A THEORY OF WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

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**Abstract:**
In our overall understanding of the general nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, there is a lack of appreciation of the phenomenon whereby military governments return political control to civilian leaders. This thesis proposes three tentative explanations of military turnovers: a withdrawal contagion effect, a process of military and civilian frustration with military rule, and slow economic growth. These explanations are tested via case studies of withdrawal...
drawals in Argentina, Guatemala and Peru, from 1930 to present. This thesis concludes that the most useful explanation is that dealing with civil-military pressure on the incumbent military regime to turn over power.
A THEORY OF WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

BY

EDWARD LEWIS CONSTANTINE, JR.

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To Betsy, for whom her first year as a wife and for whom her first year in the United States have been a traumatic experience.
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To Dr. Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, the author offers his gratitude not only for his wise counsel, which was considerable and without which this thesis would not have been completed, but for the many hours that he has suffered the author's questions and attempts at understanding the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America.

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The author would not know from whom to have sought better guidance.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. STATE OF THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ARGENTINA</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. GUATEMALA</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. PERU</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>ARGENTINA: WITHDRAWALS AND BALANCE OF TRADE, 1928-1971</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>ARGENTINA: WITHDRAWALS AND PCGNP, 1950-1973</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>GUATEMALA: WITHDRAWALS AND BALANCE OF TRADE, 1928-1971</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>GUATEMALA: WITHDRAWALS AND PCGNP, 1950-1973</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>PERU: WITHDRAWALS AND BALANCE OF TRADE, 1928-1971</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>PERU: WITHDRAWALS AND PCGNP, 1950-1973</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>PATTERN OF WITHDRAWAL IN SOUTH AMERICA, MIDDLE AMERICA, AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1930-1978</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>ARGENTINE PRESIDENTS, 1930-1978</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>THE CONTAGION PROCESS: ARGENTINA</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>GUATEMALAN PRESIDENTS, 1930-1978</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>THE CONTAGION PROCESS: GUATEMALA</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>PERUVIAN PRESIDENTS, 1930-1978</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE CONTAGION PROCESS: PERU</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>RATINGS (1-3) OF THE THREE WITHDRAWAL EXPLANATIONS BY TURNOVER BY COUNTRY</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

A THEORY OF WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

By

Edward Lewis Constantine, Jr.

August, 1978

Chairman: Terry McCoy
Major Department: Latin American Area Studies (Political Science)

In our overall understanding of the general nature of civil-military relationships in Latin America, a lack of understanding exists regarding the phenomenon whereby military governments return political control to civilian leaders, while considerable research exists dealing with the causes and consequences of military intervention.

This thesis proposes three tentative explanations of military turnovers: a withdrawal contagion effect, a process of military and civilian frustration with military rule, and slow economic growth. These theories are tested in case studies of withdrawals in Argentina, Guatemala, and Peru, from 1930 to the present.

Chairman
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 1973, while stationed in the Panama Canal Zone, I asked a captain in the Chilean Army who was assigned to the Security Assistance Force for Latin America for his impressions of the coup d'état which had just occurred in Santiago. At first, he thought that I had made a tasteless joke. Then he wasn't sure. Then he ran to contact the Chilean Embassy in Panama City, Panama. Why did the coup take place? General Pinochet said that the commanders-in-chief took over control of the country because they could not remain "indifferent to the chaos into which the government was dragging the country."¹

The main intent of this thesis is not to discover why the Pinochetazo took place nor, for that matter, any other coup; rather, it deals with a different but related phenomenon. It is a tentative explanation of why the armed forces return power to civilian governments; for as surely as military governments enter actively into the political arena, so do they withdraw from it. Even today, we can see evidence that the Pinochet government is considering a return to constitutional rule after nearly five years.²
From Figure VII (page 95), it can be seen that there have been 48 occasions in which civilian regimes were constituted following military governments. There has been a great variety in the withdrawal phenomenon. But it is undeniable that every military regime that came to power via the coup d'état eventually returned power to civilian leaders, and current military regimes in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Peru, etc., are apparently preparing to do the same.

This research effort is based on a fundamental assumption: that in Latin America the armed forces have been and will continue to be a potent actor in the internal political scene, often the most important player. The military's role has been shaped by history and by a relative lack of international conflict such that it has become principally and fundamentally a political institution. The military cannot be ignored by any civilian element. This is especially true, given its expanded role in which national security and national development have such a large role in the military's self-concept of its place in the national scheme of things.

This is a thesis about military withdrawal. It is an initial effort to explore some tentative explanations by drawing attention to some very general features which constitute a prevailing theme of Latin America's struggle to develop an effective political system. It is an attempt
to reach some level of understanding of the inevitable process by which a military government decides, for whatever reasons, to relinquish direct control of government.

Before I began this research project, I felt that there was not likely to be only one reason why or how military forces withdraw from active administratorship of the political process, although one reason might be more important than others, depending on the particular country involved and the particular timing of the event. I was aware that the causes and effects of military intervention were varied both in time and space, and suspected that the reasons for military withdrawal had equally as much variety. I recognized the interaction between the institutional, corporate concerns of the military leadership and the amalgam of societal, political, and economic features of those societies in which the regional armed forces existed. Nonetheless, it was my conviction that the first answer to the questions on military withdrawal lay mainly within the military itself.

The answer, I felt, was somehow institutional in its basic parameters. There might be some sort of democratic "enlightenment" (however difficult that might be to discover), or perhaps a sense of frustration about the lack of success in meeting the stated goals of the original intromission into the political arena. There might have been a military version of the "Peter Principle" whereby
the incumbent military regime realized that it had been no more effective in correcting those features of the national reality than had been the civilian government which it had overthrown. It was likely, too, that U.S. pressure might have affected the change of perspective. This influence, however, would be difficult to pinpoint given the various and often conflicting bureaucratic interests of the State Department, the Pentagon, and the incumbent executive.4

Regardless of the degree to which civilian groups may have encouraged the military to overthrow a civilian regime, regardless of weaknesses of the incumbent civilian administration, regardless of economic deterioration or civil strife, it was the military or significant elements of it which decided to intervene. It may even be said that, often, the decision to take charge was out of necessity, a duty as perceived by the armed forces to defend some national interest or the military institution itself. Regardless of the precipitator, the responsibility to accept the challenge remained with the military. And the decision to withdraw was made ultimately by the military.

The thesis first reviews the literature that deals directly with the issue of military withdrawal from direct political participation. In general, the issue of turnover of political control has not been addressed directly by many observers, the vast majority being more interested in the process of intromission into the political process,
a major feature of Latin American civil-military relations, although certainly not the only one. Therefore, theorizing that the conditions which lead to coups d'état may change, thereby providing the impetus for withdrawal, I review a number of works dealing with the issue of "intervention" and project them into possible withdrawal syndromes. Once able to identify what appear to be the most viable explanations, I proceed to examine them via a case study approach to determine their validity.

Notes


2 For instance, as reported in a variety of newspaper clippings collected by ISLA, Information Services for Latin America (Berkeley: ISLA, various, 1977-1978); see also Latin American Newsletters, LTD., Latin American Political Report (London: Latin American Newsletters, LTD., various, 1977-1978). The Argentine military, currently split over the issue of LTG Videla’s continuance as president, has indicated that it will retire in 1984. In Peru, election activity has already begun.


"Dominance and Fragmentation in U.S. Latin American Policy," pp. 176-204. The two articles describe the various inputs into a policy decision and the rather fragmented manner in which that policy is implemented. Not withstanding what must be the impact of such a policy in a Latin American government with different U.S. agents pushing different positions, it would be a nightmare to track down which, if any, U.S. argument was decisive in encouraging a withdrawal or, for that matter, an intervention.
CHAPTER II
STATE OF THE LITERATURE

As suggested earlier, the withdrawal of military governments has received less attention by students of Latin American politics than has the issue of military intervention into the political process. Few scholars have addressed the phenomenon of the return to the barracks, and when they have done so, the intent has been more of a descriptive nature than an attempt to generalize beyond the act itself. The notable exceptions are Ruben J. de Hoyos, S. E. Finer, and Edward Feit. De Hoyos offers four reasons to account for how and why the Latin American military returns the control of government to civilians. First, there is an institutional promise to return to civilian government. This is a feature that was more common a decade or so ago in which a military government would announce a return to the constitutional process after an interim phase for "purification" of the administration; today the military governors characteristically do not announce a fixed date for withdrawal, but rather speak of a series of stages of "structural rehabilitation" that the nation must proceed through before elections will be
permitted. Second, the military suffers from "political fatigue," a frustration syndrome resulting from critical assessment of its performance in the administration of the country. Typically, this political "shell shock" is demonstrated by a breakdown of military discipline and internal cohesion between the more-or-less hardliners. Third, there develops "political fatigue" among the civilians who begin to lose respect for the soldiers as fighting men and as administrators. This civilian fatigue is demonstrated by an increase in rumors about military performance and in political action in the form of civil strife. Fourth, there is a process of "political personalization" in which a key figure in the military regime recognizes the symptomatic fatigue and begins to effect the transferal back to civilian control. De Hoyos concludes that just as there might be a vacuum that pulls the military into active political participation, it is just as likely that there is a vacuum that pulls the armed forces out of politics.3

According to Finer, when the men on horseback return to the barracks, the process is one of abdication in which there is a disintegration of the military ruling group, more specifically a growing divergence of interests between the government leadership and the troop commanders. The military begins to suffer from the same vices that gave origin to the intervention (e.g. conspiracy) and the
senior officer is accused of fostering a "cult of personality." As the military is weakened, civil-military tensions increase and the regime is unable to cope with serious popular opposition. A variant of the abdication pattern, says Finet, is recivilianization, a process whereby the military regime becomes a quasi-civilian military government and then evolves into a civilian administration. Lissak also ascribes to the abdication-recivilianization process but adds that there are many in-betweens, noting that, in Latin America, military withdrawals are typically provisional abdications.

Feit describes the withdrawal process in three stages: the military rules directly; then civilian cadre are brought into the regime; and finally, the regime seeks legitimacy by seeking mass support. In seeking mass support, the coup coalition loses internal cohesion, and this leads to the downfall of the military government and its replacement by a civilian government which must face the same conditions that confronted the civilian regime which was overthrown earlier.

What is common to the above authors is that just as the decision to seize political power was a conscious act on the part of the armed forces or significant segments thereof, so too is the decision to return power. This decision is predicated on the deterioration of corporate
identity and internal cohesion of the military institution. And, whether the observer ascribes to the traditionalist or revisionist school, the decision to return to the barracks is voluntarist, and is, apparently, based more on corporate interests than on any enviable devotion to democratic principles. This, in itself, is not discouraging, for perhaps if the Latin American military is convinced that, in the long run, it is to its institutional advantage to concentrate on purely military matters, more military regimes will take the path back to the cuartel. This is not to suggest that the military is likely to adopt a purely apolitical stance, however; the military will continue to be an integral part of the political system. The notion that military involvement in politics is abnormal is a function of the ethnocentrism of some observers or rather of a standard of civil-military relations that is based on the experience of other regions in the world. In Latin America, the military has long been an active participant in the political process, a heritage, as it were, from the very days of independence. It can even be asserted that in the area, military involvement in the political life of the nation is, in itself, a part of the democratic process and an accepted means whereby one or another social group can ascend to dominance in the political arena. In this regard, a return to the
barracks does not necessarily signify that the troops would remain there. Most likely the turnover will be to an acceptable party or individual which is viewed as unlikely to threaten the integrity of the military as an institution.

There is the possibility that foreign influence, especially U.S. influence, might be significant in understanding why the military return control to civilian leaders; certainly, the present Carter administration's emphasis on human rights may play some part in the current trend toward recivilianization. None the less, despite the broad democratic intent of the Alliance for Progress, such was not the case in the 1960s. Assuming that U.S. pressure for democratic government existed during the period 1958-1962, it was not effective in reducing the overall proclivity of the Latin American armed forces to assume direct control of the political process. This is not surprising in view of the death of President Kennedy and the different perspectives of his successor Lyndon B. Johnson and the two respective administrations. With U.S. influence in the region decreasing since the early seventies, the Latin American governments have become less concerned about international constraints on their actions. The region has been quite eclectic in applying and adopting foreign models for its own use. What U.S. influence has been
applied has often had results other than expected by well-intentioned Washington policy makers. The evidence is that prior U.S. prescriptions for an intensification of the democratic process have met with mixed successes; however, on the whole, the assessment may be made that it has not been a significant variable in the withdrawal of military governments. Too, whatever U.S. pressure might have been operative, it has not been constant either in quantity or quality from 1930 to the present. One need only review the ideological constructs of the various "Good Neighbor," "benign neglect," "low profile," and Alliance for Progress policies that have characterized U.S. dealings with Latin America to arrive at this conclusion.

Thus far, the most promising literature related to the withdrawal phenomenon can be summarized as reflecting deterioration within the military institution. Whatever might have been the motivating factors that induced the military to assume direct control of the government in the first place, politics seems to be particularly corrosive to the required discipline that characterizes a hierarchically organized institution that is the military. A readily observable source of such irritation may be found in those incidents whereby senior military officers seek to acquire their entourage of supporters within the armed forces at those times in which they are candidates for the presidential
office, be it via an election open to the citizenry or via a direct selection process within the military institution itself.

Beyond the specific research relative to the phenomenon of military withdrawal, there is another approach. By abstracting from the many theories dealing with military involvement in the political arena certain common features, one might arrive at some basic explanations for the reverse process. The existing explanations of the coup process can be divided into three basic conceptual frameworks: first, that dealing with the military as an institution with its own perception of its corporate needs and with its own view of what is its proper mission within the nation, and second, that dealing with the overall political, cultural, and economic nature of the society. The third explanatory variable, one that fits neither the institutional nor the systemic approaches, is that which refers to a possible contagion or demonstration effect.

The notion of the existence of a possible diffusion process is mildly convincing. If one attempts to measure military seizures of power over a long period of time, it appears that there is no pattern to suggest the existence of such a dynamic. But, if one looks at the coups by periods, the evidence appears valid. There might possibly be a withdrawal contagion as well. This feature is
worth pursuing, in so far as a turnover in one country might be attributed to a similar action in a presumably "influential" sister republic.

The military component can be divided arbitrarily into a number of arguments: corporate concerns, a tradition of intervention, and the military world view.

Corporate matters include such preoccupations as budgets (for personnel, weaponry, etc.) and institutional cohesion (a major feature of professionalism\textsuperscript{19}).

There is an apparent relationship between military coups and budgetary reductions\textsuperscript{20}; however, there is no such pattern with regard to the economic ascendancy of the military. The armed forces are not likely to intervene when they receive what they perceive as an adequate budget for their needs.\textsuperscript{21} In either case, causality is not suggested by the literature; therefore, postulating military withdrawal on the basis of budgetary considerations does not appear to be promising.\textsuperscript{22} This is unlikely under a military government in any case.

Institutional cohesion, on the other hand, is a much more fertile area in which to understand coups d'etat. This category includes those arguments which focus on military seizure in light of perceived threats to the integrity of the military by "hostile" political leaders, groups, and movements.\textsuperscript{23} Also, many authors point to the
political fractionalization that occurs within the military as a major proximate contributor to coup activity.24

A possible answer to the withdrawal phenomenon may lie in a process whereby the military seeks to reestablish its internal discipline according to a set of bureaucratic standards of behavior and in which civilian groups refrain from seeking military colleagues in their political game-manship and in which societal elements are somehow shown to demonstrate a reduced threat to the military institution. In other words, both a tendency toward military isolation and civilian abstention from proselytizing the military may be important features of the withdrawal process. The reverse is likely; that is, increased civilian bargaining with major elements within the military government may lead to deterioration of the regime's resolve to continue in power.

There appears to be a coup "habit," or a "tradition," of interference in civilian politics, which condition is variously attributed to "political immaturity" (on the other hand, this lack of political maturity has been attributed to military intervention).15 Perhaps there is some reason to suspect that there might be a tradition of an apolitical military that could impact on the decision to return to the barracks or at least to step further away from the executive office building. Clearly, military
involvement in politics is more institutionalized in some countries than others. But one must ask about traditions: How long does it take for a tradition to develop? Ten years, twenty years, two hundred years? This approach does not appear to be too promising in explaining withdrawals.

The final corporate perspective involves what can be called the "world view" of the military or its concept of its mission (both of which are intimately connected with the "tradition" and "cohesion" viewpoints described earlier). It involves the concept of national interest and the military's perception of its role in serving that general interest. This viewpoint is, essentially, that as the guardians of the nation, the military will inevitably take an active role in the country's political life and will undertake any action necessary to protect itself in its guardian role. The obvious, although somewhat idealistic, application of this approach to the withdrawal issue is that a decision to return to the barracks might have been made, if only in part, by a realization that the armed forces could better serve their nation's interests by doing so. This is a possible explanation, but it seems unlikely, in view of the earlier discussion on the political tradition of the armed forces, that such reasoning would have been particularly influential.
The second principal explanatory category is systemic; that is, the military will not be likely to return to their garrisons until Latin American countries develop sufficiently complex power structures, when marginal masses become incorporated into the national life, and when economic and social conflicts will find a common framework for the institutionalized resolution of these conflicts.\textsuperscript{26} In other words, when the societal conditions that previously provoked the military intervention in the first place are removed, the military will withdraw or will refrain from assuming direct control in the future. Particularly problematic, however, in this genre of explanations, is the nagging doubt that it creates concerning the complexity of power structures. Besides being a definitional problem, one wonders why a weak power framework necessarily creates a "vacuum" into which the military is consistently pulled. The systemic explanation tends to be a bit simplistic or, rather, impressionistic in that it generally prescribes a single solution for an extremely complex situation and conveniently ignores many other possible sources of conflict and contention (e.g. the issue of land ownership). Nevertheless, the systemic perspective, as popularly held, does present many of the endemic or predisposing factors of military activism (meaning that the proximate causes lie within the scope of the institutional characteristics discussed earlier).
The systemic perspective can be divided conveniently into a number of key arguments: political "immaturity," social confrontation, economic pressures, and a class variable.

The political explanation is by far the best documented, with writers variously referring to the praetorian nature of politics and its characteristic conflicts and to the accompanying legitimacy crisis of the government. The praetorian political situation is characterized by weak institutionalization among those permitted to participate in the political process. The issue of governmental legitimacy follows directly from the political praetorianism, and military intervention is attributed to the ensuing vacuum as the armed forces are pushed or pulled into assuming control of the nation's polity. Looking for a possible connection to military withdrawal in this perspective is somewhat utopic, but is mildly promising, and Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico give some reason for hope. As a situational explanation, social conflict and related societal features have been identified as contributing strongly to the proclivity of the armed forces to usurp control from civilian politicians. These features, like the political ones mentioned above, are operative in explaining military intervention. Similarly, there may be some reason to suspect that a reduction
in social tension might be of utility in understanding the process of military withdrawal. Nevertheless, the chronic and varying (over time and among countries) nature of these features (both political as well as social) suggests that they are not likely to be so modified to the extent that the military would remain permanently in its barracks, preoccupied primarily with castrensic matters.

It has been fairly well established that there is a close connection between military activism and deteriorating economic conditions. For instance, Needler finds that there is a close relationship between the two based on his study of Ecuador; Merx notes a "stop-go" cyclical pattern of economic depression and coups in Argentina's record which is similar to Dean's observations for the entire region from 1823 to 1966. In the face of serious inflationary pressures, trade disruptions, and the accompanying political and social tensions that arise from such economic fluctuations, the military is likely to step in to take charge. But it has also been shown that military regimes are not necessarily more capable of correcting these conditions than are civilian governments. The interrelationships of political, societal, and economic factors might be visualized thusly:
Economic decline ————> Social unrest and political mobilization (strikes, terrorism, etc.)

↑

Military intervention ———— Governmental immobilization

↓

At some point, the military enters the cycle to correct the situation, but since it may be unable to solve the matter, is subject to the same pressures as a civilian government, and is unable to make a fundamental contribution toward correcting the spiral, it returns the administration to civilians and retires to reconstitute its institutional health.

The final systemic viewpoint describes the military as serving or representing specific class interests; that is, the armed forces engage in active political participation in defense of the oligarchy, middle class, or the bureaucracy and are in fact encouraged to do so. According to others, the military may also enter the active political arena in support of social reformist goals. The class variable as an explanation for military intervention is contradictory. If Victor Alba sees the military as a tool of the oligarchy, how do we incorporate José Nun's description of it as a "representative" of the middle class or Kossok's contention that a "new" (whatever that means) military is arising to defend the interests of the lower
classes? The answer is that different sectors of the armed forces are aligned with different sectors of the society, each seeking its counterparts in the military or civilian society. If this is the case, and if it is, as assumed earlier, accepted, then withdrawal pressures might be related to various class interests as one or another class seeks dominance. However, given the multiplicity of the various class arguments, this possible explanation does not appear to be feasible.

Summarizing the coup precondition arguments, we have seen that the three features, contagion, corporate, and systemic, are all functioning in the phenomenon of military activism in politics. The military is well integrated into the social and political life of the region; military action is conducted in the face of varying civilian opposition and approval. Coups d'etat are not the only processes of civil-military relations in operation. Nor, it would appear, is there any single cause for military activism beyond a functioning push-pull mechanism. Consequently, there appears to be no single dynamic for military withdrawal either.

The most likely explanations that have been identified or abstracted in this chapter are the following:

1. A contagion, demonstration, or diffusion process whereby one regime opts, for whatever reason, to retire from
direct control, and other regimes take similar actions. For my purposes, I shall operationalize this process by two major features: an external or world situation variable and an internal, regional variable in which the size and proximity of a given nation might be assumed to have a positive influence on another country, and a timing or clustering variable of similar events.

2. A process or military and civilian frustration with military occupancy of the presidency. This may be seen by intra-military conflict and by civilian pressures upon the military to withdraw. I propose to examine this explanation via accounts of various turnovers.

3. Depending on the perceived improvement or deterioration of the economic situation, the military may withdraw justification by success or humbled by failure, although the latter is more likely. I will test this explanation using national income figures, where available, and balance of trade figures on the assumption that trade was and is the main key to the region's economy.\(^{34}\)

To test my abstracted hypotheses on military withdrawal, I propose to apply the three explanatory variables to Argentina, Peru, and Guatemala from the period 1930 to the present, using historical accounts of such turnovers that have occurred and, where available, economic data to validate the relationships to faulty economic performance.
I selected Argentina and Peru as representative of the South American countries because of their relative sizes and stages of development as well as their histories of withdrawals. I chose Guatemala for the same reasons and to determine if there were any similarities between South and Middle America in so far as withdrawals were concerned.

Notes

1 For instance, see Tad Szulc, Twilight of the Tyrants (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959).


3 De Hoyos, ibid., p. 41.


5 Ibid., pp. 197-199.


The two views are described in Lyle N. McAlister, "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America," in The Annals, Vol. 360 (1965), pp. 86-95. The "traditionalist" school refers to those who view the military as an obstacle to development; the "revisionists" see militarism as an expression of, rather than a cause of, political instability.

See Janowitz, Military Institutions, op. cit., p. 72. The Author describes the process as a function of the skill of lay leaders, their ideolotical, professional, and career experiences, etc.

Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernización y Golpes Militares: Teoría Comparación y el Caso Argentino," Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 12, Núm. 47 (1972), pp. 580-559. A different interpretation, which does not contradict the corporate interest perspective and which is consistent with de Hoyos' explanation is that the turnover is more a reflection of a lack of political skill on the part of the military, can be found in Dario Cantón, La Política de los Militares Argentinos, 1900-1971 (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1971), p. 30. Various authors have noted that there is no substantive difference between military and civilian regimes; for example, see R. D. McKinley and A. S. Cohan, "Performance and Stability in Military and Non-Military Regimes, American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 3 (1976), pp. 865-884; "Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes," Comparative Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1975), pp. 1-30; and R. Neal Tannahill, "The Performance of Military Governments in South America," Journal of Politics and Military Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1976), pp. 233-244.

This observation is a modification of the professionalization formulas offered in the early sixties by a number of students of Latin American military affairs. See especially J. J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962). This sort of work suggested that if the military became more professional, it would stop dabbling in politics; it was not oriented to the view that it made good sense for the military to do so. As a result of this perspective came the rash of articles that proposed that the military was somehow a pawn of general societal characteristics and that coups were a function of political immaturity, economic fluctuations, and the like.

The military as a de facto component of the political system has been so described in Lyle N. McAlister ed., The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution (4 Case Studies) (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research


14 The military, however, will probably retain some crucial powers or prerogatives, and via rigged or restricted elections (if used) or direct appointment of a civilian successor, will attempt to ensure that the major popular threat (be it a party or individual) to the armed forces is blocked from participation. See Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1966), p. 829.


18 Manus Midlarsky, "Mathematical Models of Instability and a Theory of Diffusion," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1970), pp. 60-64, and R. P. Y. Li and W. R. Thompson, "Coup Contagion Hypothesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1975), pp. 78, 86. Li and Thompson point out that the initiator of the contagion does not necessarily establish the goals or techniques of successive coups; it is enough to reinforce the aspiring coup maker's desire to achieve his own ends (p. 81). Perlmutter is more convinced, saying that military praetorionism has a momentum of its own and is contagious: Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 172, 180. De Hoyos, op. cit., notes that there appears to be a law of political empathy by which states seem prone to imitate political behavior that looks successful in other countries (p. 40).
19 There is no apparent acceptance of civilian control of the military in the armed forces' concept of professionalism; see Hyman, op. cit. (note 12), pp. 415-416.


22 In fact, McKinlay and Cohen, op. cit., and Tannahill op. cit., indicate that there is no significant general distinction between military or civilian regimes regarding defense expenditures.

23 Feit, op. cit., p. 7; Fidel, op. cit., p. 7. He suggests that military intervention is more of a necessity than a matter of choice (p. 10); Perlmutter, op. cit., p. 12; Mauricio Solaún and Michael A. Quinn, Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 174; McAlister, op. cit. (note 12), pp. 273-274; Martin C. Needler, "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power," Latin American Research Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1975), pp. 66-68. Thompson notes that while "corporate" grievances are less numerous, they are more important than "not-so-corporate" complaints (e.g. individual aspirations, military clique conflicts, personnel adjustments, etc.): Thompson, op. cit., pp. 26-37, 50; Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 133.

24 For instance, J. J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Johnson wrote that officers who rush into the executive building to protect their corporate interests may be no more responsible for prolonging military interference in government than those who allow themselves to be used by civilian politicians, adding that the military coup is part of the democratic process in the area (pp. 114-123). See also Perlmutter, op. cit., p. 101, for more on the politicization process; Perlmutter concludes that the disposition to intervene is permanent, so much so that coup-making skills have supplanted the traditional skills of the professional soldier (p. 12). He states flatly that the "cardinal fact" about praetorian-oriented politics is

25 Needler, op. cit. (note 20), p. 146. He says that a "national habit" of coups cannot be supported; there may be a national "propensity" for such activity, but it is not consistent over the whole period of independence. See also Feit, op. cit., p. 10; Putnam, op. cit., p. 106. Fidel, op. cit., observes that frequently military participation is seen as a sequel to an officer's career, that politics may be the prime concern of the officer corps (p. 16). Fitch suggests that all coups increase the propensity for others and adds that the number of years since the last coup determines the sensitivity to subsequent activist motivations. John S. Fitch III: "Toward a Model of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," in Gary D. Brewer and Ronald Brunner, eds., Political Development and Change in Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 180-184.

26 This is the view of Edward Lieuwen in Generals vs Presidents, op. cit., p. 98. It has had a significant impact on students of Latin American civil-military affairs. The problem with this interpretation is that it is exceedingly broad; there is no clear-cut idea as to what might be the national interest beyond some boundless concept of modernization. The notion that the military views the interests of the state through "olive-drab" glasses constitutes the key to the withdrawal phenomenon. For a constitutional view of military political activity see R. A. Humphrey's "Latin America: The Caudillo Tradition," in Michael Howard, ed., Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1959), pp. 151-165.

the overall systemic perspective. It fails, however, to address the matter of how the military fits in: Is the military the major contributor to the structural characteristics of the area or simply part of them? This leaves us with the question asked by Jo L. Husbands: Is the military the "bodyguard" of the status quo or its "avantgarde?"; Jo. L. Husbands, The Military and Modernization: Political Orientations of Latin American Military Elites (Atlanta: Southern Political Science Association, 1976), p. 24.

28 The concept of praetorianism and its concomitant low level of political institutionalization was popularized by Samuel P. Huntington: "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1965), pp. 386-430; Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), and, with Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). The banner has been taken up by others, including Edward Feit, "The Pen, the Sword and the People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political Institutions," World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1973), pp. 251-273; Feit notes that it is the failure to institutionalize that causes even military governments to fail. Perlmutter, op. cit., devotes considerable attention to the praetorian model and concludes unequivocally that it is a direct consequence of military rule (p. 289). Others see a more basic problem; that is, military intervention is a consequence of a low level of political participation and mobilization, regardless of the institutional weaknesses of the system; e.g. Rosalyn L. Feldberg, "Political Systems and the Role of the Military," Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1970), pp. 206-218. Charles W. Anderson views the praetarian problem as one in which vested interests are unwilling to allow new elements into the political game that might threaten the existing equilibrium; Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967). The competitive feature is noted as well by McAlister, op. cit. (note 12), p. 268.

29 An apparent lack of legitimacy is signaled as another major contributor to military activism; see Mauricio Solaín, op. cit., p. 172. Regime inefficiency and corruption contribute to the process as well: Solaín, ibid., p. 172; Janowitz, Military Institutions, op. cit., p. 49. Feit, op. cit., p. 2, says that such corruption and inefficiency allow the military to enter at low risk. Elections, especially by groups of individuals seen to be threatening or otherwise unacceptable to the military, are closely associated with coups; this is especially true
when there is a long-standing antagonism between the armed forces and a popular individual or party that becomes mutually self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing: Needler, op. cit. (note 4), and Fitch, op. cit., p. 182. The "vacuum," theory must, then, be rejected; it, like "intervention," assumes that the military is outside the political system. In reality, the vulnerability of the regime only makes it easier and more likely for the military to step in an active capacity. See William R. Thompson, "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup," Comparative Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1975), p. 487.

30 In fact, according to Thompson's study of coup-maker grievances, societal "residuals" (maintenance of order, reformist ideology, etc.) play a very minor role in coups d'etat: Thompson, op. cit. (note 22), pp. 38-46. Gutteridge, op. cit., was less sure, noting that coups were less petty palace conspiracies than responses to deep social problems. Noting the relationship between social and economic crises and their effects on military activism, Needler refers to a "high 'indian' index" as a measure of social mobilization. He says that coups are most likely where there is a large "indian" population: Needler, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 151-154. Limited social mobilization as a contributor to coups was a principal conclusion of Putnam, too: Putnam, op. cit., p. 106.


32 McKinlay and Cohen, and Tannahill, op. cit.

is M. Kossok, "Changes in the Political and Social Functions of the Armed Forces in the Developing Countries," in Morris Janowitz and Jaques van Doorn, eds., On Military Intervention (Belgium: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), p. 419. The very fact that so many writers can ascribe so many different class motivations to the military fairly well negates serious consideration of this perspective. That is not to say, however, that various economic groups do not seek allies within the military in pursuit of their own sectoral goals. Rappoport contends that the military enters coups because of civilian eagerness for conspiracy: David C. Rappoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), p. 97. See also Fitch, op. cit., p. 182, and O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 530. O'Donnell describes the military as the most effective channel for sectoral demands on the presidency; this feature, in turn, fractionalizes the military and results in the rise of activists who pressure for the military to overthrow a civilian regime.

As employed, the term "national income" refers to PCGNP figures. I could not locate GNP data for the countries studied prior to 1950. I further recognize that GNP/PCGNP figures often hide more than they reveal, but used them as a surrogate for cost of living, balance of payments, foreign reserves, unemployment, etc., figures.
CHAPTER III
ARGENTINA

Overview¹

The September 1930 revolution of General Uriburu marked the entrance of the Argentine military into the political stage after an hiatus of nearly fifty years. Overthrowing the elderly Hipólito Yrigoyen, in the midst of the trauma that accompanied the collapse of the world's monetary structure in 1929, the pattern of civil-military relations for the next fifty years was set. This pattern may be characterized as one in which the military has established itself as the final arbiter of the Argentine polity; however, it is also a pattern of a notable lack of agreement within the arbiter's ranks of what ought to be its proper role. This very lack of consensus can be traced via the alternating patterns of military and nominally civilian rule (see Table I).

General Uriburu's goal of a "corporate" state and economic nationalism was denied him by the opposition of his major competitor, General Justo, who, organizing the liberal nationalist sentiments of the traditional elite and sympathetic elements of the military in the Concordancia,
TABLE I

ARGENTINE PRESIDENTS, 1930–1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939–1940</td>
<td>Ortiz</td>
<td>1963–1966</td>
<td>Illía</td>
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</table>

assumed the presidency in 1931. His administration proceeded in a rather lackluster manner until 1938, when he was succeeded by his handpicked candidate, Roberto M. Ortiz. Ortiz was not a well man and was forced to hand over control to his Vice President, Ramón S. Castillo, on July 1940, who served as chief executive until 4 June 1943. This time, however, the takeover was more than an exercise by an individual and a handful of cadets; but, like its predecessor thirteen years earlier, no one gave his life in defense of the "elected" occupants of the Casa Rosada.

A succession of three military leaders quickly followed, and, during this period, Army Colonel Juan Perón (a captain under Uriburu in 1930) began his move which ultimately propelled him to the presidency in June 1946.
For the next ten years, Perón built up an organization which would prove to be the major antagonist to the military in the political game in Argentina: the Peronista party. At first, both the military and the labor organizations served as twin pillars for Perón's Justicialista Third Position; but then one, then the other faltered. And the military took over again.

The third period of direct military rule began in 1955 and lasted but three years when the presidency was returned to another civilian, Arturo Frondizi. For the next four years, the military stayed in the wings; but Frondizi's days in the executive office building ended abruptly in March 1962 as an anti-peronist faction within the armed forces toppled him in the face of an upsurge of peronist electoral activity. Following an interim period by José Guido, formerly president of the Senate, a competing "legalist" military faction supervised a 1963 election in which Arturo Illía won the presidency. Illía had served three years when he was overthrown in June 1966 and replaced by a "retired" army general who had participated in the 1943 coup: Juan Carlos Onganía.

Onganía's tenure lasted four years, until he was turned out by his fellow junta colleagues June 1970. His successor, General Levingston lasted less than a year. He, in turn, was replaced by General Lanusse, who promptly announced plans for a return to an elected presidency.
In March 1973, Hector Cámpora assumed the role of chief executive in a ploy to permit Juan Perón to resume the mandate that had been lost to him nearly two decades earlier. His second occupancy was, however, short lived, and upon his death in July 1974, his wife, named by him as Vice President, was selected as his successor. She lasted for two years until she met a fate similar to that her husband had experienced in 1955.

In March 1976, the final arbiter was back in the Casa Rosada, and, as of the present, Argentina is in its fifth period of military rule since 1930. What is of interest, however, is that control has been returned to "civilians" four times.

1932

By the date of the November 1931 election in which the coalition of conservatives, anti-Yrigoyen radicals, and ex-socialists elevated General Agustín P. Justo into the presidency with the help of anti-Uriburu elements of the armed forces, similar changes were occurring in the hemisphere.

Chile's experiment with a military-backed regime from 1924 to 1931 ended when a lack of popular support for the regime of Ibáñez prompted the armed forces to remove their support from him, and led ultimately to the election of Alessandri, head of a coalition of the Conservative,
Liberal, and Radical parties. A civilian government had evolved in Bolivia, Vargas was establishing his regime in Brazil, Sanchez Cerro had stepped out only to return via an election, and there were civilians in control in Uruguay and Paraguay. Cause-and-effect characteristics are difficult to establish, but it would appear that neither the Argentine military nor the civilian populace was yet willing to continue supporting a status of direct military rule when the nation's immediate neighbors had rejected such a polity. Few were willing to totally scrap what commitment to democracy existed.

Contagion, then, may have some limited validity in explaining the decision of Uriburu to step out of the presidential office. But a stronger argument may be made for the second explanatory category. Uriburu himself promised elections, hoping for support for his nascent corporatist-fascist movement (à la Primo de Rivera in Spain and Mussolini in Italy). But, when the Radicals showed unanticipated strength in the 1931 Buenos Aires Province elections, he reneged, proscribing the Radicals from further electoral participation, thereby permitting his chief competitor, Agustín P. Justo, to garner conservative support for his own candidacy.

Other pressures were operative as well. Yrigoyen had followed, liberally, the practice of providing for "loyal"
officers choice assignments and promotions. This practice tended to violate the sensibilities of those members of the officer corps who had become bureaucratically socialized in accordance with the model of the German military. Forming a number of secret societies, of which "Logia San Martin" would be the most prominent, military officers joined together to counter the effects of colleagues who had been suborned by the patrimonialism of Yrigoyen. After Justo won the restricted election of November 1931, one of the first steps taken by the general-turned-president was a conscious but, it would seem, not too effective policy of "reprofessionalization" in an attempt to obviate the susceptibility of his officers and men to proselytization by civilian political groups. I say not too effective, because it was then-Captain Perón who would later undertake to initiate a program not dissimilar to that proposed by Uriburu (but Perón learned a lesson from his mentor: that he would have to build a base of popular and military support).

It is asserted frequently that military usurpation is associated with economic chaos. Few would attribute directly to fiscal failure a propensity to cause a nation's armed forces to overthrow a civilian regime, but the relationship between the two occurrences is strong. Argentina in the 1920s was principally a primary-producing nation
and by 1930 was in a weak position to resist the effects of the severe trade depression that followed the imposition of import controls instituted, principally, by Great Britain. Uriburu was committed to a program of economic nationalism and a policy of industrialization to obviate his country's economic dependence on London. By the time of Justo's election, there was a negative growth in real Gross Domestic Product, but the country's balance of trade had risen to nearly half of its 1928 level (see Figure I, p. 51). Some advances in industrial development did occur under Uriburu, but these are attributed less to any expertise on his part than to the exigencies of import substitution. Admittedly other factors were at work, but clearly the fact that Uriburu could not pull Argentina back to its pre-1929 level did not provide any justification for his continuance in office.

1946

V-E Day had come and gone, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force had returned from Italy and had ousted Getúlio Vargas from his fifteen-year reign, allowing a return to a democratically elected president. And Juan Perón began his first of three administrations. It seems unlikely that the proximity of the Argentine and Brazilian turnovers can be explained as pure coincidence, given the victory of the Allied Forces. Certainly, there was not a little
disillusionment on the part of the Argentine military which had expressed such admiration for the Axis powers, and certainly the actions of the Brazilian military did convince the Argentine officer corps that the goals of its 1943 usurpation had not been met. The timing of these events, then, suggests that there was a contagion factor operating at the end of the Second World War.

But it would be imprudent to attribute the 24 February 1946 election of Perón to a simple diffusion explanation. From 4 June 1943 Perón began to build his twin pillars, in effect exploiting his position as Minister of War to "syndicalize" the armed forces to his specifications and to "militarize" the urban work force in his capacity as Secretary of Labor. Neither General Rawson, who spearheaded the overthrow (with First Lieutenant Onganía following him in a cavalry vehicle) and who lasted only two days in the executive office, nor General Ramirez, who replaced him, were sufficiently competent or willing to halt Perón from using his offices to further his political career. When General Farrell, in turn, replaced Ramirez in 1944, the stage was set: Perón would soon legitimize the coup which he had been less than instrumental in effecting.

Perón's politicking was not viewed with complete acceptance in the country, for there were those within the armed forces and in the civilian community who took offense
at the specter of a populist dictator. But Perón's short imprisonment by General Ávalos served only to make him a martyr and to further the sense of weariness on the part of the armed forces in its involvement in the direct political decision-making process. That the armed forces did not block Perón's ascendance ought not be interpreted as an act of noble self-negation. Many military personnel actively supported him and his policies, especially in view of the Organic Statute of October 1944 in which, as War Minister and Vice President, he initiated across-the-board pay raises, increased the size of the officer corps, and provided for the establishment of military-run firms to produce modern weaponry.9

Civilian opposition to the military regimes of 1943 to 1945 was less operative than were the competing and conflictive pressures of the peronization of major sectors of the armed forces (including and especially General Farrell), on the one hand, and the uncoordinated opposition of those officers who sought to cut out the political demagoguery that had grown within the military, on the other hand. Subsequently, this "pro"/"anti"-peronist conflict would be operative in the series of interventions and withdrawals that would characterize Argentine politics to the present.

Economically, the military governments that preceded Perón's election provided him with a healthy fiscal
position, although not entirely as a result of their own efforts. Via the continued import substitution development and concurrent with the export boom provided by World War II, the Argentine Gross National Income rose constantly through the interregnum of Generals Rawson, Ramirez, and Farrell. In this case, the military withdrew on an economic upswing, but hardly because of it (see Figure I).

1958

Juan Perón lasted in office for nine years and was ousted by a new grouping of officers, some of whom had been arrested for an aborted 1951 coup attempt. However, despite the considerable support that would remain for the deposed populist leader, he had lost his bases of political support and legitimacy—first the military and then his own labor constituency, which had begun to grow increasingly autonomous.

When the Argentine military returned the nation into the hands of a civilian administration in May 1958, the "tyrants" Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Pérez Jimenez of Venezuela, and Manuel Odría of Peru had been removed; Argentina's chief rival for regional influence, Brazil, had begun its "miracle" under Kubitschek. Batista was being threatened by the castroites and university
students. So, the pressures for "democracy" were especially powerful for General Aramburu. But what to do with the peronists?

The Aramburu government had turned out the initial leader, General Lonardi, for seeming too "soft" on the peronists, both within the armed forces and within their labor citadel. Lonardi, in a program of "peronism without Perón," had instigated a policy of reconciliation which included a civilian advisory body of twenty representatives of all the nation's political parties less the communists and the peronists. But to many in the armed forces he had not done enough to purge the peronist scourge. And he was removed after only four months.

Aramburu, on the other hand, was committed to a vigorous policy of de-peronization, both within the armed forces and within the civilian sector. But he, too, met with criticism from his colleagues, who were convinced that he was not sufficiently aggressive, and from Perón's "descamisados" as well as those who opted for the more conciliatory tone of Lonardi.

Strikes by labor unions, sabotage, and an abortive counter-coup by pro-peronist officers were quickly dispatched by Aramburu's forces, and he was able to continue in office without any serious opposition until he stepped out of office in 1958. Aramburu had been "peronized" along
with numerous others in the military, but he had grown weary of the politicization of the armed forces and had acted to return the military to its "proper" role, even in the face of continued pressures by more hard-line colleagues. His solution to the withdrawal problem was hardly ingenious: he permitted an election, but proscribed the peronists from providing candidates. And so Arturo Frondizi, in a "deal" with Perón whereby the peronists would support his candidacy was inaugurated in May 1958. And the armed forces retired once again, but maintained their self-assigned watch of the political arena.

Economically, the Aramburu government left on an upswing. The nation's GNP had improved following Perón's ouster, but its balance of trade had not picked up appreciably (see Figures I, II).

1962-1963

This period of civil-military conflict requires at least a few comments. It was a time of confrontation between virulent anti-peronists and nominal "legalists" within the armed forces. Following unappreciated peronist electoral successes in the provincial elections held in the spring of 1962, a heavily politicized faction of the armed forces, known as the Colorados, forced out Arturo Frondizi. But a less politically active element, the Azules, led by the then-Army Commander, General Onganía,
beat back the insurrectionist golpistas and oversaw the assumption of power by the Senate president, José María Guido, during the remainder of Frondizi's term. In 1963, Arturo Illía, a Radical, assumed the post of President in which, once again, the peronists were forbidden from voting for their own candidates. In this episode, the military clearly felt threatened by the opposition and perceived vengeance of the peronists. But the decision to refrain from direct political control was based on the notion that it was not in the armed forces' best institutional interests to assume the role of governorship as had the Peruvian military and which had returned to its barracks after a brief confrontation with Peru's own popular political movement—Haya de la Torre's apristas.

1973

Once again, after an interim of nine years in which there were three military presidents and a steadily growing level of civil violence, the armed forces stepped out of the Casa Rosada. The violence, however, did not magically disappear. Nineteen seventy-three was not a big year for turnovers, and there is no convincing evidence to suggest that Argentina copied any other democratic movement. However, it is likely that the troubles that confronted Presidents Allende of Chile and Bordaberry of Uruguay were instrumental in convincing President Lanusse that by
removing the armed forces from the administratorship of the nation, Argentina might avoid the chaos that had beset its neighbors to the west and the east.

From the start of Onganía's administration he was met with a steadily increasing level of civic turmoil, characterized by the 1969 Cordobazo of strikes and demonstrations in the industrial center of Cordoba. In an effort to reconcile the competing political factions, he had even seen fit to name a peronist as his secretary of labor. But this had been insufficient. The Argentines were growing progressively disenchanted with the prospect of military rule and so, too, were major segments of the armed forces.

Still, the key to the military-civilian conflict remained with the institutional fear on the part of the military toward allowing the peronists to take charge of the country and especially toward a possible return of Perón to the presidency.

And so the military decided to return once again to the barracks, but this time the peronists were to be given the right to select and vote for their own candidates. To prevent Perón's return to the Casa Rosada, General Lanusse stipulated in 1972 that all candidates had to make their residence in Argentina prior to 25 July 1972. As this gave Perón less than two weeks to move from his villa in Spain, the military felt confident that they had solved
at least one of their major preoccupations. In March 1973, Hector Cámpora took over the presidency and the generals went back to their garrisons.

Economically, the nation was suffering a renewal of its chronic balance of trade deficit and the growth of national income had been inconsistent throughout the nine-year period (see Figures I, II). It seems apparent, then, that the Argentine military did not retire simply because of fiscal problems, but it is likely that these conditions did contribute to the withdrawal.

Summary

From the admittedly brief descriptions presented on Argentina's experience with five separate withdrawals since 1938, a number of conclusions can be made.

There is evidence to suggest that the Argentine military, if not totally sympathetic to occurrences in its neighboring countries, was, at least, not totally isolated from the internal political activity of its fellow nations in South America (see Table II, p. 47). In 1932, 1945, and 1958, it has been suggested that "pro"-democratic behavior on the part of other regional governments was operative in Argentine military withdrawals. In 1962 and 1973, there is little to indicate that such a factor is helpful in explaining the decision of Generals Onganía and Lanusse to guide their forces away from the Casa Rosada. In any case,
however, there is not enough evidence, one way or the other, to attribute to such "movements" sufficient influence to have forced the various military leaders to turn over control to the civilian sector.

In the first three turnovers, civilian dissatisfaction with the performance of the military as governors was less operative than was a sense of revulsion on the part of major elements of the military to permit themselves to be drawn into a position for which they had neither the training nor the expertise (if not the motivation). Operating, too, was a realization that as long as the armed forces permitted themselves to be torn apart by political pressures, the institution itself would lose whatever corporate integrity that it possessed.

In 1962 and 1973, civilian opposition toward the armed forces played a much larger role. Beset with a feeling of not being appreciated for what they sought to accomplish and preoccupied with the very real fear of the possible consequences that might befall the institution, on these occasions the armed forces sought refuge behind the walls of their bases. Nevertheless, as strong as may have been the desire to refrain from direct administration of the nation because of its dilatory effects on the armed forces, at each juncture the military retained its option to re-enter the arena when it felt threatened.
Economically, the premise that there is a relationship between harsh economic conditions and withdrawals is not supported. The bulk of the data suggest that the withdrawals, described above, fit better with an explanation that allows that, although the GNP continued to rise during these administrations and trade balances invariably improved, the state of the economy was not directly responsible for the withdrawals. In 1932, 1945, 1958, and 1962, the military did retire on a trade upswing, but in 1962 there was a decline in PCGNP. The data provided in Figures I and II do not extend past 1973, but the trend suggests that in 1973, at least, a declining trade balance was operative, although the PCGNP was increasing. In conclusion, the evidence concerning economics and withdrawals is inconclusive; it awaits a more detailed investigation by economic historians.
TABLE II
THE CONTAGION PROCESS: ARGENTINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Influential Countries</th>
<th>Non-Influential Countries</th>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Bolivia, Chile Peru</td>
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<td>1932</td>
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<td>1933</td>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>1946</td>
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<td>1947</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

World Situation

In the first turnover, the effects of the Great Depression were hard felt in the region for which trade was, and still is, a major indicator of economic health. Such was the trauma that it is unlikely that any leader who was in power in 1929 would have remained there for much longer. In 1946, we can point to the prestige of the United States
following the defeat of the Axis Powers as a possible determinane for the turnovers that occurred. In the last half of the fifties, the specter of Cuba and the bipolarity of the cold war were instrumental in the ensuing twilight of the dictators. Not surprisingly these same factors were operating in the early sixties, although the castroite revolution had supplanted the tensions of the cold war, too. This was the start of the Alliance for Progress which was not to bring about the goal of democracy upon which it was begun. In the seventies, with U.S. influence at a low point as a result of its performance in Vietnam, neither world pressure nor regional models can account for the return of Perón.

Notes


2 An interesting account of the San Martin Lodge is provided in Juan V. Orona, La Logia Militar que Enfrentó a Hipolito Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: La Editorial Leonardo Empresora, 1965). Throughout the entire period from 1930 to the present, civilian attempts by presidents and others to engage the support of members of the military have been common. See, for example, Jorge Antonio, No Hay Independencia Política sin Alianza Cívico-Militar (Buenos Aires: Talleres Honnegar, S.A.I.C., 1973); this article, by a "Justicialista" writer, is addressed to military readers calling upon them to join with the peronist movement to counter the effects of the multi-national corporations.


5Felix Luna, El 45 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Álvarez, 1969): an account of the events leading up to Perón's election in 1946.

6If the reader has any doubts about the extent to which Perón sought to politicize the armed forces, he might consult Centro de Documentación Justicialista, Diálogo entre Perón y las Fuerzas Armadas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Mar. 1973). Basically a collection of Perón's speeches and communiques from 1943 to 1966, its timing of publication was intended to persuade the military in 1973 it had nothing to fear from a return of Perón.

7Potash, op. cit., p. 199.

8For a well detailed description of the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (G.O.U.) "lodge" that has been variously credited with the planning of the 1943 "golpe," see Juan V. Orona, La Logia Militar que Derrocó a Castillo (Buenos Aires: Talleres Artes Gráficas "Moderna," 1966). Potash, op. cit., on the other hand, holds that most of the personnel evolved in the actual coup (particularly Rawson) had no dealings with the G.O.U. Perón was conveniently absent from the scene until it had been established that the Campo de Mayo troops had met with success (p. 211, et passim).

9Potash, op. cit., pp. 249-254. The weapons issue was particularly crucial in the eventual withdrawal of the military regime. Thwarted by the United States in its request for modern armaments to match those provided via the Lend-Lease program to Brazil because of its pro-Axis position, the Argentine government sought to rearm with German equipment. But, when an envoy was detained enroute to Europe to deal with the German government, the ensuing scandal forced General Farrell to declare Argentina at war with Berlin. The announcement met with shock within the armed forces, a shock from which the armed forces never completely recovered and which was instrumental in the eventual return to the barracks.


14 The theme of a return to the civil order apparently runs deep in the Argentine military; whether it is a deeper conviction than is the desire to assume control is debatable, although the fact that the military does, inevitably, return to the garrisons suggests that such is the case. See Jorge Ochoa de Egüileor y Virgilio R. Beltrán, Las Fuerzas Armadas Hablan (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1968) for an analysis of military communiques from 1943 to 1963. There are Argentine military men who criticize the armed forces' role as "políticos" as well; for instance: Florentino Díaz Loza, Doctrina Política del Ejército (Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo Editor, S.R.L., 1975); Luis Gazzoli, ¿Cuando los Militares Tenemos Razón? (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1973); and Juan E. Gugliamelli, "As Forças Armadas Na América Latina," Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 14, Núm. 55-56 (1971), pp. 81-90.

15 República Argentina, Mensaje del Presidente de la Nación a las Fuerzas Armadas (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nación, 7 de Julio de 1972). De Hoyos, op. cit. (ch. 2) based much of his "model" of an institutional promise to return control to civilian hands on as assessment of General Lanusse's hopes that he would be elected because of the favorable disposition he had shown toward the peronists, if not toward Perón himself (p. 13).


17 The reverse argument, that military intervention is closely associated with economic problems, is the thesis of Gilbert Merx, op. cit., and "Economics and History in..."
CHAPTER IV
GUATEMALA

Overview

In June 1944, it was the contention of Guatemala's last "caudillo," Jorge Ubico, that "the people of Guatemala are not ready for democracy and need a strong hand." In 1978, the Guatemalans have tried democracy and have had it slip through their fingers more than once. But the country has kept its "strong hand" and, in the region's eclectic manner, has developed its own brand of democracy wherein military officers run as candidates for a range of political parties.

TABLE III
GUATEMALAN PRESIDENTS, 1930-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1930-1944</th>
<th>Ubico (military)</th>
<th>1963-1966</th>
<th>Peralta-Azurdia (military)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944-1945</td>
<td>two juntas (civil-military)</td>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>Mendez-Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1957</td>
<td>Castillo-Armas (military)</td>
<td>1978-</td>
<td>Lucas-García (military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1963</td>
<td>Ydígoras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57
Not surprisingly, Ubico himself entered the presidency via the electoral route in March 1931 but quickly undertook to make Guatemala his personal fiefdom, ruling for thirteen years through the Depression years and the Second World War. But, as was suggested earlier, the democratic fervor that was engendered by the victory of the Allies caught up Guatemala as well, and Ubico resigned in July 1944, relinquishing the presidency to a troika of three retired generals in the face of surprisingly non-violent civilian pressure. The triumvirate was short-lived; the provisional President, General Frederico Ponce Vaides, lasted but two months when a new coup in October 1944 brought a new three-come to power. Colonel Fransisco J. Arana, Major Jacobo Árbenz, and Jorge Torriello quickly arranged for an election, and in March 1945, Juan José Árevalo stepped into the executive office building.

Árevalo's "spiritual socialism" as a counterpoise to the criole nazism of Ubico, was to provide the key to the political code of the next nine years, through the "Red" period of Arévalo's successor, Jacobo Árbenz until his overthrow by Carlos Castillo Armas with U.S. encouragement in 1954. Castillo Armas remained in control with apparent U.S. approval (for his actions against Árbenz' "communists") until he, in turn, was killed by a member of his palace guard in July 1957 for reasons that remain obscure to this date.
Once again, a military officer presented himself as a candidate to succeed as Castillo Armas' successor. When the "official" contender, Miguel Ortiz Passarelli won the October 1957 election, General Manuel Ydígoras Fuentes and his supporters contested the electoral results, forcing the imposition of a new provisional president, Colonel Guillermo Flores Avendaño. Finally, in January 1958, Ydígoras Fuentes won the popular vote and was confirmed by the Congress in March 1958.

Ydígoras stayed in the presidency until March 1963 when he was ousted by his defense minister, Colonel Enrique Peralta Asurdia. Peralta Asurdia, in turn, remained in control until July 1966 when he turned over the executive office to his successor, Julio César Méndez Montenegro, the only civilian candidate who had run for the election.

Méndez served until March 1970, when Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio gained the presidency. He, in turn, was succeeded by General Kjell Eugenio Laugarud-García in 1974 and by General Romero Lucas García in March 1978. All of these military presidents assumed office through elections.

1945

Nine months after the last Guatemalan "dictator" walked out of the presidential chambers, a civilian occupied the executive office. In the interregnum, two military governments of markedly distinct characteristics managed the
political life of the nation. The first was a triumvirate of retired generals who had been picked by Ubico as his parting gesture. The second was a group of two relatively junior officers and a civilian who stepped in to ensure that the goals of those who forced Ubico out would be realized.

Ubico himself was forced to abdicate the presidency in the face of stirrings for democratic rule that followed on the wake of D-Day. In El Salvador, Ubico's counterpart, General Maximo Martinez Hernandez, who had captured the Salvadorean presidency via a coup in December 1931, was forced to turn over control to a civilian government in May 1944. A similar event took place in Guatemala less than a month later when a coalition of "middle class" lawyers, university students, and a number of military sympathizers confronted Ubico with a call for a number of societal reforms, including his resignation.7

To Ubico, it was clear that he ought to abdicate, and so he did; but he named a successor regime, which was headed by General Federico Ponce Vaides. Others in the armed forces and their civilian allies put an end to Ponce Vaides' regime after only 108 days, and via a coup, Colonel Fransisco J. Arana, Major Jacobo Arbenz, and Jorge Torriello entered the National Palace. Six months later, with their backing, Juan José Arévalo assumed the presidency. It seems apparent that, in 1945 at least, foreign models were operative in encouraging the armed forces to
accede to democratic rule. Foreign influences, especially the prestige of the United States following the war, were also operative in the events that followed as the tensions for democracy and social development were sufficiently strong as to create a backlash of socialism and communism as a reaction to years of caudillistic rule. Civilian pressure was a significant feature in the removal of Ubico; work stoppages, massive demonstrations (but without civil violence), and direct negotiations played a part in Ubico's decision to retire. These same forces were in effect as the Arana-Árbenz-Torriello troika effected the transfer of the government to Arévalo after it had deposed Ponce Vaides.

In the absence of material that might explain the attitude of the military, one can only speculate. Certainly among younger officers, there was a sense of a need for change, of bringing Guatemala into the 20th century. Árbenz was but a major in 1944, although he ascended rapidly to lieutenant colonel under Arévalo, serving as defense minister until his election in 1950. Many of those who were "socialized" during the revolutionary period would later reemerge within the ranks of the various guerrilla movements of the sixties. Then, too, there was the factionalism between the "line" officers (promoted for often extra-professional criteria) and the "school" officers (who gained their ranks via the Guatemalan Military Academy, La Politécnica, who supported Arévalo and his candidacy.\(^8\)
Economics do not appear to have played a major role in the "revolutionary" activity of 1944-1945. Ubico had "bequeathed" the nation with a comfortable fiscal situation at his departure, due primarily to his practice of keeping wages low and of maintaining a low rate of expenditure (see Figure III, p. 70).

1957

Upon the assassination of Carlos Castillo Armas in July 1957, Guatemala undertook another attempt at its variety of the democratic process, again with an ex-military officer at its head. The intervening years since Arévalo assumed the mandate of the presidency had been fraught with the struggling efforts of a polity to institutionalize itself. In 1949, the death of one of the two military candidates for the 1950 election, Colonel Francisco Javier Arana, chief of the armed forces under Arévalo and titular representative of those rightist forces opposed to the perceived leftist drift of the Arévalo-Árbenz regime, served only to further the tensions that confronted the country. In the conflict between those sectors of the military and civil society that supported Arana and Árbenz, Castillo Armas was shot and arrested, only to escape to Honduras to prepare for his return at the head of a three hundred man invasion force four years later. He lasted but three years.
That there was no military uprising on that July date is notable in view of events that were occurring elsewhere. The Honduran military was in the process of stepping out of the presidential office; the Peruvians had replaced Manuel Odría as had the Colombians Rojas Pinilla. This, like the period following World War II, was apparently a time when dictators/caudillos were personas non grata, and the Guatemalan military was affected by this same outlook.

While direct military rule was ruled out, that did not inhibit the supporters of the Castillo Armas regime from attempting to impose their own successor for the dead colonel. The Guatemalan Congress quickly nominated one of its own, Luis Arturo Gonzalez López, as Provisional President. In October 1957 there was an election between the government candidate, ex-Supreme Court Chief Justice Miguel Ortiz Passarelli, and his right-wing opponent, retired General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. When the government candidate won the vote, Ydígoras Fuentes and his supporters cried "foul" and forced the annulment of the results. A new Provisional President, Guillermo Flores Avendaño (one of the original group of conspirators which had forced Ubico out in June 1944) was appointed to supervise a new election. In January 1958, having won by a small majority, the Congres chose the retired general who had been defeated by Árbenz
in the 1950 election. And Guatemala was on the road of democracy once again.

Civilian pressure against Castillo Armas was in effect at the time of his assassination as it was in the six following months. But there is no evidence to suggest that there was any notable anxiety on the part of the armed forces to relinquish the role they had held during Castillo Armas' regime. In fact, it is likely according to the sources consulted that the armed forces as an institution were unconcerned with controlling the political life of the nation. That is not to suggest that individuals did not have political ambitions nor that the various political factions did not seek military support. In the 1958 election, of the four major candidates representing the four principal parties, only one was a civilian. Therefore, the assessment that can be made is that, although there was no apparent support for a direct military regime, there was considerable political motivation within the armed forces for the military to continue to exert its influence, albeit in a less apparent manner.

Once again the nature of the turnover was such that the economic progress of the nation under Castillo Armas cannot be assigned an operative characteristic in explaining the military decision (in this instance) not to continue its role in the National Palace. Nevertheless, it is
notable that Guatemala's balance of trade situation took a severe dive during the Castillo Armas regime (see Figures III, IV). Certainly, it may have occurred to some officers that they ought to disassociate themselves from this situation, regardless of whatever confidence they might have had in their own ability to remedy the problem.

1966

The final turnover from direct military rule occurred upon the election of Julio César Méndez Montenegro in March 1966, this after a three-year military government of Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who had overthrown Ydígoras in March 1963. The March 1963 coup had come in the face of a rise of leftist insurgents and the possibility of a return of Arévalo to the presidency in the elections scheduled to be held that month. Ruling by decree throughout his occupancy, Peralta Azurdia did promise that his regime was only tutelary and supervised a constituent assembly in July 1964 as well as established a fixed date for presidential elections.

Coming as it did in 1966, and having been promised since 1964, it is interesting that the turnover process occurred concurrently with the trauma that followed the death of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic as that nation underwent its first steps at institutionalizing its polity after thirty years of personalist rule. But
contagion does not appear to have been operating on the Guatemalan armed forces.

Civil violence was certainly present throughout the years of the military government, and although the Peralta Azurdia regime was able to eliminate the organized guerrilla activity, terrorism from both the left and the right continued. Such being the case, there was little popular support for the soldiers in the National Palace. What does not appear, however, is any evidence to suggest that there was sufficient (if any) conflict within the armed forces that might have forced elements of the military to seek withdrawal in the name of institutional solidarity.¹⁵

Economically, the Peralta Azurdia regime could point to little success in its three-year regnancy. With the trade balance at its lowest in the forty years covered in this study, there was no way that he could justify "continuismo" on the strength of his economic record. So for the second time (Castillo Armas being the first), a military government departed on a severe economic downturn (see Figures III, IV). Peralta Azurdia was replaced in the presidential office by Julio César Méndez Montenegro, but the military retained its privileged position of being the final arbiter. That the armed forces kept their political option is clear, for the next three presidents were military
officers. Arana Osorio (1970-1974), Laugarud-García (1974-1978), and Lucas García (1978— ) had served as ministers of defense and had "won" elections in which there had been other candidates in uniform. It is becoming apparent that the elected military president has become institutionalized in Guatemala. If so, there may be some reason to consider this process as a version of the "Revolutionary Family" of Mexico. It is not North American democracy, nor Mexican, for that matter, and, as such, cannot be excluded from the category of military-dominated politics.

Summary

Some tentative conclusions can be offered. There is sufficient material to support partially the premise of contagion. Obviously such a demonstration effect was operating in 1945, in light of the Allied victory and dissatisfaction with the regional varieties of Nazism, when the Arana-Árbenz-Torriello triumvirate handed over the government to Arévalo. Although probably less direct or obvious, there was a similar process operative in the transfer of the government to Ydígoras Fuentes in 1958. I find, however, little evidence to indicate that Peralta Azurdia was motivated by external democratic behavior when he announced the March 1966 elections. Two out of three cases where there was a regional "push" toward redemocratization give some support to the validity of the contagion effect (see Table IV, p. 69).
Concerning civil frustration with military government, certainly we can say that such was the case at the overthrow of Ubico. Similarly, at the death of Castillo Armas, the popular support given to Ydígoras Fuentes suggests that the Guatemalan people held no great love for a regime by a dictator. The terror, the civil strife, and the guerrilla operations by the MR-13 and two FARs contributed to Peralta Azurdia's decision to hold elections.

What is not apparent in Guatemala is that there is significant pressure within the Guatemalan armed forces to keep out of politics; nor, for that matter, is there any apparent institutional commitment to military rule. What is operating, on the other hand, is a system whereby individual military officers may offer themselves as candidates and seek civilian support for their candidacy. In this regard, the military is truly a functioning element of the Guatemalan polity but in a manner fundamentally different from the political role of the Argentine armed forces.

Whereas it has been shown that in two of the three cases of withdrawal economic conditions had deteriorated under military rule, when trade data are used as the measure, one does not get the picture that such deterioration has a significant causal feature as seen by the PCGNP figures (see Figures III, IV).
Table IV

The Contagion Process: Guatemala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Influential Countries</th>
<th>Non-Influential Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
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<td>1946</td>
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<td>1956</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Argentina, Colombia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In 1945, the same factors that are hypothesized to have impacted on the decision of the armed forces in Argentina also were present in Guatemala: the victory of the United States and its democratic allies over Germany, Italy, and Japan. Clearly, militarist governments had lost much of their appeal to many. Toward the end of the fifties, there was another "movement" as the cold war intensified and Castro's forces began to gain on the Cuban army. There was little in the way of a model for Guatemala in 1966 to explain the election of Méndez Montenegro, although it is not inconceivable that the ongoing Alliance for Progress was of some influence.
(Source: see Figure I.)
FIGURE IV. GUATEMALA: WITHDRAWALS AND PCGNP, 1950-1973. (Source: see Figure II.)
Notes


2 Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 211.

3 Juan José Arévalo, Escritos Políticos (Segunda Edición) (Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, 1946), p. 147.

4 Ibid., pp. 75-78.


6 As might be expected, both Árbenz and Arévalo hailed his assassination as a triumph for "democracy": Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 269.

7 Rosenthal, op. cit., describes Ubico as having exclaimed after the overthrow of Martinez Hernandez that "a ruler should know in the seat of his pants when he ought to get out of the chair" (p. 201).

8 The "line"-"school" factions are described in Jerry Weaver, "Political Study of the Guatemalan Military Elite," in Kenneth Fidel, op. cit., pp. 62-64. Weaver notes that through the sixties, "line" officers were accusing the
1945-1954 "school" officers of having a "red tint" (p. 63). There appears to be a new factionalism in present-day Guatemalan military life, that between those who are in favor of continued military political activism and those who are opposed to it; see Brian Jenkins and Caesar D. Sereieres, "U.S. Military Assistance and the Guatemalan Armed Forces," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1977), p. 590. If so, it is not unlikely that such attitudes were prevalent in 1945 as no officer gave up his life in defense of either Ubico or Ponce Vaides.


10 The invasion was undertaken to undo the communist influence that had characterized the Arbenz regime (see note 5). But the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Guillermo Torriello, the third man, a civilian, in the October 1944 "revolution," would later write that the extent of the communist infiltration had been exaggerated, contending in a widely read work that the country had been unjustly intervened by the United States: Guillermo Torriello, La Batalla de Guatemala (México: Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, 1955). For an additional assessment of the extent of U.S. involvement in the 1954 coup invasion, see Phillip B. Taylor, "The Guatemalan Affair: A Critique of U.S. Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1956), pp. 787-806. The fact that the Guatemalan armed forces did not rise en masse to the defense of the Arbenz government can be attributed more to Arbenz' plan to arm his civil supporters which would have threatened the military institution.

11 For an interesting assessment of the situation that faced Castillo Armas following his arrival in June 1954, see K. H. Silvert, Guatemala, 1955: I—Problems of Administration (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1955), and with John Gillin, "Ambiguities in Guatemala," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1956), pp. 469-482. Castillo Armas enjoyed some considerable prestige in the United States, receiving a visit by then-Vice President Richard Nixon and later returning the visit to Washington, D.C., where he was awarded the keys to the city; see Carlos Castillo Armas, Discursos del Presidente de Guatemala (Guatemala: Presidencia de la Nación, 1957), p. 25. In the same collection of speeches there is no reference to a return to elections (although he had been scheduled to remain in office until March 1960: Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 265). However, in a March 1957 speech to the legislature, four months prior to his assassination, he praised the strict "apoliticidad" of the armed forces (p. 221), an interesting observation in light of the events that followed his untimely death.
12. He was Mario Méndez Montenegro of the Revolutionary party, a liberal organization (see Nathan L. Whetten, Guatemala, op. cit., p. 339). A candidate again, eight years later, following the three-year interregnum of Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, he was killed and replaced as the party candidate by his brother Julio César.


14. The guerrilla activity itself can be traced to an abortive November 1960 coup attempt by a group of officers dissatisfied with, among other things, promotion opportunities; see Robert F. Rose, "Guerrilla War in Guatemala" (MA thesis, University of Florida, 1969), pp. 7-14. Many of the unsuccessful conspirators chose not to accept "amnesty" and undertook to initiate a program of guerrilla warfare to change the social structure of the nation. Additional studies on the guerrilla situation as it progressed through the sixties may be found in Eduardo Galeano, "With the Guerrillas in Guatemala," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., op. cit. (ch. II), pp. 370-390, and Guatemala: Occupied Country (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); also see Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 39-120 (Guatemala).

15. E.g. Weaver, op. cit. This does not mean that there was no factionalism. In this article, Weaver describes what he calls the "Economic Reformers," the "Juristas," and the "Moderators" (pp. 64-67), all of which had their civilian allies. See also Jerry Weaver, "The Military Elite and Political Control in Guatemala, 1963-1966," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1969), pp. 127-135.

Overview

Our study of Peru begins in August 1930 with the overthrow of the eleven-year regime of Augusto B. Leguía, who himself had risen to the presidency via a coup d'etat in July 1919. Lieutenant Colonel Luis N. Sanchez Cerro served as a de facto military ruler for a six-month period until he stepped out of the presidency only to be replaced by an interim junta in March 1931. This new regime was charged with presiding over an October 1931 election which was to mark the beginning of the major political controversy of the Peruvian polity which continues to the present. Sanchez Cerro returned from Europe to participate in the vote against the man who would quickly become the major antagonist to the Peruvian armed forces: Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre and his APRA party. Sanchez Cerro won the election to the great dismay of the "apristas." The hue and cry raised by the followers of the aprista leader resulted in the APRA military conflict that has endured to date.

When Sanchez Cerro was killed by an aprista "soldier" in April 1933, following the wake of an aprista uprising
TABLE V
PERUVIAN PRESIDENTS, 1930-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-1931</td>
<td>Leguía</td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
<td>Odría (military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1933</td>
<td>Sanchez Cerro (military)</td>
<td>1956-1962</td>
<td>Prado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1939</td>
<td>Benevides (military)</td>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>junta (military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1968</td>
<td>Belaunde Terry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-1945</td>
<td>Prado</td>
<td>1968-1978</td>
<td>Velasco Alvarado, Morales Bermudez (military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1948</td>
<td>Bustamante y Rivera</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in Trujillo in July 1932 in which a number of Peruvian artillerymen were killed, he was replaced by General Oscar R. Benevides. Benevides, upon sensing a possible APRA electoral victory in 1936, cancelled the electoral results and announced that he would occupy the presidency for a six-year term from the time he assumed control.

In 1939, Manuel Prado won the election and served out his constitutional term until 1945. His elected successor, José Luis Bustamante y Rivera, was not so blessed as he was removed by his minister of defense, General Manuel Odría in October 1948, following an abortive insurrection in Callao by naval personnel with APRA backing.

Odría, in turn, finished out Bustamante's term and, via the technique of pronouncing himself the only candidate, (candidato único), won the 1951 election and continued in
office until 1956. In that year he permitted elections and
was succeeded by Manuel Prado, who once again served out
his entire term. In the 1962 election, at the prospect
of a likely Haya de la Torre victory, the armed forces rose
up once again, promising to hold elections a year later in
June 1963.

The winner of that election, Fernando Belaunde Terry,
stayed in power until October 1968 when he, in turn, was
removed by another military uprising which has continued
to date. The first military president, General Juan Velasco
Alvarado, however, was himself deposed by General Fransisco
Morales Bermudez in August 1975, who has promised presi-
dential elections in 1980.

1931

The first turnover, when Sanchez Cerro announced his
resignation after only nine months as president in March
1931, occurred almost simultaneously with similar events
in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia. Again, the
attribution of cause and effect features to this similarity
of activity is difficult, if not impossible, but the very
nature of these events in neighboring countries suggests
that they were not lost on the Peruvian armed forces.

Civil pressure on Sanchez Cerro came not from the
masses who were still disenfranchised, but from those
"oligarchic" elements of the society who were shocked with
the "cholo" that had captured control from Leguía. At another level, the aprista followers of Haya de la Torre were agitating for their place in the "city of kings." Consequently, unable to seek support from those who "counted," Sanchez Cerro withdrew and sailed off to Europe.

There were also pressures within the military for his departure. Junior officers were displeased with his apparent refusal to accede to elections, and those officers who were senior to him in grade were unwilling to support the upstart colonel. The opposition of the senior ranks was not so much a reflection of any noble democratic perspective but rather a result of the fact that they could not suffer offering their services to an individual junior to them.

Economically, the effects of the Depression were still operative in Peru. However, more crucial for the purposes of this study, the fact that Sanchez Cerro was unable to legitimize his position is more significant than is the economic variable in explaining his withdrawal (see Figure V, p. 90).

1939

Following the October 1931 election in which Sanchez Cerro won the presidency following a short period of interim junta government set up for that purpose, began the violent and destructive confrontation between the armed forces and the APRA. Most significant in this conflict is the
extent to which the APRA appealed to a not inconsiderable sector of the military. This is partly attributable to the fact that upon Sanchez Cerro's return, he had made what appeared to be a pact with such aristocratic circles that had opposed him earlier principally as an attempt to counteract the growing significance and attractiveness of the APRA to the growing "middle class."

Two events are most significant in assessing the eventual assassination of Sanchez Cerro. The first was the trauma associated with the uprising in Trujillo headed by an aprista "fellow traveler," Manuel Barreto Risco (El "Búfalo"), in which a motley crowd of peasants attacked the O'Donovan barracks during the evening of 7-8 July 1932. There was some considerable military support for the pitchfork armed formers, but the movement failed with the lack of support given by those for whom the rebels thought they were fighting. In the ensuing destruction of the attackers, which amounted to a localized civil war, sixty officers and men, who had been captured, were killed by APRA supporters.²

The second event that seems most indicative of the events surrounding the fall of Sanchez Cerro was his and the armed forces' poor showing in the spring of 1933 over a contested spit of land on the Colombian-Peruvian border. In the conflict, Colombian infantry and navy were able to
regain control of the disputed terrain, leaving the Peruvian armed forces in disgrace and subject to the criticism of the apristas and other "nationalists" in Peru. Twice within a year the vaulted Peruvian military had met with defeat—once by poorly armed "compesinos" and once by a neighboring country. Without a doubt, the lessons learned in these two engagements were not lost on the armed forces when it backed out of the presidential office six years later.

In the midst of preparations for the Leticia campaign, Sanchez Cerro was killed by an aprista. He was succeeded by General Oscar R. Benevides, who had the duty of accepting the conditions of the Salomón-Lozano Treaty, which awarded the disputed territory to Colombia. It was Benevides' intention to supervise elections in October 1936, but when it became obvious that the Social Democrat candidate, Luis Antonio Eguiren, was going to win the election with aprista support, Benevides annulled the elections and indicated that he would serve for three more years.4

In 1939, there does not appear to have been much in the way of evidence that might support a contagion explanation for the decision of Benevides not to make an attempt toward "continuismo."

Civilian pressure on Benevides to leave the presidency was intense, coming, as may be expected, principally from those sectors of the Peruvian society affiliated with
Haya de la Torre. But since the President had effectively forced the apristas underground, the major pressures on Benevides came from other military officers. Whereas Haya still maintained a certain amount of emotional appeal to a considerable number of junior officers, who would later adopt many of his nationalist prescriptions, in 1939 these men were too young to be a major influence on the military President; consequently, Haya's arguments were directed principally to more senior officers who were readily convinced that they could "save" the nation.5

Economically, Benevides had overseen a period of relative stability. The nation had seen its trade balance cut in thirds by the effects of the Depression, but it remained on the plus side until the War (see Figure V). Manuel Prado inherited a government, but not, it would appear, because of the failure of the Benevides regime in the economic sphere.

1956

Peru knew nine years of civilian, non-military government from the time of the election of Manuel Prado in 1939 through the overthrow of José Luis Bustamante y Rivera on 29 October 1948 by General Manuel Odría (which came on the heels of an abortive coup attempt by apristas and naval sympathizers on 3 October of the same year6). But Peru would also know eight years of rule by a military President,
would see an APRA turning increasingly conservative, and
would see new forces attempting to fill the political
vacuum on the left.

The period of the "ochenio" ended at a time which
appeared to be at the forefront a democratic "enlighten-
ment." Perón had been ousted and General Aramburu was
promising elections; Pérez Jimenez and Rojas Pinilla would
be on their way out shortly, as would be Castillo Armas
and the senior dictators of the region: Batista and
Trujillo. Too, there was the specter of what had happened
to the Bolivian army in 1952. It cannot be stated with any
assurance that Odría's decision to withdraw had been based
on any demonstration effect; however, it is not unlikely
that his and Perón's end were to be influential in the
events that would follow.

There is no evidence to suggest that Odría was so
unpopular with the Peruvian citizenry that he chose to end
his presidency for reasons of civilian pressure, although
the unexpected support shown for Fernando Belaunde Terry
in the 1956 election no doubt hastened his resolve.

More important to Odría's decision to step out of the
presidential office was the growing dissatisfaction on the
part of the armed forces with the prospect of supporting
a dictator with ideas of "continuismo." The change came
in part with the establishment of a Center of Higher Military
Studies (CAEM), founded in 1950, during Odría's presidency. There was even an uprising in the jungle town of Iquitos under General Merino Pereyra in February 1956, months before the election, in reaction to rumors that Odría intended to keep himself in power. To what extent this military opposition to continued political control was based on the politicization of major segments of the armed forces, to the memory of what had happened to their counterparts in Bolivia four years earlier, or to the new doctrines emerging from the Peruvian military school system is unclear; whatever the case, Odría had lost his main basis of support. And, recognizing that "his" candidate, Hernando de Lavalle had little or no chance in the June 1956 elections, Odría swung his support to Manuel Prado (who had already received the allegiance of the apristas).

Economically, Odría could not point to a spectacular record to justify his continuation in the presidency. The economic boom that followed the Korean War and which permitted him the luxury of allowing his wife to preside over an expensive social welfare program (à la Eva Perón) collapsed after the cease fire, leading to labor unrest in late 1952. Clearly, in this turnover, a poor economic showing was a factor in Odría's decision to step out of the presidential office, as measured by trade data, but not by PCGNP figures (see Figures V, VI).
Manuel Prado won the 1956 election and served out his constitutional term until 1962. But when, in June 1962, it appeared that Haya de la Torre had won the election to succeed Prado, the military balked. Hoping to save whatever it could, the APRA joined forces with Manuel Odría, the second-place candidate, to place the previously deposed president into office a second time. The very thought of its old nemesis, the APRA party, now fawning for rightist support in an alliance with a dictator whom the armed forces had pressured to give up his mandate six years earlier, was too much for the military, and it stepped in to annul the election results in July 1962. A year later, as promised, the armed forces stepped out, and Fernando Belaunde Terry took over the presidency via electoral means.

This was another period of "democratic" conjusion. The Argentine military had ousted Arturo Frondizi and had supervised the election of Arturo Illía. Restraint had been shown by the Brazilian armed forces in the election of Janio Quadros, and they had acceded, albeit begrudgingly, to João Goulart's ascendance to the presidency. The simultaneity of these events suggests that there was some contagion in effect, especially in view of the ongoing Alliance for Progress.

In this case, civil conflict does appear to have played a more direct role in convincing the military to
step out. It was the post election turmoil that developed as the Peruvian Congress and Electoral Tribunal debated to whom to assign the presidency (none of the three candidates had won the required one third of the votes) that was instrumental in encouraging the military to step in; the same pressures were present as the military retired one year later. The rural activities of Hugo Blanco in the Concepción Valley engendered some tension both for land reform by numerous peasant communities and against the same by the oligarchic sector, and the initial operations by the APRA splinter group, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), were operative in the decision of the armed forces to turn over the presidency as promised.10

Although it was the stated intent of the armed forces who "intervened" in 1962 to serve only for a limited period after which they would turn over the government to whoever was elected, it appears that the first junta chief, General Perez Godoy, had other ideas and wanted to contrive his occupancy in the executive office or, worse, to offer support to Haya de la Torre in the June 1963 elections. As a result, he was deposed in March 1963 and replaced by General Nicolás Lindley, a Belaunde admirer.11 In this instance the military chose not to occupy the government for an extended period, which tends to support the notion of military pressure to step out of active administrator-ship.
Economically, the military government was not in power long enough to have had a significant impact. Nevertheless, it is noted that the country did experience a negative trade balance and slow PCGNP growth during the "year under the saber" (see Figures V, VI). Also, there was some considerable pressure by the industrial and agricultural sectors to negate the increased direct taxes invoked during Perez Godoy's term; conveniently, when Lindley took over, these unpopular taxes were reduced. In this instance, the economic behavior of the military did play a role in the events that transpired. Certainly, however, the overall economic record of the juntas was not conducive to keeping the armed forces in the palace.

Summary

The four turnover incidents studied suggest that there is some support to the contagion theory, although the pressures were not similar in form or intensity throughout the period studied. The principal support for the first explanation arrives essentially from the timing of the turnovers in connection with similar events in neighboring countries (see Table VI).

Civil opposition as an influence on the military leaders' decision to withdraw was operative in all four cases, but it does not appear to have been as influential as it had in incidents of withdrawal in the other countries.
studied. "Aristocratic" pressures were operative in both 1931 when Sanchez Cerro resigned and in 1956 when Odría turned over the reigns of control; these pressures reflected the "oligarchy's" dissatisfaction with the incumbent military leaders' rapprochement with middle and lower class elements of society. On the other hand, "popular" pressure was influential in encouraging Benevides and the Godoy-Lindley regimes to retire.

In all of the cases studied there was internal military tension. Officers senior to Sanchez Cerro were instrumental in forcing him to step down; in the remainder of the incidents, officers who had been politicized by the current "popular" movements played a major role in convincing the military leaders of the time to turn over control to civilians. This is not to suggest that institutional cohesion was the primary feature of the withdrawals, though certainly it was a source of concern. Rather, it would appear, the pressures on the incumbent leaders to step down were based on military support to the prevailing civilian opposition leader, especially Haya de la Torre and, later, Belaunde Terry.

Regarding the economic explanation, in all but one of the turnover processes studied, that of Benevides, the nation was suffering from harsh economic conditions, as measured by trade data, but not necessarily by PCGNP figures (see Figures V, VI).
A THEORY OF WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA—ETC(U)

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Now, in 1978, one sees all three features in effect. The contagion element is visible (as discussed in Chapter I). The conservative perspective of the regime has resulted in civilian pressure for a turnover. There is fractionalization within the armed forces on a hard-soft line continuum. The nation's economy is suffering in view of the disappointing performance of the oil and fishery industries. And Peru is preparing to elect a civilian president.
TABLE VI
THE CONTAGION PROCESS: PERU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Influential Countries</th>
<th>Non-Influential Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Argentina, Chile, Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1937</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World Situation

As occurred in Argentina, Peru suffered the effects of the Depression with a rapid change of governments. And with the effects of the economic chaos wearing off, the Peruvian military handed over the control of the government to a civilian as the spectre of World War II loomed in the future. However, in the mid-fifties, besides the tensions of the cold war, there was nothing in terms of "movements" that could account for Odría's decision to step out. Nevertheless, the election of Prado did initiate the so-called dusk of the dictators. In 1963, the castroite victory in Cuba and the counter offensive of the Alliance for Progress were operating on the juntas of Generals Perez Godoy and Lindley.
FIGURE V. PERU: WITHDRAWALS AND BALANCE OF TRADE, 1928-1971. (Source: see Figure I.)
FIGURE VI. PERU: WITHDRAWALS AND PCGNP, 1950-1973. (Source: see Figure II.)
Notes


2 A most interesting account of the events in Trujillo may be found in Victor Villanueva, El APRA en Busca del Poder (Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1975), pp. 95-117. The O'Donovan action followed by two months a naval uprising in Callao conducted with aprista instigation, if not support; see Villanueva, ibid., pp. 90-93. As will be seen again and again, frequently the APRA managed to suborn elements within the armed forces, but never provided the support to back up uprisings by these isolated military units. To be sure the fact that aprista proselytizing was so commonplace is a source of considerable military rancor; but what is just as likely to be at the root of much of the anger is that when a unit had been encouraged to revolt, there was no support forthcoming from them.


4 In all fairness to Benevides, his decision to cancel the 1936 election results as having reflected considerable aprista support was based partly on the fact that the APRA had solicited the support of the Bolivian Toro government to overthrow the Peruvian government in August 1936; see Villanueva, El APRA en Busca del Poder, op. cit., pp. 173-179, 181-184.

5 In the interim, Haya de la Torre promised to "support" Colonel Eloy G. Ureta and, later, Benevides' minister of government, General Antonio Rodriguez, if they would rise up against Benevides in 1938. A major coup attempt did occur in February 1939 when Rodriguez took over the palace in Benevides' absence, but it was quickly dispatched by troops loyal to the President; see Villanueva, El APRA, ibid., pp. 184-193.

6 See Victor Villanueva, El APRA y el Ejército (1940-1950) (Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1977), pp. 64-87. The naval uprising of October was aprista in origen and followed by only
four months another uprising of anti-aprista character by Colonel Alfonso Llosa in Juliaca. Both events point to the paralyzing polarity that characterized the Bustamante regime in its affairs with the APRA.


9 Ibid., pp. 33-55. Fernando Belaunde Terry, the defeated candidate is said to have preferred the military to take over the country than it should pass into the hands of either Haya de la Torre or Odria: John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, op. cit., p. 121. It is obvious that the armed forces felt the same way.

10 See Víctor Villanueva, Un Año Bajo el Sable (Lima: Empresa Gráfica T. Scheuch, 1963), pp. 161-195. Two years later, the struggle against the MIR and its peasant supporters culminated in a major operation by the armed forces which eliminated the guerrilla "threat" and which would have a profound impact on those who conducted the coup of 1968: see Peru Ministerio de Guerra, Las Guerrillas and Perú y su Represión (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra, 1969).

11 Both arguments, that of Perez Godoy's "personalismo" (the official "reason" for the shake-up) and of his support for his old friend Odria (and his cohort Haya de la Torre), are presented in Villanueva, Un Año, op. cit., pp. 222-244. "Personalismo" or an inclination on the part of a junta chief to ignore his fellow junta colleagues, is a major crime in Peru. Velasco Alvarado's "cult of personality" was given as the principal reason for his ouster by Morales Bermúdez in August 1975: Fransisco Morales Bermúdez, Segunda Fase, La Revolución Peruana, I, Discursos y Mensajes Pronunciados por el Señor Presidente de la República, General de División Fransisco Morales Bermudez Cerrutti, 29 de Agosto al 31 de Diciembre 1975 (Lima: Empresa Editorial Perú, 1976), pp. 4, 16.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has proposed and evaluated three alternative explanations related to the withdrawal of military governments. From the investigations made, it has been demonstrated that there was a great variety of processes operating upon the armed forces within the countries involved and between them. Nevertheless, there is sufficient commonality within the three case studies to suggest that the three hypothesized explanations are helpful in explaining the withdrawal phenomenon.

1. Concerning the contagion effect, the evidence is stronger for those turnovers that occurred in connection with the Great Depression and during the last half of the 1940s and 1950s; the contagion effect does not appear to have been as influential during the remaining decades. For instance, the high point for turnovers occurred immediately following World War II (see Figure VII, p. 95). A total of eleven civilian governments were constituted from military regimes at this time (six in Middle America/Dominican Republic and five in South America), an average of 2.2 turnovers per year during the time frame 1945-1949.
The second highest incidence over a five-year period occurred from 1956 to 1960 in which there were four in Middle America/Dominican Republic and four in South America, an average of 1.6 turnovers per year. This suggests that extra-military, extra-societal forces were most predominant during these two periods. This is not to suggest that a contagion effect was not operative at other times; rather that as defined there is less evidence to suggest that the other turnovers came as a result of a direct demonstration factor.

2. Regarding civil and military frustration, both features were present in all of the turnovers, although they varied in intensity and in nature both within the countries over the nearly fifty years of this study and between them. Clearly the evidence shows that just as there were considerable differences among the various regimes and their reasons for entering into active political control, so were the internal pressures for them to retire to the barracks. Civilian groups opposed to military domination ranged from the conservative opposition to the initial Sanchez Cerro regime in Peru to work-class opposition against the junta governments of Aramburu and Organía in Argentina. There has been considerable support for military presidents and nearly unanimous opposition to the same. The personality and behavior of a given military regime and its
deposed predecessor as well as the character of the proposed leadership to which the military passed the administration have all been crucial in accounting for the level of tension. For that matter, there is no reason to conclude that military regimes have been vilified any more than have civilian administrations, which tends to demonstrate a point made earlier: in the region, the military is an accepted player in the political game, although the game has had different rules over time. One feature, however, stands out. It seems that when there is one major popular political organization (e.g. the APRA or the Peronist party), the military finds it more difficult to perpetuate itself. The opposition will inevitably convince the military to step out. With such organizations, politization of major segments of the armed forces will occur and will contribute to the ultimate retirement of the armed forces. Where there is no such popular counterpoise, the military can operate with fewer obstacles to its rules (e.g. Guatemala).

Military frustration or fatigue with a government by the armed forces has been as varied as has been civilian dissatisfaction. In the case studies, we have noted "popular" military leaders deposed operating alone or in coalition with conservative civilian elements. Similarly, there have been conservative military regimes forced out by more liberal elements within the armed forces institution.
Consistently, the key to military political activity has been the political receptivity of major sectors within the armed forces to civilian proselytization both in terms of intervention and withdrawal. This is not to discount the very real corrosion that occurs within the military institution and for which withdrawal serves as a cathartic measure; for we have seen military forces fight each other and lose wars because the military hierarchy had given priority to balance of payment figures over order of battle maps, and be disbanded because of their direct control by or active support to dictators. On this last matter, it would appear that a tendency toward "personalismo" and/or "continuismo" on the part of a leader invariably provokes his eventual ouster. If such is the case, it gives a strong indication to the internal workings of the institution. Ambitious subordinates resent any inhibitions against their potential occupancy of the presidency or for those military personnel who have been politicized by any of a number of civilian groups, such a specter of a one-man dictatorship goes against their particular political perspective. On the whole, we must conclude that military pressure to withdraw has been the major component in explaining the turnover phenomenon, although the political persuasion of military opponents has been seen to be of greater significance than postulated earlier, and the institutional
integrity feature has been less crucial. This finding is consistent with earlier observations about the political role of the military in Latin America.

3. On the whole, military regimes have shown a tendency to withdraw when economic conditions were deteriorating or stagnating, as measured by trade data, but not when compared with PCGNP figures. That this economic feature is also often present in military interventions tends to lend support to the idea that the military is no more competent to solve the crucial problems of the region than are civilian regimes, although no military government would be likely to ascribe to this contention. This last conclusion, that the military has shown a propensity to withdraw in connection with slow or negative growth, suggests that there are economic characteristics in the region that are likely to continue regardless of whether the president dresses in olive drab or grey flannel. In a region such as Latin America, economics, particularly trade patterns, play a far greater role in politics than, say, in the United States, and one is more likely to observe domestic turmoil related to economic behavior, whether the government leadership is military or civilian.

I continue to attribute the key to military activism and withdrawal to decisions made within the armed forces; however, I have convinced myself that the structural
features of a country are critical in influencing the decision of the military to enter or depart the political stage. This eclectic conclusion does not constitute an easy way out of the dilemma of attempting to explain military withdrawals. All three of the original theories proposed to explain the turnover phenomenon have shown themselves to be useful, although frequently for reasons different from those originally hypothesized and often qualitatively and quantitatively distinct over time.

The application of the three explanations is not a simple matter of either-or; rather there is a definite (but varying) interrelationship between them. I have shown that the contagion factor is not a constant and have isolated it from the internal civil-military and economic performance variables. It is my contention that the relationship is similar to the following:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{External} \\
\text{Internal} \\
\text{Military Pressure} \\
\text{Civilian Pressure} \\
\text{Economic Behavior}
\end{array}
\]

Contagion, when present, appears to be more influential in so far as the civilian sector is concerned, and less so concerning the military. Two scenarios can be identified in the civil-military pressure factor: first, civilian
elements in opposition to the military regime seek supporters within the armed forces for their causes; second, various personalities within the military seek civilian support for their own political ambitions or otherwise allow themselves to be approached by competing civilian political factions. In both cases, the inevitable result is the fractionalization of the military institution, which, in turn, creates pressures to withdraw (be it to reestablish institutional integrity or to revert to a less direct form of political involvement). I see the economic variable as impacting more directly on the civilian sector; however, in view of the civil-military scenario described above, a poor fiscal showing does influence the military as it removes a source of justification for its continuance in power.

Of the three explanations proposed, the civil-military feature has shown itself consistently to be the most operative. I have rated all of the turnovers analyzed in this thesis on the relative importance of the three explanations (see Table VII, p. 103). According to my findings, contagion is the least important. Second in rank is the economic performance variable which, as shown earlier, is associated with the final, and most significant feature: civil-military pressure. I have identified which of the two pressure variables appeared to be the
more predominant and determined that there is a close split between them (seven cases wherein military pressure seemed to be more influential and five cases in which the withdrawal was attributed to stronger civilian pressures). The interrelationship between the two is strong, and it may not be possible to separate properly one from the other. But, clearly, this "political" feature constitutes the strongest explanation for the withdrawal phenomenon.

Much remains to be accomplished. This thesis raised more questions than it answered. If it encourages additional study or if it has added some measure to our understanding of civil-military relations in Latin America, it has met its modest intent.
### TABLE VII
RATINGS (1-3) OF THE THREE WITHDRAWAL EXPLANATIONS
BY TURNOVER BY COUNTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contagion</th>
<th>Pressure</th>
<th>Economic Posture</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>3 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>2 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>1 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>1 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>2 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>1 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>2</td>
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Edward Lewis Constantine, Jr., was born 8 November 1946 at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Maryland. In June 1964, he was graduated from Bellarmine High School, Tacoma, Washington. In June 1968, he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in psychology from Seattle University. In that same month, he entered on active duty as an officer in the United States Army, and presently holds the rank of Captain. In 1977, he enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida pursuing the degree of Master of Arts in Latin American Studies. He is a graduate of the Spanish course of the Department of Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California, and has served two tours in the Panama Canal Zone.
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Terry L. McCoy, Chairman
Associate Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Glaucio Ary Dillom Boares
Professor of Sociology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Latin American Studies in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Dean, Graduate School