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Indian Ocean NALT: An Exercise in the Revision of U.S. Foreign Policy.

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ABSTRACT

The initiation of Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) with the Soviet Union in June 1977 was significant because it represented a clear departure in U.S. foreign policy for the Indian Ocean. Reviewing the events that led to the Indian Ocean NALT, this study analyzes NALT by identifying the rationale for the apparent shift in US Indian Ocean policy and examining certain issues that may have confronted the US and the USSR during their negotiations.
Executive Summary

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) were significant because they furnished an insight into the tone of the Carter Administration's approach to both foreign policy and arms control and signalled a change in U.S. policy for the Indian Ocean region.

This study examines these talks based on open source literature and a measure of deductive (as well as inductive) reasoning. It proceeds from some general, well recognized principles of arms control as a technique of international political behavior to the analysis of four specific issues that may have confronted the superpowers in their negotiations. By reviewing the events that form the background to NALT and identifying the rationale for the apparent shift in U.S. policy on NALT, the study analyzes these issues in terms of both the policy and operational impact on U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean region.

The Origin of the Talks

There are three sequences of events that form the logic of U.S. Indian Ocean NALT policy. They are:

1) the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions in the General Assembly of the U.N.;
2) the attempt by members of the U.S. Senate to operationalize naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean from 1974 through 1976;

3) the move into the Carter Administration of people who formulated their ideas on NALT in conjunction with a study conducted by the United Nations Association of the United States (UNA-USA) in November 1976.

These events were examined to determine the impact that each played in the changing of U.S. NALT policy in March 1977.

Analysis of Issues

Four specific issues are addressed to determine the policy and operational impact of NALT on U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. These issues include:

1) Bases
2) Strategic Systems
3) The Allied Implications of the talks
4) Tactical Forces

Because it would be prohibitive to analyze all the possible combinations that could be used to define limitations on naval forces, the analysis is limited to one "model" agreement as a means to analyze the operational impact of the talks. The paradigm chosen is an agreement using ship-ton-days as a measure of limitation. The analysis demonstrates that there are substantial disadvantages for the U.S. to enter into any such agreement for the Indian Ocean.
Conclusions

The study draws the following conclusions:

1). The issues that form the criteria against which the U.S. policy change for Indian Ocean NALT are measured—the Zone of Peace and Diego Garcia—serve to illustrate the range of both the political and technical problems that the talks were bound to encounter.

2). The Zone of Peace resolutions contributed nothing substantive to the talks.

3). The issue of Diego Garcia was principally a manifestation of the resurgent Congressional interest in the formulation of foreign policy rather than naval arms limitations.

4). It is difficult to identify any measurable advantage that will accrue to the U.S. from further NALT.

5). The strategy of linkage politics is still very much an option in the Carter Administration's dealings with the Soviet Union.

6). The key issue of Indian Ocean NALT is the effect which the imposition of any limitation on U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean will have on the perception of the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.
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INDIAN OCEAN NALT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On 9 March 1977, President Carter announced that he had "proposed that the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized."¹ The initiative was significant because it furnished an insight into the tone of the Administration's approach to both foreign policy and arms control and signalled a change in U.S. policy for the Indian Ocean region.

The President's proposal was part of his goal of concluding a set of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. These included a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, Mutual Force Reductions (MFR) in Central Europe, an anti-satellite agreement, limitations on the transfer of conventional arms, a treaty addressing chemical weapons, an environmental modification convention, and demilitarization of the Indian Ocean.² The latter has come to be known as Indian Ocean NALT (Naval Arms Limitations Talks). These talks have been dormant because the U.S. linked NALT to Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa in early 1978.³ But it seems likely that they will be resumed, given the Carter Administration's overall commitment to arms control.
This study examines the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks. The analysis of NALT is based on two fundamental assumptions of international politics. The first is that arms control is a technique of international diplomacy (and, at times, propaganda) that may lead to certain restraints on the use of force or the acquisition and deployment of armaments. The second is that arms control negotiations may attenuate or divert other conflicts. This process is grounded on a set of assumptions that forms, in theory, a complementary means of enhancing national security.

Together, this technique and process try to compensate for one of the fundamental facts of the international system: most nations are free to arm themselves. They do so to achieve and maintain their security, sovereignty, equality, and economic well being or for geographic and political expansion and conquest. This quest for armaments acknowledges that there are goals that otherwise could not be attained unless a nation has a capacity to employ force. Arms control offers an alternative to attaining security through the possession of arms. It recognizes the relationship between the level of armament of political adversaries and the perceived degree of security that a nation possesses.

**OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL**

Arms control is traditionally pursued to achieve some combination of at least three objectives: the enhancement of
national security, the reduction of military expenditures, and
the attainment of non-military goals, such as the recognition
of human rights. It is in the securing of these political ob-
jectives that the association of linkage politics with arms
control has come to be a common and accepted tactic.

Enhancement of National Security. A most convincing and
substantial case can be made for a specific arms control agree-
ment if there is an affirmative response to the question, "Will
an agreement substantially reduce the probability of war?"
Former Secretary of State Kissinger has said that "the test of
any agreement is whether it adds or detracts from stability,
whether it makes war less likely or more so..."  

Under certain conditions, some weapons systems might well
be a stabilizing influence and tend to reduce the probability
of war. An example is the relatively invulnerable SSBN which,
allegedly, is not accurate enough to be a credible first strike
weapon. If both superpowers possess only systems that are sus-
ceptible to a first strike, any condition of strategic parity
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will be substantially
less stable. It follows that some forms of arms control which
render an SSBN force more invincible, while not alleviating the
vulnerability problems of the bomber and missile forces, may
destabilize the relationship between the superpowers.

In a like manner, anything else which reduces the credi-
bility or capability to respond to a threat may be destabilizing
over a period of time. Such things as a substantive change in relative military strength or any series of events which requires a sudden or substantial increase in force level during a period of superpower political tension can be destabilizing.

The quantum change in the military power of the Soviet Union between 1969 and 1979 may have destabilized the international system to an extent that may only now be evident. Actions that provide prompt and authoritative sources of information about the intentions and capabilities of adversaries (i.e., intelligence) tend to increase stability by lessening the chance for miscalculation or accident.

Unfortunately, there are examples in history that dispute the logic that arms control agreements nurture stability. It has been argued that the single most significant factor that brought about World War II in Europe was the failure of Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to enter into an arms race against Germany with sufficient vigor and clarity of purpose. In a similar manner, the Washington Naval Treaty may have led straight to Pearl Harbor. The United States, the British, and the French, lulled by the Treaty and hard pressed to find money for their navies, permitted their building programs to lag behind their quotas while the Japanese, and later the Germans, took full advantage of their quotas. The post-World War I arms limitation agreements—demilitarization of the Rhineland and the various naval agreements—failed to prevent World
War II. Some scholars conclude that those agreements helped to bring on World War II by reinforcing the blind and willful optimism of the West, thus inhibiting military preparedness and diplomatic actions that could have deterred the war.\(^6\)

The lessening of the scope of war today is closely linked to the concept of strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. The era of strategic parity has heightened concern about the ability of the two superpowers to regulate the use of force and the escalatory potential of conflict. Conflicts wherein U.S. and Soviet nationals kill each other seem likely to develop into conflicts which may not be controllable. These types of conflicts may well occur wherever Russian and U.S. forces are collocated. Effective arms control may offer one possible method of defusing superpower conflicts or at least limiting their potential to escalate.

What has evolved from the dilemma of the ability to control conflict is a concept of two zones of interaction within the international system. The first is an area in which the superpowers avoid the use of force and violence to alter or maintain existing political arrangements on an inter-zonal basis. These areas include the continental United States, the USSR, Japan, the PRC, Latin America, and Western and Eastern Europe. They are areas of conflict avoidance. The second zone is peripheral to these and includes the rest of the world. In the past, the superpowers have tried to avoid confrontation
wherein the vital interests of one or both of them are threatened. The peripheral zone is one wherein conflict management is the rule. The superpowers appear to place the Indian Ocean in this second zone.

Reduction of Defense Expenditures. Not too long ago, the mention of arms control conjured up visions of large sums being diverted from the defense budget to domestic programs. However, the cause and effect relationship is not that simple and this expectation is no longer valid. Arms control agreements may not yield rapid and significant reductions in defense expenditures for two principle reasons.

First, there is the delayed cost question. An arms control agreement may only serve to change the timing of defense expenditures. In this regard, there has been a distinct tendency on the part of the United States to alternate periods of low military profile with periods of sustained rearmament. World War II and the Korean War are cases in point. The results have proven to be not only militarily precarious but also less than economically efficient.

The second problem is that an arms control agreement may not result in a net reduction in expenditures but an increase in other military outlays or even qualitative improvements in the armaments subjected to constraints. Moreover, it is not clear that the SALT I accords have reduced U.S. expenditures for strategic forces. They certainly have not reduced Soviet expenditures.
Yet of all the objectives of arms control, this particular one may have offered the best chance of achieving some symmetry of objectives in U.S.-Soviet Naval Arms Limitation Talks. Both nations have evidenced some desire to reduce their naval expenditures. Yet this desire now appears to be in conflict with these nations' perceived political and military requirements that are supported by their respective navies. While the percentage of the U.S. GNP allocated to defense is projected to decline, there is evidence that there will not be a corresponding slowdown in the Soviet military growth rate. The pursuit of naval arms control in the face of this continued Soviet military growth appears to be inconsistent with U.S. national security interests and thus makes the chance for realizing a common negotiating position less likely.

Attainment of Non-Military National Goals. A nation may choose to use arms control as a means to achieve a non-military goal. This is a recognition that national security seems to be a precondition of the other values of the nation state (i.e., equality, sovereignty, and economic well being). By means of manipulating its level of armament, a nation may be able to enhance its ability to pursue effectively its other goals. This objective incorporates the primacy of politics and economics in the international system.

The principal strategy that is employed in the pursuit of these non-security goals (and in some cases security goals) is
linkage politics. In the case of U.S.-Soviet relations, the United States has generally pursued the strategy of linkage while the USSR attempts to block or blunt the strategy.\footnote{8}

The linkage between arms and other techniques of politics can be applied to the analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter seemed to repudiate his intent to employ this tactic shortly after being elected. In February 1977, he said that:

"...I think we come out better in dealing with the Soviet Union if I'm consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights...and I think this can legitimately be severed from our inclination to work with the Soviet Union, for instance, in reducing dependence upon atomic weapons, and also in seeking mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe. I don't think we want the two to be tied together..."\footnote{9}

This apparent rejection of linkage was to be repudiated itself, at least temporarily, in the case of Indian Ocean MALT.

Study Objectives. It is against this brief background of the theory of some aspects of arms control that this study will:

1). review the events that led to the Indian Ocean MALT,
2). identify the rationale for the apparent shift in U.S. Indian Ocean policy and,
3). analyze certain issues that may have confronted the U.S. and the USSR during their negotiations.

For purposes of focus, the analysis will be limited to the issue of the naval balance in the region. Because of this,
other equally significant aspects such as tensions within the littoral states and the air power balance, though related to the overall balance of power in the region, will not be addressed.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN OF THE TALKS

The majority of foreign policy decisions are like Topsy—they just grow. They grow out of past policies, are shaped by the bureaucratic process, and are heavily circumscribed by the logic (or lack thereof) of events. This logic and the legacy of the past tend to explain most foreign policy actions, and where they do not, they may be called on to justify the policies. In any case, there are three such events that form the logic of U.S. Indian Ocean policy.

The first is the initiation of the concept of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace in September of 1970 at the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Lusaka, Zambia, and subsequent actions on the proposal by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The second is the attempt by members of the U.S. Senate from 1974 through 1976 to operationalize NALT in the Indian Ocean. Throughout both of these, the U.S. and the Soviet Union maintained a relatively constant position on the subject: they tended to discount the utility of NALT.

The third event that influenced the Indian Ocean NALT policy was the move into the Carter Administration of people who developed their ideas on this subject in conjunction with a study conducted by the United Nations Association.
of the United States (UNA-USA) in November 1976. The study highlighted several initiatives to control conventional arms. One of these initiatives was naval arms control.

The Indian Ocean Zone Of Peace. The Zone of Peace issue has traditionally been endorsed by members of the Non-Aligned Movement. As early as 1964, the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference condemned the intentions of the "imperialist powers" to establish bases in the Indian Ocean region.² The Lusaka conference adopted a resolution in 1970 that reiterated this charge and called upon the non-aligned nations to direct their efforts in the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly toward the adoption of a resolution that called:

"...upon all states to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force bases, are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons.³"

It was the initiative of Sri Lanka and Tanzania that caused the item to be added to the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly in October 1971. Their proposal recommended that the entire high seas area of the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The wording of the proposal took special note of the role that naval vessels, especially submarines, played in the context of Great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean.
The General Assembly subsequently adopted Resolution 2832(XXVI) in 1971 declaring the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with its air space and sea bed, to be a zone of peace. The resolution also called upon the Great Powers to enter into negotiations with the littoral states of the region to halt any further escalation of their military presence and to eliminate all bases and other symbols of Great Power competition. The Secretary General was requested to report on the progress of the implementation of these measures at the following session of the United Nations.

During the twenty-seventh session, the Secretary General reported that the negotiations requested in Resolution 2832(XXVI) had not taken place. In response to this and to the continuing pressure from the Non-Aligned Movement, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2992 (XXVII) in 1972. The resolution established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to study the implications of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolution, with specific reference to practical measures that could be taken to facilitate its implementation.

Since 1972, the principal focus of the actions of the General Assembly on the Zone of Peace question has centered on the yearly reports of the Ad Hoc Committee. Based on the recommendations contained in the Committee's first
report, the General Assembly carried Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) in 1973. The resolution requested the Secretary General to compile a factual statement of the Great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean with special emphasis on the patterns of their naval deployments. The report was submitted the following year.

That same year, 1974, a new facet of the issue was introduced. Resolution 3259(XXIX) requested the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations with a view toward convening a conference on the Indian Ocean. The 1975 report of the Committee was again used as the principal working document for the General Assembly. It adopted Resolution 3468(XXX) calling for the continuation of the consultations on an Indian Ocean conference. The remainder of the resolution was worded substantially the same as its predecessors.

The 1976 report of the Ad Hoc Committee noted that several nations, among them the United States and the Soviet Union, declined to participate in the on-going consultations on the proposed conference. The General Assembly noted this lack of participation in Resolution 31/88 and invited all states, and in particular, the Great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to cooperate with the Committee in the discharge of its functions.
Shortly after Secretary of State Vance's trip to Moscow in late March 1977 to discuss President Carter's proposal to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, the Ad Hoc committee on the Indian Ocean approached the superpowers to seek clarification on the status of the proposal. Noting that substantive talks had not begun, the Committee chairman reported that the position of the U.S. on the Indian Ocean and the Ad Hoc Committee had not changed, though its future policy could not be divorced from mutual and reciprocal actions by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union asserted that its major concern was the dismantling of foreign military bases and that the USSR did not have any intention of constructing such bases in the region. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. agreed to keep the Ad Hoc Committee informed of the progress of their negotiations.14

The General Assembly took note of this report in Resolution 32/86. It cited the commencement of the Indian Ocean NALT between the U.S. and the USSR in June 1977 and noted that the next step in the convening of the Indian Ocean conference was a meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean in New York at a time to be determined. The Ad Hoc Committee was charged with the responsibility for the preparations for this meeting.

The U.S. and the USSR have abstained without exception on all the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions in the
General Assembly. A voting record is contained in Appendix A. With minor exceptions, all the littoral and hinterland states of the region have consistently voted in favor of the Zone of Peace resolutions. The U.S. has successfully resisted the pressure created by such bloc voting. The United States has justified its position by stressing the issue of freedom of navigation and by continuing to fend off criticism of its Support Facility on Diego Garcia. The U.S. has emphasized that it cannot accept criticism of Diego Garcia when no mention is made of the military activities of other nations external to the region. The obvious intent of this position was to publicize the then active Soviet facility at Berbera.16

The Soviet Union has used the issue of bases to provide a rationale for its own actions. It has consistently stressed that the principal issue was the elimination of foreign military bases from the area. Moreover, the Soviets maintained that they did not have, nor intend to have, any bases in the region.17

The U.S. Senate and Diego Garcia. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the main issue which dominated the concern of the littoral and island nations of the Indian Ocean in the Zone of Peace proceedings was Diego Garcia. The same was true of the U.S. Senate, although its interest was generated by a different motive. In January 1974, the Senate again began to focus its attention on the island
when the Navy requested $29M in the FY74 Supplemental Authorization Bill to augment its facility on Diego Garcia. The request, though passed by the House, was disapproved by the Senate. The Senate indicated that it expected the request to be resubmitted in FY75 and that it would more thoroughly examine the request then.

The request was resubmitted as part of the FY75 Military Construction Authorization Bill and included an additional $3.3M for Air Force construction on the island. House-Senate conference action reduced the amount to $14.8M for the Navy while leaving intact the Air Force funding request. But a rider was attached to the legislation stipulating that none of the funds authorized for any construction project on Diego Garcia were to be obligated unless the President advised the Congress in writing that all policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia had been evaluated and certified essential to the national interest of the United States. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees authorized the Navy and Air Force to use other funds available to them in the Appropriations Act for the construction of any facility on the island, provided that neither chamber of Congress adopted a resolution disapproving the construction even though they
refused to fund Diego Garcia in a separate authorization. 19

At about the same time as the congressional debate, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) introduced a Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR -79). The intent of SCR-79 was to express the sense of the Senate that the President should seek direct negotiations with the Soviet Union designed to achieve an agreement on limiting the deployment of naval forces to the Indian Ocean. Senator Kennedy recommended that the negotiations be conducted either on a bilateral level or under the auspices of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. 20 When SCR-79 was not carried by the Senate, Senator Kennedy reiterated his concern by introducing a Senate Resolution (SR-117) in March 1975. The language of SR-117 closely paralleled that of his resolution (SCR-79) of one year earlier. 21 SR-117 became an amendment to the FY76 Economic Foreign Assistance Bill.

But the amendment was not to be included in the final version of the bill. On 12 May 1975, President Ford certified that the new construction on Diego Garcia was essential to the national interest. As a result, the House-Senate conference committee that was preparing the final draft of the legislation dropped the amendment.
One week later, in another move intended to block construction on the island, Senator Mansfield (D-Mont.) introduced SR-160. The resolution, referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, was disapproved in committee. The Armed Services Committee took the position that the U.S. should have the capability to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and that the new construction on Diego Garcia would substantially enhance that capability. The committee's report to the Senate noted that the United States has vital interests in the region and that the Soviet presence in the area had steadily increased. The committee considered the approval of the requested construction funds to be prudent and recommended approval. The Senate upheld the committee's recommendation by disapproving SR-160 by a vote of 53-43. The debate that accompanied this vote was spirited and evinced the level of emotion that had become associated with Diego Garcia (and, by implication, Indian Ocean NALT) in the overall context of U.S. foreign policy for the Indian Ocean region.

The issue was not dead. When it was realized that Senator Mansfield's resolution would not have enough support to carry it in the Senate, Senator John Culver (D-Iowa) requested Secretary of State Kissinger to initiate discussions with the Soviets on the limiting of naval activities and base construction in the Indian Ocean on 17 July 1975.
He was joined in this effort by Senators Gary Hart (D-Colo.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont). The State Department responded that there was little chance for success in negotiations at that time and asserted that the chances would increase if the U.S. finished the proposed construction on Diego Garcia. Its completion would demonstrate that the U.S. had both the means and the resolve to protect its interests in the region. Senator Culver did not agree. As a result of private discussions with the Soviet leadership, he alleged that the USSR would respond favorably to a U.S. initiative to reduce tensions in the Indian Ocean through NALT.24

Once again the issue was not allowed to end with the State Department response. Funding for the second increment of construction was contained in the FY76 Appropriations Bill. Senator Hart introduced an amendment in November 1975 to that bill requiring that none of the funds appropriated under that act were to be used prior to 1 July 1976 for the purpose of carrying out any military construction on Diego Garcia. Its purpose was to complement another amendment submitted by Senator Kennedy to the State Department Authorization Bill which required President Ford to report to the Congress on his efforts toward Indian Ocean NALT. He also said that the inclusion of his amendment in the legislation would permit a few months to get NAL talks started. His amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 51-44.25
In April 1976 the required report was submitted by the State Department to Congress. It concluded that for the United States to initiate NALT with the Soviet Union was inappropriate at that time. The rationale for this decision acknowledged that the activities of the Soviet Union in Angola and the buildup of their facilities in Somalia had raised substantive questions about Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Any form of arms limitation agreement might convey the impression that the United States was willing to acquiesce in Soviet use of a proxy or surrogate state to exploit local crises. The report emphasized that any successful NALT could only be achieved within a general political framework of mutual restraint in the region.

The debate within the Senate was not so much concerned with Diego Garcia as it was with the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Diego Garcia was the symptom - the control and direction of foreign policy were the perceived ills. The experience of the Vietnam conflict and Watergate helped in their own way to generate and fuel the controversy over the distribution of foreign policy power between the President and Congress. Any initiative was fair game for scrutiny. The Indian Ocean, both in the Zone of Peace context and the debate over the expansion
of Diego Garcia, was an issue whose timing was ideally suited to generate controversy.

Throughout the Senate debates on Diego Garcia and those in the General Assembly on the Zone of Peace, the official position of the U.S. remained consistent. Naval arms limitation talks for the Indian Ocean were not in the best interests of the United States. The position of the Soviet Union was less clear. On one hand the USSR assiduously avoided cooperating in the U.N. Zone of Peace effort while on the other - at least to Senators such as Culver, Leahy, and Hart - the Soviet leadership expressed a desire to enter into negotiations.

Just as has the United States, the Soviet Union has abstained from voting on all the U.N. Resolutions on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace because the resolutions have not been in consonance with the Soviet interpretation of the Law of the Sea. Though indicating sympathy with the principle, the Soviets have repeatedly stated that "the Soviet Union has not had and does not intend to build military bases in the Indian Ocean. We have called upon the United States to act likewise and expect a clear answer from it." This position was reiterated by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko before the 31st General Assembly of the UN when he asserted that:
"We consider it reasonable that a number of Asian and African states desire to turn the Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace. In this connection, the essential point is that there should be no foreign military bases in the area...as for the Soviet Union, it has never had and does not have any intentions of building military bases in the Indian Ocean...the Soviet Union is prepared, together with other Powers, to seek ways of reducing on a reciprocal basis the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and the regions directly adjacent thereto...but of course, this should not create any obstacles to freedom of navigation..."28

UNA-USA. Just after the Presidential election of 1976, a joint meeting of representatives of the United Nations Association of the U.S. (UNA-USA) and the U. N. Association of the USSR took place in Moscow. The meeting was held under the auspices of UNA-USA's Parallel Studies Panel and was the first of the associations meetings following the 1976 U.S. presidential elections. Coincident with this meeting was the completion of a major study by the UNA-USA's National Policy Panel. The study addressed possible new initiatives for limiting conventional arms and was one of the three papers presented by the U.S. delegation.

The study started with the premise that, while it was imperative that nuclear arms control negotiations continue to receive very high priority, it was advantageous to initiate a parallel effort to control conventional armaments.29 Among the various approaches available, the study identified
the limitation of naval deployments as having the capacity to forestall incipient arms races in potentially explosive regions by decreasing the possibility of dangerous military incidents. The study attributed much of the impetus of these so-called arms races to the growing competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in general purpose naval forces and suggested that limitations on general purpose forces were an appropriate subject for serious bilateral U.S.-USSR negotiations. Citing the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean as potential regions for discussion, the study suggested that U.S.-Soviet NAL would be less difficult to negotiate than reductions in other major conventional force components and would be effective in promoting stability. As side benefits, such negotiations were perceived as:
1) symbolic of the superpowers' awareness of the future dangers of unrestrained naval competition; 2) helpful in maintaining the momentum of detente; and 3) conducive to the creation of an atmosphere in which other significant negotiated reductions might be possible.

The study concluded that it was clearly in the interests of the U.S. to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting or controlling general purpose naval forces and their deployments. Such an agreement would be an important step toward stabilizing relations
in certain potentially dangerous regions.\textsuperscript{35} The Mediterranean was discounted in this respect since the study projected that conditions in that region might eventually stabilize. The Indian Ocean was identified as the region with the most potential for successful NALT.\textsuperscript{36}

When considered in the context of the subsequent Carter initiative and the membership of UNA-USA National Policy Panel on conventional arms control - the body that authored the study - the possible origin of the shift in U.S. policy toward the Indian Ocean takes on new perspective. Four of President Carter's subsequent appointees to policy level positions were members of this panel. They included:

1) Cyrus R. Vance, Vice-Chairman of the panel and subsequently named as Secretary of State; 2) Paul L. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and later appointed Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); 3) Lynn E. Davis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, a member of President Carter's transition team, and designated as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Policy and National Security Council Affairs; and 4) Barry Blechman, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities, and subsequently selected as Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau of ACDA.

24
As is customary with UNA policy panel reports, the final section permitted members of the panel to express minority opinions. No such variance was expressed by any of the foregoing members with respect to Indian Ocean NALT. \(^{37}\)

It is likely that the new Administration conducted a review of arms control policy in an attempt to either disassociate itself from the practices of the previous Administration, as some critics charge, or to stake out a position of its own, as its defenders suggest. With SALT II stalled, the Carter Administration may have wanted to have several additional options available in its repertoire of arms control initiatives to maintain the momentum if, as was the case, the Soviets rejected the Carter SALT proposals. The role assumed by the aforementioned policy-level appointees in the formulation of these options can only be surmised, but it is certainly a reasonable premise that they had a substantive and direct role in the policy review process. Their association with the UNA-USA study cannot be discounted in their recommending Indian Ocean NALT as one option.
CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES

This study has attempted to be contemporary. But, as in the case of the myriad commentaries on SALT I (and now with SALT II), the nature of Indian Ocean NALT is both complex and understandably sensitive. For these reasons, analysis of issues confronting the U.S. and the USSR during their talks draws heavily on conjecture tempered by a measure of deductive (as well as inductive) reasoning. This chapter analyzes four specific issues that may have confronted the superpowers in their negotiations. The issues include: 1) bases; 2) strategic systems; 3) the allied implications of the talks; and 4) tactical forces.

The analysis will be conducted in two parts. The first section will address those general means of arms control applicable to the Indian Ocean case. Two such means will be considered and will form the basis for the detailed analysis of the specific issues in the second part. Five additional means of naval arms control are discussed in Appendix B. The two means that are perhaps the most applicable to U.S.-USSR Indian Ocean NALT are regional limitations on naval presence and the limitation of a nation's overseas base structure.
Regional Arms Control

Regional arms control has been suggested as a way to defuse potential areas of conflict. As a process, it seeks to impose constraints on the movement into or basing of naval forces in an agreed upon geographic area (e.g., the Indian Ocean). The principal goal is the enhancement of the political and military stability in regions of both conflict avoidance and conflict management. The classic example of such an agreement is the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 wherein Great Britain and the United States agreed to limit the number of naval vessels deployed on the Great Lakes. A second and more recent example is the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It contains protocols which commit the super and nuclear power states to respect the denuclearization of Latin America and not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against any of the signatories to the treaty in the region.¹

¹

The regional negotiations on Europe (CSCE and MFR) have highlighted the political complexity inherent in attempts at regional arms control. The MFR negotiations have dragged on for over five years. The delay has been the result of the inability to address the issue of regional arms control from a purely technical standpoint. Negotiations involve the broad security and political
interests of the states within the region. Even if an attempt is made at regional bilateral superpower negotiations, the impact on the client states' security and regional interests may be significant. As a result, SALT and MFR have heightened the desire of the allies of both superpowers to participate in regional arms control proceedings. Regional limitations have the potential of expanding in scope from bilateral constraints to multilateral limitations imposed on the nations of a region.

**Limiting the Overseas Base Structure of a Nation**

The limiting of overseas bases is a means of arms control that complements the regional approach. Major maritime powers have traditionally recognized the need for naval bases overseas. To impose a limitation on this basing structure is to create a limitation on the forward deployments of naval forces. No doubt the implementation of this means of naval arms control would satisfy some non-aligned nations who have expressed concern over the presence of bases in their particular region (e.g., India).

**Bases**

Previous discussion in the study regarding the Soviet position on bases in the Indian Ocean suggests that the Soviet Union introduced the issue. If one takes their stated position of not maintaining or having any intention of
constructing any bases in the region, it follows that the Soviet objective would have been the U.S. abandonment of Diego Garcia. Recognizing that this objective would be unacceptable to the United States, they probably pushed for the cessation of construction on the island with a commitment to no new construction.

The negotiating objective of the United States, though originally stated as demilitarization, was actually stabilization of the U.S. and Soviet presence in the region. The shift became evident in President Carter's major foreign policy address at the commencement exercises of the University of Notre Dame in May 1977. He reiterated that the U.S. was moving "to engage the Soviet Union in a joint effort to halt the...arms race" and that his goal in these talks was "to produce reciprocal stability, parity, and security." He re-emphasized this objective in an address to the U.N. General Assembly in October 1977. The President said that "in the Indian Ocean area, neither (the U.S.) nor the Soviet Union has a large military presence, nor is there a rapidly mounting competition between (them). Restraint in the area may well begin with a mutual effort to stabilize our presence and to avoid an escalation in military competition. Then both sides can consider how our military activities in the Indian Ocean might be even further reduced." Because of its context in his overall arms control policy, the
President addressed NALT in his State of the Union message in January 1978. He said that "the fundamental purpose of our arms limitation efforts is to promote our own national security and to strengthen international stability...in the Indian Ocean, where neither we nor the Soviet Union has yet deployed military power on a large scale, we are working for an agreement to prevent a major military competition."4

Recent evidence supporting this position is the statement of Secretary of Defense Brown that "...the U.S. still hope(s) to achieve stability at the levels that prevailed during recent years."5

There is some evidence to suggest that, if successful in stabilizing their presence, the superpowers might proceed to reduce it. In welcoming the Mauritian Prime Minister to New Delhi on 2 November 1977, Prime Minister Desai of India noted the announcement that the United States and the USSR had commenced talks on mutual arms limitations in the region. The Indian Prime Minister alleged that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed on no increase in their bases or force levels in the area. It was then to be their objective to lessen their presence every year thereafter until it disappeared. He confirmed that the Soviet Union was keeping him advised on the status of the talks.6

The U.S. almost certainly would have opposed any Soviet demand to abandon Diego Garcia. A possible U.S. response
would have been to insist on finishing the current phase of construction on the island with an agreement for no new military construction. Such a position is consistent with that previously stated on the future of the island.7

But a base does not simply exist to support itself. To be useful, it must be functional—it must be capable of supporting operational units. This logic suggests that not only the issue of bases per se, but also their utilization, was raised in the negotiations. It would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union to include some form of limitation on the utilization of Diego Garcia (e.g., no SSBN/SSN support, limited support for a carrier task group, no use of the 12,000 foot runway by B-52s' etc.) in an agreement. Such an agreement does not appear to be in the overall interests of the U.S. though it is not inconceivable that the U.S. would negotiate to achieve stabilization at a level of prior usage within the context of its overall negotiating objective. Within this same framework, it seems plausible that the question of alternative facilities in other ports of the region would have been raised. Here the issue would have been one of definition: "What is a port call?" as opposed to "What is utilization of a port to support an operational unit?"

The limiting of U.S. overseas bases is clearly attractive to the Soviet Union. If successful, the Soviets would achieve an easily verifiable constraint on U.S. military
power in the Indian Ocean at little or no cost to themselves. However, the converse is not true. The assumption that Soviet "bases" are easily verifiable does not stand up to analysis. One only has to consider the various "landing rights" agreements of the Soviet Union that may have ground support from Soviet Bloc nations (e.g., East Germany), and concealed bases (as Berbera used to be), to be aware of the definitional problems of negotiating the issue of bases.

The political implications for other U.S. overseas naval bases (e.g., Yokosuka and Subic Bay) would not be lost upon the USSR in terms of the precedent that would be established. Though such an agreement might hurt the Soviet Union more in the near term by politically hindering them from seeking bases where they do not now have them (e.g., the South Atlantic), its impact on the U.S. would be more significant in the out years. The U.S. might be forced to seek other options (e.g., an increased mobile logistics support force (MLSF) structure, construction of facilities in the Trust Territory of the Pacific (TTPI), etc.) to retain its flexibility. The impact in future budget dollars is not insignificant. At the same time such an agreement might force the Soviet Navy into becoming increasingly more self-sufficient by relying more on its MLSF.

For any Indian Ocean NALT to possess significant credibility, both parties must possess the capability of a quick
and decisive return to the region if their interests so dictate. The Soviet Union, as demonstrated by the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan, is a back door neighbor to the region. It is precisely for this reason that not finishing the planned construction on Diego Garcia (or any form of more severe limitation) is more in the interests of the Soviet Union. Such rationale tends to argue against the successful completion of NALT since naval power is essential to the U.S. position in the region while it is only marginally additive to the means available to the Soviet Union to influence events there.

**Strategic Systems**

Related to the issue of bases is the concern on the part of the Soviet Union that the United States would utilize Diego Garcia to support elements of the U.S. strategic triad—SSBNs and B-52s. Soviet apprehension may have been reinforced by the lengthening of the runway on Diego Garcia to 12,000 feet, and by testimony which inferred that there may be some advantage to the basing of the Trident force on the West Coast of the United States with respect to Trident operations in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets have historically demonstrated a willingness to expend considerable resources whenever the defense of Soviet territory has been concerned. This has been true even when the potential return on their investment may not have been substantial.
This historical precedent suggests that any method of countering the U.S. SLBM threat is extremely attractive. Those means that offer an option of reducing the resource allocation problem while at the same time constraining the threat are even more remunerative to the Soviets. NALT is one such option. Some speculation is warranted, therefore, that the issue of SLBM deployments to the Indian Ocean was likely raised in the talks.

Limiting SSBN deployments would significantly diminish the problem facing the Soviet Union in defending against SLBMs. The situation is essentially one of ASW detection and localization of the missile firing platform coupled with that of defense against the missile or destruction of the platform prior to launch. The Soviet Union is at a significant disadvantage today because of its lack of technology to address the detection and localization issue. Moreover, the inherent quietness of the U.S. submarine force makes the problem even more thorny for the Soviets. Table I is an attempt to quantitatively describe the ocean area in which it is possible to conduct SLBM operations as a function of distance from Moscow.\(^{10}\)

The limiting arcs of the A-3 and C-3 missiles extend into the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. The C-4 and D-5 missiles significantly increase the area of the Indian Ocean available for SSBN patrol areas. This suggests that, whether or not the U.S. actually employs the
TABLE II

OCEAN AREA AVAILABLE
FOR U.S. SLBM OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSILE</th>
<th>RANGE (N.M.)</th>
<th>OCEAN AREA AVAIL (NM^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-3 (Polaris)</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3 (Poseidon)</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-4 (Trident I)</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-5 (Trident II)</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indian Ocean as an operating area, it is to the advantage of the United States to retain the option and thus require the Soviets to consider it in their defense plans. This option requires that the Soviet Union be prepared to conduct strategic and local ASW in four ocean areas versus three (Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean). Moreover, the United States stands to gain little, if anything, from a corresponding limitation on Soviet SSBNs in the region since they pose no threat to the continental United States.

The concern of the USSR is not limited solely to the SSBN threat. The Soviets have consistently focused their attention on the U.S. capability to employ aircraft operating from carriers to deliver nuclear weapons against Soviet territory. The reference to the carriers as non-central or forward based systems (PBS) and the Soviet position on the
FBS issue is exemplified by the following:

The Soviet Union...does not have military bases on foreign territories close to U.S. territory, whereas the United States possesses numerous military bases in Europe and Asia. According to a number of U.S. evaluations, this can increase the strategic potential of the United States and enable it to use it against the USSR in the event of war, if it is not successfully averted. Not only nuclear facilities with an intercontinental radius of operation but so-called forward forces - above all aircraft based...on aircraft carriers.12

Though the focus had been on aircraft deployed overseas that were capable of operating against Soviet territory, the scope of the FBS issue has been broadened appreciably to include a significant number of U.S. overseas bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the sea launched cruise missile.

For whatever benefits they hoped to derive from pursuing the issue, the Soviets did not consider the marginal utility to be sufficiently high to prevent them from reaching an agreement when the FBS issue was set aside in 1972 to facilitate SALT I. Throughout 1973, the Soviet Union insisted that SALT II must include limits on FBS and raised the issue again--in a regional context--in September 1973 when Soviet President Podgorny, speaking in Sofia, Bulgaria, called for denuclearization of the Mediterranean.13

The agreement at Vladivostok in 1974 not to include FBS in the basic accord suggests that FBS was not considered to
be of significant marginal utility from a strategic viewpoint in comparison with the major U.S. strategic delivery systems. Henry Kissinger alluded to this when he said that "the progress that has been made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for compensation for the Forward Based Systems partly because most of (them), or I would say all of them, are not suitable for a significant attack on the Soviet Union. At any rate, this is an element that has disappeared from the negotiations in recent months."14

Second, Moscow apparently realized that, because of the coordination among the Western allies during the negotiating process, the PBS issue had not significantly deteriorated the Alliance as it had hoped. Third, the PBS issue may have been used to extend the negotiations to the point where the USSR suspected that it had achieved at least strategic parity with the United States. Since the Soviet Union had so forcefully pursued the issue, it became a simple matter of declaring it to be a bargaining chip and writing it off as a major concession to the United States. The Soviets thus retained the option to raise it again in another negotiating context.

The United States previously asserted that its so-called forward based systems were tactical in nature. Prior to SALT II and the issues of the sea and ground launched cruise missiles, it was steadfastly maintained that only those systems that were inter-continental or central were open for
negotiation. The Soviets insisted that any system capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union should be subject to negotiation. Given their previous level of interest, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union would reintroduce the FBS issue in the Indian Ocean NALT as a means to further protect their territory and with the hope that it might set a precedent for other regions (e.g., the Mediterranean and Northeast Asia).

The United States is clearly at a disadvantage in this regard. The limitation of forward deployed systems (i.e., the CV) cuts at the heart of the U.S. Navy's ability to project national power. An agreement limiting CV deployments may cause some allies who share the U.S. desire to be able to project power to question that capability as well as U.S. intent. Indeed, such an agreement might even require the abrogation or renegotiation of existing commitments with allies if the precedent were applied to the Mediterranean.15

The ability to control sea areas vital to U.S. economic interests and those of our allies would also be seriously constrained. At best, the Soviets could offer only their KIEV class carriers as an offset though the equation of the tactical capabilities of the two is to the disadvantage of the U.S. in any such trade-off. Though the Soviets could be approached to limit their deployments to Cuba, it is doubtful they would accept such a constraint.
The Allied Implications of the Talks

National security has generally been defined by the Soviet Union to be the condition wherein Soviet military power is at least equal to, and preferably greater than, that of the United States plus that of its allies which could be brought to bear against the Soviet Union or its territory. An example of this policy that is particularly germane to naval arms control is the issue of the SSBNs operated by France and Great Britain. In preliminary SALT discussions the USSR raised the question of this eight ship force and left unresolved how these submarines should be counted in the SALT balance computations. The Soviets concluded that proliferation of French and British SSBNs beyond those operational or under construction could be controlled by the United States and claimed the right of corresponding force size increases.16 SALT and MFR have heightened the interests of our allies in any superpower bilateral arms control negotiation. It has been demonstrated in MFR that such negotiations, especially in a regional context, have the potential of expanding the range and depth of issues considered in such talks. The prospect of NAL in the Indian Ocean is such a case and may have implications beyond the US-USSR presence in the region.

The Soviet Union might have used a tactic in Indian Ocean NALT employed by the U.S. to attempt to expand the
scope of MFR. When the U.S. considered trying to expand the area covered in MFR to the flanks of NATO, the Soviet delegation responded that this expansion would entail negotiations on peripheral problems excluded in the initial MFR bargaining process. A northern context would, for example, not be included in a restricted area definition. They maintained that Soviet forces in the north did not exist to balance those of Norway's in isolation but rather the sum total of NATO's northern forces. A Kola Peninsula - northern Norway perspective would, therefore, require that the whole of Iceland, Britain, and the Norwegian Sea be addressed. Such a context might well include U.S. and allied FBS as well as Polaris/Poseidon.17

The Soviet Union could apply the same methodology to the Indian Ocean talks in an effort to include British, Australian, and French - the other western naval powers in the region - forces in the negotiations. The issue of regional definition in the Indian Ocean is analogous to the MFR case cited above. There has been sufficient argument about what actually constitutes the Indian Ocean region that the Soviet Union could exploit this ambiguity in the talks.18 In so doing, the Soviets could argue that an expansion of the region to include the east coast of Australia was appropriate both from a force and support facilities standpoint. It is not inconceivable that the Soviets would try to include the U.S. base at Subic Bay in such a framework.
It appears that the United States was prepared for such an eventuality because of the consultations that were held with the British and Australian governments. Indeed, the most extensive reaction to President Carter's remarks was from the Australian press and government. The Indian Ocean announcement was viewed as a "complete surprise" for Australia, with possible future implications for the region and a reversal of American policy. In reaction to the President's statement, the Australian government reaffirmed that its attitude on the Indian Ocean remained unchanged; Australia supported the Zone of Peace concept but did not believe it possible at the present time.

The Foreign Minister stated:

It (Carter's zone of peace announcement) is an important step but it would still be a long way off because you would need to have the Soviet Union react favorably to the overtures that have been made, and then enter into negotiations for a lowering of their significant facilities and presence in the Indian Ocean.

The Australian Foreign Minister discussed the Indian Ocean with U.S. officials and said that he was satisfied that U.S. Indian Ocean policy was very similar to Australia's long standing position. He added that Australian and American policies for the Indian Ocean were now in complete accord. Finally, he charged that the USSR had increased its naval operations in the Indian Ocean and tilted the balance of power in the area against the U.S. It should be noted that Australia, with the exception of the Whitlam government, has
generally been a supporter of the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia and critical of the former Soviet facilities in Somalia. Speaking on this subject Prime Minister Fraser has said that:

"...(The Australian) Government has supported the extension of facilities on Diego Garcia by (the U.S.) Government... we believe that balance is a precondition for stability. We are also concerned that further efforts by the USSR to enhance its strategic status in the Indian Ocean should be discouraged or adequately matched."23

The Australian Parliament considered that Indian Ocean NALT could only get underway if the Soviets acknowledged that the naval base at Berbera was under Soviet control.

Just how the Soviet Union would attempt to constrain the Australian connection is open to speculation. Utilizing the tactic of expanding the definition of the Indian Ocean region, the Soviets could argue to limit U.S. use of Australian facilities. Just prior to the President's statement, the Australian Minister of Defense announced in February 1977 that the Royal Australian Navy would use their new facility at Garden Island in Cockburn Sound in Western Australia beginning in early 1979 on a permanent basis. Though he avoided tying this basing policy to Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, he did say that, in the future, half of Australia's present submarine force would be deployed in the Indian Ocean.24 This, when coupled with Prime Minister Fraser's offer to the U.S. to use Cockburn Sound, makes Darwin and U.S. facilities in Australia potential subjects for negotiation by the Soviets.
Australia is but one of the nations that the Soviet Union may want to include in any force calculations in the talks. Both France and Great Britain still maintain the types of naval capabilities that would concern the Soviet Union. France deploys the single largest surface force in the region. It should be noted that both nations consistently abstained from voting on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace issue in the U.N.

France has said that it wants to maintain its military presence in the Indian Ocean including the use of the naval facilities at Djibouti. To support this contention France created a new naval command responsible for operations in the Indian Ocean and the Cape route leading to it. Some consideration of the French squadron in the Indian Ocean was probably addressed by the USSR. There is a precedent for similar considerations in the MFR talks in that NATO has consistently excluded French capabilities from the MFR context. The Soviets have maintained that such an exclusion is unreasonable in view of their assessment that France would meet its NATO obligations in the event of a war in Europe.

The role of the Chinese cannot be neglected in evaluating Soviet long term objectives. The potential for a Chinese SLBM threat to Russia from the Indian Ocean, though it does not now appear to be an immediate threat, cannot be discounted in Soviet strategy. Though China is the only great power that has voted in favor of all the UN Zone of Peace resolutions, the PRC has
never criticized the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia. China appears to favor a strong U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean as a counter to Soviet presence.27 The PRC perceives Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean as an extension of Russia's attempt to control southern Africa, including the Cape route and the West's vital sea lanes.28 Recent statements by Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping on the need for increased U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific (from where any Indian Ocean force will probably come) tend to confirm the continuing validity of the Chinese position.

It is in the interest of the United States to keep its allies well informed of its intentions with respect to any Indian Ocean NAL as well as the progress of any actual negotiations. This should include not only Great Britain, France, and Australia, but also Japan because of its vital economic interests in the region. The lessons learned from the FBS issue during SALT I and the cruise missile during SALT II illustrate the value of such consultations. They can act as a strong counterweight to the possible Soviet use of NALT as a means to weaken U.S. alliances. Because of the precedent setting nature of the tactic, the U.S. should firmly resist any attempt by the Soviets to link an agreement to allied forces or facilities in the region.

**Tactical Forces.**29 This last issue is perhaps really the most substantive of the four since it deals with controlling the principal business of both superpower navies in the
Indian Ocean: naval presence, or the use of naval forces short of war, to achieve nonmilitary objectives. It is also illustrative of the fourth of the negotiating issues because of the character of the forces that are employed by both sides to carry out this mission. By its very nature, presence implies that the surface components of the respective navies are the most appropriate for employment in this role. Submarines do not complement the traditional presence mission. The method most likely to be chosen to constrain surface forces is the imposition of numerical limitations on the movement into or basing of naval forces in an agreed upon geographic area. Since the issue of bases has already been addressed, this section will focus on limitations on the movement into or about the Indian Ocean by surface forces. Because the basic U.S. objective in the talks became stabilization of the superpower naval presence in the region, the analysis will be further directed to possible means and measures of achieving this goal. The discussion will address the resulting constraints on naval power from both an operational and a policy perspective.

There have been various means of constraining naval power proposed throughout the years. These means have generally had some measure of the constraint imposed associated with each of them (e.g., ship days, days in port, tonnage, etc.). Each measure has its own advantages and disadvantages; each, in varying degrees, illustrates the inherent difficulty of trying to
quantify the naval power of two nations whose navies are intrinsically asymmetric in both doctrine and force structure.\textsuperscript{31}

It is sufficient to say that these asymmetries contribute to the problem of negotiating any measure of NAL that would be mutually acceptable. This in itself is probably one of the principal issues that faced the negotiators during the talks. The reader should be aware at the outset of this analysis that there are numerous criteria that can be used to define limitations on naval forces. Some of the more prominent criteria with their respective pros and cons are summarized in Table II. Because it would be prohibitive to analyze all the possible combinations that could be used to define limitations, one such prototype will be addressed in detail. It is not the objective of this section to criticize this paradigm but simply to employ it as a means to analyze the talks and their operational impact.

It has been suggested that an agreement based on ship-ton-days be employed. Such a measure allegedly takes into account not only quantitative factors (the number of ships and the duration of stay) but also qualitative factors to the extent that tonnage can be said to relate to warfighting capability. This approach suggests that each nation would have the flexibility to mix numbers and types of platforms as well as the duration of stay as long as the aggregate remained below the treaty quota. A "model" agreement is contained in Table III.\textsuperscript{32}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>CON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Potential cost savings</td>
<td>1. Limit development of larger units, even where Soviet inferiority might justify it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Flexibility in force sizing</td>
<td>2. Implication of more technologically capable units to U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Verifiable</td>
<td>3. Limits addition of more technologically capable units to Soviet forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>CON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Current and projected force size is low to Soviet Navy</td>
<td>1. Reduces threat to Soviet forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Verifiable</td>
<td>2. U.S. technology lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Elastic ratio</td>
<td>3. Symmetry of forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEASURE</th>
<th>SOVIET</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>CNO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage limitation</td>
<td>Maximum number of units allowable</td>
<td>Force size limitation</td>
<td>Maximum number of SSNs allowable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force size limitation</td>
<td>Maximum number of SSNs allowable</td>
<td>Tonnage limitation</td>
<td>Force size limitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE IV

"MODEL" FOR A US-USSR INDIAN OCEAN SHIP-TON-DAY AGREEMENT

(Based on Maximum 12.5 million ship-ton-days per year per country, surface combatants only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO OF SHIPS</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AGF-3 (USS LASALLE)</td>
<td>8,040</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DDG (Charles F. Adams class)</td>
<td>4,100(each)</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CV (Kitty Hawk class)</td>
<td>80,800</td>
<td>60 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CGN (Bainbridge class)</td>
<td>8,580</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DDG (Farragut class)</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DD (Spruance class)</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FF (Knox class)</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Total: 12.626 million ship-ton-days per year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CLG (Kara class)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DDG (Krivak class)</td>
<td>3,900(each)</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DD (Skory class)</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>365 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LST (Alligator class)</td>
<td>5,800</td>
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<td>MSF (Natya class)</td>
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<td>(Total: 10.22 million ship-ton-days per year)</td>
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Assuming that this "model" was a negotiating proposal, several questions would most probably be raised by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. Since the Middle East Force (MEF) is the lead element of the "model" and the force component that has been in the region the longest, it is appropriate to address it first.

The MEF performs essentially a politico-military function in a diplomatic context by "politique du pavillon" (showing the flag), demonstrating the continuing U.S. interest in the Middle East, and enhancing U.S. friendship with the littoral
nations through a continuing program of port visits. The force traditionally consists of a flagship and two destroyer or frigate class ships. The flagship, currently the USS LA SALLE (AGF-3), has generally remained in the area on a permanent basis with the destroyers deploying from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. One of the premises of the agreement is that it deal with surface combatants only. The U.S. negotiating team could legitimately claim that such a premise excludes LA SALLE because it is legally classified by the Secretary of the Navy as an auxiliary\textsuperscript{33} and, as such, should be exempt from the limitation ceiling.

This in turn could raise two questions on the part of the Soviet negotiators. The first is the issue of auxiliary ships. It is likely that the USSR would contend that the model should be expanded to include non-combatants (oilers, ammunition ships, etc.) or that a separate paradigm be generated to cover the issue of limiting support units. The second question is closely related to the first and is definitional in nature. The Soviets would probably try to define auxiliaries in the broadest possible sense with respect to U.S. forces. In addition to the commissioned vessels of the U.S. Navy they might move to include those vessels of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) that support the U.S. Navy. There are two such classes of vessels: the first is the USNS vessels manned by civilian crews and operated for the U.S. Navy by MSC; the second is the group of merchant tankers that
operate under charter to MSC within the Charger Log program. All three components, it could be argued, directly support the operations of U.S. Navy combatants and should, therefore, be subject to some form of limitation. The implication here is that the Soviet Union will probably try to exploit any issue to its advantage to constrain the operations of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean whether it be the inclusion of auxiliaries in the proposed agreement or the creation of a separate one. The impact of a broad limitation would be greater on the already existing extensive underway replenishment capability of the U.S. Navy as opposed to the still growing one of the USSR.

The remainder of the ship-ton-days allocated to the United States are used to make up three task forces, each with a mix of four surface combatants, deploying to the Indian Ocean for 30 days each. The "model" permits the U.S. and the Soviets a good deal of flexibility in allocating their forces to deployments within an agreed limit. But there are very definite costs that accrue in accepting this perceived benefit. They take the form of less flexibility available for the remainder of a given year. For example, if the United States chose, for some reason, to increase the deployment of one of the model's CVTGs to 60 days vice 30 days and included in that task group an AAW cruiser (e.g., a Belknap class CG), the cost of opportunity incurred by the U.S. with respect to
subsequent deployments as described by the model is some 3,435,000 ship-ton-days, or almost 28% of the total allowable ship-ton-days. The significance of this example is that even though there are numerous force combinations that can be constructed and deployed, they are all constrained by a model that was generated based on data depicting the peacetime naval presence of the forces of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and not force mixes that are truly representative of a war-fighting capability.

From a policy perspective any such limitation reduces the flexibility of U.S. decisionmakers by undercutting the U.S. ability to promote stability in the region and contain crises. U.S. policymakers have routinely employed sea-based power—primarily that offered by surface forces—as a means of influencing the behavior of other actors in the international system. The means of exerting this influence are those forces that are forward deployed within a region to reassure U.S. allies, offer a visible deterrent to potential adversaries, and guarantee a quick response capability to demonstrate U.S. intent and resolve. Except in war, the tempo of naval operations is driven by the pattern of these forward deployments. They center on the carrier task groups (CVTG) and the amphibious ready groups (ARGs) deployed with the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. These are the forces that represent the ability of the United States to influence events ashore.
The second aspect of the stabilizing nature of such forces is in the perception of US-Soviet naval parity whether on a regional or global scale. Forward deployed units are a premium that the U.S. pays to insure that it will be able to assure sea control and influence the outcome of the land battle in the event of a crisis or major war. The trend in the open literature has emphasized Soviet gains at sea, as well as elsewhere. The forward strategy of the U.S. linking it to its allies requires the use of the seas. The perception that the Soviet Union will deny this use to the U.S. and its allies is particularly damaging to this strategy.

In many instances where the U.S. has desired to indicate its resolve, naval forces have been the preferred means of leverage for a U.S. policymaker. Forward deployed naval forces can be employed without being committed to battle and without committing allies. They are highly maneuverable and, since they operate in an international medium, they do not need to be quite so concerned about the violation of sovereign territory. They convey, as the policymaker chooses, a calculated ambiguity and a calibrated response capability whose presence does not irrevocably commit the U.S. to a given course of action. They can complicate the calculations of the opposing actors in assessing the consequences of their available options. The deployed naval force can be tailored to the mission and, through its composition, convey the message that the decisionmaker desires. If the crisis is resolved, naval forces can be withdrawn with limited fanfare.
It appears as if the Soviet Union has gained an appreciation of these aspects of the employment of naval forces and has begun to both exploit them for its own purposes as well as countering the effects of U.S. presence in a crisis setting and limiting or neutralizing the political effects of the U.S. interposition option. Events of the Mid-East War in 1973 lend credence to this thesis. It is precisely for these reasons that it would be in the Soviet interest to constrain U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and vice versa.

It could be argued that it was in the context of the presence role that the attractiveness of limiting conventional naval forces gained the attention it appeared to have in the original context of Indian Ocean NALT. However, the presence mission is not defined as an explicit mission of the U.S. Navy. Moreover, the U.S. Navy does not size its naval forces to support a presence mission. Hence, a commitment to presence (e.g., the Indian Ocean) could be viewed as conflicting with its principal missions of deterrence, power projection and sea control. Such a perception may, in the long run, not be conducive to the U.S. policy of fostering stability and containing crises (i.e., conflict management). Additionally, the commitment of forces to a mission for which they were not designed also makes the idea of constraining that mission more attractive to those who have criticized the U.S. Navy for not being able to size its forces in proportion to its missions.
Other critics charge that it is difficult, if not nearly impossible, to judge the effect of presence. Little can be offered to change this perception. It is only when the decisions of other actors in the international system have been implemented that it is possible to estimate the impact. Even then, it is difficult to attribute such actions to the effect of presence alone because other options (e.g., economic, political, etc.) may have been brought to bear on the situation. All that can be known with a reasonable degree of certainty is that naval presence, or its absence, is but one transmitter of such signals.\textsuperscript{35} To constrain the maritime options (e.g., naval presence) available to the decisionmaker that enable him to clearly transmit his intent and resolve is to deprive him of a valuable tool--a tool that once traded away is difficult to replace.

**Summary.** Table IV contains a summary of the analysis of the four issues. It identifies various pros and cons for each issue for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union and evaluates the risk encountered by each nation should the issue be negotiated. Finally, an overall net assessment of who is favored by the issue is made.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

It has been suggested that the change in U.S. foreign policy exemplified in the Indian Ocean initiative was a cardinal maritime error. The U.S. embarked on a voyage into unknown waters without the requisite charts which any mariner knows he must have at hand to help him avoid the inevitable rocks and shoals.1 The four sessions of the Indian Ocean talks constituted the first serious attempt to control naval warfare since well before World War II. The issues that formed the criteria against which the policy change was evaluated - the Zone of Peace and Diego Garcia - served to illustrate the range of both the political and technical problems that the Indian Ocean NALT was bound to encounter. Even if the talks had continued, their background augured that there was a good probability that they would become bogged down in a mire of non-political issues that would have turned them into a technical game wherein the political issues involved might have become lost in the play.

The Zone of Peace proposal did not contribute anything substantive to the success of US-USSR NALT on the Indian Ocean. It is a proposal that is devoid of rigorous definitions and measures of limitations; it costs nothing to support (or at least express sympathy with) and is loaded with emotionalism.
Its principles mean many things to many people and some of its supporters in the UN (e.g., Australia) have evinced no problems whatsoever in living with what appear to be conflicting policies (e.g., Diego Garcia). As a policy issue per se, it has become one of the accepted elements to which the non-aligned nations routinely subscribe. The verbiage associated with the statements of its supporters and the language of the various UN resolutions is illustrative of both the range of concepts associated with the Zone of Peace and the lack of depth of its definition of the threat. It is so lacking in rigor that both the U.S. and the USSR, in spite of the talks, still decline to participate in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee. Instead they have chosen to keep that body informed of the progress of their negotiations.

The debate in the Senate opposing the construction on Diego Garcia was deceptive when examined in terms of naval arms control. It was principally a manifestation of the resurgent congressional interest in the formulation of foreign policy. Its principal objective was to challenge the doctrine that the President was the sole representative in matters of foreign policy. The real issue was not the expansion of the Support Facility on a small coral atoll in the British Indian Ocean Territory but rather a challenge to the structure in which U.S. foreign policy for the Indian Ocean region was being formulated. Though the War Powers Act of 1973 was perhaps
the pinnacle of this debate, it continues today with concern by some over President Carter's withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan. What this suggests is that naval arms control was used as the case to prove the point. It was a lever on the larger question of policy formulation and its use may have been based on a less than clear appreciation of all the issues involved.

As a policy, NAL implies that it is both cheaper and more desirable to negotiate mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean than to continue the US-Soviet competition there. The issues that were discussed in Chapter III tend to confirm this perception. The United States was willing to pursue a form of regional naval parity. But such a condition would not only directly affect the naval balance; it would also tend to legitimize a sphere of influence for the Soviets in the region. It is, therefore, difficult to identify a real quid pro quo for the United States in Indian Ocean NALT; indeed it is difficult to determine any measurable advantage that would accrue to the U.S.

On the contrary, because the region is one that lacks both socio-economic and political cohesion, both real and potential political instability (e.g., Iran and Afghanistan) are present. One U.S. interest in the region—oil—is vital and demands that the U.S. retain the capability of unhindered access to the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Such a capability
can only be maintained by a naval presence and it is for this reason that the rationale for NALT is even less clear.

Today the Soviet Union can exert more pressure than ever before in its history on the Northern Tier and the region in general because of its role in Afghanistan, its ability to use the former Royal Navy base in Aden, and its presence in Ethiopia. In a world where the evaluation of intent versus capability is becoming increasingly less clear, the recognition of naval parity with the Soviet Union and the inference of a Soviet sphere of influence that accompanies it might tend to intimidate the nations of the region and cause their leadership to question just how much and what type of pressure the Soviets might be willing to exert in any future test. Pursuit of the Indian Ocean talks can only exacerbate this perception. It could very well be interpreted as U.S. intent to withdraw from the region and leave the Soviet Union as the sole remaining manager of conflict within the framework of detente. Just as the recognition of strategic parity may have altered the international system, the recognition of naval parity in the Indian Ocean could have a similar effect on the regional sub-system.

The foregoing does not challenge the fact that arms control is a valid alternative to the use of force, but it does suggest that it is not the only way to enhance U.S. national security. Arms control by itself will not reverse the trend of Soviet military growth and the influence it exerts. Arms control can only contribute in a limited manner to the situation
because the U.S. has relatively little margin of conventional maritime safety remaining. The key issue is the effect which the acceptance of naval limitations will play in the overall balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Power projection is crucial to U.S. interests in the region. It is principally this consideration which makes such limitations so unattractive for the U.S. in considering the power projection balance. The role of air power—a factor which gives the Soviet Union a decided advantage especially since it can now overfly all the countries between its domestic bases and the Persian Gulf—cannot be ignored. At present, it is the Navy's carrier air which is the only means available to the U.S. to counter this threat.

It appears as if the Carter Administration has recognized this, at least, in the case of the Indian Ocean. The dispatch of the carrier USS CONSTELLATION to the Arabian Sea and the consideration of expanding U.S. naval presence in the region lend credence to this perception. These actions, when coupled with the decision in February 1978 not to continue with the talks, suggest that the strategy of linkage politics is very much an option of the Carter Administration. This suggests that there is some question as to the real utility of Indian Ocean NALT. If NALT is to be pursued on its own merits, then why (other than as a tactic) was it linked to Soviet behavior in Africa? No successful linkage has been made in SALT
despite the efforts of both Kissinger and Brzezinski. This tends to cast some doubt on the intrinsic validity and merit of the objectives of Indian Ocean NALT.

The naval situation in the Indian Ocean is not unlike that between the Greeks leaving Persia in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Persian force escorting them. The commander of the Greeks called for talks with the Persians to try "to put a stop to...suspicions before they end in open hostility" much like the U.S. did with the Soviet Union in March of 1977 in the case of the Indian Ocean. The talks opened with the Greek Commander noting that:

I observe that you were watching our moves as though we were enemies, and we noticing this, are watching yours, too. On looking into things I am unable to find evidence that you are trying to do us any harm, and I am perfectly sure that...we do not...contemplate such a thing; and so I decided to discuss matters with you, to see if we could put an end to this mutual mistrust. I know, too, of cases that have occurred in the past when people sometimes as the result of slanderous information and sometimes merely on the strength of suspicion, have become frightened of each other and then, in their anxiety to strike first before anything is done to them have done irreparable harm to those who neither intended nor even wanted to do them any harm at all...I want to make it clear to you that you have no reason to distrust us.

The Persians chose these talks as the occasion to eliminate the Greek leadership. Though the motivation of the Greeks was noble, their lack of understanding of the Persian mind-set resulted in a severe blow to the prestige and power of the Greeks and contributed nothing to resolve the issue over which the talks were initiated.
NOTES

CHAPTER I


CHAPTER II


3. Main Documents Relating to Conferences of Non-Aligned Countries (Georgetown, Guyana: Ministry of External Affairs, 1972), p. 78


CHAPTER III


10. Moscow is selected as the target because of the apparent value that has historically been attached to its defense by the Soviet political and military leadership.


16. Tsipis, et. al., op. cit., p. 240


29. Within the scope of this study tactical forces are defined as those naval forces not earmarked for a strategic mission. For purposes of the study the discussion will not address submarines (SSN/SS) because of the implications of verification.


CHAPTER IV


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Military Documents


Miscellaneous


International Organization Documents


APPENDIX A

INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE VOTING RECORD

THRU 1976

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Voting Legend:

Y - Voted in favor of U.N. resolution
N - Voted against U.N. resolution
A - Abstained
X - Indicates that the nation was either not in attendance or did not vote or in the case of South Africa has not participated in the forum of the General Assembly.
NOTES

1. The nations chosen are either littoral or island nations of the Indian Ocean Region or considered to be "Great Powers".

2. 1976 was chosen because US-USSR Indian Ocean NALT commenced the following year - 1977.
APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL MEANS OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL
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Five additional means of operationalizing naval arms control will be discussed. They include:

- Confidence building measures
- Budgetary limitations
- Limitations on conventional naval arms transfers
- Numerical constraints on force levels
- Qualitative limitations on naval weapons systems or platforms

Confidence Building Measures. Confidence building measures (CBM) offer an alternative to the frustrations inherent in naval arms control. They can satiate the desire for progress in arms control since they are void of the problems of definition and technology inherent in other forms of naval arms control.

There are two naval precedents for the use of CBMs. The first is a 1930 protocol between Greece and Turkey. They agreed not to order or construct naval units without having first given the other six months notice "so that both governments may thus be enabled if necessary to prevent any competition in the sphere of naval armaments by means of a friendly exchange of views and explanations on either side..."
The second is the 1972 US-Soviet agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas.\(^2\)

CBMs such as those described have the potential to be extended to such areas as naval exercise notification and deployment data. Where the means of national technical verification provides a reasonably high level of confidence, CBMs are largely a symbolic gesture adding more to the format of relations than to their substance. Where such is not the case and the notification process is carried out both to the letter and spirit of the agreement, they can add to the stability of a relationship. This is of value during a crisis when the uncertainty of the intent of a specific naval capability tends to destabilize the issue at hand. A contending approach to the utility of CBMs argues that the existence of an agreed to CBM will tend to detract from the ambiguity inherent in the alert of a naval force during a crisis, a tactic that has been historically useful to the United States.

Budgetary Limitations. The proposal to limit expenditures for defense is not new. The first major initiative of this type was made by Imperial Russia at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899. Since then, this means of arms control has been suggested numerous times in a variety of forums but there is no known case wherein constraints on a nation's naval budget have been proposed and implemented.\(^3\) The major objective of any arms control measure limiting expenditures
for naval programs is to increase the perception of stability in the international system as well as the security of its actors by constraining the level of naval force that one actor can bring to bear on another. It is complemented by the notion that if conflict does occur, the decreased level of expenditure will contribute to the lessening of the destructive potential of modern naval warfare.

In addition to saving money, constraints on military budgets have two other perceived advantages. Because they are couched in monetary terms, such restrictions can cover the entire spectrum of naval programs. This includes such program elements as research and development which are difficult to physically control. Secondly, since funding is the most general of all force measures, budgetary limitations permit nations sufficient latitude in reallocating resources to meet special requirements within agreed limits.

Limitations on Conventional Arms Transfer. The limitation of conventional arms transfers seeks to reduce the probability of war between client states (with obvious superpower implications) and to lessen the intensity and duration of war if it occurs. The essence of this means is the belief that because of the pace of technology, unrestrained arms sales threaten stability in the peripheral zone and lessen the capacity of the superpowers to apply conflict management there.
Arms transfers are intrinsically neither stabilizing nor destabilizing. Depending on the circumstances they may increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict. Though it is difficult to assess the long range impact of conventional naval arms transfers, several points stand out. They are:

1) the use of conventional naval force in non-superpower vs. non-superpower interaction is still viable; 2) conventional arms in any quantity themselves will not precipitate conflict; they must be accompanied by the political will to use them; 3) where the arms transferred do not give to the recipient any new or threatening naval capability, the perception of the recipient's neighbors is not likely to change.

Arms transfers remain an acceptable technique of achieving political objectives such as the strengthening of relationships with recipient nations and demonstrating tangible support for those nations. Because of the increased sources of availability, recipients now have more of an option to change suppliers. This tends to lessen the ability of a supplier to impose restrictions or extract concessions from client states.

Numerical Constraints on Force Levels. The obvious advantage of this means of naval arms control is the relative ease of verification. Though there are several measures which can be applied to this means (e.g., total tonnage, number of ships, manpower levels, limits on a class of ship, etc.).
all have this attraction. Additionally it offers (depending on the measure chosen) the flexibility of each country allocating its resources as it sees fit within that limitation. Another objective that is achievable is a potential reduction in defense expenditures through the avoidance of operations and maintenance costs, ship construction costs, and aircraft procurement costs.

It is in this means that the classic historical precedent for naval arms control is found. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 fixed, by mutual consent, the strength of the navies of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy based on a numerical scheme of tonnages and ratios for capital ships. It is noteworthy from an historical point of view that, in the negotiations of the 1920s and 1930s on naval arms limitations which were principally an exercise in limiting force size, the Soviet Navy was not even considered germane to the issues at hand.5

**Qualitative Constraints.** The employment of qualitative limitations in naval arms control seeks to slow the momentum that technological breakthrough conveys to the development of weapons systems capable of being employed in naval warfare or to platform improvements. The objective of this particular means of naval arms control is to inhibit "destabilizing" developments in naval warfare.
There has been no substantive practical test of employing this means to any arms control problem to date. The task of defining and negotiating qualitative constraints, whether it be in the realm of NALT or in the context of SALT III, will prove exceedingly difficult if not impossible.

Qualitative improvements include any development that improves a weapons capability to deliver fire, to increase mission flexibility, or to improve survivability or sustainability. A qualitative constraint is any attempt to bar or limit the development or deployment of such an improvement.

The principle utility of qualitative constraints appears to be related to the reduction of defense expenditures. This applies almost equally in areas in which qualitative competition is characterized by indigenous competition in research and new weapon developments and in areas where the qualitative competition is a competition in acquisition from external producer states.6

The possibility of achieving this objective is circumscribed, however, by the costs that may be incurred for systems to assure compliance with the agreement or to provide for adequate response if violation is detected. Seeking this objective by arms control may also deny some opportunities to achieve net cost reductions through qualitative improvements.7
NOTES


2. The text of this agreement is contained in World Armaments and Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook, 1976, p. 36-39.


4. Ibid., p. 2-3


7. Ibid., p. 69.