ANALYSIS OF A FATALITY OF ILLUSIONS: DOMINANT IMAGES OF INTERNA--ETC(U)
1976  E H METHVIN

UNCLASSIFIED
Dr. Wilkinson's paper is an excellent scholarly study. I find myself agreeing with most of his analysis and evaluations, and with his suggestions for counteraction. My commentary will focus on the salient points, and dwell on some operational possibilities.

Wilkinson's main thesis, stated on page 7, is that we confront a "special syndrome of revolutionary-criminality" characterizing certain revolutionary movements and factions; that they "form a special international criminal sub-culture of ruthless professional hit-men" (page 17); and that the Soviet leadership "has clearly taken due note" of the growth and potential influence of terrorist groups since the early 1960s (page 25).

Primary responses, Dr. Wilkinson recommends, must be vigorous police intelligence; reinstatement of the death penalty; political retaliations against the Soviets within the framework of the "detente" relationship; and "severe international police, judicial and punitive measures."
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DDC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
The "revolutionary-criminality syndrome" postulated by Wilkinson has been amply documented; my own book, THE RISE OF RADICALISM, traced its origins in the French Revolution, where Wilkinson himself also locates it in his own book, POLITICAL TERRORISM, down to our own "Weather Underground" and "Black Liberation Army" terrorists. We seem to be dealing with a new kind of collective neurosis, or even psychosis, induced by a unique combination of Twentieth Century megamedia and mobility.

In these hate collectives, individuals seem to lose their grip on reality. As Albert Speer put it, it's like "living in a hall of distorting mirrors," with no moral or realistic reference points, in which the inmate loses touch with the real world. Talking chiefly or only to each other, they convince themselves they can reach utopia and salvation via human sacrifice, much like the Tennessee snake-handlers persuade themselves to prove faith and salvation by fondling rattlesnakes; or like Milton Rokeach's "three Christs of Ypsilanti," who maintain their delusional belief systems despite the most stunning confrontations with contrary reality.

We are, in short, dealing with a form of collective madness—the same form that touched such Twentieth Century figures as Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler. Their tactics are dictated by technology and mass response,
or lack of response. If a 1930s-type world depression recurred, we might see "Carlos," alias Ilich Ramirez of the Great OPEC Snatch, shift to electoral politics and win votes just as Hitler did with phenomenal success from 1928-33. (Hitler, after all, first launched himself upon the German national scene with his 1923 "Beer Hall Putsch," which was actually a hostage-taking episode, involving the kidnap of an entire political rally, with the ministers of the Bavarian state government — the chief targets.) "Field Marshall Cinque" of the Symbionese Liberation Army might choose, like Huey Newton, to run for Mayor of Oakland—and win. Charles Manson and his "family" might start mass-marketing their "helter-skelter" package the way Hitler marketed his Thousand Year Reich delusion. If a major international war or long-drawn-out foreign campaign analagous to the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war, the world's terrorist crystals might disgorge all sorts of demons to "pick up power lying in the streets" the way Lenin did in October 1917.

Given this historical backdrop of Twentieth Century experience, it strikes me as artificial and unduly scholastic to try to define "terrorism" in complete isolation from historical context. Lenin and Stalin in 1906 were executing bank robberies and murders to finance their bolshevik
organization. In 1905 Lenin was advocating attacks on police stations
just like the Venezuelan FIN of 1963–64, the Black Panther Party of 1967–71
and the Black Liberation Army of 1971–73. We also saw the terrorism of the
Viet Cong in the 1958–55 period, which steadily grew and shaded over into
guerrilla attacks at first, then into set-piece battled by Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese Army units. And in December 1975 the Argentine terrorists
attempted to move from terror attacks to guerrilla unit attacks on a small
scale, in obvious preparation to moving up the ladder of conflict.

Do we advance our understanding of the contemporary phenomenon by
drawing a line to exclude these characters and groups from our neat category
of "terrorists"? Our problem resembles some of the Linnaean problems
of classification in botany and biology; or Churchill's introduction to
"Mrs. Bossons," who was "neither one nor the other."

Terrorism is a
tactic, not a mentality. We are dealing with the radical-utopian-messianic
mentality, subjects who select tactics according to individual inclinations,
tactical situations, and historical-traditional environments, including
media-borne "fads." I see a common element of megalomania in such figures
as Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Charlie Manson, Bernardine Dohrn
and Che Guevara. Erich Fromm sees a large element of "non-erotic
sadomasochism in such figures as Hitler and Stalin. (See THE ANATOMY OF HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS.)

The plain fact is that we, intelligence analysts, operational authorities, journalists, scholars—collectively do not have enough raw data to begin to define the syndrome we're dealing with. But certainly we have enough specimens in captivity to begin a considerable zoological study. Recently I read that the West Germans alone have over ninety terrorists in captivity. We have many of our own. So have the Israelis, British, Argentines, Uruguays and Mexicans and Japanese. The Canadians collected quite a zooful, and Dr. Gustave Morf wrote a very useful book (TERROR IN QUEBEC) reporting on his prison interviews with them; most of these FLQ terrorists drew 5-7 year sentences, and are now re-entering society—and useful study could be done on their re-integration or non-integration. Dr. David G. Hubbard, the Dallas psychiatrist, largely at his own expense and with minimal outside financing, tracked down and interviewed scores of skyjackers, and his book, THE SKYJACKERS, turned the entire Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration, and U.S. airlines around in their responses to the problem. Result: we do not see anymore the highly publicized skyjackings on our front pages and
television news programs; though they continue to happen about once a month, the incidence is drastically lower.

Question: Why does not the National Institute of Mental Health finance a major research effort, following the pattern of Adorno's THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY and Almond's APPEALS OF COMMUNISM, to interview, analyze, and describe these terrorist collections? This literature should be open and unclassified, following the reporting pattern of the medical profession, since we need to mobilize the best brains in both academia and journalism in designing prophylaxis and response.

We also need a major effort to expose and document the doctrines taught in the major Soviet terror schools. This means finding and interviewing alumni who can tell what they are teaching. One of the most revealing experiences I ever had was spending an evening with Leonard Patterson, who back in the 1930s spent a year (and roomed with CPUSA boss Gus Hall) at the Lenin School in Moscow. (See THE RIOT MAKERS, pp. 211-213.)

The interrogator, by listening carefully, can gain immense insight into the pedagogical methods, the psychological cadre-moulding techniques, and the mass manipulation doctrines taught in such educational programs.

Harry Stack Sullivan taught us that, in the psychiatric interview, we
frequently learn as much about the parents and significant others
involved in shaping the psyche of the interviewee as we learn of the
interviewee himself. The same would hold true of interviewing alumni
of the Soviet system of subversive schooling. Unfortunately, I know of
no effort to do a careful anatomy of these terror schools, and believe
it has not been done. My own magazine once carried an article by a
Venezuelan, Juan Dedios Marin, called, "Inside a Castro 'Terror School'",
which was illuminating; and John Barron's KGB details "The Soviet Plot
to Destroy Mexico," but does not attempt to detail the North Korean
training of the Soviet-recruited Mexican terrorists.

Such research would have obvious operational applications in targeting and
developing and evaluating informants, in psychological campaigns against
terrorist movements and groups, and in operational responses in hostage
and barricade situations and the like. It might also serve to enlighten
a journalist or two.