THIRD WORLD MILITARY ELITES IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

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The importance that military aid has assumed in Soviet dealings with Third World governments has long been recognized by Western students of Soviet arms transfers, and a large number of monographs on the subject have been published in the last decade. Even so, available treatments have been largely confined to statistical analyses of aggregate data on Soviet outlays for military assistance, tabulations of hardware deliveries, or case studies of bilateral aid relationships. But a systematic effort to uncover the system of political-military views that informs Soviet policy toward and dealings with the armed forces of the Third World has yet to be undertaken. For all the tactical opportunism of their behavior, the Soviets do possess such a system of views — views which have changed significantly over the years, and without an awareness of which no understanding of the Soviet military aid program would be complete.

These views are not, to be sure, set forth in Soviet writings that treat the subject directly — it is much too sensitive for that. But the Soviets do write about their clients, the military establishments of the Third World, and in particular about the role of these establishments in the societies of which they are members. And an understanding of Soviet perceptions of this role is the key, as will become clear in the following pages, to an understanding of the
outlook that conditions Soviet military aid policy in the developing nations.*

THE POST-STALIN DECADE

In the classic Marxist-Leninist interpretation, the world's military machines are of two sorts: bourgeois and socialist. The former are an instrument of the ruling bourgeois class, charged with defending the capitalist order and keeping the working masses in a state of subjection. At the international level, the function of bourgeois armies is to "prepare and wage aggressive wars and enslave other peoples." Socialist armies, in contrast, are armies of a "new type," organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, created to defend the socialist achievements of the working class against internal and external class enemies, and the Socialist Fatherland against the encroachments of imperialism. Though consequently the army, in Lenin's oft-quoted words, "cannot be, never has been and never will be [politically] neutral," it must not be regarded as an independent socio-political entity, an organization of like-minded individuals looking mainly after its own corporate interests. For in the political arena, the army never acts on its own, but only at the behest and under the control of the ruling class it serves.2

*For reasons of space, this paper will not deal with Soviet views on guerrilla liberation movements.
With the decision by Stalin's epigones in the early 1950s to abandon his "two camp" doctrine and seek ties with the new nation-states of the developing world, however, it became clear that these views stood in need, if not of revision, at least of amplification. It was difficult to place Nehru's or Sukarno's armies, for example, in the category of those which "wage aggressive wars" and "enslave other peoples." The ruling class these armies served, to be sure, was still bourgeois because it promoted the capitalist system of development; but for all that, it was fighting against imperialism and colonialism; it was a "national" bourgeoisie. The character of this ruling class in turn determined that of the armies that served it. In the words of a 1962 text, the armed forces of the new national states differ fundamentally from the reactionary armies of the imperialist states in their political purpose and character....Being at the disposal of the national bourgeoisie, they...are more closely tied to the people and to the general national interest of the formerly oppressed countries.

It was not long after this work appeared, however, that the party line it reflected itself came under fire. It was wrong to think of the national bourgeoisie as the ruling class everywhere in the Third World, the revisionists argued, for in many countries it was "barely taking shape." Some such countries were ruled by a coalition of "bureaucrats,
landowners and profiteers" who were not only promoting capitalist development but consciously supporting the aims of imperialism as well. On the other hand, the rulers of countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the U.A.R. and Algeria, though of a far different political stripe, were equally difficult to describe as bourgeois. Rather, they were "representatives of the progressive intelligentsia, revolutionary democrats who understand the need for developing the anti-colonial revolution into an anticapitalist one." The socialism to which these "revolutionary democrats" adhered, while not presently "scientific," could in time evolve in that direction, and with it the character of their regimes.5

When first advanced in February 1963 by some Soviet scholars -- notably G. I. Mirskiy, of whom more will be said below -- these revisionist views were hotly contested;6 but before the year was out Nikita Khrushchev himself had put an end to orthodox critical declamations by publicly endorsing the substance of Mirskiy's argument.7

This doctrinal change had the great merit of providing the Soviets with a theoretical answer to the annoying question of what the behavior of domestic communists vis-a-vis revolutionary-democratic regimes should be. Rather than work for their eventual overthrow as previous doctrine had prescribed, communists were now instructed to support their anticapitalist measures and encourage their evolution in Marxist-Leninist directions. What this entailed in practice,
as Richard Lowenthal has said, was "nothing less than the deliberate renunciation of independent communist parties, publicly acting as such," in all one-party revolutionary-democratic states. Domestic communists were now to join the sole legal parties, and work to transform them into Marxist-Leninist parties from within their ranks. The Soviets hoped in this way to persuade the revolutionary democrats in power to cease persecuting communists and accept them as loyal allies and partners in the revolutionary cause.8

Although the military origins of a number of Third World regimes did not escape Soviet notice at the time,9 the classic view of the army as an instrument of the ruling social strata, even as applied to the Third World, remained fundamentally unchanged. The nature and composition of the classes wielding political and economic power was described differently, but the class relationship between them and the military elites was not. The possibility that some armies might possess a will of their own and be able to flout that of the politically and economically dominant social groups was never raised. Thus, if a country had "linked its destinies with imperialism," so ipso facto had its armed forces; and if, on the other hand, it had taken the "non-capitalist path" of development, its army became a bulwark of the revolution. Transforming an army into a force for progress seemed in Soviet eyes to require little more than freeing it
from the control of "foreign generals and officers" occupying top command and staff positions.10

With the wave of military coups that swept across Africa between November 1965 and January 1966, however, the analytical framework conditioning these views began to bend somewhat. In less than three months, President Kasavubu of the Congo (Leopoldville), President Congacou of Dahomey, President Dacko of the Central African Republic, President Yameogo of Upper Volta, and President Balewa of Nigeria were all toppled by military officers.

Attempting to explain these events, Izvestiya's Vladimir Kudryavtsev allowed on the day Balewa was deposed that African armies were "a more mobile force, capable of acting quickly" on the political stage because of the "weakly manifested" differentiation of African social classes.11

This was a clear departure from previous orthodoxy, for it implied that some military establishments were more than just an armed extension of the will of the ruling classes. But that was as far as Kudryavtsev dared go in accounting for what had happened. The latest coups, he asserted, had involved only capitalist-oriented countries, where economic conditions had changed little since colonial times. Ultimately, he suggested, these armies had acted, if not directly on behalf, then in the interests of the ruling bureaucratic-bourgeois cliques because they were trying to preserve the old order.12 It did not occur to him, or to any other Soviet
commentator then, that progressive regimes which had rejected the "capitalist alternative" might themselves be vulnerable to the depredations of military men who wished to restore the old order. For in countries which had taken the non-capitalist path, as another contemporary account had it, "the army is regarded as an inalienable part of the national political process", and "the ruling parties are in full control" of it.13 The overthrow of Algeria's Ben Bella seven months before could only have reinforced this conviction, since the officers who replaced him soon showed they were just as committed to the revolution as he had been.

THE LESSONS OF NKROMAH'S OVERTHROW

Proffered only weeks before the fall of Ghana's Nkrumah, these appraisals reflected the optimism that had infected Soviet thinking about the prospects for the spread of socialism in the developing world. The shock of the Redeemer's almost effortless removal from office on February 24, 1966 by a group of patently "reactionary" army commanders was therefore as stunning as it was unexpected, for it demolished, in a single blow, the very foundations of Soviet confidence in the rapid forward progress of the "world revolutionary process" in general and the inherent stability of revolutionary democratic regimes in particular.14 Almost overnight, the Soviets were compelled to recognize that the revolution-
ary process had not been "developing in a straight line, but in a more tortuous and contradictory way;"¹⁵ that establishing a progressive regime and choosing the "correct" path of development "do not in themselves automatically solve complex internal problems;"¹⁶ that the transition to socialism could take as long as "an entire historical epoch;"¹⁷ and that the national liberation movement could not only enjoy "headlong surges," but also suffer "temporary failures."¹⁸ And finally, that the attitude of the military was of critical importance to the fate of the revolution, for the army "is actively drawn into political life," and "often exerts a decisive influence on the development of events"¹⁹ -- a fact of Third World political life which, as one writer conceded seven months after the coup, "has until recently escaped the attention of researchers."²⁰

By late 1966 and early 1967, the main outlines of an authoritative explanation of the army's role had emerged in the Central Party and government press organs, and involved -- despite repeated disclaimers -- fundamental changes in the old view of the armed forces as an instrument of domination by the ruling classes.

The "low level of socio-economic development," "inadequate class differentiation" and "immaturity of social relationships" in many developing countries -- so the explanation went -- had led to a situation in which "no one social class can individually lead the revolutionary
process." The working class, for one thing, was small, poorly organized and politically immature; and the national bourgeoisie -- where it actually could be said to exist -- had proved unable when in power to "strengthen the economic and political stability" of the state. 21

These weaknesses, moreover, were reflected in both the ruling parties and the state. The ruling parties, which incorporated forces "heterogeneous in the social, political and ideological respects," more resembled "national fronts" than cohesive organizations expressing the will of a given class. 22 While these parties had been able to rally their countrymen when the issue was national independence, 23 they were proving inadequately prepared to deal with the "incomparably more complex tasks" that now faced their countries, and were showing themselves "incapable of exerting a decisive influence" on national development. 24 Similar flaws afflicted the state as a whole, since in most cases power was exercised not by a single class, but by a coalition of disparate petty-bourgeois, peasant, worker and even feudal elements. 25

Only the army escaped the centrifugal effect of these forces:
[When] progressive elements struggle against reactionary ones within the ruling party itself; when the party is inadequately (or not at all) linked to the revolutionary masses...; and when the functions of the state itself are still contradictory, its institutions also find themselves in a process of internal contradictions and organizational shaping. The army is frequently the only exception.26

The army, to be sure, also harbored class, tribal, regional and ideological antagonisms; but unlike civilian institutions, it was "bound together by strict discipline," and the sense of belonging to a "formally established organization" was much stronger.27 Hence, the military "frequently prove to be the best-organized force in public life"28 -- a force capable of exercising a considerable measure of independent political initiative. "The lessons of the military coups in a number of Asian and African countries," then,

have shown that the army can play not only a progressive role in the national liberation movement, but easily becomes the instrument of reactionary forces if the influence of democratic ideas is weakened. In some instances the army acts to hasten progressive development...and in others...it retards that development....The army is an institution in society where democratic ideas can get along quite peacefully with reactionary views, giving rise to the danger that individual bearers of these views might attempt to use the army or a part of it against the revolution.29

The revolution's deadliest enemy, in other words, could easily be the very same armed forces ostensibly charged
with defending it. Much ink was expended, to be sure, in blaming the "intrigues of imperialism" for what had happened, and to some extent this concern was then (and remains today) genuine. But at bottom the Soviets understood that "it would be self-delusion...to imagine that imperialist intrigue alone was the main cause of the coup" in Ghana. 30

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the Ghana debacle led to any flagging of Soviet preoccupation with or interest in the developing world. It is true, as Robert Legvold has said, that "by 1968 the Soviet Union had long since been disabused of its revolutionary vision of Africa;" but to suggest, as he does, a consequent "obvious loss of interest on the part of Soviet leaders in most of Black Africa,"31 or in any other part of the Third World for that matter, is nonsense. This view is not only at variance with the facts of Soviet involvement in the Third World since the fall of Nkrumah, but also is prey to the logical error of confusing the act of identifying the problems afflicting the revolutionary process with that of conceding defeat by them. Nowhere is this more evident than in Soviet efforts to deal with the problem of politicians in epaulettes.
To the Soviets, the problem was not one of civil-military relations -- at least not in the sense of a challenge to liberty, equality, and fraternity from the forces of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The military's involvement in Third World politics, in their jargon, was a zakonomernoe yavlenie -- a fact of life, an "objective" phenomenon governed by immutable "laws of social development" -- which would be channeled in certain desirable directions, but not in the circumstances suppressed. It was therefore pointless, in fact dangerous, to strive for an apolitical military establishment, for to regard it "as though it were a force which stands outside of politics can have grave consequences for the destinies of the national revolution." What was worse, this view failed to take account of the positive aspects of the military's political bent. "The ideologues of imperialism," as one Soviet commentator put it in 1975,

try to treat the problems connected with the participation of the young national armies in the socio-political life of their countries in a distorted way. Shielded by the hypocritical slogan of the army's "political neutrality," the social functions the armed forces perform in individual countries or groups of countries are persistently covered up, reactionary and progressive military regimes are put on the same level, and the positive role that patriotically- and democratically-minded army circles play in the developing countries is denied.33

Thus from the Soviet point of view, as these words suggest, the task was not to remove the armed forces from political
involvement, but to transform the character of that involve-
ment so as to ensure that their political initiatives served
the cause of "social progress."

The officer corps, to begin with, must be thoroughly
purged from top to bottom of all "reactionary elements." It
would not do merely to dismiss officers of the former colo-
nial metropole who had remained in key positions. Nkrumah's
removal in 1961 of British officers from the Ghanian army's
top command -- an action which had once earned Soviet
praise\(^{34}\) -- was now dismissed as purely cosmetic in effect,
amounting to no more than a "change in guise" since the new
army commanders, though Ghanian, had been "trained in British
military educational establishments and had experienced the
strong influence of imperialist ideology.\(^{35}\) The loyalty of
the military could not be assured, as Nkrumah's experience
had shown, by "leaving them untouched, by not subjecting them
to annoying 'loyalty checks,' or by refraining from politi-
cally-motivated campaigns to shift or remove officers.\(^{36}\)

Nor, for that matter, would expedients such as creating a
people's militia "as a counterweight to the army" (a decision
made by Nkrumah in 1965) accomplish anything but the "aggra-
vation of relations between army and government" unless they
were "backed up by serious preliminary organizational and
ideological-political work in the army" \textit{per se}.\(^{37}\)

Moreover, the army's officers (or what remained of them
after the purge) and rank and file must be "actively indoc-
trinated" in the "spirit of defending national interests and social progress." This, again, was something the Ghanian army had conspicuously failed to do, which resulted in its personnel being ignorant of the "essence of the [revolutionary] events which had been taking place" under Nkrumah, and in consequence unwilling to defy the will of the reactionary officers who effected the coup.

Third, internal service regulations and manuals must be revamped to "conform to the objectives and practical tasks of training the army for the antiimperialist struggle." In many of the Asian and African armies -- including Ghana's own -- military and psychological training was being conducted using the "regulations, manuals and instructions of the former colonial armies, that is, according to the canons of bourgeois armies."40

A fourth task advocated by the Soviets was to raise the low literacy levels prevailing in most of the young armies, in order to eliminate the "great difficulties" in the training and indoctrination of personnel occasioned by "high illiteracy rates in the population." Illiteracy not only hampered efforts at political indoctrination but was also "a serious obstacle in the way of mastering the fundamentals of modern combat and a nearly insurmountable impediment to the study and utilization of modern combat equipment."41

Finally, methods of manning the army's rank and file which had been instituted by the colonial authorities must be
abandoned. The recommendation, like the others, was born of the Ghanian experience. The government of Ghana, as Soviet writers began to observe within months of the coup, had "failed to change radically" the methods of recruiting employed by the colonial administration. The Ghanian army command continued, like the British colonial command before it, to "organize special recruiting expeditions to [the country's] backward northern regions, thereby furthering the preservation of the national army's previous character." Like the colonial army, the national army was dominated by illiterate ethnic minorities which were "untouched by political ferment," "more receptive to discipline" than urban groups, and attracted to military service not by notions of "duty, honor, country," but by expectations of privilege, perquisites, and high pay. "Valuing his privileged status," the Ghanian soldier "became an unquestioning executor of the officers' will," making it "extraordinarily easy" for the reactionaries to "exploit the army in carrying out the military coup." What was required to remedy these flaws, in the Soviet view, was a "permanent army which is manned by provision of a law on compulsory military service for all citizens of suitable ages." An army thus manned, to be sure, would be "numerically large" and outlays for maintaining it "extraordinarily burdensome" for the people.
But for the defense of the achievements of the national revolution and of its development along the path of progress ... the whole people must be prepared. Its physically and morally best-trained youth contingents, brought up in the spirit of responsibility for their country's destiny, are prepared [in the army] to serve, arms in hand, the cause of the national revolution. A system of compulsory military service can provide the army with trained reserves and expand the social framework of military formations; and the army as a whole will become a copy of society and will be made stronger as an army of the people. 

THE MILITARY AS AN ENGINE OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The conviction that a "radical reorganization and democratization" of the armed forces was critically necessary to the continued survival of the revolution was only one outcome of Moscow's revised thinking about Third World military elites after the Ghana debacle. Another result was the gradual emergence of the view -- which seems to have acquired the backing of most of the top policy-making Soviet leadership -- that the tortuous voyage along the "non-capitalist path" might well entail a lengthy period of military tutelage, with "democratic army circles" steering the ship of state while the socio-economic ground for a successful transition to socialism matured. For if the events in Ghana forced the Soviets to take heed of what unfettered reactionary elements in the military fold could destroy, they also provided the occasion for a new look at what progressive elements in that same fold could achieve. Egypt's Nasser and Burma's Ne Win, it is true, had already been in power for a number of years,
and both had long enjoyed Soviet esteem as two of the Third World's most radical leaders. But it was not until after the coup that the Soviets began to appreciate the significance of these men as military officers, and to think of the governments they headed as military regimes.

The notion that military stewardship might be the only answer to the instability plaguing many of the "socialist-oriented" countries, however, was adopted with not a few misgivings, for it did no little violence to the belief, consecrated by a half-century of dogmatic reiteration, in the primacy of the party as the "vanguard" of the revolution. Thus, for a time after the Ghana coup, the Soviet leadership's position on this issue was somewhat ambivalent. "The character of any social movement," asserted an authoritative Izvestiya article in January 1967, is determined not by who leads it, but by what the objective result of its development is and by what the purposes it objectively serves are. The military flavor of a given regime, in other words, was less important than its political orientation; and yet the article states just a few paragraphs later that "military leaders who have come to power thanks to the army are beginning to understand that the army ... cannot take the place of a party as the guiding force of society."

On balance, however, the article came down on the military's side. Although it praised attempts which it claimed were being made to create "vanguard parties" which would "unite within their ranks the forces ... most devoted
to the cause of the revolution," it was revealingly silent about where such efforts were underway, and conceded that "this process is for the time being proceeding slowly, and efforts to hasten it are still very timid." As if to underscore the difficulties involved, the words of a perennial favorite revolutionary democrat, General Ne Win, were adduced: "the Burmese Socialist Program Party...which is to become the political leader of the people, is nevertheless unprepared, despite the four years of its existence, to perform the leadership role." 51

In the final analysis, then, the most that could be demanded of these regimes was the leavening presence of some sort of progressive political organization, whose role would be to help the military rulers keep sight of the goals of the revolution and the "interests of the popular masses." A genuine vanguard party capable of taking charge of the social revolution must await the long-term future; until then, the military must fill the vacuum as guardians of the revolution. 52

When a series of military coups in the late 1960s and early 1970s brought uniformed revolutionary democrats to power in several countries -- including for the first time in
Latin America outside of Cuba* -- this belief hardened into certainty, as can be seen from a number of changes in the way Soviet publitsistify -- that is, apologists for and disseminators of the Party line -- wrote about progressive military regimes.

For one thing, the problem of creating vanguard parties was shelved, and no longer even mentioned by such writers. Nor, for that matter, did the vast majority of Soviet scholars -- with one notable exception, the significance of which will be discussed below -- give the subject anything resembling the sort of attention it would have commanded had the leadership regarded it as really important. As late as 1976, in fact, an editorial in the Institute of Orientology's journal detailing the research tasks assigned to Soviet Third World scholars by the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress had nothing at all to say about it, directly or otherwise.53

Secondly, the positive aspects of military rule were discussed much more frankly, and defenses of it became much less elliptical. "The establishment of military regimes has been typical of many socialist-oriented countries," said a

*General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr seized power in Iraq in July 1968; Major Marien Ngouabi did so in the Congo (Brazzaville) -- since renamed Congo People's Republic -- the following month; General Juan Velasco Alvarado deposed the Peruvian president in October 1968; Major General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in Somalia a year later, and Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Mathieu Kerekou in Dahomey -- now People's Republic of Benin -- three years after that. And in 1974, a military junta headed by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam toppled the centuries-old Ethiopian monarchy.
military writer in 1974. On the one hand, "this has had a negative effect" on the course of the revolution, since it "has objectively retarded the democratization of public life," "hampered the formation of political parties," and "shackled the initiative and activity of the popular masses." But on the other hand, he added, the "rise of such regimes ... has become an objective necessity" because "political, social-class and national institutions have remained weak in the face of a strong domestic and foreign reaction."54

More, indeed, than just a necessary evil, the military came to be viewed as an effective vehicle for launching and developing revolutions. "In contrast to the past, when military coups as a rule...possessed an openly-expressed anti-popular bent," said a spokesman for the Soviet Armed Forces Main Political Administration in 1975, "in the current situation they can ... serve the purposes of the struggle against reactionary regimes." Reflecting the "discontent of the broad popular masses with the proimperialist policy of the ruling classes," the initiatives of patriotic and democratic army circles "can accelerate the course of revolutionary development," making these circles one of "driving forces of national liberation revolutions." Another Soviet writer averred in 1974 that the army's role of "vanguard of the nation" -- a revealing choice of words -- "is not infrequently expressed in its performing not only military, political and administrative-police functions, but also important national-
economic, ideological and educational functions." Particularly if it has an insurgent background, the army "ordinarily participates in all mass campaigns of economic importance ... pioneers many cultural undertakings" and "manages 'model farms'" that are also used to "educate cadres needed by the country." All these "essential social functions," this writer concluded,

ennoble the army even more in the eyes of the population and contribute to the strengthening of its political influence and control over the masses. In many cases this turns the army into a more effective means than the civilian bureaucracy of linking the elite with the masses. What is more, the " politicization" of the army, its relative numerical strength, effectiveness and discipline make it a political organization of sorts. This is why military regimes often make do without mass political organizations....

These views, all expressed by current or former spokes-
men for the Soviet military establishment, were echoed by
writers who may be presumed to have been speaking for the
CPSU leadership as a whole. "New forms of statehood are
arising," wrote R.A. Ul'yanovskiy in 1977, "with the armed
forces taking a leadership role in [progressive] social
development." Although in time such regimes "acquire a con-
stitutional civilian form," the "'controlling shares of
power' still remain for a long time in the hands of the
ruling military group." Hence the "curious phenomenon" of
"antiimperialist bonapartism headed by the military intelli-
gentsia," which "assumes the role of hegemonic political
force" in the young nation-states. "There can be no doubt,"
Ul'yanovskiy pointedly concluded, that

national revolutionary military figures who have come to
power...to liquidate a feudal order and open the road to
social progress are helped in every possible way by the
socialist world, which not only gives them foreign
policy support, but also serves as a convincing demon-
stration of the role and importance of a revolutionary
dictatorship in the period of transition to a society of
social progress. 59

Implications for Military Ties

The realization that the future of the revolution "to a
large extent depends on the [political] position of the
army" 60, and the resulting belief that protracted military
rule may be the only answer to the instability afflicting
many revolutionary-democratic regimes appear to have affected
Soviet relations with Third World military elites in at least
two ways.

First, the importance Moscow attaches to direct ties
with these elites has risen, of which perhaps the clearest
outward sign is the Soviet Defense Minister's practice --
inaugurated two years after the Ghana coup -- of sending his
opposite number in most of the "socialist-oriented" countries
an annual congratulatory message (usually printed on the
front page of Red Star) on the occasion of the latter's Armed
Forces anniversary. Algeria, Egypt and Syria began receiving

This practice attests to the Soviet conviction that the armed forces of the Third World have become a critically important focus of East-West competition for influence. "The military-economic potential of the developing states is so weak," wrote a high-ranking reserve officer in 1974, "that their armies depend in full measure on the military-economic potential of the capitalist or the socialist states." And it was "on this very basis," he added, that "an acute and fundamental struggle" was underway between "the forces of progress and the forces of reaction" within the developing countries, and between "the forces of imperialism...and the forces of socialism" in the international arena.62

Second, the complex of political purposes that Soviet military aid is designed to serve has expanded. Until the mid-1960s, the central concern was to improve the "defense capability" of client armies, a concern which tallied with the conviction that only outside armed aggression by the imperialists or their "puppets" posed a real threat to progressive regimes. Thus, in early 1965 a Red Star commentator spoke of the imperialists' "criminal plans" to use "Asians to fight against Asians and Africans against Africans," and Latin American armies "for aggression against
But thanks to the military assistance of the socialist commonwealth, the new nations could "strengthen their defense capability" and create armed forces "that protect the independence they have won."\(^6\)

The events in Ghana, however, showed that the defense of progressive regimes was "not just limited to the purely military sphere, but...directly tied to the solution of a whole series of exceptionally important moral-political problems."

It is impossible not to see that no military organization, armament or combat equipment whatever can by themselves ensure the execution of the tasks lying before the young armies if soldiers and officers have no clear or well-defined conception of their obligations in the defense of [their country's] independence...and are unprepared to resolutely rebuff, if necessary, the intrigues of imperialism and internal reaction.\(^4\)

The purpose of Soviet aid, then, is no longer merely to enable the young nations to "completely overcome the heritage of colonialism in the military sphere," but also to "place their armies at the service of national interests as an instrument of progressive social development."\(^5\)

In practical terms, this means that the training of personnel and the "replenishment of the officer corps with progressive elements, particularly persons who have graduated from military educational establishments in the socialist countries," has become decisively important in the Soviet military aid program, for "the stability of the national
democratic system depends to a large extent on the success of this work."66 "It is becoming increasingly obvious," in the words of another commentator,

that the problem of training officer cadres of all ranks for the national armies of the developing states ... presents the main problem....

The training of cadres of military specialists of all types...is of fundamental military-political importance, and because of this a critical struggle is unfolding both in government circles and in the armies of these states, for this is a question not only of combat capability, but also of the army's future, its political orientation and its social role.67

THE SKEPTICS

A few Soviet scholars, however, look upon military tutelage as a long-term evil -- an ultimate dead end for the revolution -- and in so doing have raised basic questions about the support Moscow has invested in recent years in left-wing military regimes.

The standard-bearer of these skeptics is Georgiy Mirskiy, a Third-World specialist at the Soviet Academy of Sciences' World Economy and International Relations Institute (IMEMO) whom we earlier met as an advocate of doctrinal revision in the early 1960s.68 Since 1968, when he published an article on the "Political Role of the Army in the Countries of Asia and Africa,"69 he has expressed grave doubts about the progressive potential of Third World military establishments in general, and revolutionary-democratic military
regimes in particular. In 1970 he published The first full-length treatment of the topic in Soviet scholarship, following this with another six years later. Since all three publications follow basically the same line of argument, they may be considered here as a whole.

Mirskiy makes two main points to support his thesis. The first is that "progressive" military takeovers are infrequent, exceptional occurrences. As a rule, he argues, coups are carried out by senior armed forces commanders, officers who "have been brought up in a pro-Western, conservative bourgeois spirit," and aim only to rescue the existing order from "threats to the status quo under which they were a privileged stratum." The odds against radical middle-ranking or junior officers attempting to seize power, on the other hand, are very high, for not only must they remove the government, but their own high command as well. The deaths of many organizers of such attempts, Mirskiy observes, "eloquently attest that officers who have come out not just against the government but also the high command can expect no mercy" if they fail.

Secondly, in the unlikely event that radical officers of any rank do succeed in seizing power, their willingness to carry through really fundamental changes in the existing social order is doubtful. Not only are they members of an elite social group; they also have corporate interests.
which they feel impelled to protect. Both of these factors have a dampening effect on revolutionary ardor which very few military officers can resist. Thus, although the military are capable of playing a progressive role during the fight for national independence, "conservative, antidemocratic tendencies, conditioned by their ... corporate interests" become apparent among some officers when the time comes for the "profound social revolution." Thus, "to consider the army as the leading force of the anticapitalist revolution and as the leader of society in the socialist-oriented countries would be a serious error."76

To commit this error, Mirskiy strongly suggests, is to play into the hands of the imperialists, who "reckon that the corporate interests of the privileged military elite will make it an opponent of radical trends, and that ties with foreign capital...will hamper the influence of world socialism."77 Only a "vanguard party that upholds the positions of scientific socialism," Mirskiy concludes, "will ensure genuinely democratic, progressive development."78

Mirskiy is not, to be sure, the only Soviet writer to have observed flaws which are peculiar to revolutionary-democratic military regimes.79 But unlike his colleagues, Mirskiy is alone in his unrelieved pessimism. "The very nature of economically backward countries" he asserts in his 1970 monograph, "promotes the conversion of a professional
army into a bureaucratic corporation with conservative views. Nor, in his opinion, are the prospects for creating a vanguard party -- the only agency capable of preventing this -- any brighter, as he made clear during a 1977 conference on the political role of the military in Latin America. Speaking on "the lessons of Peru" -- where as the result of a change in the military government in 1975 the revolution began to "tilt" in a decidedly conservative direction -- Mirski y stated that the development of events there was "extremely distressing" to those "who had hoped that a force had finally appeared which even in the absence of a mass communist party and of a powerful people's movement" could "determine a progressive path of development with an orientation on socialism." But rather than offer solutions, Mirskiy spoke of a "vicious circle:" on the one hand, it was "perfectly clear" that without the army's support "it is today impossible to accomplish a revolution;" yet on the other, the military will not likely tolerate any force -- such as a vanguard party -- under whose influence the revolution might escape their control. "The way out of this vicious circle," said Mirskiy, "can be found only by answering the principal and most difficult question...how is the army to be influenced?" "No one," he concluded, "has until now been able to propose anything concrete." "Nor am I able," he added, "to offer any prescriptions."
Mirskiy's views have been greeted with considerable hostility by spokesmen and apologists for the policy-making establishment, for what is ultimately at stake is nothing less than the Soviet Union's heavy political and material investment in revolutionary-democratic military regimes. "G.I. Mirskiy paints a picture which is pessimistic in the extreme; what results is a downright hopeless situation," fumed B.G. Sapozhnikov, a conference participant, in a disjointed rebuttal that suggested he had been provoked into setting aside a prepared text. Mirskiy, he suggested, had all but abandoned ship because of "negative results," and "isolated failures of the revolutionary movement."84

A reviewer of Mirskiy's 1976 book was even more to the point in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, the ideological journal of the Army and Navy Main Political Administration. Mirskiy, he charged, had failed to highlight the "fundamental difference between progressive and reactionary military coups and the regimes established as a result of them." In "a number of instances" Mirskiy "either uses generalizing assessments on the irresolute, conservative character of the majority of military coups, or confines himself, as is obvious from the examples adduced in the book, to simply establishing the fact itself of a military coup...without penetrating to the essence of the given occurrence at all."85

Nor did Mirskiy's insistence on a vanguard party escape this reviewer's censure:
One also cannot accept without reservations the author's categorical assertion that it would be a serious error to regard the army as the leader of society in the socialist-oriented countries. In Burma, for instance, where a program of radical transformations was proclaimed as long ago as 1962, the army retains even today its leadership role in the state. In Somalia a vanguard party was established only in 1976, that is, almost six years after the proclamation of a socialist orientation [i.e. six years after embarking on the non-capitalist path]. Consequently, in concrete conditions there can be a relatively prolonged period during which leadership of the revolutionary process in this or that country can be exercised directly by revolutionary-democratic representatives of the armed forces.

But what seems to have annoyed the reviewer most about this "on the whole unsatisfactory book" was its implicit attack on Soviet military aid policy. In the concluding paragraphs of the review, for example, he condemned Mirskiy's treatment of "certain key questions of military development in the liberated countries" as "slipshod."

In the first place, it is bewildering that the author should state that many national states of Asia, Africa and Latin America "do not need an army at all as an instrument of defense against the external enemy" and that an army is necessary only as a "symbol of sovereignty." To put the question that way, whether the author wants to or not, is to cast doubt on the need to strengthen the defense capability of the young states in the face of colonialists who are armed to the teeth.... Noting the young states' difficulties in the realm of military development and dwelling in this connection on external sources of aid, the author stresses that without the latter "there is no other way to create national armed forces." But he says not one word about Soviet military supplies....
THE FUTURE OF MOSCOW'S INVESTMENT

That academic critics like Mirskiy are given the freedom to mount thinly-veiled attacks on the Kremlin's backing of tutelary military regimes is eloquent evidence of its greater willingness in recent years to permit what Jerry Hough has called "far-ranging public discussion of policy questions."

But there may be more to Mirskiy's freedom to criticize the policy-making establishment than just the sanction of relaxed censorship. For there is evidence to suggest that he has enjoyed the protection of a few in the leadership who themselves oppose Moscow's heavy investment in left-wing military regimes, and who are strong enough, if not to speak for themselves, then at least to provide him with opportunities to state his case beyond those normally available to other Third World scholars. In 1968, for example, he wrote that the example of the Egyptian revolution showed the army to be "capable of playing a progressive role" during "the struggle for independence and for the liquidation of feudal sway," but that during the "profound social revolution" which follows "conservative tendencies nearly always become apparent" in it, thereby promoting its "transformation into a bureaucratic corporation" that "strives to preserve its privileges" and "opposes radical social changes." Had this formulation appeared in a limited-circulation scholarly periodical such as Narody Azii i Afriki or Latinskaya Amerika, it would
have escaped the attention of all but a small circle of specialists; but it appeared instead in Kommunist, the Central Committee's mass-circulation (600,000-700,000 copies) ideological journal, the Party leadership's principal means of disseminating its views on "theoretical" questions to the rank and file.93

The unusually large printing of Mirskiy's "Tretiy mir: obshchestvo, vlast', armiya is equally suggestive. Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," which issued the book, is the Soviet Union's chief publisher of scholarly treatises on Third World subjects.94 In a typical press run, "Nauka" prints between 1,000 and 5,000 copies of such titles.95 Mirskiy's earlier book on the army and politics, Armiya i politika v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh, was issued in 4,000 copies. "Tretiy mir," however, was favored with a press run more than three times as large -- 13,000 copies.

Effect of Recent Developments

Ultimately, of course, the criticism of scholars like Mirskiy, or of a minority faction in the Politburo, will not have a major impact on Soviet policy unless events themselves are seen to strengthen the critics' opposition. And in fact there is evidence to suggest that their opposition has recently been bolstered, perhaps because of the sudden volte-face of Siad Barre, until 1977 one of the most staunchly pro-Soviet of Third World military rulers. This may well account
for the return in late 1977 -- after an absence of several years -- of an emphasis on the need for vanguard parties in the popular press and in other texts which may be presumed to bear the Soviet Government's imprimatur.

Thus, a recent book on war and the armed forces, signed to press in November 1977 and recommended as a "textbook for the Marxist-Leninist schooling" of Soviet military officers, notes that the army "can play an active role" in overthrowing reactionary regimes and in "creating favorable political conditions for the manifestation of the popular masses' revolutionary creative work," but "is not capable of playing the role of an advanced, conscious and organized vanguard of the working class", or of performing the mission of "political and ideological leader of the working class and its allies." An April 1978 article in Red Star echoes this theme. "Life itself suggests the need ... to strengthen or create vanguard parties" in countries under progressive military rule, writes the author, who had himself attacked Mirskiy less than two years earlier for insisting on this very same point. The "military methods of rule" employed in "a number of countries" with "patriotic military regimes" are "a substantial hindrance," he adds, "even though it is perfectly obvious that the army alone cannot substitute for the state's democratic institutions." The theme has also been picked up by the Soviet broadcast media. "What must guarantee the formation of a people's
army?" asked Radio Moscow in an English-language commentary beamed to Africa in April 1978. The answer might have been written by Mirskiy himself: a "vanguard party that expresses the interests of the masses of people and adheres to scientific socialism. This party alone can turn the army into a genuine people's army...."99

Old Wine in New Bottles

When all is said and done, however, the facts of political life in the developing world will probably discourage any really fundamental change in the Soviet approach to revolutionary-democratic military regimes. For all their recent talk of vanguard parties, the Soviets remain profoundly aware that the "army occupies a special place in the liberated countries"100 and that it often "plays a decisive role in political transformations and in the formation and conduct of state policy."101 Nor is Moscow likely to have forgotten that much of its success in courting these armies has resulted as much from its willingness to defer to their claim to pride of place in the revolutionary process as it has from its support of their revolutionary goals. If it now insists too loudly, after years of silence, on the primacy of the party in that process it might well invite their resentment for seeming to cast doubt on their revolutionary credentials. Surely the Soviets have at least this much in mind when they concede, as they still do, that the problems involved in
setting up vanguard parties are "complex" and that "time is not infrequently required for their solution." 102

We much not be misled, then, into taking Soviet calls for the "purposeful political leadership ... of a vanguard revolutionary party" 103 as more than a reaffirmation of first principles whose realization, however desirable, must await the more or less long-term future. For the present, it is clear that the Soviets are willing to live with something short of this ideal:

It is true that in the socialist-oriented countries there are contradictions between the social and political aspects of democracy. But the main criterion of democracy is not the number of parties, or the holding of elections, or the presence or absence of representative institutions... The main criterion [is] ...: who is served by this or that form of democracy or this or that regime -- the exploiter minority or the working majority....In the socialist-oriented countries the state authority and revolutionary-democratic parties are conducting a policy which accords with the interests of the majority and are establishing the preconditions for the future building of a socialist society. This is why the national-democratic regime is a democratic regime, even though it sometimes resorts to military or quasi-military methods of governing, [methods] which are most often occasioned by the acuteness of the class struggle and by the striving of internal reaction and international imperialism to push the liberated peoples off the socialist-oriented path. 104

CONCLUSIONS

In most of the countries of the developing world, the professional soldier has long played a vital role in domestic political affairs. In Latin America the armed forces have vied for power with civilian politicians for well over a
century and a half, and in Africa and Asia for more than a generation. More often than not, politicians are not in the running at all, and the struggle for national leadership is waged entirely within the military establishment itself.

Until little more than a decade ago, Soviet ignorance of these processes was profound. The army, it was held (in classic Marxist fashion), was merely an instrument of the ruling classes, acting on their behalf. That it could play an independent and often decisive part in shaping the destinies of backward countries was consequently thought impossible. In fact, the subject of the army's role in society was rarely discussed at all.

The overthrow of Ghana's Nkrumah -- a "progressive" civilian ruler -- by a "reactionary" military junta therefore came as something of a shock to the Soviet government, deprived as it had been of any advice, sound or otherwise, on how to defend revolutionary gains from the depredations of professional soldiers. The fall of Nkrumah led to a substantial reevaluation of Soviet views of Third World political processes, a reevaluation which profoundly affected Soviet attitudes toward and relations with the Third World's armed forces.

The armed forces became in Soviet eyes the center of a critical struggle between progressive and reactionary ideologies, a struggle whose outcome could be of decisive consequence to a nation's political, social and economic future.
Later, as radical officers seized power in a number of countries, Soviet hopes came to rest on left-wing military rule not only for the political stability it seemed to guarantee, but also for the momentum it seemed to impart to the revolutionary process. Military stewardship came to be viewed as an often inevitable stage along the path to a socialist order.

The exact role that this change in outlook has played in increasing Soviet military aid levels to Third World countries in the last decade cannot be determined without further research. But it is certain from the evidence of Soviet writings that the relative importance of military cooperation as an instrument of policy has grown in the measure that Third World military elites have become a leading focus of Soviet attention. Neither the warnings of those who insist on the dangers of prolonged military rule, nor the seeming confirmation of these warnings in the recent defection of Somalia from the fraternity of socialist-oriented countries, are likely to make for significant changes in this state of affairs as long as the Soviets remain persuaded that soldiers play a decisive role in the domestic affairs of Third World countries.

None of this augurs well for current American efforts to limit the international arms trade with the developing nations, for Moscow's dealings with these nations' military establishments are governed in considerable measure by con-
siderations having little or nothing to do with the behavior of Western suppliers, and a lot to do with the political stability of client regimes. In the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks now underway, the Soviets accordingly seem less interested in the sorts of blanket restrictions the U.S. would like to impose than in gaining legal enshrinement of their own military aid practices. Hence their insistence that "the aggressor and the victim of aggression cannot be put on the same level,"\textsuperscript{105} and that "rational and precise political and international legal criteria must be elaborated which would define the situations in which, and the recipients to which, arms deliveries are justified and permissible, and those in which they should be prohibited or sharply restricted."\textsuperscript{106} If the record of their public statements is any indication, the Soviets have not budged from this position since the CAT talks began in December 1977,\textsuperscript{107} and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
NOTES


3. For an authoritative view on the "national bourgeoisie" in the early 1960s, see Boris Ponomarev, "O gosudarstve natsional'noy demokratii," Kommunist, no. 8, May 1961, pp 33-48.


12. In the Central African case, for instance, the army had been "forced to reckon with the sentiments of the masses in order to avoid falling by the board of political life along with the corrupt leadership clique." Ibid.


14. The sense of alarm aroused in Moscow by the coup is difficult to exaggerate. The events in Ghana, said Vladimir Kudryavtsev eleven days after the coup, were not a "purely domestic affair," for the coup was "directed against all independent Africa and against the national-liberation struggle." The fate of Ghana, he continued, "is closely tied to the fate of the entire African continent," and particularly (or so he implied by referring to Egypt, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania) with that of other revolutionary-democratic regimes. But even in those countries which remained in the thrall of the "neocolonialist hypnosis," claimed Kudryavtsev, the "broad public" was "alarmed at the events in Ghana." See "Nakal bor'by v Afrike," Izvestiya, March 6, 1966, p 3.


18. Iskenderov, Starushenko, "Proiski imperializma v Afrike."

19. Iskenderov, "Armiya, politika, narod."

20. V. Vasil'ev, "Armiya i sotsial'nyy progress," Aziya i Afrika segodnya (henceforward AAS), no. 9, September 1966, p 5. It was no accident, indeed, that the year
that followed the Ghana coup witnessed an outpouring of treatments of the military's role in Third World societies that was altogether unprecedented in Soviet scholarship on the developing areas. Within twelve months of the coup, the following articles, devoted wholly or partly to a discussion of that role, had appeared in Soviet newspapers and periodicals: T. Kolesnichenko, "Armiya i politika," Pravda, November 2, 1966, p 5; A. Iskenderov, G. Starushenko, "Proiski imperializma v Afrike;" A. Iskenderov, "Armiya, politika, narod;" K. Brutents, "Afrikanskaya revolyutsiya: zavoevaniya i problemy;" V. Vasil'ev, "Armiya i sotsial'nyy progress;" V. Kudryavtsev, "Nakal bor'by v Afrike;" Lutfi el-Kholi, "Antiimperialisticheskaya bor'ba v Afrike na sovremennom etape," Problemy mira i sotsializma, no. 1, January 1967, pp 11-19; "Soldat v nezavisimoy Afrike," AAS, no. 9, September 1966, p 8-9; "Armiya i osvoboditel'noye dvizheniye," ibid., pp 2-4. In addition, a special session of the seminar on "Africa -- national and social revolution," held in Cairo in late October 1966 and sponsored jointly by Problemy mira i sotsializma and At-Talia (the Egyptian communist organ) was devoted to "The Role of the Army in African Political Life" (see Problemy mira i sotsializma, no. 1, January 1967, pp 59-60). The conference venue, ironically, had been moved from Accra to Cairo because of the coup. See Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp 278-279.

21. Iskenderov, "Armiya, politika, narod."
22. Ibid.
23. Kolesnichenko, "Armiya i politika."
24. Iskenderov, "Armiya, politika, narod."
25. Kolesnichenko, "Armiya i politika."
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Iskenderov, "Armiya, politika, narod."
30. Lutfi el-Kholi, "Antiimperialisticheskaya bor'ba v Afrike na sovremennom etape," p 17. El-Kholi, a pro-
Moscow Egyptian communist, was the editor-in-chief of At-Talia. A plot to overthrow Egypt's President Nasser, uncovered after the Six-Day War and headed by Nasser's own Vice President, Field Marshal Abdal Hakim Amer (who together with Nasser had been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in 1964), showed that threats to progressive development might issue even from revolutionary democrats who had fallen by the wayside. "It would be wrong," wrote Karen Brutents in 1968, "to believe that political evolution is possible in only one — a progressive -- direction for all who now are in the ranks of revolutionary democracy. This is far from being so, if one takes account of the heterogeneity of the forces formerly gathered in the revolutionary democrats' political boat as well as their socially-conditioned [i.e. petty-bourgeois] inclination to political vacillation, which can engender serious zigzags even in those who become radicalized." See "O revolyutsionnoy demokratii," MEiMO, no. 4, April 1968, p 27.

32. Iskenderov, "Armiya, politika, narod."
34. Dolgopolov, "Rozhdennye v bor'be za nezavisimost.'"

39. Dolgopolov, "Vooruzhennye sily razvivayushchikhsya stran."


43. Ibid., p 26.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p 27.


47. Ibid., p 453.

48. Iskenderov, "Armiya, politika, narod." The article is introduced by the following words, set off from the text and apparently supplied by Izvestiya's editorial board: "The fact that recently the army has found itself in the forefront of political events in many of the young national states of Asia and Africa has brought out a number of problems whose theoretical elaboration is acquiring great practical import—ance for the elaboration of ways, forms and methods of uniting progressive forces in the struggle against imperialist and internal reaction and for social progress. Among them in particular belong questions concerning the role and place of the army in the national—liberation movement, its influence on the political life of the developing countries, and the importance of the struggle of the popular masses and their organizations."

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.

52. The article concluded with a call for something more modest than a vanguard party: "It would be wrong to generalize from the experience of one or a few countries and mechanically transfer it to other countries. But regardless of how the masses are organized politically, the main thing is that building a new society is impossible if the popular masses do not take an active part. As the experience of the UAR, Burma, Algeria, Syria [all of them military regimes] and some other countries attests, the army has an important role to play in the national liberation movement .... But [it] .... will not be able to perform its mission unless it serves the interests of the people, correctly determines its place in society, and sensibly assesses its potentialities in directing the complex processes of the economic, social and political development of the liberated states." Ibid.

53. "XXV s'ezd KPSS i zadachi sovetskikh vostokovedov i afrikanistov," NAA, no. 5, September-October 1976, pp 3-14. Although the concept of vanguard parties "has entered the scientific terminology of research devoted to revolutionary-democratic parties," allowed G.I. Shitarev in 1976, "[its] content...is still being defined in the most general way....So far, the vanguard party is emerging only as a potentiality, as a problem of the more or less remote future; and the question of what the distinction between it and existing organizations consists in is being broached more on the theoretical plane than at the concrete political level." Shitarev's ideas of what a vanguard party should be are of interest. First, it must have "a clear goal -- socialism," and "know the laws of social development;" second, scientific socialism must be "the ideological basis" of its activity, with only minor "deviations" on "nonessential theoretical points;" third, it must enjoy paramountcy "over all other mass unions," organizationally as well as ideologically; fourth, it must "represent the progressive classes and social groups" of the country; fifth, its membership must be restricted to those who are "capable of assuming all the obligations which belonging to the vanguard detachment of society entails;" and finally, it must combine "in all its internal life democracy with centralism, personal initiative with firm discipline..., with the obligatory subordination of the minority to the majority, and of the lower organizations to the higher ones." (G.I. Shitarev, "Nekotorye problemy
evolyutsii revolyutsionno-demokraticheskikh organizatsiy v napravlenii partii avangarda," NAA, no. 2, March-April 1976, p 39.)


57. Sumbatyan and Dolgopolov are both Soviet Army colonels, and both have Candidate degrees in "Philosophical Sciences" -- that is, Marxism-Leninism -- which suggests they are representatives of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Administration, the CPSU Central Committee's arm in the Soviet military. Sumbatyan is assigned to the V.V. Kuybyshev Military Engineering Academy in Moscow. Dolgopolov is a frequent contributor to Krasnaya zvezda and Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (the Main Political Administration's Ideological journal) on Third World armies. (Some of Dolgopolov's articles in the latter periodical are explicitly addressed "to leaders of political study groups" in the Armed Forces, which is further testimony to his association with the Main Political Administration: see his "Razvivayushchiesya strany Azii, Afriki i Latinskoy Ameriki," KVS, no. 16, August 1973, pp 72-79, which outlines a course of instruction to be conducted by "propagandists" -- political officers -- for the edification of Soviet military personnel on Moscow's policy in the developing world.) Sumbatyan may well be a purveyor of the "party line" at the Military Engineering Academy to Soviet officers destined for advisory duties in Third World armies.

Sapozhnikov, now a major general in the Reserves, has had an association with the Main Political Administration which dates back to 1935, when he was graduated from the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy, the institution charged with training political officers for the Armed Forces. He returned as an instructor in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and in the early 1950s taught at the Frunze Military Academy (1941) and the General Staff Academy (1951). After retiring from the Soviet Army in 1958, he joined the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Orientalology. (S.D. Miliband, Bibliograficheskiy slovar'
58. Rostislav Aleksandrovich Ul'yanovskiy was until recently a deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, which is headed by Politburo Candidate Member and Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev. (Ul'yanovskiy's departure from that position may have something to do with his advanced age — 73 years in 1977.) The International Department is responsible, among other things, for relations with non-ruling communist parties and ruling revolutionary-democratic parties. For a discussion of the International Department, see Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," International Journal, vol. XXXII, no. 1, Winter 1976-1977, pp 41-55.


61. I am indebted to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service for this information.


64. Dolgopolov, "Armii osvobodivshikhya stran."


68. A capsule career biography of Mirskiy appears in Bibliograficheskiy slovar' sovetskikh vostokovedov, pp 361-362, 666.

70. Armiya i politika v stranakh Azii i Afriki, 349 pp.


72. "Tretiy mir," p 170. See also "Politicheskaya rol','" p 8; Armiya i politika, p 300.


74. Ibid., pp 172-173; see also "Politicheskaya rol','" p 9; Armiya i politika, pp 301-302.

75. "Nowhere," Mirskiy avers, "have the military resorted to a coup because they believed themselves to be a deprived or discriminated-against social group." "Tretiy mir," p 66.

76. Ibid., p 385; see also Armiya i politika, p 336. Emphasis mine.

77. Ibid., p 378.

78. Ibid., p 385; see also Armiya i politika, p 336.


80. Armiya i politika, p 334; see also "Tretiy mir", p 378. Compare Sevortyan's views: "Military bureaucratic rule," he wrote in 1970, "is a frequent trait of army governments," but is only "a temporary phase in the life of a young state;" for there are "a number of circumstances" that "force the military to define their class orientation" and "dictate" a transition to "a new political system" based on mass political support. Among the "circumstances" Sevortyan lists are (1) the military's experience under previous governments, which "graphically showed that, devoid of mass support, they were doomed to failure;" (2) the new functions that the military must perform upon seizing political power -- "func-
tions which are far from peculiar to them"; and (3) the military's knowledge "from their own experience" of "the strength and importance of ideology."
"Armiya i obshchestvo v molodom gosudarstve," pp. 105-106. Much the same point is made with reference to the Egyptian revolution in Svertyan's Armiya v politicheskom rezhime stran sovremennogo Vostoka:
"The experience of the Egyptian revolution shows that the moment comes when ... the military leaders arrive at an understanding of the limitations of military dictatorial methods of governing, and of the need for a transition to a new political organization of society." (p. 130.)


83. Ibid., pp 70-71.

84. Ibid., pp 74-75. The conference chairman, A.F. Shul'govskiy, Director of the Latin America Institute's Department of Socio-Political Problems, also criticized Mirskiy's emphasis on the "corporate character" of the military. "I do not deny any importance to the investigation of questions connected with the corporate-mindedness, elitism, and militarism which occur in the armed forces," said Shul'govskiy, whom Sapozhnikov had earlier commended for his "optimistic" keynote report. "But it is my profound conviction that the study of these elements is not at this point in time the most fruitful or promising [research] activity, above all for the struggle of progressive forces for the army." Ibid., no. 4, July-August 1977, p 148.


86. Ibid., p 92. Emphasis mine. While not of itself heretical -- no Soviet writer has ever claimed that the actual transition to socialism can be effected without a vanguard party -- Mirskiy's point is that military rule is also incompatible with non-capitalist development, or the period of anticapitalist measures that paves the way for that transition.

87. Ibid.
89. See ibid., p 366.
94. The publishing house's Main Editorial Office of Eastern Literature (Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury) oversees the publication of studies dealing with the developing countries.
95. In a sampling by the author of 27 titles, published between 1967 and 1977 and dealing with general Third World problems, the mean press run was 3,300 copies. Press runs of 5,000 copies or less accounted for 93 percent of the sample. None of the titles was issued in more than 6,300 copies.
97. See above, p 30.
100. *Voyna i armiya*, p 328.
101. Ibid., p 326.


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