THESIS

Can Lebanon Survive?

by

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March 1980

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The crisis in Lebanon involves both an internal political upheaval and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict over the armed Palestinian presence in the south. The three periods of civil war, interspersed with often violated ceasefires and sporadic violence, have left much of the country physically and socio-economically devastated. However, little has been resolved, and civil war could reignite at little provocation. The government faces a
Growing legitimacy crisis and the steps toward a political solution have not yet as much as begun. Armed militias of the internal factions, Palestinian commando units and outside military forces rule the country. Meanwhile, clashes between Lebanese, Palestinian and Israeli units continue to make the south a fortified battlefield. The longer this impasse remains, the more the future viability of Lebanon comes into question.
CAN LEBANON SURVIVE?

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ABSTRACT

The crisis in Lebanon involves both an internal political upheaval and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict over the armed Palestinian presence in the south. The three periods of civil war, interspersed with often violated ceasefires and sporadic violence, have left much of the country physically and socio-economically devastated. However, little has been resolved, and civil war could reignite at little provocation. The government faces a growing legitimacy crisis and the steps toward a political solution have not yet as much as begun. Armed militias of the internal factions, Palestinian commando units and outside military forces rule the country. Meanwhile, clashes between Lebanese, Palestinian and Israeli units continue to make the south a fortified battlefield. The longer this impasse remains, the more the future viability of Lebanon comes into question.
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I. INTRODUCTION

... people accept government only if the government accepts its first duty - which is to protect them. Whether in a feudal, modern, imperial or municipal society, people choose government over nongovernment chiefly to protect themselves from dangers they cannot cope with as individuals or families.

from In Search of History by Theodore H. White

The recent history of Lebanon has been a generally troubled and all too frequently violent one. In two periods of civil war fighting (1975-1976 and 1978) interspersed with often violated ceasefires and truces tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians have lost their lives. Tens of thousands of others have seen their villages and homes turned into battlefields or destroyed and were thus forced to join the ever growing number of dispossessed refugees with which the country is becoming overburdened. More recently, south Lebanon has also become a battlefront as Israel continues its policy of striking against Palestinian positions in this regionally disputed area. The inability of the Lebanese state to counteract or prevent these Israeli incursions on to its supposed sovereign territory and to exert its authority in the south brings into question the continued viability of the state itself. For although Mr. White's statement above was written describing China in the 1930s it holds no less true for Lebanon today.

It is at first difficult to understand or explain the reasons for what has come to be referred to as the Lebanese Crisis. In simple terms, particularly during the civil war
fighting, the crisis has been characterized as either religious sectarian strife (Christian versus Moslem) or ideological opposition (left versus right) or a combination of the two. Yet, on closer examination these factors are not only misleading but also constitute only part of Lebanon's problems. Underlying social and economic upheavals have been present in the state system since inception, and these upheavals also play their part in providing cause for the internecine fighting. Power struggles among the various clan-oriented political/military factions in the country are a cause of tension and violence as well. Traditionally, however, once civil war scale violence has erupted in the country - initially only involving several of the groups or militias - even ideologically divergent groups have tended to coalesce into opposing Christian/rightist and Moslem/leftist alliances, thus giving this commonly held sectarian characterization to the civil war fighting. Finally, external actors such as the Palestinian militias and more recently Syria and Israel have given a broader regional context to the fighting. The Palestinian militias in south Lebanon which in a sense are carrying on the Arab struggle against Israel have been involved in Lebanon's civil war disputes as well. The Arab versus Israeli aspect of this widening of the original civil war makes the Lebanese Crisis a definite threat to Middle East peace - and particularly to the success of the U.S. sponsored Camp David initiatives.
The fact that Lebanon at least constitutionally represents one of the few remaining democratic governments in the Middle East region makes its possible future demise that much more noteworthy from a Western perspective. The laissez faire Western type economy of the country along with the entrepreneurial skill of its citizens has made Beirut, Lebanon's capital, the financial capital of the Middle East. This democratic tradition and the strong Westernized economy are both threatened by the turmoil in the country. At times it seems as if the opposing internal factions (along with their external backers) are determined to either destroy and eliminate their rivals completely, or failing that, to effectively destroy the Lebanese state as it exists today. The cultural pluralism of the Christian and Moslem Lebanese is ancient and deep-seated and is only exacerbated by the sectarian civil war fighting. The hopes of reconciling differences between the two groups fade as animosities are perpetuated by acts of violence inflicted by one on the other in an escalating spiral which carries on from one generation to the next. Amidst this situation the Lebanese government has been relegated to little more than a mediatory body, its ability to exert its authority severely limited by the sectarian division in the country and the weakness of its army. In one respect, it could be said that the inherent slow response of a democratic system of government to social unrest plus the overwhelming influences of outside forces have made it difficult for both Christian
and Muslim Lebanese to identify with and support their government—giving Lebanon a legitimacy crisis in addition to or as a result of its other problems.

Lebanon's present political impasse is attributable to several distinct yet interrelated factors over and above the domestic civil war sectarian issues which are themselves as yet unresolved. The Palestinian presence, the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese military and the situation in south Lebanon are all combining to create a regional crisis with international implications. A solution to the Lebanese Crisis has thus been linked to the implementation of an overall Middle East peace program. Although some would argue that the conflict societies of the Middle East make the establishment of political stability and associated peace in the region difficult or impossible, it seems clear at this point that only the intercession of an outside actor with no direct stake in the crisis in a mediatory role may make a solution to the impasse possible. And it is becoming increasingly more apparent that the only nation both willing and able to provide this mediatory role is the United States, since the Arab League has refused to make a firm commitment to support the Lebanese state. Therefore, the need for U.S. policymakers to attempt to understand all the factors involved in the Lebanese Crisis becomes more urgent. The Camp David peace initiatives, the U.S.-Israeli relationship and the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue are all critical variables which will no doubt evolve and change as
events in the area progress. The fate of Lebanon, much to its dismay, is critically linked to the manner in which the issues these variables impact upon are resolved. Unfortunately, Lebanon itself has little or no control over the resolution of these issues on which its fate depends.

The thesis to be examined in the following discourse is that (contrary to the common Christian/rightist versus Moslem/leftist characteristic given to explain the continued Lebanese Crisis) the nature of the conflict is essentially that of political and economic determinism - essentially that of rival political elements supported by opposing external actors each with its own stake in the resolution of the crisis. The factors to be examined will be: 1) the historical background leading to Lebanon's current plight including the evolution of the Lebanese political system, 2) the legitimacy crisis and its resulting social unrest, 3) the actors and factions operating on Lebanon's domestic scene, 4) the external actors active in Lebanese affairs, 5) the civil war period and its aftermath, 6) the current impasse and the most recent developments in attempting to resolve the crisis, 7) the linkages which connect the Lebanese crisis to the Palestinian problem and the overall regional Middle East peace process, and 8) the possible outcomes of the crisis, their respective impacts and the possible role the U.S. might play in them.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC SETTING

The Lebanese society of today is a product of the past influences of ancient Phonecian, early Arab-Islamic, early Christian, Ottoman and Western European French cultures. The period of French influence - more specifically the Mandate period from 1918 until Lebanese independence in 1943 - although the shortest of these cultural influence periods was nonetheless responsible for the present democratic governmental system of the state. In reality, however, this governmental system is to some degree merely superimposed over a more complex, deeply rooted and underlying foundation of religious and feudal family type group affiliations. More recently, as the political influences in the country developed, an ideological affinity, particularly among the dissatisfied mostly Moslem leftist and Nasserist elements of the population, became yet another means of identification and group affiliation in Lebanese society.

Throughout its history, the isolated and rugged terrain of the Lebanese mountains has provided refuge for persecuted religious sects (notably the Christian Maronites, Shiites and Moslem Druzes). Under the Ottoman administrative millet system, these religious groups were able to maintain a certain degree of religious exclusiveness and also a degree of administrative autonomy. Historically, this local administrative system was organized around Ziama or clan type leaders who came to exact a combined religious and family
allegiance. Today some 10 Christian sects\(^1\) and the Moslem Shia, Sunni and Druze sects make up the religious mosaic of the country.

The 3.2 million population of Lebanon does not seem to be too noteworthy until one considers that, with the country's size (4000 square miles) the population density averages 800 people per square mile (with higher densities in the urban areas). This population figure includes an estimated 400,000 Palestinians,\(^2\) the majority of whom live in refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut. Almost 60 percent of the population is urban, centered around the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre. Eastward of these coastal cities two parallel mountain ranges - the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains - run north-south along


almost the entire length of the country separated by the Litani River valley. Fifteen miles north of the Lebanon-Israel border the Litani turns abruptly west, emptying into the Mediterranean just north of the coastal town of Tyre. Recently an east-west line just north of this last portion of the Litani River has come to be referred to as the "red line" separating Israeli and Syrian areas of interest in the contested south Lebanon area. Thus south Lebanon has come to mean the portion of Lebanon south of the Litani River from just north of Tyre on the Mediterranean to the village of Marj Uyun to the east.

Another characteristic of Lebanon's demographic pattern is that different geographic areas of the country have come to be populated by different religious and cultural groups - during the course of its historic development and more recently as a result of civil war sectarian tensions. The central coastal region from Beirut north to Tripoli and eastward to the Lebanon Mountain foothills has traditionally been the Christian heartland. This area includes Lebanon's industrial region and also the major commercial ports. Resultingly, an overwhelming majority of the wealth of the country is concentrated and controlled by the Christian

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3 After the deployment of Syrian troops into Lebanon in June 1976 in an attempt to end the civil war fighting, Israel's Prime Minister Rabin issued a statement declaring this "red line" south of which any Syrian troop activity would run the risk of Israeli involvement. See Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in a Turbulent Land", p. 457.
segment of the population. This will later be shown to be one of the causes of Lebanon's social unrest and a factor in the outbreak of the civil war as well. The northern and central inland portion of the country bordering Syria is predominantly populated by the Sunni Moslem community. This is also the area of Lebanon now under military control of the Syrian forces. The southern half of the country was initially populated by the Shia Moslem community with the exception of the mount Lebanon area of the Lebanon Mountains which is the ancient home of the Druze sect and several small Christian communities. From 1948 on a growing Palestinian (Sunni Moslem) refugee community has been added to Lebanon's population, residing in camps on the periphery of Beirut, in the southern towns of Tyre and Sidon and with additional militia camps in the south. As a result of the civil war fighting in 1976 and 1978 Beirut has effectively been separated (by an undefined barrier known as the "green line") into Christian and Moslem sectors. Also a Christian enclave protected by a breakaway faction of the Lebanese army along the Israeli border was created with the withdrawal of an Israeli occupying force and its replacement by a U.N. interim force in June 1978. Finally, a growing refugee community of Shia peasants from the south has been displaced north towards Beirut as a result of Israeli military raids on Lebanese villages, living in refugee communities alongside and sometimes even together with those of the Palestinians. With all these religiously identified groups in Lebanon's
small geographic area and with its high population density, a certain amount of interaction and tension was bound to be present in Lebanon's society. It was also inevitable that these tensions would carry over into Lebanon's political system after independence.

A. THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

One of the most significant legacies left by the French administration on the Lebanese governmental system is the confessional nature of its administrative hierarchy. It is clear that the French, upon Lebanon's declaration of its independence in 1943, wished to retain their economic interests in the country by assuring that a pro-French (pro-Western) Maronite Christian predominance in the new state be maintained. This predominance was legislated by the confessional system of representation the French instituted in the mid-1920's—a system which has remained the heart of the disagreement between the internal factions in Lebanon. Integral in this system is the unwritten 1943 vintage National Pact, which stipulates above all that the President of the Republic must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem and the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Moslem. Supposedly this system provides for a tri-presidency with each of the major religious groups represented. In actuality, however, the president retains the greatest share of executive power— including that of dismissing the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to these main provisions, the pact also calls for
the distribution of parliamentary seats not only between Christians and Moslems but also "proportionately (among the sects) within each group."\textsuperscript{4} A basic 6 to 5 ratio of Christian to Moslem representation is maintained, as determined by a 1932 census (the last one taken in the state). Legislation must be passed by a two-thirds majority. The parliament is elected every 4 years by popular vote. According to the constitution, the president is elected for a six year term by a plurality of the Chamber of Deputies (initially 44, then 66, now 99 members). The president appoints a prime minister (the actual head of the government) and the prime minister then appoints his cabinet in concurrence with the president - also with proportional sectarian representation and predominantly from among the deputies. The chamber of deputies also has approval authority over the cabinet appointments. Thus the entire federal governmental structure is organized along sectarian or confessional lines. Originally the 6 to 5 ratio was reflected in the armed forces and at all levels of government and civil agencies. Subsequently, however, as Salem explains:

The conflict of 1958 yielded one minor accommodation in this formula. Since then, appointments to the bureaucracy have been made on the basis of half-Christian half-Muslim; and in February 1976, President Sulayman Franjiyyah proposed further change in the formula to make representation in parliament on a 50-50 basis and further to strengthen the Sunni prime minister. His proposal is still pending.\textsuperscript{5}


\textsuperscript{5}Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in a Turbulent Land", p. 447.
The main Moslem grievance against the unreformed governmental system of the state is that its structure assures the perpetuation of the now minority Maronite Christian political ascendancy. As stated by Michael Suleiman:

In essence, the National Pact provided for the continuation of Maronite predominance. This was assured through the provision of a Maronite president with executive powers. Also, in the political, military, social and economic structures of the country, either through the formula or by circumstances, the Maronites gained the upper hand.\(^6\)

In political and demographic representational terms, the confessional system has become anachronistic. It is generally accepted (although not admitted by the Maronites) that the Moslem Lebanese population outnumbers that of the Christians, although a census to verify this has not yet been taken. In fact, the relatively impoverished yet fast growing Shia Moslem community is said to be the largest single sect in the country, according to their former spokesman, Imam Musa Al Sadr.\(^7\) The Shia, however, enjoy the least effective political representation of all the Lebanese sects due to their low economic status and lack of representational elites other than their religious leaders.

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\(^7\) Najib E. Saliba, "The Lebanese in the Context of the War", in *Lebanon - Crisis and Challenge in the Arab World*, p. 8.
Another aspect of the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics is a unique clan or feudal type affiliation which crosscuts and takes advantage of the basic sectarian affiliations. Predominant among the Christian sects but also evident in Junblatt's Druzes, these groups are led by strong, politically ambitious and often charismatic leaders (ziama) and center around a traditional (feudal) dominant family, thus eliciting fraternal and sectarian loyalties. According to Salem:

Interspersed throughout the political structure, both in the center and in local areas, are the ziams. Lebanon's decision-making processes can not be understood or analyzed without major allowance for this element. The ziams are leaders with almost charismatic power over their followers, revered and depended upon for services of all sorts. The more underdeveloped the region the more likely it is to give rise to ziams. 8

With the original leaders of these groups now approaching 70 or 80 years of age a second generation of leadership is now appearing. The power bases and rivalries among these groups seem to have been carried over with this new leadership, and perhaps even heightened by assassinations and the civil war violence. As Koury explains:

Confessional politics in Lebanon is in part characterized by familial rivalries within the various sub communes and by overlapping ties among the ruling elites of the various factions. The balancing process is conditioned by crosscutting affiliations and sociopolitical and economic ties. 9

Political elites in the country are thus tied to the religious and socio-economic structure of Lebanon. The fact that many of these elites are vying for power or simply concerned with perpetuating their present degree of power and influence, rather than working together for the greater well-being of the country, is certainly a factor in the continuing conflict. A majority of the elites are Christian, reflecting in one respect the acute economic imbalance in the country between Christian and Moslem. Due to the constitutional provision by which a president of the country may serve only one 6 year term of office, several of the elites are led by former presidents who still feel the need to protect their own political and economic interests. The private militias of these groups serve to provide this protection. The elites in general support the National Pact and maintaining the status quo, since part of their power is sectarian based. According to Koury:

The elites in Lebanon appear to share a consensus on at least one basic value, the preservation of the system in which they are the elites. They have tried to bring about reforms while at the same time preserving their own interests, and their motives are not exclusively self-serving. The power of the elites comes mainly from the members of the ethno-religious communes and sub-communes and from the Lebanese socio-economic system.  

A picture of the Lebanese conflict, in its internal dimensions, as a socio-economic and political struggle thus begins to emerge.

B. SOCIAL UNREST AND THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS

Although Lebanon struggled both economically and politically during the first 15 years of its statehood, this was not unusual or noteworthy for a new independent nation as the new international order was being reestablished in the postwar and cold war era. Greater Western influence in the Middle East, a growing Arab nationalist reaction to it, and the establishment of the state of Israel would all have an impact on Lebanon's internal situation. In what would become a recurring pattern for Lebanon in the decades to follow, external forces and influences would bring to the surface the latent yet ever present disagreement between the Arab and Western identifying segments of the population on the character the country should assume. In the period from 1946 to 1956 (during the presidencies of Al Khouri and Chamoun) the government had problems establishing its political legitimacy, yet the state retained a reasonable degree of internal stability. The most divisive issue of this period revolved around the relationship and degree of economic cooperation the state should maintain with its Arab neighbor Syria. Several regional events, however, would alter Lebanon's domestic scene in the next few years.

The first of these events was the Suez Crisis and ensuing Arab-Israeli war in 1956. In response to anti-Western demonstrations in the country,

A state of emergency was declared in the Lebanon during the Sinai-Suez Crisis at the end of October 1956. The
Chamber of Deputies announced its support of Egypt, but the Lebanon did not break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France. In November there were disturbances, however, at Tripoli and Beirut against the attitude of the government.\textsuperscript{11}

The Eisenhower Doctrine, revealed in January 1957, provided a second cause for anti-Western sentiment in the country and a widening of the split between the government and the Moslem Arab political elements. President Chamoun readily accepted U.S. military, financial and economic aid offered by the program in return for a pro-Western, anti-Communist stance adopted by Lebanon in its foreign policy alignment. However, this alignment was not well received by elements and political groups in the country favoring greater Arab solidarity and unity.

This split of opinion in Lebanon became heightened during the campaign for parliamentary elections in June 1957. The negotiations leading to the formation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, influenced by the appeal to Arab unity and Arab socialism espoused by Egypt's President Jamal Abd Al-Nasir, provided yet another tension producing factor in the situation. There was significant Nasirist support in Lebanon, particularly among those Moslem political groups that had always favored greater Syrian-Lebanese ties. Lebanon's leadership rejected its inclusion in either Nasir's UAR or the Arab Federation of Jordan and Iraq, established in reaction to the UAR formation, as

arrangements which would lead only to a limitation of Lebanese sovereignty. The Christian Western influence here is obvious. An attempt to reorganize the government in March 1958 in order to remove pro-Western cabinet members failed to quell popular resentment of Lebanese policy and alignment among the Moslem population. Serious disturbances and pro-Arab demonstrations continued to plague the country and threaten internal order. President Chamoun was reluctant to order the predominantly Christian army units to attempt to control the predominantly Moslem demonstrations.

The situation in Chamoun's eyes really became critical when a bloody coup occurred in Iraq in July 1958. Fearing the same fate - as pan-Arab elements were mobilizing greater support in the region:

... President Chamoun requested the United States to send American troops into Lebanon with a view to the maintenance of security and the preservation of Lebanese independence. By July 20th, some 10,000 men of the United States forces were stationed in and around Beirut.12

The presence of this external peacekeeping force and the approaching end of Chamoun's presidency brought about a gradual ease of tensions in the next few months. On July 31, 1958 the Chamber of Deputies elected Fuad Chehab, former Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Army, as President of State. Upon assuming the presidency in September 1958, Chehab enjoyed popular support from some members of both sides in the internal conflict and his appointment of opposition leader Rashid Karami as prime minister proved helpful in

quieting Moslem discontent. U.S. forces left Lebanon in October 1958 following an agreement between the U.S., Lebanon and the United Nations. Although the 1958 crisis had resulted in some sectarian fighting and internal disorder, a degree of normalcy was returned to the country with the Chehab administration. Electoral and economic reforms (a program which would become known as Chehabism) took place in Lebanon in the ensuing years. Normal parlaimentary elections were held and the cabinet restructured to include opposition elements and greater sectarian representation.

Lebanon's political stability, however, remained as always a very delicate and easily upset balance. Resignations of opposition leaders in the cabinet - notably Druze leader Junblatt - were normal and new governments were formed on an almost regular basis. In December 1961, a more serious challenge to the government occurred. Abdallah Saade, leader of the pro-Syrian National Social party, attempted an unsuccessful coup. President Chehab's reaction was strong, dissolving the party, purging its members and imprisoning Saade. Syrian complicity in the coup attempt served to again sour Lebanese-Syrian relations. Except for this incident, however, Lebanon would remain free from destabilizing outside influences during the remainder of the first half of the 1960s decade.
C. THE PALESTINIAN FACTOR

The Palestinian community in Lebanon originated in 1948 when a portion of the refugees displaced by the formation of the state of Israel and the ensuing 1948 Arab-Israeli war fled their homeland into Lebanon. Further migrations occurred after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when the West Bank and Gaza were occupied by Israel. A great number of these displaced Palestinians remained in refugee communities rather than assimilating into the Lebanese Arab community—clinging proudly to their Palestinian identity. Even some of those who became educated and did assimilate into Lebanese society later became radicalized and returned to the forefront of Palestinian militancy (see Chapter III, Section C.). In the early 1960s, when the Palestinian commando units were organized and began their military training, Lebanon became one of the sites of these training camps. In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed, initially uniting the different commando groups under the leadership of a common executive committee. A united policy of conducting commando raids into Israel from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon was also decided, with the first of such raids conducted by Yasir Arafat's Fateh in January 1965 against a water pumping station in Israel.13

These Palestinian commando raids into Israel, which brought swift and commensurate Israeli retaliation, continued

sporadically for the next several years. Added to and more vindictive than these commando raids were Palestinian terrorist acts perpetrated against Israeli citizens even outside the Middle East which began to occur at this time. By these acts the Palestinian groups, a majority of which had their headquarters in Beirut, hoped to bring international attention to their cause against Israel; but in fact they succeeded only in alienating world opinion against them.

The Israelis - holding Lebanon liable for these Palestinian acts initiated from Lebanon based groups - escalated the conflict in late 1968. In retaliation for a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attack on an El Al airliner in Athens on 26 December 1968, Israeli commando units struck Beirut International Airport two days later and destroyed 13 Lebanese commercial aircraft, escaping unharmed.  

This incident not only sparked demonstrations by Lebanese citizens against the inability of the Lebanese military to prevent the attack, but also helped to mobilize popular support among the Lebanese Moslem left for the Palestinian cause versus Israel.

Clashes between Palestinian units and Israeli army units across the southern Lebanon border continued during the next two years, with Lebanese villagers in the south frequently becoming caught in between the two. Although sentiment against the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon

\[14\text{Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976, p. 38.}\]
was beginning to grow among the Christian Lebanese community, a conciliatory approach by the Lebanese government was adopted. On November 3, 1969 a pact which would come to be called the "Cairo Agreement" was made between the PLO's Yasir Arafat and Lebanese Army Commander in Chief Bustani giving the Palestinian militias freedom to continue military training in their camps, the right to carry arms in their areas and thus implicit permission to continue their commando raids into Israel. In response to further Palestinian raids, Israeli army units in May and again in September 1970 made deep penetrations into southern Lebanon with armored forces – remaining on Lebanese territory for 32 hours and 2 days respectively, until forced to withdraw by U.N. and U.S. pressure.

At the same time, other Palestinian units were conducting raids into the occupied West Bank area (annexed by Israel after the 1967 war) from bases in Jordan – also eliciting Israeli retaliatory attacks. Jordan's King Husain, however, was not as tolerant of the growing military power of the armed Palestinian presence as was Lebanon. Husain moved his army against the Palestinians in what would become known as "black September" 1970. As a result of this confrontation

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a majority of the Palestinian units crossed over into Syria and then into southern Lebanon. This caused a temporary lull in the commando actions while the Palestinians re-grouped and reorganized their forces.

The Israeli incursions and guerrilla losses in the war in Jordan in September 1970 led to a curtailment of guerrilla activity. During 1971 there were only a few instances of raids and counter-raids across the southern border of Lebanon.17

The period 1972-1975 brought an escalation of activities involving Israeli forces, the Palestinians, Lebanese Army units and finally Lebanese Christian militias in the prelude to the outbreak of civil war. First of all, a resumption of Palestinian raids into Israel by the commandos resulted in another Israeli 4 day "land and air operation against guerrilla strongholds in the foothills of Mount Hermon in southeast Lebanon on February 24, 1972."18 On May 30, 1972 the Palestinians sought retribution in a senseless attack by Japanese terrorists (hired by the PFLP) on the Lod Airport passenger terminal resulting in 25 Israeli civilian deaths.19 This was followed by yet another Israeli retaliatory raid on Palestinian bases in south Lebanon. Finally, in one of the most infamous incidents of Palestinian terrorism, 11 Israeli Olympic athletes were killed by Black September terrorists during the Munich Olympics in September.20

18Ibid
Again, Israel responded to the Munich incident by conducting strikes into south Lebanon in what had now become an established pattern in the Palestinian-Israeli feud.

Although Lebanon remained uninvolved in the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, its army had been active since May 1973 attempting to control (and inevitably clashing with) the Palestinian commando units within its borders. Syria temporarily closed its border with Lebanon in support of the guerrillas until Lebanon finally was pressured to abandon this use of its army and air force against the Palestinian camps. The Syrians constituted a long time supplier of arms to the Palestinian commandos, which Lebanon was in no real position to stop. Thus Lebanon was unable to execute effective control over Palestinian activities even within its own territory. From this time on, until the Lebanese civil war broke out in earnest in late 1973, it was the newly organized Christian militias (established in response to the increasing armed Palestinian presence) which began clashing with the Palestinian units in sporadic yet increasing violence. As these clashes continued, the Christian-Moslem split in the country widened over the Palestinian armed presence and tended to unite separate factions on each side. As Salem states:

The Muslim Lebanese leaders, in a sense, tried to exploit the Palestinians to gain greater power in the Lebanese governmental system, and the Palestinians exploited the Muslim politicians to increase Palestinian weight in the Lebanese political system. Palestinian activism in Lebanon in the 1970s coincided with Sunni activism to secure more power for the prime
The confrontation to follow was now more or less predestined. In order to better clarify the events of the civil war fighting in 1975-1976 and 1978 (Section IV) the internal factions and alliances and the external actors in the growing crisis will first be described in Section III.

D. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTOR

The events involving the Palestinian commandos, Israeli and Lebanese army units and the Lebanese militias, although important, do not fully explain the causes of the Lebanese crisis which had their roots in this mid-1960s to mid-1970s decade. Of equal importance were some significant events related to Lebanon's economic and social order during this period. The first of these was the collapse of Intra Bank in Beirut in 1966 - under suspicious circumstances. Beginning in the early 1960s, Lebanon had become the financial and banking center of the Middle East, with capital from the emerging oil exporting countries plus Lebanese entrepreneurial profits and income from the trans-Arabian pipeline (which terminated in Tripoli) invested overseas through Beirut banks. A great majority of these banks were owned by Christian

Lebanese. Intra Bank was owned by two Palestinians - one Christian and one Moslem. In 1966 an unexplained run on its assets caused it to fold. The repercussions of this action, however intended, spread to the entire Lebanese banking community. According to Salibi:

The blow to the reputation of Lebanon as an on-coming financial center in the world, which the collapse of Intra caused, was indeed tremendous as was the blow to the domestic economy; but the upstart had been destroyed. In Palestinian circles, the destruction of the Intra institution aroused bitter feelings, and those Palestinians who had come to identify themselves with Lebanon began to have second thoughts about their adopted loyalty.22

Social unrest began to surface in Lebanon in the early 1970s in response to the situation in the south (the Israeli-Palestinian clashes) and to other perceived inequities in the Lebanese system. Predominantly this social unrest was manifest in the form of well organized and large strikes. Imam Mousa Al Sadr organized strikes to protest the inability of the state to protect the Shia peasants of the south and the unfulfilled promise of the state to arm the Shias in order to protect themselves. Students struck for educational reform and for better job opportunities. Workers struck to protest high inflation, and erosion of the middle class living standard and for greater wages and benefits.

None of the strikes was of very long duration, but it became increasingly clear that the strike was becoming the basic economic weapon of Lebanese workers at all levels.23

This socio-economic dissatisfaction, together with the growing Palestinian problem, would continue to plague the administration of President Franjiyyeh from 1970-1976 and would be the cause of the successive failure of numerous governments under various prime ministers. The social unrest made it difficult for any prime minister to gain acceptance and popular support.

Also occurring during this period were strikes and protests staged by the Lebanese left in support of the Palestinians and against Israel and the policy of suppression of Palestinian commando activities being carried out by the Lebanese army at the time. As Salibi states:

Popular demonstrations upholding the Palestinian right to unrestricted commando action from Lebanon against Israel condemned the attempts on the part of the Lebanese authorities to keep the commando movement under control, and the communists and Ba'ath socialists, working in close association with Kamal Janbalat and his Progressive Socialist Party, invariably appeared at the head of these demonstrations.24

Once this pattern of demonstration and protest against the government's policies was established, it consequently offered the opportunity for the Lebanese left to vocalize their demands for political reform and attempt to mobilize Moslem support. The main grievances of the Lebanese left were socio-economic as well as political, as explained in the introduction to the Transitional Program of the Lebanese National Movement (formed in 1976):

Under the pretext of protecting "free enterprise", the Lebanese economic system has become a hotbed for chaos, recurrent crises, and the rise of monopolies, which have been accompanied by rising costs of living. It has become the basic factor in obstructing Lebanon's economic development at the expense of the principal productive sectors. . . . At the social level, privileges are more and more being concentrated in the hands of a small minority controlling the national resources, while the overwhelming majority is living under steadily worsening conditions of employment and declining standards of living.25

Although perhaps a somewhat biased picture, this statement does allude to a great disparity in per capita income (and thus living standard) between the Christian and Moslem communities in Lebanon. Exact figures on this discrepancy are difficult to obtain (as is census data), but according to Koury:

An interview by this author with an economist at the American University of Beirut revealed that in the early 1970s some 4 percent of the population of Lebanon received about 35 percent of all income while the lower 50 percent of the population received approximately 20 percent of all income. The income of the other 46 percent of population (which is to say, the middle class) was about 30 percent of overall income.26

This skewed distribution of income must be recognized as one of the major preconditions of the 1975-1976 civil war fighting, which was carried out mainly by discontented middle class and urban lower class elements.27

Paradoxically,  


26Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System, p. 35.

27Ibid, p. 34.
as Salem points out:

The middle and lower middle classes, who are less mobile than the wealthy or the labor classes, and who depend on fixed incomes, have experienced economic hardships as a result of the war. 28

This fact, perhaps more than any other, illustrates the failure of the Lebanese governmental system and political elites to respond to socio-economic problems in the country, which ultimately contributed its part to the creation of the civil war atmosphere of lost faith in the democratic institutions of the state.

III. ACTORS AND FACTIONS

If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart.

from The Gulag Archipelago by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

In order to better understand the different groups which became involved in the Lebanese civil war fighting, it will be helpful to first present the actors and factions involved in the dispute, their ideologies and aspirations, and the alliances they formed in response to the civil war violence. This will include the internal factions in Lebanon, the Palestinians, and the major external actors which, as will be shown, all have their impact on Lebanon's continued strife as well as their own reasons and justifications for their involvement in Lebanese affairs. The proliferation of these groups, even within the major sectarian divisions, reflects both the feudal family allegiances, political power aspirations and diversity of ideologies alluded to previously. This phenomenon underscores the complexity of Lebanese society and also reflects the internal and external sources of division in the country. Yet it still fails to explain the spark which brought devastating civil war violence to the country or to provide clues to the "line dividing good and evil" in the hearts of the Lebanese citizens who resorted to violence in order to protect the particular interests of their
The divergent ideologies and personal convictions of the leadership of these groups, however, provide somewhat of a focus on the political differences in the country and their inherent incompatibility with one another.

The internal factions involved in the Lebanese conflict are best organized for descriptive purposes into two basic groups - the Christians and the Moslems. These of course are generalizations, since the groups are predominantly but not exclusively comprised of one religious group or sect. The Christian groups, as a rule, are almost exclusively Maronite, while the leftist oriented groups share both Moslem and Christian (other than Maronite) leadership. Also, the Christian groups are generally labelled as rightists and the Moslems as leftists, since the Christians support maintaining the confessional system and the status quo while the Moslems want to see secularization or other changes (radical or not, depending on one's point of view) brought about in the Lebanese government. It must also be noted that these groups represent only the politically and/or militarily active members of their community.

A. THE CHRISTIAN/RIGHTISTS

The Christian (Maronite) groups have been at different times referred to as the Rightists, the Establishment Alliance or the Lebanese Front. This group contains some of the more powerful political leaders in the country and also the largest best organized and trained militias. The most active among
these are the Phalangist (Kata'ib) Party under the leadership of Pierre Gemayel, the National Liberal Party under former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, and the Liberation Army of Zghorta (or Zghortawis) under again a former Lebanese president - Suleiman Franjiyyeh. All three of these parties are organized around the leadership of their feudal/family figureheads (ziama) and their militias serve (in part) to protect the territories these families control - the Maronite north for Franjiyyeh (centered around the town of Zghorta) and the Beirut/Mount Lebanon areas for Chamoun and Gemayel.

The Phalangists, founded in 1936, are the oldest Maronite party and have remained dedicated to the maintenance of Maronite ascendancy in Lebanon. Stressing what it calls the "Lebanese national character" as opposed to any notion of Lebanese Arab nationalism, the group's philosophy is best expressed in the claim of Gemayel (who has served in several cabinet positions in past Lebanese administrations) that "since the Christians pay eighty per cent of the taxes in Lebanon they are entitled to eighty per cent of the services." The party is also strongly anti-socialist. One estimate gave its militia a strength of 10,000 men during the course of the 1976 civil war fighting. It was militia units from the Phalangists which were in the forefront of the Christian-Palestinian clashes which led to this phase of the civil war.

29 Saliba, "The Lebanese in the Context of the War", p. 5.
30 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 11, 1976, p. 27767.
The basic aims of this rightist party must also be tempered by the long time presidential aspirations of their leader Pierre Gemayel (Jumayyil). As Salibi notes:

As the Kata'ib Party, beginning in April 1970, began to press its campaign for Jumayyil as the next Lebanese President, the first signs of opposition to his candidacy appeared. To the Lebanese political establishment, and to Lebanese opinion in general, the thought of having the leader of a well-organized party of para-military character established in power as Head of State was distasteful.31 Despite the failures in his bid for the presidency, the tenacious Gemayil, who has survived several assassination attempts, remains a figure of great power and respect in the Lebanese Christian community.

The National Liberal Party (NLP), another strong Christian/rightist group, is reputed to have been established in 1958 by Camille Chamoun at the end of his presidency "in order to endure as a political leader and compete for Maronite leadership."32 The party is not as tightly organized as the Phalangists and is held together primarily by Chamoun's charismatic leadership. The party enjoys wide popular support in the Christian community, as Salibi states:

The P.N.L. emerged after 1958 as the unrivalled representative of the Christian ethos in Lebanon. Its support came from every part of the country. Christian villagers from the mountain regions and the Biqa, leading bankers and businessmen and small merchants, contractors and brokers, clergymen and monks of every Christian sect,

and slum-dwellers in the humbler quarters of Beirut and its suburbs, were all "Shamumist" by sentiment, unless they happened to be recruited to the Kata'ib party. 33

Camille's son Danny stands ready to assume the party leadership after his father. The militia of the NLP, called the Tigers, frequently operates together with the Phalangist units, and was estimated to be 20,000 strong in 1976. 34

Sharing basically the same views on Maronite ascendancy as the Phalangists, the two groups also are in agreement on two other controversies in the Lebanese conflict. Both groups advocate an end to the armed Palestinian and the Syrian Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) presence in Lebanon.

The third largest Christian group is organized around the leadership of former president Suleiman Franjiyyeh in the Christian portion of northern Lebanon. Franjiyyeh's motives are certainly close to those of Chamoun with regard to remaining a political power contender, but his orientation is more Christian Arab. This group's militia, the Liberation Army of Zghorta, was organized and led by Franjiyyeh's son Tony, and is estimated to be 7,000 strong. 35 As president during the 1975-1976 portion of the civil war, Franjiyyeh came to rely on Syrian support in order to retain his presidency and bring an end to the violence. As Syrian interest and influence in Lebanese affairs heightened, culminating in the Syrian force intervention in June 1976,

33 Ibid, p. 4.
34 Keesings' Contemporary Archives, p. 27767.
35 Ibid.
a personal friendship also developed between Syria's President Assad and Franjiyyeh. This relationship, however, was ill-fated. Franjiyyeh's support for the Syrian military presence in Lebanon brought him into opposition with the other Maronite leaders, Chamoun and Gemayel. Some time later, in June 1978, in another of the inexplicable acts of violence for which Lebanon has now become infamous, Franjiyyeh's son Tony, along with his wife and thirty other supporters were killed in a small arms, rocket and grenade attack on their home in Ehden, near Tripoli. Members of Pierre Gemayel's Phalangists were implicated in the killings. 36 This vendetta type enmity perhaps better than anything else illustrates the crosscutting family rivalries present even within the powerful Maronite community.

In addition to these three main factions, several other groups complete the Christian Lebanese elements. These range from the more moderate National Bloc of presidential contender Raymond Edde to the breakaway Christian army faction under Major Haddad. Edde's National Bloc has strived for accommodation with the more moderate Moslem leadership and elements in the country. Although originating as a pro-Western (pro-French) party under Raymond's father, Emile, who had been president during the French Mandate period (1936-1941), the party was slowly transformed into a mediating party, attempting to unite and reconcile all elements in the country (quite an

Edde's popular appeal, however, has thus never been great enough among the Christian community to accomplish his election to the presidency. He is equally opposed to the more uncompromising alternatives of continued Maronite ascendancy or partition into a separate Christian state, as espoused by the Phalangists and the NLP. Although allied in the past with Chamoun's National Liberals, Edde is vehemently against the Phalangists and their activities. As Salibi explains:

As "Dean" of the National Bloc, Raymond Iddi abandoned his father's fervent hostility toward pan-Arabism, replacing it with an equally fervent ardour for anti-militarism.37

After several assassination attempts, however, there are indications of a change in Edde's original anti-military stance, perhaps revealing the necessity of the times for political survival in Lebanon. According to one source, "The National Bloc has no organized militia, but has armed partisans, notably in Jbail (Byblos) and in several mountain villages which are Mr. Edde's strongholds."38 The National Bloc is also reported to maintain militiamen in "certain Christian areas of Beirut."39

The breakaway Christian faction of the Lebanese army, on the other hand, is not much more than a private militia - although a well armed one. Operating along the southern

37Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976, p. 5.
38SWASIA, September 10, 1975, p. 6.
39Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 27767.
border of Lebanon, reputedly in collaboration with Israeli units against Palestinian commando camps, Major Haddad's faction on 18 April, 1979 declared the "State of Free Lebanon" in the south Lebanon area over which he exercises military control. This has earned him the disaffection of even his fellow Maronite leaders, who have branded him as a "renegade." This Christian held enclave along Lebanon's southern border with Israel is also reputed to provide a channel for Israeli support of other Christian factions. As stated in the Arab Report:

The Falange and the National Liberal parties have been armed by Israel through the rightist enclaves in the south, and through the port of Jounieh north of Beirut. Through the "good fence" opened between the Christian enclave and Israel in the eastern border area, greater economic and military cooperation between Haddad's forces (and the civilian population he protects) and Israel had been developed. This de facto partition of Lebanese territory represented by the Christian enclave has ominous implications for future Lebanese sovereignty and thus is opposed by the Lebanese leadership. Although Haddad is not a powerful political and family head as are the other Lebanese leaders, his military strength and Israeli backing make him an increasingly important force in the country and especially in the disputed south Lebanon area.

Completing the array of Christian groups in the country is a variety of smaller units which have armed themselves and organized small militias for self-protection and in order to exert their identity and authority in the atmosphere of decaying civil order in Lebanon. These groups include the Maronite League, the Maronite Order of Monks, the Defenders of the Cedars led by Said Akl, the Maronite Organization led by Fouad Chemali, the Lebanese Nationalist Front and the Front for the Freedom and the Man.  

It could easily be deduced, after this account, that the Maronite community of Lebanon displays little of a Christian ethic. It must be remembered, however, that not all of Lebanon's Christians are militant rightists. Yet, there does seem to be somewhat of a dichotomy of Christian opinion in the country. A Maronite priest explains his co-religionists thus:

The Maronite community is politically and culturally an Arab community despite occasional efforts to give it a different coloration. That this community has certain particular characteristics is due largely to its historical personality. "Ancestral fear" is not unique to Maronites or to Lebanon; it is to be found among most Christians in the orient. Furthermore, while the mountains may protect, it offers no security as history proves on repeated occasions. . . . Separation is neither Christian nor Maronite. The idea of a small Lebanon has been perpetuated by the landed clergy and by the feudal chiefs to preserve their petty interests.  

42 "Christian Responsibility in the Aftermath of the Conflict in Lebanon", in Lebanon - Crisis and Challenge in the Arab World, pp. 33, 34.
In contrast, others see the Maronite viewpoint in a far different light. The direct opposites are intriguing if not confusing. In the *Middle East Annual Review* Patrick Seale writes:

The Lebanese Christian, and particularly the Maronite, now feels light years apart from his Muslim fellow citizens; he feels himself a product of a completely different civilization, of a different value system altogether, and no amount of dialogue will persuade him that the "Arab nation" is his home. The atrocities, suffered and committed, have bred an alienation which at bottom drives the Maronites to seek if not a separate state, at least a wide measure of self government. It is not that the Christians feel that they belong to Europe: rather that they alone, and not their Muslim compatriots, are the only true Lebanese.43

Given these widely polarized and perhaps slightly exaggerated opinions, it is far too simplistic to say that the truth lies somewhere between the two. It would be safer to say that there are elements of truth in each and that there are those individuals who ascribe either to the most moderate and the most extreme positions.

One further observation also seems apparent at this point - which will hold true for all the Lebanese groups and the Palestinians as well. That is, sectarianism seems to play an equally divisive as well as a unifying role even among the different factions of the major opposing groups. This is best illustrated by clashes between the Maronites and the Armenians (Christians) which have occurred in October 1978 and again in late 1979. These clashes were the result of Maronite attempts to force the Armenians out of the Mount

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Lebanon area and to force them to end their long standing neutrality in the civil war fighting. Incidents such as these bring into question whether sectarian strike can ever be brought to an end in Lebanon.

B. THE MOSLEM/LEFTISTS

The Moslem led groups in Lebanon have been referred to similarly as the Leftists, the Progressives (or the Progressive Parties Front), the Patriotic and Progressive Forces, and more recently the Lebanese National Movement and the Nationalist Front. The commonly used Moslem/leftists identification given to these groups is actually even more of a misnomer than the Christian/rightist label, since in basic ideological terms the secularization inherent in leftist dogma is anathema to the Moslem Islamic faith. Also there is a fairly high Christian representation among the leftist groups (and especially among the Palestinians). The Moslem/leftist labeling of these groups, then, stems mostly from their opposition to Lebanese Maronite political ascendancy and their desire to transform the Lebanese system - by radical or revolutionary means if necessary.

One of the major groups representing and attempting to unite the Lebanese left is the Progressive Socialist Party - now under Walid Junblatt. Walid's father, Kamal Junblatt, founded the party in 1949 and until his assasination in March 1977 was one of the leading non-Christian leaders of

Lebanese politics, having held several cabinet posts. The party, under the traditional leadership of the Junblatt family, represents a majority of the tribes of the Druze sect in Lebanon. Kamal Junblatt always considered himself a prospective presidential candidate and it was over continuation of the National Pact (prohibiting his candidacy) that his militia clashed with Chamoun's National Liberals in the 1958 civil war. As Salibi explains the PSP goals:

The party principles reflect the personality of its founder: a mixture of eighteenth century European rationalism, utopian socialism and Indian philosophy. The party aims to establish a new society based on evolutionary socialism all over the world beginning with Lebanon. ... Hence PSP's future society will be based on reason, harmony and unity, and free from want, exploitation, class distinction and violence.45

The PSP is reported to maintain a 3000 man militia in the mountain areas of south Lebanon.46

Although accused of supporting the Palestinian issue for their own political purposes, the PSP has in the past been a vanguard unit in pro-Palestinian protest. As leader of the National Movement political coalition, the PSP became even more closely associated with the Palestinian cause. According to Salibi:

When, after the October War, the National Movement and the Palestinians began to co-ordinate their forces more closely for political action, political issues which were distinctly Palestinian became confused with Lebanese domestic issues, to such a degree that it became difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle them from one another.47

45 Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976, p. 7
46 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 27767.
47 Salibi, p. 77.
Walid Junblatt, though somewhat reluctantly, is fast becoming the leader and spokesman of not only his party, but of all the progressive forces represented by the Lebanese National Movement coalition. Although he still speaks of his slain father as "our leader", it is clear that the Moslem masses who have rallied to the National Movement founded by his father now look to him for leadership. Walid has become the leading spokesman for the Transitional Program of the Lebanese National Movement as well. This document, promulgated in 1975, spells out the manner in which the Lebanese government should be reorganized. Walid's basic feeling is that "at present the main danger is the threat against the unity of Lebanon and the identity of Lebanon as an Arab state.", and he has adopted a moderate if not optimistic stance. As he states:

It is possible to have a general dialogue between all parties and decide on a new formula for Lebanon. The progressive parties have a program. It is possible to redefine this program, to rearrange it, to discern the intentions and opinions of the other side and to reach a compromise. But there is no dialogue.48

It remains to be seen, of course, whether some of the more radical or Marxist groups in the National Movement would support such a compromise solution, should such a dialogue, as suggested by Junblatt, take place. It also goes without saying that the Moslem left obviously has less to lose than the now dominant Christian/right in such a compromise.

The next most influential group in the National Movement is the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) under Nicola Shawi. Formerly associated with the Syrian Communist Party, the LCP was legalized in 1970 by Kamal Junblatt while he held the Minister of Interior post. Not particularly revolutionary in character, the party has grown during the civil war fighting and is also 30 percent Christian. As for its ideas:

Unlike orthodox communism, the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) from its inception has disclaimed any plans to abolish private property and establish a socialist system. Instead it has been very mild - revisionist one may say - in its approach. The LCP supports Lebanese independence, national solidarity, and calls for moderate political, economic and social reforms.49

The party's support of the National Movement and its PSP leadership is explained by a LCP official who states: "One of the most important features of the LNM is that it is an alliance between communists, progressive nationalists and other democratic forces."50

The LCP is also known to be closely associated with and supportive of the Palestinian movement. Another communist group, however, the Organization for Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL), under Muhsen Ibrahim and Fawwaz Trabulsi, is even more closely associated with the Palestinians, and particularly with the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in conjunction with which it publishes

50 "Lebanese Communist Party", in The Lebanese National Movement, p. 16.
the weekly Al Hurriya." Explaining OCAL's position

Trabulsi states:

Presently we are a whole Lebanese organization, comprising representatives of both the confessions, and firmly entrenched within the basic classes of Lebanese society, especially the poorer classes, in the south, the Beqaa, the mountains and the suburbs of Beirut. . . Politically and theoretically, we believe we have adapted Marxism to the particularities of the Lebanese Political systems and social formations. Consequently, we have given a lot of attention to the question of confessionalism, as central to the whole social structure of the country.

These two separate communist parties (the LCP and OCAL) have a close relationship, and it can be assumed that some Soviet influence is infused into the Lebanese left and the Palestinian left through these organizations.

Completing the ranks of the National Movement are various groups of different socialist persuasions. The National Syrian Social Party (NSSP), dating back to 1932, was originally right wing (Nazi fascist inspired) and then swung left - turning Marxist. The party, now under Abdullah Saade, has recovered some of its former prominence after its supression following the 1961 coup attempt it orchestrated. Saade, imprisoned after the coup attempt, was later released and returned to reassume the party leadership. Its aims, however, remain the same.

The NSSP believes in the unity of greater Syria - defined by Antoun Saadeh as stretching from the Taurus mountains and the Zagros mountains to the Suez Canal and Red Sea, and from the Mediterranean (including Cyprus) to the Arabian Gulf.

51 Tarbush, "The Divided Front", p. 8.
Needless to say, the party is closely aligned with Syria. The NSSP membership is mostly Greek Orthodox Christian, and it maintains its own independent militia in current Lebanese fashion. The Pro-Iraqi Ba'th Party, its ideas of pan-Arabism and Arab socialism popular with many of the poorer Moslem Lebanese, is another leftist affiliated group. Also, numerous Nasserite groups, the most significant of which is the Independent Nasserite Movement under Ibrahim Qualayat, are included in the National Movement. As a member of this group sums up its ideology:

Our movement has carried the torch of Arab nationalism, and the most prominent defense of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. Arab nationalism and Arab unity are not just political objectives—they are an attitude, feeling, a way of life for which we are fighting.54

This group is also known by the name given to its militia—the Murabitoun—which battled Christian militias in the hotel district of Beirut in the 1976 civil war. Finally completing the menagerie of the National Movement are even smaller groups such as the Arab Socialist Union, the Arab Socialist Action Party and the Lebanese Movement For Supporting Fateh.55

For a variety of reasons, the Lebanese leftists are united in their support of the Palestinians and their presence, armed or not, in Lebanon. The Palestinians are regarded as

both an added Moslem complement to the population (despite their self-imposed status as a refugee community) and as a Lebanese leftist ally in the fight against the Christian militias. For although not to their overall liking, the Palestinians have found that they could not maintain an armed presence in Lebanon and remain uninvolved in the civil war fighting. As for the role of Syria in the maintenance of Lebanese internal security, this issue would cause a split in the Lebanese left just as it had among the Christian groups.

Syria's military intervention into Lebanon during the 1976 civil war, in opposition to the Palestinian/leftist forces and thus in support of the Christians, sealed its fate in the eyes of the National Movement. Several of the leftist groups, however, broke away from the National Movement to support and work with the Syrian Arab Deterrent Force.

According to the Arab Report:

This grouping, which became known as the Nationalist Front, accepted the "constitutional document" announced on 14 February 1976 after talks in Damascus between President Franjiyya and Syrian leaders. . . . Member groups of the Nationalist Front included the (Nasserite) Union of Working Peoples Forces (whose leader, Kamal Shatila, is Secretary General of the Nationalist Front), The Pro-Syrian wing of the Lebanese Baath Party (led by Assem Qansom), the faction of the NSSP led by Issam Mahayri and a rightist Kurdish party Rozkari. It was joined in June 1977 by Talal Merhabi's Lebanese Confrontation Front.56

Although the Nationalist Front is now small in both constituency and number of affiliated groups compared to the

National Movement, the Front has been actively recruiting new members, especially from among the Ba'hist and Nasserite elements on the periphery of the National Movement. Also as the Syrian ADF in Lebanon has become more legitimimized, so has the appeal of the Nationalist Front become greater.

Two other Moslem but not particularly leftist groups must also be considered among the Lebanese factions — one for its military strength and the other for its growing appeal to a large Lebanese Moslem segment of the population and for its growing militancy. The first of these is the Moslem breakaway faction of the former Lebanese army — the Lebanese Arab Army under Lt. Khatib. Though lacking in discipline and now more of a militia than an army, this force is nonetheless well armed and has been closely associated with several Palestinian factions. The second group, the Movement of the Deprived under Imam Mousa Al Sadr, has united a large portion of the Shia community, whose economic plight certainly qualifies them as being deprived. Imam Sadr's leadership has won him a great following among the Moslem religious community. Originally a moderate leader, Imam Sadr was no sooner elected head of the Muslim Higher Council when Israeli raids on Palestinian commando camps in southern Lebanon began causing civilian casualties in this predominantly Shia inhabited area. As Shia refugees began pouring north into Beirut to avoid the fighting in the south Sadr eventually came to encourage his followers to take up arms in order to defend themselves. Unfortunately, Imam Sadr disappeared.
under suspicious circumstances after a visit to Libya in
October 1978 - his fate still uncertain. Following the
example of Sadr, two other moderate Moslem political leaders,
Rashid Karami and Saib Salam, are now also reputed to have
recruited private militias for their organizations - the
Arab Liberation Party and the Pioneers of Reform respectively.

A final Lebanese faction, which basically defies
categorization and is affiliated with the National Movement,
is the Front of Patriotic Christians (FPC). This organization
was established in the wake of the civil war fighting in
September 1976 in reaction to the then prevalent international
press depiction of the Christian community in Lebanon as
being totally allied to or in agreement with the rightist
Lebanese Front. Although the FPC does not ascribe to the
leftist ideologies prevalent in the National Movement, it is
in agreement with the Transitional Program as the only means
of bringing internal peace and stability to the country. They
explain their aims thus:

The predominantly Christian right-wing parties, by
presenting themselves as the defenders of Christianity
in Lebanon, had all along sought to give a religious
coloring to the underlying conflict between the "haves"
and "have nots."

57 Libian authorities claim Sadr was aboard an airliner which
departed Libya for Beirut. Mysteriously, however, the Imam
was not among the passengers when the aircraft landed in
Beirut. Responsibility for the kidnapping (if one ever
occurred) was never announced. See Arab Report and Record,
No. 18, (16-31 October 1978).

58 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 27767.
The goal of the FPC is diametrically opposed to the right wing goal. The "Patriotic Christians" seek to demonstrate that in foregoing special privileges through the secularization of government, Lebanese Christians will not suffer the fate of an oppressed minority. At the same time, they can ally themselves with the Muslim majority in the Arab world in support of social change and against foreign domination. The FPC also, however, points out a failure of the National Movement's Transitional program regarding the Christian minority, in that "it has not yet provided a democratic secular solution to the question of national, ethnic and religious minorities." The FPC has no militia, which in Lebanon's current situation limits its ability to exert its identity and position. Nevertheless, it is emerging as a growing political force for those Christians who wish to express opposition to the rightist Lebanese Front.

C. THE PALESTINIANS

Added to the conglomeration of internal factions operating on the Lebanese scene are the Palestinian groups under the umbrella Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), created in 1964. As Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee (since 1969), Commander in Chief of the PLO's Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and leader of the national liberation (commando) movement Fateh, Yasser Arafat exerts loose control over a majority of the armed Palestinians in Lebanon. Made up of former Palestinian

60.Ibid, p. 20.
brigades of the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi armies, the PLA now maintains a majority of its members in Lebanon. Since the PLA was designed and dedicated to the fight to regain Palestine from the Zionists, Arafat tried (somewhat unsuccessfully) to keep this force out of the 1976 civil war fighting - initially supporting the Syrian intervention. Keeping such large numbers of armed units both discrete and uninvolved in the conflict has proven quite difficult. The distinction between the PLA forces and the armed militias of Fateh, both under Arafat's command, has become quite blurred. As Tarbush explains:

After the Jordanian civil war in September 1970, Fateh set up the Yarmouq Brigade, mainly from Palestinians who had left the Jordanian army. Though often described as part of the PLA, the brigade is actually part of Fateh and directly controlled by Arafat.61

Also included in this establishment wing of the PLO is the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, formed in 1969, which attempts to coordinate activities of the guerrilla groups while also functioning as a police force in the Palestinian refugee camps.

The dissident element of the Palestinian groups is represented by the Rejectionist Front, which interestingly enough also includes the Christian Palestinian leadership elements. These groups broke away from the leadership of Arafat (and the PLO) in September 1974 and operate independently

and often in opposition among themselves. Largest of these is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which grew out of the Arab National Movement of the early 1950s and was originally organized under the leadership of George Habash, Wadi Haddad, and Ahmed Jibril in 1967. Not a particularly tight knit group, the original PFLP would eventually split into separate groups under these three leaders. Haddad's breakaway faction, the PFLP "Special Operations Branch" (which actually operated independent of the PFLP) was created in 1972 and dissolved after Haddad's death in March 1976, after having claimed responsibility for international terrorist attacks such as the Entebbe hijacking.\(^{62}\) Jibril's breakaway faction, which split from the PFLP in 1968, was called the PFLP - General Command. Also, another group of leftist dissidents under Nayef Hawatma split from the PFLP in 1969 forming the Popular Democratic Front (PDFLP). Finally, the PFLP-GC again fragmented with the breakaway of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) under Abu Abbas in April 1977. Divided over Syrian intervention in Lebanon "the two factions have since been involved in many clashes particularly in Sidon."\(^{63}\) Rounding out the Palestinian groups active in Lebanon Saiqa, the Palestinian

\(^{62}\) Haddad, a Palestinian Christian, was one of the leading proponents of bringing international attention to the Palestinian cause by worldwide hijacking and terrorism. He was reputed to have connections with such international terrorist groups as "the Japanese Red Army, the West German Red Army Faction and the international terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (Carlos)." See Tarbush, "The Divided Front", p. 616.

\(^{63}\) Ibid, p. 617.
commando wing of the Syrian Army, and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), a similar unit of the Iraqi Army must also be included. The true allegiances of these units are an interesting question.

A rather apt description of the effects of the Palestinian presence on the Lebanese is provided by Patrick Seale:

Because they were waging a revolution; because they were disinherit ed; because they overturned the authority of the state and the social structure in the south; because, finally, they inflamed nationalist opinion against the state's impotence, the Palestinians were the most radical and radicalizing force in Lebanese society. In their orbit grew up, satellite fashion, other centres of radicalism: Nasserist street gangs recruited from among the urban Sunni proletariat disclaiming allegiance to the Sunni notables; uprooted Shia peasants driven from their southern villages by Israeli retaliatory raids to swell the shanty town population around Beirut; front organizations of the Communist Party, embracing students, teachers, women and workers, mobilized by the party in defense of the Palestinians and against the established order; and, to the left of the communists, a number of small but highly influential extremist pressure groups, such as the Organization For Communist Action, which provided the inchoate mass of the disinherit ed with slogans, fighting issues and leadership.

Palestinian infusion into the Lebanese political scene is yet another example of the influence they can exert in the country. As Hudson points out:

There is little doubt that groups like the PFLP took an active part in Lebanese politics and certainly supported the reform program of the National Movement which called for an end to, or at least a diminution of, Maronite preponderance and socio-economic "injustice".

64 Tarbush, "The Divided Front", pp. 616-617.

65 Seale, "Lebanon", p. 257.

66 Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War, p. 266."
It is difficult to say how the Lebanese political crisis might change should this Palestinian influence be removed. For the Moslem Lebanese element, this Palestinian-Lebanese left collaboration certainly has both positive and negative implications in solving Lebanon's present situation.
IV. THE EXTERNAL ACTORS

The role of the external actors on the Lebanese scene is both extensive and controversial. Although some countries have chosen to play their role in passive rather than active means, their effects are no less relevant. For it is the arming and bankrolling of the different armed Lebanese and Palestinian factions that makes a continuation of the conflict not only possible but inevitable. Still, many of these external actors are beginning to realize that a solution to the Lebanese Crisis is necessary in order to promote greater regional stability and economic development. The problem remains that neither maintaining the status quo (Maronite ascendancy) or a triumph of the Palestinian supported Lebanese left appears as a viable solution to the Lebanese impasse. This is why particularly Lebanon's "frontline" neighboring states - Israel and Syria - tend to react so strongly to apparent shifts in Lebanon's sectarian power balance.

A. ISRAEL'S POSITION

It is far too simple an explanation to ascribe reasons of national security to Israel's involvement in Lebanon. With the armed Palestinian commando units in the south of course this is a consideration, but there are other reasons for their support of the Christian militias. Not only is there a Western cultural bond between the Israelis and Lebanese Christians, but there is also a shared historical deterministic view of the survival of their societal group. For the Israelis,
the Lebanese Christians represent a fellow religious minority sect in a predominantly Arab-Islamic religious and cultural area. Thus the survival of one is linked to the other. The comment is made that Israel no longer fears being thrown into the Mediterranean Sea by the Arabs but rather being drowned in the "sea of Islam". This observation holds true no less for the Lebanese Christians.

Also, for the Israelis, any armed conflict between Christians and Palestinians in Lebanon certainly serves to divert attention from the Palestinian's main espoused opponent. However, in support of Palestinian aims, Moslem Lebanese opinion of Israel's interests in Lebanon most likely falls in line with Tarbush's statement that:

Many Lebanese believe that Israel is intent on modifying its northern border and creating a buffer zone like those between it and Egypt (Sinai), Jordan (the West Bank) and Syria (Golan). It is suspected that Israel has long cherished the idea of a Christian "statelet" in the south closely allied to Israel which would both aid Israel's security and mean Israel was no longer the only confessionally-based state in the area. Israel is also thought to have designs on the waters of the Litani.  

Israel's policy could easily be interpreted as building not just walls but impenetrable barriers along its borders. If this were the case, Israel's Lebanese border, where a majority of the Palestinian terrorist raids infiltrate Israeli defenses, would certainly be the place they would want such a barrier. Barriers, however, cause isolation as well as protection - a consideration the Israelis must also make.

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The Lebanese civilian casualties which have been inflicted by Israeli retaliatory raids into southern Lebanon, of course, are the main point of contention in this Israeli policy as far as the Lebanese government is concerned. Although Lebanese acceptance of the armed Palestinian presence, in Israel's view, makes them liable for these side effects, this way of looking at things certainly does not help the Lebanese regime's attempts to assert its authority. As Koury explains:

Israel could not tolerate increasing and continuous commando attacks without retaliation, but whatever the logic of Israeli military policy, constant Israeli retaliations against Lebanon could only have intensified anti-Israeli sentiment.68

At the same time, there were also anti-Syrian designs in Israeli policy on south Lebanon. Despite the fact that it remained non-reactive to Syria's intervention in the 1976 civil war fighting, Israel did make it clear that the extent of southern action of Syrian units which would be tolerated without response by Israel was the "red line" just north of the Litani mentioned earlier. Since the Syrian ADF was stationed in Lebanon, Israel in turn has generally confined its incursions into southern Lebanon to south of this line, along which the UNIFIL forces are stationed. It can be surmised, however, that Syrian actions in Lebanon are closely watched by the Israelis. According to Koury: "Frequent Israeli official statements have suggested that Israel would not remain idle while Syrian forces overthrew

the confessional government of Lebanon."69

The most recent Israeli raids against Palestinian camps in southern Lebanon confirm Israel's pragmatic and unchanging policy. The inability of the U.S. (Israel's chief arms supplier) to apply coercive leverage in order to affect a modification of this policy does not bode well for Lebanon. Clearly, until the violence can be curtailed, no hope for mediation can be held. And yet,

Begin has declared his intention of continuing to combat the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a matter of policy and not only in retaliation for guerrilla operations inside Israel. Moreover, Israel had shown no sign of falling in with U.S. plans in the area.70

This escalation of Israeli military policy with respect to southern Lebanon has ominous implications for both the Lebanese crisis and the Middle East peace process initiated by the Camp David accords, as will be discussed in Section VI.

B. SYRIAN INTERESTS

Syria's continued armed presence in Lebanon, under the Arab League ADF sanction, is equally foreboding for Lebanon's future. Syria is equally opposed to either a partitioned Lebanon (for fear of a pro-Israeli Christian ministate) or to a radical overthrow of the existing government and the emergence of a leftist regime. What Syria does want is less clear. At this point, its hegemony over Lebanese affairs is apparent in that:

69Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System, p. 149.
70"Lebanon - Off the Collision Course?", The Middle East, August 1979), p. 40.
The major decisions about Lebanon's defense, foreign policy, and national integrity are now made in Damascus, not Beirut, and it is there that the squabbles which periodically flare up between the still unreconciled factions are settled.\footnote{Seale, "Lebanon", p. 253.}

Regardless of the credibility of the supposed Syrian desire to unite greater Syria (the entire French mandated territory including Lebanon), and even if the Arab League is bankrolling the ADF presence, this must still be somewhat of a burden to Syria, both economically and militarily.

On a more pragmatic level, Syria has always had close links with Lebanon and is interested in its continued viability for several reasons. First of all, transportation routes to Damascus, Syria's capital, are much more modern and convenient directly west to Lebanon's major ports of Beirut and Tripoli rather than north to the more remote Syrian ports. Syria has continually tried to increase economic ties with Lebanon, going so far as to propose an economic union. Syria would no doubt like to benefit in some degree from Lebanon's position as the banking and financial center of the Middle East, particularly considering the cost incurred to Syria by maintaining the ADF in Lebanon.

Having intervened in 1976 on behalf of the Christians and against the leftists and Palestinians, and then in 1978 against the Christians (and thus in a pro-Palestinian/leftist stance), the Syrians have been accused of duplicity and a policy of preserving the standoff between the opposing...
Lebanese groups. One explanation of the Syrian actions contends:

Just as Syria could not allow the leftist-Palestinian alliance to triumph in 1976, so in 1978 the Maronites in turn had to be brought to heel. Like Kamal Junblatt before them, the hardline Maronite leaders, such as Beshir Gemayel and Camille Chamoun misjudged the regional context of their local bid for power. They failed to recognize that Syria and the states behind it could not let them win.72

At the same time, a well founded concern for Israeli designs also affects Syrian strategy. As Seale again explains:

"The fear of being drawn into a war with Israel at a time not of its choosing has always been the underlying logic of Syria's intervention in Lebanon and of its continued presence there."73

It appears that Syria would prefer to keep the Arab confrontation with Israel, which it supports, on neutral ground and carried out through the Palestinian commandos in south Lebanon, with various local forces as a buffer between Israeli forces and the ADF, rather than on the Golan Heights. Thus it sees its security as tied to the continued ADF presence in Lebanon both economically and militarily if not politically. In one view:

Syrian armed presence in Lebanon is governed by internal and regional considerations which prevent any change in connection with this presence, at least for the time being. This would have direct repercussions on the

These vested interests explain Syria's stake in the outcome of the Lebanese crisis. Syria's anti-Western (U.S.) posture and self-appointed leadership of the Arab Rejectionist Front (opposed to the Camp David accords) complicates the situation further from the U.S. perspective.

As for the other Middle Eastern countries of the Arab League, their role in the Lebanese impasse, although more clear cut and direct, is less effective. Among the more radical states, Libya, Iraq and Syria all supported the Palestinian and leftist Lebanese factions both financially and militarily, and most assuredly Libya and Iraq continue this role today. Other Arab nations fall more in line with the objectives of the Syrian ADF presence, as Koury states:

There are some Arab countries (notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) which for various reasons - remote geographic location, ideological conservatism, national interest - wish to put an end to the civil strife and to preserve the state of Lebanon. Their overriding goal is to keep the balancing process intact and their tactics simply involve the use of their power to maintain the Lebanese political equilibrium without destroying the competing communes and sub-communes.  

Saudi Arabia, with its petrodollar surplus, has actually been accused of bankrolling the Syrian ADF while aiding both Lebanese factions plus the Palestinians - quite a duplicity of policy. However, Saudi diplomatic initiatives

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75 Koury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System*, p. 46.
have been instrumental in accomplishing the ceasefires and truces which ended the civil war fighting in 1976 and 1978, illustrating their degree of influence over the opposing factions. This was accomplished despite the coolness of Saudi-Palestinian relations. Also, other moderate Arab regimes with Palestinian refugee communities are said to harbor Palestinian sympathies. In a more recent development, indications of a Palestinian-Jordanian rapprochement are now beginning to appear as well.\footnote{According to one source, shortly after a historic meeting between PLO leader Arafat and Jordan's King Husain, a commando raid was conducted, for the first time in four years, into Israel from Jordan. A Palestinian Liberation Army unit is also reported to be stationed again in Jordan. See "New Front Seen Emerging Within the PLO As A Result of Fatah's Conflict With Libya and Rapprochement With Jordan", \textit{The Arab World Weekly}, No. 545, Devembr 29, 1979, p. 20.}


For various reasons, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have been reluctant to become directly involved in the Lebanese Crisis from 1975 to the present. For the U.S. this lack of initiative on the Lebanese issue stems from the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel and the U.S. preoccupation with the initial negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords (beginning in late 1977) and subsequent policy initiatives in the area aimed at keeping the Middle East peace process alive. Also, the fact that U.S. mediation was not particularly desired by at least some factions in the Lebanese internal dispute was underscored by the unfortunate assasination of
the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut in July 1976 while on a peace envoy mission. U.S. relations with Lebanon are no doubt still tempered by this event. The U.S. is also accused by the Palestinians and leftist Lebanese of providing Israel with anti-personnel and other sophisticated armaments (which also find their way into the hands of the Christian militias) used in the raids on the south and thus resulting in Palestinian and Lebanese civilian deaths.

Only recently has the U.S. come to realize that the ultimate fate of its Middle East peace initiatives may lie in the Lebanese impasse and more specifically in the Palestinian-Lebanese linkage. Still, the U.S. position on Lebanon remains basically one of rhetorical support, as witnessed by former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young's address before the U.N. Security Council on August 29, 1979.

The U.S. government's policy on Lebanon is well known: we support that country's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity. We have special ties of sympathy with the people of Lebanon, and we have supported the government of President Sarkis in its efforts to restore its authority throughout the country - including throughout southern Lebanon.

Continuing on to condemn both Palestinian and Israeli raiding policies, the statement calls for a "complete,  


immediate and lasting halt to all shelling, terrorism and other acts of violence", words which have no doubt been reiterated by President Sarkis and other Lebanese officials - to little avail. This latest statement of U.S. policy toward Lebanon gives no commitment to come to the aid of the state in any future difficulty or danger of destruction. However, a recent PLO call for a curtailment of guerrilla activities in south Lebanon has provided the opportunity for a new U.S. initiative in the area. This new U.S. initiative will be discussed in Section VI.

The Soviet interest and involvement in the Lebanese Crisis has been complicated by the triangular relationship between the USSR, Syria and the Palestinians. Apparently the Soviets have decided to focus their support for the Palestinians rather than the Lebanese leftists (Communist) groups as their best bet of retaining influence in the area. According to Kass:

The USSR's initial reluctance to commit itself to the leftists' cause appears consistent with its traditionally cautious approach to insurgent movements which have yet to demonstrate their cohesiveness, viability and, most importantly, their functional value to Moscow's own interests.79

The split of the Marxist rejectionist wing from the PLO must no doubt have made Moscow question the cohesiveness of the Palestinian National Movement (PNM) which they hoped would provide their leverage in the Lebanese situation.

To a degree both Moscow and Syria have been frustrated in their attempts to exercise control over the PNM to their advantage.

It follows then, that the most favorable situation for both Syria and the Soviets would have been one where their interests and influences coincided with respect to the Lebanese crisis and particularly the Palestinians in Lebanon. This clearly was not the case, however, in the aftermath of the Syrian military move into Lebanon in June 1976. When the Syrian troops went into action against the Palestinian-leftist alliance, this put the Soviets in the middle, between the Syrians and the PLO, where a decision to take one side over the other was clearly a no win situation. As Kass explains:

The choice between Syria and the PLO was, indeed, a difficult one. For an open rift with Damascus was bound to send Asad closer to the Americans, endangering thereby the entire Soviet Middle East strategy and leaving Moscow with unstable Iraq as the only pro-Soviet confrontation state. On the other hand, the USSR could not afford to abandon the PLO without imperiling its image as the patron of national liberation movements and consequently, its standing with the Third World nations.80

After attempting unsuccessfully to placate the Palestinians (promising renewed support) and to exert pressure on the Syrians to withdraw their ADF forces, the Soviets eventually vacillated. For fear of losing its remaining regional client the Soviets could hope for no more than to maintain its

relationship with Syria via quiet acquiescence. As Stiefbold explains:

The Soviet Union's limited leverage over Syria in the Lebanese debacle points up the extent to which its policy options have been circumscribed in the Middle East. After the costly injury to Soviet prestige and influence inflicted by the Egyptian rupture, Moscow could not afford a permanent breach with its Syrian client.81

This left the Soviets to again reassess its policy pursuits in the area in a situation where it had been proven to exercise little control.

Moscow's subsequent policy for this portion of the Middle East, which related directly to the situation in Lebanon, was to call for a resumption of the all party Geneva Middle East Peace talks as an alternative to the Camp David initiatives. However, with its influence among the more important actors in the region limited to only a few states (Syria, Iraq and Libya) the chances of this eventuality are limited to perhaps only the aftermath of another Middle East war. Also the Soviets do not have any influence or leverage over Israel, an important actor in the area and thus an important plus for any U.S. initiatives. Soviet influence in the area, then, remains incumbent on their ability to play the Syrian-Palestinian relationship. As Kass points out:

The fragile entente between Damascus and the PRM, while offering no solutions to the numerous problems which produced Lebanon's civil strike, effectively

removed the one dimension of the conflict that aroused Moscow's interest and concern.\textsuperscript{82}

It can be safely stated then, that Moscow's interests are of little concern to either the Palestinians, the Lebanese left or the Syrians with respect to the actions each sees as necessary for their survival or security interests.

\textsuperscript{82}Kass, "Moscow and the Lebanese Triangle", p. 183.
V. CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON

There were only losers in the Lebanese civil war. So shameful were the atrocities, so terrible the death toll, so finally inconclusive the contest, that Lebanese of all factions either strive to forget the whole affair or are at pains to justify their part in it, at least on the grounds of community survival. Whatever regime finally establishes itself, whether strongly centralized or, as in the past, a reflection of Lebanese diversity, the war has left each community sharply aware of its separateness and pondering its identity.83

The two periods of civil war fighting in Lebanon in 1975-1976 and again in 1978 were, in actuality, only more intensified segments of violence and internecine conflict which have characterized the country since 1974. The destruction and devastation this warfare has brought to the country, particularly the hotel district in Beirut and the refugee camps on its outskirts, is difficult to imagine. Yet, the basic issues which led to these outbreaks remain by and large unresolved and to a certain extent further complicated by the situation in the south and the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese army in separating the opposing factions and restoring order. However, if the sectarian tension in the country may be considered as providing the foundation of the civil war, the presence of the armed, radical rejectionist Palestinian groups may be considered as the catalyst to violence. Also, the inability of the PLO leadership to curtail Palestinian involvement in the fighting played its part in the continuation of the war

83 Seale, "Lebanon", p. 255.
beyond the early truces. At the same time, certain factions of both the right and left wanted to keep the Palestinians in the fighting for their own separate purposes. Even the Syrians, after their intervention, would end up changing their support for the Lebanese protagonists over the course of the 1975-1976 and 1978 civil war phases. In the end, it can only be said that a precarious balance has been restored among the Lebanese factions and the Palestinians, with the Syrian ADF providing internal order and some degree of security. Or as one analyst puts it, after all the recent fighting "Lebanon is back to square one." In getting nowhere, however, a violent game is being played by the Lebanese and Palestinians - which shows little sign of ending.

A. THE 1975-1976 CIVIL WAR

Two significant events are generally felt to have provided the initial impetus to the escalation of fighting in Lebanon to civil war proportions in 1975. The first of these was a strike in late February 1975 in the port of Saida by Moslem fishermen who were protesting the government's establishment of a concession for a high technology fishing company called Protein - owned in part, interestingly enough, by the Chamoun family.\(^8^4\) Lebanese army units dispatched to control the protest ended up firing on the...
crowd, killing several protestors including Sunni leader Marouf Saad. Demonstrations and a general strike by Moslem Lebanese, encouraged by the rejectionist Palestinians and the Lebanese leftists, quickly led to a governmental crisis. The initiation of serious violence, however, commenced with the Phalangist attack on a bus carrying rejectionist Palestinians from a protest demonstration on 13 April, killing 27. After this incident, fighting quickly spread between Phalangist and Palestinian factions in Beirut and around the Palestinian refugee camps on Beirut's outskirts. Despite efforts by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam and PLO leader Arafat to negotiate a ceasefire, this Phalangist-Palestinian fighting continued from April through August 1975, eventually spreading beyond the Beirut area to other towns where there were both Christian and Palestinian leftist militias present - notably Tripoli in the north and Zahle in the Bekaa valley.

These Phalangist-Palestinian clashes from April through June 1975 are generally regarded as the first of four phases of the war. The second phase began when the Lebanese leftist forces were drawn in against the rightist militias as the fighting spread throughout the country. As Hudson explains:

The second phase extended from June through December. In this period the Palestinian role was relatively reduced while the dispute between the Maronite-rightists and Muslim-leftists took on greater importance. This stage began with President Franjiyyah's abortive attempt to form an all military Cabinet, thus provoking a storm of Muslim and leftist protest, while at the same time Arafat was concluding yet another agreement with Franjiyyah and other Lebanese leaders to try and remove the Palestinians from the fray. 87

After a relative lull in the fighting in July, renewed clashes occurred in several towns including Zghorta (home of Franjiyyeh) and Tripoli in August and September. Under great pressure from both Franjiyyeh and Public Works Minister Chamoun, Lebanese Prime Minister Karami reluctantly ordered Lebanese army units sent to these two towns on September 12 - eliciting strong leftist protest. This brought Christian-rightist/Moslem-leftist fighting again to Beirut, where repeated calls for ceasefires by the Lebanese government, Syria and the PLO were ignored by the militias. In the meantime, leftist units began firing on the predominantly Christian Lebanese army units deployed to Tripoli. On October 24 Lebanese army units were also positioned in Beirut in an attempt to restore order.

Next, two events occurred amidst the daily battles in Beirut which were to have substantial effects on the continuation of the fighting. The first of these occurred in late October when the Beirut fighting escalated over into the international "hotel district", 88 causing the evacuation

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87 Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War", p. 220.
of foreign embassy staffs and businessmen and the closing of many banks and businesses. This caused not only disruption of the economic activities in the country but also led to the dismissal of the Chamber of Deputies and a general breakdown of the government bureaucracy as well. Many well-to-do Lebanese fled the country as the civil war violence spread. The Lebanese Cabinet itself was forced to meet at various locations after even the President's house came under attack. Although the Cabinet agreed to accept a French offer to attempt mediation of the crisis, the Prime Minister still refused to order the army to fully deploy and enforce the now 12th ceasefire which had been declared and gone unheeded.

In a desperate reconciliation attempt, a National Dialogue Committee consisting of the leaders of the various factions met in November, but Maronite leaders Chamoun and Gemayel boycotted the meeting, which quickly deadlocked. In Beirut and other towns, indiscriminate kidnappings and murders by one faction against the other began to occur. To add to the confusion, Israeli jets flew over Beirut in November and on December 2 bombed and straffed a Palestinian camp in the south, killing nearly 100.89

The second escalating event was the arrival of 200 Syrian-Palestinian Saiqa commando troops in Tripoli in January 1976,90 supposedly dispatched by Syria to aid the

89 Ibid, p. 73.
Lebanese army units in maintaining order. The Maronite leaders, however, tended to regard this first overt military move by Syria as an attempt to take advantage of the civil disturbances in order to annex this northern portion of Lebanon.91 Regardless of their original intent, these Saiqa units soon went into action with the Lebanese leftists against the Phalangist militias as the fighting wore on despite the Lebanese army presence. Meanwhile, President Franjiyyeh's son Tony was hastily organizing the Zghorta Liberation Army in nearby Ehden, soon joining the Phalangists in the area fighting.

Fighting intensified in Beirut in December after the "Black Saturday" incident on December 6 in which Phalangist gunmen rounded up and randomly murdered 200 Moslems in retaliation for the murder of 4 Phalangists the previous day.92 Leftist militias answered this atrocity by pressing an attack on the Christian held hotel district of Beirut and succeeded in overrunning the St. Georges Hotel on 7 December and attacking the Phalangist fall back positions of the Holiday Inn. By December 17 the stalemate in the hotel district had caused a lull in the fighting in Beirut, but fighting continued in Zahle and Tripoli, where Lebanese army units and Palestinian militias were now doing battle.

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91. This opinion is expressed in Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976*, p. 118.
Possibilities of a hastily administered political reform program to placate the Moslem leftists arose with the lull in the Beirut fighting, but it was clear that the Christian factions were in no mood for concessions. Unable to make advances in the hotel district, the Phalangists chose instead to lay siege to Palestinian refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut - notably the Tel Zaatar camp. According to Salibi:

Following the bombardment and destruction of the central parts of Beirut, the Kata'ib militia, joined by a whole array of other Maronite militias - the P.N.L. al-Numur (Tigers), the militia of the Maronite League, the armed band called Hurras al-Arz (Cedar Guards), and others - actually proceeded to escalate the fighting on all fronts surrounding Beirut, apparently with the intent of forcing Karami either to yield and bring out the Army, or else to resign.93

The Phalangist attacks on the Palestinian camps, which to the Maronites represented potential enemy enclaves in otherwise Maronite areas, initiated the third phase of the civil war, which went from December 1975 until the intervention of regular Syrian Army units in June 1976. The Phalangist assaults on the Palestinian camps reinstigated widespread fighting throughout Lebanon, as leftist and Palestinian units counterattacked against Christian strongholds. The deployment of Lebanese Air Force units against Palestinian and leftist forces operation south of Beirut, despite the protests of Karami, led to the Prime Minister's threat of resignation on 18 January. Also on this date, Palestinian

Liberation Army units were dispatched to Lebanon from Syria in an attempt to break the siege of the refugee camps. The situation rapidly deteriorating, the Palestinian camps of Karantina and Maslakh were overrun by rightist forces on January 21 while progressive forces on the same day captured the Christian town of Damour in the south.94

During the next few months, the leftist-Palestinian coalition began to gain an upper hand in the fighting against the Maronite militias. Now another event - the defection of the Lebanese Arab Army under Lt. Khatib from the ranks of the Lebanese Army to join the progressives - further endangered the defensive Maronite-rightist posture. As if things were not bad enough for the beleagured Lebanese government, after Christian remnants of the Lebanese Army began deserting to join the militias fighting to defend their home villages (completing the disintegration of the army), General Ahdab, Commander of the Beirut Garrison, on March 11 declared a state of emergency in Lebanon, himself the military governor of the state and called for the resignation of President Franjiyyeh.95 Meanwhile fighting had resumed in Beirut, with the progressives reinforced by Lebanese Arab Army armored units capturing the Holiday Inn headquarters of the Phalangists on March 23.96

96 Ibid, p. 443.
A short truce during the first part of April was partially observed as the opposing forces at this point remained stalemated. Announcements of candidacy by Elias Sarkis and Raymond Edde for the July Presidential election were made, while President Franjiyyeh, despite calls for his resignation, remained determined to serve until the completion of his term in September. The PLO announced a 7 point peace plan in order that peaceful elections might be held. But the rumors of the movement of advanced units of the Syrian Army (3 miles over the Lebanese border) on April 9 led to first demonstrations and protest followed predictably by violence. Heavy fighting continued into May, with the addition of heavy artillery and mortar shelling being traded by the opposing groups in Beirut. Fighting intensified through May after a short lull during Sarkis' election to the presidency on May 8. By now confirmation of the presence of regular Syrian Army units in Lebanon led not only to Lebanese rightist-leftist fighting but also to Syrian backed Saiqa-Iraqi backed Arab Liberation Front Palestinian clashes, as well as those between Saiqa and Fateh units.

The introduction of 5000 Syrian Army troops into Lebanon, with 2000 going to the besieged Christian north and 3000 proceeding along the Damascus highway toward Beirut on 31 May and 1 June, initiated the fourth and final phase of the 1976 civil war. Interestingly enough, the Saiqa units, upon the full scale Syrian intervention, quickly
changed sides and clashed with Lebanese leftist forces on June 6. This same day, the PLO accused the Syrian forces of firing on Palestinian camps east of Beirut. It quickly became clear that the Syrian intervention was designed to break the leftist-Palestinian alliance and come to the aid of the beleagured Christians. In response to international concerns, on June 13 the Syrian Information Minister announced that the rapidly deploying Syrian force would remain in Lebanon until the administration of president-elect Sarkis was installed. 97

A hastily called Arab League Summit came out in support of Syria, and several countries promised to send troops to augment the Arab Deterrent Force (as this legitimization of Syria's intervention was called). Violence in Lebanon continued through July as N.L.P. militias instigated another siege on the Palestinian Tel Zaatar camp and in response Lebanese Arab Army units shelled Christian sections of Junieh and other leftist factions struck at other Christian areas and towns. Christian commanders refused to both allow ADF forces to take up their positions surrounding Tel Zaatar or to let International Red Cross representatives into the camp, as the stalemate continued. The ADF, even with reinforcements of small Libyan, Saudi Arabian and Sudanese units, was unable to separate the fighting factions. An agreement reached between Syria and the PLO on July 22 (The Damascus Agreement) achieved little, since the Christian militias now chose to press an advantage.

On August 12, 1976 the Palestinian camp of Tel Zaatar was overrun by the Christian militias after a renewed assault. The offensive, however, did not end there.

Following the fall of Tal Zataar, Christian and Syrian forces took the offensive in several parts of the country, apparently attempting to drive Palestinian and leftist forces into certain defined areas and to cut their lines of communication and supply. By mid-August some press reports put the total strength of Syrian forces in the country at 20,000 (including the Syrian contingent in the pan-Arab peace keeping force), in addition to which units of the Syrian-sponsored "Vanguards of the Lebanese Army" were deployed in southern Lebanon, particularly around the Moslem town of Nabatiyah.8

After these setbacks it appeared that the Lebanese leftists were ready to reluctantly fall back and regroup - perhaps even stop fighting. The Palestinian units, however, wished to avenge the fall of Tel Zaatar, and fighting continued in the Shuf region east of Beirut until another agreement was reached between the PLO and the Syrians on September 11.

A truce, generally observed throughout the country, was called for the inauguration of President Sarkis on September 23 - which took place, for security reasons, in Syrian controlled territory east of Beirut in the town of Chtaura. In his inauguration speech, Sarkis pleaded for an end to the fighting, promised social and economic reform and to consider restructure of the government, announced plans for the restoration of security, and reassured the Palestinians of a pro-Arab Lebanese stance. Fighting between Syrian, Christian and Palestinian/leftist forces

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unfortunately broke out again on September 28. Faced with the combined Syrian/Christian strength, however, the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists lost ground on all fronts. Finally on October 16, 1976 the Riyadh Agreement, mediated by Saudi Arabia, was reached by Lebanese, Syrian and PLO representatives along with those of Egypt and Kuwait.

The plan signed in Riyadh on October 18 provided inter alia for (i) the creation of a 30,000 man Arab "deterrent" force (as against the existing "security" contingent of 2,500 men) which would be under the control of President Sarkis and would be equipped with heavy weapons and armour, (ii) a definite ceasefire throughout Lebanon starting from October 21, followed by a withdrawal of all Lebanese combatants to the positions they held before April 1975, and (iii) full observance by the PLO of the 1969 Cairo Agreement regulating the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon.99

Although some isolated fighting continued after Riyadh, the Syrian ADF forces moved into many of the disputed areas in the country (including Beirut) and relative calm was restored by late November.

It is estimated that 40-60,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed during these 20 months of civil war with an additional 100,000 wounded.100 Physical destruction and economic upheaval in the country were astronomical as well. Yet, it should be noted that the provisions of the Riyadh Agreement ending the war seemed to deal more than anything else with the Palestinians, with no mention of the issues still dividing the Lebanese Moslems and Christians. Plus

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99 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 28122.
the situation for the new Lebanese government of President Sarkis was such that internal security in the country was in the hands of an outside military force, the ADF, supposedly under his command. These conditions did not particularly please many of the Lebanese factions nor did they appear very stable to one outside observer - Israel. It was obvious Lebanon's crisis, though dormant, was nowhere near resolved.

B. THE 1978 CIVIL WAR

The atmosphere of tension in Lebanon was far from slackened in the aftermath of the 1976 war. In early 1977, sporadic violence still occurred as the Palestinian militias moved to the south and clashed with the Christian forces stationed there, and as Christian militia units in Beirut continued to show defiance of the ADF forces which they now wished to leave the country. Throughout 1977 isolated incidents continued to occur showing that the situation in Lebanon had changed little. On March 16, 1977 Druze leader Kamal Junblatt was assassinated,101 which led to the now all too familiar revenge killings characteristic of Lebanon's social disorder. Fighting in the Shuf region continued though August as Christian and Druze militias clashed in the mountain home area of both the Junblatt and Chamoun families. Even the deployment of Syrian ADF troops into the region could not bring an end to

these battles. This move led instead to further Christian-ADF clashes in Beirut.

In the south fighting intensified between Palestinian forces and Christian militias who wanted the Palestinians (as well as the ADF) out of the country. Israeli units began operating in conjunction with the Christian forces, lending artillery and occasional air support from northern Israel and crossing the border for short hit and run raids. The Palestinians responded by conducting rocket attacks on Israeli border towns, refusing to give up their bases in the south. Throughout November and December these incidents began to increase in both frequency and intensity. On December 22, "Secretary General of the National Liberal Party Dory Shamun demanded 'total withdrawal' of Palestinians from Lebanon as a necessity for reaching 'national reconciliation.'" Only several significant incidents would once again be required to change the sporadic violence into major civil war.

The first of these instigating incidents occurred on March 11, 1978, when 13 Palestinian terrorists crossed over into Israel from Lebanon and hijacked a bus on the road to Tel Aviv. In the ensuing battle with Israeli police, the bus exploded in flames, resulting in the death of all occupants. Members of the Palestinian commando group

Fateh claimed responsibility. Israel's retaliation was swift and considerable. On March 15, a major offensive was mounted by Israeli air, infantry and artillery forces, striking at Palestinian guerrilla camps in southern Lebanon and establishing a 6 mile buffer zone along the Lebanon-Israeli border. Fighting continued for several days as Israeli forces, aided by Christian militias (primarily that of Major Haddad) took control of most of the Lebanese territory south of the Litani River. Approximately 200,000 Lebanese villagers and 65,000 Palestinian refugees were forced to leave the south during the fighting, moving into the already overcrowded slum suburbs of Beirut. As a result of a U.N. Security Council meeting in late March, a U.N. peacekeeping force was created, and units of this force (called the U.N. Interim Forces in Lebanon - UNIFIL) began deploying in the south on March 25. Throughout April and May the situation remained tense, with UNIFIL troops frequently becoming caught in crossfires between Israeli and Palestinian units. On June 13 the last of the Israeli units left Lebanon, and relative peace was restored by UNIFIL.

103According to its original plan, the group was to have captured a Tel Aviv hotel and then bargained its hostages for the release of several Palestinians being held by the Israelis for past terrorist acts. See New York Times, 13 March 1978.


106Ibid.
In their departure, however, the Israelis had left certain strategic enclaves in the hands of Haddad's Christian militias rather than UNIFIL.

On the very same day as the final Israeli withdrawal in the south, the son of former president Franjiyyeh and thirty other supporters were ambushed in their home in Ehden, in the north. Members of Gemayel's Phalangists were implicated in the slayings. Gemayel and Franjiyyeh had been at odds concerning the presence of the Syrian ADF in Lebanon, which Franjiyyeh alone of all the Maronite leaders supported. Syrian President Assad, a friend of Franjiyyeh, sought retribution at the hands of his ADF force. On July 1, 1978, after preliminary incidents of Christian violence in the north, heavy fighting (artillery and rocket exchanges) broke out in Beirut between Syrian ADF and Christian forces, continuing daily for the remainder of the month. In the south, Fateh units battled rejectionist PLF Palestinian forces - Fateh attempting to protect UNIFIL positions from the PLF, while Lebanese Army units were stopped from deploying to the south by the shelling of Christian militia units in early August.

Syrian ADF forces attempted unsuccessfully to pull out of Christian sections of Beirut under a ceasefire in mid-August. Fighting broke out again, however, and continued with increasing intensity throughout September, as Phalangist

107 Arab Report and Record, No. 12, 16-30 June 1978.
and NLP headquarters in turn became the targets of ADF artillery shelling, mortar and rocket fire. By early October major portions of the Christian sector of east Beirut were devastated.

In October, international efforts by the U.S., France and the U.N., calling for a ceasefire amidst continued ADF-Christian exchanges, were finally instigated. The U.S., busy with the Camp David negotiations, promoted initiatives by France which called for a ceasefire followed by a Christian-Moslem Lebanese dialogue and replacement of Syrian ADF troops in Beirut by Lebanese Army units (a plan approved of by President Sarkis). Following these proposals a meeting of Foreign Ministers of those countries which supplied troops or financing for the ADF (Saufi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Sudan) was held in the Lebanese town of Beiteddin on 15 October. As a result of this meeting, an agreement was reached calling for:

1) the reaffirmation of Lebanese unity and independence.
2) collection of all illegally held weapons.
3) full implementation of the Cairo and Riyadh agreements.
4) a timetable for the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army.
5) the achievement of national reconciliation among all Lebanese parties.
6) the establishment of a follow-up committee to oversee the accomplishment of these conditions.\(^\text{108}\)

\(^{108}\) *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, December 28, 1979, p. 30008.
Despite the all encompassing measures called for in the Beiteddin Agreement, the inconclusiveness of the Arab talks was quickly demonstrated by a resurgence of Christian-ADF fighting in November.

Obviously the disarming of the militias was a hopelessly optimistic dream. On November 21 a bus containing ADF troops was the victim of a bomb attack, while the Saudi Ambassador was wounded when caught in a Christian-ADF crossfire while on a helicopter inspection trip. Fighting between ADF and Christian units continued into January 1979 as "the nominal ceasefire between the Christian militias and Syrian troops in Beirut which had been initiated in October 1978 was frequently violated by sniping incidents and occasional outbreaks of fierce fighting, while violence between Moslems and Christians occurred sporadically."

In the aftermath of the Beiteddin Agreement, just as had occurred after the Riyadh Agreement in 1976, none of the real civil war issues had been resolved. And the fighting, although dropping off in intensity in December 1978 and January 1979, still flared up again on occasion. Another 50,000 Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian casualties had been suffered in the 1978 fighting. Still, armed clashes in the authorityless areas of the country might involve Christian versus Palestinian, Christian versus ADF, intra-Palestinian

109 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 30008.
110 Seale, "Lebanon", p. 255.
or intra-Christian fighting. In Beirut, in the north and in the south, the situation in the troubled country remained at best a fragile truce. It would be in the south, however, where the difficulties of the continuing Lebanese crisis would continue to surface.
VI. THE CURRENT IMPASSE

Anyone supposing that, given the right mixture of petrodollars and political acumen, Lebanon could rise like a phoenix from the ashes of the civil war is surely mistaken. So great has been the catastrophe that it has severed all meaningful continuity with the past. Only the problems remain; but magnified many times over.\textsuperscript{111}

After the 1978 war, the Lebanese impasse has come to be more and more centered on the south Lebanon issue. With a precedent now set and any doubts of Israeli security interests there verified by their invasion in March 1978; with the Palestinians determined to maintain their presence there; with the Lebanese army thus far unable to deploy and exert the state's authority there; with the leftists charged with the responsibility of providing the minimal services to the inhabitants there; and with UNIFIL facing the luckless task of attempting to curtail violence there; any change in the situation will obviously depend on the interaction of many actors. And a solution to the impasse will certainly depend upon such change. For Lebanon, faced with the fact that a resolution to the impasse in the south, and thus its future, is dependent upon forces and actors which are beyond its ability to control, the situation is quite disconcerting.

A. THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH

Since the civil war truce resulting from the Beiteddin Agreement of fall 1978, the situation in south Lebanon has unfortunately deteriorated. The task of UNIFIL to keep

\textsuperscript{111}Seale, "Lebanon", p. 251.
antagonistic factions separated while keeping itself from becoming targets remains a difficult one. Also, as a result of Palestinian raids into Israel in response to the signing of the Camp David Accords in December 1978, the Israelis have apparently modified their military policy in southern Lebanon to include more than simply retaliatory but also preemptive strikes against Palestinian positions (plus anything else that happens to get in the way). As reported in Internews:

> Israeli retaliation against Palestinian and Lebanese leftist targets in southern Lebanon has been swift and extensive. The most serious Israeli attack since the treaty was signed was a four-day operation launched April 23. Israeli gunboats, jet bombers and artillery pounded PLO bases, rural villages and shanty towns around the port of Tyre.112

Israel air and artillery strikes against Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon subsequent to this raid have become more frequent and devastating - causing Lebanese civilian as well as Palestinian casualties. Syrian challenges of Israeli air superiority over the south have resulted in 4 Syrian Mig 21s shot down by Israeli F-15s in June 1979 and 5 others in September. Lebanese appeals to the U.N. Security Council have had little effect on the situation. These recent Israeli actions have also displaced yet another wave of refugees from the south toward Beirut's already over crowded suburbs. According to The Middle East:

112"Lebanon: Peace Out of the Question", Internews, May 7, 1979, p. 3.
Nearly 200,000 Lebanese and Palestinians have been forced to leave their homes and property in south Lebanon over the last six months. Many villages have been destroyed and some of the big cities look like ghost towns.113

Most recently, however, in a move obviously dictated by the PLO’s Yasir Arafat, a policy of distinct curtailment of Palestinian commando raids on Israel has been in effect since the fall of 1979 – signalling a new PLO strategy.

The inability of Lebanon to exert its authority and sovereignty over the south can be attributed directly to the ineffectiveness and inferiority of the Lebanese army, still under reconstruction after the 1976 civil war. With respect to the private militias of the Lebanese factions—particularly the Christians—it is inferior both in numbers and armament. In its initial attempt to deploy to the south in June 1978, the army "was stymied in the village of Kawkaba by the Israeli-sponsored Christian militias and rebel military units of the south, through which territory it was supposed to cross."114 Lebanon is still trying to build up this force (maintaining a sectarian balance), but it is as yet far short of its desired level of 30-35,000.

According to The Arab World Weekly:

The Lebanese Army is now 17,000-strong, according to military sources who said that, however, only 10,000 of these were actually sent on security missions, such

113."SOS from South Lebanon", The Middle East, August 1979, p. 53.
as deploying in Ain Remmaneh or in the south. These 10,000 are indoctrinated troops, belonging to "balanced" units and barracks.115

The revitalized Lebanese Army is also not as well equipped as some of the private militias and the Palestinians, since much of the heavier army weapons - artillery and mortars - fell into the hands of these militias after the army's split in 1976 and have not yet been replaced. The U.S. and France have agreed to reequip the new Lebanese Army, but it is clear that as long as the private militias outnumber the revitalized Lebanese Army and show no inclination of either disarming or falling in line with governmental desires, Lebanon's problems will persist. This is also a major factor in Syria's continued ADF presence, as Yorke explains:

Unless the embryonic Lebanese Army is reorganized, the government could not enforce disarmament, and Syria would not countenance disarming her PLO allies with the accompanying risk of political repercussions in Damascus. Syria also knows that this would increase pressure to allow the PLO an alternate military sanctuary in Syria.116

Lebanese desires, backed up by recent U.N. resolutions, are for a combined Lebanese Army and UNIFIL deployment to the south. General Erskine (UNIFIL Commander), however, though not opposed to this expanded role of his small 6,500 man force, has placed several preconditions on such a move. Along with the control of the port of Tyre and


the bridge across the Litani River on the Beirut-Tyre road, "the toughest condition General Erskine laid down is that UNIFIL could not move if there were still groups of armed elements not only in Tyre but in Rashidiyyeh, Bourjal-Shamali and other (Palestinian camps)." Although in recent agreements with Yasir Arafat, Lebanese President Sarkis has received assurances of a stop to PLO activities against Israel, it is unlikely that the Palestinians are willing to give up their armed presence. Also, some of the more troublesome Palestinian groups, the PFLP for one, do not recognize PLO leadership and direction. It is difficult to predict how Major Haddad's forces would react to such a joint U.N.-Lebanese move into their enclave as well.

Most recently, in February 1980, the situation in the south again has erupted into violence. In response to a sudden Syrian announcement of a withdrawal of the ADF from Beirut, fighting broke out in the south between Christian militias and Palestinian commando units. This was followed immediately by a statement made by Israeli Prime Minister Begin reconfirming Israeli support for the Christian Lebanese. Although the Syrian move was subsequently clarified as only a redistribution of forces for training and security purposes, this example points out the continued volatile nature of the Lebanese situation. Regardless of the reason for this renewed fighting

117 "SOS From South Lebanon", p. 56.
in the south, it could very well have detrimental effects on the concurrent Palestinian autonomy talks being negotiated in conjunction with the Camp David Agreement and also on the current PLO political initiatives. Although there are also reports that Lebanese Army units (integrated with UNIFIL units) are moving into the south, their ability to prevent these Christian-Palestinian clashes seems evident. Further reports of transfers of tanks by the Soviets to the Palestinians in the south are also foreboding - indicating that the current clashes could escalate with little provocation.

B. INTER-ARAB INITIATIVES

Realizing the difficulty and the deteriorating trend of the situation in Lebanon, President Sarkis made a dramatic and desperate move in October 1979, calling for a special Arab League summit to deal specifically with the southern Lebanon stalemate, and threatening to cast his lot with Egypt, Israel and the U.S. by joining the Camp David peace initiatives if refused. The subsequently called Arab League meeting, scheduled for November 1979, would include presentation of the Palestinian and Lebanese positions along with proposals drafted by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for a solution to the south Lebanon-Palestinian problem. Thus Sarkis had thrust the Lebanon and Palestinian issues to the forefront of Middle East regional affairs and spurred the reluctant Arab countries to action on this issue by raising the spectre of a revitalized and expanded Camp David peace settlement.
With a solution to the Palestinian problem generally regarded as a prerequisite to meaningful progress on the greater Lebanese crisis, the south Lebanon situation would seem now to take precedence over the still unresolved civil war issues and internal Lebanese disputes. With the inability of the Lebanese government to influence the external actors involved in the south, it is understandable why Lebanon has attempted with some degree of urgency to bring these matters into the international forefront. Lebanon rightly foresees its very existence as an independent state in jeopardy with little control over the situation. It is clear the Lebanese leaders would prefer to see an inter-Arab solution to its plight come about, but failing this it hopes to appeal to the U.S. by its willingness to join the Camp David Accords. As explained in The Arab World Weekly:

The Lebanese position has been made clear more than once and is based on the fact that Lebanon cannot go on bearing the entire burden of the Arab-Israeli confrontation alone. It has called on the Arabs to arrive at a joint decision either to go to war and defend the South, or help stop the attacks on the South by other means - mainly by pressuring the Palestinians to stop their operations from the South and to withdraw from that region. . . . In other terms, as some observers put it, Lebanon is placing the Arabs in front of a choice: either they will take a joint decision on what to do in the South, or Lebanon - forced to choose between two evils - may decide to yield to the pressures exerted by Israel and the U.S. and agree to join the peace negotiations on the basis of the Camp David framework agreements. 119

119 "South Lebanon", The Arab World Weekly, September 1, 1979, p. 18.
At the same time, the inability of the Lebanese Army to deploy and exert the nation's authority in the country makes Lebanon further dependent on the Syrian ADF and more importantly in the south on the UNIFIL forces to preserve its sovereignty.

For Lebanon, the presence of UNIFIL in the south is indispensable, for it is the only element which "guarantees" that south Lebanon is still Lebanese and the forces' departure would lead to the dismantling of the south and perhaps of Lebanon as a whole. For this reason, officials have intensified efforts aiming at ensuring that the international forces will not withdraw despite their discouragement with the situation they are in.

Lebanon's position, then, is tenable only with the continued grace of outside forces - a most disconcerting feeling.

President Sarkis and the Lebanese leaders had placed great hopes on the results of the Arab League Summit to deal with the southern Lebanon problem. In a previous Foreign Ministers meeting held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia preliminary to the actual summit in Tunis, Tunisia, two peace plans were revealed for debate at the summit.

The Saudi plan contained four basic provisions. These included:
1) A trilateral truce among the PLO, Israel and the Lebanese state.
2) Israel would stop backing Major Haddad's renegade Lebanese army faction in the south and stop shelling Palestinian positions there.

3) PLO would freeze guerrilla operations against Israel and end their armed presence outside their camps.
4) The Lebanese Army and UNIFIL would take control of the south.

These provisions were intended to bring about the following:
B) PLO recognition of Resolution 242 and therefore Israel's right to exist.
C) A dialogue between the U.S. and the PLO.
D) Formation of a Palestinian government in exile.
E) A link between this Palestinian government and Jordan.
F) Finally, peace negotiations with Israel.\(^\text{121}\)

Interestingly enough, this Saudi plan mentioned Jordan, which has a fairly large Palestinian population and still considers the West Bank as its occupied territory, but not Syria. Also, no real commitment is made to Lebanon other than to allow it, in conjunction with UNIFIL, to move its forces into the south. The major impetus in the plan seems to deal with the Palestinians. This emphasis may be at the expense of Lebanese and Syrian interests.

The U.S. proposed plan, revealed to President Sarkis by U.S. Ambassador Dean and to Lebanese Foreign Minister Boutros by Secretary of State Vance, differed slightly in its emphasis, though not remarkably in its provisions,

from the Saudi plan. Its basic provisions call for:
1) Palestinian withdrawal to north of the Litani River and a freeze in their guerrilla operations against Israel.
2) Israel would stop backing Major Haddad's forces in the south.
3) The Lebanese Army with UNIFIL would extend its authority into the south.

These provisions were intended to bring about the following:
A) Jordan would join the Camp David peace initiatives. It is felt by the U.S. that Jordanian–Palestinian relations would have to follow rather than precede this move.
B) A Revision of U.N. Resolution 242 to recognize Palestinian rights.
C) PLO recognition of Resolution 242 and a PLO-U.S. dialogue.
D) A national accord among the Lebanese parties and a gradual withdrawal of the Syrian ADF from Lebanon.\footnote{The Arab Press Service Recorder, p. 10.}

Although its provisions were not as extensive, it can be seen that the expected outcome of the U.S. plan expressed more all-encompassing goals than did the Saudi plan. This may be the case due to the tendency of the U.S. to seek complete and long-term solutions to international problems within narrow time frames. Or it might simply indirectly reflect a proposed solution to the problem more in consonance with U.S. interests. It has always been somewhat uncertain whether Arab interests in Lebanon (other than Syrian) are concerned
with helping the Lebanese state solve its internal conflicts or simply with defusing the potentially dangerous situation in the south. The U.S. could be accused of this self-interest as well. The provisions of both the U.S. and Saudi plans, however, did delineate important initial steps in solving the problem in the south. Carrying them out is obviously another matter.

The results of the Arab League Summit on November 20-22, 1979 were both disappointing and ominous for Lebanon. Although the south Lebanon issue was discussed (along with combined Arab League policy with regard to Egypt and Iran) and a general statement in support of Lebanese sovereignty was issued, the general attitude of the league with respect to the Lebanese crisis can be summed up in the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister's statement, "There is nothing we can do. We have done what we can, and it is now up to the Lebanese themselves to get together and solve their problem."¹²³ Not only was this a blow to the Lebanese hopes but to the Palestinians as well. This has led to the formation of a new "strategic alliance" between Syrian and the Palestinians, who seem to be the only League members with recognizable and mutual interests in the Lebanese impasse. As for the Lebanese leaders' hopes for the summit:

The lesson which Lebanon may have learned as a result of the Tunis conference is that the search for a

¹²³"Arabs Bring Own Problems to Tunis", The Middle East, December 1979, p. 10.
settlement of its problem in the south through Arab channels is hopeless. The question is whether the Lebanese leadership will now seek help from outside the Arab framework.124

With the Arab League's desertion of the Lebanese cause, it is clear that the opportunity for a U.S. initiative in this area has now presented itself.

C. U.S. INITIATIVES AND INTERESTS

Ideally, as a first step, the U.S. would like to get all parties involved - including Lebanese officials, the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Syrians and representatives of the Lebanese Christian and Moslem groups - to hold talks mediated by the U.S. to attempt to resolve the problem. Obviously any U.S. mediator would be taking his life in his hands by sitting all these antagonists together in one room; therefore, according to the U.S. plan, "two separate conferences would be held in which the parties directly involved would negotiate through U.N. intermediaries."125

Although the Arabs would tend to see this U.S. initiative as simply a means of getting the Palestinians and Syria into the Middle East peace plan, it seems that even the Palestinians (PLO) are now counting on the U.S. to help their cause. As The Middle East explains:

The PLO has clearly accepted the argument, long put forward by Palestinian-Americans, that the key to the

124 "Arabs Bring Own Problems to Tunis", p. 11.
125 Ibid, p. 12.
solution of the Middle East problem lies in Washington. Equally clearly, it sees Europe as the quickest route to the White House. 126

This explains PLO leader Arafat's recent visits with various European leaders. The only remaining issue is what the U.S. has at stake in providing the impetus behind initiatives to settlement of the south Lebanon problem.

The main difficulty in the U.S. attempts to mediate the problem stems from the basic incompatibility between the Arab and Israeli formulas for the establishment of a lasting Middle East peace. Also complicating the situation are the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel and its at best pseudo-recognition of the PLO as the legal Palestinian representative body - which bring into question its credibility as an impartial mediator. However, in his State of the Union Address in January 1980, President Carter not only reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel but also mentioned the granting of Palestinian self-determination. Many feel this speech signalled a shift in U.S. policy toward the Palestinians.

Israel's true desire for peace in the area is itself open to question, considering its continued military policy in south Lebanon. Acceptance of the Camp David Accords, however, is a good indication of the Israeli-U.S. peace strategy - which basically calls for separate peace agreements (following the lead of Egypt) to be signed by

126 "Palestine State No Longer a Pipe Dream", The Middle East, December 1979, p. 12.
Israel with her other bordering Arab states (Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), thus finally legitimizing Israel's existence as a Middle Eastern nation. Yet it is apparent that such a peace process can never be fulfilled while the Palestinians (which Israel is trying to ignore) are left out of the formula. This is where south Lebanon, often referred to as Palestinian "Fatehland" comes into the picture. As Whittingham explains:

Thus on the Lebanese-Israeli border, both Palestinians and Lebanese, working separately but in close coordination, maintain a constant defense line. The region is not yet the depopulated zone dreamed of by the Israelis; many villagers have refused to leave their homes, only too conscious of the fact that just a few miles farther south people who have left in 1948 have never been able to return.\textsuperscript{127}

With Israeli eyes supposedly on the Litani River water, the southern Lebanese villagers and the Palestinians there feel that south Lebanon could become the next prize of Israeli expansionism - similar to the Golan Heights. Whether this Israeli plan is in fact true or not, it appears Israel would prefer the area be depopulated (at least vacated by the Palestinians) or controlled by Haddad's forces. As Whittingham states:

If the Israelis succeed in depopulating the area south of the Litani River, they then can claim the existence of a no-mans land - a convenient buffer zone of the kind they have south in the Golan Heights and Sinai. Such a buffer zone in Lebanon is particularly significant since much of Israel's industrial plant is situated

in the north around Haifa, and is vulnerable to attack from Lebanon in case of war. Speculation as to the aims of Israeli strategy in south Lebanon is supported by what Israeli forces have actually done on the ground.128

The only possible way the Palestinians would be willing to give up this remaining bastion of its armed presence, on the other hand, would be the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza (an idea which is beginning to receive more international acceptance and approval). This brings up the main obstacle to the Israeli-U.S. separate peace plan initiated by the Camp David Accords.

It is the refusal of Israel to realistically negotiate on the West Bank issue or to recognize the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinian people which the Palestinians feel necessitates their position in south Lebanon. Yet their situation in Lebanon has not only decreased their ability to pose a military threat to Israel, but also has threatened the establishment of their political base. As Abraham points out:

The real threat confronting the Palestinian resistance in the stalemated civil war in Lebanon stems most importantly from the political isolation it would face were a negotiated settlement between the remaining confrontation states and Israel concluded to their exclusion. Political abandonment would necessarily mean tightening the military noose in Lebanon.129

128 Whittingham, South Lebanon - Prelude to Occupation", p. 10.

Sooner or later, the U.S.-Israeli position must come to realize that the Palestinians, represented by the PLO, must have a place in any future negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this regard, the recent curtailment of commando activity by the PLO should be considered as a signal not to be overlooked by the U.S. in their peace efforts. For as Abraham further states:

Rather than facilitate the PLO's moderation, the Camp David Accords have confronted the PLO with a new set of challenges. Today the PLO stands at the crossroads between continuing its moderation or developing an alternate strategy.\textsuperscript{130}

With the strong "rejectionist wing of the PLO still calling for no recognition or coexistence with Israel and continuing to support armed struggle, the south Lebanon situation remains inextricably linked to the Middle East peace and Palestinian issues. The fact that these problems are now beginning to be recognized by the U.S. in its position as peace mediator is best expressed in U.N. Ambassador Donald McHenry's recent statement:

We are faced now with certain hard realities - whether we like it or not. The first of these is that there cannot be a just and durable solution of the Middle East conflict without the active participation of the Palestinians. The second hard reality is that so far no prominent Palestinian has indicated readiness to participate in the negotiations in view of the position adopted by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Baghdad Summits. The greatest difficulty now facing U.S. peace efforts is convincing both Israel and the PLO that negotiations and recognition are in their mutual best interest as well as the overall interest of Middle East peace.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{130} Abraham, "The PLO at the Crossroads", p. 5.

\textsuperscript{131} Donald F. McHenry, "Israelis and Palestinians", \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, December 1979, p. 51.
The Arab formula for peace in the area (supported as well by the Soviets) is to reconvene the Geneva Conference to affect an overall peace settlement within the context of a revised Resolution 242 to include the Palestinian right to self determination. As shown by the Baghdad Summit and subsequent resolutions, the Arab nations oppose the separate peace agreement formula accepted by Egypt. They instead feel that a comprehensive peace plan would be to their advantage for reasons of Arab unity. As McHenry explains:

The basic Arab argument against the Camp David agreements is that Israel's purpose is not attainment of a comprehensive peace but the destruction of Arab unity. The Arabs see Egypt as having been pulled out of a united Arab strategy, of having entered into a "separate deal."132

It is recognized by the Arabs that, at least in military terms, only a united Arab stand can hope to stand up to Israeli strength. And in this respect, Egypt's defection from the united Arab ranks is viewed with great concern.

U.S. lack of support for a comprehensive Geneva type peace settlement plan stems not only from its commitment to the Camp David plan but also from its continued commitment to Israeli security. The U.S. cannot effectively countermand Israeli objections to such a plan without abandoning (or being accused by Israel of abandoning) this commitment. As for Israel's view of the Arab plan, according to McHenry:

Many Israelis fear that Arab strategy envisages the present phase as a way-station to absorbing Israel into the dream of a "secular-democratic" Palestine. There is also profound concern that the contiguity of the West Bank and Gaza to the population centers of Israel creates unique problems for Israel's security. The basic anxiety is that the Arab nations will only pretend to accept Israel's existence and sovereignty. 133

It is obvious that U.S. attempts to reconcile these opposing viewpoints held by the Israelis and the Palestinians (with their Arab supporters) presents no easy tasks. With U.S. interests in the Middle East region now focused on the Persian Gulf area in general and Iran and Afghanistan in particular, it appears that southern Lebanon and the Palestinians have been given a rather low priority in U.S. regional diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately for Lebanon, this lack of international concern with its plight has been one of its more recurring and discouraging problems. So, while an end to the southern Lebanon problem awaits disposition of the Palestinian issue, Lebanon remains a state in internal turmoil and potential crisis.

C. THE CRISIS OF CONFESSIONALISM

Once the south Lebanon situation, with its international complications, is set aside, a critical question for Lebanon remains whether or not a reconciliation or solution to the differences among all the internal factions in the country can ever be brought about. Even if the Palestinian commando presence and the Syrian ADF were to be withdrawn from Lebanon,

133 McHenry, "Israelis and Palestinians", p. 52.
different opinions on the future of the state structure would most likely become more prominent rather than diminish. Renewed violence would almost surely follow. Upon reviewing all the factors involved, it may be safely stated that these differences are in essence political, cultural and economic in character rather than ideological or religious. This situation remains the heart of Lebanon's crisis, and it is a problem yet to be addressed in the present atmosphere of instability and chaos in the country.

In political terms, the most striking aspect of the Lebanese problem is a lack of legitimacy of the existing government. It is generally accepted that the confessional formula of the government which assures Maronite ascendancy has become anachronistic and that a new political formula is necessary. However, as the strong Maronite families (Chamoun, Gemayel, Franjiyyeh) continue to struggle for power in the lack of law and order atmosphere in the country while the leftist coalition continues to challenge the continuance of Maronite ascendancy, the hopes for peaceful political reforms remains dim. As an initial step, then, a restoration of law and order in the country must precede any initial steps toward national reconciliation. This is where the revitalized army must play its part, as Salem notes:

The army is the key to new Lebanon. If this institution can be built along national trans-confessional lines, then, one might hypothesize, other state institutions could also be rebuilt.134

The initial moves of the deployment of the Lebanese Army into the south must be viewed as an encouraging sign. Yet, the army is still structured with a predominance of Christians (Maronites) in the officer corp and a predominance of Moslems in the enlisted ranks, and this could easily limit its effectiveness in dealing with further sectarian strife in the country. The army is also not prepared (nor is Syria particularly anxious for it) to replace the ADF in the areas of the country other than the south as a security force.

The political options for Lebanon are essentially fourfold. The most likely option, at least for the immediate future, is the continuation of the present political impasse. The inherent instability and potential for violence would seem to make this option unviable in the long-term, yet the lack of political consensus as to the direction in which the country should proceed tends to perpetuate the problem. Interference of the outside actors has done its part in this perpetuation as well. The dangerous aspect of this option is that the longer this political ineffectiveness and instability last, the more the future viability and integrity of the Lebanese state is threatened. The power and intransigence of the major factions in the country, with their militias, is the greatest stumbling block here. As Koury explains:

Moreover, as long as either side believes it can win it is unlikely to seek a political solution. Only military stalemate seems likely to open the way toward
a political resolution. In general, military stalemate either could come from the exhaustion of both sides or could be imposed from outside. In either case political negotiation would begin when the stalemate had come about. 135

The second option for Lebanon is partition into Christian, Moslem and possibly even Palestinian ministates. In some respects, with the lack of centralized governmental authority, the situation in the country could be considered as somewhat of a de facto partition - although no formal lines have been drawn. The Lebanese Christian elements are said to favor this solution over one which would limit their ascendancy in power in a revised Lebanese political formula. The Moslem leftist element, however, is opposed to the sanctioning of what would no doubt become an Israeli backed Christian ministate. The Syrians, their political stake in Lebanon illustrated by the ADF presence, are opposed to partition as well. One of the reasons given for their intervention in the Lebanese civil war in 1976 was to prevent such an eventuality. For the Syrians, an Israeli backed Christian ministate in Lebanon would only provide further territory for Israeli aggression against Syria - creating a second Golan Heights front. Koury provides the best explanation for the futility of the partition option as he states: "Partition would eliminate tension in Lebanon by eliminating Lebanon, but it would not eliminate tension in the area." 136 With the current Maronite attitude that they

135 Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System, p. 62
would rather sacrifice the integrity of Lebanon than give up their militias in the current situation, however, the threat of partition remains a somewhat real one.

The two remaining options for Lebanon are basically political compromise solutions - secularization of the state or the establishment of a federation of confessional states within the country. The first of these proposed solutions is the program of the Lebanese National Movement while the other is offered by political scientists studying the Lebanon problem. Both these programs would require some outside impetus to institute and would further require some degree of reconciliation among the various factions in the country. Thus, they would necessitate an ease in sectarian tensions and acceptance of an outside body or agency to mediate the agreement on an accepted political compromise solution. The secularization option, of course, would be designed to equalize Christian and Moslem political power and representation in Lebanon, although ideally it is designed to eliminate religious bases of government structure. The federation formula, on the other hand, would leave sectarian divisions intact on a regional level while forming an equally represented federal governing body. This solution represents perhaps the only compromise which would be acceptable to the Christian community. As Koury states; "Some rightists assert that Lebanon's future lies in a loose federation - that is, partition first and the loose federation to hold the two communal parts together afterwards." 137

If partition were to be a precursor to the establishment of a federation, however, the possibility of this option being instituted is rather slim—since many feel that partition (which could never be ethnographically equally instituted without forced migrations) would only lead to continuation of Lebanon's sectarian strife on several smaller scales. A political solution to the Lebanon crisis, therefore, is a complex and ambitious endeavor and, in addition, is nowhere in sight.

The cultural basis of division in the country stems from the legacy of French colonialism in Lebanon, which has produced a Western cultural bias among the Christian community. This community finds it difficult to accept the basic Arab character of Lebanon represented by its Moslem population segment and its historical and geographic background. These cultural differences have been perpetuated by the determination of the Maronite Christian community to maintain its separate and distinct identity. This attitude has been institutionalized by inequities in social and educational programs as well as in other areas of the services sector. The educational sector, however, is where these differences are both most apparent and tend to most visibly perpetuate the sectarian differences. As Salem points out:

The national educational system, at the elementary and secondary levels, ideologically weak and uncertain, did not build citizens, and the private educational system, which accommodated more than half of the Lebanese preuniversity system, was confessional through
and through. The Sunni school system prepared a citizen different from the one prepared by the Maronite school system.\textsuperscript{138}

With some of Lebanon's future citizens being taught a French Western cultural identification while others are taught an Arab cultural identification, and while these differences are sporadically heightened by sectarian violence, the prospects for reconciliation or mutual cultural understanding or assimilation are far from promising.

Economic differences in the country comprise perhaps the most hidden yet significant of the factors dividing the two major communities in Lebanon. There is a substantial and growing gap between the rich and poor segments of the population, which generally correlates to the two major sectarian divisions as well. With the approximately 400,000 Palestinians joined by at least that number of Lebanese refugees displaced by the civil war fighting crowded into the slum suburbs around Beirut, there is little doubt which of the communities represents the poor and dispossessed. The fact that these slum quarters are located on the outskirts of the more affluent Christian quarter of Beirut only adds to the feelings of relative deprivation common among the Sunni Palestinians and Shia Lebanese peasants.

Additionally, a majority of the rural Lebanese small farmers are Moslem. This portion of the agricultural sector

\textsuperscript{138}\textsuperscript{138} Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in a Turbulent Land", p. 449.
is a low priority in government economic planning and development policy, causing further discontent. These farmers represent a substantial portion of the mostly Moslem agricultural segment of the population, as Nasr explains:

Seventy-six percent of the persons working the land had landholdings of less than three hectares and 50 percent had less than one hectare. Fifty-seven percent of the active agricultural population were "independent" or "family help."139

With many of these small farms operating adjacent to Christian-owned capital-intensive large agribusiness enterprises, the problems of perceived inequities is only exacerbated. Unfortunately, the capitalist growth and relative prosperity of Lebanon has also given rise to these socioeconomic inequities which tend to magnify sectarian differences. These poor and dispossessed, whether rural or urban, who see little prospect of improvement of their economic plight are naturally ripe for recruitment into the leftist militias.

Finally, the continued civil war atmosphere in Lebanon has discouraged government initiatives toward the rebuilding of portions of the infrastructure and public and private structures and property which were damaged or destroyed by the fighting. Although some international relief and Arab League reconstruction aid funds have been provided,

the government was initially reluctant to begin this effort while the political fate of the country remains uncertain. More recently, however:

The authorities have discarded their earlier belief that a political solution must take precedence: there is a real fear that, unless reconstruction begins immediately the country may never recover its economic strength.139

Accordingly, a major portion of the $3 billion Lebanese reconstruction program has been dedicated to the large segment of the population in need of humanitarian aid— with unemployment relief and low cost housing the biggest priorities. With capital continuing to flow out of the country due to the uncertain political situation and continued Maronite legislative control, such as it is, the question of whether these well intended plans will come to fruition remains to be seen. And with a continued threat of civil war or intra-community violence in Lebanon the hard reality, it is not likely that the Lebanese government will be able to solicit the aid to finance one half of its $3 billion reconstruction plan. In the interim, a large portion of the potentially productive work force of the country continues to be tied up with the militias of the various factions. At the same time, it is felt that a majority of the international banks which closed Beirut branches since 1976 will choose not to return, representing

139 Johnny Rizq, "Reconstruction to go Ahead, If Arab Aid Promises are Fulfilled", Middle East Economic Digest, January 26, 1979, p. 3.
further lost capital in the Lebanese economy. In the end, only political stability and an end to civil war violence in Lebanon can bring a normalization of the economy of the country - along with its reconstruction.
VII. CONCLUSION - THE LINKAGES

It has been established at this point that a solution to the Palestinian problem must be a prerequisite to a solution to the Lebanese crisis. At the same time, it is becoming more and more apparent that a solution to the Palestinian problem must precede the negotiation of a lasting and meaningful Middle East peace. By association, then, this interrelationship can be correlated to reveal a unique linkage between the Lebanese crisis and the prospects for a workable Middle East peace formula — whether attained as a result of the Camp David peace process or otherwise. For it appears that a resolution of the south Lebanon issue will depend on the end of the armed Palestinian presence there, and this armed presence presents a stumbling block in the Middle East peace process as well. However, the willingness of the Palestinians to abandon their armed struggle against Israel is dependent in turn upon a political solution to the Palestinian desire for self determination and a state of its own. Finally, the prospects for a reconciliation of the internal factions in Lebanon and a political solution to the basic civil war issues cannot reasonably be attempted while the south Lebanon and Palestinian problems remain unresolved. These linkage factors are at the heart of the issues on which the future and fate of Lebanon hinges. And yet, many of them are beyond the control of the Lebanese authority and are proving to be extremely difficult if not impossible international problems as well.
With all this political upheaval and sporadic violence, however, life in Lebanon goes on. It could even be said that the country has displayed a remarkable resiliency and will to survive to date. Several continuing trends are visible which are far from encouraging though. Educated and well-to-do citizens continue to emigrate from Lebanon while life continues to be harsh and offer little hope for the growing refugee community surrounding Beirut. The fact that the government is unable to provide basic services to these people not only heightens the legitimacy crisis in the country but also provides opportunities for leftist recruitment and radicalization of this growing population segment. For the slum-dweller, the perceived unresponsiveness of the Lebanese government to his needs plus the relative deprivation he also perceives compared to his Maronite fellow citizen, superimposed over the conflict societies of Lebanon's ethnic and cultural groups, presents a problem which would be difficult for any government to deal with. Until strong government authority, through the army and with the support of the now strong family groups, can be restored, a recurring pattern of violence can unfortunately be forecast for Lebanon for the foreseeable future. And with this recurring violence comes the associated threat of further interference of the external actors with a stake in Lebanon's future. The threat, ultimately, is to Lebanon's continued existence.

To the extent that the continued military clashes in south Lebanon may be considered as a manifestation of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Palestinians acting as the Arab surrogate, there is little hope that a peace settlement can be reached in the region which neglects this disputed area. This would necessitate some sort of U.S. involvement in this area as part of the continuation of the Camp David peace initiatives once a Palestinian-U.S. dialogue is formally established. It can be foreseen that both Lebanese and Palestinian diplomatic initiatives will now proceed in this direction. U.S. preoccupation with the Iranian crisis and the Soviet Afghanistan invasion, however, has at the same time shifted the focus of U.S. regional interests toward the Persian Gulf region. Most importantly, Israeli intransigence, its current policy toward south Lebanon, and its refusal to discuss the Palestinian issue in a realistic manner are perhaps the greatest stumbling blocks in bringing about a solution to the problems in the south. Although the longer the impasse continues the more difficult it becomes to attain a negotiated compromise solution, the prospects at this point are quite disheartening.

In the end, if the continued viability of the state of Lebanon remains in the hands of outside forces - the Syrian ADF and UNIFIL - and linked to the strategic considerations of Syria and its moderate Arab backers, there is little hope that it can remain viable in its present territorial and political entity. There must be a new and continued resolve among all the major factional groups in the country to assure the state's continued sovereignty.
Realistically, this must involve some sort of accommodation between the Christian and Moslem segments of the population and a new set of rules for the continued Palestinian presence in the country. Ultimately, it must involve some modification of the political formula in Lebanon in order to re-establish popular support for the government, which is necessary in order for it to exert its authority sufficiently to protect all its citizens and provide a credible deterrence to external security threats. If this process cannot begin until the private militias have exhausted their military strength in another round of civil war, which with increased weapons sophistication could be more devastating and lethal than its predecessors, it might be too late for Lebanon. It could find itself either divided and annexed by Israel and Syria or worse yet the battle-ground for another Arab-Israeli war. For although certain factors determining Lebanon's future remain beyond its control, the main factor which can assure its continued existence - national reconciliation - can only be accomplished by the Lebanese themselves.
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