Quotation for publication, whether governmental or private, from the contents of this document may not be made without the prior consent of the author. The Soviet and Chinese perception of South and Southeast Asia will be examined mainly from the sources I could tap from the unpublished minutes of discussions between the Russian and Chinese leaders and the Pakistani leaders and I shall also use data and information as I could gather from extensive research and interviews and as well as from my own participation in Pakistan's dialogues with the Soviet and the Chinese leaders and their ambassadors in Pakistan. I have continued my contact with the top Pakistani officials and I have also met His Excellency Mr. Han Hsu, Deputy Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington for about six times during the last few months.

The paper will examine the Soviet new moves in South and Southeast Asia such as "Brezhnev Asian Collective Security System", the Soviet continued pressured on Pakistan by exploiting fully her internal troubles in the "wild west" of "new" Pakistan -- northwest frontier province and Baluchistan, the new Indo-Soviet collaboration following the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and the War on Bangladesh in the same year. Similar analysis of the Chinese policy and roles after her emergence in world affairs from the upheaval caused by they cultural revolution needs to be examined.

The growing Sino-Soviet rift has great impact on the Russian and Chinese policies and roles in South and Southeast Asia; in fact, the rift has great significance and implications in influencing the policies of the two communist countries in these areas. Their attitude to the existing governments in South and Southeast Asia have been considerably affected by
their competition in winning the friendship of the so-called bourgeois regimes in South and Southeast Asia.

These regimes were denounced, until recently, as "stooges" of "American imperialism." Without "abandoning" their "ultimate goal" of the people's revolutionary success, both China and the Soviet Union are now engaged in shaking hands and welcoming the leaders of the countries whom they use to describe as "agents" of the U.S. "imperialism" in Asia till the middle 1960's.

Before I discuss these latest moves and developments in Soviet and Chinese policies, I shall begin the discussion by a brief account of the Soviet and Chinese perception of South and Southeast Asia; their "denunciation" of the U.S. "imperialism" in these areas in the 1960's when Pakistan began to have serious political dialogues with Moscow and Peking. Pakistan, right or wrongly, felt being "let down" by its principal ally, the U.S.A. When the American government began to give arms to India after the Sino-India War of 1962. The Soviet Union has shown great skill in exploiting regional tensions to further its own global policy. So when Pakistan was frustrated and angry with Washington, the Kremlin leaders began a policy of blandishment towards Pakistan. A series of political dialogues began between Moscow and Pakistan. An analysis of these dialogues culminating in the Pakistani president visit to Moscow in April 1965, gives an "inside" account of the Soviet policy in South and Southeast Asia and her global competition with the United States at that time.

Similarly, China, acting on the ancient myth "enemy's enemy is friend" offered olive branch to Pakistan after her war with India in 1962 and China
was afraid of a collusion between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to work against China. The Chinese–Pakistan dialogues in 1962-69 will provide the Chinese perception of South and Southeast Asia as well as her attitudes to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

After careful reading of these papers, the following trends in the Soviet and Chinese policies in the mid-1960's could be discerned.

The Soviet Union and the South and Southeast Asia

In South Asia, the Indo-Soviet relationship which began in the mid-1950's further strengthened by the Soviet attitude during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the subsequent flow of the Russian arms to India which both India and China claimed were directed against the latter — though Pakistan continued to point out the fact that the bulk of the Indian army was still concentrated on her borders. The Sino-Soviet rift widened as a result of the Soviet friendly attitude towards India during and after the 1962 war. The Chinese were bitter towards the Russians for their support to "reactionary India" as against a fellow communist country (China).

In a November 9, 1963 report to his government, the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow quoted "some reliable diplomatic sources" confirming that the Soviet government was "worried over the prompt and generous military aid given by the Western powers, particularly the United States, to India" and fears were expressed in the Kremlin that it might affect India's foreign policy." The Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow, in his reports in 1963-64, also referred to "changed attitudes" of the Soviet Union to Pakistan. The
Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan began to tell the Pakistan president, Ayub, and Foreign Minister, Bhutto that the U.S. "friendship" to an Asian country like Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines (the three Asian members of SEATO) were of no "stable value" to Washington. The United States would "drop" on these "Asian allies" as and when their global policies suited them just as "they let you (Pakistan) down." The Soviet technique of exploiting the sense of frustration in Pakistan over the U.S. policy to give arms to India was something worth noting. Whenever any country of the "Third World" has any regional problem or national worries, the Soviet Union would try to put the blame on the U.S. "imperialism", recently also "the Chinese expansion," and would pose to be the "friend" of the "agrieved party." Though the Russians gave massive military aid to India during this period (1963-69), yet they tried to depict the United States as "responsible" for "tensions" in the Indian subcontinent.

The Soviet technique seemed to be successful for a period. The Pakistani policy-makers were "influenced" by the Soviet "reasonable" attitude: They were giving military aid to India because India was "the Soviet's friend" while the United States let down her "most allied ally in Asia" (Pakistan). "We support our friends, even when they are wrong; your friends let you down, even when you are right" -- this was the main theme of the Soviet new moves to Pakistan. The Indians were happy that their friend, the Soviet Union, continued to give her support including military supplies as against a communist country (China) while Pakistanis were pleased to notice the Soviet "flexible" and "reasonable" attitude.

The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Lapin, came to Pakistan in
November 1964 and had begun first serious political dialogues with Ayub and Bhutto. I have read carefully the minutes of the meeting between the Soviet minister and Ayub and Bhutto: the Kremlin leaders made all-out efforts to increase their influence in South Asia by adapting a new policy whose essence was continuation of their friendship with India, the most important regional power in the area but simultaneously, they began to relax their attitude to Pakistan which was still a member of CENTO and SEATO. Lapin told both Ayub and Bhutto about the U.S. "imperialist designs" in Indi-China "the presence of the fleet" in the Indian Ocean; her "negative" attitude to the "causes of Afro-Asian countries." At the U.N., Lapin complained to Ayub about the attempt of the United States to keep the Soviet Union out of the U.N. by "misuse of Article 19 of the U.N. Charter to suspend the Soviet Union's right of vote." Lapin tried to impress the Pakistani leaders how "interest" of Afro-Asian countries would suffer if the American attempt were successful. These "sweet words" seemed to have some good impacts on Ayub and particularly on Bhutto who was more vocal and bitter about the new U.S. policy towards South Asia favoring India at the cost of an ally, Pakistan.

Ayub was invited to visit the U.S.S.R. This was the first State visit of a Pakistani head of the State of a government to U.S.S.R. Before Ayub arrived Moscow in April 1965, Bhutto had political discussions with the Kremlin leaders -- Gromyko, Kosygin and Mikoyan on January 12 and 13, 1965. Again, the Soviet leaders impressed "responsive" Bhutto about the rational of their policies in South and Southeast Asia. In South Asia they slurred India because India refused to join military paces while
Pakistan joined them without any "benefit" to her national or security interests. Pakistan had "still time to mend its ways." In Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union was giving aid to the freedom movement in Indi-China while the United States was engaged in "killing and bombing the innocent people"; trying to expand its military presence in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean.

The most significant and important talks took place when Ayub went to the Soviet in April (5-11) 1965. Ayub was, however, more cautious and a statesman as compared with Bhutto -- who began to talk loudly about the "neo-colonialism" of the United States. I was a member of the President Ayub's entourage to U.S.S.R. in 1965.

The Kremlin leaders demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO, particularly the former. The closure of the U.S. communications base at Badaber near the place from where the U-2 incident took place; a firm pledge that Pakistan would not allow her territories for any nuclear arms base for the United States.

Pakistan's growing friendship with China was also discussed but not with the same importance at it was the case in the subsequent years (1969-75). The Soviet modus operandi was one of "carrot and stick": now offering help and aid if Pakistan would close its old ties with the United States and also be "cautious" in her new ties with China; it it refuses to listen to the Soviet Council, Pakistan "may face dire consequences" as it actually happened in 1971.

As a result of the Soviet new moves and to both India and Pakistan, the Soviet influence and power increased in South Asia.
alleged care of "betrayal" by the United States had some impacts on other Asian members of CENTO, like Iran and Turkey. The Russian urged Ayub to tell "frustrating experiences" to American allies like Iran, Turkey in CENTO and Thailand and Philippines in SEATO -- the two other Asian members of SEATO. It had, however, lessen impacts on Thailand and Philippines as they were greatly worried over communist activities in Southeast Asia and they needed the U.S. help urgently but Iran and Turkey, as I could gather from readings of the minutes of R.C.D. meetings, were showing signs of "uneasiness" with the U.S. policy towards her non-European allies.

It was during this period (1963-65) that the Soviet began to point out that the Soviet Union had "the status of an Asian as well as European power." The Soviet Union, backed by India Egypt (UAR) and some other Arab countries like Syria wanted to participate in the abortive "Afro-Asian conference to be held in 1965. In recent years, when the Soviet Union is trying to advocate "The Asia Collective Security System", the Kremlin leaders and the Soviet propaganda media are never tried of emphasizing the "Asian status" of U.S.S.R.

When India and Pakistan were engaged in the "biggest tank battle since the World II" in 1965 (before the Arab wars of 1967 and 1973), the Soviet Union, thanks to its new flexible policy towards the South Asian countries, could play the role of "peace-maker" at the famous Tashkent Conference in January 1966. The conference could not solve the Ind-Pakistan dispute or reduce tensions in the area but the conference was a major diplomatic feat for the Soviet Union. Even today when the Soviet Union tries to
increase its role in South and Southeast Asia by preaching its "peaceful" role and "beneficiary interest" in Asia, it often cites the so-called "Tashkent spirit." In the meantime, the Soviet Union decided to give some arms to Pakistan with twin objectives of weakening its old ties with Washington and preventing China's influence in the area through Peking's special ties with Pakistan. The Kremlin leaders seemed to be trying to impose a pax-Sovietica in place of the old pax-Britannica or pax-Americana.

Kosygin-Brezhnev Proposals

With subcontinent affairs moving generally to satisfaction, the Soviet Union undertook several definitive steps to thwart China in South Asia, part of a worldwide effort to contain its communist enemy.

In 1969, a year that witnessed serious fighting on the Sino-Soviet border, the effect of the growing Soviet campaign began to be felt in Pakistan, which was greatly dependent upon China for military supplies and other support. The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, came to Pakistan in February and told Foreign Secretary S. M. Yousuf, "you cannot have simultaneous friendship with the Soviet Union and China." Yousuf noted that the Soviet Union had sought friendship with India and Pakistan, but Grechko ruled the point irrelevant. "What is permissible for a superpower, is not possible for a country like Pakistan." At a May meeting of the Pakistani envoys to neighbors and to major nations, Ambassador to Moscos Salam Ali said that moves against China were the main factor of recent Soviet policy in South and Southeast Asia; countries such as Pakistan that sought good relations with Peking as well as Moscos, warned
the Ambassador, would be put to "crude pressures." The experts on the Soviet Union at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including myself, also expressed concern over growing Soviet pressure "to unite against Mao."

It is interesting that roughly the same time the U.S.S.R. began a serious effort to curtail Chinese ties with Pakistan, China expressed concern over Pakistan's desperate wooing of the Kremlin and its "being exposed to the Soviet influence." The Chinese leaders' warning about the Soviet Union were proving accurate as it now began to demand political payment for its arms supplies to Pakistan: it pushed for Pakistani membership in groupings that ostensibly would serve economic and security ends but in reality would be primarily designed to contain China. As evidenced by the visit of Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to North Korea and Mongolia in early 1969 and by Kosygin's visit to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, also in early 1969, the anti-China campaign had become a key to Soviet foreign policy. The Subcontinent--India as well as Pakistan--could not help be affected.


It was under these most favourable changed circumstances that the Soviet Union began to unfold new plans to strengthen and consolidate her position and influence. The Soviet new moves such as Kosygin's proposal for a regional economic plan and Brezhnev's
Asian Collective Security system were linked with the Sino-Soviet rift which took a serious turn when the two countries were involved in major armed border conflicts in January 1969. Soon after the most serious border clashes, the Russians began active diplomatic initiatives in cultivating friendship with countries at the periphery of China. The Soviet diplomatic initiatives, as evidence by Podorny's visit to North Korea and Mongolia and by Kosygin's visit to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, were part of a bigger diplomatic move in their Global policy of the containment of China. The Kosygin-Brezhnev proposals for economic and military groups had the same objective — containment of China.

Kosygin's Regional Economic Groupings: In early 1969, Kosygin, while on a visit of Kabul, made a proposal for a regional grouping consisting of Afghanistan, India, Iran, and the Soviet Union. The idea of regional cooperation among these countries was, however, not a new one. The United States, which resuming economic aid to Pakistan and India in 1967 after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan was had also encouraged this idea in the subcontinent. Pakistan itself was an exponent of regional cooperation. When she took the Regional cooperation for development among Iran, Turkey, and herself. But Kostgin's apparently innocuous plan for economic grouping had political overtures as it were proposed to consolidate its position in relation to China in South Asia. It was interpreted by experts and also pointed out by the Chinese that the Soviet sponsored economic grouping of Asian countries was a part of containment of China. Moreover, Pakistan had always maintained that meaningful economic cooperation was not possible when political relations among the potential partners such as
Afghanistan and India were strained by political disputes and tensions. Yet Kosygin made his second visit to Pakistan within a period of thirteen months in May 1969. During his long dialogue with Pakistan's new President Yahya Khan, Kosygin put forward his proposal for a regional economic Grouping and urged him to accept it; he harped on its virtues as a means of development of the region. Kosygin was shrewed in stressing solely its economic aspect—the widespread poverty. The Pakistan Government in the past, Kosygin pointed out, made "vain efforts" with the help of the Capitalist Countries to eliminate the poverty and in this context he referred to features of Ayub's economic policy in expectations that it would be pleasing to Yahya; while Pakistan welcomed Kosygin's offer of Soviet development aid and trade, Yahya was warned by his foreign policy experts including the present author "to be cautious of involvement in the Soviet Union's more far-reaching economic proposals with political overtones." Kosygin yet put pressure on Yahya to accept his proposals for a Conference of Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Soviet Union at Deputy Ministers' level. It was expected that Iran could be brought in this arrangement. Yahya with his usual simplicity and as a notice in diplomatic dialogues with a major power agreed to Kosygin's proposal which he personally interpreted as having made no commitment in favour of joining Kosygin's proposed economic Grouping. But the Soviet Premier gave the impression that Pakistan had endorsed his economic proposals.

In the meantime, the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the military intelligence pointed out to Yahya grave implications of Soviet forming a political Grouping under the grab of a high-sounding economic
pain on China's Southwest flank. The Chinese Ambassador called the Pakistan Foreign Secretary soon after Kosygin's visit to find out the real attitude of Pakistan and was assured, in unmistakable terms: "Pakistan will never be a party to any Groupings, political or economic, which are directed against China." The Pakistan press like Dawn and the Pakistan Times also wrote strongly against any idea of Pakistan's joining Soviet sponsored economic plan. Yahya realized his mistake and when the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan began to remind him of his acceptance to join the Conference at Deputy Foreign Minister's level, Yahya made a Volte face and tried to avoid the issue. The Soviet Ambassador expressed his Government's disapproval and surprise when a Foreign Ministry Spokesman said on July 10, 1969 that Pakistan would not join alliance opposed to China "and the Soviet plan was also termed as of little economic advantage." The Indian newspaper, Hindustan Times of May 23, 1969 also mentioned of Pakistan's concern that a system of cooperation which include a "giant like Soviet Union" might work to the advantage of the Asian countries. It was, however, the suspicion that Moscow was forming a political Grouping against China which was the main factor in Pakistan's refusal. While putting the proposal for a economic Grouping to Yahya Kosygin made an attack on "Chinese role in the subcontinent" and asserted: "China is not interested in peace in this region while the Soviet Union wants peace and stability in the region" -- an assessment which was difficult for Pakistanis to agree. Kosygin narrated to Yahya his meeting with Mao in Peking when the latter was alleged to have told the former "China should be given free hand in Asian affairs while Soviet Union should have free hand in Europe." Kosygin
narrated to Yahya his meeting with Mao in Peking when the latter was alleged to have told the former, "China should be given a free hand in Asian affairs while Soviet Union should have free hand in Europe." Kosygin claimed that the Soviet Union could not accept and it caused "friction between the Soviet Union and China"--- again the Pakistan President could not accept such explanation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. It only confirmed Pakistan's suspicions and doubts about the Soviet proposal. Kosygın also alleged of "China's involvement in East Pakistan." Yahya's firm reply was: "There is no such evidence." In fact, Pakistan was more worried about direct Indian and indirect Soviet involvement in East Pakistan.

To sum up, the reaction to Kosygin's proposal in Pakistan was not at all encouraging.

In New Delhi and Kabul, Kosygin received more favorable responses it was evident from the joint communiqué issued after Mrs. Ghandi's visit to Kabul in June 1969. Under a Indo-Soviet agreement signed in March 1970 India agreed to finance a road from Kandahar in Afghanistan (linked by road to the Soviet borders) to Iranian border to join another road built by Iran to the Gulf port of Sandar Abbas. These plans could give the Soviet Union an outlet much needed after the closure of the Suez Canal, for its trade to South and Southeast Asia via Afghanistan and Iran but bypassing Pakistan. In July 1970, the Soviet Union also completed another sector of highway in Afghanistan ultimately capable of linking the Soviet Union with modern roads South to Pakistan --- a route the Russians may hope to use for the delivery of good, navy stores, fuel, etc. to their growing Indian Ocean fleet in preference to sea journey via Vladivostok.
Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System

One of the ironies of the feud with China is that it led the Soviets to the very "Dullesism" -- the propagation of military pacts -- that it had damned for more than fifteen years. The pro-Soviet collective security system in Asia was introduced to the world by First Secretary Brezhnev in his speech to the international meeting of the communist parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969. A few days before, Izvestia gave some details of the proposed security plan, which was described as a defensive measure to safeguard the independence of Asian countries against "imperialist aggression and neo-colonialism." That its real aim was to restrict Chinese influence becomes clear from an analysis of the Soviet envoys and leaders' diplomatic dialogues with the Pakistanis, the Indians and others. In fact, as I told Yahya after carefully reading the minutes of his July 1969 talks with the Soviet Ambassador, the plan called for nothing but "the Russian version of SEATO."

Following a Moscow conference of Soviet envoys, the Soviet
The Ambassador to Pakistan called on Yahya as well as on the Pakistan Foreign Secretary to try to sell the Brezhnev scheme. He described the proposed plan in lofty terms, stressing such features, as "non-interference in internal affairs of signatory countries" and "economic, cultural and scientific cooperation."

The Ambassador pointed out to the Foreign Secretary "the inadequacy of economic collaboration" under SEATO and CENTO in contrast to the more worthwhile collaboration under the Soviet plan.

But upon being questioned about security aspects of the plan, the Soviet ambassador had to reveal its main purpose, which had to do not with economic cooperation but with China. The specifics of the proposed security agreement also made this plain: for example, the signatories would not enter into any alliance, formal or informal, with a third country that may be hostile to any member countries, nor should they "make any commitment inconsistent with the proposed Asian Security Plan"; in addition, the signatories countries "will consult each other in case of an aggression by a third party."

The anti-China slant was also indicated by the fact that Brezhnev announced the plan only three months after the most serious armed conflict to date on Sino-Soviet borders; the chances of a full-scale Soviet attack on China could not be ruled out, and there was speculation, not entirely baseless, that the Soviets might strike at the Chinese nuclear installations. Moreover, if the proposed security plan...
would be used against a nation that Pakistan considered a friend, in apparently could not be used against Pakistan's true enemy.

Yahya wanted to know what help, if any the Brezhnev Plan would offer "in case of an aggression committed by one member country against another" -- such as would be the case in a repetition of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. The answer was as evasive as it was rhetorical: "The Asian Security Plan will put an end to such regional conflicts which the Imperialist countries like U.S.A. and expansionist ones like China encouraged."

Pakistanis were practically unanimous in opposing the Brezhnev plan. The army made it clear to the policymakers that it would not allow them to respond favorably to the Soviet moves (although they were not inclined to do so anyway), and the press joined the chorus of scorn for the plan. Yahya sent one of the top members of his military junta, Air Marshal Nur Khan, to Peking in July 1969 to give assurances that Pakistan would never be a party to any direct or indirect anti-China move, economic, political or military. "Pakistan shall not succumb to Soviet pressure," Nur Khan told Premier Chou En-lai during extensive talks on July 13 and 14.

Reaction to the proposed Asian Collective Security System was not much more encouraging elsewhere. On a September 1969 Moscow visit to discuss the plan, Indian Foreign Minister Singh first commented rather favorably: "India welcomes
the proposal ... the essence of the Soviet Plan is the development of cooperation among the Asian countries for the purpose of strengthening peace". But in view of India's traditional opposition to any form of military pact, Singh had to modify his position after he returned to New Delhi. Enthusiasm for the plan in other Asian countries was no greater than that for Dulles's Manila Pact (SEATO) in the mid-1950's.

The Soviets continued to extoll the proposed security system's virtues and advantages to Asian countries -- just as they denounced any form of alliance to which the "imperialists belong -- but without much apparent effect. The Soviet press launched a major campaign in December 1969, when the third ministerial meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) took place in Malaysia. On December 15, Moscow Radio proposed that a new regional grouping be formed with the assistance and participation of the Soviet Union as a "state with territory both in Europe and Asia". The Soviet claim that it was not merely a European power was first advanced, as we have seen, in 1964 by India in the attempt to include the USSR in the Second Afro-Asian Conference, and since the Tashkent conference the Soviet Union had been working particularly hard to establish its credentials as a great Asian country. During his visit to Pyongyang in the summer of 1970, Brezhnev claimed that Soviet ideas on European security were gaining approval
and support from the European public and governments; "in the opinion of the Soviet Government," he said, similar ideas would also prove "quite acceptable" for the Asian continent. But the Asian countries approached about the Soviet collective security system remained impressed.

President Yahya Khan scheduled a five-day visit to Moscow beginning June 22, 1969, and both the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan and the Pakistani Moscow Ambassador indicated that the Kremlin leaders would give top priority to the Asian Security System in the dialogues. I was among those advisors in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Economic Affairs who prepared the President for the trip; having joined his cabinet in October 1969, I was in active consultation with Yahya in his final planning sessions before heading for Moscow. Since joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1967, I had consistently warned both President Ayub Kahn and President Yahya Kahn of the Soviet designs in South Asia: I harbored no illusion about Soviet "friendship" for Pakistan.

During Yahya's lengthy talks with Kremlin leaders, Pakistan was assured of larger Soviet economic aid for the fourth five-year plan (1970-1975). Soviet assistance was promised for several industrial projects, including a million-ton steel melting plant in Karachi.
But when Yahya raised the question of continued arms shipments to Pakistan, the Kremlin leaders demurred. Kosygin told Yahya: "You cannot expect Soviet arms while you are unwilling to endorse our Asian Security System." He added that the system would "be the best guarantee for her [Pakistan's] territorial integrity," pointing ominously to an "explosive situation in East Pakistan," "dangers of foreign involvement there" and "China's role." Yahya and his government disagreed. "China," said the President, "is sincerely interested in Pakistan's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Kosygin, however, continued to make adverse comments about China, which made Yahya all the more certain that the so-called Asian Security Plan was nothing but the "Russian version of SEATO." Yahya, who by this time was acquainted with the technique of dealing with the Soviet blackmalls and blandishments, ended the dialogue with a polite but firm rejection of the Brezhnev and Kosygin proposals.

The Russians also sought to establish a radio relay communication center near the site of the former American Badabar base. While innocuous in theory, the proposal was revealed upon closer scrutiny as another clever Soviet device to make Pakistan sacrifice much more than she could hope to gain. As Communications Minister of the Yahya Cabinet, I examined the Soviet proposal and warned Yahya on the eve of his visit to the USSR. In a note...
to the President, I referred to the proposal as nothing but a "Russian version of the Badabar base" and worse; while it was easy to give notice to a Western country such as the United States to close its base, I said, "once you are in the Russian parlour, you are there forever."

Pakistan's rejection of the various proposals put forth by the USSR as the "price" of the military supplies doomed the era of better understanding and warmer relations between Moscow and Islamabad. In addition to their unwillingness to conform to Soviet plans and proposals, the Pakistanis annoyed the Soviet Union by providing links between Washington and Peking; their middleman's role was begun at the request of President Nixon during his twenty-two-hour visit to Pakistan in August 1969, and it was culminated in the secret trip of Henry Kissinger to Peking vis Rawalpindi in July. The Soviet attitude toward Pakistan waxed harder and harder. Even before Yahya's June visit, New Times on February 7, 1970 wrote a highly unfavorable article on Pakistan, thus reversing the attitude of the Soviet press, which had stopped its hostile comments on Pakistan after 1965.

Thus, the Soviets were frowning at Pakistan when the Bangladesh crisis began in 1971. The relationship between this soured attitude and the prompt Soviet support for the Bangladesh movement was more than casual.
China's Policies in South and South-east Asia

After a decade of closer and friendly Sino-Indian relationship, the two largest Asian country were engaged in an armed conflict. The 1962 Sino-Indian War had created a chain of reactions. India was shocked by China's "aggression"; India's prestige as the "leader of the non-aligned bloc" was seriously affected by her military debacles; Pakistan was gleeful to see her "enemy" humiliated and defeated but was greatly upset by the U. S. "massive" arms supplies to India which had upset the balance of power in South Asia.

Pakistan turned to both Moscow and Peking. Russians role in the area since the mid 1960's has already been examined. Peking's role in South Asia after the 1962 war need similar responses to Pakistan's gestures were prompt and encouraging for Pakistan. The result was a unique feature of Contemporary international politics in South Asia: the special relationship between a highly doctrinaire communist regime, The Peoples' Republic of China and an Islamic-Cum military regime, Pakistan.

The Sino-Pakistan special relationship, began after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, has shaken the South Asian triangle. In New Delhi where it was interpreted as the "Peking-Rawalpindi axis" against India, it created further bitterness to both China and Pakistan. In Washington, it caused great irritation and annoyance over what was termed 'Ayub flirtation with Mao' culminating in President Johnson's abrupt cancellation of his invitation to President Ayub Khan in the spring of 1965 and withholding of US economic aid in the same year. In Moscow it led the Kremlin leaders to reassess
their policy in the sub-continent. Its immediate results were the worsening of the United States’s relations with her "most allied ally" in Asia, Pakistan; increased Indo-Pakistan tensions and an era of a short-lived (1965-70) relaxed relations between Moscow and Rawalpindi. As the years pass, the United States began to relax its hardening attitude towards the Sino-Pakistan friendship till Nixon smiled on it during his 22-hour visit to Pakistan in August 1969 when he assigned the Pakistan President Yahya Khan a special assignment to act as "courier" between Washington and Peking (1969-70) in the context of the U. S. new China policy in the emerging multi-polar relations. On the contrary, Moscow began to harden its attitude towards the growing Sino-Pakistan relationship.

China’s policy towards Pakistan in the 1960s was largely in response to the latter’s efforts to improve her relations with the two bigger neighbours (China & U.S.S.R.) at a time when she felt threatened by the changed balance of military power in the sub-continent. It was a dire diplomatic move on the part of Pakistan and China responded to it without any difficulty or ambiguity because her relations with Pakistan had always been maintained at a 'polite and friendly level'.

Into the 1960s, however, there persisted severe limitations to the relationship. If Pakistan had no complaints about the Chinese attitude on Kashmir and military assistance to India — being the two main criteria by which she evaluated the friendliness of a country — the Chinese were disturbed by Pakistan's stands on their entry into the UN; consideration of the Tibet question at the
UN, the status of Formosa, and a few other issues.

One of the relationship's limiting factors was removed as Pakistan began the process of disengagement from military pacts. The Chinese were delighted. A congenial Liu Shao-chi told Foreign Minister Bhutto on a 1963 visit to China:

Our mutual understanding has been strengthened greatly and we feel that you understand us. So we shall speak the truth. When you joined SEATO we doubted your intentions. At that time, we protested that your participation in SEATO was directed against China. You replied that it was not so. Later on, your Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, came to China and told us that your participation in SEATO was for defence against big nation chauvinism. At that time, we developed some belief about this position but were not so deeply convinced as we are now. We are now convinced that your participation in SEATO is only against India and not against China at all. At the same time, we admired your bravery against pressure tactics.

On other issues Pakistan gradually came closer to Peking's views; on PRC's membership to the UN, for example, Pakistan not only moved away from the American move but became an active co-sponsor of PRC membership till Red China entered UN in 1971. Similarly Pakistan endorsed fully Peking's stand on Formosa and Tibet.

A significant pact -- the first major step in the Sino-Pakistan friendship -- was the Boundary Pact between the two countries in 1963.

The 1963 Border Agreement not only worsened Indo-Pakistani relations but also worried Washington and Moscow. American's resented not so much the agreement's contents as its implications of new, Peking-oriented trends in Pakistan's foreign policy. Stories circulated about a secret military pact between China and Pakistan. During my research at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs I could not find any evidence of a secret military pact with China.

On the contrary, my research at the Pakistan Foreign Ministry reveals that the Chinese Government offered Pakistan the draft for a "Friendship Pact". The Foreign Ministry turned down the proposal: The ministry's comments were significant: "without our obligations as the member of SEATO it will be politically incompatible to sign such an agreement". The matter was again considered in 1964 on the eve of Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan and again the Ministry objected to it in a note on January 27, 1964.

No wonder, that when Bhutto as President of 'New' Pakistan sought a military pact with China in 1972 as a counter measure to the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty the Chinese response was negative. Chou En-lai's own comment about a Sino-Pakistan Pact is also significant. "We are working as friends and not asking for any treaty" Chou told this to Ayub in early 1966 when China was asked to give military help to Pakistan after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. China has not yet shown interest in signing any formal military or friendship treaty with Pakistan.

Chou En-Lai came to Pakistan in February 1964 and declared support for Pakistan's Kashmir position. If, in the past, China had not recognized India's claim on Kashmir, this represented the first time that it endorsed the idea of a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Regarded as a "striking success for President Ayub Khan," the visit of the communique were hailed by Pakistan as a diplomatic coup.
In March 1965, Ayub garnered a most enthusiastic welcome in China. Meeting with Chou and President Liu Shao-chi on March 3, Ayub entered into discussion on Sino-Pakistani, Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations; India's strengthening of her military; Vietnam, Formosa; and many other issues. First, Ayub gave a resume of his country's relations with the United States and her concern over the U.S. and Soviet military shipments to India. Ayub said that while Pakistan was grateful for America's help, he could not tolerate its "policy of internal interference in other countries."

The United States, Ayub added, wanted "to make India into a counterforce to China, both economically and militarily," and to press Pakistan, which had proved an obstruction in U.S. strategy. Ayub assured the Chinese leaders that Pakistan would stand up against pressure and remain true to its Chinese friendship.

Pointing to the Soviet and American military aid to India and its implications for "the birth of neo-colonialism," the Chinese leaders assured Ayub: "If India commits aggression into Pakistan territory, China would definitely support Pakistan."

Chou added:

Neither the U.S. nor Britain wants to see India and Pakistan fight one another, because of the existence of China. Furthermore, the U. S., UK and USSR have to consider that if they help India, China would support Pakistan. This is a big point which has to be considered by their policymakers. India could not really become strong by military assistance from the U.S. and USSR. The U.S. was giving aid to Thailand and Taiwan, but this did not make them strong and the morale of their people was very low.

Pakistan's new, friendly relations with China were dramatized by Ayub's meeting with Mao Tse-tung, which was held March 4 in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality. "China and Pakistan could trust
each other," said Mao, initiating the dialogue, "as neither has the intention of pulling the rug under the feet of the other."
Ayub replied that "both countries want peace and friendship and are against foreign domination," and Mao agreed. After Ayub paid tribute to Mao's military acumen, pointing out that his writings were studied carefully at Pakistan's military academies, Mao gave China's version of the border conflicts with India: "China does not look upon India as an enemy; China had very few troops on the Indian border, yet Nehru went back and published a document as a whit paper containing all sorts of untrue things."
The two leaders then talked about the road connections between Pakistan and China and between Nepal and China -- connections that unsettled New Delhi. To Ayub's query about Sino-Soviet relations, Mao said that Krushchev's successors "had not tried to improve relations with China. The U. S. and USSR are now trying to have some sort of understanding so as to follow a policy of containment against China. Mao concluded his talks with Ayub with the words: "We agree with you and we are not with shastri."
Nothing could have been more pleasing to the President.

At the end of Ayub's first state visit to China -- which saw the conclusion of a cultural agreement providing for the exchange of educators, scientists, scholars and other experts -- the joint communiqué of March 9, 1965 reflected Pakistan's changing external relations. Joining with China, she spoke more clearly than ever before on "liquidation" of imperialism and colonialism, in opposition to the presence of Americans in the Indian Ocean and in support of the PRC's entry into the UN.
Since the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war when China threatened to intervene in favour of India, the Sino-Pakistan relationship has continued to grow in depth and warmth. The special relationship survived the Cultural Revolution in China and the 1971 Civil War in Pakistan. I carefully read the minutes of Sino-Pakistan dialogues since Chou En-Lai visit to Pakistan in 1969 and Yahya visit to Peking in November 1970 (I accompanied Yahya as a member of his cabinet) Yahya was, at time, acting as "courier" between Washington and Peking in the context of President Nixon's new China Policy. An analysis of Sino-Pakistan political dialogues, particularly those of the period when Yahya was receiving the Chinese manages to be forwarded to the White House (1969-70), reveals China's grave concern over the Russians designs against her; her persistent efforts to convince Pakistan and through Pakistan to countries like Iran, and other Muslim countries as well as Southeastern countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Philiphine that her "revolutionary role" in the "national liberation wars" were not directed against the existing regimes in these countries. China was anxious to tell the Americans that notwithstanding China's public announcements, she would not create any "problem" for U. S. A. in Southeast Asia. The public condemnation of "American Imperialism" or "Japan's militarism" were for domestic consumption in China. Mao and Chou-En-Lai requested Ayub during his 1965 state visit to Peking to tell the Americans, "China will oblige by the international obligations and shall not resort to war unless the U. S. A. attacks us." Mao made a significant remark: "The situations during the Korian War and the Vietnam War are not same." Mao narrated to Ayub how Stalin put pressures on him to be involved in the Korian War - The Soviet aim, according
to Mao, was to weaken China which Mao realized fully subsequently. China, Mao, added, would "no longer act according to dictates of the Kremlin leaders" seemed to be anxious to impress Ayub about China's desire to have "peaceful co-existence" with U. S. A.; it was stated as early as in April 1965. After the Sino-Soviet border conflicts of 1969 and after the Russians began an active policy of containment of China in South and Southeast Asia, China's consistent theme to Pakistan and through her to U. S. A. and other South-eastern countries was that China wanted "to establish normal and friendly relations with these countries." Fear of a pre-emptive attack by the Russians was the most dominating factor in China's Foreign Policy after the Sino-Soviet borders clashes in 1969 and after the Soviet Union began preaching the virtues of "Asian collective Security System."

Then Nixon asked Yahya in August 1969 to find out the China's reactions to his "new China Policy," the Chinese reaction, as I had expected from my previous readings of the Chinese trends in her foreign policy objectives, were favorable. There were initial doubts, heristancy and reservations; there was a risk of a setback of the evolving Sino-American relationship when there was escalation of fighting in Cambodia in the summer of 1970 and when Prince Sihanouk took shelter in Peking. But China's urges and needs for normalization of relations with U. S. A. when another Super Power was threatening her national Security by massing large number of Russian troops, on her borders, the process of normalization of the Sino-American relationship survived such temporary setbacks.

To sum up, the Chinese position, the Chinese are much more worried about the Russians than about the Americans. In fact, the
Chinese are upset by the U. S. policy of "withdrawal" in Asian affairs in the context of the Nixon Doctrine. They expressed this fear to Pakistanis as they did to the visiting Americans like Congressman, Mr. Ford and Senator like Mr. Henry Jackson. The recent China's wooing of Japan and most recent VIP treatment to the President Marcos or ThaiLand's Prime Minister or Malaysian Prime Minister is no surprise to one who like myself had the opportunities of reading the minutes of Chinese political dialogue with their "best friend" in South Asia, Pakistan, particularly, the contents of the Chinese manages, conveyed through the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan in 1969-70 and also during the Chou-Yahya's five days of talk in November 1970. A reading of Asian Analysis published by the research division of the British Foreign Ministry which are given for restricted use in the commonwealth countries gives the same Chinese perception and policy in Southeast Asia and towards the U. S. A. and Japan. China is acting "sweetly" not out of love for U. S. A. or existing regimes in Japan and in South-eastern countries but out of her grave concerns against what China terms as the "Socialist imperialism" of the Soviet Union.
Part II

The Soviet and Chinese Policies and Roles in the 1970s and Their Implications for the United States

South Asia

In South Asia, the great events of 1971 culminating in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh has created a "new order." The most important feature of the "New order" is the rise of India as the most dominant regional power in the area and the increased Indo-Soviet collaboration. The increasing Soviet influence in South Asia after the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 is the most menacing development in South Asia. The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war gave the Soviet Union the designation of "peace-maker" at the Tashkent Conference in 1966; the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war gave the Soviet Union to depict her as the "liberator" of the seventy five million Bengalis. The Soviet Union scored great diplomatic gains as the result of the war on Bangladesh. In India, the Soviet Union's prestige has increased considerably, though Mrs. Gandhi told: "We are unable to display gratitude in any tangible sense for anything", it would be naive to ignore that Mrs. Gandhi can ignore altogether the Soviet pressure on demands after Moscow's unqualified support, diplomatic and military during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. The Russians are noted for crude pressure, as I could note from the Kremlin dealing with Pakistan in 1969-70 (as discussed already in part I). Of course, what they could do with a country like Czechoslovakia in 1968 or with "totering" Pakistan in 1971 is not applicable to New Delhi. India is too large a country and Mrs. Gandhi is self-assertive, proud and fully rather over conscious of her country's importance.

The Soviet Strategy and Objectives in India
India's military strength is largely dependent on continued Soviet support and assistance.

India though emerged as stronger and victorious in the 1971 War. But her diplomatic options are today not as flexible or wide as it were in the heydays of Nehru's policy of non-alignment in the 1950's. Her relations with the two other major powers, U.S.A. and China were worsened during the Bangladesh crisis. Even her image among the countries of the 'Third World' was greatly affected by the war— it was demonstrated by the overwhelming negative votes against India by the countries of the 'Third World' at the UN General Assembly when the Bangladesh War came up before the UN in December 1971. India is today dependent on the Soviet Union for security and strategic reasons to an untenable degree and the Kremlin leaders are fully aware of it. Moreover both India and the Soviet Union share some 'common objectives'—such as containment of China; preventing the rearmament of Pakistan with the help of China and Iran and most recently with arms from the United States. There is also fear in New Delhi that the huge military build-up in Iran with U.S. arm supplies might be of some assistance to Pakistan. Similarly the proposed plan for manufacturing of French mirage aircrafts financed by the oil-producing gulf States but to be located in Pakistan is gravely watched in New Delhi. The Soviet leverage in India through her arms supplies is therefore likely to continue in the new order as was the case before 1971.

The Russians revive the Asian Collective Security Plan. Brezhnev kept his plan deliberately vague for sometime. But the Kremlin leaders never missed an opportunity to harp on its virtues
in their dialogues with the Asian leaders. The Russian at one stage tried to interpret the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 as preliminary step towards the establishment of an Asian collective security plan. The Indo-Bangladesh treaty of 1972 was also given similar welcome. But then the Russians seemed to have changed the tactics and came out openly in favor of the Asian collective security plan. Brezhnev spelled out publicly its new features: "collective security in Asia must, in our view, be based on such principles" as (I) renunciation of the use of force in relation between states (II) respect for sovereignty and inviability of borders (III) non-interference in the internal affairs (IV) broad development of economic and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage. After a long period of deliberate vagueness since it was first sounded by Brezhnev in the summer of 1969, the Russians gave now more details of the plan publicly though in diplomatic negotiations, as we have already pointed out, Yahya, for instance, had during his state visit to Moscow in June 1970, the Russian enough indication of the Brezhnev Asian Security Plan.

In the changed circumstances of 1972, the Kremlin leaders revived their campaign for Asian collective plan. A Radio Peace and Progress commentary on March 23, 1972 suggested that both Bangladesh and Pakistan should emulate India in entering into treaty with the Soviet Union on the model of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. The Commentator said principles embodies in the Indo-Soviet treaty were applicable to "any other people of the
Asian Continent, "... want to live independently and freely?"

Brezhnev, in his Foreign Policy speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress on March 20, 1972 claimed that there was growing interest in the idea. He was, however, shrewd enough to emphasize that in Asia it was not a question of "military blocs and grouping" but "of good-neighbourly cooperation by all interested states" - a theme which was devised to meet Asian countries like the India's susceptibilities of Asian countries like India to any idea of military pact. Yet on closer scrutiny the Brezhnev plan was found nothing less than a veriled military pact drawn in the context of growing sino-soviet rivalry in Asia. Kosygin while welcoming the Afgan Prime Minister in Moscow on March 16, 1972 also commended that Asian security plan and his speech was relayed in eleven Asian languages as well as in English broadcast. In fact, Moscow broadcasts for Asian Countries during March 1972 made several commentaries on the Asian collective security plan. Yet most of the Asian governments were not enthusiastic in being drawn with Sino-Soviet conflict by joining a Russian sponsored military pact. The Soviet commentators, however, continue to claim 'wide support' in Asia for collective security plan. Visits to Moscow in October 1972 by the Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and the Shah of Iran gave the Soviet leaders a new opportunity to air their proposals for the Asian collective security plan but not with any success. The next strategy in the Soviet campaign for the Asian security plan was launched through non-governmental channels; still anti-chinese aspects of the propaganda had cast doubts in many Asian countries. The reluctance of Asian governments to commit themselves to the Brezhnev plan seemed to have led the Russian to
adopt other techniques to gain support for the plan. A series of conference, symposia such as Afro-Asian peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) executive committee meeting in Aden in February 1973, "peace" convention in India and Nepal and Afro-Asian Women Conference in Ulan Bator were held. A leading role in this new campaign was played by the "World Peace Council (WPC) whose conference on "Asian Security and Cooperation was held in Dacca from May 23 to 26, 1973. This was one of the preliminaries of the "World Congress of Peace Forces" which was held in Moscow in October 1973 where Brezhnev again harped on virtues of the Asian Collective Security Plan.

The Russians were also 'expanding economic ties in the name of establishing the 'materials basis' of collective security. The Russians began to express hopes that their friendship treaties with developing countries like Afghanistan and India might contribute to the construction of a wider economic network under their aegis.

In 1972-1973, they began to stress the importance of greater economic cooperation as the basis for regional security and appeared to be reviving Kosygin's 1969 Plan for a trade and transit scheme covering India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and possibly Iran and Turkey. A Moscow Radio broadcast to Asia on September 30, 1972 claimed that three countries of the subcontinent, as well as, Afghanistan, Nepal were interested in 'setting regional cooperation with Soviet participation' - the claim, in as far as Pakistan was concerned, is not correct.

Again on October 2, 1972, Moscow Radio commended Soviet Union's economic relation with India, Afghanistan and Iraq "as an example to other Asian Countries." Moscow Radio commentaries on the alleged advantages of Asian countries for expanding economic as well as
other forms of cooperation were in tune with Brezhnev's Asian collective security proposals. Similar approaches were made to Pakistan when Kosygin visited Rawalpindi in May 1969 and when Yahya visited Moscow in June 1970. The technique was to stress firstly 'innocuous economic cooperation' and then to reveal their real aim for security plan. This approaches were made to Pakistan when Kosygin visited Rawalpindi in May 1969 and when Yahya visited Moscow in June 1970. The technique was to stress firstly 'innocuous economic cooperation' and then to reveal their real aim for security plan. This economic approach to security plan was confirmed in secret diplomatic dialogues till 1971 but in the changed circumstances under the 'new' order in the subcontinent the Russians began to express their diplomatic move publicly through their propaganda media.

It was particularly in relation to India, the Russians have followed the economic approach to security designs. The Soviet Union and India signed an agreement on September 19, 1972 to set up a 'commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation,' presumably in accordance with Article 6 of the 1971 Friendship treaty. The agreement stipulates that each country will take into account the needs of the other's economy when formulating India's defense and security plan for the next five years, modified their calculations. The Shah of Iran had pledged to 'protect the territorial integrity' of 'New Pakistan. "In India's eyes American objectives are much wider and include apart from building up an anti-Soviet bulwark against Russia - a considered policy to build up a counterpoise to India, now that Pakistan can no longer play this role. Iran is building up at Chah Bahar, on the Markan Coast,
barely 50 miles from Pakistan Border, a naval and air base bigger than they ever built in this region. Since Indian naval superiority in the Arabian sea played a decisive role during the 1971 war, Indian admirals are worried at the prospect of a modern Iranian Fleet coming to Pakistan's aid in the event of any future Indo-Pakistan war. Iran's new thrust into the Indian Ocean is welcomed in neither Moscow nor in New Delhi.

The arming of Iran by the United States which involves modern weapons as 48 F5E lightweight fighter planes and 30 of one of Navy's newest and most advanced fighters the R-14—is a $900 program, and it follows order for arm valued at 2.5 billion. All placed by the state over the past two years of this, naturally enough, is causing alarm in New Delhi and it consequently provides the Kremlin leaders additional leverage with the India government. As pointed out earlier, the Soviet military supplies to India gave her the most powerful leverage in New Delhi. It is correct that India is still militarily superior to the combined strength of Iran and Pakistan and Indians need nothing specifically to apprehend and it will be also naive to think that the Shah of Iran will open his newly acquired arsenal for any Pakistan's military adventures against India. Yet the Indians have always been most sensitive to any increase of military potentialities of her 'enemy number one', Pakistan.

Brezhnev's Visit to New Delhi

Brezhnev's visit to India, hardly a day elapsed without the Soviet papers publishing stories describing in glowing terms the eagerness and anticipation of the Indians. Superlatives such as
"an occurrence of tremendous importance;" 'India hail Brezhnev's visit with its whole heart" were regularly used. One of Brezhnev's main objectives in going to India in November 1973 was to reinforce the Soviet image in the eyes of the non-aligned nations and to counteract Chinese efforts to discredit it. The Russians were worried over the inroads the Chinese were making among the non-aligned and developing countries to the Third World China, though not a participant of the non-aligned nations conference at Algeria in October 1973, was most active in gaining support among these countries. China also made serious bids to gain influence in the Middle East. When an elderly statesman of the Middle East like President Bourguiba of Tunisia had echoed Peking's views about "super powers hegemony," the Kremlin leaders were certainly not unworried. Peking's denial of 'great-power status' and its claim to be champion of 'small and medium' countries were not pleasant to the Kremlin leaders. China also supported the proposal put forward by Sri Lanka, Iran and others for a 'zone of peace' in the Indian Ocean since, according to China it was a reflection of these countries logical demand' for struggle against domination by some big powers and their efforts to create zones of influence'. Prawda accused China of having inspired the scheme.

The Sino-Soviet rift has given India a geo-political importance to Moscow. India admittedly, no longer, speaks 'with the global voice' as in the hey-days of Nehru but "in the great game of Sino-Soviet rivalry India is a very substantial piece on the board." Brezhnev, therefore, wanted to get maximum political support from India. He was reported to be as certaining about India's incipient
signs of exploring chances to improve relations with China. The Russians in their present frame of mind would regard a move by India to improve relations with China as counter to Soviet-India friendship. The Russians made similar demands to Pakistan, as already started, in 1969-70 before the 1971 crisis.

As regards the Asian collective security plan, there were two interpretations of Brezhnev's mission to India. One was that a new Soviet strategy for Asia - a 'peace offensive' in which India would be given the leading role - would begin with Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi by virtually abandoning the Asian Collective Security Plan of 1969 which failed to gather support among the Asian countries. Instead the new strategy would seek to upgrade India's role as a stable and strong 'bastion of anti-imperialism' and 'peace'. The friendship treaty of 1971 was to be strengthened by more fruitful aid and trade to serve as an example for others to follow. Bangladesh, Afghanistan and even Pakistan were considered among potential signatories of friendship treaty along the basis of Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971. The other interpretation of Brezhnev's mission was that he would exert pressure on India to get endorsement of his collective security plan which would not only cement the Soviet-India relationship but would also render a Sino-India reapproachment less likely as China looked upon Brezhnev collective security plan directed against her.

In his speech at the Indian Parliament, on November 28, 1973, Brezhnev strongly advocated for his Asian security plan. He told that it was an "opportun e" time to deal with Asian Security: "In a word, we are calling for an active, broad and constructive discussion. The opportunity has arrived and the present situation in Asia has
created adequate prerequisites. Asian can and must become a continent of peace." What a irony that Brezhnev choose the Indian parliament, where Nehru denounced military pacts and harped on virtues of keeping his country away from any military or security plan for a decade, to recommend to the Asian countries his new version of "SEATO"! Mrs. Gandhi was, however, not responsive to Brezhnev's speech immediately what went on inside the conference table on Security Plan are still debated. Some diplomats, mostly Europeans, in New Delhi were convinced that Brezhnev gained major economic and political leverage in India and tacitly advanced the doctrine of Asian Security. Other diplomats and most Indians, however, maintained the various agreements signed between the two countries during Brezhnev's visit had only strengthened the 'economic friendship and Mrs. Gandhi had to pay no additional price.

In a debate in the India Parliament on December 6, members of opposition parties voiced criticism and concern over the Soviet Union's growing influence; they also alleged that the Soviet Union has obtained port facilities in India for her naval vessels - it was, however, refuted by the Indian Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh who said: "We have not given any port facilities to the Soviet Union for military purpose." The opposition members also alleged that there were "secret agreements."

It is hard to accept that the Soviet Union promised such generous economic and or military supplies - India expressed interest in MIG 23 planes as well as a fighters-bombers and mobile SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles; New Delhi also wanted Soviet assistance in plans for new naval vessel - without any 'political price' or quid pro quo. I may tell from my experiences when Pakistan
was seeking arms from the Soviet Union in 1967-70, the Soviet demands were not only 'cash' price but also 'political dividends' for any arms supplies. India is no doubts a big country to be completely 'a client' of a super power which is not an agreeable status for India under a leader like Mrs. Gandhi. At the same time, India's needs for military assistance for Moscow puts limits to her autonomy in diplomatic options as long as her relations with Peking were not improved and ties with Washington are not fully normalized.
The Soviet Union and 'New Pakistan

The short-lived honeymoon between Moscow and Rawalpindi during the period 1965-70 was coming to an end when the Soviet Union began to put crude pressure on Pakistan to join the Kremlin moves such as an Asian security scheme or regional economic grouping. Its formal ending came with the Soviet role during the Bangladesh crisis and during the third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971. The Pakistanis recollect with great bitterness the Soviet military and diplomatic support to India during the war; Bhutto was reported to have had a rough time in Moscow and was subjected to both blackmailing and blandishments--the blackmailing consisted of warnings that if Pakistan still refused to endorse the Soviet moves in South Asia and blandishments offered to Bhutto were: Pakistan should follow the Indian and Bangladesh suit and sign a so-called treaty of friendship; only then could her territorial integrity be protected.

The unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union towards the "new" Pakistan still continues. When Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972, he was told bluntly by his Russian hosts: "If history were to repeat itself we would again take the same position (referring to the Soviet role in the dismemberment of Pakistan) because we are convinced that it was correct." This was a clear warning to Pakistan in the context of present-day turbulence in Baluchistan and the Northwest frontier provinces of truncated
Pakistan. The Soviet's role in current political unrest in the "Wild West" of Pakistan was dramatized by the seizure of Russian arms smuggled into Pakistan through the Iraq embassy in Islamabad. The Baghdad Radio's broadcasting for a "greater Baluchistan" and the Kabul Radio's propaganda for Paktooinistan and the Kabul Radio's propaganda for Paktooinistan are some of the omens from Moscow for the further fragmentation of Pakistan. The recent coup in Afghanistan, which was alleged to have the Soviet blessing, and the new Afghan rulers' threats to revive the old issue of Paktoonistan are regarded by Pakistan as Russian pressures to browbeat her into the Asian collective security plan. Further fragmentation of Pakistan and the creation of Soviet client states such as 'Baluchistan' and 'Paktooinistan' would fulfill the old Czarist ambition of "warm-water" port for the Russians in the South. If this were to happen, the Russian expansionsit designs in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf would be fulfilled and the peace and stability of the area might be threatened, and not only Pakistan but Iran also would be affected. Will the U.S.A. or China be passive witness to such phenomenon?
The Soviet Union and Bangladesh

Of the great powers, the Soviet Union was the first to recognize Bangladesh. After Mrs. Gandhi, Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin were the first to send Mujib warm congratulations. Mujib on his return said: "While Bangladesh believes in the policy of friendship to all and malice toward none, she has special reasons to be grateful to the Soviet Union which had protested to the Pakistan authorities against the genocide of the Bengalis. We remember the Indian and Soviet roles; for that reason, I made my first visit to India; next I will visit the Soviet Union." An initial period of good relations was expected in the context of the Soviet role during the crisis on Bangladesh.

After the creation of Bangladesh, the Soviet Union is making efforts to penetrate the new state in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, the press, radio, sport and other spheres in the name of purely cultural cooperation. But it is clear that the Soviet aims are political.

As regards Soviet aid to Bangladesh, the figure for 1971-72 was only $136.89 million or 10.69 percent of the total foreign aid—which was smaller than the U. S. or even Indian contributions. The Soviet Union, however, got the opportunity of financing a salvage operation of the two seaports of Bangladesh—Chittagong and Chalna. This was a much-publicized operation and the Soviet navy seemed to have got an opportunity of extending its influence in the waters surrounding the Indian subcontinent. The Russians' long salvage job, however, created some misgivings and fears in some quarters of Bangladesh.
The Soviet diplomatic objective in Bangladesh was to include it under the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine of Asian collective security. The "search for peace" was a major topic in the Soviet leaders' talks with Mujib in Moscow as it had been with Bhutto while he visited Moscow later on. Bangladesh was eventually covered under the scheme through New Delhi's "treaty of friendship and cooperation" with Bangladesh along the lines similar to the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971.

Concern over the Soviet activities seems to be one motive behind the intensive Soviet effort to build up influence. One aspect of this has been the prolonged presence of the Soviet salvage fleet, consisting of more than 20 vessels under a rear-admiral, in the port of Chittagong. The clearing of mines and wrecks left by the 1971 war began early in 1972 and was due to be completed in a year. Under a protocol signed on December 20, 1973, however, it was agreed to extend the fleet's stay (for a second time) until June 30, 1974. The Russians are reported to have removed only 14 wrecks so far, compared with six salvaged in as many months by Dutch and Singaporean teams under UN auspices in the port of Chalna. The implication is that they are reluctant to abandon their only naval toe-hold in South Asia, although the Bangalees are averse to the indefinite presence of several hundred foreign sailors in a wired-off area of the docks. (The Russians also man ten fishing trawlers supplied to Bangladesh.) Chittagong has become more important to the Russians.

The increasing Soviet Naval presence in the Indian Ocean

The major Soviet political military economic and diplomatic involvements in South Asia and in the Middle East are connected
with her growing interest in the Indian Ocean. While analysing the objectives of the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, a report by the expert panel convened by the Center for Strategic and International Studies of the University of Georgetown said: "By showing the flag Soviet warships reinforce political situation in countries to which the Soviet are supplying military aid, for example Iraq and India." Although the Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean has been growing in the last decade, the real Soviet naval penetration began after the Arab-Israel war of 1967. The increasing Soviet naval in the Indian Ocean is causing considerable anxiety in many quarters. American defence analysts are paying close attention to the growing Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the threat it poses to the oil-consuming industrial nations of the West. According to Pentagon sources, as reported in Daily Telegraph of (London) of October 29, 1974, the number of Russian fighting ships and supply craft has risen to over 30 in recent weeks. They include a missile cruiser and the helicopter carrier, the Leningrad. There are reports that the 45,000 ton aircraft carrier, Kiev will also shortly join there when the Suez canal is reopened. President Ford in his first press conference noted that the Russians had established Three major naval operating bases in the Indian Ocean and that this justified the limited expansion of the American base at the British-owned island of Diego Garcia. The Russians have since tried to deny they have such bases but Pentagon officers dismiss this as semantics.

The Russian naval build-up in the Indian Ocean is regarded by the American naval strategists as posing an eventual serious threat to both Western Europe and Japan since unless a counterweight is
provided, it could leave Moscow in a handy position to intervene
with "tanker traffic" from the Persian Gulf via the Malacca straits
and the Cape of Good Hope.

One of the best analyses of the Russian growing presence
in the Indian Ocean has recently been made by Professor Alvin
Cottrell of Georgetown University who points out: "Soviet interest
in the Indian Ocean is the extension of an old Tssarist thurst
for an outlet to the South, overlaid with the ideological drive
for world wide hegemony. Increasing Soviet military power and
decline of European powers and impel the present Soviet drive to
replace Britain as the dominant power in the Littoral states and
it has been aggressive in grasping the opportunity." Cortell also
tells how in Iraq, in Bangladesh, in South Yemen and in the Somali
Republic Soviet base-building has been active. Reopening the
Suez Canal, he adds, will greatly benefit the Soviet naval presence
in the Indian Ocean is also connected with the Sino-Soviet struggle.
There are signs that the Chinese are also trying to establish a
long-term naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan and Tanzania
would favour the Chinese presence, which should not be unwelcomed to the
Western powers. The Chinese like the Western powers are no less
worried over the Russian threats in the Persian-Indian Ocean areas.
China and the 'New' order in the Indian Subcontinent

After the interval upheaval caused by the cultural revolution was over by 1969-70, China renewed its "peaceful diplomacy" particularly in the Afro Asian Countries. 1971 was a great successful year for China but in South Asia China, like the United States, has a setback as a result of the crisis on Bangladesh. China's policy, like that of the United States was wrongly misinterpreted and misunderstood. She like the United States was not opposed to the Bengali National aspirations but both the United States and China were opposed to the Soviet-Indian intervention in the Bangladesh crisis to establish their hegemony in the area. An Indian scholar in a candid way admitted that "from the beginning, a major thrust of Soviet intervention in East Pakistan crisis was to help in the emergence of bourgeois-nationalist forces in Bangladesh which could drift toward extreme radicalism in the eastern flank of the subcontinent." Peking accused: "India's long-planned scheme to annex East Pakistan had been 'stage-managed' by the Soviet Union in order to gain control of the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and enlarge its sphere of influence in its contention with super power for hegemony" Chou En Lai before the fall of Dacca referred to a "genuine Bengali nationalism movements in East Pakistan" to which China was not opposed.

The Bangladesh crisis and the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War had further worsened the Sino-Indian relationship; press and propaganda media in both countries had sharp exchanges of comments. Similarly, the Chinese Representatives at the U.N. denounced "India's aggression against Pakistan in unqualified terms. But the 1971 Crisis proved that China was not prepared to assist Pakistan in any
military confrontation with India. New Delhi’s fears of a joint Pakistan-Chinese attack against India proved groundless in the 1971 War. This might have opened new 'locks' towards China in New Delhi. The Sino-Indian relationship has not yet been relaxed though it was reported that Peking had offered a 'deal' with India: China would renew full diplomatic relations with India after a break of one decade since the India-China War of 1962, if the Pakistan prisoners of War were released and other outstanding issues over Bangladesh such as the trial of 150 Pakistan P.O.W. were settled. Deputy Foreign Minister Singh told the Indian parliament on August 9, 1973: "there have been certain indications of a change on China's part." Earlier Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh made a frank statement in the Indian parliament that India wanted to make up with both Washington and Peking. It was regarded as a 'mood of realism' and reflected on Moscow. But nothing as yet happen in the direction of improvement of relations between Peking and New Delhi. Peking still regards India as the Soviet Union's 'largest client' in the Russian diplomatic and military moves against China. Brezhnev’s recent visit to India and his championing of Asian collective security system using the Indian parliament as a form for preaching it were not certainly welcomed in Peking. Similarly, China’s continued military support and supplies to Pakistan are regarded as 'hostile actions' in New Delhi. The current political unrest in Bangladesh backed by the Moolist forces there is a new complicating factor in the Sino-India relationship. It is too early to predict the outcome of moves, if any, for a Sino-Indian rapprochement as the Sino-Indian relationship
is interrelated with the Sino-Soviet rift and India is not likely to move towards Peking if it endangers her relationship. The triangular complication which existed before the 1971 Crisis are not yet solved or show any sign of relaxation.

It is, however, unrealistic to expect that Peking will respond to New Delhi's overtures while India allows Brezhnev to use its parliament to preach the Asian Security system which China regards, not without justification, as directed against her. In the present context of growing Sino-Soviet Conflict and in the current assessment of China that Moscow's greatest ally in South and South-east Asia in India, there seems to be not much hope for healing the Sino-India relations which have been strained since the 1962 War and had further setback in the 1971 crisis.

China and Pakistan

As in the last ten years Pakistan sought to develop a special relationship with the People's Republic of China, let me begin the analysis with Pak-China relations in the 1970's. Bhutto declared more than once that friendship with China would be cherished. The first great power he visited was, of course, China. Though China was not happy with Pakistan's clumsy handling of the Bangladesh issue, Peking reaffirmed her friendship and support to Pakistan in the joint communique issued after Bhutto's visit -- China condemned "Indian naked aggression" and reiterated her "firm support to the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to preserve their state sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside aggression."
China showed considerable restraint in putting any pressure on Pakistan as *quid pro quo* for her most valuable help to the latter since 1965. China, however, will not tolerate it if Bhutto makes a deal with India on Kashmir adversely affecting China's security problem. When Ayub pleaded most frantically for Chinese help during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and immediately after the war when Chou En-lai and Liu Shao Chi visited Pakistan in early 1966, the Chinese made only one condition—any settlement of Kashmir giving "undue advantages" to the Indian would not be approved by Peking. In August 1972 when one of Bhutto's top foreign policy advisers, Asis Ahmad, went to India to follow up the Simla Agreement, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Chia Kuan-han, arrived in Pakistan rather suddenly and according to some sources to the embarrassment of Bhutto who was then talking of an "era of peace" with India. The Chinese minister said: "Certain big powers have been attempting to obstruct the implementation the UN General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions of last December (1971)." The obvious reference was to the role of the Soviet Union and India. The limiting factors in Sino-Pakistan future relations may arise if the Pakistani leadership of either Bhutto or Wali Khan goes too far either in the direction of Moscow of New Delhi—a remote possibility in view of the internal determinants of Pakistan foreign policy. So the good relations and cooperation in various spheres including military between the two countries likely to continue in the 1970s. The Pakistan army is strongly in favor of continued close ties with Peking.
China expressed her support of the Pakistani cause in the Nixon-Chous communique issued on February 27, 1972. On the Pakistania side, Bhutto after his visit to Moscow in March 1972 declared: "Pakistan would always value the friendly help rendered by China. We will never be a party to any conspiracy against China." Pakistan-China friendship was dramatized by the recent visit of the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff, General Tikka Khan to Peking in 1973. His visit was followed by fresh supplies of Chinese military equipment for Pakistan, including MIG 19 planes and tanks. It was learnt from the reliable sources in Pa that China's military during the period 1954-65.

China's continued support of Pakistan has again been demonstrated by a 12-day visit of Chang-Tsai-Chien, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the China People's Liberation Army. During the visit, China's military assistance to Pakistan was obviously discussed. There were reports that during Chang's visit to Pakistan, China offered to help Pakistan to build ground-to-ground missiles. This news, however, has been contradicted by the Pakistan Ministry of foreign affairs. It, is, however, futile to expect that either Pakistan or China would not contradict such a report even if it were correct. Sino-Pakistan close relations are likely to be continued as they are based on a mutual advantages and identity of interested in the affairs of the subcontinent.
China and Bangladesh

China's "support" to Pakistan on the Bangladesh issue and during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 caused dismay and disappointment in Bangladesh, particularly the ruling Awami League Party whose attitude to Peking was never friendly even in the United Pakistan. At the moment, Bangladesh's relations with China are far from satisfactory. China made some gestures but those moves failed presumably under pressure from New Delhi and might be also be from Moscow. Bangladesh-China relations have two great limiting factors: Peking's continued support of Pakistan and her veto against Bangladesh at the U.N. till 1974. Secondly, the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations continue to be in its present state of tensions and stresses which began during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Unless there is improvement in the relations between New Delhi and Peking, prospects for any improved relations between Dacca and Peking are not bright.

There has been, however, overt activities in Bangladesh on the part of the Maoist guerrillas, many of whom have been brutally killed by the Awami League on the charge of "collaboration with Pakistan". The easiest way to eliminate any political opponent in Bangladesh today. Yet it is naive to think that Peking has no channel of contacts with Bangladesh though there is no contact at the Government level. It is too early to predict the nature or extent of the Chinese influence in Bangladesh. But one thing is certain: "China" cannot be eliminated as a factor from such an area. While there was an outburst of protests against China when she exercised a veto against Bangladesh's entry to the U.N. on August
though China withdrew the veto in 1974 26, 1972, Mujib and his government have shown caution while referring to China. Mujib said that he would welcome friendship with China. In spite of the fact, he continued, that China had supplied arms to the enemies of Bangladesh and applied the veto against her in the U. N., the people of Bangladesh were still prepared to "let bygones be bygones." Mujib added, he would not venture to say anything about China which is a big power but he concluded by saying that he people of Bangladesh had the courage to face any eventuality.

There are recent indications and reports that China is really interested in making contacts with Bangladesh. There have already been "unofficial contacts between the two countries, including a Bangladesh trade delegation to Peking. Peking, as I could gather from my talks with Bengali diplomats in Washington, at the U. N. and in London as well as from my talks with the Chinese officials at the Liaison office in Washington including H.E. Mr. HanHSü, is eager to establish diplomatic links with Bangladesh. Bangladesh is equally responsive because link with Peking is her only diplomatic option to reduce India's dictations in her foreign and defense problems.
Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union and China found common cause in supporting the Communist forces in Viet-nam, Laos and Cambodia but the Sin-Soviet rift remained in the facade of "international communist unit." The rift was more clearly seen in case of Cambodian and its exiled ruler, Prince Sihanouk. China's hold over Sihanouk from the time he was disposed out ruled out the chance of cordial relations between him and the Soviet leaders. The Soviet Union therefore began other ways of advancing their influence in Indo China at Peking's cost. The Kremlin leaders put their main hopes on Hanoi and they were trying to exploit North Vietnam's suspicion on a Sino-U.S. deal in 1971 when Nixon announced his visit to Peking. As a counter-measure, Chou En-Lai invited The North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to Peking before Nixon's visit, presumably to reassure Chinese continued support for Hanoi. After Nixon's visit Chou again met the North Vietnamese leaders to convince them of Peking's "total commitment to aims in Indo-China." According to Prince Sihanouk who also visited Hanoi on March 3-9, 1972, Pham Van Dong later told the Prince that he considered China's relations with President Nixon "to be their own affairs."

Hanoi needed both Moscow's and Peking help while the war was going on. Now with the communist victories Hanoi is an important and independent factor in Southeast Asia. In the emerging balance of power after the Indo-China war is over, Hanoi, which has turned out to be a middle-rank military power in Southeast Asia will complicate the balance further. Even if Moscow and Peking, in their rift with each other wants to improve ties with existing regimes in Southeast Asia and also with the United States, Hanoi is
likely to lend support to insurgent movements in Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and in other areas. It would be delicate for Moscow and Peking to be totally indifferent while Hanoi will play the role of "national liberator" in these areas.

But thanks to the growing Sino-Soviet rift and their anxieties to increase power and influence at each other costs, the existing regimes in Southeast Asia have better diplomatic options than if there had "international communist unity." Thanks to the Sino-Soviet rift, the two communist giants are trying to woo the existing regimes to their sides and giving assurances of "non-interference" in their "interval affairs."

Moscow's "guidelines for Asia" were given expression a booklet The Workers' Movement in The Countries of Asia and North Africa at the Contemporary Stage in which it was stated that each communist party in Asia and Africa was free to choose either peaceful or violent methods provided there were based on Marxism-Leninism and suited national requirements. The book was intended for the inner circle of the Soviet specialist in "Third World" affairs. The Russians seemed to have realized that despite the alleged dangers of collaboration with nationalists and democratic socialists, in most Third World Countries "United Front" with the nationalist and Socialists "is the communists only hope of seizing power or even of exerting influence."

During the late 1960s the Soviet Union had cultivated relations with South-east Asian Governments, establishing diplomatic ties with Malaysia, and Singapore and developing ties with Thailand and Philippines. Soviet naval activity was increasing.

The Soviet Union has intermittently since 1969 canvassed the idea of Asian collective security system in South-east Asia as in South Asia.
Soviet propaganda continued to harp on virtues of the Asian Security plan. The aim of the propaganda was enlist as many as possible of the Asian states, including those such as Thailand and Philippines which have western affiliations. Even Japan is encouraged by Moscow Radio "to play an important in an Asian collective security system." Of course, the Soviet Union as a "state with territory both in Europe and Asia" would be its natural leader. Visits to Moscow in October 1972 by the Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and the Shah of Iran gave the Kremlin leaders a new opportunity to air their proposals for an Asian collective security system. Notwithstanding the Soviet Consistent propaganda in favor of an Asian collective security plan, most of the Asian government shown reluctance to commit themselves to a Soviet-sponsored security plan aimed against China. They seem to be unwilling to be invetred in the Sino-Soviet rift. Moscow's frequent assertions that its collective security plan "enjoys wide support are not borne out by evidence."

The Soviet Union, which has been trying to sell its security proposals in Southeast Asia, seems to be opposed to neutralize the region. Malaysia has been trying to formulate some proposal for "a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" in Southeast Asia since 1972. Malaysia was able to obtain some support from ASEAN partners for the principle of neutralization, "qualified by doubts about the trustworthiness of China and varying views on the relationship between neutralization and regional co-operation and defence" Tun Razak told a Bankok press conference on December 15, 1972 that "we feel it is in China's interest to have a policy of co-existance."

Moscow was critical of any such moves for "a neutral Southeast Asia" as it would destroy her hopes for Asian collective security plan;
it accused Peking of being "unwilling to assist in easing the tense situation in Southeast Asia. In the Soviet view "the peace and security of Asia could best be maintained through the system of collective security. Though Tun ᶊ reported Chou En-Lai's "favorable reactions" to the proposals for a neutral Southeast Asia, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR), The Voice of The People of Burma and The Voice of The People of Thailand - Pseudo - Calandesline radio stations, supported by China, blasted against such proposals.

Both Moscow and Peking are desparating trying to enlist the support of existing regimes of Southeast Asia. Moscow is continuing its campaign for collective security plans, but simultaneously try to cultivate bilateral relations with existing governments of Southeast Asian countries. Japan has become a vocal point in Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia. The recognition in Moscow and Peking that the search for greater influence in Asia includes better relations with Japan was underlined by the prompt arrival of a Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo on March 27, 1973 and the invitation to Mr. Tanaka, the then Japan's Prime Minister to visit Moscow in 1973, while the Soviet Union's aim in wooing Tokyo is largely political and central to its Asian strategy, there seems little likelihood of any Japanese leadership sacrificing the new-formal ties with China to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

For the past few months, the Russians have warned the Japanese against concluding "a friendship treaty with the Chinese that would incorporate Peking's provision opposing attempts by any country "to establish hegemony in Asia". This was interpreted by the Russians as "rebutto Moscow's efforts to convene an Asian Collective Security system".

The Soviet Union has been showing signs of anxiety recently over what it views "as an insidious campaign by China to outflank Soviet
interests in both Europe and Asia". At a Soviet Military Conference in the last week of May 1975, the Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko told that Western imperialists were "establishing a united anti-Soviet front with participation of China" and that "they find understanding on the part of the Peking leadership, which has openly embarked on the path of struggle against the Soviet Union" (Reported in New York Times, June 6, 1976).

Chinese denunciation of the Soviet Union have increased dramatically in recent weeks (after the reaching their most sustained level since the armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet frontier in the winter of 1969). These attacks which began to mount after the communist victories in Indochina have been aimed at what was described as "Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia." In the last few days (June-July, 1975) the Chinese press accused the Soviet Union of trying to "swallow Southeast Asia at a gulp"; compared Brezhnev to Hitler and denounced the Russians for what it said was an attempt "to use aid to take control of the Third World."

"The Soviet Social Imperialists have honey on their lips and murder in their hearts" said Jemin Jih Pao, the official newspaper in a warning to the people of Southeast Asia (Reported in New York Times, July 11, 1975).

China's aim is in Southeast Asia as in other parts of the 'Third World' is to secure for her a major stake in Asian affairs at the expense of the Soviet Union both as an ideological fountain-head within the World Communist movement and an influence in the developing World. The Soviet Union has been "elevated to the first rank of China's enemies" since 1969 and it is still so. China, already is also carefully watching Hanoi's future role in Southeast affairs. The recent diplomatic relation with Malaysia, Philippines and most recently with Thailand are indicative of China's anxities to woo the existing regimes in Southeast Asia. It
would be naive to think that China will completely stop its support to insurgent movements in Southeast Asian countries. But for at least next few years, Peking is likely to give priority to diplomatic relations. As she has found that her equivocal attitude to communist insurgent movements in those countries has not helped to speed up the development of its relations with South-east Asia. The Russians seemed to have taken advantages of these countries's suspicious about China's role in communist insurgency. Hence Peking stepped its diplomatic initiatives with countries of South-east Asia such as Thailand, Philippines and others; eager to establish normal relations with Peking in the emerging balance of power in Southeast Asia after the Indo-China war.

**Implications for The United States**

Neither Moscow nor Peking is true friend of the United States. Moscow will continue detente diplomacy with Washington in its bilateral relations but in South and Southeast Asia, there is global competition between two super powers. The Soviet Union, with its better economic conditions as confirmed with China and much superior military capabilities, is in a better position to dominate South and Southeast Asia. In South Asia, the Soviet Union has found in India, her best partner and ally and as such can cause serious damages to countries like Pakistan and Iran. Iran is of great strategic importance to the U. S. global interests. The Soviet subversive activities through Afganistan in Pakistan would pose, as pointed out earlier, threats to Iran's security. The increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean - Persian Gulf areas, is another source of the U. S. concern for her global interests.

In Southeast Asia, if a Moscow-Hanoi alliance and friendship develops on the model of the Indo-Soviet relationship, it would be a