MOTIVATION AND RETENTION
IN THE U. S. ARMY

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MOTIVATION AND RETENTION IN THE U. S. ARMY

by Aaron B. Nadel and Jay B. Mowbray

Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20315

Research Studies are special reports to military management. They are usually prepared to meet requests for research results bearing on specific management problems. A limited distribution is made—primarily to the operating agencies directly involved.
FOREWORD

Problems of motivation and retention in the U. S. Army are embedded in a complex of social, economic, political, and personal values in a flux of peacetime, mobilization, cold-war, and limited war conditions.

The scientific methods which the U. S. Army Personnel Research Office is accustomed to employ would tend to deal with the problem segmentally. In its manned systems research, selection research, and human factors experimentation, APRO's approach is to establish specific hypotheses and deal with their verification—for example, the characteristics of individuals who remain in the Army beyond an initial period of service would be tentatively identified and then established empirically. The present problem seemed to demand a broader approach. Even the delineation of the problem, complicated as it is by a host of factors involved in top military and national policy, was felt to require an examination of broad scope by senior analysts representing a variety of backgrounds and disciplines—behavioral science, operations research, political and economic science—and a thorough knowledge of the military environment.

TEMPO of General Electric, and the principal investigator for this problem, Dr. Nadel, seemed particularly appropriate for a first phase attack on this problem. If anything clearly emerges from this report it is that the Army is confronted with a multi-variable problem on which no one group of personnel managers can hope to make a significant impact; rather, the problem involves work for a great variety of groups. For example, there are clear indications of the need for:

1. A vigorous and continuing effort in the RDT&E area for a selected number of studies.

2. An even more vigorous effort in Operations and Maintenance type personnel management activities such as a systematic examination of the job content of junior officers and the modernization of these jobs—as job analysts have for many years done for enlisted men of the Army.

3. A vigorous analysis of the attitude survey program as it operates within the Army today in order to improve the utilization and increase the effectiveness of survey activities.

4. Also as an Operations and Maintenance activity, an economic analysis of all the fringe benefits and trade-off considerations within the basic pay structure.

These are just a few examples of the outcomes possible as a result of this report. However, as this document is staffed, additional items will undoubtedly occur to action officers who have responsibility for improving
the physical, social, psychological and economic environment of the military
in the direction of the ultimate goal of an alert and effective military force.

J. E. UHLANER
Director
USAPRO Laboratories
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to express their gratitude to various individuals who were instrumental in guiding the course of this study. Special thanks are due to Dr. Arthur J. Drucker of USAPRO for his unstinting support and counsel, and for his assistance in uncovering essential data and information. Our gratitude is also expressed to Dr. J. E. Uhlaner and Colonel Marshall O. Becker of USAPRO for their advice and criticism as the study progressed, and for providing the opportunity to meet and confer with key officials of the U. S. Army and of the various agencies of DCSPER and USAPRO. Similar acknowledgement is made of the interest, guidance, and cooperative spirit of the Chief of Staff and the many officials of DCSPER and Chief, Office of Reserve Components who gave freely of their thoughts and who provided much of the background that served as the basis for analysis and study.

Thanks are also due to several at TEMPO who proved so helpful to the authors: Miss Evelyn Harner for finding and extracting pertinent materials from the literature, Miss Suzy Aten and Mrs. Barbara Jordan for their assistance in transcribing the materials into a readable document.
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MOTIVATION AND RETENTION IN THE ARMY

THE RETENTION PROBLEM IN THE ARMY

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The conclusion of World War II saw a radical and swift change in the nation's outlook towards military service. The almost immediate demobilization of officers and men led to the determination of who should stay or who should go. The professionals, at the time, were in the minority, yet it was evident in the general political environment that the military was not to remain small, as it was prior to World War II, and still meet the post-war commitments of the U. S. By 1950 this was even more apparent with the revolutionary movements stirring in Asia and with the overt Communist expansionism in Korea. Thus, the requirements for qualified and experienced officers and men grew despite the fact that there was no formal declaration of war. Our commitments were such as to warrant a far higher standing Army than the U. S. was accustomed to support during times of peace. It became evident that greater reliance was to be placed upon military force as a direct arm of political action in the international sphere. This policy for national defense became especially critical as the Soviets came into possession of a nuclear war capability and soon initiated policies based on nuclear blackmail.

With such developments, the manpower draft was reaffirmed and new levels were authorized to the Army on a continuing basis. To meet these levels and produce the quality required of our military personnel, a voluntary program of enlistment was essential, both at the officer and troop levels. Several factors are of real concern here: (1) the reality of manpower resources, i. e., the numbers game; (2) the tremendous impact of military technology occurring immediately following World War II; (3) the increasing demand for many diverse and higher skills; and (4) the added training time required to attain skill levels.

It was therefore necessary to undertake certain moves which could be considered essentially as techniques to expand manpower resources for the Army, as well as other services. This meant providing increased sources of personnel input both for officer and enlisted duties. The general environment was not that of a true national emergency or condition of general war. It may be described as an era of peace-keeping despite the strong cold war context of international relations.
Although the Selective Service Program was still in force and was effectively used, it became an instrument of pressure in stimulating voluntary recruitment. American youth, as always, with an anti-military image except under conditions of a declared war or national emergency, needed a prod to serve the nation's peacekeeping policy, and between the draft and voluntary enlistments, the larger forces were recruited and maintained. However, this has continued at a cost. The cost is reflected in terms of high turnover rates, numerous and repeated training programs, and expensive recruiting and retention activities.

For the great bulk of AUS officers demobilized at the end of World War II, the extended (10 to 15 years) economic boom proved to be very attractive in enticing them to enter the civilian economy, already suffering from shortages of qualified manpower. Many active duty officers with excellent qualifications and performance records were unable to resist the tempting offers consisting of dollars, position, influence, and other benefits. The post-war technology, strongly emphasizing novel weapons and equipment for potential military use, needed the know-how of people with military experience together with that of the industrial technologist. This demand siphoned off substantial numbers into the various arms industries.

Similarly, trained enlisted technicians, experienced in the mechanical and electronic skills, were attracted to industry, and the re-enlistment rates for the several skilled technical occupations showed sharp declines. Various incentives were initiated and incentive programs formalized with only partial successes. The enlisted man, generally, still seemed to prefer the lesser constraints of a civilian environment, especially when he had a saleable skill as an asset.

What developed rather importantly during this period was the converging of military and civilian skills in a large variety of occupations. In addition, American youths on the farms and in many rural communities, once attracted to a military life as a career, were either going to college or migrating to the cities to take industrial employment, attracted by the new affluence that was rising in the cities. A one time major resource for Army manpower was fast disappearing as the rural workers found themselves being displaced by machines which were far more productive.
The post-World War II Army, now in a process of expansion to new levels of stability to support national policy, found it necessary to depend more and more upon the college ROTC program as its major source of junior officer input. Despite the tremendous increase in students enrolling in ROTC (in many cases as a result of the Selective Service draft), there was no concomitant expansion, as may have been expected, in the number of ROTC graduates selecting the military profession as a career. The statistics have tended to show surprising stability for some years now, actually since World War II, with less than 1 out of 4 officer graduates of the college ROTC program being interested in a military career. This has resulted in a continually revolving two-year training program for junior officers, and an inability of the service to meet and fill the gaps at the next several company level officer grades. This pattern reflects an unseemly high junior officer operating cost, both in dollars as well as manpower utilization.

The trend to long-term civilian rather than military interests must be accepted as a necessary limitation of the existing ROTC program. Most of these young officers were willing to meet their service obligation. The great majority, however, prior to their entry into obligated service, had already made their decision either to enter graduate school for specialization or to take on a civilian career occupation. Therefore, the career choice of most ROTC officers was in the civilian direction, and their military obligation was seen as a necessary two-year delay.

For those ROTC graduates who were already committed to the choice of a military career, there was generally no question but that for most the decision was firm. Others, on the fence, so to speak, found that the duties and responsibilities of a junior officer, especially during the period of so-called non-war, could be far less than glamorous and even less satisfying than expected. Their decisions, which could be influenced by their experiences during the two-year period of obligation, were strongly dependent upon the nature of their experience, their environmental pressures, their families, their expectations and a host of other related factors. So far emphasis has been placed on the ROTC graduate, the nucleus of the largest input segment of the Army's officer recruitment program.
Additional concern with attrition has found early retirement of both Regular and Reserve officers to affect the Army's needs in a period of expanding requirements. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was designed to encourage Reserve officers to remain on active duty and to qualify for retirement after 20 years of continuous service. The Act also met the objective of providing, through early retirement, a means for maintaining the vigor of the services. Thus, the early retirement concept, supported by legislative action, was established as a policy on the one hand to motivate the Reserve officers to remain in active service, on the other hand, to allow those Regulars who had not been promoted to request voluntary retirement prior to 30 years service without loss of accrued benefits.

The notion of seniority as the principal basis for promotion was modified to include qualification as a prime factor, in order to open up the promotion flow to the younger officers. The effect of legislation was to stimulate the less qualified senior officers to retire, to cut off the humps of excess officers in certain grades resulting from the carryover after the war, and to motivate the up and coming technically trained officers to remain on active duty. At the senior levels, the ratio of officers promoted to total numbers in grade declines sharply, and with a strongly maintained "up or out" policy, has produced an increasing trend in the early voluntary retirement of Regular officers. This is largely due to the failure of achieving promotion or to the anticipated failure of attaining promotion in order to make retirement voluntary and initiate a second career at an earlier age.

The principle of the 20 year career has been generally applied to Reserve officers and to enlisted personnel. Reserve officer attrition is based actually on administrative action, even at the 20 year retirement point. When the need is great, larger percentages of Reserves will be asked to remain on duty, when the need is low, many will be released prior to retirement with severance pay or at the 20 year threshold. Although there is no mandatory retirement provision at 20 years for Reserve officers, the belief has grown in the existence of mandatory retirement. Actually, the retirement rate of Reserve officers, though substantially higher than that of Regulars at the 20 year period, is not as great as would be expected with a mandatory retirement policy. Nonetheless, the high attrition
rate due to early retirement of many Reserves does contribute to increased promotional opportunity at the senior grades for those remaining in service.

Thus, the principle of the 20 year retirement plays a paradoxical role: it serves as an incentive for the retention of Regular and Reserve officers, and at the same time, clears the promotional channels by offering an acceptable way out for those not selected for the senior grades. Where it seems to go astray and acts as a negative factor to retention, is when officers anticipate the likelihood of nonpromotion by several years, and request early voluntary retirement.

RETENTION RATES OF JUNIOR OFFICERS

Upon the conclusion of World War II, the Armed Services found themselves overloaded with personnel despite the rapid demobilization. A similar condition developed several years later immediately following the Korean conflict. At that time, many Reserve officers who had been recalled to active duty were "RIF'ed" as excess, and for a number of years the retention of officers did not appear to be a serious problem. There were still several "humps" in company and field grade levels to more than meet existing requirements. Prior to the Korean conflict, however, Louis Ridenour, in 1949, recognized at least for the USAF, the existence of some deterioration in the overall personnel situation, and recommended action to prevent the "hump and trough" effect. It was not until several years after Korea that recognition was given to the problem of retention of young officers, with the realization that this need was becoming quite critical. This was found to be especially true with the incorporation of newer technological weapons and equipments into the operating forces, and initiation and spread of new military research and development centers needing qualified military officers to staff them. The demands for specialization had become more intense and the pressures for properly educated and trained officers produced a rather dramatic change as new military doctrines and operational programs were devised and instituted.
Army officer retention\(^1\) has generally shown a relatively stable pattern. These trends are directly associated with the source of recruitment, yet, to a degree, do respond to situational factors from time to time. For instance, during the fiscal years between 1957 and 1965, an average of only 1 out of 4 Junior officers classified as OTRA\(^2\) requested extension of active duty beyond their obligated term. A comparison of this rate with the rate of retention of USMA graduates at the end of three years after commissioning showed more than 9 out of 10 of the latter group remaining on active duty. Even after five years of active service, more than 8 out of 10 Academy graduates remained in active service, showing a relatively small increment in attrition. OCS trained officers, during the past five years, showed, on the average, some 7 out of 10 continuing on active duty following their obligated service. The Distinguished Military Graduate Program as a source of officer development from the ROTC source rates quite highly from the retention aspect as more than 9 out of 10 remain in active service after completing their obligated terms. This rate deteriorates only slightly to 8 out of 10 after seven years of service, comparing quite favorably with the figures for USMA graduates.

The above data represent general averages covering periods ranging between 5 and 9 years of the last 10 year period. It is essential not only to examine the overall rate but also to ascertain the trend that has developed and may be expected to continue into the future, if extrapolated with the same conditions prevailing.

Reserve officers at the junior officer level (OTRA), the bulk of whom are from the ROTC, show a low retention rate. Figure 1 indicates an upward trend between FY 1957 and FY 1961, followed by a newly decelerating trend subsequently. Graduates of the USMA, show much higher retention rates than OTRA officers. Figure 2

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1/ Statistics presented in this section are based on data obtained from PRD, DCSPE, and from ROTC, CORC.
2/ OTRA - Other Than Regular Army - Usually covering Reserve officers, and primarily ROTC, especially at the Junior officer level.
The numbers include 3900 officers recalled involuntarily for 2 years active duty during the FY 62 Berlin crisis; this accounts for the lower retention rate during FY 64.

Figure 1. Retention rates of OTRA junior officers after obligated service (2 years).

Figure 2. Retention rates of recent USMA graduates.
shows a fairly stable trend for USMA graduates for both the 3 and 4 year periods of active service. At 5 years, the trend shows a declining pattern for the most recent classes. Beginning with the class graduating in 1968, all USMA graduates will be obligated to a 5 year term of service, which factor will solve the down turn in trend shown in Figure 2 at the 5 year period, and perhaps delay this pattern an additional few years. It must be remembered that the discrepancy between Regular Army USMA Graduates and Reserve ROTC Graduates is to be associated with the fact that the Academy Graduate is oriented towards a military profession, the ROTC Graduate generally towards a civilian profession.

In reviewing the retention problem of junior grade Reserve officers, we examined the question from a different angle, that which considered the Army’s requirements for junior officers and its ability to fill these requirements with qualified personnel. For FY 1964, the stated minimum need for junior grade Reserve officers for all branches called for the retention of 2511 experienced personnel. Actual retention figures totaled 2092, indicating a gap of about 17 percent or 419 officers. Shortages were noted, in varying degrees, in all but one Branch, the QMC. One might note, in passing, that this Branch performs functional activities which appear to coincide rather closely with civilian-type activities, providing a more attractive opportunity for officers to gain experience which can be applied to future civilian employment.

The fact of the shortages, coupled with an increasing demand for junior officers, along with a decreasing retention rate, points to an urgently developing manpower problem within the Army.

ROTC SOURCE FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS

Although the ROTC is the basic manpower source for junior officers, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that enrollment totals and retention rates are susceptible to a variety of factors. Our concern at this point is not to detail the specific factors and pressures which act upon the ROTC during the different phases of the Cold War, but rather to extract the results and consider where the corrective measures may be taken.
Evidently there has been a lessening of the appeal of the Army ROTC despite marked increments in college enrollments since the beginning of the 1961 school year. Although many new institutions have been opened throughout the country, no new ones have been added to the totals of those sponsoring ROTC programs. Total college ROTC enrollments within the 247 sponsoring institutions have actually decreased by 23,000 over a 5 year period while the same institutions have shown an overall increase in their male population of some 191,600 (Table 1). The annual figures show a decreasing trend in the number of ROTC enrollments. Figure 3, below, shows the pattern of the decrease, in percentages of the total, both for total ROTC enrollments and for Freshman enrollments during the same time period.

Despite the increases in male students for all classes in the 247 institutions sponsoring ROTC activities, there has been a steady decline in ROTC enrollments. This trend holds true for the overall totals, i.e., the four years of ROTC, and for each Freshman class during the time period covered. A cursory glance at Freshman ROTC enrollments for the current school year shows an absolute increase of 3,600. However, when related to the total number of enrolling Freshmen at the same institutions, the ratio showed a continuation of the downward trend of interest in the ROTC.

It is difficult to trace this development to a single cause. It is our impression that a number of factors are probably responsible for this trend, especially when examined in the light of events occurring during the past few years. These factors are believed to include: the step-up of the pace in Viet Nam, the increasing acceptance of civilian-oriented goals by young males, a lack of interest in military activities by college youths, the influences of campus agitation and moral issues, and the preference to gamble with the Selective Service draft rather than the mantle of responsibility and challenge through public service.
Table 1. Beginning school year male and ROTC enrollment data at the 247
institutions sponsoring army ROTC (5-year period).

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<th>SCHOOL YEAR</th>
<th>FRESHMEN/MS</th>
<th>SOPHOMORE/MS</th>
<th>JUNIOR/MS</th>
<th>SENIOR/MS</th>
<th>TOTAL MALE/ TOTAL ROTC</th>
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<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>239,960/93,334</td>
<td>179,406/58,103</td>
<td>149,432/14,480</td>
<td>145,168/12,383</td>
<td>713,966/180,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>239,751/83,792</td>
<td>186,920/38,417</td>
<td>162,102/14,377</td>
<td>147,885/12,890</td>
<td>736,659/169,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>244,297/78,217</td>
<td>191,497/52,489</td>
<td>172,183/14,047</td>
<td>165,840/13,743</td>
<td>773,919/158,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>272,129/83,426</td>
<td>178,429/48,551</td>
<td>175,119/12,412</td>
<td>177,617/12,914</td>
<td>825,294/157,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>307,815/87,014</td>
<td>225,529/47,183</td>
<td>190,040/11,867</td>
<td>182,232/11,366</td>
<td>905,616/157,432</td>
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Figure 3. ROTC enrollments as a percent of total enrollments, for all students,
for freshmen (247 sponsoring institutions).
From the above data, we can derive several specific yet obvious conclusions:

1. There is a decreasing trend in overall ROTC college enrollments in relation to the general trend in college male enrollments.

2. ROTC represents a substantial resource for junior officers if recruitment can be substantially improved to fulfill Army requirements.

3. Possible alternative solutions
   a). A program to influence more college students to enroll in Army ROTC, or
   b). A program to influence retention rates of junior officers commissioned through ROTC but who withdraw from active service upon completion of their military obligation.

VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT OF REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS

Voluntary retirements of Regular Army officers have not attained the absolute numbers which might be considered critical. However, if one follows the trend of voluntary retirements during the past nine years, it is possible to conclude that a problem is in the making and may well be crystallized within the next 5 years or so. Figure 4 shows this trend and how it has doubled between 1956 and 1964. Despite the reversals which occurred in response to specific situations, the trend is unmistakably upward. The reversals may have slowed the rate a bit but they certainly did not block the trend.

If we analyze early retirements in terms of their occurrence in time, we find the bulk occurring between 20 and 24 years of service Figure 5.
Reversals in trend are: 1958, effect of payraise legislation; 1962, effect of Berlin buildup.

Figure 4. Voluntary retirements as a percent of total RA eligible officers (other than general officers).

Reversals in trend are: 1958, effect of payraise legislation; 1962, effect of Berlin buildup.

Figure 5. Voluntary retirements as a percent of total RA eligible officers (other than general officers) with 20-24 years of active service.
Eighty (80) percent of all RA voluntary retirements among those who served less than 30 years occur within the 20-24 year period of active duty for the following reasons:

1. Retirement eligibility is determined at 20 years of active Armed Forces Service.
2. Failure to achieve RA promotion to Lieutenant Colonel within this time period.
3. Request for retirement following non-selection to Temporary Colonel.

An analysis of the quality of retirees was undertaken of those retiring during FY 1964, and comparison was made with RA officers remaining on active service. For those retiring between 20 and 22 years, the findings indicated that retirees were generally below average RA quality within the same grade. For those retiring between 23 and 25 years, the study showed retirees to be only slightly below overall RA quality on the average.

RETIREMENT OF RESERVE OFFICERS

Information obtained from a variety of sources in the Army indicated the general belief in the existence of a policy calling for the "mandatory" retirement for Reserve Officers, and second, the utilization beyond the 20 year period of over 50 percent of those eligible for retirement.

The information furnished included the total number of Reserve officers with 20 or more years of active service eligible for retirement, and the numbers who did retire at the 20 year period. Figure 6, showing the number of retirees as a percent of the number eligible, seems to point to a declining trend in early retirement. Since our sample is quite small, we are reluctant to consider this a firm trend without additional substantiation.

The statistical evidence, however, seems quite sufficient to demonstrate the fallacy of a current policy "mandatory" retirement,
since it is very apparent that more than half of the Reserve officers eligible for retirement at 20 years of active service continue on active duty, a far greater portion than had been assumed.

The substantial drop in retirements for FY 1965 may be largely due to the demands of the Service created by the conflict in Viet Nam, the additional demands caused by the expansion of training facilities and activities, the need for continued maintenance of large numbers of troop units in other areas abroad and an additional pay raise effective in August 1965.

IMPACT OF ATTRITION

The foregoing material has shown either that there already exist or there are developing trends in the attrition of officer personnel which can in time prevent the Army from fielding its authorized effective strength because of shortages of experienced officer personnel. At present, the shortages are manifested most markedly at the junior officer level. Before too long, shortages will be found among the officers who represent 5 to 12 years of experience and those who represent 20 to 30 years of experience.
Where junior officers from the ROTC source are leaving the Service after fulfilling their 2 years of obligated service, we see a pattern leading to an anticipated unavailability of sufficient numbers of 1st Lieutenants, Captains, and Majors before too long. A continuing replacement cycle of 2nd Lieutenants and junior 1st Lieutenants who enter from the ROTC each year, then depart after 2 years, does not provide the manpower needed to move into the successively higher grades both for training and operational duties.

A retention rate at the junior officer level, averaging less than 1 out of 3 for the ROTC input, can produce a cumulative effect, resulting in a number of choices for the Army:

- Involuntary recall of Reserves.
- Lowering of qualification standards for retention.
- Lengthening the term of obligated service of ROTC graduates.
- Expansion of OCS as a source of officer procurement and development.
- A program of corrective action designed to motivate junior officer retention on a voluntary basis.

Attrition of senior officers through voluntary retirement has not reached a critical stage. There are, however, indications that officers who possess the qualifications and experience and who could serve some additional 8 to 10 years are requesting retirement in increasing numbers. Thus, mobility out of the Service will be greater than mobility into the service, with the result that the Army will find itself in the midst of a severe manpower shortage at the critical officer levels before too many years.

Especially important to a military organization is the requirement for experienced leadership, a function generally dependent upon years of training and the continued exercise of judgment within a military context. Unlike industry which has no direct counterpart for strictly military functions, the Army cannot induce highly qualified executives from the outside to take on the various roles of military officers.
The most logical solution therefore is to examine those factors that affect retention, ascertain which are likely to be the most attractive in influencing retention positively and facilitate their utility. At the same time, those factors which have a negative impact on retention should be identified and corrective measures instituted to nullify their influence.

For enlisted personnel, the major problem is the retention of technical specialists covering a variety of MOS's. Although there are aspects of retention which can be traced to some of the same causal factors which affect officer retention, in the main the basic problems are quite different, as will be evident from the review of the literature. Similarly, corrective actions and solutions also take different directions, and the recently instituted variable re-enlistment bonus may well prove to be a real boon to the re-enlistment of technical specialists at the enlisted level. At the same time, other important factors have been identified and solutions recommended.

The section which follows is a review of the available literature which is related to the overall problem of retention of military personnel. The sources include:

Sociological Analyses of Military Organization
Survey Studies of Civilian Attitudes toward the Military
Sociological Studies of the Regular Army
Sociological Studies of the Military Profession
Psychological Studies of the American Soldier
Governmental Studies of Military Pay
Military Retirement System Studies
Surveys of Occupational Opportunities and Pay Scales
Manpower and Human Resources Studies
Industrial Motivation and Morale Research Studies

Surveys of the Attitudes of Young People

Military Journals and Personnel Publications

Military Personnel Research Reports

Analysis of these materials has attempted to uncover principles relevant to a comprehensive view of military retention. Positive and negative factors contributing to retention have been identified where there appears to be sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion.

The final section of the report offers corrective measures and, in some situations, suggests studies to determine whether the recommended actions are feasible and/or economical, and whether they do affect retention in the predicted direction.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS IN RETENTION

Recent sociological studies (1) give some indication of the strength of the socio-psychological forces that affect retention of qualified personnel by the U. S. Army. These studies of the evolution of the professional soldier and the social organization and leadership in the Armed Forces of the United States delineate and discuss many of the social forces a young man faces in deciding upon a military career. The social factors pertinent to two important personnel categories: namely, the critical enlisted technical specialists and the newly commissioned ROTC officer, will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Enlisted Technical Specialists

In the Army the need for unskilled manpower has declined rapidly and the demand for technically competent manpower has increased correspondingly. The use of sophisticated weapons dispels the image of combat assignments as basically unskilled enlisted assignments. The mental abilities and aptitudes necessary to master the training required to produce the required skills are found among the more educated. By selection and management procedures, the level of education among enlisted personnel in the Army has risen gradually from 1941 to 1961. During this twenty year period the number of Army enlisted men with high school diplomas increased by 39 percent while the increase among all male civilians was only 30 percent.(2) Recruits procured under the pressure of the draft provided the quality of manpower needed for training. Unfortunately these men are generally not career motivated. More favorable motivation toward the service is found in the reservoir of men lacking formal educational qualifications.

Kurt Lang, (3) a sociologist who has studied these problems, has said: "The enlisted force, one of the last havens in the United States of a genuinely lower-class culture, provides an important avenue of social mobility to the young men who have aptitudes but lack the formal education required for alternative careers." In the past the
manpower for standing armies in this country has come from surplus populations in rural areas where economic opportunities were limited. Now urban areas contain the large numbers of young people whose civilian employment opportunities are severely circumscribed by educational deficiencies. Substantial increases in "school dropouts" among the enlisted population may further depress the already low status of the enlisted career soldier in our affluent society. This source of manpower, however, is the logical alternative to relying on short-term personnel with high turnover rates.

At the same time, the transfer value of military training to civilian employment is increasing. The armed forces stand out as one of the more technologically advanced sectors of our society since they employ higher proportions of technicians, administrative-clerical, mechanics and repairmen, and service workers than are found in the overall male labor force.\(^{(4)}\)

A combination of decreasing prestige of an enlisted military career and increasing transfer value of military skills suggests aggravated turnover problems among highly skilled enlisted personnel.

Newly Commissioned ROTC Officers

Army officership is still a low status profession in the United States, ranking just below the public school teacher in the minds of the adult public.\(^{(5)}\) Despite the proliferation of military specialties, the advanced technical changes in weapons systems, and the election and appointment of military officers to high offices, the public accords low prestige to the military officer. Individual military heroes and leaders are applauded but past stereotypes of disciplined inflexibility remain rooted in the public image of the profession.

Historically, the military profession was a "way of life" with a high level of group cohesion and professional loyalty. The military community, often isolated from civilian life in the United States, maintained distinctive characteristics and values. Although some of this flavor remains, recent years have seen drastic changes in the style of life, tasks and aspirations of the Army officer. The Army has changed from a small somewhat isolated social group to a large
heterogeneous society with elaborate and complex civilian ties. Before World War II career commitments to the Army were formed early and tended to be fixed for a lifetime. In a recent study only 76 percent of all Army officers indicated they desired to remain on active duty indefinitely or until retirement. Among West Point graduates 82 percent were career committed while only 58 percent of officers with ROTC commissions wished to remain on active duty indefinitely. A most interesting category, the OCS graduate, indicated a 92 percent willingness to stay in service. No longer are officers, by virtue of their commission, committed to a military career. For many it is only a phase in a longer occupational career. In many respects the Army has ceased to be a profession and has become instead a source of jobs geared to the mobility needs of individuals in a fluid society. The factors that have weakened social cohesion within the Army probably account for the loss of some Academy graduates after only eight or more years of indoctrination. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ROTC officer is seldom influenced by the "way of life" which in the past has encouraged career commitment.

The officer's place of work is seldom a completely military community. Large numbers of civilian employees, contractors, technical representatives and scientists with various interests and degrees of authority make it difficult for the young officer to establish positive identification with the military profession. Usually the officer's place of residence is separated from his work and his wife and family may associate primarily with civilian families.

Even for the young officer many military duties have become desk jobs and office work that is often similar to and performed in conjunction with civilian jobs. Seldom does the young officer have duties that give him the satisfactions of innovation or the pride of complete responsibility.

Many of the former aspects and benefits of the military "way of life" including a full gentleman's career (to age 60 with leisure for recreation and professional study as well as adequate retirement) are no longer available. Even Army publications now speak of a "second career" rather than retirement.

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The core of West Point trained officers and ROTC officers from military schools and military families is too small to disseminate the military codes of behavior, etiquette, etc., that might foster a sense of "belonging" in the ROTC officer.

As is the case with the enlisted specialist, the skill and education requirements between military officer occupational specialties and civilian job requirements have narrowed. New skill requirements, the growing importance of academic rather than strictly military education and diversification of military careers are all elements in this process. A University of Michigan study (6) of four-thousand officers who retired between 1955 and 1960 illustrates the relationship between amount of education and early retirement. Careers were classified as minimal career, 20 years or less; intermediate, 21 to 29 years; and extended, 30 years or more. Those officers with limited education - less than high school - were characterized by a high concentration of intermediate and extended careers, and as educational level rose the proportions of minimal careers rose. Under current policies, officers without educational qualifications are being passed over for promotion and are forced to retire with a minimal career. Therefore this pattern is certain to change as education and experience acquired during a military career become increasingly important determinants for mobility potential. Thus, while the family traditions and military community influences that previously held the military profession together have been weakening, the young officer is finding his skills and training more useful in the civilian world.

The ROTC graduate usually begins his service with a very low commitment to a military career. He has no stake in career prospects or retirement benefits. In fact, the young officer often has to overcome unfamiliarity with rank hierarchies and command and staff relationships that have no counterpart in civilian social structures. Sometimes he must discard previous civilian ideas and misconceptions of the profession. If he finds job satisfactions and career opportunities that appeal to him during the short period of his obligated tour, commitment to a military career is a possibility. For the ROTC officer a career commitment is usually a function of the time he has already invested, his sense of professional satisfaction, and the alternatives available to him in civilian occupations.
If, instead, the ROTC officer feels that his skills and abilities are not being utilized or that he is not being offered full and equal career opportunities, he becomes another statistic in the crucial shortage of competent young officers. A survey(6) has shown that officers who feel their skills have been properly utilized are more likely to be planning to stay in the Army. Thus perceived skill utilization seems to be a prime factor in the degree of commitment to a career. This is true regardless of the source of commission.

Conclusions

In analyzing factors associated with the sociological bases for career commitments one is impressed with the importance of career experiences. Little can be done to enhance the status of the military profession in the public image or to change the direction of civilian-military interaction in Defense Department activities. Much can be done to build commitments to military goals and careers among highly trained enlisted technicians and newly commissioned ROTC officers. The Army must be as concerned with career experiences as with career recruitment in building career commitments. Improved ways must be found to develop deeper identifications with the military establishment, to promote military career opportunities and to gain service commitments for specified career segments. All of these forces should be brought to bear during obligated periods of service to retain the qualified personnel desired by the Army Staff.

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS IN RETENTION

In the military establishment, commitment is much higher than in business organizations. Furthermore, and striking, is the conclusion that length of tenure in a military installation is not related to strength of commitment but rather that strength of commitment to the military organization is a function of the underlying professional attitudes.

It becomes highly relevant to examine the actual and potential capacity of the Armed Forces to adjust and adapt to the problems of managing instruments of violence when national policy is designed to avoid general war, and yet manage a limited war so as to avoid a
general war. A sociological analysis of the military must deal with this problem as well. The sociologist needs a conceptual standpoint for his research to bear on these policy problems or he may be overwhelmed by the sheer complexities and dilemmas of change in a military force.

Janowitz (1) talks of a constabulary force concept "when it (the military) is continuously prepared to act, committed to a minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective military posture." Schelling (7) on his special surveillance force, stated that organizational characteristics were military in part, more specifically converged with the constabulary concept. "The attributes of the force should be readiness, speed, reliability, self-sufficiency, versatility and ability to improvise."

These analyses deal with the functional requirements of the internal organization of the military profession. They are essential in ascertaining, for example, what is the effect on the military organization of incorporating a new balance of weapon systems and specialists in new political-military functions. These must be related to determine what changes are occurring in the management of careers, in professional self-images, and in professional solidarity. And, in this context, how participation in arms control and disarmament is being integrated with the other aspects of the management of violence. That these are confusing and complex problems is accepted.

The professional self-image alters only gradually under the impact of changing technology and the changing patterns of international relations. The Army was still seeking a fusion of traditional military self-conceptions with the contemporary technological and civic action requirements. Compared to the Navy, the Army change began later and produced a more marked response accompanied by greater instability.

This may be seen, for example, in the effect of rotation on the exercise of authority: the longer the officer remains on a given base, the greater his sense of authority, especially at the top ranks, as measured by his feeling of the amount of authority he has. While this relationship exists in business organizations, it is less clearcut and
operates mainly at the middle ranks. Thus, the system of rotation in the military establishment conditions and weakens personal executive authority and encourages the development of a general acceptance of organizational authority. In industry, studies have indicated that succession is disruptive, typically producing low morale and conflict. In the military, the disruptive responses are softened because the organization systematically has standardized career experiences and prepares managers for future moves. Grusky's study disclosed a greater sense of commitment toward the organization among military officers than was ascertained by the managers towards industrial organizations. Further, the favorable attitudes of the military did not change with length of association, whereas there was a pronounced increase among the managers the longer they were associated with the industrial organization.

The question of rapid succession was studied in four problem areas: executive homogeneity, control, commitment, and community involvement. Actually, all factors studied reflected relatively higher positive presence within the military organization as compared with industrial organizations. With selection and promotion of personnel necessarily a part of bureaucratic control and the extensive application of rational criteria, homogeneity tends to occur more frequently with respect to numerous social characteristics. Thus, at each rank level, there appeared greater uniformity in age, length of time in the organization and seniority among the military than among business managers. A routine program of succession conditions the exercise of organizational control.

More favorable orientation to the organization and the unit within was found in the military setting. This could be seen as associated more closely with the greater standardization of assignment and greater strength of professional commitment in the military as against industry.

On community participation, it was surprising to the author that military officers were more active participants in community life than business managers -- this despite the frequency of moves from station to station. Perhaps this pattern was developed as a faster means of adapting to the community on the premise that their life there would probably be relatively short.
Grusky at first advanced the notion of "rootlessness" of organizational personnel as having a special meaning for the military in isolating them from community integration and the values of society as a whole. This result was not found, and the author attributed this factor as being associated with the military officer's self-perception of a higher social status.

A true military professional is the person who makes the military his primary lifetime commitment. Technological transformation and the emergence of new skill requirements have seriously affected the officer corps. Combat arms officers, who compose the largest group, must acquire higher levels of skill and administrative background for directing diverse elements in combat. The decline of civilian occupations with no comparable counterpart in the Armed Forces or the converse, suggests an increasing overlap, with experience acquired in the military having increased transfer value in a civilian career.

The continuing use of the draft is conducive to high turnover both in the enlisted and officer ranks, yet organizational equilibrium hinges on the optimal balance between turnover and retention. This concept is not limited to the enlisted ranks, but to the junior officer grades as well, as the latter are spurred into service by virtue of the pressure of the draft.

Turnover at the higher levels is necessary in order to provide opportunity for those at the lower levels. Without compulsory attrition, peacetime military forces generally exhibit a tendency to "age" -- the skills of many become obsolete and many cannot be retrained in new skills. The new recruit or officer requires costly training before he becomes useful, especially in the highly technical jobs, whereas the broad perspectives demanded of middle and higher level managers in industry presuppose long prior service.

Turnover problems among officer personnel are aggravated by the need to balance the requirements of training with those of education, as used by the military. Except for the highly technical functions as an officer advances, his ability to relate to the military as a whole becomes more important than any specialized experience acquired during his period of service as a junior officer. This places increased emphasis on formal education and on obtaining the kinds of
assignments essential to develop the perspective needed both to exercise organizational leadership and to the variety of liaison roles involved in the management of defense. Mobility into the top leadership nucleus has been via assignments that offer opportunities for innovation and that facilitate a broadening of outlook. This facet is believed to be more critical than specific training in the career development of an officer.

In the Army, the early period of career development is geared to the development of an officer through assignments. Later this pattern gives way to assignments permitting his maximum contribution to the service. Even though prior civilian education is important for officer advancement, in practice the qualifications for middle and higher levels are being developed more and more in the course of, and not prior to, the military career. In sum, the upgrading of skill levels of military personnel is the continued consequence of selection procedures and of competence gained during military service. Stricter standards of selection would exclude many with aptitudes and with attitudes most favorable towards the service. Therefore, in-service training procedures are used to develop talents and to eliminate the unfit.

The actual career experiences and in-service training which is a form of professional socialization has increased in importance as against prior socialization. Zald and Simon's (9) most striking conclusion was that the transferability of skills to civilian life does not decrease commitment to the military career. To the contrary, for men with all types of commissions, commitment to a military career is much more closely tied to a feeling that one's skill is actually being utilized. ROTC officers, particularly those who have not developed real commitment to the service, perceive their skills as not being adequately utilized, whereas those with relatively strong commitments to the service are more prone to perceive the services as utilizing their skills appropriately.

These findings reaffirm the conclusion that to the extent that the military develops over-ritualized forms and fails to employ its officers effectively, to that extent it weakens professional attachment. This is reflected in the attitudes of many ROTC officers in all services with weak commitments - who have a strong belief that
comparable jobs are easily obtained in civilian life. In fact, in the Zald-Simon study, four-fifths of those with weak commitment believed they could easily obtain good jobs in the civilian market. Actually their skills and training are eminently suited for the civilian labor market and the great majority had planned a civilian rather than a military career. Even 46 percent of ROTC officers with a strong commitment to military service feel they could get comparable civilian employment.

This perception of the potential availability of comparable jobs and of skill utilization is an important clue to those factors which influence decisions on staying in the service. Career commitment appears to be a function of the individual's career investment, his sense of professional satisfaction, and his alternatives in civilian occupations.

In the past, intensive Academy training seemed essential and sufficient to initiate skill development and to assure service commitment. This type of training is unable today to recruit the range of professionals required and the numbers of personnel needed to meet officer manpower requirements. Even though the services will continue their dependence upon Academy graduates to fill elite positions, the Academy product must be continually stimulated to acquire new skills and knowledges and new command concepts. This shift within the recruitment base of the officer corps requires that there be developed new concepts for instilling commitment to military goals regardless of the source of commission. The study (9) reported indicates the value of career experiences as an area of major concern in the building of such commitments, along with the factor of career recruitment.

THEORETICAL CAREER CONSIDERATIONS

The belief that military service is an unrewarding interruption to one's life plans and ambitions is still all too common. It is a carry-over from the time when a craft, a business, or even some professions could be mastered through diligent observation and practical experience, and when military training consisted principally of drills, maneuvers, and ceremonies. Time spent in military training, therefore, was regarded, logically, as time stolen from the task of getting on with a vocation.
In recent decades, technology has changed these conditions. Experience alone is an inadequate and too slow a teacher. Education has come to the fore and has even overflowed the traditional institutions of learning and industry, into merchandising to a degree, and especially into the Armed Forces, where a huge, relatively new educational complex has developed.

The notion that military training is a hindrance to a career is an anachronism. Military service offers an opportunity. It offers a rewarding career in itself, or a period in which to acquire skills, knowledge, and a broadened outlook for a more productive and satisfying civilian life.

Education is closely related to the promotion of officers. Gradation in the military education process ranges from acquisition of specific skills and the development of supervisory and organizational techniques to the consideration of broader concepts such as overall strategy, national security, international relations, and governing policies. Gradation also exists from mandatory assignments to volunteer advanced studies, and from there to educational privileges for highly selected personnel.

Findings of several studies have shown that adult civilians do not have a clear cut notion of what the services are doing, do not understand what a military career is like, do not understand the career, and do not consider it to have prestige. The fact that the public does not know enough about the military career has an adverse effect on recruiting and retention programs designed to attract, gain, and hold the caliber of the young people needed. Continuing turnover of trained talent costs the services a total of one billion dollars each year.

Much of the negative attitudes have developed through activities which have received widespread press notices and which have denigrated the prestige of the military profession. Several contributions have supported this contention:

1. The decreasing role given to military professionals in decision making affecting military programs.

2. The notion that the military constitutes a possible threat to American security, either through bumbling or plotting.
3. Many adults have indicated a low prestige rating to a military career for their sons.

It is generally assumed, in the public mind, that "the military mind is rigid, unimaginative, stifled and free from the responsibilities of challenge and intellectual questioning."(10) It is quite obvious that there is a complete lack of awareness of the responsibilities and requirements of an officer, placing a great need upon the public for better understanding of the military career and for placing it within a proper perspective.

The career concept refers to the fate of a man running his life-cycle in a (generically) particular society at a particular time. (11) The limitations put upon his choice of occupation by his own peculiarities (sex, race, abilities, class, wealth, access to and motivation for education and access to knowledge of the system itself) in interaction with the "times" have been the object of many studies. The career includes not only the processes and sequences of learning the techniques of the occupation but also the progressive perception of the whole system and of possible places in it, as well as the accompanying changes in conceptions of the work and of one's self in relation to it. Career involves, at each stage, choices of some rather than other activities in one's economy of effort. However, progress and advancement also consist in part of change in the proportions of drive and effort devoted to various activities, and even in rather complete change of organizational function or role. Careers in different occupations are patterned in varying degree. But the patterns, the possible positions and sequences in work systems, themselves change. And each human career is worked out in some particular historical phase.

Psychologists and sociologists have long been interested in the measurement of personality traits or complexes and in their ability to use such measures in the prediction of occupational choice. Thorndike and Hagen, (12) in their concern with civilian careers, ascertained the degree to which a Biographical Inventory along with other test measures correlated with career development. They were seeking measures of ability or personality that might possibly offer early prediction of occupational choice. Masland and Radway (13) concluded that the ROTC did not initially provide the attributes and
motivation of an officer. College graduates, they noted, will not generally seek a military career unless that career is made more attractive economically, and society itself places a higher value upon the profession. Lyons and Maslaiid (14) found that a military career ranks low in the scale of values among youths of military age, as well as among their teachers, parents and friends. In general, the concept which demands small numbers of regulars to be selected from among much larger numbers of reserves does not offer an attractive career opportunity to college youths. Further, college graduates are quite reluctant to accept the far stricter military system after experiencing a rather loose college environment over a four year period.

Neither the ROTC nor other civilian components are fully trained or prepared for service, according to Ginzberg. (15) Substantial additional preparation is required, a fact which the Army recognizes. The ability to relate to an authority figure has been noted as a positive association with motivation for service. Janowitz (1) believes that true motivation in the military must go beyond the notion of dealing with a mere occupation, rather that the military profession is a way of life not an occupational interlude.

The studies of Kaplan (16) with AF ROTC officers indicated "There's a decided absence of literature which speaks of selecting men with those characteristics initially who will also remain as career men." Essentially, neither the characteristics nor the criteria have been established by the military for career minded officers. The results of military studies have been such as to ascertain what differences exist between those who do and those who do not choose careers in the military. Criterion measures are essential to specify the requirements found in the job, for use in the prediction of personality correlates of men in a relatively homogeneous career area. In civilian industry, prediction takes the form of applying or evolving instruments which evaluate what the job requirements consist of, and the results are then used in the selection of men who will probably succeed in the job. The same methodologies have been used just as successfully in the selection and classification of enlisted personnel in the Armed Services and in the selection of aviation crews.

Personality characteristics have been found to affect even aptitude scores as well as areas of interest, and, according to Forer, (17) vocational choice is best made in the area where aptitudes
and interests coincide, as affected by personality traits. Even the choice of undergraduate major subjects in college has been demonstrated to correlate with personality traits.

The military services have worked in this direction but have depended largely on self-selection procedures especially at the officer levels. As a result we do not have a true selection process but rather a mixture of self-selection and those who choose to remain. The data and information on those individuals who did not choose, military careers are necessary ingredients to the research process, and their lack is detrimental to research progress in this area.

Kaplan, (16) in his study of Air Force ROTC officers, investigated the reactions of career and noncareer officers to various hypothetical constructs which represented the military lifestyle. He found distinct differences between the groups and concluded that their reactions were significantly high enough above chance to validate his contention that such differences exist.

Instruments were designed to elicit responses that would differentiate between two groups specifically established within the lifestyle framework of the Air Force. The areas covered included security consciousness, desire for personal independence of action, confidence in one's own occupational self-sufficiency, respect for and adherence to military and civilian status symbols, desire for individual recognition, confidence in one's own supervisory ability, and acceptance of authority or supervision.

The differences found between the career and non-career officer (Table 2) provided Kaplan with sufficient evidence to help verify his overall assumption that the choice of a military or civilian career is based upon more than the mere reactions to one's immediate military experience. Rather, such choice is based upon a complete picture of what the young officer needs and expects from his culture, personal dynamics, and interpersonal relations. Using a composite score of critical items with a 90 percent criterion, Kaplan was able to show an 84 percent level of accuracy in classifying his subjects as career or non-career minded.

It is quite evident there exists a marked lack and variety of research among ROTC groups. There is a very high rate of attrition
Table 2. Comparison of career and non-career Air Force ROTC officers in reaction to aspects of military life.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Career Officers</th>
<th>Non-Career Officers</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Independence of action.</td>
<td>Either lacks desire for independence of action or shows ability to formulate independent forms of action within military life style.</td>
<td>Greater desire for independence of action; feels constrained by military life style.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Military and civilian status symbols.</td>
<td>Greater value given in response to status symbols.</td>
<td>Little value in reacting to status symbols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Own supervisory ability.</td>
<td>Feel they are more successful and adequate as supervisors, have confidence in supervising larger numbers.</td>
<td>Lack anticipation and confidence in supervision, feel more confident about supervising small numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Acceptance of authority</td>
<td>Believed Air Force regulations seldom hamper initiative; willing to accept any assignment.</td>
<td>Believed Air Force regulations were a limitation on their actions. Object to assignments under adverse conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

among ROTC graduates and the selection process is essentially one of self-selection.

To what extent can young people really make an occupational choice that can ultimately be realized? Teachers of music and dramatic arts have countless examples and heartbreaking stories of individuals who will not accept incontrovertible evidence that they lack the talent required for success. With some variations, the same story of an impassable gulf between choice and fulfillment can be documented from other fields whose special aptitude is a prerequisite for significant accomplishments.\(^{(15)}\) And is it not reasonable to assume that there are patterns of traits and attributes which are especially suited to the military officer career and that these patterns can be elicited and measured?

Githens\(^{(18)}\) sampled an NROTC population on active duty. This population consisted of both career minded and non career minded officers, many of whom were still fulfilling their obligated service. Two questionnaires were utilized, each using a list of career values derived from an earlier AF study whose objective was to identify the job factors considered to have importance to Air Force officers. Respondents were asked to give information regarding each item in terms of:

1. **Importance** — How important the value is to them personally as a vocational reward.

2. **Obtainability** — How likely they feel the value would be obtainable in the Navy.

3. **Comparability** — The values for which they felt the rewards would be greater in the Navy than in a comparable civilian job they would probably hold if they did not make a career in the Navy.

On importance, the four career values rated highest are:

- Interesting Work
- Feelings of Accomplishment
- Satisfactory Home Life
- Full Use of Abilities
The six values rated least important are:

- Steady Employment
- Travel
- Social Prestige
- Active Social Life
- Have a Definite Work Schedule
- Early Retirement

It should be noted that the emphasis, with one exception, is placed on job content, rather than job context. Contrariwise, the least important values to the respondents were those dealing with the context of work rather than its content. Herzberg et al. have theorized that content factors motivate people to become personally involved in work and to devote energy to it, whereas context factors should be met at minimum levels to prevent dissatisfaction but do not necessarily result in increased work motivation.

Considerable thought should be given by the Army to these findings in giving guidelines and direction to career counseling for junior officers, as a great deal of stress is placed on work context rather than work content. Further, these findings should form a basis for consideration in the structuring or restructuring of jobs and tasks for junior officers if for no other reason than to incorporate intrinsic factors of motivation within the job structure.

On obtainability, there were negative correlations between important career values and their obtainability in the Navy. Contrariwise, career values rated low in importance were found to rate high on availability in the Navy. These values also deal with context, and are elements considered highly important in career guidance and counseling in the Army, unhappily a detriment to the motivation of junior officers.

On career values that are rated as most important, there is a negative correlation between comparability and importance. Thus, the Navy is not regarded as having an advantage over civilian jobs in those career values rated as most important.

This study did not distinguish between career and non-career officers, so that the ability to identify a career group specifically on
the basis of this study is not feasible. Nonetheless, there were clear cut ratings on values considered important and motivating, and those considered unimportant and negatively motivating. These should be valuable clues to the content of programs aimed at the retention of junior officers.

A second NROTC study (20), as yet incomplete, has been seeking to validate an Officer Key in terms of career motivation for the Strong Interest Inventory. The objective is to discriminate the career minded from the non career minded among applicants to the NROTC. Preliminary indications seem to show that this key will hold up validly as a selection technique when the final results are reported.

A great deal of concern has been voiced about the actual reasons for departure of junior officers at the conclusion of their obligated service. An informal and unofficial survey (21) just recently published was carried out by an Army officer. He queried 94 young officers of whom 84 were ROTC graduates from 19 different colleges. An "open-end" interview was conducted, directed towards the general aspects of career attractiveness, working conditions, job satisfaction, pay, fringe benefits, and the like. There was a startling agreement on the major factors responsible for decisions to leave the service. Highest agreement was given to the factor of poor leadership on the part of immediate supervisors and the middle ranks, especially the lower field grades. Similar attitudes were elicited in the field of job satisfaction, where many "make work" activities, menial tasks, and unnecessary paper work were required. These were not felt to be essential to professional development and were expressed as detractors from career commitment by a large majority of the officers.

On the questions of pay and fringe benefits, it was found that pay was not a factor, whereas fringe benefits were "once very favorable in the service but now almost non-existent." Housing conditions dominated as the benefit of greatest concern.

More than 90 percent of the group stated they would have considered the Army as a career with higher quality supervisors whom they could respect, with more professional duties, and if their own positions as officers were respected both inside and outside the Army. Seventy five percent would like to see improved pay and benefits but these were not effective attractions unless the professional elements considered essential would be present.
The industrial literature on management has been concerned with leadership and organizational performance for a number of years. Likert's (22) analysis of a number of researches emphasized that "general rather than close supervision is more often associated with high rather than a low level of productivity." Managers and high-producing supervisors are more frequently found to provide their subordinates with the objectives and what needs to be accomplished and then give them the freedom to accomplish the job. This permits subordinates to pace themselves, use their own ideas and experience to get the job done as they see best. This is in contrast to the low productivity and low morale due to oversupervision, the existence of which has been reported as a finding by a recent Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools. (23)

RETIREMENT AND RETENTION

Prior to World War II a military career was a lifetime career. Few men, especially officers, served less than thirty years, and some served considerably more. Retirement was mandatory, first at age 64, then decreased to age 60. Few officers, when entering the service, considered the possibility of a second career upon retirement, because of age, because of lack of skills which could be utilized adequately in the civilian labor market, and because of their orientation to the military as a profession. The officer took pride in his status as a military professional and he made every effort to preserve this status through a lifetime career. In addition, the pre-World War II officer was essentially combat oriented rather than technically oriented. Even those assigned to the Technical Services were combat oriented but assigned there either because of physical factors or because of aptitude or interest in administrative or technical activities. The surge of military technology came later, toward the end of World War II. Retirement benefits provided a strong inducement both to attract and to retain personnel because the benefits were usually far better than those obtainable in industry and elsewhere.

The military retirement system in the pre-World War II days served four basic purposes: (6)
1. To attract and to retain capable people

2. To remove the superannuated and disabled

3. To provide economic security for old age after long and faithful service

4. To provide compensation for hazardous service and irksome conditions of employment

In the pre-World War II days, there were other indications reflecting congressional recognition of various military personnel problems, resulting in the enactment of considerable legislation. Notable among these actions were those based on the principle of elimination from the service of officers not promoted, and the principle of voluntary retirement prior to the attainment of thirty years of service. Actually these concepts were initiated by the Navy and Marine Corps before World War I. Thus, the concept of voluntary retirement with less than 30 years service permitted officers who had been passed over promotionally to leave the service voluntarily without loss of accrued benefits.

World War II, nonetheless, found the services, and especially the Army, handicapped by a number of older and technically inefficient officers. Legislation was enacted authorizing the Secretary of War to remove from active duty certain inefficient officers.

Termination of the war and demobilization again created the situation requiring Congress to consider the personnel problems involved in maintaining an efficient defense establishment. Chief among the several actions taken, which form the basis for many of the present problems of military retirement, was the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. This legislation was designed to prevent the recurrence of retaining older officers without adequate skills attaining senior positions through seniority, blocking the promotion flow of younger officers. The Act established a system of permanent promotions based both upon qualification and seniority, and provided for the elimination of inferior officers before they advanced too far. The promotion flow would be maintained by the forced attrition of officers in the higher ranks.
Specifically, the Act prescribed the percentage of officers who may serve in any grade and the number of years he may be retained in any grade. Thus, prior to the end of a given time period, and before attainment of a certain age, an officer must either be promoted or eliminated from the service.

The needs of the Defense establishment since 1947 have required substantially greater numbers of officers than had been contemplated. These were needed especially to serve for periods of 5 to 20 years (the ranks of Captain and Major primarily), thus encouraging the retention of many Reserve officers on active duty. The 20 year concept with early retirement offers an incentive to the Reserves for continued service and at the same time provides an added means for maintaining the vigor of the services. In the main, the retirement of Reserves at 50 percent of base pay after 20 years has become almost a mandatory action, although technically the request must receive the permission of the Secretary of the Service. The latter is seldom withheld. On rare occasions certain Reserve officers are asked to remain on active duty beyond the 20 years, usually because of certain specific qualifications or skills. Reserve officers who do not come up to the qualification standards desired are subject to mandatory retirement by administrative means with severance pay. This can occur at any time during their active duty status. It is therefore apparent that a need exists for a second career program for Reserves, since the great bulk of Reserve retirees are usually in their early forties after their 20 years of service and require a second career in order to maintain their economic integrity.

Regular officers requesting voluntary retirement tend to make their request between 20 and 24 years of service almost 80 percent of the time, according to recent studies of voluntary retirements. On the average, these officers range in their middle and upper forties in age. Here, too, a second career becomes essential since the retirement pay is usually inadequate to enable the retired officers to meet their family obligations.

Similar retirement provisions, based on the 20 year period, are applicable to enlisted personnel on a voluntary basis. Mandatory retirement provisions are also available for the inefficient personnel under appropriate administrative procedures. Again, with the bulk
of enlisted personnel generally retiring at the 20 to 21 year period, the principle of the second career comes to the fore, especially when it has been found that these retirees average between 38 and 40 years of age and their pensions, though helpful, are inadequate to give full economic support in the civilian environment. The enlisted personnel who retire at 20 years more frequently possess hard technical skills developed during their military careers, giving them a firmer employable asset than many retired officers when approaching the civilian labor market. Further, the enlisted retiree at 20 years is given Reserve status until he has completed a total of 30 years of service. During this latter period while on Reserve status, he is admittedly subject to recall if his services are deemed essential, which makes him more vulnerable to recall than retired officers.

The Armed Forces today are in sharp competition with industry for the personnel with technical skills and managerial skills. Promotions, whether in the services or industry, are tied more and more to merit rather than to seniority. No more is the military career a "lifetime career" except for the chosen few who rise to the very top.

Before World War II, the military was a way of life and expression of public service and accepted as a professional career. Thus, economic security including retirement was taken for granted and was an important ingredient. Family tradition, education and career opportunity were all incentives.

During and after World War II, retirement benefits did not play an important role, nor did economic security. Yet, various indicators showed these factors are evidently taken for granted as recruitment elements among officer personnel. Retirement benefits seem to be far less significant in the initial recruitment of enlisted personnel.
Expert opinion and data from personnel surveys have indicated the retirement system to be an important element in the retention of officers. The University of Michigan survey \(^6\) of active duty officers found that 12 percent of respondents listed retirement benefits as the primary reason and 20 percent listed retirement benefits as their second reason for remaining on active duty. It should also be noted that retirement benefits receive increasing attention with length of service; for those officers with less than 5 years service, 9 percent gave this factor as their primary reason for staying whereas for officers with 15 to 20 years service, over 50 percent indicated these benefits as their primary reason.

Retirement benefits are highly relevant to the retention of enlisted personnel after an initial period of service. For those who consider re-enlistment after the first re-enlistment, retirement benefits become exceedingly important.

The military retirement system, as part of the personnel program of the Armed Services, must consider the following factors:

1. The military profession is a hazardous one. This is recognized by the government in the form of hazard or combat pay; by disability benefits for retirement, etc.

2. The military profession, by not offering a lifetime career, poses new problems relevant to recruitment and retention.

Officers with transferable skills are not necessarily the ones to consider separation before 20 years of service. These officers, especially if they believe their skills are being adequately utilized by the services, have the strongest career commitments. Although there are a few extraordinary specialists who may be susceptible to the blandishments of industry, by far and large, the degree to which an officer possesses both military and civilian skills, to that degree will he be more career oriented.
A recent effort to ascertain whether officers qualified as scientists or technical specialists were retiring early in unusual numbers produced rather interesting information. No statistical compilations were available, nor was it believed that undue numbers were requesting retirement. Only anecdotal information was furnished. Several officers possessing graduate degrees in the scientific or engineering fields who had recently requested retirement did so either because they were passed over for promotion, saw no advancement, or were not supported by the Army in completion of the doctoral degree. It was also indicated that military technical specialists must assume responsibility for command functions in order to maintain qualifications for promotion. Where officers may be reluctant to take on this capability in addition to technical interests, they evidently do not meet the criteria for promotion or advancement. This responsibility for management functions on the part of officers is considered to parallel the technical management pattern in industry.

For the unusual officer who evidences special administrative and technical skills, neither retirement benefits nor added remuneration can compete with the financial inducements offered by private industry. Higher pay, retirement benefits, stock options, etc., can easily offset his military retirement equity. Such officers are usually motivated by public service attitudes and other considerations to remain in service.

Officers with less than a full college education tend to have a full career commitment. Without a hard skill and lacking the college degree, they generally feel less confident in competing on the civilian labor market.

The necessity exists for retention of the highly qualified and most effective personnel. It is quite likely that a re-evaluation of the retirement system and the compensation and fringe benefits may prove more

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attractive in recruitment and retention. The University of Michigan Study Committee on Retirement recommended a more flexible system as more likely to facilitate retention of outstanding personnel.

Retention of Short-Term Officers

The Army appears to have a real and increasing need, as do the other services, for short-term officers to serve 5 to 13 years. It is quite obvious that the Reserves (ROTC) who serve 2 to 3 year terms, and Academy graduates who resign upon completion of their obligated duty, contribute to a very costly and inefficient program. This is especially true as new skill and training requirements increase and their demands are too heavy on the young officer's time before he becomes valuable to the service.

Currently the responsibility for meeting the service's short-term needs falls on the officers kept on extended active duty and liable to separation via RIF without any reflection on their efficiency of performance. In many cases, due to the uncertainties, substantial numbers of Reserves prefer not to extend their active duty tours and would rather compete in the labor market under more favorable conditions.

Thought was given by the University of Michigan Study Committee to the notion of a 10 year Reserve officer employment contract with specified pension rights based on length of service and base pay, the latter optionally payable in a lump sum. This was defined as Step 1 of a 2 Step career (military and civilian). It was their belief that such permissive legislation, allowing extension of the tour of duty with guaranteed pension rights, would eliminate the necessity of separation pay for short-term officer personnel whose services are no longer required and who have not served 20 years. Further, for the short-termer, so long as separation pay is standard policy, it was recommended, on the basis of equity and in the interest of retaining the best qualified officers, that separation pay be made equal for Reserves and Regulars.

The short-term career offers an opportunity for career development with early determination of an officer's suitability, capabilities, interests and potential for utilization in a full military career. Thus,
at the end of a specified time, a 10 year period, both the individual and the Army are better able to evaluate the promise of the individual officer as well as his interest in remaining on extended active duty over the full career term (30 years). For those who would terminate at the 10 year period, either voluntarily or at the Army's request, appropriate "severance pay" would be computed and provided. The 10 year period seems to offer a suitable dividing line for those officers who would terminate their military careers and seek a second career, and for those whom the Army would prefer to terminate because they lacked certain qualifications for higher grades. Further, the officers terminating active duty can be retained in a reserve status for recall in event of a National Emergency, and maintain their ties to the military retirement program (less severance pay). For those who continue to a full military career, there are incentives in terms of increased promotional opportunity, improved career planning, choice assignments, full retirement privileges.

Retention of Long-Term Officers

It is essential that cost and effectiveness be interrelated with personnel and promotional practices to maintain a continuous flow of competent officers. Three types of officers are trained and developed for the Army:

1. The Combat Officer: This officer is first trained in practical weapon systems, later in operations and command.

2. The Military Manager: This officer is trained as the administrator, the specialist in coordination and planning in such areas as logistics, research and development.

3. The Military Technologist: This officer is responsible for linking science and technology of industry to military needs.

Present practices have seen the three types of officer careers tied to the notion of early retirement, i.e., 20 years for the typical officer, with many fewer retained for 30 years, to maintain the promotion flow and a suitable incentive system. Some changes could be supported, especially in the categories of the military manager and the
military technologist, where they can be carried outside the promotion flow. Obviously, the longer they remain on active duty, the greater the increment in retirement benefits. Such selective modification of the system implies either slower promotion or a longer period in grade with pay increases only, if these are authorized in legislation. Further, the University of Michigan Study Committee also proposed, in the case of retirement at 20 years or beyond, a more flexible payment system than is currently available.

The Army is fully aware that stagnation in grade is destructive of morale. Yet within the military, leadership up the ladder must be recruited from within, and because of the pyramidal structure, opportunities become more and more constricted as the higher grades are attained. Therefore, as officers realize they have reached a promotional ceiling, they prepare to request retirement, willing to accept the lesser pension entitlement at 20 years and taking on the risks and hopes of the civilian labor market. With many, the latter move is frequently made in ignorance or on the basis of little or poor information regarding opportunity. It is our belief that remaining on active duty even outside the promotion flow can be more satisfying economically, emotionally and intellectually to officers if they were fully informed that (1) their qualifications were still in demand in the military, (2) the reality of the civilian labor market was not "paved with gold" as many are led to believe, and (3) the transition from a military to a civilian life can be quite disheartening without substantial preparation.

In industry, leadership need not be limited to internal recruitment and promotion, as is the case with the Armed Forces. Only during wartime has leadership been recruited from outside. A corporation can reinvigorate itself by recruiting its leaders from the outside. Here, however, the expectations are better known, the transition relatively easy and the transferability of skills more direct.

Retention of Enlisted Personnel

For enlisted personnel there seems to be some facilitative effect of the retirement program in stimulating re-enlistment and long-term retention. This relationship, however, does not seem to apply until after the initial re-up, nor is it believed to have any effect on the initial re-enlistment rate. One of the associated factors of concern
in re-enlistment and retirement seems to be the level of civilian employment opportunity. Within recent years, the relative tightening of the civilian market has led to an increase in the re-enlistment rates, and barring any severe changes, will likely continue to show a rising trend.\(^4\)

On the other hand, the retirement system is designed to stimulate separation from service after 20 years, whereas there is every reason for many personnel to continue with the service in terms of increased retirement benefits and still be able to compete effectively in the civilian labor market. The new system of re-enlistment bonuses recently initiated needs a test period of several years to determine its efficacy as an incentive. Nonetheless, certain special actions on retirement benefits are needed to indicate to enlisted personnel that retirement benefits promised are not being eroded, that their service to the nation was valuable, and that assistance will be forthcoming to enable them to adjust economically after retirement.

One crucial factor must be noted here, that the enlisted personnel whose services are desired beyond the 20 year period are those with special technical skills, hardened with years of military experience and application. Thus, it may be particularly desirable to deviate from current practice in order that certain enlisted personnel be retained beyond the 20 year period of service. Some considerations recommended have included special super-grades within the enlisted ranks and limited duty officer appointments for selected enlisted personnel. A useful approach, based on Navy experience, took enlisted personnel with at least 10 years experience and with certain technical qualifications, and commissioned them to secure an additional 20 years of service in their specialty area.

\(^4\)Expansion of the Armed Forces due to the conflict in Viet Nam has recently changed the demand-supply relationship in the labor market. Manpower shortages are noted in a variety of highly skilled occupations. This is true both for military occupations and civilian occupations requiring technical specialty training.
The Impact of Retirement

Although few studies have been made of retirees, the results available have indicated surprisingly few instances of high-salaried employment. The vast majority do not attain high incomes after leaving the service, only a few individuals do. There is, however, a direct relationship between earning capacity and educational history, so that the college trained and post-graduate professional will obviously be more successful economically.

Age, too, plays an important role. The younger the retiree, the greater his chances for full time employment. There are, of course, exceptions, and these are found in association with specific or scarce skills and with prestige.

One serious factor was ascertained which relates to the civilian labor market information, or rather, lack of information possessed by most retirees. There is a great gap in the communication process that needs bridging. The officer (and enlisted man) preparing for retirement should have available substantial opportunity through counseling and information services to obtain a more realistic view of the outside world than that he has been familiar with through his military associations. The average officer, on retirement, has been associated economically with a military environment for at least 20 years. He has very little knowledge or experience, as a rule, regarding employment opportunities, qualifications, training, salaries, etc. The bulk of retiring officers tend to settle in those sections of the nation where they can have access to military facilities in order to take advantage of the various fringe benefits to which they, as retirees, are entitled: medical and hospital care, officers open mess, post exchange, and commissary. Actually, many retirees have traded job opportunity for fringe benefits as a result of their decision to locate in particular areas where they can maintain their prior personal associations with other former officers and remain in a semi-military environment. However, they have frequently found that civilian employment is not as available as expected. With some exceptions, such as those possessing professional training or specific transferable skills in high demand, most officers find that their civilian employment income, when added to retirement pay, does little more than maintain the economic position which they had attained in the military, according to the Michigan Study Group.
As mentioned earlier, enlisted personnel on the average may do better because they are generally a bit younger and have acquired specific skills which are more readily transferred to civilian employment. Further, they do not tend to congregate, as do officers, into or near military communities. However, it has been found that many enlisted retirees are not able to utilize these advantages to the fullest. They, too, lack labor market information and if furnished effective counseling could make far better and fuller use of their assets.

The period of greatest burden to the retiree covers the months immediately following retirement, the period of transition. Were he better informed, there would be fewer disparities between the experiences of the retirees, especially officers, and their expectations. Further, there are possible the opportunities for skill training, education and optional arrangements for pension payments, which will be discussed later in this report.

ATTITUDE STUDIES AND RETENTION

Much of the present knowledge of motivation, morale and related attitudes had its origin in the social science studies conducted by the U. S. Army during and shortly after World War II. The studies of S. S. Stouffer, et al, (24) demonstrated the importance of needs satisfaction of Army morale. Since motives, drives and needs cannot be observed directly, they must be inferred by observations of behavior and the measurement of attitudes which express the way in which, and the extent to which, personnel policies and practices are felt to satisfy an individual's needs and desires. No single want or exactly similar set of needs has been found to apply to all individuals in an organization as long as the basic needs of shelter, food and fundamentals of living have been satisfied. In a society as complicated as ours in the United States, motivation and morale appear to be the end result of a large variety of factors which operate with different weights in a multiplicity of patterns. For this reason permanent solutions to the problems of morale and motivation cannot be found in social or psychological theory, but must be sought continuously by systematically designed attitude studies. Ordinary channels of communication in the Army can seldom provide a clear and accurate picture of what is in the
minds of the individuals who make up the Army. An attitude survey taps the thinking of the individual and provides a systematic and comprehensive picture of the range and intensity of his problems - it brings to light many facets of motivation and morale that would be otherwise missed. The attitude survey has been compared to a thorough physical examination as contrasted with picking up casual information in determining the state of health of an individual.

Use of Attitude Surveys in Industry

American industry quickly picked up the attitude survey as a practical tool for providing management with a measure of success or failure in personnel matters and as a method for locating unsatisfactory working conditions as well as sources of worker satisfaction and dissatisfaction. The problems of morale and motivation in industry are predominantly the same problems of social interaction investigated by social psychologists in the Army when they obtained the information contained in the "Why the Soldier Fights" series of publications in World War II. Industry's core problem is the same as the Army's - the full utilization of human resources to accomplish the purposes of the organization. Surveys quickly determined that it was not possible to think of the human element in terms of production efficiency alone. It was also necessary to be concerned with satisfactions the employee derived from his job. In industry job satisfaction was found to be one of the most important, if not the most important, ingredient of employee morale. Systems of financial incentive were found to yield some gains in productivity, but no reward systems released more than a small portion of the energy and intelligence industrial workers had to give to their jobs.

Progress toward maximum utilization of human resources in increasing productivity and raising levels of job satisfaction and morale has been made by those industries that undertook fact finding investigations of factors inside and outside the plant which influenced the feelings, attitudes and behavior of the worker. They found that hours of work, wages, physical conditions, personnel policies and practices, plant organization, as well as individual differences of age, schooling, marital status, socio-economic level, etc, all had a bearing on attitudes and performance. Productivity was increased
when policies and practices were modified to change employee attitudes favorably.

Both experimental studies and attitude surveys have produced convincing evidence that the quality of supervision is also a major factor in influencing attitudes and satisfying needs of industrial workers. Supervisors who see the problem of productivity exclusively in terms of work methods and standards are less likely to motivate workers to increased production than those who see production problems in terms of worker status and the characteristics, needs and aspirations of workers. Development of employee-oriented supervisors trained in dealing with interpersonal relations is now a goal of many companies.

In a nation with a deeply ingrained democratic tradition it is only reasonable to expect that workers may have a desire to participate in determinations of policies that affect them. Surveys in industry have shown that workers are more productive when given some degree of participation in decision making about their jobs. An expression of one's opinion in an attitude survey constitutes participation in formulation of policies if pertinent information of results is made available to the employee.

Some of the reasons given by industrial firms for conducting employee-attitude surveys are: (1) to find out what workers think about each other, their jobs, their supervisors, the company and how it functions; (2) to determine training needs and to evaluate training programs; (3) to discover what employees want or need to know about the company, its policies and operations; (4) to evaluate morale conditions and high turnover of employees, and (5) to measure success or failure in personnel matters.

In industry the attitude survey as a tool of management has received ever increasing emphasis and use. Important results have been obtained in improving working conditions, strengthening training programs for the employees and supervisors, keeping supervisors "on their toes", and promoting better understanding between management and labor. Higher morale and increased motivation have been achieved by increasing job satisfactions and demonstrating management interest in the employee.
Use of Attitude Surveys in the Army

In contrast to industry, a review of recent personnel studies in the Army reveals a paucity of studies designed to provide systematic and continuing motivation and morale information from representative samples of the Army population. This, despite the fact that the Army is the largest employer in the country.

Army attitude surveys during and after World War II and during the Korean War were concerned with discovering deep seated motives that influenced performance. Such studies were in accord with psychological theory that points to the existence within an individual of a changing hierarchy of motives that control behavior. Recent Army studies seemed to be more concerned with enumeration of intentions to leave the service rather than attempting to discover sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. More studies that seek to relate motives of self-expression, self-respect, recognition status, and economic security to job satisfactions and career intentions are needed.

One of the great questions for Army management at any time is what the Army means to the individual soldier or officer with reference to his willingness to carry out missions. Accurate, continuous information of this type can be obtained only by systematically designed and conducted attitude surveys. The accumulation of evidence of successes or failures of personnel policies and evaluations of the current "will-to-fight" in the Army represents a continuing challenge to the Army Staff and its social scientists.
RETENTION OF OFFICERS

In considering the ways and means for reconciling Army requirements and manpower resources essential to meet these requirements, this study concentrated its efforts on the more critical elements responsible for producing low retention rates, or in economic terms, the reduction of high turnover among certain groups of military personnel. Our basic objectives led us to examine the input systems, the problems and influences on retention rates, and the techniques and methods likely to be most effective in improving retention rates. Although a substantial number of factors related to retention were studied, many were not included for action consideration. Their impact on retention was considered either minimal or incidental; effort was concentrated upon those factors which gave evidence of greatest possible influence on the overall retention problem and where, it is believed, the greatest impact can be obtained.

Early in this study it was apparent that the key to the solution of retention problems is to be found in the factors that produce firm individual commitments to military careers. The important factors of job satisfaction, perceived opportunities, compensation, fringe benefits, family security considerations, etc., either add up to a career commitment or to a decision to leave the Service. The Army must offer an attractive career package or suffer from perpetual personnel turnover. Some factors that seem contradictory, such as retirement as a career incentive as against discouraging early retirement, or equating RA and OTRA benefits versus RA motivation, are necessary aspects of a career package attractive to different individuals.

It was also evident that some of the needed solutions, recognized and strongly supported by the Army, were not equally supported at higher levels. More often, the solution was seen in terms of increased pay scales in lieu of other benefits. Such solutions, although helpful and necessary to meet the rising cost of living, have been inadequate, except as partial or temporary measures. What is more important is the lack of understanding of the desires, principles and values of the professional military man. Army officers and senior non-commissioned officers, both young and old, have a sense of duty and
service, and an idealism based on principles far less materialistic than has been assumed by many government officials. If some of the emphasis of the corrective action had been directed toward making a military career more attractive to motivated professionals or potential professionals, the Army's retention problem would be less critical.

Attrition of qualified officer personnel as a result of voluntary action has been most marked among the following categories of officers:

1. The junior officer, ROTC source, at the conclusion of his two year term of obligated service.

2. The Regular Army officer with from twenty to twenty-four years of service when he is eligible for and voluntarily requests retirement.

Actual rates of attrition for these classes of officers vary widely from one group to the other. A review of what appear to be the Army's current and long term needs, however, including the long term impact on officer development, gives credence to the fact that the ROTC source for officers is presently most critical to the needs of the Army. First, the ROTC is the largest numerical source of officer input of the Army. Second, the junior officer product of the ROTC is the basic source of manpower essential to meet the requirements for Company Commanders and Field Grade officers, both Regular and Reserve, during the forthcoming years. Junior officers must be available in sufficient quantity to accept training and education along the various career ladders. It therefore seems far more efficient to concentrate

5/ USMA and OCS graduates follow the same career development patterns; however, they do not approach the ROTC graduates in number, nor do they show the attrition rates found among ROTC graduates.
short term and long term efforts on the ROTC system as a whole and on its major segments in order to produce significant improvements for the recruitment and retention of junior officers developed by this system.

This emphasis on the ROTC does not necessarily preclude actions leading to the improvement of retention rates of the more senior Regular and OTRA officers. This study does take into account the relatively early attrition of substantial numbers of experienced and capable officers and proposes means which may be expected to motivate them to extend their active military service. From the viewpoint of concentration of effort, and fiscal support, where required, the ROTC as a manpower source is believed to be more susceptible to influence in considering retention as a means for meeting overall Army requirements over the long term.

The recommendations proposed in this report will follow along three directions, each requiring essentially a different pattern of implementing actions:

1. Action directed to establishing specific changes in personnel policies and/or procedures.

2. Action directed to the establishment of specific research programs and fiscal support thereof.

3. Action directed to the request for new legislation essential to the formulation of personnel policies and procedures.

General

The basic key to retention is believed to reside in the gaining of a commitment to a professional military career. What are the fundamental factors, the environmental conditions, and the time aspects that predispose the individual to a firm commitment to a professional career? Actually, we believe this to be a researchable question. In a way, it seems to foreshadow a return to pre-World War II days, when the military officer was a hardened professional careerist, essentially established for a lifetime career. Yet, it seems necessary to examine this question within the context of the current environment.
At the conclusion of World War II, and again after the Korean Conflict, it was necessary to ease out the excess numbers of officers at various grade levels and at the same time provide the needed mobility for maintaining a fluid promotional ladder. The practical solution at the time was the creation of the concept of the 20 year career, a new philosophy and substantially different, we believe, from the lifetime profession previously in vogue. The same rationale was applied in part to promotional policies with adoption of the "up or out" and limited time and age in grade. The 20 year career, it soon became apparent, offered a philosophy that served a dual purpose: it could maintain the vigor of the service, first by attracting new people at the input end, and second it could hasten, to a degree, the output at the upper end. This was important when peacetime manpower requirements for the military were substantially greater than in pre-war days. Further, it was also a useful device to build the manpower capability around the nucleus of the small but professional elite.

However, this philosophy ran into a roadblock. The Soviets reported a nuclear capability, resulting in the upping of U.S. demands for greater numbers of highly trained and experienced personnel in a variety of critical skills. This introduced, a decade ago, the problem of retention of skilled officers and men. Within the past five years, the patterns of warfare have been modified and requirements have again risen to meet the need.

Nonetheless, habit patterns have been established, and the current view of retention is running against the tide of experience. The post-war pattern of service is not that of the professional lifetime soldier, but rather that of the 20 year military occupation accompanied by retirement pay and benefits and the outlook for a second career in civilian life. In other words, the Congress and the Defense Establishment, at the urging of a war weary populace, created a military career philosophy at a time when the outlook was favorable for such a philosophy. The heart was cut out of the concept of a professional military career, except for a professional elite, and in its place was created a military occupation, good for approximately a 20 year career.
Today we should be asking and studying the question: Is a 20 year career in a military occupation a reasonable incentive for inducing people into the service, or is it better to review and re-examine the utility of the 20 year career and ascertain if it now fails to serve what is in reality a professional function?

We therefore believe that this is a researchable question and would suggest testing the following hypotheses:

A professional career involves a lifetime commitment by the individual so directed, and is dependent upon a complex of fundamental factors, both cognitive and non-cognitive, as well as the environmental context and a bounded series of inducements for the lifetime of devotion. Conversely, a 20 year occupational career is not identified as equivalent to a professional career, being accepted more as an interim occupation and associated with a different complex of motivating forces and inducements. When both career concepts are simultaneously invoked in a military environment, the conditions and inducements of the less professional dominate.

The findings of this study may lead to the formulation of a different philosophy of the lifetime of the military occupation. Today's philosophy, which emphasizes the 20 year occupational life for the great majority of incumbent officers is obviously unable to meet all the conditions created by the environmental context. It may also be desired to develop a more flexible philosophy so that the pressures of the environment can be more readily countered as needed. This could well mean greater flexibility in the legislation upon which the policies and practices are based, and for support, periodic re-study of the factors involved with the new environmental context as inputs.

THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

Study I. A System Study of the ROTC

First and foremost is the need to undertake a system study of the ROTC to reflect its current status, its operations (i.e., its education and training activities), its dynamics, and its interrelationships with other Army organizations and with the sponsoring institution and its units, all from the viewpoint of emphasizing the Army career as a profession. For the proposed study, the ROTC system is defined as encompassing the processes which are initiated with recruitment and
initial orientation and terminate with the completion of the two years of obligated service by the ROTC graduate. It is at the two-year period, or before, that the junior officer (ROTC Graduate) may request transfer to the Regular Army, may request extension of his term as a Reserve officer, or may conclude his active duty and return to civilian status.

The system study should indicate relationships with appropriate Army and college units, explained in a systematic fashion, using sequential flow charts. At each critical interface, input-output characteristics should be indicated, as should the dynamics which presumably influence the education, training and informational processes. In addition, all extrinsic and intrinsic factors that affect the dynamic processes should be included, and where feasible, the degree to which these factors lead to the fashioning of the military career as a profession.

In essence, the system study should present a comprehensive reflection of current status of the overall program and its component parts—the system of officer development based on the ROTC as its source. These findings will provide the baseline and operational segments to permit the necessary partitioning for further studies in depth of the specific component sub-systems composing the total system.

6/ Does not include ROTC student recipients of Army scholarships authorized by the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964. The Act established a four year term of obligated service. The initial group of ROTC graduates under the Act will begin their active duty during the Summer or Fall of 1967.

7/ Later, in the section on Reserve Officers, recommendations are offered which may provide a more uniform system for the retention of Reserve officers on active duty.
Study II. Junior Officer Job Studies

There is a critical need to re-assess the junior officer "job", i.e., the two-year period of obligated service, in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the content of the junior officer assignment as well as the context or environments in which it exists. This should entail a rather thorough "task analysis" approach to the duties, functions, and responsibilities.

Two initial hypotheses are offered in this connection:

1. The junior officer is more interested and more responsive to the demanding nature of his assignment and in the full utilization of his abilities, and the smaller the discrepancy between his expectations and his satisfactions with his work experiences, the more likely he will be to continue in a military career.

2. The more that opportunity is provided for the junior officer to exercise relatively greater or increasing independence of action and the greater the resulting job satisfaction, the greater the likelihood that he will accept a military career as a profession.

In our evaluation of the literature, reviewed in an earlier section of this document, it was apparent that the ROTC graduate has a high sense of values. Several of the studies reported gave evidence that studies of values may provide the needed direction for implementing motivational factors pertinent to the military career. Our hypotheses are directed to such objectives.

A third hypothesis is suggested, based on the assumption that greater clarification and specificity may be achieved:

3. That, as the junior officer (ROTC Graduate) gains added satisfactions through the challenge of job content (e.g., the intrinsic nature of the work itself), he will be more likely to prolong his active military duty than from satisfactions derived from job context (i.e., the extrinsic factors associated with his assignments).

This latter hypothesis is directed more specifically to the young officers and the work experience factors which are presumed to have greater impact in testing and influencing their sense of values in an initial assignment.
The above series of hypotheses, assuming that tests produce results in the predicted direction, offers a real challenge in the area of job structuring for junior officers. Many menial duties and tasks which officers perform have been so assigned by legislative action. Whether task re-structuring will be able to minimize the junior officer's responsibility for menial tasks or re-allocate such tasks to enlisted personnel is a moot yet critical question. Insofar as possible, it will be highly desirable to restructure tasks and jobs so that they become sufficiently demanding and yet lead to opportunities for individual accomplishment, early recognition of merit, and challenge. Industrial research (27) reviewed noted that the more challenging and demanding the tasks during the first year of work, the more successful the performance and the greater their influence on eventual success in the organization. These findings were in contrast with expectations of success during any of the succeeding years.

A fourth hypothesis suggests itself in connection with the junior officer assignment studies, though perhaps it may prove a bit more tangential. The proposed study would require a periodic repetitive sampling of attitudes and opinions of ROTC Graduates at different stages in their association with the Army, including education, training and assignment activities, to record for each his image of the Army and the manner in which the image stabilizes or destabilizes. In this connection, we assume that the ROTC Graduate, upon release from active duty, helps to form the public image of the young Army officer, and the Army in general.

The hypothesis offered is:

4. There is a direct relationship between job satisfaction and work experience, and the resultant attitudes and public expression of these attitudes by junior officers subsequent to their release from active duty receive high credence from the many publics affected, thus contributing to the pattern of development of the public image of the Army and the Army officer.

This particular study package may provide some useful clues to the influences felt and accepted within the family, among peers, and at colleges and universities. Thus, a more positive experience should contribute to a more acceptable public image within a geographically distributed segment of the public.
Study III. Evaluation of Experimental ROTC Program

Another independent study-in-depth program is suggested, to compare the effectiveness of the Proposed Senior Division Army ROTC Curriculum (28) devised by the Mershon Center for Education in National Security with the present ROTC curriculum. The experimental design proposed, covering a selected number of suitably matched units, should include short term criteria, i.e. at graduation, and long term criteria, i.e. at the conclusion of the period of obligated service. The former may include a stated intention to stay in service, whereas the latter or long term criteria would be evidenced by transfers to the Regular Army or extension of active duty as Reserves. Various measurable academic and non-academic factors should be weighed against the criteria. Further, an attitude-opinion survey at the conclusion of the obligated service period would provide needed feedback on the overall acceptance of the ROTC program, both new (experimental) and old, the strengths and weaknesses of each as seen by the participants---both those who continue in service and those who drop out.

Study IV. Steps to Improve the Program

A final major approach aimed towards enhancing motivation and increasing retention rates is recommended. This approach should combine into a newly synthesized ROTC system those programs which appear to be contributing optimally to the development, education, training, and retention of officers produced through the ROTC source. The new system will probably contain old and new programs which were found to affect retention rates. These items would be selected as a result of:

The research findings arising out of studies, as recommended in I, II, and III above.

The findings resulting from an effective Operational Attitude-Opinion Survey Program.

The incorporation of policy and administrative changes suggested by the following:

1. The development and operation of a broad and intensive public information and recruiting program for college bound high school students.
2. Devise and adopt a battery of selection tests for administration to high school students who are potential candidates for a Senior Division ROTC program.

3. Develop a classification test battery emphasizing aptitude area differentiation for the broader aspects of combat, technical and administrative classifications, and where feasible, for greater specificity in relation to Branch specialties. Early results of an interest evaluation study (20) are indicating the feasibility of an officer key much more highly predictive of retention than other trait factors. Special attention should be given to work in this area. The classification battery should feature theoretically recognized non-cognitive factors which appear to suggest higher correlation with retention, factors such as values, interests, status, etc., as well as pertinent cognitive factors.

4. Improve and extend a counseling program which will utilize test information, college work and achievements, as well as extra-curricular activities and interests in correlating Branch assignment recommendations and commissions.

5. Authorize full time trained career counselors to Army Area Headquarters and other major installations and organizations, as appropriate, to counsel all junior officers regarding a military career. Where necessary, temporary duty orders should be authorized to enable all junior officers to be exposed to reasonable periods of counseling. The counselors should also be authorized to provide career counseling generally for officers, and to provide counseling to prospective officer retirees, families, enlisted personnel, etc.

6. Authorize, develop and organize a special short course (2 months duration) at the USMA and provide TD orders to each junior officer (ROTC source) who has agreed, at the conclusion of his obligated duty (a) to transfer to the R.A., or (b) to extend his active duty for a minimum term (see section on Reserve Officers, below).
The rationale for number 6 is to provide each potential career officer committed for a minimum of 5 years of active duty an opportunity for close affiliation and integration with the USMA and Academy Graduates. The course would emphasize Army customs and traditions, military history, military law and administration. The short course not only offers a special incentive to junior officers to stay in service, but is a means for expressing the Army's good faith in closer integration of ROTC and Academy Graduates, and serves to dispel various feelings of distinction between the two.

7. Upon issuance of orders for new assignments at the conclusion of the period of obligated service, all orders for junior officers (ROTC source) who remain on active duty as RA or Reserves should carry, as an endorsement, a commitment to Advanced Branch School for training. The endorsement should indicate whether assignment will be made during the officer's 3rd, 4th, or 5th year of active service. In some cases where special technical education in a selected discipline may be desired for the officer because of his past education and his expected utility as an officer, the endorsement may specify a year of post graduate education at a civilian institution in lieu of Advanced Branch training.

The rationale for number 7 is to secure an early expression of Army commitment in support of military career requirements within prescribed time limitations, designed to attract qualified officers to a military profession and, at the same time, reflecting the Army's good faith. The early commitment would also indicate a firm approach by the Army in assisting young officers to meet both educational and promotional requirements early enough in their career to be motivated towards the service.

8. Upon conclusion of the term of obligated service, an attitude survey questionnaire geared to measure job satisfaction should be administered each year to a reasonable sample of junior officers, including those leaving the active service. This questionnaire should be designed to elicit factors concerned with job content, job context, and
relationships with supervisors. Its purpose is to monitor the influences which these factors have on retention rate, find sources of negative influence and indicate corrective measures. This instrument may be administered independently, and where appropriate, combined with the evaluation questionnaire suggested for item III above, which is proposed for the new ROTC curriculum and its impact on retention.

With the passage of the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, the Armed Forces were authorized a total of 5500 scholarships at any one time for college and university ROTC. Of this total, the Army was granted 1000 for the initial year, 1965-66. For that year 400 four-year scholarships were designated for students who would enter college for the first time and for those youths who had qualified for the USMA in 1965 but had not been accepted because of a lack of vacancies. In addition, 600 two-year scholarships were allocated for outstanding college sophomores who were completing their second year of ROTC and would receive aid for Senior Division ROTC. Conditions associated with the award included enlistment in the Army Reserve and agreement to accept a Regular or Reserve Commission if one were offered. Following commissioning, the scholarship graduate is obligated to serve a four year term of obligated service. This is aimed at increasing officer motivation towards a military career. In those cases where the scholarship graduate is unable to serve out his four years, he is obliged to serve in the Army Reserve until the sixth anniversary of the date of his commission.

Army ROTC scholarships will be awarded annually. This specific program places the Army on a competitive basis with the Navy and Air Force in supporting ROTC students through scholarships.

The Army is also afforded the opportunity for initiating and ultimately refining a selection program for that segment of the ROTC college population where, it is believed, career motivation forces may be expected to play a more substantial role than is generally the case. In other words, the scholarship awardees who will be required to spend four years in obligated service may be considered as a select population for study purposes. Effort should be expended in establishing for this group a central data base containing socioeconomic, demographic, performance, cognitive, non-cognitive and attitudinal
characteristics and their subsequent relationships to retention rates. Where various studies are accomplished with ROTC students and junior officers from the ROTC source, the data and evaluations of data obtained from Army Scholarship recipients should be treated independently from that obtained from regular ROTC students and junior officers.

The hypothesis of concern here is the following:

Where full financial support is rendered, and where more effective measures of selection are imposed, the beneficiaries, even though committed to a greater obligation, will be expected to show greater interest in and acceptance of a military career as a profession.

RESERVE OFFICERS

The major concern of the Reserve officer on active duty is with his status and security in the Army. Reserve officers, who come largely from the ROTC source, may request extension of active duty for specific periods of time, or may request to remain on active duty for an indefinite period. In either case, the Reservist may be remanded to an inactive status at any time, depending upon the needs of the Army.

There are several aspects in the relationship between Reserves on active duty and the Army which have a history. Many Reserves believe they cannot achieve the rank or position for which they may be qualified in competition with the Regular officers. Thus the Reserve officer frequently feels that he is discriminated against in promotions, in receiving desired assignments and in obtaining opportunities for advanced military schooling. He also feels that he is subject to the whims of the Service, with reasonable security being available to him only during a period of expansion of forces when his services are in demand.

These factors may account, in part, for the early departure of many junior grade Reserve officers who do not desire or feel they cannot obtain Regular Army commissions, and are not willing to take a chance on completing the 20 years of active service required for retirement.
Among the possible solutions that come to mind is the use of a fixed contract between the Army and the Reserve officer. It is suggested that a Reserve officer, upon completion of his term of obligated service, be offered a contract for a firm period of active duty, say five years. This commits the Army, as well as the man, for a stated period of service which is implemented by a contract, and makes him subject to discharge only for cause prior to the five year period. Each such contract, however, would be renewable for 5 years, and where desired, in successive 5 year terms, if mutually agreed to by both parties. Only in time of war or a declared national emergency would contractual agreements of this nature be suspended.

During the life of a contract, the officer would be entitled to the benefits and emoluments of his rank, such as promotion, fringe benefits, assignments, schooling, etc. When the question of renewal arises, the Army, where and if appropriate, may utilize as instruments of negotiation certain selected factors such as assignment, schooling, placement on the promotion list, or even a temporary promotion, depending upon the aspects of supply and demand, the area of specialization involved and the qualifications of the individual officer. Contracts may be successively renewed to the point where individuals may serve a full 30 year career or until age 62. This framework would permit full use of qualified Reserves in meeting the needs of the service. Retirement eligibility would still be attained at 20 years of service, but with the availability of the contract renewal system as a mutually acceptable device, the Army could still negotiate with these officers to remain on active duty, as needed. Further, at the conclusion of each 5 year period, a performance and qualifications review should be a prerequisite to any recommendations for contract renewal.

An additional incentive is suggested for incorporation into the plan, that of a separation pay option. A scale of separation pay should be adopted and correlated with length of service, rank, etc. Officers would have the option then to select separation pay either as a lump sum or in several annual increments and forego retirement pay, or they might select retirement pay at some pre-determined age in lieu of separation pay. Or, in certain cases, where separation pay was desired in part, the officer might prefer a combination of the two in accord with a pre-determined formula established by the Army.
Also, the Army may wish to determine the efficacy of separation pay and/or retirement benefits as incentives for officers whose contracts are not renewed beyond ten years. That is, an operational attitude survey could be used to determine whether any one of these incentives is preferred for attracting Reserve officers for as long as ten years.

A similar overall plan should be explored, based on a ten-year contract, with renewal option available for one or two additional 10 year terms, if mutually accepted.

It is suggested that a feasibility and cost-effectiveness study be undertaken, which analyzes the costs, benefits, and utility of such a program, both to the Service and to the Reserve officer. This study should compare the 5 year contract, the 10 year contract with the system in current operation to determine which of the three is likely to be of greatest utility, and if it should be one of those newly recommended, whether it is feasible to adopt.

Some form of the proposed contract system, if proven feasible and within reasonable cost parameters, could lead to:

The retention on active duty of a qualified and highly motivated corps of reserve officers.

The recognition by Reserve officers that active duty is limited to a specific time period, but that renewal of a contract and continuation of active service is associated with quality of performance.

That incentives are associated with performance and are utilized to affect motivation and continuation of service.

That these incentives may be negotiable and are utilized as needed in individual situations when shortages exist and qualified personnel are in great demand:

1. Separation pay/retirement benefits option.

2. Schooling.
3. Promotional opportunity.

4. Retirement credits and benefits.

The contractual relationship in employment of Reserve officers places on both parties a responsibility for clearer understanding of the conditions regarding term of active service, benefits and opportunities for the future especially as they affect the Reserve officer who is more seriously concerned with his own future, in or out of the Service. At the same time, retention can be almost universally assured for a 10 year period, covering an important gap in the Army's manpower requirements. Should officers depart at that time, they have both served the nation and prepared themselves for a second career at an age when it is much more feasible to compete more effectively on the civilian labor market.

Further, it would seem that the Army would be better able to plan its needs and ability to meet these needs with qualified Reserve officers when there is a better means of control of so important a trained manpower resource. It will require some experience to determine the patterns of renewal rates, how they occur, the grades at which they occur, the quality of the personnel, and the optimum operation of the system.

From a subjective point of view, the very nature of the proposed program enables the Army to improve its image and to indicate its good faith in operating an equitable system. Many Reserve officers, as well as Regular Army officers, have been critical both of the Army and the Government by indicating that "too many promises are broken". These are promises which presumably existed either through legislation or personnel policy at the time of recruitment of the officers, and indicated the various benefits to which these officers were entitled. Later, either by the passage of new legislation, or by action either of DoD or the Army, new policies were established leading to erosion of various benefits, privileges, rights, etc., frequently quite contrary to what these officers had been receiving or led to expect. Perhaps some special consideration might be given to the inclusion in legislation or new policy formulation of a statement comparable to that below, generally included in military pay legislation:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member of an armed force who was entitled to pay and allowances under any of the following provisions of law on the day before the effective date of this Act shall continue to receive the pay and allowances to which he was entitled on that day."

If the words "benefits, rights and privileges", each properly defined, were substituted for "pay and allowances", then there would be less likelihood of broken faith with the members of the Armed Forces. Then, only newly recruited personnel as of the date such legislation went into effect would be subject to the new conditions specified.

Adequate definition of "benefits, rights and privileges" is a necessary and important step. Here, the expectations of officers regarding adequate housing, medical and dental care for dependents, and several other benefits where steady erosion has occurred, could be re-affirmed as promises which remain unbroken.

In the general consideration of fringe benefits, it should be noted that they are quite essential as incentives. Business, industry, and the civil service have, in recent years, been increasing rather than decreasing fringe benefits, whereas the tightening up of the latter for the Armed Forces has been more destabilizing in their influence on retention.

REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS

The Regular Army officer has historically visualized his military career as a lifetime profession. In recent years, a new pattern has been appearing indicating a foreshortening of the lifetime career at the farther end followed by the development of a second career in civilian life. This has resulted from the retirement of senior officers some 8 to 10 years earlier on the average than expected. Obviously, this loss of experienced officers in the higher grades is costly to the Army, since it demands replacements. To alleviate this problem, revisions in policies and practices are recommended. It is quite
possible that some of these revisions may involve additional costs, but when these outlays are evaluated in relation to the losses, both present and anticipated, the newer policies may prove to be more economical on a comparative basis over the long run.

Although no statistical verification has been made, all the evidence has indicated that pay, per se, is presently not the major concern of Regular Army officers requesting early retirement. He is generally far more concerned with the factors of recognition and opportunity, the fear of non-promotion, the loss of various fringe benefits to which he believed he was entitled under law, and his expectation of retirement benefits subsequently.

Fully aware of the dollar differences in the retired pay rates at the 20 and 30 year levels, he seems to be moving toward earlier retirement, chiefly to assure himself that he suffers no real loss by remaining economically immobile. For some, it means experiencing reality in frustration, in not achieving the expected temporary promotion, for others, it becomes the anticipation and avoidance of frustration, and they will request out even before the occurrence of a promotion action. Thus, the permanent promotion system, emphasizing "up or out", appears largely responsible for the great majority of early retirements, many preceding the expected temporary or permanent promotion action.

There are some individuals, and doubtless there always will be, who receive very tempting offers to join the business world because of their special assets. This situation is inevitable and must be lived with, though it is fortunate the numbers are not very large.

Survey data coming from one of the University of Michigan studies(6) indicated that pre-retirement expectations of easy to locate, highly paid employment was in truth not as readily obtainable for the large percentage of officer retirees entering the labor market. Only those retired officers possessing special skills which are in great demand, such as medical and dental officers, physicists and engineers, could find early placement as civilians.

Another consideration for the Army is the advisability of establishing a positive program to permit senior Regular officers to
remain on active duty until they reach their 60th year of age. This
goal may mean up to 35 years of service for many Regulars even
though they do not attain star rank, in contrast with the usual range
of 20 to 24 years of active duty when retirement is either voluntary
or becomes mandatory ("up or out"). In this connection, a hard look
should be taken at selected factors:

1. Promotional policies

2. Age and length of service in grade

Promotional Policies and Grade Distribution

As officers progress along the promotion ladder, the relative
proportion of promotional opportunities decreases at each level,
especially so at the senior grades. The current policy of "up or out"
becomes an important factor to the individual who is rejected by a
Selection Board, the first time, and the individual who, anticipating
the chance of rejection, decides to act first, requesting early
retirement. Many clues are available by which individual officers
can realize what their chances are for promotion at the several
Field Grade levels.

The Bolte career management proposal, (29) gathering dust the
past five years, is evidently being resuscitated and revamped for
hearings and possible action by the Congress this year. Recent
indications are that action may be limited to the seeking of some
changes in promotional policies as recommended by DoD. This could
offer the Army opportunity for more flexible promotion and retirement
policies, improved officer grade distribution and other factors con-
cerned with career management.

Greater flexibility is essential in personnel management. Among
the needed changes in policy are those concerned with the "up or out"
policy of promotions, age and length of service in grade, and the
distribution of officers by grade. Revision of policies in this area
may be expected to deter the increasing trend of early voluntary
retirement. The current practice of "up or out" should be
re-evaluated and possibly eliminated as a standard practice. Below
zone promotions at various senior grades have been instituted as an incentive to retain younger officers with exceptionally fine performance records. Policy change may be explored either to extend the length of the promotion zone and time of consideration, or to allow officers who are not promoted to remain in Service at their present grade. This notion may best be examined by a staff study to ascertain its utility and value. Where effectiveness is not maintained, administrative procedures are available for enforced discharge or mandatory retirement.

Field Grade officers, without regard to promotion could be selected and assigned to duties warranted by their qualifications and experience until they attain their 60th birthday rather than have them anticipate mandatory retirement closer to age 50 or before, if passed over by a Selection Board. Their retention should be exclusive of the authorized numbers in grade as well as the promotion list. Assignments would be made largely in the administrative-managerial area, in connection with various training and educational facilities, civilian components, etc., i.e., primarily in functions where their competence and experience can be effectively utilized.

Individuals so treated can be designated by special organization for carrying purposes, e.g., the 100th Army, to distinguish them purely for statistical, pay and record purposes. It will doubtless be necessary to determine the sources of funds, as to whether regular duty pay or some mix of retirement pay and active duty pay will cover the fiscal requirement. Further, thought should be given to the question of periodic increments in the form of longevity pay comparable to Civil Service increments while they are on active duty, though these increments probably should not be included in computing retirement pay. Insofar as other benefits are concerned, these officers would function as Regular officers in all respects, for all purposes other than promotion. It is believed that many assignments exist where extended incumbent stability would be more suitable than the inclusion of the assignment as part of the rotational system, especially for senior officers. This plan provides the needed flexibility for the utilization of younger officers in senior grades for the more critical duty assignments where a challenge exists, and where a more competitive spirit can be enhanced. These factors should contribute to higher retention, we believe, because they act as stimuli to professional aspirations.
Pre-retirement Counseling

Of importance to the Regular officer who may or may not be requested to stay on active duty once he approaches retirement eligibility is the availability of a counseling program. Earlier reference to a professional military counseling program designed to assist younger officers in career counseling and with such personal and family problems as may require assistance offers a potential basis for a complete counseling function to military personnel. Additional emphasis should be given to the availability of counseling to all officers as they progress in their professional careers. For those expecting to retire, vocational counseling will be the primary concern so that officers may become aware of their education and training needs to acquire skills for civilian employment. They should also be informed of the opportunities in the civilian labor market, of the geographic locations where these opportunities are likely to exist, of their retirement benefits, and such other aspects which may affect readjustment to civilian status as retirees. A counseling program of this nature must revolve around the needs of the individual, evaluating his assets, liabilities, and interests, and therefore, should be dependent upon professionally trained personnel.

Job Structure Improvement

It is essential that the officer job structure at the Company Commander and Field Grade levels be re-examined, chiefly to ascertain how much non-professional detail is inhibiting professional military duties, and what portions of this detail can be eliminated, delegated to strictly administrative personnel, or downgraded and assigned to enlisted personnel. A re-evaluation and, where necessary, a re-structuring of officer tasks emphasizing professional functions should facilitate interest and create added professional challenge—all in the direction of attaining greater job satisfaction. The assumption is made that job satisfaction correlates positively with retention.

Differential Career Development

The traditional pattern of the Army has been in the direction of training the "generalist", the officer who is qualified in a variety of
skills, such as combat, administrative and staff functions, and command operations to attain the qualifications needed for growth through the successive senior grades in a career channel. Military developments in recent years have indicated more and more the narrowing bandwidth of military functions within more limited channels. It is fairly well accepted that three reasonably broad career patterns exist:

Combat functions

Technical functions

Administrative functions

These distinctive channels imply the need for establishing and implementing a policy of differential career development and assignments.

One precaution to take into account at this time - it may be appropriate, in view of the possible confusion and costs of short-term total reclassification action to consider a more gradual implementation, that is, to initiate the program with the junior officers and allow the progression to take place as these officers develop. This approach obviously means the simultaneous existence of a dual system for a number of years, which, in itself, has other limitations and problems.

This concept can be accomplished as a three phased project. First, is the acceptance of the concept and agreement on the formulation of such policy as essential to Army progress and professional development. Second is a requirement for reclassification of all officer positions accordingly, establishing career patterns within the boundaries of each of the three major channels. In some instances a further narrowing along specialty lines may be desired within the career channel but these should be along MOS family patterns and associated with specialty training and skill requirements. Third is the parallel reclassification of all officers within the appropriate one of the three channels covering his qualifications. Actually such classification should be initiated early in the officer's career, preferably at a point where the decision is made regarding the career route for which he is best suited. This decision would be based on a complex
of information, including a Differential Officer Battery, initial officer assignment experience and performance evaluations, commanding officer judgements, counselor reports based on interviews, and such other pertinent information as may prove useful. As the officer grows in experience and expertise within the framework of the basic major career channel, his assignments and performance become more meaningful both to the Army and to himself. Promotional opportunities and career ladders are geared to the major channel, which allows more flexibility than under the current Branch System.

Special insignia should be designed to distinguish affiliation with each of the three basic channels. Modern military developments indicate the unrealistic distinctions of assignments by Branch, currently in use, although these may be traditional and have morale values. These distinctions, especially within the combat arms, should be eliminated, because of the requirement for training and experience which essentially cuts across what were at one time separate Branch functions, but are presently less distinguishable as such.

The above notion is geared to provide an optimum match between the skills and capabilities of officer personnel to the requirements of the Service in order to provide more effective operations at the least cost, and produce officers who are more satisfied with their functional assignments due to training, skills, and interests.

Benefits

Earlier in this report is the statement that pay was not the only concern of officers. High in the thinking of the Regular officer are the fringe benefits which he has found to be important. These benefits have, over the years, been eroded, with a consequent erosion of his pay and security. Many officers have been disturbed

8/ DOB currently in development by APRO.

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as benefits have been taken away despite the pay increases. They do not see the latter as adequate replacement for lost benefits; rather, they look upon the withdrawal of benefits as a series of "broken promises". The important benefits, once more adequately available to officers and about which there is a consistent emotional reaction are those which primarily concern his family:

Medical care and hospitalization for dependents

Housing

Dental care for dependents

Action is recommended that these benefits be reinstated and expanded to meet the needs of officers and their dependents. Erosion over the past decade or more has been associated with economics and the problems of resource allocation primarily at DoD level. Yet, despite the persistence of the retention problem and the repeated studies pointing to the impact of fringe benefits on retention, the needed actions have been withheld. Thus family housing, medical facilities and improved medical care requirements, (30) despite the repeated recognition of these attributes of retention, are again pending, either at the DoD or Congressional level.

In accord with requirements contained in the military pay legislation of 1965, the DoD was charged with the responsibility of a series of quadrennial reviews of military compensation. The first review process has been initiated and will be completed during 1966. Presently, this process has reached the stage of formulating its objectives, to be followed by compiling pertinent data relative to:

Pay

fringe benefits

9/ Telephone discussion with Col. L. E. Benade, Army Committee.
the structure of the compensation system
imbalance of compensation in relation to skills
correcting imbalances

The findings of this study, as well as recommendations arising therefrom, will be available for consideration by the President and the Congress. It is likely that a number of recommended actions contained in the retention study may be covered by the Army's committee assigned to the quadrennial review of military pay and benefits.

Benefits are seen as crucial by the officer on active duty to provide for his family. Similar views are extant with reference to retirement benefits. With a few exceptions, the same package of benefits becomes of real concern, whether the benefits are or are not available upon retirement. For the retiring officer, medical and hospital care for himself and dependents is a major problem. Although the new national program of medicare provides a solution to retirees and spouses aged 65 and over, it does not provide coverage for those retirees and dependents prior to age 65. Current authorization is largely dependent upon availability of resources and services, with active duty personnel getting priority. Thus, the anticipation of retirement holds a bleak outlook for many who believed that the retirement benefit package was a right to which they were legally entitled.

Other benefits of concern to the retiree, though not as critical as medical and hospital care, include dental care, commissary and post exchange privileges. With increasing numbers of Armed Forces personnel, and consequently, an expected increase in the numbers of retirees over the years, provision should be made for retention and availability of these benefits because of their influence on the general retention problem during the active duty phase as well as the anticipated retirement phase of the Regular officer. It is the withdrawal of an expected legally authorized fact or promised benefit which acts as a depressant upon the long term career outlook of the officer. This is especially important when he sees the steadily increasing benefits being authorized to civil service personnel and to civilians in general in industry and business.
RETENTION OF CRITICALLY NEEDED ENLISTED SPECIALISTS

Since World War II, defense needs have required substantial military forces. Active duty military strength in the Department of Defense has fluctuated from a low of approximately 1.4 million in 1948 to a high of almost 3.7 million in 1952. The uniformed corps was stabilized at approximately 2.5 million in 1958 and continued at that level until the Viet Nam build-up began. On March 1, 1966, the totals grew to 2.9 million, containing an Army of 1.12 million. The Army had to rely on Selective Service inductees and enlistments motivated by the draft for the larger portion of its share of this manpower. Enlisted men inducted for military service are not career oriented, consequently, the Army is facing all the problems of short-term personnel during a period when its need for highly trained men is increasing.

Efforts to retain as career personnel those individuals with the long training required for critical specialties have been only partially successful. Legislation enacted by Congress in 1946 established a twenty-year career for enlisted men as a career incentive. This law permits enlisted personnel to request retirement after twenty years of service, and Defense Department regulations require that such requests be granted. Retirement benefits do not appear to be a significant incentive in the recruitment of men; however, all expert opinion and available data from personnel surveys point out that the retirement system becomes an important element in retention of enlisted men after an initial period of service. The feeling of NCO's on this subject was expressed pointedly by an Air Force NCO in Europe during a recent retirement benefits survey, "Take my retirement away and the encumbrances of service life outweigh the advantages. I'd quit tomorrow." The Services have always made their position very clear: military retirement benefits must not be eroded. A decision to remain in the Service for twenty years appears to be made during a man's second enlistment when he has accumulated some stake in retirement benefits. Certainly when a man enters into a second enlistment term the chances of his completing twenty years in the Army are markedly improved.

Benefits that go with Army life are important to enlisted men during
their first term of service. Soldiers use the post exchanges, recrea-
tional buildings, theaters, and medical and dental facilities. Married
men count on commissaries to stretch their dollars, and medical ser-
vice to care for their dependents. First term enlisted men consider
these things as "fringe" benefits and in some cases, particularly among
married service men, benefits may influence a reenlistment decision.
Once the career decision has been made, military benefits, and es-
pecially the retirement system, become crucial to future enlistments.
Thus while retirement and military benefits are strong incentives
when they appear, they have little value until the second enlistment.
The usefulness of the retirement system as a career incentive makes
its appearance too late to have much effect on personnel who enter the
Army with the idea of completing an obligation or acquiring a skill for
civilian life.

Improvement in the pay schedule for enlisted personnel has been
a continuing goal of the military establishment. Pay rates were in-
creased in 1958 and in each of the past three years of 1963, 1964,
1965. These increases have for instance, raised the basic pay of an
E-4 with over three years service from $124 to $176 per month. This
increase, while it exceeds the deteriorating effects of inflation, is
hardly large enough to influence a career decision or compete with the
high wages the enlisted man feels he can get in civilian life. The en-
listed man is a confirmed optimist when he rates his civilian prospects
as compared to military life. He tends to view his civilian future more
favorably than do officers. The Michigan Study (6) showed that 60 per-
cent of all enlisted men felt that it would be easy to find civilian jobs
equal to their jobs in the military while only 48 percent of the officers
were as optimistic. Forty three percent of enlisted men thought they
would probably make more use of their executive and managerial skills
after leaving the military service as compared to only 30 percent of
the officers. When it came to earnings, these studies made in 1961
showed that 67 percent of enlisted men felt that their wages in civilian
life would be higher than they were in military service. Only 39 per-
cent of officers felt they would initially earn more in civilian jobs.

These responses were from representative samples of all active
duty personnel and a great deal of the favorable rating of the civilian
potential, as compared to present military life, came from those with
only a short period of military service who were anticipating entering
civilian life. Some portion of greater optimism for a civilian future among enlisted men can be attributed to the fact that the Army officer's lot is a better one with relatively less room for improvement than the enlisted man anticipates for himself.

When enlisted men with over fifteen years service were asked about anticipated earnings in civilian life, 42 percent felt they could get higher salaries in civilian life. Since the fifteen years service group would include the higher enlisted grades and those with the strongest career commitments it was apparent that basic pay rates do not provide a strong incentive for the retention of enlisted men.

As an additional pay incentive for people with scarce technical skills to remain in the service, Congress by the 1958 Military Pay Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to establish proficiency pay. Until 1963, the army system consisted of two monthly rates of proficiency pay, P-2 at $60 and P-1 at $30. The percentage in particular job areas getting the extra payment ranged from 90 percent in the most critical skills to five percent in the non-critical. Only E-4 and above were eligible for proficiency pay and an annual skill test was required. If an individual scored high enough he received P-1 pay of $30 monthly. A soldier in a P-2 specialty skill area could draw $60 per month after receiving $30 for at least three months. There was no assurance that the individual soldier would receive the extra pay for more than a year. Each year he was retested and new cut-off scores were established. As a device to encourage study and self-improvement among those who had already made a career commitment, the system was effective. The stated purpose of the program, however, was to encourage those with scarce technical skills to remain in service in the face of increasing competition from rising salaries in industry.

After four years of careful study the Army decided that the proficiency pay system as established was not working as a reenlistment incentive. The system suffered from three major defects according to Lt. Col. G. C. Smith("):

"Payments were too small, too late, and too uncertain." "Too small" because $30 was not a substantial reenlistment incentive. "Too late" because a soldier deciding on reenlistment could expect to wait from several months to a year or more before he began to receive proficiency payments - if at all. "Too uncertain" because a soldier could not count upon it as a regular and constant part of his military pay. Therefore the idea of competing for additional
pay was not effective as a reenlistment incentive, particularly to technicians whom industry was clamoring to hire at more attractive wages.

On 1 October 1963 a new program for specialty pay was instituted. It was aimed at increasing reenlistments among those in whom the Army had the greatest investment in time and money. The size of the payments was increased. Instead of $30 and $60, the new rates are $50, $75 and $100 per month for P-1, P-2 and P-3, respectively. This pay begins immediately upon reenlistment in a specialty MOS. These payments go to all career people in the skill and continue as long as they maintain proficiency and satisfactory performance in that skill.

In determining which of the three rates of specialty pay a particular skill qualifies for, the Army considers training cost, training time, reenlistment rates, current career manning situations and projected requirements for the skill. To qualify, the skill must involve an investment of relatively long and costly first enlistment training and must be one in which the supply of career people is clearly inadequate.

In addition to regular monthly proficiency pay, the Military Pay Act of 1965 provided that a member designated as having a critical military skill who is entitled to a bonus on his first reenlistment may receive an additional amount up to four times the regular bonus. The additional amount may be paid in equal yearly installments in each year of the enlistment period. This bonus can be an appreciable amount which may more than compensate for differences between military and civilian pay scales.

The revised proficiency pay program and reenlistment bonus certainly provide more career incentives than previously existed. They should supply some help in retaining highly qualified enlisted men. Industry has found that no system depending solely upon money will solve personnel procurement problems, (25) but pay nevertheless remains an important factor in retention. The effect of the new proficiency pay program should be carefully studied and evaluated.
Current shortages of skilled specialists were increased by the Viet Nam buildup. Yet the range of training required in the specialties now in short supply is impressive. The January 1966 list of MOS's for which the Army is requesting retired enlistees to volunteer for recall to active duty includes 18 specialists, 14 types of mechanics, 22 categories of repairmen, and 20 miscellaneous specialties. (34)

What are the hopes, expectations, and career prospectives of the high school students who have the ability to acquire the critical skills needed by the Army? Some answers are found in a recent Opinion Research Corporation report on the views of today's youths. (35)

1. There is no shortage of young people in this country. The labor force is expected to increase by twelve and a half million during the 1960-70 decade and half of that increase will be young people entering the labor market for the first time. Beginning in 1965 over three and a half million youths will reach 18 years of age each year through 1970.

2. A larger percentage of these young people are staying in High School until graduation. The proportion of entering high school students that reach graduation has been increasing - 68.7 percent in 1960; 69.3 percent in 1962; and 71.7 percent in 1964. There are many pressures on students to complete high school.

3. There are not enough jobs to go around. Unemployment among high school graduates remains at about 18 percent and the rate among high school drop-outs is about twice as high. Past employment experience of high school graduates who enter the work force indicates that boys will have a more difficult time than girls in finding jobs if schooling is terminated at twelfth grade. This is because girls find jobs in clerical and service work which are expanding job categories. Male graduates are concentrated in blue-collar jobs, primarily as operatives and laborers - job categories that are not expanding. Most industries are now
demanding usable skills in entry jobs where they used to hire and train non-skilled workers. The highest unemployment is found among the non-skilled.

4. Most young male high school graduates desire technical and professional jobs. Fifty-five percent of all male high school seniors state that they aim for the expanding professional and technical occupational fields as a permanent job or occupation. In the professional fields they are emphasizing engineering and technician positions. They are shooting for higher job levels than those of their parents.

5. High school graduates realize that further education is becoming a necessity. Ninety-five percent of senior boys hope to gain further education or training. Of these, 56 percent hope to complete two or more years of college; ten percent hope to attend trade or vocational schools; and another ten percent expect to acquire further education and training in military service. The remainder are planning on night schools or have no firm plans.

6. Many young men will fall short of their civilian educational goals. Young people's academic aspirations always have exceeded their academic achievements. Past experience indicates only half of those entering college actually get a first degree. Competition for spaces in institutions of higher learning continues to increase. Sizeable numbers of students are not properly prepared - more than a fourth of the most able boys do not take college preparatory courses in high school. Even the brightest student who seeks to go on to higher academic education without a college preparatory course has a difficult time. Financial problems, marriage, changes in interest, family influences, and emotional problems take their toll of students. The great mass of "average" young men are not going to graduate from college and many will never begin.

7. Young men have different concerns about the type of job they will get. The male students in the upper ten percent of their class are more concerned with "challenging work" than they are with "amount of pay" or "security". Boys in the middle and lower third of their class rate pay and security as the more important considerations. Work to a young man is more than earning a living.
Some stress an opportunity to be creative, some want congenial associates, and some want a chance to travel. Only by knowing the many facets of various jobs can youths make intelligent job decisions.

8. **Young people make their own career decisions.** In keeping with the sense of independence of today's youth, only one-fourth of high school seniors give parents any credit for influence in making their career decision. Probably because of adolescent negativeism, modern parents are often reluctant to apply too much pressure in shaping their son's and daughter's career plans. Forty percent of high school seniors state flatly that their career decisions are made entirely on their own; only 18 percent admit that teachers or counselors have been influential.

9. **Young people want more career information.** The problem of getting more job information and counsel to young people grows more urgent as their numbers over-burden school guidance facilities and personnel. At the same time job requirements are becoming stiffer and career programs more complex. Eighty percent of senior high school boys in the middle and lower third of their class do not feel that they have as much information as they would like in deciding upon the type of work they want to do. Students of the upper part of the class are more satisfied with the available information mainly because their career plans are school oriented.

**BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL RECRUITING METHODS**

Of all major institutions of employment, business and industrial firms seem to be most aware of the need to compete for the best talent at the high school level. The business corporation is still the first choice of high school seniors as a place to work. Thirty three percent of all senior boys rate corporations as their first choice for employers. Business firms work to maintain this competitive edge. Some of their methods of understanding, appealing to and informing students about their companies are discussed in the following paragraphs.
1. Large companies support survey studies of youth's attitudes, values, and aspirations in regard to the world of work and career planning. Some representative reports by Opinion Research Corporation, one research organization supported by industry, include:

   Recruiting Young Men for Industry (1948)
   
   Teaching High School Students Realities of Business (1955)
   
   More Punch for your Recruiting Brochure (1957)
   
   Teenagers Judge Big Business and Government (1959)
   
   How Children Form Their Views of Business (1961)
   
   High School Student's Views on Our Business and Economic System (1964)
   

   Studies such as these are used by management to understand the thinking of youth and prepare appeals for the talent their company needs.

2. Corporations offer specific training courses in occupational skills that are immediately useful. A recent survey of 248 companies showed that 232 had some form of employee training and education program. Among high school students cooperative work-study programs that combine academic studies with actual work experiences in the field of interest encourages further education, and may convince students of the opportunities in a business career. One company with unfilled needs for technicians holds Saturday classes for high school students who are then immediately employed upon graduation.

3. Some companies encourage students to meet with and question management. By increasing personal contacts with students, management hopes to dispel any erroneous notions about their business. One scheme involves periodic forums where students
of economics, for instance, can ask searching questions. One utility company has a Junior Stockholder Program whereby students question management about "their" company.

4. Corporations help organize and support "interest clubs." These are planned extracurricular activities open to all students. Clubs, organized around occupational interest groups, meet twice a month with speakers, films, panel discussions, field trips, etc., planned and furnished by business firms. By providing a flow of information and knowledge of new technologies, these programs fill the gap in understanding a business and the opportunities it holds for training and advancement.

5. Printed materials for high school students and counselors are prepared and distributed. During high school years, when students are searching for careers, their range of available fields may be limited to the printed material in the guidance counselor's office. Brochures on broad occupational categories as well as specific jobs can provide real help to the counselor and the student as well as presenting the job opportunities in the sponsoring company. Many companies provide films on jobs and how to prepare for them.

6. Mass media are used to tell teenagers about jobs in industry. Companies have become well acquainted with the media sources of teenagers, their buying habits and recreational pursuits and have planned their advertising programs along these lines. These same advertising techniques in newspapers, magazines and on radio and TV are used to promote careers in business. General Motors' ads on careers, the "General Motors is People" series, is a prime example of the technique.

7. Companies maintain close liaison with schools to provide career information. Requests by students for specific job information place a tremendous burden on school counselors. Any offer by companies to make their staff available for information on career problems is usually welcomed with open arms. High School students seldom contact business firms directly for information yet often such companies are the best source of information about training for a particular skill they require. Corporations that seek out the guidance counselors with offers to handle
such inquiries maintain their competitive edge in the talent market.

Efforts by industry to inform and influence high school students also serve to enhance the image of manufacturing and merchandising organizations in our society. The Army particularly needs to engage in activities that will result in improved public acceptance of its recruiting appeals.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING RETENTION OF CRITICAL ENLISTED SPECIALISTS

Pre-Service Activities

Many high school graduates, qualified to learn any of the critical specialty skills, are turned out into the labor market each year. Even some of the top ten percent of high school students are frustrated in their attempts to secure jobs or continue their education. Most young men during their last year of high school are looking for ways to gain additional training and education. The modern young high school graduates are clamoring for technical training and the education required to work as scientific, technical and professional assistants. Most of the skills critical to the Army involve exactly the types of training young men now want. Increased emphasis on high school information and counselling programs could funnel more of this talent into the Army on a voluntary basis.

1. High School Information Programs should be:

   Continuous throughout the entire high school experience of a young man.

   Slanted toward the technical and training aspects of service but include a broad variety of social, travel, sports, adventure, etc., appeals.

   In varied forms for students and counselors including posters, specific data sheets for each area of training offered, pamphlets on related job categories, detailed
brochures on Army activities such as OCS, R&D programs, and West Point Preparatory Programs.

Detailed enough in each job area to outline the training that would be received, the progression in rank and pay that might be expected, and the civilian jobs that the trainee would be qualified to perform. These might be called Army Job Bulletins and contain pictorial information on training sites, classrooms, instructor qualifications, testimonials of civilian industrial acceptance, etc.

Designed to improve the Army image for recruiting to include information on Army training available to all levels from recruit training to senior officers. Boys who go on to college and university should know more about the military profession and its opportunities – some of them will not complete college and some who do may look for career changes. All will be citizens who have a part in forming the public image of the Army.

Tied to student activities and interests where possible, for example, sporting events schedules for recruiting hand-outs.

2. Army Counselors in High Schools or School Districts should:

Be acquainted with the area, the people and the teachers. Provision should be made for paying and training qualified Army counselors. Suggested sources are Reserve officer teachers and retired officers, warrant officers and NCO's who live in the area, many of whom can be utilized on a part time basis.

Have regular hours when they are available for student conferences.

Maintain close liaison with guidance and psychological counselors, school administrators, and nearby military units and installations. The Army should consider short summer camps and periodic field trips for high school students. The
purpose would be to give students greater exposure to military activities and more detailed information and experience with army jobs. Army counselors could organize and supervise these trips which would include indoctrination and familiarization activities along with recreational and entertainment aspects.

Conduct and closely supervise the Army information program in each high school in their district.

In-Service Training

The program for training in each critical skill area should have the following objectives to aid recruiting and retention.

1. Be identified as closely as possible in name, course titles, and study materials with technical, scientific and professional positions and titles.

2. Qualify individuals who complete the courses for related specific civilian technical, scientific, and professional technician positions. In-service training should parallel apprentice training in science and industry where possible.

3. Be organized around a five year period of schooling and on-the-job training. The aim should be to offer complete and recognized training which would terminate during the second enlistment.

In-Service Attitude Studies

All critical specialty skill areas should be surveyed regularly by questionnaire. An accurate and complete flow of information about the success and failures in providing job satisfactions in critical areas is essential to good personnel management. The Army could not, of course, provide inducements to retain all trained specialists, even if it were desirable. One of the goals of attitude surveys would be to identify, on a continuing basis, the inducements that will keep the required number of specialists in uniform.
Fringe Benefits and Military Retirement

A. Fringe Benefits.

The influence of fringe benefits on the re-enlistment rates of soldiers with specialist ratings should be reviewed. Research recently done by the U. S. Naval Personnel Research Authority found marriage and the number of dependents to be the variables that correlate highest with re-enlistment rates. This holds true regardless of the specialty area of the individual. A second important finding by the Navy research group was that certain geographic areas provide the men who show higher percentages of re-enlistment. These findings indicate the value of socio-economic factors and the associated family benefits to enlisted specialists.

Many of the fringe benefits are seen by the specialists who receive Armed Forces training as providing the opportunities for improving or maintaining an acceptable socio-economic status. Thus, the factors which have the greatest appeal to Regular service personnel, and which have been sources of controversy, are the following:

Medical Care for Dependents
Family Housing
Dental Care for Dependents
Commissaries and Post Exchanges
Allowances for shipment of Household Goods
Relocation Allowances
Dependents' Information and Service Centers
Legal Assistance for Dependents

The several benefits listed above are seen by career enlisted personnel as necessary stabilizing forces to their professional military careers. At present, no special research is indicated, nor
does it appear necessary to request special legislation. Adequate provision of these benefits can be made by policy or procedure establishment at either the Army or OSD level. Authorization exists, but implementation is largely dependent upon availability of funds and their allocation.

It may be appropriate, however, to consider an economic evaluation of fringe benefits—particularly those considered most important and most conducive by enlisted personnel to their remaining in service. The economic evaluation should also consider, from a trade-off view, the added training costs involved in the preparation and development of skills against the replacement of highly skilled specialists. This study should be done on a sample basis.

An additional area of fringe benefits that should be carefully explored for its utility to the Army as well as the enlisted personnel is one which emphasized educational benefits or career incentives, especially for enlisted specialists. Although this program, in part, is in operation, it may be considered worthwhile for expansion for enlisted career specialists. These program elements include:

- Extension courses at Universities or Colleges
- Tuition aid at nearby Colleges or Universities
- Assignment for advanced training to civilian trade and technical schools
- Assignment to Civilian Colleges or Universities for final year of a baccalaureate degree.

B. Retirement Benefits.

The importance of the military retirement program as a useful incentive in the retention of crucial specialists in the senior enlisted grades cannot be over-stated. However, the present program warrants consideration for some changes that may enhance the retirement benefits as more effective career incentives. Information available indicates that the retirement package is an attractive incentive to enlisted personnel beyond the first re-enlistment.
Existing legislation contains differences in the basic titles governing enlisted and officer retirements. An enlisted man who retires with less than thirty years of service is placed in a reserve status until his total service, active and retired, equals thirty years. Although the reserve status of the retired enlisted-man does not require participation in reserve training, and involuntary recall to active duty is unlikely, the legal authority for recall is present and may, in many cases, act as a career deterrent. The enlisted man, though he may have had active duty at some prior time in a commissioned status, will not receive the retired pay of the higher grade until he has served a total of thirty years, both active and retired. The Reserve officer who retires with twenty years of service will immediately receive the retired pay of the highest rank held, whether or not he held this rank on active duty. Consideration should be given to eliminating these differences.

Another important consideration is that which deals with pay benefits that are not reflected in retired pay. In recent years there has been a marked tendency to compare the economic value in dollars of all relevant benefits when determining the relative merits of civilian employment and retirement against a military career and retirement. Such incentive payments as proficiency pay, hazard duty pay, combat pay, overseas pay, quarters allowance, etc., are very necessary as benefits during active duty, as is the re-enlistment bonus. However, these specific and necessary incentives or increments to active duty pay are excluded from the computation of retirement pay.

Since the retirement program contains a package of benefits over and above pay, due thought must be given to the reactions of enlisted personnel to these supplemental benefits and their utility on stimulating the retention of enlisted specialists for a full military career.

The problems of erosion of benefits discussed in relation to retired officers are even more crucial to retired enlisted personnel. The retired enlisted man counts on the availability of various benefits essentially as equivalent to supplemental income. He sees this in the following benefits:

Medical care for self and dependents
Commissary and post exchange privileges

Dental Care for self and dependents

An additional point of consideration is the need for preparing enlisted personnel, ready for retirement, for the civilian labor market. Although the government provides a package of retirement pay and other benefits, it seems necessary to take on the responsibility for a severance program. One might even consider this comparable, at the other extreme, to recruit indoctrination. Enlisted personnel (or officers) who have spent twenty to thirty years in a totally military environment deserve the opportunity for re-education to ease their adjustment to civilian status. In the main, this would probably take the form of vocational counseling, with emphasis on civilian employment opportunities related to the capabilities and skills of the retiree. Actually this program should be initiated at least two years prior to retirement of the enlisted man in order that he can take on such additional training as he may need to convert his military skills for civilian use.

Once this program is inaugurated with individuals contemplating retirement, additional counseling can be provided, to indicate more suitable employment opportunities on a geographic basis, the various retirement benefits for the individual and his dependents, and the manner in which these benefits are realized.

As retirees scatter across the country, opportunity is presented to utilize their services, from time to time, to help build the Army image among the younger generations and to help in recruiting and public relations generally. The greater the satisfaction of retired personnel with their Army experiences, the more effective their voices in public.

USE OF ATTITUDE RESEARCH STUDIES IN RETENTION PROBLEMS

A great and continuing need of Army management is complete and accurate information on motivation and morale in the U. S. Army. Cooperative and willing personnel make the difference between success
or failure in every human undertaking and nowhere is this more
evident than in Army operations. Motivated personnel are necessary
for successful day-to-day operations and dedicated officers and non-
commissioned officers are required for the continuity demanded by
long-term plans of the Army establishment. In a broader sense, the
maintenance of our civilization and our democratic way of life
depends upon the ability of Army management to provide forces with
the "will to fight."

Accurate information on the needs and desires of Army personnel
at all levels is a prerequisite to determining the appeals and incentives
that will arouse the cooperation of the human beings that constitute the
Army. Only with such knowledge can the Army Staff arrive at bal-
anced and effective personnel programs and policies which will
produce maximum results for the Army and the nation.

In problems of retention of personnel, the Army has one great
advantage over business, industry, civilian governmental agencies
and all other sectors of the civilian labor market. Through obligated
service the Army has under its control for a period of two years all
the types of personnel it needs and desires to retain for longer term
careers. All available data indicate that the most important factors
in commitment to an Army career are the actual conditions, job satis-
factions, and perceived career opportunities experienced by the newly
recruited or drafted enlisted man or the newly commissioned officer.
This seems to apply even to U. S. Military Academy graduates. It is
true that the military academies, by and large, produce men with
strong professional career commitments, but it is equally true that
for the individual officer this commitment is strengthened or weakened
by his actual experiences and available opportunities. It is seldom
the attraction of civilian employment opportunities, per se, that
weakens the strongly committed Academy graduate. Studies (2) by
Lang disclosed that those officers who actually have found and who
feel that they could find civilian employment easily are not necessarily
those with the weakest attachments to a military career.

The core of the problem of career commitment for all categories
of personnel seems to be whether they believe they are currently being
employed effectively by the U. S. Army. Career opportunities and job
satisfactions build career commitments and where these attitudes are
not developed by actual experiences there is not likely to be any professional commitment.

During periods of obligated service the Army has unequaled opportunity to measure and modify the attitudes of the officers and enlisted men it needs to attract and retain. For critical personnel categories, it would not be unreasonable to use the entire period of their obligated service in an attempt to develop a career commitment. Certainly, the minimum effort should include research and operational studies of the attitudes, beliefs, motivations, perceived opportunities, and career experiences of personnel classes of special importance to the Army.

RESEARCH METHODS

In general the most useful research instrument for studying the attitudes important to problems of retention is the cross-sectional sample survey. This type of study develops data about individuals with various backgrounds in the many possible Army situations and assignments. Since attitudes toward Army careers will be strongly influenced, both in direction and intensity, by past experiences, the whole range of background attributes of the individuals under study is important. Similarly, all gradations of experience in different Army situations, organizational settings, geographical areas, and types of duty must be explored. The attitude survey is particularly suited for developing this type of information if planned and conducted on a systematic basis.

Continuous measurement of attitudes of individuals in some personnel areas is required to detect important changes in correctable conditions that adversely affect career commitments.

Attitude surveys in the area of career motivation must encompass more than simple statements of individual intentions. Underlying beliefs and motivations are usually more precise estimates of career intentions than mere listings of probable courses of action. Longitudinal studies (37) of individuals over a period of years give the depth needed as groundwork to relate motivations to actual behavior. Such studies are feasible on smaller numbers of selected individuals.
preliminary to the development of cross-sectional surveys with questions that probe beneath the surface of career intentions. Areas that particularly need investigation for example, are relationships between career expectations, perceived opportunities and the realities of their Army experience. What are their initial aspirations and expectations? What type of duty do they expect and what do they receive, for instance? What are the relationships between subordinate and superior officers - at different levels of command and organization? How does this affect their image of an Army career? Do they feel accepted, and how strong is the sense of belonging to the military profession at various stages of their tour of duty? What constitutes a desirable career - is it a set number of years of service - or none of these? The attitude survey is especially useful in these types of career oriented studies.

RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

The type of attitude research visualized in connection with retention of personnel is particularly suited to the facilities of in-service personnel research agencies. They have continuing access to developments producing critical personnel shortages and projections of future needs. Military personnel officers understand the problems and requirements involved in selecting representative samples and administering questionnaire studies to Army populations. Army agencies have the necessary station lists and personnel rosters readily available. Continuity of effort and continuous study of the problem areas can be achieved only by an Army research agency.

Civilian social scientists, acting as consultants or on active duty training, can furnish Army research agencies with technical guidance, new research ideas, and periodic infusions of civilian attitudes toward military career problems.

Research contracts to civilian agencies, administered by the in-service agencies, can provide any necessary complementary studies of pre-military experiences and influences or conditions in civilian societies that might affect Army retention goals.
USE OF RESEARCH RESULTS

Attitude surveys will disclose conditions that adversely affect career commitments, policies that need revision, or areas where training and indoctrination are required. Problems of personnel attrition and retention of critical personnel can be influenced if attitude research results are used to reach specific goals. For instance, if the young ROTC graduate can be persuaded to commit five years to the military service there is an 80 percent chance that he will stay for a full career. Zald and Simon (9) report that among officers with more than four-and-one-half years of service, over four-fifths intend to stay in service. Attitude surveys in this connection would be directed to finding out what conditions would influence a top-notch ROTC graduate to commit five years to the Army. The results must be used to make the changes required to achieve the goal if the survey is to be justified.

Many times attitude research results are used only as interesting reading. Industrial leaders seldom make this mistake - they are too aware of the cost. Not the cost of a research study which is appreciable, but the higher cost of short-term personnel and losses in training investments. Just recently a retired union official (38) of prominence indicated that the attitude survey when effectively utilized by industry had a deleterious effect on the growth of union membership in particular and, to a degree, on collective bargaining. This was due to the fact that management used the survey findings to correct sources of grievance, with the result that plant personnel in some corporations were turning to management rather than union representatives with their grievances and needs.

Institutional approaches to the modernization of personnel management practices tend to be slow and frequently handicapped by bureaucratic procedures. The Army, in possessing one of today's most useful diagnostic tools, has the capability of detecting the impact of management policies and practices. The techniques are available and more adequate and consistent implementation is needed to ascertain whether widespread sources of grievance and dissatisfaction exists. Moreover, organizational capabilities are also present to evaluate and recommend the appropriate solutions for Chief of Staff action in bringing personnel policies and practices up to date.
CONCLUSIONS

A number of specific conclusions have been derived from this study.

1. It is the opinion of the authors of this study that the overall problem of retention of qualified personnel by the Army can be attributed to incomplete and inadequate career offerings as compared to civilian careers. Newly commissioned officers and newly trained enlisted specialists do not develop identification with the Army nor are they offered the opportunities and incentives required to elicit the deep career commitment characteristic of the professional soldier.

   This conclusion is based upon the findings of a number of studies covered in the review of the literature, particularly the sociological analyses of Janowitz, the University of Michigan Studies, the USAF and USN studies of value systems, the Navy Studies on Enlisted Personnel Retention Variables, and the Harvard Studies in Career Development (Selected Bibliography).

2. The most critical loss of officer personnel is found among ROTC Graduates who leave active duty with the Army upon completion of obligated service. Of less importance though still a matter of concern is the attrition of senior officers through early voluntary retirement.

   This conclusion regarding loss rates is based upon the statistical information furnished by DCSPER and by CORC and the related discussion in the Section on Retention Rates of this report.

3. High school graduates who possess the higher levels of capability essential for training to meet the critical requirements of the Army as career specialists at the enlisted level are available in sufficient quantity if adequate means of attraction are utilized.

   This conclusion is based largely on the Opinion Research Corporation's youth survey of last year.

4. Attitude research studies, as used in industry as a management tool, can furnish much of the essential information required to detect and correct incipient retention problems in the Army.
This conclusion is based on the work of Stouffer, (24) Viteles (25) and Likert. (22)

5. The critical career decision point for officers is found at approximately five years of active service. For an enlisted man, the critical point is his second re-enlistment. Thus, with a five year active duty period for young officers, and the initiation of a second re-enlistment for the enlisted man, the chances of their continuing on active service for at least a twenty year period are substantially improved.

This conclusion is based upon the researches contained in the University of Michigan Studies (6) and in the work of Zald and Simon. (9)
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are offered as a result of this study:

FOR OFFICER PERSONNEL

1. A system study is recommended to reflect the status of the overall ROTC program, indicating input-output relationships at critical points and the dynamics which contribute to education, training and retention. This should be a management study aimed at obtaining the status quo of the present system for baseline purposes. (See Conclusion 2.)

2. A demonstration-evaluation study is suggested for a reorganized ROTC program. The experimental evaluation should be aimed at the efficacy of the new Proposed Senior Division Army ROTC Curriculum as the nucleus of a reorganized ROTC educational system, when compared with the present program. The criteria suggested for consideration are: indicated intent to take on a military career at time of commissioning (short term), and action taken towards extending active duty as a Regular or Reservist at the conclusion of obligated service (long term). (See Conclusions 1 and 2.) The organization believed most suited to perform this study, if accepted, is HUMRRO.

3. A study is recommended to review and analyze in depth the task and job structure of all junior officer assignments, aimed at the ultimate restructuring of jobs so that emphasis is placed on intrinsic job factors such as challenge, interest, opportunity for independent action, etc. As part of this study a review should also be made of the extrinsic factors of junior officer jobs and assignments to assure that desired standards are maintained and that adequate information is available regarding these standards. This recommendation is proposed as a management study (organization and methods) and is needed to substantiate forthcoming policy changes and actions.

4. a) It is recommended that a basic research study program be authorized to ascertain the characteristics of the professional military soldier. This recommendation is essentially based on the long-term research program proposed by the King, Helme, Vineberg
staff study (Reference 37) which in the authors' view, proposes a basic approach whose objective is the definition and characterization of the professional soldier. The results of this study program should provide the fundamental model needed as the criterion for the applied studies in motivation and retention. This study program is appropriate for APRO, HUMRRO, and university research groups such as University of Michigan, University of Illinois, Harvard and Stanford Universities. (See Conclusion 1.)

b) The recommendation is made for a study which seeks to define what a commitment to a professional career entails. This perhaps should initiate with a basic approach, examining the fundamental factors in relation to professional careers in general, then proceed more specifically to the military career. The findings may be able to indicate whether these are fundamentally different attributes to the military profession when seen as a limited career, such as a 20 year job or less. The authors believe this suggestion may be related in part to the proposal of King, Helme, and Vineberg, in that it aims at criterion development and has some genetic characteristics in the social and occupational spheres. This study should be performed by an outside group, such as Harvard University College of Education, University of Chicago, University of Michigan. (See Conclusion 1.)

c) A research study is proposed to assess the value systems, interests and associated non-cognitive characteristics possessed by the junior officer so that it will be possible to distinguish the career minded from the non-career minded. The ultimate objective would be a selection instrument for use with students who apply for ROTC. This study can be accomplished by APRO, or possibly referred to an outside research organization such as Educational Testing Service, HUMRRO, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management at M.I.T. It is also appropriate for several university centers, such as Harvard School of Education, Michigan’s Department of Psychology and University of Illinois’ Department of Psychology. (See Conclusions 1 and 2.)

5. The classification test battery (DOB) currently in development by APRO as a device for definitive classification and career channel assignment of officers should be completed and utilized for assigning ROTC senior students either to the combat-arms, technical-scientific activities or administrative-management functions. This classification battery is presently in the data processing and validation analysis
phases at APRO, with the purpose of serving as a device for classifying officers. It is our thought that it be developed for use with ROTC students prior to commissioning. (See Conclusion 1.)

6. a) Professional military counseling centered around officer career counseling is believed to be essential as an aid in the motivation and retention of officers. Access to such counseling activities should be available during the life history of an Army officer, beginning with his student or pre-commissioning period and continuing through to his retirement action. Similar resources should be provided for enlisted personnel. Counseling activities need not be limited to career counseling, but should also include the complex of services which professional counselors can provide: educational, vocational, personal, family and other counseling functions. This recommendation proposes that counseling centers be established at suitable locations throughout the Army in order that access becomes feasible to all officer and enlisted personnel who may desire such assistance. (See Conclusions 1, 2, and 5. This recommendation is essentially based on the opinion of the authors. It is believed that counselors possessing both a professional and a military background can provide the neutral role so essential to counselees who require various kinds of information and guidance where crucial decisions are to be made. Too often the freedom of exchange required in an interview relationship is inhibited when one participant is the other's supervisor, even in career counseling.)

b) It is proposed that a pilot study be initiated to develop a methodology for assessing the utility, effectiveness, and economic cost of a proposed professional military counseling program. It has not been possible to locate any studies which would clarify these factors, since there are no historical patterns available in a military setting. This type of study can be planned and accomplished by a management study organization in collaboration with APRO and HUMRRO as technical advisors. (This recommendation is offered in response to the authors' inability to find appropriate documentation in support of Recommendation 6.a), above. See Conclusion 1.)

7. It is recommended that a special short course of two months duration be authorized and established at the USMA for all junior officers produced via ROTC who commit themselves to the RA or as Reserves to an added three year minimum term beyond obligated service. The short course should concentrate on the professional aspects of a military
career, including courses such as military traditions and history, military law, military developments, doctrine, military administration, etc. Temporary duty covering this assignment should be authorized en route to third year assignment. This recommendation involves a policy decision, followed by management action to develop and initiate the course. Doubtless an evaluation study should be incorporated to ascertain the efficacy of this proposal as it affects retention and professional development. (See Conclusions 1, 2, and 5. This recommendation is strictly a suggestion by the authors.)

8. Authorization via endorsement should be given in change of duty orders for all junior officers reassigned upon completion of obligated service for inclusion of a commitment for assignment to Advanced Branch Schooling, or in special cases, to a civilian graduate school. The commitment would cover a one year assignment to be implemented during the third, fourth, or fifth year of service. This recommendation involves a matter of management policy and procedure, and is strictly a suggestion of the authors. (See Conclusion 2.)

9. Adequate housing should be provided for bachelors, and access to adequate housing should be made available for married junior and senior officers, especially within the continental U.S. The Quadrennial Review Committee reviewing military pay and benefits should be made aware of the housing problem and its impact on retention. This is a concern of the Armed Forces as a whole and requires DoD policy action. (See Conclusion 2.)

10. The operational attitude-opinion survey program should be expanded in order to provide personnel management with more useful tools and information for detecting incipient personnel problems. Job satisfaction surveys should be established as the point of emphasis for junior officers completing their obligated service. Similar utility can be gained for the detection of areas of deterioration in personnel management for officers of the middle and senior grades, and for enlisted personnel, and where appropriate, for securing needed information regarding retired officers and enlisted personnel. This proposal requires management action. (See Conclusion 4.)

11. A recommendation is made to expand and improve content and format of presentation of the Army Information Program both to supplement and implement recruiting for ROTC at high schools and colleges. Information should be geared to meet needs, desires, and
interests of college bound students, emphasizing changing characteristics and challenge of technical tasks, etc., especially where scientific, professional and technical skills and knowledge are essential to military careers and how the Army can fulfill such career interests. This suggestion involves an expanded effort for CINFO and requires policy action. (See Conclusions 1, 2, and 3.)

12. It is recommended that the new Army ROTC Scholarship Program be evaluated to ascertain its efficacy in relation to retention and professional career development. This involves a matter of policy decision, followed by an evaluation study implemented by HUMRRO as the suggested research group. (See Conclusion 2.)

13. The establishment of a system which calls for a firm contract between the Army and the individual Reserve officer is recommended.

   a) Determination should be made through an economic analysis study whether a five year or ten year contract is the better term of service. This type of study can be accomplished by a management study group (DCS/PER research organization) or by an outside organization that specializes in economic analysis. This idea (10 year contract) was first proposed by the Study Group of the University of Michigan.

   b) The type of contract specified should be renewable for like periods of service successively upon mutual agreement of the contracting parties. Renewals may be extended until the Reserve officer has served 30 years or reaches age 62. This proposal involves a policy decision within the Army.

   c) Retirement would be permissible at or after 20 years of service when there is no mutual agreement for contract renewal at or beyond this point. This is comparable to current policy and would involve no basic changes in policies or procedures.

   d) Incentives associated with officer development, assignment, promotion, etc., may be used as instruments of negotiation where deemed appropriate by Army management representatives. This proposal would involve a policy decision within the Army. It is aimed at the retention of specialists of scarce yet needed talents to remain on active duty after a contract has run out. This aspect involves a policy decision. It is a suggestion of the authors.

   e) Establish a separation pay option which permits Reserve officers departing active duty to choose separation pay either totally
or partially in lieu of future retirement pay at conclusion of a contract but prior to reaching eligibility for retirement. This overall recommendation requires a policy decision, followed by the suggested economic analysis and feasibility study. (See Conclusions 1 and 5.)

14. A recommendation is made for issuance of a policy statement that Reserve officers who possess the necessary qualifications will be retained on active duty until they attain 30 years of service or reach age 62. This arrangement is conditional upon mutual agreement between the Army and the individual officer. This recommendation requires a policy action. (See Conclusion 1.)

15. It is important that the Army utilize more effectively its Operational Attitude-Opinion Survey Operation in order to ascertain whether there is any incipient development of trends which may reflect deterioration in personnel management policies or practices. Such surveys should indicate whether dissatisfaction exists and the degree to which they affect early resignations or retirement. This recommendation requires policy action and implementation. (See Conclusion 4.)

16. A change is suggested in promotional policies which follow the "up or out" pattern, especially as the senior grades. The concept of age and length of service in grade at a fixed limitation should be relaxed and made more flexible, and officers retained so long as their performance is within acceptable limits. In fact, it may be desired to re-examine those who perform well after a second pass-over and reconsider promotion. This recommendation, a suggestion of the authors, requires a policy decision. (See Conclusion 2.)

17. An occupational program is offered for retention of senior Regular officers who are not selected for promotion but whose retention on active duty is desired. Their assignments will be made without reference to the promotion list and outside the distribution of numbers in grade. This suggestion recommends assignment chiefly to administrative, training, and related positions. These officers may be retained until they have completed a full 30 years or until age 62, providing they maintain the desired performance. Administrative techniques are also suggested for pay, statistical, and record purposes. This recommendation requires a policy decision. (See Conclusions 1 and 2.)
18. A Differential Career Structure is recommended along three lines: the Combat Arms, Technical-Scientific, and Administrative Managerial as a more adequate classification system for career development, assignment, promotion, and officer utilization. The adoption of this recommendation would necessarily involve a restructuring and improvement of the current job structure for officers and possibly a major change in the present system of designating the Branches as separate organizations for purposes of officer affiliations. This proposal warrants a management study to ascertain its utility and what impact it may have on the Army's organizational structure. This is a proposal by the authors. (See Conclusions 1 and 2.)

19. Fringe benefits for Regular officers are very essential whether during their active duty career or during retirement. Once the Regular officer has manifested his interest in a long term military career, he counts upon certain benefits as necessary rights rather than privileges. Thus, he sees medical care for dependents, housing, and dental care for dependents as urgent and essential benefits. He is also disturbed when these entitlements are removed. Similarly, when retired, the Regular officer is concerned about the more critical benefits, such as medical, hospital and dental care for himself and dependents, especially during the years when these demands are likely to show substantial increases in need. This is a matter of policy, presently dependent upon DoD action. (See Conclusion 1.)

20. A recommendation is proposed for a study of the differences in entitlement to various benefits between Regular and Reserve officers to determine where discriminatory differences should be eliminated. For example, Reserve officers have the advantage of retaining full retired pay when employed as civilians in the Federal Civil Service, whereas retired Regulars have strict limitations on their income level from government sources. Regulars on the other hand, have certain advantages, such as may be found in the manner in which severance pay is computed upon resignation. A management study is suggested to ascertain which discrepancies should be removed. It is expected that positive findings may require legislative action. This recommendation is a suggestion of the authors. (See Conclusions 1 and 5.)
FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL

The recommendations offered below are more specifically applicable to the retention of enlisted personnel.

1. The development of improved and more detailed information on military jobs, careers, and opportunities is needed for recruitment purposes. The issuance of an Army Job Bulletin, comparable to BLS's Occupations, would be a useful recurring publication for disseminating information at the high school level. This appears to be a matter for CINFO action. (See Conclusion 3.)

2. Retired Reserve officers and enlisted personnel should be called upon, as needed, for recruiting duties. Their services may best be used to clarify the contents of the various types of technical jobs, assignments, relationships to civilian work, etc. This is a matter for policy action and implementation. (See Conclusion 3.)

3. The Army may wish to organize a special Summer Camp Program for selected high school students wherein one or two week camp experiences can be utilized as pre-recruiting indoctrination and orientation programs. These activities should be operated by capable non-commissioned officers and aimed at providing a good sampling of Army experiences and interests, interlaced with sports and related activities which are attractive to high school youths. This involves a policy action. (See Conclusion 3.)

4. It is recommended that the training sequence for various highly skilled technician jobs be redesigned in order that an enlisted man can complete his training requirements and acquire the higher skill levels only during his second enlistment, not before. It is the authors' belief that if technical skill training for selected higher technical specialties is carried into a second enlistment period, the enlisted man who is interested in acquiring the technical skill can more readily visualize the career opportunity, increased responsibility and rank. This recommendation should be assigned as a management study to evaluate its efficacy. (See Conclusions 1, 3, and 5.)

5. Fringe benefits are important to enlisted personnel whether on active duty or in retired status. All efforts should concentrate on the
continuation of stated benefits and the prevention of further erosion. Medical care, housing, dental care, and commissary privileges stand out as the critical benefits sought by enlisted personnel for themselves and their dependents. This problem is largely dependent upon DoD action and should be brought to the attention of the Quadrennial Review Committee. (See Conclusions 1 and 3.)

6. Retirement pay should be reexamined and presented for legislative action on recomputation to include a portion of the new pay benefits recently allocated: proficiency pay, hazard pay, etc. Retired pay for the enlisted man takes a very sharp drop if computed solely on his standard active duty pay. This proposal should be considered for action of the Committee on Quadrennial Review. It will ultimately require DoD policy action and legislation, if as recommended. (See Conclusions 1, 3, and 5.)

7. A study is recommended to determine whether there are discriminatory policies and any negative aspects to retention as a result of the policy which retires enlisted personnel at 20 years, with retirement pay computed accordingly, continues them in a reserve status until the 30 year point, then provides full retirement pay. This suggestion perhaps should be referred to the Quadrennial Review Committee. However, a substantiating study may be needed to ascertain whether there is a discriminatory policy that requires further consideration. (See Conclusion 3.)

8. A study is suggested to provide an economic analysis of fringe benefits. With adequate cost information, the comparative pay complexities of civilian and military remuneration may be better understood, and the resulting package may provide the needed incentive for retaining the highly skilled technical personnel for longer periods of service. This proposal should be assigned to be done by an outside economic study organization. The results, it is believed, would be of inestimable value to the service man in understanding the utility of fringe benefits as part of his compensation. (See Conclusion 1.)

9. Management should give support to economic studies which evaluate the effectiveness of certain recently authorized pay and bonus systems as retention incentives. These include the new form of
re-enlistment bonus and the modified proficiency pay system. These studies may be performed by in-house groups or contracted with competent study organizations. (See Conclusion 3.)

10. Management may wish to reexamine its policies and practices on the retirement of highly skilled technical specialists after 20 years of active duty. The authors are suggesting thought be given to the retention of critical specialists with 20 years active duty experience by offering exemptions from overseas duty as an incentive for them to remain in service. Exceptions to the exemption would be allowed only if a voluntary request was made, and in times of war or national emergency. This proposal requires policy decision and a management study to ascertain its utility. (See Conclusion 3.)
LITERATURE CITED


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_____ , Opinions Concerning "Career Planning for Army Officers" as Expressed by Male Commissioned Officers. SSO Report Nr. 47-65-E.

_____ , Survey Estimate of Attitudes and Opinions of Army Male Commissioned Officers Concerning the Regular Army Appointment Program... SSO Report Nr. 59-64-E.


APPENDIX

The contents of this appendix are devoted to Task 7 of the study, with the exception of item 7 a), which is contained in the body of the report. Task 7 of the Work Statement reads as follows:

7. Indicate directions of contemplated research program, and write final report:

a. Indicate anticipated goals, list objectives of study, both short-term and long-term, (see body of the report).

b. Using matrix format where appropriate, show direction and content of proposed study program, indicating orientation to long-term goals and action program. Further, make recommendations, where feasible, regarding research criteria as a basis for evaluation study approaches; and recommendations on possible analytic methods and procedures, as well as types and sources of data.

Figure 7, in matrix format, presents the summary recommendations derived through the study program and indicates the kind of action proposed for each recommendation. The entry of an X mark in the appropriate column designates the type of action suggested for that recommendation. For the column headed Research, the entry ST indicates a short term study, the entry LT a long term study. These entries are confined to research recommendations.

In the section of the report which discusses the recommendations and suggests whether research, management or other types of studies might best support the recommendation, criteria and suggested general methods are offered, and major hypotheses are drawn.

c. Indicate timetable for overall study program and, where pertinent milestones as measures of potential progress in problem solution.

A timetable is presented in the following chart, Figure 8, indicating the estimated duration for each research study. Fundamentally, these studies are primarily aimed at producing
### Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Research Studies</th>
<th>Feasibility Studies</th>
<th>Management Studies</th>
<th>Policy Change DOD</th>
<th>Policy Change DOD</th>
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<td>c. VALUE SYSTEMS &amp; NON-COGNITIVE TRAITS OF JUNIOR OFFICERS</td>
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<td>5. DIFFERENTIAL OFFICER TEST BATTERY</td>
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| **FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL** | | | | | | | |
| 1. IMPROVED JOB INFORMATION—RECRUITING | | | | | | | X |
| 2. UTILIZING RETIRED PERSONNEL—RECRUITING | | X | | | | | |
| 3. SUMMER CAMP PROGRAM—PRE-RECRUITING | | X | X | | | | |
| 4. EXTENDED SKILL TRAINING DURATION | | | X | | | | |
| 5. FRINGE BENEFITS—EROSION | | | | | | | X |
| 6. RECOMPUTING RETIREMENT PAY | | X | X | X | | | |
| 7. DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES—20 YEAR RETIRE | | X | X | X | | | |
| 8. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FRINGE BENEFITS | | | | | | | X |
| 9. EVALUATION OF INCENTIVE PAY & RE-ENLIST BONUS | | | | | | | X |
| 10. OVERSEAS EXEMPTION OF 20 YEAR SPECIALISTS | | X | X | | | | |

**NOTES:**
* Research studies are designated ST for short term, LT for long term, and IN Process at APRO.

Figure 7. Distribution of recommendations by type of action proposed.
adequate criteria in the process of developing appropriate instrumentation. One specific potential in the development of milestone measures may be found in the short-term research on value systems, interests and non-cognitive traits as a discriminable measure between career and non-career ROTC students. The use of short-term criteria, e.g. indicated intent to stay in service, may be used as an early measure or milestone at college graduation. This can be followed by a second milestone at the conclusion of obligated service, at the two year period, by the actual transfers to RA or the requests for active duty extension as reserve officers. Additional milestones, measuring progress of the other research studies, can be established at about the two year period, at which time there should be adequate methods and results to indicate the utility of the hypothesis testing and means for discriminating the characteristics of professional soldiers, and the factors related to establishing a commitment to a professional military career.

The last column in Figure 8 suggests a level of effort which may be translated into dollars at a rate of approximately $40,000 per man year.
Management studies, feasibility studies, and economic analysis studies are generally short term in nature, varying as a rule from 6 months to a year in length. These should be initiated as soon as expedient in order that their findings may be put to practice in establishing or requesting policy change as early as convenient. In some cases, the management study has been suggested as a follow-on evaluation of policy change rather than to justify a desired policy change. In these cases, there will be a delay in initiating the management study. Feasibility studies should be initiated within the next several months, primarily as in-house studies, in order to ascertain the extent of the recommended development and to assure the feasibility of the proposed plan for policy change and procedural implementation.

A suggested program is offered below:

1. System study of ROTC program
   6 months study
   In-house activity - 8 man-months

2. Demonstration - evaluation of new ROTC program
   Evaluation study - 4 years
   HUMRRO Activity - Two man-years per year.

3. Junior Officer Job Structure
   One year study
   0 and M study - Three man-years

4. Differential Officer Test Battery
   See US APRO plans and findings

5. Pilot study to estimate cost-benefits of professional counseling program
   Management study with APRO and HUMRRO support
   18 months duration
   Two man-years per year

6. Evaluation of new ROTC Scholarship Program
   Evaluation study - 4 years
   HUMRRO Activity - One man-year per year
7. Reserve Officer Contract Feasibility Study
   Outside Economic Study Group
   Two year study
   One and one half man-years per year

8. Differential Career Structure
   In-house Study
   Nine months duration
   One man-year effort

9. Equalization of selected benefits, Regulars and Reserves
   In-house study
   Six months duration
   One-half man-year of effort

10. Stretching of skill training into second enlistment for
    selected technical specialties.
    In-house study
    Six months duration
    One man-year of effort

11. Enlisted personnel retirement at 20 years — pay discrimination
    In-house study
    Three months duration
    Three man-months of effort

d. Recommend allocations of funds between contract and
   in-house research organizations for segments of study programs.

The summary list of recommendations in the body of the report
indicated whether an in-house or contract organization was
suggested for the specific study. In Figure 8, the research
studies were given cost estimates in terms of level of effort.

e. Recommend, where feasible, organizations or senior
   scientists as suggested investigators for various segments of
   study program.
These are indicated for each recommendation where a study is proposed in the summary listing, or recommendations in the body of the report.