STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

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SALT AND THE REALITY OF DETENTE

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SALT AND THE REALITY OF DETENTE

Student research report

MAJOR JOHN H. LOBINGIER
March 1975
FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of Phase III Training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government, Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.

RICHARD P. KELLY
TC, MI
Commander
SUMMARY

This paper examines the current status of the Moscow — Washington Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and their significance within the overall framework of detente and Soviet ideology. The conclusion reached in this study is that the United States is in danger of weakening its nuclear weapons posture as a result of accepting a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the USSR in the SALT negotiations. In our eagerness to secure an arms control agreement we are ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union is and will remain inherently hostile to the United States; a fact that is quite evident from their ideological statements as well as from their manipulation of detente. Thus, by the acceptance of this weakened posture (as this paper will show), the United States could conceivably be subjected to Soviet nuclear blackmail. The purpose of this paper is to present a realistic appraisal of SALT and detente in light of Soviet ideology.
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The crux is that the US believes only what it wants to believe. Is the opponent (i.e., the USSR) really speaking of detente and peaceful coexistence? The US believes this so nobody pays attention to Soviet pronouncements of world revolution and world conquest. Furthermore, this process is being reinforced by the mass media to the point of collective narcosis and general delusion.

The Cold War is not dead; it is more dangerous now than it was years ago.

The above quote clearly expresses a danger that has become extremely serious in this age of detente -- namely, that the euphoria produced by detente is very likely to back the United States and the rest of the Free World into an indefensible position from which there can be no retreat. Specifically, I am referring to the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in which the Soviets presently have a distinct advantage, in spite of our own assurances to the contrary. The danger lies in the fact that this advantage could conceivably be expanded to the point of effectively neutralizing our retaliatory capability against a Soviet nuclear attack thus rendering us vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. With this achieved we would be forced to concede to Soviet hegemony in the world political arena, and especially in Western Europe. This danger is obscured by the fact that the Soviets are seemingly just as sincere as we are in their desire to prevent a nuclear holocaust for they know that with our current capabilities they would lose just as
much as we would in the event of a thermonuclear war. However, if our retaliatory force were effectively neutralized to the point that they did not have to fear our retaliation then they would indeed have a very powerful club, since their threatened use of nuclear weapons would be as effective as their actual employment.

It is my contention in this thesis that the United States is now faced with this very real danger as a result of our good faith in the SALT negotiations, and I shall try to prove my thesis not only through an examination of the strategic nuclear postures of both countries in light of SALT, but also via an examination of Soviet ideological attitudes toward detente. There it must be added that although ideology is a very flexible instrument in Soviet hands, it nevertheless gives an indication of Russian intentions in the sphere of power politics, and it would indeed be foolhardy to assume otherwise since Marxism-Leninism is and always will be inimical towards the capitalist world, especially the United States.

As I hope to point out to the reader's satisfaction, there is a wide gulf between what we view as detente and peaceful coexistence and what the Soviets consider them to be, and that our naivete in perceiving this difference could be potentially damaging to the strength, security and international prestige of the United States. It is not my intention herein to advocate a return to isolationism or the Cold War or even
a withdrawal from negotiations with the Soviets all of which would be disastrous. My intention is rather to urge a more cautious and patient approach be adopted by the United States in our negotiations with the Soviets -- such a policy would go a long way toward preventing the kind of erosion in our nuclear posture that has resulted from SALT I and the Vladivostok Summit. If we continue to negotiate in haste and fail to understand the dangers inherent in Soviet attitudes then we may one day find ourselves faced with the very real threat of Soviet nuclear blackmail.
CHAPTER I

SALT I AND THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

Before beginning an analysis of the SALT I agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, it might be helpful first to briefly summarize exactly what was agreed upon. As is generally well known, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were begun in November 1969 in Helsinki, Finland. After almost three years of hard negotiating they produced their first formal agreements on May 26, 1972, which were subsequently signed in Moscow. Basically, there are three agreements: a treaty to limit the construction of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems; an interim agreement to put a limit on the number of offensive nuclear weapons; and a protocol defining the effect of this second agreement on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

According to the ABM treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union are each limited to two deployment areas, one site to protect its capitol and the other to protect intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites. Each area is limited to a 94-mile radius, with a center point at least 810 miles distant from the second site, and may contain up to 100 launchers each. Also each launcher must be both land-based and static and is permitted to fire only one ABM missile and warhead. The reason for these and other
restrictions (e.g., the size, number and use of radars) is
to limit the effective coverage of the ABM sites to relatively-
ly small sections of each nation, irrespective of any
qualitative increase in ABM missile capability. This ABM
treaty is unlimited in its duration and subject to review
every five years.

The agreements limiting the total number of ICBM and
SLBM launchers allowed to each side are structured around
the number of missiles operational or under construction as
of May 26, 1972, in the case of SLBM, and July 1st for ICBM.
Modernization and replacement are permitted provided that
no heavy ICBM (such as the Soviet SS-9) are deployed. Also,
those ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 may be exchanged
for a like number of new SLBM launchers.

In terms of strategic hardware SALT I can be translated
as follows. The United States is permitted to maintain its
total of 1,054 ICBM and 656 SLBM in 41 submarines. Out of
this total 54 Titan 2 ICBM may be exchanged in the future for
an equal number of SLBM (to be located on not more than three
new submarines), thus creating a new ratio of 1,000 ICBM and
710 SLBM (in 44 submarines). Additionally, the United States is
free to replace its Minuteman 1 and 2 ICBM and Polaris SLBM
with the newer Minuteman 3 and the Poseidon MIRV systems,
and to develop the new Trident SLBM system.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, may retain its 1,618 ICBM and 740 SLBM (located on 56 nuclear-powered submarines), plus build an additional 210 SLBM to replace those deployed prior to 1964. Overall, the Soviets are limited to 950 SLBM on 62 submarines, in addition to the above 1,618 ICBM.

Numerically speaking, SALT I gave the Russians an advantage of 858 total launchers over what the United States is permitted (2,568 vs 1,710). In addition, the Soviets are free to develop their MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) capacity since the SALT I agreements make no reference to warhead configuration. Also the Soviets are clearly in the lead in total deliverable megatonnage (MT); specifically, 11,400 MT vs. 2,400 MT for the United States -- figures include both ICBM and SLBM.²

As an offsetting factor, SALT I does not mention intercontinental bombers in which at that time the United States had a total of 455 strategic bombers compared with the Soviets 140 (of which then 100 were propeller driven).³ Also no agreement was reached for on-site verification of the treaty's provisions applicable to ABM deployment and the limitation of ICBM and SLBM; on-site verification has long been a subject abhorrent to the Soviets who prefer to rely on the use of "National technical means" for verification (e.g., high-resolution satellite photography).
During the summer of 1974 President Nixon and General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev held a summit meeting in Moscow
which had far-reaching implications for SALT as well as for
other areas of mutual interest to both the USA and USSR.
Basically three agreements were made in Moscow during this sum-
mit: 1) an agreement that both sides will forego the construc-
tion of the second ABM site authorized by the original SALT I
accord; 2) an agreement to limit underground nuclear testing
to weapons with a yield of not more than 150 KT (kiloton); and
finally 3) an agreement to begin negotiations on "environment-
mental warfare", e.g., climate modification for military
purposes. In addition, the "Joint Soviet-US Communiqué"
signed on July 3, 1974, called for the undertaking of renewed
efforts to limit strategic arms on both sides before the ex-
piration of the SALT I "Interim Agreement", which is due
to expire in 1977. The "Vladivostok Summit", between Pre-
sident Ford and Mr. Brezhnev, was held in November 1974 in
response to this call.

Bearing the above agreements in mind, we can now turn
to an analysis of these negotiations. Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, at a July 3, 1974, press conference, pre-
sented the following highlights on the then just concluded
Moscow Summit and how it affected the SALT I agreement. Re-
garding the ABM deployment Dr. Kissinger remarked, "The
United States and the Soviet Union have now decided to forego
that second ABM site and to maintain only the one ABM site
that each currently has which is Moscow for the Soviet Union,
and an ICBM field for the United States." Both sides still retain the option of moving their already established sites to the alternate positions if desired, however, once moved they cannot be shifted back again.

In regards to the second agreement (i.e., the setting of a 150 KT limit on the size of underground nuclear explosions), Dr. Kissinger commented that it will, "...have the tendency to concentrate competition in the ranges of the lower yield weapons." Concerning the third agreement on environmental warfare, the Secretary of State made it clear that this is an area which, "... can have profound consequences for the future of mankind. The United States and the Soviet Union, in the near future, will open discussions on this problem...".

In examining these agreements it must be mentioned that the Moscow Summit negotiations were carried out in complete secrecy"... at the request of the Soviet Union..."; needless to say, this atmosphere of secrecy further heightened the suspicion in the United States, especially among those critics who felt that we were in danger of once again being outmaneuvered by the Soviets. This agreement to negotiate in secrecy set a dangerous precedent that could become a standard precondition in all such future negotiations with the Soviets.

The Soviet leaders have no requirement to inform their people of their actions or policy, and it is one of the great flaws of detente as now being practiced that U.S. leaders across the whole spectrum of negotiations from trade to space are accepting the Soviet
dictums of strict secrecy and are abandoning without
a whim, the long-standing U.S. policies of an open
society.

In addition to the requirement for "closed door" negotia-
tions, the Moscow talks produced a clear division between
East and West regarding the concept of strategic parity;
the Soviet and American positions on this crucial point are
at wide variance and must be borne in mind when discussing
the separate points of the 1974 Moscow accord. As Mr. Paul
H. Nitze, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for SALT, stated in response to the Moscow Summit:

The U.S. delegation's position has been consistent
with that of the congressional resolution approving
the 1972 agreements. It has not called for strict
equality in every category of strategic arms but
has called for essential equivalence (emphasis added)
with respect to the overall mix of strategic offensive
systems.

The Soviet side has consistently used the term "equal
security with no unilateral advantage to either side".
In their explanations of this term, they insist that
"geographic and other considerations" must be taken
into account in determining what is equal security.
Among these considerations is their view that the USSR
is surrounded by hostile countries, including the NATO
countries and China, while the United States has on its
borders friendly countries -- Canada and Mexico. They
argue that they therefore need substantially larger
strategic forces than does the United States. They
do not consider it pertinent that the European NATO
countries have absolutely no interest in attacking the
Soviet Union, that one can see no interest that China
could have in attacking the Soviet Union, or that a
state overtly preaching a doctrine of general hegemony
is bound to find other nations looking to their defenses.

Bearing these two Soviet preconditions in mind (i.e.,
the need for secrecy and the insistence upon "equal security"),
let us now take a critical look at the first two agreements
to come out of the Moscow Summit (the third agreement on
environmental warfare has yet to be worked out). In regard to the decision to abandon the second ABM site, there is now general agreement that no side seriously envisioned the continued spending of vital defense funds for so little security in return. "The abandonment of the second ABM sites permitted under SALT I is another farce. The U.S. never intended to build its second site to defend Washington, and the Soviets had no interest in extending their obsolescent Galosh-Henhouse system to defend a single ICBM site." The duplicity in this approach is that the original necessity to develop multiple warhead missiles was predicated on the desire of both sides to overcome the other's ABM defenses; therefore, an extremely expensive arms race to develop MIRV apparently was begun solely to stockpile an excessive number of weapons. As Secretary Kissinger stated in his press conference of July 22, 1974, the original decision "explicit" in the 1972 SALT I agreement was precisely that neither side would maintain ABM defenses.

You must remember that the original impetus for the multiple warheads derived from the desire or the necessity to overcome ABM defenses and to make sure that the required number of missiles would get through.

In the absence of ABM defenses, the extraordinary number of foreseeable multiple warheads will create a situation in which such terms as superiority should not be lightly thrown around because they may be devoid of any operational meaning.

...For present purposes, I want to say that any idea that any country can easily achieve strategic superiority is almost devoid, under these conditions, of any operational significance and can only have a numerical significance.
Dr. Kissinger here makes the basic assumption that a numerical advantage has little if any operational significance. This logic obviously rules out the possibility of technological advancements, such as advanced MIRVing, which could effectively neutralize the other's strike capability, and hence have a very great operational significance -- this becomes all the more alarming when that side also possesses numerical superiority, such as the Soviets have been granted under SALT I and the 1974 Moscow accord. This will become even more apparent in Chapter II where the new Soviet SS-18 ICBM is discussed.

It would thus seem that we granted the Soviet Union numerical superiority in exchange for an agreement that neither side would be able to defend effectively against the missiles of the other, and as such is obviously to our disadvantage.

Turning now to an examination of the second treaty, Mr. Hotz, editor of the journal, "Aviation Week and Space Technology", declares, "The underground nuclear testing threshold agreement is a farce. It allows both sides to do all of the testing they need for MIRV warheads in the next two years (the treaty goes into effect in March 1976) and then sets the threshold ban so high it has little meaning". Furthermore, there are no verification procedures built into this agreement to keep each side from cheating (other than by the use of the aforementioned "national technical means"), nor is there any limitation put on the size of underground nuclear explosions carried out for purely "peaceful purposes".
This obvious loophole gives the Soviets a green light to
test any size nuclear device they desire, since first of all
they will never admit to having committed a violation of
the treaty, and secondly, it would be obviously impossible
for any verification means to distinguish between a peace-
ful nuclear explosion and a hostile one.

In summary, as a result of the 1972 SALT I agreements
and the 1974 Moscow Summit the following picture emerges
of the strategic nuclear posture of both the United States
and the Soviet Union. 1) In regard to ABM deployment both
sides' systems are admittedly inadequate to provide the
protection for which originally constructed, hence any
reliance on their effectiveness would be extremely dangerous.
By the same token, since ineffectiveness is desired, any
further expense to improve the capability of our system
seems totally unwarranted (provided, of course, the Soviets
do not improve theirs). 2) Concerning the limitations on
offensive nuclear weapons, the United States is at a dis-

tinct disadvantage numerically both in land-based ICBM and
SLBM, although possessing a decided advantage in the area of
long-range strategic bombers. However, as a result of the
Moscow Summit, the U.S. essentially bargained away this
advantage by agreeing to offset it by allowing the Soviets
a greater number of launchers. According to Dr. Kissinger,

After all, it was not the Soviet Union that made us
build bombers, that was our decision and therefore,
an attempt has been made to establish a correlation
between the number of MIRV missiles (on our side)
and the number of launchers (on the Soviet's side) in
which perhaps to some extent the larger number of
missiles on one side can be offset by a larger
number of MIRVs on the other.

This is an obviously fragile balance which could be quite
easily upset by a Soviet MIRV capability; in fact, Mr. Nitze
was one of the first to view this as the real danger. In
July of 1974 he recommended that the one and only way still
open to achieve our goal of essential equivalence in SALT
was to indeed stop the arms race before the Soviets could
gain any type of an effective deployed MIRV capability.

According to Mr. Nitze this could be done by providing —

...for a simple undertaking that neither side would
deploy or further test large MIRVed missiles. This
would cut off the further testing or deployment of
large Soviet MIRVed missiles but would also ban test-
ing or deployment of a large MIRVed follow-on missile
to the U.S. Minuteman and would, in my view, enhance
the security of both sides.

But, unfortunately, SALT I and the Moscow Summit proved
unable to limit the testing or deployment of MIRVed weapons
on either side. 3) The ban on underground nuclear testing
will be largely ineffective as a result of its delayed 1976
implementation date and the sanction given to "peaceful
explosions", which are not restricted by the provisions of
this treaty in regards to size and date of testing. 4) Lastly,
and perhaps most importantly, the Soviets continue to effec-
tively block any discussion of on-site verification of any
kind. Add to these four factors the Soviet insistence on
secret negotiations, plus their aim of negotiating toward a
goal of "equal security with no unilateral advantage to
either side" (they do not view their numerical superiority
in deliverable MTE is an advantage since they "need" these extra to defend themselves not only against the United States but also against NATO and China as well), and you have the United States entering into the Vladivostok negotiations with a very large handicap. As will be discussed in Chapter II, these talks succeeded in making our position vis-a-vis the USSR even worse.

It is interesting to note that this view of a weakened American position has been confirmed by the Soviets themselves in their open press; the following is an opinion that they expressed two months prior to the 1974 Moscow Summit:

The militarist circles in the U.S.A. today are engaged in the intensive search for a way out of the blind alley into which military strategy was led by the long years of the "positions of strength" policy and the speedup of the nuclear arms race. The militarists of the 1970's are pinning great hopes on recovering, if even only in the long run, the United States' lost strategic superiority (emphasis added) through the qualitative improvement of weapons and the elaboration of new parameters for their use in exerting pressure against the socialist countries. 19

Before turning our attention to the November summit between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev it must be reemphasized that the Soviets were greatly concerned about the U.S. MIRV capability and were not about in any way to agree to a curbing of their desire to match us in this field. In a February 1974 issue of "Pravda" they stated that "...if during the accomplishment of tasks connected with the elaboration of a permanent agreement (to limit strategic offensive arms) any types of strategic offensive means are disregarded or there is a refusal to examine the strategic situation in its totality, this would be tantamount to an endeavor to obtain ...a unilateral advantage". 20
Looking back in hindsight it is apparent that the Soviets were preparing to come to the negotiating table armed with a definite set of goals, the attainment of which would guarantee a free hand in developing their own MIRV capability. As we shall see, they were very successful.
CH. 11
THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT ACCORD

In May of 1972 Secretary of State Kissinger attempted to achieve a breakthrough with the Soviets on the question of MIRV limitations. However, his proposal to equalize the MIRV throw weight of both sides was countered by the Soviets with a proposal to instead roughly equate the number of MIRVed launchers on both sides. According to Mr. Nitze,

Acceptance of this proposal would have resulted in a substantial Soviet superiority in MIRV throw weight coupled with a continuation of the very great Soviet superiority in unMIRVed Soviet missile throw weight. It is difficult to see how the U.S. strategic bomber capability (one of our prime advantages in SALT I), as offset by Soviet superior and unlimited air defenses, could offset these superiorities.

At the time, this proposal was not accepted by the United States, however, at the Vladivostok conference this Soviet position of MIRV launcher equality was accepted, and with that our remaining advantage in strategic bombers was negated.

One of the possible reasons for Soviet intransigence on the MIRV question might be as a result of our own pronouncements on the subject of a "counterforce" doctrine of retaliation against Soviet missile sites. An indication of Soviet reaction to this doctrine appeared in an "Izvestia" article dated June 22, 1974:

Under the slogan of a more "flexible" and even "humane" strategy, the present Pentagon chief has advanced the concept of striking at missile launching pads. The new doctrine of nuclear war is named the "counterforce" strategy.

....It consists in the idea that nuclear war, which the American people perceive as suicide, is now treated as something not necessarily totally destructive and therefore permissible. Two other facts of no small
importance are being noted. The first is that the "counterforce" strategy does not exclude but, on the contrary, presupposes that the U.S.A. fully retain its "massive strike" capability. The second is that Schlesinger, in his new concept of war, almost openly proceeds on the premise that, under certain conditions, the U.S.A. could be the first to deliver a nuclear strike at the Soviet Union's missile installations.

Whether or not this feeling was indeed the main reason for Soviet insistence on MIRV remains a relatively moot point for in any event they were successful in gaining a MIRV "green light" in Vladivostok.

In essence, the arms accord reached in November 1974 between President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev placed "...a ceiling of 2,400 each on the total number of long-range offensive missile and bombers. Of that total, each side will be able to place (MIRV) warheads on up to 1,320 land-based and submarine-launched missiles". This ceiling will be in effect until 1985, and is viewed by the White House as having successfully put a "cap" on the arms race. President Ford, at his press conference of December 3d, took the view that the agreed to ceilings were"... well below the force levels which would otherwise have been expected over the next 10 years, and very substantially below the forces which would result from an all-out arms race over that same period".

Basically, the United States traded its MIRV advantage (for at the time of the Vladivostok Summit meeting the Soviets had no actually MIRVed missiles) for an agreement which it hopes will not only halt the arms race, but also provide a point from which arms can actually begin to be reduced
beginning in 1983. In the meantime, however, the nuclear stockpiles of both countries are free to grow to the level of 2,400 delivery vehicles each (ICBM, SLBM and bombers) and to a MIRV limit of up to 1,320 of their missiles. This means that the Soviets will be adding approximately 25 new delivery vehicles and MIRVing 1,320 missiles, while the United States will be adding 194 new delivery means and MIRVing an additional 570 missiles.25

The victory of the Soviets in achieving their MIRV goal evoked much reaction within the Congress and the Defense Department. One of the most influential supporters of the accord was Senator John Stennis (D-Miss), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who stated that it "... overcomes hurdles that have complicated prior negotiations". Specifically he was referring to arguments over technological and geographical advantages and the capability of forward-based nuclear systems of both the United States and its NATO allies.26 On this latter point it must be mentioned that in an apparent major concession at Vladivostok, Mr. Brezhnev agreed not to count the 468 U.S. fighter-bombers stationed in Europe as part of our 2,400 authorized delivery vehicles.27

While it is true that the Vladivostok negotiations did put a limit on the arms race, it unfortunately has a number of flaws which weaken it considerably. For one thing, it still fails to provide for adequate verification (Other than again by "national technical means" which this treaty seemingly institutionalizes and protects). Secondly, and
perhaps most importantly, the parity in numbers required by the treaty does not in any way reduce the Soviets overwhelming superiority in throw weight and in payload capability (see page 2 and footnote 2), which are a more accurate indication of the destructive potential of a nuclear force.\(^{28}\)

SALT I legalized this imbalance when it fixed the total number of launchers authorized each side in accordance with those missiles either operational or under construction as of May and July 1972 (see pages 1 and 2). Since this Vladivostok agreement is in effect for a period of ten years, there is no relief from the fear that the Soviets may deploy an entirely new family of ICBM's\(^{29}\) which would give the USSR a significant superiority in MIRV warheads as well (a fact that becomes critical when combined with a superiority in payload capability, i.e., deliverable megatonnage). For instance, our Minuteman III ICBM carries three MIRVed warheads, while the Russians new SS-X-18 "could have more than eight".\(^{30}\) Even our latest technological advances in this field are likely to be obsolete before they can even be deployed, for example, our new MK-12A "silo-killer" warhead, which has twice the power of our present ones.\(^{31}\) The problem here is that their new missiles, if deployed, would not only have a "silo-killing" capability of their own, but would moreover be housed in significantly harder silos which would be "MK-12A proof".\(^{32}\) As a result, our MIRV capability is neutralized, and our own missiles become extremely vulnerable since they are not in super-hardened silos.
There can be no question about the fact that today neither side possesses a dangerous advantage over the other in any field. Yet developments are being realized so rapidly in the area of weaponry that what seems impossible today may be commonplace tomorrow. The basic problem inherent in both the Vladivostok accord and in SALT I is that the Soviets succeeded in getting us to sign agreements which we knew to be disadvantageous; a situation which ten years ago would have seemed incredible. The turmoil and confusion these negotiations have created within our own Government are quite obvious from the statements of Senator Jackson and Secretary Kissinger. On the one hand, Senator Jackson very cynically stated that the same logic that motivated SALT I also motivated the Vladivostok accord, i.e., "that the U.S. is better off with a bad agreement than with none". Our Secretary of State, on the other hand, argued that, "We have always assumed that once we agreed on numbers, we could solve all other problems...". As noted earlier the question of numbers (when tied to the amount of payload capacity) is the most critical, and since we have already given in to the Soviets on this the most important issue there may be few "other problems" worth solving.
CHAPTER III

SOVIET IDEOLOGY

The fact that Soviet leaders have become more pragmatic in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy does not imply that they have cast off Marxist-Leninist ideology. The pursuit of power-political objectives is not inconsistent with ideological tenets or with historical precedent. Lenin and all of his successors have advocated pragmatic approaches to specific problems and, at times, dealt with so-called bourgeois governments even at the expense of indigenous Communist governments. Despite such temporary departures from the straight ideological path, however, ideology still affects decisionmaking and provides the framework in which Soviet leaders analyze and evaluate international events.

Thus far has been discussed the workings of a very pragmatic and shrewd Soviet Union which has skillfully negotiated a favorable SALT agreement by capitalizing on our strong desire to realize and end to the nuclear arms race. On the surface, therefore, it might seem that the US is dealing with a Soviet regime that is radically different from its militant predecessors. By the liberal use of such terms as peaceful coexistence and detente the Soviet Union is very successfully presenting a "new face" to a world weary of strife and war. That they have been successful at all in convincing other nations of their sincerity is a testimony to their political acumen. Indeed the USSR is different; even in comparison with the Stalinist era one can distinguish any number of differences all of which point to a more prosperous nation and to a people that are better housed, clothed, educated and fed than their parents. However, this material change in the standard of living has not been matched by a similar ideological transformation, since the tenets of Marxism-Leninism are as inherently hostile and
belligerent today as they were during the era of Lenin himself, in spite of their masking by the jargon of detente. One has only to examine their open press to find an entirely different picture of the Soviet Union; a fact which should serve as a sober reminder not to trust them too far, especially in the SALT negotiations where so much is at stake.

The picture presented by the Soviets is that they still consider themselves in the vanguard of the inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism; i.e., of the Soviet Union over the United States, since each is the prime representative of its form of government in the world today. From its viewpoint that it and it alone possesses the true interpretation of history the Kremlin is at once in the unique position of being able to justify to the world all of its actions, while at the same time condemning, "in the interest of the international proletariat", those actions by other states which it considers harmful to this inevitable victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie -- indeed any resistance to this force is viewed as criminal in the eyes of the Soviets. Thus, "historical correctness" (plus Soviet might) makes right. Also it must be realized by the West and especially the United States that the Soviet definitions of detente and peaceful coexistence are framed within this Marxist-Leninist "scientific world outlook", an outlook which has spawned a foreign policy noted for its messianic militancy and its use of unrelenting pressure in the pursuit of its own objectives.

Particularly interesting is the Soviet approach to the
questions of war and strategic parity with the United States. 

According to Lenin, "War is a continuation of politics by other means. Any war is inseparably joined to the political structure from which it arises". It therefore follows that an analysis of the political structure and policies pursued by the combatants will invariably determine the "correct character of the war". Also Lenin added to this analysis of war and politics a very significant observation regarding the justification for beginning a war -- according to this tenet the Soviets could "justifiably" launch a surprise nuclear attack:

the true essence of a war is determined not by "who was the first to launch an attack", not by "where the troops stand" and "who is now winning" -- it is important to know the aims for which the war is being waged, by what classes and what states. And for this it is necessary to study their prewar policy. If it was an imperialist policy, i.e., a policy defending the interests of finance capital, robbing and oppressing other countries, the war following from this policy, i.e., a policy expressing the mass movement against foreign oppression, the war following from this policy is a just war of national liberation. Lenin stressed that "war is always and everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves, by the ruling and oppressing classes."

Seen in this light, any war waged by a capitalist state -- even in its own defense -- becomes automatically an unjust war since a capitalist nation is necessarily pursuing an imperialistic foreign policy. On the other hand, overt aggression by a socialist state, or by a state conducting a so-called "national liberation movement", is sanctified as just war in Soviet eyes: "...the legitimacy and justice of a war can be determined 'only from the point of view of the socialist proletariat and its struggle for its emancipation."
The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have rendered comprehensive assistance, including military aid, to the peoples fighting for the abolition of colonial tyranny. And this, it must be stressed, is not at variance with the principles of peaceful coexistence championed by our country.

From this it can clearly be seen that a sincere interest in peace is not included in their "peaceful" coexistence; instead this term (as well as detente) is nothing more than a placebo designed to keep the United States and the rest of the Free World off guard while the Soviets undermine their will and resolve with deceit and false promises.

In regards to nuclear war, the Soviets apparently share the same apprehension toward it as does the West.

During the many years since the advent of nuclear weapons, since the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union has exerted enormous efforts to preclude the possibility of a world nuclear war. The Soviet Union's struggle for the complete prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons is conditioned by the very nature of the socialist system, called upon to serve the interests of the working people, the interests of world peace.

However, while it is rational to assume that the Soviets mean what they say about the abolition of nuclear war, it would be very unwise not to regard such statements with at least a healthy pessimism. The same declarations also characterized the immediate post-World War II period, yet, as is well known, they nevertheless forged ahead at full speed to acquire their own nuclear arsenal (witness the fact that in 1949 they exploded their first atomic bomb, and four
years later their first hydrogen bomb). Clearly, the Soviet propensity for saying one thing and doing another has been largely responsible for the creation of so much Western mistrust toward the USSR, and it would be a big mistake to take their pronouncements about nuclear war at face value, as much as a weary world would like to. Whether or not they would ever resort to a nuclear war is a moot question and is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility; one thing is certain and that is that the Soviets are out to gain a clear advantage over the United States in SALT.

In pursuit of this advantage, the Soviets are apparently obsessed with their effort at keeping the United States at a distinct military disadvantage. Based on what has thus far been seen in SALT, the Soviets have achieved their aims and have settled for nothing less. SALT I gave them a numerical advantage in launchers and payload capacity, and at Vladivostok they received not only approval to equal us in MIRV, but also were given the time (ten years) in which to surpass us in this area with their new SS-X-18 family of missiles.

The Soviets apparent obsession with "oneupmanship" can be explained in an entirely historical context as an attempt by the Russians to alter their world image by showing that they are no longer a land of backward peasants. No doubt such explanation does have merit; however, the role of ideology must also be considered as a motivating force as well. For example, the so-called "law" of dialectical materialism. According to this theory, every thesis automatically gives
rise to its antithesis, which in turn evolves into a higher synthesis, thus becoming a new thesis. This dialectical interaction may be applied to all matter, including military equipment. Such a philosophy becomes a powerful rationale for the continual development of new weapons systems, and it follows that if you believe strongly enough in the doctrine you will never permit your neighbor's thesis to go unchallenged by your antithesis. This may be translated into military terms as, "The appearance of new means of struggle always brings into being (emphasis added) corresponding countermeans..." 40

Thus, for example the appearance of an American Minuteman 3 ICBM with three MIRV would have to be followed (according to this "law") by a more powerful Soviet ICBM, i.e., the SS-X-18 ICBM with its five to eight MIRV warheads. An arms race could conceivably go on ad infinitum until one side decided not to match the other's latest advancement. Since the Soviets are the ones who espouse the correctness of this law (thereby compelling them to meet means with countermeans) it must therefore be the Americans who will be the first to halt the expansion by agreeing not to match the Soviet advancement. Such a scenario would dictate to the United States that if it wants an agreement badly enough, be it in SALT, MBFR, trade or whatever, it must be willing to accept the basic premise that the USSR will emerge with some sort of a clear advantage.

Admittedly this scenario is speculative, yet at the same time it is frightening in its implication and cannot be
discounted entirely, especially where nuclear weapons are concerned. So far SALT has confirmed this thesis of a negotiated imbalance in the Soviets' favor. Whether or not this is indicative of an emerging pattern in Soviet-American negotiations is hard to say, but at least the possibility does exist.

In short, ideology still plays a role in the shaping of Soviet attitudes toward the West. The problem of determining the magnitude of its role is complicated not only by the importance of each issue, but also by the intertwined nature of ideology and great power politics within the Soviet system. As a rule, the greater the ideological input into an issue, the more "hard-line" will be the Soviet approach to it; conversely, a lessening of ideological propaganda heralds a relatively cooperative Soviet spirit. This method provides a better means of assessing its importance than does the alternative approach of trying to determine if ideology is being used as a prime motivator for Soviet action or simply to justify an action of Soviet great power politics. In any event, it must be remembered that ideology is not dead, and, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, it provides a definite frame of reference for the Soviet leadership and as such cannot be ignored by the West.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is quite apparent that the SALT negotiations are important and necessary and should be continued until a meaningful agreement on actual arms reduction is reached. However, it is also obvious that the United States agreed to accept a disadvantageous strategic position in missile numbers and payload capacity in order to take a first step in this direction. This obviously establishes a danger-our precedent which could lead ultimately to a severely weakened American nuclear arms posture which could, in turn, make us vulnerable to Soviet influence and even nuclear blackmail (especially if our retaliatory capability were affected). In its dealings with the Soviet Union, the United States should always bear in mind that the USSR is still our most dangerous rival and in spite of detente and peaceful coexistence still brandishes a hostile ideology, a very powerful military force, and continues to view treaties as temporary documents at best.41

In conclusion, it is recommended that the United States quickly adopt a three-point program for improving its strategic strength. First, enact a comprehensive plan to reverse the ominous decline in our overall military posture and strength which some observers see as already "...deteriorating to the point where in a few years the U.S. could be faced down by the Soviet Union in any test of will similar to the Cuban crisis".42 Secondly, the United States should rethink
its SALT II position to include negotiating for 1) roughly equal ceilings on the throw-weight of MIRVed missiles; 2) roughly equal overall throw-weights of both MIRVed and non-MIRVed missiles, with a realistic allowance for strategic allowance for strategic bomber strengths on both sides; and 3) for a schedule of phased armed reductions.\textsuperscript{43}

Thirdly, our negotiators should take a lesson from their Soviet counterparts and adopt a firmer, more cautious and more patient approach in securing U.S. national objectives. Agreements concluded in an atmosphere of political expediency instead of careful diplomacy often create more and bigger problems than they solve.

2. Authorities generally agreed that the comparison of gross megatonnage is neither practical nor meaningful since it does not take into consideration the "relative destructive power" of these forces. A more realistic comparison can be made by expressing "megaton equivalents (MTE)", which are figures calculated from the explosive yield of each weapon. The US 2,400 MT and the Soviet 11,400 MT would thus be equivalent to 2,300 MTE and 5,600 MTE respectively. The use of MTE in stating deterrent capability is practiced by the Defense Department, whose Secretaries "...have implied that 'assured destructiveness' of the Soviet Union would be the result of delivering not more than 400 megaton equivalents on its territory." From this it can readily be seen that both sides have more than enough overkill to devastate the other many times over. Another way of expressing this "relative destructive power" is by means of throw-weight and payload capability, which are discussed in Chapters II, III and IV.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 39.

9. Ibid.


Article I:

1. Each Party (i.e., the USA and the USSR) undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning 31 March 1976.

2. Each Party shall limit the number of its underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum.

3. The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view towards achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests.

Article II:

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article III:

The provisions of this Treaty do not extend to underground nuclear explosions carried out by the Parties for peaceful purposes. Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties at the earliest possible time.

References:

16 "Limitation of Underground Tests", p. 237. See Article III.
17 "Kissinger Assesses Summit", p. 40.
18 "Nitze: 'Essential Equivalence'", p. 43.
19 "Ogranichenie Voornuzhenii i ego Protivnikh" ("Arma Limitations and its Opponents"), Pravda, April 7, 1974, p. 4.
20 "Otvetstvennaia Zadacha" ("A Responsible Task"), Pravda, February 14, 1974, p. 4.
21 "Nitze: 'Essential Equivalence'", p. 43.
22 "Ser'eznyi Povorot" ("Serious Turn"), Izvestia, June 22, 1974, pp. 3-4.

24 Ibid.


27 "Setting a Boundary", Newsweek, p. 15.


31 David Aaron, "A New Concept", Foreign Policy, Winter 1974-75, Number 17, p. 159.

32 Ibid., p. 163.

33 "Administration View", Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 2, 1974, p. 15.


41 For a discussion of Soviet SALT violations please see:


43 Paul H. Nitze, "The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism", Foreign Policy, Winter 1974-75, Number 17, p. 154.
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