STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

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ANATOMY OF A FAILURE:
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT
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ANATOMY OF A FAILURE:
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This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

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Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.

ROLAND LAJOIE
LTC, MI
Commander
SUMMARY

This paper is a study of the history of the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship from 1955 to 1977. It traces the development of the Soviet military assistance program to the Arab Republic of Egypt from the first arms agreement in 1955, through the three Arab-Israeli wars, to the final break between the two countries. This paper relies primarily on Soviet sources, and presents the Soviet view of the stormy course of the Moscow-Cairo military relationship.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the causative factors that shaped and influenced the development of Soviet foreign policy toward Egypt from 1955 to the present, as presented primarily from Soviet sources. Special emphasis is given to the Soviet military assistance program over the years to the Arab Republic of Egypt (A.R.E.). The Soviet government is extremely close-mouthed about its military assistance programs abroad, but a careful reading of the open press over a long period of time can reveal a surprising amount of information. Specifics are, of course, lacking, but the Soviet government apparently feels compelled, from time to time, to respond to charges and accusations regarding its foreign policy that become known inside the USSR from Western Russian-language radio broadcasts, as well as from foreign visitors, Russian travelers abroad, foreign newspapers and magazines, and other sources. It is often true that the most significant information is revealed when the Soviet press responds to such foreign-originated criticism, in an effort to prove to the average Soviet citizen that his government's motives are, after all, as pure as the driven snow. Quotations from the Western press are used quite frequently to support the official Soviet position, or to disprove the Western, "imperialistic" viewpoint, thereby proving that the West is indeed motivated solely by greed and driven by the forces of reaction and imperialism. Since the Soviet press is tightly controlled, it is presumed that these quotations accurately reflect the position of the Soviet government at the time of their publication, and that information appearing in the open press is common knowledge among informed Soviet citizens. It is interesting to note that the Soviet penchant for secrecy generally causes a time lag, often as long as several years, from the occurrence of an event to its appearance in the Soviet open press. When this information is, at long last, finally reported to the Soviet public, it is commonly prefaced with the phrase "Everybody knows that..." or "It is well-known that...", leaving the Soviet reader with the impression that he must have missed something somewhere, and that the information had been previously reported.

Non-Soviet sources are cited where necessary to add factual information, or to provide first-hand information on the Soviet decision-making process (i.e. Khruščev Remembers, The Last Testament, and The Road to Yenan). The study is broken down into nine parts, beginning with the doctrinal foundations for the Soviet military assistance program, through the wars and major events of Soviet-Egyptian relations, and ending with some conclusions suggested by the Soviet experience with Egypt. It is the opinion of the author that the Soviet-Egyptian military assistance experience is a microcosm of Soviet arms diplomacy worldwide, and is capable
of offering many insights into the problems inherent in Soviet relations with the Third World in general. Hopefully, this short essay will stimulate the reader into further reading on Soviet military assistance programs as a vital part of Soviet foreign policy.
THE 1955 ARMS DEAL

DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION

After Stalin's death in 1953, the USSR began to discard the cumbersome theory of the "Two Camps," and recognize that the bipolar view of world politics was essentially outdated. The Russians explicitly accepted the legitimacy of the "Third World," and correctly assumed that future inter-bloc rivalries would focus on the uncommitted and underdeveloped nations. The Soviet Union then embarked on a policy to win friends in the Third World, to dismantle or neutralize anti-Soviet coalitions or arrangements therein, and to weaken the influence of the West wherever possible.

In 1955, the USSR embarked on a policy of active military assistance to "progressive" national leaders who, like Nasser, had chosen a non-capitalist road to development.

In their struggle for the non-capitalist road of development and in the transition to socialism these peoples rely on the comprehensive assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including their help in setting up and developing their national armed forces and in organizing the armed defense of their countries against imperialist aggressors. The Soviet government has repeatedly declared that it has always given and continues to give various kinds of assistance to peoples fighting against imperialist aggression by all, including military, means.

President Nasser's determination to remain free of Western military entanglements (specifically the Baghdad Pact), and his aspirations to lead the pan-Arab movement as well as the neutralist bloc of the Third World fitted perfectly with Soviet plans. His declared aim was to build a strong national army, and he urgently needed arms to satisfy this requirement. The Tripartite Declaration, signed by the United States, France, and Great Britain, 1950, attempted to limit arms supplies in that highly volatile region, and Nasser found himself unable to procure weapons from Western sources. He accordingly broke precedent and signed an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27, 1955. Two days later, Pravda reprinted a speech by President Nasser in which he justified his momentous decision.
...Prime Minister of Egypt Gamal Abdul Nasser declared that the government of Egypt considers one of its main problems to be "the establishment of a strong national army." ... "We always said," continued the Prime Minister, "that we need weapons. But we will never agree to have our army equipped at the cost of freedom,... At the very beginning of the revolution (which occurred in July of 1952) we turned to England, France and the United States with a request that they sell us weapons, stressing that we need weapons for the defense of peace. All of these countries lay down as a preliminary condition for weapons deliveries our agreement to participate in pacts.... Not long after that, we received an offer from Czechoslovakia to furnish us with the weapons necessary for our army, to be delivered on a purely commercial basis in exchange for Egyptian goods, mainly cotton and rice.... I immediately accepted with gratitude this Czechoslovakian offer.... When I hear cries from London and Washington that this opens the Middle East to the penetration of Russian influence, I recall the past and say that commercial agreements, concluded on the basis of mutual profit, mark the end of that foreign influence which ruled over us for many years, and does not signify the beginning of new foreign influence. An independent, strong Egypt will not tolerate any kind of foreign influence. Egypt is a free and independent state, with its own foreign policy, which is formulated here, in Cairo. Egypt will not succumb to foreign influence and will maintain its freedom and independence.5

The Soviet leaders gleefully noted the consternation of the West following the conclusion of this agreement, and were pleased to note that it "ended the monopoly of the Western powers in the sale of weapons, which they often used for intrigue, blackmail and the realization of policies of dictation."6 The Tripartite Declaration was henceforth null and void.7

The Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms agreement clearly "showed the whole world that the peoples of underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa might easily obtain modern weapons when necessary for the defense against encroachment from outside their borders"8 from the countries of the socialist bloc. Thus Soviet military assistance diplomacy was launched. It is interesting to note that the initial arms agreement was undertaken by proxy, with Czechoslovakia in the position of arms supplier. This is apparently a reflection of Soviet insecurity in initiating such a potentially dangerous
policy in an area where they had very little ability to control events. The USSR did, however, stoutly defend the right of Czechoslovakia and Egypt to make such an arrangement.

For its part the Soviet government takes the position that each state has the legal right to provide for its own defense, and to purchase weapons needed for its defense needs from other states under normal commercial terms, and no foreign state has the right to interfere or to present any kind of unilateral claims which would prejudice the rights or interests of other states.9

Much was made of the claim that this was purely a commercial transaction on the free market - a claim calculated to impress the capitalist West. It was widely asserted that this transaction would not prejudice or jeopardize Egyptian independence in any way.

...there is no doubt that the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian agreement represents a purely commercial transaction, concluded without any kind of obligation or limitation which would prove detrimental to the independence and sovereignty of Egypt. It is unnecessary to state that this is an internal affair of both countries, and will not tolerate any interference from third party states. As the Egyptian State Minister Sadat pointed out in the newspaper Al-Dumhuria, "weapons have become ordinary goods, which may be purchased on the free market for cash payments."10

For nearly twenty years, Soviet writers kept up the charade that this was an arms agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, and no one else. It was only in the mid-1970's that it was openly admitted that this was really a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal all along.11

The initial agreement resulted in the transfer of 200 combat jet aircraft, hundreds of tanks, self-propelled assault guns, armored personnel carriers, and trucks, as well as large quantities of small arms and ammunition, and six submarines. The total value of the arms deal is estimated at $250 million.12

The Soviet readiness to meet Arab demands for weapons contributed greatly to the rapid consolidation of anti-Western governments in the area, and the USSR quickly gained an impressive list of military clients in the Arab world: Syria (1955), Yemen (1956), Iraq (1958), Morocco (1961), Algeria (1962) and South Yemen and Sudan (1967). The Arab states, with the single exception of Iraq, all failed to join the Baghdad Pact, which seriously weakened this alliance from the beginning. Iraq, for its part, withdrew from
the pact shortly after General Kassem's coup in 1958.

While Soviet weapons supplies were originally envisioned by the suppliers as supporting an anti-Baghdad Pact stance on the part of the recipients, it eventually tended to evolve into an anti-Israeli issue. Western relations and influence in the Arab world flowed and ebbed largely on the basis of its expressed support for Israel. The Soviet Union avoided this trap, disassociating itself from its early support to the Jewish state, the USSR maintained and advanced its position by unabashedly extending overt support to the Arab cause against Israel.  

Each party to the arms transfer obtained certain advantages by trading with the other. On the Soviet side, they had the advantage of dealing with Egypt, the most influential and strategically located country in the area, with a messianic and charismatic national leader actively espousing Soviet aims. The Russians also gained advantages in trade and commerce, and had the perhaps unexpected opportunity to field test and evaluate their weaponry under combat conditions. In addition, they were able to show the red flag in an area where people place a high value on such symbolic gestures. Egyptian advantages were even more impressive. Soviet arms enabled Egypt to maintain its stance as a non-aligned nation, and to resist occasional Western pressure to change this status. The armaments supplied by the Soviet bloc were generally of good quality and many were highly sophisticated and effective. Bases, oil rights, or political concessions were not prerequisites of Soviet aid (in contrast to Western military aid) and it was couched in terms of socialist solidarity, anti-imperialism and pure altruism.

In addition, Soviet terms were attractive, offering long-term credit (generally at 2 and 1/2 per cent annual interest), payable in local currency or by barter for raw materials (i.e. cotton). In addition to the generous terms offered, the prices charged for the initial equipment deliveries were extremely low (apparently subsidized). The Soviet Union also proved willing to face reality and postpone payments, or in a few cases write off some debts in view of the much higher than expected attrition rate caused by periodic Arab-Israeli wars, and the costly need to replace and upgrade lost or destroyed equipment. The final advantage to Egypt in dealing with the USSR is that Soviet aid has often forced the West to offer aid to counter the Soviet programs, giving Egypt the opportunity to play one side off against the other. Like the United States, the Soviet Union is mainly interested in possible political and strategic advantages from arms sales, rather than economic profit.
THE SUEZ WAR OF 1956

After the initial agreement in 1955, the Soviet Union dropped her masquerade and began dealing with Egypt directly, rather than through an agent such as Czechoslovakia. Although Soviet military assistance policy probably was not initially intended to do so, it definitely tended to exacerbate the Arab-Israeli conflict. The propensity of Arab aspirations thus came to be the primary vehicle for extending Soviet influence in the Middle East.

The 1956 War was the first crucial step in the evolution of Soviet policy in the Arab world—opening opportunities for both Moscow and Cairo which neither could have envisioned when their first agreement was concluded.

Upset by Nasser's consistent opposition to the Baghdad Pact, by Egypt's recognition of Communist China, and by mounting evidence of Egyptian-Russian complicity to oppose Western interests in the area, the United States precipitously withdrew a tentative offer to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam in July 1956. President Nasser immediately retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Company, and the 1956 Suez crisis was launched. The British Conservative government felt that nothing less than Britain's survival as a great power was at stake, while France had an interest in eliminating Cairo as the focal point of material and propaganda support to the Algerian rebels.

Despite private Soviet warnings, the English and French planned a concerted Anglo-French-Israeli attack against Nasser, without consulting the United States. As the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, put it: "We cannot accept that we have to obtain the agreement of the United States before acting in our own vital interests." The plan, known as "Operation Mushtoeer," was for Israel to attack Egypt, followed by mock British and French attempts at mediation, accompanied by a demand that both sides withdraw from the canal zone which would then be occupied by "neutral" French and British troops. Given the virtual certainty that Nasser would never agree to evacuate Egyptian territory, the British and French planned to take the canal by force. The question of canal ownership could then be reopened, and Nasser's regime would presumably not survive Egypt's defeat. The United States was expected to be preoccupied with the 1956 Presidential elections, while the Russians appeared to have their hands full with Hungary. Despite expectations to the contrary, the American reaction was immediate and forceful. Due in part to a persistent moralistic strain in American foreign policy, the United States found herself on the side of the Soviet Union against her two most important NATO allies.
After pressure from President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden announced a belated ending to the ill-conceived operation. It was as if the entire scenario had been written by the Soviet Union as a demonstration of Western imperialism at its worst. Its effect was to enhance Soviet prestige in the Arab world, disrupt NATO, and divert world attention from the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolt.

During the crisis, the Soviet press became exceedingly vitriolic in its attacks on British, French and Israelis. A few headlines from Pravda should serve to illustrate the point: "The Aggression Against Egypt Should Be Immediately Stopped!"; "Hands Off Egypt!"; "Peoples of the World Demand a Cessation of the Aggression Against Egypt," and "The Plundering War Against Egypt Must Be Stopped!". The articles themselves typically were almost hysterical in nature, consisting largely of wild charges, warnings, admonitions, and platitudes - high on emotion but low on information. This precedent continued to be generally standard in the two subsequent Arab-Israeli wars.

When it became clear that the Americans would insist on an Israeli, British and French withdrawal from Egypt, the USSR could, with impunity, issue dire warnings to Israel that its very existence as a state was threatened by its invasion of Egypt, and mutter vague threats of a Soviet rocket attack against Britain and France. This "rocket rattling" was now perfectly safe in view of the American position. The USSR loudly proclaimed that its "warnings" to France, Britain and Israel had rescued Egypt from the clutches of the imperialist invaders, thus gaining valuable political credit for the Soviet Union in the Arab world. This undoubtedly contributed to the Arab expectation that the USSR would be willing to use force on their behalf.

In addition to his warnings to the invaders of Egypt, Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin sent an open letter to President Eisenhower suggesting that a joint Soviet-American military expedition be sent to Egypt under United Nations auspices to expel the invaders. President Eisenhower's response was unequivocal, but not unexpected. The Strategic Air Command was quietly put on alert, and the USSR abruptly shifted its threats from direct military intervention to sending Soviet combat veteran "volunteers" to help the Egyptian people. But by this time the armistice was already in force, and the immediate danger was past. What persisted in Arab eyes, however, was the contrast between the apparently passive disapproval of the invasion by the Americans, and the widely-advertised Soviet willingness to shed Russian blood in defense of Egypt. The ill-fated Anglo-French-Israeli invasion,
instead of toppling Nasser and destroying the Russian foothold in the Middle East, succeeded only in enhancing Nasser's prestige and strengthening the influence of the USSR in the Arab world.

After the Suez War, the Russians could no longer pretend that their military aid to Egypt and other Arab states had no bearing on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Instead, they took the opposite approach, claiming that their support of Egypt was linked with a larger struggle between imperialism, headed by the United States, and its agent Israel, and the "Arab national liberation movement," headed by the "progressive" Arab regimes, supported by the USSR. 29

In the two years following the 1956 war, the limited objectives which initially brought the USSR into the Middle East had been generally fulfilled. The Western attempt to enlist the Arab states into an anti-Soviet alliance was virtually a dead letter. After the disintegration of the Baghdad Pact, and the advent of intercontinental missiles, the USSR slowly began to change its policy objectives in the Arab East from purely military-strategic goals to greater concern with political advantages that could be gained in the area. Economic aid, as opposed to pure military assistance, became a prominent feature of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. The culmination of this policy was the financing and construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1958,30 the visible proof of massive Soviet technological and financial assistance to the Arab world.

Despite Khrushchev's best efforts, Communist ideologues were never able to reconcile themselves to the phenomenon of one-party dictatorships which ostensibly chose the non-capitalist road to development, but brooked no internal opposition, and worse yet, actively persecuted indigenous Communists. All Soviet attempts to apply pressure to Nasser to cease and desist were to no avail. In spite of open criticism of President Nasser in the Soviet press, the USSR persisted in its earlier assessment that Egypt was indeed the pivotal country in the Middle East, and Soviet financial, technical, and military assistance continued without interruption. Occasional tension and bitter polemics marked this period of Soviet-Egyptian relations, but Moscow proved time and again that it was not about to let mere ideological considerations jeopardize its position in the Arab world. Arms deliveries were re-negotiated at roughly two-year intervals, and continued to flow. On April 25, 1965, the Egyptian Communist Party quietly dissolved itself on orders from Moscow, and Egyptian Communists were released from prison and allowed to join Nasser's Arab Socialist Union. Thus was removed the most serious obstacle to smooth state-to-state relations.

After Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, his successors, Alexei
Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, were much less optimistic about the "revolutionary democrats" than Khrushchev had been. Their lack of enthusiasm was reinforced by the forcible retirement of Khrushchev's protégés, Ben-Bella of Algeria, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Nkrumah of Ghana. These leaders all disappeared within a year after Khrushchev's "resignation," and left hardly a ripple in their wake. After a sober appraisal of these setbacks, Soviet expectations of quick victories in the Third World were rapidly scaled down, and Soviet aid policies became more businesslike and practical in conception.

THE SIX-DAY WAR

In February 1966, a new Syrian coup brought the left wing of the Ba'athist Party to power. The new regime lacked internal support and its prospects for survival appeared dim. It loudly proclaimed its devotion to the USSR, brought a Syrian Communist into the government, and permitted MalikHadjibash, Secretary General of the Syrian Communist Party, to return to Syria after a long exile abroad. Its obvious commitment to radical social, political and economic reform, and the enhanced prospects of Syrian Communism impelled the USSR to seize the opportunity to build a second pillar to its influence in the Middle East. Military and economic assistance was rapidly accelerated, and Moscow committed its best political efforts to the new regime. In an effort to drum up domestic support, the new government undertook to demonstrate its belligerence toward the "Zionist gangsters" in neighboring Israel. Shelling of Israeli border settlements increased sharply, as did infiltration across the border by Peshayeen terrorists operating from Syrian territory. The USSR clearly aimed at exploiting this border tension to strengthen the Syrian regime, and to promote unity among the "progressive" Arab forces (notably Egypt and Syria). Continued tension would tend to discredit both the West and the conservative Arab nations for their hostility toward the only effective anti-Israeli force in the region. A secondary aim of the Soviet Union was to deter Israeli retaliation against Syria which might endanger the survival of the regime in Damascus.

The question of the role of the Soviet government in encouraging provocative tensions and an atmosphere of imminent war is beyond the scope of this study. The broad steps that led up to the 1967 War are well known. In short, a Soviet scenario in which Egypt was to create a diversion, thereby "saving" the Syrian Ba'ath regime from imminent (though imaginary) assault from Israel, resulted instead in impelling Cairo into a sudden mobilization. Egypt deployed its forces into the Sinai, expelled the United Nations Emergency Force,
and subsequently instituted a blockade of Filat. Their intention was clearly to goad Israel into the first strike, with confidence that their own military superiority would then be able to finish the task in short order. Moscow was either unable or unwilling to apply the brakes fast enough, and Nasser’s military adventures quickly created their own momentum. Nasser was determined to precipitate a war, and he succeeded only too well. The immediate result was the annihilation of Soviet-equipped and trained Arab armies, the capture of sophisticated Soviet weapons, and an unparalleled disaster for Soviet postwar prestige worldwide. Unlike 1956, Moscow was not rescued from its dilemma by the United States, and it was forced to stand by, making menacing but futile and impotent gestures as its clients went down to a shattering defeat. In the United Nations, the Soviet Union had successfully immobilized the Security Council while Egypt was going through its aggressive phase, and was confident of victory. Once the broad outlines of the Egyptian military disaster became evident, the USSR rapidly reversed its position and became a desperate advocate of a diplomatic solution to the consequences of the “Israeli aggression.” There is little evidence that the USSR ever seriously considered direct Soviet military intervention in the conflict – the likelihood of full military confrontation with the United States was a definite probability if this had been attempted. Despite ambiguous threats, the USSR made no real effort to rescue its Arab proteges from military disaster.

Soviet anti-Israeli rhetoric reached a new high (or low) during this short war. Israelis were routinely indicted as murderers, Hitlerites, Nazis, or worse. Alleged Israeli atrocities were reported in lurid detail, and included reports that Israeli soldiers burned Arab prisoners alive, tortured and shot captured Arabs, bombed ambulances and medical facilities with napalm, and refused to take prisoners.

The Six-Day War was certainly the pivotal event in Soviet relations in the Middle East. Its aftermath, although a debacle for Russia and her clients, offered many long-term opportunities, and pitfalls, for Soviet policy in the years to come.

**THE WAR OF ATTRITION**

As a result of a serious underestimate of the volatility and escalatory potential of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and an overestimate of their own ability to control a developing crisis, the Soviet Union was faced with one of the most potentially damaging setbacks of its foreign policy since World War II. The USSR could
have responded by disarming itself from a dangerous and expensive predicament. Instead, the Russians chose to attempt to rebuild the shattered Arab military forces, and to reinforce the Soviet commitment to the radical Arab states confronting Israel. In effect, the USSR was "stuck" in the Middle East by its great power status, forced to suffer some loss of prestige by successive defeats of unreliable surrogates. It was unable to withdraw its commitment without massive damage to its ideology, its reputation in the Communist and non-aligned world, and to its aspirations as a world competitor with the United States.

The 1967 War dramatically deepened Egypt's dependence on the USSR. The immediate requirement was to replace the massive equipment losses incurred in the war. President Nasser admitted that "if it had not been for Soviet shipments, Egypt would have been literally disarmed in the face of Israel after the June War."36 Egypt's plight was exacerbated by the loss of foreign currency earnings in the Suez Canal, in tourism, and in the Sinai oil fields. Soon after the war, it became evident that the Soviet Union had decided to rebuild its position in the Middle East on the same foundations as before. Nasser's Egypt remained the fulcrum of the Soviet position in the Arab world. Large arms shipments and Soviet military advisers37 began arriving, with the ostensible purpose of "restoring the military balance."38 Arab military equipment losses were substantially replaced within six months, and a new round of the Middle East arms race was thus initiated.

The USSR also expanded its own military presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The post-1967 build-up of a permanent Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, with the avowed mission of protecting friendly Arab states,39 was perhaps the most portentous development in Soviet conventional military capabilities of the decade. The Mediterranean Sea could no longer be considered an "American Lake" and the freedom of action of the United States Sixth Fleet would henceforth be constrained by the active presence of a rival super-power navy.

Moscow was successful in countering the effects of the disastrous humiliation imposed by Israel on the nascent Soviet-Arab alliance by utilizing massive military assistance diplomacy.40 Through this vehicle, the USSR was able to recover her position as the champion of Arab aspirations, and to mute Arab criticism of her role in the 1967 War. Unable to admit the possibility that the vast amounts of Soviet weaponry might somehow be inferior to Israel's Western arsenal, or that Soviet-inspired tactics might be at fault, the USSR explained the defeat in purely Marxist terms. Accordingly, they demanded that President Nasser purge his armed forces of those elements responsible for the 1967 defeat, as a
prerequisite to delivery of new weaponry.

Equipped with sufficient quantities of modern weapons, the armed forces of the UAR suffered military reversals in the war against Israeli aggression in June 1967, primarily because a significant number of generals and officers were tied to feudalism and reactionary sentiments, and did not wish to defend the progressive transformation of the republic, and as a result took part in an anti-government conspiracy. Supported by the masses, the government of the UAR cashiered hundreds of such officers and generals out of the army in June-August 1967, and placed into army command positions representatives of the progressive forces. The Arab Socialist Union initiated large-scale political indoctrination in the armed forces to increase the solidarity of military service members.41

It took nearly ten years for the real reason to appear in Soviet sources - an assessment that was undoubtedly made privately immediately after the war, and which led to the massive infusion of Soviet advisors into Egypt.

However, the reason for the defeat of the Arab armies in the "Six-Day War" of 1967 was not the exceptional armed forces of Israel, but the military unpreparedness of Egypt, UAR and Jordan for military action under conditions of modern war, and the absence of the necessary political unity of the Arab world as a whole.42

The USSR and Egypt had little choice but to draw closer together in adversity; to increase both the Soviet commitment to Egypt, and the Egyptian indebtedness to the USSR. In November 1968, President Nasser said:

Only the Russians helped us after the June War, with emergency aid from wheat to fighter aircraft, while the Americans were helping our enemies. And they have asked nothing of us in return, except facilities for their navy to use at Port Said and Alexandria.43

The magnitude of the post-1967 Russian effort in Egypt was unprecedented outside the Communist bloc, and led directly to a new phase of Soviet policy in the Middle East - a policy of direct military participation and of regional confrontation.

After a much-needed breathing spell, President Nasser renounced the United Nations cease-fire order on March 29, 1969, and proclaimed the "War of Attrition" against Israel. Egypt began conducting
attacks and artillery barrages directed at the Bar-Lev line, and Israel responded by launching deep aerial penetration raids into the United Arab Republic. The Egyptian defensive posture along the canal rapidly began to deteriorate, and President Nasser unsuccessfully attempted to call off his War of Attrition in July 1969. Conditions continued to worsen, and Nasser was forced to fly to Moscow on January 22, 1970 to seek new emergency assistance for Egypt's crumbling defenses, and support in recovering the occupied Arab lands by force. He succeeded in obtaining additional weapons, and in getting the Soviets to install additional SAM-2 and the newer SAM-3 air defense missile systems in Egypt. At Nasser's insistence, the Soviet Union gradually introduced Soviet military personnel to man the new missile sites, and even to pilot advanced jet aircraft in defensive fighter patrols behind the canal area to counter Israeli air superiority. In April 1970, Soviet-piloted fighter aircraft engaged Israeli fighters in aerial combat. This development was the culmination of the deployment of Soviet armed forces to the Middle East in 1970, and seemed to portend direct Soviet participation in any renewal of full-scale war between the Arabs and the Israelis. Soviet postwar participation in combat on behalf of another nation outside the Communist bloc is believed to be without precedent, and can well be considered the most significant development of the decade in the Middle East.

By August 1970, the Egyptian air defense system was heavily dependent on its Soviet guardians, and consisted of multiple layers of radar-controlled light anti-aircraft guns (23mm and 57mm), low-altitude SAM-3 GUIDELINE air defense missiles, medium/high-altitude SAM-2 GUIDELINE air defense missiles, and SAM-6 GAINFUL air defense missiles (deployed around Aswan). This system was backed up by a force of Russian-piloted MiG-21 interceptors, and was coordinated by an integrated air defense control system consisting of headquarters and tactical fire control centers, fed by a versatile and mobile radar network. By this time, Egyptian losses and Israeli fears of increasing Russian involvement led both sides to accept the cease fire agreement proposed by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers. This agreement was signed on August 7, 1970, and specifically prohibited military build-ups or offensive action within a zone of at least 50 kilometers wide on each side of the canal for a period of ninety days. The United States and the Soviet Union were co-signatories.

Although Secretary Rogers initially won great credit for his efforts, it immediately became apparent that the Egyptians, with Russian complicity, were massively violating the "stand-still" provisions of the agreement. The Egyptians were using the respite from Israeli air attacks to fortify the canal zone with missiles in order to neutralize Israeli offensive air power. It appears obvious
that President Nasser chose to accept the Rogers plan as a tactical ploy in order to install air defense missiles in the canal zone, and thus achieve military advantage in violation of its provisions. Moscow, as much as admitted to Egyptian violations in an attempted defense of Egyptian rights to move missiles from one installation to another.

The UAR carried out in this zone some measures which are limited to maintaining former positions and personnel in proper condition. Israel and the USA are attempting to assert that these minimal measures, including individual transfers of missile installations from one place to another and the replacement of some installations there by others, necessary to ensure the security of the missile positions and their personnel, constitute violations. In addition to its defensive role for the Egyptian heartland, the movement of missiles up to the edge of the canal opened up an air defense umbrella over the Israeli-occupied East bank, in a position to protect future crossings of the canal in force. When the Israelis became convinced that the stand-still provisions of the agreement were being massively violated, and that their military position was rapidly eroding, they withdrew from the negotiations then being conducted indirectly between the two sides by U.N. Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. They bitterly insisted that the missile sites be dismantled before they would return to the indirect negotiations. Ultimately, however, both sides used the cease fire to further consolidate and improve their defensive positions on either side of the canal.

1970 drew to a close with Soviet combat forces stationed outside the Communist bloc for the first time in postwar history, and the first time ever for Soviet regular combat forces in a non-contiguous area far from the USSR. The Soviet Union was taking a calculated risk in assuming responsibility for part of Egypt's air defenses. By this action, it tended to discourage a new war and another catastrophic Arab defeat, and it signalled Israel that it could no longer expect to find cheap and easy victories in the endemic clashes along the Suez Canal. By 1970, some 12,000 Russian troops were manning air defense missile sites in Egypt, and more than 200 Russian pilots were flying combat missions. Numerous support personnel and advisors ran the total of Russian "military specialists" to approximately 21,000. This involvement was not advertised to the world, and the average Soviet citizen was entirely unaware that Russian military personnel were fighting and dying thousands of miles from home, on foreign soil and for a foreign
state. It took nearly five years for the role of the Soviet military in Egypt to appear in the Soviet press.

Egyptians, Arabs and other countries know well, that it was Soviet air defense sites that defended the cities of the Nile Valley in the Fall of 1970, when Israeli aircraft bombed the suburbs of Cairo and Mansurah...51

An article appeared in Pravda in 1977 which more fully explained the Soviet role.

As is known, Soviet military specialists, sent to Egypt at Nasser's request, helped the Egyptian Army master modern military equipment. Soviet military personnel were also stationed in Egypt due to the fact that the USSR, at the urgent request of the Egyptian leadership, took over the defense of Egyptian airspace. This led to the cessation of Israeli air attacks - attacks which had been going on for a long time, even on Cairo, and which had placed great pressure on efforts to strengthen the defense capabilities of Egypt.52

President Gamal Abdul Nasser died on September 28, 1970,53 thus ending the first phase of the Soviet Union's attempt to increase its influence in the Arab world. His death removed the one Arab leader who had proved to be the mainstay of Soviet policy in the Middle East. Nasser was succeeded by the Egyptian Vice President, Anwar el Sadat, who inherited the state of "no peace - no war" which had characterized the Middle East situation since 1967. Egypt now had a new leader and full arsenals, and as time continued to pass without a political solution, the convergence of aims between the USSR and Egypt after the June War began to deteriorate.

Despite the unparalleled military, political and economic investment made by the USSR in a non-bloc country, the Russians had good reason to be apprehensive about the future course of Soviet-Egyptian relations. Sadat had long been Nasser's heir apparent, but he was still relatively unknown outside the UAR, and therefore unpredictable, and mutual trust was certainly not a feature of his relations with the Russians. Moscow's consistent inability to establish any sort of control over the various levers of power in Egyptian society and government, like the Arab Socialist Union, the army command, the propaganda apparatus, or the secret police, could only have reinforced their anxieties.

From the Egyptian viewpoint, the negative aspects of Soviet aid
must have appeared formidable and discouraging. The country was heavily in debt economically, and had lost much of its political independence as well. Worse still, the consequences of the devastating 1967 defeat remained a constant humiliation; vast areas were under enemy occupation, and despite Soviet help, their recovery was nowhere in sight. And the Russian leaders may have appeared pusillanimous to militant Arabs, refusing to commit Soviet forces to the recovery of Arab lands, or even to give the Arabs the offensive weapons they demanded to do so themselves.

A struggle ensued among Egypt's leadership as Sadat sought to consolidate his power after Nasser's death. To the dismay of the Russians, the pro-Soviet element of the Egyptian leadership led by Vice President Ali Sabry engineered an abortive coup attempt, and lost out to Sadat's counter-intrigues (and to their own ineptitude). Anwar Sadat thus emerged as the undisputed leader of Egypt.

Despite their misgivings, the Russians continued major shipments of military weapons to the UAR, and the Egyptian weapons inventory was enriched by additional quantities of such sophisticated weapons as the ZSU 23-4, FROG-7, SA-3, SA-6, and highly-advanced electronic command, control, and radar equipment. The Soviet aim was to re-establish their influence on Egyptian foreign policy, as formerly enjoyed by the Russians under Nasser, and to further increase the dependence of Egypt on the USSR in an attempt to build a tight Arab coalition around a Moscow-Cairo axis.

THE EXPULSION

The overriding concern of Soviet strategists is the security of the homeland (and hence, of the ruling party). The greatest danger to Soviet security would be posed by a direct confrontation with the United States over issues both perceive as in their vital national interest. Despite their vociferous advocacy of the Arab cause against Israel, and their boldness in stationing Soviet combat forces in Egypt, the Russians were not about to participate in a direct combat role on behalf of Egypt, should another general war break out in the Middle East. The risks of superpower confrontation were simply too great. The USSR therefore opted for a negotiated settlement, and after the restoration of a reasonable military balance, consistently urged Egypt to negotiate with Israel on the basis of rough military parity. It was at this point that Soviet and Egyptian goals began seriously to diverge.
The strategic aims of the USSR were to enlarge her influence in the Middle East by a series of low-risk moves, and by steady, unrelenting effort, with the ultimate aim of eventually achieving hegemony over the region. The Egyptian national objectives were to recover their national honor and the occupied Arab lands, by force or by negotiation. For the Arabs, their self-esteem and honor could best be vindicated by a successful war against Israel, but this was a high-risk proposition for the USSR, and could place Soviet security in real jeopardy. In short, Sadat saw war as the only means to resolve a totally unacceptable status quo, and the Soviets sought to restrain him.

Sadat feared that the status quo, if unchanged, would tend to ossify over time, eventually resulting in a fait accompli to Egypt's detriment and Israel's advantage. He cited the Oder-Neisse line and the Berlin agreements as proof of his argument. It was therefore imperative that he move quickly, and he proclaimed 1971 as the "Year of Decision" in liberating the Israeli-occupied Arab lands.

From the beginning, Soviet relations with President Sadat were marked with turbulence and mutual suspicion. The relationship was further aggravated by Sadat's removal of the pro-Russian clique of the Egyptian leadership, and by his warm reception of U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers. The dangers of a substantial reorientation of Egyptian policies prompted Moscow to respond by sending President Nikolai Podgorny to Cairo, with a fifteen-year "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" to be signed by Sadat (May 1971). President Sadat was obviously annoyed by Soviet insistence and timing, but he signed the treaty, thus repudiating a long-standing Egyptian policy of "no foreign pacts." Sadat defended his decision to sign the treaty on the basis that it contained secret military clauses, which he claimed "added new guarantees which had not been defined previously." The operative clauses of the pact called for prior Egyptian consultation with Moscow on major policy issues. The aim of the Russians was clearly to formalize Egyptian dependence on Soviet assistance, thus ensuring greater security for the degree of political influence then exercised by the Kremlin.

President Sadat clearly aimed at a military solution to Egypt's problems in 1971. To this end, Sadat persisted in his demands for sophisticated, non-nuclear offensive weapons (specifically tactical surface-to-surface missiles and the MiG-25 FOXBAT jet aircraft) to overcome Israeli offensive advantages. The Politburo sympathized and temporized, and Sadat's frustration grew accordingly. The situation was further aggravated by the speed with which Moscow went to the assistance of India in her short war with Pakistan in
December 1971. This aid appeared to Sadat to be at Egyptian expense, indicating a higher Soviet strategic priority in the Indian subcontinent than in the Middle East. The Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, Vladimir Vinogradov, hastened to repair the damage in mid-December by assuring Egyptian journalists that the USSR would support Egypt whether it chose peaceful means or war to regain the occupied territories. This statement was interpreted by the Arabs to indicate the possibility of Soviet tactical air support and air defense operations during an Egyptian invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. 58 1971 ended, however, without the decision publicly promised by President Sadat, and the situation of "no peace - no war" continued.

The Egyptians were now concluding that the intolerable state of affairs was to the advantage of the Russians and that Moscow desired to perpetuate the atmosphere of "controlled tension" which had enabled them to make and keep their impressive gains in the Arab world, without unduly antagonizing the United States, or endangering the prospects of superpower detente.

By this time, Soviet aid to Egypt was costing the USSR about five million dollars a day, approximately forty per cent of her world-wide military aid, and about ten per cent of the total Soviet military equipment budget (exclusive of nuclear and space programs). 59 In addition to monetary and agricultural repayments, the Soviet Union managed to win non-economic repayments in the form of concessions of base rights and port facilities. Soviet naval patrol aircraft, with Egyptian markings, were based in Egypt, directly supporting the Soviet Navy Mediterranean squadron; Alexandria, Port Said and Mersa Matruh became important naval supply and repair facilities for the Soviet Navy. 60

The continued presence of the Soviet military personnel in Egypt began to be viewed as an obstacle rather than an aid to the recovery of the occupied territories. While their presence did discourage Israel from applying direct military pressure on Cairo, they did not concomitantly add to Egypt's own offensive military capability vis-a-vis Israel. The massive Russian presence was becoming increasing onerous to the Egyptian leadership, military and general public. Sarcastic stories circulated in Cairo about the haggling of Russians over food prices, and greedy buying in bazaars of items that could easily be smuggled into the Soviet Union to be resold on the black market. The arrogant behavior of Soviet advisors toward the Egyptian military, and the barring of even high-ranking Egyptian military personnel and government officials from Soviet bases, rankled the pride of the Egyptian leadership. In short, the Russians were thoroughly disliked and resented, and the feelings were mutual. 62
Mohamed Heikal, Chief Editor of the Egyptian semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram, earned the enmity of the Soviet leaders with a series of controversial articles in which he called for an end to the ruinous state of "no peace - no war" which he claimed was benefiting the Soviet Union but not Egypt. By June 1972, Egypt's disenchancement with the Russians was gaining momentum, and reached the point where Egyptian leaders were forced to re-evaluate the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Militarily, the Egyptians had no viable option. Sadat's problems were monumental: (1) Egypt was increasingly dependent on Soviet military and economic aid; (2) no prospect was in sight for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; (3) Sadat had made a number of unfilled promises to the Egyptian people; (4) there was growing tension between the Egyptian military and their Soviet advisors, and (5) the Egyptian people were becoming increasingly disaffected from Sadat regarding the continuation of the state of "no peace - no war." Only a dramatic move could save Sadat's political career. With Soviet forces stationed in his country, Sadat was not in control of all the military facilities or forces within Egyptian borders, and could not unilaterally launch a war against Israel without Soviet permission and active assistance. The association was too close to permit independent Egyptian action to resolve the Middle East conflict. The Russians continued to counsel a negotiated settlement, but Sadat had despaired of a peaceful solution long before. Since the USSR had made it clear that it would not commit its military forces on behalf of Egypt, Sadat was left with only one solution.

When I realized that the battle was inevitable and that the Americans and Russians reached a non-confrontation agreement at the Moscow meeting, I decided to liquidate the Russian military presence, because the presence of a single Russian soldier on the land of Egypt when my battle with Israel begins, constitutes a great service to Israeli strategy. Israel would claim that it is fighting the Russians, and not the Arabs, and thus win American and even European, public opinion. The meaning of this is that the Russians had become a burden on us. They do not fight and yet they give our enemy a means of blackmail to cover up what he is getting from the United States.

The decision was made. On July 13, Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sidqi and Foreign Minister Murad Ghaleb flew to Moscow carrying the expulsion order. They were scheduled to stay for three days, but returned after only one. As they left, Moscow issued an official communiqué conceding that the Arabs could "use all means at their disposal" to recover the Israeli-occupied territories.
The decision was officially announced by President Sadat on July 18, 1972. He advanced the following reasons for his decision: (1) his disappointment with the type of weapons and the pace of arms deliveries from the USSR to Egypt, and (2) his disappointment with the outcome of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit conference in Moscow in May, insofar as the Middle East was concerned.

The expulsion order was a major surprise, and world reaction was generally restrained. The order was promptly implemented and the withdrawal was completed in about three weeks. The expulsion order initially exempted air defense units, but Moscow withdrew them anyway, perhaps as a form of punishment. Sadat responded by ordering out the Soviet reconnaissance units. The bulk of the air defense equipment was, however, turned over to the Egyptians. Four MiG-25 FOXBAT aircraft, piloted by Soviet pilots, were also removed. By the end of 1972, only 700 or so Soviet instructors were believed to be in Egypt.

The calmness of the Soviet reaction was dictated by necessity. A military takeover or political coup were nearly impossible, and a propaganda campaign of bitter recrimination would not only be pointless, but probably counterproductive as well. "Rather than risk being dragged along by its desperate client into confrontation with U.S. power, Moscow accepted the humiliation of expulsion with dignity and studied indifference." The USSR overtly tried to minimize the conflict by continuing arms and economic aid to Egypt. This pragmatic approach managed to prevent a chain reaction of adversities in the Arab world, and the USSR attempted to recoup her losses in Egypt by making significant gains in Syria and Iraq.

The Soviet press sensibly described the withdrawals as the natural ending of a successful, short-term mission.

The Soviet military personnel in the ARE (Arab Republic of Egypt) have now fulfilled their mission. In consideration of this fact and after a suitable exchange of opinions between the two sides, it has been deemed expedient to bring back to the Soviet Union those military personnel who were assigned to Egypt for a limited period of time. These personnel will return in the very near future.

This was the first open acknowledgement in the Soviet press that Soviet military personnel had been stationed in Egypt. While downplaying the Soviet withdrawal, the Soviet press was unable to completely ignore its Egyptian domestic opposition.

One cannot ignore the fact, however, that in several
Arab countries, Egypt included, right-wing reactionary forces opposed to social change are struggling to become more active. These forces are trying to sabotage progressive reforms and simultaneously undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.71

The American reaction was cautious and slow in coming, and it was basically noncommittal. It was widely believed by the U.S. government that any expression of American approval would only tend to complicate President Sadat's already difficult position, and could easily redound to the disadvantage of the United States.72

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

Freed from the constraints imposed by the presence of a large foreign military force, President Sadat was finally able to begin serious preparations for a new war to recover the Israeli-occupied Arab lands by force. The plans were finalized, and the Russians were formally informed about the war plans in a letter from Sadat to Brezhnev on September 22.73 The dependents of Soviet advisors and diplomatic personnel in Egypt and Syria were then evacuated by air.74

The machinery of war was irrevocably set into motion. Sadat hoped to break the deadlock, and achieve quick success on the battlefield, thus enhancing his stature and Egypt's international prestige. It appears that his objectives were limited from the beginning, and that he never expected his forces to advance more than twenty miles east of the Suez Canal. The Arab strategy was probably to recapture some of the territory lost to Israel in 1967, followed by quick agreement to abide by international demands for a cease fire. This would leave the reconquered territory under Arab control, and would place the onus on Israel if she did not stop fighting. All arrangements had been made; Arab unity had been achieved, and Egypt was determined to get in the first strike in this war. At 2:00 a.m. on October 6, 1973, over 8,000 heavily-equipped Egyptian assault troops bridged the Suez Canal and soon overwhelmed the surprised defenders of the Bar-Lev line.75 Coordinated Syrian attacks struck Israeli positions in the Golan Heights, and the 1973 October War was under way.

The fighting began on the Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, the quietest and most solemn moment in the Jewish religious year. Thousands of Israeli servicemen were home on leave, and the Arabs
were able to make rapid progress in the first few days of fighting. Although Israel was clearly the victim of an Arab first strike, the Arabs and Soviet bloc rapidly leveled the customary charges of "Israeli aggression," contending that Israel had started the war.76

The Arab side was determined not to repeat the mistakes of 1967. This was why they did not give Israel the first strike, and this was why they so carefully synchronized their major offensives from Egypt and Syria, holding Jordanian and other Arab forces in reserve. President Sadat went to war only after mobilizing the entire Arab world for military, diplomatic and financial support.

The Soviet Union was prepared to go to considerable risk in support of its Arab clients (and in support of its hard-won position in the Arab world). The prompt and massive resupply effort was extremely provocative. To add fuel to the fire, the USSR urged other Arab nations, notably Iraq and Algeria, to get into the fray against Israel, and further, that the Soviet equipment they had received was given for this very purpose.77

The Soviet press placed great emphasis on Arab expressions of gratitude to the Soviet government and people for their support in the war.

In these critical days, words of gratitude resounded with special force in Egypt and Syria for the support our country has given in the just struggle of the Arab states for the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression... Arab-Soviet friendship is a factor which enables liberated Arab states who are trying to embark on a course of progressive development, to preserve their independence.78

Arab criticism of the American role in the war was also prominently featured.

A. Sadat sharply criticized the position taken by the United States in the present conflict in the Middle East. The United States, he said, has undertaken a policy of arms, and we and all Arab nations cannot remain calm and silent in this regard. At a time when we are striking against aggression in order to eliminate its ugly shadow from our occupied territory, the USA hurried to take the side of the aggressor. However, we are not intimidated by the new shipments of tanks, aircraft, artillery, rockets and electronic equipment to Israel....
We know our friends and our enemies, said the President in conclusion. We have true and sincere friends, and the Arab world will not forget them, just as we will not forget those who took the side of our enemies.

The success achieved by the Arab forces was attributed to a great extent to the high quality of weaponry and training supplied by the Soviet Union.

In the first days of the present war, the Arabs, as the American weekly magazine "U.S. News and World Report" recognized, achieved "unprecedented military successes." ... Successes of the Arab armies, in the general opinion of the foreign press, were largely due to first class Soviet military technology - which the Arab soldiers knew how to use.

"This war," noted the newspaper "New York Times," precipitated a whole series of military surprises. The first of these, and the last analysis the most important from the military point of view, was the demonstration by Egypt and Syria of the fact that they were capable of using and servicing modern types of weapons in the course of battle.

It is a common device of Soviet journalism to quote Western sources in the open press, either as a tacit admission that they do not have an independent reporting capability in certain parts of the world, or that their veracity is enhanced in the eyes of Soviet readers by citing Western sources.

The Soviet Union evidently expected the October War to reverse the flow of their ebbing influence in the Middle East, and they confidently predicted that anti-Soviet elements responsible for many of their problems would be broken up and anti-Soviet myths shattered.

A number of observers noted that another serious result of the events of October in the Middle East was the break up of the anti-Soviet elements, who do not shrink from any kind of insinuations regarding Soviet policies, and who tried to disassociate the Arab world from the Soviet Union. But during the October War, a number of anti-Soviet myths were completely shattered - myths which had been strongly pushed by the imperialists, and also by Arab reactionary elements - starting with the fabrication about the quality of Soviet weapons which had been deployed to Egypt and Syria, and ending with
the idle talk about the "withdrawal" of the Soviet Union from the principal position of supporting the just struggle of the Arab peoples for the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression.

The myth of Arab military incompetence was laid to rest, as was the myth of Israeli military invincibility.

In defining the significance of the October War for the soldiers of Egypt, the Cairo correspondent of "Pravda" wrote: "Stepping across the Suez Canal was, for the Egyptian soldier, a step across the 1967 defeat. The Egyptian people gained confidence in their own forces."

The Israeli Army suffered for the first time great numbers of casualties along with the destruction of hundreds of tanks and aircraft.

"The myth of Arab military incompetence has now been laid to rest." wrote the "Washington Post."

The American resupply effort was reported to the Soviet public in great detail:

WASHINGTON: 18 October. (TASS)
The Senate of the USA supported a decision by the American government concerning heavy military shipments to Israel. The leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, S. Mansfield, justified sending military aid to Tel Aviv by referring to the "necessity to maintain the military balance in the Middle East."...the speeches of the senators decisively expressed opposition to direct US military involvement in the Middle East conflict.

The newspaper "Christian Science Monitor" revealed that 24 "F-4 Phantom" jet fighters and also air-to-surface missiles have already been sent to Israel to replace military losses. Sparing no expense, the Pentagon is sending 700-800 tons of military hardware to the Israeli aggressors daily.

Even in Tel Aviv they recognize that Israel suffered significant losses in the October War....just in the Sinai Peninsula, they suffered the loss of about a billion dollars worth of military equipment and materiel....These losses were quickly made good first of all on account of American arms shipments. According to the Western press, in the final stages of the battle,
Israel received from the USA as many as 50 "Phantom" fighter-bombers, 50-80 "Skyhawk" aircraft, 500 M-60 tanks, 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles, a large quantity of "Maverick" "air-to-surface" missiles, and other weapons. 86

During the war, the Soviet reader was left with the impression that the United States alone was feeding the fires of war, while the Soviet Union was refraining from resupplying its Arab clients in the interest of peace. The difficulties encountered by the United States in resupplying Israel were recounted with obvious relish:

The FMG refused to allow the United States to use its territory for the transfer of weapons to Israel; England and France placed a complete embargo on the export of weapons to the belligerents, including Israel. For all practical purposes, the USA was unable to use the territory of even one of its Western European allies for transferring weapons and munitions to the Israeli Army, with the exception of the Fascist regime in Portugal.87

It was not until 1975, during a critical period of Egyptian–Soviet relations, that the Soviet press first revealed the existence of the Soviet resupply effort to the Arabs during the war.88

In October 1973, the Soviet Union undertook effective measures in support of Egypt and other Arab countries. An "aerial bridge" was organized for timely delivery to Egypt of great quantities of additional military equipment. Weapons and munitions were sent from the USSR also by sea. In this regard Sadat told the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo on October 7, 1973: "I am unable to find the words to express our deep gratitude to the Soviet leadership, and the genuine friendship of Egypt. It will always remain in my heart and in the hearts of all Egyptians."89

The Soviet government expressed innocent amazement and wounded dignity at Nixon's declaration of DEFCON-3 for American forces overseas:

In relation to events in the Middle East, it was reported in Washington that the American armed forces were brought to a higher state of readiness in a few regions, to include Europe.
Government officials, in trying to justify such a step, alluded to some kind of action by the Soviet Union which purportedly was the basis for concern.

TASS was authorized to declare that such an explanation was absurd, since Soviet actions are strictly directed toward promoting the accomplishment of decisions of the Security Council concerning a cease fire, and the restoration of peace in the Middle East. This step by the USA, which hardly facilitates a reduction of international tensions, was clearly taken in an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union. It is appropriate, however, to say to its initiators, that they chose the wrong address for their stated goals.90

The Soviet press avidly seized on an American denial that any Soviet move prompted the alert declaration.

...the President of the USA tried to justify the decision taken in the past few days in Washington concerning the placement of the armed forces of the United States at a higher state of readiness in a few areas, to include Europe.

...the Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger, holding his press conference before the press conference of R. Nixon, was forced to recognize that he had "no information" about any kind of activities of the Soviet Union which would provide a basis for concern.91

Again, this move not only caused further complications in NATO, but the speculation that this move might be related to the Watergate scandal was reported.

Disagreements between a number of Western European countries and the United States were especially aggravated after the USA, without prior consultation with its NATO allies, raised the military readiness condition of its armed forces in many bases, to include those in Europe....this US measure was supposedly taken in response to the "reality of unilateral intervention of the USSR in the Middle East." As many observers noted, the fact of the matter is that this measure, resorted to by the White House, had a demonstrative character, and in addition, had an internal purpose: under conditions of the Watergate scandal and at the moment of attacks on President Nixon, he and his immediate circle wanted to demonstrate his "firmness" and "capability to function" when the "interests of the USA were at stake."92
At long last, efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution in the United Nations bore fruit. After two days of hard bargaining in Moscow between Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev, the US Ambassador to the UN, John Scali, placed a joint US-USSR resolution before the Security Council. It consisted of three interrelated parts: (1) a cease fire in place within twelve hours after the adoption of the resolution; (2) implementation of UN Resolution 242 "in all its parts", and (3) negotiations between the parties concerned. This became known as Resolution 388 of October 22, 1973. Unfortunately, this proclamatory cease fire was not implemented, and the Israelis succeeded in cutting off the Egyptian Third Army, and in occupying Suez City (As Suways). Each side accused the other of violating the cease fire.93

The Russians were active in Cairo to boost Egyptian morale, in Washington to bring pressure on the Israelis, and at the UN to legitimize whatever subsequent moves might be necessary. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin worked on a new resolution urging the two sides to return to the battle lines of October 22, and requesting the UN Secretary General to send international observers to supervise the cease fire.94 The Security Council was again forced to rubber stamp a joint US-USSR sponsored resolution, and the Yom Kippur War sputtered to an inconclusive end.

THE BREAK

Despite Soviet willingness to support the Arabs during the war with massive materiel shipments, strains continued to be evident in the Moscow-Cairo relationship. Soviet insistence that the weapons be paid for in hard currency did not endear the Soviets to the Egyptians. Sadat retaliated by limiting Soviet contact with Egyptian troop units during the war, and by restricting their access to vital equipment evaluation reports.95

By April 18, 1974, the strains were brought out into the open in a speech by President Sadat. He announced that henceforth Egypt would seek to diversify its sources of arms supplies,96 and end its exclusive reliance on the USSR. Sadat explained that this decision was necessitated by the fact that the Soviet Union had, for the previous six months, failed to act on his requests for more advanced weaponry. Immediately after this speech, all shipments of Soviet military equipment, and spare parts as well, came to a halt (except for two shipments of spare parts received in August 1974).97
Egypt still hoped that arms shipments from the USSR might be resumed on a more equitable basis, and a visit to Cairo by Leonid Brezhnev was scheduled for January 1975. These hopes were dashed when Moscow announced an indefinite postponement of Brezhnev's visit, ostensibly for reasons of health.

In the wake of this disappointing announcement, Sadat went public, complaining in an interview that "I want every Arab to know that since the ceasefire of October 1973...there has been no Soviet replenishment and no major arms received up to this moment." Sadat immediately left for France on an arms-buying expedition. He concluded a deal of ominous (for the USSR) significance, purchasing several hundred million dollars of military equipment, including 44 Mirage F-1 fighter planes (to be added to the 36 previously ordered by Saudi Arabia on his behalf).

Moscow got the message. On February 3, 1975, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in Cairo for two days of talks. He re-activated some arms contracts which had been suspended by Moscow in early 1974, and by the middle of the month, an initial delivery of six MiG-23 advanced swing-wing fighter-bombers was made to Egypt. Spare parts and other previously ordered equipment also began to arrive. MiG-23 strength reached two squadrons (about 24 aircraft) by early 1975, and over-all combat strength of the Egyptian armed forces finally reached to nearly its pre-October war level.

Despite these deliveries, the MiG-23 aircraft received by Egypt cannot be employed to their full potential without concurrent employment of the TU-114 AWACS aircraft, which the Soviet government has not supplied, presumably due to the risk of technological compromise of its sophisticated early warning and control equipment. In addition, shipments of SAM missiles and spares virtually ceased, causing the Air Defense Commander of Egypt to complain that his forces "have not received a single missile replacement from the Soviet Union since the end of the October War."99

Difficulties arising from the process of absorbing the new Mirage aircraft into a system based on Soviet equipment further tended to diminish the combat effectiveness of the Egyptian armed forces. By the end of 1975, all shipments of new weapons and spare parts had virtually come to an end. The vast inventory of Soviet matériel was gradually turning into just so much junk as shortages of spare parts and munitions made themselves felt. As a consequence, the standard flight time for Egyptian pilots was reduced from 20 to 15 hours per month. In an effort to alleviate this
problem, Egypt made arrangements for two American firms to rebuild her fleet of 200 MiG-21 aircraft, and to fit them with British Rolls-Royce jet engines.100

To make matters worse for Sadat, the Russians were demanding that Cairo resume payments for military equipment, thus denying Egypt’s plea for a resumed moratorium on repayments of Egypt’s military aid debt (approximately 1.5 to 2 billion dollars). Servicing this debt required a reported 75% of Egypt’s annual exports - which would otherwise be capable of earning badly-needed hard currency. Sadat’s appeal for a renewed ten-year suspension of arms payments to enable Egypt to build its national economy was denied, despite (according to Sadat) the fact that Syria was granted just such a reprieve. Sadat complained publicly about the Soviet government’s rejection of a payment’s delay on May 1, 1975. Foreign Minister Fahmi made the initial request in Moscow, and it was rejected. Sadat said, “We never said we will not pay, we are asking for a reassessment of our position.” Distinguishing between new agreements and deliveries made under pre-October war commitments, he complained that “The Soviet Union has refused to replace our losses, even if we pay cash.”101 Sadat was further infuriated by the Soviet Union’s agreement to furnish Libya with large amounts of sophisticated military equipment. Sadat claimed it was absolutely irresponsible to furnish Qaddafi, viewed by Sadat as “100 per cent sick” with “expensive and dangerous war toys.”102

Sadat embarked on a serious attempt to procure arms from the West. Many Egyptian military officers were understandably dismayed by Sadat’s new procurement policies, which, initially at least, did in fact seriously impair the combat readiness of the Egyptian military forces. This sentiment is undoubtedly being actively nurtured by the Soviet Union. Even the Egyptian Communist Party, inactive on Moscow’s orders since 1964, appears to be ready to return to action.

Sadat has, in turn, hampered the Soviet Union’s use of its naval facilities in Egypt. Since early 1975, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has been denied the use of its facilities in the port of Marsa Matruh and in the Gulf of Sollum. Egyptian permission has always been required for Soviet ships to enter Egyptian waters, and permission had always been routinely granted. Now, however, these requests are not even answered, thereby denying entrance. Although the Soviet port facilities in Alexandria are still in use, Egyptian harassment and bureaucratic delays continue to put pressure on the Soviet Union to resolve Egypt’s military debt question. After the October War, the Soviet Union once again
stationed four MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft in Egypt, for the purpose of surveillance in the Middle East. These aircraft have also been withdrawn and presumably have been restationed in Syria.

In an interview published by a Kuwaiti newspaper on September 9, 1975, President Sadat bitterly denounced the Soviet Union, stating that "no person with dignity can accept the method of Russian dealing." He accused the Russians of failing him in his "Year of Decision," and said "Since I assumed power in Egypt, the Russians have not been satisfied with me. They want another President." Concerning arms supplies, Sadat complained that he was always "ten steps behind Israel and three steps behind Syria."103

The Soviet Union could not ignore the Egyptian charges. The following quotations from the Soviet press clearly show the worsening state of Soviet-Egyptian relations:

I. Fakiri emphasized that "there are no disagreements concerning international problems between us and the Soviet Union." "...whoever imagines that Egypt sees the Soviet Union only as a source of arms is greatly mistaken."104

Egypt has not in the past and does not now consider denouncing the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.105

The cooperation of the Soviet Union and Egypt in the international arena became an important and ponderable factor of contemporary international relations in the Middle East. The Soviet Union unwaveringly supported all stages of the just struggle of the Egyptian people for their freedom and independence. So it was in 1956 - in the days of the tripartite aggression against Egypt; so it was in 1967 when Israel unleashed its aggression against three Arab states - Egypt, Syria and Jordan; so it was in October 1973 when the conflict situation, caused by Israel's aggressive policies, once again was enflamed by military action in this area between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Is it really possible to deny these incontestable facts without violating all understanding of conscience and honor?...

Can Egypt count on military support of those forces from which it has just freed itself? It would be strange to expect that the imperialist states would be interested in developing the strength of Egypt's military power.
They wouldn't do it. And after the October War of 1973 the Soviet Union consistently continues the course of developing friendly cooperation with Egypt in the military area, in accordance with existing agreements. But everyone knows that this is a two-way street. Cooperation cannot be developed if one of the sides undertakes to undermine it.106

After Sadat broke the "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" with the USSR, the rhetoric heated up considerably:

The culminating moment of anti-Soviet action was Sadat's decision of March 15, 1976 to unilaterally terminate the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the ARE. Many newspapers wrote about Sadat's decision in relation to U.S. Middle East policies, including the Algerian newspaper "Al Mudzhachid." "The President of the ARE," in the words of the newspaper, "plays the role of persistent supplicant to the USA and Saudi Arabia, which have placed the condition of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet policies on economic aid to Egypt."107

Thus, Sadat resorted to a gross distortion of the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations, of policies of the Soviet Union in relation to Egypt, including the period of the so-called October War of 1973, when, as everyone knows, Soviet military assistance played a decisive role in strengthening the military potential of Egypt.108

WASHINGTON, 25 (March 1976) (TASS). The newspaper "Washington Star-News" wrote: President Sadat, in terminating the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, burned all his bridges behind him. Whatever he expects from the point of view of friendship and cooperation, and primarily, of arms shipments, is rather problematic. According to prevailing public opinion in the USA, Sadat, in terminating relations with the USSR, is trying to improve his chances of receiving military aid from the USA.... American politicians, continues the newspaper, first of all need to consider the size of effort necessary for a complete re-equipping of the army, which numbers 332,500 men, 450 military aircraft, 2,000 tanks, and approximately 1,700 artillery pieces. It would take
many years and many millions of dollars. The opinion that this will strengthen the situation in the Middle East as a whole is very doubtful. Before turning to the United States as a primary source of military equipment, Egypt should reconsider, and the American government should be very careful. 109

CAIRO, 4 (Oct 1976) (MASS). The reactionary Egyptian press is using the approaching anniversary of the October 1973 War as an occasion for new slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union. As an example, in an article in the newspaper "Achbar al-Yaum," the Soviet Union was accused of supposedly trying to hinder Egypt from achieving victory over the Israeli aggressors. Soviet military specialists sent to Egypt, according to the newspaper, fulfilled their tasks without any enthusiasm, considering that their mission had a political and not a military character. This campaign in the Egyptian press, which is carried out with the permission of the Egyptian government, reflects the anti-Soviet inclination of reactionary circles in the ABE. It is new evidence that the policies of the present Egyptian government are diametrically opposed to the fundamental interests of the Egyptian people and the peoples of other Arab countries. 110

In the course of more than two decades of friendly Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in the interest of the anti-imperialist struggle and for the freedom of peoples, said the proclamation, the Soviet Union rendered great assistance to Egypt in the development of its economy and the strengthening of the defense capabilities of Egypt.

...the Egyptian leadership followed the road of distortion of everything which is connected with cooperation with the USSR, especially in the military area. Despite this, it is generally known that it was due to the shipments of Soviet weapons that the Egyptian armed forces were able to resist the Israeli aggressor over a long period of time, gaining a victory during the 1973 October War. ...The policy of the present leadership of Egypt is contrary to the fundamental interests of the Egyptian people and the peoples of other Arab countries. 111

33
Anything contrary to Soviet interests in the Middle East is consistently interpreted as contrary to Arab interests.112

After its loss of influence in Egypt, the USSR again bolstered its support to Syria and Iraq, and placed its hopes in the convening of a Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.113 As co-chairman of this conference, it could at least count on being part of the peace decision.114 The Soviet fear was apparently that it might well be excluded from any peace settlement in the Middle East,115 and the widely-advertised joint US-Soviet declaration on the Middle East seemed for a while to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet position.116

The USSR had long feared that Egypt might seek a separate peace with Israel,117 and Sadat's unprecedented peace initiative in Jerusalem only served to exacerbate Moscow's insecurities in the region.118 The worst of motives were attributed to Sadat's decision,119 and the growth of Israel's military potential was hung, like a sword of Damocles, over the broken Arab ranks.120 The resignation of Egypt's Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi121 in protest against the visit was cited as proof of the Soviet view that the Middle East question cannot be solved on a piecemeal basis.122 Sadat's initiative has probably sealed his fate so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. It is unlikely that Egypt will receive any kind of military assistance whatsoever so long as Sadat remains in power. Conversely, Egypt's chances for significant Western military aid have been dramatically enhanced by recent developments.
CONCLUSIONS

Since the inception of the Soviet non-bloc military assistance program in 1955, Egypt has been the recipient of an estimated 3.4 billion dollars in Soviet arms aid. This is roughly one-half of the military assistance extended by the USSR to the Arab world, which in itself comprised approximately 60% of the entire total of Soviet military assistance worldwide from 1955 to 1974. Egypt has clearly been the recipient of the greatest amount of Soviet military aid, and as such, the record of the Soviet military assistance program in this country can provide illuminating insights into the shortcomings and problems inherent in the Soviet military assistance program as a whole.

Soviet arms diplomacy in the Middle East and in Egypt has had many notable successes over the years. Soviet diplomatic, cultural, economic and military influence have grown as a result of the Soviet defense of the Arab cause against Israel and the West. In addition, the Western arms monopoly in the region was broken in 1955, the Baghdad Pact was shattered, and the United States was denied the opportunity to totally replace the British as they withdrew their military presence from the Middle East. Soviet prestige has grown, and the USSR has been generally recognized as a great power in the world strategic context. The USSR has succeeded in obtaining port rights ("facilities"), and increased its naval strength in the Mediterranean Sea to near parity with the United States.

In purely military terms, the Soviet Union has demonstrated a number of major achievements which could impact on any future Arab-Israeli war: (1) They have achieved a rough strategic parity with the United States, and have received American acknowledgment of this fact; (2) they have developed a coherent theory of Soviet participation in limited conventional warfare beyond the borders of the USSR; (3) they have succeeded in establishing a Soviet naval presence in all oceans of the world; (4) they temporarily equipped a non-bloc ally (Egypt) with a Soviet-manned air defense system; (5) they successfully mounted a major resupply effort to non-Communist belligerents in a war (Egypt and Syria, and Ethiopia more recently), and (6) they threatened direct conventional intervention in a non-contiguous area (Egypt in 1973 War).

Despite these significant achievements, the Soviet Union has suffered setbacks, disappointments and failures in the Middle East, and in Egypt in particular. Although it is not an immediate policy
goal, no Communist regime has yet come to power in the Middle East (though several have professed socialist philosophies), and Soviet policies generally seem to operate to the detriment of local Communist parties. Second, the Soviet Union has not succeeded in excluding Western or American influence from the region. This is caused by another loss factor - the widespread dissatisfaction with Soviet support which has, in Egypt's case at least, caused the Arabs to turn to the West for aid. A third persistent problem is that the prestige of the Soviet Union worldwide tends to suffer whenever her Arab clients suffer a military reverse. Battlefield losses have also allowed new and sophisticated weaponry to be captured by the Israelis, and therefore to be technologically compromised.

Although demonstrably unwilling to jeopardize its national security on behalf of its Arab clients, Moscow continued to make every effort to accomplish its secondary goal - to increase and extend Soviet influence through the manipulation of its military and economic assistance programs. While potential influence remains strongest in situations where military requirements remain pressing, exertions of pressure by the USSR have not met with apparent success. It is evident, moreover, that the Soviet Union is unwilling in general to compromise its foreign policy merely to express dissatisfaction, on ideological grounds, with the internal policies of recipient nations. An example in point is the failure of the USSR to threaten to cut off military or economic aid to Egypt, or even to protest convincingly, when the Egyptian regime began suppressing its indigenous Communists. Despite their role as the monopoly military supplier, they have consistently lacked the leverage to maintain even a minimum level of control over situations and confrontations as they developed in the area, and were therefore prisoners of circumstances in many cases. The Soviets had military presence without specific political influence. To be sure, the Soviet Union has exercised some influence on decisions made in Cairo because of the depth of Arab dependence on the USSR, but the street goes both ways - the Egyptians have exercised some influence over the USSR by virtue of their independence, and because Moscow could perceive few alternatives to its arrangements with Cairo. The USSR clearly recognized that its influence would persist only so long as its aid was both needed and forthcoming, and that the superior-subordinate relationship between supplier and client tends to balance out with time as the client becomes more assertive and demanding (shown both by the American experience in Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Egypt). The USSR unsuccessfully tried to maintain a balance between the risk of losing influence in Egypt due to insufficient support, and the risk of a new
war which might involve Soviet participation through excessive support. Through recent Soviet and American experiences, the theory that decisive political leverage is attainable through arms transfers is essentially bankrupt.

Despite the long-term and massive level of Soviet military assistance to Egypt, Moscow has been unable to translate this effort into effective political leverage, and its attempts to do so have only tended to have the opposite effect. The Soviet political system seems to foreclose the option that the USSR might have genuine allies in the Western sense - independent and free, yet voluntarily associated with the Soviet Union because of common military, economic and political interests. The USSR cannot seem to shake the old concept that countries are either adversaries or satellites, and the heavy-handed approach implicit in either assumption is counter-productive to long-term Soviet interests. A classic example is Egypt. Despite the commonality of interests and the many compatible aims and desires of both countries, the USSR mishandled its opportunities and only succeeded in forcing an erstwhile "ally" into becoming a genuine antagonist. Egypt considers its relationship with the Soviet Union as "dealing with the Devil" (which only becomes objectionable when the relationship begins to favor the Devil), while the Russians have found that dealing with the Arabs is like "swimming in molasses." The Russians most certainly agree with George F. Kennan's assessment:

Given the passionate, volatile, and intensely self-centered disposition of the Arabs, their friendship could be in many instances hardly less onerous than their hostility.125

Egypt remains independent, despite the almost universal prognostications of political analysts in the early 1970's that Egypt would become virtually a Soviet satellite. Despite 23 years of effort, the Soviet military assistance program has been unable to serve the political goals of the USSR in Egypt, and Soviet influence in Egypt may now be even less than it was in 1955. The break has been made, and for now, it appears to be permanent.
## APPENDIX 1

EGYPTIAN WEAPONS HOLDINGS: 1967-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Weapon</th>
<th>Post Six-Day War (Mid 1967-Mid 1969)</th>
<th>&quot;War of Attrition&quot; (Mid 1969-Mid 1971)</th>
<th>Pre Yom Kippur War (Mid 1971-Mid 1973)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21 Interceptors</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100-200</td>
<td>210-220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-19 Interceptors</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-15/17 Fighter-bombers</td>
<td>60-120</td>
<td>120-200</td>
<td>100-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-7  Fighter-bombers</td>
<td>0-90</td>
<td>90-110</td>
<td>80-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-28 Light bombers</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-16 Medium bombers</td>
<td>0-12</td>
<td>12-18</td>
<td>18-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** These totals do not reflect aircraft under exclusive Soviet control stationed in Egypt.

| SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES |                                      |                                        |                                        |
|-----------------------------|                                      |                                        |                                        |
| SAMLETS                     | 25                                    | 25                                      | 25-100                                 |
| FROG 3                      | 0-24                                  | 24                                      | 24                                      |
| FROG 7                      | 0                                     | 0                                       | Some                                   |
| SCUD                        | 0                                     | 0                                       | 0-30                                    |

| SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES (Launchers) |                                      |                                        |                                        |
|-------------------------------------|                                      |                                        |                                        |
| SAM-2                               | 150-180                               | 180-420                                | 600-780                                |
| SAM-3                               | 0                                     | 0-260                                  | 260-780                                |
| SAM-6                               | 0                                     | 0                                      | Some—Many                              |

**ARTILLERY**

| Medium/Heavy Guns              | Many—500                              | 500-1540                               | 1540-1690                              |
| Self-propelled Guns            | Many—150                              | 150                                    | 150                                    |

**ANTITANK MISSILES**

| Antitank Guns                  | Many                                  | Many                                   | Many                                   |
| Snapper Missiles               | Some                                  | Some                                   | Some                                   |
| Sagger Missiles                | 0                                     | 0                                      | Many                                   |
APPENDIX 1, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TANKS</th>
<th>Post Six-Day War</th>
<th>&quot;War of Attrition&quot;</th>
<th>Pre Yom Kippur War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-62 Medium tanks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54/55 Medium tanks</td>
<td>250-650</td>
<td>650-1200</td>
<td>1500-1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-34 Medium tanks</td>
<td>70-150</td>
<td>150-250</td>
<td>400+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS-III and T-10 Heavy tanks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20-50</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76 Light tanks</td>
<td>0-50</td>
<td>50-150</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOOTNOTES


2The Baghdad Pact in the Middle East was one of the anti-Soviet coalitions the USSR sought to dismantle. It was an alliance signed on February 24, 1955, by Turkey and Iraq, later joined by Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain. The USA was not a signatory, but participated in the alliance's committee work. After Iraq withdrew in 1959, the headquarters of the alliance moved from Baghdad to Ankara, and the alliance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).


4P. Nadezhdin, "Komu eto na Ruku?," Pravda, July 15, 1975, p. 4 quotation:

Let us remember that Egypt was the first Arab country to turn to the Soviet Union with a request for weapons deliveries. This occurred in 1955, after the Egyptian leaders became convinced that they couldn't rely on the capitalist West in this regard.


This was extremely popular in Egypt because it broke the West's arms monopoly in the area and enabled us to get weapons with which to defend ourselves at a time when America was denying them to Egypt....But in practice the arms deal created difficulties. The officer corps found itself getting arms it was unaccustomed to: the instructors were Russian, the instruction manuals were written in Russian. The whole army was obliged to switch from a Western to an Eastern outlook.

7 In the Soviet view, the Tripartite Agreement was but a vehicle 'in which the "USA, England and France factually declared a monopoly for themselves in shipments of weapons to countries of the Arab East." "Novyi nashim na arabskie strany," Izvestia, November 3, 1955, p.4.

8 Protopopov, p. 68.


10 "Novyi nashim na arabskie strany," p.4.

11 E.M. Primakov, "Prushiny Blihnevostochnoi Politiki SSHA," SSHA - Ekonomika-Politika-Ideologiya, 11-76, p. 13 quotation:

...Egypt reached an agreement with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia concerning weapons deliveries, which overturned the monopoly of the imperialist West on weapons shipments to the Arab countries.

"V interesakh mira i progressa na Blihnom Vostoke," Pravda, October 25, 1975, p. 4 states further:

It is therefore logical that President Nasser, in his national wisdom, took the historic decision in 1955 to turn to the Soviet Union with his request for assistance in strengthening the defense capabilities of the young republic.


14 Tiishkevich, p. 188 illustrates this Soviet contention well:

The world socialist system renders many forms of aid to developing states, to include aid in strengthening their defense capabilities and the development of their armed forces. The imperialist powers, conversely, try to turn these young states and their armed forces into weapons of the neo-colonialists. Among the forms used to implement neo-colonialist policies are "aid" to the young states by providing them with weapons and military equipment, by sending "instructors," by the bribery of officers of the armies of the young states, by the preservation of military
bases and garrisons on the territory of countries trying to gain political independence, etc.

"Zlobnaia fal'shivka," Pravda, April 29, 1976, p. 5 was issued to deny Western charges that it might be guilty of many of these same vices:

It is well known to the Arab world, that the USSR does not seek for itself any kind of gain and advantage in the Middle East, and is not trying to get military bases.

15F. I. Dolgopolov, Natsional'no-osvoboditel'nye Voiny na Sovremennom Etape (Moscow: Ministry of Defense USSR, 1977). p. 69, quotation:

The Soviet Union consequently supports the just cause of Arab patriots. Thus it was during the imperialist aggression against Egypt in 1956, after the invasion of American and English colonizers in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, with the goal of repressing the revolution in Iraq. In 1967 the USSR once again declared its solidarity with the Arab countries suffering from Israeli aggression. The October War of 1973 seemingly demonstrated what a great contribution the Soviet Union made in the strengthening of the military potential of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The USSR speaks for the liberation of all Arab territory and for securing the rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The military pact with peoples, forced to carry out armed struggle for independence and freedom, represents an important element of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. "We are now helping and will help fighters against imperialist interference in the affairs of peoples, victims of imperialist aggression" - said L. I. Brezhnev. - Forms of this aid may be extremely varied - diplomatic, economic or military, - but the content is the same, to repulse aggression, to defend the rights of peoples to independent development, defend the cause of peace and security of peoples, and no less to defend the interests of socialism.

16This arrangement proved to be somewhat unsatisfactory from the Egyptian viewpoint, since the USSR subsequently sold Egyptian cotton on the world market at low prices, thereby not only depressing the price received for the remainder of the Egyptian cotton crop, but also placing Egypt's traditional markets in jeopardy.

17Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 433 records Khrushchev's recollection regarding the arms sale:
I think we gave them military aid on a commercial basis, but at a reduced price.

18 Ibid., p. 433. Khrushchev recalls that Nasser's representatives approached the USSR for military aid "in order to put pressure on the English."


20 "Aggressiia Protiv Egipta Dolzhna Byt' Nemedlenno Presechena!" Pravda, October 31, 1956, p. 3.

21 "Ruki Proch' ot Egipta," Pravda, November 2, 1956, p. 3.

22 "Narody Mira Trebuuiut Prekrashchenii Agressii Protiv Egipta," Pravda, November 2, 1956, p. 3.

23 "Razboinich'ia Voina Protiv Egipta Dolzhna Byt' Presechena," Pravda, November 6, 1956, p. 3.


25 Primakov, 11-76, p. 13 wrote:

In 1956, Egypt was subject to the triple Anglo-French-Israeli aggression. But in 1957, England, France and Israel were forced to evacuate their forces from Egyptian territory under the pressure of the peace-loving forces.

Middle Eastern conflicts were always blamed on the West and on its imperialist tool, Israel. As an example, the following quote from the Soviet military press illustrates this tendency. From: "Voennye prigotovlenii Izrailia," Krasnaiia Zvezda, May 4, 1956, p. 4:

...a few Western powers are supporting and in all possible ways exaggerating the military psychosis in Israel, and do everything they can in order to precipitate a conflict between the Arab countries and Israel, and to increase tension in this area, which they hope to use as an excuse for armed interference in the internal affairs of countries of the Middle Fst.


27 Khrushchev Remembers, p. 434, recounts Khrushchev's recollections concerning this proposal to Eisenhower.
Molotov pointed out, quite correctly, "Eisenhower will never agree to join forces with us against England, France and Israel."

"Of course he won't, but by putting him in the position of having to refuse, we'll expose the hypocrisy of his public statement condemning the attack against Egypt...."


We announced publicly in the press that we were recruiting volunteers and advisors to help the Egyptian army. That had an immediate effect on the boss of the imperialists - that is, on the United States - with the result that the Americans put pressure on the British, French and Israelis, forcing them to withdraw their troops.

*29* See "Sredizemnomu Moreu - spokoinye vody," Izvestiia, February 17, 1970, p. 2 for an example of this contention.

*30* See I. I. Kovalenko, *Sovetskii Soluz v Bor'be za Mir i Kollektivnuuiu Bezopasnost' v Azii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), p. 247 for the Soviet view of the value of their economic assistance to Egypt, and the significance of the Aswan High Dam.

*31* Khrushchev, *The Last Testament*, pp. 345-346. Khrushchev, now out of power, candidly offered his opinion on the imbroglio:

I think the Soviet Union has to bear a large share of the responsibility for what happened. Given our influence with Nasser, given our ability to exert pressure on Egypt, we should have restrained the Egyptians from demonstrating their belligerence. You don't have to be very clever to realize that if someone insists on the removal of a neutral (UN) buffer force between himself and his enemy, he has fairly definite intentions with regard to that enemy. We shouldn't have let Nasser aggravate tensions that were building up, nor should we have let him provoke the Israeli's into striking first. Rather than trying to destroy Israel - a wholly unreasonable goal - Nasser should have used other means to protect the rights of the Arabs living in Israel.

I think our military men, more than our diplomats, are to blame. They should never have let the Egyptians force Israel into betting everything it had on a preventive attack.... They made a mistake by allowing the war to happen in the first place, and they didn't use our might to liquidate the consequences of the war after it was over.


36Nadezhdin, p. 4.

37After the war, the USSR sent about 3,000 "military specialists" to Egypt to advise their armed forces. With the concurrence of the Egyptian High Command, the USSR thus gained an important voice in the conduct of training and tactical doctrine within the Egyptian armed forces. See "V Interesakh mira i progressa na Blizhnem Vostoke," Pravda, October 25, 1975, p. 4, and A. Y. Yodfat, "Arms and Influence in Egypt - the Record of Soviet Military Assistance, Since June 1967," New Middle East (July 1969), p. 30.

38"V Interesakh mira i progressa na Blizhnem Vostoke," reports that:

After the Israeli aggression of 1967 the military potential of Egypt was completely restored with the help of the Soviet Union.

"Memuary' A. Sadata - Udar po Sovetsko-egipetskoi druzhbe," Pravda, February 19, 1977, p. 4, adds the following: (after the 1967 War)

In a short period of time, the military potential of Egypt was not only restored but strengthened.

39"Sredizemnomu Moriu - Spokoinye vody," p. 2 quotation follows:

Since the USA and NATO are trying to strengthen their naval and air forces in the (Mediterranean) basin, the ships of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean Sea are a stabilizing factor, as their presence there answers the interests of the people in the region.

40Nadezhdin, p. 4.

41Tiishkevich, P. 191. Heikal, in The Road to Ramadan, p. 181, adds:
Anyway, President Nasser took the decision to rebuild the Army from top to bottom, and with this end in view the decision was taken to accept the services of Soviet experts down to battalion level.


44. For an eyewitness account of the negotiations leading up to the decision to send Soviet pilot- and fighter aircraft, and missile sites manned by Soviet personnel, see pp. 78-90 in The Road to Ramadan. Concerning the initial Soviet-Israeli engagement, Heikal claims that the Russian aircraft were MiG-25s (X500 high-altitude supersonic reconnaissance planes), which were scrambled from Jiyanklis and Beni Suef airfields to intercept approaching Israeli aircraft on 18 April. All air-to-air communications were in Russian, which puzzled the Egyptians as a purposeful breach of security. Nasser finally concluded that this was a part of the superpower game – a signal to the Americans that the Russians had indeed arrived in Egypt. The Israelis also got the message – and deep aerial penetrations ceased after that date.

45. With the exception of the possible limited participation of Soviet personnel in the Yemen in 1962 (rumored but not proven).

46. On July 30, the day before Israel accepted the cease-fire proposal, the Israeli Air Force managed to get in the last licks. A trap was set, using A-4 Skyhawks for bait, covered by undetected Mirages flying at extremely low levels. Russian-piloted MiG-21 interceptors were scrambled, and five were shot down in less than a minute. It was with some satisfaction that the Egyptians witnessed the Russians humbled by Israeli aerial prowess. "Drunken parties" were even reported at some Egyptian bases. Heikal later reported the incident in Al-Ahram, much to the irritation of the Soviets. See The Road to Ramadan, p. 164, for a short description of this engagement.

47. See Heikal, p. 91, for an eyewitness account of Nasser informing Brezhnev of his decision to accept the American proposal, and his reasons for accepting it.

48. Heikal, p. 92, reports that Nasser ordered that dummy missile
batteries be constructed the night before the cease fire was to take effect, on the assumption that American satellites would photograph the position of everything at the moment of the cease fire. Later the dummy missiles could be replaced by real ones without obviously violating the "stand-still" provisions of the agreement.

49V. Laptev, "Nash Kommentarii: Diversiya Tel'-'Aviva," Izvestiiia. September 11, 1970, p. 3. Further quotation from this article follows:

Egypt did not introduce new rocket sites into the Suez Canal Zone after the temporary cease fire agreement went into effect, and will continue to observe the agreement in the future.

The UAR has not made any movements of rocket sites inside the 50-kilometer zone, in compliance with the conditions of the agreement....

50p. Demchenko, "Trudnyi put' k miru na Bliizhnem Vostoke," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenii No. 12, December, 1973, p. 80, reported:

...in August 1970, the Suez Canal cease fire agreement went into effect. On February 8, 1971, G. Jarring sent a memorandum to Israel and Egypt with a request that they answer concrete questions concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the Middle East. The Egyptian government immediately answered these questions, stressing its intention to fulfill all points of the resolution....

51Nadezhdin, p. 4.


53L. Primakov, "Shalansirovannyi kurs na Bliizhnem Vostoke ili starai politika inymi sredstvami," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenii, December 1976, p. 38 clearly recounts the Soviet view of President Nasser:

On the 28th of September 1970, President Nasser died. With his death, Egypt and the whole Arab world lost its most distinguished statesman, a fighter against imperialism, for the happiness and progress of his people, a man who gained wide fame and popularity, and a sincere friend of the Soviet Union.
54. Sadat may have had in mind the argument put forth in Pravda on September 2, 1964, defending the acquisition of territory by the Soviet Union after the Second World War:

A people which has been attacked, has defended itself, and wins the war is bound in sacred duty to establish in perpetuity a political situation which will ensure the liquidation of the sources of aggression. It is entitled to maintain this state of affairs as long as the danger of aggression does not cease. A nation which has attained security at the cost of numerous victims will never agree to the restoration of previous borders. No territories are to be returned as long as the danger of aggression prevails.

55. The Soviets claim that the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was Sadat's idea (See "Monitary S.Lua"). Sadat told Heikal the opposite (See The Road to Ramadan, p. 138).


57. It is doubtful if President Sadat ever intended to live up to the conditions of the Treaty. After all, Egypt "was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, it had no common border with the Soviet Union or any of its allies, and the Brezhnev doctrine of intervention simply could not be made to apply to it." Laqueur, p. 63.


60. Heikal, p. 169, reports Sadat's annoyance with monetary payments to the Soviet Union:

...the President, in answer to questions about Soviet experts, said: "Do you think I want to keep them? We need them to give us protection in depth, but they are a burden on us because we have to pay for them in hard currency." Brezhnev was extremely annoyed when he heard this and sent a message to President Sadat asking if he thought the Soviet experts were mercenaries.

61. The Soviets make a distinction between "bases" and "facilities". "Zaiavlenia Sovetskogo pravitel'stva," Pravda, April 29, 1976, pp. 1, 4:
The Soviet government considers it necessary to emphasize that the Soviet Union does not seek any kind of gain or advantages for itself in the Middle East. Neither in the Middle East nor in any other region of the world, does the Soviet Union attempt to get either military bases, or any kind of rights to develop natural resources, or to exert influence on the internal development of other states.

This statement was in response to Western charges that the USSR was establishing bases in Somalia, in particular. The Egyptian press was specifically chided for repeating American propaganda about Soviet bases in Somalia in "Komentarii Somaliiiskogo ezhenedel'nika," Pravda, August 18, 1975, p. 1.

62It was only when the break became open in 1976, that the Soviet press acknowledged Egyptian criticism of the conduct of Soviet "military specialists." (See: "Vrazrez s interesami egipetskogo naroda," Pravda, October 5, 1976, p. 5.)

63Heikal's charges were acknowledged in the recent book by V. P. Meshcheriakov, in the chapter entitled "Sionistskaia propaganda na sluzhe reaktsionnykh krugov SSHA," Mezhunarodnyi Sionizm: Istoriia i Politika (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), p. 160:

...Zionist propaganda places, apparently, special emphasis on its anti-Arab propaganda with the aim of distorting the international character of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, to undermine the friendship of the Arabs for the USSR, to slander the ideas of socialism and Communism, and to discredit the help of the Soviet Union in the strengthening of the defense capabilities of the Arab countries. It is for this reason that the myth arose about the attempt of the USSR to achieve "hegemony" in the Arab world, and about the special "interest" of the USSR in the preservation of the state of "no peace, no war." Zionists try to prove that the Soviet Union allegedly is interested in prolonging the crisis, since it supposedly serves its interests.

Needless to say, the chief editor of Al-Ahram, Heikal, hardly qualifies as a Zionist.


70. "Torzhestvennye provody sovetskih voin," Pravda, July 22, 1972, p. 5. The following quotation is taken from the previous page of the same issue, in an article entitled "Godovshchina Egiipetskoi Revoliutsii," p. 4. This was an obvious effort to reassure Soviet readers that there was no political rift between Egypt and the USSR.

....In the name of the people and government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Ambassador expressed gratitude to the people and leaders of the Soviet Union for their firm support and solidarity with the struggle of the Egyptian people....

...the Soviet Union rendered and continues to render great and effective assistance to Egypt in all areas and in all stages of our struggle,...cooperation with the Soviet Union assisted and continues to assist in the growth of the forces of progressive Arab regimes, and significantly weakens the position of imperialism in one of the most important areas of the world.

Heikal reports that the Egyptians originally suggested that the withdrawal be described as the natural ending of a limited mission which had been completed (p. 178):

On 13 July Dr. Aziz Sidqi was sent to Moscow. He was instructed to apply balm to the Soviet wounds....As part of the balm he suggested to Brezhnev that there might be a joint communiqué to the effect that the work done by the Soviet experts in Egypt had been completed. This would be an answer to the charges made in the Western press that they had been expelled. Brezhnev refused. He said: "You asked for the experts. If you want them to
leave that is your decision, and we will comply with it.
But we are never going to be party to a cover-up story and
will not take the responsibility before history of suggest-
ging that they are being withdrawn at our request."

Evidently this stand was reconsidered - at least for Soviet domestic
consumption.

71P. Demchenko, "Egypt: Jubilee Anniversary," Pravda, July 23,
1972, p. 4.

72Primagov, "Shalansirovanny kurs," pp. 41-43 voices Soviet
suspicions concerning the American as well as the Saudi Arabian role
in influencing Sadat's decision to expel the advisors. Interestingly
enough, he quoted selected passages from elbal's The Road to Ramadan
to support his contentions, especially those passages that revealed a
possible Saudi conspiracy to force Sadat to expel the Russians, and
the revelation that two channels of communications existed between
Nixon and Sadat - the diplomatic and the CIA.

...Nixon, possibly, would meet him halfway if Sadat would
reduce the Soviet presence in Egypt...Whatever his (Sadat's)
immediate motives, he should have known that the expulsion
of the advisors would be considered as yet another reason
for the allocation of American aid....On the pages of
American newspapers, it was reported that Kissinger was
"extremely surprised" by the unexpected decision of Sadat.
"Why did Sadat do me this favor?" - he asked a colleague.
"Why didn't he demand some concession from me?" Possibly
Kissinger really was surprised by the timing of the
decision, about the "pause" in relations between Egypt
and the USSR. But the image of the Secretary of State,
who was "confused" and "surprised" and "disinterested"
in the decision to terminate the mission of the Soviet
military advisors in Egypt, appears absolutely artificial,
unnatural. Washington directed all its policies - both
direct and indirect - to urge this decision on the Egyptian
leadership.

73Walter Z. Laqueur, "Kissinger and the Politics of Detente,"

74Some theorize that this evacuation was meant to be a signal
to the West of an imminent Arab attack on Israel, but the author leans
toward the theory that it was simply a problem of bureaucratic inertia.
There is probably a rule that in case of war danger, Soviet dependents
are to be evacuated as soon as possible, and some low-level functionary
merely did his duty. In any case, the signal was missed.
The effectiveness of the Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation in all the forces was demonstrated in the 1973 October War. Equipped with Soviet military equipment and trained by Soviet specialists, the Egyptian Army successfully forced the Suez Canal.

Deschenko, "Trudniy put' k miru na Blizhnem Vostoke," pp. 80-81, gives a good example of this contention:

Throughout all these years, Israel, making use of its ties to the USA and other imperialist states, continued an intensive program to accumulate modern weapons, to expand and modernize its military industry, and simultaneously to "assimilate" - colonize - occupied territory. According to all objective information, Tel Aviv made up its mind to convert aggression to annexation - that is to appropriate seized territory....

...the activities of the UN to put Resolution 242 into effect did not, for all practical purposes, do any good. Believing in their overwhelming military superiority over Arab armies, Israeli generals began to carry out one provocation after another against Israel's neighbors; their aircraft regularly conducted reconnaissance flights over Syria and Lebanon, and military boats patrolled along the Syrian and Egyptian coastlines. At this same time, at an increasing pace, "assimilation" of occupied territory proceeded, and the intensification of the search for collaborationists....Expressing the dominant feeling in Egypt, President Sadat said: "Our people reject capitulation to Israel. We defined our course. It is the course of struggle, because we never have capitulated and never will capitulate." In the Mideastern atmosphere, strained by Israel, which even H. Kissinger had to recognize as "obviously independent of the Arab countries," a great military conflict could break out at any time. And this actually happened. As the official Soviet declaration of 7 October stressed, "the responsibility for the currently developing events in the Middle East, and their consequences in total are completely Israel's, and those external reactionary circles which constantly connive with Israel in her aggressive aspirations."
At least, no charge was made that Israel made the first strike in this war. In the same source, Brezhnev’s speech of 8 October was quoted:

“There is an engagement between the aggressor - Israel - and the victims of aggression - Egypt and Syria - which are trying to liberate their territory. It is natural that all our sympathies lie on the side of the victims of aggression.”

77 See Haikal, p. 222.

78 L. Koriavin, "Blizhnii Vostok: idut upornyie boi,” Izvestiia, October 17, 1973, p. 2. Even after the break with Egypt, such expressions of gratitude were frequently recalled in the Soviet press. See Sergei Vishnevskii, “Meshdunarodnaia Nedelia,” Pravda, March 21, 1976, p. 4:

Very recently I heard how soldiers near the Suez in Sinai were so grateful to the Soviet peoples for the weapons which played a decisive role in the successful course of the 1973 War.


81 Primakov, "'Shalansirovanii Kurs'," p. 48.

82 General-Leitenant artillerii M. Naumenko, "Razvenchannyi mir," Krasnaia Zvezda, November 12, 1973, p. 3, quoted below:

Many Israeli pilots underwent specialized training in aviation training centers of the West.... The Israeli Air Force turned its forces to the destruction of the ground forces and against vitally important objectives in Syria and Egypt. However, they had to run up against a dense covering force of surface-to-air missile sites and rapid-firing anti-aircraft artillery. Attempts to break through the anti-aircraft defenses by using radio-electronic countermeasures and low-altitude approaches, and other tactical measures, did not give tangible results....the anti-aircraft forces of the ARE and Syria succeeded in three days of battle in shooting down a quarter of all the aircraft sent to Israel by the United States....when Washington decided to send weapons
to Israel, Israel had already lost "about one third of their arsenal of 488 military aircraft." The reasons for the tremendous losses of Israeli aircraft were obvious to everyone. Most of all, it came from the morale and fighting spirit of the Arab soldiers - rocketeers and anti-aircraft artillerymen. The significance of the outstanding modern military equipment, especially SAM rockets, which successfully operated at any time of the day or night, under jamming conditions, and also against low-flying aircraft, was well known to all. All of these things together heightened the determination of the Arab soldiers.

In order to compensate for personnel losses, Israeli agents in the USA, according to the foreign press, began to recruit American pilots who had taken part in the Vietnam War. They were offered $5,000 per month to fight in the Middle East War on Israel's side. The recruiters were particularly interested in pilots who had experience as pilots of "Skyhawk" aircraft, which, in the judgment of the American press, were most vulnerable to rockets used by the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. Thus, the myth of the Israeli Air Forces as an "invincible air armada" was destroyed.

Primakov, in "Sbalansirovannyi kurs," p. 46, also recognizes this fact:

During the October War, the fact was incontestably demonstrated that Israel had lost its air superiority. Egyptian and Syrian air defenses effectively resisted the Israeli Air Force. Even Israeli generals had to recognize this fact.

Demchenko, "Trudnyi put' k miru na Blizhnem Vostoke," p. 82.

"Na vyruchku agressoru," Izvestiia, October 18, 1973, p. 2. This was amplified several years later in L. Korneev, "Armiia Izrailia - orudie agressii," Voennyi Vestnik 4, April 1976, pp. 111-112:

In the first few days of battle in the 1973 War, the armies of the AFR and SAR, equipped with first-class weapons, were able to inflict a series of serious blows on "Tsakhal" (Israeli Army). As noted in a speech in the US Pentagon, as a result of military action in October 1973 in the Middle East, "Israel would have been on the edge of defeat after four days of military action if it hadn't been for timely and unconditional shipments of modern American weapons." This viewpoint is even shared by representatives of the rightist circles of Israel.
In creating an aerial bridge from the USA via the Azores Islands to Israel, the American imperialists sent the weapons necessary to "Tsakhal" directly from warehouses to the field of battle. In total, in the 1973 War, the cost to Israel was 8 billion dollars, about 2,500 soldiers and officers of "Tsakhal" killed (the largest number of casualties since the times of the war in 1948-1949), half of the tanks and a third of the aircraft. The myth about the invincibility of "Tsakhal" in the struggle against the Arabs, and the inability of Arab armies to conduct major offensive operations, was destroyed forever. The process of clearing away the occupying Zionists from Arab territory has begun.

85"Vooruzhaiut agressorov," Izvestia, October 20, 1973, p. 3.

86"Tel'-Aviv: Taktika sabatazh' i provolochek," Krasnaja Zvezda, November 25, 1973, p. 3.

87Primakov, "'Shalansirovannyi kurs'," p. 47.

88"V interesakh mira i progressa na Blizhnem Vostoka," Pravda, October 25, 1975, p. 4, quoted below:

The first-class quality of Soviet weapons was especially evident in the October days of 1973. With these weapons the Egyptian Army not only repulsed the onslaught of the aggressor, but also inflicted painful blows to the Israeli usurpers. In these days the whole world witnessed how Soviet weapons and munitions flowed to Egypt and Syria - both by sea and by air.

You have to be completely shameless to state, as some are now doing, that Egypt only received at that time "a few trunks full of spare parts from the Soviet Union." Scathing but unconvincing terms, having nothing to do with reality.

P. Nadezhdin, "Egipet" riskovannyi kurs," Pravda, April 3, 1976, p. 4, also referred to the Soviet resupply effort:

And is it really possible to accept the accusations which have been leveled against the Soviet Union? One of these is the question of arms shipments to Egypt. Here we need to recall the words of former President Nasser, who often repeated, that if it hadn't been for Soviet arms shipments, Egypt would have been literally disarmed before Israel after the June War.
It is well known to Egyptians and Arabs in other countries that Soviet anti-aircraft sites defended the cities of the Nile Valley in 1970, when Israeli aircraft bombed the suburbs of Cairo. And wasn't it with Soviet weapons that the Egyptians and other Arab soldiers fought in October 1973, and wasn't it rockets of Soviet manufacture that shot down "Phantoms", "Skyhawks" and "Mirages" of the aggressor over the Suez Canal and Damascus? During these difficult times for the Arabs, it wasn't just a few weapons which were sent by air and sea to Egypt. The Soviet resupply effort was kept a secret from the Soviet public during the war, and for a few years afterward. This placed Egyptian and Syrian editors and journalists in a dilemma. They did not want to antagonize their benefactors in the midst of a war by revealing the facts, so they also suppressed the story. Credibility was important to the Arabs in this war, so they went to pains to imply a denial, without actually denying, the story. For example:

The United States is indulging in a baseless uproar about an alleged Soviet supply of many weapons to Egypt and Syria in the course of the battles. It is a malicious trick designed to justify the US arms supplies to Israel.


89"Memuary' A. Sadata - Udar po Sovetsko-egipetskoj druzhbe," p. 4.


92Primakov, "'Sbalansirovannyi kurs,'" p. 47.

93See *Krasnaia Zvezda*, December 8, 1973, p. 3, and political cartoon.

94Demchenko, "Trudnyi put' k miru na Blizhem Vostoke," p. 84 quoted below:

...the Security Council provided for the creation of extraordinary UN forces with a strength of about seven thousand men from contingents of various countries, to include Sweden, Finland, Austria, Indonesia and others.
Poland and Canada participated in the formation of the contingents, and were charged with providing basic material-technical equipment to the extraordinary UN forces. These forces are being deployed between the positions of the opposing armies. At the request of President A. Sadat, Soviet representatives were also sent to Egypt. Cairo sent an analogous request to the government of the USA as well, which declared its readiness to fulfill this request.


97Pajak, p. 7.


100"2 US firms to rebuild Egypt's MiG-21 fleet," *Stars & Stripes*, August 1, 1977, p. 17. Subsequent arrangements have been made with other Western firms to rebuild many types of Soviet military equipment in the Egyptian inventory.

101Pajak, citing *The Washington Post*, June 13, 1975. The Chinese even got into the act, as was reported in "Po zybkoi osnov," Pravda, April 21, 1976, p. 5, wherein "...Mao tse-Tung declared that 'Egypt paid in advance for the assistance it received.'"


105"Oproverzhdenie egipskogo zhurnala," Pravda, July 21, 1975, p. 3.

106"V interesakh mira i progressa na Bliizhnem Vostoke," p. 4.


57
Progressive public opinion of the Arab countries emphasizes that anti-Sovietism weakens the position of the Arabs in the struggle for the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression.

Despite the obvious attempts of President Sadat, with the help of US diplomacy, to bring Syria to the point of following behind Egypt on the road to a separate peace with Israel, Damascus remained true to the interests of the general Arab struggle for the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression.

The Soviet hopes for the Geneva peace conference were outlined in "Zaialenje sovetskogo pravitel'stva," Pravda, April 29, 1976, pp. 1, 4.

Heikal, as usual, is cited whenever his opinion happens to coincide with the Soviet view. "Stat'ia egipetskogo zhurnalista," Pravda, November 18, 1977, p. 5, quoted below:

...the Egyptian journalist and former chief editor of the Cairo newspaper "Al-Ahram", Heikal, especially stresses that a durable Middle East peace settlement is impossible without the active participation of the USSR. The Soviet Union, the author reveals, is present in the Middle East geographically, and its presence is mainly connected with the problem of providing
security. Heikal sharply criticizes those Arab countries who close their eyes to the role of the Soviet Union, and who respond to the prompting of their American "friends," who would like to shut it out of participation in the Middle East peace settlement. This "greatest mistake" gives nothing to the Arabs, and only strengthens the position of the USA and Israel, and doom the settlement to inevitable downfall, stresses the author. In this article it is noted that even the USA concedes that a peaceful settlement in the Middle East is impossible without the participation of the USSR.


117 See quotation, footnote 119. Examples of Sadat's perfidy are often published in the open Soviet press. For example, in "'Memory' A. Sadata," recent statements of Sadat's are contrasted with his earlier public statements. The charge is made that "Sadat is clearly trying to rewrite the history of the past few years." Quoting Sadat in a speech of October 1970:

In fulfilling my responsibilities as President of the Republic, I want to declare the following: We urgently ask for the stationing of Soviet military personnel in our country. On the basis of the wishes and will of our people, armed forces, leadership of the Arab Socialist Union, I also will even ask for an increase in the numbers of these personnel.

This is of course contrasted with Sadat's remarks following his expulsion order. Sadat's statement to the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo on October 7, 1973, that:

I am unable to find the words to express our deep gratitude to the Soviet leadership, the genuine friendship of Egypt. It will always remain in my heart and in the hearts of all Egyptians... Today Sadat does "not remember". Despite the facts, he claims that Soviet arms were allegedly "old" and "ineffective." He "forgot" that the Peoples' Assembly of Egypt passed a special resolution to express gratitude to the Soviet Union for its help, which had a decisive effect on the course of military action.

59

119 "Posle poezdki A. Sadata v Izrael," Pravda, November 22, 1977, p. 5:

...the Premier of Israel stubbornly held to the line of a separate agreement with Egypt, for the break-up of the united front of Arab states opposing the aggressor. Now no one can doubt that the initiators of the present separate plans of Sadat-Begin, were the influential circles of the United States of America...in one of the Baptist churches of Washington, a special prayer was even offered "for the success of the mission" of Sadat, a prayer offered in the essence of the President of the USA....the Egyptian President, by the simple fact of his trip to Jerusalem, recognized the occupation of Arab territory by Israel.

D. Vol'skie, "Za dymovoi zavesoi," Novoe Vremia 52-77, pp. 6-7, adds:

The Western press perceives in the present situation a growing danger of Arab internecine war. The newspaper "Washington Post" for example, wrote as early as November 29: "Judging from an observer's information, the crafty Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had secret reasons to visit Israel. If you believe this information, he tried to neutralize the Israeli threat on his eastern front in order to free his hands to give a rebuff to his obstinate neighbor on the West - the indomitable Muamur Qadhafi....The dispatch of the observer carries the impression that Sadat perhaps has other economic reasons, to lay special emphasis on his discord with Qadhafi. Sadat is waging, and losing, a war with bankruptcy. Libyan oil industries, producing eight billion dollars a year, very possibly appear in his eyes as more than temptation." The Kuwaiti newspaper "Al-Batan," after the beginning of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, even revealed another assumption: that the Cairo leadership might be preparing itself for a major operation against Ethiopia."

120 Ibid., p. 6, quoted below:
First of all, let us recognize that the temptation has long been ripe to inflict a new "preventive strike," in order to "replay the draw" of the 1973 War. Only last Fall this was openly discussed and written about. The Israeli militarists consider that they possess substantial military preponderance over the Arab states and that they need to hurry up and use this preponderance before it disappears. And with the exit of Cairo from the Arab ranks opposing Israel, the temptation to embark on such an adventure can only grow in Israel. An expedition, let's say, to Southern Lebanon, where Palestinian military formations are located.

"Zaïavljenie sovetskogo pravitel'stva," Pravda, April 29, 1976, pp. 1, 4 amplifies this fear a little further:

The arms build-up of Israel is continuing on a massive scale. The United States of America is sending them various modern weapons, including rockets capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. In this context, the report that Israel is developing or already has developed nuclear weapons merits attention.

Primakov, in "'Sbalansirovannyi kurs,'", p. 41, adds:

...the inability of Washington (considering its traditional ties with Israeli expansionist circles, and the significant influence of the "Israeli lobby" inside the United States) to terminate shipments of offensive weapons, played a great role in expelling the true essence of the US position in this region....


123US Department of State, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974, Washington, D. C., January 1976.


125Laqueur, "On the Soviet Departure from Egypt," p. 61
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