PEKING'S EVOLVING CONCEPT OF MILITARY SECURITY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

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August 1978
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The Hua-Kuo-feng regime in China has determined a comprehensive program to modernize China by the end of the century, with priority for the development of infrastructure and basic industry and considerable reliance on advanced technology obtained from abroad. The modernization program is based on a return to a Maoist style resembling
that of the 1950's, when China was the beneficiary of a massive transfer of technology from the U.S.S.R. and made rapid economic progress. The disruptive aspects of later Maoism are now blamed on the purged group of radicals led by Mao's widow, Chiang Ch'ing. However, one aspect of later Maoism remains unchanged-the preoccupation with the pervasive military and political threat of the U.S.S.R.

The regime therefore places particular emphasis on military aspects of modernization. It recognizes that the Chinese armed forces, while impressive for their numerical size and nuclear capability, are seriously handicapped by obsolescence of equipment needed for such crucial functions as air defense, transport, and communications. In the military phases of the modernization program, foreign technology will also be important. The emphasis will be on the development of domestic production capabilities through licensing and other arrangements, rather than on the procurement of military end items, except possibly in one or two particularly critical areas such as anti-tank weapons.

The Peking regime follows a threefold military-political strategy, which attempts to compensate ideologically for various military deficiencies. China's rudimentary nuclear deterrent is designed to make the potential enemy understand that in a war he cannot escape serious damage to his cities. The Maoist concept of "People's War" is designed to impress on the enemy the futility of a land war against China, which professes not to be afraid of a better-equipped enemy because of its own human, geographic, and political resources. Finally, the regime is trying to develop as large a common ground as possible between itself and other countries threatened by Soviet "hegemonism" in the underdeveloped world and Western Europe, including Japan and even the United States. The regime hopes to gain international political support, to avoid being isolated in the balance of power, to acquire the needed access to Western technology, and to buy time to complete the modernization process.

The mutuality of interest between China and the United States lies almost entirely in the anti-Soviet orientation of both countries, and is limited by the fact that Peking professes to believe that war with the U.S.S.R. is inevitable and that therefore arms control efforts and other aspects of detente with the U.S.S.R. are not only futile but dangerous.
IDA PAPER P-1356

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August 1978

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IDA Independent Research Program
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The post-Mao regime of Hua Kuo-feng came to power in October 1976 in a military coup that overthrew the radical "gang of four" faction. China's military establishment has subsequently retained a position of influence that is high even by the standards of Communist China, where the military have always played a conspicuous role in national and regional councils. The new regime is leading China in a direction very different from the politically motivated domestic turmoil of the last two decades, and it is attempting to do so while maintaining a measure of ideological and institutional continuity. Hua carries on the cult of Mao, but it is the Mao of the 1950's, when China made rapid economic progress, rather than the Mao of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. The role of professional bureaucrats and technicians, including professional military leaders, is being stressed. Chou En-lai's historical image is being enhanced to a point nearly equal to that of Mao, reflecting the importance of the regime's top administrator, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who is Chou's successor much as Hua is Mao's.

The role of the military establishment in post-Mao China is very complex. There has been an effort to deemphasize the nonmilitary and political aspects of military training and military missions, but the military establishment nevertheless plays numerous parts in Chinese society, and has important functions besides internal and external defense. On the military side, the Chinese armed forces are trained, equipped, and deployed mainly for defensive missions, but Peking also cites directly or by implication a number of other missions for its forces, particularly those pertaining to irredenta:
Taiwan and related islands, South China Sea islands claimed by China, and disputed territory on the southern, western, and northern borders.

The new regime has maintained the overwhelming preoccupation of the Mao-Tse-tung/Chou En-lai leadership in its later years with the strategic threat of the Soviet Union. The Chinese appear to regard the Soviet threat as more disturbing than they earlier found the U.S. threat. In part this is because the Sino-Soviet confrontation is characterized by the viciousness that seems to be generic to fratricidal conflicts among erstwhile ideological allies, and in part it is simply because Peking has less confidence than it did during the anti-American phase in its ability to benefit from the manipulation of tension and to keep within bounds any resulting military crisis. For their part, the Soviets appear to be unsure that their Chinese opponents can be deterred from "irrational" military moves; perhaps for this reason, the Soviets feel compelled to maintain against China a very substantial margin of strategic and theater nuclear as well as conventional forces, which of course add further to China's concerns.

The Hua Kuo-feng regime is attempting to address the Soviet threat more systematically than was possible in Mao's declining years, when radical domestic campaigns often interfered with military modernization and preparedness measures. Peking indicates that the Soviet threat is a long-range and global one, not merely limited to the border dispute, and that therefore diplomatic and political measures as well as military ones are required.

The Chinese armed forces, which are organized in three tiers--field armies, regional forces, and militia--are impressive in size and, of course, in the fact of their nuclear capability. Nevertheless, there are major deficiencies. Aircraft and much other equipment is at least 10 to 20 years out of date. The Chinese Air Force, despite its size, would be no
match even for that of Taiwan, and would be totally outclassed in any conflict with the U.S.S.R. or the United States. China lacks adequate mobility, communications, and defenses against tanks and aircraft. China's nuclear missiles can reach targets in the U.S.S.R. and East Asia, but are slow reacting and vulnerable, and in no way comparable to the weapons the United States or U.S.S.R. can target against China.

The Hua Kuo-feng regime has adopted a modernization strategy largely attributed to Teng Hsiao-p'ing that will deal with military deficiencies as part of a comprehensive program to modernize China's agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century. This is a long-range program that will give priority to infrastructure and other basic reforms. There will be considerable reliance on the acquisition of technology from abroad, with emphasis on the purchase of complete plants, prototypes, and licensing arrangements. China may buy some military equipment to meet particularly critical needs, such as in tank defenses, but generally it is likely to forego such expenditures in favor of developing its own production capability. In addition, China is taking steps to improve its military preparedness by indigenous means, such as better unit and individual training, tightening of command and control procedures, and rationalization of domestic defense production and of manpower utilization. The adoption of such a modernization strategy has clearly not resolved all questions of priorities nor even the question of the feasibility of the modernization goals, given China's limited resources in specialized technology, qualified manpower, and foreign exchange.

In order to achieve these goals, the Hua Kuo-feng regime has adopted a military-diplomatic strategy that combines Maoism with a newly pragmatic approach. First, through its admittedly rudimentary nuclear deterrent, the regime wants to impress upon the potential enemy that in a war he cannot escape serious
damage to some of his cities (in the case of the U.S.S.R.) or the territory of allies (in the case of the United States). Second, by maintaining the Maoist ideology of "People's War," the regime professes that it is not afraid of invasion by a better equipped enemy; the historical analogies are weak, but Peking points to experience in the Japanese and revolutionary wars as evidence that a stronger enemy can be defeated. Third, the regime is trying to create as large a common ground as possible with other countries said to be threatened by Soviet "hegemonism," not only in the underdeveloped world but especially in Western Europe, and including Japan and the United States. Peking hopes thereby to gain political support as well as access to needed Western technology. This three-part strategy is meant to buy time for China to complete the modernization program.

The mutuality of interest between China and the United States lies almost entirely in the anti-Soviet orientation of both countries, and is limited by the fact that Peking professes to believe that war with the U.S.S.R. is inevitable and that therefore arms control efforts and other aspects of détente with the U.S.S.R. are not only futile but dangerous. The United States is likely to disappoint Peking's expectations except at points of direct confrontation with the U.S.S.R., and conversely a moderate and relatively constructive Chinese diplomatic posture is likely to be evident mainly where Soviet hegemonism seems particularly threatening to Peking. Otherwise, U.S. and Chinese interests will continue to diverge, although points of direct controversy are likely to be few—most importantly, Taiwan. Such points may receive occasional diplomatic or propaganda emphasis, but since neither vital interests nor survival of the state are involved, these issues will likely continue to be subordinated where necessary to the effort to obtain from the United States (and Western Europe and Japan) whatever support is possible against the Soviet threat.
I

INTRODUCTION

This paper describes the military security problems that cause concern to the Hua Kuo-feng regime in China and the strategy that is evolving to deal with these problems. What these developments imply for the United States is also discussed.

Chapter II describes the position of the Chinese armed forces in Chinese society and delineates their capabilities for fulfilling various missions, both defensive and otherwise. The third chapter deals with the accession to power through military coup of the Hua Kuo-feng regime and the results of the coup for the armed forces. Chapter IV describes in more detail the new regime's program, aimed, in Chou En-lai's words, at "the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century"--a program that stresses national defense not only as one of the "four modernizations" but also as an important part of the rationale for the other three. It appears from the discussion in these chapters that while in fact much of Mao's thought has been discarded, Maoism as an ideology has not been disowned (members of the purged gang of four are officially described as having been "capitalist roaders," thereby leaving the title to radicalism in the hands of the present regime). The regime stresses the return to basic Maoist

\[1\] Chou En-lai, Report to the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress, January 13, 1975. These principles were incorporated in the new party constitution adopted at the Eleventh Party Congress in August 1977, and were also written into the government constitution at the Fifth National People's Congress in March 1978.
principles said to have been sabotaged by the gang during Mao's later years, but it also stresses continuity by retaining some policies from Mao's final period, particularly those derived from the finding that the Soviet Union is the major military threat to China and that therefore détente with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan is expedient.

The fifth chapter describes the strategic doctrine that is derived from the combination of classical Maoism, perception of the Soviet threat, and new pragmatism. The Chinese Communists often do not distinguish between military and political strategy, and furthermore draw the distinction between military strategy and military tactics at a much lower organizational level than is customary in Western writing. A loose definition of strategy is therefore used, encompassing a range of issues pertaining to conventional and strategic weapons, deterrence, political warfare, and international diplomacy.

The task set in this paper is complicated by the fact that China has no published discussions of its strategic thinking comparable even to literature published in the U.S.S.R. The Chinese material is almost entirely Maoist in nature, and most of it deals with questions of guerrilla war, civil war, and the anti-Japanese war, e.g., the collection of lectures delivered by Mao in Yenan in the late 1930's. The Maoist material available on more contemporary military issues, such as questions about nuclear weapons, is hardly a systematic treatment, consisting of responses to journalistic inquiries or comments made to reporters and diplomats. Additional material became available from time to time when the Sino-Soviet split, the activities of the Red Guards, and leadership purges gave rise to historical analyses and ideological polemics, some of which dealt with military subjects. For example, in 1953 Peking released information on its nuclear program and the role of the U.S.S.R., and in the 1974-75 campaign to discredit Lin Piao, military campaigns from the last stage of the Chinese civil war were analyzed to
demonstrate that successes were due not to Lin's leadership but to directives received from Mao Tse-tung. In the current campaign against the gang of four some material has been published that relates Marxist principles to modern warfare; it is this latter material on which much of this study is based. In addition, occasionally classified publications have become publicly available through U.S. or Taiwan intelligence organizations; the most important body of material of this type dates from 1961, but is nevertheless useful.²

An unclassified study of this kind has to rely heavily on material published for propaganda purposes. Used with discretion, such material can provide insight into the thinking of the Chinese leadership, particularly where the purpose relates to domestic factionalism: family arguments can be very revealing to the neighbors. It is possible occasionally to verify Peking’s declaratory strategy with information about China's military dispositions, procurement, training, etc., that is made publically available by the authoritative International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London and by U.S. Government and other sources.

Another note of caution should be added. The Chinese political situation is not fixed and unchanging. China in recent years has been a kaleidoscope of changes, many of them beyond

the capacity of any analyst to predict, and it would be foolhardy to assume that the present leadership in Peking will remain stable very long—if only because key figures such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Yeh Chien-ying are in their seventies and eighties. (Even while this study was in progress, Marshal Yeh, a principal in the Hua Kuo-feng coup, was "promoted" from the decisive post of Defense Minister to the less demanding but more prestigious post of Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—in effect, chief of state.)

Changes in leadership will be important because the regime depends heavily upon individual personalities. This is not to say, however, that it is futile to make projections, since the basic realities of economics, military balance, natural resources, and the like are relatively stable. The problems that China faces are not new (nor are China's leaders, although they now line up in a different order); the solutions now being tried are a combination of old and new, with no assurance that spectacular, quick success will result.  

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3For an earlier view of the subject, see Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Evolving Military Strategy and Doctrine, IDA Paper P-646.
II
THE ARMED FORCES: MISSIONS AND EQUIPMENT

A. CIVIL INVOLVEMENT

The current heavy involvement of the PLA (People's Liberation Army)\(^1\) in Chinese government and society, as symbolized by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng’s frequent appearances in military uniform, is consistent with tradition in Communist China. The PLA grew out of the military arm of a revolutionary movement in which the lines of demarcation between army, party, and administration were blurred and in which nearly all senior officials originally held military rank, in addition to party or administrative posts. The history of the Communist movement in China is one of civil war (which technically still continues in the Taiwan Strait, although the level of violence has been minimal since 1960). Even the Japanese war had characteristics of a civil war, both in the sporadic fighting between Kuomintang and Communist elements and in the fact that the Communist forces fought against regular Japanese forces in only one major campaign—otherwise they faced Chinese troops of the puppet Nanking regime more often than major Japanese formations.\(^2\) The political element necessarily loomed large in all of these military campaigns,

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\(^1\)The abbreviation PLA is conventionally translated as People’s Liberation Army even though the PLA has since 1949 included three separate services: the army, air force, and navy. To avoid ambiguity, the abbreviation PLA will be used in this paper to refer to the Chinese armed forces, and the term "army" will be used only for that service as distinct from the navy and air force.

particularly since, except in the last stages of the civil war, the Communists fought against enemies who were almost always substantially more numerous and better equipped.

After the Korean war, Chinese military leaders sought (with Soviet assistance) to reorganize the PLA along more professional lines and to modernize its equipment; concurrently, civil administrators moved to establish a more normal nonmilitary government apparatus in China. However, these processes were interrupted in times of turmoil, when Mao called upon the armed forces to assume political and other civil functions: for example, during land reform, communalization, and especially the Cultural Revolution. At these times the armed forces had a dual role, first to stimulate and organize the Maoist revolutionary movement (to act as a "great revolutionary school") and subsequently to restore civil order and economic production. In addition, the armed forces performed more usual civil functions whenever there was an exceptional demand for military organization, manpower, and skills, such as in frontier region settlement schemes, in certain heavy construction projects, at times of natural disaster, or when transport difficulties arose (particularly with railways). The list of civil functions of the armed forces also includes such activities as training recruits in literacy, technology, and political ideology, and producing a considerable percentage of their own food and other commodities. Going even further, the PLA has traditionally operated a variety of civil enterprises (e.g., civil engineering) and has also played an operational role in Chinese society through the assignment of military personnel to working-level posts in schools, universities, and factories. 3

After 1950 Chinese military leaders repeatedly tried to professionalize the armed forces and divest them of functions thought to be more suitable for the civil sector. Some military leaders such as P'eng Te-huai (in 1958) and Lo Jui-ch'ing (in 1965) thereby came into conflict with Mao Tse-tung, whose increasingly radical mood kept the country in revolutionary turmoil requiring military intervention and who, at the height of the commune and "Great Leap Forward" movement, even tried to organize all of Chinese society along military lines. However, at least one military leader, Lin Piao, saw the revolutionary role of the military in Chinese society as the means to attain personal power. Following his abortive coup in 1971, some limits were placed on accrual of military influence, but even so the military role in Chinese society remained a very pervasive one.

In many ways China thus conformed to the pattern of increasing militarization of society that became widespread among developing countries during the 1960's. At the central level, because of the prestige of Mao himself and of Chou En-lai, the leading military figures operated out of the limelight—with the temporary exception of Lin Piao. However, at the regional, provincial, and local level, it was increasingly the military commander who held the balance of power among various elements in the civil administration and in party organs. Hua Kuo-feng's assumption of power and overthrow of the gang of four was essentially a military coup by elements of the PLA and by Mao's special elite guard unit (the mysterious "8341" unit). The leverage the PLA and security forces gained as a consequence represents a variation of, but not a departure from the traditional pattern of military participation in Chinese society.

B. MILITARY CAMPAIGNS

Given the scope of civil action performed by China's armed forces since 1950, the military campaigns conducted in the same
period are somewhat less prominent, although they are no less significant for the impact they had on Chinese military thinking. Peking itself has publicized these campaigns, for example in connection with the 50th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army in 1977, as illustrative of the kinds of missions that may continue to be assigned to the PLA. Peking listed the invasion of Tibet (1950), the Korean war (1950-53), the Taiwan Strait engagements (1955 and 1958)—particularly the seizure by combined air, naval, and ground action of I-chiang Island in January 1955—the India border war (1962), Soviet border engagements (1969), the battle in the Paracels (Haisha) (1974), and various air engagements over Chinese airspace against U.S. and Nationalist Chinese penetration. (The Indochina war has been mentioned in ideological terms, but not as a mission of the PLA except in reference to defense of Chinese airspace.) The implication of such an historical review is clear, since all of the campaigns (except the invasion of Tibet) are incomplete: Peking continues to echo Pyongyang about the continuing danger of war in Korea; its border claims against India have not been resolved; on the Soviet border major troop concentrations are maintained by both sides; the I-chiang battle—the only combined operation involving all three services in PLA history—was cited specifically as a model for a possible invasion of Taiwan; the battle in the Paracels similarly underscored Peking's claims (against Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia) to islands in the South China Sea; mention of other Taiwan Strait engagements and various air engagements further underscored the Taiwan problem. (The more recent tension with Vietnam over the status of the overseas Chinese community should be added to this list of historically based sources of potential conflict.)

C. STRATEGIC THREAT PERCEPTION

Although Peking has a considerable list of irredentist aims, for the most part the PLA's defensive missions have received the
most emphasis. Through the years Peking has perceived various countries as threatening its territory and interests: during the 1950's chiefly the United States and during the 1970's chiefly the U.S.S.R.; during the intermediate decade the two countries were seen as nearly equally dangerous.

No doubt Peking has considered the U.S. threat unpredictable, to a certain degree, but nevertheless the Chinese leaders probably did not regard the danger of an unprovoked attack by the United States as very serious, particularly since the bitterly fought Korean war did not lead to U.S. attacks against Manchuria. Rather, China's concerns were (1) that Chinese pursuit of military objectives against Taiwan or various offshore islands might lead to U.S. involvement; and (2) that the United States might support another Asian state--e.g., Taiwan or possibly India--in dangerous military undertakings against Chinese territory. Peking's anxiety seems to have peaked in 1962, when a variety of indications led the Chinese to conclude that a major U.S.-supported Nationalist landing on the East China coast might be imminent and that it might even be coordinated with an attack in the disputed India-China border region. At that time extremely significant assurances were passed to Peking (principally through the Warsaw ambassadorial talks) that the United States would not countenance a Nationalist attack. Although Peking subsequently may have been concerned that one or another U.S. escalatory measure relating to Vietnam might spill over into Chinese territory, Chinese concern did not again rise to 1962 levels, in part because of further

diplomatic assurances. In time Chinese leaders accepted so completely the fact that escalation in Indochina was not intended to threaten China that the early stages of the U.S.-China rapprochement could take place even during further such escalation. This development of mutual confidence in the face of conflicting aims and policies was one major ingredient of Sino-American détente.

The other essential ingredient was that Peking perceived the military threat from the U.S.S.R. as qualitatively different from the earlier U.S. threat. Peking concluded from the buildup of Soviet forces near the border, the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border engagements, and the subsequent not-so-veiled Soviet hints that Moscow might consider a "surgical" strike against Chinese nuclear installations, that the U.S.S.R. might attack China without specific provocation and probably with a nuclear first strike. This

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5One group of military leaders, headed by Lo Jui-ch'ing, appears to have disagreed with this relatively sanguine estimate and argued for increased defense preparations. Lo's purge over this and other issues is described in Harry Harding, Jr. and Melvin Gurtov, *Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing*, RAND Study R-548-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, February 1971). Lo has recently been rehabilitated, presumably out of respect for his status as one of China's senior military leaders rather than because of his warnings against a U.S. threat; at the same time, Lo's insistence that the primary mission of the armed forces in peacetime is military preparedness (rather than political agitation) has been newly embodied in government policy. See below.

6For example, in June and July of 1969 reports were spreading among diplomats in Moscow that the U.S.S.R. was consulting with its Eastern European allies concerning a contingency plan to destroy China's nuclear installations in Sinkiang. See Golam W. Choudhury, "Post Mao Policy in Asia," *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1977), p. 19. Similar reports appeared in various Western news sources. H. R. Haldeman's account of the episode (*Newsweek*, February 27, 1978) is no doubt garbled, but the basic point—that China and the United States were concerned at the Soviet-planted threats—is valid. For a somewhat more logical speculative reconstruction of events, see Victor Zorza, "A Solution to Haldeman's Chinese Puzzle," *Washington Post*, February 22, 1978.
situation was perceived to be much more dangerous than the earlier U.S. threat, which involved the United States only indirectly and where the danger was one of escalation rather than first strike. The Soviet threat must have seemed to Peking to be much less susceptible to deflection through astute "crisis management."" Peking's alarm at the Soviet threat has subsided somewhat since the early 1970's, and the threat is apparently now seen less in terms of an early border war or nuclear strike than as a long-range, global threat that is aimed first at Western Europe and will affect China particularly if and when the Soviets achieve some of their hegemonic aims. Nevertheless, Peking keeps about 40 percent of total PLA strength deployed near the Soviet border and is proceeding with civil defense measures, in response to Mao's call to "dig tunnels deeply," on a scale exceeding that of the days of Sino-American tension, suggesting less than full confidence that the Soviet threat has been reduced or is at least less immediate. The Soviets maintain not only a formidable strategic capability but have also deployed about a quarter of their total armed forces along


Some of Mao Tse-tung's informal remarks, such as those assembled by Red Guards and published during the Cultural Revolution, imply that it is China and not the United States that starts and stops military crises as the political situation may demand. See for example Mao's "Talks with Directors of Various Areas," November and December 1958, in which he says "Let us also create some tension, so that the West will ask us not to do so. Let the West fear tension, because it will be to our advantage." Joint Publications Research Service, *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought*, JPRS-61269-1(Arlington, Va.: JPRS, 1974), p. 135.
the border. No doubt these deployments, both nuclear and conventional, reinforce the threats perceived in both Peking and Moscow.  

D. EQUIPMENT AND CAPABILITY

Even though China's military establishment is numerically formidable compared to that of neighboring Asian countries, given China's experiences since 1950, the range of "unfinished" military business, and the perceived threat from the U.S.S.R. and/or the United States, the Chinese armed forces must be considered inadequate in terms of equipment and preparedness. The following data, taken from unclassified sources, illustrate the problem.  

Most Chinese military equipment is 10 to 20 years out of date. China would be no match against Soviet (or U.S.) air or naval forces, or against Soviet armored forces. Qualitatively, the Chinese Air Force is also outclassed by that of Taiwan. The PLA is not equipped for long-range operations, either airborne or naval; the operation in 1974 against the relatively lightly defended Vietnamese islands in the Paracel group is said to have taken place at the extreme range limit of supporting aircraft based on Hainan Island. Chinese nuclear missiles can reach targets in the U.S.S.R. and in adjoining Asian countries, including those allied with the United States, but Chinese missiles are vulnerable and slow reacting because of their dependence upon

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cryogenic liquid fuel (although many are said to be emplaced in
caves and other semihardened but unsophisticated sites). In
any case, the Chinese strategic capability falls far short of
the megatonnage that the U.S.S.R. or United States could target
against China. 9

The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports
the following figures for the Chinese PLA: 10

**Strategic Forces**

- 30-40 CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
- 30-40 CSS-1 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
- About 80 TU-16 medium bombers

**Army**

3.25 million men as follows:

**Main Forces**

- 12 armored divisions
- 121 infantry divisions
- 3 airborne divisions
- 40 artillery divisions
- 15 railway and construction engineer divisions

**Local Forces**

- 70 infantry divisions
- 130 independent regiments

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9 These judgments are based on the IISS report cited below; on
Harvey W. Nelsen, "China's Great Wall: The People's Liberation
Army," in Current History (September 1977); on Brown,
United States Military Posture, and on Harvey W. Nelsen, The
See also Chapter 4, "Capabilities and Limitations of the PLA,
" in Angus M. Fraser, The People's Liberation Army (New York:

10 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Navy:
1 0-class submarine
1 Han-class nuclear submarine under test
66 fleet submarines
6 Luta-class destroyers with Styx naval Surface-to-Surface missiles (SSM)
4 ex-Soviet Gurdy-class destroyers with Styx SSM
12 destroyer escorts (4 with Styx SSM)
16 patrol escorts
35 submarine chasers
90 OSA- and 70 Komar-type fast patrol boats with Styx SSM
175 motor torpedo boats (under 100 tons)
100 hydrofoils (under 100 tons)
400 motor gunboats
22 minesweepers
15 landing ship tanks; 16 medium and 15 infantry landing ships; and 400 landing craft
300 port and river defense vessels (most under 100 tons)

Air Force:
About 80 TU-16 and a few TU-4 medium bombers
About 400 Il-28 and 100 TU-2 light bombers
About 600 MIG-15 and F-9FB, 4,000 MIG-17/19, 120 MIG-21, and some F-9 fighters
About 450 fixed wing transports

Naval Air Force:
About 130 Il-28, TU-16, and TU-2 bombers
About 500 MIG-17, MIG-19/F-6, and F-9 fighters

The PLA's obsolescence problem has been getting steadily worse since the break with the U.S.S.R. in 1960. The most technologically advanced aspect of China's military program, the deployment of nuclear missiles, is years behind the schedule estimated by U.S. intelligence agencies earlier in the present decade for testing and deployment of intercontinental range missiles and solid-fueled missiles, and for the number
of medium-range missiles deployed. Similarly, what in 1971 were thought to be important developments in the production of advanced types of aircraft by the Chinese aerospace industry were apparently unsuccessful and production has ceased. The capability of the Chinese Navy is also far below what the number of ships listed above would imply; for example, Chinese submarines are not known ever to have ventured outside of coastal waters. The navy is now said to have suffered particularly from sabotage by the gang of four. While the ground forces are impressive numerically, they lack precisely the kind of modern equipment that would be needed to respond to a Soviet border incursion, e.g., transport, modern tanks, and particularly antitank weapons. That there may even be manpower deficiencies is suggested by the post-coup emphasis on the necessity of training in marksmanship and similar basic military skills, which the gang of four is charged with having subverted in favor of excessive political indoctrination. It appears, for

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11 For example, see Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Defense Report, a statement before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, February 20, 1970, and a similarly titled statement before the House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1971.

In connection with the failure of the Chinese missile program to achieve its goals, reports in the Communist press of turmoil in the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building (considered to be in charge of development and production of missiles) are of interest. The Peking People's Daily reports that as long ago as 1972 it became a particular target of the gang of four. Even after the fall of the gang, diehard elements refused to concede defeat and disruption continued until the so-called "third campaign" against the gang (see fn. 17, p. 27). Only in the spring of 1978 did "an excellent situation in the three great revolutionary movements--class struggle, the struggle for production, and the struggle for scientific experiment--emerge." (People's Daily report, May 29, 1978, in FBIS, Daily Report [PRC], June 1, 1978, pp. 18-22).

example, that prior to 1977 the army had not conducted large-unit training exercises for over a decade.\textsuperscript{13}

The problem caused for Peking by the growing obsolescence of its military equipment is aggravated by the nature of the presently perceived strategic threat. The threat from the United States was susceptible to political manipulation and could be reduced simply by more cautious Chinese policies. However, the Soviet threat is seen by Peking as basically impervious to Chinese actions. Similarly, Chinese armed forces are probably less able to achieve other of Peking's objectives now than they were prior to the break with the U.S.S.R. For example, Taiwan is now probably better able to defend itself against Chinese attack, even without direct U.S. assistance, than it was in previous decades.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13}Nelsen, \textit{The Chinese Military System}, p. 22. Brown, in \textit{The United States Military Posture}, states that divisional and higher level exercises have "recently" been noted.

\textsuperscript{14}See fn. 1, p. 86.
THE HUA KUO-FENG SUCCESSION AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

A. EVENTS OF OCTOBER AND THE RISE OF THE PLA

The extraordinary events of October 1976 that brought the present regime in Peking to power also had an effect on the Chinese military establishment. The military's role in decision-making increased to become comparable to what it was in the period before Defense Minister Lin Piao's abortive coup and death (September 1971), when the latter was Mao Tse-tung's ranking "comrade in arms" and designated successor. Hua Kuo-feng, who has succeeded to Mao's titles and some of his image, is Chairman of the Party and Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, but his most important military post may be that of chairman of the party's powerful Military Affairs Commission. However, except for links to the public security component through his service as Minister of Public Security, Hua has a somewhat tenuous military background—a flaw that Peking's image builders are working to remedy by articles in the media regarding Hua's past military

Statements indicate that nominally the PLA obeys orders issued not by Hua Kuo-feng as Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, but by the party Central Committee and its Military Affairs Commission "headed by Chairman Hua." (Peking Review [9 December, 1977], p. 20.) The current formulation contrasts with earlier descriptions of the PLA as "founded and commanded by the great leader Chairman Mao and the Communist Party of China." Indeed, one of the charges leveled against the late Lin Piao was that he tried to change the formulation to "founded by Chairman Mao and commanded by Lin Piao." (For examples see various PLA anniversary editorials issued annually around the beginning of August, e.g., in Peking Review [August 4, 1972].)
interests. Under Hua, of the four vice-chairmen of the party, only the financial specialist Li Hsien-nien does not have important military titles and functions. China's elder military statesman, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, ranks second to Hua and was Defense Minister until his elevation to Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress with a position equivalent to that of chief of state. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, since his second rehabilitation in the summer of 1977 the most important bureaucrat in the top leadership, is Chief of Staff of the PLA. The fourth vice-chairman is Mao Tse-tung's former bodyguard, the shadowy Wang Tung-hsing, who commands the PLA's 8341 elite guard unit (which had a close relationship to Mao and carried out special security and political intelligence missions for him). Wang is also chief of the General Office of the Central Committee, which also has security functions (and which is the custodian of party documents—a particularly sensitive function at times of factional infighting). Hua and the four vice-chairmen constitute the Standing Committee of the party's ruling organ, the Politburo. Half the members of the Politburo are active military officials, as are almost a third of the entire Central Committee.  

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2For an example of this image building, see the February 22, 1977 article in the Hunan Jih-Pao by the CCP Committee of the Hunan Military District, entitled "The wise commander Chairman Hua leads us in advancing victoriously," which describes Hua's military activities while he served as an official in the Hunan provincial government. English version in FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), February 23, 1977, pp. E-11 to E-14.

What happened during the Hua coup has emerged gradually. On October 6, 1976, less than a month after Mao's death, Public Security Forces commanded by Wang Tung-hsing and regular PLA forces organized by Yeh Chien-ying moved with striking speed to arrest the leaders of the so-called radical faction—Mao's widow, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen, and some others—allegedly to preempt a seizure of power by this gang of four. The radicals had some bases of support, including Shanghai (homebase of the gang) and the Manchurian province of Liaoning (base of Mao's nephew and accomplice of the gang, Mao Yuan-hsin). They also had supporters within the PLA and, it is now alleged, even within Public Security organs (especially in Shanghai, Peking, and Liaoning Province). However, most of the gang's military supporters held political rather than command positions—chiefly through Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's position as Director of the PLA General Political Department. They also had control of some urban militia, e.g., in Shanghai, and were influential in some regional military forces. However, Hua's coup took place too rapidly for any of this support to be of any use. Another factor in Hua's success,

"See Ting Wang, "Trends in China," Problems of Communism (July-August 1977); China News Analysts (September 2, 1977); Ronald Suleski, "Changing the Guard in Shanghai," Asian Survey (September 1977); "Change of Rule," China News Analysts Numbers 1059, 1060, 1061 (November 5, 12, and 19, 1977), and various articles and chronologies in Issues and Studies, Taipei (1976-77), particularly the article by Warren Kuo in the July 1977 issue. Some of these events are also described in Peking media. For example, on the role of the 8341 unit, see an article by the Theoretical Study Group of the Ministry of Public Security published in the November 28 issue of the Peking People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao), translated in FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), November 29, 1977, p. E-1.

in addition to the effectiveness of the PLA and Security units, was that it was widely assumed that the radical faction lacked an adequate power base, other than the ideological underpinnings and other support provided by Mao Tse-tung, and that the faction would eventually lose out in the power struggle anticipated after Mao's death. The speed with which that struggle developed was not expected, but once it became clear that Yeh Chien-ying and the military and security establishment supported the coup, only a few of Chiang Ch'ing's supporters were willing to resort to violence on her behalf.  

B. THE HUA KUO-FENG CONSTITUENCY

It has been customary when leaders fall from power in Communist China for the survivors or successors to circulate elaborate dossiers on the activities of the fallen. In the case of the gang of four, informal charges were circulated as press articles; a formal Central Committee dossier, including photographic reproductions of particularly incriminating documents, was distributed within the Party. All of this was...
accomplished with unusual speed, no doubt because Hua Kuo-feng believed he could create a constituency beyond the initial coup coalition by listing all the elements of Chinese society against which the radicals had committed "crimes." The gang was charged with responsibility for everything that has gone wrong in China in recent years, including even the heavy damage from the Tangshan earthquake (because they sabotaged earthquake warning and relief work), but a particularly interesting and prominent group of crimes relates to the Chinese armed and security forces and reads almost like a catalog of military grievances. The accusations that the gang had plotted against professionalism in the PLA, against plans to modernize and strengthen individual services, against the specialized duties of the security forces and judicial system, and even against China's advanced weapons programs (by sabotaging scientific research), were intended to repay the military for its role in the coup and consolidate military support for the Hua regime, since presumably what the gang opposed, Hua supports.

It is understandable that once the gang and its "very few" supporters were removed from political life, the new regime would try to create an image of national unity, and the current unity and integrity of the military and security establishments would be stressed. Unfortunately, the situation is not so well resolved, and increasingly the PLA itself has taken the lead in calling attention to the need for purges or at least a rectification of command and control procedures to eradicate vestiges of the gang's influence. Much of the ideological and policy line represented by the gang was supported by Mao (sometimes Chinese, in referring to the gang of four, will hold up five fingers to signify this fact), and must have had substantial civilian as well as military appeal in a country whose problems and contradictions have no ready pragmatic solution. When Hua Kuo-feng postponed the National People's Congress until March 1978 (in itself an indication of unresolved political problems),
he specifically called for intensified investigation and pursuit of followers of the gang—and it became clear at that time that the military and security establishments were not to be exempt. The need for investigation of the PLA establishment was rationalized by charges that past criticism and purges of "capitalist roaders in uniform" were falsely instigated by "sworn followers of the gang" to undermine the unity of the PLA and to enable the gang to seize control; these instigators, it was said, must be discovered and routed out. Going somewhat further, the PLA journal Liberation Army Daily began early in 1978 to publish sharp attacks on unnamed military and civil leaders who had collaborated with or accommodated to the "plots" of the gang of four. The commentaries specifically identified three factions: those who "slip away" (evade responsibility for errors); those who "follow the wind" (are too responsive to the political climate of any given moment); and those who engineer "earthquakes" (foment disturbances for careerist reasons). The

8 On October 6, 1977 the People's Daily, the journal Red Flag, and the Liberation Army Daily carried a joint editorial entitled "Carry through to the end the great struggle to expose and criticize the gang of four." The article said that the gang still "manifests itself in economic, political, ideological, cultural, military, and party affairs" and that the gang's influence must be "exposed and criticized in each specific area." In the PLA, the movement to do so is entitled "The Ten Shoulds Or Shouldn'ts." FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), October 6, 1977, pp. 1-3. See also Hua Kuo-feng's speech to the Standing Committee of the 4th NPC, October 23, 1977, in Peking Review (November 4, 1977).

"majority" of the three factions were said to have committed errors that come under the heading of "contradictions among the people"—meaning they are rehabilitable. In any case, persons in these categories were neither to remain in nor to be given leadership posts.\(^\text{10}\)

Despite the ominous tone of some of the commentaries cited above, there have in fact been only a limited number of command changes in the PLA since the fall of the gang. Possibly many of the followers of the gang within the PLA, other than those in the General Political Department, were small fish who could be rehabilitated with a simple warning. Also, many of the commentaries refer to unsuccessful attempts by the gang to seize control of various components of China's military establishment. Improvements in command and control procedures are apparently being instituted as precautionary measures to guard against any similar attempts in the future. Who controls the armed forces is, needless to say, a sensitive and important question in so highly a militarized society as China's, particularly one with a nuclear arsenal, small as it may be, and the events which have occurred when control broke down in the past are not particularly reassuring.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^\text{10}\) The three key articles, which subsequently occasioned numerous commentaries, letters to the editor, etc., were: "Initial Analysis of the Features of those who follow the Wind," (FBIS, Daily Report [PRC], January 11, 1978, pp. E-1 to E-5); "Advice to the 'Quakers'" (those who cause earthquakes), (FBIS, Daily Report [PRC], January 18, 1978, pp. E-1 to E-3); and "Portray the People of the 'Slip Away Faction',' (FBIS, Daily Report [PRC], January 12, 1978, pp. E-1 to E-3).

\(^\text{11}\) Nelsen attributes two such incidents, the 1967 mutiny at Wuhan and the 1971 coup attempt by Lin Piao, to failures by the General Political Department and by the Guard Unit of the Central Military Commission (that is, Wang Tung-hsing's 8341 unit) which, interestingly, ended up on opposite sides in the gang of four affair, the GPD being then under the direction of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. Whether breakdowns in control have ever actually extended to control of China's nuclear weapons is another question. Nelsen points out that the Second Artillery (presumed to be in charge of China's ballistic missiles) is staffed in part by former public security officers, (continued on next page)
It is possible that this precise point has also been of concern to Moscow.\(^1\)

It will not be a simple matter to eliminate completely the residual influence of the gang throughout China, since the radicals, with Mao's support, had determined much of China's ideological and cultural life for over a decade. Even the past positions of most of China's present leaders are ambiguous. Hua Kuo-feng himself was presumably selected initially as Acting Premier not because he was a leader of a "pragmatic" faction, but because he had not been involved in factionalism and was acceptable even to the radical group.\(^2\) Wang Tung-hsing, whose support for Hua in the coup was crucial, had an especially close relationship to Mao and some connections with Chiang Ch'ing—he appears to be a relatively recent convert to pragmatism.\(^3\) Yeh Chien-ying, if current accounts are to be believed, was distrusted by the radicals but supported some of Mao's radical policies. The one prominent and consistent pragmatist and therefore perhaps the most important personality in the new regime is Teng Hsiao-p'ing; yet it took the Hua regime many

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\(^1\)Rothenberg, in *Whither China* (p. 106) says, "What may be another fear—though only once articulated in the Soviet press—is the problem of how control would be exercised in case of a political upheaval in China. This was posed in a Czech article reprinted in *Za Rubeshom* in 1972. In the context of the rising Chinese nuclear threat, the article noted the political instability then evident in China and declared that the question is justified: would effective control be secured over weapons of mass destruction?"

\(^2\)There has been speculation that Hua was originally the fifth member of the radical faction, who defected to the bureaucratic-military faction only after Mao's death. See Jurgen Domes, "The 'Gang of Four' and Hua Kuo-feng," *China Quarterly* (September 1977), pp. 473-97.

\(^3\)See *China News Analysis* No. 1096 and other material on Wang cited in fn. 3 above.
months to restore Teng to his position—this despite signs that Teng had great influence and widespread support in the bureaucracy and within the military establishment, including powerful regional military leaders such as Wei Kuo-ching (now head of the PLA General Political Department) and Hsu Shih-yu in Canton (where Teng is said to have taken refuge while his status was being debated).

As part of its demonstration of unity, the Hua regime has rehabilitated not only Teng Hsiao-p'ing but numerous other victims of past purges, including particularly military commanders. Since China's present leaders were involved in these past purges, rehabilitation is often awkward, implying criticism of Mao Tse-tung and of those who were close to Mao or who now base their political legitimacy on Mao's legacy. Unjustified purges are now blamed simply on the gang or its sworn followers, but in fact purges were approved or at least condoned by Mao with the active support of officials who are still in the Peking hierarchy. Rehabilitation has understandably not been extended to Lin Piao, to whom the gang is consistently linked in retroactive guilt by association (particularly when the context is a military one). Perhaps this is because Yeh Chien-yng, Hua Kuo-feng, and Wang Tung-hsing were personally involved in investigating the Lin affair for Mao. Rehabilitation also has not been extend to P'eng Te-huai, the Defense Minister purged in 1958 in part because of his protest against the radical policies favored by Mao at the time; although many of P'eng's views are consistent with those of the present regime, the important role of Yeh Chien-yng (as well as Hua Kuo-feng) in P'eng's purge may likewise prevent his rehabilitation.15

15It has been reported that Hua Kuo-feng was promoted to Secretary of the Hunan provincial party committee because of his support of Mao Tse-tung in the purge of P'eng Te-huai. Hua first rose to prominence at the central level at the time of the Lin Piao affair, when he was named to the ad hoc investigatory committee, along with Yeh Chien-yng, Chang (continued on next page)
C. MILITARY VIEWPOINTS AND FACTIONS

The revelations made in the aftermath of the purge of the gang confirmed much outside speculation regarding factionalism in Peking, particularly the radical versus pragmatist cleavage (and existence of a possible middle faction that at times remained neutral and at other times shifted its allegiance opportunistically--Hua Kuo-feng is said originally to have belonged to such a faction). Although they were correct once, it is nevertheless hazardous for China watchers to construct new models of post-gang factionalism (this is not to say that there are now, as claimed by the regime, no more factions; that would be absurd in the Chinese political environment). It may, however, be useful to consider the military viewpoints--which do not necessarily represent antagonistic factions--that the Peking regime will have to take into account.

1. Hua and the Maoists

The purge of the gang and the new regime's pragmatism has not eliminated Maoism, but has simply changed the emphasis. For example, the publication (in Volume V of Mao's works and elsewhere) of carefully selected Maoist documents, mostly from before 1957 and some not previously published, presents a much more moderate Mao than the Maoist "sayings" that were stressed since the Cultural Revolution. But Mao's ideology pertaining to military affairs and global strategy remains intact, most of it specifically reaffirmed and in some cases amplified in authoritative publications since Mao's death. Hua Kuo-feng, as the self-proclaimed legatee of Mao and as the editor-in-chief of Mao's works, aspires to a position that is above factions and above difficult day-to-day decisions and allocations of

*(cont'd) Ch'un-ch'iao, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Wang Tung-hsing, Chi Teng-k'uai, and Li Te-sheng, according to documents released in Taiwan. See the biographical sketch of Hua Kuo-feng published in *Issues and Studies* 12(3), Taipei.*
resources. Maoism lends itself to such aspirations, just as it did in Mao's lifetime. Hua has not claimed authorship of any ideological works, but it is nevertheless reasonable to associate his name with current efforts to systematize Maoism. Hua's position, relying on such formulations as People's War and the Three Worlds thesis, is likely to be one that stresses long-range modernization plans and the permanence of external threats facing China, rather than quick solutions and imminent dangers.\(^{16}\)

2. **Wang Tung-hsing and Public Security**

Possibly Wang and the public security organs gained the most from the Hua coup. Wang's interests as a member of the military establishment may differ from the interests of those who are concerned mainly with external threats. Peking's emphasis on the need to "investigate" followers of the gang who are still hidden within the military-bureaucratic establishment points to the probability that Wang's type of viewpoint will continue to be important.\(^{17}\) There is likely to be a tightening of organizational

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\(^{16}\)These ideas will be elaborated in the next chapter. In addition to works reproduced in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume V, particularly "On the Ten Major Relationships," note the editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," published as a pamphlet by the Foreign Languages Press, and also in *Peking Review* (November 4, 1977). The latter is an elaborate rebuttal, with 90 footnotes and numerous appendixes, of Soviet charges that Mao's Three Worlds thesis is anti-Marxist. It constitutes the most definitive ideological rationalization of China's global strategy in at least a decade.

\(^{17}\)Peking has described three phases in the struggle against the gang of four. The first phase, from October 1976 through the spring of 1977, was to "expose and criticize the gang's conspiracies [to] usurp Party and state power"; the second phase, starting in March 1977, centered on exposing the gang's "counter-revolutionary features and its members' past criminal record." The third phase, in the fall and winter of 1977-78, is to "expose and criticize, from the theoretical plane of philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism, the ultra-Right essence of the gang's counter-revolutionary revisionist line and its manifestations in all fields." *Peking Review* (January 1978). See also *China News Analysis* No. 1104 (December 23, 1977), "Phase Three: Vendetta."
lines in police and security organs, presumably to Wang's benefit, following charges that the gang used a variety of means to imprison, torture, and kill those who stood in its way.\(^1\)

3. Regional Commanders

By various means, including occasionally shuffling regional commands, Peking has traditionally sought to curtail the independent power that regional commanders tend to accumulate. Nevertheless, because of linkages between party and army, many of the regional leaders have considerable leverage, as is illustrated by the above-mentioned almost public lobbying for Teng Hsiao-p'ing's return.\(^1\) (Since then, many Teng supporters

\(^1\)In November 1977, as part of the third phase of the campaign against the gang, the Hua regime began extensive publicity concerning alleged efforts of the gang to pervert to their own ends the organs of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," e.g., public security organs and forces and the judiciary. Peking's commentaries emphasized that according to Mao's directives, "dictatorship" should be exercised over "embezzlers, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, criminal gangs, smashers, looters, and bad elements ... as well as over imperialists, revisionists, counter-revolutionaries, and the secret agents and spies of the Chiang gang" but never against the "people" and particularly not against the party. The gang allegedly also tried to transform the militia into an organ of personal, "fascist dictatorship." These charges were discussed at provincial-level meetings of public security and militia cadres. (Some press reports have interpreted these commentaries as criticism of Wang Tung-hsing himself, but this seems to be a far-fetched conclusion.) See citations in fn. 3 above.

\(^1\)Parris Chang has noted that two-thirds of the military members of the Central Committee have provincial or regional assignments, and that of the total Central Committee almost 70 percent have regional assignments, military or civilian. This reverses the situation of the 1950's and 1960's, when central organs were overwhelmingly represented. Dr. Chang notes that this situation could lead to greater local assertiveness, particularly when some of the towering and overaged figures in Peking die, such as Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. See Parris H. Chang, *China's New Leadership Lineup*, Department of State External Research Study INR/XRS-18 (August 26, 1977).
Regional leaders would naturally view the allocation of military assets and priorities for military modernization differently than most leaders based in Peking.

4. Yeh Chien-ying and the Center

Yeh is representative of the old professional class of military leader, and has long been an outspoken advocate of military modernization. Yeh is not likely to have had much patience with Maoist rationalizations for military inadequacy. He represents the central Peking leadership of the PLA, so much so that some observers consider him a national rather than simply a military figure. Yeh ranks second to Hua, but commands much more respect as Peking's elder statesman. His standing is strengthened by the emphasis in China's press on military history and on charges that the gang tried to shunt aside the older generation of Communists (including specifically Yeh) under the pretext of combating empiricism ("experience-ism" is the literal translation of the Chinese): the gang is said to have maligned the older Communists by charging that since their experience dates from the pre-socialist (that is, capitalist) period, they themselves tend to be capitalist-roaders.

5. Individual Services

Service rivalry in China is not comparable to that in the United States, since all services are components of the PLA and originally derived from the army; senior officers of all services began their careers as army officers. Nevertheless, some of the

21 For example, see various references to Yeh in Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1962). Mrs. Hsieh describes Yeh as then favoring military modernization, even procuring equipment abroad if necessary.
allegations against the gang imply that service rivalry may be an issue. The gang is said to have plotted particularly against the navy as part of a "continentalist" strategy\(^\text{22}\) (perhaps not irrational for a country in China's position, but understandably not to the liking of ambitious admirals and those who emphasize overseas irredenta like South China Sea islands and Taiwan). The gang is also said to have obstructed the acquisition of foreign technology, which might handicap the air force particularly. Even if service rivalry in the sense that we know it is not involved, since military modernization is high on the agenda, Hua Kuo-feng and Yeh Chien-ying will not be able to avoid the fact that each service will have a different idea about how resources should be allocated.

6. The Modernizers

We do not contend here that there is a factional dispute in Peking involving Hua Kuo-feng on one side and Teng Hsiao-p'ing on the other; a conservative reading of current evidence not only does not support such a thesis, but rather points to a collaborative relationship. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that it is Teng and the associates of Teng who are prominently identified with all aspects of modernization, particularly in areas related to national defense. Many of these leaders have, like Teng, run afoul of the Maoists for their advocacy of a highly pragmatic approach to modernization, including procurement of technology from abroad; many technicians and modernizers have no doubt been rehabilitated through Teng's influence. If

\(^{22}\)Peking NCNA in FBIS, *Daily Report (PRC)*, March 16, 1977, p. E-1. Although cutbacks in naval construction were blamed on the gang, they actually date from the fall of Lin Piao, who apparently favored the navy over other services in allocating construction funds. For more information on naval involvement in factionalism, see Comdr. Bruce Swanson, USN, "The PRC Navy--Coastal Defense or Blue Water?", *US Naval Institute Proceedings (Naval Review 1976)*, pp. 83-107.
these persons do not constitute a faction, they almost certainly
do represent a distinctive viewpoint, comparable to the others
mentioned above.\textsuperscript{23}

Conflicting viewpoints such as those listed will not be
easily reconciled by the new Hua regime, given the substantial
political power now held by the various components of the mili-
tary establishment. The Hua regime has tried to stress Mao's
dictum that the party must command the gun, and never vice versa,
but the fact remains that Hua owes his position to those who
wield the gun and that it will be a long time before he can
accrete the kind of independent charismatic power that Mao held--
and even Mao at times was outmaneuvered by opposing bureaucratic
factions.

\textsuperscript{23}If modernizers constitute a pro-Teng faction of sorts, then,
in view of recent appointments, the regional leaders could
constitute another pro-Teng faction.
IV

ISSUES IN CHINESE DEFENSE MODERNIZATION POLICY

Peking's actions and statements indicate that the new leadership is committed to a program of comprehensive modernization. Modernization has always been a goal of the Peking regime, but at times, such as during the Cultural Revolution and during Mao's last two years, priority was given to the doctrinaire concerns that preoccupied the radical faction. The Hua regime appears to be united in the determination that modernization will again be accorded top priority and will be pursued according to general guidelines drawn from policies followed in the 1950's during the period of Soviet-aided modernization, from Chou En-lai's 1975 speech (quoted in Chapter I), from plans drawn up in 1975 under the guidance of Teng Hsiao-p'ing before his second purge, and from an "enlarged" session in the same year of the party's Military Affairs Commission in which Teng took a leading role. The Hua regime appears to be united also in the determination to emphasize the military elements of the modernization effort, in order generally to make China better able to deal with the threat perceived from the U.S.S.R. However, many questions of allocation and priority remain unresolved, including the question of how to combine various costly "quick fix" measures with the long-range, more methodical approach that seems to be preferred by the Hua regime. These questions involve judgments of how immediate the threat of Soviet aggression against China is likely to be and whether a long-range approach is an acceptable risk. It is also abundantly clear that ideology will not be abandoned; there will be limits on how far doctrine will be stretched to accommodate reality, as well as debates about these limits.
A. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

One of several recent Chinese political spectaculars was the national conference in March 1978 on science and technology, called pursuant to rediscovered instructions from Mao in 1958 that the scientific and technological revolution is "one of the important aspects of the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat."  A Central Committee circular issued in September 1977 provided the details. The circular outlined new policies that were incorporated in a plan approved by the Conference. While the whole range of science and technology in China was dealt with, from innovations developed by peasants and workers to nuclear physics, the circular revealed a heavy military emphasis. Only China's nuclear, missile, and space achievements were cited as evidence that much has already been accomplished, and a major aim of the program is stated as to "greatly strengthen our national defence and ensure that our state of the dictatorship of the proletariat will always remain invincible."  The circular placed responsibility for the mobilization of science and technology on departments under the State Council, units under the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee (presumably the Defense Science Committee in particular), and provincial-level party committees; also, a new State Scientific and Technological Commission was established. Through the jargon, there emerged in the circular and in related commentaries a pragmatic approach that leaned heavily on an "Outline Report" on science and technology that was prepared by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1975 under Teng Hsiao-p'ing's direction, and that was subsequently denounced in media controlled by the radical faction as a dangerous "poisonous weed."  It is likely that Teng and Yeh Chieng-yung, who also has long been associated with modernization proposals, will take a leading role in developing the new policies.

Peking recognizes that China suffers from an acute shortage of scientists and high caliber technicians. The proposed remedies begin with educational reforms, such as the resumption after a lapse of a decade of college entrance examinations and of postgraduate training.\(^2\) Also, the utilization of scientists and technicians is to be rationalized through the promised elimination of political harassment and assurances that scientific personnel will be given work in their own field, such persons will be permitted to devote at least 5 days out of 6 to their work, scientists will not be held to excessively high political standards, scientific units will be directed by "experts or near-experts," appropriate titles will be restored for scientific and technical specialists, and scientific truth will not be judged by inappropriate Marxist principles. Such assurances reflect the magnitude of the reforms needed in Chinese science and technology.\(^3\)

The military focus on science was celebrated, in a neo-Maoist fashion, in a four-line poem by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying entitled "Storm the Gate":

> Attacking the city wall, not fearing its hardness;
> Attacking books, not fearing difficulties;
> Science has its dangers;
> Hard fighting can pass the key point.


Yeh's poem inspired a response by the Chairman of the Defense Science Committee and Deputy Chief-of-Staff, the 70-year old Chang Ai-p'ing, who noted—in a unique fashion—the world controversy over the neutron bomb. Chang's contribution is entitled "All Hardships Can be Overcome—On Reading Marshal Yeh's Poem 'Storm the Gate':

Making steel from an alloy is not hard;  
And making neutron bombs is not difficult;  
With so much talent studying science and technology;  
All hardships in the world can be overcome.

Peking's preparations for the science and technology conference characteristically emphasized the military component of modernization. However, when the conference met in March 1978, this military emphasis was somewhat muted, perhaps out of deference to the civilian nature of the almost 6,000 representatives gathered, or possibly as part of a policy decision to emphasize the long-range, infrastructure, and basic-research aspects of scientific and technological modernization. Even in regard to nuclear research the civilian applications side was underscored; in an article published shortly after the conference the Atomic Energy Institute conceded that in its initial years it had had no time for developing civilian applications and that even after successful nuclear tests, disruption by Lin Piao and the gang of four interfered with the proper balance between military and civilian projects. However, Chou En-lai is said to have instructed the Institute that "development of atomic energy is not limited to exploding atom bombs"; subsequently plans were formulated for serving both military and civilian purposes, and these are now to be implemented. More


recently the balance has been restored, with commentaries stressing the military and strategic aspects of science and technology.

Peking considers scientific and technical modernization to be a prerequisite for fulfillment of the rest of its modernization program and to that extent is taking a long-range view. However, carrying out the program will require resolution of a number of problems with which the Peking regime has been chronically unable to deal, such as how much latitude should be allowed for basic research as opposed to applied research, for intellectual contacts abroad, and for dissent from official policies. Current pronouncements from Peking hold out the promise that a period of "100 flowers blooming and 100 schools of thought contending" will follow in China. Intellectuals who lived through the last such period in 1956-57 found it a far from pleasant experience because Mao's apparent encouragement of dissent was followed by harsh "antirightist" suppression, raising suspicions that the entire episode was part of a scheme to trap dissident intellectuals. (The "rightists" of 1957-58 are now being rehabilitated, including over 100,000 who reportedly spent the past two decades in some form of custody and have now been released and restored to their jobs where possible.) There is far more dissidence beneath the surface in China today than there was in 1957, and how to elicit a flowering of intellectual life without stimulating dissidence will remain a problem, particularly for security-minded officials like Hua Kuo-feng and Wang Tung-hsing, whose toleration for dissent has not been so great as, for example, Teng Hsiao-p'ing's. However, it is to be expected that an attempt will be made to rehabilitate China's educational system and utilize China's scientific and technical manpower resources more rationally. China's nuclear and space achievements have already demonstrated

that at least insofar as narrow military applications are concerned, science and technology can develop despite a constrictive intellectual atmosphere. 7

B. DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Industrial modernization, the second of Chou En-lai's four modernizations, is closely linked to the development of science and technology. In some ways it is an even more complicated and controversial problem, involving questions relating to worker discipline and incentives, allocation of investment among various branches of industry, improvements in infrastructure (e.g., transport), and procurement of advanced technology and plants from abroad. In addition to these matters, defense related industry has its own set of problems, derived from the need to utilize the highest level of technology. The question of obtaining such technology from abroad is particularly sensitive for a China that aspires to "self-reliance" as well as for the source country—doubly so when military technology is involved.

The Hua Kuo-feng regime established guidelines early for allocating resources to the various facets of industrial modernization. The controversial nature of these guidelines is indicated by the fact that they were not presented in the form of a straightforward planning document; instead, Hua resorted to a device that has since become familiar, first publishing a suitably selected document by Mao Tse-tung—in this case a newly-edited version of a speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships," that was delivered in April 1956 and was previously circulated in various draft versions but never as an official public document. While Mao's authority is difficult to argue with in China, the speech and related publicity do not appear to have resolved all controversy, which

7 Regarding this point, however, see fn. 11, p. 15.
continues to manifest itself in the various occult ways familiar
to China watchers and newspaper readers. Nevertheless, the
guidelines in Mao's document appear to constitute the main
thrust of the regime's policy and are therefore worth noting.

Mao's speech deals with 10 major issues, of which 6 pertain
directly to the problems of industrial modernization and prior-
ities; in general, Mao's approach is one of balance and
proportion, particularly in comparison with the excesses
attributed to the U.S.S.R. Mao argues that there must be
emphasis on heavy industry but that the "lopsided" emphasis of
the U.S.S.R. must be avoided; in fact, investment in agriculture
and light industry must be somewhat increased in order to ensure
the incentives and proper environment for the growth of heavy
industry.8 Mao describes efforts during the Korean war to
emphasize industrial construction in China's interior rather
than in the coastal areas; he says that this emphasis can be
reduced in order to make better use of existing facilities in
China's coastal regions, there being a reduced risk of attack
from the United States. (Mao's conclusion has double validity
now that Peking's concern is mainly over the danger of attack
from the northern neighbor.9) In a section dealing specifically
with the general relationship between defense construction and

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8This point, like the others made by Mao in 1956, is still
relevant more than two decades later, reflecting the fact that
Peking has been very inconsistent and slow in implementing
Mao's suggested policies.

9Mao's point regarding industry located in coastal regions has
been followed up by more specific articles in Chinese publica-
tions—as have the other points. See, for example, "Shanghai:
The emphasis on Shanghai's industry is no doubt also a welcome
reassurance to Shanghai residents that there will be no vin-
dictive policy against the city that was the main base of the
gang of four. In the early 1950's there was a decided bias
against the city because it was considered the principal
center of residual bourgeois vice in China.
economic construction, Mao argues that military and administrative expenses must be reduced (but without demobilization) in order to increase expenditures on economic construction, so that the basic industry and infrastructure can be created that will make possible the development of modern weapons. Mao argues also that worker incentives should increase, and relations between central and local authorities should be adjusted to allow for adequate local initiative. Mao's final point defends the slogan "learning from other countries," particularly in science and technology, but again Mao argues for balance. 10

The points discussed by Mao in 1956 are currently relevant, as has been made quite clear in newspaper commentaries relating both to the speech itself and to a series of national and regional conferences convened to discuss modernization and development of particular sectors or industries. The military emphasis and the long-range emphasis on basic industry are apparent in most of these, as an article in the first issue for 1978 of the authoritative party journal Red Flag states:

Internationally, a war will break out some day as the two hegemonic powers—the Soviet Union and the United States—are contending for world hegemony. The wild ambitions of Soviet revisionism to subjugate China will never die. The task before us is to follow Chairman Mao's instructions "be prepared against war, be

10 In the noneconomic section of the speech Mao deals primarily with problems of handling dissent—a subject that is also relevant to the discussion in this chapter. Mao defends the use of executions as a means for dealing with counterrevolutionaries, but draws a distinction between his defense and Stalin's excesses in this regard, and argues that henceforth there should be fewer executions. He calls for moderate policies in regard to national minorities, nonparty intellectuals and other nonmembers of the party, and those within the party who have strayed from the correct line, wherever these persons are reformable. Mao's speech is translated in FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), December 27, 1976, pp. E-1 to E-16. It is also contained in the newly published Volume V of Mao's Selected Works, pp. 284ff.
prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people," actively prepare ourselves against war, accelerate the modernization of China's national defense and improve our army's equipment. In order to accomplish this task, it is necessary to achieve rapid development of the national economy....

This is to be accomplished in phases:

During the first phase, covering the last 3 years of the fifth 5-year plan, we should build an independent and fairly comprehensive industrial and economic system.... During the second phase, covering the period of the sixth 5-year plan, we should develop our economy and construction to a relatively large extent and basically complete an economic system of six geographic regions which will have different levels and features.... During the third phase and before the year 2000, we should accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. By that time, our level in most fields should be close to that of the developed capitalist countries. In some fields we should even catch up with and surpass them....

Specifically:

... the industrial front should presently concentrate its forces on advancing the production of fuel, power, and raw and semi-finished materials. Industry should take steel as the key link....

The industrial modernization plans emphasize the procurement of advanced technology from abroad. Buttressed by appropriate quotations from Mao Tse-tung, the explanation is put forward

11FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), January 20, 1978, pp. E-11 to E-15. As an indication of the difficulties involved in Peking's development program, it is interesting to note that in the months since the above was published Peking's public statements have become less specific about what will be accomplished in the remaining years of the fifth 5-year plan, and more specific about what will be accomplished by the year 2000.
that the utilization of foreign technology, far from undermin-
ing Mao's principle of self-reliance, will actually make China
more self-reliant more quickly than would be possible by follow-
ing the isolationist line of the gang of four. During the 1950's,
before the break with the U.S.S.R., China benefited from what
was probably the most comprehensive transfer of technology ever
attempted between two countries. One of the goals of Chou
En-lai's détente policy of the 1970's was to enable China to
receive comparable benefits from a similar transfer of technol-
ogy from Western countries, including the United States, but
without incurring the political costs that the Soviet connection
entailed. After the Chou En-lai/Kissinger exchanges, China
began massive purchases of technology, particularly in the form
of complete plants, in the petrochemical, fertilizer, iron and
steel, and electric power industries. The value of plants and
equipment ordered by China reached levels close to those of the
peak years of Soviet deliveries and totaled possibly $2 billion;
after 1975, however, Chinese orders were curtailed.\textsuperscript{12}

The curtailment is now attributed to interference by the gang
of four who are said narrowmindedly to have feared that foreign
technology would corrupt China's doctrinal innocence. Even
China's foreign-exchange difficulties are attributed to the
gang's sabotage of exports on the grounds that China's nonrenew-
able resources should not be sold to capitalist countries. The
Hua regime is again actively pursuing foreign sources of tech-
nology for China, to be paid for by increased exports, particu-
larly of petroleum. Foreign technical assistance will be sought
for petroleum development; also, the regime is showing signs of
following a less doctrinaire policy toward accepting foreign
credit to finance capital imports.

\textsuperscript{12}See Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States,
China: A Compendium of Papers, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., July 10,
1975, particularly the papers by Nai-Ruenn Chen, David Denny,
and Hans Heymann, Jr.
The allegations that the gang sabotaged foreign trade and domestic industrial production have to be viewed with skepticism. Chinese industry has serious productivity problems that were aggravated by political turmoil in recent years but that to a large extent are inherent to the system. The Hua regime is attempting to improve incentives through selective pay raises and attention to consumer-goods industries; it is also reconstructing the Chinese trade union system as a monitor of worker discipline rather than the instrument of political agitation that it became in the Cultural Revolution. China's foreign exchange constraints are also an undoubted fact, particularly since Peking has so far been reluctant to accept long-term credits. Nor can the difficulties in rapidly expanding petroleum exports (particularly to Japan) be traced entirely to ideological scruples about exporting China's natural resources; impediments arose from the technical nature of Chinese petroleum, from the soft demand in the Japanese market due to recession, and from the adequacy of petroleum supplies from Japan's traditional sources in the Persian Gulf and Indonesia. Moreover, growth in China's petroleum production has slowed from the spectacular level of the 1960's, while Chinese domestic consumption has increased due to difficulties in expanding coal production—the latter aggravated by the Tangshan earthquake. (Nevertheless, in the long run China does have the capability to export sizable amounts of petroleum, which will substantially ease foreign exchange constraints.\textsuperscript{13} Also, it is likely that Peking will come to accept some long-term foreign credits.)

\textsuperscript{13}Peter W. Colm, Rosemary Hayes, and Elwin Jones, Implications of Prospective Chinese Petroleum Developments to 1980, IDA Paper P-1229. A Sino-Japanese trade agreement concluded in February 1978 provides for exports of petroleum to Japan of 15 million metric tons per year by 1982, with additional annual increases thereafter. (\textit{Wall Street Journal}, February 17, 1978.) China's potential petroleum exports, however, are probably substantially higher than the figure negotiated with the Japanese.
The Hua regime is initiating policies to encourage the kind of industrial development that can increase China's capacity to produce military end items. However, progress will be slow and therefore Peking is also taking a more direct route to modernization of its defense industry. In 1975 China had already acquired 50 Rolls Royce "Spey" jet engines from the U.K. (presumably for an advanced fighter that China is hoping to produce), together with license rights and technical assistance to produce the engines in a plant that is being constructed in Sian, Northwest China. The Hua regime has also used the technical mission, including some with overt military specialization, to explore similar arrangements with Japan, the United States, the U.K., France, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and other countries. Press reports reflect a Chinese interest in specific weapons systems, but if past policies are a guide, the Chinese will not wish simply to purchase end items, but to acquire the technology to produce the items in China. They prefer to purchase plants, as in the case of the Spey engine, but may buy prototypes abroad to be "reverse engineered" and produced in Chinese-built plants (the latter, as the Chinese seem to realize, is not usually a very satisfactory procedure for high-technology items).

The question of how much leapfrogging to do—that is, how much to invest in advanced defense-related industries while China's basic industries and economic infrastructure lag seriously behind—has always been a contentious one. In the case of nuclear weapons, Mao Tse-tung made the decision to divert massive resources to an advanced weapons program, and resources continue to be diverted to that program, apparently without effective argument from those interested in modernizing China's defense-related industries in a more systematic and evenly paced manner. However, when decisions are made concerning the numerous ancillary requirements for modern weapons, such as radar, communications, and computers, it is apparent that those who
wish first to equip the Chinese forces with more basic weapons (to say nothing of first modernizing Chinese basic industry) are being heard. The Hua regime has made it clear, as mentioned above, that steel will be the key link. In early 1971, there was a debate in China over whether steel or electronics should be supreme; the result then was a People's Daily editorial that attributed the "supremacy of electronics" to the "Liu Shao-ch'i-type sham Marxist political swindler" (later revealed to be Lin Piao) and pointed out that the position was "reactionary in politics, absurd in theory, and very harmful in practice" and that the "leading role must be taken by the iron and steel industry." The editorial said that "A distinction must be made between advanced modern industries and those which constitute the foundation and core of industry." While so far neither side of the argument between electronics and steel has been attributed to the gang of four, there have been articles and statements extolling the electronics industry and counter-articles emphasizing iron and steel (the latter appearing to be more authoritative). These articles fall just short of constituting an open debate but suggest that not everyone involved has accepted the developmental strategy of Mao's "Ten Relationships" and, furthermore, that the Hua regime, while leaning toward steel and the priority development of basic industry, either does not want to or cannot enforce that preference all across the board.\(^1\)

\(^{1}\)"Steel vs. Electronics," China News Analysis No. 854 (September 10, 1971).

\(^{15}\)In an interview by the New China News Agency and People’s Daily, Wang Cheng, Minister of the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building (Electronics), emphasized the importance of electronics in command and control, as a "combat tool," and as a link in the "four modernizations." He conceded that China lagged behind world levels in all aspects of electronics, and that the gap had widened due to sabotage by Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, and particularly the gang of four, but stated that the industry has now entered a "new stage of development." FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), November 21, 1977, pp. E-1 to E-5.
C. FORCE IMPROVEMENT

Even more difficult problems arise when one considers the resource requirements not only of the defense industry, but of the armed services themselves. Pushing the development of selected defense-related industries, such as a particular branch of electronics, more than basic industries, such as steel, may be a plausible strategy if some of the products of the advanced industry can be exported or have other developmental uses. But if the products of the favored industry have strictly military uses, pushing that industry tends to be non-productive and to retard general development. Calculations have been made, for example, of the economic growth that was foregone in China's pursuit of nuclear development.\(^{16}\) If military end-items are imported the developmental loss is even greater than if the equipment for producing such items is imported, since the equipment may be of some use in raising China's general technological level. As mentioned, various technical delegations to and from arms-producing countries are indicative of the Hua regime's interest in arms procurement; whether this is to be primarily prototype procurement (as in the case of the Spey engine) or procurement in quantities sufficient for direct issue to the armed services is not clear, at least in the open literature, but there are some suggestive indications.\(^{17}\)


\(^{17}\) Michael Pillsbury has observed that in 1974-75, at about the time the Spey deal was being negotiated, a dispute surfaced in China concerning military imports and whether these should be limited to manufacturing technology or might include military end items. Typically, the argument took the form of allegorical articles in an historical journal concerning 19th century officials who, on one side of the (continued on next page)
U.S. intelligence sources have indicated that Chinese military procurements decreased after the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. Peking's comments at the time of Hua's accession suggested that this trend was due to obstructionism by the gang and would be reversed. Almost certainly such an explanation is too simple. The decline in defense procurement probably involved factors such as the economic strategy implied in the "steel vs. electronics" controversy. Much of the decline also reflected the suspension of missile and aircraft production because of engineering difficulties. Production of the advanced fighter in particular had encountered problems in engine metallurgy and design (hence the deal for the Spey engine plant—construction of which is now also reported to have encountered difficulties). In any event, whatever combination of factors is responsible, military commanders whose expectations again were raised by the Hua coup will be disappointed, at least to some extent, because of the inherent difficulties of either domestic production or

(cont'd) argument, were so enamoured of the West that they bought obsolete and overpriced cannon, and, who, on the other side of the argument, sought to strengthen China (specifically against Russia) by judicious acquisition of western military technology. See "Sino-American Security Ties," International Security 1(4).

18 See Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China 1975, particularly the testimony by William E. Colby, pp. 44-46. Colby attributed the decline in defense expenditures to "Défense with the United States, and a reduced likelihood of armed conflict with the USSR; new priorities favoring civilian economic growth by a less military-oriented leadership [after Lin Piao's death]; and an inability to develop follow-on advanced weapons systems"—this as of June 1975. Colby's successor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, told the Joint Economic Committee in June 1977 that total spending remains at a reduced level compared to the 1971 peak. He attributed this to the same factors cited by Director Colby, omitting the less military-oriented leadership (after Hua Kuofeng's accession). Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China 1977, p. 14. Difficulties with the Spey plant in Sian were reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review (November 25, 1977), p. 5.
foreign procurement of some of the most needed and sophisticated equipment.

The core of Peking's force improvement program is a return to policies formulated under Teng Hsiao-p'ing's guidance and described at the June-July 1975 enlarged meeting of the party's Military Affairs Commission. If current accounts are to be believed, the gang succeeded in obstructing implementation of the decisions made there, although it could not block implementation altogether. The consensus of the meeting was that, for the PLA, the key link is to "prepare itself for fighting," but the gang later argued with this, contending that "class struggle" is the key link (not recognizing, as is now pointed out, that war is in fact the highest form of class struggle). Despite the emphasis on war preparedness and on weapons, the 1975 policy (as reflected in current commentaries) did not propose instant solutions to China's military problems. Rather, the emphasis was to be on accelerating domestic production of needed weapons, relying on foreign procurement only to ease specific bottlenecks, as in the case of the Spey engine deal. (Interestingly, steel was once more singled out as being an important ingredient of weapons.) When Teng Hsiao-p'ing later came under attack by the radical wing of the party, the military modernizers, while not totally subdued, were put on the defensive and the modernization program languished, even while some procurement and production programs continued. The question now

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19 In the words of the Liberation Army Daily editorial of January 30, 1978, "During the session, Chairman Mao's repeated criticisms of the 'Shanghai gang'--the 'gang of four'--were also propagated among some comrades. At a time when the 'gang of four' were still occupying high official posts and retaining the portion of power they had usurped, all this greatly supported and encouraged the cadres and people in upholding Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and in opposing and resisting the revisionist line peddled by the 'gang of four,' winning the support of the whole army and making the people happy." FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), January 31, 1978, p. E-3.
is how effectively can the 1975 program deal with the deficiencies of the Chinese armed services.

These deficiencies, as indicated in Chapter II, are staggering, despite the fact that (according to ACDA estimates) China has devoted from 10 to over 15 percent of its GNP to military expenditures from year to year—with an average almost double that of the United States. (These figures would be even higher if military expenditures were calculated as a percentage of the output of the modern industrial sector.) Despite this, Chinese forces lack almost every form of sophisticated modern weaponry. This suggests that the kind of effort that produced China's nuclear weapons, in which scientific and technical resources were concentrated on a single project, cannot remedy the present situation and might only aggravate it. The following service-by-service survey of China's requirements is not intended to be definitive (that would be difficult on an unclassified basis) but suggests the overall dimensions of the problem and what individual service commanders may expect or hope for from the Hua Kuo-feng regime's modernization program.

1. Strategic Forces

- Solid fueled missiles in place of the present cryogenic liquid fueled missiles.
- An SLBM system.
- A ballistic missile warning system (although China's geographic handicap, proximity to the U.S.S.R., may make warning impossible in any case).
- Satellite and other means of surveillance and reconnaissance for targeting.

20 ACDA's admittedly rough figures are given in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975 (Washington: ACDA, 1976). The high figure for China of 15.8% is given for 1968, and the low of 11% for 1975. The range for the United States in the same period is given as 9.47% (1967) to 6% (1975). The average over the decade is 7.56% for the United States, and 13.86% for China.
2. Air Force
   - A modern air defense system, with the associated command and control system, in place of present outdated versions of the Soviet SA-2 and conventional AA artillery.
   - An advanced fighter capable of dealing with present Soviet aircraft.
   - An air-to-air missile.
   - A close air support capability.
   - An ECM capability.
   - A troop lift capability.
   - Helicopters and V/STOL aircraft that can operate in areas with inadequate airfields.

3. Army
   - A modern antitank missile.
   - Modern tanks and modern armoured personnel carriers, in place of present antiquated versions of Soviet equipment.
   - Other improvements in tactical and logistic mobility.

4. Navy
   - Long-range patrol and ASW aircraft.
   - Improved ASW and surface-to-surface missile capability for surface ships.
   - Attack submarines.
   - Amphibious forces in place of the improvised assortment of craft now available.
   - Continuation of the program to build destroyers/frigates/corvettes and patrol boats for offshore patrols.

   All the services need all types of equipment for transport and for command, control, and communications.\footnote{The foregoing is expanded from R. D. M. Furlong, "China's Evolving National Security Requirements," \textit{International Defense Review} 9(4).}

Two points should be made about Chinese military needs. First, the list of what is required to modernize the Chinese armed forces includes, not surprisingly, the military items...
that the Chinese have procured from foreign sources in the last few years plus the much longer list of items reportedly inspected or discussed by the various technical missions. According to a variety of press sources, the Chinese have purchased, in addition to the Spey engines, aircraft quality aluminum, French Frelon and German Messerschmidt-Bolkow helicopters, U.S. and Japanese computers for civil applications (weather and earthquake prediction; petroleum exploration) but with potential military uses; U.S. and Soviet civil air transports (likewise with potential military uses); and a sample MIG-23 as well as sample Soviet antitank and antiair weapons from Egypt and Vietnam. The Chinese have indicated a serious interest in procuring the British Harrier V/STOL aircraft and the French HOT antitank system. In addition, Chinese missions have indicated varying degrees of interest in a wide range of other types of U.S. and Western European equipment, including naval missiles, jet aircraft, tanks, satellite reconnaissance equipment, antisubmarine systems, and antiaircraft systems, and various other types of radar and electronic equipment. All of this seems to indicate that the Chinese armed services are assembling shopping lists.

However, the second point to be made is that some of the commentaries appearing in the Chinese military press seem strongly to discourage premature and excessive expectations:

Preparedness for war lies mainly in mental preparedness. We must be ideologically prepared for the gravest possible situation and never leave anything to chance.... At the same time, we must make good material preparations. Our revolutionized army, when it also possesses modern weapons and equipment, will be even more

\[22\] Chinese interest in the Harrier and HOT systems appears to be substantiated, judging from unclassified sources. See "Britain Wants China to Buy Military Goods," Baltimore Sun (May 9, 1978), and "China Says It Will Buy Antitank Missiles from France in First Such Western Order," Wall Street Journal (May 2, 1978).
sure of its triumph over the enemy, like a
tiger with wings. 23

It appears that the Hua regime is adopting a fairly long-range
approach to force improvements, just as it is to defense
production.

Given the constraints inherent in trying to modernize the
equipment of the PLA, the Hua regime is also taking some steps
simply to rationalize the utilization of PLA manpower and exist-
ing equipment. Mao is said to have issued instructions to the
1975 Military Affairs Commission meeting that "it is necessary
to consolidate the army" and "prepare it for fighting." Aside
from the long-range force improvement plans discussed above,
these slogans are being interpreted to imply removal from
responsible positions in the PLA of those who collaborated with
the gang and who belong to the "wind," "slippery," or "earth-
quake" factions mentioned in the previous chapter. Control of
the PLA will thereby be consolidated in the hands of veteran
professional military men whose concern is with the PLA's
fighting capability. The implication is that the PLA will
devote more time to military tasks and less to political ones.

In that connection, Peking commentaries since the accession
of Hua have devoted much space to discussing the need for
military training, even in such basic skills as marksmanship.
Lin Piao and the gang are said to have been critical of com-
manders who emphasized military training (particularly the now
rehabilitated former Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ch'ing). Military
journals have reaffirmed the need for such training and have
called for the "mass military training movement" to be renewed
with the same "vigor" as in 1964, before Lo's purge—a movement

23"Grasp the Key Link and Run the Army Well and Be Prepared for
Fighting," editorial in the Liberation Army Daily (reprinted
increasingly originated authoritative statements that are then
reprinted in the party journal, the People's Daily.
with which Hua Kuo-feng himself may have been associated in his role as a provincial official in Hunan. In order to utilize trained military manpower more effectively, Peking has also announced that tours of duty for conscripts will henceforth be 3, 4, and 5 years for the army, air force, and navy, respectively—what they were before reductions in 1974 of 1 year each

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2 The dispute between Lo and Lin Piao in 1965-66 primarily involved different estimates of the likelihood that escalation in Vietnam would (or should) involve China (see fn. 5, p. 10). A corollary to that argument was the question of whether the PLA should devote the bulk of its time to the domestic political tasks envisaged for it by Lin Piao or whether military training and preparation for war should be the emphasis, as Lo advocated. Mao supported Lin Piao's position in 1965, but Mao's authority is now being invoked to support a return to Lo Jui-ch'ing's policy.

As part of the 1964 mass training movement, impressive demonstrations of military skills were mounted by the PLA including some specially designed for foreign observers. Banners awarded to some units at that time were later withdrawn and the units accused of demonstrating a "sinister... purely military viewpoint." Recently the banners were restored. (For a description of a 1965 military exercise, see David and Nancy Dall Milton, The Wind Will Not Subside [New York: Pantheon, 1976], pp. 88ff. The current program is described in the Liberation Army Daily, February 21, 1978, translated in FBIS, Daily Report [PRC], February 23, 1978, pp. E-3 to E-6.) Mao Tse-tung's attendance at one such demonstration is described in an NCNA feature article entitled "A Recollection of Chairman Mao's Review of Military Skill Demonstrations in June 1964" (English version in FBIS, Daily Report [PRC], October 17, 1977, p. E-8.) Although Lo Jui-ch'ing was blamed for insufficient attention to political factors in his emphasis on military skills, it is Yeh Chien-ying who is now said to have been directly in charge of military training at the time (an article by the rehabilitated Lo dated October 9, 1977 described the "loving attention and guidance" given the program by Mao Tsetung himself and credits Yeh with direction of troop training, omitting any reference to his own role). FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), October 13, 1977, p. E-6.

In reference to Hua Kuo-feng's possible role in military training and preparedness in Hunan Province, see Michael Oksenberg and Sai-cheung Yeung, "Hua Kuo-feng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years 1949-66," China Quarterly (March 1977).
that allegedly resulted from pressure from the radical wing of the party.²⁵

Peking is also taking steps to improve the effectiveness of the militia, which is particularly interesting in view of the apparent attempts by the gang of four to infiltrate the militia and utilize it as a separate armed force responsive to the gang's direction. Command and control procedures are being improved to prevent another attempt at political misuse, and the militia is being reequipped with small arms and has accelerated its training program to correspond to similar programs in the regular PLA forces.²⁶

²⁶Jay Mathews, "China Speeds up Training, Arms for Huge Militia," Washington Post (June 9, 1978). During the Cultural Revolution, the militia came under the control of the PLA acting through "People's Armed Departments" at provincial and local levels. Following the Lin Piao affair, an effort was made to bring the militia directly under Party control. (See Nelsen, The Chinese Military System, pp. 181-82.) This latter trend is now being reversed, pursuant to Article 19 of the 1978 Constitution, which calls for the integration of the field armies, regional forces, and militia (text in Peking Review [March 17, 1978]).
STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Peking has no systematized strategic doctrine, but there are various strategic concepts derived from Mao that address problems inherent in China's military situation and are reflected in Chinese military efforts and dispositions. These concepts are as follows:

- **People's War.** As a defensive strategy, the concept of People's War rationalizes China's equipment handicaps and postulates a defense against foreign invasion in which reliance is placed on China's demographic and geographic assets.

- **Nuclear Deterrent.** People's War is fought on Chinese territory. In contrast, even while China stresses that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, its development and deployment of such weapons reflects a rudimentary concept of deterrence, based on the threat that in a war an enemy of China cannot totally escape damage.

- **The Inevitability of War.** Mao postulated that "contention" between the two superpowers would inevitably lead to war and that the war would be nuclear. The inevitability of war leads to and is part of Mao's Three Worlds thesis, which has been newly amplified and elaborated by the Hua Kuo-feng regime. If war is coming, it is obviously prudent to seek alliances with all countries that fall under the same (Soviet) threat, and for the time being disregard other, lesser "contradictions."

It is difficult to visualize how these three concepts inter-relate. The Chinese have delineated what they consider a likely sequence of events, starting with the initiation of the inevitable war between the superpowers and proceeding to the attack
on China and the defeat of that attack by use of China's nuclear capability and People's War. This sequence reflects some earlier Soviet strategic discussions (e.g., the likelihood of surprise attack), but most Chinese comments on how a war is likely to unfold are fragmentary and theoretically incomplete, particularly in regard to the mechanism whereby China would become involved. A key question, of course, is whether the war will take place sooner or later; Peking's decisive preference is later, to permit preparations to be undertaken. Nevertheless, Peking does not advocate appeasement as a delaying tactic, at least not for the United States and NATO.

The next three sections of this chapter discuss Peking's strategic doctrinal concepts in more detail. In the fourth section we describe the Chinese idea of how a war would develop.

A. PEOPLE'S WAR

People's War is the most Maoist of the Chinese strategic concepts. As a defensive strategy it derives both from Mao's writings during the 1930's, which include the familiar concepts that were reduced to aphorisms (the 1936 "rules" of guerrilla warfare formulated in 16 Chinese characters: "the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue"), and Mao's more extensive treatises on revolutionary warfare that were prepared for party schools in Yanan. Particularly important was Mao's discussion of "active defense" against a superior enemy, beginning with a "strategic retreat" (also described as "luring the enemy in deep") followed by a "strategic counteroffensive," in which the defenders would have the initiative. (The alternative strategy of "engaging the enemy outside the gate" Mao described as "adventurist.") Mao's concepts were not rules for guerrilla warfare only. He spoke of overcoming "guerrilla-ism" at an appropriate time, even while retaining the useful mobility of such warfare, and also discussed how
regular and guerrilla forces might coordinate their attacks (the regular forces were usually to fight on interior lines and the irregular forces on exterior lines, but occasionally these roles might be reversed).¹

People's War is said to reflect the "lessons" of the 50-year history of the PLA. The concept has been adapted to the current situation, in which the PLA is no longer a guerrilla band struggling to survive but the world's largest armed force; still, many of the early Maoist characteristics survive in the present doctrine.

In 1969 Mao explained People's War as follows:

If the enemy should invade our country, we would refrain from invading his country. As a general rule, we do not fight outside of our own borders. I say we should not be provoked into doing so, not even if you send us an invitation. But if you should invade our country, then we will deal with you. We would see if you want to fight a small war or a big war. If a small war, we would fight at the border. If a big war, I propose that we make some room for that. China is a vast country. I presume the enemy would not come without the prospect of gaining something from it. We want the whole world to see that in fighting such a war, we would be on logically sound and advantageous grounds. As far as I can see, if he enters our country, we shall have the advantage ... making it a good war to fight and making the enemy a victim of the quagmire of the people. As to such weapons as aircraft, tanks, and armored cars, numerous experiences have shown it is within our competence to deal with them.²

¹See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings, particularly "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (1936) and "On Protracted War" (1938). Mao's discussion here—as elsewhere—is reminiscent of the classic Chinese military treatise by Sun Tzu (The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963]) particularly in the role assigned by Sun to cheng (regular) and oh'tj (irregular) forces.

The concept described by Mao has been reiterated by the post-Mao regime. According to the Headquarters of the General Staff of the PLA in February 1978:

...we must also see soberly that for a rather long period of time to come, our armaments will still be inferior compared with those of our major enemy. The war to be waged by us will always be a just war, a people's war, and will be fought with existing armaments. Being guided by Chairman Mao's military concepts and relying on the combined power of the armed forces, which include the field armies, regional armies, and the militia, we shall certainly be able to fight and defeat the strong with the weak.

Earlier, in a September 1977 article in the official journal Red Flag:

Chairman Mao profoundly set forth the nature and laws of people's war. He pointed out "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people." Confronting powerful enemies armed to the teeth, Chairman Mao put forward the famous thesis that "all reactionaries are paper tigers" and pointed out that in a battle "small forces linked with the people become strong, while big forces opposed to the people become weak" and "the big and strong cannot win, it is always the small and weak who win out." In connection with the salient features of the war waged by the Chinese people, Chairman Mao formulated a complete set of flexible strategy and tactics, thus tremendously enriching and developing Marxist-Leninist military sciences. By a succinct generalization, Chairman Mao formulated the strategy and tactics of people's war in the following words "You fight in your way and we fight in ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we can't." Chairman Mao put forward the system for integrating our armed forces.

comprising field armies, local forces, and militia, and combining the masses who are armed with those who are not, thus giving proper weight to both the army and the people."

The field armies, local forces, and militia referred to above compose the tripartite military organization of the People's War strategy, designed to defend China against a massive invasion on the order of the Japanese invasion during the 1930's. The field armies are relatively better equipped and more mobile and would constitute the main force for counterattack. The regional forces would fight in their own areas; together with the militia, these forces would constitute supporting and reserve forces for the field armies.

Although the concept of People's War is theoretically the core of the Hua regime's defensive strategy, some changes are being made in the Maoist patterns. First, the intense emphasis on military modernization discussed in the preceding chapter reflects the professional military view that People's War is at best a stopgap to be used while the armed forces are being re-equipped. Second, efforts are being made to improve the organizational basis of People's War. There are recent indications that command and control procedures are being tightened, so that regional forces and militia can coordinate more effectively with the field armies. The new procedures are also designed to ensure that all three components are politically reliable and responsive, since the gang of four apparently made inroads into urban militia and regional forces in a number of provinces.

Third is the emphasis on training and preparedness for both regular forces and the militia mentioned above.


Even with these changes, however, recent Chinese military statements reflect an understandable skepticism about how effective People's War would be under modern conditions and about the validity of the historical parallels cited by the Maoists. For example:

It is true that, as experience can fully testify, our revolutionary army is surely capable of defeating better-equipped enemies with poor equipment. However, it should be noted that our army's defeat of better-equipped enemies with our poor equipment was a dialectical process in which our army continued to capture the enemies' weapons and equipment in order to arm itself and improve its own weapons. Without this continuous improvement of our weapons and equipment, it would have been impossible for us to eventually defeat the Japanese aggressors and the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries.... In the past, although we had no guns or artillery, we could get them from the enemy troops. Those days are gone forever. In a modern self-defense war against aggression, we can no longer mainly pin our hopes on the enemy for our acquisition of conventional weapons...much less expect to seize and use the enemy's special weapons, particularly strategic nuclear weapons, as they are stored on remote bases in hostile countries. (Emphasis added)

It is evident that China's professional military leaders, while giving lip service to the People's War doctrine for its political utility, continue their long struggle to transcend the PLA's guerrilla origins, equip it to match its enemies more evenly, and overcome the Maoists' long fascination with

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6 The skepticism of China's military leaders about the applicability of the Maoist historical precedents is reinforced by Soviet propaganda aimed at the PLA, which points out, for example, that the Chinese civil war turned in the Communists' favor only when large stocks of Japanese arms captured by Soviet forces in Manchuria were handed over to the Communist PLA.

"strategic retreat." The strategy of drawing the enemy deeply into Chinese territory could, of course, jeopardize many of China's important industrial centers, such as those in Manchuria, and even Peking itself. In fact, at specific times of crisis Peking has invariably taken measures to avoid luring an enemy into Chinese territory. In the Korean intervention, in supporting Hanoi and various insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, in the Indian border war, in Soviet border incidents, and particularly in various Taiwan Strait engagements, the Chinese avoided escalatory military steps that would have increased the danger of military action spreading deep into China. The doctrine of People's War was used in these situations as a proclamation that China was not afraid of better-equipped enemies rather than as a strategic blueprint; in part this served domestic purposes, but to an important degree such a profession of faith was used also to remind the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other countries of the futility of trying to fight a full-scale conventional war against China with its hundreds of millions of citizen-soldiers. The deterrent effect of the doctrine is maintained by the fact that the PLA is organized, equipped, and deployed to fight a People's War.

In most of the instances listed, Peking's failure to follow the People's War strategy to its logical conclusion presumably reflected the professional military judgment that the material

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8The modifications of the People's War doctrine are being presented as a return to Maoism after attempted revisionism of the gang of four. However, in most regards the modifications resemble what was described as an anti-Mao line in earlier years. See, for example, the section entitled "The Opposing Military Line" in Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," Asian Survey 8(4), pp. 239-62. Only one aspect of Powell's reconstruction of the anti-Mao line is missing from the post-Mao line, and that is the suggestion that China should ease tension with the U.S.S.R. Interestingly, one spokesman for the anti-Mao line cited by Powell was Lo Jui-ch'ing, who has been rehabilitated and is now a prominent spokesman for the post-Mao line. (See also fn. 24, p. 53.)
and human cost of an invasion would have been immeasurably greater for China than for the enemy. Even in the one case where People's War might have succeeded it was not attempted. If Peking could have provoked Chiang Kai-shek to start a large-scale invasion, and if that invasion had eventually failed with very heavy Nationalist losses, as would have been likely, then Peking's chances of "liberating" Taiwan in a counterattack or by subversion would have improved immeasurably. (It was the recognition of the likelihood of such an outcome, in fact, that led even "hawkish" American military advisers to recommend against any large-scale Nationalist landing effort.) And yet, in 1962 when Peking saw the danger of a major Nationalist landing attempt, the Chinese took steps to deter the attempt and ensure that the United States would not be involved.9

It is understandable that the post-Mao regime maintains the Maoist doctrine of People's War as its official strategy, even while initiating the adjustments that have long been considered essential by China's professional military leaders. People's War is a politically appealing concept of great flexibility, usable in the export of insurgency as well as in the political deterrence of invasion.10 The Maoist proclamation that China

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9See fn. 4, p. 9.

10In addition to its domestic version, there is also an export version of People's War that is prescribed by Peking for Southeast Asian and other Third World insurgents. People's War as an offensive revolutionary strategy has its antecedents in the "armed struggle" doctrine described by the Chinese Communists in 1949 after their victory in China; it was set forth in its current form by Lin Piao at the height of his power. The strategy emphasized "self-reliance" and was in part a rationalization for China's nonintervention in Vietnam and in part a formulation for the export of Maoist revolutionary doctrine to the underdeveloped world. In the latter form it was not repudiated by Peking, unlike some other policies advocated by Lin Piao, but it is now advocated chiefly for Chinese-supported insurgents in southern Africa and—in a very low-key way—for Southeast Asian insurgents. The export of revolution is not an important part of Chinese strategy at this time.
is not afraid of its better equipped enemies and that it would actually welcome invasion because it could then deal with its enemies on its own terms may not meet the test of military logic, but is no doubt taken as seriously in Moscow as it was in Washington by those who advised against a land war in Asia.

B. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT

China's attitude toward nuclear weapons is expressed in a series of Maoist aphorisms, which disparage the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, and in the somewhat contradictory fact that China has developed and deployed nuclear missiles at great cost.\(^{11}\)

On the one hand, by maintaining that nuclear weapons cannot be decisive and that a nuclear war can lead only to the demise of imperialism (of the standard Western form as well as of the "social imperialist," i.e., Soviet form), Peking wants to create the impression that China is not subject to deterrence (or "blackmail") by nuclear threat. On the other hand, Peking's devotion of major resources to the production and deployment of nuclear weapons testifies to a belief—or hope—that enemy countries can be deterred. For the Maoists, China's ability to remain undeterred while the superpowers are deterred, even by China's relatively minuscule nuclear force, is a result of China's political stamina: that is, China possesses a "spiritual atom bomb" that is claimed to be more powerful than the material bombs brandished by the enemy. Despite all the talk, however, Peking has been very careful when following dangerous military courses (e.g., in the Taiwan Strait or on the Soviet border) to gauge risks so as not to provoke nuclear retaliation; in other words, Peking has obviously been deterred

\(^{11}\)Ralph Powell has pointed out that Maoism, like Stalin's theory of "permanently operating factors," had a retarding effect on nuclear doctrine but not on the development of nuclear weapons. (Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines.")
even while Mao insisted that the concept did not apply to China. Just to be on the safe side, the Maoists have purchased insurance in the form of their own nuclear weapons and missiles.

Mao's most famous comment on nuclear weapons was made to the American leftwing journalist, Anna Louise Strong, in 1946, and has been given new publicity by the post-Mao regime:

The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the United States reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two types of weapons.12

Mao's basic position was that one must not fear nuclear weapons and that nuclear weapons are not decisive; China thus retains the advantage its people and geography would give it in a People's War (it is always assumed—see Section D below—that a nuclear attack would be followed by an invasion). From time to time Mao elaborated upon his original statement, indicating that his characterization of nuclear weapons was not attributable to early ignorance of their destructive capability. In fact, Mao repeatedly dwelt on the point that a nuclear attack that killed a third or half of the Chinese population or a third or a half of the population of the globe would still leave enough people to construct a beautiful future. In a 1955 conversation with the Finnish Ambassador that has been extensively publicized by the post-Mao regime, Mao said:

The Chinese people are not to be cowed by US atomic blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometers. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs. Even if the US atom bombs were so powerful that, when dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even blow it up, that would

12 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Volume IV, p. 100. See also Peking Review 20(30), p. 16.
hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, although it might be a major event for the solar system.... If the warmongers ... desist from war, they can survive a little longer on this earth. But the sooner they make war, the sooner they will be wiped from the face of the earth. Then a people's united nations would be set up, maybe in Shanghai, maybe somewhere in Europe, or it might be set up again in New York...."

Similarly, Mao's statement in Moscow in November 1957 shocked even Khrushchev:

Let us imagine, how many people will die if war should break out? Out of the world's population of 2,700,000,000, one-third—or, if more, half—may be lost.... I debated this question with [Nehru]. He believed that if an atomic war was fought, the whole of mankind would be annihilated. I said that if the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist; in a number of years there would again be 2,700,000,000 people and definitely more."

This theme, which has been reemphasized by the post-Mao regime, constitutes the first element of Peking's declaratory position on nuclear weapons: China refuses to be deterred. This is an important political position. Mao's position was reinforced at the time of his Moscow visit by his conclusion that Soviet missile tests (and the sensation that had been caused by Sputnik) indicated that military trends favored the Communist camp (as he put it at the time, in a much quoted

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phrase that is not a part of the current repertory: "The East Wind Prevails over the West Wind".\textsuperscript{15} Mao obviously was not recommending that the bloc rush blindly into a nuclear holocaust, but he was advocating a strategy of calculated risk to take advantage of the political momentum created by Soviet weapons developments. The Matsu-Quemoy crisis the following year was a demonstration of what Mao had in mind, and it was, for Khrushchev's tastes, too much risk for too little potential gain. The post-Mao leadership has--so far--avoided similar adventurism but it too insists that it will take whatever military action it chooses whenever it may choose (e.g. in regard to Taiwan).

The Chinese approach to deterring an attack against China is likewise complicated. Despite Peking's rejection of the term, deterrence is a concept of long standing in Communist China. The Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was part of a deterrent effort, even before the U.S.S.R. had tested a nuclear device. During the Korean war, Peking was well aware of the fact that U.S. military action against Chinese territory and the use of nuclear weapons in Korea were deterred in part by the fact that the Soviets by then had nuclear bombs. (Peking also was aware of and used the fact that the deterrent was in large part political, consisting of allied pressures upon Washington to avoid escalation. If Peking did not know at the time, it certainly learned later that some leading U.S. military officers favored escalation but were restrained by political considerations.) By the terms of the 1950 Sino-Soviet agreements, the U.S.S.R. should have withdrawn its naval presence from the Port Arthur Naval Base in 1952; Peking's "request" that the Soviets defer the withdrawal reflected their appreciation of the deterrent effect the Soviet presence in Manchuria had on the U.S. during

\textsuperscript{15}The phrase is not included in excerpts from Mao speeches in Moscow in November 1957 that are reprinted in the new fifth volume of Mao's \textit{Selected Works}.
the Korean war. During the 1958 offshore island crisis, Chinese efforts to obtain public guarantees that the U.S.S.R. would intervene if the United States used nuclear weapons in support of Chiang Kai-shek again reflected Mao's appreciation of the nuclear deterrent. (The fact that Khrushchev provided the desired guarantee only after the crisis had abated was one of the points raised with much bitterness by Peking in the later Sino-Soviet polemic.)

Mao had concluded even earlier, while the Sino-Soviet alliance was still intact, that China should not have to rely on the deterrent effect of Soviet weapons. In his 1956 speech "On the Ten Great Relationships" Mao said:

We will have not only more planes and artillery but atom bombs too. If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb.17

16In the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, the Chiang Kai-shek government granted the U.S.S.R. "joint" use of the naval base of Port Arthur on the Liaoning peninsula of Manchuria, with defense of the base to be entrusted to the U.S.S.R. The agreement was to run for 30 years. In the February 14, 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, concluded with the newly established Communist government, the U.S.S.R. agreed to restore Port Arthur (and other Manchurian rights) to China no later than the end of 1952. However, on September 15, 1952, Chou En-lai requested that the U.S.S.R. postpone its withdrawal from Port Arthur, ostensibly because Japan had not concluded a peace treaty with either China or the U.S.S.R. The reversion of Port Arthur subsequently took place by an agreement announced on October 12, 1954 which did not refer to the continuing failure of Japan to conclude a peace treaty with either Peking or Moscow, but which did make a pointed reference to "changes in the international situation in the Far East following the termination of the war in Korea...." Peking pointed out that following the reversion, China would undertake responsibility for its own coastal defense. (Texts of the relevant Sino-Soviet agreements are given in Garthoff, Sino-Soviet Military Relations, Appendixes A and B.)

17Mao, Selected Works, Volume V, p. 284.
Even at the time that Mao spoke, the implication was that it was not only the United States that bullied a nonnuclear China but, because of the conditions that Moscow attached to its nuclear backing of Peking, the Soviet ally as well.

A Chinese nuclear weapons program was initiated with Soviet assistance. In an effort to shore up Sino-Soviet relations and give China an independent deterrent, thereby possibly minimizing direct Soviet involvement in Chinese military adventurism, the Soviets entered into a nuclear weapons assistance agreement with the Chinese in October 1957. Under an earlier agreement of October 1954, Peking had obtained a reactor and other unspecified assistance as part of an ostensibly peaceful nuclear research program. The Soviet leaders must have had qualms about hastening Peking down the road to an independent nuclear capability. Moscow's obvious preference was that the Soviets have a monopoly on advanced weapons, which would then be utilized on behalf of other bloc members as Moscow saw fit.

In any case, Soviet nuclear assistance to Peking did not last long. In June 1959, as Sino-Soviet differences sharpened, nuclear assistance was terminated before a promised sample bomb was delivered. A year later all technical assistance to Peking came to an end. By that time, however, Peking's weapons program was well under way. The first test of a nuclear (fission) device took place in October 1964, the first test of a guided missile with a nuclear warhead in October 1966, and the first test of a fusion (hydrogen) bomb in June 1967; this was a much faster rate of development than either the United States or the Soviet Union had been able to achieve.

Chinese nuclear tests have been accompanied by communiques stressing that China would never be the first to use a nuclear weapon and that the development of Chinese weapons is intended to break the nuclear "monopoly" of the superpowers, give encouragement to revolutionary movements everywhere, and facilitate the complete prohibition and destruction by all nuclear states.
of all existing nuclear weapons. The various communiques also pointed out that Chinese nuclear weapons were being developed in accordance with the thought of Mao Tse-tung and whatever political campaign was being conducted at the time. After China entered the United Nations, the above points were repeated by the Chinese delegates whenever nuclear disarmament or test-ban proposals were debated (China usually opposed such proposals on the grounds that they failed to provide for the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons).  

The Hua regime has not deviated materially from this pattern. In regard to the September 1977 nuclear test (timed for the anniversary of Mao's death), after listing the current political slogans ("grasp the key link of class struggle," etc.) and giving due credit to Hua ("our wise leader and supreme commander"), the communique continued as follows:

The conducting of necessary and limited nuclear tests and development of nuclear weapons by China is entirely for the purpose of defence and for breaking the nuclear monopoly by the superpowers and for the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government declares once again that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, work together with the other peoples and peace-loving countries in the common struggle to achieve the lofty goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.  

The aim of encouraging revolution has been dropped from recent statements, in line with Peking's deemphasis of this theme.

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18 Texts of Chinese statements on weapons tests and arms control appear in the annual volumes published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament* (Washington, D.C., ACDA). Also, see Chapter VI, Section F, "Arms Control."

The statements reveal the characteristic Maoist focus on the political impact of weapons developments (the aim of breaking the superpower monopoly of nuclear weapons). However, the Chinese have made it clear that nuclear weapons were developed and are also being deployed for military reasons. Recent Chinese discussions of military matters (such as Hua Kuo-feng's speech to the Fifth National People's Congress in March 1978) almost invariably include the Mao quotation "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack." The Chinese may believe that an attack against China will ultimately be defeated by means of People's War, but Peking is also making it clear that if an enemy resorts to nuclear weapons, he cannot escape serious destruction. Targets in the eastern U.S.S.R. are within range of Chinese weapons. The continental United States is beyond the range of presently operational Chinese missiles, but Peking has threatened that an aggressor would be pursued back to his base—and important U.S. bases and Asian allies (as well as parts of Alaska) are within China's range.

China's retaliatory capability is obviously far short of what U.S. doctrine deems an adequate deterrent. However, as noted above, Peking's experience when Soviet nuclear capabilities were also minimal and its general appreciation of political factors as well as strictly military ones may have led the Chinese to conclude that even a minimal deterrent could be effective. Another Mao quotation states that those who most rely on nuclear weapons—the superpowers—are also the most afraid of them. Furthermore, Peking may calculate that if the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the U.S.S.R. remain more

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Peking cites the wartime "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front" as the source of the Mao quotation, but the present context is one of the nuclear threat against China and China's possession of nuclear weapons.
or less balanced, in a few years Peking's weapons capability may be enough to tip the balance one way or the other even while lagging far behind that of either superpower. Or the Chinese may calculate that the United States and the Soviets will exhaust each other's nuclear arsenals in the war whose inevitability Peking continues to proclaim (see Section C below), whereupon China's smaller nuclear arsenal will become a decisive force. However, these are remote contingencies; they may underlie Chinese thinking, but are not part of the mainstream of Chinese doctrine and are not included in Chinese declaratory policy.

What is included in Chinese declaratory policy is the threat that the U.S.S.R. (or enemy) will not escape some damage if it attacks China with nuclear weapons, and that it cannot hope to realize any gain from such an attack because the ensuing invasion will be defeated by People's War. Peking also continues to augment its deterrent politically by developing détente relationships with the United States, Japan, the Southeast Asian states that are linked in ASEAN, and Western Europe. Peking has recently given various indirect assurances to Hong Kong indicating that the British colony need not fear a takeover attempt in the immediate future. A Hong Kong leftwing paper, the Cheng Ming, which is considered to be the voice of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, has pointed out that the status quo in Hong Kong benefits Peking for well-recognized economic and political reasons, but also for military reasons: Hong Kong would have great strategic significance if the U.S.S.R. should attack China.²¹ Peking may be allowing Hong Kong to fill a deterrent role parallel to that played in the Korean war by Soviet-occupied Port Arthur. A British-controlled Hong Kong presumably would remain open even if the U.S.S.R. tried to block other Chinese ports; furthermore, in hostilities with China the U.S.S.R. would want to avoid provoking the U.K. and might therefore be deterred from military

²¹Far Eastern Economic Review (March 24, 1978), special issue on Hong Kong, p. 27.
action in the general area of Hong Kong, such as in Kwangtung province and the important city of Canton. It is by numerous political moves of this kind that Peking hopes to reinforce the deterrent effect of its admittedly inadequate nuclear capability, as will be discussed below.

C. THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR AND MAO'S "THREE WORLDS" THESIS

The argument within the Communist movement over whether war is "fatalistically" inevitable predates the Sino-Soviet dispute. In February 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev echoed a line for which Malenkov had been criticized, indicating that Lenin's dictum that imperialism inevitably breeds war was no longer to be taken literally. The Chinese resisted such "revisionism," but reluctantly accepted Khrushchev's line at the time, conceding that war might be prevented through militant revolutionary action because of the strength of the socialist camp but arguing that war could only lead to the demise of imperialism. (The Chinese did not accept Malenkov's earlier assertion that war might mean the end of civilization.) In the course of time, the Maoist position on this question hardened as Mao ceased to speak of a socialist camp, and during the Cultural Revolution some Chinese who had been spokesmen at earlier world Communist conferences were accused of having yielded too readily to the Soviet position. In his later years, Mao consistently maintained that contention between (U.S.) imperialism and (Soviet) social imperialism would inevitably lead to war; this position has been strongly reaffirmed by the post-Mao leadership.

It is always difficult to judge the practical significance in a Marxist system of events that the theory decrees are inevitable. However, the Maoists make the additional point that while war is inevitable, it can be postponed by appropriate joint action of those who are threatened, and that postponement is greatly to be desired because time is needed to make preparations.
for war.\textsuperscript{22} It is this consideration that seems actually to have guided Chinese diplomacy and ideology in the past few years.

The framework within which joint action to resist the superpowers is to take place is that of Mao's three worlds, which grew out of the 1964 concept of intermediate zones whereby Mao sought to explain global power relationships once the Sino-Soviet bloc could no longer be said to exist. Mao's thesis is that the Third World (previously the first intermediate zone)—the underdeveloped and former colonial countries—is threatened and exploited by the First World—the superpowers (above all by the U.S.S.R., which claims to support the Third World)—as well as by the developed countries of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. However, the latter group of countries, the Second World (previously the second intermediate zone), is also exploited in turn and threatened by the superpowers, and thus has certain common concerns with the Third World. (China strongly asserts that as a developing country it is part of the Third World with no aspiration to superpower status.) The Chinese have recently conceded that the United States, although a superpower, shares some of the common concerns caused by the pervasive Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22}In a June 7, 1978 interview with a group of Thai journalists, Teng Hsiao-p'ing was very specific on this postponement, linking it to the turn of the century deadline for China's modernization. "The Chinese people are working hard to delay the outbreak of the new world war for at least 22 more years. During this time, we will try to realize four fundamental goals of modernization—that involves agriculture, industry, technology, and self-defence. But the party which will start the war is like a madman; if he chooses to start the war earlier, then we will have to prepare ourselves for it too." Unofficial transcript of Teng Hsiao-p'ing interview in FBIS, \textit{Daily Report (PRC)}, June 9, 1978, pp. 11-15. Variations on the inevitability of war thesis have been presented frequently by Teng in interviews with foreigners.

\textsuperscript{23}E.g., Hua Kuo-feng's comment at the Fifth National People's Congress that China and the United States "have quite a few points in common on some issues in the present international situation."
Moscow has charged, with some logic, that Mao's three worlds thesis is non-Marxist because it is not dialectical and not based on class relationships. Mao's thesis and some of its implications (such as the need for collaboration with Western European countries) has led to a serious rift between Peking and its principal ideological ally, Albania. There was little attempt during Mao's lifetime to bring the three worlds thesis into better conformity with more conventional Marxism (or to rebut Albania). However, the Hua Kuo-feng regime, as noted previously, has done precisely that, particularly with the wide distribution of a definitive People's Daily article buttressed by no less than 90 footnotes.2

Peking's current version of the Maoist doctrine was repeated at length by Hua Kuo-feng at the Fifth NPC on February 26, 1978:

Unreconciled to their reverses, the two hegemonist powers are intensifying their contention for world domination and frantically pushing their policies of aggression and war. At the same time, the factors for revolution are growing, so obviously are the factors for war. The danger of a world war is a growing menace to the people of the world. So long as social imperialism and imperialism exist, war is inevitable. The contention between the two hegemonist powers reaches every corner of the globe, but the cockpit is Europe. They work overtime to preach "détente" and "disarmament," with no other purpose than to fool people and hide their arms expansion and war preparations. A latecomer among imperialist powers, the Soviet Union relies mainly on its military power to carry out expansion; yet, it goes about flaunting banners of "socialism"

2 "Jan-min jih-pao, "Chairman Mao's Theory." The importance of the matter to Hua Kuo-feng as the custodian of Maoism is attested by the fact that Chinese media have devoted considerable space to reprints of articles on the three worlds and inevitability of war theses drawn from the Peking-subsidized press of the splinter "Marxist-Leninist" (that is, Maoist) factions in various non-Communist countries, which previously had joint Peking-Tirana support but have now divided into pro-Chinese and pro-Albanian subsplinters.
and "support for revolution" to dupe people and sell its wares. It is the most dangerous source of a new world war. Since things differ from one country to another, the people of each country must determine their own fighting tasks in the light of its specific conditions. But so far as the overall world situation is concerned, there is a strategic task common to the people the world over, and that is to consolidate and expand the international united front against hegemonism, oppose the policies of aggression and war pursued by the superpowers, and in particular by Soviet social-imperialism, and strive to put off the outbreak of a new world war.

At present, some people in the West follow a policy of appeasement towards the Soviet Union with the fond hope of saving themselves at the expense of others. This can only whet the ambitions of the aggressors and hasten the outbreak of war. Our attitude towards a new world war is: "FIRST, WE ARE AGAINST IT; SECOND, WE ARE NOT AFRAID OF IT." We believe that the outbreak of war can be put off, but then the people of all countries must close ranks, sharpen their vigilance, prepare against all eventualities, oppose appeasement, resolutely struggle against the war machinations of the superpowers and foil their strategic dispositions. In this way, even if the superpowers gamble with war, the people of the world will not be caught in a vulnerable state of unpreparedness. We are revolutionary optimists. The future of the world is bright, though the struggle of the people of the world may be arduous and protracted and the road tortuous. Victory is sure to go to the people of the whole world.25

Peking developed the three worlds thesis largely through analogy with the domestic history of the Maoist movement. Early in the Japanese war, the Chinese Communist Party began

25English versions of the Fifth Congress proceedings are available in FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), Supplement, March 16, 1978. The Hua speech is also published in English in Peking Review (March 10, 1978). The capitalized phrase is, of course, a Mao quotation.
to describe itself as the leading element in a "united front" coalition of working and peasant classes with "progressive" (or "patriotic") components of the "bourgeoisie" (described as the "national bourgeoisie"), all of which were united because of the overwhelming threat of Japan. Similarly, China now aspires to leadership of the Third World (analogous to the peasantry and proletariat) and alliance with the Second World (analogous to the national bourgeoisie since it is at once exploiting and exploited). The wartime united front gave rise to some startling quotations from the once and future radical, Mao Tse-tung, including protestations that he would like to visit the United States and model the future of China upon some aspects of the American polity. In the same vein, the three worlds period has seen Maoists praising NATO, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and ASEAN, and warning the Philippines and others not to let the (Soviet) tiger in the back door while repulsing the (U.S.) wolf at the front (translation: don't be hasty about expelling the U.S. military presence and closing U.S. bases).

Peking's ideology has several practical implications. Peking sees the United States as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R., but it concedes that military momentum may be on the side of the U.S.S.R. both because U.S. global defeats have made the United States assume a passive position strategically and because of a tendency toward "appeasement" within the U.S. political system. However, Peking points out that in the economic sphere and in technology the United States is still superior to the U.S.S.R.—in fact, Peking states, it is precisely because of Soviet economic backwardness that the U.S.S.R. relies on military power and threats of war, making it the more dangerous of the superpowers. The fact that the United States is less powerful in some areas does not obviate the usefulness of the U.S. alignment,

\[26\] These points are stated forcefully in the Jen-Min Jih-pao article "Chairman Mao's Theory."
because Peking attaches great importance to these economic factors and, in any case, in a balance of power game one may have to favor the slightly inferior side to maintain the balance. Furthermore, Peking places great importance on industrial countries of the Second World, not only as sources of trade and technology but also as part of the balance of power. Chinese exhortations to NATO against appeasement are considerably more emphatic than corresponding exhortations to the United States, and China is pursuing its Japanese connection more vigorously than the U.S. connection.

Of all the countries in Western Europe, Peking has demonstrated particular rapport with France. The three worlds thesis was originated by Mao (in the intermediate zone form) after de Gaulle recognized Peking, thereby creating the possibility for collaboration between China and France, whose position of independence and defiance within NATO Mao seems to have admired. This attitude is shared by the Hua regime. Because of China's reticence about revealing military "secrets," Chinese descriptions of the French independent deterrent to some extent serve as proxies for publicity regarding China's own deterrent, which is seldom described by Peking other than in statements such as those cited previously as accompanying the announcements of nuclear tests. Peking has quoted approvingly Prime Minister Raymond Barre's statement at the Albion strategic missile base that France's "independent" nuclear deterrent requires "forces

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27At the 11th National Party Congress Hua Kuo-feng cited Lenin to support the strategy of forming the "broadest possible united front" against Soviet hegemonism: "Lenin said: The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by ... making use without fail of every, even the smallest 'rift' among the enemies, of every antagonism ... and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional...." Peking Review (August 26, 1977).
that might not be gigantic but credible." It is perhaps no coincidence that the French destroyer Duguay-Trouin in 1977 visited Shanghai and became the first Western warship to show the flag in a Chinese port since the Communist takeover in 1949.

The three worlds and inevitability of war concepts must be appraised in the context of the Chinese emphasis on political and global aspects of military strategy. China is deeply suspicious of Western susceptibility to Soviet détente diplomacy; Peking has no use for arms control and no faith that arms limitations can reduce the strategic threat to China. Peking wants to strengthen the rationale supporting a strong anti-Soviet position in Western Europe and Western trade with China in strategically significant hardware and technology. Peking has therefore been stressing the direct threat the U.S.S.R. poses to Europe. The Chinese accuse U.S. and European "appeasers" of wanting to divert the Soviet threat eastward to China (just as Chamberlain tried to divert the Nazi threat eastward to the U.S.S.R.). Peking states that "only too glad to oblige, the Soviet Union steps up its anti-China clamour as it pursues its strategy of making a feint to the east while attacking in the west." In place of appeasement, Peking strongly advocates Western European unity and military preparedness. The Chinese estimate of Soviet priorities holds out the promise to the West that if China can be strengthened, some Soviet attention can be diverted

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29 Newsweek, April 17, 1978.

from the European target to the Asian front. Peking's global outlook is similarly reflected in discussions that stress the danger created for Second World countries by Soviet (and Cuban) advances in Africa astride communications lines that are crucial for Western Europe and Japan. In all of this Peking regards the United States not simply as a potential political ally but as a power that can help Third and Second World countries hold the line against the U.S.S.R. Peking manifests discouragement when the United States acts without sufficient decisiveness, as in the neutron warhead decision. The Chinese appear to be quite disturbed when an anti-Soviet coalition fails to materialize, as in Angola and, to date, the Horn of Africa. The kind of development that the Chinese appear to find most encouraging was illustrated in 1977 and again in 1978 by events in Zaire, when Soviet-backed Katangan incursions were blocked by coalitions of Second and Third World countries without U.S. (that is, First World) combat involvement.

While the Chinese theses regarding the three worlds and the inevitability of war can be explained to some extent as elements of the political and global philosophy Peking has formulated in the struggle against the U.S.S.R., it is clear at the same time that the concepts are more than that. In the next section, we will consider Peking's view of how the inevitable war is likely to develop militarily.

D. WAR SCENARIO

World War III has not exploded yet. We have no idea as to when this war will break out. We are not chief of staff of Soviet revisionism, nor of US imperialism. We are not fortune-tellers.\(^{31}\)

The Liberation Army Daily thus has disclaimed knowledge of when and how the inevitable war will occur, and how it will involve

\(^{31}\)"Should We or Should We Not be Ready for War?", FBIS, Daily Report (PRC), July 12, 1977, p. E-8.
China. Nevertheless, from time to time Peking commentators have envisaged various aspects of the war; these commentaries, though fragmentary, are interesting in that they are at least superficially consistent with various Chinese preparatory moves, e.g., military training and civil defense. Despite this consistency there is still an appalling gap between the threat described and the adequacy of the defensive measures and equipment available. Peking stresses that the primary Soviet expansionist drive is directed against Europe. A Chinese official told the German publication *Die Welt*:

We admit that the Soviet Union is threatening us, but it is threatening West Europe in particular. The Soviet Union must first occupy Europe and the Mideast and defeat the United States before it can solve the "Chinese problem"... Political unification of West Europe and strengthening the defensive forces first of all will serve Europe's survival. It is serving China only in a secondary way. On the other hand, a strengthened China will serve the interests of Europe.\(^{32}\)

However, Peking has also made it clear that Europe is not the only threatened area, and that attack is possible anywhere—including China. Even though the main Soviet target is Europe, China could become involved at any time. The *Liberation Army Daily* comment quoted at the outset of this section continues:

The Soviet revisionists have not given up their wild ambition to subjugate China. We must firmly bear in mind the idea of fighting. Will they fight a small or big war? We must be prepared against their fighting a big war. Will they fight the war at a later or an earlier date? We must be prepared against

their fighting the war at an earlier date. Will they fight a conventional or a big nuclear war? We must be prepared against their fighting a big nuclear war, wars in the sky, on land, and at sea and sudden attack. We must never relax our vigilance, not even slightly.33

It was Marshall Yeh Chien-ying himself who, in the early 1960's, warned that the training of the PLA must be based on the assumption that the enemy (at that time assumed to be the United States) would use all available modern weapons, including chemical and biological weapons (the latter to be used against crops), since China's "vast population and complex terrain" would make nuclear weapons alone inadequate to deal with the "China problem."34 Despite the generally less hard-line treatment of U.S. military conduct by the post-Mao Peking propaganda apparatus, it is noteworthy that various military reminiscences published in recent months have again called attention to charges made during the Korean war that the United States used biological warfare widely against Korea and China. (The reasons adduced for use of such weapons of course would apply equally to the U.S.S.R.35)

If the post-Mao leaders expect the full range of weapons of mass destruction to be used, they still ascribe to those weapons no more decisive power than Mao did. Current Chinese commentaries point out that the aggressors with nuclear weapons can cause considerable destruction, but they cannot destroy China or its will to resist, and ultimately the aggressor must mount a conventional invasion in order to realize his territorial aims. This point is strongly emphasized. Imperialists (including social imperialists)

33 See p. 79, fn. 31.

34 Yeh's comments are contained in Cheng, The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, pp. 253ff and 667ff. The specific references to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are on pp. 253 and 684.

35 The 1975 handbook on Chinese civil defense similarly deals with the need to take measures against nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare.
fight for material gains, and these cannot be achieved except by the seizure of territory:

We don't deny that nuclear weapons have considerable destructive and killing power. However, in the final analysis, nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to solve the problems of war. With nuclear weapons, the aggressors may destroy a city but they cannot occupy it.  

Or, as Acting Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung told Cyrus Vance in 1975:

You think they will use nuclear weapons to wipe out your big cities, but they don't want that kind of war. Some assert nuclear weapons will destroy mankind. We don't think so. The purpose of war is to occupy other people's land to carry out exploitation—so what is the use of wiping out other people? Nagasaki and Hiroshima—you released two atom bombs in these small cities of Japan, not at Tokyo or Osaka, the big cities.  

The Chinese civil defense handbook somewhat simplistically states, "After being attacked by an atomic bomb, the army and militia that are carrying out combat missions should immediately prepare to fight, to meet the invading enemy." The Chinese thesis that a nuclear attack is bound to be followed by a conventional invasion is strengthened indirectly by the fact that since the 1960's the Soviets have maintained a very heavy concentration of ground forces near the Chinese border.

Of course, once faced with a conventional invasion, Chinese commentators state that China has the spiritual atom bomb—the Maoist strategy of protracted People's War that is bound ultimately to defeat the aggressor. Not only will the aggressor pay the cost of eventual defeat in the People's War, but in the meantime his homeland also will suffer: "Everybody knows that

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37Knowles, China Diary, p. 73.
38Chinese Civil Defense, p. 57.
when both sides have nuclear weapons, the threat is much greater to imperialist or social-imperialist countries where industries and populations are highly concentrated."19 The Chinese are by no means overly sanguine in making these predictions. In the discussion cited above Han Nien-lung predicted that the People's War phase might last 20 to 30 years.

At the risk of oversimplification, the scenario foreseen by the Chinese thus runs somewhat as follows: The Soviets will attack in Europe as a preliminary to attacking China—or, conversely, they may attack China first. The attack against China will be sudden and general. Nuclear weapons will be used as well as chemical and biological weapons. Destruction will be widespread but not decisive, and China will be able to inflict damaging counterblows on the U.S.S.R. The nuclear attack on China will be followed by a conventional invasion, which will lead to a protracted People's War as described by Mao from which China cannot help but emerge victorious. And thereafter the world situation will be favorable to reconstruction in China and to the "building of socialism" everywhere.

When the post-Mao Chinese leaders speak publicly of war, they generally do so in the Maoist style cited above. Whether they fully believe in the apocalyptic scenario is questionable; but, as noted, Chinese military training, civil defense measures, and troop dispositions are consistent with such a belief.40 It should be emphasized, however, that preparation for the final war is not the only responsibility of the Chinese armed forces. The domestic functions described in Chapter II are of much more daily importance than the preparations for strategic war. From the viewpoint of Chinese military leaders, the various irredentist objectives listed in that chapter are not war aims since

40No doubt the scenario could be refined considerably through the use of detailed classified material on Chinese troop dispositions and other indications of Peking's contingency planning.
they do not involve territory conceded to be foreign; achievement of these aims thus becomes almost a subdivision of the PLA's domestic function but no less important. No major statement on military matters is ever issued by Peking without at least a perfunctory exhortation to the PLA to prepare to "liberate" Taiwan, and improvement of the PLA's capability vis-à-vis Taiwan is undoubtedly a goal even while the tone of Peking's propaganda regarding Taiwan remains relatively nonthreatening.¹ Peking presumably does not plan a war to seize Taiwan or other claimed territory, but it has resorted to military demonstrations from time to time (some of considerable magnitude) to keep its claims active—in various Taiwan Strait crises, in the Paracel invasion in the closing days of the Vietnam war, and in the demonstrations mounted by armed fishing vessels in the Sengaku (Tiao Yu-t'ai) area disputed by China, Japan, and Taiwan. According to press reports, even during the recent tension with Vietnam (which was perhaps anticipated but certainly not planned by Peking) use has been made of military demonstrations in the form of maneuvers and troop concentrations near the border, overflights, and naval movements near Vietnam.²

¹Matching Taiwan, if only for political effect, is no doubt an aim of Chinese military modernization, but seems to be of definitely lower priority than dealing with the Soviet threat. To a considerable extent, the Taiwan aim is being achieved as a byproduct of modernization efforts focused on the latter, e.g., improvements of general air and naval capabilities. There is no indication that Peking has expended resources in areas that would be useful only against Taiwan, such as construction of amphibious assault craft.

²The Far Eastern Economic Review, June 16, 1978, reported in its "intelligence" column (p. 7) that travelers in Kwangsi Province had noted troop movements and artillery firing, presumed to be part of a nighttime maneuver designed to lend weight to Chinese diplomatic warnings to Hanoi over the status of the Chinese community in Vietnam.
VI
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

A. THE POST-MAO REGIME

Before drawing conclusions from the foregoing discussion, it is useful to summarize the nature and outlook of the current regime in China. Six major points can be made:

(1) The Hua Kuo-feng regime was legitimized on the basis of Maoist ideology rather than constitutional forms. At the same time, it has discarded a great deal of Maoism along with the policies attributed to the purged radical faction. However, while Hua has been built up as a leader in Mao's image, in fact he presides over a collegium in which he is not necessarily the most powerful or prestigious member. China's elder military statesman, Yeh Chien-yung, although limited in activity by age, commands more respect than Hua, and the repeatedly purged and reinstated Teng Hsiao-p'ing is tremendously influential as China's chief administrator, somewhat as Chou En-lai was under Mao.

(2) The military and security establishment has achieved great political power in this regime and would be beyond challenge, except that it is itself divided by conflicting ambitions and interests. Not surprisingly, military matters predominate in almost all lines of policy.

(3) China faces some staggering problems in terms of allocating scarce resources; the leadership will have to make difficult decisions in settling priority questions between the civil and military sectors and within each sector, and among competing short- and long-range and national and parochial requirements. A return to sloganeering, factionalism, and even Maoist radicalism is always a possibility in this kind of environment, as attested to by the unceasing campaign against the gang of four, even in the second year after their purge.
Despite their nuclear capability and numerical size, China's military forces are handicapped by an overall technological gap in comparison to either superpower even greater than was the case during the Japanese and civil wars. China's military force is superior to that of the potential East Asian adversaries, but China would have difficulty utilizing that superiority due to inadequate transport and amphibious capability. Qualitatively, China's naval and air forces are no match for the numerically much smaller but more modern and better trained forces of Taiwan.1

A modernization strategy has been formulated that is attributed to Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Yeh Chien-ying, endorsed by Hua Kuo-feng, and buttressed by citations of vintage-1950's Mao. The strategy emphasizes long-range, basic infrastructure aspects of modernization, and relies heavily on procurement of advanced technology from the West and Japan. In regard to military modernization, this may mean that only some of the most serious shortfalls will be dealt with initially while the industrial base necessary for supplying future armaments is created.

China's strategic concerns are overwhelmingly dominated by the Soviet threat, which is seen in global terms and not only in terms of specific issues at dispute such as the border. An attempt to ease some points of tension would be consistent with the long-range emphasis of Peking's modernization strategy, but would not affect China's basic perception of the Soviet menace.

B. COMPONENTS OF CHINESE STRATEGY

The Chinese regime has therefore developed a patchwork military strategy consisting basically of three components.

1That is not to say that Taiwan does not have serious military vulnerabilities, which are mostly geographic. Taiwan would be vulnerable to naval blockade and even the threat of blockade could disrupt the trade upon which it depends. Taiwan's few major airfields could be knocked out in a surprise raid by aircraft flying low to evade radar (Taiwan is only 15 minutes by jet from the mainland). Also, the numbers are such that Taiwan's Air Force could be defeated in a war of attrition even if the loss ratios were favorable to Taiwan.
First, a rudimentary nuclear deterrent is maintained so that the enemy cannot escape serious damage. The weakness of the deterrent lies in the tremendous disproportion between the damage that China can inflict and the damage that can be inflicted upon it, plus the possibility that China's nuclear capability might be virtually eliminated in a systematic first strike.

Second, the Maoist strategy of People's War will theoretically deny the enemy any territorial advantage from his aggression. Although China's armed forces and civil defense efforts are configured for this strategy, it is designed as much for political as military impact. China's leaders recognize that an aggressor will not necessarily follow a nuclear attack with a Japanese-style invasion and that in any case a defense based on strategic withdrawal means the loss of vitally important territory, such as in China's Manchurian industrial base. Even Peking is close enough to the Mongolian border that it might not be defensible for long.

Third, international support is to be achieved through the likewise Maoist three worlds strategy. Perception of the Soviet threat as global is what underlies this aspect of China's strategy. China hopes to identify and strengthen points of common concern with Third World countries, with the Second World countries of Europe and Japan, and also with the United States, in order to strengthen worldwide barriers to Soviet expansion and avoid a situation where Moscow might try to deal militarily with its China problem first and in isolation from other problems.

C. OTHER CONTINGENCIES

China's preoccupation with the strategic threat does not mean that China may not mount military demonstrations to support policy in regard to other problem areas, such as Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Peking does not distinguish between military and political means of attaining objectives, and particularly
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963 A
in regard to Taiwan has resisted suggestions that the manner in which the Taiwan problem will ultimately be resolved be formally restricted. The initiation by China of large-scale military operations in support of various East Asian objectives is mitigated against by China's very limited capability for such operations outside of its own borders, by the fear that the Soviet Union might take advantage of Chinese military preoccupation elsewhere, and by the recognition that the present détente strategy, which is ultimately aimed at China's modernization, might not survive such action. However, China could be drawn into hostilities, for example by a need to salvage its relationship with either Cambodia or North Korea, if either of those unpredictable countries were threatened with a major military setback at the hands of Vietnam or South Korea—regardless of how hostilities might have originated. Or China could be drawn into hostilities through an escalatory process following military incidents (either with India or Vietnam) along its southern border or against Taiwan-claimed islands. Recognizing all of this, Peking's leaders cannot avoid maintaining some forces for East or South Asian contingencies, but the overwhelming emphasis in Chinese strategy, military disposition, and modernization policy is on the Soviet menace, not an Asian war.

D. PEKING'S EXPECTATIONS OF U.S. POLICY

Peking has from time to time publicly stated some expectation it has of the United States, such as the "three conditions" pertaining to Taiwan without which "normalization" of relations cannot proceed; more often, Peking has been reactionary, indicating disappointment or concern over particular U.S. actions such as when the United States was too open with the Soviets in regard to arms control or when the United States succumbed to Soviet pressure in the decision to defer neutron warhead production. From such indications one can determine what the Chinese expect and hope will be part of U.S. policy.
U.S. actions that could have an effect on the Soviet strategic threat against China or on Chinese strategic defense should be listed as the most important of Peking's policy expectations—if our estimate of Chinese concern over the danger of Soviet aggression is correct. Given that China perceives the Soviet threat in a global context, Chinese expectations of the United States in this regard are likewise global. It is evident that Peking would like the United States and its allies to adopt a tough posture toward the U.S.S.R. on a wide range of issues: arms control, support of NATO and the Japanese alliances, weapons development and deployment, policy in Africa and the Indian Ocean, etc. In addition, as discussed in Chapter IV, Peking expects as a result of its détente diplomacy to gain access to advanced technology, particularly in fields relevant to military modernization. China no doubt would purchase some military end items from the United States, if they were offered, but it might prefer to use its limited resources to buy prototypes and make licensing arrangements for production in China rather than develop an excessive dependence on foreign sources of supply (this is an unresolved controversy in China as it is in the United States). If U.S. arms are not to be available, Peking at least would expect the United States not to try to block purchases from other sources and to permit purchases of nonmilitary U.S. technology. In this connection, the purchase of petroleum technology has become particularly important, because petroleum exports can generate foreign exchange for foreign technology procurement and other requirements.

U.S. policy in regard to the normalization of U.S.-China relations and the status of Taiwan is important to stipulated goals of the Hua Kuo-feng regime but not vital to the regime's survival. The Chinese demands that the United States break diplomatically with Taiwan, terminate the mutual security treaty, and withdraw all forces from the island (and terminate military sales to Taiwan) have political as well as military importance.
While normalization under the given terms would imply American recognition of China's (theoretical) unity, the military seizure of Taiwan against Nationalist opposition would still be a formidable and risky undertaking, regardless of a U.S. withdrawal. Peking no doubt believes that there is political support within the United States for a break with Taiwan, and understands that such a break is necessary to complete the diplomatic isolation of that island and initiate the erosion of Taiwan's economic and political stability. U.S. compliance with the Chinese terms would increase Peking's flexibility in regard to minor military harassment (that might nevertheless have major repercussions in Taiwan) but from a strategic viewpoint, these matters have by no means the importance of the Chinese expectations pertaining to containment of the U.S.S.R.

U.S. policy actions that might affect various Chinese aims and interests in East Asia are almost a subcategory of those actions the Chinese expect the United States to take in order to contain the Soviet strategic threat. However, there is some ambiguity. For example, in regard to Korea, Peking is under an obvious compulsion to endorse Pyongyang's objectives in its own declaratory policy, particularly the demand that the U.S. military presence in Korea be totally and unconditionally withdrawn. And yet it seems unlikely that Peking ranks the U.S. withdrawal from Korea high among actions it wishes the United States to take; in fact, it is possible that Peking prefers a residual U.S. presence in Korea to forestall rash action by the North and for whatever assurance it provides Japan. In other regards, the Chinese position is more straightforward. Except for Korea and Taiwan, Peking does not agitate for a U.S. military withdrawal from East Asia. The Chinese openly support maintenance of the Security Treaty with Japan because of its anti-Soviet implications. In many regards Chinese and U.S. interests in Southeast Asia also run parallel: for example, China's constructive view of ASEAN and its acceptance of U.S. bases in the
Philippines. The presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in East Asian waters seems to be considered by Peking as an increasingly useful counter to the alarming growth of the Soviet naval presence in the Pacific. In these matters, Peking's earlier efforts to displace the U.S. influence and presence have been affected by stronger anti-Soviet concerns.

E. STRATEGIC BALANCE

Peking has concluded that the United States has fallen behind the U.S.S.R. in many categories of the arms race. Consequently there is some question as to how much Peking actually expects from the United States in this area. In commenting on the U.S. defense budget or new American weapons developments, it has become routine for Peking to point out that a particular U.S. action is a counter to some threatening Soviet move, usually one of much greater magnitude. Peking explains that it is precisely because of Soviet ascendancy that the U.S.S.R. has become the major war threat. But Peking's position goes beyond merely pointing out that the Soviets tend to take the initiative in military and strategic matters, that the United States reacts to Soviet actions rather than vice-versa, and that often the United States, in a neo-appeasement mood, chooses not to react. From a Marxist viewpoint, it is significant that Peking's position includes explicit appreciation of the fact that even with its numerous economic and social problems, the United States has a clear lead over the U.S.S.R. in terms of basic economic strength, advanced technology, and some aspects of its political system. As subscribers to Mao's thesis that weapons by themselves are not decisive, the Chinese could not logically conclude that a minor Soviet lead over the United States in development of some types of strategic weapons would be decisive, given U.S. strengths in technical and economic fields—particularly when these are considered to be augmented by the not inconsiderable capabilities of Western Europe and Japan. The foregoing point is particularly
significant since Peking is presumably not seeking direct U.S. military support against a Soviet attack, but rather wants to draw upon U.S. and Western technology for its own modernization program and wants to avoid being isolated in the overall balance of power.

F. ARMS CONTROL

With very few exceptions the Chinese have taken a strongly negative position on arms control proposals. For the most part, Peking considers arms control proposals to be a part of U.S.-Soviet détente diplomacy and for that reason harmful to China's interests. Some proposals Peking considers to have been designed to perpetuate China's strategic inferiority and specifically to retard China's development of strategic weapons, e.g., various test-ban and nonproliferation proposals. (It will be recalled that it was Moscow's adherence to the partial test ban treaty that set off one of the early, very bitter Sino-Soviet polemics.) Other proposals, such as those relating to MBFR, are seen as efforts to deflect Soviet aggression eastward, toward China.

There is no indication that Peking sees arms control as contributing in any way to China's military security, although the Chinese are beginning to use arms control discussions as an instrument of Third World diplomacy.2

2The fact that China, contrary to precedent, attended the May 1978 Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament represented a procedural but not substantive change. In a speech on May 29 Foreign Minister Huang Hua utilized the special session to reiterate forcefully all of China's objections to a long list of arms control proposals. He repeated China's warnings against the Soviet threat and against appeasement. He pointed out that Second and Third World countries (by implication including China) still lack adequate defense capabilities against the superpowers and therefore should not be expected to join in arms limitations until the superpowers have substantially reduced their arms. Huang did call upon the superpowers to take a series of measures including "by stages" to destroy all nuclear weapons (continued on next page)
G. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The foregoing suggests a number of points relevant to the formulation of U.S. policy.

Despite Hua Kuo-feng's statement that the United States and China share quite a few points in the present international situation, Chinese and U.S. perceptions are in fact far apart on several basic issues. The Chinese believe (or at least state) that war is inevitable, and that détente or any accommodation with the U.S.S.R. is appeasement and can only heighten the danger. They do not believe that negotiated restraints on weapons can contribute to mutual security.

While denouncing détente as practiced by the U.S.S.R., however, Peking has developed its own détente diplomacy. Peking's involvement with the non-Communist world has become global, through trade, economic aid, nearly universal diplomatic relations, and UN membership. Chinese support of Maoist insurgency in Southeast Asia and Africa has not ceased, but has become a much less prominent part of Chinese foreign policy (and is made more palatable in the case of Africa by the fact that Chinese support of insurgents there is now limited to black liberation movements in South Africa).

Despite this global involvement, however, the Chinese do not figure very importantly in most world situations. Except as a

(cont'd) and drastically to reduce conventional weapons. (The phrase "by stages" represents a moderation of China's stand in regard to nuclear weapons.) He indicated that China supported "rational" arms control proposals, in addition to the destruction of all nuclear weapons, such as various nuclear free and peace zones, the dismantling of all foreign military bases, the destruction of biological and chemical weapons, the development of peaceful nuclear industry without restriction on the pretext of nonproliferation, opposition to the use of military aid to extort privileges and make exorbitant profits, and opposition to hegemony in any part of the world. Huang's speech appears in English under the title "Superpower Disarmament Fraud Exposed" in Peking Review (June 2, 1978), pp. 5-13.
minor trading partner, they are not important in Western Europe. (In many countries, Taiwan's trade is more important than China's.) The Chinese levy charges of betrayal of the Arab cause at the U.S.S.R., but otherwise do not figure in the Middle East. Chinese economic aid has been pervasive in Africa, but the leverage there belongs to the Soviets (and their Cuban proxies)—even in countries such as Tanzania that were once almost Chinese clients.

Given this situation, China and the United States are no longer adversaries with regard to their respective East Asian policy aims. Removal of the U.S. presence would not resolve China's problems even in regard to Taiwan (although it would increase Taiwan's problems). In fact, Peking has come to accept most of the components of the fairly low-keyed U.S. presence in East Asia as a contribution to maintaining the strategic balance with the U.S.S.R.

China itself also has considerable importance as a military and political counterweight to the U.S.S.R., not as much as Western Europe but more than most anti-Soviet countries, because of its nuclear capability, its size and manpower, its location, and the depth of its anti-Soviet convictions. But the importance of China to the U.S.S.R. and of the U.S.S.R. to China tends to be exaggerated because of their mutual paranoia.

This study has dealt with only the very broadly defined strategic aspects of Chinese policy, and has not examined many other factors that enter into the formulation of U.S. policy. It is possible, however, to make some policy generalizations on the basis of the foregoing points.

The United States should not try somehow to make China a "quasi-ally" against the U.S.S.R. Neither China's strategic capabilities nor the commonality of interest between China and the United States is great enough to warrant such an approach, to say nothing of the fact that too much of a strategic "tilt" toward China could effectively conceal those interests common
to the United States and the U.S.S.R. This will lead to a more balanced approach.

A balanced approach can also be helpful in regard to specific issues, such as questions of licensing high technology exports. Many types of technology do not have a direct offensive military application and even some weapons systems, such as antitank missiles or ballistic missile warning radars, are more relevant for defensive use than they are for aggression. (Other categories are more ambiguous, such as military jet engines and the other technology needed to modernize China's air force.) It is no longer realistically possible for the United States to try to enforce an embargo of all such items. However, there is no reason why the United States should itself become involved in technology transfer except in nonmilitary categories, considering that U.S. actions in this area will have a much greater political impact in East Asia than corresponding actions by West European countries and considering also the difficulty of reaching agreement on what is a "defensive" weapons system.

A complete examination of the questions involved in normalizing U.S. relations with China is beyond the scope of this study. We will note, however, that Peking's expectations in regard to Taiwan (the three conditions) involve important but not vital Chinese concerns. The conditions probably cannot be compromised, but, along with normalization, they can be deferred. Meanwhile the Sino-American relationship can be strengthened through limited collaboration on some strategic matters. The potentially destabilizing effect of such collaboration in East Asia, particularly in Taiwan and possibly also in Korea and Japan, can be defused by assurance that U.S. commitments will not be phased out, including the commitments made to the lesser U.S. allies in East Asia.

Finally, it has been suggested that unless the United States is very responsive to Chinese expectations, Peking may switch its international alignment or once more tilt domestically
toward the radical faction. On the basis of the present analysis, neither course appears likely. Chinese concern over the Soviet strategic threat did not arise because the West was offering better technological support; rather, China sought to obtain foreign technology for its modernization program because of the Soviet threat. It is hardly likely that the United States, Western Europe, and Japan combined will altogether fail to provide the technological support Peking requires, even though there may be shortfalls either because of an unwillingness to license a few, specific, strategically significant items or because of problems on the Chinese side, such as with foreign exchange or ideology. Such shortfalls will tend to make Peking perceive the Soviet menace as relatively greater rather than lesser, and are hardly likely to motivate a rapprochement with Moscow. Similarly, Chinese expectations regarding the desirable anti-Soviet line to be taken by NATO, Japan, and the United States will also inevitably be disappointed, for example if there is a new SALT agreement. Such disappointments again will contribute to greater sensitivity to the Soviet threat, not to rapprochement. Total rebuff of Chinese overtures by the West might cause China once again to seek security in isolation, but occasional partial disappointments would still encourage Peking to pursue its détente policy with Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. The impact in terms of domestic factionalism is more difficult to predict, but it is worth noting that the Soviet threat and the consequent three worlds united front diplomacy were apparently not at issue in recent factional disputes.

In sum, the present study suggests that by playing the "China card" the United States will not greatly change existing strategic relationships. However, drawing China wherever possible into strategic consultations, bilaterally at first, will contribute to strategic stability, as will a flexible approach to
the Chinese desire to acquire technology and appropriate consideration of the China factor in the evolving détente relationship with the Soviet Union.