NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THE SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY:
A EUROCOMMUNIST ENIGMA.

by

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This study reviews the historical development of the Spanish Communist Party, describing its role during the Spanish Civil War and its opposition to the autocratic Franco regime which followed. The study also analyzes the party's role in the domestic politics of emerging, post-Franco Spain as well as its role in the developing contemporary phenomenon called Eurocommunism. Employing...
levels of analysis model as an analytical framework, the study concludes that the Spanish Communist Party has, in its very short period of legal existence, begun to demonstrate that it is a viable and dynamic force, both in Spanish politics as well as the international communist movement, of which policy-makers in both arenas should take serious notice.
ABSTRACT

This study reviews the historical development of the Spanish Communist Party, describing its role during the Spanish Civil War and its opposition to the autocratic Franco regime which followed. The study also analyzes the party's role in the domestic politics of emerging, post-Franco Spain as well as its role in the developing contemporary phenomenon called Eurocommunism. Employing a levels of analysis model as an analytical framework, the study concludes that the Spanish Communist Party has, in its very short period of legal existence, begun to demonstrate that it is a viable and dynamic force, both in Spanish politics as well as the international communist movement, of which policy-makers in both arenas should take serious notice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In April 1977 the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Communista Español - PCE) was announced. The public outcry and feared military reaction predicted by many doomsayers did not materialize. The party went on to participate in the June 1977 elections in a manner which, unexpectedly to some observers, was highly respectable. The PCE platform was remarkable in some respects in that on many points, it actually supported positions to the right of the platform of the Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE).

The PCE has advocated its platform internationally as well as domestically with PCE Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo expounding the virtues of Eurocommunism to the rest of Europe and the communist world. In this realm, too, PCE policy has differed in key tenets from the generally expected communist line. Such differences have led to much publicized criticism of Carrillo by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In both of the above instances the outcome was not entirely unpredictable, given the historical legacy of the PCE and the somewhat pluralistic form that the international communist movement has taken in recent years.

Using a levels of analysis model as an organizational tool, this study will investigate the development of the PCE. It is hoped that an analysis of the evolution of the
PCE party line in this manner will provide a logical, if somewhat subjective, means for predicting future PCE policy actions as the post-Franco government in Spain continues to develop.

At the first level of analysis lies the party itself. In order to completely understand the PCE of today, one must have a knowledge of the historical stigma which the PCE has acquired as a result of its actions, activities and policies during the Spanish Civil War. Even today, many perceptions and misconceptions which the Spanish people have concerning the PCE are directly attributable to that time and to the propaganda which PCE opponents, both to the left and to the right, have generated based on the PCE's Civil War activities. Consequently, many of the PCE's present day political pronouncements and party activities are directed toward overcoming its historical legacy.

At the second level of analysis lies the Spanish domestic political environment. Since 1975, the politics of Spain have undergone a radical transformation from a politically stifled autocratic regime into a politically lively constitutional monarchy. In this context an investigation of the PCE's legalization in 1976, its participation in the 1977 elections, and of the results it achieved should prove useful in determining the actual political strength of the party and assist in predicting its future actions.
Finally, at the third level of analysis lies the international communist movement and the PCE's activities within it. Since 1968 the PCE has developed into a highly independent communist party, espousing not only its own anti-CPSU views, but also proposing a West European brand of socialism called Eurocommunism as an alternative to the Soviet model. The rapidly growing acceptance of Eurocommunist ideals in recent years has caused great concern not only in the Kremlin, but also in Western diplomatic circles. Consequently, an investigation of the PCE today cannot disregard the innovative activities of the PCE in attempting to become the leader of this trend. In this light a sufficiently detailed discussion of the evolution of Eurocommunism will be presented to provide an additional perspective from which to view the continuing development of the PCE.
II. THE PCE PAST

A. THE EARLY YEARS

The PCE, like most Spanish institutions, is a peculiarly Iberian phenomenon which must be analyzed first by looking at its historical heritage. The PCE grew out of the active reform movement of industrializing Spain of the 1800's. However, the strength of the anarchist movement and the Socialists served to constrain the growth potential of the party until the events of the Civil War brought the PCE to the forefront of Spanish Republican politics.

The anarchist movement of Bakunin took deep hold among workers in Catalonia and peasant farmers of Andalusia during the 1860's and early 1870's. After the death of Bakunin and the dissolution of the First International in 1876, the anarchist movement in the rest of Europe was leaderless, in accordance with the movement's own philosophical position, and it became generally ineffectual politically. However, during the same time, foreign concepts of labor organization transformed the Spanish anarchist movement into a unique anarcho-syndicalist form which manifested itself in the Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (CNT) formed in 1910. "The anarcho-syndicalists believed in organizing the workers into syndicates or labor unions capable of industrial strikes, for they saw the strike as the prime weapon to achieve social revolution. Their ultimate objective was the general
strike that would paralyze the economy, forcing concessions and eventually bringing about the overthrow of the state.¹

A second revolutionary doctrine which grew out of the First International was Marxism. Just as in the rest of Europe, the ideas of Marx had a great impact on the labor movement in Spain. Receiving inspiration from the organizational and administrative abilities of Pablo Iglesias, its Spanish founder, the PSOE, established in 1879, worked through its trade union arm, the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) to win over Spanish workers from anarchism. Unable to penetrate the anarchist stronghold of Catalonia, the PSOE extended its appeal for support throughout the rest of Spain so that by 1910 the PSOE had achieved great influence over a large sector of Spanish thinkers and workers.

Thus, during the time of the Second International and through the First World War, the Spanish labor movement was divided between the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists who believed in violent, direct action and no compromise with the employer class, and the Socialists who strove for limited gains and evolution toward socialism through legislation. The split was also geographic; CNT strength lay in Catalonia, and Andalusia while the UGT was largely composed of Castilian peasants and craftsmen and northern miners and industrial

workers. The two organizations rarely cooperated, port-
tending a characteristic of the Spanish labor movement
which was an inherent cause of the Spanish Civil War.\(^2\)

Although the Russian revolution of 1917 was greatly
admired by Spanish proletarian leaders, few of them became
communists. Therefore, while the French and Italian
Socialist parties voted to join the Third International,
the PSOE rejected it.\(^3\) The PCE was first proclaimed on 19
December 1919 by a dissident wing of the PSOE, the Federación
de Juventudes Socialistas, as a result of the PSOE's refusal
to adhere to the Third International.\(^4\) A second split
occurred in July of 1920 when the PSOE, after reversing its
original position and sending a delegation to the Internatinal
after all, refused to accept the "Twenty-one Conditions for
Admission". In this instance the Partido Comunista Obrero
Español (PCOE) splintered off to establish ties with the
Comintern and by November 1921 had joined with the PCE.\(^5\)
Also in 1920, the CNT had voted against affiliation with
Moscow and a small group, including Andrés Nin and Joaquín

\(^2\)Herr, p. 131.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 138.


\(^5\)Witold Sworakowski, *World Communism - A Handbook 1918-
Maurín, left to join the PCE. By 1921 the PCE numbered only approximately 1200 members and was dominated by the two larger parties of the left.

The rightist dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, established in September of 1923, promised to end the threat of labor strife. He established twenty-seven corporations for various industries and professions (similar to Mussolini's model of the corporate state) which had sole authority to negotiate labor agreements. Since the anarchists refused to cooperate with these organs of the state, the CNT was outlawed and driven underground where its more militant members formed the Federación Anarchista Ibérica (FAI), soon to become the vanguard of radical, violent anarchism in Spain. Upon the issue of cooperation with the government syndicates, the Socialists were split. One faction under Indelicio Prieto did not accept the regime's plan. Another, more radical faction under Francisco Largo Caballero saw cooperation as a possible means to destroy the anarchist opposition, a move which earned him great enmity among the anarchists which was to surface in later Republican conflicts.

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6 Herr, p. 139.
7 Hermet, p. 16.
8 Herr, p. 197.
9 Ibid., p. 148.
The dictatorship initially tolerated the PCE but eventually banned the party in December 1924.\textsuperscript{10} Subsequent government repression and internal dissension quickly shrank party membership to approximately 500 members. The party remained insignificant in size, able to increase its membership to only about 800 members by the beginning of the Second Republic in 1931.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1931 the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera fell, as did the monarchy when King Alphonso XIII entered exile in disgrace in April. The Provisional Government of the Second Republic under Niceto Alcalá Zamora, composed of Republicans and Socialists was given the reins of government. It called elections for the coming June. In these elections the government coalition won the majority of seats in the one-house Cortes of the Republic while numerous other groupings on the left and right also gained seats. In these elections the PCE polled only 4\% of the vote and gained no seats in the Cortes.\textsuperscript{12} All in all, the seven years of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and the first year of the Republic can be said to have led to the eclipse of the Communists as an effective political force, whereas the Socialists on their

\textsuperscript{10}Sworakowski, p. 396.

\textsuperscript{11}Hermet, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 21.
right and the anarchists on their left emerged strengthened from this phase.  

Apparently the Comintern saw in the unsettled conditions of Spain a revolutionary situation similar to Russia in pre-revolutionary days. Comintern advisers were sent to Spain to reorganize the party, at this time led by José Díaz, for an attempt to gain control of the proletarian movement there. Objection to increased association with Moscow views caused Spanish Communist leaders Nin and Maurín to split from the PCE in 1932 to form their own rival parties. Subsequently, the two joined forces to form the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM). The anti-Stalinist POUM was a uniquely Catalan entity which soon came into conflict with the PCE as both parties strove for leadership of the Spanish communist movement.

During the years 1932 to 1934, the PCE, conforming closely to Comintern instructions, refused to cooperate with the Republican government which it considered bourgeois or with other revolutionary groups. Despite continued internal disaffections and tactical blunders, attributed largely to Comintern advice and instructions, the PCE slowly added to
its membership. By 1933 it had doubled its voting strength and had elected one deputy to the Cortes.\textsuperscript{15}

Due to factionalization and inter-party conflict, the left was defeated in the 1933 elections. A coalition of Catholic parties, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), under the leadership of José María Gil Robles became the majority party of the Cortes although political maneuvering by the left prevented Gil Robles from being named Prime Minister.

The left's loss of influence as a result of the 1933 elections provided the Communists with the opportunity to test their nascent popular front strategy.\textsuperscript{16} Cattell provides a concise background for the reasoning behind the PCE's urging of the Popular Front which emerged in Spain in 1934:

\begin{quote}
The Soviet Union's entrance into the League of Nations in 1934 marked a sharp change of the Communist's interpretation of their
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15}Hermet, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{16}In this study, the term "popular front tactic" will be used to denote the Communist strategy of proposing political alliances with Socialists and other leftist parties for the purpose of attaining greater influence in domestic politics. Once achieved, the coalition becomes formally expressed in a "Popular Front", as it was termed in France in 1934 and Spain in 1936. Subsequently, the Communists attempt to infiltrate the ranks of their alliance partners to gain operational control of the coalition. Although in later years, such coalitions were variously termed, "United Fronts", "National Fronts", or other similar designations, "Popular Front" will be used generically in this study to describe all such coalitions.
relationship to other countries. Before 1934 the Soviet Union had viewed the world generally as split into two hostile camps -- the Communists and the non-Communists. In 1934 this policy was revised providing for the temporary alliance of all anti-Fascists against fascism. This revised interpretation found its reflection not only in a change in Russian foreign policy, but in the program of the Communist International. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 defined this new policy of the United Front. The Spanish conflict, beginning in July 1936, was the first real opportunity for the Comintern to put the United Front into practical operation.17

Actually, the PCE acted to institute a popular front before its official proclamation by the Comintern by proposing, in 1934, joint action with the PSOE. The PCE overtures were rejected, however, another of the frequent miners' uprisings in Asturias in late 1934 vividly demonstrated the value of concerted, unified action as proposed by PCE. The uprising was part of a general strike called by the Socialists in three areas, Barcelona, Madrid, and Asturias. The CNT refusal to participate doomed the effort in Barcelona; army strength doomed the effort in Madrid; only in Asturias, where the CNT, the UGT and the Communists had united, did the effort reach any level of success. The violence of the uprising, although opposed by most of its leaders frightened the beleaguered rightist government into calling in Spanish Foreign Legion elements to reinforce outnumbered government

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troops. Under the orders of their commander, General Francisco Franco, the government forces ruthlessly crushed the rebellion and executed an estimated two thousand miners.\(^{18}\) This was not the only time that the left would experience the ruthless determination of young General Franco.

Nonetheless, the lesson of the advantages to be gained by unity of action were not lost on the left, at least for the time being. By January of 1936 a Popular Front Pact was signed in which the Republican Left, the Republican Union and the Catalan Left parties aligned with the PSOE and the PCE in a communist-espoused program demanding a return to the religious, educational and regional policies of the first two years of the Republic, land reform and amnesty for political prisoners.\(^{19}\)

The Popular Front platform proposed by the Communists was a marvel of political ambiguity in that it had something for everyone and nothing that could be construed as critical of any leftist faction. Cattell enumerates the Pact's four main points:

1. Confiscation of the land from the Grandees, Church and convents without compensation and its immediate distribution to individual peasants and farm workers.
2. Liberation of the oppressed peoples from Spanish imperialism, giving autonomy to Catalonia, Euzkadi and Galicia.


\(^{19}\) Sworakowski, p. 397.
3. Improvement in the conditions of life and work of the laborers.
4. Amnesty for all revolutionary and political prisoners.20

Notably, the program could appeal to Catholic Basque Republicans and peasants desiring land as well as Anarchists demanding amnesty for prisoners, without raising the alarms of the usual communist demands for destruction of the bourgeois state, collectivization or nationalization.21

The program produced electoral victory for the left which regained power in 1936 with 267 seats in the Cortes and also victory for the PCE which was allotted 16 of those seats.22 Moreover, the Communists used their improving image to take advantage of the general arousal of political activity to entice recruits to the party. By the outbreak of the Civil War the PCE claimed 117,000 members (although, 50,000 is probably a more accurate figure).23

The success of the Popular Front added greatly to the influence of the PCE on the Socialists. Previous to 1934 the Communists and the Socialists had been the most bitter of enemies. However, after the Popular Front success and following instructions from the Comintern, the PCE was able

20Cattell, p. 30.
21Ibid.
22Hermet, p. 25.
23Cattell, p. 31
to play upon the joint Communist/Socialist heritage of Marxism to gain a closer association with and cooperation from the Socialists. Additionally, the Socialist rivalry with the anarchists induced the Socialists to increasingly accept the assistance of the growing Communist party as a way to oppose anarchist political advances.\(^{24}\) An example of the growing Communist/Socialist alliance was the unification of the Communist and Socialist youth groups in March of 1936. Even though the Communist group numbered only 50,000 to the Socialists' 200,000, the resulting Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas (JSU) was controlled by the Communists from the beginning.\(^{25}\)

Probably the most important outgrowth of the Popular Front was the great influence the Communists gained over the political outlook of Francisco Largo Caballero, the rambunctious leader of the large militant section of the PSOE. By praising him as the "Spanish Lenin", the Communists were able to employ Caballero's great revolutionary zeal and influence in the PSOE to their own ends. The Communists also benefitted greatly in this respect from the favor which they held with Julio Alvarez de Vayo, Caballero's right-hand man. Some authorities have claimed that Alvarez de Vayo was actually a Communist himself, but this has never been factually

\(^{24}\)Ibid., p. 32.

\(^{25}\)Ibid., p. 33
proven. Nonetheless, he was extremely favorably disposed to Communist political desires. In these ways, the Communists later gained leverage in the running of Republican affairs during the war quite out of proportion to their actual numbers in the government.

The Popular Front government was never really able to exercise the power demonstrated in its election victory. The next five months showed a progressive weakening of the government's ability to control the rapidly deteriorating situation. In the countryside land seizures and the burning of landholders' homes become everyday occurrences while in the cities assassinations and gang warfare went on almost continually. Meanwhile, Largo Caballero's speeches demanding the immediate inauguration of socialism, calling for a collectivist utopia, and demanding a government of peasants and workers spread alarm among the right and even among moderate elements. On 19 July 1936 a junta of generals, which included General Franco, led the army in a revolt against the Republic.

Many have tried to justify the July Generals' Revolt as a rightist reaction to a communist plot to seize the government and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. Given the PCE's sixteen seats in the Cortes and its disagreements

\[ \text{26 Ibid., p. 17.} \]
with the POUM, the justification does not seem to be ade-
quate. Others have characterized the uprising of the
generals as a Fascist plot. Evidence does not convincingly
support this explanation, either. Rather, the uprising was
an internal political phenomenon resulting from the collapse
of the political center. The right, realizing that moderate
Republicans were losing out and that leftist reforms would
be swift and wide-ranging, acted to sabotage the institution
of those reforms in the only way remaining, physical revolt.\(^\text{27}\)

B. THE LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR

Probably the greatest single factor affecting the PCE's
image today is the legacy of its activities (real or imagined)
during the Spanish Civil War. To some the war provided the
Communists with their finest hour for it was in large part
due to PCE dedication and organizational ability that the
Republic withstood the early siege of Madrid, enabling the
Republic to fend off the Nationalist onslaught for nearly
three more years. To others the war was a Communist con-
spiracy to achieve socialist revolution through violence,
and it is true that the PCE did take advantage of the disrup-
tion to purge and destroy their enemies. To still others
the PCE was merely the agent of an alien power, working
solely to make way for a foreign take-over of the government
of Spain. There is some truth in all of these viewpoints.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 44.
When the Republican government found itself powerless due to the scope of the revolt, it turned to its only ally - the working masses. Immediately, workers' militias developed along trade union lines. They were armed with weapons distributed by the government and with weapons brought forth from hidden arsenals of the various political factions. For the moment political infighting stopped and cooperation between the various parties became the order of the day.

By November 1936 the Nationalist armies, having gained control of the north and south with little opposition, had reached the outskirts of Madrid. They expected it to fall easily, signaling the death of the Republic. That Madrid did not fall was due to the valiant efforts of the various Republican militia units, led by the example of the Communist Fifth Regiment and backed by the just arrived International Brigades which had been organized with Comintern backing and were equipped with Russian arms. On 6 November the recently installed Largo Caballero government, which included Communists Vincente Uribe and Jesús Hernández along with Communist sympathizer, Juan Negrín, fled to Valencia, leaving Madrid in the hands of a Junta of Defense controlled by the PCE. Roused by the stirring rhetoric of the charismatic Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria", the Madrid militias withstood the week-long Nationalist assault launched on 8 November. 28

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The PCE quickly parlayed the prestige it received for the inspiring defense of Madrid and its control of military aid from the Soviet Union (which had begun in October) to greatly enhance its power in the Republican government.

By early 1937 the PCE began taking advantage of its position to eliminate opposition Republican elements. One of its first targets was the Republican army. Richard Herr describes how the Communists moved to accomplish the task:

To gain control of the army they used the mechanism of political commissars, instituted by the government in October 1936 on the model of those of the Red Army in Russia. They were assigned to military units to instruct the soldiers in political doctrine and to be right-hand men, and watchdogs, of the commanding officers. Not by accident most of the commissars were Communists, and their association with the party and thus with the source of supplies gave them such authority that frequently they rivaled the generals.29

Nevertheless, as David Cattell points out, the Communists were the backbone of the Republican army. "...all observers agree that out of the general chaos the government, driven by the Communists, created a modern army capable of withstanding for three years the combined forces of Franco, the Moroccan Legions, the Spanish Foreign Legion, several Italian divisions, and sections of the German Army. It would be quite true to say that without the Communists as the

29 Ibid., p. 204.
unifying and driving factor, the Loyalist forces would have been defeated long before 1939.\textsuperscript{30}

The PCE was also moving in other ways to eliminate its political rivals. Early in the war the PCE had engineered the unification of Communist and Socialist elements in Catalonia under the \textit{Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya} (PSUC) which it soon controlled. Then, in May 1937, the PCE moved to rid itself of its mortal enemy, the POUM. On 3 May CNT elements holding the telephone exchange in Barcelona resisted with gunfire the attempts by government police to relieve them. In the ensuing gun battle the anarchists were supported by the POUMists. The insurrection was quickly quelled, but the PCE demanded severe punishment of the "uncontrollables", meaning the POUM. However, Largo Caballero refused to punish any group that had fought the enemies of the Republic, whereupon the Communist ministers of the cabinet resigned. Unable to form a new government, Largo Caballero himself resigned and Juan Negrín was named Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{31} During subsequent weeks, over one thousand POUMists were arrested, many of whom were assassinated or deported to the Soviet Union to an unknown fate. POUM leader Andres Nin was one who was killed.\textsuperscript{32} George Orwell,

\textsuperscript{30} Cattell, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 205.
\textsuperscript{32} Sworakowski, p. 398.
in his book Homage to Catalonia, presents a vivid account of the events of those days and POUM feelings which they evinced. Having used the revolutionary zeal of Largo Caballero to gain the needed support of middle-class Republican Socialists to counter the influence of the extreme left anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists, and then to eliminate the hated POUM, the PCE had cast aside the "Spanish Lenin" and changed their support to the more easily controlled Juan Negrín.

Due to the presence of the UGT and CNT, the PCE had never had a large following among Spanish workers. Therefore, as the war progressed, the PCE continued to seek broad support among Republican middle-class elements. Consequently, by 1938 the party had a large membership element of bourgeois and rural background holding moderate views.

One reason for the Communist success on this tack was the policies of the extreme left CNT, which espoused takeover and collectivization of all small businesses. As small businessmen lost their savings and property through confiscation, they looked for help in order to salvage something from the ruins of the old system. The Communists provided hope in their defense of middle class interests.

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34 Hermet, p. 27.

35 Ibid., p. 28.
In return, the middle class lent its support to the Communists.

A second reason is that the better organized Communists provided something stable to lean upon in the turbulent Republican sector. Cattell relates an example of this feeling:

It often happened that, when I came across a man who was just leaving for the front, I asked him:

"But why did you join the Communist Party? You were never a Communist, were you? You were always a Republican."

"I joined the Communists because they are disciplined and they do their job better than anybody else." was the answer.36

A third element of the Communist's past which still haunts them is that, of all the factions vying for power in Republican Spain, the Communists were the only ones who were considered the agents of an alien power. Although the Germans and the Italians also provided extensive aid and advice to Franco's Rebel forces, the Communists have received a very bad press during the ensuing post-Civil War years because of the participation of Soviet agents on the Republican side.

The corps of Soviet "advisers" played an important role in the increasing influence of the Communists in the Republican government. A political group, nominally under

36 Cattell, p. 95, quoting José Martin Blasquez, I Helped Build an Army, p. 205.
Marcel Rosenberg, the Soviet Ambassador to Spain, worked to gain influence among elements within the government. A second group under General Berzin worked to control critical elements of the army and Defense Ministry. This second group was so successful that at times they seemed to have direct control over military operations. It often appeared that overall strategy came from the Comintern itself. The final group was the GPU, the Soviet secret police, which worked to rid the Republican side of Fascist agents and "uncontrollables". The extent that these "advisers" actually controlled Republican policy can be attributed to the importance of Soviet military aid to the beleaguered Republican side.

Cattell points out that accurate figures concerning actual Soviet military aid to the Republic are probably impossible to find. However, he does cite statistics extrapolated from Nationalist figures on captured arms (which compare favorably with other sources) to indicate that the Soviet Union supplied nearly 100% of the tanks, 50% of the machine guns, 60% of the rifles and 15% of the larger artillery used by the Republican forces. He also states that, due to the absence of skilled Spanish personnel, Russian soldiers

37 Ibid. p. 102

38 Ibid., p. 78
drove most of the tanks and Russian pilots flew nearly all of the aircraft of the meager Republican Air Force.39

Non-intervention (and therefore non-support) by Britain and France left the Republicans in desperate need of military supplies. Indeed, without Soviet military aid and Communist organizational ability, the Republicans would quickly have succumbed to the overwhelming strength of the Nationalists. Consequently, Soviet military aid provided the Communists with a very useful lever to exert control over events in Republican Spain. The strength of this lever was further enhanced by the fact that Soviet-supplied war material did not leave Soviet control once it entered Spain. Instead, it was stored in Soviet or Communist-controlled depots from which it was doled out as the Soviet advisers saw fit.

Another form of Soviet aid to the Republic was the International Brigades, units of volunteers of all types and ideologies recruited internationally by foreign communist parties. The reasons for the organization of these units were several: the Soviet Union realized the need for well-trained foreign troops to bolster the "undisciplined" Republican militias against the Italian- and German-backed Nationalist forces; Soviet arms could be better secured in the hands of reliable, Soviet controlled units; and the

39Ibid., p. 73.
assignment of as many of the numerous volunteers to the Republican cause as possible would be assured. Among the many organizers of this Comintern project who were to later gain greater renown were Palmiro Togliatti, Luigi Longo and Joseph Broz Tito. From the initial units which contributed significantly to the early defense of Madrid, the International Brigades grew to 40,000 to 50,000 members. They were a central element in most of the major battles which followed, and they suffered extremely heavy casualties. Ultimately, however, with the tide of the war going definitely against the Republicans and under the guise of a Non-Intervention Committee plan to remove foreign volunteers from both sides, the Soviet Union called for the withdrawal of the Brigades, and by the end of November 1938 they were gone.

Another incident which has been a blackmark against the Communist image was the transfer of the Spanish gold reserves to the Soviet Union. Due in part to the Soviet Union demanding payment in gold for arms shipped to Spain, and in part to the vulnerability of the reserves demonstrated by the siege of Madrid in the early portion of the war, the Republican government shipped approximately one-half of the Spanish gold reserves, worth about $578 million, to the Soviet Union.


41 Cattell, p. 83.

The initial suggestion to make the shipment apparently came from the Russian trade envoy named Stashevsky. The gold has yet to be returned, and to this day the element of conspiracy in the transaction has been attributed to a Communist plot. 43

The Communists, under pressure from the Comintern, were also responsible for the prolongation of the war long after it became readily apparent that the Republican cause was lost. In late 1937 the Nationalists had conquered the Republican northern provinces of Asturias and Euzkadi and had consolidated their hold on Aragon from Teruel through Zaragossa to the French border. The Republicans recovered slightly, successfully retaking Teruel in January 1938. But they then suffered a series of disastrous and debilitating defeats. By the end of March, the Nationalists had regained Teruel and pushed a salient deep into Republican territory along the Ebro River in Catalonia. President Negrín, with strong Communist backing, was determined to continue the war. Meanwhile, Indelicio Prieto, Socialist Minister of Defense and staunch opponent of the Communists, had sent out feelers to Franco for a negotiated settlement. However, the Communists' die-hard measures and fanatically uncompromising positions were ultimately to extend the suffering and death for many more months.

Communist attacks soon discredited Prieto, and Negrín replaced him by forming a new cabinet in which Negrín took the Defense portfolio for himself. The Communists then began to reassert control over the army, a process that Prieto had stymied for a time. Communist seizure of power in the Republic seemed to be imminent.

However, the military situation effectively deterred them from such action. By November the last of the International Brigades had been withdrawn. Soviet military aid had already slowed to a trickle and the French and British submission to Hitler at Munich in September banished all hope of their intervention to aid the Republic. In January of 1939 Nationalist troops occupied Barcelona with little military opposition.

Negrín, having escaped to France, returned to Valencia to continue the resistance. At Communist insistence he began replacing “defeatist”, non-Communist commanders with Communists. The non-Communist officers, led by Colonel Casado, revolted against this policy, sending Negrín and the government fleeing to Algiers. A counter-revolt by the Communists was defeated, but the internecine struggle had seriously weakened the Republican forces. Subsequently, a Nationalist offensive on Madrid, now the last Republican stronghold, quickly overcame the beleaguered Republicans. They surrendered on 29 March 1939. The Spanish Civil War was ended.44

44Cattell, p. 207.
Looking back to the Civil War, it is possible to discern three factors which have significantly influenced the policies of the PCE today. The first is the obvious fact that the popular front tactic did bring the Communists to power. It is quite likely that the Communists would have held highly influential, if not controlling, positions in the Spanish government had the Republican side prevailed in the Civil War. The present PCE "Pact for Liberty" (which will be described below) can be seen as a direct outgrowth of this Communist "success" in Republican Spain.

Secondly, the Franco regime's incessant anti-communist propaganda continually misconstrued actual facts and played upon popular misconceptions surrounding the PCE's activities during the Civil War. Consequently, the PCE's poor reputation was kept prominently before the Spanish public until Franco's death in 1975. Therefore, the PCE has taken great pains, especially in recent years, to present a public image of utmost honesty, decorum and moderation.

Finally, the stigma of Soviet control has remained with the PCE throughout the years. That the PCE, through its present leader, Santiago Carrillo, is today probably the most vocal anti-Soviet communist organization in the world is to a great degree attributable to the Spanish Communists' need to rid themselves of this skeleton in their closet. However, the PCE's present position has not been easily achieved. The long years of Franco suppression and the need
to look to Moscow for moral and monetary support made the years of exile extremely difficult.

The following section is, therefore, dedicated to describing the major events of the PCE exile and underground existence from 1939 until the party's legalization in 1977.

C. THE YEARS OF EXILE

Apart from the first few months of its existence, the Communist Party of Spain enjoyed only eight years of legality, from 1931 to 1939. During that time it experienced its 'finest hour', when it was the world's only Communist Party, apart from the Soviet Communist Party, to have a share in the government. Throughout the remainder of its history, it has had to function underground.45

The legal existence of the PCE came to an end on 6 March 1939 when most senior leaders of the party, including Dolores Ibarruri, and members of the Negrín government departed Valencia airport. Other party members, including Santiago Carrillo, did not leave Madrid until 28 March, in the waning hours of the war. Many local Communists remained in Spain to face as best they could the oncoming Franco repression.46

Until the end of World War II the PCE was to remain dispersed, fragmented and ostracized. The exiles first went to France where they were interned in camps near Sept Fonds.

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45 Hermet, p. 49.

46 Ibid.
Prats de Mollo, Barcares, St. Cyprien, Gurs and Argelès-sur-Mer. The poor conditions of these camps and the discrimination inflicted upon the exiles is vividly described by Palencia in *Smouldering Freedom*.\(^{47}\) Some seventy thousand Republican refugees died in these camps from 1939 to 1942.\(^{48}\) Separation and wartime hardship prevented any effective anti-Franco opposition being mounted from this area. Eventually, most of the PCE leadership moved to the Soviet Union where they joined several hundred Spanish Communists who had earlier left Spain. However, the vast majority of rank-and-file Communist refugees stayed behind in those French camps of sad memory.\(^{49}\)

In the Soviet Union the approximately 3500 Spanish refugees were forceably separated among several towns surrounding Moscow: Planiernaya, Senios, Monino and Zangi. The hardships of the refugees in the USSR is recounted by Comín Comer in his book *La república en exilio*.\(^{50}\) In this location, too, wartime conditions and the great distance separating the Spanish Communists in exile from events in Spain prevented any effective opposition organization from developing.

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\(^{49}\) Hermet, p. 50.

\(^{50}\) Eduardo Comín Comer, *La república en exilio*, (Barcelona: AHR, 1957).
As a consequence of its dispersion, fragmentation, and discouragement, the PCE was also fragmented in its leadership so that the early years of exile became a time of "squaring of accounts". The leadership in the USSR was contested by José Díaz (the wartime Secretary-General of the party), Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasionaria), who had gained great fame and influence as a result of her charismatic and impassioned wartime exhortations, and Jesús Hernández, who had attained membership in the Comintern as Minister for the International Brigades. Meanwhile Carrillo in France and Heriberto Quinones, leader of the Communist underground apparatus in Spain, presented additional, conflicting views as to what should be PCE policy in opposition to the Franco regime.

The internecine struggle in the Soviet Union was particularly bitter. Jesús Hernández, in his book, Yo fui ministro de Stalin, describes this internal leadership struggle and suggests that the competing factions used the Stalin purges to riddle opposition ranks. He also indicates his own belief that the death of José Díaz, who fell from a window of the hospital in which he was being treated for tuberculosis, was not as "accidental" as was claimed. Shortly after Díaz' death in 1942, Hernández was, in essence, banished from the Soviet Union and Dolores Ibarruri, whom

51 Jesús Hernández, Yo fui ministro de Stalin, (Madrid: Del Toro, 1974).
the Soviets had been grooming, succeeded to the PCE Secretary-Generalship.

Inside Spain the party machine was severely and brutally repressed by Franco police. Nearly 200,000 Republicans, many, if not most, of whom were Communists, were either executed or died in prison. During these times little effort could be made to maintain contact with exiled leaders in Moscow, and activities inside Spain were limited to occasional terrorist attacks. This situation existed until the end of World War II when internal activities could again receive some direction from the leadership in exile. They continued on-and-off until the French-Spanish border was re-opened in 1951 and more extensive contacts could be maintained. Even then, however, internal activities were severely hampered as Franco police periodically destroyed functioning Communist cells. 52

Paul Preston provides a concise account of the conflict between the exiled leadership and the internal leadership of the PCE:

...the communists left behind in 1939 had kept alive a primitive organization which attempted to help prisoners, distribute propaganda and occasionally attack Falangist offices. A militant from the Canary Islands, Heriberto Quiñones, emerged as leader and claimed that the party should be led by those in the interior. Even at the

52 Hermet, p. 55.
death of Quiñones at the hands of the police, the Central Committee denounced the crime of 'Quiñonismo', or excessive independence of the exiled leadership. Clashes were constant and it has been alleged that the party simply denounced recalcitrant leaders to the Francoists. In 1945, the execution of the veteran Gabriel León Trilla was carried out by militants. Accused of theft by the party, it seems more likely that his crime was his belief that the exiles were out of touch with the real situation in Spain.53

Compounding the PCE's own lack of unity was the fact that the Republican government-in-exile had also ostracized the party. Consequently, until the end of World War II, the PCE was not a member of any accepted anti-Franco opposition group. In 1943 the Socialists and a variety of liberal Republican groups had formed the Junta Española de Liberación (JEL) in Mexico. Later, a parallel JEL was formed in liberated France. In 1944 the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas (ANFD) was formed in the interior of Spain. Composed of Republicans, Socialists and anarchist elements, it was destined to be, with the exception of the PCE, the most significant group of anti-Franco opposition forces until 1974.54

At the end of World War II and quite in harmony with the Soviet Union's return to the popular front tactic, the PCE


sought to join the Republican anti-Franco opposition. In July 1945 the PCE joined the ANFD, and in 1946 the PCE announced its full support of the Republican government-in-exile. Santiago Carrillo joined the Giral government as Minister without Portfolio, and Vincente Uribe followed him as a member of the Llopis government until its demise in 1947. Developing Cold War tensions and continued Socialist and Republican suspicion of the PCE prevented any subsequent uniting of these groups and the PCE. Nonetheless, in 1948 the PCE continued to call for a national front of all forces opposed to the Franco regime. Although unanswered, this call became the basic policy of the PCE until Franco's death in 1975.55

Disunity continued between 1948 and 1952 as many "Tito-ite bandits" were discovered among the party ranks. Also, the PCE's anti-NATO policy resulted in the expulsion of many Communist leaders from France. The party headquarters, which had been located in France since the end of World War II was at this time transferred to Eastern Europe and Moscow to escape surveillance by French police.56 It was very likely that the PCE leaders soon discovered that all that was really changed by the move was the brand of police doing the surveillance. During this time, however, the party leaders

55 Hermet, p. 56.
56 Ibid., p. 58.
were able to reassert control over the party's underground activities in Spain. Following Stalin's suggestion, guerrilla tactics were dropped and the PCE began to infiltrate the Francoist corporative vertical syndicates. The success of this change in strategy is indicated by the fact that most political prisoners of Franco in later years were Communist members of trade unions. Activity within the unions continues to the present and has become one of the greatest sources of PCE support in Spain.

After Stalin's death in 1953, de-Stalinization resulted in the declaration of reconciliation between the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1955 and the recognition of the principle that there was more than one road to socialism. For the PCE this meant allowance for the use of peaceful means in its struggle against Franco. Moderation became the key-note and social revolution was relegated to the distant future. The prime objective became the non-violent overthrow of the Franco regime. By 1956 the PCE was extending invitations to Socialists, anarchists, Catholics, and even Falangist workers to join a movement of "national reconciliation" aimed at overcoming Civil War divisions and uniting the workers' struggle with the discontent of the liberal bourgeoisie against the narrow Francoist oligarchy. In this way

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57 Preston, "Dilemma", p. 71.
58 Ibid., p. 72.
59 Ibid., p. 73.
national power was to be achieved through the creation of a coalition based upon the working class and liberal forces including sectors of the Church, the army and the industrial-financial oligarchy. The immediate objective of the hoped-for coalition was the overthrow of Franco and the establishment of fundamental political liberties as the first step on the road to the creation of a pluralist, democratic socialism. 60 Despite glowing PCE claims, the policy of "national reconciliation" was not highly successful owing to the improving economic conditions in Spain after 1953 and to the still-remaining antipathy of the other underground anti-Francoists. The "Day of National Reconciliation" of 5 May 1958 and the "Peaceful National Strike" of 18 June 1959 inspired only sporadic participation. 61

In 1960 Santiago Carrillo was appointed Secretary-General of the party and Dolores Ibarruri was "kicked upstairs" to the honorary post of Chairman of the Central Committee. Since then, the PCE has continued to expound the virtues of national reconciliation (later to become the Pact for Liberty) to oppose the Franco dictatorship and move along the peaceful road to national power.

Opposition to this moderate line emerged from the party left in 1963 when the Madrid students' faction broke away

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60 Ibid., p. 66.

61 Ibid., p. 73.
from the PCE to form a more radical PCE-ML (Marxist-Leninist). This faction followed the Chinese line and spread mostly among left-wing students of the Marxist-Leninist movement. To date this party has been rent with division and disagreement, resulting in several schisms which have severely limited its effectiveness. Among the groups at this end of the left Communist spectrum are the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria, the Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista del Primero de Octubre (GRAPO), the Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótica (FRAP), and some elements of the Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA), the violent Basque separatist organization. None of these groups has a large membership or following\(^{62}\), however, numerous terrorist acts actually performed by these radical leftist groups have been attributed to the PCE. Despite continuing claims of non-complicity, the PCE has found its implied association with radical leftist groups to be a serious impediment to its efforts to increase its influence among middle-class elements of Spanish society.

In 1964 opposition also emerged from the right of party ranks as the party's most sophisticated theorist, Fernando Claudín became critical of the Carrillo philosophy of courting bourgeois elements. While Carrillo believed that Spanish economic conditions were such that a bourgeois democratic revolution would be necessary before socialism could be

\(^{62}\text{Hermet, p. 71.}\)
achieved, Claudín argued that the Spanish economy had developed beyond that point and was ripe for a direct transition to socialism. However, Carrillo, with a strong grasp on party controls, did not admit to criticism. Claudín was accused of defeatism and revisionism and expelled from the party. For the remainder of the 1960's Carrillo persisted with the line criticized by Claudín, but also progressively modified his position and later admitted that Claudín's analysis had been correct. Apparently, Claudín had only erred in being right too soon.63

Throughout the 1960's the PCE also increasingly favored the principle of autonomy for each party within the international communist movement, following the Italian example. But the real watershed of PCE views came with the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Three weeks after the invasion, the PCE made clear its opposition to the invasion and all that it represented for independent-thinking communist parties:

Spanish Communists could neither conceive nor accept the hypothesis which our enemies are today in a position to forward, that once the Communist Party has come to power in Spain in partnership with the forces of labor and culture, another Socialist Power -- no matter which -- could dictate policies to us. Even less can we conceive or accept that such a Power could intervene militarily in our territory without the most energetic resistance on our part.64

63 Preston, "Dilemma", p. 77.

64 Ibid., p. 79.
This party position was to gain prestige for the PCE among Western communist parties, but it was gained at the cost of further dissension within the PCE. Two high party officials, Eduardo García and Agustín Gómez, were forced out of the party for their opposition to the PCE's stance protesting the invasion. They were soon joined by Enrique Líster, probably the third ranking personality in the party at the time, who left in protest over the party's anti-Soviet stand. The Líster faction formed a rival-PCE, reincarnated the name of the old PCOE, and fiercely supported a return to monolithic communism and closer ties to the CPSU as opposed to the polycentric policies of the Carrillo faction. This conflict remains to this day and has been the source of unsuccessful Soviet actions attempting to disgrace the Carrillo PCE and install the Líster PCOE as the legitimate Communist party in Spain.65

Perhaps sensing future developments, or perhaps just to negate an important aspect of dissident critiques, that no party congress had been held in seven years, Carrillo convened the 8th Congress of the PCE in October 1972 at an undisclosed location.66 The official outcome of the congress was an eleven-point political resolution reemphasizing well-known features of PCE policy of which key points were:

65Preston, "Crisis", p. 150.

1. The conquest of political liberties in Spain which would cause the downfall of Franco was the party's principal immediate objective.

2. Spanish membership in the European Economic Community was to be encouraged to further cooperation with other leftist forces toward creating a socialist Europe.

3. Party cadres should increase their political work among the more than one million Spanish immigrant workers in Western Europe.

4. A call for solidarity among socialist countries based on respect for the independence of each party and non-interference, in word as well as fact, in internal affairs.67

Two additional points defined the "Pact for Liberty" and the PCE's vision of the Spanish society which the Pact would produce. The Pact for Liberty was to be a call for all opposition forces to unite around a minimum temporary program which would include a provisional government, amnesty for political prisoners, political liberties and elections to a constitutional legislature. The success of the Pact would create a socialist Spain in which fundamental political liberties would be respected. Plurality of parties

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would exist as would freedom of information and criticism. Finally, no attempt would be made to impose an official philosophy.\textsuperscript{68} The Pact for Liberty was soon to become the basis for the PCE's legalization and emergence as a prime mover in the post-Franco political scene.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
III. THE PCE PRESENT

A. ORGANIZATION

The PCE is organized nominally along traditional communist party lines. National leadership is provided by a small Secretariat (headed by Secretary-General and party leader, Santiago Carrillo), an Executive Committee of 25 to 30 members, and a Central Committee numbering 120 to 130 members.\(^1\)\(^2\) In 1960 the honorary post of Party President (Chairman of the Central Committee) was created especially for Dolores Ibarruri when she was replaced by Carrillo as Secretary-General.\(^3\) The organizational pyramid continues to expand through the Party Congress, provincial and regional committees, down to the local level.

A unique form of the PCE organizational structure is its division into regional communist parties. The regional parties of Asturias, Andalusia, Galicia, Euskadi and Catalonia cater to the regional feelings of their respective


\(^2\)Staar, 1977, p. 223, gives the following numbers for 1976: 7-member Secretariat, 35-member Executive Committee, and 142-member Central Committee. However, due to the dynamics of intraparty interaction, actual numbers of each echelon are apt to vary.

\(^3\)Hermet, p. 96.
areas and attempt to translate them into support for the Communists. Although, in theory, the regional parties are autonomous units, at present only the Catalanian PSUC is able to express any kind of independence. According to McInnes, "Their (the regional parties') leaders are appointed by the PCE. Their existence is intended to disarm provincialist suspicion of the PCE's Castilian centralism, as well as to combat local oppositions on the Left. These latter are especially dangerous for communism in the Basque country."4 Regional congresses were conducted by all the regional parties in preparation for the 9th PCE Party Congress held in April 1977.

The transition from clandestinity to open operation has had some effect on party functioning as the PCE goal of becoming a mass party is pursued. As early as 1960 the party dropped the requirement for new members to adhere to cells. In 1976 the cells themselves were dissolved as the party moved to an "open" system of labor, school and neighborhood branches, a reorganization designed to better enable the party to operate in a democratic electoral environment.5

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The party has historically operated on the principle of democratic centralism, the effect of which has been accentuated by the party's organizational structure, long years of clandestine existence and separation from the party leadership living in exile. Party congresses have averaged only one every eight years since 1939, and the physical dispersion of the top leadership has made even regular Executive Committee meetings difficult.

In the wake of the party's legalization and Eurocommunist orientation, the strict application of democratic centralism has been liberalized somewhat. Dissatisfaction arising from the PCE's recent changing of its description from "Marxist-Leninist" to "Marxist, democratic, and revolutionary" seemed to arise less from the change of description itself than from the strong-arm methods of the upper leadership in guiding the change to fruition.

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6Democratic centralism is a process by which all party members theoretically are free to discuss alternative viewpoints. Decisions based upon these discussions are supposedly consolidated at progressively higher levels of the organization until the official party policy is enunciated. At such time, discussion must end and all members adhere to the official line. In actuality, the will of the upper leadership is easily imposed upon the faithful because, since no discussion is allowed between groups at the lower levels, the true will of the majority is never known.

7WECP, p. 150.

B. FINANCES

During the Civil War years and the early years of exile which followed, the PCE received most of its financial support from the Soviet Union. In the early exile years the PCE also received some benefit from the use of funds entrusted by the Negrín government to the PCF for purchase of arms in France. Fund raising campaigns conducted by various communist parties on behalf of the PCE produced limited additional monies.\(^9\) As these funds were depleted the party became even more dependent upon the Soviet Union for assistance. However, since 1968 PCE criticism of the Soviet Union has resulted in Moscow's cutting off its financial assistance to the PCE and subsequent bankrolling of the pro-Soviet Líster faction.\(^10\) During recent years, the PCE has relied heavily upon support provided in the form of radio time, publishing facilities, use of homes for PCE leaders and use of meeting facilities provided by fraternal parties of Eastern Europe\(^11\), particularly Czechoslovakia until 1968 and Romania thereafter.\(^12\)

Other financial support came from membership dues and contributions from PCE sympathizers in Spain, France, Mexico


\(^10\)WECP, p. 155.


\(^12\)WECP, p. 155.
and Eastern Europe. In 1968 a major fund drive called "Thirty Million Pesetas for the Spanish Communist Party" collected nearly 45 million pesetas of which 75% came from outside of Spain. The Communist Parties of France, Italy, Romania and Yugoslavia have apparently increased their moral and financial support to the PCE in recent years. Very recently, Carrillo stated that the PCE had not received money from Moscow, Peking, Bonn or the U.S. to finance its electoral campaign.

The party also derives monies from the sale of books, pamphlets and other literature. For example, Carrillo is donating the proceeds from the sales of Eurocommunism and the State to party coffers. The book was on a number of West European "best seller" lists for several weeks and reportedly had brisk sales in Eastern Europe as well, even though it was banned there.

C. SIZE

In its early years the party consisted of only a small number of members. Fractionalism and schisms, always

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13 Ibid.

14 Hermet, p. 108.

15 WECP, p. 155, 164.


recurring problems in the PCE, have worked to prevent any steady growth of the party.

The years of the Second Republic saw the greatest growth of the PCE. From a membership of 1000 in 1931, the party grew to a reported 20,000 in October of 1934. By the beginning of the Civil War, the PCE claimed nearly 300,000 followers.\textsuperscript{18} Owing to its illegal status since 1939 and its suppression by the Franco regime, the party has remained small until recent years. During its exile years, the PCE's membership was variously estimated at 5000 to 7000 hard-core militants in Spain plus 12,000 to 20,000 members in exile.\textsuperscript{19}

The PCE today claims to have 100,000 members and is aiming for 300,000 in the near future. The party claims that it now has organized groups in all fifty provinces of Spain.\textsuperscript{20} As exiled members continue to return to Spain and the party benefits from legal operation and recruiting, membership should show an increase so that it is reasonable to assume that the 300,000 membership goal will be attained or even surpassed.

D. COMPOSITION

The PCE, despite its efforts to broaden its base, remains primarily a working class party. Its major areas of importance

\textsuperscript{18} Sworakowski, p. 400.
\textsuperscript{19} WECP, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{20} Staar, 1977, p. 223.
lie in the industrial areas of Madrid, Barcelona, the Basque region and Andalusia.21 The party's real strength in the mining areas of Asturias, traditionally claimed by the PCE as a stronghold, has been put in doubt by the meager vote the PCE received from the region in the June 1977 elections.

Since the 1960's, the PCE has been highly successful in gaining influence in the (until recently, illegal) Comisiones Obreros (Workers' Commissions - CC00). PCE members have progressively moved into high leadership positions in the commissions and have gained much worker respect for their dedication and organizing efforts. The PCE claims a CC00 membership of one million and the Chairman of the CC00, Marcelino Camacho, is also a member of the PCE Executive Committee.22

PCE efforts to recruit students and intellectuals have not been previously successful. Since the 1960's leftist groups more radical in outlook that the PCE have proved more appealing to these recruiting targets.23 Moreover, the party has not been very good at making effective use of this type of supporter.24 Nonetheless, Carrillo claims that "the

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21 Hermet, p. 117.

22 Staar, 1977, 224.

23 WECP, p. 157.

24 Hermet, p. 106.
majority of today's PCE members are young" and that "the average age of our party's members does not exceed twenty-five or twenty-six years, although there are some small sectors of people who are veterans." The PCE also receives support from a limited number of priests and military officers. In fact, Francisco García Salvé, a Catholic priest, is a leading member of the Central Committee. Nonetheless, the numbers of members from the above two groups are not great, despite the PCE's moderate line and continued recruiting efforts.

E. LEADERSHIP

1. Santiago Carrillo

Just as the past has had a pronounced effect on the PCE today, so has the past had a marked effect upon its leader, Santiago Carrillo. In turn, his views and control have shaped the PCE into a unique entity among world communist parties.

Born in Asturias in 1919, Carrillo was the son of a trade unionist and moderate Socialist deputy, Wenceslao Carrillo. Himself originally a Socialist, Carrillo rose to become Secretary of the Socialist Youth Federation (FJS). In 1936 he quietly joined the Communists and engineered the

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26 WECP, p. 158.
union of the FJS with the Union of Young Communists to form the Unified Socialist Youth Federation (JSU). The JSU soon became one of the main props for the Communist Party and Carrillo was named to the Central Committee in 1937.27 He was also a member of the Junta for the Defense of Madrid and, as mentioned elsewhere, he was one of the last Communists to leave Spain in 1939.28

During the early part of the Civil War, Carrillo, then only twenty-one years old, was the Republican Chief of Public Order. He has been accused of supervising the mass execution of several thousand political prisoners in the Madrid suburb of Paracuellos de Jarama.29

In recent interviews Carrillo has repeatedly denied his complicity in the actual killings, saying that he only issued the orders for the transfer of the prisoners during which time they were intercepted and killed by unknown forces.30 To what extent his actual guilt can ever be proven the title, "Assassin of Paracuellos", is nonetheless part of the legacy of the Civil War which he and the PCE must endure.

27 Bolletin, p. 116.
28 Hermet, p. 121.
By the end of World War II, Carrillo was in France operating under the name of "Monsieur Giscard" and reestablishing contacts with the organization in Spain. By 1947 he was seen at the side of Dolores Ibarruri and other important party figures on public occasions. During the early 1950's, Carrillo was apparently responsible for the de-Stalinization of the PCE and for the institution of the policy of national reconciliation and by 1960 Carrillo had consolidated his hold to such an extent that he was elected Secretary-General of the party. During the 1960's, Carrillo's ideas on national reconciliation became firmly established party policy as did increasing autonomy and independence from Moscow's views. Carrillo's attempts to broaden the appeal of the PCE through these two main tenets of party policy also became the source of accusations of treachery and opportunism from the leftist youth of the party and the Stalinist faction on the right, and was the basis for the splitting from the party of these two factions. However, Carrillo maintained an iron hand as demonstrated by the PCE's maintaining its vocal opposition to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Since 1968, but especially in the last three years, the PCE's stance of increasingly vocal opposition to the Soviet model of communism and the CPSU's hegemonic pretensions over other parties has become the basis of Carrillo's concept of Eurocommunism and for his call for the alignment of the Western communist parties to form a solid front of independent,
national communist parties in opposition to Moscow.

Carrillo emphasized this concept at the June 1976 meeting of European Communist and Workers Parties in East Berlin and his March 1977 meeting in Madrid with Georges Marchais of the French Communist Party (PCF) and Enrico Berlinguer of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) which has since been called the "Eurocommunist Summit." Since the PCE, PCF and PCI combined compose over 92% of the West European communists, the meeting was not insignificant. Moreover, even though no direct threat to the Soviet Union emerged, the implications of convergence of views of the three parties toward the idea of independent roads to communism were clear.

Carrillo's role in urging and organizing the Madrid talks must certainly have been in the forefront of Soviet thinking because, a few days after the Spanish election results were made known, a scathing article was published in Novoye Vremya (New Times) severely criticizing the ideas Carrillo presented in Eurocommunism and the State. The conflict has continued with varying degrees of intensity including the November 1977 refusal by the CPSU to allow Carrillo to make his planned speech at the rally in Moscow marking the 60th anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

Ultimately, the PCE today is largely a creature of the Carrillo philosophy of communism as expressed in several

of his writings, Después de Franco, ¿qué? (After Franco, What?), 32 Nuevos enfoques a problemas de hoy (New Views on Problems of Today), 33 and Eurocommunismo y estado (Eurocommunism and the State). 34 By virtue of the last book, Carrillo extended his concept of how the PCE will come to power in Spain to apply to all democratic states of Europe. Since Eurocommunism has in this way become identified with Santiago Carrillo and the PCE, a discussion of the development of Eurocommunism and the PCE's position in the movement is provided in another chapter of this study.

2. Dolores Ibarruri

Born into an Asturian miner's family on 9 December 1895, Dolores Ibarruri Gómez, "La Pasionaria" 35 is now the most venerated "elder statesman" of the PCE. Hugh Thomas provides a particularly vivid characterization of Ibarruri in her early years:

...as a girl, she had been a devout Catholic. In those days she wandered from village to village in the Basque provinces, selling sardines from a great tray which she bore on her head. But Dolores la Sardinera married a miner from Asturias, one of the obscure


35 Meaning "passion flower", Ibarruri first took the name as a nom-de-plume for a series of newspaper articles for a Socialist weekly in 1918; she soon lived up to it with a passionate involvement in politics both before and during the Civil War.
founders of the Communist party in northern Spain. She transferred her devotion from Our Lady of Begoña to the prophet of the British Museum Reading Room. 36

Originally a member of the Socialist Youth, then of the PSOE, she joined the fledgling PCE when it was first established. She rapidly rose in the organization, being admitted to the Central Committee in 1930. During the Asturias uprising, her impassioned oratory inspired the militants and greatly enhanced both her prestige in the party and her notoriety among opponents.

Always dressed in black, with a grave but fanatical face which caused the masses who listened to her platform speeches to suppose her a kind of revolutionary saint. 37

In 1935 she was elected to the Presidium of the Comintern and in 1936, as Deputy for Oviedo, she became Vice President of the Cortes. 38

During the siege of Madrid in the early months of the Civil War, her fiery oratory was an inspiration to the Republican militias who defended the city with unmatched fanaticism. Throughout the war La Pasionaria was looked upon as the acknowledged standard-bearer of the PCE and, indeed, of the Republic. 39

36 Thomas, p. 8.
37 Ibid.
38 Hermet, p. 123.
39 Ibid.
She became celebrated for her appeals to Spanish womanhood to bear sons without the encumbrance of husbands. The Right spread rumors that she had once cut a priest's throat with her own teeth. But ... she was unrebellious in her adherence to party instructions from Moscow. 40

With the fall of the Republic she sought asylum in the Soviet Union where she succeeded José Díaz as PCE Secretary-General in 1942. In 1943 her signature was among those on the document dissolving the Comintern. 41 Except for two years in France and Romania (1944-1945), she lived in Moscow from 1939 until her return to Spain in 1977. While in Moscow she devoted her time to improving the lot of her fellow Spaniards also living there. Her son was killed in the Battle of Stalingrad and a daughter is married to a Russian general, so that her ties to the USSR remain strong despite her returning to Spain as soon as she could be issued a passport. 42 From 1960, when Santiago Carrillo succeeded her as Secretary-General of the party, until her return to Spain, she remained in the background, only making periodic appearances at major party events or to exhort the faithful through occasional broadcast messages over Radio España Independente.

40 Thomas, p. 8.

41 Hermet, p. 123.

Upon her return to Spain after the PCE's legalization she became a PCE candidate to the Cortes and was elected by her old constituency in northern Asturias. Also, she has maintained tacit support of Carrillo's independent stance from Moscow and his Eurocommunist outlook, much to the disappointment of those in the party who are dissatisfied with Carrillo's leadership.

3. Other Factors

The personal leadership is clearly evident in the great esteem in which the membership holds Carrillo, Ibarruri and, to a lesser extent, a few of the other top leaders such as Santiago Alvarez and Manuel Azcárate. Despite his protestations that he is not God, and that the cult of personality no longer exists, it is nevertheless true that "Don Santiago" is highly revered by most of the membership who greatly praise him at every sort of PCE gathering. It is also evident that Carrillo basks in his popularity, attending all major PCE meetings to accept the fielty of his followers. As a consequence, any PCE policy output will be highly colored by the personality of Santiago Carrillo.

Secondly, largely due to the traditional communist organizational structure, the leadership is highly centralized. The long years of exile and clandestine operations have served to accentuate this quality in the PCE. Certainly, PCE policy decisions, even though requiring final approval by Carrillo, are thoroughly analyzed and substantiated by
the Executive Committee, made up of Carrillo's staunchest and most powerful supporters. Even the top leadership of the regional parties, although ostensibly autonomous, are mere functionaries in those sub-organizations, representing and being controlled by the PCE leadership. The top leadership is thoroughly familiar with every aspect of the party and supremely competent to engineer the required "consensus" for any projected action. Consequently, in any PCE policy action, any serious criticism will be stifled well in advance of the policy pronouncement, a basic characteristic of democratic centralism.

Thirdly, even though the PCE leadership is growing older (Ibarruri is eighty-three years old, Carrillo is fifty-nine, and the majority of the remainder of the top leaders are veterans of the Civil War years), they are determined and quite able to hold on against a younger group which is growing in influence. The "generation gap" is indicated by a young PCE dissident's comment, "The leaders speak of liberalism, but obedience remains the word. They simply want to maintain their positions." Nevertheless, the "old guard" remains in control. Consequently, for the foreseeable future at least, any PCE policy action will be highly representative of the views, acquired over many years of spartan existence, of the older leadership.

F. LEGALIZATION

1973 marked an historic turning point for the PCE's efforts to become public. The developing energy crisis and the assassination of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's apparently designated successor, in late 1973 convinced the entrenched right that change must be allowed to take place gradually, though as slowly as possible, before it occurred by force. This apertura enabled the PCE to work more freely in gaining support for its desired legalization.

Building upon regional round-tables or "democratic juntas", based on the model of the Asamblea de Catalunya, and armed with their Pact for Liberty, the Communists moved quickly to extend and intensify contacts with neo-capitalist groups anxious for dialogue with the party. On 30 July 1974 the Communists announced the existence of the Junta Democrática, described as a "temporary convergence of the working class and neo-capitalist forces."44 The Junta was a coalition of opposition parties, the Partido Carlista (PC), the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), and the PCE plus various personalities who were members of the Opus Dei.45 It issued a twelve-point Manifesto which called for a provisional government, amnesty for political prisoners, legalization of all political

44 Mujal-Leon, p. 54.

45 Ibid.
parties, free trade unions, a free press, an independent judiciary, recognition of regional "personalities" and separation of Church and State. Soon after the formation of the Junta, the extreme left issued violent denunciations that the PCE had "sold out" to the bourgeoisie. They were joined in their denunciations by elements of the PCE left, but Carrillo prevailed with the argument that realism demanded such compromise and that alliance with the bourgeoisie was essential for the overthrow of the regime.

Fearing hegemonic intentions of the PCE over the Spanish left and suffering from its own conflict between competing exile and interior leadership factions, the PSOE declined to join the Junta. At the PSOE October 1974 party congress the PSOE exiles, who favored the Junta, were defeated and Felipe González was elected Secretary-General of the reconstituted PSOE. The PSOE subsequently organized an opposing leftist coalition with the Christian Democrats and anti-PCE Marxists groups and announced the formation of the Platform of Democratic Convergence in July 1975.

The excesses of the Franco regime in September of 1975 accelerated the trend toward cooperation between the two similar, but opposing, groups, eventually producing a merger of the Junta and the Platform in January 1976. The new


47 Preston, "Dilemma", p. 83.
organization, officially named Democratic Coordination, but more popularly called the Platajunta, produced a compromise program which had two interesting elements. First, the PSOE-led Platform got first billing in the group's informal title, reflecting its need to project an image of resurgent strength in the Spanish left. Secondly, the key demand of the program was the legalization of the PCE, reflecting the more immediate political needs of the Communists. Perhaps the basis for the PSOE's support for the PCE's demands for legalization was the thought that a legal PCE would be less of a threat than a clandestine PCE.

In November 1975, after a valiant struggle, Francisco Franco finally succumbed to the ravages of age and disease. If he had hoped that his regime would live after him, he had not reckoned with the young Juan Carlos, the grandson of King Alfonso XIII, whom Franco had designated as his successor. According to Stanley Payne, "Most observers agree that the political transformation that occurred in Spain after the death of Franco ... (was) impressive and in some respects breathtaking." The credit for this remarkable transformation belongs to King Juan Carlos. He deftly maintained Franco's right-hand man Carlos Arias Navarro as his own Prime Minister to prevent any fatal backlash from the military and entrenched right, while he

encouraged slow expansion of civil rights and liberalization of the Spanish political structure. In July 1976 Juan Carlos moved to accelerate the changes taking place in Spanish politics and society. He accepted Arias Navarro's previously submitted, pro-forma resignation and installed his personal selection, Adolfo Suárez González as Premier.

The left quickly moved to adjust to the changing political situation. Succumbing to pressures to widen its representation to increase its strength vis-a-vis the rightists of the Popular Alliance in bargaining with the Suárez government, the Platajunta constituted a new organization called the Platform of Democratic Organizations (POD) which included many of the regional movements previously excluded.49 Intricate political maneuvering between Prime Minister Suárez, the Right and the Left, represented by the POD, occurred throughout early 1977 until 9 April. On that date the PCE achieved an important goal as the legalization of the party was announced by the Spanish government. The PCE Executive Committee expressed the jubilation of PCE members and supporters all over Spain:

The Spanish Communist Party has regained its right to a legal existence. We greet this as a triumph for the cause of democracy for which we have never ceased to fight for one single day in the 38 years of our harsh clandestine existence and as a triumph for

49 Story, p. 484.
the policy of reconciliation which the PCE has advocated since 1956 and which today has been adopted by the vast majority of all Spaniards.

The joy which is being expressed at this very moment throughout the country by thousands of men and women among the working people and among people of culture, by communists of several generations ... reflects how much the legalization of the Communist party was a need felt by the majority of the people.50

G. ELECTIONS OF 15 JUNE 1977

Soon after the PCE was legalized, Spanish attention turned to the campaign for the constituent Cortes to be elected 15 June 1977. The three weeks of campaigning were surprisingly calm and civilized, belying the warnings of pessimistic doomsayers. Yet the campaign was also lively and colorful. Adolfo Suárez, the designated Prime Minister who had successfully engineered the post-Franco transition to date, campaigned under auspices of the Union of the Democratic Center (UDC), a confederation of fifteen centrist parties. Making full use of his media background and his youthfulness, Suárez was highly effective in television and radio appearances.

Felipe González, Secretary-General of the PSOE and also youthful, "blitzed Spain in an American-style campaign. Riding in a Learjet, reading Don Quixote between stops, he

50 Radio Independent Spain broadcast of PCE Executive Committee communiqué, 11 April 1977 as reported in FBIS-WE, 12 April 1977, p. Ni.
made so many appearances that the press dubbed him 'Hurricane Felipe'.

Meanwhile Santiago Carrillo, reflecting the moderate tone of the PCE campaign, traveled to various rallies in his armored, 1956 Cadillac (a gift from Nicolae Ceaușescu). Ardent PCE followers endearingly called him "Don Santiago", while opponents dubbed him "Friar Carrillo" for his conciliatory pronouncements. Despite dazzling rallies such as the campaign finale outside of Madrid which drew over 200,000 people, the PCE campaign was most remarkable for its unrevolutionary soft-sell, based upon Carrillo's simple aim to implant the PCE as a respectable political party in a country where it had been banned and repressed for thirty-eight years and in which serious rightist opposition still exists. The degree of PCE moderation is indicated by an early campaign statement by Carrillo:

...the first point of the PCE's program is to tell Spaniards to vote in accordance with their consciences, without fearing how they vote. If they support the right, they should vote for the right; if they support the center, they should vote for the center; but if they support the left, they should have the courage to give their vote to the left without fear of any reprisals whatsoever. It is essential that in these elections, Spaniards should go to vote in the conviction


52"Spain's Red Luther", Newsweek, 11 July 1977, p. 38.

that they are indeed free to vote as they wish and that no one is going to know for whom they voted: That is to say, there will be no reprisals.54

At the close of the campaign Spanish voters went freely to the polls for the first time since the generals' revolt plunged Spain into Civil War forty-one years before. Charles Gallagher points to the significance of this signal event of the post-Franco era:

By successfully carrying out nationwide free and secret elections on June 15 for the designation of a new Cortes elected by universal suffrage, Spain has effectively completed its transition to a pluralistic parliamentary democracy in the relatively brief period of a year and a half. More rapidly and with less violence than almost anyone would have thought possible, an authoritarian regime embedded in seemingly impregnable legal walls and which had lasted four decades was dismantled -- and even persuaded to self-destruct -- without the intervention of a civil war, an international conflict, a coup, a revolution, or a foreign adventure, at least one of which was needed to bring down every similar regime in our time. All was done within a framework of law and order, and altogether, it represented a feat unprecedented in Spanish history and unparalleled in European political behavior since the peaceful revolution of 1688 in England which produced the Bill of Rights. 55

For the PCE the elections were to be the prime example of how a Eurocommunist party would conduct itself within the democratic political system which it purported to desire.

54 Madrid Domestic Service undated Alfonso Diez interview with Santiago Carrillo, as reported in FBIS-WE, 11 May 1977, p. N2.

Although minor irregularities did occur, the election by all accounts was fairly and impartially conducted. In some districts, suspiciously many of which were working class, the unexpectedly heavy voter turnout resulted in 130,000 ballotless voters who were required to wait two days for additional ballots to arrive before they could cast their votes. The PCE and other smaller parties criticized the use of the d'Hont system of proportional voting decreed by the electoral law as being discriminatory and tending to downgrade their importance. The results of the election are portrayed in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1.

An analysis of the results presents a number of implications for the PCE to consider:

1. The turnout of approximately 80% of eligible voters casting ballots and the free campaigning which was allowed the 150-odd parties and splinter parties indicate that the elections gave a fairly true picture of Spanish political feeling. While fifty-seven percent of the votes cast were for parties which oppose any kind of continuity with Francoism, the overall results indicated a voter profile similar to that existing in France where two political groupings dominate -- the center-right versus the combined left.

2. The PCE did worse than the thirty seats it expected to gain, showing less popular support than media stories

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56 Ibid.
SPANISH ELECTION RETURNS, JUNE 1977

CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Popular Vote</th>
<th>Seats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union of the Democratic Center</td>
<td>6,220,889</td>
<td>165</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialist Workers' Party</td>
<td>5,240,464</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>1,655,744</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Alliance</td>
<td>1,503,376</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular Socialist Party</td>
<td>804,382</td>
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Note: The remainder of the vote and the 25 other seats divided by regional and splinter parties.

SENATE

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<th>Party</th>
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<td>Socialist Workers' Party</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senators for Democracy</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed by the king</td>
<td>41</td>
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</table>

Note: The government has not released any national popular vote totals for the Senate.

Note: Senators for Democracy were supported by the Christian Democrats, the Socialist Workers' Party, and the Communists as joint candidates in some provinces.

Note: These tables were released in July 1977 by the Spanish government.

COMPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUENT CORTES

June 1977

Source: Gallager, p. 8.

FIGURE 1
CORTES 1977

Distribution of Seats by Historical Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>UCD</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>PSP</th>
<th>PCE</th>
<th>PSUC</th>
<th>REG-NATL</th>
<th>C-R</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Catalonia</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pais Vasco (w/Navarre)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Andalucia</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>21</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

350      | 16 | 165 | 118  | 6   | 20  | 19   | 2        | 2   | 2 | 2   |

AP - Alianza Popular
UCD - Unión de Centro Democrático
PSOE - Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PSP - Partido Socialista Popular
PCE - Partido Comunista de España
Regional Nationalists - in Catalonia: Pacte Democratic per Catalunya
in País Vasco: Partido Nacional Vasco

Source: Gallagher, p. 5.
might lead an observer to believe existed and much less than the PCE's own propaganda had claimed. Carrillo explained the lower than expected PCE vote was due to the limited time which the party had to campaign after its legalization and to the residual fears of rightist reaction among undecided voters. Pre-election polls predicting that the PCE would get approximately ten percent of the vote were proved true. Henceforth, the PCE propaganda machine will have more difficulty in "puffing" the PCE's importance by overstated claims of membership or support. Moreover, the PCE's Catalan Communist affiliate, the PSUC, was responsible for nearly one-third of the Communist votes and eight of the twenty seats that the PCE gained in the Cortes. Without this strength, the PCE would surely have been shattered as badly as the far right. Finally, what support the PCE did get came from industrial Madrid, Catalonia and Andalusia -- hardly a broad-based return. In fact, the PCE received only one seat in Asturias, for a long time considered a PCE stronghold, and that went to the venerated Dolores Ibarruri.

3. The PSOE emerged as the major significant political party in Spanish politics. Some observers feel that mergers with small splinter parties will soon make the PSOE the hegemonic party in Spain. However, this feeling should be

tempered with the thought that a sizeable block of votes which might have gone to the PCE may have been transferred to the PSOE by way of voter prudence. The residue of the bitter and unhappy remembrances of PCE activities during the Civil War may still exist despite the PCE's moderate, Eurocommunist face.

4. The Left vote was concentrated in those areas of Spain where it has been traditionally strong, the urban-industrial Basque lands, Catalonia, Valencia and Madrid. Consequently, the PCE is faced with the renewed realization that it must compete with the PSOE for votes in those regions rather than with the UDC.

5. The UDC, while being the majority bloc, is nonetheless a coalition and therefore, subject to disorganization and disagreement. Possible defections from the right of the UDC are possible, thus possibly enhancing the PSOE's strength by default. Possible defections from the UDC left are also conceivable, thereby giving the PSOE even greater prospects for becoming the majority in the government. On the other hand, Suárez may be able to weld the coalition together into a truly homogeneous party in which case it could remain a formidable political force in the future. The historical penchant of the Spanish to follow the guidance of the forces in power would tend to reinforce this consideration.

6. Even with possible defections from the UDC right, the far-right Popular Alliance does not appear to be as powerful a political force as expected.
Therefore, the PCE, given these implications and its already somewhat rightist slant for a communist party, seems to have two courses of action for future development open to it. One is to move further to the left in its outlook and policy. However, probably the only way for the PCE to espouse more radical policies would be if Carrillo were ousted. This seems to be a highly unlikely prospect in view of Carrillo's obviously strong grasp of party controls. The other course is to continue to pursue the Pact for Liberty, seeking a political alliance with the PSOE. However, this course is fraught with danger as well. The PSOE may be able to co-opt so many of the PCE's platform planks that the PCE is left with little remaining appeal for voters.

These implications seem to pose a rather bleak outlook for the PCE in domestic politics. Perhaps for this reason Carrillo has intensified his efforts to demonstrate that the PCE is the guiding force behind Eurocommunism. The logic of this move is that by demonstrating the power of the PCE outside of Spain, the party will gain a greater following within Spain. The hope is that the two trends will then be mutually reinforcing toward the end of gaining real power within Spanish politics and in the international communist movement.

In the year since the election, two major developments have occurred which have solidified the implications indicated in the election results presented above. Both cases involve
consolidation moves by the PCE's major competitors for votes, the PSOE and the UDC.

In the first case two recent moves by the PSOE to consolidate its elections gains may make it more difficult for the PCE to expand toward the center of the Spanish political spectrum. In the one instance, the PSOE and its rival Socialist splinter, the PSP, headed by Enrique Tierno Galván, have reunited under the PSOE banner. The PSP's six seats in the Cortes equal nearly one-third of the PCE presence and represent a considerable addition, both in voting power in the Cortes and in campaign support, to the Socialists. In another instance, shortly after the PSOE-PSP reunification was formalized, Felipe González announced that he intended to recommend that the PSOE remove the word "Marxist" from its party definition. Apparently, the move was part of a design to broaden the party's electoral base by giving the PSOE a more Social-Democratic orientation, thereby to entice elements from the center-right of the political spectrum to the PSOE. González declared, "the electoral space on the PSOE's left is occupied by the PCE and so it is on our right that our party can win votes." The objective appears to be to divide the government party


in order to form a center-left alliance with its more liberal elements.

Apparently, the announcement came as quite a surprise to many in the PSOE. The outcry from the more leftist PSP and the party's Catalan federation was considerable, they being staunchly Marxist-Socialist in outlook. Consequently, the PSOE at this point is again somewhat factionated, posing possibilities for both PCE and UDC inroads into its electoral constituencies.

The second development complicating the PCE's political maneuverings is the consolidation of the UCD from a federation of small center-right parties into a unified entity. During the past year, all of the UCD-affiliated parties dropped their independent organizational structures to unite under Suárez' leadership in a single party. A unified party platform, ideology and outlook is in the process of being formulated and will be presented for ratification at the party's first congress to be held in the near future.60 As the center-right appears to be gaining strength in unity, it may also prove to be more attractive to Spanish voters. Consequently, while this development in many respects may pose more difficulties for the PSOE than to the PCE, it nonetheless further reduces the PCE's prospects for influencing the opinions of prospective voters.

H. WHERE DOES THE PCE STAND?

One of the more important tasks facing the PCE has been to gain respectability among the Spanish electorate as a responsible, constructive and forward-looking political alternative to the other political blocs. In order to accomplish this task the PCE has embarked upon a two-pronged strategy of conciliatory, non-violent political agitation coupled with a progressive policy stance concerning vital issues which face Spain today or which will present themselves in the near future. Carrillo alluded to this strategy early in 1977:

...we know we cannot gain a majority in the elections and that we will not be among the majority parties. We are not fighting for ministerial positions; we are fighting for a free and democratic Spain. We are, of course, also fighting for socialism, but that is our more long term battle. Our path to socialism will be a long one just as the socialism for which we are fighting will be different from those kinds we have experienced so far.61

Following is a survey of the PCE's stance on a number of important issues as presented by Santiago Carrillo on various occasions:

1. Democracy in Spain

In the short term we want a fully democratic regime, in which all political parties, all philosophic currents, all cultural currents, can express themselves and in which the

workers have the right to organize themselves and defend their interests without repression and persecution. After, in the long term we want to start the process of structural economic change.62

We believe the King should continue as head of state until a constituent assembly makes a final decision. If its majority approves of a monarchy for democratic Spain, we will accept that decision although, quite frankly, we prefer a republic.63

...we are ready to get out (of a coalition government) if we lose elections -- just like any other party. When I speak of democracy I mean Western democracy, I consider universal suffrage the criterion.64

I believe in parliamentary democracy and I believe that what this country needs is a parliamentary democracy.65

If we have to have a coalition to get a completely democratic constitution and to develop a recovery plan and to clean up the Spanish economy in a progressive sense, I personally will have no objection to cooperating with Prime Minister Suárez or with anyone else who would share that aim ... I have no phobias against anybody. I would collaborate with anyone who is prepared to carry out the sort of program I have described.66


65 BBC Domestic Television Service, 10 June 1977, as reported in FBIS-WE, 13 June 1977, p. N3.

Communism is compatible with democratic monarchy ... Spanish society has little reason to question the democratic vocation of the Communist Party, simply because we Communists have spent many years fighting to achieve democracy.67

2. The Economy

We are for a political economy that will eliminate the corruption characteristic of the Francoist system. Today in Spain those who pay are the workers. After a certain point of wealth, no one pays taxes: this is a scandal.68

We are watching closely the economic crisis developing in our country. We are changing from a fascist dictatorship to a democracy. In view of this situation we do not want to confuse the economy of our country even more. We want to create a more stable economy than there is today. So we do not think this would be the proper moment for nationalization ... 69

We subscribe to the Moncloa Pacts (a two-year Government/Opposition agreement on economic reform), participated in their drafting and defended them -- indeed to the point of often risking unpopularity more than the government itself -- because we believe that, in view of the way in which change has come about, it will be impossible for the country to advance in any way other than through a policy of concerted action and consensus.70


3. Spanish Membership in EEC

We are in favor of the entry of Spain into the EEC, and we are in favor of the building of a European economic and political union.71

4. U.S. Bases in Spain

We are for the American bases in Spain as long as an accord is not reached that dismantles the military bases -- American and Soviet -- in the whole of Europe.72

...there should be no foreign military bases on Spanish soil because only Spain should occupy its territory. However, the existence of U.S. military bases in Spain serves as a strategic balancing force. The PCE accepts the presence of U.S. military bases in Spain until the time all other military bases in the Eastern and Western blocks in Europe are eliminated.73

5. Spanish Membership in NATO

We think that, above all, NATO is an enormous bureaucracy that tries to perpetuate itself. And it seems that for the Warsaw Pact it is the same thing ... Because in alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, inevitably, the strongest power is hegemonic and that irritates -- it ends up turning the opinion of the other countries against the power that plays that role. So I, who accept American bases in Spain, don't think it would be useful for Spain to enter NATO. If the Spanish Parliament votes entry into NATO, we obviously will accept it.74

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72 Ibid.


6. Human Rights

(Spanish Communists) condemn energetically all violations of liberty and democracy ... wherever they occur ... even if these regimes profess socialist ideals.\(^75\)

7. The Monarchy

I must confess that I have done everything possible, everything within power, to prevent the establishment of the monarchy in this country. However, I must recognize today that the present monarchy is not what the old regime was aiming for ... I cannot ignore this reality ... I am a republican, I am a communist. But what I can say is that I do not see any drawback to the king contributing to the change from dictatorship to democracy. And there is no reason why my party should not act within a constitutional monarchy so long as the king reigns but does not govern, so long as only the people will govern.\(^76\)

If the monarchy plays a positive role for the stability of democracy in my country, I would accept it. This is the case today.\(^77\)

8. The Catholic Church

(PCE/Church relations) are characterized by dialog. It is inevitable that the Church as an institution should intervene in the problems of society. Our wish is, as far as possible, to seek a field of cooperation with that social reality which the Church is. We are striving and will continue to strive to achieve this, in order to surmount ... the historical


\(^76\)BBC Domestic Television Service, 10 June 1977, "PCE's Carrillo Interviewed on General Elections", as reported in FBIS-WE, 13 June 1977, p. N2.

\(^77\)Ya, 14 July 1977, pp. 5-6, "Santiago Carrillo's 'Confessions'", as reported in FBIS-WE, 17 July 1977.
confrontation between the progressive movements and the Church. Since the Church has accepted political pluralism, that kind of relationship of cooperation and respect is possible.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{78} El Pais, 22 January 1978, pp. 10-12, Interview with Santiago Carrillo, as reported in FBIS-WE, 3 February 1978, p. N8.
IV. THE PCE AND EUROCOMMUNISM

The Spanish Civil War marked a significant period in the history of the PCE. If the Republican side had been victorious, it is highly probable that the PCE would have had a significant, if not controlling, influence in the resulting government of Spain. Indeed some observers suggest that a major reason for the Soviet Union's withdrawal of military aid to the Republic in 1938 was due to the Soviet's fear that successful revolution outside of Russia would diminish Soviet dominance of the international communist movement.

In part due to the highly effective repressive measures of the Franco regime and in part due to the exiled Republicans' exclusion of the PCE from opposition efforts, the PCE was forced by circumstances to evolve under the wing of the CPSU. Therefore, the story of the PCE during the 1940's and 1950's was one of close association with the policies of the Soviet Union.

Until 1945 the Soviet model of communism held complete sway among world communist parties. However, the installation of communist puppet regimes in Eastern Europe under the specter of Soviet military presence, rather than increasing the dominance of the Soviet model, in reality marked the beginning of the gradual dissolution of Soviet hegemony among world communist parties. Just as other parties have been re-examining Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism through
the years, the PCE has also been reappraising its relationship to the CPSU.

The result of the transformation of communism has been titled at various junctures as Titoism, national communism, polycentrism, and most recently, Eurocommunism. Through the years of transformation, the PCE has evolved from a staunch Soviet supporter to a vehement Soviet antagonist.

This section will first view the evolution of international communism from 1945 to the present in general terms to show the effect of certain events and developments upon the changing character of the PCE and its evolution into probably the most ardent proponent of the phenomenon of Eurocommunism.

A. THE STALIN YEARS - STAGNATION

During the 1945 to 1948 time period the Soviet Union progressively consolidated its control in Eastern Europe. A popular front program soon resulted in the installation of pro-Moscow communist parties in power in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and East Germany. The Sovietization and Stalinization of Eastern Europe followed quickly as the Soviet Union exploited the region economically to rebuild its own devastated economy. Moscow, bolstered by the presence of the Red Army, turned the region into a belt of cowed and compliant satellites. It was not until the Czech Coup of 1948 that the West finally became convinced of the realities of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe.
Similar expansion of communist influence was taking place in Western Europe as the PCF and PCI also employed popular front tactics to gain strength in numbers and influence. Several PCF members, including Maurice Thorez, PCF Secretary-General, were ministers of post-war French governments. Thorez even ran for the Presidency of the Provisional Government in the November 1946 elections. In Italy Togliatti capitalized upon the respect the PCI had gained among the populace for its resistance activities to expand Communist political influence. Under Togliatti the PCI supported the royal government and aligned itself with the Badoglio cabinet. By the end of World War II the PCI was the second largest political party in Italy and became an important member of the first post-war government, until excluded by Alcide de Gasperi in 1947. Quite in harmony with Soviet urgings and the French and Italian examples, the PCE also returned to using the popular front tactic. However, unlike in immediate post-war France and Italy, the PCE's call for unity of all forces opposed to the Franco regime was to remain unanswered until 1974.

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The 1947 critique and 1948 expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform heightened internal squabbling among the various groups competing for leadership of the PCE. The PCE press, like those of all pro-Soviet parties, was replete with denunciations of "Titoite bandits" and scores of expulsions and schisms took place within the PCE. Jesús Monzón, a leader of PCE elements in the Spanish interior, was one of those denounced. The demoralizing effect on the militants in Spain of seeing their leaders denounced as traitors and provocateurs was quite evident. Meanwhile, the "correct" PCE revered Stalin with no less religious adoration than the rest of the pro-Soviet parties.

In foreign policy matters also, the PCE strongly supported Soviet positions. In fact, the dispute between the exiled leadership and the clandestine leadership described in an earlier chapter was just one of many episodes of the early Cold War years which indicated that the exiled PCE was less interested in fighting the Franco regime than in promoting Soviet foreign policy. As a consequence, by 1950 the PCE, with its leadership in Moscow owing their positions and physical support to the Kremlin, had become firmly wedded to the CPSU.

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3 Hermet, p. 56.

4 Preston, "Crisis", p. 131.

5 Hermet, p. 57.
However, two developments were soon to reverse the retreat to the East. One was the growing weakness of the Franco regime in 1950-52 which allowed the party to reinforce and strengthen its cells within Spain and to increase contacts with other groups in the Spanish underground. From 1953 on, despite some setbacks, the PCE was to continue to gain influence in the anti-Franco underground and to eventually infiltrate several of the officially permitted labor syndicates. The growing importance of underground leaders coupled with the desire of the leadership in exile to maintain control over party activities necessitated the return of party headquarters closer to activities in Spain.\(^6\)

The second factor which began to impel the PCE away from Moscow was the de-Stalinization of 1953-56. By October of 1954 the PCE announced a policy of reinstating unjustly expelled members of the anti-Tito era and by 1956 the "errors" of the Stalinist cult of personality were officially put to an end at a meeting of the augmented plenum of the PCE Central Committee.\(^7\) The entire process echoed completely the line put forth by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU. As Leonard suggests, the majority of communists, including the PCE, welcomed the events of the 20th Party Congress.

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 59.

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 16.
To them the criticism of Stalin and the proclamation of new concepts meant that the past could be totally abandoned and new roads embarked upon, roads leading toward the democratization of the communist parties, toward freeing themselves from lies, and toward an open discussion on all subjects.8

B. THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS - THE BEGINNING OF CHANGE

As a result of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement and the Soviet recognition that there was more than one road to socialism, the early Khrushchev years were to become years of searching for new models for the attaining of socialism by the various communist parties. In June of 1956 a Polish workers' uprising in Poznan showed the need for internal reform which Soviet leadership was unable to squelch. When the nationalist communist, Gomulka, was installed in October it appeared that it was safe to continue the reform course in Poland.9

Taking inspiration from the Polish developments, the reformist followers of Imre Nagy in Hungary demonstrated in Budapest on 23 October, demanding independence, democratization, freedom of the press, withdrawal of Soviet troops and the reappointment of Nagy to the premiership which he had held in 1953. The demonstrators were fired upon by Soviet troops, whereupon the formerly peaceful demonstration


9Ibid., p. 278.
turned into a full-blown revolution. By October 30 a coalition government under Nagy was set up and Hungary appeared to be embarking upon an independent program of social democracy. However, as Leonard points out, "The Soviet invasion of November 4, 1956, the brutal crushing of the Hungarian Revolution and the subsequent arrest of the leading Hungarian reformers, including Imre Nagy, meant that the breakthrough toward socialist democracy in Hungary had been, at least for the time being, drowned in blood."\(^{10}\)

It was also in 1956 that Togliatti of the PCI coined the word "polycentrism" to describe the notion that different countries should follow different roads to socialism, that they should tailor their tactics to national contexts and that the Soviet model should no longer be obligatory.\(^{11}\) Polycentrism delineated the two diverging themes of international communism. On one hand was the Soviet desire for leadership and hegemony over the movement expressed to the point of forced subordination of restive factions. On the other hand was the growing strength of independent, national communist movements refusing, with varying intensity, to subordinate themselves to politics inspired by specifically Russian conditions. The all-important controlling factor became the presence of Soviet troops.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 286.

The PCE opted for the independent road. In 1956 the PCE firmly announced its policy of "National Reconciliation", that is, the PCE was ready and willing to conclude pacts, agreements and alliances with all political groups, Falangist, Catholics, and Socialists alike, in order to oppose the Franco regime by peaceful means. However, due to the previous close relationship of the PCE with Soviet policy and the obvious example of Soviet intentions provided by the crushing of the Hungarian resistance, PCE pronouncements were not taken seriously by other anti-Franco groups.

Probably another factor contributing to the PCE's enunciation of the national reconciliation policy was the regained strength which the Franco regime was exhibiting following its 1953 military pact with the U.S., its Concordat with the Vatican and its 1955 election to United Nations membership. Therefore, both the realities of communist party relations and the Spanish domestic scene necessitated a "peaceful road".

In accordance with its policy of national reconciliation, from 1956 to 1960 the PCE expounded the virtues of "peaceful national strikes." The "Day of National Reconciliation" of 5 May 1958 and the "Peaceful National Strike" of 18 June 1959 were signal attempts to implement this policy. However, in spite of glowing PCE praise for their success, the strikes could be more accurately described as total failures. Lack of participation by most other underground organizations

\[12\text{Hermet, p. 63.}\]
and improving economic conditions militated against their success.13

It was also during these years that Carrillo maneuvered to gain control of the party. Despite his strong connection with the policy of national reconciliation and the failure of the 1958 and 1959 strikes, Carrillo managed to become elected Secretary-General at the 6th PCE Party Congress in Prague in 1960. He was also able to paralyze his adversaries by replacing the previous governing Political Bureau with an Executive Committee largely composed of his supporters and to have former Secretary-General Dolores Ibarruri elevated to the purely honorary post of President of the Party.14

After 1960, closely reflecting Carrillo's views, the party program stressed the need for closer links with the middle class. Increased efforts were expended to cultivate support among the non-monopoly bourgeoisie, students and intellectuals and Catholics.15 The party was also able to consolidate its gains in the syndical unions through increasing control of underground workers' commissions. These organizations have contributed greatly to the growing PCE influence in Spanish politics. However, even though expansion of recruitment efforts was to increase party membership and influence, events were soon to take place that would severely jolt the party's growing effectiveness.

13 Ibid., p. 65.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 66.
After 1956, Sino-Soviet enmity increased rapidly, precipitating the final break in 1963. However, when considered in the backdrop of traditional Sino-Soviet rivalries, the polemics of this period were merely the final stages of the realization by the Chinese of a developing distinction between what could be termed the "Soviet" and the "Chinese" roads. Among other ideas, the Chinese attacked the Soviet line on the concept of the non-inevitability of wars, the possibility of peaceful coexistence, and Moscow's concept of the unity of the world communist movement. Ultimately, however, the Sino-Soviet split had as its basis the Chinese desire for independence and autonomy from the CPSU.

The conflicting tenets of the Chinese and Soviet models quickly effected the students and intellectuals which the PCE had successfully recruited to the party ranks during the late 1950's and early 1960's and soon provoked a serious challenge to party unity. As a result of PCE support for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in opposition to Carrillo's "moderate" line, the Madrid students organization broke away from the PCE in 1963. This group soon developed its own splinter factions which alternately split and coalesced with other disenchanted elements of the PCE. By October 1964 however, three of these groups, the self-styled "Communist Party of Spain", "Proletaria", and the "Communist Revolutionary Opposition of Spain", joined to form the PCE (ML)

17 Hermet, p. 71.
This group and other radical left groups which have sprung up since 1967 have provided strong competition to the PCE's recruitment effort among Spanish students and intellectuals.

At this time Carrillo also came under attack from the party right. In 1964 Fernando Claudín and Jorge Semprún were expelled from the Executive Committee for criticizing the party's non-recognition of the changes that had occurred in Spanish society during the 1950's. They demanded that the party abandon its belief in the imminent downfall of the regime and recognize that a long-term strategy was needed to gain the revolution.

Chinese views on independence and autonomy also apparently had some effect in changing PCE views on the subject. Probably the success of the Chinese' departure compounded developing PCE ideas of independent party action resulting from the Khrushchev years and were buoyed by the examples of Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania. Consequently, 1964 marked the hesitant beginning of PCE non-conformity with CPSU views. Even though the PCE officially supported the ouster of Khrushchev, party pronouncements became increasingly vocal in embracing the principle of autonomy for each party within the international communist movement.

Willenz and Uliassi take note of the change in the character of the PCE and other Western European communist parties after 1964:

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19 Hermet, p. 75.
The Sino-Soviet dispute has not seriously weakened the West European communist parties, but it has involved their leaders in a half-hearted defiance of Moscow which became more pronounced after Khrushchev's fall. It led most European communists to reaffirm publicly their support for the basic policies of the deposed leader -- if only to warn the new Soviet leaders against radical changes in policy. This effort to commit Khrushchev's successors to positions favored by the Western parties was unprecedented, as was their equally emphatic and almost universal criticism of the manner of Khrushchev's removal. These developments illustrate the rapidly changing relationship between Moscow and the West European parties. Their position may be characterized as continued opposition to the principal ideological arguments of Peking combined with an increasing unwillingness to accept subordination to Moscow.²⁰

They continue by pointing out the serious implications to small parties such as the PCE of such a change in policy:

It should be noted that the smaller communist parties have generally been more seriously affected by the Sino-Soviet dispute than the larger ones, mainly, perhaps, because their organizations are more vulnerable to attacks from militant minorities. The three proscribed parties -- Portuguese, Spanish, and West German -- stand as a special case of small-party vulnerability. Since their leaders are safely domiciled in Moscow (or elsewhere in Eastern Europe), there is the danger of a breakdown of communications between militants within a country, working at times under conditions of extreme danger and deprivation (as in Portugal and Spain), and exiled leaders who, in counselling patience and moderation, seem to the militants to have lost touch with political realities.²¹

²⁰ Willenz and Uliassi, p. 50.

²¹ Ibid., p. 57.
Despite the implications, the PCE had taken the risk and made the move toward independence. After 1965 the PCE increased its associations with the PCI, the Communist Party of Romania (PCP) and the Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY). By 1966 the PCE described themselves as being in sole charge of Spain's march toward socialism.

C. CZECHOSLOVAKIA — THE BREAKING POINT

By early 1968 the confluence of the independence trend forced by the student breakaway and the reassessment of the revolutionary situation in Spain forced by the Claudín faction was to lead the PCE to the position of voicing profound sympathy for the processes taking place in Czechoslovakia under Dubček and to force a PCE decision which has marked the party's character ever since.

The August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia marked the real turning point in the PCE's attitude toward the CPSU. Just prior to the invasion the PCE had emphasized its endorsement of Dubček's new course, and on August 21, the day of the invasion itself, Dolores Ibarruri and Carrillo, accompanied by Pajetta and Longo of the PCI, personally voiced their opposition to Mikhail Suslov, Soviet Politburo member, in Moscow. He dismissed their protests out of hand, declaring to Carrillo, "After all, you represent only a small party." 22 A subsequent attempt to solve the problem

by a compromise failed\textsuperscript{23} and in September a plenum of the PCE Central Committee voted 66 to 5 to condemn the invasion, embarking the PCE upon a policy of open, public and vocal opposition to the Soviet action.\textsuperscript{24}

It should be noted that in light of the opposition of other Western European communist parties to the Soviet action and the PCE's growing commitment to democratic socialism, the PCE could do no less. It should also be noted that in contrast to the PCF, which shortly reverted to supporting the invasion, and to the PCI, which soon softened its opposition, the PCE has remained staunchly critical of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia to the present day. However, the policy was destined to exacerbate internal PCE quarrels. Subsequently, the exit of García, and Gómez in 1969 and Lister in 1970 to form the rival, pro-Soviet PCOE has provided a ready-made haven for anti-Carrillo forces. That Carrillo maintained control of the PCE in spite of this serious schism goes a long way toward explaining his continued vocal anti-Soviet proclamations.\textsuperscript{25}

Moreover, Carrillo's successful opposition to the CPSU put a serious dent in the CPSU ideological armor which other West European communist parties were quick to note, but have

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 57.
\textsuperscript{24}Preston, "Crisis", p. 150.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.
nevertheless, been prudently slow to exploit. Therefore, PCE anti-Sovietism has combined with existing polycentric tendencies in international communism to become an important aspect of the PCE's evolution to its present Eurocommunist stance. To be sure, other West European communist parties have been warily reluctant to fully accept the PCE's anti-Soviet tenet in defining Eurocommunism, but they have nonetheless been drawn inexorably to that position. Good examples are provided by the changing character of the PCI and PCF through the years.

Willenz and Uliassi provide a good description of the PCI pursuit of autonomy after 1963:

Years before the Sino-Soviet dispute erupted, Italian communists were struggling to win greater autonomy for their party (they became more explicit and insistent in pursuing this goal after 1956), to develop their own strategy of power, and (more important) to 'domesticate' their political objectives. They were obviously intent on traveling their own road to socialism, but at the same time they wished to avoid disruptive conflicts with the USSR, since the Soviet revolutionary myth was and still is an important source of authority within the party and a factor in its appeal to members and voters. The Sino-Soviet dispute has forced a quickening of the PCI's evolutionary pace. It has, of course, enabled the party to assert its independence more vigorously and safely than it might otherwise have done; and it has permitted -- even compelled -- the PCI to move more rapidly and freely in search of its distinctive identity.²⁶

²⁶Willenz and Uliassi, p. 50.
The publication of Togliatti's "testament" in 1964 raised grave doubts within the party as to the validity of the Soviet model. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia compounded these doubts and caused serious intra-party discussion of how strictly the party should adhere to Moscow's international leadership. The continued success of the PCI at the polls through the years has enhanced the PCI's power in Italian politics. Soviet attempts to arrest this trend, including cutbacks on financial assistance, have been generally unsuccessful and possibly counterproductive. For example, the PCI led a number of West European communist parties to insure that the 1976 East Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties emphasized the independence of national parties rather than Soviet leadership of the international movement.

The PCF transformation is rather analogous, but the French Party has been a relative latecomer to the West European anti-Soviet fold, and it remains reluctant to completely sever the bonds. The PCF has long been proud of its image as the most Stalinist of West European parties and it has maintained strong support of the Soviet Union. The zig-zag course which the PCF followed from 1934 to 1962 showed its readiness to identify completely with Soviet foreign policy objectives. In fact, the first time that the PCF publicly criticised the CPSU was on the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, the criticism was immediately softened and the PCF became the first West European communist
party to send a delegation to Moscow to renew ties. 27

The PCF also supported the PCP during the Portuguese revo-
lution of 1974 and has maintained its support while other
West European communist parties have found Cunhal's policy
pronouncements and avowedly Stalinist pro-Sovietism to be
distasteful.

Thorez' death in 1964 eased the way toward a liberali-
zation of the PCF's domestic policy so that by 1970 it
was turning more and more toward the building of a mass
party. The election gains of the left in the 1970's as a
result of the PCF-Socialist Common Program accelerated this
trend. Consequently, when preparations for the East Berlin
Conference indicated that Soviet-inspired proposals would
have the effect of limiting the PCF's freedom to develop
domestic policy to fit national requirements, the PCF switched
from strongly backing the Soviet proposals to opposing them
at the side of Italian-Spanish-Romanian autonomists. More
recently, Georges Marchais, PCF Secretary-General, did not
attend the 25th Congress of the CPSU but sent a representative
instead. Consequently, while the PCF of today still cannot
be characterized as anti-Soviet, it certainly cannot be
considered as entirely pro-Soviet either. Given the back-
ground of the PCF, this change is significant.

27 Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, (NY: Columbia
D. THE EMERGENCE OF EUROCOMMUNISM

Soviet frustration with its inability to muzzle the PCE and control other West European communist parties has been exacerbated by implications of two recent conferences, the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the 1976 Conference of European Communist Parties. The Soviet acceptance of the so-called "Basket III" provisions of the Helsinki agreement has provided disaffected communist parties with a document to support critical views of the disparity between the Soviet model of socialism and its actual treatment of individuals. Although the Soviets have attempted to "stonewall" on their implementation of Basket III human rights provisions, most recently at the first compliance review in Belgrade, their obstructions have only served to increase criticism of Soviet human rights violations from East as well as West European communist parties.

The preparations for the 1976 East Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties have been well documented and analyzed by Kevin Devlin.28 He describes the outcome of the conference as a decided victory for the "nationalist" communist parties. By joining forces, the PCI, PCF and PCE plus the Romanian (PCR) and Yugoslavian (LCY) parties gained concessions on all important issues.

According to Devlin, the final document produced by the conference was a "lowest-common-denominator text based on the new principle of consensus, itself a formal recognition of the equality and autonomy of all communist parties; it contained no criticism of the Chinese and no praise of the Soviets; it dealt with political action and not with ideology; and it was not binding upon the participants (in fact, it was not even signed by any of them)."

The PCE played an instrumental role in determining the content and character of this document. As a member of the eight-party subgroup (four independent parties: LCY, PCR, PCI and PCE, and four loyalist parties: CPSU, PCF, East German and Danish) which drafted the document, the PCE was in the forefront of those opposing CPSU attempts to control its content. In this position the PCE was able to rebuff Soviet attempts to erect a facade to give a false impression of unanimity of the participating parties.

The confrontation over the conference document served to consolidate a convergence of ideas among the Western communist parties. Based on the PCF's about-face regarding support of the CPSU, a strategic alliance of the PCE, PCI, and PCF emerged. The alliance was formalized by the adoption

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29 Devlin, "Challenge", p. 15.
30 Ibid., p. 4.
31 Ibid., p. 6.
of bilateral communiques proclaiming the parties' commitment to pluralistic and libertarian ideals. Devlin suggests that the PCI-PCF statement of November 1975 could be considered the "Manifesto of Eurocommunism" although the PCE would probably argue the point based upon a similar PCE-PCI statement issued earlier, in July 1975. Devlin observed that the PCI-PCF statement committed the two communist parties to "support for the plurality of political parties, for the right to existence and activity of opposition parties, and for democratic alternation between the majority and the minority." The eventual building of a socialist order in Italy and France would be characterized by "a continued democratization of economic, social and political life," while existing bourgeois liberties would be "guaranteed and developed." The statement went on: 'This goes for freedom of thought and expression, of the press, of assembly and association, of demonstration, for free circulation of persons at home and abroad, for inviolability of private life, for religious freedom.' It also pledged 'complete freedom for all currents of philosophical, cultural, and artistic opinion.' Within a regional and not merely national context, the two parties vowed to promote 'the common action of the Communist and Socialist parties, of all the democratic and progressive forces of (Western) Europe.'

The East Berlin Conference effectively marked the emergence of Eurocommunism, and the PCE played an important role in the shaping of its character. In view of the developments arising out of the two conferences just

\[\text{Ibid., p. 9.}\]
discussed, Carrillo wished to further unify the policies of the three most important West European communist parties. Toward this end he called the so-called "Eurocommunist Summit" in Madrid in March 1977. One of the results of this meeting was that the participants came away calling themselves Eurocommunists. However, before discussing the other outcomes of this meeting, it would be useful to mention some distinctive elements of Eurocommunism as they are viewed by the three West European communist parties.

Since 1975 the term "Eurocommunism" has become very popularly used. It was apparently a word invented by an Italian journalist in 1975 to contrast the PCI's form of communism, operating within the traditional Western political framework, with the Soviet model, operating under the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" -- a sort of extension of the concept of "communism with a human face" to the concept of "communism with a democratic face."

Since then, the term has become a catch-all, meaning different things to different people.

Unfortunately, the concept which the term is intended to describe is also somewhat nebulous. As perceived by this writer, and as indicated by prior discussion in this study, Eurocommunism can be considered as the most recent extension of the ongoing world-wide communist re-examination of various tenets of Marxism-Leninism and particularly of the position which the CPSU should hold in the international
communist movement. This re-examination could be considered to have begun at the time of the imposition of National Front governments in Soviet occupied Eastern Europe in 1945. Before then, the Soviet model was universally revered and strictly followed. Since then, national communist parties have been moving progressively away from the Soviet fold. On occasion, such as the Yugoslav case, the process has been swift and cataclysmic, on other occasions, as with Romania (and to a lesser extent other East European nations) the process has been very gradual and sometimes fraught with setbacks, such as in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. A unique aspect of the generally growing independence of communist parties from Soviet influence has been the evolution of the parties of Western Europe. It is the emergent ideology of these communist parties to which this writer applies the term "Eurocommunism."

Therefore, under the West European ideology, Eurocommunism seeks to transform several basic tenets of Soviet-style communism. One is the rejection of "proletarian internationalism". As the previous discussion has pointed out, the gradual defiance of the international authority of the Soviet Union in communist affairs has been the foundation of the evolution toward Eurocommunism. However, this rejection has not been complete nor universal, making it a bone of contention among the Western European communist parties themselves. For example, while the PCE rejects Soviet hegemony vehemently,
the PCI has been more sophisticated and ambivalent in its choosing of words of opposition, and the PCF has been even more circumspect in its pronouncements.

The remaining two Marxist-Leninist tenets which Eurocommunism desires to transform are "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and "democratic centralism". A short discussion of the evolution of the three Eurocommunist parties to their present positions will serve to compare and contrast the PCE's position on these tenets with those of the PCI and PCF.

All three parties now reject the tenet of "the dictatorship of the proletariat". In fact the PCI has never made use of the slogan and has not even mentioned it since becoming a force in Italian politics after World War II. In contrast, other Western parties originally enshrined the concept in their statutes and programs, but have since gradually dropped the notion.33 Undoubtedly, they were discovering individually that for any party which had abandoned the project of seizing revolutionary power by itself, the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat was a considerable handicap. No other party would consent to collaborate with it for the peaceful conquest of power at the cost of being suppressed in the event of success.34


34 Ibid., p. 175.
The PCF, while stubbornly refusing to repudiate the slogan until 1974, gradually stopped using it between 1964-1968. By 1972 Marchais was saying, in the process of urging the "Union de le Gauche", that the party no longer spoke of the concept in traditional terms, but rather, referred to it as a broad form of democracy for workers and the mass of the people. In 1976 Marchais announced casually, in a TV interview, that the phrase would be expunged from the party statutes.35

In contrast to the PCF's foot dragging, the PCE, a clandestine party with little necessity for consulting the membership, abruptly dropped the phrase in 1968, declaring that one-party rule was a deformation of Marxism good enough for backward countries, but unsuited to modern conditions. By 1976, the justification for renunciation was that the dictatorship of the proletariat had been a Stalinist doctrine; consequently, the PCE linked its abandonment to the party's condemnation of one-party rule in East Europe.36 More recently, Carrillo explained at a press conference that it was not valid to do away with the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat in all countries, but only in advanced capitalist countries and that the concept of Eurocommunism

36 Ibid., p. 11.
involves the idea of socialist forces achieving power democratically. 37

The third tenet of traditional communist ideology which is in jeopardy is "democratic centralism". In contrast to the previous two tenets, which have been largely repudiated, the doctrine of democratic centralism has not been overtly rejected by the Western communist parties. However, it does appear to be coming increasingly under attack as the parties attempt to deal with the problems of controlling a mass party while publicly professing a democratic character.

The impediments to effecting change of a party structure that is based on absolute centralization and rigorous discipline are well stated by Neil McInnes in Eurocommunism:

The Leninist party machine is prized by the leaders like the apple of the eye, while the fact that the parties continue to recruit tens of thousands of Europeans each year shows that it is attractive, at least for a time, to many of the led. It would be natural for the incumbent leaders to cling to a structure that gives them their present social position and political eminence, and promises to carry them to the highest offices of the state. It would be normal, too, for them and their aspirant successors to defend a structure that provides a unique means of intervening in western political life, that magnifies a group's influence far beyond its numbers, and that brings with it the advantages - moral and material - of representing a world

superpower on the local scene. Finally, members and voters who come to politics in a romantic or conspiratorial mood, or who come to communism disappointed with the futility of Latin socialist parties, relish the discipline and blind devotion the machine asks of them.  

Despite the probable desires of the leadership to oppose loosening of their controls over their respective parties, there has been some limited evolution in this area. McInnes credits the PCI with having the freest internal democracy, "yet it has evolved less on this point than on any other since Togliatti set his stamp on it after the war." He continues to point out that PCI democratization has been limited to a few acknowledged spokesmen who elucidate the "correnti" which they lead within the party. One also occasionally hears rumors of debates within the Central Committee. Nonetheless, in the PCI, even today, once the policy has been set at the top, further discussion is not to be found.  

Change in the PCF has been even more limited than in the PCI. According to McInnes, "The PCF, boastful of its Leninist rigidity, never even pretended to be liberalizing party life until it became plain that its reputation for orthodoxy was an electoral handicap to the Union de le
Gauche. Thereupon, Marchais had the effrontery to declare the PCF was 'the most liberal party in France'.\textsuperscript{41}

It is on the point of democratic centralism that the PCE has apparently become the most daring and innovative of any communist parties. All three Eurocommunist parties express serious desires to come to power through democratic methods and promise to abide by alternation of parties in power, if elected and then turned out. But the PCE under Carrillo's guiding hand has ostensibly gone so far as to allow at least semi-open debate and secret balloting in party affairs. In fact some critics of Carrillo claim he is using Stalinist tactics to democratize the party at too fast a rate.\textsuperscript{42} If this is true, the irony of the transformation process is highly intriguing.

In this respect the recent PCE 9th Party Congress, held 17-23 April 1978 produced an astonishing spectacle -- the membership, after two days of open debate, voted to change the description of the party from "Marxist-Leninist" to "Marxist, democratic and revolutionary". The vote, 968 "For" to 248 "Against" with 40 abstentions,\textsuperscript{43} serves to reinforce Carrillo's claim that the PCE, at least on the surface, is adhering to democratic principles. However, the

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 47.

\textsuperscript{42} "Democracy v. Authority", p. 32.

\textsuperscript{43} "Spanish Reds Vote to Break with Soviet-style Line", Monterey Peninsula Herald, 22 April 1977, p. 1.
outcome also reaffirmed Carrillo's firm grasp of party controls and indicates that the PCE will continue to develop along the course he has set for it. An indication that democratic centralism in the PCE will continue to be more centralized than democratic was Carrillo's reply when he was questioned at a post-congress press conference about future discussion within the party. Carrillo said that from now on debate within the party will continue, "but not of course on Thesis 15 (which changed the party description), which has already been approved."44 He added that the conduct of the minority has shown that party unity has not been undermined despite the fact that the former monolithic form no longer exists. In sum, within the PCE the outcome of the conflicting trends of democratization and democratic centralism remains clouded and confused.

E. EUROCOMMUNISM A LA SANTIAGO CARRILLO

Since Santiago Carrillo is probably the most outspoken proponent of Eurocommunism and his party apparently firmly supports his leadership, some reference should be made to what Carrillo himself thinks Eurocommunism to be. He put forth his concept of Eurocommunism in his recent, best-selling book, Eurocommunism and the State. Following

are a few excerpts from his book which should suffice to outline Carrillo's views.

The 'Eurocommunist' phenomenon is not a 'tactical maneuver on the part of Moscow' ... It is an autonomous strategic conception, in the process of formation, born of experience of those concerned and of concrete reality ... this strategy has not been worked out with a view to 'extending Soviet influence', nor in order to upset the correlation of military forces on our continent.

...there cannot be any confusion between Eurocommunism and social democracy in the ideological sphere ... What is commonly called 'Eurocommunism' proposes to transform society, not to administer it; to work out a socialist alternative to the system of state monopoly capitalism, not to integrate in it and become one of its governmental variants.

...the Eurocommunist strategy aims to bring about a convergence with the socialist and social democratic parties ...

The parties included in the Eurocommunist trend are agreed on the need to advance to socialism with democracy, a multi-party system, parliaments and representative institutions, sovereignty of the people regularly exercised through universal suffrage, trade unions independent of the state and of the parties, freedom for the opposition, human rights, religious freedom, freedom for culture, scientific and artistic creation and development of the broadest forms of popular participation at all levels and in all branches of social activity ... the parties claim their total independence in relation to any possible international leading center ... 

Carrillo has consistently repeated his ideas in numerous press conferences and interviews. In a recent one he specified which "international leading center" he was referring to in the excerpt above taken from his book. He stated that Eurocommunism was "socialism running parallel to democracy, freedom, with universal suffrage and alternation of parties in the government, independence of the communist movements vis-a-vis the socialist state without submitting itself to any international discipline and without obeying orders from Moscow."46

Obviously the other Eurocommunist parties, the PCI and PCF, seem to be comfortable with most of the elements of Carrillo's concept and definition of Eurocommunism. The PCI, operating under Togliatti's notion of polycentrism, has espoused the virtues of the democratic political process as a viable method to make the socialist revolution. The PCF has been less public in its support, but has nonetheless actively used the democratic political process to increase its influence in French politics. The point of major disagreement among the three parties seems to boil down to what the proper degree of independence from the CPSU should be.

To settle this point was a major reason why Carrillo called Marchais and Berlinguer to meet together with him in

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Madrid in March 1977 for a "Eurocommunist Summit". Even though the three leaders reiterated statements that the meeting should not be construed as a challenge to the CPSU, it was a symbolic display of independence of the three parties in view of the CPSU's earlier warnings to the Japanese and other communist parties that none had the right to organize a congress or regional meeting without inviting a Soviet delegation. However, after two days of secret talks, the leaders issued a "Declaration of Madrid" in which the independence of the parties was affirmed, but which fell short of supporting Carrillo's anti-Soviet position.

In the building of this new society, the Spanish, Italian and French communists are resolved to work within the pluralism of the political and social forces and to respect guarantees and develop all individual and collective freedoms: freedom of thought and of speech, of the press, of association and meeting, of demonstration, of free circulation of persons within the country and abroad, trade union freedom, independence for the trade unions, the right to strike, inviolability of private life, respect for universal suffrage, prospects for the democratic alternative of the majorities, religious freedom, cultural freedom, freedom of expression for different trends of opinion, philosophical, cultural and artistic.

This will to build socialism within democracy and freedom inspires the concepts which have

47 James Goldsborough, "Eurocommunism After Madrid", Foreign Affairs, July 1977, p. 801
48 McInnes, "Eurcommunism", p. 53.
evolved in full independence by each of the three parties. The three parties are determined to continue to develop in the future international solidarity and friendship, on the basis of the independence of each party, the equality of rights, noninterference and respect for the free choice of original solutions for the building of socialist societies, which correspond to the conditions in each country. 49

Therefore, even though Carrillo was not as successful as he had hoped to be, he did accomplish two very important tasks: 1) he gained public agreement from the other two major West European communist parties upon the general concept of Eurocommunism and, 2) he demonstrated that the PCE intended to be the initiator of change in the international communist movement. The events of the PCE's 9th Party Congress, already mentioned, serve to reinforce the second point.

Such, then, is the overall concept of the society which some hope Eurocommunism will create. However, Santiago Carrillo appears to hope that it will do something extra for him. That is, to strengthen his image as a world leader in the communist movement. A short example should suffice to indicate what may be on Carrillo's mind: Carrillo has often claimed that Moscow used to be viewed as the "Vatican of the Communist Movement", but that Eurocommunism

was the Communists' "Vatican II". When asked in a recent interview where he envisioned the seat of this Vatican II should be located, he replied, "Maybe, Madrid." 50

F. SANTIAGO CARRILLO V. THE CPSU

One of the much publicized manifestations of the PCE's evolution to Eurocommunism has been the increasing polemic between Santiago Carrillo and the CPSU. Having its roots in the PCE's growing independence of mind and its genesis in the combined factors of the PCE's criticism of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the CPSU's moral and monetary support to Líster's rival PCE, the polemic has existed at varying levels of intensity for a number of years.

The most recent flareup of the conflict (mentioned earlier in this study), during which Carrillo was snubbed by the CPSU by its refusal to allow him to speak before the delegations to the 60th anniversary celebration of the October Revolution, is actually just a continuation of the upsurge of the dispute which began in 1974. At that time the CPSU attacked a report to the PCE Central Committee Plenum presented by Manuel Azcárate, the party's chief ideologist and international affairs expert. According to Mujal-Leon, the CPSU singled out four aspects of Azcárate's

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report for hard criticism: 1) "his incorrect and absurd thesis that there were contradictions between the state interests of the socialist countries and the interests of the evolutionary movement", 2) his invective against the Soviet socialist system which spread "all manner of lies about the absences of democracy in the USSR", 3) his outlook on the problem of autonomy and equality of rights of the fraternal parties which included "not one ounce of proletarian internationalism" and, 4) his call for a democratic and socialist Europe "which reek(ed) with nationalism".\(^{51}\)

The events of Portugal in late 1974 and early 1975, combined with the growing strength of the PCE in the anti-Franco opposition caused the CPSU to back off from its critique, but the PCE was not consoled. In June 1976 at the East Berlin Conference, Carrillo took the offensive with vigor, declaring,

> For years, Moscow ... was our Rome. We spoke of the Great October Socialist Revolution as if it were our Christmas. That was the period of our infancy. Today we have grown up.\(^ {52}\)

Later, he compared the new resistance to Moscow's domination to Martin Luther's rejection of Rome.\(^ {53}\) Carrillo's speech was characterized as probably the most provocative of the

\(^{51}\) Mujal-Leon, p. 51.

\(^{52}\) Devlin, "Challenge", p. 1.

conference. His statements, plus the leading position of
the PCE in opposing Soviet efforts to reassert control
over the events of the conference certainly increased Soviet
enmity toward him. The Madrid Eurocommunist Summit added
fuel to the smoldering fire as the PCE-CPSU conflict rose
to the flash-point. The publication of Carrillo's Euro-
communism and the State in April 1977 provided the spark
for a renewal of Soviet accusations, and the relatively
poor showing of the PCE in the 15 June Spanish elections
provided the opportunity for the attack.

A few days after the election results became official,
the Soviet foreign affairs weekly, Novoye Vremya (New Times),
issued a blistering attack on Carrillo and the ideas he put
forth in his book. Claiming that the ideas of Eurocommunism
were intended to aid imperialism, denigrate "real socialism",
strengthen NATO, further the goals of reactionary forces,
and split the international communist movement, the attack
was a veritable "excommunication" of Carrillo. The PCE
responded coolly, expressing surprise at the virulence of
the attack and stating that it was apparently a demonstra-
tion of the Soviet's inability to enter into the process
of discussion.54

Carrillo quickly mustered the support of his Central
Committee which soon declared that the attack was not just

54 Radio Independent Spain, 24 June 1977, as reported in
on Carrillo, but against "all those communist parties which believe in a democratic way to socialism and for socialism in democracy."55 Later, Carrillo himself responded by saying that the attack had been received with indignation by all the members of the party, that the party did not recognize the power of any Holy Office, that it thereby rejected its excommunication, and that to continue such efforts would be pointless and doomed to failure.56

Apparently, the CPSU had miscalculated the reaction of the other Western communist parties. They came to the aid of the PCE, although in uneven terms. In early July the Soviet Union softened its criticism. The situation remained at a low boil for the next three months only to erupt again when the CPSU refused Carrillo the previously extended offer to speak before the rally commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

Just prior to departing for Moscow for the rally, Carrillo spoke to the regional congress of the Basque Communist Party saying, "Our relations with the CPSU are not broken off, but they are burdened and affected by the fact that there is still the lack of readiness with the Soviet comrades to accept the changes which took place in recent years. Relations


among communist parties today must be based on readiness to accept differences in views. These relations can no longer be based on monolithness and total unity.\textsuperscript{57} It was the Basque Party Congress which prevented Carrillo from attending the opening session addressed by Brezhnev.

Soon after his arrival, Carrillo learned that he would not be allowed to speak before the solemn joint session of the CPSU Central Committee and the Russian Federation as he had been invited to do earlier. It was a serious rebuff, but Carrillo made great publicity from the incident. In explaining why he was barred, Carrillo said, "I wanted to state the specific conditions of our party, regardless of the opinions held here (in Moscow), but that was not possible. It is their house and they are free to listen to whom they wish to hear. Time and experience will tell who is right."\textsuperscript{58} It seemed that Carrillo delighted in his pariah status to such an extent that some observers suggested he may even have engineered the whole incident for his own ends. Said one diplomat in Madrid, "The Russians were booby-trapped. Carrillo came out looking like a stalwart democrat.\textsuperscript{59} Be that as it may, relations between Carrillo and the CPSU have continued to remain stiffly formal.

\textsuperscript{57} TANJUG, 1 November 1977, as reported in FBIS-WE, 2 November 1977, p. N1.

\textsuperscript{58} Kevin Klose, "Carrillo Speech to Soviet Rally Barred", Washington Post, 4 November 1977, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{59} "Apostle Carrillo", Time, 21 November 1977, p. 47.
since the incident, while Carrillo has continued to gain acclaim as Eurocommunism's premier and most notorious bear-baiter.

G. WHAT IS TO BE GAINED?

In the context of the Madrid Eurocommunist Summit, the continuing PCE-CPSU conflict, the PCE's self-initiated change of description at its 9th Party Congress, and continuing, obvious efforts to be the initiators of change in international communism, the question arises as to what the PCE hopes to gain from its maneuverings. The final portion of this chapter will attempt to provide some answers to that question.

As was emphasized earlier in this study, the PCE was an extremely powerful element in the Republic during the Civil War. From this circumstance two important considerations arise: 1) the party knows by its own experience that popular front or coalition government tactics can be successfully used by a communist party to gain governmental power. Hence, the PCE today stresses a policy of demanding a "government of national concentration" in which all important parties have membership, and 2) the Soviet Union withdrew its military support from the Republic and thus from the PCE, at a time when it was crucially needed. In effect, the CPSU abandoned the PCE when it became evident that Soviet particular interests were threatened. Hence, the PCE has a strong basis, albeit late-developing, for its anti-Sovietism.
Recent events in Spanish politics and PCE/CPSU relations indicate that these two considerations will continue to remain important in influencing the course of future events.

At the domestic level, the PCE has been quite successful at enhancing its popularity. By strongly supporting the monarchy, by acting quite responsibly during the 1977 election campaign and by being prudent and constructive in its criticism of the military and police forces, the PCE has preempted any serious reaction to its existence and public political activity. In fact, in many ways the PCE has appeared more patriotic and self-sacrificing than even the rightist Popular Alliance. The building and securing of such an image is highly important to the PCE in expanding its electoral clout in domestic politics.

Eurocommunism provides the PCE with a vehicle for expanding its influence in domestic politics. Hardly a week goes by without an interview with Santiago Carrillo appearing in one of the major weekly news magazines of Spain, and he is frequently interviewed by the major news magazines of other West European nations as well. Moreover, hardly a day goes by without some sort of article concerning the PCE appearing in the Spanish press. Without the Eurocommunism issue, Carrillo would be a much less sought-after personality and the PCE would be just another communist party agitating to overthrow its government. Carrillo and the PCE have been quick to take advantage of this free publicity and
also to use the publications as forums to convey party views to Spanish voters.

In these media forums the PCE has projected a remarkably moderate and even-handed image on several important Spanish political issues. Its conciliatory attitude toward the monarchy, the police and the military were previously mentioned. Its views on Spanish membership in NATO appeal to the independence of the Spaniard. The PCE proposes the abolition of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but it also realizes the realities of the existence of these organizations and would therefore, submit to Spain's membership in NATO if it were to occur. Meanwhile, the PSOE's position opposing Spanish NATO membership is creating friction with center-right elements of the UDC which it would like to assimilate. In other matters the PCE has voiced approval for the Government's economic program (with appropriate reservations, of course) and has portrayed itself as working for constructive change in this area. In this matter, also, the PSOE has become one of the more vocal critics of the Government program, inspiring additional dissonance among moderate Socialists and Centrists. In sum, the PCE continues to work diligently toward enhancing its image as a responsible, contributing and constructive element of Spanish politics, whereas the PSOE and other political factions have often appeared to be indulging in criticism for its own sake. The PCE apparently hopes to capitalize upon voter dissatisfaction with these obstructionist tactics to make inroads, particularly
into PSOE voter strength, to expand its own political influence.

At the international level, the PCE's anti-Sovietism gives it a unique place among communist parties. By demonstrating to Western European communist parties in particular that they have little to fear from the CPSU, the PCE leads the way in enhancing the acceptance of communist parties in European politics. By demonstrating to East European communist parties that the CPSU is not as potent as it pretends, the PCE represents an example that national communism can be pursued even if it opposes Soviet desires. The developing models of liberalizing communism of Poland and Hungary and the Romanian model of prudent independence are thus encouraged as viable examples of socialist development growing in the shadow of the Soviet Union. Consequently, anti-Sovietism has become an important card in the PCE's Eurocommunist deck, and it should be expected that the PCE under Carrillo's skillful guidance, will continue to play it as opportunistically as possible in the future.

Three recent events have been instrumental in proving the viability of PCE views of Eurocommunism and serving to indicate the future development of Eurocommunism. The Italian elections of 1976 have become an excellent supportive example to the PCE's claim that the socialist revolution can be achieved progressively and peacefully by democratic means through the development of mass support. The PCI example has shown that a mass party can be controlled and
developed to the point of gaining government control in a pluralistic political system. The process has been quite slow and deliberate. In 1948 the PCI had 2.1 million members, but gained 5 million votes, or 23% of the total. By 1976 the PCI's membership had actually declined to 1.7 million, but it garnered over 36% of the vote, not to mention the numerous municipal and regional governmental positions under PCI control. That the PCI could not gain a plurality in 1976 may be attributed in part to lingering doubts among the Italian electorate as to the veracity of Eurocommunist pronouncements. Therefore, following the PCE theory, PCI renunciation of the CPSU model could allay Italian fears and put the PCI "over the top" and into control of the government.

The French elections of 1978 can be viewed as sustaining the PCE's anti-Soviet view, also, while providing additional proof that the popular front tactic must be maintained until power is achieved. Subsequent to the 1972 Communist-Socialist Union of the Left with its Common Program, the PCF gained in party membership and percentage of the vote attained so that the 1974 elections portended the French Left's gaining the Presidency and hence, the PCF becoming extremely influential in determining the course of French policies. However,

60 Coe, p. 259.
Soviet Ambassador Tchervonenko's well-publicized pre-election call on candidate Valéry Giscard d'Estaing seemed to indicate Soviet support of him against Socialist candidate François Mitterrand. As Giscard subsequently won by only 1.4% of the vote, the PCF had good reason to be highly disturbed by the Soviet interference.\textsuperscript{61} Later, in 1977, Brezhnev himself visited France. Courting Giscard and Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac, but not Marchais, Brezhnev seemed to be confirming that the Soviets still regarded the Giscard government as a privileged Soviet ally in the Western camp.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, rather than take advantage of the slight to renounce Soviet influence, the PCF renounced the Common Program instead. The public lost faith in the veracity of the PCF's conciliatory posture, and the Left lost the elections of March 1978. In fact, the Center actually gained additional seats in the Chamber. The PCE approach was, by contrast, proven correct once again. Hence, it should be expected that the PCE will continue to call for its own "government of national concentration" to increase its importance in Spanish politics.

As mentioned, the PCE voted at its 9th Party Congress to drop the term "Leninist" from its description, describing itself as "Marxist, democratic, and revolutionary" rather

\textsuperscript{61} Goldsborough, p. 802.

\textsuperscript{62} "Was this Journey Desirable?" \textit{Economist}, 25 July 1977, p. 54.
than using the "Marxist-Leninist" description which it formerly shared with all other communist parties. This event has added a new dimension to the ideas of Eurocommunism. Carrillo described the reasoning behind the change:

In practice for some years the Communist Party has left behind a whole range of Leninist concepts and this, which some party members consider a wrench, is merely being consistent with what we have done in the past... I would say that we are more faithful to Lenin's attitude toward the problems of his time than those who retain the definition of Marxism-Leninism, because one of the original aspects of Lenin's attitude was the open break with a number of Marxist theses which he considered outdated by his time and did not hesitate to leave aside in order to accelerate society's transformation in Russia... That is why we are more faithful to Lenin's creative and innovative spirit than others. 63

Although declining to abandon all of Lenin's ideas (only Lenin's name and a number of "outdated" teachings were dropped), the PCE nonetheless has made a radical new move to deemphasize the relevance of the Soviet model as the guiding light of world communist parties. This move represents a serious challenge to orthodox communists and an attempt by the PCE to enhance its position as the model for independent national communists. The repercussions of this move by the PCE, although not immediately felt, should prove to be far-reaching and serve to accelerate the further disaggregation of the international communist movement.

In answer to the question, what is to be gained, which was posed at the beginning of this section, it is clear that Carrillo hopes to gain the voters of Spain. Only by continuing to enhance its democratic image, to renounce its conspiratorial heritage, and to demonstrate its vitality in domestic politics can the PCE make inroads into PSOE domination of the left. Only by demonstrating that Eurocommunism is a viable and effective alternative to violent revolutionary tactics for the attainment of socialism can the PCE pacify the radical left and gain international support. Carrillo seems to believe that Eurocommunism provides the best method to accomplish both of these vital tasks.
V. THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS MODEL

If there are truly "many roads to socialism" as the Eurocommunists claim, then certainly the Spanish road is the narrowest and most fraught with possible pitfalls. The next few years will be crucial ones to the very existence of the PCE in its present form in Spain. This chapter will examine the levels of analysis model as a useful and appropriate tool to understand political developments within the PCE, within Spanish politics and within the Eurocommunist-CPSU relationship. Armed with this understanding, conclusions can be reached as to the probable future course of events in each of these three arenas.

The first section of this chapter will describe the levels of analysis model, expanding upon the brief description presented in the introduction of this study. Following sections will present various elements at each level and attempt to show the interaction of those elements within the levels, as well as between the levels. In this way the various elements (events, characteristics, perceptions) presented in the preceding chapters of this study may be integrated to analyze past activities of the PCE and, hopefully, to predict future activities.

The operation of the model can be likened to that of a three-dimensional chess game in that, just as the movement of a piece at any level of play effects the play at all
levels, a change at any level of political relationships effects the situation at all levels. Consequently, when an event is analyzed for its effect on the situation at the level in which it occurs, it must also be analyzed for its effect at the other levels as well. Moreover, the analysis is complicated by the fact that different events may occur at all levels simultaneously, thus increasing the unpredictability of the results of the interaction. The following figure shows the model schematically.

Levels of Analysis Interactions

![Levels of Analysis Interactions](image)

Figure 2
Unfortunately, no observer can have full knowledge of how an event will interact with other elements at the level where it occurs nor how it will interact within the elements of the other levels. However, by knowing and having a good understanding of the character of the major "effectors" at each level, an observer can attach some sort of probability to the possible outputs. Indeed, a major aim of political science today is to reduce the subjectivity of the assigned probabilities so as to predict outcomes with greater certainty. Use of the levels of analysis model allows for the inclusion of quantitative indices as well as subjective characterization so as to view the elements in better perspective. Consequently, the indices take on more meaning and enhance the reliability of the predictive output of the model.

A. FIRST LEVEL – INTRAPARTY INTERACTION

Looking to the first level, several factors can be found which effect intra-party politics and lend a certain character to the outputs from this level. One factor is the nature of the leadership of the party. As indicated in earlier section concerning the PCE leadership, it is very personalized, centralized and growing older. It is, nonetheless, still very strong and very much in control of the party. Consequently, PCE policy will likely remain into the near future very much as it is today.

Another factor which lends itself to the PCE ideal of discipline and respect for authority is the composition of
its membership. Being largely a working-class organization, the membership is somewhat oriented toward following instructions, even to the point of following orders that lead to no readily apparent goal. The relatively small number of students and intellectuals reduces the possibility of serious dissent within the party ranks. Added to this is the factor of the quasi-religious nature and family tradition of PCE membership. Most communists are convinced of the righteousness of their ideals and cling to them tenaciously, even when confronted with obvious discrepancies in logic, much as deeply religious church goers maintain their convictions despite theological inconsistencies. In addition, communism in Spain seems to be something of a family affair, in some cases with all members of a family being believers, a tradition which sometimes extends to second and even third generations. Consequently, when a party line is announced, the first, and possibly only, inclination of most of the membership is to fall docilely into line.

A look at the PCE's recent change of description will demonstrate how the elements presented above interacted to enable the change to take place and will provide an estimate of what can be expected in the near future. In the first instance, the whole evolution of the PCE under Carrillo has seemingly pointed to this change. Many of the ideals of

1McInnes, "Communist Parties", p. 62.
Marxism-Leninism and Marxist Social-Democracy are shared. The Soviet model of Marxism-Leninism is being increasingly discredited and denounced by even its own adherents. The practicality of using the democratic process for attaining power is being increasingly accepted. (Perhaps even Carrillo's own Socialist youth and parentage has had an effect here.) At any rate, a very astute observer might have suspected some change in the offing from analysis of Carrillo's comment at the press conference at which Eurocommunism and the State was first publicly presented.

The PCE's attitude does not blaspheme against Leninism, although it is possible that in the future I may be described as a renegade against Lenin.2

The pending change in ideology was given further clarification by Manuel Azcarate in a later interview:

We Spanish Communists discarded the term Marxism-Leninism eight years ago. We felt long ago that many aspects of Leninism were outdated. The dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin's conception of democracy, the setup of the cadre party and the idea that the revolution of the world would take place as a world-wide civil war -- all of this is no longer acceptable.3

Consequently, given the internal characteristics previously discussed, once Carrillo decided upon the change, gaining party approval was not difficult. Carrillo's fall over the


policy change, although broached by some observers, was highly improbable. Had he not survived worse threats in the 1960's? Had he not stood eyeball-to-eyeball with the Soviets on a number of occasions in recent years and forced them to blink on each occasion? Therefore, despite the ironic position of the Catalan PSUC's both supporting the change and opposing the change at the same time, the PCE will henceforth be a "Marxist, democratic, revolutionary" party, with little or no subsequent criticism of Carrillo. It should be expected that the PSUC will clarify its position to conform to the PCE stance. It should also be expected that the PCE's evolution away from democratic centralism will continue, but at the slow pace desired by Carrillo. That Carrillo is satisfied with the present state of events is indicated in his reply to a question of how democratic he believes the PCE's internal organization to be:

I believe that it is perfectly democratic.
I do not think that there is any party whose groups meet and discuss as frequently as the PCE's. I know that there are those who

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4 On 8 April 1977 the PSUC Central Committee voted 97 to 87 to abolish the term "Leninism" with 6 abstentions. This vote was taken on the basis that the Central Committee should vote in bloc. On 9 April 1977 the conference decided the Central Committee should vote in accordance with their personal convictions. The decision resulted in 97 votes to retain the term to 81 against with 7 abstentions.

5 "Democracy v. Authority", p. 32.
reproach our system of democratic centralism as not being sufficiently democratic. All the parties in Spain today, however, are undoubtedly ruled by centralism which is often just centralism and not democratic centralism. They are centralists without being aware of it. The difference is that our centralism is democratic and our party's militants discuss, hold meetings and give expression to their opinions with full freedom.\

B. SECOND LEVEL – DOMESTIC POLITICAL INTERACTION

Looking to the second level, a number of inter-related factors are found which complicate the PCE aim to gain more influence in the domestic political scene. The June 1977 elections showed quite vividly that the PCE, with just over 9% of the vote is, after all, a small party. Moreover, even if the figure of 300,000 members is accepted, the entire PCE membership amounts to less than 2% of the total vote returned. Consequently, in order to exert a noticeable influence, the PCE must continue with its moderate program promulgated in the Pact for Liberty. The pitfalls of maintaining such moderate views is that they may easily be usurped by other parties. For example, the PCE has long pressed for regional autonomy. However, through the Platajunta, the PSOE was able to assimilate that issue as it it were solely its own. Then, after the elections, when the Suárez government moved to grant autonomy to Catalonia, Galicia

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and the Basque provinces, the PCE was able to claim only a small part of the credit for the accomplishment.

Much the same occurred with the issue of free trade unions. Here again, the PSOE was able to proclaim its support of trade union freedom. This came to pass on 8 April 1977 when the Government legalized the existence of the major unions (the Communist Workers Commissions (CCOO), the Socialist General Workers' Union (UGT), the Independent Socialist Workers' Labor Union (USO), the United Catalan Workers (SOC) and the United Basque Workers). Similarly, the close proximity in the political spectrum of the PSOE and the PCE on a number of other vital issues, provides the PSOE with an ominous ability to subsume PCE platform planks into its own platform, or at least to embrace them as part of the popular front program, thereby weakening the PCE in any political campaign.

Analysis of the implications posed by the election results and the consolidation efforts of the PSOE and UCD present some related problems for PCE expansion. Much of PCE voting strength was concentrated in northern industrial areas. Additionally, nearly one-half of the PCE deputies in the Cortes are members of the Catalanian affiliate, the PSUC. If, in the context of a popular front, the PSUC felt that it could make greater gains through closer relations with the PSOE, the PSUC might desire to "de-affiliate" itself from the PCE. Such a turn of events is not likely, but if it were to happen, the prospects for the PCE would be disastrous.
For much the same reason, irritated leftist factions of the PCE might feel "sold-out" by the party's generally moderate stance and splinter off to join existing radical, leftist parties. Again, the prospects for the PCE would be disquieting, to say the least. Therefore the dilemma for the PCE within a popular front is that the party is too small at present to stand by itself and gain any power, but to move to the right opens grave possibilities of being subsumed by the larger PSOE, while to move to the left reopening the specter of the PCE's Civil War legacy and its years of Soviet association while in exile.

Therefore, though the PCE has had some success in ameliorating public images of its past, it will continue to have to deal with that legacy for some time to come. Spaniards have long memories, and many Spanish voters today had relatives or lovers who were liquidated by the Communist-controlled Republican government. Consequently, accusations about Civil War atrocities allegedly performed by a PCE candidate could quickly dispel weeks or months of campaign gains. Just such a tactic was used against Carrillo himself several times during the 1977 campaign, and it undoubtedly cost him votes. Therefore, unlike most other communist parties of Europe, the PCE must make great efforts to stay on the "straight and narrow". Any slip could conjure up the "conspiracy" of the Second Republic, causing hard-won PCE gains to vanish.
Ironically, public exposure and media publicity have also had some beneficial effect on the PCE's popularity. In fact, some observers have noted that the plethora of newspaper and magazine articles, interviews and commentary concerning the uniqueness of the PCE struggle for legalization and recognition have inflated the importance of the party all out of proportion to its actual political strength. So far the party has done well at capitalizing upon its supposed novelty, to publicize its program and to advertise its own virtues. As time passes and the PCE loses the luster of this "newness", it will be forced to devise other measures to keep itself in the public eye. One way is to become an outspoken proponent of Eurocommunism, as will be discussed later.

Another of the ways the PCE can maintain its uniqueness and thus its public exposure is through vocal opposition to the CPSU. Posing as an outspoken, maverick opponent of Soviet-style communism not only gets the PCE into the news limelight, it also serves to dispell aspects of its historical legacy that associate the PCE with Soviet hegemonic intentions. Thus, "A vote for communism is a vote for democracy" became the slogan of the PCE's first legal Central Committee meeting on April 15, 1977.7 Later in the month,

Carrillo said in an interview, "I mistrust the Russians as much as you do. I am a Spaniard, not a Russian. We want democratic socialism, not Stalinism."\(^8\) In another interview he stated, "The state we want for Spain would bear very little resemblance to the state which exists in the Soviet Union because we want a democratic, multiparty state with universal suffrage and with the possibility for changes in the government."\(^9\) The obvious intent in all three cases was to enhance the nationalistic appeal of the party and to dispel as much as possible any inferences of control by an outside power.

Therefore, analysis of the elements of the second level indicates that the PCE seems to be gaining some of its much sought-after respectibility, and that even though it is still small in membership and commands less than 10% of the Spanish vote, it yet has room to maneuver within the solidifying amalgam of Spanish politics. However, in order to add to its appeal for Spanish voters, the PCE needs a source of prestige from outside Spanish politics. Consequently, not only is the PCE moving in domestic politics to try to allay suspicions that it is controlled by the CPSU, it is also moving through the espousal of Eurocommunism to

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\(^9\)Interview with Santiago Carrillo, as reported in FBIS-WE, 11 May 1977, p. N2-N4.
publicize its independence in the international communist movement as well.

C. THIRD LEVEL - INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL INTERACTION

At the third level of analysis, the PCE is plagued by problems very similar to the ones it encounters at the domestic level. The first problem, again, is its small size. Not only does it comprise less than 2% of the Spanish electorate, its membership comprises only 4% of the total for West European communist parties. Therefore, without an issue, it is of little consequence in the international communist movement. Eurocommunism has provided the issue by which the PCE has become internationally important. Carrillo's Eurocommunism and the State is being touted as a sort of "New Testament" of communism, and Carrillo himself delights in the image of the PCE playing David to the Soviet Union's Goliath. Similarly, Carrillo has attempted to use the Eurocommunist Summit as an outward expression of the support which the PCI and PCF ostensibly give him as a guiding light in the Eurocommunist movement. In sum, Carrillo seems to be trying to use Eurocommunism as a sort of popular front against the hegemonic intentions of the Soviet Union and a method by which the small but vocal PCE can exert great influence on the policies of a much larger coalition of West European communists.

However, here again, Carrillo is faced with the prospect that either of the other parties contending for Eurocommunist
leadership, the PCI or the PCF, or other divisive interests of the parties will drastically curtail the PCE's importance. In the first case, the PCI, as the largest communist party in Western Europe and the one closest to gaining governing power, conceivably would like to be considered as the leader of the Eurocommunists and therefore displace the PCE's leadership pretentions. In the second case, the PCF and other European communist parties do not totally agree upon just how independent of Moscow it is prudent for the Eurocommunists to be. Therefore, they could easily withdraw their support of the PCE and, again, displace the PCE's leadership pretentions.

The PCE also has an international legacy to overcome and that is its strong Stalinist image despite its increasing anti-Soviet stance since 1968. There is no question that Carrillo runs the PCE with an iron hand and that democratic centralism, despite appearances, is alive and well in the PCE. Indeed the extent to which democratic centralism prevails is a major observation made by PCE critics. Moreover, the long years that the party machine existed in Moscow under the wing of the CPSU leaves lingering doubts in the minds of would-be Eurocommunists that the PCE is truly as independent of the Soviet line as it claims to be. European communists

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know very well that it is quite possible for party policy to change overnight, especially in a tightly controlled party like the PCE. Consequently, the sincerity of the PCE's anti-Sovietism remains in some question.

Finally, in taking its anti-Soviet stance, the PCE has elected to take on a formidable foe. The CPSU has tremendous political resources at its disposal to use in pressing other communist parties to oppose the PCE and the Eurocommunists. Failing that, just levering some parties into a non-supportive stance would be sufficient to dim the luster of Eurocommunism, create doubts as to the sagacity of vocal anti-Sovietism and severely undermine the prestige of the PCE. This is one reason why Carrillo eagerly courts the favor of the PCI, PCF and even Eastern European communist parties such as those of Romania and Yugoslavia. Moreover, Soviet resources can be used to support anti-Carrillo elements in the PCE to lever an amelioration of PCE policy or even to try to oust Carrillo.

The possible success of the PCE poses additional complications for the CPSU as it continues to try to reassert its authority in international communist relations. After forty years, the PCE has cropped up again to pose the threat of a markedly different model of communism which challenges the Soviet model on a number of decisive points. And the new model is developing in a country where the most powerful support of the Soviet model, the Soviet Army, has no sway.
It can be expected that the CPSU will use every other means at its disposal to rid itself of the PCE threat. Consequently, the PCE is playing a very serious and dangerous game in opposing the concept of proletarian internationalism, defined as the Soviet domination of the international communist movement.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the factors of the three levels of analysis are not independent. Instead, they are quite interdependent. This interdependence has been alluded to in the discussion of the individual levels presented above, however, a more specific example will illustrate the concept further.

The PCE, being a small party, obviously desires to increase its membership. Since its moderate domestic policies are liable to appropriation by political elements to its right and may cause severe internal disaffection within the party, the PCE needs to project an internationalist image in order to enhance the importance of its total program and to maintain party unity. It thereby maintains and controls its present membership while using its international luster to attract additional adherents. It logically follows that as the party grows and becomes a more important domestic political entity in an emerging European power such as Spain, the party's international importance also increases, and the process continually renews itself.

However, the spiral to success can easily become a spiral to failure. A poor showing in future Spanish elections
could weaken Carrillo's control, exacerbate internal PCE tensions and render it a less potent domestic political force, thereby reducing its importance as a proponent of Eurocommunism. If, in addition, the PCE should subsequently react to domestic political pressure by shifting party policy to the left, its prestige as a supporter of Eurocommunist ideals would suffer further. As PCE retrenchment reflects unfavorably on the PCI and PCF, they may tend to reduce their support. Lack of international communist support, then, might enable Soviet pressures, acting upon internal party disputes, to become more effective and further hinder the PCE's ability to act effectively in domestic politics. The whole process could lead to an entire change of leadership and political orientation of the PCE.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The great advantage of using the levels of analysis model as a reference for viewing political entities such as the PCE is that it provides a framework for developing an understanding of the interactions between and within each level of political relationships. Consequently, the model can be extremely useful in helping not only to identify phenomena and trends, but also to attach subjective probabilities as to the significance of those phenomena or trends and to determine where they may lead.

Using the model, several phenomena have been identified at the internal party level which will have some bearing on future events. The first conclusion is that the Pact for Liberty, i.e. the "bourgeoisification" of the PCE, will be continued to be pursued. The PCE can be expected to consolidate its worker-based strength in the northern industrial areas and continue to attempt to recruit students, intellectuals and other middle-class elements. Meanwhile, intensified efforts will be expended to expand the limited PCE influence among the working-class elements of the southern areas. As industries continue to grow around the cities of the South identified as "industrial poles" in the development program begun by Franco, the opportunities for expanded PCE presence in the South are improved.
A second conclusion is that PCE membership will continue to expand and increase. A number of PCE policy positions are progressive enough to entice certain middle-class and agricultural elements to the party and are realistic enough to be achieved, thus enhancing the PCE's image as an effective political entity and which will ultimately result in further increasing PCE membership. The increased PCE recruitment effort cited above certainly adds to the probability of this outcome.

The trends noted in the discussion above interact with a number of developing trends at the national political level to indicate the great possibility of increased PCE vote totals in coming elections. First, it appears that the PCE's moderate stance has vitiated its Civil War legacy to some degree. Its moderate stance is also enabling the PCE increasingly to become a viable alternative to the PSOE among Spanish voters and certainly to the radical left. Secondly, it is highly probable that Carrillo was at least partially correct in his assessment of the June 1977 election results when he stated that he thought many voters, fearing some sort of reprisals or being confused by all the choices, opted to vote for the PSOE as the only "safe" leftist vote.1 Consequently, as it becomes more firmly evident that

Franco-era repression has truly disappeared, it is probable that the next Spanish elections will show the PCE receiving a larger percentage of the left vote.

Thirdly, the PSOE, despite its reunification with the PSP, has not as yet fully developed into a cohesive political opposition to the Government. González' apparently tentative attempts to move the party more to the center and a Social-Democratic orientation may re-introduce a splinter of the more Marxist elements led by the PSP. This outcome, when viewed in the light of the PCE's move away from Leninism, makes the possibility of a PCE-PSP political union far from remote. Consequently, prospects for the PSOE's losing in voting percentages from its June totals are, for a number of reasons, quite probable, as are the prospects for the PCE's gaining votes in the center-left.

Finally the UCD appears to be coalescing very nicely under the dynamic personality of Suárez and becoming well aware of the political advantages of unity and incumbancy. The UCD's political effectiveness and enhanced organizational ability will probably result in its gaining additional support from both its right and from regional parties of the center-left. Therefore, the UCD should maintain or even expand its plurality and governmental control.

The ultimate prospect is that a political spectrum may develop in Spain similar to that existing in France, where the Communists and the Socialists comprise a governmental
opposition (albeit at the moment not unified) very nearly equal to the center-right majority. It would also be very similar in the respect that the Socialists would be only a slightly larger party than the Communists. Time will tell if developing international trends could provide an impetus to further change this prospective Spanish correlation of political forces into a political spectrum similar to the Italian case, where the Communists are the dominant party of the opposition.

Such a prospect is enhanced by the fact that each Latin Eurocommunist party is being increasingly viewed as a viable governmental participant. A recent article in Foreign Affairs illustrates this point. In it, Ugo La Malfa, President of the small Italian Republican Party and long-time anti-communist, lends his support to a coalition government to include the PCI.2 Such changes of political heart add greatly to the probability that the PCI will enter the Italian government in the near future. In addition, even though the Union of the Left in France is dormant at the moment, the French Left remains a potent political force. Therefore, the revival of the Common Program remains possible, as does the possibility of PCF participation in a leftist government in France. If, and some would say when, such events occur, the PCE will

2Ugo La Malfa, "Communism and Democracy in Italy", Foreign Affairs, April 1977, pp. 476-488.
be the most likely beneficiary of Eurocommunism's heightened importance. A "government of national concentration" resulting from a political union of the Spanish left would, as a consequence, be given a significant boost. At the moment the prospects for a "Unión de la Izquierda" in the French manner are small, due largely to PSOE resistance to the idea. Consequently, the political spectrum in Spain will stabilize in a three-way struggle between the PCE and PSOE on the left and the UCD on the right.

To the above considerations should be added the continuing maturation of Eurocommunist ideology as a new model for reform-minded regimes in Eastern Europe. Little has been mentioned in this work concerning the Eurocommunist challenge to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The reader is referred to the numerous recently published works addressing the problem, some of which are noted in the bibliography of this work. Jiri Valenta makes the following point concerning this trend:

Indeed, since the East Berlin Conference, the relationship between the Eurocommunists in Western Europe and the reformist and dissident circles in Eastern Europe seems more and more to have become one of mutual reinforcement.

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3 See Coe, Devlin, Gati, Goldsborough, Helms, McInnes, and Valenta for the most extensive discussions of the topic.

A major effect of this phenomenon is to enhance the PCE image of no longer being under Soviet control or even influence. Such an image can only improve the PCE's domestic political standing vis-a-vis the other elements of the Spanish left.

Another consideration is the not readily apparent, but logically imputed, growing Soviet irritation with the likes of Santiago Carrillo and his revisionist ideas. Although Carrillo claims that the PCE does not desire to break with the CPSU,\(^5\) the CPSU has already made preliminary attempts to "excommunicate" Carrillo. As he continues to "de-Leninize" the PCE, and as he continues to espouse autonomist ideas and cajole the other West European parties toward a similar bent, the probability that the PCE will break with the CPSU is becoming greater.

The overall conclusion resulting from the above analysis is that the PCE is not merely a fleeting antithesis in the dialectic of international communism. Rather, it is a firmly established force of growing importance in Spanish politics as well as international communist relations, which will remain so into the future. Therefore, U.S. observers of Spanish politics and international communist relations should take cognizance of this reality and give it due consideration when deliberating American foreign policy measures.

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