibility for covert operations already had been given to the CIA with the NSC 10/2 directive. The military services agreed to this because of their strong desire to "do something" about the perceived threat of Communism, and because of their reluctance to become openly associated with the "dirty tricks" business in peacetime. At the same time, the Services--and particularly the Army--were sensitive to their institutional prerogatives and resisted any interpretations that would remove from them a voice in the conduct

¹Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Recorder, Subject: Briefing on NSC Meeting, 3 June 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Designation of Military Establishment Representatives NSC 10/2 (Office of Special Projects) (JCS 1735/14), from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director, P&O Division, 15 August 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, P&O 091.412 TS (31 July 1948), National Archives.

³Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/1), from Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, 16 June 1948, RG 319, Army Operations, 1948-52, Box No. 9, Hot Files, P&O 091.412 TS (16 June 1948), National Archives.
of wartime covert operations. The planning and preparation responsibilities for such wartime activities, however, provided a potential area for ambiguity and discord, as we shall see later.

Creation of the Office of Special Projects did not mean that the military ceased to think about unconventional warfare. In response to a request from the Secretary of Defense to continue examination of "unconventional operations," the JCS formed an ad hoc Guerrilla Warfare Subcommittee to prepare a study on guerrilla warfare. Interestingly, the GW (Guerrilla Warfare) Subcommittee was part of an ad hoc PW (Psychological Warfare) Committee. In any event, the study was essentially an exercise to establish for planning purposes those geographical areas of the world where it would be advantageous to have in place resistance movements that could wage guerrilla warfare in the event of hostilities. The priority established, by geographical area, for the creation of such organizations was: Central Europe, Middle East, South Europe, West Europe, Scandinavia, and the Far East. The study also concluded that the JCS "should retain strategic and broad policy planning functions of guerrilla warfare" within the National Military Establishment, and that the Army "should be assigned primary responsibility for all other guerrilla warfare functions." The Navy and Air Force should not have primary, but "collateral responsibilities," for this activity. Finally, a familiar theme--in time of war, the Theater Commanders should control guerrilla warfare within their areas.¹

¹Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Study on Guerrilla Warfare, 1 March 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P&O 370.64 TS (1 March 1949), National Archives.
The Office of Policy Coordination

Without question, the NSC 10/2 directive was perceived by many to be a significant escalation of U.S. interest in the covert side of the Cold War.

As William R. Corson states:

The intelligence community's reaction to the NSC's apparently unanimous endorsement and support of the "dirty tricks" authorizations was swift. In their view no holds were barred. The NSC 10/2 decision was broadly interpreted to mean that not only the president but all the guys on the top had said to put on the brass knuckles and go to work. As word about NSC 10/2 trickled down to the working staffs in the intelligence community, it was translated to mean that a declaration of war had been issued with equal if not more force than if the Congress had so decided.¹

The principal agent for this increased emphasis on covert activities was to be the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), headed by Frank G. Wisner. A lawyer by training, Wisner had served with distinction in the OSS, planning and participating in a number of imaginative operations in the Balkans during the war. At the time of his selection to head the OPC, he was serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for occupied countries. Although by background, experience, and temperament Wisner appeared to be an excellent candidate for the new post, Army intelligence leaders opposed the choice on the basis that he was "another Donovan who'll run away with the ball." Nonetheless, George Marshall was confident that Wisner was the right man for the job, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal endorsed the choice.²

Since the growth of OPC during the years 1948-52 was to have an important impact on the Army's development of its own "special warfare" capability, it is important to understand Wisner's view of his charter. This was outlined in some detail in a 1 August 1949 memorandum to Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton

¹Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, p. 304. ²Ibid., pp. 306f.
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Wisner explained that the mission of OPC was:

To plan and to execute special (covert) operations or measures which are designed to reinforce or to accomplish United States foreign policy objectives; in peacetime, to formulate and execute plans to the necessary state of readiness in order that appropriate special (covert) operations may be executed in time of war as considered necessary for competent authority; in wartime, to plan and execute such special (covert) operations or measures as may be appropriate in the discharge of the OPC mission or as directed by competent authority.

Activities of the new organization would set it apart from other governmental agencies principally through an important distinction:

The techniques and means by which OPC attains its objectives differ from those of the Department of State and the National Military Establishment inasmuch as OPC operations are conducted in a covert or clandestine manner to the end that official United States interest or responsibility is not permitted to appear and if such interest should inadvertently appear, it can be plausibly disclaimed by this government.

Specifically, the OPC was responsible for the planning and conduct of the covert and clandestine aspects of:

a. Political warfare including assistance to underground resistance movements and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.
b. Psychological warfare including "black" and "gray" propaganda.
c. Economic warfare.
d. Evacuation including the paramount responsibility for escape and evasion.
e. Guerrilla and partisan type warfare.
f. Sabotage and countersabotage.
g. Other covert operations (excluding espionage, counterespionage and cover and deception for military operations).

Having laid out the mission and responsibilities of OPC, Wisner pro-
needed to argue the necessity for a "process of mutual education, collaboration and understanding" between OPC, the Department of State, and the military services with respect to this "new weapon in the United States arsenal." In particular, he felt that the National Military Establishment should "provide guidance and support with respect to such escape and evasion, countersabotage, sabotage and guerrilla warfare activities as may be undertaken during peacetime or which must be prepared during peacetime to a state of readiness for wartime execution [emphasis added]."¹

This latter point is important to highlight, because later considerable differences of view were to develop between the Army and OPC over just who was responsible for what—and to what degree—both in peacetime preparation and in war. At this point, however, the field appeared to be left relatively open to the CIA/OPC, and Frank Wisner was anxious to receive help from the military services in getting his operation under way.

Army Assistance to OPC

In mid-1949 Wisner requested assistance from the Army in the training of personnel for guerrilla warfare, for the provision of certain logistical support, and for the nomination of an Army officer to be Chief of the "Guerrilla Warfare Group" of CIA (the latter request was subsequently withdrawn). The Secretary of the Army authorized the Plans and Operations Division to contact the CIA direct to determine the details of assistance required. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Deane, Jr., was designated as the Army's representative for the purpose of such coordination. Later, Lieutenant Colonels R. A. Baker and E. E. Baker were designated for direct contact in the areas of logistics and

¹Ibid.
organization and training.¹

By November 1949, a series of conferences between representatives of the Department of the Army and the CIA had resulted in the selection of Fort Benning as a suitable site for the location of a training course desired by the CIA. Interestingly, one of the CIA/OPC representatives who took part in these conferences was an Army lieutenant colonel who had served with Detachment 101 in Burma during World War II.²

This officer's former experience in OSS ensured him an important role in these Army-CIA conferences. For example, in one meeting a discussion of OSS theater organizations in World War II resulted in agreement among the participants that the most efficient operation was one in which all clandestine organizations were brought under one head. While not committing OPC to a position, this former Detachment 101 member stated that he felt "reasonably certain" that all of these plans and projects would be done with the knowledge and approval of theater commanders. He further expressed the view that the proposed joint training endeavor would assist in training some military personnel in covert activities, thus making the transition to JCS control of such operations in case of war a smoother task.

¹Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Department of the Army Assistance to the Central Intelligence Agency in the Field of Guerrilla Warfare, 26 July 1949, and Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, same subject, 29 July 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P&O 370.64 TS (23 June 1949), National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Department of the Army Assistance to the CIA in the Field of Guerrilla Warfare, 21 November 1949 and Notes on Meeting of Representatives of CIA and NME Re Joint CIA/NME Training Program, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P&O 370.64 TS (21 November 1949), National Archives.
With respect to this latter point, Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Deane, Plans and Operations Division, expressed an opinion that if the CIA came under JCS control during wartime, there was no necessity for the Army to organize OSS-type units in peacetime, since their resistance operations would conflict with those of the CIA. Thus he believed that the National Military Establishment would want to ensure JCS jurisdiction over CIA during war, and in this way the Army—by its assistance to the CIA in its peacetime training program—would be laying the groundwork for possible future behind-the-lines support for its tactical ground operations. The notes on these meetings show a considerable amount of agreement between Deane and the OPC representative on these issues, as well as the other participants. Indeed, the importance of these early conferences between the CIA and the Army—in addition to highlighting the influence of OSS experience—was the degree of harmony that existed, harmony that would later disappear in jurisdictional squabbles.1

Further evidence of this attitude of cooperativeness was the provision of two Army studies on guerrilla warfare to the CIA, to assist them in the preparation of a training program for covert operations. The studies, prepared by Major Materrazzi and Captain West of the Plans and Operations Division, were forwarded with a memorandum indicating that they represented solely the individual views of the officers who prepared them. Nonetheless, the studies demonstrated a recognition by some officers of the potential value of resistance operations in a future war. They also demonstrated again the influence of OSS experience on those officers interested in the subject of covert operations. Further, both papers concluded that the Army should organize

1Ibid.
and train a unit in peacetime for the purpose of support of foreign resistance movements in the event of hostilities. Both studies had been prepared in early 1949, however, and with the growing prominence of the CIA in this field they had apparently been overtaken by events.\(^1\)

**The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division**

The emergence of the CIA in both psychological warfare and covert operations, as well as the growing interest among the Services in these activities because of increasing Cold War tensions, led to the establishment of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division (JSPD) in late 1949. This new joint agency, under the control of JCS, was to coordinate the peacetime development of psychological warfare and covert operations capabilities within the Armed Services, coordinate detailed military plans and other agencies of the government, particularly with Department of State and the Office of Policy Coordination (CIGS), and, in wartime, would become the means by which the JCS would provide continuous direction and guidance in these specialized fields to commanders under their control.\(^2\)

Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens was selected to be the first Chief of the JSPD, although he had limited experience in psychological warfare and covert operations. Stevens was to be assisted by deputies from each of the other Services, and initially by a small staff of six officers. His nomination was concurred in by the Army.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum For: The Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Request for Documents, 18 October 1949, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P&O 091.04 TS (18 October 1949), National Archives.


\(^3\)Ibid.
Actually, the principal impetus for establishment of the JSPD appears to have come from the CIA. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in May 1949, the Director of Central Intelligence requested that a staff of Service representatives be appointed to "consult with and assist CIA officers in the establishment of a para-military training program." Frank Wisner's request for unilateral assistance from the Army was part of this overall move by the CIA. The JCS considered the CIA's request and determined that a need existed for the proposed training program. Their creation of the JSPD in November 1949, they believed, also provided the staff requested by the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chief, JSPD, was directed to effect the necessary liaison between the CIA and the National Military Establishment.1

The Army and Unconventional Warfare Prior to Korea

By early 1950 it was evident that the responsibility for unconventional warfare--primarily as a result of NSC 10/2--was shifting to the CIA. The intelligence agency had agreed to attach liaison officers to the staffs of unified commands to participate in planning for special operations, and the JCS staffed a message to these commands notifying them that such liaison was available if they desired it.2 Slowly but surely, the "new kid on the block"

1Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Paramilitary Training Program (JCS 1735/34), 23 November 1949, from Major General Bolte, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P6O 091.412 TS (16 November 1949), National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Liaison With Unified Commands for Special Operations, 20 December 1949, from Major General Charles L. Bolte, Director of Plans and Operations, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, P6O 091.412 TS (17 December 1949), National Archives.
was becoming more active, and the Services appeared willing to accept him.

This is not to say that the Services themselves ceased to consider the potential for unconventional warfare in the face of growing U.S.-Soviet tensions. An excellent example of this interest was a letter from Colonel C. H. Gerhardt, G-2, Headquarters Second Army, Fort Meade, Maryland, to Lieutenant General Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations. Gerhardt, who had just attended a conference that included General Gruenther and the Army's Chief of Staff, General Arthur Collins, indicated his concern for both psychological and unconventional warfare in this paragraph:

Now as to the ideas: About two years back Froggy Reed of the Ordnance was out here and we got talking about new developments. He stated that there appeared to be no new developments planned in sabotage equipment and other material necessary for an underground. We then wrote up a short study to fit the then situation as far as doing something about equipment was concerned, Europe being concerned after being overrun by the Red Army. The stages being: first, psychological warfare; second, an organized underground. This underground to be planned for now, and particularly development of equipment, new and streamlined explosives, radios, kits of various kinds, etc., that could be stockpiled—some here and some in the countries involved, and an organization put into being that would blossom into a resistance movement in case of invasion.

Gerhardt's letter was shown to General Collins, who wrote next to the cited paragraph: "I agree that something definite should be done on a plan and an organization." Both the Director of Logistics and the Director of Intelligence were requested to "investigate the present status of planning on the matter and submit appropriate recommendations." The resultant status report on covert operations summed up basically what has been discussed in

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1 Headquarters, Second Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, Letter to Lieutenant General Alfred M. Gruenther, 30 November 1949, from Colonel C. H. Gerhardt, RG 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, Box No. 10, Hot Files, filed with P&O 000.5 (30 November 1949) TS, National Archives.
this chapter: the CIA's responsibility, under NSC 10/2, for planning and conducting covert operations in peacetime; the establishment of OPC to implement NSC 10/2; the work of two ad hoc JCS committees to prepare guidance to OPC in the fields of guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion; the creation of the JSPD to insure "the effective discharge of the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for psychological warfare and covert operations"; and the Secretary of the Army's approval on 28 July 1949 of the provision of unilateral assistance to OPC in the field of guerrilla warfare.1

Because of its sensitivity, the draft reply to Gerhardt's letter left out much of the material contained in the status reports prepared by the Army Staff. Nonetheless, the paragraph that dealt with covert operations was significant:

We have been active on the Joint and Service levels for sometime now in the field of resistance movements and other allied covert operations. We are convinced that the utilization of indigenous manpower in covert operations is an important and very necessary adjunct to conventional type operations. We feel that we are making progress in these matters but, of course, we must proceed with considerable caution.2

This statement typifies the Army's attitude toward unconventional warfare during the interwar years. As has been shown, the Army--prompted by Secretary of War Robert Patterson--began considering the possibilities for a covert operations capability patterned after OSS units as early as 1946, prior

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2 Ibid.; Tab "C," proposed letter to Colonel Gerhardt.
to the establishment of the CIA and OPC. This interest was fueled on the one hand by a growing suspicion of Soviet intentions, but also somewhat constrained, on the other hand, by a recognition of the political sensitivity of such a capability during peacetime. Thus it was almost with a sense of relief that the Services—and particularly the Army—welcomed the emergence of CIA/OPC to take the primary responsibility for covert operations. During a period of personnel and fiscal constraints, this allowed the Army to concentrate on the "conventional type operations" with which it was more comfortable. Nonetheless, the Army could not entirely evade some responsibility for the embryonic development of an unconventional warfare capability. Thus it agreed to assist the OPC in its initial organizational and training efforts. In fact, the evidence suggests that some Army leaders saw limited cooperation with CIA/OPC as in their enlightened self-interests; that is, an opportunity to preserve some influence during a period where institutional prerogatives and jurisdictional boundaries in a new field were in a process of flux. At any rate, the Army's attitude toward unconventional warfare during the interwar years was ambivalent. Limited though it was, however, the Army's activity in this field—particularly the doctrinal confusion that marked its tentative thinking on unconventional warfare and its early interaction with the CIA/OPC—is important to grasp for a full understanding of the subsequent developments that contributed to the creation of Special Forces. The first of these developments was the outbreak of war in Korea.
CHAPTER VI
KOrea AND THE Office of THE Chief
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A little over two years after North Korean armed forces crossed the
38th Parallel, the United States Army, in May 1952, established the Psycholog-
ical Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This institution en-
compassed a school for both psychological operations and Special Forces train-
ing, operational psychological warfare units, and the first formal unconven-
tional warfare force in its history--the 10th Special Forces Group. We have
seen that while some planning activity took place during the post-World War II
years, the Army's capability to conduct overt psychological warfare was minimal
in June 1950. Similarly, while some embryonic thinking on unconventional war-
fare took place within the Army during the interwar years, at the time of the
outbreak of war in Korea primary responsibility for that type of activity
had shifted to the CIA/OPC--or so it appeared. Thus, an examination of the
period between June 1950 and May 1952 is crucial to understanding the Army's
unprecedented decisions to establish a center in which capabilities for both
psychological and unconventional warfare would be combined at Fort Bragg.
This chapter examines the impact of the Korean War on these decisions.

Impetus for a Psywar Division at Department of the Army

When the North Korean invasion began on June 22, 1950, a small Special
Projects Branch existed in the G-2 Division of Headquarters, Far East Command
(FECOM) that was charged with the responsibility for the development of strategic and tactical warfare plans. This branch, headed by a civilian, Mr. J. Woodall Greene (who had been in the Far East since 1943), was initially confined to radio broadcasting from Japan and to leaflet air drops, both of which were begun by June 29. Its shortages of personnel were partially overcome by the augmentation of local State Department Information Service personnel. The Department of the Army, of course, was unable to furnish adequate support, due to shortages in trained personnel, units, and suitable equipment.¹

The situation was such that by June 5, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace—who, it will be remembered, had been prodding the Army Staff to get its psychological warfare house in order—displayed his concern with a memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Events of the current Korean situation further confirm my views on the need for a Psychological Warfare organization in the Department of the Army. Please let me have a report on this matter showing action taken or being taken and, as well, such recommendations as you deem appropriate at this time.²

The Secretary was told that action had been taken to activate a branch of ten officers within the G-3 Division on July 31, 1950, to provide General Staff supervision of all psychological warfare and special operations activities. Additionally, a study to determine how to provide for a nucleus of


²Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Collins, Subject: Psychological Warfare Organization in the Department of the Army, 5 July 1950, from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., filed with G-3 091.412 S (5 July 1950), National Archives.
personnel trained in psychological warfare was in progress. It is interesting to note that the Army planned to combine psychological warfare and special operations activities in the proposed branch. Even with the CIA/OPC's growing prominence in the latter field, apparently the Army wanted to at least keep its hand in the game.

Understandably, Secretary Pace was beginning to show his impatience with the glacier-like movement of the Army bureaucracy on a subject of personal concern to him. As was discussed in chapter II, there were a number of reasons for this apparent foot-dragging by the Army Staff during the interwar years. But at this point perhaps the most candid analysis of the Army's failure was done in mid-July 1950 by a young staff officer in the G-3 Division:

With the transfer of primary responsibility for Psychological Warfare from G-2 to G-3 in January 1947, the activity reverted basically to a planning function insofar as the Department of the Army was concerned. Being largely a planning function, the activity consisted mainly of actions on highly classified matters which seldom came to the attention of other General Staff Divisions and the Technical Services. Consequently, because of the relative newness of the activity and because of the high classification placed upon it, a general lack of information gradually developed outside of G-3 (TSO) concerning Psychological Warfare. The low priority placed on this activity within G-3 in 1948, plus the return to inactive duty of most experienced Psychological Warfare officers, tended to accelerate this condition.

The officer went on to state that with the outbreak of war in Korea, the Army again had an interest in psychological warfare operations. He thus recommended that the responsibilities for this field be more clearly delineated among

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1Department of the Army, G-3 Operations Division, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet for the Chief of Staff, Psychological Warfare Organization in the Department of the Army, 13 July 1950, from Major General Charles L. Bolte, ACoS, G-3 091.412 S (5 July 1950), National Archives.

Within a month of this assessment, the name of that old World War II psychological warrior, Brigadier General Robert McClure, again surfaced. In a "Dear Al" letter to Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer (who had recently moved from his Pentagon assignment to become Commanding General of the Sixth Army, with headquarters in San Francisco), Major General Charles Bolte, the G-3, stated that the Army's program for psychological warfare was being reviewed in order to determine "the further organizational steps necessary to meet the operational requirements of the Korean situation or of a general war." He further indicated that the Army's responsibilities in this field were such that the possibility of a permanent staff agency, "preferably in the form of a Special Staff Division," should be considered for the Department of the Army. In order to develop specific recommendations on psychological warfare organization for the Chief of Staff, Bolte requested the advice and assistance of McClure (who was assigned to General Wedemeyer) for a few days because "I know of no one better qualified to assist us in that respect." In less than two weeks, Bolte received this message from McClure: "Will report to you for TDY 29 August." Help was on the way.

Notwithstanding these steps, by the end of August the Secretary of the Army's patience with the apparent lack of progress in psychological warfare

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1 Ibid.


organization came to an end. His displeasure, plainly evident in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, General Collins, deserves to be quoted in its entirety:

1. I have been following the progress of the development of a psychological warfare program within the Department of the Army with considerable concern. I am not at all satisfied that we are giving this matter attention and support commensurate with the capabilities of psychological warfare as a military weapon and an instrument of national policy.

2. The discussion of the Army Policy Council meetings of 15 and 16 August and my own review of the Army's effort in this field have indicated that the principal difficulty for well over a year has been organization and manpower. Although I am aware of the high caliber of work which has been performed, it is of particular concern to me that a psychological warfare organization which Mr. Gray approved in July 1949 has through delay in its establishment cost the Army the services of these spaces which for the past year could have been utilized in developing the Army program to a more comprehensive degree. Nor do I believe that with the establishment of a psychological warfare branch as of 1 August we have in fact assured ourselves of accomplishing desired results, if in so doing we are forced to rely on the Korean crisis to secure temporary spaces to meet personnel requirements for a unit which was not designed or intended to operate under war-time conditions.

3. The establishment of a psychological warfare organization within the Department of the Army indicates recognition of the importance of this activity in military science. Adequate allowance should therefore be made in the appropriate personnel ceilings to afford this field the permanent spaces it requires. I do not believe an organization which has necessitated so many studies and taken so long to set up should owe its final establishment and complement of personnel to an emergency which may well warrant an entirely different type staff unit.

4. I therefore desire that such spaces as have been allocated to psychological warfare on a temporary basis be established on a permanent basis and that the nomination of suitable personnel to bring the recently established psychological warfare branch to required strength be expedited.

5. I have asked Assistant Secretary Earl Johnson to give this matter of manpower for psychological warfare his personal attention.  

This letter is important in several respects. First, the blunt tone of
Pace's memo—unusually so for correspondence between a Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff—vividly demonstrates his exasperation with what he perceived to be foot-dragging by the Army on a subject that he considered to be vitally important. Second, it gives us some valuable insights into Pace's personal philosophy concerning psychological warfare, particularly with respect to having the necessary permanent organizational framework in place during peacetime, rather than relying on a crisis-imposed response to the problem. Finally, the memorandum is further evidence of a theme that we have seen throughout this study—the pressure brought to bear by civilian leaders on an Army somewhat reluctant to grapple with activities of an "unconventional" nature.

What Secretary Pace—and his predecessors—were perhaps not as sensitive to, however, were the genuine difficulties that personnel and fiscal constraints posed for Army leaders. After all, most of them were men who had advanced in a system that gave highest priority to the "conventional," or "regular" units—infantry, armor, and artillery—associated with the combat arms. Even with those senior officers who displayed interest in psychological and unconventional warfare capabilities, it should not have been considered unnatural for them—with the exception of a few like General McClure—to place these activities in a lower priority when faced with the necessity of making such choices.

In any event, the Army Staff—both as a result of Secretary Pace's prodding and as a result of some other ongoing actions—struggled in the face of a deteriorating combat situation in Korea to improve its psychological warfare organization. Ironically, on the same day that Pace's blistering memorandum was signed, General Bolte, the G-3, reported in a meeting on the Army's
General Council that McClure had arrived in Washington to advise and assist in preparation of recommendations to the Chief of Staff on several important aspects of psychological warfare—to include the possible establishment of a special staff division at the Department of the Army, operations in the Far East Command, and adequate, preparatory measures in the European Command.  

On the following day, August 31, General Bolte forwarded a recommendation to the Chief of Staff for immediate activation of the Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, stating that this step was necessary because "a review of present organizational arrangements indicates that the Army is not prepared to meet its Psychological Warfare obligations," which had greatly increased as a result of growing cold war tensions and the Korean Conflict. The organizational concept and proposed strength of 102 personnel for the new division were quickly approved by the Vice Chief of Staff on the first of September.  

McClure obviously had a hand in these moves, because during the period August 28 - September 3 he held conferences with all the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, Secretary Pace, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and members of the Joint Staff. At the September 13 meeting of the General Council, General Bolte reported that General McClure fully supported the G-3's proposal to establish a psychological warfare 

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C., Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, Item No. 8, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 30 August 1950, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

2Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, Subject: Department of the Army Organization for Psychological Warfare, 31 August 1950, RG 319, G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412 Case 41-100, Box No. 157, OPS 091.412 (31 August 1950) S, National Archives.
division, and that approval for such had been obtained. To effect an orderly transition, initially the Subsidiary Plans Branch of G-3 would be expanded to take care of psychological warfare planning. Later the activity would be transferred from G-3 to the new division, after final approval had been given as to its functions, and after acquisition of sufficient personnel.¹

Creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare

Despite the sense of urgency, creation of the new division did not occur overnight. First of all, there was the problem of obtaining authorization for the permanent allocation of the additional personnel needed. A more serious difficulty was procuring the necessary personnel trained in specialized skills of psychological warfare. Since there was no basic course available in psychological warfare within the Army—indeed, within all the Services—the G-3 requested that a minimum of six officers attend a thirteen-week course on the subject proposed by Georgetown University, and scheduled to begin on October 2. Admittedly, this was a purely stopgap measure that would not adequately meet the Army's overall requirement for trained officers.²

There were, in fact, only seven officers on active duty who were qualified in the field of psychological warfare in 1950. One of these, Lieutenant Colonel John O. Weaver, was sought by the Chief, Army Field Forces, for assignment to the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, to become Chief of

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, Item No. 3, 13 September 1950, Military History Institute.

²Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, Subject: Psychological Warfare Training, 12 September 1950, from Major General Charles L. Bolte, G-3, National Archives.
a projected psychological warfare department. Weaver had served as commanding officer of the combat propaganda team of the Fifth Army in Italy during World War II, and was a graduate of the British psychological warfare school in Cairo. In one of the first actions signed by Brigadier General Robert McClure in his new position of Chief, Psychological Warfare Division (an obvious choice!), this request was forwarded to the Assignment Branch of the Adjutant General and acted upon quickly. Weaver was ordered to report to Fort Riley by December 1950.¹

On October 31, General McClure held his first weekly staff meeting with personnel of his embryonic division. The minutes from this initial meeting give us some valuable insights into McClure's philosophy toward psychological warfare and unconventional warfare. First, he stated that he had "backing from the top down" for psychological warfare, and the division would be authorized a considerable number of personnel. But then he issued a warning: "As a general policy, all officers assigned to this work should watch their step as there is an opinion prevalent among individuals not conversant with psychological warfare that anyone connected with the function is a 'long-haired, starry-eyed' individual." Such a pessimistic note at the outset must have been disquieting to the assembled officers, particularly those who were ambitious. This statement was a commentary on the Army's attitude on psychological warfare—or at least its attitude as perceived by a "true believer" like General McClure. He hastened to add, however, "I think that there is

nothing that is not ninety percent common sense," a rather pragmatic approach, perhaps, to quell the apprehensions of his new subordinates.  

With respect to unconventional warfare, McClure stated that General Bolte agreed with him that the function did not belong in G-3 and should be transferred to the Psychological Warfare Division. It should be remembered that at this point the Psychological Warfare Division--expanded from the Subsidiary Plans Branch--had not yet formally become a separate Special Staff division, and therefore was still under the G-3. In any event, McClure felt that his new organization should possibly be entitled "psychological warfare," with three subdivisions: psychological warfare, cover and deception, and unconventional warfare. We see here evidence of McClure's early feelings about the marriage of psychological and unconventional warfare, but also his perhaps natural tendency to place psychological warfare in a relatively higher priority. This attitude on his part undoubtedly would be a factor in the subsequent co-location of psychological and unconventional warfare units at Fort Bragg in 1952, and the selection of the title, Psychological Warfare Center.  

Finally, on January 15, 1951, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) was officially recognized--but not without difficulty. This was best expressed in a letter by McClure to Major General Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff, EUCOM, on that same day:

Orders have been issued effective today, separating this Division from G-3 and setting it up as a Special Staff division. With most of the stops pulled out it has still taken us four months to get

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1Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Minutes of Psychological Warfare Division Staff Meeting, 31 October 1950, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, Box No. 2, File 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.  

2Ibid.
the administrative responsibility from G-3. Even in time of grave emergency the Pentagon moves slowly.\(^1\)

A note of exasperation, perhaps, that Secretary of the Army Pace would have agreed with. Nonetheless, a new organization, the first of its type in Army Staff history, had been born. Psychological Warfare had evolved from a small section within a branch of G-3 to an office at Special Staff level with direct access to the Chief of Staff.

By early February McClure had briefed the General Council on the organization and function of OCPW and explained the necessity for a rapid organization of unconventional warfare. At this point his views on the organization of his new division were firm—since the division had been recognized and published in orders, he wanted to get an amendment authorizing special operations activities, and he envisaged three divisions: propaganda, unconventional warfare, and support.\(^2\)

As stated in the special regulation that later outlined its organization and functions, the mission of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare was to "formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in those fields." To

\(^1\)Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington 25, D.C., letter to Major General Daniel Nace, Chief of Staff, EUCOM, from Brigadier General McClure, 15 January 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, 091.412 Propaganda, National Archives. General Order No. 1, Department of the Army, 17 January 1951, established the division as of 15 January 1951, General Council Minutes, 24 January 1951, Military History Institute.

\(^2\)Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C., Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 31 January 1951, Military History Institute; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Weekly Staff Meeting, 1 February 1951, RG 319, Army Chief of Special Warfare, Box No. 2, National Archives.
carry out this mission, the office was organized into three major divisions—Psychological Operations, Requirements, and Special Operations. Although the thrust of this organization was on psychological warfare, the words "and special operations" in the above mission statement and the existence of the Special Operations Division are highly significant because it was in this division that plans for creation of the U.S. Army's first formal unconventional warfare capability were formulated. Both the Psychological Operations and Special Operations Divisions were subdivided into branches for plans, operations, and intelligence and evaluation, while the Requirement Division was primarily concerned with matters pertaining to organization, personnel, training, logistics, and research requirements to support both psychological and special operations activities.¹

Clearly, the two major concerns of this unprecedented Army Staff office were psychological and unconventional warfare (or "special operations," as the latter was termed at this time). Over the next sixteen months—a period of frenetic, diverse activity for General McClure and his staff—plans, policies, and decisions were made in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare that were instrumental in the Army's decisions to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to create the 10th Special Forces Group, the first unit of its type in Army history, and finally, to co-locate the two capabilities of psychological and unconventional warfare at this new center. To fully understand why these decisions were made, we now turn to an

¹Department of the Army, Special Regulations No. 10-250-1, 22 May 1951, "Organizations and Functions, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Staff," pp. 11-12; U.S. Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 through June 30, 1951, p. 92.
examination of these two activities in Korea, as seen from the perspective of OCPW—and particularly from that of General McClure.

**OCPW and Psychological Warfare in Korea**

Shortly after the formal establishment of the OCPW, Secretary of the Army Pace again entered the fray to give McClure's embryonic program a well-timed boost of support. In another of his by now well-known memorandums to the Chief of Staff reference to psychological warfare, Pace referred to the establishment of the OCPW (one can almost sense a between-the-lines "and it's about time!")

I am keenly interested in and concerned over the successful development and progress of the psychological warfare program. Its vital importance to national security and defense in the present emergency must be fully recognized by all responsible commanders and staffs throughout the Army.¹

McClure could not have asked for a better entrée in the struggle for recognition and influence that any new organization invariably experiences in a bureaucracy, particularly one that is "different." But the Secretary went even further—he also put in a plug for the special operations part of McClure's office. Referring again to OCPW's organization, he stressed that theater commanders should use it as a model to put their own staffs on a sound basis:

Such a basis should envisage the supervision of a combination of propaganda and unconventional warfare activities [emphasis added] by staff organizations that will provide for effective integration of those activities in such a way as to insure full support of

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Importance of Army-wide Support of the Psychological Warfare Program, from Secretary Pace, 2 February 1951, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War, Decimal File 1951-54, 384-385, Box No. 23, filed with Psy War 385 (2 February 1951), National Archives.
combat operations now being conducted or contemplated and planned for the future. 1

Since Pace heretofore had not mentioned unconventional warfare in his prodding of the Chief of Staff, and since he referenced in this same memorandum a recent discussion with the Chief of Psychological Warfare and members of the Army Policy Council, one could reasonably conclude that the Secretary's apparent endorsement of combining psychological and unconventional warfare planning functions was at least partially influenced by General McClure's views on this concept. At any rate, the philosophy expressed by Pace's memorandum in this regard is significant, for McClure carried it forward in his relationships with both Far East and European theater commands and his attempts to influence their staff organizations, and with Headquarters, Army Field Forces in the United States—culminating in the co-location of psychological and unconventional warfare schooling and capabilities under the Psychological Warfare Center, established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in May 1952.

The "present emergency" that Secretary Pace referred to, of course, was the war in Korea, abetted by heightening cold war tensions with the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union. But he believed that the Korean situation offered an "especial opportunity for highly profitable exploitation" for psychological warfare. 2 Indeed, a key feature of the period under discussion was the intense personal interest in the psychological warfare aspects of the conflict shown by the Secretary—an interest that was of great assistance to General McClure.

Examples of the Secretary's preoccupation with the subject are to be

1Ibid. 2Ibid.
found in his numerous conversations with General McClure and frequent communications with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, General Matthew B. Ridgeway. In early May 1951, Pace called McClure into his office, reiterated his "keen interest" in psychological warfare, and expressed his view that "quality rather than quantity" should be the measure of success in utilization of this tool. He told McClure that he had discussed psychological warfare with General Ridgeway and passed on his desire that an all-out effort be made in the field. Offering to help McClure with his attempts to get the Air Force to furnish a special squadron of aircraft for psychological and unconventional warfare purposes, Pace concluded the conference by asking the General to keep him informed of activities in the field and to seek his assistance if any problem developed.¹ Later in the same month, the Secretary called McClure to inquire whether the Army was prepared for psychological warfare activities "should the military success of UN forces result in routing of the Reds." He also wanted to know if McClure was satisfied with the Far East Command's performance in psychological warfare, and restated his interest in quality rather than quantity in their production of leaflets and radio broadcasts.² By the end of May, Pace was convinced that the time was ripe for the maximum use of psychological warfare in Korea, and conveyed his "great personal

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conversation with the Secretary of the Army, 10 May 1951, by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare, RG 319, Army Chief of Special Warfare, National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Telephone Conversation with Mr. Pace, Sec/Army, 26 May 1951, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, National Archives.
interest in the matter" to General Ridgeway.

The Far East Commander's reply to Pace gives us an excellent snapshot of psychological warfare activities in Korea at this point. Ridgeway stated his plan to materially expand the psychological warfare effort in support of military operations, and indicated that current leaflet operations gave priority to tactical leaflets, "whose themes can be varied on short notice to adjust propaganda emphasis to fit different battle situations." A number of broad themes were being used for these tactical operations, to include good treatment of prisoners, United Nations Materiel superiority, and mounting enemy casualty figures. Strategic propaganda efforts included news sheets, troop leaflets designed to depress morale and increase susceptibility to later tactical propaganda, and civilian leaflets to arouse anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet feeling. Plans were under way to double the weekly leaflet effort of approximately 13 million leaflets. Radio broadcasts, totalling 13 hours daily in the Korean language, would be augmented by short-wave broadcasts in Chinese to reach Chinese troops in Korea, as well as Chinese civilians and troops in Manchuria. While it was too early to determine how large a factor psychological warfare had been in the recent heavy increase in the number of enemy prisoners taken, "preliminary interrogations indicate considerable effectiveness, both by leaflets and by loudspeakers." Ridgeway concluded by stating his belief that regular psychological warfare guidance from Washington was of "considerable importance," since activities were "an integral part of

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1 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Message DA 92760, 31 May 1951, from Chief of Staff, USA, to CINCFE; filed with Psy War 091.412 TS (13 June 1951), Psychological Warfare Far East Command, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, National Archives.
the worldwide US effort in this field and should be closely geared to activities in other areas, especially in the Far East."¹

This latter point by Ridgeway was alertly seized upon by Pace. During meetings with members of the Army Staff, he frequently stressed his endorsement of psychological warfare and urged them to give it their full support. He believed that not enough effort was being put into it, and considered it "the cheapest form of warfare." He emphasized that psychological warfare had to be conducted within the framework of national policy, and that the situation during negotiations in Korea illustrated this point. Explaining that he felt a responsibility to "do something" to ensure that necessary high-level government policy views on the subject were prepared and properly coordinated with field psychological warfare, he directed that General McClure prepare a memorandum stating "what he as Secretary of the Army should do" in this matter.²

General Ridgeway followed up his desire for "more positive and definitive policy guidance" for psychological warfare in a message to Pace in August 1951. He also asked for help in providing a few qualified personnel for a psychological warfare planning group in FECOM, adding an interesting note concerning the primary qualities that he desired in those personnel: "I personally rate integrity and intellectual capacity above experience, for the latter without

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Message C 64846, 13 June 1951, from CINCPE to SECARMY; filed with Psy War 091.412 TS (16 June 1951), Psychological Warfare Far East Command, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: ORO Briefing for Secretary of the Army Pace, 23 July 1951, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, National Archives.
both of the former is a liability, not an asset.

Pace's "Personal for Ridgeway" reply again demonstrated his interest in this rather specialized field: "Psychological warfare can and must become one of our most effective weapons in combating communism. I am anxious to take whatever steps I can to achieve this end." Pace indicated that the recent establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), headed by Gordon Gray, should be able to provide the national level policy guidance needed, and that "every effort is being exerted to make the board fully operational at the earliest possible date." As directed by President Truman, the PSB was created to provide more effective planning of psychological operations within the framework of approved national policies, and to coordinate the psychological operations of all governmental departments and agencies.

The Secretary's attempts to influence the situation in Korea went beyond these communications with FECOM. He sent a copy of Ridgeway's cable to Gordon Gray, together with his reply. Additionally, McClure forwarded copies of the same message to the JCS, urging them to emphasize to the Psychological Strategy Board that General Ridgeway's request for high-level policy guidance be included "among the foremost of the Board's priority operational matters."

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., unnumbered cable from General Ridgeway to Secretary Pace, 17 August 1951, filed with Psy War 091.412 FECOM TS (17 September 1951), RG 319 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Message DA 81176, 11 September 1951, from Secretary Pace to Ridgeway; filed with Psy War 091.412 FECOM TS (17 September 1951), RG 319 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.

3Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, Subject: Psychological Warfare Policy Guidance for FECOM, Psy War 091.412 FECOM TS (17 September 1951), RG 319 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.
Unquestionably, Secretary Pace's intense interest in the Korean situation, and in particular his preoccupation with psychological warfare, significantly impacted upon the attitudes and decision of key decision-makers in the Far East Command. Moreover, his enthusiasm for the subject must have certainly been an aid to General McClure in his endeavors to carve out a niche for the OCPW within the Washington bureaucracy. McClure was to make valuable use of the Secretary's sponsorship of psychological warfare, particularly in his relations with the Far East Command.

General McClure's attitude toward the Far East Command's conduct of psychological warfare activities was mixed. On the one hand, he often expressed satisfaction with FECOM's progress in this area, was publicly complimentary of its efforts, and enthusiastically attempted to give it assistance. On the other hand, he was privately critical of psychological warfare operations in the Far East, and felt that the Command there was not willing to accept the help offered. Undeterred, he intended "to put pressure on them to let us help them."

McClure's primary concern was with the Far East Command's organization for psychological warfare. Initially, the responsibility for psychological warfare resided in the G-2 Division of Headquarters, FECOM. Reflecting his own World War II experience in establishing the PWD/SHAEF and, more recently, with the OCPW, McClure believed that a special staff division combining both psychological and unconventional warfare functions would enhance its stature and facilitate operations. Thus, he urged in letters, reports, and visits

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum of Weekly Staff Meetings, 8 March 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 020 Staff Meetings, Box No. 2, National Archives.
that this step be taken. He also recommended that the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (R&L) Group become the theater operating agency for psychological warfare when it arrived from the United States later in 1951.¹ At this point, in early 1951, the only U.S. psychological warfare units that the Department of the Army had been able to provide to FECOM was the Tactical Information Detachment, a small unit of a little over twenty personnel.

When the North Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment—organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1947—was the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the U.S. Army. Sent to Korea in the fall of 1950, it was reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, and served as Eighth Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the conflict.² Tactical propaganda, sometimes called combat propaganda, was directed at a specific audience in the forward battle areas and in support of localized operations.³ Mobile loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and aircraft became a primary means of conducting tactical propaganda in Korea. One noteworthy example was the use of a C-47 aircraft-mounted loudspeaker that in 1951 circled overhead 1,800 Chinese Communist troops and induced them to surrender.⁴

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Informal Report as a Result of Visit of Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, DA, 24 April 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, Psy War 319.1 TS (24 April 1951), Box No. 7, National Archives.


It should be remembered that as early as 1947, while there was no real military psychological organization in being, a small planning staff—a Psychological Warfare Section (PWS)—had been created in the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Far East Command. Although the PWS had absolutely no field operating units, with hasty augmentation it did begin using leaflets and radio two days after the invasion.

Obviously, the PWS could not long or efficiently support full-scale strategic operations, so the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, and shipped to Korea in July 1951. The 1st RB&L Group was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations.\(^1\) Strategic propaganda was intended to further long-term strategic aims, and was directed at enemy forces, populations, or enemy-occupied areas.\(^2\) To accomplish these tasks the 1st RB&L Group had the equipment and capability to produce newspapers, leaflets, and augment or replace other means of broadcasting radio propaganda. The Group supervised a radio station network known as the Voice of the United Nations, and often produced more than twenty million leaflets per week, disseminated as propaganda by aircraft or by specially designed artillery shells.\(^3\) Example themes for the leaflets were inducements for enemy soldiers to surrender, and those intended to bolster Korean civilian morale by proclaiming United Nations support.

Although the RB&L Group was a concept accelerated to meet the require-

\(^1\)Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, pp. 301-302, 304.


ments of the Korean Conflict (plans were initiated by G-3, Department of the
Army, in early 1950), it performed functions similar to those deemed neces-
sary to the conduct of psychological warfare in World War II. And in its
Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company, a direct ancestral linkage could be
shown with the mobile radio broadcasting companies formed under PWD/SHAPE to
conduct propaganda operations in North Africa and the European Theater during
1944-45. In point of fact, the MRB companies were the basic units organized
to prosecute tactical psychological warfare during World War II, although it
later became established that radio was essentially a strategic weapon and
had no place in a purely tactical psychological unit. ¹ Both the strategic
propaganda concept embodied in the R3&L Group and the tactical propaganda idea
expressed by the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company were to figure prominently
in the psychological warfare capability subsequently formed as part of the
Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.

By April 1952, when the military situation had stalemated generally
along the 38th parallel, three different types of psychological warfare were
under way on the Korean Peninsula. "Strategic" psychological warfare was car-
ried out by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ FCOM, located in Tokyo,
having made the transition to a special staff section, as recommended by
McClure. It was assisted in this endeavor by the 1st R3&L Group, the head-
quar ters of which was also located in Tokyo. Leaflet operations were confined
to North Korea less a 40-mile zone directly north of the military lines.

¹Psychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western Europe," p.
19; McClure, "Trends in Psychological Warfare," p. 10; Daugherty and Janowitz,
A Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. 132; The Intelligence School, Fort
Riley, Kansas, "Tactical Psychological Warfare; The Combat Psychological War-
Radio operations covered North and South Korea as well as parts of Manchuria and China. "Tactical" psychological warfare was directed by the Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, of HQ Eighth Army, eventually located in Seoul. Assisted by the 1st L&L Company, this division directed leaflet and loudspeaker operations within 40 miles of the military line of contact. "Consolidation" propaganda was carried out by the State Department's U.S. Information Service, based in Pusan. Its printed and visual media operations were confined to that part of Korea under the civil administration of the ROK government. Radio operations in this area were under the control of field teams of the 1st RB&L Group's Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.1

To return to General McClure's views with respect to psychological warfare activities in Korea, another concern was what he considered to be the failure to use Korea as a profitable testing ground or laboratory. He believed that the campaign there provided great opportunities for both experimentation and testing of methods and equipment, but expressed to the Chief of Staff in August 1951 his disappointment in the results to that point. As an example of what he had in mind, McClure suggested that noise devices for spreading of terror could be used with helicopters.2

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief, Psychological Operations Division, Subject: Report on Field Trip to HQ, FECOM and Korea, Captain James J. Kelleher, Jr., Operations Branch, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, 333-334, Psy War 335 (22 April 1952), Box No. 14, National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Briefing of the Chief of Staff on Letter from General Doyle Hickey, Chief of Staff, FECOM, and FECOM Interim Report on Comprehensive Psychological Warfare Plans, 7 August 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 1, Psy War 020 C/Staff TS (9 August 1951), National Archives.
General McClure was particularly critical of the air support for psychological warfare in Korea, and utilized every tool at his disposal in an attempt to improve the situation. In a "Dear Charles" letter to the G-2, GHQ FECOM, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, he unveiled his concerns:

I only wish that aircraft were assigned for the tactical leafletting and strategic leafletting so that specific targets and timing could be given with an assurance that they would be hit. The New York Times Magazine Section two weeks ago carried a photograph of the interior of a C-47, showing a couple of harassed soldiers attempting to throw out handfuls of loose leaflets which apparently were blowing all over the interior.

Demonstrating his own experience in World War II, McClure continued:

I feel that the Air Forces have fallen down badly on us in not using, at the beginning of this trouble, the techniques that we would up with in 1945, such as: special leaflet squadrons, fibre casings for leaflet bombs (of which there are 80,000 here in the Arsenal), regular operations plans and orders, printing and delivery on call, etc. We are still putting pressures on back here but can do very little unless FEC makes this type of operation a military requirement.1

During his visit to FECOM in April 1951, McClure again presented his views on the subject of air support, stating that "unless aircraft demands are made operations requirements, the airdrops will continue on a catch-as-catch-can basis." The C-47, he felt, was inappropriate for leaflet drops, thus "Front line support suffers for lack of delivery by fighter bomber." He recommended that a special squadron be organized for psychological and unconventional warfare purposes.2

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., letter to Major General Charles L. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, Far East Command, from Brigadier General McClure, 10 March 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, Psy War 091.412 (10 March 1951), Box No. 6, National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Informal Report as a Result of Visit of Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, DA, 24 April 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, Psy War 319.1 TS (24 April 1951), Box No. 7, National Archives.
Having outlined his basic themes, McClure hammered away at them with every opportunity. He told the U.S. Air Force Director of Operations in May that "we were using 1918 methods of dropping leaflets over front line troops and that it was both inefficient and expensive," and requested that the special air wings being organized to support CIA activities in Korea be utilized for psychological warfare. In June he fired off a memorandum to the JCS recommending that discussions be initiated between the Services in order to achieve maximum utilization of all tactical aircraft for the support of psychological warfare. He forcefully expressed his views to both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army, both of whom attempted to influence the situation in discussions and correspondence with their counterparts in the Air Force.¹

Writing to the Chief of Staff, Far East Command, on "the question of air support for psychological warfare operations," McClure charged that such support in actual practice was worked out locally, with the theater commander unable to obtain a specific allocation of aircraft. Observing that the "un-desirability of such a haphazard arrangement was apparent in the European theater during World War II and is in great measure borne out by what I saw

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conference with General Edwards, Director of Operations, USAF, 10 May 1951, Psy War 337 (10 May 1951); Memorandum for the Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, Subject: Participation by the Tactical Air Forces of the Services in Psychological Warfare, 14 June 1951, Psy War 360 (14 June 1951); Memorandum for Record, Subject: Briefing of the Chief of Staff on letter from General Doyle Hickey, Chief of Staff, FECOM, and FECOM Interim Report on Comprehensive Psychological Warfare Plans, 7 August 1951, Psy War 020 C/Staff TS (9 August 1951); Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force, Subject: Equipment for Psychological Operations in Korea, 9 June 1951, from Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of the Army, OSA 400 Korea; Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Utilization of Aircraft in the Conduct of Psychological Warfare, 24 July 1951, by Colonel Frederick S. Haydon, Chief, Plans Branch, Psy War 373 S (24 July 1951); RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.
and covered in my report to General Ridgeway during my recent inspection of psychological warfare operations in Korea," McClure boldly reiterated his proposal: "The solution we arrived at in Europe, and which I firmly believe is the remedy now, was to place certain specified aircraft under the operational control of the Psychological Warfare Staff of the Senior Commander." But even before this step, such support "should be determined to be an operational requirement, and this determination should be made now, once and for all." This was rather forceful language to be used in addressing a three-star general, and smacked of telling the Theater Commander how to do his job. Perhaps the knowledge that he had the support of the Secretary of the Army gave McClure a measure of confidence in these matters. At any rate, the point that he was trying to make, McClure believed, was basic to the whole question—psychological warfare must be recognized as important by the Theater Commander. Having once established this premise, it was "simply a question of the necessity for the theater staff to control its operational tools in order to fulfill its mission efficiently and effectively."¹

This was vintage McClure. His campaign to improve the air support for psychological warfare in Korea is illustrative of the strategies and techniques employed by this articulate, energetic "true believer" in his attempts to influence events in the theater commands.

Still another example of General McClure's technique was his reaction to "Operation Killer," a phrase used by HQ FECOM in its press releases to describe

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., letter to Lieutenant General Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff, Far East Command, 13 July 1951, from Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, RG 319, Army Staff, Psy War Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 360-370.64, Box No. 19, Psy War 369 (13 July 1951), National Archives.
operations against the North Korean and Chinese forces. The following passage in a letter written to Major General Willoughby is again illustrative of McClure's approach:

I have personally been disturbed by the comparatively few Chinese prisoners we are taking, either by surrender or by capture. I realize that they are not fighting as the Chinese did in their civil wars in the three-year period that I sat along the Shankaivan Railway Line. On the other hand, for two thousand years the Chinese have been induced to change sides, even to that of the Japanese, by considerations of personal gain or creature comforts. Is it possible that the "Operation Killer" and the "Hunter Killer Teams" have been so widely publicized to Chinese forces that they do not believe that they would be allowed to surrender? The wide publicity and constant repetition of the "killer" intent of our operations and the gloating of the press, and apparently even the individuals in the Battle Area, over the numbers killed versus the numbers captured, has led to a good deal of unfavorable international reactions.

Demonstrating that he did indeed understand the perspective of the combat soldier, McClure added:

I fully recognize that our troops must adopt a tough, hard-boiled killer attitude if they are going to not only survive, but to win these battles. I wonder, however, if that indoctrination, which, I repeat, is very necessary, needs to be widely publicized in the press and broadcast to our enemies.¹

Willoughby's response to McClure acknowledged that the "unfavorable psychological effects caused by recent publicity of such terms as 'Operation Killer' has been recognized here, and you will note that Eighth Army news releases have avoided such phraseology." His reply also indicated acceptance of several other McClure suggestions on propaganda themes and techniques.²

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., letter to Major General Charles A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, from Brigadier General McClure, 12 March 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, Psy War 091.412 (10 March 1951), National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Thus, through personal and official correspondence discussions with key personnel, adroit use of his relationship with the Secretary of the Army, and visits to the Far East Command—both by himself and members of his staff—McClure kept his finger on the pulse of events in Korea at the same time that he struggled to staff the OCPW and to establish a niche for his new organization within the Pentagon bureaucracy.

These efforts by OCPW to help were not always appreciated by HQ FECOM. As an example, in January 1952 General Hickey wrote to McClure questioning a UP story entitled "Psy War Accounts for Third of POW's." Hickey felt that the story was an exaggeration, stating:

While psychological warfare has unquestionably been one factor in lowering the combat effectiveness of enemy soldiers and in influencing many of them to desert, it seems evident that in almost all cases the action of our ground troops, supported by other combat arms, remains the strongest and most direct reason for the capture of prisoners.¹

In this instance, McClure demonstrated considerable tact in his response, telling Hickey, "I share fully your concern over the tendency to overplay the results of psychological warfare operations as evidenced in the United Press dispatch which you brought to my attention in your letter of 13 January."

Never losing an opportunity to sell his wares, however, the General further elaborated:

On the whole, I believe that we have been successful in our determined effort to keep psychological warfare in a proper context


¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter from Lieutenant General Doyle C. Hickey, Chief of Staff, GHQ, Far East Command, 13 January 1952, to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff), Admin Office, Psychological Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 1, Psy War 000.7 (13 January 1952), National Archives.
within the "family of weapons." My views on this point are included in the Secretary's report which states: "Psychological warfare has been firmly recognized as an integral member of our family of weapons. While we realize fully that this mode of operation is not decisive by itself, it is also certain that, in combination with the conventional combat weapons, psychological warfare will contribute materially to the winning of wars." ¹

The report that McClure referred to was the Secretary of the Army's semi-annual report, included in the Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense--illustrating again the similarity of views between Secretary Pace and the Chief, OCPW, on the subject of psychological warfare. This exchange of letters, however, is also illustrative of the tendency of conventional commanders to be sensitive to actions that appear to downgrade the "primary role of the combat role of the combat troops in the field," as Hickey expressed it, and thus to consider psychological warfare as strictly an ancillary, supporting activity. As an infantry officer, McClure recognized this tendency, and his reply to General Hickey reflects an attempt both to placate the conventional commander's view--to take a balanced position, that is--but also to insure that "psywar" received the recognition that he felt it deserved. McClure walked this particular tightrope often.

Other criticisms by the Psywar Section, Far East Command, of the support received from the United States included a serious shortage of personnel with psychological warfare training or experience, particularly during the first eighteen to twenty-four months of the war; lack of firm, prompt high-level policy guidance and operational directives; the limitations of current printing,

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter from Brigadier General McClure to Lieutenant General Hickey, 28 January 1952, RG 319 (Army Staff), Admin Office, Psychological Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 1, Psy War 000.7 (13 January 1952), National Archives.
loudspeaker and dissemination equipment; a serious shortage of linguists; and a lack of understanding of psychological warfare capabilities by commanders and troops at all echelons, which FECOM attributed to an apparently ineffective orientation program in the United States. This latter problem area was finally overcome, according to a FECOM report, through high-level emphasis and orientation by the Psywar Section within the theater; at the end of the conflict "all division and Corps commanders were enthusiastic supporters of psywar, and demanding psywar support beyond ability of psywar agencies to produce."1

Notwithstanding these differences of perspectives between the Far East Command and OCPW, it is apparent that General McClure and his staff genuinely strove both to assist FECOM and to influence the organization and conduct of psychological warfare in Korea. In large measure, these efforts were successful—due principally to the personal interest and sponsorship of Secretary Pace, to the provision of psychological warfare personnel and units by OCPW, and to the energetic, dedicated leadership of General McClure. Unconventional warfare activity in Korea, however, was another story.

OCPW and Unconventional Warfare in Korea

General McClure's attitude toward the Far East Command's conduct of unconventional warfare operations was similar to his views on its psychological warfare effort, and perhaps even more critical. His criticisms focused on two broad areas: overall organization and planning for unconventional warfare by

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., AFFE Cable No. EX 22958 to DEPTAR Wash, DC for Psy War, 090425Sep 53, R: 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, 333-334, Box No. 14, Psy War 334 S (9 September 1953), National Archives.
FEOM, and CIA involvement.

When the Korean War started, even the minimal psywar organization that existed in FEOM was more than that for unconventional warfare. Operations were initiated in the winter of 1950 by the G-3, Eighth Army, when it appeared that the potential existed for the use of disaffected North Korean civilian personnel in behind-the-lines activities. Officers and enlisted personnel—many of them with no previous experience in unconventional warfare—were recruited from within the theater to train and direct these native personnel in guerrilla-type activities. To control these operations, the G-3 Miscellaneous Group, Eighth Army, was initially formed, later redesignated the Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit, then finally called the Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army unit. According to its TD, the mission of the 8086th was:

a. To develop and direct partisan warfare by training in sabotage indigenous groups and individuals both within Allied lines and behind enemy lines.

b. Supply partisan groups and agents operating behind enemy lines by means of water and air transportation.

Although tactical conditions dictated that initially more emphasis be placed on operations as opposed to training, by early 1952 the 8240th had three control organizations for guerrilla operations known as LEOPARD, WOLF-PACK, and KIRKLAND; air support—C-46s and C-47s—was provided by BAKER Section. All of the control organizations were based on the islands off the east

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1 Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army Korea, Table of Distribution Number 80-8066, Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit, undated, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, 400.112 to 413.52, Box No. 26, Psy War 400.34 (S) (1951), National Archives; Interview with Robert Bodroghy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15 May 1979. As a young Army officer, Bodroghy was a member of the LEOPARD organization.
and west coasts of the Korean Peninsula. While their strengths varied, by
late 1952, for example, LEOPARD reported 5,500 combat effectives and WOLFPACK,
6,800. The forces of these organizations operated as groups from centers
within North Korea while others conducted tactical raids, ambushes, and
amphibious operations from the UN-held offshore islands. While U.S. person-
nel often accompanied the tactical operations, rarely were they assigned in-
definitely to the guerrilla forces located within mainland North Korea. As
an example of their hit-and-run activity, the Far East Command reported a
total of 63 raids and 25 patrols launched against Communist forces during
the period November 15-21, 1952, resulting in 1,382 enemy casualties—al-
though as was often the case in these type operations, the casualty figures
may have been inflated.¹

WOLFPACK provides an excellent example of the manner in which these
unconventional warfare organizations evolved and operated. Established in
March 1952, using the standard battalion organization as a guide, the initial
force had an aggregate strength of 4,000 North Koreans. At the beginning, the
U.S. personnel consisted of four officers—the commander, one other in WOLF-
PACK headquarters, and two in subordinate units—and three enlisted men, two
of whom were communications specialists. Combat operations were required con-
currently with the process of organizing, equipping, and training. Initially,

¹Interview with Robert Bodroghy; Psy War 091 Korea (31 December 1952),
Weekly Summary from Korea of items of Operational Interest for Period 16-22
December 1952, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files,
1951-54, 091-091.412, Box No. 7, National Archives; HQ Far East Command,
Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army Unit, Guerrilla Section, Guerrilla
Operations Outline, 1952, to Commanders of LEOPARD, WOLFPACK, KIRKLAND, and
BAKER Section, 11 April 1952, by LTC Jay D. Vanderpool, OIC Guerrilla Divi-
sion, filed with Staff visit of Colonel Bradford Butler, Jr., March 1953,
RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.
six battalion-type units were organized, each with a separate island operating base, and by June 1952 two more units had been created. By December 1952 the WOLFPACK staff consisted, in U.S. personnel, of a commander, S3, S2, two enlisted radio operators, one operations NCO, and one intelligence NCO. The S3 and S2 were lieutenants without previous unconventional warfare or special operations experience. Only three of the eight subordinate units were commanded by U.S. officers (captains), the others by North Koreans. The captain generally functioned as a commander of a battalion-size group. A total of two enlisted men served in these subordinate units, as general assistants and, on occasion, as deputies to the captains to whom they were assigned.¹

The operations conducted by WOLFPACK units were generally divided into three categories: coastal, intermediate, and interior. Coastal-type operations were planned on a conventional basis with forces of up to 800 men, often involved the use of air and naval fire support, and had as their primary objective the killing and capture of personnel. Intermediate operations took place further inland, were executed by groups of five to ten men over a period of three to five days, and generally directed against pinpoint targets such as gun positions, wire lines, and targets vulnerable to sniping and demolitions. Interior operations were representative of the more classic guerrilla warfare operations in that a small element made an initial reconnaissance, followed by a larger increment, then recruiting in the operational area and infiltration of the final increment. Planning usually called for these forces to be

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Notes on WOLFPACK, Source: Major R. M. Ripley, Series No. 037760, Former Commanding Officer, by Colonel Bradford Butler, Jr., Chief, Special Forces Operations and Training Branch, Special Forces Division, 29 December 1952, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives; interview with Robert Bodroghy.
infiltrated in the spring and to remain until November of the same year.¹

In 1953, cadre from WOLFPACK and the other organizations subordinate to the Far East Command Liaison Detachment (8240th Army Unit) were utilized to form what was called the United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea (UNPFK), consisting of five Partisan Infantry Regiments and one Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment. It was planned that this "first United Nations Partisan Division" would reach a strength of 20,000 personnel by March 1953. Guidelines to the Regimental Commanders by the 8240th included the following advice:

Initiative and aggressiveness tempered by calm judgment will be encouraged. Avoid trying to win the war by yourself; pace the attack in accordance with your advantage; when the advantage has passed, get away to fight another day. Hit and run; these are the guerrilla's tactics. The planning of such an operation should include an escape route and rallying point. Substitute speed and surprise for mass.²

Although this was classic, Mao Tse-tung type advice for the conduct of guerrilla warfare, as the guerrilla organization became larger and more conventional, according to one participant, the effectiveness of its operations decreased correspondingly.³

To oversee these unconventional warfare operations in Korea, Headquarters, FE_COM in Tokyo established the Far East Command Liaison Group (FEC/LG), under the operational control of the G-2. The CIA's operations, on the other hand, were controlled by the Documents Research Division, a part of the Special

¹Ibid.

²Headquarters, Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army unit, Guerrilla Operations Outline 1953, by LTC Jay D. Vanderpool, OIC Guer-rilla Division, 22 January 1953, filed with Staff Visit of Colonel Bradford Butler, etc., March 1953, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.

³Interview with Robert Bodroghy.
Staff, Headquarters, FECOM, and headed by a CIA representative. Within Korea, CIA operations—both those of the OSO and OPC—were controlled by the Joint Advisory Commission Korea (JACK), the head of which was a military officer assigned to the CIA. Activities of the CIA ran the gamut of both covert intelligence and unconventional warfare and included the placing of agents for intelligence and to assist downed pilots in escape and evasion, sabotage, small-boat patrolling on both the east and west coasts for tactical information, the organization of stay-behind indigenous forces in certain areas, shallow penetration patrolling to augment combat patrolling and to gain information for large tactical commanders, and some guerrilla warfare. As one might have expected, the variety of unconventional warfare activities engaged in by both the CIA and the Services resulted in some conflicting and overlapping interests.¹

In an attempt to eliminate this conflict, an organization for Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea (CCRAK) was activated in December 1951. Its purpose was to centralize direction of all services and CIA unconventional warfare operations at Headquarters, FECOM, by combining them in one organization to support U.S. forces in Korea. The CCRAK was put under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief Far East, but continued under the staff supervision of G-2. The Deputy Chief, CCRAK, was an individual desig-

¹Headquarters, Far East Command, Letter from Major General Willoughby to Major General Bolte, Subject: Covert Intelligence Activities, Korea, 12 January 1951, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 5, 091 Korea, National Archives; Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Subject: Report on Trip to FECOM, 26 November - 17 December 1951, by Colonel W. H. S. Wright, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 323.3-333, Box No. 9, Pay War 333 TS (20 December 1951), National Archives.
nated by the Chief, Documents Research Section (CIA). Colonel Archibald Stuart, U.S. Army, was installed as the Chief, CCRAK, and soon promoted to brigadier general. Essentially, the unconventional warfare organizational framework of the services and the CIA in Korea remained unchanged, however, with continuing examples of lack of coordination among their activities.¹

It was this apparent lack of coordination of unconventional warfare activities and relative autonomy enjoyed by the CIA that most concerned General McClure. In early 1951 he had already commented on the "unusual organization" that FECOM had established, "whereby responsibility for covert operations and special operations behind the lines is placed in the office of the AC of S, G-2, in addition to its intelligence responsibility." He thought that such operations should be the responsibility of G-3, or, even better, of a special staff division for both psychological warfare and special operations.² As we have seen, the Chief, OCPW, had recommended to the FECOM that such a division be established—and it was, in June 1951, but apparently the new division's responsibilities for special operations existed in name only, and in reality resided within the G-2. Calling the G-3's attention to the apparent contravention by FECOM of its own general order which established a Special Operations Section within the Psychological Warfare Division, McClure recommended that a cable be dispatched to CINCFE requesting clarification of theater command and staff organization for planning and conduct of overt and

¹Ibid.; interview with Robert Podroghy.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject: Reports on Special Operations in Korea, 15 March 1951, by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War, Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, 091, Box No. 6, Psy War 091 Korea (15 March 1951), National Archives.
covert unconventional warfare and psychological warfare and the relationship of CIA/OPC to that organization. 1

The recommendation was returned to OCPW without action a full two months later with the comment, "[W]hen the psychological warfare organization within YECOM has been established on a firm basis, it is considered that representatives from your office should go to the Far East Command to discuss psychological warfare activities." While this response from G-3 may have been an attempt to keep an overzealous OCPW from appearing to question the prerogatives of a theater commander, it was also indicative of deeper tensions between McClure's office and those of the principal staff agencies--particularly the G-2 and G-3. These tensions were the result of many factors, to include the inevitable personality conflicts that often develop when strong-willed men disagree over issues. For example, there was "bad feeling" between McClure and the G-2, Major General Belling, part of which was due to jurisdictional differences over the staff responsibility for escape and evasion. Perhaps the major factor, however, was the belief of many staff officers that the relatively new fields of psychological and unconventional warfare were "incidental activities" that demanded a larger share of attention and resources than was justified in terms of their real value to the Army. This was particularly true of the younger field, unconventional warfare, and unfortunately the single-minded dedication with which some of McClure's staff pursued the creation of Special Forces alienated many of those with whom they had to coordinate. 2

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to: ACoFS, G-3, Subject: CINCFE Organization for Covert Operations and Clandestine Intelligence, 3 August 1951, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 2, Psy War 040 CIA TS (20 July 1951), National Archives.

2Ibid.; response from G-3 was dated 2 October 1951; also, interview with
Undeterred by the G-3 rebuff, McClure tried other tactics to emphasize his point on staff organization. Writing to the Chief of Staff, FECOM, in October 1951, he observed:

I understand that in the setup of your new Psywar Division you have not yet reached a firm decision on the placing of the special operations and particularly guerrilla warfare and similar type activities. I strongly reiterate my comment to you on my visit to your Headquarters in April, that Psywar and Special Operations are so interrelated that they should be under the same Staff Division.¹

With perhaps some exaggeration, he added: "We have found the organization here at the Department of the Army level to be working splendidly and in complete harmony with other Staff Division, both General and Special."

McClure's principal concern about placing special operations under G-2 was that it might therefore become relegated to a lesser priority, thus:

While Special Operations has some aspects of intelligence gathering, that is by no means its principal mission, and if it remains under G-2 risks being subordinated to the intelligence field. All our planning here contemplates the separation of the intelligence field from the Special Operations field . . . . I feel very strongly that the Special Operations is as it states an operation more appropriately monitored by G-3 than G-2.

The recommendation had little effect, so, several months later, McClure decided to try another tack. He prepared a comprehensive analysis of the Far East Command's organization for psychological and special operations for General Mark Clark, who had replaced General Ridgeway as Commander-in-Chief Far East in April 1952. Reviewing his recommendation to Ridgeway in April

Colonel (Retired) John B. B. Trussell, 7 May 1979; a review of the OCPW, G-2 and G-3 files reveals numerous instances of policy differences.

1951 to establish an organization to handle psychological and special operations and the subsequent FECOM general order in June 1951 to establish such an office, McClure observed:

While I have no desire to prescribe or unduly influence the organization which should be adopted by any Theater Commander, I would like to point out the fact that Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ FECOM has to date assumed only those functions pertaining to Psychological Warfare. Special Operations has remained under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.¹

As a result of a JCS message in August 1951, CIA and Covert Operations in Korea had been placed under CINFE. The activation of CCRAK was an attempt to bring all behind-the-line operations under a single command agency, but it remained under the general staff supervision of G-2, FEC, as McClure reminded Clark. Additionally—and this was a particularly crucial point with the Chief, OCPW—CIA, FEC insisted that CIA Korea (JACK) be maintained as an integral organization and remain under the control of CIA, Far East.

Based on frequent field trips to FECCM by members of his office and their background experience, plus a comprehensive debriefing of a former member of CCRAK, McClure offered the following conclusions in his analysis for Clark:

a. G2, FEC, General Staff supervision of CCRAK and all behind-the-line operations has resulted in emphasis on intelligence, rather than adequate developing indigenous forces (guerrilla) in North Korea and in support of Eighth Army.

b. To obtain a balance of G2-G3 interest, this office is of the opinion that Special Operations functions should be placed in the Psychological Warfare Section, FEC.

c. In order to eliminate duplication of personnel, equipment, and facilities, and to insure efficient coordinated operations, CIA,

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Clark, Subject: Psychological Warfare Matters, 2 May 1952, by Brigadier General McClure, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 6, Perv War 091.412 TS, National Archives.
Korea, should be integrated into a joint task force organization (Army, Navy, Air, and CIA) under the command of CINCPAC.

d. The organizational integrity policy advocated by CIA is a basic factor adversely affecting Special Forces operations in Korea.

e. Highly qualified personnel for key positions in Special Forces furnished in accordance with a special FEC requisition are not fully utilized in this field.1

These conclusions and their supporting discussion vividly depict the extent of OCPW's disapproval with the autonomous CIA role in Korea. While all behind-the-line operations were ostensibly under the control of CINCPE, in reality, McClure argued, a dual chain of command existed. The Commander of CCRAK took his orders from CINCPE; the Deputy Chief, CCRAK received his marching orders from Documents Research Division (CIA Far East), who in turn received their guidance from CIA Headquarters in Washington. At the operational level, this meant that JACK (CIA, Korea) did not carry out missions in support of Eighth Army without authority from CIA, Far East. Cooperation on the coordination of those unconventional warfare operations run by CCRAK and Eighth Army was too dependent on the personalities of key individuals, he felt. Ironically, the CIA in Korea depended heavily on the utilization of military personnel integrated into their organization, and often engaged in activities similar to those conducted by Eighth Army—but without proper overall coordination. All in all, McClure argued, CIA's insistence on organizational integrity resulted in an allegedly Joint Command--CCRAK—that had no authority to exercise command jurisdiction over CIA personnel and efforts, in unnecessary duplication of personnel and activities, and in multiple channels that complicated the coordination and integration of operations. Together with the lack of overall formal planning and training for unconven-

1Ibid.
tional warfare by CCRK or any other agency, and the emphasis placed on in-
telligence as opposed to guerrilla warfare, this added up to a situation
wherein the potential for behind-the-lines operations was far from being re-
alized, McClure and his staff believed. As we shall see, these differences
with the CIA were the harbinger of similar frustrations encountered by OCPW
in its efforts to create Special Forces and to plan for their employment in
Europe, and is a major theme in the evolution of the Army's attempt to cre-
ate its own special warfare capability.

Shortly after his memorandum to General Clark, McClure reiterated his
views to the G-3: "I believe that the unconventional warfare organization
for Korea, including CIA/OPC participation therein reflects fundamental and
serious defects, specifically for the conduct of guerrilla warfare." These
latter activities were criticized as "essentially minor in consequence and
sporadic in nature" and FECOM lacked "an overall, integrated program of
Special Forces operations in Korea." It is interesting to note that OCPW
began to use the term "Special Forces Operations" as differentiated from
"special operations," to describe U.S. Army participation in guerrilla war-
fare activities. "Special Operations," through long usage in the Army and as
outlined in "Field Service Regulations" (FM 100-5), related to "night com-
bat," "jungle operations," "joint amphibious operations," and similar activi-
ties. 

1 Ibid.

2 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Subject:
Revised Discussion of Queries Concerning Guerrilla Warfare, 23 May 1952, by
Brigadier General McClure, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS
Decimal Files, Box No. 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (23 May 1952), National Archives;
Actually, few Special Forces personnel were used for unconventional warfare operations in Korea. The 10th Special Forces Group was not officially created until May 1952, at which time it began training and continued recruiting efforts for personnel. Although Headquarters FECOM was urged by OCPW in November 1952 and January 1953 to requisition Special Forces staff personnel and detachments, this was not accomplished until early 1953, resulting in the deployment of fifty-five officers and nine enlisted men from the 10th Special Forces Group during March, April, and May of that year. Some of these personnel were disillusioned with their assignments, believing that their Special Forces and airborne training had not been properly utilized. More importantly, however, there were no Special Forces operational detachments, as opposed to individuals, requested and employed by the Far East Command. One would have thought that this could have provided an excellent opportunity to both utilize and test the unconventional warfare doctrine and organizations being developed in the United States. Obviously General McClure thought so, because he complained on numerous occasions of the difficulty encountered by OCPW in getting experience data from FECOM and in having them conduct "laboratory" tests of guerrilla operations.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Memorandum for Colonel D. V. Johnson, Assistant Chief, Plans Division, ACoS, G-3, Subject: Responsibilities of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Unconventional Warfare, from Brigadier General McClure, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (26 October 1951), National Archives.

\(^1\)Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group Airborne, Fort Bragg, NC, Letter to Commanding Officer, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, Subject: Situation of Special Forces Officers in FECOM, 19 May 1953, by Colonel Aaron Bank, Commanding Officer, filed with Psy War 220.3 (14 May 1953), RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Major General Riley F. Ennis, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, CHQ, FECOM, from Colonel William J. Blythe, Chief, Special Forces Division, 24 November 1952, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National...
Although McClure continued throughout his tenure as Chief, OCPW, to have reservations about the Far East Command's organization and conduct of unconventional warfare, not everyone shared his views. A staff visit to FECOM by a member of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division in late 1951 confirmed the fact that the organization for the "covert" aspects of unconventional warfare did not follow the general lines of command and staff responsibility established by OCPW, but also resulted in the observation that there was little inclination to do so:

There is nowhere within FEC a desire to organize covert activities under a Psychological Warfare Section as in D/A [Department of the Army]. The organization is suitable to the personalities and operations within the theater. It is sound, workable, and has the unqualified backing of both the military and CIA personnel concerned, from top to bottom. Officers within the theater are of the opinion, and rightly so, that the theater should be free to solve its organizational problems in its own way; that what may seem ideal organizationally to far-off Washington is not necessarily the best solution to those more nearly under the guns.

The tone of this report indicates that there was some sympathy by JCS with FECOM's posture on this matter. Furthermore, as we have seen, both the Department of the Army G-2 and G-3 from time to time resisted OCPW's attempts to influence FECOM's organization and conduct of unconventional warfare. The

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Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Message DA 927709 to CINCFE, 2 January 1953, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (13 December 1952), National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conversation with General Taylor reference Special Forces Operations in the Far East Command, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 319, Psy War 337 TS (26 December 1952, National Archives; interview with Robert Bodroghy.

1The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Subject: Report on Trip to FECOM, 26 November - 17 December 1951, by Colonel W. H. S. Wright, U.S. Army, 20 December 1951, filed with Psy War 333 TS (20 December 1951), RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 323.3-333, Box No. 9, National Archives.
records of this period reveal a number of instances where the G-3 in particular attempted to stop or "tone down" OCPW's initiatives and proposed cables. In early 1953, for example, G-3 nonconcurred in a cable to FECOM that requested information concerning the status and role of "partisan forces." Observing tartly that "considering the number of G-2 and PSYWAR officers who have visited FECOM within the past few months for the purpose of examining CCRAK organization and activities, there should be no dearth of information on the subject in DA," the G-3 response went on to conclude: "While the ostensible purpose of the proposed cable is to obtain information, the overall effect tends towards veiled suspicion that CINCFE is on the 'wrong track.'"\(^1\)

This was, of course, exactly what McClure's office suspected, but their efforts to get FECOM to recognize the errors of its ways in unconventional warfare generally came to naught. Although the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, shared some of McClure's concerns reference lack of a fully integrated joint staff in Korea for unconventional warfare, the Far East Commander, General Clark, insisted that the CIA's organizational integrity under CCRAK be maintained. And while Clark also instructed his staff to establish closer liaison with OCPW, this did not result in any significant organizational changes by FECOM in their handling of unconventional warfare.\(^2\)

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Disposition Form to G-1, G-2, G-3, Subject: The Status and Role of "Partisan Forces," 18 February 1953, from Brigadier General McClure with G-3 response, 20 February 1953, by Major General C. D. Eddleman, RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 363.7-385, Box No. 20, Psy War 384 PE TS (18 February 1953), National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington 25, D.C., Letter from General Collins to General Clark, 19 February 1953, filed with Psy War 370.64 TS (19 February 1953), RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15; Headquarters, Far
For all practical purposes, the Far East Command--and the CIA--went their own way, relatively uninfluenced in this activity by General McClure and his staff.

With the impetus of the Korean War, the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organization--the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. The personal interest in psychological warfare, and persistent pressure that Secretary of the Army Pace brought to bear on senior Army officers, both before and after the outbreak of war, were key factors in this step. With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff under which were placed the responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. While in the process of staffing and organizing this office, McClure energetically turned to the emergency in Korea in an attempt to both assist and influence the Far East Command's organization and conduct of psychological and unconventional warfare--capabilities that the Army had neglected during the interwar years. He was relatively successful in the first endeavor, less so in the latter. The conflict in Korea, however, is only one part of the story in our quest to determine why the Army decided to establish the Psychological Warfare Center and to create the 10th Special Forces Group. To complete the picture, we must next examine the events that were also taking place both in the United States and in Europe.

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East Command, Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Letter from General Clark to General Collins, 12 March 1953, filed with Pay War 370.64 TS (9 April 1953), RG 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, National Archives.
CHAPTER VII

THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGG

Spurred by the war in Korea and the persistent pressure of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare took place in early 1951—a key link in the chain of events leading to establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Under the leadership of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the OCPW initiated plans that resulted in authorization for this unprecedented center and for activation of an equally unprecedented concept and organization—Special Forces. To complete our examination of how and why this occurred—that is, to understand the origins of a "special warfare" capability for the Army—we must look beyond the more obvious stimulus of the Korean emergency to the events taking place both in Europe and in the United States.

WAR IN EUROPE

While the conflict in Korea naturally occupied a major share of the OCPW's attention, McClure found soon after arrival in Washington that his acquaintances in the European theater would be reminding him of their requirements. In December 1950 the Chief of Staff of Headquarters, European Command, sent him a "Dear Bob" letter:

I was sorry to hear that you lost your nice billet on the West Coast, but feel that the Army will benefit materially from your assignment as head of the new Psychological Warfare Division in the Department. Certainly, we have no other officer who has the broad experience which you have had in that field.1

1Headquarters, European Command, letter from Major General Daniel Noste.

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After this introductory compliment, General Noce got down to business, stating that their difficulty in obtaining qualified officers for psychological warfare and special operations had substantially slowed progress in planning for these activities. He outlined his requirements for trained officers in both fields, indicating that these needs had been discussed recently with Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Deane, Jr., whom McClure had sent to Europe on a liaison trip. Interestingly, in a comment that reflects some of McClure's organizational philosophy, Noce added:

The organization of your division works in quite well with the psychological warfare and unconventional warfare organization which we have established in this headquarters, since we have placed both of these activities in one branch of our OPOT (G-3) Division.

McClure's reply reflected his frustration in attempting to restore specialized skills neglected in the immediate post-World War II period:

I fully appreciate your difficulty in obtaining qualified officers for psychological warfare and unconventional warfare activities. We are encountering the same difficulties here. I am greatly embarrassed that we have been unable so far to furnish you the two officers for psychological warfare planning which you requested in a radio message some time ago.¹

This is precisely the condition that McClure and a few other farsighted individuals had sought to avoid when just a few years previous they had lamented the dispersion of people with World War II experience, and warned about

the lack of attention being paid to maintaining psychological warfare capability. Now their prophecies were being fulfilled. As one of the few senior officers who grasped the complexities and possibilities of this specialized field, McClure struggled to redress the shortage of trained personnel situation in both the U.S. and the overseas theaters and also to maximize his personal experience to improve the situation.

Unable to immediately provide the planners that General Noce needed, McClure offered to do "some little work here along that line as suggestions for you." In this same letter, McClure again discussed the valuable contribution made by civilians in psychological warfare, mentioning specifically the forthcoming visit to Europe of Mr. C. D. Jackson, his former Deputy throughout World War II. He also provided a lengthy illustration of what he called the "practical side of back-stopping" psychological warfare operations, emphasizing:

It is for this reason of thinking the problem through from the leaflets in the enemy soldier or civilian hands back to the tree from which the pulp is produced, that a man with Jackson's experience will be essential. God forbid that you go through the growing pains, trial and error, and frustrations that we did in World War II until we finally reached maturity. I can assure you that we will give you all the help possible back here.

And help he did. McClure sent General Noce a considerable amount of guidance materials for psychological warfare planning, to include training circulars, programs, schedules, a draft National Psychological Warfare Plan for General War, the State Department's "Russian Plan," and estimates of logistical requirements for psychological warfare planning.1 Increased

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1 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., letter from Brigadier General McClure to Major General Noce, 12 June 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 6, Psy War 091.412 (TS (12 June 1951), National Archives.
efforts were made to provide the officers EUCOM needed, and by October a small Psywar Section had been formed in the Special Plans Branch of Headquarters, EUCOM. The 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a New York City reserve unit, was recalled to active duty, sent to Fort Riley, Kansas, for training, and shipped to Europe in November, together with the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.¹

The decision to ship the 301st to Europe was itself fraught with controversy and indicative of the competing requirements that OCPW faced during this hectic period. General Willoughby felt that assignment of the 301st to the Far East Command would be the most practical solution to their urgent needs, and McClure initially agreed with this assessment. He was forced to backtrack, however, because of a decision by G-3 to honor the corresponding and prior need expressed by the European theater. Thus the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a prototype unit stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, was instead shipped to FECOM.²

¹Ibid., Headquarters, European Command, letter from LTC R. G. Ciccolella, Chief, Psy War Section, Special Plans Branch, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division, to Brigadier General McClure, 15 October 1951, Pay War 337; letter from LTC Ciccolella to McClure, 14 November 1951, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 385.2-400, Box No. 24, Psy War 400 (14 November 1951) S, National Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Progress Report - 1 April 1951, RG 319 - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 319.1, National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., letter from Brigadier General McClure to Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 10 March 1951, RG 319 (Army Staff), Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54; Psy War 091.412, National Archives; also Psy War 322 (19 February 1951), Request for Increase in Authorized Strength of Psy War Units, Psy War 322 (28 February 1951) RB&L Group for FECOM, and Psy War 322 (5 March 1951) Reduced Strength RB&L Group for EUCOM, RG 319 (Army Staff) Psy War Admin Office Records Branch Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, Box No. 13, National Archives.
In addition to providing such assistance as they could to EUCOM, the
OCPW was also involved in numerous planning actions oriented toward off-
setting the perceived Soviet threat in Europe. An example of such actions
was a meeting called by the Joint Strategic Plans Division (JSPD) of the
Services' psychological warfare intelligence representatives. The purpose
of the meeting was to explore sources of discontent within the Soviet satel-
lite services which could be exploited by propaganda to reduce morale, and to
explore means by which the Services could furnish the State Department with
materials for psychological warfare against the USSR and its Satellite forces.
The Acting Chief, JSPD, agreed to await OCPW's submission of an outline plan
for overt psychological attack against Soviet and Satellite forces prior to
taking further action, a plan that would confine itself to military psycho-
logical vulnerabilities. The Army was in a posture to make this contribution
because McClure had previously alerted his staff to prepare a draft plan, "EEI,
Psychological Vulnerabilities of Soviet Armed Forces in Current Period
(Draft)." This particular plan was illustrative of many such actions initi-
ated by McClure during this period, and reflected both his ability to antici-
pate requirements and his desire to lead the way in psychological warfare
planning among the Services.¹

He was to have some competition on this latter score, and OCPW's running
feud with the Air Force was indicative of the interservice rivalry that marked
these years. While attending a joint EUCOM-USAFE (U.S. Air Force, Europe) in

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Meeting called by
Colonel Hopkins, JSPD, by LTC Richard Hirsch, Intelligence and Evaluation
Branch, 2 August 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare 1951-54, TS
Decimal Files, Box No. 6, Pay War 091.412, National Archives.
Europe, McClure noted somewhat peevishly that while both the Army and Air
Force had exhibits at the conference illustrating psychological warfare ob-
jectives, techniques, and historical examples, the Air Force exhibit "was an
elaborate and expensive one" which had been on tour in the United States and
would visit portions of Europe. Moreover, in his eyes the exhibit was mis-
leading:

It is unfortunate that the air exhibit fails to indicate any joint
participation by other services in the field of Psychological War-
fare. A false impression is given that the Air Force is unilaterally
conducting Psychological Warfare even in Korea today. Korean leaf-
lets used in the exhibit and sample ones given to the audience leave
the impression that the Air Force determines the content, prints the
leaflet, selects the target, and then makes distribution. Quite the
contrary, no leaflet has been designed or printed by the Air Force
in the Far East command to date. It is an Army operation except for
aerial distribution. This is the same practice as World War II.  

We have seen that McClure was critical of Air Force support of Army
psychological warfare operations in Korea, but this statement reveals an even
deeper concern--that the Air Force, in its organization and activities, was
"going into Psywar in a big way, disturbingly so in some respects," as he re-
marked to his staff. 2 Apparently the Air Force felt that they had claim to a
strategic role in psychological warfare beyond that of simply providing the
airplanes for leaflet distribution. Not illogically, they argued that in

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Washington 25, D.C., Memo for Record, Staff Meeting, 6 December 1951, RG 319
Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, Pay War 020
Staff Meetings, National Archives; Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
Subject: Psychological Warfare Conference EUCOM, 27-28 November 1951, by
Brigadier General McClure, 6 December 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special War-
fare, Pay War 334S (6 December 1951), National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Washington 25, D.C., Memo for Record, Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 March 1951, RG
319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2,
Pay War 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.
addition to providing the airlift through their special Aerial Resupply and Communication (ARC) Wings, they should also be able to compose and print leaflets. In their staff organization, research projects and training plans, the Air Force embarked upon a psychological warfare program that resulted in what one disinterested Navy observer characterized as "the clash of two growing organizations, Army and Air Force Psychological Warfare." McClure, on the other hand, believed that the Air Force plans, if implemented, would "result in extravagant duplication of the minimal numbers of personnel and items of equipment envisaged for Army propaganda operations." McClure's suspicions of these Air Force intrusions into what he considered to be Army terrain continued unabated and were intensified by disagreements over responsibilities for unconventional warfare. Our investigation of this latter topic will come later; now we must turn to the important activities in psychological warfare taking place in the United States.

1 Interview with Colonel John B. B. Trussell, U.S. Army (Retired), at Carlisle Barracks, PA, 7 May 1979. Colonel Trussell, as a Lieutenant Colonel, was a staff officer in the OCPW during the early 1950's.

2 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum from Captain Hahn, USN, to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: Air Force Views Relating to Retardation (of Soviet Advances), 20 October 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 16, Pay War 381, National Archives; see also Pay War 350.001 TS (7 January 1952), Subject: Psychological Warfare Presentation for PSB, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 13, and Pay War 385 TS (29 August 1951), Subject: Appraisal of Capabilities of Psychological Operations in Department of Defense, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 20, National Archives.

3 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Psychological Warfare Conference, EUCOM, 27-28 November 1951, by Brigadier General McClure, 6 December 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, Pay War 334 S (6 December 1951), National Archives.
Psychological Warfare Activities in the United States

The requirements of the theater commands, both in Europe and the Far East, and the concurrent necessity to develop a training program and supporting structure for psychological warfare in the United States, placed heavy demands upon McClure's office. The immediate need for a qualified Psychological Warfare Officer in each Army Headquarters was met by sending selected personnel to a 17-week course at Georgetown University, but this stopgap measure only scratched the surface. A letter from one of McClure's staff to the harried commander of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, being readied at Fort Riley, Kansas, for deployment to the Far East, vividly depicts the situation:

In order that you will be better able to appreciate the personnel problems facing us here, I would like to give you a little indication of our immediate requirements for officers. We must find 38 officers for your Group, 24 officers for a student body for the first unit officers' course in the Psychological Warfare School, 14 officers for the Staff and Faculty of the Psychological Warfare School, 5 officers for the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 8 officers for the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, which is to be activated in the near future, and approximately 20 additional officers for this office. That totals 109 officers needed in the immediate future and there are additional miscellaneous slots to be filled. To meet this requirement, we have so far requested approximately 100 officers. We are finding that we get only fifty percent of those we request. Those now being requested will not be available at the earliest until late April or May. However, we hope to have enough available by mid-April to provide a minimum staff for the units at Riley, a minimum staff for the School, and a small student body for the first unit officers' course.¹

As we saw earlier, plans to establish the Psychological Warfare Department as a part of the Army General School at Fort Riley began in the winter

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., letter from Major Kenneth B. Stark to LTC Homer E. Shields, 12 March 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfars, 1951-54, National Archives.
of 1950 when General McClure forwarded a request from the Chief, Army Field Forces, to have Lieutenant Colonel John O. Weaver assigned as its first Chief. Weaver finally acquired enough of a faculty to establish "the world's first formal school of military propaganda" in the spring of 1951. The purpose of his initial endeavor, the Psychological Warfare Officer Course, was to train selected officers for assignment to psychological warfare staff and operational units; to develop in officers an understanding of the nature and employment of propaganda in combat and to make them knowledgeable of the organization's methods and techniques for the tactical conduct of propaganda in the field.  

Designed to provide a general introduction to psychological warfare, strategic intelligence, foreign army organization, intelligence, and psychological operations, courses for officers ranged from six to seven weeks in duration. Four officer and two noncommissioned officer classes were graduated between June 1951 and April 1952, for a total of 334 students. This included representatives from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as Allied students from Canada, Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Italy.  

By April 1951, OCPW had requested the activation of five psychological warfare units: the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (the old Tactical

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1Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, p. 304; letter, Colonel Otis Hayes, May 5, 1959, to Office of Information, John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, "Program of Instruction for Psychological Warfare Unit Officer," January 1951, p. 4. USAJFYCENMA Archives.

2Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, "Program of Instruction for Psychological Warfare Officer Course," August 1951, p. 12; letter, Colonel Hayes, May 5, 1969, to Office of Information. Colonel Hayes was recalled to active duty in 1951 to be the Psychological Warfare Division's Deputy at Fort Riley. After the Psychological Warfare Center was activated at Fort Bragg, NC, in 1952, he became the first Director of the Psychological Operations Department (in the Psychological Warfare School) and remained in that position for eighteen months.
Information Detachment) with the Eighth Army in Korea; the 2d Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company at Fort Riley as a prototype unit; the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company at Fort Riley but scheduled for shipment to Europe; the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group at Fort Riley originally as a prototype unit but scheduled for shipment to the Far East command; and the 301st (Reserve) Radio Broadcasting Group, which was to be stationed at Fort Riley for training in May, then shipped to Europe. Additionally, organizational concepts and functions for these troop units, as well as for the OCPW and a Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, for theater command use were developed. A directive was sent to Army Field Forces to establish training programs for the general indoctrination of all military personnel in psychological warfare, and to prepare detailed programs for both active and Reserve psywar units. In accordance with this directive, all Army schools were requested to include general indoctrination instruction in psychological warfare in their curriculum. And by the end of May, McClure began sending out the first of a series of informational letters designed to maintain a close contact between OCPW and Psychological Warfare officers in the Army Headquarters.¹

To conduct nonmateriel research in support of the burgeoning psychological warfare effort, the Army relied almost exclusively upon a civilian agency, the Operations Research Office (ORO), operated under contract by the Johns Hopkins University. Examples of the type studies done by ORO were a three-volume basic reference work for psychological warfare, specific country-

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Progress Report, Personnel and Training Division, 1 April 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 319.1, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, letter to LTC John V. White, G-3 Section, Headquarters, First Army, Governor's Island, New York, from General McClure, 24 May 1951, Psy War 320.2, National Archives.
oriented manuals for the use of psychological warfare operators, an analysis and grouping of sample leaflets from World War II and Korea to develop classification schemes, and a considerable amount of field operations research done in Korea. McClure's staff was not entirely satisfied with ORO's work, claiming that their projects were "too general in concept" and not easily utilized by the Army's psychological operators. And Johns Hopkins also began to have misgivings about the contract, believing that it could not properly perform the development research (as opposed to operations research) required by OCPW in support of psychological warfare. Eventually the Human Resources Research Office (HUMRO) was formed to supplant ORO and undertake a general program in psychological research for the Army.1

McClure was particularly interested in improving the development and procurement of suitable materiel for the conduct of psychological warfare. He felt that "as a result of the 1945-49 hiatus in psychological warfare and special operations planning," the military "entered the Korean conflict with little more than obsolete pieces of World War II equipment." Examples of some of the type equipment put under development were a mobile reproduction unit for propaganda leaflets, a newly designed lightweight portable loudspeaker for use in front-line operations, and a completely equipped mobile 5,000-watt

1Department of the Army, Operations Research Office, Washington 25, D.C., letter from Ellis A. Johnson, Director, to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Subject: Research for Psychological Warfare, 8 May 1951, Psy War 400.112; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for: Chief, Psychological Warfare, Subject: Non-material Research Program, 7 February 1951, from LTC Jerome G. Sacks, Research Branch, filed with Psy War 400.112 (29 February 1951); Office of the Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Appraisal of Capabilities of Psychological Operations in Department of Defense, from Secretary Frank Pace, Jr., 21 September 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 20, Psy War 385 TS, National Archives.
radio broadcasting station.\(^1\)

And if this myriad of competing requirements was not enough to keep it busy, the OCPW was soon faced with the possibility of a reduction in its civilian and military personnel strength—a threat that they avoided by invoking the previously announced views of Secretary of the Army Paco with respect to support of the Army's psychological warfare program. McClure had a difficult enough time as it was obtaining "be qualified people that he needed for the specialized skills of psychological warfare and special operations.

Coupled with the fact that many officers were reluctant to become involved in an activity considered to be "out of the mainstream," he often had to "take what he could get," in the words of one of his former staff officers. Many of the officers that were sent to OCPW felt "trapped" by the assignment because of McClure's reluctance to release them for other jobs, apparently a source of considerable discontent.\(^2\)

There was also some disgruntlement among his officers concerning McClure's insistence on special staff status for the OCPW, rather than remaining under the G-3 as a part of the General Staff—a position, they thought, of greater stature and "clout" within the Army bureaucracy. Certainly there was some basis for these feelings—under normal circumstances the General

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\(^1\)Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., "Briefing for Secretary of Defense on OCPW Activities," 5 November 1951, RG 319 (Army Staff), Pay War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 334-337, Pay War 337 S (5 November 1951), National Archives.

\(^2\)Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Subject: Reduction of Military and Civilian Personnel in the Chief of Staff area, 27 August 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, C92-230, Box No. 9, Pay War 230 (17 August 1951), National Archives; interview with Colonel John B. B. Trussell, 9 May 1979.
Staff does carry more "clout" and an aura of greater prestige. But McClure's World War II experience had firmly etched in his mind the overriding advantages of relative autonomy and access to the top decision makers that special staff status afforded. As we have seen, this was a theme consistently advocated by him, both in the United States and in his relations with the theater commands. Despite these resentments, however, McClure was apparently liked and held in high esteem by those who worked for him. "Robbie" backed his subordinates loyally, was tremendously energetic and enthusiastic about OCPW's role, and was considerably more articulate than most general officers of his time. And he had vision. This vision extended to the field of unconventional warfare.

The Special Forces Ranger Regiment

At the time of OCPW's creation, General McClure had successfully lobbied to have responsibilities for the unconventional warfare function from G-3 transferred to him. While some thinking on the subject of behind-the-lines activities and special units had taken place in the Army during the interwar years, nothing much had been done to follow through on these initial ideas—particularly in view of the CIA/OPC's assumption of the primary responsibility for covert operations. Under McClure's leadership, this situation was to change—for within a year and a half the plans formulated within his Special Operations Division (later renamed the Special Forces Division) to create a formal unconventional warfare capability for the Army came to fruition. But the path to that goal was not easy, nor did it proceed in a straight line.

McClure realized that his own firsthand expertise was basically in the

1Interview with Colonel John B. B. Trussell, 9 May 1979.
psychological warfare field, so early on he indicated to his staff that he was "fighting for officers with background and experience in special operations."1 Into the Special Operations Division he brought several officers with World War II and Korean War experience in guerilla warfare or with long-range penetration units: Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Russell Blair and Lieutenant Colonel Marvin Waters, both of whom had served with "Merrill's Marauders"; Colonel Aaron Bank, who had fought with the French Maquis as a member of the OSS; Colonel Wendell Partig, who commanded the guerrillas on Mindanao after the Japanese occupied the Philippines; and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Voickmann, who had organized and conducted guerrilla warfare operations in North Luzon and had planned and directed behind-the-lines operations in North Korea.2

Colonel Voickmann remembered that General McClure approached him in the hospital (he had been evacuated from Korea to Walter Reed Hospital in December 1951) with a request to help organize the Special Operations Division, and it was only after being assured that the Department of the Army was interested in organized behind-the-lines operations that he agreed to take the job.3 Together the group in OCPW prepared studies, plans, organization and operational concepts and training programs for a formal U.S. Army unconventional warfare capability--Special Forces.

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 March 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, National Archives.


These studies and organizational concepts were inevitably based to a considerable extent on the personal operational experience of the officers involved, plus research of the past major resistance movements. In addition to his World War II guerrilla warfare adventures, Colonel Volckmann possessed a considerable amount of information resulting from more than six months of research he had undertaken in 1949 at Fort Benning, Georgia, while preparing draft field manuals on Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare and Combating Guerrilla Forces. Colonel Bank, another key figure, had operated as a Jedburgh in southern France, later organized and trained anti-Nazi German prisoners of war for harassing tactics against the Germans in Austria (the assignment was ultimately cancelled) and still later completed two OSS missions in Indo-China.

Bank, who joined OCPW as Chief of the Special Operations Division at the end of March 1951 (to be succeeded by Colonel Fertig in July), gives Volckmann considerable credit for "the development of position, planning, and policy papers that helped sell the establishment of Special Forces units in the active Army." Bank also makes it clear that he and Volckmann based their plans for the Army's unconventional warfare capability on their World War II experiences with the Philippine guerrillas and OSS, and that Special Forces units

1Ibid.; letters, Colonel Bank, February 17, 1968, and April 5, 1969.


3Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Staff Meetings, 29 March 1951 and 19 July 1959, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, National Archives. These frequent changes of division chief designations were probably due to the relative date of rank, or seniority, among the colonels brought into the Special Operations Division.
were developed "in the OSS pattern of tiny unics with the prime mission of developing, training, and equipping the guerrilla potential deep in enemy territory." To those who would insist on linking the Army's Ranger units as forerunners of Special Forces, Bank unequivocally states that "actually they [Special Forces] have no connection with ranger type organizations since their mission and operations are far more complex, time consuming, require much deeper penetration and initially are often of a strategic nature."¹

The comments of Volckmann and Bank, made in retrospect, may give the impression that this rather clear delineation of roles and missions for Special Forces was clearly understood from the very beginning. The evidence suggests otherwise. In actuality, the path that led to the concept for organization and employment of Special Forces was tortuous and marked by controversy. The initial discussions within the Army on this subject, in fact, were reminiscent of the rather confusing dialogue that took place during the interwar years concerning the "Airborne Reconnaissance units," the "Ranger Group," and the "Special Operations Company," all of which tended to intermingle OSS and Ranger precepts. The task of clearing up this doctrinal confusion proved to be no easier in 1951 than it was during the period prior to Korea.

We have seen that in early February 1951, General McClure briefed the Army General Council on the necessity for a rapid organization of unconventional warfare, and that shortly thereafter Secretary Pace provided strong official support for the combining of psychological and unconventional warfare planning functions. By late March, a few weeks after Volckmann joined OCTW,

McClure's new office received a copy of a brief memorandum to the Director, Organization and Training Division, from Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, the G-3:

In consultation with General McClure, please develop the Army responsibility for guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare within the field of G-3 interests. Having determined what our responsibility is, I should then like to verify that the various elements in the guerrilla mission are clearly assigned to subordinate Army units.\(^1\)

It is interesting to note that Taylor's directive included anti-guerrilla warfare. While some lip service was given to this in the studies which followed, it was not to be considered an important part of the Special Forces bag of tricks until the 1960's, when "counterinsurgency" became the third leg of the "special warfare" triad at Fort Bragg.

At any rate, to this point General McClure had not been able to do much about the unconventional warfare part of his mission. Arrangements had been made for a few officers from Army Field Forces and the various Army headquarters in the United States to attend a Staff Familiarization Course in Guerrilla Warfare at Fort Benning, Georgia, commencing April 5, 1951. In most cases, there were the same officers who attended the special psychological warfare course run by Georgetown University.\(^2\) The course in guerrilla warfare was set up after a series of conferences in 1949 between the Army and the CIA resulted in the selection of Fort Benning as the site for a training course.

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\(^1\) Department of the Army, Office of the G-3, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Director, O&T Division, Subject: Responsibilities of Army with Respect to Guerrilla Warfare, 20 March 1951, by Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2 - 370.64, Box No. 15, Psy War 370.64.TS (20 March 1951), National Archives.

\(^2\) Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 March 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, National Archives.
desired by the CIA. And McClure had requested that his office receive full reports on all behind-the-lines operations in Korea in order to carry out its assigned responsibilities in the field of unconventional warfare. Other than these tentative steps, the special operations planning in OCPW at this point lagged considerably behind that being done in psychological warfare, primarily because of a lack of experienced personnel. As McClure acquired the people he needed, however, he plunged ahead.

Within ten days of receiving General Taylor's memorandum, McClure discussed the subject of guerrilla warfare with him and General Boite, and reported to his staff that both were "very much" in favor of organizing "foreign national units." The G-3 was to do a study on the use of foreign nationals as individuals or in units, while OCPW's Special Operations Division was requested to study the possibility of organizing a Ranger Company at Fort Riley with each platoon constituting a different nationality group. One of the purposes of this company would be to work with U.S. aggressor forces in exercises to teach soldiers counterguerrilla tactics. McClure's tentative thinking at this early stage was to propose organization of six Ranger companies of foreign nationals in Europe, each company to consist of a different nationality and attached to a U.S. division. These companies were to be in addition to "regular" Ranger battalions of U.S. personnel.

Two points need to be noted about this early dialogue. First, it was

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject: Reports on Special Operations in Korea, 15 March 1951, by Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War, Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, Box No. 6, Psy War 091 Korea (15 March 1951), National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 29 March 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, National Archives.
clear that the focus of attention for future possible utilization of unconventional warfare was on Europe—even though the Army was currently engaged in a "hot war" in Korea. The "foreign nationals" referred to were those from Eastern European countries, and would be brought into the U.S. Army through the provisions of the Lodge Bill. Secondly, it was also obvious that the principals involved in this discussion—to include General McClure—had not sorted out in their minds the type of special unit desired, nor its primary objective.

Perhaps this was because the Chief of Staff himself was unclear on the subject, as was evident in his visit to the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, a few days later. During his conference there, General Collins observed that "the Infantry School should consider the Rangers as well as other troops and indigenous personnel to initiate subversive activities. I personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus of expansion in this direction."¹

This statement is particularly interesting when one considers the rather clear-cut delineation between the roles and missions of Special Forces and Ranger units later insisted on by the Chief of Staff. But such a delineation was not either well understood or agreed to by key decision makers in early 1951.

Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann from OCPW was present at the conference attended by General Collins at Fort Benning, and was asked by the Infantry

¹Headquarters, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, Memorandum to: The Commanding General, The Infantry Center, Subject: Analysis and Suggestions Re General Collins's Conference 5 April 1951, from LTC R. W. Volckmann, 9 April 1951, filed with PSYOP 337 TS (16 April 1951), RG 319 Army—Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TSDecimal Files, Box No. 12, National Archives.
School to analyze portions of the Chief of Staff's statements. Volckmann's analysis should be examined in some detail, for it is the first evidence within OCPW of the philosophical basis for creation of an Army unconventional warfare capability.

First of all, Volckmann interpreted General Collins's use of the phrase "subversive activities" to mean what he called "special forces operations." He defined the latter to include operations carried on within or behind the enemy's lines, which could encompass the following:

1. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.
2. Sabotage and subversion.
3. Evasion and escape.
4. Ranger and commando type operations.
5. Long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance.
6. Psychological warfare (through above media). ¹

Secondly, commenting on the Chief of Staff's reference to indigenous personnel, Volckmann offered the following theoretical framework to clarify the overall objective of special forces operations:

We may visualize the world today as being divided into two major groups or layers of individuals that cover the earth unrestricted by national boundaries. These layers, a red and a blue, are held together by common ideologies. Any future war may well be regarded as an international civil war waged by these opposing layers. The full exploitation of our sympathetic blue layer within the enemy's sphere of influence is basically the mission of special forces operations. It is from the blue layer within the enemy's sphere of influence that we must foster resistance movements, organize guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis, conduct sabotage and subversion, effect evasion and escape. We should, through special forces operations, exploit this layer to assist our ranger and commando operations, and as a media for psychological warfare.

¹Ibid.
Exploitation of this "sympathetic blue layer," stated Volckmann, would enable the West to offset the manpower superiority of Soviet forces in Europe, particularly during the initial stages of their invasion. Similarly, the Allies must be prepared to counter the "red layer" within their friendly sphere of influence; a problem that involved rear area defense, for the Soviets would exploit their "sympathetic red layer" to the maximum.

To effect the transition from this theoretical framework to reality, at least as far as the Army was concerned, Volckmann advocated that concrete measures be taken: "Through actual command, staff, training, and operations we should pull the overall field of special forces operations out of the clouds, out of the discussion stage, and reduce it to organization, training, and operations." To accomplish this he recommended that the Infantry Center be designed as the focal point for doctrine, policy, and technique, and further advocated the activation of a "Special Forces Command" under the Center to "explore, develop and conduct training in the field of special forces operations." Under this command should be placed Ranger training and "all other special forces operations."

Two other points should be noted in Volckmann's analysis. He believed that this concept should be considered an accepted field of conventional ground warfare; therefore "we should cease to regard special forces operations as irregular or unconventional warfare." Thus, the ultimate objective of special forces operations was to "organize and support, wherever possible within the enemy's sphere of influence, guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis that are capable of efficient and controlled exploitation in conjunction with our land, air, and sea forces."

Having established this point, Volckmann proceeded to carve out what he
envisioned as the Army’s role in this activity, both among the Services and in its relationship to the CIA:

To me, it is basically sound that the military (the Army, since this field falls within ground operations) has the inherent responsibility in peace to prepare and plan for the conduct of special forces operations and in time of war to organize and conduct special forces operations. Furthermore, I feel that it is unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civil agency.

Volckmann’s analysis is important because it contains most of the major elements of controversy attendant to the creation of an unconventional warfare capability for the Army. It also provides us with some valuable insights into the philosophy of the man who, probably more than any officer in General McClure’s employ, shaped the creation of Special Forces. Certainly, Volckmann’s reservations about the CIA’s role vis-à-vis the military Services—and particularly the Army—was a major theme during these early years of OCPW’s existence, as was his view that among the Services the Army should have the predominant responsibility in this relatively new field. (The Air Force, in particular, disagreed with this contention.) His rather astute attempt to avoid use of terms like "irregular" or "unconventional" warfare indicated an early recognition of the need to allay the suspicions of conventional military men (although the term "unconventional warfare" remains in use to this day).

And his advocacy of a "Special Forces Command" and training center was to come to fruition the following year—but not at Fort Benning, and not in the form that he intended. While Volckmann clearly attached considerable importance to the potential use of indigenous personnel in guerrilla warfare, apparently the type organization that he initially had in mind to support and direct these personnel was a Ranger unit—not the OSS-type Special Forces organization that

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1Ibid.
he ultimately played such an instrumental role in creating. His use of the words "special forces operations," then, was practically synonymous with OCPW's understanding of "special operations"; that is, broadly defined as all types of behind-the-lines activities conducted for a military purpose, not just guerrilla warfare. Later he would be more specific in differentiating between Ranger and Commando missions, and those involving the organization and support of indigenous personnel in guerrilla warfare.

Another interesting aspect of Volckmann's memorandum was the bureaucratic tactic employed to bring it to the attention of decision makers. After Volckmann returned from the Fort Benning conference, his memorandum was sent to the Chief of Staff, General Collins, with a request that "the interpretation that has been placed on these statements of General Collins be confirmed and/or commented on in order that appropriate action may be initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to initiate the directives necessary to accomplish the desires of the Chief of Staff." This proved to be the impetus for a series of foundational studies by OCPW, to include the initial one, "Army Responsibilities in Respect to Special (Forces) Operations," written principally by Volckmann and later approved by the Chief of Staff--a classic illustration of the manner in which one achieves "visibility"

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for General Taylor, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Subject: Definitions Relating to Psychological Warfare, Special Operations and Guerrilla Warfare, 17 April 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 370.64 (17 April 1951), National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet to Chief of Staff, Subject: General Collins Conference at the Infantry Center, 5 April 1951, from Colonel Edward Glavin, Acting Chief of Psychological Warfare (Summary Sheet was prepared by LTC Volckmann), 16 April 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Psy War 337 (16 April 1951), National Archives.
for a pet project in the Pentagon bureaucracy.1

By the end of May the thinking in G-3 and OCP had begun to crystallize
concerning the utilization of Lodge Bill recruits. Standards of selection
were established, and a goal of 800 individuals established for those who
would volunteer for airborne training, and who possessed specialties related
to the conduct of guerrilla warfare. The mission of these aliens would be to
organize guerrilla bands in Eastern Europe after war began and attack the
Soviet lines of communication—the purpose being to slow, or "retard," the
Soviet advance into Western Europe. Plans were being developed to train these
personnel in increments of 100 in a cycle that included Basic Combat Training,
followed by completion of the Ranger Course at Fort Benning, then further
specialized instruction in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, clandestine commu-
nications and related subjects.2

At the end of this training cycle, the aliens would be made available
to the European Theater Command. It was here that the planning was less pre-
cise. One alternative being examined was the formation of additional

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1Ibid.; also Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Briefing Notes Conference with G-1, 2, 3, 4, and A/P RE Training in the Field of Special (Forces) Operations, 21 June 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 12, Pay War 337 TS (21 June 1951), National Archives. The studies resulting from this action, in addition to "Army Responsibilities in Report to Special (Forces) Operations," were: "Theater Special Forces Command and (Z.I.) Special Forces Training Command"; "Special Forces Ranger Units and Special Forces Ranger Units Recruiting and Training of Personnel"; "Rear Area Defense"; and "Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Matters Pertaining to Guerrilla Warfare."

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General Eddleman, Subject: Utilization of Lodge Bill Recruits in Special (Forces) Operations, 23 May 1951, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, box No. 15, Pay War 373.2 TS (23 May 1951), National Archives.
"(Special Forces) Ranger Companies" to which could be assigned those Americans and Eastern European aliens trained for behind-the-lines operations, and which would be made available to the theater command for commitment on D-Day. Another idea was to move the aliens to Europe for organization into provisional units, so as to be available for such operations upon the outbreak of hostilities. These options show evidence of McClure's initial ruminations on the subject, but it was clear that nothing definite had been settled upon.

Approximately a month later, OCPW's thinking on the Lodge Bill recruits began to show more specificity. The formation of a "Special Forces Regiment" of three battalions, a total of 2,481 personnel, was proposed. Approximately 1,300 of the 2,097 enlisted requirements would be Lodge Bill recruits, and it was envisaged that the force could be trained and deployed to Europe in company-size increments. The total force would then serve as the troops required to implement the unconventional warfare portion of current war plans and "exploit the estimated 370,000 man potential within the USSR and its satellites." The latter statement is particularly interesting because, as we shall see, the subject of resistance potential in Europe was to become a bone of contention between the Army and CIA. Also noteworthy during this period were discussions by OCPW which included the idea that approximately 4,415 personnel organized into appropriate "operational groups" (an OSS term) would be required in peacetime for commitment in the event of war, the object being

1Ibid.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to ACofS, G-3, Subject: Staff Studies, "Special Forces Ranger Units" and "Special Forces Ranger Units, Recruiting and Training of Personnel," 12 June 1951, from General McClure, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, Psy War 370.64 (12 June 1951), National Archives.
to avoid the mistakes made during World War II: "We must not scatter arms, ammunition and supplies like so much grass seed and hope that they will fall on fertile soil and in turn prove of some assistance to our aims." To direct these forces in Europe, a "Theater Special Forces Training Command" in the United States was proposed. Notwithstanding this discussion of OSS-type organization, at this point the basic frame of reference was the Special Forces Ranger unit.¹

This frame of reference began to take on a different perspective when the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, deactivated all of his Ranger companies in July 1951. The Rangers had been reactivated during the Korean Conflict as separate companies and attached to infantry divisions. The 82nd Army Unit, known informally as the 8th Ranger Company, was the first to be created and was formed at Camp Drake, Japan, in August 1950, with volunteers from U.S. forces in the Far East. It was attached to the 25th Infantry Division, took part in the drive to the Yalu, and deactivated in March 1951. Between September 1950 and September 1951, fourteen Airborne Ranger companies were formed and trained by the Ranger Command at Fort Benning, Georgia. The

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Briefing Notes Conference with G-1, 2, 3, 4 and AFF RE Training in the Field of Special (Forces) Operations, 21 June 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 12, Psy War 337 TS (21 June 1951), National Archives. Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann had earlier reiterated to McClure the conclusion "that a need exists for a training command or center that will bring together the many segments of special (forces) operations under a program that will fully develop doctrine, policies, techniques and tactics . . . and that will develop equipment and supplies." This came after a trip, directed by McClure, to observe training and instruction at the CIA's "School Number One," the Ranger Training Center, and the Infantry Center—all at Fort Benning. Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Findings and Recommendations Re Special Operations Training, Fort Benning, Georgia, 24 April 1951, by LTC R. W. Volckmann, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (3 May 1951), National Archives.
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th companies were assigned to divisions throughout the Eighth Army in Korea and were used primarily at long-range patrols for specialized missions and to spearhead attacks. The 2d and 4th were also attached to the 187th Regimental Combat Team for the combat jump at Munsou-ni. After suffering more than 50 percent casualties, the Ranger companies were inactivated and the remaining personnel assigned throughout the divisions. ¹

At the time of CINCFE's action, the Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), indicated that he could see no need for Ranger companies in Europe, although he believed that there might be a need for Ranger units of battalion size under certain circumstances. One of CINCEUR's primary reasons for his position was the feeling that "Rangers, as a whole, drain first class soldiers from infantry organizations," a common complaint leveled against elite units--and one that Special Forces would have to contend with. ² More pertinent to the advocates of "Special Forces Operations," however, were the views of both CINCFE and CINCEUR that the Rangers were not capable of conducting guerrilla warfare type missions in their theaters due to racial and language boundaries. Instead, they believed, such missions should be conducted by indigenous personnel who were in turn trained, supplied, and controlled by American military personnel. ³

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Ranger Units, 17 July 1951, from Colonel Wendell Fertig, Chief, Special Operations, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, Box No. 13, Psy War 322 S (17 July 1951), National Archives.


³Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Voicing a related concern, Army Field Forces--in commenting on OCPW's staff study "Special Forces Ranger Units"--forwarded their view that any reference to Rangers should be deleted because "envisioned Special Forces will in all probability be involved in subversive activities." They believed that the concept of Special Forces should focus on the use of indigenous guerrilla groups behind enemy lines rather than American-staffed Ranger units; therefore, Rangers and Special Forces should be kept as separate and distinct organizations.

The result of all this was a meeting on August 23, 1951, presided over by the G-3, General Taylor, out of which came a decision to deactivate all Ranger units and convert the Ranger Training Command to a department of the Infantry School. This department would conduct Ranger training for selected officers and enlisted men, who upon completion of the course would be returned to their parent units (a pattern which has continued until the present day).

During the meeting the question arose concerning what agency would be capable of conducting "deep penetration activities," at which point, according to Colonel Aaron Bank's memorandum, "General Taylor was thoroughly briefed on the mission and capabilities of a Special Forces organization."2

This was perhaps the perfect illustration of that old adage, "being at

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1 Adjutant General, Army Field Forces, Letter to Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Subject: Training of Individuals and Units of the Army in Special (Forces) Operations, 23 August 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Box No. 6, 091.412 TS Propaganda (23 August 1951), National Archives.

2 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conference to Resolve Ranger Program, 24 August 1951, by Colonel Aaron Bank, Special Operations Division, RG 319, Psy War 337 (24 August 1951), National Archives. The principals attending the conference were General Taylor, General Bradford, G-3, etc., and General McAuliffe, G-1.
the right place at the right time," because ultimately the personnel spaces needed to create the 10th Special Forces Group were made available as a result of the deactivation of the Ranger units. Henceforth, there was to be little use of "Ranger" terminology by OCPW in their efforts to sell the concept of Special Forces, or in their proposals for the organization to carry out guerrilla warfare. Their initial draft TO&E for the "Special Forces Group," for example, presented as the Group's mission: "To infiltrate its component operational groups [emphasis added] to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a military basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea, and air forces."¹ The organization and functions of this group and its subordinate operational elements clearly depicted the influence of OSS concepts—particularly the Operational Group Command—rather than those of the Rangers.

Ironically, a year later OCPW found it necessary to point out to Army Field Forces that use of the subordinate units of the Special Forces Group on independent commando or Ranger type missions, "while a capability," was "to be discouraged as being highly wasteful of the highly developed skills wrapped up in the operational teams."² This was in the fall of 1952, when the 10th

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: ACofS, G-3, Subject: Request for Spaces in the Active Army, 28 September 1951, from Brigadier General McClure, RC 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 311.5-319.1, Box No. 11, Psy War 320.2 (28 September 1951), National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to ACofS, G-3, Subject: Table of Organization and Equipment 33-510 (proposed) for Special Forces Group (Abn); 13 November 1952, with draft 1st Ind letter to OCAFF, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 8, Psy War 320.3 TS (30 September 1952), National Archives.
Special Forces Group was recruiting and training at Fort Bragg for deployment to Europe.

But Army Field Forces was not the only Command in late 1952 that had ideas different from those of OCPW on how Special Forces elements would be utilized. In his preliminary planning for the utilization of the 10th, Brigadier General Liebel, of the European Command, envisaged the D-Day employment of small groups to strike at close-in targets within a fifty-mile zone immediately in front of U.S. tactical divisions. McClure objected strenuously on this question of "basic Special Forces doctrine," telling Liebel that such an activity was a Ranger or Commando-type action, normally of short duration, which would not require highly trained Special Forces personnel, and thus "was not in consonance with the concept underlying the creation of the 10th Special Forces Group." That concept was clear, thought McClure: "We continue to maintain that Special Forces Operational Detachments have the mission and capability of developing indigenous guerrilla forces, conducting operations behind the enemy lines, and of sustaining these operations for an indefinitely long time." To buttress his case, McClure told Liebel that "the Chief of Staff has insisted that Special Forces shall not duplicate the training and doctrine of ranger and commando units."¹ This was the same Chief of Staff, General Collins, who in April 1951 stated that he had "personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus

for expansion in this direction" (to initiate subversive activities).

This apparent turnabout in the Chief of Staff's philosophy illustrates the confusion and difficulties that often accompany the emergence of a new concept within military bureaucracy—particularly if that concept involves the creation of an "elite" unit. One of the principal requirements for "eliteness" is the possession of a specialized function, one that does not fall within the province of other military organizations. It is difficult to justify the existence of elite units if there appears to be unnecessary overlapping or redundancy of their functions and capabilities with those of other units. This is particularly so during periods of acute manpower shortages. In order to survive, the definition of an elite unit's special mission—and the acceptance of that mission by the bureaucracy—is a crucially important task.  

McClure and his staff came to recognize this necessity. With the deactivation of the Rangers more and more effort was expended to specify guerrilla warfare as the primary mission of the Special Forces organization that they proposed. Part of the confusion which marked this effort was of their own making, however. Their concept of "Special Forces Operations," for instance, was in actuality an all-encompassing heading under which was grouped the many types of operations—of which guerrilla warfare was one—whois common denominator consisted only of their being conducted within or behind enemy lines. One would have thought, obviously, that a Special Forces unit should conduct "Special Forces Operations"—which included, by OCPW's definition, Ranger and Commando activities. But no: as time went on, the architects of Special Forces found it necessary to point out the error, as they saw it, of linking

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1Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, particularly his discussion of "The Specialist Function," pp. 30ff.
the Group and its component unit missions with the term "Special Forces Operations" on the assumption that the Special Forces Group was a TO&E unit designed to conduct all such operations. Needless to say, this rather subtle distinction must have been lost on many. This blurring of roles and missions was not aided, either, by OCPW's initial moves to graft the guerrilla warfare concept onto the Ranger organization, only to be followed by its rather vigorous efforts to dissociate Special Forces from the Rangers.

Eventually, OCPW did answer General Taylor's initial directive to develop the Army responsibility for guerrilla warfare and then to assign that responsibility to subordinate Army units. The unit that evolved at Fort Bragg in 1952 was the Special Forces Group--and its organization was based on OSS concepts, not Ranger. Perhaps Volckmann and company had OSS organizational principles clearly in mind from the very beginning, but found it more opportune to gain initial acceptance for their ideas by tagging them on to the Rangers, whose historical precedence in the Army was known--and particularly since the Chief of Staff initially appeared to favor utilization of the Rangers in a guerrilla warfare role. Or perhaps it was simply a case of the officers involved grappling with new ideas and experimenting with the types of organizational machinery to implement those ideas. In all probability, the answer is that a combination of the two motives was at work during this initial conceptual period, and the deactivation of the Rangers helped to clarify the situation.

The Road to Fort Bragg

Concurrent with the deactivation of the Rangers, General McClure began to take an interest in establishing a training facility for both psychological warfare and unconventional warfare. To be sure, Colonel Volckmann had
campaigned since April for a training command or center that would fully develop doctrine, techniques, and logistical aspects of special forces operations. And there had been some discussion between the G-3 Division and AFF in early 1950, before the creation of OCPW, of the need for a "school center" for psychological warfare—which resulted in establishment of the Psychological Warfare Department at Fort Riley, just producing its first graduates. But now McClure began to entertain the idea of centralizing the functions of "the whole field of OCPW" at a post other than Fort Riley.¹

McClure and Colonel Bank visited Army Field Forces in mid-August to outline the Army's responsibilities in the field of unconventional warfare and to stress the lack of organization, training, or planning that had been done in unconventional warfare, as compared to the progress made in psychological warfare. The possibility of establishing a "Guerrilla Training Command" at Fort Benning or perhaps Fort Campbell was discussed, to which would also be moved the Psychological Warfare Department from Fort Riley.² Thus began the search

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Findings and Recommendations re Special Operations Training, Fort Benning, Georgia, from Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Volckmann, 24 April 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, from 370.2 - 370.64, Box No. 15, PS; War 370.64 TS (3 May 1951), National Archives. Volckmann had been directed by McClure to visit Fort Benning for the purpose of observing and reviewing the course of training and instruction at the CIA's "School Number One," the Ranger Training Center, and the Infantry School, with emphasis on the special operations related instruction, then render a report to him concerning findings and recommendations (see memorandum from McClure to Volckmann, 19 March 1951, filed with above reference). For discussion by McClure and Bank with AFF concerning a Training Center, see Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 16 August 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 020 Staff Meeting, Box No. 2, National Archives.

²Ibid., especially Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 16 August 1951.
for a training center, a search that would end with the selection of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Along this road to Fort Bragg would travel McClure's efforts to establish Special Forces and its concept of employment, and to gain authorization for the center he envisaged. It was not an easy journey.

First of all, there was the matter of the CIA. As we have seen, the Army basically welcomed the emergence of CIA/OPC during the interwar years, and in 1949 agreed to provide it unilateral assistance in the field of guerrilla warfare, which included helping in the location and establishment of a training course at Fort Benning, Georgia. And after the outbreak of war in Korea, the Army also provided some personnel to the CIA for their activities in that theater.

But then General McClure and his OCPW appeared on the scene. By the spring of 1951, McClure had already expressed his reservations concerning the relatively autonomous OCPW role in Korea. In subsequent months, the frustrations of unsuccessfully attempting to influence this situation in Korea, plus the battle to bring Special Forces into being and plan for its employment in Europe, increased McClure's reservations to outright suspicions of the CIA's motives.

These suspicions were reciprocated. As an example, in mid-1951, both CIA/OPC and OCPW entered into a series of conferences to determine means of further collaboration in guerrilla warfare training programs. Even though the study that resulted indicated that the CIA would benefit by sending some of its personnel to the center being proposed by OCPW, the forwarding memorandum sent to General McClure stated that "Mr. Wister would like it to be clearly understood that this understanding is reached on the assumption that the Army is creating a Special Forces-Training Command for its own purposes and not at
the request of CIA. The caveat expressed by Frank Wisner, head of OPC, was obvious: The CIA was not going to place itself in the position of providing an excuse for the Army to use in justifying the creation of its own unconventional warfare capability. Perhaps it was inevitable that two strong-willed, energetic men like Wisner and McClure, both eyeing the same "turf" in a relatively new field, would come into conflict in attempting to establish the boundaries within which each would operate.

Not that there were not attempts to define those boundaries and to cooperate with each other. There were. Both men entered into an initial, tentative agreement in July 1951 concerning their understanding of the respective roles of CIA/OPC and OCPW in the field of unconventional warfare. This was followed by the aforementioned conferences on training programs, and in April 1952 the two agencies agreed to an official liaison arrangement to coordinate material research activities.

There is also evidence that despite his early reservations concerning
OPC's activities in Korea, McClure took a considerably more broad-minded view of CIA's role in unconventional warfare than did certain members of his staff. After returning from an important visit to Europe in August and September 1952, to discuss unconventional warfare planning for that theater, McClure chided his staff:

Putnam [a JCS officer] and I talked at length reference the philosophies I expressed--as I have repeated over and over with you people. Putnam says they are not being reflected by you people at the JSPD level. I believe the Army should be the Executive Agent for guerrilla activities. I am not going to fight with CIA as to their responsibilities in those fields.

Another is the fact that I am fully in accord with supporting CIA in their peacetime activities in getting ready for war to the maximum extent I can and in wartime will welcome any of their resources to the maximum of their capability.1

This was the pragmatic McClure of World War II who, as Chief, FWD/SHAEF, brought together a number of disparate agencies and nationality groups, civilian as well as military, in order to get the job done. He had learned his trade well from that master of compromise and cooperation, Dwight D. Eisenhower. But as the months and years went by, McClure became less tolerant, gradually adopting in his condemnation of the CIA the phrases of the most virulent critics on his staff. At the end of his tenure as Chief, OCPW, the subject preoccupied him.

What caused this turnabout of affairs? Perhaps the most succinct explanation of McClure's change of attitude can be found in one of his last letters before departing OCPW in early 1953. Writing to his old friend, Lieutenant General Bolts, then Commander-in-Chief, Europe, McClure explained:

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Meeting, 5 September 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 12, PSY War 337 TS (5 September 1951), National Archives.
Unfortunately I will not go through Germany on my way to Iran else I would take the opportunity to bring you up to date on the Army/CIA relationship. I feel that the latest paper on command relationship has so much fine print in it that we have committed ourselves to the creation of a fourth service which will effectively tie the hands of the military and require the Theater Commander to lean on and support CIA for all Unconventional Warfare. In recent conferences at CIA, I have heard the statement made repeatedly that, "Since we are now a fourth service many of the activities for which the Army was planning should be transferred to CIA, including the command of military forces designed for guerrilla warfare in time of war." Needless to say I am very unhappy about it both because I question the ability of CIA and second, because I have never believed the Joint Chiefs intended to abrogate their responsibilities for the active command of military operations in time of war.

Here, then, were McClure's key grievances. Aside from the perennial question during these early years of the precise delineation of peacetime and wartime responsibilities for unconventional warfare between the CIA and DOD, McClure had simply come to believe that the CIA was not capable of holding up their end of the bargain—however it was defined. Imbued with the urgency of preparing the nation and the Army for a possible war in Europe, McClure was dissatisfied with the CIA's apparent lack of progress in preparation of guerrilla warfare. He reported to the Chief of Staff in early September 1951 that the "CIA has only now initiated planning for the execution of preparatory measures to aid in the retardation of a Soviet advance." He believed, therefore, that the military—and particularly the Army—needed to have unconventional warfare forces

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter to Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, from Brigadier General McClure, 1953 undated (probably late February or early March 1953), RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, 020-40, Box No. 3, Psy War 040 CIA (undated) 57, National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, Subject: Staff Visit to Europe, 13 September 1951, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files 323.3-333, Box No. 9, Psy War 333 Europe TS (12 September 1951), National Archives.
in being, and that necessary planning, organization, and training be carried out prior to D-Day. In his view, the military services could not leave such preparations to chance or in the hands of a civilian agency. Nor should the JCS allow a situation to develop where the theater commander in an active theater of war would not have full control over all military operations in his area of responsibility—as had happened in Korea, he believed.

Underlying McClure's doubts concerning CIA's capability to perform the unconventional warfare mission, however, was a deeper difference of philosophy between OCPW and CIA concerning the nature of resistance potential in Europe. The CIA position on this subject was perhaps most eloquently stated by its Director, General Walter B. Smith, in a letter written to the Army G-2 in March 1952. Smith opened his letter by referring to McClure as follows:

At certain times in the past we have been importuned by General McClure's people to provide them with detailed information concerning guerrilla groups of which we may have some knowledge. We have consistently declined to furnish this information to General McClure because the information requested impinges directly upon secret operations in which we are currently engaged and for which, at this time, we are solely responsible.

Here was a real source of irritation. The CIA—understandably—was reluctant to share information in its operations which could lead to compromise of important intelligence assets, and perhaps undermine by premature disclosure the very resistance potential that would be counted upon in wartime. McClure's office—also understandably—was frustrated by its inability to require the information believed to be necessary for proper prewar planning;

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1 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to Major General A. R. Holing, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, March 10, 1952, from Walter B. Smith, Director, Filed with RC 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.64, Guerrilla Warfare, National Archives.
and the extreme secrecy involved only heightened their suspicions of CIA's lack of preparedness. It was to be a perennial topic of discord between the two agencies.

Not only would they refuse to provide the information desired, said Smith, but his agency questioned the "validity of General McClure's proposal for retardation by guerrilla forces." Expressing both the views of his agency and those of "the leading British experts in this field," Smith explained:

It is highly doubtful that general resistance forces will develop any substantial offensive capability until at least D plus six months. Enemy controls and reprisals will be extremely severe upon the outbreak of war. Certain underground organizations have even indicated that they will hesitate to go into action until the Allied battle line is stabilized on the continent and the tide is turning our way.

After enlarging upon this theme for several paragraphs, Smith then summarized his position:

For the reasons outlined above, any program which contemplates that large scale resistance organizations, developed prior to D-day and held in readiness for an indefinite period of time would be willing and capable to deliver major offensive blows within the first few weeks after the commencement of hostilities is considered by us to be unrealistic and infeasible.

McClure had, of course, considered the pros and cons of what he termed the "two different schools of thought on the timing of the commitment of unconventional forces." One school held that the first few days of a Soviet attack were critical, and that even a few hours of delay accomplished by unconventional warfare forces would be significant. The other school (the "British view") held that guerrilla forces should not dissipate their efforts prematurely and thus did not favor any uprising until regular allied armed forces were in a

1Ibid.
position to support them. His own analysis, as presented to the Chief of Staff in September 1951 was that:

To accept the latter view would mean nothing would happen on D-Day and not until we were in a position to start liberating overrun countries. To accept the former view would mean attrition might completely dissolve that work and organization which had been created. My personal view is that even with the attrition we have more to gain than to lose, and that if the British can organize after D-Day for a future use, such guerrilla forces as desired, obviously we could reorganize in those areas where attrition had taken its toll.¹

In addition to disagreeing on the philosophical approach as to how the resistance should be generated, when it should be committed, the CIA also took exception with OCPW's attempts to estimate resistance potential in Eastern Europe. It called the projected indigenous strength estimates in OCPW's Special Forces Operations Plan for Europe "unrealistic and unattainable"; this and other views advanced by the CIA apparently formed the basis for initial JCS disapproval of the plan in late 1952.²

These were fundamental differences. McClure's deepest concern, however, was best illustrated by the remark in his letter to Bolte about CIA's ambitions to become a "fourth service." He was genuinely apprehensive of allowing too much latitude to the CIA which could establish the basis for undue

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff Subject: Staff Visit to Europe, from Brigadier General McClure, 10 September 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 323.3-333, Box No. 9, Pay War 333 (10 September 1951), National Archives.

²The CIA's statement appeared in a memorandum dated 6 June 1952, an enclosure to JCS 1969/73, Memorandum for Chairman, JCS, Subject: Overseas CIA Logistical Support Bases; see Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for: Chief of Military History, Subject: Summary of Major Events and Problems, Pay War 314.7 TS (15 August 1953); see also Pay War 314.7 (6 January 1953), History of DA Activities, for OCPW's explanation of why JCS disapproved their Special Forces Operations Plan for Europe; both are filed in RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 311-319.1, Box No. 7, National Archives.
reliance by the military on CIA/OPC for unconventional warfare activities. In doing so, he feared, unconventional warfare may then "become regarded among military commanders and planners as a limited, special 'cloak and dagger' function rather than as a basically important, possibly essential military responsibility."

Here again was a reminder of the image problem, as perceived by McClure and his staff; the constant battle to achieve legitimacy for unconventional warfare among "conventional" military officers. If too much responsibility for unconventional warfare was passed to the CIA, it could reinforce the reservations that many officers already harbored concerning the Army's role in unconventional warfare. In a period of budgetary and manpower shortages, such reservations could quickly lead to the conclusion that the Army could not--and should not--attempt to duplicate the functions of a civilian agency. In short, McClure's primary concern--while well intentioned--was bureaucratic in nature and aimed at the establishment and preservation of an unconventional warfare capability for the Army.

Another threat to McClure's attempts to establish a strong Army role in unconventional warfare was the opposition of the Air Force. We have already seen that he was critical of the Air Force support of Army psychological warfare activities in Korea, and concerned over what he considered to be the

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Brigadier General Paul D. Harkins, Subject: JSPC 808/112, Command Relationships Between the CIA/OPC Organization and the Armed Forces in Actual Theaters of War Where American Forces Are Engaged (29 December 1952), from Brigadier General McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare, 30 December 1952, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 000.1-020, Box No. 1, National Archives. General Harkins was the "Army Planner," a senior officer responsible for presenting the Army's position on JCS actions.
unnecessarily duplicative propaganda equipment and personnel in their Aerial Resupply and Communication wings. These same wings, however, and their support of CIA operations in Korea, also gave the Air Force claim to a leading role in unconventional warfare. Their list of wartime missions for these ARC wings included: the introduction and evacuation of agents behind enemy lines; aerial resupply of guerrillas; support of commando type operations and isolated Army units; and the printing and packaging of leaflets, as well as providing trained personnel capable of conducting psychological warfare through other media. In short, the Air Force claimed the ARC wings provided them with a capability to support CIA activities during peacetime or wartime; to conduct overt psychological warfare; and to direct, coordinate, and support unconventional warfare operations.\(^1\)

This close peacetime association with the CIA caused the Air Force—in the eyes of OCPW—to champion CIA/OPC as the agency responsible for planning and preparing for the conduct of unconventional warfare, thus taking issue with the concept that the Army had a major responsibility and principal function in this field as part of land warfare. Similarly, this association with CIA/OPC was being used, thought OCPW, to seek a unilateral, preeminent Air Force position among the Services for control and direction of wartime unconventional warfare activities.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Air Force Presentation to the Psychological Strategy Board on 10 January 1952, filed with RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 337-350.05, Box No. 13, Psy War 350.001 TS (7 January 1952), National Archives.

\(^2\) Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Discussion of Questions by the Under Secretary of the Army concerning Army Role in Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare, in response to a Memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff, Subject: Guerrilla Warfare, 11
As one might have expected, General McClure disagreed with the contention of the Air Force. In his view, the Air Force was essentially a "supply agency" for unconventional warfare activities, "with transportation capable of doing certain things that the Ground Forces are going to require and going to command." He supported Air Force development of special wings to support psychological and unconventional warfare activities—but not to duplicate the Army's capabilities, and certainly not to be used as a license to claim a dominant role in these fields. He was particularly disturbed by the lack of joint unconventional warfare planning that he found when he visited Europe in the fall of 1951, and told the Chief of Staff that the Air Force not only disagreed with the Army view on retardation, but also "felt they had a major responsibility in the field of unconventional warfare which did not exclude the actual command of guerrillas." Because of the unilateral efforts of the Services and what he saw as unnecessary duplication and confusion among them and in their relationship with CIA, McClure believed that one Service should be designated as the Executive Agency for guerrilla warfare—and that Service, of course, should be the Army.

Valuable support for McClure's view of a predominant role for the Army

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Meeting, 5 September 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 12, Pay War 337 TS (3 September 1951), National Archives.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, Subject: Staff Visit to Europe, from Brigadier General McClure, 12 September 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 323.3-333, Box No. 9, Pay War 333 (10 September 1951), National Archives.
in unconventional warfare came from General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe. During another visit to Europe in November 1951, McClure
briefed Eisenhower on the command and coordination difficulties that had
arisen with respect to unconventional warfare planning for Europe. Eisenhower
was "keenly alert" to the potential that unconventional warfare offered,
stated McClure in his trip report to the Chief of Staff, and gave permission
to quote him on the following views:

    One Service must not only have a paramount interest in this
field but also be the controlling authority.
In my opinion this field is an Army one and ... in my theater
it will be:
All facilities must be put under the Army. The Navy and Air
Force will have to support the Army. Air support is essential but
in this field the Air Force is only a transport outfit.1

Eisenhower went on to speak strongly against extravagance resulting
from duplication or individual Service jealousies. It was a strong endorse-
ment of McClure's views, but the interservice rivalry in unconventional war-
fare continued, particularly with respect to planning and command responsi-
bilities in Europe. Although OCPW eventually did succeed in obtaining recogni-
tion for the Army as having primary responsibility among the Services for
this new field,2 the conflict between the Air Force and Army that marked this

1 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject:
Unconventional Warfare (Special Forces Operations) Discussions Held at EUCOM
and SHAPE, from Brigadier General McClure, 5 December 1951, RG 319 Army -
Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No.
15, Pay War 370.64 TS (5 December 1951), National Archives.

2 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to Chief Military History, Summary of Major
Activities of OCPW for Period 9 September 1951 to 31 December 1952, 7 April
1953. JCS Decision 1969/18, 27 March 1952, Responsibilities of the Services
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Guerrilla Warfare, assigned to the Army the
primary responsibility for guerrilla warfare as it pertains to combat opera-
tions on land. The Army was also made primarily responsible for the develop-
ment, in coordination with the other Services and subject to JCS policy
process—as that between the Army and the CIA—was a key feature in the background of McClure’s efforts to create Special Forces and establish the Psychological Warfare Center.

In addition to the interagency and interservice rivalry that OCPW had to contend with, there was also the not inconsiderable challenge of selling the Army on the Special Forces concept and the idea of a centralized training command for both psychological and unconventional warfare. In June 1951 General Collins—the Chief of Staff—approved the conclusions of Volckmann’s initial study, "Army Responsibilities for Special Forces Operations," and forwarded it to the JCS indicating that until they delineated Service responsibilities for unconventional warfare, the Army would use this study as a basis for planning. Although an important initial step, this general endorsement by Collins to proceed with investigation and planning on the subject did not provide OCPW with the specific authorization needed.

This came only after the initial discussion by McClure and Colonel Bank with Army Field Forces in August 1951, when the G-3 in mid-September concurred with the recommendation of the Army Field Forces that a training center should be established for psychological warfare and special operations. Indicating to OCPW that this center should be established initially "on an austere direction, of the doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment employed by guerrilla forces in combat operations on land and the conduct of training such forces with the assistance of the other Services. RG 319 Army – Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal File, 311-319.1, Box No. 7, Psy War 314.7 (6 January 1953), National Archives.

1General Collins’s directive remained in effect for nine months, until March 1952, at which time—after considerable interservice battling—the JCS designated the Army as having primary responsibility among the Services for guerrilla warfare. Ibid.; see also Brigadier General Bullock’s (McClure’s replacement as Chief, OCPW) briefing to the Chief, Army Field Services, at Fort Monroe, Virginia, 5 October 1953, RG 319 Army – Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal File, 1951-54, 337-350.05, Box No. 13, Psy War 337 TS (2 October 1953), National Archives.
basis," the G-3 also directed that action should be undertaken "to establish the extent to which the resources of the Army are to be allocated to Special (Forces) Operations." Lest this guidance be interpreted too liberally by the Special Forces enthusiasts, the following caution was rather pointedly added:

In view of the acute manpower situation and the known reluctance of overseas commanders to accept special units within their troop ceiling, in preference to established units, the basic policy in regard to Special (Forces) Operations should be the maximum utilization of indigenous personnel for such operations and the minimum use of American personnel.¹

Following on the heels of the deactivation of the Ranger units, this statement is a rather clear indication of the wariness with which conventional commanders and staffs regarded "elite" and "special" units—particularly during periods of budgetary and manpower shortages.

In any event, the opening—albeit rather narrow—provided by G-3 was alertly acted upon by OCPW. A virtual cascade of actions poured forth from McClure’s staff: representatives met with the staff of Army Field Forces to develop an agreed Table of Distribution (TD) for a Psychological Warfare Center; Tables of Organization and Equipment for the units of a Special Forces Group (no longer called a Special Forces Ranger Regiment) were developed for staffing; a proposed training circular describing the mission, capabilities, organization, concept of employment and training of a Special Forces Group was written; a requirement for 3,700 personnel spaces, including 300 spaces for the proposed training center, was submitted; a proposed directive to the Chief

¹Department of the Army, Organization and Training Division, G-3, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief of Psychological Warfare, Subject: Training of Individuals and Units of the Army in Special (Forces) Operations, 14 September 1951, from Brigadier General D. A. D. Ogden, G-3 370.2 TS (23 August 1951), filed with RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, Pay War 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), National Archives.
of Army Field Forces outlining his responsibilities in psychological warfare and Special Forces Operations was prepared, as well as a suggested AFF training program for these fields; and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was recommended as the site for the new center, with a suggested activation date of December 1, 1951. All of this was reported to the G-3 on October 5, scarcely three weeks after OCPW received the go-ahead from them. McClure wanted to move fast!

Army Field Forces had recommended that the proposed training center be established at either Fort Campbell or Camp Pickett, Virginia. The OCPW favored Fort Campbell because it had airborne and parachute maintenance facilities, but recommended to G-3 that a final decision on the location be held until a survey of installations was conducted. In the final analysis, neither the personnel spaces requested for Special Forces and the Center, the target date for activation of the Center, nor the tentative preferred location would prove to be accurate, but progress toward accomplishment of McClure's goal was being made.

Both McClure and his chief architect for the Special Forces concept, Volckmann, realized the suspicions engendered among many officers by these

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Response to G-3, 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), Subject: Training of Individuals and Units of the Army in Special (Forces) Operations, from Brigadier General McClure, 5 October 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, filed with Psy War 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), National Archives. Minutes of the 13 September 1951 weekly OCPW Staff Meeting show that a plan for a Center for Psychological Warfare and Special Operations Training was being worked on, with the intent of making the necessary suggestions to AFF, who in turn could then recommend to G-3 that such a center be established—an interesting, but not uncommon, bit of bureaucratic maneuvering to get a pet project under way; RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, Psy War 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

2Ibid., 5 October 1951, OCPW response to G-3.
efforts to introduce into the Army new ideas and an unprecedented organization to carry out those ideas. Both men took steps to attempt to dispel these suspicions. In a paper written in late October 1951, Volckmann analyzed the problem this way:

The question of assets, capabilities, and support that must be diverted to behind-the-lines operations brings us to a final major problem. So many strictly conventional military minds "flash-red" at the mention of anything "special" or at the diversion of personnel and equipment to any channel other than conventional regular forces. In a way, they are justified in safeguarding the diversion of personnel, equipment, and support that will in any way tend to weaken the capabilities of our regular forces. For the most part, however, their fears are without foundation. If they will but take time to view the problem of any future war as a whole, their initial reactions should be modified and their fears dispelled.\footnote{Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., "Special Forces Operations," by Colonel Volckmann, 26 October 1951, filed in Psy War 372.2 Operations, National Archives.}

Volckmann believed that historical analysis of World War II showed that behind-the-lines operations were not fully developed and fell far short of their potential. This was due, he believed, to a failure by the military to regard these activities as an integral part of conventional warfare; proper emphasis, in other words, was lacking at both staff and operating levels. The result, in his view, was guerrilla warfare conducted as a "side show" and on a "shoestring" basis, for the most part uncoordinated with the operations of conventional forces. To prevent this from happening in the future, and to convince military men of the importance of behind-the-lines operations in modern warfare, he advocated general indoctrination on the subject through service schools and specialized training in appropriate centers—like the one for "special forces operations" that he had advocated six months previously.\footnote{Ibid.}
Similarly, in a briefing prepared for the Secretary of Defense in early November 1951, General McClure voiced his concerns about the adverse image that unconventional warfare had among some military men:

"I have been told that the dynamic manner in which my office developed led to apprehension on the part of some that the Army was seeking to enter fields not properly a part of ground warfare. This is furtherest from our intent. We have sought and will continue to seek to prepare ourselves and the Army to discharge those responsibilities which are proper and appropriate Army functions. . . . This broad field of unconventional warfare must be planned and conducted on a Joint and National basis. No one Service can "go it alone.""

While he was proud of what his office had accomplished, McClure told those present at this briefing that he was also "deeply apprehensive over the future." Typifying the cold war fears that imbued so many senior officers with a sense of urgency, he stated that "none of us in this room today knows how much time we will have," because "we face an enemy who is prepared to take the field tomorrow morning." His summation: "In Psychological Operations we are fast approaching a state of readiness," but in Special Operations "we are years behind.""

An ironic footnote concerning the term "special operations" should be mentioned. It was about this time--the fall of 1951--that the Army began to adopt the term "special forces operations" as opposed to "special operations"; the reason being that the latter term was defined through long usage in the Army and as set forth in FM 100-5, as relating to "night combat," "jungle operations," "joint amphibious operations," and the sort. The OCPW argued

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1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., "Briefing for Secretary of Defense on OCPW Matters," 5 November 1951, by General McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff) Psy War Admin Office Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-34 334-337, Box No. 15, Psy War 337 S (5 November 1951), National Archives.

2Ibid.
that to adopt some other term "would only lead to confusion or result in costly expenditure of funds . . . to modify existing literature and doctrine already published."¹ Later the term "special forces operations" itself would be dropped by the Army, to be replaced by "unconventional warfare" (which encompassed guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion and sabotage) as the primary mission for Special Forces units. The irony is that during the 1970's Special Forces would again adopt a version of "special operations" (with the official definition still relatively unchanged in JCS and Army literature) as one of their primary missions—a move that contributed to the perception of duplication of functions and capabilities between themselves and Ranger units.²

A few days after his briefing for the Secretary of Defense, a discussion took place during McClure's weekly staff meeting on the forthcoming survey of

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¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Colonel D. V. Johnson, Assistant Chief, Plans Division, ACofS, G-3, Subject: Responsibilities of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Unconventional Warfare, 26 October 1951. From Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 370.2-370.64, Box No. 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (26 October 1951), National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Training Circular 31-20-1, The Role of US Army Special Forces, 22 October 1976. Eliot Cohen states that "the US Army contributed to the downfall of Special Forces by creating two Ranger battalions [in 1974-75]. These units fit the specialist model: they are relatively small forces trained for such missions as the rescue of hostages (along the lines of Israel's Entebbe Raid)." Cohen, op. cit., p. 88. This type of operation, however, as well as other unilateral (without the employment of indigenous personnel) Ranger or commando-type "direct action," activities have become part of the Special Forces ever-growing repertoire of missions and capabilities (Cohen somewhat inelegantly calls Special Forces "guerrilla/ commandos, preparing for a variety of military odd jobs," p. 25). Cohen discusses the urge among elite units to acquire new missions and additional personnel, and concludes: "The mission of elite troops must be as rigorously defined as possible: a niche must be carved out for them and they must be kept within it" (p. 97).
Army posts to select a site for the Psychological Warfare Center. Of the posts to be visited--Fort Benning, Fort Campbell, and Fort Bragg--McClure had a definite preference, as he stated to Colonel Lank: "Make it Bragg if you can." ¹

And Fort Bragg it was--but not without difficulty. The surveys conducted in November by representatives of OCPW, Army Field Forces, and Third Army, turned up some resistance. The Infantry Center at Fort Benning did not want to allocate space and facilities to any activity not directly related to its mission (an interesting position, in view of the direct support being provided to infantry divisions in Korea by psychological warfare teams) and there were other objections as well. Third Army opposed establishing the Center at Fort Bragg on the grounds that other conventional combat units scheduled for activation there would have to be organized at a less desirable post. They suggested Camp Rucker, Alabama, as an alternative, but this site offered little with regard to airborne and amphibious training, and had no housing for dependents--a potential morale problem. Of the sites considered, the representative from OCPW and Army Field Forces clearly favored Fort Bragg: the necessary personnel spaces could be accommodated, buildings--with some modification--were available, and it offered superior training advantages and facilities for both psychological warfare and Special Forces units. ²

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meetings, 8 November 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Survey for Psychological Warfare Center, 19 November 1951, by Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, Chief, Special Operations Division; Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Status
the impasse had to be broken.

This was accomplished by Colonel Glavin, the Army Field Forces representative (who had been recently transferred from OCPW), who arranged a conference between General Leonard, General Bradford, and General Hodge in an attempt to break the deadlock. Colonel Fertig, Chief of OCPW's Special Operations Division, urged McClure to personally brief General Hodge on the desirability of Fort Bragg—which apparently he did, because on December 4 Glavin obtained approval for the North Carolina post.¹

Still to be obtained were the exact facilities needed at Fort Bragg, so another survey trip was planned for this purpose. General McClure's guidance was clear: "I want these requirements to be modest. We have to go on a very austere basis at first."² He was very much aware of the precarious position of these new ideas during a period of budget-cutting and did not want to jeopardize the chances of their survival by appearing to be too greedy in his demands.

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Status of Special Forces Training Center, 3 December 1951, by Colonel Fertig, Psy War 322C (3 December 1951), RG 319 (Army Staff) Psy War Admin Office Records Branch, Decimal Files (C), 1951-54, National Archives. The personnel who made the initial survey to Fort Benning and Fort Bragg during the period 13 to 15 November 1951 were Colonel Bank and Major Stark of OCPW, Colonel Glavin of AFF, and Major Taylor of the G-3 Division, Psy War Section, Third Army.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 6 December 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.
The minutes of the OCPW staff meeting for the October-December 1951 period also depict continuing efforts to identify personnel on active duty with experience in behind-the-lines activities. The Adjutant General was requested to prepare a roster of officers with OSS, commando, Ranger, and guerrilla backgrounds. An officer was sent to visit General Donovan, then practicing law in New York, to examine his personal files in an attempt to obtain a list of Army officers who had served in OSS. This latter effort resulted in a roster of 3,900 names that were being screened to identify those still on active duty.1 Certainly this must be considered as still another indicator of the pervasive influence of OSS on the thinking of the architects of Special Forces during this crucial formative period.

The survey team that returned to Fort Bragg to select the exact location decided upon an area known as Smoke Bomb Hill. It contained the necessary buildings left over from World War II mobilization for barracks, mess halls, administration, and those required for conversion to classrooms and a library. Estimated cost of rehabilitation of the facilities was $151,000, an exceedingly modest sum—particularly when compared to today's inflated figures for similar work. Even this minimal estimate, however, was a source of some agitation: the Third Army representative stated unofficially that his headquarters had no funds available, thus Army Field Forces would have to allocate the necessary monies in order to get the project under way. Despite this minor maneuvering between headquarters to fix fiscal responsibilities, Lieutenant Colonel Blair from OCPW reported to General McClure that "in

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1 Ibid.; see also Minutes of Weekly Staff Meetings, 25 October 1951, and 8 November 1951, Box No. 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.
general, the area is exactly what we wanted. At the end of 1951, the only major tasks remaining to be accomplished were to obtain the necessary personal spaces for activation of both the Center and Special Forces—and to get the Chief of Staff's blessing for the whole project.

General McClure personally involved himself in these tasks. After a busy January—during which he made a major presentation before the Psychological Strategy Board on the Army's activity in psychological warfare and guerrilla warfare, pursued the question of funds for his proposed center, and investigated a security breach concerning the activation of Special Forces 1

1Office of the Post Engineer, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Center, 12 December 1951, by A. W. Hart, Division Chief, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, File 123 Money and Savings, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Fort Bragg Survey, 17 December 1951, from Lieutenant Colonel Melvin R. Blair, Special Operations Division, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, File 061.2 Army and Military Surveys, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Minutes of Weekly Staff Meetings, 20 December 1951, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives. The survey team that selected Smoke Bomb Hill consisted of Colonel Glavin, APF; Lieutenant Colonel Blair and Major Stark, OCPW; Lieutenant Colonel Weaver from the Psychological Warfare Division, Army General School, Fort Riley; and Lieutenant Colonel Brock and Major Taylor, Third Army.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: General McClure, Subject: Psychological Warfare Presentation for PSB, 7 January 1952, from Colonel Vertig, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 337-350.05, Box No. 13, Pay War 350.01 PS (7 January 1952), National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum to: ACoS, G-3, Subject: Funds for a Psychological Warfare Center, 14 January 1952, from Brigadier General McClure, Pay War 123 (14 January 1952), National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject: Compromise of Classified Information, 22 January 1952, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff), Pay War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File C, 1951-54, 370.64-380.01, Box No. 20, Pay War 380.01 C (22 January 1952), National Archives. The breach of security that annoyed McClure, who initiated the investigation, was the following sentence from the 21 January 1952 issue of Newweek: "The Army will soon open a secret guerrilla warfare and sabotage school for military personnel and CIA agents at
he continued the campaign to bring his goals to fruition. In an early February 1952 memorandum to the G-3, McClure urged that the activation of new psychological warfare and Special Forces units "be expedited by every feasible method." His rationale was convincing: no Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group existed in the United States to function as school troops, to train replacement personnel for similar units in Europe and the Far East, or to meet emergency requirements; and units of the proposed "Special Forces Group (Guerrilla Warfare)" were needed to meet planned D-Day requirements in Europe. Clearly establishing that, in his view, the activation of psychological warfare and Special Forces units was closely intertwined with the concurrent action to approve and authorize spaces for the Psychological Warfare Center, McClure also requested that the latter project be expedited. Recognizing the vulnerability of his plans in the hands of budget-cutters, McClure made an eloquent plea:

At times when the Army as a whole is faced with a reduction in the number of authorized spaces, it becomes necessary to determine areas which can absorb "cuts" without unduly impairing overall efficiency. A new activity faced with an across-the-board cut, or with a "cut" made on a fixed percentage basis, can be crippled to the point where its existence is seriously threatened. This is particularly true in the case of Psychological Warfare and Special Operations activities which are already on an austere basis. I recommend that these factors be considered when an Army-wide reduction in space authorization is contemplated.¹

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,
The G-3's response to this plea was terse. McClure's request for early activation of the psychological warfare and Special Forces units desired would be acted upon after the "implications of the reduced FY 1953 budget have been fully weighed," which was probably not the response that he had hoped for. On a brighter note, the G-3 did indicate that a Summary Sheet was being prepared for the Chief of Staff that recommended approval of the Psychological Warfare Center.¹

Sure enough, on March 3, 1952, the promised Summary Sheet went forward to General Collins, stating that implementation of the conclusions reached in the study "Army Responsibilities in Respect to Special Forces Operations," previously approved by Collins, required a "Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Center" in peacetime to train individuals and units to support theater Special Forces operations. (Again we see the importance of Volckmann's initial study as the underlying rationale for this concept.) The memorandum also indicated that the proposed center would consolidate psychological warfare and Special Forces training activities at a single installation. Three weeks later—on March 27, 1952—the Chief of Staff gave his approval that such a center be established.²

Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to: ACofS, G-3, Subject: Utilization of Active Army Spaces Allocated for FY 1952 and FY 1953, 6 February 1952, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff) PsyWar Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 319.5-320.3, Box No. 12, PsyWar 320.2 (6 February 1952), National Archives.

¹Ibid., Comment No. 2 from Brigadier General G. J. Higgins, Chief, Organization and Training Division, G-3, 15 February 1952.

²Department of the Army, ACofS, G-3, Washington 25, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Center, 3 March 1952, from Major General Eddleman, Deputy ACofS, G-3, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files.
Within ten days, General McClure proudly provided the details of the Chief of Staff's decision to JCS. A Psychological Warfare Center would be activated on or about May 1, 1952, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The administrative staff and faculty for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Departments and a Research and Development Board would total 173 personnel on an austere basis, with an increase to 362 officers and men at full strength. The Psychological Warfare School and units at Fort Riley, Kansas, would move to Fort Bragg upon activation of the new center. A total of 2,220 spaces had been authorized for activation of Psychological Warfare and Special Forces units for fiscal year 1951-54. A Special Forces Group would be activated at Fort Bragg in three increments of approximately 600 men and officers each, commencing about May 1, 1952. General McClure's dream of centralizing the functions of "the whole field of OCPW" was about to be realized. The long journey to Fort Bragg was soon to end.

(1951-54), Box No. 8, Psy War 322 TS (3 March 1952), National Archives. The total personnel requirements for the center itself were stated as 362, of which 312 would be military and 50 civilians. Twenty-nine spaces (27 military and 2 civilian) from the Psychological Warfare Division, Army General School, Fort Riley, would be transferred to the new center at Fort Bragg.

1 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Subject: Activation of Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 319.2-320.3, Box No. 13, Psy War 322 (7 April 1952), National Archives.
CHAPTER VIII

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER AND THE ORIGINS OF SPECIAL WARFARE

After receiving the Chief of Staff's formal approval in late March 1952, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare moved rapidly to get the Psychological Warfare Center on its feet. The formal order establishing the Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Third Army, was published on 14 April 1952. Copies of the Table of Distribution (TD) for the Center were hand-carried by General McClure's staff to Third Army, Army Field Forces, and Fort Bragg during the period 16-18 April. The mission of this unprecedented Center, as explained by the TD, was:

To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment employed in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations.¹

Movement of equipment and personnel from Fort Riley to Fort Bragg began by late April, and on 29 May 1952, the Chief of Army Field Forces at Fort

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, Subject: Activation and Mission of the Psychological Warfare Center, from Brigadier General McClure, 22 May 1952, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-325, Box No. 13, Psy War 322 (22 May 1952), National Archives. Department of the Army General Order No. 37, 14 April 1952, established the Psychological Warfare Center as a Class I activity and installation, effective 10 April 1952 (extract filed with above reference). A copy of the Recommended Table of Distribution for the Psychological Warfare Center can be found with Psy War 320.3 (16 April 1952), National Archives.
Monroe, Virginia, formally announced the activation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The same order officially transferred responsibilities for development and teaching of psychological warfare doctrine from the Army General School at Fort Riley to the newly formed Psychological Warfare Center.¹

Organization of the Center

As originally established, the Psychological Warfare Center consisted of a provisional Psychological Warfare School, the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a Psychological Warfare Board, and the 10th Special Forces Group.² Colonel Charles H. Karlstad, formerly Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, was selected as the first Commander of the Center and Commandant of the Psychological Warfare School.³ In the foreword of an administrative booklet prepared for visitors participating in a psychological warfare seminar during 1952, Colonel Karlstad offered some thoughts on the role of his new command:

The PsyWar Center represents an effort unique in the military history of the United States. For the first time, the techniques of attacking both the minds and the bodies of our enemies have been coordinated in

¹Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, VA, Letter, Subject: Psychological Warfare Doctrine Development and Instruction, USAJFKCENMA Archives; Letter, Colonel Hays, 5 May 1969. An advance party from the Psychological Warfare Division, Army General School, consisting of LTC John O. Weaver with 5 officers and 7 enlisted men was scheduled to arrive Fort Bragg on 27 April 1952; the remainder of this division (8 officers and 4 enlisted men) was scheduled to move not later than 15 May 1952. See Army Field Forces letter, Subject: Psy War Center, 30 April 1952, to Commanding General - Third Army, filed with Psy War 322 (1 May 1952), National Archives.


³Letter, Colonel Hays, 5 May 1969.
a single training operation. The Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Departments [of the Psychological Warfare School], closely linked, instruct in the unconventional weapons and tactics with which our modern army must be equipped to function effectively against enemy forces.1

(Karlstad's comments are strikingly reminiscent of General Donovan's all-encompassing concept of psychological warfare when he organized the Coordinator of Information eleven years earlier.)

One may wonder why the Psychological Warfare School was initially given a provisional status. The G-3, Department of the Army, disapproved its activation as a formally designated army service school on the basis that such a school was not necessary to the accomplishment of the Center's mission and the establishment of a formal school would require additional funds.2 This must have been particularly perplexing to the personnel at Fort Bragg since even as an element of the Army General School at Fort Riley the Psychological Warfare Division had been given service school recognition. Obvious advantages of formal service school status—as opposed to informal schools in the category of those often set up by divisions and regiments—were increased prestige, funding and equipment procurement advantages, and the opportunity to attract quality faculty personnel. The Psychological Warfare Center, in a letter signed by Colonel Karlstad and addressed to the Chief, Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, made a strong case for reconsideration of the


2Department of the Army, Organization and Training Division, G-3, Washington 25, D.C., DF to Psy War, Subject: Establishment of the Psychological Operations School, 27 August 1952, G-3 352 (6 August 1952), filed with Psy War 322 (25 September 1952), National Archives.
decision; an appeal that received the strong support of General McClure.  

 Apparently this appeal was effective, for on 22 October 1952, the Psychological Warfare School was officially established and recognized as a service school by Department of the Army General Order Number 92.

 The purpose of the Psychological Warfare School was to "prepare selected individuals of the Army to perform those psychological warfare and special forces duties which they may be called upon to perform in war." The school was organized into a small headquarters staff and two instructional divisions: the Psychological Operations Department and the Special Forces Department. In terms of longevity, the senior element in the school was the Psychological Operations Department, which was a direct descendant of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Army General School, before being transferred and integrated in the Psychological Warfare Center in early 1952.

 Lieutenant Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr., who had been Deputy of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Army General School, became the first director of the Psychological Operations Department. The mission of the Psychological Operations Department was defined as the instruction and training of selected officers in the duties of psychological warfare operations.

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1 The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Letter to: Chief of Psychological Warfare, Subject: Activation of the Psychological Warfare School, 12 September 1952, USAJFKCENMA Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum to: ACoS, G-3, Subject: Establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, 25 September 1952, Psy War 322 (25 September 1952), National Archives.


3 Letter, Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr., 5 May 1969.
staffs from Department of the Army to field army and corps levels; instruction and training of selected individuals, officers, and noncommissioned officers as specialists in propaganda operations and as key persons in psychological warfare operational units; and the preparation and revision of extension courses, training literature, and field manuals on psychological warfare organization, operations, and doctrine.\(^1\) The importance of the Department's activities certainly became enhanced by the Army's requirements in Korea, as evidenced by this statement from the January 1-June 30, 1953, report of the Secretary of Defense:

The role of psychological warfare as a support weapon in combat was highlighted by improved psychological warfare operations carried on by the Army during the year, stimulating the development of the program at the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg . . . . Schools and units have been established there to train officers and enlisted men in all phases of this specialty.\(^2\)

An interesting fact to note about this report is that no mention was made of the activities of either the 10th Special Forces Group or its counterpart in the Psychological Warfare School, the Special Forces Department. Nor was there any mention of these two elements--or of the Army's attempts to develop an unconventional warfare capability--in the January 1 to June 30, 1952, report of the Secretary of Defense, a report which did, however, mark the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, "to provide comprehensive courses of instruction in all phases of psychological warfare."\(^3\)

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The lack of publicity given to Special Forces can be largely attributed to security considerations. Because the mission of Special Forces was classified, little reference to their organization and activities initially appeared in press releases concerning the Psychological Warfare Center. This caution was carried through by the Center in its own publications—much to the consternation of the Special Forces enthusiasts among McClure's staff. They complained that the student handbook published by the Psychological Warfare School was "slanted heavily towards Psychological Warfare to the detriment of Special Forces," and feared the result would be "that the Special Forces student, therefore, will look upon himself as a 'country cousin' to the Psychological Warfare Center." Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Blair, who had been on the road attempting to "sell" Special Forces in a recruitment program, was particularly miffed and recommended that OCPW take action "to revise the hand-

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief of Information, Subject: Proposed Contingency Press Release Regarding Psy War Center, 17 June 1952, from Brigadier General McClure, Psy War 000.7 (16 June 1952), and Memorandum for: G-3, Subject: Proposed Press Release Regarding the Psychological Warfare Center, 1 July 1952, from Colonel Fertig, Acting Chief, OCPW, Psy War 000.7 (1 July 1952), both in RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, 1951-54, Box No. 1, National Archives. General McClure told the Chief of Information in his 17 June 1952 memorandum that the mission of Special Forces was classified confidential, thus it was "considered unwise to make any reference thereto in the proposed contingency release." Upon Colonel Karlstad's assumption of command of the Center, the story noting this event in the Fort Bragg newspaper made no reference to Special Forces operations. Later the Chief of Information suggested that the press release include reference to Special Forces, "To prevent undue probing by the news services into Special Forces activities at Fort Bragg, NC." After several weeks of correspondence between G-2, G-3, CINFO, OCPW, and Army Field Forces, a specific policy on the matter had still not been resolved by late August 1952. Nor had the problem been solved by January 1953, when the Special Forces Division initiated action to downgrade from Confidential to Restricted certain aspects of the Special Forces Program (see Psywar 380.01, RG 319 [Army Staff], Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File [C], 1951-54, 370.64-380.01, Box No. 20, National Archives.
book along more impartial lines."¹ (In later years, particularly during the heyday of the "Green Berets"—the 1960's—psychological warfare would be considered the "country cousin" at the Center, an ironic turnabout in perceptions.) While these complaints may appear trivial, they were evidence of a resentment that went beyond the security restrictions on publicity for Special Forces—some of McClure's staff simply did not believe that unconventional warfare units should be associated with psychological warfare, and certainly not in a subordinate role. But we shall return to this point later.

In any event, the junior member of the Psychological Warfare School was the Special Forces Department, which, unlike the Psychological Operations Department, had no predecessor in U.S. Army history. With Colonel Filmore K. Mearns as its first director, the missions of this department were outlined as:

- the conduct of regular Special Forces courses for officers and selected enlisted personnel;
- the conduct of Special Forces orientation courses for designated personnel;
- the preparation and revision of literature and lessons for Special Forces extension courses;
- and the preparation and revision of training literature, field manuals, circulars, and special texts on Special Forces operations.² Essentially, the department's primary orientation was on teaching

¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for: Chief, Special Forces Division, Subject: Student Handbook—"The Psychological Warfare School," 13 August 1952, from LTC Marvin J. Waters, Operations and Training Branch; Memorandum for: Colonel Fertig, Subject: Psy War Center Student Handbook, 14 August 1952, from Colonel William J. Blythe, Chief, Special Forces Division; Memorandum for: Colonel Blythe, Subject: Student Handbook—"The Psychological Warfare School," 21 August 1952, from LTC Melvin R. Blair; all filed under Psy War 332 Army Service Schools, National Archives. Blair complained that "not a single word is devoted to the role of Special Forces" in Chapter I of the Handbook, while "approximately 50% of the Staff and Faculty personnel and student body will be Special Forces personnel."

fundamentals of unconventional warfare to personnel being assigned to Special Forces, with emphasis on the conduct of guerrilla operations.

Another rather unique organization created as part of the Center was the Psychological Warfare Board, which was to "test, evaluate, and compile reports on material, doctrine, procedure, technique, and tactics pertaining to and for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces." As an example of the type work carried out by the Board, by early 1954 the Psychological Warfare Board had completed over forty projects, to include operational facets of psychological warfare transmitter and receiving equipment, loudspeaker equipment, mobile reproduction equipment, and different types of leaflet dissemination techniques such as by mortar and artillery shells, rockets, light liaison planes, and balloons. It appears that in the early days of 1953-54, the Psychological Warfare Board devoted its activities almost exclusively to support of units like the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, rather than Special Forces.

The nucleus of the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RBL) began on 14 September 1951, with the formation of a provisional Psychological Warfare Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas. Soon this unit achieved status as

1Ibid., p. 34; The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Psy War, 1954, p. 1, USAJFKCENMA Archives.

The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Psy War, 1954, USAJFKCENMA Archives. Apparently there was little attention given to Special Forces operations by the Board, for in the above publication which outlined activities of the Board since its inception, there was no mention of any unconventional warfare projects, nor were there any Special Forces members on the Board as of early 1954. This publication, Psy War, purports "to tell the story of the US Army's Psychological Warfare Center," but nowhere in the ninety-nine page book is any reference made to the Special Forces Group or instructional department that constituted integral elements of the Center. Undoubtedly, this was again the result of security-consciousness—perhaps carried to an extreme—concerning Special Forces activities.
a permanent organization, and on 2 May 1952, it became the 6th RB&L Group. The Group consisted at that time of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, the 7th Reproduction Company, and the 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company; and in June 1952, it moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to become a part of the Psychological Warfare Center. In June 1952, the 2d Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company was attached to the 7th RB&L, and on 27 May 1953, the 12th Consolidation Company was activated and also attached to the Group. As previously mentioned, the RB&L organizational concept was first employed in Korea, and the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company's ancestry could be traced to World War II, when several of these companies were employed in the European theater. The 6th RB&L was designated as a strategic psychological warfare operational unit, and its primary purpose was to assist the national psychological warfare program during wartime within the theater of operation to which it was assigned. In addition to conducting theater-wide strategic propaganda, a further mission of the 6th RB&L was to support tactical operations.¹

The 10th Special Forces Group

Even before the 10th Special Forces Group was activated, Lieutenant Colonel Blair and Colonel Volckmann from the Special Operations Division, OCPW, began visiting Army installations and schools throughout the continental United States, in Alaska, Hawaii, the Far East, and Europe in order to promote interest in the "new concept" of war. Volunteers had to be at least twenty-one years old, airborne qualified or willing to become so, and undergo

a series of physical and psychological tests. Enlisted men accepted into Special Forces were to acquire one or more of five basic occupational specialties: engineering, weaponry, communications, medical aid, operations, and intelligence.¹

Interestingly, the material used by OCPW for orientation and recruitment purposes specifically drew a distinction between Special Forces and Ranger units:

Ranger units are designed and trained to conduct shallow penetration or infiltration of enemy lines. They can remain in the objective area for a limited time only. Primarily, they execute missions of a harassing and raiding nature against targets close to friendly front lines. Ranger missions are performed solely by US personnel; they do not utilize indigenous personnel in their objectives. Special Forces units have the capability of conducting long-range penetration deep into the objective area in order to organize, train, equip, and control indigenous guerrilla forces.²

¹Melvin Russell Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," Saturday Evening Post, 228 (May 12, 1956):40-1; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Orientation Conference for TIEE (Troop Information and Education) Officers, Subject: "Current Developments in the Field of Special Forces Operations" (15 January 1952), by LTC Blair, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 334-337, Box No. 15, Psy War 337 (C) (10 January 1952), National Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Letter to: Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: Special Forces Orientation for Training Directive and Reception Centers, 24 June 1952, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 352.16-354.2, Box No. 18, Psy War 353 (24 June 1952), National Archives; also OCPW letter, Subject: Orientation Conferences for Service Schools and Selected Headquarters and Installations, to Chief, Army Field Forces, 1 August 1952, Psy War 353 (1 August 1952), same reference as above, National Archives.

²Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Orientation Conference, "Current Development in the Field of Special Forces Operations," to be presented to Service Schools, Army Headquarters, and Selected Installations during the period 1 October 1952 - March 1953, written by LTC Blair, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C) 334-337, 1951-54, Box No. 15, Psy War 337 S (24 September 1952), National Archives; also Psy War 353 (6 November 1952), Orientation Material for Use in Connection with Selection of Volunteers for Special Forces, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Decimal File (C), 1951-54,
Indeed, not only did OCPW draw a distinction concerning the mission and capabilities of Special Forces and Rangers, the term "Special Forces Operations" itself underwent a gradual metamorphosis. Volckmann's original definition in early 1951 established that Special Forces Operations were activities carried on within or behind the enemy lines which could encompass: the organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare, sabotage and subversion, evasion and escape, Ranger and commando type operations, long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance, and psychological warfare. From January to late September 1952, the term embraced the following in OCPW recruiting material: organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare; subversion and sabotage, political, economic, and psychological warfare as it pertains to behind-the-lines activities; infiltration and/or organization of agents within the enemy's sphere of influence in support of actual or projected Special Forces operations; commando type operations; escape and evasion, as effected through Special Forces operations; and antiguerrilla warfare in areas overrun by friendly forces.1 It will be noted that both "Ranger operations" and "long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance" had disappeared during this transformation; only "commando type operations" remained as a hint of the earlier conceptual confusion. By November 1952, the focus became even more precise, and potential volunteers for this new elite unit were told that Special Forces operations included guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and "other behind-the-lines activities.

1Op. cit., Psy War 337 TS (16 April 1951), Psy War 337 C (10 January 1952), and Psy War 337 (24 September 1952), National Archives.
missions, which are within the capabilities of guerrilla warfare.\textsuperscript{1} The lack of reference to Ranger or commando type operations is evident; shortly thereafter General McClure chastened General Liebel for contemplating use of the 10th Special Forces Group for these types of activities in Europe.\textsuperscript{2} In effect, "Special Forces Operations" was becoming synonymous with "unconventional warfare"; eventually the latter term would be predominantly used to describe the mission of Special Forces.

The Special Forces came to life formally on May 19, 1952, with the establishment of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 10th Special Forces Group, constituted and allotted to the Regular Army for activation and organization under the Commanding General, Third Army. One hundred and twenty-two officers and men were:

To furnish command, supply, and organization maintenance for a Special Forces Group located in rear areas and, when provided with the necessary augmentation in personnel and equipment, for subordinate units committed in the objective area; to furnish administration for a Special Forces Group.\textsuperscript{3}

Initially, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company was basically a "paper organization," for when Colonel Aaron Bank left OCPW to join the Group on

\textsuperscript{1}Op. cit., Psy War 353 (6 November 1952), National Archives.

\textsuperscript{2}Op. cit., Psy War 290 TS (8 December 1952) and Psy War 390 TS (19 December 1952), National Archives.

June 19, 1952, as its first commander, he had a total complement of only seven enlisted men and one warrant officer present for duty.¹

If Bank expected his new unit to be swamped with volunteers, however, he was to be disappointed. By early July he complained that the flow of applications for Special Forces was very slow, attributing this to less-than-enthusiastic Army-wide support for the program and to the security classification of Special Forces activities.² A month later Colonel Karlstad reported to General McClure that the total assigned enlisted strength of the 10th was 259, of which only 123 were "operational unit" volunteer personnel. The rate of arrival of volunteers was, he felt, "wholly unsatisfactory."³ Another factor inhibiting a rapid buildup was the slow progress in attracting foreign nationals through the Lodge Bill. As originally passed, the Lodge Bill (Public Law 597, 81st Congress, 30 June 1950) provided for the enlistment of 2,500 aliens in the U.S. Army. This ceiling was raised to 12,500 by mid-1951, but actual recruitment fell far short of expectations. By August 1952, of 5,272 men who had

¹Letter, Colonel Bank, 17 February 1968.

²The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Comments by Members of Attending Organization and Training Conference, 9 July 1952, USAFJFCENMA Archives. Attendees included representatives from OCPW, AFF, Third Army, and The Psychological Warfare Center. Colonel Bank strongly urged that action be taken to declassify the Special Forces Group TO&E's: it restricted publicity in Army publications and the men could not even tell others their correct unit designation, other than the Psychological Warfare Center—which did not give them the necessary pride in their unit, he believed.

³Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Letter to Brigadier General McClure from Colonel C. H. Karlstad, Commanding Officer, 12 September 1952, filed with RG 319 (Army Staff) Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 322, National Archives. Karlstad asked McClure for assistance in getting the seven U.S. training divisions to fulfill their allotted quotas of 35 volunteers per month for Special Forces. McClure followed through on the request rapidly and wrote back to Karlstad on 22 September that the situation should soon improve.
applied for enlistment, only 411 received the necessary security clearances, and of that number only 211 actually enlisted. Concerned, McClure's office reported that "the need to increase Lodge Bill enlistments remains a vital problem affecting the accomplishment of missions assigned to OCPW." At the end of November 1952, however, only 22 Lodge Bill personnel had been assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group. Despite this disappointing start, by April 1953 the strength of the organization designed to implement a "new concept" had increased to 1,700 officers and enlisted men.

The "new concept" can best be explained by the training objective proposed for the newly activated 10th Special Forces Group:

To infiltrate its component operational detachments to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasimilitary or a military basis.

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Staff Study to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Staff Study on Intensification of Lodge Bill Recruitment Program, 8 August 1952, from Brigadier General McClure, RG 319 Army, Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-56, TS Decimal Files, 337-350.05, Box No. 13, Psy War 342 TS (8 August 1952), National Archives. The reasons for this low rate were many: many married persons applied but were not eligible; many German nationals applied but were not eligible; the citizens of NATO member nations who applied were not eligible; many applicants were disqualified on mental and physical grounds; and many applicants changed their minds during the long time required for security checks.

2Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to: Chief of Legislative Liaison, Subject: Program for Liaison with the Congress, Tab A, "Intensification of Lodge Bill Recruitment Program," from Colonel Fertig, Acting Chief, OCPW, 15 August 1952, RG 319 Army, Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, Box No. 2, Psy War 032.1, National Archives. Tab A, prepared by Colonel Blythe, Special Forces Division, outlined the overall need for Lodge Bill personnel as a projected 4,875 for Special Forces and 40 for psychological warfare units.


4Letter, Colonel Bank, 17 February 1968.
basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea and air forces.1

Clearly, Special Forces was designed for unconventional warfare, with emphasis on guerrilla operations. This is a significant point, because in 1952 very little attention was given to counterguerrilla, or counterinsurgency, operations. That portion of the special warfare concept was to come later, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, initiating a doctrinal battle as to the proper function of Special Forces. At this early stage of its history, however, Special Forces was oriented toward unconventional warfare requirements, and the framework for the 10th that resulted was a rather unique blend of Army organizational traditions and conventions with the prominent ideas and principles of guerrilla warfare.

Essentially, the Special Forces Group represented a pool of trained manpower from which units or combination of units could be drawn to execute specific unconventional warfare missions. The heart of the original Group organization was the Operational Detachment, Regiment, a fifteen-man unit established along the same lines as the OSS Operational Group. Commanded by a captain, with a first lieutenant as executive officer, the Operational Detachment, Regiment, contained thirteen enlisted men and was capable of being infiltrated behind enemy lines to organize, train, and direct friendly resistance forces in the conduct of unconventional warfare. Depending on the size and makeup of the guerrilla forces in a specific area, the Operational Detachment, District B (commanded by a major), or the Operational Detachment, District A

1Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Training Circular, Special Forces Group (Airborne), 13 May 1952, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, Box No. 13, Psy War 322 (13 May 1952), National Archives.
(commanded by a lieutenant colonel) could also be employed, or a combination of the three types of teams. In other words, these detachments (called "teams") could be employed singly or in various combinations, depending on the size and complexities of the specific guerrilla organization involved. The teams--in whatever combination necessary--would come under the direct control of the specified theater command for briefing and infiltration into the objective area, then remain in radio communication with the theater headquarters so that the activities of the guerrilla organization could be directed to support operations of friendly conventional forces most effectively. In short, the Special Forces Group itself was not designed to be employed as a tactical entity--as, for instance, a conventional division or brigade--but rather was constructed around a cellular concept in which each area, district, and regimental detachment was viewed as a separate and distinct operating unit.¹

Colonel Bank had assumed command of a unique organization in June 1952--one that required special training in order to fulfill the missions envisaged in the operational concept for Special Forces. Based primarily on the wartime experiences of a few former OSS officers in the unit, a training program was developed for the 10th Special Forces Group that was entirely new to the Army. Early training stressed the individual skills represented in the basic Operational Detachment, Regiment: operations and intelligence, light and heavy weapons, demolitions, radio communications, and medical aid. Each man was thoroughly trained in his particular specialty, then participated in "cross-training" in order to learn the rudiments of the other skills represented in the detachment. The communications and medical aid specialists naturally

received the longest training courses, since these were more technical skills.

Emphasis was also placed on clandestine operations training, such as the formation and operation of intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, and security, since, as Colonel Bank remarks, "these are easily neglected in favor of the more exciting guerrilla tactics." The individual and cross-training phase was followed by detachment training at Camp McKall, North Carolina, and finally by a lengthy group-level maneuver in the Chattahoochee National Forest, Georgia.¹

And so was born Special Forces, the first formal U.S. Army capability for unconventional warfare, co-located with but yet a junior partner to psychological warfare at Fort Bragg. Was this a marriage of choice, psychological and unconventional warfare? Apparently not. As Colonel Volckmann remembered:

Those of us who had worked on these programs were primarily interested in Special Forces and not Psychological Warfare and were very much opposed to having Special Forces associated with and under the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. We felt that there was in general a stigma connected with Psychological Warfare, especially among combat men, that we didn't care to have "rub off" on Special Forces. Behind-the-line operations and the "dirty-tricks game" had enough opposition amongst conventional military minds that had to be overcome without adding the additional problems inherent in Psychological Warfare. However, we lost that battle.²

Colonel Bank had similar misgivings. Shortly after taking command of the 10th, he differed with the Psychological Warfare School faculty concerning the "position of Special Forces in relation to psychological warfare." He discovered that the concept being taught in the Psychological Operations

¹Letters, Colonel Bank, 17 February 1968 and 3 April 1968.
Course was that Special Forces operations were a part of psychological warfare and objected to this interpretation in an early organizational meeting at the Psychological Warfare Center:

I don't believe that, as far as Special Forces is concerned, that is correct. All the time that I was on the staff of PYSWAR [OCFW] I never saw any paper of any kind that indicates Special Forces operations is a part of psychological warfare. It is our concept that Special Forces operations is a part of unconventional warfare. Just because OCFW is responsible for the monitoring and supervision of planning and conduct of psychological warfare and special forces operations does not mean that they have to be the same.1

Interestingly, at about this same time a Reserve Officer doing his annual two weeks' training at the Department of the Army took issue with the notion of even combining the two fields within the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. Colonel Oliver Jackson Sands's view was that the types of background, education, training, and experience required for persons engaged in psychological warfare were inherently different from those necessary for the conduct of special operations, thus "rarely . . . is a person who is suitable for one of these activities qualified for the other." He also argued that the planning, execution, facilities, equipment, and support required for the two operations were "totally different." Because these activities were, in his view, "widely divergent in type and character," he recommended that OCFW be divested of the Special Forces function. The latter should then be made a part of the G-3.2


2 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum to: Chief, Plans and Policy Branch, OCFW, from Colonel Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., USAR, 7 July 1952, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Box No. 6, National Archives. Jackson's memorandum forwarded a study that he had undertaken during his two
As might have been expected, General McClure did not agree with Sands's analysis, particularly since the special operations function had been moved from G-3 to OCPW at his request. There is evidence, however, that other psychological warfare officers also had some misgivings about the Army's organization for psychological and unconventional warfare. Writing in 1954 on tactical psychological warfare during the Korean conflict, Colonel Donald F. Hall expressed this view:

Many psychological warfare officers experienced in combat propaganda operations have never subscribed to the placement of psychological warfare and special forces under the same controlling staff agencies. Some have felt that a great error was made when the two functions were placed under the same agency at Department of the Army level, and there has been a growing concern about the tendency to combine the two on down through the echelons to the Army in the field. The doubt as to the justification for this concept has been an honest one, although few have had the capacity to question the decision in high places. As a matter of economy in meeting training requirements, most have gone quietly along with the development of the two functions as "twin activities" at the higher levels, and particularly at the Center [The Psychological Warfare Center]. But it is difficult to conceive of guerrilla-type operations as true psychological warfare; they seem to be much more closely allied to straight combat operations within the jurisdiction of G-3.¹

Believing, as did Colonel Sands, that there were few individuals who would...
have wide experience and capabilities in both psychological and unconventional warfare, Hall feared that by combining the two fields under one head, one or the other "may suffer as a result of particular emphasis given to the function in which the controlling personnel is especially interested and experienced." This, of course, was part of the anxiety suffered by Special Forces adherents in 1952; at that time the "controlling personnel," both at OCPW and at the Psychological Warfare Center, were those with psychological warfare backgrounds. (In later years, the situation would be reversed, particularly at the Center.) From early 1951 on, Volckmann and others in the Special Operations Division had spoken primarily in terms of a Special Forces Training Center, not a Psychological Warfare Center at which Special Forces would be relegated to a subordinate role. But, as Volckmann admitted, "we lost that battle."

Indeed they did. But why? Could it have been because there was even greater "stigma" attached "by conventional military minds" to unconventional warfare than to psychological warfare? Particularly since in the case of psychological warfare, staff representation had existed at both Department of the Army and in overseas theaters during World War I, Korea, and World War II, and a definite lineage of formal Army units existed from both the Korean War and World War II. To be sure, as Daniel Lerner has shown in his Sykevar, psychological warfare in World War II had its share of "characters" who tended to alienate military professionals. But the major point here is that the Army did in fact have staff sections and units designed exclusively for the planning and conduct of psychological warfare, an activity that gradually

1Ibid.

gained greater respectability in both World War II and Korea. Such was not the case with Special Forces and unconventional warfare in the Army, whose only real ancestry—and that indirectly—was with the civilian-led OSS in World War II, an organization not exactly held in the highest esteem by many senior military leaders.

Viewed from a historical perspective, it seems clear that Special Forces emerged as an unprecedented entity within the Army under the protective wing of an established and ongoing activity, psychological warfare. General McClure's foresight in organizing a Special Operations Division in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and his selection of the personnel for this division, gave unconventional warfare advocates like Bank and Volckmann the official platform from which to "sell" the Army on the need for Special Forces units. McClure's rationale for including unconventional warfare with psychological warfare can reasonably be linked to his World War II experience with PWD/SHAPE, his knowledge of General Donovan's insistence on the close interrelationship of psychological warfare and special operations, and the fact that the other Services—as well as the JCS—had the same organizational philosophy in their staffs. Although it is apparent that key officers in the Special Operations Division wanted to dissociate unconventional and psychological warfare, without McClure's stature and backing as a general officer heading a special staff division at Department of the Army Headquarters, it

1Op. cit., Psy Wr 090.412 TS (7 July 1952). McClure's handwritten comment regarding Colonel Sands's report is instructive: "This is an interesting report although I do not concur that Propaganda and Special Forces Operations are so completely different as to require separation particularly when (a) all other services have same combination, (b) JSPD has dual responsibility, (c) black (covert) and white propaganda are split between State and OPC."
improbable that Special Forces would have become a reality at the time that it did. In a very real sense, Special Forces and unconventional warfare arrived through the back door of the psychological warfare house. While the marriage of psychological and unconventional warfare was probably a union of convenience rather than choice (as Colonel Volckmann suggested), it was certainly one of necessity for the Special Forces adherents.

Thus was created the Psychological Warfare Center and the 10th Special Forces Group—the origins of special warfare.

A Summing Up

Our quest in this study to determine the origins of a special warfare capability for the U.S. Army has led us to investigate the pre-1952 roots of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. In doing so, we have traced the modern historical antecedents of American experience with psychological and unconventional warfare. These two elements had a common point of origin with the establishment of the Coordinator of Information in 1941; indeed, General William J. Donovan's all-encompassing concept of psychological warfare included all the aspects of what the Army was later to call "special warfare" (with the exception of counterinsurgency). With the dissolution of COI in 1942 and the parallel creation of OSS and OWI, the threads of psychological and unconventional warfare took separate paths. In the Army, they did not formally unite until the formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in 1951 and the founding of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.

Between 1941 and 1952, psychological warfare developed a formal lineage in the Army that can be traced through units and schools in World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Army General School at Fort Riley, and the Psychological
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. Additionally, there had been Department of the Army staff representation for psychological warfare during World War I, then almost continuously since 1941. Psychological warfare, in other words, had a tradition in the Army.

It was a civilian--Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy--who pushed the Army into developing a branch at the War Department for the planning and coordination of psychological warfare activities, initially in June 1941, and again in November 1943. McCloy's interest illustrates a theme seen throughout our investigation of the origins of special warfare: the initiative demonstrated by influential civilian officials to prod somewhat conservative Army leaders into venturing forth in new and uncertain fields.

Certainly Brigadier General Robert A. McClure was an exception to this theme. The civilian-military team that he headed first in North Africa, then later in PWD/SHAPE, served as the model for successful Army psychological warfare operations. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) companies employed in Europe were the first tactical propaganda units of their type in the Army's history and were to influence the development of similar units during the Korean War. And McClure himself had a strong hand in urging that a central psychological warfare agency be established in the War Department. All in all, General McClure must be considered the most important Army officer to emerge in this new field during World War II.

Contrary to the official lineage of Special Forces, unconventional warfare--in its strictest definition--did not have a traceable formal history in the Army. The Office of Strategic Services, to which the Army contributed personnel in World War II, was the first American agency devoted to the planning, direction, and conduct of unconventional warfare, but it was not a
military organization. Nevertheless, it left a legacy of organizational and combat knowledge that, together with a few key officers who had World War II experience in guerrilla warfare, was instrumental in the creation of Special Forces in 1952. This gave the Army a formal unconventional warfare capability for the first time in its history.

During the interwar years, the Army's psychological warfare capability languished, but staff planning activity did not cease entirely (contrary to the claim of one prominent psychological warfare text \(^1\)). This activity was kept alive by growing concerns of Soviet intentions, the interest of a few senior military officers like General Lemnitzer and General McClure—and the pressure brought to bear by several secretaries of the Army. In point of fact, a good bit of planning went on during this period that carried over to the OCPW, more so than was later acknowledged by General McClure, even though he substantially contributed to that effort from his posts outside the Army Staff.

Similarly, the impetus for the initiation of covert activities after World War II did not originate in the Central Intelligence Group (forerunner of the CIA); it came from Secretary of War Robert Patterson, whose interest in developing an OSS-type "airborne reconnaissance" unit led the Army to study an

\(^1\) Daugherty and Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, pp. 137f. They write: "In the military establishment in Washington, staff planning activities involving psychological warfare ceased with the end of World War II hostilities," and infer that nothing was done at the Department of the Army until creation of the OCPW. McClure himself was prone to exaggerate somewhat the authorship of OCPW's achievements. As an example, planning for both the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group and Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company concepts were under way in G-3 before the outbreak of war in 1950, and before the creation of OCPW, although McClure would claim later that these ideas, based on World War II experience, originated in his office.
organization that combined both OSS and Ranger precepts. Although interest in the subject waned after the growth of CIA/OPC's responsibilities, the studies and dialogue that took place--limited though they were--clearly showed the influence of OSS on Army thinking, and presaged similar discussions in the early 1950's prior to formation of the 10th Special Forces Group.

Notwithstanding the fact that more planning activity in both psychological and unconventional warfare took place during 1945-50 than is generally acknowledged, on the eve of the Korean War the Army was ill-prepared in terms of personnel, equipment, and organization to conduct psychological warfare operations, and its unconventional warfare capability was nonexistent.

With the impetus of the Korean War, the heightening cold war tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organization--the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff under which were placed the responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It was largely as a result of McClure's stature and foresight that the Army developed its first capability to conduct unconventional warfare, for the inclusion of a Special Operations Division in OCPW and his selection of the key personnel for this office gave officers like Colonel Russell Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Rank the opportunity to formulate plans for unconventional warfare and the creation of Special Forces. Despite an ongoing "hot war" in Korea, the primary influencing factor behind the Army's interest in unconventional warfare was the desire for a potential guerrilla capability in Europe to help "retard" a Soviet invasion, should it occur. (In fact, the development of Special Forces came too late to
play other than a minimal role in Eighth Army's behind-the-line activities.) After some initial experimentation with the organizational machinery to conduct this "new concept" of warfare, the unit that emerged was clearly designed to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities, and it was based primarily on Donovan's OSS Operational Group concepts—not those of the Rangers or Commandos. In order to provide the necessary training, materiel, and doctrinal support for both Special Forces and psychological warfare units, McClure was able to sell the Army on a separate center at which the functions of the "whole field of OCPW" would be located.

In reality, roughly the same cold war tensions facilitated interest in both psychological and unconventional warfare, but there was a crucial difference in the receptivity of each by the Army. Despite some of the "characters" associated with "sykewar," psychological warfare organizations gradually attained increased respectability in the Army during World War II and Korea. On the other hand, the Army continued to view unconventional warfare with a certain distaste. This reluctance to accept Special Forces resulted from the legacy of OSS-military rivalry during World War II, a lack of appreciation for unconventional warfare by officers trained for conventional war, a continuing suspicion of elite forces by the Army, and from the fact that there was no formal precedent in the Army's history for Special Forces-type units. Most important of all were the constraints of manpower and money in what was, despite the cold war, a peacetime Army. New ideas, particularly those that require an increase in personnel and funds, are understandably difficult to sell to leaders who must make decisions on the basis of essentiality. (In this regard, it is instructive to note that the spaces finally made available for the
formation of the 10th Special Forces Group came from the deactivation of the Rangers, another elite concept.)

In the face of resistance, both within the Army and from the Air Force and CIA, Special Forces nonetheless became a reality largely through the support of General McClure and the persistent efforts of Colonel Volckmann and Colonel Bank. But the bargaining position of unconventional warfare advocates was weak in 1951-52; those in OCPW who wanted a separate existence for Special Forces found it necessary to compromise. Because psychological warfare had a formal lineage and a tradition—and unconventional warfare had neither—it was expedient to bring Special Forces into existence under the auspices of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare. This, plus the security restraints placed on the publicizing of Special Forces activities, explains the apparent ascendancy of psychological warfare over unconventional warfare at this time.

General McClure's rationale for combining these two activities within OCPW in 1951 and at the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 can be partially attributed to the heritage of General William Donovan's organizational philosophy, and because the other military services and the JCS had the same combination in their staffs. In allowing McClure to do so, the Army may simply have found it convenient to lump these two relatively new out-of-the-mainstream (thus "unconventional") activities together while it attempted to sort out both ideas and weapons. The resultant package could very well have been called "miscellaneous warfare" instead of the eventual, more glamorous, "special warfare." Thus, the combining of psychological and unconventional

1I am indebted to Professor Theodore Ropp, Duke University, for this insight.
warfare under the Psychological Warfare Center was a marriage of both convenience and necessity, but one which nevertheless gave the Army the beginnings of a "special warfare" capability.

The person most responsible for achieving this feat was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, clearly the central figure to emerge in this study. From World War II until early 1953, he alone provided the continuity, expertise, and guidance at the general officer level that was so essential to the ultimate establishment of his dream—the creation of the Office of Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Forces, and the Psychological Warfare Center. At every crucial point in the unfolding of events leading to these accomplishments, particularly after World War II, one finds his personal imprint; indeed, the story of the origins of special warfare could almost be told through a biography of this dedicated, energetic visionary. Today his name is recognized by few; the achievements of Volckmann and Bank are more familiar. One searches in vain for McClure's picture on the walls of the Center for Military Assistance, or in its museum. But if any one man can be called the father of special warfare, surely that man was Robert A. McClure.

Even after being established, the Psychological Warfare Center and Special Forces led a precarious existence.1 And McClure himself left the OCPW in March 1953, an embittered man; the implication was that he had been in a

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1 In an economy move, Army Field Forces recommended in October 1953 that the Psychological Warfare Center be deactivated and the responsibility for psychological warfare training transferred back to the Army General School at Fort Rilev. Under this plan, all Special Forces schooling would have been conducted within units, rather than in a separate school. After a long and impassioned appeal by OCPW, the end result was a Psychological Warfare Center that survived, but at reduced strength. See Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia, Letter to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army, Subject: Future of Psychological Warfare Center, 12 October 1953, filed with Psy War 322 Psy War Center C (30 October 1953), RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, Box No. 13, National Archives.
specialized activity too long.  

But his legacy is clear: the foundation he laid was built upon in the 1960's when special warfare was expanded to encompass counterinsurgency, and to this day Special Forces and psychological warfare units exist—albeit uneasily—under the Center at Fort Bragg. Ironically, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare has not survived in any form. In a real sense, the manner in which psychological and unconventional warfare evolved from 1941 until their union as a formal Army capability in 1952 suggests a theme that runs throughout the history of special warfare: the story of a hesitant and reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature.

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1 McClure wrote a letter to his friend, Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, expressing his feelings about leaving OCPW: "To my unexpected surprise and with no little consternation, I have received orders transferring me to Iran to lead the Military Mission. After 10 1/2 of the past 12 years in this particular field and with the added emphasis being placed thereon by the White House, I fail to appreciate G-1's policy. I asked the Chief if there was anything behind it and he assured me there was not. The inference is that I have been in this field too long and there was no future for me as long as I continue in a specialized activity. There are already some rumbles in Defense and across the river but nevertheless I am selling my house and packing up."

Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Letter to Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, 4 March 1953, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, 020-40, Box No. 3, Psy War 040 CIA (undated) 53, National Archives. Ironically, McClure had decried the scarcity of general officers in the Army with psychological warfare or special operations experience, and attempted to increase the number assigned to these specialized activities—to include a general officer to head the Psychological Warfare Center. He was unsuccessful in these endeavors. Now he, probably the most experienced general officer in any of the Services, was being forced to leave the field that he had devoted so much of his career to building up. See Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, Subject: Assignment of General Officers to Psychological Warfare Activities, 30 October 1952, from Brigadier General Robert A. McClure; McClure's Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conversation with General McAuliffe Reference General Officers, 26 December 1952; and Memorandums for Record, 2 March 1953 and 6 March 1953, Subject: Selection of Commander for the Psychological Warfare Center, by LTC William Trabue, Executive, OCPW all filed with Psy War 210.3, RG 319 Army - Chief of Special Warfare, National Archives.
SOURCES
Sources

Section I - Research Aids

The research effort for this study began, naturally enough, at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Center archives were found in three separate locations: the Institute for Military Assistance Library, the Center GI, and the Center Public Affairs Office. Within recent years, the GI files have been transferred to the Public Affairs Office, and are maintained there by the Center Historian, Mrs. Beverley Lindsey. Mrs. Lindsey also has a file of correspondence with many of the key officers at the Center in the early 1950's, and keeps some historical documents in her private collection. The personal files of Mr. John Farrell, Combat Developments, Institute for Military Assistance, were helpful. The Institute library is small but specialized in its collection of special warfare secondary sources. While important materials pertaining to the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center were uncovered, the primary sources of the Center Archives are not well organized, and pertain primarily to the post-1952 years. One must search elsewhere for more detailed evidence of the Center's historical roots.

At the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, key staff personnel who were most helpful to the author were Miss Joyce Eakin, Assistant Director, Library Services, and Dr. Richard Sommers, Archivist. Miss Eakin has special MHI bibliographies for U.S. Rangers and Special Forces in her files, is quite knowledgeable concerning Institute holdings and can provide valuable contacts at both the Center for Military History and the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Dr. Sommers maintains the papers and oral histories of numerous senior Army officers; those of Robert A. McClure, Ray Peers, and William P. Yarborough were particularly useful for my subject. The MHI Special Bibliographic Series, Number 13, Volumes 1 and 2, Oral History, contain references to these and other officers, as well as a cross-index of key topics. The Institute also has a complete set of the Army General Council Minutes for the period 1942 to 1952. The Council met weekly, was composed of the senior War Department leadership, and was chaired by either the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff. These minutes were particularly useful in providing an overview of the key decisions and events leading to establishment of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in 1951. Similarly, the War Department's History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941 - 2 September 1945, which can be found in the MHT, provides some useful leads to the Army's psychological warfare activities during World War II.
Miss Hannah Zaidlik, General Reference Branch, Center for Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C., provided CMH special bibliographies on psychological warfare and Special Forces, as well as assistance in locating materials on these topics in their card catalogue and files. Of note were copies of Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (CPW) semiannual and annual historical summaries for the early 1950's, which provided valuable leads to pursue in the Department of the Army records, National Archives.

At the National Archives, William Cunliffe and Ed Reese, Modern Military Branch, were the key archivists who helped me to ferret out information on U.S. psychological and unconventional warfare from 1941 to 1952; John Taylor was most helpful with OSS records. Indeed, these collections in the National Archives provided the foundation upon which this study is based. Foremost in importance were the records of the War Department General and Special Staff (Record Group 165), and those of the Army Staff (Record Group 319). Records of the following staff agencies were instrumental in tracing the history of psychological and unconventional warfare activities within the Army: the Military Intelligence Division, G2 (Special Studies Group), 1941; the Psychological Warfare Branch, Military Intelligence Service, G2, 1941-1942; the Propaganda Branch, G2, 1943-1945; the Psychological Warfare Branch, Plans and Operations Division, 1947; the Psychological Warfare Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, 1951-1954. The latter records were crucial in determining policies, key personalities, and decisions leading to the formation of Special Forces and creation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The footnotes at the end of each chapter of my study will provide more comprehensive reference to all of the records mentioned above.

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Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Record Group 218). See the 385 series, 1946-1953, boxes 147-156, for information on psychological and unconventional warfare.

Records of the War Department General and Special Staff (Record Group 165). Military Intelligence Division (G-2), Propaganda Branch Correspondence, 1939-1945, boxes 326-344. Reports, directives, bulletins and other papers dealing with psychological warfare and propaganda activities in overseas theaters. 6 feet.

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G-3 Operations, March 1950-51, 091.412 series, boxes 154-158.
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Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Letter to Chief, Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, dated September 12, 1952, subject: "Activation of the Psychological Warfare School." The Center's appeal to Department of the Army to give the Psychological Warfare School a formal service school status rather than a provisional status.

Headquarters, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Undated fact sheet, "Lineage of Special Forces."


Public Affairs Office, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Letters from:

Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann (Retired), with 1 enclosure, March 21, 1969.
Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr., (Retired), with 5 enclosures, May 5, 1969.
Colonel Aaron Bank (Retired), February 17, 1968; April 3, 1968; and February 27, 1973.

These letters contained not only valuable information but also provided some important leads to check on the origins of The Psychological Warfare Center.

The Institute for Military Assistance Library, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
"Examples of UW." A folder of reports and speeches on various aspects of unconventional warfare. Includes the script of a talk by Ray Peers given in 1956 to the Special Warfare School that is one of the most comprehensive speeches I have seen on the details of a guerrilla warfare organization (OSS Detachment 101, Burma).

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BIOGRAPHY

Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., US Army, was born February 11, 1937, in Moscow, Idaho. He was awarded a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science from Park College in 1967, a Master of Arts degree in history from Duke University in 1974, and completed his requirements for a Ph.D. degree in history from Duke in December, 1979. His article, "Does the Army Have a Future? Deterrence and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Vietnam Era" appeared in the September, 1978, issue of Parameters. He is a Fellow, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

His military career has included command and staff assignments in Korea, Laos, Okinawa, Vietnam, and the United States. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He was one of five students selected from the Class of 1978 to form the Army War College Current Affairs Panel, which visited twenty-six universities and colleges across the United States to discuss a wide range of national security issues with students and faculty. He was also an instructor in strategy and strategic studies at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, served in the Politico-Military Division of the Department of the Army Staff in Washington, DC, and was a faculty instructor for the Department of National and International Security Studies, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

In November, 1979, Colonel Paddock assumed command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, moving to that position from duties as a Strategic Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

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19th SFCA (NG)
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