ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMLIC)

PRECONFLICT PERIOD
FINAL REPORT

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
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ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMIC).

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FINAL REPORT

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We shall, then, hope that whatever uniformities we can detect in the revolutions we are analyzing will turn out to be obvious, to be just what any sensible man already knew about revolutions. We shall be genuinely disappointed if the anatomy of revolutions does not turn out to be a familiar one. It will seem a sufficient gain if these uniformities can be listed, recorded, as uniformities. Those whose appetites demand great discoveries are, then, warned in advance. Here they will find poor fare.

Crane Brinton
The Anatomy of Revolution
ACKNOWLEDGMENT (U)

This study has been approved by the Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, for publication and distribution. It should not be considered as having official Department of the Army approval, either expressed or implied.

The conclusions and recommendations are based on data gathered and analyses performed by the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (now the Institute of Land Combat (Provisional)).

Colonel Ralph T. Tierno, Jr., the Study Team Chief, planned, organized, and directed the research, evaluation, and analysis.

The Carlisle Research Office of Operations Research, Inc., Silver Spring, Maryland, provided much of the technical input on which the study was based. Donald S. Macdonald was coordinator of this effort.

The guidance and direction of Colonel Lucien F. Keller, whose insights and experience greatly aided in the organization and conduct of the study, are gratefully acknowledged.
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ABSTRACT (U)

ARKLIC is the acronym for a five-part study on Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict. This document, the final report on the preconflict period, covers the first two parts of ARMLIC through that period.

The study was designed to identify the factors that lead to change in, or loss of control by, Government and to the establishment of a climate conducive to low intensity conflict; to determine the appropriate roles and missions of the Army in such situations; and to develop the operational, organizational, and materiel concepts and doctrinal principles to support those roles and missions.

Findings are based on extensive research of literature pertinent to low intensity conflict and on in-depth research on seven countries in which such conflict had occurred. These country substudies, published separately and on file at DDC, have been summarized in an appendix of this final report.

Comparison and analysis of common factors in specific situations led to development of a system for recognizing and assessing preconflict situations. Conclusions and recommendations, derived from the total study effort, offer possible means for meeting the unique requirements and the challenge of low intensity conflict. Emphasis has been placed on the desirability and possibility of averting such conflict.
SUMMARY (C)

Nature and Purpose

(U) This study of Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC) has three objectives:

- To identify the factors that lead to change in or loss of control by the Government or produce a climate conducive to low intensity conflict and the techniques most likely to succeed in averting, countering, or subduing such conflict.

- To determine the appropriate roles and missions for the US Army in the low intensity conflict area of the conflict spectrum.

- To develop the operational, organizational, and materiel concepts and doctrinal principles to support such roles and missions.

(U) The ARMLIC study had its beginning in the Army '85 Concept Study. One of the results of that study was a requirement to expand the low intensity conflict (LIC) concepts for the 1985 timeframe. After research had been initiated on the expansion, it became apparent that the near timeframes were equally relevant. The original LIC study plan was modified accordingly and the title changed to ARMLIC.

(U) The following general considerations have guided the study:

- It is generally recognized that there is a high probability of low intensity conflict in the foreseeable future. The US Army must be prepared to assist in carrying out national policy in this field.

- As recognized by many recent policy statements, the extent of US ability to realize its policy objectives in low intensity conflict situations will depend on the limits of its national power and resources and the allocation of resources to meet competing demands. It also will depend on the disposition of other nations to cooperate and to help themselves.

- The basic intent of this study is to help assure that only policy decisions and resource allocations, not lack of knowledge and techniques, limit the US capability for action in future low intensity conflict situations.

(U) ARMLIC is based on indepth study of a set of real conflict situations, using the coordinated insights of all social science disciplines and military analysis and drawing on available literature on research into the subject of low intensity conflict. The research and analysis
for the study was to be performed on three distinct periods: the preconflict, conflict, and postconflict stages of low intensity conflict. This report presents only the findings from research and analysis of the preconflict stage and the conclusions and recommendations derived from that part of the study. Subsequent study stages, when completed, would provide clearer understanding of the subject and more comprehensive conclusions and recommendations, which could require modification of the conclusions and recommendations reached in this initial stage.

Nature and causes of low intensity conflict

(U) Low intensity conflict is the use of violence or other illegal action by an organized group to force compliance by a political system (national or local) with its demands or to bring about changes in the leadership or structure of the system. It does not involve sustained engagement of opposing regular military forces. It differs from limited or general war in three conceptual ways:

1. The roots are in large part internal to the affected country, although external influences may be of great importance. Accordingly, low intensity conflict is a distinct part of a spectrum of conflict that begins with simple controversy and ordinary crime at the lowest extreme and runs to general war at the highest extreme.

2. The intermixture of political and military aspects is very complex.

3. One of the parties—the Government—has a legal right to the use of force.

(C) The outbreak of low intensity conflict in each of the countries (Colombia, Greece, Iran, Kenya, Malaya, Philippines, Vietnam) can be explained as a result of interaction of the following major considerations:

1. Demand-output imbalance (deprivations and frustrations). Failure of significant groups of the populace to receive satisfaction for what they believe to be legitimate demands, and their consequent frustration.

2. Functioning of the social system. Deficiencies in policymaking, leadership, performance, and communication, with consequent failure to meet popular demands and needs.

3. Cultural factors. Beliefs, attitudes, and values that affect the functioning and modernization of the social system.
4. External influence. Foreign ideas, influence, living standards, or organizational techniques, including those of Communist origin, which affect popular expectations and thus put strains on the social system.

5. Internal influences. Strategic location, terrain characteristics, deficiencies of resources or discoveries of new ones, natural disaster, population growth and shift, technical or social innovations.

6. Modulators of conflict. Intensifiers and dampeners that tend to increase or decrease the likelihood or the level of conflict. The best known, but by no means only, intensifier is an organized dissident group. Other modulators include the strength, capability, and use of internal security forces; external influence and assistance; institutions for mediation and arbitration; cultural factors predisposing the people toward or away from violence, especially the legitimacy of the Government; displacement of hostility to another target; and polarization of political loyalties. Two special varieties of modulators are the perceived responsiveness of a Government to popular demands, and precipitators of conflict, such as assassination of a popular leader.

(U) Three of these considerations are most important in conflict avoidance and control: the perceived deprivations of the people, the malfunctions of the social system that give rise to them, and the modulators (including external incitement and support) that drive the resulting frustrations into confrontation and violence. The modulators (intensifiers and dampeners) constitute the category that is most responsive to short-term measures. Conversely, any nation wishing to promote conflict also would concentrate on using the modulators to intensify the level of conflict. The underlying causes of deprivation and frustration are too complex and too long-term in nature to permit corrective action in time to avert imminent or actual violence.

US concepts and options

(U) The results of ARMLIC offer no assurance that all conflicts are avoidable, or that the United States always will be able to use its capabilities successfully in other countries to avoid them. On the contrary, ARMLIC findings document the complexity of political, economic, and social, as well as military, factors that lead to low intensity conflict and the difficulties of dealing with them.

1. External influences, particularly Communist influences, are an important factor in low intensity conflict. As intensifiers, they act in two ways: they create dissatisfaction and frustrations by increasing the demands of the people, and they instigate illicit and increasingly violent action. Communists use existing deprivations or manufacture supposed deprivations of groups of the people as a tool to create
dissension among the people and dissatisfaction with the Government. Communist influences were very great in the genesis of the low intensity conflicts in Greece, Iran, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam; their influences were relatively unimportant factors in the low intensity conflicts in Colombia and Kenya.

2. The findings also show that preconflict situations have an important component of real deprivations that are recognized by the people, which indigenous leaders are unable or unwilling to recognize and overcome. The dissidence and violence of low intensity conflict are the symptoms, not the essence, of social malfunction.

(C) US interests may sometimes be best served by allowing the low intensity conflict to run its course, without US or other intervention, or by seeking to minimize external influences. Law and order are means, not ends; they are not useful policy goals in themselves, because they, too, are symptoms rather than essence and, if exaggerated, may inhibit needed social adjustment.

(U) The ARMLIC analytical system offers a basis for achieving improved understanding of the nature and causes of low intensity conflict, for focusing US efforts toward conflict avoidance where a US role is feasible and desirable, and for determining appropriate US Army contributions to these efforts.

The prediction of low intensity conflict

(U) The analytical system developed by ARMLIC, if applied to a sufficiently large number of countries over a period of time, may prove to have predictive capability. With refinement of the analytical system and regular collection of data for a large number of countries over time through normal Government reporting, correlations might emerge that would permit estimation of the probability and gestation time of low intensity conflict in a given country.

Doctrinal principles

(C) The following principles emerge from the study as basic to military operations in conflict avoidance:

1. (U) Low intensity conflict is a distinct part of the conflict spectrum. It calls for different approaches, designed to meet its special characteristics.

2. (U) Conflict avoidance or control is basically a political problem. As such, it is the responsibility of the political authorities of the affected country. The extent of US involvement, if any, is the responsibility both of those authorities and of US political and diplomatic officials.
US military capabilities must be under overall civilian control. Insofar as possible, indigenous military capabilities also should be under civilian control.

3. (U) The military forces, both US and indigenous, nevertheless have a continuing responsibility to be thoroughly informed about situations that may lead to low intensity conflict; to advise and support the political and civilian security authorities in the special problems of conflict; to train military forces for any role they may be required to play; and to be prepared for effective planning, coordination, and command and control arrangements.

4. (U) Military capabilities should be regarded as strategic reserves, to be used only when civilian capabilities fail and the advantages of military participation outweigh the risks.

5. (U) Armed Forces should be employed in a manner to strengthen their image as symbols of the legitimacy, power, and effectiveness of the countries they serve. Involvement in day-to-day political affairs, identification with partisan causes, and association with death and destruction within the country diminish their ability to mediate or arbitrate and often increase the level of conflict.

6. (U) Military operations and activities in support of conflict avoidance and control, except for specialized political coordination, should be based on standard organizations, doctrine, and procedures suited to primary military functions.

7. (U) Military operations should have definite objectives, be limited in scope and time, have good prospects of success, and have the least possible political involvement.

8. (U) Military operations and activities should reinforce and increase legitimate civilian authority, not supplant it.

9. (U) The impact of military activities on the civilian community, both nationally and locally, should be taken into careful account in both planning and execution.

10. (C) Ultimate US objectives in conflict avoidance and control are broader and deeper than the mere maintenance of law and order. They may be better served by standing aloof from conflict, isolating it, or conceivably, in extreme circumstances, by supporting rebellion. Policy determination must be made in each case by civilian US authority.

US Army roles and missions in conflict avoidance

(C) The primary missions of the US Army in preconflict situations are intelligence, advice, training, and planning and coordination. Possible
supporting missions, to be conducted under civilian direction—unilateral or with other nations or international organizations—include supply, psychological operations, border control, internal security, peacekeeping, show of force, civil works, civic action, and disaster relief. Army intervention with force in the preconflict stage is a risky course.

(C) Intelligence. The collection of information about the conflict potential of foreign countries should be a US Country Team responsibility, and the analysis and interpretation of the data should be of concern to several US Government agencies in addition to the Army. However, Army personnel, thoroughly trained in the nature and problems of low intensity conflict, could be of key importance in gathering and analyzing data, in making prognoses of conflict, and in planning and providing measures to avoid and control conflict—particularly those involving military forces. Information concerning external influences on a country, particularly subversive influence, could be shared with appropriate authorities of the affected country as a means of neutralizing their impact and hence their conflict potential.

(C) Advice. US Army officers trained in the politics of conflict can advise civilian US officials on conflict avoidance and control and on the applicability of Army resources. In addition, quiet counsel by US Army officers, extended through informal contacts with their local military counterparts, can assist indigenous forces in their conflict avoidance plans and operations.

(C) Training. There should be a center for the development of doctrines, skills, operational and materiel concepts, and policy recommendations for handling low intensity conflict in specific situations. It should have troop units sufficient to test new weapons, techniques, and tactics. Emphasis should be placed on the underlying social causes of revolt and their remedies as well as on the techniques and control of revolt. US training programs for local security forces, particularly their key officers, could promote not only the capability of the forces to quell disturbances effectively, but also the understanding by the forces of their proper role. Training for the civilian internal security forces should be separate and distinct from training for the military forces, to emphasize the reserve role of the military.

(C) Planning and coordination. Programs for conflict avoidance (and conflict control) require careful planning and coordination, because of the complexity of causative factors and the difficulty of dealing with them. The Army attaché, if properly qualified and adequately supported, can play a key role in this process, particularly in planning for any US Army involvement that may occur. Staff sections should be established in major commands and in the Department of Defense to coordinate the US Army Role in conflict avoidance and control.
Conclusions

(U) There has been a great deal of low intensity conflict since the end of World War II, and current conditions and trends indicate that this type of conflict will continue to be a major problem. Furtherance of US national interests, objectives, and security require a capability for preventing the occurrence of low intensity conflict, as well as controlling and terminating it. A requirement exists for a clearer understanding of the nature of this type of conflict and its causes, of the kinds of actions that might be taken to decrease the possibility of its occurrence or diminish its intensity, and of the probable results of such actions within the context of varying situations.

(U) Use of the method of approach adopted and application of the analytical model developed during the ARMLIC study have permitted a critical examination of these problems. It seems evident that continued study of low intensity conflict would be helpful, and further refinement of the model appears likely to supply a predictive capability invaluable for conflict avoidance—a capability that could be improved and validated by broadened application to situations in which conflict had been averted, as well as to those that ended in conflict.

(U) Evaluation of the results obtained from the indepth research performed and the use of the model indicates that existing concepts and doctrine should be reassessed to determine their applicability to low intensity conflict and that there may be a requirement to broaden them to include conflict avoidance.

(C) There is an additional and urgent need to improve organizational and operational capabilities and to redefine and expand related concepts, if the roles and missions suited to low intensity conflict are to be performed effectively in all phases of such conflict. The Army has an overall operational capability, but its effective use depends on an adequate organizational capability. There is no US Army organization designed specifically for preventing or countering low intensity conflict, and the existing organization is not sufficiently flexible for that purpose. Creation of this kind of organization, or augmentation of the existing one to include the needed capabilities, involves personnel, training, civil-military relations, special priorities, and command relationships, among other aspects.

(C) Three organizational changes would be necessary to enable the US Army to support US objectives in situations involving low intensity conflict:

1. A reorientation and strengthening of the attache system, concomitant with a broadening of the military attache's functions beyond the traditional ones of intelligence and representation.
2. Establishment of a training center devoted to the study of conflict, which would emphasize social causes of conflict and remedies, along with techniques of conduct and control of revolt.

3. Establishment of a staff organization designed to function at every level, with responsibilities for decisions concerning civil-military relations assigned to higher command levels and those for monitoring and coordinating civil and military activities assigned to a single staff component at every level.

(C) Collection and use of intelligence, provision of advice and training, and assistance in planning and coordination will continue to be the primary missions of the US Army in preconflict situations, with the various supporting missions conducted under civilian direction.

(C) There are many possible supporting roles, such as supply, civil works, civic action, psychological operations, and shows of force. Any or all of these and similar roles may be performed unilaterally, or they may be accomplished in cooperation with other nations or international organizations. The danger of providing certain kinds of supplies, such as obviously offensive or lethal military equipment, has been recognized, especially in low intensity conflict situations. In many instances, provision of military equipment and munitions could hasten or intensify the conflict or cause international tensions.

(C) Individuals assigned as attaches or as members of a Military Assistance Advisory Group or a US Military Mission play extremely important roles. Their success in advising their civilian (political) counterparts and in monitoring and coordinating civil-military activities depends greatly on a thorough understanding of the country (its system, capabilities, problems, and people) and on the ability to recognize indicators of potential conflict. Communication and command channels with and support from the military are essential.

(C) Army personnel, oriented to and trained in the causes, nature, and problems of low intensity conflict, could play key roles in gathering intelligence, predicting possible occurrence of conflict, and planning and providing measures for conflict avoidance and control, even though the major responsibility for collecting information about conflict potential should be assigned to a US Country Team. Sharing of intelligence, particularly that concerning subversive influence, with appropriate authorities of the affected country could be one means of neutralizing the threat and lowering conflict potential.

(C) It is neither possible nor desirable to train every soldier to be a stability operations specialist, but there is a need for developing a group of specialists to fit the general purpose forces, enabling the required mix to be formed for the situation. Establishment of career
areas, with emphasis on political-military relations and social science skills, could result from modification and expansion of current training programs for military assistance officers and foreign area specialists. Emphasis on the relations between social and political factors and military aspects is not accidental; malfunctions of social systems and deprivations of the people have been identified in ARMLIC as extremely important causes of conflict.

(C) The need for a special training center for study of conflict has been identified as one type of organizational change. The training offered would be available to high-level military and political authorities and to civilians of many countries, as well as the United States.

(C) US training programs for local security forces will continue to be an important means for helping those forces understand the problems and their roles and for improving force capabilities for countering and subduing violence. Training of internal security forces should be separate and distinct from that provided for military forces to emphasize the reserve role of the military.

(C) The third organizational change needed was identified as the establishment of a staff organization for every level. If the mission to avert and control low intensity conflict were combined with that of civil affairs, the resulting staff (a Civil-Military Relations Section) should prove extremely useful in accomplishing the normally difficult task of coordinating civil affairs activities with military operations and could provide liaison, during low intensity conflict operations, between Department of State and other Government Agencies and between military commanders and civilian authorities (both indigenous and US).

(C) Decisions to give or refrain from giving assistance and selection of proper times to act are extremely important, both in their effect on the situation and on the perceived US position and role.

(U) There is a lack of information—thus a need for research and study—in several areas in which either a causal relationship to conflict or a modulating effect on it is discernible. One of these concerns the relation between a high incidence of malnutrition (as a normal condition) and a people's propensity toward conflict and violence and the probable direction and extent of change in attitudes which might result from an effective mitigation of the condition.

(U) To sum up, the need for further study is obvious. Additional knowledge and understanding and improvement of capabilities are needed, if the United States is to select appropriate courses of action that have a good possibility of achieving US objectives. US politics related to current conditions and future events and situations should be examined carefully. Statements of US doctrine, now available only by searching through a number of regulations, should be gathered together, examined, and modified or extended to cover the preconflict, conflict, and post-conflict periods.
CHAPTER 1 (U)

INTRODUCTION

1. Content. This report summarizes the findings of the first two parts of a projected five-part study of low intensity conflict. It focuses attention on the nature of low intensity conflict, its causes, the roles and missions that the US Army can undertake to avert it, and the conditions under which such Army roles and missions would further the interests of the United States.

2. Purpose. The purpose of the Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC) study is two-fold:

   a. To enable the Army to develop a more effective doctrine and capability for dealing with low intensity conflict.

   b. To determine whether there are actions that might prevent initiation of low intensity conflict which the Army could take, in conjunction with other US agencies, early in the conflict.

3. Objective. The five-part study has three objectives.

   a. To identify the factors that lead to change in or loss of control by the Government or produce a climate conducive to low intensity conflict and the techniques most likely to succeed in averting, countering, and subduing such conflict.

   b. To determine the appropriate roles and missions for the US Army in the low intensity portion of the conflict spectrum.

   c. To develop operational, organizational, and materiel concepts and doctrinal principles to support such roles and missions.

4. Scope. The ARMLIC study is concerned with all aspects of low intensity conflict, whether or not US forces are involved, together with conditions preceding and following such conflict. It synthesizes all important postulations, writings, reports, and data about the political, economic, social, psychological, and military factors that lead to the loss of control by the Government and establishment of a climate conducive to development of insurgency.

5. Background. The ARMLIC study is an outgrowth of the Army 85 Concept Study (conducted by the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies) to determine the roles and missions of the US Army in the 1985 timeframe. It was directed as a follow-on study to synthesize data on low intensity conflict (LIC).
4. A vast quantity of writing has been done on the subject of low intensity conflict under many topic headings, such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. The literature contains theories of conflict; theories on how to launch, counter, and control it; and studies of many specific examples. An initial survey of the literature indicated that the existing materials had not yet been drawn together, compared and analyzed, and put into a form that would provide meaningful bases for formulation of concepts and doctrine to support military operations. Moreover, very little consideration had been given to events and periods preceding conflict which might reveal underlying causes and enable Governments to prevent as well as control or terminate low intensity conflict.

b. Consequently, USACDC directed the Institute to expand its LIC study to include indepth study of low intensity conflict to provide a better basis for formulation of Army roles, missions, and concepts in the 1985 timeframe. As work on the study progressed, USACDC directed that it not be confined to the 1985 timeframe but relate to all future problems in regard to low intensity conflict. The title was changed toArmy Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC) to reflect this emphasis.

c. During conduct of part two (refer to appendix II), budgetary constraints halted programmed subsequent stages of the study. This report therefore contains a summary of the findings on the nature and causes of conflict that can be drawn from examination of the preconflict period; analysis of the findings; and recommendations concerning US Army roles, missions, and concepts during a preconflict period.

6. Study method. The ARMLIC study plan consists of five parts: the first is a thorough preliminary survey of existing literature and research and the development of a detailed study method; the second, third, and fourth are analytical studies of conflicts (preconflict, conflict, and postconflict stages) in selected representative countries; and the fifth is an analysis of findings from the four preceding stages. The final step is to validate the analyses against existing and potential Army capabilities and make recommendations for formulation of concepts of Army roles, missions, and doctrine for low intensity conflict.

a. Activities to date cover the first two of the five parts: a general survey of the literature and development of a bibliography and study method and a study of the preconflict stage in seven countries. Parts three and four (conflict and postconflict stages) and part five (final analysis and interpretation) have not yet been undertaken. Therefore, results presented in this report necessarily are partial and preliminary. Subsequent research could modify the findings in this report or open up areas of investigation not yet covered.
b. All the preconflict situations selected for study entered the conflict stage about 20 years ago, with the exception of Vietnam. These conflicts were selected in preference to later ones, because the basic factors underlying low intensity conflict remain essentially the same, although their mix may vary with both time and circumstance; the time lapse since the earlier conflicts permits greater objectivity; and the greater amount of factual data available on them permits more valid analysis.

7. **Definitions.** Low intensity conflict and major related terms as used in this report are defined below. Other terms are defined in appendix III.

a. **Low intensity conflict.** The organized application, against the established political regime of a country, of illicit methods of opposition, including violence, at a level which threatens significant change in the leadership, policies, or structures of the Government, but which does not involve sustained major engagement of opposing regular armed forces.

b. **Preconflict stage.** A period during which political and social tensions mount toward or are sustained at a level likely to erupt into low intensity conflict. It begins with the emergence of significant groups voicing dissatisfaction with the existing political or social order or the expression of such views by existing groups. It ends either with the onset of low intensity conflict or with reduction of tensions to normal or acceptable levels.

c. **Conflict stage.** A period during which low intensity conflict is sustained. It may develop through a rise in the level of violence over a period of weeks or months or it may begin with a key event.

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The term low intensity conflict was defined by USACDC (as Low Intensity Warfare, Types I and II) in the USACDC study, "Definitions to Support Counterinsurgency Doctrine," dated July 1965. However, the USACDC definition was found unsatisfactory for research purposes, because it dealt with US operations, advice, and support, rather than with the situations that necessitated such activity. In addition, research showed the desirability of distinguishing between two general kinds of conditions: those similar to war, in which opposing sides committed specialized military forces in conventional or unconventional military operations, and those of lesser scale, in which normal military doctrine clearly was not applicable. This definition of low intensity conflict was devised to respond to these requirements. In approximate terms, it includes Phases I and II of insurgency as currently defined, but excludes Phase III, which is considered to have more in common with civil war than with lesser types of insurgency. The definition of insurgent war in AR 310-25 or FM 31-23 makes somewhat the same distinction. It is not intended, in making this distinction, to suggest that there is any actual discontinuity between the successive phases of insurgency.
conflict episode, such as an assassination. It ends with the abatement of violence to levels controllable by mechanisms normal to the environment. It may or may not be accompanied by oral or written agreements between the parties to the conflict.

d. Postconflict stage. The period that begins with cessation of low intensity conflict and during which tensions threaten renewal of conflict. It ends when no existing organized group has the overt or covert goal of changing the established political order by illicit means or has the resources and the following to threaten accomplishment of its goal, or it ends when conflict is renewed.

e. Key conflict episode. An act, incident, event, or series of occurrences which crystalizes political sentiment or mass emotions and thus intensifies, abates, or triggers the onset or cessation of low intensity conflict. Key conflict episodes may or may not occur, and those that occur may or may not mark the boundaries between conflict stages.

8. General considerations and assumptions. There is a high probability that low intensity conflict will occur somewhere during the foreseeable future. The Army must be prepared to assist in carrying out US policy in this event.

a. The occurrence of low intensity conflict anywhere carries some degree of threat to the security and interests of the United States. Current concepts of military operations, however, do not provide a basis for action to avoid or control low intensity conflict as defined herein.

b. The extent of the US ability to realize its policy objectives in low intensity conflict situations will depend on the limits of its national power and resources and on the allocation of resources to meet competing demands. It also will depend on the disposition of other nations to cooperate and to help themselves. The basic intent of this study is to help assure that only policy decisions and resource allocation, not lack of knowledge and technique, may limit the capacity for US action in future low intensity conflict situations.

President Nixon’s foreign affairs message to Congress on 19 February 1970 stated: “In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense . . . . If we do too little to help our partners . . . . they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own self-defense . . . Yet, if we do too much and American forces do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote dependence rather than independence.”
c. Similarities between current and past low intensity conflicts become increasingly more apparent. Examination of the key factors underlying past conflicts indicates that the factors are likely to continue in the same or similar form. Striking similarities between preconflict conditions in several of the countries studied and current conditions in the same countries appear to bear out this hypothesis.
CHAPTER 2 (U)

NATURE AND CAUSES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Section I. Nature

9. Low intensity conflict. The spectrum of conflict extends from simple disagreement between two individuals, at one extreme, to strategic nuclear exchanges between major world powers, at the other. Low intensity conflict is at the lower end of the spectrum. It includes the lower levels of actual violence associated with insurgency, revolts, and other forms of rebellion. When violence reaches the level of sustained engagement of opposing regular armed forces, it has escalated beyond the upper limits of low intensity conflict into civil or limited war.

10. Conflict as a social process. Conflict occurs when two or more individuals or groups are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and when each party intends to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other. Conflict may or may not involve illegal actions or violence. Some forms of conflict are found in every social system. Certain forms are an acknowledged part of the system, usually in the form of competition with rules and limits of loss, such as elections and civil law suits, and others are tacitly accepted, such as violent games or--in some cultures--duels. In some Latin American countries, the threat and occasional use of violence, albeit illicit, is a tacitly recognized form of political action. When there are illicit acts and violence, the Government, by its nature, is involved. The extent of its involvement and the threat to the social system depend upon the participants in the conflict and their objectives. Even in a peaceful state, every society sustains a certain frictional level of essentially nonpolitical crime and violence, reflected in the crime rate.

11. Government role. Ideally, the political system--the State--is the controller and arbiter of conflict on behalf of the entire populace and the enforcer of rules which protects the parties in conflict from total loss. (In this context, the State as an institution can be distinguished in some degree from the particular people who make up the actual government. In less-developed societies, the distinction may not have much meaning.) When the State itself is seen as a party to conflict, its function as arbiter is obstructed; it must defend itself by responding to the opponents' demands or by coercing their submission. As the opponents' strength and support grows, the State becomes more and more like any other group involved in conflict, and its ability to perform its role of control and arbitration for the whole of the society diminishes, until the terminal condition of civil war, in which two or more parties in the conflict claim equal status and recognize no higher authority, is reached.

6
Section II. Causes

12. General. Many variables, elements, and influences go into the creation of the particular set of circumstances that leads to low intensity conflict, and many underlying factors will affect the likelihood of its occurrence. Influences are only one consideration among many, although they may be of great importance. Response to adverse conditions appears to consist of a psychological mechanism, with a pattern of deprivation, followed by frustration and aggressive action.

a. An aggressive response to feelings of frustration is a basic characteristic of human nature and is a constant acted on by variables of the social system. People become frustrated when they are or think they are being unjustifiably deprived and cannot perceive any nonaggressive way of changing the system or the situation to eliminate the relative deprivation, or when they fail to receive an adequate response to what they believe to be legitimate demands.

b. Frustration does not invariably cause aggression, although this study concentrates on low intensity conflict as a form of aggression; nor does deprivation always lead to frustration. Apathy is another response to frustration. If the group perceives a discrepancy between its state and that of another group or of its own past or anticipated future state (relative deprivation) but accepts it as being legitimate or as being part of the normal pattern (one's lot in life), little frustration develops. Aggression and violence also are less likely to occur when the tensions produced by frustration can be channeled into nonaggressive activities—even if the activities are completely unrelated to the actual causes of frustration.

c. Members of a group involved in aggression may not all have the same frustrations or the same aggressive urge. The frustrations of the leaders may stem from entirely different personal causes than those of the followers. Further, the targets of aggression may or may not be connected in fact with the original frustration.

d. Analysis of a given situation in terms of the six basic considerations described below will give an overall picture of the likelihood of the situation to develop into low intensity conflict.

13. Demand-output imbalances. Relative deprivation may be caused by changes in the outputs of the social system to demands, by changes in the demands, or by both. The two kinds of changes generally are the result of influences of external societies; of the effect of internal (environmental) changes, including changes in the size and composition of the population; or even of technological or sociopolitical innovations. Because of the dual source of relative deprivations, they will be referred to hereafter as demand-output imbalances. The length of duration of such imbalances also may be a factor. Long-term imbalances
are more likely to create conflict than short-term, although an additional short-term imbalance or short-term worsening of long-term imbalances may aggravate the frustrations caused by the long-term imbalances.

14. Malfunctions of the social system. The social system furnishes outputs in the form of regulation of the society (maintenance of law and order); production, allocation, and distribution of material goods and services; and provision of such nonmaterial values as status, honors, personal liberties, recreation, welfare, and the various satisfactions of community life. The system may function efficiently or inefficiently. Deficiencies may exist in policymaking, leadership, performance, communication, or other aspects of the society. It may or may not be capable of meeting popular demands, especially in a period of rapid social change, and it may or may not be able to control the scope and magnitude of these demands.

15. Cultural factors. The operation of the social system, including the conduct of the component individuals, is governed by the society's culture: the beliefs, attitudes, and values shared by the members of the society. Cultural attitudes toward conflict—whether it is good or bad, justifiable or unjustifiable under given conditions—is a factor in the likelihood that frustrations will lead to violence. Change in one cultural aspect requires adaptive change in others; small gradual changes are easily adjusted to, but extensive or rapid changes may create serious tensions and increase instability. Cultural changes alter norms, beliefs, and values that have been a source of social cohesion; the existing relationships between people (developing feelings of insecurity, uncertainty, and ambiguity); and daily habit patterns (causing feelings of vague uneasiness). The resulting anxiety and frustration may be projected outward as hostility toward the Government, industry, ethnic groups, or other entities for which the culture base is inadequate. A slower rate of change in one part of a culture than in another that causes a maladjustment within the society may inhibit necessary additional social change, reducing the responsiveness of the social system and adding to demand-output imbalances.

16. External influences. External influences may be categorized as political, economic, social, and military-security, but they overlap and interrelate in their effects on the internal social system. Influences of other nations or societies can cause changes in the demands of the people or in the response of the social system to those demands. Foreign ideas, living standards, or organizational techniques that affect popular expectations put strains on the social system or affect its performance or capability. The strategic location of the country may cause increased foreign influence because of the importance of the country to the national interests of foreign countries.
17. Internal (environmental) influences. Geography, ecology, and demography are environmental factors that affect the operation of the social system but essentially are beyond direct control by it. Climate and soil fertility; ratio of population to arable land; population growth and shift; lack of natural resources or their discovery or development; ethnic groupings; and technical or social innovations affect the expectations of the people and the capability of the system to respond to such expectations adequately.

18. Modulators of conflict. Modulators are variables in the social system that act on deprivations and frustrations to heighten or lessen the trend of a situation toward increasing conflict and violence. Those that lead to increased or more widespread violence are called intensifiers; those that have the opposite effect are called dampeners. The use of a modulator at the proper time in a situation of incipient violence can have a definite impact on the situation. The logical first action to be taken by a Government to avert violence is to apply a modulator that could reverse the trend toward violence. Similarly, from the viewpoint of an insurgent leader, the application of an intensifying modulator can be of use in gaining popular support and inciting violence. Certain kinds of modulators are inherent in a society, such as cultural attitudes, and these act automatically. Others consist of actions that can be artificially introduced and arbitrarily applied, such as the initiation of arbitration. Modulators may not necessarily have an effect at every stage or on every aspect of a conflict situation. Also, some modulators may affect the selection of the target for aggression rather than the level of violence in a situation or its directional trend.

a. Modulators may be external (e.g., foreign subversion or standards of living) or environmental (e.g., an isolated self-sufficient area of dissidence). They may be political or social (e.g., a dissident organization and leadership or excessive coercion) or cultural (e.g., a predilection for violence or habituation to it) or a combination of these or other factors. These examples all are intensifiers, but the statements are true for both intensifiers and dampeners. Cultural pressures against violence, the availability of machinery for conciliation and arbitration, and the wise and adequate use of force are examples of conflict dampeners. The existence of an organized dissident group probably is the strongest of all intensifiers.

b. Responsiveness of the political system to deprivation is a special kind of modulator. If a deprived group sees that the Government is working to eliminate the deprivation, both frustration and consequent aggressive urge may be reduced. The system, however, cannot always operate in such a way as to convince the deprived groups that they will attain their objectives. Responsiveness also may act as an intensifier, if it is postponed until aggressive acts are committed or threatened and appears to reward aggression or to indicate weakness in the social system, or if response to the demands of one group adds to the demand-response imbalances of another group.
c. Key conflict episodes also act as modulators by crystal-
ing group opinion, presenting targets for aggression, or providing
group emotional release. The assassination of Gaitan in Colombia and
police firing into a crowd in Greece are examples of key conflict
episodes that intensified the conflict.

d. Timing of actions is a modulator in itself. An action
taken at one point will indicate Government weakness and act as an
intensifier; the same action taken at another point will indicate the
Government's self-confidence and strength and its ability to adapt or
adjust responsively to new demands or new political forces. Further,
an action taken in conjunction with supporting actions may be a dampener;
the same action taken in isolation may be an intensifier.
CHAPTER 3 (U)

MODEL FOR ANALYZING CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Section I. Source of Data for Analysis

19. Requirements. Many descriptions of low intensity conflict and analyses of the situations that led to such violence have been written, but they are too personalized, intuitive, and nonanalytic to be useful to military planners. The general causes of low intensity conflict are well known, but generalizations are inadequate bases for development of military concepts and doctrine. Specific underlying causes, their interrelationships, and their cause/effect relationships with the social system and its processes must be determined to provide military planners with the necessary knowledge and understanding of the subject. No single model (analytical method) or combination of models previously developed was suitable for application to a wide range of preconflict periods, primarily because they were noncomparable in structure and content; were mutually contradictory in many instances; and, in most cases, focused on the conflict itself rather than on the preceding period.

20. Data. Comprehensive and detailed research was completed on the preconflict period in each of seven countries in which low intensity conflict has occurred since World War II. Each country's strategic and geographic location; climate and natural resources; political, economic, and social systems; military and security forces; and internal problems plus external influences on the society were analyzed in depth for periods of 20-30 years prior to the eruption of conflict into violence and in less depth for earlier periods, to provide a thorough background for analyzing the preconflict settings in a variety of cases. The data are largely descriptive, rather than quantitative, because of the scarcity and unreliability of relevant statistical information.

Section II. General Determinations

21. Analysis of preconflict situations. The results of this indepth research were reexamined separately by country in terms of the six major considerations in conflict analysis that had been developed during the original research: demand-output imbalances; functioning of the social system; external and internal (environmental) influences and cultural factors; and conflict modulators. The elements in each situation that turned it toward violence were determined empirically from these analyses. It became apparent that certain types of elements had been influential in escalation of the basic problem into low intensity conflict. Some were clearly identifiable as causal factors, and others were identifiable not as causal factors but as modifiers (modulators) of them. The actual importance of the separate elements in generating violence varied from one country situation to another; some had great impact on the situations and others had relatively little.
22. **Genesis of low intensity conflict.** Comparison of findings in the separate countries developed an overall picture that indicated that a society moves from a condition of peaceful change to low intensity conflict through the following steps (figures 1-4):

a. External influences or environmental factors cause changes in the basic demands of a significant segment of the populace.

b. The social system, operating within the constraints of its culture and institutions, is unable to respond adequately to the changed demands; its leaders are unwilling to make the necessary response; or the system is in a state of flux that decreases its ability to respond adequately.

c. The demand-response imbalance creates frustration in the affected group, which then makes additional efforts to get satisfaction.

d. Continued failure of the system to respond to demands for elimination of relative deprivation heightens frustration, and the group becomes more aggressive in behavior. It may start by holding demonstrations, aimed solely at dramatizing the group's grievances or, at some higher conflict level, in an attempt to coerce the desired response from the social system. The group also may skip this step entirely.

e. Intensifiers, especially overly ambitious leaders/groups or dissident organizations with or without outside support, operate on the aggressive urge, escalating it into illicit attacks (including violence) on part or all of the political and social order. The intensification process typically is accompanied by atrophy of communication between the two sides and polarization of beliefs on many issues.

f. The political subsystem responds to the attacks by mobilizing its security forces to defend the established order. The use of force interrupts communication and polarizes beliefs even further and, thus, begets more violence on an ascending spiral.

Section III. Model

23. **Description.** A generalized comprehensive model that is applicable across the variety of situations studied was developed. It shows causal relationships and effects among the factors that intensify and dampen conflict. The generalized model (table I) has an immediate diagnostic capability and provides a basis for development of a predictive model. After the country substudies were analyzed in terms of the six basic considerations in low intensity conflict, the smallest number of categories of components of the considerations that would include the findings adequately was selected. Categories labeled "none of these" were provided in which data identified in the future that do not fall in the specified headings can be placed. Appearance of any large amount of
data under "none of these" would raise questions as to the universality of the model, and appearance of additional generalizations in the labeled categories would increase the comprehensiveness of the model.

24. Tentative typology of low intensity conflict. The magnitude of low intensity conflict can be evaluated in terms of the numbers and kinds of people involved, the type and scale of illicit acts committed, the extent of damage and injury caused, and the duration and territorial extent of the conflict. The magnitude of the violence, however, gives only a very crude indication of the kind and significance of the conflict. A tentative typology was developed, based on classification of the participants and the scope of their objectives (figure 5). It consists of the base state of peaceful change and five conflict states described below. Only three of the conflict states in the typology are low intensity conflict: high-level dissidence, revolt, and revolution. The five conflict states are conceptually distinct but are not necessarily sequential (a state of peaceful change conceivably can develop directly into any other conflict state), nor are the boundaries between states necessarily distinct or discontinuous. Each state represents the net effect of the variables in the model on the constants of frustration and aggression. A given conflict state may involve only part of a national system.

a. Peaceful change. Most significant elements of the populace perceive the gap between demands on the social system and its responses to be tolerable; conflict is at frictional level, usually without political purpose and controllable by normal social processes.

b. Low-level dissidence. Significant segments of the populace perceive demands and responses to be out of balance and are resentful, but they have not gone beyond calling attention to their demands and grievances. Any violence or illegal acts that occur are either unorganized or on a small scale.

c. High-level dissidence. Organized groups use illicit coercion on the social system, to force compliance with their demands, or coerce other groups to support them against the system.

d. Revolt. Portions of the populace make organized efforts to change leaders of parts of the political system by illegal and usually violent methods, such as armed uprisings or coups d'etat.

e. Revolution. Portions of the populace make organized efforts to change the entire political system in at least part of the country by illegal and violent means.

f. Civil war. Portions of the populace make organized efforts to replace the established political regime in at least part of the country through the use of organized armed forces.
Section IV. Validation of the Model

25. Second analysis of country situations. Each preconflict situation was analyzed again, using the model rather than the original broad checklist, and the two sets of findings were compared and evaluated. Use of the model not only brought out the same findings as the original analysis but refined and modified them.

26. Utility of the model. The ARMLIC study method and the model can be used to determine the actions, incidents, and circumstances that were most influential in any past situation in turning a state of peaceful change into low intensity conflict or in turning a developing conflict back into peaceful change. The validity and accuracy of predictions made by using the model to analyze ongoing situations would depend ultimately on the level of the observer's or analyst's understanding of the genesis of low intensity conflict, ability to identify problems and foresee probable reactions to frustrations, understanding of the specific society, and knowledge of actions that might be taken to solve the problems or to diminish the frustrations. A US representative in another country who was thoroughly familiar with the model, methods of avoiding low intensity conflict, and all aspects of the local situation conceivably could identify relative deprivations and nascent frustrations earlier than those more closely involved and could point them out to appropriate local leaders in time for preventive action to be taken.
Figure 1 (U). Genesis of Violence. Social System.
Figure 2 (U). Genesis of Violence. Malfunction of Social System.
Figure 3 (U). Genesis of Violence. Escalation into Violence.
Figure 4 (U). Model for Analyzing Conflict Situations
Figure 5 (U). Conflict States of the Social System.

*Other results of frustration: Apathy, attack on scapegoats, accommodation, native cults, etc.
TABLE I. MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN ANALYZING CONFLICT SITUATIONS

1. Demand-output imbalances
   a. Bodily needs: food, clothing, shelter
   b. Physical security and social order
   c. Psychological security (succorance)
   d. National status
   e. Individual and group status, rights, and freedoms
   f. Distribution of material benefits
   g. Law enforcement and adjudication of disputes
   h. None of these

2. Functioning of the social system
   a. Political
      Demand articulation
      Demand aggregation
      Leadership, decision, policy
      Administration
      System maintenance and development
      Adjudication
      None of these
   b. Economic
      Plans and policies
      Distribution of resources
      Agriculture
      Industry
      Labor, manpower
      Trade (domestic)
      Finance and credit
      Monetary stability
      None of these

(continued)
TABLE I (continued)

c. Social

Family system
Community
Class and caste
Ethnic subdivisions
Religion
Education and literacy
Nutrition and health
Amusement and arts
None of these

d. Military/security

Armed forces (including reserve forces)
Political orientation
Discipline, effectiveness
Strength
Organization
Relations with population
None of these

Internal security forces (police, constabulary)
Political orientation
Discipline, effectiveness
Strength
Organization
Relations with population
None of these

None of these

e. Communications

Language differences

Formal communication
Media
Content
Penetration
None of these

Informal communication
Means
Extent
None of these

None of these

(continued)
TABLE I (continued)

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3. Cultural factors

a. Attitude on government

- Legitimacy
- Civic consciousness
- Administration type
- None of these

b. Attitude toward institutional cooperation and group action

- Attitude toward authority; deference
- Individual and family vs community and nation
- Obedience to law
- Personalism and factionalism
- None of these

c. Religious orientation

d. Attitudes of the elite

e. Pragmatism vs ideology

f. National tradition and symbols

g. Competitiveness

h. Willingness to compromise

i. Attitudes toward progress and change; effects of social change on these attitudes

j. Attitude toward material living standard

k. Sense of political and social efficacy

l. Attitude toward planning

m. Achievement orientation

n. None of these

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideas</td>
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<td>Influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
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<td>None of these</td>
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<td>b. Economic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
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<td>Trade</td>
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<td>Credit</td>
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<td>Technical assistance</td>
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<td>Controls sanctions</td>
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<td>None of these</td>
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<td>c. Social</td>
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<td>Religion</td>
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<td>Health and welfare</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>d. Military/security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conquest</td>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<td>Support</td>
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<th>5. Internal influences</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Geographic</td>
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<tr>
<td>World location</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>b. Ecological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources: availability, changes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land fertility, population/land ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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TABLE I (continued)

c. Demographic

Population density
Ethnic differences
None of these
d. None of these

6. Modulators

a. Dissident political groupings

Organization
Discipline
Effectiveness
Duration (legal, clandestine)
Experience
Cadre, primary control mechanism
Clandestine apparatus
None of these

Leadership

Ideology and agitation/propaganda capability

Following
Members of organizations
Infiltration of other groups
Front group activity and potential
None of these

Access to arms
Sources of supply, support
Freedom of movement and access
None of these

b. Convergence of political/social differences vs differentiation
   and pluralism

c. Charismatic leadership

d. External influences

e. Traditional intergroup antipathies

f. History of recourse to violence

(continued)
TABLE I (continued)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Culturally conditioned attitude on conflict and violence vs negotiation and compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Communication barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Arbitration: mediation institutions and practices</td>
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<td>j.</td>
<td>Use of coercive power</td>
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<td>k.</td>
<td>Key conflict episodes</td>
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<td>l.</td>
<td>Responsiveness of social system</td>
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<td>m.</td>
<td>None of these</td>
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7. None of these
CHAPTER 4 (C)
ANALYSIS BY MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS (U)

Section I (U). Introduction

27. (U) General. Data on the preconflict period in the seven countries studied can be ordered according to the analytical method described in chapter 3. This approach has been used to provide both a demonstration and a test of the model.

a. Although all the major considerations and the majority of the factors listed in the model (table I) were present in all the countries analyzed, the importance of a particular consideration or specific factor was found to vary significantly from country to country, depending on the overall situation and the interaction of the components. Therefore, the summaries which follow present the findings across all the countries in terms of the six major considerations of the analytical model. They summarize the results of applying the model to the data and highlight the relationships of those considerations to the specific country situations, thus yielding a comparative evaluation of the various components.

b. The seven country substudies have been published separately under the title of Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine (ARMLIC), Preconflict Case Studies 1-7. Each of these studies contains detailed data for one of the countries studied. These data, analyzed and compared, were used to construct the analytical model, and all the country studies together provided the basis for this final report on preconflict situations. Appendix IV of this report makes the major findings from each substudy available without having to read the separately published country studies. It provides a country-by-country summary of the separate case studies, in which the preconflict situation in each country is analyzed in terms of the six major considerations of the model.

Section II (C). Analysis (U)

28. (U) General. The factors discussed in the summary analyses that follow apply to all countries studied except as otherwise stated.

29. (C) Demand-output imbalances. Relative deprivation results when a group perceives a difference between its status and that of another group/time (chapter 2). Differences between what the group wants or demands and what it gets from the social system create demand-output imbalances.

a. In each country studied, various groups of people became aware of the imbalance in the distribution of material benefits and failed
to accept it as legitimate. Expansion of mass media and greater communication through internal migration created relative (perceived) deprivation among rural groups and urban workers. The influx of people to cities in search of jobs not only increased unemployment but also promoted awareness of wide disparities between socioeconomic groups.

b. In all countries except Greece and possibly Iran, land reform campaigns and programs, which held out the hope of ownership of land for the peasants, produced feelings of deprivation among those who remained landless—particularly those whose hopes were aroused and then dashed by nonimplementation of laws and promises. The sudden influx of an overwhelming number of people into Greece and the displacement of blacks by whites in Kenya caused deprivations among those forced to migrate to an uncertain future in the cities and towns.

c. Normally, close family ties and loyalties provided strong psychological support for individual family members. Individuals who moved acquired feelings of insecurity and deprivation because of their lack of such family support.

d. All the countries were heterogeneous, although the heterogeneity in Greece was more regional than ethnic. In a heterogeneous country, ethnic and religious differences especially may produce some measure of prejudice and discrimination. Increased movement of the people to the cities not only made the difference more visible; it also tended to heighten discrimination. The prejudice and discrimination directed against the less privileged groups increased their awareness of the differences in status and, thus, their relative deprivation.

e. In each country except Greece, the lower-level socioeconomic groups were aware that they had less status in the political and social system and derived fewer benefits from it than did the comparatively small group that comprised the elite. Development of political organizations and the political activities of unions indicate that segments of the less privileged groups considered this disparity unjust and were motivated to seek redress.

f. Each country continued or started to improve its education system during the preconflict period. Except during World War II, larger proportions of the people were obtaining some formal education and reaching a higher level of education. Those who had completed at least an elementary education expected nonmenial, high-status, well-paying jobs. Economic growth was insufficient to absorb the educated applicants except in Malaya, and ethnic or other discrimination was present. Groups of the better educated thus developed strong feelings of deprivation.

g. Except for Iran and the hala's in Malaya, external cultural and political influences had made enough impact on large groups of people
that traditional values were yielding under new challenges causing an increase in psychological insecurity.

h. In most instances, several of these factors acted simultaneously on the groups that felt deprived. Such a condition tends to heighten the degree of frustration experienced and to increase the potential severity of aggression.

i. In contrast, widespread malnutrition and poor health was an objective deprivation but not perceived as a relative one--except, perhaps, in the Philippines. Culturally conditioned food preferences and unavailability of adequate protein led to malnutrition, and ignorance of public health practices prevented control of endemic diseases. However, malnutrition and relatively poor health were generally accepted by the people and did not become a significant source of relative deprivation.

j. On the other hand, there were indications in the Philippines and Kenya that the loss of public health programs caused relative deprivation—a new demonstration of the J-curve hypothesis (see appendix VIII). It follows from such considerations that the discontinuance of programs for social betterment may intensify rather than dampen the propensity toward conflict.

30. (C) Functioning of the social system. The way the social system functions—effectively, adequately, or poorly—can cause or prevent, increase or decrease, or eliminate both objective and relative deprivations. The kind of response the social system makes to the people's demands to eliminate relative deprivations is an important determinant of their expectations and of the method they select to attain their expectations.

a. This does not mean that such institutions are essential; other ways can be devised. Nor does it mean that such institutions were absent; except for the absence of political parties in Kenya throughout the preconflict period and during the dictatorial or wartime periods in Iran (1923-40), Greece (1936-44), and the Philippines (1941-44), they were found in each country. However, these institutions did not perform the demand articulation and aggregation functions adequately, and alternative means of performing them also were inadequate. The reasons are that legislatures, parties, groups, and mass media were foreign to a great extent, not thoroughly integrated into society and culture, and the political leadership gave them no encouragement to perform effectively because of class and interest barriers between the masses and the elite. The organizations that existed merely reflected the demands and aspirations of the elite.

(1) In Iran and Greece, the demand articulation function was performed partly by the institutions of the family and informal social groups, because these institutions cut across class and regional lines.
This mechanism was blocked in other countries by ethnic and class barriers, but, even in Iran and Greece, there was no effective process of aggregating demands, other than to respond to the most pressing one at a given moment.

(2) Although the data of the country studies do not mention it, experience suggests that effective political and social leaders develop their own channels of information. These channels, when they work properly, can provide for demand articulation and aggregation to a considerable extent. The problem is that channels established by the leadership, without cultural and social support or institutionalization, can be readily perverted and choked by ambitious or partisan individuals.

b. Deficiencies of leadership and policies also were pervasive.

(1) In general, failures of both leadership and policies characterized the countries studied. The fact that periods of strong, authoritarian leadership had preceded the weak leadership evident in Iran and Greece during and after World War II reinforced the unsettling effects of that weakness. In addition, the remedial policies and action programs selected to respond to the problems resulting from the war were inadequate and frequently inappropriate. The British attempt to impose the Union structure in Malaya in 1946 was ill-conceived under the actual circumstances. Similarly, British policies in Kenya failed to take account of the changing circumstances among the black populace, especially following World War II. France had failed to make satisfactory plans for independence in Vietnam and had permitted the Vietnamese to have only minimal participation in the Government. As a result, Vietnam was left with an unresponsive Government bereft of able leadership.

(2) Leadership and policy failures derived partly from class and ethnic barriers that blinded leaders to popular needs; partly from lack of pragmatism in translating ambitious ideas into actual implementation; partly from long-established patterns of competition among the elite for power and status, in a sort of game which took little account of wider needs; and partly from ignorance of the ongoing process of social change and its significance. Such ignorance was by no means confined to the countries affected. The lack of economic planning in the Philippines after World War II, for example, reflected the prejudice of US leaders against any kind of "socialistic" overall plan—a prejudice that seems almost ridiculous from the perspective of 25 years later, but which was very widely and firmly held at the time.

c. Poor administration was characteristic of Colombia, Greece, Vietnam, and Iran, although allowance should be made for the ex cathedra flavor of the judgments made by Western administrative experts. Over-centralization, conservatism, timidity, obsession with form, concern with status rather than function, change of personnel for family or partisan advantage, and partisan loyalty rather than impartial duty characterized
the public services of these countries. One consequence was the proliferation of new and often overlapping or duplicating agencies to avoid the handicaps of the old ones—notably the Plan Organization developed in 1949 to implement economic development in Iran. The public services reflected American and British administrative standards in the Philippines, Kenya, and Malaya, although there was some decline in the quality of the Philippine services after World War II. Administrative competence in these three countries could not compensate for inadequacies of leadership and policy; in Colombia, Greece, Iran, and Vietnam, the weaknesses of the public services hindered leadership and policy execution and reinforced leadership inadequacies.

d. Partisan, venal, weak, overly coercive, or poorly organized internal security services were characteristic of Colombia, Iran, and Vietnam (the latter also poorly trained and equipped) during most of the preconflict period. The quality of the security services in the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya was reduced by World War II. Although the security forces in Kenya operated according to British standards, the strangeness to the blacks of the rules that the police endorsed and the distinctions made between the white and black communities probably made security appear partisan to the blacks. Pronounced popular hostility toward the security forces was found in Malaya and Vietnam during the Japanese occupation and in Colombia, Iran, and Greece.

e. Poor judicial services, especially in excessive legalism, delay, and expense, were a deficiency of relatively minor significance in most countries. In Kenya, however, justice was too sophisticated for the situation and inhibited early Government efforts to bring dissidents under control.

f. The economies were strongly influenced by external factors, often with adverse effects, as elsewhere noted. The major underlying internal deficiencies were the inequitable distribution of goods and services and the failure to respond economically and socially to the unforeseen effects of industrialization and modernization or to achieve a balanced economy.

(1) All the economies showed good overall growth rates, but encountered crises and setbacks that strained and aggravated their deficiencies, notably the world economic depression and World War II. Economic development efforts in Kenya were made almost wholly by the Europeans, the blacks participating only to the extent that they were needed by the Europeans' enterprises. The Europeans and some Chinese were the chief beneficiaries in Malaya. The distribution of benefits from economic development was inequitable in other countries.

(2) The problem of land tenure, important in all countries except Greece, was political and social as much as economic; but it was
an outstanding case of inequitable distribution. A related development was the increase in absentee landlords and the appearance of agents or middlemen, particularly in the Philippines and Iran, which upset traditional social as well as economic relationships.

g. The institutions of family and community were principal continuing sources of stability and security. Loyalty to these institutions retarded the development of civic responsibility and adequate performance of national, rather than partisan or parochial, functions; but it was simple realism for people to look to long-established and proven ways of meeting their needs at a time when the ability of the Government to do so was unproved and uncertain. The institutions and capabilities of the social system for social welfare, other than the family and local community, were mostly rudimentary or nonexistent. The gross inadequacy of public health facilities and programs illustrates the point.

h. Although all countries studied show the strains attendant on change of the social system, as the rise in demands consistently exceeded the outputs of the social system, Kenya is unique in that the European leaders deliberately set out to force sudden change in key elements of the African (chiefly Kikuyu) system, with insufficient attention to the consequences and side effects. Riza Shah also forced certain changes in Iran, but these were peripheral and symbolic rather than central elements, and the changes were undertaken with full understanding of the culture and mores of the people and the existing system.

i. Practically no evidence is available on the proper function of the social system in relation to art, amusement, and pageantry. Greece and Colombia present a dramatic contrast in relative quality of life among the masses. Material poverty is general in both countries; but descriptions of rural Colombia (as distinguished from the famed culture of the elite) convey an impression of great dreariness and monotony, relieved only by the often primitive rites of the church, while Greek rural life seems gay and lively.

j. In terms of the overall capability, adaptability, and responsiveness of their social systems, it can be concluded that the basic problem was lack of capability to respond to the increased demands and of flexibility to make the necessary changes.

(1) Colombia probably had the greatest capability and adaptability but still failed to meet the challenge. The main problem in Greece may have been the extreme demands levied on the social system as a result of strategic location, world economic depression, and above all the impact of the world wars rather than inadequacy of the system itself. Even a perfect system with perfect leadership could have had difficulty under such circumstances.
(2) It was evident that the leaders not only lacked information on popular demands but were not greatly concerned with them, either because of self-interest or because of class or ethnic bias. It was this fact that gave disdistant or subversive leaders their causes (the Communists have used this lack in many areas to stir up unrest). When the problem was perceived—as it was by Jorge Gaitan in Colombia and, eventually, by Mohammed Riza Shah in Iran—the way was opened for needed change.

(3) The processes of maintaining and developing the social system are crucial to capability and flexibility. They were deficient in all cases. Socialization was inadequate in community life and education. The most extreme example was Greece, where there was irrelevant emphasis on ancient glories and serious mismatching of educational curricula to social needs, combined with early inculcation of suspicion and distrust of people outside the family group. Primary school attendance was low in most countries, and vocational training inadequate. However, every country had attempted to improve its educational system, special training was made available, and education was stressed (and accepted) as a means for upward social movement. Because economic growth was inadequate to absorb the newly educated groups, their unrealistically high hopes for achieving better paying jobs and higher social status were seldom realized. The result was the creation of groups of overeducated, frustrated people—the intellectual unemployed—in the cities. Also, the leading political and social positions customarily were filled by members of the elite, with family and status, rather than insight and ability, as the criteria for selection. Some system development occurred during the preconflict periods studied in each country, but it was generally inadequate. Iran, under Riza Shah, and the Philippines, under US tutelage, made the greatest advances; Colombia and Greece had made their principal advances and reforms before the record under study, and changes during the period were either unresponsive to basic problems or inadequately implemented. In Kenya, both traditional and modern systems existed side by side without noticeable integration (a characteristic of all other countries to some degree, but less dramatically manifested).

31. (C) Cultural factors. Several cultural factors were shown to be highly relevant to the development of conflict.

a. Violence in varying degrees is acceptable to most cultures. Colombia is the outstanding example of a society whose culture is permeated by the use of extreme violence to settle disputes. For centuries, Philippine peasants had used rebellion to secure redress for grievances. Violence was so common in these countries that it was difficult to distinguish between political violence and banditry. Changes of dynasties and elite leaders in Iran usually were accomplished by violence; it was common for one side to pay crowds from the bazaars to riot against the other. Islam condoned extremes of violence against unbelievers and heretics and, sometimes, self-flagellation, and tribes in Kenya used violence toward other tribes. Although violent differences between religious and regional groups
were an accepted part of the culture in Vietnam, the people were not accustomed to using violence as a means of political coercion. Neither Greece nor Malaya accepted violence as a legitimate social form, but guerrilla activities carried on in both countries and in the Philippines during World War II became a way of life for some individuals.

b. Radical culture change was a major tension-creating factor in five of the countries studied; a lesser factor in two.

(1) Kenya experienced the most traumatic changes. Missionary activities seriously undermined traditional religious beliefs, initiatory rites, and marriage and family customs; and colonial Government policy largely destroyed tribal governing systems—all of which were basic to the Kikuyu pattern of life. As a result, both social cohesion and control were weakened. Changes in the web of relationships (husband-wife, old-young) and the virtual elimination of some roles (elders, warriors) caused insecurity. These feelings were intensified by life pattern changes resulting from new types of employment, and unemployment, urbanization, and related causes. Psychologically, the situation created a high degree of suggestibility and susceptibility to crowd behavior and manipulation.

(2) The breakdown of the traditional family village system in Vietnam caused by years of war, destruction, dislocation, and general chaos did much to disturb and disrupt the sociological heritage of the Vietnamese people. They often became a people without a past and, consequently, without a future according to their cultural beliefs.

(3) The cultural changes in Colombia were less dramatic. The farmers became more aware of the outside world through newspapers, radio, and air transportation. Improved communication and economic changes altered many of their beliefs and values and modified status and class structure. These changes became a major source of frustration, insecurity, and social tension.

(4) Similarly, US-sponsored programs in the Philippines introduced radical changes that aggravated farmer and worker dissatisfaction. Increased emphasis on democracy, individualism, and equality contrasted sharply to Spanish colonial traditions and seriously undermined existing social relationships, respect for authority, and other forms of social control. Importation of foreign goods stimulated desires for a higher standard of living.

(5) The impact of culture changes in Iran was equally significant, but the mechanism of its operation was different. Riza Shah, an authoritarian innovator, attempted to impose a more modern political framework on his country. However, changes in the political culture were not adequate to meet the new demands. Although the elite were impelled toward modernization, their traditional patterns of socialization had not
preparing them for new roles. Individual loyalties, rights, and duties continued to be defined in terms of family and clique rather than of a modern nation-state. The result was inefficiency, nepotism, corruption, and a general lack of responsiveness to the needs of the public. The value system of the lower economic class urban dweller also was severely challenged by Western ideas, and easily exploitable tensions developed. Rural areas, by contrast, were hardly touched, and the old patterns remained a stabilizing factor.

(6) External and internal influences and development of a modern economy in Malaya had little effect on the culture of the Malays but changed the culture of the Malayan Chinese significantly.

c. Cultural differences within the society were a major tension-producing factor in Kenya, Malaya, Vietnam, Colombia, and the Philippines and a minor factor in Greece and Iran. Among the many traits found to be significant in specific situations were religious beliefs; magical practices; work and consumption habits; food and dress; norms of honesty and loyalty; concepts of land ownership and of economic and social justice; sexual, marriage, and family patterns; attitudes toward race; emphasis on the superiority of one's own group; hostility and suspicion toward other groups; and language and other symbols.

(1) The initiation rites and marriage and family patterns of the Kikuyu in Kenya conflicted sharply with European ideas of human behavior and sexual morality; and British and African attitudes on race, land ownership, economic and social justice were irreconcilable.

(2) Language, family, and clan traditions; feelings of cultural superiority; even dress helped isolate the Chinese in Malaya from other ethnic groups and aroused feelings of resentment and suspicion; Chinese traditions of clan self-government conflicted with British law; the Malays' work habits and needs contributed to their economic subordination to the Chinese and thus to hostility. A common religion unified the Malay aristocrats and peasants on one hand and yet separated them from other ethnic groups.

(3) The native Vietnamese distrusted and feared the minority ethnic groups and were wary of white foreigners. Strong regional differences between the Annamites, Tonkinese, and Cochin Chinese prohibited their functioning together as a nation. Class antagonisms, while they did not lead directly to violence, made it extremely difficult to form the nation necessary to ward off violence. Religious tolerance did not exist, and differences raged among the religious sects.

(4) In the Philippines and Kenya, the growth of separatist religions was both a symptom of and an intensifier of conflict. In general, religious beliefs, distinct from church structure, were conducive to conflict only as part of a subculture. Otherwise this factor was either neutral or a dampener.
The contrast between the life styles of the Spanish-Creole elite and the Malay-Mestizo peasants in Colombia and the Philippines militated against rapport between them.

Similarly, in Greece the elite subculture, with its orientation toward European society, was a factor in the inadequate Government response to popular needs. In Iran, the farmers regularly suffered from the traditional spring and fall migrations of the tribesmen; the poor farmer and the aristocrat shared many Persian culture traits, but the differences in their life styles were so great as to constitute conflicting subcultures.

d. The people of six countries had a traditional suspicion of the Government, a lack of identification with it, and a tendency to reject the legitimacy of the administration. All were linked with insurgency conditions.

(1) The Africans and Indians in Kenya regarded the British as an alien and exploitative colonial power. The Filipinos had struggled in turn against the Spanish, the Americans, and the Japanese; and the wartime guerrillas felt betrayed by the strong Japanese-collaborationist character of the post-World War II administration. The Greeks had a long history of foreign domination, and many had never regarded the European-imposed monarchy as legitimate. Similarly, the Vietnamese had a heritage of foreign rule and domination which traditionally was never recognized by the people as being legitimate.

(2) In Iran the peasants showed strong respect for the institution of the Shah and tended to accept whatever authoritarian regime was imposed on them so long as it had strength; but the elite, including tribal leaders, were engaged in a constant and nonpeaceable struggle for power.

(3) In Malaya the Malays showed a strong loyalty to the legitimate ruler of each of the constituent Malay States and were conditioned by culture to respect superior authority, including the British; but the large Chinese population had few ties of loyalty to the Government, which tended to let them govern themselves through their traditional secret societies.

(4) Colombia had observed a peaceful transfer of power for almost 40 years, and at first glance might seem to constitute an exception. However, questionable election methods and habitual suppression of the opposition by the party in power were conducive to instability and conflict situations.

(5) There was no well-developed civic consciousness in any country to serve as a dampener of conflict. Its absence was particularly noticeable in elite subcultures.
e. There was a general absence of attitudes facilitating cooperation and group action. A modern nation can hardly function effectively without a willingness to compromise. Except in Colombia, individuals were culturally conditioned to a high degree of cooperation within the family, but this did not carry over to the nation.

(1) Greece, Colombia, Iran, Vietnam, and the Philippines were characterized by extreme personalism and factionalism. Even where fervent patriotism and pride in the nation's past were much evidenced (as in Greece and Iran), day-to-day situations were interpreted in terms of personal and family advantage rather than material welfare. The situation was made more volatile by concepts of individual pride, dignity, and manliness, ingrained suspicion of outsiders, and an expectation of being cheated by others.

(2) In all the cases except Kenya (where the British controlled the situation), the web of personal relationships created an institutionalized nepotism and contributed to Government inefficiency and social tension.

f. Attitudes toward progress and change were not significant in the abstract but became important in the total situation.

(1) Attitudes favoring change, if implemented by measures which upset the existing web of relationships (status, roles), were initiators of conflict.

(2) Attitudes opposed to change when remedial measures were needed to meet imbalances that already had occurred were conducive to conflict.

(3) Conflict most commonly arose when one element of the population opposed and another supported change.

g. Beyond those already identified above, attitudes must be reported with caution. Although this study indicates that the cultural norms related to competitiveness, group action, individualism, and cooperativeness are potentially useful in the study of preconflict situations, they are ill-defined and inadequately examined in the available studies. Individualism is variously used to mean nonconformity, self-reliance, initiative (in the sense of opportunism), lack of a sense of social responsibility, and self-interest. Competitiveness frequently is confused with aggressiveness, unwillingness to cooperate, and interest in material goods. The individual may compete for nonmaterial as well as material goods. He cooperates within one group to compete with another. Competitiveness neither intensifies nor dampens conflict. It can legitimately be considered only in terms of specific goals and situations. More carefully defined cross-cultural studies of attitude are needed than those available.
32. (C) **External Influences.** Political, economic, sociocultural, and military aspects of external influence are interrelated and difficult to isolate; however, they have been separated for analysis.

a. The destruction and dislocation caused by World War II were major contributors to internal conflict except in Colombia, where they had less effect. Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya experienced violent conquest by one or more Axis powers and severe hardships under enemy occupation. Iran, which was occupied by the Allies, escaped the direct destruction of war but suffered severe internal deterioration both in political and military effectiveness and credibility. The Japanese occupation of Vietnam contributed greatly to Vietnamese nationalism and desire for independence.

(1) Relatively small and ineffectual Communist parties in each of these five countries grew immensely during the war and became the most potent internal partisan forces—well-armed and with ready access to large elements of the populace. In Iran, the Communists managed to get control of the Tudeh Party, the only true political party in the country during the war. Although the war did not touch Kenya directly, it did bring new wealth, increased urbanization, and rising expectations to the country. The many blacks who served in the British forces in Europe and Asia returned with a heightened sense of anticolonialism and desire for independence. The war affected Colombia very little, although it did lead to flirtations with fascism and communism and caused a more critical look at US interests in the country. The Japanese occupation of Vietnam limited French authority to such an extent that the Communist Viet Minh was able to expand and to exert control over large portions of the country.

(2) There was also a tremendous upsurge in the awareness of Western ideas, power, and wealth in the preconflict periods. The parallel desires of acquiring these advantages, on the one hand, and ridding one's country of the exercise of them by one or more great powers, on the other, operated in each case. This nationalism/anti-imperialism was directed most intensely toward France in Vietnam, Great Britain in Kenya, Malaya, Iran, and to a lesser degree in Greece, and less intensely toward the United States in the Philippines and to some degree in Colombia. Only in Iran was the Soviet Union made a similar object of nationalist sentiment.

(3) The conflicts in Iran and Greece, and to a lesser degree in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaya were direct reflections of competition between great powers. The Kenya conflict involved the then perceived vital interests only of Great Britain.

b. The economic dislocations of World War II, and especially the postwar slump with its slow and uneven recovery in the face of rising popular expectations and demands, were major factors in every
preconflict period except in Colombia. The presence of great power investment, trade interest, or active economic intervention were national irritants in all cases. Slow recovery from recession was also the principal factor in the recurrence of conflict in Greece, and in the continuing subconflict frustration in the Philippines, Vietnam, Colombia, Kenya, and Malaya.

c. External social influences were important sources of strain and tension, but their operations were more diffuse in both time and mode, and few generalizations about them could be made.

(1) The clearest case of external social influence was the role of Christian missionaries in breaking down Kikuyu society through their attempts to suppress certain traditional practices. Elsewhere, Western society had a parallel but more subtle impact, through exchange of persons and ideas, in upsetting traditional social balances.

(2) The strong attachment of the sizable Chinese minorities in Malaya and the Philippines to their homeland made them a beachhead of Chinese influence and contributed, along with the internal effects of language and ethnic differences, to tension and conflict.

(3) The public health situation (appendix VI) is a good example of the ambivalent effect of external social influence. Health and nutrition were poor and sometimes very bad indeed for most of the people; yet the concept of attacking these problems by community action was virtually unknown, and the poor conditions themselves often were unrecognized. By Western standards, health and sanitation programs were poor and few, and external assistance was small; but the lack usually was neither apparent to the people nor a significant cause of tension (unless psychosomatic mechanisms were involved, on which no data have been found). In some cases, the proposed beneficiaries of health and sanitation programs objected to their infringement on traditional practices, and the programs caused rather than decreased tensions. When public health programs succeeded in lowering mortality, the consequence was a spurt of population growth which in itself was destabilizing. In other cases, however, carefully conceived and modest public health programs probably had a stabilizing effect. The Near East Foundation's work in northern Greece after World War I, certain work in Kenya (e.g., rat control) which was welcomed and even demanded by the people, and work in the Colombian rubber plantations by the US Public Health Service are examples. There is some evidence that cessation of public health programs without proper warning or phasing out had tension-inducing effects.

d. Foreign military support for the Government in the preconflict period occurred in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Greece, and to some degree in Iran. US technical assistance built up the Philippine Armed Forces and an effective and independent constabulary. The United Kingdom supplied forces and assistance to Greece before and
during the first conflict. The United States supported the French in their attempt to retake Vietnam after World War II and later provided direct assistance to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Both the United Kingdom and the United States provided assistance to Iran prior to the first outbreak, but both were absent through the second conflict period. In both the Kenya and Malaya conflicts, the British had to bring in additional forces. The Colombian Government had received some US lend-lease assistance in the preconflict period, but this support was minimal.

(1) Of the insurgent forces studied, only two received direct military support from a Communist power. The USSR forces that occupied Northwestern Iran assisted the Azerbaijani rebels and helped them set up a separatist government, and the Viet Minh in Vietnam received military aid from Communist China and the Soviet Union via Peking. The Greek insurgents received a little aid from newly Communist nations in the north during the second preconflict period, but, by and large, Communist support for insurgents in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, and Iran during the second conflict period was moral, diplomatic, and propagandistic.

(2) The insurgents in the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya were organized and were able to arm themselves as a result of World War II, in part from Allied assistance to partisan forces, in part from captured enemy and abandoned allied arms caches. The Vietnamese Communists seized rifles, artillery pieces, tanks, and other weapons of French and Japanese manufacture which the Allied forces failed to secure. In these cases, the insurgents had no great need for further external support prior to the outbreak of conflict. Allied efforts to disarm partisan forces at the end of the war were largely ineffectual, primarily because no one had a clear idea of the numbers of weapons involved.

(3) The Iranian insurgents during the second conflict period had no access to large numbers of arms; this factor, together with their ineffective attempts to infiltrate the Army, caused their inability to strike effectively when the opportunity arose.

(4) The Mau Mau in Kenya suffered similarly from a lack of external arms supply, thus severely limiting them as a threat to the British colonial hold on the country.

33. (C) Internal influences. In general, the environmental factors isolated in this analysis were not in themselves major causes of the development of conflict, but were more on the order of facilitators of its outbreak and intensifiers of the ensuing violence.

a. Geographic factors.

(1) Strategic location or geographic proximity to areas considered vital by the great powers added to the internal strains
leading to conflict in each country. This was particularly true of Iran, which was regarded by the Soviet Union as a potential enemy passage into the Soviet heartland and by the United Kingdom as a potential Soviet avenue of approach endangering India, British oil interests in the Persian Gulf, and commerce with the Middle East and Southern Asia. Greece is situated in a commanding position in the eastern Mediterranean and also was regarded as vital to British commercial interests. The location of Singapore and Malaya's strategic position in the South China Sea made that country similarly vital to British interests. Kenya was important to the British originally as a means of access to the resources of central Africa; later it was the center of East African trade, and the growth of a large European population added to the British sense of responsibility and vital interest. The Philippine proximity to the Asian mainland made the islands of both strategic and commercial interest to the United States. Colombia's proximity to the Isthmus of Panama attracted both US and Axis attention. Vietnam's strategic position on the eastern shore of the Indochinese Peninsula, contiguous to Communist China, and its relative isolation from the non-Communist world created an ideal environment for insurgency and Communist subversion.

(2) The terrain in every country analyzed was both a causal factor and a modulator. Topographical features tended to encourage regionalism, obstruct communication, and hinder continued and effective Government control. Rugged terrain in Iran, Colombia, and Greece reduced the effective presence of Government authority and encouraged the sense of regionalism and isolation. The isolation and self-sufficiency of the "Huklandia" area in central Luzon in the Philippines favored insurgent operations. Malaya possessed a large rain forest area and lowland swamp, much of it virtually uninhabited. Such terrain, together with the malaria and other diseases it encouraged, hampered insurgent operations and made operations by conventional military forces almost impossible. Two mountainous and heavily forested regions in Kenya close to concentrations of Kikuyu population made it difficult for Government forces to isolate the insurgents from the general populace or to tell the terrorist from the farmer. The predominantly mountainous and heavily forested terrain of Vietnam is not conducive to conduct of conventional military operations of the type that would be normal in Europe and most of the Western Hemisphere.

b. Ecological factors.

(1) Growth of cities and strong urban/rural differentiation characterized all the countries to some degree. The rural people remained bound to both tradition and the land and were relatively insulated from the rapid modernization process taking place in the cities. The occupation and destruction of World War II increased the influx of people into urban areas, except in Colombia; but other factors were creating a similar urbanization trend there. The breakdown of traditional social support
systems accompanying this process is well documented in each case. Heavy population pressure on available land was a problem in Greece and Kenya.

(2) The discovery of oil in Iran, although it preceded the preconflict period, clearly was an important factor in the genesis of conflict, because it reinforced the strategic importance of the country for the great powers and contributed to internal stresses through the economic and social effects of its exploitation.

c. Demographic factors. In all cases the incidence of disease or malnutrition was great, often further intensified by wartime dislocation and privation. Patterns of death rates tended to place the bulk of the populations in the age group under 25. Population growth was acutely sensitive to changes in basic economic productivity, such as the level of annual food production, and to reduction of mortality rates by the introduction of public health measures. The presence of minority groups highly differentiated from the bulk of the population by locality, means of livelihood, religion, or traditions increased social strains. The Philippines had both a Chinese community and isolated ethnic subgroups; Malaya had a large Chinese minority; Iran had the Azerbaijani Kurds and other large ethnic groups; Greece had the Asia Minor refugees; Kenya had European settlers, blacks, and Indians; Colombia had Spanish-descendant Indians, and blacks, as well as regional groupings; and Vietnam had large Kemer and Cham minorities, as well as many ethnic subgroups among the mountain dwellers.

34. (C) Modulators. Modulators include both intensifiers and dampeners of tendencies to conflict. The same modulator may operate as an intensifier in some circumstances and as a dampener in others; accordingly, the two are discussed together in the following paragraphs. Modulators also can be grouped roughly into categories paralleling some of the major considerations of the model—functioning of the social system, cultural factors, and external and internal influences.

a. External modulators to conflict often are quite easy to identify and, in fact, receive prominence in the analysis of conflict by Government authorities to justify proposed Government counteractions. Outside influences on the social system often are better documented than internal modulators, and for this reason their importance often is exaggerated.

(1) Important external influences include the Communist (Soviet and Comintern) multiplier influences on the Iran-Azerbaijan separatist republic, the Greek Communist Party role within EAM, the ties of the Malay Communist Party to the Chinese and to individual Indonesian and Australian Communists, and the Philippine Communist ties to Chinese and US Communists. The international Communist Youth Congress in Calcutta of January 1948 was an important ideological and tactical intensifier in the Philippines and Malaya.
(2) On the other hand, non-Communist external intensifiers often have critical importance. Examples are the presence of British troops in Athens, 1944-45; the meeting of inter-American representatives in Bogota at the time of the "Bogotazo," July 1948; and the extensive negotiations and investments of Western oil companies in 1948-51.

(3) External influences also may have dampening effects on conflict situations. Well-intended international and bilateral initiatives have been identified during the preconflict period which were designed to stabilize and unite the societies under study. Often, however, these influences had unforeseen consequences that intensified internal conflict.

(4) The case of Greece illustrates how external modulators can receive an exaggerated amount of attention, diverting attention from the internal modulators which influence conflict intensity. US economic aid to Greece was designed to offset the effects of Soviet Communist aid to the Greek Communist Party. Thus, with attention focused on the Communist threat, internal polarization in Greece was undervalued.

b. The major environmental modulator of conflict is terrain, discussed in paragraph 33a(2) above. A very fine line exists between the impact of physical terrain, geography, ecology, and demography as factors in or modulators of conflict situations. However, the environment also provides specific short-run inputs which act as modulators on the system and the conflict situation. In Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya, war-time destruction and refugee displacement into the cities served to heighten conflicts and tensions. Blockage of the Corinth Canal and Athens-Salonika railroad lasted until 1949. In Kenya, the droughts of 1949-50 cut into African cash crops, particularly coffee; in postwar Malaya, long delays in replacing overage rubber trees meant a progressive decline in productivity for small holders, at the peak of production of low-cost American synthetic rubber.

c. Polarization, or the confrontation of opposing demands, was a modulator in all cases. It is related to malfunction of the social system. The concept is familiar: political polarization proceeds through various stages to become progressively more intense and uncompromising as unresolved counterpositions accumulate. The postwar issue of collaboration with occupation authorities was an intensifying factor in both the Philippines and Greece; this issue reinforced other divisive political questions. Political polarization in Colombia and Vietnam was extreme and violent. In Kenya and Malaya, both colonial plural societies, differentiation and ethnic politics weakened the national social system but limited the extent of actual violence.

d. Charismatic leadership is a crucial determinant for the timing of conflict events and for steps in the escalation of violence. Gaitan in Colombia, Roxas in the Philippines, Mosadeq in Iran, Ho Chi Minh in
Vietnam, Kenyatta of Kenya, and—in an earlier era—the elder Venizelos in Greece were charismatic figures. With the death of Roxas in 1948, hopes for a meaningful adjustment between the rebels and the Government became dim. The assassination of Gaitan made subsequent compromise between Liberals and Conservatives difficult and temporary. In Iran, Razmara's attempt to prevent nationalization of the oil industry and obtain a better agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could not succeed in the face of Mossadeq's opposition and mass appeal. The personality of Venizelos impelled both development and division in Greece.

e. Cultural and other enmities that normally are dormant and below the social surface may turn into intensifiers or dampeners as the conflict process continues. Malaya provides an example, where the traditional separation between Malay and Chinese communities kept actual rebellion against the Colonial Government comparatively limited. In Kenya, intertribal distrusts, like those between Kikuyu and the Luo, helped to moderate what was potentially a black uprising against domination by white immigrants. Traditional antipathies may be ethnic, religious, or even social, as in the hostility between landlord and tenant or between rural groups and the city. The traditional political divisions in Colombia were based partly on the Government's attitude toward the church—Gomez revived traditional fears and frustration when he campaigned for the church and against ex-President Lopez. Hostility toward the ethnically distinct Azerbaijani on the part of other elements of the people and toward the neighboring Soviets helped to keep the uprisings in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan localized and to consolidate national support against the rebels.

f. A history of using violence as a means for modern social protest and change also serves to intensify certain types of conflict. Rebels in the Philippines and Greece historically had resisted Government control from secure mountain or swamp areas, and hit and run operations against larger towns had proved effective during the wartime resistance. In Colombia, old traditions of extreme violence in the political wars between the two parties helped to justify the intense, bitter political war of the 1950's. Strong regional and religious differences in Vietnam did not directly lead to violence but, rather, made it extremely difficult to attain the national unity necessary to ward off violence. In Iran, Kenya, and Malaya, past history offered less rationalization for widespread social conflict.

g. Cultural attitudes on compromise also may act as conditioners to modify an ongoing process of conflict. While rebel leaders and their followers are less inhibited by the traditional values and behavior, they are constrained by public attitudes as is the Government. Traditions of compromise and negotiation normally are dampeners to conflict, although cultural glorification of virtues associated with violence, such as "machismo" or intense loyalty to a patron, represent intensifiers of violence in the conflict process. Political vendettas were the result in Colombia. In Malaya, Colonial Governments had much experience with negotiated compromises between and among the various communities, whereas
in Kenya similar compromises were limited to bargains struck between the Government and the white settlers. Iran perhaps represents a national culture which valued compromise and negotiation most highly, even to the point of sacrifice of principle; this quality was an intensifying modulator in the Anglo-Iranian dispute of 1948-51.

h. Each country had arbitration mechanisms, such as legislative and judicial units, religious groups, and the like, but their effectiveness differed widely. Joint parliamentary committees were used in the Philippines, Vietnam, Colombia, Greece, and Iran, although without success, since political polarization had progressed very far in these countries. Judicial inquiries in Colombia, the Philippines, and Kenya were largely ineffective as well. The normal arbitration and negotiation mechanisms are less likely to be effective modulators during a conflict process; their inept use for mediation may be an intensifier when it results in failure or inaction. Mediation is more likely to succeed when the leaders of the Government and the rebels actually meet, as did Roxas and Taruc and then Quirino and Taruc in 1947-48. Such personal negotiations act as real dampeners, but their breakdown provides a dramatic intensifier.

i. Coercion—the use of force by either the Government or the rebels—may be an intensifier or a dampener, depending on the amount used and the timing. These two aspects must be considered carefully in any decision to use coercion. Excessive coercion by the Government may diminish conflict sharply in the short run or the long run, but it may tend to increase violence between the two extremes. Excessive coercion usually is termed terrorism when used by revolutionary forces against the Government or the social system. Terrorism was used by the rebels in Colombia, Kenya, and Malaya and particularly in Greece and Vietnam. However, extralegal and excessive use of violent coercion by the Government also can be defined as terrorism. These were, in fact, found to be significant in Colombia, Greece, and Vietnam. Kenya and the Philippines showed only limited examples of such excessive coercion. Terror tactics in Malaya, especially toward the Chinese, characterized the Japanese occupation; and resistance fighters used the same tactics after World War II.

j. Key conflict episodes are important conflict modulators.

(1) Roxas' refusal to permit six Democratic Alliance legislators in the Philippines to take their seats in 1946 was a key conflict episode; and the later breakdown of the 1948 Quirino-Taruc amnesty negotiations was a key event in transition to full-fledged hostilities. The key conflict episode in Malaya was the aborted British effort to create a Malay Union in 1946 which polarized the beliefs of both the Malayan people and their local rulers against the British and convinced the Chinese community that use of force of the Government was both desirable and necessary. The assassination of Gaitan in Colombia in 1948 is a clear example of a key conflict episode, and actual violence and hostilities continued at a high level of intensity through 1953.
The Athens riot of December 1944, triggered by policemen's shots into a demonstrating Communist crowd and which directly involved British troops and the Athens police in dispersing the rioters, clearly marked a transition of major importance. In Iran, two quite different conflicts occurred in 1946 and in 1950-53, and there were two crucial key conflict episodes: Premier Quayam's sudden policy reversal barring Communist representatives from the Majlis in October 1946; and the assassination of Premier Razmara in April 1951. In Kenya, the key conflict episode was the effective week-long strike declared in Nairobi in May 1950. The strike was led by the illegal East African Trade Union Congress, with support from members of the legal Kenya African Union. Nairobi police countered the strike by repressing the illegal organization. The Communist regime in North Vietnam began stepped-up efforts to subjugate South Vietnam through a campaign of subversion and terror in 1959. This marked the beginning of the key conflict episode in Vietnam, which eventually culminated with US intervention to help repel full-scale armed aggression from the north.

Although these key episodes all represent a selection from important conflict events, there can be little debate over their critical importance in defining the end of a preconflict period for each society cited. The precise importance of these events for the subsequent conflict-hostilities period remains to be studied. Any detailed analysis of the confrontation sequences, in which the authority of the Government is placed in opposition to the aggressive thrust and resistance of the rebel revolutionary forces will need to define a sequence of key conflict episodes and conflict stages.

Section III (C). Subversive Organizations as Intensifiers of Conflict (U)

35. (C) General. The country studies which provided the data base for this analysis represent a broad spectrum of subversive organizations, their leadership, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Iran and Greece are examples of Communist organizations heavily dependent on the support and guidance of the Soviet Union; the Malayan and Philippine movements were heavily influenced by the Chinese Communists; and the Vietnamese insurgents depended on Communist China and the Soviet Union for military aid transported to them through North Vietnam. A Communist organization was present in Colombia but was unable to take advantage of, or become a major participant in, the conflict situation. The violence in Kenya was exclusively a product of the colonial environment and was almost entirely free of external influence and direction.

a. Every subversive organization is a distinct product of the specific environment of the country within which it develops and operates. Despite the heavy ideological overlay imposed by the world Communist movement on individual country parties, this generalization also holds true for them. It took the Soviet Union some 25 years to fully
appreciate and begin to react appropriately to this fact. Indeed, the principal weakness of many Communist movements, even today, develops out of major contradictions between Communist ideology and Soviet or Chinese policy directives on the one hand, and the specific environment in which the subversive organization is attempting to operate, on the other.

b. The country analyses demonstrate that a subversive organization can survive almost any extreme of repression so long as relative deprivations and consequent frustrations continue to operate unabated in the given society. At the same time, it appears that a subversive organization is, by its very nature, unable to challenge successfully an authority that is reasonably willing and able to defend itself. Therefore, the Government of any country in the process of rapid social change, with its attendant revolutionary potential, is best advised to tolerate some level of subversive activity and not to succumb to the temptation of throwing all resources into efforts to eradicate it.

c. A subversive group with organization, discipline, weapons, and popular appeal is capable of posing a severe threat to the Government when a situation of great crisis exists, which materially reduces or destroys the Government's ability to defend itself. The creation of such circumstances is largely beyond the capability of the subversive organization itself, but it seeks to be prepared to exploit the situation when it arises. Communist theorists have long recognized this as the prime prerequisite of revolution and have regarded the state of war as the most propitious crisis situation.

d. The Communist concept of organization and employment of subversive organizations was being tested and developed to a high state of sophistication through the cumulative experience of scores of revolutionary successes and failures during preconflicts studied. Non-Communist subversive movements are likely to pattern themselves along the same general principles. Foremost among these principles is the requirement for an organization tightly controlled by a central governing body which uses an inner cadre of dedicated, indoctrinated, and experienced people as its primary control mechanism at every organizational level; a body of ideology and propaganda appeals consistent with the mass of popular aspiration and geared to popularly perceived frustrations; the use of a clandestine apparatus for illegal activities, front groups seemingly independent of the subversive organization, and infiltration of other organized groups; creation of sources of supply and access to arms; and development of freedom of movement and other means of access to the population. Presented below are the findings of the seven country analyses on the successes and failures of the respective subversive movements in achieving these requisites to successful conflict.
36. (C) Organization. All the subversive organizations studied, or their predecessor organizations, were created sometime in the 1920's and, after an early period of weakness and internal squabbles, began to operate effectively, if on a small scale, by the 1930's. None posed a serious subversive threat, although internal political weakness in Greece and Iran tended to make their threat appear larger. In Iran, Greece, Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippines, successive periods of legal and illegal existence acted to strengthen rather than weaken the movements in the long run. During periods of legal existence, the subversive parties could make broad popular appeals, encourage greater perception of popular frustrations, and organize interest groups according to sex, age, and profession. During illegal periods, the parties were forced to develop their clandestine apparatus and further indoctrinate their hard-core cadres.

a. With the exception of Vietnam, dissidents tended to be limited in following along ethnic and social lines. In Greece and Iran the principal organizational focus was on organized labor, youth, and intellectuals. Although Soviet theorists kept reminding the movements of the importance of the peasants, in practice, this group was largely ignored in these countries. Because of the geographic situation, the Philippine movement relied heavily on peasant membership. In Malaya the mainland Chinese Communists constantly urged the movement to organize among the Malays and Indians, but the movement remained essentially overseas Chinese in membership. Some efforts were made in Kenya by the Kikuyu movement to incorporate other tribes, but they achieved little success.

b. The major crisis situation that enabled these movements to become serious political threats was World War II and its attendant dislocations, aggravated in several cases by foreign military occupation. German occupation of Greece totally destroyed the government which had retarded the growth of the Communist movement prior to World War II. Through their clandestine apparatus, honed to a keen edge by the Metaxas repression, the Communists found themselves alone prepared to organize the people and resist the occupation. The Japanese occupation of Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippines created the same state of affairs in these countries. Joint Soviet-US-British occupation of Iran effectively reduced the authority of the Government and the credibility of its Armed Forces, permitting the Communist-dominated Tudeh Party to emerge as the single most powerful popular political movement in that country. Colombia remained relatively untouched by the war, and the Communist movement there was relatively sterile. Kenya experienced a variety of pressures indirectly from the war, combining with reduced British power to permit the rise of powerful nationalist and anticolonialist demands.

c. The liberation of the occupied countries found the Communists in de facto control of much of the population and, in the cases
of Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines, possessing powerful, well-armed military forces. Efforts to disarm these forces failed largely, because no one had any idea of the numbers of weapons possessed by them. In each case sizable quantities of arms could be hidden for future thrusts against the returning Governments, in the event that efforts at consolidation of power by temporary cooperation with the returning authorities failed to accomplish their revolutionary objectives.

37. (C) Leadership. Kenyatta, Ho Chi Minh, and Taruc were charismatic subversive leaders. Although Kenyatta's name became synonymous with the nationalist movement, the movement's drive toward conflict soon surpassed his organizational and control capabilities.

a. The leaders in Greece and Iran, such as Zakhariadis and Siantos in the former and Sultan Zade and Pishevari in the latter, possessed charisma or wide popular appeal. They were competent revolutionaries because of their dogged determination or outstanding organizational abilities. They were Greeks or Iranians only by accident of ancestry; their loyalties belonged undisputedly to the Soviet Union, which had trained and indoctrinated them.

b. In neither the Philippines nor Malaya did outstanding or popular leaders emerge. As with the examples above, the leaders were adept at the management of clandestine and illegal organizations but possessed no national appeal. The movement in Colombia failed to develop even reasonably competent leadership.

38. (C) Ideology. The Communist movements followed closely the Communist ideological precepts of class struggle and world revolution against bourgeois/imperialist/fascist dictatorships. From time to time in each country the party or its fronts attempted to appear as a radical reform movement, free of Soviet or other foreign influence.

a. In several countries Soviet policy and ideological directives to the local parties ran so directly contrary to popular national interests that the appeal of the party was destroyed. Soviet insistence that the Greek party publicly espouse as legitimate the Bulgarian interests in Macedonia, a point upon which Greek national sentiment was acutely sensitive, strongly limited the party's attraction to Greeks prior to World War II. Soviet policy to eradicate religion among its own minorities, and several ill-advised attacks on Islam between world wars, markedly reduced the appeal of the Iranian Communist Party among the devout Iranians. Similar errors were made in Colombia, Malaya, and the Philippines.

b. The Mau Mau movement had a remarkably uncomplicated set of ideological principles but clung to them with the tenacity of a newly converted religious fanatic: the ills of the Kikuyu were caused by destruction of their traditional custom and culture; the European
settlers and colonial rule were directly responsible for this breakdown; the Europeans were intent on making slaves of all blacks through the mechanisms of Government, control of education, and Christianity; therefore, the means to recapture black dignity was to drive the Europeans out and institute native black Government, education, and religion.

39. (C) Arms sources. Ready access to weapons and a strong measure of military experience provided by the circumstances in World War II made the subversive movements in Greece, Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippines formidable opponents of the governments which returned to those countries after the war. The Soviet Union armed and trained armies in the separatist states of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, but these forces were unable and unprepared to defend themselves against the reconstituted Iranian Army once active Soviet support had been withdrawn. Mau Mau in Kenya was led by a few blacks with experience in the British Army, but it possessed few arms and had no external source of supply. Such arms as it did have were generally not weapons of war, and ammunition often was found and stolen a round at a time.

a. Disarming the Greek, Malay, and Philippine partisan forces also proved to be a complicated problem. Rewards were offered for the return of weapons, and a great store of arms was turned over to the authorities. However, sufficient quantities of usable arms were hidden to provide an abundant supply for the subsequent revolts. The authorities believed in each case that they had disarmed the partisan forces, having no idea of the extent of the weapons possessed by them.

b. External sources of supply and support varied widely. Kenya's Mau Mau had none. The Huks in the Philippines had little, but because of geography and available local supplies, they required very little. The Greek insurgents had some internal supply, but required sanctuary and support from Yugoslavia to sustain operations. When Yugoslavia withdrew its support, the Greek movement began to wither. The Vietnamese insurgents received direct military aid from Communist China and from the Soviet Union through North Vietnam via Peking. The Soviets supplied the separatist movements in Iran directly, and these movements were totally incapable of supporting themselves after Soviet assistance was withdrawn. The Malayan insurgents were largely able to fend for themselves, independent of foreign supply. In general, a subversive movement must have exceptional sources of internal support and supply, have a large stockpile of weapons and ammunition, and have areas of safe haven provided by favorable terrain and other geographic features, if it is to survive and conduct successful operations independent of external support.
CHAPTER 5 (C)

CONFLICT AVOIDANCE AND THE UNITED STATES (U)

Section I (U). Introduction

40. **The limits of conflict avoidance.** The frequency of low intensity conflict throughout history shows that considerable numbers of people sometimes prefer the dangers of conflict to the deprivations and frustrations of the existing social order.

   a. No one has applied cost-benefit calculations to conflict, because the variables—human satisfactions and human lives—are exceedingly difficult to quantify, but it is logically possible that a certain amount of low intensity conflict under certain social conditions could be justified objectively. Such was the opinion of the leaders of the major revolutions—American, French, Russian, Mexican, and others.

   b. Regardless of the facts, if a group of people is convinced that revolt is the only way to solve its problems, identifiable action to avoid or suppress conflict may create additional frustration, and the agency of avoidance or suppression may become a target of hostility and aggression. If this happens, a host of other frustrations probably will be projected at the same target. This consideration makes it important that any US role in internal conflict in other societies be played with great care.

41. **The time factor.** The genesis of conflict may extend over a period of 20-30 years and may have roots still farther back in time. The land problem in Colombia and the Philippines emerged as a relative deprivation at least a generation before the outbreak of conflict and was viewed as illegitimate by considerable numbers of people for nearly as long. The British impact on Kikuyu culture in Kenya and the Kikuyu land issue reached major proportions by 1931, 20 years before the emergency was declared. In general, it takes a long time to correct long-lasting deprivations or even to convince people that correction is possible. Accordingly, the more imminent a conflict appears to be, the less benefit can be expected from efforts to influence the earlier steps in the sequence, and the more emphasis must be placed on the later ones. Conversely, the earlier a situation is seen as conducive to conflict, the greater is the range of feasible avoidance actions.

42. **Agencies for conflict avoidance action.** The agencies that can avert conflict are the political, economic, social, and military leaders both of the social system and of dissident groups in the country; the institutions of the social system; and influences of external diplomatic, economic, and military policies and actions.
Section II (U). Actions to Avert Violence

43. **General.** The six basic categories of factors in conflict (para 13-18) have been analyzed separately to identify the kinds of actions that might prevent conflict situations from escalating into low intensity conflict. Economic and technical assistance is the only external action that could improve the environment (internal influences) in another country. The other basic considerations are examined in detail below.

44. **Demand-output imbalances.** Relative deprivations are the consequence of a disparity between what people desire and what they get, if they are convinced that they are entitled to fulfill their desires. The imbalances may be in terms of material goods (food, clothing, shelter, luxuries) or nonmaterial benefits (services, relative status, individual dignity and identity, freedom, security, leisure, or recreation).

   a. The nature of individual demands and needs, as well as the extent of deprivation, varied widely among the countries studied. Desires above the level of an absolute biological minimum and the imbalances that individuals and groups consider tolerable appear to be strongly conditioned by culture. A sudden deprivation following rising satisfaction is particularly frustrating, as indicated by some of the findings concerning the impact of public health programs.

   b. Most developing societies are conspicuously lacking in alternative channels through which individuals who are frustrated in their traditional social or occupational milieu can find satisfaction. Opening up alternative channels would be a means of reducing frustration. Under certain circumstances, military service can be such an alternative.

   c. There are two solutions to the problem of demand-output imbalance: reduce the demands, or increase the outputs. Demands might be reduced by improving communication to the deprived, by offering substitute goals or rewards (such as sacrifice for national growth or recognition for social service), and by assuring that available outputs are distributed as equitably as possible. Increasing output is a function of the operation of the social system. In addition, the passage of time normally diminishes demands that are obviously unrealizable. Changes in either demands or outputs are likely to be slow, however, and long-term deprivations may lead to explosions when other deprivations or provocations are added.

45. **Functioning of the social system.** The country studies suggest that key weaknesses in social systems are in demand articulation and aggregation (i.e., expression of demands to political leaders, and the combination (aggregation) of those demands into programs for political action), leadership and policy, administration, and security. Other
factors, resulting in large part from these deficiencies, are inefficient exploitation of resources, maldistribution of material and nonmaterial benefits, and inadequate economic development policies. None of these elements are susceptible to rapid improvement, although military leaders and other reformers claim and seize power specifically on the basis of taking action in these fields. Military administration is one way to speed solution of certain problems in the social system. Promiscuous use of military administration that is not under civilian control can exact a heavy price. On the other hand, the concept of maintaining civilian control of the military may not always be practicable, because the military establishment may be the only viable institution that can initiate change.

a. The Armed Forces, as the final repository of the coercive capability of the country, are a key element in national stability and an important symbol to the people of national power and identity. Preservation or achievement of political detachment, power to act, and prestige are of great importance.

b. Many countries maintain large Armed Forces made up of a cross-section of the population. They are, therefore, a potential channel for expressing demands and a source of important information about the attitudes of the people. The Armed Forces often are a source of political leadership in civilian roles and also are an important potential source of administrative and technical skill, which can be used to improve the capability of the social system. The role played by the Armed Forces in incipient conflict situations, whether positive or negative, can be of critical importance to the course of the conflict.

c. Under certain circumstances, resolute action aimed at remedying demand-output imbalances may reduce frustration even though the imbalances themselves are not immediately affected to more than a token degree.

d. Communication is a very important part of the social system and its ability to function effectively. It appears to have ambivalent effects on conflict situations. Development of the social system, particularly for articulation and aggregation of demands, requires greatly increased and improved communication for mutual understanding. The process of preparing people to be effective members of society (socialization) also depends on communication. On the other hand, communication may spread new ideas and new demands faster than the social system can keep up with them, and may increase deprivation, frustration, and the likelihood of conflict. Furthermore, communication can be used for criticism, propaganda, sedition, and subversion by those who seek to intensify tendencies toward conflict. If the rate of mobilization of the people into active political and social roles (a major result of improved communication) is matched by the development of well-rooted institutions, the chances of relative deprivation developing into
conflict will be minimized. Unrestrained promotion of mass communication, without reference to its effects, can be conducive to conflict. The breakdown in communications that occurs in tense situations has a feedback effect, adding to the polarization of beliefs among the contending parties. An objective outside agency sometimes can reduce tensions by acting as a channel of communication; such action often is the first step toward mediation.

46. **Cultural factors.** The culture of a people—the beliefs, attitudes, and values governing social behavior—affects the character of its demands and the performance of its social system. It also affects the people's response to demand-output imbalances, functioning as a modulator of conflict. Culture in any country is virtually a constant over any short period of time. The possibility of making short-run cultural changes is very limited, even for the indigenous authorities, and virtually nonexistent for US agencies. Technical assistance workers all over the world have run into impenetrable cultural blocks to their efforts to introduce new ways of doing things. The mere fact that such blocks are irrational or obsolete makes little short-run difference, if the beliefs are held firmly and considered important by the people. However, thorough knowledge of local culture may show how to circumvent one cultural imperative by manipulation of a different one and judiciously relating the second one to the self-interests of the people. In Iran, for example, the tradition of the Shahanshah, coupled with judicious use of force, proved to be an effective counter to Mossadeq's attempt to depose the Shah and take over the Government.

47. **External influences.** It is assumed that avoidance actions can be applied by external agencies only through the leaders, institutions, culture, and people of the affected country, however ineffectual they may have been in meeting its problems. External influences in each of the countries studied, mostly unplanned byproducts of international or colonial contact, led to enlargement of demands by the people, caused deprivations and war, imposed new deprivations to suit outside interests, or adversely affected the functioning of the social system. In some cases, external interests deliberately played on existing deprivations and frustrations and supported illicit and violent action, thus qualifying as modulators rather than as underlying causes. The existing social systems were unable or unwilling to cope with the new demands or the new deprivations, and frustration and conflict were the consequence.

a. Mere exposure to external influence does not necessarily create new demands. In the affected country, there is likely to be considerable discontent and certain individuals who are particularly disposed to adopt and promote new ideas and new demands. Even in the absence of external influence, the same kind of person also is the most likely source of innovation within a society; however, response to foreign ideas is more common.
b. External influence not only leads directly to enlarged demands, but also causes strains and deprivations indirectly because of the clash of new ideas with old ways. Cultural strains among the Kikuyu in Kenya are a good example of the indirect effect.

c. Some countries, especially the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, have interposed barriers to foreign contact and communication to reduce external influence. Other countries have undertaken programs to filter, reinterpret, or neutralize foreign influence through education, propaganda, and reference to indigenous values and goals.

48. Modulators of conflict and violence. Intensifiers and dampeners of conflict situations are factors which push them toward or away from illicit conflict and violence. Accordingly, the closer a situation moves to the outbreak of low intensity conflict, the more crucial these factors become in conflict avoidance. Modulators of greatest importance in terms of US capabilities and interests are dissident organizations, coercive capability, mediation and arbitration capability, external pressures, responsiveness to deprivation, and displacement of hostility. Other modulators either are not amenable to short-run application or change or are not susceptible to US influence.

a. When deprivation and frustration have given rise to a dissident organization, and it becomes frustrated over not achieving its ends within the system, it is likely to become a promoter and intensifier of conflict—even to the extent that conflict itself, and victory in the conflict, replaces the original frustrated goals. The further the organization moves toward such replacement of goals, and the nearer it gets to success, the more vigorously it will pursue the conflict, and the less susceptible it will become to negotiation, compromise, or integration into the national social system. The outcome of conflict will depend on the stage of the dissident organization's development; the amount of outside support it has; the strength of the security forces; and the ratio between popular support for the social system and the dissidents.

b. Overreaction to the presence of dissident organizations should be avoided. Such organizations do not really threaten a reasonably capable social system; and if the system is not capable, it cannot defend itself anyway. Moreover, dissident organizations thrive on coercion and persecution short of total destruction. On the other hand, any country should keep close and vigilant control over its security forces and civil service (its ultimate bases of power and prime targets for subversive penetration) while concentrating its major efforts on eliminating major relative deprivations and guarding against development of crises that can be exploited by the dissidents.
c. Coercive capability. Weakness and political partiality of security forces at critical times promotes conflict; strong, capable security forces reduce the prospects of conflict. Both minimum or maximum effective coercion have had a dampening effect in past situations, but intermediate amounts of coercion seem to have had an intensifying effect. Thus, with efficient use of minimum resources of manpower and materiel, the security forces of a nation should be adequate to maintain order but should not be expanded beyond minimally adequate levels. To assure maintaining a capability to cope with emergencies, it might be advisable to keep the various security forces separate, with each targeted on a different type of threat, to minimize the possibility of simultaneous commitment of all of them and to permit involvement of one at a time. Thus, the police, the gendarmerie or provincial forces, the Armed Forces, and the Reserves would be called individually or in combination as required by the magnitude of the threat. For this and other reasons (especially to preserve their symbolic roles), it might be best for the Armed Forces to stay out of internal security work except in serious emergencies, but to be ready for such duty when called on. Emergency interservice command and control arrangements would be essential in this case.

d. Mediation and arbitration capability. Mediation or arbitration by an impartial and prestigious person or agency not connected with either side can avert or dampen conflict. The problem is to establish the impartiality, prestige, and capability of the mediator with both sides.

(1) The Government of a nation should avoid using its Armed Forces in internal conflict, if possible, because their commitment to one side also commits the Government to an extent far greater than would the use of police or gendarmerie and thus destroys whatever mediating power the Government may possess.

(2) The possibility of an international conciliation and arbitration service to mediate internal conflict might be considered as a recourse for Governments which have lost their own mediating ability and prefer not to turn to individuals or other nations. Such an international service might be more acceptable if combined with a capability to provide emergency aid, such as technical assistance, and the mechanisms needed to attack underlying problems. The Cyprus situation is a partial illustration.

e. External influences. The principal factor causing conflict in one of the cases studied (Azerbaijan in Iran, 1946) and a major factor in four others (Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam) was the outside support and encouragement given subversive organizations. These influences were in the form of propaganda, ideology, organizational techniques, leadership training, psychological and material support for insurgent forces, and (in Greece) provision of sanctuaries. External
diplomatic, economic, and military advice and actions can be effective. Countering actions may include using border controls to prevent movement of men and materiel into the country, population controls to detect infiltrators and exfiltrators; censorship, interruption, or jamming of communications; and psychological operations to offset the effects of subversive propaganda from outside. All these actions except the last involve elements of coercion and are subject to some of the same considerations discussed under coercion, particularly that they may cause more trouble than they avert if they are used beyond an acceptable minimum point. Wide domestic popular support for the measures taken and selectivity and discrimination in their implementation are essential.

f. Responsiveness to deprivation. Responsiveness of the society to deprivation can be either an intensifier or a dampener of conflict, according to circumstances. Responsiveness is not the same thing as an attack on the basic causes of deprivation and frustration. Such an attack may not be recognized by the people, particularly if it involves sophisticated planning and long lead times. On the other hand, history is filled with examples of empty promises which appeared to be responsiveness. The conflict in Indonesia in 1968 was partly the result of Sukarno's apparent responsiveness to some of his people's demands, without the necessary action to assure elimination of basic deprivations. Responsiveness is a major element in the art of political leadership. Promises, not reinforced by practical action programs, may only postpone frustration and aggression instead of eliminating them. Promises made in response to demands but not fulfilled also may heighten frustrations (as in Colombia, where promises of land reform were unfulfilled for many years).

g. Displacement of hostility. A common way for Governments to deal with internal conflict has been to place the blame for the causative frustrations on scapegoats--often outside forces. The United States, because of its power and wide-ranging interests and activities, has become a favorite scapegoat and probably will not escape the role completely for a long time. This fact inhibits US assistance, because, however well-intentioned and well-conceived such assistance may be, it always can be cited by demagogues, falsely but convincingly, as evidence of US subversion or imperialism. The Soviet Union and other foreign countries also have been made scapegoats in some situations.

49. Summary. The actual causes of low intensity conflict are complex, often deeply rooted, and difficult to recognize and control. Improved understanding of the major causes and development of better methods of dealing with them may make it possible to avert low intensity conflict in some cases. However, it appears that such conflict will continue to erupt in the foreseeable future.

a. The major causal factor in low intensity conflict is the imbalance between popular demands (especially economic demands) and responses of the social system. These imbalances are caused by external
and environmental influences that increase demands, lack of efficiency or capability of the social system, cultural factors that condition attitudes and behavior, and modulators that drive frustration and conflict toward or away from greater intensity and violence. The problems created by the interplay of these factors must be solved within the national society, and some of the solutions obviously take a great deal of time. When conflict appears imminent, the modulators offer the best means of avoidance, but long-run solutions require actions to modify demands, increase outputs, or both.

b. To the disadvantaged and deprived, who can readily be convinced that they have nothing to lose but their chains, revolution may be more appealing than patience and waiting, because it offers quick and glorious action against those who seem to be deliberate oppressors. The only possible answer to men with aroused expectations and inadequate fulfillment is to show them that there are nonviolent processes that work. This is not easy, particularly if violence is an accustomed means of action or seems to be producing the desired results. On the other hand, the system may be stimulated to respond more effectively to nonviolent articulation of demands if it realizes that its failure to make the necessary responses leaves the people with only one ultimate course of action: to revolt, justified by the system's failure.

c. Low intensity conflict is an obviously undesirable method of settling disputes, because it causes irreversible loss of lives and resources, tends to escalate out of control, and often fails to solve the very problems that caused it. Yet, violent conflict sometimes is the only alternative to indefinite submission for a greatly deprived and frustrated group.

Section III (C). US Concepts and Options (U)

50. (C) US concepts. Revolt against unjustified relative deprivation when other remedies fail is sanctioned by the basic political doctrine of the United States, which was itself born out of just such circumstances; yet US statesmen and scholars have been unwilling in recent years to accept violent conflict as a fact of political life.

a. The US concept that political, economic, and social development should be accomplished only through peaceful evolutionary change does not recognize that such change almost inevitably involves a certain amount of violent conflict, because of the unsupportable strains attendant on social growth. The Soviet Union and Communist China have followed the opposite course, glorifying violence and revolution as not only inevitable but necessary and desirable to achieve needed social change. The actions of these two countries and a few others have been focused on the use of violence and destruction, with
considerable disregard for the potentialities of peaceful development, although the Soviet Union appears to have moved somewhat in the direction of evolution in recent years.

b. The United States might increase its ability considerably to promote its national interests and security if it were to recognize low intensity conflict as an integral, and even useful, though dangerous aspect of social life. While seeking to avert it when avoidance is possible, the United States might well acknowledge that revolt under certain circumstances is the right of men who want to be free and equal, as it was for the Founding Fathers in 1776. To do so would be to challenge the current Communist monopoly of revolutionary zeal and to lessen somewhat the idea that the United States always sides with the status quo, right or wrong. Such an attitude might well avoid more conflict than it would stir up, since it might encourage the elite in developing countries to make needed improvements in their national social systems.

c. Implementation of such a concept would require that the United States be prepared to

1. give sophisticated advice and assistance to leaders genuinely prepared to avoid low intensity conflict through constructive change, and to be patient and steadfast when even sincere and well-advised policies fail;

2. recognize and tacitly support intelligent and restrained coercion in developing countries which also are expanding the capability of their social systems and are buying time to complete the process;

3. learn better techniques for the control of low intensity conflict, so that the risk of uncontrolled escalation can be minimized. (One probable reason for greater Soviet willingness to risk or provoke conflict is that the Soviet Union, because of its emphasis on violent action, understands it better and is more confident of its ability to control it.);

4. assure that low intensity conflict is settled as promptly as possible and attempt to channel the turbulence and emotions it generates into actions to solve the underlying problems.

d. The power of the United States, as an external influence, to exert the kinds of basic and delicate pressures required to avert low intensity conflict is very limited. The US role is restricted basically to advising, informing, and training indigenous leaders and providing necessary resources. If this concept is to be followed, all these things must be given in a way that will not automatically perpetuate the control of the regime in power.
51. (C) Possible US options to avert low intensity conflict. US policies and actions must be considered in the light of their impact on the expectations of people in developing countries. The United States must avoid premature reaction or overreaction to activities of dissident organizations which, after careful appraisal of the capabilities of the regime in power, do not appear to have good prospects of successful revolt but may actively serve to force necessary reforms. However, if the decision is made to provide US support against dissident organizations, the action should be taken before they are too close to success to accept any approach other than violence as a means for resolving their problems. Such decisions must be reached early, sufficiently in advance of the need for action to permit the decisionmakers to evaluate available options. Unless policy decisions (and contingency plans) had been defined, a requirement for early action would place the United States (decisionmakers) in the difficult position of being forced to select a plan of action without sufficient time for deliberation, wise choice, and adequate provision for implementation, and before the dangers to which the United States is responding are clearly evident to the general public—thus, at a time when US public support would be most difficult to obtain.

a. US representatives overseas must maintain continuous awareness of the impact of US policies and actions on the expectations of the local people as situations develop, and advise US decisionmakers when they appear to be creating adverse reactions or raising the people's expectations above attainable levels. US representatives overseas can temper US influence in other countries to minimize the possibility of arousing unrealistic expectations. They also may be able to assist in preventing conflict by proposing modifications in US policies and programs.

b. The United States can help control external influences on developing countries by providing appropriate advice, intelligence, and information about overt and covert activities of foreign powers to the leaders of the affected country.

c. The United States and its overseas representatives can maintain effective but discreet contact with significant non-Government groups in developing countries, notwithstanding anticipated efforts of the authorities in such countries to prevent it, both to foster an image of US impartiality and to improve US understanding of the problems involved. In certain circumstances, US representatives can serve as communicators between sides if they have sufficient prestige and detachment in the eyes of both sides and lines of communication are available. The communication role can be an important one for US Army representatives, especially if the Armed Forces of the affected country are a major factor in the situation. The prestige and insights of the representatives, their contacts in the country, and the availability
of technical communications facilities all are factors in the US Army potential to perform this role. Appropriately trained US representatives, including the military, can head off internal conflict through quiet mediation if they have sufficiently good relations with both sides and are not considered to be committed to one side.

d. The US role normally is limited to providing advice and logistic support to internal security forces (Armed Forces, paramilitary forces, and police). Appropriate division of US advisers among the several security forces could reinforce the idea of targeting each type of security force against a different type of threat. The United States can promote better communication and interchange between its Armed Forces and those of other countries to pave the way for acceptance of projects or actions that may be necessary or desirable to exert a restraining influence on premature military involvement and as a supplementary source of information on the host country's political and social conditions. At the same time, US assistance to the security forces carries particular risks. If the forces become heavily involved in conflict, and the United States obviously is assisting them, it loses the position of impartiality that might allow it to exercise a mediating role. The indigenous forces also may suffer from association with "imperialists." Thus, US assistance to the security forces may, by its very success, encourage local leaders to depend on the coercive capability of their own forces rather than to make unpleasant and difficult but necessary changes in the social system.

e. The United States should develop an improved capability for specific types of quick reaction projects to meet certain types of situations in developing countries and thus lower frustration thresholds, but the effectiveness of such projects will degenerate rapidly if they are not followed up by additional actions that produce visible results. Existing disaster relief capabilities are an example of quick reaction forces, but they could be expanded to make use of US military potentialities. Natural disasters provide excellent opportunities for indigenous Governments to demonstrate responsiveness, because responsiveness in such situations is less likely to be viewed as a concession to dissidents. US Army capabilities could be used alone or in combination with local resources, but such assistance should involve local commitments to follow through on whatever actions are begun and commitments or continuing US or international civilian assistance.

f. A further possibility is to encourage creation and maintenance of an international security capability to separate the sides in an internal conflict and function as a sort of fifth reserve level. Such a force, supported by technical assistance programs where needed, could mediate, arbitrate, or control conflict situations. Use of such a force would be made only with the consent of the parties to the conflict or, in extreme cases, after a decision by the UN Security Council or a regional organization to separate the parties and initiate
negotiations to counter a threat to world or regional peace. US Army forces can provide technical assistance and material support. A US presence along a border, to seal it off as in Korea, is a conceivable action, but it would be taken as part of the international force.

g. The United States can increase its capability to give sophisticated, low visibility assistance to the Governments of developing countries, either directly or through third countries. To avoid hostility toward the United States and to refute the credibility of accusations of imperialism, the US role must be to minimize its visibility by means of a low profile and discreet behavior, while conducting actions responsive to foreign countries' needs, thus restoring the US reputation as a disinterested but helpful and friendly member of the international community. The United States also should recognize accusations of imperialism for what they are and should not inflate them out of proportion.

h. The United States should provide military assistance primarily through supplying advice and nonlethal equipment, rather than with US armament; make such assistance conditional on genuine progress toward economic and social development; and discourage expansion of the indigenous security forces beyond minimum necessary levels.

i. The prospects for constructive and politically acceptable assistance to other countries are greatest in cases where the United States and the local populace can unite against a perceived common external threat. Thus, the most likely future US contribution to the control of dissident organizations is through action to identify and interrupt external support to them through intelligence activities, publicity, and, in certain cases, assistance to local security forces.

j. The United States can do relatively little to correct demand-output imbalances, although judicious advice to indigenous authorities can help them to recognize the existence of such imbalances and the potential conflict that can result. It also can assist in formulating programs and actions to avert escalation of low-level dissidence into low intensity conflict. Maintenance by US representatives of expertise in the genesis of low intensity conflict and in methods of averting it would increase materially their ability to influence events through advice and informal contact. Their analyses of and recommendations for resolving conflict situations, presented in credible and convincing terms, would be respected by local leaders as beneficial to their own interests. Armed Forces are particularly receptive to advice from skilled military representatives of a major military power, because their primary responsibility for external security requires them to know the techniques and weapons of other nations, and the military profession shares traditions and attitudes that transcend national and cultural boundaries.
52. (U) **Introduction.** The ARMLIC findings in chapters 1-5 are the basis for military operations, in support of civil authority, to avoid low intensity conflict and for development of proposed general principles for such operations. This discussion pertains primarily to the US Army, but relates also to indigenous Armed Forces because of the US Army advisory function. As background for the discussion, low intensity conflict is examined in terms of implications for the US Army and from the standpoint of US options in low intensity conflict situations.

a. Armies have played and will continue to play a role in support of policies and programs designed to avoid and control conflict. In the case of the US Army, this role may include training assistance to indigenous forces, as in Iran; advice on suppression of guerrilla operations, as in Greece; development of a national defense system, as in the Philippines; interposition between warring factions, as in Lebanon; or outright commitment to combat, as in South Vietnam.

b. The US Army also has had extensive experience in military government operations, civil affairs programs, police and constabulary activities, intelligence and counterintelligence operations, psychological warfare, and many other aspects of maintaining public order. It also has engaged (either at home or abroad) in construction and sanitation engineering, preventive medicine, disaster relief, communications operations, and water control. All these activities are important in solving intrasocietal conflict. If these skills and experiences can be mobilized and adapted to specialized situations effectively, the Army is well equipped to play an effective role in response to and control of the threats to US interests posed by low intensity conflict.

c. The US Army has the skills needed to accomplish the following:

1. Assist other countries to strengthen their economies, promote political cohesion, and upgrade educational systems before discontent reaches low-level dissidence.

2. Help other countries remove sources of discontent before the situation reaches a state of crisis.

3. Provide military advice, support, and training and nonmilitary assistance to nations threatened with low intensity conflict situations.
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(4) Intervene in low intensity conflict, either alone or with third countries, regional organizations, or the United Nations.

d. These roles are consistent with the roles currently assigned the Army. However, they require a different emphasis on organization, operations, and materiel concepts, because the military units and systems needed to avert, counter, or subdue low intensity conflict differ from those needed for conventional warfare operations.

53. (C) Implications of low intensity conflict for the US Army.

a. Neither the regular military forces nor the regular internal security forces are fully trained, equipped, or practiced to function properly in low intensity conflict. Low intensity conflict in other countries raises special legal, political, psychological, and operational problems for the US military forces, which are more complex in a pre-conflict situation.

(1) International law and usage sanctions military intervention in another country only on the side of the Government (since it must request or approve the intervention). This fact does not necessarily mean that US long-term interests are best served by supporting the Government in a low intensity conflict or preconflict situation.

(2) Foreign intervention in low intensity conflict may actually result in both sides turning against the foreigner, regardless of its intentions.

(3) Military suppression of low intensity conflict may hinder solution of the problems that caused it and, thus, lead to eventual renewal of the violence.

(4) Premature commitment of military force to the support of one side of a conflict identifies the forces and the country they represent with that side and reduces the external country's mediation capability and its Armed Forces' deterrence capability.

(5) Regular military forces tend to concentrate on the military tasks and to subordinate political problems, unless they interfere with military operations. Political factors are paramount in low intensity conflict.

b. The Armed Forces symbolize the legitimacy, power, and effectiveness of the Government. Military operations against external enemies strengthen the prestige of the forces and their country. Internal operations or operations against dissident factions in other countries may weaken it; on the other hand, such activities may add to the country's prestige, depending on internal and world public opinion about the particular situation. Therefore, the political ramifications
of using either indigenous or US Armed Forces in internal affairs must be weighed carefully before the decision to commit them to such activities is made.

c. Military forces can be used to advantage in noncombat activities to solve development and welfare problems, and thus avoid the necessity for using their combat skills. Although the adverse implications described above apply primarily to combat operations, they also apply to some extent to noncombat operations, because the people engaged in them obviously are part of the Armed Forces.

d. Because of the unique political, psychological, and social aspects of each low intensity conflict situation, leaders in LIC situations must have greater political sensitivity, and thus greater flexibility, than is required for performing the Army's primary task. General staff officers who are required to direct the use of the Army in noncombat operations in low intensity conflict situations and military personnel on the scene must have training and experience in the special fields that apply to low intensity conflict.

54. (C) US options in low intensity conflict situations. The constant goal of US foreign policy (appendix VII) is an international environment that permits maximum prosperity and security for the nation with minimum threat or use of force. The United States must be concerned with actual or potential LIC situations, because any one of them may become a significant threat to US interests if a hostile power involves itself in the situation.

a. The United States has the following options in a given situation of actual or potential low intensity conflict:

(1) Ignore it, apart from appropriate statements of human concern and humanitarian measures such as relief or medical care.

(2) Isolate it by diplomatic means, border control techniques, or otherwise, so that it will not spread to or involve other countries.

(3) Avert or moderate it by such nonmilitary means as diplomatic influence, technical assistance, and economic support.

(4) Demonstrate the capacity to intervene, as a means of reinforcing diplomatic pressures.

(5) Seek international intervention, with or without US participation, to resolve the conflict.

(6) Provide military assistance, overt or covert, conventional or unconventional, to the Government of the affected country or the dissidents.
b. Military assistance is only one of many forms of assistance that the US Government can provide to countries engaged in conflict avoidance, but it is the one of most direct concern to the US Army. Forms of military assistance can be classified, from the standpoint of the degree of US commitment and risk, in terms of six major factors (Table II): the degree of relationship to combat; the degree of involvement; the ratio of US assistance to the indigenous resources and effort; the basis for compensation; the visibility of the assistance; and the degree of international legitimacy. Actual military assistance given should be a balance of the best kind and the least amount needed to achieve the desired result with minimum feasible US commitment, with least risk to US interests, and within the shortest possible time.

c. In selecting among these options, US decisionmakers must be in a position to evaluate the following basic decision factors:

(1) The likelihood that the actual or incipient conflict situation will affect major US interests adversely, or that it will escalate, through external involvement or otherwise, to a level where major US interests are jeopardized.

(2) The likelihood that the underlying causes of conflict can be better attacked by action to avert or control conflict or by allowing it to run its course.

(3) The likelihood that a given policy option will succeed in averting or controlling conflict.

(4) The prospects for dealing successfully with the long-term causes of conflict after the conflict has been averted or controlled; i.e., the availability of the necessary plans, insights, skills, and resources for the length of time required.

(5) The cost to the United States, in terms of financial and human resources, national prestige and influence, and domestic requirements and preferences, both long-term and short-term, if the action succeeds and if it fails.

d. The objectives of the United States and a country it is assisting in combating low intensity conflict must coincide. Unless they are in harmony, US implementation of any option will inject an additional dimension into the conflict, complicating the problems rather than solving them. An objective can be accomplished only if a general consensus supports it; such support is most likely to exist on the simple issues of national power and survival.

e. Objectives of countries in which an elite group provides all the leadership and controls the social system often are conceived
### TABLE II (U). CLASSIFICATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ACCORDING TO THE EXTENT OF US INVOLVEMENT

**Relationship to Combat**

1. Support of activities not related to combat (food, medical care, nonmilitary clothing and communications, recreation and welfare, noncombat education, general logistics, civilian utilities or industry)

2. Support of activities indirectly related to combat (military communications, engineering works, transport, military clothing, noncombat intelligence, general defense budget support)

3. Support of combat activities (unit training, weapons, ammunition, combat intelligence, operations, command)

4. Direct engagement in combat

**Degree of Involvement**

1. Financial
   - a. Third country origin
   - b. US origin

2. Materiel
   - a. Third country origin
   - b. US origin

3. Civilian (or civilianized military) advisers or consultants
   - a. Third country
   - b. US

4. Military advisers or consultants
   - a. Third country
   - b. US

5. Logistic support troops
   - a. Third country
   - b. US

6. Combat support troops
   - a. Third country
   - b. US
7. Combat troops
   a. Third country
   b. US

8. Combat command
   a. Third country
   b. US

Relative Magnitude of Assistance (percentages illustrative only)
1. Very small: token contribution, less than 5% of indigenous
2. Small: 6-10% of indigenous
3. Moderate: 11-25% of indigenous
4. Large: 26-50% of indigenous
5. Very large: more than 50% of indigenous

Basis for Compensation
1. Cash
2. Loan on normal international terms
3. Loan on easy terms
4. Grant

Visibility of Assistance
1. Overt
2. Unpublicized or lightly concealed
3. Covert

Degree of International Legitimacy
1. Regional or UN sanction and participation
2. Joint implementation of multilateral treaty
3. Implementation of bilateral treaty
4. Response to request of affected Government
5. Unilateral
primarily to provide narrow short-term advantages for the elite group. Support for Government policies and concepts thus may be weak in some countries. If US policies are formulated to coincide with the policies of such a Government, they may clash with the desires of most of the people in the country and make the United States a party to the internal conflict. US decisionmakers must have a thorough knowledge of the real as well as stated objectives and policies of a country's leaders and of the amount and degree of opposition of the people to them before they can make an adequate estimate of whether the United States should become involved. If the objectives do not coincide or are not compatible and US decisionmakers cannot find a way to make them compatible, involvement of the United States in the conflict situation cannot further US interests.

f. Military assistance is only one of many forms of action available to the US Government; others include diplomatic pressures, negotiation, mediation, economic and technical assistance, private enterprise assistance, and trade.

55. (C) US policy relative to low intensity conflict avoidance. In evaluating a conflict or preconflict situation, the United States should recognize that: US interests are not always served by supporting the indigenous Government; the Government may be incapable of making the basic changes needed for real stability and development; popular aggressiveness may be of such a pitch that only some kind of conflict will vent it; and US involvement may simply turn the people's hostility against the United States. There is no correlation between the incidence of violence and the achievement of profound social change; hence, in view of the damage likely to result, violent conflict is to be avoided if reasonably possible. It will not benefit the United States to direct the affairs of other countries unless important US interests are at stake; nor should the United States protect incompetent or venal administrations against the wrath of their own people merely to maintain law and order. In fact, the United States may be able to influence the affairs of other nations better if it is not unequivocally identified with all Governments regardless of the character or performance of their leaders.

a. Once it has been established that US interests require US involvement in a preconflict situation, and that involvement has a reasonable prospect of influencing the situation favorably, then the ARMLIC analytical model can be used as a tentative basis for determining appropriate US actions. Conflict modulators, intensifiers and dampeners, offer a better route to avoidance or control of LIC than the other basic considerations in the model. Major elements of this category are the strength, effectiveness, and prestige of the security forces (Armed Forces plus internal security forces); the legitimacy of the administration; availability of agencies for mediation and arbitration; organization and effectiveness of dissident groups; external pressures toward or away from conflict; and the responsiveness of the Government to popular demands.
b. The United States should decentralize its advisory personnel, in accordance with the existing separation of missions among the indigenous forces, by assigning appropriate advisers to the Armed Forces, paramilitary forces, and security forces. This statement is not meant to imply that US control of in-country US personnel should be decentralized. Training of indigenous forces should concentrate on techniques that minimize the need for using military forces in internal security, bolster the prestige of the Armed Forces, and identify the Armed Forces with the symbols and institutions of the nation rather than with partisan interests. This last point is especially important when large percentages of the people consider the partisan interests to be inimical to those of the populace as a whole. The United States can promote acceptance of a country's administration by conducting relations with it and interpersonal relations between US and indigenous citizens on a basis of sovereign equality, and by assisting the administration to establish better rapport with its citizens through improved policies and the use of both modern and traditional communications media.

c. Under certain conditions, US officials themselves might mediate or arbitrate between opposing groups, as the British endeavored to do in Greece. However, once the United States becomes overtly involved to any considerable degree on one side, the ability of US citizens to perform this function is weakened or destroyed, depending on whether the Americans can preserve a degree of detachment from the involvement. US involvement in a situation should be weighed with this factor in mind. It is preferable to use local agencies of mediation and arbitration if they can be created or supported. Other alternatives are mediation and arbitration by international agencies, which might be most effective if combined with assistance on a non-partisan basis, and the good offices of third-country representatives.

d. Emasculation of dissident organizations that threaten revolt will only lead to eventual creation of others, unless underlying causes are eliminated. More serious, forcing a dissident organization underground, or giving it alternate periods of overt and clandestine existence, is likely to strengthen the dissidence rather than weaken it. The US strategy, therefore, should be to advise indigenous Governments to steal the dissidents' thunder insofar as possible by undertaking well-publicized actions to remedy their complaints and to keep them weak but not force them underground or suppress them, unless the force and intelligence available makes possible their complete elimination without arousing popular resentment.

e. Removal of external pressures toward conflict can change the entire situation. The removal of the Soviet pressures in Azerbaijan in 1946 and the cessation of Yugoslav assistance to Greek rebels in 1948 are examples. The United States may be able to apply diplomatic pressures to bring about the elimination of external influences or to work with indigenous Governments to control borders and
neutralize external communications media. The latter course, however, should not block needed channels of internal political communication, including systems for articulating grievances against policies and actions of the Government.

f. Government responsiveness to legitimate popular demands is an important basis for gaining public support; yet there was astonishing obtuseness about this elementary point on the part of ruling elites in the countries studied. US representatives can promote responsiveness, both by friendly counsel, supported by economic and technical assistance when the affected Government’s resources are inadequate to meet popular demands, and by denial of assistance in the absence of Government responsiveness.

g. Diversion of hostility to new targets can dampen an incipient conflict, although at the risk of another one. It is probable, for example, that the Peruvian attack on Leticia in 1931 averted conflict between the two Colombian political parties. The United States can seldom make positive use of this strategy because of its risk (although US anti-Communist policies have served this purpose in the past). However, the United States should avoid intervention of a kind or at a level that would make it a substitute target of hostility.

h. An attack on underlying causes of conflict should be part of any US strategy for conflict avoidance, for two reasons: achievement of forward momentum in solving basic problems, if popularly recognized and believed, is itself an important dampener of conflict, even if immediate results are not initially impressive; and basic causes will continue to fester despite any short-run avoidance of conflict and will lead to renewed tensions later on, if they are not eliminated. The best time to apply pressures aimed at basic improvements is when the United States first enters a tense situation. US policy should recognize not only the need for improving the performance of the social system in the affected country, but also the need for modulating the unrealistic escalation of popular demands that results most frequently from external influence.

56. (U) Civil-military relations. There are complicated mutual feedbacks between political and military actions. Moreover, the possibility of using political means to resolve a conflict, as an alternative to termination through military force, varies to a greater or lesser extent according to the degree of escalation and commitment. Thus, where in higher intensity conflicts the political problems of any Army in dealing with the civilian population are regarded as peripheral to the central issues of military operations, the situation is exactly the other way around in low intensity conflict—particularly in the preconflict stage: civil-military relations are a central problem, and military operations may be peripheral to it.
a. This fact does not mean that any Army should be deeply involved in civil politics. It does mean that every military policy and program pertaining to preconflict and low intensity conflict situations should be formulated with due regard to the anticipated political effect and to the political alternatives, if any exist. Where there are satisfactory political alternatives, they should be given preference over the use of military force; however, the military options should remain available should all other approaches fail to achieve the desired result.

b. The employment of military forces by a Government for internal purposes should be based on the following general principles:

1. There should be separate and clearly differentiated internal security forces, preferably at more than one political level, adequately organized and equipped to handle all normal and routine problems without recourse to the Army, although the Army can and should provide certain training and logistics.

2. The Army should be prepared to support the internal security forces promptly and effectively when required, with no more than necessary use of force and with Army involvement kept as limited and as brief as possible. This principle implies efficient command and control arrangements to coordinate civil and military efforts in support missions and preparation by plans and training for execution of support missions.

3. All reasonable alternatives should be exhausted before committing Army forces to civil disturbances.

4. The Army should obtain full and current information on situations in which it may be called to support the internal security forces, to be able to understand the situation thoroughly if called upon.

5. Military skills (including organizational and leadership skills) and equipment should be used in support of civil development works and disaster relief, both to support the effectiveness of civil government and to improve the Army's image; but such operations should be definite, limited, and have reasonable prospects of success.

6. All military activities should be conducted so that they will reinforce but not exaggerate the Army's prestige as a symbol of the legitimacy, power, and effectiveness of the Government.

c. In a preconflict situation in another country, the employment of US Army resources, including advice to indigenous authorities, should be guided by the same general principles. US activities also should support indigenous authorities and give them the responsibility and credit whenever possible.
d. Direct US Army participation in LIC situations has been characterized as a risky course, particularly in preconflict periods. There may be situations, however, in which US forces can provide disaster relief, perform certain civil works functions, help in border control to prevent entry of outside forces, or support the activities of international forces.

e. Military capabilities must be used in low intensity conflict or preconflict situations with great care and with close political coordination. A general rule might be that military forces are always to be treated in internal situations as reserve forces: their influence, derived from their potential for the use of force, may be more useful than use of their combat skills. They should be used only when they are the only applicable resource or the potential benefit from their use is overwhelmingly greater than the risk. This rule applies even more to activities of the US Army in other countries than to indigenous forces, and it applies to noncombat as well as combat missions.

f. The use of US military resources in a preconflict or low intensity conflict situation, therefore, should be undertaken under the following conditions:

1. Nonmilitary options by themselves will not meet the situation.

2. The least degree of involvement necessary for successful accomplishment of the mission has been selected.

3. Arrangements have been made for unified direction and close coordination of all civilian and military assistance.

4. The military task is definite, limited, reasonably assured of success, and, insofar as possible, being performed in support of local forces.

5. Military activities are assured of sensitive constant monitoring by trained political officers (civilian or military) to minimize confusion and maximize benefits to the civilian political structure.

6. Plans and programs conducted by the indigenous Government should assure reasonable harmony of objectives among the indigenous leaders, their people, and the United States. Such programs typically will call for continuing programs of development and social welfare that provide for appropriate public voice in influencing the conduct and the goals of the programs.

g. Another dimension of civil-military relations is the relationships of the military forces with the surrounding community.
particularly when these forces are engaged in missions affecting the community directly. Difficulties in these relationships may jeopardize the usefulness of the tasks performed. This is true of indigenous forces, and even more true of US forces in the affected country.

(1) The Armed Forces can be described as a subsystem of the larger social system, interacting with it through a pattern of reciprocal demands and supports. In return for providing security, the forces need men, money, and space which must be diverted from other purposes. Moreover, military activities have impact on the lives of people, affecting the social and cultural atmosphere of communities; challenging local traditions and customs; and causing deprivations, injury, or damage. Resulting resentments can add to tensions and instability.

(2) The US Army not only should be mindful of these problems with regard to its own forces, but also should stress them in its contacts with indigenous forces. The problems should be anticipated and minimized by creating conditions that increase civilian loyalties, create confidence, and build appreciation for the military presence. On the local level, this means good community relations; on the national level, it means prudent and effective use of resources and a good public image.

57. (C) Findings.

a. FM 100-5: Operations of Army Forces in the Field divides the conflict spectrum into cold, limited, and general war. Low intensity conflict should be added as a fourth component of the spectrum, overlapping but distinct from cold war. Appropriate general doctrine governing low intensity conflict, based on the findings of this study, should be developed and incorporated in Army regulations and field manuals.

b. The priority given to military requirements in low intensity conflict should vary according to the level and circumstances of the conflict. LIC operations, particularly military operations designed to avert conflict, should support and contribute to the life of the civilian community.

c. Current doctrine should be amplified to emphasize the importance of information relative to the probability of low intensity conflict, its probable causes, and the means available for its avoidance or control. The Army attaché, as the military officer most knowledgeable about local conditions and potentially the most knowledgeable regarding the nature, causes, and control of low intensity conflict, should play a key role in collecting and evaluating such information. This point concerns not only current intelligence directives, but also various ongoing studies on the role and functions of military attaches.
d. Current doctrine on planning, coordination, and command and control needs to be reviewed in the light of ARMLIC findings to elucidate the relationship between civilian and military authority and to assure appropriate military command and staff channels regarding the use of military capabilities and appropriate coordination of political and military approaches to conflict avoidance and control. Chapter 13 of FM 100-5 should be rewritten to reflect the findings of this study on low intensity conflict and might be retitled accordingly. The ARMLIC study has not yet examined the conflict and postconflict stages; if the study is extended through these stages, further modification of this and other doctrine may be required.

e. Current doctrine on military advice relates primarily to the operation of military advisory groups. This doctrine should be expanded and modified to clarify the Army attache's role as the Ambassador's military staff adviser on the problems of low intensity conflict and to incorporate the doctrinal principles in g below.

f. More effective future planning related to support capabilities of the US Army for low intensity conflict may be needed.

g. The principles listed below should govern the role of the US Army in conflict avoidance. Table III lists the principal documents affected by these proposed doctrinal principles. Table IV lists these and other Army publications that will need modification if these principles are adapted.

1. Low intensity conflict, actual or impending, is characterized by the high proportion of internal elements, the complex mixture of political with military elements, and the fact that only one of the parties is sovereign and, thus, legally entitled to outside support. Although the ranges of cold-war situations and of LIC situations overlap, they are different in concept and require different approaches.

2. Political factors are more important than military in averting or controlling low intensity conflict. For this reason, conflict avoidance or control is basically a responsibility of the political authorities of the affected country and, if the United States is involved, of the political and diplomatic officials of the United States. Military capabilities used to avert or control low intensity conflict must be controlled and coordinated by civilian authority and closely coordinated with civilian activities. Priority must be given to political, rather than military, means of avoidance or control.

3. It is a responsibility of the military forces, including those of the United States, to be thoroughly informed about
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*Proposed principles have been reviewed to determine impact on current doctrine
1Terminology for the lower end of the conflict spectrum should be reviewed with a view toward adopting meaningful terms
2Subscripts indicate items where inconsistencies need to be resolved

Legend
a - Resolve inconsistencies
b - Add principle or doctrine for principle application
c - Terminology clarification
### TABLE IV (U). ARMY DOCUMENTS AFFECTED BY PROPOSED DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES

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situations that may lead to low intensity conflict; to advise and support the political authorities and the civilian or paramilitary internal security forces in conflict avoidance and control; to train military forces for any eventual role they may be required to play; and to be prepared for effective planning, coordination, and command and control arrangements with civilian authorities when military support is required.

(4) Military operational and logistic capabilities should be regarded as strategic reserves for civilian organizations directly concerned, and used in support of civilian capabilities. When the advantages of military participation outweigh the risks, the minimum military force necessary to accomplish the political objectives would be used.

(5) Since the Armed Forces of the United States and other nations are important external and internal symbols of the legitimacy, power, and effectiveness of their respective states, their use in conflict avoidance and control should strengthen this image, not weaken it. Involvement in day-to-day affairs, identification with partisan advantage, and association with death and destruction within the country therefore should be avoided.

(6) Doctrine for military operations and activities that support military operations to avert or control low intensity conflict should be compatible with standard military doctrine and capabilities.

(7) Missions should have definite objectives and means of accomplishment, should be limited in scope and time, should have good prospects for success, and should call for minimum political involvement.

(8) Military operations and activities should be designed to reinforce and increase legitimate civilian authority, rather than to supplant it.

(9) The impact of military activities on the civilian community, both nationally and locally, should be taken into account in both planning and execution. The use of resources should be held to the necessary minimum, and due attention given to problems of community relations.

(10) The ultimate US objective in conflict avoidance and control is to further US national interests. These interests are broader and deeper than the mere maintenance of law and order. They may be served best by standing aloof from conflict, isolating it, or conceivably by supporting rebellion in extreme circumstances. Policy determination must be made in each case by civilian US authority. Future planning would be facilitated if doctrine and operating procedures, based on
accumulated US experience since World War II, were prepared for each support capability. Future findings of ARMLIC for the conflict and postconflict stages might provide additional material on the subject.
CHAPTER 7 (C)

ROLES AND MISSIONS IN CONFLICT AVOIDANCE (U)

Section I (C). Forces and Agencies Concerned with Conflict Avoidance (U)

58. (U) Affected country. The first requirement for the Government of a country threatened by political instability or social disorder and unrest is to recognize the danger and its causes at an early stage and take action to avoid conflict. All agencies of the Government, civilian and military, should develop plans and conduct operations in appropriate and coordinated ways as required by the particular situation and conditions.

a. Civilian Government agencies normally will be responsible for identifying and resolving the major grievances of the population. The degree of their success (which may require difficult and painful changes in organization, policies, and personnel) will play a large part in determining the extent to which coercion and the use of military forces will be required to avert violent conflict. Civilian Government agencies also will play significant roles in selecting and using conflict modulators (intensifiers and dampeners of conflict). Their ability to satisfy popular demands will demonstrate Government responsiveness, strengthen the Government, and help to undercut the positions of dissident organizations. High-prestige and relatively neutral civilian agencies may be able to mediate or arbitrate interest clashes.

b. Internal security forces can dampen conflict directly and can strengthen the Government by maintaining their strength, readiness, effectiveness, and prestige. Countering the actions and weakening or destroying the structure of dissident organizations is one of the major security missions. Internal security forces also must serve as one of the Government's vital information-gathering systems for intelligence purposes and, if used appropriately, may serve as a communications channel between the people and the Government for determining popular needs and desires.

c. The primary role of the Armed Forces in a preconflict situation should be that of a strategic reserve behind the civilian agencies and the internal security forces. The Armed Forces should remain separate at all times, except when it is absolutely necessary to augment internal security forces. They will increase their own prestige and both their deterrent and operational effectiveness by maintaining a high state of readiness and professionalism. Appropriate neutral and nonpolitical actions by the Armed Forces will strengthen the Government and might permit the military to serve as mediators or arbitrators. The traditional military role lies in protecting the country
from external pressures leading toward conflict through use of border
control and protection and by otherwise maintaining an effective shield
against external threats that could adversely affect the Government's
internal policies or that could strengthen or encourage dissident organ-
izations. Using military forces in nonmilitary activities might strengthen
their image, but this should not be allowed to interfere with their pri-
mary roles and missions or to dilute their military professionalism.

59. (C) United States. US policy is to persuade countries threat-
ened with the possibility of low intensity conflict to take all measures
necessary to provide for their own internal defense and internal develop-
ment. In many cases, however, the less developed countries are unable to
attain their goals for modernization and internal stability without
external help. Where US interests are involved and the resources are
available, the United States can provide assistance alone or in conjunction
with allies.

a. Many US Government agencies are concerned directly or
indirectly with conflict avoidance, particularly the Departments of State
and Defense, the Information Agency, the Agency for International
Development (or a successor agency), and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The assignment of roles and missions within the Government involves the
US official family and is influenced and determined by US values, goals,
interests, national policy, and laws. US policy is made at the highest
Government level, but execution of US policy in LIC situations is accom-
plished, operational decisions are made, and activities are coordinated
at the country team level. Close coordination of the roles and activi-
ties in both planning and execution is imperative for success. Inter-
national coordination between the United States and the host nation must
be conducted between comparable agencies and elements at all the levels
concerned. The Army, through its understanding of conflict avoidance and
control, can facilitate such coordination at both national and country
team levels.

b. The Ambassador is the chief of the country team, the head
of the official US family in a foreign country, and has final authority
for executing US policy within the country. The Army is the executive
agency to implement policy decisions in low intensity conflict situations.
Because the Army is the executive agency for LIC missions and has special
knowledge and experience in the field, it should have special advisory
responsibilities to the country team chief, especially on the subject of
averting and controlling low intensity conflict.

(1) Civil-military relations and their problems involve
the diplomats, the top-level authorities, and the military of the
Governments concerned and frequently extend to other US agencies and
to private businessmen in the country. Military organizations of a
training and advisory nature also are involved at the national level,
and their negotiations and relations are largely with their military
counterparts, but also with civilian officials. Relations of this type are not unusual, and they are critical when an indigenous Government administration is a military junta or is staffed with members of the military.

(2) The country team not only coordinates US activities in the affected country, but also resolves divergences among interests and viewpoints of the agencies and the indigenous Government. The Army attaché, if specially trained, would be the key member of the country team in all matters pertaining to low intensity conflict.

60. (U) Multilateral action. Multilateral action in preconflict situations may be preferable to unilateral in some cases, even though it may involve operational and procedural problems peculiar to the United Nations or other multilateral and regional organizations. Sometimes ad hoc arrangements with other nations providing diplomatic, political, economic, and military support will be necessary.

a. Coordination of military and nonmilitary matters among the various Governments is a complicated and time-consuming process, involving negotiations that usually must be conducted at and through the various political levels and organizations of all the Governments involved before any agreements can be made concerning military plans and programs. The problem of coordination is further complicated by the existence of multiple agencies, many of which have independent communication channels providing them with direct contact with the host Government or direct lines to Washington. Such a situation can, and frequently does, destroy the unity of effort essential to clear understanding and smooth operations.

b. Under low intensity conflict conditions, civil-military relations constitute an ever-present problem of the highest significance, and the practice of agencies' using direct internal communications makes it extremely difficult to reach and implement satisfactory international agreements, even within mutual overall objectives. An additional factor is that the Army's own complex organization may make it difficult for the commander to obtain advice concerning the possible political implications of his decisions and actions.

61. (C) Military missions in preconflict situations. The basic role of land combat forces can be sharply distinguished from the internal security role. The internal security role in the United States is in the hands of local and State security forces, reinforced in emergencies by the National Guard or, in the extreme, by regular and reserve forces. In some other countries, the external threat may be virtually nonexistent, or the forces of the United States or some other nation may be relied on to counter it, so that Armed Forces—as the term usually is understood—hardly exist. Alternatively, the internal threat may reach such dimensions as to become the primary mission of the Armed Forces, which then
become an integral part of the internal security organization. The blurring of lines between the Armed Forces and the internal security forces generally is undesirable; the military establishment, however small, should have as separate and limited a role in internal security as possible.

a. The US Armed Forces have the additional role of symbolizing, to Americans and to the world, the power and effectiveness of the United States as a nation and, at the same time, demonstrating adherence to principles of conduct in domestic and international affairs which constitute the basis for its legitimacy. Legitimacy and effectiveness of the Government are a major basis for the stability of the nation and the Armed Forces can help to make them visible. In doing so, they also increase their deterrent capability.

b. The US Army must be prepared to support the decisions and actions of the civilian authorities of the Government to avert the outbreak of low intensity conflict in affected nations. The Army's capability to perform this mission is limited by its other roles and missions. In conflict avoidance, the Army should constitute a strategic reserve behind civilian capabilities. It should be prepared at all times, through intelligence and planning, to recommend appropriate use of its capabilities to provide prompt and effective support to civil authorities and to meet an eventual conflict situation. The Army also may be given additional functions with respect to the Armed Forces of other countries: to provide advice, training, supply, and possibly support for their contingent role in internal security; to keep informed of their needs and capabilities; and to gather additional insights on the countries' problems through its contact with them.

Section II (C). Primary US Army Missions (U)

62. (U) General. The US Army has four primary missions in low intensity conflict: intelligence, advice, training, and contingency planning and coordination. These missions apply to both conflict and preconflict situations.

63. (C) Intelligence. The traditional intelligence processes include collecting information, processing such data into useful intelligence, and disseminating and using it. The other three primary missions all depend on intelligence. Concepts and doctrine already developed in field manuals concerning the intelligence processes apply to conflict avoidance. The concepts appear valid for both preconflict and conflict phases in low intensity conflict situations.

a. Three main categories of information for intelligence purposes are necessary for decision and action in averting or controlling low intensity conflict: information regarding the threat to US
interests that the outbreak of low intensity conflict would pose, as a basis for deciding whether and how much US involvement is justified; information regarding the likelihood, underlying causes, and moderators of conflict in the affected country(ies); and information on the anticipated and actual effects of US policies and programs, as a means for deciding on and continually adjusting selected programs, to assure maximum effectiveness and minimum risk. Table I (chap 3) offers a guide for development of information requirements. Special knowledge of possible sources of information and an understanding of the kinds of information obtainable from them are of critical importance. However, it is of little value if there is no capability to use all agencies to exploit these sources.

b. The US Army is not, and should not be, the sole agency or even the principal agency for collecting information on factors relating to low intensity conflict. It should, however, be a major contributor on the subject, particularly with regard to the capabilities, effectiveness, and attitudes of indigenous Armed Forces and should coordinate and interpret information from all available sources to develop a coherent, detailed, and current estimate of conflict potentialities in countries of importance to the United States. In particular, through contact with local security forces, Army officers are likely to have early knowledge of frustrations, disaffection, and dissidence existing within the internal security and military forces of the country, enabling them to gain insights into the country’s problems.

c. Information gathered by the Army and the resulting intelligence will be supplied to US Government agencies and to the appropriate US country team. In addition, certain types of information, especially those concerning external influences (particularly subversive ones), could be shared with appropriate authorities of the affected country as a means of neutralizing the impact of such subversion and of lowering the conflict potential.

64. (U) Advice. The Army has traditionally advised the US Government and, through appropriate channels, foreign Governments on military matters. In the light of the findings of the preconflict phase of this study, this mission should be expended.

a. Qualified US Army personnel should advise US civilian authorities in affected countries regarding the likelihood of low intensity conflict, its causes, and ways to avert and control it, including the use of Army capabilities. Staff officers specially qualified in the field of low intensity conflict should advise planners and commanders of US military units on the use of their forces in such activities. The Ambassador also may direct such officers to advise indigenous civilian leaders of the likelihood of low intensity conflict and the means for avoiding or controlling it. Experts from third countries may be brought in to provide advice in some cases.
b. Advice and quiet counsel extended by qualified US Army officers to their local counterparts could be of considerable importance in preventing low intensity conflict. Such counsel could influence and aid local security forces as they develop plans and conduct operations designed to avert conflict; it will be effective only if the sociocultural factors that are unique to the country are understood and considered.

c. Neither the Army nor any other agency of the US Government is ideally suited to advising affected Governments on the conduct of internal security operations, but the Army has experience in conducting such activities and operations. Responsibility for internal security in the United States is fragmented among federal, state, and local governments. There is no national police force in the United States, and the knowledge and experience of State and local police forces is not gathered together into any single repository. The FBI and the National Police Academy do not deal with the total field of internal security. The Army and the National Guard have still other areas of specialization. Some civilian US agency, possibly AID or a successor, should be assigned responsibility to advise civilian security forces, to preclude tainting the advice with a military label. This does not mean that the Army should not retain the capability to do so in the event that other agencies fail.

65. (C) Training. The importance of training as a basic military mission has long been accepted. Too often, only one aspect has been considered: development of combat skills and expertise in US troops to enable them to fight under any conditions in any location. Other requirements related to conflict avoidance and control may prove to be equally important: programs for US Army personnel specializing in low intensity conflict; training of Army units which may be engaged in conflict avoidance or control; and programs conducted by the US Army for indigenous military personnel.

a. Unit training, aimed at inculcating special skills and sensitizing personnel to special problems, should be designed and supervised by personnel of the proposed Civil-Military Relations Staff and should be conducted in addition to the training appropriate to the normal military functions of the units concerned.

b. Selected indigenous officers should attend the proposed Center for the Study of Conflict and the US Army Intelligence School. Materials developed in this study and in other Government and private studies of conflict should provide a rich source of information for training programs but will require screening and editing for maximum utility. The emphasis in US Army training should be on US and foreign military personnel, but a mixture of selected and qualified civilians would improve the program and its long-run effects.
c. Training of US Army personnel should center around the proposed Center for the Study of Conflict and the program for training political officers, plus appropriate courses at the US Army Intelligence School for intelligence personnel.

d. Internal security training programs should be developed and conducted by a civilian agency of the Government and should be kept separate from Army programs. However, the Army should assure that such training is as effective as possible and should, if necessary, support it with money, materiel, and know-how. Third-country experts could be called on to provide training.

66. (U) Planning and coordination. The experience of the Army in planning and management of complex operations, combined with its capabilities for conflict avoidance and conflict control, give it a major potential role in planning for preconflict situations. The interrelatedness of political and military factors in low intensity conflict requires a major Army role in the coordination of military operations with those of civilian agencies. Both the planning and the coordination aspects extend, through advisory channels, to the activities of indigenous Government agencies and military forces.

a. Traditional levels of precision and detail in military planning will have to be modified for low intensity conflict because of the imprecision and flexibility inherent in the nonmilitary factors that are involved. Planning and coordination must achieve a degree of flexibility that can accommodate the kaleidoscopic nature of the political, economic, social, and psychological fundamentals involved in low intensity conflict.

b. Planning and coordination also will be complicated by three considerations: the great number and variety of Army capabilities that might have to be used, the great number and variety of other US Government and non-Government entities that will be involved, and the possibility that allies or multinational organizations may be involved.

c. The Army attache, in the absence of a Chief, MAAG/Mission, should assist the country team in planning policies and programs for conflict avoidance and control and should advise it on Army capabilities. If Army capabilities are used, the Army attache and/or the Chief, MAAG/Mission, should coordinate and direct them to best support the total effort of the US Government and the affected country. The Army attache and/or the Chief, MAAG/Mission, in close coordination with the Ambassador and country team, also can assist leaders of the affected country in their own planning for conflict avoidance and control. Given the special abilities of the military services in management, personnel of the Army and other services can be used in designing and administering coordinated conflict avoidance and control programs. Although the Army should have primary responsibility in the field of
In low intensity conflict, the other services should contribute their abilities and skills as required and feasible.

d. The planning and coordination function is carried on continuously as part of the ongoing activities of the country team. In the event that sizeable programs of conflict avoidance and control are decided on, special groups with precise authority assignments and lines of command may have to be established to direct and coordinate them. All such arrangements should provide for effective military support to the total program under overall civilian direction, and should provide effective and practical working relationships and allocations of responsibility among programs of the United States, the affected country, and third countries or international organizations.

e. In the field, the responsibility for planning and coordinating conflict avoidance and control is basically the Ambassador’s, operating through the country team. The Army attache and/or the Chief, MAAG/Mission, should serve as his principal military adviser in LIC matters. Primary responsibility in Washington rests with the Department of State and the National Security Council; the Civil-Military Relations Staff would advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the appropriate military contribution.

Section III (C). Supporting US Army Missions (U)

67. (U) General. The Army’s past experience demonstrates a wide range of capabilities that can support civilian programs for conflict avoidance. None of the missions or the capabilities proposed for use in the preconflict period is new. However, limitations and modifications of present doctrine may be required for preconflict situations or low intensity conflicts. The operational capabilities below can be used within the structure of overall civilian control in preconflict and low intensity conflict situations.

68. (C) Supply. The problem of providing a less developed country with the materiel to permit its Government’s military and internal security forces to control instability or avert violence is complex. Such equipment as communications gear can be valuable for increasing the capabilities of local security forces and can reinforce the acceptability of US training and advice. US-manufactured lethal equipment or ammunition normally should not be provided, because it places the United States in the position of apparently instigating violence and tends to identify it with one side of the conflict, reducing the acceptability of the US presence and weakening the believability of the peacefulness of its intentions. Although nonlethal chemical agents are basically different, popular attitudes in much of the world are such that the United States should use extreme caution in supplying them to indigenous forces in low intensity conflict situations.
69. (C) Psychological operations (PSYOP). In preconflict situations, the United States should provide the type of advice, intelligence, training, and facilities that will enable the affected country to carry out psychological operations. The principal objectives would be to strengthen civilian support of the affected country's Government, expose the actions of subversive and dissenting groups as forces leading to violence and conflict, create dissension within and weaken or subdue insurgent forces, and publicize the threat and subversive nature of the activities of hostile countries. PSYOP can be conducted with or without acknowledgement of US participation. In some cases, recognition of the presence of US forces would provide assurance of their support and bolster the confidence of the people and administration in their ability to control and subdue the conflict. Conversely, it may be necessary to use PSYOP to make the presence and assistance of US forces acceptable to the people.

70. (C) Border control. Where the threat caused by infiltration of external personnel and supply is clearly evident and detected in its early stages, the US Army may be able to neutralize the impact by assisting in the conduct of surveillance and border control activities. An equally important objective is to prevent the border areas from offering havens of safety to hostile forces, such as guerrilla units. US operations and activities would be limited in most cases to technical assistance and tactical advice to indigenous forces, but they could include limited combat support. No such activity should be attempted without unequivocal consent of the host Government, specific unequivocal advance understandings of the limits of US involvement and the responsibilities of the host Government for defense and development, determination by analysis of the situation that the prospects for success of the border control activities justify the attempt, and determination that the national interests of the United States justify the risks involved. One other aspect of border control should be recognized: the possibility that neutral and uninvolved friendly nations that share common borders with the host country can be persuaded to provide a buffer-state against infiltration, use their own forces to prevent it, and refuse to permit hostile groups of other nations (including the threatened neighboring country) to use the border areas as havens for retreat, regrouping, or training.

71. (C) Internal security operations. Provision of internal security is primarily the responsibility of civilian Government organizations and agencies, and internal security operations normally are conducted by such forces as the police, augmented as required by the gendarmerie and paramilitary organizations. Indigenous military forces may be required to support and enforce these operations and to aid and control refugees, prevent violence, and protect citizens from violence. Direct US Army participation in such activities would rarely be desirable but remains a possibility. Activities conducted by police and other civilian forces must be coordinated with those of military forces to
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avoid duplication of effort and confusion. The overall purpose is to prevent insurgent elements from assuming control and to provide an atmosphere within which Government agencies can function to avert conflict. Specific measures of control must be applied selectively. Confiscation of weapons and cameras, for instance, or curfews and blackouts, might cause a level of resentment that would outweigh the actual degree of prevention of violence achieved.

72. (C) **Show of force.** Interposition and show of force imply the use of combat troops or other military elements that have the capability to conduct combat action. Results of interposition and intervention are somewhat unpredictable, and use of either is potentially explosive. A show of force is far less provocative and carries with it some of the effect that actual use of the force would have. It is, in a limited but unmistakable sense, a form of commitment, a demonstration of combat capabilities and declaration of an attitude that gives credibility to an ultimate willingness to use the forces displayed or other forces held in reserve in a combat role. This activity may be conducted by indigenous forces alone or with the visible support of the assisting nation's forces, or it may be carried out by using the forces and equipment of the United States or a third country. The show of force may take place within or outside the affected country; the latter course is less risky.

a. The actual presence of US or third-country military personnel, accompanying, supporting, and assisting indigenous forces in performing noncombat tasks and civil activities, can be considered a display of force within the affected country.

b. Mobile US forces, specially trained for both civil works and riot control--dual-mission forces--could be organized. Their presence would constitute a display of force at a low or somewhat muted level that would be acceptable to the affected country, might increase the support of civilians for their Government, and could be expected to provoke little legitimate opposition from third countries, providing the reason for the presence of such units was openly stated or visible and credible.

c. External displays of force usually consist of such activities as patrolling the coastal waters of the affected country or, possibly, visiting or being located in a friendly neighboring nation. This provides evidence of intent and strength--a show of force equally unmistakable in its implications for aggressor nations.

d. These kinds of actions are more provocative in nature than participation in parades and support of noncombat civil works. Although military forces would not actually be used against a hostile nation and its forces, their presence could cause open expressions of resentment or objection that would clarify a nation's intentions.
73. (U) Civic action. Military civic action operations are one aspect of the Army's civil affairs mission. Establishment of good and productive military-civilian relationships is essential in situations short of conflict. Although US forces may, under certain conditions, engage in civic action in less developed countries, indigenous military forces normally should conduct civic action programs. The intended immediate result is to benefit the people in preconflict periods as well as in low intensity conflict situations. It is important that indigenous military forces initiate and conduct the programs, and that indigenous civilians are part of the effort. Civic action projects fall into various categories such as training and education, health and sanitation, public works, communications and transportation, and agriculture.

74. (U) Civil works. US military personnel or units can accomplish carefully chosen civil works projects, such as building roads or bridges, which are important in opening up isolated regions or in gaining public support. The visible benefits of such projects should exceed the liabilities and costs of foreign presence. Alternatively, US personnel may provide training and logistic support to indigenous agencies in selecting and carrying out appropriate civil works projects. It is important that the subsequent upkeep and repair of such works be provided for at the time they are accomplished.

75. (C) Disaster relief. Supply, transport, and special skills can be provided for meeting the emergency needs of the people promptly in a disaster area created by fire, flood, earthquake, drought, or war. Military units are qualified to participate in emergency relief and control operations because of their disciplined manpower; their technical skills; their stores and equipment; and their ability to plan, advise, and conduct (or help conduct) such operations. Civilian agencies should administer the programs. US participation would be relatively acceptable because of the humanitarian motive that would be displayed. Such actions could provide opportunities for giving advice, augmenting intelligence activities, serving as mild shows of force, and strengthening favorable attitudes toward the United States. An important element in such operations is to assure that resources will be available to meet needs that will continue to exist after the operation is terminated. This may involve the continuing presence of US advisory personnel to work with indigenous agencies.

76. (C) Peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations use military forces to achieve stability in areas of concern to the affected nations by preventing or averting violence or conflict or by controlling conflict after it has begun. Coordination with the various Governments involved is complex and time-consuming. Activities, tasks, and roles pertaining to peacekeeping include commitment of military forces, civilian specialists, and Government agencies and personnel; provision of supply and support for all these; coordination of civil affairs activities with military
tasks; and provision of advice, assistance in planning, implementation
and conduct of all levels of tasks, activities, and programs in any of
the deficient areas—defense, national economy, social imbalances, and
political and administrative structures and procedures. In addition,
international efforts to provide peacekeeping capabilities for a host
country may include any or all of the other primary or supporting Army
missions. Peacekeeping, however, differs in two significant respects.

a. Peacekeeping operations are best conducted under the
authority of an established international organization, with the atten-
dant respect and aura of international community sanction implied, or
under the authority of an ad hoc multinational arrangement. In either
event, the stigma of unilateral intervention is avoided; the burden in
manpower and materiel is shared widely instead of by just the United
States and the affected country; the basis for hostile-nation, third-
country, or domestic political criticism is significantly reduced; and
the affected country is better able to accept outside assistance with-
out strengthening the position of dissident organizations.

b. Using combat units in a peacekeeping operation differs
significantly from using them against identifiable hostile combat units.
In most peacekeeping operations, the international forces have been
neutral or equally opposed to the forces of both sides. Serious opera-
tional and doctrinal problems must be solved if US forces are to be
prepared to participate in peacekeeping operations in the future.

Section IV (U). Contributions of Other Countries and Organizations

77. General. In many cases, the interests of the United States
may be served better if the needs of affected countries are met in
cooperation with personnel and forces of other countries, civilian or
military, or by other countries without active US participation. All
the roles and missions described above theoretically can be performed
by other countries, alone or in coalition, or by international organi-
izations. Arrangements for command and control and for allocation of
functions and responsibilities should be developed to fit the needs
of each case. Insofar as the United States is involved, the Ambassa-
dor and country team would be responsible for assuring that these arrange-
ments were made and carried out. The Department of State and established
interagency mechanisms would have this responsibility in Washington. The
Army attache, the Chief, MAAG/Mission, and the Civil-Military Relations
Staff would advise about arrangements affecting US military forces and
would coordinate their implementation.

78. Third-country operations. In conjunction with leaders of
affected countries, US representatives may agree to ask qualified
personnel of one or more third countries to provide needed training.
advice, planning and coordination, or operational support. US participation in third-country operations may be limited to helping in the initial arrangements or may extend to providing financial and logistic support and low-key aid in planning and coordinating the assistance provided.

79. **Coalition operations.** The United States, in coordination with leaders of affected countries, may request or accept third-country participation in jointly conducted assistance activities. The direct US role in such operations should be held to the minimum for effective accomplishment of the task.

80. **International organization operations.** Operations of international organizations could be of two types, only one of which has involved military force heretofore: ad hoc operations under special resolutions or decisions of international bodies that request member states to provide forces; operations by UN peacekeeping forces in-being or earmarked for the purpose, if such forces are ever constituted. The applicability of international organization operations to low intensity conflict situations has not been studied extensively, although the Congo and Cyprus are two good examples of such operations that involve military forces. The possibility of greater participation by international organizations in conflict avoidance deserves further study to determine its feasibility and its desirability from the standpoint of US interests.
81. (C) General. US Army organization for low intensity conflict currently exists only on an ad hoc basis. Most Army components from the Pentagon down—command, staff, planning, research, operational training—are deeply concerned with the problem but lack an organizational threat to draw all elements together. Organization for this level of conflict is described in FM 100-20 (FSR: Internal Defense and Development) as being of such importance that it "commands a full share of Army resources and professional military thought and equal priority with readiness for limited and general war missions." The results of this study fully support such a position. If the US Army is to perform effectively the missions and activities in low intensity conflict identified and described in chapter 7, it is necessary to strengthen and reorient the attache system, emphasize the low intensity conflict responsibilities of MAAG and missions, establish a center for the study of conflict, and develop a civil-military relations staff organization that extends down to division level.

82. (C) The attache system, MAAG, and Missions. The Army attache and the Chief of the Army MAAG/Mission offer the Army a major means of mission accomplishment in low intensity conflict: avoidance and control. The Army attache is legitimized and accepted by long diplomatic tradition and is less open to challenge than others; however, the MAAG/Mission chief normally is accepted as part of the country team when he exists. The attache and the Chief of MAAG/Mission, by advance training and time in country, develop understanding and knowledge of the area and the people. Using such knowledge and understanding and with additional advance training in low intensity conflict problems and indicators, both could advance US Government capabilities in obtaining information of impending conflict situations. In addition, both individuals could advise the US Ambassador on Army capabilities, organization, and command structure and provide recommendations for military actions and support to avert conflict or assist in controlling it (figure 6). Preparatory training of the Army attache and the Chief of the MAAG/Mission would include the political-military aspects of low intensity conflict avoidance and control as developed in this study.

Recommendation: That the Army attache (or Chief of the MAAG/Mission, as appropriate) be made responsible to the US Ambassador for the following actions:

Estimating the potential for low intensity conflict in the country, on the basis of
Figure 6 (C). Proposed Country Team Organization (U)
his own information and that of other country team elements and of his interpretation of this information in coordination with the country team.

Proposing ways to use US military capabilities to support indigenous and US civilian authority in averting or controlling low intensity conflict.

Coordinating and controlling US military assistance in the field of low intensity conflict avoidance and control.

Advising the Ambassador and, as directed, appropriate officials of the host Government on the nature, causes, avoidance, and control of low intensity conflict.

Maintaining effective relations between the Army of the host country and US military and civilian agencies.

Collecting, monitoring, and evaluating information from which to estimate the probability of low intensity conflict, to assist in planning avoidance and control measures, and directing and coordinating the military input, including advice and training for indigenous military forces.

83. (U) **Doctrinal literature.** Terminology in Army doctrinal literature pertaining to low intensity conflict is overlapping, confusing, and unstandardized. Inconsistencies in methods of handling situations by similar or closely related activities exist in regulatory publications and key field manuals.

**Recommendation:** That key field manuals and other Army doctrinal publications be revised to delete contradictions and inconsistencies of definitions, terms, tactics, and other aspects.

84. (U) **Reorientation of functions and training of attaches and chiefs of MAAG and Missions.** Effective discharge of the duties and responsibilities, described above, by the Army attache will require that his duties no longer be limited to information gathering and diplomatic representation. Army attaches and MAAG/Mission chiefs must be given political training, with emphasis on the nature and causes of low intensity conflict and experience of various countries with this kind of problem; must be capable of dealing effectively with a wide
range of US Army units and individuals; and must be able to work effectively with officials, particularly senior military officers, of the host country. These advisers to the Ambassador, also should be in direct contact with and administratively responsible to the unified command in the area, as well as having responsibility to report to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Recommendation: That a career field be established in the Army that would embrace attaché service and MAAG/Mission and other appropriate political positions, with opportunities for advancement to general officer grade equal to those in other careers and that would be based on the existing program of political training, with appropriate modifications.

Recommendation: That consideration be given to establishment of a channel for attaches that would give them rapid means of calling on the resources of the Army for research, planning, and dispatch of needed military assistance in accordance with programs recommended by the Ambassador and country team.

Recommendation: That attaches be assisted by trained intelligence and counterintelligence personnel in support of the low intensity conflict responsibility when the need arises.

85. (c) Conflict study center. The results of this study indicate that the study of conflict itself must be a continuing effort by the United States. Conflict has been a constant factor in human affairs throughout history, and it is evident from current affairs that conflict at some point on the spectrum will continue to influence the future. Definitive solutions to the problems of conflict and violence in human affairs appears far from attainable, but every attention to the knowledge of this subject increases the US Government capability to avert, control, or in rare cases to capitalize on its effects. The establishment of a center for the study of conflict or the addition of such a program to the current military assistance program would facilitate the attainment of major Army objectives in the understanding, control, and avoidance of low intensity conflict. Establishment of such a program would demonstrate continued Government interest in understanding the causes of conflict, would help undercut the appeal of communism and other radical ideologies to would-be revolutionaries, and would promote general awareness of the causes of conflict, alternatives short of violence for dealing with them, and the need for institutions to control conflict. The Military Assistance Institute program of conflict study would differ from those of various private groups concerned with the study of conflict in that it would be concerned with
policies and programs rather than with theory alone and could bring together the many different lines of research on the subject of averting and controlling conflict.

**Recommendation:** That the current John F. Kennedy Center and the Military Assistance Institute programs be expanded to include the study of conflict as a major project. Students would include qualified US and foreign, private and governmental, and military political officer trainees. It would operate on a level comparable to the Command and General Staff College but would conduct its activities on an unclassified basis. The existing program of instruction for the Military Assistance Institute could be used as the basis of the curriculum, but more emphasis and direction would be added to the politics of conflict.

**Recommendation:** That the Army's Military Assistance Officer and Foreign Areas Studies Training Program (MAOP and FASTP) be modified to emphasize the nature, causes, and manifestations of conflict and low intensity conflict avoidance and control.

**Recommendation:** That the Military Assistance Institute be provided a research and development capability staffed with both military and civilian experts for support of the study of conflict and of low intensity conflict avoidance and control. In addition, that an experimental program be conducted by the center for the study of conflict, using troops, faculty, and students in field exercises to develop techniques and doctrine for low intensity conflict avoidance and control.

**Recommendation:** That the analytical scheme/method developed in the Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict study be incorporated into the curriculum of the Military Assistance Institute program of instruction. Further, that the country case studies developed in ARMLIC be used as background reading by all students in military courses concerned with conflict avoidance and control.

86. (C) **Army staff organization.** The Army obviously has many capabilities that can be used to avert conflict. Decisions made at high levels on the use of these Army capabilities must be made by commanders and staff officers familiar with the problems of, as well as the benefits from, their use. The actual use of such supporting capabilities must be in consonance with overall US policies and programs and must be coordinated closely with the policies, programs, and
activities of host countries and with other activities in the area that are comparable to those of the Army, whether local, national, or international.

a. The simplest organizational method of attaining such coordination would be to combine the conflict avoidance and control mission with that of civil affairs in a single staff component that would be responsible at all levels down to division for civil-military relations activities (figure 7), such a combined staff section might be called the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) Staff. This would necessitate recasting current doctrine and understanding to make this staff responsible for the current aspects of military-civil affairs and low intensity conflict avoidance and control missions. Personnel for the Civil-Military Relations Staffs at major commands would be drawn from the career group described in 84 above and would be equipped to perform needed civil affairs and military government functions for their respective commands in time of war.

b. Establishment of this CMR staff organization also would be useful in meeting the Defense Department's increasing responsibilities in the security assistance field, especially if proposed legislation on security and economic assistance is enacted.

c. A modular table of organization should be developed for small CMR detachments that could be attached quickly to Army units for conflict avoidance and control missions. Personnel of such detachments, drawn from the conflict politics career field, would handle liaison with US and indigenous civilian authorities and would counsel unit commanders on civil-military relations aspects of their responsibilities.

d. The implications of low intensity conflict avoidance and control for the Joint Staff and DOD will require maximum coordination and exchange of ideas. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and appropriate civilian departments and agencies will require data input to support country programs.

Recommendation: That a Civil-Military Relations Staff be established at all levels from joint staff and unified commands down to division, and that civil-military relations detachments be established at lower levels as required.

Recommendation: That a modular table of organization be developed for small civil-military relations detachments, to permit rapid attachment of such elements to Army units for conflict avoidance and control missions.

87. (c) Intelligence coordination. One of the major factors that this study has developed is the importance of the proper gathering
Figure 7 (C). Proposed Army Staff Organization (U)
of information on the indicators of low intensity conflict and the proper utilization of such intelligence once it is available. Adequate coordination of information and dissemination of all available intelligence in the early stages of low intensity conflict is absolutely essential to guide US action and policy in prevention or avoidance of conflict. Current US Army doctrine appears adequate but should be examined in conjunction with other appropriate Government agencies, with a view toward improving the current intelligence coordination system. Of particular importance is the relationship between the Army attache and the Chief of a MAAG or Mission when both exist within a host country. Of particular importance here is the transfer of primary responsibility of low intensity conflict information gathering when a MAAG or a Mission phases out of a host country, leaving the Army attache the proponent information-gathering agency.

Recommendation: That basic directives, standing operational procedures, and memorandums of agreement between attaches and Chiefs of Army MAAG and Missions be reviewed to insure responsibility for and coordination of low intensity conflict information gathering and dissemination.

Recommendation: That US Army doctrine for intelligence information be examined in conjunction with that of other appropriate Government agencies to insure maximum effectiveness for low intensity conflict avoidance and to control information gathering.

88. (C) The contribution of public health factors to conflict. Further research is required on the subject of physiological adaptation to various stages of malnutrition, changes that occur with each successive stage, and mass psychological responses to the presence of disease and malnutrition.

Recommendation: That research by an appropriate agency be programmed to permit definitive insights into how malnutrition and incidence of disease affect the propensity of people toward conflict and violence, and to determine what effects dramatic improvements in these fields might have on the attitudes of people.

89. (U) Literature access. The literature search during the preconflict stage of this study compiled much data on the subject of low intensity conflict, a large part of which is in the US Army War College Library.

Recommendation: That the Military Assistance Institute and other comparable Government agencies examine the information that has been compiled on low intensity conflict.
by the Institute of Advanced Studies, which is available in the US Army War College Library, and extract any that may be of use to them.

90. (U) Continuation of study. The research and analysis done in the preconflict stage of this study have resulted in new insights into the causes of low intensity conflict and emergence of ideas to guide development of doctrine for preventing its occurrence as well as for controlling and terminating it. Although the findings for the preconflict period are substantial, additional study of situations that did not escalate into violence, refinement of the analytical model, and indepth study of the conflict and postconflict periods is essential to fulfill the purpose, objective, and scope of the study.

Recommendation: That the Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict study be completed as planned.
APPENDIX I (U)

STUDY DIRECTIVE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

CDIAS-C
6 May 1968
SUBJECT: Army 85 Concept Follow-On Studies

Commanding General
US Army Combat Developments Command
ATTN: CDCPL-L
Fort Belvoir, Va. 22060

1. Reference:
   a. Letter, USACDCIAS, 6 October 1967, subject as above.
   b. Letter, USACDC, 27 November 1967, subject as above.

2. Since concepts for the low intensity portion of the conflict spectrum are not fully developed, the methodology and procedures set forth in reference c are not suitable for the expansion of the priority conceptual objective, Low Intensity Conflict. As viewed by IAS, this PCO comprises a study of considerable breadth and depth and, therefore, must be approached along conventional CDC concept study lines. Accordingly, IAS proposes inhouse development of a study plan for the PCO, Low Intensity Conflict, which will follow normally prescribed CDC concept study procedures and incorporate the following as its scope and objective:
SUBJECT: Army 85 Concept Follow-On Studies

The study will research, analyze, and synthesize, to the extent feasible within available time and resources, all postulations, writings, reports, and data concerning the political, economic, social, psychological, scientific, and military factors which lead to the loss of indigenous Government control and the establishment of a climate conducive to the development of insurgency. All aspects of Types I and II low intensity conflict will be examined and analyzed to identify those tactics and techniques most successful in defeating insurgency and to evaluate the employment of anti-infiltration and surveillance barrier systems as an adjunct to the application of military force in such conflict situations. Based on this research and analysis, draw conclusions and make recommendations as to future Army roles in low intensity conflict and develop the necessary operational, organizational, and materiel concepts for their support.

3. This proposal represents a departure from and a considerable expansion of the proposed scope of past CDC draft study directives for the Synthesis of Low Intensity Conflict; however, as pointed out during reference d, there appears to be an urgent requirement to probe conditions and circumstances prior to the development of an actual low intensity conflict situation. This examination is needed as a means of better understanding the underlying causes for the development of insurgency and to determine whether there are actions or measures which the Army in conjunction with other US agencies could apply at an early stage which could possibly prevent the outbreak of low intensity conflict.

4. Recommend approval of the scope and objective and the procedures proposed in paragraph 2 for the development of the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) study.

5. Correlation: USACDC ACN 13525.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHARLES W. SEAVER
Major, AGC
Asst Dir, Admin
SUBJECT: Army 85 Concept Follow-on Studies

Headquarters, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060


1. Scope, objective and procedures recommended in the basic communication are approved.

2. It is suggested that the following be considered in the scope and objective to highlight current doctrinal weaknesses in the areas of Urban Insurgency, Identification of Insurgent Activities, and Pacification Roles of US Combat Units in Low Intensity Type I Conflicts:

   All aspects of Types I and II low intensity conflict, to include urban based insurgency, will be examined and analyzed to identify those tactics and techniques most successful in identifying and defeating insurgency. The roles of U. S. combat units other than fighting insurgents and the employment of anti-infiltration and surveillance systems as an adjunct to the application of military force in such conflict situations will be evaluated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A. J. DOMBROWSKI
LTC, GS
Adjutant General
APPENDIX II (U)

STUDY PLAN

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

SUBJECT: Revised Plan of Study, Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC)

Commanding General
US Army Combat Developments Command
ATTN: CDCPL-L
Fort Belvoir, Va. 22060

21 Nov 1969


2. This plan of study is a revision of the plan contained in letter, CDIAS-C, USACDCIAS, 9 October 1968, subject: "Plan of Study, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) - An Army 85 Concept Follow-On Study," and as approved by letter, CDCPL-L, 24 December 1968, same subject. The revision reflects IAS experience during the first year of the study, and CDC and IAS discussions regarding the Army and DOD needs to be met by the study.

3. Objectives and Scope. The approved purpose, objectives, and scope of the study are contained in referenced letter, paragraph 1 above.

a. Purpose.

(1) The purpose of the study is to enable the Army to develop a more effective doctrine and capability for low intensity conflict, to include improved methods of integrating US military and civil assistance with all allied and indigenous military and nonmilitary
resources to achieve optimum unity of effort and viable internal strength through preservation, restoration, or creation of an environment of law and order.

(2) As a significant part of such doctrine and capability the study will endeavor to determine whether there are actions or measures which the Army in conjunction with other US agencies could apply at an early stage which could possibly prevent the initiation of low intensity conflict.

b. Objectives.

(1) Determine the factors which lead to change in indigenous Government control or produce a climate conducive to low intensity conflict and the techniques most likely to succeed in averting, containing, and constructively resolving such conflict.

(2) Develop Army roles and missions in low intensity conflict (as contemplated in paragraph f, Army Chief of Staff letter dated 8 June 1967, guidance for the development of Army 85 follow-on studies).

(3) Develop the Army operational, organizational, and materiel concepts in support of these roles and missions.

c. Scope.

(1) The study will be concerned with all forms of low intensity conflict of Type I (US combat forces involved) and Type II (US combat forces not involved) in any part of the world. It will consider the limitations of the Army as an element in such conflict, as well as its actual or potential capabilities. The roles of US combat units other than in fighting insurgents, and the employment of anti-infiltration and surveillance systems as an adjunct to the application of military force, will be evaluated.

(2) The study will research, analyze, and synthesize to the extent feasible within available time and resources all postulations, writings, reports, and data concerning the political, economic, social, psychological, scientific, and military factors which lead to the loss of indigenous Government control and the establishment of a climate conducive to the development of insurgency. It will, accordingly, cover periods of time before and after actual conflict.
CDIAS-C

21 Nov 1969

SUBJECT: Revised Plan of Study, Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC)


   a. References: A partial list is included in inclosure 1.

   b. Assumptions: A partial list is contained in inclosure 2. As new assumptions become apparent, they will be forwarded for approval.

   c. Methodology: The study will consist of five basic parts--a background survey; a set of preconflict case studies; a study of the conflict stage (Type I and Type II); a study of the postconflict stage; and the development of Army roles and missions and supporting operational, organizational, and materiel concepts.

      (1) Part one: Background and state of knowledge survey.

         (a) Task 1-1: Select appropriate terminology.

         (b) Task 1-2: Develop an overall annotated bibliography and classification scheme with contributions from each discipline (political, economic, etc.).

         (c) Task 1-3: Develop a methodology for the preconflict study.

         (d) Task 1-4: Examine available studies of conflict completed or in process, to determine their relevance and usefulness to the present study.

         (e) Task 1-5: Develop detailed study outlines for each discipline for the preconflict stage.

         (f) Task 1-6: Develop a tentative draft general outline for the final study report.

      (2) Part two: Preconflict stage.

         (a) Task 2-1: Select target countries appropriate for detailed comparative case studies.

         (b) Task 2-2: Conduct interdisciplinary research and analysis of the selected countries to identify factors which lead to loss of or change in Government control.

         (c) Task 2-3: Evaluate interdisciplinary findings and prepare a summary statement of the factors for each country.

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in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC)

(d) Task 2-4: Evaluate and synthesize all factors in all
countries.

(e) Task 2-5: Prepare procedures and outline for research on
the conflict stage.

(f) Task 2-6: Prepare a final report on the background study
and preconflict stage, incorporating such preliminary findings
relative to Army roles, missions, and concepts as may be supported
by the data thus far obtained.

(3) Part three: Conflict stage. The following tasks may in
certain cases be performed concurrently or in combination:

(a) Task 3-1: Study the military and paramilitary aspects of
low intensity conflict in terms of strategy, tactics, organization,
personnel, materiel to determine factors making for success or failure
in applying violent methods against established authority and in
controlling such violence.

(b) Task 3-2: Study the nonmilitary (political, economic, social,
psychological, scientific) factors in conflict situations and their
importance in initiating, aggravating, sustaining, dampening, suppress-
ing, or resolving violent conflict, relating the study as appropriate
to the findings in part two.

(c) Task 3-3: Study the application of external military resources
(US and other) in low intensity conflict and their effect on conflict.

(d) Task 3-4: Study the application of external nonmilitary
resources (US and other) in low intensity conflict and, to the extent
determinable, their effect on conflict.

(e) Task 3-5: Develop procedures and outline for research on the
postconflict stage.

(f) Task 3-6: Prepare a final report on the conflict stage,
incorporating such preliminary findings relative to Army roles, missions,
and concepts as may be supported by the data thus far obtained.

(4) Part four: Postconflict stage. This stage will be studied
to determine the longer range effects of the preconflict and conflict
stages in terms of whether and why underlying conflict is resolved,
eliminated, or aggravated and of the prospects for renewed low intensity
conflict under various circumstances. The component tasks and exact
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Method of study will be determined under task 3-5 above in the depth of study findings in parts one, two, and three.

(5) Part five: Army roles, missions, and concepts. On the basis of the findings in parts one thru four, this part will determine appropriate Army roles and missions in low intensity conflict. It will examine the benefits and costs, in terms of US national objectives and policies, of various courses of action in a range of scenarios and will give full consideration to:

(a) The full range of Army capabilities from cold war operations, including commitment of combat forces, to nationbuilding activities and military advisory functions.
(b) US nonmilitary capabilities, with and without a military component.
(c) The limitations and inappropriateness of US intervention or assistance, as well as capability and usefulness.

(6) Revision and updating. As the study proceeds, all previous products will be reviewed in light of subsequent work and revised as necessary, subject to time and resource limitations. Continuing check will be maintained on related research completed or in process elsewhere in or outside the Government.

(7) The study will be accomplished by a team from IAS, supported by the Carlisle Research Office (CRO) of Operations Research Incorporated (ORI).

(8) Requests for assistance by other CDC agencies will be submitted as required.

5. Administration.

a. Critical dates:

(1) Completion of part one (background and state of knowledge survey): December 1968.
(2) Completion of part two (preconflict stage): 1 September 1970.
(3) Completion of part three (conflict stage): To be determined.
(4) Completion of parts four and five (postconflict stage; Army roles, missions, and concepts): To be determined.
CDIAS-C  21 Nov 1969
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b. Coordination. Direct contact with other CDC commands and agencies is requested. Informal contact with the Army staff, Army agencies and commands, the Joint Staff, and government agencies will be in accordance with appropriate regulations and protocol.

c. Contract portions will be monitored closely by IAS.

6. Correlation. Study is assigned USACDC ACN 13525 and supports the following:

   a. Army Concept Program: Army 85

   b. Army Tasks:
      3. Low Intensity Conflict, Type I
      4. Low Intensity Conflict, Type II
      7. Complementing Allied Land Power

   c. Phase: Concept

   d. Functions:
      Intelligence
      Mobility
      Firepower
      Command, Control, and Communications
      Service Support

7. Recommend approval of this revised study plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
1. References
   Major, AGC
2. Assumptions
   Admin Officer
REFERENCES

National Intelligence Survey (U)
National Intelligence Estimate (U)
Special National Intelligence Estimates (U)
Economic Data Books, AID (U)
Program Memorandums, AID (U)
Area Handbooks, CRESS (U)
Country Plans, USIS (U)
The Army Master Study Plan 1968 (U)
ASD/HS Bibliographic Catalog (U)
Military Assistance Manual (HAM) (U)
Military Assistance Plans (U)
Survival of Military Assistance (U)
RAC Publications List (U)
RAND Publications Index (U)
Basic Army Strategic Estimate (U) (BASE) (Current)
Army Strategic Plan (U) (ASP)
The Army Force Development Plan (U) (AFDP)
The Army Strategic Capabilities Plan (U) (ASCP)
Joint Long Range Strategic Study (U) (JLRSS)
Army 85 Concept Study (U)
The Threat to Army 85 (U)

A Worldwide Integral National Strategy for 1970, Part II: Conflicts in the Lower Spectrum of War (U) WINS II

Inclosure 1
REFERENCES (Cont)

The Very Long Range Strategic Forecast 1980-90 (U)

Psychological Operations Role in Establishing a Sense of Nationhood (U)

Counterguerrilla Operations (U)

Inclosure 1

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ASSUMPTIONS*

1. The basic national purpose and long range goals of the United States will not change.

2. There is a high probability of continued low intensity conflict.

3. The US Army will be a major force in providing an element of national power for preconflict and low intensity conflict roles.

*The general assumptions listed above will be supplemented by assumptions peculiar to each discipline. These disciplinary assumptions will not negate the overall validity of the interdisciplinary research.

Inclosure 2
APPENDIX III (U)

GLOSSARY

Conflict--The spectrum of conflict extends from simple disagreement between two individuals, at one extreme, to strategic nuclear exchange between major world powers, at the other. Conflict may or may not include violence, and the terms are not synonymous.

Conflict avoidance--The use of activities and measures aimed at foreseeing and averting the outbreak of violence and controlling the level of conflict.

Conflict control--The use of activities to manage, limit the extent of, reduce the level of, or end low intensity conflict.

Demand aggregation--The process, carried out through a social institution, of combining several demands of segments of the society into a program of action that the social system is capable of implementing.

Demand articulation--The process of expressing the demands of members of the society in coherent form, usually through the medium of one of the social institutions.

Economic dualism--The condition in a society, usually underdeveloped, where two sharply differentiated economic subsystems coexist without much apparent interaction; for example, obsolete or unmechanized farming methods and technologically advanced commerce/industry coexisting in one society.

Extended family--Members of a large family unit, usually of three or more generations and often including collateral relatives, who have strong ties of loyalty and responsibility for mutual assistance, and who may live in close spatial relationship.

Frictional conflict--The level of conflict associated with peaceful change. The gap between demands on the social system and its outputs are resented by minor elements of the society, but strikes, picketing, demonstrations, riots, and crime are at a level that the normal forces of law and order can reasonably control.

Kinship system--A system that determines the relationships of members of a society, or portion of a society, by rules that govern descent, succession, inheritance, marriage, extramarital sex relations, and residence and also determines the status of individuals and groups based on their ties of consanguinity and marriage.
Outputs--Material and nonmaterial goods and services which result from the operations of the social system: personal services; maintenance of security and order and resolution of disputes; and allocation and distribution of benefits, communications, and symbolic and esthetic values. Outputs may or may not be responsive to the needs, desires, and grievances of the people.

Polarization--A state of affairs, usually political, in which two (or more) persons or groups adopt and adhere firmly to opposing ideas, beliefs, or principles. If the antithesis is so strong that it prevents reaching some agreement between the opposing factions or mediating a peaceful settlement, a heightened level of conflict and violence is likely to result.

Reference group--Any group by which an individual or another group measures or compares his (‘ts) present, past, or future status and satisfactions. The reference group may be the same group at another point in time, usually the past.

Relative deprivation--The awareness of an individual or group that it has a lower status or level of need-satisfaction, including significant rights and privileges, than its reference group. The major distinction between relative deprivation and objective deprivation is the term awareness. An objective deprivation is a deprivation that exists but is not perceived by the deprived; a relative deprivation exists only when members of the deprived group become aware of the deprivation.

Revolt--Organized effort(s) to change leaders or parts of the political system by illegal methods, including armed uprisings and coups d’etat.

Revolution--An organized struggle to change the entire political system in at least a part of the national territory.

Social change--Change resulting from adoption of a new norm of behavior or cultural element or from modification or discontinuance of existing social usage by members of a society. Such change may occur as a result of contact with other societies, through institutionally sanctioned innovation, or from the tensions and conflicts generated by the system.

Social institution--A significant and persistent set of recognized patterns of normative behavior or established forms of procedure through which a group of people carried out some function in the society.

Social mobility--The condition or frequency of moving up or down in social status.

Violence--An armed uprising against a constituted government or actions by governmental forces attempting to control or put down such an uprising, in which hostilities are above the level of rioting and below the level of civil war.
APPENDIX IV (C)

SUMMARY OF COUNTRY SUBSTUDIES (U)

Section I (U). Introduction

1. Background. A preliminary study was made to select several low intensity conflicts that appeared to be representative of the kind that might be expected to occur any time in the next 20 years. Relatively recent occurrences of such conflict in Colombia, Greece, Iran, Kenya, Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam were selected for indepth study. The years preceding the violence in each country were examined to determine the period during which "normalcy" had existed before the rise of the unrest that led to low intensity conflict. To limit the literature search to a reasonable timespan, a date late in the "normal" period was selected quite arbitrarily as the beginning of the preconflict period that would be analyzed. Reports of these country studies (except Malaya) were published between June 1969 and April 1970. Final publication for all will be completed before 15 March 1971.

2. Content. This appendix provides a summary of the analyses of factors which contributed to the buildup of tensions. Each country is examined in terms of the six major considerations (the categories) of the analytical model developed during the study.

Section II (C). Colombia (U)

3. (C) Setting. The preconflict period in Colombia began when the Liberal Party regained political power, after 36 years of Conservative Party administration, in the 1930 elections. It ended in 1948, when the assassination of Jorge Eleicer Gaitan precipitated riots in Bogota that left the heart of the city in ruins and spread violence throughout the country. Political infighting became very noticeable during the preconflict period, as some Liberal administrations attempted to accomplish needed social reforms, and Conservative and other Liberal administrations ignored them completely.

4. (C) Demand-output imbalances. Food production in Colombia tended to keep pace with the population growth during the period. However, little improvement in overall health was noted, because of widespread poor nutrition and sanitation. Food production lagged somewhat at the end of World War II. During the preconflict period, migration from rural to urban areas made many people aware of major imbalances between living standards in rural and urban areas and among socioeconomic groups in the cities. Larger numbers of people became more aware of marked inequalities in distribution of clothing, housing, and goods and services generally.
a. The growing demand of agricultural workers for their own land was met with passage of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1936. The 10-year administrative adjustment period was followed by a 5-year extension, however, and no real land reforms occurred during the period.

b. A growing rivalry between the police forces and the Army did much to hamper internal security in the rural areas. Political partisan warfare, habitual brigandage, and growing friction between the social classes increased until they were almost out of control. In some cases, the police and the Army were participants in the violence for political reasons.

c. The anxieties of both the rural and urban segments of the population were increased by disruption of traditional close family and community ties, mass communications, rural to urban migration, status strain induced by social movement, conflict between modern and traditional values, and confusion over the legal status of squatters.

d. As the masses became more politically aware, they began to discover that the system as a whole was less responsive to them than to the more favored socioeconomic groups. The elite appeared to be above the law, while lower classes were exploited by the same law. The dissatisfaction with this "traditional lot" concept began to grow following World War I both in the rural and urban areas.

5. (C) System effectiveness and capability. Inadequacies in the political system contributed to the frustrations of the lower socioeconomic groups. The inability of the bureaucracy to put policies and programs into being, coupled with vascillating policies of political leaders, raised and then dashed the hopes of the underprivileged. The broad reform program, publicized and partially instituted by President Lopez in the mid-1930's, was not continued by Santos, his successor, nor resumed by Lopez when he later returned to office. Through improved communications, the people became more politically aware and were subject to mass appeals, first of Lopez and later of Gaitan and Gomez. In addition, they found that there were no institutionalized channels through which they could articulate their new-found demands. The two political parties were controlled by members of the elite whose views were inflexible. A very strong spoils system assured that the bureaucrats came mostly from the elite, and that their loyalties were personal rather than public. Government personnel were interested in prestige or profit rather than public service.

a. Economic growth, especially in the industrial area, continued throughout this period, despite the worldwide depression. However, it was not rapid enough to absorb the large numbers who migrated to the urban areas, producing a frustrated group of unemployed and underemployed. Landless farmers, who had looked forward to owning their own...
land under the Agrarian Reform Law of 1936, found their goal blocked by the 10-year and then 5-year adjustment periods which gave owners of large landholdings extended time limits for obeying the law. Inflation, starting in 1940, added to the frustration.

b. The strong ties of kinship and loyalties that characterized Colombian families having common religious bonds tended to be stabilizing to a degree. However, such destabilizing social factors as monopolization of power and prestige, changing of traditional social structure, regional differences, and widespread poor health and malnutrition more than canceled out the stabilizing effects. Kinship and community loyalties inhibited development of loyalty to the nation, and a strong sense of regionalism, supported by regional subcultures, encouraged divisiveness. Discrimination against the less favored ethnic groups, and family disruption concomitant with migration to the urban areas promoted anxieties and frustration. The educational system was not expanding fast enough to meet the demands of the people, and many of those who completed at least an elementary education were not satisfied with the kind of jobs that were available.

c. The position of Colombia's Armed Forces had been weakened a few years prior to the assassination of Gaitan because of conservative political activity in the Army (ill-fated coup at Pasto, 1944) and the administration's emphasis on the national police. The weakness of the Armed Forces, and the manner of their deployment, prevented them from effectively supporting the police in providing internal security. The police force was reorganized by the conservatives in 1946 to purge it of Liberal Party members; it then became much feared by the general populace because of its use as a vehicle of political repression by the Conservatives.

d. There were no language barriers in Colombia, since all but a small number of isolated Indians spoke Spanish. Use of mass media increased during the preconflict period, and a moderately strong system of informal communications existed countrywide. Good communication is a two-edged sword, since it not only carries the Government's case to the people, but also permits more of them to hear the case of the dissidents. It also allows the people to become aware of better social and economic conditions elsewhere. The net effect in Colombia is that it was more stabilizing than destabilizing.

6. (C) Cultural factors. The development of civic responsibility was inhibited by cultural values stressing strong family and personal loyalties, geographic and ethnic differences, and a dominant upper class. Cooperation of groups against a common enemy, rather than for a positive constructive purpose, was the rule. The attitudes and values of the elite also were conducive to development of tensions within the society. The elite did not generally concern themselves with problems of public welfare; they were concerned with more abstract philosophical principles
or ideologies and not with problems of implementation. Individual honor and status were valued highly, but not negotiation or compromise. The values of lower social classes were influenced by those of the elite. The lower socioeconomic groups' suspicion of all strangers; the ideal of individualism, stressed by certain groups; and the general male belief in the ideal of physical aggressiveness (machismo)--all these produced a cultural base that supported violence as a way of life.

7. (C) **External influence.** Colombia's proximity to the Panama Canal and its Caribbean coast made it strategically important—especially to the United States—and thus attracted foreign interest to internal affairs.

   a. The US influence had some destabilizing effects. US democratic values conflicted with the Hispanic traditional acceptance of the authority of a charismatic leader. Most of Colombia's exports (primarily coffee) went to the United States, and any downturn in the US economy tended to be destabilizing. On the other hand, US investments in Colombia and extension of credit to the Government stimulated growth of public works and industry, all of which were stabilizing. However, the worldwide depression of the 1930's halted the flow of US investment capital and credit, created a relatively mild recession, and markedly reduced economic growth.

   b. Other foreign influences had destabilizing effects on Colombia. There was German and Spanish penetration before World War II, and Fascist values were taken up by the Conservative party and deepened the antipathies between the Conservatives and Liberals. The Liberal administration in Colombia declared war on the Axis in 1941. A Colombian Communist Party, formed in 1926, exerted its influence within labor unions and the radical section of the Liberal Party, but its influence was severely limited, since it was unable to develop mass support.

8. (C) **Internal influences.** Colombia's varied terrain, which includes high, rugged mountains, swamps, jungle, and forests, divided the country into natural regions with concomitant regional loyalties, inhibited communication and transportation, and provided safe havens for dissident groups. The heterogeneity of the population, made up of Spanish, Indian, and Negro elements in several combinations, permitted continuation in a milder form of the rigid racial discrimination practiced by the early Spanish conquerors. The high rate of migration to urban areas, primarily of individuals rather than families, produced insecurity and anxiety and brought about increased contact among the diverse groups.

9. (C) **Modulators.** The Colombian Communist Party was organized by nationals trained in the USSR and operated as a legal party. The party had some early success; however, concentration on labor unions
and segments of the urban population never produced the mass support required. Its contribution to the intensification of conflict was considered small. The heightening of tensions within the society was caused primarily by polarization of the Conservatives and Liberals. Charismatic leaders of each party played on the traditional divisions within the society and waged vitriolic and sometimes violent political campaigns. Strong emotional attachments to one or the other, machismo, and coercion of Liberals by the politically oriented police were factors in the widespread violence. Upon Gaitan's assassination, the severe tensions built up over a period of time were loosed in Bogota and spilled over to the countryside. The assassination apparently was the act of a deranged individual, but it was responsive to the temper of the time.

Section III (C). Greece (U)

10. (C) Setting. The preconflict period in Greece began in 1923 with the defeat of Greek military forces in Turkey after World War I and the political and social turbulence that followed. It ended in 1946 with a second eruption of violent conflict between Greek Government forces and the Communist-dominated resistance group of World War II. The factors underlying both conflicts were essentially the same, the period between 1945 and 1946 contributing to, rather than lessening, previous tensions.

11. (C) Demand-output imbalances. The average Greek's material wants were modest. However, even before World War II, the depression-induced drop in living standards for the masses brought deprivations, especially in northern Greece, manifested in Communist-encouraged labor union activity and the Salonika general strike of 1936. World War II brought actual famines (over 300,000 persons died of starvation); there was vast destruction of homes; numbers of whole villages were wiped out. Deprivation was thus extreme, and postwar recovery was slow and visibly benefited the few more than the many.

a. World War II was a time of widespread terror and reprisal by occupying enemy forces and freedom fighters. After liberation, terror and reprisal continued to characterize action by both sides of the political struggle, with strongly adverse and widespread effects on physical security and order. Psychological security, also, was adversely affected, although the strength of family bonds mitigated the impact of continuing fear and uncertainty.

b. Loss of personal and group freedom under the Metaxas dictatorship and enemy occupation was a major source of deprivation. Numbers of the rising middle class were especially frustrated at their inability to reach positions of control held by the elite oligarchy. The relative immunity of wartime collaborators after World War II aggravated these emotions. Feelings of resentment were caused by unequal
distribution of material benefits between elite and mass, city and country. An additional, though less significant, frustration was caused by the red tape, delay, and expense involved in litigation.

12. (C) System effectiveness and capability. There was no lack of opportunity for Greeks to express their demands through both formal and informal channels until 1936. Thereafter, dictatorship and war inhibited demand articulation. However, the principal problem was in aggregation of demands into projects that could be effectively carried out. This process was made extremely difficult by factionalism, unwillingness to compromise, the superficial nature of Greek political parties and parliamentary process, and lack of civic responsibility. Elections by proportional representation in the early 1930's aggravated these shortcomings.

a. Greece had a tradition of concentrating on national expansion rather than domestic development, which caused its leaders to look outward rather than to internal problems. Other more subtle factors also inhibited strong leadership, especially in the period after World War II. Greek self-confidence and faith in improvisation inhibited planning. Unrealistic attitudes and desire for family or group advantage took precedence over objectivity and pragmatism. Foreign ideas and ways were not adapted to accord with Greek requirements. There was insufficient elite perception of and response to popular needs. Strong and capable leaders were lacking at critical times—in 1935-36 and again in 1945-46—because of personal rivalries of, and complete domination by, individual personalities (Venizelos and Metaxas), who refused to permit emergence of new leaders. The Greek Government-in-Exile was either unwilling or unable to control the liberation movement in occupied Greece during World War II, and left the initiative to individual Greek leaders, the Communists, and the British, thus allowing the Liberation Front to establish a rival power position. The conservative leadership after the war reverted to traditional patterns of factional rivalry.

b. Like those of other developing countries, the Greek Government was handicapped by constant changes of top personnel, overcentralization, legalization, red tape, and civil service lethargy and timidity, with the consequent creation of numbers of special autonomous agencies to accomplish specific tasks. Nevertheless, the civil service was the best in eastern Europe until World War II, when it became seriously overstuffed, overladen with senior personnel, and tainted with collaborationism. It was thus at a low ebb of effectiveness after the war, when its tasks were greatest.

c. The crisis in Greece after World War II highlighted the bankruptcy of the old informal system of elite oligarchy and patron politics, which had underlain the outward trappings of Western democracy throughout Greek history and had largely survived the reforms of Venizelos and the Military League in 1909. Moreover the monarchy and admin-
Administration had little real popular support or participation—because of the lack of acceptance of the monarchy, the pull of family and parochial loyalties, and resultant lack of civic responsibility.

d. In the postwar crisis, economic planning was obstructed by the laissez-faire tradition and by politicking; priority, moreover, was given to rapid increase in living standards to the detriment of production growth. The economy was mismanaged by occupation authorities during World War II, causing extreme hyperinflation, aggravated hardships, shortages, and inequities. Other economic problems included inefficient agricultural methods, a surplus of farm labor, the destabilizing effects of industrialization, unemployment, heavy dependence on foreign trade, and the burden of paying off the heavy Government debt.

e. Education was destabilizing in failing to prepare either the elite or the masses for contemporary realities and in raising expectations of lower classes for upward movement. Strong family loyalties, which survived throughout the period, were a major basis of personal security, but also were destabilizing in that they hindered growth of civic responsibility. Had the Government been better run, it probably would have received more support. Religion, as a national symbol and force for unity, also was a stabilizing factor.

f. The security forces were weak in the critical postwar period. The police were aligned with the conservatives and suffered, despite changes of personnel, from the collaborationist image of wartime. The Armed Forces were weak as a result of defeat by the Germans and subsequent purges. These forces were hardly a match for the Communist-directed liberation army, which had directed much of its attention, even during the German occupation, to suppressing rival forces and achieving control of Greek territory.

g. Differences between the official language and the demotic Greek spoken by the masses inhibited mutual understanding. Formal and informal communication channels were nonetheless good. Since they not only facilitated the spread of information and awareness, but also the spread of criticism and rumor, their effect on conflict was ambivalent, but more stabilizing than destabilizing.

13. (C) Cultural factors. A substantial part of the populace had no positive feeling toward the monarchy or the State; there was no real tradition of acceptance of either. Confusion and insecurity after World War II drove many people to turn to the monarchy as a reaction to Communist excesses rather than from real enthusiasm for it. Greeks lacked any strong sense of commitment or duty to the national community (except against outside enemies), notwithstanding their pride of ethnic identity. Family and faction took precedence, and obedience to law was not valued. Since support for the Government was weak, its capability also was weak. Greek culture put relatively low value on cooperation and compromise.
among groups, although it put great stress on cooperation within the family or group. Assertion of separate group demands, vigorous inter-group competition, and suspicion, rather than negotiation and compromise, were characteristic of political and social life.

14. (C) External influences. British support for Greece was an established tradition since formation of the Greek state in 1829. Throughout the preconflict period, the United Kingdom continued to have considerable strong influence on political affairs because of its power and interest in the Mediterranean and historical affinities. The British role counterbalanced growing German political and economic influence in the 1930's, but it drew ambivalent reaction from the Greeks. British support for King George II and for the conservative Government-in-Exile during World War II, together with British military intervention in 1944, stirred up growing nationalist tendencies and evoked considerable anti-British feeling among liberal forces. This negative influence was partially offset by British support for resistance forces of both liberal and conservative persuasion through the war years and by efforts to restore and preserve order through dialogue and negotiation. Nazi and Fascist ideas contributed to the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936 and to its ideology and techniques, which became increasingly onerous for the freedom-loving Greek people. Communist ideology also influenced some intellectuals and workers. Neither ideology, however, had widespread mass appeal.

a. Greece had long borrowed heavily from Europe to finance its large military establishment. In consequence, a measure of foreign control of economic matters, both formal and informal, persisted until World War II. In addition, foreign firms were active in construction, utilities, and tobacco processing. Most important, Greece was heavily dependent on foreign trade and invisibles (shipping and remittances) and thus highly sensitive to international economic trends—notably the depression of the thirties.

b. The elite of Greece were strongly attracted to western European society and customs, at the expense of their concern for internal problems. The general public did not share this view; yet foreign influences in education may have contributed to unrealistic increases in expectations among both the elite and the masses. On the other hand, modest and well-directed foreign public health efforts, especially in northern Greece, probably were a stabilizing influence.

c. Several military coups d'etat took place after the 1923 defeat of Greek forces by the Turks, and Army officers maintained a prominent role in politics, which contributed to political instability. The decisive victory over Italian forces early in World War II and the subsequent defeat by overwhelming German forces in 1941 established a habit of resistance and violence among the Greeks. The German occupation forced the Government into exile under British protection from 1941.
to 1944, and it had only two brigades to back up its authority when it returned to Greece. British military support and assistance before and during World War II probably was more stabilizing (it afforded security) than it was destabilizing (it favored the conservative royalists). On the other hand, British military intervention after liberation, however necessary it may have been under the circumstances, was destabilizing. Constant Balkan rivalries were a factor in maintenance of the disproportionately large military establishment despite its drain on national resources; after World War II, the military establishment remained large primarily because of the threat from the Communist-dominated and -assisted resistance forces and the perceived threat from Greece's old Balkan enemies which now were Communist satellites of the USSR.

15. (C) Internal influences. Greece's location on the Mediterranean Sea made it important to the interests of the United Kingdom because of the water link with India and the Soviet threat through the nearby Dardanelles. Internally, the rugged terrain divided the country into regions and fostered distinctions between the poor hill dwellers and the more prosperous plains dwellers.

a. The influx of nearly a million refugees from Asia Minor in 1923-27 added both skills and demands to Greek society. The newcomers generally were more sophisticated than the native-born Greeks. Many settled in the former Turkish region in northern Greece, but, although they developed liberal and Venizelist sentiments, the administration treated them like a colony. Many, placed in tobacco processing plants, were particularly hard-hit by the depression of the 1930's. In addition, the natural growth of population crowded the available arable land, causing both economic and social tensions; it also increased the number of people in their productive and restless years.

b. Public health measures, scant as they were, contributed materially to the habitability of northern Greece, and their interruption in World War II caused an increase in disease that added to the war's extreme deprivations (although the effect on attitudes has not been determined).

16. (C) Modulators. The principal intensifier of conflict in Greece was the tightly-organized Communist Party with its trained and disciplined cadre. This group was able to unite and control the various forces in Greece which were opposed both to the enemy and to the traditional conservative Greek oligarchy, and to lead the struggle to take over political control. During World War II, its efforts were reinforced by access to the arms of the surrendered Italian forces. After World War II, it was aided by new neighboring Communist countries. Other factors intensifying conflict were

a. the convergence of many Greek political and social differences into one great schism between the conservatives, who rallied
behind the monarchy, and the liberals, many of whom rallied to the Communist-dominated resistance;

b. external influences of the Soviets, the Germans, and the British, although the British efforts toward mediation also had a dampening effect;

c. a history of recourse to violence to redress wrongs, especially the traumatic World War II occupation period; and

d. Greek military and security weakness at the critical time following liberation.

Section IV (C). Iran (U)

17. (C) Setting. The preconflict period in Iran began in 1923, when Riza Khan became Prime Minister, and ended in 1951 at the start of the dissidence that arose over oil nationalization and culminated with Prime Minister Mossadegh's ouster in 1953. Riza Khan changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran after he became Shah, and initiated modernization programs while continuing his authoritarian rule. He abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, in 1941, and the latter attempted to rule as a constitutional monarch through the Majlis (National Assembly).

18. (C) Demand-output imbalances. The wartime occupation by the British and Soviets and later the Americans led to popular acknowledgment of the Government's inability to offer either physical or psychological security to its people. Inequitable distribution of food, clothing, and other basic necessities (which was especially apparent in the urban areas) gave rise to considerable frustration. Similar inequities existed between regions. The vast bulk of the people, poor and sparsely distributed in the rural areas, possessed no political consciousness and remained more or less untouched by these inequities. However, the great upsurge in urbanization was creating an increasingly large group, that was aware of inequities, hated foreign interference, and was frustrated in its desire for justice and national status. This chain of frustration culminated in the extreme and fanatic nationalist sentiments that Mossadegh played on, as a Majlis deputy and chairman of the Majlis oil committee, in his drive to nationalize the oil industry in the late 1940's and 1950.

19. (C) System effectiveness and capability. The inadequacies of the political system to deal with the complex problems developing in the country are well-documented: both preconflict periods. The World War II occupation by the Allies and their insistence on Riza Shah's abdication removed his strong governing hand and left the Army and the administration badly shaken. With morale destroyed and political and social
progress arrested, the Government, under its new Shah, was ill-equipped to deal with the growing problems caused by modernization and urbanization, increased nationalist sentiment, and foreign encroachments.

a. Economic dislocations caused by the war were severe and further complicated the national problems of economic underdevelopment and an unintegrated economy. Government plans and policies either did not exist or were woefully inadequate for the immense problems. During the occupation, new wealth accrued to the emerging class of entrepreneurs while the bulk of the people suffered from severe inflation and dislocation. Mass urban awareness of these inequities was a substantial generator of frustration and anger. After 1945, Government inability to get the economy moving again intensified these frustrations. In addition, the growing emotional anti-Western nationalism, arising from indignation over foreign occupation, culminated in the popular belief that Iranian economic problems were caused by foreign exploitation. This nationalist sentiment was focused on the British oil interests and erupted into violence when encouraged by Mossadeq for his political advantage.

b. The social system, particularly the patterns of family and community structures, acted as a stabilizing factor during both preconflict periods. Islam, however, provided both rationale and justification for extreme outbursts of religious fanaticism for "righteous" causes and acted as a major intensifier of violence in 1951-53. The educational system, by producing more ambitious intellectuals than the social system could absorb effectively, promoted the growth of discontent and alienation.

c. The security forces were generally disliked, especially during the 1930's. Many of the military officers had been trained in foreign countries and, as a result, were pro-British, pro-German, or pro-Soviet. Significant rivalry and antagonism existed among the Police, Gendarmerie, and Armed Forces; and corruption was widespread, especially during the war. Military security varied widely after the war. Mohammed Riza Shah built a strong and coherent military force, and the Army's success in putting down the separatist movement in 1946 reestablished the stature of the military forces with the public. Throughout the period, the continuing loyalty of the military to the throne was the most powerful dampener of pressures leading toward conflict. Although the Armed Forces never were particularly popular with the people (because of their use to impose social reforms and to subdue dissident tribes and groups), they were the major element of Riza Shah's political power and were respected by the people because of their strength, discipline, and effectiveness. In spite of obvious abuses of position by some greedy officers, the Army remained a coherent unit, was a deterrent to insurgency, and was the single most stabilizing factor in the country.

d. Language barriers between the ethnic Persians and the tribal groups may have contributed to development of separatism. A pervasive
set of informal communication channels existed within the Persian culture which probably acted to mitigate the rigidities of communications among formal political and social groupings and to reduce conflict potential. The relative lack of mass media in the rural areas inhibited the spread of new demands and was a stabilizing factor.

20. (C) Cultural factors. Iranians have a strong sense of history and national heritage and value their religion and past glories highly. They also have an inherent xenophobia, based at least partially on a tendency to consider all nonfollowers of Islam to be infidels.

a. Frustration over national weakness and lack of international prestige was a principal motivating force behind the growing nationalism of the preconflict period. Iranians also have a tendency toward acceptance of authoritarianism, individualism, and expediency which militates against rash and dangerous acts to advance a specific ideology. They resort to violence only when the traditional systems of maintaining authority have disintegrated or when the authority itself calls for violence by appeal to religious sanctions.

b. In the period before establishment of independent governments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, the power of the throne had been weakened, and its symbols of authority—the Army and the Government administration—were inadequate, but the majority of the people made no effort to change the situation. In the period following elimination of the separatist government, Mossadeq appealed to the people's emotions and, as a charismatic leader, was able to generate and sustain a wave of violence. Although the actual power of the Shah varied during the 48 years of the preconflict period, the tradition of the Shahanshah generally was respected and served as a unifying factor among all Iranians except alienated intellectuals.

21. (C) External influences. The principal external factor was the geopolitical position of the country, which promoted great-power interests and rivalry. Because of Iran's proximity to the Soviet Union, the latter saw Iran as a potential enemy passage into the Soviet heartland and viewed control of Iran or its Government as a way to acquire a warm water port on the Persian Gulf. Iran's common border with India (now Pakistan) made the British view it as a potential Soviet passage not only to the Gulf but also to India and the Far East. Iran's location gave it strategic importance to the Allies during the war as a relay point for lend-lease supplies and equipment on their way to the Soviet Union.

a. Soviet occupation of northwestern Iran during the war gave the USSR the opportunity to exploit separatist desires and to encourage the Iranian Communist Party to establish independent States in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan under Soviet military protection. After the Prime Minister persuaded the USSR to withdraw its forces and subsequently sent in
the Iranian Army to put down the independent governments in 1946, the Soviets still could work to exploit the Government's weaknesses through the (by then) Communist-controlled Tudeh Party.

b. British investment interests had the concession for exploitation of Iran's oil resources. It was the rise of popular nationalist sentiment over unsuccessful efforts to renegotiate the concession terms and Soviet insistence that it be granted oil concessions in the northwest that enabled Mossadeq to nationalize the industry in 1951. British economic reprisals that prevented Iran from marketing its oil in a glutted world market were used by Mossadeq to keep anti-British feelings high during his attempt to take over the country in 1953.

c. Allied occupation of Iran during the war demoralized the Army, weakened the political system, and stimulated the pace of both modernization and urbanization. Soviet influence was a principal factor in the 1945 separatist movement in the northwest, and British control of the oil industry and influence on the government of southwest Iran laid the foundation for the violent nationalism of the late 1940's and early 1950's. US passivity and apparent lack of interest during the occupation years encouraged Soviet postwar aggressiveness, but it also prevented the Iranians from suspecting the United States of entertaining any ulterior motives when it offered military aid in 1947. It was this offer that gave the Majlis the backing it needed to reject the proposed Soviet oil concessions later that year.

22. (C) Internal influences. The rugged terrain, almost impassible by surface means in many parts of the country, divides Iran into semi-autonomous regions. The topography plus extreme differences between urban and rural living standards enforced separatist sentiment and handicapped the Government in its efforts to exercise countrywide control. The presence of valuable oil and mineral resources and the geographic location of the country stimulated great power rivalry for influence in the Government. The country's basically agrarian economy was adversely affected by the necessity to let approximately two-thirds of the cultivable land lie fallow annually because of an inadequate water supply and by the fluctuations in crop production caused by droughts and floods. Tribal beliefs and hierarchies that controlled nearly half the population increased the potential for regional dissidence and separatism at the same time that it retarded the spread of dissidence.

23. (C) Modulators. The presence of the Iranian Communist Party, under its own banner and later as the Tudeh Party, was a persistent danger to the Government and the traditional social system. Originally composed of rightists, liberals, and left-wing politicians, the party came under Communist control during the war and emerged as the only party with a real program. Organization and leadership were developed along classical Communist lines, and its leaders were careful to con-
ceal its Communist ties. The only modern mass-based party, it offered a particular challenge to the Shah after the war and was a conflict intensifier.

a. Separatist elements and the Iranian Communist Party (which changed its name to Tudeh in the northwestern Provinces) had the benefit of Soviet guidance and training in insurgency practices. During the revolt, they had access to arms directly from the occupying Soviet Army and were backed by that Army's presence. After the Government put down the movement in 1946, the party never was able to reestablish an armed force or to regain access to arms. These inabilities and the further inability to infiltrate the Iranian Armed Forces eliminated the party as a significant influence on the situation by the time Mossadeq attempted to depose the Shah.

b. Almost complete nonexistence of sanitation facilities, an expensive and usually contaminated water supply, and insufficient protein in the diet were conflict intensifiers insofar as they created awareness of deprivation, and dampeners insofar as they contributed to lethargy and disinterest in attempting to change the status quo.

c. Mossadeq's demagoguery served to focus religious fanaticism, traditional mob action, and all the various frustrations of the underemployed and unemployed urban masses into anti-British sentiment. His demagogic activities and his use of the British as a whipping boy were conflict intensifiers.

Section V (C). Kenya (U)

24. (C) Setting. The preconflict period in Kenya began in the early 1920's, when immigration of European settlers increased and tribesmen started demanding political participation for the blacks and restitution of their alienated lands. It ended in 1951 when Kikuyu tribesmen started using terrorist tactics against blacks who were reluctant to join their subversion movement against the white settlers. This group came to be known as Mau Mau and spread violence throughout the colony within a year.

25. (C) Demand-output imbalances. A sense of loss of tribal status and value was particularly acute among the Kikuyu. The progressive depreciation of tribal culture had caused many Kikuyus to lose their psychological security. The loss of traditional sense of community and social constraints had led to high rates of both criminal and self-destructive behavior.

a. Increased population pressures were causing a decline in living standards and shortages of food and housing in the rural reserve areas, which made it increasingly necessary for blacks to work on the
white-owned farms or seek their fortunes in the city, divorced from
traditional systems of tribal support.

b. The Kikuyu grew increasingly aware of their inferiority
in status and living standards, while Europeans continued to assert
their racial superiority. Even such channels of upward mobility as
commercial or clerical positions were barred to blacks because of the
Indian minority which largely monopolized such jobs.

c. The responsiveness of the social system to these conditions
was poor. The colonial administration faced conflicting pressures from
London and the white population. The presence of an organized Indian
population with a monopoly on petty trade and commerce seemed to the
colonists to be a more immediately pressing problem until the 1930's.
European settler pressures, shortages of funds, and failure to perceive
the imbalances in their true light all inhibited official action.

26. (C) System effectiveness and capability. Demand articulation
and aggregation lagged badly behind the growing requirements of the
black people. Their participation in the political processes of the
colony came only late in the preconflict period, and even then it was
kept at an insignificant and grossly unrepresentative level. The grow-
ing body of black leaders, both radical and conservative, were forced
to operate almost entirely outside the colony's real governing system.
In addition, the system operated primarily in the interests of the
white colonists rather than of the vast majority of black natives.

a. Similarly, the economics of the colony were governed by
the needs of the colonists. The imposition of taxes and other require-
ments which forced blacks off the land and into the labor market for
the colonists' farms and other enterprises was onerous to the indigenous
tribes, but particularly to the Kikuyus.

b. The traditional socialization process among the African
tribes was very intense; the totality of life was dictated by family,
clan, and age-group responsibilities. The breakdown of this system
without any satisfactory substitute was the overwhelming social charac-
teristic in the latter part of the preconflict period.

c. The Government service of Kenya, including the security
forces, was basically honest and effective; but its capability was limited,
particularly after World War II, by shortages of funds and personnel
and by the failure of top levels to respond to recommendations from men
closer to the people. The white settlers received a disproportionate
share of attention and benefits.

d. The differing languages and mutual animosity among the many
African tribes hindered communications in Kenya. In addition, there was
a broad communications and culture gap between blacks and whites. Kenya

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still had only a rudimentary sense of nationhood by 1951, except for the white settlers' conception of it. In the Mau Mau period, nationalism in Kenya still translated itself primarily into the aspiration for tribal reconstruction and freedom from the European administration.

27. (C) Cultural factors. Prior to establishment of the colony, the tribe was the principal source of security, and violence was regarded as a legitimate expression of individual or group strength. As tribal strength and authority began to break down, no national institutions were available to substitute for them. There was no popular acceptance of the Government, and institutional cooperation rarely extended beyond the indigenous African's external family and local clan or ridge system. No national tradition or symbols existed. Religion and magic were inextricable from tribal custom, family association, and Government. The introduction of Christian missions soon had an immense impact on blacks, for it offered education and access to the Europeans' "magic," but at the expense of depreciating the total traditional culture. The rise of independent tribal churches, the creation of independent schools, and the reduced influence of the Christian missions resulted from the rejection of the price demanded by the missions to achieve "civilization."

28. (C) External influences. The penetration of European (especially British) liberal ideas, the concept of nationalism, and the worldwide rise of desire of Asian and African colonies for independence had profound impact in Kenya. Many black Kenyans served in the British Armed Forces during World War II. They learned of the wealth and progress in other countries, discovered they shared anticolonialist sentiment with many other Africans and Asians, and lost much of their awe of the European, his weapons, and his seeming cultural superiority.

a. British liberal ideas and the feeling of responsibility for African welfare conflicted increasingly with the older sense of empire and with white settlers' interests. The resulting policy dichotomies inhibited effective administration, especially after the British loss of power and prestige following the war. The economic life of Kenya was controlled from Britain and dominated almost entirely by the interests of the colonists. The worldwide depression affected the Kenyan economy adversely and curtailed such economic development as had occurred.

b. Foreign religious influence through the Christian missions was particularly intense among the Kikuyu. The missions offered education, and the perceptive Kikuyu were among the first to recognize the opportunity to acquire the powers of the colonists. The desire for education never abated; but missionary attempts to abolish basic Kikuyu customs created hostility, threatened the tribal cultural fabric, and led to establishment of independent Kikuyu churches and schools.
29. (C) Internal influences. The geography and ecology of Kenya were major factors in the development of conflict. The black population had suffered severe depletion from disease immediately prior to the first European contact. The early Europeans saw fertile land with temperate climate, seemingly neither owned nor occupied. However, as the black people recovered and increased in number, the tribes found their access to land blocked by colonists who had settled vast tracts in the highlands. Unable to endure the heat and disease of the lower altitudes, confined to land incapable of supporting the growing population with traditional means of agriculture, the blacks and especially the Kikuyus were rapidly overpopulating the land they did hold. The relative deprivation in landholdings was a principal contributor to Kikuyu frustration and a major issue of the Mau Mau.

30. (C) Modulators. The impact of European presence was particularly strong among the Kikuyu. They began to seek redress for grievances by political association and petition to the Colonial authorities in the early 1920's. The Kikuyu Central Association was the first political expression of Kikuyu grievance. Although it appeared to have been replaced after World War II by the new Kenya African Union, the original KCA members formed the inner cadre of KAU and the leadership of the subversive movement which became known as Mau Mau. The independent churches and schools also became expressions of political dissidence and training grounds for KAU adherents. The trade union movement was similarly caught up in the new movements; many of its leaders also operated in the inner circle of KAU.

a. Organization for subversion was generally poor; there was practically no tight central direction, and each locality operated more or less autonomously. This limited the magnitude of the Mau Mau coordinated threat but made the organization most difficult to eradicate.

b. Kenyatta offered charisma to the movement, but he was unable to control its trend toward open conflict, even though it had no real military arm before the state of emergency was declared. Mau Mau remained primarily a Kikuyu movement, although other tribes were represented in it. The preponderance of Mau Mau violence was directed at Kikuyus who were reluctant to join or cooperate with the movement. Mau Mau had practically no access to arms, and no source of external support was available.

Section VI (C). Malaya (U)

31. (C) Setting. The preconflict period in Malaya began in 1930, a year of stress between the British administration and the Chinese community, and ended in 1948 after Communist insurgency reached a level that caused the British to declare a state of emergency in July.
32. (C) Demand-output imbalances. Malaya as a whole enjoyed the highest per capita income in Asia throughout the preconflict period. However, living conditions were very poor for many of the Chinese who worked the tin mines, even in prosperous years, and the depression years saw unemployment and reduced wages. While conditions, even at their worst, may have been better for many Chinese than in their homeland, they contrasted with the vastly better conditions of both the Europeans and the well-to-do Chinese in Malaya. Moreover, the fluctuation in living standards could be perceived as being caused by the European and Chinese entrepreneurs and their effect on the economy. Conditions were hardest for the Hakka and Hainan minorities among the Chinese, who made up a disproportionate share of the Communists and guerrillas. World War II brought severe shortages which, like those of the depression, caused the greatest deprivation to the Chinese. The shortages continued after the war. The Malaya, mostly living in their traditional agrarian economy, were less affected by depression and war. The Indians were more transient and had a measure of protection because of Indian Government interest.

a. Until the war, physical security and order were generally well maintained by the British administration; the Chinese community largely policed itself. The Japanese occupation brought extortion and terror, particularly for the Chinese. It also aroused antipathies between Malays and Chinese, particularly because of the Japanese use of the Malay police against the Chinese. After the war, restoration of order was slow, and the Communist guerrillas were the only effective force in many areas for a time. Thousands of Chinese, displaced by the Japanese into marginal agricultural settlements on the edge of the jungle, were effectively separated from Government protection and authority. The gradual erosion of traditional customs and institutions among the Chinese had contributed to psychological insecurity even before the war; the prospect of returning to China had disappeared with the Japanese invasion of the 1930's; and war in Malaya added physical as well as psychological insecurity. The Malay and Indian communities were far less affected by these trends.

b. There was little national awareness among the people of Malaya before the war, but restiveness under subordination to British authority was beginning to emerge. Each of the three ethnic groups kept largely to itself and discriminated against the others in employment. There was no serious friction among groups, until the war, nationalism, and decline of British power led to antipathy and political rivalry, particularly between Chinese and Malays. These factors were brought to a head by the British-sponsored but short-lived Malayan Union of 1946, which both reaffirmed British domination and caused Malay fears of Chinese political control. Communal rivalry and hostility, already engendered by the wartime experience, increased rapidly thereafter.
c. Traditional inequalities in Malaya were reinforced by economic development, which brought wealth to Chinese and some Indian businessmen as well as to resident Europeans. The Malay Sultans' traditional pomp and luxury were supported by the British administration. At the same time, conditions for workers in mines, plantations, and cities were comparable to those in Europe in the early industrial revolution. The average Chinese income was significantly higher than that of the Indians and four times as much as that of the Malays. The effects of these inequities were dampened for many years by separation of the communities, by Malay cultural accommodation to class differences, by the relatively open class structure among the Chinese, and by comparison with worse conditions in other countries. Changing circumstances during and after the war, together with Communist influence, focused increasing attention on the differences and challenged their legitimacy.

33. (C) System effectiveness and capability. The British administration of Malaya was honest and effective, as far as it went, but was concerned primarily with improving commerce rather than social welfare. It took the enduring supremacy and power of British rule for granted, and did not seek to unify Malaya as a nation until after British power and prestige were lowered by the defeat of 1941. In consequence, the three ethnic communities thereafter were rivals for political power, without a history of multiracial cooperation. Moreover, the entire Chinese community had been allowed largely to control its own affairs, its quasi-political associations constituting almost a government within a government; the Malays had been encouraged to continue in their traditional feudal ways; the Indians looked to the Government of India to safeguard their interests. Only the British-dominated administrative machinery approached national scope, and it, too, was split into separate elements until 1946.

a. Until World War II, the British relied primarily on their district officers as channels for expression of popular demands, supplemented by the advice of the Malay Sultans. As the administration grew in size and complexity, these officers became more desk-bound and insulated from the public. Relations with the Chinese community were maintained through special Chinese-speaking officers, but these officers' special powers reverted in 1932 to the district officers, few of whom spoke Chinese. There were legislative councils at all governmental levels; but their powers were limited, most of their members were nominated or were members because of their Government positions, and they had few Chinese and Indian members. Moreover, the British pro-Malay policy, which persisted in fact after abandonment in principle, caused inadequate attention to be given to the demands and grievances of the growing Chinese community even after the war.

b. Institutions for aggregating popular demands were very weak, and none of them crossed ethnic lines until 1946. There were no political parties prior to World War II, except the outlawed
Communist Party and the circumscribed Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party), both of which were anti-British. Various associations existed, most of them Chinese, but without great political influence. An illustration of the isolation of the British administration from the people was the short-lived Malayan Union, launched shortly after World War II, which aroused such opposition that it had to be drastically modified.

c. Prewar leadership and policy was formulated by a British elite and tempered by civil servants, long resident in Malaya, who were trained thoroughly for their roles. This effective administration, backed by a large internal civil service, was interrupted by the Japanese occupation and reestablished slowly after the war, while new demands and new voices accumulated rapidly after 1945. British officials after the war failed to coopt the popular leaders or to respond to mass demands. Official policy objectives of equal treatment of all communities, of rapid economic recovery, and of legal efficient government were not pursued energetically. No official leaders emerged until Governor Macdonald; leadership was similarly lacking among the three major ethnic communities. The British Colonial Office provided vacillating direction because of UK political charges.

d. The 1942-44 Japanese administration was a travesty of the British one, characterized by autocratic high-handedness, political and economic mismanagement, favoring of the Malays, persecution of the Chinese, and the use of Malay officials and police to advance Japanese ends, which created a collaboration issue as well as promoting rivalry and hostility between Malays and Chinese.

e. The political system of Malaya, even before the war, was an anachronism made possible by continued if fluctuating prosperity, by British power, and by the still partially transient character of the Chinese and Indian communities, with their ties to their respective homelands. Despite the changes brought by the war, British interests called for postwar revival of the prewar system of social and economic plurality and laissez-faire. Thus, little real political development took place; postwar mass movements and currents of change were resisted. This lack of system flexibility continued beyond the emergency.

f. The prewar predominance of private investment and production in tin and rubber was highly effective in earning for Britain a needed foreign exchange; revival of these exports ranked highest among postwar priorities, with the reequipment of Singapore as seaport and processor for the entire region ranked immediately thereafter. These recovery policies were successful in the cities, but they did not create rapid growth in employment to match the postwar needs. Official emphasis on monetary stability and other prewar British policies had exaggerated the effects in Malaya of international economic swings. They also led to post-1945 deflation, a slowly recovering economy dependent on export markets, and low public investment in needed utilities and infrastructure.
damaged during the war. British laissez-faire policies tended to increase, rather than decrease, disparities in income among members and groups of the population. European incomes averaged five times those of Chinese in 1947; Indian incomes were less than Chinese, and the Malay average was twice as high as the Chinese. There were enormous differences in income levels and living standards within the Chinese community.

The prewar British land policy reserving most farm lands for Malay use was ignored during wartime by many Chinese; after 1945 the British failed either to evict these squatters or to recognize them. Official postwar action to import Thai rice, together with a rationing program, encouraged much smuggling; at the same time, the rice crops of northern Malaya lacked adequate price supports and transport. The prewar concentration of industry within Singapore and Georgetown (Penang) was rapidly revived, since these cities had the best electric power and public security. This natural preference, however, kept recovery benefits narrowly distributed and helped to attract additional rural people to the overcrowded cities. Local labor surpluses created during wartime were eased very slowly; many Chinese squatters lived close to tin mining districts and waited for employment.

Malaya's largely unregulated domestic and external trading patterns provided a major source for growth and for Government revenues; after the war, however, the old patterns could not be rapidly established. The governments found their export-tax revenues greatly reduced until 1950; trade moved slowly, and benefits were heavily concentrated in European commercial hands and in the cities. The fragmented Malayan administrations were unable to take effective economic recovery actions or plans. Since private initiative was vital, the energetic Chinese community appeared to benefit excessively from scarcities, wartime debts, and extralegal activities; resentments even led to Malay-Chinese rioting.

34. (C) Cultural factors. The institutions of family and community were strongly stabilizing in both Malay and Chinese communities and were strong enough to survive World War II, although there was some erosion in traditional practices among the Chinese.

Before the war, the Malays had essentially a two-class system, divided by birth, and the Chinese had an open class structure, with status determined largely by wealth. Cultural conditioning led most Malays to disdain manual or routine labor, whereas the Chinese were ever ready to sacrifice time and energy for economic advancement. The urban middle class was accordingly heavily Chinese in composition. The three non-European communities remained so distinct and separate in employment, urbanization, social customs, and habits that Malaya has been termed the model of a plural society.
b. The school system in Malaya served to encourage separation of the three major ethnic communities, failed to inculcate any real sense of nationhood, and, in the case of the Chinese, preserved ties with the homeland and served as a channel for anti-British and dissident sentiment. A minority of eligible children attended school in any of the ethnic groups, although desire for modern education and consequent attendance was highest among the Chinese. Lack of a common language other than English—learned only by a small minority—prevented effective intercommunity communication.

c. The British administration undertook effective measures to control major diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis; the Japanese did not continue these measures, and the resulting illnesses may have reinforced wartime deprivations. Health and nutrition in the large cities and the tin mines was poor, but there is no evidence that these conditions contributed to conflict.

d. The prewar Armed Forces of Malaya, except for two regular Malay battalions, were either ceremonial in character or made up of European volunteers. British and Indian troops were expected to provide security against external aggression, and their resounding failure in 1941-42 destroyed their credibility for this role. However, the prewar internal security force was well-trained and effective. For one year Malaya was under British military administration, which did little towards advancing recovery. Thereafter, the resident British military forces were kept apart from internal conflicts, until the emergency had lasted several years. British Army effectiveness, discipline, and organization was demonstrated after 1950, and operations were closely coordinated with police and civil authorities under Governor-General Templer.

e. The effective prewar police forces were largely discredited and dissipated during the Japanese occupation. There was a thorough postwar reorganization, although it was perhaps implemented slowly. These security forces, although administratively fragmented and widely dispersed, were a real force for social stabilization after 1945. Discipline and organization were good, although their strength was not adequate for both normal law enforcement and counterguerrilla operations until after 1948, when strengths were doubled. Their anti-terrorist activities were conducted imaginatively and were well coordinated through a Special Emergency Council. Nevertheless, they failed to eliminate jungle guerrilla bands in any of their major districts between 1948 and 1950, when the Army came to their aid.

f. The real power of the British colonial administration was based on Malayan acceptance of its legitimacy. The Japanese defeat of the British caused an irreversible loss of British prestige, and Malayan attitudes toward the legitimacy of both the British administration and the Malay sultans were seriously undermined during the Japanese occupation period. Civic consciousness, always weak, was further
attenuated, since wartime shortages and hardships put extra emphasis behind the primary Malay and Chinese loyalties to their families and their local or ethnic kinfolk.

g. Although Malay culture long valued deference to authority, group welfare, and obedience to custom (adat), these loyalties did not extend to a larger pan-Malayan level. Such nationalist ideals were introduced by the new postwar party leaders, who clashed with the established elites and proposed new nonlocal values. Similarly, the younger Chinese who sought full participation in Malayan politics went beyond the habits and attitudes of their inward-looking fathers. Personalism and factionalism marked all Malayan postwar communities, however, and resulted in a number of mutually hostile organizations.

h. Both the Malay and Chinese prewar elites used British values and patterns as their models of behavior; thus Malayan society was marked by considerable pragmatism and mutual tolerance, a strongly stabilizing element. The natural Chinese instincts favoring competitiveness, energy, and frugality provided an often-noted contrast to Malay habits of leisure, reluctance to sacrifice for material advantage, and preference for security and stability over rapid change and progress. British belief that these characteristics were innate and unchangeable contributed to an administration without a keen sense of rapid responsiveness or adaptability to change.

35. (C) External influences. There were six main sources of external influence on Malaya during the preconflict period: British, in the sense that the Colonial Government was more responsive to its home Government than to the people it governed; Chinese, both nationalist and Communist; Japanese, through occupation; Indian, reflecting the growing nationalist trend; Indonesian, since the people of the Netherlands East Indies are akin to the Malays of the peninsula; and Muslim, carrying currents of thought from the Middle East.

a. Policies of the British Colonial administration were strongly conditioned by British national interests, which were served rather by maximizing profits from European trade and enterprise than by political and social development of Malaya as a nation. It was the needs of British enterprise that started the immigration of Chinese and Indians into a previously all-Malay country in the 19th century and resulted in a triracial population. British defense requirements took a considerable portion of Malayan revenues during the depression. Nevertheless, the British influence up to World War II brought greater stability and prosperity to Malaya than it had known for centuries, and laid the groundwork for a national political system, even though the British were reluctant to release it to local control. Increased popular demands, inevitably resulting from a continued European presence, eventually might have induced conflict, but they had not up until World War II.
b. Chinese influence was powerfully exercised through the schools of the Chinese community, through propaganda, and through political organization. Chinese revolutionists had sought material and moral support in Malaya since the beginning of the 20th century, and both the Chinese Nationalist Party and Communist Party had organizations there. The postwar strength of the Malayan Communists, almost wholly Chinese, depended partly on Chinese Communist training and advice, partly on Comintern support, and partly on the British training of Communist guerrillas for the siege of Singapore. Both Chinese Nationalists and Communists encouraged continuing ties with the homeland, and promoted anti-British sentiment. Communist successes in China, and the causes they were fighting for, undoubtedly evoked a response among the discontented young Chinese in Malaya.

c. The Japanese invasion destroyed faith in British omnipotence and strength; it also undermined the credibility for and legitimacy of the non-British civil service and the police. Therefore the postwar British insistence upon the dangers of militant Malay nationalism, of worldwide Communist subversion, and of disruptive labor militancy found little popular support. The Japanese created great deprivations in Malaya during the war with autocratic and discriminatory policies, terror, shortages, and bad management.

d. Other influences are less significant, but the currents of thought from India, Indonesia, and the Middle East all fostered the growth of nationalism among the people of Malaya.

e. Prior to 1940, the British overlordship in Malaya had provided a century of unquestioned internal security and protection against outside domination; relationships among the Malayan Sultans and among the three communities depended on this insulation from the external world. The rapid overwhelming nature of the 1941-42 Japanese invasion and conquest had enormous impact, because it was unanticipated. Collaboration with the Japanese occupation was inevitable, although often reluctant. Only the Chinese community found itself directly oppressed without any expectations of long-term benefit. Resistance to the Japanese, despite oppression and cruelty, was limited and was led by the MCP and by Chinese who had fled Malaya's cities. Members of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) found little welcome in postwar British Malaya, while passive Malay and Chinese collaborators quickly regained political leadership.

36. (C) Internal influences. British interest in Malaya originated in its strategic position astride the pathway between India and the Far East. Singapore's location on the Straits of Malacca quickly made it the trading and transshipment center and lookout post for the entire southeast Asian region. Thus the fall of Singapore had obvious symbolic meaning for the entire region; the postwar reinstallation of British Colonial guidance also had widespread significance, for all
peoples of the region. However, British control was sharply constrained by Malaya's physical character; the extensive coastline and nearness to Sumatra made smuggling and illegal population movements easy. The central spine of mountains, and the rapidly renewing jungles with their numerous rivers and swamps, fragmented the peninsula into many separate districts. Despite energetic British efforts to construct rail and road connections along the eastern coast, there were few north-south arteries and poor secondary communications. The scattered self-sufficient pattern of early Malay settlement was reflected in modern Malay's fourteen administrative states.

a. The underpopulated peninsula long was an attraction for immigrant settlement and labor. The soil was fertile, and jungle land was available for anyone hardworking enough to clear it. Farming self-sufficiency was possible wherever water was available; the British policy reserving land for Malay settlement helped to perpetuate these conditions. Thus the Chinese who fled to the jungle during Japanese occupation, as well as the post-1948 guerrilla bands, found little difficulty in supporting themselves or in extracting supplies from a number of widely dispersed farmers. On the other hand, Malaya's northern rice states found poor communications a serious barrier to regional specialization during and after the war.

b. The historical concentration of Malayan production in tin and rubber export and rapidly growing commerce helped to create concentrated population areas, along with an underpopulated interior. The largest seaport colonies attracted a rapidly growing population throughout the period, while immigrant labor created highly concentrated settlements in the major tin districts. Malayan settlements tended to be linear, along roads and rivers; Chinese immigrants grouped tightly and provided the majority of the urban residents. Wartime conditions modified these patterns slightly, as many Chinese and Indians escaped Japanese control by becoming rural squatters. Although the Chinese predominated in the postwar cities, they lacked urban or rural political power; the influence not held by the British was reserved to Malayan elites. Thus, the continuing growth of the cities, as well as Chinese movement into rural areas, introduced destabilizing forces as it stressed the difference in achievements of the Malay and Chinese communities.

37. (C) Modulators. The major postwar dissident group in Malaya was the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), together with its numerous non-Communist supporters who had made up the wartime MPAJA and the MPJA Union. Members and supporters were almost all Chinese. The power of the MCP after the war lay in its high degree of organization, enhanced by its World War II experience, and its consistent anti-Japanese and anti-British stance. Founded in the cities in 1930, the postwar MCP rapidly asserted its control over the revived labor movement and led series of strikes against British-run city utilities. In 1947 and 1948, the longtime MCP leader, Loi Tok, disappeared, and the British
struck hard against Communist leadership in the trade union movement. Although these serious blows damaged the MCP, it successfully moved most cadres into rural districts, reestablished the wartime supply and intelligence network, and instituted a war of terrorist attacks in 1948. Such surprising achievements were partly the result of ineffective early British action against MCP rural bands. Further, British unwillingness to negotiate with alternative communal political groupings undoubtedly helped to polarize mass Chinese sentiment in support of the MCP. The 5,000 active jungle terrorists of 1949 were supported by an estimated minimum of 20 times as many active sympathizers. Despite vigorous British security efforts, this wide support made it easy for the MCP-led army to obtain supplies and arms; there was little evidence of outside support from abroad, for the terrorists collected food and funds from inside the Chinese community and obtained arms by theft and attacks on police stations. Despite physical communication problems and fragmentation, the MCP successfully implemented a single overall strategy, hit-and-run tactics, and coordinated agitation and propaganda.

a. Other important short-run factors intensified the violent conflict between the British-led security and Army forces, and the MCP-led guerrilla bands. Chinese grievances accumulated because of inept British efforts to create a single overall Malayan citizenry and preserve the political and social leadership of the Malays. The Malayan postwar political parties, headed by Onn bin Jaa'far's United Malay National Organization (UMNO), were not paralleled by any Chinese political group, but rejected Chinese participation. Chinese economic leadership and wartime sufferings were not rewarded in postwar administration; such grievances converged in the labor union movement of the cities and the Chinese squatter problem of many rural districts.

b. Charismatic leadership, which had appeared to be developing in the various communities, did not appear promptly after the war either among the British officials or the Malay and Chinese groups. Official British attention to the traditional elite and the Sultans failed to provide this personalistic element, to channel mass tensions and frustrations; Jaa'far and Tungku Abdul Rahman gained their post-1948 importance largely because of British obstinacy, and the Chinese community lacked any vigorous spokesman.

c. The primary external modulator was the destabilizing effect of the unrealistic British colonial policy, which vacillated with successive shifts in the home Government. While the successful Chinese Communist takeover of the Chinese homeland may have lent moral support to MCP revolutionary tactics, no practical external support was extended to them, and none could be expected. The traditional separateness of the communities of Malaya permitted non-Chinese groups to view the post-1948 conflict as one between the official British community and a Chinese minority. Throughout Malayan history, violence was an individual, personal affair, and such conflict was considered to be strictly local and personal. Traditional
communal hostilities, therefore, were not a primary factor, as the MCP ideology emphasized broad nationalistic goals. Terroristic tactics by the MCP did not alienate the rural masses rapidly, as British officials had expected.

d. The coercive force of security and military troops was not applied evenly throughout Malaya at an early stage of the conflict. Because of Malaya's administrative fragmentation and the Chinese predominance in the MPC, tight security measures affected primarily the cities and specific Chinese rural concentrations, and overall regulations were applied selectively. This policy failed to rouse broad support for the British effort, while it strengthened and deepened Chinese resentments.

Section VII (C). The Philippines (U)

38. (C) Setting. The preconflict period in the Philippines began with the establishment of the autonomous Commonwealth in 1935 and ended with the final period of confrontation between President Quirino and guerrilla leader Taruc under amnesty conditions in 1948. This period included four years of Japanese occupation and guerrilla organization and resistance to Japan's control. The longer term roots, factors, and issues of wartime People's Army Against Japan (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon--the Hukbalahap or Huk)* activities and of the post-1948 conflict were essentially unchanging and show remarkable continuity and consistency.

39. (C) Demand-output imbalances. Japanese controls of rice and sugar worked real hardships in rural areas and helped drive many peasants into the mountains or to Manila. Wartime rationing had much more uneven effects in the towns and Manila, as inflation created both mendicants and profiteers. Manila's destruction during liberation helped to cause grave shortages in postwar housing, while land values shot up and land speculators flourished. Food production recovered very slowly, and continued controls and UNRRA relief goods were manipulated for personal advantage, causing widespread disaffection and distrust of the Government.

a. Although the prewar Constabulary had been respected, the Japanese converted it to their own purposes. They also formed a village defense corps (BUDC) to manage local security. Numerous district guerrilla bands sprang up, with little coordination beyond their USAFFE enrollment, and in central Luzon several of these warred with the Huk

*Named the People's Liberation Army (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng E'tlayan) after 1946 but still called Hukbalahap or Huk.
as often as with occupation forces. The Huk penetrated the BUDC network, strove to strengthen local relations, and termed other guerrillas little more than bandits. After the war, rural security and law was reestablished very slowly, with US Army units active only irregularly and selectively. Landlords returning to abandoned estates created their private bodyguards and armies, while the collaboration question made most municipal police ineffective and clogged the courts with confused cases. The psychological insecurity created by this issue and local factionalism was not resolved until a 1948 law extended amnesty to all collaborators.

b. Other imbalances existed between the demands made of the postwar social system and its output of rewards to selected social groups. The issue of national identity and sovereignty was fogged by the collaboration question; many viewed Laurel as a national hero for his role in the "independent" puppet government, a role which differed little from that of his rival, Roxas. Very high postwar individual status was given to active guerrilla leaders, and the Government attempted to select guerrilla soldiers to qualify for postwar backpay and bonuses, as well as property owners to receive war damages. This process, which favored those with connections, quickly repolarized sentiment. Government relief programs and controlled import licensing created additional imbalances and feelings of relative deprivation. Personal and family loyalties, highly exaggerated by the confusion of wartime, continued to be essential for postwar survival. Some landlords returned to their lands, asking back payment of all crop and tax arrears, while their life-style showed they were profiteers from Manila's war inflation. Postwar financial reforms benefited those already well off, and, in general, material and psychological inequalities of wartime continued to exist.

c. Public health conditions and mortality rates were essentially unchanged from 1920 to 1940, while wartime deprivations caused the 1946 levels to be worse than in 1936. The wartime breakdown in malaria control, prolonged after the war, had immediate consequences: large amounts of central Luzon farmland remained uncultivated due to labor shortages. Public health aid preference given to Manila and major municipios, with postwar general inaction, intensified rural deprivations and frustrations. Postwar nutrition and diet levels reflected chronic malnutrition and continued to run below prewar levels until 1960. Dietary levels in Huklandia (the central Luzon Provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac in which the Huk held power) were below the national averages.

40. (C) System effectiveness and capability. Demand articulation and aggregation were handled poorly under the Philippine nominal and personalized two-party political system. Politics long was a national battle between opposed personalities: Quezon-Osmena, Roxas-Osmena, Roxas-Laurel, and Quirino-Recto. Similar personal factions existed at
lower levels, even down to the village, with the patron-client relationships all-important, and shifting political loyalties a norm. Such personalist and factionalized politics permitted total demand articulation, but almost no real aggregation and accumulation of demands into concrete programs. Public or group opinion always could find a spokesman, but rarely a pragmatic leader. Wartime censorship was keenly resented, and any postwar hint of control of opinions created an outcry. The only effective pragmatic groups were composed of farmer union leaders, Manila intellectuals and trade unionists, and exguerrillas, led by Communist Party ideologists and eager to transform all prewar social and economic relationships.

a. Government leaders in Manila were by tradition strong-minded centralizing autocrats whose skills were centered on the subtle balancing of patronage and personal influence to increase their personal followings; thus compromise and negotiation were valued far above administrative consistency and efficiency. During the postwar period, Roxas and Quirino showed little initiative in creating effective Government programs or an even-handed administration; their awkward attempts to handle the difficult questions of collaboration and Communism reflected their personalist interests. Various postwar US recommendations therefore were accepted with little debate, and slow reconstruction efforts were tolerated.

b. The efficient and loyal prewar bureaucracy continued to serve under the Vargas and Laurel occupation governments and were thereby tainted by collaboration with Japan. Most continued to serve after 1945, but they were more completely subordinated to presidential whim, rigid judicial interpretations, and outside pressures. Mostly they sought to isolate themselves as technocrats. The Philippine Army refused to consider the Huk as a defense problem; and the Constabulary regularly emphasized the small number in the Huk, the criminality of its operations, and its political insignificance.

c. All elements of the prewar elite were actively concerned with postwar reestablishment of prewar social, economic, and political relationships; US officials lent their assistance and financing to this goal. After some reluctance, the United States granted the Islands complete independence in July 1946, apparently convinced that this action would put Filipinos forever in debt to the United States. There was little recognition that wartime upheaval and destruction had dramatically and permanently affected the social system; and the changes in landlord-tenant and patron-client relationships in the country, plus changed union-employer and Filipino-Chinese commercial relations in the city were not readily reversible.

d. Government plans and policies during the prewar period had been of little immediate importance; in the postwar period, the bureaucracy had little experience in active program planning. All economic
revival plans were developed in 1947 and later by nonofficial American experts; the plans reflected a prejudice against extensive macroplanning and went into effect very slowly. Agriculture recovered especially slowly, because of low price controls and official procurement programs. Policy emphasized revival of commerce and foreign trade with the United States, limiting industrial production and materials and slowing recovery. Intervention to rebuild the badly damaged rail, highway, and bus fleet system was irregular, uneven, and politically manipulated. The rigidities and structure of the prewar economy were re-formed as rapidly as possible after the war, largely with US indulgence. The peso again was pegged to the dollar, causing drastic inflation; fiscal responsibility was emphasized and expenditures limited, although US-held Government accounts were released only slowly and reluctantly. American businesses were rapidly reestablished in Manila, and their rights vigorously protected.

e. Family and local community interests received extreme emphasis after the war. This emphasis was natural, since such interests often had meant survival during the occupation, but it resulted in a dearth of individual initiative and investment and much municipal lethargy, in the face of overwhelming reconstruction needs and limited Government revenues. Postwar class and caste divisions of interests between landlord and tenant, Manila and countryside, local political chief and farmer became considerably more marked and more depersonalized. The prewar ethnic and linguistic divisions, especially marked in central Luzon, continued to play important social roles without any dampening influences exerted from the Manila elite. The Roman Catholic Church, still socially important, continued to interpret its social role narrowly and to avoid politics, except to oppose such groups as the Chinese, the Moros, small Protestant sects, and the Freemasons active among the trade unions. Public education had progressed farther in the Huklandia municipalities than the national average. Literacy in this region was higher than normal, while postwar school facilities were worse than average. The region's educational level undoubtedly helped to politicize the people of the area and increase distrust of vague official programs and promises.

f. The conventional training given prewar Philippine officers often made them less effective guerrilla leaders but postwar training again returned to conventional subjects. The Armed Forces took precedence over postwar Constabulary needs, and vigorously attempted to reestablish a nonpolitical tradition, despite the problems of USAFFE guerrillas. The Constabulary suffered from benign neglect and from the taint of wartime collaboration with the Japanese. Municipal police were similarly handicapped and were politically hampered by local leaders with their private armies.

g. Local language differences and physical barriers were a permanent aspect of communication difficulties that blocked official
efforts to create widespread popular support for economic or social programs, to create national identity, or to mount an ideological anti-Communist campaign. The central and elite languages were English and Spanish; the 1937 official endorsement of Tagalog meant little advance for central Luzon, where Pampangianese was widely spoken. Therefore, informal communications were of particular postwar importance: the confused centralized Manila bureaucracy was at a disadvantage in languages, and inept American advisers were largely unaware of the problem. Manila's more formal communications channels were good—a large number of varied small newspapers sprang up quickly after 1945—but narrow self-interest resulted in much yellow journalism and character assassination that discouraged real analysis or wide influence. By contrast, all reports demonstrate that the Huk followed an energetic public relations program in central Luzon, extending even to hired brass bands and local entertainment.

41. (C) Cultural factors. The attitudes and biases favoring personal and family advantage over community and national responsibility were exaggerated by wartime privations and postwar corruption. Personalism and factionalism were rewarded and became increasingly prevalent; obedience to an abstract legal system was undermined by delays and miscarriages of justice. Pragmatism reigned supreme in this cynical postwar period, tempered not at all by an inactive religious establishment.

a. Prewar civic consciousness was relatively high, but the Japanese manipulated civic groups for their own purposes during the occupation; thus, there was widespread resistance when Roxas attempted to establish postwar local associations. The prewar civic spirit found postwar expression through participation in ethnic, business, and occupational associations which were cleverly united and politicized by the Communist Party, acting through the Democratic Alliance.

b. The strong Filipino interest in and preference for legal forms made governmental legitimacy a major issue. This was one implicit aspect of the postwar debate concerning the collaboration question. The 1946 election, however, exaggerated this confusion rather than resolving it. Later arbitrary acts by the Government tended to reinforce doubts about its legitimacy, while the uncompromising anti-Japanese and antielite position of the Hukbalahap was consistent.

c. Filipino willingness to compromise reached its extreme development during this period; traditional concepts of shared responsibility remained operative despite postwar preoccupation with narrow personal material benefit. Thus, a number of successive political amnesties for the Huk members were announced by the Government; more important, Huk leaders were forced to take these amnesty announcements seriously for a time, to retain public approval.
42. (C) **External influences**: Political factors injected into the Philippine system included the importation of foreign ideas and ideals, the system shocks caused by external political and economic influence and power, and examples of external assistance which assisted in the modernization and development of the Philippine systemic structure.

   a. American ideals of individual liberties, separation of Government powers, a two-party system, and political equality were successfully introduced and grafted onto historical Spanish political concepts. American ideas led to an early land reform program, which failed in its purposes but established a policy target, to be reaffirmed frequently. Communist ideas became important during the 1930's, with the creation of the Philippine Communist Party (PCP), primarily aided by US Communists and using tactics of secret subversive organizations and united front maneuvers. During wartime, foreign concepts of the worldwide struggle against imperialism and fascism received additional support, as did the notion of a popular mass uprising against overwhelming conventional armed force. The highly personal centralized influence wielded by the US Governor General set a model, reinforced by traditional patterns, for later presidential activism. However, party competition within the United States regarding Philippine policies did leave local politicians room for much maneuver. US external influences also were modernizing: an effective national Constabulary and a well-trained civil service cadre were created early, and a small competent Army officer corps was created and assisted after 1936.

   b. Economic external factors during the preconflict period included the large amounts of US investments which entered the Philippines, both in plantation farming and industry, the predominance of the US export market, and conservative US emphasis on financial and monetary rigidity. Japanese economic intervention included rice confiscations, rapid currency expansion, and casualties and property destruction. After 1945, US payments of war damages and guerrilla bonuses represented a major credit intervention, while Philippine-owned balances in the United States were released slowly. US opposition to national economic planning may have slowed postwar recovery.

   c. US programs for widespread public education and public health assistance received uneven financial backing during the 1930's, which combined with wartime interruptions to make conditions in 1948 worse than in 1935. The Filipino elite valued its close ties with the United States and its Spanish heritage but became increasingly divorced from internal social realities. Chinese refugees from the Japanese-controlled mainland helped to revive a fear of this historical entanglement, and some Chinese promoted Communist ideas.

   d. External military and security factors created a confusing pattern of national pride, a sense of external betrayal, extreme loyalty to American individuals and ideals, and a pragmatic willingness to
collaborate with Japanese occupation authorities and a puppet government. The US Army created the Philippine Armed Forces in its own image and prepared a purely defensive plan for resisting invasion. After liberation the US Army treatment of guerrilla forces was uneven and insensitive, with rapid demobilization hastened while reconstruction lagged. Japanese security measures during the occupation created a puppet police and a local defense force of "collaborators." Postwar US policy on punishing collaborators was highly selective and irrationally applied. Thus, external military influences helped to polarize domestic politics. American civil-military traditions further led the Philippine postwar Armed Forces to emphasize their own separation from the Huk-Constabulary conflict and to concentrate on internal training, discipline, and convention.

43. (C) Internal influences. The many small islands, the rugged mountain chain that defines Luzon terrain in particular, and the central Luzon plain (Huklandia) with its rice surplus and impenetrable swamps makes rapid reaction by the social system very difficult. These factors increased local and regional autonomy and favored the activities of small self-sufficient armed bands. Manila's metropolitan nature made it especially vulnerable to resistance located in central Luzon, while its physical closeness to rugged mountain hideouts also simplified opposition. Demographic factors of importance included the wartime flight of refugees into Manila, which greatly increased problems of postwar adjustment. The long-term trends in Philippine demography showed rather steady rates of population growth, resulting in an unusually large percentage of dependents.

44. (C) Modulators. The existence of the Hukbalahap army was a major intensifier of conflict. The Huk showed remarkable ability for organization, internal self-control, leadership management, ideological indoctrination, and guerrilla tactics during its difficult formative years under the Japanese occupation. The superior organizing ability was supplied largely by PCP members, whose long experience with clandestine and united front operations during the 1930's, assisted by US and Chinese Communists and the Comintern, was reinforced by the prewar alliance with the Socialist-led local farmer unions of central Luzon. The PCP had established secret cells in Manila, and wartime patriotism expanded the reach of this network enormously, reportedly even into the Presidential palace. After the war, this effective organization was kept in place and working, on both overt and covert levels, with negligible external support.

a. The Huk Army never developed a truly charismatic leader. However, Communist ideology was fully accepted by both leaders and lower cadre, and thus the Huk and the Communists were the only groups to link together agrarian unrest in the countryside with the political and occupational interests of urban Manila. This prewar link, forged again by wartime privations, remained strong through the preconflict
period after the war. While actual armed Huk members were few, they were supported by many times as many sympathizers.

b. The Huk Army had no trouble with access to weapons: during wartime it drew on US Army stocks that had been hidden from the Japanese. After the war, abandoned Japanese arms were available, and newer American weapons and ammunition stocks were at hand for collection by robbery, bribery, and perhaps outright purchase. The Government estimated that some 300,000 weapons were in private hands during 1946-48, while Huk forces numbered some 20,000. Supply channels for foodstuffs, medicine, and gunpowder were established in wartime and were readily activated as needed during postwar battles. Huk efficiency extended so far that portable armories were available for the post-1950 conflict period. The Huk freedom of movement was excellent and unchallenged.

c. Accumulated extremist political attitudes converged in the Huk-Government confrontation, polarizing political choice and intensifying the conflict. Convergence began with the creation of the Democratic Alliance; issues of collaboration and of communism intensified the process; and successive breakdowns of political amnesties and the slow process of reconstruction and recovery were further accelerators and multipliers. Other important postwar intensifiers included traditional intergroup antipathies in central Luzon, that region's long history of violent insurrection reinforced by the war, and ineffective arbitration and mediation channels. Calculated use of terror tactics by the Huk, by the private armies, and by some Government agents also was important.

Section VIII (C). Vietnam (U)

45. (C) Setting. The preconflict period in Vietnam began in 1945, when World War II ended in the Pacific, and ended in 1959, when full-scale military combat started in South Vietnam. These intervening years were a time of great fluctuation, with extremely unstable conditions. They encompass the regimes of Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem in the south and Ho Chi Minh in the north, and the advisory efforts of France and the United States.

46. (C) Demand-output imbalances. Widespread deprivation and disparity in the standard of living between the masses and the small elite and upper class prevailed in Vietnam during the preconflict period. The gap between city and village grew wider as new economic opportunities developed which tended to increase the wealth of the rich without giving any compensating benefits to the poor. Although these conditions did produce social tensions, their impact was greatly reduced by two main factors: 85 percent of the people were farmers who were generally unaware of prevailing conditions elsewhere, and massive amounts of US aid enabled the Diem regime to pacify the people by providing them with consumer goods.
a. General lack of public health and educational facilities was not perceived directly by the people, but was held up to them as benefits to be gained with the success of the revolution. Lack of opportunity to participate in the governing process caused increased social tensions, particularly among the educated. The abuses of tenancy and landlordism, coupled with slow Government progress in implementing land reform programs, created feelings of frustration and deprivation among the landless.

b. The Government's inability to provide security and its excesses of control, including gross misuse of the police forces and legal apparatus, widened the gulf between the people and both the police and the rest of the Government. These conditions led the people to believe they needed protection from governmental abuses as well as from those of the insurgents.

47. (C) System effectiveness and capability. The Vietnamese were permitted almost no participation in the Government and were integrated into the military, the police, the economy, or the administration only at the lowest levels. The political system, centered around a strong executive with a subservient legislature and cabinet, generally was unresponsive to the needs of Vietnam. Political parties in the Western sense of loyal opposition did not exist in Vietnam during this period; neither the French nor Diem allowed any legal opposition to their policies. The inability of the Government to cope adequately with rural discontent, its lack of acceptance by the people, and the prohibition of autonomous political parties were the main factors leading to political instability and the growth of underground nationalist groups.

a. Under French rule, Vietnam's economy was transformed into an extension of France's mercantilistic policies and worked to the disadvantage of the Vietnamese. The partitioning of the country in 1954 created the problem of developing a balanced economy in the predominantly agricultural south. This problem never was solved during the preconflict period. Lack of long-range economic planning by the Diem regime and its failure to apply US aid to establish economic controls created conditions that, in turn, caused dissatisfaction and frustration among various elements of the populace.

b. Modernization programs administered by the elitist administrations tended to disturb and disrupt the apathetic masses. Although they helped increase geographical, occupational, and social mobility, they worked to undermine and break up the traditional family village system. Resettlement programs improved the economic situations of some families, but not enough to make any difference in their social positions. Lack of decentralization of secondary and higher level educational facilities plus the cost of tuition and books made attainment of higher education almost impossible for most of the people.
c. Following World War II the security forces were weak, ill-equipped, and poorly organized. Operations were characterized by violence and brutality. Failure of the police to stem the rising level of insurgent terror and official use of police during elections served to alienate the people further from the Government.

d. News of interest to a village was disseminated orally by a highly effective village gossip system. High illiteracy rates precluded the use of printed matter, and the mass media was accessible only to the elite and upper classes. Diverse languages and dialects inhibited mutual understanding among the people and with the Government. These deficiencies in the communication system were compounded by lack of understanding that existed between the modernizing elite and the masses of tradition-bound people.

48. (C) Cultural factors. Violent differences between religious and regional groups were an accepted part of the culture; however, the people were not accustomed to using violence as a means of political coercion. On the contrary, Vietnamese culture, steeped in Confucian philosophy, often caused the masses to drift into apathy.

a. The individual's main commitment was to his family and village, with little or no feeling of civic responsibility. Among the elite and the middle and upper classes this attitude most often found expression in graft and other misdealing. There was little interest in Government, except among members of the elite.

b. The native Vietnamese distrusted and feared the minority ethnic groups and were wary of white foreigners. Strong regional differences between the Annamites, Tonkinese, and Cochin Chinese prohibited their functioning together as a nation. Class antagonisms, while they did not lead directly to violence, made it extremely difficult to form the nation necessary to ward off violence. Years of war and foreign domination served to create a traditional suspicion of the Government among the people and contributed to the rise of Vietnamese nationalism.

49. (C) External influences. There were five main sources of external influence on Vietnam during the preconflict period: France, during the colonial period; Japan, during occupation; the United States, as an ally and through diplomatic, military, and economic support to the south; and China and the USSR, through military aid to the north.

a. As a colonial power, France ruled Vietnam for the benefit of metropolitan France and made little effort to educate the Vietnamese in the French way of life or in modern technological advances. The Vietnamese played a very minor role in the Government and the administration of their own country. Lack of education crippled the efficiency of the indigenous civil service. The French departure after the
fall of Dien Bien Phu left the country bereft of able political and
civil leaders and unprepared for independence.

b. Japan became the dominant force in Indochina during World
War II and contributed greatly to Vietnamese nationalism and desire
for independence. Japanese occupation of Vietnam near the close of
the war limited French authority to such an extent that the Communist
insurgents were able to expand and acquire control over large areas
of the country.

c. The United States was the most important external influ-
ence during the preconflict period. Formal US recognition of the
State of Vietnam in 1950, the beginning of economic aid in 1951, and
its leading role in the establishment of SEATO in 1954 mark the first
steps toward US involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. These measures
were stabilizing to the extent that they gave the South Vietnamese
Government hope of future US support if needed.

d. Unlike the exploitive economy set up by the French, US
aid and technical advice was provided to shore up the economy and
rally the people around the Government. However, massive US aid did
not stabilize the economy but, instead, created a false prosperity in
South Vietnam that would collapse at the first sign of economic diffi-
culties. In addition, US economic advisers made many proposals to
rally and unify the countryside which failed to give adequate consider-
ation to the Vietnamese cultural heritage and tradition, and their
implementation succeeded only in alienating the people. On the plus
side, US aid was responsible for great improvements in the fields of
public health and technological renewal and development.

e. The United States supported France in its efforts to
retake Indochina after World War II and later provided direct military
support and technical advice to the Vietnamese Army (ARVN) through the
US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). The MAAG was successful
in developing a degree of esprit de corps in the ARVN and in supplying
and training it in the use of modern weapons. Attempts at reorganizing
the ARVN, however, were not as successful, added to the confusion, and
did nothing to improve Vietnam's security.

50. (C) Internal influences. Vietnam’s strategic position on
the eastern shore of the Indochinese Peninsula, coupled with its juxta-
position to Communist China and its relative isolation from the non-
Communist world, created an ideal environment for insurgency and Com-
munist subversion. The predominantly mountainous and heavily forested
terrain is not conducive to conduct of conventional military operations
of the type that would be normal in Europe or most of the Western Hem-
sphere. Partition of the country in 1954 destroyed the once-balanced
economy. The north was industrialized with little agriculture, and the
south was agricultural with little industry. The influx of refugees
from the north after the demarcation line was established overcrowded the cities and lowlands, produced anxiety and frustration, and brought about increased contact among diverse groups.

51. (C) Modulators. A principal intensifier of conflict in Vietnam was the Viet Minh, a Communist-dominated coalition group under the charismatic leadership of Ho Chi Minh and a dedicated cadre of Communist guerrillas. Under the guise of a nationalist movement, this group attracted the active or passive support of most of the people. Of equal importance were the years of repressive rule by the French and later, by the Diem regime, which alienated the people from the Government and created an environment conducive to the growth of dissident nationalist groups. Other major intensifying factors were longstanding social, cultural, and regional differences; disruption of French control by World War II; excessive use of violent coercion by Government security forces; failure to develop a balanced and independent economy; and external influences of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China.
1. **General.** This appendix summarizes some of the considerations and theories which formed the basis for determining the nature and causes of conflict and for constructing the analytical model. These considerations are included to expand the rather brief analysis presented in the text, and because they constitute a link between ARMLIC research and the relevant social science literature.

2. **Relative deprivation, frustration, and aggression.** The concept of relative deprivation and the frustration-aggression hypothesis developed by psychologists in the last 30 years provides the basis for an analytical system. The argument, in brief, is that any society contains conditions that produce deprivations; perceived deprivation (relative deprivation) produces an emotional response called frustration, which usually leads to aggression; aggressive behavior by some groups toward others in the society or toward the Government intensifies conflict and can lead to violence. These concepts have been used to explain the behavior of both individuals and groups. This study has emphasized actions of the group and its leaders rather than individual action.

   a. The concept of relative deprivation has been defined by Coas as the experienced discrepancy between one's lot in life and that of other groups that serve as a standard of reference. Experienced discrepancy means that the group must be aware of a difference between its status, rights, or privileges and those of another group (the reference group) for the deprivation to be relative. There may be an objectively observable difference between two groups in a society (or between two societies), but the difference will be considered an objective deprivation until the deprived group itself recognizes and becomes aware of its deprivation. Lot in life refers to the group's concept of its present status in society, including its current expectations for its future condition. The group may compare its current condition with that of another nation or of a group within another nation, with that of another group within its own society, or with its own past or expected future condition. All these are called reference groups. The definition may be rephrased as follows: a group will become relatively deprived when it becomes aware that it has a lower status or fewer rights and privileges than the reference group has or when it believes that it will not be able to achieve its expectations. Collective awareness of differential status may be imported by an agitator or leader, or it may come about through individual logic, as in the case of landlords who experience a loss of status in the face of well-implemented land reforms.
b. According to the definition used by Gurr, relative deprivation always leads to frustration. However, there have been observable instances which show that some relatively deprived groups do not necessarily become frustrated. If the status differential is perceived but is considered by the deprived group to be legitimate, no frustration results. For example, traditional caste distinctions in India were accorded and reinforced by religious, cultural, and political sanctions and were, therefore, generally accepted by members of the caste groups even though they were very much aware of the status differentials. However, in contrast, the statements and actions generated by the current women's liberation movement in the United States demonstrate in no uncertain terms that a significantly large group of women have a deep sense of frustration, because they regard as illegitimate the inequality of the status of women in reference to the rights and privileges accorded men. It has been argued also that frustration will occur when action toward some goal is arbitrarily blocked or when an anticipated or expected reward cannot be realized. However, again, when the group interprets the blockage as being legitimate, frustration is unlikely to result. Because a group's interpretation of a condition of relative deprivation as being legitimate or not is a determining factor in its reaction to its deprivation, it was necessary to broaden the definition and the concept of the move from deprivation to frustration to include the constraining effect of perceived legitimacy.

c. Recent writings on the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Berkowitz and others) state that a frustrating event increases the probability that frustrated groups will act aggressively soon after the event. This hypothesis, as stated, does not imply that frustration always leads to aggression nor does it imply that aggressive behavior always is preceded by frustration. Aggressive behavior may not follow frustration if the deprived group has learned (or can be persuaded) to channel the tensions produced by frustration into nonaggressive action. In fact, continued frustration may lead to apathy, rather than to aggression. On the other hand, if individuals or groups have learned through experience that aggressive behavior generally permits the realization of goals, their normal goal-seeking behavior will be aggressive even though there has been no frustrating event. However, the occurrence of an event that causes or increases frustration can be an indication that aggressive reaction may follow.

(1) It is not unusual for a fairly long period of time to intervene between the onset of continuing frustration and the occurrence of aggression. In contrast, a single frustrating event can spark an aggressive reaction which may be initiated soon after that event's occurrence. However, it is not unusual for a fairly long period of time to intervene between the event and the aggression, especially when the event brings a long-standing period of frustration to a head.
The target of the aggression is the source of the frustration as perceived by the group. If the true source is not readily apparent, the tension, hostility, or anger generated by a frustrating event may be stored, waiting an outlet. However, aggressive acts will be directed toward the accepted source of the frustration, whether or not the actual source is identified. Identification of the source may be made simultaneously by members of the group because of some announcement, or the source may be identified for the group by a leader or agitator.

d. A brief discussion of three models of internal conflict are presented to indicate how the sequence of relative deprivation-frustration-aggression provides an explanatory framework for the relations identified by the models. No attempt has been made to criticize the models.

(1) In 1962, James Davies published an analysis of three revolutions. His conclusions, which he believes apply to many other revolutions and civil disturbances, were that the expectations of segments of a society are raised under conditions of continued economic growth; that, in the face of a sudden downturn in the economy, expectations continue to rise, but the gap between actual achievement and expectations grows wider; when the gap becomes intolerable, revolution will occur. (This is sometimes referred to as the J-curve hypothesis.) Using its own expectations as the referent, the group became aware of a gap between its achievement and its expectations and was not willing to accept the gap as legitimate, because the group lacked control over the situation. According to Davies' data, the source of the frustration which resulted was identified as the regime which was perceived to be the controlling force, and the group reacted by aggression against the regime.

(2) The same reasoning may be used to explain the Tantor and Midlarsky model. In this case, the source of relative deprivation is a perceived gap between the group's aspirations (which continue to rise because of past economic growth, despite the threat of an economic downturn) and the dismal belief that the group's achievements can be expected to reach an even lower level in the future. Again, frustration results among members of the society who perceive the downturn as arbitrary, because they feel they have had no control over events. The "powerful" Government is considered to be responsible for the situation, and thus is identified as the source of frustration; the result is aggression against the Government.

(3) In 1966, the Feierabends reported on a cross-national study of internal political instability in which they found a relationship between "social frustration" and modernization. They further determined the best predictor of political instability and domestic conflict to be the differential rates of change between the literacy
rate and the rate of change in GNP. It was found that rapid increase of literacy rates accompanied by a slow increase in GNP provided an excellent predictor of internal instability. Segments of the society which had attained higher literacy levels expected education to provide the vehicle for upward social mobility by qualifying them for occupations with higher status and better incomes. However, when the rate of economic growth could not provide sufficient advancement for them, they became aware of being deprived of their expected goal. The deprivation was not considered legitimate and frustration occurred, which then led to aggressive behavior.

3. Functioning of the social system. Malfunctions of the social system are a principal underlying cause of conflict. Malfunction leads not only to deprivation, which in turn can lead to frustration, conflict, and violence; it also leads to loss of support for the social system, and thus to additional or increased malfunction.

a. The social system has at least three aspects: political, economic, and social. These can be regarded as subsystems. The political subsystem protects and regulates the society. The coercive capability of the society—the security forces—belongs to this subsystem, but security forces are so important a factor that they were treated as a distinct subsystem in the study. The economic subsystem produces, allocates, and distributes material goods and services. The social subsystem (or subsystems) includes all other organized aspects of the society: education, religion, family life, arts and esthetics, recreation, health and welfare, and such nebulous groupings as social classes and ethnic groups. All three subsystems are interrelated so that distinctions among them are hard and even impossible to draw; nevertheless, they are useful for analysis even when their boundaries are somewhat arbitrarily defined.

b. The social system as a whole, and each of its subsystems, can be said to have infrastructure, communications, inputs, conversion processes, maintenance and development processes, and outputs. Each of these concepts is discussed briefly below. For the analysis of causes of conflict, the crucial issue is the degree of balance or imbalance between inputs and outputs. It seems to be the nature of mankind to resort to illicit conflict or violence only when the outputs (responses or satisfactions) fall far short of inputs (demands).

(1) The infrastructure of the social system (comparable in a way to the machinery and operating procedures of a factory) is its culture and its established individual roles, forms, and procedures, both written and tacit. Tacit and written forms often are inconsistent and even contradictory, even in an effectively functioning system. Societies vary greatly in the degree to which roles are differentiated—the Kikuyu of Kenya, for example, traditionally had no clearly differentiated political roles, and their social organization was simple in
comparison to that of Britain; yet they did have an infrastructure, which was not compatible with British-imposed roles and forms. In a period of rapid change, when new demands are made on the social system, its infrastructure often is inadequate to meet the challenge, and change is essential if the demands are to be met. Such change is inherently destabilizing, for it adds the deprivation resulting from requirements for security, order, and predictability to existing deprivations, and it leads to other and usually unforeseeable changes throughout the social system.

(2) Communication is vital to the operation of the social system. It comprises language, speech, and formal and informal media (press, electronic communications, face-to-face contact). As used here, the term "communication" refers only to the passive transmission of information. Evaluation and commentary, such as in newspaper editorials, are part of the conversion processes of the society.

(3) The inputs to the social system are of two sorts: the demands made by the people, based on their needs and wants; and the supports provided by the people in both material (taxes, contributions, and labor) and nonmaterial (allegiance, obedience, cooperation) form. Demands, although based on needs and wants, are not fixed: they can be augmented by new ideas of what is possible—for example, by reading about or seeing new things in foreign books and movies or strange places visited, as happened in each of the countries studied; and the demands can be constrained to some extent by the social system itself—for example, the limiting of a people's demands by restraints imposed by tradition, religion, or the people themselves when their country is at war. Supports usually are provided by the people in response to requirements formulated by the social system; they are the raw material that permits the system to exist and develop and to respond (produce outputs).

(4) Conversion processes are the ways in which input supports are transformed by the operation of the social system into output satisfaction. For the political subsystem, these processes can be described as expression of demands in coherent form (demand articulation); combination of these demands into program packages which can be acted upon (demand aggregation); development of policy and decisionmaking by the leadership; the making of rules for action and the enforcement of these rules; the adjudication of their operation, such as arbitration of disputes among individuals and groups; and political communication. The economic and social subsystems can be considered to have comparable conversion processes.

(5) Maintenance and development processes are the social equivalent of maintenance, repair, and modernization in industrial plants. They preserve the form and the operating efficiency of the social system. Citizenship training, in school and elsewhere, is a principal example of maintenance in the political subsystem; recruitment
of personnel to fill the roles of the system is another; state ceremonial and symbols, still another. System development processes involve conscious social and economic planning for change, such as those that occurred to some degree in each of the countries studied (although generally insufficient to meet the challenge of new demands). Maintenance and development of the system may conflict with the status quo, such as when an entrenched bureaucracy resists changes in organization and procedure.

(6) Outputs are what the social system does for its members. The political subsystem provides for preservation of social order and safety; for resolution of disputes; and for allocation of certain nonmaterial benefits, such as status, recognition and reward, personal liberties, and symbols and ceremonials. The economic subsystem produces, allocates, and distributes material goods and services. The social subsystem provides for health, welfare, recreation, and the various satisfactions of communal life. To an extent that varies for each social system, the political subsystem regulates and controls the outputs of the other subsystems; for example, by requiring an equitable distribution of economic and social benefits.

c. In varying degrees, whole societies are divided into subsocieties along political, ethnic, geographic, economic, or other lines of separation. Such subsocieties also can be regarded as subsystems of the social system. In developed federal states like the United States, politically and geographically distinguished subsystems (the 50 States) are a formal part of the social system. The Provinces of Iran before Riza Shah and the States of Malaya and of Colombia also were in this category. In Kenya, the various tribes comprised subsocieties on ethnic and cultural lines. This type of subsystem may be extremely important in conflict analysis for some countries, because the entire cycle of input-output imbalance, deprivation, frustration, and violence may be largely confined to a single subsystem (Azerbaijan in Iran, Kikuyu in Kenya). Conflict analysis must, therefore, recognize possible differences in the situations of various subsystems and treat them accordingly.

d. Three major characteristics of a social system, relevant to conflict analysis, are responsiveness, adaptability, and capability. Responsiveness means the system's ability and willingness to meet the expressed demands of its population. Adaptability means the ability of the system to change to meet new conditions and requirements. Capability means the total ability of the system, in terms of resources, skills, and processes, to meet its people's needs.

4. Cultural factors. Culture may be defined as the socially standardized ways of feeling, thinking, and acting that man acquires as a member of a society. It encompasses rules for behavior (norms), values, beliefs (including knowledge), and symbols. Taken together these constitute a social heritage. Culture is transmitted from one
generation to another through learning. It is cumulative, permitting each new generation to build on the base formed by the achievements of the previous generation. The forms and levels of conflict, like other kinds of behavior, are to a large extent culturally conditioned.

a. For the individual, culture provides a design for living, a set of ready-made definitions and guidelines which he may modify to some extent but which, nonetheless, govern most of his life's activities. Even rebels against the establishment follow, often unconsciously, modes of thought and action that are not for the most part of their making. Few are aware of the pervasiveness of culture; of the extent to which it selects what one will see, hear, and remember from the totality of one's experiences; patterns one's emotional reaction to people, events, and things; specifies the goals for which to strive; provides the basic assumptions for thought; and influences the individual's concept of himself.

b. Culture plays an essential part in the functioning of all societies. Its primary role is establishment of orderly relationships between individuals with varying traits and abilities: men and women, old and young, weak and strong, skilled and unskilled. Culture organizes diversity by defining statuses (positions) and roles (behavior patterns) and the rights and duties associated with each. Norms for the division of labor and patterns of respect for and definitions of authority, for example, make possible mutually predictable behavior which enables the individuals of a society to function more efficiently and with less strain and friction than might otherwise be possible. Rejection of these definitions and norms by individuals or groups challenges authority and interferes with the peaceful operation of the social order.

c. The beliefs developed within a culture rationalize the established relationships and provide the people with a framework for understanding their society and relating themselves to it. As long as these beliefs are generally accepted, culture serves as a tension-managing function for dealing with otherwise threatening situations. A breakdown of belief results in increasing tension.

d. Culture lays down the rules for social interactions. It defines the in-group and the out-group, tells people when it is proper to cooperate and when to compete, and thus establishes the rules for social mobility.

e. A major function of culture is social control. Most effective are the patterns of socialization through which the individual examines norms, beliefs, and values and accepts them as the natural, the best, or possibly the only way to behave and think. Where this is not accomplished, culture provides sanctions for enforcement and designates positions whose incumbents are empowered to compel obedience to
the norms according to specific rules. It thus specifies rules legitimizing the use of force. Culture institutionalizes conflict by specifying the acceptable forms it may take. In so doing, it may condone patterns of extreme violence and turmoil.

f. Culture contributes to social cohesion and group solidarity. Values, beliefs, and symbols that are shared by a people constitute a kind of social adhesive that holds them together.

g. A small primitive society may have a homogeneous culture. Today, however, most nations have groups within them which either have distinct cultures or which share part of the culture of the dominant group but differ in a number of significant traits, such as language, religion, or life style. In either case, cultural differences may be a potent source of conflict. They make the differences between groups more visible, block meaningful cross-cultural communication, create hostility and suspicion, encourage charges of immorality and other derogatory stereotypes, and build up loyalty to the small group at the expense of the state. Large or active groups with diverse cultures or subcultures within a society increase the potential for conflict.

h. Culture is never static, and change in even one aspect necessitates adaptive change in other traits. Societies differ in the degree to which their cultures have provided techniques for adjustment to change. Usually changes that are small and gradual are easily adjusted to, but those that are extensive or rapid may create serious tensions that could lead to conflict. Since elements of a culture change at different rates, there usually is a lag while the rest of the culture adjusts to the changes. This is a period of tension and incipient conflict.

i. Cultural change is an important potential cause of conflict because it changes norms, beliefs, and values which have been a source of social cohesion; alters the existing relationships between people (i.e., changes statuses and roles), thereby developing feelings of insecurity, uncertainty, and ambiguity in individuals; and alters habit patterns of daily life, causing feelings of vague uneasiness which may be projected outward as hostility toward the Government, industry, or other targets. The culture base may be inadequate to accept or assimilate such changes easily. It may be that few individuals are adequately trained for the new positions; allocation of authority may be ambiguous; or definitions of privileges and responsibilities may not be clear. Change causes the supporting values to be questioned; at the same time, there is, in transitional societies, both a need for a strong Government to assure rapid progress and a heavy pressure to develop such a Government.

5. External influences. The term external influence refers to the influence on a given social system by another separate social system or by a group of outside systems. It is convenient to group external
influences into political, economic, social, and military/security categories, although there is overlapping and interrelationship among these categories and in their effect on the social system being analyzed.

a. The boundary between external and internal factors often is hard to establish. In this analysis, the distinction has been made by considering the social system of the colony, including all indigenous or imposed elements that are an integral part of the functioning of the system during the period analyzed, as internal and considering all influences of the external ruling country that arise out of the functioning of its own system as external. For example, decisions and actions of the Governor of Kenya, or even of the British Colonial Office, are deemed internal matters when dealing with the internal pressures and problems of the colony in accordance with the established procedures of its Government; but the superposition of British interests, whether or not through the colonial Government mechanism (such as the drafting of Kenyans into the British Armed Forces during World War II) is treated as an external influence.

b. External factors may induce strains leading to deprivation, frustration, and violence in two ways. One is by influence on the social system itself—for example, the world economic depression affected the ability of the social system in each of the countries studied to meet the economic needs of the population. The other way is by influencing the demands of the population on the system, or popular attitudes—for example, by making the people want more food or more freedom.

c. Once frustration has developed within the system, external influences can act as intensifiers or dampeners of conflict and violence, operating with a strong multiplier effect on the internal factors in conflict.

d. Analysis of the country data revealed that in all but one country (Colombia), external influences were present with great intensity and were major contributors to the circumstances leading to conflict. In large part, these influences were beyond the control of the governments of the countries affected; the governments themselves lacked the capability and, in some cases, even the understanding to make an effort to counteract the strains these factors were creating in their respective countries.

6. Internal influences. Terrain, ecology, and demography are environmental factors (internal influences) which affect the operation of the social system but are essentially beyond the direct control of the system. Other specific examples are soil fertility, ratio of population to arable land, terrain characteristics having social implications, natural resources (especially the discovery of new resources), strategic location, and ethnic variations among population groups.
a. The concept of strategic location is separable only with difficulty from considerations of external influence. Clearly, the location of a country is a large factor in determining which other countries are most able to exert influence on it and most interested in doing so. On the other hand, location in the geographic sense is a given invariable factor and can be treated as part of the environment.

b. Indigenous social or technical innovation is not entirely an environmental influence. It is included under the environmental heading, because its occurrence is not explainable in terms of any of the other major considerations (except possibly the functioning of the social system), and because in any event it is infrequent. No major innovation was noted within any of the countries during the periods studied, although the adaptation of external influence had somewhat the same effect as innovation. However, on the basis of historical instances of indigenous innovation (such as the various developments which led to the industrial revolution in Europe), this category was included to make the analytical scheme complete.

7. **Modulators: the intensifiers and dampeners.** The conflict modulators represent mediating variables which act on deprivations and frustrations to facilitate or block trends toward increasing conflict and violence for the society. They may have either a positive or a negative influence on each of the states of the national society at any specific time. In the complex interrelationships of a society in conflict, modulators act as multipliers on other variables resulting in intensification or dampening of the conflict.

a. To define these modulators more precisely, those which encourage the social process toward increased violence or its spread are called intensifiers. Those which tend to decrease violence and its spread are called dampeners. Every society contains within it a certain normal frustration level and an associated level of frictional violence, which may be considered to be the background noise level of the particular society operating at normal effectiveness. Thus it seems likely that the conflict intensifiers and dampeners are conceivably present in any stage of conflict, and this makes their precise identification additionally difficult. This is particularly true in the absence of a detailed study of the conflict and nonconflict stages. A preliminary compilation of the major system modulators or multipliers is given in table I.

b. This list of modulators contains a major subsection consisting of factors that pertain primarily to the dissident groups in the societal system. Such a group operates as an intensifier, the strength of which depends on the effectiveness and the policies of the group. Other modulators describe the entire system itself.
The social system represented by the Government and those dissident groups that seek to change or even transform the system in various ways represent a basic and time-honored dichotomy between authority and the rebel or the revolutionary. To some extent the same modulator operates on both groups and may act as both intensifier and dampener.

c. A special warning is needed for those who attempt to define specific manifestations of intensifiers and dampeners for a particular society. The timing of actions, taken either by the State or the rebels, is extremely important in that it can determine whether a decision or action will be an intensifier or a dampener for the existing pressures and processes of conflict. For example, an action taken at one time, may be interpreted as a confession of weakness by the Government and thus will act as an intensifier of conflict; whereas the same action taken at another time, and perhaps used in conjunction with a number of supportive steps, will represent proof of a Government's self-confidence and its ability and willingness to adapt or adjust responsively to new demands and new political forces, and thus will act as a dampener. Many examples exist of actions taken by Governments in response to rebellious pressures, in the hope of dampening the frustration or the conflict, which later were seen to have been badly timed or incapable of being carried out successfully, or which actually worsened the situation. The holding of elections during emergency conditions, the declaration of a limited truce or an amnesty period, or the announcement of a new economic development program are typical examples of steps that failed to accomplish their purpose because they were poorly timed. Determining appropriate actions is difficult, and determining the proper time for those actions is equally difficult and equally important.

d. A separate modulator, largely self-explanatory, has been added: the key conflict episode. This modulator introduces a random element of uncertainty and risk and illustrates the importance of timing and the difficulties involved in getting it right. Key conflict episodes or events, as seen from historical perspective, are central to the intensification or dampening of violence.

(1) Such events frequently are considered to be entirely random and unpredictable, and therefore to be of little use either for predicting or analyzing conflict situations or for planning to avert or control them. However, although the decisions and timing related to actions such as assassinations, terrorism, brutalities, and riots may be subject to individual free choice, they are by no means entirely random or free from social influences and constraints, the Government's processes of retribution, or the political climate of the period and its conditioning influences. This is true even of spontaneous acts of individuals that are independent of any organized direction.

(2) Since the conflict process itself remains to be studied in detail, only key conflict episodes which appeared to end
the preconflict period have been considered here. In terms of the Bloomfield-Leiss model of the complete conflict process, which was found to be applicable and illuminating for the current study and the seven substudies, key events represent the thresholds or transition points between system-states; the key episode separates conditions of a dispute and the perception of a conflict condition by one side.

e. The preliminary list of factors identified with dissident groups are organization, leadership, ideology, following, armaments, supply-support, and access-mobility. These factors are developed from the country studies. However, in general, these modulators may have different effects on the conflict process. For example, although research to date cannot document the point, it is likely that leadership which is highly suitable for a conspiratorial political party may be ineffective, inoperative, or a positive handicap to a rebel group which moves into a higher stage of conflict. Similarly, the armaments needed to conduct warfare against conventional forces may be crippling to the mobility of hit-and-run guerrillas, and may not be effective against guerrillas. Also the generalized modulators listed here apply with equal logic and force to the State's own internal security troops and police; in fact these modulators become dampeners or intensifiers only in relation to the similar conditions which exist for the entire social system.

f. External influences may act not only as long-term causes, but also as specific precipitants or intensifiers of violence and internal conflict. In this category are subversion, propaganda, and other actions by outside powers to undermine the legitimate authorities of the society and assist dissident groups. External influences may also act to dampen or even terminate conflict (for example, provision of arbitration means, friendly assistance, and visible support of authority).

g. Environmental modulators originate within the society's boundaries, but arise from outside the actual, functioning social system. They have a primary long-term effect, represent slow-changing relationships between the society and its surroundings, and are only slightly amenable to direct human control. Some environmental modulators are so well-known that they have received little attention: for example, the effects of seasonal change or of climatic extremes on individual emotional stability, personality, and the incidence of city riots; the effect of large-scale, dramatic natural disasters such as epidemics, earthquakes, typhoons, or even crop failures and famines. Other environmental modulators have received an excessive amount of emphasis in contemporary analyses as being critical determinants for social conflict. Examples include the traditional military concepts of physical terrain in terms of the requirements of and suitability for established rebel base areas; the demographic inevitability that population growth is usually highest in rural areas, where its social usefulness in terms of labor needs and productivity is lowest; and the fact that existing or newly
discovered natural resources are often in areas so isolated from large numbers of the society that their innovative effects are felt only to a very limited degree or are not uniformly distributed.

h. Other systemic modulators, listed in table I, include the broad concepts of polarization and convergence; charismatic leadership; traditional antipathies; history of violence, cultural compromise; mediatory institutions; communications barriers; system response; and coercive force. The somewhat abstract and generalized terms listed in table I represent a first approach to identifying factors that can intensify or dampen conflict situations and to providing a basis for use in analyzing situations and testing and validating conclusions concerning possible preventive measures, results of actions, and requirements as they apply to the study of conflict and postconflict periods.
APPENDIX VI (U)

CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH FACTORS TO CONFLICT

1. Introduction. Very little research has been done on the way the human body adapts physiologically to various stages of malnutrition, changes that may occur as these stages are modified, or psychological responses to lack of adequate nourishment or the presence of disease. It is known that a well-fed man is less likely to become aggressive or antagonistic over minor matters than one who is suffering the pangs of hunger. Conversely, a man who is hungry or whose diet is subnormal is more likely to feel deprived and frustrated than one whose diet is adequate. This idea extends to the nutritional state of the man’s family; minor irritations are less likely to create aggressive frustration if his family is properly fed and more likely to lead to aggressive frustration if his family is either undernourished or hungry.

2. Malnutrition. Malnutrition was not perceived by the people as the cause of the numerous nutritional diseases or as the predisposing factor in most of the infectious diseases that abounded in the countries studied. This lack of understanding was in itself a prime cause of malnutrition. The people, however, were acutely aware of variations in the availability of food. Food became more scarce or of lower quality in every country during the preconflict period except Colombia, where the nutritionally inadequate diet remained relatively unchanged. Food shortages were recognized by the people as a deprivation; they stimulated riots in Iran and were used by dissident groups in Greece to accentuate popular frustrations. Few governments recognized the extent or effect of food shortages and malnutrition, except when conditions of famine or starvation existed. Both Malaya and the Philippines attempted to improve their rice crops and fortify their rice to prevent beriberi, but neither was successful during the preconflict period.

3. Health facilities. Health improvements in most countries were expressed in the form of more hospitals and clinics. The cost of maintaining these structures strictly limited the number of people they served. This may have been a blessing in disguise, for once personal medicine is accepted in a community and people realize modern medicine can forestall death, withdrawal of such services is seen by the affected people as an act of social injustice or even of deliberate cruelty. Yet an underdeveloped country cannot afford the financial burden of individual medical care and, of necessity, must invest instead in collective preventive measures that assure a higher economic return.
a. Only the Chinese of Malaysia were cognizant of the advantages of modern medicine and the Government's role in providing it. Although the increased demand by all classes for medical treatment went unsatisfied, there is no evidence that it provoked aggressive action.

b. The social philosophy that disease prevention is the responsibility of Government rather than of private groups has become almost universally accepted in the years since the end of the periods studied. It will have to be considered as a potential deprivation factor in any future surveys.

4. Traditional patterns. There is little evidence that the people understood the need for uncontaminated water, sanitary sewage and garbage disposal, immunization programs, insect control, or modern medical facilities and personnel. Each society had its own kind of folk medicine that conformed to its cultural traditions. Medical treatment, food habits, and the practices of daily living were delicately entwined with the religious beliefs of each group, and efforts to eradicate deleterious health practices or conditions frequently created animosity and even provoked some violence. Filipinos resisted sanitary restrictions in the early 1900's, and 2,000 black Kenyans marched in protest against the killing of diseased Kamba cattle.

5. Health and relative deprivation. Disease and malnutrition apparently coexisted with low intensity conflict and may have predisposed the people to conflict even though the low health standards were not perceived as actual deprivation. Levels of health or nutrition were below the national average, almost without exception, in the areas of the countries in which low intensity conflict occurred.

a. Undernourishment restricts physical and mental activity, hampering work output and adversely affecting the economy, but it seems not to have created enough lethargy to retard political and social action against relative deprivations in the situations studied.

b. Statistics are not available on group responses, especially psychological, to the effects of a disease or combination of diseases. Malaria was prevalent in all but the mountainous areas, tuberculosis was a general problem, and pellagra was widespread in Colombia, Iran, and northern Greece. There is no indication, however, that the incidence of disease or unsanitary living conditions predisposed the people to mass violence. Certain disease conditions might stimulate mass aggressive action, but it is more likely that physical disability and deprivation reinforce social incompetence and anxiety and help create a climate conducive to conflict rather than directly instigating aggressive actions.
6. **Short-term and long-term programs.** No short quick health-improvement actions can be taken that will relieve a situation where conflict is imminent. Use of such temporary measures as sending in goodwill health teams in such situations will only stimulate new feelings of deprivation when they are withdrawn. Even distribution of free food is effective only so long as it continues, and its discontinuance causes renewed feelings of deprivation.

   a. Long-run health programs attacking deprivation generally are not recognized as such by the public. Since they generate little if any popular support and frequently require considerable time to achieve results, they offer no immediate political reward. In the countries of this study, preventive medicine either was ignored or was given only token support. The health departments, if not the Governments, of several of the countries recognized the people's needs, but remedial action consistently was too meager to produce significant results. Health programs in all the countries stressed curative rather than preventive medicine, and hospitals and clinics devoured the funds that should have been spent on less ostentatious disease prevention programs.

   b. The most critical yet nebulous problem in improving public health was popular ignorance regarding sanitation and nutrition. Health education programs were conducted only in the Philippines and sections of Macedonia in Greece. In the Philippines, children were taught fundamental hygiene by their primary school teacher, but this approach proved unsuccessful. In Macedonia, the adults in selected towns were taught means of improving water supplies, waste disposal, and malaria control, as well as agricultural methods to improve their harvests. The results were so gratifying that the program was to have been extended throughout Greece, but World War II prevented further action. A trial program of home welfare, including training in personal hygiene, child care, first aid, and disease prevention, was accepted and appreciated by the public but rejected as unessential by the Government. These trial programs provided a scheme for successful rural development in Macedonia; the results similar programs might have produced in the other countries are unknown.

   c. The greatest defect in all the health programs was the omission of community and home health (including nutrition) education of the masses. Ignorance was a prime cause of both malnutrition and disease, and it negated many of the sanitation programs that were instituted. The complexity of such programs no doubt discouraged the few who contemplated them. Each country also faced the prospect not only of failing but of antagonizing the people as well, unless it tailored its program to fit the local culture.

   d. Other nonmedical programs that improve health are appreciated by the general public and, under normal conditions, have
an immediate and permanent effect. Irrigating and draining land and building roads, bridges, and dams increase both production and distribution of food. Use of residual insecticides allows reclamation of uninhabitable land. A convenient water supply is sought by everyone; when it is uncontaminated as well, it is an effective health measure. Each country made attempts to do some or all of these things, but effective insect control never was accomplished in any of the areas during the preconflict periods. More attention should have been directed to supplying uncontaminated water to the general public.

7. Drug addiction. Drug addiction was not a factor in any of the insurgencies surveyed. Opium was the primary narcotic used in countries where significant drug addiction existed, except in Colombia where coca leaves were chewed. Smoking opium depresses the central nervous system and generally tends to induce torpor, although it may be a stimulant or a euphoriant to some individuals. Both opium and coca were used by individuals to anesthetize themselves against the pains of hunger or disease or against anxieties associated with social pressures. These drugs temporarily alleviated problems that might otherwise have aggravated the users into acts of violence.

8. Conclusions. Malnutrition, infections, and nutritional diseases were present at fairly high rates in all countries analyzed. The disruptive effects of World War II increased their incidence in Greece, Iran, Malaya, and the Philippines. There was no general popular perception that these chronic conditions were deprivations, however, or that any individual or institution was responsible for the conditions.

a. The people were aware of reduced food supplies and inequitable distribution of available food during the war, but they generally had adjusted themselves to the relatively milder states of malnutrition which existed before and after the war. Therefore, unless a Government or outside agency already had made obvious efforts to alleviate these conditions and had chosen or been forced to abandon them, no frustration contributing to the outbreak of conflict was directly associated with the presence of malnutrition or disease.

b. On the other hand, once efforts have been undertaken to improve health and nutrition, and awareness of their effect and expectation of their continuance develop, withdrawal of Government or outside assistance can lead to intense frustration and anger at their loss.

c. The creation of health facilities (such as hospitals and roving clinics) to treat disease has more immediate visible impact on the public than does a program of disease prevention, such
as malaria mosquito eradication or local sanitation programs. However, a country with limited resources would appear better advised to concentrate them in disease prevention, which will have greater long-term positive, social, and economic impact, than to undertake heavy investment in disease treatment, which creates new expectations and possibly dangerous frustrations over inadequate response to the new demands.

d. In all societies studied, the patterns of food acquisition, preparation, and consumption and of disease avoidance and treatment were inextricably bound up with the traditional customs, religion, and law of the societies. Therefore, any program to induce change or introduce innovation for purely health or sanitation purposes may encounter intense resistance on moral, religious, or legal grounds. An intimate awareness of these social factors must precede efforts to institute change if hostility, indifference, or aggravation of frustrations is to be avoided.

e. Drug addiction and consumption of alcoholic beverages were present to some degree in every society studied. Except for Colombia and Iran, however, these factors were not of major importance; and if they had any effect on conflict, it was negative. The implications of addiction or changes in drug or alcohol usage on the development of conflict are not known. Further research in this area also is indicated.

f. Further research on the subjects of physiological adaptation to various stages of malnutrition, changes that occur with each successive stage, and mass psychological responses to the presence of disease and malnutrition also is indicated. Current knowledge of these subjects is not adequate to permit definitive insights into how malnutrition and incidence of disease affect the propensity of people toward conflict and violence or the effect that dramatic improvements in these fields might have on the attitudes of the public.
NOTES ON RELEVANT ASPECTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY

1. Trends in US policy, World War II to the present. Immediately after WWII the United States hoped to assist in the establishment of an international political and economic institutional framework that would resolve world security and economic problems without the necessity for unilateral US involvement. As conditions in Europe and Soviet practices dashed this hope, US policy found expression in the Marshall Plan and in the Truman Doctrine. The latter stated, "It must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." Thus began a major strand in US policy that emphasized using military assistance and economic aid to counter indirect aggression.

a. As economic and political deterioration and armed insurrection became more widespread, military assistance was added to economic assistance. More countries were offered a combined military and economic assistance program of mutual security. In underdeveloped countries, such programs were based on the premise that their security and that of the United States was inextricably interrelated. The objective was to counter aggression and subversion by assisting in the buildup and support of indigenous military forces and by improving internal economic and social conditions.

b. By the late 1950's, as many underdeveloped countries achieved independence, emphasis shifted in the total US program from military security to economic development; by the early 1960's economic development had become the major element of the program. The captions Decade of Development and Alliance for Progress, as contrasted with The Mutual Security Program, indicate the difference in emphasis.

c. In the more recent past, US foreign assistance policy has been molded by new developments including the following:

(1) Military capabilities and political relations have changed so that the United States, the leader of the West, finds its lead increasingly questioned.

(2) US commitments and problems around the world have increased because of the many new independent countries with multiple problems and louder voices in world affairs.

(3) Generally speaking, many people in the United States now view the Communist threat as having changed and diminished to such a degree that US public sentiment no longer endorses a requirement to confront communism everywhere and every time it may appear.
(4) Hopes for the UN to develop as an agency capable of dealing effectively with international security problems have not been realized. Financial problems, the mid-East crisis, and the controversy over Article 19 of the UN Charter on financial support of UN actions have made it questionable whether UN peacekeeping operations are likely to be successful in the future.

(5) Many of the assumptions underlying the system of US alliances (e.g., NATO, SEATO, and CENTO) have been modified by apparent changes in Soviet tactics and intentions and by Chinese development of a nuclear capability.

(6) The achievement of independence and growing nationalism have forced the closing of some US overseas military bases and put others under increasing pressure.

d. All these developments, combined with emerging domestic problems, have led to a situation in which the United States appears to be limiting its area of foreign policy concern and may be approaching greater selectivity in its international involvements. For example, US assistance programs, both economic and military, are being concentrated in relatively few countries. In 1965 some 90 percent of development aid was concentrated in nine countries; in 1967 some 75 percent of military aid was concentrated in five countries.

e. At the same time, the United States has broadened the base of its aid programs by using multilateral arrangements for extending economic assistance and by emphasizing regional rather than national projects. On the other hand, US involvement in Vietnam represents massive and extensive bilateral US participation. US policy determination for the future appears to require a greater discrimination both in its basic purposes and in the geographic areas singled out for attention.

2. Salient aspects of current US policies.

a. Current US foreign policy is guided by the Nixon Doctrine and is based on the following general principles:

(1) We will honor all our commitments.

(2) Where there is a nuclear threat to the freedom of a nation allied to us, or to a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security, we will provide a shield.

(3) In the face of other attacks, the principal responsibility must be borne by the country directly concerned, with the United States assisting where it will make a difference and where our interests are involved.

(4) The best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform, and to control them with police, paramilitary, and military action by the threatened Government.
(5) We shall evaluate new commitments in the light of a
careful assessment of our national interests and those of other coun-
tries, of the specific threat to those interests, and of our ability
to contain these threats at an acceptable cost and risk.

b. In the case of capital projects and facilities, the United
States now prefers to limit its assistance to financing construction by
the recipient country or its contractors. Supervision is provided by
engineers financed by the Agency for International Development but
employed by the recipient country. Similarly, the United States insists
on self-help on the part of the country and decreasing direct involve-
ment by the United States.

c. There is also a policy trend away from the use of US Gov-
ernment personnel in project and program implementation and toward
greater use of elements of the private US sector, including business
firms, universities, and various specialized private organizations and
institutions (cooperatives, labor unions, special foundations, and the
like).

d. US policy now contemplates selective termination of US
economic assistance. If a country has progressed to a point where
self-sustaining growth is possible with assistance only from such
institutions as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and regional development banks, US bilateral assistance will be
downgraded in favor of a multilateral assistance approach.

e. During the last 5 years (1963-68), US grant-aid Military
Assistance Programs (MAP) in the NATO countries of western Europe have
been completed; the weight of the grant-aid programs has been shifted
to east Asia. In other areas, training and civic action have been
given priority over military hardware, sophisticated combat weapons
have been deemphasized, and the Latin American emphasis has shifted
from external defense to internal security. The Chilean election may
cause reappraisal of such trends for Latin America.

f. In 1966, the Vietnam portion of MAP was transferred to the
regular Defense budget, and certain other Southeast Asian programs were
transferred, as proposed, in FY68, together with the programs for infra-
structure and support of international headquarters. The changing world
situation has caused shifts in thinking in this area in State and
Defense as to who should handle budgets for this type of assistance.

g. The DOD appears to visualize that the trend of military
assistance appropriations for the next 5 years (1968-73) will be down-
ward (but not too severely),* considering transfers of some MAP to other
appropriations. Training and civic action will be emphasized; and phase-
cuts of grant aid will be accomplished wherever possible, with sales, as

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*Appropriations for FY 71 appear to slow the downward trend in the mili-
tary assistance area.
the Congress permits, taking its place in certain areas. Military assistance will continue to maintain certain forces previously equipped and will be used as a quid pro quo for certain base and facility rights, but advanced weaponry for less developed countries will be reevaluated.

3. Possible contingencies and trends.

a. Over the next 20 years the changing world environment will probably profoundly affect Army roles and missions in stability operations. No longer can a simple projection of a monolithic Sino-Soviet threat serve as the basis for establishing US security requirements, nor do most of the underdeveloped countries border on the Soviet Union or Communist China. In many of the underdeveloped countries, internal and external security threats are not related to Communist instigation. The Sino-Soviet schism complicates the evaluation of foreign policies of the two major Communist countries as it affects the underdeveloped countries.

b. Variations in policy guidelines must be related to environmental situations and policy choices that can be predicted for the next 10 to 20 years. Postulated Soviet and Communist Chinese policies will be an important input to evaluation of alternative US national policies. The following situations are illustrative of those that might prevail during the time period under study.

(1) A settlement among the successors to Nikita Khrushchev on the leadership of the Soviet Union and the resolution in Communist China of the internal political questions likely to be heightened by the passing of Mao from the scene. Settled leadership would provide more efficiency in the domestic political and economic programs that underpin the foreign policy activity of the two powers.

(2) A rapprochement between new leaders in the Soviet Union and Communist China. This agreement might be somewhat limited but could be significant in terms of the political and economic viability of both countries and their influence abroad.

(3) The acceptance of a common policy by the Communist countries involved in Europe and Asia. Such a policy could provide the basis for applying power and resources to confrontations in the underdeveloped countries.

(4) A series of unsuccessful developments in the domestic and foreign areas of primary interest to the Communists, leading to the counterpart of "fortress America" and to an introspective posture enforced by mutual antagonism. Such a development could insulate the underdeveloped countries from effective Soviet or Communist influence.

c. Each of the elements illustrated above would affect Communist involvement in the underdeveloped countries and influence the nature of US concern with the Soviet Union and Communist China in the
years ahead. On the other hand, Communist threats to security in the developing nations may not be a major concern 10 to 20 years hence. Impacts on regional security posed by leaders such as Nasser in Egypt and Fidel Castro in Cuba could give rise to requirements for indigenous and US security forces independent of any Soviet or Chinese Communist actions.

d. Instability in some countries may not originate externally or be directly exploitable by external influence—Communist or other (e.g., the situation in Nigeria). The continued urban and rural unrest within countries of Latin America may pose similar threats and call for increased security force capabilities.
APPENDIX VIII (U)

STUDIES OF CONFLICT: A REVIEW AND GUIDE TO CURRENT LITERATURE

Section I. Overview

1. An ever-expanding body of literature has been produced on the matter of social violence and the conditions promotive of convulsive changes in many areas of the world. The continued incidence of social violence has intensified the efforts to define more systematically the particularities of such actions. The fact that political and social phenomena are in a continuous state of more or less rapid flux complicates considerably the problem of making a definitive analysis of the political and social determinants of low intensity conflicts. This problem is exemplified by the absence of any consensual theory of social change and any successful program of conflict control.

2. The quantity of literature given to the systematic analysis of social change and social violence and exhibited in every academic discipline of the social sciences is truly copious even when the focus is narrowed to consider only intrastate warfare and political instability. A bibliography of bibliographies of insurgency compiled by Cornog in 1964 had 20 entries. (Ref: Douglas Y. Cornog, Unconventional Warfare: A Bibliography of Bibliographies.) The bibliography by Condit et al., published in 1963, lists 965 writings on counterinsurgency, all unclassified and in English. (Ref: D. M. Condit et al., A Counterinsurgency Bibliography.)

Section II. Theoretical Studies

3. The vast quantity of material on this subject is almost purely descriptive, some is explanatory, and relatively little is theoretical or analytical in a scientific sense. For an excellent, and recent, critical review of the really salient literature in the field, the little book by Bienen is outstanding. (Ref: Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change: A Review of Current Literature.) This book covers 108 selected items up to 1968. Another very valuable review of the social science literature of revolution is provided by the historian Lawrence Stone (Ref: Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics), and an essay by Wilson compares some 15 classification systems of internal war found in the literature. (Ref: Barbara Anne Wilson, Typology of Internal Conflict: An Essay.)

4. Among the numerous analyses of civil unrest and political development, theoretical works are covered almost exclusively in the above reviews. These reviews show theoreticians at war not only with
each other but with themselves. Broadly speaking, the psychological explanation of social aggression is competing with structural functional explanations. In the latter category, David Apter and Almond and Coleman have been acknowledged as being especially stimulating structural "modelers." (Refs: David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization; Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas.) Chalmers Johnson is practically a structural modeler in that he attempts to relate conditions directly to action. (Ref: Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System.) The ARMLIC study had drawn heavily upon the revised political system model of Almond and Powell (Ref: Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach) and upon Dahl's Modern Political Analysis (Ref: Robert Alan Dahl, Modern Political Analysis).

5. Within the psychological arena, there is competition also. Lucian Pye emphasizes the notions of socialization, Daniel Lerner emphasizes aspirations and empathy, Karl Deutsch proposes to study social mobilization, and Hadley Cantril undertakes to analyze aspirations with an ingenious "self-anchoring" scale in a massive survey research project. (Ref: Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society; Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review; Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns.)

6. More recent and notable additions to the theoretical literature which have appeared since the above-mentioned reviews are works by Coser and Huntington. (Ref: Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.) A splendid book by Gurr, summarizing and integrating a great deal of theoretical and practical work on conflict, appeared as this report was being drafted. (Ref: Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel.)

7. However, there is still another body of literature, comparative case studies and cross-national studies, which is largely absent from the reviews of the literature. Therefore, to complement those reviews, the next sections will survey more empirical analyses of interstate and intrastate war most relevant to the ARMLIC study's special concern for the preconditions of low intensity conflict. Because this part of the ARMLIC study has focused on the preconflict period, these reviews have the same emphasis. Therefore, studies of insurgent conflict, military intervention in politics, coups d'état, international aspects of civil conflict, and other aspects of strife that do not include the preconflict period are not covered here.
Section III. Comparative Case Studies

8. To compare subjects with a view to identifying differences and similarities is, in fact, one of the main categories of research, or technique of learning; however, it has been largely neglected in the study of conflict. (But, then, the study of conflict and social change itself has been relatively neglected in social science.) The table below lists four comparative case study efforts which have been surveyed because of their relevance to the ARMLIC study. They are abstracted in succeeding paragraphs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study investigator</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1967; 1968)</td>
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<td>2. Bloomfield, et al.</td>
<td>1941-65</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Local conflict</td>
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<td>(1967)</td>
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<td>4. Sanger (1967)</td>
<td>1914-67</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Insurgency</td>
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9. Following are abstracts of the studies in table I:


(1) Content: 57 case studies of the use of military force against threats to a government in power; the cases cover the time period 1898-1965 and every major area of the world; the cases included Algeria (1954-62), Angola (1961-65), Arabia (1916-18), Burma (1942-45), Burma (1946-60), Cameroon (1955-62), China (1898-1901), China (1927-37), China (1937-45), Colombia (1948-58), Cuba (1906-09), Cuba (1953-59), Cyprus (1954-58), Dominican Republic (1916-24), East Germany (June 1953), Ethiopia (1937-41), France (1940-44), Greece (1942-44), Greece (1946-49), Haiti (1918-20), Haiti (1958-64), Hungary (October-November 1956), Indochina (1946-54), Indonesia (1946-49), Indonesia (1958-61), Iraq (1961-64), Ireland (1916-21), Israel (1945-48), Italy (1943-45), Jammu and Kashmir (1947-49), Kenya (1952-60), Laos (1959-62), Lebanon (1958), Madagascar (1947-48), Malaya (1942-45), Malaya (1948-60), Mexico (1916-17), Morocco (1921-26), Nicaragua (1927-33), Norway (1940-45), Outer
Mongolia (1919-21), Palestine (1933-39), Philippines (1899-1902), Philippines (1942-45), Philippines (1946-54), Poland (1939-44), Portuguese Guinea (1959-65), South Africa (1899-1902), South Africa (1961-64), South Korea (1948-54), South Vietnam (1956-63), South-West Africa (1904-07), Tibet (1951-60), USSR (1917-21), USSR (1951-44), Venezuela (1958-63), and Yugoslavia (1941-44). It is interesting to note that the coup d'etat was not included nor was counterinsurgency in which conventional warfare tactics predominated (such as the Spanish civil war, 1936-39).

(2) Method: brief studies of events and actors presenting an overview of major strategic and tactical factors bearing on the operations and indicating the complexity of interaction among political, economic, social, psychological, and military factors.

(3) Findings: the findings to date have not been drawn together; the cases simply bring together a data base for further analysis; it is important to note that these published narratives do not in themselves constitute the data base but are capsule statements which give an overview of the conflicts and a guide to the literature.

(4) Conclusions: the study is continuing at present with a comparative analysis of 183 variables (about 50 relating to underlying conditions) drawn from each case; the comparison and analysis of these data were expected to be published sometime in 1970.


(2) Method: in a preliminary effort the 52 cases were arranged in a variety of ways against selected variables in a typologies exercise; conflicts were analyzed in terms of a five-phase model of conflict encompassing a progression from dispute, through violent hostilities, to settlement of the dispute. In the 16 cases selected for detailed study, factors were isolated that tended either to help control the course of the conflict or to make such control more difficult; and policy responses that seemed to support or counter those factors were also identified. 182
(3) Findings: with respect to the typologies exercises: internal conflicts tend to be harder to control than interstate conflicts; the more intense great-power partiality in a local conflict, the more the conflict has resisted prevention, moderation, or termination of hostilities; rough terrain and poor weather conditions, aid to dissidents from neighboring states, and regional political instability contribute to the difficulty of conflict control; and high commitments of adversaries produce conflict hard to control. With respect to the historic cases and relevant to preconflict: the distinction between internal and interstate conflicts becomes blurred when there is direct or indirect involvement of third parties; and over 60 percent of identified conflict control measures were applicable before the dispute had turned into violent hostilities.


(2) Method: a novel experimental analytical computer-based technique was devised to search for patterns of conflict within the context of the five-stage model of Bloomfield et al., (see 9b above).

(3) Findings: with respect to the dispute and conflict phases, prior to violent hostilities: absence of great power or other third party involvement is the single characteristic that most effectively differentiates simple conflict from violent hostilities; the five most critical preconditions of hostilities all had significant elements of third party involvement; establishment of a fully competitive political party system where previously there had been none, and an increase in the level of political integration from "low" to "moderate" were preconditions of violent hostilities; violent hostilities tend to
erupt after a crisis and change in the leadership of one of the antagonists; and violence comes after at least one party no longer feels the issue at hand to be subject to political accommodation.


(1) Content: 9 cases, 1914-67, of insurgency in three categories and excluding coup d'état; cases were Russia (1914-21), China (1921-49), Egypt (1952-56), Cuba (1952-61), Indochina (1945-54), India (1945-48), the Congo (1959-66), Philippines (1945-53), and Vietnam (1954-67).

(2) Method: sweeping narrative description and explanation of the course of events in the selected cases (the "wise man" approach).

(3) Findings: this exposition employs case studies to illustrate "findings" previously made, some of the most significant being: a successful revolution must have a popular leader, and principal indices of coming revolt are "elite disintegration," desertion of the establishment by intellectuals and professionals; etc.

10. Other comparative case studies or reports of such efforts examined in the course of ARMLIC include the following:

a. University of Pennsylvania, *The Challenge of Revolutionary Insurgency to United States Security*. ONR Contract Nonr-551(60), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 1968. This document reports on a multifaceted approach, some components of which were synthesis of social theories of revolution, construction of a ten-stage process model of revolutionary behavior, exploratory simulation; and empirical study of 45 cases of revolutionary insurgency in the Third World since World War II (employing factor analysis). Some of the findings relevant to ARMLIC were: prerevolutionary activity (alienation, withdrawal of political loyalty from the existing system, etc.) seems to begin in urban centers; however, violence tends to begin in remote rural areas; thereafter, urban and rural efforts are loosely coordinated with the population centers providing resource support to rural forces; it did not seem that insurgency could be defined by any measure of absolute or percentage magnitude, nor was magnitude significantly correlated with outcome; the violent stage may be influenced by foreign political decisions; insurgency is more likely to occur in times of socioeconomic turbulence.

led to the conclusion that if specific estimates of attitudes and perceptions of the various parties to the conflict are available, then the range of their most probable actions can be determined, and subsets of feasible and infeasible termination strategies can be indicated.

c. John H. Glover, Identification of Subversive Insurgencies: Latin America (U). McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, April 1969 (SECRET). Separates Phase I subversive insurgent operations into three levels of intensity according to the development of clandestine organizations in Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela during 1960-66. From analyses of raw intelligence on these countries, approximately 100 guidelines or "observables" for intelligence analysts are derived and recorded by level of intensity within the categories of leadership, development of clandestine organization, supply, communications, and external support. Particular attention is devoted to the prehostilities period.

d. John H. Glover, Insurgent Network Analysis and the Caribbean Problem: Intelligence Research in Early Phase I (U). McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, March 1968 (SECRET). Begins the development of an intelligence research methodology intended to shed light on early Phase I insurgent organizations from existing intelligence data. The general problem of intelligence analysis is discussed and Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela are examined as hosts to contraband traffic and subversive operations during the period January 1960-67. Emphasis is on the analytic perspective that can be achieved through the plotting of crime and subversion data on the same area.

e. Richard P. Joyce, et al., Alternatives or Modifications to Present US Advisory System (U). McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, December 1967 (SECRET). Addresses the problem of determining the best method or combination of methods for providing military advice and assistance to nations that seek to improve the internal defense capabilities of their armed forces. Primary emphasis is placed on assistance to friendly developing nations threatened by indirect aggression or internal conflicts and in the period when subversive activity is only latent or in its incipient stage. Consideration also is given to the nationbuilding role of indigenous armed forces in newly emergent nations. The aspects of US military assistance covered include training assistance as well as the activities of US advisory personnel. Assistance in the form of logistical and materiel support provided under the MAP is excluded. Two separate investigations are presented: an analysis of the present US advisory system (focused on a representative group of countries in the major developing regions of the world) with emphasis on its weaknesses and strengths, and a comparative examination using selected examples of the techniques employed by other nations in passing on military expertise to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. Alternatives to the present US advisory system are evaluated in terms of the increase in effectiveness to be obtained and their applicability under the constraints that can be expected to apply in future US military assistance programs.
Recommendations for retaining or modifying the present US advisory system or adopting other systems are offered.

f. John P. Lovell, ed., The Military and Politics in Five Developing Nations, Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, American Institutes for Research, March 1970. This report consists of five case studies of the political role of the military: Ethiopia, Jordan, Pakistan, South Korea, and Burma. It includes an introductory essay by the editor suggesting conceptualization of a research format—that an explanation of the political role of the military depends on the political resources of the military, the political perspectives of the military, and patterns of demands and supports within the civilian sector. Each study presents the history of the Armed Forces, their organization, training, patterns of social recruitment, and values. The political history of each country emphasizes causes of political stability or instability such as sociopolitical divisions or presence of a potential external threat. The politicalization of the military resulting from these internal and political factors has led to incidents of military involvement in politics, including coups d'etat in all countries, and to military governments in three of them; these incidents, and the military governments, are described in detail.

g. Lyle N. McAlister, et al., The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies, Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, January 1970. The political role of the Latin American military is analyzed in four case studies: Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Data came from printed sources and informal interviews. The research method relies on objective description of the phenomenon and related variables rather than on analysis of the appropriateness of a political role for the military. Political action by the military in each country is discussed. Common variables assumed to have explanatory value for each case are: attributes of the political system, social structure, civilian image of the military, professionalism, the military mission, social origins, military socialization, internal cleavages, and historical factors.

h. One other recent contribution to the literature that might best be included in the category of comparative case studies, because it is too empirical and practical to be included under theory and it cites examples, is Luttwak's fine treatment of coup d'etat. (Ref: Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat.)

Section IV. Cross-National Quantitative Studies

11. Quantitative studies of political stability and violence across many nations or polities are almost completely missing from reviews of
the literature. Therefore, since some very relevant contributions have been made which are not critically reviewed or reported in one readily accessible document, a relatively large number of these studies will be reviewed here. Actually, the oversight of empirical studies by the reviewers will probably be corrected shortly due to the prominence of empirical studies in the volumes Violence in America cited below (in 13f(4)(f)) and the new book by Gurr. (Ref: Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel.) In this book Gurr draws on his relatively successful attempt, probably the best so far, to assess and refine a causal model of the general conditions of civil strife. The results of some specific studies by Gurr are abstracted below (in 13h and i).

12. Although it is not cited here, the work of Buck in operationalizing, testing, and analyzing a model combining the structural-functional and evolutionary modes of analysis in the study of societies will be published shortly and it, too, is expected to stimulate much more work. The early work in this line of approach was described in Gary L. Buck and Alvin L. Jacobson, "Social Evaluation and Structural-Functional Analysis: An Empirical Test," American Sociological Review, vol. 33, No. 3, June 1968. Table II summarizes the studies surveyed and serves as a guide to the brief abstracts which follow.

13. These abstracts, listed by author in table II, have been focused to concentrate on findings related to typology of conflict, causes or preconditions of conflict, and stages or processes of conflict.


(1) Content: analysis of 3,973 events of internal violence (13 types of disturbance) for 130 countries and colonies in the period 1946 to 1965.

(2) Method: static and dynamic analysis of the relationship between various social, economic, and political indices and level of violence index.

(3) Findings: in general, the long-term level of disturbance increases with the increase of certain economic and political deprivation measures, increases with suitability for guerrilla war, decreases with regime coercive potential, is highly related to past disturbance levels, is higher in politics with greater than 5 percent of the population discriminated against; sudden increases in disturbance levels predict, within limits, future major disturbances.

(4) Note: forecasting of future disturbances was studied and found to give some promise for further development.
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<th>Study/investigator</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
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(1) Content: data was collected on 309 cases of politically significant violent conflict (12 types of uses of military force) interstate and intrastate, indexed by 37 variables in the period 1944 to 1966.

(2) Method: factor analysis was employed to determine underlying dimensions, or common factors, across all cases of conflict.

(3) Findings: the underlying factors were such that conflict in the period could not be described in terms of a continuum or in stages; i.e., there was no empirically discernible low-level conflict; guerrilla, civil, colonial, and other types of conflict formed separate distinct categories; i.e., guerrilla warfare did not take place simultaneously with domestic turmoil; deadliness of a conflict was a unique factor not necessarily determining the tactics or other characteristics of the conflict.


(1) Content: the principal sources were published conflict data collections by Quincy Wright (30 major hostilities 1945-63); Bloomfield and Leiss (50 conflicts 1945-67); David Wood (80 violent situations involving regular Armed Forces 1945-67); Carnegie Endowment (138 disputes and UN peacekeeping operations 1946-65).

(2) Method: analysis of trends and frequencies of conflicts of the various categories defined in the source data collections; in terms of six descriptors (nine types of dispute); time frequency counts of conflicts (note: nonviolent conflicts in 1968 were originating at about three new cases per year and increasing at a rate of about 0.2 cases per year, and violent conflicts at about 1.5 per year); frequency counts to determine 12 most common "causal" factors (or issues), the 12 most common aggravating circumstances in addition to the effect of weapons available to the disputants.

(3) Findings: the differences between internal and interstate conflict seem to be growing less distinct; it is likely that a majority of internal conflicts in the future will have international aspects, a principal common denominator of which will be border violations; there is a tendency toward a high incidence of internal/interstate...
conflicts in which only one of the states will recognize an international military presence.

(4) Note: an analysis of current 1968 disputes and conflicts (220 in 1968) was projected 10 years and on the basis of the above findings 73 were selected as most likely to become violent hostilities in the 1970's.


(1) Content: data was collected on nine types of domestic aggression against 20 Latin American governments for three time periods 1955-57, 1958-60, and 1962-64 (2 years).

(2) Method: factor analysis of the 1958-60 data identified two dimensions "Organized Violence" and "Anomic Violence." Indices of organized violence (four indicators) and anomic violence (three indicators) were constructed for the 20 countries and standardized across the three time periods. The linkages between the two styles of violence and measures of three independent variables--political legitimacy, systemic discontent, and anticipated retribution--were tested through multiple regression and other techniques.

(3) Findings: anomic violence was strongly related to forces of retribution (being high at moderate levels of coercive force) while organized violence was unrelated; organized violence was most strongly related (linearly) to measures of legitimacy while anomic violence was essentially unrelated. Systemic satisfaction (measured by change in GNP per capita) was negatively associated with political violence; however, the correlation with organized violence was much stronger.


(1) Content: data was collected on 24 types of domestic conflict events and 13 measures of governmental response in all 65 provincial units of Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Panama for the 9-year period 1950-59; also, survey data of psychosocial satisfaction in 21 of the 65 provinces of the four countries (Brazil and Cuba 1960, Dominican Republic and Panama 1962).

(2) Method: factor analysis of the 1950-59 data identified two dimensions of violence--turbmoil and internal war--and three dimensions of governmental response--elite instability, nonviolent response, and violent response; the survey data provided a variety of
measures of personal and national satisfaction and legitimacy; regression equations were calculated for prediction of violence.

(3) Findings: elite instability occurred prior to internal war (probably a causal factor) but changed to cohesion during internal war; elite instability is closely related to turmoil; nonviolent government response is antecedent to internal violence but is stronger in explaining internal war; violent government response is not consistently or strongly related to internal violence; legitimacy is the negative correlate of internal violence, however, high illegitimacy is more strongly associated with internal war than with turmoil; satisfaction is positively related to internal war (supporting the upswing hypothesis) and negatively related to turmoil (supporting the downswing hypothesis).


(1) Content: data was collected on 5,000 events (28 kinds of events of which nine were conflict events) in 84 nations over the period 1948-62.

(2) Method: factor analyses of the conflict variables identified three dimensions of conflict labeled turmoil, palace revolution, and power struggle or purge; a wide variety of socioeconomic data was collected to construct a modernity index, a frustration index, and a permissive coerciveness index; a stability index was constructed for each polity for the period 1955-61, and the relationships among the variables analyzed.

(3) Findings: instability (by their index) varied directly with the index of frustration; high variance in stability (on a year to year basis) was associated with a high rate of change in modernization; however, the higher the rate of change of national income, the greater the stability; in static analyses the best predictor of stability was level of literacy; however, in dynamic analyses the best predictor of instability was change in primary education and the worse predictor was change in literacy; coerciveness was curvilinearly related to stability, with greater stability at the two extremes.

(4) Note: these two sources, cited above, report on a number of studies, viz.,


(1) Content: the data analyzed was political data (68 variables) from A Cross-Polity Survey (115 polities) covering the period, generally, 1959-61; five measures of conflict were added in order to examine the relationship of conflict to other political phenomena.

(2) Method: factor analysis was employed to identify basic political dimensions, and the relation of the conflict variables to these dimensions was studied.

(3) Findings: lack of consensus was most frequently associated with domestic conflict; strong executive leadership was most frequently associated with foreign conflict.

(1) Content: data on civil violence (five descriptors) for 119 polities in the period 1961-63; data was collected along with data for 29 indices (21 instigating and eight mediating) thought to be related to civil violence.

(2) Method: an index, total magnitude of civil violence (TMCV) was constructed; cluster analysis was employed to identify four political clusters of polities, six socioeconomic clusters, four technological development clusters, and four ecological size clusters; finally an analysis of relationships of TMCV and environmental conditions were made.

(3) Findings: the results of the analysis were quite extensive, and suggestive for further work by Gurr noted later herein, but inconclusive; TMCV was the best explained of the dependent variables as follows—log TMCV is curvilinearly related to per capita income being lowest at the extremes, and linearly related (negative) to budgeted central government expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product.


(1) Content: data on approximately 1,200 events of civil violence for 114 polities in the period 1961-65, and data for measures of deprivation, coerciveness, institutionalization, facilitation, and legitimacy,

(2) Method: multiple regression analyses were carried out on the dependent variables (civil violence) for the ten independent measures.

(3) Findings: causal analysis showed that there were direct and important causes of turmoil—long-term deprivation, a history of strife, and the legitimacy of the political system—which controlled (mediated) the effects of all others (short-term deprivation, institutionalization, facilitation, and coercive force loyalty); persistent deprivation was equally potent as a source of conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil.


(1) Content: data was collected on measures of political instability and hostility toward the United States (three measures) for 1958-60 and two independent variables (US economic presence and GNP per capita) for 1956 in 18 Latin American countries.

(2) Method: correlation analysis based on a 3-year time lag between economic data and violence data.

(3) Findings: no significant relationships between US economic presence and hostility and violence; hostility toward the United States and violence were positively related, and violence and revolution were positively related; US economic presence leads to (appears to cause) higher levels of economic development, which in turn is related to revolution (most strongly in nondemocratic countries).


(1) Content: four measures of economic and social development were taken as independent variables, with political violence score as the dependent variable for 82 nations in the period 1948-61.

(2) Method: scales were developed by three techniques of data reduction (the scales were found to be highly correlated).

(3) Findings: four scale positions of violence (the measure of instability) were identified; level of violence was curvilinearly related to social and economic development, being lowest at the extremes and with the greatest amount of violence occurring at middle levels of development; polyarchy (type of polity) was negatively related to violence, and the personalist type of polity had the strongest relationship to violence; traditionalist polities showed almost no relationship to violence; a suggested general model of political instability was proposed with three independent variables—democratization, political development, and economic development, and three intervening variables—associated group strength, coercion, and heterogeneity.


(1) Content: data on 118 incidents involving the use of military force (in six categories) from 1946 to 30 June 1968.
(2) Method: analysis of trends and frequencies of conflict by time, type of conflict, area, and principal countries involved.

(3) Findings: with respect to local conflicts the trend throughout the period has been greatly increasing, with level of development being negatively related to the use of military force.


(1) Content: this anthropological study collected data on 50 societies (from the Egyptians of 1250 BC to African societies of 1950).

(2) Method: three categories of variables (social structure, political organization, and intersocietal relations) were used for their influence on the occurrence of warfare between culturally similar political communities.

(3) Findings: fraternal interest groups and unauthorized raiding parties positively influence the frequency of internal war in uncentralized political systems, but not in centralized ones; the frequency of external war (war between culturally different communities) does not influence the frequency of internal war; i.e., the hypothesis of Coser, Sherif, and others that intergroup conflict creates cohesion within the contending groups was not supported.


(1) Content: data on 314 internal and international wars, 1820-1952, each which resulted in at least 317 deaths; about one-half of the wars were internal.

(2) Method: comparisons were made to test whether life under a common government had a unifying effect by investigating the frequency of internal wars against the number of preceding years of common government.

(3) Findings: the findings were essentially inconclusive; there appears to be a relationship between magnitude of quarrels and frequency of occurrence (number of quarrels inversely proportional, very roughly, to some power of the number of dead); armed strength had no discernible deterrent effect on war; internal and external wars were about equal in number (112 to 137).


(1) Content: 9 measures of domestic conflict were obtained for 77 nations in the period 1955-57, (1963a-65) 10 measures for 105 nations in the period 1962-64 (only 2 years), (1963b).

(2) Method: factor analysis identified three dimensions of domestic conflict--turmoil, revolution, and subversion--for the 1955-57 period; 12 domestic conflict factor analyses by Rummel and others covering various periods from 1837-1964 were compared by means of social field theory.

(3) Findings: from 1963a and 1965 studies: turmoil is a distinct and separate dimension of domestic conflict; subversion and revolution appear as distinct dimensions but not completely separate; from 1963b: domestic and foreign conflict were independent (or practically so); the selected national attributes, foreign war, or belligerent behavior are not good predictors of high domestic violence.


(1) Content: 12 measures of domestic conflict for 113 countries in 1946-59.

(2) Method: factor analysis identified three dimensions of domestic conflict--turmoil, revolution, and subversion.

(3) Findings: turmoil, characterized by unplanned spontaneous events was clearly an independent kind of domestic conflict; revolution and subversion, involving planned behavior, might be two dimensions, or perhaps just one, which might be labeled internal war; in any case, domestic conflict is highly structured.


(1) Content: L. F. Richardson's data (see above) were employed, viz., data on 314 internal and international wars, 1820-1952; the final data collection analyzed was for 779 pairs of belligerents ("dyads") with 21 variables for each.

(2) Method: factor analysis was employed to determine patterns of conflict across all variables, and patterns for nation-state pairs on 12 appropriate variables.

(3) Findings: the findings were essentially inconclusive with respect to internal conflict.

(1) Content: this volume contains data on 133 countries, 70 variables, for the period from 1920-60 (but mostly in the 1950's).

(2) Method: all variables were interrelated, selected plots, profiles, and multiple regressions (linear and curvilinear) were analyzed.

(3) Findings: with respect to domestic violence--GNP per capita had a weak negative effect on violence; however, rate of change of GNP had a strong negative relationship (the higher the GNP the faster the increase in GNP, and the less violence); high voting turnout was associated with violence; life expectancy was negatively related to violence; and inequality of land distribution had a strong effect on level of domestic violence, and, in interaction with the intervening variable "percent of labor force in agriculture," explained a large proportion of domestic violence; violent deaths were less frequent at low and high GNP levels and at a maximum in the middle range.


(1) Content: data was collected covering 1629 disturbances, 600 B.C. and 1925 in 13 polities.

(2) Method: a measure of disturbance magnitude was calculated (four factors); disturbance levels were plotted as a function of time; comparisons were also made among the polities.

(3) Findings: there was little apparent association between the incidence of unsuccessful external wars and internal disturbances, suggesting that the two types of conflict are independent of one another.


(1) Content: this study expands on the previous work with Midlarsky (see above); data for 18 Latin American nations was collected on four measures of external involvement 1953-61, two intervening variables ca. 1960 (urbanization and social mobilization, and the dependent variable of composite (three component) indicator of total magnitude of civil violence (TMCV) 1961-63).

(2) Method: intercorrelation linked analysis on the time lag between the external involvement and the other variables.
Findings: external private investment and total US presence were associated positively with violence; other external economic aid and assistance were associated negatively with violence; US military aid had no direct relationship to violence; urbanization and social mobilization were significant intervening variables in this analysis.


Content: these studies repeat an earlier study by Rummel (1963) but for the years 1950-60, 83 nations, and for the years 1955-60 on, 74 nations common to both the 1955-57 and 1958-60 studies; data was collected on nine domestic and 13 foreign measures of conflict behavior.

Method: factor analysis identified two dimensions of internal conflict (turmoil and internal war) and three dimensions of foreign behavior (war, diplomacy, and belligerency).

Findings: domestic conflict and foreign conflict behavior have only a slight relationship, which increases slightly with a time lag.


Content: data on 278 major internal and international conflicts occurring between 1480-1941 where a legal state of war existed or involved more than 50,000 troops; 78 of these were considered civil wars; several hundred lesser conflicts were listed also, including over 300 in Latin America.

Method: an exceedingly large number of analyses were performed, apparently based on visual comparison and observation of the data sets.

Findings: in modern times the intensity of war is a direct destabilizing influence on the political order; there is a general relationship between internal and external conflict behavior such that external conflict (or threat) promotes internal cohesion and integration.
Section V. Summary of Literature Surveyed

14. Empirical research by social scientists and historians has produced a body of useful information about the kinds of trends and activities that precede and accompany internal violence and political instability. Comparative case studies and cross-national quantitative studies (literature which has been largely neglected in surveys and critical reviews) most relevant to the ARMLIC Study have been surveyed and digested in the preceding sections and are summarized in this section.

15. The common characteristic of all of these studies is the attempt to analyze internal conflict by making broad comparisons of national attributes across several nations or polities (in one case ethnic societies). The studies differed in the number of polities selected, in the problem under study, and in the methods of analysis. But, despite the differences, the attributes selected by the researchers most commonly were a large number of social and economic variables, measures of regime legitimacy and coercive power, measures of deprivation, and again a large number of measures of violence, conflict, and political instability.

16. Several notable findings have been drawn from these studies. The findings must still be considered tentative, but as guides to possible preconditions of internal conflict based on empirical research they have distinct advantages over the unsubstantiated assertions (indeed, in many cases untestable assertions) found throughout the popular literature and in some of the social science literature:

a. That internal violence has structure is clearly substantiated in these studies. That is, there are distinct types of internal violence. Generally these types of violence may be defined following Gurr's terminology (Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel):

(1) Turmoil - relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.

(2) Conspiracy - highly organized political violence with limited participation, including organized political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups d'etat, and mutinies.

(3) Internal war - highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions.

b. That nations or polities may be grouped or classified on the basis of such variables as type of regime, type of economy, and geographical
region has been established in other studies. The studies surveyed here show that certain types of countries may be more prone to violence of one type rather than others.

c. There is evidence of a basic difference between international conflict and internal conflict behavior in the work cited herein, and elsewhere. Several of the studies surveyed show that internal conflict and international conflict do not occur simultaneously with any degree of regularity, and the evidence available contradicts the notion that external war is an outlet for domestic popular frustration and therefore a way of bringing cohesion to a divided society.

d. Several studies contain evidence and indications that the number killed in a conflict, i.e., deadliness, is a separate independent dimension of conflict essentially uncorrelated with other variables in the analyses which have focused on this aspect of the pattern of violence. (An historian has suggested that deadliness of internal conflicts is determined by the qualities and characteristics of opposing leaders.)

e. There is no single indicator (predictor) of internal violence (just as there is no single indicator of the quality or quantity of economic life in a country, or the level of technological development). However, in addition to a typology of internal violence, there are some patterns associated with internal violence: there is a curvilinear relationship between violence and the level of economic development, with the greatest amount of internal violence occurring at the middle levels of development; some indicators of internal violence are instability of the political elite, disaffection of professionals and intellectuals for support of the regime, rapid rate of change of per-capita GNP, a high degree of social mobilization (indicated, for example, by a large percentage of people voting, and large or rapid increases in primary education); there is a near certainty of internal violence associated with persistent, long-term relative deprivation (defined by Gurr as perception of discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities).
APPENDIX IX (C)

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## APPENDIX X (U)

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USACDC Subordinate Command and Agencies (Cont'd)

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The findings presented in this report are relevant to periods which precede low intensity conflict. The report itself covers the first two parts of a five-part study designed to identify factors that lead to loss or lessening of Government control and establishment of a climate conducive to insurgency; to determine Army roles and missions in such situations; and to develop the organizational, operational, materiel, and doctrinal concepts to support those roles and missions. (U)

Extensive literature research, plus thorough examination of all factors present in 7 countries where low intensity conflict occurred, provided the basis for analysis and evaluation of causal situations. A system for recognizing possible causative factors and for evaluating the potential of specific situations was developed. Conclusions were drawn concerning the unique requirements for and restrictions on the use of Army capabilities in low intensity conflict situations, with emphasis placed on possible means for averting or preventing this type of conflict. Recommendations include concepts for organizational structures, specialized training, civil-military relations, and interagency and international cooperation for preventing violence through cause removal or lessening. (U)
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**Title:** Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMILIC): Preconflict Period (U)

**Abstract:** Presents research findings on low intensity conflict literature and preconflict situations. Offers system for identifying causal factors and recognizing nascent threat. Discusses possibilities and limitations in using the military to avert conflict. Examines pertinent Army roles, missions, doctrine, and improved military-assistance capabilities, use, and acceptability.

**Time Frame:** Research: 1920-60. Application: 1971 through 1985, and beyond (open end.)

**Descriptors:** Low intensity operations; Insurgency; Counterinsurgency; Environmental factors; Conflict avoidance; Internal defense and development; Advisory assistance; International logistics; Military assistance; Nixon Doctrine; US foreign policy; Military attaché; Stability operations; Military-civil operations; Military civic action; Special operations; Conditional probability; Operations research; Effective measures. Open-end terms: Low intensity conflict; Modulators.

**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

**Contributes to:** Army 85 Concept Program, par. 120n, ODDG. Contingency planning, conflict avoidance.

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Time Frame: Research: 1920-60. Application: 1971 through 1985, and beyond (open end.)

Descriptors: Low intensity operations; Insurgency; Counterinsurgency; Environmental factors; Conflict avoidance; Internal defense and development; Advisory assistance; International logistics; Military assistance; Nixon Doctrine; US foreign policy; Military attaché; Stability operations; Military-civil operations; Military civic action; Special operations; Conditional probability; Operations research; Effective measures. Open-end terms: Low intensity conflict; Modulators.

Contributes to: Army 85 Concept Program, par. 120n, CGOC. Contingency planning, conflict avoidance.